

CHILEAN – TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS, 1926 – 2016:

AN ACCOUNT OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY



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YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
JANUARY, 2018

CHILEAN – TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS, 1926 – 2016:

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BY

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILISOPHY
IN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
JANUARY, 2018

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09.01.2018

Yaman KEPENÇ



ÖZET

Şili – Türkiye İlişkileri, 1926-2016: Bir Diplomatik Tarihin Hikayesi

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Yeditepe Üniversitesi

2018

Şili ve Türkiye, coğrafi konumları ile birbirinden oldukça uzak, iki bağımsız ülkedir. Aralarındaki uzak mesafeye rağmen, her iki ülkenin birbirleri ile 1926 yılında başlayan dostluğu önemlidir. 1. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında, verdiği istiklal savaşı ile bağımsızlığına kavuşan Türkiye Cumhuriyetini, Latin Amerika kıtasında ilk tanıyan ülke Şili'dir. İki ülke Ocak 1926 yılında, Roma'da "Dostluk ve Konsolosluk" anlaşması imzalamışlardır. Genç Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, uluslararası ilişkilerde içinde bulunduğu zor bir dönemde, kendisini eşit ve bağımsız bir ülke olarak tanıyan ve ardından diğer Latin Amerika ülkeleri ile de karşılıklı tanıma anlaşmaları yapılmasına öncülük eden bu kararı unutmamıştır. Soğuk savaşın başladığı tarihten, soğuk savaşın bittiği güne kadar her iki ülkenin yaşadığı siyasi ve toplumsal gelişmeler, büyük benzerlikler göstermiştir. Bu tez çalışması, her iki ülke arasındaki diplomatik ilişkileri, iki ülke resmi arşivlerinden toplanan diplomatik belgeler aracılığı ile takip etmiştir. Diplomatik belgeler, ait olduğu dönemin gündem ve ruhunu yansıtmaları bakımından önemlidir. Kullanılan diplomatik belgeler, Şili ve Türkiye birbirleri ile olan dostane ilişkilerini, daha üst seviyelere çıkararak stratejik bir işbirliğine doğru ilerlediklerini göstermektedir.

ABSTRACT

Chilean -Turkish Relationships, 1926-2016: An Account of Diplomatic History

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Doctoral Dissertation

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Yeditepe University

2018

Chile and Turkey are two independent states geographically distant from one another. In spite of the long distance between the two countries, they share an important friendship since 1926. After the First World War, Chile was the first country in the Latin American continent to formally recognize the Republic of Turkey, which gained independence following the Turkish War of Independence. In January 1926, the two countries signed a Friendship Agreement and Consular Convention in Rome. As the young Turkish republic entered a challenging period in international relations, she did not forget Chile's decision that led other Latin American countries to sign similar treaties with the Turkish government. The political and social developments that both countries experienced from the beginning to the end of the Cold War reveal great similarities. This thesis follows the diplomatic relations between the two countries through official diplomatic documents that were retrieved from the Chilean and Turkish state archives. Such diplomatic correspondence is important since it reflects the political agenda and *zeitgeist* of the period. The diplomatic documents studied in the thesis demonstrate that Chile and Turkey are progressing their existing friendly relations to higher levels and are moving towards a strategic partnership.

DEDICATION

To all the people who have worked towards the Chilean – Turkish friendship since 1926



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A doctoral work like this would not be possible without the assistance and support of a large group of people both in Chile and Turkey, each of whom I owe my deep gratitude to.

First of all I would like to thank Mr. Bedrettin Dalan, the founder of Yeditepe University and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of İstek Foundation for providing me with a scholarship for my doctoral studies at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yeditepe University.

I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu, for his kind support, continuous advice and recommendations, and friendship from the very beginning until the last moment of my doctoral research. Without him, it would not have been possible to write and complete my dissertation.

My advisor Dr. Bilgen Sütçüoğlu, assistant professor at Yeditepe University, helped me to sketch the outline of the research and strengthen my arguments. I am also indebted to Dr. Şakir Dinçşahin, associate professor, who has directed me and the research since the very first doctoral classes.

I am honoured to know Ambassador Ayşenur Alpaslan, former Turkish ambassador to Chile, who helped me at every stage of my archival research at the Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. She also helped me with her thorough knowledge of Chilean-Turkish relations. Without her help, this work would not be feasible.

I would like to thank Ambassador Selçuk Ünal, who is currently the Turkish ambassador in Ottawa, Canada. Thanks to him, I was able to first get access to the Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives.

I wish to thank Dr. Enrique Accorsi Opazo, former member of Chilean parliament, for his kind help to broaden my view while in Chile. I owe special thanks to Ambassador Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago Concha, who worked with ten Chilean presidents and with his extensive knowledge is a treasure of Chilean diplomacy.

I am grateful for the support of Jorge Arancibia Reyes, former Chilean ambassador to Turkey and commander in chief of the Chilean navy, whose remarks and opinions were a valuable contribution to this research.

I would like to thank two Chilean ambassadors to Turkey, namely Francisco Marambio Vial and Luis Palma Castillo, for their contributions and for sharing their knowledge on the topic during the interviews.

The Chilean diplomat Sebastian Marin kindly helped me to gain access to the Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives. As a good friend and a good diplomat, I am grateful to him.

I am proud to call the former vice admiral of the Chilean navy, Francisco Guzman Vial, a lifelong friend, and I am thankful for the help of him and his wife.

