**T.C.**
**YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY**
**GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**


**DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF TURKISH NATIONALISM**


**by**


**ÇAĞLA GÜL YESEVİ**


**Supervisor**
**PROF. DR. AHMET NAKİ YÜCEKÖK**


**Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences**
**In unanimously fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**
**Doctor of Philosophy**


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# LIST OF ABBREVIATONS

| | |
|---|---|
| BSEC | Blacksea Economic CoperationOrganization |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CUP | Committee of Union and Progress |
| DHKP-C | Marxist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front |
| DLP | Democratic Left Party, *Demokratik Sol Parti* |
| ESDP | European Secuirity and Defense Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| FP | Felicity Party, *Saadet Partisi* |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISI | Import Substituting Industrialization |
| JDP | Justice and Development Party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* |
| KRG | Kurdish Regional Government |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| MUSIAD | Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Organization |
| NAP | Nationalist Action Party, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NOP | National Order Party, *Milli Nizam Partisi* |
| NSP | National Salvation Party, *Milli Selamet Partisi* |
| NTSU | National Turkish Student Union, *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* |
| NWP | Nationalist Work Party, *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi* |
| PKK | Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan |
| RPNP | Republican Peasants Nation Party, *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Milli Partisi* |
| RPP | Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* |
| TPP | True Path Party, *Doğru Yol Partisi* |
| TIS | Turkish-Islam Synthesis |
| TUSIAD | Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association |
| TUSKON | The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States |
| VP | Virtue Party, *Fazilet Partisi* |
| WP | Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi* |

# ACKNOWLEGMENTS

# ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to analyze emergence and development of Turkish nationalism. In the first element of the research, particular attention is paid to the origins of nationalism in political theory and political history. Chapter two of the study gives a background which naturally brings forth the problem to be discussed throughout the dissertation. The historical background of nationalisms is particular area of the study. Chapter three gives the methodology of this study by referring to the theories of nationalism. In this chapter, the main arguments on theories of nationalism will be examined. Chapter four which is the core of the present study starts with investigating Ottoman modernization process. It is believed that these developments have contributed to the evolution of Turkish nationalism. In the chapter five, the research highlights the emergence of Turkish nationalism with the contribution of political thought of Young Turks and policies of the Community of Union and Progress. Chapter six of the study examines the main parameters of Turkish nationalism in the Republican era. The second aim of this dissertation is to be a guide to evaluate the parameters Turkish nationalism by referring to conducts and policies of the Republican People's Party, Nationalist Action Party, and Justice and Development Party.

# ÖZ

Bu tezin amacı Türk Milliyetçiliğinin doğuşunu ve gelişimini incelemektir. Öncelikle, milliyetçiliğin kökeni, siyasal tarih ve siyasal kuram açısından açıklanacaktır. Bu bağlamda, ikinci bölümde, tez boyunca bahsdilecek olan milliyetçilik kavramının tarihi geçmişi incelenecektir. Üçüncü bölümde, tezin metodolojisi ve milliyetçilik kuramları üzerinde devam eden tartışmalar üzerinde durulacaktır. Dördüncü bölümde, tezin ana konusuna girilecek ve Osmanlı modernleşmesinin, Türk milliyetçiliğinin oluşmasına katkısı üzerinde durulacaktır. Beşinci bölümde, Türk milliyetçiliğinin ana özelliklerinin nasıl oluştuğu ve bu oluşuma Genç Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki Partisi'nin etkisi konu edilecektir. Altıncı bölümde Türk milliyetçiliğinin, Cumhuriyet döneminde oluşan ana özellikleri ve farklılaşan yönleri belirtilecektir. Bu tezin ikinci amacı, günümüzün Türk milliyetçiliğini değerlendirebilmek için, bir kılavuz olmaktır. Bu bağlamda, yedinci bölümde, Türk Milliyetçiliğinin boyutları, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin siyasetleri incelenerek, belirlenecektir.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Nationalism has always provided a fascinating object of study and it has been important subject of research. This thesis examines mainly the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism. The main question behind this thesis was how Turkish nationalism could be defined and classified. The aim is to provide an explanation of emergence and development of Turkish nationalism. The historical evolution of Turkish nationalism has been a guide to determine the main parameters and approaches and changes occurred during the time. It aims to facilitate a better understanding of processes contributing to the development of Turkish nationalism. Moreover, giving comprehensive historical background of Turkish nationalism, this study aims to be a guide for evaluation of main features of present day Turkish nationalism.

The problems related to concept of nationalism will be presented in this study. Initially, emergence of nationalism will be examined. Such a prolonged period of time will be taken into account to be able to present the background of nationalism. While the focus of the thesis is on this process experienced in Turkey, the study provides a historical narrative on the emergence of nationalism in political theory and political history. Dealing with the emergence of nationalism, it is demonstrated that the Turkish nationalism has not been an isolated phenomenon. The main debates on nationalism have been still taking these old samples of nationalism into consideration. Moreover, it is striking fact that nationalism has been relative and relational issue. In that sense, one dimension of this debate has been revealed how Turkish nationalism could be explained according to these nationalisms. This debate can be briefly elucidated as whether it is civic nationalism or ethnic nationalism.

It is also demonstrated in this study, the theories of nationalism should be evaluated to have strong base to explain the issue of nationalism. The third part of this thesis deals with the theories of nationalism. In this context, this study is based on modernism. It is proposed that Turkish nationalism emerged in the Ottoman Empire and developed subsequently,

within the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, previous tribes, principalities, states, and civilizations related to Turkism will not be taken into consideration within this study.

The arguments of this thesis from the most general to the main one can be conveyed as the following: firstly, it is argued whether there is only one definition of Turkish nationalism or it has been evolving throughout the history. Secondly, it is tried to find out whether it is possible to classify Turkish nationalism. Thirdly, it is argued whether or not the old samples of nationalism are convenient to explain the Turkish example of nationalism. Fourthly, it is claimed that Turkish nationalism is not limited with the Republic of Turkey. Its roots come out of the Ottoman Empire. It is explained that Ottoman modernization generated the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Fifthly, it is apparent that there are many constructing factors behind Turkish nationalism as homeland, creation of bourgeoisie, wars, migrations, nationalist elites, nationalist publications, common will, and purification of Turkish language. Sixthly, it is obvious that Kemalism should be analyzed to understand the official roots of Turkish nationalism in the Republican era. Moreover, Turkism and Turkish-Islam Synthesis are considered as the other branches of Turkish nationalism. It is known that post-cold war era indicated the victory of liberalism and globalization. Therefore, these new developments affected the nationalisms, neo-nationalism, *ulusalcılık* came to the scene. Lastly, 2002-2007 periods will be examined by referring to nationalist and anti-nationalist policies of Turkish political parties, the Republican People's Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the Justice and the Development Party.

This thesis is composed of six main chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion chapters. After the introductory chapter, in the second chapter, the emergence of nationalism will be argued. The purpose of this chapter is both to give some idea of the emergence of nationalism, and also to show the main factors behind the varied forms of nationalism. It is hoped that understanding the reasons behind the notion of nationalism will help understand the constructive factors behind the Turkish nationalism. The second chapter begins with explanation of the social and political life in the Ancient Greece and its contribution to the idea of nationalism. It was argued, initially, whether the Ancient Greek city-states could be called as nation or not. Moreover, the adherence to the city-state and its relevancy with the concept of nationalism will be investigated. In this context, the

Peloponnesian War will be examined. The loyalties and cohesive sentiments among soldiers and ruling class during the war will be argued. The affinity of these sentiments and patriotic discourses to the concept of nationalism will be inquired. Nation-states were not existent in the middle ages. The middle ages were envisaged as the ages of empires. The multiple political authorities of that time will be argued. Moreover, the main features of the Renaissance and Reformation periods and their main contribution to the notion of nationalism will be revealed. Moreover, the emergence of English, American, French, German and Italian nationalisms will be explained.

In the third chapter, main theoretical debates on nationalism will be explained. The concepts such as nation, nationalism, and nation-state are going to be discussed. This chapter will attempt to clarify several difficulties about the theoretical framework of the study. In this context, main theories of nationalism as primordialism, perennialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism will be elaborated. The modernist approach will be used within this study. Contributions of Kohn, Deutsch, Kedourie, Breuilly, Brass, Minogue, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Anderson, Hrosch, Nairn and Hechter to modernist theory will be examined.

In the fourth chapter, it is noteworthy to mention, the modernist approach of the third chapter, will be taken into consideration. This chapter will examine the main features of nascent Turkish nationalism. Instead of Central Asian background, other related previous historical Turkish states, and Seljuk Empire, the historical analysis begins with the Ottoman Empire, because of the premises of this study is that the Turkish nationalism in modern sense had been begun to be shaped during the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, not before. It became apparent that Turkish nationalism is defined and classified by referring to Ottoman modernization. The political thought of *Tanzimat* statesmen and Young Ottomans will be elaborated. The main parts of this chapter will be homeland, bourgeoisie, common language, common will, and opponents. The works and contributions of Young Ottomans; Şinasi, Ali Suavi, Ziya Pasha and especially Namık Kemal will be investigated.

In the fifth chapter, the emergence of Turkish nationalism with the help of Young Turks will be explained. As natural outcome of changes in the international system and also in the administrative system of the Empire, nationalism became rather apparent phenomenon. This period will be examined by explaining the contributions of homeland, bourgeoisie, and common language, common will, constructing factors and thoughts of Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura.

The sixth chapter will analyze the classification Turkish nationalism within the Republican era. Initially, Kemalist nationalism will be explained. Afterwards, Turkism and emergence of the Nationalist Action Party will be mentioned. Turkish-Islam synthesis will be examined. Lastly, Turkish nationalism will be evaluated with the contributions of the globalization process and neo-nationalist, *ulusalcı* movement.

In the last chapter of this thesis, explanation and classification of Turkish nationalism will be given with respect to Turkish political parties, between 2002 and 2007. In that sense, nationalist and anti-nationalist policies of the Republican People's Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the Justice and Development Party will be examined. The main aim of this chapter will be how these parties contributed Turkish nationalism. It will be examined whether there is only one explanation of Turkish nationalism or many. In this context, nationalisms of the political parties will be explained. In this respect, party programs, election declarations of parties; political discourses and speeches of party leaders will be investigated. Moreover, attitudes, policies of these parties towards some important issues as developments in Iraq, the Annan plan and the Republican rallies will be studied to evaluate their nationalisms.

In order to fulfill the aim of this study, the research tries to make use of diverse sources as much as possible. It is important to note that, only the referred sources were given in the reference section, not all the studied sources. First off all, historical background of nationalism will be studied through the books and articles related to political history and political thought. Afterward, detailed investigation will be given on theory of nationalism and first-hand sources will be studied. Many history books related with the Ottoman and Turkish history are used in this study. Beside the argumentative sources, which were

written as a reflection of state discourse, many explanatory history analyses and critics are also used during the research. They are read with critical eye and the possibilities of the underlying meanings to explain the parameters of Turkish nationalism are tried to be revealed. In the fourth chapter, many explanatory history analyses will be used. Also, the letters, journals, books, articles of Namık Kemal will be elaborated. In the fifth chapter, mainly the studies of Karpat, Sarınay, Zürcher, Heyd and Ahmad will be analyzed. The books, journals, articles of Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura will be examined. In the sixth chapter, the studies of Toprak, Parla, Kili, Oran, Poulton, Çağaptay, Landau and Ahmad will be used. In the seventh chapter, the party programs, election declarations, speeches of party leaders will be examined to evaluate nationalisms of the Turkish political parties.

# 2. EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN POLITICAL HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Throughout history, loyalties and identities of people have tended to shift from one identity and concept to another (Dawisha, 2002, p.15). The concept of nationalism has evolved throughout history under different circumstances.

## 2.1 Ancient Greece

Hellenic society was based on many city-states settled on the lower Balkan Peninsula and many islands of the Aegean, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic seas. Athens, Sparta, and Corinth were some of the important city-states of the *Hellas*. Although each city-state had its own identity, ceremonies, cults and political arrangements, there were some similarities. The Greek city-states, the Hellenes shared a common ancestry, common language, common religion and a common way of life which defined the Hellenic culture. It is important to note that they regarded others who did not speak Greek as barbarians. The Greeks obeyed certain rules based on gods of *Hellas*, but the various city-states of *Hellas* did not share equal sovereignty. Athens and Sparta were more powerful than the other city-states and were self-contained. Thus, the international society of the Greeks was not based on international law, and they felt no obligations or duties to other cities. Their relations and communities were revealed cultural-religious, and Ancient Greece, *Hellas* could be regarded as a single cultural unit. It is extravagating definition to call Ancient Greece as a political unit or a state (Jackson & Owens, 2001, pp.49-50).

The term "politics" was derived from Greek word, *polis* which indicated city-state. A central state organization to unite Greek city-states did not exist. The *polis* was created as a self-sufficient and competent political organization. Their aim was to stay in power for a long-lasting period. Greek city-states were comprehensive units comprising religious, militaristic and economic, political and social aspects of life. Every Greek saw himself as a citizen, *polites*, and member of a city-state. In conclusion, every man depended on his own

city for identity. Outside the city, he was nothing. Personal happiness was based on the well-being of a city-state. This situation was an element to enhance the cohesiveness among the other citizens (Ağaoğulları, 2009, pp.11-12, 16).

There has been a debate on whether polis was a city-state or a nation. Finley indicated that Greeks could be regarded as a *Kulturnation* not a *Staatnation*. Edward Cohen, on the other hand, argued that having uniform laws, shared customs, territorial attachment and size, Ancient Greece could be named as *ethnos* (nation) not a *polis* (city-state) (Smith, 2008, p.659). It was indicated that Athenians acquired citizenship at birth. In that sense, members of other Greek states residing in a Greek city could not acquire Greek citizenship. There was a division of Greeks and Barbarians. Barbarians were first identified as non-Greeks. It was apparent that in the earliest times, there were two worlds; Greek and the Barbarian. Alexander the Great tried to change this situation; he tried to treat Greeks and Asiatics alike. Although his successors would not follow him, the word "barbarian" became synonymous with uneducated, ignorant people. Rollo (1937) indicated that the words *"Barbaros"* and *"Barbarizien"* referred to the sounds of babbling water, of birds, of neighing horses, of people speaking unintelligible language (pp.133-137). Moreover, Hanson (1995) indicated that Athens created a federated fortress of Greece, and formed a defensive alliance of autonomous agricultural city-states as a result, Athens played an important role in the unification of Greece (Hanson, p.235, cited in Berent, 2000, p.287). The separation of people as "us" and "the others" could be seen as the first sign of a kind of nationalism.

Dealing with different views related to Greek understanding of nationalism, Anthony Smith (2008) initially indicated that ancient Greece could be considered as an ethno-cultural entity. Although national sentiment and ethno-cultural exclusion was sighted especially during the Persian war, it was stated by Smith that these cohesive situations stopped and started seemingly without a regular pattern. It is important to indicate that Smith stated that there was no ideological movement to maintain identity of a nation and to unify Greece before 338 BC. He claimed that Pericles asked Athenians *"to fall in love with their cities,"* not with their nation. Smith remarked that Greeks were dispersed ethnic

community sharing common festivals and cults and could be divided into sub-ethnicities (p.658).

Economic and social life is essential in order to call an entity a nation. Family economy was seen in Ancient Greece which was self-sufficient and a closed economy relying primarily on a bartering system (Turanlı, 2000, p.4). After the development of trade, city-states became more powerful, however, it should be noted that an emerging bourgeoisie class was needed in order to convert Greek city-states into a nation.

Berent (2000) mentioned about the decentralized character of the polis which causes warlike qualities. He proposed that polis was not a state but, as anthropologists defined it, was a stateless community. This stateless community was different from tribal stateless communities. He explained the issue that the stateless tribal community was primitive, egalitarian and simple. Everybody was engaged in the same type of food production, had the same level of income and political influence. It was also added by Berent that polis was both stateless and civilized. It was indicated that polis had no standing army, no proper police system, and no proper public prosecution system. Therefore, Greek civilization was defined by stateless conditions and was sustained by non-state mechanisms. This was a community comprised of citizens and slave community. Citizens exercised coercive power on slaves. Exploitation of slaves by the privileged citizens revealed that polis was a coercive community. The coercive character of the polis differentiated it from Gellner's agrarian state. Slaves were owned by individuals and individuals were responsible for their control. Thus, internal cohesion was not organized or professional; it was basically a self-help system. Moreover, Aristotle said it could be regarded as an association or partnership. Exploitation and slavery were seen in these stateless communities. Direct taxation of citizens was not applied. The economic burden of the polis was carried by the wealthy people, and conscription was not a duty but a privilege (pp.257-287).

It was indicated that there was close tie between war and social cohesion of the community. A common enemy ensured social cohesion. There was no gap between the army and community in stateless communities. Furthermore, Berent illustrated that Greeks were stateless and civilized which was ensured by non-state mechanisms. Furthermore, he

claimed that stateless communities succeeded against states and empires by joint effort. It could be added that the Greeks failed to form a unified state, they lacked unified political structure, and individual Greek city-states were at continuous war. This continuous war was influential in the formation of some kind of state. It was explained that comparing the state of that times with modern times could be misleading (Manicas, 1982, p.676), since nationalism did not exist when there was a stateless community.

## 2.1.1 Social and Political Life in Ancient Greece

There were three classes in Athens. Firstly, there were citizens who comprised nearly 10 percent of the total population of Athens. Citizens had rights of usage of armaments and possession of territory, but women had no rights to become citizens. The second class was called Metoikos or Metics, or foreigners. They were free but had no right of citizenship. The third class of Athens was that of the slaves who, of course, had no rights or freedom. Sparta, on the other hand, had no slaves because local residents called *helots* were turned into a kind of agricultural slaves like feudal serfs by Dorian invaders. It is important to note that an increase in the number of citizens was a burden to the budget. Thus, in the time of Pericles, a law was enacted in which designated that in order to be a citizen, a man was obliged to have both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother (Ağaoğulları, 2009, pp. 18-22).

## 2.1.2 Thucydides' the History of Peloponnesian War

Thucydides (455-400 BC) was a historian. His famous work was History of Peloponnesian War, which was about the war between the Spartans and the Athenians. It has become the cornerstone of the Realist theory of International Relations. This work was analyzed to observe such important features of international relations as balance of power, hegemonic war, military alliances and the meaning of power, fear and threat. Moreover, some kind of loyalties and cohesive sentiments were observed among the soldiers and ruling class belonging to the same city-states during the war times. Hence, these could be regarded as the pioneering feelings or incentives of nationalist feelings and nationalist behaviors.

Thucydides was a witness of the war and also the commander of the Athenian fleet. He was unsuccessful in preventing the capture of Amphiopolis, and as a result of this, he was sentenced to penalties and exiled. Thucydides used scientific method in his book. He was an empirical observer and he did not rely on supernatural explanations. In his work, he used technical terminology, and he gave importance to naturalistic explanations by mentioning the environmental and climatic factors, diseases and observing the events and points of the crises (Goodman, 1972, p.251). Thucydides claimed that the war between the Athenians and the Spartans occurred because of the growing power of Athens (Luard, 1992, p.120) and explained dynamics of international relations through the development of differential growth of power (Gilpin, 1988, p.591). In that manner, the balance of power changed and the capabilities of the Athenians changed. The growing power of Athens was regarded as a threat and this threat created fear in the Spartans, who were frightened and perceived threat. Thus, taking into consideration the changes in the power of these competing entities, a security dilemma occurred and the Spartans began to increase their military power.

The war broke out between the Athenian Delian League, which had a navy, and the Peloponnesian League headed by Sparta. This war was resulted in a victory of the Spartans, and expansion and militarization of the Spartans (Arıboğan, 1997, pp.35-38). This war between Sparta and Athens was characterized as a hegemonic war caused by the differential growth of power. Thucydides mentioned that hegemonic wars were like diseases that deteriorated stable hierarchical systems. Athenians increased their power through commerce and empire, becoming a commercial, democratic and naval power. Sparta being a land power was named a traditional hegemon of the Hellenes. Moreover, it was called a slavocracy. Sparta had conservative foreign policy prior to and during the Persian wars, and its land armies and agriculture were important elements of its power. Therefore, Spartans were enjoying ascendant positions among Greek city-states. Sparta was land-locked and had an agricultural system based on slave labor. Athenian naval power and an increased amount of commerce reversed the situation and the Spartans were stopped by the Athenian technology of fortification and erection of walls around Athens, whereupon the capabilities of Athens and elements of state power changed. The components of power in that time were navy, commerce and finance. After the Persian

Wars, international systems favored Persian hegemony and commerce and navies became much more important than agriculture and land armies, thus the power shifted to Athens. Although the Athenians lost the war, an economic and social revolution was realized in Greece. At last, however, Macedonian imperialism gained power over the Greeks (Gilpin, pp. 592-605). Tradesman of Ancient Greece would increase their wealth and after that, they would share the power of administrative authorities. The type of economic life within city-states had been an important indicator of social cohesiveness and social loyalties which would be the leading elements of nationalism in the future.

The Peloponnesian War caused the political instability. Athena enjoyed its golden age in the time of Pericles, but after this war, the institutions of Pericles' era were deteriorated and the self-confidence of the Athenian people was lost. The economic life of the city was spoiled and a new class emerged which became wealthier through trade. The villagers lost their territory due to high interest rates, they sold their lands to the aristocrats, and they were obliged to move to the cities. Thus, social and economic turmoil occurred in cities (Denis, 1982, cited in Ersoy, 2008, p.43).

Manicas stated that boundaries of polis were unchanged. He gave the example of Sparta; there were limits on wars of expansion. Polis and territory was not the same thing. The single class of equals ruled over a large territory and subject population. The Spartan military also conducted police functions. Spartan's self-sufficient economy and its stabile military were significant in the development of later Greek interpolis politics. Moreover, in Ancient Greece, the city-states could wage war for slaves, gold or domestic necessities. Furthermore, they could wage war for being a tribute-paying empire but not for commercial rivalry. Manicas claimed that Greek emphasis on statis was apparent in the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian War. There were debates on term statis; it was an unresolved problem of the polis world. However, particularism, autonomy, and its open character within boundaries of Greek Polis fostered that statis (pp.677-680).

Gilpin (1984), being a Realist, simply argued that intergroup conflict remained unchanged over time in organization of the competing groups, namely tribes, city-states, kingdoms and nation-states. He stated that competing tribes could be named nations in modern times

and their loyalty could be considered as nationalism. However, he stated that nation-states were relatively recent phenomenon (pp.290, 300).

Gilpin (1984) claimed that the Peloponnesian War was significant in international economy. There were some significant events such as expansion of the trade, monetization of agrarian economies, and the rise of commercial powers, namely Corinth and Athens. He claimed that these changes were influential in the eruption of the war. Moreover, he stated that hegemony or political domination was associated with the command economies of the empires which aimed to control and exploit other economies (pp.293-297).

### 2.1.2.1 The Melian dialogue

One of the important readings within "History of the Peloponnesian War" was the Melian Dialogue. It was stated that the Melians were the colony of Sparta. They refused to join the Athenian Empire. Firstly, they were neutral, but when Athenians brought their forces to their land, they became hostile to Athens. Athenians wanted them to give the control of the island, but the Melians did not want to be slaves of the Athenians. The Athenians stated that by giving the control of their island, the Melians would save themselves from the disastrous conditions inflicted on them. The most important sentence of this Dialogue could be the Athenians pronouncement in which they stated that "*…the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept…" The Athenians stated that they would not accept the claims of the Melians by implying whether or not they would join Sparta in the war. Athenians indicated clearly that the Melians' neutrality or being friends of Athenians were not important because they believed that the Melians would not do any harm to the Athenians. Moreover, the Athenians stated that friendly relationships towards Melians could be regarded as weakness by the others. Moreover, it was added by the Athenians that by conquering the Melians they would increase the size of their empire and also secure its safety. Furthermore, they stated that the Melians were the weaker islanders and the Athenians, being the rulers of the sea, would not allow them to have their independence. The Athenians claimed that they were much more alienated from the islanders because they had behaved recklessly (Thucydides, 1972, pp. 400-403).

The Melians mentioned fortune, hope and they also trusted that the gods would help them. Moreover, the Melians believed that the Spartans would help them. However, the Athenians determined that all of these elements of the Melians' confidence were irrelevant and in fact, they stated that hope was an expensive commodity for the Melians. The Athenians also claimed that the Gods would favor them because their behaviors were identical to the law of nature which accepted rule over whatever one could. Moreover, the Athenians stated that the Spartans were not going to help the Melians. They added that the Melians' actual resources were very insufficient. The Athenians accused the Melians of having a false sense of honor and stated that they offered a graceful agreement that the Melians should accept: a tribute-paying basis alliance and right of private property. However, the Melians refused the Athenians' offer because they were reluctant to give up their liberty. At last, after numerous attacks and skirmishes, the Melians surrendered, all of the men were killed and women and children were sold as slaves (Thucydides, pp. 404-408). This part of the work indicates the self-confidence of Athenians, self-help international system, the conflict between the weak and the powerful entities. In that sense, this dialogue clearly demonstrates the separation of us and others. The Athenians loyalty to their city and the consciousness of their unique identity could be regarded as nascent nationalist sentiments. The Athenians were aware of the weakness of the Melians and the Athenians wanted to secure their territory by invading Melos. Therefore, Athenians aimed to provide the survival of their state which has been one of the indicators of nationalist behavior.

**2.1.2.2 Pericles' Funeral Oration**

The other preeminent writing of Thucydides was Pericles' Funeral Oration. The apparent emotion which could be felt from this Oration was a great pride in them. The Athenians admired their courageous and virtuous ancestors, fathers, customs, institutions, constitution, military policy, and having an open city for foreigners. In that case, it was stated that their governmental system was not a copy of the institution of others. Their government was presented as a model. Their constitution presented a democracy in which the power was held by the whole people. Moreover, Pericles stated that all the people were equal before the law. He claimed that Athenian political life was free and open. Athenians

obeyed the laws and authority. Furthermore, Athenians had high standard of living and they acquired beautiful things from all corners of the world because their society was so highly developed. The Athenians were courageous and loyal so that their cities and educational system were open to foreigners. They had no secret weapons, as the Athenians were confident and they trusted their own troops rather than their allies. Pericles claimed that the Spartans depended on their allies and also their educational system was based on most laborious training in courage (Thucydides, pp. 143-146).

Pericles pointed out that poverty would not be seen as a source of embarrassment but people should find ways to escape from it. The most important contribution of Pericles' speech could be "*…here each individual was not interested only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well". Moreover, focusing on politics, he stated that a man who took no interest in politics was a man who minded his own business but, that said, that he had no business here at all. He admired Athenians because they took decisions after proper thinking and discussions (Thucydides, pp.147-151). It is explicit in this part of Thucydides work that Athenians were identified themselves with their city-state. This identification could be considered as the first instance of nationalism.

Ancient Greece could not be regarded as a sample of nationalism; however, it was seen as influential phenomenon of modern nationalism. Issues as the chosen people or the institutionalized will of the citizenry were evident in Ancient Greece. Thus, they were able to transfer some important elements, institutions, beliefs, customs, literacy, ritual centers to aid in the development of nationalism (Breuilly, 2008, pp.642-643). Athenians saw themselves as a part of Hellenic cultural community and they imagined themselves dependent on other Athenian citizens, their common ancestors and their nationalist myths (Roshwald, 2008, p.652). It could be claimed that Ancient Greece was a model of cultural unity and a guide for future nationalisms and modern states through the upcoming history.

## 2.2 Transitory Years

The Hellas was defeated and invaded by the Macedonians. Afterwards, the Romans took the place of the Macedonians and they created a great empire. This empire extended from Europe into North Africa and the Middle East. Contrary to the decentralized structure of the Greek city-states, the Roman Empire was regarded as centralized empire with a huge acquired army. It presented privileges to the aristocracy of the allied states known as horizontal penetration. Initially, the Roman Empire harshly opposed Christianity, but afterwards it supported Christianity as a unifying factor (Arıboğan, pp.49-58).

Kohn notes that imperialism and universalism were seen in the Roman Empire. He mentioned that the Stoic understanding of cosmopolitanism was widespread. He claimed that Roman political structure was organized and institutionalized (Kohn, 2005, p.65). With the spread of Christianity, there had been an idea that mankind was one and had to form one community. He stated that this universalism began to suffer with the Renaissance and Reformation (Kohn, 1971, pp. 13-14). Therefore, the idea of a community of mankind which could also be called universalism or cosmopolitanism was apparent in the political thought of the middle ages.

The Roman Empire was divided as the Western and the Eastern Empires in the $3^{rd}$ century. The Roman Empire collapsed in the $5^{th}$ century after assaults coming from the so-called barbarians of the imperial colonies. The Western Empire that was formerly known as the Roman Empire turned into a theocracy called Christendom in Latin. The Eastern Empire was the Byzantine Empire which was the supporter of Orthodox Christianity and had existed a thousand years longer than the Roman Empire. The Byzantine Empire was superseded by the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the middle ages were envisaged as the ages of empires. Furthermore, the religious regulations and institutions were powerful in that time. Western medieval Europe between the years 500 and 1500 was called the "*Respublica Christiana*" with the Papacy operating as a supreme umbrella over the Europeans. The religious authority was divine and a cohesive political authority over people. Moreover, the people of medieval Europe were divided into fiefdoms and they obeyed different feudal lords rather than their weak kings. Then, after centuries, the powers of feudal lords and

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papacy waned. The Roman Empire collapsed when it was conquered by Alaric barbarian soldiers. Saint Augustine wrote in this period that he divided the universe into two parts: God's state and the earthly state. He claimed that perpetual peace could be achieved only through God's state. He presented his "just war theory" in which he explained that wars should be in conformity with Christian peace and order (Arıboğan, 64-70). It should be taken into consideration that the features of the Eastern and the Western Roman Empire were different; Eastern Orthodoxy had national churches and Western (Roman) Catholicism had universal character and it compromised with the local churches. Thus, the church was subordinated to the state in the east, but decentralization was observed in the west (Kohn, 2005, pp.75-78).

The use of the plow in Europe ensured an increase in agricultural production, and villagers became wealthier through the usage of the plow, animals and wind power. They began to pay more taxes and higher rents. At last, the revenues of villagers ensured the foundation of the modern army. There was a decentralized political structure; nonetheless, a centralized political structure was needed. Three classes were seen in the feudal system; lords, vassals, serfs. There was a contract between the lord and the vassal. The vassals, who had smaller territories, would be protected by the lord. The vassals, in response, would serve as soldiers of the lord once a year. As Oral Sander (1992) pointed out, this system could be regarded as the starting point in the emergence of national states of Europe. The lords of France chose a king in 987 and became his vassals. Moreover, vassals chose a king in German territory and he came to power as emperor in 962. Thus,the Holy Roman Empire was founded. Furthermore, when the Normans invaded England they set up a feudal system.  England having a king from the beginning; the king had important authority (pp.51-54).

The cities became rather wealthier with the increasing amount of trade. The number of cities increased, and the need for agricultural products increased. New cultivation areas were carved out, and, as serfs gained their freedom, they went to new and remote cultivation areas.  The system of serfdom was terminated in Northern France and Southern England in the 12$^{th}$ century and serfdom was disappeared throughout Europe from about

the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Serfs gained their independence by paying the lords and they bought their own tracts of land to farm independently (Sander, pp.55-56).

From the eleventh century till the end of the Hundred Years Wars could be called an "era of political turmoil and instability" in Europe. Sander stated that there were four political authorities at that time. One of them was Christianity, which was represented by the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy. The second authority was the national monarchies and the third one was feudal lords. Fourthly, there were nascent city-states. He alleged that powerful national monarchies were established in France and England in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, and city-states were founded in Germany and Italy (p.57).

## 2.3 The Renaissance and the Reformation Periods

The idea of nationalism was developed in the Renaissance and the Reformation periods. Active, self-confident individuals of the Renaissance period emerged in the city-states, especially in Italy, Portugal, Netherlands and England (Sander, p.59). The political authority of the Respublica Christiana lost its supremacy over its subjects with the influence of the Protestant Reformation, headed by Martin Luther. The position of the papacy within political system had changed. It was separated from the administrative structure of the state and the monarchs gained power. England, Scotland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Northern Germany separated themselves from the Holy Roman Church (Jackson & Owens, pp.50-52; Sander, pp.61-64). German philosopher Martin Luther observed that Germany was being exploited by the Papacy living in Rome. He believed that the Papacy deceived Christians and lived a luxurious life. The Scholastic philosophy and natural law were replaced by rationalist philosophy after the reformation period. Reformation ensured the rise of bourgeoisie and nationalism; the individual gained priority. From this point, secular education system was constructed. (Gökkaya & Yeşilbursa, 2008, pp. 70, 76).

**2.3.1 The identification of the Renaissance**

The Renaissance was an important turning point in the evolution of international society. Between the 14$^{th}$ and 16$^{th}$ centuries, the idea of medieval imperial administration was changed and, indeed, the city-states of Italy were regarded as first indicators of the Renaissance. Ancient teachings of Greek and Rome were transmitted through Arabic scholars (Jackson & Owens, pp.51-52). Italy for two centuries starting around 1400 became the center of the Renaissance, known for the rediscovery of philosophical works of Ancient Greece and Rome. Art and philosophy shifted from religion to humanism. Rulers and religious authorities of the middle ages were closely related to each other. The Holy Roman emperor protected the Catholic Church and the Church blessed the emperor (Flash Focus, 2009, pp.1-3).

The Renaissance was characterized by the diminishing authority of the church and increasing authority of science. The culture of those times was secular rather than religious. Bertrand Russell summarized the issue that states gradually overcame the authority of the churches and they began to control the culture. It was stated that the duty of government was realized firstly by the kings, after that, by democracies and lastly, by tyrants. Feudal aristocracy was replaced by the alliance of the king with the wealthy bourgeoisie. The salvation from the authority of the church brought individualism initially, and then turmoil. There were conflicts of power among the princes of Italy, who made alliances with Spain and France against each other. Russell (2004) stated that the Renaissance was the revival of the Greek culture. Moreover, it was mentioned that both instability and individualism were features of that time (pp.15-31).

In sum, the Renaissance was simply defined as a revival and rebirth of the ancient times. It should be added that, comprehensively, the Renaissance was a different era and that any assessment of human beings was being changed. By considering ancient times, new interpretations were made and essentially and fundamentally distinct results were gained. From this period, humans were considered precious. Furthermore, it was claimed that the Renaissance was developed within a Latin-German world and not in Byzantium, the seat of

the Eastern Roman empire. In the 14th century, the universal medieval Christian state began to be divided into nation-states. The middle class had gained importance and economic revival of bourgeoisie weakened the economic power of the church. The changes in social structure resulted in the removal of the feudalism. Also, the ecclesiastical education system reverted to a more secularized system (Gökberk, 1996, pp.182-183).

Comparing the middle ages and the Renaissance, it could be stated that the medieval philosophy was based on the Christianity. The Catholic Church was the common property of the whole Christian world. There was a common Latin language and a common culture. In the Renaissance, there were plural cultural systems, artists were free and the art began to be identified with the names of their artists. Moreover, the religious people as St. Augustine, St. Thomas were also philosophers of the middle ages. Scholastic philosophy of that times basing on religion was reserved, static and closed philosophy. It was called as an *ecole philosophy* which was taught not searched. The Renaissance philosophy, on the other hand, was individualistic, and broadly, it was plural (Gökberk, pp.183-193).

### 2.3.2 Machiavelli and the Prince

Machiavelli was a Renaissance man; politician, political philosopher, diplomat and author of famous book *the Prince*. He declared that his famous work of art was devoted to Lorenzo (the Magnificent) de Medici, member of Medici family living in Florence. It was claimed that *the Prince* was written to gain the appreciation of the Lorenzo de Medici. In that time, Lorenzo was chosen to be the Pope (Russell, p.36). Machiavelli was the main theorist of realism and it was deemed that an absolute ruler was needed to restore a stable and powerful state. He was living in Florence. There were many Italian city-states at that time: Siena, Venice, Genoa, Pisa. They were fighting against Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and France. He wanted to see a powerful and united Italian state and he felt that only a powerful prince could form this entity. These city-states of Italy each had a different political organization. Not only were the Italian city-states art and trade centers, but they also were formed as feudal agrarian societies and had military power, which meant that these urban centers had great capacity and they prevailed over any power as king, emperor or prince (Chittolini, 1989, pp.689-690) which Machiavelli thought was needed to form a

unified Italian state. It was apparent that after the defeat of the emperor and the pope, a universal medieval political conception had disappeared, leaving the individual Italian city-states to enjoy republicanism. By losing ties to a medieval world-state, they became self-sufficient, autonomous states. These city-republics, namely Florence, Siena, Venice, Pisa, Genoa having bourgeoisie-capitalist structures, realized world-wide economic expansion. Some city-states became rather powerful, and the power shifted to some prominent families. In the 15th century, autocracy became the predominant form of government in Italy. It was stated that "the political thoughts of humanists which started being republican became monarchical" (Gilbert, 1993, pp.454-456). Cesare Borgia was the model of Machiavelli's "strong leader" (Russell, p.35; Sabine, 1959, p.299). It was apparent that having some kind of bourgeoisie class would be needed in order to develop a nation-state. Italian agriculture was developed utilizing new techniques and concurrently, industrial, mechanical, optical and watchmaking sectors progressed. Furthermore, accounting, foreign exchange, insurance, and banking became important tools which Italian city-states used in order to expand their influence. Some families dealing with trade and banking became influential and they began to govern the city-states. However, a gap between wealthy north and the poor south was observed (Dupouey, 1998, pp.8-9).

In the *Prince,* it was stated that armed and trained subjects were needed for combat (Langton & Deitz, 1987, p.1280). The readiness for a combat to protect the country's soil was regarded as the initial duty of the subjects. The main aim of the Prince was giving advice to the ruler. These advices were to secure and control the city-state, to develop a strong army, and to expel foreign forces from Italy (p.1282). In conclusion, Machiavelli stated that a unified, strong state could be achieved only through a strong, intelligent ruler. Machiavelli disliked both nobility and mercenary soldiers; because he believed that they caused the lawlessness in Italy, since these hired soldiers were fighting for anyone who gave them maximum payment. They could fight for the enemy; however, they were unsuccessful against the French army. He advocated the idea that Italy needed a national army. Sabine stated that Machiavelli strongly opposed mercenary armies and foreign auxiliaries. In his book, he also declared that the art of war was an important aim of a ruler, and that he needed the support of his disciplined, equipped and loyal citizens. Sabine pointed out that Machiavelli's desire to develop a citizen army and his hatefulness towards

the nobility revealed his purpose of national patriotism and unification of Italy. It was concluded that "the duty to one's country overrides all other duties all scruples" (pp.299-300). An absolute and, in a way, ruthless ruler was for essential for the realization of the well-being of the state.

Dealing with the nationalism of Machiavelli, Felix Gilbert (1954) alleged that in the last chapter there was a suggestion that a prince needed to liberate Italy from the barbarians. Liberating Italy from the barbarians could be regarded as the expulsion of foreigners from Italy (pp.38-39). Italian city-states were invaded and controlled continuously by Spanish, Norman, French, German armies and the armed forces of the Papacy. At the end of $15^{th}$ century and beginning of the $16^{th}$ century, wars, changing alliances, and petty struggles were seen among Italian city-states (Burnham, 1987, p.38, cited in Arıboğan, 2007, p.99). In this chapter, Machiavelli suggested that Italy needed a virtuous leader who enforced good laws and rules. Moreover, Italy needed its own army, because only Italy's own soldiers could be better, more reliable and faithful.  In this part, Machiavelli asserts that Italy had been waiting for its redeemer, the Prince. Italians were suffering: "this barbarian occupation stinks in all our nostrils". He stated that this new leader would be applauded and greeted with great enthusiasm (Machiavelli, 1977, pp.72-75; Machiavelli, 2008, pp.97-101). Moreover, by looking to his nationalism, it could be also a clue when he stated that the new prince should always arm his subjects. The arms of the subjects become the arms of the prince. By arming the subjects, the new prince would gain faithful supporters and partisans of his own (Machiavelli, 1977, pp.59-60).

He was against the church, and he believed that the Church disarmed the country and made it weak. Moreover, the church relied on mercenary arms and this ruined Italy. The Church and Christianity were, he stated, to be found guilty of both the problems of Italy and the modern state (Scott & Sullivan, 1994, pp.888-897).

Machiavelli stated his views on religion in these words:

> Actually the cardinal told me that Italians knew nothing about war, and I told him that the French knew nothing about politics; since if they knew first thing about it, they would never allow the Church to grow so great. It has been our experience in

Italy that the Church and Spain have grown powerful through the influence of France, and that their power caused her ruin. From this we can draw a general rule, which never fails or only rarely: the man who makes another powerful ruin himself (Machiavelli, 1977, p12).

Thus, it could also be defined as his significant contribution to political theory and exemplified his secular approach (Siner, 1978, cited in Saybaşılı, 1989, p.141).

It was an allegation that Machiavelli was close to monarchy in *the Prince*, but he was in favor of republicanism in his *Discourses*. It could be claimed that Machiavelli aimed for a republican state, but in the short run, it was impossible to achieve. Thus, he initially advocated the establishment of monarchy. However, it should be taken into consideration that republicanism of Machiavellian time was different from our present understanding. Republicanism was based on the bourgeoisie and nobles, not ordinary people. In that sense, it was apparent that administrative tasks would be performed by virtuous and intelligent people (Adabağ, 2008, pp.xiii-xviii; Dupouney, p.151; Russell, p.34). It was stated in *the Prince* that a strong leader was regarded as a precondition for republicanism (Langton & Deitz, p.1277).

In conclusion, a unified state could be achieved through a strong leader, good laws and a good army composed of subjects of a country. Also, Machiavelli suggested the residence of the prince in invaded countries would ensure the loyalty of people living there. Burglary and bad governance of the officials could be prevented through this residence. Moreover, foreign struggles could be overcome (Machiavelli, 2008, p.77). Machiavelli gave the example of Turks in Greece. They lived there to ensure the control of the country. Another suggestion of t*he Prince* was setting up colonies in one or two places (Machiavelli, 1977, p.7).

Machiavelli compared administrations of Turkey and France. He stated that Turkey was governed by a single master; everyone else was his servant, that he divided the kingdom into districts, sending different administrators to each, and changing them around as he thought best. On the other hand, Machiavelli claimed that many noblemen who recognized their own subjects were seen in France. He stated that conquering the Turkish state might be hard but, after the conquest, it would be easy to hold. Conquering France, on the

contrary, would be easy but holding the country would be difficult. Rulers did not invite foreign powers to help and to take control of the land. All the district rulers of Turkey were the servants of the Sultan. Also, any foreign attack would be met by the whole country. If the Sultan was beaten in battle, and the descent of the Sultan was eliminated, there would be no danger for an invader. However, anyone could enter France by allying themselves with inside power. Descent of the king could be eliminated, but there would always be other local nobles to rebel against invaders (pp.12-13).

According to Machiavelli, war is a necessary element to satisfy countries' subjects. This understanding resembles Ottoman expansionist imperial policies. Many empires applied the same rules of expansion to ensure the safety, security and good health of their administration (Doyle, 1986). In the peacetime, the prince should prepare for war by training his army. He should also go hunting in order to know the geographic structure of his country. Therefore, he would learn the features of his county and how to protect it (Machiavelli, 1977, p.43). Bertrand Russell concluded that national independence, security and stable state structure were three elements of Machiavellian political theory (Russell, p.40). It should be noted that as Sabine stated Machiavelli had no definite plan for the assurance of Italian unification. He thought of the expansion of city-state as Rome (Sabine, pp.300-301).

Peoples did not fight for national values, they fought for dogmas. In that time, people were expelled because of heresy and apostasy not for ethnic or linguistic differences. Machiavelli has been an important figure in theories of international relations and political theory. He is observed as both a realist and nationalist. In his famous work, *the Prince,* he supported a powerful state and powerful leader. Moreover, he supported a secular state independent of any religious or moral sanction. The Renaissance consolidated the emergence of new centralized states. Absolute monarchies came onto the scene which in turn, became the core of modern nation-states. The Reformation promoted the religious and linguistic pluralism of modern times. In that time, reading the Bible and translating it strengthened national languages. These new central states were king's states. In 17th century England and 18th century France, states became the people's states, or fatherlands (Kohn, 1971, pp.13-14).

## 2.4 Emergence of Early Modern Political Thought and Explanation of Political Life in Europe

Geographical discoveries of the 14th century paved the way for the emergence of a mercantilist economy and also missionary activities. The transformation from Greco-Roman character to European character was seen. After the accelerating geographical discoveries, humanism became more developed during the Renaissance. Europeans began to give importance to reason and the individual. Monarchies were strengthened in Renaissance, the masses began to read cheap books and newspapers and foreign travel increased. After the Renaissance and Reformation, armies were modernized, made more efficient and small artillery began to be used (Gökkaya & Yeşilbursa, pp.40-42, 47-51, 65).

 The power and privileges of nobility and papacy were decreased. Establishment of a Holy Christian Unification was the goal of the some European people even in the 16th century. However, this goal was not accomplished. European countries confronted external and internal problems. External European problems included many invasions. In the 7th and 8th centuries, Muslim invaders first attacked Spain and then the Balkans. Afterwards, in the 9th and 10th centuries, Asian nomads and Hungarians attacked and moved towards inner regions of Europe. Moreover, Vikings were threats to Europe from the 8th century through the 11th century. Moreover, Mongol invasions were seen in the 13th century (Woodruff, 2006, p.39). These assaults were significant in envisaging the structure of Europe; however, it should be taken into consideration that the system had begun to change politically and economically.  Internal problems of the Christian European system were related to secularization of the system and questioning of absolute authority of the papacy, and the declining power of feudalism.  These were also the indicators of the Renaissance. Moreover, tradesmen tried to save themselves from the dominance of the papal rules over open and free trade, and nationalist sentiments were growing in France and England due to the enduring wars during the 14th and 15th centuries (Woodruff, pp.39-40).

Between the 10th to 15th centuries, world trade developed, and capitalist economic system emerged. There was an apparent transition from the economic system of city-states to a central economy. The main characteristic of this era was the ongoing rise of the prices of

goods. The rise of prices led to political instability and religious wars. New metals and mines were begun to be extracted. The supply of these raw materials increased much more than the supply of goods and services. Thus, the value of raw materials diminished and the prices of goods, especially agricultural goods, increased. From the 13th century onwards, population growth was seen, and, as a result, new and remote cultivation areas were needed to feed this growing population. The cost of production and transportation increased and mercantilism emerged due to the rise in prices. The main aim of mercantilism was to limit importation of manufactured goods and exportation of raw materials. They banned the importation of any goods other than raw materials. Hence, Sander believed that mercantilism helped the emergence of nation-states in Europe. Sander added that the feudalism, knighthood, and the structure of Renaissance city-states were torn by regular modern armies equipped with artillery and arms weapon (pp.69-70).

In 1555, the Augsburg Peace Treaty was signed. Every state acquired the right to choose its own religion. However, this was accomplished only after the Thirty Years Wars (1618-1648) (Sander, pp.72-73), after which the Westphalia Peace Treaty was signed. The collapse of the Holy Roman Empire was witnessed. It was replaced by a European society of states and 300 German states came to the political arena. Moreover, Sweden gained its independence. There were three principles of the Westphalian International Society: firstly, the king was emperor in his own realm; secondly, the ruler began to determine the religion of his realm; and the third principle was the balance of power which prevented any hegemon from arising and dominating the others. The Westphalia was seen as the cornerstone in recognition of separate sovereign states and the non-intervention into internal affairs of states was recognized (Jackson & Owens, pp.53-55). England witnessed a political revolution; the power of king was limited by the parliament. By 1700, Europe began to use steam power and the development of medical science and hygiene ensured a rise in population.

### 2.4.1 English Nationalism

England was a fruitful place for the emergence of nationalism. England had a centralized and parliamentary government; moreover, she witnessed the decline of villeinage, the

limitation of royal power, the ending of slavery, the emergence of an industrial society. The writings of Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Hume, Smith, Bentham and Mill helped the formation of political thought of England (Hastings, 1997, p.6).

The unity of Christendom was important for the esteemed author of *Utopia*, Thomas More (1478-1535). He was killed after his refusal to approve the supremacy of English king in the affairs of English church. 16 May 1532 was the date when Henry VIII was acknowledged as the Supreme Head of the Church. It was the date of England's separation from Rome. In that sense, national consciousness and national identity were evident by 1600. The main characteristic of English nationalism was a community of free and equal individuals. English nationalism was based on reason which was seen as a basic characteristic of humanity. The political participation, citizenship, patriotism were seen as the rights of individuals. Free and equal human beings should be respected. It was asserted that membership in a nation was considered a right of one's humanity. Greenfeld explained that love of a nation and exaltation of a nation meant principled individualism and exaltation of oneself as a human being. Words were also important in identifying things. During the period 1500-1650, country, commonwealth, empire and nation were used and at last, they were recognized as synonyms (Greenfeld, 1992, pp.29-31).

Firstly, English nationalism could be depicted through the concept of the state and government. The English people did not allege that they had a common ethnic origin and a common language. England was invaded by Celts and Danes before the Roman conquest. After that, French Normans colonized the country. It could be concluded that the English race was mixed and the English language was formed by invaders and settlers (Dawisha, pp.10-11). It has been shown that the centralized position of government with limited powers was established in England before France and Spain. There was a collaboration of Catholicism and absolute monarchy and association of liberal Protestantism with the parliament. Moreover, intervention of foreign powers in the internal affairs of England was obstructed by its insular position, industrial growth and by its being a commercial empire. Breuilly (1994) stated that the transformation of English nationalism into British nationalism was accomplished in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (pp.84-87).

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Secondly, in dealing with English nationalism, political, economic, social and religious conditions of England should be investigated. Before the end of the 15th century, it was not a wealthy and developed country. The first important change was that Atlantic Ocean became the area of significant commercial activity. The Mediterranean had lost its preeminent position as a trading route (Kohn, 1940, p.69). This change in trade routes and its growing naval power was beneficial for the augmentation of English wealth. Hill (1983) wrote that English merchants had gone to America, India, and Russia by the end of the 15th century. Industry, commerce, and division of labor developed. Flocks of sheep were bred to get more wool. Silver was discovered in America. Thus, the food prices increased by 150 % and currency usage was seen in that time. People dealing in commerce and people producing for the market became wealthier. However, poor people who could not pay their rents were expelled from their homes (Hill, pp.25-26), and thus, these people were to become the source of social and economic turmoil.

Hill pointed out that the revenues of England increased during the 16th century. Revenues were gathered from commerce, the textile industry, and the production of coal, iron, glass, and shipbuilding. It is important to note that there was an arrangement from exportation of raw material to exportation of manufactured material. Hill added that they needed more raw materials, and in this way, English colonialism accelerated. Moreover, with victory over Spain in 1588, the naval power of England was strengthened, and a more powerful state structure was needed. Therefore, the monarchy and parliament confronted on economical arrangements and at last, parliament gained the upper hand. Nobles, the Church and big landowners sided with the King; the king levied higher taxes on the bourgeoisie (Hill, pp.36-37, 47).

Thirdly, as Greenfeld pointed out, the active participation of people in English politics was important in explaining English nationalism. Extinction of old nobility was observed and a new mobile aristocracy, a type of official elite, emerged. Education became important. After the religious movements, the old esteemed position of clergy was replaced by the university-trained layman. The definition of nobility changed; it was redefined as a status gained by merit and not by birth. In sum, as Greenfeld mentioned, the blue blood of nobility was transferred to ordinary people through acquiring nationality. Moreover, this

new aristocracy was strengthened with the wealth of church after the separation from Rome. The number and wealth of the middle class increased and these educated people acquired ownership of lands. The position of descent declined, and learning became the feature of the nobility (Greenfeld, pp.44-51).

Fourthly, the change of dynasty in power helped the development of English nationalism and the French army was defeated under the Tudors. Kohn maintained that national homogeneity was attained under the Tudors when they came to power in the 15th century. Henry VIII and Elizabeth were important rulers who were instrumental in the growth of English nationhood. It was explained that Henry VIII worked for the withdrawal of the remnants of feudalism; he tried to strengthen the middle class, which was the best supporter of the Tudor dynasty. Moreover, the Elizabethan period could be illustrated through rising colonialism, and the increasing literary works and growing wealth induced national sentiments (Kohn, 1940, pp.70-71). The English Renaissance could be symbolized as the Elizabethan era, in which English colonialism helped increase national wealth and power (Kohn, 2005, p.158).

Fifthly, the geographical position of England was essential for the rise of English nationalism. It is an island and it is easy to defend. It should be taken into consideration that the combination of feeling of national security, parliamentary structure and increasing economic power ensured the development of nationalism. As English people began to feel more vital, the economic and cultural situation of foreigners began to get worse, with the English replacing the economic positions of foreigners (Kohn, 1940, pp.71-73).

Sixthly, the importance of England's contribution to science also elevated their status (Greenfeld, p.84). Moreover, the importance of the English language increased and the Bible was translated into English (Kohn, 1940, p.69). The first English translation of part of Bible was started in 1525, and it was completed in 1538. Reading the Bible and having a better education contributed to the pride of the new aristocrats, clergy men and ordinary people, who felt dignity and self-respect in being English. People began to see that their destiny was linked to the destiny of their nation (Greenfeld, p.53). The people of England were freed from the domination of a Christian universal autonomy. Moreover, English

monasteries were removed and their property was confiscated and passed into the hands of the Crown and nobles, and this movement was supported by the parliament and bourgeoisie (Hill, p.26). Development of language and translation of Bible contributed to the improvement of English nationalism. Henry VIII nullified the authority of church and declared himself as the high authority of the English church in 1534 (Woodruff, 41-42). At last, Kohn (1940) summarized that people of England became more confident, and the authority of the Church and state was overcome by the liberty of the new Englishman. The English revolution was defined as a combination of Calvinist ethics and optimistic humanism (p.79). The Protestantism of the English people was regarded as the manifestation of true faith and manifestation of Englishness. This English position was observed as the nation's distinctiveness. English nationalism was defined through Protestantism and with the symbol of the virgin queen; it was not defined in ethnic terms. It was defined through the ideas of liberty and the equality of the individual (Greenfeld, pp.57, 62, 65).

Kohn (1971) asserted that the first modern nation was 17th century England. In the 17th century, man's liberty became the most important phenomenon and the authoritarian tradition based on Church and state started to erode. Kohn asserted that under Puritan influence the English nation regarded itself as the new Israel. Puritanism could be explained as advocation of purity of worship and doctrine. Puritans opposed much of the Calvinist summations in the Church of England, or the Anglican Church, and there were conflicts in distribution of power between the Parliament and the Crown. The King was on one side, and Puritans and Parliament on the other side, in this conflict (Kohn, 1971, p.16). One side claimed that the English Revolution was a Puritan Revolution and the other says it was a Bourgeoisie Revolution (1640-1660) (Ateş, 2004, p.68).

The Puritan Revolution began because of dissatisfaction of Elizabethan religious adjustments. Puritans were against the rituals and ecclesiastical courts and directions of the Book of Common Prayer and the Puritan Revolution brought two important elements to history: liberty of conscience and liberty of the subject. Cromwell proclaimed that "the free church demanded free state".

Kohn (1940) asserted that

> Cromwell identified the English people with Israel; English nationalism was born in the great decisive hour of its history by repeating the experience of the chosen people, of the covenant, of the battles fought for the Lord.

Moreover, it was believed that Cromwell's England fought for civilization and for liberty of all subjects, even Irishmen (p.90). Puritans attacked the bishops and insisted on the right of every one to read the Bible. Thus Puritanism insured reformation in the society (Greenfeld, p.72).

Charles I regarded himself as the sole representative of England and he collected taxes without the consent of the parliament. He was determined to make England a Roman Catholic country again. In 1640, the parliamentary forces headed by Oliver Cromwell began to fight against the king. Although Parliament was victorious in 1648, Cromwell did not gain the support of the majority of Englishmen. Cromwell believed that state should be ruled by virtuous man and was against all entertainment such as theatres, celebrations, and sports. The Civil War strengthened the power of the parliament and England became a constitutional monarchy.

In the Glorious Revolution, more rights were acquired including the supremacy of law over the King, the preponderance of Parliament in law-making, the impartiality of justice, the security of individual rights, the freedom of thought and press and religious tolerance (Kohn, 1971, pp.16-17). John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill believed that the nation and state were tied through liberty including the liberty of the individual and his right to choose his own government. The consent and free will of the individual constructed the English nation (Dawisha, p.14).

Liberty was political, religious and personal according to Milton. As Kohn (1971) stated, that new feeling of liberty was defined by John Milton:

> Nationalism was not the independence of alien yoke, it was the affirmation of individual freedom from authority, self-assertion of personality in the face of its

own government or church the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery and superstition with Puritan Revolution (pp.16-17)

Kohn (1971, 2005) and some other experts asserted that Britain as a good example of a "nation-state", however, as Knight (1982) indicated, four major cultural groups existed in this state, and they acquired different cultures within particular territories (p.518). During the English Civil War (1642-1651), it was claimed that patriotism and parliamentarianism were interlinked. The English Civil War was called a symbol legend of national identity and ethnic difference. The parliament supported Englishness and also the parliament had close ties with the Scots. The Celtic peoples of Wales and Cornwall, on the other hand, united with the king. However, a model army of the parliament excluded all the foreign soldiers, thus, the relationship of the Scots and the parliament was destroyed (Stoyle, 2000, pp.1113, 1117). Exclusion of foreign soldiers revealed that national feelings and national loyalty began to be an apparent phenomenon of England. Summarizing the issue of English nationalism, firstly, different alliances were formed, and then a new model army excluded foreigners. Secondly, parliaments' main role was considered as being the guardian of English liberties. Thirdly, parliament supported Protestantism. Protestantism was seen as having close ties with the concept of Englishness (Stoyle, pp.1115-1116).

Cornwall was added to England in the $10^{th}$ century, Wales in the middle ages and Wales was assimilated in the $16^{th}$ century. Since 1541, Ireland has been ruled as a separate kingdom. James I united the two crowns of Scotland and England. However, in the $17^{th}$ century, struggles and rebellions occurred in Scotland and Ireland. Therefore, Charles I lost the control of Scotland and Ireland. These losses caused the feeling of insecurity and national fears among the English people (Stoyle, 1115).

The Tudors were considered the pioneers of nascent English nationalism, and they strived for the emergence of a new entity, hence, the English began to feel themselves the common people of England; the chosen people. Kohn (2005) asserted that autocratic and aristocratic traditions and applications were weakened the well being of individual liberty. It was stated that the English Revolution was the synthesis of Calvinism and humanism; they demanded the creation of a truly Christian Commonwealth with a universal Protestant

policy. The Puritan Revolution converted the feeling of the common people into the feeling of a nation (Kohn, 2005, pp.165-166).

Tudor rulers inspired the Welsh to feel themselves esteemed partners of the English. The Tudors tried to change the Welsh feeling of being vassals of English and the term Britons was used to replace the term "Welsh". It was cited that Wales joined the English state; however, during the turmoil of coming war, suspicions were seen against Wales within England. Anti-Welsh attitudes were demonstrated and clear animosity was apparent among Welsh and English people during the Civil War. Also, the Cornish felt inferiority by comparing themselves with the natives of England. Unlike Wales, Cornish had a well-organized parliamentarian faction (Stoyle, pp.1118-1123).

The parliament supported the English nationalism and Englishness with a new model army. The King, on the other hand, was supported and protected by the Welsh, Cornish, Irish and Scots. The result of civil war was seen as the victory of the Parliament and the Parliament forcefully united England in 1645 (Stoyle, pp.1126-1128). Under the rule of Cromwell, England was managed without a king. After Cromwell's rule, there was a restoration period. The Bill of Rights was written in 1688. It is important to note that the consensus was established between bourgeoisie and feudal aristocracy. After the establishment of divisions of labor, the English nation-state emerged (Belge, 2006, p.19).

It should be taken into consideration that English people learned effective war-making. They developed banking and financial institutions, hence, the common people of England were not badly affected during the wars. The consumer-oriented economy, the self-confident middle class, the growth of religious toleration and a representative government were the features of England in the mid-18th century. There was apparent English national consciousness and patriotism. The growing class, the bourgeoisie, caused this national awakening. Moreover, the protestant rhetoric "God Save the King" militantly strengthened the Protestant culture (Breen, 1997, pp.16-20).

**2.4.1.1 Thomas Hobbes and the Leviathan**

Thomas Hobbes was an English political philosopher who lived from 1588 till 1679. He was seen as a transitory period philosopher during the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment (Kılıçbay, 2010, p.9).

It was stated that men were equal by nature. This equality could be harmful. Men could desire the same thing, and therefore, they could fight for it. As a result, they could be enemies. Hobbes explained this situation as equality turned to diffidence. Then, from this feeling of diffidence, war occurred. It was maintained that there were three causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence and glory (Hobbes, 1962, in Viotti & Kauppi, 1993, pp.94-96).

Hobbes declared that every citizen should give his rights to a supreme power which was called *Civitas*, Commonwealth, or *Leviathan*. This supreme power or supreme authority was the state. In the absence of the state, it was the state of nature. The state of nature was anarchy. It was determined that out of civil states, there was a war of everyone against everyone else. This was a self-help situation. Hobbes stated that there would be no art, no industry, no justice, no culture, no navigation, no science, no letters, no society. Therefore, he indicated that everybody would be frightened and they would also be poor, isolated, offensive and cruel. It was apparent that if there is no common power, there is no law, no injustice. Fraud and force would be the tools to be used in this position. Being fearful in the state of nature, human beings gave their rights to a commonwealth, *Leviathan* through contracts (Hobbes, pp.96-98).

Hobbes indicated that during the war of everyone against everyone else, there would be nothing which would be contrary to justice. Moreover, he added that in this situation, anyone who had power could possess property or sovereignty. Hobbes mentioned that justice and proprietorship began with the state (Hobbes, 2010, pp.99-103).

Economic changes of that time are really important. As Kılıçbay (2010) determined, capitalism developed and a national market was created. However, the remnants of feudalism were still visible (p.10). It is needed to appreciate the thoughts of Hobbes within the context of English political system of the late 16th and 17th centuries. *Leviathan* is an important work of art and it is a precious document of political thought. *Leviathan* advocated a strong ruler over a state. Subjects of this country give all of their rights to the ruler in order to be secure through the contract. Firstly, strong one man, namely a sovereign, monarch, king or ruler, was required. Secondly, subjects of this country give all of their rights to the ruler in order to be secured through their contract. Thirdly, through this contract men ensured their security, right of property, justice, freedom of commerce, ability to perform art, right to deal with industrial activities. Kılıçbay asserted that "Hobbes introduced national individualism which would be the first step of nation-state", and national individual was secured through a strong ruler in his own country which was limited with the boundaries of other states. The internal system of a state was turned from self-help, anarchical structure to a stable, peaceful structure. Thus, "everybody was an enemy of everybody else" was correct terminology outside the boundaries of state, the Commonwealth. This stable and peaceful state tries to protect the well-being of the state and also well-being of its citizens against outside states. In this sense, having one brilliant, powerful monarch having powers of all of its citizens was a necessity in order to protect the nation-state against others. Nationalism of that time required a strong ruler heading the state. Moreover, all the citizens of this nation-state needed to obey their ruler in order to be protected against the dangers of outside world. Kılıçbay maintained that through this system, the people saved themselves from feudal dependency links, Hobbes was against feudalism and the Church, the citizens began to depend on state, their state gave them security, welfare and identity. They began to live in a more precious place which was stable, peaceful, and comfortable. Their neighbors would not be potential threats or enemies. Their enemies would be outside the boundaries of their own state. As Kılıçbay mentioned, Leviathan was not a holy state but a utilitarian state, therefore Leviathan was the symbol of a secular state and an indicator of the closure of a period, namely the period of Medieval Holy Empires. It was mentioned by Kılıçbay that the cover picture of the book was an illustration of a huge king holding a sword, and this king had been crowned by

many people: he was the symbol of commonwealth, the community of citizens (pp.11-13), and thus, the king symbolized the state.

Hobbes stated that "…within this state, harmony is good health, faction is disease, and internal war is death" (Hobbes, 2010, p.17). Imagined state of Hobbes was envisaged as harmonious, peaceful and sheltered. It was illustrated as an umbrella protecting its citizens from outside enemies; moreover, internal quarrels are most dangerous phenomenon for the health of this state.

Hobbes (2010) cited that power of state was the collective powers of its citizens given with their own wills. Many things could be appreciated as power according to Hobbes. These were wealth associated with generosity, success, nobility, rhetoric, fame of being powerful and so on (p.73). The usage of power and the state was frequent in this work; there should be powerful state which was the conglomeration of many powers. Power was needed to put people together harmoniously.

It should not be forgotten that Hobbes (2010) mentioned will to power would never end, and he stated that the desire of maximization of power could only be ended after death, ordinary people tried to gain more power to have better life, kings tried to assure their power with good laws and wars (p.81). This understanding of Hobbes resembles that of Machiavelli, who also suggested good laws and good armies for the well-being of the state. Hobbes declared that the aim of the state was personal security, and added that this security could not be achieved with natural law. Hobbes claimed that without the fear of enforcement, human nature would cause bad results. Thus, all the contracts and agreements would be null and void, without enforcement (p.133).

Hobbes (1994) explained the generation of a commonwealth in Chapter 17 as

> The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or

assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will and their judgments, to his judgments. This more than consent, or concord, it is a real unity of them all, in one and same person made with covenant of every man with every man.

Hobbes called the united multitude in one man as Commonwealth, Civitas. Hobbes (1994) summarized that "…this is the generation of the great Leviathan, or rather of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defense." (p.109) Hobbes endeavor to give all the wills to one man to unite people was presented as early nationalism.

The main question is when the state established. Hobbes answered this question as,

A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all (that is to say, to be representative) every one, as well as he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves and protected against other men (Hobbes, 1994, p.110)

Thus, state was born with the contract made by majority, after it was established; all the people being proponent or hostile to it should obey the sovereign power. This obedience ensures the national unity.

Hobbes (1994) mentioned about three commonwealths; these were monarchy, democracy and aristocracy. He pointed out that if representative is one man, it is monarchy; when an assembly of all, it is democracy and lastly, if representative is assembly of a part, it is aristocracy (p.118). It should be taken into consideration that state had priority and supremacy over its subjects. Hobbes mentioned that liberty which was praised in ancient writings of Greeks and Romans was the liberty of sovereign not of the private men, thus the well-being and liberty of commonwealth was much more important than well-being and liberties of the individuals. In that sense, individuals could only be free with strong commonwealth. Absolute liberty could not be attained by men but by commonwealth. Hobbes briefly explained this as "*…The Athenians and Romans were free, that is, free

commonwealths, not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative, but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other people…", therefore, another evidence of nationalism of Hobbes is apparent in this passage, strong commonwealth held its subjects together against foreign states and this commonwealth tried to ensure stable internal structure to prevent resistance of its own subjects against itself. As Hobbes mentioned that sovereign power should be absolute in all commonwealths and also he added that subjects would not dispute the sovereign power in long-lived commonwealths (pp.135-140), thus, strong and uninterrupted obedience of subjects was essential for the protection against foreign attacks.

Hobbes (1994) is against the reading of Greek and Latin authors, he believed that they gave feeling of fake liberty, people by reading these authors, gained bad habits as loving turmoil and controlling the activities of sovereigns. These works of Ancient Greece and Rome taught that democracy is better than monarchy. In order to prevent resistance, Athenians living under democratic city-state were taught that they were free people; on the other hand, people living under monarchy were slaves. Hobbes indicated that Athenians advocated tyrannicide, or killing the tyrant (pp.140-141, 214-215). It is a harmful political thought that killing the tyrant could propose many problems for the commonwealth. The definition of a king and definition of the king becoming a tyrant are difficult. Reading of those books could cause the collapse of the state with the help of internal war.

### 2.4.2 American Nationalism

After Seven Years' Wars (1754-1763), the British Empire became the most important naval and imperial power. France lost North America. British crown tried to alleviate its burden resulted after long wars, new taxes were needed. American colonies were forced to pay more taxes. However, 13 American colonies were disturbed and insurgencies began. France helped American colonists. American independence movement began in 1774. The American colonies declared independence in 1776. Great Britain was obliged to accept the American independence in 1782. Sander stated that France helped in the American Revolution, hence, financial problems were seen in France after the American Revolution. Sander considered that these financial problems were influential in the emergence of the

French Revolution. It should be taken into consideration that American Revolution was a guide for Latin Americans, Asians and Africans in their independency movements. Sander mentioned that the Europeans learned that they could loose their colonies after the American Revolution (pp.114-115).

A loyalty to an entity is an important factor in studying nationalism. Throughout the history, loyalties have changed, firstly there was medieval feudal cohesiveness and secondly, there was collective loyalty to the nation. It should be noted that the feeling of loyalty for the mother country, the British Empire, was observed among American people. It was apparent among American Whigs and American Tories. Afterwards, this loyalty was ended for the Whigs with the independence; nonetheless, it continued to be influential in the feelings of the Tories. The consciousness of being different from the people living in mother country emerged among American people. Their loyalty to the mother country, the British Empire continued between the years 1763 and 1775 (Savelle, 1962, pp. 901-905).

The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776. It was the act of secession from the British Empire. It was stated by Savelle that this act did not create an American nation. People revealed their loyalty to their provincial lands e.g. Virginia or South Carolina. Afterwards, Americans became conscious of their heroic past and their own culture as well as of the English traditions. It was stated that the war years of 1766-1783 was regarded as the period of emergence of American nationalism (pp. 914,918, 923).

The American people did not have feudal past, aristocracy as English and French people. People migrating to the US wanted to acquire more religious freedom and economic prosperity. They were active and mobile people. The American people have been together not because of national unity and integrity but because of liberalism, federalism and locality. Belge (2006) mentioned that Republicans were advocating locality, and Democrats were advocating federalism (pp.20-21).

## 2.4.3 French Nationalism

The age of Reason or the age of Rationalism was the political thought of 17th century. Deductive method and skepticism were used by Descartes in the age of Reason. Descartes was skeptical about the existence of the God. The other important philosophers of the age of reason were Spinoza and Leibniz. They believed that all the knowledge could be gained by the Reason, they gave importance to mathematics. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were very influential on French Revolution. Philosophers of the Enlightenment era were aristocrats; the leaders and intellectuals of French Revolution, on the other hand, they were coming from the middle classes. The philosophers of the Enlightenment used the inductive method; Locke and Newton were significant intellectuals of that time. Being inconformity with the nature was proposed. The terminology like good nature, good God and good human were being used (Öğün, 2000, pp.1-4).

Dealing with French nationalism, identity of French person should be explained. The consciousness of being French belonged to elites. Being French was firstly understood and expressed by French clerics. Initially, French identity was religious. The ministry of Richelieu (1585-1642) was turning point in explaining French identity. During his ministry, the religious identity of French turned to French identity defined with the notion of state. Religious loyalty to the Catholic Church reverted to the loyalty to the king. Richelieu was a Catholic clergyman, noble and King's chief minister. His main aim was to strengthen the royal power. He repressed the nobility. He tried to prevent the Habsburg dynasty from becoming a supreme power in the international system. Therefore, he allied with Protestant German rulers to overcome the Habsburg Empire. Afterwards, this loyalty to the king was replaced by nationalization of French identity in the 1780s (Greenfeld, pp.91, 133).

In the twelfth and thirteenth century, the French king was identified as the most Christian king. There was an idea of a chosen king and kingdom of France by God. Divine election of king was apparent and being French was identified as being a good Christian. In the 14th century, loyalty to the king was observed. Afterwards, the French language was reversed

and French law and institutions were become widespread. As Greenfeld stated, French people acquired cultural and institutional characteristics and became a people whose existence was not identical with the royalty (pp.92-97).

Greenfeld explained that the French language was an important indicator of French nationalism. It was stated that the French of Paris was considered as the language of upper classes and in the twelfth century those who did not know French were called "barbarians". Moreover, French was used at the courts of England, Germany and Flanders. French was used in all official deeds in the sixteenth century (pp.98-99).

French patriotism was defined with loyalty to the king in the sixteenth century. It was evident that monarchs of France began to free themselves from the authority of Rome in the seventeenth century. Cardinal Richelieu believed the *reason of the state* which provides a set of behaviors for leaders in conducting state affairs to ensure the survival and the security of the state (Greenfeld, pp.103-104, 113).

The employment of new officers who were loyal to the king was a precious new development in the evolution of French nationalism. It was stated that forty thousand new officers who were commoners were employed in the beginning of the 17th century. It is important to indicate that nobility became a marginal unwanted minority in the 1780s. Moreover, the nobility was turning to financial revenue. The title of being noble began to be sold and ennoblement continued. Sometimes, the title was removed and sold again (Greenfeld, pp.122-123, 141). Greenfeld explained that the aristocracy lost its prestige and perceived itself as degraded and they became sympathetic to the idea of the people as the bearers of sovereignty (p.154).

The process of unification of France was begun under the reign of Louis XI (1461-1483). Henry IV (1533-1610) created a unified French state, ended wars of religion, abrogated Protestantism and replaced it with Catholicism. Moreover, France was strengthened in the 17th century by the French kings Louis XIII and Louis XIV. Renan accepted the preeminent position of French kings creating a French nation. The French nation was created by the French state. Rousseau pointed out that the government and the system of

law created the nation. He mentioned that the consent of the people is essential in the creation of a nation. He gave great importance to the primary education which could unite people and ensure loyalty to the fatherland (Dawisha, pp.12-14, 18-19).

The social contract explained that a state of nature no longer existed. Rousseau was against representation, and explained sovereignty as the authority of the collective being which was the state. The peasants were under great pressure from the landlords. There was a corrupt, unstable political system. Taxes were high and a huge percentage of them were stolen by the officials. There was a great gap between the rich and the poor. It should be taken into consideration that the middle class of France was represented in States General and it was inefficient and was not convened for a long time. The middle class of France included doctors, teachers, lawyers and merchants who were very angry about the situation. The church and nobles were rich and they were not paying taxes. The king met with States General, and representatives of the middle class demanded that the king should rule the state through the parliament. Nonetheless, the poor people were encouraged to revolt against the government. Hence, they attacked Bastille prison. The revolutionaries killed nobles; however, they could not build a stable and democratic government. The poverty, violence and instability continued. At last, a new dictator, Napoleon Bonaparte, came to power in 1802. He fought many wars against other European powers and brought the ideas of "liberty, equality and fraternity". Old empires were influenced badly and they opposed the ideas of French Revolution and defeated Napoleon in 1814. The Concert of Europe which was convened in 1815 tried to protect empires from collapsing and shattering into nation-states (Sander, pp.118-128).

