



**T.C.
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE CHANGES IN NATO DEFENSE CONCEPT AND TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY**

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKKA	Europe Conventional Powers Agreements
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COE	Council of Europe
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DP	Democrat Party
DISK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unio
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FIR	Flight Information Region
MC	Military Committee
MLF	Multilateral Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAC	North Atlantic Committee
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RP	Republican Party
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limited Talks
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TLP	Turkish Labor Party
U.S.	United States

ABSTRACT

In this study, the relations between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Turkish Foreign Policy are examined. The changing strategies of NATO throughout periods and how Turkish Foreign Policy is affected in this period are discussed. NATO has developed four main strategies during cold war period : 1. Classical Defense Strategy, 2. Massive Retaliation Strategy, 3. Flexible Response Strategy, 4. NATO's Renewed Confrontation after Detant period.

It has been difficult for Turkish Foreign Policy to develop and take a stand against NATO's developing new strategies. For Turkish Policy makers rule the country mainly with domestic and external development has been trouble.

It was aimed to use nuclear power against the Soviet threat so Massive Retailation Strategy was also developed in this manner. Correspond to Turkey's onset on NATO membership resulted in discussions. The country was going to be center of nuclear war and targeted of nuclear weapons. Also if nuclear weapons were fired without knowledge of Turkey, the country would be a victim of disaster war.

The developed strategy 'Flexible Response' following the Detant process opened a new discussion that Turkey would be the first target in the conventional war because it was a wing country near to Soviet state. The planned of new strategy was to stop Soviets by using first conventional powers so that Turkish lands would possibly be invaded by the Soviets.

The developed process of Detant and Flexible Response Strategy in 1960 and 1970's has weakened later times. Particularly two events in the 1970s stopped the new developments in the way of disarmament. During 1970's, the Soviets and Americans signed SALT I and SALT II disarmament talks however Islamic Revolution in Iran, the biggest ally of the Americans in Middle East and the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan prevented disarmament process in the world. On those years, Turkey wasn't able to solve its economic and political problems so a military coup was occurred on September 12, 1980. Throughout 1980s, both NATO parties and Turkey tried to be adopted for the new world's conditions when the Soviets began to lose its power.

The subject of this thesis : “NATO’s Defense Concept and Turkish Foreign Policy” will be analyzed in the framework cause-effect relations. Furthermore, how Turkish Foreign Policy’s changes under external events affected the inner Turkish policy will be answered.

Key Words : NATO, Turkish Foreign Policy, NATO’s Defense Strategies, America, the Soviet Union

ÖZET

Bu çalışma da, Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) ve Türk Dış Politikası ilişkileri ele alınacaktır. Atlantik Paktının dönemsel olarak değiştirdiği savunma stratejilerinin Türk karar alma mekanizması üzerindeki etkileri ne derece olduğu ve Türk Dış Politikasını hangi aşamalarda etkilediği tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda NATO’nun soğuk savaş sürecinde dört temel strateji geliştirdiği üzerinde durulmuştur : 1. Klasik Savunma Stratejisi, 2. Topyekün Mukabele Stratejisi, 3. Esnek Karşıtlık Stratejisi, 4. Yumuşama Dönemi Sonrası yeniden yapılanma süreci.

Türk Dış Politikası’nın, NATO’nun geliştirdiği yeni stratejiler karşısında aldığı tedbirler ve değişiklikler sancılı bir şekilde olmuştur. Hem iç dinamikler hem de dış dinamikler, ülkeyi yönetenleri; oluşan yeni şartlara adapte olmakta zorlamıştır.

Sovyet tehdidine karşı öngörülen Topyekün Mukabele Stratejisi nükleer gücü etkin bir şekilde kullanmayı hedefliyordu. Türkiye’nin NATO üyeliğinin ilk yıllarına denk gelen bu süreç, ülkede şu tartışmayı beraberinde getirmişti. Türk toprakları nükleer başlıklı füzelerin merkezi olacak ve savaşta hedef ülke haline gelecekti. Aynı zamanda nükleer füzelerin kullanımı Türkiye’nin haberi olmadan ateşlenirse ülke yıkıcı bir savaşın kurbanı olacaktı.

Yumuşama dönemiyle birlikte geliştirilen Esnek Mukabele Stratejisi Türkiye’de başka bir tartışma başlatmış bir kanat ülkesi olan Türkiye’nin Sovyetlerle olan savaşında ilk hedef ülke olacağı söylenmiştir. Çünkü Sovyetleri durdurmak için konvansiyonel silah kullanımı ilk aşama olacaktı. Bu durumda olası savaşta Sovyetlerin ilerlemesini durdurmak zor olacak ve Türkiye toprakları büyük bir savaşın içine girecektir.

1960’lı ve 1970’li yıllardaki yumuşama dönemi ve geliştirilen Esnek Mukabele Stratejisi zaman içinde zayıflamaya başlamıştır. Özellikle Sovyetlerle yapılan SALT I ve SALT II silahsızlanma anlaşmaları 70’li yılların sonunda yaşanan iki olay ile başarısızlığa uğradı. Birincisi Amerikanın Orta Doğu’daki en büyük müttefiki İran’ın İslami devrim sonrası

Batıyla olan ilişkilerinin kopması. İkincisi Sovyetlerin Afganistan'ı işgali. Bu yıllarda Türkiye ekonomik ve siyasi meselelerini çözememiş ve 12 Eylül 1980 askeri müdahalesine maruz kalmıştır. 80'li yıllarda hem NATO ülkeleri hem de Türkiye, Sovyetlerin zayıflamasıyla birlikte oluşan yeni şartlara adapte olmak için çaba göstermişlerdir.

Tezimin konusunu oluşturan: "NATO Savunma Stratejilerinin Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri", tüm detayları ile sebep-sonuç ilişkileri çerçevesinde analiz edilecektir. Aynı zamanda Türk Dış Politikası'nın dış etkenlere bağlı olarak geçirdiği değişiklikler iç siyaseti ne derece etkilediği sorularına cevap aranacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler : NATO, Türk Dış Politikası, NATO Savunma Stratejileri, Amerika, Sovyetler Birliği

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INTRODUCTION

In the concepts and methods of political science, the study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been explained by traditional security approaches. In this thesis, security has economic, environmental, social and political aspects.

An alliance system, on the other hand is directly related to the security subject. Ensuring the alliance system in history has been the strongest way to establish security system. The Alliance structure in the history of International Relations has not been a subject of research yet. However, it is significant to understand the security system if the alliances or cooperation in International system are searched well, the security system can be understood.¹

This thesis has two dimensions: the first one is NATO and the other is Turkish foreign policy. Foreign Policy in Turkey is seen as above on domestic policy. In other words foreign policy is seen as being politics. This kind of notion mostly is seen in 1950's so that neither government nor opposing members of parliament criticized each other about foreign affairs in public. Ismet Inonu in the 1950s, for instance, he was in the opposition and didn't like the foreign policy of ruling party.

Turkish foreign policy has been heavily affected by respect for the United Nations' debates and the North Atlantic Pact for six decades. In Turkey a few of studies about NATO examined on its structural and operational aspects. However analyzing Turkish Foreign Policy, more specifically a detailed research of the effect on North Atlantic Pact, is one of the greatest needs in academic research. Previous studies have simply separated NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy.

This thesis will examine long-term pro-NATO and anti-NATO debates over Turkish political life. Protests in the 1960s and 1970s against NATO and American power in the country indirectly affected different Turkish governments. Anti-NATO articles by Mehmet Ali Aybar, Dođan Avcıođlu, Ecvet Güresin in Cumhuriyet were written. Moreover, the effects of such institutions as the Turkish Labor Party, Universities and DİSK are significant in evaluating Turkish Political life. This study also aims clearly shows Turkish Political life via domestic events.

¹ In Turkey the Alliance system hasn't been on agenda of academic researches so that my thesis will cover this kind gap in academic field.

Moreover, Turkey-NATO relations have been significant for the modernization of the Turkish army. Modernism is not seen only in military area but also in the infrastructure of the country. This thesis aims to examine the “Modernization of Turkey”, that is to say, the modernization of the army and the rest of the country. All divisions of the continuum of modernization are bound to some extent to the arbitrary which have taken place in all subjects.

It would not be correct to write in terms of a complete break with the past, as if what had existed earlier had been totally renewed by NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy. It is more accurate to evaluate the process as having been created by a complex interaction between Turkey and the pact.

The onset of the Cold War and creation of NATO heavily affected Turkish foreign policy. America became the most powerful state after Second World War. On the other hand Soviet state was the second powerful state. Both super powers formed their own defense security pacts: Warsaw pact was established on the initiative of the Soviets and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed under the leadership of the United States of America. The Eastern European states next to the Soviet Union gathered under the Warsaw pact but Western and Atlantic states came together under NATO. Turkey as its part of foreign policy tradition, felt itself nearer to NATO from the first year of the formation of the alliance and Turkey indicated its willingness to be a part of the alliance.

In the late 1950's, the Americans and Soviets dominated the two alliances. The Soviets controlled huge territories in Eastern Europe such as, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia and Poland. On the other side, the United States had gathered 15 Western countries under NATO protection: England, France, Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Norway, Greece, Turkey and Federal Germany.

However there is more disagreements than agreement among writers and politicians concerning NATO, In this study NATO as a subject in Turkish foreign policy is one of the issues which has dominated over Turkish public opinion. One of the biggest discussions has been Turkish national defense. The debate takes place between two camps : Leftist groups and the liberal one's capabilities. Those who oppose NATO claim that Turkey has been a slave country in the alliance and its national defense capabilities are so weak because of NATO membership.

In this dissertation, I aim to answer the following questions :

Throughout NATO history, as Is it based on the subject, it is first focused on changing in NATO's defense concepts ? And how has Turkish foreign policy responded to NATO's changing defense policies ? What are the strategic concepts of NATO which have been declared up to now? How has Turkey responded any of these strategic concepts ? How has NATO affected Turkey's security concept ?

The purpose of this thesis is to answer these questions comprehensively. I hope to find the answers from a Turkish-centric perspective and help contribute to the academic literature on the subject as well. Turkish foreign policy has many components that one of the most effective component is NATO. That's why I will take into account both NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy in historical process together. When we take a look at Turkey's domestic politics, it is clear that the external events have always affected Turkish domestic policy. The relationship between NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy, therefore is significant.

The research was based on quantitative and qualitative research methods. I used archives, statistical data, graphics and maps for better presentation of the subject. The literature review is made to great extent in order to present different perceptions of specific subjects. Since this study focuses on both NATO's defense concepts and Turkish foreign policy together, it will be a unique contribution to the academic literature as well. Previous works in this field were solely based on NATO. Previous studies haven't focused on Foreign Policy and NATO together.

This dissertation first reviews primary sources particularly the treaties which formed NATO's structure. The most important is the Washington Treaty, which was signed on 4 April, 1949, and is the foundation of NATO, in addition various reports, published under the initiative of NATO are significant for this study because, they are helpful in understanding later strategies developed by NATO Headquarters. For example, after the French withdrawal from NATO's military body in 1966, the organization was in deep crisis. This dispute was resolved by the Harmel Report of 1967 For that reason evaluating these kind of reports are so important for this study.

From the beginning, NATO has repeatedly changed its defense concept strategies in order to adapt to new global situations. These strategic concepts are comprehensively analyzed in this dissertation.

Moreover, I have analyzed the speeches of the Secretary Generals of NATO, statesmen and ambassadors (Turkish and foreign), which make up some of my primary sources. Retired ambassadors who worked in NATO are also interviewed for this study. Selected states men who assisted in this work are Edip Baser who worked as the Commander of NATO land forces in Southeast Europe, Ömer Akbel, the Chairman of Türk Atlantic Council, Hüseyin Dirioz, Ambassador Assistant Secretary General For Defence Policy Planning of NATO, Necdet Serin, Secretary of General of the Turk Atlantic Council.

I used two more sources as primary sources. The first one was the official web site of NATO,² and the second one was Turkish and English daily newspapers. In addition, I gave particular emphasis to NATO's hand books which are published every year and explain NATO's policies and future plans.

I heavily utilized secondary sources written about NATO such as books and academic articles, which formed the basis of the literature review. I collected these kinds of secondary sources from the Islam Research Center (ISAM), Yeditepe University Library and Beyazıt State Library.

In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council in Ankara has a great selection of archives on the subject of previous conferences held in Antalya for every year. Several statesmen and academics discuss NATO and its problems at the yearly Antalya conferences in which I also participated.

Aside from NATO's changing defense concepts, this dissertation analyzes Turkish foreign policy so it is also necessary to analyze Turkish sources. Just as with NATO, Turkish foreign policy was analyzed with the primary sources. Official reports of the Turkish Assembly helped me greatly enhance Turkish Foreign Policy. I also examined the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover Turkey's Multilateral Conventions with NATO serve as basic documents of the Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

Furthermore, the diplomatic speeches of states men in the Turkish Assembly concerning NATO and Turkish foreign policy.

Foreign Ministers' speeches and policies serve mostly as basic sources to evaluate the relationship between NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy therefore both from the archives of ministry of Foreign Affairs and daily newspapers are important to get their speeches and acts.

² NATO's official web site presents a great selection of archive related to NATO and world history. See, www.nato.int

The secondary sources for Turkish Foreign Policy have been investigated by distinguished academicians and experts. For the most part selected Turkish and non-Turkish. These are William Hale's **Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000**, Baskın Oran's **Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1980)**, Oral Sander's **Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964**, Mehmet Gönlübol's **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)**, Tayyar Arı's **Yükselen Güç : Türkiye ABD İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu**.

The memoirs of Turkish and non-Turkish states men were also undertaken for this dissertation. George Mc Ghee, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey (1951-1953) wrote a famous book called "Turkey, the USA and NATO", which is a good source for that-time period. Kamuran Gürün's³ **Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Politikası : 1939'dan Günümüze**, includes his memoirs, is also significant. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil's⁴ **Anılarım**, Kemal Girgin's⁵ **T.C. Hükümetleri Programında Dış Politikamız: 75 Yılın Panoraması 1923-1998**. İlder Türkmen's⁶ articles as well as his book about Turkish foreign policy, Taner Baytok's **Diplomasi Düşleri**, and Vahit Halefoğlu's⁷ memoirs are all very important as well.

The Dissertation is composed of five chapters. 1. Theoretical Framework : The Balance of Power theory (During the cold War period) Institutional Liberalism (Post Cold War Period). 2. NATO as an organization and its changing strategies during cold war period. 3. The Beginning of the Cold War Period-Turkish Foreign Policy, and NATO. 4. Détente Period – Turkish Foreign Policy and NATO. 5. The Second phase in Cold War and Turkish Foreign Policy – NATO Relations.

The first chapter is devoted to the overview of the theoretical framework of this study. NATO's first "long"⁸ period lasted until the end of the Cold war. This time period is explained by the means of Balance of Power theory.

Balance of power is described the polarity of the Cold War that it was integral synonymous with, the concept of the East-West order. Though the image was so familiar as to be almost apparent, a great agreement of political presumption was locked within its crystalline structure. East and West obtained, and there was a "balance" between them that

³ Turkish Diplomat who wrote several books about Turkish Foreign Policy.

⁴ He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey for three terms; 1965-1971, 1975-1977, and 1977-1978.

⁵ Turkish Retired Diplomat

⁶ Retired Diplomat

⁷ Retired Diplomat

⁸ The events between 1949 to 1990(end of cold war) is evaluated and emphasised this period "long".

theoretically in one way "counterbalanced" an affirmation called power, inhaled by the enemies, each side, in the way material objects possess accumulation. The enemy also postulated by the balance of power-without an enemy, what would be balanced?-served to anneal political alliance, and hence political identity, on both sides. Throughout the Cold War, divisions among states party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact, as well as divisions within each state, were obscured by the need to maintain a common front against the enemy.⁹

In the context of the balance of power, the discipline of strategic studies turned on a single inquiry: to what extent did an event, either actual or possible, enlarge the military potential of one side or the other? This inquiry often advanced the problems of judgment. Both the United States and the Soviet Union long conserved inefficient capacity for the manufacture of steel in order to serve anticipated wartime needs. Within the strategic argument, the definite relationship between the capacity to manufacture steel and military fitness was debatable, but the stakes and the terms of the argument were clear. Political questions, such as how to pay for the subsidy, were not unrelated, but were considered analytically separable inquiries. Just as participants in a sport rarely consider the appropriateness of the rules that inform their game, the balance of power so well defined strategic questions that larger questions went unasked.¹⁰

The East-West order, which defined both the actors and the objectives, no longer exists. In the words of Polish politician Bronislaw Geremek, we are confronted by dangers, not enemies. There is no balance of power with danger, no conflict with danger. Danger may be assessed. But without a hard-edged notion of conflict to provide a context in which probability can be calculated, danger assessment is a hazy enterprise. Suppose, for plausible example, that the European Union is somehow at risk from unrest in Southern Europe. Should the Union attempt to integrate its forces to defend itself against Southern Europe? Should a new wall be built? Or should the Union attempt to integrate Southern Europe into its defense structure, either through NATO or the Western European Union, in the hopes of minimizing the risk of violent disorder? How much of Europe (what is Europe?) should be included in this process of integration? Should this process be limited to the military sector, or should it include the economy? How complete, and how swift, is this effort to be? And so forth.

⁹ <http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/1326-Balance-of-Power-in-International-Relations.html>

¹⁰ <http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/1326-Balance-of-Power-in-International-Relations.html>

Strategy that would confront such threats requires a view of politics considerably more nuanced than polarity; policy can not be determined by argument that one "side" enjoys some military advantage over the other. Strategic thinking now entails politics, economics, and history, in addition to its traditional focus on military capability, because a strategic world where security is threatened by dangers rather than enemies is complex and vague in ways that the old strategic world was not. In response to uncertainty, the new strategic thinking seeks stability more avidly than it seeks some ill-defined "advantage." Stability is hardly a new concern; what is new is that stability has become virtually the only concern. So, for example, it recently appeared to make strategic sense to cut the size of our military, in part because the federal deficit was thought to hamper national competitiveness and economic unrest was seen as a greater threat to our security than invasion. Similarly, it makes strategic sense for Western European states to give money to help the young governments of Central and Southern Europe stabilize their economies, not because those governments plan to invade, but because their failure may lead to massive immigration or civil war. Rather than the purchase of military hardware, security concerns now impel the provision of loan guarantees. Strategy used to mean the attainment of military superiority, or at least deterrence; it now means the pursuit of social stability. Politics writ large has absorbed strategic studies.

The vague character of threats to social security means that when we cannot quarantine social instability (as we frequently do with those chaotic Africans), intervention is likely. In a dangerous world, security is obtained by proactive measures designed to shore up the social order. In contrast, in the traditional world of enemies, security is the capability to respond to the threat posed by the enemy. (Only rarely has security been thought best obtained by preemptive attack.) So we long preserved the capacity to respond to Soviet aggression with nuclear force, if necessary. Today, the United States is criticized not for its lack of readiness, but for not taking enough action within the former Soviet Union to help ensure that the weapons of mass destruction remain in sane hands. In this light, the invasion of Panama and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement may be understood as attempts to establish a viable social order in situations that present profound threats to our security, our lust for drugs and the weaknesses peculiar to a highly technological economy.

If security is now better procured than defended, then early intervention will often be more effective and cheaper than late intervention. Contemporary strategic thinking inclines to the adage "a stitch in time saves nine." Diffuse threats to security should be addressed before they have time to gain focus and momentum. The task for contemporary strategic thinking is therefore the avoidance, rather than the development, of the logic of war. For example, it has for some time been argued that more decisive action by the European Community (and then the European Union) and the United Nations at the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia might have prevented at least some of the carnage and associated risks. War, even civil war, has its own awful logic, and the various factions in what was Yugoslavia fought within that logic, to regain territory lost by military action. Had the logic of violence not been established, Yugoslavia might be merely politically fractious, like Belgium or even what was Czechoslovakia. The transformation of strategy amounts to an imperative to intervene, militarily if necessary, in the service of order.

The Post cold war period is not the subject of my thesis nevertheless I take into account this time period and make a correlation with Balance of Power theory. Hence NATO had to change its position after the 1990's when the Soviet Union was dissolved. NATO's primary source of collective defense was expressed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However NATO apart from being a collective defense organization against Soviet Union, it has given importance to the institutionalization of the relationship between North America and Western Europe.

NATO, in this new world, has changed its strategy and declared a collective security system in which its new focus global security. The safety that can be drawn from this is part of the basement of the neoliberal institutionalism debate. This period will be explained by Institutional Liberalism, which uses the importance of military power in international relations, international law and the need for interstate partnership through institutions to preserve the stability of the system.

Apart from Balance of Power and Institutional theory, it is necessary to underline a sublevel of systems of alliances. The Alliance system is the method : the states are not attained its national desire on that account states agree with other parties in which they follow common purposes. Furthermore each party set up alliance system for prestige,

increasing its effect on other states, providing legality in international areas and decreasing defense budgets.¹¹

The second chapter underlines historical backdrop of NATO. While taking into account the historical process, it is evaluated in terms of the European construction after the Second World War. The NATO was founded in 1949 by 12 countries : The United States, England, France, Iceland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Norway in 1949. It was set up as an international collective-security defense organization which would protect the North Atlantic basin of Western European states. However the organization was neither composed of Atlantic states nor aimed to check Soviet expansion after the Cold War ended.

NATO's most deterrent clause is the fifth article of the Washington Treaty. In it, all parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. However this article was never used until 2002. NATO members agreed to act on this article after 9 /11 events.

The second chapter evaluates NATO and its organizations. They consist of three main bodies : 1. civilian bodies, 2. military bodies, 3. organizations and agencies. One of the most significant parts of the thesis is NATO's Changing Strategies is underlined in the second chapter. The strategies are separated into four parts :

1. Classical Defense Strategy (1949-1954). The strategy was developed because the perceived Soviet threat against Europe in this way, the United States tried to enhance its nuclear power.

The first atomic test of the Cold War was conducted by the Soviets in August 1949 an event which shocked US policy makers. In response Truman began America's nuclear energy development program. His administration started to discuss whether the US nuclear monopoly had ended or not.

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces on 25 June 1950 and NATO parties to rethink itself once again. It realized that it had to change the NATO military structure. On September 1950, the North Atlantic Council established an integrated military force under central command. Three major commands were initially recommended. The first was to be the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The second was a commander for the Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean. The third was to be a Supreme Allied Commander,

¹¹ Tayyar Arı, **Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika**, Alfa Press, İstanbul 1996, p. 237.

Atlantic. The first General Commander of the military structure was Dwight D. Eisenhower. Turkey, at that stage tried to be a member of the alliance. During Turkish membership negotiations, Ankara sent its military force to Korea and was criticized by opposition groups in Parliament. Turkey sent 4500 troops under Colonel Tahsin Yazıcı command. The Republican People's Party reacted negatively to this decision because the 26th article of the Constitution did not allow as only National Parliament get decision the however, the government to send troops without the permission of Parliament. Despite oppositions, the government did not step back from its the decision. It was,for them, a big opportunity to join NATO and the Western bloc. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 after that time, the country tried to adopt new organization and new strategy.

2. Massive Retaliation Strategy(1954-1961). It was accepted after the ministerial meeting in 1954. Until 1953 nuclear weapons had not been mentioned as part of NATO strategy. General Alfred Gruenter established a "New Approach Group" at Shape in August 1953 which decided to complete the integration nuclear policy into NATO strategy. Moreover ninety six NATO divisions after ninety days of mobilization would be planned to be ready for any hostile attack.

This new policy titled and enacted on NSC 162/2 of 30 October 1953 stated that : "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be available for use as other weapon. The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory power if the area is attacked."

3. Flexible Response Strategy.(1961-1979) This strategy aimed to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight. A second element in this strategy was escalation. In it, overcoming hostility could be done by employing nuclear power. Nuclear reaction was seen as the ultimate to that policy hindrance. Parallel to Flexible Response, the Harmel Report was published in 1967 to provide a dual track approach to security : political and military. Political relations towards the East were to seek a relaxation of tensions and politics issues that separated Europe. The Harmel Report brought in the Détente period and lasted until 1979. However, in that year, three events increased tensions between the two blocs: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the introduction of Soviet SS-20 missiles, and Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran shocked the US because Iran was an important ally of it.

4. NATO's Renewed Confrontation and the End of Cold War (1979-1991). New developments such as in 1978, Washington stopped supporting Nicaragua dictator resulted in leftist militants coming to power one year later. In February 1979, as mentioned, the US lost its ally Iran because Islamists took over the country. Moreover, also mentioned the US and Soviet confrontation reached its climax when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The cause of the invasion was 1978 Camp David the agreement between Israel and Egypt which was seen as a major strategic gain for the United States in the Middle East that's why Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a reaction to that new situation.

Arms limitation attempts after the US Senate didn't approve Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter followed a passive foreign policy but the opposition in congress criticized this policy as it made US foreign relations unsuccessful.

This perception led to Ronald Reagan winning the next election. He committed to a more confrontational approach with the Soviets in arms control. This is new period saw increased tension and confrontation between two the super powers was sometimes described as a second cold war comparable to the early period of tension between 1946 and 1954. Reagan spent a lot of money on high technology for the military and in response the Soviets tried to contest this high technology but Soviets weakened economically. This was the main reason for the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Third Chapter will emphasize "The first years of the Cold war period –NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy" The onset of the construction of NATO will be underlined in this section. Turkey's membership in NATO was not on the agenda because it was thought the pact should only include Atlantic States Turkish Policy makers thought only Mediterranean states were going to be accepted yet Italy as a Mediterranean state was accepted in pact. Hence the Turks started to work for being a part of NATO. Turkish press wrote Turkey stayed in more dangerous place than Italy. Why Italy was accepted but Turkey was not accepted ? Turkey was stressed an important gate to the Middle East and bordered the Soviets. Furthermore, it was written that Turkey and Iran were only used as posts by the West. The efforts to gain NATO membership began in the time of the Republican Peoples Party but when the Democrat Party came to power it completed the

process successfully. Turkish participation in Korean War under the United Nations army gradually changed the US thought about Turkey joining NATO.

The first period of NATO corresponded to the Massive Retaliation Strategy of which the effect on Turkish Foreign Policy will be evaluated in this chapter. Turkey in the 1950s fully supported the Massive Retaliation Strategy and NATO's security concepts which the relations with the USSR and Arab states were the worst. Ankara neither support the Middle Eastern countries nor the Soviet Union. When France had troubles with Morocco, the Turkish government showed its full support for France against the nationalist movement in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

Even though there was no significant problems with Greece until the 1950s. when the British showed to leave Island, the Greeks demanded full management so that growing protests increased in Turkish public opinion.

Moreover, the modernization of Turkish army thanks to the NATO assistance program, benefited not only the Turkish army but also the infrastructure of the country. Infrastructure projects resulted in the addition or improvement of 140 airfields, 5000 miles of fuel pipeline, and 15000 miles of land telephone and telegraph lines that helped to link depots and airfields from northern Norway to eastern Turkey by the 1960's.

The indirect connection with regional pacts such as Balkan and Baghdad Pacts were significant in understanding Turkish Foreign Policy behavior apart from NATO and American policy. Turkey's position in NATO alienated it from the Third World. On 18 April 1955, the Non-Aligned Countries gathered a meeting in Bandung. The US foreign department described this formation as immoral. Just like its ally, Turkey opposed this notion but joined the conference to express its feelings.¹² A Turkish deputy in the conference criticized the Non-Aligned ethos. In the few years, Turkey's this attitude would become isolated from the third world that particularly which led them not supporting Turkey over the Cyprus issue.¹³ Ebu Ziyya who is an opposition party member from Hurriyet party, asked at the Bandung Conference why Fatin Rustu Zorlu supported imperialist camp instead of the Non-Aligned states. Zorlu answered the question in parallel to NATO membership. For him, the world is divided into two. One side was democratic but the other side was Communist and undemocratic. In addition to these two, Non-

¹² Stephen Ambrose, **Dünya'ya Açılım, 1938'den Günümüze Amerikan Dış Politikası**, (Trans. Ruhican Tul), Dış Politika Enstitüsü Press, Ankara, 1992, p. 117.

¹³ Zeki Kunalp, **Menderesle Anılar**, Bilgi Press, Ankara 1991, p. 74.

Aligned states existed. This neutralism was practically impossible because the Soviets were easily able to attack on it.¹⁴ He explained “*we are part of NATO and the peace can be provided by military power. If there is no military power, no one can mention peace.*”¹⁵

The last part of third chapter is devoted to the Eisenhower Doctrine and its effects on NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy. Under this doctrine, a country could demand American economic and military assistance if it was threatened with armed aggression from another state.¹⁶ The Doctrine had two implications : First, the US expanded its authority over the Middle East. Second, The US replaced and British-French power in the Middle East The doctrine was supported by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Lebanon and Jordan when they came together at a meeting in Ankara on January 19, 1957. They all, declared their support for the doctrine.

Turkish Foreign Policy under mostly concerned with security thus was shaped by NATO's perspective. Since Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East was made by way NATO and American policy, it is necessary to see Turkey's joining Bagdad Pact in this manner. In addition, the Menderes government didn't support some Arab states' the anti-Western attitudes. Arab states which had relations with the Soviets were seen as a Communist threat in the region.

The Fourth Chapter will evaluate the period between from 1960 to1970, years in which the changes in Turkish political life and its effects on foreign policy occur. NATO's effects on foreign policy were felt more than the previous time.

This time was also called the Détente in that period Turkey experienced with a military coup(1960) The military believed that the Democrat Party compromised Turkey's national sovereignty. The military regime first declared Turkey's loyalty to NATO and CENTO. U.S President Kennedy also adopted a new strategy for NATO called 'Flexible Response', which aimed rely less on nuclear weapons. The Detente period was preoccupied with Flexible response strategy within NATO headquarters. It has two features : Flexibility and Escalation.

¹⁴ Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, Vol, 10, sess, 44, p.p. 737-738, 25.11.1956

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 737.

¹⁶Melih Aktaş, **1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü**, Sema Press, İstanbul 2006, p. 111.

The first challenge to the Flexible Response strategy came when the Americans withdrew its Jupiter missiles from Izmir without asking for Turkish permission. For Turkish statesmen the NATO concept of collective security had collapsed.

The second issue in the Détente Period was the Cyprus problem. Cyprus entered Turkish political life when the friendship between Greece and Turkey was undercut in the mid-1950's. Since this issue had potential to damage NATO, Washington intervened in the Cyprus problem between the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey. NATO, moreover, mediated between Athens and Ankara to find a solution. It was soon understood that NATO was unprepared for solving problems among its members. NATO started to pay attention to the Cyprus issue in January of 1964. The reason for NATO's involvement the problem was that a war could occur between Greece and Turkey. Both were NATO members and the speeches of the countries were so aggressive. The Johnson letter was a breaking point for Turkish-US relations. The letter wasn't to the Turkish public for two years. In 1966 a writer for Cumhuriyet newspaper Cunejd Arcayurek published the letter.

The Flexible Response Strategy brought some disadvantages for Turkey. In subsequent years, growing protests against NATO and America were another problem for the country. Turkey's relations began to change and the relations with the Soviets were developed. The press particularly leftist newspapers was also important in giving direction to radical political movements. Some journalists were against the Menderes government, Some of whom were Mehmet Ali Aybar, Behice Boran and Doğan Avcıoğlu. Furthermore, the Turkish Labor Party (TIP) had an effective voice in the Parliament. Their criticism of American imperialism and NATO caused unrest in Turkey. The News Polls of workers conducted by a panel of professors in September 1969 showed that 47 percent of people believed that America exploited Turkey and another 25 percent undecided on this question. The poll also showed that the higher the educational level of the respondents the more apt they were hold to negative views of the United States.

Labor groups were the growing mass in radical groups of Turkish Society. After the 1960 military coup, the new constitution gave workers the new right to strike, which brought freedom movement for the Labor groups. The first strikes were for economic reasons. The big labor confederations were DİSK and Turk İş which had mass of workers in the fields. Their meetings reflected the growing anger towards NATO and the United States.

In the Parliament, the leftist party Turkish Labor Party gained 15 seats. Under these circumstances, the Republican Peoples Party had to change its ideological slogan to “left to center”. The government and TLP members had interesting debates in the Parliament: On 9 November 1965, Demirel denied that the US bases in the country when he said: “*There is no American bases in Turkey but all bases belong to NATO in the country.*” On the TLP representative Çetin Altan (Istanbul deputy) claimed that there were 35 million square meter of American bases which any Turk cannot enter into there. Moreover, suspicion of Anti-Americanism toward the Justice Party in the election campaign in 1965. Their accusation of previous government to be stooge of American state.

The discussions on the subject of the poverty of Turkey arose that Aksam pointed out Turkey was the poorest country among NATO states however it had 480 thousand soldiers which meant the third largest military corporation in the organization.

In these days, the 40 Professors of Middle Eastern Technical University proclaimed a declaration that Turkey needed to stop American support because of the US’s Cyprus and Vietnam policies. This declaration was also signed by famous men : Bahri Savcı, Haluk Ulman, İbrahim Yasa, Rusen Keleş and Mumtaz Soysal.

The 1968 student uprisings in Turkey turned into NATO protests. The growing protests against NATO and American policy hit the top in the first month of 1969. In January, American ambassador Komer visited Middle Eastern Technical University. He was a former CIA agent and played an important diplomatic role in Vietnam war for adopting appeasement policy. The ODTU students protested him in the campus and fired his car. Prime Minister Demirel condemned these protests by saying that they were being done by those who wanted to break Turkish-American relations. The police protected the country legality.

Discussions started over whether the Turkish army was real national army or not. Prime Minister Demirel rejected the idea of the Turkish army not becoming a National. He said that the equipment of the Turkish army imported from abroad but that did not mean that the Turkish army was a national army.

NATO had some crises at different times. France’s attitude during De-Gaulle’s time, for example, was a big challenge for the organization. By 1966, all French forces were withdrawn from the combined command and all NATO units were forced to leave France

leading to NATO headquarters being moved from Paris to Belgium. Turkish opinion about France's move will be mentioned in detail in the fourth chapter.

After French President De Gaulle withdrew French forces from the alliance, a new period began for France which led to its government resisting American proposals as well as those of other countries within NATO.

Despite the fact that the Turkish government for NATO and America, some military officers had serious doubts about the strategy of Flexible Response. They thought that their allies wouldn't help Turkey in a non-nuclear war if the war didn't spread to other NATO countries. Some of these skeptics attack by the Soviet Union as a possible scenario. Turkish leaders had unwillingly adopted new strategy. Domestic politics in the country brought with many problems. The military intervention on the date of 12 March 1971 opened a new compact on Turkish Policy. Turkish General Staff declared a protest journal to President, Prime Minister and Senate in order to reestablish a new consistent government. If it were not provided, the Turkish army would intervene to protect the country according to the Constitution. Thereupon, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel resigned the government and the President assigned Nihat Erim¹⁷ who was an independent deputy in the assembly, to become the new prime minister.

In 1973, the Republican Peoples Party won the election for the first time in the Multi-party period. Prime Minister elect Bulent Ecevit who was seen as anti-American in the corners. After Republicans and Erbakan's 'National Salvation Party formed a coalition government, for example, opium production in Turkey was re-legalized. Washington reacted negatively and stopped financial aid to Turkey immediately. Turkish government in response promised to prevent illegal opium moving to Europe and the United States.

The second problem for NATO and Turkey was Turkish intervention in Cyprus 1974. The United States government tried to make peace between Greece and Turkey. The Greek government, under Karamanlis power, was dissatisfied with American failure to stop Turkish intervention to Island. Hence Greece withdrew Greek military units from NATO's military wing.

The parties of NATO members didn't support this intervention so the US condemned Turkish of being invader country. Turkish-American relations worsened the opium issue

¹⁷ Nihat Erim was an important man in Republican Party. After military intervention, he resigned the party to form new independent government.

was forgotten by American policy makers. However military embargo against Turkey by the United States started in 1975 and lasted until 1978.

The Fifth and last chapter underlines the second round of the Cold War. It also takes into account the Turkish military intervention 12 September 1980. The question is whether NATO had any effect on the Turkish army or not. In addition, Turkey at that time mostly affected America's Green Line policy so the 12 September coup. On the other hand, the Soviets had gained an advantage when they invaded Afghanistan. However, they withdrew into their shell and gradually lost that advantages completely.

Turkey's problems in foreign relations increased, for example, there were terrorist attacks who were organized by the Armenian group ASALA. Several Turkish diplomats were killed by this group. Additionally the PKK terror attacks were the beginning for Turkey to be lonely international arena. 12 September rules first three years caused many deaths and anti-democratic actions for the country. This situation rule wasn't taken seriously by the US government because it had good relations with Turkey, but The Europeans did care human rights and freedom much more than United States.

Moreover the regional developments such as the Islamic revolution in Iran and Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets were necessary a trust country for the Americans in the Middle East. Besides, the United States and Turkey relations had developed in negative way through 1970s. By 1979 Turkey rejected all American U-2 flights, the planned Rapid Deployment Force wasn't approved, Greece's return to NATO was vetoed, Turkey was one of the first countries to accept the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Furthermore, the Roger's Plan and Greece's return to NATO changed the political balance in reverse. 17 October 1980, US General head Roger came to Ankara and talked with Turkish General Evren. This event was new for diplomacy because a political issue were discussed by two military men. Kenan Evren never informed civil government at that time period. General Roger told that there was going to be election in Greece within 6 months. If they didn't help and the Socialists came to power, it would be possible to lose the Greeks. Evren's fear for the future that the possibility of Greeks' advance in this situation. Roger's promised a military oakley. General subjects in the last chapter can be summarized by the issues of Rapid Deployment Force, Memorandum of Understanding, the Limni Issue, Mersin Crisis, the modernization of Turkish army in the 1980's, the changes in NATO Defense Concepts in 1980s and Turkish foreign policy.

1. Theoretical Structure

This thesis is based on the Balance of power theory has its roots in 18th century political thought when the classical power system began to develop. This system needs at least five equally power national states. No state can have superiority within the system. Moreover ideological differences don't hamper the alliances between states. One state can have democratic liberal ideology while the other state can be Islamic or communist state.¹⁸ For Kaplan it is necessary to have at least five states because if there are only three states, two states can ally and damage other state.¹⁹ On the other hand, some thinkers such as Waltz and Morgenthau think that three states are enough to establish the balance of power system. However, Holsti gives more than a state in order to achieve this yet Deutch and Singer say it is better to establish powerful alliance.²⁰

The Balance of Power theory in International Relations has several meanings which is why it has no common description. The system is described as balancing component in some periods, However some states only use it as a propaganda tool to strengthen its power in the alliance. Therefore some states use it balance element yet others aim to strengthen their power. Variety of meanings exist difficult to evaluate common criteria in the political system. For Inis L. Claud, balance of power equally equilibrium. This means sometimes is the system balance and sometimes it is unbalanced. Castleragh, the British foreign minister, indicates that in the European balancing system one state or states can't be superiority to other states in the system. According to Claud there is no real balance as there is competition between states. Each state aims to get more power in the alliance system. States consider their own benefit. For example the British demanded a European balance of power system in 19th century in order to benefit from the global political system. Similarly, French government used this system after the First World War, because they wanted to be superior to Germany.²¹

A state which benefits from joining the system, establishes a balanced system in the organization. The balanced state aims to benefit from the existence of the alliance system.

¹⁸ Ari, p. 84.

¹⁹ Morton Kaplan, "Variants on Six Models of the International System" (Ed. James Rosenau), **International Politics and Foreign Policy**, The Free Press, New York 1969, p. 294.

²⁰ Ari, p. 85.

