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TRANSFORMING NATO ALLIANCE AND NEW DEFENSE STRATEGIES

by

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
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Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN - Özyeğin University

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS
ACT	ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION
CFE	CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE
CFSP	COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
CJTF	COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE
EAPC	EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL
EDA	EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
ESDI	EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE INITIATIVE
ESDP	EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
IEA	INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
IPAP	INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN
ISAF	INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
MAP	MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN
NAC	NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NACC	NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NGO	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
NRF	NATO RESPONSE FORCE
PfP	PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
SACEUR	SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
SCO	SHANGHAY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
UK	UNITED KINGDOM
UN	UNITED NATIONS
US	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WEU	WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
WMD	WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WTO	WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the factors and conduct of the transformation of NATO and its new strategies for the future. With the disintegration of the Warsaw pact,for some experts NATO lost its reason and purpose of existence. But NATO began to search for a new mission and identity in the changing international environment. The new forms of threats such as terrorism, and the spread of nuclear weapons, are adopted by NATO as the new missions of struggle in the modified international environment. The implications of politics of the US, the EU, Russia, China and other regional powers on global security will be analyzed with related to NATO. The new threat perception will be investigated as the main driver of NATO transformation. The way transformation carried out will be analyzed in political and military areas. New NATO strategy for coming decades will be explained. As a theorotical framework Liberal and Realist views will be the main area of discussion. The method used in this thesis is a textual analysis of primary and secondary sources.The thesis will conclude with future trends for NATO and its new role in the World politics.

Key words: NATO,strategy, nuclear weapons,cold war,post cold war.

ÖZET

Bu tez NATO'nun Transformasyonu ve gelecek için yeni stratejilerini analiz etmektedir. Bu tezin temel amacı NATO'nun soğuk savaş sonrası transformasyon sürecini göstermektir.Ayrıca değişen güvenlik ve savunma parametreleri küresel ve yerel ölçekte incelenecektir.NATO'nun problemleri ve bunların üye devletlere etkisi bu çalışmanın parçası olacaktır.Bazı uzmanlara göre Varşova Paktının dağılması ile NATO var olma sebebi ve amacını kaybetmiştir.Fakat NATO değişen Uluslararası iklimde yeni bir kimlik ve görev arayışına girmiştir. Terörizm ve nükleer silahların yayılması gibi yeni tehtidler NATO tarafından değişen Uluslararası ortamda yeni mücadele alanları olarak benimsenmiştir. Yeni tehdit algılaması NATO transformasyonu sağlayan temel faktör olarak araştırılacaktır. Transformasyon süreci Siyasi ve Askeri açıdan incelenecektir. Gelecek on yıllara yönelik Yeni NATO stratejisi açıklanmaya ve son olarak NATO'nun Dünya siyasetindeki yeni rolü izah edilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: NATO, strateji,nükleer silahlar, soğuk savaş, soğuk savaş sonrası.

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INTRODUCTION

The research question of this thesis is whether or not North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO) would be able to successfully transform from a military alliance designed for the threats of the Cold War into an effective collective defense organization capable of responding to new security challenges of the 21st century.

For this purpose, this thesis analyzes the transatlantic collective security in the 21st century, which focuses on the NATO's transformation and its new strategies. The presence of a transformed NATO is vital for the transatlantic security alliance in the 21st century. The main research question is *what is the meaning of Transformation for NATO?*

Since, the Soviet threat is not present any more, the researchers are still analyzing the NATO enlargement in terms of what is the current threat. In this research I would analyze and aim to explain the transformation and evolving strategies of the NATO alliance. This would be done by analyzing and comparing past strategies of NATO and its enlargement process. I believe that NATO is still a complex organization that should be further analyzed in order the process to be clear.

The history of the need for a strong military security alliance between USA and Western-Europe goes back to years of the World War II. With the beginning of the Cold War the Western democracies became stronger against the threatening Soviet Union and were consolidated through the establishment of NATO defense alliance in

1949. (NATO) was established in 1949 as a collective defense organization. It was the result of Truman doctrine in United States (U.S.) and steadily escalating tension between the democratic Western World and the Soviet Union. NATO was the number one tool for the containment policy during the Cold War. NATO is not just a military alliance but also very well structured International Organization. During the passing decades it is transforming to a global security force.

This research demonstrates how the historical experiences of major European actors have influenced the European Union's (EU) approach to security and defense issues. The thesis illuminates the circumstances, which led to France's ambivalent relation with the Transatlantic Alliance and ongoing political disputes. The present and future nature of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and NATO relations is a product of the historical relation between France, Germany, Britain and the United States. Recognizing the events, which created the support for the European Defense and the underlying national motives, is essential in understanding the EU's relationship with NATO.

In this thesis NATO's presence and importance for the security of the West in the 21st century will be analyzed. The American policies during the Afghanistan war which was backed by the West and later Iraq war which caused a split between the US and the Europeans in the transatlantic relations alliance will be explained. The reasons behind the shift of United States to multilateralism after Iraq war instead of continuing with unilateralism will be demonstrated. The arguments of the pro-Atlantics that favor the continuity of NATO's presence and the transatlantic security

alliance and the arguments of the Integrationists that prefer developing their own security institutions in the European Union namely the ESDP will be explained.

This thesis proposes that NATO had a functional transformation process to survive in the new security environment which makes NATO very different than the Cold War NATO. The functional change has been achieved through the adoption of new tasks such as combating international terrorism in addition to Article V missions[1]. The most important reason is NATO's ability of direct response to the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. These operations revealed that NATO is the only capable politico-military international organization that can enforce and support peace and stability in Europe. This new function of NATO has become an instrument as effective as the traditional collective security of NATO.

In analyzing the transformation of NATO in the changing security dynamics, One of the main question of this thesis is; *is there a limit for the NATO enlargement process?* The answer strongly related with the enlargement and integration processes of EU. The reason is U.S. and U.K. do not want to see a dominant continental Europe under the control of Franco-German axis. NATO is a defense organization which has an unofficial purpose of keeping France, Germany and E.U. under the wings of NATO. But on the other hand there are some geopolitical limits, such as possible membership of Russia in the near future. This option would transpose NATO into a global security force but it can also change the core structure of the alliance.

In this thesis in order to analyze the transformation process of NATO and its new defense strategies realist and liberal perspectives will be used. According to realists,

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[1] Afghanistan Operation since 2001 as a result of the activation of the article V.

states are the main actors of the international arena and power is the core concept. For this reason, we should focus on first American foreign and military policy then other member states to understand NATO and transatlantic relations. NATO can only be analyzed by member states political behavior. From the perspective of Neo-Realists U.S. has a special place in NATO as the most powerful military capable state. For this reason, U.S. foreign and security policies are interacting NATO's political behavior more than any other state. In this thesis Neo-realist explanation for the NATO's transformation is main focal theoretical point but there are also references to classical realism for the broader philosophical understanding.

Liberal on the other hand think that NATO as an international institution has its own unique place and effect on world politics. NATO's norms have transforming effect on member and candidate states. This thesis argues that liberal effect on NATO's transformation and new defense strategies is minimal.

In the first chapter under the "Theoretical and Historical Overview of NATO" title a brief account is provided on the theoretical and historical origins of the NATO during the Cold War. Theory part in this chapter focuses on NATO mainly liberal and realist perspectives. In later chapter I showed that realist explanation which is based on power relations of international actors connected to NATO's transformation is more accurate.

Chapter two is the core of this thesis under the title of "Transformation of NATO in the New Security Environment". I divided the NATO's transformation subject into four main parts in this chapter which are first; *political and geographical transformation*, second; *NATO operations in the transformation era*, third;

transformation of NATO's military strategy, and the last one as; *NATO's relations with EU and Russia in the transformation era.*

In the third chapter, I focused on future and recent events related to NATO under the title of "The Critical Issues of NATO in The Post-Cold War Era." In this chapter I will analyze the out of area debate of NATO politics, annexation of Crimea by Russia and its effect on the balance of power, and I will debate three scenarios for the future of NATO which are related to international political developments of Russia and China.

The purpose of this thesis is to make an analysis that would give a better understanding of the NATO's enlargement process, transformation and its new defense strategy. This will be done by analyzing and discussing the factors present in the international arena that contribute to the decision if the enlargement should occur or not, and which country can participate in this collective security organization. Will NATO become a global security organization? Will it be armed wing of United Nations? These questions remain to be valid and require further research for the future.

1. THEORIETICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NATO

"War is a grave affair of state; It is place of life and death, a road to survival and extinction, a matter to be pondered carefully."

Sun Tzu

1.1. Theoretical overview of NATO

In this section I will explain the theoretical positions connected to NATO in International Relations discipline. While main debate is between realism and liberalism, I intend to favor neo-realist approach for the existents and durability of NATO.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty creating NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a 'defensive' military alliance was signed between the US, UK, Canada, France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the Benelux countries. The core concept of the NATO treaty is article 5 which states that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.[2] This is the *casus feoderis* of the Atlantic alliance. Whole Cold War security calculations had evolved around this concept; "all for one, one for all" formula was the basic architecture of the NATO alliance.

It is the case that the end of the Cold War has created a positive opportunity for the regeneration of a genuine collective security system in which the UN, cannot be expected to be the unique source of peace enforcement, but will function rather as a political forum mechanism through which a variety of resources will be deployed to

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[2] The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4 1949. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm

that end in cases of need.[3]International politics are heading towards a new equilibrium in which collective defense becoming more and more important while collective security, based on common values is losing supporters among nation states.

Ideally, in a global collective security system, alliances should be unnecessary. Collective security allows states to renounce the unilateral use of force because they are assured of alliance assistance if a state illegally uses force against them.[4] The purpose of a collective security system is to maintain peace among the members of the system, but not between the different systems and outsiders. NATO is not a collective security system. NATO is a military alliance, and it could be called a collective defense organization.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally designed as a collective defense alliance. It was a classic example of a group of states defending each other against an external threat. This alliance was interested in pursuing positive political changes in Europe while avoiding war (with the Soviet Union).[5] NATO is concerned with preserving peace and stability in what has become known as the Euro-Atlantic region. Regional security is not necessarily a deviation from the ideas of collective security or dividing global security policy. The concept of ensuring international security is at the heart of collective security and therefore is consistent with regard to the role of NATO.

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[3] H. McCoubrey and J. Morris, **Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era** (The Hague: Kluwer LawInternational, 2000), p.243.

[4] Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, **International Relations The Key Concepts,** Routledge, New York 2008, p.44.

[5] David S. Yost, **NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security**, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p.35.

The Alliance was having two purposes. First one is to maintain sufficient military strength to deter aggression and second to create a climate of stability, security and confidence. This premise helped to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the political problems can be solved. The Alliance prepared for war by building a strong conventional and nuclear capability, while at the same time seeking diplomatic opportunities to ensure security in the North Atlantic region. This two-pronged approach can be viewed as the blending of collective defense with other elements of collective security.

The best example of collective defense language is contained in Article 5 of the NATO treaty which can be paraphrased as "an attack against any one state is an attack against all states" within the Alliance. This concept is vital to the Alliance and is instrumental in forming a collective defense entity. Collective defense against the Soviet Union was the paramount reason for the Alliance and served it well for the duration of the Cold War. However, after the fall of the Berlin wall, collective defense, for the Alliance, became a much more ambiguous concept. Since there was no longer a Soviet Union, the object of the collective defense for the Alliance has been less tangible.

In April 1999, the NATO alliance published a new strategic concept. In Paragraph 4, saying, "it must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibilities."[6] It goes on to underline NATO's essential purpose as set out in the Washington Treaty,

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[6] North Atlantic Council, **The Alliance's Strategic Concept**, paragraph 4, 24 April 1999.

to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.[7] This outlines NATO's commitment to collective defense. However, it is not apparent just whom the Alliance is collectively defending against in the new century. It is clear that the Alliance is interested in defending against an outside threat but there appears to be little regional threat for NATO.

According to Mesanheimer realism in IR can be explained in the following way: the international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other.[8] Anarchy is a condition without dominant authority over states; there are no general rules or laws that can be enforced. This condition is what Hobbes calls "the state of nature," a world of "all against all."[9] The keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states.[10]The Cold War did not conclude officially, as it had not begun officially. There could be no official peace treaty, and as a result there was no international conference to debate the issues of the era, there was no replay of Vienna in 1814–15, Versailles in 1919 or even Yalta and Potsdam in 1945.

From a neo-realist perspective, the end of the Cold War did not suggest a brighter future for the world. Therefore, the collapse of the semi-stable bi-polar international system which had dominated the politics of the world as a whole could only have one

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[7] Ibid., paragraph 6.

[8] Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-1995), "The False Promise of International Institutions" **International Security**, Vol. 19, No.3: 5-49, page 6

[9]Thomas Hobbes and Marshall Missner, eds., **Thomas Hobbes : Leviathan** (New York: Pearson Longman,2008), p.264

[10] John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," **International Security** 15, no. 1, (Summer, 1990), p.12.

conceivable outcome which is a return to multi-polar system. This is the neo realist image of the world.

 According to neo-realist theory, multi-polarity is inherently more warlike than a bipolar world for three main reasons first, because there are far more actors in play causing greater likelihood for war than in a world where all nations are divided between two blocks; secondly, the relative power between the states is more differentiate and finally, with more actors in the field, it is more difficult to calculate the relative power of an opponent states and their possible alliances. The natural outcome of this type of complex system, is an increase in conventional warfare between nations.

As a result of weapons of mass destruction, it is possible to essentially sidestep the threat of war through miscalculation of military power, for it is impossible to attain the upper hand in relative power without the creation of a strategic defense. This would allow balancing to occur against the now stronger opponent, and prevent war on a grander scale.[11]   The conflicts during the Cold War had proven, however, "nuclear weapons eliminate neither the use of force nor the importance of balancing behavior," since proxy[12] wars can occur and balance of power is still essential in maintaining a stable World system.   The difference between the political reality of the Europe of the history, upon which most of the theories of alliances are based and the today's Europe, is the presence of nuclear weapons on the old continent.

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[11]   Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," **International Security** 18, no. 2, (Autumn, 1993), p.73.
[12] **Ibid.,74**

Waltz argues that states faced with unbalanced power, states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance.[13] NATO was found as a result of these power calculations in the early years of the Cold War to balance the military strength of the Soviet Union against the Western democracies.

Kenneth Waltz summed up the neo-realist prediction for the future of NATO.

> *Europe and Russia may for a time look on NATO, and on America's presence in Western Europe, as a stabilizing force in a time of rapid change… The Soviet Union created NATO, and the demise of the Soviet threat "freed" Europe, West as well as East. But freedom entails self-reliance… In the not-very-long run, Europe will have to learn to take care of themselves or suffer the consequences. American withdrawal from Europe will be slower than the Soviet Union's. America… can still be useful to other NATO countries, and NATO is made up of willing members. NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are.[14]*

Although in 2016 we can assume that this prediction not exactly correct. NATO is in a rapid transformation process and it found new missions to be relevant as a defence alliance. But it is true that NATO is significantly weak compare to its heyday during the Cold War era. The main reason of this decay is the increased number of threats on a larger NATO geography and the changing nature of threats to security. NATO is still in an adaptation process in this new era.

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Waltz, Kennet N. (1997), "Evaluating Theories" **The American Political Science Review,** Vol. 91, No.4, p.915

According to the realists, state is expected to operate in accordance with maxims of political reality, not with moral virtue. As Machiavelli suggested a prince cannot observe all those things which give a man a reputation for virtue, because in order to maintain his state he is often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion.[15] Political ethics allows some actions for states that would not be tolerated by private morality.[16] Nuclear weapons strategies in NATO's security concepts can be seen as a result of this thinking. Intermediate and short range US nuclear missiles in Europe which were putting European population under jeopardy in the case of a Soviet aggression for the sake of US geopolitics was the subject of long debate between Europeans and Americans during the Cold War.

The most powerful states are the poles and the great powers, in international system.[17]The great powers are the main actors in the international system. They possess enough capability to manipulate the system by themselves. A regional power is a potential candidate for a global superpower. It may expand to challenge a global hegemonic power and change the status quo of the international politics.[18]This situation is the main source of conflict in the international system. Rising regional power challenges, the dominating great power and in this case confrontation becomes inevitable. NATO is designed to protect the western hegemony in the world politics. Although Atlantic alliance originally founded for defense against the Soviet

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[15] Niccollo Machievelli, **The Prince** (trans. by. G. Bull), London: Penguin Books,1995, p. 56
[16] Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, **Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches**, New York: Anchor Books, 2003, p.77
[17] Randall L. Schweller, **Deadly Imbalances : Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p.267.
[18] John J. Mearsheimer, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics** (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 40-42.

aggression 21st century NATO as a strongest military alliance in history has more than collective defense purposes.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union after the long Cold War, current international system is a unipolar one dominated by the United States.[19] This international system includes a superpower and several candidate super powers.[20]Power transition is the key factor that changes international system. All states pursue interests defined in terms of power, but their power growths are not usually at the same level. Organski and Kugler argue: "*the fundamental problem….is the differences in rates of growth among the great powers and, of particular importance, the differences in rates between the dominant nation and the challenger that permit the latter to overtake the former in power.*"[21] NATO is a key defense organization in the power rectangle of US, EU, Russia and China. As the power transition process goes on in the international system this changing dynamics force NATO to reshape and reinvent itself.

The future of NATO, according to the liberal theory, would be slightly more certain. An alliance based upon common values, as liberalism predicts, is more likely to continue to function stably even though there is no common threat.[22]Liberalist theory predicted a slightly better course for the future than its neo-realist counterpart. The collapse of the Soviet Union could conceivably lead to a much larger population of

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[19] C. Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," **Foreign Affairs** 70, no. 1 (1990), 23-33

[20] G. John Ikenberry, ed**., America Unrivaled : The Future of the Balance of Power** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002),p. 103-116.

[21] A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, **The War Ledger** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 19-23; 61-63,

[22] Martin Reicherd, **The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective**, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), p.111

democracies and thus a broader area of peace. Liberalism would suggest the fostering of democracy and an increased economic cooperation for eastern European nations.

Institutionalist theory would lead us to expect that rather than folding NATO's tent, declaring victory, and moving on to create new institutions, NATO members will take the alliance in new directions, making use of existing procedures and mechanisms to build on past successes to deal with new problems.[23]The liberal institutionalism did not predict as bleak of a future as neo-realism. The structures from the Western powers established during the Cold War would essentially remain in place with a few changes to the future goals of institutions such as NATO. Once they have been established, the institutional structures help to foster continued cooperation between the allied states.

The practical realities of institutional behavior of international organizations necessitate the integration of organizational behavior theory. Complex bureaucracies [such as NATO] are composed of individuals and interest groups who 'must be expected to have an interest in their incomes and careers, and therefore in the survival of the organization in which they are employed.[24] This organizational 'survival instinct' may manifest itself in bureaucratic inertia, but it can also provide an organization with a 'life' of its own, and hence with a creative potential for inventing new missions for the organization once old ones are accomplished.[25]   The Alliance became more institutionalized with mechanisms of membership, and partnerships.

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[23] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," **International Organization** 50, no. 3, (Summer, 1996)
[24] Martin Reicherd, **The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective**, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 111-112
[25] **Ibid**.p.112.

The level of institutionalization of a security coalition is very much linked to its ability to persist in the face of change in its environment.[26]Although NATO has its own large bureaucracy it is still very much control of the its member states and does not show a behavior of a separate political entity with its own agenda.

When we analyze NATO one has to understand the dynamics of its behavior as an organization, the interplay of member interests within the security regime that surrounds NATO and the opportunities and constraints of the domestic political considerations.[27] NATO is a formal commitment for security cooperation and collective defense among its member states.[28]Although organizational behaviour theory has some merits I believe that it is the weakest theory to explain the survival of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In NATO politics the interest of the member states is the key element. Bureaucratic structure of NATO is not strong enough to impose its own policies.

Despite academic predictions that its years are numbered, NATO persists and adapts.[29] NATO has institutional adaptability by readjusting its organization to fulfil the strategic demands of contemporary issues. NATO will remain a major instrument for conflict resolution and collective defense in Europe for a near future. NATO has been the most successful military alliance for the last 66 years.

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[26] Celeste A.Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War", **International Organization**, 54:4 (Autumn, 2000), p.707, 711.

[27] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the Cold War," **International Organization**, 50 summer (1996): pp.446-447.

[28] Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliance Endure or Collapse," **Survival**, 39 Spring (1997): p.157.

[29] Christian Tuschhoff, "Why NATO is Still Relevant*,"* **International Politics***,* 40 Mar (2003): p.102.

NATO has been able to increase its cohesion after the fall of the Berlin wall because its features as a security institution allowed the member states to manage the changing intra-alliance balance of power caused by united Germany's re-emergence in the post-war period.[30] NATO's system of information exchange reduced mutual uncertainty and increased the predictability of behavior in case of attack.[31]Contemporary cohesion in NATO is fostered by institutional management features within the alliance. Intra-alliance management and information sharing among allies explain present cooperation level.

NATO needed political, functional and geographic transformation in order to survive.[32] NATO became a forum for discussion and collective security provider for its members, a mechanism for transition to democratic rule for ex-communist states, and a military to military cooperation theatre.[33]NATO increases its strategic dimensions in order to cope with the changing environment while searching for ways of coordination and unity amongst member nations.

Cooperation within NATO can be measured along three variables: the ability of allies to engage in joint operations or offer explicit military assistance to each other, the ability of allies to compromise on policy issues, and the level of financial contributions for collective defense.[34]During the hard times of post 2008 financial

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[30] Tuschhoff, Christian. 1999. Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO. In Haftendorn, Helga; Keohane, Robert; Wallander, Celeste. **Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space**. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 1999. P. 140.

[31] **Ibid.**p.151.

[32] Charles B.Hagan, "Geopolitics", **The Journal of Politics**, (Harvard University, Cambridge, 1942), p.484.

[33] Osvaldo Croci and Amy Verdun, **The Transatlantic Divide: Foreign and Security Policies in the Atlantic Alliance from Kosovo to Iraq**. (Manchester University, Manchester, 2006), p.25.

[34] Kupchan, Charles. "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior." **International Organization**. Vol. 42, No. 2. Spring: 1988. P. 323

crisis era it is not easy to find resources for expensive military operations of NATO. This factor is one of the key obstacle for the NATO alliance and it is also connected the scarcity of military personal as a deployable force when needed on the operation areas.

After the transformation began, NATO has become a great tool for each group of its members. For great and middle nations, it is a platform for band-wagoning for status and prestige. As a result of its intra-alliance functions, NATO impedes its members to be engaged in conflicts over misperception and misunderstanding.[35] Many scholars have argued that alliances, generally, would not last without threats.[36] An alliance such as NATO could endure beyond the end of the Cold War because the low level of internal threat provided the necessary conditions for cooperation to continue.[37] Alliances that confront low levels of internal threat and low levels of external threat provide the necessary, though not sufficient. In the absence of conflicts of interest, common values, institutions, and new goals may flourish.[38] NATO is not an organization without internal political rivalries. Member states sometimes have serious political conflicts as in the case of De Gaulle's France and U.S. when U.S. rejected to share details of NATO's nuclear strategy with France in 1966, or even military confrontations in the case of Greek and Turkey disputes on Cyprus and Aegean issues. In any case NATO had survived in those troubled periods which shows the organizational maturity of the alliance.

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[35] John S.Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War", **Political Science Quarterly**, 109:5 (Winter, 1994-1995), p.774.
[36] Robert B.McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", **International Organisation**, 50:3 (Summer 1996), p.446.
[37] Weitsman, Patricia. **Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War**. Stanford University Press: Stanford. 2004. pp. 26-27.
[38] **Ibid**.p.27.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO faced a dual challenge: it lost its initial 'raison d'être' and was confronted with a new security environment characterized by complex and diffuse risks and challenges."[39] As a result, "analysts in Europe and the United States have confidently predicted NATO's destiny of irrelevancy, if not total collapse.[40]Although there was discussion in academia and possibly among NATO members of the alliance's potential demise, the 2000s figures show that NATO faces very low levels of cohesion.[41]In fact Ukrainian crisis with Russia gives clear justifications for the existence of the Atlantic Alliance and improves cooperation with US and EU.

Expansion of NATO was not just about increasing the number of members; it was about expanding the scope of NATO's collective security sphere and revising the whole purpose of the alliance. For the first time in NATO's history, the alliance was able to act upon its most central founding goal, Article V. NATO's swift response to the 9/11 attacks reveals that the institutional infrastructure in NATO works well.

Alliance cohesion can be preserved when the strong members of an alliance consult with threatening external actors and internal threats. Without this structure, an alliance would lack some control over its cohesion. Externally, NATO reaches out many former threatening states, through programs like the Partnership for Peace. Internally, the institutional structure of NATO fosters management. The NATO military

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[39] M. de Haas (ed.), "From taking stock to increased European defense cooperation", **Clingendael Discussion Paper, The Hague, Clingendael, 2007, p. 18.**

[40] R.C. Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death", **Parameters,** spring 2007, p. 98.

[41] Most notably in Waltz, Kenneth. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." **International Security**. Vol. 18, No. 2. Autumn: 1993. p. 76.

committee has a decision-making procedure based on consensus. The alliance also has periodic summits to discuss important political matters.

NATO has achieved all of its founding goals in the first half of the 1990s. Although NATO were seen as useful in bringing the former communist bloc close in relations with the alliance, the long term utility of the alliance was uncertain. NATO was formed after World War II primarily to counter the Soviet Union. Now that the threat was largely removed, NATO's mission seemed to be over. Despite this, NATO found its place in the second half of the 1990s. An expanded alliance and military operations in continental crises became the alliance's new role. Expansion of NATO was not just about increasing the number of members; it was about expanding the scope of NATO's collective security sphere and revising the whole purpose of the alliance.

1.2. Historical Overview of NATO

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned the repeat it.

George Santayana

The first and most obvious explanation for NATO 's formation was the threat from the Soviet Union. At the Potsdam conference the Soviets pushed for the redrawing of Polish borders in their favour, and for a military base on Turkish territory in the Straights of the Dardanelles. Clearly unsatisfied with the status-quo the Soviets were trying to extend their control and pull as Churchill called the "Iron Curtain" over Eastern Europe.

The Cold War and the Cold War structure are two different concepts. The former lasted from 1946-47 until about 1963, when the political freeze of East and West relations began to melt. However the structural features of system remained until 1989: the role of superpowers and politico-military blocks, the high peacetime level of military confrontation in Central Europe.[42]During the Cold War the immense destructive power of thermo nuclear weapons has fundamentally altered the relationship between costs, risks and advantages in the relationships.[43] This is the reason why almost all wars since 1945 have taken place in the Third World countries.[44]These wars were called the proxy wars. Korean and Vietnam War, Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet Union are the most important ones. NATO was successful enough to keep the armed conflicts away from the Euro-Atlantic geography. The sad reality is highly industrialized countries found ways to avoid destructive wars amongst each other but they tried to solve their political antagonism in the geography of poor countries. Nuclear weapons brought nuclear peace for a while for some states in the form of a kind of a stalemate which is called Cold War.

NATO was not simply about defending the West against the Soviet threat. During the Cold War NATO became the institutionalization of the relations between USA and Western Europe. For this reason, the role of NATO in the Cold War years was, in the words of NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, *to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and Germans down*.

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[42] Pekka Sivoven, "European Security: New, Old and Borrowed", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 27, No.1 (Nov. 1990), p. 385
[43] Kalevi J. Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 286
[44] **Ibid**., p. 285

After the end of World War II, Germany was occupied by Allied states on the basis of partition such as *...the northern part of what would later become West Germany was occupied by British forces, the southern part of future West Germany was controlled by American forces, and the remaining eastern parts of Germany were to be occupied by the Russian army.… The protocol was modified in 1945 to create a small French zone in the very South-Western corner of Germany, which was achieved by reducing the size of the British and American zones of occupation.*[45]

With the military defeat of Nazi Germany, a power vacuum resulted in Continental Europe. Both the US and USSR sought to fill this power vacuum. Following the Potsdam conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, US President Harry Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, worked out the occupation and administration of post-war Germany.[46] In February, 1948, to reach a comprehensive German settlement, the USA, the UK, and French representatives, later joined by representatives from the Benelux countries, met in London to decide what to do about Germany.[47] The situation that developed in Berlin was the spark that galvanised the allies "commitment" to the formation of NATO. Soviet and Allied goals for the occupied city quickly came into conflict.

The Western occupation powers also decided to finalize plans to set up a liberal democratic West German state and to reform the economy of West Germany and

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[45] Stephen Redding and Daniel M. Sturm, "The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German Division and Reunification", **Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper** No. 688 (May, 2005), p. 7.
[46] McGeehan, Robert., **The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defence after World War II**. Chicago: UP of Illinois 1971. p.12.
[47] David S. Painter, "**German Question and the Cold War**", 1995, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, p.2.

West Berlin by means of the introduction of a new currency.[48] Soviet Union tried to delay the implementation of the London Program by applying pressure to the vulnerable western enclave in Berlin.[49]Soviet Union blockaded the section of Berlin located in their occupation zone, and put a stop to all highway and railway traffic to and from the western parts of the city.[50] Despite the blockade, the Western powers supplied West Berlin with water, and food through the use of an air corridor.

In response to the worsening situation in Berlin, President Truman agreed not just to a massive airlift operation to supply the city of Berlin, but also to the deployment of three medium bomb groups of B-29 Superfortresses to airbases in England.[51]Soviets retreated and lifted the blockade.

The crisis in Berlin, combined with common perceptions of internal political instability and the Soviet's attitude towards Eastern Europe, had convinced the Western allies that a swift security commitment had to be put in place. It was also quickly apparent that NATO could be an institution that would confer a degree of political stability in a highly dangerous international environment.

The advance of Soviet influence in Europe and sharpening tension over Germany compelled the United States to begin revising its policy in Europe.[52] In the initial stages of the US occupation of Germany, the US lacked a policy with regard to the

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[48] Klaus Larres, "International and Security Relations within Europe", In M. Fulbrook (Ed.) **Europe Since 1945**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 202

[49] Avi Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War", **International Affairs**, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 1983-1984), p. 3

[50]Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih 1918 – 1994 (9th ed.),** Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2001 p. 251

[51] Ken Young, "US 'Atomic Capability' and the British Forward Bases in the Early Cold War", **Journal of Contemporary History,** Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), p. 117

[52] W. Friedman, **An Introduction of World Politics (5th ed.),** London, Melbourne, Toronto; New York: Macmillan and St Martin's Press, 1968, p. 103

future of Germany. The US foreign policy began to be defined in 1947 rapidly after World War II, with the emergence of the so-called Truman Doctrine. According to the Truman Doctrine, the US would seek to confront and contain the communist and so called Soviet expansion around the globe.

This was the policy of "containment" directed against the Soviet Union and so called global communism. Greece and Turkey were the first test cases of this policy. The Truman Doctrine entailed the commitment of the US to contain communism and to wage a world-wide Cold War against it.[53]The Truman Doctrine constituted a form of shock therapy: it was a last ditch effort by the Administration to prod Congress and the American people into accepting the responsibilities of the world leadership which one year earlier [1946], largely because of the public opinion, Washington officials had assumed by deciding to get tough with Russia.[54]The events in China also contributed to the anti-communism politics US political elite understood that communist gene was out of the battle and it was challenging the Western capitalist status quo in a very harsh way regardless the soft diplomatic efforts. As a result, brothers in the arms of World War II who fought together against he Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan became the enemies of the post war years.

George Kennan, recognized some of the dynamics of the Cold War in early days.

> "A North Atlantic Security Pact will affect the political war only insofar
> as it operates to stiffen the self-confidence of the Western Europeans in
> the face of Soviet pressures. Such a stiffening is needed and desirable. But

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[53] **Ibid**. p.26.
[54] John Lewis Gaddis, **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947**, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 351

it goes hand in hand with the danger of a general preoccupation with military affairs, to the detriment of economic recovery and of the necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to Europe's difficulties."[55]

Author of the "long telegram" had seen the writings on the wall, long before the official declaration of the Truman doctrine. Later, George Kennan declared the master plan for containment policy in his article posted on Foreign Affairs Journal. One can say that the containment strategy worked very well until the demise of the Soviet Union.

The President Truman had pointed out in the Truman doctrine that the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured in misery. So while the containment policy began with military assistance, it was quickly assisted by a plan of economic aid that was conceived in the State Department.[56] President Truman and the US State Department also saw the correlation between the economic and security realm in Western Europe. Modern Military aid needs an modern economic infrastructure to support it.

The Marshall Plan entailed the commitment of 13 billion dollars of US aid to the new members of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation[57] and after four years of operation had assisted in producing phenomenal economic growth in recipient countries of Europe, with industrial production increasing by 35% between

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[55] Kennan, G., "Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact", **Foreign Relations of the United States**, Vol. 3, pp. 153-158
[56] Kaplan, L., (1988), **NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance**, Twayne Publishers, Boston, p. 15.
[57] Recipient countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and West Germany.

1948 and 1952 and agricultural production surpassing pre-war levels.[58] It is hard to separate the Marshall Plan from the formation of NATO as a part overall strategy to enable a comprehensive European recovery.

> "America committed herself under the Truman Doctrine (March, 1947) to the economic reconstruction and protection of Greece and Turkey against Communism…. [Besides] to keep the disrupted and discouraged democratic nations of Europe from falling, one by one, into hands of communism or other dictatorial parties, the United States would supply the money and materials necessary to revitalize the European economy."[59]

Simultaneous cooperation in the economic realm formed a foundation through the Marshall Plan. Having made a massive economic commitment to Western Europe it was easier for the US to take the next step - the Marshall Plan can be seen to have underpinned security cooperation. The US recognized that economic wellbeing was essential for European countries to defend themselves against the external threat from the Soviets.

Between 1947 and 1949 a series of threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, and Turkey, confrontations in the Middle East, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Blockade of Berlin, brought a rethinking of Western security policy towards the Soviet Union.[60] Truman finally went for a global strategy in 1950 after reading the NSC Memorandum 68 about a Soviet atomic weapon explosion in August 1949. This,

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[58] Grogin, R. C. (2001), **Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-1991**, Lexington Books, p. 18.
[59] George B. De Huzar and Alfred De Grazia, Jr, **International Relations (2ⁿᵈ ed.)**, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1953, pp. 120-121
[60] Ernest R May, **Lessons of the Past**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973, pp. 19-51

coupled with Mao's victory in China (1949), led to a new global strategy for the United States during the Cold War climate. Soviet Union was seen to have become more than a political menace with the atomic weapons they have.

The sequence of events leading to the Berlin blockade began on March 17, 1948 when Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Defense Pact, a mutual defense treaty that was to last for fifty years.[61] The Brussels Treaty which modified into WEU, which later give its place to larger and geographically extensive framework of NATO.[62] NATO started with a political idea and with a strategy of containment and deterrence, and pursued this defense policy and strategy through the decades of the Cold War.[63] The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, established the basis for the development of a comprehensive strategy, structures, procedures, capabilities and military strategies.[64] Nonetheless, each member state brought national concerns and interests to the NATO Alliance as well.[65] The Washington treaty laid the basis for the collective defence organization, but detailed answers on the military command network, the military strategy, and the strategic and tactical force structure were postponed until further negotiations, due to the common understanding of the main threat for the Western democracies security.