It was claimed that liberal English nationalism influenced France. As it was cited, France was the most influential country of Europe in that time and French became the universal language. French thinkers introduced English liberal thoughts to French politics. As Kohn pointed out, there was an authoritarian and absolutist government in France. Thereby, English constitutional liberalism and limited government had some impacts on French political thought. Thus, it was claimed that the absolutist sovereignty of the French king was replaced by an absolutist sovereignty of the people with the French Revolution. Rousseau became the most important figure in this process by introducing the term "social

contract" which was concluded by the governments and the people. It was expressed that nationalism of French Revolution brought about the idea of the duty of citizen by participating in political life and its complete union with the nation-state. In assessing the process, patriotism and national will were the key words of French nationalism. It was also pointed out that this new nationalism coincided with industrialism and popular education. Moreover, it was articulated that although Napoleon, who was in power, was not a nationalist, he was the most significant figure of new French nationalism. Furthermore, it was also expressed that Germans, Italians, Spaniards and Russians did not learn from the French Revolution but from Napoleon. Most importantly, they learned that nationalism was not a tool of individual liberty but an expression of collective power. However, it also stated that this English influence on political life was much more apparent in American nationalism in 1775 than French politics (Kohn, 1971, pp.18-29). The main indicator and fundamental reason of the French Revolution could be explained by saying that the bourgeoisie was strengthened with the increase of foreign trade numbers five times during 1718-1789; they wanted to acquire political privileges after becoming rather wealthy (Sander, p.119).

Nationalism then spread to the whole of Europe. The French Revolution removed the feudal relations within Europe. Napoleon encouraged many nations to revolt against their imperial authorities by sending his agents. The thoughts of Rousseau were very influential in the emergence of the French Revolution. Emergence of nation-states, the removal of class divisions, secularization of churches, the principle of self-determination, systemization of education, national loyalty to nation-state, and increase of the terms like fatherland, national flag were observed after the revolution (Oba, 1994, pp.28-29). It was apparent that the leaders of French Revolution gave great focus to the role of education; they believed that the language could connect the people of a nation and the fatherland (Dawisha, p.19).

France had a much more powerful feudal aristocracy than England. Aristocrats did not want to pay taxes. Burke supported the American Revolution but he was against the French revolution. France could not establish a stable state system; consensus between different social strata could not be established. Belge alleged that industrialization was apparent

especially after the 1760s. French, American and English nationalisms did not emerge due to the aims of establishing nation-states. All of them were against monarchy (Belge, pp.24-27).

## 2.4.4 German Nationalism

Italian and German nationalisms were different from these mentioned three nationalisms. German Junkers were feudal landlords and soldiers at the same time. They needed the establishisment of a nation-state. Zollverein, the economic union, was founded among 36 German states in 1830, but some of the states did not participate in this economic union. There had been a militant nationalism within Germany rather than an economic one. Italian nationalism, on the other hand, was based on economy even if it had a weak bourgeoisie. Thoughts of French nationalism were favored in Italy but not in Germany. Italy tried to open its economy to foreign investment and tried to ally itself with France and Germany, and they sent soldiers to Crimea (Belge, pp.29-31).

In the 18th century, the French Revolution influenced the intellectual life of Germany, Italy and Russia. It should be taken into consideration that the new nationalism did not penetrate deeply into the life of common people. It was popular among intellectuals (Kohn, 1971, p.38) There has been an approach that the idea of nationalism did not influence the unification process, however the Napoleonic wars, conquests and defeats influenced the political life. Breuilly asserted that Austria revealed greater resistance in the Napoleonic wars because there had been the Holy Roman Empire which was dissolved in 1806. Moreover, as stated by Breuilly, the German Confederation which included Prussia and Austria was a much more effective institution than the Holy Roman Empire. The Holy Roman Empire formed the political culture of German states. Breuilly (1994) indicated that nationalism was a product of national unification rather than its cause. He added that like in Italian lands, Napoleon diminished the numbers of German states which ensured the efficient and easy administration of German states. The geographic position of Germany was important; it was between two great powers, France and Russia. Thus, this provided some kind of national sentiment (pp.96-100).

Reactionary actions against Napoleon's imperialism developed a new understanding of nationalism. Germans ended the invasion of Napoleon. National consciousness of Germans emerged in the beginning of the 18th century; the Napoleonic wars were very influential in the birth of German nationalism. The main characteristic of German national identity was based on an educated common people and professional intellectuals. The reformation, German pietism and Romanticism had significant impacts on the evolution of German nationalism. The Reformation could be defined as achievement of a foundation of Protestantism and separation from the Roman Catholic Church (Greenfeld, pp.277-283, 293).

The cities were growing and becoming wealthy, and the Reformation period could be called the "burghers" age. Moreover, in the end of the fourteenth century, many universities were founded. These universities trained clergyman, and educated ordinary people, not just the nobles. Law was another science which was attractive for the people. Educated people, lawyers and officials replaced the nobility. These educated people acquired land and they became territorial princes at the end of the fifteenth century. It is important to mention that the religious wars of the Reformation period resulted with the disintegration of the German people. German nationalism was identified with the middle class. The German middle class was comprised of bourgeoisie and secular intellectuals (Greenfeld, pp.280-281).

Greenfeld summarized the characteristics of German national consciousness. Firstly, it was against the western, capitalist world. Secondly, modern man was considered as fragmented and alienated from society. Thirdly, she mentioned that true individuality could be acquired through collectivity. Fourthly, it was determined that the transformation of society could be accomplished through war. Lastly, the intellectuals of the society were regarded as the main realizers of this transformation project (pp.386-387).

Germans initiated a nationalism which was against humanist and liberal approaches. Bismark built a strong army. Prussia defeated Austria in the Battle of Sadowa in 1866 and Bismark called all German states to come together against France. German states came

together; France was defeated by Prussia in the battle of Sedan. However, in 1871, all German states were united to form a unified German state.

Herder stated that folklore, folk songs and traditions were important and they were the basis of German nationalism. Herder and Fichte, the theorists of German nationalism were influenced by German romanticism. They gave importance to feelings and emotions. Bismark used conservative and authoritarian methods and he ignored liberalism (Oba, pp.29-30).The center of the Enlightenment was France; the center of Romanticism was Germany (Öğün, p.6). It should be stated that German Romantics did not have a political agenda to ensure the foundation of German nation-state (Özkırımlı, p.34).

Romanticism was defined as a movement against the age of reason and the ideas of the French Enlightenment.  Romanticism was shaped in the second half of the 18th century. The rationalists gave importance to reason and rational thoughts, The Romantics, on the other hand, gave importance to the emotions and inner feelings. German romantics formulated a cultural nationalism which focused on the concept of *volk* which was developed by Herder. *Volk* could be defined as metaphysical entity having common language, art, culture, traditions and religion. Herder explained the cultural nationalism of that time as two thousand separate territories, most of them were tiny and domains of other powers. Although English and French people had a unified state, the unified state of the Germans did not exist. Therefore, when Germans praised their ethnic and linguistic features and, as Dawisha stated, defined their nation by existence, it was natural. This was declared primordialism in the theory of nationalism. Germans adored their original and pure ethnic identity which was not mixed with alien people or hybrid. The cultural nationalists, the primordialists advocated the role of the state in educating the masses. This program of education was to construct patriotism and nationalism by teaching history (Dawisha, pp.7-10. 20).

Hans Kohn (1971) dealt with Herder. He articulated that according to Herder, folk songs and folklore were the affective factors of nationalism. Herder claimed that nationality was not political and biological but a spiritual and moral concept. It was stated that he actually hated Prussian nationalism and desired Russian rule. Moreover, he had sympathy towards

Slavs and the consciousness of Slav intellectuals. He pointed out that each nationality was a manifestation of the divine. He proposed that true nationalism would promote the cause of people (pp.30-32).

Looking from the perspective of primordialists, language was the essential tool to connect the people. The cultural nationalists have regarded language as the expression of conscience and spirit of a nation (Dawisha, pp.16-17). Herder stated that language is the most important factor in defining humans. He believes that communities were created by nature. In that case, they should not be mixed forcefully. He articulates that language reflects the natural soul and language should be purified of foreign words. He tried to realize his views by stating that the German language should be saved from harmful effects of Latin language (Özkırımlı, pp.38-39).

Herder stated that humanity resembled a mosaic. He believed that God created humanity as nations. Hence, he claimed that it was beneficial and efficient to live as cultural communities divided into us and others. He mentioned that the idea of universalism should be abrogated. Moreover, he claimed that nations were not racial or biological, but cultural entities. Fichte determined that a common language was the dominant factor of being members of a particular nation (Öğün, pp.16-18).

Herder articulated that violence and revolutions filled history. He stated that diversity was created by God. God had scattered men all over the world. In that sense, all men should have a chance to live and realize themselves in their own individual, peculiar way. As Kedourie (1996) stated, French revolutionaries mentioned that a nation meant a number of individuals who had signified their will as to the manner of their government. In that sense, a nation became a natural division of human race, endowed by God with its own character, which its citizens must preserve in its pure and inviolable character. Thus, it could be observed that God had separated the nations and they should not be amalgamated. Herder stated that the Empire of the Ottomans and the Grande Mogul were corrupt states which comprised a multitude of nations while the states of China, of the Brahmins, and of the Jews were wholesome states (pp.48-52).

Herder strongly supported speaking German rather than French. In his essay called "the Treatise upon the Origin of the Language" he rejected the view that each language was the creation of God but claimed that language was a product of the rational faculty. Language was described as a living amalgam in which things and happenings were combined with the emotions which they arouse in man. Consequently, in this theory, the world was seen as a world of diversity and humanity was divided into nations. Language was seen an important tool to distinguish one nation from another. According to Fichte and Herder's views, it was stated that people who spoke an original language were nations and nations had to speak an original language (Kedourie, pp.53-61).

In the beginning, Fichte (1762-1814) suggested in his *Staatlehre* in 1813 that Christianity would ensure supra-national goal of human history. Primarily, he believed that French people would ensure absolute freedom and rational morality. However, afterwards, he stated that this role was transferred to Germans. Fichte was not regarded as a nationalist in the beginning. His philosophy was based on the creation of a universal new order. He believed that mankind was one in spirit and should become one in reality. Kohn asserted that the patriotism of Fichte could be identified as cosmopolitan patriotism. Fichte began to consider that the leadership of this cosmopolitanism could be done by Germans. After the occupation of Berlin by French troops, he abandoned the rational liberalism which was taught him by Kant. Investigating modern European civilization, Fichte concluded that this civilization was established by Latin and Germanic people. Among these people, Germans preserved their original language while others could not preserve their mother tongue. Hence, he mentioned that French, Italian, English and Spanish tongues had changed; Germans, having the true culture, were the sole power to accomplish historical movements. Fichte indicated that the French nation would be unable to create a perfect state because only a nation which solved its education problems could establish a perfect state. He alleged that Germans, having original language and history, were superior to the French and could form the perfect and ideal state. Fichte avowed that Germans had the potential to lead Europe and the world (Kohn, 1949, pp.323-325, 333-337).

Fichte stated that the state is more important than the individual. Understanding of organic nationalism was presented by Fichte. Fichte determined that a common language was the

dominant factor of being members of a particular nation (Öğün, p.18). Fichte gave importance to individual liberty and he admired France. However, his views began to be changed during French-Prussian war of 1806. From this war on, he began to support German Nationalism. He divided humanity accordingly into believers of individual liberty and those who did not believe individual liberty (Özkırımlı, pp.36-37).

Kohn (1971) stated that in the years between 1852 and 1878, the ideology of nationalism was supported by capitalism and industrialism. A growing middle class changed the social and political life of central Europe. As Kohn explained, Friedrich List was a German immigrant to the US who returned to Germany as US consul and opposed the cosmopolitan theory of political economy which was practiced in England as free trade. List wanted to see a "national system of economy". He advocated a Customs Union, *Zollverein.* He said that high tariffs were needed to ensure Germany's rapid industrialization. Germany's main competitor was Britain. Railroads should be developed and the German navy should be strengthened**.** List was not supported by his own people, however, his views were applied in France under Napoleon III (p.54). The Customs Union encouraged economic nationalism (Breuilly, 101).

Friedrich List pointed out that the essential requirements of a normal nationality were a large population, extensive territory and various national resources. Initially, the principle of nationalism could be applied to entities having proper size. Mazzini and Mill did not see Ireland as an appropriate candidate for independence. Mazzini, by shaping the European map, illustrated the "threshold principle". He mentioned ten nations or federations. Both thoughts of Mazzini and Mill did not resemble Wilson's principle of self-determination. They considered that self-determination could be applied only to culturally and economically viable nations (Hobsbawm, 2003, pp.29-32).

Biological nationalism is based upon natural tribalism, which is based upon ancestry and blood. Arthur de Gobineau firstly systematized the new biological nationalism in his *Essai sur l'ineagalite des races humanies (1853-55).* He stated that blood was of supreme importance. He believed that human races were unequal in creative ability. Moreover, anti-semitism was manifested in the racial theory of Continental Europe. It was claimed that

anti-semitism reflected rejection of both the individualism and liberalism. Furthermore, in World War I, 20 years after the first Congress of Jewish people, Arthur Balfour, on behalf of the British government, promised to establish a national home in Palestine. Due to Hitler's anti-semitism after 1933, many European Jews began to look for refuge in Palestine. Gobineau's racial theory was not generally accepted by French intellectuals but supported and used by German intellectuals. Richard Wagner devoted great efforts to the spread of anti-semitism. Heinrich von Treitsche published an article in 1879, the main idea of which was that the Jews were their own misfortune. Kohn stated that Germany became the fatherland of modern anti-semitism (Kohn, 1971, pp.73-78).

## 2.4.5 Italian Nationalism

The impact of Napoleonic wars was essential for the growth of Italian nationalism. Breuilly (1994) stated that Napoleon created a national identity by establishing the Kingdom of Italy. Moreover, it was mentioned that Napoleon reorganized the Italian lands and limited the number of Italian states which eased their administration. He added that, like German nationalism, unification of Italy brought about Italian nationalism (pp.96-99). Piedmont gained its independence from Austria in 1848. The prime minister of Piedmont, Count Cavour, did not want to liberate all Italian states. He struggled against Austria and the Papacy. He encouraged nationalism and received help from France, Prussia and Britain. Piedmont helped Prussia in its battle against Austria. Rome was saved after the Prussian-French war and the unification of Italy was achieved.

Mazzini believed that Europe was divided into distinct nationalities and the evolution of a number of nation-states which were the will of God and the will of the people. Both Austrian pressure and Napoleonic invasions were influential in the emergence of Italian unification and afterwards of Italian nationalism (Breuilly, pp.102-103).

Kohn (1971) mentioned that Mazzini was the leader of Young Italy which was "the secret raising of the masses". He supported a united, centralized and strong nation. It was important to note that Mazzini believed the Italian Revolution would go far beyond the French Revolution. He believed that Italians could bring a positive message for the new

age and establish that unity which was brought twice to the world. He supported a third and greater Rome. Afterwards, many secret revolutionary organizations were founded, such as Young Europe, Young Turks and Young China (pp.40-41). He tried to cooperate with the middle classes and legitimize his conquests through parliamentary resolutions and plebiscites. Bismark, on the other hand, hated western liberalism and parliamentary constitutionalism. He gave the upper hand to the king and army rather than parliament and the people. Kohn also asserted that Bismark was a Prussian monarchist, not a German nationalist. Moreover, it should also be pointed out that after the unification of Italy and Germany, many nationalist uprisings were seen in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire (p.61).

It was known that there were 3 monarchies: the Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, and Austria- Hungarian Empire. There were 3 dominant nationalities: Russians, Germans and Turks. It should be remembered that between 1815 and 1918, national insurgencies surged as people started to acquire independence from dynasties. Thereby, in 1918, the Russian, Austrian, Prussian and Ottoman dynasties lost their powers. It should be noted that Mazzini and the Young Europe movement expected that there would be international peace. However, many wars occurred. Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) revealed national sentiment after Napoleonic wars and national movements of Magyars, Czechs, Croats, Romans and Ukranians were seen (Kohn, 1971, pp.45-48).

As Kohn (1971) explained, this new nationalism stressed collective power and unity above individual liberty. It could be claimed that observing nationalism, we can conclude that in the middle of the 19th century, an evolution from liberal humanitarianism to aggressive exclusivism was seen. In that sense, it was expressed that individual liberty and constitutional guarantees were used to realize nationalist aspirations. John Stuart Mill criticized the events of 1848. He stressed that nationalism made man indifferent to the rights and interests of people. In that sense, many conflicts were witnessed between Poles and Prussians, Danes and Germans, Czechs and Germans, Croats and Italians. Therefore, it could be articulated that nationalist struggles strengthened Metternichian system (p.50-53).

## 2.5 Evaluation of the Emergence and Development of Nationalism

Although Ancient Greece was not regarded as a sample of nationalism, it could easily be considered as an influential phenomenon in modern nationalism. The striking fact was that the rhetoric of a chosen people and institutionalized will of citizenry were evident in Ancient Greece. Eventually, Athenians saw themselves as a part of a Hellenic cultural community and adhered to the ideals of Athenian citizens, their common ancestors and their nationalist myths (Roshwald, 2008, p.652). Therefore, it could be claimed that Ancient Greece was a model of cultural unity and guide for future nationalisms and modern states through the history. Focusing on Ancient Greece, it could be presumed that there were three important contributions of Ancient Greece which aided in the process of becoming a nation and understanding the nationalism: adherence to the community, holding the common ancestors in esteem and paying respect to the national myths.

Taking into consideration the middle ages, the idea of a community of mankind which could also be called either universalism or cosmopolitanism was apparent in the political thought. As noted, the middle ages were envisaged as the ages of empires. Hence, the religious regulations and institutions were powerful in that time. As a consequence, the *Respublica Christiana* became the significant power center. The Papacy was considered as the supreme umbrella over the Europeans. Its religious authority was divine and exerted a cohesive political authority over people. Summarizing this long political process, the period from the eleventh century till the end of the Hundred Years Wars could be called an "era of political turmoil and instability" in Europe. It is evident that there were four political authorities at that time; the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy, national monarchies, feudal lords, and the nascent city-states (Sander, p.57; Greenfeld, pp.44-53;Hill, pp.25-47, Kohn 1972; Kohn,1940).

The striking fact was that the idea of nationalism was developed in the Renaissance and the Reformation periods. Active, self-confident individuals of the Renaissance period emerged in the city-states. Most importantly, the political authority of the Respublica Christiana lost its supremacy over its subjects with the influence of the Protestant Reformation. The

Renaissance was characterized by the diminishing authority of the church and increasing authority of science. The culture of modern times was secular rather than depending on the authority of religious people. It was contended that medieval philosophy was based on Christianity. The Catholic Church was the common property of the whole Christian world. There was a common Latin language and a common culture. In the Renaissance, there were plural cultural systems, artists were free and the art began to be identified with the names of their artists. Machiavelli aimed to form a unified Italian state. It was apparent that after the defeat of the emperor and the pope, universal medieval political conception disappeared, and individual Italian city-states enjoyed republicanism. Thus, losing ties to medieval world-state, they became self-sufficient, autonomous states. These city-republics having bourgeoisie-capitalist structure, realized world-wide economic expansion. The striking fact is that the bourgeoisie class was needed for the formation of a nation-state. Machiavelli stressed the necessity of an absolute ruler, good armies and good laws. Moreover, Machiavelli suggested the liberation of Italy from barbarians: in other words, the expulsion of foreigners from Italy. He emphasized that Italy needed its own army. He was against the Church, and he believed that the Church disarmed the country and made it weak. In light of this, it was relevant that the Church relied on mercenary arms and this ruined Italy. Thus, it was stated that the Church and Christianity were founded guilty of both the problems of Italy and the modern state (Scott & Sullivan, pp.887-900).

These results could be interpreted by explaining that Machiavelli supported a secular state independent of any religious or moral sanction. Most importantly, the Renaissance consolidated the emergence of new centralized states. Hence, the absolute monarchies came onto the scene which in turn became the core of modern nation-states. The Reformation promoted the religious and linguistic pluralism of modern times. In those times, reading the Bible and translating it strengthened national languages (Machiavelli, 1977).

Between the $10^{th}$ to $15^{th}$ centuries, world trade developed and a capitalist economic system emerged. Consequently, there was an apparent transition from the economic system of city-states to a central economy. The striking dimension of the issue was that mercantilism emerged due to a rise in prices. The main aim of mercantilism was to limit importation of

manufactured goods and exportation of raw materials. Governments began to ban the importation of any goods other than raw materials. Thence, mercantilism helped the emergence of nation-states in Europe (Sander, pp.69-70).

It is evident that the Westphalian Peace Treaty signed after the Thirty Years Wars (1618-1648) was influential in emergence of nation-states. Evidently, the Westphalian system was considered as the cornerstone in recognition of separate sovereign states. Kohn (1972) asserted that the first modern nation was that of 17th century England. In the 17th century, the liberty of man became the most important phenomenon, and the authoritarian tradition which was on based on Church and state began to decline. English nationalism was represented by a centralized and parliamentary government. It is evident that the decline of villeinage, the limitation of royal power, the ending of slavery, the emergence of industrial society and being a commercial empire prevented the intervention by foreign powers in the internal affairs of England, thus contributing factors in the development of English nationalism. Highlighting English nationalism, the striking fact was that a new mobile aristocracy came on the scene and this dynastic change was beneficial for the middle class. The economic wel-lbeing, self-confidence, emancipation from the authority of the Christianity, development of language and translation of the Bible all contributed to the improvement of English nationalism. English nationalism was defined by Protestantism and with the symbol of the Virgin Queen, but it was not defined in ethnic terms.

Considering American nationalism, the American people did not have feudal past, so, in that sense, people migrating to the US wanted to acquire more religious freedom and economic prosperity. It was alleged that the American people joined together not because of national unity and integrity but because of liberalism, federalism and regionalism. It is clear that the French Revolution changed the feudal relations within Europe. Strikingly, Napoleon encouraged many nations to revolt against their imperial authorities by sending his agents. The thoughts of Rousseau were very influential on the French Revolution. The emergence of nation-states, the removal of class divisions, secularization of churches, the principle of self-determination, systemization of education, national loyalty to nation-states, and an increase of terms like fatherland and national flag were apparent after the revolution (Oba, p.27-28). France had a much more powerful feudal aristocracy than

England. Aristocrats did not want to pay taxes. It should be emphasized that French, American and English nationalisms did not emerge due to the goals of establishing nation-states. Nonetheless, all of them were against the monarchy (Belge, p.27).

Considering German nationalism, it could be noted that the national consciousness of the Germans was emerged in the beginning of the 18$^{th}$ century with the help of the Napoleonic wars. The German national identity was based on an educated common people and professional intellectuals. The Reformation, German pietism and Romanticism had significant impacts on the evolution of German nationalism. The Reformation could be defined as the combination of a foundation of Protestantism and separation from the Roman Catholic Church (Greenfeld, pp.280-281). It should be underlined that, while the English and French both had unified states, the unified state of the Germans did not exist. Therefore, Germans praised their ethnic and linguistic features and defined their nation by its mere existence. In other words, it was identified as natural. This approach was called primordialism in the theory of nationalism. Friedrich List opposed the cosmopolitan theory of political economy which was practiced in England as free trade. List wanted to see a "national system of economy". He advocated the use of a Customs Union (Zollverein). It was emphasized that high tariffs were needed to ensure Germany's rapid industrialization.

It is worth mentioning that Napoleon helped create the national identity of the Italians by establishing the Kingdom of Italy. Moreover, it was mentioned that Napoleon reorganized the Italian lands and limited the number of Italian states which eased their administration. Therefore, it could be stated the unification of Italy brought about Italian nationalism (Breuilly, 96-99).

Liah Greenfeld (1992) stated that nationalism has been the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty and the basis of collective solidarity. She asserted that nationalism settled the source of nationalism within a people. She explained that the word "*nation*" defined group of foreigners in Roman Empire. *Nation* meant a community of opinion in medieval universities. *Nation* meant elite in Church councils. At last, *nation* meant a sovereign people within England. Greenfeld alleged the nation means a unique people today (pp.3-9).

Greenfeld claimed that the modern idea of a nation first emerged in $16^{th}$ century England. She mentioned that civic nationalism was born in England and then exported to the US. Afterwards, collectivist nationalism was seen in France and Russia in the $18^{th}$ century and it was seen in German principalities in the $19^{th}$ century. France revealed the mixture of collectivist and civic nationalism. However, it was added that ethnic nationalism also developed in Russia and Germany (pp.13-15).

# 3. THE THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

Yael Tamir (1995) defined nationalism as a community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, exclusivity as well as common ancestry and a continuous genealogy. He pointed out that members of such a community were aware not only that they shared these feelings and beliefs, but that they had an active interest in the preservation and well-being of their community (p.425). War has been regarded as most significant indicator of identity. Poulton (2006) indicated that religious communities formed imagined communities before the advent of nationalism (pp.8-9).

An ethnicity was defined as a group of people with shared cultural identity and spoken language. Hastings (1997) defined that the nation was a more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. He mentioned that a nation was formed of one or more ethnicities. A nation was identified with a literature, it possessed political identity, it controlled specific territory. On the other hand, the nation-state presented a bond among the state and the citizens, and there was an identity of character between state and people. Nationalism divided into two parts; theoretically, each nation should have its own state. The practice of nationalism was defined in the sense that ethnic and national tradition should be protected at almost any cost (pp.3-4).

Sieyes defined nation as a body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature (Kedourie, 1996, p.7). Ernest Renan (1939) described the nation as the daily plebiscite (cited in Poulton, p.4). Mazzini and Anthony Smith argued about the largeness of a nation to be called as a nation (Poulton, p.4). Poulton mentioned that nationalism was used by elites as a method to overcome the backwardness of the nation. He also stated that nationalism was about belonging. There has been perception of a group and the others. In that sense, Frederick Barth mentioned that groups defined themselves not in reference to their characteristics but in comparison to strangers (p.7).

Immanuel Wallerstein explained the world system theory, and defined world economies and world empires. His most important contribution was the explanation of core, periphery and semi-periphery states. It was stated that redistribution of resources from peripheral areas to the central core area was done by a centralized political system. There was not a single center of political authority in a world economy. As Lenin stated, the dominant core exploited a less developed periphery (Hobden & Jones, 2005, pp.231-234). Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out that nation, race and ethnicity were the parts of the pivotal division of labor within an international context. He mentioned that the bourgeoisie used the organs of state to satisfy its own interests. Wallerstein asserted that the bourgeoisie had used nationalism to strengthen itself against foreigners in the international market and to protect its place in the internal market. Moreover, he claimed that every core state used nationalism to legitimize its place in the international system. Furthermore, he determined that there were anti-bourgeoisie nationalist movements in periphery states (Roger, 2008, p.52).

Ernst Haas (1986) articulated that nationalism posed an "elephant problem". The "elephant problem" could be defined as the perception of the animal's appearance seems to differ depending on where it is touched by a group of blind persons. Haas cited that Dudley Seers defined nationalism as a type of economic policy. He indicated that Benedict Anderson defined nationalism with manufactured linguistic identity. Anthony Smith considered nationalism to be a particular ideology of solidarity based on preindustrial roots. Haas stated that Ernest Gellner treated that phenomenon as a distinctly industrial principle of social evolution and social organization. Haas defined nation as a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing them to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state. He pointed out that these individuals shared collective consciousness of uniqueness that was fostered by the group's sharing of core symbols. He cited that a nation was a group of people who wished to practice self-determination. He defined that nationalism was a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation. He pointed out that nationalism was a doctrine of social solidarity based on the characteristics and symbols of nationhood (pp.707, 726-727).

Rabindranath Tagore (1917) described the nation as political and economic union of a people. He mentioned that if the nation became all the powerful at the cost of harmony of the higher social life, it was an evil day for humanity. He indicated that an abstract being, the nation, was ruling India. He claimed that the governors did not know their language, and they did not care about individuals. Tagore proposed that individuals were not an abstraction, they were living creatures. He dealt with the governance of the British nation in India. He mentioned that the West was necessary to the East. He avowed that they were complementary and both could learn different aspects of the truth. He mentioned that they were suffering from the conflict between the spirit of the West and the nation of the West. He determined that the spirit of conflict and conquest was at the centre of the Western nationalism (pp.19-33).

Anthony Giddens (1994) stated that a nation could only exist when a state had a unified administrative reach over the territory. He explained the development of a plurality of nations was a basic to the centralization and administrative expansion of state domination internally. It was mentioned that fixing of borders depended on the reflexive ordering of a state system. He summarized nation state as a bordered power-container which involved urban transformation, internal pacification of states. Thus, he alleged that the nation-state was a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with borders. He stated that its rule was sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence (pp.34-35). Giddens (2008) distinguished modern and traditional societies. He alleged that historical materialism explained the relationship of production with traditional and modern states. Giddens added that gathering of information and storage of this information was also important. He maintained that there was a difference between industrialism and capitalism. He proposed that traditional states were scattered, members of political institutions would not rule the state. He mentioned that the concept of sovereignty from the period of absolutism was regarded as a founding element of the modern state. The development of nation-states assumed the dissolution of urban/rural relations, and rise of administrative arrangements. Nation-states were regarded as polyarchic. Moreover, nation-states existed within an international system. He mentioned that both capitalism and industrialism influenced the emergence of nation-states but the international system could not be explained through

this. The war industry accompanied with the rise of nation-states. He regarded globalization as the dissemination of nation-states. Giddens identified modernity with capitalist entrepreneurship, industrial production and central control of tools of violence (pp.7-13).

Giddens (2008) stated that absolutism caused the secessions in European continent. Congress diplomacy was witnessed in seventeenth century with the Westphalian Treaty. Spanish power was regarded as an international power in the 15th and 16th century, Spanishs were ruling Holy Roman Empire, Napoli, Sicily, Milano, Habsburg region. In 17th century, Spanish Armada was failed and British became supreme naval power. China was important power in 11th and 13th centuries by acquiring big armies, modern armament and gun powder. It was important naval power in 15th century. Giddens stated that energizing factor for the rise of absolutism by administrative sources and increase of financial organization was war and preparation to a war. The most important point in *the Nation-State and Violence* was the development of sovereignty of nation-state that based on reactive relations among nations. He mentioned that industrialism was married to war rather than economical advancement (pp.120-129, 334,343).

Walker Connor (1994) defined state as the major political subdivision of the globe. He explained the essence of a nation as a psychological bond that joined a people and differentiated it from other people. He claimed although most groups claiming nationhood did not incorporate several genetic strains. It is important to mention that he stated what matters are not "what is but what people believe is". Connor determined that nation was a self-defined entity, in that sense, ideas related to the origin of group did not accord factual data. He pointed out that nation and state was merged in popular perception, nationalism should be identified with the state rather than loyalty to the nation. He stated that Germany and Japan were regarded as qualified as nation-states (pp.36-42).

Craig Calhoun (1997) explained nationalism with its three dimensions. Firstly, there was nationalism as a discourse which was the production of cultural understanding. Secondly, nationalism was regarded as a project; interests of collectivities were pursued through social movements and state policies. Thirdly, nationalism was considered as evaluation

which was political and cultural ideologies that claim superiority for a particular nation. Calhoun indicated that in this third dimension, nationalism was given the status of an ethical imperative which meant that national boundaries had to coincide with state boundaries (p.6).

Calhoun regarded the French Revolution was seen the date of emergence of the modern nation. He mentioned that European states grew stronger; they had huge political, military power. The Europeans colonized the rest of the world. He added that technology of map-making was advanced. In addition to this, he declared that maps were shaped by the experience and orientation of Europeans (pp.9-17).

E.H. Carr (1994) defined three phases of nationalism. He stated that the first phase was begun with the dissolution of empires and Holy Christian Unity. Moreover, establishment of the national state and national church were observed. Nation was identified with the sovereign in the first phase. The second phase comprised the period from the Napoleonic Wars and ended in 1914. This phase included modern international relations. Carr considered Rousseau as the modern founder of nationalism who identified nation and people, rejected the embodiment of the nation with the sovereign and the ruling class. Carr illustrated third phase with the change in the character of the nation. The growth of nationalism and decline of internationalism were witnessed after 1870 and its full development was witnessed after 1914 (pp.243-244).

Charles Tilly (1994) focused on European experience of nationalism. He maintained that consolidation of central control was accomplished through coercion and extraction. He rejected the idea that modernizing elites articulating demands and needs of the people. Nonetheless, he alleged that there were small groups of power hungry men who fought off numerous rivals and great popular resistance in the pursuit of their own ends and they promoted the formation of national states (pp.251-254). Tilly stated that the nation-states were made by wars. He explained this situation that the kings needed greater funds from their subjects (Jaffrelot, 2003, p.6).

Charles Tilly (2001) maintained that the states have existed for 5000 years. He considered that there were many types of states that were non-national such as city-states and empires. He opposed allegations of self-determination by the minorities of such institutionalized western states as the Armenians, Basques, Eritreans, Kanaks, Palestinians, Kurds, Sikhs, Tamils, Tibetans, and Western Saharans. He proposed if all the people claiming right of self-determination established their own nation-states, there would be thousands of statelike entities. He mentioned that these statelike entities would be tiny and economically unviable. He also indicated that there were rivals of states as NATO, the European Union, the EFTA, drug traffickers, international oil companies, financial organizations. He agreed with Paul Kennedy that there was a an important relation between the states and war, Kennedy considered if a state diverted too much resources to military purposes, the national power of it would decrease in the long run (pp.18-30).

Tilly focused (1997) on capital and coercion. He stated that coercion played a crucial role in the creation of national states. Moreover, he mentioned that manipulators of capital generated cities. These two items were both affected the emergence of nation-states. Tilly pointed out that various combinations of capital and coercion produced many different kinds of states (pp.16-17).

Tilly (1997) tried to explain the relation between warfare and state organization within historical context. First period was called as patrimonialism which was continued until fifteenth century in much of Europe. He explained that tribes, feudal levies, urban militias played the major role in warfare. The monarchs gained their capital as tribute and rent. Second period from 1400 to 1700 was identified with brokerage when mercenary forces recruited by contractors in military activity and rulers depended on independent capitalists for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises and for installation and collection of taxes. Third period from 1700 to 1850 was nationalization. Mass armies and navies were created by national populations. National armies were settled in state's administrative structure, states operated the fiscal policy directly. States obstructed the involvement of independent contractors. Fourth period was from mid-nineteenth century to the recent past and called as specialization. In this period, the military force grew as specialized branch of national government. Division of labor between army and police was

seen. The representative institutions influenced military expenditures. Tilly explained three types of states as coercion-intensive, capital-intensive and a capitalized-coercion path to state formation. He maintained that rulers acquired means of war from their own populations and from the populations of conquered lands within coercive-incentive mode. These states were revealed as Bradenburg and Russia when they were tribute-paying empires. There were armed landlords within this coercion-intensive mode. Moreover, capitalists rent or purchase military force and they fought without building vast permanent state structures. Tilly mentioned city-states, city-empires, urban federations within capital-intensive type of states. He indicated Genoa, Dubrovnik, the Dutch Republic and for a time, Catalonia exemplified the capital-intensive mode. Furthermore, France and England were the followers of capitalized coercion mode and they became nation-states rather earlier than the other modes. It was indicted that they tried to incorporate capitalists and sources of capital into the structures of their states (pp.28-30).

Tilly (1997) stated that big and powerful states were formed at the edges of urban places where cities and their capital were accessible but not overwhelming. He pointed out that Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden and Norway belonged to empires and federations dominated by others. They formed their own coercive state formations. These places were rural, and German merchants dominated Scandinavian trade. During the sixteenth century, Baltic trade developed. Capital accumulated and urban populations rose in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. From the $14^{th}$ to $16^{th}$ century, the Scandinavian Union of Denmark, Sweden and Norway overcame German traders and the Hanseatic League. The commercial city-states and city-empires of Italy followed a different mode. They gave importance to capital; they applied less coercion than the Nordic states (pp.133-137). Tilly (2001) proposed that Russia, Hungary and China applied this coercion-intensive mode. Venice and the Dutch Republic applied this capital intensive mode. France, England and, after a period of time, Prussia applied the capitalized coercion mode (pp.313-314).

Gellner considered that nationalism was not the awakening of nations; nationalism invented nations where they did not exist. The cultural homogenization that was gained through education maintained national consciousness. This collective national consciousness was regarded as nationalism (Jaffrelot, pp.14-16).

Ethnic nationalism could be explained as consciousness of having primordial or transmitted group characteristics which were parts of ethnicity as language, customs and territorial connection. Antiquity and uniformity of a community's origins would reflect the ethnicity of a community, the ethnic community. This ethnic community was seen as natural grouping (Greenfeld, pp.12-14).

Patriotism was generally identified with the features of that ethnicity. The origin of the word had been "patria" or the country of the father. It was alleged that there was a transition from the patria to the nation. It was explained that people began to die for a more abstract social construct within the context of nation. Christophe Jaffrelot (2003) claimed that nations had an institutional dimension that was state-oriented. He determined that nationalism was an ideology that often claimed the control of a nation and/or promoted one's own superior identity against others (p.4).

Anthony Smith (1976) regarded nationalism as both an ideology and a movement. He defined nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and the maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality as a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation (cited in Poulton, p.2). Anthony Smith (2001a) stated that Breuilly regarded nation as a modern phenomenon and nation was also a product of modernity. In that sense, nation could be defined by citizenship and law. On the contrary, national symbols and ceremonies were still important. Hobsbawn indicated that nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols and histories are cultural artifacts. He gave examples of Jewish and Palestinian nationalism. He equated nation with the territorial state. He stated the disconnectedness of modern Israeli and Palestinian nations and nationalism from their ethnic antecedents (pp.10-13).

## 3.1 Primordialism and Perennialism

Primordialism stresses the naturalness of nations, thus, nations were apparent since ancient times. Focusing on the term primordial to explain it, some common words as ethnicity,

blood and family ties and kinship have been used extensively. Özkırımlı divided primordialism into three categories: the naturalist, sociobiological and culturalist approaches. The naturalist approach of primordialism gives importance to the ethnicity and the national identity; in essence, ethnicity and nationality were considered identical. Perennialism explains that the modern nations are the descendants of their ancient counterparts and economic, social and technological changes did not affect the basic features and structures of human groupings throughout the history. Minogue's metaphor of the kiss given to Sleeping Beauty was widely used to explain the revival of nations with little motivation. Moreover, the prince was considered to be the nationalists. The sociobiological approach of primordialism gives priority to the kin selection. People belonging to the same culture get married. Ethnic cohesiveness is based on genes and instincts. The sociobiological approach explains nations as big families. The cultural approach of primordialism stresses faith in cultural loyalties. According to them, people believed that they depended each other because of ethnic ties (Özkırımlı, 2000, pp.64-74).

Smith (2001b) explained primordialism by referring to Abbe Sieyes and Rousseau. Nations were primordial; they had existed since the dawn of time. One version of primordialism has some links with biology and culture. The socio-biological version, referring to Pierre Van der Berghe, indicated that cultural group was treated as a kin network. In that sense, cultural symbols as language, religion and color were used to mark biological similarities. Secondly, the other version of primordialism referred to by Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz, held that ethnic groups and nations were formed as cultural givens (pp.51-54).

Geertz (1994) explained this givenness as stemming from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language or a dialect of a language and following particular social practice. He stated that the general strength of primordial bonds differed from person to person, from society to society and from time to time. Geertz mentioned that modernizing countries which had weak civil politics or a poor welfare system could use and produce race, language, religion, hence, primordial attachments were used. He stated that modern societies which had civil states depended on tools of social integration rather than primordial ties (p.31).

Perennialism indicated that nations were natural communities. Perennialists believed that some nations had existed for a long period of time. There have been two types of perennialism: continuous perennialism and recurrent perennialism. Continuous perennialism asserts that some nations have a long continuous history. On the other hand, recurrent perennialism claims the antiquity of nations that particular nations have been historical entities and they changed with the time (Smith, 2001a, pp.49-51).

## 3.2 Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolism gives importance to ethnic backgrounds; myths, symbols, values and memoirs to understand the modern nations (Özkırımlı, pp.167-168). John Armstrong (1982) was an influential theorist of ethno-symbolism. He wrote *Nations Before Nationalism.* Armstrong believed that ethnic consciousness had a long history. He mentioned that ethnic consciousness was seen in the ancient civilization of Egypt and Mesopotamia. He claimed that contemporary nationalism was the final stage of a larger cycle of ethnic consciousness. He stated that groups defined themselves with others, with strangers. Exclusion from the group was seen an important feature of ethnic identity. It was also added that the character and the essence of the group could be changed according to group members. Confrontation with the others could be called as "differentiation" that ensured the main characteristics of the group. He mentioned that ethnic ties could be mixed and intermingled with the religious and class ties. He determined that Islam and Christianity were very influential in shaping the ethnic identities (Armstrong, pp.4-13, cited in Özkırımlı, pp.170-174).

Anthony D. Smith was a student of Ernest Gellner. Smith (2001b) distinguished civic and ethnic types of nations and nationalisms. His main contribution to the study of nationalism was the indication that nations had pre-modern origins. His approach was called ethno-symbolism. He defined nation as an ideology. This ideology gives importance to the well-being of a nation. In that sense, nationalism endeavored to ensure the well-being of the nation with the realization of three goals. These goals were presented as national autonomy, national unity and national identity. He figured out main differences of ethnie

and nation. Thereby, ethnie has a proper name: common myths of ancestry, shared memories and collective cultural identities, similar to a family. Moreover, ethnies have had some links with homeland but it should be added that historic territory was not needed. Furthermore, the ethnic community lacked a public culture. Some elite solidarity was seen in ethnic communities. On the other hand, nations acquired proper names, common myths, shared history, common public culture, a single economy, common rights and duties and a definite homeland. Thus, Smith identifies nation as a named human community having a homeland, common myths and a shared history, a common culture, a single economy, common rights and duties for all members (pp.1-14).

According to Smith (2007), gender was the most important factor in defining national identity in ancient times. Territorial factors and socio-economic class were stated as other determiners of national identity in ancient times. Smith indicated that although divine religions had tried to undermine the ethnic structures, some ethnic communities became the most devoted religious communities, such as the Armenians, Jews, gypsies (before the Arabic invasions of Egypt) and Ethiopians. Moreover, he gave present examples of the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland, Poles, Serbians, Croatians, Maronites, Sri Lankans, Iranian Shiites, and Karens (Myanmmar, Tailand) which preserved their strong ties with religious symbols (pp.17-23). In his book *National Identity*, he elaborates western/civil nationalism and nonwestern/ethnic models of nationalism. Thus, western/civil nationalism required that nations should have had defined territories. Moreover, patria (fatherland) should have laws and institutions. The ethnic model, on the other hand, contained local culture, vernaculars and traditions. In that sense, wherever he went, a person would belong to the place where he was born. According to the Western type, a legal factor was an apparent and favorable election of ones' own nationality (pp.23-29).

Factors of national identity were counted as historical common homeland, common myths and memories, common culture, rights and responsibilities of every person of a community, and a single economy (pp.31-33). Nation could be defined as a community which shared a historical homeland, common myths, historical memories, common culture, common legal duties and rights. He emphasized that nations needed ethnic elements in

order to complete the nation-building process. The first nations were based on ethnic grounds and strengthened common culture. Others followed and imitated these samples. Even there had been slight evidence of ethnic ties, myths and symbols were used to create a nation (Smith, 2007, pp.70-73). In other words, kinships and also religious ties helped the creation of nations.

Smith (2001b) summarized some basic propositions of nationalism. Accordingly, he affirmed that the world was divided into nations each of which had its own character, history and destiny. Secondly, it was indicated that the nation was the sole source of political power. Thirdly, it was stated that loyalty to the nation was supreme. Fourthly, freedom could only be achieved through a nation. Fifthly, self-expression and autonomy were characteristics of every nation. Lastly, it was implied that global peace and justice could be realized through autonomous nations (p.22).

According to Smith (2001b), core concepts of nation were juxtaposed firstly as autonomy, unity and finally, identity. Subsequently, authenticity, continuity, dignity, destiny, attachment and the homeland were stated as core concepts which would come to be used to evaluate the nation (p.28). Smith dealt with culture and religion and he stated that these two factors were influential in explaining nationalism. In that sense, he articulated that nationalism was much more than a political ideology; it was also a form of culture and religion. Thus, he identified nationalism as a form of public culture and political symbolism, a politicized mass culture. Moreover, it was also added that nationalism was more akin to political religion than political ideology (pp.33-35).

Smith (2001b) argued the merits of voluntarist and organic nationalisms. He gave Renan's thought as a sample for the voluntarist approach. In that sense, Renan affirmed the consent and demand to live a common life. On the other hand, German Romantic thinkers presented an ethno-linguistic criteria and historical memories and determinism. In that sense, Smith classified them as an organic type of nationalism. Moreover, Smith elaborated ethnic and civic types of nationalism by referring to Kohn's works on that issue. Thus, he concluded that although there were differences between these types of nationalism, it is important to note that there were similarities between the policies that they applied. He

pointed out that treating nationalism as a single set of phenomena was needed. Ideological variances of its forms should be remembered (pp.39-42).

Anthony Smith (2001b) classified paradigms of nationalism as modernism, perennialism, primordialism, and ethno-symbolism. He explained the different varieties of a modernist paradigm. These versions of the modernist paradigm were presented as socioeconomic, sociocultural, political, ideological and constructionist. He explained socioeconomic version by referring to Nairn and Hechter. Accordingly, industrial capitalism, regional inequality and class conflict were seen as factors for the emergence of a nation. The sociocultural version was based on Gellner's thoughts. Gellner claimed that nations emerged in the transition to modernization. Thus, high culture and public education ensured the emergence of a nation. The political type of nationalism was explained by Smith by referring to works of Breuilly, Giddens and Mann and relevantly, nations and nationalism were formed by modern professionalized states. The ideological version was explained with the work of Kedourie. The focusing points of this version were its European origins, the modernity of nationalist ideology, quasi-religious power and its role in dissolution of empires and emergence of nations. Lastly, the constructionist version of modernism was explained through the works of Anderson and Hobsbawm. This type of modernism examined the modern and socially constructed character of nationalism. Hobsbawn dealt with invented traditions which were products of social engineering and elites. Anderson stated that the nation was an imagined political community (pp.45-49). As Anderson stated, construction of imagined communities was needed for the establishment of a nation. He pointed out that a religious community could be converted to a national-secular community with citizenship and homeland. Therefore, as Özdoğan (2001) stated that nationalism was merged with capitalism/modernism and industrialism (pp.290-291).

Smith (2001b) indicated that ethno-symbolism focused on subjective symbolic and social-cultural elements in the continuity of ethnicities, formation of nations and impact of nationalism. Multi-faceted and inter-related relationships were influential. In that sense, both elites and non-elites influenced each other. Ethno-symbolists deal with earlier collective identities and their influence on the ascent of nations (pp.57-61).

Smith (2001b) dealt with postmodernism in the last chapter of his book. He stated that post modern society was also post-national. In that sense, western products, capital and technologies were seen everywhere. Dissemination of transnational companies and standardization of consumption patterns were seen. Regulations of governments became rather difficult. Moreover, bypassing of national cultures brought the decline of nationalism. Cultural imperialism undermined the national cultures. Moreover, cultural similarities outweighed cultural differences. However, he concluded that although nations and nationalisms were threatened by both larger political associations and claims of smaller cultural groups, pre-modern ethnicities survived the modernization process, so modern nations and nationalism would persist into the postmodern age (pp.120-146).

## 3.3 Modernism

Modernism explains that nations and nationalism are modern phenomenon. It is stated that both the nation and nationalism are recent phenomenon which are apparent for two hundred years. The nation, nationalism, capitalism, industrialism, the bureaucratic state, secularism and urbanization are the products of modernism. It is observed that, as Hobsbawm articulated, "nationalism comes before nations" (Özkırımlı, pp.85-86).

Craig Calhoun (1997) by referring to Mann, Breuilly, Deutsch, Kohn, Poggi, Tilly, Anderson and Giddens indicated that the modernity of states grew in Europe during and after the era of absolutist monarchies. The main indicators of thsee absolutist monarchies were their administrative capacity, unification of territories, increasing direct control of and intervention into disparate territories and populations, their reliance on political participation, their capacity to mobilize citizens for warfare, and their assertion of clear boundaries rather than frontiers (p.66).

Calhoun (1997) dealt with the size of nations and tried the answer the question if some nations more real than others. He concluded that nationhood can not be defined objectively; nations are in part made by nationalism. The members of the nation should understand the national identity. Thus, there has been a need to acquire the recognition of

others to be genuine nationness. Calhoun pointed out that nations existed only within the context of nationalism (pp.98-99).

### 3.3.1 Hans Kohn and Nationalism

Hans Kohn (1971) has defined nationalism as the supreme loyalty the individual felt for the nation-state. It was stated that in the past, there had been some strong sentiments towards one's own soil, traditions and its own territorial authority. However, modern usage of the word did not come about before the end of the eighteenth century. That each nationality should form a state was a very new phenomenon. Moreover, this term also included the idea that the state should include a whole nationality. Characteristically, nationalities are not rigid; they are living forces of history. Kohn proposes that there have been some factors distinguishing nationalities such as descent, language, territory, political entity, customs, traditions, or religion. He also suggests that the US, having no common descent, and Switzerland having many languages, still formed nations. He advocated that the most essential element is corporate will. He called this will nationalism. He presents that before the 18th century, we can see some sentiments like nationalism. However, these sentiments are felt by individuals and not by the masses (pp.9-10).

Kohn's (2005) nationalism thesis was based on reason and universal justice, which were the features of liberalism. He noted that the story of nationalism was based on that of a western civilization presented first by England, France and the US (p.215).

Hans Kohn (1971) claimed that before the 18th century people, fought against others in order to acquire the same nationality. He determined that with the French Revolution, national emotions of people began to rise. He also added that religion was a much more important determinant of cultural and spiritual life. Thereby, nationality began to be a cultural determinant after the 19th century in Europe and America and in 20th century Asia and Africa (pp.10-11).

Kohn (1971) expressed that Ancient Hebrews and Greeks had a consciousness of being different from all other peoples. However, it was also pointed out that although they had

such a consciousness, the idea of a nation state was unknown to them. He emphasized that Ancient Hebrews saw themselves as the chosen people. Moreover, they had a common memory of the past and hopes for future. Furthermore, Hebrews believed in messianism. Ancient Greeks, on the other hand, felt superior to all other people (pp.11-12). He classified nationalisms and explained the evolution of nationalism throughout history. He defined the main features of English, French, American, German, Italian, Japanese and Italian nationalisms. He stated that English nationalism was the first nationalism of the world.

Kohn (1971) also opened a classification known as totalitarian nationalism. Charles Mauras' integral nationalism stressed the authority and absolute precedence of the national community over the individual. World War I resulted in the rise of totalitarianism, with Lenin establishing the first totalitarian state. In this state, individual liberty was impossible. Stalin used Slavophil tendencies, thus instigating Ukrainian and Muslim opposition to Russian rule (p.78).

Kohn (1971) classified racialism and totalitarianism and gave a place to fascism after explaining Western nationalism, the Irish problem, Anti-Semitism, Jewish nationalism and totalitarian nationalism. He asserted that fascism was for national growth, increased population and military preparedness of the whole population. He looked back to Rome's ancient times and tried to renew these times. It was defined that fascism absolutized nationalism. Mussolini's Italy, Spain's falangists, Japan's patriotic terrorist organization of young officers, Integralistas in Brazil, Peronistas of Argentina, a legion of the Archangel Michael of Romania, and the Third Hellenic Civilization of Greece were all considered examples of fascism. (p.79)

After World War I, with the principles of Woodrow Wilson, nationalism served to promote an open society, individual rights and liberties. New states were comprised of many minorities and dominant entities. Although they had many cultural affinities, they were hostile to each other. Hans Kohn divided this period into different categories: Middle Eastern nationalism, Asian nationalism, Indian nationalism, Far Eastern Nationalism and contribution of the UN. In Japan and Turkey, the old ruling class preserved its vitality and

guided transformation. In India and Ceylon, western education had an important effect. Chinese nationalism was awakened under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek and they fought for national independence (Kohn, 1971, pp.81-82).

After World War II, nationalism was the most important factor to ensure a new order of society. However, it was to be known that there were different nationalisms. India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma gained their independences. Many independent states were established in Africa and Asia. In addition to these examples, different roads to socialism also produced independence from Soviet Russia. Moreover, nationalism became dominant in France under Charles De Gaulle. Additionally, Cyprus was divided. Furthermore, Quebec demanded the separation from Canada. Kohn asserted that the UN was the only meeting ground for all races, nations and ideologies (Kohn, 1971, pp. 90-91).

### 3.3.2 Karl W. Deutsch and Nationalism

Karl W. Deutsch (1994) mentioned in his famous book *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953), that a larger groups of persons linked by complementary habits and facilities of communication could be called a people (p.26) Deutsch (1966) mentioned that people formed a social, economic, and political alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupations around a center and a leading group. He stated that its members were united by more intensive social communication, were linked to these centers and leading groups by an unbroken chain of connections in communications and in economic life. He determined that the primary basis of this alignment was the complementary nature of communication habits. Secondly, the complementarity of acquired social and economic preferences involved the mobility of goods and persons. Thirdly, the rise of industrialism and modern market economies offered economic and psychological rewards for successful group alignments. It was also avowed that security and success could be promoted by effective organization, alignment of preferences and coordination of behavior (p.101).

Antoine Roger (2008) explained the views of Deutsch by stating that the first phase should be that of linguistic unification. Afterwards, the second phase was integration of

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communication channels: economic barters, and building of roads and railways. Thus, people began to be bound together physically; and the emergence of folk and people was achieved (p.41). Deutsch (1969) explained that a nation could also be a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors. He claimed that the political experience of Europe should be understood in order to define nationalism (p.3).

Deutsch (1969) mentioned there was an evolution in political integration. He stated that firstly, villages became districts, counties, or baronies. These entities turned to duchies and provinces, and then merged into kingdoms. He added that the kingdoms reverted to federations or empires. He expressed that by considering this evolution of political integration, Dante articulated the term "world government" at the end of the 13th century (p.4).

Deutsch (1969) focused on six important processes that went parallel in the development of integration. Firstly, he stated that the integration of countries. He mentioned that more roads, more communication and more economic activity resulted as the different groups of people gathered together, united and thought themselves as a country. It was stated that prices and wages were all interconnected within a true country which ensured the fates of members of the country who were dependent on each other (pp.4-10). Secondly, political integration required the consolidation of language. Thirdly, a dominant elite social group was needed for political integration. Fourthly, there should be the integration into peoples. Fifthly, social communication revealed the concept of being a people. Lastly, political integration of administrative districts progressed towards the emergence of the states. Deutsch argued the reasons why this process went further to create a world government. He answered the question by stating that secession was the obstacle to establish a world government. He admired the example of the European Union and considered the European Union a pluralistic security community (pp.5-20, 34-36).

### 3.3.3 Elie Kedourie and Nationalism

Kedourie (1996) stated that nationalism was an ideology. He pointed out that nationalism was invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The doctrine held that humanity was naturally divided into nations. He mentioned Kant's works and indicated the importance of self-determination. Elie Kedourie explained the connection of nationalism with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It is apparent that Kant was the essential figure in Kedourie's works (pp.2-23).

According to Fichte, "the universe is an organic whole, no part of which can exist without the existence of all the rest." In that sense, only reality is the whole. Schelling stated that individuals were only phantoms like the spectrum. On the contrary, Kant stated that determination of free wills of individuals was the most important point. However, if, as Schellling proposed, individuals were phantoms, natural rights and utility became pointless and invalid. The new theory stated that the state was not a collection of individuals; the state was higher than the individual and came before it. Fichte stated that the state was an artistic institution and its purpose was culture. He added that the culture was the process whereby man really became man, realizing himself in utmost plenitude and it was this realization which was the perfect freedom (Kedourie, pp.29-31). Rousseau argued that neither individuals nor the state could attain happiness or virtue unless man exchanged a general will for his own selfish particular will, and willed good of all, rather than his own (p.32).

Kedourie mentioned statism in his work. Freedom of man could be accomplished by absorption by the state. According to Fichte, the war between states was a living and progressive principle of history. All the states saw their culture as higher than the others. Therefore, there were three elements of doctrine of nationalism. The first one was the idea of self-determination; the second one was the individuals' absorption in the state and struggle (pp.44-47).

Kedourie mentioned about classifications of nationalism. He firstly pointed to linguistic nationalism and then he defined racial nationalism. He also pointed out that there was no clear-cut distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism. Kedourie stated that in nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture and religion constitute different aspects of the nation. Kedourie defined patriotism as the affection felt for one's own country or one's group, loyalty to its institutions and zeal for its defense and defined xenophobia as the dislike of strangers or outsiders and a reluctance to admit him into one's own group. Nationalism, on the other hand, as Kedourie stated, was a comprehensive doctrine and a product of European thought in the last 150 years (pp.66-68).

Kedourie argued that there has been a debate over whether nationalism is politics of the right or of the left. He answered this question with "neither". Although there were examples that nationalists at one stage, were considered men of the left, at a later stage, they were firmly denounced as men of the right. He gave as examples Pilsudski, Mussolini, Chiang Kai-shek. However, it should be noted that nationalists' aims were national self-determination and living as members of a sovereign nation (pp.84-85).

Kedourie defined nationalism as a doctrine. He stated that this doctrine was a complex of inter-related ideas about man, society and politics. He tried to give the historical background of this ideology and criticized Gellner's ideas about nationalism. He proposed that nationalist ideology spread to areas like Greece, the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire because industrialism was not developed in those places. Moreover, he claimed that in countries like Great Britain and the US, nationalism was unknown (pp.136-144).

### 3.3.4 John Breuilly and Nationalism

John Breuilly is the author of famous book *Nationalism and the State*, written in 1982. He explained nationalism as a form of politics. Breuilly (1994) mentioned that nationalism was the political behavior in the context of the modern state and modern state system. He stated that nationalism was about politics, which was about power. This power was defined as having to do with the control of the state. Nationalism was explained as the usage of the state power. He stated that the nation had an explicit and peculiar character. Moreover, he

stated that the interests and values of the nation took priority over all other interests and values. Lastly, he indicated that the nation had to be independent (pp.1-2).

Breuilly focused on nationalism as a form of politics. This form of politics could be revealed as opposition politics. He classified these opposition movements as separation, reform and unification. He mentioned separation as breaking away from the present state. He explained reform as reforming the state in the nationalist direction. Moreover, he compared unification with uniting with other states. He stated that Turkish and Japanese nationalisms were reform nationalisms (p.9).

### 3.3.5 Paul Brass and Nationalism

Paul Brass published the book *Ethnicity and Nationalism* in 1991. Brass (1996) mentioned in his book that ethnicity and nationalism were not 'givens', they were social and political constructions. He explained both ethnicity and nationalism as creations of the elites. He indicated also both of them were modern phenomena. Ethnicity and nationalism had connected to the activities of the modern centralizing state (p.8).

He was not a primordialist. He explained his position thus; ethnic identity and modern nationalism arouse out of specific types of interactions between the leaderships of centralizing states and elites from non-dominant ethnic groups (pp.8-9).

He stated that ethnic identity was not a fixed or given element but it was a variable. He focused on the relationship between the elites and the state. The elite class was explained as influential subgroups within ethnic groups and classes. Brass agreed with Deutsch's theory of social communication. This theory indicated that the precondition for the development of nationalism was a socially mobilized population within a distinctive ethnic group. Moreover, he became aware of the political leadership as an independent force (pp.13-15).

Brass stated that cultural forms, values and practices of ethnic groups became political resources for elites in competition for political power and economic advantage. Moreover,

it was mentioned that elites tried to mobilize their ethnic group against its rivals or against central state (p.15).

Brass considered that cultural forms, values and practices were important indicators for ethnic identity formation. Elites used them for the mobilization of ethnic groups. Brass mentioned that elites might simplify, select or distort the attributes which would be useful for the creation of ethnic community or a nation (pp.16-17).

### 3.3.6 K. R. Minogue and Nationalism

K. R. Minogue's book, *Nationalism* was first published in 1967. Minogue (1967) stated that nationalism as a story began as Sleeping Beauty and ended as Frankenstein's monster. He investigated the rise of German nationalism. He alleged the servitors of the German model could be Heine, Herder, Fichte, the Grimm Brothers, Scheleiermacher and Bismark (p.7).

He mentioned that nationalism was an ideology for the young. He also stated romanticism was the cultural twin of nationalism and it was defined as the rejection of the compromises of adult authority. He gave the examples of the Young Turks and Young Italy (p.8).

Minogue referred to Carr, who alleged that the founder of modern nationalism was Rousseau. French nationalism was identified with the interests of everyone. Renan stated that the nation was based on will. Minogue stated that Marxists described nationalism as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie class and they wanted it to be removed from the scene (pp.10-11).

Minogue classified nationalism. The first category included the original nations of France, Italy, Germany, and Hungary. He stated that the European people in this category tried to establish states comprised of all the members of the nation which would be grouped within one sovereign state. Secondly, he determined Afro-Asian world after 1947. Thirdly, he named pan-movements as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turanism, Pan-Arabism. Fourthly, he mentioned about the nationalism of the homeless, the Jews in Europe,

Negroes in America and Kurds in Iraq. Lastly, he explained fascism or totalitarian nationalism by giving examples of Mussolini and Hitler (pp.12-16).

Minogue stated that nationalism appeared to be love for an abstraction of the nation. He defined the three stages of nationalism. Nationalism was considered a political movement depending on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners. Minogue called the first stage stirrings; a nation became aware of itself as a nation suffering oppression in this stage. The second stage was defined with the struggle for independence. The third stage was called one of consolidation, maintenance of national unity (pp.25-29).

Minogue regarded nationalism as a European invention. He firstly explained it through the use of the examples of 18th century France and the patriotism of Rousseau, ideas of Sieyes and the French Revolution. Then, he dealt with nationalism and German unity. Minogue determined that the French Revolution began as a conflict between the principle of privilege and the principle of national equality which then turned into a war between France and the other countries of Europe. This war was considered as a war of liberation and retained a strong element of universality. Minogue concluded that nationalism was a reaction of the particular to the universal. He considered the French Revolution as universalistic and nationalism was a response to it. Afterwards, he mentioned that German romantic thinkers admired Burke because Burke rejected French nationalism and favored ordered and hierarchical society. Minogue indicated that Herder's contribution to nationalism was that the *volk* is not simply the people of the country, but a metaphysical entity which produced a particular language, art, culture, and set of great men, religion and collection of customs. Moreover, he focused on Fichte, and his ideas of nationalism. Furthermore, Minogue focused on problems of German nationalism (pp.35-80).

Minogue explained nationalism by referring to liberalism and Marxism. He indicated that in the twentieth century, the principle of nationalism was described as national-determination and favored by Wilson and his allies. Marxism and nationalism were seen as revolutionary doctrines and they could be used in attacks upon the status quo. He indicated that Marxism divided the world into exploiters and exploited (pp.133-144).

Minogue believed that nationalism had many strands of history. Moreover, he claimed that nationalism was an untidy, unrefined abstraction. He articulated that one common accompaniment of nationalism was xenophobia. It was also explained when religion declined, nationalism advanced. In conclusion, Minogue considered nationalism was any form of political group consciousness which took an aggressive form (pp.144-146).

### 3.3.7 Eric Hobsbawm and Nationalism

Hobsbawm wrote his work in 1989. In the preface of the Turkish-written edition in 1991, Hobsbawm (1995) claimed that dissolution of the SU occurred not because of national pressure, but due to a collapse of central authority. He also indicated that ethnic and national problems of the Soviet era originated from treaties of World War I. Present explosive ethnic and national problems belonged to the post-1918 era. Moreover, he maintained that Eurasia was Balkanized or Lebonanized. Reconstruction of the new European map after 1918 taught us that this could only be achieved through genocide, expulsion or mass massacre. Moreover, he stated that after 1991, Turks could probably foment instability in territories of the ex-Soviet Union by using Pan-Turkism. He warned that Great Russian nationalism, Serbian expansionist policies and Turkish expansionism should be defied (pp.8-10). Although Hobsbawm warned about Pan-Turkism, Turkish Islam of Gülen movement was much more influential in the territories of the ex-Soviet Union. Moreover, financial capabilities of Turkey and political strategies of the government were inefficient and inconvenient to pursue Pan-Turkist movement.

It was summarized by Anthony Smith (2001b) that Hobsbawm viewed nationalism as having been created by the modern state. Moreover, Hobsbawm stated that nations, like nationalism, were not older than the early 19$^{th}$ century. It was added that Hobsbawm believed that intelligentsia and bourgeoisie created both the nations and nationalism. He stated that ethno-linguistic nationalisms should be distinguished from civic-political nationalisms. Lastly, Smith stated that Hobsbawm explained that nations and nationalism fulfilled their functions and became unnecessary in the era of globalization (p.92). In this context, although many experts maintain that nations and nationalism were waned during the era of globalization, it is apparent that they have been still alive.

Hobsbawn (2003) cited Renan's definition that a nation was a daily plebiscite. Moreover, Austrio Marxists stated that nationality could be attached to people if they chose to claim it. Hobsbawm stated that no a priori definition of a nation could be made. It could be defined initially as a large body of a people whose members regarded themselves as members of a nation. He used the term of nationalism like Gellner. In that sense, nationalism required that political and national unit should be congruent. Moreover, he stated that nations were a recent and modern phenomenon and nationalism came before nations. Nationalism creates state and nation. Nation could be understood via a defined territorial state, or nation-state. Furthermore, nations should be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative and economic requirements. Finally, he stated that nations were dual concepts and that nations were defined both from above and below. He criticized Gellner's work in that Gellner preferred the perspective of modernization from above. He affirmed that development of nations and nationalisms in Britain and France were not attractive and had not been studied properly, by referring to Hroch's studies, he claimed that national consciousness developed unevenly among the social groupings and regions of a country. Secondly, he affirmed that popular masses as workers, servants and peasants were affected lastly by national consciousness. Hobsbawm accepted Hroch's three levels in his study about history of national movements. Hobsbawm summed that nationalism required too much belief in what was patently not so. In other words, as Renan stated, being a nation was getting its history wrong (pp.8-12).

Hobsbawm (2003) referred to the French Declaration of Rights. Thereby, in the French Declaration of Rights of 1795, each people were independent and sovereign irregardless of the individual who composed it and the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is alienable (p.19).

Hobsbawm (2003) contended that the basic characteristic of a modern nation and everything connected with it was its modernity. On the other hand, national identification was seen as natural and permanent. In that sense, it is useful to deal with the vocabulary of the subject. Before 1884, *"nacion"* meant the aggregate of the inhabitants of a province, a country or a kingdom and also foreigners. After 1884, it was defined as a state or political body which had a government and the territory constituted by a state and its individual

inhabitants considered as a whole element of a common and supreme state, at least in the Iberian world. Moreover, it was stated that *"gobierno",* which means government, was not linked with the concept of nation until 1884. It is important to note that the first meaning of the word nation indicated the origin and descent (pp.14-15).

According to the New English Dictionary of 1908, the old meaning of the word was defined as an ethnic unit, but in recent times, nation was also described as an aggregate of men speaking the same language, having the same customs, and endowed with certain moral qualities which distinguished them from other groups of a like nature. During the age of Revolution and in the 1830s, the term nation started to be used. In the American and French revolutions, nation was equated with the people and the state. The terms of nation-state and the United Nations were used. Hobsbawm referred to John Stuart Mill's definition of the nation as an entity with the possession of national sentiment and also having the desire to be under the same government which has a representative government and democracy. Hobsbawm affirmed that "nation=state=people", and foreign people especially linked nation to territory. In that sense, the territorial meaning of nation and self-determination became apparent (pp.17-19). Hobsbawm articulated the popular-revolutionary point of view by referring to Pierre Vilar, who stated that the common characteristic of a nation was not ethnicity or language but representation of common interest and common benefits against particular ones (p.20).

Dealing with the relationship between liberalism and nation-states, Hobsbawm summarized that even the most liberal economies did not undermine the importance of national economy. According to Friedrich List, on the other hand, Germans called their economy a national economy or the people's economy rather than political economy. Moreover, economy's goal was to achieve the economic development of a nation and to prepare its entry into the universal society of the future. In sum, it was pointed out that such development would further realize capitalist industrialism with the help of the bourgeoisie (pp.29-30). It was apparent that the bourgeoisie needed new markets to increase its revenues. The French revolution was the turning point for the bourgeoisie, and the boundaries of the nation-state were defined for them by states in order to increase the efficiency of the country's economy. Hence, it was clear that the bourgeoisie was

supported by the policies of the states to form the nation-state and national market. Nationalism had been a bourgeoisie ideology; moreover, nationalism helped the bourgeoisie to increase its power. Therefore, Westerners colonized the periphery and they used an open market economy. Nonetheless, developing countries like Turkey used imports substituting economy in order to protect its national economy (Altan, 2008, pp.6,18).

Hobsbawm (2003) mentioned that the building of nation was seen inevitably as a process of expansion. It was also important to point out that the principle of nationalities is legitimate when it tends to unite in a compact whole. On the contrary, it was regarded as illegitimate if it tended to divide a state. A viable nation was considered an independent and real nation, and some smaller nationalities and languages were seen as insignificant. Thus, Engels by seeing the future of Czechs as disappearing was accused of being a radical German chauvinist. Moreover, in addition to the threshold principle, there were three criteria to classify an entity as a nation. Firstly, historic association with the current state or a lengthy and recent past was needed. Secondly, existence of a long–established cultural elite who possessed a written national literature and administrative vernacular was essential. This second condition was the essence of German and Italian claims of nationality. Thirdly, Hobsbawm unfortunately stated that a proven capacity for conquest was required. Additionally, looking at an internationalist side, the world must be unified even linguistically. However, artificial world languages were not successful (pp.32-39)

Hobsbawm (2003) articulated that nation was a part of liberal ideology. It was linked to slogans of the French Revolution, "liberty, equality and fraternity". Therefore, nation was opposed by conservatives and traditionalists. The French Revolution's Declaration of Rights rejected the threshold principle (pp.40-41).

Hobsbawm stated that "the principle of nationality" changed the map of Europe in the period from 1830 to 1878. Massimo D'azeglio articulated "we had made Italy, now we have to make Italians. The liberator of Poland, Colonel Pilsudski affirmed that it was the state which made the nation, it was not the nation made the state (pp.44-45).

Hobsbawm (2003) dealt with popular proto-nationalism when he concluded that, except for rulers and the literate, language was not a criterion of nationhood (p.56). The story about the Tower of Babel seen on the front cover of Hobsbawm's book was interesting to note. According to medieval commentators on the book of Genesis, after the collapse of the Tower of Babel, 72 languages began to be spoken by 72 different nations and tribes. It was stated that God destroyed the tower because people did not build it to worship God but their intent was to make name for the builders. Babel came to mean the confusion, bubbling. In that sense, a multiplication of languages and races occurred. Hobsbawm stated that language was one of the alternative ways of distinguishing cultural communities. However, language was not the primary way of accomplishing this. For literate people, language was an important tool, but for the illiterate ones it was not so important. Hobsbawm exemplified this by using examples of French and Italian people. During the Revolution, only 50% of French people did not speak French and only, 12-13% spoke it correctly. Moreover, at the unification period in 1860, only 2, 5% of Italians were using formal Italian (pp.58-64).

Hobsbawm (2003) explained ethnicity by describing common origin and descent. He added that kinship and blood bonded together members of a group and excluded others. Hobsbawm gave the examples of Kurds, Somalians, Jews and the Basques. He stated that according to Herodotian understanding, ethnicity was, is and can be something that binds together populations living in large territories or in dispersion, and  lacking a common polity which could be called proto-nationalisms. Tribal ethnicity resisted the imposition of any state. He gave examples such as the Pusthuns of Afghanistan, the pre-1745 Scots highlanders and the Atlas Berbers (p.64)

Ethnic origin and race were also deemed significant in modern nationalism. Firstly, these differences were used to separate social strata. Secondly, visible ethnicity was used to define the "others" as distinguished from one's own group. Thirdly, Japan, Korea and China were rare examples of countries having homogeneous populations. Thereby, in these rare countries, ethnicity and political loyalty were connected. Thus, even the most apparent ethnic differences had played a rather slight role in the birth of modern nationalism.

Hobsbawm simplified this by giving the example of Negritude. He stated that, although color could be a political factor, it did not produce any single African state (pp.65-67).

Hobsbawm (2003) claimed that close ties between religion and national consciousness were obvious, as seen in examples of Poland and Ireland. Hobsbawm explained that religion was an ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion. However, it was added that religion was seen as a paradoxical cement for proto-nationalism. In that sense, it was claimed that religion could challenge the nation's monopoly claim to its members' loyalty.  It was also stated that transnational religions imposed some limits on religio-ethnic identification. Gellner remarked that converting to a world religion and meeting with a larger literate culture ensured the turning of ethnic groups into modern nations. He gave the example of African nationalism. Hobsbawm pointed out that if religion was not a necessarily mark of proto-nationality, holy icons, on the other hand, were a crucial component of proto-nationality and modern nationalism. However, holy icons could be either too wide or too narrow as symbols of proto-nation (pp.67-72).

Hobsbawm cited that the most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism was the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity, which was explained as a political nation. He claimed that popular movements against foreign invaders in the 15th and 16th centuries in Central Europe could be defined as religious and social, not national. It could be stated that proto-nationalism could ease the emergence of modern nationalism. It could also be taken into consideration that proto-nationalism could not form nationalities, nations or states. In sum, Hobsbawm stated that proto-nationalism had been important for the formation of state–aspiring movements. He added that proto-nationalism was not important to ensure patriotism or loyalty once the state was founded (pp.73-78).

Hobsbawm stated in his famous article *"the Invention of Traditions"* that primary schools were essential tools to spread the image and heritage of the nation and to ensure the emotion of loyalty in a nation. He indicated that states inventing traditions and even inventing nations implemented the attachment to the flag and the country (pp.91-92).

Between the years 1870-1918, a new phase of nationalism began, according to Hobsbawm. He explained that between the years 1880-1914, Mazzini's "threshold principle" was abandoned. Self-determination could be claimed by any group seeing themselves as a nation. Moreover, Hobsbawm cited that ethnicity and language became the significant elements of being a nation. Furthermore, nationalist sentiments in nation-states moved towards the rightist political side (pp.101-102).

