T.C
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF 1976 IN ARGENTINA AND 1980 IN TURKEY

– AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

by

ASLI POSTACI

Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Political Science and International Relations

ISTANBUL, 2012

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Abbreviations:

AAA Argentine Anti-communist Alliance

CONADEP National Commission for Disappeared People

CUP Committee of Union and Progress

DP Democratic Party

EGP Guerilla Army of the People

ELN Army of National Liberation

ENR National Revolutionary Army

ERP People's Revolutionary Army

ESG Superior War School

ESMA Naval Mechanics School

FAL Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion

FAP Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IMF International Monetary Fund

JP Justice Party

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC National Security Council

NUC National Unity Committee

PCA Argentina Communist Party

PJ Partido Justicialista (Peronists Party)

PPA Authentic Peronist Party

RPP Republican People's Party

UBA Universidad de Buenos Aires

UCR Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Party)

Acknowledgements

It would not have been possible to write this doctoral thesis without the help and support of the kind people around me, to only some of whom it is possible to give particular mention here.

It is difficult to overstate my gratitude to my Ph.D. supervisor Professor Ahmet N. Yücekök for his guidance and trust in me, and Professor Arturo Aquilino Fernandez for supervising, supporting and encouraging me through my research year in Argentina. I would also like to thank Professor Feroz Ahmad and Professor Cemil Oktay for their support and precious academic mentoring. My chair of department, Professor Meral Sağır is above any gratitude with her endless tolerance all the way through, her wisdom and high spirit at all times. I am also grateful to Assist Professor M. Deniz Tansi for his academic and friendly support; and Assist Professor Hande Tek Turan -my colleague, roommate and friend- for her patience and cordial fellowship. I would also like to give my cordial gratitude to all my beloved colleagues and friends for their support and encouragement throughout, some of whom have already been named.

And above all my family, my angels, Hakan, Nursen and Deniz; thank you, for neither this work nor I would be complete without you.

Abstract

The Military Interventions of 1976 in Argentina and 1980 in Turkey

– An Analysis and Comparison of the Civil-Military Relations

Aslı Postacı

Doctoral Dissertation

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Institute of Social Sciences

Yeditepe University

2012

This thesis aims to shed light on the similarities of the contexts and underlying reasons of the military interventions that took place in 1976 in Argentina and 1980 in Turkey through analysis and comparison of the civil-military relations in Turkey in Argentina. Argentina and Turkey are two countries which originated from and have existed in indisputably distinct historical, cultural and institutional conditions. However, they also have significant similarities as far as their courses of political evolution are concerned, among which the military intervention patterns play a crucial part. The most common patterns are found to be the role of the militaries in the founding of the states and the high esteem of the military figures among the society as the founders of the state, self-perceptions of the militaries as the saviors and the guardians of the nation and the state ideology, German impact on the military officers and institutions until 1960s, United States training and impact on the military officers and institutions from 1960s onwards, political culture that favors military interventions as an alternative to the civilian governments, international conjuncture of Cold War, National Security Strategies designed accordingly, the silent concession of the United States to the interventions, and the role of religion as an antidote to communism.

Key Words: Civil-military relations, military interventions, Argentina

Özet

Arjantin'de 1976 ve Türkiye'de 1980 Askeri Müdahaleleri

Sivil-Asker İlişkileri Üzerine Bir Analiz ve Karşılaştırma

Aslı Postacı

Doktora Tezi

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Yeditepe Üniversitesi

2012

Bu doktora tezi 1976'da Arjantin'de ve 1980'de Türkiye'de gerçekleşen askeri müdahalelerin gerçekleştiği ortamları ve nedenlerini anlayabilmek amacıyla bu ülkelerdeki sivil-asker ilişkilerinin çözümlemesi ve karşılaştırmasını yapmaktadır. Türkiye ve Arjantin temelde farklı tarihsel, kültürel ve kurumsal koşullarda ortaya çıkmış iki ülkedir. Buna rağmen, siyasal deneyimleri göz önüne alındığında, başta askeri müdahale deneyimleri olmak üzere anlamlı benzerlikler göze çarpmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın sonucunda saptanan en çarpıcı ortak noktalar; her iki ülkenin kuruluş aşamasında ordunun oynadığı etkin rol ve askeri figürlerin devletin kurucuları olarak taşıdığı toplumsal değer, orduların ülkenin kurucusu ve devlet ideolojisinin koruyucusu olma yönündeki kimlik algısı, 1960'lı yıllara kadar kurumlar ve subaylardaki Alman etkisi, 1960'lı yıllardan itibaren Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile işbirliği ve askeri personelin bu ülkede eğitim görmesi, her iki ülkede askeri müdahaleleri sivil hükümetlere alternatif olarak algılayan siyasal kültür, uluslararası Soğuk Savaş konjonktürü, bu doğrultuda hazırlanan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejileri ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin askeri müdahalelere edilgen onayı ve her iki toplumda da din öğesinin varsayılan komünizm tehdidine karşı sistemli kullanımı olarak saptanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker ilişkileri, askeri müdahaleler, Arjantin

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Chapter I

Introduction

1.1. Purpose and Significance

Whereas Turkey and Argentina are two countries composed of different historical, cultural and institutional elements, the military interventions which occurred in Argentina in 1976 and in Turkey in 1980 have comparable features in terms of context and consequences. Argentina and Turkey are two countries which originated from and have existed in indisputably distinct historical, cultural and institutional conditions. However, they also have significant similarities as far as their courses of political evolution are concerned. It is arguable that Argentina and Turkey have many common aspects which have been rather neglected as a field of study. This thesis focuses on the course of civil-military relations in Turkey and Argentina until1980 in order to detect similarities between the underlying factors of the military interventions of 1976 Argentina and 1980 Turkey.

Max Weber defines the modern state as "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory". This definition underlines the necessity for a state to control its military, since the monopoly of force is an integral part of what constitutes the state itself. However, the relationship between civilian authority and its military is often complicated, particularly for countries that had a recent democratization process. In many cases civil-military relations has gone through crises, threatening democratic sustainability.

Along the same line, one of the most significant issues which constitute an incontestable role in the modern history of Turkey and Argentina is the military interventions which took place in the second half of the 20th Century. Argentina experienced a period of military interventions between 1930 and 1983, in which six successful interventions took place. Turkey, on the other hand, experienced three successful military interventions between 1960 and 1981. It can be argued that the motives and patterns of the interventions have particular aspects however; the remaining similarities are adequate to design a comparative research. I intend to

conduct this research in order to reveal the similarities and differences between two precedents.

Involvement or intervention of the military in the political affairs of a nation-state has been a recurrent phenomenon throughout recorded history. The aim of this study is to address and widen our understanding of the underlying conditions of 1976 Argentine and 1980 Turkish military interventions through comparative analysis, using data derived from previous research conducted on each of the cases, as well as the documentaries, newspapers, visuals, official documents which I accessed and interviews which I ran with related persons. I will deliberately avoid the inclusion of datum regarding the democratization processes which came after the course of military regimes in order to keep the focus of the thesis on the units of comparison, namely the underlying factors and conditions of the Argentinean and Turkish experiences of military interventions.

1.2. Conceptualization and Definitions

By asking the question *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* (Who will guard the guardians?), Clausewitz established the interrelationship between political objectives and the military means, and he pointed out that military action should always be governed by political requirements, that it must be subservient to ultimate civilian goals and authority. His analysis laid down the theoretical foundations of civilian control of the military in modern states.[1]

In order to avoid repetitive discussion of the meaning of various terms, the most important and frequently used concepts will be defined in order to set the stage for discussion.

Civil-military problematic: It is a paradox that lays in the root of all the civil-military relations theories. According to Feaver, civil-militaryproblematic is a simple paradox

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[1] J. Rudolf. (1996) The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Chaillot Paper 23, Institute for Security Studies of WEU.

where "the very institution created to protect the polityis given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity."[2]

Separation Theory (Prerogatives Approach): The perspective that militaries need to remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions and decision making process. Civilian leadership would decide the objective of any military action but then leave it to the military world to decide upon the best way of achieving the objective.

Military Professionalism: It is the development of expertise, responsibility and corporate customs which can be provided through higher standard of professional military education, one that would ensure that military professionals were more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society.

Civilian Control: Civilian control is another important category used to study civil-military relations. Since the military has the potential to become a threat, many of the civil-military relations theories involve a conception of how the civilians could set control on the military. Huntington relates the concept of "civilian control" with "the relative power of civilian and military groups"[3]. It decreases when the military becomes increasingly involved in institutional and constitutional politics (Huntington 1957, 83). A military coup is an example of complete breakdown of civilian control.

Successful Military intervention: The author utilizes the conceptual definition of a successful coup as one where an current regime is displaced and overthrown by a group of military generals. Successful interventions have three main features. First, members of the armed forces execute it; second, actors of the civil and political society support it; third, the outcome of the intervention is the removal of the civilian authorities previously selected in a national election. There were six such interventions in Argentina between 1862 and 1999: 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976.

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: A non-democratic governing system where central actors in the governing coalition consist of military and civilian technocrats those work in collaboration with foreign capital sources and particularly governments.

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[2]P. D. Feaver. (2003) Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p: 4.
[3]S. P. Huntington. (1995) The Soldier and the State p: 80.

Concordance Theory: Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state. Concordance Theory of Schiff mentions that the consensus of three actors on four indicators is sufficient to prevent domestic military interventions.

1.3. Research Process and Methodology

There is abundant literature on the several military interventions which took place in these two countries separately.The greatest portions of the literature on military interventions in Argentina or Turkey adopt a historical approach focusing on a defined time period, and involve an analysis of social and military divisions.

In terms of comparative studies, there are some works which focused on certain similar concepts and parameters derived from Turkey and Argentina such as privatization, economic crisis, and their impacts on democratization. However, the similarities and differences of their experiences of military interventions have not sufficiently been the focus of scientific research so far. This research will involve a comprehensive comparison of the backgrounds, processes and consequences of the military interventions of 1976 Argentina and 1980 Turkey. The analysis will not only be based on the historical comparison of military and institutions and societies, but also the interaction among them.

In addition to specifying the data sources gathered from each country, it is also important to provide a brief profile of the two countries included in the analysis, particularly with regard to their suitability for a comparative analysis of military interventions.

Turkey and Argentina, which are two countries composed of different historical, cultural and institutional elements, have encountered similar events in the political scene including military interventions. However, this statement does not necessarily imply that similar conditions have arose in Turkey and Argentina since different sets of factors may lead to the same outcome whereas the same set of factors may end up in different results in different contexts. The research will be a comparative historical and institutional analysis. The research design will be a most different system design. I will

ask the question "what was common between these different systems to produce similar events, namely the military interventions in the second half of the 20th Century and in particular the 1976 Argentinean and 1980 Turkish cases?" Therefore I will try to identify and analyze all the potential factors in my research, and determine the casual connections as well as determining the correlations.

The research strategy will be based on the perspective that, simply focusing on external factors (institutionalization level of political system, economic indicators, etc.) which lead to the military intervention or on the contrary, only favoring the internal variables (social background of officers, threat perception etc.) is insufficient. Therefore I will try to employ an efficient set of variables including both internal and external factors.

The main theory I will adopt in my analysis will be the Concordance Model of Rebecca L. Schiff which she introduced in her article "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance". I will use this model since it suggests that the level of agreement and cooperation among three main actors – namely the military, the political elite, and the society – determines the likelihood of a military intervention. I prefer to use this model since it underlines that the radical isolation of the military from the politics is not necessarily the only method to prevent military interventions, and this implies a more applicable model for both Turkish and Argentine conditions. Besides, previous academic work has already proven that the Theory of Concordance is applicable for both Turkey and Argentina.

While using the aforementioned theory of Concordance, I will still employ other perspectives where I find necessary in order to reach a comprehensive comparison of the two cases. Another significant perspective which I will use in order to deepen my analysis is that, the successful military interventions only take place when there are civil-military coalitions.[4] In other words, certain segments of the society perceive the military as virtually a political institution that has the potential and ability to represent them. The strength of the civil-military coalition has a determining impact on the success of a given Coup. For instance, Battaglino suggests that the civil-military coalition in Argentina is rather strong since the army played a major role in state-

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[4] J. M. Battaglino. (2005) *Cycles of Civil-Military Relations in Argentina - A framework of Analysis,* Documentos de Trabajo No.125, Universidad de Belgrano, Buenos Aires.

building process, and the elites depended on the Army in order to centralize power. The same can be argued for Turkish military, in terms of the role it played in the state-foundation and centralization process.

Another focus of comparison will be the extent of the tradition of military subordination to civilian authorities.[5] This point had been raised by David Pion-Berlin who argues that institutional mechanisms of civilian control are necessary but not sufficient for the maintenance of democracy, and military interventions can still take place unless a stable and legitimate governmental system is introduced. Therefore, it is a significant aspect of the intended comparison.

As the first step of data collection, a comprehensive selection of the scientific literatures on the military interventions of 1980 (Turkey) and 1976 (Argentina) was collected. Since Latin American politics is not an area of study with abundant literature in Turkey, I took one year off in order to run my research in Argentina between May 2009 and May 2010. During my visit, I was entitled as a visiting researcher in Universidad Nacional de Cordoba and Universidad de Belgrano (Buenos Aires) as I was running my research. My affiliation with the aforementioned universities enabled me to get into contact with political scientists who the political structure of Argentina, civil-military relations and particularly the military interventions in Argentina. I attended the related PhD lectures as a visiting researcher at the aforementioned universities in order to strengthen my knowledge of Latin American politics and especially of Argentina. Besides, other sorts of documents which shed light on the facts of these periods including newspapers, memoirs, and legal texts, the official publications of Turkish and Argentine armed forces were collected and studied. Since the military histories of both armed forces will have a descriptive contribution to my research, I collected documents including books, articles, official documents, policy papers, curriculums of military schools. Especially the memory museums of *ESMA* (Buenos Aires) and *La Perla* (Cordoba) were significantly accessible, organized, and enthusiastic for contribution.

I also derived data from interviews which I personally conducted with military officials of both countries who had played a role or witnessed the events of the era

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[5] D. Pion-Berlin. (2009) "Democratization, Social Crisis and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.*

from within. Expectedly, arranging an interview with former Argentinean military officers was extremely difficult if not impossible, due to their defensive reactions against their negative image in the society and the obvious risk of being monitored and questioned by the government. Those who agreed to give an interview were strict about the confidentiality of their identities.

There is limited amount of literature in comparative studies that focus on the civil-military relations of Turkey and Argentina in the field of political science. The few comparative studies which included these two countries were in the field of economy, focusing on the similar economic indicators and events. Expectantly this thesis will pioneer a set of new research that looks up to the common patterns of military interventions throughout the world during the Cold War period.

1.4. Organization and Summary of Chapters

The impact of the armed forces on politics is difficult to measure as an independent variable, which goes far beyond the mere phenomenon of military interventions. The civil-military relations would demonstrate drastic differences during the times of peace, war, crisis etc.

The balance between the civil government and the armed forces cannot be maintained unless on the one hand the politicians recognize the integrity of military expertise and domains, and the armed forces remains neutral and obeys the political will, on the other.[6] Therefore the prevention of democracy requires that the armed forces should be controlled by civilians but at the same time preserve their professional independency. Besides, describe the previous classifications and intentions to clarify the concept of coup d'état. I will describe the civil-military relations theories and why I prefer to use the theory of Concordance as my basic theoretical background.

The units of analysis are the Turkish and Argentine Armed Forces. In the analysis of the institutions, historical institutionalism will be the main theoretical framework. The intention is to combine the comparative method with close historical process tracking

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[6] S. Huntington.(1995) The Soldier and the State.p: 72.

the individual cases. On the other hand, the theoretical frameworks which were introduced in the current literature will be referred when necessary.

The military's position in Turkish society derives its legitimacy from its role in the founding of the Turkish state. The struggle to form a nation from the remainings of the Ottoman Empire was led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who was a military officer. Following the proclamation of the republic in 1924, the political legacy of the military was defined as the guardianship of the Kemalist principles.[7]

A brief description of the chapters of the thesis is as follows:

The Chapter II is an overall introduction and evaluation of the theoretical literature on the civil- military relations. This chapter provides background for the conceptual framework that consists of five descriptive categories. The five categories are civil-military problematic, civilian control, military professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges.

In the Part A of Chapter I, The theories of civil-military relations will be introduced and the reasons why the concordance theory is adopted as the main theory for the comparative research will be explained. The bulk of civil-military relations' theory was built up by Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer. While Huntington emphasized professionalism as the base for non-intervention in the political sphere, Janowitz proposed that the adjustments in the organizational framework of the armed forces would serve the same purpose. Finer stressed the civilian side of the relationship and suggested that an efficient and influential political sphere could manage the civil-military relationship in such a way that military intervention would be less likely. [8]

In the Part B, the former applications of the concordance theory to Argentine and Turkish cases will be introduced under sub-categories. This part will be mainly based on the political scientist Nilüfer Narlı's article "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" and John M. Anderson's thesis "Civil Military Relations and Concordance Theory: A Case Study of Argentina".

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[7]P. Tank. Turkey as a `Special Case' for the EU: Will the Generals Retreat from Politics? Security Dialogue June 2001 32, p: 220.
[8]E. Aydınlı.Is the Prerogatives Approach Obsolete? A Reconsideration of Civil-Military Relations Theories <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/aydinli1.pdf>

Chapter III explains the historical background of political involvement of military in Turkey. The evolution of Turkish military will be analyzed starting from the late Ottoman period. Turkey's historical and political conditions are essential to understand the role of the army as the defender of Kemalism and also the continuation of the Ottoman legacy.

Although the armed forces had a great impact on and contribution to the state-foundation period of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk paid special attention to keep politics and military separated. Turkey did not experience significant problems or improvements during the single-party period. However, the second half of the 20th Century civil-military relations had fallowed a rather problematic era.

The contributors and the nature of the military culture will be explored in reference to interrelated actors and conditions. The chapter will have a historical institutional perspective in the search for historical reasoning to the set of military interventions. 5. The military had a prominent role during the Ottoman period. For example, the janissary had a dominant position at the pinnacle of the imperial system. It was not broken until 1826, and it was only after this that Sultan Mahmud II was able to pursue his modernization program, which included military reforms. It examines the Turkish military and its relationship with larger society from a historical perspective.

The picture of contemporary Turkish politics would not be complete without a discussion of the military, which, since its first intervention in 1960, has been one of the most important actors in the country's politics. The military intervened both in 1971 and 1980. Although each intervention lasted only a reasonably short period, on each occasion the military gained important exit guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic regime. The historical course of 1980 intervention in Turkey can be understood from a point of view which includes the outcomes of 1960 intervention and 1971 memorandum. Being a member of the Turkish Armed forces had traditionally been a prestigious position. Truman Doctrine of 1947 and Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952 had provided the conditions where young military officers gained access to the western world, and the use of high technology. On the other hand, higher rank officers who had limited instruments with the high technologies were in consent with Demokrat Parti (DP) government of Prime minister Adnan Menderes,

since the prime minister pursued the policy of creating a trust relation with high-rank military officers. However, DP had to set their priorities to economically support in terms of social segments, and unintentionally the young military officials were neglected in a way that had never been experienced before. The support for high-ranks and neglect of the law-ranks created a separation of generations in among the military. 1960 intervention was launched by mainly lower rank officials who were not fond of the social and economic statue they were doomed to. Given the fact that the Turkish economy was in dramatic decline in 1960s, the young officers launched an intervention on May 27, 1960. They had a committee of academicians prepare a new constitution which went into force in 1961. Although the interruption lasted rather short, it caused drastic change in Turkish political life especially with the execution of Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan.

On the experience of 1960, the military went through a process of restructuring, providing that the unity among the corps is maintained. With the power and autonomy that the 1961 Constitution had provided them, the military had regained position in social and political life. As the economic tightness and social chaos rose once more up to 1971, the military forced the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to resign with a memorandum. The current political parties were suspended, and a technocrat government was formed by Nihat Erim. The liberal freedoms introduced with the constitution of 1961 were limited.

On a ten-year cycle basis, the Turkish society went into similar political polarization and economic stress, with the magnifying effect of 1973 oil crisis. This era was again was interrupted by the military intervention of September 12, 1980. This intervention was impactful and comprehensive. A new constitution which lacked the liberal freedoms of 1961 Constitution was set for a referendum, and accepted in 1982. The referendum passed with more than 91% of the votes, not only because of the mere support to the new constitution, but with the contribution of the fact that it was the exit to democracy.

The new constitution further empowered the military in politics by increasing the role of National Security Council (NSC) and changing its composition to include more military commanders. It is arguable that the 1980 intervention has shifted the Turkish

military's position towards a more influential point. The differences between the 1961 and 1982 constitutions are significant indicators of the mentality of the both coups.

Civil–military relations in Turkey have always been characterized by a combination of continuity and change. Traditionally, the military has regarded itself as the guarantor of national and territorial integrity, the guardian of Atatürk's ideology and the nation. Despite recent legislative amendments which have curbed some of the instruments used by the military to exert political leverage, the legal foundation and public support for its role and has remained unchanged for over 70 years. However, the methods it used to fulfill its interpretation of this role have always been subject to debate.

Chapter IVwill include a similar analysis is made for Argentina. The intention will be to base bureaucratic authoritarian tradition to historical reasons. On the other hand, in Latin America, there was a time-lag between the modernization of the state and the modernization of the army.[9] The US policies which perceived Latin America as a backyard to initiate their further goals backfired, causing the rise of communism.[10] The armies served as both the core and defenders of the state. The centralist perspectives of the armed forces were intolerant to the diverse expectations of the society, which is an essential component of a plural democracy. A depoliticized society was desired since the indoctrination was based on the priorities of the state, rather than the nation.

Argentina was among the top five economies of the world in 1910, and had promising growth expectancy. Between 1880 and 1930, the country was a producer of first class agriculture, mineral and meat goods. Only between 1900 and 1914, approximately 2 millions of Italians immigrated to Italy to seek jobs in the promising industries. However the newly settling economy depended on export –in particular to the United Kingdom- to European counterparts and collapsed during the 1930 crisis as the European purchases subsided. The first of the series of military interventions takes place on 6 September 1930, forces of General José Félix Uriburu overthrowing the Hypolito Yrigoyen's government of Union Civica Radical (UCR).[11] In spite of the radical change and the replacement of the government by the military junta, the country failed to recuperate since it had not developed any economic or political

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[9]A. Rouquie.(1987) The Military and the State in Latin America p: 13.
[10]A. Rouquie. (1987) The Military and the State in Latin America p: 403.
[11]The period between 1930 and 1943 is known as "decada infame"(the infamous decade)

backup mechanisms then. In struggle to reconstruct the economy, those who favored agricultural development confront those for industrialization.[12]

On 4 June 1943, the second military intervention took place which ended the government of Ramón Castillo and formed the junta regime, which was a combination of revolutionary nationalism and some totalitarian inspirations from Italian fascism. During the junta, Colonel Juan Domingo Peron began to rise as a popular figure as he took a minor office in the department of labor and favored the setting of labor laws thus gaining the support of the working class.

Argentina went for presidential elections in 1945, where Peron was elected president thus beginning his populist dictatorship. Rejecting both communism and capitalism, he claimed to introduce a new system where the basis of the social solutions would be the cooperation of social segments for the sake of the national sovereignty, economic independence and social security. He increased the labor salaries, stabilized the market and gaining the admiration of masses. He presented his regime as the savior of the workers but also set good relations with the capital holders and empowered the military, police force and the church as well. With all the popular support, he gained even more votes in the elections of 1951. However, his system was not sustainable, and the decline in the agriculture was followed by other indicators with a domino effect. Even the Catholic Church that he traditionally collaborated distanced itself from Peron in 1954. He could only hold on until 16 September 1955, when a coup led by General Eduardo Lonardi, General Pedro E. Aramburu and Admiral Isaac Rojas, deposed Perón and established a provisional government.[13]On 23 September, General Lonardi assumed the presidency, Perón and his followers were accused of treason and Peron was sent to exile in Madrid. The Peronist Party suffered a proscription that was to last until Perón's return in 1973. The final military intervention took place on 24 March 1976, overthrowing Isabel Perón who became the president after the death of her husband. The military rule lasted until 1983, traumatizing the whole nation but especially those with left wing view. The junta called their rule as *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (or simply *el proceso*) during which an estimated 30.000

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[12]Argentinean historian Luis Alberto Romero suggests that the rise of nationalism was the main reason of the failure to restructure the system. See, Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006.
[13]The 1955 Coup is frequently referred as "La Revolucion Libertadora"

persons were killed by the illegal embodiments within the military institution. Democracy was reintroduced in1983, after the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) defeat to England, where the military suffered a severe loss of confidence.

Argentina is a typical example of the bureaucratic authoritarian political system. The Argentinean political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell suggests that bureaucratic authoritarianism emerged as a response to the populist wave in Argentine politics with the impact of Juan Peron.[14] As the economic indicators began to fail, populism encountered a serious gridlock. The urban working middle class that prospered with the economic policies of the populist government had a natural faith in Peronists. However, the technocrats who were aware that the economic policy based on import substitution system was not sustainable thus developing an opposition to the government. These elites grew in number and capability, but were not enough to democratically challenge the middle class masses who sided with Peron. As a reaction, they encouraged and supported military coups in order to exclude the popular sectors. O'Donnell states that the mobilization of lower-class during populist rule creates fear in the other actors in the political system such as the bourgeoisie, technocrats and international capital holders and military, thus forcing them to cooperate against the populist policies.[15]

Chapter V will explore the institutional cultures, traditions, self-perception tendencies and finally civil-military relations of Turkey and Argentina in comparison, in order to demonstrate similarities and differences in the process of bureaucratic authoritarianism.

The chapter will explore the historical background of the political life and the patterns of military interventions in both countries. The role of military institutions in developing democracies will be introduced. Developing democracies have to face several challenges of development states all at once, which include the sacrifices of industrialization. In the developing democracies, where the middle class is not strong enough, the military has relatively greater power in the political system and this power

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[14]G. O'Donnell. (1988)*Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective.*
[15]G. O'Donnell. (1988) *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective.*

tends to increase during the times of crisis. Armed forces are the most disciplined, organized and equipped structures of modern societies. Besides, they have a moral value as the symbol of the independence of a state. The motivations of military interventions depend on a variety of factors such as the ideology, traditions, self-perception of the armed forces as well as external factors such as the attitudes of civil institutions and economy of the country.[16] The increase of threat perception, the existence of a tradition of intervention and erosion of legitimacy of the civil leaders are generally factors that increase the likelihood of a military intervention to take place. Finally, internal factors such as poor life conditions of military officers may contribute to this process, as it did in the 1960 military intervention of Turkey.

The social background of military officials is an essential factor that determines their perspectives and attitudes. Another factor is the training of the military schools. Like any other institution, the interests and self-perception determines the priorities and attitudes. No matter how much public support it initially found, the military governments are generally succeeded by the governments of the powers they opposed.

In the upper segment of developing societies such as Turkey and Argentina, the military tends to intervene without breaking the chain of command since this increase the chances of success.[17] However, the ideology and motivations of the armed forces inevitably vary among officials. In the same way, the ideology inevitably differs over time even in the cases where the name remains the same. Kışlalı mentions that it is hardly arguable that the military officers who intervened in 1960 and those who did in 1980 perceive Kemalism in the same way.

While analyzing the nature of the civil-military relations, two factors contribute to the unique conditions in Turkey, namely the identity of the Army as the guard of Kemalism, and the change and continuity of Ottoman military traditions. In order to understand the role of the military in the Turkish society, we should interpret the historical roots and foundation of the modern Turkey as regards to the roles military has played.

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[16] A. T. Kışlalı. (2000) Siyasal Sistemler: Siyasal Çatışma ve Uzlaşma p: 306-315.
[17] A. T. Kışlalı.(2000 p: 322.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic was founded as an independent nation-state. The founders of the republic, most of which were the high-ranking military officials of the Ottoman Empire, endeavored to break ties with the past.[18] Although they succeeded in their attempts to a great extent, there remained a considerable continuation especially regarding the societal elements. On the contrary to the Western societies which developed upon functional evolution and horizontal structure, the heritage of the Ottoman Empire was a hierarchical society in vertical structure.[19] The ruling class included the sultan, military and "ulema" the higher class of the society, while the subjects constituted the lower class. The state and military were strongly tied in Ottoman Empire, although in times of crisis there were incidents when the military interfered in the politics upon their interests. This tradition continued during the Republican era. The army played a significant role in the modernization of Turkey.

Although the armed forces had a great impact on and contribution to the state-foundation period of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk paid special attention to keep politics and military separated. Turkey did not experience significant problems or improvements during the single-party period. However, the second half of the 20th Century civil-military relations had fallowed a rather problematic era. Özdemir had defined four roles of armed forces in Turkish experience, namely the legal-military role, cyclical role, extra-ordinary role, and civil-political role. The legal-military role refers to all the liabilities of the armed forces imposed by the Constitution, laws and related regulations of Turkish Republic.[20]

In part B, the context of Argentina will be discussed in reference to civil-military relations.

From 1880 to 1929, Argentina enjoyed increasing prosperity and prominence while emerging as one of the 10 richest countries in the world, benefiting from an agricultural export-led economy. The population of the country swelled sevenfold. Conservative forces dominated Argentine politics through non-democratic means until

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[18]F. Ahmad. (2008) Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu, Kaynak Yayınları p: 11.
[19]N. Narlı. (2000) "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" in *Turkish Studies* **1**:1 p: 107.
[20]H. Özdemir. (2004) "Sivil-Asker ilişkileri ve Türkiye Deneyimi"Y. Anzerlioğlu. et al (eds.), *80. Yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Demokrasi,*p: 114.

1916, when their traditional rivals, the Radicals, won control of the first free-elected government. The military forced Hipólito Yrigoyen from power in 1930, leading to another decade of Conservative rule.Political change led to the presidency of Juan Perón in 1946, who worked to empower the working class and greatly expanded the number of unionized workers.

As a result of the unsustainable popular policies, the economy gradually declined and Perón started to lose support and eventually his administration deteriorated. The *Revolución Libertadora* of 1955 unseated him, and he fled into exile to Spain.

From the 1950s to 1970s, moderate military and weak civilian administrations traded power.During those years the economy grew strongly and poverty declined while political violence and protests towards the military government continued. The social demand for the return of Perón was escalating. In 1973, Perón returned to the presidency, but he died within a year of assuming power. His third wife Isabel who was the vice president at the time succeeded his presidency. However, the military coup of March 24, 1976 removed her from office. The military government which called the junta "*Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*" or shortly "*el Proceso*" (National Reorganization Process) suppressed the opposition and leftist groups using harsh illegal measures, which would be called the "*Guerra Sucia*" (Dirty War) where thousands of people "disappeared" (*desaparecidos*). *El Proceso*, which lasted until the fall of the military government as a result of the failure in the Malvinas (Falkland) War, was associated with the Condor Plan which was a campaign of political repression and terror involving assassination and intelligence operations officially implemented in 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone of South America, aiming at eliminating socialist and communist influence and ideas and to control opposition movements against the participating governments, as a part of Cold War doctrine.

Economic problems, charges of corruption, public reaction to drastic human rights abuses and finally 1982 defeat by the British in the Falklands War discredited the Argentine military regime.Democracy was restored in 1983 and Raúl Alfonsín was elected president. His government worked for justice for the "*disappeared*", established civilian control of the armed forces, and consolidated democratic

institutions. Subsequent president Carlos Menem, Fernando de la Rua, Nestor Kirschner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner also focused on democratization process, civilian control and judicial process for the responsible for the military interventions.

Chapter VI will discuss the very incidents of 1976 military intervention in Argentina and 1980 intervention with their contexts and catalysis factors such as the domestic and international factors; namely the domestic clashes and cold war conjuncture. It will employ the motivations of the military interventions of 1976 and 1980 in reference to the historical background introduced in the previous chapters. The most common patterns are found to be:

1- The role of the militaries in the founding of the states and the high esteem of the military figures among the society as the founders of the state,

2- Self-perceptions of the militaries as the saviors and the guardians of the nation and the state ideology,

3- German impact on the military officers and institutions until 1960s,

4- American training and impact on the military officers and institutions from 1960s onwards,

5- Political culture that favors military interventions as an alternative to the civilian governments,

6- International conjuncture of Cold War, National Security Strategies designed accordingly, and the silent concession of the United States to the interventions,

7- The role of religion as an antidote to communism.

Chapter VII Conclusion will finally sum up the findings of the comparative research and will suggest reasons for these similarities which came along in societies with almost totally distinct historical, political and cultural parameters. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the differences between regions and countries complicate the designing of a comprehensive theoretical framework. When the historical and political contexts are analyzed, the first thing to notice on Latin

American pattern, including Argentina is over-politicized military which functioned and ruled as political elites. On the other hand, Turkey had different circumstances and the actors' motivations differed greatly.[21] During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the Republic, the intellectual elite included military officers at high level.[22] Thinking that religious fanaticism and exclusion of technologic advancements was one of the reasons of decline of the Ottoman Empire, they perceived secularism as one of the most important aspects of the republican ideology.[23] Western values were at the center of the modernization process, and democracy was perceived as an integral part of it. In this line of thinking, the military officers gradually took on a mission as the guardian of the secular and democratic state. The founders of the republic were also former Ottoman generals and officers. During the single party period between 1923 and 1950, the state apparatus was carefully managed as to provide the military subordination to the civil authority. However, the military was still perceived as the ultimate protector of the new republic. From 1960s onwards, the political fragmentation in the Turkish society and the clashes between groups underlined the position of the military as a guardian of the status quo.[24]

There are strong similarities between the experiences of Argentina 1976 and Turkey 1980 in terms of:

- The role of the militaries in the founding of the states and the high esteem of the military figures among the society as the founders of the state,

- Self-perception of the militaries as the "founder of the state, the guardian of the nation and the state ideology," and a feeling of superiority towards the civilians,

- German impact on the military officers and institutions until 1960s,

- American training and impact on the military officers and institutions from 1960s onwards,

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[21]The most similar condition in Argentina and Turkey was the military's self- image as the guardian and tutelary.

[22]The reasons of this condition will be elaborated thoroughly in the 3rd chapter.

[23]M. Heper &A. Güney.(2000) "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience" in*Armed Forces & Society*26(4) p: 635-636.

[24]M. Heper &A. Güney.(2000) p: 637.

- Political culture that favors military interventions as an alternative to the civilian governments,

- the Cold War context National Security Strategies designed accordingly,and the threat perception of Communism,

- the covert encouragement of the United States for conservative military interventions in order to contain Soviet impact,

- the constant economic problemsand the civilian governments' inability to solve them,

However, there are also deep differences. For instance, the Turkish Armed Forces has a high level contact with the civil society as a result of the conscription system and the recruitment method of professional soldiers, whereas Argentine Armed Forces does not have compulsory military service and recruits the professional soldiers from traditional and closed segments of the society, which consequently creates a gap between the soldier and the society.

Chapter II

An Overview of Civil-Military Relations' Theoretical Framework

2.1. Praetorianism:

The term Praetorianism originally described the military rule in ancient Rome, now refers more generally to military intervention in politics. Modern praetorianism usually develops where political and social institutions have failed to provide a stable structure for channeling political participation and mediating social conflicts. In this context, civil society disintegrates and social groups begin to polarize. Military rule is often perceived as a solution to this crisis and can often temporarily command high levels of popular support. The absence of institutional mechanisms for sustaining popular support, however, tends to isolate such regimes and reproduce the oppositional relationship between state and society. This often results in additional instability, which rationalizes continued military rule and greater repressive measures. Escaping this political double-bind is one of the main challenges facing post-praetorian democracies—especially in Latin America, where military rule was common until the 1980s, and where continued economic instability imposes high political costs on elected governments.

Praetorianism is not a new phenomenon. But the centuries which were greatly affected by praetorianism were the 19th and 20th centuries. Almost all Latin American countries as well as many Arab countries, Asian and Mediterranean countries experienced military interventions during the 20th century. Interestingly enough, most of the aforementioned regions were composed of post-colonial countries which newly gained independence from European Colonists. Nevertheless, this is not to say that praetorianism is not a risk for western democracies.

It is useful to analyze the historical evolution of civil-military relations in order to understand the modern experiences. The archetype and name inspiration of the concept was the Praetorian Guards of Rome which was a small group determined to protect the Senate. Military obedience is an essential component of the prevention of military

intervention. The real question is not why the armed forces ever intervene, but why they ever obey.[25]

Military doctrine is the perspective of an army towards events and facts, which is one of the essential factors that determines its relations with politics, among everything else.[26] The balance between the civil government and the armed forces cannot be maintained unless on the one hand the politicians recognize the integrity of military expertise and domains, and the armed forces remains neutral and obeys the political will, on the other.[27] Therefore the maintenance and sustaining of democracy requires that the armed forces should be controlled by civilians while preserving their professional independency.

2.1.1. The Problems of Civil-Military Relations[28]

1- Praetorian Problem, which is the necessity to limit the power of the armed forces.[29]

2- To ensure that the armed forces is a disciplined force so as to protect the state and the citizens without harming them through indiscipline, misadventure etc.

3- To protect the armed forces from the misuse of politicians while the armed forces obeys the political power[30]

4- To manage the relations of military experts with the civil ministers who lack the necessary technical knowledge.[31]

The impact of the armed forces on politics is difficult to measure as an independent variable, which goes far beyond the mere phenomenon of military interventions. The civil-military relations would demonstrate drastic differences during the times of peace, war, crisis etc.

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[25] S. Finer. (1962) ''The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics'' p:5.
[26] H. Özdemir. (2004) "Sivil-Asker İlişkileri ve Türkiye Deneyimi" in *80. Yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Demokrasi,* p: 108.
[27] S. Huntington. (1995) ''The Soldier and the State'' p:72.
[28] D. Bland. (1999) "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-Military Relations" in *European Security,* p:12-13.
[29] S. Huntington. (1991) ''The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century'' p:231.
[30] M. Howard. (1957) ''Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations'' p:12.
[31] S. Huntington. (1995) p:20.

In Latin America, there was a time-lag between the modernization of the state and the modernization of the army.[32] The US policies which perceived Latin America as a backyard to initiate their further goals backfired, causing the rise of communism.[33]

The armies served as both the core and defenders of the state. The centralist perspectives of the armed forces were intolerant to the diverse expectations of the society, which is an essential component of a plural democracy. A depoliticized society was desired since the indoctrination was based on the priorities of the state, rather than the nation.

2.1.2. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who will guard the guardians?)

The ever-relevant question of who guards the guards was a central issue in Plato's dialogue The Republic, written about 2,500 years ago. Plato, in presenting what he considered to be the right order of society, described the military state as a deviation. Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire were both confronted with the dilemma. The question has remained the same over the centuries, but as armed forces and society have changed, the nature of the problem has also changed.[34]

In Europe, in the early nineteenth century, the experience of the Napoleonic wars and developments within the German states influenced Carl von Clausewitz in his philosophical conceptualization of the relationship between political and military affairs. In his classic work *On War*, he emphasized the point that `*war [is] only a branch of political activity: that it is no sense autonomous . . . If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character . . . For it is policy that creates war, policy is the guiding intelligence, and war only the instrument and not vice versa.*' Clausewitz established the interrelationship between strategic (political) objectives and the military means, and he pointed out that military action should always be governed by political requirements, that it must be subservient to ultimate civilian goals and

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[32] A. Rouquie. (1987) ''The Military and the State in Latin America'' p:13.
[33] A. Rouquie. (1987) p: 403.
[34] R. Joó. (1996) The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces p:6.

authority. His analysis laid down the theoretical foundations of civilian control of the military in modern states.[35]

Two contradicting assumptions are at the heart of the civil-military problematic. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to protect its nation against the threats they face. Therefore it must always be ready and strong. On the other hand, the military must not use its power against its civilian authority. When the military fulfills the first condition, that is to have coercive power to enforce its will on society's enemies, the consequence is the possibility that the same coercive power may also be exercised against the society.

2.1.3. Impact of Armed Forces on Politics and Military Interventions

The impact of the armed forces on politics is difficult to measure as an independent variable, which goes far beyond the mere phenomenon of military interventions. The civil-military relations would demonstrate drastic differences during the times of peace, war, crisis etc.

Successful coups often bring about the exile, assassination, or imprisonment of the incumbent executive head and a drastic overhaul of the constitutional relationship between the organs of the state and the new political leaders. The ideological purpose of coup leaders can arise from reactionary or revolutionary predispositions, often characterized by their belief that the old regime has exhibited incompetence in political administration or failed in delivering public goods. Implicit in this definition of successful coups is that they are carried out in a matter of hours or days, and that they are distinct from longer episodes of political turmoil that often involve the military but are characterized by extreme polarization of the masses and high civilian casualties. These longer struggles for political power are outside the definitional purview of successful coups and are known as rebellions, revolutions, or civil wars. Coups also affect a variety of regime types. For instance, they displace with equal frequency

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[35] R. Joó.(1996)The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces p:7.

civilian dictatorships with a charismatic leader, struggling democracies, or already existing military regimes.[36]

Developing democracies have to face several challenges of development states all at once, which include the sacrifices of industrialization. In the developing democracies, where the middle class is not strong enough, the military has relatively greater power in the political system and this power tends to increase during the times of crisis. Armed forces are the most disciplined, organized and equipped structures of modern societies. Besides, they have a moral value as the symbol of the independence of a state. The motivations of military interventions depend on a variety of factors such as the ideology, traditions, self-perception of the armed forces as well as external factors such as the attitudes of civil institutions and economy of the country.[37] The increase of threat perception, the existence of a tradition of intervention and erosion of legitimacy of the civil leaders are generally factors that increase the likelihood of a military intervention to take place. Finally, internal factors such as poor life conditions of military officers may contribute to this process, as it did in the 1960 military intervention of Turkey.

The social background of military officials is an essential factor that determines their perspectives and attitudes. Another factor is the training of the military schools. Like any other institution, the interests and self-perception determines the priorities and attitudes.

In the upper segment of developing societies such as Turkey and Argentina, the military tends to intervene without breaking the chain of command since this increase the chances of success.[38] However, the ideology and motivations of the armed forces inevitably vary among officials. In the same way, the ideology inevitably differs over time even in the cases where the name remains the same. Kışlalı mentions that it is hardly arguable that the military officers who intervened in 1960 and those who did in 1980 perceive Kemalism in the same way. No matter how much public support it

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[36] R. F. Tusalem. (2010) "Determinants of Coup d'État Events 1970–90: The Role of Property Rights Protection" in *International Political Science Review* p: 351.
[37] A. T. Kışlalı. (2000) ''Siyasal Sistemler – Siyasal Çatışma ve Uzlaşma'' p:315.
[38] A. T. Kışlalı. (2000) p: 322.

initially found, the military governments are generally succeeded by the governments of the powers they opposed.

While analyzing the nature of the civil-military relations, two factors contribute to the unique conditions in Turkey, namely the identity of the Army as the guard of Kemalism, and the continuity of Ottoman military traditions. In order to understand the role of the military in the Turkish society, we should interpret the historical roots and foundation of the modern Turkey as regards to the roles military has played.

Civil-military relation theory focuses on the relationship between the officer corps and the state. Civilians trust the military to obey because obedience is part of their professional ethos. Professionalism in the military is thus a core subject of civil-military relations. The process of professionalism began in the 20th century when the military officer was transformed into a professional soldier. [39]

Operational control of the military occurs through institutional structures. Hence, the *roles of the executive, the legislative branch,* and *the bureaucracy* are important factors in the overall theory of civil-military relations. Civilian political leaders are found in the executive and legislative branches, and are responsible for military defense policy. Defense policy is the mechanism civilians use to direct military action, and institutional structures are the mechanism used to monitor military behavior and thus detect *working and shirking.*

2.2. The Literature and Major Theories on Civil-Military Relations

Every nation has unique and distinct cultural, historical, political, and even symbolical sets of memories which design their own democratic forms. Obviously it is practically challenging to try and set a theoretical framework that can apply to all nations and experiences. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the search for a better theory will not endure. The leading theoretical approaches in civil-military relations and the leading variations from scholars are as follows:

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[39] L. B. Arı. (2007) ''Civil-Military Relations in Turkey'' p:29

2.2.1. Theoretical Approaches of "Civilian Control"

The wide range of theories which are classified as theories of separation describe the separation of civil and military institutions as it occurs in the United States and suggest that it is the ideal method for all the nations.[40]

Democratic control of the armed forces is an important component of societal structure and domestic politics. Issues surrounding the control of the military should take into account whether the society is a mature or emerging democracy.[41]

Theories of civil-military relations are the core of this subject. The works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz set the basis of the literature in 1960s. However, several other scholars contributed to the literature with different perspectives. Below, some of the major theories, including the Concordance Theory of Rebecca Schiff which will set the theoretical framework of this study, will be evaluated.

2.2.1.1. Samuel Huntington: Separation Theory (Institutional Approach Model)

Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State (1957) is a classic for anyone studying civil-military relations. Huntington's book describes and handles the civil-military relations as a separate concept, and deeply inspired the further conceptions in both academic and military spheres. Huntington uses Hobbes's liberal theory as a basis of his theory. Like Hobbes he assumes a social contract between the citizens and the state, which refers to a consensus on the protection of the citizens' natural rights.[42]

Huntington's normative theory is a cornerstone of traditional civil-military relations theories. The key theme of Huntington's institutional approach model is objective civilian control. This policy suggests that civilian leaders should command the military's security policy, but should not interfere with the armed forces' independence in determining "what military operations were required to secure the policy

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[40] S. Huntington. (1995) p: 189-192.
[41] L. B. Ari. (2007) p: 9.
[42] J. Burk. (1998) "The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber" in *Armed Forces & Society,* p: 460.

objectives"[43]. Huntington argues that with the achievement of "objective civilian control" there would be a balance provided by the "distribution of political power" between the civilian and military spheres[44]

According to Huntington, **Civilian Control**is achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is reduced. He maintains that "the general concept of civilian controlis identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups." Thus, thefrequently asked question is "how can the military power be minimized?" It can be minimized through two forms of control: *subjective* and *objective*civilian control. Huntington maintains that civilian control isseen in mature democracies, while military control is seen in totalitarian governments**.** However, the danger is that even in the democratic process themilitary might weaken civilian control and gain political power by manipulating the legitimate processes and democratic government bodies where civilian control reside.[45]

Huntington defines subjective civilian control as "maximizing civilian power" in relation to the military. However, it is impossible to maximize civilian power as a whole because of the conflicting interests, great number, and diverse characteristics of civilian groups. Therefore, this effort frequently maximizes the power of certain groups that are involved in civilian control of the military. Subjective civilian control thus is part of the relationships and power struggles between civilian groups. Huntington argues that subjective civilian control is the only form of civilian control possible in the absence of a professional officer corps.[46]

According to Huntington, "the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere." Thus, subjective civilian control "achieves its end by civilizing the military". Objective civilian control is the opposite of subjective civilian control, which is "maximizing military professionalism". Huntington maintains that "the essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism." In other words, objective civilian control minimizes military power by "professionalizing the military" and making them politically neutral. In this

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[43] J. Burk. (1998) p: 458.
[44] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 83.
[45] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 80-83.
[46] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 81.

scenario, the military holds little political power while preserving the imperative element of power and security that is essential to the military profession's existence.[47]

In a system of objective civilian control, the military enjoys the professional autonomy while the civilians set the political goals. As military professionals, the soldiers accept their subordination to the civilians. Thus, military officers would remain politically neutral as a part of their professional ethos.[48]

Huntington argued that the tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism could be relieved only by weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism, because he saw the liberal political environment as the gravest domestic threat to American military security. Therefore, Huntington suggested changing the ideological environment to stand against the Soviet threat in the long run.[49]

Huntington argued that a society's military institutions are formed by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. He stated that the reciprocal action of these two forces is the center of the civil-military relations problem[50].

Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*, which challenges the implicit progressive optimism of modernization literature. In his view, if political institutions, most importantly political parties are inadequate for reflecting the demands of social groups then all such bodies including the armed forces become highly politicized. They exert continual pressure on the formal holders of political power, since there is a complete lack of intermediate institutions that collect, contain and transmit societal demands. Huntington argues that military coups are principally instances of raw social conflict. He notes 'it is fallacious to attempt to explain military interventions in politics

[47] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 83-84.
[48] For a criticism of Hunington's apoach to professionalization, see: Gough, Terrence J. Isolation and Professionalization of the Army Officer Corp: A Post-Revisionist Review of the Soldier and the State", Social Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1992, p: 420-436.
[49] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 78.
[50] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 79.

primarily by reference to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the intervening'.[51]

Huntington uses the term praetorianism to describe situations in which social mobilization and economic growth were not channeled through legitimized political institutions. This leads each group to attempt to impose its will on the others, with the military ultimately achieving dominance. In such a praetorian context, each social group utilizes the means available to it and the military intervenes. The incapacity of the political sector to deal with differing rates of social, economic, and political modernization helps explain the existence of coups. In this scenario, it becomes necessary for the armed forces to impose order on turbulent, modernizing societies. The book's main hypothesis is that countries with high levels of mobilization and low levels of institutionalization are more prone to military intervention than those with strong institutions.

The balance of power is kept in check by the *partisan neutrality* of the military. Over time, civilians of different political perspectives can maintain control because the military is neutral politically. The partisan neutrality of the military helps to guarantee they will not be involved in political power struggles and tip the balance. In other words, "the area of military science is subordinate to and yet independent of the area of politics" Hence, the military is obliged to obey the politicians' decisions, but has autonomy in their implementation.[52]

Huntington's work represents an important starting point for developing a theoretical framework to account for the problem of military intervention in politics. Political Order in Changing Societies is one of the most ambitious attempts to develop a theoretical framework to analyze the problem of institutional instability and military intervention in developing societies. A brief discussion of Huntington's argument might therefore contribute to shedding some light on the political role played by the Armed Forces and the shifts in the pattern of military intervention in Argentina.

Huntington presents praetorianism as a result of a developmental lag of political institutionalization in relation to socioeconomic development and social mobilization.

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[51] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 70.
[52] S. P. Huntington. (1995) p: 71.

The result is political mobilization without political integration. New social and political actors are being mobilized without the simultaneous building of political institutions that could articulate and aggregate their demands. In the absence of mediating institutional mechanisms, social and political forces confront each other 'nakedly', i.e., their politicization is not channeled by institutional mechanisms but consists of an unmediated war of all against all.

Higher rate of participation to politics worsens political failure of governability since it brings new social interest groups into politics without establishing adequate instruments of intermediation. The growth of pluralism is not simultaneously accompanied by the development of sufficient institutional developments that can handle the new and more complicated social structure. Huntington considers two main political roads to institution building. The first one has the military as the central agent of the process of institutionalization. The second one relies on the organizational skills of political parties. Let us briefly examine some of the problems posed by the military road since it is the one that concerns us in this article. In his analysis of possible institutionalizing alternatives, Huntington foresaw military authoritarianism as a possible solution to the problem of praetorianism. He distinguished occasional military interventions (an integral aspect of praetorianism) from attempts at establishing a permanent authoritarian regime:

Intermittent military intervention to stop politics or to suspend politics is the essence of praetorianism. Sustained military participation in politics may lead a society away from praetorianism.

Huntington's confidence in the military as a potential institution-builder comes from their possession of the monopoly of the means of aggression. In a praetorian context, characterized by generalized politicization, the military appears as the only actor capable of acting as a neutral depoliticizing power. Only the military, he argues, is in a position of being able to rally the people behind shared national goals.

2.2.1.2. Morris Janowitz: Civic-Republican Theory

Janowitz's famous work *The Professional Soldier* is the leading comprehensive sociological examination of the military institution. In this book, he conceptualizes the military as a whole by analyzing its institutional life and uses his findings as a basis for suggesting changes that will empower the military to cope with the needs for security and civil control. Janowitz does not accept the ideal-type division of labor that Huntington finds necessary for military professionalism. On the contrary, he claims that politicization of the military is inevitable, considering its worldwide reach and the importance of the U.S.-Soviet competition to both international and domestic politics.[53]

Janowitz maintains that the military ought to be ready to carry out both strategic deterrence and limited war. This creates a new military function and a concept of new ideal-type military, namely the *constabulary concept.* Under the constabulary concept, the distinguishing differences between war and peace become lost and "the military derives its inspiring power more from the idea of the police officer rather than the warrior."Nevertheless, it is stressed that the area of operations must be international, not domestic.[54]

Janowitz acknowledges that military politicization involves a potential "challenge to civilian supremacy". He is concerned that the gradual shift toward the constabulary force may cause greater military "frustration"[55] Furthermore, Janowitz's theory emphasized the role of the citizen-soldier and how the institution reflected the larger society. Huntington's strong opponent comes up with similar answers to the civil-military problematique.

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[53] P. D. Feaver. (1996) "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control" in *Armed Forces & Society* p: 16.
[54] P. D. Feaver. (1996) p: 164.
[55] P. D. Feaver. (1996) p: 149.

2.2.1.3. Eric A. Nordlinger: Penetration Model

In his leading work *Soldiers in Politics*, Nordlinger identifies three models of civilian control over the military, which are *the traditional, the liberal, and the penetration models*.[56] His description of the *traditional model* refers to the situations where the lack of contradiction between the military and civilian spheres is a result of their common social backgrounds and shared belief and value systems. During the 17th and 18th centuries' Europe, both the military and civilian elites belonged to the aristocrat class thus sharing the same interests.