I also would like to thank Carmen Gloria Duhart and Roberto Mercado Martinic, both former directors of the General History Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, always warmly welcomed me during my archival research.

I will never forget the kindness and help of Ambassador Songül Ozan, former Director of Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives.

The General Manager of Alplas Endüstriyel Yatırımlar A.Ş., Tufan Öney and his wife Zeynep Öney have played a crucial role in French and Spanish translations. I am thankful for their kindness and patience and standing with me during the most difficult times.

A Turkish businessman living in Santiago de Chile, Ali Devlen, is a lifelong friend and has always welcomed and supported me during my visits to Chile.

I also want to show my gratitude to Murat Sancaktar, the Chairman of Board of MGS İnşaat Ticaret A.Ş. His support, especially in those challenging moments, is unforgettable to me.

This work would not be possible without the kind help of Lara Savenije, who has helped editing the dissertation with her respected patience.

I would like to thank associate professor Neda Üçer; Mr. Özkan Öney; Gendarme Colonel Erkan Arıkan and Dr. Aslı Postacı.

This list would not be complete without Christiane Ubber from Cologne, whom I am honoured and feel privileged to know. She stood by me at any moment and has supported me in any possible way. No words can express my gratitude to her.

Finally, last but not least, I owe a great deal of thanks and am indebted to my mother and father.

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INTRODUCTION

Chile, a country of 17 million people isolated by the formidable Andes mountains on a narrow and elongated strip of land running 2,650 miles into the far southern reaches of the earth, developed early on a distinctive political system that set it apart from its Latin American neighbours (Valenzuela, J. & Valenzuela, A., 2005: 501). Turkey, a transcontinental Eurasian country with a population of 79 million people, inherited a land that has hosted many civilizations throughout history and lies at the crossroads of continents and therefore carries significant geostrategic importance. Turkey controls the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea as Aydın states (2000: 165). Chile, a long and thin sash of land, *una larga y angosta faja de tierra*, as Chileans themselves often say (Collier & Sater, 2004: xix), on one side of the globe and Turkey, with an important geostrategic position located between Western Asia and Southeastern Europe which controls the entrance to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and borders the Caucasus and the Middle East, on the other.

The history of republican Turkey begins with the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923 as an independent nation-state. Turkey, as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, inherited the heartland of the former empire. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, recognized Turkey as an independent state, fixed its frontier, and applied to it principles and standards of 'the civilized world' (Mango, 2004: 387). After the First World War, the former Ottoman Empire territory was occupied by the victorious Allied states, which invoked the onset of the Turkish War of Independence. The decisive Turkish victory led

to the withdrawal of Allied forces and the establishment of a new Turkish state over a small piece of land on Europe and Anatolia. Following the War of Independence, the Lausanne Conference negotiations started between Turkey and the victorious countries of World War I. Since the beginning of this conference, the Turkish side tried to impose its existence as an independent and sovereign entity on other countries. With the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the foreign policy objectives established during the Turkish independence struggle were largely achieved.

During the colonial era, Chile was one of the most inaccessible realms within the Spanish empire. It was hemmed in by barren deserts in the north, the Andean *cordillera* (mountain range), and treacherous seas around Cape Horn to the south (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 268). Chile proclaimed independence from Spain on February 12, 1818. Upon independence, Chile emerged as the most stable and economically dynamic country among the South American countries. Chilean political life is the reason for the great interest in the country. Its stability was built on the strong presidential regime established by the 1833 constitution (Williamson, 1992: 485), which regulated the Chilean state for ninety-two years. Until the 1973 coup it was one of the oldest constitutional democracies in the world. Since 1833, with only two interruptions - a short but bloody civil war in 1891 and a period of military intervention and plebiscitarian rule between 1925 and 1932 - its political system followed regular constitutional procedures, respected the rule of law, and held periodic, contested elections for a bicameral legislature and a directly elected president (Sigmund, 2007:165).

Despite the geographic distance between both countries, a Treaty of Friendship was signed between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Turkey on January 30, 1926, which presents a remarkably early date, in the presence of the King of Italy in Rome. By signing this friendship

treaty, Chile became the first country in Latin America that recognized the young Turkish Republic with the 'Treaty of Friendship and a Consular Convention' Agreement. This treaty was signed by the ambassadors of both countries present in Rome, the Chilean Ambassador E. Villegas and the Turkish Ambassador Suad Bey. The official report recording the proceedings of the signatory session reveals details of the negotiations between the two ambassadors as follows:

Embassy of Chile in Italy

Act of the Session of 30th of January, 1926

The session was opened at eleven and half hours.

Attended: His Excellency Mr. Suad Bey, Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Turkey before His Majesty King of Italy and His Excellency Mr. Villegas, Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Chile before His Majesty King of Italy.

His Excellency Mr. Villegas: Declared that he is authorized for his Government to negotiate and sign a treaty of friendship with the Mister Delegate of the Republic of Turkey to establish and strengthen the ties of friendship and the commercial and economic relations between Turkey and Chile.

His Excellency Mr. Suad Bey: Responded that his Government is animated by this desire to develop good relations between Turkey and Chile and he is also authorized to negotiate and sign a treaty of friendship with the Mister Delegate of the Republic of Chile.