Dealing with nationalism before 1914, it was pointed out by Hobsbawm (2003) that illiterate people were interested in oral language. In that sense, it was stated that official language or writing language were not so important for them. Thereby, official language entered into homes through the army and primary school. Hobsbawm articulated the term "interest" while dealing with linguistic nationalism. He determined that giving a higher official position to vernacular languages could increase the number of women and men who could have vested interests. Moreover, Hobsbawm added that fifty years before 1914, the major characteristic of nationalism was the rejection of all proletarian socialist movements because they were regarded as proletarian, militarily internationalist and non-nationalist (pp.114-123).

Hobsbawm (2003) declared that the principle of nationalism gained ascendency after World War I. The Bolshevik Revolution urged allies to cooperate and support Wilson's principles, especially that of self-determination. Economic crisis and the war-torn situation of European states brought about state-planned national economies after World War I. Hobsbawm cited that the treaties of Versailles and others at the end of World War I were the last examples of redrawing maps according to the principle of nationality. Hobsbawm stated that Wilsonian principles could not be applied efficiently and practically. Thereby, borders of states were not drawn according to the languages and nationalities. Hobsbawm stated that Hitler was a Wilsonian nationalist. In that sense, homogeneous territorial states could be a product of a barbarian program. Between the years 1919-1945 fascist nationalism was seen. Hobsbawm explained that after 1945, independence movements against colonialism collaborated with socialism and communism (pp.131-162).

Hobsbawm concluded that the collapse of the SU occurred not because of internal national conflicts but due to economic difficulties. Wilsonian-Leninist program of creating nation-states from ethno-linguistic communities was also a Soviet program. Moreover, in the last chapter, Hobsbawm dealt with the close relation between fundamentalism and ethnic/nationalist phenomenon. Both the ambiguous feature of nationalism and its weak programmatic content were observed. However, Hobsbawm did state that fundamentalism presented a reliable minority phenomenon which objected to modernism (pp.163-177).

Hobsbawm (2003) determined that weakening of national economies were seen with the development and strengthening of multi-national companies after the 1960s. Developments in technology, communication and transportation resulted in international and intercontinental migration. This huge amount of migration caused racist movements. However, it was also added that after the 1980s, although states applied neo-liberal economic policies, states continued to plan, direct and manage their economies. Hobsbawm concluded that the Wilsonian-Leninist ideology could not present any solution to the problems of our century. He declared that nations and nationalism were present in this history but their role would be subordinate and have minor effect. He stated that he shared the same doubts about the strength and dominance of nationalism with John Breuilly in his book *Nationalism and State*. He criticized Gellner and Anderson for their statement that nationalism was strongly rooted in the thought and behavior of the people (pp.181-192).

### 3.3.8 Ernest Gellner and Nationalism

The sociological focus on the transition to industrialism and its cultural and political consequences was very different. Firstly, we have to define what nationalism is. Kedourie has already implied that nationalists believed that nationalism would assist modernization. It was claimed that this was revealed in British, American, French and German nationalisms (O'Leary, 1997, p.205).

While studying nationalism, it was apparently seen that Ernest Gellner had been seen as the most esteemed theorist of nationalism. It was alleged that Gellner introduced the

connections between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies. In Gellner's essays and books, nationalism was revealed as a necessary component of modernity (O'Leary, p.191).

Gellner (2006) defined nationalism as a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. He stated that nationalism was a theory of political legitimacy, which required that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the power holders from the rest. Gellner pointed out that mankind had passed through three fundamental stages in its history, pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial. He noted that problem of nationalism did not arise when there was no state. Moreover, he concluded that the problem of nationalism did not arise for each and every state. Furthermore, he stated that nationalism arose only for some states (pp.1-4). Gellner mentioned that nationalism held that nations and states were destined for each other that each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. In that sense, Gellner presented that the state had certainly emerged without the help of the nation. He added that some nations had certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. He determined that two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture. Moreover, he indicated that two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation (pp.6-7).

Dealing with culture in agrarian societies, Gellner stated that in the middle and agrarian age, all agrarian societies did not attain literacy. It was indicated that the written word seemed to enter history with the accountant and tax collector. He further stated that agrarian societies brought forth a major chasm between the great and little traditions. In that sense, the ruling class formed a small minority of the population, separated from the peasants. In agrarian societies, society divided horizontally and vertically. The ruling classes, namely clergy, military, administrative and commercial separated horizontally. On the other hand, peasants were separated vertically. It was clearly observed that cultural differentiation was widespread in agrarian societies. In other words, Gellner mentioned that political units could not be defined in terms of cultural boundaries in agrarian societies. Culture and power did not intersect in agrarian society. It is advantageous for an

agro-literate society to stress and sharpen the diacritical, differential and monopolizable traits of privileged groups. Inequalities were fortified in these societies. Gellner also claimed that Marxism was wrong in defining strong horizontal differences in industrial societies. Gellner mentioned that in agrarian societies, horizontal differences were apparent and industrial societies strengthened the international boundaries rather than class boundaries. As Gellner mentioned, although cultures proliferated, cultural imperialism did not occur in agrarian societies. It was added that cultures proliferated in many different ways and it was difficult for any one to define his cultural background (pp.8-18).

Gellner defined industrial society with high powered technology, sustained growth, mobile division of labor, communication between strangers which has explicit meaning, a standard idiom and writing. In this age, the state acquired the monopoly of legitimate education. Gellner presented that nationalism did not have very deep roots in the human psyche. On the other hand, he stated that the roots of nationalism in industrial society were very deep. Universal literacy, and numerical, technical and general sophistication are seen in an industrial society. Members of industrial societies are mobile. Communication is widespread and the educational system becomes large and indispensable. Except for some precious teachers and professors, every profession could be filled by another person. Man's education is his most precious investment in this world. Modern men adhered to a culture rather than to a king or a religion. In this society, the school transmits culture and education is sustained by the state. Gellner defined culture as a shared medium and atmosphere where every men could live, speak and work. In other words, it is the same culture. Moreover, this culture must be a culture which is literate and training sustained rather than diversified, locality-tied and illiterate, with little culture or tradition (pp.19-37).

Gellner indicated that there has been a process of movement from agrarian society to industrial society. It was stated that there has been also a process from the industrial society towards an age of nationalism. He pointed out that there was a fascinating relationship between Reformation and nationalism. Reformation brought the decline of the monopolistic priesthood, and helped the emergence of individualism. He claimed that a reformist character was also seen in Islam. Islam stressed scripturalism and opposed a spiritual brokerage. Gellner observed this movement known as Islamic Protestanism gave

way to Arab nationalism. Gellner mentioned that there has been a link between nationalism and processes of colonialism, imperialism and decolonization. The emergence of industrial society resulted in conquest of the entire world by European powers. Gellner claimed that this conquest was planned for economic results, not for military purposes. Gellner articulated the weakness of nationalism even in the age of nationalism. It was stated that there are 8000 languages and only 200 states, even taking into account the effective nationalisms and 800 nationalisms. Thus, we can conclude that there is one effective nationalism for ten potential nationalisms. Thereby, Gellner noted that many cultures and potential groups have entered the age of nationalism without making any effort to benefit from it. Gellner determined that nationalism was not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force. It is the result of a new form of social organization based on high culture, protected by its own state. Hegel expressed that nations might have had a long history before they finally reached their destination that of forming themselves into states. He claimed that the pre-state period was pre-historical. Gellner affirmed that observing nations as natural and God-given is a myth, that nationalism takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them and often obliterates pre-existing cultures. In that sense, Gellner concluded that nationalism is a very strong force (pp.38-51).

Gellner claimed that nations could only be defined in terms of the age of nationalism. Standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high culture, and a pervading entire population were needed. Nationalism engenders nations. In the age of nationalism, nations worship themselves. Nationalism can be basically defined as general imposition of high culture on society (pp.32-57).

Gellner told a story about Ruritania and the Empire of Megalomania. He determined the emergence of Ruritanian nationalism. Although these two entities lived close to each other, Ruritania was less developed and more rural. Megalomania was a rather developed and wealthy place. Ruritanian youth became teachers and journalists and were supported by other non-Ruritarian ethnographers, musicologists and historians. They suffered and they created folk music. However, this event did not create cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism emerged later. Culturally and linguistically differentiated Ruritanians suffered much more than the proletariat, who spoke the language of the ruling class. Ruritanians

conceived and expressed their resentments and discontents. Previously, they felt themselves within a family, village or valley, but early industrial development swept away all these ties. It was observed that impoverished people spoke the same dialects but wealthy people spoke different languages. Thereby, these events realized the birth of the concept of a Ruritanian nation, with some encouragement from those aforementioned journalists and teachers (pp.57-61).

Gellner indicated that industrialization created a culturally homogeneous and mobile society. In the early stages, this process produced very sharp and painful inequalities. After that, the wealthy and impoverished would identify themselves differently. A new nation came onto the scene (pp.72-73)

According to Gellner, agrarian populations were affected by a centralized government and the discovery of writing. He defined the agrarian society as Malthusian. Defense and production needs compeled this society to seek a growing population. On the other hand, he pointed out that industrial society was not Malthusian. It was based on cognitive and economic growth and discouraged population growth. Universal literacy, mobility, individualism and political centralization were seen as characteristics of industrial society. He concluded that all these factors ensured that political and cultural boundaries were on the whole congruent. He stated that the state was the protector of a culture and maintainer of a homogeneous and standardizing educational system. This system enabled the citizens to move from one job to another. He indicated that the most violent phase of nationalism was seen in the early industrial era, where widespread and harsh inequalities were observed. He claimed that industrialization came to different places and groups at different times. Within modernization period, everyone felt unjustly treated, and purveyors of these methods were seen as symbolizing another nation. Gellner also proposed that when the freedom of international movement became general, nationalism would cease to be a problem. He added that communication gaps engendered by cultural differences would no longer produce nationalist tensions. He confirmed that late industrial society did not endanger deep social abysses, which could be activated by ethnicity. This society would respect cultural differences (pp.106-117)

Gellner claimed that the culture needs to be sustained as a culture, not as a carrier of faith. He stated that the transition from one kind of high culture to another was seen as the coming of nationalism (pp.135-136).

O'Leary claimed in his "Thought and Change" Gellner alleged both Marxism and Liberalism went wrong. Marxists have observed that nationalism could be seen as a necessary but temporary level leading to global socialism. On the other hand, Liberals affirmed that nationalism was irrational, superstitious and brutal (p.192).

O'Leary articulated that conservatives and secular rationalists were disturbed by Gellner's arguments. Gellner assumed that nationalism placed religion as a secondary and minor factor, establishing stable political order. Moreover, it was also suggested that the law, reason, material prosperity and social justices were revealed as secondary principles in establishing a stable and legitimate political order. Gellner's thoughts were criticized by Elie Kedourie (p.192).

O'Leary has stated that Gellner rejected four theories of nationalism. Firstly, he rejected the Dark Gods Theory. The Dark Gods Theory means that nationalism is the expression of the atavistic and irrationalist passions motivating people (p.192). Secondly, he rejected the nationalist theory which is natural and self-evident. Thirdly, he also rejected Kedourie's theory by claiming that it is inessential to the life of industrial societies. Kedourie claims that nationalism is an accidental and bad set of ideas. Fourthly, he rejected Marxism's "Wrong Address Theory". This theory means that, while Marxism proposed a theory for the awakening of classes, it was accepted by nations. His theory says that nationalism is an essential component of modernization, of the transition from the agrarian to industrial society (p.198).

Gellner affirmed that nationalism was a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialization or modernization, but with its uneven diffusion. It could be defined as successive waves of industrialization and modernization which brought sharp stratifications between peoples (O'Leary, p. 194).

Gellner accepted that there were some pre-modern political entities having many similarities with new entities that had been produced by modern nationalisms. Modernizing forces generating nationalisms have been seen in Europe since the Reformation. Gellner tried to protect his thesis, and in that sense, he separated modern nationalism, which is defined by citizenship through education, from pre-modern nationalism (O'Leary, p.195).

He admitted that nationalism is not an all powerful force by giving the examples of Switzerland, Belgium and Canada. These states were resisting the idea of "one culture, one polity". Traditional society with a tempered modernization can tolerate linguistic pluralism. It was claimed that the most important benefit of nationalism is the preservation of pluralism (O'Leary, pp.196-197).

The preconditions of nationalism should be studied. According to Gellner, first of all, widespread or universal literacy is needed. Then, economic growth, free communication and high culture are needed. Gellner proposed that nationalism is distinctive to industrial society and connected to its mode of production, coercion, cognition and culture.

Gellner states that

> Whereas tribal societies worship themselves indirectly (as spirits), agrarian societies worship their rulers directly or indirectly (in monotheistic religions), while in industrial societies the participants directly worship themselves (nationalism) (O'Leary, p.199).

Gellner explained nationalism according to its beneficial consequences. Thus, he utilizes a functionalist approach to nationalism. His argument reveals that nationalism is an effect of modernization. It is also beneficial for modernizing states. Gellner claimed that the creators of modernization did not have any intention to produce nationalism (O'Leary, p.204). As O'Leary stated, Gellner's is a strongly modernist theory. Both John Armstrong's *Nations before Nationalism* and Anthony Smith's *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* criticized the modernist interpretation of nations and nationalism (p.206).

Gellner's theory could not be falsified by the existence of the word nation in pre-eighteenth century England or by the presence of national consciousness in the times of Henry VII. It

could be observed that most of the nations before nationalism were establishing the existence of cultural precedents, plus ethnic and other materials shaped by nation-builders (O'Leary, p.207). Gellner insisted that within industrialized nation-states, the emergence of secessionism was less likely (O'Leary, p.209) .

O'Leary suggested that there were great waves of modern state-creation. Firstly, it occurred in Latin America in the 1820s. After that, new European states were recognized in Versailles. Then, the new Asian, African, Caribbean and Pacific states were established after 1945. Lastly, after the collapse of the SU, newly independent states were introduced to the world arena (p.212).

O'Leary stated that nation-state formation took place by permission. It was claimed that nation-formation was not a by-product of indigenous mobilization for nationhood. He gave examples of the creation of America with the help of France and the Versailles Treaty, which redrew the map of Europe. It was suggested that Gellner's theory of nationalism rested on cultural and materialist premises. Moreover, it was added that Gellner undermined the importance of power-politics. Many intellectuals claimed that the functional relationship between nationalism and military success is more significant than the relationship between nationalism and economic performance. He was also criticized for drawing a relationship between egalitarianism and nationalism but disregarding the relationship between nationalism, egalitarianism and democratization. In that case, the democracies of the US, France and the UK were given as examples. Gellner assumed that democratization was a lucky accident in industrialized societies. It was not a systemic product (pp.212-217).

Ernest Gellner (1981) determined that modern society was politically centralized. He cited that modern society was economically specialized to a very high degree. He noted that this industrial society was also occupationally mobile. In that sense, he added that in various ways, a good proportion of these specialisms require a high technical level and prolonged genuine training. He expressed that the idea that an industrial society was not merely mobile between generations but also within individual life-spans and careers. He cited that modern societies could range along the whole gamut from mild to extreme socialism. He

lastly said that neither tribalism nor quietism-on-principle are viable options in a modern society (pp.753-776).

Gellner claimed that nationalist ideas were just as bad as Kedourie's. Gellner did not give much importance to Universalist theories of nationalism. The writings of Burke, Herder, Fichte and List have been seen as of particular concern for their national causes (O'Leary, p.219). Gellner treated nationalism as the doctrine of "one culture, one state".

### 3.3.9 Benedict Anderson and Nationalism

Anderson (1996) said that a nation is an imagined political community. It was imagined as both limited and sovereign. He articulated that a nation was imagined as limited because there should be boundaries which lie beyond other nations. Anderson also proposed that nation should be sovereign. The idea of a nation came onto the scene in an age of Enlightenment and Revolution. It is important to note that the integrity of dynasties was terminated in this period. Moreover, he asserted that nation could be imagined as a community, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation. Thus, the nation was always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Having fraternity, deep horizontal comradeship ensured that many people willingly died for such limited imaginings. Anderson investigated why so many people died because of nationalism. He tried to answer this question by looking at the cultural roots of nationalism. He found that national imagining has a strong affinity with religious imaginings. He explained the cultural roots of nationalism with death. However, in the 18$^{th}$ century, Western Europe witnessed the birth of nationalism, and in a sense, a death of religious thinking. Rationalist securalism was seen. Although it was agreed that nation-states were a new phenomenon, it was accepted that there was an immemorial past and limitless future of nation-states. He proposed that nationalism had to be understood by aligning not with political ideologies but by investigating cultural systems. These cultural systems were the religious community and the dynastic realm (pp.6-11).

Benedict Anderson wrote his famous book "Imagined Communities" in 1983. He remarked that nationalism was close to kinship and religion rather than liberalism and

fascism. He defined nation as an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He expressed that nation was imagined because members of the even the smallest nations would never know most of their fellow-members. He indicated that nation was limited because all of them have finite boundaries. In this context, he stated that no nation could imagine itself coterminous with mankind. He also proposed that nation was imagined sovereign. It was stated that nation as a concept was born in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution. In this age, the legitimacy of divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm was destroyed. Therefore, it was articulated that even societies which adhered to religion chose to be free. The address of this freedom was shown as the sovereign state. Finally, nation was imagined as a community, because nation was conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (pp.1-7).

He stated that dynasties lost their powers. One of the reasons for the fading of dynasties was exploration of the non-European world. The other reason was lowering position of the sacred language itself. Thus, Anderson summarized that the fall of the Latin Language illustrated that sacred communities unified by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized and territorialized (pp.11-19).

Anderson addressed ideas about dynastic realm, apprehensions of time and prosperity. In that sense, in the old dynastic realms, there were vague boundaries and heterogeneous populations. Besides the decline of sacred societies and languages, a much more important phenomenon was observed; perception of time by people changed. Coming into prosperity, the emergence of the novel and newspaper were instrumental in this process. Different stories of news happening throughout the world were seen in newspapers. Imagined linkages could be presented as chronological coincidence. Moreover, the relationship between the newspaper and the market could be identified. It was emphasized that books were the first mass-produced industrial commodities. Then, it was also pointed out that newspapers were daily consumed and one day after they were published they became useless. Hegel also stated that newspapers served modern man as a substitute for morning prayers (pp.19-35).

Anderson named three important items which lost their power before imagining nations. Firstly, sacred languages declined. These sacred languages could be exemplified as Arabic and Latin. Secondly, there was a belief that society was organized around and under high centers, or kings. Thirdly, there had been a conception of time in which history and cosmology were regarded as the same. Also, the origins of human-beings were seen as the same. Cosmology and history were distinguished with the help of economic change, discoveries and rapid communication. Print-capitalism was the most influential development in this process (p.36).

Anderson explained the rise of national consciousness with the help of capitalism's influence on vernaculars. There was a change in the character of Latin. Secondly, the impact of the Reformation was important. The Reformation also succeeded with the help of print-capitalism. Thirdly, absolutist monarchs benefited from the spread of vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization. Anderson concluded this part by articulating that convergence of capitalism, print technology and diversity of human language created an imagined society, and, eventually, a nation (pp.37-46).

Anderson stated that the bourgeoisie was illiterate; they were the first class to achieve solidarity on an imagined basis. He affirmed that the general growth in literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machineries in 19th century created strengthened new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification within each dynastic realm (pp.76-78).

Anderson expressed that the last wave of capitalism occurred in Africa and Asia. These colonial territories of Asia and Africa responded to global imperialism achieved by industrial capitalism. Capitalism contributed to the development of print and in turn, this helped the creation of vernacular-based nationalisms in Europe (pp.139-140).

Anderson pointed out that in the nation-building process, mass media, the educational system and administrative regulations were helpful elements to inspire national ideology. Moreover, Anderson added in other editions of his book that census, map and museum were also important contributors for the development of nations (pp.163-164). Anderson argued that the nation was an imagined community. It is imagined because the members of

even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members (Tamir,1995, pp.420-421).

### 3.3.10 Miroslav Hrosch and Nationalism

Miroslav Hrosch wrote *the Revival of the Small European Nations I: The Nations of Northern and Eastern Europe* in 1971. He brought the idea of "the three phases of nationalism" to the literature of nationalism. He conducted a quantitative analysis. He stated that there were eight state-nations; England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and Russia which had literature, high culture and ethnically homogeneous ruling elites at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He regarded Germany and Italy as emerging nations. Moreover, he added that there were thirty non-dominant ethnic groups within the territories of the empires (Özkırımlı, pp.156-157).

Hrosch stated the differences of the national and nationalist movements. He mentioned that nationalism gave an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests. He alleged that there were many forms of nationalist consciousness, and nationalism was one of them. He explained the three groups of demands of nationalist movements. Firstly, the development and improvement of a national culture based on the local language which had to be used in education, administration and economic life was demanded. Secondly, the creation of a complete social structure including educated elites and entrepreneurial classes was requested. Thirdly, the achievement of equal civil rights and some degree of political self-administration was demanded. Hrosch stated that the national movement was completed when three conditions were fulfilled (Özkırımlı, p.158).

Hrosch explained the three structural phases between national movements and its successful completion. He defined phase A as that in which activists investigated linguistic, historical, cultural attributes of their ethnic group. Moreover, he articulated that a new range of activists emerged who tried to gain the support of more ethnic groups to aid in the project of creating a nation. Furthermore, he defined phase C when the majority of the population acquired national consciousness and a mass movement was formed. Hrosch

determined that after the completion of phase C, a full social structure could be established (Özkrımlı, pp.158-159).

Hrosch dealt with big and small nations. He distinguished them according to their social structures and did not consider the geographical dimensions. He stated that there was a national aristocracy and developed class stratification in big nations. There was a foreign aristocracy and undeveloped class structure within small nations. The conflict and struggle between national bourgeoisie and national aristocracy was witnessed in big nations. The conflict was seen between national bourgeoisie and foreign aristocracy in small nations. Nationalist arguments were presented with democratic demands in big nations and were used with autonomy in small nations. Class structure was merged into the nation in big nations. Class structure was partly integrated into nation in small nations. Although nation-building was completed in big nations, it was not completed in small nations (Roger, pp.55-60).

### 3.3.11 Tom Nairn and Nationalism

Tom Nairn (1994) stated that nationalism was determined by certain features of the world political economy in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day in his famous book, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism* in 1977 (p.70). Tom Nairn (1981) was a Scottish Marxist theorist; he stated that the theory of nationalism represented Marxism's great historical failure (cited in Özkırımlı, p.88). The unbalanced, unequal development of capitalism in the eighteenth century resulted in the emergence of nationalism. Nairn (1981) stated that core states exploited and dominated the periphery states. He also stated that nationalism carried both the seeds of goodness and badness. Societies were led to development and industrialization with the help of nationalism. He was also stated that there has been ambiguity about the essence of the nationalism. Nairn compared the resemblance of Janus' face to nationalism. He stated that Janus had two faces; one looking forward and the other looking backward. Özkırımlı summarized the ideas of Nairn; uneven development of capitalism caused the emergence of nationalism in backward states. The pressure, exploitation and the dominance of

developed western states reacted with nationalist movements in backward countries. The elites were influential in this process (cited in Özkrımlı, pp.112-114).

Nairn (1994) mentioned that, as Marxists stated, nationalism required a national market economy and a viable national bourgeoisie class. Idealists, on the other hand, focused on the spirit of the community and a common personality developed through history. Nairn determined that both Marxists and Idealists agreed that internationalism could be attained after the development of healthy nationalism. Moderate, reasonable nationalism was praised and immoderate or excessive nationalism was regarded as unhealthy. Nairn defined nationalism as a social necessity, a growth stage, located between traditional, feudal societies and world society and mentioned that nationalism corresponded to some internal, psychological needs of the society (pp.70-71).

Nairn (1994) identified nationalism as an ideology, and he stated that generally accepted false consciousness of a social world was still in the grip of nationalism. Moreover, it was plausible that there was a connection between nationalism and the concept of development, social and economic growth. He stated that the nationhood had acquired systemic and abstract meaning within the context of development since the 1800s. Furthermore, Nairn articulated that nationalism was connected with internal movements of personnel and persons. However, he highlighted the importance of international political economy over citizens or the individual's passions for wholeness or identity (pp.71-72).

Nairn (1994) dealt with those Western European states which developed modern capitalism. He stated that the leading countries of Western Europe experienced domination and invasion. Peripheral states faced new periods known as Anglicanization, Frenchification, Westernization and, finally, Americanization. He summarized this political development as the Enlightenment realized widely by bourgeoisie revolutions (p.73) Nairn (1981) mentioned that imperialist policies of core western countries motivated the elites of the periphery. He mentioned that elites were influenced by Romanticism and Populism and they created and used national myths. The elites were nationalists of that time. The elites of undeveloped states strived to acquire factories, schools and parliaments. The elites objected to the intervention of foreigners. This involvement could be performed

by a militant society which undermined class differences, conscious of its identity. However, Nairn considered that the elites did not have any tools to acquire their needs (cited in Özkırımlı, p.113). Thus, they focused on resorting to populism. Nairn (1994) mentioned that nationalism worked through differentiation. People differentiate according to ethnicity, speech, folklore and skin-color (pp.73-75).

### 3.3.12 Michael Hechter and Nationalism

Michael Hechter wrote the book *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* in 1975. He explained nationalism within the context of internal colonialism (Özkırımlı, p.96).

Hechter mentioned that assimilationists considered that ethnic/racial minorities were isolated from the national culture, and thus, they were poor and frustrated. Socialization and education of these people were seen important. Hechter's diffusion model of development identified three stages. The first stage was seen as pre-industrial, and there was no relationship between the core and periphery. The second stage was the process of industrialization, and institutional penetration of core to periphery was observed. At the third stage, the equality of regional wealth, elimination of cultural differences, and application of social and political policies through the national parties was realized (Özkırımlı, pp.97-98).

Hechter stated that an uneven wave of modernization created advanced and less advanced groups. The powerful, wealthy core tried to institutionalize its privileged position over the periphery. The regulation and division of social roles was arranged according to powerful core groups (Özkırımlı, pp.98-9).

Hechter stated that the greater the economic inequalities between collectivities, the greater the probability that the less advantaged would resist political integration. Moreover, he mentioned that intra-collectivity communication resulted in peripheral collectivity. Furthermore, he asserted that the greater the intergroup differences of culture, the greater the probability that the culturally distinct peripheral collectivity will be status solidarity. It

could be summarized that economic and social inferiority comparing to advantaged classes would pave way for strengthening of cultural differences and also would lead to secession (Özkırımlı, pp.99-100).

Hechter wrote *Containing Nationalism* in 2000. Hechter (2000) explained the types of nationalism and described state-building nationalism as a nationalism that was embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. He believed that peripheral nationalism occurred when a culturally distinctive territory resisted incorporation into an expanding state or attempted to separate and form its own government as in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia. Irredentist nationalism was explained as the attempt to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of adjacent states occupied principally by co-nationals, as in the case of Sudeten Germans. Unification nationalism involved the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state, as in Germany and Italy in the 19th century. Patriotism was defined as raising the prestige and power of one's own nation-state relative to rivals in the international system. It was added that patriotism was not a form of nationalism. The boundaries of the nation and the governance unit were congruent (pp.15-17).

Hechter (2000) dealt with the containing the dark side of nationalism. He stated that one of the solutions to the containment of the dark side of nationalism was granting self-determination. The second solution was presented as reducing the demand for national sovereignty. The third solution was seen as raising the costs of collective action (pp.18-19).

Hechter (2000) observed that nationalism could cause xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. He tried to discover what kind of institutions could contain nationalism's worst excesses. He categorized 3 types of conditions necessary in order to solve this issue. Firstly, the cost of collective action was at its maximum in repressive regimes. He argued that repression had been effective in the past however, its future role would be reduced by economic interdependence, increasing role of international organizations, development of communication technology, and emancipation of free media. Secondly, national identity could wane. He could not explain how this could happen. He mentioned that capitalism,

socialism and other ideologies could not eradicate cultural stratification. He stated that national identity would be likely to remain in the foreseeable future. Thirdly, he hoped that containment of the destructive sides of nationalism could be obstructed by the decrease the demand for sovereignty. He classified some institutions to increase accountability of central state by national minorities and to reduce the demand for sovereignty. One of them was consociationalism, which was presented as a suitable form of government for multinational, multiethnic societies. In this model, the leader of each nation participated in the decision-making process. Moreover, constituent nations acquired a high degree of governance. Secondly, electoral systems would offer parliamentary representatives who were accountable to their constituents. Thirdly, a federation was seen as a better solution if consociationalism and electoral systems were unsuccessful. However, he claimed that a federation could intensify nationalist conflict. It was also added that a federation could also inhibit nationalist conflict (pp.134-145).

## 3.4 The Evaluation of the Theories of Nationalism

In highlighting the terms of nation, nationalism and nation-state, many definitions were considered. Adrian Hastings (1997) dealt with the differences and similarities between ethnicity and nation and concluded that a nation was more a self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Hastings concluded that a nation was formed of one or more ethnicities. It is striking that as Hastings emphasized, a nation was identified with a body of literature, it possessed a political identity, and it controlled specific territory. Sieyes defined nation as a body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature. Ernest Renan described the nation as the daily plebiscite. Both Mazzini and Anthony Smith stressed that largeness of a nation was needed for it to be called a nation.

Haas (1986), on the other hand, defined nation as a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing them to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state. He pointed out that these individuals shared a collective consciousness of uniqueness that was fostered by the group's sharing of core symbols. He cited that a nation was a group of people who wished

to practice self-determination. Moreover, Anthony Giddens stated that a nation could only exist when a state had a unified administrative reach over its territory. He mentioned that both capitalism and industrialism influenced the emergence of nation-states. Giddens (2008) also alleged that the war industry was accompanied by the rise of nation-states. He regarded globalization as the dissemination of nation-states. Giddens identified modernity with capitalist entrepreneurship, industrial production and central control of tools of violence. Charles Tilly stated that the nation-states were created by wars. He explained this situation by the fact that kings needed greater funds from their subjects.

Yael Tamir (1995) defined nationalism through a community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness and exclusivity as well as a common ancestry and a continuous genealogy. Wallerstein (2005) asserted that the bourgeoisie had used nationalism to strengthen itself against foreigners in the international market and to protect its place in internal markets. Moreover, he claimed that every core state used nationalism to legitimize its place in the international system.  Benedict Anderson (1996) defined nationalism with manufactured linguistic identity and Anthony Smith (2001b) considered nationalism to be a particular ideology of solidarity based on preindustrial roots.

Ernest Gellner (2006), on the other hand, treated that phenomenon as a distinctly industrial principle of social evolution and social organization. Gellner contended that nationalism was not the awakening of nations, but that nationalism invented nations where they did not exist. The cultural homogenization that was gained through education maintained national consciousness. Thus, this collective national consciousness was regarded as nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism, being one of the key issues of nationalism, was explained as consciousness of having primordial or transmitted group characteristics which were parts of ethnicity such as language, customs and territorial connection. Antiquity and uniformity of a community's origins would reflect the ethnicity of a community, or the ethnic community. This ethnic community was seen as a natural grouping. Patriotism, being another factor to be considered, was generally identified with the features of the ethnicity. It was explained that people began to die for a more abstract social construct within the

context of nation. It was proposed that nations had an institutional dimension that was state-oriented.

Dealing with theories of nationalism, primordialism stressed the naturalness of nations, and that nations were apparent from ancient times. Focusing on the term primordial to explain it, common words such as ethnicity, blood and family ties and kinship have been used extensively. Özkırımlı (2000) divided primordialism into three categories: the naturalist, sociobiological and culturalist approaches. In that sense, the naturalist approach of primordialism gives importance to ethnicity and the national identity: in other words, ethnicity and nationality were considered identical. The sociobiological approach of primordialism gave priority to kin selection. Therefore, people belonging to same culture got married. Ethnic cohesiveness was based on genes and instincts. The sociobiological approach explained nations as big families. The cultural approach of primordialism stressed faith or cultural loyalties. According to this approach, people believed that they depended upon each other through ethnic ties.

Perennialism indicated that nations were natural communities. As Anthony Smith explained, perennialists believed that some nations had existed for a long period of time. There have been two types of perennialism; continuous perennialism and recurrent perennialism. Continuous perennialism asserted that some nations had a long continuous history. On the other hand, recurrent perennialism claimed the antiquity of nations that particular nations were historical and they changed with the time.

Ethno-symbolism gave importance to ethnic backgrounds; myths, symbols, values and memoirs were important in order to understand modern nations. John Armstrong, being the most influential theorist of ethno-nationalism, believed that ethnic consciousness had a long history. He mentioned that ethnic consciousness was seen in the ancient civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Anthony Smith claimed that contemporary nationalism was the final stage of a larger cycle of ethnic consciousness. His main contribution to the study of nationalism has been the indication that nations had pre-modern origins. His approach was called ethno-symbolism. Nation could be defined as a community which shared a historical homeland, common myths, historical memories, a common culture, common

legal duties and rights. He emphasized that nations needed ethnic elements for the nation-building process. The first nations were based on ethnic grounds and a strong common culture. Meanwhile, even when there had only been slight evidence of ethnic ties, myths and symbols were used to create a nation. In other words, kinships and also religious ties helped the creation of nations. Smith dealt with culture and religion and he stated that these two factors were influential in explaining nationalism. Taking these into consideration, nationalism was much more than a political ideology; it was also a form of culture and religion.

Modernism explained that nations and nationalism were modern phenomena. It was stated that both the nation and nationalism were recent phenomena which were apparent for two hundred years. The nation, nationalism, capitalism, industrialism, the bureaucratic state, secularism and urbanization were the products of modernism. It was observed that, as Hobsbawm articulated, "nationalism comes before nations.'

Dealing with nationalism, Hans Kohn advocated that the most essential element is corporate will. He called this will as nationalism. Kohn's nationalism thesis was based on reason and universal justice, which were the features of liberalism. He mentioned the story of nationalism was based on western civilization presented first by England, France and the US. Deutsch explained that a nation was a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors. It was claimed that the political experience of Europe could be understood by defining nationalism. Deutsch mentioned there was an evolution in political integration. He stated that firstly, villages became districts, counties, or baronies. These entities turned to duchies and provinces, then, merged into kingdoms. He added that the kingdoms reverted to federations or empires and expressed that, by considering this evolution of political integration; Dante articulated the term "world government" at the end of the 13th century.

Kedourie (1996) stated that nationalism was an ideology. He pointed out that nationalism was invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. Respectively, the doctrine held that humanity was naturally divided into nations. He cited Kant's works and indicated the importance of self-determination. Elie Kedourie explained the connection of nationalism

with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It is apparent that Kant was the essential figure in Kedourie's works. He tried to give the historical background for this ideology.

John Breuilly (1994) explained nationalism as a form of politics. He mentioned that nationalism was political behavior in the context of the modern state and modern state system. He expressed that nationalism was about politics, which was about power. This power was defined with the control of the state. Nationalism was explained as the usage of state power, and he stated that the interests and values of the nation took priority over all other interests and values.

Paul Brass (1996) mentioned that ethnicity and nationalism were not 'givens'; they were social and political constructions. He explained both ethnicity and nationalism as creations of the elites. He also indicated that both of them were modern phenomena. Both ethnicity and nationalism have been connected to the activities of the modern centralizing state.

Minogue (1967) regarded nationalism as a European invention. He firstly explained 18<sup>th</sup> century France and the patriotism of Rousseau, ideas of Sieyes and French Revolution. Then, he dealt with nationalism and German unity.

Hobsbawm (1995) stated that nations were a recent and modern phenomena and nationalism came before nations. Nation could be understood as a defined territorial state, or nation-state. Hobsbawm summarized that even the most liberal economies did not undermine the importance of national economy. In that sense, economy's goal was to achieve the economic development of a nation and to prepare its entry into the universal society of the future. Hence, it was pointed out that such development would further realize capitalist industrialism with the help of the bourgeoisie. Hobsbawm articulated that nation was a part of liberal ideology. It was linked to the slogans of the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. Therefore, the nation was opposed by conservatives and traditionalists. Hobsbawm stated that language was one of the alternatives of distinguishing cultural communities. However, language was not the primary way to identify this. He pointed out that even the most apparent ethnic differences had played a rather slight role in

the birth of modern nationalism. Hobsbawm simplified this by giving the example of Negritude. He claimed that close ties between religion and national consciousness were obvious, as seen in the examples of Poland and Ireland. Hobsbawm explained that religion was an ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion. However, it was added that religion was seen as the paradoxical cement for proto-nationalism. In that sense, it was claimed that religion could challenge the nation's monopoly and claim to its members' loyalty. Hobsbawm cited that the most decisive criterion of proto-nationalism was the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity, explained as the political nation. Hobsbawm stated in his famous article, "The Invention of Traditions", that primary schools were essential tools needed to spread the image and heritage of the nation and to ensure the emotion of loyalty to a nation. He indicated that states inventing traditions and even inventing nations implemented this attachment to the flag and the country.

Gellner (2006) defined nationalism as a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. He stated that nationalism was a theory of political legitimacy, which required that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the power holders from the rest. Gellner pointed out that mankind had passed through three fundamental stages in its history. These were pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial. Gellner stated the problem of nationalism did not arise when there was no state. He concluded that the problem of nationalism did not arise for each and every state. Gellner defined industrial society by high powered technology, sustained growth, mobile division of labor, communication between strangers which has explicit meaning, a standard idiom and also writing. In this way, schools transmit culture. Education has been sustained by the state and Gellner indicated that there has been a process leading from an agrarian society to an industrial society. It was stated that there has been also a process from an industrial society towards an age of nationalism. He pointed out that there has been a fascinating relationship between reformation and nationalism. He claimed reformist features were seen in Islam. Gellner claimed that nations could only be defined in terms of the age of nationalism. A standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high culture pervading the entire population was needed. Nationalism engenders nations. In the age of nationalism, nations

worship themselves. Nationalism was basically defined as general imposition of high culture on society. Gellner indicated that industrialization created culturally homogeneous and mobile society. The preconditions of nationalism should be examined. According to Gellner, first of all, widespread or universal literacy is needed. Then, economic growth, free communication and high culture are needed. Gellner proposed that nationalism is distinctive to industrial society and connected to its modes of production, coercion, cognition and culture.

Anderson (1996) said that a nation is an imagined political community. It was imagined as both limited and sovereign. He articulated that nation was imagined as limited because there should be boundaries which lie beyond other nations. He expressed that nation was imagined because members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members. Anderson also proposed that a nation should be sovereign. The idea of a nation came onto the scene in an age of enlightenment and revolution; he proposed that nationalism had to be understood by aligning not with political ideologies but by investigating cultural systems. These cultural systems were the religious community and the dynastic realm. Anderson indicated that the eighteenth century was the birth of nationalism and demise of religious thought. He emphasized that nation-states were accepted as new and historical. Firstly, sacred languages deteriorated. These sacred languages could be exemplified by Arabic and Latin. Secondly, there was a belief that society was organized around and under high centers or kings. Thirdly, there had been a conception of time in which history and cosmology were regarded as the same. Also, the origins of human-beings were seen as the same. Cosmology and history were distinguished with the help of economic change, discoveries and rapid communication. Print-capitalism was the most influential development in this process. Anderson explained the rise of national consciousness with the help of capitalism's influence on vernaculars. Anderson pointed out that in the nation-building process, mass media, the educational system and administrative regulations were helpful elements to inspire national ideology. Moreover, Anderson added in other editions of his book that census, map and museum were also important contributors for the development of a nation.

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# 4. THE NASCENT TURKISH NATIONALISM

Turkish nationalism should be defined by considering its historical evolution and can be investigated through explaining the parameters of homeland, bourgeoisie, common language, common will, opponents of Turkish nationalism and constructing factors.

There have been ongoing debates about the Ottoman administrative system. Berkes (2006) indicated that it could not be defined as feudal or theocratic but neither, he asserted, could it be defined as both theocratic and feudal. It is needed to be explained the main features of the Ottoman administrative system. To this end, the best example of a theocratic state could be given as the Roman Catholic Papacy. Berkes stated that the Ottoman Empire did not apply enforced Islamization in its treatment of its subject. There was a diversification based on religion. This, then, revealed the fact that the Ottoman Empire was not a theocratic state. Dealing with Western Europe, experts have stated that feudalism was replaced by absolute monarchy and absolute monarchy was removed by a capitalist, liberal, constitutional system in Western Europe. Comparatively, the reigns of Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali Pasha were regarded as Eastern-style despotisms. It was alleged that Asian and Eastern states were not based on racism but rather, they were based on geographical and military conditions. All the reactions and uprisings against modernization were considered to be religious reactions by western political observers. The westerners identified all the non-Christian societies with their religion (pp.24-30).

In the 19th century, economic activities were being conducted by Greeks, Jews and other Christian subjects. Ömer Lütfi Barkan stated that feudalism did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. The proprietorship of the lands belonged to Ottoman state. There was no Turkish bourgeoisie. *Timars* were dissolved, and the *timars* reverted to *miri* lands. Tax collection was given to *mültezims*. Devaluation of money, a rise in the expenses of the state and army, sale of official ranks, and tax-collection of *mültezims* all led to the emergence of a new capitalist class The administrative system of the Ottoman Empire could be regarded as traditional, and this traditional character carried some features of religion but also of despotism. However, the whole system could not be defined as religious. The Ottoman

Empire could not be called theocratic in western understanding. Imposition and enforcement of Islam on non-Muslim societies and provincial authorities were not observed. Strikingly, feudalism did not exist in the Empire; the peasants and administrative bodies as well were the subjects of the Sultan. Administrative authority was based on military power. Taxes collected from the peasants and war booty ensured the continuance of the economic life of the Empire. In sum, the economy of the Ottoman Empire was based on agriculture and continuous conquests. The Muslim subjects of the Empire were farmers and soldiers. The non-Muslim subjects were artisans and tradesmen. It is important to note that the *timar* system did not let the capital accumulation. (Demir, Acar & Toprak, 2004, p.166; Lewis, pp.44-45).

Berkes indicated that the main feature of Ottoman Empire was its traditionalism. It was mentioned that this concept was comprised of religion, the caliphate, and eastern despotism. It is important to note that serving classes were also social classes in the west. However, the servers of the Sultan did not comprise social classes; they were simply subjects of the Sultan. From the 18th century to the 20th century, corruption was witnessed within the Ottoman system. Berkes explained these changes, briefly as godly order being replaced by the natural order. Moreover, it was observed that the supreme state began to revert to a legal state. Furthermore, the traditions were altered to reflect progressive conditions. Berkes again mentioned that the Ottoman Empire was not a spiritual entity, but it was basing on military power (Berkes, 2006, pp.30-33).

After the conversion to Islam in the eighth century, Turks extended the boundaries of the Islamic world by fighting with the faith of Jihad. Afterwards, Turks began to be known as Muslims (Karpat, 1959, p.3). The Ottoman Empire comprised three distinguished groups of people. Firstly, there were military people who were entitled to carry arms. This group included soldiers, the clerks of scribal institutions, and the royal household. Secondly, there were *ulema* people who were educated, religious people and they were responsible for affairs of justice and official education (Zürcher, 2007, pp.11-13). Poulton (2006) mentioned that both a low and high culture of Islam existed. The low culture of Islam was represented by Islamic sects, *tariqats* (brotherhoods). High culture was considered as *ulema* (p.29).

Zürcher pointed out that these two groups of people, the *ulema* and higher military officials were regarded as the ruling elite. Therefore, they were the servants of the Sultan. Moreover, they did not pay taxes. The third group was called *reaya* and they were also the subjects of the Sultan. The slave officials of the Sultan, or *devşirmes*, could acquire the second highest post of the Empire and they became *Grand Vizier*. Bright, educated and successful Muslim subjects of the Sultan, on the other hand, could acquire the position of judges, higher court judges, clerics or even *Şeyhülislam* of the Empire (pp.11-13).

The majority of the Ottoman population was comprised of rural communities (Poulton, p.39). The term "Turk" was used to describe ignorant peasants. It was apparent that Turks identified themselves as Muslims till the end of the 19th century. Turkishness belonged to peasants and nomadic people. Lewis (2008) stated that the well-trained elites acquiring administrative posts did not have an ethnic consciousness like the Arabs and Iranians. Turkish nomadic tribes did not have administrative posts: they were settled in different places of Anatolia, and they became peasants. They were settled in newly invaded territories; and they acquired important roles in these new places. Afterwards, they became the members of the dominant elite. They disseminated Islamism in these territories and they founded sedentary living. The Europeans used the term "Turkish" to describe Muslims (pp.4-19). It was known that Islam has rules which demand obedience. Therefore, Muslims were loyal to the Sultan. Zürcher focused on *tariqats* that they were binding elite civilization and the illiterate rural people. These *tariqats* were Mevlevi, Nakşibendi, Rifai and Bektaşi (p.12).

The birth of Turkish nationalism could be explained with Ottoman modernization. The features of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire would need an explanation of some terms such as homeland, bourgeoisie, common language, common will and opponents of Turkish nationalism and constructing factors of Turkish nationalism. Even before the reign of Selim III, military reforms were undertaken by sultans Mustafa III (1757-74) and Abdülhamid I (1774-89). The main features of their eras could be explained with advanced technology, an economic system relying on industry, and new types of government which answered the external Western challenge. Therefore, these Western technological, economic and intellectual forces were observed in the daily life in the

society in the form of expanded trade, change in land tenure and intensified communication (Karpat, 1972, p.245).

From the 17th century, the supremacy of western states was witnessed. Russia was strengthened. It was observed that the balance of power shifted, and this was considered detrimental to the Ottoman Empire. Reformation of the Ottoman Empire was needed. The main problem was to secure the boundaries of the Empire; however, the Ottoman army was backward. Military schools were opened. The teaching staff of these schools was westerners. Karpat alleged referring to Bernard Lewis, that the French Revolution revealed the secular values which in turn diminished the religious differences (Karpat, 1959, pp.5-7).

It could be stated that many structural changes occurred in this era such as the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution in the West resulted in urbanization. Technological and the military advancement changed the patterns of trade. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, became an importer. The Ottoman state had been using the Black Sea as an exclusive Ottoman trade area, and which compensated for the French and British domination of Mediterranean commerce. The Ottoman state lost its important Black Sea economic base after the opening of the Black Sea to Russian trade following the Küçük Kaynarca peace treaty in 1774. The Ottoman state began to export agricultural products rather than manufactured products. Moreover, the Ottomans imported indigo, coffee, sugar, steel, and clothing. Karpat (1972) stated that the empire became an exporter of foodstuffs, woolen clothes and raw materials and it sold wool (p.247).

 Sultan Selim III (1789-1808), tried to create a modern army, an army of the new order, "*Nizam-ı Cedit*". He believed that this new army would be more loyal to him. Nonetheless, it could not be finalized, and the janissaries dethroned him. Lewis alleged that Sultan Selim III was not inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution. Nonetheless, he admired the absolute monarchy of Louis XVI and military strength of France (Lewis, 2007, pp.25-26). Zürcher stated that during the second half of the 18th century, the central government relied on local notables (*ayans)* both for troops and for tax collection and their position was strengthened (p.16).

It was noted that the defeats of the Ottoman-Russian wars of 1768-74 and 1787-92 undermined the authority of the central government. As a result of this, *ayans* emerged as the *de facto* rulers of various areas. There were two major groups in the Empire at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. The first group included notables called *ayans* and *eşrafs*. The second group was the bureaucratic-military elements of the government. The *ayans* were often landlords, not traders or manufacturers. The *ayans* organized military forces including local Muslims who were promised booty and land. The *ayans,* with the help of the *ulema* and the janissaries strengthened the local authority and weakened the central autonomy. The Muslim subjects of the empire did not have a middle class. It should be noted that Muslim craftsmen were pushed into less important trades and ordinary jobs. Moreover, Muslim-Turkish peasants fled to remaining territories of the Empire after Greek and Bulgaria gained independence. Karpat (1972) alleged that the Turkish peasant used religion as a basis of group solidarity and identified himself with the Ottoman political elite. Selim III created Nizam-ı Cedit to fight outside enemies and moreover, he wanted to prevent ascendance of the ayans. He wanted to reform *timars.* New embassies opened in Europe. Modern schools opened and the teaching personnel came from France. Both Selim III and Mahmud II aimed to provide centralization. Selim III's reforms were obstructed by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha who was a notable *ayan* of that period. Karpat stated that Mahmud II began his reign with a most humiliating concession to ayans. *Sened-i İttifak* was signed between *ayans* and the Sultan in 1808. The ayans agreed to protect the central authority against military uprisings in return for a guarantee of their lands and the right to pass them on to heirs. Karpat stated that the conflict between the central bureaucracy and the ayans resulted in accelerated centralization. The Sultan Mahmud II abolished the remaining timars. He created a new army in 1826. Afterwards, the Sultan seized the lands of the ayans and distributed them to his own men in the new army. Karpat alleged that the Sultan tried to get the support of the masses against the potential new upper classes in the countryside. He mentioned that the new property groups expanded their power after the suppression of the ayans. Ziya Gökalp, on the other hand, claimed that the rise of *ayans* was considered as the beginning of a struggle for freedom. Mahmud II founded the *Evkaf* administration to use their revenue for government expenditures. A Translation Bureau was established and became the training center for

Ottoman intellectuals. The newly emerging agricultural and artisan groups pressured the bureaucracy for a stable economic life (Karpat, 1972, pp.249-257).

In 1804, during the reign of Selim III (1804-1807), national uprisings occurred. He gave importance to consultation, *Meşveret* parliaments were founded. He decided that the *ayans* would come to power through elections. He decided to limit taxation; he obstructed the irregular applications of the *kadıs*. The *Sened-i İttifak* was to protect the authority of the Sultan. The soldiers would be assigned to be soldiers of the Ottoman Empire. If the military revolted against the government, *ayans* would help the Ottoman Empire to quell these uprisings. The *ayans* would give priority to fair taxation and security. The main purpose of the *Sened-i İttifak* was to tame the janissaries and to ensure the dependence of the *ayans* on the central government. However, it was removed after the time of Alemdar Ahmet Pasha. This agreement was in force for only 5 weeks. It was to be signed by every Grand Vizier and the Sultan in order to be effective. Some experts found this document democratic. Some other experts, on the other hand, considered it as a legitimizing tool for the cruel administration of *ayans* (Tanör, 2006, pp.35-57). Tanilli (1990) stated that this document was a sign of feudalism. However, by this time, feudalism had disappeared in the West (cited in Poulton, p.57). It is important to mention that there was a national bourgeoisie within Romania, Greece and Serbia. However, Turkish-Muslim landlords did not see a bourgeoisie class (Tanör, p.63). This could explain one of the causes of the proto-Turkish nationalism.

The Ottoman administration was non-assimilative and multi-national. The Ottoman Empire followed a policy of classifying its citizens according to religion. This system was called the *millet* system. Tunçay mentioned that there were no minorities, but there were founding members of the empire. These *millets* were divided according to their religions and not according to their ethnicities. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, were considered as second class members of the empire. However, all these people needed each other and there was division of labor (Tunçay, 2008, pp.242-243). The Ottoman Empire allowed the separate Balkan states to retain their individual cultures and identities. This changed in the 19th century; The Ottoman state began to treat all its citizens as equal, regardless of their religion after the declaration of *Tanzimat* Edict. The *Tanzimat* reforms did not lead to the

creation of an Ottoman nation. These reforms undermined the conservative *millet* leaders and helped the nationalist movements (Poulton, pp.84-85). It was known that traditional religious leaders condemned the new developments and called them an imitation of the Christian West. These elites observed that their power was eroded by the reform program of new bureaucratic-military elites. Moreover, Christian minorities were not pleased with military service equality (Canefe, 2002, p.140). It is important to note that the Tanzimat period helped the emergence of a culture of critical discourse among Ottoman intellectuals (Gündüz, 2009, p.193).

Karpat mentioned that there were three types of leaders among the Christian subjects of the Empire who encouraged nationalist movements by the end of 18th century. The first group was comprised of leading merchants, manufacturers who conducted intensive trade with Europe. The Greek merchant colonies in Vienna, Venice, Trieste and Odessa became active revolutionary vanguards of their ethnic groups. The second group was non-Muslim intellectuals. The third group was made up of half highwaymen, half popular leaders and they often served in Western armies and navies and fought as guerilla commanders and as military leaders during their respective national revolutions. Karpat (1972) indicated that these groups were from agricultural lands and maintained some sort of relations with the peasant masses (p.248).

The Sultan Mahmud II was successful in replacing the janissaries with a new modern army. Moreover, he confiscated the military fiefs. He applied the policy of modernization and reform. This reformation period continued with the *Edict of Tanzimat* which was written by Mustafa Reşid Pasha with the consent of the Sultan Abdulmecid. The *Edict* proposed equal rights to all citizens. Moreover, it aimed to protect the people and their property. Furthermore, it presented reforms on military and judiciary fields. In addition to those reforms, the Edict strived to reform the tax system. New modern and also foreign schools were opened during the *Tanzimat* era. It was important to mention that the *millet* system was replaced by Ottomanism, which was a theory of one citizenship for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This ideology was influential until the end of World War I (Lewis, 2008, pp.8-11). Basically; *Tanzimat* Edict revealed the establishment of guarantees for the life, honor and property of the Sultan's subjects. The *Tanzimat* Edict demanded financial

security for government officials. Karpat (1972) alleged that the edict's promise of security for life and property was to ensure their loyalty to the throne. Moreover, the edict also mentioned the need for banks (p.258). Some experts stated that the emergence of Turkish nationalism dated back to the *Tanzimat* era. The dominant value of Ottoman political culture was order. Nationalist movements were regarded as disorder and instability. The Ottoman identity was built in the Tanzimat era. The main aim of this policy was to ensure the loyalty of non-Muslim people. Nonetheless, this system was not successful. Separatist and nationalist uprisings increased. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Ali and Fuad Pashas were the bureaucrats of this era. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha believed that civil law should be based on Islam and moreover, internalization of this law by the Muslim people was needed. He developed a private law called Mecelle. He gave importance to Turkish identity; however, it should be taken into consideration that his Turkish nationalism was based on Islam. He supported the dominance of the Muslim society (Öğün, pp.102-104). Rationalization and specialization of the central administrative system was witnessed. Zürcher (2007) stated that the central power within the government shifted from palace to the bureaucracy (p.57).

*The Tanzimat* Edict aimed to arrange things according to *Shariah*. The reason of corruption was identified as disobedience to the rules of *Shariah*. The Ottoman Empire would treat all of its subjects equally. Consultation and new procedures of debate would be arranged. This edict could only bind the Sultan to those who swore allegiance. England and France were in favor of this edict. Russia and Austria opposed it (Tanör, pp.86-95). Afterward, old pashas and ayans were replaced by tradesmen and new landlords (p.113).

The rescript of 1856, *Islahat Fermanı*, granted equality to Christians as promised in 1839. The main obstacle of this rescript was the lack of institutions and a legal framework. Moreover, equality in military service, justice, schools and governmental jobs was proposed (Karpat, 1972, p.259).

The Christians and Jews were tolerated under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. However, they were forbidden to carry arms or ride horses. They were not eligible for the army. The Ottoman state was divided by religious affiliation. Different millets were treated like corporate bodies and allowed their own internal structures and hierarchies (Poulton, pp.46-49). The *Tanzimat* reforms brought the secularization of the state machinery, the judiciary and education. The religious equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in the courts was defined. A new penal code was introduced in 1840 which emphasized the equality of all Ottoman subjects. The poll tax for non-Muslims was abolished in 1855 and they could bear arms. Moreover, the Imperial Rescript of 1856, *Islahat Fermanı* emphasized the full equality of all subjects and Christians, Jews and Muslims were admitted to government schools and administrative positions in the government. However, military positions were not allowed to non-Muslims. The Imperial rescript of 1856 proposed fixed salaries to the Christian clergies. Thereafter, new millets for Protestants and Catholics were created. These new millets were established with the help of the great powers. It could be summarized that the monopoly and unity of the Greek Patriarchate was demolished with the creation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1557, the Bulgarian Exarchate Church in 1870, and the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1885. Although the millet system was regarded as more suitable for nationalisms of these millets, the millets had been ruling through traditional leaders who preferred the continuation of the Ottoman rule. The continuity of Ottoman rule provided traditional religious leaders the continuity of their absolute powers. However, the removal of the absolute powers of these traditional leaders paved the way for the radical nationalists (Poulton, pp.51-53).

Berkes (2006) mentioned that there was an alliance of local notables Ayans-Bektasis-Janissaries. This alliance was confronted with the alliance of Sultan Mahmud II-Ulema-Mevlevis. The local notables of the Ottoman Empire were removed by the central government and Berkes alleged that this strengthened national activities. It was also noted that there was an economic side of this issue in that Bektashis were trying to acquire all of the charitable institutions in order to levy their revenues (pp.155-161).

The Ottoman Empire faced many challenges during the 19th century. One of them was the Crimean War. It was apparent that the Crimean War was not related to Crimea, but was

related to the ownership of the church of Bethlehem. France alleged that the Bethlehem Church was Catholic and Russia, on the other hand, claimed that it was an Orthodox church (Quartet, 1994, cited in Zürcher, 2007, p.53). The discontent within the non-Muslim communities of the Empire resulted with Serbian, Greek and Lebanese crises (Zürcher, p.55).

The Young Ottomans Society was formed in 1865. They used the ideas of the Enlightenment, and they aimed to synthesize modernization with Islam (Poulton, p.55). They went to London and Paris where they were influenced by the western values and ideas. They aimed for the establishment of constitutional monarchy. They opposed the secular character of reforms; Namık Kemal was the leader of this group. They favored constitutionalism and Ottomanism. Nevertheless, Sultan Abdulhamid II, abolished the constitution in 1877 (Karpat, 1959, pp.12-13).

Ali Suavi repeatedly used the term "Turk" and looked to Turks in Central Asia as brothers. He called for the codification of Islamic laws in Turkish and for Ottoman schools to adopt Turkish as the single language of instruction. He was considered as first Turkist (Poulton, p.57).

Tanzimat bureaucrats, intellectuals, and Young Ottomans could not be regarded as nationalist in today's terms, because there was no bourgeoisie class. The cultural nationalists, primordialists stressed the state's role in the education of the masses. German nationalism favored pure ethnicity. Herder stated that diversification and separation of communities were created by God. Herder was against this universalism. Turkish nationalism was not based on pure ethnicity. Moreover, Turkish nationalism of that time purposed to realize a unification of the Empire under Ottomanism and Islam. Herder stated that diversification and separation of communities were created by God. Herder was against universalism as was Kemal. Fichte, on the other hand, was called a cosmopolitan nationalist. He focused on the establishment of new universal order led by Germans and he believed in the superiority of Germans over Frenchmen (Kohn, 1959, pp.323-324).

## 4.1 Homeland: The Ottoman Empire

A homeland is important for nationalism. The homeland was the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire lost the Central European territories of Vojvodina, Hungary, Croatia and Dalmatia to the Habsburgs and its northern Black Sea and Dalmatia to the Habsburgs. Ottoman Muslims were persecuted in these territories. This territorial decline continued with the independence of the Balkan states (Çağaptay, 2006, pp.5-6).

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was comprised of the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Large parts of Romania), Anatolia, Greece, Bulgaria, and the Arab world (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria). Zürcher (2007) pointed out that the Sultan's power was slight in large parts of his dominions. He added that the power of the Sultan was not apparent in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. The population of the Empire was 25 million and its area was 3 million km². 85 percent of its population was living in the countryside, and only15 percent of its population was living in towns (p.9).

The wars fought in Russia and Greece resulted in territorial losses. Large territories in the Balkans and Greece were lost. Moreover, Cyprus and Egypt were occupied by the British. Furthermore, non-Muslims began to talk about their right to independence. Capitulations hindered the development of the economic life of the Empire. Dealing with *Servet-i Fünun School* ceased to advance (Heyd, 1950, p.20).

It is important to note that new millets were created. Firstly, the Greek Patriarchate was dissolved. The Serbian Orthodox Church was founded in 1557. The Bulgarian Church was founded in 1870. The Roman Orthodox Church was founded in 1885. Although the millet system could be regarded as suitable for inciting nationalism, it was also mentioned that the traditional conservative leaders heading millets preferred the continuation of Ottoman rule. The only loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire were the Jews. The Tanzimat could not provide the loyalty of non-Muslims' loyalty to the empire (Poulton, pp.52-54).

Sultan Abdulaziz was deposed by the liberal reforms party in May 1876 under Mithat Pasha. Although the Young Turks supported the reign of Murat V, his mental health was not strong and he resigned in favor of Abdulhamid II. The first Ottoman constitution was declared in 1876. Mithat Pasha served as a Grand Vizier. However, he was dismissed in February 1877. Heyd (1950) identified this era as a "period of despotism" and Heyd maintained that the thirty years of Abdulhamid II's reign could be regarded as an interruption of the reformation and modernization of the Ottoman Empire (p.19).

The Young Ottomans, namely, Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha began to study the idea of "*vatan*", the homeland, and "*hürriyet*", the idea of freedom based on a homeland. Namık Kemal harshly criticized *Tanzimat*. It was contended that westernization would cause the abrogation of the Turkish national personality. Namık Kemal opposed the *Tanzimat* secularization of law and considered *shariah* as the basis of society. He aimed to produce a synthesis between modernization and Islam, and he investigated Islamic references to parliaments and representative government. During his exile, he studied the glorious past of the Turks. He distanced himself from the idea of an Ottoman nation with the rise of Pan-Slavism and the Ottoman retreat in the Balkans (Poulton, pp.55-56).

"Homeland" according to Kemal was comprised of many elements such as common language, common interests, common thoughts, and being sensitive to each other. Namık Kemal, Şinasi and Ziya Pasha advocated a pure Turkish language. There has been a debate about whether Namık Kemal was a nationalist or not. Oba claimed that there was no clear evidence that he was a Turkish nationalist or the advocator of the unity of the Ottoman Empire (Oba, pp.183-189). Ahmed Mithat Efendi supported the idea that the origins of the Ottomans could be traced back to Central Asia. Moreover, he determined that nationalism had a racial meaning (Öğün, pp.110-111). Ottomans began to be identified religiously and racially.

Namık Kemal wrote his historical novel "*Cezmi*" in 1881, in which Kemal (2008) told the story of the evolutions of the Ottoman Empire, Persian Shahdom, and Crimean Khanate in the 15th and 16th century. Crimean Khan Adil Giray was taken captive by Persians. Both the wife of the Shah, Şehriyar and Şehriyar's sister, Perihan, fell in love with Adil Giray.

Adil Giray loved Perihan. Perihan was a Sunni girl. She proposed to seize the Persian Shahdom and they planned to save the Shahdom from the Shias. Perihan wanted to ensure unification of all Muslims, and her aim was to embed Sunnism into Islam. This novel aimed to end the Sunni-Shia conflict with the victory of Sunnism. This conflict would be ended with the Ottoman victory over Persian Shahdom, and at last, unity of Islam would be established.

Berkes (2006) differentiated Şinasi and Kemal as Jeune Turk and Young Ottoman. Berkes considered Şinasi as Jeune Turk, and he was seen as the symbol of nationalism and secularism. Şinasi demanded the separation of state and religion. He dealt with the problems of language, semantics and mentality. Kemal was considered as a Young Ottoman; he was not revolutionary and against constitutional liberal regime. It was stated that Namık Kemal did not like Turks living outside the Empire because he believed that they could be harmful to the empire. Suavi, on the other hand, dealt with them because they were Muslims. Suavi believed that we could struggle with Slavism and Europeanism with the help of Islamism (pp.282-285).

Namık Kemal wrote in his letter on the love of nation and homeland was nothing but the serving to the Sultan. He mentioned that "we could be under the custody of our Sultan, but we again love our Sultan and our homeland" (Kemal, 1881, March 12, in Tansel, 1973, p.116). He defined homeland as "valide", mother. He mentioned that ignorance dissolved huge nations (Kemal, 1881b, in Tansel, 1973, pp.116-117).

Namık Kemal dealt with Crete, and stated that Cretan Muslims were suffering pain for years which had been dealt by the states' officials. He wrote that the Cretan governor was a Christian. He stated that governor Fotyadi Pasha had been implementing Greek politics. He warned in his letter that Sakız Island could be acquired by the Greeks (Kemal, 1884, January 12, in Tansel, 1973, p.xiii). He collected money for Crete in 1866 when there were uprisings (Tansel, 1973, p.339).

Namık Kemal (1873, March 22) claimed in his article *"vatan"* on *İbret* that a human being loved his homeland because the body of a human being was a part of his homeland. He

stated that freedom, rights and duties persist through the homeland and those ancestors and children were protected within the homeland. Kemal avowed that the homeland was not comprised of boundaries drawn by (clerks) *katips,* it was a holy idea including *millet* (nation), freedom, interest, fraternity, *tassarruf* (saving), sovereignty, respect for ancestors, and love of family (Özön, 1997, pp.257-258). He mentioned that abrogating the idea of a homeland for the sake of the idea of the world government could be defined as killing oneself for the sake of an afterlife. Namık Kemal could be defined as a realist if we categorize his ideology according to the theory of international relations. He considered the idea of world government somewhat utopic.

Namık Kemal mentioned in his article "*Vatan*" that people abandoning the love of their homeland would be invaded by the others who loved their homeland. He opposed abrogating the idea of a homeland and mentioned that many people were martyred for their homelands. He used the term "the bread of our sword" to describe the homeland and alleged that "we love our homelands much more than ourselves and we could sacrifice ourselves for its sake". He mentioned that all of the English, French, Germans, Spanish, Italians, Russians and Ottomans love their homeland but they were skeptical of its well-being in the future. Kemal gave the examples of the main international conflict in that time. He stated that English were frightened about the separation of Irishmen and the Russian approach towards India. The French were searching for political stability. They were trying to build a free government which held itself apart from the political parties. Germans were trying to unite. All of them were worried about their survival after the solution of those problems. Italians were worrying about slavery of the popes again. He added that Russians could not be hopeful about the survival of their country if the people under their sovereignty would not be assimilated. Kemal warned of separation in the Ottoman Empire due to sectarian and (*cins)* ethnic diversities. He considered that it would not be possible. He alleged that there would be no such separation, because people were mixed everywhere except in Arabia. There was no majority of people belonging to same nation, (*kavim*). He mentioned that Arabia would not be separated due to the Unity of Islam. He believed that there would not be any Kurdistan provocation, (*fitne*) or events like Crete. He proposed that there were many nations, (*akvam*) which was not fewer than Europe. He stated that all of these nations were protecting their own language, and

nationality, (*milliyet*). He stated that any one of these nations separated from the Ottoman Empire could fall a prey to Russia or other foreign powers. He defined Europe as comprising many nations which killed people, and obstructed free trade. However, he stated that Europe had progressed significantly within two centuries. He explained that the main problem was incompetence in education (Özön, pp.248-252).

Kemal repeated the idea that every nation would protect its own entity within the Ottoman Empire (Kemal, 1872, April 22, in Özön, p.72). He mentioned that all the parts of a nation were interrelated and gave the example of a factory and machinery (Kemal, 1872, June 27, in Özön, p.86) to illustrate his theory. In that sense, Namık Kemal's views could be considered very similar to an organic approach.

Kemal stated that if the new order was introduced to Arabia and if the caliphate called for conscription of the soldiers of the Sultan in Africa, Ottoman army could compete with the larger European states. He opposed the separation of the Muslim people according to the maps, physical and sectarian features. Namık Kemal mentioned that the people who practice Islam should listen to religious speeches and read books rather than destroy their unity through sectarian conflicts (p.88).

Kemal (1872, June 2) intended that state's officials would be comprised of people from all kinds of millets, *her cins* and sects. He proposed that all people were equal before law and they shared common interests in the Ottoman Empire. He added that these people did not want to be separated from each other due to competing languages and sects. He believed that parts separated from the homeland did not exist. He gave the example of Arabia where people claimed that they belonged to different ethnic groups, *cins.* He indicated that the Turks and Arabs were dependent on each other due to the Muslim brotherhood and loyalty to the caliphate. He proposed that common schools should be opened to serve to all kinds of children belonging to different sects in order to ensure solidarity (Özön, pp. 93-95). Namık Kemal advocated developing solidarity under the flag of the Ottoman Empire with the help of shariah. Herder, on the other hand, stated that God had separated the nations and they should not be amalgamated. In that sense, he mentioned that an Ottoman Empire comprising multitude of nations could be identified as a corrupt state (Kedourie, pp.48-52).

Thus, German nationalism and the nationalism of the Young Ottomans were different. Moreover, it could also be maintained that the emotions and concepts of the Young Ottomans could not be called the same type of nationalism as that referred to in German nationalism.

Kemal (1873, July 21) wanted his son to become a soldier. He wanted Ekrem to be educated in Germany. He also believed that the Ottoman Empire would not be left in peace. He preferred Germany because he believed that the German military service was the best. He avowed that without being a soldier, a person could not serve his homeland properly (Tansel, pp.306-307).

## 4.2 The Bourgeoisie

The Ottoman Empire had an agricultural economy. As Gellner (2006) stated, cultural differentiation was widespread in agricultural societies. He mentioned that cultures were proliferating, but that cultural imperialism did not occur in agrarian societies. He indicated that industrialization was needed for nationalism, however, it could also be stated that capital accumulation by merchants and the creation of a bourgeoisie could cause the emergence of nationalism. The production surplus was to be given to provincial landlords. Thus, *reaya*, peasants, did not want to produce extra products. All the institutions were deteriorating coming into the *Tanzimat* era (Tanör, pp.76-77). The Ottoman economy was not mercantilist. The *timar* system declined and private ownership spread. Taxed farming replaced the *timar system*. Taxed farming was defined as the right to collect taxes in a given area during a certain period which were auctioned off by the state and bought and paid for in advance by individuals. It should be noted that lifelong leases became widespread in the 18$^{th}$ century. Zürcher (2007) explained that the guild systems maintained a hierarchical order, and that they presented their values and ethics through a religious adjustment. There was close link between the guilds and the tariqats (pp.16-17).

In the sixteenth century, cheap and abundant silver coming from the west decreased the value of silver. Turkish raw materials were cheaper and they were exported. As a result, local protection declined (Lewis, 2008, p.42.)

Hale (2002) indicated that the main adversary of the Ottoman Empire was Austria and its main ally was France during most of the 18th century. This changed in the 1770s when Russia became the most immediate threat. After the treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* in 1774, Russia entered the Black Sea from the north. The Ottoman Empire recognized the independence of Crimea and allowed Russian navigation rights in the Black Sea (p.21). Hale mentioned that during 1890-1914, intense rivalry was seen among the great European powers and that during the sixteenth century, the empire was equal to the European states in technology, economy and administration. However, by the last quarter of the 18th century, it fell behind the major European powers. The Empire was described as a tributary state. Army officers and bureaucrats did not have specific socio-economic foundations (p.14). Bülent Tanör (2006) described the main causes of political dynamics of change and gave five reasons for the political changes: feudal reactions of local landlords, *ayans* reaction of public, pressures of foreign powers, liberal-reformist enterprises, and national uprisings. The regression and decline of the Ottoman Empire was witnessed during the 17th and 18th centuries. The war revenue amassed from conquests was lost and the agricultural system of the Empire collapsed. The *Timar* system had broken down; agricultural production decreased and the tax system deteriorated (pp.19-21). In sum, these periods of Ottoman regression and decline should be considered within the context of devastating changes in the economic system. The Ottoman Empire could not conquer new lands and the *timar* system which was protecting soldiers of the Ottoman army collapsed. *Timar* system was replaced with *iltizam.*

The janissaries then became craftsmen. The Consultation system, *meşveret,* replaced the closed door politics which had been practiced by the Sultan and Grand Vizier. *Ayans*, provincial landlords replaced timar owners. *Ayans* rented territories to quell the uprisings between 1595-1610 on behalf of the Sultan. They were called a *mütesellim, voyvoda,* and *subaşı.* This rent system was to become permanent and life-long from the 18th century and their children gained priority in acquiring these lands after the death of their fathers. In this

way, they established local dynasties. Tanör stated that justice was the fundamental concept. It was considered that justice could not be achieved without the state and proprietorship. The subjects could obtain welfare through justice. The states' revenue was collected from the subjects. This wealth was needed to support the soldiers, without which there would be no state and property As stated within *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, *has,,zeamet* and *timar* were not given to people who did not cultivate the land. Taxes were raised. The *reaya,* or peasants, became poorer and were also oppressed (Tanör, pp23-27).

The structure of Ottoman mentality could be seen as the main factor of this political and economic corruption. *Tasavvuf* (Islamic mysticism) and *tariqats* proposed the notion of "us", and the obedience to authority became a widespread philosophy which applied to actual life. This was contrary to developments occurring in Europe. Individualism, constitutionalism and capitalism were being applied in the West. However, capitalism and accumulation of capital (Tanör, p.32) could not be realized in the Ottoman Empire.

The reforms of the Mahmud II were based on centralization. He aimed to strengthen the state within state-society relations, to strengthen the central authority against provincial authorities and to strengthen the palace against military-religious powers. He also removed *müsadere* and protected the rights of property owners (Tanör, pp.66-69).

During the years of the French Revolution, Greek traders and shippers held higher ranks. During the reign of Mahmud II, the territories of Serbia, Greece and Egypt were lost (Zürcher, pp.27, 36-42). After the end of the 1820s, the Empire began to enter the capitalist world system. Mahmud II opened new roads and enhanced the communication and post offices. He aimed to establish a central administration with these reforms. There had been very small numbers of educated people. Moreover, reforms were being made by the upper classes. Thirdly, efficiently working institutions were scarce and nepotism was widespread. Lastly, the reforms except that of 1826 were not abolished. They kept the old regulations (pp.38-46).

The 1838 Treaty allowed foreign merchants to engage directly in internal trade for the first time. The abolition of export monopolies enabled foreign merchants to compete with the Ottoman merchants. Before this treaty, trade was regulated through monopolies sold by the

state to Ottoman merchants and producers.  There was an attempt to develop cultivation of landholdings. It was observed that land remained the primary factor needed to consolidate internal power against external powers (Ahmad, 2008a, pp. 4-8). The Edicts of 1839 and 1856, the land code of 1858 and the 1876 constitution could be regarded as important turning points for the legalization of private property with private land (Mardin, 1962, cited in Ahmad, 2008a, p.8). Karpat (1972) mentioned that the Land Code of 1858 provided the transference of state lands to individuals. Liberal economic policies were introduced. The Muslim middle class was strengthened after the breakdown of the Ottoman feudal system. This middle class was comprised of landowners rather than commercial entrepreneurs (p.260).