According to Nordlinger, this type of civil-military relations was a consequence of traditional oligarchic regimes and left its place to the *liberal model* due to the increasing professionalization of the militaries. In this model, the civilian leaders are responsible for the management of the social life whereas the military is only responsible for the national security and stays out of politics. In return, the civilians respect the professional area and autonomy of the military. The aim of liberal model is the maintenance of a depoliticized military that is subordinate to the civilian power.[57] This model resembles Huntington's definition of *subjective civilian control* where military professionalism is reduced due to co-opting of the military by civilian political groups.

Nordlinger stands closer to the last one, the *penetration model*. This model is quite the opposite of the liberal model in the sense that it suggests the indoctrinating the military corps with the political ideology of the state in order to have a powerful but supportive army.[58]

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[56] E. A. Nordlinger. (1977) *"Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments''* p: 11-15.
[57] E. A. Nordlinger. (1977) p: 14.
[58] E. A. Nordlinger. (1977) p: 15.

2.2.1.4. Peter D. Feaver: Agency Theory

The contemporary theory of Peter Feaver is the agency theory. Feaver's theory is an alternative to Huntington's normative theory and contributes back to the general principal-agent literature. Feaver argues that while civilian *principals* and military *agents* interact they develop the essence of the civil-military relations.[59]

Feaver suggests that,

> ... *"[t]he empirical literature is vast and informative but it has advanced primarily along theoretical lines of analysis laid out by Huntington and Janowitz thirty or forty years ago. Theoretical debates, such as they are, largely recapitulate Huntington's claims about professionalism or Janowitz' early critique of Huntington. Despite their prominence, however, neither Huntington nor Janowitz adequately explain the problem of civilian control and so both are uncertain guides for future study and policymaking. Specifically, as I outline below, they skirt crucial aspects of the civilian control problem and make claims about other aspects that subsequent empirical research has challenged."[60]*

Feaver's agency theory focuses on the nature of military obedience. In particular, he examines factors associated with the military's failure to obey (shirking). Today the *military* has *functions other than security,* such as peacekeeping and humanitarian roles. It would be desirable to see military forces deployed to assist civilians following unexpected natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.

Feaver suggests that there is a contract between the civilian principal and the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defense of the civilian's interests." When this contract is established, the civilian principal monitors the military agent to make

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[59] P. Feaver. (2003) ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations'' p: 2.
[60] P. Feaver. (1996) "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control" in *Armed Forces & Society* p: 4.

sure the agent follows the orders of the civilians thus minimizing the risk of power abuse.[61]

In *Armed Servants*, Feaver introduces the ideas of "working" and "shirking." Feaver describes working as the "ideal conduct" of a military agent if the civilian principal were fully aware of what the agent was doing. Working is the functioning of the system in the way civilians' desire, and shirking is the functioning in a way that the military desires that is contrary to civilian direction. When the military shirks its responsibility, civilians lose control. At the far end of shirking is the traditional concern of a military coup, while at the far end of working is an ideal-type military that carries out every civilian order willingly and without corruption.[62]

From time to time the military does not agree with civilian direction, and the military leadership communicates their concern to civilians. Such communication is not considered shirking; civilians do have a responsibility to consider and evaluate military advice.

Feaver asks whether the military will obey its civilian masters, or "will its latent strength allow it to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?" He explains the civil-military problematic as a strategic game between principals (civilians) and their agents (military). Civilian control is exerted when the military works and is diminished when the military shirks its responsibility. Therefore the question of civilian control is, how the civilians get the armed forces to work and not shirk.

The military needs *coercive power* to protect society, but the risk is that the army may misuse this power to accomplish its own interests. According to Feaver "once established, however, the coercive power is itself a potential threat to the interests of the political group it is meant to protect. Managing the coercive power of the military (making sure that those who govern do not become a tyranny to the governed) is the central focus of civil-military relations."[63] He concludes that empirical evidence exists, that the assertive control is prevalent in Western democracies, particularly the U.S.

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[61] P. Feaver. (1999) "Civil-Military Relations" in *Annual Reviews Political Science* p: 224.
[62] P. Feaver (2003) p: 60-62.
[63] P. Feaver. (2003) p: 4.

2.2.1.5. Douglas Bland: Theory of Shared Responsibility

A theory that has a universal appeal and utility must meet certain criteria. Specifically, the theory should address all the "problems" of civil-military relations within one model; be transferable to any model or political system; explain changes in civil-military relations within states over time and those caused by specific circumstances and events; and provide a high degree of predictability across state lines, time, and events. Finally, the theory should be falsifiable. Bland intended to come up with a unified theory of civil-military relations that attempts to meet these challenges, provides a framework for analysis, and serves as a guide for managing civil-military relations in general.

Bland's starting point is the inspiration from Feaver, who suggests that a comprehensive theory of civil-military relations should:

> *...acknowledge "distinct civil and military spheres"; it must explain "the factors that shape how civilians exercise control over the military"; it must "transcend the concept of professionalism;" and it should "be deductively derived before it is empirically tested against the historical record."[64]*

The theory of shared responsibility rests on two assumptions. First, the term, "civil control," means that the sole legitimate source for the direction and actions of the military is derived from civilians outside the military/defense establishment. The second assumption is that civil control is a dynamic process susceptible to changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues, and personalities and to the stresses of crises and war.[65] civil-military relations in any state or situation should focus on the regimethat defines the rules for all players and the accountability mechanismmeant to audit how they exercise authority, how they play the game.[66]

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[64] D. L. Bland. (1999) "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations" in *Armed Forces and Society*. p:9.
[65] D. L. Bland. (1999) p: 10.
[66] D. L. Bland. (1999) p: 20.

2.2.1.6. Samuel E. Finer: Cultural Explanation

The Man on Horseback by Samuel Finer best represents the cultural explanation for military intervention. Finer categorizes societies according to their political culture by evaluating their structure of government and respect for the rule of law. He found that in societies where this respect was low or minimal there was a greater likelihood for military interference and intervention in politics. Thus, citizen support for liberal democratic values represents the most important explanatory factor behind a military intervention. The higher the respect for the Rule of Law the lower the likelihood of a military coup is.[67]

2.2.1.7. Guillermo O'Donnell: Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model

In the late 1960s and 1970s, military regimes flourished throughout South America. The challenge to scholars was to explain these phenomena, particularly as the pattern did not fit the expected trend toward modernization and democratization. Various explanations were posed for the emergence of these military regimes; however, one of the most popular analyses was undoubtedly Guillermo O'Donnell's (1973) Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian model developed by Guillermo O'Donnell has influenced social scientists for many decades. O'Donnell argued that, in the Argentine case, social and economic modernization led to authoritarianism rather than to the strengthening of democracy. O'Donnell established a causal link between specifics political events and precise features of the economic landscape. He claimed that a strong elective affinity exists between higher levels of modernization and the rise of so-called bureaucratic authoritarianism. According to this view, the role of the military in the 1960s and beyond has been to guarantee the political conditions necessary for continued capitalist industrial expansion. The connection between the overall context of peripheral capitalism and bureaucratic authoritarianismrests upon an elaboration of the concept of threat. A crisis of accumulation, for instance, is one in which actions of

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[67] J. M. Battaglino (2007)*The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex, p: 9.

the lower classes are perceived by the dominant classes as blocking the accumulation of capital.[68]

The explanation O'Donnell offers for the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (a form of military rule in which the military institution dominates) is based on a combination of economic cycles and perceived levels of political threat. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes thus sought to reform the economy and control the political threat from the popular sector (generally through repression). The relative success with which regimes met these goals, and hrough what means, left important legacies for the democracies that followed. Argentina's rebellions may have been unique, but many of the problems of post-authoritarian rule are shared among these countries.[69]

2.2.1.8. Singer-Prebisch Thesis: Dependency Theory (Instrumental Approach)

The instrumental approach holds that the primary role of the military institution is to protect and defend the interests of the dominant classes or those of the foreign countries. This approach was heavily influenced by Marxism and emphasizes the exogenous factors of international and domestic economic determinants. According to this theory, the armed forces are a willing instrument of international capitalism and its domestic class allies. Dependency theory began to be influential both in the US and Europe in the 1970s. Dependency theorists suggested that the dependency of Latin America explained its underdevelopment, and the close links between the US military and the Latin American military establishments through the *Inter-American Defense Board* and the *U.S. Mutual Assistance Program* were related to the objective economic need of international capitalism to maintain control over Latin America for its raw material, markets, and exploitable labor.[70] The instrumental approach perceives that the armies of the underdeveloped nations are influenced by the central states and in particular the US to a great extent. Many dependency theorists advocate social

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[68] J. M. Battaglino (2005) ''Cycles of Civil-Military Relations in Argentina - A framework of Analysis'' p: 6.
[69] D. L. Norden (1996) ''Military Rebellion in Argentina- Between Coups and Consolidation'' p: 181.
[70] J. M. Battaglino (2005) p: 6.

revolution as an effective means to the reduction of economic disparities in the world system.

2.2.1.9. Alfred Stepan: the Concept of Professionalization

The emphasis on professionalization of the military for explaining military coups began with the book by Alfred Stepan, The military in politics: changing patterns in Brazil. Stepan analyses how the ideology of new professionalism arose and how it contributed to the expansion of the military's role in politics. New professionalism appeared when modern armies defined defense against internal threats as one of their main functions, which in turn made it necessary for them to become experts in internal political matters. The process that Stepan explains is the expansion of the political role of the Brazilian and Peruvian military establishments in the 1960s. The process of political involvement in Brazil began in the Escola De Guerra. This institution trained officers in internal security matters, including virtually all aspects of social, economic and political life. The principal assumption of Stepan´s approach is that the causes of a military intervention are more related with changes in the nature of professionalism than with the socio-political environment.[71]

Stepan's Rethinking Military Politics (1988). Stepan suggests that the issues most likely to induce a military reaction during the period following a military regime concern the withdrawal of military prerogatives. The relative levels of political stability versus fragility are therefore presented in terms of the balance between military "prerogatives" and military "contestation" as those prerogatives is challenged.

In "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion" (1973), Stepan suggests that the shifts in the military doctrine toward a more encompassing conceptualization of security changed the meaning of professionalism in Latin American countries. As the concept security gained new dimensions as a broad conjunction of social, economic, and strategic factors, with particular attention to domestic affairs, military perceptions of their roles expanded accordingly. This is how their self-evident responsibility for security began to include politics. "These concerns

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[71] J. M. Battaglino (2007) p:9.

provided a *professional* justification for military intervention, yet with a form of professionalism that went far beyond the technical proficiency implicit in a more narrow definition of the term."[72]

2.2.1.10. Jorge Mario Battaglino: Theory of Cycles of Interventionists Coalitions

Battaglino suggests that the large volume of literature on military intervention in the study of civil-military relations have a unidirectional emphasis. He argues that 'they tend to explain interventions stressing one set of causal variables' which, he suggests, constitute two groups of independent variables.[73] The first group focuses on exogenous variables and views military intervention in politics as a direct result of the interaction of forces and processes that take place outside this institution. In this point of view, military interventions are seen as the consequence of societal and structural processes in which the armed forces play only a minor role. This kind of analysis has developed a variety of independent variables, including the level of institutionalization of the political system, the degree of political culture of a society, the stage of economic modernization, and competing class interests and/or international pressures. According to Battaglino, the second group favors endogenous variables, which tends to associate intervention with processes and perceptions that take place within the armed forces, and to argue that the military itself develops features that determine interventionist behavior.

Battaglino's focus is to account for the processes that induce civilian and military actors to take part in pro-coup coalitions that could eventually end in a successful military intervention against civilian regimes. In other words, the aim is to elucidate why in some contexts different actors are available to join an interventionist coalition and why in other situations they are not. Successful military interventions were always

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[72] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 17.
[73] See J. M. Battaglino. (2007) Jorge Mario, "The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex, England, 2007.

preceded by the building of coalitions between sectors of the armed forces and groups from civil society.[74]

Battaglino's research design seeks to integrate aspects of the exogenous and endogenous explanations by studying the process of pro-coup coalition building as the outcome of the interaction among four major variables:[75]

- The orientation of government economic policies (the predominant direction adopted in government policies of the economic sphere). This orientation can favor free-market forces or those groups that depend on protectionism or other types of state interventionism,

- The nature of the political regime (features of the process by which governmental authorities are selected); the purpose of this variable is to analyze the impact of the nature of the political regime on the probability that political actors (mainly parties) will integrate pro-coup coalitions.

- The civilian government's treatment of the military institutional interest; Civil-military relations could maximize military security with a minimum sacrifice of other social values if civilians recognize an autonomous sphere of military professionalism. When civilians are responsible for the degradation of the integrity of the military, the chances of the military being encouraged to enter the political arena are greatly increased.

- The military role beliefs (the military's conception of its role in politics). The analysis of military role beliefs is normally based on the examination of professional journals, speeches, political testimonials, and official histories and documents.

The formation of pro-coup coalitions that lead to successful interventions can be linked to a change in the level of threat perception by armed forces and by civilian actors. Changes in the perception of threat are linked with different configurations of the four above-mentioned variables.

> *... [T]he core objective of the army is to preserve if not enlarge their*
> *coercive capabilities, projecting them outward against foreign foes*

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[74] J. M. Battaglino (2007) p:8.
[75] J. M. Battaglino. (2005) p: 7-8.

and, if need be, inward against domestic foes. To do so, they are motivated to maintain physical and material standards and organizational control reliant on such factors as budget, equipment, discipline and cohesion. For this reason, civilian government treatment of the institutional interests of the armed forces plays a key role in civil-military relations.[76]

An interventionist coalition tends to takes place when sectors within the Armed Forces and civil society perceive a threat against their interests. These actors co-operate because it is in the best interest of each party to do so. Therefore a coalition differs from a more formal pact because it is a temporary combination of persons, parties, institutions, economic groups, or social groups, all with different interests. An interventionist coalition has a greater chance of ending in a successful military intervention when it is more inclusive, covering a major portion of the Armed Forces and relevant fractions of the dominant actors in society. Successful military interventions have varying degrees of organization.[77]

All the comparative historical studies share a perspective that examines political and economic development in historical context and in terms of processes unfolding over time and in relation to each other, within a broader context in which developments in one realm impinge on and shape developments in others.[78]

2.2.1.11. Rebecca Schiff: Concordance Theory

Political scientist Rebecca L. Schiff introduced an alternative to the CMR literature with her concordance theory, proposing that "three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship" that does not require separation.[79] Separation theory describes the separation of civil and military institutions as it occurs in the United States and suggests that it is the ideal model for other nations. Concordance theory argues that three partners the military, the political

[76] J. M. Battaglino. (2005) p: 103.
[77] J. M. Battaglino (2006) ''Regime Stability and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina: A Process-Driven Explanation'' p: 18-20.
[78] K. Thelen. (1999) ''Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'' p: 22.
[79] R. L. Schiff. (1995) "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance" p: 7.

elites, and the citizenry should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation, but does not require it. Schiff has set four indicators of cooperation and agreement among the three actors, which are; the composition of officer corps, the political decision-making process, the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces, and the military style.[80]

She maintains that "the ability of the three partners involved to agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style" is more important than the type of civil-military relationship adopted.[81]

The main idea of the concordance theory is each nation's degree to which civil-military relations manifest more separate or integrated forms due to its historical and culture experiences and conditions. Concordance theory achieves two goals: first, it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among military, the political elites, and society. Second, it predicts that if three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. Schiff describes two problems with the former theory of separation and she intends to solve them with the concordance theory. First problem is that, the current theories rest largely on the United States' experience, and assume that American institutional separation should be practiced in all nations to prevent domestic military intervention. Schiff criticizes this perspective by mentioning that the American case is derived from a particular historical and cultural experience and it may be inapplicable to other countries. By contrast, Schiff's concordance theory takes into account the unique historical and cultural experiences of other nations that may lead to other types of civil-military relations that differ from the United States' example.[82]

Second, the current theory advocates the separation of civil military institutions, and its core is institutional analysis. However, this analysis does not consider the cultural and historical circumstances that may encourage or discourage the institutional separation of civil-military spheres.Concordance theory moves beyond institutional analysis by

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[80] J. M. Anderson (1998) "Civil-Military Relations and Concordance Theory: A Case Study of Argentina" Masters Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, California.
[81] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p:8.
[82] R. L. Schiff (1995) p: 8.

focusing on the issues about a nation's culture. Concordance theory uses the unique institutional and cultural indicators and to point out the empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on the most efficient form of civil-military relations in order to prevent domestic military intervention.[83]

Concordance theory does not ignore the importance of outside threat conditions; rather, in agreement with current civil-military relations theory, domestic politics is the central focus. What sets concordance theory apart from the current theory is its primary focus on culture as a great influence on political and military institutions, as well as society.[84]

Schiff's main argument is that if the three partners attain concordance on four indicators, "the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style," then domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society. Concordance theory does not require a specific form of government, set of institutions or decision-making process. However, it usually occurs in the circumstances surrounding active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values. Cooperative association and harmony of opinion on four particular indicators may result in a range of civil-military patterns such as separation, the elimination of civil-military boundaries, and other variations. To sum up, her model is not limited to an "institutional analysis, but employs other factors of society" which influence the armed forces.[85]

On the other hand, Rebecca L. Schiff offers an alternative theory, namely the Theory of Concordance, which basically argues that three partners (the military, the political elites and the citizens) should aim for a cooperative relationship which does not necessarily involve separation. This theory involves a higher level of integration

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[83] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 8.
[84] R. L. Schiff (1995) p: 9.

[85] R. L. Schiff (1995) p: 12.

among the aforementioned actors than the theories which are based on the idea of separation.[86]

Schiff argues that various types of civil-military relations may exist as there are many kinds of democracy. The arrangements of each system are rooted in the cultural and historical experiences and backgrounds the particular nation they serve. Concordance theory relies on the agreement of the three partners with respect to four indicators which are:

-The composition of the officer corps,

-The political decision-making process,

-The method used in the recruitment of the officers,

-And the military style.

Political scientist Rebecca L. Schiff introduced an alternative to the CMR literature with her concordance theory, proposing that "three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship" that does not require separation.[87]

She maintains that "the ability of the three partners involved to agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style" is more important than the type of civil-military relationship adopted.[88]

Concordance theory seeks to utilize the cultural and institutional factors in order to detect the unique characteristics of each nation's civil-military relations. It predicts that if three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. Schiff describes two problems with the former theory of separation and she intends to solve them with the concordance theory. First problem is that, the current theories rest largely on the United States' experience, and assume that American institutional separation should be practiced in all nations to prevent domestic

[86] R. L. Shiff. (1996) "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism" in *Armed Forces & Society.*
[87] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 7.
[88] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 8.

military intervention. Schiff criticizes this perspective by mentioning that the American case is derived from a particular historical and cultural experience and it may be inapplicable to other countries. By contrast, Schiff's concordance theory takes into account the unique historical and cultural experiences of other nations that may lead to other types of civil-military relations that differ from the United States' example.[89]

Second, the current theory advocates the separation of civil military institutions, and its core is institutional analysis. However, this analysis does not consider the cultural and historical circumstances that may encourage or discourage the institutional separation of civil-military spheres.Concordance theory moves beyond institutional analysis by focusing on the issues about a nation's culture. Concordance theory uses the unique institutional and cultural indicators and to point out the empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on the most efficient form of civil-military relations in order to prevent domestic military intervention.[90]

Concordance theory does not ignore the importance of outside threat conditions; rather, in agreement with current civil-military relations theory, domestic politics is the central focus. What sets concordance theory apart from the current theory is its primary focus on culture as a great influence on political and military institutions, as well as society.[91]

Schiff's main argument is that if the three partners attain concordance on four indicators, "the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style," then domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society. Concordance theory does not require a specific form of government, set of institutions or decision-making process. However, it usually occurs in the circumstances surrounding active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values. Cooperative association and harmony of opinion on four particular indicators may result in a range

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[89] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 8.
[90] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 8.
[91] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 9.

of civil-military patterns such as separation, the elimination of civil-military boundaries, and other variations. To sum up, her model is not limited to an "institutional analysis, but employs other factors of society" which influence the armed forces.[92]

A real comprehension of civil-military relations is affirmed by the notion that the behaviors and attitudes of the military and its civilian counterparts do not happen in a vacuum; these are dependent upon one another, and a result of "ongoing interaction" and "a network of relations" [93]

The empirical knowledge of civil-military relations includes "direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the military, legislative haggling over the funding, regulation, and use of the military, and complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy". Furthermore, these relations vary in form and results depending on if they are seen in mature democracies or emerging democracies. In the course of literature building, several scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver and Rebecca Schiff have developed theories to explain the essence of civil-military relations.

Each country has its own cultural and historical background and the military is influenced by those cultural and historical values. Although the Central and Eastern European countries are discussed in depth by civil-military relations theories, there is neglect of the Turkish case[94]

Turkey has complicated and unique conditions for democratic consolidation, such as a considerable GDP per capita, prospects of EU membership. Like every other case, Turkey should be considered in the light of its historical heritage as well as the cultural and geopolitical conditions when dealing with civil-military relations.

Leman Başak Arı suggests that the literature provides a background for the conceptual framework that consists of five descriptive categories. These categories are used for

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[92] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 12.
[93] T. Demirel. (2003)
[94] A. Güney. and P. Karatekelioğlu. (2005) "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects" in *Armed Forces & Society,* p: 439.

the content analysis section of the applied research project. The five descriptive categories are: civil-military problematic, civilian control, professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges.[95]

2.2.2. The Applications of Concordance Theory to Turkey and Argentina

2.2.2.1. A Case Study of Argentina

John M. Anderson applied the concordance theory to Argentina in his master's thesis in Naval Postgraduate School.[96] First of all, he mentions that although Huntington's prescription for separation and professionalization of the military is fairly applicable to the case of Argentina for the period after 1983, it fails to explain the prior decades. Although he has certain criticisms for the theory of Concordance in terms of methodology, he finds it applicable to the bureaucratic authoritarian era of Argentina. Anderson applied the theory to two different eras in order to detect whether there were different outcomes. As described in Schiff's Concordance theory, he searched for general disagreement among the *three partners* (namely the political elite, the military and the citizenry) with respect to the four indicators defined in the theory for the era of interventions (1930-1976) then he applied the theory to the democratic period after 1983.

After the first military intervention in 1930, interventions became the rule rather than the exception. In Argentina, the interventionism was the consequence of a combination of conditions, including the civilian tendency to search for military allies and military's tendency to respond to that. Military regimes in Argentina always occurred with substantial public support. Although the military constantly had an assumption to govern, its concern to avoid complete isolation was an overriding factor. Giving reference to Deborah L. Norden and George Philip, Anderson suggests that military

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[95] L. B. Arı. (2007) p: 9.
[96] See; J. M. Anderson. (1998) *Civil-Military Relations and Concordance Theory: A Case Study of Argentina,* Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

interventions are more likely to occur if the military and citizenry (two actors in Schiff's model) both disagree with the third partner, the political leadership.[97]

Schiff identifies *the composition of the officer corps* as one of the four indicators of concordance. Throughout history, Argentinean officer corps was not representing the society. The composition of each force was based on the cultural and historical traditions of the nation. The military in general and particularly the officer corps hardly had any ties to the civilian sphere. However in the second period the military has become comparatively more representative of the society in general.[98]

The second indicator, *the political decision making process* involves the institutional factors of society (including budget, size, material and structure) that effect how the military operates and its satisfaction in general. Anderson suggests that this question was irrelevant before 1983 since the military could get everything it demanded. Following the transition to democracy, starting with the Alfonsin government there was concordance on the political decision making process between the political elite and the citizenry, but the military was clearly in conflict. However Anderson mentions that the focus of conflict was none of the factors that Schiff determined.

Another indicator is the recruitment method, which can be either coercive or persuasive. In 1995 enlistment became completely voluntary.[99] Since then the recruits are heavily drawn from lower social and economic segments of the society. Before that recruitment was obligatory, although it cannot be classified as coercive.

Final indicator is *the military style* which refers to a combination of what the military looks like, its image on the society, and what norms and beliefs drive it. Military style endeavors to determine how symbols and rituals effect the relations of the military to the other institutions and/or sectors of the society. The symbols and rituals hold an important meaning in the military culture, in comparison to most other institutions. The members of the corps attribute meanings such as respectability, professionalism, uniqueness, and cohesiveness. Anderson mentions that in the period of 1930-1983, the military perceived itself as a coequal partner in the political realm. "Their self-

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[97] J. M. Anderson (1998) p: 42.
[98] J. M. Anderson (1998) p: 61.
[99] J. M. Anderson (1998) p: 63.

perception as the guardians of the nation led to the cycle of interventions, and the human rights violations were justified by their overriding obligation to restore order and to protect their democracy from the communist threat."[100] During that period, concordance was maintained under the strong dominance of the military. Following the return to democracy in 1983, a gradual transformation took its toll. Although there was some resistance from the military during Alfonsin government, the military became more compatible under Menem thus maintaining the concordance once again.

Concluding the above analysis, Anderson suggests that the Concordance Theory generally complies with Argentina, although he has some criticism in terms of methodology and the determination of the indicators.

2.2.2.2. Implications in the Case of Turkey

Political scientist Nilüfer Narlı adopts the Concordance Model of Rebecca L. Schiff in order to explain the civil-military relations in Turkey efficiently. According to the Concordance Model, the interpreted institutional and cultural conditions determine the relations among the three partners which are the military, the political elite, and the society. The higher the agreement among these two actors is maintained, the less likely an internal military intervention to occur.

The organization of the civil-military relations differs from the Huntington's separation model. According to concordance model, military and civilian authorities develop a partnership based on a concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry despite their formal separation. This pattern of governance is a consequence of Turkey's unique cultural, social, and institutional context, that is to say the multi-layered society, culture and historic conflicts with neighboring states and the constant prudence on territorial integrity.[101]

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[100] J. M. Anderson (1998) p: 64.
[101] N. Narlı. (2000) "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" in *Turkish Studies* p: 109.

Additionally, there are major convictions in the political culture which enhance the tendency to deny the separation of civilian and military spheres and sustain the military's influence in civilian political decision-making process.[102]

The current trends in civil-military theory in Western Europe and the United States focus the *separation* of civil and military spheres and assume that the authority of the civil sphere over the military has to be achieved in order to prevent domestic military intervention. Although it applies better to the Western democracies, this perception is hardly applicable to Turkey, like it is to Argentina. On the other hand, the concordance model which the author assesses to be more applicable to our units, and which was developed by the political scientist Rebecca L. Schiff, envisages a civil-military partnership that seeks the following objectives:

Firstly it sets the institutional and cultural conditions which prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Secondly it identifies three actors (the military, the political elite and the society) and predicts that the domestic military intervention is less likely to occur when there is agreement among those three actors. Among the aforementioned actors, the military signifies the institution of armed forces and army personnel; the political leadership refers to government officials and those with direct influence over the composition and funding of the armed forces such as the president, prime minister, cabinet ministers, party leaders, parliament members, and royal families; and the society is defined by its function in the concordance model.[103] Therefore the main argument is that; the absolute supremacy of the civilian sphere is not necessarily required to prevent a military intervention.

Schiff theorizes that we can come up with four indicators that are observable in order to figure how likely a military intervention is in a given society. If the military, the political elite, and the society achieve concordance on *four indicators* then domestic intervention is less probable. Schiff suggests that the combination of outcomes of these indicators may result in a range of civil-military patterns.[104]

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[102] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 111.
[103] Narlı gives special emphasis to the fact that the *separation theories* focus on political institutions as the main 'civil' components of analysis, in opposition to *concordance theory*.
[104] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 7-24.

These indicators are:[105]

- the composition of the officer corps,

- the political decision-making process,

- the recruitment method of the army corps,

- and military style.

The first of the four indicators in the model is the composition of the officer corps.

The second indicator is the political decision-making process that "involves the institutional organs of society that determine important factors for the military: materials, budget, size, and structure." To fulfill its needs, the military generally turns to a governmental channel that weighs both military and societal resources and requirements. This channel, be it a parliament, cabinet, etc. debates and estimates the military's needs, and conceives a compromise budget for these needs. However, concordance requires an agreement among the political elite, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best meets the requirements of the armed forces.

The third indicator in Schiff's model is the recruitment method, in other words the drafting into the armed forces. Conscription can be *coercive*, in the case of a compulsory military service, or *persuasive*, like in the case of voluntary attendance or paid duty.

The last indicator of the model, the military style, denotes "the external manifestations of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it." Schiff argues that the military style matters since it determines social boundaries or their absence. It determines how members of a certain group associate with their peers and distinguish themselves from members of other groups.

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[105] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 13.

Forms and rituals such as military traditions like uniforms, parades and marches, and customs are symbols that generally bear power and authority for a military. They generally constitute a part of the historical development of the institution and the identity that is held dear by the members of it. Schiff defines political culture as a specialized part of a whole culture, referring to the dominant or typical attitudes, values, assumptions, and beliefs that affect the political action and attitudes of individuals composing a society.[106]

Schiff refers to Richard Dekmejian, who set a scheme where "civilian rule" and "military rule" are seen as the two opposite ends of the spectrum of civil-military relations, giving reference to Perlmutter's three-fold classification.[107] Applicably to the Turkish and Argentine cases, is suggested that the power of one actor is never absolute since there is always some degree of military influence on civilian regimes and vice versa. Perlmutter's 'professional soldier', possessing a strong sense of corporatism, considers himself *subservient* to civilian authority. The opposite end is the case with the 'praetorian soldier' who seeks to identify the military's corporate aspirations with the national interest and develops a self-evident sense of mission.[108]

Nilüfer Narlı adopts the Concordance Model of Rebecca L. Schiff in order to explain the civil-military relations in Turkey efficiently. According to the Concordance Model, the interpreted institutional and cultural conditions determine the relations among the three partners which are the military, the political elite, and the society. The higher the agreement among these two actors is maintained, the less likely an internal military intervention to occur.[109] Narli suggests that the Turkish case deviates from Dekmejian's model since the "increased professionalism of the army is associated with greater military influence in the Turkish case rather than increased subordination of the military to the civil authority."[110]

The tenacious climate of terrorism created by the ultra-left and the right in the 1970s and the threat posed by the PKK since the early 1980s, combined with the unstable environment of the Middle East, have shaped the relationship between the Turkish

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[106] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 13.
[107] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 111.
[108] R. L. Schiff. (1995) p: 13.
[109] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 110.
[110] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 112.

Armed Forces (TAF), political institutions, and society. The TAF's influence on government, industry, and the ethos of the Turkish people illustrates how integrated the civil and military spheres in Turkey are. However, not every sector of society supports the military's interventionist role in Turkish politics. Whereas there is broad political and social agreement on the military's involvement when the nation is threatened by foreign forces or domestic radicals, a sizeable minority including Islamist and pro-Kurdish groups, as well as liberals and leftists, have become increasingly vocal in challenging the armed forces. Thus, concordance among the military, the government, and society is fragile and fluctuating. Turkey experienced military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 that largely came in times of crisis when civil-military relations were stressed and the army command perceived that the country was in danger due to harmful activities that the government could not control. After each intervention concordance among the three main actors was restored.[111]

With regard to the first of Schiff's four indicators of concordance, the composition of the officer corps, the officer corps is not a separate and exclusionary institution. Rather, it comprises a group of elite soldiers who sustain a citizens' army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of the citizen soldiers. The officer corps does not exclude any group, but it largely consists of urban men from central Anatolia and the Aegean and Marmara regions. These officers are modern and secular, and are committed to Ataturk's ideals. Most citizens have not demonstrated any opposition to this composition, nor have they favored expelling pro-Islamist officers from the army.[112]

The consensus over the corps' composition can be explained by analyzing Schiff's second indicator, recruitment method. In Turkey, the military is not seen as a separate institution within society. Military service, though compulsory for all Turkish men since 1927, is seen as a national duty since citizens have been socialized with values promoting the army's role as protector of the state.

With respect to political decision-making, a third indicator, the military has a high degree of autonomy and impact. The chief of staff, who acts as commander in chief

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[111] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 117.
[112] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 118.

during wartime, does not fall under the domain of the minister of defense, and he conducts military affairs independently of the cabinet. His office is responsible for drawing up all programs, principles, and priorities related to personnel, operations, intelligence, training, and education and logistic services, preparing the armed forces for war, and coordinating among the ground, naval, and air force commands, as well as other institutions attached to the general staff. The office also presents its views on the military aspects of international treaties and agreements, and if necessary, participates in meetings regarding such agreements.[113]

The last indicator, military style, reflects the military's superlative role in Turkish society and its function as a modernizing agent.

Cultural and institutional factors, such as Schiff's four indicators, offer a clear explanation of civil-military relations in Turkey. Despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry. This ruling style is the product of Turkey's specific cultural, social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as well as historic conflicts with neighboring states.

Since 1960, the military has staged four coups in order to protect national unity, democracy, and secularism. In each takeover, most citizens accepted the military's political involvement because of society's deep confidence in the army and its role as an organic part of the society. Although Turkey's civilian sector is more prominent, the military has constitutional tools at its disposal and an endorsing political culture, should it choose to play a behind-the-scenes role in the political process.

Concordance theory, on the other hand, assumes accommodation and shared objectives among the military, political elites, and the citizenry. Enhanced professionalism has better enabled the military to meet shared objectives. Further, its technological advancements and strength demonstrated successfully against PKK terrorism and in international peacekeeping operations, has increased its prestige in the public's eye. Its sophistication has also enabled it to grasp the complexities of social issues and the needs of the citizenry, and hence, to increase its standing in the public domain.

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[113] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 120

Moreover, working toward shared objectives with the citizenry may lead to the erosion of civil/military boundaries, an assumption of the concordance model. This erosion has seemingly been taking place in Turkey since early 1997. Military officers, for example, joined civilians in celebrating the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Republic. Military officers in uniform held hands with civilians and marched in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir on October 25, 1998, symbolically manifesting the removal of civil/military boundaries. Given the structure of Turkish society, efforts to discredit the military will lead to political turmoil rather than increased democratization at a time of political instability.[114]

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[114] N. Narlı. (2000) p: 121.

Chapter III

Historical Backgrounds of Political Involvement of Military in Turkey

3.1. The Role of Turkish Military on Turkish Political Life from Ottoman to Republic: Change and Continuity

The focus of this chapter is the history and roles of the Turkish military and its relationship with larger society as well as some unique features of Turkey in its geopolitical context as well as its civil-military organization.

In the analysis of civil-military relations in Turkey, one of the essential points is the past roles the armed forces played, which constitute important milestones in Turkish political history. The past practices and experiences of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish society established a unique pattern of civil-military relations. Like in every other nation, these historical precedents, has set the boundaries of what is 'normal', probable and legitimate in the minds of soldiers, politicians and the citizenry.

The military institution had a controlling role in the establishment and protection of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government had been an Army before it was anything else, and the army and government were intermingled in structure and function.[115] The military occupied the highest place in the traditional state organization, which basically involved four groups: the military, the learned (*ulema*), the merchants, and the peasants (*reaya*).[116] Military power was the one of the most striking features of the Ottoman Empire. There was little distinction between the military and civilian functions of the state; thus, for instance, the same man could occasionally serve as a military commander, and then a provincial governor.

The military was not only a means of protection in the Ottoman Empire, but it was also a tool for land policy with its "Sipahi" (Cavalrymen) system. The essence of this

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[115] G. Karabelias. (1999) "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-95" p: 130.
[116] K. Karpat. (2004) ''Studies on Turkish Politics and Society; Selected Articles and Essays'' p: 235.
* The term "successful military intervention" signifies a military act that aims to change the government and results in a due change in the government.

system was that the land was not a private property of the people who use it, and was not subject to private law acts in that regard.[117] As every other antity of the Empire, the land belonged to the Sultan, the caliph (the representative of Muhammed). The Sultan distributed the land to military, civil and religious elites for their benefit, in return for an appropriate amount of tax. This system used to constitute the backbone of the Ottoman central authority for a few reasons. Firstly, it integrated the military and the major means of production of the time which was the land. Second, it enhanced the central authority since the Sultan could take back the land from a particular officer or change their service places that become too strong that it could challenge the central authority.[118]

The military decline of the Ottoman state enforced modernization in the armed forces before any other institution. As the Ottoman military officers became more open and prone to change, the course of modernization gained other dimensions than mere technical innovation. This course of change established a historical mark by seeding the ideological polarization of the traditionalism and modernity. Taking the side of modernization, the armed forces were engraved to the social memory as an essential part of the course of modernization.

3.1.1. Janissary Guild:

Janissary guild was first established by Sultan Murad I in the late 14th century, and lasted until their disbanding in 1826. The Janissaries became famous both for their military skills, and also for their recruitment method. The Janissary corps was composed of the young men gathered from Christian families of the Balkans. After the conscription they went under the possession of the sultan, and converted to Islam.[119]When the empire began to fall because of unsuccessful military campaigns and inability to catch on modernity, the Ottoman military, especially Janissaries, became a source of instability and began to frighten their own sovereigns and civil

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[117] M. Bozdemir. (1982) ''Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Kaynakları'' p: 43.

[118] Adding up the "lonca" system which controlled and limited the industry and trade, we see that the Ottoman system closed all the doors, we see that the ottoman system prevented the accumulation of capital and therefore the birth of a bourguaois class.

[119] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity* p: 130-137.

population.

3.1.2. The Modernization of the Military: Selim III and Mahmud II

During late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the sultans began to focus on reformation in order to catch up with the advancements in the Western world. As the modernization took its toll, the priority was given to the army. As a part of this effort, military education was transformed in accordance to the Western Model. Out of these institutions 'emerged a new generation of reformist officers dedicated to the salvation of their state and empire.'[120] The graduates of these new military schools began to perceive themselves as the pioneers of enlightenment, committed to political reforms as well as positivist thought.

The Ottoman reformation was not a consequence of social evolution and demand but rather a necessity of the state to catch up with the technological advancements of the western world. Moreover, at least in the beginning the reformation was limited to military realm which prevented a fundamental and structural change. The ongoing losses on the battlefield forced the empire to take military precautions, but the structural reasons behind the scene were ignored. The series of revolutions were intended to be limited to the military field because of the religious concerns towards the innovations and reforms.

First serious attempts to reform came from Selim III (1789-1806) who formed a new army, *Nizam-ı Cedid* (the New Order) which was trained in the Western methods by Europeans. The reason for the founding of *Nizam-ı Cedid* was to challenge the external threats as well as the strong local notables. However, Selim III was deposed as a result of rebellions of notables and particularly Janissaries.

After a short period of Mustafa IV on throne, Mahmud II came to power under threatening conditions such as powerful notables and nationalist revolts in the Balkans, and the challenge of the strong Ottoman governor Mehmet Ali (*Kavalalı*) in Egypt. Nevertheless, after signing an agreement with the local notables, he restarted the

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[120]F. Ahmad. (1993) ''The making of Modem Turkey'' p: 2.

reform program and managed to disband the Janissaries, which was praised as *Vaka-i Hayriye* (the Auspicious Incident) and establish a new in army in 1826.

The military reform had an unexpected consequence, namely the politicization of the military officers. Initially the reforms intended to provide the transfer of military technology; but like any other social engineering they came along with their side effects. Since this new army was comprised of soldiers who came from within the less wealthy and most populous stratum of the Turkish society, they were familiar to the lives, habits and troubles of the less advantageous among citizenry, which make it possible for them to identify with their problems. On the other hand, they received modern education designed with Western ideas and practices, and they were eager to apply these ideas to the Ottoman society. For instance, foreign language became a part of the education of the officers, which provided access to any other information as well as the intended military technology issues. Thus, the innovation of the military institutions paved the way to the introduction of western value system and thoughts such as laicism, positivism and rationalism. The new generations which grew up with these relatively revolutionary thoughts began to question the social order and search for solutions for political problems besides the military ones.

The awareness of the military officers developed mainly around three circles. First of all the secret societies in the military academies housed the development of opposition against Abdulhamid II. Another group was İttifak-ı Hamiyet, an organization at political awareness which had both civilian and military members and was founded at 1865. They were inspired by the Italian Carbonary movement, and the Narodnik thoughts as guerrilla fighters. The third such group was the "Jeunnes Turquies" opposition in exile, those who left the Empire because of the pressure of Abdulhamid rule. In 1867 they founded a political party in France, and were influencial in European capitals such as Paris and London.[121]

Abdulhamid II was against the constitutional ideas of the Young Ottomans and closed the parliament in 1878 using the excuse of emergency conditions and the inexperience of the people involved in constitutional government practices. The 1876 Constitution

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[121] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 67-70.

was set aside without receiving "any official recognition for a period of thirty years, and the country plunged into an era of despotism".

3.1.3. First Constitutional Monarchy and Reform Era: 1839-1876 (Tanzimat)

The janissary army was abolished in 1826. The replacing corps was designed with Western methods, and it was committed to the process of modernization. The proclamation of the "*Rescript of Gulhane"* by Rashid Pasha in 1839 began a period of reform called the *Tanzimat* which continued up to 1876. An extensive reform program was launched under Mahmud II, guided by strong Western influences. Any opposition by conservative religious agitators was crushed. The imperial rescript enabled reforms in the judicial, administrative, financial and military fields and in the system of taxation. It also included a list of rights as to the securing of life, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects, and it emphasized the equality of all Ottoman citizens before the law.

Abdülhamid II perceived this modernized army as a potential threat to the tradition-based absolute rule that he sought to establish. One of the measures he took was to divide his army developing two different sources of recruitment. Some of the soldiers were educated in modern war academies and were equipped with modern values whereas the other group simply had entered the army and had risen among the army ranks. The former had had acquired such secular values as patriotism and nationalism, and the ideas liberty, fraternity and the rule of law.[122] There were deep differences among the world views of these two groups, for the latter was loyal to the traditional system whereas the moderns were critical of the system and supported reformist policies.

Efforts to sustain the Ottoman Empire by initiating numerous reforms were not enough for the survival of the empire. However, these reforms enabled the training of certain social groups with a sense of public service and with an increasing dedication to modernization. The most important among them were army officers, civil servants and

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[122] For the impact of French Revolution in Ottoman military see B. Lewis. (1953) "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey: Some Notes on the Transmission of Ideas" p: 116-35.

some intellectuals who were motivated by a sense of national consciousness. Tanzimat conditions led to the development of new bureaucratic and military elite. This movement was started by a group of army officers, bureaucrats and writers who believed the *Tanzimat* reforms were inadequate and demanded the establishment of constitutional monarchy. While taking advantage of the 1876 conditions, these constitutionalists took over Sultan and brought Abdülhamid II to power. By forcing the new ruler to sign a constitution which directly limited the powers of the Sultan, the young officers were able to establish a representative government.

Despite the progressive ideals of Young Ottomans, the parliament which opened in 1877 lasted for no more than a year. The Young Ottoman activities led to the proclamation of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876, followed by the opening of the first Ottoman Parliament in 1877. As Abdulhamid II suspended the Constitution; he intended to establish a central authority with an iron hand, amid continuing the perspective of innovation. Although he was a supporter of military reforms, he was suspicious that the officers might dethrone him, thus causing ambivalent attitudes towards military innovation. The army maneuvers were not allowed while the new military equipment bought from Europe was left unpacked in stocks. Abdulhamid II hoped to contain the army's political power with such precautions. On the other hand, he encouraged modernization in the military education. Colonel vonder Goltz from was appointed as a military advisor, under whom the military education system was reconstructed according to the German methodology.

In 1889 the Ottoman Society for Union and Progress was formed in Paris. The society was founded by journalists, publishers and officers who had been forced by the Sultan to go into exile. More commonly referred to as the 'Young Turks', its members advocated the return to a constitutional regime in Ottoman Empire. The initial core of Committee for Union and Progress (CUP)was established by students at the military medical college in 1889. After a failed coup attempt in 1896, Young Turks began to organize in exile. At the same time, the serving army officers were establishing their own secret organizations in different parts of the empire. In line with these developments, 1907 the Young Turk movement created theCUP, which gained momentum in the highly politicized environment and enforced Abdulhamid II to reestablish the Constitution in July 1908. Although officially declaring the new regime

to be a parliamentary government, in reality it was run by the CUP and the military in a rather authoritarian manner.

At the same time, by 1906 military committees were organized secretly among the junior officers of the Ottoman army.[24] These cells were called "*Vatan ve Huriyet*" (Motherland and Liberty); one of the earliest members was a General Staff lieutenant officedin the Fifth Army in Damascus, Mustafa Kemal.

3.1.4. 31 March Incident and Second Constitutional Monarchy: 1908

The 31 March Incident was a rebellion of reactionaries in Istanbul against the restoration of constitutional monarchy that had taken place in 1908. was the rebellion of alaylı officers and religious students, where they demanded that Islamic law would be completely implemented. It took place on 13 April 1909 (31 March on the Rumi calendar which was in use at the time). The *counter-coup* had attempted to put an end to the newly emerging Second Constitutional Era in the Ottoman Empire and to the newly established influence of the Committee of Union and Progress, in order to reaffirm the position of the Sultan Abdulhamid II as absolute monarch. However, the reformist segment of the military was quick to answer. Third Army in Salonika moved on in order to defend the constitutional regime. It was a revolt towards the high command by the lower ranks, breaking of chain of command.All in all, the attempt failed even increasing the power of Union and Progress.

Protests against Abdulhamid II's absolutism caused the second phase of the Young Turk movement. The most important members of this movement were army officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals. The officer corps was enthusiastic about the re-establishment of the constitution. The 1908 revolution brought together the Young Turks of civil and military origin.

The military's role in 1908 was even more then the 1876 revolution. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was, in some respects, a reoccurrence of that of 1876. The revolution began in Macedonia when Ahmed Niyazi, with his 200 soldiers took hold of garrison's arms, ammunition and treasury and retreated to the mountains, with the objective of restoring the constitution of 1876.

As a result of the revolution and under the pressure of the opposition, Abdulhamid II declared the 1876 Constitution was in force, the constitution he had shelved 30 years ago. Abdulhamid II was accused of having staged the uprising, he was forced to leave the throne and Mehmed V replaced him. The parliament reopened and thus started the Second Constitutional Period, in which the Young Turks ruled the Empire, leaving their imprint on history. This was the beginning of the Young Turk Revolution which continued for the next ten years, ending with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the WWI. [123]

The 31 March Incident is significant in terms of understanding the relation between the society and the military. The clash of traditionalism and progressivism, or the cultural duality is still a fundamental concern in modern Turkey, which is exemplified by the Turkish Armed Forces keen interest in protecting the secular nature of the regime on the one hand, and Turkish society's strong religious feelings and attachment to religious customs and figures on the other.

It is worth mentioning once again that at the time the duality among the soldiers had taken its toll. The "mektepli" (*educated*) soldiers formed the backbone of the Ottoman army and supported the reformist policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) when it took over the political power.Moreover, those who supported the revolution – educated young officers and upper echelons- were divided among themselves as far as their priorities were concerned. Those who took territorial integrity as a priority were in favor of a strong central government. On the other hand, the liberals were supporting a federal structure with greater freedom for all social groups. They were also more prone to cooperate with civilians. The Ottoman society was also divided in their attitude towards the revolution. A considerable part of the society was Islamic traditionalists who opposed the constitution and suspected the Westernized intellectuals.

Alaylı officers were either loyal to the sultanate, or neutral. They were loyal to the status quo and it institutions, more tradition-bound and therefore alienated by the ideas that flourished after the constitutional revolution in July 1908. The conservatists, "along with members of the rank file revolted in April 1909" were expelled from the

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[123] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 2.

army after the failure of 31 March rebellion. Feroz Ahmad points out that;[124]

> *"...with the purge of traditionalist officers after 1908, the progressivists died in large numbers in the many wars the empire waged between 1908 and 1922. Had these enlightened officers been a larger part of Mustafa Kemal's supporters after the formation of the republic, his reforms would probably have taken root more firmly."*

The 2nd Constitutionalist Period which started on 1908 reestablished the Constitution which was pending for 30 years. The revolutionary accumulation took place in Salonika, which provided a suitable environment in terms of cosmopolitan ambience and distance from İstanbul. Resneli Niyazi and Enver Pasha who commanded a group of rebellious soldiers revolted in a manner that the Latin Americans would name a Telegráfico revolution. Indeed, the rebellions were in Salonika but the revolution took place in İstanbul. Sultan Abdulhamid II sent troops to Salonika in order to reestablish power but these troops ended up joining the rebellious forces. Recognizing the severity of the situation, Sultan Abdulhamid II announced that he was happy to reestablish the constitution that he declared and suspended 30 years ago, considering the advancement and consciousness of the society.

The most important external motivation of the takeover was that King of England Edward VII and Czar of Russia Nicola came together at Reval in June 1908, and the Young Turks propagandized that this meeting was arranged in order to come up with an agreement on the partition of the Ottoman Empire, which was considered as a "sick man."

The impact of the military officers in the revolution of 1908 and the prominent role they played in the aftermath was a milestone in the political life. The coup established the precedents for military intervention in politics, on behalf of the welfare of the people. The involvement of the military in political parties, such as the CUP, where the responsibilities were shared between civilians and officers, established the notion of the military as mutually responsible for the state affairs. The precedent for military

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[124] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 130-137.

activism in politics has thereafter been a part of the military tradition in the republican years to follow. The Young Turks' experience of political involvement was later perceived as disastrous in recent years.

From 1912 to 1918 the CUP launched comprehensive secularization reforms of the educational and legal systems and introduced programs aiming at the emancipation of women. As part of this Westernized transformation they also started to conceptualize a modern Turkish nationality. In order to limit the power of "*ulema*" the religious courts were brought under the Ministry of Justice in 1915. While all religious schools were transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1917, a new family law was introduced where marriage became a secular contract. Their public popularity contributed to their ability to remain in the government, thus contributing to their political mission to modernize and implement reforms in the society. This mission was especially supported by the more educated circles in the cities, who believed that such reforms would enhance the standard of living in the empire. The government attempted to undertake several reforms in spite of harsh conditions of war. First reform was the abolishment of the capitulations in 1914, a set of legal and fiscal privileges which dated back to 15th C and foreign merchants benefited from. In 1915, a law which encouraged domestic industry was enacted and in 1917, the first Turkish owned private bank, Ottoman National Bank was established.[125]

However, the Balkan Wars was the turning point in the course of events. In 1913, the leading three members of the CUP, Enver Talat and Cemal, became ministers which would drive the Empire into WW I joining the Central Powers.[126]

3.1.5. The WWI and the War of Independence

The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Central Powers in November 1914, with the decision of the small group of CUP leaders aforementioned. During the war years, the CUP continued its policies of modernization and secularization.

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[125] See F. Ahmad. (1993).
[126] W. Hale. (1994) ''Turkish Politics and the Military'' p: 49.

However on the war front severe defeats were weakening the empire. The war ended up with the division of the Ottoman Empire.

The War of Independence was carried out by the resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal; the Ottoman army was dramatically reduced and disbanded according to the Mudros armistice agreement on October 30, 1918. After the defeat of the empire and the signing of the Mudros Armistice, the allied powers required the demobilization of the Army; so that the total presence of the army was reduced from 650.000 (the high number reached in 1914 after the military mobilization) to 70-80.000.[127]. Yet, some commanders like Kazim (*Karabekir*) and Ali Fuat (*Cebesoy*), did not concede to disband their forces. The military as well as the society considered that the great defeat was the fault of the Sultan and the government. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the WW I and with the invasion of Western Anatolia by the Greeks, a resistance movement against the invading forces was formed. General Mustafa Kemal was the leading figure in the process of resistance.

In the last meeting of the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul which was held on January 28 1920 a political declaration regarding the territorial basis (*misak-ı milli*) of the independence struggle was prepared. During the Independence War, the delegates from all over the main land gathered in Ankara and declared the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The success on the battlefield was followed by diplomatic initiatives. On 29 October 1923, the Assembly announced the establishment of the republic. The majority of the leadership had military backgrounds and it can be said that the Republic of Turkey was established by the soldiers.

The CUP lost credit due to their decision to enter into in the war and the defeat. On the other hand, the Revolution of 1908 had major impact on political life of ordinary citizens in terms of civilian participation in politics. When Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues decided to organize the movement of resistance, there was already a sparkle lit by the Young Turk rule. Because of the notorious CUP figures, they avoided identifying with the CUP. Although there was a continuation of personnel between the Young Turk and Kemalist periods and the organization of the nationalist movement benefitted from the former CUP establishment, Ataturk and his followers did not adopt

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[127] As quoted by M. Bozdemir from S. Selek (1966) ''Anadolu İhtilali'' p: 102-105.

their imperialist approach. Being aware that a military resistance need organized societal base, they set their own goals and methods with a perspective to receive public support.

The war of independence was a product of a coalition of a variety of social groups. The Kemalists cooperated with the local powers during the struggle, which in turn, caused trouble during the latter process of modernization, particularly the failure of the long-debated land reform. The objective shifted from maintaining the Ottoman Empire to sustaining the homeland. This national crisis brought people from different social segments together levels to defend their land.