The original transatlantic bargain was a bargain between the U.S. and its original European states with the militarily modest but politically important participation of

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[61] El-Agraa, Ali M., **The European Union: Economics and Policies**. A.M.El-Agraa, ed. London: 2001 Pearson Education. p. 26.

[62] Rees, G. Wyn., **Western European Union**. US: Westview Press,1998. p.5.

[63] Lord Ismay, **NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954**, Bosch - Utrecht, Netherlands, 1954, p. 10

[64] Sean Kay, **NATO and the Future of European Security**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford-England, 1998, pp. 35-50

[65] Douglas Stuart and William Tow, **The Limits of the Alliance**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 5-8

Canada. The deal, was that the United States would contribute to the defense of Europe and to Europe's economic recovery from the World war if the Europeans would organize themselves to help defend against the Soviet threat and use the economic aid efficiently.[66]Europeans at the end used the economic aid of USA very well and continental Europe again became one of the biggest industrial centre of the Western World. NATO's security umbrella provided conditions European democracies to stand and survive against the Soviet threat.

A year after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the British held a conference in London in 1950 which laid out the basic policy objectives for United Kingdom. The aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power and the transformation of the "special relationship" into a more effective partnership with U.S. Cold War strategy. For a while Winston Churchill's personal prestige and skill of British diplomacy created a illusion of Britain's enduring great-power status after World War II. But after the founding of NATO "special relationship" between Britain and USA deteriorated.

The North Atlantic Treaty was designed to counter Soviet Union expansion and military power. But the Treaty itself was based on common values, named no enemy, protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to accommodate changing international circumstances.[67]The U.S. director for mutual security Averill Harriman, declared on the third anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty: *Through NATO, we are*

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[66] Stanley R. Sloan, **NATO*, *The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered**, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 1.
[67] Sloan, p. 3.

working for the common defense against aggression. Through NATO, we are working for economic expansion and the prosperity of all our peoples. Through NATO, we are seeking to release the intellectual and social forces which are our common heritage.[68]This was the liberal understanding of the NATO during the early years. The West versus communist bloc formulation worked very well until the France's 'independent' foreign and national security policies create cracks on the monolith of the NATO alliance.

It took the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 to put the "O" in NATO – that is, to persuade the Allies to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime and to establish the presumption of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe. The attack against South Korea was perhaps a prelude or distracting feint before a Communist attack against Western Europe.[69]The unifying force in the beginning of NATO's political history was the Korean War.   USA had been one of the major players in Asia-Pacific throughout the nineteenth century. American policy makers envisioned the North Korean invasion of Korean peninsula as part of the global Communist assault against the Western democracies. The Truman administration assumed that Soviet Union had incited the North Korea to test NATO's resolve. USA embraced the NATO alliance and intended to fortify it and turn it to a military organization.

In January 1951 General Eisenhower became first supreme commander (SACEUR) and General Montgomery, became his deputy. The Shape headquarters was

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[68] Ian Q. R. Thomas, **The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination**, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997, p. 36.
[69] David S. Yost, **NATO Transformed**, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, pp. 29-30

established in 1951, taking over the work of the preliminary five European Regional Planning Groups.[70]After the integration of Greece and Turkey into NATO, on 18 February 1952, and the Lisbon Summit from 20 to 25 February 1952, the need to adapt the existing Strategic Concept became evident.[71]When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in January 1953, the overall role of nuclear weapons, as a means of last resort weapon, changed to one of being possibly a weapon of first resort to balance Soviet military power.

During the National Security Council (NSC) meeting, 30 October 1953, this change of role became evident: The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked.[72] The new policy was relatively cheap compare to the older one and the 1960s flexible response strategy. But there was a problem of credibility of the nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union.

In NSC-162/2, National Security Policy analyzes the nature of Soviet threat, the implications for U.S. alliances and foreign policy commitments, and the national security requirements.[73]Some of the factors, which tended to slow down the necessary build up of strength and cohesion, are summarized in the NSC 162/2:

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[70] Richard L. Kugler, **Commitment to Purpose**, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p. 55
[71] Lawrence S. Kaplan, **NATO and the United States**, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, pp.58-59
[72] N.N., NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, Washington, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol.11, p. 585
[73] David Alan Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill, Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 1945-1960, in: **International Security**, Spring 1983, vol.7, No.4, pp. 27-35

The economic and military recovery...has given them [NATO Allies] a greater sense of independence from U.S. guidance and direction...A major weakness is the instability of the governments of certain NATO partners, such as Italy and France. The colonial issue in Asia and Africa ...Age-old issues such as divide France and Germany, or Italy and Yugoslavia, still impede creation of a solid basis of cooperation against the Soviet threat.... Many Europeans fear that American policies, particular in the Far East, may involve Europe in general war, or will indefinitely prolong Cold War tensions.... Many have serious doubts whether the defense requirements can be met without intolerable political and economic strains. Certain of our allies fear the rearmament of Germany...[74]

U.S. decided to strengthen British, French, and German cooperation in the field of defense to overcome the danger of disorder and to improve the means of collective defense.[75]This approach in the long run created the environment for independent European security identity visa vis U.S. and NATO. Although US leadership in NATO was only challenged by De Gaul's France during the later years and severely in 1966, in the early years of the Cold War US was setting the course for NATO as the captain of the Western World.

NATO's first strategy was based on nuclear deterrence and an early use of nuclear weapons. This had considerable attractions for the European states, relying on the American nuclear arsenal without the need for maintaining national conventional

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[74] N.N., NSC-162/2, 30 October 1953, Washington, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol.II, pp. 586-587
[75] J. Michael Legge, **Ibid**.pp.2-7.

forces at a level that was unattainable in view of the political and economic situation in Europe.[76]In February 1955 the U.S. Technological Capabilities Panel, stated that the Soviet Union was capable of damaging U.S. territory and that this threat would drastically increase in the next 3-5 years, owing to new technological developments in the delivery systems and hydrogen bombs.[77]Although USA took on more and more foreign responsibilities, Eisenhower as president cut the military budget for conventional arms and reduced the number of army personal. As a result, USA decided to depend for deterrence mainly on nuclear weapons.

NATO strategy, based on "massive retaliation" incurred criticisms. How would NATO deal with minor assaults, for example Soviet Union occupation of West Berlin? Could the United States use its nuclear arsenal in a limited conflict? Even when the Korean battle seemed most desperate USA could not use atomic weapons after all. Massive retaliation strategy assumed that the USSR would permanently remain much inferior in nuclear technology and USA would remain invulnerable to a Soviet attack.

The incorporation of West Germany into the alliance in 1955 had strategic benefits for the alliance. Germany 's presence was vital to NATO 's capacity to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion, and German personnel complemented the deterrence of the alliance considerably. Germany 's economic strength, geographical size and population meant that it would always be a significant power in Europe.

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[76] J. Michael Legge, **Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response**, Rand,Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 5
[77] David Alan Rosenberg, **The Origins of Overkill**, Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 1945-1960, in: International Security, vol.7, No.4, Spring 1983, pp.38-40

There were two perspectives inside the NATO. The first of these was the fact that, while the Federal Republic viewed rearmament and institutional membership as a way to obtain rehabilitation and equality, the European allies planned institutional membership as a way to keep Germany permanently subordinate. The second was that, for Washington, German rearmament would potentially allow for a reduced US military presence in Europe, but for the European members it would necessitate the *maintenance* of that presence.[78] There were different conflicting views on West-German accession within NATO. The benefit of West Germany 's reincorporation into the Western democracies security system, was not viewed in the pesitive way by all of the NATO alliance members.

West Germany's entry into the Alliance and its re-armament became a crucial point for the realization of the political and military goals of the Alliance.[79] West Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself expected from the re-armament the chance of obtaining full sovereignty. His policy at the beginning of the 1950s was aimed at integrating West Germany into the political and military structures of the Western community.[80] The question of German rearmament was also seen as an essential issue to resolve in light of the emerging sense of threat from the Soviet. German accession to NATO thus offered a solution to some of the most important post-war security issues as German forces would be integrated into the NATO command structure and would not be under the sole control of the German state.

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[78] Smith, M., (2000*),* **NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance**, Palgrave, New York, p. 107.
[79] Sean Kay, **NATO and the Future of European Security**, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford England, 1998, pp. 54-56
[80] Douglas Stuart and William Tow, **The Limits of the Alliance**, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 53-55

The proposal for the German rearmament by the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden found approval. West Germany's armed forces were supposed to be under SACEUR's (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) operational control in times of war and under supervision and inspection in times of peace. West Germany accepted restrictions as to the structure and armament before the treaty could be signed, in October 1954 in Paris.[81]The establishment of NATO and the fact that West Germany became a member of on May 6 1955 was considered as a threat by the Soviet Union. In reaction, the Soviet Union urged Eastern European states to create a deterrent military alliance.

As a result, eight eastern bloc states held a conference in Warsaw on May 11, 1955. These states reached a consensus that the ratification of the Paris agreement means that a new military group, the Western European Union, in which a remilitarized West Germany would participate, increased the danger of armed conflict and created a threat to their national security.[82]All participant states (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R.) concluded the meeting by signing the Warsaw Treaty Organization on May 14, 1955.

German strategic thinking in the nuclear age was driven by two fundamental principles: there had to be a commitment to equal security within the alliance and the use of nuclear weapons to defend Germany if necessary to do so, and Germany ought not to become a nuclear battlefield for the sake of American geopolitics.[83]In the

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[81] Lawrence S. Kaplan, **NATO and the United States**, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994, pp. 62-63
[82] "Warsaw Collective Security Pact", **International Organization**, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1955), p. 445
[83] Beatrice Heuser, NATO, **Britain, France and the FRG**, St. Martins Press, New York, 1997, p. 146

changing environment of East-West relations at the end of the 1960's, the new chancellor Willy Brandt, initiated Ostpolitik in a major break with the German past.USA and western Europeans de facto acceptence of the Berlin wall drove German chancellor to try a new approach to German foreign policy.

German Chancellor Willy Brandt, initiated a policy aimed at closer relations with the Eastern Europe states, which led in 1970-1971 to treaties between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland and an accommodation with the East German regime. Brandt's policy created an atmosphere which encouraged detente. And the fruition of this *Ostpolitik* was the Helsinki agreement, signed at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[84]*Ostpolitik* made the unificication of two Germanys in 1990 possible. Helsinki agreement on the other hand fueled the human rights movements in Eastern communist countries which at the end finished the communist rule and torn apart the so called *Iron Curtain*.

Another seminal moment in NATO 's Cold War evolution came with the production of the Harmel Report in 1967. The report followed on from the French withdrawal from the alliance 's integrated military command structure, and came at a time of easing tensions with the Soviets, as a result of détente policy.

The report was written by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. He recognised the changing context in which the alliance was operating and saw the need for a comprehensive study on NATO 's future. Based on this military balance, the Harmel Report, which approved in 1967, underlined the Alliance's commitment to achieve

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[84] Gordon A. Craig, **Force and Statecraft**, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp.137-138; and Helsinki Final Act, CSCE, 1 August 1975, available (online): <www.osce.org' /indexe-da.htm>

progress in seeking detente through dialogue with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.[85]In the 1967 Harmel Report, the two main purposes of the Atlantic Alliance were recalled in a classic formulation. The first purpose was to maintain sufficient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to defend the Allies in the event of aggression, and to assure the balance of force, as a result creating a climate of stability, security, and confidence. Fulfilment of the first aim would create a basis for the second: to pursue the search of progress toward a more stable and peaceful relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.[86]It was no surprise thar European partners of NATO was seeking peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europe was under constant threat of a massive invasion by armed divisions of the Warsaw Pact and there were no, one hundred percent guarantee for the successful deterrence of NATO.

Harmel aspired to narrow the political divide between the two blocs, to reduce Soviet paranoia, to temper the Warsaw Pact's aggressive instincts, and to lessen the danger of war breaking out over unresolved disputes. MC 14/3 endeavored to render war less likely by shoring up NATO's deterrent, and to make war more manageable and less prone to runaway escalation if it did occur. The effect was to be a two-fold contribution to NATO's security: better relations with the adversary and a more stable military balance of power.[87]The most important thing to understand about the Harmel report was the effect it had in recognizing, the alliance's transition from a military agreement to an institution with a clear political role. The report also encouraged a

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[85] Helga Haftendom, **NATO and the Nuclear Revolution** - A Crisis of Credibility 1966-1967, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 320-386

[86] David S. Yost, **NATO Transformed**, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998,pp. 35-36

[87] Richard Kugler**, Commitment to Purpose**, Rand, Santa Monica, 1993, p. 185

greater degree of coordination with policies towards the Soviets.[88]The timing of the report was the period when the Western Europe developing with full throttle in economic field and it was vital for France, Germany, Italy to have a relatively peaceful environment or at least a stable one.

NATO was creating an atmosphere by which security more generally could be achieved both within the alliance and with the Soviets.[89] The Harmel report demonstrates one of the most important aspects of NATO's evolution in its history, that when threat levels diminish, political and institutional consolidation or stabilization can occur. Although some questioned the importance of the alliance during *détente*, member states of the alliance ended up reaffirming their commitment to NATO. This again shows the ability and the trend of the alliance to transform from a collective defence agreement to a kind of collective security system.

With John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara a new phase of restructuring of the American security and foreign policy started, during which the role of nuclear weapons was redefined and new decisions regarding the introduction of flexible response doctrine.[90] Because of the risks of the all-out nuclear war and the destruction of the whole civilization J.F.Kennedy administration had sought for alternative options other than the *massive retaliation* strategy. As with the massive retaliation strategy, the origins of the *flexible response* strategy lay in evolution of the U.S. foreign policy.

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[88] Joe Burton, **NATO after the Cold War:Explaining the Durability of the Atlantic Alliance in a New Global Context**. Phd thesis. University of Otago,Dunedin ,New Zealand. February,2012.,p.94.
[89] Ibid.p.95
[90] Michael Mandelbaum, **The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons**, 1946-1976, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp. 69-78;

The massive retaliation strategy was developed at a time when U.S. territory was not endangered by Soviet low range nuclear missiles. In October 1957 this situation dramatically changed, when the Soviets successfully launched its first earth satellite known as Sputnik.[91] This technology demonstration of the Soviet Union meant that U.S. could be targeted by ICBMs. There were strong reasons for changes in NATO strategy: The lack of credibility in the unlimited war concept; the Soviet technological advance due to the Sputnik and other space missions; and the 13 days Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which nearly triggered a nuclear war.

This process started with the second Berlin Crisis, when the Soviets used Berlin as a lever to weaken Western alliance cohesion in the NATO. From the Soviet's view Berlin was a good opportunity for limited hostile activities to test NATO's credibility as the free access to Berlin was a main security and prestige issue of the Western Allies.[92] A NATO strategy that would have called for the employment of nuclear weapons only as a countermeasure in the event of a nuclear attack would have made West Germany vulnerable to conventional attacks by the Eastern block. West Germany agreed to a flexible response only when the Americans managed to convince them of their willingness to defend Germany's territory with both conventional and nuclear weapons.

At the ministerial meeting of the NAC, in Athens, 5 May 1962, McNamara advocated a continuous examination of the balance between conventional and nuclear forces. Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years.

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[91] Michael Mandelbaum, The **Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons**, 1946-1976, Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp.60-68,
[92] Richard Reeves, **President Kennedy - Profile of Power,** Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993, pp. 175-184,

The unprecedented destructiveness...has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. ...The question at issue now is the point at which NATO, not the Soviets, would wish to escalate a non-nuclear conflict. ...it simply is not credible that NATO, or anyone else, would respond to a given small step - the first slice of salami - with immediate use of nuclear weapons.[93]

The recommendations to change the existing massive retaliation strategy aroused the European Allies criticism. The French, whose attempts to create an independent nuclear force were directly attacked by the American Secretary of Defense, reacted with open hostility, the French government perceived the McNamara strategy as another proof that the United States was about to withdraw from its alliance commitment.[94]It was clear that US does not want to involve in all out nuclear war during the chaotic dynamics of the Cold War. This approach later became the main reason of France's withdrawal from the NATO'S military command and building up its own nuclear arsenal.

Kennedy administration's arguments for a change of strategy followed two paths. The vulnerability of the USA systems should be reduced by a flexible response, and the risk of unavoidable global destruction by means of all out nuclear weapons had to be minimized.[95]The flexible response strategy identified three types of response: First,

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[93] McNamara, Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 5 May 1962, in: **Foreign Relations of the United States**, 1961-1963, vol.VIII, pp. 275- 283

[94] Thomas Risse-Kappen, **Cooperation among Democracies**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1995, p. 185

[95] Gordon A. Craig, **Force and Statecraft**, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, chapter XV Crisis Management, pp. 213-216

seeking to defeat the enemy on the same level; second, escalating deliberately by expanding intensity of combat; and third, responding according to the old doctrine of a general nuclear war.

Such a policy clearly entailed risk; there was widespread agreement that if deterrence failed, deliberate escalation would be extremely difficult to control once it reached the nuclear level. But both the American and the European Allies were prepared to accept this, although for essentially different reasons: the Europeans because the threat to use TNW (Tactical Nuclear Weapons) represented the best way of "coupling" the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe, and for the Americans it offered the best hope of preventing a major land battle in Europe from escalating to an all-out strategic exchange.[96]After the fall of the Berlin wall some of retired Soviet Union security experts of the Cold War era argued that *flexible response* strategy was a naïve strategy and there was no way to prevent total nuclear war in the event of the first minutes of the nuclear escalation even if it were to be started by tactical nuclear weapons level.

Under the new strategy, the role of NATO's limited ground forces in Europe was viewed as a means of compelling an aggressor to mobilize for an attack, thereby giving NATO advance warning, and holding the aggressor as far forward as possible until nuclear retaliation could take place. The strategy thus became widely known as the so-called "tripwire"[97] During the Cold War, the European allies often resisted U.S. proposals to strengthen NATO's conventional forces because doing so would in their view devalue the U.S. pledge to use nuclear deterrence to repel an attack from the

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[96] J. Michael Legge, **Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response**, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 10
[97] J. Michael Legge, **Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response**, Rand, Santa Monica, April, 1983, p. 5

east.[98] This observation illustrates the internal friction in NATO which is also related to the burden shifting concept. Paradoxically European allies saw the conventional built up compare to nuclear arsenal, as a negative factor linked to the nuclear deterrence of NATO alliance.

The superpowers would refrain from attacking each other because of the certainty of mutual assured destruction, better known by its acronym, MAD. This theory, which underpinned the Cold War, epitomized the cold reality of the nuclear balance of power: to start a war would mean almost certain self-destruction.[99]But this understanding did not prevent proxy wars between the two blocks. In retrospect, it appears remarkable that all the U.S.-Soviet Union confrontations be regulated without ending in a world war. The reason behind that has been the common fear of an all out nuclear war. Khrushchev one of his speech neatly summed up the Cold War's nuclear paradox: each side devoted huge resources to developing weapons it hoped never to use. Their strategic value lay in deterring the other side.

The superpowers had learned some fundamental tactics for managing their rivalry. Arms control measures and crisis avoidance strategies were established to prevent unforeseen developments in military technology and major changes in the force structure, which could destabilize the status quo of the Cold War.[100] The U.S. accepted the Soviet Union as a superpower in general and legitimized the division of Europe in a diplomatic manner.

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[98] Thies, Wallace J., **Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO**. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003,p.254.

[99] Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, **Cold War: an illustrated history, 1945-1991**, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, p. 231

[100] Michael Mandelbaum, **The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons**, 1946-1976,Cambridge University Press, London, 1979, pp. 191-208;

United States entered into a variety of formal diplomatic agreements with the Soviet Union in the economic and commercial sphere to overcome political tensions, and set norms and rules for the competition between the two superpowers.[101]These policies reduced the European states dominance in the world politics. For France and Western Germany status quo on the European continent was unacceptable and ending the Cold War was their main foreign policy pillar.

The main criticisms against detente were: first that linkage had not produced the results the administration had promised; second that the global military balance had been allowed to shift in favor of the Soviet Union; third that excessive concentration on relations with Russia and China had led to the neglect or distortion of other pressing issues; and fourth that no attempt had been made to maintain the foundation of morale principle upon which United States foreign policy had to rest if it was to command support at home and respect abroad.[102]Although *detent* policy had some problems it provided stability in the bipolar Superpower politics until the deployment of SS-20 missiles and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Major success of the *detent* was, preventing the Cuban missile crisis type confrontations.

The deployment of the SS 20 [Intermediate-Range Missile] by the Soviet Union in 1977 marked a new chapter in relations between Warsaw Pact and West.[103]In pursuing détente with the U.S., the Soviet Union was developing means and probability to wage a limited nuclear war in European theatre.

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[101] Gordon A. Craig**, Force and Statecraft**, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 136-146
[102] John Lewis Gaddis, **Strategies of Containment**, Oxford University Press, New York, 1982, pp. 309- 310
[103] Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing**, Cold War: an illustrated history**, 1945-1991, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1998, pp. 316-319

There was the danger that the strategic nuclear deterrence practiced by the U.S. could be separated from the defense of Western Europe. Therefore, Germany, United Kingdom, France and USA agreed upon a common dual-track strategy. In December 1979 the NAC adopted a resolution concerning the dual-track position and the deployment of 572 Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe.[104]But this approach to the deterrence problem started another debate in Western Europe about the validity of the tactical nuclear deterrence of NATO. There was a risk of tactical nuclear war with short range missiles on European soil without Risking U.S. and Soviet Unions involment in a larger scale of nuclear war. This strategic thinking was increasing the risk of war on European continent while reducing the risk of all out nuclear war.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 lead to an opinion for Americans and NATO members that the detente policy which had not brought the desired success. As a result, after Jimmy Carter's term in the office Republican U.S. president Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and started Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI) program.

The NATO Alliance fully matured in the 1980s. It was a decade of strategic resurgence followed by the end of the Cold War. U.S. President Ronald Reagan mounted a military buildup by increasing defense spending, modernizing strategic forces, and launching the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) also known as "star wars" for ballistic missile defense.[105] This military program highly popularized during the

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[104] Thomas Risse-Kappen, **Cooperation among Democracies**, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 190
[105] Richard L. Kugler, **NATO Chronicle: The Cold War Years**, 1999, p. 12

1980s with the "star wars" term. Soviet Union could not answer this technological challenge and had showed first signs of demise.

President Ronald Reagan promised to strengthen U.S. military power, to restore containment, deterrence, and respect for American power.[106] Return to dominance was the credo of Reagan's policy.[107]Some analysts believe that Soviet Union's staggered economy could not compete with these new developments and Reagan's aggressive foreign policy caused Soviet Union's ultimate collapse.

With the breakup of the Soviet Empire, the dissolution of NATO alliance was not considered reasonable. As Hungarian Prime Minister Jozef Antall said in October 1991: The point is that NATO should assume responsibility for the security of the region lying between its borders and the Soviet border. The legal and organizational issues are of secondary importance.[108]The domino effect that Gorbachev set in motion in 1985 finally came to end in 1991.As a result Germany was reunited, the Warsaw pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union itself imploded. The Baltic and Central Asia republics regained the independence. These dramatic changes left the USA as the sole Superpower in the world politics.

It is possible to say that Cold War period was a success story for NATO. The Trans-Atlantic alliance won against its rival Warsaw pact at the end. Without firing a single shot, during the era of 1949 and 1990 NATO strategies based on the deterrence concept worked very well.

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[106] Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, **Reagan and Gorbachev**, Vintage Books New York 1987, pp. 27-42,47-66
[107] Lawrence Friedman, **The Price of Peace**, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1986, p. 142
[108] Jozsef Antall, quoted in Celestine Bohlen, Tensions in Other Countries Raise Concerns in Hungary, **New York Time**s, 13 October 1991, p. 6

2. TRANSFORMATION OF NATO IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIROMENT

2.1. Political and Geographical Transformation

"NATO is now an Alliance that opposes no one" Sergio Balanzino, deputy secretary general of NATO 22 June 1994

After the Cold War NATO entered a period of transformation which has two pillars: namely political and geographical. Political transformation is about redefining the reason d'état of the Atlantic alliance. And the geographical transformation is the enlargement process of NATO.

2.1.1. Transformation of NATO in the 21st century

The supporters of NATO's presence in the 21st century insist on its transformation into a body that can go 'out of area' as the strategic locations of the 21st century security challenges are located 'out-of NATO's area'. But some thinkers suggest that for this reason NATO is obsolete and it cannot do this.

It is not NATO having an identity and spreading its liberal values to new member states through socialization, and interaction; it is the dominant power USA in the Alliance promoting liberal values and institutions, creating the underlying rules of the game, helping other member states to commit themselves to these rules, making states aligned to those of it. NATO, today, does not need exclusively a limited transatlantic character. This situation gives a global perspective for the future of the transforming

NATO in which geographical limits and definitions losing weight in favor of western political, cultural and economic values.

USA has less interest in maintaining a tight alliance structure. It also aims to enlarge the number of value-bound democratic states through various degrees of partnerships. Each degree creates another hierarchy and an incentive for ranking higher, where each promotion would require an increase in contribution. Although some human right abuses and civilian causalities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq puts some question marks to the minds of international community about the validity and honesty about these values in Western foreign policy calculations.

Post-Cold War international society is characterized by much greater political uncertainty and moral ambiguity than the bipolar East-West conflict when international relations were perceived in much more black and white terms.[109] In an interdependent world in the Twenty-First Century, international organizations have gained an ever-larger influence on the global political scene amid debate about the meaning of this globalization process.[110]Liberal understanding of the World gained momentum with the rapid development of the international trade. Collapse of the Soviet Union without any armed conflict with NATO gave boost to international optimism for the future of the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflicts. Unfortunately end of the bipolar era brought the bloody religious and ethnic conflicts to the surface. The *perpetual peace* dream of the liberalism is still far away and as one

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[109] Adrian Hyde-Price, "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force", **European Security,** 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 334.
[110] Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," **International Journal**, 45:4 (1990), 731.

of the early realists of the past, King Solomon said "There is nothing new under the Sun."

Post-Cold War period' definitions include "the new paradigm of Empire"[111], "monopoly of the core"[112], "hegemonic project of transnational capitalist class"[113], "geopolitical identities in flux in which there is no hegemonic understanding of the world order", "US imperial dominance with little or no competition"[114] , "neoimperialist project designed through development"[115] end of history"[116],all these new definitions shows the diversity of the perception of the post bipolar era. It is clear that until the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia in 2015 NATO countries did not feel under serious security threat from a nation state. But in the form of international terrorism NATO had faced a military challenge as a result of the Sepemper 11 attacks in US soil in 2001 which started a new period in the transformation process of NATO.

One of the main elements of NATO politics in the transformation process is the concept of Multiretalism. O. Keohane, describes multilateralism as the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions and distinguishes multilateralism as specific to interstate relations and inter-government relations. Other transnational

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[111] Stanley Aronowitz, "The New World Order", in **Debating Empire**, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, (Verso, London, 2003), p.19-20.
[112] Samir Amin, Beyond US Hegemony, (Zed Books, London, 2006), p.3.
[113] William I.Robinson, "Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational Hegemony", **Critical Review of International School and Political Philosophy**, 8:4, (December 2005), p.1-11.
[114] Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies: Contextualizing the Human Security Agenda", **Institute of International Relations**, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper, No.30, (April 2000), p.1.
[115] Henry Veltmeyer, **Globalisation and Antiglobalisation**, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hants, 2004), p.1-2.
[116] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", **Reader**, (1989), p.114.

organizations or alliances, such as those in business or humanitarian aid remain outside of his conception of multilateralism.[117]

Two competing sets of ideas connected to multilateralism drove U.S. foreign policy makers in the immediate period after WWII. The first set of ideas was political in nature and derived from fundamental beliefs regarding the balance of power and the desired number of poles in the international system. The second set of ideas concerned the military and command/control considerations of nuclear deterrence.[118]NATO was established as a result of this multilateral perspective and it is still evolving in this path. By initiating a multilateral effort, NATO was expected not only to serve as the framework for military preparations against communist aggression, but also to provide the political framework for negotiations with its communist adversaries.[119]

One of the important aspects of post-Cold War period in history is the rise of multilateralism. Strong influential institutions as the UN and NATO are increasingly mentioned in the news as independent political actors and their role is undeniable.[120] The main and concrete feature of current international institutional arrangements is their multilateral form.[121] The multilateralism in world politics has been a key

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[117] Keohane, "Multilateralism," pp.731-732.

[118] Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," **International Organization** 46:3 (1992): 634.

[119] Ian Q. R. Thomas, **The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination**, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997)p.92.

[120] Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the **"New Europe:" The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War**, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005),p. 216.

[121] John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," **International Organization**, 46:3 (1992), p.598.

component of post-WWII international arrangements.[122] The meaning of multilateralism, its implementation in international organizations is largely unrecognized by theorists as well as by makers of foreign policy.[123]Liberal thinkers think that bilateral agreements are discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict.[124]Multilateralism was always one of the key factor of U.S. foreign policy especially after the defeat in Vietnam War as a result of lack of *multilateral* coalition. After learning the importance of coalition building and using resources of the international organizations. U.S. never repeated the same mistake again. With this understanding NATO became a critical security organization in U.S. EU relations. NATO not only has capabilities of large military projections but also it creates a kind of legitimacy in its operations because of the large number of the member states even some of its actions questionable from the perspective of international Law.

The United States foreign and security policy is torn between the desire to act through multilateral institutions offering broad acceptance and legitimacy even if it can be difficult, on one hand and the temptation to act unilaterally the more efficient and often more promising option, on the other.[125]As a result of this dilemma in some situations US relations with NATO allies do not give desired results.

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[122] 1992Ian Q. R. Thomas, **The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination**, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1997), p.85.
[123] James A. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," **International Organization** 46:3 (1992), 599.
[124] Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers," **International Organization** 46:3 (1992): 682.
[125] Joachim Krause, "Multilateralism: Behind European Views," **The Washington Quarterly**, 27:2 (2004): p.45.

After the Cold War the NATO faced with another challenge: globalization. Globalization, as a process in which many different complex patterns of interconnections and interdependence have arisen in the late 20th century, which creates wealth for some people, nations and societies but, due to its unequal character it also creates inequalities for others by leaving them increasingly marginalized and it maximizes not only opportunities but also risks.[126]NATO faced globalization in a most undesirable and bizarre way with the diffusion of threats and increasing number of asymmetric threats. The reaction threshold of NATO as an effective military alliance is under a severe test. Successful adaptation to the new security environment is a question of life and death and the situation became critical when Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. Because NATO faces both classical geopolitical risks in the case of Russian invasion, and asymmetric threats in the form of international terrorism at the same time. For decades NATO's military structure and strategic concept was based on large scale conventional and nuclear warfare but when asymmetric terrorist threats became clear and present danger, unfortunately boot was on the other foot. NATO's force structure, training, strategic concept was not effective and ready.

It is a clear historical fact that the bipolar power politics was the cause of relatively balanced global system. The changing nature of security, threats, the duality of globalization, and identity-based fragmentation, and failed states[127] are not always in

[126] Christopher Coker, **Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risks**, New York: Oxford University Press [International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 345], June 2002, pp. 19-21.
[127] Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium", **Annals of the Association of American Geographers**, 90:1, (2000), p.168-169.

the interest of great powers, but systemic dynamics of geopolitical transition.[128] The redistribution of power at the global level is leading to a new form of multipolarity, and that increasing interdependence is affecting the prosperity and security of large powers and thus the broader international community.[129]According to Kenneth Waltz unipolarity "is the least durable international configuration"[130] compare to bipolarity and according to Zbigniew Brzezinski "America's global dominance will fade".[131]And eventually it is fading in a unpredicted rapid scale. This situation also weakens NATO in both political and strategic way. As a result NATO members put more and more emphasis on nuclear weapons in the case of worst comes to the worst.

The traditional approaches to security based on the realist assumptions about the anarchic nature of international relations is less and less relevant when it comes to understanding the more complex and diffuse nature of security risks and challenges in the modern world.[132] The concept of security dominated by the idea of national security defined in militarized terms has been undermined in the post-Cold War era and an expanded version of security concept defined in broader international terms to include political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects has been argued.[133] The fundamental human interests that deserve to be accommodated and secured include not only physical safety and public order, but also economic

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[128] Bruce W. Jentleson, "America's Global Role After Bush", **Survival**, 49:3, (Autumn 2007), p.195.

[129] Giovanni Grevi, "The Interpolar World: A New Scenario**, Occasional Paper 79**, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies (2009): p.9.

[130] Kenneth N.Waltz, "Intimations of Multipolarity" in **The New World Order, Contrasting Theories**, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (Macmillan Press, New York, 2000), p.1.

[131] Zbigniew Brzezinski, **The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership**, (Basic Books, New York, 2004), p. 213.

[132] Adrian Hyde-Price, "'Beware the Jabberwock!' Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century" edited by Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter, **Europe's New Security Challenges**, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 27-28.

[133] John Baylis, "International and Global Security in the post-Cold War Era" edited by Steve Smith and John Baylis, **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 254.

subsistence, a sustainable ecological environment, individual civic and property rights and opportunities for cultural and religious communities.[134]The new security agenda of the post-Cold War world is increasingly composed of more intangible and diffuse risks, since they lack the physicality and directness of the Cold War conflict, with its symmetric clear and present dangers coming from the Warsaw Pact. As a result, perceptions of insecurity by the publics of the NATO states increasing. NATO must prove itself that, it is not just a fair-weather friend on the eyes of the NATO states tax payers by a successful transformation.

From London to Rome, NATO was transformed from an Alliance dedicated to immediate collective defence against the possibility of a massive invasion to a new political military configuration, watching over peace in a time of transition and instability.[135] The necessary decisions to make the Atlantic alliance a community of values, security and a forum of political consultation on vital issues of foreign policy was taken in the Rome Summit. [136] In this way the NATO alliance would become the core security organization in the maze of a future Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which all states, irrespective of their size, geographical location, population, economic condition and military power must enjoy the same freedom, cooperation, peace and security.

The NATO's structure allows it to meet the requirements posed by modern security challenges that threaten its multinational interests. As the strategic environment

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[134] Seyom Brown, "World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security' edited by Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, **World Security: The Challenges for a New Century State**, New York: St. Martin's Press , 1998, p. 16.

[135] John R. Galvin, "From Immediate Defense Towards Long-Term Stability", **NATO Review**, December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 15,

[136] Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit", **NATO Review**, December 1991, Vol. 39(6), p. 8,

develops, the member-nations of the organization continually shape its goals, to overcome political, economic, and adversarial obstacles. As globalization increases, NATO members further cements itself under the umbrella of the organization's ideals. Throughout the last six decades, and into the twenty-first century, NATO maintains its relevance through continuous transformation, meeting the security demands of its member-nations, and embodies the characteristics of an institution.

In its simplest interpretation, transformation is understood as the application of information technologies to the conduct of modern warfare. But it also means a good deal more. Hans Binnendijk, describes transformation as the process of creating and harnessing a revolution in military affairs.[137] It includes new capabilities harnessed to new doctrine and new approaches to organization, training, and even culture.