²¹ Inis L. Claude, **Power and International Relations**, Random House Press, New York 1964, p. 20.

This kind of priority for beneficial strength is clearly seen with British power in the 20th century. During the 18 and 19th centuries the British sea power dominated the world and its geopolitically it didn't need to be a part of the European alliance system. However, it later started to lose its geopolitical advantage and power in the 20th century so it tried to join European alliance system. The superiority of the United States followed the same strategy. Ernst Haas differentiated the Balance of Power into eight categories.

1. It is a distribution. A state can say the balance within the alliance is broken so it is against for its benefit. If the balance is going well, that state benefits.
2. The case of equilibrium is explained by two or more states forming a balance of power organization. Prior to the Napoleonic era, in the European alliance system, the alliance of states refers to the balancing system.
3. Superiority is the meaning of hegemony. The power of Napoleon in Europe was seen the protection against the British threat. That's why each state tries to establish hegemonic power. They weren't interested in equal power.
4. Stability and peace concepts are the reality of alliance systems. The states demand peace when they come together in the system.
5. Instability and war are opposite concepts. When we look at Europe in the 18th century, the chaos and wars dominated the century. The balance of power was needed in this war filled period.
6. Power politics is a tool which generally the states' use of military power in politics.
7. Law of Universal history : there has always been a law of balance. For instance the European alliance system was broken by France but the other states restored the broken relations.
8. The way of politics and the system : this system prevents one state in a coalition trying to become the superior state. Other states unit prevent this kind of damage behavior.

Morton Kaplan also provides a new distinction by referring to a Loose bipolar system. The most significant feature of this system is the states divide into two hegemonic states' control. There would be two blocs and the weak states join the blocs. The Cold war period until 1990 displayed this division between Pro-American and Pro-Soviet states. However there were some states which didn't join either bloc. These states were called non-aligned states. India, Egypt, Indonesia and Gana were some of these non-aligned countries. Another fact was that all states were part of a universal political body called the United Nations. The two blocs were dominated by the United States and NATO and the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, respectively a loose bipolar system is not part of balance of power theory so there is a peacemaking entity between which were sometimes the non-aligned

states or the United Nations. There are some rules of the loose bipolar strategy : The organization which has hierarchical structure aims to abolish enemy organization yet this is done by small wars. The blocs purpose to raise their capacity so that they can establish good relations with another bloc. One bloc tries to have more capacity against enemy bloc. If the enemy bloc becomes more powerful, war is inevitable. All members prefer its own bloc's choosing than the United Nations. The non-aligned countries prefer universal institute's will.²²

The Systems approach in International Politics is a more sophisticated version of Balance of Power theory which has variables in the structure of the system namely to the pattern of relationships among the States. The pattern of the relationship depends on capacity distribution. The different characteristics of the systems approach refers to polarity, bipolarity or multi polarity. The hierarchy within the system consist of dominant and subordinate sub systems.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was fundamentally based on the structure of defense policy in the 1950's. For this reason, Lord Ismay, NATO's first secretary general said : *"The role of NATO during the Cold War was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the German down."*²³ The notion of collective defense continued until 1990's. However the end of cold war with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the decomposition of the Soviet Union has changed the situation. At that time period NATO was the winner against Communist threat but why does it still exist today ?

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has renewed itself with new concepts. Apart from being an organization for defense, it has become an institution. Instead of having a common threat, NATO has come a community of countries sharing common values. Its new mission is now also providing the promotion of Western values, such as democracy and free market economy.

Historically, because of this drastic change, we can distinguish the theoretical framework into two.

The first period is NATO's classical defense concept, which existed in the bi-polar world of the Cold War.

²² Arda Ercan "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Sistem Teorisi", **Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş Teorik Bakış**, (Ed. Hasret Çomak), Umuttepe Press, Kocaeli 2009, p. 173.

²³ Wesley M. Baiby, **America's relations since World War I**, Oxford University, Press, Oxford 1999, p. 156.

This time period will try to be explained by means of the Balance of Power Theory, see the international system as a group of states protecting themselves against another one. States can achieve of Balance of Power in two ways : first a state can increase its own power by arming itself second by adding its own power to that of other states in an alliance.

For classical realists, power is a basic concept which is why it must be analyzed. However even among realists, there is no common explanation of power. Some realists claim that power is a military, economic and technological tool which each state use its power with these tools. For some other realists see power as the success relations with other states.²⁴

Power is both thought alone and the completion with other states that is a total talent of the states. It is also a management of a society and nations. As all social relations have, struggle in management for reaching authority, the international relations of the total executive struggle in itself. Hans Morgenthau explains human. Man/Woman's effect on other men/women yet in political arena, it is about the struggle between executive organs and bureaucrats and the management of the public.²⁵ Military force is the biggest tool of the nation in international relations.

The core definition of the Balance of Power theory is given by classical realists. A state or states in the international arena, for realists, if it does not established superiority, they are fearful of other states because of misunderstandings. In this world anarchy would be dominant. Within this anarchic environment the distribution of capability among states would be possible by the balance of power system. In history, every state has tried once to increase its power visa-vis its neighbor state. The great empires in every age tried to imperialistic policies over other countries. A system which composes of three or more states, has the balance of power system. If we have these states as A, B, C. State A, power decrease or increase, the other two states would be negatively affected this situation. If A invades B, this would be dangerous for C. In this environment, the policy makers of State C would try to establish partnership with B state, and would defend themselves against state A easier.²⁶

The states don't fight all the time. What keeps the peace? Who prevent the wars ? For Kenneth Waltz, *"to explain war is easier than to understand the conditions of peace. If one*

²⁴ Mehmet Kocaoğlu, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Kara Harp Okulu Press, Ankara 1993, p. 30.

²⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, **Uluslararası Politika**, Sevinç Press, (Trans. Baskın Oran&Ünsal Oskay), Ankara 1970, p. 31.

²⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, **Uluslararası Politika İlkeler, Kavramlar, Kurumlar**, Ankara Üniversitesi Press Ankara 1978, p. 426.

*asks what may cause war, the simple answer,*²⁷ Except for small clashes, throughout cold war period, there was no war. Why there was no war in this time period? Because there was a bi-polar system which was established by the Soviets and Americans. Two great powers and two different ideologies clashed in every area. One was managed under capitalism and the other was managed by communism.

The blocs which were founded by the U.S. and Soviet Union divided the international system into two. The Eastern Europe states were the Soviets under the Warsaw Pact as opposed to West European states, which were united with the U.S under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This divided world, which is called the Cold War period will be explained by the Balance of Power theory as told above, NATO was formed as defensive alliance between North America and Western Europe in order to guarantee the security of its members against Soviet Union. Turkey, for example, had wanted to join the Western community in order to remove the Soviet threat. That's why Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

A defensive alliance system is formed when a state cannot guarantee its own national security. Moreover states establish an alliance system for prestige, increasing its effect on other states, providing legality in international areas and decreasing defense budgets.²⁸ International organizations were formed when the national states were formed in Europe. The beginning formation of modern states was when the effect of religion on state policy declined. In this context 1648 Westphalia Agreement is significant in declining religious authority. The end of Middle Ages is also end of local powers in society. The beginning of the Renaissance and Reformation movements started the small princes gathering around monarchical authority. The development of commercial life and urbanization made Kings more powerful than feudal princes. On the other hand, the Protestant movement under Martin Luther leadership disintegrated the Christian world and conversely, national states became more powerful. The bloody 30 years war devastated the center of Europe. The war began when Catholic King Ferdiand and Protestant princess went to war. The French, Sweeden, Holland, Spain Germany and Bohemia fought each other. At the end of war, they signed an agreement to be respectful to all religion sects. Catholic and Protestant religions

²⁷ Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf, (25.10.2011)

²⁸ Tayyar Arı, **Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika**, Alfa Press, İstanbul 1996, p. 237.

were to respect each other. The development of Europe might be possible when the over sea trade was developed and scientific researches became common. A period ended after the Westphalia agreement. It might be said that in the old system an emperor represented the world in contrast there was a Pope who resembled the divine. There was a strict hierarchy in the old system but in the new era each nation had its own equal state. The end of the 18th century signaled the settlement of the nation state system in Europe. The great states . Britain, France and Austria protects its statuesque while Spain, the Netherland and Portugal lost their power in the system. Prussia was the new comer and Russia strengthened its power in Peter the Great time. On another front side, the Ottoman empire was in decline. In history, several formations were cited as similar to the alliances of the 20th century yet, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was the first which really resembled the well-known alliance system in the 20th century.

The Congress of Vienna 1815 had two principles : One was legitimate and the other was balance of power. The purpose was to bring Europe back to its of 1792 borders, and restoring old monarchs which were destroyed by Napoleon. Hence the balance among states should have been provided and the status quo had to be preserved. For this purpose, Britain and Austria powers blocked Russian expansion into Eastern Europe.²⁹ Bourbon princes achieved to get power again. Austria's most lands were lost and were also given some lands to Germany and Italy. The continuity of the European alliance system was prepared by Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, he advocated congress system to solve their problems. The purpose of the congress was to organize a balance of power among the European parties and maintain peace between the nations. The Concert of Europe originally formed by the great powers :Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. International Law, diplomacy, and the balance of power came to be applied around Europe or the West. The conference started with the attendance of the Russian czar Alexander the first, Austria emperor I. Francois, Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm, Von Metternich, Lord Castlereagh, Kont Nesselrode, Kont Capo d'Istria, Prens von Hardenberg, Prens von Humboldt. These are all important figures who played in the fate of European state system. This congress didn't last long, however due to the political between and 1830-1848. Britain in the 19th century was dominant in Europe and it was also concerned with other continents. One of these continents was North America where the United States was the

²⁹ Yelda Demirağ, "Viyana Kongresi ve Güç Dengesi Sistemi", **Uluslararası İlişkiler Giriş, Kavram ve Teoriler**, Platin Press, (Ed. Haydar Çakmak), İstanbul 2008. p. 252.

strongest. Britain tried to preserve its power in the commercial arena. The rest of the constituted the Third World – Near East, Africa, Asia and Pasific Islands. 1830s show the British active in all three worlds.³⁰

Although, Russia was one of the allied states in the Concert of Europe, the Crimean War of 1853-1856 separated European states against Russia in the war. The conflict began with a dispute between Russia and France in 1851-1852 over the respective rights of the Orthodox and Latin churches in Jerusalem. In 1853 when Russian General Menchikov demanded the restoration of all Orthodox privileges in Jerusalem and Ottoman lands. This demand was rejected by Western Powers. The Crimean War began in September 1853 when British, French and Ottoman troops landed in the Crimean peninsula and ended after the allies captured Sebastopol in September 1855. In conclusion, under the treaty of Paris signed in 1856, the Black Sea was closed to warships of all nations.³¹ The treaty of Paris came to table after Crimean War on one side of the meeting table in one side the Ottomans, Sardinya, Austria, and Prussia and Russia on the other side. It was a peace settlement but beyond peace negotiation, the Ottomans for the first time, joined the Europe of Concert meeting. This also showed that Muslim country could able to be a part of the concert. The Ottomans principally was a part of new European system but this never benefitted for them. The law for sea wars was arranged in the conference. This law was enacted at first conference which orders the naval status in international and domestic waters.

In the second part of 19th century, Germany and Italy were newcomers to international politics, particularly Germany, which unified after it defeated France in 1871. Bismark, the chancellor, aimed France to stay alone to prevent a future Russia-French agreement for the future that Bismark, therefore signed some agreements with Russia to establish the German-Austria-Russian alliance system however when Friederich the second died in 1888, Kaiser Willhelm II came to the throne and changed Bismark's policy. He introduced Eastern Policy and quit his alliance with Russia for this reason, didn't agree with Bismark that he was sent away German politics in 1890. Kayzer's this policy caused Russia to become closer with France that they signed agreement in 1894. The process going to the First World War formed Alliance systems : German-Austria-Italy(Italy changed its side after a while) The British-France-Russia was called entente.

³⁰ Roderic Davison, **Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms**, The Isis Press, Istanbul 1999, p. 150.

³¹ William Hale, **Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000**, Frank Cass Press, London 2002, p. 27.

The spread of European political control, John Baylis said, it began in the late fifteenth century and only came to an end in the early twentieth century.³² Before the First World War, Europe had not experienced an unlimited major war. The consequences of the First World War were significant for the international area. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Ottoman Empire had collapsed. The League of Nations was founded by the winners of the First World War but the conflicts and wars didn't stop. The years 1900-45 for Baylis, were the most destructive period in human history. Not only did human beings kill one another in greater numbers in those four decades but also barbaric methods of doing so; six million Jews exterminated in the concentration camps, to America's atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 1945)³³

The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers after 1945 opened a new age in international politics but created conflict between the two powers. The onset of the cold war reflected the failure of Yalta and Postdam conferences. The future of Germany, Eastern and Western countries were the forthcoming problems between the Great Powers. The Soviets' growing control over Eastern Europe by ideologically bothered the US and Western states. In March 1947, the US helped Europe including Turkey and Greece to rebuild their states and this was followed by the Marshall Plan for European recovery. On the other hand, the Soviets took control over Eastern states as installing Marxist-Leninist regimes. Despite the Soviet expansion, Yugoslavia under Tito, maintained independent policy from Moscow so it played leader role in Third World's Non-Aligned Movement.³⁴

The contest between Washington and Moscow created two opposing military alliance systems : the first was established by the leadership of the United States -the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty signed in 1949. The most important article of this Alliance that an attack on a member would be treated as an attack on all. In opposition to NATO, the Soviet Union signed Warsaw Pact in 1955 which was a military defense organization between eight communist states. : the Soviet state, Czechoslovakia-Bulgaria-Hungary- Poland-Romania-East Germany and Albania. For Soviet statesmen, the Warsaw pact was established against the aggression of NATO. Like NATO's fifth article, the

³² Robert Jackson, "The Evolution of International Society", **The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford University Press, (Ed. John Baylis & Patricia Owens) Oxford 2001, p. 46

³³ Ibid, p. 52.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 60.

Warsaw pact had a similar article which stated that an attack on one was an attack on all members would be taken. It promises them to taking necessary steps to help each other if any attack came.³⁵

Moreover, the Brezhnev Doctrine aimed to sovereignty against the harmful acts within the friend states that became the part of the Warsaw Pact.

The alliance system is sometimes able to establish without any signature between states. The British and United States, for example, have had this kind of relationship due to their common history and interest.³⁶

The alliances which aim to protect status quo, are longer-lived than revisionist alliances. The states ,if they protect the status quo, succeed longer because the states in the alliance have to act common behavior. The new situation of 1815 the Concert of Europe had lasted until 1914 nearly a hundred years. However Italy, as a revisionist state, ended its alliance with Germany in 1943 because its aims changed during the Second World War.³⁷

-The Problems within Alliance Systems :

The common feature of an alliance ,if it is defensible, is to increase diplomacy and deterrence to the enemy. Tayyar Ari divided Alliance's problems into four categories : 1. Alliances and Casus Foederis(Alliance states in which situation will act.) 2. Alliance agreements and Responsibilities. 3. Unification of military power. 4. The Responsibility of a Military Alliance.³⁸ For Cemil Oktay, the International legal system is different from previous times. The Peace for instance in ancient Roman times was a result of force. There was a dominant power on one side (the Roman Empire) but the other side was weak state. This was called Pax Romana. The continuation of the Roman policy in the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empire. However, the process of maintaining in modern times are more different than previous times. Negotiating peace process is the dominant of the states. All states' agreement is must. The parties struggle to persuade for a long time period to consume other side's patient.³⁹ the member parties of North Atlantic Pact are agreed on the base of unanimity and common accord. There is no majority voting system.

³⁵ Serdar Kesgin, **NATO-Rusya İlişkileri**, Karadeniz Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Press, Giresun 2009, p. 8.

³⁶ Ari, p. 244.

³⁷ Raymond Hopkins and Richard Mansbach, **Structure and Process in International Politics**, Joanna Cotler Books Press, New York 1973, p. 311.

³⁸ Ari, p. 248-258.

³⁹ Cemil Oktay, **Modern Toplumlarda Savaş ve Barış**, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Press, İstanbul 2012, p. 79.

The second period for NATO began after 1990's when the Soviet Union was dissolved. NATO's primary source of collective defense was expressed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty⁴⁰ however NATO apart from being a collective defense organization against Soviet Union, it has given importance to institutionalization of the relationship between North America and Western Europe.

NATO, in this new world, has changed its strategy and declared the collective security system in which it focuses on global security.⁴¹

Collective Security, is a peace-keeping system based on the respect of international norms. During the construction of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security goes beyond the pure idea of defense to include facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes, assuming that the mechanisms of preventing war and defending states under armed attack will supplement and reinforce each other. It also involves economic and diplomatic reactions, in addition to military retaliation. It is hypothesis that accomplished corporate security would avoid potential attackers from enraging a gather of countries. Alike balance-of-power, collective security process on the premise that any potential attacker would be dissuaded by the explored of articulate revenge, but it last beyond the army forces domain to incorporate a broader range of safety issues. It employs that states will leave rule and liberty of process or inactivity to growing mutually and the assume of the indivisibility of harmony. The safety that can be drawn from this is part of the basement of the neoliberal institutionalism discussion.

The Theoretical structure of collective security is rooted by the Institutional Liberals that this time-period will be explained by Institutional Liberalism that accepts the significance of military power in international relations, international law and the need for interstate partnership through institutions to preserve the stability of the system.⁴² For Liberal

⁴⁰ The member countries agree to act an armed attack on any of them as an attack against in Europe and North America. It promises them to taking necessary steps to help each other if any attack would come.

⁴¹ In 1991, at a summit Rome, NATO declared its new strategic concept : *"Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculate aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, and territory dis-putes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe... This could, how-ever, lead to crises inimical to European security and even to armed conflicts, which could in-volve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, and have a direct affect on the security of the Alliance."* See, Joshua Stern, "NATO Collective Security or Defense: The Future of NATO in Light of Expansion and 9/11", <http://www.dias-online.org> (18.03.2010)

⁴² Scott Len, "International History 1945-1950", (Ed, John Baylis&Steve Smith), **The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001 p.p. 307-311.

School, collective security aims to prevent conflict by establishing a “community of power” by altering the nature of states’ interactions from competitive to co-operative. The Wilsonian/Kantian school suggested replacing the ‘Balance of Power’ system with a system based on ‘community of power’ Woodrow Wilson said : “There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”⁴³ To any potential threat, its members respond to a coalition for the stability of the system.

⁴³ David Yost, **NATO, transformed the alliance’s new roles in international security**, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington 1998, p. 11.

2. NATO - ITS ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIES

NATO is an international collective-security defense organization which protected Western Europe against the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. It also has two states distance from European continent: the United States and Canada. This geographic definition is the nucleus of the organization. However it does not reflect the whole picture, NATO has neither been composed of Atlantic states nor been founded against Soviet expansion after the Second World War.

Historically, the foundation of the organization went back to 1945 when Nazis ceased fire and Japanese forces were willing to take away weapons. The United States proved its power when it launched atomic bombs in Japan and it ended the war.

The aim of USA was to establish a stable environment not only in Europe but also in the world more importantly to create a Pax-Americana and form a hegemonic state. For this purpose just like League of Nations, the U.S. had worked to establish the United Nations during Second World War years and later it was founded successfully by fifty member-countries in San Francisco. (1945)⁴⁴

Moreover, Washington tried to get its ally the Soviet Union to adopt this new world order by integrating her into the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this way the Soviets would be integrated into the capitalist system. By February 1945, the U.S. and British rulers had accepted the authority of Soviets on East Europe in Yalta Conference thus they invited her cooperation with every area.⁴⁵

However, the Soviets refused to be a part of Capitalist system in contrast she preferred to establish her own system, which is why Washington changed its policy by founding new organizations in Europe to protect and defend against the Soviet threat.

It was necessary to settle down in Euro-Asia to keep international order for the U.S. For this purpose, the Soviet threat had to be weakened by the containment policy. On the other hand, the political balance needed to be established to guarantee political security in Western Europe.

⁴⁴ Ramazan Gözen, "NATO, ABD Patentli Savunma Örgütü", *Uluslararası Örgütler ve Türkiye*, Liberte Press, Ankara 2001, p. 174.

⁴⁵ After Yalta Conference was held in February 1945, the big tree leaders : Stalin, Truman and Churchill met in Potsdam from July 17 to August 1945 to negotiate how to handle Germany and disarmament and demilitarized the region.

After the end of the Second World War, several countries hoped to find peace and wealth for their future. As promised, Western European countries started to demobilize their armies⁴⁶ as their peoples were tired of wars and soldiers were willing to return homes. In order to minimize the bitterness of the war, it was necessary to build new countries.

On the contrary, Soviet Russia refused to reduce its military forces and didn't accept evacuating its forces from Eastern Europe. In addition, Soviet Union continued to produce gun, widening its occupation in Eastern Europe.

The period between 1945-1949 was an attempt to found peace in the world, and European countries particularly tried to prevent Soviet expansion. The Soviet expansion policy began during Second World War years but it lasted after the end of war (1945). First Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were absorbed later, Finland, Poland, Romania and East Germany and Czechoslovakia limited occupied by the Soviet Union. Paul Henri Spaak⁴⁷ criticized Russian expansion :

“It is not necessary for Soviet deputy to look for European policy. Let me say what this policy is. My word may come rude but a small country's prime minister can use this word : the basic of this policy is fear from Soviet Union and its government. I have used “fear” because this is not a fear of a country's deputy who is afraid of everything. This is a real fear which is possible to happen for future a great destruction and deterrence.

Does Soviet deputy know why West Europe fears from ? They fear from Soviet imperialism. What is imperialism concept? It is generally an invading policy of a nation in the world to have more lands. What is historical reality? Only a great state has had more lands after war that it is only Soviet Russia that the reality is foreign policy of Soviet state is more dangerous and threatening than Czar Russia.”⁴⁸

The Soviet Union settled its troops near Northern Ireland when the war ended. Also, Soviet troops invaded majority of Manchuria and all of North Korea in 1945. This resulted in Russia to be more powerful in Asia. The civil war in China led by Communists also was

⁴⁶ In 1945, the U.S. had 3100000, the United Kingdom 1321000, Canada, 299000, In 1946, the U.S. had 391000, the United Kingdom, 488000 and Canada demobilized all its soldiers. However, Soviet Russia kept its war industries and in 1946 kept 6 million men in the army. See, **NATO handbook**, NATO Headquarters Press, Belgium 1989, p. 4.

⁴⁷ He was the Prime Minister of Belgium from 1947 to 1949. In 1949 he presided over first General Assembly of the United Nations. He was chosen as Secretary General in 1957 until 1961. See, *ibid*, p. 48.

⁴⁸ Kenan, Çoygun “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin NATO İçindeki Değeri”, **Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi**, NATO özel sayısı, Sayı, 201, Mart 1962, p. 6.

supported by Soviet rule so that the U.S and France fought against with this uprising in Indo-China.

In Greece, Communist guerillas supported by the Soviet government got more power in 1946. The political and military situation became worse so it was impossible to make agreement with Soviet rule. Particularly the attempts at non-proliferation were failed. At this time, the British and French governments signed an agreement on 4 March 1947 in Dunkirk to stop the German threat. The struggle was uncertain in Greece. (March 1947) The British declared that it would withdraw its financial support to Greece thus possibly strengthen Communists. This would be dangerous for both Turkey and the Middle Eastern region. Moreover, the Soviets wanted to change the status quo of the straits.

As soon as the British withdrawal from Greece, the U.S. declared Truman doctrine which included 400 million dollar to Greece and Turkey both. (12 March 1947) However the threat was not only for Greece and Turkey more importantly but also for Western European countries.

In June 1947, General George Marshall, American Secretary of State, gave a speech at Harvard which was the start of the European Programme :

“The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.”⁴⁹

In September 1947, The Soviet Union set up the Cominform in response to the Marshall Plan. The participants were the Communist parties in Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, Italy and , the Netherlands. One year after the Marshall Plan took effect a successful coup was staged by communists in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. In response on economic, social and cultural defense treaty was signed by Holland, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and England which is called “Brussels Treaty Organization”. Following the establishment of this organization, the Soviets blockaded West Berlin on June 24, 1948 to invade East Germany. That led to the

⁴⁹ OECD, “The "Marshall Plan" speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947, http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html,(12.02.2011)

Western Union Defense Organization was formed by the members of Brussels Treaty Organization in 28 September 1948.

The utility of this organization was quickly seen in the founding of common military education and technology. The Brussels Treaty Organization aimed to strengthen its military power and was supported by the U.S. In addition the U.S. Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally opened preliminary talks about security issues in the North Atlantic area on April, 1948. This was called the Vanderberg Resolution which was announced at the end of October 1948. It included defense pact for the North Atlantic area. While the North Atlantic Treaty was preparing invitation for Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal, the Soviets sent notes to each of them, protesting this organization.⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty document was published on March, 18, 1949.

The United States had dealt with Europe before the foundation of NATO in 1949, however financial and political aid were not enough to combat the Soviet threat so it was necessary to form a military and political organization.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by twelve countries: The United States of America, England, France, Iceland, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Norway.

The treaty consists of 14 Articles and it underlines that the Alliance has been created by the United Nations Charter and states its main purposes.

Article 1 describes the basic principles that needed to be followed by member countries in managing their international relations, in order to keep peace and world security

Article 2 emphasizes the aims which its members will follow in their relationships in the social and economic areas

Article 3 In order to prevent attacks, the signatories will maintain and develop their skills and abilities.

Article 4, territorial integrity and political independence is underlined and if any threat to it exists for any of its members, they would defend themselves cooperatively.

Article 5 is the most important core of the treaty whose member countries agree to act an armed attack on any of them as an attack against all of Europe and North America. It promises them to take necessary steps to help each other if any attack comes.

⁵⁰ Kamuran Gürün, **Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası**, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Press, Ankara 1983, p. 257.

Under the guidance of 51st article of the United Nations Charter, the member states must try to restore and maintain security but this is bounded when the Security Council of United Nations has acted as need to renew and provide international peace and security.

Article 6 describes the territories of its parties that should be protected by the Alliance if an armed attack occurs.

In Articles 7 and 8, it is divided the treaty of NATO and international agreements in order not to mix each field because the North Atlantic Treaty and for instance United Nations has different areas so NATO doesn't interfere in their structure.

In Article 9, a Council is established by the parties, on which each of them shall be met and represented at any time. Also, the creation of Subsidiary organs of the Council is determined to be formed under this structure.

In Article 10, the parties can accept other countries to NATO to help each other.

In Article 11, all parties must sign the treaty under their constitutional processes later the signed papers should be presented to the United States of America. This article shows that the U.S. is the top of all other parties as the other states must give their signed papers to the Washington.

Articles 12 and 13 explain any possible revision of the Treaty if needed. It may be in 10 or 20 years periods. In addition, any party after 20 years can initiatively leave the Alliance.

Article 14 explains the texture of the treaty is English and French and it will be reserved in the U.S. archives. Any party can demand the original copy of the treaty.⁵¹

since its foundation with twelve states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has enlarged six times.

The first enlargement of NATO started when Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance in September 1951 but they were formally accepted on February 18, 1952. A second enlargement was the Federal Republic of Germany which was invited the organization in October 1954 and officially became a member on May 9, 1955. The accession of Spain to NATO on May 30, 1982 was the third enlargement. The fourth accession was Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic on 12 March 1999. The fifth one was larger because seven countries ; Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia were joined on 29 March, 2004. The sixth and the last enlargement was Albania and Croatia on 1 April 2009.

⁵¹ Muzaffer Kıran, **NATO ile ilgili Kanun ve Anlaşmalarımız**, Yıldız Press, Ankara 1957, p. 33.

2.1. NATO and Its Organization

Like many international organizations, the member states of NATO are agreed on the base of unanimity and common accord. There is no majority voting system. According to the ninth article of the treaty it has only one body : the Council however, it has right to create subsidiary organs under its authority. Up to now 3 different bodies and more than 175 subsidiary organs have been created. The main purpose of NATO is defense organization but it has formed various organs composed of every subject. It is very difficult to understand this structure as a whole so that it is better to take into account as separating each organ in its own field. NATO has formed three different organs : 1. Civilian bodies 2. Military Bodies 3. Organizations and Agencies

1. Civil Bodies : It is composed of NATO Headquarters, Permanent Representatives and National Delegations and International Staff.

The Headquarters is the highest political and executive organ and it arranges weekly, monthly and once a year meetings according to different levels of member deputies. Nearly 5000 meetings are held every year under the control of the Headquarters.⁵² It is located in Brussels, Belgium and a home to national delegations and of member countries to liaison offices. The work of these members is done by NATO's and Military Staff of International. Nearly 4000 people work full-time in NATO. Also 2000 are delegated by members of national military personnel of NATO.⁵³

Permanent Representatives or National Delegations is like an ambassador system. Each ambassador represents his/her own country at NATO and is appointed by his/her government for a period (from one to eight year)

Within the Civilian body, the International Staff is one of the most important level from which is works under the Secretary General.

Its structure is composed of seven divisions (each is headed by an Assistant Secretary General and a majority of free offices)⁵⁴

2. Military Bodies : Pertaining to its structure on defense policy, NATO's military organizations are the Military Committee composed of International Military Staff,

⁵² Permanent delegations and partners of NATO are seated for formal and informal consultation on the decision making process. This organ because of its structure is held several meetings every year.

⁵³ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49284.htm, NATO Official Web Site. (18.11.2010)

⁵⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58110.htm, NATO Official Web Site.(18.11.2010)

Military Command Structure which is composed of the Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation which in turn is managed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). These forces are available for NATO operations in accordance with the laws of settlement and transfer of power to NATO command that can vary depending on the state's military strength.⁵⁵

3. Organizations and Agencies : A various tasks are being done under this authority. The subsidiary organs are logistics, standardizations, civil emergency planning, air traffic management, communication and information system, education and training.

The budget of the North Atlantic Pact is also significant in order to understand alliance better. Each NATO member state has responsibility for its own military expenditures and their national civil officers in NATO headquarters. However NATO has a common budget for common operations and projects. These budgets are determined according to their participation, in other words a state can expense according to its participation level. However the reality is different that every country can spend expenses according to its welfare condition. Rich countries, however help less standing economic countries. There are three types of common budget of the alliance : civil budgets for civil officers, international meetings and expenses. The military budget is included in military expenses for international military operations and military officers. Third, there is the NATO Security Investment Program for the investment in military facilities and logistic tasks. The United States has the largest participation to civil and military budget for instance the US contributed 23 % of all civil expenses but Turkey 2,5 %, Iceland 0.08 %. in 1998. The US 27 %, France, Spain and Iceland 0 %, Turkey 1.17 % to NATO Security Investment Program.⁵⁶

It can clearly be seen that the United States has the biggest contributor in the system if we compare to other NATO states. Military expenses of all NATO states were 465 billion dollars. Only America had 184 billion dollars of this expense.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-90C9ABCE-9C0CD113/natolive/topics_49608.htm, NATO Official Web Site.(2010)

⁵⁶ Gözen, p. 200.

⁵⁷ **NATO Handbook**, NATO headquarters press, Brussels 1998, p. 229.

2.2. NATO and Its Changing Strategies

2.2.1. Classical Defense Strategy (1949-1954)

The Classical Defense Strategy began after Truman Doctrine aimed outlined strategy to stop a possible Soviet attack against Europe. U.S nuclear power was inadequate for that with conventional would be used for defense. The First Strategic Concept was called DC 6/1⁵⁸ 6, January 1950 It outlined a strategic concept for the pact. It pointed out the primary to deter aggression if the enemy launched an attack. Another point of this strategy was to provide complementariness and standardization between members. Each NATO member was to contribute its economic, industrial, geographical and military assistance to the organization.⁵⁹ This time strategy was developed against the Soviet threat on Europe's borders and that's why the US tried to increase its nuclear power.

The Soviet Union conducted its first-atomic test in August 1949 which shocked US policy makers. In response Truman began the development program of the nuclear energy. They started to discuss whether US nuclear monopoly ended.

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces on 25 June 1950 made NATO members realize that they had to change the NATO military structure. On September 1950, the North Atlantic Council established an integrated military force under central command. Three major commands were initially recommended. The first was to be the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The second was a commander for the Allied Naval Forces, Mediterranean. The third was to be a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. The first General Commander of the military structure⁶⁰ was Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Besides Eisenhower, the other figure who played important role in the construction of NATO's military force was British General Bernard Montgomery, who had been chairman of the Western Union's Commanders-in-Chief Committee and served as the first Deputy

⁵⁸ During the onset of NATO in 1949's, first meeting of Military Committee was chaired by General Omar Bradley. The Military Committee declared a general document : "Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area and it was approved by NATO's defense Committee in December, 1949. See, Gregory Pedlow, **NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969**, NATO International Staff Central Archives Press, Belgium 1999, p. 13.

⁵⁹ Pedlow, p. 13

⁶⁰ This structure was called Supreme Allied Commander ;Europe (SACUER).

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Both Montgomery and Eisenhower were significant in the development of NATO planning during the decade of the 50's.⁶¹

This structural change had to be renewed upon the accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO so a second strategic concept was prepared by NAC on 3 December 1952 (MC 3/5). This new strategic concept accepted the core principles in DC 6/1 and was fundamentally similar. The amendments of this strategy aimed to conduct an air offensive and sea operations. It also made provisions for destroying the Soviet Union's satellites.

2.2.2. Massive Retaliation Strategy (1954-1961)

This strategy was designed as a deterrent against Soviet expansion, which was called Massive Retaliation Strategy. It was accepted after a ministerial meeting in 1954.

Until 1953 use of nuclear weapons had not been mentioned in NATO strategy. General Alfred Gruenter established a "New Approach Group" at Shape in August 1953 that they decided to complete integration of nuclear policy into NATO strategy.

Moreover ninety-six NATO divisions for ninety days of mobilization would be ready for any hostile attack. By the way of this strategy, the US shifted in 1953 to the so called "New Look" strategy which emphasized the use of nuclear weapons. This new policy called as NSC 162/2 agreed to on 30 October 1953 stated that : *"In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other weapons... The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory power if the area is attacked."*⁶²

This approach, later combined with other additions for the next five years (MC 48), was accepted by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and by the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) on 17 December 1954. MC 48 was the first NATO document with MC 14/2 which included the concept of massive retaliation.

As NATO was strengthening its military and strategic position, in parallel, it decided to reinforce the political role of the alliance. The report of the three Wise Men⁶³ emphasized

⁶¹ Robert Thomas David, **The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968**, (Non-Published PhD thesis), Faculty of College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, 2008, p. 59.

⁶² Ibid, p. 14.

⁶³ The report was published by three Foreign Ministers : Lester Pearson (Canada), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Halvard Lange (Norway)

the importance of economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and most importantly cultural cooperation.

The Massive Retaliation strategy started to be questioned by European members of the NATO when the Soviets first launched Sputnik satellite on 4 October 1957. It was the first artificial Earth satellite which could easily to launch a nuclear warhead up to 5 miles.⁶⁴ Despite the US nuclear deterrence, it had also several disadvantages. First, the USSR's ballistic missile capacity could reach the whole world so NATO's nuclear deterrence decreased over the Soviet rule. The outbreak of the Second Berlin crisis in 1958 was provoked by the USSR, increased these doubts about the ability of NATO's Massive Retaliation Strategy to stop the USSR. After the Cuban Missile crisis, the United States began to discuss non-nuclear solutions. The strategy of "Flexible Response" was discussed but no consensus was found.

2.2.3. Flexible Response Strategy (1961-1979)

Flexible Response was first presented by NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker, who reported on NATO Defense Policy,(1962) that explained the control of nuclear weapons through consultation under varying circumstances.⁶⁵ The document⁶⁶ was written by the Defence Planning Committee on December 1967. There were two key elements for this strategy : The first and most important would stop a potential attacker from unacceptable behavior. The work was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight. The second element in this strategy was escalation. There would be a joint effort to overcome hostility by continuously raising the danger level of employing nuclear power as the catastrophe intensified. A nuclear reaction was seen as the ultimate deterrent. Parallel to Flexible Response, the Harmel Report was published in 1967 to provide a dual track approach to security : political and military. Political relations towards East aimed to seek a relaxation of tensions and holding near to clarification to implicit in politics issues

⁶⁴ Derya Gonca Pekseri, **NATO'nun Değişen Konsepti**, Asil Press, Ankara 2007, p. 38.

⁶⁵ Pedlow, p. 23.

⁶⁶ Flexible Response in strategy was called as MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 that they remained valid until the end of the Cold War.

separate Europe. The Harmel Report brought about the Détente period and opened relaxation in relations until 1979, however, some events between two blocs increased the tensions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Soviet SS-20 missiles took great attention by NATO members and Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran shocked in the USA because Iran was an important ally in the Middle East.

2.2.4. NATO's Renewed Confrontation and the End of Cold War (1979-1991)

US Foreign Policy was exposed to several problems during Carter's presidency.(1977-1981) In 1978, Washington stopped supporting the dictator Somoza in Nicaragua which resulted in leftist militants coming to power one year later. In February 1979, the US lost its ally Iran because Islamists took over the through country revolution. Moreover, The US and Soviet confrontation reached new heights when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The cause of the invasion was the agreement Israeli-Egyptian peace brokered by the US support. It was seen as a strategic gain for the United States visa-vis Moscow that's why Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a reaction to this new situation.

Arms limitation attempts after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan wasn't approved by the US Senate.⁶⁷ President Carter followed passive foreign policy but opposition in congress criticized this policy as it made US foreign relations unsuccessful.

This perception led to Ronald Reagan winning the next election. He committed to a more confrontational approach with the Soviets in arms control. This new period saw increased tension and confrontation between two the super powers was sometimes as a second cold war⁶⁸ which compared to the early period of tension between 1946 and 1954.

Reagan's new policy aimed to gain technologic advance in military area against the USSR because the more military equipments were provided in the US the more defense expenses were done in the Soviet Union. Modern Military expenses caused Soviet economy

⁶⁷ It is called SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) There were two rounds : the first one was signed in 1972. A second round was accepted by Carter and Brezhnev but it wasn't approved by the US senate.

⁶⁸ Len Scott, "International History 1945-1950", (Ed, John Baylis&Stewe Smith), **The Globalization of World Politics**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p. 83.

weakened. The result of this policy was seen when the military expenses increased in 1981-1989.⁶⁹

The US's hard line policy in defense area divided NATO members in the alliance system. The US in Reagan period began to develop military power against the Soviets however the increasing trend against the nuclear power in Europe showed different views. The European states rejected the project of increasing military budget within NATO.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ In 1982 Ronald Reagan started National Space Program which is commonly known as Star Wars that aims the Space to use for military interests. This program was tried to adopt in Moscow but the financial expense accelerated the falldown of the USSR.