3.1.5.1. The Condition of the Regular Army

According to Rustow, who studied the backgrounds of high rank officers during the Independence Movement, 12 out of 17 commanders took part in the cause. Following research by Kurt Steinhous suggests that the average age of the revolutionary officers who took part in the Independence War were significantly lower than those who remained loyal to Istanbul administration. The commanders who were appointed by Istanbul administration occasionally came up with creative strategies in order to support the National Struggle, without obviously challenging the orders they received from Istanbul; such as pre-arranging collusive rebellions of their inferior commanders in order to support the struggle.[128]

The interactions of the Kemalist army with the public had multiple aspects. Although there was a solid public resistance which came about instinctively, the public was not ready to accept the leadership of the army and go into war. The Kemalist army gradually earned the confidence of the public and came over the distrust and reluctance which was obvious at the first place. It is arguable that aforementioned tendency prevented the declaration of mobilization until the Battle of Sakarya, which was an advanced stage of the war.

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[128] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 82.

3.1.5.2. Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri (Associations for the Defense of the National Rights)

It is worth mentioning that the traditional link of the Turkish society to the military had a crucial role in the fate of the War of Independence. The army played a leading role in the success of the war of independence. Nevertheless, the mainly civilian 'Defense of Rights Associations' throughout Anatolia also contributed to the struggle to a great extent. Like Turkish military, the Turkish society was also determined to resist after the first intrusions by allied powers. Several disorganized groups and guerilla movements called *Kuvay-i Milliye* emerged to resist the invasion. The breakup of the empire and the invasion of Anatolia traumatized the whole population regardless of their social segment. The partial invasions of Anatolia, the chaotic and insecure atmosphere of wartime stimulated the people and created an instinctual defense movement. The national defense forces namely *Kuvay-i Milliye* were a reflection of the societal reflex of self-defense. Spontaneous reactions began to occur all over Anatolia and from various segments of the society.[129]

Insecurity of life and property led to a concern of existence and an instinct of defense. Thus, reactive movements started to flourish spontaneously in different parts of the land. Intellectuals who can play a leadership role such as former military officers, former politicians, teachers, journalist etc. encouraged and organized the society for defense. The national forces had a specific organization which resembled guerilla forces with political tenure.[130]

Hence, the War of Independence was more of a grassroots movement than a guerilla movement under its own steam. On the contrary, there was a functional cohesion and cooperation between the guerilla and the people. *Kuvay-i Milliye* organizations were on the one hand coordinating the recruitment and transfer to the front lines, and on the

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[129] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 83.
[130] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 84.

other hand collected cash and kind in order to run the campaign. In this environment, the guerilla and the regular army were nested and intermingled in terms of function, if not structurally.

3.1.5.3. The Efe (Zeybek) Traditions:

The Efe were the leaders of Turkish irregular soldiers and guerillas from the Aegean Region of Anatolia, sometimes called the Zeybek. After the World War I, Efe were known for leading their bands of Zeybek in guerilla strikes against the Greek forces during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922), before voluntarily joining the newly formed national army in the Turkish War of Independence. Although this resistance model did not spill over the rest of Anatolia, it still played a significant role during the war of independence. Such embodiments gathered around the name Kuvay-i Milliye also played crucial parts in the Southeast Anatolia against the French forces and in the Black Sea region against the Pontus bands. After the declaration of the Republic, Efe groups were awarded with The Medallion of Independence for their participation in the war. Most Efe leaders received military ranks and pensions for their services. When they retired after the foundation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, they resettled in the cities of western Anatolia.[131] Obviously the financing of these forces was a challenging task given the dramatic conditions of the society. Supplying equipment, food and shelter for the fighters was much harder than finding the fighters. The notables supported their local defense forces politically and financially. The donations in cash or in kind first started as an indefinite tax collected by the Kuvay-i Milliye commanders. Wealthy tradesmen, farmers and landowners perceived these donations as a question of honor and reputation, which indicates a notable sense of cooperation among all the segments of the society.

The most significant formation of national defense forces in terms of land, time and the size of invading force, namely Greek forces, were in the Aegean region. On the other hand South-east Anatolian defense forces against the French and Black Sea region against the Pontus guerillas were also significant.

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[131] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 85.

In the critical times of the Independence War, the first cabinet of 11 ministers which was established on May 2,1920, included the "Ministry of General Staff" and the "Ministry of Defense". The head of general staff was directly accountable to the commander-in-chief (Mustafa Kemal himself). This incident was a consequence of the conditions of the National Struggle and it continued in the Constitution of 1921; and Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, General Kazım Orbay served their office in this framework.[132] Atatürk's attitude towards the seperation of civil-military spheres was precisely followed by İnönü during his presidency as well. [133]

Ataturk resigned from the Ottoman army in July 1919. While nationalist army officers were detaching themselves from the empire and joining the Anatolian forces, the line between the society and its army was becoming more blurry. One thing that was easy to distinguish was the apparent rivalry between the Ottoman government and the imperial army, and the Turkish national army.

In 1921, Mustafa Kemal was appointed as Supreme Commander for a period of three months during the critical times of war. The Assembly was very sensitive with this post, and hardly agreed to prolong it three more times by three months each time. The nationalists in Ankara were very careful to assure that the army was under the control of the Assembly. Although the organized movement of resistance was initiated by the military, the society gradually emerged as the actual power holder, which has been able to control its army effectively.

In spite of the efforts to maintain the civilian control of the military, there were blurry cases such as generals who had important posts both in the government and the Assembly.[134] Very much like the way the military successes of Mustafa Kemal had brought him fame and support, the same military background was a political asset for his rival generals, like Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele and Kazim Karabekir. Among them, Rauf Orbay was a liberal nationalist, who served as a minister of navy in the Ottoman government during WWI.

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[132] M. A. Birand. (1996) ''Emret Komutanım'' p: 425.
[133] M. A. Birand. (1996) p: 424.
[134] This condition would change after the founding of the republic.

However, he did not serve as a commander in the War of Independence. The other three had active military posts in both wars. Especially, Kazim Karabekir was an able commander and famous for his refusal to disband his army after Mudros Armistice. As such, he had strong popular support and was a powerful rival against Mustafa Kemal. While Rauf Orbay was more vigorous in politics, Kazim Karabekir enjoyed more popularity both in the Assembly and in the public due to his military background. Although these generals used their military background as a source of their political power, their main concern was to prevent the establishment of a personal dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal, more than a military struggle for power.[135]

3.2. The Republican Era

It is useful to give reference to some historical events during the pre-republican years and the first years of the republic in order to understand the evolving of the armed forces. The congress of Sivas which was summoned on September 4, 1919 paved the way to the establishment of the Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920. The signing of the Treaty of Sevres catalyzed the reaction of the public opinion. The Constitution of 1921 (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*) was proposed in the TBMM. Despite heavy disputes and opposition, Mustafa Kemal was assigned as the chief commander of the armed forces in August 1921 which also provided dominance within the institution. Given that the armed forces were centralized and high rank offices were assigned to officers who were close to Mustafa Kemal; such as İsmet İnönü, Fevzi Çakmak, Kazım Karabekir.[136]

Fevzi Çakmak (Marshal) was assigned as the Chief of Staff in 1921and remained at that post until his retirement in 1944. As Çakmak remained the chief commander for 23 years, the harmonious cooperation between the state and the armed forces became more sustainable. The concepts of "state", "government" (RPP) and "armed forces" gained an almost synonymous meaning. As the military officers internalized this change, the Kemalist influence in the institution further strengthened. Thus, a coalition of segments of society which perceived themselves as the true defenders of the ideals

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[135] W. Hale. (1994) p: 75.
[136] S. Şen. (2000) ''Geçmişten Geleceğe Ordu'' p: 23.

and values of the new ideology came into being. This political unity led the way to the practical and intensive involvement of the military in the social affairs. According to Ahmad, Fevzi Çakmak, who had been appointed Chief of Staff in 1921, was a suitable commander for keeping the army out of politics. "But he personally exercised considerable influence… and was left free of constraints from both the cabinet and the assembly, making him virtually independent of political control".[137] The new army was focused on the defense of the Republic, and Çakmak was given excess authority for this purpose. Though the state was run largely by civilian institutions, namely the RPP, the Assembly, and the new bureaucracy, Fevzi Çakmak was able to act independently of civil authority if he thought the defense of the Republic was threatened.[138]

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took the loose ends of the *Motherland and Liberty* cells and used them to form the nucleus of the *Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.*(*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) This defense association was responsible for organizing, planning, and executing the revolution for Turkish independence.

In December 19, 1923 law no 385 was passed which demanded that the generals and officers who were elected to the parliament were to resign from the armed forces in 10 days. This law reflected the perspective of Mustafa Kemal in terms of the involvement of the military officers in politics as well as serving the process of purging the armed forces from the dissident officers. The law made a major change in the military policy of the regime, so much as the withdrawal of the *Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekaleti* (the ministry of general staff in government) in March 3, 1924, which meant that the military decisions would be abstracted from the political clashes.

In the pre-republican years, the infrastructure of the official ideology was founded. The resistance to the invasion and the strong position of the armed forces and its organic bounds with the *Grand National Assembly* inevitably strengthened the official ideology and helped its roots to go deeper in the institution itself and the state. In a

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[137] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity* p:130-137.
[138] F. Ahmad. quotes from D. A. Rustow (1959) ''The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic'' in *World Politics,* p: 549-50.

course of practice, the officers developed a consciousness of being the founder of the new state and ideology, instead of a self-perception of being merely the pressure device of the state.

Another point is that, in the pre-republican years of 1920-1923, the military officers tended to play a significant role in the modernization process since there was no strong and functional bourgeoisie to play its part. Indeed, the armed forces played a crucial role in the transmission of the values of the modernist vision to the other segments of the society. As the influence of Mustafa Kemal and his counterparts increased, how to carry out the change and continuation of the legacy became clearer. The initiative which was taken for the innovation of the military as its European equals in order to save the state, gradually spread to the modernization of economic, cultural and political spheres. In the 1920s, the modernist view went through a course of evolution with special emphasis on republicanism, nationalism, secularism, and statism; forming the backbone of the state ideology. This change was in rhyme with the ideologies of the modernist officers. In the following years the military further increased its influence with the support of the state ideology, which was developed with its support.[139]

On 17 February 1920 the Ottoman Parliament adopted the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) and for the first time the world 'Turkey' was included in the text and became part of diplomatic vocabulary. The territorial reference point was now Anatolia for both the administrations of Istanbul and the Nationalists in Ankara.

Treaty of Sevres was signed in August 1920 by the Istanbul government. "Europe's idea of the new 'Turkey' was incorporated in the treaty."[140] The Sultan was left with a fragmented Anatolia which he accepted under pressure. The Treaty of Sevres was leaving the new Turkey only a central part of Anatolia and setting the political structure as a religious state under the Sultan-Caliph. But such a state was totally unacceptable to the Kemalists, so they launched an armed struggle to liberate the Anatolian territory. Only after they had won the war in 1922 could they forge the new Turkey.

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[139] S. Şen. (2000) p: 25.
[140] F. Ahmad. (2010) p:130-137.

Ahmad mentions that the majority of the people and even associates of Mustafa Kemal "…would have preferred continuity under a constitutional monarchy led by the Sultan-Caliph. Such a regime provided continuity as well as legitimacy that would have given the new state prestige throughout the Muslim world and a say in world affairs" The generals believed that the institutions and religious ideology of the empire could be maintained in the new republic. On the contrary, established a secular republic and separated the military and civilian spheres. However, "unlike Western European states," modern Turkey inherited "hierarchical lines" from the Ottoman society.[141]

Even before the rivalry between the generals was resolved in Mustafa Kemal's favor, in December 1923 the Assembly passed a law to end military involvement in politics; commanders had to choose between their military careers and politics, and officers on active service could not be deputies. After 1926, when the opposition had been defeated, the Republican People's Party played the dominant role, becoming the instrument for formulating and implementing policy. The new regime shifted its focus on reform from the military to the social and economic spheres.

3.2.1. Single Party Era: 1923-1950

The Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties continued into the Republican era, giving the armed forces a distinguished role in society extending into the civil sphere. The military became the Republic's defenders and the guardians of secularism and the six principles of Kemalism: nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism. Many factors such as the army's epic status as guardian, the perception of external military threats from the region, and favorable portrayals in schools has facilitated the army's strong presence in society.[142] It is arguable that the Kemalist revolutions and the social transformation would not be the same without the absolute support of the military.

Atatürk was able to revitalize and perpetuate the Tanzimat reforms of the previous century. Moreover, he initiated new, far more consequential modernizing reforms,

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[141] F. Ahmad. (2010) p:130-137.
[142] N. Narlı. (2000) "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" in *Turkish Studies*, p: 107-127.

which not only brought the Republic of Turkey into existence but gave it substance and a solid social and ideological identity. It is arguable that Atatürk was able to initiate and perpetuate these reforms because he had the total support and loyalty of the Turkish military.

In spite of the traditional and inherent impact military had on the Turkish society, The Turkish Republic was meant to have a civilian administration. The military elite had faith in a westernized and democratic society. Believing that they had 'to create a modern, therefore western, state in Turkey', Atatürk and his followers, mainly former military officers, were eager to announce to their people and the world community that the old system of arbitrary relations between the ruling elite would be abolished. Instead, the western idea of citizenship would be recognized as the new principle for regulating the relationship between the elected rulers and the citizens. They focused on the construction and function of the country's political institutions. The implementations of Kemalists were not always brand new ideas, but applications of thoughts which were introduced and debated in the Ottoman society, only being utopic thoughts at the time, perhaps indicating continuity through Ottoman-Republic timeline.[143]

The military obedience to the civilian power until 1960s can be explained by the ideological solidarity of civil and military spheres, leading to a conscious within the military for their subordination to civilian authority and the separation of civil and military spheres.

The armed forces which served as a functional device in the takeover of the political power, gradually transformed into a heavy hand aimed at the protection of the state and regime during the special conditions of the single-party years. The most significant milestones of this process are the states of emergency which were declared after the Şeyh Sait Revolt and Kubilay incident as well as the one declared as a measure against the World War II, between November 20, 1940 and December 23, 1947. Inevitably this environment increased the influence of the armed forces and modified the self-perception of the officers. However another important result was a significant increase in the interest of officers into politics. Aforementioned interest in politics would lead

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[143] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 165.

to direct interventions to political sphere only after the beginning of multi-party era, where the ideological standing of the government became different than the military for the first time. The politicization of the military gained a new dimension as it began to perceive its role as a means of pressure *for* the state. [144]

The position of TAF in state affairs constantly differed since the years of War of Independence, although it was always somehow effective. In spite of the critical role it played in the War of Independence and the efforts to establish the new state, greatest attention was paid to keep the Armed Forces away from the politics during the era of Ataturk. As Ataturk observed the complications of the military's engagement in politics in the CUP era, he put great effort to place the armed forces under civilian authority. A very good example for this attitude is that he provided that the officers resigned from their military posts in order to enter to become parliamentarians.[145]

Marshal Fevzi Çakmak retired on 1 January 1944, with the explanation that he had reached the age of retirement. Feroz Ahmad suggests that the resignation indicated a future change in policy, which would probably have been refused Çakmak. Irritated by Turkey's *benevolent neutrality* towards Nazi Germany, the Allied Powers cut the aid to Turkey as a sanction in 1944. Finally on 23 February 1945 Ankara declared war on the Axis powers in order to be able to join the United Nations (UN). In the same year USSR called for the modification of the Turkish-Soviet border and the joint defense of the Straits as a condition for renewing the 1925 Treaty. This forced Turkey into seeking US guarantees, which was a turning point for the Turkish military history.[146] Turkey found itself on the side of the western block and the United States against the communist East, and the Soviet Union in the new bipolar world. As a result, Turkey gave up its principle of neutrality in its foreign relations. Alliance with the West forced RPP government to take political and economic measures to harmonize its system to the Western liberal thought.

[144] S. Şen. (2000) p: 27.
[145] M. A. Birand.(1996) p: 424.
[146] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity* p:130-137.

3.2.2. The Democrat Party Era: 1950-1960

In the last days of the WW II, Turkey symbolically declared war against Germany and sided with the Allied forces. WW II years put Turkey in a serious economic crisis when the production dramatically decreased as a result of conscription of millions of men to the military. Although Turkey did not enter war, the need for a large army during the war, forced RPP to take harsh economic and political measures. While the economic measures deteriorated the purchasing power of the citizens, the political measures limited their civil liberties making RPP the absolute power. Consequently, CHP lost the confidence of the people at a great extent.

The first sign of the new liberalization process was seen when president İnönü stressed the parliamentary characteristic of Turkish political system in his opening speech of Turkish Grand National Assembly in November 1944. Accordingly, a new political party called Democrat Party-DP (*Demokrat Parti*) was established by four former members of RPP in 1946. When President, İnönü decided to end the single-party regime and introduce Turkey the multi-party system, the military institution supported him. However, the overwhelming electoral victories of the Democratic Party (DP) against the pro-military Republican People's Party (RPP) throughout the 1950s and the introduction of a new style of economic and social policies which undermined the political and economic power of the military elite caused commotion in the military ranks. The middle and low-ranking officers seemed to be among the hardest hit interest group of DP's economic and political decisions. Unable to overthrow the DP government through electoral procedures, they relied on the power of the gun for their return to power.[147]

The Democrat Party (DP), which had ruled for ten years (1950-60), represented a coalition of diverse and usually conflicting groups such as landowners, peasants, small businessmen, and traders. People who have been unhappy with RPP policies started supporting DP. What united those interests was opposition to RPP rule.[148]For example,

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[147] W. Hale. (1996) p: 108-111.
[148] T. Demirel. (2005) ''Lessons of Military Regimes and Democraey: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective'' p: 248.

farmers who felt abandoned by the regime's absorption in industrialization, businessmen who did not want a dominant state in economics, the urban workers who suffered during the war years and the religious conservatives who never liked secular principles of Atatürk – all started to support this new political party. With the development and expansion of transportation and communication through good networks of roads, the emergence of mass-circulation of national newspapers, the extensive use of radios, and an increase in economic activity amplified social mobility and changed the nature of popular demands. Professionals, small businessmen, and entrepreneurs of all kinds acquired economic power and social standing. Thus, a new social profile with pragmatic tendencies and accumulated resentment against the old statist elite had come to power.[149]

In 1950 DP won Turkey's first fully free elections and *Adnan Menderes* became prime minister, receiving 55% of the votes in the general elections Despite the transition to multi-party politics, the generals still considered the RPP as their natural ally. Consequently, the new emerging middle classes, religious conservatives, urban poor, mainly the ones who have remained in the periphery for decades came to power, for the first time during the history of the republic. On the contrary, the *Kemalist* elite, bureaucratic class and the military that used to remain in the core for decades, this time were pushed to the periphery. The roles were shifted. In response to İnönü's defeat in the 1950 election the generals even thought of intervention to prevent the formation Democrat government, however İnönü prevented it[150].

In its first four years of DP (1950-1954) managed to bring an economic development to the country mainly as a result of American aid. DP leaders were motivated by advices of American experts and concentrated on agricultural investment. Economic development brought a new class of commercial entrepreneurs and businessmen. These new classes decreased the power of the military and the bureaucracy in politics. Since Menderes government realized the industrialization and the modernization of the agriculture through external borrowing, eventually, he had to pursue inflationary policies. These inflationary polices furthermore decreased the social and political

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[149]K. Karpat. (2004) p: 241.
[150] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 130-137.

status of the bureaucrats and the military. The social groups that used to be part of the core were quite unhappy with the new situation.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Menderes scared of a military coup that could overthrow his government, dismissed the top commanders of the military. However, one of the first acts of Prime Minister Adnan Menders was to eliminate officers thought to be loyal to İnönü. Menderes was aware of the need for support of the military. However, by appointing officers who were closer to him to high commands only further increased the reaction and feeling of betrayal among the corps. The connection between the Turkish military and the RPP that during the era of Atatürk had been rather unproblematic was openly criticized already in 1946 by the Democratic Party. With the defeat of the RPP in the elections of 1950, also the military lost its political influence through its former military-civilian bureaucratic coalition.

During Menderes period, the military was not happy with other policies either. Among these policies were DP government's tolerance to religious orders, their permission to the broadcasting of readings from Koran over the state radio and increasing the budget of Directory of Religious Affairs. In its second term, Menderes government's populist and unsustainable economic policies caused shortage of products, foreign currency crisis and inflation. As DP started to lose ground, it started using undemocratic measures such as banning press from writing anything negative about DP and limiting the rights of the opposition party. Authoritarian tendencies and failing economic policies of DP created public resentment. Many groups such as university and military school students held demonstrations against the government, which in turn, triggered Democrats to harden their policies towards all the opponents.

On the other hand, the RPP had become much more socialistic in its ideology since its defeat in 1950, and had begun to oppose the politics of Menderes through numerous political agitations and by mobilizing mass demonstrations to express its discontentment with the DP government. While İnönü remained active in politics the Democrats were never sure about the loyalty of the military and always regarded İnönü's political activity with suspicion and fear. Ahmad suggests that if *"...İnönü had resigned in 1950, the history of democratic Turkey might have been more*

stable".[151]During the 1950s the salaries and working conditions of the officer corps deteriorated and the DP frequently interfered in military postings and promotions.[152]

The Democrats' ultimate aim was also to developTurkey, but to serve this purpose; however they did not consider military as an instrument in this process. While Menderes was aware of the military's historical role as the defender of the state, he also thought that the military had become something more than it ought to be since the founding of the Republic: the guarantor of the highly centralized system which was unfriendly to land notables and other groups that favored some administrative decentralization. Moreover, the military was perceived as a non-productive group that demanded a larger share of the national income than it deserved. Since these groups were the potential supporters Democrat Party, Menderes had another reason to crop the power of the military.[153]

The Democrats acted with certain caution and impartiality until the elections of 1954. The overwhelming popular support they received at that time led them to believe that intensified economic development and economic development of the peasantry would be enough to maintain their popularity, while it would intimidate the opposing groups. In the meanwhile, the aid derived from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and association with NATO after 1952 resulted in a dramatic modernization of weapons, training and organization and in more democratic relations the military establishment.

The cost of living in 1960 was about eleven times what it had been in 1950[154], while salaries had barely doubled, causing hardship for the military officers.On the other hand, the newly rich politicians, landlords, contrasted sharply with the idealism of the military. The social standing of the military deteriorated, while the new power groups took toll.Karpat states that many of the officers he interviewed after the Revolution complained that in the 1950's some landlords would not even bother to show them houses for rent. Officers were seen to have "shiny uniforms but empty pockets".[155]

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[151] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity* p: 130-137.
[152] G. Jenkins. (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" p: 341.
[153] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 10.
[154] K. Karpat. (2004) p: 241.
[155]K. Karpat. (2004) p: 241.

Karpat suggests that it was actually Menderes' decision to use the military against the RPP that made a handful of officers decide to intervene. The old ties between the military and the RPP which represented the *Kemalist* legacy should not be underestimated; since Atatürk strongly opposed military intervention in politics, which according to Karpat was the main reason why a corporate coup did not initially take place.[156]

3.2.3. The Era of Military Interventions (1960-1983)

Although the Turkish Armed Forced was directly involved in politics through military interventions after 1960, each intervention was followed by the return to democracy through democratic elections. Turkey tends to be categorized as a guardian state by many scholars in the sense that after the interventions TAF tended to be willing to return to democratic rule after a few years. It is worth mentioning that Turkey's membership in NATO and the Council of Europe played a significant part in the aforementioned enthusiasm to return to democracy.

A number of factors have contributed to the maintenance and increase of the political supremacy of the military over politics throughout the Cold War period. The Kemalist ideological orientation of the officer corps left no room for alternative approaches to the country's modernization and Westernization. Political leaders failed to impose their supremacy over the military institution[157]. In line with the reluctance of the United States to exercise pressure upon the officers due to the country's geo-strategic significance for the Western block, especially under the Cold War conditions, the military influence did not meet any serious challenge. Finally, the increasing financial power of the military and the political culture also contributed to the political influence over the civilians in the following years.[158]

The US was initiating and funding organizations to fight communism and plans for those militaries integrated into NATO's structure like TAF. Turkish officers introduced the concept of 'internal subversion' and were trained to combat against it

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[156] K. Karpat. (2004) p: 241.
[157] G. Karabelias. (1999)
[158] G. Jenkins. (2007) p:19.

by American officers at various bases throughout the country. A number of junior officers, including Alparslan Türkeş, who was a captain then, were sent to the US for further training. There they worked with officers from other countries, internalizing the 'free world ideology' and the so-called Communist threat.[159]

By the early 1950s US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was practically controlling Turkish military intelligence. When the undersecretary to Prime Minister Menderes reported that the Americans had great control on National Security Organization (NSO) and paid the salary of the personnel and therefore the entire service was accountable to them, Menderes ordered that all money coming from the CIA would be put into the NSO budget and all relations between individuals and the Americans be ended.[160]

3.2.3.1. May 271960 Intervention

The Democrats declared martial law following the events of 6-7 September 1955, thereby bringing military into politics. The attacks on Greek businesses grew into chaos and the government was forced to proclaim martial law in order to restore order in İstanbul and İzmir.

The first military intervention in Turkish modern politics occurred on the 27 May 1960. The intervention was welcomed enthusiastically in Istanbul and Ankara but accepted with disappointment in much of the Anatolian countryside, where it was widely regarded as an intervention against the Menderes government on behalf of the RPP.

The May coup was unique, because junior officers outside the High Command carried it out. State intelligence was caught off-guard.[161]Essentially, the coup originated among a group of middle ranking and junior officers, who brought their commanders into their preparations only at a relatively late stage. As George S. Harris concludes, *"it had been in essence a colonels' coup with merely a facade of senior officers recruited*

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[159] F. Ahmad. (2010) p:130-137.
[160] F. Ahmad. (2010) quotes U. Mumcu (1990) CIA- MIT, Cumhuriyet, 17 March.
[161] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 130-137.

by their juniors to take advantage of the strong hierarchical sense of the Turkish military profession."[162]The group which seized power was known as the *Committee of National Unity* (CNU) (Milli Birlik Komitesi) and consisted of thirty-eight officers, among which t he most powerful figure was the charismatic Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who played an important role in the next decades of Turkish political history.

The *CNU* issued a statement justifying the coup on the grounds that the DP had become an instrument of class interests in Turkish society and had aligned itself with forces opposed to the secularist principles of Atatürk's revolution. All DP parliamentarians were arrested, and the party was shut down. General Cemal Gürsel, the seeming leader and chairman of the CNU, filled the offices of president, prime minister and commander in chief, having more power on paper than even Atatürk himself had ever held.[163]

In a 27 May broadcast, Gürsel rejected dictatorship and announced that the government had been overthrown to help establish an honest and just democratic order and to give over the administration of the state into the hands of the nation. In another occasionhe emphasized that the "purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy … we want to transfer power and the administration of the nation tothe free choice of the people". In the same vein, the cabinet issued a policy statement promising respect for human rights and the abolition of all laws contrary to the Kemalist tradition.[164]

The military punished severely both members of the governing party and the elected Cabinet as well as members of the officer corps for indecent behavior towards the military institution and the Kemalist principles. They decided to restructure the country's political life by introducing a number of political, legal, and economic institutions in order to prevent further unwelcome developments in the political arena and in the military. Through the creation of a new Constitution, a second political institution, the Senate, and the Constitutional Court with the aim to supervise Parliament's legal behavior, the officers tried to curb the decision-making power of the elected government.

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[162] G. Harris. (1985) p: 8.
[163]D. A. Howard. ''The History of Turkey'' p: 14.
[164] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 249.

Karabelias underlines that the coup of May 27 1960, opened widely the road for the legalized intervention of the military in the postwar political life of Turkey.[165] Especially with the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the council of Ministers on national security issues, the military legalized its intervention at will into the country's economic, social, cultural, foreign, and political affairs. As Ahmad articulates, Turkey had become a "national security" state.[166]

Since the National Unity Committee (NUC) was over-crowded, it had difficulties in decision-making. Gürsel advocated a return to civil rule as soon as possible, a policy that was opposed by many members of the junta. The "fourteen radicals", who wanted the junta to remain in power for some years so as to carry out structural reforms to transform political life in the direction of corporatism and away from democracy and pluralism, were expelled from the NUC and exiled, including their leader Colonel Alparslan Türkes. Although the junta did not want to alienate the radicals, some officers were upset for being left out of the NUC although being a part of the process. The purging created anger amongst some of the younger officers who felt that they indirectly had lost the representation in the NUC. Led by Colonel Talat Aydemir, they made two unsuccessful attempts on 22 February 1962 and 20-21 March 1963 to overthrow the government.[167] Both failed and the military put the instigators to trial and executed them. To prevent any further military coups from below, senior officers formed the Armed Forces Union (AFU) in 1961, consisting of officers of all ranks and whose aim was to monitor all dissident elements and activities within the army. Ahmad concludes that: "the days of military coups from below were over".[168]

In July 1961, four months before the transition from military to civilian rule, and signaling the most important change from the previous period, Turkey approved a new constitution. Initially drafted by a commission made up of academics (Onar Commission) it was then subjected to discussion and revision in a basic assembly committee (Karal Committee) composed of scholars and politicians. The constitution

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[165] G. Karabelias. (2003) ''A Brief Overview of the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Albania, Greece and Turkey During the Post-WWII Period'' in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* p: 57-71.
[166] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 130-137.
[167] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity*.
[168] F. Ahmad. (2007) Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, p: 186.

was submitted to a referendum on 9 July 1961, where 61.7 percent of the voters favored it.

The constitution of 1961 was politically ambiguous in the sense that it granted political, social and economic rights and freedoms on one hand, and it contained illiberal signals of military influence in politics such as NSC on the other.[169]

The NSC was composed of high ranking military officers and civilians, and was intended to serve as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers in decisions regarding national security, setting the institutionalgrounds for military involvement in politics.[170] Obviously, the 1960 intervention broke the tradition of military's separation from politics, which was deliberately and carefully imposed by Atatürk.

Besides the NSC other measures such as the creation of the senate and the constitutional court, and the adoption of a proportional electoral system designed to prevent parliamentary majorities that could lead to abuse of power were taken in order to limit future governments' actions. The more limited the governmental sphere got, the stronger the military got with the new constitution. The office of the chief of the general staff was put back under the office of the prime minister, hierarchically above the minister of national defense.[171]

The military approved its Internal Service Law, where the Article 35 of the law defines the duties of the TAF as: *"…to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish republic as defined in the Constitution." From that date onwards, the TAF could take up the legal duty of looking after the republic which is, according to the unchangeable article 2 of the Turkish constitution, "a democratic, secular, and social State…based on…the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble"*[172] Additionally, the *Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations* (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği) mandated that: "It is the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces to

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[169] F. Ahmad. (2007) p: 186.
[170] G. Jankins (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", *InternationalAffairs*, p: 342.
[171] Ü. Sakallıoğlu. (1997) "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy" in *Comparative Politics,*p: 159.
[172] Ü. Sakallıoğlu. (1997) p: 159.

protect the Turkish homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and external threats."[173]

The NUC administered the country for a period of 17 months. Despite the brief one and a half year of government, the changes introduced in this period were significant. By the time the armed forces abandoned power several measures had been taken to address the problems that led to the military intervention. First, they sought to prevent a re-enactment of the social, economic and political conditions that brought the TAF to power; second, they aimed at avoiding breaches in the hierarchy of the armed forces, guaranteeing that, for the future, the chain of command would be respected.

The institutional and legal aspects of military entrenchment into politics were only one part of the Committee's decisions. TAF gradually changed as the environment did, and as a result of the economic involvements it became more sensitive to economic fluctuations. The officers were more aware of the connection between economy and politics and economic crises were considered as another type of threat towards the regime. In 1960s, the military focused on economy and took part with the establishment of the Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK– *Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurulu*). The economic trends of the day and the perspective of the 1961 Constitution were in harmony with the economic advances of the Armed Forces, and the investments were made according to the five year development plans. As a result, in the 1980s, OYAK was among the 10 major capital owner groups in Turkey.[174]

The TSK also stepped in the economic sector with the creation of the *Armed Forces Pension Fund* (OYAK which functioned in a variety of sectors such as industry, trade, services, finance, construction and insurance, as a measure to address the lowering economic and social status of the Armed Forces.[175] OYAK was founded in 1961, integrating the military into the rapidly expanding economic structure. Ahmad draws attention that "statism, one of the six pillars of Kemalism, was abandoned by TAF in favor of free-market capitalism and the armed forces became the economic and political partners of Turkey's bourgeoisie."[176]

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[173] Resmi Gazete, No: 10899, September 6, 1961.
[174] Ü. Sakallıoğlu. (1997) p: 159.
[175] F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity,* p: 131-132.
[176] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 133.

The establishment of the *State Planning Organization* (DTP – *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)* in 30 September 1960 was also significant. This new agency was intended to give assistance to the state in economic and development matters, and "become an instrument to potentially interfere with future government's economic policy priorities and decisions."[177]

The 1960 military rule did not resemble a highly repressive military dictatorship. While Prime Minister Menderes and two ministers of his government were executed and other prominent members of the DP were sentenced to prison, the regime sanctioned acts of intimidation toward the lower rank members of the DP were not insidious. The military had remained in control of Turkey's political life even after the return to elected governments in 1961. In 1965 the *Justice Party* (JP), which was the continuation of the DP, won the election and formed a government on its own. But power remained firmly in the hands of the generals, with Cevdet Sunay succeeding Cemal Gürsel as president.

After the 1961 intervention, hierarchy and preservation of the chain of command had become two essential goals for the TAF. After the 1960 coup, military interventions in Turkey were operated by the commanders in Turkish General Staff. However, in most occasions, the Chief of Staff and force commanders have had to take into account the pressure and the sentiments expressed by the lower ranks, or have used them in justification of their actions.

The October 1961 elections and the installation of a new coalition government headed by İsmet İnönü marked the official end of military rule. In practical terms, however, the military's interference until after the 1963 aborted coup; the new institutions created in 1961 such as the MGK; the number of former military officers (from the MBK) in the new senate; and the fact that both men that occupied the presidency throughout the 1960s were retired four-star generals indicated that the TSK would be, if not participating directly, vigilant in the background.

The military dominated the political scene until October 1965. During that time, a series of conservative coalition government led by former President İnönü held office. When free elections were once again permitted, Süleyman Demirel, who would remain

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[177] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 133-134.

in office until the Turkish military forced him to resign in March 1971, led his *Justice Party* (JP) to victory.[178]

3.2.3.2. March 12 1971 Intervention

The 1960s coup, determined not only several changes in Turkey's constitutional, political, social and economic spheres, but also had consequences for the internal functioning of Turkish armed forces. The most pressing issue was the reassertion of authority by the commanding officers in order to prevent future bottom-up revolt movements, or breaks in the chain of command.[179] The TAF internal service law mentioned earlier addressed this issue in its article 13 which stated that: "Discipline is the basis of military service," achieved by a "…absolute obedience to the codes, orders and superiors…" The preservation of such principles would be regulated by criminal and administrative laws. However, the intervention of 1960 broke the tradition of strict hierarchy and reassuring the chain of command within the armed forces would take more than legal measures.

After the intervention of 1961, the Turkish military continued to be interested in politics. Many middle-rank officers along with university professors, journalists, and RPP politicians thought that the coup was not finished, and only the long term military regime could carry out the measures needed to transform the Turkish society. The JP, which appealed to the DP supporters, won the clear majority in the 1965 and 1969 elections. However, those who were sympathetic to military rulecontinued questioning the legitimacy of the JP governments.[180]

Due to the increase in vertical and horizontal social mobilization and the liberal notes of the 1961 Constitution, the number of political parties increased in parallel with their growing autonomy from bureaucracy and the power to articulate them. But the inability of political leaders to reach a minimum level of compromise on the issue of civil–military relations and their concentration on partisan gains rather than on tackling people's socioeconomic problems contributed to a raise in social violence. The

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[178] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 249.
[179] W. Hale. (1994) p: 154.
[180] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 250.

military high command was annoyed by the socialist and worker movements after 1961, fearing that another They also feared that another non-hierarchical coup, like that on May 27 1960 could take place.

The political situation in Turkey deteriorated dramatically during the latter half of the 1960s. On 16 June 1970 İstanbul was in chaos and TAF was called in to suppress the protest. In the preceding months leading to the 12 March 1971 intervention, the government and politicians were warned to fix the problems that plagued society and the political system. Clearly, the goal of the regime that had lasted from May 1960 to November 1961 – to fix the political problems created during the rule of the Democrat Party and to avoid future interventions – failed.The 12 March 1971 brought the second intervention of the military in modern Turkish politics. This time, however, it was without taking over the government of the country.[181]

In the end, the high command presented a written memorandum to the President and it was handed to the JP government on March 12, 1971. It was demanding "the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk's views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by the constitution", putting an end to the "*anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest*". If this demand was not fulfilled it would result in the armed forces taking over the administration of the country. The Demirel government was forced to resign and a new coalition government was appointed under Professor Nihat Erim, and martial law was declared in Ankara and Istanbul and in the 11 major provinces of the country.

According to Feroz Ahmad the armed forces turned into an anchor of the regime, and a committed defender of the *status quo* created after 1960[182] and gradually became more involved in politics. In doing so, the survival of the government, headed by Süleyman Demirel, became depended on the military for as long as it served the TAF's interests of stability.[183] The anarchic situation in which the country dipped towards the end of the 1960s dictated the future of the government. Extremism on the right and on the

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[181]N. Momayezi. (1998) "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" in *International Journal on World Peace,* p: 7-8.
[182]F. Ahmad. (2007) p: 194-195.
[183]F. Ahmad. (2007) p: 195-198.

left; worsening economic conditions, particularly after 1969, contrasting with the growth of previous years; and ideological polarization and dissent between and within political parties were a sign of a deteriorating domestic situation.[184]

Until the general elections of October 1973, Turkey was governed by technocratic governments under the tutelage of the Turkish armed forces. Feroz Ahmad describes the situation as[185]:

> "By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities had ceased tofunction. Students emulating Latin American urban guerillas robbed banks and kidnapped USservicemen, and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of thegovernment were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike and moreworkdays were lost between 1 January and 12 March 1971 than during any prior year. TheIslamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National order Party,openly rejected Atatürk and Kemalism, infuriating the armed forces."

Martial law was declared on 26 April with serious repression on the leftists. The generals governed through a coalition of technocrats until the election of 1973.

The military intervention in 1971 seems to be a rather clear case of the army declaring its duties as guardians of the national interests. Generals would actively intervene only if the civilians refused to provide effective rule to stabilize the country in a time of social unrest.

Besides, the high command took external factors into consideration when planning its move, which explains why a memorandum instead of a full-scale military intervention was preferred. As a reaction to the intervention of 1971 several European states suspended their economic aid to Turkey and demanded a return to democracy.However, the support from NATO continued to be strong due to Turkey's geostrategic position facing the Soviet Union. NATO actually provided for an

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[184]F. Tachau and M. Heper, (1983) ''The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey'' in *Comparative Politics,* p: 23.
[185] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 147.

enhanced professionalism within the Turkish military by modernizing arms and by involving the Turkish military in operations abroad.[186]

The 1971-73 military rule draw reactions generated a level of anti-military sentiments and the military lost some prestige during this time. Particularly former allies in the RPP, student groups, and intellectuals who gave the military at least tentative support had been alienated. However, "the experience was not bitter so as to strengthen faith in democracy."[187]

As Cevdet Sunay's term as president ended on 28 March 1972, General Faruk Gürler commander of the land forces who was one of the generals who had forced Demirel's resignation on 12 March, seemed to be the military's choice for president. However the Assembly elected Senator Fahri Korutürk as Turkey's sixtieth president, who was a retired admiral and ambassador. Gürler's failure to be elected president was interpreted as a reaction to 12 March intervention.[188]

The general election of October 1973 brought Bülent Ecevit's RPP with social democratic aspirations to power. Despite its electoral success of 33 % of votes, the RPP failed to gain majority in the assembly, and Ecevit formed a coalition government with Erbakan's NSP. Ecevit had opposed the memorandum regime in contrast to Ismet Inönü, and defeated him for the party's leadership. The electoral success Islamist National Salvation Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan was another source of dismay for the generals.These two parties with contrasting views on laicism formed an unstable coalition.[189]

The government decided to intervene in Cyprus after the Greek-Cypriot National Guard coup, supported by Athens, overthrow Archbishop Makarios on 15 July 1974. Ankara demanded the restoration of Makarios and the legitimate government in Cyprus and then intervened on 20 July as guarantors of the 1960 constitution. In the

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[186] S. Schulman. (2000) *"Give them toys?"- The role of the military in the Turkish democratization process*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, p: 23.
[187] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 250-251.
[188] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 135.
[189] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 135.

meantime the US Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975, in retaliation for its intervention and occupation of northern Cyprus.[190]

Ecevit resigned on 18 September 1974when he was very popular due to the intervention to Cyprus, planning to receive enough votes for a single party government. However the right wing parties refused early election and Süleyman Demirel formed a coalition of right wing parties in December 1975 which became popularly known as "First Nationalist Front Government". At the time, violence became a daily issue on the streets with the strong impact of the Nationalist Action Party and reactionary leftist groups such as Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) and Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path).[191]

In the 1977 elections the RPP won 41 % of the votes but its 213 seats were still insufficient to form a single-party government. After Ecevit's minority government failed to get the vote of confidence, Demirel founded the second National Front government with the NSP and the NAP. The second National Front government ended in December 1977 to be followed by Ecevit's minority government.

The second Front government of Demirel lasted short since it did not receive vote of confidence. Ecevit's minority government which was formed right after, intended to cope with the escalating violence for six months. However, he finally had to impose martial law in thirteen provinces to give an end to revolts, which aggravated particularly after the Maraş Massacre of Alevis.[192]Although martial law brought some respite in the violent terrorism, it might also be argued that martial law increased the militancy and determination of the extremist factions, many of which had gone underground because the pressure of military rule gave them no other alternative. The military could have intervened at any time in order to stop the bloodshed, but seemed to be waiting for an appropriate moment when it would be seen as the savior of the nation.[193]

Turkey's importance to the West had begun to increase dramatically because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iran in 1978, and the generals were aware that

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[190] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 135.
[191] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 166.
[192] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 172.
[193] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 136.

providing stability in Turkey was of utmost importance. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 26 December 1979 ended the detente of the 1970s and marked the beginning of the 'Second Cold War'was another reason Turkey became a critical outpost for NATO. As stability in Turkey became essential for the Western strategy in the region, and aid to modernize the army which was weakened by the embargo increased once again. The US wanted to restore relations with Turkey, but was also trying to get the maximum benefit out of it, such as the freedom to supply Israel from Turkish bases.

The partial senate and by-elections of 14 October 1979 were huge defeat for Ecevit. He resigned two days later, making way for Demirel's minority government. The strategic importance of Turkey continued to grow as a result of the crisis in the region with developments such as the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by 'revolutionary guards', the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by pro-Iran Islamists and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[194]

In December Demirel appointed Turgut Özal as his undersecretary in charge of the economy. Soon after that, Ozal launched his economic program known as the 'Decisions of 24th January', that required severe belt-tightening by workers and consumers. He declared that he needed five years of social peace before the economy would be stabilized, which meant there was no tolerance for revolts, demonstrations or violence.[195]

3.2.3.3. September 12 1980 Intervention

The military takeover of the government on September 12, 1980, marks a definite turning point in the history both of the Republic and of democracy in Turkey. The crises which precipitated the intervention are so deep and so complex as to preclude any hasty judgment of the action taken or of its future consequences.[196] It deserves attention that the military was motivated to take strong action by many of the same social, economic, and political conditions that have eroded the Kemalist values since

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[194] F. Ahmad quoted M. A. Birand (1987) p: 166.
[195] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 137.
[196] New York Times, September, 14 (1980).

the late 1950s. The 1980 intervention differed in is the significant influence of the rightists, the ultraconservatives, led by retired Colonel Alparslan Türkes.

> *While the post-1973 posture of the military caused the RPP and intellectuals to give up encouraging the military against the JP, it prepared the ground for rapprochement between the right and the military. It was at this time that many in the right started to view the military interventions favorably against the left wing movements. The apparent failure of the democratic regime to restrain violence in the streets led many people to call the army to intervene, including members of the assembly.[197]*

The intervention was a result of the failure of JP government to stop the terrorism which had escalated into almost a civil war between the leftists and the rightists, to break the legislative blockage or to lower the rate of inflation which had gone to over 100 percent. Ecevit and his RPP had also failed to accomplish these goals. Military's urging to form a coalition between the two parties produced no result. The immediate reason for the 1980 military intervention was the growing political violence and terrorism that between 1975 and 1980 left more than five thousand people dead and three times as many wounded. Acts of violence which became particularly acute between 1978 and 1980 also included armed assaults, acts of sabotage, kidnappings, bank robberies, occupation and destruction of workplaces, and bombings.[198]

In 1970s, governments could not solve the problem of violence even through martial law was in effect in many provinces of Turkey. According to the Turkish constitution, martial law requires the functions of civilian authorities to be transferred to military authorities, the restriction or suspension of civil liberties with a wide range of authority granted to the Martial Law Command. However they could not end the violence since the extremist views of both right and left had already penetrated into the police force

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[197] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 257.
[198] E. Özbudun. (2000) ''Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation'' p: 35.

due to the general erosion of state authority.[199] Özbudun explains that

> *"[A]t a deeper level, the incidence of political violence reflected a growing ideological polarization in Turkey between the NAP and, to much lesser extent, the National Salvation Party (NSP) on the right and small radical groups on the left. The NSP was not involved in violence; however, its Islamic themes undermined the regime's legitimacy among those committed to the Kemalist legacy of secularism, including the military. The balance of political forces in parliament and the inability or unwillingness of the two major parties (the RPP and the JP) to agree on a grand coalition or a minority government arrangement gave the two minor parties enormous bargaining power, which they used to obtain important ministries and to colonize them with their own partisans. This fact seems crucial in explaining the crisis of the system."[200]*

Unlike the radical right, the radical leftwas not represented in the parliament, but extreme leftist ideologies had many supporters among teachers, students and in the labor class. Political polarization also affected and undermined the public bureaucracy. Extensive purges were taking place in all ministries after every change in government. The narrow majorities in the parliament and the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions deteriorated the governmental inability to take brave policy decisions. Economic troubles and international problems such as the Cyprus crisis and the U.S. arms embargo aggravated the legitimacy crisis.The failure to solve the six month old deadlock was the final straw and ended with military coup of 12 September 1980.

The coup was preceded by an almost full decade of political, social, ethnic and sectarian divisions and violence. One of the main predicaments rested in the political system itself. Throughout the 1970s, the two major political parties, the RPP and JP were unable or unwilling to form stable majority governments, which led to coalitions with the periphery radical parties. The escalating paralysis had consequences at all

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[199] E. Özbudun (2000) p: 35, also see the Martial Law: **Sıkıyönetim Kanunu, No:** 1402, 13/05/1971 published at Oficial Gazette no: 13837on: 15/05/1971 online at http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/466.html

[200] E. Özbudun. (2000) p: 36.

levels of society, and it was particularly felt in the daily insecurity of ordinary Turks. Political polarization penetrated the police, with the creation of a left-wing organization Pol-Der, and its right-wing rival Pol-Bir.[201]

The parliament was almost paralyzed under the described circumstances of political violence and sectarian unrest, and the country was left without an elected president. The polarization was so serious, that by the end of the decade, the Assembly was unable to elect a successor to President Korutürk, whose term had expired on 6 April 1980.[202]The NSP sponsored a massive rally at Konya, where Islamists staged a demonstration in order to demand the restoration of Islamic law in Turkey. These acts were regarded as an open renunciation of Kemalism and a direct challenge to the military. On September 7, General Evren met secretly with the armed forces and police commanders to set in motion plans for another intervention.

In the early morning hours of September 12, 1980, the armed forces seized control of the country. Kenan Evren, the then chief of general staff and leader of the coup, addressed the country at 1 p.m. on state radio and television.[203]

> *"Dear citizens, it is because of all these reasons…that the Turkish armed forces were forced to take over the state administration with the aim of safeguarding the unity of the country and the nation and the rights and freedoms of the people, ensuring the security of life and property and the happiness and prosperity of the people, ensuring the prevalence of law and order- in other words, restoring the state authority in an impartial manner."[204]*

General Staff, General Kenan Evren announced that the military members of the National Security Council were in charge and, as soon as possible, they would transfer power to an elected government.He pointed out that the country's armed forces did not eliminate democracy by staging a coup. In contrast, guided by Kemalism and its principles, the officers were obliged to launch this operation in order to restore democracy with all its principles, to replace a malfunctioning democracy. The military

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[201] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 175-176.
[202] W. Hale. (1994) p: 236.
[203]W. Hale. (1994) p: 246.
[204] F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 181.

institution thus underlined its image as "the ultimate guarantor of modern, secular democracy".

There was no organized resistance to the coup; on the contrary many Turks welcomed it as the only alternative to anarchy. General Evren announced that retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, would serve as interim Prime Minister. A Consultative Assembly was appointed to draft a constitution.

Martial law was extended to all the provinces, alleged militants of all political tendencis as well as trade union and student activists were arrested, and party leaders were taken into custody along with a large number of deputies. Demirel and Ecevit were soon released but told to keep a low profile. When Ecevit began to publish political articles, he was rearrested and jailed for several months. The Grand National Assembly was dissolved and its members barred from politics for periods of up to ten years. Political parties were abolished and their assets liquidated by the state. The trade unions were purged and strikes banned. Workers who were striking at the time of the coup were given substantial pay raises and ordered back to their jobs.

Military rule lasted three years, and the 1982 Constitution was put to a referendum on 7 November and approved by 91.4 percent of the voters, thus providing an element of legitimacy for the generals. by the time power was handed to the new elected government, Turkey had a new constitution, new laws to regulate elections, political parties, trade unions, and universities; and the economy was going through a program of stabilization and market oriented policies.[205] Moreover, the council of ministers was going to "give priority consideration to decisions" of the NSC. The National Security Council Law of 1983 defined national security in very broad terms allowing the military greater scope of intervention internally and externally. In order to increase the impact of military within the council, it also regulated that the post of Secretary General of the NSC would be occupied by a full general. Besides, the approval of the constitution brought with it additional military supervision over the political system. First, General Evren was elected president of the republic; second, the remaining

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[205]F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 185-188.

members of the ruling MGK would gain a six year seat in a presidential council with the ability to assist the president in examining laws submitted to him.[206]

The group of five generals and admiral that governed Turkey until 6 November 1983, besides strengthening the mechanisms of military involvement in politics, did more. In an international context marked by the not too distant Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and renewed bipolar tension, religion became a tool to fight domestic radical leftist ideologies, and to achieve national unity. In other words, religion was used for political ends, hitherto a declared anathema to the military institution. Islam became the antidote to the divisions in society, and the answer to the polarization that secular nationalism was seemingly failing to resolve. The conservative worldview of the members of the MGK, close to an ideological current developed in Turkey, the *Turkish-IslamicSynthesis*, would seemingly be reflected in some policy areas such as national education. For example, mandatory religious education was introduced in the school system, the number of students and the number of Qu'ran courses under the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) rose between 1980 and 1983; and, bearing in mind the dispute on figures regarding the *İmam-HatipLisesi,* there seems to have been an increase in the number of these schools and students at the high school level, and a growth of students at the middle school level These issues have been the source of controversies lasting until today.[207]

Whereas the 1960 and 1971 military coups had institutional reform as their objective, the 1980 action was undertaken to shore up the order created by the earlier interventions. The man in the street appeared to be so dismayed by the pervasive chaos and widespread anarchy of pre-coup days that he enjoyed the return of order and state authority, however harsh it might be. The military regime was by no means a failure on the economic front; rather,it appeared to put the economy back on track.[208]The performance of the Turkish economy improved significantly in the first two years after the military intervention. The new regime saw that the economic stabilization program introduced by Demirel was implemented under the direction of Özal, one of the few members of the former government retained after the coup. The measures and the

[206]W. Hale. (1994) Turkish Politics andMilitaryp: 120.
[207] After the transition to democracy the (mis)use of religion did not end. The governments of the central right further encouraged the presence of religion in Turkish society as this was part of their support base.
[208] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 252.

strict monetarist policies promoted by Özal,which were seen in some quarters against the Kemalist principles, were strictly enforced, bringing the inflation rate down to 30 percent in 1982.[209]

3.3. Overall Assessment of Turkish Case

The reasons which led to intervention are almost the same in all three interventions, namely corruption, deformation of the system, lack of consensus about the important issues of the country, having a public which was extremely politicized last but not the least the encouragement of the international zeitgeist. Especially before the 1971 and 1980 breakdowns, the political violence and political polarization were extremely high all around the country. The role of the Turkish army in both the independence war and the establishment of the republic gave them a mission of protecting the country and the regime. In military schools, while the cadets are taught to stay away from the political life, their mission of protecting the country and regime is always emphasized. The duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution and this is cited in both coups as the reason of intervention. Even though they have differences in their establishment and transition, both interventions were made in the name of protecting the country and the regime.

The first outstanding feature intervention of 1980 that sets it decisively apart from the 1960 action was that it had been planned well ahead of time by the General Staff in consultation with the field commanders. Mehmet Ali Birand has pointed out that there had actually been a sort of planning staff that not only worked toward achieving the consent and cooperation of all the leading military field commanders but also designated individual officers to perform specific tasks during the takeover and after.[210] Besides, quite unlike its predecessors, the military seem to have determined in detail the basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that would be established, the division of labor between the "state" and the government, and the sort of mechanisms that would be needed to ensure smooth

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[209] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 252.
[210] M. A. Birand. (1984) 12 Eylül saat 04:00.

functioning after return to the civilian rule.[211]It appears certain that, in common with the previous takeovers, this one was not envisaged as a permanent military regime but aimed toward the eventual re- establishment of civilian parliamentary rule once the army had put the government house in order.