With the growing importance of information technologies in post-modern societies, the military cannot escape adapting defense structure, adjusting doctrine and developing new weapon systems.[138] In a sense, transformation of military affairs and NATO's force strurcture addresses the obvious: the military culture is not isolated from other human activities. Political, cultural, societal, industrial and technological "transformations" have always had a direct impact on military affairs throughout history.

U.S. military is shifting from force-oriented to capability-oriented approaches to military planning; from attrition-based force on force warfare to effects-based operations; from terrain-based to time-based capabilities; and coordination across all

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[137] Hans Binnendijk, ed., **Transforming America's Military** (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002).,pp.1-30.
[138] Ibid.

military services. U.S. is focusing more on asymmetric threats. Pentagon is focusing on smart weapons, space-based systems, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) capabilities and technologies and practices that can save manpower and increase lethality and survivability.[139]The shift to small, light, and quickly deployable units have advantages over heavy slow and hard to transport units. This is clear as daylight but there is the other side of medallion which is the durability and the fire power problems of these units. As in the nature small fishes are fast but big fishes has its own advantages. Nevertheless, military technologies of NATO countries have trend of getting more and more computerized.

U.S. is spending huge amount of money from its defence budget compare to European allies of NATO to complete this technological transformation. Even if the European nations cannot raise their defense expenditure, they can reorganize their budgets that will allow them to spend more on expeditionary missions, as the US desires, in fulfilling the consequence management tasks that requires civilian capabilities. EDA(European Defense Agency) will play a critical role[140] in supporting US projects of having hi-technology smart weapons, sophisticated real-time reconnaissance systems and high speed data links.[141]But European allies are still far away closing the gulf of capabilities gap. In any case these debates have not stopped NATO nations from working together in relatively successful coordination in robust, complex and difficult missions from Kosovo to Kabul and Libya.

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[139] Paul K. Davis, **Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytic Community** (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002)

[140] Nick Witney, **Re-energizing of Europe's Security and Defense Policy**, (European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2008), p.37.

[141] Simon Duke, "The Future of EU-NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?", **Journal of European Integration**, 30:1, 27 – 43, (2008), p.37.

NATO's defense transformation agenda, will lack a compelling strategic purpose and in the end prove ineffective unless it is accompanied by the second part of a dual-track strategy that gives equal weight to NATO's political transformation and strategic realignment. The fact that most European allies did not participate meaningfully in the Afghanistan war demonstrated NATO's need for defense transformation, but the war in Iraq highlighted NATO's need for strategic realignment.

Europe cannot assume that it will not be a target of future terrorist attacks. If Alliance nations fail to defend their societies from a major attack using weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance will have failed in its most fundamental task.[142] It will be marginalized and the security of Europe and North America will be further diminished.[143] In past years NATO reforms of transformation period have focused on projecting force and coping with threats beyond the NATO area if necessary. But NATO's nations must be equally prepared to prevent, deter and, cope with the consequences of WMD attacks on their soil.

Effective NATO transformation will also depend on the degree to which European capabilities will be harnessed to the technological revolution driving the U.S. military, any successful European effort to develop transformational capabilities will have to be tailored to particularly European requirements which are connected to 'soft-power'

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[142] Terrence K. Kelly, "Transformation and Homeland Security: Dual Challenges for the US Army," **Parameters**, Summer 2003
[143] Jonathan Stevenson, "How Europe and America Defend Themselves," **Foreign Affairs,** March/April 2003.

policies, and will have to be done via the track of deeper European integration around the EU core.

Although Europe's overall economic potential rivals that of the U.S., European spending on military power is half that of the U.S.A. The U.S. spends close to six times what EU nations spend on military R&D which alone is greater than Germany's entire defense budget. There are spending gaps per service member. U.S. spending per active duty service member is almost four times that of Europe's.

Also, there are gaps in the cost-effectiveness of spending. Although Europeans spend about half what the U.S. spends, they get less than 50% return in terms of capability. These disparities add up to an enormous gap in capabilities between U.S. forces and European NATO forces. The discrepancies between European leaders and laggards are even greater than those between Europe and the United States.

Bearing in mind the traditional Clauswitzian adage that even in times of peace , war or in this case evolution of military concepts and doctrines "*is merely the continuation of policy by other means,*" the U.S. insisted that "transformation" rapidly become part of NATO's agenda and thus instrumentalized the concept during a transitional period.

Figure 2.1. Alliance defence expenditures as percentage of GDP

Figure 2.1. Source: NATO, www.NATO.int

Figure 2.1. shows that European allies of continental Europe are reluctant to invest in military technology and hardware as much as U.S. and United Kingdom. This situation hinders the cooperation and coordination which creates a capabilities gap in modern defence politics of NATO members. The capabilities gap also threatens to impose a debatable division of labour regarding global hot spots linked to NATO missions, with the U.S. primarily engaged in the high-risk, high-intensity hard military action and most Europeans doing the easy and sometimes profitable post-conflict reconstruction.

This kind of a division of labour encourages American unilateralism, European insularity, and mutual resentment. It leaves Americans with the world's most difficult military missions. It leaves Europeans with little influence on U.S. military

operations. This strategy is difficult to sustain politically even when there is a high degree of agreement on aims, as has been the case in the Balkans since 1995.[144] It becomes deeply corrosive when consensus doesn't prevail within the Alliance, as is the case regarding Iraq.[145]

As a result, the Europeans are developing lesser innovations and experiencing less change in the most advanced military capabilities. NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen's call for a "smart defense" approach may provide the most palatable solution, given the tightening of defense budgets. [146]Transformation is not about capabilities alone, but capabilities harnessed to new ways of conducting military action. As a result, European members of NATO find civilian or post conflict missions more suitable other than peace enforcement. Rome was not built in one day, NATO needs time to complete its transformation to become a global security organization.

2.1.2. NATO's partnerships and PfP program

NATO launched the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP) initiative during the Brussels annual summit of the North Atlantic Council in 1994. In that meeting, the Framework Document, which contains the program objectives, was presented. The purpose of the

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[144] David Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, **America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

[145] Simon Serfaty and Christina Balis, eds., *Visions* **of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations** (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004)

[146] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General, "NATO after Lybia," **Foreign Affairs** (July/August 2011): 1–3.

PfP was to response to the new security challenges of the post-Cold War. According to the 2001 *NATO Handbook*, the objectives are:

• to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting process;

• to ensure democratic control of defence forces;

• to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;

• to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently agreed;

• to develop over long term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.[147]

PfP was hailed as the cornerstone of a new security relationship between NATO and the newly democratic states in the Eastern Europe.[148] Launched in 1994, PfP became a structure for preparing candidate countries for membership through MAP, and encouraging defense sector reform in the post-communist East[149] which prompts cooperation between NATO and non-member states. Contemporary history of eastern Europe showed that PfP was one of the first steps toward full membership.

According to NATO documents, the nations of the partnership will participate with NATO in a range of military activities, including joint military planning, training, and

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[147] *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p.68.
[148] Ted Galen Carpenter, **The Future of NATO***,* London: Frank Cass and Co., 1995, p. 65
[149] Adrian Hyde-Price, **European Security In the Twenty-First Century**, (Routledge, New York, 2007),p.87

exercises as well as search and rescue missions, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management.[150]

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) created in December 1991 to propose a new cooperative relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As a result of the successful Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in the first years, the Alliance decided to enhance the role of the Partnership.[151]NACC was terminated in 1997 in favor of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC, formed by member and PfP nations, which allowed NATO to focus on individual regional security issues through ad hoc working groups on South-eastern Europe and on the Caucasus[152] and provided a valuable forum for international politics without serious binding treaties. With these new sub organizations NATO adapted itself to changing security environment.

The PfP states that are aspiring to be NATO members expect of a NATO membership, mainly, to have a guarantee of defense and security, sovereignty, democracy and territorial integrity, and integration with the West.[153] PfP helps rapprochement of neighboring regions to address international problems together within the Alliance. Almost all new PfP members supported US-led multinational

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[150] Joseph Kruzel, 'Partnership for Peace and the Transformation of North Atlantic Security' in **NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future?**, eds. S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 340

[151] Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, **NATO Basic Texts**, Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b970530a.htm, Accessed on 4 December 2013.

[152] John Borawski and Thomas-Durell Young, **NATO After 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance**, (Praeger, Westport, 2001), p.91

[153] Alexander Nicoll (Ed.), "Georgia and NATO", **International Institute fore Strategic Studies**, Strategic Comments, 14:01, (January 2008).

military operations including those conducted by NATO.[154]The ultimate aim of the most of the PfP countries which are not member of NATO is to be a full member of NATO.

In accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities and the PfP exercises are designed to improve practical military cooperation and common capabilities in the areas on which PfP focuses and help to develop interoperability between the forces of NATO Allies and Partner countries.[155] NATO's mission in with its PfP Programs is to expand political and military cooperation between NATO. Here "expanding" is the key term to understand the development of dramatic political events in Ukraine, Georgia, Middle East and Central Asia related to NATO.

Central Asian republics which became independent after the breakup of USSR, developed their relations with NATO after joining to the PfP in 1994, with the exception of Tajikistan joining in 2002, to enjoy the advantages that NATO offers with its PfP Programs which offers participating countries the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO. According to the Central Asian governments' perspective, the NATO's PfP programs as a means of strengthening and modernizing their national militaries.[156] Their objective was accomplished by participating in joint peacekeeping exercises within the framework of PfP. The Central Asian Battalion (Centrasbat) was established on 15 December 1995 by

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[154] James W.Peterson, "An Expanded NATO Confronts Terrorism and Instability", **The Journal of Slavic Military Studies**, 20:4, p.476 478.

[155] Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia', **Survival**, Vol.42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 131

[156] Bruno De Coppietiers, Bruno De Cordier and Firouzeh Nahavandy, 'The Central Asian Region in a New International Environment', **NATO Review**, Vol.44, No.5, 1996

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) and NATO's PfP.

Both NATO and Central Asian leaders agreed to form the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (Centrasbat), one of the seven regional units organized under the Partnership for Peace (PfP).[157] Within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), with the support of NATO, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan created Central Asian Battalion (Centrasbat) in 1996. The tasks were supposed to keep the Tajikistan united and prevent the Afghan conflict from spreading into Central Asia as well as strengthening the military-to-military relationship and improving regional security.[158] NATO has developed special relations with Central Asian states in the context of the regional security. This was the significant geopolitical achievement for NATO as a Trans-Atlantic military alliance. The result was Russia, China NATO power triangle in the middle of Asia.

The NATO alliance wishes to foster security in Central Asia as part of its strategy of building partnerships with emerging democracies, meeting new security challenges and promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.[159] The stability of the Central Asia depends, to a large degree, on how events unfold in Afghanistan both at the present time and in the more distant future.[160]Cooperation with the US and the NATO is already the most effective way for these states to modernize their

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[157] Lyle J. Goldstein, 'Making the Most of Central Asian Partnerships', **Joint Force Quarterly**, Summer 2002, p.83

[158] Global Security, 'Centrasbat'. www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm, 26 June 2003 cited in Niklas Swanstrom, 'The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia', **Central Asian Survey**, 23(1), March 2004, p. 47

[159] Osman Yavuzalp, 'On the Front Line', **NATO Review**, Winter 2001/20002, p.24

[160] Sultan Akimbekov, 'Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, Problems, and Prospects' in **Central Asia: Gathering Strom**, ed. Boris Rumer, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 2002, p.69

militaries.[161] Geographical factors tie the Central Asian countries together, to the extent preservation of security in these countries cannot be the result of their individual efforts at the national level.[162]This is a "security complex"[163] which brings NATO and Central Asian states together. Contrary to most other PfP Programs, it is not based on pre-existing common democratic norms, and only marginally on common security interests.[164]PfP can be seen as a tool for NATO to kill two birds with one stone. In this allegory stone is the PfP and the two birds are Russia and China. Maybe NATO does not aim for "killing" but sure it aims to tie down China and Russia in to a geopolitically defensive position.

According to NATO no country should view the PfP as threatening, and underlines that the program emphasizes activities such as peace-support operations, humanitarian intervention and search-and-rescue operations.[165]NATO presence and its PfP program activities in Central Asia have been facing challenges from third parties namely Russia and China. According to pro NATO rhetoric the basic objective of NATO's PfP is to strengthen stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond towards a global eternal peace.

Russians watched with concern as the security cooperation between Central Asian states and NATO countries developed first, within the framework of the PfP program

[161] Martha Brill Olcott, **Central Asia's Second Chance**, Olcott and Anders Arslund, Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005, p.71

[162] Peimani, Hooman. **Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran and Turkey, and Russia,** London: Praeger Publishers, 1998, p.2

[163] Barry Buzan, **People, States and Fear: National Security Problem in International Relations**, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991

[164] Bruno Coppieters, 'Between Europe and Asia: Security and Identity in Central Asia' in **Security and Identity in Europe**, eds. Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p.198

[165] Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the eds. Martha Brill Caucasus and Central Asia', **Survival**, Vol.42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 139

and later through bilateral agreements with NATO member states.[166] According to the Russian actors, NATO activities of any type are simply against Russia's interests. On the other hand the PfP supporters argue that NATO's mission are not directed against anyone; furthermore, that by increasing regional security in Central Asia and other former Soviet regions, NATO's programs actually increases rather than decrease Russia's security.[167]After the annexation of Crimea by Russia it is very hard for the both NATO and Russians side to see each other as friends rather than foes. But the developments in Ukraine showed that Russia has nothing to fear, NATO is unable to protect any state no matter the level of the relations when the state is not a full member.

China also has sceptical opinions about NATO presence with its PfP programs in Central Asia. Although China has not expressed a clear statement about PfP it somehow opposes NATO's move to the region. China viewed Centrasbat as a rival tool to Chinese interests. A Beijing foreign policy think tank expert has argued that "NATO's move eastwards was an example of Christian expansion which was psychologically threatening to China and which could lead eventually to the clash of civilizations."[168] Another claim was put forward as, 'closer military ties between NATO and the Central Asian states will not promote the elimination of 'hot spots' in

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[166] Jonson, Lena. **Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapng of Russian foreign Policy**, London: I.B. Tauris and Co, 2004, p. 49
[167] Svante Cornel, 'NATO after Enlargement: PfP Shifts Emphasis to Central Asia and the Caucasus', **NIASnytt**, 2004, p. 11
[168] China's Worry About America' in *Foreign Report,* no.2, 465, 25 September 1997 cited in Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia', **Survival**, Vol.42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 139

the region, but rather aggravate military confrontation.[169] Here, the closer cooperation between NATO and Central Asian states maybe a reason for competition between NATO and SCO. In the near future The most important resistance against the US superpower position is expected to come from Asia and possibly from China.[170] It is a undisputable fact that Russia and China forming a balance of power structure against NATO and the west. Both countries are supporting a multipolar world no matter the cooperation format. But there is a key element here, for the development of their economies both Russia and China do not want to kill the goose that lays golden egg by totally cutting relations with the west.

The PfP program was designed to promote civilian control of the military; enable joint operations with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions; encourage transparency in defense planning and budgeting; and open communications among PfP member countries.[171]The process of transformation of NATO, which has started right after the end of the Cold War, has been significantly developed with the establishment of the PfP. As part of NATO's transformation process, the Alliance sees itself as more than just a military organization and has taken an increasing interest in the promotion of democracy, free market economy, fundamental freedoms, human rights and the rule of law.[172]Unfortunately for some NATO members, massive immigration to Europe from Africa and Asia showed that fundamental freedoms and

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[169] Xing Guangcheng, 'China's Foreign Policy toward Kazakhstan' in **Thinking Strategically: the Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus**, ed. Robert Levgold, Massachusetts: Cambridge, 2003, p.111
[170] Barry Buzan, and Ole Woever, **Regions and Powers-The Structure of International Security**, (University of Press, Cambridge, 2003), p.445-446.
[171] Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia' **Survival**, Vol.42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 131
[172] General Rapporteur Vitalino Canas, 'NATO and Kazakhstan', 21 October 2005, p.17, Available at www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?-Shortcut=678, Accessed on 12 February 2014

human rights issues can be very elastic when they are disturbing social and economic structures in NATO countries.

NATO's engagement in Central Asia with its PfP Programs has three strategic objectives. These involve firstly, achieving stability and security in Afghanistan; secondly, implementing defense reforms that contribute to broader democratic reform; and, thirdly, boosting a modernization of Central Asian state militaries that could allow interoperability with NATO forces in peacekeeping operations.[173]Central Asia's new independent States and their governments after the collapse of the Soviet Union liked to cite the unstable situation in Afghanistan as the sources of many problems, and claiming it creates an environment in which democratic reforms becomes risky. After the sad ending of the Arab spring these states do not dare to change horses in the mid-stream, by pushing the radical reforms ahead.

The threat posed to Afghanistan's neighbors will be mitigated as long as there is a substantial US and NATO presence in Afghanistan, logistically supported by the presence of the two US bases in Central Asia. After the tragic events in 2001, this new security environment created an unexpected second chance for the Central Asian states.[174]NATO's involvement in Central Asia with its PfP Programs is limited than other regions like Central and Eastern Europe and Balkans. Contrary to most other PfP Programs, it is not based on existing common democratic norms, and only based

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[173] Acting Rapporteur Rafael Estrella, 'Central Asian Security: The Role of NATO', 14 September 2006, p. 6, Available at http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=990, Accessed on 17 April 2014

[174] Martha Brill Olcott, **Central Asia's Second Chance**, eds. Martha Brill Olcott and Anders Arslund, Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005, p.2

marginally on common security interests.[175]Nevertheless, a rolling stone gathers no moss, NATO enlarges its scope of action by the PfP program. Also it creates an opportunity for participant states to have closer relations with U.S. and EU via a NATO program.

NATO is active through the PfP in the former Soviet Union Central Asia and through its ISAF in Afghanistan, but it has no strategy or overarching structure of engagement with the region.[176]PfP programs provides neither security guarantee nor an incentive for an overall reform for westernization, nor democratization,[177] NATO should have global support for their actions is to avoid alienating applicants by offering them second-class membership.

PfP program is building political and military bridges between NATO member countries, but also between NATO and non-members countries.[178] NATO's PfP goal has been modified to offering participating states the possibility of strengthening relations with NATO countries, without the promise of eventual NATO membership.[179] PfP Invitation Document indicates that active participation in the program will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO. Although, PfP, can and will lead to NATO membership for some countries

[175] Bruno Coppieters, 'Between Europe and Asia: Security and Identity in Central Asia' in **Security and Identity in Europe**, eds. Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p.198
[176] S. Frederick Starr, 'A Partnership for Central Asia', **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 84, No. 4, Jul/Aug 2005
[177] Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy", **International Security***, 25:4 (Spring, 2001), p.67.
[178] Svante Cornel, 'NATO after Enlargement: PfP Shifts Emphasis to Central Asia and the Caucasus', *NIASnytt,* 2004, p. 11
[179] Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia', **Survival***, Vol.42, No. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 131

though this need not be a goal for all those who participate.[180]It is unlikely for most of the PfP countries to join NATO in the near future. But PfP created a friendly environment around NATO for support of the out of area missions. For this reason, PfP program can be considered as successful.

Partnership for Peace program of NATO opened new horizons for the alliance to improve its ability to protect peace and stability in the area of North America and Europe. It is like creating an aura of political networks around NATO for the sake of diplomatic influence in the international security arena, without putting too much emphasis on the brute force of the military power.

2.1.3. NATO's Enlargement after the Cold War

"Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era." George Kennan, 5 February 1997

The question of NATO's expansion has been one of the primary issues debated in the alliance since its establishment. The debate became vigorous after the fall of communism in 1991 when several post-Communist countries announced their aspirations for NATO membership. Since the alliance was founded primarily to serve as a Western security system against threats from the Soviet Union, the idea of

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[180] Yuksel Inan and Islam Yusuf, 'Partnership for Peace', **International Affairs***, Vol.4, No.2, June-August 1999

accepting former Warsaw Pact Countries as new members challenged NATO's traditional mission.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that NATO may invite any other European State for membership according to the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Article 10 is also noting that any state that wishes to join NATO must do so by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The U.S. administration would accordingly bring this request to the attention of all the other NATO members, and NATO would determine whether or not to grant membership to the applicant.

NATO secretary general Javier Solana made four points for further enlargement in an op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* in 1998[181] several weeks before the U.S. Senate voted for the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic:

> 1) A larger NATO will mean a stronger NATO, because more countries will commit their forces, as well as financial resources, to the alliance thus expanding NATO's political and military clout;

> 2) "An enlarged NATO will not lead to new dividing lines in Europe. The alliance's decision to open doors has led many countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate their political, economic, and military reforms, to bury old enmities, and to reject the destructive nationalism of the past;

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[181] Javier Solana, "Do We Need New Allies? Yes, to Enhance Everyone's Security," **Wall Street Journal**, March 12, 1998."

3) A larger NATO is compatible with a stronger relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs demonstrated that NATO has established the right mechanisms for political consultation with Moscow;

4) The costs of an enlarged NATO are affordable. NATO concluded in 1997 a study on costs based on the most objective and thorough analysis to date of the military situation in the three member countries. The study found that the costs would be modest: only $1.5 billion over 10 years for NATO's jointly funded programs. They would be shared fairly by all and add up to only 0.02 percent of allied defense budgets.

Figure 2.2. Selected Countries in Central and Eastern Europe

Figure 2.2. Source: CRS Geospatial Information Systems and CRS Graphics.

The NATO map already covered most of the Europe. However, as the Atlantic Alliance was founded to provide a common defense shield, NATO was looking for possibilities to include the remaining European countries.

The British House of Commons approved its third report on the implications of expansion for transatlantic relations on March 31, 1999. The report underlined potential problems that the upcoming wave of NATO enlargement could bring:

First, it might become more difficult to establish and maintain a firm strategic purpose for the alliance, since an enlarged NATO would have to devote more efforts on

preserving its internal coherence. The danger could be a NATO that was so intent on internal political compromise that it lost effective touch with its strategic purpose in relation to the rest of Europe.

Second, in a situation of real pressure, the new members were likely to regard the backing of the United States as their only viable reassurance and remain sceptical about any subtle adjustments of a delicate Euro-American transatlanticism.[182]

The report, admitted that the efforts of NATO's three latest members to enter the alliance are producers rather than mere consumers of security. NATO enlargement has been realized in order to foster and spread the security of the Alliance in Euro-Atlantic area at a time when filling the area of influence left by the Soviet Union, Central and East Europe, was viewed as a historic opportunity for Europe. In this sense, the enlargement had structural and geopolitical vacuum fill facets.[183]

On February 26, 1999, the decision by NATO to bomb Serbian forces over the repression in Kosovo provided NATO's newest members with an abrupt test of their commitment to the alliance. According to a polish journalist: *The simple view in Poland was that NATO was here to protect us, and now the moment comes when we have to do something for others.*[184]

During his visit to Sofia in October 2000, NATO secretary general Lord George Robertson told defense ministers of eight aspiring NATO members that the alliance

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[182] British House of Commons, "The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit," House of Commons Defence Committee Third Report, March 31, 1999, <http://www.parliament.thestationery office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/3902.htm>.
[183] Javier Solana, "NATO Beyond Enlargement", in Anton.A.Bebler, **The Challenge of NATO Enlargement**, (Preager, 1999), p.36.
[184] Peter S. Green, "Stern Test for NATO's 3 New Members: Prague and Warsaw Express Support, but Budapest has Reservations**," International Herald Tribune,** March 25, 1999, p. 5.

would not accept those who fall short of NATO and modern warfare standards. According to Robertson, the alliance will enlarge again when NATO is ready, when those nations aspiring to membership are ready, and when their membership will contribute to security and stability in Europe as a whole.[185]NATO enlargement is a continues process and its already reached frontiers of Ukraine. Although Ukrainian case become a focal point and opened the Pandora's box in Eastern Europe, every cloud has a silver ring, NATO members understood the mistake of naïve liberalism in their relations with Putin's Russia.

After the Cold War it was concluded that the enlargement of the Alliance would contribute to an enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in numerous ways. It would encourage and support democratic reforms, including the establishment of liberal democracies and free market economy; it will foster the patterns and habits of cooperation and will promote positive relations in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. Furthermore, it will strengthen the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security under the United Nations or OSCE; and it will strengthen and broaden the transatlantic cooperation.

If the criteria for membership remain the same, any European democratic country can apply for NATO membership and should be granted accession. Some experts argue that if NATO wishes to maintain its efficiency, integrity, and capability, it should limit its membership policy. For the time being, NATO has left the door open for new members, but the criteria for membership include stricter military and economic requirements for the new contenders. Can NATO become a Global Alliance with the

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[185] "Robertson Warns NATO Aspirants Membership Not a Gift," **Reuters**, October 14, 2000.

further expansion in the near future is an open question in the modern international politics.

2.2. NATO Operations in the Transformation Era

The Western-European dependency on US military power for protection became a fact. A new era dawned upon the relationship with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The sudden break-up of the Soviet Union ended its stronghold on Eastern Europe, Balkans and Central Asia, but also caused the *raison d'être* of NATO to be questioned as the communism and Russia were no longer threats to the Western World. However, the importance of NATO became obvious during the Balkan war of the early 1990's, when the EU showed its military weakness by waiting around for NATO to intervene in Europe's own backyard.

Conflicts in the Balkans in the early 1990s caused NATO to re-define itself. Anthony Forster and William Wallace have noted; the eruption in 1991 of conflict within the former Yugoslavia provided a long and painful learning process for the European allies and the United States, from which new concepts of joint task forces and peace-enforcement operations have evolved.[186] In a sense NATO re-invented itself with the post-Cold War Balkan conflicts. War in the Balkans showed the weaknesses of the European Union. EU's biggest handicap was the lack of united foreign and security policy and still Europe could not solve this problem.

The NATO interventions in Balkans in the 1990s were very significant for the alliance. They served both as key indicators of the changing nature of the global

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[186] Forster, Anthony, Wallace, William. Winter 2001. 'What is NATO for?'. **Survival**, Vol 43, No 4, p.107

security environment in which NATO was operating and the transformation of the alliance itself.

2.2.1. Bosnia operation

The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia produced a wave of conflicts in the region. Despite the many political and operational problems associated with in, NATO was the institution that had a decisive impact in bringing the conflicts to an end. The former Yugoslavia was, essentially, an artificial state. The role of the central government and its relationship with the six constituent republics "Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia" began to be questioned, and a destabilizing economic nationalism emerged.

The Communist party Yugoslavia collapsed in January 1990. After the fall of the communist government, the republics of Yugoslavia followed the way through secession. The leaders of Slovenia and Croatia began to push constitutional changes for loose confederation for sovereign republics. As a result the Slovenian parliament declared it would no longer follow Federal legislation.[187]In July 1990 Serbian President Milosevic warned that the internal borders of Yugoslavia were predicated on the continuation of a federal state, and that moves to break the country up into sovereign parts would open the question of redrawing the borders.[188]

On June 25,1991, Croatia and Slovenia each declared their independence. The result of this policy was the outbreak of warfare. On June 27,1991, Serbian Yugoslav

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[187] Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", **AJIL**, Vol.86, 1992, p.569.
[188] John Zematica, the Yugoslav Conflict, **Adelphi Paper** no.270, Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London-1992, p.22.

National Army (JNA) attempted to seize control of Slovenia's borders. By July, the incidents and exchange of fire occurred between Croatian armed forces and JNA. By January 15, 1992, Croatia and Slovenia had been formerly recognized by the European Community.

EC's Badinter panel recommended Bosnia-Herzegovina to hold a referendum to confirm popular support for independence.[189]In February 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for referendum and the results were in favour of independence but the Serbian population boycotted and rejected the result. The government of Bosnia declared independence on March 3, 1992. Violence after this declaration speeded up by the EC's recognition of Bosnia- Herzegovina.

On April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. Formerly, the war in Bosnia dates from the day of recognition, but fighting had been going on for more than a week.[190]

Bosnian Serb forces, supplemented with remnants of the Yugoslav army and supported by the government in Belgrade, began working to control as much of Bosnia. Various Bosnian Croat factions, moved to seize as much territory as they could with the overt approval of the government of Croatia. In between were the outmatched and under armed Bosnian Muslims.

One of the reasons for the reluctance of the European powers to allow more arms into the area was a complete misjudgment of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Western

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[189] Roland Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", **EJIL**, Vol. 4,
No. 1, 1993, p. 50.
[190] Noel Malcolm, **Bosnia: A Short History** (New York: New York UP, 1996) 234-5.

politicians referred to the conflict as a "civil war," and implied that all fighting parties were equally at fault.[191]

The European Community had monitors in the country, but the UN refused to dispatch peacekeepers when Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic requested them.In mid-April 1991, Izetbegovic requested NATO air strikes against the Serbian aggressors; it was not until the next year that NATO became involved, and then it was to assist in enforcing the arms embargo.[192]

By the end of 1992, NATO was enforcing the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, patrolling and enforcing the no-fly zone, delivering humanitarian supplies, supporting the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia as a whole, providing close air support for UNPROFOR, and conducting limited air strikes.[193]

UN recognition in May 1992 was followed by increased ethnic violence by Bosnian Serbs toward Muslim population, including the use of ethnic cleansing, violence and incentives to ensure that no non-Serbs remained in areas under the control of Serbs.[194] In the meantime, the UN Security Council had responded in June 1992 to Izetbegovic's request for peacekeepers by authorizing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).[195]Although UNPROFOR's actions helped to avert an even greater humanitarian disaster in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the troops proved to be more liability

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[191] **Ibid**, 238-9, 242-3.

[192] Warren Zimmermann, **Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers** (New York: Times
Books, 1999) 172-197.

[193] David Yost**, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security**
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) pp.193-194.

[194] Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, **Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help**, Westview Press, 1996, p.83.

[195] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, **The Military Balance 1995-1996** (London: Oxford UP, 1995)p.303.

than asset when hundreds were taken hostage by Bosnian Serb forces.[196]The European approach through a United Nations protection Force(UNPROFOR) proved powerless to protect civilians.

It was not until August 1993 that all the allies agreed on the necessity of threatening and, if necessary, conducting NATO air strikes. However, reaching that agreement required sharing the decision on conducting strikes with the UN, the "dual key" arrangement. At the end of 1994, unfortunately, the results were not satisfactory. Air strikes on Serbian assets and threats of more to come not only did not deter the Serbs, but they led to the first detention of UN peacekeepers and observers. Allies with vulnerable UNPROFOR troops rejected further strikes to answer the Serb action.[197]

The next round of hostage taking of UN personal by the Serb forces in May 1995 led the UN to refuse to conduct any more strikes. The longer NATO failed to take decisive action, the louder questions on NATO's credibility became. William Perry, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, assessed NATO thus in 1995: *Paralyzed into inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis...It appeared to me that NATO was in the process of unravelling.*[198]NATO only brought its full force when, developing events created conditions for the Clinton administration of U.S. to take lead. NATO's success then was clearly dependent on the leadership of its most powerful member.

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[196] Ivo H. Daalder, **Getting to Dayton** (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 41.
[197] **Ibid**, pp.25-33.
[198] Perry quoted in Sean Kay, **NATO and the Future of European Security** (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) p.80.

On 28 August 1995, Serb forces shelled Sarajevo once again. Two days later, NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force. Over 3,000 sorties were flown by the end of the operation on 14 September 1995. At the same time, the Muslim and Croatian forces were able to take advantage of the disarray of the Serbian forces and conducted offensives for their biggest gains of the war. The ratio of territory controlled by the Serbs and the Muslims/Croats respectively shifted from 70/30 to almost 50/50.[199]While NATO air power was a decisive factor in curbing violent Bosnian conflict successfully, the intervention was an event which created serious intra alliance tensions.

These operations brought Serbian government to the negotiating table as the representative of the Bosnian Serbs. The result of these negotiations was the Dayton Peace Accords, which gave fifty-one percent of the country to the Muslim-Croat Federation and forty-nine percent to the Republika Sprska. Neither side was pleased with the outcome but neither side had a choice.[200]

The first of the lessons that can be drawn from the NATO experience in Bosnia is the simple fact that U.S. role in NATO is the key. When U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher travelled to Europe to present the lift-and-strike plan, the allies were appalled at the apparent unwillingness of the United States to take the lead.[201]The operation contributed to the security objectives of NATO members. The Bosnia was also more generally the first time in which NATO had taken a peacekeeping role, and

[199] **Ibid**,pp.124- 131.
[200] Warren Bass. "The Triage of Dayton." **Foreign Affairs** 77.5 (September/October 1998)
[201] Daalder, p.16.

had used military force in its history up to that date. It was also the first time NATO had gone out of area.

For a time, the U.S. operated under the belief that it had to choose between NATO and Bosnia; to save NATO, it was argued; USA had to stop pushing to use the alliance. In contrast, when the United States took the initiative in August 1995, it got the agreement it wanted that eventually led to Operation Deliberate Force, and the European partners were relieved even if they did not like all aspects of the plan.[202]It became clear that EU and UN efforts would not reach a peaceful conclusion unless a credible military force was available in the form of NATO alliance. In the post-Cold Europe NATO's strategic capacity was still necessary.

The Bosnian conflict pinpointed a number of conclusions that had a direct bearing on the question of NATO's durability. NATO was increasingly looked to as the organization that would have to be involved to bring the warring sides to the negotiating table. NATO's strategic and military capabilities especially airpower was still the key factor in the post-Cold War Europe to bring the conflict to an end.

2.2.2. Kosovo Operation

Unfortunately for the people of the former Yugoslavia, the Dayton agreement did not signal the end of the violence or the end of uncertainty over the future of the region. Further instability was a regular feature in Kosovo, stemming from the rise of Kosovo Albanian militancy and the Serbian Interior Ministry to suppress it. Growing nationalism and separatism in the late 1990s led to increased tensions between the

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[202] **Ibid**,p.114.

Serbs and the Albanians. The formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and attacks on the Serbian forces, were the start of a sustained period of ethnic conflict and violence.

Historical works on the conflict in Kosovo trace its origins to as far back as the defeat of Serbian kingdom by the Ottoman Turks in the 14th and 15th Centuries; the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 has acquired a central place in the historical mythology surrounding the province.[203]The modern history of the Kosovo conflict may be said to have begun in 1974, with the drawing up of a new constitution for Yugoslavia which gave Kosovo the status of an "autonomous province" within Serbia.[204]But it did not make it one of the constituent republics of the Yugoslav federation. Therefore, unlike these republics, Kosovo did not have the constitutional right to secede.

Constitutional right secede, was to prove important when the federation began to break up during the early 1990s; while the other constituent nations of Yugoslavia, won recognition from Western governments when they declared independence, the Kosovo Albanians, were not able to gain international backing for their own efforts to establish an independent state.

Police harassment and repression of Kosovo Albanians had begun to escalate as early as 1987, but the beginning of the period of crisis in the province can be dated to March 2 1989, when Kosovo Albanian party leaders were arrested on the grounds that

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[203] M. Vickers, **Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo**, London, C. Hurst & Co., 1998, pp.12-16
[204] Independent International Commission on Kosovo, **Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.35

they had organized a miners' strike. This policy led to massive demonstrations and the imposition of emergency rule over Kosovo.[205]

As the Yugoslavian federation began to disintegrate, Kosovo was to follow the example of Slovenia and Croatia in declaring independence. A clandestine referendum was held in September 1991, which produced a 99% vote in favour of independence for Kosovo on an 87% turnout.[206]It is almost certain that, had the Kosovo Albanians stuck with peaceful resistance, there would have been no war and Kosovo would still be in Serbian hands today. it can be stated with certainty that NATO would not have intervened in Yugoslavia without the emergence of the KLA.[207] NATO almost worked as air force of KLA during the Kosovo operation. This approach has some merits but taking into to account that KLA was not a fully legal entity other than a guerrilla organization according to the international law this way of of dealing with international crisis may damage the reputation of NATO.