His Excellency Mr. Villegas: Proposed as the text of the new treaty, that of the Treaty of Friendship firm in Constantinople on the 28th of January, 1924 between the Turkish Republic and the Republic of Austria.

Likewise he proposed, it would be more beneficial for both governments to enter immediately in consular relations for the development of their economic relations, which constitutes the second article of this treaty, adding the word “and consular” after the words “diplomatic relations” and sign a Consular Convention also.

His Excellency Mr. Suad Bey: Replied that he accepts this proposal. Adds that the 3rd article of the Treaty between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Austria considers the subscription on the same day a commercial convention and a convention of establishment in the sight of replacing with that proposed by the 4th article.

His Excellency Mr. Villegas: I accept this proposal and we can pass to the signing of the Treaty.¹

By signing this treaty, Chile became the first country in Latin America that officially recognized the Republic of Turkey. The first diplomatic representation of the Turkish Republic in Latin America was opened in Chile’s capital Santiago on August 2, 1930 and was headed by charge d’affaires Kaya Alp. A consular section was established on the same premises. The Turkish representation briefly closed in 1931 due to financial reasons and started operating again

¹ Ministerio De Relaciones Exteriores De Chile, Secc. Diplomática Fol: 69. No: 4. 30/01/1926. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile.

on December 2, 1944. The Turkish diplomatic mission in Chile was raised to the embassy level in 1954. As for Chile, the first embassy of the Republic of Chile in Turkey began operating in Istanbul in 1939, then moved to Ankara in 1940 with Don Hector Briones Luco operating as its charge d'affaires. The first permanent ambassador of Chile was appointed in 1957. Archival research conducted at the Chilean Foreign Ministry in Santiago as part of this study led to the discovery of documents dated 1940 that noted the presence of a Chilean legation in Istanbul conducting limited correspondence. In 1955, the Chilean Honorary Consulate General opened in Istanbul, headed by Mr. Mordo Dinar until his death in March 2004.

This research aims at examining the processes undergone by Chile and Turkey that are geographically distant to each other in the light of their internal dynamics and to examine and investigate the diplomatic relations between these two countries and reveal (if any) their influences to each other. This research also aims at drawing attention to Chilean-Turkish relations that have not been a subject matter of scientific works so far, shedding light on this subject and setting an example to other academicians, who may be interested in this subject that he finds worthy to explain and investigate by scientific methods.

In the field of international relations, relations between two countries, or bilateralism, are composed of different areas that together form a unity of relations. The most important aspect among these established relations are the political relations between countries. Thus, countries first form diplomatic relations with each other and consequently open diplomatic missions mutually. Building relations between two countries on solid grounds is only possible by having ambassadors in each other's countries. Countries can follow their respective political developments and issues and thereby pave the way for other types of relations, such as cultural and commercial.

Some consider international relations as the diplomatic and strategic relations among states and the focus of international relations as war, peace, conflict, and cooperation issues. Others consider international relations as a bundle of any cross-border political, economic, cultural, and social relations. In general, the discipline of international relations scrutinizes attitudes and acts of states as well as transnational actors and tries to define relations, composed of these attitudes and acts, to estimate and explain them for the future.

The first relations between the Ottoman Empire, with Turkey as its heir, and the Latin American states began with the establishment of diplomatic contacts. These diplomatic relations were followed by commercial relations. In the period before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire made a breakthrough in opening consulates and aggregation, including an attempt to form consular relations with countries in the American continent, in exception of the United States. Consular agreements were signed with Cuba in 1903, and with Mexico and Argentina in 1910. The Ottoman Empire's official relations with Chile dates back to 1913.² As the Ottoman Empire and Chile signed a consular protocol in Madrid, the capital city of Spain, March 10, 1913 is considered to be the starting date of official relations between the two states (Aybay, 2009: 45).

The primary social and economic motivation behind the emergence of Ottoman-Latin American relations is the issue of migration (Kaygusuz, 2012: 279). Through the end of the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire faced numerous challenges to its survival, the Latin-American continent received intense migration from various regions of the empire. The

² Prior to the establishment of Turkish Republic, Chile enjoyed relations with the preceding Ottoman Empire. Based on the, General Directorate of State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (*Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü*), the Latin American Studies Institute at Ankara University's *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu-Latin Amerika (Başlangıç Dönemi)* (2012) provides a detailed and a unique summary of early Ottoman-Latin American relations. It demonstrates that the Ottoman administration likely was in correspondence with Chilean government as early as December 1910.

acceptance of immigrants due to Latin America's need of workforce and population led to a wave of immigration from Europe and the Ottoman geographies. Moreover, the internal conflicts, social turmoil and economic difficulties in the Middle East increased the rate of migratory movement from this region in particular. The migration of predominantly non-Muslim citizens of the empire forced the Ottoman state to turn their attention to the continent. As a result, a consular agreement regarding Chile became part of the empire's agenda and was prepared and signed in Madrid on March 10, 1913. Subsequently, the appointment of the first consul by the Chilean government to the Ottoman Empire institutionally started the official relations between the two states (Kaygusuz, 2012: 282).³

According to Kaygusuz, however, Ottoman interest in the Latin American continent actually dates back much earlier. A report found in the Ottoman archives at the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey showed that the developments in Latin America had been followed by the Ottoman Empire for a long period of time. The report in question is dated July 14, 1891 and evaluates the civil war that was then evolving in Chile. The report discusses the political situation in Chile in great detail, maintaining that unrest is generally avoided. Furthermore, it notably praises the military victories of Chile against Peru and Bolivia. This detail begs attention and special interest, for an interview with Admiral Arancibia Reyes revealed similarity between Chile and Turkey in this respect. Admiral Jorge Arancibia Reyes, former commander of the Chilean Naval Forces, former senator, and the Chilean Ambassador to Turkey between 2011 and 2014, stated that Turkey and her military achievements have always evoked admiration in Chile.