Unlike the military chiefs of 1960 and 1971, the generals of 1980 showed their concern for the public. Kenan Evren succeeded in becoming quite influential with his articulation and rhetoric that conformed to average population combiningtraditional and modern characteristics. The wide approval of the military by the people was particularly necessary in 1980 since, unlike the interventions of 1960 and 1971, this one did not have the organized support of a political party or a social group. The most significant aspect of the takeover was the lack of identification with any specific civilian or bureaucratic group.

With a comparative overview on the Turkish experience, 1960 intervention was carried out by a group of middle-rank officers who upon assuming power invited a senior general to head the junta committee, the NUC. In contrast, the1971 memorandum and 1980 intervention were realized according to the hierarchical chain of command. As a consequence, during the first military regime important differences appeared within the NUC. These conflicts occurred between the moderates who favored the restoration of democracy as soon as possible and the radicals who were intent on establishing a long-term military regime supposedly to carry out radical structural reforms. These conflicts ended with the purge of the radicals, opening the way to a relatively quick transition to democracy in fall 1961. However, tensions did not end with the purge. In 1961 senior officers with active commands formed an informal umbrella organization called the Armed Forces Union (AFU) to monitor the activities of the NUC. During 1980-83 the National Security Council (NSC) was composed of the five highest ranking generals in the armed forces, and no conflicts within the NSC became a matter of public knowledge.[212]

All three military interventions in recent Turkish history were preceded by martial law regimes instituted by civilian governments. None of the three breakdowns of democracy in Turkey seem to be the inevitable outcome of deep-seated structural or

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[211] K. Karpat. (2004) p: 367.
[212] E. Özbudun. (2000) p:24-25.

sociological causes. In all cases the behavior of the leaders of political parties looms large as a factor leading to the breakdown.

In terms of the groundwork, the 1980 coup was the best prepared both technically and ideologically. In 1960 the coup makers had no idea of what they were going to do with their newly acquired power. They were soon taken in hand by the intellectuals, mainly law professors, who wrote the liberal 1961 Constitution which democratized Turkish politics but soon came to be described by the right as a luxury for Turkey. The liberal intelligentsia also came to be hated by the conservative establishment, which went so far as to inflict the indignity of torture upon it.[213]

The 1960 and 1980 interventions are real breakdowns and transitions in the sense that they represented a constitutional discontinuity with the previous system. In both instances, new constitutions were made and the military played the key role in making the constitution. The military ruled the country after both cases, but military was willing to give the power back to the civilians. The other similarity between the 1960 and 1980 interventions is that in both casesthe political influence of the leavingmilitary regime continued long after the civilian governments were formed with elections.

As to the differences between the two military regimes of 1960 and 1980, their relations with civilians should be mentioned. The NUC regime collaborated closely with the main opposition party, the RPP, while the NSC regime did not collaborate with any political party or any other civilian political institution. Instead, it outlawed all existing political parties and permitted only three of the newly established parties to enter the race for the 1983 parliamentary elections.[214] Özbudun suggests that the main objective of the 1960 intervention

> *"...was to resolve a constitutional crisis rather than to make radical*
> *changes in the social and political structure. NUC legislative*
> *activities remained essentially limited to making a new constitution,*
> *a new electoral law, and a few other laws. The NSC regime, on the*
> *other hand, passed more than six hundred laws effecting almost all*
> *aspects of social, economic, and political structures- including laws*

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[213] F. Ahmad.(1981) Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey, MERIP Reports, No:93, p: 7.
[214] E. Özbudun. (2000) p: 25.

> *regarding political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations,*
> *public professional organizations, universities, radio and television,*
> *local governments, the judiciary, and emergency regimes."*[215]

The 1960 coup was shorter in duration, whereas 1980 was more similar to a bureaucratic authority regime. The resultant regimes attempted to solve the problem by moving the economic structure in a more free-market, export oriented direction and demobilizing the activated popular sector by restricting its political participation opportunities.Besides, 1960 was a non-hierarchical coup, 1980 was a hierarchical one. In a non-hierarchical group with a great probability, there is friction between military as government and military as institution in 1960 while cases of frictions were seen in both NUC and in the rest of the TAF.

The military regimes in Turkey were not perceived as unreservedly repressive by political actors. They were not regarded as complete failures in the political, economic, or military realms either. Turkey's experience with military regimes is one of the significant reasons why political actors, including the military, have found it difficult to internalize the inevitability of a democratic regime. Lack of negative evaluation of military rule led civilians and soldiers to consider military coup as a feasible option, and this generated overwhelming consequences for the democratic regime. "The political learning about the virtues of democracy seems to have existed, but it is hard to say that it was profound and widely shared by the majority of political actors."[216]

The 1980 military intervention differed from its antecedents in that it aimed at the total rearrangement of the political system in Turkey. The officers abolished the Assembly, disbanded political parties, labor unions and political associations, arrested political and labor leaders and banned all political activities claiming that their action was carried out in order "to defend and maintain national integrity and unity, to prevent possible civil war and reestablish the state's authority and presence". The military felt obliged to strengthen the state in order to prevent people from 'misusing' the virtues of democracy against it.[217]

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[215] E. Özbudun.(2000) p: 26.
[216] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 264.
[217] G. Karabelias. (1999) p: 130-151.

By any account, the September 12 regime was the most repressive military rule that Turkey ever had. Taking its lesson from the past, soldiers were careful to treat political leaders rather tolerantly, but they were punitive dealing with the masses. Although the socialists, social democrats, and politically active Kurds were the primary targets, the ultra-nationalist right and Islamists, too, were not spared from wrath of the security forces. Birand 650,000 people were taken into custody, and many people lost their lives in prison as torture and mistreatment became ordinary occurrences. It was officially accepted that one hundred and seventy one people lost their lives as a result of torture in prison. Many political activists had to leave the country. The administration ratified the execution of the forty three people who were sentenced to death by military courts for committing politically motivated crimes.[218]

Chapter IV

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[218]As T. Demirel quotes from M. A. Birand, H. Bila and R. Akar. (1999) ''12 Eylül-Türkiye'nin Miladı'' p: 231-232, 240.

Historical Background of Political Involvement of Military in Argentina

4.1. Military in Latin America

The guerilla warfare has a long tradition in Latin America. There were episodes of ideological impact by nationalism and communism in the course of guerilla struggle the most inspiring of which was the Castro-Guevara led rural struggle. While Fidel Castro established the socialist regime in Cuba, Ernesto Guevara tracked the route of military strategy believing that the people's forces would defeat the regular armies. A major consequent of this very methodology was the tendency of the armed forces to challenge the political entities with a fear of national defense. [219] In Latin America, independence was maintained through a cooperation of the church, the armed forces and the capital holders. The leading characteristic of the regime is that the state considers itself as the savior of the people from the colonial powers. Patrimonial tendencies are strong, populism is the driving force and the state is under the domination of the armed forces.[220]

The domination of the armed forces is not merely a consequence of its own will but also facilitated by the civilian politicians. Many civilians preferred the military intervention and junta over the rule of other civilian points of view. In Latin America the colonial rule of Spain and Portugal lasted about 300 years, and both the colonial rule itself and the process of independence made an impact on the political culture of the continent.[221] The independence wars did not take place as mass revolts against colonial powers; they were rather actions of small Creole groups. In this respect these incidents were more like military actions than revolutions. The very continuation of the wars fed the development of the military values rather than the political ones.

The US had pursued ideological objectives in its policy towards Latina America before, during and after the Cold War. The distinctive feature of the Cold War period is

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[219] M. K. Öke. (2002) ''Din-Ordu Gerilimi – Küresel Toplumda Dışlanan Demokrasi'' p: 47-48.
[220] M. K. Öke. (2002) p: 49.
[221] B. Keen. (1996) ''A History of Latin America'' p: 225.

the increased ideological concern as a primary factor that shaped the policy making.[222] During the period 1960-1985 the influence of US government in Latin America increased. The principal event at the beginning of this period was the triumph of the Cuban revolution on January 1st, 1959. Since 1960 the US government reinforced its response to the Cuban revolutionary government acting in Latin America in two main directions: First, the support of the armies and the aim to increase their professionalization in name of the "*national security*". The primacy of ideology as a shaping factor in the relations between the US and Latin America increased the likelihood of US military intervention in Latin America.[223] The objective was to defeat the Latin American guerrilla movements especially those of Nicaragua beginning in 1963, El Salvador 1969, Guatemala 1961, Colombia 1964, Venezuela 1967, Uruguay 1970, and Argentina 1972.[224]

Previous work shows that subjects who consider themselves as "democrats" tend to support the military interventions in high proportions and they see the interventions as a part of the democracy. Although this tendency decreased in the 1990s and 2000s, considerable portions of Latin Americans see the military interventions as natural tools to solve political obstructions.[225] The scholars used a number of methods for classifying the military interventions in Latin America, and one of the classifications focuses on whether the intervention is institutional or personal. The 1976 coup in Argentina is an example of institutional interventions where the armed forces dominated the political sphere in command.

Rouquie classifies the Latin American armies in three phases chronologically. The first phase was the rout to independence where the intervention of the military into the political realm was not an issue since politics and military were synonyms at the time. He explains that the *Creoles* (those who were of Spanish ancestry who were born in Latin America) gathered around a *Caudillo* (strong man) and struggled for the political power and economic benefits. The next phase was the state formation process around late 1800s until mid1900s, where national armies are formed with the assistance and

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[222] J. Dominguez. (1999) ''US-Latin American Relations during the Cold War and its Aftermath" p: 33.
[223] J. Dominguez. (1999) p: 35.
[224] F. Nunn. (1996) "Latin American Military-Civilian Relations between World War II and the New World Order: Thoughts on Tradition and Change in Comparative Perspective" in *UNISA Latin American Report*.
[225] M. K. Öke (2002) p: 50.

training of the European militaries. Conscription was introduced at that time and the military was relatively professionalized. However, some moral and institutional bases for the military interventions were also settled at that time.[226]

As mentioned previously, one of the main footages of the *National Security Doctrine* was the relation between security and development and this causality motivated the armed forces to a great extend to play a modernizing role. At a general glance, the militaries of Latin America were in cooperation with the church playing its part within the feudal status quo.

During the 1960s and 70s, the labor unions were allowed to function under state supervision, therefore controlling their activities. Argentina tended towards new right conservative-authoritarian policies; the industry was opened to international competition, as the working class was kept under state control. Including those in Argentina, most Latin American military interventions served the capitalist development and functioned as a defensive wall around the ruling class.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its support of leftist insurgencies around the world, the strength of most of the insurgent movements in Latin America has waned, thereby removing one of the main threats for the region's militaries. Moreover, the impetus for economic reform across the region puts pressure on civilian governments to reduce the size of their armed forces and free up budget funds that are desperately needed elsewhere. A variety of factors support Latin America's civilian governments in their efforts to reform civil-military relations: the relatively recent wave of democratization that has swept over the region; the end of the Cold War and the widespread disappearance of leftist guerrilla insurgencies; and the spread of neoliberal economic reforms that have reduced the military's ability to command the direction of these countries' strategic economic sectors. [227]

Especially before and during the fifties, the consolidation of the Latin American military institutions and its political influence in the region was developed through the *caudillo* functions. They gained legitimacy from their societies and were able to carry out direct functions within the governmental power. Most of the theoretical interpretations of Latin American militaries after the WWII underline the importance

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[226] B. Keen. (1996) p: 225.

[227] W. Hunter. (1996) Peaceworks no:10 (Washington: United States: Institute of Peace) p: 7.

of the US support. Through this support and in several cases direct intervention, the US tried to impose its political and economic interest in the area. This kind of support and intervention increased after the triumph of the Cuban revolution in 1959. The US response to the alleged Soviet threat from Latin American countries was developed mainly during the period 1960-1985 through the *national security doctrine*. In the name of combating the communist threat and the guerrilla movements, Latin American militaries developed important repressive activities.

During the fifties several authors considered Latin American militaries as institutional means to maintain the regional stabilization. During the sixties and seventies they were seen as repressive organizations trying to protect the international US hegemonic position in the Western Hemisphere, and to share benefits to the regional political elites. During the eighties several authors considered Latin American militaries as institutions that allowed for the establishment of a more stable economic scenario, and in particular cases, even reformist movements of the governmental sector. In any case Latin American militaries are important actors in the political arena of their countries.[228]

The Argentine political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell introduced the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism to describe institutional dictatorships that were not a legacy of Iberian rule but used coercion to respond to what they viewed as threats to the capitalist system. While the revolutionary left condemned these dictatorships as fascist and turned to armed struggle as a means to overthrow them, O'Donnell argued "that the appropriate way to oppose them was through an unconditional commitment to democracy" (O'Donnell, p. xiii). These regimes resulted from a failure of democracy to extend the protections of citizenship to an entire population. A notable gap between liberal principles and exclusionary economic practices led to what O'Donnell terms "low-intensity citizenship" (p. 143). Unfortunately, economic inequalities persisted and even grew as part of neoliberal policies that were retained even after O'Donnell's long-desired return to democratic governance in Latin America.

the U.S. government supported authoritarian regimes that promised stability, anticommunism, and economic trade and investment opportunities. this policy

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[228] G. E. Reyes. (1998) ''Latin American Armies 1945-1998: Main Events and Conceptual Approaches''.

conflicted with a theoretical embrace of the principles of liberal democracy and human rights. U.S. officials viewed Latin Americans as racially inferior and strong authoritarian leadership as necessary to maintain order, prevent social and political chaos, and implement neoliberal policies necessary for economic modernization (Schmitz, p. 304). Rather than fostering democratic institutions, U.S. support for authoritarian regimes often led to political polarization, instability, and radical nationalist movements. Critics constantly charge that such support conflicts with U.S. interests, virtually no matter how those interests are conceptualized. "Equating dictators with freedom," Schmitz maintained, "blinded American leaders to the contradictions and failures of their policy". Authoritarian regimes often performed poorly in terms of economic development and, together with extensive human rights violations, lost legitimacy internally. Democracy emerged and economies grew in Latin America in spite of, rather than because of, U.S. policies.

4.2. The Political System and the Armed Forces in Argentina

The Argentine Constitution of 1853 mandates a separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the national and provincial level. The political framework is a federal representative democratic republic, in which the President is both head of state and head of government, complemented by a multi-party system.

Executive power resides in the President and the Cabinet. Legislative power is vested in the bicameral National Congress, comprising a 72-member Senate and a 257-member Chamber of Deputies. Senators serve six-year terms, with one-third standing for re-election every two years. Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected to four-year terms by a proportional representation system, with half of the members standing for re-election every two years. A third of the candidates presented by the parties must be women.

The judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The Supreme Court has seven members appointed by the President in consultation with the Senate.

The Armed Forces of the Argentine Republic,(Fuerzas Armadas de la República Argentina) in Spanish Fuerzas Armadas de la República Argentina, are controlled by the Commander-in-Chief (the President) and a civilian Minister of Defense. The Argentine military have been reduced both in number and budget, but became more

professional, especially after conscription was abolished. Although the dominant approach is to maintain that the armed forces constantly interacts with the other elements in the society, the educational and other institutional procedures, such as recruitment and socialization set military forces somewhat apart from other social groups, and fill in military officers with a sense of corporate autonomy and interest.[229]

4.3. Historical and Cultural Context of Civil-Military Relations in Argentina
4.3.1. The Role of Military in the State Building Process:

Amidst the nation building process out of a colonial territory, Nicolas Avellaneda, became the President of yet fragmented Argentina in 1874. Being a cultured liberal rather than a caudillo, Avellaneda promoted education, immigration and domestic harmony. He established the railroad service between Buenos Aires and Tucuman in 1876, thus strengthening the economic and political links between Buenos Aires and the interior.[230] With its economic advantage as a port, Buenos Aires gradually dominated over the rest of the country and completed the unification of Argentina as a state.

The political leaders who developed the Argentine national unity promoted the material progress of the state as a key solution to all other problems, however their ultimate ideal was to develop a democratic society where the broad mass of citizens had access to state facilities such as education and possession of land. But until developing "useful men out of gauchos" the leaders believed that they had to cooperate with landowners and wealthy merchants. They favored order and progress at the expense of freedom, and regarded the uneducated masses as unqualified for running healthy civic functions.[231]

In 1879-1880, President Roca led Argentina's hierarchical and unified army, occupied Patagonia and defeated warring Indian populations in what became known as the "*conquest of the desert*." This period was critical in establishing the army's self-image of national unifier and defender against not only divisive internal forces but external

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[229]A. F. Lowenthal and J. S. Fitch. (1986) ''Armies and Politics in Latin America''.

[230] B. Keen. (1996) p: 226.
[231] B. Keen. (1996) p: 227.

attack as well.[232] The conquest added vast soil to the province of Buenos Aires which could be utilized with a democratic land policy in order to create a small farmer class; however Roca government chose to sell the large parcels of land to army officers, politicians and foreign capitalists. As a result, great majority of immigrants who arrive to Argentina worked in meat-salting and meat-packing plants, railroads, or small factories.[233]

Compared to past eras, when Argentine *caudillos* and generals issued sweeping "*pronunciamentos*" with far reaching consequences for the political and economic order, today's armed forces, while still an actor to be reckoned with, have assumed a much narrower scope and exercise less authority in the economic, social, and political order of the country.[234]

The introduction of modern agricultural techniques and integration of Argentina into the world economy with its export potential were the two forces combined to create the modern Argentine nation in the late 19th century. Argentina increased in prosperity and prominence between 1880 and 1929, while emerging as one of the 10 richest countries in the world. After 1870, a great wave of immigration from Europe came to Argentina accompanied by considerable foreign investment. At that time, Argentina received some of the highest levels of foreign investment in Latin America.[235]

In the middle of this economic expansion, the Law 1420 of Common Education of 1884 guaranteed universal, free, non-religious education to all children in Argentina. The rule of law was consolidated in large measure by *Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield*, who's 1860 Commercial Code and 1869 Civil Code laid the foundation for Argentina's constitutional laws.

In the 19th C, the upper class of the Argentine society was composed of large land holders and beef suppliers. As the nation grew more urban, an urban middle class was formed around Buenos Aires, which concentrated on bureaucracy and labor. In the last decade of the 19th C as the economic boom turned into depression, the urban middle class who were opposing the one party rule embodied an organization called *Unión*

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[232] W. Hunter. (1996) p: 12.
[233] B. Keen. p: 227.
[234] W. Hunter. (1996) p: 10.
[235] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) ''The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination'' unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex.

Cívica. Gradually the organization transformed into a political party and took the name "*Unión Cívica Radical.*" However, they did not have a chance to govern in the traditional and corrupt election methods.[236]

From about 1900, Argentine nationalism began to associate Argentina with Europe and the United States of America rather than with the rest of Latin America. President Roque Sáenz Peña, one of the most progressive politicians among the *Conservatives*, took office in 1910 with a promise that he would satisfy the Radicals' demands.[237] In 1912, as a part of his promise he urged the Congress to establish universal, secret and obligatory male suffrage and the secret ballot.[238] By doing that, the conservatives were hoping to form a broad-based national political party that would be largely supported.

4.3.2. Civil- Military Relations in Argentina until 1930

In a history of constant conflict and political instability, Argentina's armed forces have played a primary role. The military's role in politics was determinative albeit it was due to change according to the context.[239]

In the first decade of the 20th C, the Argentine military went through major transformations. First of all it professionalized in the sense of the European militaries, and it became a national institution. Escuela Superior was founded in 1901 in order to train the cadets according to the modern warfare. In 1910 a law of conscription arranged the terms of corps' enlargement. Seniority and merit became conditions of promotion. Consequently, the social composition of the military changed in favor of the middle class immigrants.[240] As the traditional oligarchy lost its predominance, the military itself became an important political actor.

Robert Potash introduces extensive information on the recruitment, composition, and training of Argentine officers, as well as about informal cliques within the Argentine military and their relations with civilian factions. The evidence Potash adduces enables him to document the emergence of a highly professional, notably self-protective Argentine officer corps. The basic argument in his conclusions is that the Argentine

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[236] B. Keen. (1996) p: 309.
[237] B. Keen. (1996) p: 230.
[238] F. Pigna. (ed) (2006) ''*Los Mitos de la Historia Argentina''* p: 51.
[239] D. L. Norden. (1996) ''Military Rebellion in Argentina – Between Coups and Consolidation'' p: 20.
[240] B. Keen. (1996) p: 309.

army's more assertive role, reflected in Perón's rise, is related to the gradual changes within the military over the prior fifteen years.[241]

Throughout the 1930s, Argentina was ruled by a succession of military dictators and unfairly elected presidents. These regimes were weakened by their internal corruption and sought to legitimize themselves by reviving an ancient Hispanic alliance of the Cross and the Sword. The ties with Franco of race, religion, and language were emphasized. Some even called for undoing Argentina's war of independence from Spain and was calling for rule by a Viceroy. The military leaders and the Catholic Church, urged on by the Vatican, dreamed of creating a Hispanic Catholic nation that could counterbalance the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. By the time war broke out Argentina was divided into two camps, one pro-Nazi the other pro-Allied. However, Argentina's foreign policy was controlled by Vatican connected operatives calling for a triangle of peace between Argentina, Spain and the Vatican. Following the WW II Argentina was a prime destination for Nazi war criminals. Even war criminals that escaped to other South American countries generally first entered the continent through Argentina. While other South American countries generally supported the US policies during the war, there was no cooperation from Argentina.

4.3.3. Yrigoyen and the Radicals: 1916-1930

Conservative forces dominated Argentine politics until 1916, when the *Radicals*, led by *Hipólito Yrigoyen* won the first national elections made at universal suffrage with 46.5 % of the votes.[242] The landed oligarchy which had long dominated the Argentine politics had to share political power with the middle class for the first time.[243]

The character of the Radical administration was determined by the delicate relations between the radical voters and the conservative landowner elite, since the elite was still influential on agricultural lobbying groups, foreign business partners and even the military. Therefore Yirigoyen had to keep the balances and please the conservatives in order to prevent a potential takeover.[244] On the other hand, although they won the

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[241] R. A. Potash. (1981) ''El ejército y la Politica en la Argentina 1928-1945 – de Yrigoyen a Peron'' pp: 25-28

[242] F. Pigna. (2006) ''Los Mitos de la Historia Argentina'' p: 51.

[243] B. Keen. (1996) p: 305.

[244] B. Keen. (1996) p: 310.

elections the Radicals did not have sufficient power on the government since they were still a minority in the Congress until the Senate elections in 1922. Argentina experienced depression during the WW I due to the decline in foreign investments, and reduced number of import and export shippings. The crisis lasted until 1907, when Europe restarted to demand cereals and meat. The gradual recovery of the war meant another export boom and prosperity for Argentina. However, the European demand increased the food prices and the Radical Government was left in between the urban demand for lower prices, and the interests of the land elite. The harsh opposition of the land elite overcame and Yrigoyen abandoned the working class. The answer of the working class came along with a series of strikes.

Yrigoyen was a democrat who ideally desired to prosper the middle class. He made a university reform in 1918, by secularizing the curriculums and establishing a series of new universities. However his economic submission to the landowners and the 1921 crisis eroded his camp. Still, he managed to win the elections for a second time in 1922, and left the presidency to his successor, Marcelo de Alvear, but he was reelected in 1928. The Radicals were split in two factions in 1924. One of the factions which called themselves "*Personalistas*" were headed by Alvear.[245] Yrigoyen won the elections once more in 1928; however during his second presidency the Great Depression context challenged his government. As the crisis hit Argentina in 1929, Yrigoyen's rivals campaigned that he was responsible for the economic decline, and in the meantime social violence increased. Finally, Yrigoyen was overthrown by the military on September 6, 1930. This event led to another decade of Conservative rule and thus started the cycle of interventions.

Despite the military's relatively short tenure in office, following the 1930 coup the armed forces interpreted the supervision or guardianship of the political system as an accepted role which gradually expanded from monitoring the system to directly governing the system.[246]

4.3.4. The Era of Military Interventions (1930-1983)

[245] B. Keen. (1996) p: 312.
[246] D. L. Norden (1996) p: 22-23.

Argentina has experienced often military interventions and rule between 1930 and 1983. Events between 1930 and 1976 form an important part of the backdrop for the subsequent evolution of Argentine politics. The military's eruption into politics in 1930, Peronism's drastic impact on Argentina's political forces, and the institutionalization of military rule that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s helped mold the political context of the day. As Norden points out, over decades, *"military intervention had become the norm rather than the exception."* She suggests that the chronic interventionism in Argentina stems from both the civilians' preference to find military allies, and military's tendency to respond.[247]

Between 1930 and 1983, Argentine history was characterized by repetitive military interventions. After the polarization of the political system in the 1930s and 1940s, Argentina fluctuated between military and civilian governments. the *Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente* (UCRI) government of Arturo Frondizi, 1958-62, and the Peronist government (Hector Cámpora, Juan Domingo Perón, Raúl Lastiri, María Estela Martínez de Perón), 1973-76. The pattern of military interventionism was further heartened.[248] Civilians considered the military as a political actor, and all accepted the military's participation in politics. The AAF ruled the country and influenced civilian regimes. This military participation increased gradually, not only in terms of the military control over the state, but also in the arbitrariness of the military rule. In this sense, the last military regime of 1976-1983 was the most violent one in Argentine history.[249]

The Argentine experience indicates that successful interventions were accomplished by sectors of the Armed Forces or by the military as an institution, with supporting actors of civil society. The armed forces include the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The actors who participated in each intervention were subject to change, as well as the civilian counterparts differed. During the first successful military uprising, on 6 September 1930, the AAF carried out the intervention excluding the Navy; while the land notables and the industrial bourgeoisie supported the intervention.[250]

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[247] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 157.
[248] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 20.
[249] Battaglino, as quoted from Andres Fontana, «Political Decision Making by a Military Corporation: Argentina, 1976-1983», Ph.D. Diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1987. Vicente Palermo y Marcos Novaro, La Dictadura Militar, 1976-1983 (Buenos Aires: Norma, 2001).
[250] J. M. Battaglino. (2005) ''Cycles of Civil-Military Relations in Argentina'' p: 8.

The Alvear government (1922-1928) improved relations with the military, but with Yrigoyen's return in 1928, the conflict with the military began again. The main source of the conflict was Yrigoyen's treatment of the institutional interests of the military. Military politicization was a response to Yrigoyen´s policies. This process of politicization adopted several forms.The main instrument of this manipulation was the system of military promotions and assignments.[251]One of the most common forms of manipulation was to ignore the requests of commissioned officers who had met the conditions for promotion but had not participated in interventions in 1890, 1893, and 1905, and instead to favour officers who had.[252]This presidential attitude affected the professional prospect of officers who could not accede to the next step in their career.

As a result of these policies, a sect called San Martin was created in 1921 by a group of Army officers unhappy with Yrigoyen's military policy.There was also a concern about the activities of leftist groups in the country. According to the San Martin sect, the social policy of the Radical government was resulting in the empowerment of the anarchist and communist trade unions.[253] Although the sect was intended to protect professionalism from political manipulation, it paradoxically encouraged the development of a political opposition against the government of Yrigoyen. The policy of Yrigoyen toward strikers and trade union demands and his unwillingness to repress social disorder promoted a change in military role beliefs. The military began to associate Yrigoyen's government with social conflict.[254]The relationship between the Army and nationalist groups reached a peak during the 1920s. Argentine nationalist groups augmented their attacks against democracy and pointed out that the military was the only honest institution left in Argentina, therefor was responsible for the wellbeing of the nation.[255]

European military missions in Argentina also contributed to the shaping of military role beliefs by spreading a negative vision of democracy and politicians. French and German military missions in military academies affected the Argentine military´s self-perception. They transmitted to the Argentine officers their ideas on affairs of State,

[251] R. Potash.(1985) p: 25-33.
[252]A. Rouquie (1994) Autoritarismos y Democraciap: 156.
[253] R. Potash. (1981) p: 29-38.
[254] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) ''The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination'' p: 64.
[255] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 65.

nation, and society. The military progressively incorporated the idea that its values were innately superior to civilians´ and that military structure and organisation provided a more effective and orderly model of progress than did a political system based on egalitarianism and mass participation.[256]

The next president, Alvear regularised promotions and assignments. The previous policy of presidential manipulation of promotion lists was replaced by an absolute respect for military autonomy in this area. A variety of prerogatives was also conceded to the military. Alvear re-established the tradition of reserving the Ministries of Army and Navy for active members of the Armed Forces. [257], These policies favoured the concentration of the military officers in professional activities, thus diminishing the reasons for their politicisation.

The second presidency of Yrigoyen represented a return to the past for the military. Discontent was especially evident in the military academies where cadets who were expelled for academic or disciplinary reasons were reinstated by presidential order. Battaglino notes that many officers published articles in the newspaper *La Prensa* denouncing the return of the politicisation of the Army. The military were again in politics.

The military threat perception rose during the Yrigoyen administration; on the other hand the economic crash of 1929 caused serious deterioration in the relations between the Radical government and business organisations. Ten days before the intervention, a joint declaration of key entrepreneurial organisations, the first of its kind in Argentine history, reflected the dissatisfaction of these groups towards the Radical government. It was the first time that these organisations threatened the government with the prospect of "extreme actions".[258]

On August 9, socialist, conservative deputies constituted a political group to denounce the institutional and economic crisis. The group announced "extra-parliamentary actions" against the government.The Manifesto was a summary of the interests threatened by the policies of the government of Yrigoyen.Jose Uriburu and Agustin Justo headed the two most important factions in favour of the intervention. The former believed that democracy and political parties had to be rejected and replaced by a

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[256]*Ibid*. p: 138.
[257]A.Rouquie (1994) p: 165-170.
[258] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 70.

corporatist system of government. The latter thought that the military regime installed after the intervention should be a transition government.[259]

Finally, on September 6, a small number of troops, less than 1000 cadets from the Military School, carried out the first successful military intervention of Argentina. Business organisations, students, the main newspaper, and the Church, that is all the relevant actors of Argentine civil society at that time, supported the intervention.[260]A civilian president would be back in less than two years; however the experience of 1930 opened Pandora's Box, paving the way to the future role of the military in the Argentine political life.[261]

"In 1930 a faction of the Army led by General Jose F. Uriburu, inspired by fascist and corporatist models of state and society, overthrew President Hipólito Yirigoyen in Argentina's first coup of the twentieth century. Five more major coups followed over the next forty-six years. The Argentina armed forces became accustomed to governing: they considered themselves the supreme guardians of the nation, embodying the national essence, with a mission to guide an unruly civilian population along the path of order, security and development. These beliefs were fortified and deepened by the national security doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s"[262]

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[259] A. Rouquie (1994) p:191-197.
[260] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 72.
[261]D. L. Norden (1996) p: 21.
[262] J. P. McSherry. (1997) ''Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina'' p: 31-32.
[263] J. P. McSherry. (1997) p: 31-32.

4.3.4.1. The Military Intervention of 1930: "Década Infame"

The coup indicated the end of Argentina's short experiment with democracy. For the next 13 years the military would involve in the politics with harsh repression and corrupt relations, for which the era would be recalled as "the Infamous Decade". The leaders of the coup of 1930 in Argentina were united by long hostility toward Yrigoyen, the deposed president of the Radical Party. A "nationalist" faction led by General Jose F. Uriburu dominated the coalition of factions[264], and became president of the provisional government. Uriburu and his associates exemplified a nationalism that perpetuated the Patriotic League's contagious anti-communism and its myths and values. Among the nationalists clericalist doctrine of *hispanidad*, which had developed in *Miguel Primo de Rivera*'s Spain was popular, and they were also influenced by Italian fascism.[265] In the months following the coup, Uriburu launched harsh repression against the opponents of his government.

After a year of repression Uriburu opted to go for elections, perceiving that the opposition was intimidated enough so that he would be elected president, thus gaining public legitimacy. However, the result of the elections was a remarkable victory for Yrigoyen and Radicals. Uriburu immediately cancelled the election, many radicals were expelled and the election was repeated in 1931 without the participation of UCR.[266] This marginalized the UCR and motivated them to contribute several military interventions in the subsequent decades.

In order to prevail in the elections Uriburu needed a partner among the radicals; [267]and *AntiperonistRadicals*[268]would be the partner they were looking for. They formed a coalition namely *Concordancia and* ruled Argentina between 1930 and 1943. The *Concordancia* reconstructed the conservative power with a new association with A*ntipersonalist Radicals.*

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[264]Conservatives, right-wing nationalist-fascists, Progressive Democrats, Socialists, Independent Socialists were among these diverse factions. See: Keen.p: 313.
[265] Spanish dictator Miguel Primo de Riviera (January 8, 1870 – March 16, 1930) was a conservative albeit sought a number of radical reforms in Spain, and he believed that the military and church had to ally for a successful order in the society.
[266] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 79.
[267] B. Keen. (1996) p: 313.
[268] Antipersonalist Radicals stand for a faction that separated from UCR and adopted this name to indicate their opposition to Yirigoyen.

From 1930 onwards, the Argentine military was transformed into a group of praetorian soldiers who portrayed themselves as responsible and patriotic officers who protected the constitution and the nation from the unhappy consequences of continued civilian rule.[269] The military considered that the coup of 1930 was a necessity and even a sacrifice on their part, and expected that such a measure would never be necessary again.

The Justo government which was elected in 1932 balanced the factions within the military corps and improved the standard of professionalism by impartial promotion policies. The next president Ortiz continued the process of military reorganisation started by Justo, cooperation between Argentine and German officers continued, and forty Argentine officers were sent to Germany every year until 1940.However, Ortiz had to delegate the presidency to his vice-president Ramón Castillo due to his deteriorating health. Castillo excluded the UCR once again, and the process of democratisation and the strong relationship that Ortiz maintained with the Armed Forces were thus ceased.This new exclusion of the Radicals forced the *UCR* to run conspiracy against Castillo's government. This time the military was also more willing to intervene since they were worried about the return of the fraudulent political system.[270] In June 1943, an easy military coup interrupted Argentine politics once again.

The orientation of government economic policies between 1930 and 1943 continued to favor agricultural interests which led to a conflict between the industrialists and successive national governments. The world crisis of the 1930s depressed the prices of cereal and meat. Another reason for maintaining the agrarian orientation of the economy was the bilateral trade agreement with the United Kingdom (UK), where the UK agreed to maintain the meat import level in spite of the economic crisis.[271]

The Argentine officer corps doubled between 1930 and 1945, and professionalism became a priority with the establishment of the National War College where senior officers received an extra year of training for the arsenals and factories run by the military. These changes tended to confer increasing self-confidence on the officers in their own capacity to handle national problems, and provided functional and cohesive

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[269] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 83.
[270] R. Potash. (1981) pp: 241-262.
[271] For the contraversial Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933, see Keen. p: 314.

basis for the Argentine Armed Forces (AAF) to adopt an explicit political role.[272] In the meantime the emergence of Argentine industrial bourgeoisie and working class heightened the political tensions within the Argentine society. The military intervention of 1943 was an effort to resolve the gathering crisis.[273]

4.3.4.2. Intervention of 1943

The intervention which took over Castillo in 1943 had a complicated background. The UCR was constantly working against the successive governments of the *Concordancia*. There was a truce during the Ortiz presidency because of his attempt to incorporate the *UCR*. However, the *UCR* began to contact members of the Armed Forces after President Castillo proposed *Patron Costas* as his successor. Many *UCR* leaders were in contact with military officers. Castillo chose *Patron Costas* as candidate for the presidential election of 1943. At the beginning of January 1943, the leaders of the UCR met with the military organizers of the future intervention, and agreed that *Patrón Costas* was unacceptable.[274]

Most Argentine officers had a pro-German attitude partly because of the German military training they received and partly because they believed that the US and the UK were deliberately keeping Argentina as a rural economic colony. Therefore, they believed that Argentina should remain neutral in the great conflict, if not take sides with Germany.[275]The military was concerned with the possibility that the Costas government might declare war on Germany. The military perceived their neutrality as the best option for Argentina, particularly because some factions within the corps supported the axis powers while some others were pro-allied; and entering the war would ruin the unity of the institution. In addition, the officers were concerned with the support given to agriculture at the expense of industrial development in economic policies, since they perceived that Argentina was not ready for a potential war with neighbouring Chile and Brazil, with whom the relations were deteriorating.[276] Adding the political role belief that eventually helped to justify an intervention, the conditions

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[272] R. Potash. (1981) p: 260.
[273] B. Keen. (1996) p: 315.
[274] R. Potash. (1981) p: 275.
[275] B. Keen. (1996) p: 315.
[276] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 85-86.

for an intervention was setting up. Argentina remained neutral during the Second World War, and as a result, the United States cancelled all exports of weapons to Argentina. By 1940, the Army began to suffer from a lack of supplies. Meanwhile, huge quantities of weapons were sold to Brazil and Uruguay, which declared war on Germany in 1942.

The presidential election of 1943 where *Patrón Costas* was a presidential candidate triggered the intervention, since he supported agrarian economy and he declared that he would declare war on Germany if he was elected. On June 4, 1943, Castillo was displaced and the AAF broadcast the following declaration: *"The Armed Forces of the nation have observed stealthily, but attentively, the activities and performance of the authorities of the Nation… these have defrauded Argentines, adopted fraud and corrupted practices."*[277]

The coalition that carried out the coup was composed of a diverse composite of Radicals, senior army and navy officers, and some middle rank officers like captains to colonels. A group of mid-level officers who had secretly organized as the GOU (Group of United Officers) formed the heart of the movement. The inner circle of the GOU was strongly nationalist. According to Felix Luna, the group was characterized by "its sympathy for the Axis, its fundamental nationalism and its mistrust of democracy, at least the democracy that had been practiced up until then".[278] The GOU was also concerned with issues of social justice, and inclined toward an increased role of the state both in fostering economic distribution and in managing politics.[279]

4.3.4.3. Peronist Era: 1943-1955

In the 1943 coup that ended the "infamous decade" of fraudulent conservative rule, Colonel Juan Domingo Perón was primarily a background figure.[280] After a controversial period, a group within the military regime elevated General Farrell from Vice-president to President on February 24, 1944. Perón was posted as the Minister of War and Vice-president. He occupied key posts during the military regime (1943-1946)

[277] Battaglino quoted: República Argentina, Ministerio de Guerra, *Memoria 1943-44* (Buenos Aires: 1945).
[278] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 24.
[279] R. Potash. (1984) *Elejército y la Politica en la Argentina 1945-1962 – de Peron a Frondizi* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana). p.188
[280] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 24.

and later became president of the country for two consecutive terms. Perón constructed a strong coalition during the military regime using the prerogatives of Vice-president, Minister of War, and Labour Secretary. From these positions he favoured the empowerment of trade unions, the institutional interests of the military and industrial development. These policies encouraged regime stability during his first term which was between 1946 and 1951. However, a number of policies implemented by Perón, especially after 1951, reduced his legitimacy and led to the third successful intervention in Argentine history in 1955.[281]

The military regime launched a strategy of industrialisation which had not only defensive but also social purposes. In the meantime as the Labor Secretary Perón supported only the unions whose leaders recognized the authority of his office, marginalizing those union leaders opposed to him. As a result of favouring unions, the incomes of the labour class rose, which in turn made a positive impact on industrialization process. However, the changing economic orientation resulted in a conflict between factions of industrial circle.[282]The most favoured sector by far during the three years of military rule was the military. As Head of the War Department, Perón continued the process of military modernisation that favoured the institutional interests of the military. The professional aspect of the Armed Forces' institutional interests was also favoured. Perón implemented a system that permitted the rapid promotion of officers.

Perón forged a new political doctrine in which a progressive working-class orientation merged with an emphasis on industrialization and a conservative, essentially Catholic vision of the social order. At the same time the military government took over the trade unions, suppressed the newspapers and imprisoned many of the opposition leaders.[283] This complex combination of elements, combined with Perón's increasingly authoritarian and provocative behavior, succeeded in rending the fabric of Argentine society into two; loyal supporters of Perón and his equally severe opponents.[284]

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[281] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 87.
[282]The products of landowners and traditional industries which were dependent on agricultural inputs were able to export their goods and therefore were not sensitive to the changes. On the other hand small and medium size businesses which produced goods for the internal market welcomed the pro-industrial orientation launched by the military regime. See Battaglino 2007, p: 89.
[283] B. Keen. (1996) p: 315.
[284] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 23.

On the other hand he was a mastermind of manipulating the working class, and he soon earned the admiration and trust of the urban proletariat. He helped them to organize, supported them in labor negotiations and provided that their share of the national income increase. He also created a Labor Party to mobilize the working class and thus gain power before the presidential election in 1946 and created a profound division in Argentine society between the Peronists and the anti-Peronists that would last until today. In the meantime, he was also strengthening his position in the military.

After the end of WW II demonstrations demanding transition to democracy emerged in Argentina. Seeing his popularity, Peron's civil and military rivals staged a coup and imprisoned him in order to exclude him from the political game. However the labor organizations got organized and massive street demonstrations were held in order to protest Peron's imprisonment. As the conspirators had to release Peron, he resigned from his posts in the government, retired from the army and started his campaign for the presidential elections of 1946.[285] During his campaign, the US State Department issued a "Blue Book" which was prepared *Spruille Braden*, which in essence claimed that Peron had ties with fascism. Despite its title "*Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation*", there had been no "consultation" with the other governments of the hemisphere. Peron campaigned with the dictum "*Braden or Peron?"* and won the election and gave the US a hurtful diplomatic defeat.[286]

In February of 1946, General Juan Domingo Perón was elected president of Argentina with 54 percent of the popular vote. Argentina found itself in an entirely new situation, with Perón promising a new Argentina founded on values such as social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence. Peron pushed for higher wages and social reforms for the *descamisados* (those without shirts), who made up Argentina's urban proletariat.[287] The reforms of his government included reducing the working hours, limiting child labor, and extending the vote to Argentine women.[288] In economic terms he increased the income of the popular sector, creating a demand for industrial

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[285] B. Keen. (1996) p: 316.
[286] See A. Josephson (2011) "Bad Neighbor": US-Argentine Relations in the 1940s" p: 23-30.
[287] M. E. Andersen. (1993) Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War" (Westview Press: Oxford) p: 27.
[288] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 28.

goods, and improved the agricultural prices.[289] Besides, for many workers he was a father figure, looking after and caring for them, distributing drinks and sweets for the Christmas holidays.

Like their Conservative predecessors and military successors, the Peronists believed that the ends justified the means. The policies of the populists, like the policies of their conservative predecessors further eroded the possibility of achieving a government grounded in the belief in the rule of law buttressed with a system of checks and balances. Besides, the post-war economic recovery enabled Peron to keep his coalition together. The exports earned in abundance so as to finance the industrialization process.[290] The aftermath has been economic and political instability. The swinging of the economy and the challenges it faced caused a continuing "crisis of the state as a system of political domination."[291]

Peron was keeping the military content with generous salaries, commitment to industrialization and providing modern equipment. However, as Perón's tenure continued, a dangerous opposition group began to develop within the military.[292] The split between General Perón and the army had a variety of causes. Perón's "*personalist*" treatment of the armed forces and the increasing authoritarianism of his government were causing tension within the military. Perón was manipulating the trade unions in order to extend the government's control to a greater number of Argentine workers.[293]

Although left-wing Peronists and Marxist-oriented guerrillas claimed Peronism's covering trying to adapt the principles of Peron's doctrine *Justicialismo* to the *Dialectical Materialism*, Peron was proud of his alleged contact with Mussolini and was inspired by him on the "transformative power of crowds"[294] He also was aware that the support of the military was essential for the survival and success of his government, therefore he promoted military institutional interests. He avoided fraud in

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[289] G. O'Donnell. (1978) ''State and Alliances in Argentina, 1956-1976'' in *Journal of Development Studies,* p: 7-8.
[290] L. J. Alston. and A. A. Gallo. (2005) "The Erosion of Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Rise of Populism in Argentina: An Explanation for Argentina's Economic Slide from the Top Ten" in *Institute Of Behavioral Science Working Paper PEC2005-0001*, p: 23.
[291] G. O'Donnell. (1978) p: 24.
[292] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 26.
[293] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 27.
[294] A. C. G. M. Robben. (2007) ''Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina- The Ethnography of Political Violence'' p: 13.

the promotion of the officers, and thus gained the trust of even those officers ideologically distant to him. As a material development, the Air Force was created as a separate branch in 1946, purchasing 400 aircraft from the United Kingdom.[295] The Army and Navy were also innovated with machinery purchases and technical training. Nevertheless, although the government did offer certain professional benefits such as improved equipment, the majority of Perón's policies toward the armed forces contradicted norms of professionalism, personal loyalty, rather than institutional obedience.[296]

In the elections of 1951 Perón received 62 % of the total vote and started his second term in presidency. Perón's term was already oppressive from the beginning, but yet became more so from 1951 onwards. The Peronist doctrine was declared the official national ideology and the *PJ* was declared the only national movement by a law enacted in 1952. In the meantime, torture, imprisonment, censorship, purges, and exile became regular practices of the regime. As Peronism became the official doctrine, Perón shifted his policy towards the military and supported only the promotion of the Peronist officers to higher posts. In 1952, a course on Peronist doctrine was made obligatory in the Military College and the War School (*Escuela Superior de Guerra).* This was the first flaw between Perón and the AAF. At the same time, the share of military expenditures in the budget was reduced. As a result of this gradual alienation the AAF began to conspire against a civilian regime once again, but this time against one of the leaders of the 1943 coup.[297]

After 1949, Argentina entered a period of severe recession, which was a combination of low harvest years due to severe drought and increased competition from the US and Western Europe. In response to the economic crisis of the early 1950s, Perón changed his economy policy for his second term between 1953 and 1957, so as to increase agrarian production. He paid higher wages to the farmers and supplied them with equipment in order to reach this goal. He also dropped the wages of working class in order to reduce the domestic demand. Nevertheless, the government signed a contract with the Standard Oil Company of California for exploration, drilling and refining oil; hoping that this income would balance the capital shortage. This was a point when the

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[295] The UK's impact on the Air Force continued since then. See J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 92.
[296] R. Potash. (1984)p: 107
[297] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 96.

nationalist military began to question Peron's policies. The military was also disturbed by Peron's efforts to indoctrinate the military with *Justicialismo.* In the meantime he began to employ greater coercion to suppress the growing opposition.[298] The drop in the wages of the working class, repression and dismayed military paved the way to the next military intervention.

One of the major reasons of Peron's popularity was his wife Eva Duerte de Peron (Evita) who ran a massive charity organization network that distributed remarkable amounts of money, food and clothes to the needy population. She also strongly advocated women's suffrage and managed to earn it in 1947. However Eva Peron died in 1952 at the age of thirty two[299], and the president's popularity among the working class declined after her death.

However, the last straw in the successful intervention of 1955 was the confrontation of Perón with the Catholic Church.[300]Argentina has always been an extremely Catholic country and so was the AAF. Actually, significant part of Perón's popularity was due to the similarities between his ideas and Catholic teachings.[301] Actually, Peronism was the most Catholic movement of Argentine history, and the Catholic Church supported Perón during the presidential campaign in 1945, because of his support of religious education in state schools. As a president Perón favoured the Church by increasing the number of religious posts as well as the salaries. However, from 1951 onwards the Church turned against Perón, particularly because he was opposed to the establishment of a Christian Democrat Party in 1954. "*As a response, Perón ceased funding to Catholic churches, eliminated Catholic education in schools, closed Catholic newspapers, and arrested several dissident priests, and legalised divorce and prostitution.*"[302]

Besides, the Church was concerned that *Peronism* began to occupy its territory. "*The Church was affronted by the government's political exploitation of organized charity and by Perón's designation of justicialismo as a 'doctrine,' its adherents as 'believers,'*

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[298]B. Keen. (1996) p: 318.
[299]B. Keen. (1996) p: 317.
[300] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 99.
[301]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 28.
[302] Battaglino quoted: "El Peronismo y la Iglesia Católica" inJuan Carlos Torre, *Nueva Historia Argentina: los años Peronistas, op.cit*., p: 441-481.

and himself on occasion as its 'apostle."[303] Perón alienated a major part of the society by his conflicts with the Church, and triggered the organisation of the intervention.[304]On June 11 1955 a demonstration organized by the church brought together all the rivals of Perón, and turned into a political challenge. As a response to this, the forces which are loyal to Perón organized another demonstration on June 16. The military wanted to take advantage of this demonstration and fired on the demonstrators intending a coup, however it did not turn out successful. The tension further rose when the Peronists burned several churches that night.

Hoping to reduce the tension, Perón launched a call for national unity declaring that he resigned as a Chief of the Peronist Party and proclaimed the end of the "*Peronization*" process. This time opposition took advantage and increased publications. Peron had to go back to repression as a result of increasing social protests. Finally, in September of 1955, Perón was removed from the presidency by force and fled into exile.[305]

4.3.4.4. The Military Intervention of 1955: "Revolución Libertadora"

"*Revolución Libertadora*" (The Liberating Revolution) took off on September 16 in Cordoba, followed by other military units throughout Argentina. Perón resigned and went into exile in Spain. On September 20 the insurgent leader, *General Eduardo Lonardi*, took office as provisional president promising to restore democratic government and made the following declaration:

> *"The Navy, the Air Force and the Army have left their garrisons*
> *once again in order to intervene in the civic life of the Nation. It was*
> *done in order to remove a dictator who used the state power to*
> *humiliate his people… We do not make this revolution for the*
> *advantage of any political party, social class or ideology, but in*
> *order to restore the rule of law.*"[306]

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[303] Norden quoted: Rock. (1987) p: 314.
[304] On the relations of Peron with Catholic Church see: R. Potash. (1984) p: 171-78, and A. Rouquie (1994) p: 98-99.
[305] D. L. Norden (1996) p: 28.
[306]*La Nación*, September 22, 1955.

Political organizations were outlawed and members of the Supreme Court were ousted. Congress was dissolved and troops were sent into all the Universities of Argentina. Ongania emphasized national security and sent out the message that his government would destroy the "left", defending a neoliberal policy to solve the serious problem of the economy. Perón was accused for *"...[s]owing hatred in the Argentine family and inciting violence and crime,[…]attacks on the Catholic religion […][f]ailure to comply with the oath to respect the national constitution; and lack of loyalty to the [military] institution."*[307]

After Peron's fall, Argentina's social problems became more extreme and appeared ineradicable. Unemployment and underemployment afflicted all major sectors, while the high living standards that had once distinguished Argentina from the rest of Latin America slowly eroded. The period was dominated by the polarizing dynamics set by the previous Peronist regime. Despite his frequently authoritarian tactics and high number of enemies, Perón was a hero to many people. This polarization, as it was afterwards called, was the result of the articulation of power and opposition according to rules that were not shared. There were almost two distinct nations; one that could only consider Argentina with Peron, and another that could only accept Argentina without Peron and Peronism.

The years 1955-1966 were marked by futile attempts at reconstructing a political system based on the authoritarian exclusion of the Peronist camp. The politics of *"deperonization"*, like past policies of *"peronization"*, rested on a manifest political using of legal-constitutional arrangements: *Peronism* was banned, electoral laws were constantly rewritten for political purposes, and elections were canceled if their results were disliked. Obviously those measures further harmed the reputation of political institutions.[308] For decades following the 1955 overthrow of Perón, the military tried to wipe out Perón's influence. While leaving power in 1958, the commanding officers of the *Revolución Libertadora* prohibited Perón or any Peronist party from participating in the political system, in order to prevent the return of Perón.[309]

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[307] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 28.
[308] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) From Praetorianism To Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina's Difficult Transition To Civilian Rule Journal of Third World Studies p: 99.
[309] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 30.

Lonardi's administration lasted less than two months: a military coup headed by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu led to the hardliner's takeover. The new administration rejected Lonardi's tolerant and mild politics and moved quickly to terminate the remainings of Peronism. After declaring the *state of emergency*, Aramburu dissolved the Peronist party, prohibited the use of Peronist symbols or Peron's name, and banned members of the Peronist regime from public posts. A strike in support of Lonardi was rapidly repressed by the military, and hundreds of Peronist union leaders were taken in custody. The harshest suppression, however, took place within the military itself. On June 9, 1956, Peronist military leaders staged a failed coup against the government that led to the detention and execution of its leaders.[310] According to Potash, "Over the next three days, despite the removal of the death penalty from the code of military justice, 27 individuals, eighteen military and nine civilians, were shot by firing squads".[311] The executions were followed by the "increased use of political criteria in promotions, the retirement of large numbers of nationalist or politically suspect officers, and the reincorporation of previously retired anti-Peronists into the active armed forces"[312] Thus, by the time of the 1958 elections, Peronist officers were fairly cleaned off the corps.

4.3.4.5. Frondizi Administration: 1958-1962

Transition did not come easily. There were many officers who advocated postponing the transition until the revival of Peronism became impossible. However, President Aramburu persistently defended the need for constitutional rule in Argentina and for the military to avoid prolonged interference in the political system. In the end, the transition to civilian rule was allowed to take place largely due to Aramburu's considerable personal authority.[313]

Between 1958 and 1966, ineffective attempts at recreating a democratic regime excluding the Peronists took place. The 1958 elections developed into a contest between two factions of the UCR, and resulted in the victory of *Union Civica Radical*

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[310] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) "From Praetorianism to Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina's Difficult Transition to Civilian Rule" p: 100.
[311] R. Potash. (1984) p. 233.
[312] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 31.
[313] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 31.