NATO's humanitarian motives, and the alleged extreme severity of the human rights abuses that were taking place in Kosovo, were widely cited. Tony Blair told the House of Commons on 23 March 1999 that we must act to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship.[208]The Independent International Commission on Kosovo argued that one of the major lessons of Kosovo is that greater

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[205] S. Woodward**, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War***, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 98
[206] N. Malcolm, **Kosovo: A Short History***, London, Macmillan, 1998, p.343
[207] J. Pettifor, 'The KLA: The Myth of Origin', in M. Waller, K. Drezov & B. Gokay, eds. **Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion***, London, Frank Cass, 2001, p.25
[208] Blair, cit. in S. Henig, 'Britain: to War for a Just Cause', in T. Weymouth & S. Henig, eds. **The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?**, London, Pearson Education Ltd, 2001, p.55

early engagement with a region in crisis with a view to preventing conflict is invariably a more effective response than late intervention using force.[209]

NATO commander Wesley Clark argues that the really decisive impulse propelling the campaign was not Milosevic's human rights violations…. "What mattered most was the need to impose NATO's will on a leader whose defiance, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, was undermining the credibility of American and European diplomacy and of NATO's willpower."[210]With the Kosovo operation NATO showed that it not an *all bark but no bite* military alliance, and its bite was worse than its bark as the operation record had showed. This was the NATO of 1999.

In some anti-war circles, claims have been made that NATO was motivated by some economic factors. These involve the routing of a pipeline through the Balkans for oil from the Caspian Sea, which aside from ensuring American energy security was also meant to "advance the privatization aspirations of the US government in the region" and "facilitate rapid integration" of the Balkans "with western Europe".[211]

The case of Kosovo does show the continued truth that the international order does not provide any general protection of human rights, only a selective protection that is determined not by the merits of the case but by the vagaries of international politics.[212]On 24 March 1999, NATO aircrafts launched the first bombing raids

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[209] Independent International Commission on Kosovo, **Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned***, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.295*

[210] M.Ignatieff, 'Review of W.Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict',**New York Review of Books**, 19 July 2001,p.18

[211] G. Monbiot, 'A Discreet Deal in the Pipeline', **The Guardian** 15 Feb 2001;

[212] H. Bull, **The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics***,* London, Macmillan, 1977, pp.89-90

against Yugoslavia. The bombing was to last for 78 days, until it ended with the signing of the Kosovo Peace Accords in early June.

During the operation, NATO planes flew 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties, during which 26,614 air munitions were released against 900 separate targets.[213] With pilots flying at 15,000 feet in order to negate the threat of Yugoslav air defences, NATO forces did not suffer a single casualty throughout the campaign- an unprecedented occurrence in any war.[214]But this defensive tactic greatly degraded allied pilots ability to hit troops on the move, so support facilities received most of the attention once the air defense systems were as degraded as possible.[215]Air to ground military campaigns against small and mobile forces are like looking for a needle in a haystack. For this reason, Kosovo operation took more time than the expected but in the end NATO prevailed.

Two operations were to be conducted simultaneously: the Phased Air Operation, focused on air defense systems and enemy forces in Kosovo; and the Limited Air Operations, with authority to strike headquarters, armed forces, and facilities supporting the Serbian troops operating in Kosovo.[216]

According to its own figures, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suffered at least 600 casualties among its own troops, about half killed by NATO and half by the

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[213] Independent International Commission on Kosovo, **Kosovo Report**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.92

[214] **Ibid**,p.94

[215] Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia," **Foreign Affairs** 78.5

[216] Wesley Clark, **Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat** (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 176.

KLA.[217]During the bombing campaign, approximately 863,000 refugees were displaced from Kosovo, and another 590,000 people became internally displaced within the province. This amounted to over 90% of the Kosovo Albanian population as of 1998.[218]

As the bombing campaign dragged on, many observers sensed that, as Robert Skidelsky put it, NATO had got itself into a deep hole "from which we now rely on Russia to rescue us."[219]The role of the Russians was very important. "The decisive event that made Milosevic fold his cards" was not the bombing but the effective way in which American diplomacy worked to isolate Serbia from Russia.[220]During the operation and its aftermath, Russian position weakened in Balkans and international politics. In the unipolar era of the world politics between 1990 and 2001 U.S. was like a rising sun as the unopposed super power, while Russia was the setting moon.

Providing the resources for war but not for peace in Kosovo was irrational if the war was truly fought for the rights of the ethnic Albanians but it makes sense if it was a war fought for NATO's credibility at Kosovo's expense.[221] The objective of 'protecting NATO's credibility' was achieved.

The perceived limitations of the NATO during the Kosovo operation also fed into the new Strategic Concept of the late 1990s. The intervention in Kosovo solidified the

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[217] Independent International Commission on Kosovo **op.cit**. p.94
[218] Independent International Commission on Kosovo **op.cit**. (Annex I: Documentation on Human Rights Violations), p.304
[219] Cit. in M. Ignatieff, **Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond**, London, Chatto & Windus, 2000, p.81
[220] M. Ignatieff, 'Review of W. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflict',* **New York Review of Books** 19 July 2001, p.18
[221] E. Herring 'From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO's War Against Serbia and its Aftermath', in K. Booth ed. **The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions***,* London, Frank Cass & Co, 2001, p.242

perceived need for NATO to have an expeditionary force that could deploy rapidly in the Balkans regions or any area where the security of the alliance under threat. NATO's political and decision making procedures which were lacking necessary speed for the modern warfare, were also reformed as a result of the Kosovo operation.

2.2.3. Afghanistan operation of NATO

Afghanistan is a country which has been subject to many foreign invasions such as the ancient Macedonians under Alexander the Great, the Mongols under Ghengis Khan, and the British in the 19th and early 20th Century. The country gained independence in 1919 after the First World War and managed to retain a degree of independence through to the Second World War. However, Country's geostrategic location eventually brought it into the sights of the superpowers of the Cold War. Soviet forces entered the country in 1979, in order to bolster the new "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan". In response, the US government began covertly funding and arming the Afghan Mujahedeen, enabling them to mount a successful guerrilla warfare that repelled the Soviet forces. The long conflict ended by the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. Continued internal instability and violence led to the rise of the Taliban which took power in Kabul in 1996. The establishment of order by Taliban by ousting Burhauddin Rabbani and establishing the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad in power in Afghanistan posed serious threats to the security of Central Asia. The Taliban sought to re-establish Afghan statehood under Pashtun dominance and to prevent the division of the country into separate realms under the control of leaders

from the national minorities.[222] There is an interaction and interdependence of events in Afghanistan and Central Asia.[223]In Afghanistan NATO involved in a difficult operational and strategic environment which hampered the success of the mission. However, fortune favors the bold, NATO took control in Afghan capital Kabul and established rule of law.

The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is very different to anything the alliance has dealt with before. NATO has never before in its history been involved in such a large operation, which has lasted now for over a decade. NATO's role in Afghanistan involves a comprehensive political and civil reconstruction of a country and to prevent the country from breaking up into independent regions by fostering a sense of national unity.

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan began in October 2001. While several NATO states offered to contribute troops to this mission, and NATO declared that the September 11 attacks constituted an article 5 attack, the United States did not seek NATO's participation in the invasion. This reflected President Bush's desire to avoid having allies dictate how the war would be fought.[224] Equally important was the question of whether NATO allies could contribute the specialized capabilities needed for the campaign the United States was planning.[225]

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[222] Sultan Akimbekov, 'Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, Problems, and Prospects' in **Central Asia:**
Gathering Strom, ed. Boris Rumer, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 2002, p.71
[223] A. Hyman, 'Afghanistan and Central Asia' in **Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States**, ed. Mehdi Mozaffari, New York: St. Martin's Press Inc, 1997, p.122
[224] Terry Terriff, "Fear and Loathing in NATO: The Atlantic Alliance after the Crisis over Iraq," **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), p. 424
[225] Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, **America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy**, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003), pp. 101-102;

NATO's mission of Afghanistan began for the Alliance with the takeover of the command and control of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in 2003. The main role of NATO in Afghanistan is to boost the Afghan Transitional Authority in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country and assist in the reconstruction. NATO conducts its mission mainly through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.

ISAF was initially established with UN Security Council authorization under British command in October 2001. NATO assumed control of ISAF in August 2003. Initially ISAF's mission was limited to patrolling Kabul area, but since 2004, ISAF has undertaken expansion of its mission into the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan, and later to the south and east. It has also deployed several provincial reconstruction teams, which are based on model developed by the U.S. military that combines security and reconstruction functions in an effort to stabilize the countryside.[226] ISAF assumed responsibility for security in Afghanistan in October 2006. At that point, it was NATO's largest operation, involving about 31,000 troops, including 12,000 U.S. troops under ISAF command.

At the same time, ISAF has suffered from three significant problems. Since 2003 the alliance has been unable to secure sufficient troop commitments to meet the target force size. When NATO took control of the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan in August 2006, its 31,000-strong force represented about 85 percent of the troops. NATO troops have confronted far more intense fighting than expected.

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[226] Robert Borders, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post- conflict Reconstruction and Development," **Journal of Development and Social Transformation**, Vol. 1 (November 2004), pp. 5-12;

The alliance appealed for more troops in September 2006, but only Poland, offered to send additional troops.[227] The December 2008 NATO foreign ministers' meeting approved ISAF's 'Strategicvision' which revealed strains within the alliance beyond persistent U.S. efforts to draft ISAF into counter-terrorism operations.[228]ISAF reached in 2012 to 50 Troop Contributing Nations and 129,895 total strength.[229]

Many troops in Afghanistan operate under "national caveats," whereby governments place limits on what military activities their troops are allowed to do or where they are allowed to go. These caveats hurt operational effectiveness; and alliance members do not share risks equally, which causes friction.[230] National caveats can increase the probability of a strategic failure.[231] Germany's troops can be deployed only near Kabul, and in 2006 Poland resisted sending additional troops to southern Afghanistan, where they are needed the most. Only six NATO members operate without caveats. National caveats caused headaches during NATO's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as well, and they have long been a problem in UN peacekeeping missions too. Caveats tend to creep back in, moreover, as is evident in repeated efforts to eliminate them.

It is unsure what NATO's authority over both the security and counterterrorism mission will mean in the long run. Concern has also been raised about whether NATO has the political will and capabilities to fight a sustained counterinsurgency campaign

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[227] Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, "NATO Faces Growing Hurdle as Call for Troops Falls Short," **Washington Post**, September 18, 2006.

[228] James Sperling and Mark Webber, "NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul", **International Affairs** Volume 85 issue *3*, 2009, p. 502

[229] Available on ISAF official site: www.isaf.nato.int/history.html , (accessed on 28.03.2014)

[230] Philip H. Gordon, "Back Up NATO's Afghanistan Force**," International Herald Tribune**, January 8, 2006.

[231] Astri Suhrke, "A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan", **International Peacekeeping***, 15:2, p.214.

in Afghanistan.[232] Since NATO forces assumed responsibility for security in southern Afghanistan, the frequency and intensity of Taliban attacks have increased. This renewed fighting, forced the United States to reverse plans to reduce its military commitment in Afghanistan.[233] Notably, U.S. forces, ISAF's largest contingent, will continue to conduct the bulk of counterterrorism activities. The U.S. military also retains 11,000 troops outside ISAF's command to sustain a separate counterinsurgency function.

The only example of NATO assuming a combat role is found in Afghanistan, where ISAF took control over security operations in October 2006. Although the security problems on the ground in Afghanistan range from crime and drug trafficking to counterterrorism, ISAF's rules of engagement do not explicitly cover missions other than peacekeeping and it does not have a formal counterterrorist mission.[234]

One of the main problems of Afghanistan is its place in the world illegal drug traffic. Narcotics issue is one of the crucial problems to be solved for the future of Afghanistan. Cultivation, transportation and processing of opium poppy in the country constitute a major source of funding for the insurgency.[235] Afghanistan supplies %93 of the world opium production.[236] Through its linkages to insurgency and terrorism, it is an increasing threat to regional and international security in a traditional, military sense.[237] Geopolitical factors and geographical conditions are suitable for drug

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[232] Seth Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan," **Survival**, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 111-128.
[233] Eric Schmitt, "Springtime for Killing in Afghanistan," **New York Times**, May 28, 2006;
[234] Ali A. Jalali, "The Future of Afghanistan," **Parameters**, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 4-19.
[235] Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance", **Congressional Research Service**, 3 December 2009, p. 14
[236] Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and the US Policy", **Congressional Research Service**, 12 August 2009, p. 2
[237] Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, 'The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional

dealership in Central Asia.[238] Some of the heroin is smuggled via multiple methods of transportation across neighboring Central Asia states, such as the mountainous Afghan-Tajik border, which is very difficult to patrol, and then on through other post-Soviet states.[239]

During the last decade opiates consumption in post-Soviet Central Asia increased by 6 times, this is the highest rate in the world.[240] The economic and political impact of the drug trade on state functioning is inevitable in Central Asian states. This has created severe corruption problem across the region at all levels, even, high level officials have also been involved in the trafficking of drugs, raising the question of whether systemic criminal infiltration into state agencies is taking place.[241]

Because of the significant differences exist in the Allies' approach to counter narcotics in Afghanistan, an effective unique strategy could not be established and counterinsurgency efforts are undermined. While the USA favours a policy of using hard power for the eradication of the opium fields such as aerial spraying, NATO allies do not support the USA proposal because of the fear of losing the battle for hearts and minds.[242]

Security', **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol. 53, No. 4, July-August 2006, p.10

[238] Erica Marat, 'Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan', **China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No.1, 2006, p.96

[239] Nicole. J. Jackson, 'The Trafficking of Narcotics, Arms and Humans in post-Soviet Central Asia: (Mis)perceptions, Policies and Realities'**, Central Asian Survey**, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2005, p.40

[240] Sergey Golunov, 'Border Security in Central Asia: Before and After September 11' in **Facing the Terrorist Challenge – Central Asia's Role in Regional and International co-operation**, eds. Anja H. Ebnother, Maj. Ernst M. Felberbauer and Martin Malek, Vienna: Akademiedruckerei Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2005, p.101

[241] Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P. Swanstrom, 'p.19

[242]Ibid, p. 4

NATO endeavored to contribute rebuilding of the Afghan state and took important steps within this framework. A new constitution was ratified and presidential and parliamentary elections were held. There has been a progress in extending the rule of law, establishing effective governance, and furthering economic development despite some problems. Also there have been concerns for the deteriorating security environment on the ground. Insurgent attacks became frequent and complex because rebellious groups managed to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan.[243] NATO members participate in offensive efforts to respond to terrorism through bilateral activities or loose coalitions of the willing with non NATO membeer states.

NATO comes up against a number of challenges that hinder its efforts in Afghanistan. The most important of this challenge is the unwillingness of some of the Allies to commit troops to counter-insurgency tasks.[244]Many allies committed forces to the NATO operation, with certain restrictions called as "national caveats" on tasks those forces could undertake during the operation. They do not allow their troops to participate in combat operations except for self-defense situations. NATO faces difficulties in securing the countryside because of the lack of sufficient number of troops. And even though there has been work on the removal of the limitations placed on the troops, restrictions that allies impose on the use of their forces, continue to trouble ISAF.[245]

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[243] Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress" **Congressional Research Service**, 3 February 2009, p. 6

[244] Łukasz Kulesa, "ISAF Operation in Afghanistan and the Future of NATO – Time for Change", **The Polish Institute of International Affairs** *PISM Strategic Files*, web edition, Number 2, March 2008, p.1

[245] Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance", **Congressional Research Service**, 3 December 2009, p. 10-12

The existence of two major military coalitions – the US led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the ISAF complicates the situation in terms of command and control. Presence of the two security forces with two commands violates the principle of 'unity of command' and creates a serious problem of coordination in the operational field.[246]This attitude shows that even without the support of NATO, U.S. is willing to have military presence and a leading role in Afghanistan.

NATO's military policy in Central Asia has four main components: establishment of direct military contacts; assistance in democratic transformations (civil military relations, civilian control, and defense management and accounting); expansion of cooperation (training, doctrines, and equipment); support for security measures (nonproliferation and control over weapons).[247]At the end of the 2014 ISAF mission of NATO ended and the new mission *Resolute Support* has started.

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[246] Shanthie M. D'Souza, "NATO in Afghanistan: Fault lines in the transatlantic alliance?", Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, **Special Feature**, 2 April 2009, p. 3

[247] Rustam Burnashev, 'Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects' in **Central Asia: Gathering Strom***, ed. Boris Rumer, New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc, 2002, p.114

Figure 2.3. Afghanistan Resolute Support Mission

Figure 2.3. Source: www.NATO.int

NATO's military value as a partner to the United States in the war against terrorism remains in question. The bulk of the struggle against terrorism requires substantial non-military means. NATO may have a useful diplomatic role to play, but many of the critical tasks in this fight are outside the military domain, leaving NATO with little role. NATO's ISAF mission is the essential test for its survival. Its success or failure in Afghanistan will be a critical indicator of the alliance's ability to address the type of security threats that will emerge around the globe. Success would confirm NATO's unity and capability to act "out of area," but a defeat would undermine NATO's claim to a broader global organization. The alliance would continue to provide for the defense of Europe, and the alliance members' shared values may be sufficient to sustain NATO as an organization. But a defeat in Afghanistan would

raise serious questions about NATO's contribution to its members' core security concerns.

2.2.4. Libya operation of NATO

The "Arab Spring" in North Africa in 2010 roiled the old order of the Middle East, leading to internal conflict in several countries. Demonstrations shared a common cause for personal dignity and rebellion against a responsive government.[248]The wind of change was blowing with full power at the beginning, but unfortunately it reached a bitter end in many middle eastern countries. Libya is one of them and there is no simple solution in sight for the near future.

In January 2011, the winds of Arab spring also began to blow against the ruler of Libya and the protest grew in intensity by February 2011. Demonstrators called for a day of protests on February 17. Libyan government limited internet access on February 18 and they increased their attacks on protesters during the next two days.[249] During these four days of protest Libyan security forces killed 232 demonstrators.[250]

Before the NATO operation Gaddafi's government's military strength was 50,000 conscripted army personnel, 20,000 paramilitary forces and an 18,000 man Air Force with 100 MIG-25s, 15 F-1s and Soviet-era SAMs.[251]By March 17, Libya governments' armed forces were in position to crush the uprising movement that had fallen back to Benghazi. Gadhafi said to those who continue to resist, we will come

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[248] Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," **Foreign Affairs**, May/Jun 2011,

[249] Ben Smith, "Turmoil in the Middle East," House of Commons Libary, 13, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05902.pdf (accessed May 5, 2013).

[250] Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Government Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings," http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings (accessed April 26, 2013).

[251] **The Economist**, "Libya's No-Fly Zone the Military Balance," March 3, 2011,

house by house, room by room. It's over. The issue has been decided... We will have no mercy and no pity.[252]It was clear that Gaddafi did not understood the consequences of his speech. It was not possible stop democratic and peace loving nations of the World from acting for the sake of human rights and dignity, especially when the large amount of oil and natural gas resources were also at stake.

That afternoon the United Nations Security Council voted to adopt Resolution 1973, which called for an immediate cease-fire, establishment of a no fly zone and all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.[253] It also authorized to financial assets of Libyan government to be frozen by the UN member states in which they are located.[254] Resolution 1973 is that it is the first time that the UN Security Council has authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state.[255]

Due to the immediate threat to civilians in Benghazi, the U.S. African Command initially led the enforcement of Resolution 1973 under the code name OOD. On March 19, French fighter aircraft attacked Libya *regime* forces lying siege to Benghazi. That same night, coalition ships launched 112 Tomahawk land-attack missiles, while B-2 bombers attacked key airfields and coalitions forces continued to prosecute the remaining Libyan forces surrounding Benghazi. By March 21, Gadhafi's

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[252] Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, "As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role Is Unclear," *New York Times*, March 17, 2011,
[253] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone over Libya, Authorizing All Necessary," http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ sc10200.doc.htm (accessed April 26, 2013)
[254] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011.
[255] Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm," **Ethics and International Affairs**, (2011), 1.

military forces were retreating away from Benghazi. On March 31, NATO assumed responsibility for enforcing Resolution 1973 under the NATO code name OUP.[256]

Through the summer of 2011, the rebels and armed forces of Gadhafi were locked in a battle with neither side able to reach a victory. Some argued that NATO lacked clear strategic goals. The coalition partners cannot agree regarding whether the operation is intended to remove Gadhafi, to support rebel operations against Gadhafi loyalists or to simply protect civilians from attacks by Gadhafi's military forces.[257] Also some critics claimed, The air campaign strategy, while expedient diplomatically, was flawed from the start.[258] On August 21, Libyan opposition entered the city of Tripoli thus ending Gadhafi's rule in Libya.

During *Operation Unified Protector*, NATO used 260 air assets from 12 different countries that flew over 26,500 sorties of which more than 9,700 were strike sorties. NATO forces destroyed 5,900 military targets including 400 pieces of artillery and 600 armored vehicles.[259] NATO ended its military action in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, on October 31, 2011.[260]

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmussen sees the Libyan operation as a template for future NATO missions and proof that the United Nations can outsource

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[256] Christian Anrig, "Allied Air Power over Libya," **Air and Space Power Journal** (Winter 2011): p.91

[257] Robert Farley, "Over the Horizon: Libya and the Afghan Model," **World Politics Review**, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9870/over-the-horizon-libya-and-the-afghan-model-revisited (accessed May 2, 2013).

[258] Kareem Fahim and David Kirkpatrick, "Jubilant Rebels Control Much of Tripoli," **New York Times**, August 21, 2011,

[259] NATO, "Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats," ,http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf (accessed May 2, 2013).

[260] NATO, "NATO Secretary General statement on end of Libya mission," Press Release, October 28, 2011.

its muscle to the alliance, but still insists that NATO's core mission is to protect its member's nations, and he also notes that Libya was a new model for NATO because USA "took a relative back seat, unlike NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo ,as the operation stats shows U.S. launched 99 percent of the Tomahawk cruise missiles, provided the majority of surveillance, refueling and targeting capabilities, but only conducted 26 percent of the sorties.[261]

One of the defense policy expert argues that Western air power can easily annihilate Moammar Gaddafi's modest air force and prevent him from using massed armor and artillery in the open. But, once the dictator's forces move into populated areas and resort to fighting among the civilian populations, the utility of air power diminishes rapidly.[262]Some experts may argue not to draw too much from Libya operation success as General James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe along with Ivo Daalder, the United States representative to NATO, because OUP was about one-fifth the size of that in Kosovo in terms of numbers of military assets involved that NATO may not be able to replicate its success again in the era of declining defense spending.[263]

The implications of Libya operations for policy and strategy are highly suggestive for experts of strategy and political observers as it shows how modern nations deal with

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[261] Eric Westervelt, "NATO's Intervention in Libya: A New Model," NPR Find a Station, http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/140292920/natos-intervention-in-libya-a-new-model   (accessed September 27, 2011).
[262]   Vanguard, "Libya   War   Gives   Us   Air   Power   Advocates   A   Lift," http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/10/libya-war-gives-us-air-power-advocates-a-lift/ (accessed May 2, 2013).
[263] Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, "Nato's Victory in Libya," **Foreign Affaris**, Febuary 2, 2012,

each other in NATO and UN.[264] Some experts presented the case that coalition action in Libya was *just* under international law by examining it against the agreed on tenets: *just cause*, *right intention*, *competent authority*, *last resort*, *proportionality*, *jus in bello*, and *just peace*.[265]

China and Russia have expressed consistent opposition to Western-inspired interventions when it comes time for action despite previously expressed support for *Responsibility to protect* in principle. *Responsibility to protect* has made it harder to say "no," without justification.[266]It is a new norm that calls on the international community to intervene when a government of a state fails to protect basic human rights of their own civilians.

Regarding the cases of Brazil, China, and India, it is surmised that such newly emerging powers have little interest in overthrowing the global system on which their prosperity was built.[267] Germany, a country with international aspirations, the economic engine of European Union opposed to the use of force. Instead of aligning with its well advocated principles which are evident in the founding documents of the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy, Germany diverged from its NATO partners.[268]

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[264] Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," **International Affairs** vol. 87 no. 4 (July 2011).

[265] David Fisher and Nigel Biggar, "Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya," **International Affairs** 87:3 (2011), 701-704.

[266] Simon Chesterman, "Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention in Libya," **Ethics and International Affairs**, (2011) 6.

[267] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "NATO after Libya: the Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times," **Foreign Affairs**, (Jul/Aug 2011),

[268] Eve Bower, "Germany's Libya policy reveals a nation in transition," ed. Rob Mudge, **Deutsche Welle**, December 9, 2011,

In an unexpected act of distancing itself from its long established NATO allies, Germany abstained. [269] Germany's aspirations to match international influence with its current economic might will likely be compromised by statecraft of parochialism as well as under resources of military force as well as lack of solidarity with NATO allies in the face of compelling humanitarian need.[270] There is a tendency of humanitarian missions which set out to protect civilian population to turn into missions that seek forced regime change, lead to much higher levels of causalities, and tend to fail.[271]It would be a dangerous adventure for NATO to enforce regime change in many undemocratic countries. This kind of a normative strategic vision would jeopardize the core security aim of the NATO alliance.

Libya operation had showed that NATO has enough military capability to reach victory by only using air and sea power without using significant number of land forces other than Special Forces and intelligent personal. Although Libya operation was a military success, political objective of stabile and democratic Libya could not have achieved. Also a regime change does not necessarily bring a democratic government to power when there are different competing factions in a country. After the NATO operation the fate of Libya is still unclear.

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[269] Bruce D. Jones, "Libya and the Responsibilities of Power," **Survival**, 53:3, 51-60, (June/July 2011), p.55.
[270] Henry Chu, "The World; Germany goes its own way on Libya; The NATO nation's decision to sit out the military mission draws criticism from within," **Los Angeles Times**, April 2, 2011,
[271] Amitai Etzioni, "The Lessons of Libya," **Review of Military Literature** 92, no. 1 (January-February 2012): 45-54.

2.3. Transformation of NATO's Military Strategy

Post-Cold War NATO is facing different type of threats compare to Cold War era which can be classified as *Symmetric threats*, *Asymmetric threats*, and *Hybrid threats*. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya operations showed that NATO needs strong conventional capabilities in the new security environment such as strategic air lift, light but more mobile land forces, *real time* intelligence, Special Forces, tactical air superiority and humanitarian mission support branches like field hospitals. Also strategic nuclear deterrence still important and necessary for NATO as the Russian invasion of Crimea has showed in a dramatic way.

2.3.1. Threat Perceptions of NATO for the current and future threats

With the end of the Cold War, the threat perception, the relations between the actors and their roles have changed dramatically. Most of NATO's Western European members have almost excluded the possibility of a military threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty, from their strategic reasoning, but most of the East European members emphasize the relevance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as an assurance against an immediate military threat from abroad.[272] Eventually, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia brought back the probability of a major military conflict on European soil in to the core of strategic calculations of NATO.

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[272] Karl-Heinz Kamp, "After the Summit: Long-Term Consequences for NATO," **NATO Defence College Research Paper**, 37 (May 2008),p. 4

In 1999, Chris Donnelly, NATO's special adviser for Central and East European affairs wrote that the major threats to European security were:[273]

- Economic threats;

- Ethnic hostility;

- Insecure and inefficient borders;

- Organized crime;

- Corruption;

- A shortage of competent specialists in governmental and parliamentary structures;

- The proliferation of military or dual technology, including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and

- Information warfare.

The long threat list shows that NATO must prepare for more than one type of conflict compare to NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario. This new situation increases the workload of NATO and consumes its resources. In the age of uncertainty strategic planning and its implementations by all the members of NATO alliance becomes problematic. The new threats forces NATO to transpose itself into a more elastic organization other than a military alliance.

In October 2002, then-Secretary General Lord Robertson attempted to predict what the strategic environment would be like in 2015. He made note of five major security

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[273] Chris Donnelly, "Reshaping European Armed Forces for the 21st Century," NATO On-line Library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/2000/a000913a.htm>.

challenges that NATO would face: more instability from volatile areas such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East; spill over as a result of the instability, in the form of migration, human smuggling, and the criminal activity associated with it; terrorism in all its forms; failed and failing states; and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[274]Balkan crises prompted the first engagement by NATO forces outside the Alliance's territory in a non-Article 5 operation. This is an example of a "new security landscape" which is characterized by nationalist, ethnic, and religious conflicts and unconventional, transnational threats[275] and which rapidly became NATO's most pressing concern. The EU manner of resolution of conflicts through diplomacy remained ineffective.[276] EU Commission on Energy report stated, While the economic impact of Europe's reliance on energy imports may be cause for concern, the security consequences could be dire.[277] Energy security is so tightly connected to a country's national security that any threats to the availability of energy resources may lead to war to seize or defend them.[278]A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and in this case the weakest link for the European members of NATO is energy security and namely European economies dependency on Russian natural gas.

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[274] Lord Robertson, "The World in 2015—Predicting the Unpredictable," **Keynote Speech at the Defense Industry Conference, London**, 14 October 2002,
[275] John R. Deni, **Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century**
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co, 2007), p.1.
[276] Susan L.Woodward, "Upside-Down Policy", in H.W.Brands (Ed.), **The Use of Force After the Cold War.**(,Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.111.
[277] Andris Piebalgs, "Europe's Energy Future: The New Industrial Revolution," *EU Commission for Energy's Energy Portal,* 4 November 2008,
www.energy.eu/news/Europes_Energy_Future_The_New_Industrial_Revolution.pdf
[278] Andrew Monaghan, "Energy Security: NATO's Limited, Complementary Role," **NATO Defense College Research Paper***, 36 (May 2008),p. 2.

Figure 2.4. Russian gas pipelines to Europe

Figure 2.4. **Source**: FOI, based on World Energy Atlas 2009, The Petroleum Economist Ltd,

In recent years, Western Europe has suffered the disruption of natural gas shipments from Russian-owned pipelines as a result of disagreements that Russia has had with countries in its "near-abroad" through which the pipelines pass. There is a risk that the delivery of hydrocarbons will be used as leverage with greater frequency to increase

influence politically.[279] Gazprom, Russia's state-owned natural gas company, earns nearly 70% of its income from sales to the European Union. The European Union currently imports half of its energy requirement, a dependence expected to grow to 70% by 2030, with 40% of the total natural gas demand imported from Russia. [280] Europe will have to import 94% of its oil and 84% of its natural gas by 2030.[281]Europe must hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. In any case, it is not easy for Russia to cut gas supply to Europe and suffer the loss of large amount of hard currency.

These considerations are forcing NATO leaders to pay much closer attention to the Alliance's potential role in providing energy security. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said that NATO's primary role with regard to energy security is to police and protect.[282]The European Allies have a great dependence on imported energy, which is growing quickly, coupled with the fact that energy-producing countries tend to be unstable or politically fragile. Putin noted in 2003 that Gazprom is a 'powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the world'.[283] If these states chose to manipulate the flow of energy, there would be direct effects on NATO members at the economic and political levels. The possibility that access to energy resources may become an object of large-scale armed struggle is almost

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[279] Paul Gallis, "NATO and Energy Security," **CRS Report for Congress**, RS22409, 28 December 2007, p.2.
[280] **Ibid**,p.2
[281] **Ibid.**
[282] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Energy Security in the 21st Century," **Keynote Speech at the Economist Energy Security Dinner**, 23 October 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s081023b.html
[283] **Jamestown Eurasian Daily Monitor**,19 January 2006 and "EU's Barroso Demands Natural Gas Supply Assurances from Russia," *Bloomberg News*, 16 March 2006.

incontestably the single most alarming prospect facing the international system today.[284]

Neglecting to ensure European energy security could be lethal to NATO's unity because it could split the alliance between vulnerable and non-vulnerable members to energy security. The threat to NATO's security that a disruption in energy would cause could be devastating to the some of the allies most highly dependent on energy imports. European leaders have recognized this risk and have worked to diversify sources of oil and gas so that disruption from one source does not strain them. In spite of calls to develop a strategy to mitigate the threat, NATO has proceeded cautiously in order to ensure that solutions to this problem are appropriate for the Alliance on the whole.[285]

Having no clear enemies but several allies, NATO has become a *selective security* organization. NATO selects on what to engage itself or not. Its attention is directed more to the marginal security issues[286] which are called new security threats. The crisis management operations displayed that the crisis were not territorially limited and short termed, but apt to spread and create *a new global disorder*[287].

The threat profile of today is *modular, ephemeral, and asymmetric*. This is the reality of the information age related to security issue. The new reality is that violence can

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[284] Daniel Moran and J.A. Russell, "The Militarization of Energy Security," *Strategic Insights,* 7, 1 (February 2008),p. 2.
[285] **Ibid**.
[286] Henning Sørensen, "NATO and Its New Military Security Position", **European Security**, 7:1, (1998), p.75-76.
[287] Klaus Wittmann, "The Road to NATO's New Strategic Concept" in Gustav Schmidt (Ed.), **A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years**, Vol.3 (Palgrave, Hampshire, 2001), p.225.

also be in the hands of "sub-state or non-state actors"[288]. Asymmetric warfare's principle is finding and applying methods that will frustrate and foil an enemy that cannot be defeated by standard methods.[289] The abstract character of the new threats has forced NATO to develop a comprehensive military strategy and necessary capabilities to confront these challenges. Future conventional high-tech capabilities and thus operational concepts would include information superiority, long-range precision strikes and space control[290].All these factors are for managing the complexity of new security challenges.[291]NATO needs to wear more than one hat in the new security environment. NATO needs to adapt strategies for the coordination of intelligence services, police force and humanitarian departments.

The changes in the nature and sources of threats and risks means that NATO must be prepared to respond to every type of threat. The particular role NATO could play must be flexible. The Alliance must be prepared to engage in a variety of international responses, ranging from NATO-led missions and NATO-supported missions to coalition of willing type missions.[292]

Information warfare or cyberwarfare issue is another important and new kind of source of threat for NATO members.Althoug NATO is trying to build its defences in this area, the author of this thesis does not believe in cyber defense and suggests further devolopments and usage of mechanical systems instead. Cyber security issue

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[288] Pavel Necas, **Beyond Tradition: New Alliance's Strategic Concept**, (NATO Defense College Monograph Series No.21, Rome, 2004), p.75.
[289] Adam B.Lowther, **Americans and Asymmetric Conflict**, (Praeger, Westport, 2007), p.vii.
[290] Andrew Krepinwich, "Transforming American Military" in H.W.Brands (Ed.), **The Use of Force After the Cold War**, (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.213.
[291] Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Warfare", " in H.W.Brands (Ed.), **The Use of Force After the Cold War**, (Texas A&M, University, 2003), p.222.
[292] Stephen Hadley, US Deputy National Security Adviser, "Challenge and Change for NATO. A US Perspective," October 3, 2002 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/ s021003e.htm.

is a part of long debate and there is a fast growing litreture about the subject.But the main problem is no matter how very well preapared defences are it is possible to breach it.In cyberwarfare attack is stronger than defence as a fundemental rule. Because it is easier to distrup modern computer networks than building and defending them.