³ A point emphasized in correspondence between the Ottoman government and the Embassy of the Ottoman Empire in Madrid is that the consular agreement to be signed with Chile would, under no circumstances, include articles similar to capitulations under no circumstances and that the existing laws of international law would be abided by. Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, Political Section, Foreign Affairs File nr:77 / 30. Cited from Kaygusuz Özlem, 2012, p. 281.

He believed that the two countries both experienced difficult geographical conditions that have produced powerful people and Chile therefore feels closeness and sympathy towards the Turks.⁴

The political relations between Chile and Turkey have been uninterrupted since its inception and have not been discontinued even during the most bloody and contested events in the two states' political history. For instance, throughout the 17 years of the Pinochet era, unlike many Western countries that lowered their level of representation or closed their embassies, Turkey continued diplomatic operations throughout this troubled period of Chilean history. The Turkish Embassy maintained its diplomatic mission and representation at an embassy level. Moreover, Chile was the only Latin American country that made an official declaration and, from a distance, took a stance against the oppression of and violence against the people of Turkish origin in Bulgaria (Çevik, 2002: 60).

At present, Chilean diplomatic representation consists of an embassy and a consular section in Ankara. There are three honorary consulates of Chile in Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin. Furthermore, in 2006, a permanent Military Attaché was established in the Turkish capital.⁵

Although the diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey date back to an early period, the geographical distance between the two countries and the priority of different foreign policies led to a smooth but relatively stagnant course of relations. State visits had largely carried only symbolic value until Colonel Valdez, the undersecretary of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, paid a visit to Turkey in 1989. During his visit, the two countries' foreign ministries sat down for political consultations for the first time in history.

⁴ Personal communication, March 31, 2014.

⁵ He is the head of diplomatic mission to advise on the issues of the military function and represents the Ministry of Defense of Chile in protocol activities and liaison with the Ministry of Defense of Turkey. He also coordinates the link between the Joint Chiefs of Chile with the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey and thus also serves as a liaison and coordination between the institutions of the Armed Forces of both countries, in compliance with its program of cooperation, which include staff exchanges, attending courses, and professional visiting academic or specialized nature. <http://chileabroad.gov.cl/turquia/en/sobre-la-embajada/agregadurias/oficina-agricola-agregaduria/>

There has not been a direct political dispute between the two countries. With the beginning of the 1990s, it was observed that political relations gradually gained momentum. The number of reciprocal visits is constantly increasing. The visit of Süleyman Demirel, then president of the Republic of Turkey, to Chile in 1995 became a turning point in the history of bilateral relations, leaving a deep and positive mark on the Chilean nation.

The current political and economic stability in Chile is placing the country in a privileged position among the other Latin American countries, making it a reliable partner for Turkey in terms of international relations as well as political and commercial issues. Simultaneously, Chile considers Turkey as a country with significant political weight in the region and attaches particular importance to her Middle East policy. Primarily, the geographical location of Turkey as well as her historical relations with Middle Eastern countries and Central Asian republics are of great significance to Chile. In addition, Turkey's geographical proximity and her historical, cultural, and material connection to the Balkans increase Turkey's importance to Chile. Chile reiterates her support to Turkey's full membership to the European Union on every platform.

The year 2006 was declared the year of Latin America in Turkey. Under the leadership of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many activities and studies aimed at introducing the Latin American continent and making a contribution to the relations between the continent and Turkey, took place. About a decade earlier, in 1998, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had similarly implemented the 'Action Plan for Latin America' with the purpose of developing the relations between Latin America and Turkey in a more effective and efficient framework. The plan included the preparation of intergovernmental bilateral agreements to form the legal base of relations, introduction of Turkey in Latin America and also informing the decision-making bodies in Turkey about this region.

Another major aim of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's agenda in recent years is the preparation and signing of trade agreements with countries in the region, thus increasing the bilateral trade volume, and contribution to the Turkish business world and Turkish industry by investing on joint projects.⁶ Drawing on this point, the fact that the first free trade agreement by the Republic of Turkey in South America was signed with Chile is one of the important factors affecting the choice of this research topic.

Chile and Turkey are two countries that demonstrate similarities in their political trajectories, especially due to their political experiences in the second half of the 20th century. The military coups that took place in both countries brought along new constitutions as well as a transitional process to a free market economy. Chile, in particular, had acted as a laboratory in this respect. Economic changes and transformations that are very difficult to realize in a democratic regime could be implemented without any objection under the pressure created by the military takeover. This gains particular credibility when comparing both countries' economic transformations and foreign policy aims after the coups that took place in Chile on September 11, 1973, and in Turkey on September 12, 1980.