⁷⁰ İlhan Uzgel, "1980'lerde NATO Stratejisindeki Gelişmeler", (Ed. Baskın Oran) , **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol II, İletişim Press, İstanbul 2002, p. 71

3. THE BEGINNING OF COLD WAR PERIOD – TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND NATO

3.1. Turkey Post-World War II

The basic problem of Turkish Foreign Policy, for Selim Deringil, has always been readjustment to secondary power status from an imperial past. Decrepit, and war-worn as the latter day Ottoman Empire was, it was still one of the great powers, if only by courtesy. Although The Turkish Republic is one of the best harboring states. it is clear that the state is far from the center of world politics.⁷¹

Second World War, for Turkey, was a struggle of Axis and Allied states to bring Turkey over to their sides. Turkey didn't participate in the war because the former Turkish statesmen strongly believed in that Turkey should stay out of the war as it had experienced disasters in previous wars. In the 1920's and 1930's, while the world was seemingly heading towards a new war Turkey solved many of its domestic and foreign problems. After the Montreux Convention was signed in 1936, Turkish Foreign Policy developed good relations with western European states.⁷²

When the Second World War started, Turkey, under Ismet Inonu's presidency, stayed neutral. The neutrality wasn't *de-jure* like that adopted by Switzerland, its policies which were largely caused by changing Turkish perceptions of which side would win the war, was called a *de-facto* neutrality⁷³

Turkey's military weakness was a restraint on intervening such a great war Both sides were so powerful with their military and technological gun industries that Turkey used its strategic position to balance off both sides. On 18 June 1941 it was signed a treaty with Germany that brought Turkey into a fully neutral position. In addition, Turkey accepted to supply Germany with chromium, a critical raw material which is used in weaponry manufacture for three years. With former Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, it was

⁷¹ Selim Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Ataturk", (Ed. H. Dodd) **Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects**, The Eothen Press, England 1992, p. 1.

⁷² Fahir Armaoğlu, **20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi**, Türkiye İş Bankası Press, Ankara 1983, p. 346

⁷³ Hale, p. 102.

adopted ‘active neutrality’ in which the both Allies and Germany were dealt with equally position.

Turkey’s neutrality agreement with Germany bothered the Allies and the U.S. cut financial aid yet Turkey thus, prevented German troops from annex Iraq. 1943 was the high period for Turkey in its negotiation with the Allies. Ismet Inonu and Winston Churchill met at Adana in the station-building.⁷⁴ Turkish delegates were also Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu, Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, General Commander Fevzi Cakmak and some exclusive military advisors. Churchill pointed out inevitable German attack in order to reach Middle Eastern oil supplies so that Turkey for his consider, necessary to enter war with the Allies. At the October 1943, The Soviet Union demanded for the Turks to join the war with their side.⁷⁵ On the other hand Turkey’s joining to the war would be accepted if only the Allies supplied military equipment for Turkey throughout a year. Turkey’s relations with the Allies intensified at the Cairo conferences in 1943 with the efforts of Menemencioglu. The result was in vain because the Allies didn’t want to supply Turkey military equipment.⁷⁶ By the end of 1943 Germany began to be defeated on the Eastern fronts by the Soviets. 6th of June, the Battle of Normandia, 1944 was a turning point for the war in Europe. The U.S. and British forced Turkey cut its all diplomatic and economical relations with Germany. Turkish policy makers realized that German defeat was near in 1944. This initiated major changes in Turkish foreign policy. It began when the first Soviet-Turkish relations were retained in June 1944 yet Soviet rulers demanded Turkish-German relations end. On 2 August, Turkey declared to end its all relations with Germany.

During the war years, Turkish leaders tried to establish balance of power in order to neutralize in the war. As a result Turkish policy makers realized that the country’s capacity and resource weren’t sufficient to conduct the battle, they established the balance between conflict sides to prevent the invasion of its borders. In the early years German threat was strongly seen for Turkey, following years, the Soviet threat took German’s place instead. Stalin’s demands on northeastern Turkey and Turkish straits bothered Ankara.

⁷⁴ Before this meeting, Turkey’s participation in the war was negotiated in the Casablanca Conference (1943). A new front in Balkans would be planned to open and Turkey would fight in this front.

⁷⁵ Armaoğlu, p. 413.

⁷⁶ The Final Conference in 1943 was held on December in Tehran similarly the Ally states wished Turkey to participate in the war but Inonu explained that Turkey wouldn’t accept this demand without military help.

At Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August, the US state department officially described its views about Turkey as : 1. the peoples freely choose their political, economic and social systems. 2. The equality in the commerce. 3. Freedom of the press. 4. The continuity for the American schools in Turkey. 5. Protection of American people.

The last-two principles for the US can be explained the imperial policy that complement to aim for the world economic system in the world. Moreover in this letter, it is aimed that Turkey should be stay out of the hegemony of the Soviets with the British assistance.⁷⁷

For the US national interest, it was necessary that Turkey should be out of Soviet affect particularly for the security of Turkish straits. On 7 June 1945, Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) had demanded Turkish land yet this didn't bother Washington because it was a local problem, however the Turkish Straits' issue was a global problem which was related to both USA and the world.

At the Postdam conference, Truman and the British Prime Minister Atlee both agreed to change the Montreux treaty in the field of necessities. They all agreed in the way of changing Montreux but what it included was not clear. Truman gradually changed his mind about the Straits after the Soviets were getting more powerful in the Balkans. Turkey, was anxious about the new situation in the Postdam conference and gave Note to both the US and British governments in which emphasizing that the independence of Turkey wouldn't be damaged with new changes in the Straits by Soviet Union.

Edwin Wilson, the US ambassador of Ankara, pointed out new amendments which his government demanded : all states' commercial ships are able to use the Straits in the war; the war ships of Black Sea states within the war and also the war ships of not bordered states in the peace times would be permitted by the UN decision. These changes wouldn't be harmful for the Turkish independence.⁷⁸ The end of Turkey-Soviet friendship emerged when Molotov gave a letter to Selim Sarper, Foreign Minister, cancelling the old treaties of Friendship(1925-1935). The reason for terminating on March 19,1945, was the changing international environment for the states.(19 March 1945).⁷⁹

By the beginning of 1946, the Soviets supported Azerbaijan autonomy and the pro-Soviet Mahabad Kurdish state was established. The U.S perceived these developments a threat for

⁷⁷ Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", (Ed. Baskın Oran), **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol I, İletişim Press, İstanbul 2002, p. 522.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 523.

⁷⁹ Kamuran Gürün, **Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)**, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press Ankara 1991, p. 278.

moving to West Europe. The Soviets, as Washington, first blockaded Iran and Turkey which could possibly damage American interests in the Middle East.

Elements in Turkey wanted to be pulled into the Western bloc with using all different means. The press for instance, started to mention the Soviets' land demands from Turkey. This increased the tension contrary to Soviets. Additionally Anti-Soviet in Turkey was the climax when the leftist Tan newspaper was fired by extremist right groups .⁸⁰

Following the World War II, the US proved Turkey's importance with sending one of its biggest battleship (Missouri) in order to bring Munir Ertegun's funeral on March 1946.⁸¹ The Missouri was a message to the Soviets that emphasized the importance of the Turkish straits for the USA. The day which Missouri came in Istanbul, President Truman gave a speech ; underlying the importance of Middle East and the Straits for the United States. One more step taken by the US welcomed by Turkey. During the war years, the Turks had loaned from the US for their gun technology. All these loans were canceled by Washington so that Turkish economy breathed.

On the contrary, the Soviet Union never gave up its demand on the Straits. On 7 August 1946, the Moscow gave a Note for three countries : Turkey , the USA and Britain. The lists of demands were : 1. The Straits should open commercial ships of all the states. 2. It should open Coastal Countries' war ships. 3. Except particular dates, it should close all the war ships which has not a Coastal Country 4. The status of the Straits are able to be determined by Turkey and Coastal Countries 5. The defense of the Straits was provided by Turkey and Soviet Union.⁸²

This note was unacceptable to the US, particularly the last two articles which were threat to the US interests. The US state department sent counternote on 19 August 1946 stating that the Soviet demands on the Straits were unacceptable. Just like the US, Ankara warned the Soviet rules that the last two demands would not be negotiable.⁸³

The US foreign policy towards the Turkish straits wasn't aggressive until Truman Doctrine because the close relationship had been established during the Second World War years between Washington and Moscow. That's why Turkey felt alone itself during these years.

⁸⁰ Hurriyet, 4 Aralık 1946

⁸¹ He was Turkish ambassador in Washington and died 16 months ago.

⁸² Mehmet Gönlübol, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1973)**,Sevinç Press, Ankara 1974, pp. 218-219.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 220.

However, declaring the Truman Doctrine was a turning point in the world system which was also the beginning of the Cold War period.⁸⁴

The traditional American foreign policy thus began to transform with the Truman Doctrine To defended Greece and Turkey against Communist Threat, President Truman decided to aid both countries including US 400 million dollar (US 300 million was to be allocated to Greece and US 100 million dollar was given to Turkey).

Turkey's attempts to deter Soviet expansion so required more expenditure on the military this economic help was an important advantage. This aid money was spent in the following:

Land Forces	\$ 485.00.000
Air Craft Forces	\$ 26.750.000
Naval Forces	\$ 14.750.000
Military Supplies	\$ 5.000.000
Highway Construction	\$ 5.000.000 ⁸⁵

Necmeddin Sadak⁸⁶ emphasizes that “The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish People, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated .”⁸⁷

The use of Truman's aid was an independent program of the US so it continued for ten years. On 6 October 1949, the Mutual Defence Act was ratified by the US parliament. Between 1947 and 1949, American military financial aid was equivalent to 152 million dollars. 147 million dollars were set aside for Ground-Air-Naval army's modernization. The other 5 million dollars was spent for the construction of highways. Particularly possible Soviet attack would stop on the South side of Taurus mountains that's why it was significant to construct the supply roads.⁸⁸

In the framework of the Truman Doctrine, the US gave away its military surplus which she used in the World War II. Since these war surplus was produced during the war years, all were more modernized than Turkish equipments. Especially, air force aid modernized the Turkish military in a good manner. 241 P-47 Hunter Aircraft, 32 A-26 Bomb Aircraft, 100 AT-6 forward training plane, 67 AT 11 training plane and 50 C 47 transport plane were

⁸⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı, **Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li yıllar**, ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Press, Ankara 2001, p. 5.

⁸⁵ See for details : George McGhee, **ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu**, (Trans. Belkıs Çörekçi), Bilgi Press, İstanbul 1991, p. 90.

⁸⁶ Foreign Minister

⁸⁷ Necmeddin Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol, 27, April 1949, p. 461.

⁸⁸ Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih Birinci Dünya Savaşının Sonundan 1980'e Kadar**, İmge Press, Ankara 1989, p. 23.

given to Turkish Military Command under the Truman Doctrine.⁸⁹ This shows that the doctrine helped in the way of Turkish military modernization. This equipment, however, had some repair costs that Turkey had to borrow from the US in return.

The separation between Western Liberal thought and Soviet Communist thought was clearly evident in the Truman Doctrine. Capitalism and Communism were both global ideologies but both excluded each other thus each side divided the world into two. Countries were forced to choose one side.

The Truman doctrine changed Turkish Foreign Policy completely. As soon as American aid was received, Turkish foreign policy started to become in the side of American side.

American military aid which was nearly 100 million dollars but repair costs exceeded American aid. For example, the repair and maintenance of military equipments cost 143 million dollars yearly. This cost consumed the dollar reserves of the country.⁹⁰

Economic and military dependence on the US resulted in a change from a traditional foreign policy in the pro-American position. The clearest example was seen with regard to the Palestine issue in 1948. Up to this time, Turkey had been sided with the Arab world but in this case, Turkey became the first Muslim state to support Israel and accepted it as a state. Moreover Turkey let its Jewish people move to Palestine. This also helped increase the number of Jewish people in Jerusalem. This policy distorted Turkey from Arab countries.⁹¹

The Truman Doctrine affected Turkish political life to the extent that Turkish society found an opportunity to get to know American Democracy. President Ismet Inonu took the first step by resigning from the Chairmanship of Republican People's Party (July 1947) indicating that he believed the President had to be independent from any political party. In 1949, the Military Command's autonomous structure was ended and joined under National Defence Ministry. This amendment was done according to American wishes in the treaties. Opponents in Turkey of this foreign policy shift were silenced particularly the leftist teachers in Universities such as Pertev Nail Boratav, Muzaffer Serif Basoglu, Niyazi Berkes were fired.⁹²

⁸⁹ Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", p. 535.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 536

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 536.

⁹² See, Cemil Koçak, **Türkiye' de Milli Şef Dönemi**, vol. II, İletişim Press, İstanbul 2009.

In the following days the US clarified the nature of its aid to Turkey, which was the Marshall plan. The outline of the plan was given in a speech by Secretary of State, General George Marshall at Harvard on 5 June 1947. He said:

“The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and Political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.”⁹³

Marshall's proposal underlined three points: First, in contrast to the Truman Doctrine, economic aid is emphasized. Second, this aid would go to all European countries. (before, only Greece and Turkey, were able to get American help.) Third, if any government or party opposed these aids, American power will directly prevent any intervention. (This warns particularly Soviet and periphery governments)

What was it going to bring to Turkey? The planned Marshall Aid didn't include Turkey because Turkey was thought of a natural source country for the modernization of the Europe with its natural sources so Turkish reaction in the public opinion against the US government started soon. The government wanted the country get into Marshall Aid. The USA had some wishes if it was possible to get into plan. First of all, the aid would have to develop agriculture. With the modernization of the agricultural and transportation systems, Turkey would become rich for raw material. Moreover the production of chrome material had to be paid importance because US defense requirements. Turkey accepted all these demands thus the US gave Marshall plan aid to it as well.

On 4 July 1948, the Marshall Plan was started to be given to Turkey upon the signing of the Economic Cooperation Treaty.⁹⁴

In September 1947, The Soviet Union set up the Cominform as a response to the Marshall Plan. Its members were the leaders of the Communist parties in USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, Italy and later, the Netherlands. One year later after the Marshall Plan started in February 1948, a successful coup was held by communists in Czechoslovakia which led to the signing of an economic, social and cultural defense treaty was signed by Holland, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and England.

⁹³ Baiby, p. 152.

⁹⁴ Armaoğlu, p. 168.

It was called the “Brussels Treaty Organization”⁹⁵ On 22 January 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin talked about his plans for a multilateral security organization. Bevin’s own purpose for the West at this time worked on two levels. On the one hand, closer American association with the problems of Western security was certainly seen as useful. But Bevin was also eager to pursue a policy which would strengthen Britain’s position and global role against both the Soviets and the Americans.⁹⁶ Following this organization, The Soviets blockaded West Berlin on June 24, 1948 to invade East Germany that’s why Western Union Defense Organization was formed by the members of Brussels Treaty Organization in 28 September 1948.⁹⁷ Despite the fact that the Berlin blockade necessitated for Western security alliance, the Atlantic treaty had not emerged in 1948.

The usefulness of this organization was quickly realized in the founding of common military education and technology. Brussels Treaty Organization aimed to strengthen its military power and was supported by the U.S. In addition the U.S. Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally opened preliminary talks about security issues in the North Atlantic area on April, 1948. It is called Vandenberg Resolution which was announced at the end of October 1948, included defensive pact for the North Atlantic area. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty was published on March, 18, 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949, formalized the alliance, but disappointed Turkish government because Italy had been included but Turkey and Greece rather left out.⁹⁸ During the year after signing treaty, the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty turned into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁹⁹

3.2. Turkey and the Onset of NATO Membership

⁹⁵ Aydın Alacakaptan, **Atlantik İttifakı**, Türk Atlantik Andlaşması Foundation Press, Ankara 1991, pp. 7-14.

⁹⁶ Yost, p. 19.

⁹⁷ Kamuran Reçber, “Batı Avrupa Birliği’ nin Evrensel ve Bölgesel Barışı Korumada Üstlendiği Rol”, **Akademik Fener, Balıkesir Üniversitesi Bandırma İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Press**, Vol. 1, Num. 1, 2003. p. 285.

⁹⁸ Hale, p. 116.

⁹⁹ See, Lawrence Kaplan, **NATO and the United States**, Twayne Publishers, Boston 1988.

At the end of World War II, the survival of Turkey was threatened by the relative disparity between Soviet and British power in the region.¹⁰⁰ Afghanistan stayed as conflict state; Turkey and Iran were still under pressure from the Soviet Union. However the British Empire was integrating.

By 1948, British forces were to withdraw from Greece, Turkey, India and Palestine. While the states of the Middle East welcomed the decline of British influence, Turkey and Iran were concerned about the new situation because they bordered Soviet Union and were directly threatened by the Soviets. The entry of Turkey and Greece into NATO was now discussed. Opposition came from the smaller NATO countries, especially Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Canada, for these small countries didn't have direct interests in the Southeast frontier area. Moreover Norway and Denmark feared that Soviet Union would possibly attack Turkey and Greece.¹⁰¹ Kamran İnan, the former minister said in an interview: *"There had been so many discussions about Turkey's participation among NATO members. However, these discussions have been kept and never allowed to be published."*¹⁰²

For the United States, Turkey's full cooperation in NATO was required. If the Soviets attacked on its border Western, Iran and Turkey would stay neutral.(therefore the Soviet right flank would be protected). If Bulgaria attacked, Greece and Turkey would not oppose Bulgaria unless there was an attack on their territories. The security of the Turkish straits was also necessary for the US. Without such support, Turkey would possibly to go neutral as it had in World War II. The result for the US and Western Europe would lose the assistance of a potential ally.¹⁰³

The old politics of the British alienated Middle Eastern states particularly Egypt, which as a new power, criticized Britain's imperialist politics that's why neither Britain and Egypt got along with together. This situation brought the Soviets closer to the Middle East. Towards the Soviet closer to Middle East, Turkey was seen as a buffer state. Egypt demanded that a treaty signed in 1936 by England and Egypt was to revised that led to Turkey, the USA, Britain and France coming together to negotiate a new agreement in

¹⁰⁰ Bruce Kuniholm, "The Evolving Strategic Significance of Turkey's Relationship with NATO", **A History of NATO-The First Fifty Years**, Vol, 3, New York 2001, p. 339

¹⁰¹ Frode Liland, "Explaining NATO's Non-Policy on Out of Area Issues During the Cold War", **A History of NATO-The First Fifty Years**, Vol, 1, New York 2001, p. 175

¹⁰² Interview with Kamran İnan, (16.07.2012)

¹⁰³ Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II", **Turkey Between East and West, New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power**, Oxford 1996, p. 49.

1951. According to the planned treaty, Egypt would become equal state but the British could able to set up bases on the Suez Canal territory. The Egyptian government rejected this plan because no matter what the Arab world did not want any foreign power in their territory. Necmeddin Sadak criticized this new treaty by two questions : 1. Would only Turkey defend the Middle East? 2. If Turkey took charge in the North Atlantic Pact and Middle East Command,would the US and British be to protect both of Turkey's flanks¹⁰⁴ To defend the Middle East, The relationship between Turkey and England focused periphery of the Middle East. The United Kingdom was particularly concerned with the defense of the Suez Canal. Moreover, Britain was also concerned about Egypt but also in Iran. On 7, March 1951, Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated instead Mosaddegh was chosen prime minister who was nationalist so his first step was to nationalize the British-Iran Petroleum Company. The company had been founded in 1909 and the British had % 56 share. On the contrary, London went to International Justice Court but Iran never quitted its decision. Mosaddeqh stayed two years as Prime Minister then he had to quit his authority in a coup, organized by CIA agents in 1953.¹⁰⁵

The British government, rather than Europe, wanted Turkey and Greece to defend the Middle East for that reason London opposed Turkey and Greece joining NATO in July of 1951. However politic conflicts in Egypt and Iran created anxiety for Britain so it quitted its objection. British Foreign Minister Morrison made a speech on July 18 1951 and explained his country's positive approach towards Turkey and Greece to join Atlantic Pact saying "the government after a detailed search, decided Turkey and Greece joined pact in addition defending the Middle East is necessary"¹⁰⁶ This explanation proves that England was planning Turkey assigned not only in Atlantic pact but also in Middle East Command. Turkey had no alternative aside from the British demand eventually Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu in the Parliament expressed his pleasure about the British's changing view of Turkey's NATO membership :"*I would like to point out the defense of Middle East both strategically and economically*"¹⁰⁷

Turkey, moreover, would be important to the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) both for the deterrence of the Soviet Union (if it were to attack to Europe and

¹⁰⁴ Aptülaha Akşin , **Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri Orta Doğu Meseleleri**, Akgün Press, İstanbul 1959, p. 39.

¹⁰⁵ Gürün, **Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Politikası**, p. 309.

¹⁰⁶ Gönlübol, p. 248.

¹⁰⁷ Gönlübol, p. 249.

Middle East.) Therefore President Truman decided that Turkey and Greece should join as full members of NATO. In September 1951 the NATO Council voted to extend invitations Turkey and Greece and on 18 February 1952 the two countries were formally admitted as full membership.¹⁰⁸

On the Turkish side, the efforts to enter NATO began during the Republican Party's tenure. The signature of Brussels Treaty 1948 was glad for Turkish Opinion since it was believed to provide Europe's defense security. The happiness concerning the Brussels Treaty Organization replaced to displeasure due to no invitation letter has extended to Turkey.

When no invitation letter came to the fact that Ankara, the government repeatedly wished its willingness to join new military defense organization. Prime Minister Hasan Saka told : *“ Turkey is much more ally of the US so it is necessary to establish military organization together.”*¹⁰⁹

During the preparations for establishing NATO, Turkey expressed its desire to enter the soon to be established. In February 1949, Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak made a speech during a European Economic Cooperation, saying that if Turkey did not join the North Atlantic Pact, Turkey, Greece and Italy would establish a Mediterranean Pact.¹¹⁰

Even there was no invitation came from NATO members , Turkish government applied for NATO membership on May 11, 1950 however this application had received no positive response so the Democrat Party continued the process.

3.2.1. Turkey in Korean War

During World War II, Korea was under the siege of Japanese forces. When the war was over, Korea was divided by American and Soviet powers. The Northern part of Korea was controlled by the Soviets on the contrary the Southern part was under the domination of Americans. A Communist regime was established a Capitalist system. The conflict between two sides began on June 25, 1950. As soon as the war broke out, the US had Security Council decided to stop the attacks of North Korea. Despite the fact that the Soviets were one of the five permanent delegates of the Council, she couldn't prevent this

¹⁰⁸ Akşin, p. 50.

¹⁰⁹ Cumhuriyet, 12 Haziran 1948.

¹¹⁰ See Necmeddin Sadak, : “Atlantik Paktı bir Akdeniz Paktı ile Tamamlanmalı”, Ulus, 18 February 1949.

decision as it hadn't joined the meeting. On 27 June, the US troops landed in South Korea but Turkey held back so the Soviets perceived this as threat so that Feridun Cemal Erkin, U.S ambassador, and Selim Sarper were called to Ankara and asked their opinions. Their views were in favor of the US side because if Turkey didn't participate the war, it would possibly stay alone when the Soviets attacked in the future.¹¹¹ Turkish public opinion was interestingly supportive of sending Turkish troops to the Korean war, Senihi Yürüten who was a deputy of Democrat Party established a community to send volunteers in Korea¹¹² Afterwards, Turkey sent 4500 men under Colonel Tahsin Yazıcı command. Republican People's Party reacted to this decision because the 26th article of Constitution only permitted as only National Parliament but the Menderes government sent troops without the permission of parliament. Despite opposition rejections, the government didn't reverse its decision, for them, was a big chance for joining NATO and Western bloc.¹¹³ Following the sending of troops to Korea, Turkey applied for NATO membership at the second time on 1 August 1950. A second application of Turkey to NATO was rejected since the US General Commander's report was negative as it said Turkey's joining to NATO would be dangerous and prevent the organization develop. George McGhee explains why the US Commanders rejected Turkey's application : *"It is early for accepting Turkey into NATO. If it is accepted the security area is needed to be widened because both Turkey and Greece lands are big and difficult to protect against the Soviet Union."* From the light of these thoughts, they made these suggestions :

1. The USA, for now, would able to accept both Turkey and Greece for common partnership program.¹¹⁴
2. As soon as the security of NATO members would provide, the full membership would be given to Turkey and Greece.
3. For now, Iran isn't thought to be a part of semi-membership nor advisor.

Feridun Cemal Erkin¹¹⁵ warned that *Turkey's membership should be real as quickest as possible Since the Turks felt themselves as the second class position in European community. Although the US helped under the Truman doctrine and Marshall aids to the*

¹¹¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, **Dışişlerinde 34 yıl**, Vol. II, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara 1997, p. 153.

¹¹² Nearly 3000 men applied to this call. See, Meltem Yetener, "Adnan Menderes" (Ed. Ali Faik Demir), **Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler**, Bağlam Press İstanbul 2007, p. 75.

¹¹³ Haluk Gerger, "NATO", **Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi**, vol. 6, İletişim Press, İstanbul 1983, p.1546.

¹¹⁴ This was like semi-membership within the organization.

¹¹⁵ Turkish Ambassador of Washington.

country, if Turkey's application was rejected, this would possibly create great sadness on Turkish opinion.

Echoing Erkin's words, Celal Bayar, the President, expressed the unhappiness of Turkish people due to being for NATO membership.¹¹⁶

This report also suggested establishing the Mediterranean Pact. This suggestion wasn't accepted by Turkish government because it didn't want to be a part of one-sided agreement.

The Republican People's Party for the sake of National interest abandoned its protest over sending Turkish soldiers to Korea so that Republican and Democrat parties united and declared common manifesto which showed their support and love to Turkish soldiers in Korea on 27 December 1950.

3.2.2. Turkey's entry into NATO

In the early years of the pact, Turkey's membership to NATO wasn't on the agenda because it was thought that the pact could include only Atlantic states Turkish Policy makers thought only Mediterranean states were going to be accepted yet only Italy was accepted in pact. Hence Turkey started to work to become a part of NATO. The public opinion wrote Turkey stayed in more dangerous place than Italy. Why is Italy accepted but Turkey is still out of pact ? Turkey is an important gate way to the Middle East and borders with the Soviet Union. Cumhuriyet criticized the situation by giving the example of Iran. It says that Turkey and Iran are used for outstation by Western states.¹¹⁷ Efforts to gain NATO membership began in the time of Republican Party but when Democrat Party came to power it carried out the process successfully.

The positive side of Turkish participation into Korean war under the United Nations auspices gradually changed US opinion about Turkish joining into NATO. Turkey's participation into Western bloc was strongly supporting in the US policy makers however the British had different plans for this. The British General Robertson officially visited Ankara to negotiate Middle East future. Before his visit, he had been taken a briefing from Defense Ministry which underscore :

¹¹⁶ McGhee, p. 136.

¹¹⁷ Cumhuriyet, 20 March 1949.

*“ A defense organization should be established together with Turkey, the USA and Britain. The biggest aim which it will make more powerful of the British will, is to give attendance to Middle East. Turkey in this aim will be a part of Middle Eastern defense. For this plan, the General should convey the message to the Turkish government.”*¹¹⁸ Nuri Yamut, the chief of General Staff just like the British General Robertson had similar ideas in order to defend Middle East. Despite two General’s similar opinions, the US admiral Carney objected the British plan in the Middle East. Ankara changed his view after Carney’s view on Middle East and Fuat Koprulu starting in favor of the Carney view. This change was interpreted by the British as the US obstacle that affected Turkish side in a negative way. Robertson explained this changing policy : *“The biggest problem in Turkey is America. The Americans in Turkey are powerful and donate to the country with many gun, equipment and money. The Americans, also, see Turkey as the part of Europe on the other hand the chief General Staff Nuri Yamut agrees the British plan in the Middle East.”*¹¹⁹

In May 1951, with the support of Admiral Carney, the US suggested to other NATO countries in that to Turkey and Greece be admitted to NATO. The reason for the US suggestion was rooted in changing situation in the world.

The Soviets declared that they had had Atomic bomb and they would be able to reach the US with it. In the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, the US needed to have air bases near Soviet territory. For this reason Washington demanded bases in Turkey but Ankara accepted this demand only if NATO would accept Turkey with full membership. Moreover, the Korean War had been seen as part of a Soviet communist propaganda campaign. Similar to the Far East, the Soviets would try to enlarge in the East. The first target would be Turkey that would be dangerous for NATO members’ security. One more reason that the US wanted Turkey and Greece to be integrated into NATO was the developments which occurred when Yugoslavia had resigned from Cominform. If any Soviet invasion on Yugoslavia would be a threat for Europe and NATO. Turkey and Greece for the security of Southern Europe, became so significant too.¹²⁰ The last reason that Americans wanted Turkey into NATO was Turkish army’s effort in the Korean war especially Turkish soldiers saving the US army in the famous Kunuri battle.

¹¹⁸ Cüneyd Akalın, **Soğuk Savaş ABD ve Türkiye**, Kaynak Press, İstanbul 2003, p.p. 287-288.

¹¹⁹ Akalın, p. 289. In here it is necessary to divide Yamut and government’s views because from the beginning Turkish Foreign Policy was very distant to the British view of Middle Eastern policy.

¹²⁰ Erhan, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, p. 549

The US suggestion faced objections from Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Norway. If an enlargement, they said, was made throughout Mediterranean region, it would be dangerous for them out of their will and policy. Second objection was that this was not only a defense agreement but also it composed of Atlantic states yet Turkey and Greece both culturally and traditionally are not part of Atlantic civilization. The US answered these questions underlying that Greece and Turkey were the partners of European Economic Cooperation Organization and European Council so that Scandinavian state quitted their objections.

On 4 June 1951, Turkish ambassador Erkin had met with George McGhee to deliver President Bayar's opinions. One interesting point that Bayar emphasized about Zekeriya Sertel's letter¹²¹ in which Sertel warned Bayar to follow neutral foreign policy and if a war would happen, Turkey shouldn't trust the Western states. Using a leftist writer's letter as a tool for Turkish Foreign Policy was an interesting event that it had never used before.¹²²

Under US pressure, London weakened its objection to including Turkey in the Middle East Command, NATO Ministerial Meeting was held to 16-20 September 1951 in Ottawa and called for Turkish and Greek for membership. On the other hand Norway and Denmark had still indecisive for NATO enlargement with Turkey and Greece. Moreover, the Britain insisted of being established the Middle East Command next to NATO membership.

The threat of the Soviets against the sovereignty of Turkey particularly its demands for the Eastern part of the country and Turkish straits after the Second World War, was one of the biggest problem for Turkish Foreign Policy since the foundation of Republic. Turkey needed support from an ally in order to eradicate the Soviet aggression. In the past, Ottoman state got support from the British against Russian threat until 1878.¹²³ However, when its support ended, the Ottomans looked for German support but this transformation couldn't prevent the state's dissolution. Along with historical experience, Turkey sought the US support via bilateral security agreements. On October 12, the US General Omar Bradley, the British William Slim and the French man Lecher came to Turkey and talked

¹²¹ Zekeriya Sertel was one of the leading leftist writers and he was the chief of famous newspaper TAN.

¹²² McGhee, p. 156.

¹²³ 1977-1878 Ottoman- Russia War called "93 Harbi", was a turning point which the British help was cut to the Ottomans.

with Turkish authorities in order to decide about the nature of Turkish participation in NATO before the agreement was signed. They declared those principles:

1. Turkey's membership in NATO should be carried out as soon as possible. After this, it will be negotiated with NATO members for acceptance of a Turkish General to reside in NATO Commands in Washington.
2. Eliminating an attack against the Middle East, we should establish a Middle East Command. Turkish government basically had accepted this idea so it simply expressed that opinion to the related states.

The same day (October 15) in London a protocol which was signed for the entry of Turkey and Greece into the organization was signed in London that was the first enlargement in NATO. The Soviet Union had protested this signature with a note on 3 November 1951. Due to Soviet protest, Fuat Koprulu gave a speech on National Assembly and he said the Soviets claimed that new Bases were constructing in the country so Turkey let imperialist states to be able to attack the Soviet territories. Koprulu denied Soviet claims as pointing out Turkey was entering NATO and letting Bases for peaceful aims.¹²⁴ When the negotiations was going on, the new appointed Soviet ambassador Lavrichief gave a note to the vice Foreign Minister S. Agaoglu on 3 November 1951. The note accused NATO of being imperialism tool that Turkey helps this imperialist aim with the entrance to this organization. The answer came on 12 November 1951 that Ankara pointed out NATO had been founded as defense organization and it was also mentioned the military power of the Soviet state. The United Nations as proper structure is not enough to protect the Nations that's why several states join the security organizations for peace and security.

The Soviets one more time, gave a note on 30 November 1951 however the Turks didn't even gave an answer because, *"the Soviets for Koprulu, will not quit demands unless Turkey leave the North Atlantic Organization. Their purpose is to bother the Ankara government."*¹²⁵

Despite Soviet threat, the question of command was problem for a while. Which command would Turkey be under the control? Britain wanted Turkey under the command of the British general in the Middle East yet Turkey demanded to be a part of NATO under Eisenhower command in the USA.

¹²⁴ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Vol 11, sess. 15, term 44, p. 89.

¹²⁵ Suat Bilge, **Türk Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920-1964**, Türkiye İş Bankası Press, Ankara 1992, p. 336.

There was another problem Egypt's attitude about Middle East Command. By the time allied commanders visited Turkey and declared Egypt was equal state in 13 of October. Egypt Prime Minister Nahas Pasha had already started that his country was going to cancel old agreements with England.¹²⁶ Egypt's this attitude canceled the British plan for the Middle East Command. Turkey's full participation into NATO was canceled for a while that the ministerial meeting which was gathered in 14-28 November 1951 at Rome, discussed those subjects :

1. Turkey and Greece should be under control of NATO as Balkan Command.
2. Both state should be under command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
3. The Middle East Command should be established so that Turkish and Greek forces have to be part of this command. Also any state can be able to join this organization.

These subjects were discussed but no consensus was reached in a way. French opinion later was accepted by the others which it suggested Turkish and Greek ground forces would be united in the Shape but their naval and air forces would be under Middle East Command.

Turkey was formally accepted NATO on 18, February 1952 and joined the first NATO meeting as full member in Lisbon one week later.(20-25 February 1952).¹²⁷

George Harris evaluates Turkish-American relations after Turkey entered NATO in this way : *“as this connection served as the general foundation for the whole range of political, economic and military relations between Turkey and the United States. Previous programs, such as economic assistance extended under the Marshall Plan and the military aid provided through the Truman Doctrine, were expanded”*¹²⁸ he said.

Turkey's large land army would be ready under NATO command if there was any possible war. Turkish roads and other infrastructure facilities needed to support a defending army began to build within the country. Construction of air fields and other projects had already begun since Truman doctrine. By the time Turkey's entry into NATO, Incirlik airbase near Adana was nearing completion. When Izmir was chosen as the headquarters of NATO's ne

¹²⁶ The British-Egypt agreement in 1936.

¹²⁷ Gerger, p. 1546.

¹²⁸ George Harris, **Troubled Alliance Turkish-American Problems in historical perspective**, 1945-1971, 1972, American Enterprise, Institute for Public Policy Research Press, Washington 1972, p. 49.

Southern Command in 1952, the headquarters unit of the Sixth Allied Strategic Air Command was established there.

3.3. NATO's Massive Retaliation Strategy (MC-48) and Turkish Foreign Policy

The starting point of the "Massive Retaliation" strategy began when the U.S. shifted in 1953 to the so outlined "New Look" which emphasized the use of nuclear weapons. This new policy called as NSC 162/2 of 30 October 1953 stating that: *"In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other weapons... The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory power if the area is attacked."*¹²⁹

This approach later combined with other additions for the five next years (MC 48) accepted by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) on 17 December 1954. MC 48 was the first NATO document with MC 14/2 which composed of massive retaliation.

As NATO was strengthening to strong its military and strategic position, in parallel, it decided to reinforce the political role of the Alliance. The report of Three Wise Men which emphasized the importance of economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and most importantly cultural cooperation. The combination between Massive Retaliation Strategy and Turkish Foreign Policy, it is necessary to analyze the domestic and foreign events in Turkey. During the Massive Retaliation plans were being negotiated in the pact, the death of Stalin opened a new gate for the relations of two countries. Particularly new authority in the Soviet state gave a note showing its quit to demand Kars, Ardahan and the Straits. However, the Turkish government did not reply a positive answer for this development.¹³⁰ This shows that the security of the new strategy and its effect on the government directed no returning step from the status quo. Parallel to Turkish government, Greek Prime Minister made a formal visit to Ankara and told the peaceful trials of the Soviets were just words and didn't reflect the reality. The reality for him, was

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 14.

¹³⁰ Cumhuriyet, 11.6.1953.

different that the security problem was still going for the NATO parties at all. Hence the armament was always necessary for NATO states.¹³¹

In September 1953, the Turkish government showed its full support for France against the nationalist movement in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia. Turkish support to France would later cause a negative react by Arab states in the 1960's

Turkish policy makers in the 1950s fully supported for the Massive Retaliation Strategy and NATO's security concepts which was the relations with the USSR and Arab states. Nasser was questioned about Turkey and he said “ *on the subject of defense for the Middle East, we do not support Turkey as it was the first Muslim state recognizing and trading Israel state. And It also supported imperialism against the Arab states' interests in the United Nations. Moreover, Egypt's strategic plans can not compare with Turkey's.*”¹³²

On the other hand, Ankara emphasized the importance of Middle East for Turkish foreign policy. Selim Sarper noted that Middle East was significant for the United States and no other place is more important than the Middle East. If there was a space in the region, the communists would fill in there, this would continue to invade through Africa. Two continents Africa and America are closer so they can go to New York by plane with a few hours. This was strategically dangerous for strategic plan for America.¹³³

The Massive Retaliation Strategy and Turkish Foreign Policy were also connected the defense of Balkans since, it was necessary to surround the Soviet Union. This led to the attempt to establish the Balkan Pact in the 1950's

3.3.1. Construction under the NATO programme

The Infrastructure plan had resulted in the addition or improvement of 140 airfields, 5000 miles of fuel pipeline, and 15000 miles of land telephone and telegraph lines that helped to link depots and airfields from northern Norway to eastern Turkey in the first decade of NATO's history.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Cumhuriyet, 17.6.1953.

¹³² Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili...*, p. 117

¹³³ Milliyet, 21.2.1954

¹³⁴ Kaplan, p. 78.

Menderes government's relations with NATO and the United States motivated the opposition that they began to voice irritation that economic help protected DP from the results of its mistakes. NATO project with American assistance was the highway program. Although it was originally as part of military aid under Truman Doctrine, the highway construction was viewed from the first by both the Turks and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads.¹³⁵ During Menderes period, Turkey completed construction on highway projects for the first time stretching to corners of the country. Menderes had promised in the election period that "Roads to villages".¹³⁶

3.3.2. The Construction of Incirlik Air Base

Incirlik Air Base was conceived by the US government after the Soviet trial in the using of its Atomic bomb in 1949. Hence Washington looked for a new policy to stop the Soviets' growing capacity in Nuclear technology. On October 1953, NATO General Eisenhower declared New Look Strategy which emphasized the use of nuclear guns. In the incident of opposition, the United States would take into account nuclear power to be as readily available conventional weapons. The major deterrence to assaulter against Western European states is the display resolution of the United States to operate its atomic power and massive retaliatory power if the country is assaulted. Turkey, parallel to this strategy, let the US bases installed in the country due to New Look Strategy.

In order to provide the deterrence, it was necessary to install bases near to the Soviet lands. Turkey was one of the best allied country which was near to the USSR.

The biggest air-base under NATO command is Incirlik Air Base near Adana, It has been the largest and most controversial air base. The concept of Incirlik Air Base as already mentioned came from after plan modify in the United States when the Soviet achievement Atomic bomb trial in 1949. On 22 September 1949, Truman announced that the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb. Six days later, Truman commanded to development of the

¹³⁵ The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads was an agency which provided the infrastructure for economic development. See, Harris, p. 80.