The citizenship law was passed in 1869; however, this law did not prevent the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of the Porte. Foreign powers continued to grant *protégé* status to non-Muslim subjects of the Porte. It was indicated that during the Hamidian era, financial crises were seen, and moreover, the state was defined with the interests of the dynasty (Mardin, 1962, cited in Ahmad, 2008a, p.9). As mentioned before, Ömer Lütfi Barkan stated that feudalism did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. The proprietorship of the lands belonged to Ottoman state. There was no Turkish bourgeoisie (Lewis, pp.44-45).

Looking at the international system, Zürcher (2007) stated that in the 17$^{th}$ and 18$^{th}$ centuries, the main enemy was Austria. In the second half of the 18$^{th}$ century, the main enemy was Russia.  The French instructors trained the corps under the reign of Sultan Selim III (pp.19, 23). The French revolutionary wars to the end of the 1830s, Zürcher summarized that the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire were economically incorporated and Greek traders became significant in the Ottoman Empire's trade. In this period, the first nationalist movements emerged and reforms were initiated. Between the years 1830 until the 1870s, the British economic hegemony over the Ottoman Empire was monitored. The Free trade regime was declared in 1838. France and Britain supported the existence of the Empire and a continuance of its reforms. Bureaucracy became the central power and the Ottoman constitutional movement began. Zürcher also noted that Muslims reacted to the privileged position of Christians. He added that this period ended with a deep

economic and political crisis in the years 1873-78. Between the mid-1870s and 1908, economic growth was rather slow. Foreign investments were made by the Empire and the Palace consolidated its power again. Reforms continued and Islamism became more powerful (p.3).

There was a millet system which enabled non-Muslim religious groups to preserve their own cultural identity. It was alleged that the non-Muslims became rather receptive to nationalist ideas with the help of this system. Karpat (1972) claimed that the economy of the Ottoman Empire was based on war booty which was used for the military and for purposes of consumption. Moreover, there were religious restrictions on economic occupations. Furthermore, manual labor was socially frowned upon (p.4). The right to collect taxes assigned to the churches was removed with the *Islahat Fermanı* that was signed in 1856. Afterward, religious communities were allowed to open places of worship and schools. All non-Muslims acquired the right to have posts in the military, justice departments and all schools. The cases related to non-Muslims would be heard by the mixed courts. The *iltizam* system was removed and non-Muslims were allowed to become state officials (Tanilli, pp.96-101) Moreover, they were given the right of real estate ownership (Engelhardt, 1982 cited in Tanör, pp.205-209).

The penal code of 1840 declared the equality of all Ottoman subjects. Moreover, the ban on bearing arms by for Christian subjects of the Empire was removed in 1855. Moreover, the Imperial Rescript of 1856 again emphasized the full equality for the all subjects of the Empire (Poulton, p.51).

It was stated that the 19th century state was centralized, patrimonial and interventionist. The *Tanzimat* state, on the other hand, was considered as ensuring separation from patrimonialism and interventionism. In that sense, the new social structure was beginning to be constructed. Social engineering was applied. The fundamental principles of *Tanzimat* reforms were instituted in order to create a modern economy. Feroz Ahmad (2008a), in referring to studies of Fındıkoğlu and Mardin, mentioned that Ottomans were aware of theories and facts concerning English and continental economy. *Tanzimat* elites considered

the need for active state intervention. Thus, the state acted as a social engineer in that time (pp.2-3).

A declining crafts industry led to the erosion of the guild system. The Empire reverted to a money economy and paper money was introduced in 1840. Tax-farming was abolished in 1839, direct collection came onto the scene, and the taxes were paid in cash. The peasants were forced to produce more to pay the taxes (Ahmad, 2008a, p.4).

The peasants were obliged to apply to money lenders who were non-Muslims to obtain loans in order to pay their debts. Capitalism and free trade was introduced to the Empire. However, the state intervention played a primary role in the economy. It was witnessed on the eve of the Crimean War that a great number of Ottoman state manufacturing facilities were built. Railways, harbors, public utilities and mining accelerated the expansion of the European economy by providing raw materials and opening new markets. In the 1860s, Muslims and Jews faced an economic decline (p.6). The Commission for Industrial reform, *Islah-ı Sanayi Komisyonu,* was formed. It recommended the increasing of customs, organizing of industrial and trade affairs, and opening of industrial, technical companies. However, it was abolished in 1874 (Ökçün, cited in Ahmad, 2008a, p.6).

The free trade policies of *Tanzimat* were criticized by Young Ottoman intellectuals. Developing a class was difficult; the posts of commerce and industry were dominated by the Western powers. The Ottoman Empire decided to impose reforms upon Muslim landowners. The Deed of Agreement, *Sened-i İttifak* reforms transferred the economic power to the landlords, *the ayans*. However, the Porte needed their acceptance of the supremacy of the Empire which equaled the centralization of power. Ahmad (2008a) mentioned that the edicts of 1839 and 1856, the Land Code of 1858 and the 1876 constitutions contributed to the legalization of private property and private land (p.8). From 1838, Ottoman landlords gained large advantages. The Porte began not to buy the products. The landlords gained independence and they began to buy and sell their products, so they became wealthier. The consolidation of the landholdings was realized with the Land Code of 1876 and the landholders, *ayans* became a class (pp.8-9).

The Porte granted economic high ground to the British, and, by extension, to Europe. Ottoman merchants could not compete with Europeans. A *Tanzimat* statement was issued in 1867 which permitted foreigners to own urban and rural property, except in Hejaz (p.26). The *Tanzimat* era could be identified with capitalism and liberalism. The *Tanzimat* introduced an open market economy, emergence of a new class, landlords, free trade by landlords, consolidation of private property, technological changes (railways), cash taxes, expansion of European economy (especially British economy) over the Ottoman Empire, permission of foreigner'sownership of urban and rural property, and also protection of Ottoman citizens by foreign powers (Ahmad, 2008b, pp.24-28).

Ali Pasha's memorandum complained about the abuses of the capitulations. The first abuse was revealed as the status of protected persons. They were exempted from taxes. Secondly, consuls enjoyed extra-territorial status. Thirdly, prosecution of foreign criminals was difficult because foreigners were not dependent on Ottoman laws. Fourthly, consuls interfered in Ottoman courts. Fifthly, dragomans claimed to take part in a judicial decision. The most important abuse of capitulations was revealed as the sale of consuls of protégé status to Ottoman subjects. Ottomans were forbidden to seek the citizenship or protection of another state with a law which was passed in 1869. However, this was not successful. The feeling of being an Ottoman had not been internalized. Moreover, embassies of the great powers did not obey this new law (Ahmad, 2008b, pp.26-28).

The Westerners, Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800-58), Ali Pasha (1815-1871), and Fuad Pasha (1815-1869), believed that the Empire should be part of the European System (p.48). Moreover, it was alleged that Ali Pasha acted as the "ambassador of that European powers" (İnal, 1955, cited in Ahmad 2008b, p.48).

The public debt became one of the tools to interfere the internal affairs of the Porte. It controlled one-quarter of the state revenues. As a result, the Empire did not have sufficient capital to invest. The Porte tried to save itself by giving concessions to build railways. Between 1878 and 1882, the Ottoman Empire lost 232,000 km² of its land and 6 million of its population (Zürcher, pp.10-13).

Non-Muslim communities, Jewish and Christian groups within a dominant Islamic society, were given *dhimmi* status. They were to be autonomous in their own affairs, they would be represented by their own religious authority. Although the capitulations were voluntary concessions given to foreign powers, they gained treaty status after the 18th and especially in the 19th century. The most important feature of this governmental system was that both the administration and the rules of territorial ownership obstructed the emergence of new centers of power. It should be noted that this system had deteriorated by the 1800s (Zürcher, pp.10-13).

Abolition of *cizye* was observed and the military service exemption tax replaced it. The sheep tax, *ağnam vergisi* was applied to all farm animals in 1856. A new land registration system was introduced in 1858. *Miri* lands were turned into privately owned land, *mülk*. Direct taxation was introduced, and the *iltizam* system was abolished in 1841. The Ottoman government tried to reduce the powers of the provincial governors; however, the new provincial regulation of 1858 strengthened the roles of the provincial governors again (Zürcher, p.60).

Although the Hamidian regime was characterized by censorship, spying and limitations on freedom of speech, many technological and educational reforms were made. New schools were opened. Railroads and telegram services consolidated the strength of the center (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, pp.30, 32). The telegraph was introduced in 1855, and the first railway was seen in 1866. This strengthened the Mahmud II's initiative of centralization (Lewis, 2008, p.134).

It was important to note that the Muslim Ottoman traders were replaced by minority traders protected by Western powers. The British strengthened their power over the Ottoman Empire with the free trade agreements of the 1820s and 1830s. Moreover, Greeks served as interpreters of the Empire from the seventeenth century (Lewis, 1961, cited in Poulton, p.47). The new elite in power were comprised of interpreters, not the members of the *ulema* and army (Lewis, 2008, p.165). Armenian and Greek communities emerged as national bourgeoisie. They got richer and more self-confident (Zürcher, p.61). One of the reasons for the rising wealth of non-Muslim could be explained by the fact that the

Ottoman Empire did not levy trade earned with cash money (Bağış, 1983, cited in Cucunel, 2004, p.25)

Zürcher stated that after the free trade treaties of 1838-41, the Ottoman economy graduated to the capitalist system (p.63). As Anderson stated, the first Ottoman census of population and geodetic survey were done in 1831, although women were not counted (Lewis, p.126).

Young Ottomans were also in favor of reformations like Tanzimat bureaucrats. The Ottoman economy had been declining since 1856 due to foreign debts. Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha and Ali Suavi harshly criticized the economic policies of Fuad Pasha. They criticized foreign debts, foreign intervention, economic domination and superiority of minorities, unjust taxation, and possession of real estate by foreigners, wasted expenditures, budget deficits and financial crises. They wrote criticisms about economic policies of Ottoman bureaucrats in *Ulum, Hürriyet, Muhbir*. However, they opposed Tanzimat's granting better position to non-Muslims. Namık Kemal was complaining about debts which were imposed by foreign powers (Şehsuvaroğlu, 2008, pp.100-102). Moreover, Kemal (1869, Feb 22) mentioned the political and legal intervention of foreigners. Kemal (1869, 17 May) opposed borrowing (cited in Şehsuvaroğlu, p.102). Young Ottomans advocated a national economy rather than Tanzimat's liberalism (p.103).

Friedrich List opposed the cosmopolitan theory of political economy. His views contradicted the free market economy of England. He supported national economy like Kemal and advocated high tariffs to protect industrialization of Germany (Breuilly, p.101). Thus, developing industries needed to be protected. An open market economy could be harmful and nationalist protectionist measures were required.

Namık Kemal's ideas could not be simply categorized as nationalism but it could be classified within the birth of Turkish nationalism. This nationalism did not conform to Kohn's (2005) model of nationalism. Kohn's model of nationalism (p.215) was based on values of liberalism as reason, universal justice and on western civilization. Ziya Pasha (1868, September 1) alleged that statesmen persecuted citizens and they acquired

undeserved gain. He mentioned that Fuad Pasha had thirty million francs in a French bank (cited in Şehsuvaroğlu, p.102).

## 4.3 Common language

Every *millet* had its own educational system. The Ottoman language was comprised of Turkish, Arabic and Persian words. Many accents were being used among the people of the Empire. As Turan stated, Turkish began to be used as an educational language in schools from the second half of the 18th century with the opening of naval and land war schools, namely Mühendishane-*i Bahr-i Humayun* and *Mühendishane-i Berri-i Humayun*. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha gave great importance to a Turkish educational curriculum in the newly founded Teacher's School, *Darulmuallimin*. He founded the academy, *Encümen-i Daniş*, the aim of which was to develop Turkish so that Arabic and Persian words could be limited. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and Fuat Pasha wrote a Turkish grammar book, *Kavaid-i Osmaniyye*. Şinasi and Agah Efendi published the first Turkish newspaper, *"Tercüman-i Ahval"*. They tried to make the Turkish of ordinary people a publishing language. Şinasi began his studies to reveal the rich language background of Turkish in his work *Durub-i Emsal-i Osmaniye* in 1863. Intellectuals of this era worked hard to establish Turkish as the language of their ideology. However, it should be taken into consideration that Ziya Pasha and Namık Kemal could not apply this in their works (Turan, 1998, pp.171-172).

Şinasi identified the literary value of folk-words. He rebelled againt the traditional grammar rules. It was stated that main problem of modernization of language was related to the modernization of the mentality of intellectuals (Berkes, 262-266). Hobsbawm (2003) advocated this view, as illiterate people were interested in oral language, and an official language was not important for them (pp.114-123). It could be considered there was disconnection between the ordinary people and the ruling class due to a scarcity of communication. This situation was an obstacle for unity and solidarity.

Kemal was influenced by Montesquieu, Rousseau and Locke. He agreed that there must be reconciliation with *shariah* and natural rights and the social contract. He was against Ibni

Haldun's idea of birth, growth and collapse of institutions. He proposed the idea of progress (Berkes, pp.289, 292, 299). Namık Kemal opposed to change in the alphabet. He believed that the translation of all the works written in Arabic would be difficult (Yetiş, 1989, cited in Turan, p.174). Kemal (1878a) mentioned that the Latin alphabet was not appropriate for Turks. He stated that "there were 19 letters in the Latin language but we needed 32 letters". Also, he stated that there were no sofas and tables in our houses and villages; he added that it was impossible change to right from left to right (Tansel, 1969, p.191).

Namık Kemal (1878b) condemned Turkish intellectuals for knowing neither Turkish nor French (Tansel, 1969, p.158). Herder strongly supported speaking German rather than French. It was important to note that both Fichte and Herder indicated that people who spoke an original language were nations and nations had to speak an original language (Kedourie, pp.3-61). Kemal (1878c) stated that the language in education of the medical sciences could be either French or Turkish; however, he alleged that our students knew neither. Thus, he proposed that an appropriate language should be used in education of medical sciences. Both the instructor and students should understand this language (Tansel, 1969, pp.304-305).

Namık Kemal (1878d) praised Arabs in that they brought their own language wherever they went. He criticized the idea of giving the Lazes, Albanians, and Kurds their own alphabets. He referred to Leibniz's statement that "Give me a beautiful alphabet and I will give you a good language and make a beautiful nation" (Tansel, 1969, p.231).

Namık Kemal (1866, July 10) mentioned that our children could learn the Arabic letters within 3 or 4 months like their European counterparts. Nonetheless, Arabs had same amount of published material as the Europeans. Thus, he stated that the excess of the letters did not affect the publishing of literature. He concluded that the reason for our backward position was related to educational procedures that were followed (Tansel, 1969, pp.233-234). Namık Kemal (1879) criticized Sultan Selim's poems, which were written in Persian. He mentioned that Sultan's Persian was better than his Turkish (Tansel, 1969, p.436).

Fuad Köprülü (1986) alleged that the Young Ottomans were influenced by western literature. As a result of this, they inclined toward folk literature. Ziya Pasha wanted to save literature from Persian influence by benefitting from folk-language and folk literature. Therefore, he supported folk literature against classic literature. Şinasi and Namık Kemal also advocated the independence of Turkish (Şehsuvaroğlu, pp.38-39).

Ali Suavi advocated pure Turkish. He advised omitting Arabic and Persian technical terms. He proposed that the language of praying should be Turkish. He mentioned that performing namaz could be in Turkish (Danişment, 1942, p.29). Suavi supported in *Ulum,1* the antiquity and old writing of Turkish. He also mentioned that all the languages were mixed and that having some words coming from Arabic, Persian, Chinese and Western languages were not drawback (Danişment, p.26). He alleged in *Ulum, 4* that Arabic was not the language of Arabs; Turks and Persian codified it and it was developed as the common cultural language of the whole Islamic world. He mentioned that Islamic culture was the creation of Turks (Danişment, 127).

It could be stated that language was the main notion of primordialism because it ensures the connection and communication among people. Herder indicated that language was the essential factor in identifying individuals and he gave importance to the purification of German language from foreign and Latin words. Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha, on the other hand, demanded purification of the Turkish language, and they wanted to omit Arabic and Persian words.

## 4.4 Common Will

The main concerns of Namık Kemal were Ottomanism and Islamism. Karpat (1972) stated that the Muslim-Turkish intellectuals supported Ottomanism as a nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content according to their own cultural-social background and interpretation of history. Karpat explained that nationality began to transform itself into nationalism (p.261). Şehsuvaroğlu (2008) alleged that these ideologies could be considered as the origin of Turkish-Islam synthesis. Moreover, it was added that Kemal was the first

to mention about both homeland (vatan) and freedom (hürriyet). Furthermore, by emulating Montesquieu, he gave importance to justice (adalet). In addition to these features, he could be regarded as the pioneer of traditional right-nationalist ideologies. Thus, he believed in the necessity of conserving the national values through the process of acquiring western science, and technology (pp.36-38). Namık Kemal gave importance to the idea of freedom. He believed that Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations had progressed with the primary effect of freedom. Kemal's concept of freedom could be understood through parliament and consultation, *meşveret* (Masami, 1994, p.16).

İbrahim Şinasi, Ziya Pasha and Namık Kemal were educated in government schools and occupied government positions. They demanded constitutional order. Kemal desired the renewal of *meşveret* and *Şura* (consultation and assembly). They aimed to correct the errors of the *Tanzimat* reforms. They criticized the Sultan's absolutism, and believed his power should have been limited. Secondly, they criticized the positions of *ayans*, and they stated that, while the old administrative system was abolished, and system was left immune to punishment of the *derebeys* and *ayans*. They were also against the capitulations. Moreover, the young Ottomans introduced the concept of "vatan". They introduced new form of identity that superseded religious, ethnic and local divisions. They also supported the loyalty of all subjects to the government (Karpat, 1972, pp.262-264).

There was no common will within millets of Ottoman Empire. As Rennan stated, nation was a daily plebiscite. It was important to note that neither the reforms made to ensure equality among Ottoman subjects with the edicts of *Tanzimat* and the *Islahat*, nor the term "Ottoman" used in the text of first constitution affected any difference on the perception of identity among Ottoman subjects. Religious communities and *millets* continued to be important (Kalaycıoğlu, p.30). There were four major millets in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Muslims (Lewis. 1993, cited in Kalaycıoğlu, p.33). The term *Turk* was used to describe uneducated peasants. Therefore, Ottoman elites identified themselves as *Ottomans* rather than as *Turks* (Poulton, p.43). The *Millet system* ensured the non-Muslim religious groups could preserve their own cultural identity. It was alleged that the non-Muslims became rather receptive of nationalist ideas with the help of this system (Karpat, p.4). *Ottomanism* was revealed as consolidating factor, and it was seen as an

impediment for the dissolution of the Empire. It was to ensure solidarity among different millets of the Empire. Afterwards, Namık Kemal supported the idea of *Ittihad-ı Islam*, which could even provide the solidarity of Muslims under the flag of Islam. This phenomenon was explained by Hobsbawm (2003) who mentioned that there were close ties between religion and national consciousness. It was known that, as Hobsbawm indicated, religion was a good method of establishing communion and it was seen as cement for proto-nationalism (pp.67-72). Thus, it could be stated Kemal used religion as cement for Turkish proto-nationalism.

The churches helped in the dissolution of millet system of the Ottoman Empire, as they mobilized national movements. It was proposed that religious nationalism emerged in the Balkans. Thus, religious nationalism aimed at territorial gains. It was intolerant to religious and ethnic diversification (Kalaycıoğlu, p.33). Christian millets living within the Ottoman Empire were dealing with commercial activities. They were forbidden from carrying arms or riding horses, because they were not members of the Ottoman army. As Mardin asserted, they were not comprador until Crimean War (Mardin, 1989, cited in Poulton, p.47). Jews never had a patriarchal leader for the whole community (Shaw, 1991, cited in Poulton, p.48).

## 4.5 Opponents. Wars, Nationalist Uprisings

Berkes (2006) contended that economically developed classes incited nationalism. Greeks were initially supported by Russians. Afterwards, Hellenic love was intensified and Greeks were assisted by other foreign powers. Greeks and Romans led nationalist movements because they were dealing with trade in the Mediterranean and beyond the Balkans. The capitulations helped national movements. The capitulations were granted to England in 1675, to Austria in 1718, to France in 1740 (pp.151-152).

Serbs were granted autonomy with the Bucharest Treaty signed after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1812; the Serbian Princedom was recognized in 1817 and it converted to a kingdom in 1882. Bulgarians were affected by the Hellenistic influence of the Orthodox Church, but

the Bulgarian language was still alive. Bulgarian youth read books on Bulgarian history. The main contribution to Bulgarian nationalism was the separation of the Bulgarian church from the Patriarchy (Berkes, pp.154-155). The first phase of E.H. Carr's model of nationalism could explain Bulgarian nationalism. Carr's first phase of nationalism began with the dissolution of the Empires and the Holy Christian unity. In that phase, establishment of a national state and separation of national church (Carr, p.243) were witnessed.

## 4. 6 The Main features of the Nascent Turkish Nationalism

The birth of Turkish nationalism could be explained with Ottoman modernization. Even before the reign of Selim III, military reforms were undertaken by sultans Mustafa III (1757-74) and Abdulhamid I (1774-89). Thusly, the main features of their eras could be explained with advanced technology, an economic system relying on industry and new techniques of government which constituted an external Western challenge.

The Ottoman administration was non-assimilative and multi-national. The Ottoman Empire followed a policy of classifying its citizens according to their religion. This system was called the *millet* system. These *millets* were divided according to their religions, not according to their ethnies. Both Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II tried to centralize the administration of the empire. Sultan Mahmud II was successful in replacing the janissaries with a new modern army. Moreover, he confiscated the military fiefs and applied a policy of modernization and reform.

Firstly, it was important to mention that the millet system was replaced by Ottomanism, which was a theory of one type of citizenship for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state began to treat all its citizens as equal regardless of their religion, with the declaration of *Tanzimat* Edict. The Tanzimat reforms did not lead to the creation of an Ottoman nation. The religious leaders were upset that their power had been eroded by the reform program of the new bureaucratic-military elites. Also, the Christian minorities were not pleased with military service equality. Briefly, the *Tanzimat* Edict revealed the

establishment of guarantees for the life, honor and property of the Sultan's subjects. The Tanzimat Edict demanded financial security for government officials. These *Tanzimat* reforms brought about the secularization of the state machinery, the judiciary and education. The religious equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in the courts was stated. Moreover, the Imperial Rescript of 1856, *Islahat Fermanı,* emphasized the full equality of all subjects. It is a striking fact that the Ottoman identity was originally intended to be built in the *Tanzimat* era. The *Tanzimat* Edict tried to ensure equality among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Intellectuals helped construct the solidarity. Ottomanism was first constructed with the help of the Edicts. However, it failed. Afterwards, Islamism was used. It was recognized that Islam was a common culture, and even a common civilization; nonetheless, it could not construct a common identity.

Secondly, Young Ottomans were using the ideas of the Enlightenment. Namık Kemal considered the weaknesses of the Tanzimat. He proposed to construct a synthesis between modernization and Islam. He investigated the Islamic preferences for the government and representative government. Namık Kemal harshly criticized the *Tanzimat*. It was stated that westernization would cause the abrogation of the Turkish national personality. Namık Kemal opposed the *Tanzimat's* secularization of law and considered the *shariah* as the basis of the society. Namık Kemal identified homeland as an emotional bond containing memories of ancestors, recollections of one's own youth and earlier experiences. Namık Kemal emphasized the usage of Turkish and Suavi was seen as the first Turkist (Poulton, p.55). As mentioned, Ahmed Mithat Efendi supported the thought that the origins of the Ottomans traced back to Central Asia. Moreover, he determined that nationalism had a racial meaning. Ottomans began to be identified religiously and racially. It was stated that Namık Kemal did not like Turks living outside the Empire because he believed that they could be harmful to the empire. Suavi, on the other hand, dealt with them because they were Muslims. Suavi believed that we could struggle with Slavism and Europeanism with the help of Islamism.

The main concerns of Namık Kemal were Ottomanism and Islamism. It was stated that the Muslim-Turkish intellectuals supported Ottomanism as a nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content according to their own cultural-social background and

interpretation of history. Karpat (1972) explained that nationality began to transform itself into nationalism (p.261). It was alleged that these ideologies could be considered as the origin of Turkish-Islam synthesis. Moreover, it was added that Kemal was the first to mention both homeland (vatan) and freedom (hürriyet). Furthermore, by referring to Montesquieu, he gave importance to justice (adalet). In addition to these features, he could be regarded as the pioneer of traditional right-nationalist ideologies. Thus, he believed the necessity of conserving the national values through the process of acquiring western science and technology (Şehsuvaroğlu, pp.36-37). Namık Kemal gave importance to the idea of freedom. He believed that Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations had progressed with the primary result of freedom. Kemal's concept of freedom could be understood through parliament and consultation, *meşveret.*

Namık Kemal's patriotism and his devotion to the homeland contributed to this process. Namık Kemal could be identified as a patriot who claimed that "we love our homeland more than ourselves and we could sacrifice ourselves for its sake". He stated that freedom, rights and duties exist through the homeland. Ancestors and children are protected within the homeland. Kemal avowed that the homeland was not comprised of boundaries drawn by (clerks) *katips;* it was a holy idea including a *millet* (nation), freedom, interest, fraternity, *tassarruf* (saving), sovereignty, respect for ancestors and love of family.

Secondly, economic development was influential in the construction of nationalism. It was mentioned that the edicts of 1839 and 1856, the Land Code of 1858 and the 1876 constitutions all contributed to the legalization of private property and private land. From 1838, Ottoman landlords had gained freedom. The Porte stopped buying their products. However, as the landlords became more independent, they began to buy and sell their products and became wealthier. The consolidation of the landholdings was realized with the Land Code of 1858 and landholders became a class. The *Tanzimat* introduced an open market economy, emergence of a new class, landlords, wealthy landlords, free trade by landlords, consolidation of private property, technological changes (railways), cash taxes, expansion of a European economy (especially British economy) over the Ottoman Empire, permission of ownership of urban and rural property, and also protection of Ottoman citizens by foreign powers. Although the concessions were voluntarily given to foreign

powers, they gained treaty status after the 18th and especially in the 19th century. The Young Ottomans harshly criticized the economic policies of Fuad Pasha. They criticized foreign debts, foreign intervention, economic domination and superiority of minorities, unjust taxation, possession of real estate by foreigners, wasted expenditures, budget deficits, financial crises and the Tanzimat's granting better position to non-Muslims. Namık Kemal was complaining about debts which had been levied by foreign powers. The Young Ottomans advocated a national economy rather than Tanzimat's liberalism.

Thirdly, the journals were useful in the construction of solidarity and of the sense of belonging to the Ottoman Empire. Namık Kemal criticized Tanzimat statesmen because they could not merge Islamic traditions with newly exported European institutions. He believed that the best features of the European civilization were derived from Islamic civilization. Namık Kemal stated in *Hürriyet* in 1868 that Ottoman agriculture was burdened under high taxes and conscription. Financial politics and a deficit of educational service caused the dependence on European exports. Thus, he mentioned that the cure for all these ills was a constitutional government (Lewis, pp.196, 234-235). Berkes (2007) identified Namık Kemal as the founder of Ottoman nationalism (p.50).

The plays of Namık Kemal were useful in constructing nationalism (Enginün, 1998, p.87). Kemal's play, "Vatan yahut Silistre" was presented on April 1, 1873 in Güllü Agop theatre. This play caused great enthusiasm and excitement and Kemal was sent into exile and imprisoned for three years after this play (Kemal, 2008a, p.7). One of the characters in the play, an army officer, Islam Bey, wanted to be recruited. He mentioned that the homeland was feeding 40 million people but there were not 40 people to sacrifice themselves for the homeland. He stated that there were many nations gathered under this homeland, but that nevertheless, it was surviving with the help of foreign powers. Islam Bey considered women and men as ignorant and indifferent to the homeland. He stated that the homeland needed them and he proposed to die for the homeland to ensure its progress. Islam Bey called on other Muslim men to enlist in the war with him in order to save the homeland. He stated that he intended to fight and die. He would not loot or vandalize. Islam Bey united the feeling towards homeland with the love of Allah. He stated that "a person who does not love his homeland would not love his God (Allah)" (Kemal, 2008a,

pp.23-.51). The other character was Sıtkı Bey, a war hero, but he was treated poorly by his higher officers and he entered the army with a new identity. He lost his family during his military service protecting the homeland. Kemal had criticized wrongdoings of corrupt state officials. Moreover, Zekiye altered her appearance and entered the army. Kemal gave importance to women, their love of their family, husbands and their homeland. Kemal blessed the identity of women and their place in society to change the faith of the homeland. Most of the people were ignorant in that time. They were incited by these plays and patriotic feelings began to be internalized.

Fourthly, educational modernization was observed. The educational system was secularized with the new schools of the Hamidian era. The Ottoman m*illet system* created a decentralized educational system. There was an official system for slaves who were recruited through the procedure of conversion (devşirme) from the Christian subjects such as Albanians, Serbians and Bulgarians. These subjects converted to Islam after they were accepted as slave officials of the Sultan (Kalaycıoğlu, p.34) Islam was regarded as a divinely ordained political system (Poulton, pp.33-34). Namık Kemal (1872, July 4) claimed that European progress was based on its educational system. All the technologic devices were coming from Europe, and he gave the examples of clothing, clocks, paper, ships, trams and railways. He proposed that schools should be opened (Özön, pp.96-97). The change in the educational system was one of the factors in emergence of Turkish nationalism, and also it served as a model for it as a society.

Fifthly, huge dislocations of Muslim people resulting from the loss of the Balkan territories could be seen as a constructing factor for Turkish nationalism. During the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877-1878, Karpat (1985) stated that 250,000 to 300,000 Muslims, mostly ethnic Turks, were killed and 1.5 million more became refugees in the Ottoman lands (cited in Kalaycıoğlu, p.36). Moreover, besides the loss of lands in the Balkans, more than a million people fled to the territories which were mostly populated by Muslims and Turks. The expulsion by their Christian neighbors resulted in a destruction of identity. It was apparent that they were massacred and expelled from their land because they were Turks and Muslims (p.36).

Sixthly, Turkish officers going to the Balkans learned about nationalism and they were educated by French and German officers (Turan, 1969, cited in Kalycıoğlu, p.36). Turkish officers investigated nation and nationalism because there were secessionist movements (p.36). New schools were founded: Mektep-i Mülkiye was founded in 1859. Galatasaray High School and Mektep-i Sultani were established in 1868 and Darüşşafaka was established in 1873 (Zürcher, pp.62-63). These new schools helped to educate the Turkish elite and they served as the tools of modernization.

Seventhly, as Kushner (1977) stated, European orientalists studied the origins of the Asiatic peoples, their languages and cultures. Armenius Vambery claimed that Turks belonged to the same Turanian group as the Hungarians, Finns and Estonians. Moreover, Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, a Polish national by birth, worked on the contributions of Turks to civilization. These studies helped the construction of Turkish nationalism.(cited in Kalaycıoğlu, p.37) Moreover, Kushner mentioned the Russian invasion of Central Asian Turkish khanates and their appeals to the Ottoman Empire were influential in construction of Turkish nationalism (p.11)

Another factor in constructing nationalism was a common type of living. Ottoman people were living in rural areas and, as Carol Delaney pointed out, village was considered as the main element of loyalty and identification. Immigrants of Balkans to the Ottoman Empire strived to build their own villages, because they were not accepted by local settlers of villages (Delaney, 1991, cited in Poulton, pp.39-40).

Furthermore, the thoughts of Ali Suavi contributed to the development of Turkish nationalism. He published the journal called *Ulum*. He claimed that the Turkish race was old and superior to all races militarily, socially and through civilization. Moreover, he alleged that the Turkish language was the richest and most perfect language in the world. He added that European languages were backward with respect to Turkish. Furthermore, Suavi claimed that the Turkish race played the biggest role in world cultural history and they had created the Islamic culture. He mentioned that the name "Turk" was traced back to ancient ages by referring to old states that were founded by Iskits, Huns, Tukyus, Hazars, Uygurs and Ottomans (Danişmend, p.25).

It was known that Islam was an urban religion; however, the Islamic type of state was different from Western states. Administrative apparatus of the Islamic state was not large like Western states. The structure of cities was also different. The small operative unit of a city was the *mahalle*. Mardin considered that *mahalle* ensured group identity like villages in rural areas (Mardin, 1981, cited in Poulton, p.41).

Finally, as Giddens (2008) mentioned, war was an energizing factor for the rise of absolutism. He explained that the sovereignty of a nation-state was based on reactive relations among nations (p.343). Thus, the rise of industrialism, wars and preparation for war ensured and helped solidarity and strengthened the absolute power of a central administration. Many wars and uprisings were witnessed in the 19th century within the Ottoman Empire. These wars helped to ensure solidarity among Turks and affected the birth of nationalism.

The emergence of Turkish nationalism dated back to the Tanzimat era. The dominant value of Ottoman political culture was order. Nationalist movements were regarded as disorder and instability. The Ottoman identity began to be built in the Tanzimat era. The main aim of this policy was to ensure the loyalty of non-Muslim people. However, this system was not successful and separatist and nationalist uprisings increased. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, Ali and Fuad Pashas were bureaucrats of this era. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha believed that a civil law based on Islam and internalized by the Muslim people was needed. He developed a private law called Mecelle. He gave importance to a Turkish identity; however, it should be taken into consideration that his Turkish nationalism was based on Islam and he supported the dominance of a Muslim society (Öğün, pp.102-104). The New Ottomans, Jeune Ottomans, namely, Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha began to study  the idea of "vatan" (homeland) and freedom based on a homeland.

Turkish people living in Kazan and Crimea assimilated the identity of being Turkish and they formed Turkish nationalism (Oba, p.12). Moreover, the Balkan nationalist movements and Pan Slavism helped with the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Tartars coming from Russia lead the Turkish nationalism. The cause of this was pan Slavism, which was a fascist movement and they escaped from this and came to Turkey. It is important to note

that the people of Kazan and Azerbaijan were very wealthy, and thus, they ensured a Turkish middle class (Belge, p.44, 143).

Dealing with Turkish nationalism, the Young Ottomans Şinasi and Namık Kemal claimed to awaken the modern national consciousness. In 1876, Mithat Pasha introduced a liberal constitution for the Turkish Empire and Western education was encouraged. In 1877, the Parliament which had been founded in 1876 was dissolved and the absolutist rule of the Sultan was restored. In 1908 a successful revolution took place. Kohn (1971) compared Japan and Turkey, it was expressed that Japan used the Prussian model. Military and authoritarian tools were used. Economic and educational reforms were not applied. On the contrary, the Young Turks applied the Italian model used before 1860 and the Russian model used before 1905. Nationalist reforms against the government started to be applied (pp.62-63).

The newspaper called *İkdam* was published by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, and it was mentioned that *İkdam* started with a claim that "it was a Turkish newspaper". The subjects of the nationalist newspaper called Ikdam were Turkish history, Turkish people living in China, Iran, Hive, assimilationist of policies towards Asian Turkish people and the expansionist policies of China and Russia. Words like Turan and arian were used in this newspaper. Veled Celebi, Mehmed Tahir, Necip Asım were most esteemed journalists. Necip Asım translated the works of Leon Cahun. Hence, he focused on the close relationship and kinship between the Turkish people and the Mongols. Hungarians and Turks developed closer relationships during the Balkan Wars in 1870. Vambery was very influential person of that time (Öğün, pp.111-113).

# 5. ERA OF THE YOUNG TURKS: EMERGENCE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

The absolute power of the Sultan had deteriorated and diverse power centers were emerged. Anthony Giddens (1994) indicated that there should be a unified state administrative control over the land in order to create a nation. He also stated that a nation state was sanctioned by law and it controlled the external and internal means of violence (pp.34-35). Nevertheless, there were national uprisings within the Empire. Moreover, there were struggles among the tariqats to acquire more power and revenue. The Young Ottomans, Young Turks, provincial administrators, landlords and foreign powers all strived to change the administrative system. Thus, the central control eroded in the Ottoman Empire.

The policy of centralization was to be established through some technological initiatives such as the telegraph and railways. Moreover, Islamism was used against the emergence and expansion of Arab nationalism. Abdulhamid II's decree in 1894 required the use of Turkish in all the schools of the Empire. There was a purification study of Turkish. Clear and simple language was demanded which was devoid of Arabic and Persian words (Poulton, pp.59-62). Also, it is important to mention that Sultan Abdulhamid II viewed himself as a Turk (Kushner, cited in Poulton, p.62).

Fuat Dündar (2006) stated that the birth of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) dated back to 1889. He stated that it emerged on the policy scene in 1895. After two years, it disintegrated. Its rebirth occurred in 1906, in Macedonia. Dündar mentioned that initially, it was composed mainly by students and intellectuals in 1895. However, afterwards, it included army officers, and the majority of its members were Macedonian Turks. The loss of the Balkans played a significant role in the Committee's activities. Dündar summarized that the CUP intended a Turkification of the entire state mechanism, Islamization and Turkification of Asia Minor's demography in addition to Turkification of the economy (p.37).

After the abolishment of the constitution, many secret organizations emerged. One of them was the Young Turk Association. As Karpat (1959) noted, their main aim was to compel the Sultan to reinforce a constitutional regime. Ahmed Rıza Bey and İbrahim Temo established the Ottoman Union and Progress Association in 1889. The Young Turk Association decided to establish a common course of action. Prince Sabahaddin and his group were called the Private İnitiative and Decentralization Association (*Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi and Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*). They supported the idea that foreign assistance was needed in this internal revolution. Ahmet Rıza and his group, on the other hand, supported non-interventionism and they called themselves as the Ottoman Progress and Union Association. They merged with the Ottoman Freedom Association, which included army officers and government officials. Afterwards, the Young Turk Association became powerful. Both the Muslims and Christian minorities helped them in the establishment of national independence. Ahmed Rıza Bey was a follower of the ideas of August Comte. He disseminated the positivist teachings of Comte through the *Meşveret*, the newspaper of the CUP. He believed that Islam should be reformed according to Comte's teachings. He defended Ottomanism. Karpat alleged that the implicit demand of Ahmed Rıza was the establishment of a centralized Turkish government. Prince Sabahaddin, on the other hand, supported the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and individualism (pp.13-14, 18-23).

Gökalp rejected the idea that there was a fundamental contradiction between Islam and nationalism. He advocated Islamic patriotism, especially during the war against the Greeks. He tried to give Islam a national Turkish character. Moreover, it was stated that he opposed Islamic elements inherited by Arabs and Persians before and during the First World War. Gökalp aimed to synthesize Islam, Turkish national culture and European civilization. Islam was regarded as individual conscience. Turkish national culture was the peasant culture of Anatolia. However, it was stated that Islam was seen the weakest partner of Gökalp's program (Poulton, pp.79-80).

 The Young Turks Associations united to end the reign of Abdulhamid II and to reestablish the Constitution. Balkan people helped them in their struggle against the Sultan. Finally, the intelligentsia of Young Turks and the army defeated the Sultan. It was considered that the army was the main organ of military-political modernization. Karpat (1959) mentioned

that the intelligentsia of the Young Turks was coming from the lower middle class (p.15). The Ottoman constitution was prepared under the leadership of Mithat Pasha. The Ottoman parliament was established in 1877, but it was closed by Abdulhamid II in 1878, however, the regime of Abdulhamid II was challenged by the Young Turks. They had been educated in such Ottoman schools as the Civil War Academy, *Mülkiye,* The Naval War Academy, *Harbiye,* and the Military Medical Academy, *Askeri Tıbbiye.* It could be stated that Unionist reformers were "Ottomanists" rather than Turkists. It should be noted that they supported Turkism after the end of the Balkan wars (Canefe, 2002, pp.142-143).

The main reasons for the outbreaks of July 1908 and April 1909 were regarded as the inefficiency of the system, financial problems, financial distress, pressures of the Hamidian regime on social life and espionage. Ahmad (2008c) indicated that the Young Turks were influenced by Japanese, Russian and Persian methods of reform and progress. Moreover, the era of Abdülhamid II was presented as the period of change and reform. Furthermore, a new social class comprised of advocators of liberalism emerged. It was observed that the liberals of the Ottoman Empire were prosperous and conservative and who were the advocators of decentralization in government and autonomy for ethnic groups like the *millet* system. The Ottoman Liberal Party was founded in September 1908. The Unionists were trying to change the existing social structure. However, as Ahmad indicated, they did not grant any privileges to the masses. They aimed to found a centralized government controlling by the elected assembly. They were against the traditional institutions and the parameters of the *millet* system. It was also contended that the July Revolution created a delicate balance between the Palace, the Liberals and the CUP. Ahmad mentioned that the CUP was the vanguard Party and driving force behind the Ottoman government from 1908. Regarding powers opposing the Unionists, the foundation of the Muhammedian Union on 5 April 1909 was significant. The members and supporters of this party were against modernization, and stood for the rule of Shariah. The role of the Palace had been severely weakened after the dethroning of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. It was stressed that the role of the palace as one of the dominant elements in Turkish politics ended (pp.1-21).

Nationalism was called a bourgeoisie ideology, Turkish nationalism was regarded as proto-nationalism, and this rather slow development of Turkish nationalism occurred because

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there had been no national bourgeoisie among Turkish people. A characteristic of Turkish nationalism was that it was elitist; this nationalism was realized with the policies of Turkish civil-military bureaucracy and Turkish intellectuals. Turkish nationalism was approved as a state ideology in 1913 by the CUP. It was stated by Oba that the journal of *Türk Yurdu,* which began to be published in 1911, was a very important journal for the development of Turkish nationalism. Afterwards, the *Türk Ocağı* published this journal. *Türk Derneği* was founded before this association published a journal, namely *Türk Derneği.* This association and journal then reverted to *Türk Ocağı* and the journal of *Türk Yurdu* (Oba, pp.16-17).

 The Turkish Hearths were turned into the People's Houses in 1930-1931. It was stated that they were established again in 1949 as a private associations. Pan-Turanist tenets of nationalism were removed after 1918, and Pan-Turanism was supported by the refugees from Russia. This was considered as a tool against Pan-Slavism (Karpat, 1959, pp27-28).

The Turkish Hearth approved the membership of Turks. Article 5 of the 1924 regulation, *1924 Türk Ocağı Yasası,* was debated. At last, Turkish descents and people who accepted Turkish culture were accepted as Turks (Sarınay, p.317) Gökalp offered that Ottomanism should be Turkified. If not, it would be impossible for the other Turks to come closer to Ottomanism (Arai, pp.145-146).

The representatives of scientific Turkism were Ahmet Vefik Pasha and Süleyman Pasha. Ahmet Vefik Pasha being a lecturer in Istanbul University maintained that Ottomans were one of the Turkish speaking tribes and their language was being used outside Turkey. Süleyman Pasha wrote *Tarih-i Alem,* and he used the research of European Turcologists and Sinologists. Scientific research of these and other experts paved the way for the investigation of Ancient Turks and Turkish people outside the Ottoman Empire. As Heyd pointed out, national arts and national language became the main concerns of that time (pp.105-106)

Heyd, referring to intellectuals coming from Russia and its provinces, proposed that these Turkish intellectuals brought Western influence to political Turkism. Nonetheless, the state

structure of Russia was very different from that of Western Europe. Understanding of strong state control over the individual was very apparent in Russian political thought. Mehmed Emin Resulzade published his national poem and the most often quoted words were *Ben bir Türküm, dinim, cinsim uludur.* (I am a Turk, my religion and my race is noble). Heyd alleged that like Hüseyinzade, Mehmet Emin linked his nationalism with the love for the masses (pp.107-108)

The origins of Turkism could be stated as *İkdam ,* edited by Ahmet Cevdet. Gökalp, Ömer Seyfettin, Ahmet Hikmet and others began to publish *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens) in Salonika. *Türk Yurdu,* (Turkish Homeland) was published in Istanbul. Afterwards, Turkish Hearth was founded. In that time, Heyd summarized, Halide Edip wrote her novel *"Yeni Turan".* Concurrently, Fuat Köprülü worked on scientific Turkism through his Turcological research. Gökalp published *Yeni Mecmua* in 1917.

Karpat (1963) maintained that Turkish Hearth was seen as an ideological guide of the CUP and the CUP supported it (cited in Sarınay, p.156). Sarınay (2005) alleged that Turkish Hearth had some autonomy outside the control of the CUP and it could be called an institutionalization of Turkish nationalism and a reaction to the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire. The main aim of the Turkish Hearth was to establish a nation by creating national consciousness among Turks. The Balkan wars were considered as the turning point in this issue. Sarınay stated that it helped solve the identity crisis of the Turks. Thus, Turkish Hearth was the center of intellectuals who came together and believed the salvation of Turks became the main aim rather than the salvation of the Empire. It should be pointed out that within the CUP era, the official ideology was Ottomanism, but Turkism began to be developed. The main dimension that supported within Turkish Hearth was to create a nation based on national culture. Turkish Hearths was the center for all the Turkist approaches and nationalist intellectuals such as Akçura and Gökalp. Initially, the intellectuals of the Turkish Hearths supported Islamism and Ottomanism. Nonetheless, the Balkan Wars and the First World War were turning points. They were obliged to deal with Turks living inside and outside of the territories and with the loss of territories and population. The ideology of these intellectuals was shaped by Ottomanism and Islamism and their ideology was changed with the external factors as

wars and insurgencies. Sarınay mentioned that Turkism was based on cultural nationalism and it had territorial rather than racist dimensions (p.373). Sarınay alleged that, although within the first regulation of the Turkish Hearths, Turkish race was used instead of Turkish nation, Turkish Hearths were not racist. He stated that the terminology of nation, tribe, state and ummah were not developed and thus, the term racism was not used properly (Turkish Hearth Regulation, 1912, Sarınay, p.197). Turkish intellectuals within Turkish Hearths supported a national struggle and new republican regime. It was known that Turkish Hearths merged with the RPP in 1927. The principles of the Turkish Hearths were nationalism, populism, civilization and secularism. Turkish Hearths supported the reforms of Ataturk and tried to strengthen national unity and solidarity. Sarınay indicated that after the Seyh Said insurgency, the Turkish Hearths opened new branches in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in order to disseminate the Turkish language. Turkish Hearths were closed in 1931 (pp.158, 373-378). Also, Landau stated that Turkish Hearths had branches in the Caucasus and Turkestan and Turkish Hearths had been spreading Pan-Turkism propaganda since 1917 (Sarınay, p.182).

Sarınay noted that the development of Turkish nationalism had distinct stages. This process began with the Islamic community, *ummah*. It continued with Ottomanism, Islamism and lastly, with Turkish nationalism and patriotism. French nationalism, initially, affected the non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire, and then Muslims were affected. Turkish administrative staff reacted to these insurgents and Turkish nationalism developed as a reactive movement. Sarınay stated that cultural Turkism developed with the help of territorial losses, modernization movements, immigrations, independency movements, and gradually, Ottomanism was left. The Balkan wars especially contributed to the abolishment of Ottomanism (pp.371-372).

Gökalp supported secularism and separation of religion and eastern civilization. He believed that western civilization and Turkish culture could be reconciled through this separation. He also stated that a modern state could be founded when women participated in social and economic life. He alleged that *Şeyhülislam* should be removed from the cabinet and religious staff should not deal with the state's affairs (Sarınay, pp.240-242).

## 5.1 Homeland

The territorial decline accelerated in the nineteenth century with the emergence of the new Balkan states and Balkan nationalism emerged. The Balkan national movements also tried to establish homogeneous states based on religious affiliation. Çağaptay (2006) mentioned that Balkan nationalists tried to annihilate the Muslims in order to achieve ethnically homogeneous national homelands. Thus, Ottoman Muslims living in these newly founded Balkan states were faced with extermination, persecution and expulsion. Karpat (2000) noted that between 1856 and 1914, more than 7 million immigrants came to Anatolia from various parts of the Ottoman Empire (cited in Çağaptay, p.5).

As Çağaptay (2006) alleged, this religious classification could be a reason for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Ethnic identities were merged and converted into religious identities. "*Millets*" were considered as the dominant identity. The expulsion of Ottoman-Turkish Muslims from the Balkan states and other invaded territories motivated the immigrants to focus on the peninsula as their homeland, *vatan.* Moreover, immigration of Ottoman Muslims to Anatolia caused the enhancement of the peninsula's Muslim and Turkish demographic base at the expense of its Christian communities. Furthermore, the Ottoman Turkish-Muslim Community began to unite as a political community by perceiving decline of the Ottoman Empire as a real threat to their survival. It should be noted that during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Empire lost 69% of its population and 83% of its territory in Europe (Mardin, 1997, cited in Çağaptay, p.6).

 The loss of Salonika was considered a psychological trauma for the Ottoman Turkish Muslims. Regarding all those events, the intellectuals, army officers and bureaucrats mostly coming from the Balkans started to study the Turks' place in the Ottoman realm. They defined Turkishness as including the Turks and Muslims in Anatolia and Thrace. Therefore, it could be stated that Anatolia was considered as the immutable homeland of Turks and other Muslims and Turks were praised as an ancient and civilizing people of Anatolia. Turkish nationalism began to develop as a dominant political ideology, especially after the CUP's seizure of power in 1913 (Çağaptay, pp.5-8).

Rival powers of the system were Russia and the British Empire, who were managing millions of Muslims. Islamism became the official state policy under the reign of Abdulhamid II (Kalaycıoğlu, p.31). However, there was increased pressure of taxation, unrest in the Empire's Balkan provinces and uprisings were seen in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Therefore, the Austria-Russian agreement resulted in reforms within Bosnia-Herzegovina under foreign supervision. During the war of 1877-1878, Russians were near Yeşilköy (Ayastefanos). According to the Ayastefanos Agreement signed on 3 March 1878, Greater Bulgaria was established between the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea and Montenegro was added to its territory. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent. Batum, Ardahan, Kars and Doğubeyazıt were all given to Russia. The new Bulgarian state remained under Russian occupation. According to the Treaty of Berlin, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro gained their independence (Zürcher, pp.72-75).

Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by the Austrians. The Unionists organized a boycott against Austrian goods and shops (Ahmad, 2008d, p.30). Bulgaria declared independence, the Cretan question emerged, and antagonistic behavior of European powers towards to the CUP was observed in the first years of the constitution. Moreover, animosities of both the conservatives and the liberals were observed in April 1909 (Ahmad, 2008e, p.70).

Heyd (1950) pointed out that Gökalp supported the view of Ottomanism in his writings in 1913, however, after a short time; his enthusiasm towards Ottomanism was lost. It was observed that Gökalp wrote that a state could only exist if based on one nation, since men belonging to different nations could not love the same fatherland (p.73).

After the loss of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire became the Near Eastern state, with its territories stretching from Anatolia down to the Arabian Peninsula. Armenian nationalists coveted parts of Eastern Turkey. Armenian armies massacred and deported local Muslims in eastern Anatolia. Çağaptay (2006) alleged that the Muslim immigrants of the Balkans and Caucasus coming to the Anatolia experienced deportation and extermination. They revealed antagonism towards Anatolia's non-Muslim population. Firstly, there was governmental antagonism against the coastal Greek populations of Western Anatolia.

Thereafter, some Ionian and Marmara Greeks were deported to Anatolia due to security reasons. The conscription of some Greek males forced them to flee to Greece. Moreover, Armenians were expelled to Syria and lower Mesopotamia. Deportations, chaos, disease and famine resulted in the death of many Armenians. The deported Muslims were settled in central Anatolia and non-Muslims were dispersed among Muslims and Turks in central Anatolia. Moreover, Albanians were banned from living in Turkish Thrace and Western Anatolia and Albanians and Bosnians were settled in central Anatolia. The Muslim refugees coming from Russian occupied Eastern Anatolia in 1915 and 1916 were settled away from their ethnic kin and in the midst of the Turkish population. Georgians and Lazes were settled in northwestern Anatolia, and the Kurds were settled in Central Anatolia. In sum, it was stated that after the end of the First World War, the Turkish-Muslim community was consolidated in Anatolia and there was a sharp drop in the number of the Christians. Moreover, large numbers of non-Turkish Muslims were dispersed among the ethnic Turks so that they could be assimilated (pp.9-10)

Dündar (2006) pointed out that the Committee established the General Directorate for Settlement of Tribes and Refugees in 1916. This Directorate was responsible for displacement and settlement issues. Also, it was responsible for linguistic and ethnological research on the minorities of Asia Minor. Dündar stated that Talat Pasha sent coded telegrams to all the provinces and districts on 20 July 1915, instructing them to prepare ethnographic maps and statistical tables of their regions, including the smallest villages. It should be noted that the Law for the Settlement of Immigrants came into force on 13 May 1913. Albanian immigrants who were expelled from the Balkans after 1913 were dispersed from western Anatolia to the Interior and Eastern Anatolia. Moreover, the ethnic and religious composition of the Syrian region was restructured with the expulsion of the Druze of Hauran to Osmaniye. Moreover, resettlement policies were applied towards Arab communities. Furthermore, Bosnian Muslims were settled in the interior and eastern parts of Anatolia and the Ajaras were settled in Bolu and Ordu. There was an attempt to settle the Kurds in central and western Anatolia and afterwards, in May 1916, Kurds were not allowed to settle in the south. They were forbidden to return their land after the retreat of Russian army from eastern Anatolia. As Dündar stated, despite the disobedience of Lazes, they were not considered dangerous and they were allowed to settle in coastal areas. The

Circassians were settled along the Baghdad-Hejaz railway in Syria to protect the railway against Arab tribes. The CUP accepted only the Muslim gypsies. Nonetheless, at the end of 1917, the Directorate decided to ban their entry to the Empire. The Balkan Turks were settled in Thrace, in the coastal region of western Anatolia, in the Marmara region, and in Adana. Turkish refugees were settled in eastern and southeastern provinces such as Diyarbakır, Urfa, Maraş, Musul and along the railway lines (Çağaptay, pp.13-23).

## 5.2 Bourgeoisie

As mentioned, there was no economic system to ensure accumulation of capital in the Ottoman Empire. There were not landlords, and, since the owner of territory was the Ottoman Empire, he added that this situation obstructed the emergence of the bourgeoisie (Altan, 2008, p.61).

All the intellectuals demanding national economy supported the same themes: participation of Turks in the national economy, establishment of companies, the state's protectionism, abolishment of capitulations, nationalization of capital and foreign companies, establishment of national banks, using national products and elevation of customs barriers. Ziya Gökalp and Tekin Alp supported a national economy (Sarınay, p.232).

The development of a capitalist economy in the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth century promoted social mobility among the Turkish Muslims. Moreover, mass literacy, printing press, newspapers and universal army service revived the Turkish-Muslim awareness (Çağaptay, p.6).

Mehmed Emin stated that the Ottoman Empire was accumulating war booty. The main obstacle of economic enlargement was lack of production, art and trade. Emin mentioned that foreigners sold them their raw materials after they processed their raw materials (Arai, p.31). He was a member of the CUP, a writer, and the founder of the journal of *Türk Yurdu* in 1911 (Yüksel, 1987, pp.21-22).

Big industry was strengthened in Europe and it gained impetus within the Ottoman Empire. This caused financial distress in the Empire. Akçura (2006) believed that it was ridiculous to hope for the development of colonial and semi-colonial economies under the slavery of the foreign big capitalist powers (p.171).

Abdulhamid II tried to balance Anglo-French interests in the Empire with Germany. Kaiser promised to abolish capitulations if the others did the same thing. Abdulhamid II tried to abolish the capitulations. However, it was apparent that Kamil Pasha, being a close friend of European embassies, often acted against the Porte's advice (Ahmad, 2008a, p.29). This period could be regarded as one of unlawfulness and misery during which Ottoman power declined. All the policies for saving the Empire were unsuccessful. Ottoman statesmen had proposed free trade regulations. They had abolished all protective regulations. The Tanzimat statesmen, on the other hand, with the influence of List, tried to raise the tariffs from 4% to 7%. The foreign powers agreed on this increase in 1907. However, they stated that the increase in revenue would be given to the Ottoman Public Debt and also, 25 % would be allocated to finance reforms in Macedonia (p.29).

The CUP was called the vanguard party of the Turkish bourgeoisie. The CUP and the state carried out social and economic policies designed to create a new class, the Turkish bourgeoisie. The inner core of the comprador bourgeoisie included Greeks and Armenians, and it was pointed out that they were superior in commerce and finance. Greeks and Armenians did not regard the Ottoman state as representative of their interests (Ahmad, 2008d, pp.23, 27).

Ahmad (2008f) pointed out that the Unionists encouraged Turks and Jews to challenge the economic hegemony of the Christians, and they were seen as potential for the creation of national bourgeoisie by the CUP. The ideas of List relating to national economy were supported by Moiz Kohen. He maintained that Jews identified themselves primarily as Turks or Turkish Jews. He himself gave himself a name, Tekin Alp (p.137). It was apparent that Jews were still a part of a traditional, non-capitalist, socio-economic structure. Moreover, the Jewish community coming from Salonika and Baghdad supported the Unionists (Ahmad, 2008d, p.28).

The *millet* system was mentioned as the division of Ottoman society along the lines of religious communities. Non-Muslim *millets* enjoyed almost total religious and cultural autonomy. It was important to note that there was no national autonomy of the Ottoman state, thus there was no Ottoman nation. Ahmad (2008d) stated that the economy of the Empire was divided along religious-ethnic ties (p.27).

The removal of the capitulations in 1914 revealed a conscious policy of strengthening the entrepreneurial class of Turks by offering the most generous incentives. Ahmad (2008d) referred to *Türk Yurdu* (3 April 1914) that there were two important aspects of this issue. Some experts gave importance to cultural tendencies and the so-called mentality of Turks to explain the reluctance to engage in commerce and modern industry while others mentioned the structure of the economic system of that time; European economic hegemony did not permit Turks and Muslims to make profits from their investments (p.41).

During the Balkan Wars, the first signs of economic nationalism indicated that the National Consumption Society was founded to encourage people to buy goods produced in the homeland (Poulton, p.81). The economic policy of the CUP could be called statism. It was explained as giving priority to the state to arrange the economic policy rather than private enterprise. Ahmad (2008d) referring to Tekin Alp, (Moiz Kohen) (1917) explained that the state supplanted the private sector, and that the state supported the private sector in order to obtain more profits (p.61). The issues related to the national mobilization were presented in the periodical, *Türk Yurdu.* The bourgeoisie of the Turkish speaking people of Russia developed the idea of economic nationalism and the policy of statism. They tried to confront economic dependence on the European economy and aimed to strengthen the middle class. Yusuf Akçura stated that the foundation of the modern state could be realized through the bourgeoisie class (Ahmad, 2008d, p.40)

It was alleged that the war profiteering of this emerging bourgeoisie led to statist policies. Moreover, it was maintained that German supervision and control should be taken as a model for Turkey. The state under the governance of the CUP decided not to supplant the private sector or replace the individual. The CUP maintained that the state's aim would be

to show the individual the way to maximum profit and create the conditions most favorable for his development (Ahmad, 2008a, p.13).

The CUP explained its economic program at its first convention. Initially, the elaboration of laws defining the relations between employers and employees was proposed. A distribution of land to the peasants was offered and credit for the peasants at a moderate rate of interest was proposed. Existing systems of titles would be changed; the cadastral system would be gradually adopted. Furthermore, the state would supervise the educational system in which state schools would be open to all races and creeds. The Turkish language would be introduced in elementary schools and commercial, agricultural and technical schools would be opened. The Unionists tried to reform economic life. Their main aim was to decrease the dependence on foreign capital for economic growth. Japan was seen as a model for the CUP. Ahmad (2008d), referring to his previous work, "Young Turks" stated that the Young Turks believed that European states would help them to develop an independent capitalist system. However, Cavid Bey was forced to seek loans in France (pp.30-32).

The CUP introduced names and numbers for the houses in order to facilitate communications. Irrigation of the Konya plain under the direction of the Deutsche Bank was proposed. Moreover, it was stated that under the new regime in Turkey, a constitutional government would be formed; they strived to obstruct abuses and corruption. In addition, concessions were granted for the building of new railways and extension of the old ones, building of highways, installation of telephone, electric lighting, power plants and for the electrification of the tramway (Ahmad, 2008d, pp.36-37).

Economic liberalism was initiated starting in 1908. Free enterprise and foreign capital were encouraged. French political thought of the Enlightenment was very influential among Ottoman liberals at that time. Toprak (1995) mentioned that the liberal Young Turk movement was considered as a rebellion against Ottoman state tradition. Thus, there were two dimensions of this movement. Prince Sabahaddin advocated free and private enterprise and Cavid Bey advocated the removal of all the barriers and that the state should not interfere in economic life. At that time, it was maintained that westernization could be

accomplished through liberalization. Thereby, between the years 1908 and 1912, there was a comparatively liberal situation. There were labor movements, feminist movements and powerful opposition. The labor unions and other associations were founded (pp.1-3).

As Toprak (1995) and other experts mentioned, although the CUP intended to strengthen Ottoman nationalism, application of liberalism enhanced the efficacy of the non-Muslims and foreign powers, Muslim merchants and tradesman, on the other hand, became impoverished. Although some experts stated that the *Tanzimat* era indicated the birth of Turkish nationalism, Toprak mentioned that Turkish nationalism began after the 1908 Revolution. It was stated that the Balkan Wars resulted in the demise of Ottoman nationalism. Afterward, the Unionists began to apply privileged economic policies in order to enhance the economic situation of the Turkish people. Toprak indicated that Turkish nationalism had anti-liberal features which resulted from dissolution of guilds and liberalisms and which had a worse impact on Muslims (pp.4-5).

1913-1914 Muslim boycotage was significant in that Muslim people were called upon not to shop from non-Muslims and Muslims opened 500 new shops in Istanbul. During the First World War, nepotistic policies towards Muslims continued. A protectionist foreign trade policy was pursued and the state helped Muslims founding incorporations. The National Economy Bank was established and the ethnic division of labor was removed. These types of cooperation were founded in order to strengthen Muslim producers and merchants. Therefore, the peasants and military-civil bureaucracies reverted to the middle classes in order to establish nation-state (Toprak, pp.6-8). Gökalp believed that by internalizing principles of a national economy, Turkey would become both an agricultural and industrial state: he believed that economy was not cosmopolitan (p.145). However, this war economy served the well-being of some people. Gökalp proposed that curing the ethics of the society could be realized through maintaining professional ethics. He suggested the foundation of professional corporations. In that sense, class struggle would be eliminated (p.154).

"The Bill to Encourage Industry" was introduced in June 1914. Indigenous manufacturers were assisted; the Bill bound the state to buy from native manufacturers even when

substitutes were cheaper by as much as 10%. It was noted that small-town gentry, artisans and small merchants joined the party. Moreover, it could be indicated that the landlords and landowning peasantry were influenced by the policies of the CUP. The war in Europe introduced new factors to the Turkish economy. Turkish industrial and agricultural goods were in high demanded. As Ahmad (2008d) indicated, it was apparent that the mobilization of all Turkish resources was needed to be victorious in the war. However, black marketeering of scarce commodities during the war of Gallipoli ensured great benefits to a small group of the CUP in Istanbul. The Committee of National Defense monopolized all of the commodities (pp. 42-44).

The Unionists founded *Esnaf Cemiyeti* (The Society of Tradesman) in 1915. The CUP tried to prevent profiteering and promulgated a law to regulate the sale of essential goods and a commission to prevent profiteering was established. A regulation on customs tariffs was introduced in February 1916. Moreover, Turkish became obligatory in commercial matters. New tariffs were passed on 23 March 1916. Many commercial firms were established even in Arab provinces. It is important to note that bureaucrats of the CUP founded these firms. The CUP tried to create a national economy both in the capital but, more importantly, in the provinces. The Ottoman Joint Stock Company for General Transport, which was founded by seven former provincial governors, was an example of a successful commercial enterprise. Moreover, the CUP ensured the foundation of *Memurin Şirketi*, which was comprised of minor bureaucrats. Local merchants, artisans and notables created a national economy in the provinces. The agricultural policy of the CUP was presented as a way to strengthen the *etatism* (Ahmad, 2008d, pp.45-56).

The CUP tried to end small farming and consolidate land holdings under big landlords. However, there was a shortage of labor at that time. The Agricultural Bank was established. Compulsory labor was introduced to help the landowners at the outbreak of war. The CUP prevented the farmers from selling to the German and Austria-Hungarian purchasing companies. This maintained the consolidation of a national company. Therefore, an awakening of national consciousness was seen (Ahmad 2008d, pp.57-59). The Unionist Land Policy ensured the peasantry that they would be able to acquire their

own land. Because the landowners could not find a cheap labor force, they began to use more modern agricultural techniques (Ahmad, 2008e, pp.69-70).

The Unionists supported large landowners and they believed that large landowning could save the Empire. The position of peasantry declined during the Young Turk period and production for the market increased. Moreover, due to the war economy, the prices of food increased. At first, peasants benefitted from high wages; however, after the outbreak of the war, they were forced to work. Thus, as Ahmad explained, peasants became outlaws (Ahmad, 2008e, pp.69-70).

Gökalp opposed any class struggle. He opposed Marxism, explaining that the economy worked through class conflict. Moreover, he mentioned that Ottoman society was divided between the Ottoman Bureaucracy and the Turkish masses ruled by them. He suggested that Turkish masses should be raised culturally and economically. Gökalp tried to find a middle way between socialism and capitalism. He identified this middle way as solidarism, *tesanetçülük* or social democracy, *içtimai halkçılık*. Solidarism was based on the recognition of both private and public rights of the ownership. Gökalp demanded the abolition of classes and substitution with occupational unions or guilds that were to provide cooperation among the members of the community. Also, this would have ended the class struggle among the members of the society (Heyd, pp.140-144). Solidarism was explained as anti-Marxist, anti-socialist, anti-liberal, rightist ideology, and it was also added that he assumed that solidarism was not anti-capitalist. Solidarism did not approve individualism or the existence of social classes and conflict among those classes (Parla, 1993, pp.7, 29).

As Heyd pointed out, economic development was needed and Gökalp first suggested the removal of Islamic traditions such as pious foundations, the tithe and prohibition of interest. It was mentioned that he was in favor of capitalism; however, he knew that Turkey was a backward agricultural country and establishment of national economy was required. Therefore, local production should be protected against European imports. Gökalp mentioned that the Ministry of National Economy should be established. It should have directed economic life, control customs, railways, ports, the National Bank and

drafted social legislation. It was apparent that Turkish private enterprise was too weak to carry out the economic development program (Heyd, pp.146-147).

It was to be pointed out that Gökalp and his friends were not representatives of the Western type bourgeoisie. Heyd explained that they were comprised of a group including intellectuals, journalists, writers and civil servants who were influenced by Western political thought. The army was the most influential institution needed to ensure the modernization of the state. Thus, this group of people consolidated their power within the army. Also, they demanded the creation of a Turkish middle class. (pp.166-167). Gökalp mentioned that industrialists, artisans, merchants and professional people were significant elements for the development of a strong middle class. He indicated that the peasants and the government officials were not creative elements of the economy. Moreover, he stated that an efficient and strong government could only be established with the inclusion of a middle class (Heyd, p.167).

## 5.3 Common Language

The educational system of the Ottoman Empire was based on the madrasa, or religious, education and the students of that time learned the ummah discipline. The language of these schools was Arabic. Hence, the students lost their Turkish identity. Enderun, on the other hand, ensured the Turkification of Ottoman citizens who were not Turkish. The Ottomans removed the divisions of nationalities and the Ottoman Empire divided its people according to their religion. The churches in European empires were prohibiting national revival and self-determination. Nonetheless, the church was supporting the right of national self-determination in the Ottoman Empire (Oba, pp.38-41).

With the 1894 decree it was decided that the Turkish language was to be used in all the schools of the Empire. This decree was important in that use of clear, simple language purified of Arabic and Persian words was stipulated (Poulton, p.60). The League of the Prizren was founded in 1878 to promote the use of Albanian. Abdulhamid II banned the

usage of Albanian written material which was backed by the Greek Patriarchate (Poulton, pp.66-67).

The CUP Program of 1908 made Turkish the official language (Akşin, 1987, cited in Poulton, p.80) The CUP government declared Turkish as the only medium of education in the Empire's high schools. Afterwards, the CUP installed Turkish as a compulsory subject in the community schools of the non-Muslims (Yıldız, 2001, cited in Çağaptay, 2006. p.8). The use of Turkish became compulsory with the law of 23 March 1916. It was also decided that signs and registers would have to be written in Turkish (Akşin, 1987, cited in Poulton, p.80).

Gökalp mentioned that İsmail Gaspıralı (1841-1914) published *Tercüman* with the slogan "Unity in Language, Thought and Action", "*Dilde, Fikirde, İşte Birlik"*. He aimed for the cultural and political unification of the Turks. Gökalp was also influenced by Hüseyinzade Ali. Ali was impressed by Socialism and Pan-Slavism. As Heyd stated, he came to Istanbul at the beginning of the nineties and he tried to disseminate his ideas about social reform and Pan-Turkism. He went to Baku to unite Sunnis and Shias. Moreover, he worked to internalize Ottoman-Turkish culture and tried to strengthen his ties with Turkey (Heyd, p.107).

Ahmet Hikmet stated in the journal of *Türk Derneği, no.1-2 that* there were many Arabic and Persian words in the Ottoman language and that it did not inspire a feeling of nationalism. He mentioned that the ingredients of being Ottoman did not constitute a nation. His proposal was to resurrect Turkish. Hikmet (*Türk Derneği, no.3)* favored pure Turkish to rude Turkish (Arai, p.30). *Türk Derneği, no: 5* proposed that Ottomans would be united referring to political thoughts and with the help of *Kanun-i Esasi*. In this regard, this association proposed that the language should be purified (Arai, p.33). Moreover, *Türk Derneği, no: 1* indicated that the unifying factor was the Turkish of Anatolia. It was proposed that Ottoman Turkish should be disseminated among all Ottomans. Moreover, it was demanded that Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Kaşgar, Buhara and Hive should use Ottoman Turkish. The association stated if there were similarities within Turkish, Arabic and Persian, foreign words should not be used. It was pointed out that simple and

understandable Turkish should be used in official documents. Moreover, it was maintained that every person could be a member of the association by not referring to his race, religion, nationality and the tribe. *Türk Derneği* was supporting the unification of Turks but the essential aim was to be beneficial to the Ottoman Turks. It was mentioned that these benefits were to be identified as industrial and commercial (Arai, pp.40-44).

The journal of *Genç Kalemler*, edited by *Ali Canip,* with the assistance of *Ömer Seyfettin,* was published in Salonika. They aimed to eliminate foreign words from the Ottoman language and to allow ordinary people to understand the written language. Heyd mentioned that the creation of a Turkish national language was designed to ensure cultural progress. Moreover, he added that Gökalp's ideology evolved from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism. The most important indicator of this could be revealed as the Gökalp's poem of *"Turan"* which was published in 1911 (Heyd, p.33). The simplification of the Turkish language was an important tool for the construction of Turkish identity and Turkish nationalism.

The newspaper called *Ikdam* was published by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and started with the descriptive sentence that "it was a Turkish newspaper". The subjects of the nationalist newspaper *Ikdam* were Turkish history, Turkish people living in China, Iran, Hive, assimilationist policies towards Asian Turkish people and the expansionist policies of China and Russia. The words like Turan and Arian were used in this newspaper. Veled Celebi, Mehmed Tahir and Necip Asım were the most esteemed journalists. Necip Asım translated the works of Leon Cahun. Hence, he focused on the close relationship and kinship among Turkish people and Mongols. Hungarians and Turks developed closer relationships during the Balkan Wars in 1870 and Vambery was a very influential person of that time (Öğün, pp.111-113).

The oppositionist tendencies of the Young Turks, during the reign of Abdulhamid II were witnessed. Öğün stated that the Young Turks accepted the idea of Ottoman brotherhood. *Mizan* and *Şuray-ı Ümmet* were Turkish nationalist newspapers of that time. Azeri Hüseyinzade Ali, Azeri Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Seyh Süleyman Efendi of Uzbek tekke and Yusuf Akçura were very important Turkish nationalists of the Second constitutional era.

The journal of *Genç Kalemler* was published in Salonika. Ömer Seyfeddin, Ziya Gökalp and Ali Canip Yöntem were prominent authors of this journal. These two groups were integrated within the journals *Türk Derneği* and *Türk Yurdu.* Öğün stated that Yusuf Akçura was not a Young Turk and he was not a member of the CUP after the 1908 revolution (Öğün, pp.119-123).

The writers of the *Genç Kalemler* did not give importance to Central Asian Turks. The main purpose of its authors was to construct a pure Turkish extracting Arabic and Persian words. Therefore, it was developed in order to allow Turkish people to understand each other. Gökalp and the CUP supported this journal financially (Arai, pp.60, 78, 87).

Gökalp believed that true culture was alive in the masses and that there was a need to abolish the barriers between the masses and intellectuals. However, Gökalp did not advocate an excessive linguistic purification (*tasfiyecilik*) like the writers of *İkdam*. Heyd indicated that Gökalp opposed the elimination of all Arabic and Persian words and their replacements with Turkish words. He explained his formula as modernization and Europeanization of the language related to ideas, Islamization of scientific terms and Turkification of all other words in grammar, syntax, and orthography (Heyd, p.116, 119).

Heyd articulated that Turks from Russia tried to settle the cultural separatism which was supported by Russia to cut the bonds between the Ottomans and other Turks. They began to develop their own literature and local dialect. As Heyd summarized, a centripetal model was seen in Crimea and Caucasus. *Tercüman* (Crimea) and *Şelale* (Baku) used Ottoman Turkish (p.127).

Ismail Gaspiralı advocated the idea of *usul-ı Cedit*. He published the newspaper, *Tercüman* on 10 April 1883. He stated that education should be provided in the vernacular language. Internalization of western science and education systems and the adoption of a western life style were revealed with the policy of jaadedism. Gaspıralı supported a pure Turkish language; he wanted to see pure Turkish which was cleansed of Arabic and Persian words (Oba, pp.151-152).The capital accumulation in Crimea and Azerbaijan helped the emergence of national bourgeoisie in these places. They began to oppose the Pan Slavism

and Russification processes. The reformation of the education system and usage of pure Turkish language were supported (Öğün, pp.117-118).

## 5.4 Common Will

Promotion of the Ottoman culture with the help of religious loyalty to the Empire and to the Sultan in Muslim areas was considered a tool for the centralization. This centralization process was supported with telegraph system and the railways. Railway lines were established in order to enhance communication with Baghdad, Syria and Hejaz (Poulton, p.59).