At first glance, the countries' vastly different geographical locations may infer that Chile and Turkey attach importance to different economic, political, and social alliances/partnerships and international organizations. For example, for Chile, APEC, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, is of vital importance. At a meeting held at the Embassy of the Republic of Chile in Ankara in February 2014, Embassy Consul Sebastian Marin, serving as an interim Ambassador, put specific emphasis on this issue. Similarly, during the negotiations held at the Ministry of

⁶ Ankara University, Latin America Studies, Research and Application Center (LAMER) has a valuable work on this issue, *Latin Amerika Çalıştayı-Bildiriler Kitabı (22-23 Kasım 2012, Ankara)*, 2013.

Foreign Affairs in Chile, this issue was pointed out. To give an example, Chile's largest trade partner is not in the European Union, but the Asia Pacific region.

As for Turkey, the EU membership continues to be a very important target. At the same time, the present political and economic relations with the European Union and NATO play a crucial role in terms of demonstrating a part of the region that Turkey identifies as her habitat. Within the framework of Turkey's foreign policy initiatives in recent years, it is seen that the country attaches importance to the whole continent of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as well.

As a result of the changes in the international political scene and their effects on social life, especially after 1990, Chile and Turkey experienced significant changes in their communities, and as a result decided to change and re-shape the foreign policies they constructed. Both countries have focused on rearranging their foreign policies according to new axes. While Chile has particularly intensified its relations with Southeast Asian countries, Turkey has turned almost all her attention to Central Asia and the Balkans. One reason for this, in terms of Turkey, is that the geographies in question share historical, social, and religious ties with Turkey. As a result of these century-long relations, Turkey directed her attention to these regions throughout almost all of the 1990s while continuing full membership negotiations with the European Union and the customs union.

While Turkey was experiencing these developments, she also turned her attention to Latin America in terms of the changing perceptions of foreign policy and priorities. In 1995, the incumbent president paid an extensive visit to Latin America, including Chile. This was the first visit between the two countries at the presidential level. Over the last ten years, by following a multi-dimensional foreign policy, Turkey has pursued a more active policy towards the Latin American continent aiming to expand and fortify her relations. In this regard, in order to define

how and in which areas Turkey's relations with Latin American and the Caribbean countries can be enhanced, several meetings were held in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of Turkish Ambassadors in Latin America. At the conclusion of these meetings the 'Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean' was prepared and put into effect. It was a road map for political and economic openings to the region.⁷

In 1998, Turkey implemented the 'Action Plan for Latin America'. As a result of the significant intensification of relations with the region, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared the year 2006 as 'the Year of Latin America and Caribbean'. In this context, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade and Economy, representatives of the business organizations, and academicians from the region were invited and had contacts with Turkish government institutions and private sector representatives during 'the Latin American and Caribbean week' which was organized in Istanbul and Ankara between 5 and 11 June 2006.⁸

In line with Turkey's multi-sided foreign policy objectives and its vision to build upon the opportunities the Latin American region provides, Turkey gives priority to the exchange of high level visits and meetings in order to strengthen political and economic relations with countries of the region. Strategies included concluding trade, economic, military, cultural, and technical cooperation agreements to solidify the existing legal framework, establishing business councils, participating at fairs, initiating promotional activities to increase trade and enlarging diplomatic representation and cultural interaction to ensure better and more accurate presentation. In this framework, mutual high level visits between Turkey and countries of the region have gained momentum. Since 2009, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and St. Vincent and Grenadines and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-american-and-the-caribbean-countries.en.mfa

Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela have visited Turkey, whereas Turkey's prime minister has visited Mexico and Brazil, and foreign minister has paid a visit to Brazil. During this period, political consultations have been conducted with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela.⁹

The number of Turkish diplomatic representation in the Latin American countries has increased and efforts are underway for more. In this regard, Turkish embassies in Bogota, Colombia and Lima, Peru became operational in February and March 2010 respectively, increasing the number of the Turkish embassies in the region to eight. The Turkish Consulate General in Sao Paulo, Brazil became operational in November 2009. The Turkish embassy in Quito, Ecuador opened in 2012. Latin American countries have reciprocated by increasing their representations in Turkey. With the establishment of the Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and Colombian embassies in Ankara, the number of Latin American Embassies in Turkey has reached nine.

Turkey's Honorary Consuls in the region are also promoting and representing Turkey as well as promulgating the issues that are important for Turkish foreign policy. While the number of Turkey's Honorary Consuls in the region is currently 29, the countries of the region have 25 Honorary Consuls in Turkey.¹⁰

Chile considers Turkey a significant country with a stable, constantly growing economy in its region and a developing, enriching foreign policy perspective. At the same time, Turkey is in a central logistic position regarding the supply of Chile's export products to the markets of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Likewise, Turkey recognizes Chile as a high-potential commercial partner due to its stability and rapidly developing economy. As a result of the implementation of mutually reinforcing foreign policies, Chile and Turkey signed a free trade

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

agreement in 2009. Chile is the first country in Latin America with which Turkey signed a free trade agreement. The signing ceremony was held under the patronage of President Michelle Bachelet at the La Moneda Presidential Palace as a sign of the importance the Chilean government attaches to the issue.