¹³⁶ Harris noted : "Menderes was famous for his urban reconstruction, including construction of major arteries in İstanbul, Ankara, and other cities. Such road building was carried out in urban reconstruction, including construction of major arteries in İstanbul, Ankara and other cities. Such road building was carried out in urban areas by the municipalities involved, not by the General Directorate of Highways. The city projects were fraught with complaints about the quality of workmanship, etc, whereas the work of the highway directorate enjoyed general approbation. Harris, p. 80.

hydrogen bomb. The danger was so imminent because if the Russians could make the first to Western European targets and then to the United States. The Soviets now had two powers, the atomic bomb and the Red Army against the West.¹³⁷ In this period, the USA did not have any long-outstrip bombers that could travel all the way the United States to the Soviet Union.¹³⁸ The construction started Adana airfield by three American companies: namely Meltcalfe, Hamilton, and Wilson&Kruge, in 1951 while Turkey's NATO membership was still ongoing. The construction was mainly finished in 1952 at a cost of \$15 million. No matter how, reposition facilities and air dock were built until 1954. Turkish Grand National Assembly contracted agreement with the US later it became amply functional and was called Adana Air Base on February 20, 1955. Abdi İpekçi published a series researches about Turkish-American relations, NATO and¹³⁹ he asked the experts about the issue of bases. İsmet İnönü thought that especially İncirlik air-base was a provocation against the USSR that always would be a threat for Turkey.¹⁴⁰

Discussions over US personnel in Turkey has always heated concerning the sovereignty of the country. The number of İncirlik Air Base personnel in this context was 199 military staff in 1955. It was the one year later that the number reached to 361.

By the Summer of 1958, Lebanon crisis started, the İncirlik Air Base was seen as important base for the Americans. The US Air forces were deployed to İncirlik that the operation was being held during the Lebanon intervention.

The importance of İncirlik has increased from time to time. In 2000, there were nearly 1400 US Air Force military members, more than 670 US and Turkish civilian employees over 2000 family members about 900 Turkish maintenance contractors. Totally 1700 personnel including 1443 military members at the İncirlik Air Base.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Stephen E., Ambrose , **Rise to Globalism American Foreign Policy 1938-1976**, Penguin Press, New York 1976, p. 181.

¹³⁸ Selin M. Bölme, "The Politics of İncirlik Air Base", **Insight Turkey**, Vol 9, No:3, 2007, p. 82

¹³⁹ The series of news were published on May of 1970.

¹⁴⁰ Abdi İpekçi "Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Durum" Milliyet, 21 May, 1970, İsmet İnönü's worries about İncirlik bases, were replied by Turkish authorities in the following newspaper : they said " İncirlik ,with last amendments, has been common complex. The Commander of İncirlik is Turk. There is also an American Commander who receives orders from NATO. All activities which they do, have to be informed to Turkish General Staff. American planes can't fly to Middle East or even to Germany without Turkish permission. We, also, have right to nationalize İncirlik whenever it is necessary. İpekçi asked Turkish authority (his name is not written) whether İncirlik would be a provocative?. He answered : "yes , it is possible, but if the Soviets attack İncirlik air-base, this attack will be both for Turkey and the USA because both American and Turkish soldiers are residing there. The Soviets can't take into account this war.

¹⁴¹ Bölme, p. 87.

3.3.3. NATO's Contribution on Modernization of Turkish Army

Turkish opinion welcomed NATO membership, so this was one of the turning points in Turkish Foreign Policy that Prime Minister Adnan Menderes said:

*“We are about to enter the organization that was established by all sovereign states of the world in order to defense freedom and justice of humanity. Our country after this will have an international law security and military deterrence. Nobody can despise its worthy. Foundation of world peace and defense of freedom, justice of world peoples and independence of nations will be more powerful with Turkey's entrance into the organization.”*¹⁴²

As Prime Minister's words, Turkey was expecting great hopes for NATO membership. From the beginning, Turkey's relations developed mostly with the USA due to European states were still the recovery process. These relations showed with bilateral agreements and the US bases within Turkey. The military assistance for Turkish state, the Americans were the primary source in the Turkish military establishment. The Canadians were able to supply modern aircraft but the first ten-years, the other suppliers who later became significant such as the West Germans did not become purveyor states for Turkey.¹⁴³

For the United States, Turkish mobility in the army was more important than the number of soldiers, that's why rapid progress was made in this endeavor, Turkish men under arms were reduced from about 700,000 to some 400,000.¹⁴⁴

After NATO General Eisenhower declared New Look Strategy (1953) which emphasized the use of nuclear weapons. In the time of opposition, the United States will deliberate nuclear power to be as ready for use as other guns. The vital hindrance to attack against Western Europe is the demonstrating resolution of the United States to utilize its atomic talent and massive retaliatory power if the area is invaded. Turkey, parallel to this strategy, let the US bases installed in the country due to New Look Strategy.

On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the first satellite Sputnik. Two months earlier the Russians had launched intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

¹⁴² Yetener, p. 77.

¹⁴³ Harris, p. 53.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 53.

Eisenhower dispersed Strategic Air Force units and installed medium range ballistic missiles in Turkey and Italy.¹⁴⁵

The bilateral agreements¹⁴⁶ were always criticized by the opposition because of the behaviors of US soldiers. The well-known and most discussed agreement was the Status of Forces Agreement in 1954. After Turkey had signed it with the USA, the number of American personnel in Turkey began to rise. At first these Americans were working in construction projects began in the days of the Truman doctrine. The Construction, for instance, of net of air fields, naval base at Golcuk, modernization of port in Iskenderun. The high number of Americans began to increase when electronic installations were set up along the Black Sea coasts. American Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) was projected by the Americans in Turkish lands against the USSR. Turkish opinion took little attention to American activities within Turkey in mid 1950's. However when the Soviets accused American Ballons¹⁴⁷ as spy machine tools that the Americans claimed these ballons were being used for the scientific purposes. The Soviet Union protested these ballons and gave notes to America and some NATO countries including Turkey. On February 1956, Turkey replied the Soviet note as explaining these flights aimed to receive climate information and the outcomes would be useful for scientific researches and future geographic conference.¹⁴⁸ the Turkish opinion for the first time, reacted America's existence.

As mentioned, the most discussible agreement was the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. This agreement was first signed in 1951 among NATO members. Turkey joined this agreement in 1954. The most problematic issue was the second paragraph of the agreement as follows : *“employees of United States Government departments, Post Exchanges, and United Services Organization personnel, and technical representatives of contractors with*

¹⁴⁵ The Americans wanted to ask France, Greece, Turkey, Italy and Britain to settled the Balistic Missiles. See, Uslu, p. 137.

¹⁴⁶ Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel gave a detailed review on press conference on February 7, 1970. He said : the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the USA under article 3 of the NATO Pact and the new NATO strategy. Over the 25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral agreements had been signed and 54 of them had been in force when the Justice party had come to power in October 1965. See, Suleyman Demirel Press Conference, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni, February 9, 1970.

¹⁴⁷ These ballons were explained by the use of meteorological purposes. However the Soviets claimed that these were spy materials which watched the USSR from Turkey.. See, Gönlübol, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, p. 339.

¹⁴⁸ Gönlübol, p. 339.

the United States forces who are assigned to United States military organizations in Turkey. All of these persons are subject to United States law."¹⁴⁹

The problem for this agreement existed over the matter of traffic accidents. The famous case happened when Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison ran down a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring several Turkish citizens. The trial in the U.S. military court, found guilty of negligence, fined \$ 1200, and restricted from troop command for two years. This case had a great reaction in Turkish opinion because he might probably have received at least three years jail from Turkish court. The press in Turkey protested this incident in several articles.¹⁵⁰

Another issue that Turkey faced with the increasing American presence was black-marketeering among the US personnel. The Americans brought the American goods in Turkey without taxes and sold. Also, currency trafficking offered great profit for the Americans. Turkish government never acted to stop these exercises but this would be a big problem for Turkish opinion after 1960's.¹⁵¹

At the convenience of the Massive Retaliation Strategy, Turkey signed atomic energy agreement with USA on June 10, 1955. It composed of the US scientific assistance in the area of nuclear energy which Turkey would allow nuclear reactors. For the second article of agreement, the USA would lend enrichment uranium to Turkey.¹⁵² However, this agreement could not go from a wish. Turkey has not had a nuclear reactor up to now.

Prior to Second World War, Turkish Army had been designed for the effect of German and French army. Parallel to bilateral agreements with USA, the structure of Turkish Military Forces have been changed according to NATO standards. This standard reflects the US army completely.

¹⁴⁹ Agreement Implementing NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June 23, 1954. For the full text see, Appendix II.

¹⁵⁰ Bedii Faik, wrote : "When you meet one of the Americans residing in our country, do you ask, even before learning his name, whether he is "on duty" or not? No? Then let us warn at once that you are exposing yourself to great danger... You really don't know what on duty means... In the dictionary the meaning of this word just 'on duty', but in the NATO language it assumes many different meanings. It is a kind of insurance policy. It is also unlimited...Just as (these American friends) bring all their foodstuffs, even their salt, from their own country, they never use the local justice! It looks as though one harms their stomachs and the other their heads.", Harris, p. 59. Morrison case has become symbol for the opposers which Morrison Knudsen company suffered because of its name similarity. Suleyman Demirel had worked this company before he was in politics, was called Suleyman Morrison by his opposition.

¹⁵¹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, "Türkiye'deki Amerikan Üsleri", Yön, November 26, 1965. pp. 8-9.

¹⁵² Fahir Armaoğlu, **Belgelerle Türk Amerikan İlişkileri**, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara 1991, p.p. 236-237.

3.4. Turkey – Regional Pacts – NATO

During the 1950's, Turkey was voluntarily part of regional and international agreements to reduce the possibility of attacks from the Communist side. Particularly the Communist threat in the Balkans feared the Yugoslavia as President Tito cut diplomatic relations with Soviets in 1950's. Turkey as a NATO member tried to strengthen its position both in Balkans and Middle East.

After Turkey joined the North Atlantic Pact, diplomatic maneuvers started in the Balkans with the support of USA. For this time period, Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia had troubled in politics so that Washington looked for providing of Yugoslavia's security.¹⁵³ Hence, the US seek for the unity of three states: Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. Particularly after Greece and Turkey had been part of NATO in 1952, several negotiations were held between Yugoslavia and Turkey and Greece. At the first time, Italy was anxious if Tripartite Balkan states were agreed on defense pact because Trieste issue¹⁵⁴ between Yugoslavia and Italy were still alive. Italy was relaxed by Turkey for the developments of the process. De Gasperi, Italian Prime Minister, went to Greece for formal visit and explained that he did not oppose any formation which Yugoslavia included if it was done according to NATO standards.

In February 1953, three Foreign Ministers; Fuad Koprulu(Turkey), Stepanopulos(Greece), Koca Popović(Yugoslavia) were signed agreement on the subject for friendship and cooperation. Concerning the Tripartite defense agreement were subjected by President Tito when he said if any attack would occur against Yugoslavia, how Turkey and Greece behave in this situation. Would they automatically respond and help to Yugoslavia? Turkey didn't want to take more responsibility from NATO agreement. Moreover, Italy, for Ankara, should have been part of any defense pact hence Turkey was waiting for Italy's positive response.

¹⁵³ Communism had never achieved majority support in any country outside the USSR. Even before 1948, the problem of nationalism and national independence had affected Soviet control. In mid 1948, Communist Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform. Under Tito, Yugoslavia adopted a neutral position in the Cold War. See, Derrick Murphy & Terry Morris, **International Relations 1879-2004**, Collins Press, London 2008.

¹⁵⁴ Trieste was a commercial land which became problem after Second World War between Italy and Yugoslavia. Trieste was divided into two. Northern part was given Italy and southern part was ceded to Yugoslavia in 1954.

On August 9, 1954, the three states were signed the agreement in Yugoslavia, the city of Bled. With this agreement, the Balkan Pact was established by Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Just like the article 5 of the NATO agreement, Balkan Pact stated that an attack on one country was an attack on all. It promises to take necessary steps to help each other if any attack would come.

Under the guidance of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the member states must try to restore and maintain security but this depends on when the Security Council of United Nations has acted as necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The Bled treaty was signed for twenty-year period. As mentioned the agreement was similar to NATO agreement so that 12th article said that any state could join this pact if the convenient situation would possibly occur.

However the future of Balkan Pact did not last longer as long as North Atlantic Organization. Aftermath Khrushchev came to power in 1953 Soviet foreign policy changed the old demands from Turkey and Southern Europe. For this reason, Yugoslavia began to state close relations with the USSR again. On the other hand, President Tito supported Bandung Conference in 1955 which was aimed to be non-aligned in the world politics. Yugoslavia's this attitude weakened the Balkan Pact in addition, Greece posed cold to the pact because of Cyprus issue. In 1956 Suez crisis, Greece with Yugoslavia supported Egypt but Turkey was near with the British side. For all the Balkan Pact lasted till 1960 and on June 1960 formally the end of the agreement was declared by the signatory states.

The developments in the Middle East were also concerned to Turkey and NATO defense concepts. The idea of Northern tier defense concept of the USA aimed to bring Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Syria together in 1953. Turkey and Pakistan volunteered to join this project and they signed an agreement on 2 April 1954. The British government in the beginning had not been enthusiastic about this project since the bases on the Middle East were in danger. However when the Baghdad Pact was signed, the Britain saw the pact as an opportunity to preserve the rights in the region. According to Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, the Baghdad Pact could grow into NATO for the Middle East and defense agreements. The idea of Northern tier concept was originally an American idea, but by joining the pact as the only Western state, Britain naturally assumed the leadership of the

pact.¹⁵⁵ Thus, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran with Britain formed Baghdad Pact in 1955. The USA chose not to join the pact because it feared losing its interests in the Middle East.¹⁵⁶

Turkey's position in NATO alienated it from the third world. On 18 April 1955, the Non-Aligned Countries gathered for a meeting in Bandung. The US foreign department described this gathering as immoral. Just like its ally, Turkey opposed this notion but joined the conference to express its feelings.¹⁵⁷ A Turkish deputy attending the conference criticized the Non-Aligned concept. For next years, Turkey's this attitude would become isolated from third world that particularly they did not support Turkey particularly in Cyprus issue.¹⁵⁸ Ebu Ziyya, opposition party member from Hurriyet party, asked a question for Bandung Conference why Fatin Rustu Zorlu supported imperialist notions instead of Non-Aligned states. Zorlu answered the question in parallel to NATO membership. For him, the world is divided into two : One side is managed under democracy, but the other side is ruled by Communist rule. Except these two, Non-Alligned states exist. This neutralism is practically impossible to survive because the Soviets are easily able to attack on it.¹⁵⁹ He explained that "we are part of NATO and the peace can be provided by military power. If there is no military power, no one can mention peace."¹⁶⁰

Relations with the Arab world became worse after Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact. For radical Arabs, Turkey was the follower of imperialist Western world since it was a member of NATO and the Baghdad Pact. However for Turkish statesmen, Arab states except Iraq were not aware of the Soviet threat to the region and that the Arabs helped the expansion of communism towards the region. The Arab states were much more eager to Israel state that they believed its foundation was provided by the Western support. From this defensive bloc, the Arab League was divided but great side appeared to be side of Nasser. In Saudi

¹⁵⁵ Nasuh Uslu, **The Turkish-American relationship between 1947-2003**, Nova Press, NewYork 2003, p. 121.

¹⁵⁶ The US didn't want to lose its interests with Egypt and Saudi Arabia because these two countries were strongly opposed the grouping. Moreover, by joining the pact, the Soviet Union in turning its attention to Middle East

¹⁵⁷ Stephen Ambrose, **Dünya'ya Açılım, 1938'den Günümüze Amerikan Dış Politikası**, (Trans. Ruhican Tul), Dış Politika Enstitüsü Press, Ankara, 1992, p. 117.

¹⁵⁸ Zeki Kunalalp, **Menderesle Anılar**, Bilgi Press, Ankara 1991, p. 74.

¹⁵⁹ Meclis Tutanak Dergisi, Vol, 10, sess, 44, p.p. 737-738, 25.11.1956

¹⁶⁰ **Ibid**, p. 737.

Arabia the royal family was opposed to the Baghdad Pact because they feared any increase in the power of Hashemite family against Wahhabi family in Iraq and Jordan.¹⁶¹

Peter Mansfield explained that it was from this time that Nasser began to become the hero of Arab nationalism and his picture shown in public places, cafes and taxis from Aden to Aleppo and Tripoli. Most Arabs felt that here at last was the leader they had been waiting for, who could place upright to the imperialist states.¹⁶² Nasser was militarily supported in 1955 by the Soviets in return for agricultural product corn.¹⁶³

After the signature of Bagdad Pact by Turkey, Nasser began to preparations for Arab bloc with Syria against Bagdad Pact. This attempt was reacted by Turkey that Adnan Menderes reacted warning Syria by pointing out Syria forgot the long border between two countries and if Syria went on this behavior, the relations would be in danger. On March 1955, Turkey gave a note to Syria but Syrian government answered this note underlying it was not related to Bagdad Pact. This bloc between Egypt and Syria was not against Turkey but Israel threat.¹⁶⁴

The British-Egypt disagreement on the Suez Canal was affecting Turkey's position. The events were developing against Turkey. Nasser demanded the British army to withdraw not only from Suez Channel but also from Cyprus. For this, Nasser and Makarios (archbishop) established good relations so that Nasser supported Makarios in all international meetings.¹⁶⁵ Nasser and Makarios rejected Turkish claim for sharing Island into two. Turkey had to establish good relation in the area of military and politics with the Britain.¹⁶⁶ Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu accused Nasser of enemy of Turkey and England. The cooperative-agreement which was signed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen that Koprulu called it "ridiculous". The nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956 was forced British Prime Minister Eden to resign. Nasser's nationalist movement was also problem for Turkish Foreign Policy as Ankara had to follow the British policy against Egypt. On 16 August 1956, 18 countries supported Britain held a meeting and Turkey joined this conference. Despite Turkish joining into conference, Greece rejected to join and showed support to Egypt. Greek behavior attracted sympathy among Arabs and non-aligned countries. They

¹⁶¹ Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*, Penguin Press, Maryland 1969, p. 55.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, p. 55.

¹⁶³ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, (Trans. İbrahim Kurt), İş Bankası Kültür Press, İstanbul 2002, p. 503.

¹⁶⁴ Sabahattin Şen, *Ortadoğu'da İdeolojik Bunalm*, Hemen Kitap Press, İstanbul 2010, p. 201.

¹⁶⁵ Bağcı, p. 73.

¹⁶⁶ Feroz ve Bedia Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi*, Bilgi Press, İstanbul 1976, p. 148.

accepted the Resolution, and its terms were called the Eighteen-Power Proposals. In later years, Greece successfully used this sympathy when the issue was discussed in the United Nations conference. The US foreign minister Dulles sent to Eden, the British Foreign Minister that had been dictated by Eisenhower:

*"I think it refers not to the going through the motions of an intermediate conference but to the use of intermediate steps as a genuine and sincere effort to settle the problem and avoid the use of force."*¹⁶⁷

As soon as Nasser nationalized the Suez Channel, Israeli troops attacked Egypt with the support of the British and French, 29 October 1956. The British and French intervention were seen as invaders in international opinion. Both the Soviet and US states opposed of French-British annexation of Suez. They had never behaved together for a long time because the US did not want Arab states to get closer with the Soviet Union that's why Washington paralleled to Moscow in this issue. *"The President said he was inclined to think that those who began this operation should be left to work out their oil problems-- to boil in their own oil so to speak."*¹⁶⁸

Eisenhower's demand brought shock to Britain and France. They vetoed a resolution submitted by the United States at the U.N. Security Council that called for Israel withdrawal Egypt lost the war but Egyptian anti-aircraft units in Sinai fought bravely and the government in Cairo survived within a few days of Anglo-French coalition had to accept a cease-fire. Moreover, Israel withdrew its troops from Sinai desert. With the final withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai and Gaza, the Suez crisis ended but it had been clothed in paradox.

Nasser became more of a hero than ever in the Arab world. Turkey's behavior was different from America's. According to Ankara, Anglo-French intervention was a violation of International Law but the real responsible for the conflict was Nasser. Moreover Suez crisis provided benefit for the Soviets that's why it was the Baghdad Pact, according to Turkey, was necessary for the security of Middle Eastern states.¹⁶⁹

After British and French troops had been withdrawn from Suez, the Baghdad Pact members gathered a meeting on 7 November 1956 in Tehran. Besides Turkey, other

¹⁶⁷ Selwyn Lloyd, **Suez 1956 A Personal Account**, Mayflower Books Press, New York 1978, p. 98.

¹⁶⁸ Stewen L. Spiegel, **The Other Arab-Israel Conflict Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan**, The University of Chicago Press, London 1985, p. 75.

¹⁶⁹ Atay Akdevelioğlu & Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, (Ed. Baskın Oran), **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar**, Vol I, İletişim Press, İstanbul 2002, p. 629.

Muslim countries suggested Britain be removed from the pact. However, Adnan Menderes appeased the members and prevented this suggestion. Turkey on the other hand, set down its diplomatic relations with Israel in middle-ambassador level.

3.5. The Eisenhower Doctrine and its effect on NATO and Turkish Foreign Policy

The developments in the Middle East began to gain favor in the USSR, hence, the US started to take some counter. One of these steps was taken by Eisenhower, president, in 1957 which was called Eisenhower doctrine. Under this doctrine, any country could demand American economic and military assistance from the US if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state.¹⁷⁰ The doctrine had two meanings: First, the US enlarged its will on Middle East. Second, The USA took the power on Middle East replacing Britain and France.

The doctrine was supported by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Lebanon and Jordan when they came together at a meeting in Ankara on January 19, 1957. They declared their support for the use of the doctrine.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes expressed his belief in a press meeting that he believed this doctrine would bring political stability in the Middle East.¹⁷¹ Similarly opposition party RPP supported this doctrine just like government.¹⁷²

Ankara supported the doctrine not only itself in the Middle East because it was believed that Turkey was going to be the main power in the Middle East. James P. Richards, personal advisor of Eisenhower, made a short trip to Turkey on 27 March 1957. Richards said Baghdad Pact was established to prevent International Communism. Turkey was the main actor to gain this purpose. He also made trip to 18 countries in the region in order to talk about Eisenhower Doctrine. In addition to Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were satisfied with the doctrine. Since the USA did not support the British military operation over Suez, London was impartial to the doctrine. Moreover, the US superiority over Middle East bothered the British policy makers.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰Melih Aktaş, **1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü**, Sema Press, İstanbul 2006, p. 111.

¹⁷¹ Zafer, 6 Ocak 1957.

¹⁷² Bağcı p. 86.

¹⁷³ Bağcı p. 86.

The result of the doctrine was that the US needed Turkish military bases more for operations in the region.

On the Soviet side, an interesting comment was made by the Foreign Minister of Soviet State that he pointed out Turkey's NATO membership was not an obstacle establishing good relations.¹⁷⁴

In April 1957, pro-Nasser officers tried to overthrow King Hussein in Jordan. In response President Eisenhower sent the US Sixth Fleet from the French Riviera to the Eastern Mediterranean and gave \$20 million to Hussein in military aid.¹⁷⁵ The relations of Ankara was so stressful that Turkey and Syria was on the threshold of war in the summer days of 1957. Turkey's reaction to the Syrian crisis had begun before the US become interested the problem aftermath the Soviet-Syrian relations had been close. As the North and North-East borders were bordered by Bulgaria-Soviet alliance plus Turkey did not want Southern border surrounded by Soviet-Syrian alliance. In reaction, Ankara increased the number of Turkish troops along the Syrian border and Turkish military maneuvers in the region lasted through the winter months.

The problem began when the Soviet-US economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed in August 1957. Later three US diplomats were expelled from Syria. The US government replied brutally by declaring persona-non-grata for Syrian ambassador of Washington. August of 17, 1957 a cleansing was started in Syrian army that General Nizamettin was fired and Colonel, Afif Bizri, "Communist-initiated".

Confronting several problems in Syria, the US expert Ley Handerson came to Ankara to negotiate the "Syrian Crisis" with Hussein (Jordan King) and Turkish government. Nasser accused of Handerson being a coup expert, so the USA was not able to destroy Syria by itself, instead handling this task to the neighbor countries. Thus, Turkey-Syria crisis turned into International crisis particularly Egyptian marines came to the Lazkiyan shores of Syria to help Damascus government. The tension between states decreased in the United Nations conference (November 1957) that Syria retired to accuse of Turkey being an invader state hence Turkey withdrew its troops from the Syrian border.

¹⁷⁴ This news for ,Feroz Ahmad, wasn't mentioned in Turkish Press so he quotted from Jaschke,Turkei, Ahmad Bedia, Feroz, p. 159.

¹⁷⁵ Ambrose, p. 254.

Although the Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to combat international communism, it rapidly became an instrument against Nasserist Arab nationalism. The Egyptian leader remained an enigma in Washington in the 1960s.¹⁷⁶

The year 1957 was the seven years for the Democrat Party government, and both the President and members of the government were gathering public meetings to express what they had done within seven years. Celal Bayar announced in Taksim : “*We are working in our country as Americans do. We are hopeful that this holy state will be a small America with fifty million population 30 years later.*”¹⁷⁷

In 1958, Syria and Egypt decided to be united as one state under the name of of the United Arab Republic on February 21, 1958.¹⁷⁸ Another crisis occurred this time in Lebanon. The country's pro-Western-president was threatened by pro-Nasser and anti-American armed mobs. Nasser seemed to be encouraged. The American Marines landed on the beaches of Beirut yet they did not engage in any serious combat and situation in the country rapidly calmed.¹⁷⁹ Turkey supported the US intervention in Lebanon and admitted the put into practice of the Incirlik air base. Though the operation was outside its NATO transmit.¹⁸⁰

Moreover, Iraq was one of the biggest allies of Menderes government in the region however a military coup was occurred against Iraq government on July 14, 1958. That happened to be the date of the Bagdad Pact meeting.

The Revolution in Iraq resulted in it being the only Arab state in the pact left out. Instead of Bagdad Pact, Central Trade Organization was established (CENTO) and the headquarters were moved to Ankara.

During the second half of the 1950's Turkey was also interested in another conflict: Cyprus Issue. The island had been under the control of Britain since 1878. The dispute came into the international arena in September 1954 when Greek people submitted their case to the United Nations. In 1955, the underground Greek terrorist organization EOKA began its campaign of violence on the island. The British called a conference in London with representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments. In 1954, Fuat Koprulu (Foreign Minister) said that Turkey didn't have any concern about the island. However, as the Greek

¹⁷⁶ Spiegel, p. 85.

¹⁷⁷ Cumhuriyet, 21 October, 1957.

¹⁷⁸ Egypt and Syria participated in a plebiscite that approved both the creation of of the UAR and the acceptance of Nasser as president. See , Abid Al Marayati, **The Middle East its government and politics**, Duxbury Press, USA 1972, p.158.

¹⁷⁹ Spiegel, p. 88.

¹⁸⁰ Hale, p. 129.

lobby became powerful in the region Turkish policy on the Island changed completely. Menderes in 1955 expressed a preference for the continuity of British rule in Cyprus.¹⁸¹ However at the London conference, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rustu Zorlu implied that if British sovereignty was to end then the whole Island should revert to Turkey. At that point, Turkish policy makers claimed the island to separate it into two parts. Finally it was accepted by the British government, Turkish and Greek governments at conferences in Zurich and London (1959). It established an independent Republic of Cyprus in August of that year.¹⁸²

To sum up 1950s, Ankara evaluated Turkish Foreign Policy under security problems thus as general its foreign issues from the aspect of NATO's window. For this reason, Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East was made by the way of NATO and American policy. As a result, it is necessary to see Turkey's joining Bagdad Pact in this window. In addition, Menderes government didn't support some Arab states' protesting attitudes against the Western states. Arab states' relations with the Soviets seen as Communist threat in the region. Moreover, Algeria's independent war against France wasn't supported by Turkey as France was a member of NATO.

Consequently, Turkey's former statesmen behaved parallel to NATO and America in 1950's. however this policy was seen puppet of the imperialism by the Arab states. Having realized this problem, Turkey tried to restore its relations with Arab states during 1960's.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Hale, p. 130.

¹⁸² The President a Turkish Cypriot both elected by their respective communities and assisted by a cabinet in which there were to be seven Greek and three Turkish ministers. The President and vice-president would have 'separately or jointly' the right of veto in matters affecting foreign affairs, defence and security. The legislature comprised 50 members would be divided between Greek and Turkish members.

¹⁸³ Mehmet Şahin, "Orta Doğu İlişkiler" **Türk Dış Politikası 1919-2012**, (Ed. Haydar Çakmak), Ankara 2012, p.498.

4. DÉTENTE PERIOD - TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND NATO

Turkey experienced with a military coup in 1960 believed that Democrat Party betrayed to Turkey's national sovereignty. They accused previous administration of having misguided foreign policy. Others believed that Menderes's close relations with Soviets bothered the Americans so that they let the Military junta take power. Menderes' words one month before the coup : *"Even though the American government doesn't change its policy, they have to accept the new situation."*¹⁸⁴ Alvin Rubinstein, US strategist, claimed that the coup occurred because of this speech.

During the period of military rule, the soldiers were divided and unable to concentrate on the country's defense. Under these circumstances, pressures for a return to civilian rule increased. Both inside elements the National Unity Committee and within the officer corps opposed the continuation of military governmental rule. A parliamentary system was the preference of public opinion so Ataturk and his successors were disciplined by a civilian code of practices. The Republican People's Party and his chief Ismet Inonu were pressured the environment and supported the writing of a new constitution in 1961. Constitution was presented by a referendum in August of the same year. Following the referendum, the elections were held in October, and civilian was restored.

The 1961 elections resulted in success of two parties : The Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. They received the most votes but some parties represented in the parliamentary. Voting was held under a system of proportional representation which was aimed to prevent any party from gaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority as it had done in Menderes' time. Turkey after elections, was managed by coalition governments. Its foreign relations during the Détente period are needed to be evaluated in this context.

Throughout the 1960's, the resistance of the Soviets against the United States on Cuba proved that even if the US had superiority in nuclear power, the Soviets would be able to attack on American territories (if any attacks were made by the US) For this reason, President Kennedy adopted a new strategy for NATO was called 'Flexible Response' that aimed to less depend on nuclear power. The Detente period was concentrated on the basis

¹⁸⁴ Mehmet Saray, **Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Girişi III. Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeleri**, Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, Ankara 2000, p. 150.

of Flexible Response strategy within NATO headquarters. It had two features : flexibility and escalation. NATO explained that “the hindrance construct of the Pact is secured on a pliable that will preclude the attacker from foretell with reliance NATO’s particular retort to attacker from hinting with trust NATO’s particular retort to attacker and which will direct him to result that an disagree grade of endanger would be included in spite of the nature of his aggress” It was classified those type of military reaction. One is Direct Defense which is to defeat the attacker on the point at which the rival is onset of destruction.¹⁸⁵

During the 1960's the Soviet nuclear capacity threatened not only for Europeans but it was also a threat for the American continent which completely changed the international security environment. To adapt to the new environment, NATO decreased the number of nuclear arms to implement flexible response strategy and that brought a new period called Detente. The war in flexible response strategy planned to keep out of which is why the Wing states and Center states concepts were used in the pact. Turkey as it had long borders with the Soviet Union, was a Wing state. That idea bothered Ankara in case of war it would be the in the center of the conflict. The Cuba crisis showed clearly that NATO membership would not protect Turkey against any aggression. This was the first time that Ankara realized the possibilty of sustaining isolation. The Turkish government began to ask about the advantages and disadvantages of NATO membership and the opposition groups criticized Turkish Foreign Policy for being too submissive. The Cyprus issue and the Johnson letter (1964) was a turning point for American-Turkish relations as Ankara changed the status quo monopoly in its foreign policy to a multi-dimensional. Since the Johnson letter deeply affected its relations, Turkish policy makers so this event resulted in significant consequences in the country. Ankara was more independent within the military structure For example, NATO’s Multilateral Force (MLF) was rejected by the National Assembly. Çetin Altan pointed out that Turkish foreign policy gradually lost its initiative when Jupiters were removed from Izmir which it caused to lose its importance within the alliance.¹⁸⁶ NATO had not only crisis with Turkey but it also had a crisis with France when President De-Gaulle protested the US hegemony By 1965, the Justice Party (as it was

¹⁸⁵ Francis Beer A, , **Integration and Disintegration in NATO**, Columbus Ohio State Press, USA 1969, p. 79.

¹⁸⁶ Esra Çayhan, “AET ile İlişkiler”, (Ed, Haydar Çakmak), **Uluslararası İlişkiler Giriş, Kavram ve Teoriler**, İstanbul 2008. p. 624.

established by followers of the Democrat Party) won the general elections. Its foreign policy aims are declared in the party program :

“To widen Turkey’s position in the international arena, aid to develop economic wealth for powerful foreign policy, to solve the Cyprus issue without damaging Turkey’s sovereignty. Also it points out Turkey’s loyalty to the security pacts and organizations : NATO, CENTO and other regional security pacts. On the other hand, Turkey’s loyalty to the Western bloc doesn’t mean to prevent to have relations with East. This is useful for peaceful and secure environment. For this notion, we believe that Turkey should develop its relations with all countries and this will be a guide for us.”¹⁸⁷

The new government developed the relations not only with the Soviet Union but also Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries. More significantly Ankara declared itself to be loyal for the principles of the United Nations and Bandung Conference. This was an interesting point for Turkish Foreign Policy as Fatin Rustu Zorlu hadn’t accepted the principles of the conference in 1955 but this policy changed in 1965 when Turkey finally accepted the principles of Bandung conference. The second JP government program was the completion of the previous program in 1965. It was read on 7 December 1969 in Grand National Turkish Assembly. It is a continuity of the program that only difference which might be foreign policy towards Arab states after 1967. The program emphasized the relations with Arab states on the basis of both Turkey and Arab states having a common historical and cultural background. With this motivation, it is said the “Turkish government strongly believes in peace in the Middle East which is the right for the region. These are their sovereign rights.

During the last mid-period of 1960’s, for the first time, there was an opposition argument about whether Turkey should be neutral. Professor A. Haluk Ulman, policy adviser of Bulent Ecevit argued that should Turkey be neutral in the international security system. He thought if the country were neutral, the use of its resources would be better utilized. However if the Soviets conducted a nuclear attack against Turkey, there was a question whether the US help if it were neutral. Contrary to neutralism, Admiral Sezai Orkunt and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil were took a both pro-NATO line and found the idea of neutralism as unacceptable for the security of Turkey. Orkunt also thought this would weaken

¹⁸⁷ Melek M. Fırat , **1960-1971 Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu**, Siyasal Kitapevi Press, Ankara 1977, p. 204.

Turkey's military power and its conflict with Greece over Cyprus. There was also the question of how would Turkey makes economic investments without the US assistance.

After the fallout in relations between Turkey and the US in 1964, Turkish-US economic cooperation remained stable on the other hand a growing foreign trade with the Soviet Union was seen in 1960's. Actions like Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 damaged the relations. Ismet Inonu in opposition side said "*We have examined the NATO agreement and announced our stand. The recent Czech events have shown how correct this stand was.*"¹⁸⁸

Turkish and US statesmen tried to reinforce relations in the Détente period were tried to be reinforced by Turkish and US statesmen but, some events prevented the success of these efforts in the 1960's.

4.1. The Strategy of Flexible Response and Turkish Foreign Policy

By mid 1960's, Turkish foreign policy and its Western Bloc and NATO dimension was one of the main subjects. There was question whether the new NATO strategy, "Flexible Response Strategy" would be sufficient to protect Turkey's security.

As explained in the Massive Retaliation Strategy continued till 1960's, the vital deterrent to attack against Europe was the declaration of the United States to use its nuclear power and massive retaliatory power. Hence, European conventional military strenght was extremely weak, contrary to Soviet conventional power. The counter balance was provided by US nuclear power yet this balance was changed in 1957 when the Soviets first launched Sputnik satellite. On the other hand, the US had only middle-range ballistic missiles in Europe¹⁸⁹

The first problem in the Flexible Response Strategy appeared when the Americans withdrew their Jupiter missiles from Izmir without asking Turkish permission. Turkish statesmen as a result, thought that collective security had collapsed. Who was the real

¹⁸⁸ Hale, p. 152.

¹⁸⁹ Only Three countries had accepted the US ballistic missiles : England, Italy and Turkey. This decision was taken in NATO Ministries Meeting

authority? All parties in NATO or the USA? Turkish public opinion thus doubted the new strategy and several criticisms were made by the opposition political groups.

These questions weren't asked only in Turkey but other members of NATO also had serious doubts about the organization. France for example, under De Gaulle left the organization in 1967. West Germany also demanded its right on the use of Nuclear power in NATO that whether the new strategy was sufficient to protect Europe.

Strategy as a word is explained by Gonlubol as a technological variant but also the classical strategy of Clausewitz, "*War is politics by other means.*"¹⁹⁰ In the last three decades diplomacy and defence have both complemented each other and can't be separated. Nowadays, the main purpose of the strategy is to prevent the war and use it as a defense tool against deterrence the opposite camps. Today, nuclear weapons are the main deterrent that prevents quits the enemy from behaving badly. The biggest deterrent is to be logical and planned and knowing by enemy states. Continental nuclear missile power established the balance of power As a result, any nuclear attack affects both the attacker and defender. That is to say that deterrence power transformed NATO from the Massive Retaliation Power to the Flexible Response Strategy.

Which strategy would have been better for Turkey? In reverse answering this question, the best thing for Turkey is its security and in which situation its sovereignty will be more secure ? Today, We have seen that Nuclear Power on the basis of Flexible Response Strategy provided security both to Turkey and other states in a possible nuclear war.¹⁹¹

4.1.2. The Effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) on Turkey and NATO

During 1960 and 1961, Turkey was in the hands of Military officers. The military coup first overthrew Adnan Menderes' government in May 1960 and then set about trying to reconstruct Turkish politics. Civilian government was established after general elections in October 1961 by Ismet Inonu under a coalition with the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi).

¹⁹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz , **Harp üzerine.** (Trans. H. Fahri Çeliker) Genkur Press, Ankara 1984, p. 42.

¹⁹¹ Pedlow, p. 42.

The military regime first declared Turkey's loyalty to NATO and CENTO. Behind the scenes, for Hale, decisions were being taken which were to protect Turkey during a major international crisis in 1962.¹⁹²

The US was the leader in nuclear power since the first Atomic bomb was used against Japan. However, through the 1950's the Soviets developed international ballistic missiles and the nuclear balance of power was on the agenda of the two great powers. The destructive new technology created anxiety in the international system.

The history of the Cuban missile crisis goes back to when Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 and established to have good relations with the Soviet Union. The state of Cuba (Communist state) which only was far away 90 km from American borders, bothered Washington. The first US attempt to destroy Castro government was to use the Organization of American States but this failed to succeed. Later, the unsuccessful military Bay of Pigs Invasion (Domuzlar Çıkarması) of Cuba was undertaken by the US. A counter-revolutionary military group (they were generally refugees) attacked Fidel Castro's army.

As Robert Komer, later the US ambassador to Turkey wrote in a memoir soon after the crisis: Robert Mc Namara (secretary of state) knows the Jupiters are no military value. George Mc Ghee who was then chairman of the US Policy Planning Council told the President in June 1961 that if the Jupiters were removed this would be seen as a sign of weakness, particularly after Soviet diplomatic maneuver at the Vienna summit that month.¹⁹³

In order to develop East-West relations, a summit was going to be held in Paris between Soviet Russia, France, Britain and West Germany on May 1, 1960 but after the Soviets fired on a U-2 spy airplane on May 1, 1960, this meeting was canceled. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Missile crisis which is known as October Crisis, occurred. It was a 13-day conflict between the Soviet Union and Cuba on one side and the United States on the other in October 1962. It was a turning point in the Cold War, the nearest it got to turning into a nuclear conflict.

The Turkish Press began to put the Cuban Crisis on the agenda, so this issue became a problem for Turkish security which led the Soviet Russia installed a fleet in Black Sea

¹⁹² Hale, p. 133.