The Ottoman Empire did not deal with Central Asian Turkish entities or Turkestan. It was stated that the people of Turkestan demanded the help of Ottomans against Russian invasions and cruelty. However, they were sent to their homes with expensive presents by the Ottomans (Belge, p.45). Proto-nationalism was caused by the "*kul* system"; the policy of being subject, and Oba allged that Turkish people could not acquire administrative posts within the Empire (p.47).

The Constitutional regime was refounded by the Young Turks after the 1908-1909 revolution. Heyd summarized the situation by saying that three conflicting ideologies came onto the scene in that era. Firstly, liberalism of the *Tanzimat* period was observed, and reforms were put into place in order to develop like the West. Ottomanism was presented to ensure equal rights to all subjects of the Empire. Secondly, Islamism or Pan-Islamism was presented to consolidate unity among the Muslims of the Empire. Lastly, Turkish nationalism, namely Pan-Turkism and Turanism, was presented (Heyd, p.71).

Heyd stated that the great sufferers of Ottomanism were the Turks themselves. He alleged that Turks lacked national consciousness. It was known that the Christians and the Jews occupied key economic positions in commerce, industry and professions. Turks, on the other hand, were peasants, government officials and soldiers. Although non-Muslims did not take part in the government, they were wealthy bourgeoisie with European educations

(Heyd, pp.73-74). Having a bourgeoisie class had been required for the development of nationalism.

The Jewish Community supported the new regime. The Sefardi Jews who were expelled from Spain and Portugal in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries identified themselves with the CUP. It is important to note that centuries of decline for Jews and revival for Greeks and Armenians were observed. Moreover, it was indicated that these two Christian *millets* began to replace the Jews in many economic and administrative functions. The common interest of the Jews was the revival of the Ottoman Empire and they identified themselves with the CUP. The Jews were aware that Ottoman rule was the best protection against Christian anti-Semitism. The Ottoman Greek Community was monolithic and it accepted the absolute authority of the Orthodox Church and Patriarch. Moreover, it was stated that the Patriarchate allied with the Ottoman liberals in the elections. Ahmad stated that their nationalism overshadowed class consciousness. The Armenian community, on the other hand, was not monolithic like the Greeks. The Patriarchate supported the interests of the merchants of Istanbul and Dashnaks. It was known that every side of the economy was dominated by the minorities, especially Greeks and Armenians. The Dashnaks became legal in 1908. They agreed to collaborate with the Committee to support the constitution. Ahmad (2008f) indicated that during the Balkan wars, the consciousness of being Turkish was awakened among the members of the CUP (pp.90-107).

It was mentioned that, during the course of the Turco-Italian war in September 1911, Italian forces occupied a number of Aegean islands and encouraged pan-Hellenism among the Greek inhabitants. Athens supported that and spread propaganda in favor of union with Greece. Greeks landed at Limni and occupied other offshore islands not held by the Italians during the Balkan wars. Turkish and Muslim people fled from the Balkans to Anatolia (Ahmad, 2008f, pp.115-117).

The Balkan war broke out in 1912 and this changed the place of the CUP, because the CUP's headquarters moved from Salonika to Istanbul. The main ideals of the CUP changed and Ottomanism was removed from the political scene. Revolts in Albania (1912) and Hejaz (1916) disappointed the CUP. As Heyd mentioned, the Turkish intelligentsia chose their own way and began to advocate nationalist and pan-Turanian ideals (p.44).

The anti-Greek boycott of 1912-1913 could be considered as a constructing factor for the birth of Turkish nationalism. It was organized against Greek Christian economic domination, and it was to promote Muslim enterprise and Muslim entrepreneurs. However, the Greek community was so powerful that the Patriarch promoted his choice of Greek candidates for the Assembly in the 1914 general election. Another consolidating factor was the CUP's demand of a de facto exchange of population by forcing Greeks and Bulgarians to migrate from Anatolia and Thrace. However, this was not an official policy. Bulgaria declared independence in 1908 and the Greeks in 1912 (Ahmad, 2008f, pp.119-120).

The CUP wanted to unite all the community under the identity of Ottomanism. The Patriarch opposed the policies of the Dashnaks and supported the Armenian bourgeoisie who were not satisfied by being the part of the European economy. Therefore, the Patriarchy was against autonomy or independence in eastern Anatolia. There was Unionist-Dashnaks cooperation in 1909. The Unionists wanted to destroy the authority of the Patriarchy and ensure total control over the Empire. The Patriarchy wanted to preserve its communal privileges. Agrarian disputes between the Armenians, Turks and Kurds were seen in eastern provinces. These events changed Turkish-Armenian relations. Kurdish unrest in the Bitlis region was seen in March 1914. It is important to note that the troops were gathered from Van and Muş and arms were distributed to Armenians to protect themselves (Ahmad, 2008f, pp.122-123, 132).

Karpat (1959) stated that, during the time of opposition, from 1889 to 1908, Turkish nationalism was not expressed. In that period, Christian minorities were advocating the policies of the Young Turks. The Union and Progress party entered the elections in 1908. They won most of the seats in the House of the Deputies. Karpat observed that the period from 1908-1918 was dominated by the Union and Progress party. From 1908 to 1913, the Young Turks' theory of nationalism was explicit. However, this incited the uprisings in Syria and Albania. Moreover, it could be stated that this was influential in precipitating the Balkan Wars. Karpat claimed that the entrance of Empire to the First World War on the side of Germany was supported because there was the Young Turks' dream of acquiring territories inhabited by Turkish people in Russia and in the Balkans. Karpat proposed that

Arab nationalism resulted from the Pan-Turanist and secular views of the Young Turks (pp.15, 23-24).

Turkish people living in Kazan and Crimea gained the consciousness of being Turkish and they started to feel Turkish nationalism (Oba, p.12). Moreover, Balkan nationalist movements and Pan-Slavism helped with the emergence of Turkish nationalism. It was a common understanding that the Tartars coming from Russia led the move toward Turkish nationalism. The main reason of the emergence of Turkish nationalism in this territory was Pan-Slavism. It is important to note that the people of Kazan and Azerbaijan were very wealthy and they were members of the middle class (Belge, pp.44, 143).

Although Abdulhamid II called for a holy war by declaring himself the caliph of all Muslims, Muslim Arabs fought against the Empire. It was apparent that World War I proved that Pan-Islamism was defeated by nationalism (Karpat, 1959, p.25). Territorial expansion was avoided in this era. The main aim was to protect the empire against Russians. Abdulhamid II relied on Britain and he supported Pan-Islamism to ensure solidarity among his subjects. However, this was not successful. Apparent western influence was felt both in the heartlands of the empire and in provinces like Egypt. Western penetration was effected economically by using trade and moreover, it was accomplished by using religion or opening schools. Capitulations helped this situation. Bankruptcy was declared in 1875, and it is important to note that 25% of the Empire's revenue was given to the Public Debt Administration. The tools of internal communication, railways, telegraph and educational activities were promoted to provide centralization and internalization of the Ottoman culture. Pan-Islamism was used by the Sultan to confront Arab nationalism. In sum, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism were revealed in this era (Poulton, pp.58-60).

## 5.5 Constructing Factors

Folklore and customs were considered important constructing factors. It was presented that the Eastern European ethnic nationalism gave importance to villages and peasantry.

Poulton mentioned that Turkish proto-nationalism resembled the Eastern European proto-nationalism in this respect. Moreover, it was mentioned that the city was also an ideal forum for the emerging Turkish proto-nationalism. Furthermore, it was stated that Anatolia began to be identified with the notion of a Turkish homeland (Poulton, p.64).

The CUP maintained economic and demographic Turkification. The government signed a treaty with Bulgaria to exchange Bulgars living in Thrace with Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria. Another agreement was signed with Greece to exchange the Greeks living along the Aegean littoral with the Muslims of Macedonia. In addition, the CUP passed laws to favor Turks and Muslims in commerce and industry, which provided the Turkification of the Empire's economy by forcing the Christians into the margins of Ottoman life. It should also be noted that the war strengthened Turkish nationalism and Anatolia became rather important after the Balkan wars (Çağaptay, p.8).

Macedonia was nominated as a nationalism school for young officers of the war academy and bureaucrats who were the nucleus of the CUP and they overthrew Abdülhamid II (Poulton, p.69). They ensured the origins of traditional Turkish politicians. The military-civil bureaucracy was the constructor and activist of Turkish politics for a long time, especially until the reign of the JDP.

Ottoman people were settled in mountain villages to avoid paying taxes. They were living freely. After the reign of Mahmud II, the establishment of modern states began. Mahmud II tried to change the centralist structure of the state and tried to return it to a decentralized structure. Abdulhamid II founded the Hamidian Militias. This strengthened the Kurdish people, the Kurdish provinces did not strongly support the central government, the Ottoman central authority had given them some kind of freedom. Being members of the Hamidian Militias, Kurds began to persecute Armenians and Suryanes (Belge, pp.58, 70-71; Arai, pp.16-17). Belge (2006) stated that Kurds and Cherkessk people were influential and became leaders of the persecution of Armenians. Kurds would get the properties of Armenians. Concurrently, Cherkessk people were migrating from Russia and they needed soil (p.77).

Albanian nationalism was confronted by the CUP and compulsory Turkish language education was applied in Albanian schools. Jewish and Muslim emigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria had their lands confiscated and thus, they settled in Albanian territories. It is important to mention that, as Akşin (1987) remarked, violence and assassinations were used as methods in order to quell nationalism in the Balkans (cited in Poulton, p.70). The law of association of 1909 banned political organizations based on ethnic and national basis (Poulton, p.70).

Poulton (2006) mentioned that there was a difference between the main Young Turk factions. Young Turks could be divided into Unionists and Liberals. Liberals demanded decentralization, and they were supported by non-Muslims and non-Turks. Unionists, on the other hand, later being the supporters of the CUP, aimed to modernize and Turkify the state.

Ziya Gökalp, a member of the CUP, stated that the nation could not be founded only on race, geography, political affinity or on mere will power. He stressed the necessity of the culture; namely, a common language, religion, ethics and arts. He mentioned that Turan based on cultural affinity was the great country of all the Turks. Gökalp believed that the language of the country should be vernacular Turkish based on Istanbul usage. He supported secularism and a separation of Islam from the government. Karpat (1959) indicated that Gökalp united the three ideologies as Islamism, Westernism and nationalism. Many Turkish intellectuals were the disciples of Gökalp including Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura, M. Fuat Köprülü, Halide Edip Adıvar, Mehmet Emin, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Hüseyinzade Ali, and Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver (p.25).

Sarınay mentioned capitulations, *Duyun-i Umumiye* and the Balkan Wars strengthened Turkish nationalism and as a result, minorities responded this development harshly. Therefore, Turks began to boycott shops of Greeks and Armenians as well as shops belonging to other minorities. The boycotts were supported by the CUP and the Turkish Hearths. This movement strengthened the Turkification of the economy (Sarınay, p.172).

Albanians played great roles in the CUP. The Albanian national movement was allied to the CUP. However, they used Albanian nationalism to gain their independence. Poulton alleged that Turkish nationalism of the CUP incited this outcome (Poulton, pp.66-67). Gökalp mentioned that nationalism first emerged among non-Muslims, then among Albanians, afterwards among Arabs, and lastly among Turks (Gökalp, 1918, cited in Tanyu, 2006, p.14).

Ahmad (2008g) mentioned that initially the Young Turks-Unionist and Liberals demanded the support of Britain. Germany helped the Hamidian regimes. Hostility towards Germany increased with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the German ally Austria-Hungaria. The Unionists offered an alliance with Britain, but this was rejected. Moreover, the *millet* system and the capitulations undermined the authority of the Ottoman state. The Unionists seized power in January 1913 and a 30% military cut was realized in 1914-15. Turkey was in debt to Germany by 1918 (pp.59-82) Pan- Turkism became the key element in Unionist ruling circles since 1912 (Ahmad, 2008h, p.105).

### 5.5.1 Ziya Gökalp

Gökalp was against internationalism and he disagreed with the ideas giving superiority to internationalism over nationalism. He opposed Western liberalism and its understanding of international law and customs giving upper positions to international society rather than national society. Moreover, he paved the way for Islam as a consolidating factor of nationalism. He did not give a superior place to the individual, but believed that the individual was a self-centered ego and could not serve as a moral ideal. He believed that a nation had superiority over the individual. Moreover, international society could not be established until all states gained their independence. Furthermore, he regarded the League of Nations as a weak federation belonging to the same civilization. In addition, it is important to mention that an international organization would be weak, having no legislative, executive and judiciary powers or an army (Heyd, pp.123-125).

Heyd (1950) articulated that the Turanian movement started after the revolution of 1908-9 with the help of Young Turks from Russia. Turan was defined by Gökalp and friends as a

union of all Turks from the Balkans to the Chinese border. Gökalp's poem Turan defined "Turanism" thus:

The Country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan,
Their country is broad and everlasting land Turan. (Heyd, p.126)

Gökalp stated that the Ottomans, Azerbaijanis, Crimeans, Turkmens, Kirgizs and Kipchaks potentially formed one nation. He mentioned that although there were important racial differences among them, they nevertheless shared a common culture. They had acquired similar customs and institutions and their language was fundamentally the same. It should be taken into consideration that the main issue of that time was gaining independence from foreign powers. Thus, the main ideas related to Gökalp's writings were presented as regaining self-respect and self-confidence (Heyd, pp.127, 168-170).

Gökalp completed his famous work, The Foundations of Turkism, *Türkçülüğün Esasları,* in 1923. In this book, he identified nation with common feelings, common culture and common education. He mentioned that a nation was formed through a common education in all fields such as language, religion, ethics and aesthetics. He mentioned three important concepts: Türkiyelilik (Anatolian nationalism), Oğuzculuk (belonging to Kayı tribe), and Turanism (Arai, p.20; Gökalp, 2007). Gökalp stated that the easiest way to unify the Turks could be realized among the *Oğuz* Turks. These Turks had a common language and common traditions. *Turan* was considered as a remote purpose to be realized. He believed that Tartars, Uzbeks and Kirgizs would establish separate nation-states. Therefore, the ethnic unity of these people could be identified as *Turan.* He added that Hungarians, Fins, Tunguzs and Mongols had all lost their bond with *Turan.* In other words, Turanians were people who spoke Turkish, while the others had different names (Gökalp, 2007, pp.17-24).

The main idea presented by Gökalp was to enter Western civilization by preserving the Turkish and Muslim identity of the Turkish people (p.40). Gökalp was considered as the main ideologue of the CUP. He distinguished culture and civilization. He mentioned that they accepted the three ideals of Turkism, Islam and modernization at the same time. He mentioned that the Turkish nation belonged to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic community, and to the West internationally (Berkes, 1959, cited in Poulton, p.77).

Gökalp called for the removal of *Şeyhülislam* from the cabinet in a 1916 memorandum. He suggested the abolition of *evkaf*. He also opposed an exaggerated reliance on God. *Tariqats* opposed these orders. He, then, ordered all religious courts to be transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Gökalp indicated that unification of Islam and the modern state was possible. The basic components of this unification were Turkish national culture, Islam and European civilization (Poulton, pp.77-79).

Gökalp stated that Turkish nationalism started as a cultural movement. It was strengthened through grave dangers. He pointed out that confrontation with crisis resulted in a loss of individual perception and individualistic purposes and the general population became immersed in their society (Berkes, 1959, cited in Kalaycıoğlu, p.40). Thus, it was apparent that the existence of a threat was needed for national solidarity. So, by referring to the model of Greenfeld, the ideas of Gökalp could reveal some similarities to German nationalism (p.387). It was contended that true individuality could be acquired through collectivity (Arai, p.20).

Gökalp said "Turkism is the real support of the Islam and of the Ottoman state, and it is against cosmopolitanism."(Berkes, p.74) According to Greenfeld, German nationalism was against the western and capitalist world (p.386). It could be stated that German nationalism opposed humanism and liberalism.

Gökalp also stated,

> For us today, modernization…means to make and use battleships, cars and airplanes that the Europeans are making and using. However, this does not mean being like them only in forms and in living. When we see ourselves as no longer in need of importing manufactured goods and buying knowledge from Europe, then we speak of being contemporary with it (Berkes, pp.75-76).

Heyd stated that the main ideas of Gökalp were not original; they were learned from Western ideologists, especially from French sociologists. The political thought of Gökalp has been influential; he proposed his ideas during a time when significant changes were witnessed in the Ottoman Empire. His political ideas were not stagnant and fixed, and, in time, as he wrote articles and poems, his ideas evolved and changed (Heyd, pp.vi-xi).

Gökalp was influenced by the Kurdish atheist doctor Abdullah Cevdet, who was active in the formation of an organization that reverted to the CUP afterwards. Gökalp's mental illness later led him to homicide. He went to Istanbul and enrolled in Veterinary College. However, his revolutionary activities were understood by the Hamidian secret police. He was sentenced and then exiled to Diyarbakır. He could not continue university however, in later years he was hired as a professor at Istanbul University (Heyd, pp.24-29).

Heyd mentioned that the *Hamidiye* regiments under the command of İbrahim Paha which were comprised of Kurdish *Milli* tribe were robbing, looting and applying arbitrary taxation in Diyarbakır. Gökalp headed a group opposing the *Hamidiye* regiments and they sent messages to the central government. Gökalp was invited to the CUP Congress in Salonika after the abdication of the Sultan in April 1909. After this congress, as Heyd indicated, he became a national figure (pp.30-31).

Heyd mentioned that the non-Muslim communities of Salonika such as the Jews, the Christians and *Dönmes* who were the supporters of Sabetay Zevi, supported the CUP. It should be considered that Salonika was a cosmopolitan city, and the socio-economic situation of its people was considerably better than those in the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The liberal and tolerant position of the city influenced the leaders of the CUP as well as Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp was advocating Ottomanism at that time, Ottomanism being explained as giving the equality to all of the subjects regardless of any differences related to race and religion. Moreover, nationalist uprisings and the Balkan wars led to the evolution of Turkish nationalism within the minds of the CUP members, especially Ziya Gökalp (pp.32-33).

As a member of Central Council of the CUP, Gökalp dealt with legal and cultural problems, the history of Turkish guilds, the development of the dervish orders, national education and the problem of minorities, especially the Armenian problem. He advocated abolishing the institution of *Şeyhülislam* in 1917. Most of his suggestions were accepted by the Party. After World War I, he was accused of anti-Armenian agitation during the war. He refused to admit that there had been any massacres, but he admitted that he had approved of the expulsion of Armenians. He and his friends were sent into exile in Malta

by the Military Court. After the War of Liberation and victory over the Greeks in 1921, he and his friends were allowed to return to Turkey and he was appointed as chairman of the official Committee for Writing and Translation, *Telif ve Tercüme Heyeti,* at the end of 1922. Afterward, he was elected as a member of the Parliamentary Education Committee (pp.35-39).

As Heyd maintained, Gökalp gave priority to the society and the state rather than the individual. He believed in national independence and sovereignty rather than individual freedom (p.45). Gökalp was influenced by the ideas of sociologist Durkheim, and, referring to his work, divided the evolution of society into four units: tribal society, *aşiret*, society based on ethnical affinity, *kavim*, society with a common religion, *ümmet* and a society united by a culture, *millet*. He suggested that a national democratic and independent state was the first stage for the ideal form of the society. He mentioned that, in the final stage, the abolishment of classes and organization of the society on the basis of occupational groups or guilds were needed. This was presented as the true form of social democracy (Heyd, pp.60-61).

Gökalp repeatedly stated that the true essence of the nation was a cultural unity. Thus, he rejected all racial and religious unities. It was mentioned that he believed that a nation could be united through a common cultural heritage rather than the political will to create a common future. In that sense, he disagreed with Renan's idea of "…the clearly expressed will to continue a life in common". Gökalp defined a nation as a society having a common culture and religion in which people speak the same language, have the same education and are united in their religious, moral and aesthetic ideals. One of the main contributions of Gökalp could be defined as his division and definition of culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*). He defined culture as feelings, judgments and ideals and he examined civilization utilizing rational and scientific knowledge, methods and technology (Heyd, pp.62-63).

Gökalp severely criticized the Tanzimat movement; he mentioned that the Tanzimat leaders did not understand the philosophical and scientific foundations of Western civilization. Reforms should have been introduced in the military organization, judicial

system, economic structure and education. Gökalp stated that, while they embraced a number of new fashions in dress, food, and building, they did not adopt Western methods of production. Most importantly, while non-Muslim subjects had new schools; the *medrese* system (religious education) remained untouched. This dualism occurred in cultural and social life within the Empire. Thereby, both the Oriental and the European institutions existed. Gökalp stated that *Harbiye* and *Mülkiye* were considered as exceptions and he indicated that the *Tanzimat* could not solve the main problem of Turkish culture related to the conflicts between the peasants and the elites of the Empire. They were getting different types of education, using different languages, and were living different ways of life. Most importantly, as Gökalp indicated, the peasants did not adopt this Western civilization. The situation was similar to that of the past, in which peasents did not adopt the Oriental culture of the ruling classes. He mentioned that individualistic attitudes plus the artificial and remote life of elites increased the gap between elites and ordinary people. Gökalp mentioned that the Oriental civilization was alien to the Turkish spirit, and, in that case, adoption of Western civilization was necessary. (Heyd, pp.74-80)

He suggested adopting Western civilization fully, unlike the *Tanzimat* statesmen. However, he criticized the exaggerated Westernization, and proposed that Turks should adopt parts of Western civilization, but not parts of the Western culture. Gökalp regarded that adoption of the Persian culture in the past was a big problem and he advised learning the philosophical, aesthetic and moral teachings of Western civilization in order to destroy the adopted past traditions, mainly those coming from Persia (Heyd, p.81).

Gökalp opposed the ideas of Muslim Orthodoxy that Islam and the idea of nationalism were contradictory. He proposed that modern Islam could be understood though the combination of Turkish nationalism and the national culture. He gave importance to Islam as a strengthening tool for Turkish patriotism during the struggle against the Christian enemies, in the Tripoli war and the Balkan Wars. However, this changed after the Albanian revolt. He wanted to give Islam a Turkish national character. He suggested that the call to prayer, *ezan*, the sermons, *hutbe*, and the general prayers, *dua* should be recited in the national tongue. He mentioned that the Qur'an should be taught in schools in a Turkish translation. Gökalp was on the editorial board of *İslam Mecmuası,* and the Qur'an was

translated within this journal. The Theological Faculty of the Istanbul University appointed a committee to ensure reformation in Islam. Köprülü headed this committee and they presented a report in 1928. However, the usage of Turkish within the prayers was not accepted by the government (Heyd, 98-103).

Gökalp was a very well respected political thinker who knew that Turks had conquered many lands. However, they did not find their own ideals, or try to internalize their own national culture and national ideal. Thereby, Turks gave freedom to every nationality and allowed them to practice their own culture and gave them a place to live. The problem, however, was that Turks had deluded themselves for the benefit of the others. The main dimension that needed to be realized was Gökalp's proposal that the Turkish people should "know themselves". It was stated that the ideal form of national spirit would be revealed by the intellectuals. Rediscovery of the soul of the people which was tarnished by the alien cultures would be needed. It was alleged that, in order to extract the sub-consciousness of the nation, education would be required. These ideas were the keys for later years' studies of the construction of Turkish identity and Turkish nationalism (Heyd, p.111).

Gökalp investigated the cultural development, religion, laws and customs of the Ancient Turks. He considered that other peoples have been compelled, in order to adopt a modern civilization, to depart from their past. He stated that Turks would have only to turn back to their ancient past. Thereby, investigation of Turkish kingdoms and Turkish conquerors such as Atilla, Cengiz Khan, Timur and Babur was carried out in his works. Moreover, as Atatürk later referred to, he mentioned the Scythians, the Sumerians and the Hittites who were considered as examples of ancient cultures. Heyd mentioned that there were some contradictions in Gökalp's works related to nationality. Most of the time, he defined a nationality as the sharing of a common culture and a common language. However, there was an endeavor to discover some prominent people who were Turks in their origin but who not speak the Turkish language were not educated within the Turkish culture and moreover, did not feel like Turks. Heyd gave examples such as Ibni Sina and Mevlana (Heyd, pp.112-113).

Gökalp's populism was significant. Reversal of interest towards ordinary people would be much more beneficial. He mentioned that true Turkish culture was alive among the Turkish peasants, because it was known that the upper classes internalized Persian, Arabic and later, European cultures. He suggested the establishment of a Turcological society, national theatre, conservatoire, museums, ethnography, archeology and libraries containing materials for the understanding of Turkish culture and also the foundation of institutes to learn some statistical data (Heyd, p.115).

It is important to note that Gökalp supported the unification of all Turks, especially those living under the administration of Czarist Russia. This demand was strengthened during World War I. He mentioned in his poem *Kızıl Destan* that Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan. However, the war against Russia was lost. The hopes for the realization of Turan were revived again during the Bolshevik Revolution. Heyd mentioned that Gökalp tried to encourage Turks of this region to gain their independence. He proposed that they found a large state with a central government. Moreover, Ottoman-Turkish should be used within it. He advised the assignment of supreme commander in his article published in April 1918 (Heyd. p.128).

Gökalp set aside the ideology of Turanism afterwards. He indicated the significance of cultural unity only among the *Oğuz Turks* in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and *Harezm*, who all had a common literary heritage. He abrogated the idea of Turan and he proposed the postponement of this aim. Atatürk, who agreed with him, did not want to disturb Soviet Russia (Heyd, pp128-129).

It was noted that Gökalp was concerned with simplifying and purifying the language. This movement turned into the *tasfiyecilik* movement in the early republican period. The Sun Language Theory was launched in 1935. It was stated that the Law on Settlement (no.2510), promulgated in 1934, which gave ethnic Turks the priority in obtaining Turkish citizenship (Aydıngün, A. & Aydingün İ., 2004, pp.419-425) Hamdullah Tanrıöver stated that accepting the Turkish language could convert a Jew into a Turk (Gözübüyük, 1957, cited in Aydıngün, p.426).

As Heyd mentioned, Gökalp distinguished minorities as Muslims and non-Muslims. He aimed through the establishment of homogeneous society to make Turkey a national democracy. It was apparent that he favored a nation composed of Turkish-speaking Muslims. Regarding the Kurds, he stated that these two people lived together and he hoped that they would live together peacefully (pp.132-133). It was mentioned that these two nations should love each other, since it was both a religious and political necessity. Gökalp (1922) stated any Turk who did not like Kurds is not a Turk and vice versa (pp.18-19).

The Young Turks aimed to ensure Turkification and modernization. As Poulton and other experts stated, intellectuals from Russia played a crucial role in the birth and propagation of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. Many newspapers were published there. Moreover, communities helped maintain contacts between different parts of the Islamic world and tariqats from Central Asia. Uzbek Tekke's Sheik Buharalı Süleyman Efendi (1860-1870) published "The Chagatay Language and Ottoman Turkish" in 1882 which introduced Chagatay to the Ottomans. Another member, Mehmed Sadık, published a Chagatay dictionary (Poulton, pp.71-72).

## 5.5.2 Yusuf Akçura

Akçura mentioned that the nationalist ideas of the French Revolution. His views were based on the consciousness of race and ancestors. He proposed that *Islamcılık* originated from Western Europe. The use of Islamism, *Islamcılık* began during the reign of Abdulaziz and this is when the Ottomanism, *Osmanlılık* started to be weaken (Poulton, p.73).

Young Turk Dr. Şerafettin Mağmumi convinced Akçura that the only way to go forward was through Turkish nationalism. Yusuf Akçura revealed that Ottomanism was to make the Ottoman Empire similar to the US. It was emphasized that it would be based on freedom of religion. Akçura introduced "Three Kinds of Politics" namely *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. He mentioned about three important political doctrines. Ottomanism was based on the idea of an Ottoman nation. Secondly, he indicated a state basing on Islam. Thirdly, he explained Turkism, which was a type of political nationalism based on the Turkish race similar to European states which were using racial ties in the creation of nations. As

Poulton stated, Mahmud II and later *Tanzimat*'s statements tried to create an Ottoman nation which resembled Smith's concept of civic nationalism. However, Akçura criticized the notion of an Ottoman nation and he noted that German ethnic nationalism overcame the notions of French territorial nationalism. Akçura mentioned that the idea of Islamism had originated from Western Europe and its use began during the reign of Abdulaziz when Ottomanism was weakening. Turkism, on the other hand, was identified with the unification of all Turks. Turan was identified as the homeland within Gökalp's poem "Turan", with sentences such as "The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan. Their country is a broad ever-lasting Turan". Turanism was seen as one of the most significant ideas of Akçura. Many émigrés came from Russia after the Young Turk Revolution. Turkish Hearth was founded by the Military Medical School students with the help of intellectuals in June 1911 and Akçura was appointed as the vice president. The object of this association formed in 1913 as stated in Article: 2 was to strive for the totality of the Turkish race and language by promoting national education and improving intellectual, social and economic standards of Turks (Poulton, pp.73-83).

*Türk Derneği* was established in 1908. Its main aim was to provide scientific studies and investigation of Turkish tribes within the context of their current and past experiences. Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Ahmet Hikmet, Hüseyinzade Ali and Dr. Akil Muhtar and Mr. Özden founded the *Türk Yurdu* Association on 18 August 1911. The Journal of *Türk Yurdu* was published in the last days of 1911. (12) Moreover, Mehmet Emin, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ferit, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Dr. Fuat Sabit founded *Türk Ocağı* on 12 March 1912. *Türk Yurdu* and *Türk Ocağı* merged in 1917 (Akçura, 2007, pp.12-13).

*"Türk"* was defined by Akçura (2007) as coming from the race of *"Turk-Tartar"*, sometimes from *"Turk-Tartar-Mongol"*. The languages and traditions of these peoples and tribes, coming from the same clans and tribes, were very close. Thus, he explained that Kazans, Azerbaijanis, Kirgizs and Yakuts were to be included in the notion of "Turks". Akçura included some racial implications to his definition of "Turk" and "Turkish nationalism" (p.25).

Akçura (2007) indicated that (*kabile ve kavmiyet*) tribal feelings had converted to nationalism in western countries. He mentioned that Germans and Slavs gave importance to race and language in their definitions of nation. Frenchmen defined nation by referring to a common will. Moreover, Italians defined it by dealing with territory and language. By definition, he concluded that nationality, *milliyet* came from the unity of religion and race, and afterwards, formed unity and solidarity within the social consciousness. He condemned both Young Ottomans and *Tanzimat* people of abstaining from using the notion of nation, "*millet*". Akçura stated that both the Young Ottomans and *Tanzimatçılar* were Ottomanists (pp.26-37). Akçura (2007) discovered that the notions of homeland, nation, law, and freedom, were used very often in the political literature of the Young Ottomans but, he considered that these notions were not widespread in the documents of the *Tanzimat* (p.35).

Ethnic kinship was very important in the definition and classification of nationalism. It was mentioned that Celaleddin Pasha considered Turks as belonging to the same tribes and clans (*kavim*) as those of Europeans. Akçura (2007) dealt with Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha in that Celaleddin Pasha aimed to prove that Turks came from the same origins as the Ulahs, Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks. His purpose was to change the European point of view towards Turks. He tried to prove that Aryanis and Turanis were coming from the same race. He stressed the power of the Turkish race, the richness of the Turkish language, the importance of Turkishness. It was also stated that there were some ideas of Celaleddin Pasha that non-Muslim subjects of Ottoman Empire should be bound through race and language. Mustafa Celaledddin Pasha wrote his book in French, he was a Polish noble, and his name was Constantine Borzecki (pp. 35-45).

Akçura (2007) stated that all Central Asian Turks were pressured by the Russians during the years from 1860 until 1870. It was pointed out that idea of Turkishness emerged in the 1820s in Istanbul. The English were very concerned about the invasion of Russians. As a result of this, Akçura alleged that Vambery travelled through Central Asia with the encouragement and assistance of the English (pp.52-54).

Akçura (2007) also mentioned that there were periods of Turkishness, The first period was between 1865 and 1870 and included the Crimean War and the invasion of Turkestan. The second period lasted from 1876 until 1880. The pressure of Abdulaziz resulted in the decline of the freedom of the Tanzimat. As mentioned Akçura indicated, Süleyman Pasha, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Ahmet Mithat Efendi, and Uzbek Sheikh Süleyman Efendi were influential characters in Turkish nationalism. Akçura mentioned that Süleyman Pasha wrote *Tarih-i Alem* which aimed to teach and explain the superiority of Turkish race and achievements of Turks to the young. Akçura stated that Buharalı Sheikh Süleyman Efendi wrote *Lugat-ı Çağatay* and *Turkı-i Osmani.* Süleyman Efendi regarded *Çağatayca* was one of the mother tongues of the world. He also considered that *Çağatayca* was the main source of the Ottoman language. Sheikh strived for the development of relationships between Turkestan Turks and Ottoman Turks and worked toward the unity of Turks. Akçura mentioned that Ahmet Mithat Efendi dealt with the Turkish language. He was a populist, and used populist approaches related to language. Akçura stated that Ahmet Cevdet Pasha translated Muslim canonical jurisprudence into Turkish. He wrote *Tarih-i Cevdet,* wherein he gave importance to Turkishness and the Turkish race (pp.59-69)

Akçura (2007) maintained that, while Turks were not developed socially and economically, Christians were full of the feeling of freedom and independence. Akçura alleged that the independence movement of Christians obstructed the development of Turkish nationalism. He assumed that in these two periods, political Turkists believed in Ottomanism and Islamism (p.72).

Şemseddin Sami Bey was Albanian. He wrote *Kamus-i Fransi, Kamus-i Türki,* and *Kamu'l Alem.* Akçura stated that Sami was the most prominent Turkist of his time. Sami explained that there was not a big difference between Western Turkish and Eastern Turkish. In referring to this, Akçura stated that Eastern and Western Turks were a nation and that both were Turks. Akçura stated that Turkism stopped. Pure Turkish omitted Persian and Arab words and this continued until the declaration of the second Constitution. Akçura mentioned that Necip Asım Bey and Veled Çelebi were esteemed Turkists of the Hamidian era. Akçura added that both of them supported the purification of language and that they were criticized. Akçura stated that the main criticism came from *Ebuzziya Tevfik.* Akçura

identified him as an Islamist and Arabist. Necib Asım Bey wrote the first complete Turkish history of the Ottomans and Turks. The other Turkists were Emrullah Efendi, Bursalı Tahir Bey, Raif Fuad Bey (vizier of Abdulhamid) and the poet Mehmet Emin Bey. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha published the *"İkdam"* newspaper in 1893 in Istanbul. *Ikdam's* heading stated that *"Ikdam is a Turkish newspaper"*. The articles of this newspaper related the Turkist approach of its time (pp.102-114).

Akçura noted that Tunalı Hilmi was identified as a Young Turk. Akçura maintained that Tunalı Hilmi dealt with the Ottoman nation. Moreover, Tunalı Hilmi stated that there was a need to use understandable language for the peasants. Akçura considered the Young Turks were constitutionalist liberals, and they were coming from higher ranks. Akçura mentioned that they did not understand nationalism and populism. Akçura mentioned the deficiencies in analyses related to his own article and stated that application of Turkism and Islamism within internal affairs of the Empire did not require their application as foreign policy. Akçura stated that national consciousness emerged among Azeris, Tartars, Bashkurds, Kazakhs and Uzbeks in 1906-1907. He further stated that the movements between 1905 and 1907 were called Russian Muslim movements, but these movements were national. Hüseyinzade Ali Bey in his work *"Füyuzat"*, proposed the usage of Ottoman Turkish among Turks in general (pp.147-174).

Akçura dealt with Ağaoğlu Ahmet, Gaspıralı İsmail Bey, Hüseyinzade Ali and Topçubaşı Ali Merdan Bey. Akçura stated that the main problem of Azeri Turks was the Sunni-Shia conflict. He added that Shah of Iran tried to make Azerbaijan a Persian territory. Akçura stated that Ağaoğlu proposed that in order to solve the problems concerning women, education was needed and that he considered the other problem was the difficult alphabet (pp.188-190).

Akçura (2007) believed that Turkish nationalism had developed in the second constitutional era. Akçura mentioned that the CUP tried to uncover all the works related to Turkism and the Turkish nationalism which accompanied it. The CUP supported Genç Kalemler. Also, he articulated that the CUP supported Türk Yurdu and Türk Ocağı (pp.208-209). *The Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearth) was the intellectual center of Turkish

nationalism. Gökalp became its member and also wrote articles in the journal *Türk Yurdu* (Heyd, p.34). Parla (1993) mentioned that the Young Turks, Unionists and Kemalists were not revolutionaries. They aimed to create a national bourgeoisie and they used solidarist methods to realize this aim (pp.155-156).

In conclusion, the CUP era was between 1908 and 1918. This era engendered many events such as the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of independent states in the Middle East, the intensification of conflicts over Macedonia, the emergence of Turkish and Arab nationalism, and the Libya affair in 1911. It was the era of nationalism. The Romanian Vlah, and the Ottoman Christian subject Batzaria stated that the adoption of Turkish nationalism by the Union and Progress government had a devastating effect on Christian Ottomans and non-Turkish Muslims. It was maintained that the Turkifying effect was doomed to fail because the Turks were the economically weakest and least educated people of the Empire. Moreover, Karpat (1975) added that, while Turks and Muslims fought wars, the Christians revealed their superiority in education and trade. The nationalistic policies of the Young Turks irritated both Albanians and Arabs (pp.276, 293-298). It could be alleged that the loss of territory in the Balkans and the rise of nationalism among Muslim Albanians and Arabs strengthened Turkism. Moreover, the outbreak of war paved the way for the CUP's open support of Turkish nationalism. Russian émigrés supported the Turanist movement and their ideas were disseminated through the *Türk Ocağı* and *Türk Yurdu* periodicals (Poulton, p.86).

Georgeon (2005) stated during the reign of Catherina II, Tartars had religious and civil autonomy. They began to trade with the western states. They sold Central Asian products to the west. Therefore, a wealthy Tartar bourgeoisie was born. The Greek bourgeoisie was trading in the Balkans. Similarly, Tartar tradesmen were seen in Russia and Turkestan. Georgeon stated that both bourgeoisies were hegemonic and inclined to expand their market. The Tartar bourgeoisie struggled against the Russian bourgeoisie and Russian tradesmen began to enter Central Asian markets after the development of railways. Russification and Pan-Slavism accelerated during the reign of Alexander III. Tartars aimed to acquire all the Muslim markets. Georgeon stated that the Tartars used the Turkish language and religious unity as tools against Russian imperialism. He mentioned that

during the Ottoman era, the Asian origins of the Turks were forgotten and the main dimension of Turkishness became language (pp.8-14).

Akçura was a member of a big bourgeoisie family. During his visits to Russia, he witnessed the widespread usage of alcohol and religious suppression and wrote about it in *Defter-i Amalim*. He became a member of the Young Turks, who were coming from the petit bourgeoisie. Prince Sabahaddin advocated "*adem-i merkeziyetçilik*", or decentralization, to save the Empire. Ahmed Rıza, on the other hand, supported the use of authoritarian centralism to save the empire. Georgeon (2005) stated that Akçura was in Rıza's faction. Akçura opposed the *Tanzimat* because its leaders ignored Islamic institutions (pp.20-25).

It should be noted that the Young Turks did not react harshly to the invasion of Bosnia, the independence of Bulgaria or the annexation of Crete. These events happened within one or two months after they come to power. However, they were affected by the Trablusgarb war and the Balkan wars. The Empire lost Trablusgarb, Bengazi, twelve islands and many territories in the Balkans (Georgeon, pp.60-61).

As Ağaoğlu maintained on 13 March 1935 in *Cumhuriyet* that Akçura was never a member of the CUP (Georgeon p.62). He believed that Cengiz Han was a hero because he had unified all the Turks. He included Mongol history in Turkish history. Akçura was against the adoption of capitalism in Turkey and supported economic self-sufficiency and a national economy (Georgeon, pp. 80-81, 95).

Akçura condemned the *Tanzimat*, and contended that since old and modern schools operated side by side, the structure was weakening and this resulted in the collapse of the Empire. He also criticized the economic program of the Tanzimat. The Ottoman market was opened to European capitalism and he mentioned that French imperialism had inspired the Tanzimat. Therefore, he advocated a German model in his "*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*" He also advocated an alliance with Germany. To summarize, Akçura supported Turkism, a national bourgeoisie and a Tartar model. Gökalp was more popular than Akçura because Gökalp's

nationalism reconciled the interests of both the bureaucracy and the petit bourgeoisie. (Georgeon, pp.99, 117, 135-137),


## 5.6 The Main Features of the Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era


Nationalism was called as bourgeoisie ideology, and Turkish nationalism was regarded as a type of proto-nationalism. The rather slow development of Turkish nationalism occurred because there had been no national bourgeoisie among the Turkish people. The characteristic of Turkish nationalism was elitist; this nationalism was realized through the policies of the Turkish civil-military bureaucracy and Turkish intellectuals. Turkish nationalism was approved as a state ideology in 1913 by the CUP. It was stated by Oba (1994) that publication of the journal of *Türk Yurdu,* which began publication in 1911, was very important for the development of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Hearths, *Türk Ocağı,* published this journal (pp.16-17).

Ismail Gaspıralı advocated the idea of *Usul-ı Cedit*. He began to publish the newspaper *Tercüman* on 10 April 1883. He stated that education should be taught in the mother tongue. Internalization of western science and educational systems, and adoption of a western life style was shown in the policy of jaadedism. Gaspıralı supported the use of pure Turkish, and he wanted to see pure Turkish purged of Arabic and Persian words (Oba, pp.151-152). The capital accumulation in the Crimea and Azerbaijan helped the emergence of a national bourgeoisie in these places. They began to oppose Pan-Slavism and the Russification movement. The educational reform and the usage of pure Turkish were supported (Öğün, pp.117-118).

The Turkish educational system was based on madrasa, or religious education, and the students of that time learned the *ummah* discipline. The language of these schools was Arabic. Hence, the students lost their Turkish identity. *Enderun,* on the other hand, ensured the Turkification of Ottoman citizens who were not Turkish. The Ottoman Empire divided its people according to their religion. The churches were prohibiting the national revival

and self-determination in Europe. Nevertheless, the churches were supporting the right of national self-determination in the Ottoman Empire. It was alleged that the proto-Turkish nationalism resulted from the "*kul system*"*,* or policy of being subjects, since Turkish people could not acquire administrative posts within the Empire (Oba, pp.38-47).

The Ottomans did not deal with the Central Asian Turkish entities or Turkestan. The people of Turkestan demanded help from the Ottomans against Russian invasions and cruelty. However, they were sent to their homes with expensive presents by the Ottomans (Belge, p.45).

Ömer Lütfi Barkan (1993) stated that feudalism did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. The ownership of the lands belonged to the Ottoman state (cited in Oba, p.45). The Ottoman people settled in villages in the mountains to avoid paying taxes. They were living freely. After the reign of Mahmud II, modern states began to be established. Mahmud II tried to change the decentralist structure of the state and tried to revert it to a centralized structure. Abdulhamid II founded the *Hamidiye Alayları*, which strengthened the Kurdish people. It was stressed that Kurdish provinces did not send much to the central government. Hence, the Ottoman central authority had given them some kind of freedom.  Being members of *Hamidiye Alayları*, Kurds began to persecute Armenians and Suryanes. Belge stated that Kurds and Cherkessk people were influential and they were considered as the leaders of the persecutions made against the Armenians. The striking fact was that the Kurds would get the properties of Armenians and, also Cherkessk people were migrating from Russia, they needed land (pp. 58, 70-71, and 77).

Azeri Hüseyinzade Ali, Azeri Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Seyh Süleyman Efendi of Uzbek tekke, and Yusuf Akçura were very important Turkish nationalists of the Second constitutional era. The Journal of *Genç Kalemler* was published in Salonika. Ömer Seyfeddin, Ziya Gökalp, and Ali Canip Yöntem were prominent authors of this journal. These two groups were integrated within *Türk Derneği* and in the journal of *Türk Yurdu.* (Öğün, pp.119-123). The authors of *Genç Kalemler* were influenced by the populist movements which had emerged in Russia. Ömer Seyfettin, in his famous article, "New Language", stated that national sovereignty could be maintained through dissemination of science, knowledge and

literature, and it could be provided through the national language. He suggested that Turks should abandon their old and ornamental language, the antiquated Turkish language of yesterday which was created by five centuries of irrationality and oddity (Varlık, 1983, cited in Aydıngün, p.418). Ziya Gökalp opposed to the continuation of usage of the two languages. He stated that the national language of Turkey should be Istanbul Turkish. He considered Ottoman an artificial language. He proposed in his famous work "the Principles of Turkism", that the spoken language should be the same as the written language (Aydıngün, p.419). Ömer Seyfettin stated that Greeks aimed to realize *Megalo Idea*, or Hellenism. Bulgarians tried to conquer Istanbul and called it Charigrad. He mentioned that only Turks did not own common national belief and consciousness (Feyzioğlu, 1996, p.27).

The accumulation of capital in the Ottoman Empire was inconsistent, and that obstructed the emergence of the bourgeoisie. The ideologists of the CUP proposed the establishment of a national economy and proposed similar measures such as the participation of Turks in the national economy, establishment of national companies, provision of the state's protection, the abolishment of capitulations, nationalization of capital and foreign companies, establishment of national banks, use of national products and elevation of customs barriers. The economic policy of the CUP could be called statism. It was explained as giving priority for the state to arrange the economic policy rather than leaving it to private enterprise. It is important to stress that the bourgeoisie of the Turkish-speaking people of Russia helped with the evolution of the idea of economic nationalism and the policy of statism. They tried to confront the economic dependence on European economy by strengthening the middle class. There was a realization that the foundation of a modern state could be realized through the bourgeoisie class. Prince Sabahaddin advocated free and private enterprise. Cavid Bey advocated the removal of all the barriers and stated that the state should not interfere in the economic life. At that time, it was maintained that westernization could be accomplished through liberalization. Thereby, between the years 1908 and 1912, there was a comparatively liberal atmosphere. There were labor movements, feminist movements and powerful opposition; moreover, labor unions and other associations were founded (Toprak, 1995, pp.1-3). However, application of liberalism enhanced the efficacy of the non-Muslims and foreign powers and the result was

that Muslim merchants and tradesman became impoverished. It was alleged that Turkish nationalism began after the 1908 Revolution. It was stated that the Balkan Wars resulted in the demise of Ottoman nationalism. Therefore, the Unionists began to apply privileged economic policies in order to enhance the economic situation of the Turkish people and a protectionist foreign trade policy was pursued. The state helped Muslims founding Muslim corporations. Moreover, the war economy served to ensure the well-being of some people. "The Bill to Encourage Industry" was introduced in June 1914, and that provided the state the ability to buy from native manufacturers. It was mentioned that this encouraged small-town gentry, artisans and small merchants to join the party. Moreover, it could be indicated that the landlords and landowning peasantry were also influenced by the policies of the CUP. Turkish industrial and agricultural goods were in high demand during the wars. Gökalp called for the abolition of classes and their substitution with occupational unions or guilds that were to provide cooperation among the members of the community. In addition, this would have ended the class struggle among the members of the society. Gökalp suggested the removal of Islamic traditions such as pious foundations, as well as the tithe and prohibition of interest. It was mentioned that he was in favor of capitalism; however, it was emphasized that Turkey was a backward agricultural country and the establishment of a national economy was required. Thus, the local production should be protected against European imports. Gökalp demanded the abolition of classes and their substitution with occupational unions or guilds that were to provide cooperation among the members of the community. It was proposed that this would end the class struggle among the members of the society (Ahmad, 2008d, pp.42-44).

The Balkan war broke out in 1912, and this changed the place of the CUP, as the CUP's headquarters moved from Salonika to Istanbul. The main ideals of the CUP changed and Ottomanism was removed from the political scene. Revolts in Albania (1912) and Hejaz (1916) disappointed the CUP. As Heyd mentioned, the Turkish intelligentsia began to advocate nationalist and pan-Turanist ideals (Heyd, p.34).

Karpat (1959) stated that, during the time of opposition, from 1889 to 1908, Turkish nationalism was not expressed. In that period, Christian minorities were advocating the policies of the Young Turks. The Union and Progress entered the elections in 1908 and

they won most of the seats at the House of the Deputies. Karpat observed that the period from 1908-1918 was dominated by the Union and Progress party. From 1908 to 1913, the Young Turks' theory of nationalism was explicit.

Moreover, Balkan nationalist movements and Pan-Slavism helped with the emergence of Turkish nationalism. It was common understanding that Tartars coming from Russia led the push for Turkish nationalism. The main reason for the emergence of Turkish nationalism in this territory was Pan-Slavism. It is important to note that the people of Kazan and Azerbaijan were very wealthy, and they were members of the middle class (Belge, p.44, 143).

The CUP maintained an economic and demographic Turkification. The government signed a treaty with Bulgaria in which there would be an exchange of Bulgars living in Thrace with Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria. Another agreement was signed with Greece which mandated the exchange of Greeks living along the Aegean littoral with the Muslims of Macedonia. Moreover, the CUP passed laws to favor Turks and Muslims in commerce and industry which provided for the Turkification of the Empire's economy by forcing Christians into the margins of Ottoman life. It should also be noted that the war strengthened Turkish nationalism. Ziya Gökalp, a member of the CUP, stated that the nation could not be founded only on race, geography, political affinity or through mere will power. He stressed the necessity of the culture; namely, a common language, religion, ethics and arts. He mentioned that Turan based on cultural affinity was the great country of all the Turks. Gökalp believed that the language of the country should be vernacular Turkish based on Istanbul usage and he supported secularism and the separation of Islam from the government. It was indicated that Gökalp united the three ideologies of Islamism, Westernism and nationalism. (Karpat, 1959, p.25)

Gökalp maintained that *Turan* was considered as a remote purpose to be realized. He believed that the Tartars, Uzbeks and Kirgizs would establish separate nation-states. Therefore, the ethnical unity of these people could be identified as *Turan.* He added that Hungarians, Finns, Tunguzs and Mongols lost their bond with *Turan.* The main idea of Gökalp was to enter Western civilization by preserving the Turkish and Muslim identity of

Turkish people. Gökalp was considered the main ideologue of the CUP, and he distinguished culture and civilization. He mentioned that they accepted the three ideals of Turkism, Islam and modernization at the same time and stated that the Turkish nation belonged to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic community, and to the West internationally (Poulton, p.77). Gökalp called for the removal of *Şeyhülislam* from the cabinet in a 1916 memorandum and he suggested the abolition of *evkaf*. He opposed an exaggerated reliance on God. *Tariqats* opposed these orders and so he ordered all religious courts to be transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Gökalp believed that the unification of Islam and a modern state was possible. The basic components that Gökalp mentioned included the idea that the Oriental civilization was alien to the Turkish spirit, and, in that case, adoption of the Western civilization was necessary. He suggested adopting the Western civilization fully, unlike the *Tanzimat* statesmen. However, he criticized exaggerated Westernization, and suggested that Turks should adopt parts of Western civilization but not all parts of Western culture (Heyd, pp.79-80).

It was important to note that Gökalp supported the unification of all Turks, especially living under the administration of Czarist Russia. This demand was strengthened during World War I. He mentioned in his poem *Kızıl Destan* that Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan. However, the war against Russia was lost. The hopes for the realization of Turan were revived during the Bolshevik Revolution and, as Heyd mentioned, Gökalp tried to encourage Turks of this region to gain their independence. He proposed that they found a large state with a central government. Moreover, Ottoman-Turkish should be used within it. He advised the assignment of a supreme commander in his article, which published in April 1918 (Heyd, p.128).

Gökalp set aside the ideology of Turanism afterwards. He recognized the significance of cultural unity only among the *Oğuz Turks* in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Khawarizm, all of whom had a common literary heritage. He abrogated the idea of Turan, and in a way, he proposed the postponement of this aim. Atatürk also agreed with him because he did not want to disturb Soviet Russia (Heyd, p.129). Gökalp and Akçura were very prominent intellectuals who played major parts in the emergence of the Turkish nationalism. Akçura supported Turkism, a national bourgeoisie and the Tartar model.

# 6. TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE REPUBLICAN ERA

The nationalism of the republican era could be explained mainly through determining the main parameters of Kemalist nationalism, Turkism, Turkish-Islam synthesis and lastly neo-nationalism, *ulusalcılık.*

## 6.1 Kemalist Nationalism

Kemalism has become an official ideology in Turkey. Parla stated that it started as an official ideology between the years 1923 and 1945. Moreover, Kemalism was influential after the military intervention of 1980, during the 1980s and 1990s (Parla, 2008a). Bora (2003) defines this official nationalism as one which is based on the survival, power and manifestations of the nation-state. The national army has been envisaged as the crystallized evidence of this survival, power and manifestations (pp. 437-438).

In the first national assembly, there were two groups. The first group was the Kemalists; the second group, on the other hand, was against secularism and supported liberalism (Ersanlı, 2009, p.107). It should be noted that, even after the proclamation of the Republic, the second group continued to struggle against the Kemalists. After Kemal's speech on cleansing and elevating Islam, The Grand National Assembly abolished the Caliphate and moreover, banished all members of the House of Osman from Turkey (Ahmad, 2002, p.54). Thus, Kemalists secured their positions in the Assembly in order to build a secular and westernized Turkish nation-state.

Parla (2008a) pointed out that the political method of Atatürk was pragmatic; he could be identified as a radical reformist but not as a revolutionary. Parla stated that Atatürk's views were proposed as the most valid views for the whole nation and he noted that Atatürk saw the public as a growing child that needed to be raised properly (pp.34-36).

It was stated in a publication of the Turkish Chief of Staff that Turkish nationalism aimed to protect national independence and modernize Turkish society. According to this simple book illustrated as a graphic novel, Atatürk nationalism is modern and secular. It demands keeping national consciousness alive. Atatürk nationalism assumes that everyone who believes himself a Turk is a Turk regardless of his religion, sects and ethnic origins. (Dündar, 2009, pp1-3)

According to Nutuk (1960), Mustafa Kemal believed that empires including different ethnic elements were unstable, groundless, and decayed. In this regard, he considered Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism as deceptive policies. He pointed out that the strongest organization had been the nation state (Parla, 2008a, pp.69-72) Parla stated, by referring to Nutuk, that the nationalism of Nutuk was a cultural and territorial nationalism. Moreover, it was sensitive and moderate, not offensive and expansionist. The main aim of Mustafa Kemal was to establish an independent nation-state (p.158).

 Zafer Toprak (1995) determined that Kemalist populism defined people as an organic unit composed of professional groups. It should be taken into consideration that neither colonialism nor class-led independence movements were experienced in Turkey (Keyman & Öniş, 2007, pp.295, 303). It is alleged that Franco-Germanic materialism was the basis of Turkish Politics. It is important to note that the English liberal-empiricist system was unknown in the Ottoman time and it has been acknowledged that August Comte was the main source of Ottoman intellectuals' visions of changing the world. It was determined that Ottoman-Turkish modernization was depended on a Jacobin French model (Kahraman, 2009, pp.50-51).

Özdoğan (2001) stated that Kemalists were influenced by both French and German models of nationalism. She mentioned that this unitary and Jacobin statism tried to establish a homogeneous nation based on common citizenship. She indicated that this nationalism did not allow sub-identities, but that these identities were to be assimilated under an upper identity. She alleged that both Kemalist nationalism and Turkism were intolerant towards the Anatolian mosaic and Anatolian history. She stated that the assimilationist policies of Kemalism were created because they were afraid of separatism and secession. Özdoğan

expressed that Turkists, on the other hand, considered non-Turks as threats. Turkists based their theory on Central Asia and racism while Kemalists asserted a Turkish history thesis (p.296).

It is a widespread conception that the foundational ideology of modern Turkey, Kemalism, identified with westernization and Kemalists defined modernity with the notion of separation from the Ottoman and Muslim past. Therefore, Kemalism has been regarded as a progressive ideology (Tank, 2005 p.4). Islam, on the other hand, has been identified with causing backwardness and reactionary movements. Kahraman (2009) explained that there were two kinds of modernization. Active modernization was a model identified with the rightist policies of Turkey. Passive modernization, on the other hand, was seen in the policies of the Republican People's Party (the RPP) during the years between 1923 and 1950. It is a striking fact that both the CUP and the RPP supported and tried to strengthen the classes, namely the military-civil bureaucracy and intellectuals that could follow their politics (p.x).

Kemalism has been considered as the system of thought of the Turkish Enlightenment. The main objective of Kemalism[*] was the establishment of a nation-state and the creation of a national culture. Kemalism has been synonymous with the modernization process, and is seen as a republican, national, populist, secular system of thought. Kili (2008) separated the notions of secularism and laicism. She stated that laicism had been implemented in France. Laicism gives state the right to intervene when religion began to interfere in state affairs. Secularism, on the other hand, means the separation of the state and religion, and is a system which has been implemented in the US and the UK. Therefore, the secularism of Turkey is not only the separation of the state and religion, the state also has the right to arrange the religious affairs and impede the religious intervention in state affairs. The Kemalist system of thought is republican. It provides for the nationalization and popularization of the political regime (pp.xv-xvi). Oran (1997) alleged that the reason behind the strong support given to secularism was that Kemalists believed that this would impede the position of the old elites (p.191).

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[*] Kili used Ataturkism instead of Kemalism Kemalism has been used to define Ataturkist system of thought. Kemalism will be used within this study

Atatürk's nationalism was based on the unitary state: one nation and one language. He summed up his foreign policy with the slogan "*yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh*", "peace at home, peace abroad" (Uslu, 2008, pp.73-74). As mentioned, the main goal of Atatürk's reforms was to establish a national, modern and secular society. Keyder (1997) claimed that modernization is westernization. Turkish modernizers, as Keyder stated, increased rationality, bureaucratization and organizational efficiency. They tried to ensure the social transformation in order to achieve secularization, autonomy for the individual and the equality of men and women. In this context, it was stated that this project did not allow the development of local cultures. The modernization process was pursued with a formula, "modernization from above". In this context, Keyder indicated that the masses in Turkey remained passive recipients of the nationalist message propounded by the elites. As Keyder noted, the Turkish nationalist movement was directly affected by the expulsion, deportation, massacre and exchange of Greek and Armenian subjects of the Empire. Therefore, Turkish nationalism, by focusing on the vulnerability of the new community, gained support from the masses. In that manner, the striking factor was that collectivist nationalism, as the legitimating principle of the state, depended on authoritarianism (pp.37-46).

It was maintained that all these aims could be accomplished through a national education system. The modernization of education was defined with reforms such as the law of Unification of Instruction, (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat),* the alphabet reform, foundation of public schools, the founding of the Turkish Historical Society and Turkish Language Society and the reformation of universities. Gündüz (2009) stated that the education policy of France was based on raising patriotic citizens in the 1880s. This educational policy started to be used in the Ottoman Empire to spread Ottomanism. This policy was pursued later in the Republican period. Such courses as Turkish History, Turkish Geography and National Studies were put into the schedule. It was alleged that the new role of education was inspired by Durkheim. Durkheim stated that the first aim of education was to develop the talent needed for the industrial economy and the second was to achieve social unification through cultural communication (pp.195-205).

As Hakan Yavuz (1997) mentioned that Kemalism had been superficially Western in form while remaining rigidly authoritarian and dogmatic in substance. He added that it continued to stress republicanism over democracy, homogeneity over difference, the military over the civilian, and the state over the society. It should also be noted that the policies of Atatürk were largely affected by the ideology of the Young Turk era. (Karasipahi, 2009, p.12) It should also be noted that, as Oran (1997) stated, the West of the 1930s was not the same as the West of the 1990s. The West of the 1990s gave importance to democracy and human rights. The West of the 1930s, on the other hand, gave importance to a single state, a single nation, a single party, a single leader and a single ideology (p.14).

Kili (2008) alleged that the Kemalist paradigm of development was not capitalist or Marxist but a nationalist paradigm of development. She indicated that the resources of the country were activated within the context of economic planning in the 1930s.  Public initiative was used for the development of industry.  Indeed, the domestic challenges stemmed from the traditional structure of society, Kemalism was proposed as a modernization process. Kili mentioned that modernization means the emancipation of man in all areas and enhancement of his welfare. She mentioned that modern western states first completed this paradigm of development.  Kili stated that it was inconvenient to apply a western paradigm to the states where cultural, religious, social and tribal distinctions remain, and which had not undergone nation-building and where economic problems existed (pp.16-18).

Kemalism was institutionalized in the civil-military bureaucracy. Its principles began to be challenged from the time of the transition to a multiparty system in 1946 (Aras & Caha, 2000, p.39). It is known that, as Kili mentioned, since there was no bourgeoisie, the Turkish military filled this vacuum. The Turkish military has been against the religious pressures and intervention of religion in state affairs. Kili explained that the Republicanism was based on the sovereignty of the people, and that the common good of the people was important. It was alleged that globalization attacked the basic premise of republicanism. It was claimed that democracy was used for the pursuit of private profit, and so democracy could be tolerant towards private interests. However, republicanism was considered as the

precondition of democracy. It gives priority to the socio-historical and institutional context. If the republic was destroyed, democracy would die. However, Kili mentioned that the main aim was the democratization of the republic. Therefore, it was stated that there was a contradiction between republicanism and globalization. Democracy was considered tolerant towards religiosity. Republicanism, on the other hand, supported the laic regime. Thus, Kemalism, based on rationalism, nationalism and laicism, rejected the Islamic perspective. Western positivism and solidarism influenced Kemalism. National interest supersedes class and individual interests. Atatürk aimed to modernize the society and to reach the highest level of civilization (pp.193-195, 331-333).

The four significant dimensions of Kemalism were revealed as fatherland, nation and government, politics and public rights of the citizen. Its principles were Republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, laicism and revolutionism-reformism (p.199). It is anti-imperialistic. The main task of Kemalist nationalism was to eliminate the inferiority complex. It is the idea of modernization. Populism stated that the Republic was based on a national regime and should have popular support. In 1935, class conflict was rejected. Establishment of social order, harmony and solidarity between occupational groups became important. It was based on solidarism. In sum, statist, planned economic policies were applied to ensure development (pp.209-248)

Kili's approach considered Kemalist nationalism to be based on Turkish citizenship, republicanism and secularism. The other approach could be identified with Soner Çağaptay. Çağaptay (2006) stated that Turkish nationalism was an influential ideology between the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, and Empire's end in 1922. Afterwards, Turkish nationalism merged with secularism and Westernization to create a Turkish nation-state. Kemalists, under the leadership of Atatürk, defied the Ottoman legacy and tried to build a secular Republic of Turkey. Çağaptay stated like Oran that the 1930s could be defined by state sponsored, authoritarian nationalism. He also added that the 1930s was a decade of authoritarian nationalisms all over Eastern Europe (Çağaptay, pp.1-2).

Turhan Feyzioğlu (1996) mentioned that Atatürk's nationalism was rationalist, modern, progressive, democratic, unifying, humanistic and peaceful. Atatürk mentioned that a

nation is composed of citizens connected to each other by common language, common culture and common ideals. Feyzioğlu indicated that Atatürkist nationalism is related to secularism and denies all sectarian divisions. It also refutes class conflict and communism and approves social solidarity. Atatürk (1921, December 1) indicated that Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and federal imperialism were dreams and the survival and interests of Turkish nation should not be sacrificed for the realization of these dreams (Feyzioğlu, pp.44-46, 62-79). Afet İnan's book provided a guide to learn the elements necessary for the establishment of the Republic. These were common politics, common language, common homeland, common race, common history and moral familiarity (Oran, 1997, p.173). According to Mustafa Kemal, a nation was a society formed by persons who share a rich historical legacy, have a sincere desire to live together, and have a common will to preserve their shared heritage. In this context, as Bali (2006) maintained, non-Muslims were not excluded from being a part of the nation. In that sense, by referring to Afet İnan's book, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazmaları* (1969) Mustafa Kemal mentioned "if the Christian and the Jewish citizens who live among us today bind their faith and destiny to the Turkish nation, the civilized and nobly moral Turkish people would not consider them as strangers." (Feyzioğlu, pp.23-24)

Mustafa Kemal and his team supported the idea that non-Muslims were accepted as the part of Turkish nation and required three minimum conditions: non-Muslims had to adopt the Turkish language as their mother tongue, the Turkish culture and the ideal of Turkism. Moreover, the RPP regulation accepted in 1927 indicated that the strongest bond among citizens was the union of languages, sentiment and ideas. During his visit to Adana in 1931, Mustafa Kemal stated that one of the most obvious and precious attributes of a nation is language (Bali, 2006, pp.43-44; Karpat, 1959, pp.13-23).

The CUP applied the politics of centralization and focused on Turkish identity and Turkish consciousness. Özdoğan (2001) stated that this process was strengthened in the Kemalist era. Kemalist nationalism created a type of high culture by removing Islamic elements. This common culture was based on secularism and westernization. It was stated that Gökalp's populist culture was not internalized by Kemalist cadres. Kemalists approved of

western culture and they tried to teach this culture in the People's Houses, *Halk Evleri* (p.293).

Top-down methods were used in the adaptation of Kemalism. The education of the public was inspired by modernization, nationalism and secularism. As known, there were two camps: the Kemalists and the conservatives. Mardin designated this division as state-dominated center and periphery. After the 1950s, the supporters of the Democrat Party (the DP) were considered as the counter-elite coalition. The RPP and its supporters were identified as the state-dominated coalition. The clientelist position of the RPP deteriorated with the DP's heavy industrialization and agriculturalization. It was observed that the DP presented liberal-conservative ideology, clientelist populism and a western-oriented ideology. It has been a significant point claimed by Hale and Özbudun (2010) that the Turkish conservatists opposed the statist elites. The voters of the DP were poor people and non-state bourgeoisie. Thus, the *ezan* was delivered in Arabic and the number of Imam Hatip Schools increased during the DP's time in office. It was also added that the DP made no attempts to alter the laws and regulations to ensure a conservative Islamic state or to change the secular character of the state (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp.xvii-xx).

### 6.1.1 Homeland

Küçükcan (2010) pointed out that the war of independence was an important constitutive element of a nation-building process. Moreover, it could be identified as the birth of civil religion. It is apparent that Mustafa Kemal used religious discourse beginning and during the war (p.963). Altınay (2004) indicated that the War of Independence was not fought in the name of the Turkish nation. She noted that it was fought in the name of the Anatolian and Rumeli Muslim people. Mustafa Kemal gave an opening speech when the Grand National Assembly was formed. He outlined the national borders and stated that Turks, Cherkessk and other Muslim elements existed within these borders. He defined that these borders were national borders for sibling nations that lived in a mixed way and they had totally unified within these borders (p.19)

The Independence War, the foundation of the republic, and the abolition of the caliphate were influential events in the development of Turkish political life. It is important to note that 85% of Ottoman civil servants and 93% of staff officers retained their positions in the republic (Rustow, 1981, p.73, cited in Poulton pp.87-88). Thus, war has been the engine of the social transformation. It can accelerate the growth of nationalism. McCarthy (1983) emphasized that Anatolia suffered from huge rates of mortality and migration. The Anatolian population fell by 30%, and 10% of it was due to emigration (Poulton, p.89).

It is important to note that the local groups of notables had begun to organize resistance against the foreign invasion throughout Anatolia. However, the parochial interests were rather more important than national interests. Moreover, compromising with one of the great powers was a strong tendency among the notables (Ahmad, 2002, p.73).

Mustafa Kemal stated that "people whom this assembly represents are not only Turks, are not only Cherkess, and are not only Kurds and not only Lazes". He defined that these people were the ultimate collective of all these Muslim elements. He indicated that these people were composed of various Muslim elements and maintained that every citizen should respect each other's racial, social, geographic rights. He added that all these people shared the same interests (Atatürk, 1997, cited in Ahmad, 2002, pp.74-75).

The natural boundaries of the homeland were considered as the defensible Anatolian heartland. The minority rights were protected according to the Treaty of Lausanne. All Muslims were seen as the founding members of the Turkish nation.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk stated that,

> In today's Turkish national, political and social community we have patriots and citizens who have been subjected to propaganda about Kurdish, Caucasian and even Laz and Bosnian nations. But these are misnomers, which are a result of the despotic ages of long ago, had no influence on the individuals of this nation, except for a new enemy agents and brainless reactionaries and have left our people in grief and sorrow. Because the individuals of this nation, as members of the integrated unified Turkish Community have a common past, history, morality and law (İnan, 1969, cited in Poulton, p.95).

The CUP initiated nationalist governmental policies. It was important to note that the mass of the population did not internalize these policies. However, the War of Independence changed this situation. There were collisions against Armenians, Russians and Greeks. Therefore, these wars strengthened the feeling of "us and others" (Poulton, p.90).

The Sultanate was abolished after the War of Independence and the Sultanate was discredited. However, the abolition of the Caliphate was opposed. Abdulhamid II gave importance to the Caliphate in order to unify Muslim subjects of the Empire. The Young Turks also used the Caliphate to gain the support of Muslim populations of Russia and Britain. The CUP's ideologue Ziya Gökalp tried to synthesize Turkish nationalism with Islam. Atatürk set up a committee to abolish the Caliphate. He tried to obstruct any potential religious opposition from the upper clergy and *tariqats* (Poulton, pp.91-92).

Mustafa Kemal stated that:

> I am neither a believer in league of all nations of Islam, nor even in a league of the Turkish peoples. Each of us here has the right to hold the ideals, but the government must be stable with a fixed policy, grounded in facts and with one view and one alone – to safeguard the life and the independence of the nation within its natural frontiers. Neither sentiment nor illusion must influence our policy. Away with dreams and shadows! They have cost us dear in the past (Atatürk, Nutuk, 1980, pp.6-7, cited in Poulton, p.93).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk regarded Turks and Kurds as two inseparable brothers (Poulton, p.96) However, Kurdish uprisings continued. Mustafa Kemal also considered them as fellow Muslims, however, he recognized in his speeches the Kurds as separate people. Poulton stated that Mustafa Kemal's nationalism was a mixture of Smith's two variants, the ethnic and the territorial. The territory was Anatolia. Islam was seen as the cement in the identification of members of the new nation. Islam was also a strong element used to counter the Istanbul government. He called the struggle for independence as a Holy War with the *fetva* of Ankara *müftü*. On the other hand, Kemal was aware of the potential threat of *tariqats* to his reforms. The Christians were considered as people unsuitable to be called Turkish. Also, most of them were outside of the Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal considered Kurdish uprisings during and after the Independence War as a 'fratricidal war' (Poulton, p.97).

The main aim of Mustafa Kemal was to modernize and westernize the Republic of Turkey. He ignored the role of Islam as a unifying factor after the War of Independence. After the abolition of the Caliphate, the 1924 constitution included elements emphasizing Islam as the state religion and Shariah the holy law. However, Mustafa Kemal considered them as superfluous expressions which were incompatible with the modern character of the new Turkish state. He mentioned that these superfluities must be eliminated from the constitution (Atatürk, 1980, cited in Poulton, p.98). It was to be stated that the loss of Arab lands did not take Islam away from the social life of the new republic. It was still a component part of the identity. Kurdish uprisings under the leadership of Sunni Sheikh Said were not supported by the Alevi Kurds, who preferred a secular republic (Bruinessen, 1978, cited in Poulton, p.98). All the tariqats were banned and the lodges and the *türbes* were closed in 1925.

Poulton pointed out that the Jewish community of Edirne and the straits, having 8,000-10,000 people, were removed and settled to Istanbul in 1934. Moreover, it was stated that Armenians, Jews and Greeks were forced to take Turkish surnames in 1935. Furthermore, they were forced to speak Turkish. 5,000 male Greek and Armenians ages between the ages of 18 and 45 were sent to special camps in Anatolia and were instructed in non-combative skills like road building. As Poulton stated, these camps were based on an agreement signed with Germany in June 1941 (Poulton, pp.116-117).

Hamit Bozarslan (2006) correctly classified Kemalism by dividing it into three periods. In that sense, he stated that the first Kemalism was seen during the War of Independence. He stated that Kemalism of this period was the offshoot of the CUP. In this period, it was stated that the religious homogenization of the Anatolian population was completed. The expulsion of Armenians and population exchange with Greece provided this population homogenization of Anatolia. Religion was used as a cement to ensure solidarity. Bozarslan mentioned that the second era Kemalism occurred between 1922 and 1930. In that period, the Turkish-Kurdish Alliance and Unionist-Kemalist alliance were finalized. The personality of Mustafa Kemal became the most important indicator of this regime. As Mete Tunçay stated, Kemalism inspired European and non-European liberal and anti-democratic

movements and experiments. The third period of Kemalism began after the Liberal Party experiment in 1930. It was clear that the Kemalist regime was unpopular across Turkey. This was proved after the Menemen incident. In this context, Kemalist intellectuals went to Italy and the Soviet Union to try to solve the problems of the regime. The nationalist policies began to be applied with the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory (pp.28-32).

The National Pact was declared on 28 January 1920 by the Ottoman Parliament. It was contended that the original text of the National Pact did not bring a clear understanding of the national frontiers outside the conditions of the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1919. It was further stated that the National Pact defined acceptable borders for Turkey, including Eastern Thrace, Anatolia and Istanbul. In this context, Arabs were allowed to choose their own affiliation. Moreover, the National Pact called for plebiscites in Kars, Ardahan, Batum and western Thrace. Furthermore, it denounced all outside interference in the country's financial and economic affairs. It was maintained that it rejected any outside interference on behalf of the minorities in these internal affairs. The Pact promised respect for the rights of minorities return for the protection of the rights of Muslims in neighboring states. The boundaries which could be controlled and defended militarily were proposed as the territorial boundaries of the Turkish nation. Muslim Turkish speakers of the Thrace and Anatolia were to comprise the Turkish nation. It is important to note that the Pact aimed to provide a national unity (Vanderlippe, 2005, pp.12-13).

It was maintained that national frontiers were not clear in this pact. In this context, the Ottoman Muslim majority living within and beyond the armistice line was united in religion, in race, and in aim, and was imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for the racial rights of each other. These tenets and surrounding conditions form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance. Therefore, it was proposed that the common will was considered as a precondition (İçduygu & Kaygusuz, 2004, p.31).

It was stated that the Sivas Declaration indicated precisely that the armistice line was accepted as the national frontier. There was a proposal to make a plebiscite for Kars,

Ardahan, Batum and the Western Thrace. In that manner, as İçduygu and Kaygusuz (2004) stated, the Sevres Treaty became the turning point in this process of nationalization of the territorial perspective. The Sevres Treaty was regarded as an important document for the nationalization of territory. Allied forces aimed to divide Anatolia among Armenians, Kurds and Western Anatolian Greeks, however, that idea was rejected. The saving of the territories in which the Ottoman-Muslims were the majority became the main objective (p.32).