Intransigente (UCRI) over the *Union Civica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP)*, bringing Arturo Frondizi to the presidency.[314] As aforementioned, the military government forbade participation of the Peronists before leaving office. Since banned Peronism had a drastic amount of electorates, whichever candidate managed to acquire the support of the Peronists was likely to win the elections. However, appealing to the Peronist leadership would inevitably attract the reaction of the AAF. Finally, UCRI candidate Arturo Frondizi chose the Peronist masses as a tactical necessity.[315] Frondizi thus came to power with the support of Peronist votes, after a controversial pact with Peron that consisted of a trade of Peronist votes for Frondizi's compromise to lift the political restrictions against the Peronist party. After the making of the "pact", Perón explicitly ordered his supporters to vote for Frondizi.[316] This collaboration further increased the polarization of the anti-Peronist camp.[317] Thus, Arturo Frondizi's governing term began under challenging circumstances.

Having many rivals inside and outside the military, Frondizi tended to deal with his military opponents by granting their demands, rather than attempting to frustrate them. The Argentine military was also granted increased professional autonomy and authority during the Frondizi years. The Cuban revolution stimulated extensive fear of the threat of communist insurgency among the military officers. In combination with the growth in terrorism, the development of guerilla organizations encouraged the government to institute *"Plan de Conmoción Interno del Estado"* (Plan for Domestic Upheaval).[318] This was a state of emergency that granted direct responsibility to the AAF to repress terrorism, subordinated provincial police forces to their authority, and gave military courts jurisdiction over civilians accused of participating in or fostering subversive acts.[319] The Plan was placed in effect in March 1960. By late 1961, the armed forces had formally begun training for counter-revolutionary warfare.[320]

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[314]UCRI and UCRP are two political parties which were formed with the division of UCR in 1956.
[315] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 30.
[316]The existence of the alleged pact is highly debated and the original copy was never found. In June 1959, more than a year after the agreement was formulated, Perón decided to make the text public, asserting that Frondizi had not fulfilled his commitments Nonetheless, Frondizi continued to deny that any such document was ever signed, emphasizing instead an informal accord between the two parties. See Rouquie (1975) p: 96.
[317] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 101.
[318]A. Rouquie. (1994) p: 156-157.
[319] R. Potash. (1984) p: 322.
[320]A. Rouquie. (1994) p: 159.

4.3.4.6. Intervention of 1962

In addition to laying down the rules for the transition, the leaders of the *Revolucíon Libertadora* maintained active oversight of the new "democratic" government. The anti-Peronism that first stimulated the 1955 coup and that was then expanded and elaborated during the years of military rule stimulated a context in which Frondizi's every action was immediately subject to evaluation.[321] The prohibition of Peronism limited Frondizi's ability to govern. In addition, Frondizi himself caused significant distrust from the armed forces. His policies toward the military only weakened his position further. Eventually, Frondizi too became an unacceptable president in the eyes of the military leadership. One of the important reasons of disturbance was the appointment of General *Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero*, who was appointed commander in chief by General *Elbio Anaya*, the Secretary of Army.Montero began pursuing his own agenda within the army, eventually seeking control of the government as well.[322] Frondizi's inability to overpower Toranzo Montero, and his reluctance to assert his own control seriously eroded the president's authority.[323]

The Cuban problem was another source of tension between the government and the military. Despite Argentina's close relations to the United States, Frondizi supported tolerance for the Cuban revolution. In August of 1961, Frondizi meet secretly with revolutionary leader *Ernesto "Che" Guevara*, who was Cuba's minister of industry at the time.[324] After a series of confrontations with the armed forces and repeated denials of communist sympathies, Frondizi finally ended diplomatic relations with Cuba in February 1962.[325]

Frondizi's decision to allow the participation of Peronist candidates in the congressional and provincial elections was the final stone that paved the way for another military intervention. Frondizi believed that his electoral success in 1961 gave him a chance to defeat Peronism in the electoral arena. However the Peronist Party won the elections, in response to which the military demanded the national government to intervene in seven provinces to launch a "*direct assault against*

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[321] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 30.
[322] R. Potash. (1984) p: 314.
[323] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 30.
[324] R. Potash. (1994) p: 338.
[325] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 32.

communism and proscribe Peronism, its emblems, and its activities".[326] Frondizi placed five provinces under federal control, but it was not good for either side: His move was insufficient for the hard line anti-Peronists on the one hand, and too much for the constitutionalists on the other. Frondizi's tolerance for both Peronism and Cuba had managed to unify the divided military.[327]On March 23, the *UCR* National Committee made a direct call for a military intervention.Frondizi was arrested on March 28, 1962. There was no significant opposition to the military intervention. The official declaration after the coup held that

> "*the Armed Forces watch over the institutional process with only one goal: the full realization of the ideals of the Liberating Revolution…. We have to intervene actively and energetically when totalitarian subversion threatens the lives and security of the Argentines.*"[328]

Following the 1962 coup, *Jose Maria Guido* became president. In the meantime, the anti-Peronists were divided into factions as well concerning the means to exclude Peronism from the political realm. Some preferred to lift the political ban on mild Peronists in order to integrate them to the system while others sought to exclude them fundamentally. The Guido government and the army believed that there was a need to neutralize the influence of Peron through a mild neo-Peonist party while the Navy believed that it would open the door for the return of Peronism to power. Eventually a neo-Peronist party called the *Union Popular (UP)* was founded hoping Perón's support from Spain. Because of the government's support to this policy, the Navy set a new revolt on April 2, 1963. The rebellion lasted several days and caused hundreds of casualties. In the same vein the *UCRP*, the Conservatives, and the Socialists denounced the formation of the UP as an attempt to re-establish totalitarianism in Argentina.[329]

Many Generals like Onganía, chief of the staff believed that the participation of the UP in the following election would cause another military confrontation, therefore the best thing to do was to prevent the participation of neo-Peronist candidates in the next

[326] R. Potash. (1984) p: 362.
[327] R. Potash. (1984) p: 335.
[328] J. M. Battaglino quoted: *La Nación*, March 29, 1962.
[329] A. Rouquie. (1994) p. 216.

elections. Finally the UP and Peronism were banned, with a term of imprisonment for every activity that challenged this ban.[330]

4.3.4.7 1964 Election and Illia Government

During his administration, Frondizi had to face severe opposition by the UCRP camp, anti-Peronist groups, and the AAF which posed great challenge against governmental control. Again, the Peronists were excluded, leaving the competition between the two Radical parties. The political ban now extended to Frondizi, whose prior pact with Peron made him an untrustworthy candidate. After a series of political conspiracies and last minute alliances,Dr. Arturo Illia of the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP) was elected.[331]

Illia adopted a moderate policy characterized by respect for civil and political rights and the implementation of a cautious populist economy. Illia removed all legal obstacles preventing Peronists from participating in elections. The partial congressional elections in 1965 led to the victory of the Peronists.[332]

As far as the AAF was concerned, the Illia government intended to restructure professionalism through a stick and carrot policy. The military's political involvement had provoked serious internal tensions within the institution. The armed forces divided vertically into two major factions, the *Azules* (the Blue) and *Colorados* (the Red), based on their attitudes toward Peronism. The *Colorados* were against granting any political space to Peronists, whereas the Azules tended to see it as a national movement that could *prevent* communism through its absorption of the working class.[333] The Azules thus came to be seen as a legalist and professionalist faction.[334]

Illia's policies toward the armed forces were much more assertive than those of Frondizi. Illia and chief of staff General Onganía launched a campaign to restore military discipline after the revolts of 1962 and 1963[335], as well as authorising an extra

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[330] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 118-120.
[331] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 103.
[332] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 103.
[333] A. Rouquie. (1994) p:213
[334] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 33.
[335] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 121.

salary bonus for military personnel in 1964 and 1965.[336] The progress of civil-military relations during these first two years would seemed to solve the conflicts, since the military had overcome their factionalism and was satisfied by Illia government. However the military was going through a fundamental change in mentality. The influence of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) had taken over the military assessment, which expanded the military understanding of institutional interests in relation to social and political contexts. Therefore, the military began to develop a special interest for political and social issues. The Armed Forces, were seen as the true representation of the essence of the nation, and implied that the military had the right to oust an elected government if necessary; since Argentina was challenged by a revolutionary warfare which was a part of the global Marxist-Leninist struggle to take control of the world. Gradually the AAF began to perceive Peronism as the domestic agent of this global struggle, thus identifying the fight against Perón with the fight against communism. The NSD expanded the concept of subversion to the point that Peronists, intellectuals, priests, journalists, and critics of military rule were associated with terrorists.[337]

4.3.4.8. The Military Intervention of 1966: "Revolución Argentina"

After canceling contracts with foreign petroleum companies, the government confronted high costs from refunding companies and declining petroleum production. Perceptions of economic crisis were further intensified by growing inflation and devaluations.[338] On the other hand, the unions were prone to condemn Illia due to the traditional rivalry between UCRP and Peronism. Labor movement was out of control and increasingly militarized, since the government did not fulfill the demands of the Peronist *CGT* union organization.[339]

The domestic environment that favored intervention was further strengthened by the context of NSC and the U.S. counterinsurgency methods that provided the ideological justification for the new type of military interventionism.[340] The high chance of

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[336] R. Potash. (1996) "The Army & Politics in Argentina 1962-1973 - from Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration"p: 187-190.
[337] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 122-123.
[338]F. Luna. (2003) ''Los gobiernos radicales'' p: 173-176.
[339]F. Luna. (2003) p: 174.
[340] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 103.

Peronist forces in the elections was another factor that determined the fate of Illia's government. A few days after Illia announced the end of the ban on Peronist candidates for the next legislative elections, generals decided to overthrow Illia's government because of its incapacity to prevent a Peronist victory in the next elections.[341] Just like his predecessor Frondizi, Illia crossed the ultimate barrier by permitting Peronist participation in the elections, stimulating a military coup.[342]

By the end of 1965, relations between the government and the military had deteriorated even beyond their questionable beginnings. The idea of a military intervention was explicitly discussed and encouraged by the press for several months, and was relatively supported by social and political actors and business organizations. On June 28, 1966, a junta of the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the AAF, overthrew President Illia and declared General Onganía as president with no major opposition.[343] Rather than a relatively limited, interim period of de facto rule, General Juan Carlos Onganía and his allies sought an extensive and prolonged role in restructuring the political system.[344] Ongania's junta differed from previous ones in that its main goal was to suppress political party activities, defined as the main obstacle for Argentine development. The commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces declared themselves as the national political authority. All the political and bureaucratic posts including the National Congress were dismissed.[345]National Defense Law passed in October 1966, which emphasized internal security and outlined the Argentine version of the "*national security doctrine*". In May of 1971, a new decree-law created a federal court in order to deal with criminal acts throughout the country, in contrast to Argentina's standard regional system of courts. This court was designed to combat guerrilla organizations, allowed the prosecutors to collect information from different regions of the country.[346]

Although this set of legislation violated certain civil rights, torture and forced disappearances were not among these violations. The armed opposition that arose as a reaction to the military regime appeared more violent than the military itself. The

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[341] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 126
[342]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 39.
[343] R. Potash. (1996) p. 246.
[344]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 40.
[345] A. Rouquie. (1994) p:. 253-257.
[346] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 41.

violence of the guerrillas including the brutal torture and assassination of former military president *Pedro Aramburu* strengthened the military's standing within civilian society. The primarily legal, nonviolent methods they utilized earned the military some legitimacy at that time.

After 1966 the Armed Forces became a central actor, not only because of their control of the means of force, but also as the result of their organizational strength. Military Regime of Onganía ruled Argentina between 1966 and 1973. The period was dominated by a demand for order that created a *"negative legitimating input in the sense thatlegitimacy no longer derives its authorizing power from the fulfillment of specific normative claims but out of a functional demand for governability."*[347] The fragmentation was not limited to the Peronism and anti-Peronism anymore. The AAF was injured by factional struggles; Radicalism broke into two parties and so on. Ongania gained prestige among the three branches of the Armed Forces due to his efforts at reorganizing and professionalizing the AAF. As a part of the general pattern, the military either applied pro-agrarian or pro-industrial policies according to the need, thus receiving the resistance of the opposite section.

Being the only institution with internal consistency, the Armed Forces, attempted to carry out a process of restoring authority. Engaging in politics, the Armed Forces risked politicization and fragmentation of the institution once again. Despite all efforts to prevent the re-politicization of the military institution, conflicts among internal military factions and between the military institution and the president dominated the Ongania administration.[348] The fragmentation of the AAF and the permanent conflicts between the army-commander and the president, dominated Ongania's term.

During the first years, the government successfully implemented an export-oriented economic plan. Inflation declined, accompanied by significant industrial growth. At the same time, the government faced an increasingly powerful reaction from those sectors excluded from the benefits of the economic plan, the organized working class which eventually forced a revision of some policies.[349] The combination of these and other factors stimulated a discouraging reversal in the economy from 1969 onwards.

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[347] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 104.
[348] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 106-107.
[349] G. O'Donnell.(1988) "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective" p: 264-65.

The last straw before the fall of Ongania's administration was the "*Cordobazo*", when workers and students led by young militants established a massive revolt occupying the second largest Argentine city, Córdoba, for several days in May of 1969.[350] At the very same time, there was an upsurge of urban guerilla activity by a number of groups, the most important one being the *Montoneros*, who represented the left wing of Peronism.[351] The event, unprecedented in Argentine political history, indicated novel (and more violent) forms of mobilization and protest within civil society. The "*Cordobazo*" was not an isolated incident; popular uprisings proliferated in other provincial cities, followed by massive union and student mobilizations as well as by the emergence of guerrilla movements. The combination of new groups and new types of political action added a sudden destabilizing element to Argentina's praetorianism.[352]

The military government changed its economic orientation after the *Cordobazo*. National manufactures had priority over foreign ones for public sector purchasing. At the same time, political parties began a campaign for the return of democracy.

Through the 1960s and the 1970s increasing guerrilla actions moderated the fear of Peronism within the Armed Forces. Anti-Peronism still prevailed, yet it had been overcome by the fear of communism. Peronists began to be perceived as potential allies in the battle against the guerrilla groups. Negotiation with Perón was fundamental in order to control and eventually weaken this revolutionary force, which -the military calculated- would end up in the erosion of both groups.[353] For the first time since 1955, Peron and Peronism were recognized hoping that Peron would be able to contain the revolutionary groups within the Peronist movement.

Radical and Peronist parties decided to cooperate against the military regime. On March 11, 1973, the Peronist electoral front headed obtained 49% of the votes versus 21% for the Radicals. By 1973, the military government faced enough internal opposition that a timely exit was a wise choice. While designing the transition, Lanusse sought to use his position to turn the situation as much to his advantage as possible by assuring a continuation of the military's oversight role. In a document

[350] See A. Tosco. (2006) "El Nombre Del Cordobazo", (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual)
[351] B. Keen. (1996) p: 320.
[352] E. Peruzzotti.(2004) p: 108.
[353] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 40.

entitled Los *"Cinco Puntos"* (The Five Points), military leaders specified their expectations of the incoming government. All generals signed the document, symbolizing their shared determination to continue overseeing the policies of the subsequent government.[354] The Document stated that the army would not allow any intention of unacceptable political practices that tend to enforce tyranny through allegedly democratic acts and demanded that all legal measures be taken against subversion and terrorism.[355] The Peronists formed the FREJULI (Frente Justicialista de Liberación) which nominated Héctor J. Cámpora as its presidential candidate. In this context, the military government of President Lanusse abandoned the government, led to a transition to civilian rule and announced general elections for March 1973.

4.3.4.9. The Return of Perón: 1973-1976

Like most political developments, the return of Peron also was related to the changing balances within military. Because of the emerging revolutionary sentiments resulting from military repression, the dominant liberal-right wing wanted a controlled transition to civilian rule. Thus in 1973 exiled leader Juan Peron, victoriously returned to power.

Héctor Cámpora, the candidate of the political front formed by Perón, won the presidential election with almost 50% of the votes in 1973. In order to avoid a military veto, Hector Cámpora was announced as the candidate. Peronists were confident in him, which reflected to their cheering:"Cámpora to the government, Perón to power"[356] Expectedly, he resigned on 13 July 1973, and new elections were held in two months. Perón finally assumed the presidency in October of 1973 and Argentina hoped to get rid of the period of chaos and violence would finally end. Memories of his earlier time in power remained strong in the minds of the working classes. [357]However, Peron's government would face the same problems as the previous ones. Same old vicious circle was soon established by a tough situation between agrarian and industrial sectors, conflict with business organisations, and concerns of the military.

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[354] L. Lanusse. (2009) ''Sembrendo Vientos - Argentina: del Primer Peronismo a la Masacre de Ezeiza'' p: 319-322.
[355] D. L. Norden. (1996) p:41.
[356] Norden quotes De Riz 1981, p: 55.
[357] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 46.

During his short presidency, Cámpora experienced the most dramatic outbreak of political violence, which took its place in history as the "Ezzeiza Massacre" on Perón's return to Argentina on 20 June 1973. In order to welcome their leader, thousands of Perón's supporters, including Peronist guerrillas (Montoneros), came together at Ezeiza Airport however the celebration had been transformed into a violent clash. Cámpora failed to control the movement.[358] The widespread presence of urban violence in the form of guerrilla warfare was a new feature of Argentine politics. This reaction was against a military regime that negated political participation not only to Peronists but also to all political forces. The founders of the *Montoneros*, the most important guerrilla group in Argentina, held that *"armed struggle was our response to the violence exerted by the military regime of the State."* *Montoneros* had large support and solidarity not only from young groups of Peronists but also from many sectors of civil society.[359]

As far as the military was concerned, national security was at stake, therefore for the armed forces, the most important criteria between potential presidents was how these leaders would with the problems of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and subversion. When Cámpora took office in 1973 the *Montoneros* announced the suspension of military actions and concentrated their efforts on legal activities in order to extend their influence on the new government. Cámpora had links to the leftist Peronists, and he issued an extensive political amnesty law to imprisoned guerrillas.[360] By the following day, Congress had lent its support to the pardons, through an amnesty law.[361] In one dramatic gesture, the amnesty eradicated the results of the legal battle against guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas were back on the streets, free to resume organizing. From the perspective of the military, Cámpora's decree had demonstrated police actions to be insufficient in combating terrorism or guerrilla actions. Only by permanently eliminating perpetrators could the military be sure of having terminated the formers' activity.[362]

However, the return of Perón in 1973 changed this strategy of integration soon since he chose to exclude the Montoneros and the forces linked to them instead of suggesting

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[358] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 47.
[359] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 132.
[360] Decree 2, República Argentina, *Boletín Oficial,* 4 July 1973: 4.
[361] Law 20.508, República Argentina, *Leyes Nacionales,* 27 May 1973.
[362] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 47.

integration. Seeing that the events at Ezeiza had highlighted the danger that the extremists posed, Perón shifted toward legality. Norden quotes a speech of Perón on February 1974:[363]*"Our Armed Forces are and will be a chief support of national institutionalization. Their duty affirms it and their honor guarantees it. Neither the ultraleft nor the ultraright have a place in Argentine reality, whose people have already decided the path they want to follow"*

In the same line, one of the key initiatives of Perón's third term in office was a law increasing penalties for guerrilla-related activities. Perón decided to exclude this faction of leftist sectors in order to strengthen the traditional sector of the movement, the so-called "union bureaucracy". Expectedly, the political exclusion provoked an amplified the level of violence.[364] Besides, Perón came to terms with his traditional rivals the UCR, and agreed to respect the minority rights and to ensure clean elections.[365] Being aware that the military valued symbols even more than material gains, Perón wore his military uniform in his first public appearance, thus indicating respect to the armed forces. Such policies significantly enhanced Perón's standing with the military during his last tenure.

After Peron's death on July 1, 1974, his wife Isabel Martinez de Perón took his place, which intensified the struggle among Peronist party factions. Martínez de Perón had little political experience and her extreme right-wing adviser, José López Rega, managed to assume much of presidential power. Losing their political ground, Montoneros went back to military option. Paramilitary groups of the extreme right also contributed to the growing violence. The *Triple A (Alianza Argentina Anticomunista)*, allegedly with the support of José López Rega, began employing methods at least as brutal as the guerrilla organizations in order to combat the influence of the left.[366]By 1975, guerrilla groups began to attack garrisons where many members of the AAF and their families were killed. Panicked by the mounting number of deaths, the Armed Forces came to believe that the government was incapable of controlling the violence. The tendency to switch to military solution was further supported by other sectors of the society which opposed Peronists.[367]While Martínez de Perón's government granted

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[363]D. L. Norden. (1996) p:48.
[364] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 137.
[365] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 135-136.
[366] B. Keen. (1996) p: 321.
[367] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p:139.

the armed forces the autonomy they needed in the counter-subversive war, in other respects, the government failed to challenge the upheaval, which eliminated the tolerance that the armed forces might retain for the government.[368]

4.3.4.10. The Last Military Intervention of 1976: "El Proceso"

The military became worried about the likelihood of a revolutionary government similar to that of Allende in Chile or Castro in Cuba and became obsessed with the definition of guerrillas as functional rivals. This led to the idea that the guerrilla could actually win, and in such a scenario, the Armed Forces would disappear, a fear that fostered the military's willingness to intervene. It is worth noting that according to several accounts, the armed fighters of the two most important guerrilla groups never amounted to more 5,000 men, a relatively small number to confront the 170,000 members of the Armed Forces and the 130,000 members of the security forces in 1975.[369]

In August 1975, Jorge Videla became Chief of the Army. He soon held a secret meeting of top Army officers to discuss the coup and the strategy to eliminate subversion.[370]The intervention committee composed of representatives from each of the armed forces met for months prior to the event, drafting and redrafting the political plan of the "*Proceso de Reorganización Naciona*l" and deciding on such critical details as who would become the minister of economy.[371] According to the document's authors, the government's objectives included the following:[372]

> "*Re-establish the fundamental values that constitute the foundation*
> *of the State, underlining morality, decency and efficiency, essential to*
> *reconstruct the substance and the image of the Nation, eradicate*
> *subversion and promote the economic development of national life*
> *based on the balance and responsible participation of different*
> *sectors towards the aim of assuring the setting up of a republican,*

[368] D. L. Norden. (1996) p:48.

[369] It should be mentioned that perception Argentine officers is highly influenced by the NSD. The military perceived Argentine society as a living organism that has infection in some of its cells and needed military "surgery"See Patrice McSherry .p. 92

[370] J. M.Battaglino. (2007) p: 140.

[371] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 46.

[372]H. Verbitsky. (2006)b "*La ultima batalla de la Tercera Guerra Mundial*" (Buenos Aires: La Pagina) p: 145.

> *representative and federal democracy, suited to the demands for*
> *solution and progress of the Argentine people".*

After several months of meetings and talks between military officers and UCR leaders in order to negotiate on their support, a military coup put an end to Isabelita's government on March 24, 1976. The military junta led by General Jorge Videla suspended all civil liberties and political activities. The military was willing to not only eliminate guerrillas but also all the foundations of the populist society. The 1976 coup was designed to restructure Argentine politics, society and economy and "*to change the mentality of the Argentines*". The commanders of the Armed Forces decided to eliminate Peronism and the leftists and to build the State and society from scratch.[373]

> *"The Armed Forces, on repeated occasions, sent clear warnings to*
> *the government about the existing dangers and also about the*
> *shortcomings of its senseless acts. Their voice went unheard, and as*
> *a consequence, not a single essential measure was adopted…. In the*
> *face of this dramatic situation, the Armed Forces assumed control of*
> *the national government. This conscious and responsibly taken*
> *action was not motivated by an interest in or desire for power. It was*
> *in response to the demands of an indispensable obligation emanating*
> *from the Armed Forces′ specific mission to safeguard the highest*
> *interest of the nation."[374]*

Finally, on 24 March 1976, Isabel Perón was removed from office and replaced by a military junta consisting of General Jorge Rafael Videla (army), Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera (navy), and Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti (air force). In contrast to both the violently chaotic social context in which it occurred and the large scale repression that followed, the coup was a surprisingly peaceful event.[375]National security soon became the sole purpose of the military regime and every aspect of governing rested on a strong belief in the NSD principles. The economic program disassociated labour and attempted to move away from rapid industrialisation, which the military believed to be the root cause of the country's problems. Thus, the military

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[373] J. P. McSherry. (2008) p: 79.

[374] Quoted in Battaglino, p: 142: Speech by General Jorge Videla, published in La Nación, April 5, 1976.

[375] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 54.

turned inward in its search for an enemy and utilised this doctrine to legitimise the necessity of coercion and repression.[376]

Peron's charisma and appeasing attitude proved to be insufficient to control the dynamics that led the Argentine society to violent clashes. During his short third presidential term he failed to placate the internal praetorian tendencies of a heterogeneous Peronist movement that had now expanded to include a broad and contradictory umbrella of tendencies, from far right organizations to the revolutionary "Montonero" guerrillas.[377]

With Peron's death on July 1, 1974, the country witnessed the takeover and privatization of the presidency by a clique leaded by Welfare Minister Lopez Rega, an obscure and corrupt political figure. During Isabel Peron's presidency the praetorian struggle reached unprecedented heights: hyper-inflationary crises and clashes between the administration and the trade unions were combined with a widespread guerrilla offensive and the open activities of a state-sponsored anticommunist paramilitary group. The state was torn by tendencies within the governing Peronist movement, while political opponents ineffectively witnessed the violence and failure of governance created by Peronism's internal divisions. Overwhelmed by the events and the power vacuum, the society anxiously waited for the debated military coup. The latter finally arrived on March 24, 1976.[378]

The military junta governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983, with a mission of reversing the failure of governance and reinforcing state power and authority. Immediately after taking power, the junta issued a document, the "Act of the Process of National Reorganization," defining itself as a revolutionary power.[379] The laws declared that the junta, a body integrated by the commandant-in-chief of each of the forces, was the supreme authority of the nation. After the Ongania experience, the military regime of 1976 decided to reverse the relationship between military commanders and executive power that they had established in the 1966 authoritarian experiment in order to be able to maintain control of the political process. The president was to be designated by the junta and was supposed to carry out the

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[376] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 143.
[377] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 109.
[378] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 109.
[379] B. Keen. (1996) p: 322.

directives that the latter set out in the different revolutionary proclamations. Public posts were equally distributed among members of the three forces.[380]

The universities were perceived as a source of subversion and "Proceso" took measures to set control of universities. At the time, many of Argentina's universities had become highly politicized centers of leftist activity, a condition that probably did interrupt the process of education. From the perspective of the armed forces, however, limitations on students' learning possibilities were less critical than the possibility that the universities could be used to disseminate what the military interpreted as subversive ideologies. Accordingly, the junta's education policies largely involved modifying the ideological and moral formation of students.[381]

The glue that maintained the cohesion of the authoritarian coalition was the subversive challenge. Once the common enemy was defeated, the internal organizational cohesion of the Armed Forces weakened, re-initiating the praetorian struggle within the state. The first major conflict among the competing military factions was provided by the need to select a successor to President Videla, as dictated by the institutional act of the regime. The designation of General Viola, who represented moderate Army groups that intended to initiate a gradual process of political liberalization, stirred great opposition from the Navy and important groups within the Army. Viola's presidency was short; in December of 1981, a palace coup displaced him, and brought General Galtieri, to the presidency.[382]

4.3.5. The Malvinas Defeat

In 1982 Galtieri tried to revive the regime by militarily occupying the Malvinas (Falkland) islands. He sent Argentine forces composed of 9000 troops in order to

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[380] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 110.
[381] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 56.
[382] B. Keen. (1996) p: 322.

capture the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands in the South Atlantic. [383] Galtieri did not expect Britain to fight back to preserve the islands. However, the British opted to fight, which was expectable given the declining power it had as a traditional global actor. One thing more that Argentina miscalculated was the attitude of the US. While the Argentine generals expected the US to be neutral at most, the US took sides with Britain.[384]

The military defeat by Great Britain led to a bitter confrontation among the three forces characterized by mutual accusations concerning their role in the brief war. As a result of the departure of the Navy and Air Force from government, the junta was temporarily dissolved. In the midst of the regime disintegration, the newly designated president, General Bignone, initiated a disorderly transition to democracy.[385]

The Argentine military appeared to need a "clean" war, a classical conflict against a foreign enemy that would perhaps help heal the wounds left by the internal conflict. In 1978, Chile very nearly became that enemy. With the enthusiastic encouragement of junta member Admiral Emilio Massera, the longstanding territorial dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel barely missed exploding into a full-scale war. However, the intervention of the pope at the last minute helped Argentine and Chilean leaders reach a diplomatic solution. Armed troops, poised to invade Chile the very next day, were ordered to put down their arms, forget the valiant mission they were about to commence, and calmly return home. For some, feelings of frustration overshadowed feelings of relief.

Particularly since Peron's rise to power in the late 1940S, Argentines have been taught from childhood that the islands rightfully belong to them. According to Carlos Escudé, "By force of law every map of Argentina, including elementary-school ones, must carry not only these islands but also the so-called Argentine Antarctic Sector, which overlaps with Chilean and British claims". The Falkland/Malvinas Islands thus provided a timely distraction both for a population disillusioned with military government and for a military struggling with its own "dirty war" experiences and an

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[383]Argentina and England both claimed the islands for 150 years. For contradictory views see: Max Hastings and Simon Jankins, (1984) *The Battle for the Falklands*; and Daniel Pabon, Juan C. Corbetta; Eduardo Di Marco,(*1982) Conflicto entre Argentina y Gran Bretaña por las Islas Malvinas* (La Plata : Universidad de La Plata); Oscar Raúl Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum, and Eduardo Van Der Kooy, (1984) *Malvinas : la Trama Secreta*Buenos Aires : Sudamericana.
[384]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 322.
[385]E. Peruzzotti. (2004) p: 110.

increasingly fragmented institution[386]. Efforts to resolve the question diplomatically had not been entirely exhausted, but could not guarantee the Argentines a title to the territory. The English-speaking islanders staunchly preferred to remain under British control; thus as long as the British continued to defend the islanders' wishes, the possibilities of a peaceful transfer of the islands remained slim. Hence, when an excuse for a military offensive emerged, both the military and the nation were inclined to rush in.

Although the British reaction to the Davidoff incident certainly provided an immediate stimulus for Argentine action, it would be misleading to argue that the Argentines were forced into an unwanted war. On the contrary, the invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, given the name Operación Rosario,[14] had been on the junta's agenda since 12 January 1982, only shortly after Galtieri took power through an internal military coup in December of 1981. According to the military's plans, however, the operation was not supposed to occur until the end of the year, and at the very earliest on 9 July 1982 (later pushed up to 15 May), with no less than fifteen days of advance warning [387]

Nonetheless, the occupation of the islands succeeded. While the Argentines did suffer some casualties (three deaths and seven people injured), none occurred among the British. The Argentines hoped that by not spilling British blood, they could avoid any severe British retaliation. As late as 2 April 1982, the day on which they invaded the islands, Argentine leaders still hoped to recuperate the Malvinas without escalation into a full-scale war.

As subsequent events demonstrated, this was not a realistic expectation. Despite the distance, expense, and probably limited value that the islands had for Great Britain anyway, Britain launched a very determined and very successful campaign to reclaim the territory. On 14 June 1982, little more than two months after its euphoric conquest of the islands, Argentina surrendered to Great Britain, unable to deny a devastating defeat.

For at least six years after the surrender, from the moment when crushed Argentine troops returned to their homeland through the day in 1988 when the wartime commanders were sentenced for their performance, the "mission" of both military and

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[386]See Fontana (1984).
[387] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 71.

civilian analysts would be to uncover the causes of defeat, along with clarifying the reasons that the dispute escalated to such a scale.

From one perspective, the immediate cause of the Argentines' loss was simply the numerical and material superiority of British troops. According to Frederick Turner, at the time of the conflict "both Argentina and Britain were spending 4.5 percent of their gross domestic product on the military; yet, given the larger size of the British economy, total British spending was three and a half times greater". Both the weapons and number of men available in the two countries reflected these differences. At the time of the war, the number of military personnel in the British forces was nearly double that at the disposal of the Argentines, around 343,600 in contrast to 185,500.[388]

The allocation of resources probably also advantaged the British, as the Argentine military's recent efforts had emphasized counterinsurgency rather than conventional warfare. Much of their training and equipment was thus somewhat inappropriate for this kind of conflict. Furthermore, the distribution of resources among the army, navy, and air force differs considerably between the two countries. At least in part due to geographical demands (Great Britain is a relatively small island nation, while Argentina covers a much more extensive and complex territory and shares borders with five other countries), Argentina's military favors the army much more than do the British forces. In an island war, in which air and naval forces are critical, this seems likely to be a disadvantage.

Other factors favored the Argentines, however in particular, the limited likelihood that the battling countries would make full use of their forces and have them available to do so. The Malvinas conflict was not a total war, fought on home territory and engaging the complete power of both nations' national defense systems. Instead, it was a war fought on and around territory claimed by both but not extensively occupied by either. Despite Britain's prior presence in the islands, its physical distance from the battlefield posed a serious problem. For Great Britain, the time and costs of transporting troops and equipment to this tiny, primarily sheep-inhabited piece of land thousands of miles away were considerably more than those borne by the Argentines. Consequently, overall, Britain actually employed a smaller number of troops than Argentina, and certainly suffered fewer casualties. According to one estimate, by the end of the war

[388]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 72.

the Argentine army had between 9,000 and 11,000 men present, while the British forces numbered between 3,000 and 4,000 men. In sum, while differences in training and equipment undoubtedly made a difference, the sheer difference in size of the respective military institutions does not seem to be an adequate explanation for the outcome of the war.

From the perspective of many Argentines, the primary reason for the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war was the U.S. decision to support Great Britain, only stopping short of sending American troops to the islands. The United States reportedly aided Britain's intelligence capacities through the use of an American satellite whose orbit was supposedly changed from the Soviet region to the South Atlantic, and facilitated two hundred Sidewinder missiles to the British, which were later considered to have been responsible for a considerable proportion of Argentine aerial losses[389]. The United States was also reported to have offered Great Britain aircraft fuel and aircraft carriers, had they become necessary.[390]

The U.S. position probably should not have taken the Argentines by surprise. The United States clearly holds important historic ties to Great Britain, as well as being joined through the nato alliance. In addition, the United States would seem to have a natural interest in supporting the international territorial status quo. Yet the Argentines could also find several reasons to expect the United States to maintain neutrality. Relations between the Reagan government and the military junta had been quite friendly. More formally, Argentines could point to the existence of the 1947 Inter-American Defense Treaty, or Rio treaty, which bound members of the Organization of American States to join in the defense of American states against any external aggression. For the Argentines, the war *was* stimulated by British direct aggression in 1833 and provocation during the Davidoff incident. Unfortunately, the OAS did not perceive the situation in the same way. While no condemnation of Argentina was issued, the oas remained on what it considered to be middle ground, asking both parties to withdraw.

The other factor leading Argentines to expect at least neutrality from the United States was the latter's dependence on (and obligation to) Argentina in Central America.

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[389] Norden quotes Garcia Enciso 1984:8; and de Martini 1988.
[390] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 73.

Practiced in combating communist "subversion" in their own country, the Argentine military had become involved in battling communism in Central America. Much of the training and organization of Nicaragua's counterrevolutionary forces (Contras) occurred under the direction of Argentine officers, thereby helping the United States to keep its involvement out of the public eye. Thus, according to some Argentine leaders, by supporting Britain in the war, the U.S. government would face not only the alienation of its American allies but also a strong domestic reaction to the consequent need of the United States to expand its activities in Central America.

Initially, the junta's gamble seemed likely to pay off. The United States ostensibly assumed the role of mediator, and as prominent a figure as Jean Kirkpatrick openly advocated American neutrality. According to an American officer then working in the Pentagon, the Defense Department had also reached the conclusion that U.S. interests would best be served by not taking sides. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Alexander Haig apparently took a different perspective, and it was not long before the United States had given up its neutral facade.[391]

The war in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands helped even more than the military's experience in government and the counter subversive war to provoke the already simmering rupture between commanding and intermediate ranks in the armed forces. Not only did the military leaders steer their people into a war that, however popular, realistically was not likely to be won under the circumstances, but they even implicitly blamed those people for the defeat upon their return. Rather than receiving a hero's welcome, or even returning promptly to their waiting families and friends, the war veterans were temporarily isolated, hidden away from the public eye. For many, it seemed that they had gone from being the prisoners of the British to being the prisoners of their own institution. As a captain expressed in a July 1989 interview, "This event [the Malvinas war], beyond whether it was strategically or politically good or bad, had a terrible effect on the armed forces, because once the war was over, and having lost the war, those that had combatted were received in the country as delinquents, but not by the population, by the very members of the armed forces that were the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional"*[392]

[391]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 74.
[392] R. Moreno (1986) p: 430-441.

Argentina ended nine years of military rule in 1983 with a total victory Radical Party candidate Raul Alfonsín. Alfonsín had to face the difficult problem of the trials of the military officers who were accused of the atrocities during the "Dirty War". Shortly after taking office, he appointed a commission headed by *Ernesto Sabato*, in order to investigate the military terrorism. The commission's report, including all the criminal connections and accusations towards military officers, was brought together and published with the title "*Nunca Mas*" (Never Again). Controversial debates about the era as well as some of the trials continue even during Kirshner governments, in the 2010s.

After the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, the military government quickly moved toward relinquishing their now wobbly seat of power. Under General Bignone, elections for a new now civilian president were held, ending the regime. Yet the military government of 1976-83 left armed forces very different from those with whom they had started. The military had failed at government, failed at external war, and failed at convincing the civilian population of the legitimacy of their methods in the internal war. None of the other South American military regimes of this period could boast such a miserable record. An army captain (active in the military rebellions of 198790) summed up the situation in the following manner in a July 1989 interview: "Having ended the government of the Proceso, that undoubtedly was a disaster, and that provoked one of the most difficult situations for the armed forces, we found a morally destroyed army, because of the war against the subversion and, fundamentally, because of the year 1982, which produced the Malvinas war."

These combined experiences resulted in the revision of the national security doctrine, as officers reverted to an interest in a Huntingtonian "objective" professionalism. Various officers expressed the sentiment that the military had failed in its attempt to govern and that politics should be left to the politicians. Particularly those officers active in the Malvinas war expressed a desire to end the politicization and bureaucratization of the armed forces and to place a new emphasis on combat and leadership skills. Although many of these sentiments went little further than casual conversation, some indications of this new orientation on the part of the mid-rank and lower rank officers did begin to appear in the military journals. In 1984, for example, a lieutenant colonel wrote, "The value of the armed forces is given by its effective

capacity to support national politics in its obtention of its objectives" (Figueroa 1984:11). In its espousal of military responsiveness, the statement implies that a military that contradicts the national government is of no value whatsoever. In sum, an effective military is a subordinate military.[393]

Chapter V

Structures of the Turkish and Argentine Armed Forces

[393]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 76.

5.1. Turkish Armed Forces

It is a very challenging attempt to illuminate the structures and processes of the difference between civil and military attitudes in Turkey. The Turkish case is unique in many aspects because while Turkey is a Muslim country which was founded on the historical tradition of Ottoman Empire, it has been also a secular country with a modern parliamentary system. Also, the military as an actor has always had a significant and active role in shaping the political culture in Turkey. Apart from all the precious links that the Turkish society has with the military, the role it played during the founding of the republic has a unique place. It is crucial to mention the perception of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on military, since the generals have sought to legitimize their military interventions by referring to the principles of Kemalism.On the one hand, Atatürk constantly mentioned the importance and status of the military as the guardian of the state against foreign and domestic enemies, and made sure that the military academies indoctrinated its officers with the ideology of secularization. However, as soon as the War of Independence was won, Atatürk made a clear distinction between the military and the civilian sphere; advocating for a professionalization of the armed forces.[394]

Although religion was very important in Ottoman Empire, it would be misleading to assume that it was a typical theocratic state. In spite of the fact that the religion and religious values and norms were systematically used in state affairs, there were other sources of practice such as "orfi hukuk" (customary law). Although the Islamic identity was a strong motivation for Ottoman expansion, it would be misleading to accept it as an unquestionable answer.

Turkish history shows many developments that emphasize the duality and interdependence of civil-military cultures. For example, Hale[395] maintains that Turkish military heritage has three determinants. First had been the military's identification with the state in the rising period of the Ottoman Empire. Second was military's undertaking of the reforms in 19th century. Third had been military's withdrawal to barracks and involvement in politics only in times of threats to state security. The major cause of post-independence war period after 1923 seems to be connected with

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[394]S. Schulman. (2000) "Give them toys?"- The role of the military in the Turkish democratization process'', Unpublished Master's Thesis, (Lund University) p: 23.
[395] See W. Hale. (1996) ''1789'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset''.

the reality that the Turkish military bureaucratic class became the most powerful political group in the Republican state.[396]

Since 1924, The Turkish political life is shaped according to the philosophy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Since Islam and the government have been interwoven, the separation of religion from government has not been easy for Turkey. The Kemalist reformers were confronted at every step of the way by Islamic restrictions on their reforms. Despite the radical nature of Kemalist secularism, it never intended to eradicate Islam in Turkey. It was anticlerical, but not anti-religious.[397]

After the WW II the introduction of multi-party democracy brought religion to the forefront. Kemalist revolution failed to introduce modern education into the rural areas and to transform the peasant population into industrial class. Kemalist revolution created two different cultures. One, secular culture with Western values; other, deeply Islamic and traditional, continued almost unchanged from the eras when the farmers of the Anatolian plateau provided the backbone of the armies that ruled the Middle East for 400 years as staunch defenders of Islam. Contemporary Islamic movements in Turkey emerged during the 1950s when a mass migration began from countryside to the cities and towns. Just as in other developing countries all over the globe, Turkey's rural poor flocked into Turkeys cities. And while looking for economic opportunities, they created large slum areas around the big cities. However instead of internalizing urban lifestyle and secular culture, they brought their rural and Islamic tradition with them. The rural migrants who felt isolated from the cultural mainstream sought the comfort of Islamic associations which became the political expression of a conflicting link between an Islamic-Turkish identity and a secular western modernity.[398]

The *National Order Party* (NOP) led by *Necmettin Erbakan* party drew the support of lower middle class groups in the smaller towns of the provinces that were marginalized and alienated by the creation of larger economic units in the 1960s in the Turkish economy. After being banned by the military coup in 1971, the NOP was re-established in 1972 as the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (*National Salvation Party* - NSP)

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[396] B. Akşit.,S. Kalaycıoğlu.,K. Varoğlu. and M. Çakar. (2007) "A Comparison of Civil-Miltary Attitudes: The Case of Turkey" in Caforio G. (ed.) *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development***4**: 326.
[397] N. Momayezi. (1998) ''Civil-Military Relations in Turkey''*International Journal on World Peace*, **15**:3 p: 10.
[398] N. Momayezi. (1998) p: 11.

which participated in two coalition governments from 1974 to 1975. The NSP rose quickly during a period of political change that saw the creation of a Turkish Civil society in which organizations possessed an unprecedented level of autonomy from state interference. The NSP alleged that it was Westernization that had weakened Turkish society, so the NSP "promised a country which would be fully industrialized through economic cooperation with the Muslim world, the prerequisite of which was the return to Islam as the basis of social organization."[399]

With the military coup of 1980, political parties were banned once again. The Islamist Party, which was legalized a second time in 1983, has continued to exist under the name of *Refah Partisi* (*Welfare Party*, or WP). This demonstrates the continuity of the political concerns of the Islamist political movement in Turkey and documents that it was viable. The Islamist movement, and perhaps indirectly the Welfare Party, benefitted from state support after the military coup of 1980. As Ahmad expresses, the generals saw Islam as an antidote to the left, the creation of a religious culture for the youth and that Islam "if manipulated properly, could overcome, or at least paper over, the many divisions in Turkish Society" The generals, despite their promise to restore Kemalism to its proper place, played a key role in enhancing the role of religion in society.[400] With the turbulent experience of the 1970s at the back of their minds, however, the military elite considered Islam as a major instrument for promoting social and political stability. Hence, rather surprisingly, Islam was employed by the military as an instrument for consolidating and institutionalizing the post-1980 regime. In concrete terms, the steps taken in this direction in Turkey involved the introduction of religious education in primary schools as well as increasing financial resources of the *Directorate of Religious Affairs*. But this short-sighted policy favored anti-secular movements.[401] The civilian governments after 1983 have continued to support the religious policies of the generals. In the immediate aftermath of the military regime, The Prime Minister *Turgut Ozal*'s liberal reforms included a relaxation of Kemalist and secularist stances of the state, and public admission of Islam as an essential component of Turkish identity. The Party he formed, the *Motherland Party* (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), did not hide its religious connections.

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[399] B. Toprak. "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey," in Metin Herper and Ahmet Evin, (eds.)*State, Democracy and Military-Turkey in the 1980's,*p: 125.
[400] A. Feroz.(1993) ''The Making of Modern Turkey'' p: 219.
[401]N. Momayezi. (1998) p: 11.

5.1.1. The Ideology and Self-perception of the TAF

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic was founded as an independent nation-state. The founders of the republic, most of which were the high-ranking military officials of the Ottoman Empire, endeavored to break ties with the past. Although they succeeded in their attempts to a great extent, there remained a considerable continuation especially regarding the societal elements. On the contrary to the Western societies which developed upon functional evolution and horizontal structure, the heritage of the Ottoman Empire was a hierarchical society in vertical structure. The ruling class included the sultan, military and "ulema" the higher class of the society, while the subjects constituted the lower class. The state and military were strongly tied in Ottoman Empire, although in times of crisis there were incidents when the military interfered in the politics upon their interests. This tradition continued during the Republican era. The army played a significant role in the modernization of Turkey.

The ideological background of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) dates back to the early 19th Century, when the new Ottoman army was founded by Mahmud II after abolishing the Janissary guild.[402] In the first years of the republic, as the armed forces were more influenced by Kemal Ataturk, the relations between the state, government and the army worked in harmony. The TAF is a dynamic organization which went through functional evolution as its duties transformed.[403]

The principles, revolutions and related methodologies and applications of Kemalism frame the value system of the Turkish military. Kemalism involves a significant level of change in the value system at ideological level, besides a level of continuity. The formation of the Kemalist army represents a transformation from an instinctive public defense movement into an institutional and national perception of defense. As nationalism influenced the peoples of Ottoman Empire, the Turks also started to develop a sense of fending for themselves. Naturally, nationalism brought forward social identity, in reciprocal influence with Kemalist formation. The political outcomes of the search for national identity were opposite to Ottomanism, in terms of a

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[402]S. Şen. (2000) ''Geçmişten Geleceğe Ordu'' p: 10.
[403]S. Şen.(2000) p: 22.

transformation from a cosmopolitan empire into a national state. The ideal of founding a modern state motivated Kemalist Turkey to a dual approach, namely centralist and statist revolutionism in internal politics, and strict independency externally.[404] The Kemalist army was careful with the legitimacy of its actions, and this was a priority especially considering the level of disorder and distrust of the time. Arbitrary punishment was minimized by commanding the servicemen to beware punishment and send the suspects to *"istiklal mahkemeleri"* (independence courts) for a hearing no matter how clear or severe their crimes are. Mustafa Kemal exemplifies this attitude with a general order of Western Front Command.[405] Although the independence courts are severely criticized in their function and methods, they were the closest embodiments at the time to secure the justice.

The Republic's establishment and the Atatürk's reforms introduced swift and far-reaching change. From imperial collapse, partition, and occupation in 1920, the Turkish Republic emerged three years later as an internationally recognized, independent nation-state. During the Independence War and the establishment of a new nation, the military became not only the Republic's defenders, but also the guardians of secularism and the six principles of Kemalist ideology, which are nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism. The Turkish military became the shield of the secular republic and acted as a protector above the civilian and military functions. Although the armed forces had a great impact on and contribution to the state-foundation period of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk paid special attention to keep politics and military separated. Turkey did not experience significant problems or improvements during the single-party period. However, the second half of the 20th Century civil-military relations had fallowed a rather problematic era.

From the early 1930s this concept of a military nation was robustly instructed through the education system. School children were taught not only that Turks had always been soldiers but that they had always been members of an organized army. Even today the Turkish army still traces its origins back to 209 B.C., when the Hun leader Mete Hun

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[404]M. Bozdemir. (1982) ''Türk Ordusunun Tarihsel Kaynakları'' p: 157.
[405] "It is essential to prevent customary precautions which may result from resentments in the chaotic realm of war. No matter how proven their crimes are, no villages will be burned down; no person will be executed by no units, for no crimes. Those who are suspected to be spies or other traitors shall be passed in to independence courts." Nutuk, p. 503.

reportedly first formed an organized army; and the TGS claims that, throughout history, "by personally devoting themselves to the military profession Turks have demonstrated to the entire world that they form an army-nation". The joint identification of nation and army was strengthened by the introduction of compulsory military service in 1927. In addition to providing military training, military service also assumed an educational and 'civilizing' role as it attempted to imbue the young conscripts with the values of the new republic.[406]

"The Ottomans (…) rather acted with their emotions and ambitions and that is why they had to retreat after they reached to Vienna. After that they couldn't hold onto Budapest. They were defeated in Belgrade and were forced to retreat. They left the Balkans. They were expelled from Rumelia. They bequeathed us a land under the invasion of the enemy. We shall be imperturbable, standing down on our ambitions and emotions; at least while we are liberating this remaining piece of the motherland."[407]

The representation of the officers in the Grand National Assembly gradually declined between 1920 and 1950. The ratio of retired military officers continued to fall from one sixth one in 1920 to one eighth in 1943, and one twentieth in 1950. In November 1937 Ismet Inönü was replaced as prime minister by Celal Bayar who was a civilian[408].

Marshal Fevzi Çakmak retired on 1 January 1944, having served as Chief of Staff for 23 years. His resignation was the indicator of a future change in policy. Turkey's benevolent neutrality towards Nazi Germany had angered the Allies, and February 1944 Anglo-American aid to Turkey was cut. On 18 May, the government put anti-Soviet pan-Turanists, many of whom were in the army, on trial. The next day, President Inönü denounced racism and Turanism as subversive ideologies that contradicted Turkey's foreign policy.[409] Finally on 23 February 1945 Ankara declared war on the Axis powers so as to join the UN.[410]

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[406]G. Jenkins.(2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", International Affairs, **83**:2, p: 339-355, p: 340. Includes Jankin's translations from the web site of Turkish Armed Forces.
[407] M. K. Atatürk. ''Nutuk'' v.2, p: 636.
[408]As F. Ahmad quotes from Rustow, 1959.
[409]F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" inC. Kerslake,K. Öktem and P. Robins (eds.) *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity*, p: 140-145.
[410]F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 140-145.

Pentagon's decision to give modern arms to Turkey in order to confront the Soviet Union on its southern border resulted in transformation of the TAF[411]. Since the foundation of the republic, Turkey had a defensive foreign military policy. However, it became offensive after 1946 and even more so after joining NATO in 1952.[412]

Even though Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modern, secular state, had separated the military from politics, the armed forces continued to think of themselves as the guardians of secular, reformist, and democratic goals proclaimed by Ataturk and followed by his successor Inonu.[413] The Turkish military has seen its role as the protector of society from various threats. The need to defend it against all threats is drilled into the military officers. Since 1950, the army has intervened directly three times in the country's politics under the aegis of its doctrine of national security.

The Turkish military has historically shown itself to have sufficient freedom to make and change civilian allies in line with its perceived image of being above social conflicts, party politics, and particular interest. The military positioned itself at a distance from the rest of the society for several reasons. Most important, the army reproduced within itself its sentry role as an ideological task force prescribed by Kemalism, the official ideology of the state, named after the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism as an ideology came to the forefront between 1927 and 1935 as a project of politically constructing and manipulating a modern Turkish nation-state on secular and western, rather than Islamic, precepts. The aim in adopting secularism was to create a modern, rational state with institutions and laws which would facilitate the development of capitalism in Turkey Ataturk was determined to take his country out of the Orient and convert it into a European state, which meant adopting Western ways in law, education, social policy and even dress.[414]

Although the Turkish Republic was founded by former Ottoman soldiers, Atatürk had insisted that all officers who wished to participate in politics should first resign from the armed forces. The result was to remove the military as an institution from the political arena.[415]

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[411] As Ahmad cited Pach(1991)p: 88-129.
[412] F. Ahmad. (2010) p: 140-145.
[413] N. Momayezi. (1998)p: 3.
[414] N. Momayezi. (1998) p: 5.
[415] G. Jenkins. (2007) p: 341.

The military has taken upon itself the duty of offering advice and has delivered stiff warnings as soon as the political institution has shown signs of getting out of hand. Martial law has also been imposed frequently in order to curb violence. As Jankins summarizes,

> *" [t]he Ottoman officer corps was at the forefront of the efforts to modernize the empire and, during what has become known in English as the era of the Young Turks, effectively ruled the empire in the decade leading up to its defeat at the end of the First World War. It was also former members of the Ottoman officer corps, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), who founded the Turkish Republic in 1923. Atatürk not only sought to create a secular, homogenized nation-state out of the Anatolian rump of the Ottoman Empire but actively encouraged the identification between the nascent nation and its military. Himself a former Ottoman general, Atatürk appears to have been influenced by the ideas of General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916), the German general appointed to restructure and revitalize the Ottoman officer corps in the nineteenth century. Von der Goltz's classic Das Volk in Waffen ('The nation in arms') was translated into Turkish in 1884 and was recommended reading for all Ottoman military cadets. The treatise called on the military to play an active role in reshaping society and regarded the armed forces as representing almost the distilled essence of the nation."[416]*

After the WWII, democratization and switching to multi-party system become indispensible in order to take part in the Western alliance. Turkey adopted multi-party system in 1950 became a NATO member in 1952. Military officers either visited or served in the NATO headquarters in the United States developed sympathy towards the United States and its value system while gaining international perspectives, talents and developing a sense of professionalism.[417]

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[416]G. Jenkins.(2007) p: 339-355.