¹⁹³ Gusta Schmidt, **A History of NATO, the First Fifty Years**, Palgrave Publishers, New York 2001, p. 85.

retaliation in kind 6th US fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Ankara declared its loyalty to the international agreements.¹⁹⁴

Turkish public opinion realized that the security of the country at any time was able to be jeopardized. The discussions concerning the Jupiter missiles in Izmir were on the Turkish parliamentary agenda. The deputies objected the notion of remove of the Jupiters from the country because of the Soviet threat. On the same day, a group in the assembly established a Commission called “The Struggle with Communists”¹⁹⁵

Defense Minister İlhami Sancar declared that Jupiter missiles would be removed soon in replacement of Polaris missiles would be installed.¹⁹⁶

More directly, the withdrawal of the Jupiters, for Hale, also removed an obstacle to the development of better Turkish-Soviet relations. After 1963, there were still some US-supplied to other NATO armies. They were again subject to a dual-key control system, and could reasonably be seen by the Soviets as being defensive rather than aggressive. In the late spring of 1963, after the withdrawal of the Jupiters, a high-ranking Turkish parliamentary delegation visited the Soviet Union for the first time since 1932. Economic contacts between Turkey and the Soviet Union had increased, and in October the Turkish newspaper, Cumhuriyet, published an article by Krushchev claiming that there were now 'no serious reasons that could prevent the establishment of good neighbour relations between our two countries. This did not mean that the Soviets Union was satisfied by Turkey's position after 1963, since it was still pressing for Turkish non-alignment, but it was at least less perturbed than it had been while the Jupiters were installed on Turkish soil.¹⁹⁷

During this time period, a US-Soviet agreement was first signed in Geneva on June 20 1963 for the installation of a "red line telephone" between Washington and Moscow; the second was the US-Soviet Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Atmosphere in Outer Space and under water. The treaty was signed in Kremlin on August 5 1963. All countries which supported it were invited to add their signature.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ Milliyet, 25.10.1962.

¹⁹⁵ The founders of the commission were Fethi Tevetoğlu, Şadi Pehlivanoglu, Ahmet Topaloğlu, Süreya Koç, Celal Sungur, Nurettin Özdemir, Seyfi Öztürk, Saadet Kaçar Evren, Talat Aysal, Nihat Diler İsmet Kapısız, Rıza Polat, Ahmet Yıldız. Cumhuriyet, 12.1.1963.

¹⁹⁶ Hurriyet, 24.1.1963.

¹⁹⁷ Hale, p. 136.

¹⁹⁸ NATO handbook, p. 65.

The Consequences of the Cuban Crisis was significant for the relations of NATO and Turkey :

1. The US speeded up its exportation of F-104 and F-100 planes to Turkey after Jupiters had been removed, thus the transition from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response in accordance with the new the NATO strategic aim was given importance to increase Turkish conventional power.
2. The Cuban crisis showed the decision in Washington related to Cuba Crisis excluded Turkey out of NATO nation which were negatively perceived by Turkish Policy makers. Hence anti-American protests were gradually started to Turkey.
3. A dimensional Turkish Foreign Policy had not been beneficial for the Turkish interests in International Relations. Cuba Crisis spurred transition to the multi-dimension in Turkish Foreign Policy in 1960s.

In 1963, Jupiter missiles started to be removed from the Izmir bases instead the US submarines were to be deployed.¹⁹⁹

4.1.3. Cyprus Dispute : Johnson Letter (1964)-NATO Relations

After the Second World War, two great developments affected the world politics which also were significant for the Turkish-Greek relations in the Cold War Period. The first was that the colonial states achieved the self determination right²⁰⁰ The second thing was the formation of the Cold War. Self determination movement for the Cyprus issue for the agenda hence the friendship between Greece and Turkey was thus broken down in mid 1950's. Since the notion of this issue would possibly damage the North Atlantic Pact, Washington interfered in solving the Cyprus problem between two-members countries : Greece and Turkey. NATO, moreover, held a forum for Athens and Ankara to find a solution approach. It was soon understood that NATO was unprepared among its members in local issues. The idea of NATO peace-keeping force was bitterly rejected by Makarios and both Greek and Turkish statesmen prevented the idea developed in this manner.

¹⁹⁹ This Submarine was called Polaris which were told by the Americans that Polaris submarines were better and newer technology so that they were brought to deploy. However Ismet Inonu in 1970 explained the

²⁰⁰ Self Determination : The right of a nation to have its own form of government without influence from outside.

Washington was impartial in the Cyprus dispute for fearing of alienating either Turkey or Greece. NATO Supreme Commander Lyman Lemnitzer came to Greece and Turkey at the end of January and June in order to negotiate the Cyprus problem. afterwards, Seretary General Dirk Stikker, visited both countries however, all attempts showed that it was useless to find a solution because of Makarios' existence in Cyprus.²⁰¹

In 1959, after Greece and Turkey signed the Zurich agreements, Ismet Inonu said : "As far as both nations are not converted that enosis is not feasible in the long period, we will take a puzzling time to assure that other papers of the constitution are achieved."²⁰²

The London conference as well as Zurich brought the respecting the rights which Turkish Cypriots had been secured under constitution. Cyprus's constitution and treaties weren't determined by a referendum or plebiscite. The United Kingdom as the old colonial ruler, Turkey as the big brother of the Turkish Cypriot minority, Greece as the sponsor of pan-Hellenistic unity, and all three were concerned to prevent the spread of violence into a military confrontation within the North Atlantic Pact. Both Greece and Turkey were allowed to have soldier (950 for Greece, 650 for Turkey), Cyprus itself had a small army made up of both communities and a force.²⁰³

However in 1963 President Makarios declared new amendments which meant to remove Turks from government. That led to bloody fighting in which Turks were mainly victimized. As the crisis arose in 1964, Inonu tried to induce the United States to broker a peaceful settlement. The Britain proposed that a NATO force should be sent to the Island as peace-keeping force. Despite its previous stand, America agreed to contribute troops to the island but the idea was rejected by Greece and Makarios. In June 1964, the Turkish government was ready to send land forces on the Island, under the rights of 1960 the treaty of Guarantee. Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu informed the US on the Turkish plan for the Island. However an informal letter from the US President Johnson warning him that NATO could not protect Turkey if it were attacked by the Soviets. Moreover if Turkey attacked the island, Turkey could not use the weapons which were taken from NATO and the US.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Beer, p. 17.

²⁰² Hale, p. 148.

²⁰³ The Cypriot Police become eventually totally Greek. The Turkish Cypriots reacted by establishing a militia of their own. See, Parker Hart, **Two NATO allies at the Threshold of War : Cyprus, A First Hand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968**, Duke University Press, Durham 1990, p. 8.

²⁰⁴ Sadak, p. 69

During the crisis moments between Greece and Turkey, NATO got involved in the Cyprus issue in January of 1964. The reason for NATO's involving the problem was this could trigger war between Greece and Turkey. They both were the member parties of NATO and the speeches of the statesmen were so violent that Greek Prime Minister at the beginning of January 1964 were extremely stident.

The effect of the Johnson letter was felt in both relations with NATO and the US relations. The letter wasn't shared with Turkish opinion along two years. By 1966 the writer of Cumhuriyet newspaper Cuneyd Arcayurek published the letter. Afterwards, the most Turks felt that the United States was supporting the Greece. Not only Cyprus issue broke down the relations but also bilateral agreements and the US personnel in the country were other problems. Following the letter, Anti-NATO protests were on the agenda of Turkish Workers Party (TIP)²⁰⁵ They called for Turkey's withdrawal from NATO and political links with the United States.

Turkish Foreign Policy after 1945, had been one dimension until 1964, which prevented the policy makers from defending national interest of the country. Cyprus issue was the first time that Turkey was on the different camp from NATO and the US side.²⁰⁶ President Cemal Gursel criticized the North Atlantic Pact as NATO didn't support Turkey's national right in Cyprus issue.²⁰⁷ Lack of confidence to the United Nations and international community, the Turks felt the only solution to interfere in if attacks against Turkish community did not stop. In mid March of 1964, Turkish parliament granted Inonu special authority to intervene on Cyprus.²⁰⁸

Following the Johnson letter in 1964, the Washington tried to restore the negative effects of the letter which led Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State attempted to meet with the representatives of Greece and Turkey in Geneva in July 1964. His plan called the division of the Island between two NATO allies. However the plan was disturbed by Makarios when he leaked Acheson's plan prematurely. In August 1964, it also disturbed the negotiations in Geneva. On August 20, 1964, Acheson was finalizing his plan but both

²⁰⁵ Turkish Workers Party (TIP) was founded in 1961. It was the socialist party and represented in the national parliament.

²⁰⁶ Burcu, Bostanoğlu, **Türkiye ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası: Kuram ve Siyasa**, İmge Kitapevi, Ankara 1999, p. 439.

²⁰⁷ Ahmad, p. 493.

²⁰⁸ Milliyet, March 17, 1964.

parties : Greece and Turkey was cold to the final amendment and this mission came to a close.²⁰⁹

On 18 December 1965, the United Nations Council voted on the Cyprus issue(Whether a state from outside the Island can be interfered in. This vote was a disaster for Turkey because Ankara felt itself alone not only in Western Bloc but also in the world arena.) General Assembly agreed 47 positive votes in contrast 6 negative votes. With Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Albania and the United States voted for Turkish side. Washington was probably aimed to restore its relations with Turkey. On the other side, Eastern bloc states voted uncommitted. The new trend was a signal for Turkish Foreign Policy

The newly elected Justice Party concentrated on Turkey's internal problems. Hence Cyprus was not at first a problem high on the list of priorities for Turkish Foreign Policy. The United States followed Turkey's relations with the Soviets. Just like, Washington, the Kremlin didn't support Turkish military intervention on the Island. Cyprus could become a host for one or two large NATO bases, one Greek, one Turkish, dominating Eastern Mediterranean. However, for Parker Hart, the United States was not seeking a military base in Cyprus because if it was necessary, the bases in Turkey would be sufficient for NATO purposes.²¹⁰

The result of Johnson letter was that Turkish Foreign Policy established good relations with

Turkish policy makers stopped the fully of American support conversely Turkish relations with the United States were again taken into account by policy makers. For this framework, the Vietnamese policy of the US was not supported.²¹¹

Moreover, Turkish public opinion turned against America and its military personnel in the country. Suleiman Demirel's government particularly rearranged the bilateral agreements with the United States of America. The last amendment was signed in 1969 under the title of Joint Defense Agreement.

Naturally the hostility against the American presence in the 1960's ,for Duygu Sezer, just because of Cyprus issue because even if Turkey didn't have a Cyprus problem, Turkish

²⁰⁹ Harris, p. 118.

²¹⁰ Hart, p. 28.

²¹¹ Turkey voted negative for the use force of Security Council of United Nations in Vietnam.

leftist groups would have accused of being an imperialist state. Its was a movement against the western style of capitalism.²¹²

4.1.4. Growing Complaints about NATO in Turkey

The American presence in Turkey and the growing tension of the Greek-Turkish conflict related to the Cyprus events motivated some political groups to question NATO. The climate of the Cold War, for Harris, was visibly shifting. The notion of détente was sweeping Europe and fears of armed attack disappeared in the NATO members. Peaceful thoughts seemed at last to have come of age.²¹³

The departure of Jupiters was a first for Ankara felt that there was no guarantee (in extraordinary events), to be a NATO state.

The Cyprus crisis broke out at the end of 1963 which first motivated radical movement in Turkey was first motivated by a number of students who concerned the Cyprus crisis but foreign policy became an issue among university students. Their protests took to the streets against the American presence in blocking Turkish aspirations. Their propaganda was on the subject “No to NATO, no to America”. In this situation, for Harris,

“Turkey’s attachment to the United States and to NATO became one of the major touchstones in the struggle for dominance within student movement. This struggle quickly passed from the stage of verbal insults to fisticuffs, then to armed clashes in which some students even lost their lives, and the normal functioning of the universities was seriously interrupted. Indeed, this disruption played a leading part in provoking the ultimatum of the generals on March 12, 1971, which brought down the Demirel government.”²¹⁴

The press, particularly leftist newspapers (Yön newspaper was controlled by Mehmet Ali Aybar) were also important for guiding radical movements. Some journalists led protests the groups against the Menderes government. Furthermore, the Turkish Labor Party (TIP) was small but had an effective voice in the parliamentary. It sharply criticized American imperialism and NATO as the cause of trouble for Turkey’s problems. Milliyet published

²¹² Duygu Sezer, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995**, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Press, Ankara 1996, p. 498.

²¹³ Harris, p. 124.

²¹⁴ Harris, p. 129.

the result of a poll of workers conducted by a panel of professors in September 1969 : 47 percent of the sample believed that America exploited Turkey and another 25 percent were undecided on this question. The poll also showed that the higher the educational level of the respondents the more apt they were to hold negative views of the United States.²¹⁵

Labor groups in Turkey were also radical groups of Turkish Society. After 1960 Military coup, the new constitution brought new rights for labor strike, this brought free movement for the Labor groups. The first strikes were economic reason that the workers acquired the right to strike by Law No : 275. The biggest major confederation was DİSK²¹⁶ and Turk İş which gathered mass of workers in the fields. The meetings reflected the growing tension against NATO and the United States.

In parliament, the political struggle in the 1960's gave the leftist TLP 15 seats in the parliamentary. Under these circumstances, the Republican People's Party had to change its slogan²¹⁷ to "left of center". The government and TLP members had interesting dialogs in the parliamentary: On 9 November 1965, Demirel denied the existence of the US bases in the country in which he said: "there are no American bases in Turkey but all bases belong to NATO in the country. On the TLP side that Çetin Altan (Istanbul deputy) claimed there were 35 million square meter of American bases which no Turk could even enter.²¹⁸ Moreover, suspicion of Anti-Americanism toward the Justice Party in the election campaign in 1965. Their accusation of being a stooge of American imperialism in the previous government.

The discussions on the subject of poverty of Turkey arose that Aksam pointed out Turkey was the poorest country among NATO states however it had 480 thousand soldiers which meant the third largest military corporation in the organization.²¹⁹

In those days, 40 professors of Middle Eastern Technical University issued a declaration that demanding Turkey stop supporting American because of the US's Cyprus and

²¹⁵ Milliyet, October 1, 1969.

²¹⁶ DİSK –Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union was the leading group during the end of 1960's and 1970's.

²¹⁷ Under the General Secretary Bulent Ecevit, the Republican Party criticized the old management of Ismet Inonu.

²¹⁸ Ahmad, p. 302.

²¹⁹ Turkey was the fourth who kept the budget for defense expenses after America, Britain and Germany. See, Aksam, 26.11.1965.

Vietnam policies. This declaration was also signed by famous men : Bahri Savcı, Haluk Ulman, İbrahim Yasa, Rusen Keleş and Mumtaz Soysal.²²⁰

The Issue of the Johnson letter was again raised in 1966 when the JP accused the RPP of being insufficient on Cyprus issue. The RPP wished to publish the letter on 11 January 1966. A day later, Cunejd Arcayurek, Hurriyet writer, published the letter that caused great reaction the public opinion.²²¹ The reaction was bitterly came from TLP members that Behice Boran underlined the situation was so bad if any attack comes from the Soviets, Turkey would be defendless because non-NATO members is going to accept the assistance to Turkey. Hence Turkey would be occupied by the Soviet troops. She proposed the idea that Turkey would be excluded NATO membership instead it should join the Third-World-Bloc thus Turkey would be the strongest state in the Third World and be a leader of the bloc.²²²

In April of 1966, French President De Gaulle decided to withdraw from NATO's military wing similarly some groups in Turkey asked why Turkey didn't do the same.

One important labor organization Turk-İs was divided into two. The new splinter group called as DİSK(Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions)²²³

In this Anti-NATO and anti-America, the American military in the country started to affect Turkish public opinion in mid 1960s.²²⁴ American employee used the customs privileges. particularly, the alcohol and cigarette were sold by the Americans in Istanbul, Izmir and Adana. Moreover, refrigerators, radios and several American goods were being sold without duties. The more American goods entered the country, the more shopping increased in the cities.

The perception of America in the 1960's was now very different in Turkish opinion for example when the 6th American fleet came to visit in 1950's, the Turkish people showed its great love at that time. However the situation was very different in 1960's. The rising power of leftist groups protested the 6th American Fleet.

The United States tried to tackle the increasing Anti-Americanism in Turkey by 'keeping a law profile' project was enforced within the country that the first attempt was American

²²⁰ Milliyet, 29.11.1965.

²²¹ The letter was published along three days in Hurriyet, 13,14,15,16 January 1966.

²²² Milliyet, 20 February 1966.

²²³ This organisation was going to be the strongest labor group in 1970's. .

²²⁴ In the late 1950's, the American presence was also problem because of the bilateral agreements between two states.

institutions' move out of central places. In parallel to movements, the number of American personnels was decreased.

The opposition groups increased their voices in editorials. Some didn't want the us to leave NATO completely but rather desired sovereignty. Cihad Baban wrote :

*“Turkey without a doubt, America’s friend. Friendship and alliance will continue. However, this alliance was different in 1951, when the circumstances have changed, the alliance system was broken. This friendship doesn’t mean that Turkey is going to accept to mandate system.”*²²⁵

“A discussion emerged about whether the Turkish-American alliance would continue. It is debatable whether Turkey would able to defend itself without the assistance of NATO army. The Turks have right to wish national defence and take into account the agreements with NATO and other alliances again.”²²⁶

The writer in another one his article pointed out :

“It is obvious Turkey benefited NATO’s contribution in the first-five-years. NATO was founded in case of the Soviet expansion stopped. Then its pressure dropped out and gradually began to learn live together.

Meanwhile, the world has changed. The Soviets avoided conflicting with the Western states since it started having in trouble with China. Nuclear deterrence power was dominated by both America and Soviet Russia. The Russian power on its mandated states was decayed. The outcome of the events shows that Russian expansion didn't end at all but decreased. Parallel to Russian threat decreased, NATO's use fallen off in the security system. However, NATO began to be dominated by the United States that she used the organization as a tool.

Turkey has begun to be one of the most helpful countries in the pact. It has given all its army personnel duty in NATO military organization. All weapons are made of America. The bases are under control of America and nuclear missiles are settled in these bases. Under these circumstances, the Soviet threat against Turkey overtook the country unprepared. Should Turkey leave NATO? It is pointless to look for an answer this question because NATO has gone deep into the country so that gradually Turkey may leave its connection with the alliance. The Turks should have their weapon. Nuclear weapons should be excluded from its lands. Nuclear weapons should be excluded from its

²²⁵ Cihad Baban, “Ulus”, 21 March 1966

²²⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Ulus”, 22 April 1966

lands. New NATO strategy aims to defend the lands with nuclear weapons after conventional weapons are being used. Hence Turkey is the first target of any possible attack when the conventional weapons are used, it is useless settled nuclear weapons in Turkish territory. It wouldn't be aimed to withdraw NATO but it should be aimed to leave dangerous links of the pact phase to phase.²²⁷

Cumhuriyet in the 1960's showed its irritation too. Ecvet Güresin one of the leading writers, expressed this concern : Today international relations have significant problems. The reason for the trouble arises from two super-powers : America and Soviet Russia. Their hegemonic behaviors on lower states create problems. These two super powers just like angry football team captains don't let team members to do anything except his orders. If the negotiations are needed, the super powers negotiate eachother and the others do their decisions. The problems within NATO come from this kind of troubles. The members of Varsaw have the similar problems. Through 1970, the efforts for normalization by Harmel Report has established new period between East and Western blocs. It is aimed to establish good relations in economic political areas between two bloc countries.

The 13 December Brussel meeting is important for Turkey because it should have multi-dimensional foreign policy. Moreover, Turkey recently has started to develop economically Turks should benefit from this new environment. Furthermore, Cyprus issue can't be resolved by only one super-power like America. Finally Turkey realized that isolation over the Cyprus problem three years ago was useless for its foreign Policy and tried to right this wrong. We, Turks, should be careful about Harmel report that might be new falses for the country. ²²⁸

Abdi İpekçi emphasized that the notion of NATO notion was born during the climax of the Cold War and the Soviet threats against Europe. The only solution for European countries was get support by Americans since the disasters of Second World War weakened them economically. Since that day, the situation has changed. European countries have gradually improved economic and military power so they don't need American assistance anymore. Except this changing enviroment in Europe, one more transformation has happened in the continent. Today's Soviet Russia is different from Stalin's Russia. They have quitted to invading policy. They want to stay in peace with Europe. Hence the reason of Atlantic pact has ended itself.

²²⁷ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "NATO 19 yaşında" Ulus, 7 April 1968.

²²⁸ Ecvet Güresin, "Mukaddes İttifaka Doğru", Cumhuriyet, 7 Aralık 1967.

Both the end of Soviet threats and economic-military recovery of Europe has led the Europeans ask to change the status quo so that they are looking for the changing situation. What is the situation for Turkey? Is it possible to follow De-Gaulle's way? We have to weigh every factor before making a decision. It is obvious that NATO gives Turkey some obligations. National defense issue and NATO bases are one of these subjects. We should take into account these issues again. Withdrawal from NATO completely needed to be discussed. Turkey, today, doesn't have war economy. It is impossible to withdraw NATO in this economic situation.

France is able to produce Atomic bomb, launching missile and it has economic superiority that's why she doesn't need NATO anymore. Turkey should have France's power then it can think to withdraw NATO.²²⁹

Mehmet Barlas asks does Turkey continue with NATO or withdraw ? This discussion has been main subject for years. Moreover there is bilateral agreement issue with America. Turkish military staff is one of the most talented army in the world however, gun technology of Turkey is still poor. Turkish Generals have complained the NATO equipments are old. NATO's benefit is on the agenda but its disbenefits are more than benefits. If the take measures, the responsables for this bad event always will be remembered."²³⁰

It is also debatable Turkey entered NATO in 1952 and the defence the Eastern wing of the pact. I honestly confess that Turkey was relaxed when it joined the pact because of Soviets' impact in the bad days of cold war years that Turkey felt more secure after NATO entrance. On the other hand, Turkey's joining NATO is not equal partnership. Turkey had to give some tavizler in order to join NATO. For 15 years, NATO has still accepted Turkey as a frontier station. Hence, America has done bilateral agreements with Turkey to approve its superiority on Turkey. If Turkey had done a resistance against Soviet threats just like Denmark and Norway did, under this conditions, its joining can't be criticized anymore. Turkey displeased the countries which are not member of NATO and the country has been America's satellite."²³¹

Some writers were opposed to anti-NATO and the Western bloc and thought that Turkey was a slave country because of pact and alliance. İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal, Çetin Altan

²²⁹ Abdi İpekçi, "NATO Meselesi" Milliyet, 23 February 1966.

²³⁰ Mehmet Barlas, "NATO'dan çıkmak ya da kalmak", Cumhuriyet, 11 August 1968.

²³¹ Akşam, "NATO'da 15 yıl, 19 February 1967.

and Nadir Nadi were some of these. For instance İlhami Soysal said this ceremony, as the official men said, It is the last technological complex and the modest war industrial equipments have been established inside the plant. This is the ceremony takeover of Turkish-American common plant to the Turks. For years

Only dogs and American soldiers have kept guard and no Turk may have enter this plant. The roads of the complex have been for American names too. This installation right now is being over from Turks. What a surprise. The price of plant is 14 million dollar. The great our friend and ally America donates this place to Turkish government. The chosen Prime Minister²³² Sulaiman Demirel always say there is no bases but installation. Here it is the Americans give that which is called “Installation 23” to Turks. This installation has been used for monitoring the Soviets up to now. However when times over, the availability of technology of this installation has finished. This place was wrongly chosen near Ankara (Golbasi) which is far from Soviet state to monitor. The good material has been taken by Americans - old and useless materials has left to us. The Americans have built new bases to Black Sea region which was nearer to the Soviets. They give this useless installation and our government accept this. The installation is useless and luxury for the country. It has staff houses, lodges, laundries, restaurants, swimming pools, hospital and other things for American personnel. 160 experts of Americans are settled here and their expenses will be ordered by Turkish government. What a luxury installation doesn't to be needed for Turkish General Staff. The pro-Americans and their followers have tried us to slang to be swindled. This stake is irrational, no mind accept this kind of thing. That is the Friday ceremony story. Enjoy your new installation Turkey.²³³

Çetin Altan was also critic of this situation these don't know and realize other people what they write and what they realize in other countries. Turkey doesn't actually have freedom of thought. Despite all claims about freedom, Turkey is one of the most restricted countries in the world. There are still laws in which punish the free expression of writers and journalists. There are still laws which protect Turkish Foreign Policy. The journalists can't totally criticize it. They have kept the nation slept for the foreign policy. What shall I write for Cyprus issue? How can we show truth while our pens in the jail?

Neither Russia nor other Socialist countries. It is misstated about these countries. Who misstates? Certainly they are Capitalists. They know there is no Capitalist on these

²³² It is pointed out that Sulaiman Demirel has been chosen by Americans.

²³³ İlhami Soysal, Akşam, 17 June 1968.

countries. They are propagating for their own wills and these indecent people accused of those who follow the truth as communist and Russian spy. They are supposed to nobody look for truth but will. I am the writer of this country. Whatever it is, I will tell the truth. I don't mind these truths bother the Capitalists. Turkish Foreign Policy can't be set by lies and Capitalist propaganda. What is American reality? What is Russian reality? We should know these realities clearly. How long betrayals continue to stay ?”²³⁴

İlhan Selçuk wrote that it should be taken into account the bilateral agreements with America in the Turkish assembly again. Ataturk's Turkey put up for sale its independence with these bilateral agreements out of assembly and without knowledge of Turkish nation. The statesmen, who don't want the property incomes to be known, want also bilateral agreements to be secret. What a shame democracy is this? In every subject we follow close policy.”²³⁵ In order to discuss one subject, it is necessary to know the basic things, lies, shadowed words, casuals, suspicious, trials to hide truths eradicate democracy from the beginning. Turkish citizens should know everything about their country.”²³⁶

“Turkey makes an effort not to be alone in the future. These behaviors are criticized that they are actually positive progress. For instance, Eastern policy or Balkan pact, new African states even with China make closer to catch reality.

An innocent young person who doesn't have any guilty except that he had protested only to NATO in a meeting, was attacked by Sukan's police²³⁷ while he was sleeping on bed, but the police appeared completely unmoved while those who attacked on print offices, newspapers, broke print machines, beaten opposers, and the police didn't stop them. The enemies of 27 of May are in fact the enemies of Ataturk. They oppose every reformation movement. The awake nation bothers these people as they defence the national unity and will. That's why they accept democracy as dictatorship of majority. Today's government bothers if any criticism is made about Foreign Policy. In order to prevent any criticism, they accused everyone of being communist. Saying 'No to NATO' is a right given by

²³⁴ Çetin Altan, “Türk Dış Politikası” Akşam, 31 August 1965.

²³⁵ İlhan Selçuk, “Şu Meşhur İkili”, Cumhuriyet, 12 November 1965.

²³⁶ İlhan Selçuk, Peşini bırakmıyacağız” Cumhuriyet, 18 November 1965.

²³⁷ Faruk Sükan was an Interior Minister of the Sulaiman Demirel's cabinet. He was brutal against opponent groups. Particularly his criticism on leftist groups on the assembly is well known. On 1969, he gave 48 names to show up leftist traitors: Among these names there are famous persons : Ertugrul Gunay (Fikir Kulübü Member-TİP Eminönü member), Deniz Gezmiş (Devrimci Öğrenci Birliği –TİP member., Celal Doğan, TİP member. And Sukan explained their slogans : America get out, NATO get out, Amerikan gavuruna yuh(Fie upon American infidel), Amerikan ayısı, Morison'un dayısı (American bear, Morison's uncle), Go Home American dog., Grand Turkish Assembly records, 13 March 1969

Turkish Constitution. Not only there are anti-NATO movements in Turkey but also other NATO countries have several opponents against the pact. They are freely expressing their feelings in newspapers, books, meetings, protest walkings.”²³⁸

4.1.4.1. Pro-NATO and Western Bloc Writings

In Turkey, the politics has always been extremely controversial issues. One subject is generally discussed by extreme level. One side accuses other of being traitor and the other side accuses other side the same. Pro-NATO writers generally accused other side of being Communist and traitor. These wrote in Son Havadis, Adalet and Tercüman.

Adalet Unkown writer :

“Our make up socialists love to talk about Turkish Foreign Policy. Either all of them or one by one are interested in this subject. Cyprus issue caused to break the relations with Western bloc. Our leftist robots looked for an opportunity on this problem.

Their only way is that : “Turkey should be out of Western bloc. It should leave NATO, CENTO. All agreements with West should be broken out. Is there any benefit of Capitalist and imperialist states ?

It is not necessary to say that these poor thoughts are wrong. Turkish Foreign Policy is supported by citizens and still this route is the most convenient way. It is not true to wait for a radical change in this subject.”²³⁹

Tekin Erer from Son Havadis “Communists are based on their actions for four words : American enemy, Russian friend. In fact all pro-communist newspapers obey these four words. They are carefull when talking about

These claims are communist thoughts. These are the slandering words of our local traitors. These people say that America exploitour country however I don’t beleive in that claim. Not only Turkey use America but also all Europe and NATO parties use America. Turkey has taken 147 million dollar for each year since 1947. They say NATO exploits Turkey. Everyone knows that Turkey wasn’t accepted the pact in the first years then It was

²³⁸ Nadir Nadi, “Diktaya Yeşil Işık”, Cumhuriyet, 25 July 1968.

²³⁹ Adalet, 27 Nisan 1965.

accepted in 1952. Following the joining the organization, the Soviets stopped to demand Turkish lands.

Anti-Americanism has begun since Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Hence pro-Communists have realized the Communism are not able to find place in the country because of NATO support.

They say France demands some things and plan to withdraw. We, Turks, has to behave like that. First of all are we France ? There are seven countries between France and Russia. France is the fourth biggest country of Europe and it has Atomic bomb. We have to analyze the countries which have borders with Soviets rather than France.²⁴⁰

Son Havadis Mümtaz Faik Fenik points out it *shall be realist. It means to waving of Soviet flag when we accept neutralist policy. They don't say directly this claim but they say we shall be neutral. These are nit neutral but Soviet supporters.*²⁴¹

Son Havadis Advıye Fenik contines his evaluations of America yet continue to stay membership in NATO and cooperate with third world states. Anyhow we don't say that we ignore to cooperate with these states. However we have to realize that Ghana don't send war plane or Republic of Côte d'Ivoire submarine in any attack. It is not discreet being a neutral so this means to reject all military helps.²⁴²

Ahmet Kabaklı Tercüman thinks the US has served the sentence its previous false actions. Once upon time America had so much sympathy among Turks. Afterwards this sympathy has run away. For example, America's arrogant military staff, expedient American companies, commercial falses, the wrong economy politics on Turks, finally her irrational behavior on Cyprus issue broke away with Turkey.

This break in relations reflected former prime Minister İsmet İnönü's famous words : The new world establishes and Turkey rebirth in this new order." This was a warn to our friend America. Turkish press (including me) has been warning America but our friends haven't waken up and understood us.

The fact is that Turkey has been trying to find a place in this new world. Is this paradise or Araf ? It is unknown. American hostility means to forget democracy, tradition, national history, religion, sermaye and ownership. These are Western style life values which are needed to defend for Americans. It is necessary to demolish American friendship and

²⁴⁰ Tekin Erer, "Amerika'ya düşman Rus'a dost" Son Havadis, 30 November 1968.

²⁴¹ Advıye Fenik, "Üçüncü Dünya" Son Havadis, 30 Kasım 1965.

²⁴² Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Bizi tecrit mi etmek istiyorlar", Son Havadis, 22 February 1966.

NATO membership in order to demolish these values. It is the Communist propaganda they say independent but their independency means to be a slave of Soviet empire.

As they said, Turkey is a slave of America, our army, fleet and everything are not independent. Turkey is similar to Vietnam.”²⁴³

For Kadircan Kaflı, imperialists exploited Turkey. Particularly they accused America of being imperialist however the United States has no colonial state. Moreover, Russia and China had more than 30 colonies.

The US has occupied 35 million square metres of Turkish territory. They cry no Turkish soldier and police enter these lands.

This is completely lying. These bases aren't American bases but NATO. 14 states which unite against Communist imperialism and defend Turkish lands. If NATO didn't establish, if Turkey didn't join the pact, Russia has already attacked against Turkey.

The Turkish military staffs are able to enter to these bases yet civil police and judge can't enter these places. No matter which police and judge can enter Turkish Military areas ? There would be no order if anyone entered any place.”²⁴⁴

Orhan Seyfi Orhon parallel to talks with Turkish Worker Party leader Mehmet Ali Aybar asked 21-questions about Turkish-American bilateral agreements. These questions in my opinion aimed to defend pro-Soviet state.

These questions haven't been answered yet because of secret security issues. What are they ? We don't know. We don't need to learn answers.

For instance, what are the nuclear and atomic bombs in Turkey ? He asked. Don't blame ! we don't know it. As well , who will use these bombs ? we don't know.

Question : does the government believe the bilateral agreements are profit for the country ? So shall we break the agreement with America? But why? What is the use of breaking the deals with America and counter the Soviets alone? What is useful for ? or who is useful for ?”²⁴⁵

Tekin Erer on the other hand said those who want Turkey to leave NATO gave two reasons :

1. The world has changed. Russia was an aggressive country in the past but now it is like a sheep.

²⁴³ Ahmet Kabaklı, “Aslı nedir bunun” Tercüman, 2 January 1965.

²⁴⁴ Kadircan Kaflı, “İşçi Partisinin Yalanları”, Tercüman, 12 November 1965.

²⁴⁵ Orhan Seyfi Orhon, “Maksadı nedir ? Son Havadis, 11.December 1965.

Let's say this idea is true. Since NATO is a defense organization. There will be no war possibility. Hence What is the reason for leaving NATO ? If there is no possibility blowing up a war. Turkey can go on the membership in NATO.

2. If the Russians attack on West, they will first attack on near countries in order to destroy NATO and American bases. There are several NATO bases in Turkey. Thus Turkey will be first target of Communists. For this reason Turkey should leave NATO and we should protect the country to be attacked Atomic bombs.

Let's consider that Turkey withdraw NATO and the Soviets and Western states go to war. Who can guaranty the Russians will not attack on Turkey which it has already been left the pact. The communists run the risk of with West and they don't attack Turkey because Turkey is out of NATO pact. On the other hand let's consider the Soviets will not attack Turkey and they invade Trakya and East lands. Will the Western states not attack the Russians to stop their forward march?²⁴⁶

4.1.4.2. The Multilateral Force and Turkey's Denial

During the first quarter of the 1960's, US President Kennedy commissioned 5 submarines equipped with nuclear force(Polaris missiles) for the command of NATO forces in order to defend Europe. He also emphasized that forming a Multilateral Force for sea power was so significant hence he invited France, Britain and Federal Germany joined this force.

The first acceptance came from the British government and on 21 December 1961, the British and American governments signed an agreement to establish a Multilateral Force for the purpose of the British government adding its submarines to this force.

For Çağrı Erhan, the real purpose of America was to prevent France from coming a nuclear power in NATO. After De Gaulle came to power, he sped up the nuclear program. The United States, on the other hand didn't want to lose its nuclear monopoly in NATO. France's ability in nuclear force was a threat for American interest because it would be

²⁴⁶ Tekin Erer, "NATO'nun Hür Ufukları", Son Havadis, 24 December 1968.

difficult for Washington to take decisions alone in the organization. Also, De Gaulle's nationalist thoughts against the American politics created an issue for Washington. Kennedy wished France under control if it joined the MLF in the pact.²⁴⁷

This project was neither useful nor harmful to Turkey. At first, Turkey informed to join the project (Turkey's aim was marine personnel to train in nuclear force).

The cost of the project for Turkey was approximately 50 million dollar. It was the one percent of total costs. Anyhow its cost, Turkey would be a symbolic power in the project. Turkish staff was going to be deployed back duties. Despite its negative reasons, Turkish naval personnel began to deploy American fleet (Ricketts) in 1964. This was the beginning attempt for the MLF.

Following the Cyprus issue and Johnson letter, Turkey announced its withdrawal from MLF project on January 1965 and called back its military personnel from Ricketts. It is clear that Johnson letter changed Turkish policy makers and Military men's attitude.

Although Turkey's rejection of the MLF did not signify that it was necessary to pay attention to the nuclear power. Opponent party RPP saw a need for Ankara to play increased role in the planning and decision for the use of nuclear weapons²⁴⁸

4.2. Turkey's Developing Economic and Political Relations with the USSR

After the Second World War, Turkish states men saw the national interest parallel to the Western bloc that's why both Inonu and Menderes tried to enter the organizations under the leadership of America. Because of this correlation between Turkey and West, Turkish economic relations with the USSR didn't develop. However it was clearly seen, except for some events, following the Stalin that the new Soviet government took some steps in order to develop political and economic relations with Turkish state. Since 1953, the Soviet state tried to normalize the relations with the Turks yet, Ankara had a handicap with Moscow because of previous demands.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", p. 691.

²⁴⁸ Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis" **International Security**, Vol 10, (Summer 1995)

²⁴⁹ Hoffman, p. 68.

The growing problem of Cyprus was a turning point for Turkey concerning Soviet relations. Johnson letter (1964) led foreign minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to make formal visits to the Soviet state in order to talk economic relations between two states. Hence both states declared common edict which cited aims to develop economic and political relations among parties. Thanks to this agreement, the Soviets imported tobacco, nuts and fruits more with regard to previous years in return the Turks exported construction and drill equipments from the Soviet state.²⁵⁰

The real impetus for developing economic relations was provided by the visit of Prime Minister Suat Hayri Uygulu 9 from 17 August 1965. He started in Kremlin Palace : “*I strongly believe in economic and political relations of two states are going to develop in a good manner. The more talks between the Soviet and Turkish states, the more development in trade would be possible of each state.*”²⁵¹

Following Uygulu’s visit, he revealed detail in which parts of economic agreements : Turkey will sell products in return the Soviets will invest those areas : Iron-Steel, Oil-refineries, aluminum factories, Sulfuric-Acid factory, Tractor factory, Wooden factory, Glass Factory, Vodka Factory, Arpaçay Dam. These investments will cost 150-180 million dollar and the payment would yield 2,5 percent interest for 15 years. Every kind of Turkish products will be beneficial for Soviet market in which will be balance for Turkish exportation from the Soviet state. The first Soviet experts will visit Turkey and negotiate with our experts on 15 September 1965. Prime Minister Uygulu also explained the good relations with the USSR would not damage Turkish relations with the Western states. On 30 September 1965, 22 Soviet experts came to Ankara and a final agreement was signed between these experts and Turkish statesmen. (11 November 1965) Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayan announced that “*Seven different topics has been negotiated, and if their proposals are beneficial for Turkish interests, we will sign the final agreement with the Soviet state.*”²⁵²

One month later (on 18 December 1965), the Cyprus issue was voted in the United Nations. Suleiman Demirel followed multi-dimension in foreign policy when he established new government in 1965. The first government program of Demirel in November 1965 based on Turkish Foreign Policy under economic structure in other words pragmatism in foreign

²⁵⁰ Gönülboğ, p. 518

²⁵¹ Ibid, p. 519.