The Moscow and Kars treaties left the Batum and Ankara agreement, which left Hatay under French control. The Western Thrace was given to Greece. Therefore, except for Kars and Ardahan, all the territories mentioned in the National Pact were lost. The striking factor was that both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact presented the idea that a new political community would be homogeneous on a basis of religion. İçduygu and Kaygusuz indicated that the Sevres Treaty strengthened the idea that non-Muslims, especially Armenians and the non-Turkish origin Muslim community, and the Kurdish people of Anatolia were excluded from proper membership. It was known that the Sevres Treaty presented an independent Armenia and autonomous administration for Kurds in Southern Anatolia (pp.33-37)

It is important to note that during the Kurdish uprising of 1930, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt stated (1930, September 20, Posta) that Turks were the masters of this country. He added that all those who were not pure Turks had only one right in the Turkish homeland: the right to be servants, the right to be slaves (cited in Kieser, 2006, p.25).

## 6.1.2 The Lausanne Treaty and the Minorities

The Ottoman administration was non-assimilative and multi-national. The Ottoman Empire followed a policy of classifying its citizens according to religion. This system was called the *millet* system. However, separate Balkan states were allowed to retain their individual cultures and identities (Poulton, pp.84-84) and there was a Kurdistan province within the Ottoman Empire in 1847 (Özoğlu, 2009, p.51).

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. The definition of concepts of minority and minority rights in Turkey was based on the Lausanne Peace Treaty that was signed after the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922). The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923. According to this treaty, minorities were defined as "non-Muslims" living in Turkey (Oran, 2004). All the Muslims were seen as the founding members of the Republic. Thus, a nation-building process was pursued. "Standardized citizenship" was implemented and the denial of Kurdish identity was seen (Ergil, 2000, p.123). Kurds were seen as the parts of the general term "Turkish". It was stated that all the people of Turkey were dependent upon each other within the framework of "Turkish citizenship" and they pointed out that the Republic of Turkey was not based on ethnic and kinship ties (pp.123-124). The goal of the new state was to create a homogeneous, centralized, secular nation-state (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006, p.105). Kurdish people, being Muslim, did not acquire minority status within the Lausanne Treaty. However, after the abolishment of the caliphate, Kurdish uprisings increased (Belge, pp.82-83). In sum, anyone who aligns himself with an identity acquires that identity (Mete, 2007, p.55). Ayhan Aktar (2006) stated that 1,200,000 Greeks and 400,000 Muslims were exchanged after the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (p.18).

İçduygu and Kaygusuz stated that the Lausanne negotiations crystallized Turkish national citizenship and territorial claims of non-Muslim minorities and Kurdish claims were seen as threats. In that sense, İsmet İnönü stated that non-Muslims were the foreign elements that should be removed from Anatolia in order to guarantee the security of the majority. It is important to note that non-Turkish Muslim communities were not accepted as official minorities in the Lausanne Treaty (pp.40-41).

The Law of Foundations was accepted in 1936. In this context, Bali stated that the General Directorate of Non-Profit Foundations acquired the authority to designate the directors of the minority foundations. Moreover, this new law froze the acquisition of new property. (Bali, 2006, p.46) It was decided that the non-Muslim donations were lost their properties that they acquired after 1936. 1971 decree by the Court of Appeal stated that corporate bodies that have been constituted by non-Turks are not allowed to appropriate immovable property (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010, web p.7).

It is important to note that Guttstadt (2006) dealt with the citizenship policies of early Republican Turkey. In that sense, law no.1041 of 23 May 1927 empowered the Council of Ministers to denaturalize citizens who had not participated in the War of Independence and had not returned to Turkey prior to the promulgation of the law. Furthermore, she stated that Article 10 of law no.1312 on citizenship of 23 May 1928, entitled the Council of Ministers to denaturalize people for various reasons such as desertion, not doing military service, not returning within a given time or from Turkish citizens who have been living abroad for five years and have not registered with the Turkish consulates in question. In addition to those, article 7 of law no. 2848 was passed on 18 November 1935 as an amendment to the *İskan Kanunu*, law no.2510 and gave the Council of Ministers the right to determine who was regarded as a Turk because of his culture. Guttstadt, also mentioned that Passport Law no.3518 of 28 June 1938 allowed for the denaturalization of people if they had not contacted a consulate for five years. She stated that in law no.1042, non-participation in the Independence War was one of the man reasons for the mass deprivations of citizenship in the 1930s and 1940s (p.51).

Oran (1997) explained that although Lazes and Cherkessees were incorporated as Turks and they entered the national market, Kurds were not incorporated in the same manner. Moreover, during the Independence War, Mustafa Kemal used the name Turkey Nation, *Türkiye Milleti,* however after 29 October 1923; he used only the term Turkish nation, *Türk milleti* (p.211).

**6.1.3 The Construction of Turkish Nationalism**

Ahmad (2002) pointed out that the Turkish national consciousness and the mythology of the Kemalist revolution began to be formed during the period after 1908. Ahmad stated that the Turkishness involving pride in the history and traditions of Anatolia was rediscovered or even manufactured (p.78) or created.

It is mentioned that half a million immigrants came to the new Turkey and that Turkish Muslims filled the places left by the Christians who had departed from the cities. It is obvious that war is an initiator of social transformation and has a strong capacity to

strengthen nationalisms (Poulton, p.89). Thus, Turkish nationalism was strengthened in this period.

The population of Turkey was 13,542,795 in 1927. It was stated that between the years 1921 and 1935, 719,808 people arrived in Turkey as immigrants. (İstatistik yıllığı (Yearbook of Statistics), vol: 2, 1929, pp.65-66, cited in Çağaptay 71) These immigrants were mostly Balkan Muslims. Moreover, according to the 1927 census, less than 9% of the population was literate (Ahmad, 2002, p.81)

Yeğen (2004) pointed out that according to article 788 of the law enacted in 1926, being Turkish was a precondition for becoming a state employee. The Settlement law, *İskan Kanunu* of 1934 proposed to settle the nomadic clans such as the Kurdish tribes. Moreover, he mentioned that the Republic of Turkey and Greece signed an agreement of population exchange after the Independence War, the Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians were asked to leave Turkey, while non-Turkish speaking Muslims in the Balkans were admitted into Turkey (pp.56-57).

It is important to note that the second article of the Resettlement law that was adopted in 31 May 1926 stated that Turkish and Muslims were considered as immigrants. Moreover, article 7 of this law stated that immigrants who belong to the Turkish race might settle wherever they wished if they had not applied for material help from the government, but that immigrants who did not belong to the Turkish race had to settle where the government asked them to. Furthermore, article 9 stated that the Ministry of Interior was entitled to resettle nomads who did not share the Turkish culture, by sending them to Turkish towns and villages. (*İskan Kanunu*, The Settlement Law, no.2510, p.1158, Çağaptay, 2002, pp.71-73).

*İskan Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi,* the statute on Exemption from Settlement, was issued on 27 October 1934. Çağaptay (2002) referred to Article 3 which said that people who belonged to the Turkish race were to be given immigration visas without approval from the Ministry of Interior if they did not need material help upon their arrival in Turkey. Those who did not belong to the Turkish race, on the other hand, were subjected to approval from

the Ministry of Interior (p.74).As Çağaptay (2006) stated; language became the most important indicator of nationality. In this context, the "Speak Turkish" campaign began (p.156).

The Capital Levy of 1942 was imposed to ensure a beneficial position to Turkish-Muslim elements in the bourgeoisie by levying tax on non-Muslims. The Capital Levy was valid between 1942 and 1944. As Aktar (2006) mentioned, the Capital Levy was presented as a means to tax the speculative profits gained during World War II. It was levied against the non-Muslim minorities in order to Turkify the bourgeoisie.

Oran (2005) maintained that during the Republican period, discriminatory policies were applied against minorities who explicitly articulated their sub-identities. Oran emphasized that segregation was not applied. In that sense, policies of the Republic were assimilationist not segregationist. Any person who did not articulate his or her sub-identity was not discriminated against. Moreover, Oran stated that despite the articles of the Lausanne Treaty, non-Muslims and Alevis were discriminated against. Oran explained that Turkish authorities did not obstruct acquisition of the supra-identity, Turkishness. Such an obstruction was defined as segregation. Nonetheless, the Republic of Turkey has had assimilationist policies. Oran stated that the Turkish state conducted religious discrimination but not racial discrimination. Oran emphasized that Turkishness did not include non-Muslims and Kurds in Turkey. Lastly, a common national market was not established until the 1980s. Oran stated if a national market was established, national minorities could be assimilated. Moreover, he articulated that if consciousness of minorities had flourished before the creation of the national market and even during the globalization process, assimilation could not have succeeded (pp.106, 136).

### 6.1.3.1 The Opposition against the Regime

Some deputies from the RPP resigned and formed an opposition party on 17 November 1924. The Progressive Republican Party was led by Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Rauf Orbay. As Ahmad (2002) indicated, the Sheikh Said revolt broke out in February 1925. This revolt was realized by Zaza speaking Sunni Kurds with the leadership of Sheikh Said. Ahmad

stated that there might have been a strong Kurdish nationalist element in this rebellion, but the main reason was religious. In this context, it is important to note that the regime's fears of a religious reaction increased. Afterwards, the assembly passed an extraordinary law. The Independence Tribunals were established. As a result of this, the opponents of the regime were suppressed. The Progressive Republican Party was dissolved in June 1925. The Free Republican Party was created in September 1930. Nevertheless, a violent reactionary incident occurred in Menemen. It is important to mention that Menemen is near İzmir, and it was understood that the principles of the regime were not approved of or internalized by the people (Ahmad, pp.57-61). Afterwards, the nationalist revolt occurred in Ağrı Mountain. (Poulton, pp.119-120)

The Law 1850 of 1930, Article 1 stated that,

> Murders and other actions committed individually or collectively, from 20 June 1930 to 10 December 1930, by the representatives of the state or the province, by the military or civil authorities, by the local guards or militiamen, or by any civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during the pursuit and extermination of the revolts which broke out in Erciş, Zilan, Ağrı Dağı and the surrounding areas including Pülümür in Erzincan province and the area of the First Inspectorate will not be considered as crimes (Kendal, 1980, cited in footnote:120, Poulton, p.120).

Prime Minister İnönü stated that,

> The revolution [the Kurdish uprisings], fanned by foreign intrigue in our Eastern provinces, has lasted for five years, but today it loses half of its strength. Only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this country. No other element has any such right (Milliyet, 31 August 1930, cited in Poulton, 120).

It was maintained that mass deportations were carried out, and more Turks were settled in Kurdish areas by the law of 1932. After the Dersim incident in 1938, the area remained under martial law until 1946. Poulton mentioned that the use of Kurdish language, dress, folklore and names were prohibited (Poulton, pp.120-121). Çağaptay (2006) stated that, as the *Kadro* group explained, Kemalists considered the Kurdish question in detail, by referring to nationalism, security, centralization, and modernization. In this context, the Turkish government aimed to modernize and assimilate Kurds by harshly quelling the

Dersim uprising. Moreover, resettlement policies aimed for the Turkification of Kurds (p.157).

Ahmad (2002) stated that material benefits to the country from the new regime were not seen. Instead, there was economic and social turmoil. In this context, Kemalist ideology and Kemalist regime were not internalized. In that sense, by 1930, liberalism and democracy were discredited by the Kemalist regime with the help of an international system. There were the single party regimes, authoritarian and fascist regimes. Kemalists were sympathetic both to Fascist Italy and to the Bolshevik regime. Nonetheless, Ahmad indicated that Turkey did not have the conditions of class formation. Moreover, Kemalists opposed class conflict because they believed that this would impede the development of capitalism and a bourgeoisie. Ahmad alleged that fascism suited the ideological needs of Ankara. Kemalism was a nationalist regime and it opposed to class conflict. He stated that pro-fascist sentiments were popular and widespread during these years (pp.61-62).

### 6.1.3.2 The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory

The re-interpretation of history has been crucial for nationalisms. There was a need to write a new history textbook to create Turkish nationalism. The Turkish History Congress was launched in 1932 for this purpose. Kemalist nationalism was based on a pre-Ottoman Turkish identity. Poulton stated that Turks were considered as the founders of the civilizations in Iraq, Anatolia, Egypt and the Aegean (p.102).

In the 1930s, as Çağaptay (2006) stated, under the Turkish History Thesis, ethnicity and race joined religion and language as markers of Turkishness. Turkish language was used to convert non-Turkish Muslims into Turks (p.157). The rewriting of Ottoman and Turkish history in the 1930s was considered as a necessity in order to create a new Turkish identity. In this context, a history commission was established under the Turkish Hearths. The textbook entitled *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları,* The Main Tenets of Turkish History, was written in 1930. As Altınay (2004) indicated, Mustafa Kemal and historians did not consider this book satisfactory. *Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti,* The Society for the Study of Turkish History was founded in 1931. Moreover, the Turkish Linguistic Society was founded in 1932. It is important to note that the Turkish Historical Society published a four

volume history textbook titled *Tarih*, which was used in the 1931-32 Academic year (p.21).

As mentioned Turkish Hearth was the cultural branch of the RPP. *Türk Ocağı* was started in 1912 to raise Turkish educational standards, encourage social and economic progress and advance the language and Turkish race. However, it was closed in 1931. Also, it should be noted that Turkish Hearths was linked to the Republican People's Party in 1927. The name was changed and its property was turned over to the Republican People's Party (Poulton, p.102).

Fuat Köprülü did not support the theory that the Turks were the origin of all Anatolia's inhabitants (Tuncay, 1981, cited in Poulton, p.103). It should be noted that history was politicized in both the Young Turk era and the Republican era. Many famous historians of the Republican era were politicians. The main important development was that the new textbooks were to be written according to the new ideology of the state. These new books tried to emphasize pre-Islamic Turkish history, Turkish culture, Turks as state creators, the racial characters of Turkish history, Turks as founders of the great civilizations and the importance of the Turkish language and Turkish race (Poulton, pp. 103-106)

Two important results came out of the First History Congress. Firstly, *Afet İnan* stated that Turks belonged to the Arian race like their European counterparts. Secondly, *Samih Rıfat* stated that many languages like Chinese and Persian had originated from the Turkish language. The main debate was seen over the theory that there was a great drought in Central Asia that led to migrations. Zeki Velidi Togan opposed that theory. Both Maksudi Arsal and Velidi Togan later joined a disorganized opposition to the one-party rule and Kemalist nationalism. (Ersanlı, 2009, pp.151, 171-174; Poulton, 107-109) Basically, the participants of the First Historical Congress approved the idea that Turks had created a rich civilization in Central Asia in prehistoric times. It was also claimed that Turkish civilization was the fount of all subsequent civilizations in human history (Kasaba, 1997, p.29).

Afet İnan was a very strong personality of these Congresses. She represented official ideology and also Mustafa Kemal. She completed her Ph.D. thesis in 1939 and her thesis was entitled "On the Anthropological Character of the Turkish people and the Turkish History". It was written under the supervision of anthropologist Eugene Pittard at the University of Geneva in Switzerland. It was based on anthropometrical research on the skulls of 65 thousand Turks. The main argument of this thesis was that Turks were a brachycephalic race. Altınay summarized both the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory by referring to Günaltay and Tankut. In that sense, the original homeland of the Turks was not Mongolia, but Turkestan. Moreover, Turks were not members of the Mongoloid yellow race, but they were members of the white race. Furthermore, Neolithic civilization was first created in Central Asia by Turks. In this sense, it was also alleged that Turks of Central Asia migrated to different parts of the world due to climatic changes, especially drought, and introduced Neolithic civilization to Asia, Europe and America. Hence, the Turks developed the early civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. It was also claimed that the early civilization of Anatolia, the Hittites, were also of Turkish origin. It was indicated that the Turkish language was the oldest language of the high culture and was the origin of the Sumerian and Hittite languages. Lastly, it was stated that Turks formed many states in history (Altınay, pp.22-23).

Afterwards, the First Language Congress convened in 1932. Samih Rıfat believed that Mustafa Kemal saved Turkey from the Ottoman defeat, and he actively supported Kemal's language reforms. The Minister of Education, Reşit Galip, supported the Turkification of the language. This congress stressed that Turkish was the most powerful ancient language. This theory was called the Sun Language Theory. The Sun Language Theory mentioned that science and archaeology had revealed that the superiority and predominance of the Turkish race in world history. Moreover, Turks, being the source of civilization, should provide a mother language to all others (Landau, 1993, Poulton, pp.110-111).

The RPP's Fourth Grand Congress revealed the parameters of state nationalism. According to the First Article, the fatherland was the sacred country within the present boundaries where the Turkish Nation lives and its ancient and illustrious history is still living in the depths of its soil. It was stated in article 5 that the Turkish Republic was not composed of

different classes, but of various professions. The party aimed to provide social order and social solidarity. It was stated in article 41 that the RPP stressed the education of republican, nationalist, populist, etaist and secular citizens. To that end, the level of education had to be high, national, patriotic, and separate from all sorts of superstitions and foreign ideas. Moreover, the party gave importance to citizens knowing Turkey's great history. Furthermore, it was stated that the party would continue to render the Turkish language a perfect and ordered national language. It was stated in article 50 that the defense of the Revolution and the fatherland was the highest duty of the Turkish Youth. Poulton maintained that these articles were in line with Kedourie's views on society as an organic whole. Moreover, Poulton also mentioned the similarities of Gellner's idea that the state was pushing a unified high culture through the education process (Poulton, pp.112-113).

The Second History Congress which convened on 20 September 1937 emphasized the Sun Language Theory. Freeing the Turkish language from the Islamic yoke was the main purpose. The politicians and historians focused on archaeology which was used as a tool to prove that Anatolian civilizations were the works of Turks (Ersanlı,1989, cited in Poulton, pp.113-114).

Bernard Lewis (1961) and Suna Kili (1980) asserted that Kemalist nationalism was not racist, although Poulton disagreed with this view. He mentioned the expulsion of Orthodox minorities and genocide of Armenians (Poulton, p.114) The Turkish national identity was formed in the 1930s. The Koran was translated into Turkish. Moreover, all primary education was delivered in Turkish, and foreign schools were also obliged to obey the rules. They had to omit all references to religion, and they hired Turkish teachers. Turkish was taught in these schools (Armstrong, 1932, p.292, Poulton, p.115.)

According to the "Turkish History Thesis", Kurds were of Turanian origin, coming from Central Asia five thousand years ago. They spoke Kurdish, which is mixture of old Turkish, Persian, Arabic and Armenian. (Kendal, 1980, p.69, in Poulton, 121) They were called "mountain Turks" by the Kemalist state. (Poulton 121)

The schools and the army were considered as the vanguard institutions for Turkish modernization. There has been a debate whether the modernization and secularization were internalized by the all layers of the Turkish society. Recent events have revealed that secularization was not internalized by the mass of the society. (Poulton, p. 121)

The government gave importance to speaking Turkish. Recep Peker believed that Kurdism, Circassianism, Lazism, and Pomakism were false conceptions inherited from the Ottoman Empire. He stated that today's scientific truths did not allow that a thousand or even a million people could establish a nation. He also articulated that they preserved warm affectionate interest for Turks outside our frontiers, as an independent state, but belonging to other states (Quoted in Tekin Alp, La Kemalisme, pp.253-254, Poulton, p.123).

Poulton mentioned that irredentism was not on the agenda of Kemalist nationalism. Moreover, it was mentioned that 'Outside Turks' were welcomed to Turkey. Poulton considered that they were seen as a resource for aiding the nation-building process and Turkification of the territory. (Poulton, pp.123- 124)

Anybody who, despite his language or religion, feels himself to be a Turk and respects himself as a Turk is a Turk.(İlkokullar için Sosyal Bilgiler 5, 1993, Poulton, p.125) This is similar to Renan's daily plebiscite. The Alevis were sympathetic to the script reform and language reform of the Turkish language Foundation (Türk Dil Kurumu). They regretted the closure of the Turkish Language Foundation after the 1980 coup. (Shankland, 1993, p.175, Poulton, p.126)     Firstly, Islam was seen as a cohesive element in the first period of the Republican era. Turks were defined as Muslims in the first period. (Poulton, p.128)

Poulton maintained that Kemalist nationalism displayed strong elements of Smith's ethnic and territorial models and Gellner's state-building high-culture-forming paradigm. Poulton stated that Mustafa Kemal did not aim to regain the lost territories of the Ottoman Empire outside the Anatolia or to unite Turkic Muslims in the Caucasus or Central Asia. Thus, taking these features in to consideration, Kemalist nationalism was territorial. Moreover,

Poulton maintained that it was also viewed as a modernizing factor according to Gellner's paradigm (Poulton, pp.136-138).

As Çolak (2004) maintained, the debates on script revolution and purification attempts dated back to the Tanzimat reform movement. Moreover, nationalist writers also considered language as one of the essential elements of the nation. In this context, Turkish nationalists developed the Turkish part of Ottoman language. Afterwards, Ömer Seyfettin and Ziya Gökalp tried to establish the main elements of the "new language movement" that aimed to create a new language by standardizing the vernacular of the people. As noted before, the CUP supported this process and as a result of this, the new language became the legal and administrative language. The Turkish Language Policy was developed in the early Republican period of the 1920s and 1930s. The main goal of this policy was to create a pure Turkish by eliminating foreign grammatical rules and words from the Turkish language. Initially, the script change was maintained in 1928. The Turkish Language Society was founded in 1932 and Samih Rıfat was elected as the first president of Turkish Language Society. Ruşen Eşref was the first general secretary. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Celal Sahir were other first members. (pp.76-77) Samih Rıfat claimed that Turkish was the mother of all languages and this view was mostly accepted by his colleagues who were affiliated with the Turkish Language Institute (Aytürk, 2004, p.15). Turkish Language Society convened the first Turkish Language Congress, *Türk Dil Kurultayı* in Istanbul on 26 September 1932. (Çolak, p.77)

Ahmed Cevad Emre compared the Turkish and Sumer languages. The Turkish History and Language Theses aimed to establish the ethnic unity of Sumerians and Turks (Aytürk, p.11). This Congress aimed to replace old language with newly constructed pure Turkish. In that sense, the Congress elected a Central Committee that would collect the words from the vocabulary of ordinary people, old texts of ancient Turkish vocabularies and other Turkish languages. The second aim of the Committee was to create Turkish equivalents of foreign origin words. It should be noted that replacement of Arabic and Persian origin words reached its peak between 1933 and 1935. Moreover, a "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign began in this era. The striking fact is that the People's Houses had a significant contribution in educating and spreading pure Turkish. As Çolak stated, this campaign

targeted mainly the non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims to make them speak the new Turkish. Hence, this new approach reached its peak with the Sun Language Theory during late 1935 and early 1936. This theory was publicized in the Third Turkish Language Congress, on August 1936. The Sun Language Thesis claimed that Turkish was the mother of all languages. This thesis was written in accordance with the Turkish History Thesis that claimed Turks were cultural creators and their homelands of Central Asia and Anatolia were considered as the cradle of human civilization (Çolak, pp.77-83). The striking fact was that fifteen foreign Turcologists and experts were invited to the Third Turkish Language Congress; however, only Soviet scholars openly supported the Sun Language Thesis (Aytürk, p.16).

It is most likely that, dealing with the Sun Language Theory, if all existing languages were of Turkish origin, there would be no need to eliminate foreign origin words. Thus, it is obvious that dealing with the Sun Language Theory, in a way, ended the conflicts created by the radical purists. (Çolak, 84)

**6.1.3.3 The Kemalist Economy**

Feroz Ahmad (2008i) mentioned that the first step to modernizing the political and cultural life of Anatolia or to gain the acceptance of Europe was to eabolish the capitulations of September 1914. As a result of this, the CUP would raise tariffs on imported goods which would lead to the protection and development of local commerce and industry. Ahmad explained that the existence of free trade discouraged the growth of local industry. Moreover, a non-Muslim commercial community emerged. These communities had better opportunities for money-making by dealing with foreign trade (p.197)

Feroz Ahmad (2008i) mentioned that the Young Turks were aware of the necessity of creating a national bourgeoisie. They encouraged the creation of this bourgeoisie. However, after World War I, there was only an infant bourgeoisie class. The striking fact was that capitalist farmers and some officials gained wealth through wartime profiteering and were encouraged by the Young Turk government (p.196).

Ahmad (2008i) proposed that the Kemalists who succeeded the Young Turks accelerated the protectionist trend and accomplished a bourgeoisie revolution from the top. It was mentioned that Kemalists made no distinction between political and economic sovereignty (pp.197-201). The main important indicator of the Kemalist regime could be its endeavor to establish a modern industrial base with the help of the state. The main reasons for this endeavor were the weakness of private industries in interwar years and also the influence of the SU's five-year plans (Hale, 1981, cited in Cooper, 2002, p.117).

Mustafa Kemal stated on 1 March 1922 that the Turkish economy had been unable to defend itself against European competition ever since free trade was permitted by the *Tanzimat* regime. It should be noted that Kemalists were anti-imperialist during the war of independence. Their main aim was to prevent the partition of Anatolia. Moreover, they refused to be an economic colony of the West. Ahmad (2008i) stated that the economy of Kemalism was capitalist but also anti-imperialist. Therefore, foreign capital was welcomed if it was to be used to build the infrastructure for a modern economy (pp.202-204). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt became the Minister of Economy in 1922. His main aim was to Turkify the economy. He dealt with the poorer classes and in this context, he set up a system of loans for farmers. Kieser (2006) alleged that he tried to oust and dispossess the non-Muslims (p.24).

The most important point is that, as Ahmad (2008i) mentioned, the main problem of agrarian Turkey was the shortage of labor rather that the shortage of land at that time. In this context, Mustafa Kemal stated in his speech to the assembly on 1 March 1923 (Öztürk, 1969, p.128) that the Turkish population was small in relation to their land and needed to use machines and scientific tools for farming. Moreover, Anatolian peasants suffered from poverty, exploitation and oppression. It was declared that the revolution of 1908 would bring change to the lives of peasants. However, they were disappointed. The significant fact was that peasantry was alienated from the state. Ahmad (2008i) maintained that the peasants saw the national struggle as the continuation of all the other wars and they did not want to wage war (pp.206-210).

The striking fact was that Kemalists and notables collaborated. The landlords were powerful elements of the People's Party. As a result of this, there was an effective landlords' lobby in the Assembly. Moreover, Ahmad (2008i) stated that inclusion of article 74 in the new constitution obstructed the land reform. Furthermore, it was mentioned the peasantry needed to be educated (p.211). Ahmad (2002) indicated that the conservative notables and infant bourgeoisie played important roles in the national struggle and the creation of the republic. However, the new state was dominated by the military-civil intelligentsia which formed the hard core of the Kemalist movement (p.76).

Statism was incorporated into the RPP's program in 1931. This was a policy in which the RPP encouraged the use of locally produced goods. The impact of the depression was disastrous, and the price of agricultural goods and industrial products dropped. The government introduced a Labor Law in 1934. The workers were not permitted to form trade unions or to strike. In that sense, all forms of dissent was prohibited. The government introduced a price support program and bought crops with higher prices in 1932 (Ahmad, 2002, pp. 97-99).

There were opposing groups in the parliament that were supporting different directions for the Kemalist political economy. On the one hand, authoritarian policies were supported by İnönü and his friends. On the other hand, there was a liberal group led by Celal Bayar. İsmet İnönü was patronizing the journal *Kadro*, however, his journal was closed in 1934. Celal Bayar, the leader of the Business Bank group was appointed as the Minister of Economy in 1933. İnönü, being Prime Minister stated that state intervention was needed to provide an industrial base. In that manner, *Sümerbank* was founded in 1933 and *Etibank* in 1935 (Ahmad, 2008i, pp. 216-217). Bali indicated that the first step in implementing the Turkification of the economy was the firing of non-Muslim employees working in foreign companies established in Turkey (Bali, 2006, p.47).

Although there was a strong tendency towards fascism, the regime shunned fascism as an ideology. In the meantime, the private sector was constantly growing and increasing its political influence around Celal Bayar and the Business Bank, *İş Bankası.* In that sense, the Business Bank group agreed that there was a need for state intervention in order to create a

strong private sector. Ahmad (2002) stated that Kemalists approved of this strict control over labor, although they disliked the excessive control exercised by the fascist state on freedom and the autonomy of the propertied class. Ahmad indicated that the most radical wing of Kemalism was the monthly *Kadro* (Cadre) in which ex-Marxist intellectuals rejected the relationship between fascism and Kemalism. The *Kadro* journal began its publication in 1932. Ahmad mentioned that fascism was suitable only to semi-capitalist societies and not suitable for fully capitalist or pre-capitalist countries like Turkey (pp.64-66).

It is important to note that throughout the 1920s, a liberal economic model was applied. Moreover, the state played an important role in the economy. The Economic Congress of Turkey was held in February 1923. The main aim of the Congress was to establish a national economy and strengthen the economic powers of the country. The striking fact was that the ruling cadres of the new state were dominated by civil-military intellectuals. Moreover, there was collaboration between the government and principal classes as the infant bourgeoisie and the landlords. Statist policies were applied after the Great Depression. Ahmad (2008i) indicated that the main features of this policy remained unchanged. In that sense, statism, *devletçilik,* aimed to help the private sector to grow. It was mentioned in the 1935 Congress that the Turkish Republic was not comprised of different classes, but was a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor for the individual and the social life of the Turkish people. It was noted that the aims of the Party, with this principle, were to secure some form of social order and solidarity, instead of utilizing class conflict to establish harmony of interests. Ahmad mentioned that despite the corporatist rhetoric evident in this document and influenced by the prevailing fascist mood of the 1930s, the Kemalists denied any affinity with fascism (pp.213-215).

Poulton mentioned that each firm operating in Turkey had to have a high percentage of Turkish capital, Turkish directors and staff. The government arranged campaigns encouraging people to buy Turkish goods. Moreover, heavy import duties and quotas were applied to foreign goods. It should be noted that these quotas were also the result of a 1929 world economic crisis (Poulton, p.115). Gülalp (1997) stated that the nationalist, statist

developmentalism in Turkey was identified with Kemalism. Kemalists, with the help of Great Depression, applied import-substituting industrialization (ISI). In this context, the state actively engaged in economic development and protected the domestic market. However, throughout the 1950s, this policy was unsuccessful because of the economic conditions. Gülalp mentioned that the ideological elements of the ISI were nationalism and developmentalism. The ISI-based development was in crisis in the late 1970s. As a result of this, Turkey applied a market-oriented transnationalist model. Gülalp noted that this transformation was realized by the military regime. Thus, the dominant ideology in Turkey between the 1930s and 1970s was nationalist-statist developmentalism (pp.54-56).

Feroz Ahmad (2008i) indicated that Kemalism with its six principles was defined in 1931 at the Congress of the Republican People's Party. These principles were inserted into the constitution in 1937 (p.195).

Ahmad (2002) stated that hard-line Kemalists wanted to transform Turkey into a republic of independent peasant proprietors. The stronghold of landlords and war profiteers should be removed. To that end, the Land Reform Bill was passed in the Assembly on 11 June 1945 (p.103).

Ahmad (2002) maintained that the war years destroyed the Turkish economy. It is important to note that İnönü complained about the hoarding, the black marketeering and the profiteering that the business community was practicing in his speech during the opening of the new session of the parliament on 1 November 1942 (p.70). For the capital tax which came into force in 1942, religion and ethnicity were considered as criteria for the amount of the payment. There were separate lists for Muslims and non-Muslims, and the ratio between them was 1/10. Moreover, later different payments were presented for *Dönmes* (Jews converted to Islam) and other foreigners. *Dönmes* were obliged to pay double the taxes of the Muslims.  Foreigners were obliged to pay like Muslims. However, sometimes they were treated like non-Muslims. It was stated that the defaulters were sent to labor camps. 10,000 petitions were filed in 1943; however, all of them were rejected. At last, this law was abolished and all the unpaid dues were cancelled (Lewis, 1961, pp.290-292, Poulton, p. 117).

As stated, Kemalist regime was dominated by bureaucrats and the military. The large landowners had been the essential element in the Young Turk coalition since World War I. However, the government applied artificially low pricing to agricultural produce to combat inflation during the war. Moreover, the RPP's policy tax on agricultural produce and introduction of a land distribution bill resulted in political opposition. The capital tax of 1942 also contributed to this opposition among even the Turkish bourgeoisie. (Zürcher 2005, pp. 207-208) It could be stated that this tax provided the transfer of wealth from the non-Muslims to Turkish bourgeoisie.

Turkey, Great Britain and Greece held negotiations over the future of Cyprus during August and September 1955. Some nationalist riots began with the help and provocation of the press. Large-scale riots took place in Istanbul on 6-7 September and Greek businesses were attacked by the inhabitants of the slums. Zürcher also noted that trucks from Anatolia came to collect the loot. The government declared martial law in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Zürcher, 2005, p.231). Moreover, the ethnic clashes in Cyprus made by the Greek Cypriots were retaliated by the Turkish state with the policies targeting Greeks of Istanbul in 1964. Although they had rights under the Lausanne treaty, they were forced to leave the country within 48 hours (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010, wp.2).

It should be stated that the early 1950s were considered as the most successful years of the Menderes era. Both the Korean War and the increasing need in Europe for the Turkish agricultural products contributed to this situation. However, the economy began to stagnate by 1954. The Turkish lira was overvalued, which eased imports and the commercial and industrial classes became wealthier. Nonetheless, Turkey was unable to buy capital goods and spare parts by the mid-1950s. As a result of this, liberal policies were abandoned and protectionist policies were applied. The rural side of the population prospered with the help of subsidies, tax exemptions and cheap farm credits (Ahmad, 2002, pp. 116-7).

## 6.2 Turkism and Turanism

Landau (1995) alleged that the main source of irredentism was considered within the ideology of Pan-Turkism. The Pan-Turkist movement aimed to provide some sort of union among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living within or outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently the Republic of Turkey. Turan, on the other hand, has had a rather broader concept, including Finns and Hungarians. It was stated that, according to a Turkish document of 1832 regarding Kokand Khanate, Turan was also comprised of the territories of Turkestan, Tatarstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Armenius Vambery contended in his book *Sketches of Central Asia*, which was published in 1868, that all Turkic groups belonged to one race which was subdivided according to the physical traits and customs (pp.1-2).

Özdoğan (2001), also, alleged that Turanism and Pan-Turanism could be defined as the unity of all Turkish-originated communities including Hungarians and Finns (p.28). Ağaoğulları (1987) defined Pan-Turkism with the four features of Turanism, racism, militarism and anti-communism and with another component which included a disciplined hierarchical society, obedience, glorification of the leader and self-sacrifice for the state. (Poulton, p.135)

The Journal *Turan* was published regularly in Hungary from 1913 till 1970. (Landau, 1995, p.1) It was stated that Turanism was born in Hungary in 1839. This term was created as a reaction to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. Pan-Turkism was used as a synonymous for Turanism. It was born as a reaction of Turkish intellectuals living in Russia to Pan-Slavism. Turanism was developed and turned into an ideal with the help of Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp indicated the Turkish speaking tribes as Uzbeks and Kazaks used the term "Turan" for themselves, but not the Finns, Hungarians or Mongols. Gökalp proposed the Turkish of Istanbul as a general language for all Turks (Sarınay, pp.202-203). Ömer Seyfettin stated that all Turkish-speaking Muslim people belonged to the Turkish nation and their territory was called Turan. He mentioned that the development of economic ideals led Turks to Turan (Kohen, 1914, cited in Sarınay, pp.204-205).

Pan-Turkism envisages all tribes of Turkic descent, from the Eastern Mediterranean to Sinkiang and from Volga to Southern Anatolia, as a unity. Landau maintained that Pan

Turkism was cultural in the beginning. Early twentieth century, it acquired a political character. It is important to note that during the World War I, Pan-Turkists aimed to establish a union with Turks living in Russia. Landau (1974) gave Enver Pasha as an example for this attempt; he died attempting to lead Turkic origined soldiers of Russia. Afterwards, it is obvious that Germans used Pan-Turkist aspirations to form military units of Soviet war prisoners of Turkic descent. In sum, there was inclination to Nazism, pro-German tendencies and anti-Soviet sentiments among the Pan-Turkists in 1930s and 1940s. It is noted that the Democrat Party had permissive attitudes towards Islam and Pan-Turkism. *Bozkurt, Çınaraltı, Tanrıdağ* were influential Turkist journals of that time. After Second World War, the Pan-Turkists were rather racist, and Nazi-style. Landau maintained that Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was the most prominent Pan-Turkist. His Journal of *Büyük Doğu* and *the Büyük Doğu* Association criticized secularism, westernization, free masonry and Jews. Zeki Velidi Togan stated that communism and socialism were dangers for Turkey; Pan-Turkism should be used. Moreover, he stated that Pan-Turkism should be used to prevent Russification of all the peoples in the SU (pp.193-198).

Poulton maintained that Kemalist nationalism did not include characteristics of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism. Kemalist nationalism included the features of Smith's civic nationalism, although it had some ethnic features. It was alleged that the slogan of "Peace at home, peace abroad" demonstrated that Turkey had followed a civic nationalist theory. Therefore, all the people within the boundaries of Turkey were Turkish. The radical right, having some pan-Turkist inclinations, could be considered as pursuing an ethnic model. Russian émigrés helped with the emergence of Pan-Turkism. This ideology was influential in the Young Turks era and during the First World War. Turkish Hearths were established in 1911, and they displayed Turanist tendencies. The Turkish Hearths published *Türk Yurdu*. It was closed by the British in 1920 and reopened in 1924. In order to curb its activities, it was put under the control of the RPP. Afterwards, it was again closed in 1931 (pp.130-132).

Regarding official Turkish nationalism, strikingly, Pan-Turkism was refused before the declaration of the Republic by referring to the document of *Misak-ı Milli*. The Republicans

focused on territorial and cultural bases of the nation. Turkists were opposed to some RPP reforms related to the rural areas (Özdoğan, p.39).

### 6.2.1. The Turkism Case

The Republic of Turkey endeavored to stay out of World War II. However, it seemed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union; and a resurgence of the Pan-Turkist propaganda was witnessed. In that sense, a Pan-Turkist committee was founded in July 1941 with German encouragement. Even so, a German defeat was considered possible in May 1944. Thus, the Turkish government suppressed the pan-Turkist organizations and propaganda (Zürcher 2005, p.205)

Anatolianism, on the other hand, was developed after the Second World War. Anatolian nationalists opposed Turanism, and they supported Anatolian Islam. This approach was strengthened through the journals *Anadolu* and *Dergah*. The representatives of this approach were Hilmi Ziya Ülken, M. Şemseddin Günaltay, Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar and Ahmet Kutsi Tecer. After the Republican era, Remzi Oğuz Arık and Nurettin Topçu were identified as Anatolianists. The journal of Anatolianism, in that era, was *Hareket Dergisi* (Öğün, pp. 129-130). It is important to note that three groups of people were harassed and persecuted in the 1930s and 1940s. The first group was that of the Islamists and the other group was the non-Muslims (Kasaba, 1997, p.28), and lastly, Turkists.

Poulton maintained that the racist currents were seen as unifying factors. Atsız was the symbol of Pan-Turkism. The Atsız Review was published by Nihal Atsız in 1931. Atsız organized demonstrations to support outside Turks and was against the annexation of Hatay. Landau (1974) classified five groups of Pan-Turkism. The first one was *Zeki Velidi Togan*'s group. The second group was *Nihal Atsız*'s group. The third group was led by *Rıza Nur*. The fourth group was led by racist *Reha Oğuz Türkkan*. The last group was called *Çınaraltı*, and they were the supporters of the ideas of Ziya Gökalp (cited in Poulton, p.134). It should be noted that the Kadro movement included different ideologies such as Marxism, nationalism and corporatism and elitism (Ahmad 2008i) and was active in the 1930s. Nonetheless, Kadro was shut down in 1934. Pan-Turkism was strengthened

during the Second World War. The governmental authorities understood that Nazi Germany would be defeated, and the trials against the Pan-Turkists began in 1944.

Atsız stated that,

A Turk is one who believes in the superiority of the Turkish race, respects its national past and is ready to sacrifice himself for the ideals of Turkdom, especially in the fight against Moscow, the implacable enemy (Landau,1974, Poulton, p.135).

Nihal Atsız declared in his last will to his son on 4 May 1941 that Jews, Russians, Chinese, Iranians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans, Italians, English, French, Arabs, Serbians, Croatians, Spanish, Portuguese, Romans, Japanese, and Americans were external enemies. He also declared Armenians, Kurds, Chechens, Abhazs, Bosnians, Albanians, Pomacs, Lazes, Lezgis, Georgians and Cherkessees, as internal enemies Özdoğan (2001) stated that Turkists were detained in 1944. Afterwards, a new nationalist movement began in the 1970s and it evolved into a Turkish-Islamic synthesis on 12 September 1980 (pp.15, 297).

### 6.2.2 The Emergence of the Nationalist Action Party

The military intervention occurred on 27 May 1960. The National Unity Committee (the NUC) was set up on 13 November 1960. Ahmad (1977) mentioned that the NUC accepted Islam as a vital ingredient in the Turkish character; they accepted the Imam-Hatip schools and advanced Islamic Institute and their main aim was to ensure the Turkification of Islam (cited in Poulton, p.138). Alparslan Türkeş founded the Union of Ideal and Culture to substitute a national ideology for Islam in June 1960. Therefore, it is important to note that Türkeş saw Islam as a rival ideology to Turkish nationalism. The persecution of Turkish Cypriots and Turks in Iraq were important issues to be dealt with in 1961. The Union of Turkish nationalists headed by *Necdet Sançar* was founded in 1964. Moreover, a rival Islamic Congress was led by *Kafesoğlu,* and it was convened in 1967 (Landau, 1974, p.201-204, cited in Poulton, p.139). The radical right was revived with the return of exiled *Türkeş* to Turkey in 1963. (Poulton, p.139)

As Landau (1982) maintained, socio-economic unrest and political turmoil were experienced in Turkey in the 1960s. Both leftist and rightist groups contributed to this turmoil. The Labor Party was set up in 1961. It was a Marxist Party. On the other hand, a rightist, nationalist party began to emerge under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş. Alparslan Türkeş, being an army officer, participated in civilian anti-communist demonstrations in 1944. As Landau stated, the ensuing trials ended in a conviction and were subsequently overturned in an appeal. Türkeş was the chief initiator of the military intervention against the Democrat Party (DP) in 1960. However, he and his group who were called "the Fourteen" were expelled by the Council for the National Unity and assigned to diplomatic missions (pp.588-589).

Türkeş returned to Turkey in February 1963. He resigned from his military assignments and joined the Republican Peasants Nation Party (the RPNP), *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Milli Partisi.* Afterwards, he became the leader of the party in 1965. It is important to note that Türkeş changed the name and ideology of the party in 1969 and the Nationalist Action Party, the NAP was founded. According to the official gazette, *Resmi Gazete,* the RPNP gained 2.2 % of the total vote in 1965. The National Action Party (the NAP) won 3% of the total vote in 1969, 3.4% in 1973, and 6.4% in 1977. In this context, 11 seats were obtained in 1965, 1 seat in 1969, 3 seats in 1973 and 16 seats in 1977. By looking at its number of votes, Başkan maintained that the NAP was a marginal party during the pre-1980 period (Başkan, p.87). It is important to note that the NAP participated in the Cabinet Coalition during 1975-1977. The NAP exerted stronger impact on the Turkish parliamentary system by participating the Cabinet Coalitions of 1975 and 1977 (Landau, 1982, pp.589-590).

The nine lights of the Nationalist Action Party were proposed in 1963. The nine lights were nationalism, idealism, moralism, communitarianism, positivism, libertarianism, ruralism, modernization, populism, and industrialism (Başkan, 2006, p.91). Zürcher (2005) identified these principles as nationalism, idealism, morality, social responsibility, scientific-mindedness, support for freedom, and support for the peasants, developmentalism and industrialization/technology (p.257).

As Türkeş stated in his book *9 Işık ve Türkiye,* the core of the Nine Lights Doctrine was the Turkish nation. It was proposed as a third way rather than communism or capitalism. Türkeş defined in *9 Işık ve Türkiye* that Turkish nationalism signified a deep love of the Turkish nation, loyalty to the Turkish nation, and a consciousness of sharing a common history and common ideals. It is obvious that this definition resembles the definition of Kemalist nationalism. Moreover, Türkeş stated that the nation comprised all those living within the borders of the Turkish Republic, sharing a common language, history, religion and culture. The NAP mentioned that the only independent Turkish state in the world is the Turkish Republic and it was the foundation stone of Turkishness. Moreover "idealism", *ülkücülük* was defined as the love and ideal of serving and sacrificing everything for the state. It is apparent that communism and communist revolutionaries were considered as the enemies of the state in the 1970s and the NAP persecuted them. Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, the PKK was considered as the enemy of the state and, as such it was the enemy of the NAP (Başkan, pp.90-93).

As mentioned before, Türkeş was an active Pan-Turkist in the 1940s. In the 1960s, Pan-Turkists formed some organizations such as the Pan-Turkists' Association, *Türkçüler Derneği,* which supported the NAP and its leader, Türkeş. Although Pan-Turkists participated in the party, they could not dominate the party. It is important to note that three crescents were chosen as the party symbol instead of the grey wolf and in 1969, a third general party convention was held in Adana. It was stated that this selection was interpreted by the Pan-Turkists as a move towards Islam. The commando-training camps were opened by the NAP in 1968 and they were used to train nationalist militants who began to be active in the streets of Ankara and Istanbul. The Heart of Ideals and then, from 1979, the Association of Idealist Youth dealt with propaganda activities against their opponents as leftists. Moreover, the Nationalist Federation of Workers' Trade Unions that was established in 1977 was very close to the NAP. Briefly, it is obvious that the NAP was close to Turks and Sunnis rather than Kurds and Alevis. Moreover, it was oriented towards early Turkish history and culture. Nonetheless, Landau mentioned that the party's attitudes towards society and economics were ultra-modern. The NAP was considered as anti-communist, anti-Marxist and even anti-capitalist. It was searching for a third economic way that was based on Turkishness (Landau, 1982, pp.593-600).

Pan-Turkists like Atsız and Türkkan were racists, however, although Özdağ denies that Turks have ever been racists. Türkeş mentioned that because of this historical background, it was not possible to apply in Turkish society any idea like the extermination of people belonging to a different race and religion. The Nationalist Work Party (the NWP) was opened as a continuation of the NAP, after the 1980 military intervention and their program of December 1988 mentioned that Turkish nationalism was a cultural movement which rejected racism (Poulton, p.152).

The NAP mentioned in its 1973 election declaration that commerce would be purged of non-national elements and the term national state was founded on a single homogeneous nation. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu stated that they believed in the theory of a superior race. He added that Turkishness was an essence comprised of religion and race. He mentioned that the Turkish race was more precious than all others. The NAP mentioned prior to 1977 elections that Greek-Armenian-Jewish converts, Kurds, Cherkess, Bosnians and Albanians destroyed the Ottoman Empire. It was asked that how much longer they would tolerate those dirty minorities. The NAP's main duty was presented as fighting against the communist-Kurd danger. Secondly, nationalists considered Alevis as the main enemies (Poulton, p.153).

The NAP opposed Özal's proposal on Kurdish TV and considered this as a separatist initiation. However in 1992, he stated that Kurds were their brothers, even if they belonged to the PKK and he was against bloodshed. But Türkeş accused the PKK of collaboration with the violent anti-Turkish ASALA, in March 1994. Türkeş claimed on 15 March 1993 that terrorists were trying to create a greater Armenia. Poulton mentioned that the ideology of NAP/NWP resembled the Turkish Hearths. The main features of this ideology were the denial of minorities within Turkey, and the insistence on a unitary state dealing with the events related to Turkish people outside the country. It should be noted that the RPNP program emphasized the idea of a secular state in 1965. However, in the late 1960s, there were debates about Islam's place in the party's ideology. In that sense, Islamism was revealed as an integral part of the party's ideology in 1969. Moreover, the three crescent

flag replaced the grey wolf emblem flag in the third MHP Congress in Adana. Also, Islamic principles were added to the morality principle in 1972 (Poulton, pp.154-156).

The NAP was one of the parties that were responsible for the street violence in the 1970s. It was mentioned that the NAP's role in the street violence was considered as part of their strategy to obstruct communism and revolution. They aimed to support the newly emerged capitalist class. The NAP was accused of using extra-parliamentary means with grey wolves/commandos which had been active since 1968 (Poulton, pp.160-161). Turkish nationalists were disappointed in the 1980s that they were seen as antagonists of the state like the leftists. When their past experiences were reconsidered, they believed that they behaved as a militant power of holy state (Mete, pp.157-58).

The military took power on 12 September 1980 and all parties were dissolved. The NAP identified its ideology with nationalism and statism and it regarded the enemies of the state as the enemies of the party. In the aftermath of this intervention, the supporters of the NAP were arrested, tortured and even killed by the military government. (Başkan, 92) Afterwards, former members of the NAP established the Conservative Party, *Muhafazakar Parti*. The Conservative Party was renamed the Nationalist Work Party, *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi.* Alparslan Türkeş became the leader of the party in 1987 when the political ban was removed. The NWP got only 2.9% of the total votes in 1987 elections (Başkan, p.87).

After the Cold War, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Turkish Republics became independent. As Fukuyama noted, it was the end of history. Therefore, anti-communism was dropped from the agenda of the NAP. The NAP had used Islam as a component of Turkish nationalism since the 1960s. Moreover, Islamic tendencies were strengthened in the ideology of the party in the 1980s with the help of the resurgence of Islam and the adoption a Turkish-Islam synthesis by the military and this doctrine was pursued by NATO. The Islamic wing of the NAP left the party in 1993 and the Grand Unity Party, *Büyük Birlik Partisi* was founded. Başkan claimed that the NAP softened the Islamic tone of its ideology during the post-1990 period. It was stated that the NAP was critical of Islamist political parties for using religion for political purposes and the NAP tried to distinguish itself from the Islamic-oriented parties (Başkan, pp.92-93).

The NWP made an alliance with the Islamist Welfare Party and the Reformist Democracy Party in 1991 during the general elections and this alliance won 16.9% of the votes and 62 seats in the Parliament. Nineteen deputies of the NWP resigned from the Welfare Party after the elections. The NAP returned to its original name in 1993. It had 8.1% of total votes in 1995 general elections. Türkeş died in 1997 and, after that, in the 1999 elections, the NAP gained 17.9 % of the total vote and 129 seats in the Parliament. It joined a coalition government. Başkan stated that the 1999 general elections confirmed that the aim of the NAP was to become a "catchall party". It was alleged that the rural population of central and eastern Anatolia and low-income settlers of big cities gave their votes to the NAP in the 1999 general elections. Başkan concluded that the losers of the globalization process supported the NAP. However, nationalists withdrew their support, especially after the postponement of Öcalan's death sentence. Moreover, the "headscarf issue" could not be solved by the NAP. Furthermore, collaboration with the IMF disappointed the followers of the party. Lastly, the success of the JDP as a new party contributed to the failure of the NAP in 2002 elections (Başkan, pp.87-90).

## 6.3 Turkish-Islam Synthesis

Mustafa Kemal and his friends used Islam in the struggle against the Greeks and they tried to construct a Turkish Islam. However, afterwards, they refused to use Islam as a tool for social cohesion. It was already stated that Gökalp tried to reconcile Islam and Turkish nationalism. The *tariqats* were closed down and Turkish *ezan* began to be used in 1933. Moreover, the dual schools system was abolished and the charitable religious foundations were transferred to the state. At last, as Poulton maintained, the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory were declared as the main pillars of the new ideology to promote national identity rather than Islamism. The RPP Supreme Council allowed religious instruction in schools in 1947, and, in addition, Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay opened the Theological Faculty at Ankara University in 1949 (Poulton, pp.160, 170).

It is important to note that there was revival of Islam in the 1950s. There was a reaction against the years of the RPP after the election victory of the Democrat Party. The members of the *Ticani tariqat* destroyed the busts and statues of Atatürk. For this, they were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Moreover, Said Nursi was arrested and tried in 1953 and the "Law to Protect Freedom of Conscience" was passed to prevent the politicization of religion on 23 July 1953. Furthermore, the Millet Party was banned and dissolved because of exploiting Islam in 1954. However, both the DP and the RPP used religion to gain votes (Poulton, pp.168-172).

The National Unity Committee tried to encourage the Turkification of Islam after the 1960 coup. It should be noted that the leftists were strengthened with the help of the 1961 constitution. Islam was identified with anti-liberal and anti-socialist forces and with those who opposed the 1961 constitution. The Islamization process was strengthened with the growth of the National Salvation Party and its participation in the coalition governments in the 1970s (Poulton, pp.168, 173).

The National Order Party (the NOP), *Milli Nizam Partisi* was founded on 26 January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan was the follower of the *Nakşibendi* leader Halidi Sheikh Mehmed Zahit Kotku. He was identified as a technocrat, an Islamist and an anti-European. Erbakan mentioned at a press conference on 26 January 1970 that the NOP was against freemasons, communists and zionists. Moreover, it opposed to population planning, or birth control. He criticized severely the European Economic Council (the EEC). He supported the strengthening of national morals in universities, media and education. The NOP was dissolved with the military intervention in 1971. *Milli Selamet Partisi,* the National Salvation Party (the NSP), was founded in 1972. (176-177) The NSP's official doctrine was based on a religious view of the world, swifter industrialization and redistributive populist economic and social ethics (Mardin, 1977, cited in Poulton, p.177). Landau (1974) claimed that the NOP/NSP and Nurcus supported "Islamic Nationalism" (Poulton, p.178).

The main dimensions of the Turkish-Islam synthesis (the TIS) was that "science, without religion, is the source of all disaster, and there can never be contradiction and conflict

between science and religion. The TIS maintained that religious movements were born and developed as a reaction to enmity for religion. Moreover, if the reactionary movements were not desired, the state should not distance itself from religion. In this context the thesis supported that there was no problem of religious fundamentalism in Turkey. The TIS was based on Islam and Turkish national culture. In sum, Islam was the only precondition to become a Turk and remain as a Turk. In this sense, Turks adopted Islam and became the leaders of Islam. The advocators of this thesis were all imagined the Ottoman Empire as a world power (Şen, 2010, p.65).

The Hearths of the Enlightened, *Aydınlar Ocağı* was an influential organization founded on 14 May 1970. The Hearth's members were university professors and businessmen. This group believed that left-wing ideologies had penetrated into Turkey. They aimed to strengthen the right wing nationalist forces. They considered humanism as the enemy of the national culture. The Hearth presented five groups of enemies. The first group was comprised of atheists, including materialists and communists. The second group was the enemies of society such as the Kurdish separatists. The third group included humanists and communists. The fourth group was other religious groups like Christians and those responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The last group included the forward-thinking and governing intellectuals (Bozkurt & Şaylan, 1991 cited in Poulton, pp.179-180). The leading ideologue of the Hearth was Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kafesoğlu who formulated the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Turgut Özal and Korkut Özal were also members of the Hearth of Enligthened. (Poulton, p.180) Turkish-Islam synthesis was explained by the fact that Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because there were number of similarities between pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization. This thesis places a special emphasis on justice, monotheism, the immortal soul, family life and morality. Thus, the mission for the Turks would be to assume the role of becoming the soldiers of Islam (Zürcher, 2007, p.288)

The Hearths of the Enlightened supported the NAP. They were opposed to the policies of the RPP. Moreover, they influenced Demirel's National Front governments. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was supported by the military government of the 1980s and also by the administration of Özal (Poulton, pp.180-185). It was clear that the army considered

socialism and communism as the most dangerous enemies of Turkey. Kenan Evren used Islam in his speeches. Moreover, "religion and ethics lessons" were put into the curriculum by the military government after 1980. After 1983, this thesis became the guiding principle in Özal's Motherland Party (Zürcher 2005, p.288). The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was accepted by Kenan Evren and Turgut Özal during the meeting of the Ataturk Culture, Language and History High Commission on 26 June 1986 (Cumhuriyeti Kuşatanlar, 2005, p.40)

Kasaba alleged that the 1983 elections were considered as a strict choice between the old and the new. It was considered that Turkey's problems resulted from the continuing influence of the pre-republican institutions and attitudes. Indeed, before the 1980s, it was widely accepted that Turks had to cut their ties from their recent Ottoman history. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Turkish people began to inquire about old institutions, beliefs, identities and cultures by the 1980s. The Kemalist modernization program was criticized. The Welfare Party, having an Islamist ideology opposed Kemalism. In addition to this Islamic and traditional revival, Kurds asserted their distinct cultural and ethnic identity. As it is known, the PKK was founded in the late 1970s. Besides this, there has been an ongoing Turkish modernization that aimed for a militantly secular, ethnically homogeneous republic. Hence, the main aim of this process was to catch up with the civilized nations of the West. Kasaba mentioned that Muslim intellectuals claimed that Muslims in Turkey were separated forcefully from their religious traditions under Atatürk. In this manner, Muslim intellectuals claimed that Turks would rejoin the Islamic world. It is important to emphasize that Kemalists denied the existence of a Kurdish problem, and that, furthermore, this problem was identified with terrorism and underdevelopment. In addition, Kemalists believed that this issue had been provoked by external forces (Kasaba, 1997, pp.15-24).

The new Islamist intellectuals criticized Turkish nationalism, and they disseminated their religious messages with the help of the rapid radical economic and social changes of Özal's government. These religious messages influenced the people living in slums. (Poulton, 196)

In sum, after the 1980 military intervention, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was adopted by the military. It was alleged that it was a menace to radical leftist ideology and that it was adopted to ensure a link between Kemalism and Islam. Importantly, a new constitution was introduced in 1982; article 24 stated that "Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools." Thus, during the Motherland Party's governance between the years 1982 and 1989, a number of *Imam-Hatip* schools and many new mosques were built. Özal advocated internationalism, open-market economy, American pluralism and an American type of secularism. This American type of secularism was explained as "the state could be secular, but not individuals, who were to be left free to practice their religions (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p.6). Özal's Motherland Party supported a program which was a mixture of economic liberalism and nationalism, with some Islamic elements (Atasoy, 2009, p.53).

The Turkish state institutions continued to advocate Turkish Islam after the 1980 coup d'état. General Evren used Islam as a vehicle to ensure national solidarity and reconciliation of diversities within Turkish society (Tank, 2005, p.10).This policy was called the Turkish-Islam synthesis and was supported by Turkish institutions and, more importantly, by foreign powers. It was presented in Brezezinki's doctrine as the establishment of the green crescent to contain the USSR (Somer, 2007, p.1276). It should also be noted that the ideology of Turkish-Islam synthesis that was supported by the Motherland Party integrated Islam into an export-oriented economic model. In this context, as Atasoy stated, the West was no longer perceived as a coherent cultural unit of modernity but as an economic power within the larger space of global competition (Atasoy, 2009, p.154). It is apparent that the 1980s were regarded as turning point. The rise of Anatolian capital was witnessed with open and liberal economic policies. It was obvious that Özal started the process of opening the economy to the outside world that led the formation of Anatolian capital (Demir, et.al, pp.168-170).

This ideology paved way for the strengthening of some tariqats such as *Nakşibendi* and *Nur*. They established holding companies and financial institutions. Therefore, a significant accumulation of wealth was realized with the help of the *Nakşibendi* movement. Fethullah Gülen's *Nur tariqat*, on the other hand, has not accepted any contradiction

between Islam and a market economy. This movement, therefore, mobilized small and medium sized business groups based largely in smaller Anatolian cities (Atasoy, pp.170-171).

## 6.4 Evaluation of Turkish Nationalism in the Republican Era

It was stated before that Ottomanism was a patriotic kind of nationalism that was based on allegiance to dynasty, state and homeland. Tanzimat reforms provided for the adoption of the principle of legal equality of all religious communities in the Empire. However, nationalist and separatist movements within the Empire ensured the strengthening of Islamism. Afterwards, Turkism continued to develop at the end of the nineteenth century. It was mentioned that the Young Turk period accelerated the process of conversion to Turkism and prepared the ground for Kemalism. As Kushner (1997) stated, the period of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk enabled Turkism to become a political doctrine. The Turkish nation included only the Muslim people living within the national borders. Secularism, westernization and economic revival coupled with the creation of a national bourgeoisie were the main goals of the Kemalist regime (pp.219-222).

At the beginning, Turkish nationalists were secular and this movement was supported by city-dwellers, it should be noted that the movements and ideology of the 1930s and 1940s were seen as the exceptions. Turkish nationalists were considered as opposing racism. Moreover brotherhood literature was used to reinforce the integrity of the society. After the waves of immigration from rural areas to the cities, urban Turkish nationalists changed, and the symbol of the grey wolf was converted to the crescent. The idea of ruralization, *"Köylüleşme"* has been rather influential on the ideology of Turkish nationalism. Islam became the priority of Turkish nationalists. This tendency was strengthened in the 1980s with the approval of a Turkish-Islam synthesis as the state ideology (Mete, pp.169-176).

It has been stated that Nilüfer Göle (2008) divided the Ottoman-Turkish modernization into two parts. On the one side, there was *nizam-ı ceditçi* politics, Jaadedism which meant that there was a need to change the order from above. The main leaders of this approach

were Mahmud II and Atatürk. On the other side, there was *nizam-ı kadimci* politics, or Quadeemism, which refers to lower structural politics. The key figures of *nizam-i kadimci* politics were Abdulhamid II, and subsequently, engineer-politicians, such as Demirel, Erbakan and Özal. Many experts of Turkish political science, namely Şerif Mardin, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Mümtaz'er Türköne, classified the Jaadedist leaders and intellectuals as Ali Fuat Pashas, Tevfik Fikret, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Yusuf Akçura, Falih Rıfkı and Ziya Gökalp. All of them were in favor of secularism, westernization, and constitutionalism. The Quadeemists were Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, Said Halim Pasha, Namık Kemal, Ahmed Mithad Efendi, Mehmed Akif, Süleyman Nazif, Fuad Köprülü and Samed Ağaoğlu. They were identified with liberalism and democracy in İdris Küçükömer's famous book, "*Düzenin Yabancılaşması*" (Aksakal, 2010, p.248). Şerif Mardin stated that brotherhood groups were the intermediaries between the state and the society. It was maintained that the work of Turkish modernization was transferred to the lower strata of the society (Kahraman, 2009, p.81).

The Turkish modernization process was formulated from above. It was maintained that the masses in Turkey remained passive recipients of the nationalist message propounded by the elites. The masses were affected by the expulsion, deportation, massacre and the exchange of Greek and Armenian subjects of the empire. As a result, in order to focus on the vulnerability of the new community, the support of the masses was needed. In that manner, authoritarianism became the necessary element of collectivist nationalism (Keyder, 1997, pp.37-46). Turkish modernization was based on Westernization, however, it should be noted that the West of the 1920s and 1930s had authoritarian features than liberal features (Oran, 1997, p.14).

Dealing with Kemalist nationalism, the main approach stated that Kemalist nationalism placed a higher value on Turkish citizenship. Turkishness could be explained with the association with ideas, goals of Turkish nation, protection of the Turkish republic and commitment to Turkish modernization. Kemalist nationalism rejects racism and Islamic nationalism (Kili, p.208). It is important to note that Kemalism was associated with republicanism rather than democracy. Democracy was considered tolerant towards

religiosity. Republicanism, on the other hand, supported the laic regime. Moreover, national interest was to supersede class and individual interests (Kili, pp.193-195).

Kili's approach considered Kemalist nationalism basing on Turkish citizenship, republicanism and secularism. The other approach could be linked to Soner Çağaptay. He agreed that Turkish nationalism had been merged with secularism and Westernization to create the Turkish nation-state. Kemalists under the leadership of Atatürk defied the Ottoman legacy and tried to build a secular Republic of Turkey. Çağaptay (2006) stated that the 1930s could be described as demonstrating state-sponsored, authoritarian nationalism (pp.1-2).

Özdoğan (2001) stated that the assimilationist policies of Kemalism were engendered because they were afraid of separatism and secession. Moreover, the Turkists, considered non-Turks as threats. Turkists based their theories on Central Asia and racism. Kemalists supported the Turkish history thesis. (p.296) Atatürk mentioned that a nation is composed of citizens connected to each other by common language, common culture and common ideals (İnan, 1969, cited in Feyzioğlu p.46). Feyzioğlu (1996) indicated that Atatürkist nationalism is related to secularism and contains no sectarian divisions. It also includes no class conflicts or any inclination to communism and it encourages social solidarity. Atatürk indicated that Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and federal imperialism were dreams and the survival and interests of Turkish nation should not be sacrificed for the realization of these dreams.

The natural boundaries of the homeland were considered as the defensible Anatolian heartland. The rights of the minorities were protected according to the Treaty of Lausanne. All Muslims were seen as the founding members of the Turkish nation. Moreover, Atatürk set up a committee to abolish the Caliphate. He tried to obstruct any potential religious opposition from the upper clergy and *tariqats* (Poulton, pp.91-92).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk regarded Turks and Kurds as two inseparable brothers (Poulton, p.96). However, Kurdish uprisings continued. Mustafa Kemal also considered them fellow Muslims. Moreover, he recognized in his speeches that Kurds are a separate people. He

called the Independence Struggle a Holy War with the *fetva* of Ankara *müftü*. On the other hand, Kemal was aware of the potential threat of *tariqats* to his reforms, and also, that Christians were considered as unsuitable people to be called Turkish. It was stated that the National Pact defined acceptable borders for Turkey including the Eastern Thrace, Anatolia and Istanbul. In this context, Arabs were allowed to choose their own affiliation. The Muslim Turkish speakers of Thrace and Anatolia comprised the Turkish nation. It is important to note that the Pact aimed to provide national unity (Vanderlippe, pp.12-13). The Sevres Treaty was regarded as an important document for the nationalization of territory. The Allied forces aimed to divide Anatolia among Armenians, Kurds and the Western Anatolian Greeks, but that idea was rejected. The preservation of the territories in which the Ottoman-Muslims were in the majority became the main objective (İçduygu & Kaygusuz, p.32) According to the Treaty of Lausanne; the minorities were defined as "non-Muslims" living in Turkey (Oran, 2004). All Muslims were seen as founding members of the Republic and the nation-building process was pursued (Ergil, 2000, p.13). The Sun Language Theory claimed that Turkish was the mother of all languages. This thesis was developed in accordance with the Turkish History Thesis that claimed Turks were culture creators and their homelands of Central Asia and Anatolia were considered to be the cradle of human civilization. (Çolak, p.83)

Ahmad (2002) indicated that the conservative notables and infant bourgeoisie played important roles in the national struggle and the creation of the republic. However, the new state was dominated by the military-civil intelligentsia who formed the hard core of the Kemalist movement (p.76).

The national economy, Kemalism, and the six arrows were all based on past experiences and previous thoughts. Şerif Mardin (1997) explained that the idea of national economic mobilization was seen in the studies of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and the New Ottomans. Moreover, he pointed out that the nationalist economy and statism had been considered by Namık Kemal. It was stated that economic patriotism was presented by Ziya Gökalp, and that solidarism was mentioned in the studies of Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp (cited in Turan, İ., p.134). Taha Parla (1999) claimed that Turkish public philosophy had been corporatist. It was stated that this philosophy was usually solidarist-corporatist and

sometimes it revealed fascist features. Thus, it could be indicated that the center of Turkish political thought was based on rightist political views (cited in Turan, İ, p.135).

After 1950, rural people and the industrial bourgeoisie came onto the scene. The military began to regulate things after the 1950s and politics from then onwards was called populism (Kahraman, p.x). Bora (2003) stated that Kemalist nationalism was basically left-wing. The main principles of Kemalist nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s were anti-imperialism and independence (pp.438-440). Bora mentioned that Turkish radical nationalism was identified with the NAP, especially after the 1960s. Islamism contributed this ideology in the 1970s (pp.445-448).

Nationalist, statist developmentalism in Turkey was identified with Kemalism. Kemalists, with the help of the Great Depression, applied import-substituting industrialization (ISI). In this context, the state actively engaged in economic development and protected the domestic market. However, throughout the 1950s, this policy was unsuccessful because of the economic conditions. The ideological elements of the ISI were nationalism and developmentalism. However, ISI-based development was in crisis in the late 1970s. As a result of this, Turkey applied a market-oriented transnationalist model. It was noted that this transformation was realized by the military regime. Thus, the dominant ideology in Turkey between the 1930s and 1970s was nationalist-statist developmentalism (Gülalp, 1997, pp.54-56).

It is important to note that the Kemalist regime was dominated by bureaucrats and the military. The large landowners had been an essential element in the Young Turk coalition since World War I. However, the government applied artificially low pricing of agricultural produce to combat inflation during the war (Zürcher 2005, pp.207-208).

It was alleged that the main source of irredentism was considered within the ideology of Pan-Turkism. The Pan-Turkist movement aimed to provide some sort of union among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins, whether living within or without the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently the Republic of Turkey. Turan, on

the other hand, was a far rather broader concept, including Finns and Hungarians (Landau, 1995, pp.1-2).

The Republic of Turkey endeavored to stay out of World War II. However, when it seemed that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union; a resurgence of the Pan-Turkist propaganda was witnessed. In that sense, a Pan-Turkist committee was founded in July 1941 with German encouragement. Nonetheless, the German defeat was considered possible in May 1944. Because of this, the Turkish government suppressed the pan-Turkist organizations and propaganda (Zürcher 2005, p.205)

The nine lights of the Nationalist Action Party were proposed as nationalism, idealism, morality, social responsibility, scientific- mindedness, support for freedom, and support for the peasants, developmentalism and industrialization/technology (Zürcher 2005, p.257). As Türkeş stated in his book *9 Işık ve Türkiye,* the core of the Nine Lights Doctrine was the Turkish nation. It was proposed as a third option rather than communism or capitalism (Başkan, p.91).

It is obvious that the NAP was close to Turks and Sunnis rather than Kurds and Alevis. The NAP was considered as anti-communist, anti-Marxist and even anti-capitalist. It was searching for a third economic way based on Turkishness (Landau, 1995, p.1-2). It should be noted that the RPNP program emphasized a secular state in 1965. However, in the late 1960s, there were debates on Islam's place in the party's ideology. In that sense, Islamism was revealed as an integral part of the party's ideology in 1969. Moreover, the three crescent flag replaced the grey wolf emblem flag at the third MHP Congress in Adana. Also, Islamic principles were added in addition to a morality principle in 1972. (Poulton, p.156)

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which had been active since 1968. (pp.160-161) Turkish nationalists were disappointed in the 1980s in that they were seen as antagonists of the state just like the leftists. They were recognized for their past experiences when they behaved as a militant power of the holy state (Mete, pp.157-158).

The Hearths of the Enlightened, *Aydınlar Ocağı* was an influential organization founded on 14 May 1970. They considered humanism as the enemy of the national culture. The Hearth presented five groups of enemies: atheists, including materialists and communists; the Kurdish separatists; humanists and communists; other religious groups like the Christians; those responsible for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; and finally, the forward and governing intellectuals (Güvenç & Saylan, Poulton, pp.179-180). The leading ideologue of the *Aydınlar Ocağı* was Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kafesoğlu who formulated the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Turgut Özal and Korkut Özal were also members of the *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Poulton, p.180.) The Turkish-Islam synthesis explained that Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because there were a number of similarities between pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization. This thesis put a special emphasize on justice, monotheism, the immortal soul, family life and morality. A mission was created for the Turks -being the soldiers of Islam. (Zürcher, p.288)

It should be indicated that the Hearths of Enlightened supported the NAP. It opposed the policies of the RPP. Moreover, it influenced Demirel's National Front government. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was supported by the military government of the 1980s and also by the administration of Özal (Poulton, pp.180-185). It was clear that the army considered socialism and communism as the most dangerous enemies of Turkey. Therefore, Kenan Evren used Islam in his speeches. After 1983, this thesis became one of the guiding principles in Özal's Motherland Party (Zürcher. 2005, p.288)

Bora (2003) explained that liberal neo-nationalism was developed at the end of the 1980s due to the progress of the capitalization/modernization process in Turkey. Economic development and wealth were essential elements of this nationalism. Bora stated that the most important supporter of this discourse was the media which was associated with big capital. The economical dimensions of nationalism were apparent in this type of

nationalism. As a consumer culture was presumed to be the most important indicator of the rank of modern civilization, high culture began to be replaced by popular culture (pp.440-445)

It was mentioned that some kind of controlled secularism was apparent in the Republic of Turkey. This means that the private sphere of religious activities was controlled by the authorities of the state. Nilüfer Göle, being an esteemed expert, claimed that there had been a shift from authoritarian modernization to a more civil society-centered modernization. In that case, she stated that contemporary Islam was seen as a product of Turkish modernization rather than a return to past (Tank, p.14).

Çağlar Keyder mentioned that the 1980s and 1990s were a time of momentous change for Turkish society, when all the institutions, values and ideals of modernity had come under siege. He claimed that the focus of any modernity project should the society. In that sense, he maintained that a society needed to be constructed with the notions of freedom and citizenship. It was obvious that Islamic elements became rather visible in that era. Nilüfer Göle stated that the rise of Islam resulted from poverty, authoritarianism, and massive urbanization. She mentioned that the revival of the Islamic identity was seen. She warned that the oppressed could be emancipator only if it was not itself repressive (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997, pp.8-9).

It was stated that rightist politics had been the politics of the bourgeoisie. A liberal-conservative synthesis was led by Turgut Özal. This view was enhanced through a consensus of strengthened modernization, economic enrichment and religiosity and moreover, a collaboration of discourses and symbols of nationalist and conservative politics (Turan, İ., p.150).

Nuray Mert (1999) contended that there have been important differences among the conservative right and liberal right. She pointed out that liberal right has seen the society as a mosaic; although there have been differences among the elements of the society, and this was regarded as an enrichment of the society. It was stated that political problems could be solved with the recognition of different religious and ethnic identities within the society

(Turan, İ, p.154). In this context, it should be pointed out that the Turkish constitution of 1980 identified all inhabitants of the country as Turks, however, non-Muslims, especially Christians, were not viewed as Turks and they could not become army officers or diplomats (Çağaptay, 2006, p.1).