NATO in the 21st century must deal with terrorism, cyber-attacks, protection of critical infra structure, energy security, piracy in the sea routes, CRBN threats. All of these can be classified as new asymmetric threats. But also there are old symmetric threats of Cold War such as problems with Russia which has a strong military with strategic nuclear capabilities. NATO must build, improve and keep its both new and old capabilities.

2.3.2   The transformation of NATO's nuclear strategy

"We escaped disaster by the grace of God"

General George Lee Butler, Commander of STRATCOM

One of the key factor in Atlantic Alliance's overall strategic calculation is the nuclear question. NATO alliance has been engaged in an internal review of nuclear deterrence and strategy requirements for the twenty-first century since 2000s, with a view to incorporating the results in a new strategic concept.[293]

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[293] **Final Communique**, NATO, Ministerial meetings of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 15 June 2007; Federal Minister of Defence, **White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr**, Berlin, 2006, p. 26.

NATO's capability of responding to the needs of the time manifests itself in the discussion of nuclear strategy, where the text of the 1999 Strategic Concept states that the nuclear forces of the Allies continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option.[294]

Table 2.1.World nuclear forces (warheads), January 2013 (*January 2011 in brackets***)**

Country	Deployed Warheads	Other Warheads	Total Inventory
Russian Federation	~1 800 (~2 427)	6 700(~8 570)	~8 500 (~11 000)
United States	2 150 (2 150)	5 550 (6350)	~7 700 (~8 500)
France	290 (290)	10 (10)	~300 (~300)
China	-	250 (200)	~250 (~240)
United Kingdom	160 (160)	65 (65)	225 (225)
Pakistan	-	100–120 (90–110)	100–120 (90–110)
India	-	90–110 (80–100)	90–110 (80–100)
Israel	-	~80 (~80)	~80 (~80)
North Korea	?	?	6–8 (?)

Table 2.1 FOI, SIPRI 2013: 284, Table 6.1; SIPRI 2011: 320, Table 7

Deployed means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces. Other warheads mean These are warheads in reserve, awaiting dismantlement or that require preparation before becoming fully operationally available.

The nuclear forces of the U.S., France and the United Kingdom are all, considered to contribute to overall nuclear deterrence and to the security of all of the NATO members. Nuclear forces based in Europe and which are committed to NATO

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[294] **The Alliance's Strategic Concept**, approved by the Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 23–24 April 1999, paragraphs 62–64.

considered to provide an essential political and military link between two sides of the Atlantic. According to current NATO thinking, the commitment to maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe is dependent on those forces having the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war.[295]For the sake of not putting all the eggs in one basket, every nuclear power seeks to maintain a *nuclear triad,* which is based on three different force type consist of submarines, bombers and ICBMs. NATO has a credible nuclear structure based on *nuclear triad*.

The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons considered might have to be extremely remote. Beginning in the early 1990s, NATO allies have reduced the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe by roughly 90 per cent in comparison to the early 1970s when the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe an area reached its peak point in terms of size and diversity. At that time, there are estimated to have been more than 7,000 nuclear weapons available in Europe for delivery by a wide variety of different delivery platforms based on artillery, missiles and bombers. By 2003, only one type of weapon remained, an air-launched gravity bomb, and the number of weapons is currently believed to fall within the range 150–200.[296]These are tactical nuclear weapons which has limited strategic effect compare to much destructive strategic warheads.

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[295] Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, **Nuclear Posture Review to Reduce Regional Role of Nuclear Weapons**. Available at: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/02/ nukemission.php.

[296] **The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent***,* Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6994, December 2006.

The risk that additional states might acquire nuclear weapons in the future is widely recognised, The UK government highlighted major trends and noted that we cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons may have increased by 2050.[297]A similar analysis can be found in major influential nongovernmental assessments. For example, the underlying point of the four senior US statesmen is that the accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. "We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands."[298]All good things must come to an end, the nuclear oligarchy of the UN security council members is over. Countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea has nuclear capabilities and this situation makes a new balance of power or a comprehensive nuclear arms control regime is hard to obtain in the century we live in.

NATO governments are aware of this risk and take it into account in their nuclear policy planning. In the official documents, NATO has stressed that its nuclear policy is not based on either nuclear first use or a policy of no first use. NATO alliance does not determine in advance how it would react to aggression. It leaves this question open, to be decided as and when such a situation materialized.[299] Nevertheless, NATO

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[297] **The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent**, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6994, December 2006.
[298] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, Toward a Nuclear-Free World, **Wall Street Journal**, 15 January 2008.
[299] **NATO's Position Regarding Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues**, NATO Fact Sheet. Available at: http://152.152.94.201/issues/nuclear/position.html.

statements have underlined that the circumstances in which they might have to contemplate any use of nuclear weapons are extremely remote.[300]

The national plans of the Allies with nuclear forces are obviously critical. It is a sovereign decision when and how these weapon systems are used. The overall pattern of development in nuclear force structures in the NATO countries with nuclear assets has shown a clear tendency of a consolidation of nuclear delivery systems and a reduction in different warhead types. This pattern can be seen both long-range and dual-capable delivery platforms with shorter ranges that could be armed with either nuclear or conventional weapons.[301]

From the early 1990s the United States began to reduce the numbers and types of strategic nuclear weapons for the force transformation to respect the provisions of arms control treaties and voluntary undertakings to other countries. Decisions reflected the retention of land, sea and air based delivery platforms, intended to provide a range of capabilities and flexibility in nuclear planning, as well as providing reassurance that unexpected problem would compromise the overall effectiveness of the deterrent. After 1991, the United States retired many types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.[302]

By 2009, the multiple types of delivery system that characterised US strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War had been replaced by a more streamlined force structure with one land-based system: Minuteman III inter-continental ballistic missiles, one

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[300] **NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment**, NATO Fact Sheet. Available at: http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment. html.
[301] Ibid.
[302] For a summary, see Amy F. Woolf, **US Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments and Issues**, CRS Report for Congress RL33640, 14 July 2009.

sea-based system the Trident II missiles carried onboard submarines and two airborne systems:B-52 and B-2 bombers that carry air-launched cruise missiles, as well as gravity bombs.[303]

In Cold War conditions, the need for rapid military response dictated a rigid approach under which a complex and integrated plan was developed in peacetime for immediate implementation during conflict. Since the end of the Cold War there has not been the same degree of urgency. The emphasis has been on developing and adapting plans and to meet the much wider range of contingencies that have actually engaged the Alliance.[304]

USA already put a premium on what was called "adaptive planning" in its January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review which noted that the current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapon system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, single integrated operational plan (SIOP) and moves towards more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role.[305]

Some experts argued that, the Ukraine crisis has proven the non-effectiveness of NATO's nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) for deterrence and reassurance

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[303] Shannon Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko and Hans Kristensen, World Nuclear Forces 2008, **SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security** (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008)
[304] Ibid.
[305]   **Nuclear Posture Review Report**, 8 January 2002, p. 29. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.

purposes, thus strengthening the case for their elimination.[306] On the other hand the opposition states that the forward-deployed weapons are still serving as a reminder of U.S. involvement in European security and can balance the threat of nuclear escalation by Russia during a possible crisis. Both the NATO and Russia seemed to signal to each other by publicizing pre-planned exercises involving their strategic units that a further escalation of the crisis could have severe consequences.[307]

In June 2014 The deployment of three B-52H and two B-2 strategic bombers to Europe was presented as a training mission that, and according to US government, "was to demonstrate to our nation's leaders and our allies that we have the right mix of aircraft and expertise to respond to a variety of potential threats and situations."[308] Also, Russian military doctrine envisions the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in certain scenarios of a conflict with NATO forces.[309]

A superpower is not born it is made, and it is made by nuclear capabilities. For some states like North Korea and Iran, this is a shortcut to achieve the superpower status. Since the detonation of first atomic bomb more than 70 years passed. In other words, nuclear technology is not a state of art 21st century technology. It is relatively cheap and easy for a regional power to acquire. With the increasing number of nuclear players, unfortunately risk of a nuclear war also increases.

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[306] T. Sauer, "Ukraine shows uselessness of NATO nukes in Europe," **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, www.thebulletin.org.
[307] Z. Keck, "Russia, US Conduct Nuclear Weapon Drills," *The Diplomat*, 14 May 2014, www.thediplomat.com.
[308] "Strategic bombers deploy to Europe to train, exercise capabilities," **U.S. Strategic Command Public Affairs**, 3 June 2014, www.afgsc.af.mil.
[309] See, N. N. Sokov, "Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike 'de-escalation'," **Bulletin of the Atomic** *Scientists*, 13 March 2013, www.thebulletin.org.

Here, transparency will be of paramount importance for NATO. Nuclear strategy considerations must reflect political, war-preventing nature of nuclear weapons based on deterrence. Apart from the changes in stockpile size and composition, the support of the Alliance's nuclear strategy depends more than before on the public's understanding. In contrast, other potentially irrational nuclear powers may have to be deterred because they make any armed conflict incalculable.[310]

Although the discussion of nuclear issues in NATO is still to take place, the emphasis in tailoring capabilities would be to provide a mix of systems that could be configured to meet any given scenario. The rationalisation, concentration and reduction of nuclear weapons in NATO would be difficult to deploy forward in an enlarged NATO or "little green man" situations and for "Out of Area" missions.

2.3.3. Strategy of NATO to counter the terrorism

The beginning of the 21st century was also the beginning of a new era for global security challenges. After the terrorist attacks on September 11 in 2001, the US, was declaring the 'war on global terror which could only be succeeded by multilateral action of the NATO members.

President George W. Bush summarized the U.S. approach, We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the

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[310] Klaus Wittmann, "NATO's Future Military Strategy" in William D. Wharton, **Security Arrangements for a New Europe**, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 125.

world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.[311]American policy states that the United States and its friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.[312]Although its missions have expanded in unexpected diversity since the end of the Cold War and alliance members agree on the threat posed by international terrorism, NATO's actual role in the complex struggle against terrorism is minor.

The dramatic changes in the international security environment had become too fundamental to allow for business as usual. Both the transatlantic relationship in general, and NATO in particular, have had to adapt to the realization that the immediate post-Cold War period has ended and a new, still undefined era has begun.[313]

At the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in May 2002, there was intense debate over the final communiqué. Several Allies advocated the inclusion of a statement that NATO was prepared to combat terrorism globally and that there would be no limits on NATO's global reach for such operations.[314]

In the final communiqué, a global role was granted to NATO. The ministers agreed that NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are

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[311] President George W. Bush, Speech at West Point, 1 June 2002. Quoted from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), p. 11.
[312] National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003) p. 12, emphasis added.
[313] Michael Rühle, "NATO After Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11," **Parameters**, US Army War College Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 91.
[314] Nora Bensahel, **The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union**, MR-1746 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 24

needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.[315] the Allies agreed to give NATO a global role in combating terrorism. These activities have led NATO's secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his period, to declare that more than ever, NATO is in demand, and NATO is delivering.[316]

The terror challenge brought about the international cooperative initiatives reflected with the NATO's September 12 decision for the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which is the *casus feoderis* of the alliance. The straightforward declaration of Javier Solana stated that 'the European Union stands firmly and fully behind the United States', which means to the US that the Alliance was fully behind the USA and that there would be no safe haven for terrorists in Europe.[317]

The post-September 11 U.S. dominance represents a statement of separation of these interests in many context, and the reason behind is the fact that The United States no longer seeks to be the *primus inter pares* (first among equals) in the modern security environment but rather a somewhat isolated step ahead of all other countries.[318] Europe no longer occupies the central role in the US diplomacy as it is no longer the nexus of world politics[319] and the Agreement on western values does not necessarily

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[315] Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002," Press Release M-NAC-1 (2002) 59, 14 May 2002.

[316] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy," Munich, Germany, February 4, 2006, **http://www.securityconference.de/.**

[317] Christopher Hill, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", **Journal of Common Market Studies***, 2004, Vol. 42(1), pp. 145-146.

[318] Jeffrey S. Lantis, "American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda", **European Security,** 2004, Vol. 13(4), p. 369.

[319] Ronald D.Asmus, "NATO's Double Enlargement: New Tasks, New Members" in Clay Clemens, **NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security**, (Macmillan, Hampshire, 1997), p.65.

lead to agreement on policies at the global level[320]European support to the US has declined, and support for a more independent ESDP has increased.[321]

President Bush reinterprets the meaning of self-defence by rejecting armed attack as the only basis for using force. He argues that Out of necessity, force must be used to pre-empt terrorists and those states that harbor and provide them with the means of war and terror.[322]As a result of Bush doctrine, all attention turned to the discussions on the right to use military force to "prevent" latent threats, associated with terrorism and nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, from emerging.[323] NATO has a reactive and defensive approach compare to US military strategy.NATO places greater emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities and improving coordination between the members states of the alliance to respond quickly to potential terrorist attacks.

According to European allies addressing the root causes of terrorism rather than dealing with its symptoms was more important as a result Europeans accepted only reluctantly the fact that military would have to be a part of the American strategy.[324] Some European politicians fear that any actions taken against extremist elements of those societies could result in a backlash and further radicalization.[325] Indeed, This is the ongoing problem of today's Western civilization both in Europe and North

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[320] Henrik Larsen, "The EU's Role in the World", in **The New World Order, Contrasting Theories**, edited by Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (Macmillan Press, New York, 2000), p.235.

[321] Marta Dassù and Roberto Menotti, "Europe and America in the Age of Bush", **Survival**, 47:1, (Spring 2005), p.105–122.

[322] Richard H. Schultz and Andreas Vogt, "It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism Through a Doctrine of Preemption", **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol. 15(1), Spring 2003, pp. 24-26.

[323] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", **Survival, Winter** 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), p. 55.

[324] Osvalso Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, 2003, Vol. 8, p. 469.

[325] Jack Clarke, "The United States, Europe, and Homeland Security: Seeing Soft Security Concerns Through A Counterterrorist Lens", **European Security**, 2004, Vol. 13, pp. 129-130.

America which causing   civil unrest and boosting the support for radical right movements against immigrant population in these societies.

Brussels Summit of December 2003 with the European Security Strategy, titled as A Secure Europe in a Better World[326] Despite the common assessment of the key threats, the European Security Strategy offered markedly different prescriptions in dealing with terrorism and non-proliferation.[327] The European strategy was mainly conceived to be developed as a response to American pre-emptive war understanding and the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention, this perspective is far from an endorsement of pre-emption.[328]

In the post-September era, three reasons for a more expansive use of preventive force are mentioned by USA: "the changing nature of the actors who threaten the US, the characteristic of the new threat, and the inadequacy of relying on collective action through the UN."[329] The US determination for destruct and destroy terrorist organization, have been declared in the National Security Strategy paper by the words that: While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent

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[326] **A Secure Europe in a Beter World: European Security Strategy**, December 2003, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf,
[327] Stephen J. Flanagan, "Sustaining U.S.-European Global Security Cooperation", *Strategic Forum,* September 2005, p. 4, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_217/ai_n15950663,
[328] Dana H.Allin, "The Atlantic Crisis of Confidence", **International Affairs***,* 2004, Vol. 80(4), p. 658.
[329] James Steinberg, "Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy", **Survival***,* Winter 2005-06, Vol. 47(4), pp. 58-59.

them doing harm against our people and our country…[330]On the other hand the United Nations from the view point of many Europeans is the most legitimate body for defining the world's general counter-terrorism policy.[331]

By invoking Article 5, NATO allies not only showed their support and solidarity for the USA, but also showed their determination for their faith in multilateral engagement within the international system. Indeed, the combination of commitment and discretion in Article V had originally been designed to allow states (not least the United States, ironically) some freedom of maneuver, and in any case it was rusty from non-use. It was therefore all the more remarkable that NATO members, 11 of them also in the Europe, were willing to make such an immediate and bold commitment.[332]

It should be noted that NATO's formal engagement, stemmed from the Article 5 commitments of September 12, began with a series of concrete measures. These were:

• Enhanced intelligence sharing, both bilaterally and within NATO;

• blanket over-flight clearances for the US and other NATO aircrafts;

• assistance to allies and other states that might be subject to terrorist threats as a result of their co-operation with the US,

• measures to provide increased security for the US facilities in Europe;

• backfilling certain allied assets in the NATO area that might be required elsewhere for   the campaign against terrorism;

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[330] White House, **The National Security Strategy of the United States of America**, September 2002, p.6, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, accessed on 16.02.2006.
[331] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", **Survival**, Winter 2001-02, Vol. 43(4), p. 95.
[332] Christopher Hill, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", **Journal of Common Market Studies***, 2004, Vol. 42(1), p. 146.

• access for the US and other allies to ports and airfields on NATO territory;

• the deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and the deployment of NATO airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) to US airspace so that American AWACS could be used abroad.[333]

However, when the time came to implement the NATO treaty under Article 5 in the form of the military campaign, namely Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO was not used by the USA. The US decided not to ask for a NATO operation for military, political, and strategic reasons: only the United States had the right sort of equipment to projected military force half way around the world, and Washington did not want political interference from 18 allies in the campaign.[334]NATO has a deeply institutionalized, consensus-based model compare to bilateral or multilateral cooperation model of U.S., NATO's strategy combating the terrorism is based on first prevention and defence, and then counterterrorism operation when necessary.

Terrorism problem will not be solved easily. There are several reasons for this problem in modern times. The main issue today is connected to the Islamic world. There are more than 56 Islamic countries in the word and many of them can be classified as developing nations. But some of them are failed states like Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. Majority of Islamic countries are also called third world. Although this term is not popular among intellectuals of these nations.

The "population bomb" has already blasted and the population of the Islam world doubled in last 30 years. As a result, there is a severe unemployment in these

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[333] Sten Rynning, **NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 124.

[334] Philip Gordon, "Reforging the Atlantic alliance", **National Interest**, Fall 2002, p.1,

countries. The modern economic theory based on so called "productivity" which advocates the high tech production and reduction of employed personal in business is unable find answer to this problem in developing nations. Because of this situation the young population in Islamic societies are full of anger and dissatisfied with the political situation, for this reason it is not hard for the terrorist organizations to find recruits and sympathizers.

During the George W. Bush presidency USA followed a strategy with two phases to combat terrorism. First phase was based on the unitarily anti-terror operations of USA and then the second phase was based on international cooperation with UN and NATO as an ongoing campaign. According to the 2010 strategic concept of NATO, main threat regard to terrorism is acquisition of chemical, radiological, biological and nuclear weapons by the terrorist groups or individuals. NATO is adopting itself to these new threats by improving training and technology level of the member states militaries of the alliance. Nevertheless, NATO members are still facing serious terrorism threats.

On the illegelag imigration problem NATO is unable cope with with the pace of events. Recent devolopments because of the Syrian civil war showed that NATO is not prepared for massive imigration Crises.NATO has problems with dealing with the civilian missions and this is apperant in a dramatic way with loss of lifes in Mediterranian when the imigrants from Syria and Africa uses sealines to reach Europe with their primative boats.This is because NATO and Europe do not have compharansive strategy for dealing with the modern imigration problem.

2.4. NATO's Relations with the EU and Russia in the Transformation Era

European Union and Russia are the key actors of the western Eurasia. Most of the member states of the EU are also members of NATO. After the Invasion of Crimea NATO relations with Russia became problematic. In this section NATO-EU-Russia political triangle will be analyzed.

2.4.1. NATO and EU relations

If we get the capabilities, NATO, along with the European Union, can do amazing things.
-Lord Robertson, NATO secretary-general, 1999-2003

Defensive military alliances were established in Western Europe after the Second World War. These alliances were planned to be a safeguard against a renewal of German militarism, and were developed in reply to fears of Soviet aggression.[335]

After the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, the US proposed that West Germany should contribute to Western European defense. But, France was not satisfied with the proposal and French fears of a revival of German militarism led to their 1950 Pleven Plan for European Defense Community (EDC). According to the France's calculation the EDC would provide a way of controlling the proposed German Army under the supervision of a European entity.[336]As a result of establishing a supranational European military not Germany but Germans would be armed.

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[335] Anne Daltrop, **Politics and the European Community** (New York: Longman, 1986), 11.
[336] Mark Wise, "France and European Unity," in **French in World Politics**, eds. Robert Aldrich and John Connell (London: Routledge, 1989), 64.

The EDC never came into existence as a result of parliamentary opposition in France in 1954. During the Cold War, the need for such an organization was minimal due to the fact that the security of Western Europe was guaranteed by the US-dominated structures and institutions.[337]One of the main criticisms made by opponents of the EDC was that it was unrealistic and premature.The cost of transition to a supranational European military oganization would be very high.

France worried about the possibility of losing control over its national army within a European force. This worry may also be seen in de Gaulle's words:[338]

> *"We alone would be surrendering our army. To whom? To Europe? But it does not exist. We would be giving it to General Eisenhower. For centuries our value and prestige have been merged with those of the French Army. We therefore must not and cannot give up an army of our own."*

After the failure of the EDC Treaty, defence issues become a taboo area for the European integration and were never discused until 1998 St.Malo summit. U.S. found another way to rearm and rebuilt West German military by admitting it to NATO. It is emphasized that the EDC was intended a Frenchdevice for keeping Germany out of NATO. Although the EDC Treaty did not materialize, as Fursdon states the EDC Treaty successfully delayed German rearmament and joining NATO for five years.[339]

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[337] Michael J. Baun, **An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and New Politics of European Integration**. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 83.
[338] Martin J. Dedman, **The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95** (New York: Routledge, 1996), 80.
[339] Dedman, **The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95**, p.91

Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic France has attempted to assert a foreign policy, which was 'independent', in Gaullist terminology.[340]De Gaulle is remembered with his great achievements, such as the creation of free France, the post-war recognition of France as a great power again.[341]

For a long time De Gaulle resisted establishment of the European Community, because believing that supranational economic integration posed a threat to French sovereignty and to French identity. But after returning to power he accepted the Common Market project seeing that France could play the leadership role of Europe and thus gain greater leverage on the world stage. In order to provide French hegemony and gain upper hand in Europe, de Gaulle believed that the Federal Republic of Germany was to be locked in and Great Britain locked out.[342]

De Gaulle had clear principles for his foreign policy. Firstly, Western Europe should be economically, politically and militarily an independent union. It should never be part of an Atlantic community dominated by the United States.[343]French security policy also developed along the lines of nuclear diplomacy within NATO.France decided to build its own nuclear weapons for international prestige, particularly in as much as it served to compensate for the loss of French overseas empire.

De Gaulle had worked to establish national independence on the sole basis that France should have the control of an effective national security system. As a result of this policy de Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw France from the integrated command of NATO,

[340] Philippe Moreau Defarges, "France and Europe," in **Policy Making in France from the Gaulle to Mitterran*d*,** ed. Paul Godt (London: Pinter Publishers, 1986), 226.
[341] Douglas Johnson, "De Gaulle and France's Role in the World," in **De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France***,* eds. Hugh Cough and John Horne (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 83.
[342] Robert Gildea, **France Since 1945** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 210.
[343] Johnson, De Gaulle and France's Role in the World,p.93.

which was dominated by the US.[344]The second attempt for defense and security cooperation in Europe was the Fouchet Plan, which was proposed by France. The Fouchet Plan which was preapared by a french commision headed by France's ambasador to Denmark Christian Fouchet, called for the coordination of defense and foreign policies outside of the EC institutional framework.[345]The main idea of the plan was to for a new 'Union of States' in Europe but not 'United States of Europe'. This was an intergovernmental alternative to the supranational European Communities project during that time which became E.U. at the end. There was a second draft of the plan but it was also unsuccessful. Benelux Countries and West Germany did not support the plan and they thougth that the Fouchet Plan was an attempt to weaken the power of NATO.The Fouchet Plan was never implemented.

One of the defense and security instutions other than NATO is WEU(Western European Union). The WEU, in the 1950s, was put into practice with nominal headquarters in London. Any proposal on defense that came from its Consultative Assembly was ignored by the member governments.[346]

During the Cold War, The WEU, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 served as a partially dormant European defense and security organization. NATO, then, had assumed the WEU's military tasks.[347] In the mid-1980s, France made efforts to improve the WEU. Meanwhile, West Germany was beginning to

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[344] Alan Clark, "*Foreign Policy*" in **France Today**, ed. J.E. Flower (London: Methuen, 1987), pp.107-108.
[345] Michael J. Baun, A**n Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and New Politics of European Integration**. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p.84
[346] Derek W. Urwin, **The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945** (London, Longman, 1993), p.70.
[347] Rob de Wijk, **NATO on the Brink of The New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus**, (Brassey's, London, 1997), p.6.

question France's own intermediate range nuclearweapons and especially where they were targeted.[348]

Security institutions of Europe, in particular the EDC and WEU failed to provide a security and defense cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War. During this period, the security of Western Europe was provided by the US, and European defense was organized within the framework of US dominated institutions such as NATO.[349]

The main reason behind the failures of old European policies was the divergences of the security policies between the leading states of Western Europe, especially between France, West Germany, and Britain. For Britain, the US security guarantee had primary importance.

Britain's reluctant attitude towards a security alliance in westerneurope was based on three reasons:[350]

> firstly, Britain believed that Atlantic-oriented security system also reflected its own interests. The relationship between NATO and Britain provided the British with cooperation in military matters, including collaboration in nuclear weapons. Secondly, Britain believed that European allies were not capable of constructing defense arrangement that would be an alternative to NATO. Thirdly, Britain generally has a global

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[348] Joanne Wright, "France and European Security," **European Security**, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): p.31.
[349] Baun, An Imperfect Unio*n*, 83.
[350] G. Wyn Rees, "Britain and the Western European Union," **European Security**, vol. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 529

perspective rather than a regional one. This policy proved useful collaboration with the US after the Second World War.

Although France pressed for the establishment of an autonomous security system for Europe, West Germany emphasized NATO as the main element in the European security during the Cold War.[351]At the end of the Cold War, there were several reasons that have necessitated moves to develop a European Security and Defense Policy:[352] German unification encouraged the deepening of European integration and the US began to withdraw a significant portion of its troops from Western Europe.

The European nations reignited the flame for the development of a European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) that has been sleeping since the establishment of the WEU, answering the calls of Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[353] France and Germany were evident in the transformation of the European Community into the European Union at a summit meeting in Maastricht in December 1991. After this meeting the promise of a common foreign and security policy emerged. These policies were the first signals of independent Europe from USA and NATO.

The decision of the EC meeting at Maastricht to move for a CFSP and designate the WEU as the defense component of the European Union indicated that NATO was no

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[351] Tom Lansford, "The Question of France: French Security Choices at Century's End," **European Security** 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): p.44.
[352] Karen E. Smith, "The End of Civilian Powers EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?," **The International Spectator** XXXV, no. 2 (April-June 2000): p.14.
[353] Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, **NATO in the New European Order**, (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.16.

longer the only defense institution in which Europeans would develop their collective security approaches.[354]

The tasks that were envisaged for the WEU were decided at the Petersberg meeting in June 1992. These tasks included three types of operations:Humanitarian tasks, The deployment of armed forces for peacekeeping operations and Crisis management.

It was also decided that 'decisions to use military units answerable to the WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.[355]Nine member states of the WEU declared that they were Prepared to support case-by-case basis, for the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council.[356]

The issue of a WEU peacekeeping force was discussed at a WEU ministerial meeting on 19 September 1991, but no decision was reached. Because, there were arguments between Germany and France on what type of operational capability WEU should have. Germany insisted that WEU should have a peace-enforcement force,on the other hand France pursued the option of a peacekeeping force.[357]

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was launched in January, 1994 at the NAC meeting in Brussels where the US accepted the prospect of putting military assets at the disposal of their EU member allies on a case-by-case basis to

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[354] George Stein, "The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture," **European Security** 2, no.2 (Summer 1993): p.200.
[355] Martin Ortega, "Military Intervention and the European Union," **Chaillot Papers** no. 45 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 2001): 106.
[356] **Ibid.** , 107
[357] **Ibid**. , 132.

peacekeeping and peacemaking operations to which they did not wish to take part. This is also known as the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept.[358]It was announced that the WEU would be able to use NATO military assets and headquarters for the conduct of European-only operations through the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).[359] The WEU would have the politico-military leadership, but the forces and staff from NATO and WEU nations not represented in NATO's military commands would participate in the conduct of operations.[360]

The CJTF concept was paralyzed by France. France was uneasy about European dependency on American military equipment, such as heavy air transport, AWACS, also France did not want a WEU operation to be answerable to SACEUR.[361]France insisted on a blank cheque that gives Europeans a guaranteed right to access NATO equipments if there was a need.[362]

This difficulty was resolved after France announced a *rapprochement* with the Alliance at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1995 which led to the signing of an agreement on the CJTF concept at the NAC meeting in Berlin in June 1996,[363]and in December 1996 Brussels ministerial meetings.[364]CJTF would be "a US-approved and NATO-sponsored" tool to control the development and direction of

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[358] Jean Klein, "Interface Between NATO/WEU and UN/OSCE" edited by Michael Brenner, **NATO and Collective Security**, London: MacMillan Press and New York: St.Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 250-252.

[359] Rees, Britain and the Western European Union, p.534.

[360] Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine, and Charles Grant, "Building European Defense Capability," **Survival** 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 22.

[361] Rees, **Britain and the Western European Union**,p. 534.

[362] Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force," **International Journal** (Spring 2000): 260.

[363] Rees, **Britain and the Western European Union**, 534.

[364] Robert E.Hunter, **The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor**, (Rand, Santa Monica, 2002), p.21.

the ESDI.[365] Berlin meeting reaffirmed to build the ESDI within NATO structures.[366] At the Berlin Summit of 1996, NATO began to develop ESDI to provide a more balanced partnership between USA and Europe. NATO decided to make its assets available for WEU operations and adapted the CJTF concept.

France was interested in achieving full cooperation in the defense and security affairs within the European framework. France's key objective was to diminish US influence in Europe and gain more French and European autonomy in security affairs.[367] France pursued the proposal of a WEU operational capability within the framework of an EC defense policy during the Bosnia crisis.[368]

Great nations in Europe, pushed for politics of creating the ESDP, which encompasses the three fears related to power of united Germany, the US intentions, and nationalistic militarization attempts, which would engender relative power concepts and renationalization of defense.[369] Prevention of renationalization of defense in Europe was one of the key principles that has to be retained in 1999 Strategic Concept.[370]

The integration of the EU was primarily achieved in the area of trade and finance, symbolized by the Common European Market and the Common European

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[365] Paul Cornish, "European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO", **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1994***), 72:4, (Oct. 1996), p.764.

[366] Final Communiqué (M-NAC-1(96)63) of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, article 5.

[367] Baun, An Imperfect Union,p. 83.

[368] Gülnur Aybet, **A European Security Architecture after the Cold War** (London: Macmillan, 2000), 130.

[369] Robert J.Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", **Political Science Quarterly**, Vol.111, No.1 (Spring, 1996), p.3.

[370] George Robertson "The New NATO" in Wesley K.Clark, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, **Security Challenges of the New NATO**, XVth NATO Workshop, (Center for Strategic Decision Press, California, 1998), p.47.

Currency.[371]NATO is a vital component of the global security framework for both the US and the European countries. But the EU seeks further European integration by a ESDP. The demand for consistencyin European relations is natural and desirable to allow European states the ability to take higher responsibility in a globalized world.[372] On 3-4 December 1998 in Saint Malo, European defense gained momentum with the Franco-British summit. The Saint Malo declaration emphasized that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness, in order to respond to international crises.[373] The Saint-Malo declaration went directly to the heart of the European security architecture by positioning the need for appropriate structures to be established within the EU, for the EU itself to acquire the capacity for autonomous action backed up by operation capable military forces, and an EU contribution to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance.[374]

When, at the St.Malo Summit, French president Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the European Defence Initiative, many believed it would fail as the EDC.But over the following years, ESDP made remarkable progress.EU established a Political and Security Committee,a Military Committee, a Military Staff, a Defence Agency, and EU Battle Groups, Military operations were undertaken in Balkans and Congo.

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[371] LTC (GS) Nikolaus Carstens, "**The Value of a European Security and Defense Policy**" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2007), 8.
[372] Wolfgang Wagner, **The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy**, European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2005, 29-30.
[373] Schake, Bloch-Laine, and Grant, **Building European Defence Capability**, p. 22
[374] Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler "The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy" edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, **Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy**", New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p. 10.

From 1947–1997 Europe was stifled by a security dilemma resulting from different interpretations of Washington's response to a serious European military capability. London feared U.S. defection from Europe if they developed their own security mechanism. Paris assumed the United States would take allies more seriously if they took themselves seriously.[375] As a result this political calculations, no significant European security policy outside of NATO mechanism could be developed. The summit at Saint Malo in 1998 partly solved this deadlock and permitted the EU to embrace security and defense issues as part of the European politics.

Following the Saint Malo,U.K. France initiative of 1998, EU tried to deepen Union integration by implementing the CFSP and CSDP. But there is aproblem in this policy, this initiative could also jeopardize NATO as a collective defense organization. The US policy towards CSDP was spelled out in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's concerns as the "three Ds": she warned European leaders not to "Duplicate" NATO assets, not to "Discriminate" against non-EU NATO Members and not to "Decouple" the US from Europe.[376]

The possibility of unnecessary duplication of military capabilities worries the US and other non-EU members of NATO. This is because the EU may over time develop a permanent military structure that duplicates NATO's integrated military structure.

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[375] Jolyon Howorth, **Security and Defense Policy in the European Union**, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)pp. 36-37.
[376] Kori Schake, "Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on US Military Assets," **Centre for European Reform Working Paper** (January 2002): 5

This separate standing military structure may become an alternative rival collective defense organization to NATO and even finally ruin NATO.[377]

The development of an autonomous EU defense capability that does not undermine NATO and the transatlantic link would be difficult. Discrimination against states that have considerable potential to contribute to Europe's common defense–such as Turkey, Norway, and Poland– might distance these countries by creating tensions and dissent within NATO.[378]

For example both Finland and Sweden argue that the EU peacekeeping operations should be multilateral mandated by the UN. According to them, a mandate by the UN represents the support of international community. Another problematic issue is related with Finland. With a parliamentary decision in 1995, Finland began to participate in peacekeeping operations in order to make use of force for humanitarian tasks. For instance, Finland participated in the implementation and stabilization forces in Bosnia as well as in KFOR.[379]

This disagreement about the level of military integration still continues between the three dominant powers in the EU– Germany, the UK, and France. These three states generally disagree about the optimal degree of military integration within European military institutions and the US' role in Europe within the NATO framework.[380]

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[377] Stuart Croft and others, "NATO's Triple Challenge," **International Affairs**, 76, no.3 (July 2000): p.516.
[378] Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective," **Survival,** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): p.19.
[379] François Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity," **Survival** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 9.
[380] Sarah Tarry, **A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?** (Canada: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998),p. 7.