²⁵² Ibid, p. 520.

policy was centered by economic purposes. It should Turkish Foreign Policy with the Soviets be seen as this economic aim. On 25 March 1967, both Turkey and Soviet states signed “Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement” following this agreement, Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel made a formal visit to Moscow on September 1967. Ankara received economic and technological support from the Soviets with this agreement.²⁵³ Aliaga Oil Refinery, Seydisehir Aluminium Factory, Iskenderun Iron-Steel Factory. Because of better relations with the Soviets, Ankara established close relations with Bulgarians. Both agreed upon the rights of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Turkey started to use Bulgarian electric. Demirel was criticized in which the country was using the communist country’s energy. He said : “Electric isn’t to be communist.”²⁵⁴

The developments with the Soviets for Demirel : “We, as government, gave an importance for a development process. However, the West didn’t give us financial support in case we were not able to pay the credit. That’s why the Soviet Union proposed to give credit to us for five great project.

On the other hand the Soviet intervention in the Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused a rift Marxist Turkish Labor Party.(TIP). It became divided in 1971 because some protested the Soviet invasion to Czechoslovakia in the party.

Turkish – Soviet relations started after Harmel Report with formal visits, Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil visited Moscow in 1968. Following the year, President Cevdet Sunay, went to there. Turkey at this time period, was willingly providing good relations with the Soviets so Turkish public opinion had already begun to have an impact on government communications with Moscow.

The Demirel government initiated ind develop industrial projects with the sake of Soviet aids. The common declaration promised to the independence of each other’s freedom of sovereignty and national policies emphasizing development of economic and political relations.²⁵⁵

Moreover a new amendment for embassy rules and a highway construction which provides to transfer from Turkey to Finland and from Soviet region to the Arabic lands. Both welcomes the preparations for European Security Conference and invited to the parties to

²⁵³ Çetin Yetkin, **Türkiye’de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika, 27 Mayıs, 12 Mart ve 12 Eylül’de Amerika’nın yeri**, Yeniden Ana ve Rum Press, Ankara 1995, p. 676.

²⁵⁴ Cüneyd Arcayurek, **Demirel Dönemi : 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971**, Bilgi Press, İstanbul 1992, p. 129.

²⁵⁵ Williams Phil, Goldstein . M. Donald, Shafritz Jay, (ed.), **Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations**, Wodworth publication, U.S.A. 2006, p. 65.

join the conference. The first result of Sunay's visit showed itself with Soviet financial aid for the construction of Iskenderun steel factory.²⁵⁶

Not only Turkey developed its relations with Moscow but also she established good relations with the Soviet bloc states : Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania. These states even if they were the part of Socialist bloc, all followed different ways in their Foreign Policy. Their respective towards the Soviets wasn't the same at all. Yugoslavia for instance, wasn't a part of Warsaw pact and also didn't participate Cominform and followed neutral policy. Despite the fact that Romania was a communist state and the member of Warsaw pact, she didn't follow in Foreign relations. Albania, on the other hand withdrew from Warsaw and supported Socialist China against the Soviets. Only Bulgaria showed its complete support with the Soviet state.²⁵⁷

Meanwhile, by 1969 Turkish-Soviet trade rate reached 74.8 million dollar this is four times more than 1965 rates. This clearly shows that how two countries develop relations in a positive fashion.

4.2.1. Turkey's developing relations with Middle Eastern countries.

Relations with the Middle East were left in the background. Although there was an effort in Ataturk's 1930 period to improve relations, the memories of the First World War still were on Turkish and Arab minds. The biggest question of the 1950s was who would fill the absence of the British. Also Turkey's interest in the Middle East was another question.²⁵⁸

There was a reverse correlation between Turkish relations with the West and Middle East as it was seen in the Truman and Marshall helps. Whenever Ankara did good relations with the Western bloc, the relations with Middle Eastern countries. While Turkey was a part of NATO, the relations with Middle East went worse. However this trend in Foreign Policy changed after 1965 because of Turkey's position in the Western Bloc. Indeed it was the beginning of Turkish Foreign Policy transformed its relations with Arab states when

²⁵⁶ 13,7 million dollar credit was given to Turkey for the project. Kemal Karpat, **Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi**, (Trans. Güneş Ayas), Timaş Press, İstanbul 2012. p. 279.

²⁵⁷ Mehmet Gönlübol, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, p. 575.

²⁵⁸ Deringil, p. 4.

reversely went far with Western states. The Justice Party came to power in 1965 and its party program declared “*It is one of the main purposes of us to establish relations with the Middle East and the brothers in Maghreb, Arab and Muslim countries. Turkey stayed to continue with all Arab states in their rightful struggle for peace world. Arab states can trust Turkey’s understanding and support for them.*”²⁵⁹ Six-day wars between Israel and Arab states on 5 June 1967 showed Turkish attitude on its foreign policy Ankara called for a meeting with All Arab states’ ambassadors to negotiate the war in the Middle East. Prime Minister Demirel didn’t show its support in the onset of the war that he was criticized by Senator Ahmet Yıldız who said that *the government hasn’t criticized Israeli aggression and just as it is a Greek Megalo Idea, Israel has a Megalo Idea. Both notion feeds from the same source.*” He also noted that how Incirlik base was used against the Arabs in 1958.²⁶⁰ Foreign Minister Çağlayangil declared that Turkey opposes Israel’s occupation policy in the Middle East. Iraq in these days cut its diplomatic relations with the United States so that Washington asked Ankara to represent its rights in Iraq from Turkey. However Ankara refused to be representative of the US in Iran.²⁶¹ A similar declaration was made by Iran Shah when he visited in Turkey (17.06.1967).

The United Nations General Council held a meeting where Çağlayangil once more showed Turkey’s support for Arab states against Israel. He said : “*In these difficult days, the Arabs are going to protect their sovereignty otherwise If there is any loss territory, the Turks willnot accept any soil occupation.*” Ankara voted for Arabs in the General Council. Ankara’s support for Arabs were welcomed by the Arabs that Syrian Foreign Minister showed its pleasure as : “*In the last conflict, Turkey supported us in the United Nations council and outside that’s why Syrian people thank this kindness of Turkey. We strongly believe that the continuity of Turks’ assistance will contribute the rightful struggle for the Arabs and to establish eternal peace in the Middle East.*” Since the uprisings in 1958, two countries has the first time established good relations. Similarly Egyptian government spokesman Hasan El Zeyyad said : Turkey’s behavior proud of us that they supported the Arabs. Thus, Turkey got supported Egypt, the most powerful country in the Middle so the problems has put an end in 1967 for Ankara.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 582.

²⁶⁰ Cumhuriyet, 7.6.1967.

²⁶¹ Cumhuriyet, 11.06.1967

²⁶² Mehmet Gönübol, **Olaylara Türk Dış Politikası**, p. 584.

The changing relations with Arabs were on display with formal visit and agreements by Turkey and Arab countries. In 1967, Prime Minister Demirel visited Iraq to show his support for Palestine against Israel. He said Israel was an occupier state in Jerusalem.²⁶³

Turkey after Second World War, had been alone two times : One began with the end of the war that the Soviets demanded Turkish lands without asking Turkey's sovereignty. The Second was Johnson letter that as a Turkey's biggest ally, the US made Ankara become alone in the world politics. Multi-dimension policy for this aspect is so important to get new opportunities. Better relations with East didn't mean Turkey changed the axis anymore. This was useful for Turkish National interest too.

4.2.2. French Withdrawal From NATO's Military Wing and Turkey

In the mid-1960's, Communism in Russia had not collapsed as US strategist had predicted²⁶⁴ Europe was still divided into West and East Germany.²⁶⁵ Nuclear power remained uncontrolled but it was limited to American Power. This limit united with the arrival to superpower status of a United Europe, turned out to be a new threat to the survival of NATO. The US-British special relationship bothered De Gaulle that's why he thought a sovereign state excluded this alliance. For its defense with its own armed forces

²⁶³ Milliyet, 23.10.1967.

²⁶⁴ The collapse of the Soviet empire was estimated by American strategies earlier. But this estimate didn't become real.

²⁶⁵ After World War II, Germany was divided between the Federal Republic of Germany (West) and the German Democratic Republic (East). Particularly, both governments claimed that they represented the entire German nation. However, the Federal Republic said that it was the only German government with democratic legitimacy. Later, at the end of the 1960s, the communist government of GDR claimed that there was no longer a common German nation as the GDR had established a "socialist" nation. The Federal Governments were dominated by the Christian Democratic Union from 1949 to 1969.²⁶⁵

Even before his election as Chancellor, Willy Brandt, the Social Democratic mayor of West Berlin, argued for and pursued policies that would ease tensions between the two German states, generally in the interest of cross-border commerce. His proposed new Ostpolitik held that the Hallstein Doctrine²⁶⁵ did not help to undermine the communist regime or even lighten the situation of the Germans in the GDR. Brandt believed that collaboration with the communists would foster German-German encounters and trade that would undermine the communist government over the long term.

With Washington's knowledge, Germany started to negotiate with the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany. This concluded treaties with Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia as well as other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

De Gaulle declared “*France should defend herself by herself for herself and in her way*”²⁶⁶ By the way, De Gaulle tried to escape the shadow of the United States as being an independent power. This motivation showed itself in the Yalta conference (after the Second World War) because he was expected being an equal partner but was treated as junior state.

Stage by stage, De Gaulle withdrew France’s forces beginning with its Mediterranean fleet in 1959. By 1966, all French forces were excluded from the combined command and all NATO units were announced to leave France so that NATO headquarters near Paris moved to Belgium.

In April of 1966, the Turkish press asked the government when Turkish forces were still in the land of French territories. Later times, Turkey was gradually withdrawing its forces.

Both De Gaulle and Suleiman Demirel were parallel to the Middle East question. As it is known most parties supported Israel in the question yet, Turkey at this time period, didn’t vote for Israel in United Nations meeting. Just as Turkish Foreign Policy, De Gaulle criticized Israel occupation using force against Arab states. This parallel policy showed itself when Arab-Israel war occurred in 1967 that President Cevdet Sunay made an formal visit to France and both states published common declaration (30 of June) in which emphasized the military occupation wasn’t a solution for the region. The problems could have been solved by peace negotiations.²⁶⁷

During these days, 7 Defence Ministers of NATO gathered in Ankara to negotiate Turkey and France to follow the similar concerning politics of the Middle East in the 1970s.

4.2.3. The Harmel Report (1967) And Changing Relations Between East And West

After France pulled out from NATO’s military wing, the anxiety of this behavior among NATO parties became apparent. The first well known step was the Harmel report which was accepted at a NATO ministerial meeting on December 14, 1967. The report included

²⁶⁶ Robert D. Warrington, “DeGaulle, NATO, and Gaulist Foreign Policy Core, Course Essay”, National War College Report 1994, p. 2.

²⁶⁷ Mehmet Gönlübol & Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1973**, p. 569.

double-side approach to the security. Previous times, the security was being handled by only military aims but this policy was understood as inactive to operate. Lawrence Kaplan analyzes the situation in this way :

“Charles de Gaulle's France provided a second though unwitting element in the background of the Harmel Report. By withdrawing from the military structure of the Alliance, President de Gaulle signalled his belief that military confrontation with the Soviet bloc was a thing of the past, and that the Soviet Union could be treated not as an abnormal entity seeking the destruction of the West but as a potential partner in a new European order. Continuing defence measures would be irrelevant in this scenario for the future of Europe The Harmel report in this context represented NATO's response to the Gaullist challenge. The report made clear that the success of the military pillar made détente possible. Building on this foundation, NATO could develop credible means of expanding political and economic contacts with the Warsaw bloc. While de Gaulle agreed with détente as the means of achieving a new relationship with the Soviet adversary, he was dissatisfied with the role the North Atlantic Council would have in coordinating national policies to achieve this objective. The problem was resolved when France agreed to the general concept of political consultation without having to accept the prospect of an integrated political structure.”²⁶⁸

France's withdrawal from NATO's military power, opened opportunity for Turkish policy makers to raise their voices. The United States changed its policy about nuclear weapons because the European countries and Turkey had bothered the US hegemony in nuclear power.

The Détente period in the 1960's was first by the US however the Vietnam war changed the environment. The first years of the war were supported by NATO Allies however, later years when the bloody fighting occurred in the Southeast region, the allies withdrew their support for the US. America was also losing the support within the nation itself.

The Harmel Report is a very short document, consisting of 17 paragraphs. It highlights two main tasks for the Alliance and several other key issues.

²⁶⁸ Lawrence Kaplan,

“http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Reviewing_Riga/40_anniversary_Harmel_report/EN/index.htm
(12.03.2013)

The first task for the Alliance

1. *“...to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur”;*

And the second task

2. *“...to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.”*

And the text continues:

“Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.”²⁶⁹

The growing effect of Harmel report spread throughout the 1970's. The arms control was a signal of the good relations between East and West. However when NATO and the Soviets tried a new arms build up in the mid 1970's, the situation changed. The optimism between two blocs ended with two events : the Islamic revolution of Iran (1979) and the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

4.2.4. The 1967 Arab-Israel War - 1967 Coup In Greece- Cyprus Events NATO and Turkey

The 1967 Arab-Israel war gave the first signs of the changing attitude in Turkish Foreign Policy. By the time war had begun, Ankara called all Turkish ambassadors to Arab countries for a meeting. After this meeting, an announcement was declared : *“The Turkish government strongly believes in the United Nations laws and justice principles. In addition the government takes into account good relations with Arab states.”* Even though Turkey

²⁶⁹ The Harmel Report, www.nato.int (12.03.2013)

didn't show direct support for Arabs however, its indirect support are clearly seen in the declaration.²⁷⁰

Turkey maintained on the same attitude after war had started. Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil's speech on 6 June 1967 : "*The Bases in Turkey can't be used against Arabs*" June of 10, Turkey opposed "all invasion policy of Israel against Israel" that Ankara clearly supported the Arabs.²⁷¹

During the war and in its aftermath, Turkey continued its support for the Arabs particularly the decisions about the status of Jerusalem in the United Nations and the calls for UN Palestinian Refugees. Turkey gave positive vote for two main subjects in support of Arabs. Turkey in spite of its old politics, was in the side of Arabs against Israel. The US and Britain in this conflict, generally supported Israeli government. Non-alignment states gave a note to the United Nations General Council in order Israel to withdraw from her occupied territories. Turkey supported this proposal but America and Britain were against.

In 1967, the relations between Greece and Turkey deteriorated because of military coup in Greece. The military administration in Greece weakened its power in Cyprus issue so its democracy had ended by this way. Turkey used this handicap for Greeks and demanded Greek soldiers to withdraw. Also, Ankara said commander Grivas should leave Cyprus. The military management in Greece had to accept Turkey's demands with the sake of Washington's press.²⁷² The political power of Turkish government was different if it is compared 1950's. The newspapers and writers were more effective on government hence when the events came into exist in Cyprus, the Demirel government should have taken the priorities of public opinion. When the American government asked Ankara to defend her will in Iraq, Turkey rejected American interest at that time. It was the time for Turkey not only forming good relations with the Western bloc but also having good relations with Eastern bloc.

In September 1967, the Prime Ministers meeting was held in Alexandroupolis but no result was declared. After a while, the Greek government ordered an attack on Cyprus against Turkish troops. This attack was protested by the United Nation General Secretary. Public protests in main cities of Turkey were increasingly anti-American Turkish citizens. Turkish

²⁷⁰ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası (1945-1970)**, AÜ Siyasal Bil. Fak. Press, Ankara 1972, p. 154.

²⁷¹ Ibid, p. 156.

²⁷² Bostanoğlu, p. 449.

intervention on Cyprus was again on the agenda but Johnson's private delegate Cyrus Vance visited Ankara and replied President's demand about Cyprus issue.²⁷³ Vance because of protests in Esenboga (public air station of Ankara) his flight had to land in military air station. Vance's proposals didn't last solutions for the Turkish government. Then Vance made a visit to Greece too. He called both nations : Turks and Greeks to calm tension. In these days, NATO General Secretary Manlio Brosio went around triangle : Ankara, Athens and Lefkose in order to find a solution. Finally, Greece accepted Turkish demands about Island. According to agreement, the first group of Greek soldiers left the Island on 8 December 1967. The civil war in Greece deepened in the days of December so the remaining Greece soldiers' departure was delayed for next month. The situation in 1967 cool down after a while.

Just like Turkey, Greece had trouble with the United States in 1960s. The Acheson Plan in 1964 was an unacceptable solution for the Greek parliament. The ambassador complained the President that : "No Greek Government could accept such a plan.

Johnson answered very rudely :

*"Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good...If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long."*²⁷⁴

The relations of the Greeks with Washington were at the worst similar to Turkey's problems occurred with Johnson's letter. The problem for the Greeks showed itself withdrawal from NATO in 1974 after Turkish intervention to Cyprus was held in Turkey as a wing and neighbor state became alone in NATO until 1980's.

4.2.5. The Developments after the Harmel Report

After French President De Gaulle had withdrawn French forces from the alliance, a new period in the security system began for France which led to resisting American proposals by member states in NATO.

²⁷³ This demand was Johnson's letter of 1964. He had said that Turkey can't use American arms and weapons in Cyprus. Moreover, if Turkey attacked on Cyprus, it will be alone when Soviet attacks on Turkey.

²⁷⁴ Christopher Hitchens, **Hostage to History Cyprus From Ottomans to Kissinger**, the Noonday Press, New York 1989, p. 61.

Despite the Turkish attitude towards NATO and the American presence, some military officers had serious doubts about the Strategy of Flexible Response. They thought that their allies would not help in a non-nuclear war if the war wouldn't go more widely against NATO member states. The military men who, some were retired explained the possible crisis in which the country attacked by the Soviet Union would response instead. Turkish leaders had unwillingly adopted the new strategy.²⁷⁵

On the other side, opposition leader Ismet Inonu warned the government to be careful about the possible hostilities. Turkish public opinion made the American preference become less important within the country's territory. The parallel attitude was seen in American statesmen that they thought the American military presence needed to be reduced in Europe. In 1968, under congressional pressure. Washington cut US support to military bases in West Germany by 10 percent.²⁷⁶ The same year, European states expressed their fear in which they had exposed by the Soviet threat. For finding a solution, NATO kept a negotiation with Warsaw pact for force reductions. Both the US and the USSR however slowly responded to requests for strategic arms limitation talks.

In Turkey, discussions over NATO were in the universities. 308 academicians declared that Turkey should take into account its relations with the pact and these relations should be open and discussed in public. In this way, people would decide whether to be part of NATO. Also there was also a Russia-Turkish agreement on the establishment of third steel factory.(8.5.1968)²⁷⁷ Five days later 108 students were arrested in the protest of "No to NATO". The growing tension with NATO and America was trouble for the Demirel government. The pressure on Universities and the press was seen as police arrested. Turkey's students uprisings were partly affected by the student protests in France.²⁷⁸

Turkish-Russian closer relations in 1968 were facilitated in the form of formal visits by Foreign Minister Çağlayangil to the Soviet Union on 8.7.1968.

On the other side, it was the first time that the US fleet was protested in Istanbul.²⁷⁹ Public security forces occupied student dormitories at Istanbul Technical University in Gumussuyu campus as they were thought the protesters of 6th US fleet. 53 students and 4

²⁷⁵ Abdi İpekçi interviewed with retired Turkish military Generals.

²⁷⁶ Harris, p. 150.

²⁷⁷ Cumhuriyet, 8.5.1968.

²⁷⁸ Student-worker movement began in Paris, later it was called 1968 French Revolution. This movement in Paris affected Turkey and the other world, Milliyet, 20.5.1968.

²⁷⁹ The 6 fleet of the USA was first visited Turkey in 1950's and it was welcomed by Turkish people with love and greeting because good relations was established with the United States in Menderes' time.

police men were injured in the events.²⁸⁰ Attempting to reduce tensions US existence, President Cevdet Sunay made a speech and criticized those who protested the NATO and the American alliance he said “Be respectful to 6th fleet of the US as you see, the events in Czechoslovakia showed us the necessity of the Atlantic pact. However, the opposition group had different idea about the Czechoslovakia events. According to Mehmet Ali Aybar, Turkey should break up the relations with the United States. Small states like Czechoslovakia and Turkey which are controlled by big states : Soviets and Americans, are dependent to them completely so that Czechoslovakia is an example of this tragedy.”²⁸¹

The events in Czechoslovakia began when complaints started about the totalitarian regime’s laws in 1966. People in Slovakia complained to the government about poor economy, and living the standards of workers. The students demonstrated in Prag and the party leader Antonin Novotny had resigned because of demonstrations. He was replaced by Alexander Dubcek who was a reformist candidate of the party. His first action was the reformation on the constitution of Czechoslovakia. It aimed to democratic standard of living in the country. Dubcek announced that the power of the Czech Communist party would remain but its totalitarian aspects to be reduced that bothered the party members. He also declared that farmers have right to form Cooperative organizations. The most important policy of Dubcek was the relations with the Soviets. He also noted that there was no change in the relations with Warsaw pact but this explanation wasn’t enough for Brezhnev. On August 20th 1968, the Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia caused in Turkish public opinion particularly among the leftist groups which were divided internally.²⁸² Senator İbrahim Şevki Atasagun delayed his visit to Moscow because of the Soviet invasion.

France, at that time period, was outside of the pact as De-Gaulle withdrew French troops from NATO’s military wing, visited Ankara to negotiate the issues both countries. Both government and press gave much more attention for this visit and it was seen in the newspapers. However the message for the anniversary of Republic foundations given by President Sunay unlike De-Gaulle, insisted on the importance of NATO membership for

²⁸⁰ Hurriyet, 18.7.1968

²⁸¹ Cumhuriyet, 22.08.1968

²⁸² Some still supported the Soviets as though it was seen as the leader state of Communism, some criticized as it was seen as imperialist state.

security. De Gaulle expressed that security pacts like NATO and Warsaw shifted the tension between states.²⁸³

Changing Turkish policy towards NATO operations showed itself in 1968. The planning NATO operation in Mediterranean Sea was rejected by Ankara.²⁸⁴ Ten years ago, a similar military operation was held in that region but Turkish behavior NATO operations were proudly accepted by the government.²⁸⁵

The growing protests against NATO and American policy hit the top in the first month of 1969. On January, American ambassador Komer visited the Middle Eastern Technical University. He was a former CIA agent and played an important role in Vietnam war for adopting appeasement policy. The ODTU students protested him in the campus and fired his car. Prime Minister Demirel expostulated these students by saying these words : *“These protests are being done by those who want to break Turkish-American relations. The Police are protecting the country under the guidance of law.”*²⁸⁶

The discussions over National Defense Army of Turkey were on the subject of public opinion. Prime Minister Demirel rejected the idea of Turkish army not becoming a National. He said : The equipments of the Turkish army are imported outside but this is not the meaning that Turkish army is not National.²⁸⁷

On 16th February 1969, a bloody fighting was occurred in the center of Taksim, A group of people protested the 6th fleet of the US in Taksim. The opposite group attacked by crying “Muslim Turkey” and there were 2 dead and 200 injured in the clashes. This event was called ‘Bloody Sunday’ (Kanlı Pazar). The newspapers accused the police of being insufficient to prevent the fighting.

Another issue that the government tried to solve was the authorization of the Aegean Sea since it was under the control of Greece. The Aegean Sea is an important place for defense just because Ankara demanded its right as a significant ally of the pact.

1969 was the year of students events in Europe and in Turkey the violence gradually grew between left and right groups. As the police was insufficient, the army forces stepped in. The Universities closed and the exams delayed.

²⁸³ Son Havadis, 24.10.1968

²⁸⁴ The operation was called Orient Express. The military operation was being planned to exercise near the Syrian border.

²⁸⁵ Cumhuriyet, 26.11.1968.

²⁸⁶ Tercüman, 19.01.1969

²⁸⁷ Son Havadis, 7.2.1969.

The forgotten organization in those days was CENTO so it became a current issue when Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas visited Ankara by putting emphasis on the organization. For him, *“CENTO is over as though the parties should establish a new kind of organization.”* he said.

For two decades, the bilateral agreements between Turkey and NATO partners were problematic and the governments were sharply criticized by leftist groups. Hence the Demirel government started the negotiations with the US to renew old bilateral agreements in 1967.²⁸⁸ By the time 1969 elections, the government signed new agreement however this new amendment canceled previous 97 agreements. The government expressed this new agreement in secret meeting in the Assembly on 25 January 1970. İhsan Sabri Caglayangil (Foreign Minister) made speech and said : *“After a detailed researchs of government members, the formal negotiations began on 20 January 1967. They lasted two years and four months aftermath the well-known good relations between Republic of Turkey and the United States of America were developed in positive way so that 3 of July, 1969 two states signed new agreement according to third paragraph of North Atlantic Treaty Agreement.”*

Caglayangil never mentioned the outcome of student event that they were protesting the American presence in the country. However İsmet İnönü, opposite party leader, criticized Foreign Minister : *“As Caglayangil said that we haven’t been a part of Western club since the membership of NATO yet, we have been a sovereign state since 1923. In 1945, Russian ambassador Molotov gave a Note which demanded the Straits and Kars, Ardahan. Selim Sarper, former Foreign Minister rejected to take this Note. Molotov was surprised and said ‘take it give it to your government.’ Sarper said it is not necessary, I know my colleagues’. All party members gathered and declared invasion policy of any state was an unacceptable thing for Turkey. In those days, the Soviet Union was popular state and their invasions were allowed by the other states. We rejected all demands at that time. Their desires for Istanbul and straits ended thanks to our struggle. The US ambassador Harriman told me that when we heard that Russians gave us the note demanding the Turkish straits. I said to myself : What a bad, one more state is going to join Iron curtain*

²⁸⁸ The bilateral agreements between Turkey and the USA began in 1953 according to third paragraph of NATO treaty. Since first signature, 97 agreements were signed by both government members and military men. Turkish Worker Party criticized the government to explain these agreements. Turkey demanded to cancel all agreements and unite only one document for this kind of bilateral agreement.

bloc.’ Then we have learned Turkey rejected all demands. We were surprised and said there is still strong nation in this time too.

In Postdam Stalin was asked why he gave us this note to the Turks and he said we demand and they reject. That’s it. After that American experts reported the necessity of aid for Turks. Çağlayangil was wrong. We appreciate the Turk-American relations on the other hand this doesn’t mean that we give sovereign rights.”²⁸⁹

The Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement on July 3, 1969 was signed by two party states. The text of document was kept secret by Demirel government until 1970. When it was opened by the Foreign Minister, the opposite groups criticized

The last decade of 1960s is also important for the agreement of Strategic Arms Limited Talks which began in 1969 with parties : the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The talks lasted 30 months and signed on 26 May 1972 in Moscov. Sami Kohen emphasised these talks are about Middle East and Vietnam war.²⁹⁰ The second round of talks started following the signature of SALT I in 1972.²⁹¹

To sum up of 1960’s, NATO’s new strategy: Flexible Response Strategy was effective on Turkish foreign policy on the other hand the developments in political arena made Ankara felt alone. Turkish Policy makers started to ask use of NATO for the country. The criticism arose against NATO partnership as though Turkey’s maneuver and relations with other states decreased. In this period, Cyprus crisis broke the relations with United States too. Turkey was preparing military operation on Island yet the former President Lyndon Johnson wrote an informal letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, saying NATO had not had a chance to think about protecting. Turkey if it was attacked by the Soviets. Moreover, if Turkey attacked the island, Turkey would not be able use the weapons which were taken from NATO and the US.

It was the turning point which felt Turkey alone since the US and NATO parties’ behaviors in Cyprus issue.²⁹²

In the 1963-1969 period, Turkey diversified its foreign policy so that except Western states, Ankara developed good relations with the USSR and Middle Eastern states.

²⁸⁹ Şengül Kılıç Hritidis, Ersel Ergüz, **İsmail Hakkı Birler’in Anılarında CHP’li yıllar (1946-1992)**, İş Bankası Kültür Press, İstanbul 2010. s. 168

²⁹⁰ Sami Kohen, “Havadan Sudan Başladılar Ama”, Milliyet, 25 May 1972.

²⁹¹ SALT II talks lasted longer than first one. The parties : America and Soviet state agreed on June 1979. However when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the US congress didn’t approve the limitation talks.

²⁹² Gönülbol, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, p. 498.

Moreover, Turkey for the first time, rejected a military proposed project which was tried to form in the pact.²⁹³

The developments within the country was another change for the statesmen since this was the correlation period of leftist groups in Turkey. Their criticism about NATO had an effect on public opinion. The Flexible Response Strategy and some events such as Cuban missile and Cyprus crisis had Turkey looked for new dimensions in foreign relations. This new look went on into the 1970's.

²⁹³ Multilateral Force MLF was tried to form by United States in order to prevent De Gaulle's attempt in nuclear technology because the US aimed to be unique power in the North Atlantic Pact.

5. THE SECOND PERIOD IN COLD WAR AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-NATO RELATIONS

5.1. The Onset of 1970s and Turkish Foreign Policy-NATO relations

The world witnessed new events which were mostly organized by students in the late 1960's. The student protesters in Paris have been called the 1968 generation. Similar events were seen in Turkish universities. The freedoms which were brought by the 1961 Constitution facilitated opportunities for workers and students. Having right to found labor unions provided facilities for workers. Moreover, University reform produced a kind of self- autonomy in which both academicians and students freely expressed political views inside. Middle Eastern Technical University (ODTU) was one of the central places of protests. Because of uncontrolled events, the Rector delayed opening the University.²⁹⁴ However, the environment was troubling for Demirel government as there were many protests and strikes. Hence, new legal amendments were enacted to control the universities and workers. One of these amendments was made for Television and radio. Since Television Radio institution was on the target, Alparslan Turkes for example said : “*TRT has turned out to be a brainwashing tool in the hands of Leftists.*”²⁹⁵ On the other side, the Millet Party Vice President said : “the government aims to take TRT from leftist and give it to Freemasons.”

The shadow of conflicts within Turkey correlated with Turkish foreign policy and NATO itself. The military coup in Greece (1967) created a problem on the Cyprus issue. As NATO member states, Greece and Turkey were in cold war period during 1960s. It was the climax when the military came to power in Greece and threatened Turkey and Cyprus.

The existence of the US personnel in the end of 1960's was still a problem for Turkish opinion. Harb-İş (A labor Union of Incirlik Base Personnel) went a strike at Incirlik Air Base and this strike widened to Iskenderun, Adana, and Ankara. A few days later, it was

²⁹⁴ Rector Kemal Kardas closed ODTU till 1 October. The other day students and police fought and 114 students got arrested. Milliyet, 15.4.1969

²⁹⁵ Hurriyet, 22,4.1969.

announced that a new amendment were being enacted by the two member states. The agreement of SOFA in 1954 was rearranged and signed in 1969.

On the other side, freedoms for Democrat Party members²⁹⁶ were on the subject. After their freedom right were approved by the parliamentary with support of Ismet Inonu. Some party members in Republicans, for instance, Orhan Erkanlı, told he was going to resign from party.

The 1970's are also known for the military intervention on 12 March 1971. The Turkish General Staff issued a protest journal to the President, Prime Minister and Senate in order to reestablish a new consistent government. If it is not provided, Turkish army will interfere in the country to protect it under Constitution right. Thereupon, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel resigned as prime minister so the President assigned independent deputy Nihat Erim²⁹⁷ who was an independent deputy in the assembly.

The domestic political had Turkish Foreign Policy forgotten Turkish Public Opinion's subjects began to change as American's minimize policy of its sight in Turkish lands. The Soviets' behavior against East European states had bothered pro-Soviets in Turkey because they thought the Soviet state wasn't an imperialist state. Hence the Soviets let down Turks who were followers. These followers couldn't easily defend to establish good relations with the Soviet state anymore. Particularly Czechoslovakia intervention in 1968 by the Soviets was worried in Turkey so that Turkish Foreign Policy was in stagnation period during onset of 1970's.

Consequently, Turkish Foreign Policy during the 1965-1971 period entered its peak of dynamism. International events showed clearly that Turkey was away from the Western bloc in the late 1960's. Conversely close relations were providing with Eastern states. In this regard, Turkish Foreign Policy reached optimal balance point in 1971. As understood the former Foreign Minister Osman Olcay's words : It is coincidence if Turkey follows active and dynamic policy in foreign relations. To present Turkey to the world, economic

²⁹⁶ When the coup took the power, all members of Democrat party were banned from politics. The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu and the Ministry of Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed and the others were prisoned.

²⁹⁷ Nihat Erim was an important man in Republican Party. After military intervention, he resigned the party to form new independent government.

contacts will get better for the country. The countries which don't use its resources well, they will have to lose the developments of world changes.²⁹⁸

The Republican People's party rose under Bulent Ecevit's leadership. After 1971 military intervention, the Justice Party lost government with military intervention. The domestic political chaos didn't end with elections of 1973. The Republicans got % 33 votes but Justice Party got 29 %. Bulent Ecevit propaganda White Days "Ak Günler" and against the stand of United States in the country.²⁹⁹ The right-wing parties in the election were divided. They were Suleyman Demirel's Justice party, Bozbeyle's Demokratik Party, Erbakan's Milli Selamet Party, and Feyzioğlu's Cumhuriyetçi Güven Party. This vote for Republicans didn't enough to form a government by itself. Hence the Republicans after unsuccessful trials for forming government, they united with Erbakan's party. Their coalition didn't go on healthy way because two sides were completely different political background. Following the Turkish operation to Cyprus Island, the coalition government ended. The President called Suleyman Demirel to establish government. Demirel united four right parties : Justice Party, Cumhuriyetçi Güven Party, Milli Selamet Party and Demokratik Party. Their coalition was named Milliyetçi Cephe (National Front). This was a growing reaction to the rising leftist movements. The new coalition programme was to demolish the Communist danger in the country. For them, there were big dangerous movements which the Communists had done with the support of Soviets. The more political divisions increased in the time of the National Front Governments, the more violent events increased in the great cities of the country. The anarchic events gradually grow up till the 12 September 1980 military intervention.

5.1.1. The Opium Trafficking Issue in Turkey

The issues facing NATO revolved around two main subjects at the beginning of the 1970s : The first was a coup in Greece. How does Greece will behave in the organization? The second issue was the decline of the Justice Party with growing protests supported by Universities and the growing power within the military officers ranks. The General Staff issued the 1971 Military declaration (1971 Muhtırası) and brought the government down.

²⁹⁸ Mehmet Gönübol & Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995**, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Press, Ankara 1978, p. 540.

²⁹⁹ Davut Dursun, **12 Eylül Darbesi Hatıralar Gözlemler Düşünceler**, Şehir Press, İstanbul 2005, p. 19.

These two issues directly or indirectly affected Ankara's position in security policies. One of the most discussible issues was the Security agreement with the US and NATO parties. 1969 Common Defense Cooperation Agreement was a restoration of 1954 SOFA agreement. In this way, The United States couldn't operate any state from the bases in Turkey without permission of Ankara. The ownership of all US bases in the country were accepted to belong to Turkey itself. Turkish authorities had right to control these US bases too. Moreover, the government might be limited to use the bases if the government needed. The full paper of the 1969 agreement was published in Hurriyet six years later.³⁰⁰ The paper included : the number of NATO planning bases in Turkey, where they would be settled in, their location near roads and railways taken into account for peace and war conditions.

Another trouble which emerged with the US was opium traffic. The production of opium was controlled according to the League of Nations' standards in 1932. During the Second World War and afterwards production was under the authority by the state. It was the first time that the US State Department reported 80 percent of heroin sold in the United States was the production of Turkey.³⁰¹ Hence the Washington forced Turkey to stop the illicit drug supply. The trials to shut off the illicit traffic of drug were adopted by Demirel's government so that he showed great attempt to stop illegal opium trade in the mid-1960s. The Justice Party in government time aimed to reduce opium production from 1967 till 1971.³⁰² In order to research substitute crops and equipments for police in action against drug traders, the United States helped Turkey 3 million dollar loan.³⁰³

By 1970, The United States had put more pressure on the Turkish side. The Political developments in Turkey cutted the relations with the US. For a while, Turkish Public Opinion more attended the issue that it was seen America was interfering the sovereignty of Turkey. The news on papers "*American pressure on Turkey and Its independence, America Banns Opium', Farmers in trouble*"³⁰⁴

American demands were made clear by itself John Mitchell's declaration that threatened the approval of economic sanctions against Turkey. However Ankara saw American sanctions as destructive to the American-Turkish relations. On the other hand Mitchell's

³⁰⁰ Hurriyet, 16-17, March 1975.

³⁰¹ İsmail Baltacıoğlu, "Türkiye'de ve Dünyada Uyuşturucu Madde Kaçakçılığı", Ulus, 17-21 June, 1967

³⁰² Demirel government aimed to eradicate opium during mid 1960's

³⁰³ Devrim, 28 April 1970.

³⁰⁴ Cumhuriyet, 10.07.1970

project didn't bring a sharp crisis for Turkey as if it was compared to Johnson's letter. Later times, the Department of state denied any economic sanction against Turkey. Moreover, opium issue didn't become a national issue just as a problem in Cyprus had been in 1960's.

After the military intervention on 12 March 1971, Nihat Erim established a technocrat government and he was more strict than Demirel government. The United States suggested paying 30 million dollar for economic reassurance in the loss of opium production. Erim government accepted to stop production of opium but this was related to approximately 100 thousand farmers. The US didn't send her promise 30 million dollar but only she sent 1 million. This made thousands of villagers in economic trouble.

In 1973, Turkey went to election and Republicans for the first time in multi-party system became the winner. After the Democrats had won the election in 1950's, the Republican Party was the second in the contest. In the leadership of Bulent Ecevit who was seen as anti-American in the corners. After Republicans and Erbakan's 'Milli Selamet Partisi' formed a coalition government, as soon as they came to power, the opium production was let to produce free again. Washington reacted and stopped financial help to Turkey at once. The Turkish government promised to prevent informal opium traffic moving Europe and the United States. The trouble opium issue shifted more after this.

5.1.2. Greece's Withdrawal From NATO (1974)

In July 1974, a second coup was staged in Cyprus by Nikos Samson.³⁰⁵ Greek officers ended the democratically elected President Makarios in Republic of Cyprus. The aim of this military junta in the Island was to impose an enosis (union) with Greece. Makarios had to flee to London with the help of British so that Turkey intervened and occupied the north part of Cyprus Island. Turkish military action was 40.000 men and 300 tanks and equipment.

³⁰⁵ He was an EOKA leader.

The Greece wasn't prepared for the war so the Turkish forces forwarded easily and successfully. Constantin Karamanlis was recalled to unite the country later the events developed with collapse of military junta in Greece.

On July 26, Britain, Turkey and Greece, three guarantor states met in Geneva to end the crisis. An agreement was taken to implementation of the cease fire on the separation to opposing forces. The Turkish government demanded that Cyprus should stay independent nation. In other words : each nation should have its own territory separation. Each state has full autonomy

NATO didn't support this intervention so the US criticized Turkey as an invader country. Turkish-American relations got worse after 1974 Turkish intervention to Cyprus hence opium issue was forgotten by American policy makers. Military Embargo against Turkey by the United States started in 1975 until 1978.

There were other other problems for example, the airspace dispute between Greece and Turkey : ten-mile airspace and the Flight Information Region(FIR) disputes. Ankara didn't oppose Greece's airspace and FIR polices until after 1974 Cyprus dispute since 1952. Turkey objected to accepting that Greek airspace is ten nautical miles whereas its territorial waters are only six miles. One more advantage for the Greeks according to International Civil Aviation Organization decision signed in 1952.