Dealing with the Kurdish issue, Kurds were regarded as a part of the Turkish nation, and the Kurdish problem was not declared officially in those years. Kurdish uprisings were seen as the actions of the terrorist group, the PKK. Moreover, it was considered as an economic and social protest. The solution that was presented was the suppression of the rebellions and acceleration of economic and social development and the consolidation of the democracy. (Kushner, 1997, p.224) Nonetheless, this situation began to change after the Iraq war of 1991. There were plans to acquire the lands of Northern Iraq. Moreover, Turgut Özal acknowledged his Kurdish identity. However, after the Gulf War, a Kurdish state was formed in Northern Iraq, and the Kurdish nationalist movement was strengthened in Turkey. These developments paved the way for the fundamentalist/essentialist factions to articulate their views. At this point, a military intervention was considered the sole solution of the issue, and democratization plans were abandoned (Bora, 2003, p.435).

The Sunni-Alevi tensions were witnessed during the 1990s. Alevis were mostly the supporters of the RPP. They had been supporting secularism and the principles of Atatürk. During that time, The Sivas Pir Sultan Abdal Festival was held and 36 people were burned by the crowd on 2 July 1993. Afterward, Alevis began to identify themselves religiously rather than politically, both in Turkey and in Europe. Many Alevi organizations were opened (Zürcher, 2005, p.291) However, it was revealed that the Sunni-Alevi tension was seen as an artificial problem and largely fanned by outside forces. Kushner stated that the insignificance of the religious divisions was stressed, and, in that sense, the distinction between the sects was not recognized officially. President Süleyman Demirel articulated on 18 May 1992 in Budapest that their conceptualization of nation and nationalism was based on the principles of a common destiny, constitutional patriotism and civic identity. Moreover, Tansu Çiller indicated on 20 July 1993 that the concept of a nation in Turkey was based on a combination of joint values, joint political beliefs and a joint future. (Kushner, 1997, p.225)

The French Prime Minister insisted that Turkey needed to find a political solution to its Kurdish question during his 1995 visit to Turkey. Demirel severely replied to the French president that the Europeans sought to separate the southern provinces from Turkey. This official rhetoric was widely accepted and it was recognized that there were European demands pertaining to the Kurdish issues (Uslu, p.77).

Turkish national identity and national aspirations were affected by the opening of the Turkish world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In that sense, they gained confidence by stating that there had always been a Turkish world stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia (Kushner, 1997, p.226). Moreover, capital accumulation occurred with the new right-wing economic policies in the 1980s. In that sense, at the end of 1980s, Turkey applied for full membership in the EU (Bora, 2003, p.434).

Fethullah Gülen's Nurcu movement grew during the early 1990s. They built many elementary schools, high schools and even universities. They sought to combine Western technology with Islamic morals. Gülen's relations with the Welfare Party were strained when he supported the 28 February process. (Zürcher, p.291) He was also declared as the main theorist of Turkish Islam. In that sense, his schools have been major forces in teaching the Turkish language, Turkish culture and Turkish Islam throughout the world. In that sense, his movement could be considered as one of the branches of Turkish nationalism.

The connection between the mafia and state was one of the main issues of the 1980s and 1990s. Zürcher claimed that there were two groups of mafia; Turkish and Kurdish. The Kurdish mafia supported the PKK. The other group was called the idealists, *ülkücüler*. It was maintained the idealists were used against Kurds by the state. (Zürcher, p.322)

As it was stated in the Turkish preface which written by Özdoğan and Ersanlı for the second edition of Gellner's Nation and Nationalism, in the 1970s, the emergence of regional nationalisms began to be seen in western Europe. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought about a new wave of nationalisms. It was apparently seen that

nationalisms were revolting against nation-states. Many groups within nation-states began to question the establishments of their own nation-states. Moreover, there had been a tendency of subcultural identity groups to try to acquire more rights in the public sphere. Also, globalization had shaken the sacred position of nation-states. In addition, implementation of Gellner's doctrine of "one culture, one state" also strengthened the statist (etaist) nationalism. Religion has often been used to strengthen nationalist tendencies (Özdoğan & Ersanlı, 2006, p.11).

Tanıl Bora (2003) maintained that Turkish nationalism gained momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Globalization incited and encouraged nationalism. The biparty system collapsed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the borders of the old world changed. Newly independent states came onto the scene, and ethnic rivalries were witnessed. Bora stated that globalization challenged the nation-state. It was an obvious fact that the Kurdish issue played a leading role in this perception (p.434).

In Turkey, nationalism had been affected by many elements such as globalization, the issues related to Armenians, the Kurds, Christians, the EU, the US and Iran (Özdoğan, pp.14-15). Considering the religious ties within Turkish society it was stated that there had not been a longstanding and perpetual definition of "other and others" within Turkish society. As a result of this, Turkish nationalism was regarded as anti-racist (Mete, 2007, pp.21-22), although this situation could not be applied to general Turkish political history. It was proposed that *Ümmetçilik,* the ideology of common religious community could solve the problem of division and aid with the dissolution problems. An international system was designated for the development and changing nature of nationalism. In that sense, the 1990s (especially the last years of the 1990s) could be considered as an important turning point for our investigation.

The discourses of both Erbakan and Erdogan during the 1990s revealed that they were considering the democracy as a means, not as an aim. Democracy was seen as a means to establish "*Asr-ı Saadet*", the age of happiness. Ruşen Çakır stated that the Welfare Party (the WP) was defined as both pro-sharia and democratic in its own way. Secularism was

defined by the WP as the freedom of religion but not by the separation of religion and state (Hale & Özbudun, p.7).

Aktar (2006) stated that Kurdish movements resulted in many deaths and 40 Turkish diplomats were killed by Armenian terrorists during the 1980s. Aktar stated that, considering these events, there were some themes that needed to be expressed. Firstly, there were threats against the unity and solidarity of the country. It is a striking fact that the Sevres Treaty was always on the agenda. Secondly, it is proposed that the innocent Turkish nation was under threats coming from internal and external entities. Thirdly, it is alleged that the Turkish nation had been suppressed, and had been hard done by throughout history (p.46).

Tanıl Bora (2003) summarized that there were two dynamics in Turkish nationalism in 1990s. One of them was a reactionary movement that gave importance to national survival. It is important to note that this movement was influential among right-wing and center-left-wing politics. Moreover, it was strongly supported by the state elites and the army. The second nationalist movement was a pro-Western nationalist movement that advocated a globalization process. Bora (2003) proposed that this movement was supported by the new urban middle class, the internationalizing sectors of big capital, and the media elite. As Bora stated, there were four main Turkish nationalist dialogues in that era. One was the language of the official Kemalist nationalism that aimed to build and perpetuate the nation-state. The second one was seen as the dialect of the root language, left-wing Kemalist nationalism called *ulusçuluk* in Turkish. The third one was the liberal dialect of Kemalist root-language, a pro-western nationalism supporting civilization and prosperity. The fourth one was a deviate dialect of the Kemalist root-language, the language of a racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism (Bora, 2003, pp. 436-437).

The Kemalist nationalism of the 1990s, *ulusçuluk*, contributed secularism to its discourse. It was apparent that its anti-globalistic discourse strongly emphasized anti-imperialism and independence again (Bora, 2003, pp.438-440). It was claimed that many variations of nationalism have been seen in Turkey, including Kemalist nationalism, Turkism, Turkish-Islam synthesis, and conservationist Islamist nationalism (Özdoğan, p.12).

Bora (2003) stated the neo-Kemalism of the 1990s constituted a reaction against the neo-right-wing hegemony and Islamist movement. It is important to note that neo-Kemalists criticized the activities of the right-wing governments and contended that Kemalism had become watered down. The right-wing government put its people in permanent governmental positions after the 1980 military intervention (pp.438-439). Therefore, Atatürk nationalism accompanied by a Turkish-Islam synthesis was no longer deemed an official language.

After the Cold War, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The Turkish Republics became independent. As Fukuyama said, it was the end of history. Therefore, anti-communism was dropped from the agenda of the NAP. The NAP had used Islam as a component of Turkish nationalism since the 1960s. Moreover, Islamic tendencies were strengthened in the ideology of the party in the 1980s with the help of the resurgence of Islam and the adoption a Turkish-Islam synthesis by the military, and this doctrine was pursued by NATO. The Islamic wing of the NAP left the party in 1993 and the Grand Unity Party, *Büyük Birlik Partisi,* was founded. Başkan claimed that the NAP softened the Islamic tone of its ideology during the post-1990 period. It was stated that the NAP was critical of Islamist political parties for using religion for political parties and the NAP tried to separate itself from the Islamic-oriented parties (Başkan, pp.92-93).

It was alleged that after the recognition of Turkey's candidate status by the EU in 1999, the reconciliation of the state-centrism and Westernism of the Kemalism became rather difficult. It is apparent the state was obliged to pursue liberal policies (Çınar, 2006, web p.3).

Second Republicanism movement came to scene in 1990s. It based on a liberal democratic ideology. The main aim of this second republican movement has been the removal of the bureaucratic structure of the state, limitation of state's power on economic affairs, transparency, and obstruction of military's role on politics. Mehmet Altan (2004, November 8) distinguished the notions of democracy and republicanism. He stated that second republicanism was proposed to democratize the republic. In this context, accession

to the EU should be realized; Turkey should have adopted the EU standards. He also stated that Turkey should be industrialized to be a democratic and wealthy country. Second Republicans were close to problems of Kurds and religious people. They openly argued about their rights within the Republic of Turkey. Nonetheless, the PKK and the political Islam strengthened. Afterwards, 28 February process began and old elites, military-civil bureaucracy gained power again. It should be noted that popular nationalism revealed itself in celebration of national ceremonies, crescent-star clothes and jewelries, and flags. This popular nationalism of late 1990s was based liberal, civil and European views. They rejected statism; they demanded liberal and civilized state. The Republic of Turkey should have been the member of the EU. The popular nationalists were also called as Euro-Turks. Gürpınar maintained that neo-nationalism *ulusalcılık* was a reaction to popular or liberal nationalism of 1990s (Gürpınar, pp.49-82).

The chief editor of nationalist *Ortadoğu* newspaper, the media organ of the NAP, Arslan Bulut reported to Doğu Perinçek. Afterwards, Atilla İlhan and Arslan Bulut met in *Divan Pastanesi* in 1997. In sum, they tried to find their common points and some kind of cooperation flourished. The term *ulusalcılık* was begun to be used in the middle of 1990s. (Gürpınar, pp.43, 47) This integrity of leftists and rightists was called as "Red Apple Coalition", *Kızılelma Koalisyonu.* Leftist intellectuals as Mümtaz Soysal, Erol Manisalı, Atilla İlhan contributed this process and the coalition began to be converted to an ideology. The Workers Party, *İşçi Partisi,* supported the process (p.99).

It is important to note that re-Turkification was evident in the 1990s. The main indicator of this development was the revival of the Pan-Turanist/Turkist literature that had become marginalized since the middle of the 1990s. Moreover, a reduction of Islamist discourses in the nationalist field was evident. It was obvious that member of the Islamic movement had the upper positions and they became the rivals of the NAP in the Turkish Republics of Central Asia. The NAP supported the 28 February process which reinforced the secular tendency of the NAP. The NAP adopted Atatürk as the greatest Turkish nationalist and as a Turkist. Türkeş articulated that at modernization of the image of the party was needed. It is important to note that Bahçeli restored a relatively moderate image and as a result, the party was very successful in the 1999 elections. However, the NAP failed, according to its

constituencies during the coalitional governance. The critical issues were the headscarf issue and the execution of Öcalan. Moreover, they behaved like a supra-party. Nonetheless, they believed that the EU would undermine the foundations of the nation-state and they voted against the EU harmonization laws in parliament. (Bora, 2003, pp.445-448)

Başkan stated that the 1999 general elections confirmed that the aim of the NAP was to become a "catchall party". It was alleged that the rural population of central and eastern Anatolia and low-income settlers of the big cities gave their votes to the NAP in the 1999 general elections. Başkan concluded that the losers of the globalization process supported the NAP. However, nationalists withdrew their support, especially after the postponement of Öcalan's death sentence. Moreover, "headscarf issue" could not have been solved by the NAP. Furthermore, collaboration with the IMF disappointed the followers of the party. Lastly, the success of the JDP as a new party contributed to the failure of the NAP in 2002 elections (Başkan, pp.87-90). Bulut mentioned that the 2001 economic crisis revealed weakness of the Turkish state and moreover crystallized the symbolic elimination of enemy figures. Therefore, Bulut summarized, the nationalist demobilization was considered (Bulut, 2006, p.134).

It should also be noted that Turkish modern Islamist intellectuals criticized both the nation-state and nationalism. It was believed that the Muslim community stood above the nation. It is obvious that the nostalgia for the Ottoman past became a widespread dream. In this context, an anti-Western xenophobia was the common indicator of Turkist nationalism and Islamism. Moreover, this faction advocated progressivism-developmentalism (Bora, 2003, p.449).

# 7. The Classification of Turkish Nationalism with respect to Turkish political parties in 2002-2007

Turkish nationalism has been represented by the Republican People's Party (the RPP) and the Nationalist Action Party (the NAP). The NAP has been a hierarchically organized party; it gives supremacy to the state over the individual. The NAP's ideology has been Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism of the NAP has been conservative, and the NAP has supported traditional and Islamic values. The NAP identifies itself as assigned to protect the survival of the state. The RPP, on the other hand, identifies itself as Atatürk's party, follower and protector of the principles of Atatürk. It is noted that one of Atatürk's principles has been nationalism; therefore, the RPP has been the representative of Kemalist nationalism. The main aim of the party is to protect the secular, democratic Republic. The neo-nationalist movements were very influential between the years 2002 and 2007.

The Justice and Development Party (the JDP), was presented as conservative globalist party, whereas the RPP and the NAP were considered as defensive nationalist parties. Both the RPP and the NAP have had negative attitudes towards globalization. It should be noted that both the RPP and the NAP built their policies on threats and fears coming from abroad and also from certain groups of the society. The JDP aimed to provide accession to the EU, and there has been an apparent tendency to integrate into the global markets. It has been stated that the JDP has been trying to implement democratization. In addition, the JDP also supports traditional values. It is obvious that the economic growth of the country contributed to the electoral success of the JDP (Öniş, 2009, pp.22-25, 36).

It is important to note that the JDP was identified as the representative of Anatolia. The ideology of the JDP was based on conservatism and Islamism. Indeed, Islamists had been giving greater importance to internationalism. However, this internationalist approach has compromised the understanding of the religious community, the *ummah*. Strikingly, the JDP implemented policies designed to unite Islamic countries, being the reminicentof the Ottoman Empire under the flag of Turkey (Şen, 2010, p.63).

Turkish nationalism needed antagonistic forces to become powerful and influential. It was maintained that the Kurdish issue, the Armenian genocide issue, the issues pertaining to Cyprus and Kirkuk, and the minorities living in Turkey, Islamist activities, reaction against globalization process, antagonism against the US and the EU were considered as significant issues that were on the top of the agenda of Turkish nationalism of that era.

Most importantly, until the winter of 2006, the Kurdish issue was frozen, and PKK terrorist attacks were stopped with the PKK's ceasefire. This situation continued until the spring of 2007, and afterwards, the Kurdish Regional Government (the KRG) in Iraq provided safe haven for the PKK terrorists across the Turkish-Iraqi border. Therefore, suspicions were aroused about the intentions of the KRG and the US and its allies. The Kurdish issue was considered as an artificially created problem, supported by foreign powers such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, Armenia, the US and the EU. As a result, anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism emerged because it was supposed they were helping the PKK. In this context, the US and the EU were considered as antagonistic elements for the unity and the solidarity of the Republic of Turkey. It became apparent that the PKK used American weapons in the fall of 2007. Referring to the National Pact of 1920, there has always been a tendency to acquire or to control Mosul and Kirkuk as witnessed in Özal's era, and during the 1991 Iraqi war, and when Turkish concerns were aroused during the 2003 Iraq war (Uslu, 2008, pp.77-81).

The main dimensions of Turkish nationalism of that era could be defined by considering relations with the US, the accession process to the EU, new developments in Iraq, the Annan plan for Cyprus and the Republican meetings. Dealing with the Iraq War, it was alleged by many foreign policy experts that the absence of Turkish troops in Iraq diminished the power of Turkey influencing the new developments. Consequently, the refusal of the vote by the Turkish Parliament on 1 March 2003 aiming to allow US troops the use of Turkish territory for their invasion of Iraq eroded the relations between the US and Turkey. It is a striking fact that Iraqi Kurds became a rather important ally of the US. It is obvious that the inciting event was considered as disgraceful and a national insult coming from a traditional ally. US soldiers arrested 11 Turkish Special Forces officers in the northern Iraq city of *Süleymaniye.* It was alleged that Turkish soldiers were suspected

of planning the assassination of a local Kurdish politician. Most importantly, there was a widespread belief among the Turkish people that the US tried to partition Iraq and moreover, that it aimed to establish an independent Kurdish state in the north of the country (Grigoriadis, 2010, pp.56-58).

Evaluating the previous events, the US initiated a green crescent doctrine in the 1980s to contain communism with Islamism. Afterwards, the US tried to implement "moderate Islam" in the 1990s and lastly, it introduced the "Greater Middle East" project. As a result, there has been widespread belief that the US had been trying to abolish the secular state structure of Turkey. In this context, the JDP was considered being a tool of the US, in accomplishment of this goal (Gürpınar, 2011, p.196). It was known that Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the US officials before they came to power and they met with the Jewish lobbies. Therefore, their governance was initially approved by the neo-cons (Uzgel, 2009, p.20). The Greater Middle East Project aimed to establish democratic states in the Middle East with the help of Turkey and this was declared during the G-8 summit in June 2004 (Yeşilyurt & Akdevelioğlu, 2009, p.389). During and after the Iraq war, the JDP demanded US assistance to help eliminate the PKK threat. The US was not willing to take military action against the PKK or let Turkey carry out a unilateral military strike against the PKK (Rabasa, p.82). Thereafter, anti-Americanism gained momentum among the Turkish public.

Dealing with Republican rallies, firstly, the neo-nationalism, *ulusalcılık* should be explained. This neo-nationalist movement comprised many different thoughts; it was not organized with an established doctrine. Uslu summarized the fundamental elements of neo-nationalism as anti-Westernism, externalization of Islam from Turkish nationalism, and ethnic exclusionism. It is a striking fact that the Sevres Complex was apparently seen in the views of neo-nationalism and that there have been four Sevres related issues: the Kurds, the Armenian genocide, Cyprus and the Kirkuk (Uslu, p.76). The neo-nationalist, *ulusalcı* manifesto is based on a common theme:  that Turkey is for the Turks. The manifesto also maintains that Turkish natural resources must belong to the citizens of Turkey, not to foreign capitalists. Moreover, neo-nationalists consider globalization as a harmful process. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the neo-nationalists considered the JDP as the

serious threat to Turkish secularism. (Uslu, pp.83-84) There was widespread suspicion that the US, by having good relations with the Kurdish Regional Government, backed an independent Kurdish state in Iraq and also used the PKK for its own strategic aims. The neo-nationalist *Yeniçağ* newspaper harshly criticized Erdoğan for not invading Northern Iraq (Yeniçağ, 7 November 2007, cited in Uslu, p.86) Also, Erdoğan's support to the Greater Middle East project was considered as a type of approval of Kurdish independence (Uslu, p.86).

General Özkök criticized the EU in his speech delivered at the War Academy in Istanbul on 20 April 2005 and stated that the EU had advocated the democratic rights and human rights for Kurdish people. Moreover, the EU proposed that these rights should be recognized and included in the constitution. Özkök maintained that all these developments targeted the unitary structure of the Republic of Turkey. He mentioned that "…we should not let those who wish to destroy our unity deceive us."(Patton, 2006, p.45). It should be noted that the *Şemdinli* affair was a complex issue that it is related to the deep state of Turkey. However, this issue could not be enlightened properly at that time. Therefore, it could be stated that the military was still more powerful than the government at that time.

Uslu indicated that there were many activist organizations that identified themselves as *ulusalcı:* the Nationalist Forces Movement, *Kuvayi Milliye Hareketi*, Patriotic Forces United Movement, *Vatansever Kuvvetler Birliği,* (the VKGB), the Great Union of Jurists, *Büyük Hukuçular Birliği* led by Kemal Kerinçsiz, the Ataturkist Thought Association *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (the ADD) led by former gendarmerie commander Şener Eruygur, the Turkish Drivers and Automotive Owners Association, and the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions, *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Kurumu*(the DİSK). Dealing with the Turkish media, *Yeniçağ, TürkSolu, İleri, Yeni Hayat, Türkeli, and Aydınlık* were identified as supporting neo-nationalism. Moreover, Kanalturk and Mesaj TV channels were also deemed neo-nationalist TV channels. Uslu stated that DİSK and Turkish Labor Party aligned themselves with extreme nationalism. Uslu also indicated that *Cumhuriyet* was voicing nationalist themes. Emin Çölaşan, Melih Aşık and also a columnist of *Yeniçağ,* Rauf Denktaş, were considered *ulusalcı* columnists (Uslu, pp.86-90). The neo-nationalists condemned and sued Orhan Pamuk, Elif Şafak and Hrant Dink for their alleged

insults of Turkishness. This neo-nationalist, extreme right groups were criticizing the NAP for its alleged passivity and moderation. The NAP avoided being part of the "street politics" (Taşkın, 2008, p.131).

*Yeniçağ* newspaper was the forum for the right-wing extremism and the emergence of Turkish neo-nationalism. Taşkın stated that the majority of its authors claimed the continuity of Turkist wing of the NAP, and they disliked political Islam. Some authors were called *ulusalcılar,* because they stressed secularism. Taşkın stated only few of the authors stressed an ideological synthesis between Turkishness and Islam. They had anti-EU and anti-JDP tendencies. It was stated that some authors advocated the Red Apple Coalition, *Kızılelma Koalisyonu*, which was comprised of nationalists and neo-nationalists, *ulusalcı*. Therefore, *Yeniçağ* aimed to provide an ideological consensus among these groups. The Turkist authors came together around Prof. Dr. Ümit Özdağ, who was struggling against the NAP leadership (Taşkın, p.132).

Ümit Özdağ criticized in his column in *Yeniçağ,* on May 10, 1995, Bahçeli's metaphor; the Turkish identity of Anatolia is the flower garden. Moreover, he mentioned in *Yeniçağ*, on May 16, 2006, that Kurds and Zazas were inseparable parts of the Turkish nation while they did not try to separate themselves Turkish nations by using different historical and geographical factors. Özdağ supported the idea that the Turkish world could be an alternative to the EU. Özdağ also considered China as a threat; he suggested that a Turkish-Russian alliance could stop China (Taşkın, pp.138-142).

Importantly, the *Yeniçağ* columnists blamed neo-liberal economic policies, believing that these policies would harm the interests of small and medium sized Anatolian entrepreneurs who would clash with the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie of Istanbul (Taşkın, p.134). Yeniçağ and the other sources of the nationalist press criticized religious tolerance and the alliance of civilizations that were promoted either by the JDP or by the Gülen Community (Taşkın, p.144). They were both against the JDP and the economically and politically powerful tariqats, especially Gülen's movement.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this neo-nationalist, *ulusalcı* approach flourished in the middle of the 1990s. The support of the RPP made the main contribution (Gürpınar, p. 113). It should be summarized that the protesters were mobilized because they believed that there was an Islamic threat to their secular life. Moreover, the protesters advocated that the JDP government was too pro-Kurdish and was seeking to change the founding principles of the republic to accommodate Kurdish political demands. It was also alleged that the government was disloyal to Turkish identity and interests and served global forces. In sum, it is apparent the protesters were insisting that the JDP government was a threat to the Kemalist nation-state structure (Yavuz & Özcan, 2007, p.122).

The goals of neo-nationalists were revealed with phrases such as "free Turkey from imperialist occupation"; "ensure that local entrepreneurs work for national benefit, not for personal profit"; "establish a unitary state"; "create modern Turkish values and substitute them for the standards of Western civilization"; "free Turkey from international relationships that legalize colonialism"; "enforce laicism and create social equality". Therefore, neo-nationalists aimed to remove Erdoğan and the JDP from power. The presidential candidacy process severed the tension, and neo-nationalists harshly opposed Erdoğan's presidency. Abdullah Gül was nominated on 26 April 2007. However, General Yaşar Büyükanıt issued an ultimatum utilizing the internet. He expressed that "those who do not adhere to *ulusalci, neo-nationalist* principles are enemies of Turkey" (Uslu, pp.91-92).

Important rallies took place in the spring of 2007; they occurred in Ankara, Istanbul, Manisa, Çanakkale, İzmir and Samsun. These meetings were headed and organized by the Ataturkist Thought Organization. General Şener Eruygur, retired High Commander of Gendarme, was the head of this organization at that time. He as later accused of attempting a coup d'etat against the JDP. These rallies were held during the debates about presidential elections. There has been a widespread view that the wives of military officers were not permitted to wear headscarves, because if they did so, their husbands would be discharged from the army. It was voiced by some that, as a rule, the president, being the commander in chief of the army, should obey this rule. However, initially, this was not explained openly by Büyükanıt (Kökütürk, 2007, p.95).

It was apparent that both President Sezer and Büyükanıt warned the government about growing Islamic fundamentalism. Büyükanıt warned the government with an e-memorandum, on 27 Nisan 2007. He stated that some spheres of society had increased their activities in order to erode the secularism and the other values of the Republic of Turkey. He harshly criticized the educational system which was being religiously infiltrated. Moreover, Büyükanıt overtly stated in his press statement written in official web site of the Turkish Armed Forces on April 27, 2007 that the Turkish Armed Forces would be a definite protector of secularism. He stated that the TSK would oppose any negative activity related to this issue. He announced that the person who opposed the saying "How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk", "*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene*" was an enemy of the Turkish Republic.

The newspapers *Zaman, Vakit, Bugün, Sabah, Şafak, Star* condemned the Turkish Armed Forces due to the e-memorandum, and both Kanal D and the CNNTURK channels stated that the army would not intervene (Kökütürk, p.298).

 Sezer gave a speech in Turkish War College Command on April 13, 2007 that the secular Turkish state was threatened by both internal and external powers. He added that the essential values of secular republic were open to debate. He mentioned that external powers were demanding the revision of the secular republic to a democratic republic. Sezer explained that the "democratic republic" rhetoric was a cover, and he emphasized that it was moderate Islam. He pointed out that moderate Islam could be a progressive model for other Muslim states. However, this moderate Islam was a reactionary force against Turkey. He explained that bringing the religious state, the theocracy, side by side with democracy could conflict with history and science. He presented the view that moderate Islam could easily be converted into radical Islam (Kökütürk, pp.111-112)

Sezer mentioned in the Turkish War College that he was against privatization policies of the globalized system. He claimed that Turkey had not fully entered this globalized system. He alleged that this had been caused by the Ataturkist structure; institutions of the republic gave importance to national interests. He mentioned that after the Turkish Armed Forces were criticized they became the target of internal and external powers. He was against the

wearing of headscarves in the public sphere. Sezer opposed using graduates of *İmam-Hatip* schools to fill every rank of the institutions of the state. He mentioned that secularism was not defined as the freedom of religion and freedom of faith. According to the 24th Article of the Constitution, religious rules could only apply to personal lives. Sezer pointed out that the threat of reactionary forces was causing anxiety. Sezer criticized the monopolistic media. He mentioned that by losing its sense of responsibility, it could jeopardize both social life and national security. Sezer stated that the essence, principles and values of Turkish Republic were based on Atatürkism (Kökütürk, pp.100-123).

The first protest which was held in Ankara was organized against the presidential candidacy of Erdogan. The rallies continued after the declaration of the candidacy of Gül on 26 April 2007. It is important to mention the slogans of these rallies: "Turkey is secular and will remain secular" was the most popular one. "We do not want an imam as a president" was the other famous slogan. In the Istanbul rally, the famous slogan was that "we demand neither sharia nor a coup, but a totally independent Turkey". It should be noted that the other important slogan was "neither the EU, nor the US, but a fully independent Turkey" (Güler A.,2007, in Kökütürk, pp.301-306).

The Istanbul Çağlayan Rally was held on 29 April 2007. The Association in Support of Contemporary Living, *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Vakfı* and Association of Republic's Women *Cumhuriyet Kadınlar Derneği*, organized the Çağlayan rally. Tuncay Özkan, founder of TV Channel Kanalturk, opposed the policies of the JDP. His channel was broadcasting views opposing the JDP government. During the Istanbul rally, he displayed some of the speeches of Erdoğan with a slide show. Erdoğan indicated in 1993 that one could not be secular and a Muslim at the same time. After that, Erdoğan stated in 1997 that democracy would be the tool, not the goal. Moreover, he mentioned in 2000 that "esteemed" Öcalan was paying the price for the heads he had taken, not for his ideas. His usage of esteemed, *"sayın"* was criticized severely. Furthermore, in dealing with the Kurdish problem, he took further steps and in 2005, he stated that "the thing that unites us is the upper identity". Erdoğan's remark in 2006 towards an unemployed and complaining person was rather rude. He angrily shouted at him to "…go and take your mother with

you…" Furthermore, he defined the Republic protests as "embarked forces of 81 provinces."(KanalTurk, 29 April 2007).

Şener Eruygur stated during Tandoğan meeting held on April 14, 2007, that they were trying to take over the presidential office. He added that debates over identity were seen. He alleged that the plans of globalists such as division and fragmentation of nation-states were presented as the tools of civilization. He alleged that there were debates on the Lausanne Treaty and new minorities were being created. He defined the accession to the EU as a vain hope and in order to achieve this, they were trying to break down the secular Turkish Republic (Kökütürk, pp.136-138).

Nur Serter identified the participants as *ulusalcı*, nationalist, Atatürkist, and patriotic. She added that they wanted a president who would not obey the politics of the EU or surrender to imperialism. She stated that they wanted a president who would protect the nation-state. Moreover, she declared that they could voice Atatürk's aphorism proudly *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene"*, "How fortunate he who calls himself a Turk". She claimed that anyone who feared declaring this sentence should not become the president (Kökütürk, pp.140-141).

The organizers of these meetings were against the sale of national factories, banks, privatization, accession to the EU, non-governmental organizations; especially those headed by George Soros, the rhetoric of "we are all Armenians", "Hepimiz Ermeniyiz", and moderate Islam. These views were articulated by Alparslan Işıklı and Birgül Ayman Güler during the Tandoğan rally. The head of the Organization Committee of Tandoğan Republic Protest, Prof. Dr. Ali Ercan, declared in his speech on 4 April 2007 that all of our national resources were being exploited, there was mass unemployment, corruption of language, different implementations of education, and that interventionist approaches towards the independence of justice were being clearly observed. He added that the essential values of our republic were being destroyed by the factions using democracy as a cover. He claimed that the president representing national unity and solidarity should internalize the fundamental values of the Republic. He stated that this meeting must be arranged for the indivisible unity of our nation, and for the democratic, secular, social,

constitutionality and full independence of Turkey. He added that this meeting was held to obstruct political religious reaction, *irtica*. He articulated that they wanted to advocate the institutions and gains of the Republic (Kökütürk, pp.69-70).

It is important to note that the Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt declared that any political discourse ascribed to the ethnic structure would lead to ethnic nationalism and this would turn into terrorism. Büyükanıt stated that Atatürk defined the term "Turk" as people who founded the Republic. He mentioned that the constitution of Turkey was based on Turkish citizenship, not on race. He added that there had been important differences between Turkish nationalism and Western Nationalism. He stated that English nationalism included national racism and xenophobia. Büyükanıt emphasized the anti-racist character of Turkish nationalism. He noted that the president of Turkey should internalize the essential values of the republic and secular and democratic structure of the social constitutional rule, "he should be loyal to these values, not of words, but of deeds", "sözde değil özde bağlı olmalı" Moreover, he mentioned that you could not separate the PKK from Northern Iraq or Northern Iraq from the rest of Iraq. These places all had organic ties (Büyükanıt, 2007, April 12, in Kökütürk, pp.75-98).

The *Kızılelma* coalition, including leftists, fascists and neo-nationalists was accused of opposing Armenians, Kurds, and Islamists. It was alleged that they were given an upper hand for the integrity of the state. Democracy, equality and peace were undermined. Moreover, it was claimed that the internationalist aims of the leftist ideology had been discarded for the sake of raison d'etat. According to Murat Belge (2006), nationalist aggression was observed (Günçıkan, 2006, p.ix). He believed that the real leftist ideology had not been on the agenda since the emergence of the nation-state in Turkey (p.9).

In conclusion, the neo-nationalist expectations failed; the JDP increased its vote by 13% in the 2007 elections. Gül's presidency, police operations on neo-nationalist undergrounds and the Ergenokon trials resulted in a serious decrease in the power of neo-nationalism (Uslu, p.92; Gürpınar, p.10).

## 7.1 The Republican People's Party and Turkish Nationalism

It could be mentioned that the Turkish left had grown up with the seeds of Turkish nationalism. It is apparent that there has been a close link between the Turkish left, the Turkish state and the military (Belge, 2009, p.7). It is apparent that Kemalist nationalism, *Kemalist ulusçuluk,* was identified with anti-imperialism and national independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The main dimension of Kemalist nationalism has been secularism since the 1990s. In this context, it has opposed political Islam and it has had antagonistic attitudes towards minorities living Turkey (Bora, 1995, p.7).

Baykal stated that on 30 June 2001 that "all the citizens of Turkey living in the east, in the south east, in the north, are all one and we are brothers". He proposed that they could solve the problems of the Kurdish people by integrating them, not by separating them. The essential elements of the RPP ideology have been national independence, a nation-state, secular republican values, and the principles of Atatürk. The RPP supports the universal principle of social democracy; an organized, productive and competitive market economy; a social state; and an honorable foreign policy (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention Party Assembly Report, 2003, October 24).

The RPP maintained that the three fundamental elements of the republic are the understanding of citizenship, secularism and the principle of "peace at home, peace abroad". The RPP pointed out that the Lausanne Treaty should be protected. The unitary state structure was irrevocable. The Turkish republic was founded on the unitary state and the nation-state. The RPP maintained that the definition of nation in Turkey was never based on racism. There has been a respectable place for every person regardless of ethnic origins. The RPP referred to Cherkess, Georgians, Arabs, and Albanians and stated they belonged within the Ataturkist nationalism. Briefly, the RPP stated that those who internalized Turkish citizenship and accepted it voluntarily, whatever their sub-ethnic identity, whether Kurd or another ethnicity, are all Turks. They are all equal before the law. There should not be any ethnic or sectarian identification between the state and the citizen. Every person should be able to live his ethnic identity freely. However, ethnic identity could not be converted into a constitutive part of Turkey's political structure.

Moreover, the RPP report maintained that Turkey should not be surrendered to tariqats, and Turkey should not be transformed into a moderate Islamic Republic (The RPP's 31st RPP Regular Convention Party Assembly Report, 2005, November 19-20).

The RPP condemned the JDP motivated people who were insensitive to secular republican values. The RPP warned that the armed forces should be excluded from political debates. Most importantly, the RPP maintains that democracy is based on citizenship that is not the captive of theocratic thought. Insofar as the RPP's definition of citizen, this citizen does not assume himself to be part of a tribe, a community, a faith group, or a subgroup of faith group. The RPP pointed out that democracy and republicanism were not the rivals of each other. The report defined Kemalism including its six arrows, as an enlightenment project aiming for modernization and a secular republic. It was also stated, "Turkey is not a republic of religion or race, and it is a republic of consciousness." Moreover, it was indicated that Turkey is a nation-state, but this was not an obstacle to respecting any citizen's identity, ethnic origin, or language. It was mentioned that "we are all the individuals of the same nation; we are citizens of the same state" (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention Report, 2003, October 24).

The RPP gave importance to the negative effects of globalization, which was beneficial for the club of the rich The RPP maintained that it is mistaken to think that globalization would terminate the understanding of national identity. In that sense, it was stated that the globalization process was not an obstacle to proudly living with one's own nationality and identity. Moreover, it was mentioned that this process was not an obstacle to one's patriotism, protection of his country's rights or obedience to his country's national laws (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention Report, 2003, October 24).

The RPP Election declaration of 2002 was called a "we will see nice days". The RPP declared that they owned Atatürk's "Turkey model". This model was proposed as a secular, democratic Turkey model. It aimed to utilize the human power of Turkey, its production potential, and its rich natural resources. This declaration cited the advantages of the strategic geopolitical location of Turkey. In this respect, it was expressed that this location would be used for the well-being of all of the citizens. The "Turkey model" aimed

to provide a transparent, efficient and democratic state structure. This model would be sensitive to both labor and the environment. It also aimed to establish an organized, productive and competitive modern market economy. Moreover, the RPP aimed to establish a social state based on the rule of law. It was stated that Turkey would be an energy bridge across Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the RPP aimed to enhance the contribution of Turkish natural resources to the economy.

The RPP maintained that the Turkey model could be constructed with the leadership of Atatürk, and moreover, could only be realized with the RPP. In this context, the RPP assumed that Turkey could be a model for all countries from the Atlantic Ocean to China. It was stated that Turkey harmonized Islam, the secular state, a plural democracy, and the West. In this context, Turkey, by applying the EU standards, would realize its mission as a cultural and reconciliatory bridge between the two civilizations. The RPP stated that the main problem was terrorism. It was mentioned that Atatürk's foreign principle of "peace at home and peace abroad" could be realized with the help of NATO. The RPP would contribute to the protection of the acquired rights of the Cyprus Turkish people. Moreover, the RPP would help with the assurance of perpetual peace between the two communities of Cyprus. It was proposed that the Balkans, the North Africa, Caucasus and the Middle East would be within the areas of influence of our foreign policy and economic cooperation. The RPP maintained that they would contribute to stronger economic and cultural cooperation with the Central Asian Turkish Republics. Moreover, it was declared that the RPP would support the independence of both Israel and Palestine and their peaceful coexistence (The RPP's 2002 Election Declaration). The RPP supported the right of Israel to live peacefully and the party advised all the terrorist activities against the state of Israel and people of Israel should be stopped (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention report, 2003, October 24, pp.73-74).

The main target of the RPP was entrance into the EU. It was maintained that Turkey should participate in the EU while preserving its identity, values, and honor. The RPP would ensure the application of the harmonization laws and they would be careful about the European army and would protect the rights of Turkey. The RPP mentioned that the

national interests of Turkey would be protected with a multi-dimensional foreign policy. The RPP would also support the BSEC and the relations with Turkish Republics Moreover, the party claimed to protect the rights of Turkish citizens living abroad (The RPP's 2002 Election Declaration).

The RPP was enthusiastic about the EU's decision to begin accession negotiations at its December 2004 summit, as this was considered as the ultimate goal of the Ataturk's westernization program. It is important to note that the legislative reforms required meeting the EU's Copenhagen criteria recognized the linguistic and cultural rights for Kurdish people and reduced the power and the influence of the army. Although some articles were contrary to the unitary character of the state and weakened the position of the army, the RPP supported these legislative reforms (Uslu, p.75).

The RPP condemned the JDP's policies as being too submissive. The RPP indicated that the negotiation process should not be open-ended. Moreover, the RPP demanded that the same conditions implemented by other candidate states should also be implemented in Turkey. The RPP opposed limitations on freedom of movement, and agricultural subsidies. Moreover, the RPP opposed the privileged partnerships, and preconditions related to Cyprus (The RPP's 31st RPP Regular Convention Party Assembly Report, pp.86-100).

Deniz Baykal stated that nationalism was the cement that holds all of them together (Takvim, 31 January 2006, cited in Uslu, p.75). Baykal criticized sending Turkish troops to Lebanon and stated that this deployment would serve Israel and the US's interests more than Turkey's. Baykal demanded that Turkish troops be used against the PKK (Radikal, 18 August 2006, cited in Uslu, p.75).

## 7.1.1 The Republican People's Party and Developments in Iraq

It was stated that a US delegation offered Turkey a deal that would have permitted Turkish troops to be deployed in northern Iraq to counter the PKK terrorist activities, but without the right to use weapons except in self-defense (Uslu, p.78). The 1 March 2003 incident

has been seen as significant to examine the tendencies of Turkish political parties towards the US, Iraq, Kurdish terrorism and insurgency. The Turkish Parliament voted down the Turkish government's note to deploy American troops in Turkey and open a northern front into Iraq on 1 March 2003. As Soli Özel stated, the United States requested the use of Turkish airbases near Istanbul and the Black Sea, permission to deploy 80,000 to 90,000 American troops on Turkish territory en route to Iraq, permission to station 250 planes at Turkish airports, and the use of 14 airports and five seaports. It is important to stress that in return, the United States would establish a 20-kilometer security zone in northern Iraq. The striking fact was that up to 50,000 Turkish troops would go into this zone, some 30,000 of whom would be under the U.S. operational command. In addition to this, it was stated that the United States also promised it would not allow the Kurdish political parties in Northern Iraq to send their forces to Kirkuk. Moreover, Turkey was also promised to receive $6 billion in grants or $24 billion in long term loans. It is important to mention that before parliamentary voting, the Turkish government had approved of U.S. technical personnel upgrading several bases and sending men, vehicles and material to the port of Iskenderun (Soli, 2004, cited in Kaya, 2011, p.70).

The first official talks between the US and Turkish governments were held before the government of the JDP came to power. In that sense, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, President George W. Bush and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held talks. Indeed, Ecevit was suffering from poor health. In light of this, there were calls for early general elections. In addition, many talks were held between the authorities of the United States and Turkey during the fall of 2002 in which they discussed war plans. Nevertheless, The Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory on 3 November 2002. At that time, it could be stated that the JDP was inexperienced in domestic and international politics. Considering the ideology of the JDP, it was to be expected that it seemed hard for it to get involved in large-scale military operations against Iraq, a Muslim country. There were two decrees; the first decree would be related to the arrival of American military personnel on Turkish soil for the proposed modernization effort, and the second decree would be related to the deployment of military units in Turkey. The first part of the US request for the upgrading of the military infrastructure was approved. The second part of

the U.S. request for the landing of U.S. combat forces en route to Iraq and deployment of their support units on Turkish soil was not approved (Kaya, pp.69-74).

The opposition party, the RPP, opposed the deployment of American troops into northern Iraq but supported the unilateral deployment of Turkish troops to the same area (Kaya, p.73). Önder Sav gave a speech in parliament on 1 March 2003. He warned the JDP government that if a single Turkish soldier was killed; neither they nor the constituents would forgive the government. He mentioned a slogan that said "do not fear from the US, but fear God". Erdoğan stated that they had found the Iraq issue on their agenda when they came to power. Sav condemned the JDP and said that they fed the Iraq issue with the US's baby food. He stressed that international legitimacy for the Iraq war should have been implemented through the UN Security Council's decision, not with the decision given by the US or the UK. He pointed out that international conflicts could be solved through peaceful settlement of disputes. He stated that the investigations of the UN Arms Control Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been ongoing. Moreover, he repeated Wolfowitz's words: that "we could succeed with or without Turkey". He stated "Let's see how they succeed without Turkey". He condemned the US's military and equipment deployment in the Iskenderun port. Sav warned the JDP that they should not support such a disgusting war and he advised them to change their decisions. Sav stated that this decision related to the war in Iraq was illegitimate, and contrary to both international law and the Turkish constitutional law. He mentioned the 5-6 billion dollars of US credit which had been loaned to Turkey. He indicated that the government should not breach national and international law because of this credit. He urged the Parliament to not allow impinging on a Muslim country's independency, territorial integrity and natural resources". He concluded his speech by saying that "the American ships should go as they came", "geldikleri gibi giderler" (Sav, 2003, March 1).

The RPP supported the idea that Turkey should not be on the war front or the battle field. The RPP demanded that Turkey launch its forces in Northern Iraq. In addition, the RPP stated that the party was right in rejecting the 1 March note. The RPP declared that the party supported the US war against terror. Nevertheless, the party condemned the US because they did not neutralize the PKK/KADEK terrorists. Most importantly, it was expressed that the US's policies on Iraq were contrary to the national interests of Turkey.

The RPP alleged that there had been no legitimacy of Iraq War according to international law. The RPP's report explained that self-defense of a country could justify a war. Moreover, the UN should decide on the legitimacy of a war. As a result of this, there were no such conditions and it was expressed that the Iraq War is illegitimate. The RPP presented that the US and UK had become invading countries. The RPP noted that, in dealing with the Iraq issue, the US had tried to loan 8.5 billion dollars of credit to Turkey. Addressing the solution to of the Iraq issue, the RPP stated it would give importance to national security, honor and national interests, understanding of international principles and cooperation (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention Report, 2003, October 24, pp.54-58). After the refusal of the note, the General Vice President of the RPP, İnal Batu maintained, it had become apparent that Turkey was not a banana republic, and declined bargaining for credit (Cumhuriyet, 2003, March 3,).

Prior to the "hood event", it was declared by the US officials and experts that there was no need for stationing Turkish soldiers' in Northern Iraq. In that sense, they stated that there was no threat of migration, or the effectiveness of the PKK terrorism. Moreover, it was added there was no threat against the Turkmens. The Turkish state had aimed to strengthen the Turkmens and then, use this position as leverage to control the political events in Northern Iraq. Moreover, the obstruction of the PKK activities was the main goal. The US, on the other hand, demanded that Turkey cease arming the Turkmens and provide general amnesty for the PKK militants (Birand, 2003, July 8). The RPP severely criticized the "Hood Event". Baykal stated that the honor of Turkish people was flagrantly violated and that the honor of the Turkish Armed Forces was injured. Baykal demanded that the US should apologize. Moreover, Baykal condemned the JDP in that it did not behave appropriately according to the Parliament's decision taken on 1 March 2003. Baykal maintained this decision was honorable and respectable. He alleged that the world community understood the value of this decision. It was declared by Baykal that "Turkey should reasonably adjust its foreign policy by not betraying the alliances, but should consider its national interests". Baykal asked if it was true that the US was keeping touch with the authorities of the KADEK and the PKK (Baykal, 2003, July 8).

Baykal stated that the commission's explanations on the hood event were not satisfactory and could not restore the honor of Turkey. The reasons behind the kidnapping of Turkish soldiers were not presented in the report. He mentioned if there was a legitimate reason, this should be explained. He added if not, the US should apologize. He stated that exportation of the terrorism from Northern Iraq had begun. Moreover, he stressed that the PKK and KADEK were permitted to open official buildings. Baykal mentioned that there were five thousand terrorists in Northern Iraq (Baykal, 2003, July 15).

The RPP condemned the failed policies of the US and the JDP regarding Iraq and contended that they paved the way for the reemergence of terrorism. It was declared that this was the first time Turkey was blocked from taking precautions against terrorism beyond its borders. It was maintained that democracy could not develop in a place where violence and terrorism existed (The RPP's 31st RPP Regular Convention Party Assembly Report, pp.27-31).

The RPP proposed that it is the responsibility of the US to remediate the difficult relationship between the US and Turkey. The RPP declared it would support all positive steps taken by the US. The RPP considered all the people living in Iraq as brothers and intimates, regardless of their ethnicity, sects or religion. It was also added that the only aim of the US was to realize the Greater Middle East (The RPP's 31st RPP Regular Convention Party Assembly Report, pp.27-31).

### 7.1.2 The Republican People's Party and the Annan Plan

Annan plan aimed to reunite Cyprus. It was initiated in 2002. The 2004 version of the plan was rejected by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders and a twin referendum was held on 24 April 2004. The Greek Cypriots rejected the plan in the referendum, but Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, voted in favor of the plan. The Foundation Agreement of the Plan provided for the United Cyprus Republic, an independent and sovereign state with a single legal personality, and a federal government with two component states based on an indissoluble partnership. It was planned that the republic would be a member of both the UN and the EU. The proposed Republic of Cyprus would be a bi-communal state based on

equal political representation of Turks and Greeks. As Hasgüler and Tüzünkan (2009) stated, the Turkish Cypriots supported the plan to end their isolation. Denktaş abstained from putting the Annan plan to referendum. However, trade unionists and Mehmet Ali Talat were in favor of the plan. Mehmet Ali Talat tried to retain a good relation with the JDP government and he supported the plan. According to the plan, the island would be demilitarized. Although the plan was rejected, the Greek Cypriots became members of the EU on 1 May 2004 (pp.1-6).

Deniz Baykal stated "the supporters of the Annan plan were lost in the Cyprus elections" (Hürriyet, 2003, December 16). Baykal alleged that the Annan Plan posed many serious problems both for Turkey's position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the future of Cyprus. (Hürriyet, 2004,  April 22). He alleged that the Annan Plan would convert the island into a Greek Cypriot (Rum) island within 20 years (Radikal, 2003, December 19).

The RPP condemned the Minister of Foreign Policy as the "last person on earth to call the Turkish armed forces stationed in Cyprus an occupying force should be the Turkish foreign Minister". It was mentioned that the JDP had been denying 30 years of history, and refusing to protect the security interests of both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The RPP declared that they would not allow one-sided concessions to be given in this national case. The party would pursue a powerful struggle to protect the interests of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The RPP accepted one state in Cyprus, having a sole international legal identity. It was mentioned that the RPP who supported this legal entity should comprise bi-zonal, bi-communal, equal sovereign state (The RPP's 30th Regular Convention report, 2003, 24 October, p.61).

### 7.1.3 The Republican People's Party and the Republican Meetings

The Tandoğan rally was held on 14 April 2007and was supported by the leftist parties, the RPP, *Democratik Sol Parti,* Democratic Left Party (the DLP.) (Yetkin, 2007, April 15) The organizers of the rallies gave more priority to secularism in comparison to democracy (Akınoğlu, 2007, May 3). Deniz Baykal, Zeki Sezer, Yaşar Okuyan and Mümtaz Soysal participated in the Republican rally held in Ankara, Tandoğan. After the first Republican

rally, Baykal criticized the presidential election process and indicated that the Chief of Staff, the Legislature, the President, and university professors were all warned about the presidential elections and advised that an impartial person should be elected. Baykal severely criticized Arınç's statements that "everyone should prepare himself for the new Turkey". Moreover, Baykal contradicted the rhetoric that the new president would integrate the values of the nation with the values of the state. He mentioned that "there is no difference between the values of our nation and our state". He pointed out that there should be loyalty to the constitution. Baykal noted that the two-Turkey idea was the allegation of the JDP. He indicated that the JDP was assuming there were two Turkeys; however, as they saw at the Tandoğan republican rally, what they must consider was that there was also Atatürk's Turkey. He indicated that Turkey had been a democratic, secular, social and legal state. "Our nation is a whole comprising all the people, whatever their descent and origin." Nonetheless, Baykal by recalling the speeches of Erdoğan emphasized that the 28 ethnic identities, sub-identities, supra-identities, and the separation of Turkey into provinces were not essential values of Turkey. He stressed that national integrity had always been the national value and official state value (Baykal, 2007, April 17).

The Chief of Staff convened a meeting and invited influential columnists on 12 April 2007. He stated that the Armed Forces demanded a presidential candidate loyal to Ataturkism, secularism, the basic principles of the republic; someone not of words, but of deeds. The Armed Forces published an e-memorandum in their official website on 27 Nisan 2007. The RPP declared that, while they agreed with the explanations of the Armed Forces, they rejected the idea that three top positions of the republic would be devoted to the ideology of a national view. The RPP alleged that there should be consensus on the election of the president. After the e-memorandum, Onur Öymen stated that they agreed with the explanations of the Armed Forces. He pointed out that no one should denigrate anyone stating "how happy is he who can say I am Turk". He stated that we assume that anyone disrespectful to them is an enemy of the state. Baykal condemned both Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, because they supported the ideology of the national view and they were submissive. Baykal stated that the presidential election seemed to be an internal issue of the JDP. He mentioned that Erdoğan wanted to be elected as the president; however, the

nation did not accept him. Baykal emphasized that Abdullah Gül's candidacy instead of Erdoğan was regarded as a victory of the democracy (Baykal, 2007, April 24).

Baykal expressed that the Çağlayan meeting was magnificent, and that it was the "herald of the new Turkey". Baykal did not participate in the Çağlayan meeting, but he stated he was there with his organization, with his thoughts and emotions. He identified this new process as an enormous transformation (Baykal, 2007, April 30).

Baykal by participating in the Samsun meeting held on 20 May 2007 stated that the mission of the meetings had been accomplished: our people asked us to unite and we did. The RPP and DLP (Democratic Left Party) were united for the elections. Baykal stated that they were expecting more unity at the ballot box.

## 7.2 The Nationalist Action Party and Turkish nationalism

The Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) opposed to communism in the 1970s and 1980s. The NAP internalized the Turkish-Islam synthesis and had close ties with the Hearth of Enlightened, *Aydınlar Ocağı* in the 1970s. In this context, it is important to note that the NAP gave importance to national culture, not the Turkish race. Arıkan maintained that the NAP tried to motivate conservative constituents of central and eastern Anatolia against communism with the Turkish-Islam synthesis in the 1970s. Moreover, it opposed the PKK in the 1980s, and it considered the globalization process, the PKK, and the EU as enemies and threats to the integrity of the Turkish state in the 2000s. The NAP tried not to conflict with the secular state structure in the 2000s (Arıkan, 2008, pp.6-7, 15-18, 38-39).

It was alleged that the Kurdish issue has been influential in the revival of the Turkist ideology within the NAP in the 1990s. Indeed, the Turkist ideology was removed from the agenda from the middle of the 1970s until the end of the 1980s (Bora, 1995, p.77). During the regime crisis of the 1990s, the NAP's member Nesrin Ünal took off her headscarf during the parliamentary meetings. The NAP was revealed as an antidote to political Islam and, as Bora and Can (2007) maintained, the actors of the centre came closer to the NAP.

Indeed, the NAP tried to be a center party, but it also gave messages to its organization and members that the party did not change (pp.470-471).

It is important to note that, as former NAP Central Executive Board Member Vedat Bilgin stated, the Anatolian tigers supported the NAP in 1990s, and these nationalist-conservative Anatolian people brought about the success of the NAP in the 1999 elections. Nonetheless, it is apparent that they were siding with the JDP in the 2000s. Moreover, it was indicated that the NAP's policy arena, the Central Asian Turkish Republics, had also become the activity field of religious communities. Bahçeli stated after the 1999 election success that the NAP represented the center in Turkey, and it represented the common values of Turkey (Kemal & Hacaloğlu, December 8, 2010). The NAP identified that nationalism was not racism; it was an integrating, innovating, merging lovely understanding, and would be the savior of Turkey (Bahçeli, December 12, 2004).

As Canefe and Bora (2003) indicated, the NAP has been the vanguard party having anti-European attitudes and discourses before and after the 2002 elections. The NAP opposed to fulfillment of the legal criteria regarding the full membership in the European Union. The Party indicated many times that there has been a hidden agenda of the Europeans. It was mentioned before that this view was supported since the early days of the National Assembly and the second group within it. Although this authoritarian second group was removed from the Assembly, they gained power after the 1950s (p.127).

The NAP members and cadres continued to support the death penalty of Abdullah Öcalan. Moreover, the issue of Cyprus' accession to the EU was criticized severely. It was articulated that this accession was proposed in order to complete the Greek *Megalo Idea* and would turn Cyprus into another Crete that was cleansed of its Turkish Muslim heritage. Moreover, the NAP was opposed to the repentance law for Kurdish militants and also the reformation of the State Security Courts. The statist policies were pursued, and the NAP political elites identified themselves as people assigned to protect the survival of the state. The traditional position of the NAP was that its mission was to protect the Turkish state in the name of the Turkish nation. The Party Program of 1999 emphasized the

unified Turkish nation as the sole and social and cultural basis of the country's existence (Canefe & Bora, pp.129-135).

The 6th NAP Congress was held on 5 November 2000. The NAP leader, Devlet Bahçeli maintained that if the EU approached the membership of Turkey realistically and sincerely, the accession would be realized in a reasonable time. In this congress, Bahçeli initially dealt with some liberal values such as democracy, human rights, justice, cooperation and tolerance. He emphasized that those values were vital. He indicated that the problem was to put those values into practice both nationally and globally. However, Bahçeli had doubts about the globalization process. In that sense, he stated that those values could not be easily realized within this globalization process. He mentioned that the other dimensions of globalization were regionalization and localization. It is apparent that Bahçeli was in favor of regional organizations. Bahçeli strongly emphasized that there were both advantages and disadvantages of globalization. He was skeptical about the aims of the multinational companies. He articulated that there was a consensus among the liberal values such as human rights and democracy, and the global companies had been a serious problem. Therefore, he maintained that the control of new economic empires was not seen. He juxtaposed the problems as new economic empires, and their campaigns to destroy nation-states and national cultures. He stated that technologic potential and economic domination would threaten the national cultures and national languages. He believed that 21st century could not be transformed into the "century of human rights" spontaneously. In that sense, Bahçeli proposed that globalization should be shaped into a more humane and just process. He stated that technologic potential should be used for the well-being of all humanity. Human rights principles should not be limited only to the freedom of expression (Bahçeli, 2000, November 5).

The NAP severely criticized the globalization process in the 3 November 2002 Election Declaration, because this process was identified with terrorism, migration, ethnic conflicts, financial bankruptcies, famine, and injustice. The NAP strongly proposed that a humanitarian world order should be based on strong nation-states for the realization of global tranquility and global stability. It was mentioned that global economic empires and civil society organizations had been acquiring all the power. However, it was stated in the

declaration that they were not controlled and they were not participatory organizations. Moreover, equitable and justifiable sharing was needed globally. As Bahçeli stated before, globalization was destroying national cultures and national languages. It is important to note that the NAP election declaration emphasized that the globalization process had been advocating the development of sub-cultures. Nevertheless, the NAP considered that nation-states had been the most natural and efficient resource to protect local cultures. It was indicated that the globalization process had been trying to destroy national cultures through one-sided global cultural trends. These trends were strengthened by technologic potential and economic supremacy. The NAP focused on the fact that human rights policies should not be limited solely to individual rights. The NAP mentioned that national cultures should be strengthened with modern technologic developments. The NAP supported a moral globalization process. The NAP believed that strong national culture and self-confidence might contribute to this universality and they warned that personal interests had been taking precedence over national interests. The NAP identified this process as the corruption of values. The solution of the NAP for this problem was to provide "morality of responsibility". The NAP identified itself in this declaration as the responsible party which would solve the problems of the country and they condemned irresponsible behaviors of organs of the state, civil society organizations and media in that they were giving priority to personal and group interests. These behaviors were a far cry from the morality of responsibility. The NAP gave importance to national consciousness and moral norms. The main dimension of the NAP politics was presented as understanding of "my country first" (The NAP's 3 November 2002 Election Declaration, pp.3-7, 19-20).

Bahçeli presented religion and religious people as the moderators in this process. He condemned religious rivalry among different religions and racist and separatist activities as well as the crusade mentality. He proposed institutionalization of a global moral understanding and consciousness of new responsibility (Bahçeli, November 5, 2000). Bahçeli maintained that the democratization understanding of the JDP was to invite ethnic and religious discrimination and fight against the national and unitary structure of the state (Bahçeli's Press Meeting, June 26, 2003) Moreover, Bahçeli criticized genetic science in that it brought new ambiguities to human life. In this context, he maintained that

International Science and Technology Ombudsmen were needed (Bahçeli, 2000, November 5).

He mentioned the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of Turkey. He stated that Anatolia has been the heartland of Eurasia. Dealing with relations with the Central Asian Republics, he maintained that the 1990s were "wavering years". In that sense, he stated that relationship with the Turkish Republics were not at an acceptable level. Therefore, these relations should be developed meticulously (Bahçeli, 2000, November 5). He proposed the establishment of the Ministry of Turkish Republics. Bahçeli indicated that the Turkish language should be used as a common culture and science language in the whole Turkish world. The NAP advocated Turkey being a model country for the Turkish and Islamic world. Moreover, they supported transformation of energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin through Turkey. Furthermore, he stated that the Eurasian Union would be established with Caucasus and Central Asia (The NAP, 2002, October 29).

The NAP proposed the establishment of the Sport Festival of the Turkish World to provide the rapprochement of Turkish states. One of the essential targets of the NAP foreign policy principles was related to consanguine and relative communities living outside Turkey. The NAP would provide conditions for peaceful living in these communities. Moreover, it would help consanguine and relative communities living outside Turkey in the development of their national cultures and national identities (p.90) The NAP would provide all the necessary support for the Turkish world (The NAP's 3 November 2002 Election Declaration, pp.61, 90-91).

Bahçeli considered the accession to the EU as the policy of the state. He mentioned that after the collapse of communism, regional cooperation had become rather important. The NAP policies towards the EU had changed. Nonetheless, he articulated that the main antagonism towards the EU originated from the EU policies on Cyprus and other Aegean issues. (Bahçeli, November 5, 2000) Bahçeli mentioned on May 11, 2002 that the EU had a one-sided, unlawful approach towards Cyprus. Bahçeli supported two separate bi-communal, bi-zonal, sovereign states in Cyprus. He maintained that the Accession Partnership Document would jeopardize the balance between Turkey and Greece. The

Cyprus issue became the precondition of the accession talks. He stated this document had articles on the cultural rights and descent differences. Bahçeli maintained that the demand for minority rights would be inconvenient for Turkey. Bahçeli considered on November 14 2000 that the EU commission was not behaving in good faith. He repeated on 18 November 2000 that the Accession Partnership document of 8 November 2000 was not a document of goodwill. He stated that it was implicitly legitimizing and institutionalizing ethnic discrimination.

Bahçeli stated that the EU allies of Turkey were criticizing Turkey about terrorism. However, he replied by saying that it realized that terrorism should be cured globally by referring to 9/11. He mentioned that global injustices and inequalities were feeding international terrorism. Moreover, he criticized that idea that the ESDP would use the sources of the NATO and Turkey would have no word on this usage (2001, November 3). Bahçeli repeatedly criticized the EU policies on Turkish accession. He maintained that the NAP supported an honorable accession process. He stressed that Turkey could be a member of the EU by preserving its national and cultural values. Moreover, the international rights of Turkey related to Cyprus and the Aegean should be preserved. He stated that the Cyprus issue could be solved with political equality and a new cooperation structure among the two sovereign people and the states (Bahçeli, 2002, September 29)

The NAP gave priority to the national interests in the implementation of the EU accession policy. The NAP did not support the last EU Harmonization Package that enforced the abolishment of the death penalty, and imposed cultural rights including radio, TV and education in languages other than Turkish. The NAP considered these demands as threatening to the national unity and national sovereignty (The NAP's 3 November 2002 Election Declaration).

The NAP published a general assessment report on November 2004. This report was related to the EU Commission's Recommendation on Turkey that published on 6 October 2004. The EU Commission adopted both the Recommendation on Turkey document and a regular report on the progress towards accession of Turkey for 2004. The NAP opposed to the EU demands for the retrial of Abdullah Öcalan. Moreover, the NAP opposed to the

EU's insistence on Kurdish broadcasting and Kurdish education. The NAP also opposed to the EU demands for the abolition of a 10% threshold in elections for the representation of minorities. The NAP asserted that this initiative would pave the way for ethnically discriminatory policy-making. Moreover, the party opposed to the EU demands on new amendments in article 159, 169 and 312 of the Penal Code and article 7 of the Anti-terror Law. Those demands were regarded by the NAP as a statement that the EU did not want people who insulted Turkish state and Turkishness to be punished. The NAP maintained that the EU demanded the regulation of these provisions in order to pave the way for the propaganda of separatism. Moreover, it was mentioned that the EU demanded extra rights for the non-Muslim minorities, thus giving legal personality to these communities, allowance to train their clergy and noninterference of Turkish administrators. In addition, the NAP was opposed to the usage of an ecumenical patriarchy and stated that the EU demanded recognition of the ecumenical status of the patriarch. The NAP strongly opposed the EU demands on the emergence of Alevis as a Muslim minority. The EU stated in the report that Alevis were not recognized as a religious community (The NAP General Assessment Report, November 2004).

The NAP criticized the EU policies that would obstruct Turkish national foreign policy and condemned the EU for jeopardizing the status of the Turkish Straits by demanding Turkey ensure free passage through the Straits of the Bosphorus. In that sense, the NAP maintained that the EU ignored the Montreaux Convention. Relations and borders between Syria and Turkey were presented as a problematic issue by the EU report. The NAP stated that the EU recommended more water should be given to Syria by emphasizing ambiguous borders with Syria. However, looking at the report regarding Turkey's accession, it was mentioned that one could expect international management of water resources and infrastructures. (The NAP General Assessment Report, November 2004)

Considering the EU report, the NAP dealt with Armenian issue. The NAP stated that the EU recommended opening of land borders with Armenia and reconciliation with Armenia regarding human suffering in the region in 1915/1916. Moreover, dealing with Cyprus issue, the NAP mentioned that the rights and interests of Turkish Cypriots, the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic and Turkey were undermined by the EU. The EU demanded that

Turkey abolish current restriction related to Cyprus flagged vessels and vessels serving the Cyprus trade (the NAP General Assessment Report, November 2004).

The NAP alleged that the unitary state structure of Turkey and the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne were supported. In that sense, the NAP alleged that Kurdish people were not regarded as a minority. It is important to note that this allegation of the NAP was apparent in the report. Dealing with economic dimensions, the NAP stated that the whole Turkish market would be open to the EU. Nonetheless, the NAP pointed out that limitations were imposed on Turkish agriculture and Turkish labor. The NAP criticized plan for the international management of water resources after the accession. As written in the EU report, the NAP criticized the provisions for the free movement of workers and suggested that permanent safeguards would be considered. The NAP pointed out that, according to the EU report, border controls and visa applications would continue. In the conclusion, the NAP focused on the EU recommendation that broadcasting in Kurdish and minority languages is initiated, and that legal status is accorded to non-Muslim religious communities. The NAP emphasized the ambiguity of the outcomes of the negotiations. It is apparent that the EU proposed that it was an open-ended process whose outcome could not be guaranteed beforehand. The NAP alleged that the EU did not give equal rights to Turkey, and they claimed that the surrender and imprisonment of Turkey was demanded. Moreover, the NAP criticized the notion of the EU that regardless of the outcome of the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process, the relations between the EU and Turkey had to ensure that Turkey remained fully anchored in European structures (The NAP General Assessment Report, November 2004).

The EU published the Turkish Accession Partnership Document and the Strategy Paper on 9 November 2005. These documents were assessed by the Devlet Bahçeli in the press meeting that was held on 11 November 2005. Bahçeli made the same criticisms related to EU papers that were published before. He criticized the fact that the EU demanded the abolition of articles 3 and 42 of the Constitutional Law that stated that Turkish language had been deemed the official language and that education could not be done in a language other than Turkish. Bahçeli stated that the EU wanted to abolish the authority of the Turkish state over Kurdish courses and Kurdish broadcasting. Moreover, Bahçeli

considered the EU, was trying to establish the Kurdish language in official schools as an alternative educational language (Bahçeli, 2005, November 11).

The EU-Turkey Progress Report and the Strategy Paper were published on 8 November 2006. It was assessed by Devlet Bahçeli on 9 November 2006. Bahçeli regarded the EU as a lie and the EU integration process was stalled. Bahçeli juxtaposed the EU's criticisms. Firstly, the EU tried to create a Muslim minority. The EU's concerns about Article 301 were presented by Bahçeli. It was stated that the EU demanded freedom for people insulting Turkishness, the Turkish state and the Turkish nation, especially related to the so-called Armenian genocide. Moreover, he dealt with the EU's demands for freedom of religion for minorities, the ecumenical status of the Patriarchy and the opening of Heybeliada High School. (The NAP, 2006 Progress Report and Strategy Paper under the Political Dimensions, November 2006)

The past policies towards the US continued. Bahçeli stated that Turkey-US relations should be strengthened and converted into a strategic partnership. However, Bahçeli also proposed the development of relations with Japan, Russia, and China. (2002, September 29, 3 November 2002 Election Declaration Meeting)

Bahçeli identified the idealist movement, *ülkücü hareket*, as a long suffering movement. On this point, Bahçeli glorified death. In that sense, he defined idealists as people who gave their lives for the homeland and nation. He proposed the general principles of the NAP in the congress that was held on 5 November 2000. This struggling against Turkish history and culture was not seen in the NAP. The NAP would support policies which supported democracy and human rights. Moreover, the Turkish language should be developed. Bahçeli condemned daily, worthless, irresponsible policy-making and political discourse. In this speech, Bahçeli condemned both the exploiters of Atatürk and exploiters of religion. It is important to note that Bahçeli emphasized the fact that their movement had historical roots and claims which conserved its entity permanently. In that sense, their movement was not changed, but developed (Bahçeli, 2000, November 5).

Bahçeli stated in May 2005 that Turkey was a huge flower garden composed of different colors, tones and scents. He maintained that the national duty for everyone who loves his fatherland and nation is to destroy the weeds in this garden. (Zaman, 5 May 2005) As Taşkın stated in the first sentence, the NAP rejected racism, however, the NAP was against any threat which jeopardizes this national harmony (Taşkın, p.137).

It was mentioned that the NAP supported a fair solution of the headscarf issue. Bahçeli alleged that republicanism, democracy and love for Turkey were not contradictory notions. He emphasized the necessity of democracy. However, it is important to note that democracy should not be limited to minority rights. He stated that ethnic and religious differences should not be essential parameters of the public sphere. It was stated that the NAP would not approve any attempt that paves way for the separatism and discrimination. In this context, the NAP proposed that the main goal of the democratic regime was to maintain the peaceful coexistence of whole members of the Turkish nation regardless of their origins, professions and sects (Bahçeli, 2000, November 5).

The NAP was in favor of privatization Moreover; it was declared that the party was in favor of foreign entrepreneurship. The NAP advocated both an economic consensus and a social consensus. In that sense, regional and local cultural differences have been regarded as the wealth of the nation. The NAP proposed the reinstatement of morality. The NAP identified secularism, specifying that it should not jeopardize beliefs and it should provide peaceful coexistence. (3 November 2002 Election Declaration, pp. 30-35, 15-18)

The NAP Election Declaration indicated that the initial social and cultural policy was the raising of new, responsible generations possessing honor and consciousness of being members of the Turkish nation who have internalized the national and moral values. Moreover, these generations should be democratic and entrepreneurial. According to the declaration, courses on religion and morality would be supported. (The NAP's 3 November 2002 Election Declaration, pp.55-56) The NAP proposed the foundation of an ombudsman to prevent corruption and immorality (p.74).

The NAP supported the investigation of Turkish culture, establishment of a Turkish Culture Centers and development of Turkish folklore and national cartoon-making sector, in addition to the establishment of a responsible media. The NAP would also work for the protection of the national culture and national identity of Turkish citizens living abroad. (The NAP's 3 November 2002 Election Declaration, pp.62-64)

Bahçeli severely criticized the JDP's policies on minority foundations, saying that these policies would threaten the national identity. Bahçeli pointed out that after the amendment of the law, the definition of minority was enlarged and new privileges were given; the number of minority foundations increased, and, what is more, these foundations were allowed to buy real estate. Bahçeli alleged that these amendments would strengthen the missionary activities. (Bahçeli, 2003, March 1)

Addressing the Malatya incident, Bahçeli allowed that the massacre of three Christian missionaries was inhumane; it was not related to Turkism and Islamism. He was worried about the criticism of Turkish nationalists. The striking fact was that, although these were brutal murders, the missionary activities behind this event could not be considered innocent. It was maintained that the JDP encouraged missionary activities. These missionary activities were considered as a plan for the Christianization of Anatolia and identified as a systematic invasion exercise. In addition, Bahçeli saw it as a threat to the unitary structure of Turkey, national solidarity, and historical solidarity. Bahçeli condemned the Prime Minister of being a volunteer advertiser of global capital and consciousness. Moreover, the JDP was accused of selling national resources for less than their value. Dealing with the natural resources, the NAP advised that "bor fields" should not be given to foreign entrepreneurs (Bahçeli, 2003, June 26).

The PKK and its political restructuring were considered as separatist threats. The PKK terrorism had been changing into a war among brothers. Bahçeli criticized both Öcalan and Erdoğan for the escalation of terrorism. The JDP was accused of its ineffective attitudes towards terrorism and weakening of power of the Turkish Armed Forces (Bahçeli, 2006, March 19).

**7.2.1 The Nationalist Action Party and the Developments in Iraq**

Bahçeli criticized on February 27, 2003 that the negotiation and bargaining process pursued between the US and Turkey over Iraq. He stated that government's attitudes had jeopardized the international image of Turkey. The main criticism of Bahçeli was about the constructed image of Turkey. He referred to the promised US credit, and stated that Turkish strategic support could not be bought and sold. Bahçeli emphasized that the peaceful solutions were not exhausted, yet. Moreover, he mentioned that international legitimacy for the Iraq War had not been provided.

The government's note on Iraq was called in. Bahçeli severely criticized the government's note on Iraq. Bahçeli mentioned that launching foreign troops in Turkey and sending Turkish troops abroad were put on the same note. The international legitimacy principle had not been provided. Moreover, he stated that the people's reasonable reaction to the deployment of foreign troops in Turkey was not removed. Moreover, he maintained that the JDP government considered Cyprus a national burden, nevertheless, the US's military intervention on Iraq was presented as national interest and responsibility of the state. Bahçeli stated that this was a serious dilemma (Bahçeli, 2003, March 4). Bahçeli regarded that the Turkish foreign policy under the governance of the JDP had been converted into a submissive and weak foreign policy (Bahçeli, 2003, March 7).Bahçeli advised multi-dimensional preparations to obstruct any threat to Turkish national interest, such as the emergence of the puppet state in Northern Iraq and the protection of Turkmens (Bahçeli, 2003, March 9).

The NAP severely condemned both the US government and the JDP government on the hood event. Bahçeli stated that Turkish forces should be settled in Northern Iraq because there was a terrorist threat. Bahçeli expressed his concerns regarding the immediate release of Turkish soldiers. Moreover, he stated that the US should apologize for this event. He pointed out that the JDP government again presented its submissive and unpatriotic

behavior regarding the developments occurring in Iraq. Bahçeli was suspicious of the JDP government's policies concerning the lives of Turkish soldiers. Bahçeli warned that the JDP placed more importance on the lives of the American soldiers during the Iraq War. Bahçeli demanded that the JDP should vehemently condemn the US and the JDP should apologize from  Turkish nation for their party's misinformation and insensitiveness on the issue (Bahçeli, 2003, July 6).

**7.2.3 The Nationalist Action Party and the Annan Plan**

The NAP published a report on Cyprus in February 2003. It was called the *Kıbrıs Gerçeği ve Annan Planı,* The Reality of Cyprus and the Annan Plan. The NAP's report presented that the JDP considered Cyprus as a national burden, and moreover, that the JDP had applied *ver-kurtulcu,* give and get rid of policies (p.1).