[417] A. L. Karaosmanoğlu. (2000) ''The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey'' in *Journal of International Affairs*, p: 209.

The end of Cold War also led to fundamental changes in Turkey's national security culture, thus causing changes in the perception of the military role. Although the military traditionally perceives itself as the guardian of the state whose duty "is to protect the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as its secular character not only against the external threats but also against its internal enemies", limitations imposed upon the military's political role tend to be increasingly effective.[418] Unlike the case in Argentina, Turkish armed forces enjoy a high level of trust and sympathy of the vast majority of the population, particularly for its struggle against terrorism and separatism. [419]On the other hand, the public opinion is less tolerant to its interference in the political sphere in the last decade.

In their study on democratic culture, Altınoğlu & Tessler have found that support and confidence in democracy was significantly high among the members of military and police institutions. They comment that, this finding is not surprising due to the special condition of Turkey, as the military perceives itself as the founder and guardian of the democratic republic.[420]

5.1.2. Curriculum and Content of Training

5.1.2.1. The Tradition and Curriculum of Military Schools from Ottoman to the Republic

Seeing the poor performance of the Ottoman military in the recent wars emerged the need for innovation and reformation in the training of the officer corps. Introduction of

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[418]A. L. Karaosmanoğlu. (2000) p: 213.
[419] A. L. Karaosmanoğlu. (2000) p: 214.
[420]M. Tessler &E. Altınoğlu.(2004) "Political Culture in Turkey: Connections among Attitudes toward Democracy, the Military and Islam" in *Democratization,***11**:1, p: 35.

structural reforms in the light of the Western examples was deemed necessary. However, conservatives believed that there was no need for a fundamental change in the system since, on their comment; the reasons of the failure were the misuse of the current system and corruption. The Janissaries were the *backbone* of the old military system, and they were the strong hold against the ideas of reformation until their abolishment of their guild. However, this system began to decline as the arms technology and professionalization improved in the Western countries. Therefore it was not before 1826 that serious steps could be taken towards a comprehensive reform in the military education. [421]

Being enthusiastic about the innovation and reform process, Sultan Mahmud II founded Turkish Military Academy (Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye-i Şahane) in 1834. This was a milestone in Turkish history of modernization since the Military Academy and its graduates would play a crucial role in the modernization process.[422] Before that, there was no special education for the military officers, and the posts were filled by any officer of the Empire due to promotion and success.

The Military Academy was intended to educate military cadets in the European style and form new army corps with the graduates. The new officers were expected to come over the technological deficiencies of the Empire, as well as understanding the European culture thus continuing the reforms in the other institutions of the Empire. However, the lack of equally successful primary and secondary schools was a great challenge in the enrollment. Besides, the society was indecisive about the new education which was perceived as a challenge against the Islamic tradition, therefore the families were reluctant to register their kids. For these reasons the education was starting from basic literacy and taking more time than it should.[423]

The first graduates of the Academy did not fulfill the expectations, but the quality went better through years. In 1860s the graduates already began to work in other posts than military, and the curriculum was reshaped according to the feedbacks, thus increasing the spectrum of lessons. Besides, new military high schools were founded in order to give graduates that can cover the curriculum of the Military Academy and Military

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[421] M. Uyar & A. K. Varoğlu. (2008) "In Search of Modernity and Rationality: the Evolution of Turkish Military Academy Curricula in Historical Perspective" in*Armed Forces & Society*, **35**:1, p: 181.
[422] As M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu quoted from Niyazi Berkes, ''Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma'' (1978) p: 191.
[423]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu.(2008) p: 183.

Engineering School (Mühendishane). The increasing number of the military secondary schools which were free of charge provided the chance for lower income groups to become a part of the corps.[424]

The German assistance was widely used as such that German generals were assigned to commander positions in the Ottoman Army. Rustow notes that in 1918 a total of 25,400 German citizens were assigned in the Ottoman Army.

As a keen supporter of the reforms, Abdülhamid II continued the modernization process. Since France was not responsive to the demand of military interest, he turned to Germany which agreed sending a military mission to support the training of the Ottoman corps in 1882. The German officers observed that the Ottoman cadets were receiving high level scientific information but little field experience, and changed the curriculum according to German system where military application and practice was the heart of training.[425]

As a part of the German system, general staff officers began to be trained in an exclusive system based on evaluation. The most successful cadets were selected for General Staff College, gradually forming a privileged, disciplined and closely tied group of officers. At the same time, the officers were being sent to Germany for training, not only learning the military innovations but also developing alternative perspectives on culture and political system. Abdülhamid II thus created his own enemies by providing these officers with a European education and broader world view. The officers started to criticize the regime and founded secret societies aiming at overthrowing Abdülhamid II. The Ottoman Comitee of Union and Progress (CUP) founded by the medical school cadets would be of most importance, spilling over to the Military Academy, Engineering school, Navy school, and others. In April 1908 they put their plan on the scene. Although the attempt was rather unproficient, public demonstrations and intense pressure led Abdülhamid II to restore the constitution which he suspended 30 years ago, in 1878. This "success" of *mektepli* officers would not be the last military intervention in the Turkish history.[426]

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[424]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu.(2008) p: 184-185-186.
[425]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu note that influential Ottoman general insisted to keep basic sciences in the curriculum, and they suggest that the reason was that they saw the military as a modernizer agent and therefore wanted to train officers who were capable of their societal duties. p: 186-188.
[426] For Mektepli (from school) and Alaylı (from tradition) difference, see Feroz Ahmad.

As the Sultan's powers reduced after the takeover, the General Staff filled in the vacuum and the young officers of CUP dominated the political scene. Lectures which were forbidden during Abdulhamid II era, such as military and political history, were introduced, and modern instruments started to be used in maneuvers. However, there was not enough time to receive the feedback of these efforts. The Italian assault to Tripoli was followed by Balkan revolts in 1912-13, and the WW I was on the horizon and it was too late for educational measures.

WWI changed the perception of military education due to the limited conditions and resources. The Academy was shut down and replaced by several officer training corps which provided basic training and sending the soldiers directly to the frontline. As the Turkish war of Independence lasted until 1923, there was constant need for new officers and therefore reopening the Academy was not possible. In the first years of the Turkish republic, there was a two year training for officer corps with only technical classes and their applications, continuing the war time tradition. It was only after WW II that the curriculum was changed to include mathematics, physics, economics, law, international law, world history and modern Turkish history.[427]

Since the new army needed officers that were trained accordingly, the education in military schools was westernized. As the young officers became familiar with Western culture and ideas besides the technological advancements, the military became the major Westernizing agent in the society, continuing through the constitutional periods of 1876 and 1908.[428]

There was a strong German impact in Ottoman Army until WW I, which dramatically reduced after the war. Although still taking the Western system as a model there was little direct Western impact on the military during the years between the World Wars. The end of WW II and the beginning of high level American aid changed the conditions once again. In 1953, a group of military officers visited the US Military Academy, starting a tradition of regular visits. In 1969, a new curriculum of three years

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[427]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu. (2008) p: 184-191-192.
[428]A. L. Karaosmanoğlu. (2000)p: 206.

was introduced, including a combination of technical and practical classes as well as basic sciences.[429]

Finally in 1974 university level training was introduced, due to several reasons. Firstly, the military commanders believed that the military had a traditional role as a modernizing agent and therefore needed intellectual officers as a part of this mission. After all, increasing number of university graduates was recruited every year, and commanders with compatible education were necessary to protect the rank relations. In 1997 the Land Forces Command decided to provide master's degree for every 2% of the graduates in domestic or foreign universities. Doctoral programs which were introduced in 2005 completed the full scale academic performance in the military education.[430]

5.1.2.2. Curriculum and Training in the Military Schools in Republican Period

Historically, the Turkish Military Service system has always been a mixed system with a minority of core professionals and a majority of non-professionals. Today, the Turkish Armed Forces is composed of four sister services: Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie.[431]

Two points are important to understand TAF and civil-military relations in Turkey. First is the historical roots and different roles of the Armed Forces and the conscription system. Second factor is the change process of transition because of internal and external factors like perceptions of threat, technological developments, societal and environmental changes.

From the beginning of their career, when they enter a military school at the age of 14-15, for a period of four years, or a military academy, at age 18-19, also for four years, the future Turkish officers are introduced with the idea that they form elite, with a

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[429]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu suggest that the special importance given to the economy classes may indicate an intention to arm the officers with sufficient entellectual background against Communist propaganda. See ibid, p: 193.
[430]M. Uyar &A. K. Varoğlu (2008) p: 195-196.
[431]B. Akşit; S. Kalaycıoğlu; A. K. Varoğlu and M. Çakar. (2007) "A Comparison of Civil-Miltary Attitudes: The Case of Turkey" in Caforio G. (ed.) *Cultural Differences between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*, **4**: 327.

special mission.[432] To be admitted to these military schools and academies an applicant must fulfill all the conditions required from a student who applies to an elite school anywhere in the world: good marks, especially in sciences, good looks, good general attitude. Besides, an investigation is made not only of the candidate's personality but also that of his family, including his parents' profession their political activities. The existence of a relative who is suspected of being a militant, a member of a leftist or Islamist party, or any organization sympathetic to the Kurds, is enough to disqualify the candidate.[433]

The curriculum of the military schools follows the basic study curriculum of Turkish high schools but with additions: intensive physical training, a basic military training, and a course of political education, including special attention to the study of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. After eight years, the new Turkish officer considers himself responsible for preventing any threat against Turkey. He is now a state appointed guardian of the Republic, assigned with the task of protecting it against all internal and external threats. And he also has the deepest contempt for the Turkish politicians, who he considers manipulate ignorant masses for their own ends.[434]

While his pay differs little from the salary of a civil servant of a comparable rank, the Turkish officer enjoys many material privileges like housing, special supermarkets offering cheaper prices, the military hospital, where officers and their families are treated totally free of charge.

Successful candidates are nominated by the Supreme Military Council, a body of 18 members set up after the 1971 coup which usually meets in August. 30 to 50 colonels are promoted each year, after long investigations.

5.1.3. The Recruitment Methods and Social Composition of Military Officers

5.1.3.1. Conscription and Military Culture

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[432] C. Kutschera. (2000) ''A World Apart - An Examination of the Turkish Military Hierarchy'' The *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, **20** (1): 298.
[433] C. Kutschera. (2000) p: 298.
[434] C. Kutschera. (2000) p: 298.

It is often stated that the mass conscription is the main reason as to why the Turkish culture is interwoven with military culture. All young Turkish men must serve in the army, which means that virtually every adult male is a veteran and that most families have had the experience of seeing sons in uniform. Turks do not fear their army or consider it oppressive the way terrified Africans and Latin Americans did when cruel military dictatorships dominated their societies. Most see it as a benevolent force that has successfully defended Turkey against foreign and domestic enemies and that truly has the national interest at heart.[435]

According to the Turkish constitution, military service is regarded both as a duty and a right of the citizen. Although it is hard to deny the enormous influence of mass conscription on overall Turkish society, it should be noted that the military service is not regarded as an unpleasant, involuntary service.[436]

5.1.3.2. A comparative study

A comparative study between military cadets and university students of Economics and Political Science showed that the cadets and students do not have significantly different value systems.[437] In values which referred to the perception of authority like responsibility, self-control found high approval among both groups; however obedience was more important for the cadets than the students. Also, they agreed on values like honor and honesty as most important which may be accepted as representing a general view of Turkish society. Besides, both groups also agreed on values which emphasized broad-mindedness, initiative, spirit of equality, and tolerance which represent the youth values rather than traditional culture in Turkey.

University students seemed to be more religious than the cadets. One possible reason for this would be the impact of the rationalist and modernist education tradition of the TAF.[438] There was also a significant difference between the cadets and students in terms of their political attitudes. While students showed more leftist position with 48.3 %, cadets' political position was mostly in the center left with 42.2%. The cadets had

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[435] A.K. Varoğlu and A. Bıçaksız. (2005) "Volunteering for Risk: the Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces" in *Armed Forces and Society* **31**:4. p: 584.

[436] A. K. Varoğlu and A. Bıçaksız. (2005) p:585.

[437] See B. Akşit; S. Kalaycıoğlu; A. K. Varoğlu and M. Çakar. (2007) p: 325-331.

[438] M. Uyar and A. K. Varoğlu. (2008) p: 180-202.

more materialistic and masculine values while students showed a more post-materialistic and mixed value preferences. In terms of confidence in various institutions the first three were military, presidency of the republic and universities for both groups; only the order was changing slightly. 48.4% of cadets believed that subordination of the military to political leadership was achieved while this percentage was 37.6% for students. Another attitude difference was the civilians' disagreement of subordinating the military profession to political leadership. While 49.7% of students disagreed with the statement of military profession was subordinate to political leadership, 37.7% of cadets showed the same disagreement.

There is a perception of incompetency towards politicians in Turkey. When this perception is attributed to the historical role of military in politics, the traditional role of Armed Forces has been reproduced in Turkish society. There is no intention of Turkish Armed Forces to alter into All Volunteer Force in the short run because of threat perceptions.[439]

5.1.4. The Legal Status and Institutional Structure

Among the several documents which provide the Turkish Armed Forces its legal power, the most important one is the constitution where the functions, duties and responsibilities of the TAF are defined along with the other state organs. The constitution of 1982 was drafted and adopted during the period of military rule following the September 12, 1980 intervention. Considering the conditions of the time, it is mostly regarded as a text under military influence; It is argued that in order to obtain privileges in the upcoming democratic system, the military included some guarantees into the constitution, which equipped it with extra prerogatives.

The constitutive principles in Turkish Constitution of 1982 are stated in the preamble and the first three irrevocable articles. The preamble states that the constitution has been prepared according to "the concept of nationalism outlined and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, and affirms the existence of the Turkish nation, motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state".

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[439] M. Uyar and A. K. Varoğlu. (2008) p: 180-202.

The problem of the Turkish Armed Forces' place in the constitutional system dates back to 1960 military intervention. With the 1961 constitution the Chair of the General Staff was accountable for the Prime Minister, instead of the Ministry of National Defense. There is no reference as to the functions and duties of the Turkish Armed Forces in the constitution. Therefore, it is not possible to state that the constitution gives Turkish Armed Forces a praetorian power.

On the other hand, the most detailed statement of the legal role and obligations of the military are designed in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law No. 211 of January 1961. Article 35 states that 'the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution.[440] There has been considerable debate about whether article 35 gives the military the right to remove an elected government which is perceived as violating the constitution. The Turkish military cited article 34 of Law No. 2771 as legal justification when it seized power in 1960 and article 35 of Law No. 211 when it intervened in 1980.[441] Besides, Turkish Armed Forces is the largest armed forces in number in Europe, and is the second after the US in NATO, with around 515.000 soldiers.[442] According to 2010 data, the overall defense expenditure was 15.3 billion US dollars which constitutes 2% of the GDP.

5.1.4.1. Turkish General Staff and Ministry of National Defense

Turkish General Staff (TGS) was founded on May 2, 1920 with the law no: 3 as a ministry. On March 3, 1924, law no: 429 its status was converted and functioned as a strong and independent headquarter during two decades of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak's term in office. After the retirement of Marshal Çakmak, Turkish General Staff was bound to prime ministry on June 5, 1944 with law no: 4580. Five year later, with the law no: 5398 the status of TGS was modified and it was bound to ministry of national defense. The Constitution of 1961 changed the structure of the TGS once again and bound it to the prime ministry, as well as arranging that the Chief of Staff would be

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[440] Article 35 of Code No. 211 is identical to article 34 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code No. 2771 of 1935, which had been introduced during the civilian single-party regime.
[441] G. Jankins. (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", *InternationalAffairs*, p: 342.
[442] A. Cordesman.& M. Kleiber. (2006)''The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Overview of major Asian Powers'' in *Working Draft for Review and Comment Revised*, p: 32.

appointed by the President upon the advice of the cabinet. The Constitution of 1961 also arranged that the Chair of General Staff as the head commander of the TAF during peace and war, thus further empowering the TGS both in function and state bureaucracy.[443]

5.1.4.2. National Security Council (NSC)

After the WW II it seemed crucial to bring together the civilian and military decision making tools in order to solve the security problems.[444] Besides, the political experiences of the pre-coup period of 1960 created a reflex to increase the observatory capacity of the TAF as well as increasing the communication between the military and civilian spheres.[445] With the emergence of the international condition of Cold War, the NSC was founded in order to meet the aforementioned needs.

The constitution establishes the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory organ to the government for security matters. Meetings of the NSC are chaired by the Turkish president. The NSC has been established with the Constitution of 1961 the military intervention of 1960, and was included in the subsequent constitutions. [446]

The National Security Council (NSC) is the body where the Turkish Armed Forces express their opinions at governmental level. It was founded after the intervention of 1960 and in the Constitution of 1961 the Article 111 stated that the NSC was to provide help in the decision-making process as regards to national security issues and their organization. It was formed in order to provide better communication of the Armed Forces with the government thus reducing the chances of another military intervention. The 1982 constitution gave further power to the NSC with its Article 118, which stated that the Council of Ministers should give priority to the recommendations of the NSC in order to provide the existence and the independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the land, and the peace and security of the republic. The head of the NSC was the President, and it is composed of the prime minister, the chief of the general staff, the minister of defense, the minister of internal affairs, the minister

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[443] H. Özdemir. (1989) ''Rejim ve Asker, Türkiye Üzerine Araştırmalar-2'' p: 44-74.
[444] M. A. Birand. (1984) *12 eylül saat 04.00* p: 443.
[445] M. A. Birand. (1984) p: 444-445.
[446] D. Akyaz. (2006) ''Hiyerarşi Dışı Örgütlenmeden Emir-Komuta Zincirine Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi''p: 348.

of foreign affairs, the commanders of land, navy and air forces, and the commander of the gendarmerie.

The power of the NSC increased gradually with every new constitution. The phrase that NSC "communicates requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers" has been changed with the 1971 intervention to "recommends". The 1982 constitution specified that "recommendations of the NSC would be considered with priority by the Council of Ministers", so that it was no longer a merely advisory body. In 1983, Law No. 2945 on the National Security Council and the National Security Council Under secretariat gave the NSC secretary general unlimited access to any civilian agency and the authority to monitor the implementation of recommendations forwarded by the NSC to the Council of Ministers. In addition, the number and weight of senior commanders in NSC increased at the expense of its civilian members. Thus, the NSC has become a major element of Turkey's national security system, which sets the national security policy of the state of the Turkish Republic.[447]

In addition to the president, the NSC is comprised of the prime minister, foreign minister, interior minister and defense minister from the civilian government, and the chief of staff and the commanders of the land forces, navy, air force and gendarmerie for the military.

5.1.5. The Role of the TAF in Turkish Political Life

While modern Turkish military with pro-western values has been characterized as one of the constitutive agents in the formation of the republican, reformist, secularist and democratic attempts, it had been unavoidably involved in politics. In the long run, one of the reasons for the weakness of a civil-political culture in Turkey has been the effect of getting used to Turkish military's political intervention culture.

The Turkish military have had a self-evident duty to play a part in the democratization process, even social engineering intentions at times. However, they tend to underestimate the tools like sociology which would help them analyze the society they

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[447]W. Hale.(1996) ''1789'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset'' p: 163.

intend to shape. While monitoring the current development in Western countries, they tend to pay more attention to material aspects and less to intellectual accumulation.[448]

The armed forces in Turkey have had a significant role in the political system for much of the twentieth century One of the fundamental issues which must be understood is the perception that these armed forces have about their role in society The Turkish army historically built the republic and subsequently modernized it along a western path. This mission turned the army into the political symbol of nationhood and the instrument of preserving the nation. Because of the republic's obsessive anxiety in maintaining national unity in the face of divisive forces such as Islam, sectarianism, and separatist Kurdish nationalism, the Turkish army has not taken openly partisan positions.[449] It is possible to say that the military has been conscious of the need to avoid excessive arbitrariness[450]

5.1.6. The Military Image in the Turkish Society

Arguably the most distinctive characteristic of Turkish civil-military relations has been the apparent anomaly that despite various explicit and implicit military interventions into politics and social life, Turkish society has consistently indicated the military as the country's most prestigious and trusted institution. One explanation of this incident can be the conscription method of recruitment in Turkish Armed Forces. Another sound explanation is that the traditional guardian role of the military is internalized by the society and the society has a patriarchic image of the military. It is also arguable that the military had efforts of mass communication and strategically designed its relationship with society.[451] Nevertheless, even at times when the military lost ground or went through institutional or legal hardships, the trust degree and popularity among the society kept significantly high if not at the top at all times. Obviously there are

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[448] One may suggest that this was a deliberate choice in order to avoid the politicization of the officers. The counter argument would be that the underestimation of social sciences did not prevent the military from intervening in politics.

[449] N. Momayezi. (1998)''Civil-Military Relations in Turkey'' in *International Journal on World Peace*, **15**(3) p: 3.

[450] T. Demirel. (2005) ''Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective" in *Armed Forces & Society*, **31** (2) p: 254.

[451] E. Aydınlı.(2009) ''A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey'' in *The Middle East Journal*, **63**(4)p: 581-596.

deeper ties between the Turkish society and Armed Forces than the obvious ones at the first glance.

The nature of Turkish civil-military relations has been affected and shaped by its historical background, its relations within the region, and its ongoing experience with democratic practice. The most important parameter in the formation of the Turkish civil-military relations is its emergence during the break-up and dissolution era of the Ottoman Empire.[452] Aydınlı suggests that the public found the reliability and guardianship in one institution, which was the military.[453] In very deed, the armed forces fulfilled the basic security needs of the society and at the same time served as a national guardian at state level since the National Struggle. Aydınlı concludes that, "Turkish society always has had a direct relationship with the army (which came to represent the "state"), and maintained a more fragile, secondary relationship with its politicians and politics (represented as the "government")". He describes the historical differentiation between the terms "state" and "government" as follows:

[…] a widespread view of the military as the ultimate protector of the nation — even, if necessary, against its own political representatives [exists among citizens]. The Turkish paradigm traditionally has rested firmly on a structure in which the armed forces and the society enjoy a relatively complementary and symbiotic relationship, despite the Turkish army's periodic expansions of its prerogatives into the societal and political systems.[454] For the army, the difficulty of such an army-in-society approach in an ethnically and ideologically heterogeneous country such as Turkey is that societal divides could tear the institution of the army apart. Societal fragmentation, the potential for conflict, and shifting expectations and ideas about the future of the nation are all reflected in the army, and arguably could destroy it. The Turkish army has, however, built up protective practices and mechanisms to maintain its symbiotic relationship with society while keeping itself immune from society's potential problems. To do this, the Turkish army holds absolute control over the internal indoctrination of its personnel, drawing its members from the heart of the society, but then doing its best to keep them independent from popular national and international ideas and trends. "*The Turkish army is not the army of the elite, but is rather an elite-*

[452] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 582.
[453] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 583.
[454][454] Z. Sarıgil. (2009) "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity" in*Armed Forces & Society*, **35** (4) p: 709-728.

making institution." It recruits cadets largely from rural Anatolian towns, but with its carefully crafted institutions, turns these Anatolian kids into a unique new societal elite — a group neither completely inside nor outside of society.[455] Interestingly, they still feel a part of society and believe that they are the true representatives of the society.[456]

> *All young Turkish men must serve in the army, which means that virtually every adult male is a veteran and that most families have had the experience of seeing sons in uniform. Turks do not fear their army or consider it oppressive, the way terrified Africans and Latin Americans did when cruel military dictatorships dominated their societies. Most see it as a benevolent force that has successfully defended Turkey against foreign and domestic enemies, and that truly has the national interest at heart. In much of Turkish society there is a desire to believe the best about the armed forces and their commanders.[457]*

The Turkish elite tended to have a paradoxical sentiment towards the western world. It was both a symbol of civilization that the Turks wanted to be a part of, and the "enemy" who occupied their land after the WWI. [458]

Evren noted that Turkish people placed high confidence in the military because:[459]

> *It was the military which established the Republic and brought democracy. Whatever new came to Turkey after the abolition of (Ottoman) dynasty, and even before it, was brought through the channels of the army...for that reason people placed trust in the military. The soldiers do not behave partially (They are not partisan). (Besides) there is a tradition as a result of a military service*

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[455] J. Brown. (1989) "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case" in *Middle Eastern Studies,***25**(3)p: 387-404.

[456] Ersel Aydınlı suggests that there is an interesting similarity between this system and the "devşirme" system of Jenissary recruitment in the Ottoman era. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 586.

[457] A. K. Varoğlu &A. Bıçaksız.(2005) "Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces" in*Armed Forces & Society*, 31(4) p: 584.

[458] A. L. Karaosmanoğlu (2000)p: 207.

[459] G. Jenkins. (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" in *International Affairs*, 83(2) p: 339.

experience. (People) do want an authority, and do not like disorder"[460]

Kenan Evren correctly diagnosed that concepts of social contracts and the right to resistance did not have deep roots in Ottoman-Turkish political traditions. He assessed the mass of Turkish people as having been socialized into a tradition that held that as long as the state behaved impartially, or so long as it conformed the ideal of the "*just prince*", the question of how the authority in question assumed power was a minor problem as he explained by the respect people pinned on the army with the soldiers' tendency to act impartially.[461]

Aydınlı explains a variety of paradigms of civil-military relations for different conditions within which they exist. He determines four such paradigms which are namely the European, the former Soviet, the Latin American, and the American.[462] According to Aydınlı, "The European paradigm of civil-military relations is based on the complete separation, unquestioned subordination, and almost radical isolation of the armed forces from civilian politics"[463] which finds its roots in the E1*uropean experiences where the involvement of the armed forces in politics caused catastrophic consequences. In the Latin American paradigm, the key point of the civil-military relationship is mistrust to the armed forces itself. The army is seen as a predatory institution, capable of intervening into civilian politics at any time, and tending to remain in power for long periods of time once intervened.[464] There is therefore an understanding that armies should be kept completely away from politics, and that their loyalty to the civilian government has to be kept under guarantee at all costs. When it comes to the Turkish paradigm, Aydınlı thinks that it does not fit into the aforementioned frameworks and he explains the unique condition of the Turkish case as follows:[465]

> *"The Turkish army and the Turkish pattern of civil-military relations*
> *do not neatly fit into any of these paradigms. The nature of Turkish*
> *civil-military relations reflects the centuries-long historical*

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[460] As Demirel quoted from his interview with Kenan Evren. Demirel (2003b) p: 270.
[461]T. Demirel (2003b) p: 270.
[462] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 581-596.
[463] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 585.
[464] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 581-596.
[465] E. Aydınlı. (2009) p: 581-596.

experience of the Ottoman Empire (and its gradual decline), a traumatic War of Independence (1919-1923), a Cold War that was actually quite hot in Turkey, and an immense modernization project which was ultimately entrusted to the Turkish army itself."

The TAF was never the tool of radical politicians or a paternal army that sought long-term power. On the contrary, always returned power to the civilians soon after the various military interventions it made. On the other hand, it was never convinced that the level of democracy in Turkey and the quality of civilian politics was good enough to become completely subordinate to them.

5.1.7. The Legitimacy and Political Power of TAF

The historical factor that has the most impact on the relationship between Turkish society and the modern Turkish military is the memory of the major role military played in the establishment of the republic. Although for the military this role cannot be separated from the legacy of Atatürk, the Turkish society honors Turkish military independently of the Kemalist ideology. This is in part due to the nature of that period. War of Independence was a struggle both against foreign domination on the one hand, and for the establishment of a democratic republic on the other. The Turkish military receive credits from the society for its contribution to both struggles. Therefore, it is not unusual that those who does not have great sympathy for Atatürk and his understanding of democratic republic, still respects Turkish military.

TAF's political power resides mainly in its close relation with society, both culturally and in daily life. It includes identity formation and cultural myths and the role that is attributed to the military concerning the future expectations of the society. The power that the TAF holds is handed by the society. The society defines itself as a military-nation and establishes cultural bonds with the TAF which evolve around the ritualsconcerning military conscription. The conjunction of military and civilianidentities leads to the establishment of a strong bond of trust between the two.[466] Besides, the military and the society have plenty of communication mechanisms which increase empathy and establish the positive sentiments of the society towards the TAF. The TAF acts almost as a political

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[466] G. Biltekin. (2007) Non-Material Sources of Turkish Armed Forces' Political Power: A "Military in Society" Approach, Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, p: 112.

party, whose policies and activities reflect the hopes and anxieties of the society.[467] The strong identification of the Turkish society with its military finds resonance in Turkish politics. The positive identification of the society with the military leads to the establishment of a popular trust for the military. Turkish military establishes its self-definition as the "permanent institution of the state" as opposed to the elected governments. It is described as "the institution which can best interpret and uphold the general interests of the nation" above partisan politics.[468] It is arguable that the military elite deliberately indoctrinated the society with military values in order to influence and manipulate them easily. However, even if it was pure indoctrination, the underlying basis which is proven to be eligible for "militarization" should be taken into account in order to understand why militarization has been successful in the first place.

Although the military has traditionally always enjoyed considerable respect among the mass of the population in Turkey, the degree of respect has varied both between different sections of society and according to prevailing circumstances. Some of its admirers have even become irritated by the military's authoritarian self-confidence during times of stability and economic growth; while many of its harshest critics have not hesitated to turn to it when the country appeared headed for chaos or Kemalist values seemed under threat.[469] Besides, Varoğlu & Bıçaksız demonstrated that the voluntary conscriptions increase dramatically during times of armed tension with other countries, as well as domestic challenges such as increase in PKK terrorism.[470]

Given that one major characteristic of Turkish politics is the strong influence of the military, Zeki Sarigil investigated the confidence in public institutions in order to determine the position of the armed forces among other institutions. He came up with puzzling results which demonstrate that the popularity and prestige of the armed forces did not erode in spite of the interventions and the changing political environment. He mentioned that although the period which started with Turkey's candidacy for European Union (EU) in Helsinki Summit held in 1999 limited the political powers to a certain extent, the popularity of the armed forces still empowered the military.[471]

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[467]G. Biltekin. (2007) p: 112.
[468]As Biltekin quotes from Ergun Özbudun(2000) *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation,* p: 110.
[469]G. Jenkins. (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", p: 354.
[470] A. K. Varoğlu & A. Bıçaksız. (2005)
[471]Z. Sarıgil. (2009) "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity" in *Armed Forces & Society*, 35(4)p: 710-712.

The Turkish Republic experienced an increase in the democratic consciousness against military interventions in the post-Cold War period, and particularly after 2002 when AKP came to power. Given the Turkish Armed Forces' commitment to secular values, one might assume that the religious segment of the society would be less supportive for the armed forces. However, Sarigil's study demonstrates that while pro-Islamic groups who desire an Islamic state don't have high confidence rates, the religious people do have a high level of confidence in the armed forces. Obviously the religious people are aware that the military is against an Islamic state, but it holds the religious values preciously. After all, traditionally Turks perceive the military as an inseparable part of *Turkish identity* and this shared identity is an umbrella that brings together the virtues of religion and nation.[472]

The author has brought together several surveys performed in the last 12 years in order to see whether there has been any change in the attitudes of the Turkish society towards public institutions, particularly the military. The recent surveys confirm Sarigil, since the overwhelming confidence in the armed forces still continue in spite of the eroding legal procedures that high rank officers and generals are going through in the last five years. Even the subjects who mentioned particular sensitivity towards democracy and trust in civilian institutions mentioned almost equally high confidence in the military.[473] Although the Turkish armed forces always had a great interest in and impact on politics, it was a priority to position itself above all the political ideologies, parties and sects, and act as a referee. As a rule, political affiliation of the military has been strictly avoided since Atatürk.

Table 1

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[472]Z. Sarıgil. (2009) p: 715.
[473]Z. Sarıgil. (2009) p: 719.

Confidence in the Public Institutions in Turkey[474] (%)				
Year	State/President	Government	Political Parties	Armed Forces
2000	94,1	56,2	31,1	91,1
2001	85,7	22,8	30,5	85
2006	68,8	50,4	18,4	89,6
2008	69,8	61,2	28,8	89,6
2009[475]	-	53.4	-	80.6
2011[476]	70,9	64,6	48,1	82,6

5.1.8. Military as a School in Turkey

As mentioned previously, TAF has played a crucial role during the War of Independence, but the peace time missions got more complicated in terms of scope. Due to the lack of sufficient infrastructure and ideological apparatus of modernization the military filled the vacuum and played its traditional role as a modernizing agent in a broader sense in the republican era. Vast majority of the population was yet rural, and the state had trouble in setting a productive relationship with the rural population, and challenging their traditional-Islamic-feudal value system with the modernized values of the new republic. Military obligation was the most important device for the state to communicate with the citizen and equip them with republican values.

The vacuum due to the lack of ideological tools was filled by the military which was the most reputable institution of the new republic. In this respect, the institution took over roles beyond its main duty such as making contribution to the process of the creation of the new citizen profile. The compulsory military service was the most

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[474] A&G Araştırma Şirketi, (2008) the data of year 2001, 2006, 2008.
<http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/pdfler/kurumlara-guven-anketi.pdf>
[475] GENAR Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Merkezi, "Türkiye Toplum ve Siyaset Araştırması 2009.
<http://www.genar.com.tr/siyasal-itibar.asp>
[476] Konsensus Araştırma-Danışmanlık for HaberTurk newspaper, 4 - 10 March 2011,
<http://www.konsensus.com.tr/news/404/en-guvenilen-kurumlar.html>

functional device for the success of the transformation process of the society. Especially the young men from the rural areas had their first contact with the new state and modernized institutions through compulsory military service.[477]

The transformation of those citizens' mentality in accordance to the aims of the new state became a prior objective of the armed forces. Since most of the young men were illiterate, there was a special effort on increasing the literacy during the conscription. Besides, the soldiers were introduced to basic knowledge of geography, mathematic, agriculture and social relations as well as information on the new republic. The Article 102 and 103 of the Internal Services Code (İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği) of the Turkish Armed forces introduced that: "the soldiers are obliged to learn the provisions of their vocations as well as to recognize their nation, homeland and the world as a citizen; and have general information on the civil rights and duties as a citizen,"[478] And, "If the soldiers are not literate when they are conscripted, they are obliged to learn to read and write during their service."[479]

Modernization thus gained a broader meaning than the mere innovation process within the state institutions. The military' undertakings which aimed at cultural transformation of the society left marks in the social and cultural life as well as the political life.

Although transformation was maintained through obligatory methods, it was surely contributing to the course of modernization. Since historically Turkish modernization process took place from top to bottom and yet the traditional societal bounds –which didn't have expectation of democratization–, were still in charge, this manner didn't attract much reaction. The state-government-military relations gradually changed due to the evolution of the conditions. With the beginning of multi party era, political parties communicated to the rural population over conservative values in return to their votes. This new attitude was in conflict the modernization approach of the armed forces therefore the military's relations with the government started to diverge. Thus, the idea of protecting and preserving the regime *despite* the government flourished

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[477]D. Lerner. and R. D. Robinson. (1960) "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force" in*World Politics*, p: 32
[478] Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği, Resmi Gazete Tarihi: 06.09.1961 Resmi Gazete Sayısı: 10899 madde 102.
[479]Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği, Resmi Gazete Tarihi: 06.09.1961 Resmi Gazete Sayısı: 10899 madde 103.

among the military officers contributing to the historical background of the military interventions.

During the 1940s and 1950s, given the still very limited access to formal education (particularly in rural areas), military service played a greater role in shaping the characters and attitudes of the mass of the male population of Turkey than the state education system.[480] The conscripts most of which left their villages for the first time were introduced to an alternative notion to their traditional/religious background and received basic education including literacy, household, agriculture and stockbreeding, as well as basic family health. Acting as an ideological apparatus, military also indoctrinated the conscripts with the virtues of the republic.

The conditions of the first decades of the republic gradually changed as a result of a number of factors such as technologic developments in telecommunication and transportation, immigration to greater cities and industrialization. However, the society had already accepted the *schooling* function of military.

The military service is mandatory and has been so since 1927. There is a deep and widespread perception that the fulfillment of the military service is a debt to the nation and therefore has sacred grounds. Commonly, it is found inappropriate that a young man intends to get married before completing his service due to the societal subconscious acceptance that he is not a *man* yet. When a young man prepares to join the military, his family and group of friends make loud and cheerful celebrations, singing songs about his courage, heroism and sacrifice. Neighbors and relatives congratulate his parents, since their son has become a *genuine man*.

TAF Internal Act Regulation "Title C General Obligations" Lines 102 to 110 mentions the responsibilities of a conscript to learn about his profession, his nation and country, learn to read and write during the military service if not learned already, teach his family and friends the knowledge and virtues he gained during the military service, and always consider the pride and responsibilities of being a member of the TAF and

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[480]G. Jenkins.(2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey"in *International Affairs*, 83(2) p: 341.

act accordingly.[481] Therefore the TAF overtly claims a role and responsibility in the education of the citizens and modernizing the society.

The army has played a prominent role in Turkey's political modernization leading the country towards the western world, by transforming of the Turkish state and society, according to Atatürk's ideological commitment to the West. It also intervened politically to counter the domestic Islamist, separatist, and sectarian challenges to this transformation and to preserve democracy, secularism, and national unity.

Table-2 [482]

Perception of the military service by Turkish youngsters in 1972	Number	%
A sacred duty	89	44.5
A constitutional obligation	102	51
A means to acquire social status	2	1
Necessary for the patria	6	3
Other	-	-
No answer	1	0.5
Sum	200	100

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[481] Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri İç Hizmet Yönetmeliği, Resmi Gazete Tarihi: 06.09.1961, Sayı: 10899, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5905&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=t%C3%BCrk%20silahl%C4%B1>
[482] M. Bozdemir. (1982) p: 25.

5.2. Argentine Armed Forces

Pion-Berlin suggests that the military political thought is important to analyze since Authoritarian rules are freer to pursue their policies without worrying much about public interest group pressures, since they are less vulnerable to them in comparison to civilian regimes; and decision making is more highly centralized. For that reason, an examination of the military mindset should be fruitful as it will reveal the cognitive, attitudinal and ideological motivations of authoritarian regimes.[483] He maintains that during el *Proceso* the Argentine Armed Forces (AAF) was under the strong influence of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) and the state terror was mainly a result of this perspective. The Argentine National Commission of the Disappeared CONADEP calls the NSD as "the doctrine behind repression in Argentina."[484] The exaggerated fear of opposition was driven by a NSD that alleged threats to national security and urged the state to engage in a permanent combat against those security threats. The doctrine influenced the military perceptions in a subtle and ambiguous way. The AAF had a selective vision while practicing the doctrine; magnifying those components they like, and ignoring the rest.[485] Intentionally or not, the junta eventually created its own version of the NSD. The regime broadened their ideological description of subversion to all those who criticized Western Christian way of life. Pion –Berlin quotes that in a speech, General Videla said that "a terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization"[486]

The NSD is an interrelated set of concepts about the state, development, counterinsurgency combat and security. By nature every state is sensitive to security issues; however the NSD attributes overwhelming importance to national security. It underlines the right of the right of the state to determine what is in the scope of national interest and the public good. However, the achievement of these objectives is often at the expense of individual freedoms, and he individual rights are violated by the state illegally and repeatedly for the sake of "national security".

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[483] D. Pion-Berlin. (1988) "The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina" in*Comparative Political Studies***21** (3) p: 383.
[484] -, (2009) Nunca Mas, CONADEP (Eudeba: Buenos Aires) p: 473.
[485] D. Pion-Berlin. (1988) p: 383-384.
[486] D. Pion-Berlin. (1988)" p: 405.

The counterinsurgency (CI) doctrine was developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in France and the US in respond to revolutionary warfare in Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba.[487] CI is perceived as the operative branch of the NSD since it developed rules for combatting rural guerrillas. CI was essentially a mirror strategy designed to imitate the guerilla action, in order to cope with it. Its conceptual framework was extended and modified in order to cover unconventional enemy that struggles within. In war between states, armed forces engage in direct combat, in order to hold onto the territory. However in guerilla warfare the enemy uses a combination of regular, irregular and paramilitary forces attacking and dispersing, thus avoiding direct confrontation with the opposition. Besides, they are hard to identify since they are melted in the civil population.[488] The CI operations targeted "insurgents" or "subversives", -which were trying to erode "western civilization and value system" all over the globe- and intended to undermine their regimes. Argentina was one of the contexts of this struggle. The teaching reached Argentina through the French military missions which visited the country by request, in order to train the Argentine officers. The officers who were trained and indoctrinated at that time would rule Argentina throughout 1970s.[489]

As a part of the NSD the officers had a developmental perspective, and believed that only industrial growth, technological improvements and enhanced productivity could ensure national security.

In contrast to the rivalry between managers and warriors, the rivalry between the different arms arises from inherently bureaucratic divisions. On the one hand, rivalries between the different services of the military and, within the army, between the different branches are essentially universal to military organizations, stemming from the natural competition for resources. On the other hand, these rivalries also have a foundation in the different functional roles of these branches, the backgrounds of those associated and corresponding variations in the political attitudes of their memberships.[490] Consequent to his discourse analysis, Pion-Berlin indicates that the AAF was unwilling to admit that the relations with its political foes could improve in the future. The junta perceived a great distance between itself and its political foes,

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[487]D. Pion-Berlin. (1988) p: 386.
[488] U. S. Department of the Army Field Manual (1967).
[489] D. Pion-Berlin. (1988) p: 388.
[490] D. L. Norden. (1996) ' 'MilitaryRebellion in Argentina - Between Coups and Consolidation'' p: 114.

which derived from an absolutist notion of war. Only the complete extermination of the enemy would satisfy this absolutist perspective of security.

5.2.1. Politics and Ideology

The political and ideological tendencies of the AAF have been a permanent source of attraction for political science observers. Not surprisingly, in the rebellions of the late 1980s, these issues again surfaced.[491] During the 1950s and 1960s, the military's ideological tendencies were complicated toward Peronism. Peronism emerged from the more nationalist sectors of the army, and shared the concern of those groups with promoting and protecting traditional Argentine values and reducing foreign influences. The liberals, on the other hand, tend to be identified with a more "internationalist" position in earlier periods, relatively more pro-British; in later periods, more pro-American. Free market economic policies and a relatively smaller state were also among their priorities. That is to say, military liberals usually support political pluralism in appearance but only when it is within their acceptable framework. For instance, political groups such as Peronists and communists did not enjoy any tolerance from "liberal" officers.[492] Contrary to the liberals, the nationalist officers have traditionally thought that Argentine interests would best be protected by avoiding foreign domination and by creating a strong state. Nationalists also tend to support state education and cultural policies according to the principles of the Catholic Church.

In sociological terms, the liberals generally have a background of elites, and tend to be from Buenos Aires region, in contrast to the nationalists' frequently provincial roots. Of the three branches of the armed forces, the navy is usually identified as the most "liberal," due both to its higher level of exposure to other countries and cultures and to its initially British foundations. On the other hand, the army and the air force have a relatively nationalist orientation, although considerable variation exists between the different arms. [493] The most complicated branch both politically and ideologically is the army. Long and bloody battles were fought in Argentina to conquer land originally held by native populations. Part of the legacy of these battles is the miscellaneous battalions spread throughout the country. This mode of organization as well as the

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[491]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 119.
[492]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 120.
[493] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 121.

traditional role and responsibility in providing security, increases its concern with domestic politics.[494]

5.2.2. Role Beliefs and Self-Perception

The role beliefs of the Argentine military change continuously, they perceive themselves as makers of the state, defenders of the country, guardians of the nation and western culture or protectors of the constitution. Such self-definitions, especially when shared by key sectors of society, have contributed to the military becoming one of the most powerful political players in twentieth century Argentina.

Military coups come from a complex series of conditions and organizational operations. In Argentina, they are also part and product of a pattern of chronic interventionism, unique among the more advanced countries of South America. Argentina's military interventionism stems from both a civilian tendency to seek military allies, and the military's tendency to respond.[495]

In Argentina, the armed forces are not a pressure group, but a powerful political actor. Control of weapons creates the capacity for such a role, but this is true of any modern military. It does not explain why the Argentine armed forces have been especially prone to assume this role.[496]

The military's tendency toward political involvement in Argentina has both ideological and rational causes.[1] the "rational" component of decision making refers to actors' assessments of the relative costs and benefits of particular strategies. Ideologies, or belief systems in general, help to define which goals decision makers consider worth pursuing, and which strategies they consider legitimate. At a more concrete level, these beliefs also influence the formulation of laws and regulations that help determine some of the costs actors might incur.

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[494] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 129.
[495] A. Rouquie. (1994) Autoritarismos y Democracia (Buenos Aires: Edicial).
[496] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 157.

5.2.2.1. Mythical History and the Role in Nation Building Process

The myths about the relationship between the Argentine military and the nation help form a standard by which members of the military evaluate events and circumstances and directly influence decision making within the armed forces.[497]

Argentina, like the rest of the countries in the Americas, originated as a European colony. Its birth as a sovereign state took place through revolutionary warfare under the leadership of *José de San Martín*. Yet the popular image of the revolution of the US is very different than that of Argentina. In U.S. folklore, the *New England* colonists who are ordinary townspeople pick up arms to free themselves from a distant ruler. In contrast, the Argentine army preserves a much different myth. In this conceptualization, it is the army that came first it is the army that liberated Argentina from colonial rule, and the army that created the nation.[498]

The military's founding role in Argentina is a popular theme in military discourse. Thus the symbolism of independence, and of San Martín, became relatively more important in Argentina (Diamint 1990). Military perceives its actions as having been responsible for all relevant steps in the formation of the nation-state. The people of Argentina are depicted as the spirit behind the process but not as central to the events as the organized army.[499]

5.2.2.2. Guardian of the State Ideology

From facilitating the "birth" of the nation, the military moved to guarding its interests. Neither the government nor the Constitution are consistently accepted as the "voice" of the nation. Among the argentine officers, the feeling that the military has the right to decide prevails. It may decide on issues of constitutionality, or it may decide what is in the interests of the nation. The armed forces thus have historically placed themselves above the nation and the state.[500]

Correspondingly, the armed forces have traditionally seen themselves as the nation's conscience. The mission of the army is to safeguard the superior interests of the

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[497] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 158.
[498] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 159.
[499] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 159.
[500] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 160.

Nation. The army constitutes one of the most elevated moral reserves of the spiritual life of the country. In the barracks the basic elements are studied that constitute the essence of the moral values of the people. The military thus does not only constitute Argentina's statehood but also its values and morals. This myth provides members of the armed forces with a driving justification for the military's interventionist role as guardian of the nation.[501]

It should be taken into account that a political existence of a military for approximately 50 years creates a habit of involving in politics. The interventions of 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976 were the six successful military interventions in Argentina. The interventions during the 60s and 70s had a tendency to be related to the United States, and the Catholic Church was also an actor. Given the changes in the political environment, it can be argued that no military interventions are expected to take place in Argentina. However, Argentinean politics are still vulnerable to foreign and internal manipulation which may result in government changes, if not in a military intervention.

Military role beliefs shape the extent to which the officer corps remains an important political actor. According to Frederick Nunn, the study of military role beliefs is key to the understanding of subsequent political behaviour, including their subordination or propensity to intervene in politics.[502] Role beliefs include explicit and implicit notions of the relationships between civilian authorities, the military and the society. The military perception of domestic conditions contributes decisively to the incorporation of political concerns in role beliefs. These conditions include the presence of extensive domestic unrest, political parties considered unacceptable by the military, the existence of "enemies", and the lack of government attention toward military concerns regarding an external or internal threat. These factors are normally linked with the development of a political stance of the military, and eventually with role beliefs that justify interventionism.[503]

Since the early decades of the twentieth century, the military has been one of the main agents of economic modernization in Argentina. The model of development advocated

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[501]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 162.
[502]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 167.
[503] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) ''The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination'' unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex.

by the officer corps, import-substitution industrialization (ISI), required extensive state intervention in production and finance to insulate the domestic economy from global competition. Leading officers promoted the growth of strategic industries like steel, petroleum, chemicals, and petrochemicals.[504] The emergence of neoliberal economics and the extensive privatization it occasioned in the 1980s rolled back the military's involvement in industrial production.[505]

One striking characteristic of Argentine political history is that, from the very beginning, political and economic forces did not agree on the most basic political and economic issues. Neither the elite nor the principal social forces were able to consolidate regimes, where the rest of the society accepted their projects. The antagonism between the agricultural and the industrial model, or the conflict between Peronism and anti-Peronism has characterized the history of the country since the beginning of the 20th century.[506]

Although the military included a political role in its self-perception since the first years of the Argentine State, the encouragement of its institutional interests during the 1930s favoured its focus on professional activities. This helped to neutralise professional concerns that in the past led to their politicisation and subsequent intervention. This interpretation is consistent with the argument of Claude Welch, who holds that the Armed Forces are by definition a highly political institution that remains confined within the professional sphere only when the government respects its institutional interests.

During that period, and in fact, until the coup in 1976, the military maintained a sort of "moderating power", somehow placing themselves above the constitution, in a role reminiscent of the king´s role in colonial Spain, with the de facto power to interpret the law and to "guarantee" the constitutional order. Officers regarded themselves as "moral reservoirs" in wayward societies, "guardians of the nation", or watchdogs against corrupt, incompetent civilian politicians who affected democracy's future. This

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[504]W. Hunter. (1999) "The Dirty War and Its Aftermath: Recent Contributions On The Military And Politics In Argentina" p:209.
[505]D. L. Norden. (1996) p:168.
[506]J. M. Battaglino (2005)''Cycles of civil-military relations in Argentina''p: 10.

moderating power was a systematic feature of this period and emerged when institutional interests were threatened.[507]

Although the AAF perceived a political role since the founding of the state, during the 1930s it did not feel the need to go further than professional activities. The military considered that the coup of 1930 was a necessity and even a sacrifice" on the part of military, and expected that it would not be necessary in the future. Nevertheless the idea of the military's moral, intellectual and technical superiority over civilians was preserve.

Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Alfred Vagts (as quoted in McSherry 1997) found that "one of the most noted characteristics of the military mind is a marked conservatism" as well as a low faith in humanity and a pessimistic view of human nature. Utilizing survey data, they demonstrated that military officers tended to have a Hobbesian worldview, with images of human beings as inherently aggressive, willful, anarchic, emotional and violent.

Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz and Alfred Vagts (as quoted in McSherry 1997) found that "one of the most noted characteristics of the military mind is a marked conservatism" as well as a low faith in humanity and a pessimistic view of human nature. Utilizing survey data, they demonstrated that military officers tended to have a Hobbesian worldview, with images of human beings as inherently aggressive, willful, anarchic, emotional and violent.

Officers believe in authority, order and community; they have a strong conservative inclination to regulate and control society. Huntington stressed the "conservative realism" of the military ethic; the military mind was convinced that war was inevitable and violence unavoidable (McSherry 1997:32).

The United States have led a war against communism in the hemisphere especially after Fidel Castro's takeover in Cuba in 1959 and again with the arrival of the Reagan administration. But Argentina already developed its counterinsurgency doctrine beginning in the late 1950s at the Army's high command headquarters and at its

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[507]J. M. Battaglino. (2007) ''The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination'', unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex, p: 83-84.

Escuela Superior de Guerra–Command and Staff College.[508] At the time, colonels were sent to France for training, which were coming back with more than technical skills such as revolutionary war and counterinsurgency. Until then, guerrilla warfare discipline did not exist in the AAF.

The Cold War had made neutrality difficult for any South American nation, and Argentina, despite unpleasant and often catastrophic relations with the United States, was in the Western camp both by tradition and inclination. Besides, the Armed Forces in 1955 had overthrown the elected government of President Juan D. Peron, viewed with bitterness by millions of working class people, which was a strong motivation for the AAF to take counterinsurgency training seriously.

In 1956 Argentina asked for the services of a French military advisory team. France sent two lieutenant colonels who were skilled, skeptical men, committed anti-Communists whose ideas became popular among the Argentine officer corps most of which were Catholic conservatives.[509] Their students, mostly captains in their early 30s, were the brightest of the Argentine Army. The Escuela's graduates during the late 1950s took part in the Process of National Reorganization in great numbers.