The author of this thesis originally became interested to Chile while visiting the country regularly between 2008 and 2011. This interest was intensified with the author's attendance of the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement ceremony between Chile and Turkey held at La Moneda Palace, under cover of the President of Chile Michelle Bachelet Jeria. In fact, this ceremony became the very starting point of the author's doctoral research. After the signing ceremony, the president invited a small group of representatives, including the author, to a celebratory reception. In a brief conversation, the president asked the author about his occupation and, learning that he recently started a doctoral programme, suggested that he could, in fact, study Chilean-Turkish relations. The following six years, the author has conducted formal interviews with significant Chilean political and Chilean and Turkish diplomatic actors, who played a crucial role in strengthening Chilean-Turkish relationships, including the honorary head of the Chilean diplomatic academy, ambassador Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago Concha who worked with eleven Chilean presidents; former Chilean ambassadors to Turkey Jorge Arancibia Reyes, Fransisco Marambio Vial and Luis Palma; deputy head of the mission and consul of Chile Sebastian Marin; Enrique Accorsi the former head of Chile-Turkey inter-parliamentary friendship group; the former Turkish ambassador served in Santiago Ayşenur Alpaslan; ambassador Selçuk Ünal the former minister plenipotentiary and special adviser to the Turkish foreign minister; Ahmet Sadık Doğan the deputy director of the Americas; ambassador Naciye Gökçen Kaya.

According to the author's knowledge, a doctoral dissertation that aims to study the political, diplomatic relations between the two countries and the historical development of these relations in terms of international relations and political science has not been written so far. Therefore, as a topic that has not yet been academically studied at the doctoral level and whose significance has remained unnoticed except for diplomats paying attention simple due to their profession, the history of Chilean and Turkish relationships, by following official diplomatic documents, has been chosen as the subject of this research.

A dissertation presents a 'meaningful work' in the sense that it makes an original contribution to the field. As Umberto Eco states, "...the dissertation is a piece of original research, in which one must not only know the work of other scholars but also 'discover' something that other scholars have not yet said" (Eco, 2015: 2). This research aims to provide a retrospective look at the beginning of the diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey, a unique, early relationship, and how it has developed up to the present by considering the current level of the relations between two countries.

The purpose of this thesis is to detail and analyse the evolution of diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey by considering international political developments and the transition of both countries to democracy, under the influence of the international political environment as well. This research is examining and interpreting the diplomatic and political relations between Turkey and Chile in a historical process. The mutual perspective of the two countries and their policies implemented towards one another will be evaluated in the same way. During this research, the two countries' foreign policy development processes will be investigated together with their causes. While studying the relations between Chile and Turkey, this dissertation will also try to analyse and interpret the external political developments in both countries as well as

the events that have affected or are likely to affect the relations between the two countries within international relations and political science approaches. In short, this research aims to explain diplomatic, political, and social course of the relations between Chile and Turkey within a historical process by taking into account the global political and social developments.¹¹

The dissertation attempts to reveal the fact that the low-intensity but smooth relations between Chile and Turkey gained significant momentum after the mid-1990s. This is one of the reasons why the researcher focused on this topic for a dissertation project. In spite of the geographical distance, both countries have demonstrated a strong will to develop and strengthen bilateral relations and, up to this day, still continue their determined attitude towards this purpose.

Within this research, it is also aimed to evaluate both countries' agendas, and the effects of domestic social and political developments in a specific time span. It is a fact that countries' political agendas designate their foreign policies and shape the characters of their relationship with other countries. In this study, it is argued that foreign policies of countries and the decision-making processes are affected by their domestic political agenda. Therefore, the researcher will not only analyse the political relations by categorising different periods but also try to highlight significant political and social events in both countries in the period in question.

There are several ways to analyse and comment on relations between countries, for example countries as different and as geographically far apart as Chile and Turkey. One approach might be to highlight geopolitical issues focusing on Chile and Turkey's strategic

¹¹ The researcher of this study has been travelling to Chile since the year 2008. The researcher's personal interest in Chile for many years reached up to the point of holding his wedding ceremony at the Turkish Embassy in Santiago which became the first step of a long journey. Upon the invitation of the Turkish ambassador to Chile of the period, the researcher participated in the Free Trade Agreement ceremony held at ministerial level between the official delegations of the two countries at La Moneda palace in 2009. During the ceremony held in Chile under the auspices of President Michelle Bachelet and at the following reception, the idea of a dissertation research focusing on the bilateral relations of the two countries emerged. The personal friendships and contacts the researcher developed throughout his travels to Chile, which is a quite remote geography from Turkey, has provided indescribable benefits.

locations. Another might be to focus on historical issues such as migration or an echoed struggle for independence. Finally, one approach might concentrate on national interest, including diplomatic recognition in international relations. In this dissertation, the researcher takes a multi-dimensional approach to the study of diplomatic history centring official diplomatic correspondence from and between Chile and Turkey. The researcher believes that these original records hold a unique value in revealing historical and geopolitical issues as well as the countries' interest to be recognized internationally. Rather than focusing on certain geopolitical or historical developments and seeking sources about them, the dissertation reveals these developments *through* a careful analysis of the documents themselves. Thus, this research positions the original documents, taken from both the Chilean and Turkish state archives, as the starting point, the core of this study, and thereby presents a unique analysis of Chilean-Turkish diplomatic relations as it has not been attempted before.

One can not understand people's thoughts and attitudes without proper knowledge about the historical events of the time. Therefore this dissertation dedicates attention to Chile and Turkey's history of foreign politics since the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1926 and as such presents the reader with the necessary context to understand the discussed documents.

1.1 Research Details

As the topic of this research, the political and diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey with specific attention to its improved development until today is investigated using different but complementary research methods and social research techniques. Namely, these methods are: archival research, carried out in both countries; literature review; data collected from publicly available sources; and interviews conducted with persons with political and

diplomatic identities, who have played an important role in the relations between the two countries.