All three countries have made pragmatic moves to accommodate each other's traditional strategic positions on the management of European security and defense. France has abandoned its dream of an independent European defense (i.e. without relying on the US). Germany has accepted that it must participate in military operations if it wants to be considered as a full European player in the defense field; and Britain has given up its opposition to a EU-only involvement in the international defense matters where the EU will be playing central role.[381]

In the Post Cold War era, Germany insisted on continuing in its integration into Western Alliance system, besides it proposed an acceleration of European Union integration.[382]Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, while paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member.[383]Germany's participation in the Kosovo air strikes was based on a commitment to humanitarian and international democratic values and on a desire to show solidarity with its NATO allies.[384]

Germany has tried to influence EU security policy in the direction of non-military endeavors in which political cooperation is more important than military intervention.[385]Germany assumed an important role in the implementation of the Stability Pact to provide regional security, development in democracy, human rights,

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[381] Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Precarious Center: Franco-German Co-operation and the CFSP," **European Security** 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 17.

[382] Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" **Survival** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 69.

[383] Alister John Miskimmon, "Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and the Transatlantic Relationship," **European Security, Special Issue: New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?** (2001): 93.

[384] Maull, Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?, 76.

[385] Miskimmon, Recasting the Security Bargains,p. 97.

and economy to South Eastern Europe. This, emphasizes the civilian soft power approach of Germany.

When differences will remain in culture, education, language, an economically and politically integrated Europe could not exist without an effective common foreign and security policy to address the shared interests of the members of the Union.[386]

In the Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 all 15 EU member states declared that The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope of Petersberg Tasks.[387]

The EU member states also committed themselves explicitly to a common European crisis management ability by declaring that the Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.[388]

After the Washington Summit of NATO, at the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999, EU members declared a number of military goals: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 15 brigades for Petersberg Tasks on 60-day readiness and sustainable for at least one year, backed by airpower and warships, with its own planning staff and satellite reconnaissance system, a decision making strucure

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[386] **Ibid**. , 67,68.
[387] Alistair J. K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?," **European Security** 9, no. 2, (Summer 2000): 15.
[388] Van Ham, **Europe's Common Defense Policy**, p.218.

and operational capacity.[389]Helsinki Summit also facilitated the division of labour between NATO and the EU, allowing the EU to get involved in crisis management, when NATO as a whole is not involved.[390]The EU, like the UN but unlike NATO, has at its disposal a wide array of civil assets essential in any nation-building operation.[391]

Kosovo operations demonstrated the superiority of the US in military technology including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, precision-guided munitions, massive air and sealift resources, modern communications, and solid logistics. The Kosova experience showed that the Europeans could not support their diplomatic efforts with military means when neccesary.[392]The EU failed to take any meaningful joint political or military action in Kosovo. The crisis in the Balkans required the use of force to stop bloodshed and enable the use of civilian measures for long-term stability in the region.[393]

The EU member states did not have the required strategic capabilities for a peace-enforcement operation. As a result, during the Operation Allied Force, US aircrafts delivered over %80 of the weapons.[394]This factor shows the industrial urgency to consolidate the European defense industries and compete the US superiority and

[389] Moens, **Developing a European Intervention Force**, 264.
[390] F.Stephen Larrabee, "ESDP and NATO" in Lidija Čehulić (Ed.), **NATO and New International Relations**, (Atlantic Council of Croatia, Zagreb, 2004), p.47.
[391] James Dobbins, "New Directions for Transatlantic Security", **Survival**, 47:4, (Winter 2005-06) pp.39-54, p.44
[392] Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship," **Security Dialogue** 31, no. 2 (2000): 216.
[393] Sverre Stub, "European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective," in **EU Civilian Crisis Management**, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 15.
[394] David Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," **Survival** 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-01): 103.

create a significant economic initiative for cooperation.[395] After the Kosovo operation the EU's redoubled efforts to forge a collective defense policy and a military force capable of operating military operations independently of the US is not a coincidence. The main reason behind was the European awareness that they would be lonely, without the US support, in the case of a possible military crisis emerged on the old continent in the future.[396]

The primary purpose of the CJTF was to provide the Alliance with a more mobile and flexible military to conduct contingency operations beyond NATO area. The secondary aim was to provide NATO resources in support of WEU operations for crisis response.[397]

The phrase of Combined Joint Task Force comprises three separate terms having specific military meanings: A *task force* is a military body, which is organized to conduct a specific mission or operational purpose. *Joint* operations include troops from different services like army, navy, marine and air force units that would cooperate with one another during an operation. *Combined* operations involve forces two or more nations.[398]

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[395] Margarita Mathiopulos and Istvan Gyarmati, "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense," **The Washington Quarterly** 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): p.68.

[396] Charles A.Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", **Political Science Quarterly**, 2003, Vol. 118(2), pp. 219-220.

[397] Charles L. Barry, "Creating a European Security and Defense Identity," **JFQ** (Spring 1997): 67.

[398] Nora Bensahel, "Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force," **European Security** 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 56.

Three types of CJTSs were foreseen:[399]

- NATO-only CJTF, involving Alliance members and without any outside participation,

- NATO-plus CJTF, involving as many members of NATO and PfP as desire to take part,

- WEU-led CJTF, where the WEU uses NATO assets, including a CJTF headquarters, in its own operation.

Separable forces means that EU forces could borrow NATO and US assets. These assets provided the WEU with capabilities that WEU and EU members could not easily reach on their own, while keeping decision making process and political control over European security and defense activities inside NATO alliance.[400]

In case the military operation was conducted only by European forces, the commander would be European, and SACEUR would remain in the background as a supporting commander with consultative functions.[401]At Washington Summit of 1999, NATO agreed to support operations led by the EU where NATO was not engaged. NATO members also decided to make NATO planning, assets, and capabilities available to the EU while recognizing that nothing is automatic.

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[399] Ibid, p.57.
[400] Alexander Moens, "NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defense Identity," **Security Dialogue** 29, no. 4 (1998):p.467.
[401] **Ibid**., 471.

NATO alliance agreed to support EU-led operations, but did not give a blank cheque. USA insisted that the permission would be given on a case-by-case basis.[402] There are three factors that could limit the future development of the CJTF: the unresolved fight for political control; the fact that solutions on paper do not always work in practice; possible internal resistance from NATO's bureaucracy.[403]

France and the United States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. French officials argued that the CJTF should not become a part of NATO's integrated military structure arguing that it was too rigid to accommodate limited operations and it lacked adequate political oversight.[404]

Europeans were not pulling their weight in a NATO dominated by the USA and that the European Union was losing its political influence and military effectiveness. British prime ministerTony Blair noted that:[405] We Europeans should not expect the US to have to play a part in every disorder in our backyard. The EU should be able to take on some security tasks on its own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own. The inadequacy of the EU and the reluctance of the US to deal effectively with the crisis in Kosovo led the British Prime Minister to revise the European defense project.[406]

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[402] **Ibid**.,p.260.
[403] Bensahel, **Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force**, p.64.
[404] **Ibid**. , p.60.
[405] Van Ham, **Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship**, p.218.
[406] Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative." **Survival** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): p.33.

The European Union at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 agreed at Helsinki to establish a number committees and staff organizations in Brussels to provide the necessary infrastructure for the ESDP:[407]

- Political and Security Committee (PSC). It would be at ambassadorial level and responsible for the CFSP. During a military crisis, this committee will exercise political and strategic direction of the operation under the authority of the EU Council.

- A Military Committee (EUMC). It was made up of the military representatives of national Chiefs of Defense and would provide advice to the PSC and direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

- European Union Military Staff (EUMS). it would perform early warning and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

After the Helsinki Summit, the Capabilities Commitment Conference took place on 20 November 2000 in Brussels. EU governments, except Denmark, made offers amounting to 100,000 troops, 400 aircrafts, and 100 ships for the rapid reaction force by the end of January 2001.[408]

The Clinton administration reacted to the Helsinki decisions by declaring that it could *decouple* Europe's security from that of the US, *duplicate* what NATO already does

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[407] Van Ham, **Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship**, p.218

[408] Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," **International Affairs** 77, no. 3 (2001): p.593.

in a costly and ineffective way, and *discriminate* especially against European NATO allies that were not EU members.[409]This is because the EU may over time develop a permanent European military structure that duplicates NATO's integrated military structure.[410]

The development of an autonomous EU defense capability would undermine NATO and the transatlantic link.[411]Disagreement continues between the three dominant military powers in the EU– Germany, the UK, and France.[412]But all three countries have made pragmatic moves on the management of European security and defense.[413]

Differences in security culture between Britain and France remain considerable: issues such as state versus market/civil society; territorial defense versus force projection; conscription versus professionalism; integration versus cooperation; deepening versus enlargement; institutional priorities versus capabilities; strategy versus tactics; political will versus pragmatism; and above all, Europeanism versus Atlanticism.[414]

France thinks that the emergence of an effective ESDP would create a more balanced Atlantic Alliance, but Britain fears that the opposite would be the case: if Europe demonstrated a mature capacity to manage its own security and defense affairs, the

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[409] Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, " Putting Europe First," **Survival** 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001): p.79.

[410] Stuart Croft and others, "NATO's Triple Challenge," **International Affairs**, 76, no.3 (July 2000): p.516.

[411] Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective," **Survival** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): p.19.

[412] Sarah Tarry, **A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?** (Canada: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 7.

[413] Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Precarious Center: Franco-German Co-operation and the CFSP," **European Security** 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 17.

[414] Michael Clarke, "French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World" **International Affairs** 76, no.4 (October 2000), p.734.

US would move back to isolationism and NATO would collapse.[415] But there is also a growing positive coperation of France within NATO. France is more militarily engaged in NATO in 2000s than at any time since the 1960s, fielding sizable ground and air forces in Afghanistan and using its air and naval forces in NATO operation in Libya 2011. France intends to have a credible "full-spectrum" capability, including nuclear forces despite spending cuts to its military, which eventualy enlarges NATO's capabilities.

In the case of Germany, Post Cold War Germany insisted on continuing in its integration into Western Alliance system, besides it proposed an acceleration of European integration.[416] Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, but paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member.[417]Germany has tried to influence EU security and defense policy in the direction of non-military endeavors in which political cooperation is more important than military intervention.[418]France and Germany follow their own agenda to make EU a global power.[419]But Germany also remains committed to institutional course it developed during the Cold War.[420]

Another problematic issue is the lack of consensus among Western European states on what kind of role the European Union should play as a unitary actor on the world

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[415] Howorth, *Bri*tain, **France and the European Defense Initiative**,p. 33.
[416] Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" **Survival** 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): p.69.
[417] Alister John Miskimmon, "Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and the Transatlantic Relationship," **European Security, Special Issue: New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? (**2001):p.93.
[418] Miskimmon, Recasting the Security Bargains,p. 97.
[419] Mesut Hakkı Caşın,Uğur Özgöker, Halil Çolak, **Küreselleşmenin Avrupa Birliği Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına Etkisi**,Nokta Kitap İstanbul 2007,p.311.
[420] Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticisim: NATO ad the evolution of European Security After the Cold War", **Journal of Strategic Studies**, 22:1, (1999), p.22.

arena.[421]Many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threat and interpretations over the implementation of a CFSP.[422]

Most European governments remain reluctant to open their defense markets for competition. It is argued that larger and insustrially advanced EU member states do not want to lose national autonomy over their defense industries.[423]It is believed that without the Soviet threat, which required large and prepared sophisticated standing military forces in Europe, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable to maintain Cold War levels of military spending.[424]

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU decided to absorb the WEU in the near future, and to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops.As a result of this development, at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999, it was declared that NATO would provide ready EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, on a case-by-case basis and consensus. There are various problems hindering the development of the CJTF concept.

France, rejects NATO's this approach by arguing that the notion of 'first refusal' is contrary with European aspiration towards some autonomy in relation to the US and NATO. France and the United States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. It is argued that CJTF lacks operational capabilities.

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[421] Peter Van Ham, "The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity," **European Security** 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 527.

[422] William T. Johnsen, Stephen J. Blank, and Thomas-Durell Young, "Building a Better European Security Environment," **European Security** 8, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): p.9.

[423] Alistair J.K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom–Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?" **European Security** 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): p.26.

[424] Tarry, **A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?**, p.10.

The Iraq conflict and disunity in NATO caused relations between France and the U.S. to decline again. While relations have been historically tense, the NATO crisis over Iraq made relations the weakest after the Cold War. France had a fundamental different view on Iraq. France wants a strong EU that conducts politics towards other power poles, but at the same time it wants a strong French national presence in Europe where France conducts a politics of alliances that threatens to fragment the structures of the EU.[425]

The peak of the diplomatic conflict between France and the U.S. was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's comments: "Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem . . . But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the United States . . . Germany and France represent 'old Europe' and NATO's expansion in recent years means the center of gravity is shifting to the east."[426]

The United States and Great Britain continued their historically relationship into the 2000s. While the Iraq conflict isolated central European powers from the U.S., it brought Great Britain and the U.S. together in a strategic way.[427]This was one of the historical split in the NATO alliance since the era of De Gaulle.

In 2001 there were slightly fewer than 10,000 peacekeepers personel deployed under EU command across the globe.Since 2003 we can see EU flag on military and police

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[425] Holm, Ulla. "The Old France, the New Europe and a Multipolar World." **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**. Vol. 5, Iss. 3. Dec: 2004. P. 471.

[426] Rumsfeld: France, Germany Are 'Problems' in Iraqi Conflict." **Cable News Network**. January 23, 2003. Http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/22/sprj.irq.wrap/.

[427] See Kramer, Steven. "Blair's Britain After Iraq." **Foreign Affairs**. Vol. 82, Iss. 4. July/August: 2003. pp. 90 - 104.

uniforms in Bosnia, Macedonia, Palesstine, Sudan, Congo, and Chad in addition to several civilian crisis management operations.

The European security and defence policy implied a certain rapprochement between NATO and the EU.But it also differed from its failed predecessors in a number of ways.ESDP was portrayed as a bottom up process, which would rationalize existing forms of cooperation.ESDP granted decision-making autonomy to the EU and promised European foreign policymakers without undermining the military infrastructure of defence planners.

There are also several challenges ahead for the ESDP and it is still debated whether a force of 50,000-60,000 troops would be enough for military crisis management missions. European states are reluctant to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities. Military budgets are decreasing in European states due to economical reasons. There are nationalistic rivalries in the defense industry that hinders the development of European defense industry. EU member states cannot agree on which types of missions would be conducted by the Rapid Reaction Force. Most of the EU member states emphasize that the EU should acquire a military capability to address the small scale operations.

The conflicts in the Balkans, and Afghanistan have shown that the usefulness of military power alone has serious limits.[428] The Allies identified the importance of civilian security instruments very early in 1956, the Report of the Three Wise Men on

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[428] J. Howorth, **The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union**, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 93.

Non-Military Cooperation stated: Security today is far more than a military matter.[429]

NATO underlined the importance of civilian instruments in responding to the

changing security environment also in its Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999.[430]

NATO has been seeking to enhance the integration of civilian instruments through

civil emergency planning. However, National stabilization and reconstruction

capabilities are rarely organized into deployable assets that can provide cohesive,

effective response options[431]. In Afghanistan for instance, the lack of civilian

capabilities forced NATO troops to take over civilian tasks.

The concept of 'civilian power' represented one of the earliest and most influential

attempts to conceptualize the European Community's role in international affairs.

According to Duchêne, the nuclear stalemate during the Cold War devalued pure

military power and gave more weight to "civilian forms of influence and action".[432]

These include diplomatic, economic and cultural policy instruments, for example, the

Single Market, humanitarian relief and the single currency, not to mention

enlargement.[433]

When the Cold War ended, the concept of civilian power had a renaissance. Some

scholars argued that the exercise of power in international relations ceased to depend

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[429] NATO, **Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO**, Brussels, 13 September 1956.

[430] NATO, **New Strategic Concept**, Rome, 7/8 November 1991; NATO, **Strategic Concept**, Washington D.C., 23/24 April 1999.

[431] H. Binnendijk & R. Kugler, "Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force", **Defense Horizons**, no. 45, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004, p. 1.

[432] F. Duchêne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence", in M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager (eds.), **A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community**, London, Macmillan, 1973, p. 43.

[433] A. Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, vol. 9, no. 1, 2004, p. 51.

on military means and that forms of 'soft power' would prevail.[434] With this changed definition of power, the EU was to play a crucial role in providing non-military instruments to civilian aspects of security.[435]

Europeans provide most of the NATO troops in Europe.[436] The EU is the world's most important military power after the US. It has over 2 million men and women in uniform and a combined defense budget of over €200 billion.[437]Although these figures sound impressive, they are misleading. Actually, only around 5% of the EU's 2 million troops are currently deployable in out-of-area operations.[438]

The main problem is how to connect soft and hard factors in order to project 'comprehensive power'. If the EU wants to implement the comprehensive approach, it needs to be able to complement its civilian instruments with military ones. While it has acquired civil-military institutions and expertise, it is still dependent on other actors when it comes to high-intensity armed conflicts.[439]

In today's international politics there is no stronger civil player than the European Union and there is no stronger military alliance than NATO.[440] A peaceful Europe depends on NATO's ability to manage conflicts successfully. Because NATO has been the only organization that possessed standing forces available for crisis

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[434] J.S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power", **Foreign Policy**, vol. 80, 1990, pp. 153-171.

[435] S. Duke, **The New European Security Disorder**, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1994, p. 228.

[436] Yannis G.Valinakis, "NATO and European Security, Burdensharing: A European Viewpoint", in A.Th.Symeonides (Ed.), <u>**European Security in the 90s**</u>, (Fopse, Athens, 1990), p.148-149.

[437] S. Biscop, "The Ambiguous Ambition: The Development of the EU Security Architecture", paper presented at the colloquium **The EC/EU: A World Security Actor?,** Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 15 September 2006, p. 1.

[438] A. Toje, "The EU, NATO and European Defence – A Slow Train Coming", **Occasional Paper**,no. 74, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008, p. 26.

[439] N. Pirozzi & S. Sandawi, "Five Years of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends, Shortfalls", **European Security Review**, no. 39, 2008, p. 2.

[440] P. Hughes, "NATO and the EU: Managing the *Frozen Conflict*: Test Case Afghanistan", **ZEI Discussion Paper**, C178, Bonn, Center for European Integration Studies, 2007, p. 7.

management operations and the political support, NATO has become the only recipient for such missions.

The operational cooperation between the EU and NATO in the framework of the 'Berlin Plus' operations was hampered whenever the quarrels at the political institutional level impacted on the operational stage. Ahead of operation Concordia, Turkish-Greek differences prolonged the negotiations on the 'Berlin Plus' Agreement and as a result postponed the European takeover.[441] Ahead of operation Althea, negotiations were stretched since the US did not have enough confidence in the military power of the new ESDP. In reaction to the EU accession of Cyprus, Turkey prevented any meeting of EU and NATO military committees throughout the period of September 2004 to March 2005.[442]

The case of parallel NATO-EU engagement that currently draws most attention is Afghanistan. NATO has been on the ground since 2003, when it took over the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Since then, the Alliance has been expanding the outreach of the mission and has increased the number of troops from an initial strength of 5.000 to approximately 120.000 troops from 46 countries in 2010.[443] In 2007, NATO and an array of international actors on

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[441] J. Varwick (ed.), **Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU**, Opladen, Barbara Budrich, 2006, pp. 190-191.
[442] Kupferschmidt, "Strategische Partnerschaft in der Bewährung. Die Zusammenarbeit von NATO und EU bei der Operation *Althea*", Berlin, **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)**, 2006, p. 15.
[443] NATO, "NATO's Role in Afghanistan", **NATO Topics**, 2009.

the ground called for an increase in the EU's civilian presence. The EU responded to these calls by launching the police mission EUPOL Afghanistan on 15 June 2007.[444]

While both the EU and NATO have underlined the importance of a comprehensive approach for Afghanistan, the CSDP contribution was rather meagre. "EUPOL's initial mandate provided for 160 civilian staff, representing roughly one-tenth the size of the contingent deployed to Kosovo. In May 2008, the Council decided to increase the number of civilian personnel to 400, but only 265 international experts were on the ground by June 2010.[445]

Some scholars have predicted that NATO will develop into a two-pillar Alliance with the US on one side and the EU on the other.[446] The Alliance would be re-balanced permitting increased burden sharing between US and the EU. This would result in a flexible division of labour: in which the most suitable framework for engagement around the globe would be chosen for the success of the mission.

Europeans would have more leverage in the Alliance's decision-making process. Due to an increased burden sharing, there would be a constant need for consultation with NATO. This would permit the EU to use the Alliance as a forum to restrain the US.[447] This facet would assuage fears of European allies for NATO becoming a 'toolbox' for U.S. military operations.

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[444] Ibid.

[445] Council of the European Union, "Factsheet on the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan", **EUPOL Afghanistan**, Brussels, June 2010.

[446] S. Biscop, "NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re- Equilibration", **Egmont Paper**, no. 11, Brussels, Royal Institute for International Relations, 2006, p. 22.

[447] G. Press-Barnathan, "Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity", **Security Studies**, vol. 15, no. 2, 2006, pp. 280-309.

2.4.2. NATO and Russia relations

"I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But there may be a key, and that key is Russian national interest."

Winston Churchill

Russia's influence decreased after the Cold War, but Russia kept in touch with the Western countries throughout the post-Cold War period and actively engaged with the Western countries to negotiate a variety of European security affairs. Dialogues and cooperation replaced the Cold War confrontation politics.

The relationship between NATO and Russia began informally in December 1991 after the collapse of Soviet Union, with the session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Although it stopped short of establishing a formal relationship between NATO and Russia, it did at least create the initial conditions for the two to begin consultations and dialogue. This was particularly important, due to the speed of political change in Europe. In fact, while the NACC was meeting at NATO Headquarters, the Soviet Union actually disintegrated, with the result that the Soviet ambassador present was only able to speak on behalf of the Russian Federation by the end.[448]

By 1994, Russia joined the PfP, and gradually began to join in a greater degree of cooperation with NATO activities. In 1996, Russian peacekeepers even deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to serve alongside their Allied counterparts in the NATO - led Implementation Force (IFOR) and later in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) to

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[448] Christopher Bennett, "Building Effective Partnerships," **NATO Review - Istanbul Summit Special**, June 2004, 22.

oversee implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord. The Russian contribution was the largest non- NATO contingent in these forces.[449]

The Founding Act guaranteed that NATO enlargement would not harm Russia's security interests or at least minimize the security threat it posed to Russia."[450]There is a connection between the Founding Act and "Russia's attitude toward NATO expansion. The negotiation of the Founding Act began right after the North Atlantic Council declared the enlargement in the end of 1996.[451] In 1997, Russia and NATO concluded the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation. This created a permanent institutional dialogue forum for Russia and NATO. Russia-NATO Permanent Joint committee (PJC) was created to discuss the common security concerns between Russia and NATO members. The meetings of PJC were conducted at different levels of government officials from the head of state to Permanent Representatives.[452]

President Clinton made the initial decision in the fall of 1996 to push for expansion of NATO's membership ranks. NATO's leaders eventually endorsed Clinton's proposal at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, and invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to start accession talks. In March 1999, these countries were admitted into

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[449] Growing NATO-Russian Cooperation," **NATO Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide**, 2004, 125-126.

[450] Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia between East and West : Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century** (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 64.

[451] Anton Bebler, ed., **The Challenge of NATO Enlargement** (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), p. 76-77.

[452] Andrei Kelin, "Attitude to NATO Expansion: Calmly Negative," **International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations** 50, no. 1 (2004), 17-18.

the Alliance on the eve of its 50th anniversary celebration.[453]. According to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO specified in its Strategic Concept of 1999 that no European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.[454] Great Britain and the U.S led NATO efforts to reaffirm the alliance's relationship with non-ally partners, particular Russia, but also supported NATO expansion to East Europe and worked together to prevent Russia from dominating Central and Eastern Europe again.[455]

On NATO-Russia cooperation in NATO's handbook starts out by stating that since the end of the Cold War, NATO has attached particular importance to the development of constructive and cooperative relations with Russia. Over the past ten years, NATO and Russia have succeeded in achieving substantial progress in developing a genuine partnership and overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition in order to strengthen mutual trust and cooperation.[456]NATO during that period was wise enough to keep friendly states close and Russia closer. There was a merit in this approach, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the successive state Russia was still a major military power with its nuclear capabilities. NATO members did not want Russia to become unstable and leaving the orbit of West. On the other hand, Russia was also happy with this situation. Russian state was in a

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[453] Robert Mroziewicz, "Enlargement and the Capabilities Gap," in **Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives**, ed. C. Richard Nelson and Jason S. Purcell (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States,January 2003), 79.

[454] "**The Alliance's Strategic Concept**," Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 23 and 24 April 1999 (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public DiplomacyDivision, 1999), 12.

[455] Seib, Philip. **Taken for Granted: The Future of U.S. – British Relations**. Praeger Publishers: Westport. 1998. pp. 30 –33

[456] Cooperation between NATO and Russia, **NATO Handbook**, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 80

turbulent transition period, and positive relations with NATO was important to find capital from West to reform the economy.

The Western allies sent friendly signals to Russia. NATO states maintained communication and coordination with Russia and Russia's opinions concerning the post-Cold War order were solicited. NATO was willing to treat Russia as an important partner and bind itself with agreements to satisfy Russia's security demands.[457]The Western countries avoid a Russian perception of encirclement that might trigger tensions between Russia and NATO.[458]

The dual expansion of the European Union and NATO has always been a security concern for Russia after the Cold War. The dual expansion gave the Western countries more advantage to influence the domestic politics, economic development, and foreign policy of the former communist countries in the behalf of west. Under this process, the Western countries encroached on the sphere of influence of Russia.[459]

NATO enlargement was more threatening to Russia than EU enlargement since NATO was essentially world's biggest military alliance. Other European military alliance, such as, Western European Union, did not shown such capacity to launch major military operations.[460] NATO expansion was a security threat to Russia and it might have caused defiant resistance from Russia. NATO expansion would create an

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[457] Hall Gardner, **Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO** (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 178-179.
[458] Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," **Foreign Policy**, no. 98 (Spring, 1995), p.126.
[459] Hall Gardner, **Dangerous Crossroads**, pp. 136-137.
[460] Stuart, Croft Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, and Mark Webber, "NATO's Triple Challenge," **International Affairs** 76, no. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 511-514.

unintended consequence that increased Russia's perceived NATO threat.[461] At the end waves of dual expansion came to the shores of Russia in the form of quest of Ukraine's membership to NATO and EU. At this point Russia drew the line and showed the limits of its patience to the expansion of NATO in a cruelest way by invading Ukraine.

Boris Yeltsin the former president of Russia, expressed Russia's fear. They [Russia and Soviet bloc countries] will be integrated with one another in just one package…this will bring security to everybody. But if you sort of dismember us, I mean, accepting us or admitting us one by one is no good.[462]Boris Yeltsin understood that exclusion of Russia from the major Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and E.U. will eventually divide peace in the region.

Russia seized every possible opportunity to express Russian's opposition whenever the possibility of NATO enlargement was mooted.[463] Russian power decline made Russia difficult to maintain control on its sphere of influence under NATO enlargement.[464] Russia strongly objected to the NATO membership of the Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia because these states represented a significant strategic interest for Russia. The Baltic States clearly wanted to join NATO to get rid

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[461] Douglas M. Gibler, "East Or further East?" **Journal of Peace Research** 36, no. 6 (Nov., 1999), 627-637.

[462] James M. Goldgeier, **Not Whether but When : The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO** (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 59.

[463] Margot Light, Stephen White and John Lowenhardt, "A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and Kyiv," **International Affairs** 76, no. 1 (Jan., 2000), p. 79-80.

[464] Bobo Lo, **Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era : Reality, Illusion, and Mythmaking** (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 116-118.

of Russian political control.[465]Baltic states are no match of Russian military might on their own. They clearly need NATO's assistance and security umbrella to protect their safety and freedom.

Table 2.2. Baltic States Defense Information

	Army Size	Tanks	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters	2013 Defense Budget	Defense Spending % of GDP
Estonia	5,300	--	334	--	--	$480 million	2.0
Latvia	1,250	3	76	--	--	$300 million	1.0
Lithuania	7,350	--	48	--	--	$355 million	0.8

Table 2.2. **Source:** International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2014*

Baltic States joined PfP in 1994 when the program started. But the Baltic States did not enter NATO until the second round of enlargement in 2004 because of Russia's continuous efforts to disqualify the Baltic States as eligible NATO members.[466] The U.S. also tried to avoid discussing the Baltic States' membership in NATO because it was sensitive to Russia-NATO relationship.[467] Russia's position toward the Baltic States' membership in NATO was unyielding until Russia gained the guarantee that NATO expansion to the Baltic area would not isolate Russia or sacrifice Russia's security interest.[468]

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[465] Charles Krupnick, ed., **Almost NATO : Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security** (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), pp. 274-277.

[466] J. L. Black, **Russia Faces NATO Expansion : Bearing Gifts Or Bearing Arms?** (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 203-221.

[467] M. Kramer, "NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement," **International Affairs** 78, no. 4 (10, 2002), p. 731; 740.

[468] Tuomas Forsberg, "Russia's Relationship with NATO: A Qualitative Change or Old Wine in New Bottles?" **Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics** 21, no. 3 (09, 2005), p. 340.

When the question of enlargement changed from "whether" to "when and how", Moscow targeted the enlargement plan and tried to delay its process. Russian policy that opposed NATO going east never stopped throughout the post-Cold War period. The best Russia could do was to delay the enlargement process.

Institutional agreements were the trump cards for Russia dealing with the NATO expansion. These agreements gave Russia more influence in NATO decision process that Russia could protect its political and security interest. Russia participated in both NACC and PfP. By participating in NATO, Russia could keep close surveillance of NATO's movement and ensure that it would not be excluded from European security affairs.[469]Recent history and development of events in Ukraine show us that liberal intuitionalist approach is not working anymore. For this reason, NATO is trying to be more realist by improving the military capabilities of its eastern flank against Russia.

Since Russia held a veto in UN Security Council and played a major role inside OSCE, Russia would have the power to boycott NATO's decision if NATO's new mission would harm Russian security interests.[470] These mechanisms increased Russia's influence in post-Cold War security issues. The Act represented both détente and a safety lock for possible security competition between Russia and NATO allies.

The Russia-NATO relationship was really tense during and after the Kosovo crisis; Russia found out that it was getting more and more difficult to constrain

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[469] Mark Webber, **Russia and Europe : Conflict Or Cooperation?** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 52-53.
[470] Webber, **Russia and Europe**, p. 106-118.

NATO.[471]Russia also used multilateralism to participate in regional security affairs. Russia never lacked diplomatic seats in the post-Cold War order. Russia utilized its seats in UN Security Council, OSCE, NATO, and Contact Group to influence the decisions made by the Western allies.[472] Russia saw Kosovo operation of NATO as a direct threat to Russian understanding of Westphalia state system. The corner stone of the Russian political thinking is the sovereignty of the *nation state.* The abandonment of this concept may one day create problematic questions about the positon of minorities in Russia which can be a subject to international support like in the case of Kosovo.

As Yeltsin stated a month before the Kosovo bombing, "in spite of NATO's aggressive actions, we cannot break with the Western countries. We cannot lead ourselves into isolation because we are in Europe and no one will kick us out of Europe."[473]Russia believed that its security interest relied on continuous cooperation and participation with NATO. Russia's dissatisfaction was carefully expressed to prevent conflict between Russia and NATO.[474]

 In a remark Russia President Vladimir Putin made after the 9/11 incident, he stated: "There is no reason whatsoever why we shouldn't pool our efforts together, the Russian Federation and NATO…, for our part, we are prepared to expand our

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[471] Andrew Cottey and Derek Averre, eds**., New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe : Securing Europe's East** (Manchester ; New York; New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 99-100

[472] William E. Odom, "Russia's several Seats at the Table," **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)** 74, no. 4 (Oct., 1998), p. 814-816.

[473] Martin A. Smith, **Russia and NATO since 1991 : From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?,** 1st ed. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 81

[474] Latawski and Smith, **The Kosovo Crisis and the Evolution of Post-Cold War European Security**, p. 97-105.

cooperation with NATO. And we are prepared to go as far as the Northern Alliance [NATO] itself is prepared– taking into account, of course, the national interest of the Russian Federation."[475]This was the finest hour of NATO Russia relations during the Post Cold War era but the "honeymoon" did not last for long .

Russia tended to protect its main security interests while reconciling with the West. Russia could not easily give in its position concerning its own sphere of influence. For example, NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe and Baltic states was still a sensitive issue to Russia in 2001.[476] The new members might become more aggressive in the bilateral relationship with Russia because of NATO's security commitment. Russia had to discuss the civil rights of Russian speaking population in Latvia and Lithuania not only with these countries but also with NATO.[477]

Russia worried that the new members can use NATO as a diplomatic leverage against Russia. Andrei Kelin, expressed this concern about the NATO expansion: "There is nothing good in it… the most important thing for us… is that our European neighbors will be increasingly dependent, both politically and militarily, on NATO's decision-making mechanism. In practice, the dependence will be in force on a much broader range of issues than defense against outside aggression."[478]Russians understood that they are losing ground in European politics. Loss of the Baltic after the collapse of Soviet Union was a serious blow to Russian geopolitics and the security interests.

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[475] Putin's speech in Rice University, 14 November 2001, in Peter B. Zwack, "A NATO-Russia Contingency Command," **Parameters: US Army War College** 34, no. 1 (Spring, 2004), p. 94.
[476] A. I. Voronin, "Russia-NATO Strategic Partnership: Problems, Prospects," **Military Thought** 14, no. 4 (2005), p. 22.
[477] Andrei Kelin, "Russia - NATO: Toward a New Stage of Interaction?" **International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations** 51, no. 1 (2005), p. 36.
[478] Andrei Kelin, "Attitude to NATO Expansion: Calmly Negative," p. 21.

Russia tried to protect its vital security interest when the war on terrorism might undermine Russia's sphere of influence.[479] The competition between Russia and the U.S. in Central Asia was an example.[480] Although Russia agreed that the U.S. rented airports in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for military use in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Russia was concerned with the U.S. military presence in Central Asia.[481]Afghanistan operation of NATO gave western powers an opportunity to have a foothold in Central Asia.

In response, Russia strengthened the Collective Security Treaty signed earlier between Russia and CIS countries which created a Russia-led collective security system. Agreements were made between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan that permitted Russian military protection to these countries in the events of threats to their security.[482]

The 9/11 incident further gave an opportunity for Russia and NATO that created a substantial cooperation under a formal agreement. At the NATO-Russia summit in Rome on May 2002, a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was announced to setup a new mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action. Like the PJC, the NRC served as a forum for NATO and Russia to coordinate their policies on the security affairs. The difference between the two was that NRC changed the 19+1 mechanism to a council at 20. This was the 19+1

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[479] A. D. Tsyganok, "NATO's Istanbul Summit and Problems of the Russia-NATO Council," **Military Thought** 13, no. 4 (2004), p. 208.
[480] Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., **Russia between East and West : Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century** (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 53.
[481] Ibid,p.53.
[482] Zhu Zhenghong, "Regional Security in Central Asia and Russia After 9/11**," Far Eastern Affairs** 33, no.
1 (2005), p. 23-24.

discussion mechanism in PJC that NATO and Russia were sitting on two sides of the table. Russia sarcastically called it 19 versus 1.[483]The new council at 20 invited all NATO members and Russia to discuss issues on security affairs. Every state worked as an equal partner in the council to deal with global terrorism, crisis management, arms control, non-proliferation, and substantial military cooperation. Russia would maintain a permanent mission at the NATO Headquarters.[484] Russia did not get all of the privileges enjoyed by the one hundred percent NATO members. Within the "council at 20", all the members had the veto power except Russia. [485] In the NATO-Russia Council, Russia's influence diminished to an extent that the NATO members could hold the power of full membership to protect their security interest while Russia could not.