Guerrilla war is a nasty business and officers in the Argentine Army, as in most conventional armies, disliked the idea of fighting one because it did not respond to the training and personal goals that attracted them to military service. Traditional objectives such as winning battles, conquering territory, inflicting casualties have little meaning in an insurgency. Thus, ideological concepts were underlined during the training in order to legitimize the process for the officers. Communism was explained as a poisonous ideology which was trying to conquer the globe, which threatened the western civilization.[510]

Gugliotta quotes in professor Lt. Col. Mario Orsolini's words:[511]

> *"With ideology as cause, it is easy to embark on a holy war, with the*
> *ferocious characteristics that are peculiar to it; no quarter given or*

[508]G. Gugliotta. (1986) Argentina and the Third World War, The Alicia Patterson Foundation, <http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/argentina-and-third-world-war>

[509] G. Gugliotta. (1986) Argentina and the Third World War, The Alicia Patterson Foundation, <http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/argentina-and-third-world-war>

[510]G. Gugliotta. (1986) Argentina and the Third World War, The Alicia Patterson Foundation, <http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/argentina-and-third-world-war>

[511] G. Gugliotta. (1986) Argentina and the Third World War, The Alicia Patterson Foundation, <http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/argentina-and-third-world-war>

> *granted; no recognition of the adversary's character as a belligerent," Orsolini wrote in 1964. "The Army indiscriminately and at all levels develops a tendency to assume the views of the most extreme politicians, to imitate the adversary's terrorist methods, to consider as an enemy anyone who raises his voice against the Collective insanity....With the ideological army as the instrument of revolutionary war, judgment is impossible, sensitivity is cowardice, prudence is a sin."*

Nonetheless, the French-inspired crusade clearly prevailed over U.S. limited war. From 1957 until the Process, the Argentines were examining the doctrines and shaping it to fit their own needs. Control of the population, ideological indoctrination and, if necessary, intimidation and worse, were the key elements needed to isolate the guerrillas from their environment.

Officers believe in authority, order and community; they have a strong conservative inclination to regulate and control society. Huntington stressed the "conservative realism" of the military ethic; the military mind was convinced that war was inevitable and violence unavoidable.[512]

Since World War II, the United States has had extensive programs designed to strengthen the Latin American militaries and to provide mechanisms for US influence. foreign military sales (FMS) programs (excluding E1 Salvador and Honduras) increased from an average of $130-million for 1969-1970 to more than $300-million in the mid- 1970s. The FMS program includes government-to-government cash sales of arms and services and purchases financed through Department of Defense loans or loan guarantees. During the 1960s, at the apogee of the US military presence in Latin America, the magnitude and multi-dimensional character of US-local military relations provided significant incentives not to antagonize US suppliers of arms, training, and military technology. Only a handful of countries still receive sufficient military aid to serve as a source of potential political leverage[513]

Efforts by the United States to limit arms exports to the Middle East and to restrict the proliferation of sensitive military technology have also led to increasing conflicts with

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[512]J. P. McSherry. (2008) ''Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina''p: 32.
[513] J. S. Fitch. (1993) ''The Decline of US military Influence in Latin America''

the more advanced Latin American militaries. Argentina hoped to modernize its defense industry by emulating the Brazilian example with its medium tank and aircraft projects. In sum, world events have substantially transformed the agenda of issues in US-Latin American military relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in Cuban support for Central American insurgencies, and the electoral weakness of Leftist parties have significantly reduced the salience of the dominant shared goal of the past: i.e., containment of international communism. Changes in US policy objectives and the declining dollar resources to provide economic and professional rewards for cooperative behavior have combined to reduce the bargaining power of the US military in Latin America.[514]

Whether there has been a parallel decline in the deological influence of the US military is less certain. Ideological influence is defined here as impacts on the attitudes, values, and belief systems of Latin American officers which lead them to behave differently than they would have without those impacts. In this view, the effects of US military assistance programs are indirect and long-term. According to the "indoctrination" model, Latin American military behavior is influenced, not through the carrot/stick calculus of the bargaining model, but through shaping the values and belief systems that define the options, and specify the costs and benefits, in future situations involving choice.[515]

During the 1960s, at the heighth of the US military presence, US officials had substantial access to high-ranking officers in almost every Latin American military. Personal networks, contacts established at the US School of the Americas, and the close working relationships between US military advisory groups and their hosts provided myriad opportunities for the United States to communicate its policy preferences and its view of local politics to politically influential members of the host militaries. While there is still controversy over the US role in promoting the Latin American military's preoccupation with the "communist threat" in the 1960s, there is little doubt that the emphasis on counter-insurgency doctrines in US training and manuals following the Cuban Revolution, the changes in the kinds of equipment available, and the prestige attached to new special forces units and new doctrines all contributed to the shift toward greater concern with internal threats. To the extent that

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[514] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35**: (2).
[515] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35**: (2).

this shift in military thinking made it more likely that progressive and nationalist governments would be perceived as threatening national security, US military-to-military relations indirectly influenced political outcomes far more effectively than attempts to use military aid as a mechanism for direct political influence. To the extent that the strong US military presence in the 1960s enhanced the prestige or institutional position of officers sympathetic to US views and/or diminished the position of nationalist officers, that presence influenced the factional balance of power within the host institutions, thus indirectly influencing the military response to political crises.[516]

In countries like Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala, which were excluded from participation in US military aid programs for long periods, US military personnel lament the presence of whole military generations which have had little or no exposure to the US military.

In the 1950s and 60s, the dominant US message -opposition to local and global communism -- was dearly consistent with existing military perceptions of communism as an anti-national, anti-Catholic, anti-Western, anti-military ideology. the US message began to change during the 1980s, reflecting the new agenda of US policy objectives. Lasswell's thesis on propaganda effects suggests varying degrees of receptivity to US efforts to disseminate beliefs and values consistent with this new agenda[517]

Disseminating US views in opposition to military coups or military governments is, however, quite different from convincing Latin American officers of the virtues of civilian control. Particularly in countries with traditionally powerful militaries and relatively more successful military regimes, national security doctrines provide a ready rationale legitimizing permanent military involvement in policy questions that affect national security, broadly defined.

In earlier decades, the most important vehicle for US ideological influence was the diffusion of military doctrine through US training, military advisors, the periodic conferences of service commanders, and military writings used in Latin American military schools and reproduced in local military journals. The reorientation of US military assistance programs in Latin America, after 1959, to focus on counter-insurgency reinforced the military's preoccupation with the internal enemy and

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[516] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35** (2).
[517] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35** (2).

provided a doctrinal basis for interpreting that threat and relating it to the global East-West struggle and the Russian-Cuban strategy of "indirect aggression" via revolutionary warfare. The rapid diffusion of the new doctrine was based on a number of favorable conditions. First, counter-insurgency doctrine drew on a long tradition of military antipathy to domestic and international Marxism. Second, it provided a conceptual basis for responding to the widely perceived threat of revolutionary attempts to emulate the Cuban model, which, if successful, would result in the destruction of the regular armed forces and their replacement by revolutionary militias. US doctrine was also consistent with local doctrines developed earlier which messed the linkage between underdevelopment and the threat to internal security. Finally, even for officers less preoccupied with internal security problems, the massive expansion of US military aid programs in the early 1960s offered tangible incentives to find ways to adapt old programs and resource needs to the new doctrine.

In the countries of the Southern Cone, a third version of the doctrine emerged in the 1970s which stressed "ideological subversion" as the central core of the internal security threat. In this variant, groups that failed to uphold "Western Christian values" were viewed as the active, or unwitting, accomplices of subversive forces trying to undermine noncommunist regimes by attacking the moral and spiritual foundations of the nation, thereby weakening its ability and will to resist a communist takeover. While US counter-insurgency doctrine said little or nothing about the political implications of that doctrine, Latin American interpretations used the expanded definition of national security to rationalize the expansion of their traditional "guardian" functions in professional terms.[518]

In stressing the socio-economic and politico-ideological character of insurgency warfare, LIC doctrine may reinforce, albeit inadvertently, the politicized conception of military professionalism which has dominated many Latin American militaries since the introduction of earlier counter-insurgency doctrines. In Argentina and Uruguay, civilian governments have attempted to disengage the armed forces from internal security and to eliminate the influence of the "doctrine of national security."

With the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, local insurgencies are no longer viewed from the same strategic standpoint. In the view of Washington,

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[518] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35** (2).

detaching the threat of insurgency from Soviet/Cuban advances in the region has already lessened the relative salience of revolutionary insurgencies,

In Latin America, the assumption of shared regional security interests was already being widely questioned during the 1980s by officers who had been alienated by the US role in the Malvinas/Falklands war,[519]

The central conclusion which emerges from this analysis is that the decline in US military influence has been most acute in the major nations of South America, particularly Brazil, Argentina, and Chile which, as a result of human rights violations and non-proliferation restrictions, have been excluded from US military aid programs for most of the last two decades. For the moment at least, the domestic context in Argentina is conducive to US-style civil-military relations and closer military relations with the United States, but many officers complain that thus far there has been very little payoff for Argentine participation in the Gulf War or the decision to scrap the Condor II.

In 1977, a US Senate Appropriations Committee report noted that[520]

> *"In many developing countries the military is the core of the state. It is frequently the only effectively organized instrument of national policy and, accordingly, occupies leadership positions in economic and political as well as security fields. One effective way of exposing foreign leaders to the ideas and practices of the United States is through the provision of military education and training"*

5.2.3. Curriculum and Content of Training

O'Donnell mentions that the sense of superiority of the Argentine armed forces roots from the education they come from. He claims that the process of professionalization enhanced the feeling of differences and their superiority, which undermined the civilian control even further.

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[519] J. S. Fitch. (1993) **35** (2).
[520]H Amos et al (1979) Us Training Of Foreign Military Personnel, Vol. Ii. Mclean, General Research Corporation. p. 16

Some scholars argue that the military officers tend to see themselves superior to other segments of society in terms of education and talent.[521] Alfred Stepan argues that, the military that functioned as a moderating power of the system in 1960s took on other roles in the following decades, increasing its influence in the state. He further underlines that the United States of America was military professionalization in Latin America. Rouquie suggests that the United States of America plays a significant part in the process of professionalization of Latin American militaries in the framework of the Cold War. He further even claims that not the military was a function of the state but the state was a function of the military. Inevitably the political realm narrowed down and the political parties gradually lost their influence and function.

5.2.4. The Structure of the Argentine Army

The Argentine army is divided into three primary and two secondary branches, making a total of five. The secondary branches are communications and engineering, which, though of increasing functional importance given the highly technological nature of modern warfare, nonetheless have had less impact politically. The primary branches, which collectively form the bulk of the officer corps, are the infantry, cavalry, and artillery.[522]

The roles of these branches have become far more complex than in the days of early modern warfare, when territory was the principal focus of war, and battles were fought using limited weapons in relatively restricted locations. However, the original functions still influence the political orientations of the army branches and the attitudes of their members. The infantry, for example, still has the primary task of occupying territory, thus requiring perhaps the highest degree of cooperation and camaraderie. The physical occupation of territory is also one of the most dangerous and probably least personally rewarding tasks of the army. Thus, for individuals with more privileged backgrounds and consequently more available options, the infantry is not commonly the branch of choice.

In contrast, the cavalry historically has tended to recruit from more aristocratic sectors of society, due to their greater exposure to horses. For most purposes, horses have long

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[521] M. K. Öke. (2002) ''Din-Ordu Gerilimi – Küresel Toplumda Dışlanan Demokrasi'' p: 53.
[522] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 115.

since been replaced by tanks. Yet the symbol remains cavalry officers are still expected to be equestrians, and participation in such sports as polo is both customary and encouraged. Along with biasing selection toward elites, the emphasis on horsemanship also facilitates interaction between these officers and civilians, particularly the aristocrats who can also be found on the polo fields. Thus, the cavalry has gained the reputation as the branch most in sympathy with these sectors. Finally, the principal function of the artillery is to man the "big guns," such as cannons and other long-range weapons. In contrast to the infantry and the cavalry, the artillery is probably most aptly described as being composed of technicians.[523]

5.2.5. The Impact of the United States and the Monroe Doctrine

The most important determinant of the US approach to the Latin America was the Monroe Doctrine for a long time; which was introduced on December 2, 1823 and stated that further efforts by European countries to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention. Keeping the European powers away, the US itself tended not to interfere with the domestic affairs of the Latin American countries either. As the United States emerged as a world superpower, the Monroe Doctrine came to define a recognized sphere of control that was hard to challenge. However, the edition of "Roosevelt Corollary" in 1904, which asserted the right of the United States to intervene in Latin America in cases of "flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin American Nation", constituted a turning point in the US policy.

In 1928, the Clark Memorandum was released, concluding that the United States need not invoke the Monroe Doctrine as a defense of its interventions in Latin America. The Memorandum argued that the United States had a self-evident right of self-defense, and that this was all that was needed to justify certain actions. The policy was announced to the public in 1930 and thus the US interest in the region reached a peak.

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[523] D. L. Norden. (1996) p:114.

5.2.6. The Cold War Context

The military's role as political actor further developed with the emergence of the Cold War. As the bipolar world developed, national security doctrine came to being. The growing anticommunism of the AAF added an ideological and even sacred dimension to military perception. The war against subversion led to a new definition of the enemy that covered large segments of the population.[524] Thus, based on this doctrine, the military actively intervened in national politics in 1966, overthrowing Illia. The resulting *golpista* (interventionist) tendency marked the influence of anticommunist paranoia, particularly in relation to the rise of social opposition in Argentina. For the next decade, the military dominated politics, establishing national security structures, ideology, and counterinsurgency methods.[525]

The rapid spread of Communism in the globe became the major worry of the US after the 2nd World War. Especially the establishment of the Socialist regime in Cuba under their leader Fidel Castro triggered the US interventions in the region. During the Cold War, the Monroe Doctrine was applied to Latin America by the architects of U.S. foreign policy.[526] In that period, the United States often provided intelligence and military aid to Latin and South American governments that claimed or appeared to be threatened by Communist subversion.

However, all these advancements resulted in further clashes in the Latin America, which didn't develop its regional identity yet. The region was divided between communist and rightist groups which consequentially brought long years of armed conflicts and instability.

The United States supported dictatorial rightist regimes in the region in order to maintain stability in their favor and to suppress the leftist groups. It is arguable that this policy retarded the consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America.

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[524] J. P. McSherry. (2008)''Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina''
[525] J. P. McSherry. (2008) ''Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina''
[526]J. Dominguez. (1999) "US-Latin American Relations During the Cold War and its Aftermath". The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda. Institute of Latin American Studies and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin Americas Studies. p: 12.

5.2.7. National Security Doctrine

NSC has an important impact on the Latin American civil-military relations. Taking the perception "security with development" as the main objective, the doctrine functioned as a device to protect the status quo of capitalist advancement focusing on the inner threats. As the doctrine was taught in the military schools, the armed forces were focused on the concept of total war. The main assumption was that the threat was not necessarily military but could be economic, political, and cultural. The military text books mention that the armed forces cannot refrain from this constant war. Given that the "communists" could confuse the citizens through black campaigns, the military had to focus on the domestic propaganda, and therefore the military developed a policy of domestic security.

In Latin America, the armed forces play a dual role as the secular guardianship and the holy savior. The predators of the Latin American armies are the Spanish discoverer/invaders. The mission of the armed forces was to impose the Christian civilization to the new continent. This mentality permeated to the Latin American armed forces professionalizing after the independence. In deed the Latin American militaries were convinced that they had unique missions and destinies. General Ongania claimed that "the reason of the existence of the Argentine armed forces was to protect the sovereignty of the nation, the territorial integrity, the ethical and spiritual values of Christian Western civilization, maintain domestic peace, increase welfare, strengthen the constitution supporting the rights and basic guarantees that it introduced, and to cherish the institutions of the republic.[527]

Through much of the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarianism predominated in Latin America. In other South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, more modern forms of authoritarianism prevailed in which professional military institutions became integrally involved in political rule. In the 1980s, as the Cold War melted and idealists lauded the purported "end of ideology," Latin America rediscovered democracy. In Argentina, the military's infamous chronic interventionism further complicated the consolidation of democracy. Since 1930, Argentine history has been punctuated by frequent military coups, creating a virtual pendulum between

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[527]M. K. Öke. (2002) p: 56.

civilian and military regimes. The difficulty of democratizing Argentina was further exacerbated by the high levels of state-directed political violence during the 1976-83 period of military rule, among the worst in the region.[528]

During the 1970s, in Argentina, 30,000 people were reported as "missing", "many others were imprisoned illegally, and thousands went into exile. Argentina's Dirty War model was not a random occurrence in the history of Latin America; other countries like Chile suffered the dictatorship experience. The cycle of violence, characterized as the worst genocide in Argentina, started on March 24 1976. However, its roots can be found many decades prior, with the different coups that portrayed the authoritarian-nationalist and the intervention of the Argentinean military that expanded its interests and functions into the political, economic and foreign policy realms.

The European military officers who trained the Latin American armed forces introduced them the positivism and nationalistic notions, which infused the Latin American armed forces and became their ideology. It is worth mentioning that the same process took place in the Ottoman armed forces during the Young Turks era.

Especially during the 1930s the officer corps of AAF which had predominantly middle class background, developed an ardent nationalism that saw the solution for Argentina's problems in industrialization and technical modernization. The interest of the military in industrialization was closely linked to its desire to create a powerful military technology in order to end Argentina's neocolonial status, provide an independent and compatible place in international markets and even play a more influential role in the Southern cone.[529]

Most Argentine officers had a pro-German attitude partly because of the German military training they received and partly because they believed that the US and the UK were deliberately keeping Argentina as a rural economic colony.[530]

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[528]D. L. Norden. (1996) p:2.
[529] B. Keen. (1996) ''A history of Latin America'' p: 315.
[530]B. Keen. (1996) p: 315.

The Motivations of the Military Interventions in Argentina in 1976 and in Turkey in 1980

6.1. The background of 1976 Military Intervention in Turkey

An overview of military regimes in Turkey reveals that such interludes were kept short, and those who assumed power managed to escape an image of power-hungry soldiers motivated solely by personal or corporate interests. The military did its best to ensure that every coup d'état was sought and supported by a sizeable segment of the political elite. They paid attention to maintaining the appearance of legality in all actions of the administration, and were somewhat restrained in their appeal to violence. Nor did the military regimes have to leave power due to economic, political, or military failures. One remembers here the Cyprus debacle that spelled the end of the Greek junta (1967-1974), as well as the defeat of Argentina in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) War that precipitated the exit of the military government. In those countries, military defeats were used to make the point that the military was not fit to govern; the defeats were tied to the declining fighting powers of the army as a result of its involvement in governing the country. Yet no such thing was observed in Turkey. It was the authoritarian rulers themselves who, by and large, decided the timing, pace, and conditions of their exit from power.[531]

The coup of 1980, and the events leading up to it, seems to be a very complicated case to analyze. Political dissensions as well as personal disputes and rivalries amongst the high commanders of the Turkish armed forces seemed to erode military prestige from within the army itself.[532] Feroz Ahmad has claimed that the fragmentation within the

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[531] T. Demirel. (2005) ''Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective" p: 252

[532] B. Toprak.(1988) "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey," in Metin Herper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and Military-Turkey in the 1980s , p: 189.

army could best be described as a power struggle between the military 'moderates' and the 'extremists' in their approach to solving the state of crisis in the late 1970s.[533]

The coup of September 12, 1980, led to the formation of a new Constitution, the abolishment of the Senate, the augmentation of the President's political power, and the enhancement of the National Security Council. As a result, the NSC, became almost the highest, nonelected, decision making body of the state, although not responsible to the Parliament. The officers' voluntary return to the barracks in 1983 was a natural outcome of what they considered a successful restructuring of Turkey's political system.[534]

6.1.1. Internal Grounds

Tachau and Heper put together the aspects of the crisis that led to the military takeover in 1980 as follows: the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics in the 1970s, the latter being extended to important social sectors such as organized labor, the teaching profession and the civil bureaucracy; escalating waves of violence caused by extremist militants; massive outbreaks of communal conflict marked by an ominous emergence of inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cleavages; and rampant inflation accompanied by serial industrial slowdowns and shortages of consumer and import goods. They argue that, for the military all these dimensions fused into one major failure of the system, that is, the complete erosion of governmental authority.[535]

William Hale has concluded that the army had four main tasks set for itself when intervening in 1980: "firstly, to suppress terrorism; secondly, to restore economic growth and stability; thirdly, to introduce a new Constitution and legal arrangements which, it was hoped, would prevent another lapse into anarchy; and, fourthly, to work out effective arrangements with the civilian politicians, both old and new"

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[533] F. Ahmad. (1993) ''The Making of Modern Turkey'' p: 181.
[534] G. Karabelias. (2003) ''A Brief Overview of the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Albania, Greece and Turkey. During the Post-WWII Period, Journal of Political and Military Sociology'' **31**(1) p: 57-71.
[535] F. Tachau and M. Heper. (1983) ''The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey'' in *Comparative Politics*, **16** (1): 17-33.

6.1.1.1. High Level of Political Polarization

When polarization and power struggles between the leading political parties in the late 1970s delayed the declaration of martial law needed to respond to escalating civil riots and violence, and the police seemed unable to stabilize the situation, the chief of the NSC, Kenan Evren, tried to convince the parties to collaborate in order to regain control of the society, although with little effect. Thus, when the generals initiated the coup they were in a sense trying to safeguard the Turkish democracy from itself. Evren himself stated that the main reason behind the intervention was "to avert a civil war and to save the democracy that was going down the drain".

The emergence of the Islamist National Salvation Party, which assumed a 'swinging' position and therefore managed to shape government polices supporting a Muslim educational system, concerned the generals greatly. By manifesting their religious cause, for example by remaining seated and silent during the playing of the national anthem, and by insulting the army by not paying respect to the generals on the Day of Victory on August 30, 1980, as is customary, the leaders of the National Salvation Party managed to provoke the military, who certainly viewed these symbolical demonstrations as both a blasphemy of the secular Kemalist legacy, as well as directly undermining the military confidence.

Thus, that the civil society by 1980 was deeply frustrated of and disappointed with its politicians is not difficult to understand. In addition to economic stagnation and increased unemployment, it is estimated that approximately 1,500 people lost their lives in terrorist attacks during the Demirel government.[536] Without a doubt, the poor economic performance in the 1970s had discredited the government and eroded its legitimacy,

The two major parties, the right-wing Justice Party (JP) and the leftwing Republican People's Party (RPP) could not assume power because the party system was fragmented. Fragmentation was accompanied by increasing ideological polarization between parties.'* While the RPP leaned towards economic statism and (in a bid to

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[536]F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 179.

attract rising labor militancy) flirted with socialist ideas, the JP's nationalist and anticommunist stance became more pronounced. The JP condemned the RPP for nurturing anarchy and paving the way to communism. The RPP, in turn, accused the JP of protecting "fascists" to maintain the status quo. The polarization rendered the formation of a grand coalition or cooperation between the two leading parties only a distant possibility.[537]

To come to power, both major parties needed the support of smaller extremist parties, the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP) and the Islamist National Salvation Party (NSP). These fringe parties eagerly capitalized on the situation. During the National Front coalitions (1975-1977) formed by the JP, NSP, and NAP, for instance, each party filled the ranks of the bureaucracy, including security services and teaching positions, with their partisans, as well as engaging in unbridled party patronage." The NAP, in addition, used its position as a coalition partner to protect its own activists, who were bent upon fighting with leftists by any means, including the use of violence.[538]

At that time many hoped the RPP government would purge the civilian bureaucracy of partisans, cope with terrorism through impartial and effective implementation of law, and initiate an economic stabilization program. It soon turned out, however, that the RPP could not provide effective governance either. Terrorism continued unabated. Terrorists targeted well-known public figures and tried to inflame latent religious/sectarian cleavages. Indeed, after sectarian conflicts claimed more than a hundred lives in the Kahramanmaraş province, the RPP government had to declare martial law. Its economic policy was affected by similar problems. The ability to make and implement painful (yet beneficial) economic decisions proved beyond the coalition-building capacities of the government.

In the wake of the mid-seventies, the democratic regime in Turkey seemed to be heading towards a crisis. Rapid social change such as peasant migration to cities and the related crisis of import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, as well as the legacy of patrimonial peculiarities of the Turkish revolution have already generated

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[537]T. Demirel.(2003) ''Turkish Military's decision to intervene: 12 September 1980''in *Armed Forces and Society,* p: 258.
[538]T. Demirel.(2003) p:258.

dilemmas for the democratic experiment. This state of affairs was further severed by new institution adopted after the 1960 coup since democratic governance became harder to maintain.[539]

Confrontations between the left- and the rightwing student groups were escalating and turning more violent. Labor unions intensified their activities and appeared to be ever more demanding. Economic crisis, which manifested itself in economic stagnation, rising inflation, and shortage of goods due to a recurrent foreign exchange problem, was a source of resentment. Several left- and rightwing clandestine groups, which precipitated the military intervention in 1971, re-emerged and began to commit acts of violence, including sabotage, armed assaults, bank robberies, and killings. The death toll resulting from terrorism increased daily." Security forces, which were poorly trained and badly underequipped to cope with terrorism, were also sharply divided between left- and right wing associations. Judicial decisions were painfully slow. As a result, the authority of the state (a must if a democratic regime is to survive) appeared to be dwindling.[540]

6.1.1.2. Political Violence, Chaos and Disorder

On the other hand, growing political violence and terrorism should also be noted as the immediate reason for the intervention, specifying that the incidence of political violence reflected a growing ideological polarization between the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), and to a much lesser extent, the Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP) on the right, and many small radical groups on the left. Pointing out that "the 1973 election campaign and its aftermath witnessed an increasing ideological polarization between the major parties, and the issue distances between them became 'exceptionally' large by normal standards", the major third party revolts preceding the elections (especially that of the NSP) revealed the incapacity of 'politics as usual' to aggregate and integrate emergent political demands. Ahmad states that during the Nationalist Front government the state was parceled out between the parties which used the ministries assigned to their members to provide patronage for their support, and the strong

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[539]T. Demirel.(2003) p: 257.
[540]T. Demirel.(2003) p: 257.

presence of the Nationalist Action Party in the cabinet helped legitimize the neo-fascist philosophy throughout the country. Accordingly, NAP's young militants, the Grey Wolves, saw themselves as part of the state and operated with greater confidence in creating a climate of terror, designed to intimidate their opponents.[541] Claiming that the response of such leftist fractions as Dev-Sol and Dev-Yol added to the confusion and facilitated the task of the right, Ahmad nonetheless marks a difference between the terrorism of the left in the early 1970s and that of the right and left in the mid- and late 1970s. He states that in the early 1970s, the left hoped to ignite a revolution by inspiring the workers to rise with anti-western and anti-capitalist actions like kidnapping American soldiers, whereas in the mid-1970s the aim was to cause chaos and demoralization to create a climate in which a law and order regime would be welcomed by the masses as the savior of the nation[542].

While statements by military leaders make it clear that they had considered an RPP-JP government highly desirable and saw the lack of such cooperation as the primary cause of the breakdown, it would be erroneous to attribute the lack of cooperation between the two major parties chiefly to the uncompromising attitude of, and deep personal animosity between their leaders, because the logic of the prevailing political situation also dictated polarization. Accordingly, the party system displayed some of the functional characteristics of an extreme (or polarized) multiparty system since the JP was pulled to the right by its partnership with the NAP and the NSP, and the RPP was pulled to the left by the small but vocal radical groups to its left. Nevertheless he agrees with others that the ideological differences between the two major parties were not great enough to preclude a grand coalition of the two, and an accommodation between them would have been welcomed by most of the important political groups in Turkey, including the business community, the leading trade union confederation (Türk-Is), the military, the press, and the president of the republic, and it would have been acceptable to a majority of the JP and RPP deputies[543]

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[541]F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 165-166.
[542]F. Ahmad. (1993) p: 163-164.
[543]S. Binay. (2006) ''Coming to Terms with the Past: Narrating the 12 September 1980 Military Coup'', Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, p: 34-35.

6.1.1.3. Constant Economic Trouble

Nevertheless, the military intervention of September 12, 1980 cannot be understood if located only in the general crisis Turkey had been undergoing in the few years prior to the coup. He states that what was often referred to as the signs of the crisis indeed conceal the crisis of capitalism in Turkey, the origins of which are to be found in the history of Turkey's capitalist transformation. Accordingly, the political implications of the industrialization wave of the 1960s became evident by the late 1960s, and could firstly be observed in the alienation of the undermined independent producers of local small scale industries from the Justice Party, which they saw as the party of the monopolies and foreign capital, and subsequently in the emergence of smaller parties like NSP and NAP to result in the fragmentation of the right. At the same time, small holders' losing their land to the capitalist farmer led to the migration from the countryside to the towns and cities, and this also threatened landlords who lived off rent, hence they also ceased to support the JP[544] by 1980, the economic situation had much improved as a result of the introduction of the economic stabilization plan agreed with the IMF in January 1980 and the revival of United States military aid once the American administration decided that it needed a strong Turkey as an ally against the forces unleashed by the Iranian revolution[545]

Demirel suggests that had the economic crisis been solved, the military intervention would not have taken place, mentioning that the officers were reluctant to intervene worried that they might also fail to put the economy back on track.[546]Thus, it was the perceived threats to integrity of the Republican state and nation posed by escalating terrorism and violence that had led the Turkish military to envisage that they might have to terminate the democratic regime. The high command had little confidence in the democratic regime's ability to contain terrorism.

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[544]F. Ahmad cited inS. Binay. (2006) p: 35-36.
[545] S. Binay. (2006) p: 37.
[546] T. Demirel.(2003) p:260.

6.1.1.4. Self-perception of the officers

Özdemir had defined four roles of armed forces in Turkish experience, namely the legal-military role, cyclical role, extra-ordinary role, and civil-political role. The legal-military role refers to all the liabilities of the armed forces imposed by the Constitution, laws and related regulations of Turkish Republic. The cyclic role, on the other hand, is not imposed by the Constitution, and is not continuous. Namely, this is the role which implies the military interventions. As far as the republican period is concerned, this role re-emerged in the environments of political crisis of multi-party era. The extra-ordinary role is defined as the exercise of influence on politics without direct or indirect military interference, such as the Presidential elections. Finally, civil-political role implies the unique role military plays in the founding and modernization of Turkey in reference to the ideological reflection of Atatürk.[547]

Kemalism itself paid special attention to separate the military from politics. While Ataturk proclaimed that "*the Turkish nation ...considers its army as the guardian of its ideals*" he simultaneously chose to limit the powers of the military. Although the army was given the task of protecting the revolution, the officers were banned from political involvement in the state affairs. This was legislated in the 1924 constitution in which Article 23 stated that "no person can be a deputy or hold office under the government at the same time". In that period, other laws were also passed which required the officers to resign in order to become a parliamentarian.[548]

Although Mustafa Kemal was cautious about keeping the military off the politics, the army is able to legitimize its guardianship through the perception of the society as the most trustworthy institution. This role of guardianship resulted in three successful interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. A strongly politicized society and political

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[547]H. Özdemir. (1989) Rejim ve Asker, Türkiye Üzerine Araştırmalar-2 p:114.
[548]P. Tank.(2001) ''Turkey as a `Special Case' for the EU: Will the Generals Retreat from Politics?'' in *Security Dialogue,* p: 219- 220.

leadership that could not cooperate in the interests created a power vacuum that was filled by the armed forces.[549]

The Internal Services Act of the Turkish Armed forces founds the legal basis of the guardianship role. Article 35 of the Act states that "the duty of the armed forces is to defend and safeguard the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as designed by the Constitution." Besides, Article 84 of the Internal Service Regulations -which was prepared in line with the Internal Services Act specifies that "Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against internal and external threats, by force if necessary." Although the constitution has been renewed in 1982 and several amendments have been made especially after 2001 the protection of the republic from external and internal threats remain the main objective of the Turkish Armed Forces.[550]

> *The education and training of the Turkish officers does not resemble that of other armies. In those armies, officership is perceived as a professional job the same as that of civil servants. For us, on the other hand, it is held in high esteem. It is not only a professional job but also a national duty, guardianship of the state. Trained with such beliefs in (army) schools, officers spread these beliefs in their environment as they move up the ranks, thus the duty to watch and to protect the Republic becomes an entrenched belief in their whole army career. When they deemed it necessary, to do that job (watching and protecting the Republic), either they spontaneously act or perform commands which tell them to intervene comfortably as if performing a normal duty.* [551]

As 1978 neared an end, the military high command, consistent with public opinion, came to judge the effectiveness of the RPP government as dwindling. General Kenan Evren believed that Ecevit was far too complaisant about terrorism in general and Kurdish separatism in particular. It was the perceived inability of the RPP government

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[549]P. Tank. (2001) p: 217-230.
[550]P. Tank. (2001)p: 220.
[551] As Demirel quoted from Orhan Erkanli, *Anilar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular* (Memoirs, Dilemmas and Those Who
are Responsible), 3rd ed. p: 375.

to end terrorism that prompted the high command to seriously contemplate the possibility of a takeover.[552]

Evren reports that he, for the first time, asked other commanders in the high command whether or not "intervention might be necessary" to prevent disintegration of the state and to avoid sliding into civil war. That was, according to him, in July/August 1979, and there is no way to know whether the high command spoke about the intervention earlier. Nevertheless, the issue was openly debated by the high command at that date, and Evren found that commanders were similarly distressed by events but were quiet because they did not want to be the first to air such views in the presence of superiors.[553]

As noted, because the military perceived itself as the ultimate guardian of the state and national interests, there was little, if any, discomfort for officers in conceiving the possibility of overthrowing the elected government. In their well-entrenched role as the ultimate guardian of the state, Turkish officers regarded the idea of staging a coup, not as unlawful and unethical, but as a special duty which they were trained to carry out when certain conditions occurred.[554]

The high command feared that if they remained passive, political feuds could also spread into the army and might lead to the crumbling of the last bastion of the Republic. This was even more true since the declaration of martial law (in December 1978) had brought the army into close interaction with other civilian actors. In fact, several events reinforced the high command's worries. The increasing numbers of students expelled from the military schools for involvement in political activities and the escape of Mehmet Ali Ağca (a person charged with killing journalist Abdi Ipekçi) from the military prison were among the most publicized events.[555]

They were also distressed by the likelihood that junior officers could circumvent their authority and execute a coup. Evren indicated that he had received unsigned letters from staff officers and suspected that secret organizations had been established within

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[552]T. Demirel.(2003) p:258.
[553]As Demirel quotes from Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren 'in Anilan (The Memoirs of Kenan Evren), vol. 1, (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990) p: 276-277.
[554]T. Demirel.(2003) p:259.
[555]T. Demirel.(2003) p:259.

the army. He was apprehensive that if this state of affairs went on, another colonel-led intervention (as happened in 27 May 1960) would occur. Therefore, prospects of the disintegration of the army as the last bastion of the Republic seriously concerned the high command, and preventing such an eventuality was a decisive motive urging commanders to act.[556]

In a self-fulfilling prophecy par excellence, the military actually contributed to bringing about the state of affairs it predicted because it is the vital organ of the state apparatus that is supposed to suppress terrorism. This is not the same as saying, however, that they deliberately omitted their duties. It is rather to be seen as an unintended and unforeseen consequence of perceiving military intervention as a solution.[557]

The military initiated a program that would first depoliticize the society and later restructure their ideology. This new framework was intended to weaken the leftist sentiments through introducing a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" and imposing national and cultural morals and underlining common values to bring together the population ideologically.[558] The idea was not an Islamic state; Islam was rather intended to be sociological glue for the fragmented society.

Apparently Turkish-Islamic synthesis was a deviation from Kemalist principles, placing Islam in the state ideology after many decades of struggle to perpetuate secularism. As a side effect that the generals did not calculate, Islam began to be perceived as an alternative to the current political system.

Equally important has been the officers' treatment of the Islamic issue. Traditionally, the Kemalist elite has viewed Islam as an obstruction to progress and tried to bring it under state control. However, during the early 1980s the military hierarchy decided that along with Atatürk's principles it had to carry out society's close contact with 'Turkish historical and moral values'. Realizing that it dangerous for Turkey's unity to let the youngsters receive religious training and values from unauthorized Koran schools, the military leadership announced that religious education and training will be

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[556] T. Demirel.(2003) p:260.
[557] T. Demirel. (2003) p: 266.
[558] M. B. Altunışık and Ö. Tür (eds.) (2005) ''Turkey: Challanges of Continuity and Change'' p: 42.

taught by the state in state schools.[559] However, their superior, western democratic ethos was apparent behind their attitude towards Islamic activities and the increasing financial power of the Islamic Anatolian bourgeoisie. The aim of the military leadership was the employment of religion as a factor which would ensure the unity and integrity of the state and Atatürk's principles. Islamic values were seen as a major contributor to the creation of an apolitical, non-ideological 'consensual' society.[560]

In March 1971 the junta had calculated that the 'fine tuning' of the constitution and various institutions would be sufficient to put the system on an even keel. This time the new junta decided that a total overhaul was required, with a new constitution and institution designed to strengthen the state. The military banned all political and social groups –including all parties- from the country's political life, though not TUSIAD and other business circles, which did not have difficulty in partially filling the vacuum so created. On 12 September 1980, as street fighting between leftist and rightist extremists brought the country to the edge of civil war, the military staged a third coup. This time it assumed direct control of the administration and remained in power for three years. In 1982 the military promulgated a new constitution, which remains in force today, before restoring civilian rule in 1983.[561]

6.1.1.5. Public Encouragement

Tanel Demiel suggests that the Turkish experience has given rise to a conviction that the costs of abandoning democracy are not so high; therefore, in some cases, the military regime might be acceptable. This presumption has, in turn, weakened the civilian resolve to seek remedies within the democratic system. The military regime seemed to offer quick, clear-cut, and less costly solutions. It made it difficult for soldiers to appreciate the idea that staging a coup might be a catastrophic and costly affair.[562] What we see in the Turkish case is that the very experience with military regimes has generated a feeling that the chief disadvantage of authoritarianism is not

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[559]G. Karabelias. (2003) "A Brief Overview Of The Evolution Of Civil-military Relations In Albania, Greece, And Turkey During The Post-WWII Period" p:57 -70.
[560]G. Karabelias. (2003) p: 57-70.
[561] G. Jenkins. (2007) "Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey" p:342.
[562] T. Demirel. (2005) "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: the Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective" p: 246-247.

an insurmountable problem. The military does not renounce democracy, and it returns to the barracks relatively easily. Moreover, the presumption continues, the military is conscious of the need to avoid excessive arbitrariness. So the cost of a military regime might not be so dreadful. The Turkish business, unlike the situations in many Latin American countries, did not mean that people had to worry much about their offspring being disappeared or tortured to death. Nor did they have to be distressed about being excluded from economic policy-making, or finding themselves in an unpredictable economic environment.[563]   The difference between the so-called democratic regime and the military regime, in terms of the better protection of these liberties, did not seem sufficiently clear or important enough for people to prefer the former to latter. Thus, instead of trying to insist on a democratic process, deferring to the military seemed to be a better alternative. The unstated (because it was politically incorrect to say so) assumption was that the military would clear away the playing ground and then return to its barracks without doing much damage to the status quo. The previous experience of military regimes only reinforced this belief. The civilian encouragement of the military in the years following the May 27 1960 intervention is a good example. The fact that the military seized power so swiftly, cooperated with sympathetic civilians, and returned to barracks after only one-and-a-half years in power generated the idea that another military coup might be useful to move the country in the direction they wanted.[564] It is arguable that if the May 27 intervention had harmed essential interests of those groups, their behavior would have been somewhat different. Indeed, such a change was observed after the 1971-1973 military rule, during which the military intervention and adopted a stance which many found contrary to their own definition of a good society.[565]

It is worth attention that DP voters tended to blame individual coup leaders rather than organizational and ideological characteristics of the military. Thefeeling was not resentment of the military, but an anti-National UnityCommittee sentiment. The DP constituency viewed the state (and its core, themilitary) in high esteem. The idea that as an exalted entity, the statecould do no wrong was taken seriously.[566]

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[563]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 254-255.
[564]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 255-256.
[565]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 257.
[566] T. Demirel. (2005) p: 249.

6.1.2. External Grounds

6.1.2.1. Cold War Context

After the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, international concerns about the stability of Turkey increased dramatically. The American Ambassy to Iran in Tehran was occupied on November 4, 1979, and the importance of Turkey as an outpost gained vital importance for the Western block. On December 26, 1979 Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan which further engraved the situation. On March 29, 1979 Ankara signed the Turkish-American Defense and Cooperation Treaty, indicating the anchoring of Turkey to the Western block.[567]

Ahmad refers to Birand who underlined that right after Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren joined the meeting of NATO military committee meeting at Brussels on December 13, 1979 and as soon as he arrived back to Istanbul he held a meeting with the high command of the TAF with the agenda of the coming military intervention.[568]

6.1.2.2. The Silent Concession of the United States

The international environment of the mid to late seventies was not conducive to supporting democratic governance. These were turbulent years for world politics as both the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in renewed competition to protect and, if possible, extend their spheres of influence. In these circumstances, keeping Turkey firmly tied to the Western bloc became ever more important. This meant that for the U.S., preserving the integrity of the Turkish state as an ally of the West was much more important than preserving the democratic regime.[569]

The United States of America was mild in reaction to the military intervention of 1980, and declared that the aids would continue. The next day of the intervention, the US ambassador to NATO visited Ankara. The military junta of 1980 gave harm to

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[567]F. Ahmad. (2007) p: 455
[568] F. Ahmad. (2007) p: 454.
[569]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 257.

relations between Turkey and European Union therefore Turkey shifted towards the USA in foreign policy making. The focus of attention was security in relations with the USA. There is a debate as to whether the U.S. also provided signals that a takeover that would restore political stability and keep Turkey (whose strategic importance to the western bloc greatly increased after the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1978 and invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979) in the Western bloc would not be looked on with disfavor. Both James Spain' U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, and Paul Henze who served as assistant to Zbigniew Brzerzinski in the U.S. National Security Council at the time, denied such a thing. But they added that U.S. was expecting a military intervention to take place, though they did not know its exact timing. U.S. policy in the Cold War context was based on the premise that, as long as the country in question was firmly tied to the Western camp, it would not look with disservice on such military coups. even if no such signal had taken place on the part of the U.S. officials, it is realistic to assume that the Turkish officers would be able to spot the U.S. posture and to guess that their intervention was not likely to be opposed. In fact, Paul Henze argued that "the Carter administration would not have discouraged the takeover, if informed in advance, but it preferred not to be."[570]

On the basis of U.S. behavior in the then- Cold War period, one could reason that given Turkey's strategic importance to Western bloc, the U.S. could have encouraged the Turkish military to intervene, if it had not already been disposed to a coup. But there was no need for active encouragement.[571]

6.2. The background of 1976 Military Intervention in Argentina

One of the most accepted scholarly and political accounts of the phenomenon argues that it was the tenets of the National Security Doctrine itself that governed the particular way in which the military in power in the countries of Latin America perceived the world, defined the nature of both threat and enemy, devised the countermeasures to this situation, and acted upon them. The argument is advanced even more forcefully for countries such as Argentina, notorious for the several

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[570]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 272.
[571]T. Demirel. (2005) p: 272.

thousand people who were made to disappear under brutal conditions during the years of the military juntas, and Uruguay, a country once famous for its democratic traditions, that became an oppressive tool for its inhabitants during the twelve years of military rule. The argument is that the National Security Doctrine was generated within the Department of State and the Department of Defense of the United States of America. It was then disseminated through the School of the Americas in Panama and, to a lesser degree, through the training courses that Latin American military officers received in the U.S. The Latin American armed forces' historical tendency to intervene in politics was thus fostered by the adoption of this particular outlook.[572]

The second main activity of the US government was to develop the initiative: Alliance for the Progress. This program began under the Kennedy administration in 1961. During the sixties the attitudes toward the Cold War were reinforced. The US viewed Cuba as a Soviet threat especially after the crisis of October 1962, when the Soviets attempted to establish missile basis in Cuban territory.[573] They exercise their repressive methods in the name of the *doctrine of national security* of each country and with the critical support of the US government.

Three main events affected the social and military conditions in Latin America and marked the end of this historical period. First the decrease in the Cold War tensions when in March 1985, *Mikhail Gorvachev* took power in the Soviet Union. A second factor was the near total defeat of guerrilla movements in all Latin American countries, with the exceptions of the insurrect movements of the National Liberation Army in Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru. Third, Latin American governments faced the need to carry out economic adjustment plans, mainly in order to pay their external debts (Aguilera 1991).[574]

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[572] G. E. Reyes. (1998) ''Latin American Armies 1945-1998: Main Events and Conceptual Approaches''
[573] G. E. Reyes. (1998)
[574] G. E. Reyes. (1998)

6.2.1. The National Security Doctrine

One way to understand the history of the 1976 coup in Argentina, and its aftermath, is by reading the Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons), 1984. The paramilitary group of Lopez Rega, was functional to the coup of 1976. Videla, Agosti and Massera who were the leaders of the junta shared the same philosophy that extermination of young citizens was legitimate in the name of national security. The military perceived Argentine history as a struggle between primitive and advanced cultural forms. The nineteenth century witnessed the development from barbarism to civilization. The twentieth century was facing a new challenge with the rise of a communist ideology going back to primitive notions of collectivism and social equality. [575]

The real purpose of the National Security Doctrine was to promote the hemispheric goals of an imperial central power — the United States — at war with another central Power — the Soviet Union — in a world divided into two separate and alien camps. The supremacy of the hegemonic country in its area of influence was strongly dependent on the maintenance of the status quo in the region and thus on the defense of the dominant groups' interests.[576]

To convince the nationalistic Latin American military of the necessity of safeguarding the interests of their "Big Brother" in the region, it was necessary to identify an enemy within their own society that was simultaneously universal and local. The identification of this internal enemy was often achieved by equating any popular movement trying to ameliorate the living conditions of the masses in the 1960s with the international communist movement. Thus, thanks to the existence of the National Security Doctrine, repression and virtual suppression of any elements seeking social justice within Latin American societies were perceived as part of the struggle to vanquish an enemy that not only wanted to destroy a way of life but also the whole of

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[575] A. C. G. M. Robben(2007) ''Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina- The Ethnography of Political Violence'' p: 172.

[576] C. Perelli. (1993) "From Counterrevolutionary Warfare to Political Awakening: The Uruguayan and Argentine Armed Forces in the 1970s" in *Armed Forces & Society,* **20** (1): p:25.

Western civilization.[577] The National Security Doctrine thus lured the armed forces into becoming the enemies of their own people, trapping the military in a scheme of distorted perception that led them to intervene in politics against the will and best interests of their societies.

The new doctrine had the important advantage of setting out in unambiguous moral, political, and practical terms the problem of control and repression.[13] However, the importance of the doctrine did not lie only in its instrumentality; the school of thought it expressed was also vitally concerned with the construction of a Western ideology comparable to and in competition with Communist ideology.Only by generating an alternative way of thinking and feeling in accordance with the principles of Western civilization, the theorists of this school of thought affirmed, would the West be able to effectively confront and vanquish its enemy.[578]

Because of their historical inheritance and geopolitical position, the Uruguayan and Argentine armed forces equated order with belonging to and defending Western civilization. Loosely formulated in terms of common values and sensibilities as well as of a certain lifestyle, this affiliation with the West was resumed at the level of the military organizations in a strong anti-Communist sentiment. In Argentina, among the more conservative sectors, this affiliation with the West was also synonymous with belonging to the Western Christian civilization. In Uruguay, on the other hand, the West was traditionally identified with the values of secularism, tolerance, and equality born of the Revolution of the Enlightenment.[579]

The NSC has gone through many changes and evolution since its creation. The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council5 because government realized the degree of disorder and lack of coordination existing among agencies involved in major post-war policy-making. The NSC then acted under the "chairmanship" of the President, and included the following seven officials as permanent members: the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The President would designate "from time to time" the secretaries of other executive departments to

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[577] C.Perelli. (1993) p: 27.
[578]C.Perelli. (1993) p: 29.
[579]C.Perelli. (1993) p:30.

attend meetings depending on the topic under discussed. While the new Central Intelligence Agency reported to the NSC, the Director of Central Intelligence was not a permanent member, although he attended meetings regularly as an observer and adviser. The NSC was the body responsible for coordinating foreign and defense policy.

From the evaluation of the historical course civil-military relations and the patterns of military interventions, several observations can be made. , the political forces in Turkey failed to establish a similar trait in spite of the country's pro-western attachment and lengthy NATO membership. As for Turkey, the skillful use of the political, economic, and strategic power and the potential of the enormous military institution by its high-ranking officers as well as their ideological orientation facilitated their "corrective" interventions and the perpetuation of their political hegemony over all civilian forces. But the road to democratic governance can also be a unique experience to each of them, as long as political leaders and external administrators are determined to pursue it.[580]

Military specificity indicates the differentials of the military culture and the set of values that apply to them. Values such as discipline, hierarchy, authority, solidarity, pride, heroism, courage, obedience, martyrdom, sacrifice and devotion considerably shape the military behavior patterns.[581]

The national security doctrine has received extensive attention from observers of Latin American politics, many of whom have employed it as the principal explanation for authoritarianism and repression in the 1960s and 1970s. As doctrines of national security do promote a higher level of interventionism along with a stronger propensity to combat ideologies, rather than solely military action, such arguments are fairly convincing. However, certain misinterpretations have tended to dominate these discussions, including the degree to which the United States defined and successfully promulgated the national security doctrine, the uniformity of conceptualizations of

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[580] G. Karabelias. (2003) ''A Brief Overview of the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Albania, Greece and Turkey During the Post-WWII Period'' in*Journal of Political and Military Sociology*.**31**(1) p: 57-71.
[581]M. Bozdemir (1982) p: 168.

national security in different cases, and the degree to which emphases on national security were actually new.

Analysts of Latin American politics have frequently portrayed the national security doctrine as an obvious example of a U.S. attempt to utilize Latin American countries for its purposes. According to these interpretations, the United States disseminated the national security doctrine to Latin American countries in order to combat the U.S. enemy, international communism. As with most popular arguments, important elements are true. The United States did train Latin American militaries in counterinsurgency tactics and did promote anticommunist notions of national security.[582] Furthermore, the national security orientation did contain an internationalized vision of the nature of military threats. The fact that Latin American guerrilla movements were fre quently regional or dependent on external support lent credibility to this vision[583]

However, Latin American militaries had an important role in designing their own national security doctrines. Particularly in Brazil, military strategy in this epoch clearly did not merely mimic doctrines developed in the United States. Stepan writes that "By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Escuela Superior de Guerra had developed its key ideological tenet: the close interrelationship between national security and national development". Elsewhere as well, Latin American militaries undertook their own studies of how to combat revolution and, in general, how to enhance the security of their own countries.

US centered analyses of the national security doctrine also tend to create a mistakenly monolithic vision of the doctrine. While there was a relatively generalized trend in the region toward emphasis on national security as opposed to merely national defense, in other respects, the versions of the national security doctrine differed significantly from country to country. In Argentina, the national security doctrine placed more stress on ideological factors. The military involved itself in economic promotion only minimally in this case and instead focused more attention and concern on culture and education.

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[582]A. Rouquie. (1987) ''The *Military and the State in Latin America* '' p: 248.
[583]D. L. Norden. (1996) p:162.

These differences illuminate the degree to which the national security doctrine reflected earlier trends rather than emerging as a new invention of the 1960s. The vision of a completely subordinated military, dedicated only to the defense of the nation-state and acting consistently at the command of an elected government, is rather foreign to the reality of many Latin American countries. Military intervention certainly did not begin with the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, nor were all earlier cases of intervention propagated by military caudillos. Rather, many of these cases reflected the fact that the Latin American militaries' perceptions of their role were already quite a bit broader than in the north. In Argentina, the myths of the military's role in the founding of the nation and its subsequent role as guardian have long been mainstays of military ideology. The Teissere article quoted above, which discussed the phases in the military's founding of the nation-state and the role of the military in developing the values and morals of the nation, was published in 1953, before the national security doctrine became defined (which occurred around the beginning of the 1960s). In sum, while the national security doctrine did contribute to the propensity toward interventionism in Latin America, it built upon a base that at least in Argentina had existed long before.[584]

6.2.2. Military and the Church

It is essential to understand the relation between the armed forces and the church, in order to further analyze the military behavior. The armed forces have a specific conception of "*la patria*" (homeland) and a cult of patriotism which created their own sacredness, leading them beyond merely being professional soldiers. Although the basis of the sacredness was secular values rather than celestial teachings, the armed forces never denied the church and the symbols of Catholicism were also used for the sanctification of the new ideology. So the armed forces actually contributed to the politicization of the church, which it would suffer in the future. One of the main reasons of the state terror was the holistic self-image of the armed forces and its

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[584]D. L. Norden. (1996) p:162.

devotion to convinced them that state terror was but a tool for the protection of la patria.[585]

It is worth questioning how the "dirty war" reached to excessively criminal dimensions. Individuals who were good Catholics, fathers and friends also were fierce torturers, mafia members or guerillas. Dealy explains this phenomenon with the dualist ethical paradigm of Latin American societies. Home and the street, the religion and politics are dissociated mentally, and completely diverse ethical concepts rule these distinct realms. It seems that the identity crisis which is likely to occur when secularism is introduced to a religious society is prevented by the construction of these distinct worlds.[586] The national security mission of the armed forces inevitably led to a controversy with the guerillas, overtly or covertly supported by the United States of America. During the Cold War, the armed forces used the terminology and symbols of Catholicism in his fight against the guerilla.

Christianity was introduced to Latin America by the Catholic Spanish and Portuguese colonialism. The church served as a catalyzer for the colonialist expansionism and was therefore was an ally of the state. As the Latin American states, the logic of this relation lingered and the newly independent states also utilized the church as a means of earning their legitimacy. In return to its social functions, the state recognized Catholicism as the official religion and provided the church with economic privileges.