Official diplomatic documents are at the centre of this research. Due to a lack of scholarly literature on early Chilean-Turkish state relations, the researcher aims to enlighten this diplomatic history through the original diplomatic texts themselves. Furthermore the researcher believes that these official diplomatic documents and reports carry a unique value since they offer a first hand perspective directly through the eyes of both sides' ambassadors¹² and representatives. In his discussion of diplomatic history, Kedourie draws on the words of G.M. Young, author of *The Diplomatic History*, and – somewhat mockingly - describes diplomatic history as “the record what one clerk said to an another clerk” (1979: 502). At the same time, he believed that in the study of history it is important to observe “not what happens but what people felt about it when it was happening” (Kedourie, 1979: 502). In a similar vein the researcher thinks that not just the historical events but the authors of the original documents - in this case, ambassadors, diplomats, other state representatives – and the people's attitudes towards them are critical in studying diplomatic history. For this reason, the referenced official documents are crucial in giving an impression of the time period, or *Zeitgeist*.

The archival documents which will serve as reference for this study were obtained from the archives of the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the archives of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the archives of the Diplomatic Academy of Chile.¹³

These archival resources generally consist of the correspondence of the Turkish and Chilean

¹² Every state maintains a network of diplomatic missions abroad, one in each state with which it conducts relations; it also acts as host for similar missions sent by other states. Each mission abroad is led by a 'chief of mission' usually titled 'ambassador'. His function is multiple: he represents his state before the host government, he acts as a channel of communication, he reports information to his own government, he performs a public relations task for his state before the people of his host country, he maintains contact with his own nationals who are subject to jurisdiction of his host country, and he may sometimes conduct negotiations (Lerche and Said, 1970: 43-44).

¹³The original names of the archives: Archivo General Historico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile and Ministerio De Relaciones Exteriores, Academia Diplomatica de Chile.

diplomatic missions and embassies and the country reports they send to their capitals. In most cases they are complementary. Among the documents in the archive of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, the ones dated after the year 2005 were not open to research during the researcher's first archive visit in 2014.

During his second archive trip to Chile, the researcher was able to reach almost all collections of the Turkey section the documents written until the year 2007. As for the Turkish diplomatic archives, the documents were obtained from the Central Archive Headquarters at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Since the documents belonging to the Turkish Foreign Ministry were declassified up to 1980, only these documents dating until 1981 could be accessed. State documents that have been written since continue to be inaccessible for research purposes. In fact, the Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives are generally closed to researchers. The researcher had access only to the Chilean section thanks to Selçuk Ünal, currently Turkish Ambassador to Canada, who at the time was acting as the special adviser to the Turkish Foreign Minister.^{14, 15} As for the documentation regarding Chile, it was possible to reach confidential documents which were classified as secret documents dated until 1999. The only thing of notice was that for a short period of time following September 11, 1973, namely the Chilean military coup, a number of documents were removed. A similar case was also observed in the practices of the Chilean Embassies in other countries as they sent documents to Santiago regarding the country reports classified as special documents.

¹⁴ Şuhnaz Yılmaz who wrote her PhD dissertation at Princeton on Turkish-American Relations 1800-1952, similarly mentions her gratitude for getting access to the related part of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives thanks to the then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem which proved to be invaluable resource to her work.

¹⁵ The difficulty in accessing Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives is also discussed in detail in Engin Berber's *Türk Dış Politikası Çalışmaları-Cumhuriyet Dönemi İçin Ulusal Rehber* (2012), a guide for those studying diplomacy and foreign politics in Turkey. Berber's book provides an index of valuable resources and where to find them.

Since access to archival documents was limited up to 2007 and 1981, for Chile and Turkey respectively, the final chapter of the thesis follows a different path. Due to the absence of Turkish archival documents after 1981, this section relies on more heavily on Chilean sources as well as alternative sources such as media coverage, interviews and other public texts.

During the archival work conducted for this research, it was seen that the officials of the two countries reported to their centre very detailed information about the other country and its political developments with great attention although neither bilateral agreements were signed nor high-level reciprocal visits were paid between the two countries over the years. The reports sent by the embassies of both countries to their capitals did not only describe the developments in that country but also included information on the country's contact with her neighbours and regional problems.

With this research the author is not solely interested in the content of the diplomatic reports but more importantly tries to understand the purpose of the document and the interpretation of the evidences provided. We can see that the political context of the time of writing has at times impacted the language of the diplomatic reports/documents.

It could be argued that the detailed contents of the reports sent by the embassies of both countries to their capitals were not reflected in the relations between the two countries for a long time. Throughout this time period, which coincided with the Cold War era, the relations between the two countries did not improve; however, they continued smoothly and were void of any conflicts or interruptions. In a period when the political climate in the world was dominated by blocks, the potential between the two countries could not be utilized sufficiently. Turkey, particularly in the period following World War II, implemented block policy regarding her international affairs and was thus limited in putting forth an independent foreign policy except

for certain issues such as the Cyprus case. On the other hand, Chile occupied a temporary space in the international arena with a distinct character as a result of its experience in the early 1970s, creating its own area of movement. However, this period did not last long and following the September 11, 1973 military coup, Chile too got involved in the block policy regarding her international relations. The period following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War witnessed a different course of the relations between the two countries with significantly increasing and improved activity between Chile and Turkey.