Bahçeli alleged on March 1, 2003 that the main aim of the Annan Plan was to provide the accession of the Greek Cypriot Republic to the EU as the representative of the whole island. Bahçeli stressed the JDP had submissive policies, and an allergy to national causes and moreover, sought international approval. Bahçeli repeated that the Cyprus issue was considered as national burden by the JDP government. Bahçeli proposed that Turkey should support the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic economically and politically. Denktaş should be supported on every level.

The Cyprus issue was considered as an issue related to the survival of the Turkish state. It was presented that the security of Cyprus could not be separated from the security of Turkey. In this context, Turkish Cypriots, being the founding community, having equal rights and equal sovereignty, should preserve their national entity and national identity under the guarantorship of Turkey. Therefore, the Annan plan was considered as a project aiming to establish the republic of the 1960s. It was alleged that this plan comprised unfair articles for the Turkish side and that they were forced to give up their lands and migrate. It was proposed that this plan was not based on the establishment of a new cooperation arena having two sovereign and equal founding communities and states. The campaign against Denktaş was criticized severely, and Bahçeli stated that anyone who demanded a Cyprus

without Denktaş and a solution without Denktaş was demanding a Turkish Cypriot without national identity. Denktaş was considered as a national hero both for Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Bahçeli condemned the time limit given by the UN and the attempts to solve the issue according to the EU schedule (Bahçeli, January 23, 2003).

The rhetoric of the JDP, "deadlock is not the solution" was considered as submissive policy by the NAP. Bahçeli declared that the plans for the Karpaz peninsula should be terminated (Bahçeli, March 7, 2003) and he accused both the JDP and some politicians of Northern Cyprus that they were attempting to realize Enosis step by step (Bahçeli, 2003, June 26).

After the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots, Bahçeli stated that this unfortunate page of history was closed. The JDP's war against Denktaş was articulated many times. It was stated the EU membership provided for the refusal of Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots. The NAP demanded the removal of sanctions applied to the Northern Cyprus (Bahçeli, 2004, April 27)

### 7.2.4 The Nationalist Action Party and the Republican Meetings

The Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) opposed the possible presidential candidacy of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan was considered as a person trying to polarize the nation, destroy the social fraternity, who was struggling against the values of the Republic, safeguarding the campaign for denial and erosion of values of Turkishness, and using ugly words about Turkish soldiers. The JDP was considered responsible for the humiliation of Turkmens; the demographic structure of Kirkuk was changed. The NAP demanded military intervention in Northern Iraq. Bahçeli stated there were two ways "submission or nationalism" (Bahçeli, 2007, April 15).

The General Vice President of the NAP, Mehmet Şandır, stated related to the republican rally, that the Turkish community and Turkish individuals owned the values of the republic due to their freewill. He defined this alliance made around the values of the republic as a magnificent manifestation. He considered the meeting as pleasing, promising and

reassuring for the republic. Afterward, he advised that the government should think well about the meeting and he advised early election (Şandır, 2007, April 30).

The NAP's member Mustafa Yeşilyurt stated on March 20, 2007 that the *ulusalcı,* neonationalist ideology was an artificial ideology. He expressed that true Turkish nationalism involved both Turkishness and Islamism (Uslu, p.84).

The NAP's Izmir Provincial Chairman, Musavvat Dervişoğlu, criticized these Republican rallies, because initially these rallies supported republicanism, secularism, democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, these rallies contributed to reshaping of the political arena. These rallies were detached from the Ataturkist and republican lines and the loyalty of people to Ataturk and his values were abused. (2007, May 12, STV)

The former NAP Central Executive Board Member, Vedat Bilgin defined neo-nationalism, *ulusalcılık,* as an anti-democratic and statist ideology on February 7, 2007. He maintained that the NAP gave priority to the nation rather the state and the NAP's nationalism was the antithesis of neo-nationalism (Gürpınar, p.117). In that sense, the top executive members of the NAP were excluded from this movement. Moreover, Kemal Kerinçsiz and Levent Temiz who were within the *ulusalcı* movement were kept away from the NAP (Karpat, 2005, May 18, cited in Gürpınar. p.117). Ümit Özdağ, having no idealist, *ülkücü* past, supported the neo-nationalist movement. It is important to note that the NAP supported the election of Abdullah Gül and supported the abolishment of the ban on headscarves. In sum, the NAP excluded itself from the *Kızılelma* alliance (Gürpınar, pp.117-119).

It could be mentioned that although some of the members and constituencies of the NAP supported neo-nationalism and participated in the Republican rallies, considering the political discourses of Bahçeli, the NAP officially tried to distance itself from this movement. It could be indicated that the NAP was considered responsible for many violent acts against leftists, communists, Alevis and, in the 1990s, Kurds. There had been a need to cleanse itself of all the catastrophic events of the past. Moreover, it was apparent that the party included Islam in its ideology since the late 1960s. Moreover, the NAP declared that Kurds and Turks were indivisible, inseparable members of the Turkish nation. In this context, the NAP could be identified with anti-globalization, anti-Americanism and

especially, with anti-Europeanism. Therefore, it could be stated that anti-Kurdism and anti-Islamism were not witnessed within the agenda of the NAP. Most importantly, they presented themselves as the protectors of the survival of the state and its values, not as the soldiers of neo-nationalist tendencies. The NAP aimed to silence the streets and idealists and stop any movement against Kurdish people.

## 7.3 The Justice and Development Party

The Justice and Development Party were founded on 14 August 2001. As Çağaptay mentioned, the JDP was an offshoot of the Islamist Welfare Party, which was banned in 1997 for Islamist activities. The party was considered itself a new force (Çağaptay, 2002, p.1).

### 7.3.1 The Historical Background of the Justice and Development Party

The founders and members of the Justice and Development Party (the JDP) had pursued the "national view, *"milli görüş"* tradition. Many parties were founded and closed. This view first emerged in the *Milli Nizam Partisi*, the National Order Party (the NOP) in 1970. This party was shut down in 1971, and afterwards, this view was followed in the *Milli Selamet Partisi*, National Salvation Party (the NSP) which was founded in 1972. However, it was closed in the 1980 coup d'etat. In 1983, the Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi* was founded. It should be noted that these three parties were founded by the same cadres (Atacan, 2005, p.187; Mecham, 2004, p.341).

The national view parties proposed the leadership of Turkey over the Islamic world. Hale and Özbudun stated that Islamism of the national view parties contains elements of Turkish nationalism. It was alleged that by referring to the early victories of the Ottoman past, leadership of Turkey over the Islamic world and restoration of Great Turkey could be accomplished (pp.6-7).

It was known that the national view was formed in the 1970s. This view was against the hegemony of the West. The Western civilization was considered as colonialist, imperialist and oppressive and therefore, formation of a new civilization was needed. The national view approach was based on an Islamic community, *ummah*. Moreover, it should be noted that it had a nationalist character. It aimed to establish a powerful and greater Turkey. Industrialization and statism were considered as the cores of this program (Mecham, p.343).

Anti-Westernism and anti-Semitism were apparent in the national view, and it also had anti-EU and anti-NATO characteristics (Hale & Özbudun, p.6). It was stated that the powerful *tariqat* (Mecham, p.343) the *Nakşibendi* group, was comprised of the followers of Mehmed Zahid Kotku was influential. Allegedly, this group founded the religious parties, the NOP and the NSP, with the help of the *Nurcu* group. Mehmed Zahid Kotku was the sheikh of the *İskender Pasha Community*. The important members and founders of these parties, namely Necmettin Erbakan, Korkut Özal, Fehim Adak and Hakan Aksay, were also members of this *Nakşibendi* group. The *Nurcu* group, on the other hand, was dissatisfied with the politics and the leadership of Erbakan and therefore, they did not continue to give their support to Erbakan (Atacan, pp.189-192). The *Akıncılar* Group was the youth organization of the NSP. They were outside of the internal struggle and anarchy during 1975-1980. They were settled and expanded their cadres in the State Planning Organization, *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı,* and Ministry of National Education (Kahraman, 2009, p.97).

The NSP regarded moral development as the basis of the material development Moreover; heavy industry was supported in the 1970s. Members of the party were in favor of close relations with Muslim states and they opposed birth control (Atacan, p.188). The Welfare Party supported and developed the "felicitous order", "*saadet nizamı"* and economic model, "just economic order", *"adil düzen"*. They wanted the creation of a Muslim common market; they were also against membership in the EU. The political discourse of the Welfare Party (the WP) was based on the assurance of the social and economic justice, criticism of the western hegemony over Turkey, creation of interest-free Islamic economy. Moreover, the WP emphasized the threats to Turkish Republic by the imperialist Zionist

system, and the importance of ethnic and religious toleration and freedom (Mecham, p.342). The cultural impacts of globalization were apparent in the governance of the WP. These problems were related to ethnicity, identity, diverse cultural entities, and religious differences. In that sense, it was alleged that globalization caused the weakening of the nation-state and strengthening of ultranationalist, religious groups. Moreover, poor people were affected negatively by the globalization (Hale & Özbudun, p.13).

The WP members were devotees; they had many duties such as participating in the special days of their neighbors, organizing meetings and strikes. They worked hard for the party; however, as in the other Turkish parties, there was no intra-party democracy. Hale and Özbudun did not regard the RP as a mass party (Hale & Özbudun, pp.17-18). Dealing with the Kurdish issue, the WP identified the issue as a Kurdish national identity. Three reports were prepared by the WP. They advocated educational rights and free broadcasting in the Kurdish language. Most importantly, the WP proposed a provincial system with elected governors, elected judges and prosecutors. This policy of the WP was a mixture of the "just order" and the Muslim brotherhood (p.86).

After the closure of the Welfare Party, *Fazilet Partisi,* the Virtue Party (the VP) was established. They had a positive approach towards the EU (Atacan, p.188). It was apparent that the military intervention of 28 February 1997 was influential in this development. They acknowledged that they needed democracy to realize their goals. Hence, they supported the EU and its policies (Hale & Özbudun, p.10). All of the mentioned pro-Islamist parties of Turkey were in favor of the national view. Only the JDP rejected it and declared that their ideology was democratic conservatism (Atacan, p.188).

Özal challenged this state-centric political discourse, especially on the Kurdish issue. He declared that "even we should debate about creating a federation with the Kurds" Also he stated that individuals could not be secular; it was the state that should be secular. Thus, he challenged the discursive immunity of the Republican elites and he enlarged the discursive area for the civil actors. The state elites were also suppressed due to Özal's close relations with the West (Bacik & Salur, p.171).

The RPP was reopened on 9 September 1992. *Doğru Yol Partisi,* the True Path Party (the TPP) - the WP Coalition government was formed on 28 June 1996. The non-interest financial corporations were allowed to form their institutions. All the regulations were changed within 6 months after they came to power (Cumhuriyeti Kuşatanlar, 2005, p.42).

As mentioned before, after 1980 the coup d'etat, the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was confirmed and applied to ensure national integrity and cease the support given to leftist movements. However, civil society organizations, business organizations and trade unions, namely, the Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchange, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Artisans and the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey came together and opposed the WP-TPP coalition, as the WP's policies were seen as the threat to Turkish democracy. After the 28 February decisions, the WP was closed; Erbakan was banned from the politics for 5 years.

The new party, the Virtue Party, was founded. Recai Kutan was supported by Erbakan as a leader of the party against Abdullah Gül in 2000. Afterwards, the VP was closed in 2001. At last, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan acquired more freedom to establish a new party, the Justice and Development Party. *Saadet Partisi*, The Felicity Party (the FP) which was established after the closure of the VP, followed the policies of Erbakan and the national view. The JDP, on the other hand, separated itself from the national view and declared its ideology to be conservatism.

Turkish nationalism and Islam were the two key words of this Turkish conservatism. The economic program of this ideology had been capitalism. It was stated by Atacan that Erdoğan and Gül were the members of the Foundation for Unity, *Birlik Vakfı,* which was founded in 1986 by İsmail Kahraman, who was the leader of the *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*, National Turkish Student Union (the NTSU). The *Birlik Vakfı* acquired the heritage of the NTSU which was opened in 1916 and closed in 1936 by the RPP. Afterwards, it was considered as the place of education for the conservatives from 1946 to 1980s onwards. The main ideology of the NTSU was based on Turkish nationalism, Islam and anti-communism in 1965. However, Islam had become a more important footstep of the

organization since the 1970s. In 1971, the Social Science Institute was formed to train conservative youth by the esteemed conservative academicians, journalist and intellectuals. Even Erdoğan was trained in this institute in the academic years of 1974-1975. When Erdogan became the governor of Istanbul in 1994, the *Birlik Vakfi* became an influential organization in municipalities and they supported Erdogan in the WP (Atacan, pp.192-193).

The Turkish Armed Forces, being the guardians of the Turkish state, were very cautious about the JDP governance when it came to power in 2002. Although Islam had been used as cement since the 1970s and 1980s to protect Turkish society from communism by the institutions of the state, the policies and party identity of the JDP was regarded as a threat to Turkish secularism (Tank, 2005, p.10). Graham Fuller (2004), being vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, paved the way for the issue of moderate Islam and its possible operator, policy-maker and the model, namely the JDP government. He stated that Turkey was a both an Eastern and Western country. He stated that "…If the Western version of Turkey's past is a myth, however the good news is that today's Turkey based on the remarkable realities of its evolution during recent years is in fact now becoming a genuine model…" He claimed that the JDP and *Nurcu* movement represented the new Anatolian elite who were Islamist and striving to be modern (pp.51-53).

According to article 35 of the Internal Service law no.211 of 1961, the Turkish Armed Forces exist to protect and defend "the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as determined by the Constitution."(Başar & Savrul, 1961, cited in Tank, p.8). Moreover, the Internal Service Regulations article 85/1 explained that the Turkish Armed Forces must defend the country against internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force (Heper & Güney, 2000, cited in Tank, p.8). These articles paved the way for the military interventions in Turkish politics. It was a common idea and discourse that Islam provided strengthening of Turkish identity. Demirel mentioned that Islam was the key to the founding of the Turkish nation and state. There has been a discussion that Kemalism had seen the Turkish state as a secular entity, nonetheless Islam has been used as a reinforcing element of Turkish nationalism in re-establishing social order (Tank, p.11).

Erdoğan and political elites of the JDP insisted that the JDP was not an Islamist party, but it was a conservative democratic party. The JDP expressed its approval for the adjusting of the EU's Copenhagen criteria. In that sense, the JDP reduced the role of the military's influence in the National Security Council and moreover, military membership in the security courts and the Higher Education Council were eliminated. The senior bureaucratic posts gradually began to be replaced by new elites. It is important to note that the JDP applied liberal economic policies that paved way for foreign investment (Uslu, p.82).

There had been a division of secularism into assertive secularism and passive secularism. Hale and Özbudun defined assertive secularism as privatizing religion and banning or limiting its visibility. They stated that passive secularism was seen in western countries and defined as the state's neutrality towards different types of religions and permission of their visibility in the public sphere. Thus, the supporting of passive secularism by the JDP was observed. Assertive secularists were members of the statist elites, the military-civil bureaucracy and the RPP. Şerif Mardin (1972) created an important division related to Turkish politics, dividing it into the center and periphery. Centrist values were presented by the RPP, and the JDP was considered as the leading figure of the periphery (Hale & Özbudun, pp.21-22, 33). Regarding the main features of Turkish modernization, it was stated that Kemalist elite agreed on guidance of Western modernity in order to build Turkish modernization (Keyman & Öniş, p.295).

As Yalçın Akdoğan wrote, the JDP's ideology was called "conservative democracy". Thus, they claimed that they were not against the change, but believed that this change should be evolutionary. They wanted to preserve the values, not the old institutions. Hale and Özbudun stated that the JDP was against social engineering and they believed that the JDP resembled the Democrat Party, the Justice Party, the True Path Party and the Motherland Party, all of whom promoted Turkish nationalism, Islamism, developmentalism and conservatism. Hale and Özbudun made the distinction that center-right parties have usually been constituency-oriented parties, while the RPP, on the other hand, had a tutelary approach (Hale & Özbudun, pp.24-25).

**7.3.2 The Justice and Development Party and Turkish nationalism**

The conservative ideology in Turkey has had close links with nationalism and state centrism. Nonetheless, as Uzgel indicated, although the JDP has used the resources and power of the state, it did not bless the state and applied neo-liberal politics. (Uzgel, p.23) The religious entrepreneurial class that was flourished in the Özal's era supported the JDP. In that sense, the JDP has benefitted from the language of modernity. Moreover, the accession process with the EU would be beneficial for the JDP (Rabasa &Latrobe, 2008, pp.51-52).

Prime Minister Erdoğan tried to justify constitutional citizenship and he stated that the first red line of the party was the rejection of nationalism based on ethnic origins. He asserted that Turks would express their Turkishness and the Kurds would express their Kurdishness and he declared that citizenship of the Republic of Turkey was the foremost identity for all of us. (Zaman, 2005, November 22, cited in Taşkın, p.137) Erdoğan also added on the ATV, on September 3, 2003 that they should reach a consciousness of being members of Turkey, *Türkiyelilik* like the different ethnic groups who felt and defined themselves as Americans (Taşkın, p.137).

The JDP program was presented in 2001. It was maintained in the program that the JDP embraced all citizens without discrimination, regardless of their sex, ethnic origins, beliefs and opinions. Moreover, it was stated that on the basis of pluralistic concepts, the party's fundamental objective was to develop a consciousness of citizenship and share it with all their countrymen, and to instill the pride of possession and belonging to the country where they live. The JDP expressed in the program that it refused to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes and declared that they considered religion as the most important institution of humanity and secularism as the prerequisite of democracy and the assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. In that sense, secularism was seen as the principle of freedom and social peace (The JDP Party Program, 2001).

The east and southeast titles were used in the JDP program. The JDP abstained from calling the problem a southeastern problem, Kurdish problem or problem of terrorism. It was revealed as a reality of Turkey and was noted that the cultural diversity was seen as richness. The JDP approved the unitary state structure of Turkey and that the Turkish language was the official and instructional language of Turkey. The JDP program indicated that broadcasting and cultural activities could be done in languages other than Turkish. It was stated that the terrorism was intensifying with outside support. The JDP indicated that the region's population was attached to the unitary state structure. It was stated that the problem would not turn into an ethnic conflict because of the commonsense of their people and therefore it could be solved as an internal problem. The JDP proposed a general democratic project should be conducted to alleviate the backwardness of the region. It was stated that terrorism would cease in a state respecting the basic rights and freedoms and which, moreover, considered economic development and security as equal parts of the same whole. The JDP proposed new economic projects to increase the employment level of the region. The main goal of the JDP program in the region was to construct a state based on rule of law. It was mentioned that Turkish citizenship was the cement of the community (The JDP Party Program, 2001).

The development of a national security sector was revealed as one of the aims of the party. Regarding foreign policy, the JDP stated that the geopolitical situation of Turkey had the potential to create a desirable zone for many cooperative projects. It was pointed out that Turkey had close relations with European states. In that sense, Turkey should rapidly fulfill it promises regarding its relations with the EU. Turkey, being an important country contributing to the NATO, deserved to be in the new European Security and Defense Policy created within the framework of the new European defense strategy. It was stated that cooperation with the US which had been defense oriented should be maintained and this cooperation should be extended to areas of the economy, investments, science and technology. The JDP proposed friendly relations with the Russian Federation. The relations with Greece should be based on mutual economic interests. Dealing with Cyprus, the presence of the Turkish population on the island, its identity and right of self-determination should not be ignored. It was indicated that the solution of the Cyprus

problem should be based on an agreement between the two states coexisting on the island (The JDP Party Program, 2001).

The 2002 election was seen as a new path in Turkish political life. Corruption, economic, social and religious problems of Turkey bred the objections of Turkish voters to old political parties and their leaders. Assessing the success of the JDP in the 2002 elections, the most important one was the message of integrity and fairness. Turkish people were tired of unstable coalitions and struggles among politicians on ideological, political and economic issues.  2001 economic crisis badly affected Turkish people. Others claimed causes that contributed to this success could be the JDP's emphasis on democracy and the JDP's distancing from Islam in its political program. Also, a result of the 10 % threshold ensured many seats for both the JDP and the RPP (Keyman & Öniş, pp.163-166).

The election slogan of the JDP was called "everything is for Turkey". The election declaration stressed new dimensions of the 21$^{st}$ century such as the development of science, technology, communication, the freedom of labor and capital; and economic and political integration. It was noted that totalitarian ideologies were abandoned, equality was supported against any discrimination, and participatory political approaches gained power in that era. The JDP mentioned an international judiciary, universal living standards and norms. It was stated that while the world was changing, however, Turkey, still dealt with internal problems. The problems of Turkey were revealed: it was undemocratic, underdeveloped and Turkey did not have the capacity to compete in the international markets (The JDP's 2002 Election Declaration, pp.2-4).

The JDP identified itself as democrat, conservative, progressive, and a modern party. The JDP assumed that different faiths and cultures are the wealth for a country. In that sense, the JDP maintained that all people speaking different languages, believing in different religions and of different races and social status should live freely under the protection of laws and be able to participate in politics. The JDP proposed a limited role for the state in the economy, and, in turn, this would diminish the control of the state over civil culture (The JDP's 2002 Election Declaration, pp.6-8).

The JDP was opposed to turning ones back on the modern world for the protection of local values. One sentence later, it was written that the JDP did not approve of the destruction of local values.  The JDP supported the opening of Turkey to the global world and asserted that the most important value was morality. It was expressed that the most important goal of the JDP was to construct trust for the state again (The JDP's 2002 Election Declaration, pp.8, 32).

The JDP aimed to ensure dialogue among all neighbors and to develop good relations with the EU countries. The fulfillment of the preconditions for the EU membership should be realized. In this context, Turkey should acquire the deserved position in the European Security and Cooperation Concept. It was stated that cooperation should be provided to combat terrorism. The military-defensive cooperation with the US would continue and Turkey would develop its relations with the Turkish Republics. Moreover, Turkey would help with the construction of peace in Palestine. It was written that the party gave special importance to the development of relations with other Islamic countries. The party would work for the enhancement of the Islamic Conference Organization. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization would be supported. The JDP supported Iraq's obedience to the UN provisions and solution of their problem peacefully. They also supported both the Atlantic-European and Eurasian dimensions of the Turkish foreign policy (The JDP's 2002 Election Declaration, pp.82-84).

It was apparent that Turkish nationalism was a widespread feeling and ideology among Turkish society. Somer (2007) mentioned about scenarios in Turkish political parties that there could be a clash between secular nationalists and Islamic nationalists. Allegedly, it was a possibility that the JDP could try to balance secular Turkish nationalism with Islamic nationalism. Respectively, it should be noted that nationalism has always had an economic basis. Hereby, Somer stated that there was an important clash between the middle classes, namely the religious-conservative middle class and the secularist middle class. The JDP came to power after the 2001 economic crisis; the secularist middle class was badly affected by the crisis (pp.1271-1276).The religious conservative middle class, on the other hand, was supported by the government.

Many people believed that the JDP Party would have acted against accession to the European Union. The so-called "Copenhagen Criteria" was demanded from Turkey to become a member of the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria was comprised of a strengthened market economy, stable democratic institutions, rule of law, and application of laws of human rights and regulations to assure the rights of minorities. It was clear that the JDP strived to regulate arrangements of the state intuitions according to the rules of the EU. Therefore, as the state security courts were removed and military representation to a higher education board was abolished, the military hegemony lessened (Carroll, 2004, p.5).

It was alleged that the JDP gave importance to human rights, rule of law, pluralism, tolerance, and respect for diversity. This specification was stressed in election platforms and in many political discourses. As Hale and Ozbudun pointed out, the JDP supported people having different beliefs, races and languages, and this diversity was advocated by the JDP and seen as cultural richness. The JDP keenly backed the establishment of civil society organizations. In the 2002 elections, human rights, the Copenhagen criteria and basic liberal values such as freedom of expression, freedom of thought and free enterprise were proposed (pp.20-21).

The JDP promised to end corruption and fulfill the necessities to become EU member. It gained a parliamentary majority and achieved being the first single-party government since 1987 (Tank, 2005, March, p.3). As Vice Chair Murat Mercan stated on 8 November 2002, the JDP's main tenets of Turkish foreign policy were its desire to join to the EU, enhance relations with the Western world and increase regional cooperation. He stated that Turkey's strategic relations with Israel would not change and that religious and ideological concerns would not determine foreign policy. Abdullah Gül mentioned that Turkey would support an American invasion of Iraq if authorized by the UN. Dealing with the Cyprus issue, the JDP regarded Kofi Annan's November 18 draft paper as the base. The Annan paper aimed to reunite Cyprus under a central government. As Çağaptay (2002 December) maintained, the JDP's willingness to settle the Cyprus issue was linked to its desire to make Turkey an EU member. In that sense, the JDP supported the EU membership as a tool to bolster the democratic process of Turkey. As Çağaptay stated, this membership

would help the economic growth of Turkey and also give religious and personal freedom to conservative voters of the JDP (p.5).

It is important to note that the JDP supported important legal and constitutional changes since August 2002. The EU oriented legislation passed before the November 2002 elections. This legislation was comprised of provisions such as limiting the use of the death penalty and opening the way for teaching and broadcasting in native languages other than Turkish. The JDP opposed only the death penalty change. It was stated by Çarkoğlu that the JDP knew this vote would not impede the package's passing (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.38). The JDP wanted to discover the provisions which would be proposed in Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002. This meeting was expected to ensure the exact date for Turkey to begin full accession talks. The Council decided to see the progress of Turkey within two years' time, by December 2004. Germany, Austria and France had been opposing the membership of Turkey since the accession talks of 2004. France supported "a privileged partnership" for Turkey. These changes ensured the decision which opened accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (Keyman & Öniş, 2007, p.81; Hale & Özbudun, pp.121-123).

The Turkish government was obliged to sign an additional protocol enlarging the customs union agreement including new members. Moreover, a new provision came onto the scene, the "absorption capacity of the union." It was stated that this accession process would end in 2014 at the earliest. 35 chapters would be completed. 6 chapters were opened afterwards on 4 October 2005 and a science and research chapter was completed in June 2006 (Hale & Özbudun, pp.124-128). The constitutional amendment of 2004 passed with the support of the RPP. The death penalty was abolished with these amendments. Secondly, international agreements would take precedence over internal laws. Thirdly, the State Security Courts were abolished. Moreover, the military representative was withdrawn from the Board of Higher education. The other important issue about the amendment was the presentation of gender equality (Hale & Özbudun, pp.55-57).

Considering the reforms, the Anti-terrorism Act was abolished. Moreover, authors of the journals and periodicals would not be forced to reveal their sources after the amendment. It was stated that freedom of association was strengthened. Erdoğan declared that their main

aim was to speed up the EU integration process rather than to solve the headscarf issue (Radikal, November 7, 2002, cited in Dağı, p.10)

The first harmonization package was presented by the government in January 2003. The freedom of association, deterrents against torture and mistreatment, and safeguards for the rights of prisoners was contained within this package. (Dağı, p.10) After the third package, the use of local languages was allowed. Moreover, non-Muslim charitable trusts were permitted to acquire real property with the permission of Council of Ministers after the third package. After the fourth harmonization package, international activities and collaboration of the associations were approved. After the sixth package, they acquired the right to build places of worship with the permission of the respective administrative bodies. Moreover, the sixth package brought the permission of broadcasting by public and private radio and televisions. It is important to note that the seventh harmonization package enlarged the freedom of assembly. Hence, the power of the provincial government to ban or postpone meeting was limited from two to one month only if there is danger of a crime (Hale & Özbudun, pp.58-60).

It should be noted that the Sivas events of 1993 and the Çorum and Maraş events of the late 1970s had catastrophic effects on the Alevi community. It has been proposed that these events were initiated by the "deep state". As a result, Alevis believed that these events were actualized by Islamists and ultra-nationalists (Köse, 2010, web p.6).

The JDP government directly engaged with the problems of the Alevi community. Alevis are a non-Sunni Muslim group, and the number of them living in Turkey was not definite. Alevis declared that the Deputy Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs did not represent Alevis. Moreover, they demanded the official recognition of *Cemevi* just like mosque. They have been against compulsory religious lessons in the schools. In sum, they demanded the recognition of their places of worship and abolition of Sunni Islam teachings in the schools. The JDP tried to solve the issue and it was called the "Alevi initiative". Erdoğan appointed an Alevi member of the JDP as a special envoy to hear the problems of Alevis. Many workshops were held. Alevi demands were listened to in official and

unofficial meetings, but no proper adjustment was made in reality (Küçükcan, 2010, pp.976-977; Hale & Özbudun, pp.77-89; Köse, 2010, p.6).

The Secretary General of the National Security Council was to be chosen either from high rank civilian officers or from military officers. Hence, after 2004, the Secretary Generals have been selected from civil officers. Moreover, military officers were removed from the Court Of Accounts after the 2004 amendment. The Criminal Code and the Civil Code were adopted by the parliament elected on 3 November 2002. Gender equality came onto the scene with the new Civil Code. New crimes were entitled within the new Criminal Code: genocide, crimes against humanity, immigrant smuggling and human trafficking (Hale & Özbudun, pp.61-62).

The JDP attempted to elect Abdullah Gül. However, the Constitutional Court invalidated the early rounds of elections. The JDP amended the constitution with a referendum. Gül was elected. Gül has been responsible for appointing high level military appointments such as governors, ambassadors, judges, higher bureaucrats, members of the Constitutional Court, and university rectors (Bacik & Salur, 2010, p.174).

It was alleged that the JDP has been using Police Intelligence Force, *Emniyet İstihbaratı*, to gather intelligence. Therefore, the JDP was much more powerful in obstructing military interventions. The Police Intelligence Force was equipped with all the technical and legal capacity to follow illegal activities. The strengthening of the police force helped the JDP. Some newspapers such as *Sabah, Star, Bugün, Zaman,* and *Taraf* also helped the JDP government to consolidate its power (Bacik & Salur, pp.176-183).

The JDP was considered as a peripheral force in Turkish politics and responsive to the demands coming from the periphery. The bureaucratic elites were opposed to globalization. These peripheral forces needed to topple the suppressive power of these elites. It was stated that the JDP moved to cooperate with the global forces to break the resistance of the bureaucratic and ideological centers (Dağı, 2006, p.9). Erdoğan articulated during the Address to the Nation Speech on May 9, 2003 that there were no

plans to jeopardize the unitary structure of the state or anything associated with the provincial system.

As Hale and Özbudun indicated, rejection of ethnic nationalism by the Islamic parties was apparent. There has been a clear explanation that the Islamic parties believed in the thought of *ummah,* which means the brotherhood of all Muslims regardless of their ethnicities, languages or nationalities. Defining Ataturkist nationalism, it was stated that Turkishness was identified with Turkish citizenship. Hence, the unity of culture and language was required for the Turkish nation, rather than common ethnicity and race. Hale and Özbudun determined that the secular parties eroded the important link between the loyal Kurdish citizenship and Islam (pp.75-76). Their loyalty to the state was defined with their loyalty to Islam. When this link was terminated, conflicts began.

Erdogan cited a supra-identity of Turkish citizenship and ethnic sub-identities. He claimed that the Kurdish problem could be solved through democratization. Also, he added that the principles of a single state, single nation and single flag should be respected. Thus, a 45 minute Kurdish program was aired on TRT beginning on January 2006. After that, on 1 January 2009, a Kurdish TV Channel, TRT6, started to broadcast (Hale & Özbudun, pp.77-89).

As Yeğen mentioned, the Kurdish identity was concealed and excluded from the Turkish modernity project. The state-centric Turkish modernity considered the Kurdish question as a tribal and traditional problem rather than an ethnic one (Keyman & Öniş, pp.304, 311).

An e-memorandum, announced by the general staff's web page, warned the JDP against the anti-establishment activities and fundamentalist reactionary, *irticai* developments contrary to the basic principles of the Republic of Turkey. It was known that the Constitutional Court made its decision that the AKP was not to be closed down, but that state funding to the party was to be cut on 30 July 2008 (Göl, 2009).

Many nationalist journals criticized anti-nationalist policies of Erdoğan and the JDP. Erdoğan claimed that there were 27 ethnicities within Turkey. He stated that if the Kurds

wanted to live separately, an administrative structure like the Ottoman Provincial system could be adopted. (TürkSolu, 44, 2004, November 24). Moreover, it was alleged that the JDP was changing the Turkish political structure and Tayyip Erdoğan was aiming to convert the governmental system into a presidential system. It is important to note that there was an attempt to change the identity of being Turkish. In that sense, Turkishness would be converted into being a settler of Turkey, *Türkiyeli*. It was also stated that new laws such as harmonization laws, twin laws, and the homecoming law, *"eve dönüş yasası"*, would accelerate the separation of religious and ethnic identities. Furthermore, it was apparent that the Public Administration Reform Draft would remove the national state and constitutional order (TürkSolu, 48, 2005, January 19). The military command was opposed to the radio and TV broadcasts in languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens (Hale & Özbudun, p.86)

It was alleged that the periphery became the center with the JDP government. The US has supported moderate Islam and the JDP government. Kili maintained that post-modernism rejected the principles of enlightenment. Kili stated that post-modernism demonstrated lack of principles, supported anti-integrative movements and ideas, and supported anti-integration with sects and religious movements. The post-modernists have supported fragmentation. In that sense, they supported the JDP policies (pp.335-337).

In sum, Kemalism was institutionalized in the civil-military bureaucracy. Its principles started to be challenged since the transition to a multiparty system. The economic developments of the 1980s altered the nature of Kemalism. Economic statism was replaced by liberal economic policies. After the Cold War, the world system changed, and the effects of globalization accelerated. Rapid communication and global trade further shook the Kemalist republic. The JDP introduced a new era. The JDP members were rooted in the Islamic movement called *Milli Görüş,* national view; however, they called their party a conservative democratic party. It should be taken into consideration that, as the world system changed, globalization converted our world into a global village, and postmodernism gained an upper hand. In that sense, the JDP supported the EU accession process, and made many reforms. The JDP's aims and discourses were different from the Kemalist paradigm. They gave importance to Islam. Moreover, Kurdish identity was

openly addressed and the Kurdish question began to be identified as an ethnic problem rather than as a problem of terrorism. They emphasized Islam as a unifying factor among Kurds and Turks. The other solution was seen as the constitutional change. The liberal policies of the JDP identified the nation with other ethnicities and Islam rather than with the secularism and homogeneity supported by Kemalism. In sum, JDP's liberal democracy was seen as a solution to the Kurdish question. The main supporter of Kemalism was the military. The Turkish military organization lost its autonomy over state affairs, especially after the trials of the Ergenokon case.

### 7.3.3 The Creation of the New Bourgeoisie

As Kahraman stated, conservative Anatolian capitalism was organized in the 1970s. This situation expanded when Özal held office (p.xi). The National Salvation Party was advocated by the small Anatolian merchants and business people. The Islamic bourgeoisie had grown in the 1980s and 1990s. This Islamic bourgeoisie included holding companies, investment houses, banks and insurance companies. Consequently, the Welfare Party changed its statist politics. Change in the structure of the voters altered the economic policies of the Welfare Party. It began to support globalization and an open market economy. In the 1991 election campaign, the Welfare Party advocated the just order, *"adil düzen"*. This order was considered as an interest-free economic order. Moreover, it was also alleged that it was the mixture of liberalism and statism (Hale & Özbudun, p.8).

Since 1979, Western Europe and the US began to apply a new right approach to politics, with neo-con policies being on this new right. They were against the social statist left. In that era, Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl came to power. After the 1980s, the public lost their rights of free education, health and social insurance (Kahraman, p.109).

In 1983, the adventure of the national bourgeoisie ended. Bourgeoisie was separated from the state-controlled character. Thus, free bourgeoisie wanted to control the state (Kahraman, p.120). Özal was tolerant towards Islam. In that time, privatization and deregulation of the mass media was witnessed. Islamic television channels, newspapers, magazines emerged. Moreover, democratization, liberalism, pluralism and an open society

were strengthened. Furthermore, a number of socio-cultural Islamic organizations, Sufi orders and Islamic Business associations like the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, *Müstakil Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği*, (the MÜSIAD), human rights organizations such as the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People, (Mazlum-der), and trade unions such as (Hak-iş) were strengthened and prospered during this time.

It should be noted that the policies of Turgut Özal were export-oriented, supporting free market economy and conforming to global capitalism. Urbanization, social mobility, and communication increased (Karasipahi, pp.35-36). The majority of the population suffered from high inflation and unemployment. The hegemonic character of Kemalism deteriorated. Kahraman defined the Motherland Party's economic policies as neo-liberal, new right. The neo-liberal politics were in favor of non-governmental organizations and freedom. The new right politics, on the other hand, were in favor of conservatism. Afterwards, the WP was in power and the power of Anatolian capitalism increased. It was apparent that the military intervention of 28 February 1997 interrupted this process. Kahraman declared that the Turkish right had not processed liberal consciousness in real terms. In a common sense, the Turkish right has always been in favor of statism. He mentioned that the suppression of others and an Islamic cover-up of this situation were apparent (Kahraman, pp.xi-xii, 10).

The economic program of the JDP was regarded as a mixture of communitarianism (conservatism) and liberalism. The communitarian-liberal ideology was explained as a combination of free market with community values, religious beliefs, norms and traditions. In that sense, the economic program of the JDP was based on establishment of a democratic, transparent, caring post-developmental state having closer ties with its society. It is clear that this post-developmental state ensured the development of a free market economy. Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that this system would also aim to ensure economic growth and distributive justice (Keyman & Öniş, pp.167-189). The privatization program accelerated under the governance of the JDP. Even the Minister of the Finance, Kemal Unakıtan, declared that they would sell all of these firms, including both the profitable and unprofitable ones (Cumhuriyeti Kuşatanlar, p.101).

The JDP's liberal economic policies and its entrepreneurship in the Middles East, plus its policies on the EU were supported by MUSIAD, TUSKON, TUSIAD and *Gülen* and *Nakşibendi* tariqats (Uzgel, p.38). TUSKON, the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey have been representing the interests of conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs in Turkey and abroad. It was founded in 2005 (Rabasa & Larrabee, p.53.). Islamic Business associations like the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, *Müstakil Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği*, (the MUSIAD) also called the "Anatolian tigers" was comprised of small and medium-sized business units from Anatolian cities (Demir, et. al.). It was important organization in the 1990s when the Welfare Party was in power. The MUSIAD continued to be an influential economic force in the time of the JDP government. Both the TUSIAD and MUSIAD supported the pro-European policies of the JDP. It was claimed that the JDP was against the class differences, and the JDP held religion to be the cement in social issues. Moreover, the JDP's administration of local governments satisfied the needs of Turkish society (Keyman & Öniş, pp.185, 188).

It should be noted that the Anatolian bourgeoisie used the opportunities of the 1990s to insert its interests between the TUSIAD and military. It was stressed that the TUSIAD's approach after 2002 elections was anti-military (Yavuz & Özcan, p.122) MUSIAD had close relations with the Welfare Party in the 1990s. It has even had organic ties with the JDP. It was expressed that about ten MUSIAD members were also the founding members of the JDP and also, about twenty MUSIAD members became the JDP deputies in the 2002 elections. It should be noted that half of the MUSIAD companies were established between 1980 and 1990. The majority of these companies have been family-owned small and medium-sized companies. Some of these companies are located in Istanbul and half of them are located in Anatolian cities, especially, Konya, Kayseri, and Gaziantep. It is obvious that the members of the MUSIAD, being proponents of the privatizations and marketization of public services, have been neo-liberals Islamic capital, they became the bosses and the owners of rural industry. The main point related to this has been the internationally integrationist character of these organizations. They were in conformity with globalization (Kahraman, p.119). They have been powerful and confident and have been trading around the world. It was mentioned that the rise of the new middle class in

Anatolian towns ended the monopoly of state-centric capital. The pro-JDP, conservative proto-bourgeoisie supported the new political elites. New industrial centers emerged in such Anatolian cities as Kayseri and Gaziantep (Bacik& Salur, p.173; Şen, 2010, pp.71-74).

It should be indicated that the Islamic sects and religious community structure strengthened the formation of Anatolian capital. Moreover, there has been intra-community solidarity helped the formation of cooperation in many other fields. In sum, they are loyal to religious values but they are also open to changes, and they are rational in their economic decisions. They are uncomfortable with state intervention in the economy. In that sense, it is mentioned that they believe that they can guarantee their future within the market economy. There has been a conflict among Anatolian capital and Istanbul capital.  Istanbul capital was strengthened with the help of state support. It was alleged that Anatolian capital benefited from the open market economy and competition. (Demir, et.al. pp.171-177).

In sum, it was maintained, this new bourgeoisie of the JDP was not that new, and it was born during 1970s developed in Özal's era and also during the office of the Welfare Party. This bourgeoisie strengthened in Erdoğan's era. Lending mechanism of the JDP government was operated successfully; this helped the small and medium-sized enterprises borrow from the public banks. Social policies of the JDP were regarded very active. Also, TUSIAD was satisfied with the JDP's economic policies in office in terms of closer relations with the IMF and the EU (Kahraman, 2009; Keyman & Öniş, pp.192-193, 199).

The "green holdings" collected large amounts of money from Turks in Germany. Most of them were based in Konya (Rabasa & Larrabee, p.57). Baykal condemned the JDP for creating a religion-based economy on 9 November 2004. It was claimed that Erdoğan owned important amounts of shares in the distributer firms of *Ülker*. *İstikbal,* and *Yimpaş*. Ömer Zapsu's BIM Markets flourished after the JDP came to power.  Moreover, it is significant to note that in the first six months of 2004, 1.3 billion dollars entered the system. The source of this amount of money was unknown. The consultants of the JDP, Cüneyt Zapsu and Korkut Özal, determined that they were dealing with the administration

of Islamic investments. It should be noted that Korkut Özal has been one of the shareholders of Faisal Finance and Al Baraka Finance. These financial organizations had originally been founded in Saudi Arabia (Rubin, 2005, cited in Akinan, 2006, pp.164-168). It is important to note that a commission was set up to investigate this "green money" issue in March 2005. Afterwards, a report was prepared and approved by the parliament in April 2006. It was declared that 5 billion Euros had been collected by green holdings. The report was forwarded to the Prime Ministry and Ministry of Justice, but no one took proper steps against these companies (Rabasa & Larrabee, p.58).

### 7.3.4 The Justice and Development Party and the Developments in Iraq

Erdoğan pointed out that if the note of 1 March 2003 was refused, the massacre of *Halepçe* could be repeated in Mosul and Kirkuk. Moreover, he threatened his MPs by saying that they were guided by other party leaders, implying Erbakan. He forced his MPs to approve the note by emphasizing that if the note was refused, they would take radical economic precautions, they would limit the expenses and impose new taxes. Moreover, Erdoğan indicated that if Turkey did not go to war in Iraq, the losses in Iraq would increase. Furthermore, he stated that according to the Turkish armed forces, Turkey could not prevent the war. In this context, the JDP expressed going to war would allow Turkey to be one of the actors having a word on the future of Iraq (Erdoğan, 2003, March 1). It is important to note that Erdoğan was trying to persuade his MPs that Turkey would ease the burden of the US and therefore, Turkey would not be obliged to apply a heavier economic package.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made an "Address to the Nation Speech", *"Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşması"* on 23 March 2003. In this speech, he maintained that the opening of Turkish air space to foreign air forces was in the Turkish national interest and it was considered as a necessity of being an ally. He also stated that the presence of Turkish soldiers in the region would be the source of stability and safety for both Turkey and for the region. Erdoğan stated that the natural resources of Iraq should belong to the nation of Iraq. He mentioned that the territorial integrity of Iraq was essential. He claimed that Turkey and the US agreed on all these issues. He articulated that the JDP government had

provided all the things necessary to prevent such a war. Erdoğan claimed that the UN was harmed by this process; the EU states were separated, and the Arab League faced clashes among its members. He stated the common sense of the world could not prevent the war. He stated that they hoped this war to be stopped as soon as possible. In that sense, he stated that the memorandum to open Turkish air space to foreign armed forces was approved in Parliament on 20 March 2003. Moreover, he stressed the military regulation of the border to control the migration process (Erdoğan, March 23, 2003).

Dealing with the foreign policy of the JDP government, the book of Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategic Depth, *Stratejik Derinlik*, would be an important guide. As seen in the writings of Huntington and Fukuyama, a new era was beginning in international politics. Communism was not seen as a threat against liberalism and liberal values after the end of the Cold War. The new threat was Islam. It was articulated by Huntington that there has been a clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West. Davutoğlu, being the director of foreign policy of the JDP, was the most well respected intellectual. He stated that Turkey possessed a strategic depth, and the moving away from this threat assessment approach to develop active engagement in regional political systems was needed, and this for the enactment of this policy, he was proposing intermediary relations in problematic issues of the Middle East, the Balkans, Transcaucasia and Asia (Davutoğlu, 2000, cited in Hale & Özbudun, p120). Davutoğlu regarded Turkey as a problem-solver and the central country to contribute global and regional peace and become a bridge between the West and the Muslim world (Davutoğlu, 2002, cited in Hale & Özbudun, p.120).

Hale and Özbudun stated that there was a division of foreign policy arrangements into hard power and soft power approaches. It was stated that the Republican foreign policy-making prioritized hard power. This meant that national security and military affairs would come first. This policy could be called a securitized nationalism. The JDP government, on the other hand, chose the soft power approach; it was also called de-securitized liberalism. This approach gave importance to economic, cultural and political issues. The JDP tried to solve conflicting regional issues. Moreover, good neighborhood relations had been forged with Greece, the Balkan countries, Russia, the Central Asian countries and the

Transcaucasian countries. It was pointed out by Hale and Özbudun that this soft power approach gave some freedom in the relations with the US and the EU (p.121).

Manisalı mentioned that there was collaboration among the US, the JDP and big capital. It was alleged that both the US and the EU were against the position of the Turkish Armed Forces. Manisalı articulated that the main supporters of the JDP during the establishment of the party were the US, the UK and Israel (Manisalı, 2008, pp.33-379).

It was observed that the US and the EU preferred moderate Islam over radical Islam. In 1996, the RAND Corporation, headed by Fuller, proposed that moderate Islam was much better than an Atatürkist Turkish Republic. Moreover, it was alleged in the *Aydınlık* newspaper on 20 October 1996, that Morton Abramowitz was grooming Tayyip Erdoğan to replace Necmettin Erbakan. The JDP was needed to pursue the Greater Middle East policy of the US (Manisalı, pp.53, 81, 26, 31). It is significant that the JDP supported the US-led invasion of Iraq (Keyman & Öniş, p.173). Manisalı stated that the US and the EU were against establishment of a Turkish state just like their own. They preferred the strengthening of the market and brotherhood organizations (Manisalı, p.91).

The strategic relations between Turkey and the US deteriorated after the decision of the Turkish Parliament not to allow the stationing of the US troops in south-eastern Turkey. It was mentioned that this decision taken in the parliament received a positive response on the public front and moreover, it was supported by France and Germany. It was alleged that the democratic reform process of Turkey within the EU context had progressed (Keyman & Öniş, p.192).

The JDP and the military decided that the intervention of the US in Iraq was seen as favorable. Hence, the stationing of the US troops in Turkish territory was supported. It was hoped that Turkey could be a buffer zone in northern Iraq. However, the 1 March voting which allowed US troops to enter Turkish territory was refused by the Parliament because of three votes (Hale & Özbudun, p.124). A memorandum of understanding with the US had provided that 62,000 US troops and 255 war planes would be stationed in Turkish territory, with 60,000 Turkish troops occupying a 30 km buffer zone in Northern Iraq

(Bila, 2003, cited in Hale & Özbudun, p.131). The government demanded 92 million dollars from the US. In return, the US promised 6 billion dollars in grants and 24 billion dollars in loans on 26 February 2003. The rejection of the memorandum was surprising both for the JDP and the US. The second resolution of 1 March 2003 allowed the coalition air forces to use Turkish air space. Moreover, on 24 June 2003, the government allowed the US to use *İncirlik* NATO air base and the Mersin port for logistical support. Furthermore, Turkish troops which were expected to number 10,000-12,000 would join an international stabilization force in Iraq. However, this was disapproved of by the US and Interim Iraqi Authorities (Hale & Özbudun, pp.131-133).

Although the military had major reservations about the war and the future of northern Iraq, the high military command supported cooperation with the US. The speaker and the president of the Parliament were opposed to cooperation without a UN resolution that could legitimize the war against Iraq. Moreover, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül was uncomfortable with the idea of a northern front launching from Turkey. The Prime Minister-elect, the leader of the JDP, was in favor of cooperation (Kaya, p.73).

The Hood Incident that happened on 4 July 2003 was called an awful and inappropriate event by Erdoğan. He stated that "all the necessary steps were taken and all the necessary things were said". However, he emphasized that governance of the state should be done reasonably; it was not to be accomplished with instant emotions (Erdoğan, 2003, July 10). He was against giving a diplomatic note to the US and he declared that the relations between the US and Turkey should not be colored. He defied anyone who wanted to harm these relations to come on the scene (Erdoğan, 2003, July 7).

The Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Hilmi Özkök, expressed his views in a meeting held with the US's Commander in charge of American forces settled in Europe, General James Jones said that "we would retaliate largely if any such event happened, again" (Özkök, 2003, July 9).

Erdoğan stressed that the *Süleymaniye* crisis was solved with diplomatic intervention, and he identified this event as "unfortunate". He hoped, after those events, these two allies,

Turkey and the US would not behave with erroneous intelligence He maintained that, being allies, they should acquire intelligence directly from each other (Erdoğan, 2003, July 9). Moreover, there were demands on military operations that should be held against the PKK. However, Erdoğan told a group of journalists that "there is no reason to carry out an operation against the PKK if they are not attacking" (Cemal, 2006, October, 1).

## 7.3.5 The Justice and Development Party and the Annan Plan

The JDP was considered a pragmatic party with cosmopolitan tendencies (Keyman & Öniş, pp.232-233).The JDP definitely mentioned that the Cyprus problem should be solved. The JDP gave the Belgium case as an example. The JDP supported creation of a state with two sovereign communities. Dealing with the solution, the JDP was sure that the unity and identity of the Turkish community and self-determination rights would be protected (The JDP's 2002 Election Declaration, pp.82-84). In that sense, the JDP denied the understanding that "lack of a solution is the solution". The JDP converted from the "thesis of the confederation" to the "thesis of federation" by referring to the Belgium model (Fırat, 2009, p.444)

The Cyprus issue was a conflicting issue between the army and the JDP. The JDP supported the Annan Plan in November 2002. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arranged a plan for the establishment of a bizonal federal republic. There would have been a significant reduction in the Turkish military presence. However, the Commander of Land Forces, Aytaç Yalman, strongly opposed the so-called plan during his Cyprus visit to Denktaş in January 2003. However, the National Security Council supported the Annan Plan on 23 January 2004. Twin referenda were held on both sides. Turkish Cypriots supported the plan while Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, rejected the plan (Hale & Özbudun, pp.82-83). Erdoğan and Denktaş had totally different agendas for the solution of the Cyprus issue. Denktaş characterized the Cyprus issue as a national struggle, and in that sense, he was not so keen on the Annan plan and negotiations. The neo-nationalists advocated rigidly standing by the status-quo. As Uslu maintained, General Büyükanıt and Rauf Denktaş linked the Cyprus issue to the Treaty of Sevres. Erdoğan, on the other hand, was trying to solve this issue as soon as possible (Uslu, p.81).

According to accession negotiations that began on 3 October 2005, the Turkish government was obliged to sign an additional protocol enlarging the customs union agreement including new members. Turkey was conflicted about the issue to sign this agreement with Southern Cypriots. It was argued that this would mean recognizing them. Moreover, opening of the harbors and airports of Turkey to Southern Cyprus was required. The JDP government allowed the visa-free entry of Greek Cypriots to Turkey in 2003. Moreover, a new provision came onto the scene "absorption capacity of the union (Hale & Özbudun, pp.124-125).

## 7.3.6 The Justice and Development Party and the Republican Meetings

Ayla Göl opposed the views of Huntington about Turkey as a "torn-country" in his famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*. He claimed that the JDP was an Islamist Party and they would be against any pro-western policies. Göl pointed out that the JDP accelerated the accession talks with the EU and moreover, trade between Israel and Turkey had increased between the years 2002-2008. Furthermore, Huntington mentioned that Turkey could lead Islam by rejecting the legacy of Atatürk. Nonetheless, Göl considered that the protest meetings of 2007 which took place in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir revealed that the Turkish people participating in these meetings opposed both the domination of the army over Turkish democracy and the Islamic agenda of the JDP (Göl, pp.798-802). It was alleged that many secularists thought that, although the JDP was following policies to enter the EU, democratization demands were regarded as hiding the issue of a gradual Islamization agenda (Somer, p.1279).

The JDP was condemned by the nationalist leftists in that its politics paved the way for the creation of the alliance of Kurd-Islam (Erdem, 2007, p.15). They alleged that the theorists of the Kurd-Islam synthesis were all in favor of Ottomanism. They were all against Turkish nationalism, but advocated Kurdish nationalism (TürkSolu, 109, 2006, June 12). It was alleged that there had been a block created by the JDP government, Sharia-Kurdism-Liberalism (TürkSolu, 120, 2006, November 20). Moreover, the JDP was regarded as the collaborator of the West, the EU and the US. TUSIAD supported the JDP policies, especially, related to the IMF and the EU and they tried to convince the EU that the JDP

was not an Islamic party (TürkSolu, 17, 2002, November 18). The strengthening of Laz and Cherkess ethnicities were dangerous for the national integrity of Turkey. Moreover, TürkSolu claimed that the Armenian Lobbyists, the TUSIAD and the media owned by Aydın Doğan wanted the improvement of the relationship between Armenia and Turkey. Furthermore, TürkSolu opposed the European Union's harmonization packages by stating that Kurdish educational and broadcasting rights would bring a Free Kurdish State (TürkSolu, 23, July 21, 2003).

It was mentioned that the mass republican rallies of 2007 were organized by retired military officers, Kemalist associations and secular women's groups. Indeed, the majority of the protesters were coming from the new middle class. It is indicated that this new middle class was emerging out of the service economy. This class is comprised of lawyers, engineers and doctors. They focused on the outside world and they stressed individualism. Moreover, they strongly emphasized rule of law, rather than rule of ethnic, tribal or religion-based solidarity. They felt threatened by the JDP's policies. The common slogans of the rallies were "Turkey is secular and will remain secular!", "No pass to headscarf at the Çankaya Palace", "We are all Turks", "Neither Shariah, nor military coup", "Look at us! Count! How many are we here?" It was mentioned before that supporters of these rallies were anti-EU and anti-US and they believed that the JDP was using the EU to counter the Kemalist nation-state. It was emphasized that the core mobilizing force of these meetings and new mergers of the parties resulted from a fear-based nationalism. The republican rallies and protesters' slogans called for secularist parties to unite against the Islamists. (Yavuz, Özcan, pp122-124)

It is apparent that the people participating in these rallies did not compose a definite economic class. Some of them were opposing to the EU, and the US. Some of them were opposing to privatizations and globalization process. Some of them were against the authoritarian and interventionist policies of the Turkish armed forces. Indeed, all the participants were against the conservative, religious polices of the JDP that were detrimental to secular character of the Republic. Moreover, they were all against the presidency of Erdoğan. Having no common economic base, 2007 elections did not reveal the power of the rallies in the ballot box. It was the victory of the JDP and its bourgeoisie

class and moreover, the victory of the people benefitting from its liberal policies. After the 2007 election victory, the JDP pressed the button for Ergenokon trials; almost all the organizers of these rallies were sued.

It is alleged that Ergenokon organization has comprised nationalist, secular intellectuals and members of high military command, retired generals, journalists, academicians, and party leader. It was stated that they tried to form coups against government of the Justice and Development Party. The Ergenokon Crime Organization including ultranationalists were accused of plotting famous author of Turkey, Nobel prize winner Orhan Pamuk, journalist Fehmi Koru, Kurdish politicians, the death of Armenian-origin Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, two Italian priests, three Protestant missionaries (Gökçek, 2009, p.113), bombing of leftist newspaper Cumhuriyet, the murder of the Council of the State. Many people were detained, long trial process has been continuing. It was stated the Ergenokon Crime Organization was charged of extortion, narcotics trafficking and it had been controlling the PKK, Marxist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) and Islamist groups and organizations (Jenkins, 2009, p.9).

# 8. CONCLUSION

This study carried out to discover the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism. It was initiated by awareness of complexities and problems inherent in definition and classification of Turkish nationalism. Secondly, it aimed to be a guide to evaluate the main features of today's Turkish nationalism.

The second chapter of this thesis points the emergence of nationalism in political history and political theory. Dealing with Ancient Greece, it is indicated although each city-state had its own identity, ceremonies, cults, and political arrangements; the city-states shared some similarities as common ancestry, common language, common religion and common way of life. It is important that language was constitutive element in Ancient Greece. In that sense, it was used to categorize people as Greeks and Barbarians. The Ancient Greece was a stateless community comprising of citizens and slave community. Having no bourgeoisie class and being a stateless community, nationalism was inexistent in the Ancient Greece. It is argued that whether Ancient Greece could be a sample of nationalism, or not. It is explained that Ancient Greece was not regarded as a sample of nationalism, it could easily be considered as an influential phenomenon in modern nationalism. The rhetoric of a chosen people and institutionalized will of citizenry were evident in Ancient Greece. Ancient Greece was a model of cultural unity and guide for future nationalisms and modern states through the history. Focusing on Ancient Greece, it could be presumed that there were three important contributions of Ancient Greece which aided in the process of becoming a nation and understanding the nationalism: adherence to the community, holding the common ancestors in esteem and paying respect to the national myths. Dealing with Peloponnesian war, it is examined that war has been the constructive element in emergence of some kind of nationalist feeling and behavior.

Imperialism and universalism were seen in the Ottoman Empire. The community of mankind was apparent in the political thought of the middle ages, this era was envisaged as the age of empires. The feudalism was considered as the starting point in the emergence of

nation-states. The multiple political authorities as the Roman Empire, papacy, national monarchies, feudal lords and city-states were seen. The idea of nationalism was developed in the Renaissance and Reformation periods. The authority of the church was diminished during the Renaissance era, secular culture began to be developed, and states gained power. The middle class strengthened. Therefore, the economic revival of the bourgeoisie class resulted with the abolishment of feudalism.

English nationalism emerging in 17<sup>th</sup> century had liberal and individualistic features. Centralized government, limitations of the royal power, alteration of old nobles, industrialization, commercial activities, English colonialism, scientific advancement, political participation, Protestantism, the Puritan Revolution, translation of the Bible, and the geographic position of Englansd, contributed to the development of English nationalism. English nationalism was not defined with ethnic terms, it was defined with Protestantism. The Puritan Revolution was influential on common people to feel as the parts of a nation. Hobbes suggested that the strong state was needed to provide a peaceful society. Hobbes maintained that well-being and liberty of commonwealth was much more important than the well-being and liberty of an individual.

Dealing with emergence of American nationalism, the loyalty to mother country, the British Empire was ceased. The American people had no feudal or aristocratic past; liberalism, federalism, religious freedom and economic conditions help create American nation.

The Philosophers of the Enlightenment were influential on French nationalism. French language was revealed as important indicator of French nationalism. The employment of new officers diminished the power of nobles. Popular education, industrialization, patriotism, national will contributed to French nationalism. Unlike English nationalism, French nationalism considered as collective power, not as individual liberty. The main indicator of French revolution was the strengthening of bourgeoisie class. In sum, American, English and French nationalism were all against the monarchy.

German nationalism was against humanist and liberal approaches; romanticism was influential on German nationalism. The national consciousness of Germans flourished with the Napoleonic wars; Napoleon helped decrease the numbers of German states. German states were surrounded by France and Russia, this paved way for the enhancement of national sentiment. Germans gave importance to their ethnic and linguistic features. In this context, as Herder pointed out that language was a product of rational faculty and distinguished one nation from another. German nationalism was defined as cultural nationalism focusing on a concept of *volk. Volk* is metaphysical entity having common culture, art, language, traditions and religion. Unification of Italy provided the emergence of Italian nationalism.

Investigating all these nationalisms, it is determined that nationalism is defined with common culture, common history, common language, common will and with a state comprising these features. It has been a bond to comprise and unite some people and differentiate and separate some others. It is also apparent that bourgeoisie class is needed for the emergence of nationalism.

Theories of nationalism have been a guide to determine our approach. Primordialism maintains that nations have been existent since the ancient times. In this context, ethnicity and kinship are used to explain nationalism. Perennialism explains that the modern nations are descendants of their ancient counterparts. Ethno-symbolism gives importance to the ethnic backgrounds, myths, symbols, values to explain the modern nations. As Armstrong stated, contemporary nationalism was the final stage of a larger cycle of ethnic consciousness. It is alleged that the first nations were based on ethnic grounds and strengthened common culture. According to Smith, ethno-symbolism focuses on subjective symbolic and socio-cultural elements in the continuity of ethnicities. In that sense, ethno-symbolists deal with earlier collective identities and their influence on the ascent of nations. This approach suggests that bypassing national cultures would bring the decline of nationalism.

Modernist approach maintains that nations are made of nationalism. In that sense, nations exist within the context of nationalism. Contributions of Kohn, Deutsch, Kedourie,

Breuilly, Brass, Minogue, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Anderson, Hrosch, Nairn, Hechter were investigated. Breuilly indicates that nationalism was explained as the usage of state power. The interests and values of the nation take precedence over all other interests and values. Brass maintains that, both nationality and nationalism are not givens; they are social and political constructions and modern phenomenons. Brass indicates that these notions are connected to the activities of the modern state, and they are created by the elites.

As Minogue alleges nationalism has been a political movement emerged depending on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners. First stage has been revealed that nation suffers from oppression. Secondly, the nation struggles for independence. The third stage has been the consolidation of national unity. It is also mentioned that one common accompaniment has been xenophobia.

Hobsbawm states that intelligentsia and bourgeoisie created both nations and nationalism. He alleges that nationalism create state and nation. Hobsbawm believes that nations and nationalisms fulfilled their functions and became unnecessary in the era of globalization. He points out that language has been one of the alternative ways of distinguishing cultural communities. Hobsbawm alleges that religion has been ancient and well-tried method of establishing community.

Gellner, also states that nations are not natural and god-given. In that sense, nationalism can be defined as general imposition of high culture on society. Anderson states capitalism provided the development of print, and in turn, this helped the creation of vernacular-based nationalism in Europe. In that sense, mass media and educational system are influential to inspire national ideology.

Nairn states that unequal development of capitalism resulted with the emergence of nationalism. He maintains that imperialist policies of core western countries motivated the elites of the periphery. These elites objected to the intervention of foreigners.

Fourth chapter explains the nascent Turkish nationalism by referring to the Ottoman modernization process. The term "Turk" was used to describe ignorant peasants. Turks

identified themselves as Muslims till the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Sultan Selim III tried to create new army to consolidate his power. *Sened-i İttifak* was signed to protect the authority of Sultan against the emerged class, *ayans*. It is explained that there was national bourgeoisie in Romania, Greece and Serbia; however, Turkish- Muslim class did not see a bourgeoisie class. The Ottoman administration classified its citizens according to their religion. *Tanzimat* Edict proposed some king of equality among the subjects of the Sultan. The Edict maintained the replacement of *millet* system with Ottomanism. The *Tanzimat* reforms brought the secularization of the state machinery. The non-Muslims were allowed the carry arms. Traditional leaders of non-Muslims preferred the continuation of the Ottoman rule to protect their positions. *Tanzimat* aimed to ensure the loyalties of non-Muslims; however, this system was unsuccessful to provide Ottoman unification and solidarity. Young Ottomans could not be regarded as nationalist in today's terms. There was no bourgeoisie class. Moreover, there has been no ethnic solidarity and identity among the masses.

The Young Ottomans; Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha dealt with the notion of *vatan* (homeland) and *hürriyet* (freedom). After the end of the 1820s, the empire began to enter the capitalist world system. The free trade policies of *Tanzimat* were criticized by the Young Ottomans. The Edicts of 1839, 1856, and the Land Code of 1858 and the constitution of 1876 contributed to the legalization of private property and private land. It is important to indicate that from 1838, the Ottoman landlords gained independence, and they began to sell and buy products. The *Tanzimat* era was identified with capitalism, liberalism, consolidation of private property, technological changes, and the emergence of new class, landlords, *ayans*. Armenian and Greek communities were the national bourgeoisie of the Empire.

Young Ottomans harshly criticized the economic policies of Ottoman bureaucrats. The main criticisms were against foreign debt, foreign intervention, economic domination and superiority of the minorities. Young Ottomans advocated omitting the foreign words from Turkish. Dealing with common will, constructing factor of nationalism, *Tanzimat* intellectuals and bureaucrats introduced Ottomanism as consolidating factor. However, there was no such common will among the subjects of the Empire. Young Ottomans

introduced homeland, freedom, and consultation in to agenda. They aimed to correct the errors of *Tanzimat* reforms. Namık Kemal proposed *İttihad-ı İslam* to provide the solidarity of Muslims under the flag of Islam.

Fifth chapter explains the emergence of Turkish nationalism. As Berkes maintains that economically developed classes incited nationalism. Turkish nationalism was considered as a proto-nationalism and it was the state ideology in 1913 by the CUP. In that sense, policies of the CUP, the nationalist elites, journals and organizations were influential in construction of Turkish nationalism. The Balkan Wars contributed to the abolishment of Ottomanism. The Balkan national movements tried to establish homogeneous states based on religious affiliation. Moreover, the Ottoman Muslims were expelled and persecuted in these Balkan states. Furthermore, the immigrants were settled in the Anatolia. Therefore, the resettlement policies of the Ottoman Empire consolidated Turkish nationalism.

The CUP government helped establish private firms, and accomplished many regulations to create Turkish- Muslim bourgeoisie. It is noted that Young Turks and also the members of the CUP were not the representative of bourgeoisie. They were intellectuals, journalists, writers and civil servants who were influenced by the western political thought and changes arouse both in the administrative system of the Empire and the world system. Dealing with common language, Decree of 1894 provided Turkish language to be used in all the schools of the Empire. Moreover, the CUP program of 1908 declared Turkish as official language. Ahmet Hikmet favored purification of Ottoman language from Arabic and Persian words. Moreover, the journal of *Genç Kalemler* contributed the purification of the language. Gökalp did not advocate excessive linguistic purification. The CUP maintained economic and demographic Turkification. Gökalp alleged that Turan was remote purpose to be realized. Yusuf Akçura has been other important intellectual of that era by advocating Turkism.

Chapter six explains the main parameters of Turkish nationalism in the Republican era. Turkish nationalism of the Republican era could be explained through Kemalist nationalism, Turkism, Turkish-Islam synthesis and lastly neo-nationalism, *ulusalcılık.* Kemalism has been the official ideology of Turkey. Kemalism is based on modernization

process. It aimed to establish national, modern and secular society. Kemalist nationalism has been explained as collectivist nationalism depending on authoritarianism. Turkish national movement was affected by the War of Independence, invasions of the foreigners, deportation, massacre, exchange of population, and expulsions. In this context, vulnerability and survival have been the significant factors in construction of this nationalism. It aimed to construct unitary nation-state with one nation and one language. The notion of homeland has been primary variable of nationalism. In that sense, as mentioned, the demographic conditions, wars, settlement of Lazes, Kurds, Cherkessees, the National Pact and Sevres Treaty strengthened Turkish nationalism. Moreover, the Lausanne Treaty has been significant to determine the minorities of the Republic. Non-Muslims were considered as the minorities of the Republic. It has been determinant in crystallization of Turkish national citizenship. The status of minority foundations and citizenship policies of early Republican period consolidated the Turkish identity. Moreover, Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were used to interpret the history. The economic policies of Kemalism were capitalist and anti-imperialist. Turkification of the economy was the main aim of the early Republican era. The landlords were the powerful elements of the RPP. Also, there was infant bourgeoisie. It is significant that military-civil intelligentsia was the main core of the Kemalist regime.

The Pan-Turkist movement aimed to provide some sort of union among all peoples of Turkish origin. Turan has been rather broader concept, including Finns and Hungarians. It is stated that Kemalist regime rejected Pan-Turkist tendencies. During the Second World War, Germany supported Pan-Turkism against the Soviet Union. After the defeat of Germany, Turkism trials were begun. The Nationalist Action Party has been influential party of Turkish nationalism. The NAP was close to Sunnis and Turks. The NAP was against communism, Marxism, capitalism. It is declared that the enemies of the state have been the enemies of the party.

The revival of Islam was witnessed. The Turkish-Islam Synthesis was based on Islam and Turkish national culture. Islam has been regarded as the precondition to become a Turk. The Hearth of Enlightened was the vanguard of this ideology.

Chapter seven tries to evaluate the nationalisms of the Republican People's Party (the RPP), the Nationalist Action Party (the NAP), and the Justice and Development Party (the JDP). Turkish nationalism has been represented by the RPP and the NAP. Nationalism of the NAP has been conservative, in that sense, the NAP supports traditional and Islamic values. The RPP has been the follower of the Kemalist principles. The Justice and Development Party (the JDP) pursues the necessities of the globalization process. It gives importance to internationalism, accession to the EU, integration with the global markets. Also, the JDP gives importance to Islamism and traditional values.

Turkish nationalism needs antagonistic forces to become powerful and influential. During this period between 2002 and 2007, Kurdish issue, Armenian genocide issue, Cyprus issue, Kirkuk issue, minorities living in Turkey, relations with the EU, and the US and the Republican rallies were the main dimensions that should be investigated within the agenda of Turkish nationalism.

The neo-nationalist, *ulusalcı* approach has had anti-EU, anti-US, anti-JDP tendencies. This approach gendered in the middle of 1990s, against the Islamist Welfare Party and liberal economic policies of that time. The RPP has made the main contributor to the neonationalism. Yeniçağ, neo-nationalist newspaper, critisized Islamist and pro-Kurdish policies of the JDP a well as its neo-liberal economic policies, and also the impacts of tariqats on the society. In that sense, the JDP was condemned of being pro-Kurdist, pro-EU, pro-US, anti-Kemalist, and anti-secular. The main aim of the neo-nationalist movement was the full independence of Turkey from foreign intervention, consolidation of unitary and modern state, enforcement of secularism and the toppling of the JDP government. They prepared the Republican rallies. The organizers of these rallies were against the sale of national factories, banks, privatization, and impact of non-governmental organizations, moderate Islam, and also the rhetoric like "we are all Armenians".

Dealing with the nationalism of the RPP, it accepts the living of one's ethnic identity freely. However, ethnic identity should not be converted into constitutive part of Turkey's political structure. The RPP has been against the supremacy of tariqats and moderate Islam over secular character of the Republic. The RPP mentions all the individuals of Turkey

belongs to same nation and they are all citizens belonging to same nation. The RPP points out the negative effects of the globalization process. The secular and democratic Turkey model has been proposed by the RPP. Although some of the recommendations of the EU e.g. giving linguistic and cultural rights for Kurdish people, have had some contradictions with the unitary structure of the state; the RPP supported the legislative reforms. It considers the policies of the JDP submissive. The RPP supports the accession to the EU and having good relations with the NATO. Moreover, the RPP stated the Iraq war was illegitimate. It rejected March 1 note. Furthermore, the hood event was severely criticized. The US was condemned of helping the PKK. The RPP considered policies of both the JDP and the US were failed. Dealing with Annan Plan, the RPP sided with Rauf Denktaş. The RPP was in favor of the Republican rallies and participated in them.

Dealing with the Nationalist Action Party, the NAP opposed to communism in 1970s and it opposed to the PKK in 1980s. The main threats to national integrity and solidarity 2000s have been the PKK, the EU and the globalization process. It is important to note that the NAP lost its economic power that supported it in 1990s. In that sense, the Anatolian tigers have supported the JDP in 2000s. The NAP rejects racism being part of its ideology. It continued to support death penalty for Öcalan. Accession of Cyprus to the EU was severely criticized. The NAP aims to protect the survival of the state. Cultural, regional and local differences are regarded as the wealth of the nation. Nonetheless, the NAP gave much more importance to the protection of national culture and preservation of identity of Turkish citizenship. Bahçeli criticized the promised US credit for Iraq war. He mentioned that the international legitimacy for the Iraq war had not been provided. Also, like the RPP, the NAP severely criticized the US government and the JDP government on the hood event. Bahçeli condemned the JDP policies that these policies were submissive. The Cyprus issue was declared an issue directly related to the security of Turkey. Annan plan was to provide accession of the Greek Cypriot Republic to the EU. Moreover, the NAP supported Denktaş. Although some of the supporters, members and constituents of the NAP participated in the Republican rallies, administrative cadres of the NAP did not support the rallies. In sum, the NAP could be identified with anti-globalization, anti-Americanism, anti-Europeanism. However, it could not be identified with anti-Kurdism and anti-Islamism.

The cadres within the JDP were the supporters of the national view. The national view approach aimed to provide greater Turkey being the leader of Muslim world, creation of interest free Islamic economy, establishment of Muslim common market, foundation of heavy industry. The supporters of national view were against the western civilization. They have had anti-Semitic, anti-EU, anti-NATO tendencies. They were more tolerant towards ethnic groups and religious activities. The JDP rejected national view and declared itself as conservative democratic party.

The JDP proposes a limited role for the state in the economy, moreover, it promises to diminish the control of the state over civil culture Nationalism has always had economic dimension. When the JDP came to power, the secular middle class had been severely affected by the economic crisis. The conservative middle class, on the other hand, was supported by the government. The JDP has applied liberal economic policies that paved way for foreign investment. It is important to note that the religious entrepreneurial Anatolian bourgeoisie that was flourished during the Özal's era, supported the JDP. The so- called new bourgeoisie of the JDP, the Anatolian tigers, has included owners of small and middle sized businesses supporting liberal policies and open market economy. The JDP tried to fulfill the necessities to become the EU member and enhance the relations with the Western world.

The JDP rejected the ethnic nationalism and justified the constitutional citizenship. The JDP declared that it accepted the unitary character of the state. Moreover, Turkish language has been accepted as the official and instructional language. The JDP indicates the cultural diversity as richness. The JDP approves broadcasting and cultural activities could be done in languages other than Turkish. Erdoğan dealt with supra-identity of Turkish citizenship and ethnic sub-identities. The JDP maintained that this issue could be solved through democratization.

The JDP supported the Turkish contribution to Iraq war. The rejection of the note in the Parliament severed the relations with the US. Moreover, despite all the criticisms about the hood event, the JDP government did not give diplomatic note to the US. The JDP tried to

solve the Cyprus issue and rejected the rhetoric that "the lack of solution is the solution". Therefore, the JDP supported the Annan Plan.

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