Theology of Liberation: This is an important concept for understanding the political links to the church. The theology of liberation was not an intellectual inducement but rather a demand from the societal base. The movement has its roots back in 1930s however the main development took place in 1960s in Argentina.[587] Parishioners (communidades de base) were coming together in weekly home meetings, reading the Bible, chatting on daily issues or merely socializing. Their objective was to defend the Catholic culture against the malice of modernity, at the same time mentioning the unbearable social inequalities in their society. These embodiments gradually spilled over the whole continent and leaked into student and labor organizations.

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[585]Loveman, For La Patria. (1999) p: 180.
[586]R.A. Camp.(1996) Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles, p: 59.
[587]E. L. Cleary. (1985) Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today.

As the Pope John XXIII called for the church to be more active in earthly matters and take its share from modernism, some Latin American priests tried and adopted this approach to Latin America. The common point of these efforts was to mention the earthly responsibilities of the church including taking initiative in politics, which was against the perspective of Vatican who traditionally took sides with the state. However Vatican dare not lose the continent therefore instead of the denial of the demands of Latin Americans, the Pope preferred to keep this movement under control. As the social injustice increased in the 1960s, the movement gained further impetus and became an alternative ideology against the national security ideology of the state. Marxist tones in the rhetoric of the theology of liberation are remarkable, especially when it gives reference to the grinded poor Christians. This is how the Catholic messiah conception fused with revolutionary Marxist ideas.[588]

6.2.3. Self-Perception of the Officers

The negative consequences of interventions were considered as the lesser of two evils during most of the period of military interventionism (1930-1976). The military perception of certain threats (corrupt politicians, communist danger, or reestablishment of order) always goes beyond the military concern for professional integrity. The "military appraisal" is a logical operation that the military makes before an intervention is carried out. It consists in the evaluation of the costs and benefits that an intervention has for military professionalism. The analysis of military declarations, articles in professional journals and official documents can be useful to examine the assessment made by the military before an intervention.[589]

Modern societies experience problems with maintaining the balance of power with their militaries. On the one hand the military serves as a modernizing agent for its society. On the other hand, there is a constant risk that the military disobeys the civilian authority when its interests are at stake. In the political realm, violence is not only a threat to order, but is also an important part of it. The concept of state is inseparable from its monopoly of legitimized violence. Many of the military leaders

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[588] M. Löwry. (1986) The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America, p: 79-95.
[589] J. M. Battaglino. (2006)

that took part in the Dirty War were trained in the U.S.-financed School of the Americas, among them Argentine dictators Leopoldo Galtieri and Roberto Viola.They are motivated to maintain physical and material standards and organizational control reliant on such factors as budget, equipment, discipline and cohesion. For this reason, civilian government treatment of the institutional interests of the armed forces plays a key role in civil-military relations. The notion of military mission is the principal tactical derivation of military doctrine. The mission that a nation's military is assigned has a major impact on civil-military relations. A military's mission denotes its primary task in terms of both the nature of the threat (military or non-military) with which it must deal and the location of that threat (internal or external).The concept of military prerogatives refers to those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationship between the state and political or civil society.[590]The necessity for maintaining the apolitical nature of the officer corps was raised continuously in official documents and discourses before and after a coup was thrown. In this case, the maintenance of professional integrity was at stake.

The 1976 coup was designed to restructure Argentine politics, society and economy and "to change the mentality of the Argentines".[591] One of the main goals of the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (Process for National Reorganisation) was "*the strengthening of national security and the eradication of subversion and the conditions that facilitate it*." The commanders of the Armed Forces decided to eliminate Peronism and the leftists and to build the State and society from scratch. In his first presidential message, Videla argued that:

> "*the country is passing through one of the most difficult periods in its history. With the country on the point of national disintegration, the intervention of the Armed Forces was the only possible alternative in the face of the deterioration provoked by misgovernment, corruption, and complacency....but it should be*

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[590]D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 78.
[591] P. McSherry.(2008) Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina p: 79.

abundantly clear that the events which took place on March 24, 1976, represent more than the mere overthrow of a government. On the contrary, they signify the final closing of a historical cycle and the opening of a new one whose fundamental characteristics will be manifested in the reorganisation of the nation....to do this it is necessary to modify the structure of the Argentine economy in both public and private sectors… this process has to transform norms and institutional settings and even the mentality of private and public economic agents."[592]

But the military's attempt to control the orientation of the new cycle and to reshape Argentine society had dramatic consequences for the military institution, which was going to suffer its deepest crisis since its creation in 1861.

The document *A Time for a Fundamental Reorganisation of the Nation*, published by the Military Junta a week after the coup, clearly shows the place that the Armed Forces reserved for themselves in the Argentine political system:

"The Armed Forces, on repeated occasions, sent clear warnings to the government about the existing dangers and also about the shortcomings of its senseless acts. Their voice went unheard, and as a consequence, not a single essential measure was adopted…. In the face of this dramatic situation, the Armed Forces assumed control of the national government. This conscious and responsibly taken action was not motivated by an interest in or desire for power. It was in response to the demands of an indispensable obligation emanating from the Armed Forces´ specific mission to safeguard the highest interest of the nation."[593]

These roles were not new for the Argentine military. What was new was the crisis that Argentina experienced in 1976, a crisis that was going to lead to the largest civilian massacre in Argentina's history. National security soon became the sole

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[592] Argentine Republic, "A time for fundamental reorganisation of the nation." Speech by General Jorge Videla, published in La Nación, April 5, 1976.
[593]*Ibid.*

purpose of the military regime and every aspect of governing rested on a strong belief in the NSD principles. The economic program disassociated labor and attempted to move away from rapid industrialization, which the military believed to be the root cause of the country's problems. Thus, the military turned inward in its search for an enemy and utilized this doctrine to legitimize the necessity of coercion and repression.[594]

An environment of violence surrounded the *sixth intervention* in 1976. The restrictive nature of the third Peronist government excluded leftist Peronists from institutionalized politics. The restriction on the institutional participation of this group led to their militarization and to an increase in the level of urban violence. In turn, this growing violence legitimized the Armed Forces' position as the only institution capable of imposing order and stability. The nationalist economic orientation and the power of trade unions favored the support of dominant groups for the intervention. Finally, the widespread presence of violence affected the institutional interests of the military, not only because of the increasing number of casualties among members of the Armed Forces due to guerrilla actions, but also because of the military's perception of the guerrillas as a functional rival. The military's perception of the government's incapacity to deal with the increasing spiral of violence favored a military solution for the crisis.[595]

The Argentine experience shows that the stronger the presence of these threatened actors the greater the likelihood of their convergence in a coalition that crystallizes the opposition against the government. In this sense, there is a feedback effect among these actors that results in the legitimization of a particular interest in the name of a general one. The Armed Forces began to feel that their intervention not only benefited the military, but also that the support they received from other groups conferred a certain degree of legitimacy to their actions. [596]

The most salient feature of the Argentine party system until 1983 was that the chief political parties (the Peronists and the Radicals) encouraged and supported military

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[594] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) ''The Politics of Military Intervention in Argentina (1880-1999): Comparing Cycles of Coups and Subordination'', unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Essex, p: 143.
[595] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 145-146.
[596] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 146.

interventions. Political parties were disloyal to existing civilian regimes, and they were willing to defect from the political game to explore other options to achieve power, including a military coup. In this context, coups were seen as a part of the political game, not as an exception or a practice to be eradicated.[597]

A context of deep crisis and political violence surrounded the military coup in 1976. By the end of 1975, leaders from both the Peronist and Radical parties were negotiating measures to confront the crisis. One of the most serious attempts to preserve institutional continuity consisted in moving the date for the presidential elections forward and removing President Isabel Perón from office through an impeachment process. The military awaited the results of this manoeuvre. However, Isabel Perón was alerted of this movement in February 1976 and immediately aborted it by closing the sessions of the National Congress early.[598] Through this compulsive measure, she stopped her imminent impeachment. This was interpreted by the Armed Forces as a final sign of the incapacity of politicians to find a solution to the crisis within the democratic system. The coup took place three weeks later.[599]

During the preparations for the coup of 1976, the military sought a new institutional scheme for regulating relations between the Armed Forces as an institution and the Armed Forces as a regime. They finally chose the opposite institutional arrangement to that implemented in 1966. This time, they designed a military government with the participation of the entire Armed Forces as an institution, rather than a government only backed by the military.[600] The goal of this strategy was to commit the Armed Forces to the government in order to increase the stability of the regime. This resulted in the most significant institutional involvement of the military in a government in its entire history.

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[597] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 149.

[598] J. M. Battaglino quotes Alberto Dearriba (2001) *24 de Marzo de 1976: el Golpe,* p: 246-257.

[599] E. Peruzzotti. (2004) "From Praetorianism to Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina's Difficult Transition to Civilian Rule" in *Journal of Third World Studies*, **21** (1) p:110.

[600] J. M. Battaglino. (2007) p: 151.

The ambitious hopes of the authoritarian coalition never materialized. The parceling and privatization of state institutions contributed, as in the past, to the erosion, fragmentation and, eventually, breakdown of bureaucratic authoritarianism.[601]

Within three years of power, *Peronismo* was overthrown by an intervention which aimed at the creation of a more far-reaching national security state. From 1976 to 1983, Argentina witnessed a consolidation of national security ideology, structures, and methods including the infamous Dirty War.[602]The great myth of the Dirty War, is that the guerrillas posed a real threat to the state. Argentine military and intelligence officials could not have doubted the actual weakness of the insurgency given the fact that the *Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP) had been decimated by the end of 1975 and several *Montonero* leaders had been neutralized. Anderson maintains, moreover, "U.S. intelligence officials knew early on the real size of the guerrilla threat and the stunning degree of Argentine military penetration in the leftist groups but remained silent and did nothing to bring the phony 'war' to a halt". Only with the Carter presidency and the appointment of Patricia Derian as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights did the U.S. government begin to promote human rights. Even then, it may well have sent mixed signals. Defense attaches and intelligence officials stationed in the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires found it difficult to get in step with this new policy orientation.

The Argentine military to some degree had been preparing for the possibility of guerrilla warfare since the late 1950s. Military journals stemming back from the late 1950s and early 1960s are replete with articles on counterrevolutionary warfare, many of these authored by French advisers drawing on their experience in Algeria. For example, in December 1958, an article appeared in *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* by French Lieutenant Colonel Patricio de Naurois, entitled "*Subversive War and Revolutionary War.*"[1] The article emphasizes the moral and mass foundations of revolutionary or subversive warfare and, corresponding to the national security doctrine, the need to combat it with combined "political, administrative, economic, social, cultural, and military means".

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[601]E. Peruzzotti. (2004)p: 111.

[602] J. P. McSherry.''Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina'' p:80.

During the next few years, planning for counterrevolutionary warfare in Argentina advanced. As elsewhere in Latin America, Fidel Castro's 1959 triumph in Cuba made communism appear much less abstract and much closer to home. However, the most vehement reaction seemed to come from the United States, which, under the leadership of John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara, began to encourage Latin American countries to expand their notions of security in order to protect the West from communism[603]. This emphasis merged well with concepts of national security already developing in Latin America, par ticularly in Brazil. The idea also had resonance in Argentina. In 1964, General Juan Carlos Onganía delivered a speech at West Point that became the public symbol of the military's shift toward an internal security orientation.[604]

6.2.4. Public Encouragement

In Argentina, cultural innovation eliminated a key element that in the past had fed the malicious cycle of praetorianism and military interventionism: the civilian calls for military intervention. The politics of human rights altered well-established features of Argentine political culture and introduced a novel and healthy concern for rights and constitutionalism, which provided normative validity to claims for the consolidation of a constitutional form of democracy. The introduction of a concern for rights and constitutionalism into the Argentine political culture marks a point of inflexion that left behind a turbulent period of political instability and disregard for institutions. By privileging constitutionalism over authoritarianism, Argentine society was able to break with Huntington's sterile road to institutionalization.

First, if military intervention in developing societies stems as much from pressures and calls of civilian groups and institutions as from military initiative, the analysis of processes of political and cultural innovation within civil society-like the emergence of new actors, discourses and forms of politicization organized around a demand for rights and the rule of law-can shed light on developments that can help remove the social bases of military authoritarianism and open the way for a solid process of political institutionalization.

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[603] A. Stepan. (1988) "Rethinking Military Politics" p:126-133 .
[604] D. L. Norden. (1996) p: 57.

Second, Huntington's assumption that the military, due to their organizational characteristics, are better prepared to ensure political stability and institutionalization proved not only erroneous but very costly for the military institution. Military intervention in politics inevitably affects the unity and institutional coherence of the Armed Forces, fragmenting them into conflicting factions. The dramatic discredit and crisis of the Argentine Armed Forces and the alienation of the institution from large sectors of the citizenry shows the high costs that the military is paying for their politicization. In the Argentine case, the resort to illegal violence further aggravated the institutional crisis of the military. The use of illegal means erased the element that distinguishes the military from criminal, terrorist or paramilitary organizations: the monopoly of legal violence.[605]

Lastly, while authoritarian polities might provide temporary relief to the problem of ungovernability, they are poorly equipped to deal with the challenges of political institutionalization. Only constitutionalism can emancipate institutions from shortsighted political dynamics, providing them with an autonomous and coherent institutional logic. A legally constituted state no longer depends on the will of the military or of any other group, as in authoritarian polities, but on stipulated procedures that prevent the colonization of its administrative apparatus by specific social and political powers. It is consequently misleading to view constitutionalism as a mere mechanism for limiting state power, as Huntington did. His statement that in developing societies the state must be first created only to be limited at a later stage is mistaken. Such an assumption, which provides the grounds for his theory of political institutionalization in developing societies, disregards constitutionalism as a tool for institution-building, not taking into consideration the fact that it is precisely constitutionalism that simultaneously creates and organizes state power. The constitutionalization of state power and the development of the state as an institution represent two sides of the same process, for it is only constitutionalism that gives birth to the modern legal state. Analysis of the challenges and obstacles to political institutionalization in Third World societies must therefore abandon Huntington's misleading axis of civic/praetorian polities in favor of a theoretical framework that clearly distinguishes authoritarian polities from constitutional

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[605] E. Peruzzotti. (2004)p: 112.

6.2.5. Cold War Context

Sanders (1981) uncovered the impact of Cold War tension and American hegemonic influence in creating a third-world military infrastructure that largely became hostile to socialist policies of wealth equalization through land redistribution. Perlmutter and Bennet (1980) explored the dynamic of how the military apparatus of the third world identified itself with the neoliberal economic policy of guaranteeing property rights protection as a result of its dependence on American arms transfers and US military aid. Further, military institutions in the developing world incorporated elitist "pro-property" rights values because the top generals who masterminded putsches were often recruited from well-to-do families that had received Western education or training. Undoubtedly, the link between property rights and political instability is most apparent in Latin America, where most coup events had a reactionary character propagated by the military's desire to protect the property rights of the status quo. As O'Donnell (1973) argued, the military in Latin America assumed corporate values in terms of its dogmatic insistence that state intervention with the goal of redistributing the wealth of the nation was a destructive policy that would lead to economic collapse. Latin American populist regimes were overthrown in tandem with the rise of military juntas or civilian–military regimes that emphasized the protection of property rights, which was seen as the only engine of economic growth. Latin American military generals often shared an ideological mission to secure property rights that had been confiscated by populist regimes with socialist leanings. Historical cases that validate this include the 1971 coup by General Banzer against Juan José Torres in Bolivia, the putsch of General Pinochet against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the El Tacnazo coup against Juan Velasco of Peru in 1975, and a series of rightist coups in Guatemala in 1983.[606]

The 1960s witnessed an expansion of the military role throughout Latin America, significantly enhancing Argentina's already active interventionist military myths.

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[606]E. Peruzzotti. "From Praetorianism to Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina's Difficult Transition to Civilian Rule". Journal of Third World Studies, FindArticles.com, 27 Mar, 2011. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200404/ai_n9399341/

Largely in reaction to the Cold War and, more directly, the Cuban revolution, Latin American militaries began to explicitly expand their roles to encompass different facets of security. Latin American militaries increasingly defined their roles as including national security, which implies preventing both military threats and other threats to national autonomy, rather than merely national defense. As Fitch explains, "According to the national security thesis, the military has a professional responsibility for all issues which affect national security the economy, external ideological influences, foreign relations, political leadership instead of purely external defense". The perceived need to prevent or abort revolutionary movements dominated military strategy. Since economic and ideological factors are critical to the early development of revolutionary movements, promoting economic development and guarding against the development of revolutionary ideologies was considered an essential part of a strategy of preventing revolutionary warfare.

Another factor contributing to chronic interventionism in Argentina has been the limited costs generally endured by those participating in interventionist actions. Legal reprisals have been limited, and those sanctions that have been imposed have frequently lasted only briefly, due to the lack of continuity in the overall political system.

Until relatively recently, jurisdiction over insurrectionary actions taken by members of the military resided primarily in their own courts. *The Código de Justicia Militar* (Military Code of Justice) defined what actions were punishable and how, and military officers decided whether offenders should be sentenced and what that sentence should be. From the perspective of the military, however, coup attempts are not necessarily the most horrendous of all possible violations. Infractions against the military hierarchy or wartime violations of discipline appear to be viewed as significantly more serious.[607]

These laws remained largely unchanged until 1984. At this point, the newly elected Alfonsín government passed the "Law for the Defense of Democracy." A primary aim of this law was to increase the punishment for attempts against the constitutional regime. At the same time, it sought to eliminate the distinction between threats from

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[607]D. L. Norden. (1996)p: 163.

the military and threats from guerrilla insurgents, subjecting both groups to the same set of laws, following the "two demons" approach of shared blame. Thus, the law begins by changing the term rebellion (which remains in use in the 1984 version of the Military Code of Justice) to "attempts against the constitutional order and the democratic way of life" in order that either source of instability would be covered.[608]

The government's intention to ally Argentina internationally with the Western and Christian world was obvious. This point is closely related to the famed U.S.-orientation of the relatively internationalist "national security" doctrine. In some respects, the American and Argentine versions of the doctrine coincide, particularly with regard to the perception of the world as distinctly bipolar, divided between East and West. Yet, the U.S. version of the cleavage emphasizes different economic systems: communism and capitalism. In contrast, the Argentine version appears to place more emphasis on value systems, for example, criticizing the atheist definition of the Soviet state and lauding the perceived Christian base of American society.

6.2.6. Silent Concession of the United States

Since World War II, the United States has had extensive programs designed to strengthen the Latin American militaries and to provide mechanisms for US influence. These include direct military aid, military training programs, and arms sales. Encouraging like-minded Latin American officers to take a tough stance against governments that were "soft on communism" in the 1960s was a relatively easy task given the commonality of US and Latin American military outlooks, particularly among the more conservative military factions that predominated in most Latin American militaries. Trying to prevent military intervention against democratic governments is a different matter. Whether there has been a parallel decline in the ideological influence of the US military is less certain. Ideological influence is defined here as impacts on the attitudes, values, and belief systems of Latin American officers which lead them to behave differently than they would have without those impacts. In this view, the effects of US military assistance programs are indirect and long-term. Attitudes and values can be influenced through training received in the United States

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[608]D. L. Norden. (1996)p: 164 quotes (Law 23.077, Leyes Sancionadas, 1984:3839).

or provided in-country by Mobile Training Teams or through the innumerable personal and institutional contacts involved in arms sales, exchange programs, joint exercises, and the various activities of the inter-American military system (see Child, 1980). According to the "indoctrination" model, Latin American military behavior is influenced, not through the carrot/stick calculus of the bargaining model, but through shaping the values and belief systems that define the options, and specify the costs and benefits, in future situations involving choice. During the 1960s, at the heighth of the US military presence, US officials had substantial access to high-ranking officers in almost every Latin American military. Personal networks, contacts established at the US School of the Americas, and the close working relationships between US military advisory groups and their hosts provided myriad opportunities for the United States to communicate its policy preferences and its view of local politics to politically influential members of the host militaries. While there is still controversy over the US role in promoting the Latin American military's preoccupation with the "communist threat" in the 1960s, there is little doubt that the emphasis on counter-insurgency doctrines in US training and manuals following the Cuban Revolution, the changes in the kinds of equipment available, and the prestige attached to new special forces units and new doctrines all contributed to the shift toward greater concern with internal threats. To the extent that this shift in military thinking made it more likely that progressive and nationalist governments would be perceived as threatening national security, US military-to-military relations indirectly influenced political outcomes far more effectively than attempts to use military aid as a mechanism for direct political influence. To the extent that the strong US military presence in the 1960s enhanced the prestige or institutional position of officers sympathetic to US views and/or diminished the position of nationalist officers, that presence influenced the factional balance of power within the host institutions, thus indirectly influencing the military response to political crises.[609]

The debate over the political significance of US military assistance programs in Latin America has been a hardy perennial in Washington and in academia. Supporters of US military aid programs argue that they strengthen local military capabilities to defeat

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[609]J. S Fitch. (1993) The decline of US military influence in Latin America. Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs, 00221937, **35**: 2.

communist insurgencies, increase military professionalism, enhance respect for North American values including democracy and human rights), and provide a channel for US influence over a key political elite.[610]

IMET (International Military Education and Training) provides significant opportunities for future access to the civilian and military leadership of other countries. Many of the foreign students, by virtue of being selected for US training, are potential senior military leaders. As in the past, (many) are likely to hold future positions of prominence in their countries. IMET not only provides training for recipients, but also promotes a greater understanding of the US military, of American culture and values, and of respect for individual liberty.[611]

Since World War II, the United States has had extensive programs designed to strengthen the Latin American militaries and to provide mechanisms for US influence. These include direct military aid, military training programs, and arms sales.

National security conception is shaped by the geo-strategy, history and political culture of each and every nation. Besides, it is not static and it is responsive to the changes in the international and domestic conditions. Like others, Turkish sense of national security has evolved according to the Cold War environment, and accordingly to the post- Cold War era. The role of the military in the foreign and security policy making has been diminishing gradually. Civilian initiative is increasingly dominating in the post- Cold War era. [612]

The military was willing to not only eliminate guerrillas but also all the foundations of the populist society. The functionality of unrestricted markets would be the best tool for an adequate allocation of resources and the modernization of the economy.

Andersen, a special correspondent for Newsweek and the Washington Post in the mid-1980s, based his narrative on dozens of interviews with Argentine citizens persecuted by the regime, families of the disappeared, former guerrillas, U.S. intelligence agents, and Argentine military officers. He also consulted recently declassified documents of the U.S. State Department. In his work *Dossier Secreto*,

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[610]J. S. Fitch.(1993).
[611]J. S. Fitch.(1993).
[612] A. L. Karaosmanoğlu. (2000)p: 200.

Andersen reveals a balance not easily detectable in the early pages of his book: although the Argentine security community and US foreign policy and defense establishments went out of their way to exaggerate and distort the threat posed by the guerrillas, the guerrilla leaders themselves bear some share of the blame for the violence that led ultimately to the *Proceso*.

National Reorganization Process intensified measures against armed groups on the far left such as People's Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros, which from 1970 had kidnapped and murdered people almost weekly. Repression was quickly extended to the opposition in general, however, and during the "Dirty War" thousands of dissidents "disappeared". These abuses were aided and abetted by the CIA in Operation Condor, with many of the military leaders that took part in abuses trained in the U.S.-financed School of the Americas.The country's 1982 defeat by the British in the Falklands War discredited the military regime and led to free elections in 1983.

6.2.7. A survey on trust in military and expectancy of further military interventions

The large scale research on Confidence and Governability which was ran by FLACSO in 2009-2010 throughout Latin America came up with interesting results as far as the public confidence in the armed forces in Argentina is concerned.[613] In this study, several questions were directed to the subjects in order to measure their approach to the military. The author opts to demonstrate the average findings for Latin America besides Argentinean values in order to provide a comparative view.

According to 2010 results, 75,8 % of the Argentinean society thinks that another military intervention is either not possible or not likely. On the other hand, a significant percentage of 24% is unconfident of the consolidation of democracy.

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[613]FLACSO 11-18

Table 3 [614]

Confidence in the public institutions in Latin America in general and in Argentina								
	Government		Political Parties		Church		Armed Forces	
	ALA [615]	Argentina	ALA	Argentina	ALA	Argentina	ALA	Argentina
1995	41,8	37,7	25,9	26,2	72,9	63,6	49,3	37,3
1996	28,3	19,8	21	16,9	76,2	61,8	42,3	31,9
1997	-	-	27,9	28,3	75,3	59,2	47	34,3
1998	-	-	21,4	16,8	78,3	59,4	38	24,7
2000	-	-	19,5	16,1	77,3	62,7	41,9	37,2
2001	-	-	18,2	12,2	72	55,7	35,8	31,6
2002	24,4	6,5	13,8	4,6	72,3	54,2	41	30,3
2003	23,5	44,9	10,6	8,3	63,2	53,3	29,6	26,9
2004	29,6	43,6	18,3	12,4	72,4	61,9	41,6	37,2
2005	35,4	41,6	18,3	17,8	71,8	64,8	43,6	38,3
2006	43	60,6	21,7	12,7	71,5	50,9	43,7	32,5
2007	38,7	35	20,1	14	73,8	63,4	51,1	39,9
2008	42,9	31,3	21,3	13,5	66,1	54,6	44,4	36,3

It is worth attention that confidence in the Catholic Church highly exceeds all the other institutions, and the confidence never fell below 50% whatsoever. This explains the manipulative power of the Church and why other public institutions seek its cooperation. On the other hand, military has better confidence rate than expected. In terms of public confidence the military comes right after government, but still has much better rates than the political parties.

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[614]FLACSO 88-99
[615]Average of Latin America

Table 4[616] Military Necessity Perception in Argentina

The answers to "Do you believe that the military in your country should…"		
	Average of Latin America	Argentina
Continue to exist	85 %	86 %
Be abolished	14,5 %	11,6 %
No response	0,5 %	2,4 %
Total	100 %	100 %

The study indicates that the Argentinean society still favors the existence of their armed forces in spite of the past experiences and the traditional distance between the corps and the society. The ration of those who are in favor of the existence of their armed forces in Argentina slightly exceeds that of average Latin America.[617]

Table 5[618]Military Intervention Expectancy in Argentina

What is the probability of another military intervention in your country in one year time?		
	Average of L A	Argentina
Very likely	10,0 %	10,4
Somehow likely	12,1 %	13,6
Not likely	33,3 %	29,3
Not possible	44,5 %	46,5
No response	0,1 %	0,2
Total	100 %	100 %

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[616] FLACSO 41

[617] It should be noted that this question does not leave the subjects with a decision between having an armed forces or having none. The question is continued as whether "there should be a new development or there should be no armed forces at all")

[618] Ipsos- FLACSO, Estudio de Opinion sobre Governabilidad y Convivencia Democratica en America Latina, 2009-2010.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In the previous chapters the author intended to demonstrate the backgrounds of military interventions by a comparative study on particularly the 1976 Argentinean and 1980 Turkish experiences. Upon comparison, obvious similarities were encountered in spite of the fundamentally different set of historical, geographical, religious, social and cultural experiences of the two nations. This thesis also went through the classic challenges of the *most different system comparisons*, but there were enough similarities to detect a meaningful connection between the data.

This work intended to demonstrate that the Cold War context had a unique aura that had contributed to the military interventions throughout the globe; creating a common background even for the experiences of the nations which seemed to have no common grounds. Regardless of the theories one may adopt in order to analyze the reasons of the military interventions, one reality is hang up in the air: the military corps that intervened had a good set of supporters that provided them the overconfidence to intervene. The severely fragmented environment of the Cold War period seems to have been a crucial catalyzer for the interventions. The proxy Cold War that was taking place among each and every nation and the overrated fear of communism set concerns that overrode democratic concerns.

The process that precedes a successful intervention has several features that we shall group under the term "interventionist coalition." An interventionist coalition tends to emerge when sectors within the Armed Forces and civil society perceive a threat against their interests. These actors converge in a coalition that crystallizes the opposition of different groups against the government. These actors co-operate because it is in the best interest of each party to do so. A coalition thus differs from a more formal covenant because it is a temporary combination of persons, parties, institutions, economic groups, or social groups, all with different interests. Successful interventions have three main features. First, members of the armed forces execute it; second, actors of the civil and political society support it; third, the outcome of the intervention is the removal of the civilian authorities previously selected in a national

election. There were six such interventions in Argentina between 1862 and 1999: 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976.

It is worth mentioning that in both countries the military interventions came along with a touch of religious concerns in the discourse. In Argentina the Catholic Church collaborated with the intervening corps in financial terms as well as functioning as an instrument of psychological warfare against the leftist students, labor union members and a propaganda office to convince the society.

The Turkish case was not identical due to the nature of the two contexts, however it is remarkable that the 1980 intervention also came along with a clear anti-communist rhetoric and religious items became a part of the new discourse and ideology, although the junta strictly claimed that there were the supporters and guardians of *Kemalism*.

In developing nations such as our units of comparison, namely Argentina and Turkey, the international 'zeitgeist' of the Cold War overlapped the conjuncture and pain of development. What these nations were going through can be best explained by Emile Durkheim's *anomie* where the *mechanical solidarity* and *organic solidarity* cannot coexist. Developing societies in transition to democracy lack a consolidated set of values and concrete devotion to democracy and therefore they tend to "knock the doors of the barracks" when they encounter challenges and find it hard to solve within the democratic norms. For the first time in history, both civilians and the military seem to dismiss the option of a military intervention as a viable solution to a political crisis.

The national security doctrine was thus significantly revised, if not entirely discarded. In some respects, the emphasis on values (rather than economic factors) in the Argentine national security doctrine may have facilitated its transformation. The military did not relinquish the idea that Argentina had significant potential internal threats to security, but the holistic concept of national defense faded. In other words, while members of the military generally believed that they should be prepared and permitted to fight against internal enemies (ostensibly armed), for the most part they did not seem to believe that controlling the government or the economy was a necessary or functional part of the package. In sum, by the end of 1983, the Argentine military seemed ready for a new and subordinate role within the Argentine state.[619]

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[619] D. L. Norden (1996)p: 77.

However they may be evaluated, both the war against subversion and the governmental experience of the *Proceso* had increasingly drawn the armed forces away from traditional military roles and, consequently, further away from conventional sources of prestige and honor. The military government could not demonstrate that their economic policies had rescued the country from some dramatic security threat; on the contrary, Argentine economic conditions had become significantly more precarious.

On the other hand, the counter-subversive war did provide an identifiable threat to security that the armed forces had undeniably conquered. However, the manner through which the war was implemented denied the military any public claim to battlefield heroism. The dramatic escalation of the repression after the military takeover, the regular use of methods considered unacceptable internationally, and the military's failure to openly declare war on the guerrillas led many to even deny that this *could* be considered a war. Thus, when the violence tapered to an end, there were no parades to pay homage to the victors, no public acclaim for acts of heroism. Rather than being honored as saviors of the nation (as they continued to perceive themselves), the armed forces were disparaged as a collection of power-hungry, immoral monsters.

Despite the different roles that officers took, in one sense, the counter-subversive war did lend an element of unity to the military. Several officers made unsolicited comments to me that they had participated in one form or another (either actively or from a desk) and that they still felt that their actions were essential. When asked exactly what percentage of the army had participated in the counter-subversive war, an active-duty general replied in a June 1989 interview that practically all officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had taken part in some way, even if supervising travel, and that in Tucuman, even soldiers (draftees) had participated. [7] Similar to other officers, the general explained the brutality of the repression by the combination of the extensiveness of terrorism, the lack of a legal framework for that kind of problem, and the inevitability of "excesses" in any war. Along the same lines, a lieutenant colonel explained in a November 1988 interview that the military's refusal to accept the human rights trials did not imply a denial that excesses had been committed. Instead, the reaction emanated from the common belief that a greater end was at stake, which justified the use of even cruel and drastic means. "Beyond excesses," he argued, "the

republic was saved from a totalitarian regime." More than a decade passed before the military institution, beginning with Army Chief of Staff Martín Balza, would openly condemn the repression.[620]

Yet, the relative unanimity that existed in the early 1980s with respect to the ethicality and necessity of the counter-subversive war could not completely overcome the divisions that it produced. Instead, the varying modes and degrees of participation generated related differences in prestige, along with the predictable accompanying rivalries.

Closely related to the enhanced status of members of the illegal apparatus was the loss of prestige by the high command. Writing orders and directives for the repression was simply not equivalent to physically dirtying one's hands. As a middle-level officer indicated in a July 1989 interview, "the generals had the Swiss bank accounts, and we were left with the blood." According to CONADEP, this attitude was not unique. During their investigation, they received various voluntary testimonies from officers who had participated in the repression. The cooperation of these people generally was not due to any repentance for their actions but, instead, came from their feeling of '"having been abandoned by their own leaders,' after 'having contributed to the counter-subversive war in some cases losing their career or risking their own life, while they contemplated their leaders' enrichment, the generalized corruption in the ranks, and the loss of the objectives which had been denoted as the motivations for the fight'".[621]

In both nations the societies provided de facto legitimacy to the intervening corps with the expectation that they would fix what the "civilians" messed up. In spite of the massive difference in the background factors, they had developed a similar political culture, so that they perceived the military rule as an alternative to the civilians, almost as another political party. Arguably this tendency worked in harmony with the militaries that perceived that they could do basically anything as far as national security was concerned. The US methodology of exportation of ideologies as a part of the Cold War Doctrine thus found the ideal domestic allies in order to indoctrinate the related nations.

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[620] D. L. Norden (1996)p: 61.
[621] D. L. Norden (1996)p: 62.

Western societies experienced the collapse of feudalism and the rise of a new social class, namely bourgeois, which changed the basics of the society including the military's role and ideology. A common point of Turkish and Argentine political histories is that they had professional armies and a tradition of centralization which was designed by the very military authority, long before bourgeois class existed. In the absence of bourgeois class and revolution, naturally the value system and world view of this class was inexistent. As the strongest forces to play the role of social engineering, the militaries pioneered the importation of bourgeois values, institutions and innovations in both Turkey and Argentina.

In the Republican period, the military's guardianship role was further reinforced as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic and a former soldier, ultimately relied upon the army for his reforms. Ataturk's principles of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and reformism—upon which the Republican state is based—and the belief that the army is the chief guardian of these, were inculcated in the hearts and brains of officers from the first day students entered military schools and continued throughout their army careers.' While the military saw itself as an ultimate custodian of the regime, it avoided the idea of a long-term military rule. Rather, the Turkish military felt authorized to intervene in civilian politics when acts or decisions of the civilian authorities seemed to threaten what they interpreted as the national interest. For the founders of Turkish Republic, the idea of democracy had positive connotations. Democracy signified the defining feature of contemporary civilization that Turkey endeavored to achieve. Therefore, even when the military acted in an authoritarian manner, they claimed that it was to be temporary. The fact that they did not develop an authoritarian ideology in the strict sense give evidence to the positive image of democracy they held. In the same way, Argentine officers are indoctrinated with the legend of "Nation-builder" army, the "father of the nation" and the "defender of the state ideology".

Samuel Fitch observed a critical change in the military role beliefs of Argentinean soldiers, which he connected with the failure of the previous military government (1976-1982) and particularly its defeat in the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) War.[622] The

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[622]As Demirel cited from "Samuel J. Fitch. (1998)*The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America,* p: 73.

officers suffer "learned helplessness" and believe that both the society and their commanders turned them down; by first inviting them to intervene and "redo" the corrupt system, and then abandoning them with the outcomes of the military rule. It is important to emphasize that this change in values was experienced not only by those who had been part and parcel of the regime, but also by other officers who were not directly involved with the regime, but who nevertheless endured some uneasiness as a result of their association with the military as an institution.

The military regime that proceeded the constitutional period of 1983 deeply traumatized Argentina's armed forces. The seven-year military government achieved few of its stated intentions, failing bitterly at efforts to achieve legitimacy or economic success and even immersing the country in a devastating war with Great Britain. The one major goal that the government did reach was the elimination of guerrilla warfare; however, that also traumatized the military. Overall, Argentina's military regime of 1976-83 appears to have been the least successful experiment in bureaucratic authoritarianism in South America. Brazil and, in particular, Chile could claim some economic success to help even the score card, and Uruguay at least balanced limited success with somewhat more moderate repression. Argentina's authoritarianism had no such balance.[623]

In sum, the military junta initiating the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional proposed to eliminate the roots and acts of guerrilla warfare (subversion), institute a traditional code of morality, and boost the economy. A subtle tension between liberalism (free market policies and a close political alliance to the West) and the army's more common nationalist tendencies pervaded the plan. The repeated references to Christianity and morality reflected the nationalist tendencies, as did the declaration of the need for some measure of continued statism. The varying degrees, to which these policies were implemented, taken in conjunction with their outcomes, significantly influenced later orientations within the armed forces.[624]

The junta's preoccupation with combating insurgency represented the culmination of years of theoretical and practical preparation for domestic conflict, similar to trends throughout Latin America. It also marked a critical turning point in the military's

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[623]D. L. Norden (1996)p: 57.
[624]D. L. Norden (1996)p: 55.

approach to that conflict. From initially defensive and largely legal counter-guerrilla tactics, the armed forces passed to a much more extensive, offensive strategy in 1975. With the military takeover in 1976, the intensity of repression escalated dramatically, and the armed forces definitively relinquished legal boundaries.[625]

In the years following Onganía's 1966 coup, would-be guerrillas were finally given a more marketable purpose: to end military rule (Anzorena:1988). The Montoneros (the armed branch of the Peronist youth), *Ejército Revolucionario* del Pueblo (ERP), and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* began to organize. However, for most members of the military, the real beginning of guerrilla activity is marked by the 1970 kidnapping and murder of former military president General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. Aramburu's death indicated the degree to which guerrilla attacks tended to point directly at military and police personnel, active duty and retired.[3] For the left, this emphasis constituted popular retaliation for the military and security forces' recurrent interference with political freedom. Yet, by concentrating on these targets, the guerrillas magnified the military's perception of the extent of the threat. Even in Tucumán, where the guerrilla threat appeared most convincing, the size of the movement remained limited. According to Martin Andersen, "Arrayed against 5,000 army troops, the ERP guerrillas never succeeded in putting more than 120 to 140 combatants into the field, and that only for less than two weeks". However, the much larger military is also in some ways a small cohesive organization. The assassination of members thus generated a very real panic among the remaining officers. A naval officer told of having his wife stand at their apartment window with a rifle to guard him each morning as he drove away. Others recounted their constant fear and insecurity, never knowing when they or a friend might be the object of an attack. If the guerrillas wanted to assure that the military took them seriously, they certainly succeeded.

Any democratic regime encounters the challenge of the past experiences as well as confronting the tradition of military interventionism. More information about the legacies inherited by the newly founded regime can be derived from studying the prior period of military government. The collapse of the Peronist government resulted not from the violations of the military's rules but from the government's obvious inability to carry out basic functions of government in particular, providing some kind of order

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[625]D. L. Norden (1996)p: 56.

and stability. The legacies of the military regime determine the degree to which the military is likely to act in a cohesive manner, the amount of power it retains to impose its demands, and the kinds of issues that the military leadership will consider to be relevant. The military policies of the new government interact with that inheritance, challenging it or maintaining it. In the end, transitional democracies seem to have the best chance of success if their governments act to incorporate the military institution into the state, neither accepting nor encouraging politicization and simultaneously refraining from threatening professional roles and capacities.[626]

However, other evidence suggests that involvement may have been more restricted. Those estimates place the number of military personnel who were directly involved in the repression at anywhere from slightly under 900 to around 1,300.[6] According to the Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparación de Personas (CONADEP) [National Commission on the Disappeared], the repression did not implicate all members of the military or the security forces, due to the need for secrecy[627]. Although this topic was clearly a difficult one to broach in interviews, and even more difficult to verify, at least one interview supported the position that participation was not universal. In this particular case, an army major related in June of 1989 that in 1976, he was about to be transferred to a post in which his principal duty would be interrogation. After being informed by a friend that "strange things" were happening in the interrogations, he requested to be sent to a different post. The request was granted.[628] Such a request probably represented the maximum dissent an officer could express, however. Moving from asking for a different assignment to either openly opposing the repression or aiding suspects constituted a rather dramatic escalation of risks. Any member of the repressive apparatus who attempted to cross that divide could be gambling with his own safety[629].

Starting in the 1990s, particularly in the more recent years of relative political stability and political leadership, society's confidence in its politicians has strengthened, and signs of a growing dissonance in societal expectations from the military have grown. It is unlikely that an old-style military intervention will take place in either in Turkey or in Argentina for several reasons. Firstly, a considerable level of public support is

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[626]D. L. Norden (1996)p: 54.
[627] CONADEP 1986:65-66
[628] D. L. Norden (1996)p: 60.
[629] CONADEP 1986:294

necessary in order to encourage the militaries to intervene, which is less likely to occur due to the enhancing democratic culture and awareness in both societies. Secondly, the neo-liberal policies which were adopted by both countries resulted in high level of economic interdependency with the global system, thus disabling the possibility of intending to set a self-sufficient, or at least import substituted economic system. The conjuncture of Cold War which covertly encouraged militaries to intervene in order to contain and terminate left wing movements left its place to the zeitgeist of global glorification of democratization and condemnation of regimes that lack democratic elements.

A variety of factors lead the military to seize power in the first coup. The DP drew wide support solely because it was an opposition party to RPP. This support came from many sectors of society including the business class who resented the state managed economy and the religious who resented the RPP's militant secularism. As voices of dissent grew louder the DP increasingly turned away from political liberalism and increasingly towardauthoritarianism.When the DP was confronted with opposition from the RPP, the DPresponded with legislation that restricted freedom of speech and the press. Theeconomic crisis and restricted freedoms led to violent student protests against the DP andthe DP tried to use the military to quell protests. When the DP leader asked the Militaryto step in on behalf of the government against the students, a core of military officers sawthis as the final straw. In others words, it looked as though the DP was reverting back toa pre-1950 type of one-party authoritarian rule.[630]

It is interesting to note that once the DP came into power, they radicalized and in some sense acted like an opposition party even when they were in power. This was also the case in Argentina where once the opposition (UCR) party was elected, it continued to use the same antagonistic tactics that helped it win the election. This inflexible stance was one of the factors that led to the breakdown in Argentina's democratic government in 1930.[631] Peter Smith suggests two reasons for the UCR's behavior in the Argentina case.

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[630]F. Tachau & M. Heper. (1983) p: 21.
[631]Linz-Stepan (1978)p: 22.

First, the long experience of the UCR as the "out" group created a firm oppositionist mentality. Second, the new political opportunity offered unprecedented power and the party professionals were unwilling to share this power. These factors could have been responsible for the DP opposition in Turkey as well. Although it is unlikely that the DP's original leaders initially had such a strong oppositionists mentality as they were born from the traditional state elite tradition. However, their constituent base quite likely had an opposition mentality because they were excluded from politics for so long, which may explain their rapid success as an opposition party. The opposition mentality of the masses probably radicalized the leaders of the DP. In terms of the second factor, the newfound power of the DP leaders was probably something they did not want to abandon.

In 1960, the military assumed a guardian role of the state in which it tried to reestablish and preserve the status quo. The intervention can be characterized as what Samuel Huntington calls "reformist coup" since the junta did not only clean up the government, but also made reforms in political, social, and economic structure.[632]

It is of note that the military did not set up a praetorian state in which they used the state for personal entrepreneurship, as was the case in many South American countries. The military regime did, however, establish a much wider base of power through the exit guarantees they created for themselves, including an opportunity to influence all matters concerning security through the NSC.[633]

The constitution created by the junta represented a pact between the military elite and reformers in the RPP. The 1961 constitution established a legal framework which aimed at limiting the state institutions by setting a check and balance system, as well as safeguarding the basic rights. The constitution maintained that the state power was fragment into legislative[634], executive, and judiciary branches each with independence from one another. It also provided exceptional political freedoms for the citizens by allowing more freedom of speech, religion, and the formation of unions.These new

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[632]S. Huntington.(1962)Changing Patterns in Military Politics.p: 32-34.
[633]E. Özbudun. (2000)Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p:116.
[634] Bicameral parliament was introduced with the constitution of 1961.

freedoms in civil society caused a rapid transformation in politics that the military did not expect.[635]

The electoral results did not produce the desired outcome. The RPP received only 36.7% of the vote, while DP's successor parties, the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP) received 34.7% and 13% of the vote respectively.

The first parliamentary cabinet after the restoration of civilian rule was established with a forced coalition between the RPP and the DP. The state elite would not let the two successor parties of the DP form a government themselves until the following election. The RPP-JP coalition was short lived and was followed by several coalitions between the RPP and the minority parties. However, by 1965 the JP had over 50% of the popular vote and was able to form the government.

By 1968 the new multiparty system was out of control. The left became increasing fragmented and radicalized. The right "regrouped" to counterattack the rise of leftist radicalism and in turn became radical themselves. Violent clashes began to occur between right wing and left wing groups. The government (JP) took an aggressive attitude toward the left and jeopardized the new era of pluralism by taking sides with the right[636] In 1971 the military issued a communiqué to the JP which threatened a coup if the government could not put an end to anarchy, which had arose from their impotency.

The RPP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit moved even further to the left and began to ally itself with groups that were against the state centered tradition of the RPP. This was a total shift in the state-centered ideology and a move toward creating a socialist party.[637] With this genuine ideological shift of the RPP, both RPP and JP began seek allies from the periphery, ending up associating with radical groups. With this move, RPP completely alienated itself from the military as they saw these leftist

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[635]It is common for authoritarian regimes to make liberalizing concessions to pacify and co-opt opposition. See Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A., p.150
[636] K. Karpat. (2004) p: 134.
[637]K. Karpat. (2004) p:147.

groups as a threat to national security. As the left and right ideologies shifted away from the center, polarization between the political parties increased.[638]

The formation of the "Nationalist Front" government in 1975 as coalition between the AP government and two radical parties caused further tension between the political parties and the military.[639] The polarization in the political sector spread to other sectors such as teaching, security services, and the civil bureaucracy.[640]The continuing violence polarized political divisions even further. The violence and the fragmentation in Turkish politics and Turkish society led to the third intervention in democracy.

This intervention was different than the others in that the military was no longer aligned with the RPP, or any other social group for that matter. There was no state elite to align with as they had in the 1960 coup. Rather than creating a new body to run the government, the NSC took control and made governing decisions with little outside consultation. They abolished all of the old political parties in an attempt to limit partisan competition and also reaffirmed the powers of the NSC. The new constitution also restricted freedoms regarding the formation of groups that were allowed under the 1961 constitution.

This high level of polarization between parties and within parties has remained. In several elections, five separate parties were able to pass the 10% voting threshold and made it into parliament. This provided for several unstable coalitions. No government had been able to establish a ruling majority in parliament until the most recent election. Furthermore, the military has maintained a high level of autonomy and has continued to influence political decisions behind the scenes, using the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as their justification.

Several South American cases illustrated how the development of a democratic political culture is important to the development of democratic institutions.Why hasn't Turkey developed a political culture more conducive to democracy?This is perhaps due to the types of regimes transitions that have occurred in each case. From the beginning, reform came from above. This was the case with all transition to

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[638]M. Heper. (2006) Türkiye'de Devlet Geleneği p: 118.
[639]M. Heper. (2006)p: 119.
[640]M. Heper. (2006)p: 122.

democracy. However, when those from above did not like the outcome they took control and tried again after altering the rules by amending the constitution or creating a new one. There was never a rupture in the traditional power structure. The state elites always remained the ultimate arbitrator of power. On the other hand, in cases where there is reform through rupture, transitions seem to happen more smoothly. This was the case for Argentina in 1982. The agenda of the transition was set by the anti-incumbent elites. Without competition from the incumbent military regime, the two main opposition parties were able to face-off in an election the following year. The transition was brief and relatively uncomplicated.73 This type of transition is smoother and shorter because the pre-existing power base is eliminated. The lack of a bottom up or a transition from outside the traditional elite structure may explain why Turkey has not developed a political culture more suitable for democracy. The state elite maintained too much power in each case for a true democracy to develop.

Although parliamentary rule was restored after the election of November 1983Turkey was under military rule throughout the 1980s. Supported by Washington, the generals totally disregarded criticism from Europe concerning the lack of democracy and the violation of human rights. For the Pentagon, it was stability that mattered.[641]

Military rule lasted three years, a relatively short period when compared with other regions like Latin America. Yet, by the time power was handed to the new elected government, Turkey had a new constitution, new laws to regulate elections, political parties, trade unions, and universities; and the economy was going through a programme of stabilization and market oriented policies.[642]

The junta that was in power for three years, from September 1983 called itself the National Security Council (NSC). It was headed by Chief of Staff Kenan Evren and included the four chiefs of the armed forces (army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie). Martial law commanders ran the country the armed forces had been 'transformed into an institution of militarism… One sign of the advent of militarism is the assumption by a nation's armed forces of numerous tasks that should be reserved for civilians' (Johnson, 2004). The result was a system in which the TGS used a number of

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[641]F. Ahmad. (2010) "Military in Turkey" in Kerslake, C., Öktem, K. and Robins, P. (eds.) *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity,* p: 142.
[642]F. Ahmad.(1993) The Making of Modern Turkeyp: 185-188.

institutional and informal mechanisms to ensure that government policy remained within acceptable bounds.[643]

These observations, however, seem contradictory to those familiar with the western notion of democracy (supremacy of civil authorities and citizens). For, a political system can be regarded as democratic if its citizens enjoy civil and political freedoms that permit them to 'articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests', to compete at regular intervals by non-violent means for their claim to rule and exercise control over public policies and the officials who make them. If the authority of citizens and democratically elected leaders is constrained by reserve powers held by any group or institution that is not democratically responsible then the system should be considered as falling significantly short of the democratic type.[644]

The events leadings to the 1980 intervention indicate that a coup is unlikely to happen unless it has the support of some important civilian groups. Many believe that the military deliberately delayed action, assuming that the continuation and aggravation of the crisis would further support the intervention. The Turkish Armed Forces performed three successful interventions, namely 1960 intervention, 1971 memorandum and 1980 intervention. Each time, after holding power in its hand for a relatively short period, it went back to the barracks, leaving the political scene to the civilians, nevertheless obtaining some exit guarantees such as tutelary powers, reserved domains, manipulation of the electoral system, irreversibility of military acts and amnesty laws; which are characteristics of reform mode transitions. The government took exit guarantees as a price to be paid by democratic forces to outgoing authoritarian power holders in order to re-establish the democratic order.

While the military intervention of 1960 brought a de facto identification of the military with the RPP via the reforms and the Constitution, that of 1971 not only failed to limit but actually accelerated the process of alienation primarily because it brought into the open divergence of opinion among the politicians and the military on social classes.[645] Atatürk, nationalism, secularism, and reformism, had previously been marked.

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[643]N. Narlı. (2000) Civil-Military Relations in Turkey in*Turkish Studies,***1**:1 p: 107-127.
[644]N. Narlı. (2000) Civil-Military Relations in Turkey in*Turkish Studies*, **1**:1 p: 107-127.
[645]K. Karpat.(2003) Studies on Turkish Politics and Society; Selected Articles and Essays p: 366.

There are strong similarities between the experiences of Argentina 1976 and Turkey 1980 in terms of:

- The role of the militaries in the founding of the states and the high esteem of the military figures among the society as the founders of the state,

- Self-perception of the militaries as the "founder of the state, the guardian of the nation and the state ideology," and a feeling of superiority towards the civilians,

- German impact on the military officers and institutions until 1960s,

- American training and impact on the military officers and institutions from 1960s onwards,

- A cyclic pattern of successful military interventions,

- Political culture that favors military interventions as an alternative to the civilian governments,

- the Cold War context National Security Strategies designed accordingly, and the threat perception of Communism,

- the covert encouragement of the United States for conservative military interventions in order to contain Soviet impact,

- promotion of religion as an antidote to communism,

- the constant economic problems and the civilian governments' inability to solve them. These common aspects of the compared units imply that the global political conjuncture may contribute the development of similar –if not identical- consequences in different contexts.

However, there are also deep differences. For instance, the Turkish Armed Forces has a high level contact with the civil society as a result of the conscription system and the recruitment method of professional soldiers, whereas Argentine Armed Forces does not have compulsory military service and recruits the professional soldiers from traditional and closed segments of the society, which consequently creates a gap between the soldier and the society.

Another significant difference seems to be the composition of the officer corps and recruitment methods. Argentine Armed Forces tends to recruit officers from certain

segments of the society, and even each force has a family tradition, which prevents its contact to the other segments of the society. On the other hand, Turkish Armed Forces recruits professional soldiers from a wider class; albeit it avoids the recruitment from certain groups with religious or separatist tendencies.

All in all, this work suggests that another military intervention is not likely in either of the countries; due to the zeitgeist of the post-Cold War period, negative memories of the past experiences and the change in political cultures as to favor democracy.

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Biblioteca Nacional, Buenos Aires

ESMA (Museo), Buenos Aires

La Perla, Centro de Clandestino de Detención, Córdoba

Library of Boğaziçi University, İstanbul

Yeditepe Knowledge Center, İstanbul

Interviews:

By their request the identities of three military officers of Argentine Army are confidential.

*Andres Fontana (PhD)

*Arturo Aquilino Fernandez (PhD)

*Dardo Alzogaray (PhD)

*Edip Başer (Retired General)

*Eduardo Gonzalez Villa Monte (Retired Colonel)

*Jorge Mario Battaglino (PhD)

*Luis Tibiletti (Retired Captain)

*Maria Paula Cicogna (PhD)

*Sebastian Barros (PhD)

* Anonymous (Retired Colonel)

*Anonymous (Major on duty)

* Anonymous (Major on duty)

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MAP OF ARGENTINA

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