Connected to these problems, the division of naval and aerial responsibility areas within NATO was controversial. Turkey's claim right known as NOTAM 714. Hence in 1974 Greece declared its own NOTAM 1157 which explained Aegean air corridors unsafely. This dispute also came up after 1980 when Greece returned NATO's military wing from which it had withdrawn in 1974 in protest over NATO's. Greece wanted to return its large control areas just like previous 1974. Greece's return NATO in 1980 with Roger Plan arose crisis on flight zones. Both Turkey and Greece with bilateral agreement canceled their NOTAM so civilian air traffic has been opened. Greece still insisted of large part of control. However both Ankara and Athens have not been agreed on their sphere up to now.³⁰⁶

US policy was a dilemma for both NATO member states : Greece and Turkey. The bases in Cyprus were necessary for the Survival Project of the United States. But nothing pleased any of the parties. Any suggestions of the US was countered suspicion by

³⁰⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Turco-Greek Dispute", **Turkish Foreign Policy**, New Prospects, Eothen Pree, Britain 1992, p-p. 40-41.

Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. In this political atmosphere, several conspiracy theories were being produced by some groups. This suspicion has been dominated by the conspiracy theories of international politics which controlled by CIA as being superior on internal and external political affairs. According to them, events were manipulated by the CIA in order to increase American power. Some Turkish newspapers like *Yön*, claimed that the CIA was responsible for establishing a military regime in Athens in 1967 and that back to 1964 Johnson letter prevented Turkey to intervene in Cyprus operation. Moreover just like these claims, some Greek writers claimed that Turkish attack on 1974 was supported by CIA agents in July 1974. Also US press told American Mediterranean fleet did nothing to stop the Turkish invasion.³⁰⁷ On the fact, this doesn't completely resemble the reality. On February 5, 1975 Congress cut off military aid to Turkey when it invaded Cyprus was seen as further evidence of American determination. To impact political life on the international arena.³⁰⁸ The relations between the United States and Turkey was in crisis since 1964 Johnson letter. Turkey was preparing for military intervention to Cyprus, President Johnson sent an informal letter which desired to stop any military action on Cyprus Island. He said that Turkey couldn't able to use American and NATO weapons without permission. If Turkey would do any action, she was going to ban all relations. On June 1964, Johnson met with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu started talks on the Cyprus dispute in Geneva under the coordinator of United Nations. Dean Acheson, the former United States Secretary of State. He drew a plan for the union of Cyprus. And two Turkish cantons would be formed. The plan was protested by Makarios and led to another outbreak of fighting on Cyprus in which Turkey alarmed its air strikes. The Acheson Plan increased anti-Americanism in Cyprus and Greece so American suggestion failed with an unsuccessful close. Aftermath military coup was held in Greece (1967), the United States was again caught in a dilemma between two nations. Cyrus Vance, Johnson's private representative, helped to solve the crisis and Secretary General of NATO offered a plan and the United Nations appointed his special representative. All three men were called "Wise Men" worked together to gain the tentative agreement that Greece would remove its soldiers illegally stationed on the Island. Turkey also would reduce its forces. However Makarios refused to accept any bilateral effort between Greece and Turkey. Until 1974, the anti-Americanism continued to grow

³⁰⁷ New York Times, March 9, 1975.

³⁰⁸ New York Times, February 6, 1975

between three nations : Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. This was a great challenge for the security of North Atlantic Pact.

One of the biggest criticisms against Washington not to take a stronger stand against Turkish intervention. In addition, domestic politics was in crisis because Nixon administration collapsed and American Foreign Policy seemed to be suspended during these days. After Turkish intervention to Cyprus, department of United States made an effort to make agreement between Greece and Turkey. Greek government, under Karamanlis power, was dissatisfied with American failure to stop Turkish intervention to Island. Hence the Greeks withdrew Greek military units from NATO's military wing. Also, the stand of American 6th fleet was banned and other American facilities were shut down such as the airbase at Hellinikon operated by the Air Transport Command, the ballistic missile range and telecommunication. It had privileges, exemptions granted to American personnel and declared that remaining five American installations in Greece were to be placed under Greek commander.³⁰⁹

Turkish policy makers were angered by the 1975 congressional arms embargo prohibited any ship stand in Istanbul and Izmir.³¹⁰ President Ford seeks to obtain congressional decision to delay military aid to Turkey but the Congress voted for ban. It was claimed that the congress was under control of Greek lobby that's why they banned military aid to Turkey. This lobby was so effective even though NATO and US bases in Turkish lands were closed, they didn't reconsider their decision.³¹¹ Also President warned the congress any ban decision may increase anti-Americanism in Turkey.

5.1.3. The US arms embargo on Turkey (1975-1978)

The beginning of embargo started when American-Greek organizations³¹² in Washington lobbied in the US congress in order to turn them against Turkey. On the 15 of August,

³⁰⁹ Thomas Ann Wann, "The Cyprus Crisis 1974-75, **Political and Judicial Aspects**, Southwestern Law Journal, Vol. 29, (1975) p. 521.

³¹⁰ Time, May, 12, 1975

³¹¹ New York Times, March, 9, 1975.

³¹² The biggest lobby of the Greeks was American Educational Progress Association which had 530 brands and 50000 members and its effect on US congress was so much. Except this, American Hellenic Institute,

1974, John Bredemas, one of the Greek leaders in the US congress, visited Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger with a group of Greek lobbyists. They blamed the United States not to prevent Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Moreover, using American weapons in Cyprus wasn't legal for bilateral agreements and it also contradicted for American laws. Kissinger after the meeting, made a press expression and said : "Turkish operations in Cyprus will be examined and whether the weapons are made of the US will be known. If the Turks used American weapons, they will be punished by military embargo.

Discussions in the US congress ensued and congressional members drew the following conclusions :

1. Turkey's first operation aimed to rescue citizens on the Island but the second operation was illegal and had no legal explanation.
2. Turkey used the American weapons but this contravened for bilateral agreements.
3. In order to stop Turkey from withdrawing from occupied Cyprus territory, the US would apply a military embargo otherwise Turkey will continue this kind of unlawful practice.

Before the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the United States had been shaken by some events : The Watergate scandal and the operations in Vietnam, Chili and Cambodia : the Congress was criticized for loosing control over these events. Hence, the Congress gave much more attention to the Cyprus issue. However, Kissinger and American statesmen were thinking difference to solve this problem. For them, Turkey is one of the biggest allies in the North Atlantic Pact. If the United States punished the Turks with embargo, Turkey would be alone and closed American military bases in the country. Executive organ in democratic rules belongs to Government. If the Congress used executive power, this would be illegal movement according to American laws. Moreover, similarly Israel used American weapons against the Arabs in 1967 and 1973. However the US didn't lay an embargo against the Israelis. This was hypocrisy.

The United States also a had different problem :the Watergate scandal.³¹³ President Nixon had to resign on August 9th,1974 as a result of the scandal.

United Hellenic American Congress and American Hellenic Council such as organizations supported the campaign against Turkey and its Cyprus intervention. See, Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", p. 704.

³¹³ The scandal came into exist when the burglars were arrested by FBI. They were tasked by Nixon's fellows. Their purpose was to install voice-tapping in the opposite group offices. Nixon first denied the

In 1975, the US Senate slapped an embargo on Turkey even though President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger tried to prevent it. Turkey reacted on June and declared all US military and intelligence facilities closed down. The US Foreign Affairs Committee voted in July to decide embargo on Turkey. They decided to vote 206 to 223 accepted on the assembly. Turkey subsequently closed the US facilities in July 26 response to US embargo. Historically, for Murat Karagöz, US policies toward Greece and Turkey has been linked since the formal aid relationships were established in 1947 under Truman Doctrine, Greece then in the midst of civil war was viewed as relatively more vulnerable to the Soviet threat and was deemed more urgent, but both nations were in need of post-war assistance.³¹⁴

Two countries have a similar process in history. Both joined NATO in 1952 and played role as south eastern flank of Western countries. Throughout years, their economies went stability. Both had military intervention (Turkey in 1960, Greece 1967). US aid flowed gradually from 1947 to 1974 with Greece receiving up 4 billion dollars and Turkey received 5.6 billion.

In congress problems more influenced by Greek-Americans from Turkish lobbies. Even though the executive branch paid attention to Turkish interests, the congressmen didn't take into account Turkey's wishes. Kissinger says : "From the geopolitical point of view, Turkey was if anything, even more important than Greece. Bordering the Middle East, Central Asia, Soviet Union and Europe, Turkey was indispensable for American policy in each of these areas. Turkey had been a staunch and loyal ally in the entire Cold War period. Turkish troops had fought with distinction at our side in Korea. Twenty six electronic stations were monitoring Soviet missile and space activities from Turkish territory."³¹⁵

For the American Congress, the second Turkish intervention in Cyprus was an aggressive action and was an unacceptable for them. Representative Donald Riegele said about Cyprus :

"To this point (after the first Turkish invasion) the Turks had achieved the goals intended by their military intervention: they stopped the illegal coup on Cyprus, restoring that island's legitimate government. The intervention also caused indirectly, the fall of the 7-year Athens dictatorship.

claims and employed prosecuting attorney. However the judge found voice-tapping of Nixon and his fellows and demanded this tappings. Nixon didn't accept to give tappings to judge. The debate weakened Nixon and he resigned. Reverse, Vice President Gerald Ford came to power.

³¹⁴ Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey after 30 years and Institutional Approach Towards US Policy Making", **Perceptions** , Winter 2004, p. 119.

³¹⁵ Ibid, p. 120.

Turkey had a right under the London accords of 1959, to intervene in Cyprus if the other guarantor powers (Greece and Britain) failed to act jointly but only for the purpose of restoring the state of affairs under the treaty. If Turkey had moved militarily for that purpose and had ended its actions when such restoration occurred, tragedy of Cyprus would not exist today.”³¹⁶

The American government was at the forefront of the pro-embargo asserting position that remaining silent about the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and not giving reaction to an important ally was logical. However, the opium traffic in Turkey was let to free by Bulent Ecevit government despite American opposition. This also changed the US Congress negative way against Turkish attitude. After Vietnam trouble, Congress attempted to reassert its role in Foreign Policy and public opinion. While negotiating embargo on Turkey, President Ford tried to prevent this decision and said :

“ One thing, however, should be made clear, aid to Turkey was not given within the context of the Cyprus problem. Neither was it a favour, it was based on the common perception that Turkey had a crucial importance for the security of the East Mediterranean, the United States and its allies. To halt military aid to Turkey might set an obstacle for to find a just and lasting solution in Cyprus. The US Administration concluded that to halt military aid to Turkey would create many adverse effects, and asked Congress to review its decision and authorize the Government to restart the aid relationship.”³¹⁷

Moreover, President Ford added that the broader thoughts and results of previous actions in the complex Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus problem. The United States military aid to old ally Turkey was cut off by Congress. This was went on embargo on military purchases by Turkey. America is trying its best effort to find equitable solutions to the problems which exist between Greece and Turkey. However the consequences of Congressional action has blocked the progress towards restoration, therefore our will to promote successful negotiations. America’s relations with Turkey are not simply a favour to Turkey : it is clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey stands on the border to Soviet Union and the gates of the Middle East. The security of southern Europe is protected by Turkish troops. President also convinced that immediate congressional action is needed to relax the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey if the US security interests in the Mediterranean are not to be jeopardized beyond repair.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Paul Watanabe, **Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy : The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo**,Pracyer Press, USA 1984, p. 100.

³¹⁷ Karagöz, Ibid, p. 125

³¹⁸ Watanabe, p. 109.

The problem can be categorized as follows : First it was not convenient to pressure only Turkey in this conceptual environment. The arms embargo didn't force Turks to compromise but caused the US to lose its influence on Turkey.

Second the embargo might close Turkey to Soviet Union instead Western bloc. The United States may lose its strategic military installations and get lost its strength in the region.

Third, losing Turkey in the region may affect strength combat capability, deterrence capacity.

Fourth, the effect of the Greek lobby in the Congress caused problems in American foreign policy such as the embargo on Turkey. That is, for Karagoz, some members of Congress who were outspoken in their support of the embargo did not know very much about the situation in Cyprus is a point that even congressional sources concede. In public debate, one member spoke of the "Greek island of Cyprus" One participant suggested that a majority of members of Congress failed to grasp that Cyprus was an independent republic and not a province of Greece."³¹⁹

Turkish military experts drew up some alternative plans for finding a solution. The United States had maintained approximately 20 military facilities in Turkish territory. Turkish authorities decided to assume control over all American military bases and suspend all American military operations despite the fact that Ford's offered a fifty million dollar grant of weapons in return for reopening the bases, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel rejected this offer. The congressional arms embargo halted military aid to Turkey but also banned the sale of military hardware on a commercial basis violated its common defense agreements with the United States to supply military equipment to its NATO allies.

5.2. The 12 September 1980 Coup Period (1980-1983)

By the end of the 1970s, the economic, domestic, and foreign policy issues had brought the problems. Following the military coup of 1980, relations with the US quickly got better. All tax changes were developed by the main events : politically, Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 and the changes in the Middle East. The same year, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and all these events gave Turkey more importance in the region.

³¹⁹ Karagoz, p. 127.

Economically, Turkey started to adopt 24 January 1980 economic program prepared by Turgut Ozal which provided the country with a capitalist free market and better relations with the United States. The domestic structure of the United States changed with new President Jimmy Carter who followed more liberal politics. He defended non-liberalism and the danger of Soviets was exaggerated previous power.³²⁰ More significantly Carter insisted on human right politics however his new doctrine was failure in foreign relations. The United States quitted to support Somoza guerillas in Nikaragua yet leftist groups took power and got rid of American residents (1979). Secondly, Iran was the biggest ally in Middle East of America. Ayatullah's revolution dramatically changed the structure. Moreover, America was shaken when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.³²¹

Disarmament was in vain for Carter because after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the congress didn't allow to sign SALT II to be signed with the Soviets. President Carter was criticized for being passive in Foreign Policy. From the economic aspect, the United States' growing rate stopped. Several reasons may be counted this kind of recession in economy. Japanese progress, Petroleum crisis, non-worker rates, Vietnam war. American lose in economy increased anxiety for example the US GDP in the world was % 40 in 1950 but decreased to % 20 in the 1970s.

Developments in the Middle East pushed Ankara closer to United States. First of all, the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 threatened the Gulf states and oil the trade. Also the Soviet invasion to Afganistan with 85000 soldiers was more dangerous for the security of Gulf oil because the border distance between the Soviet border and Gulf was just 500 kilometres.³²² Moreover, the Soviets took an interest in Yemen, Syria and Etiopya. In addition the Soviets suggested the provide of security for Basra gulf roads to European states.

Furthermore, Iran was under the control Islamists but there were also powerful leftist groups in the government. Tudeh party was one of the biggest communist party. It was considered possible that Soviet support Tudeh control Iran. During this period, Egypt made Camp David agreement with Israel but started to become isolated in the Arab world. The

³²⁰ The Previous government Nixon believed in Reel Politik.

³²¹ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Savunma Politikamızı İncelemek", **Türkiye'nin Savunması Dış Politika Enstitüsü**, Ankara 1987, p. 5.

³²² Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Basra Körfezi Güvenliği ve Doğu Anadolu'daki Havaalanları Tartışması", **Dış Politika** vol.10, (1983), p. 23.

Arab states were completely against the closer relations with Israel. The previous doctrine Nixon Doctrine had two pillars for the United States security in Middle East : One pillar is Saudi Arabia, the other is Iran. Iran was lost by revolution so that Washington needed to change its Middle Eastern Politics.

The Americans changed their politics in the Middle East. They strengthened 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and established Gulf Cooperation Council. They also cooperated with Pakistan and China. Turkey and Pakistan- China relations developed with correlation to the United States. Turkey was on the center of these politics. The Americans needed Turkey's help in politics. Northern Tier project was developed by the helps of Turks. Alexander Haig, NATO head Commander, tried to cooperate with Pakistan and China. Egypt's exclusive in Arab world was dissipated by the Turk and American helps. When Enver Sedat started peace talking with Israelis in Camp David, the Arab world reacted and protested Egypt. Turkey in this aspect figured an important ally role. As the movement of the United States became easier when it established Rapid Deployment Force. This subject importance for the relations of both Turkey and America.

Since 1960, Turkey experienced three military coups the last in 1980. These coups directly affected Turkish political life. The day of the 12 September 1980, Turkish General Military Staff, explained the reason of the operation as protect for Turkish lands that given rights to them interior Constitution laws.³²³

The bad state of the economy, politics and social life was met by Turkish people normal way. Through forward days the military rule showed a dictatorship policy for Turkish people. Hence this military rule bothered variety of people in the country. The previous Prime Minister and his government was rid of, Turkish Grand National Assembly was closed and military staff established a dictatorship management in Ankara. 1961 Constitution was banned instead a new secure and less democratic Constitution was adopted by new rulers.

All political parties were closed and the leaders were judged and put into jail. Their political activities were also banned in this period.

They arrested thousands of members of rightist and leftist groups. 517 of them were charged for execution trials. But only 57 people put to death. For 300 days the press was closed. 400 journalists were charged. Education and universities. 120 academics including

³²³ Yetkin, p. 170.

Murat Belge, Bulent Tanor, Emre Kongar. Council of Higher Education was created to control the universities.

12 September and American influence on the military operation has always been discussed in Turkish Public Opinion. It was mentioned by the first time Mehmet Ali Birand claimed in his book : “12 Eylül”. Head of American National Defense Council, Paul Henze told the day of 12 September to President : “Our boys have done it”. This was strong motivation that Americans indirectly affected the military intervention in 1980.³²⁴

The concerning NATO, the US and Turkish relations changed during the military rule. Turkey would not accept Greece’s return NATO’s military wing but following the military intervention 12 September 1980, Kenan Evren raised the old politics. First Turkey established good relations with Greece and let them into NATO again. Moreover, Greece’s joining to Black Sea Cooperation was done by Turkey permit. Furthermore, Turkey stopped to visa problem for Greek citizens. All attempts of Turkish government wasn’t welcomed by Greeks particularly after they had full membership in European Union system, Greeks tried all negatives positions against Turks in international politics. This stress in politics met them near to war in 1987.

The normalization of Turkish politics started with the November,6 1983 general elections. For three years, the country had been under Military rule was named Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (National Security Council). The Council was formed General Military leader Kenan Evren and he was also President of the country and the branches were shared by Military leaders. National Security Council had superior privileges that their laws even though they are against the Constitution laws, they have superiority. No Constitution law could be higher than their dictated laws.

The National Security Council prepared a new Constitution which was more secure and had less freedoms. New Constitution was voted referendum. % 90 percent of Turkish citizens said yes to new military prepared laws. Only Bingol province voted no with %90 against. The Multi-Party was re-introduced system under the new Constitution. The New comer parties were Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social Democrat Party), Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), Büyük Türkiye Partisi (Grand Turkey Party) and Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). However only three party could able to

³²⁴ İlhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, p. 38

access for new elections. Halk Party (People's Party), Motherland Party and Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (National Democracy Party).

The Motherland Party was the winner and the head of party, Turgut Ozal was a new comer to Turkish Political life. This was also a new period for Turkish Foreign Policy. Turgut Ozal and his foreign policy dominated a decade for the country. He strongly motivated and followed liberal economy system in other words free market. Turkey succeeded in opening outside world in the time of the Motherland Party rule. Prime Minister Ozal closed the previous politics : statuesque and statism instead privatization tried to be developed. On the other hand privatization didn't develop in a good way because the national companies weren't ready for a big change as well.

Turkey tried to adapted a globalization since the international big companies were founded in 1970s and developed 1980s. Turgut Ozal was successful for developing new investments, high ways, common use of electricity and telephone lines. However this period created inflation too. The open market had brought some advantages and disadvantages together.

Turkey at this time mostly affected by America's Green Line Politics and worked in with it parallel ways together. The Soviets on the other hand, had jeo strategic advantage when they invaded Afghanistan. However, gradually withdrew into their shell lost advantage of them completely.

Turkey's troubles in international relations increased with outstanding terror events which were organized by Armenian group (ASALA). Several Turkish diplomats were killed by this group. Additionally, PKK terrorist attacks signalled the beginning of Turkey's isolation in the international arena. The military regime caused many deaths and anti-democratic actions for the country. This anti-democracy wasn't cared by the US government because they had good relations with Turkish soldiers but the Europeans did care human rights and freedom much more than United States. On the other tool, 12 September deleted Turkish Public Opinion because of domination of military junta. The more freedom of Turkish public opinion between 1960-1980, increased foreign policy independence after 1980 with military power.³²⁵

Turgut Ozal strongly believed that : if it is dealt with commerce with any country, the political problems spontaneously is solved. However Turkey couldn't solve problems

³²⁵ Armaoğlu, **Türk Amerikan İlişkileri**, p. 265

neither with Greece nor Middle Eastern countries. Ozal's speeches about foreign policy broke some rules in traditional Turkish diplomacy. For instance, some ministers who weren't deal with Foreign Ministry interfered in Foreign relations. The sell drug to Iraq, one of the foreign policy issue, was managed by some interior ministers thanks to Ozal's support. In some speech, he said "Azaris are Şia sect so they are near to Iran" this mistake sentence was tried to be corrected but it was late. "Bulgaristan can send our nations even 1 millions of them." Then Ankara needed to close border for Bulgarian Turks". The former Foreign Minister Ali Bozer's resign was scandalous. While Turgut Ozal was negotiating Foreign relations with President Bush and US State Departments represantatives, Bozer wanted to join the negotiations but Ozal refused to allow to him enter the meeting hall. The next day Ali Bozer resigned his tasks.³²⁶

The United States tried to employ the Green Line Project which was aimed a tool of diplomacy. The closer Islamic countries used to be supported by United States of America against enemy countries. After the Second World War, America realized Islamic countries had problems against Soviet Russia so it was used against the Soviets. Moreover, the development of a nationalist and secular movement in Egypt targeted America as enemy so Islamism was supported by Americans in Middle East. American Foreign Policy focused the use of Islam at the end of 1970s. Fighting with socialism, the distinguished thinker and strategist Zbigniew Brezinski used to support and think Islam would be a firewall against Socialism. However America's supportive Islam was moderate Islam because Islamic movement in Iran was against American way of life. The targeted states the south part of Soviet states : Turkish states. These nations would be supported by American propaganda so the power of Soviets would be declined. Also leftist movements in Turkey would be controlled by moderate Islam. In other words against the red danger, they put the Green counter project. This was also solution for radical Islam states such as Saudi Arabia. The purpose of America was to create controllable Islam, use it against Socialist Soviet states. Transforming radical Islam into moderate Islam. If this is not possible,it would be necessary to use force and impact them. The economic structure of Turkey was planned to be adopted liberal market economy. The negative effects of the liberal economy were going to be impacted by force like 12 September military force.

³²⁶ İlhan Uzgel "Türk Dış Politikası", p. 29.

The effect of the United States on military junta 12 September 1980 was more controversial and dubious for Turkish public opinion. The correlation between soldiers and America wasn't seen as a direct relationship. In other words, America didn't directly plan and organize Turkish army in this period but the economic and political structure. The people who believed in America interfered in Turkish military intervention of 12 September 1980 have those points of proofs :

First America directly organizes coups in Iran (1953), Greece (1967), Chili (1971). Hence these events were under control of America, it is strongly believed in they handled Turkish military coup.

Additionally, the regional developments such as the Islamic revolution in Iran and Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets were necessary a stabil and trust country for the Americans in the Middle East. To further underscore the importance the United States and Turkey relations had developed in negative way through 1970s. By 1979 Turkey rejected all American U-2 flights, the planned Rapid Deployment Force wasn't permitted, Greece's return to NATO was vetoed, Turkey was one of the first countries who accept Islamic revolution in Iran.

All these rejections by developing Ankara were accepted after military coup in Turkey. The reaction of Washington : *“ A Power which was voted and governed by democratic ways has been relieved of duty by undemocratic way. Turkey has been in political terrorism and economic troubles. The United States of America with other NATO partners, are ready to help Turkey in order to bring democracy into country again. We also hope economic and political stabilization will be established soon”*³²⁷

Whether America directly or indirectly affected military coup in 1980, we do know better, the events developed for the use of Americans strategically. Kenan Evren after military intervention established National Security Council with four General Staff. The first day meeting Evren told that Turkey continues to agree all international pacts and agreements. Under military power, a temporary government was established. Bulent Ulusu who was former Navy Commander, was duty by Kenan Evren as Prime Minister. Turgut Ozal was appointed as Vice-Minister who was responsible Turkish economy. New government's foreign policy doctrine was described in its government programme :

³²⁷ **Ibid**, p. 39.

“Our government in foreign policy will go on the peaceful process which has been established under our National leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For this belief, we try to effort to establish with all sovereign states under respectful for their independence and rights, never interfere in their domestic policy, right equality. Our government will support Detente period and contribute peace and security in the region and the world as much as possible.

Turkey’s bilateral and multi-lateral security sitting agreements before our government are all still on the agenda. Our government is responsible for the necessity of all agreements.

In Particular, we will develop the relations with United States and other parties of NATO. Our government strongly believe that NATO is a significant security pact for the peace of world. Our relations with European Economic Community is shaped by Ankara agreement. Our priority to return parliamentary system so we will always be part of democratic system. We also give attention to relations Islamic countries which have established for centuries. Our feeling of brotherhood and friendship with these countries is quite strong.

We strongly support Palestinians in the Middle East. Our support for their rights will continue .

Our government wishes to have good relations with all neighborhood countries in the region. For this reason, our relations with the Soviet Union is also special for us.

Our rights in the Aegean Sea are so significant for Turkey’s survival. These our rights are determined and protected by the international laws. Turkish citizens in West Thrace and their rights are under protection of Turkey.

We support and demand two federative state systems in Cyprus. Previous agreements which were signed according to international law are acceptable for Turkey.

Our relations with Iran and Pakistan are also being cultivated. We are neighbours and so close geographical and historical ties each other.”³²⁸

Moreover, 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with Turkey, focusing on: (1) the impact of U.S. security assistance in meeting Turkey's needs; (2) the U.S. use of military facilities; and (3) proposed military construction. With acceptance of DECA agreement, Turkey lost its advantage. Turkey is countered with economic problems, including a lack of foreign exchange, a high debt burden, and balance of

³²⁸ Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu read Government Program on a meeting of National Security Council 27 September 1980.

payment difficulties. Turkey stays behind other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies militarily and must back on their economic and military assistance. DECA contains no specific level of commitment for U.S. assistance; it does include an umbrella agreement to provide military, economic, and social development, as well as agreements on defense, industrial cooperation, and installations. The United States has improved its military operations and interests in Turkey and, with minor exceptions between 1981-1985. Military rule could able to pay foreign debts with DECA helps. Visible government was under Bulent Ulusu but both foreign and domestic issues were under control of Kenan Evren and his staffs.³²⁹

Greece returned to NATO with the acceptance of Kenan Evren and General Rogers.

5.2.1. Rogers' Plan and Greece's return to NATO's Military Wing

Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus was a trauma for Greece so it left NATO's military wing. This changing situation also affected the United States and Turkey relations. The control of territorial waters in Aegean and Mediterranean Seas in 1957 was given to Greece by the common agreements of NATO parties. Thereupon, Comland Southeast in Izmir and Comsix Ataf in Aegean sea was set up. There wasn't any serious problem between Turkey and Greece therefore Ankara accepted Greece's advantage in the region. When the Greece withdrew from NATO's military wing, all privilege of Greece was given to Turkey instead. The lose of command privilege in Aegean sea, Greece demanded to return NATO's military wing two years later (1976). However Ankara laid down as a condition of regulating of the command privilege in the Aegean sea.

This subject wasn't on NATO's agenda because of the political stabilization of the world. However with the changing situation in Afghanistan and Iran, the European states began to anxious Greece to be outside security system. They preferred Greece to be secure under NATO umbrella. Aftermath 1978, the priorities for Greece's return to pact started for European states and the United States of America. NATO head of SACEUR, Alexander

³²⁹ Safa Atalay, "ABD Güvenlik Yardımı", *Avrasya Dosyası*, (Autumn 1994), p. 238.

Haig set about two attempts for Ecevit and Demirel yet both leaders rejected requests for returning Greece into NATO.

In the meantime, opposition leader, Andreas Papandreu, prior to elections was talking in public very criticized returning NATO. If he won the elections, he would remove all components of the Greece from NATO and West partnership. Hence, before elections, Greece needed to be returned to NATO.³³⁰

After 12 September, NATO authorities accelerated the process, on 6 October (one month later from military intervention), the formal authorities of US department started talkins with Kenan Evren to solve Greeks' return to NATO. Finally on 17 October 1980, US General head Roger came to Ankara and talked with Turkish General Evren. This event was surprising and new for diplomacy because a political dispute had been solved by two military men. Kenan Evren never informed civil government at that time period. General Roger told that there was going to be election in Greece within 6 months. If they didn't help and the Socialists came to power, it would be possible to lose the Greeks. Evren's fear for the future that possible Greeks would turn this advance. Roger promised a military oak. Cumhuriyet gives details about Rogers' visit Ankara.³³¹ Three days later, NATO security council urgently gathered a meeting to take the Greeks back to NATO military power. Evren's mistake has clearly seen after a while that the rights of Turkey which it already took power in Aegean sea, Turkey lost again this power in the Aegean sea. One more thing that it is needed to emphasis that the civil politicians, Demirel and Ecevit had behaved more careful for the security but military man Kenan Evren's behaviour was more unsecure. Kenan Evren in his memoirs came up with Turkey was profitable with this agreement. For him, Turkey's prestige was more than previous times.³³²

³³⁰ Hikmet Erdoğan, **Avrupa'nın Geleceğinde Türkiye'nin Önemi ve NATO İttifakı**, IQ Kültür Sanat Press, İstanbul 2004, p. 115

³³¹ Cumhuriyet, 18 September 1980.

³³² Kenan Evren, **Kenan Evren'in Anıları**, Milliyet press, Vol. II. , İstanbul 1991, p. 98.

5.2.2. The Rapid Deployment Force – NATO and TURKEY

The issue of the Rapid Deployment Force was one of the biggest problems for Ankara. The United States began to install bases in Kenya, Oman and Somalia to develop the Rapid Deployment Force³³³

However these three countries were far to Gulf and their capabilities for infrastructure were insufficient. For this reason, the US demanded installing Rapid Deployment Force in Turkish lands. By the time 12 September 1980, Demirel government rejected this kind of organization. After military intervention 1980, Washington delivered their demands to Haluk Bayulken, National Defense Minister, but he added the defense of Gulf states belongs to Gulf states” Also , Ilter Turkmen, Foreign Minister, said the parallel words.³³⁴ Though there were government and its staff, the last decision was taken by Kenan Evren , the Americans went to Evren and asked the Rapid Deployment Force in Turkish lands. Evren even if it was tolerable, he said he was going to permit this if all NATO parties decided to protect Gulf states. Turkey can’t be only a state which goes to war in the Middle East.³³⁵

In this political situation, the American strategists took attention in Turkey. They tried to effort persuade Turkish policy makers and military authorities. The head of Central Information Agency (CIA) came to country first time and also strategist Albert Wohlstetter and National Security Guard member Paul Henze gave the serial conferences in Turkey. They used to give briefing Turkey’s regional role and Soviet Union’s threat plans. The boost of Armenian terror against Turkish diplomats, for them, was a part of handle of Soviets that they wish to cut Eastern Anatolia regions off from Turkish lands. The new military power in Turkey was not reluctant to permit Rapid Deployment Force because Turkey was still under influence of leftist propaganda. They could show the military power

³³³ Throughout the 1970's, American attention gradually focused on the Persian Gulf. The policy shifted towards a willingness to use military force in the area "as a diplomatic signal, if not yet as a full-blooded counter-intervention force" and a gradual expansion of facilities. However, the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the US / Soviet confrontation and the oil embargo of 1974 which led to an American warning "that American military intervention to protect vital oil supplies"

The first force under this command was established in Florida.(1979) Their numbers were 200 thousand men. Reagan went forward and increased the number 300 thousand. In 1981, America binded this force under NATO SACEUR command control. However all attempts for defending Gulf states were in vain because Turkey and other countries didn't give enough attention.

³³⁴ Ufuk Güldemir, **Çevik Kuvvetin Gölgesinde**, Tekin Press, İstanbul 1987, p. 134.

³³⁵ Uzgel, p. 46.

under effect of Hegemonic powers. Turkish leaders also didn't know enough information about this kind deployment force. What will they act ? will they act in the clash of Israel-Arab war ?. If they will use Turkish bases, what will Arabs do ? Turkey's position would negatively be affected from this situation. Moreover, Turkey used to develop economic relations with Iran, Iraq and Libya. If the Rapid Deployment Force had established, they would have reacted Turkey.

Furthermore, this force aimed to protect Gulf states, even though Gulf countries weren't reluctant to permit these force to operate in the Gulf.

Finally, Turkey let limited use of Turkish infrastructure and bases for the sake of Rapid Deployment Force.

5.2.3. NATO and the Memorandum of Understanding

At the beginning of the 1980s, neocons Richard Perle and Albert Wohlstetter talked about security danger in the place of Turkey's Eastern regions. They proved this by citing the number of Soviet troops in the Caucasian border.

The Soviets had 19 divisions in Caucasia yet the Turks had got only 8 divisions so that the United States thought the Eastern regions of Turkey needed to be strengthened. In this framework, Caspar Weinberger, the US Secretary of Defense came to Ankara for a formal visit and discussed the defense necessities Brussels and signed Memorandum of Understanding. Ten military airports would be modernized and two new airports in Muş and Batman would be built.

One year later, Milliyet revealed gives some details about this agreement : It was bound with NATO framework. If it is necessary to use out of border areas, Turkish land can't be used for this purposes. Any arms and military equipments could be exported with permission of Turkey. If Turkish bases needed for operation use, Turkey's permit are necessary to be taken. The commander of bases will be Turkish Generals. The agreement will continue for ten years. And if there were no objection, it would be extended every year.³³⁶

Both in public opinion and official explanations made anxious how these operations will be done. The operations, in other words, will be under control of NATO headquarters so

³³⁶ Milliyet, 26 April 1983.

that it was necessary all members' permit in any out of area operation. Turkish officials insisted that this agreement was signed under NATO umbrella but the United States would pay 200 million dollar for this investments directly and the bases would be used by America not by NATO states. Turkey had some priviledge right in the agreements such as they couldn't able to operate without Turkey's permit. However, their cargo planes could land and departure in Turkish bases. The distance between Gulf and Turkish lands are near so the United States had advantage of using these aircrafts. In the 1991 Gulf War, US planes used Incirlik base and bunkered in Mus and Batman airports to operate Iraq lands. Aftermath Military junta in 1980, the security was provided, Greece's return to NATO military wing, the foundation of Rapid Deployment Force, the strenghten of Northern Tier and cooperation with Pakistan.

5.2.4. The Limni Issue – NATO – Greek and Turkey Disagreements

The issue of Limni was a dilemma for the NATO in the 1980s. The problem came to exist when the Greeks demanded that Limni Island would be fortified NATO however previous agreements disallowed storing armament in this Island. Hence Turkey opposed the armament in the Island. Naturally Turkey expected NATO headquarters to go along with it.

NATO thought the Island might be equipped with weapon against the Soviet threat so they tried Turkish government persuade in this context. Turkish government was told to be comprehensive but Ankara insisted on a solution without armament and if the issue was on the NATO agenda, Turkey continued to keep resistance.³³⁷

NATO General Secretary Lord Carrington made official statement and told NATO should be neutral on the Limni Issue (29 November 1984). December 1984, Limni Issue was underlined on the agenda again in NATO Defense Organization Meeting.(Brussels). The countries reports were published in the conference except two countries :Greece and Turkey. Both countries military forces weren't shown in the chapters that's reason to Limni Issue. Greece protested action drill after meeting yet Turkey accepted to join action

³³⁷ Ellen Laipson, **US interest in the Eastern Mediterreanean Turkey Greece and Cyprus**, CRS Report for the Sub-Comm. Press, Washington, 1983, p. 25.

drills. The issue changed dimension when the Greeks didn't accept nuclear trials of NATO offer if the Limni Issue wouldn't be solved in favor of Greek state. Again the NATO parties made pressure Turkey to solve Limni Issue instead of the Greeks. NATO General Secretary Harrington brought another solution that Limni issue would never be issued in NATO documents.

For a while the Greeks showed its forces as a part of NATO forces in Limni Island.(1984) Turkey reacted that this situation wasn't acceptable by previously signed documents as they included the Island would be excluded any weapon system.

The Americans stopped insisting to solve the problem under NATO. They signed directly with Greeks a document which included use of Limni Island in any surprise attack by the enemy. Turkey's veto right was taken case of in another way.

5.2.5. The Mersin Crisis and the modernization of the Turkish Army in the 1980s.

During the 1980s, the reduction in conventional weapons was on the agenda of both sides. The Warsaw Pact (23 countries) and NATO made principal agreement. The détente period in international politics went the states this kind of necessity. Turkey demanded that Mersin and the South Eastern part of Turkey would be excluded from reduction because these regions were under threat. The Soviets agreed Turkey's this demand and other NATO countries also accepted this demand.

However, the Greeks in 1989, rejected the project which was prepared by 16 countries. The Greek government claimed that Mersin was near Cyprus and any possible attack against Turkey would use this port against Cyprus Greeks. The United States was negotiating about use of bases in Greek lands, but the Greeks was using Mersin crisis as a tool in negotiating. The Americans directly contacted with Turgut Ozal to withdraw the Mersin insistence on Conventional weapons. However this time Ozal wasn't willingly to accept American offer. The issue was later solved by smart diplomatic writing in the documents. They wrote a line passing from Gozne (near Mersin). The name of Mersin was never mentioned in the documents. Final statement was added this issue was going to be solved by following parties in the future. The Greeks also signed a paper which

emphasized America will help any attack on Greeks in Mediterranean region. Turkey reacted this paper and protested it diplomatically. The Americans promised this is not an agreement against Turkey. The NATO parties has security guarantee thanks to pact why Greeks and Americans signed this kind of paper wasn't clearly understood at that time.

The modernization in Turkish army was on the subject after 1950's when Turkey joined the NATO in 1952. The 1980s, this subject was again on the agenda. Most workings in modernization were held by American and NATO help. During the cold war years the Americans supported a powerful Turkish army Both country had the same wills in the war conditions. A research which was held by Pentagon showed that 18 billion dollars were needed for the Turkish army modernization for the next decade.³³⁸

Hence, first of all, this expense had to be paid by NATO and America if they wanted a stronger NATO partner in the region. Ankara demanded this help from its partners in NATO.

Two option were seen as possible for the Turkish army's modernization : first the surplus Germany and American weapons donated to the Turks by or be put on credit. The Second option, was for the Turks to form their own National Defense production. But this option was never strongly believed by Americans and Turks. In 1980s, Turkey was one of the highest-spending on weaponry. From 1980 to 1990, Turkey had the fifth-largest defense budget. Defense spending during the 1980s amounted to 5 % of its GDP. This rate was the third range after United States and Greece. The nature of Turkish economy had been effected negative way by these expenses for military defenses.

The US embargo from 1975 to 1978 was a turning point for Turkey. Turkish leaders realized they had to have a National Defense industry. Dependence on foreign countries for weaponry was a big threat for defending the country. Hence they looked for to form trials for National Defense industry. Both Cyprus and Kurdish problem and other threats were always justifications for having a National Defense industry. The arms spending had also put the country in currency crisis if the Turks were able to succeed in having Turkish weapon, the currency incomes would increase. Besides, the Turks could acquire currency if they could sell their weapons.