Russia-NATO relations became tense before the Iraq War in 2003. However, the contention over the Iraq War was not a dispute between just NATO and Russia. All of the NATO members did not have consensus on the war on Iraq.[486]Russian position was not very different than the French position towards U.S. demands for the military action. Actually, France and Russia was on the same side against U.S. in one of the critical crisis of NATO's history.

One of the key parameters of NATO Russia relations is the case of Polland.Russia was the main security threat to Poland after the Cold War. Poland's foreign minister

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[483] Donald C. Daniel, **Russia and NATO** (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2005), p. 2.
[484] Martin A. Smith, **Russia and NATO since 1991 : From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?,** 1st ed. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 89-100.
[485] Ibid,p.101
[486] Smith, **Russia and NATO since 1991 : From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership?,** p. 103.

Olechowski once said "We are not afraid of Russia, but of objective situations that could provoke her to behave in a way threatening to Poland. Such a situation is the security vacuum that now exists in Central Europe."[487] Polish political elites, all agreed that joining NATO and EU was a vital national interest. Poland was seeking Western support for its security protection and economic development. Poland struggled to get rid of Russian control, and Russia tried to control Poland by limiting the impact of Poland's pro-Western policy.[488] In order to resist a Russian rollback, Poland adopted a two-track policy to hedge Russia. In spite of approaching the West and NATO, maintained dialogue with Russia and improved its relationship with non-Russian Former Soviet Republics.[489]Because of its geographical position and its smooth terrain, Poland always faced difficulties to protect its boundaries against invasions throughout history. According to polish state the NATO membership of Poland is the key element for the security of the country.

Russia was sensitive that Poland approached these Republics because Poland was a corridor for the Western allies to enter Russia's sphere of influence like Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltic States. For this reason, whenever Poland approached to the West or to the Former Soviet Republics, Russia became nervous and accused the Polish ambition of undermining Russia's interest.[490]

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[487] Jonathan Haslam, "Russia's Seat at the Table: A Place Denied Or a Place Delayed?" **International Affairs** 74, no. 1 (Jan., 1998), p. 121.
[488] Ibid.,122.
[489] Andrew A. Michta, ed., **America's New Allies : Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO** (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), p. 46.
[490] Janusz Bugajski, **Cold Peace : Russia's New Imperialism** (Westport, Conn.; Washington, DC: Praeger;
Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), p. 140-142.

Poland had a tight commitment to assisting ally forces in UN and NATO missions. Its steady and supportive military contributions proved that Poland was a faithful ally with the U.S.A and NATO. Poland made huge contribution to IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[491]Poland was also one of the strongest supporter of U.S. in Iraq war of 2003.

In the case of Czech Republic, The Russo-Czech relationship was stable after the Cold War. Prague maintained a stable relationship with Moscow. However, for the Czechs, Russian imperialism was no less a fear than the Soviet one. The fear of the second Prague Spring haunted the Czechs.[492]But because of the distant geographical position of Czech Republic to Russia, the debates about the Czechs in NATO are less significant compare to Poland's security issues.

The missile system dispute was a turning point for Russia-NATO relations. It was related to Russia's vital security interest. In response Russia announced more plans to escalate the arms race with the West. President Putin warned that Russia could once again turn its missiles against European countries. He said in an interview "If the American nuclear potential grows in European territory, we have to give ourselves new targets in Europe."[493] Moscow claimed that the missile defense system potentially could be used against Russia in an act of war, and therefore posed a serious threat to Russian national security and credibility of its nuclear deterence.

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[491] Jeffrey Simon, **NATO Expeditionary Operations** (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press; Institute for National Strategic Studies,[2005]), p. 17.

[492] Tina Rosenberg, **The Haunted Land : Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism**, 1st ed. (New York:
Random House, 1995), c. 2-3.

[493] "Nuclear Fallout; Putin Warns: Build Star Wars and I'll Point Missiles at West," **The Mirror** *(London,England)*2007.

According to Russia, the missile defence can shift the power balance further to NATO's advantage and alter the nuclear balance.

Russia is a nuclear power and its nuclear arsenal is one of the most sophisticated and developt. Russia is using its nuclear capability as a bargaining or balancing tool in the diplomatic relations. Russian state considers using nuclear weapons in the case of massive terrorist attack against Russian soil or population. Although tactical weapons are considered as weapons of lost in a conventional battlefield.This sitution makes the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the near future very feasable.

Russia also announced a possible new missile deployment in Kaliningrad. This military deployment would increase Russian military threat to western European NATO members.[494] Russia resumed long-range bombers patrols in Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific air space.[495]Russia also works on the development of its own missile defense technology. Russian military experts believe that NATO is a threat for Russia and a military show down in Europe between these two opposing forces is still possible in the 21st century.

In Russian view, United Nations and OSCE are perfectly suited to take on the role of collective security organization instead of NATO. Russian president Putin, at the Rome Summit, made clear the Russian way of thinking.

> *"Russia is primarily interested in it as a working instrument. It is of fundamental importance that cooperation at twenty should be based on a firm foundation of international law—the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final*

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[494] "Russians Threaten Missile Site to Counter US Shield," **Financial Times** *(London, England)*2007;
[495] "Russia Says U.S. Intercepted 2 of its Bombers Over Pacific," **The Washington Post** *(DC)* 2007.

Act and the OSCE Charter on European Security…. For Russia, with its geopolitical position, the enhancement of cooperation with NATO as equal partners is one of the real embodiments of the multiple approach, to which there is no alternative and which we intend to pursue resolutely. We do not think of ourselves as outside Europe, but it is also unthinkable for us that the role of approved cooperation mechanisms in Asia and in the Commonwealth of Independent States should be underestimated. Only by harmoniously combining our actions in all these areas will we open up wide-ranging possibilities for building a single security region—from Vancouver to Vladivostok."[496]

We can see that Russia wants to stay as a both European and Asian power in the World politics. Although in the coming decades Russia will be the weakest power compare to U.S., Europe, China and India, Russia still will be a major military power with its space and nuclear technology. Russia wants to be the *balancer* of the *balance* between Asia and West.

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[496] Vladimir Putin, "Address," **NATO-Russia Council: Rome Summit 2002** (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002), 18.

Figure 2.5. Do You Approve of Putin's Work? (Positive Answers in Percent, VTsIOM, **Putin as Leader (February 2011–March 2014)**


Figure 2.5. Source: representative opinion polls by VTsIOM, February 2011-March 2014

Despite NATO's many assurances, Moscow continues automatically to view with suspicion any expansion of Atlantic alliance farther eastward. There also remains a persistent belief that one of the main reasons for NATO expansion was to contribute to the weakening of Russia, which began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[497] Russian concerns center around the prospect of facing the most powerful military alliance of history right on its borders. Russia clearly favours softer international security mechanisms for the Euro-Atlantic area, such as the UN and the OSCE.

The Central and Eastern European still have a tendency to view NATO as a sort of U.S. tool for protecting its European partners against military aggression from third parties, mainly Russia.[498] Russia already has a hard time accepting that former

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[497] Mikhail Troitski, **The Transatlantic Union 1991-2004: Transformation of the U.S.-European Partnership in the Post- Bipolar World** (in Russian) (Moscow, Russia: Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004), 146.

[498] Robert Mroziewicz, "Enlargement and the Capabilities Gap," in **Transforming NATO Forces: European Perspectives**, ed. C. Richard Nelson and Jason S. Purcell (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council of the United States, January 2003), 91.

Warsaw Pact members are now members of NATO. Any expansion that includes the Caucasus and especially Ukraine will, in Kremlin's view, directly threaten its influence over an area that borders the Russian Federation. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the Russian empire had its beginnings in Kievan Rus (current-day Ukraine) as far back as the 9th century.[499]

By 1997, the two sides had signed in Madrid the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which recognized the importance of an independent, and democratic Ukraine to European stability. That same year, the Alliance established a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv to facilitate wider access to information on NATO, and concerning Ukrainian benefits from their Distinctive Partnership. In 1999, NATO also opened a Liaison Office in Kyiv to help Ukraine's participation in the PfP and to support Ukrainian defense reform efforts.[500]

Russia still tends to see current global relationships in more of a 19th century "great power" context and mirror that view onto the West. Russian leaders see the net of Western relationships in Eurasia as a form of neo-containment to restrict Russian power and influence. President Putin stated shortly after his re-election in March 2004,

> *"The main goal of our policy is not to demonstrate some or other imperial*
>
> *ambitions, but rather to secure favorable external conditions for the*
>
> *development of Russia. There is nothing unusual in that. And we will be*
>
> *building a multi-vector foreign policy, we will work together with the*

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[499] MacKenzie and Curran, **A History of Russia and the Soviet Union: Revised Edition**,p. 24.
[500] "New Relationships: Practical Cooperation and Dialogue," **The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation: A Reader's Guide** (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2003),p. 44.

United State, the European Union, and with individual countries of
Europe. We will work together with our Asian partners, with China, India,
and with countries of the Asia-Pacific region."[501]

It is clear that Russia does not want to be dependent on a one sided foreign policy. Russia wants to be more independent and flexible compare to its USSR past.

There are benefits of cooperation with Russia, a purposeful Western policy of cooperation will remain important to help Russia reform and to meet the sensitive issue of Russia's perception of itself as a world power. Russia that is focused forward on reform and that cooperates with NATO will be an indispensable and positive factor in European security.[502] On the other hand an unstable Russia would make for an unstable Europe.

At the beginning of a new millennium the Russian Federation did not have its prestige as a super power as in the Cold War era. The Bosnian conflict, the Kosovo crisis and the expansion of NATO as Russia's former adversary, clearly demonstrated that a new West centric geopolitical architecture has to be accepted by Moscow.

The September 11 attacks brought Russia and USA to a cooperation point for a while. In the first hours after the events, Putin was the first to call Bush. Putin also said that "Russia knows directly what terrorism means. And because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the name of Russia, I want

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[501] Anatolii Torkunov, "Russia and the West: Common Security Interests," **International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations** 50, no. 4 (2004): 3-4.
[502] Martin H.A. van Heuven, NATO **in 2020** (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, August 1999), 3, 6.

to say to the American people - we are with you."[503]Those were days of second honeymoon of U.S.-Russia relations since the first one during Reagan - Gorbachev era of late 1980s. But it did not last for long as a result of crude reality of realist foreign policies of both Russia and U.S. and this perspective also shifted NATO from Neo-Liberal understanding to Neo-Realism.

Only two weeks after the September 11, Putin backed his support with concrete actions. The Russian president faced a strong opposition from his government officials on military cooperation with the USA and NATO. For example In the immediate days after September 11th, the Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov spoke openly against military cooperation with the United States to fight terrorism.[504] In his response to the question of possible NATO troops stationing Central Asia, Ivanov said: "I see absolutely no basis for even hypothetical suppositions about the possibility of NATO military operations on the territory of Central Asia nations."[505]

On the 24 September 2001, President Putin declared a five-point plan of action to be followed by Moscow in its contribution to the fight against terrorism in cooperation with the USA:

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[503] V.V. Putin cited by Jill Dougherty in "9/11 a "Turning Point" for Putin," *CNN World*, September 10, 2002 accessible at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/10/ar911.russia.putin/ (accessed on May 21, 2013)

[504] Michael McFaul, "U.S-Russia Relations after September 11, 2001," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**,** accessible at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=840&prog=zru (accessed on October 21, 2013)

[505] Sergei Ivanov cited by Suzanne Daley in "After the Attacks: In Europe; a Pause to Ponder Washington's Tough Talk," **The New York Times**, 16 September 2001 accessible at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-the-attacks-in-europe-a-pause-to-ponder-washington stoughtalkhtml?scp=2&sq=ivanov+no%20basis%20for%20even%20a%20hypothetical%20possibility &st=
cse (accessed on October 21, 2013)

• Firstly, the Russian Federation will advance cooperation in sharing intelligence service data regarding the location of international terrorists.

• Secondly, the Russian Federation will make its air-space available for the aircrafts delivering humanitarian cargo to the area of anti-terrorist operation.

• Thirdly, the Russian Federation came into an agreement with the Central Asian countries, allies of Moscow, who do not exclude the possibility of making their air bases available for anti-terrorist operations.

• Fourthly, the Russian Federation is ready, if necessary, to participate in international search and rescue operations.

• Fifthly, the Russian Federation will expand its cooperation with the internationally recognized Afghan government and support its military forces by providing arms and military hardware.[506]

NATO and the Russian Federation had quite polar motives for that cooperation. The motive Putin perceived for forging a coalition with the USA and NATO against terrorism was an excuse for a military decision in Chechnya that he was sure was an important piece in the global terrorist chain.[507] Russia "had a unique opportunity to destroy its worst enemies with American hands,[508] which prompted it to cooperate with NATO. The driving force behind the US decision could be explained not only by its desire to combat terrorism and establishing democracy in Afghanistan but, by the far-reaching goal of securing US presence in the Middle East and the Central Asia

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[506] Russian President's Statement, The Kremlin, Moscow, 24 September 2001 available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2001/09/24/0002_type82912_138534.shtml (accessed on October 22, 2013)

[507] Lilia Shevtsova, , **Putin's Russia**, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace: Washington D.C, 2003 p. 232

[508] Andrei Kazantsev, "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sear Region," **Europe-Asia Studies**, Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008, p. 1081

through Afghanistan. There was a fear on the part of Russia that US was trying to encircle Russia with stationing its military bases in Central Asian countries and to create a kind of cordon sanitaire around Russian territory.[509]Nevertheless, the position of NATO in Afghanistan is not so strong compare to its position in Europe.

The main concerns in Moscow regarding NATO expansion in its former Soviet Republics were lying mainly in the military and political spheres, from the outset, Moscow regarded the prospect of Baltic membership in NATO as a threat to Russia's military security,[510] which meant bringing NATO very close to the Russian border. The Founding Act stating that the Alliance will not resort to "stationing of substantial combat forces" on the territory of the Baltic members raised suspicion in Moscow. The credibility of NATO guarantees would be under question without permanently station NATO troops on the territory of new members, since the geo-strategic location of the Baltic States would be connected to the Alliance by a narrow corridor from Poland.[511] . In spite of the fact that NATO clearly reiterated that the member states of the Alliance have no intention, and no plan nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

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[509] **Ibid.**, p. 1082

[510] Leonid A. Karabeshkin and Dina A. Spechler, "EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations, Responses and Options for the Future," **European Security**, Volume 16, Nos. 3-4, September-December 2007, p. 314

[511] Nadezhda Arbatova, "Paradoksy Bezopasnosti v Baltiiskom Regione [The Paradoxes of Security in the Baltic Region]," **Nezavisimaya Gazet**a, 30 January 2001 available at http://www.ng.ru/politics/2001-01-30/3_paradoks.html (accessed on June 12, 2013)

The Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, argued that:

"Russia's military and political leadership has good reason to be concerned about the integration of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, particularly if NATO decides to create large military bases in those countries. The alliance is gaining greater ability to control and monitor Russian territory. We cannot turn a blind eye as NATO's air and military bases get much closer to cities and defense complexes in European Russia."[512]   Also there was fear that the fear that NATO membership would act as a shield for more radical exclusionary policies toward the Russian immigrant populations in Latvia and Estonia.[513]

The region of the Black Sea has an increasing strategic importance for the USA in relation to challenges in the broader Middle East. The U.S. is interested in the ability of states in the region to facilitate the projection of military power to the Caspian, Central Asia and the Middle East and perhaps the deployment of radars and interceptors as part of a nascent missile defense system to counter Iranian or other missiles deployed in the Middle East.[514]

For the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Georgia cases are not the same as the Baltic States. Russian has its Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol, Ukraine.

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[512] Sergei Ivanov, "As NATO Grows, So Do Russia's Worries," **The New York Times**, 7 April 2004 Available
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/07/opinion/07IVAN.html?scp=1&sq=ivanov%20nato%20enlargement&st=cse&pagewanted=1 (accessed on June 14, 2013)

[513] Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution," Chapter 2 in **NATO Enlargement : Illusions and Reality***,* ed. by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, Cati Institute, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 145

[514] Daniel Hamilton, "A Transatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea?" in **The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Starategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives***,* ed. by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), p.323

Russian fleet presence was extended until 2042 in April 2010, by the law signed between the Russia and Ukraine. The military and the heavy industry in both countries are intertwined and there is a large Russian population in Ukraine. This the critical issue and the main reason of Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In the case of Georgia, the Russian Federation has its troops still remaining in Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as peacekeepers. Certainly, Kremlin does not favour any presence of NATO in the Black Sea region which has vast energy resources and routes to transport them.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that

> *"We will do everything possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO and to avoid the possible worsening of relations with the alliance, its leading member states and our neighbors...In Ukraine about 70% of the population is against joining NATO. If we take Georgia, then [the unrecognized republics of] Abkhazia and South Ossetia don't even want to hear about Georgia becoming a NATO member."*[515]

Sergei Lavrov is the master mind of Russian foreign policy. He clearly states Russian position in 2008 but unfortunately the biggest and the strongest member of NATO, namely U.S. did not understand the significance of these statements or higher echelons of U.S. administration under estimated the possible Russian reaction.

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[515] Sergei Lavrov, "Moscow to Prevent Ukraine, Georgia's NATO Admission*,*" **RIA NOVOSTI**, 8 April 2008 available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080408/104105506.html (accessed on January 13, 2014)

The way Russia deals with Ukraine and Georgia's NATO bids; the "frozen conflicts" in the Caucasus; and the issue of Europe's energy security will help define the kind of international player Russia will become.[516] The issue of Ukraine and Georgia's membership in the NATO raised doubts over the expediency of further expansion of the Alliance to the East and former Soviet Republics. This is still one of the critical issue of International security.

In 1 May 2001, when at the National Defence University, President Bush made a number of statements which later formed the core of his foreign policy for the rest of his presidency. President Bush stated that a new framework that allows us [the American Nation] to build missile defense to counter the different threats of today's world. He also added that the USA must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty.[517]

Russia strongly opposed any initiative which could undermine the ABM Treaty, which could also lead to the proliferation of the ICBM missile technology. Regarding the President Bush's missile defense project, President Putin said,

> *I am confident that at least for the coming 25 years the U.S.missile defense will not cause any substantial damage to the national security of Russia,...We will reinforce our capability" by mounting multiple*

[516] Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region" in **The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Starategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives***,* ed. by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008, p.117

[517] George W. Bush, The Transcript of President Bush Speech on Missile Defence at National Defence University in Washington, **CNN***,* 1 May 2001, available at ,http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.missile.trans/ (accessed on June 16, 2013)

warheads on our missiles and that will cost us a meagre sum...the nuclear

arsenal of Russia will be augmented multifold.[518]

Russian President also mentioned about the negation of START I and START II and violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, which would result in the elimination of verification and inspection requirements and damaging the relations between Russia and USA.

From Moscow's point of view, NATO's limited membership makes it inadequate for solving international security problems; this Russian frustration with its inability to influence NATO underlies its proposal of a new European Security Treaty[519]However, the EU members have different views over Medvedev's proposal. The new members of NATO and countries near to Russia view NATO as the main pillar of Europe's security, remain either openly hostile to, or extremely wary of the Russian security proposal.[520] According to their view Moscow seeks to undermine the role of NATO and OSCE in Europe and institutionalize Russia's own sphere of influence through a new international security treaty.

The NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that he did not see any need for a new treaty on European security.

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[518] V.V. Putin, cited by Patrick E. Tyler in "Putin Says Russia Would Counter U.S. Shield," **The New York Times**, 20 June 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20010620wednesday.html?scp=6&sq=u s%20missile%20defence%20shield+russia+2001&st=cse (accessed on June 17, 2013)
[519] Javier Morales, "Russia's New National Security Strategy: Towards a "Medvedev Doctrine"?" Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 135/2009- 25/09/2009, available at
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/defense+security/ari135-2009 (accessed on June 25, 2013)
[520] Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Russian Proposal for New European Security Pact Encounters Skepticism," **Eurasianet**, 3 March 2009, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav030409a.shtml (accessed on June 26, 2013)

"I don't see a need for new treaties or new legally binding documents because we do have a framework already. We have already a lot of documents, so my point of departure is: I don't see a need for new treaties. But let me reiterate, we are of course prepared to discuss the ideas in the right forum."[521]

In the first months of Medvedev's presidency, his leadership was tested by Georgia's attack on South Ossetia. The Rose Revolution of 2003 brought a pro-West and pro-NATO, president, Mikhail Saakashvili, to power who eagerly supported a US/UK coalition in Iraq by dispatching 2000 troops. As a result of reinforced aspirations for NATO membership. In 2002, U.S. trained three Georgian infantry battalions and equipped them with [522] "even uniforms and boots." During Saakashvili's presidency, the defence budget of Georgia grew from $30 million in 2003 to more than $750 million.[523]

On the night of August 7-8, 2008, when Saakashvili ordered an attack on South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali, Russia decide to give a military response. It was Georgia which initiated the military conflict by invading South Ossetia, this fact was confirmed after lengthy inspections by the Human Rights Watch:

After months of escalating tensions between Russia and Georgia and following skirmishes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, on August 7, 2008, Georgian forces launched an artillery assault on Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, and

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[521] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, cited by Gary Cartwright in "European Security Treaty Rejected," **EU Reporter Independent**, 22 December 2009, available at http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/europeansecurity- treaty-rejected (accessed on June 26, 2013)
[522] John Barry, "Georgian Army, American Made," **Newsweek**, 6 September 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/05/georgian-army-american-made.html# (accessed on June 28, 2013)
[523] **Ibid**.

outlying villages. [524]Further assaults by Georgian land and air forces followed. Russian military stroke when the iron is hot. The next day Beginning on August 8, Russian army crossed into South Ossetia and Russian artillery and aircraft hit targets not only in South Ossetia but also undisputed Georgian territory.

Given that Georgia was a U.S. client, that the United States (along with Israel) had armed and trained Georgian forces, that only days before the Georgian attack it had participated in joint maneuvers with Georgian forces, and that U.S. and Israeli personnel were present in Georgia at the time of the attack.[525] It is very possible that the Georgian attack was not a foolish mistake, but rather a proxy action carried out on behalf of the United States. Without a military build-up and assistance by the USA, Georgia would hardly think of such a dangerous military adventure.

Medvedev made it clear that Russia was taking a course on a tougher foreign policy intolerable towards external interference in its backyard. The West recognized that Russian Federation's interests and concerns have to be counted on. The reaction of the NATO to the conflict was limited which resulted in the suspension of formal meetings in the NATO-Russia Council, though without extending the long-awaited NATO collective security guarantee to Georgia. As a result, Georgia's membership in NATO comes under question.

…given the ostensibly close diplomatic and military relationship between the United States and Georgia, and Georgia's repeated and unanswered calls for American,

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[524] Human Rights Watch, **Up In Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia**, 23 January 2009,

[525] Edward S. Herman, "Russia, Georgia & the U.S.: A Double Standard in Action," **Z Magazine**, October 2008, ava_lable at http://www.zcommunications.org/russia-georgia-and-the-u-s-a-doublestandard-
in-action-by-edward-herman (accessed on June 29, 2013)

European, and NATO military assistance during the 2008 conflict, it does not appear that NATO allies are willing, at least at this time, to provide a meaningful promise to collective defence-all of which raises doubts over the wisdom of further NATO expansion to Georgia.[526]

The Russian people have struggled for centuries to define their place in the world. As an enormous empire and still the world's geographically largest country by far, Russia straddles the European and Asian continents, in more than just a physical sense. [527] Throughout Russia's history, outside influences, or even sometimes bitter invasions of foreign power have had profound impacts on the development of Russian identity. The main debate over the centuries has centered on whether to "Westernize" or to remain pure and unique Russian civilization. This is a question Russia has struggled with during the past 300 years since the Great Petro.

Russia was and is both European and Asian, and will not fall completely into either camp. As much as Russia feels itself to be a part of a larger Europe, it also considers itself to be a global and Eurasian power. NATO is now seeing the results of this outlook as it seeks to enlarge towards East.

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[526] Travis L.Bounds and Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Georgian Membership in NATO: Policy Implications of the Bucharest Summit," **Journal of Slavic Military Studies**, Volume 22, Issue 1, January 2009, p. 30

[527] David MacKenzie and Michael W. Curran**, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union: Revised Edition** (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1982), 197-198.

3. THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF NATO IN THE TRANSFORMATION ERA

If NATO cannot deter or defeat the real physical threat facing alliance members...then we have to ask ourselves what is NATO for?

Canadian defense minister Peter MacKay

3.1. The Out of Area Debate and the New NATO

The developing European Security and Defense Identity were advocating addressing out-of-area crisis management and conflict prevention in a multilateral context. NATO is a military alliance whose focus is too narrow to meet these new threats. So, this old alliance needs a transformation which means its shift towards out-of-area missions.[528] The Alliance had to reorganize itself to address the problems of projecting stability beyond its borders. NATO has gone out of area since the end of the Cold War, and its missions have proven increasingly challenging for the alliance as their distance from Euro-Atlantic zone increases.

The greatest threats to NATO members' security are likely to emanate from the Middle East in the future. It is the problems of this region that are likely to preoccupy the West in the 21st century. The geopolitical conflicts in the region that must be addressed are long and well known as the Israeli-Arab conflict, turmoil in Iraq, the nuclear threat from Iran, and ensuring success in Afghanistan.[529] Civil war in Syria together with the Russian involvement to the conflict will be a major concern for NATO in the coming years.

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[528] Wallace, William. May/June 2001. 'Europe, the Necessary Partner' **Foreign Affairs**, Vol 80, No 3, p.17.

[529] Asmus, et. al. Spring 2005. 'A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East'. **The Washington Quarterly**, Vol 28, No 2, p.15.

Paradoxically, because of its effectiveness within the European theatre, most of the major crises bearing on the interests of the Atlantic allies have taken place beyond Europe. There has never been a proverbial golden moment when NATO was insulated from developments outside its boundaries or from the interests of its individual members in those developments.[530]

The out-of-area dimension of the Atlantic alliance politics has been documented by several examples of fractious disputes over Indochina (1949-54), Suez (1956), North Africa (1954-62), Portuguese Africa (1961-75), Vietnam (the mid-1960s), and Libya (1986). Ian Thomas mentioned, Though out-of-area concerns had been of great importance since NATO's founding, the term 'out-of-area' formally entered the alliance lexicon only in 1980.[531]

NATO members attempted to bridge disagreements over geographic boundaries by casting the threat in global terms: Concern about the global nature of the Soviet threat contributed to the decision by the signatory governments to include in the final treaty a clause of the treaty, which clearly stipulates the boundaries of the alliance, and Article 4, which commits the signatory governments to consultation whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, of any of the parties is threatened[532]

Actions taken in out-of-area crises have often existed as consensual statements of moral support. The most glaring example was the April 1986 decision taken by the

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[530] Elizabeth D. Sherwood, **Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security**, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 1.

[531] Ian Q. R. Thomas, **The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination**, (Boston: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 128.

[532] Douglas Stuart and William Tow, *The* **limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949**, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 96.

U.S. Government to initiate retaliatory military measures against Libya for its terror attacks on American troops stationed in Germany.[533]

NATO's out-of-area management emerged repeatedly. Three factors shaped the Alliance politics beyond Europe: competing definitions of allied out-of-area interests, divergent views about the appropriate allocation of human and material resources, and marked inequalities in the distribution of power within NATO.[534]

NATO members carefully guarded their independence refusing to be bound by the other NATO partners' commitments. Therefore, the allies were interested in cooperation if it was tantamount to support for their national policies, but not if joint action would constrain their chosen course. This put a damper on efforts to formalize allied obligations beyond the treaty area and forced the allies to rely on alternative means of policy coordination outside Europe.[535]On the other hand if NATO is not strong in Euro - Atlantic region, it will not be strong elsewhere around the Globe. NATO needs to balance its core commitment, which is the protection of soverignty and boundries of its members with the out of area missions.

In the late 1990s, when questioned on the legality of the out-of-area mandate Tony Lloyd, the British Secretary of State said that NATO considered each operation on a case-by-case basis and UN mandate would not be needed in every instance. It was inconceivable that NATO would break international law. The British Defense Minister George Robertson stated that non-Article 5 missions needed to be

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[533] William D. Wharton, **Security Arrangements for a New Europe**, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 96.
[534] Elizabeth D. Sherwood, p. 2.
[535] **Ibid**.

incorporated into the revised NATO strategic concept and gave the example of Bosnia and Kosovo to demonstrate this as a pragmatic role that has a legal mandate. He emphasized that Article 5 must remain at the core of the concept and added that possible legal bases for military action would be the UN Charter, UN Security Council Resolutions and the OSCE mandate.[536]

The NATO's Balkan missions represented the first extended use of force by NATO as well as the first major combat operations conducted for humanitarian objectives. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in October 1993. "For the first time in history, NATO today is operating beyond its borders in support of crisis management and peacekeeping. We have abolished the old distinction between in-area and out-of-area."[537]

After the Balkan operations, it became clear that NATO had to be shaped into an effective multilateral military instrument. It has been demonstrated that there were shifting 'policy communities' whose members were consistently at the forefront in seeking to give NATO an 'out-of-area' role. There were simultaneously seeking to resolve complex domestic and transatlantic 'burden sharing' issues. The Alliance's role in the Balkans was therefore never purely driven by the fear of an external threat or by humanitarian concerns.[538] It was about keeping the NATO in the international security business. It would be very naïve for U.S. and Britain to end NATO alliance and to leave continental Europe, especially after the unification of Germany. Balkan

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[536] Thomas Neve, "UK Clarifies 'Out-of-Area' Mandate," 24 February 1999, available at: <http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/1-3.htm>.
[537] NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, "NATO: A Changing Alliance for a Changing World," speech to Foreign Policy Association, New York, 7 October 1993.
[538] Giovanna Bono, **NATO's 'Peace-Enforcement' Tasks and 'Policy Communities'***: 1990-1999,* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p. 146.

operations in 1990s were like '*deux ex machina*' for NATO to play a role in the political history of Europe.

However, Europeans always demanded protection under the UN framework. Moreover, as the Allies recognized in the Kosovo crisis, depending on the UN Security Council as the only entity capable of legitimizing an intervention in support of collective security could hamper the Alliance's ability to act in cases in which the gravity of the injustice and the magnitude of the threat to Allied interests demand immediate action.[539]

The new security environment insisted not only on transforming the Alliance, but also on all structures and organizations, such as the UN. A serious risk of a 'hollowing out' of NATO appeared. The fact was provoked by the differential rates of force modernization, especially in the form of high technology. The fact that tomorrow's U.S. forces might be unable to fight in collaboration with allied forces remaining stuck at outdated technological levels.[540]There are two basic solutions. First European countries have to spend more on security defense and force modernization. Second, the US government should relax the stringent export control regulations on technology transfers for its European allies, offering them benefits of the American military technology.[541]European allies had failed to invest in the newest developments in military technology. European allies lagged behind in adapting commercial high-

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[539] David S. Yost, "NATO's Contributions to Conflict Management," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, **Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict**, (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 600.
[540] Ibid.
[541] Peter van Ham and Richard L. Kugler, "Western Unity and Transatlantic Security Challenge," **The Marshal Center Papers**, No. 4, 2002, pp.18.

tech to military purposes and remained far removed from the US level of sophistication.[542]

Josef Joffe argues that, "NATO I, the anti-Soviet alliance formed in 1949, dedicated to the principle of "all for one, and one for all," had been replaced by NATO II. This new NATO is no longer the embodiment of a unilateral security guarantee by the United States to the Europeans, but a collection of nation-states with its 26 members, NATO II is going to look like a small United Nations."[543]

The scope of the Alliance domain was characterized by Truman in his speech during the signing ceremony. He announced, The pact will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world.[544] Already in the early fifties, the Alliance was affected by developments outside the formal area of the NATO responsibility.

The emergence of a potential foe with weapons of mass destruction, which cannot be deterred by the threat of any reprisal, and the need to maintain readiness with full spectrum of capabilities all add impetus to NATO transformation. Rapid changes in the security environment after the Cold War convinced the Alliance that urgent steps had to be taken. NATO acknowledged the necessity to reorient itself to create deployable more mobile forces, and enhanced expeditionary capabilities to deal with crises.[545]

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[542] Ibid.

[543] Josef Joffe, "The Alliance Is Dead. Long Live The New Alliance," **New York Times**, 29 September 2002.

[544] Truman address, reprinted in **New York Times**, 5 April 1949, p. 6.

[545] Brendan Wilson, "In Search of Stability: NATO's Strategic Crossroads," **Strategic Insight**, Center for Contemporary Conflict, 1 May 2003.

The center of politics for the last 50 years in the Alliance has been in Western Europe, but the center of activity is moving east. The geostrategic focus of interest for the foreseeable future will be the Greater Middle East, a region that stretches from northern Africa to the Black sea, from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. [546] There is also an emerging concern to NATO's south and East. Because Africa and Near East are replete with ungoverned spaces as a result of failed states which are attracting terrorists, and all kinds of criminality.

Some Scholars argue that NATO in the future must be permanently able to develop new skills, techniques, and practices as follows: (1) design and employ military forces in significantly different ways from those of the past, (2) interact effectively with NGOs, (3) deal with the paradox of information which is defined as more access to information ,the greater challenge to political decision making, (4) revise methods of making and carrying out U.S. and European foreign policies (5) reconcile the competing demands of domestic special interests toward the outside world, (6) build international institutions, practices, processes, and relationships that can be sustained over time and that will engage a broad range of other countries in collaboration with the Alliance.[547]

My list on the other hand a little bit shorter but more radical. First of all, NATO needs a fundamental change, if NATO wants to be relevant in the coming decades it should open itself to the full membership of some of the African and Near Eastern countries,

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[546] General James L. Jones, "Surrender Monkeys—Not: The NATO Supreme Commander Speaks Out," 6 October 2003, **Newsweek**, p. 41

[547] Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, **The Global Century: Globalization and National Security**, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, "Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics," pp. 123-124.

such as Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Israel. In the Asia pacific region NATO should try to make Japan, South Korea and Australia the members of the NATO alliance. In short NATO must adapt a strategy to become a global security organization. Otherwise the tasks and the security challenges are too problematic and complex for NATO to find solutions with its existent structures.

A number of arguments support the idea of widening the geographical horizon of NATO. Conflicts can no longer be regionalized as a result of the technological progress. The proliferation of missile and nuclear technology makes the number of nuclear players in world politics increasing compare to past. NATO allies are likely to face future military threats from regions far beyond the borders of traditional NATO defense planning of Cold War years. Vital challenges are not strictly limited to the military realm, a sudden cut in the supply of energy from the Gulf region or a disruption of trade routes from East Asia would undoubtedly be viewed as an essential threat to Euro-Atlantic region.[548]

Asia's stability is the major strategic stake for the World peace. The magnitude of Asia's growth and the increasing economic and financial interactions among European, American, and Asian markets forbid NATO to treat Asia as just another continent. [549]The development of strategic ties between Asia and the Middle East will have considerable consequences: in the rapidly developing geopolitical game, the zone running from the Mediterranean to the Pacific ocean is becoming the meeting point of Western and Asian strategies.