The attempts at national weaponry industry goes back to 1930s when first war plane factory was opened in Kayseri. Aftermath 1945, Machinery Chemistry Factory was

³³⁸ İlhan Uzgöl, p. 77.

established but it was given less attention to factory after NATO membership. The American arms embargo from 1975 to 1978 directed Turkish government to decide to have a National weapons program but domestic political chaos prevented its progression. During military power after 1980, this subject was discussed and in 1983 Defense Controlling Directorship was established under National Defense Ministry. This Directorship was transformed later to Industry Developing Department. Turkey tried to find financial aids to develop its own national industry so that they established some foundations connected to Turkish General Army. Ground, Naval and Air defenses were thus satisfied by developing foundation system. In this time period, the most successful project was F-16 war plane production. The purpose of the project gaining and developing Turkish war plane technology. Turkish War Plane Industry Company was trying some workings about this project since 1973. In 1984, Turkish War Plane Industry Company and General Dynamics Company(the US company) signed cooperation The % 51 share belonged to Turkey and % 49 shares went to American company. Moreover the production of plane motor was going to be handled by General Electrics and Tusaş Motor Industry. The works for F-16 planes were successful that they produced 156 planes till 1995. The biggest problem for Turkish defense technology was to produce advanced technological parts of the plane. Turkey needed to have advanced technological equipment from the United States. In this point, it was being asked whether it was national or not. Turkey started to produce F-16 planes but critical parts of plane were imported from the United States. Electronic Communication System, for instance, of the F-16 plane was imported from American defense industry. Another problem for the plane production was its cost. Turkey used to produce one F-16 plane 25 million dollars yet America did the same plane 17 million dollars. Advanced technological planes were costed much more 25 million dollars for the country. In spite of all, the produce of F-16 planes knowledged for the Turks for the future technological developments.

US financial aids to Turkey during the 1980s was also significant in developing the Turkish army. The SEIA agreement signed with America allowed the United States to continue to use 12 bases on Turkish territory.³³⁹ At the same time 13 bases were under Turkey's control. The Carter administration gave more promises to support Turkish defense budget. The US financial help to Turkey reached 715 million dollars in 1984.

³³⁹ İhsan Dağı, **Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi**, Liberte Press, Ankara 2001, p. 105.

When the cold war became less, the US financial help decreased to 526 million dollars. Turkey after Israel and Egypt was the third country which took US support in armament technology. Thanks to the SEIA agreement, Turkey developed its own national defense industry. In 1985 the relations with the United States dropped off because Greek and Armenian lobbies were working against financial helps. Turkey signed SEIA second chapter in 1985 however the US congress decayed 914 million dollar help to 715 million dollars. The same year Armenian lobbies demanded 1915 year official mourning year in the congress. In contrast with President Evren canceled his visit to America and Turkish government restricted use of Incirlik air base at the same time.

Turgut Ozal also aimed to develop the private sector gun industry. He invited foreign investment into the country and wished them to open Weapon factories in Turkey. The administration of the United States supported Turkish government's demand principally. On the other hand the US companies didn't trust political stabilization in Turkey and they wanted eight year guarantee for investment. If Ozal government declined, their investment also needed to continue with other Turkish governments.

Turkish leading companies such as Koc, Tekfen, Alarko, Profilo, and Nurol were all ready for this kind of cooperation and investments. European Gun produced companies took attention for this calling. The negotiations for instance, started between French company Aesrospatial and Turkish government. Following this visit, an English company visited and started talkings.

Ozal's preference for the private sector in arms technology wasn't successful at all. The high costs of this technology were one of the biggest problem for companies. The high budget expenses were financed by ASELSAN and MKE state institutions.

During the 1980s, the effect of United States in the production Gun technology was the most. This shows that Turkish-American relations developed well in this period. Political, economic and military cooperation specifically the Cyprus issue, Turkish-Greek relations, Armenian Congress decisions, the Kurdish issue were differentiated between two powers. They tried to take concessions each other. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan bothered both countries and made closer. Definitely it would be wrong to evaluate relations one point's view. Turkey in Turgut Ozal government didn't give in American hegemony. The Foreign Policy developed in different lane in some periods. Out of Area issue, Rapid Deployment Force subject for instance couldn't able to

solved by American demand. Also additional nuclear installation bases weren't let by the Turks. A solution for Cyprus wasn't handled by Americans. Naturally the effect of Turkish public opinion and the possible loss of Turkish ally. Hence mutual protection for both countries developed relations in 1980s. Turkey's economic development in half decade stopped so that foreign debts increased and made trouble for Turkish economy. This enhanced American power against Turkey.

The US changing policy showed itself in Cyprus issue that they didn't support Turkey in this issue but they support the Greeks much more than Turks. Armenian decisions in congress weren't prevented by American government. Kurdish and human rights issues were more underlined by American statesmen. The US financial and military helps were lessened from year to year in 1980's. The doubts for American support to Turkey remained on the agenda after the decline of Soviet rule in 1989.

5.2.6. The Changes in NATO Defense Concepts in the 1980s and Turkey's Foreign Policy

Turkey's close relations with the United States in 1980's affected its position inside the NATO. If any strategic issues were on the agenda, American and Turkish officials solved the problem together. They didn't go and bring the issue to NATO headquarters meetings. General Rogers for instance, solved the big issue of Greece's return to NATO with General Kenan Evren. Neither were civilian politicians nor diplomats Moreover they didn't inform NATO members. Although relations improved in Prime Minister Turgut Ozal period, there were some disagreements with NATO members. Turkey's priorities and NATO's defense policies clashed some times.

In this period, relations with NATO, there were new strategies and new approaches in NATO. There were nuclear arms demands from Turkey and the issues in the Aegean sea and Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. NATO's use for Turkish security. All these subjects were tried to be underlined in this time period. NATO as an international security organization would take decision with all members. Turkey sometimes uses this advantage sometimes can't use. For example Turkey delayed Greece's return to NATO until 1980. Definitely, Turkey couldn't able to use this tool in the pact. The United States and other

parties in the pact had more card such as economic and military power. Their cards were more effective in the political arena.

In the 1980s, the changes in the international system, technological changes, the new foreign policy of Ronald Reagan, the new developments of Soviet deployment of its rocket missiles were all some needs for changing NATO strategies.

In the first half decade of 1980's, the Soviet superiority on conventional guns on the other side NATO's superiority on nuclear power lost its significance. Moreover, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and incremental power in Mediterranean sea. These reasons worried about security between two axis powers. However the United States officials needed to have more security expenses, the European states were against the armament and particularly to nuclear weapon technology. The Americans developed the neutron bomb but never informed the European parties. Hence they were against all armament developments as the more dangerous attacks would happen in the European lands. The Western world started a new relations as called "decoupling" which means to quit all relations.

The missile system in Europe was weak compared to the Soviet system it was thought that more powerful missile system needed to be installed.

The United States decided to enlarge Flexible Response Strategy as the planned new strategy to responded to a counter Soviet attack with conventional weapons. General Rogers came up with the "Airland Battle 2000 doctrine. It provided for a deep war which meant the delay war as much as late. For Europeans, this strategy was a more threat as the Soviets would possibly move their troops in the Western lands. Roger's plan "Follow on Forces Attack" the American conventional forces wipe out the Soviet forces in-place.

Later times these new approaches were decided under NATO command. This new strategy was accepted by European partners but wasn't pleased at all.

This new strategy was a disaster for Turkey since it was a wing state that Thrace is straight land easy to move for enemies. This meant Istanbul and straits would directly in danger. The Black Sea and Eastern regions of Turkey are huge and difficult to defend any possible attacks.

To succeed in this kind of war, Turkey needed more conventional Weapons however in the 1970s, Turkey was embargoed by NATO members because of Cyprus issue. During 1980s, Turkey's expectations weren't satisfied by NATO parties.

Moreover, Turkey's second important issue was the settlement of nuclear weapons. The United States withdrew its ballistic missiles from European territory in 1983. Instead Turkish territory was seen as a new place for long-ranged missiles by American planners, Turkish officials didn't like this new project. Turkey had followed statuesque since 1970s in its territory. The Soviet reaction to new long-ranged missiles for Turkey would be so dangerous attempt. The Soviet threat would be much more than before. Moreover, Turgut Ozal government had some economical agreements such as natural gas import and in return agricultural goods export exchange. Some construction commercial activities were signed between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Ankara didn't want to lose this kind of commercial relations.

One more reason that Turkey didn't want to be a nuclear power the nuclear war was possible to be in the middle of Turkish lands. If Turkey had accepted to be nuclear power, NATO members wouldn't have cared Turkey's conventional needs anymore.

Another discussion arose when General Roger made a statement in 1987 (Ankara) stating that : "*I am not sure that European states would protect Anatolian lands if the Soviets attacked.*"³⁴⁰ A report was presented to President Reagan parallel to Roger's statement that some European states wouldn't volunteer to defend Turkish territory in a war. All these statements were reacted by Turkish Public Opinion. In general, the more Flexible Response strategy, the more modernization in the army was needed for Turkey. However the required attempt in modernization wasn't seen in the state.

³⁴⁰ Hurriyet , 29 November 1987

CONCLUSION

The defense strategies of NATO and Turkish foreign policy do not have a direct correlation in the historical context. However, during my research of this dissertation, I have observed indirect relations between the two. Turkey's first years in the organization passed with its adaptation to the Massive retaliation strategy. Turkish policy makers fully supported the American alliance and NATO during this period. By 1957, it had been seven years of the Democrat Party in government and both the President and other politicians were conducting public meetings to express what they had done in those seven years. Celal Bayar announced in Taksim : *"We are working in our country as Americans do. We are hopeful that this holy state will be a small America of fifty million population 30 years later."* Turkey's populist policy has affected Turkish Foreign Policy for a long time so state's behavior has been shaped by Western alliance system.

The relations between Turkey and NATO is problematic on the subject of nuclear issue. The US fully accepted the nuclear war strategy against the Soviets. On the other side both Turkey and European countries had no nuclear technology. Any possible war would cause mass of disasters in European and Turkish lands. Washington was confident as it had better technology than the Soviets' yet this superiority ended when the Soviets launched long-range missile in 1957. It was the first artificial Earth satellite which was easy to launch nuclear warhead through 5 miles. Despite the US nuclear deterrence, it had also several disadvantages. First, the USSR's ballistic missile capacity could reach all over the world so NATO's nuclear deterrence decreased over the Soviet rule.

Eventually, Turkey's former administrators behaved in parallel with NATO and America in the 1950's. However, this policy was seen as serving imperialism by Arab states. Having realized this problem, Turkey tried to restore its relations with Arab states in the 1960's Turkish and US statesmen tried to reinforce Turkish-NATO relations in the détente period but some events prevented these efforts in the 1960's. Issues such as the Cyprus crisis, Johnson letter, the multilateral Force, the Harmel Report and the Flexible Response Strategy were the main issues that the Turkish governments found difficult to solve. Moreover, NATO, keeps the West bloc together among its members against political, military and ideological Soviet threats.

In conclusion concerning Turkish-NATO relations we see that Turkey's position, since the beginning, has always been climax for the organization. During the first 10 years of membership, after ending one-party rule system, the DP had some difficulties to adopt democratic way of life. Both foreign and domestic politics were difficult for the Democrats. They received pressure from University teachers, soldiers, intellectuals, and journalists. This finally toppled the elected government with a military coup in 1960.

Thus, Turkey was criticized by non-aligned countries as being the slave of America and NATO for the first ten years.

The Republican Party for the sake of National interest stopped its protest against sending Turkish soldiers to Korea as a show of political unity. Afterwards, several Turkish soldiers died in the war and this has been remembered as a black page for the Democrats.

The Democrats assessed Turkish foreign policy in terms of security issues. Thus, foreign policy was tied to NATO's protection. Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East was provided by the way of NATO and American policy. It is necessary to see Turkey's joining the Bagdad Pact from this viewpoint. In addition, the Menderes government did not support some anti-Western Arab states. Arab states' relations with the Soviets were seen as a Communist threat to the region. Moreover, Algeria's independence war against France was not supported by Turkey as France was a member of NATO.

In the 1960s, the Flexible Response Strategy affected Turkish Foreign Policy. On the other hand, developments in the political arena left Ankara isolated. Turkish Policy makers were under criticism as Turkey became isolated because of NATO effect. In this period, the Cyprus crisis damaged the relations with the United States, too. Turkey was preparing military operation on the island yet President Lyndon Johnson wrote an informal letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, saying NATO had not had a chance to think of protecting Turkey if it was attacked by the Soviets. Moreover, if Turkey attacked the island, Turkey could not use the weapons which were taken from NATO and the US.

In the 1970s, there was a relaxation of the Flexible Response Strategy in NATO but Turkey had domestic political troubles. The military intervention of 1971 ended political activities in democratic way. Nihat Erim's temporary government did not make things better. The Republican People's Party won the 1973 elections but had to enter a coalition with conservatives. Their biggest act was the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Afterwards, the US senate approved military an embargo (1975) It was the first time a

NATO member was being embargoed by a NATO state. However Ankara never withdrew from NATO. Even though there were serious discussions about it, Turkish policy makers never think to give up NATO membership.

The end of 1970s saw the economic, domestic, and foreign policy problems. Following the military coup 1980, the relations with US quickly got better. All tax changes were spunned by the main events : Politically, Iran Islamic revolution in 1979 and the changes in Middle East. The same year, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. A year later Turkish military intervention changed the whole Middle Eastern.

NATO has expanded its power during both cold war and later. Its aims, operations, and responsibilities have always been widened from day to day. The reason for its sustainability is the common will of its members. Also the support of a super power like the United States has kept the organization together. America has always been strongly supported the pact financially and politically. Furthermore, the organization has created strong tie in military area. For example the Turkish army has successfully used NATO criterias and modernized the army thanks to NATO's aid. For these reasons, NATO has always developed and expanded its power although there have been crises among its members. However these crises have always led NATO to reorganize and renew itself. The biggest success of NATO was its victory for the Warsaw pact. It is inevitable to accept the success of declining Soviet Empire. If it is evaluated that cold war is a conflict between West and East. It is easy to say West side is the winner thanks to NATO. It has also contributed its development and power for organization. European countries haven't only been protected from Soviet threat but they have also been strengthened in economically, technologically and militarily areas. Turkey hasn't developed itself as Europeans did. I may count several reasons for this situation for Turkey but the most important reason has been domestic political issues in the country. There have been four military coups in Turkey. Also political instability has its development. NATO and American aid to Turkey has not proper by Turkish governments.

NATO has experienced several crises among its members since its inception in 1949. The roots of these crises have been two different camps within the pact. The first group is led by France, the other one is led by the United States and the pro-Atlantic group. These two groups have been different wills and demands within NATO. The position of organization, roles, political coalitions, military aids are all controversial and problematic. The

background of crisis are the defense of European states in war, the American helps, freedom of foreign relations and how America would protect Europe against the Soviet Union.

Historically, there have had serious crisis within the organization : 1955-1956;1965-1967-;1979-1980 and after 1990 (the decline of the Soviets). The first 1955-56 crisis has two dimensional problems : one was the armament of Germany. The Americans thought that the Germans needed to have military sufficient power against the Soviet Union. However, the French government was still afraid of German affair because of previous disaster wars with them. There were two big wars : First and Second World Wars and two states demolished each other tragically. For French people, the German threat was still alive. The French government demanded the Germans armament in the international security organization. For this purpose, a meeting was convened in 1952 between France, Germany, Netherland, Brussels, and Belgium. They signed European Defense Communication agreement. This paper was protested by pro-De-Gaulle forces in National Assembly(1954). The movement of De-Gaullism started with this action. Another crisis within the pact was the support of French and British to Israel during the Suez war. The United States was disturbed by the war between Israel and the Arabs because the rise of nationalism in Middle East and American wills were in conflict. Washington tried to mend relations with Egyptians and other nations. Hence a long war did not benefit American interests. Washington warned the French and British to stop their support for Israel. De-Gaulle thought the wishes of the United States and Europe were not the same so European states needed to strengthen their military power. For this purpose, France pioneered the foundation of the European Economic Society and EURO ATOM. They tried to form both economic and nuclear power on the continent. The anti-US movement was directed by De-Gaulle and his followers. He was chosen President in 1958. He aimed to keep relations with NATO at minimum level so, the French authority didn't trust the American protect in European defense. The Europe had to exclude the Unites States protect its own power. Moreover, the special relationship of Britain with America bothered De-Gaulle. He wanted Britain to be outside of the European Concert. For this reason, France vetoed the British application to the European Economic Community twice.

Furthermore the settlement of Polaris missiles in Europe was vetoed by French rule. In addition, Gaulle started negotiations with Soviets and believed that if the close relations

were able to be established with Eastern nations, they could exclude American hegemony. In 1966, France declared to leave NATO's military wing and after this no French soldier was sent under NATO auspices. France also demanded all American bases in French lands removed. This kind of crisis was calmed down with Harmel report.

NATO in 1970s had another crisis when it tried to place nuclear missiles in Europe. Public opinion was against American use of nuclear power in their lands. Civil society groups protested the Americans in the city centers but protests affected the relations a little way. After the end of cold war when the Soviets decline, the new discussion has been around a new European army. It has been planned to form an independent army with support of European states : Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg. On the other side, America supported to form European army under NATO pact. The Europeans demanded an autonomy army in Europe. Following September 11 events, the US operations against Afghanistan and Iraq were opposed by its European partners. Particularly Iraq operation of the United States and British army was criticized by German and French rulers. The Public discussions in Turkey and in the assembly were high in 2003. The assembly didn't let the American army use Turkish territory for logistical purposes. It was determined that NATO's foundation on common defense is difficult to explain with samples. Hence NATO had never done any operation during Cold War times. NATO's army had never fought with Soviet army and Warsaw countries. NATO's priority in Euro-Atlantic region was to develop common knowledge in the political arena. The parties in the pact have cooperated militarily, economically and in the defense area. Except the clash between Greece and Turkey, there have been no clashes between NATO states. The Common projects have become closer and their interdependence increased. The Integrated military structure is the core of this structure. The advantage of this framework is superior states like America and Britain. The smaller states have subordinated themselves. NATO's one advantage is to satisfy the wishes of all its all members. In other words, NATO is acting in the name of its members. The main subjects are related to Eastern European countries, disarmament, and security operations with respect to the regional and international system.

Since the end of the cold war period NATO has found a different way to adapt itself to a new world. It is necessary to comprehend the new security concept of the organization. Globalisation has brought new problems: the protection of natural resources; environment, population, individual rights, health, technological issues, and drug marketing.

In this context, its military concept has changed with these new issues. In the traditional military concept, armed forces had to protect peace but in new period, beyond protection of peace, they have to establish new peaceful world. For instance, natural disasters, the military might able to help to nations. The states and international institutions have begun to develop new threat description. NATO, with this changing concept, has brought new descriptions to adopt itself to the security environment : struggle against terrorism, protect to peace, illegal immigrants, natural disasters and such as new threats were accepted by new NATO strategy.

During the Cold War, NATO had one enemy : the Soviet and Warsaw Pact and it was easy to develop new strategies against this kind of enemy. However, the end of cold war has also removed this old enemy, As a result, NATO has faced some problems in this new order such as:

- its legitimacy has been questioned after the wiping out of its raison d'être (decline of the Soviets),
- the issues of political, economical, military which were rooted the enlarging problems.
- Out of Area issue,
- issues within NATO parties (France and Germany demands about security of Europe),
- issues with out of NATO members particularly the problems with Soviet states,
- new threats,

NATO, after the Cold War has followed new changes in order to wipe out the above issues and continue its presence. As such, its new strategy has made NATO into a global security organization instead of a regional one. The analysis of NATO can be conducted by the means of its bilateral agreements, strategic concepts, and new military operations. The new NATO strategic concept was declared in 1991 at its Rome summit. It was called "New Strategic Concept". The transformation and its conditions are described in the document. It is underlined that there is no threat to the center but threat for political, economic, and social instabilities, nationalist and ethnic conflicts and threat of nuclear weapons. The Flexible Response Strategy which was used till the end of 1980s was replaced by the Reduced Forward Presence doctrine. No longer serious threat in the center, they designed more flexible and dynamic forces inside NATO headquarters.

They have accepted pre-emptive diplomacy Crisis management concepts. It has also been underlined that NATO can cooperate with other organisations : the United Nations, AGİK

and European Union. The new NATO has been on three dimensions : Cooperation, Dialogue, and defense concepts.

At the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO accepted the European Union's demand on for more powerful defense. It was also emphasized that NATO was against any decoupling, duplication and discrimination. It decided to form a Joint Combined Task Force. It aims to increase to use this force in out of NATO areas in peaceful wars. Also they aimed to rise of personel power in military headquarters. Moreover, NATO has developed new program for those states which fear the Russian threat, the Partnership for Peace. It purposed is military cooperation with non-NATO members but it is also to protect their peace and security. The Partnership for Peace project continued to follow dialogue and cooperation target. High defense in military organization in Europe, stability, the decrease of threats against peace, more democracy joined countries in the program and most significantly prepared these members to North Atlantic Pact process. The target of this Peace program has reached out its purpose. Not only Partnership for Peace was tried but also for those countries : Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel were put in Mediterranean Dialog Cooperation. Jordan in 1995, Algeria in 2000 were accepted to join in the cooperation. When terrorism increased in North African regions in 1994 NATO drew a new strategy to struggle terrorism in the continent. The basic aim was to teach mutually understanding and wipe out misunderstanding among problematic countries.

One more clear proof of Mediterranean Cooperation that NATO expanded its area not only to Atlantic regions but also out of the Atlantic region. Thus, the transformation to a global organization has been completed with new additions.

In 1997, additional steps were taken by Atlantic Pact to form the Europe-Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO-Russia Permanent Cooperation Council, NATO and Ukraine Commission. Russia has been bothered by the enlargement project of the pact in the backyard of old Soviet Empire. With new projects and agreements with Russia, these sources of irritation has been minimized. On the Fiftieth anniversary of its foundation, NATO gathered Washington summit which made several subjects more clear for the next decade. The second strategic concept has been accepted in this summit. Its criterias are shown in the context :

- NATO will stay for the previous doctrine Collective Security Defense organization.
- Transatlantic connections will be protected.

- article 5 of the foundation agreement will be protected and new tasks will be followed to continue in new tasks.

- The struggle against terrorism and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- More flexible and mobility in Europe-Atlantic regions.

- NATO cooperation with other international security organizations.

As it is obviously seen the out of area issue began to be solved with these steps. These steps allowed the organization to maintain global security. The September 11 event was a turning point for the organization that for the first time NATO involved article five. The international terror attacks were accepted to all members of the pact. Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded by American other by NATO members. Turkey also sent its troops in within the organization. Not only America had a high interest about terror events but also other 19 NATO parties declared common paper to cooperate with the United States.

- Cooperation in intelligence

- Struggle against terrorism

- More security in the territory of NATO members

- To provide necessity military equipment

- Security in Air Defense

- Allow necessary bases on the territory of NATO members

One day later operation started with the names of “Eagle Assist” and “Active Endeavor” operations under the guidance of America. It is difficult to say that all NATO members have had the same feelings about terrorism. Turkey asked for PKK terror organization stop in NATO states but they freely have offices in Belgium and Denmark.

Following the September 11 events, Russia and America formed closer relations to prevent terrorist attacks. This development also helped along the enlargement process. In May 2002, the Russia- NATO Council was established which Russian have to vote for struggling against authorizing terrorism, peace force, human rights operations. NATO has these rights but doesn't have veto right.

In spite of closer relations, the joining of Baltic states to NATO, bothered Russian Federation in 2004. Russia's operation to Georgia(2008) disrupted the relations. NATO's reputation was lost with Russia action to Georgia. Particularly Putin had Russia strengthen again. Russia became energy and military power in the region. But this power became strained the relations. NATO's transformation was two times declared in Prag(2002) and in

Istanbul (2004). They all decided the importance of enlargement process, the mobility of military civil organization. The struggle was against terrorism on the basis of Common Action Planning. The struggle against terrorism would be done under international laws. However all these decisions on terrorism haven't benefited for Turkey's continuous problem PKK terror actions. NATO hasn't taken enough attention Turkey's terrorism problem.

NATO's last strategic concept in the 21st century was declared on 19-20 November 2010 in Lisbon. Prepared documents for new strategic concept started in 2009 with direction of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, General Secretary of NATO. 12 experts including one Turkish (Umit Pamir) prepared new strategic concept report. Their report was accepted and the following list was approved :

- Alliance should protect its deterrence and itself against attacks
- NATO should protect the whole Atlantic region.
- NATO obliged to tackle any problem related to crisis and security
- NATO should enlarge its partnership programs

The experts' report accepted little changes at the Lisbon Summit. Moreover, NATO-European Union relations are mutually open, transparency and completeness. NATO is against nuclear weapons but if there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will continue to have nuclear power.

NATO's new strategic concept in Lisbon and its effect on Turkey needs to be evaluated in detail. NATO has declared seven strategic concepts with the Lisbon summit. These concepts are application documents that guides the future plans for military commanders. During the Cold War Period, two main strategic concepts were declared. The seventh strategic concept is an open document. The 2010 strategic concept has been prepared by academics, civil institutions, and with international cooperation. The last concept is Active Endeavour Modern Defense. The document has seven parts and thirty eight articles. It includes the use of ballistic missiles, deterrence, development for security, reform and renovation, defense missiles. The Defense Missile project goes back to Ronald Reagan's time (1981-1989) He first used the terminology "Star Wars" that provides potential missile attacks. Missile Apron Shield system has been developed in President Bush in the first years of 2000s. However this defense system has been adopted into North Atlantic Pact by Barack Obama, President (2008). The aim is to accomplish to protect NATO states against

potential attacker. Turkey had also been considered for the when the Erdogan government demanded this defense system for the Malatya region. The continuous domestic war in Syria forwarded Turkish leaders protect their country with this new missile system. Particularly debates have arisen due to Iran's objections. It claimed this system was being done against Iran state.

For Turkey, Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia and their full membership prospects are also important agenda items. Turkey's relations with NATO continued with enlargement and peace aim programs in 1990s.

APPENDIXES

1. THE PAPER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY³⁴¹

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

³⁴¹ **The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Facts and Figures**, Brussels 1989, p. 376

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

(3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including

the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

2. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey³⁴²

London, October 22, 1951

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,
signed at Washington on April 4, 1949

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the
accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article 2 of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

Article 2

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 3

³⁴² The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Facts and Figures, Brussels 1989, p. 379

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article 4

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. Report of the Council - 'The Harmel Report'³⁴³

1. A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to *"study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace"*. The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schutz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping

³⁴³ Ibid, p.p. 402-404

Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of "*peaceful co-existence*" has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of *détente* are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of *détente*. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the

exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in

timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arm control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective détente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the present situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialized studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of détente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen

from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.


4. NATO's Strategic Concepts Since 1949

Generally speaking, since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO's strategic thinking has evolved:

- the Cold War period;
- the immediate post-Cold War period; and
- the security environment since 9/11.

One could say that from 1949 to 1991, NATO's strategy was principally characterized by defence and deterrence, although with growing attention to dialogue and détente for the last two decades of this period. From 1991 a broader approach was adopted where the notions of cooperation and security complemented the basic concepts of deterrence and defence.

- From 1949 until the end of the Cold War, there were four Strategic Concepts, accompanied by documents that laid out the measures for the military to implement the Strategic Concept (Strategic Guidance; The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years; Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept);
- In the post-Cold War period, three unclassified Strategic Concepts have been issued, complemented by classified military documents (MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept; MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy; and MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept)



Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy have given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; NATO has committed troops beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and reached a membership of 28; new threats have emerged such as energy security and cyber-attacks. These are among the factors that brought Allied leaders to produce a new Strategic Concept in 2010.

From 1949 until the end of the Cold War

From 1949 to 1991, international relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than it was on dialogue and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race.

As mentioned above, four Strategic Concepts were issued during this period. In addition, two key reports were also published during those four decades: the Report of the Committee of Three (December 1956) and the Harmel Report (December 1967). Both documents placed the Strategic Concepts in a wider framework by stressing issues that had an impact on the environment within which the Strategic Concepts were interpreted.

NATO’s first Strategic Concept

NATO started producing strategic documents as early as October 1949. But the first NATO strategy document to be approved by the NAC was “The Strategic Concept for the

Defense of the North Atlantic area (DC 6/1), 6 January 1950 - the Alliance's first strategic concept.

DC 6/1 provided an overall strategic concept for the Alliance. The document stated that the primary function of NATO was to deter aggression and that NATO forces would only be engaged if this primary function failed and an attack was launched. Complementarity between members and standardization were also key elements of this draft. Each member's contribution to defence should be in proportion to its capacity – economic, industrial, geographical, military – and cooperative measures were to be put into place by NATO to ensure optimal use of resources. Numerical inferiority in terms of military resources vis-à-vis the USSR was emphasized, as well as the reliance on US nuclear capabilities. DC 6/1 stated that the Alliance should “insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception”.

Although DC 6/1 was quite detailed, more guidance was needed for use by the five Regional Planning Groups that existed at the time. As a consequence, the Strategic Guidance paper (SG 13/16) was sent to the Regional Planning Groups on 6 January 1950. Entitled “Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning”, SG 13/16 was formally approved by the Military Committee on 28 March 1950 as MC 14.

MC 14 enabled Regional Planning Groups to develop detailed defence plans to meet contingencies up to July 1954, a date by which the Alliance aimed to have a credible defence force in place. Its key objectives were to “convince the USSR that war does not pay, and should war occur, to ensure a successful defence” of the NATO area.

In parallel, SG 13/16 was also being used by the Regional Planning Groups as the basis for further, more comprehensive defence plans. These plans were consolidated into “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan” (DC 13), which was approved by the Defence Committee on 1 April 1950, just one year after the signing of the Washington Treaty.

NATO's strategy was effectively contained in three basis documents:

- DC 6/1 which set forth the overall strategic concept;
- MC 14/1 which provided more specific strategic guidance for use in defence planning; and
- DC 13 which included both of these aspects as well as considerable detailed regional planning.

The Korean War and NATO's second Strategic Concept

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean divisions on 25 June 1950 had an immediate impact on NATO and its strategic thinking. It brought home the realization that NATO needed to urgently address two fundamental issues: the effectiveness of NATO's military structures and the strength of NATO forces.

On 26 September 1950, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the establishment of an integrated military force under centralized command; on 19 December 1950, the NAC requested the nomination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); in January 1951, from Hotel Astoria in Paris, Allies were already working to get the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Forces, Europe (SHAPE) into place and on 2 April 1951, the new SHAPE HQ was activated. Other structural changes were implemented, including the abolition of the three European Regional Planning Groups, and the replacement in 1952 of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group by Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), leaving only the Canada-US Regional Planning Group in existence.

These structural changes, together with the accession of Greece and Turkey, needed to be reflected in the Strategic Concept. This led to the drafting of NATO's second Strategic Concept: "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area", which was approved by the NAC on 3 December 1952 (MC 3/5(Final)). The new Strategic Concept respected the core principles outlined in DC 6/1 and, in this sense, did not differ fundamentally from this document.

Consequently, the strategic guidance also needed updating. MC 14 was thoroughly revised and reviewed so as to include the information that had been previously contained in DC 13. MC 14 and DC 13 became one document: "Strategic Guidance" (MC 14/1) approved by the NAC at the 15-18 December 1952 Ministerial Meeting in Paris. It was a comprehensive document, which stated that NATO's overall strategic aim was "to ensure the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war...". NATO would do this by initially conducting an air offensive and, in parallel, conducting air, ground and sea operations. The Allied air attacks would use "all types of weapons".

There was another issue which the Korean invasion raised, but was only addressed years later: the need for NATO to engage in a "forward strategy", which meant that NATO

wanted to place its defences as far east in Europe as possible, as close to the Iron Curtain as it could. This immediately raised the delicate issue of Germany's role in such a commitment. This issue was not resolved until 1954 when NATO invited the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member, which it effectively did on 6 May 1955.

The “New Look”

In the meantime, while structural issues had moved forward, the strength of NATO forces remained a problem. At its meeting in Lisbon, in February 1952, the NAC set very ambitious force goals that proved to be financially and politically unrealistic. As a consequence, the United States, under the leadership of NATO's former SACEUR, Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided to shift the emphasis of their defence policy to greater dependency on the use of nuclear weapons. This “New Look” policy offered greater military effectiveness without having to spend more on defence (NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953). However, although alluded to in the strategic documents, nuclear weapons had not yet been integrated into NATO's strategy. SACEUR Matthew B. Ridgway stated in a report that this integration would imply increases instead of decreases in force levels. His successor, General Alfred Gruenther, established a “New Approach Group” at SHAPE in August 1953 to examine this question. In the meantime, the United States, together with a number of European members, called for the complete integration of nuclear policy into NATO strategy.

Massive retaliation and NATO's third Strategic Concept

The work of the “New Approach Group”, combined with other submissions gave birth to “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years” (MC 48), approved by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and by the NAC on 17 December 1954. It provided strategic guidance pending the review of MC 14/1 and contained concepts and assumptions that were later included in NATO's third strategic concept.

MC 48 was the first official NATO document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons. It introduced the concept of massive retaliation, which is normally associated with MC 14/2 – NATO's third Strategic Concept.

An additional report entitled “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years – Report 2” was issued, 14 November 1955. It did not supersede MC 14/1 but added that NATO was still committed to its “forward strategy” even if there were

delays in German contributions that would push the implementation of the “forward strategy” to 1959 at the earliest.

After considerable discussion, MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area” was issued in its final form on 23 May 1957 and was accompanied by MC 48/2, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept”, on the same day.

MC 14/2 was the Alliance’s first Strategic Concept which advocated “massive retaliation” as a key element of NATO’s new strategy.

While some Allies strongly advocated massive retaliation since it had the advantage of helping to reduce force requirements and, therefore, defence expenditures, not all member countries wanted to go so far. A degree of flexibility was introduced in the sense that recourse to conventional weapons was envisaged to deal with certain, smaller forms of aggression, “without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.” This was also reflected in the accompanying strategic guidance. Despite this flexibility, it was nonetheless stated that NATO did not accept the concept of limited war with the USSR: “If the Soviets were involved in a hostile local action and sought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong it, the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO’s disposal, since in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets.”

In addition to including the doctrine of “massive retaliation”, MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 reflected other concerns including the effects on the Alliance of Soviet political and economic activities outside the NATO area. This was particularly relevant in the context of the Suez crisis and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956. The importance of out-of-area events was reflected in a political directive, CM(56)138, given from the NAC to NATO’s Military Authorities, 13 December 1956: “Although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of the dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area.”

While NATO was hardening its military and strategic stance, in parallel, it decided to reinforce the political role of the Alliance. A few months before the adoption of MC 14/2, in December 1956, it published the Report of the Committee of Three or Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO.

This report, drafted by three NATO foreign ministers – Lester Pearson (Canada), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Halvard Lange (Norway) - gave new impetus to political consultation between member countries on all aspects of relations between the East and West.

The Report was adopted in the midst of the Suez Crisis, when internal consultation on security matters affecting the Alliance was particularly low, jeopardizing Alliance solidarity. This was the first time since the signing of the Washington Treaty that NATO had officially recognized the need to reinforce its political role. The Report put forward several recommendations, including the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field.

Similarly to the Harmel Report, published in 1967, the Report of the Three Wise Men contributed to broadening the strategic framework within which the Alliance operated. Both reports could be perceived as NATO's first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues.

As soon as NATO's third Strategic Concept was adopted, a series of international developments occurred that put into question the Alliance's strategy of massive retaliation. This strategy relied heavily on the United States' nuclear capability and its will to defend European territory in the case of a Soviet nuclear attack. Firstly, Europeans started to doubt whether a US President would sacrifice an American city for a European city; secondly, the USSR had developed intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and, more generally, its nuclear capability. As the USSR's nuclear potential increased, NATO's competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence diminished. Terms such as "Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD" started to be used.

The outbreak of the second Berlin crisis (1958-1962), provoked by the Soviet Union, reinforced these doubts: how should NATO react to threats that were below the level of an all-out attack? NATO's nuclear deterrent had not stopped the Soviets from threatening the position of Western Allies in Berlin. So what should be done?

In 1961, J.F. Kennedy arrived at the White House. He was concerned by the issue of limited warfare and the notion that a nuclear exchange could be started by accident or miscalculation. In the meantime, the Berlin crisis intensified, leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and in October 1962, the Cold War peaked with the Cuban missile crisis.

The United States started advocating a stronger non-nuclear posture for NATO and the need for a strategy of “flexible response”. Initial discussions on a change of strategy were launched among NATO member countries, but there was no consensus.

The Athens Guidelines

NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker presented a special report on NATO Defence Policy (CM(62)48), 17 April 1962, on the issue of the political control of nuclear weapons. It was basically NATO’s first attempt to temper its policy of massive retaliation by submitting the use of nuclear weapons to consultation under varying circumstances.

Other attempts at introducing greater flexibility followed, but these caused resistance from several member countries. This internal resistance combined with the fact that the US Administration had been shaken by the assassination of Kennedy and was increasingly concerned by US military involvement in Vietnam, momentarily froze all discussions on a revised Strategic Concept for NATO.

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept and the doctrine of flexible response

NATO’s fourth Strategic Concept – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area (MC 14/3) – was adopted by the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) on 12 December 1967 and the final version issued on 16 January 1968. It was drafted after the withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966.

There were two key features to the new strategy: flexibility and escalation. “The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on a flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack”. It identified three types of military responses against aggression to NATO:

1. Direct defence: the aim was to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chose to fight.
2. Deliberate escalation: this added a series of possible steps to defeat aggression by progressively raising the threat of using nuclear power as the crisis escalated.
3. General nuclear response, seen as the ultimate deterrent.

The companion document, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area (MC 48/3) was approved by the DPC on 4 December 1969 and issued in final form on 8 December 1969.

Both MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 were so inherently flexible, in substance and interpretation, that they remained valid until the end of the Cold War.

The immediate post-Cold War period

In 1991, a new era commenced. The formidable enemy that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved and Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and, in some case, NATO members. For the Alliance, the period was characterized by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations.

During the immediate post-Cold War period, NATO issued two unclassified Strategic Concepts that advocated a broader approach to security than before:

- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, November 1991;
- The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 1999.

Both of these were accompanied by a classified military document: respectively MC 400 and MC 400/2.

NATO’s first unclassified Strategic Concept

The 1991 Strategic Concept differed dramatically from preceding strategic documents. Firstly, it was a non-confrontational document that was released to the public; and secondly, while maintaining the security of its members as its fundamental purpose (i.e., collective defence), it sought to improve and expand security for Europe as a whole through partnership and cooperation with former adversaries. It also reduced the use of nuclear forces to a minimum level, sufficient to preserve peace and stability:

“This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new

opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.”

The 1991's Strategic Concept's accompanying document was - and still is - classified. It is entitled: “MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept (MC 400), 12 December 1991.

NATO's second unclassified Strategic Concept

In 1999, the year of NATO's 50th anniversary, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

The document stated that the Alliance's fundamental tasks were security, consultation, and deterrence and defence, adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It noted that NATO had managed to adapt and play an important role in the post-Cold War environment, and established guidelines for the Alliance's forces, translating the purposes and tasks of the preceding sections into practical instructions for NATO force and operational planners. The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance's missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations. It also stipulated that the Alliance would maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

The 1999 Strategic Concept was complemented by a strategic guidance document that remains classified: “MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy” (MC 400/2), 12 February 2003.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to the fore. NATO needed to protect its populations both at

home and abroad. It therefore underwent major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks, such as leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world.

These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO's strategic documents.

A first step in that direction was taken in November 2006 when NATO leaders endorsed the "Comprehensive Political Guidance". This is a major policy document that sets out the framework and priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years. It analyses the probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. Against that analysis, it sets out the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform in light of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and the kinds of capabilities the Alliance will need.

Later, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the "Declaration on Alliance Security" which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept. This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, reprioritising and reforming NATO. The 2010 Strategic Concept was issued in Lisbon and is accompanied by the Military Committee Guidance MC 400/3, March 2012.

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