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[548] Karl Heinz Kamp, "A Global Role for NATO?" **The Washington Quarterly**, Winter 1999, p. 9.
[549] Isabelle Cordonnier and Bruno Tertrais, **L'Asie nucléaire**, (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2001), p. 167.

Globalization's uneven dynamics are reaching very different regional consequences. International mechanisms for coping with the challenges of the global era remain asymmetrical an uneven. The lag in the development of new security structures calls for further strengthening of the institutions for regional cooperation and security.[550] NATO has its own rationale and motive to exist in the 21st century. A big organization without purpose eventually loses its legitimacy and will to live. After that a slow death is inevitable.[551] NATO's future depends on a clear political definition of its future tasks. NATO's future further depends on a new balance of American and European defense responsibilities, a credible rationale as to why it continues to make sense to provide for security in a collective manner.[552]

The convergence between NATO and the United Nations in terms of security seems to be inevitable. NATO is no longer a regional security organization but collective security instrument acting in a global scope. Both organizations were established to provide predictability and order in a world in constant flux.[553] NATO adopted a complex rational transformation program, but the United Nations remains complacent about the security consequences caused by globalization. The idea of creating a more robust U.N. force capable of dealing with aggressors has been around since the late

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[550] Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, **The Global Century: Globalization and National Security***, (NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 1, Stephen J. Flanagan, "Meeting the Challenges of the Global Century," p.22

[551] Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," **Defense Horizon***, November 2003, p. 2.

[552] Klaus Wittmann, "NATO's Future Military Strategy" in William D. Wharton, *Security* **Arrangements for a New Europe***, The Fourteenth NATO Symposium Spring 1991, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1992), pp. 130 - 131.

[553] Ramesh Thakur, "Reforming the United Nations: Changing with and for the Times," **International Peacekeeping***, Vol. 10, No.4, Winter 2003, p. 40.

1940s. It got a brief burst of life in the early 1990s after the Cold War, but it was entombed after the failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.[554]

Globalization has changed security matters and the military. No social institution is more affected by both national and international factors than the military.[555] Successful strategies and policies in the global era require much closer coordination. The promotion of international norms and institutions for managing change will be an important element of an effective strategy. [556] NATO's core mission to deal with security is an inevitable element of making globalization process less unpredictable and more peaceful. NATO will surely survive with new "out of area" missions even if UN and other international organization become the more important platform for settling disputes.

3.2. The Anexation of Ukraine by Russia and the New Balance of Power

Present-day NATO is a shadow of what it once was.

Andrew Bacevich

From the Realist perspective aggrasive Russian foreign and security policy increases the coordination levels in NATO and cements the alliance.Invasion of Ukraine by Russia and its involment in Syrian conflict makes the liberal optimism of the early post cold war order less reliable international theory to explain currents events.

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[554] Max Boot, "Shouldering the Load, And The Rifle Failed States Need New U.S. Activism and a U.N. Army," **Los Angeles Times**, 26 February 2004.

[555] Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David. R. Segal, **The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 265.

[556] **Ibid**

For the effects of international influences, as in all other countries, the democratisation process in Russia is not merely a domestic process. In the post-Cold War period, international actors and structures played an even more important role in the Russian case.[557] But ongoing NATO enlargement process and rejection of Russia's demand of full membership to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance made Russsia suspicious about the real the intentions of the West.

A Russian military analyst General Anatoly Klimenko argues that,

> *Essentially West's intentions are, first, to prevent the re-emergence in the former Soviet space of a structure which would be able to compete with the USA and other NATO states; second, to have relative stability maintained in that space, and third to assure the security of the property of Western investors, and an unhampered access to Russia's cheap natural resources.*[558]

Alexei Mitrofanov sees Russia in a "situation of geopolitical Stalingrad",

> *It has become absolutely evident that the prospects are for Russia's isolation from Europe, the creation around its perimeter of a quarantine belt of unfriendly states, bound by military bloc ties to the United States and its allies, further weakening of our country, ...followed by the*

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[557] Esra Hatipoğlu, The Democratisation Process In Russia, **Perception,** vol:3no:2, pp.1-8

[558] Anatoly Klimenko, Vojny Dlja Rossii"(Wars for Russia),Nezavisimaia gazeta, e-version,GlasNet,,no.040, 24 Oct 1997.in **Why NATO Endures**? Ed.,Charles-Philippe David, and Jacques Levesque, McGill-Queen's University Press, London,1999, p.182.

formation on its ruins of 10-15 satellite countries, hostile to each other

and totally dependent on external suzerains.[559]

Russia's 2008 war with Georgia was militarily successful. But the operation revealed serious failures in command and control of Russian forces.[560] Much of the troops' equipment was outdated compare to the latest US equipment, and The Economist notes that since then the improvements have been slow.

Until the T-50 stealth fighter appears in small numbers towards the end of the decade, the mainstay of the air force will remain upgraded SU-27s and MiG-29s that first flew in the 1970s. The navy is getting new corvettes and frigates, but the industry cannot produce bigger vessels: hence the order of two Mistral ships from France. The army is to replace Soviet amour with the Armata family of tracked vehicles, but not yet.[561]

Russia's GDP is 2 trillion dollars, its defence expenditure is almost 120 billion dollars, annually, and its armed forces are at 1.2 million level. However low levels of education, and the limitations upon the available time to train conscripts mean that sophisticated equipment is not always used to its full potential.[562] Russia's military industry is trying to recover from years of under-investment and corruption. The army is also suffering from a shortage of conscripts.[563] The size of the Russian military, which was cut as part of the modernization program, is estimated to be between

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[559] Alexei Mitrofanov,"AntiNATO: Novaia ideiarossijskoj geopolitiki,Taktika i strategia na sovremennom etabe"(AntiNATO: A new Idea for Russian Geopolitics.Tactics and Strategy at the Present Stage),**Ibid**,p.182

[560] McDermott, Roger N.,Russia's Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War., The US Army War College Quarterly: **Parameters**, Spring 2009. pp. 65-80

[561] Putin's new model army , **The Economist**, 24 May 2014

[562] Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), **Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2013**,p. 40.

[563] **Ibid**.,p.40

700,000 and 1 million.[564] This is significantly smaller than the approximately 3, 370, 000 service personnel in NATO allies armed forces.[565]

Russia's ability to field large military forces for a sustained, long-term conflict is limited by the country's economic problems. The overly optimistic economic was based upon an annual average growth rate of 6% but the level achieved was in fact 4.3% in 2011 and had reduced to 2% in 2013.[566]Since 2012, Russia's expenditure on the military has increased and, during the period 2013-17, defence expenditure will estimated to be amount to 4.8% of GDP. Russia has embarked on a $720 billion weapons modernization program.[567]

The Russian military's increased effectiveness was demonstrated recently when Russia carried out the large-scale Zapad 2013 exercise in the Baltic region, which included: Large-scale deployment of conventional forces (believed to be c. 70,000 troops) including land, sea, air, air defence, airborne, special forces (Spetsnaz), the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior (VVMVD), medical units and army psychological personnel, logistical and engineering forces; search and rescue; amphibious landing and anti-landing operations; air and ground strikes on enemy targets; submarine and anti-submarine warfare; missile strikes with long-range precision strike assets; and airborne and air assault operations.[568]

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[564] **Economist**. 24 may 2014

[565] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, **Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence**, (February 2014) p. 10

[566] The International Institute of Strategic Studies, **The Military Balance 2013**, (March 2014) p 164

[567] Ibid.

[568] Stephen Blank, What Do the Zapad 2013 Exercises Reveal? (Part One), **Eurasia Daily Monitor**, vol 10 issue 177, (October 2014)

The implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) resulted in intensive Russian activity aimed at developing and introducing new strategic weapons systems, including at least three new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) programs.[569]

United Kingdom's The Defense Committee's report on Deterrence in the twenty-first century, concluded that The 2015 National Security Strategy must reflect that threats to... security include the re-emergence of state threats that we may have been tempted to think had diminished with the end of the Cold War. These state threats may become manifest in a range of ways, including through attack with CBRN weapons, conventional forces, terrorist proxies or cyber capabilities.[570]

The concept of asymmetric warfare is not a new development and it was an element in Russian military doctrine for some time. The use of such asymmetric strategies are perceived to allow attacks against states which have a superiority in numbers of troops and weapon technology. This strategy has been analyzed in the Russian journal Military Thought:

> *"Asymmetric actions, too, will be used extensively to level off the enemy's superiority in armed struggle by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns in the form of indirect actions and non-military measures. In its new technological format, the indirect action strategy will draw on, above all, a great variety of forms and methods of non-military techniques and non-*

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[569] Keir Giles and Dr. Andrew Monaghan, **Russian Military Transformation - Goal In Sight?** May 2014, p 28

[570] Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2013–14, **Deterrence in the twenty-first century**, HC 1066 , paragraph 75.

military measures, including information warfare to neutralize adversary actions without resorting to weapons, by exercising information superiority, in the first place."[571]

In February 2013, the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov published an article which highlighting that: The very *rules of war* have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.[572]

> "Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special-operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected."[573]

Various types of asymmetric warfare, which have been practised by Russia in operations in Estonia in 2007,[2] Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 include Cyber warfare, disinformation, Psychological operations, Economic warfare, and the Proxy attack: the use of armed civilians or terrorist groups against a state, or the use of forces that operate without insignia or official affiliation also known as 'little green men' Following the annexation of Crimea, the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has described Russia as speaking and behaving not as a partner, but

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[571] Col. S.G. CHEKINOV (Res.), Doctor of Technical Sciences Lt. Gen. S.A. BOGDANOV (Ret.), Doctor of Military Sciences, *The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War*, **MILITARY THOUGHT**:A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, East View Press, No. 4, 2013
[572] Dr Mark Galeotti, **The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War**, July 2014
[573] Ibid.

as an adversary ... In recent weeks, Russian officials have accused NATO of breaking its promises, interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs, and escalating the crisis. It is time to see these claims for what they are: a smokescreen designed to cover up Russia's own broken promises, interference and escalation.[574]And has rejected claims that Russia was motivated by NATO enlargement, emphasising the intensive engagement between NATO and Russia which resulted in the NATO-Russia Council.[575]Russia has consistently asserted a legal and moral duty to protect ethnic Russians who live abroad. The claim has been made that the revolution in Ukraine endangered Russian ethnic minorities in the country and it was on that basis that Russia sent troops in to Crimea.[576]

Table 3.1. Ukraine Defense Information

	Army Size	Tanks	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters	2013 Defense Budget	Defense Spending % of GDP
Ukraine	64,750	1,150	2,170	231	139	$2.42 billion	1.3

Table 3.1.**Source:** International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2014*.

There is significant difference between NATO's readiness levels during and after the Cold War. In 1984, 131,565 ground and air personnel were involved in Operation Lionheart which involved transporting 57,700 soldiers including British Troops, American, Dutch and West German forces from Britain by air and sea. The purpose of the exercise was to establish a method of attacking the 'follow-on forces' that would

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[574] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General, NATO, **De-escalation starts on the ground**, April 2014
[575] Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General, NATO **'The Future of NATO: A Strong Alliance in an Unpredictable World'**, Chatham House 19 June 2014
[576] Russia's humanitarian actions vs Western military interventionism: Tskhinval is not Tripoli, Crimea is not Kosovo**, The Voice of Russia**, 21 March 2014

be sent in to battle after the first wave of Soviet Union attacks.[577] The 2013 NATO exercise by contrast, *Steadfast Jazz* which took place in Poland and Latvia in 2013 involved a force of only 6,000 troops which was the largest NATO exercise to take place since the end of the Cold War.[578]

NATO had to shift from operational engagement to operational readiness, from campaign to contingency from deployed NATO to prepared NATO.[579] The main aim was to preserve at times of economic austerity and political wariness since a "mere survival may be construed as a success for the Alliance.[580] NATO is, unlikely to conduct in near time another state-building enterprise at *strategic distance* like the Afghan deployment because of the limited resources and tense situation in Europe.[581]

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[577] British Start War Games on Continent, **New York Times**, 18 September 1984

[578] Andrew Cottey, **The European Neutrals and NATO: Ambiguous Partnership**, Contemporary Security Policy, 34:3, (2013) 446-472,

[579] Secretary General Andres Fogh Rasmussen. NATO after ISAF: staying successful together. Speech to the Munich Security Conference, 02.02.2014.

[580] Andrew Dorman. NATO's 2012 Chicago Summit: A Chance to Ignore the Issues Once Again? In: **International Affairs** 88: 2 (2012), p. 302.

[581] Jacob Stokes, Julianne Smith, Nora Bensahel, David Barno, Charting the Course: Directions for the New NATO Secretary General, **Center for a New American Security**, Policy Brief, September 2014, p. 6.

Figure 3.1. NATO membership in Europe

Figure 3.1. Source: www.nato.int

Reassurances and Alliance's cohesion are one of the main principles of function that are necessary to keep the NATO working in a viable way.[582] Recent developments seem to push the Alliance to spend more energy on the collective defense and the success of the organization rests ultimately on U.S. leadership. NATO's place in the American grand strategy sees NATO as the force multiplier for United States international security system connecting with partners around the globe.[583] Although

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[582] Mark Webber, Ellen Hallams and Martin A. Smith. Repairing NATO's motors. In: **International Affairs**, 90: 4 (2014), p 773-793.
[583] **Ibid**.,776

the Wales Summit made clear that the Alliance can do very little to roll back the territorial gains already gained by Russia.[584]

There is a highly important transition in world affairs and ongoing developments; NATO is entering a new and unpredictable era as the alliance shifts from operations to contingencies. The Syrian and Ukrainian crises demonstrate the danger of several threats. There is a new balance today, which necessitates the ability and capability of NATO to conduct operations across the full spectrum of missions from stabilization and reconstruction to high-end war fighting. [585]

Figure 3.2. Estimated military expenditure as a share of GDP for Russia and selected countries, 2003–2012; *per cent*


Figure 3.2. **Sources:** SIPRI (2013) and MoF.FOI

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[584] Ian Davis, Nigel Chamberlain. An Evaluation of the Wales Summit: NATO builds coalitions for conflict on multiple fronts. ***NATO Watch***, 10. 09. 2014, p. 7, 13.
[585]Mesut Hakkı Caşın,
http://www.hazar.org/analizdetail/analiz/future_of_nato_and_atlantic_security_after_the_2014_wales_ summit_942.aspx

One of the most important challenge for NATO is how to deal with the new strategic consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The proposed NATO trust funds can have a positive effect on the Ukrainian military in the longer term, but does not strengthen it against clear and present dangers. Russia is attempting to block Ukrainian efforts to join NATO at all costs. Russia has the capability to go further with fullscale invasion and cutting it off from the Black Sea. This policy would keep Ukraine away from western integration and create an area of instability close to EU and NATO borders, and give Russia the capability to project power further into southern Europe.

NATO, together with the EU, need to adopt a common view and effectively employ all political, economic, and military tools to prevent Russia from further gains in NATO has already demonstrated its commitment to an open door policy by offering new initiatives to support Georgia's integration and opening intensified talks with Montenegro. But the weak response from the EU could lead to unofficial acceptance of a Russian enforced status quo, which would *de facto* create a new Russian sphere of influence. This would be the historical reversal from the post-Cold War order.

3.3. Scenarios for the Future of NATO

It is not easy to predict the future in the age of uncertainity. There are many parameters connected to the future of security enviroment in Trans-Atlantic area and beyond. The Future of NATO can be a another long research subject. In this section only three different scenario perspectives are shown.

3.3.1. NATO faces a new Russian empire

There are three main threats for NATO from the *New Russian Empire*. First re-occupation of selected territories along Russia's European borders most probably whole Ukraine and Baltic. Second, *Finlandisation* of Europe, using the threat of brute military force to pressure Europe into complying with Russian vital interests. Third the threat to European energy security by cutting off the gas supply from Russia to Europe.

From a pessimistic perspective, in view of the ongoing global military conflicts and political developments, it appears that the world is becoming a far more dangerous place rather than a more peaceful one. Despite NATO's enlargement, the allies have encountered a new kind of mission, different in scope and kind from the Cold War security challenges: piracy, terrorism, cyber-warfare, and Russia's hybrid de-stabilisation strategy. The nature of the strategic security environment has changed dramatically, with traditional and non-traditional risks as well as emerging threats. These unpredictable challenges are unlikely to be eliminated any time in the near future.[586]

The 2020 Russian Naval doctrine has put forth a new view of traditional naval strategy by underlining the role of naval routes in the transportation of Russian energy resources to the international markets...This means that Kremlin's traditionalaim of having access to "warm waters" remains in place, and has been uptaded according to new circumtances. The Black Sea has a central geopolitical role in Russian naval

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[586] Mesut Hakkı Caşın, The Future of NATO and Atlantic Security after the 2014 Wales Summit, in ed.Ahmet Yükleyen**, Geopolitics of the Caspian Region**, 2015 Caspian Strategy Institute, p.108.

strategy...The crimean peninsula posseses a great capacity for transportation and abundant natural resources...Crimea has strategic importance for Moscow as a port city, a role that it had also played during the Cold War.[587]

It is not just a regional crisis over Ukraine. It is the first overt clash of two civilisations with potentially irreconcilable worldviews and vital interests and what is at stake is not just Eastern Ukraine, or Ukraine in its entirety. The stakes are very high, it is the future of the European political order, and whether Russia will be dictate the orders. The crisis in Ukraine marks the end of liberal Western dominance in Europe. The soft power approach in the European security calculations are declining Hard power politics have now returned. The potential for major inter-state war in Europe, including the threat of using nuclear force, is not over.

Russia has constantly emphasized the importance of its strategic nuclear forces and keep them in peak condition. Russian rationale is clear, nuclear weapons are seen as Russia's final trump card in a hostile world and they play a crucial role in Russia's self-image as a global superpower.

Russia began a ten-year rearmament programme (2011-2020) in March 2010. It aims to develop a professional force of 104 brigades at 100 % readiness and with 70% modern equipment. Even if Russia only gets halfway, this would still provide an overwhelming power along its frontiers, totally outmatching any European military.

The three Zapad manoeuvres (1999, 2009 and 2013) are classical 'Cold War' military scenarios simulating major inter-state war in Europe, including nuclear war. Zapad

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[587] Mesut Hakkı Caşın,The Ukraine Conflict and the Seach for Sustainable Peace,in ed.Ahmet Yükleyen, **Geopolitics of the Caspian Region**, 2015 Caspian Strategy Institute, p.81.

2009 started with defence against western invaders, followed by a simulated nuclear strike against the invader, after which the invasion stopped. Vostok (East) 2010 included a similar simulated theatre level nuclear strike. And Zapad 2013 was up to 70,000 troops in a massive trans-Eurasian operation. Putin launched a major Russian nuclear exercise in April 2014, in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis.[588]Russia gives rapid answers to every new move of NATO to protect its position.[589]

After the Cold War Behind the facade of cooperation with NATO, Russia never abandoned its traditional view of power as a struggle for superiority. Russia launched major military rearmament programmes that will, under current trends, provide overwhelming military superiority in Europe in 10 years. Unless the Atlantic Community, takes measures to meet this challenge, Europe risks becoming fatally vulnerable to Russian military coercion and some European countries may face direct military occupation.

3.3.2. Russia Joins NATO

This is the most optimist scenario for the future of NATO but it is also the less probable option. If Russia faces significant problems in Asia as a result of China's assertive foreign policy, then this 'game changing' historical and geopolitical shift can be possible.

Russia's joining NATO has been occasionally discussed in the past. In 1954 the Soviet Union proposed to the governments of the U.S., Great Britain and France a

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[588] Tomas Ries, *The clash of civilisations – Ukraine in context,* in ed. David Vestenskov, **10 Years after NATO Membership**, Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House 2014,p.89.
[589] Mesut Hakkı Caşın, NATO'nun Attığı Her Adıma Karşı Rusya Refleksi, **Hazar World**, June 2016 p.10.

new security system for Europe one aspect of which would have been the Soviet Union's entry into NATO. The Western powers ignored the Soviet proposal.

In 1992/1993 Russia signed with NATO member states numerous agreements, declarations and other documents containing the statement that they do not consider one another as adversaries. In the early 1990s when discussing NATO's enlargement with the members of his administration U.S. President Bill Clinton remarked that Russia's joining NATO is a "blue-sky staff" which will require "different Russia, different NATO, different Europe"[590]

Upon 9/11 Russia joined the counter-terrorist coalition, closed its military bases in Cuba and in Vietnam, agreed to build US military bases in Central Asia and assisted NATO troops in Afghanistan. Practically Russia entered the Western security space and started examining the possibilities of joining NATO. The attitudes of third countries to Russia's possible membership in NATO should be considered and China is the one important example.

According to general belief in the West, NATO's efforts to engage Russia with the Trans-Atlantic order after the Cold War through their *Russia First* policy was a mistake. The *Russia First* policy has resulted in making European Union increasingly more dependent on Russia rather than making Moscow dependent on West. Now NATO has returned to employing a strategy that gives priority to attaining the conditions of a strengthened collective defense and continues to leave the diplomatic door of NATO open for Russia.

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[590] Talbott, Strobe (2003): *The Russia Hand*. Random House Trade Paperback Edition.p.132.

3.3.3. NATO faces a global rival alliance consist of Russia and China

In a multipolar World, Great Power relations usually are unstable and dynamic compare to bipolar or unipolar systems. In the changing seasons of the World politics, British Lion is already retired. America Eagle once flying high is now tired. Russian Bear is out of its cave with a vengeance, German Wolf is sniffing the air to dominate Europe again, Indian Elephant is moving slowly but surely from periphery to core, Japanese Samurai is still meditating in the economic recession, while Chinese Dragon is wisely watching the horizon from its den, as the long sunset of Western civilization continues.

There will be five main players in the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century which are USA, Russia, EU, China and India. NATO contains USA and EU while SCO contains Russia and China. With these calculations in mind we can assume that India's position will have critical importance. If India joins Russia and China as a main ally in the world politics It would be very hard for the Western democracies and NATO to have the Global leadership for a longtime.

The Ukraine crisis has an important aspect, in a bid to punish Russia, the United States has used its economic power as a regulator of the global economic system as a weapon. This prompted geopolitical opponents of the West to search for a new system beyond the current design of the global economy in favor of some other system.

U.S. efforts to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) a.k.a. *'economic NATO'* and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade zones actually undermine the globalization perspective and the liberal understanding. These new

treaties mean cancelation of WTO's principle of universal rules for world trade. The rapidly strengthening partnership between Russia and China suggests is a response to TTIP. Both Countries have their own big projects: Russia's Eurasian Economic Union and China's Silk Road Economic Belt. Although Coordinating Russia's and China's interests in order to facilitate cooperation between these two projects will be difficult, both China and Russia are searching for alternatives to TTIP.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will play a major role in the future of transatlantic security and defence, with the EU and the US at its core. TTIP is geopolitical in nature, seeking to compete with a rising Asia, rather than betting on global liberalism. TTIP is being driven by the joint concern that standard-setting power could be increasingly lost to China, and [transatlantic] cooperation is the only way the two sides can continue to assert their market power and preserve their mutual economic interests worldwide.[591]

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[591] Klaus Günter Deutsch, *Atlantic Unity in Global Competition: T-TIP in Perspective*, Deutsche Bank Research, EU Monitor (August 2013).p.16.

Figure 3.3. Multi-Component Global Power Index

Source: National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*

In 2012, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) offered a devastating outlook on the future of US and European power in world affairs. The NIC's so-called *Multi-Component Global Power Index* visualizes the decline of the West and the rise of Asia with cruel clarity. The NIC concludes that "by 2030, no matter the power index, developing states overtake developed states".[592]

There is a tendency in Western media to show India as a potential rival competitator to China for comming decades.But in the world of 2030's China and India's population will exceed 3 billion in total and their technological and economic

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[592] National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (December 2012), p. 17.

development will be much better compare to todays standards. It is very possible that these two Asian continental countries with rapid industrial growth rates can shake hands and dominate the world politics as a result.

NATO can not be a global collective defence organization without including Japan and ASEAN countries to balance China.NATO in the pacific region would be a very different NATO 3.0 compare to NATO 1.0 (1949-1990) or NATO 2.0. (Post Cold War).NATO in the pacific would be a real "game changer".But it would not be easy to convince European parthners especially France and Germany to this Project. Germany and France and even UK see China as a very important comercial parthner and They do not opose to China's silk road project which is consist of massive transportation and infrastructure investments from China to UK.

China understands that Russia's conflict with the West has only postponed a global rivalry between China and the Western world including Japan, which may intensify in coming years. The dispute between Russia and the West has hardly erased Sino-U.S. tensions. That is why Russian-Chinese cooperation is one of Russia's most consistent responses to increasing pressure from the NATO members.

CONCLUSION

It is a historical fact that NATO won the Cold War but the end of the Cold-War did not marginalize NATO but rather the alliance transformed itself according to the challenges of the new century. Although the highest priority will remain for the military capabilities, the future surviveability and success of NATO will be determined by its members ability to development and expand their co-operation in the intelligence, economic, political, and humanitarian field.

At first NATO was only a military alliance against the Soviet threat. But after the Cold War and the dissolution the Soviet Union, NATO was restructured in an organization which main role is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries. In the post-Cold War period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has focused much of its energy on the transformed European security environment.

The original purpose of the NATO was to counter Soviet Russia and the spread of communism in the 20th century. But, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring peace to the European continent. The world witnessed the conflicts between newly developed states in Balkans which required a military interference for the stability of the continent. This was the beginning of the transformation process of the NATO as a collective defense organization. This transformation continued with the enlargement of NATO to the Eastern Europe. With the NATO enlargement parallel to the EU enlargement, there seems no serious threat to the security of the transatlantic alliance coming from within the continent.

With every new member NATO transpose to an international political forum which also has military capabilities.This aim can be best achieved by keeping NATO member states on the same track of political ideals such as democracy, rule of law and free market economy.

The frictions between the US and the EU's ways of handling the international problems are due to differences on perceptions. Observations on discussions in the NATO Headquarters for gaining efficiency on decision making process reveal that the core EU nations continue to build international relations on the "balance of power" concept.

Europe still has classic geopolitical parameters to include its security calculations. If Germany and Russia become tempted to old power politics and pursue a domination over Central Europe or quarrel with each other, then United Kingdom and France would be unable to sustain the political balance in Western Europe without the support of USA.This one of the reasons why NATO still relevant in 21st century.Atlantic alliance is not only for outside threats but also for balance of power issue in European continent.

By the time we have witnessed the unification of the Federal and Democratic Germany and emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe, the international bipolar system changed, Cold War ended so the cards had to be redistributed. The aim of the pro Euro block in the NATO is to make the EU another super power in the coming decades. After the economic integration, the security integration is the next big project. But this is not an easy task to achieve. USA and pro Atlantic block in the

EU such as UK, Poland and Turkey criticize these efforts as a weakening factor for the capabilities of NATO.

In realist terms, Europe has a subordinate position in the new institutional structure. Its economic, strategic, international and military relations are constructed by the U.S. after the World War II and U.S. insists to keep trans-Atlantic relations in this way in the post-Cold War era. The key institution as an effective tool for a cooperative common military action over other parts of the world is the NATO alliance. It should be noted that all NATO strategies conducted throughout its existence was mainly prepared by the U.S.

A peaceful Europe depends on NATO's ability to manage crises successfully. NATO will stay as a number one military alliance of the Western World until the establishment of an effective European military organization of the EU.

The degree of how the US is influential in security matters of Europe is unquestionable, though mostly achieved by means of NATO. The US stick of not having NATO in its interests has also been a conditioning factor on decisions of the other NATO members including the great powers. According to American security calculations USA should not be a big isolated island near Europe. USA always follows the policy of full engagement with the rest of the world since the World War II. Especially after the declaration of the Carter doctrine, Middle East and Mediterranean area became the focal point

The first NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, gave a brief explanation of NATO's purpose to exist in a more informal way when he claimed the alliance is for 'keeping

the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in'. This effectively sums NATO's key objectives even today. After the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in the year 2014 gave a significant importance to the role of U.S. in European security enviroment by the NATO aparatus.

NATO will maintain a nuclear capability for the near future.This capability tradionaly supplied by USA, Britain and France.Although NATO considers nuclear weapons as the weapons of last resort.This capability provides a level of strategic uncertainty in the eyes of a potential adversary. According to NATO's strategic concept the fundamental purpose of its nucleal capabilities is political.

Nuclear capability of NATO relies on three diffirent countries which are USA,UK and France.This makes nuclear strategy of NATO more complex.USA insist on some kind of anti-balistic missile defence system while European partners have questions about the merits of a such system.Number of Nuclear states with balistic missile technology is increasing.This trend increases the propability of a nuclear conflict and makes the nuclear balance in the world politics instable.

The open door policy of NATO for the membership makes the alliance policaly dynamic in the Euro-Atlantic area. But it also increses the risk of military engagement for the alliance.Invasion of Ukraine by Russia in March 2014 made NATO members to remember Cold War legacy and Russian military strength. Experience showed that without support of Pakistan and Central Asian states or even Russia, it is very unlikely for NATO to hold on in Afghanistan.This situation gives Russia a strong position in its relations with the western powers or NATO members.

Changing geography of NATO is effecting its capabilities and stragecic concept.With every new member the area of responsibilty for the alliance gets larger.'Out of area' missions became the common *modus operandi* of NATO in the new century.As a result NATO tries to be in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. In the long run even the East Asia may be in the agenda. NATO is aiming to fill the power vacum of the ended security organizations CENTO and SEATO.

It is clear that NATO is not a separate entity by itself.It is a military alliance of sovereing states. Every member State has right of veto in the NATO council and every member State is equal according to NATO treaty.But without support of USA and its existence in alliance it is very hard for NATO to survive as a solid military alliance.This situation makes American foreign policy one of the key factors on the NATO politics.

The 21st century has brought new security problems to the West such as terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction or regional conflicts. These threats require a strong transatlantic alliance to counter them. The most important threats lie in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East which are mostly out of NATO's defined mission area. For this reason, NATO has to be transformed into an alliance that can act globally. As a result, NATO has enlargement options not only as full membership, but different programs such as Partnership for Peace or Mediterranean Dialogue.

The terrorism threat has political social, and economical causes. As a military alliance NATO has very little options to deal with international terrorism. First of all, NATO was not invented to deal with terrorist groups. NATO can be an umbrella organization for the member countries police and intelligence departments. This approach can be

more successful than using heavy military units to combat and prevent terrorism. NATO must adopt itself to the new threats of the non-governmental actors by transposing into more modular and elastic organization.

In this complex security environment of World politics NATO can execute only military missions, while the UN and EU can operate as a military force and at the same time take responsibility for civil peace-building. NATO needs to be more flexible and has abilities to conduct low intensity conflict operations in a complex political environment.

In order to survive, NATO had to change just like living biological organisms as a result of generic character of the milieu in which it is. NATO needs flexible strategies and force structure and better intelligence sources to cope with the new security environment.

When it comes to hard-power soft-power debate and the role of NATO in the international politics, problems of lack of enough diplomatic capabilities for the Alliance reveal itself. Although NATO has political dimensions, it is a military alliance. NATO's diplomatic capabilities are very weak contrast to its military power. Unlike UN, NATO was not built for political negotiations since its establishment. NATO secretary general is not powerful as UN secretary general when it comes to diplomatic issues. Member countries of the Trans-Atlantic alliance most of the time have different or even conflicting foreign policy objectives. This is the key obstacle for the transforming NATO in the 21st century.

The power-maximizing policy is common for all the nation states. But the composite factors of the power and its definition are a subject of long debate. Disintegration of the Soviet Union has showed that military power and geographical advantages are not enough to be a strong country. On the other hand, States with large economies but without sufficient military capabilities fall victims of aggression. The adaptation of the NATO members to the challenges of the new century will be the main question for the Atlantic Alliance in the coming decades.

When it comes to the collective defense versus collective security debate it is clear that NATO as a collective defense organization becoming more active and having the leading role in the World politics. The concentration of governance in the hands of the Security Council of UN is a direct concern to practice of collective security system. UN system has significant problems as a result of undemocratic structure of the Security Council. Only five members of the UN have right to veto. But there are new important rising powers such as India, Japan, Brazil, and Turkey and without these countries acceptance to the Security Council with equal rights as permanent members there will be no future for the UN as an effective collective security organization.

NATO is the biggest military alliance of all times but this power should be used wisely. Members of the Atlantic alliance must recognise the major threats before they begin to evolve more critical stages and levels.American and European coperation and scynocranation against the international crisis is the key factor for the success of the alliance.

Instead of letting NATO disappear after the Cold War, the US administration opened the Alliance to new members, "extending US influence into Russia's former sphere of

influence, and re-orienting the strategic rationale of NATO away from Article 5 security guarantees towards non-article 5 "crisis response operations", ensuring allied participation in US-led and directed military crisis management. Without the support of NATO, it is clear that American foreign policy in the Middle east and Central Asia would be in jeopardy. NATO transformation led the organization to create a new security order in the world politics.

NATO's members face different threats, but the United States is unlikely to abandon NATO. NATO provides a crucial forum in which the United States can discuss foreign and security policy with its key allies to reach common understandings of shared problems. This is vital to the United States as the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy begins to influence the policies of European states. Only in NATO the United States have a voice in European security affairs. This helps explain U.S. support for expanding the alliance, and it has sought to make NATO the forum for discussion of a broad range of security problems.

Transformation of NATO is an ongoing process and economy of defense is one of the key parameters. "Smart defense" idea in the new strategic concept of NATO is the reflection of this understanding. Also Burden sharing issue is still a vital debate between USA and other members. It is hard to think an effective NATO without US military spending. American contribution and capabilities will be very important as in the Cold War period for the transforming Atlantic alliance. States will be the main actors of the global politics and international security in the near future as long as "perpetual peace" idea accepted by all the nation states. For this reason, NATO will continue to be one of the main security apparatus of the international system.

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia strategic deterrence based on nuclear capabilities again became very important for NATO. With this perspective NATO must increase military spending even in the age of economic austerity. The balance between the *collective defense* and the *cooperative security* is a critical issue in the Euro-Atlantic area after the crisis in Ukraine as result of Russian military intervention.

NATO members understood that core task of the Trans-Atlantic alliance is maintaining security of its members and the collective defense is the reason d'état of the alliance other than the cooperative security issues and crisis management. Although transformation process of NATO brought new challenges, NATO as the biggest military alliance of the world and the Western civilization, will continue to exist in the near future.

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APPENDIX A THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (1949)

The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and

by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty

on the Accession of Greece and Turkey

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article 2 of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

Article 2

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

1. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in whicH occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 3

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article 4

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty

on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has, by a declaration dated October 3, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on October 3, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany, Agree as follows:

Article 1

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

Article 2

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when

a. each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof,

b. all instruments of ratification of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and

c. all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article 3

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

APPENDIX B CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR

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