In addition to these written documents of diplomatic significance, one-on-one interviews have been conducted with persons who have played an important role on the relation between the two countries in recent years. These interviews have been recorded and used in the relevant sections of the dissertation. Naturally, the most obvious figures were the employees of the diplomatic missions, and specifically the ambassadors, of the two countries, but the researcher also spoke with other political and academic actors for a more comprehensive view. Interviews were conducted with the ambassadors of Chile who had previously served in Ankara, the political capital of Turkey, and the Turkish ambassadors who had served in Santiago, the capital city of Chile. In addition to these diplomatic figures, in-person interviews were also conducted with persons who played a role in the bilateral relations of the two countries and who were directly related with the construction and implementation of foreign policies. One of the most important interviews was with Mr. Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago de Concha, former ambassador, statesman, diplomatic coordinator of the National Congress, and adviser on diplomatic issues of eleven Presidents of Chile. Mr. Fontecilla, being responsible for foreign policy development of the Chilean Presidency and who is still the President of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Diplomacy Academy, provided invaluable insights and – as expected from an

experienced diplomat – every single sentence of him was of relevance to our discussion. Just to give an example, Mr. Fontecilla stated that Turkey has demanded a copy of the 1981 constitution prepared by the military government of Chile and approved in a popular plebiscite in 1980 in the process of drafting the new Turkish constitution following the 1980 coup.

The author found that diplomatic documents belonging to the Foreign Ministry of Chile since the end of the First World War are not only stored in the Historical Archive of the Chilean Foreign Ministry but also the National Archive of Chile. Even the staff of the Foreign Ministry themselves were not aware of the location of all diplomatic records, yet the researcher found a set of valuable records in the National Archive. It appeared there are no clear criteria regarding storage; documents pertaining to the same issue from the same time period were divided between the two archives without any cross-reference. Interestingly, the collection in the National Archive contains a wider range of documents sent from the various foreign diplomatic missions to the Chilean Foreign Ministry than the Historical Archive of the Foreign Ministry - including those prepared by the Turkish Embassy in Chile. The author wants to stress that it remains unclear how and why the documents were divided between the two archives.

1.2 Chapter Overview

The research aims to realize a projection on both countries' relations based on Chilean and Turkish diplomatic correspondences sent to their own capital cities by their diplomatic representatives. The chapters are organized largely chronologically, with specific attention to the period following the Second World War.

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 aims to give information about the diplomatic recognition within the context of international law. Subsequently, the text continues by providing

a brief overview of diplomatic relations essentials and the study of diplomatic history. In doing so, this part places an emphasis on newly founded countries' foreign policies.

Chapter 3 opens with general information about both Chile and Turkey. It introduces the period which starts with the foundation of Chile as a republic until the signature of the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey in 1926, encompassing the foundation of the Republic of Chile, the proclamation of independence from Spain, the writing of the first constitution, and the foundation and the functioning of social and political institutions from the 1800s until the First World War. This chapter also shortly evaluates the foundation of Republic of Turkey and the early years of the young republic, including an overview to the Turkish foreign policy¹⁶ of the new born Turkish republic. The period following 1926, developments of both countries and their relationships with each other are examined correspondingly.

Chapter 4 includes the period which extends from the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between Chile and Turkey until the end of Second World War. This part covers reports and messages between the first Turkish Embassy in Latin America in Santiago de Chile and the Foreign Ministry in Ankara. Then, it comprises messages from the Turkish Embassy which continued functioning from Buenos Aires, Argentina for a certain time. Furthermore, the chapter explores the foundation of Chilean Delegation of Istanbul, then its transfer to Ankara, and diplomatic reports sent to Chile about Turkey and the neighbouring region as well as the both countries' foreign politics during the during the Second World War.

¹⁶ A brief definition of foreign policy from Hill (2003: 3) is useful in this context: "Foreign policy is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. The phrase an independent actor enables the inclusion of phenomena such as the European Union; external relations are official to allow the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanisms of the state or enterprise while also maintaining parsimony with respect to the vast number of international transactions now being conducted; policy is the sum of these official relations because otherwise every particular action could be seen as a separate foreign policy whereas actors usually seek some degree of coherence towards the outside World."

Chapter 5 examines worldwide developments affected by the end of Second World War in regard to these two countries. This chapter includes the period until the fall of Berlin Wall which is considered as the end of Cold War. Both countries' political and social situation just after the Second World War are explained and Turkey and Chile's diplomatic representation level are put into light by documents achieved during the archive researches.

Furthermore chapter 5 discusses 1950 Turkey's Elections, the change of government, the inclusion of Turkey to Korean War and Turkey's NATO membership as well as the civil political developments of Chile. Thereby, both countries perspective to internal and external political agenda and their attitude towards the Cold War are respectively examined. Turkey's special ties and relations with the US were an important factor shaping Turkey's Latin America policy and Turkey's relations with Chile especially during the Cold War era. Cuban crisis, the Allende¹⁷ government and its background, Turkey's 1960 and 1970 military interventions are evaluated in parallel. Chilean September 11, 1973 military coup is one of the main part of Chapter 5. Turkey's difficulty to establish the political and social stability in 1970's are explained as well as the military coup of September 12, 1980. To better clarify this chapter and to exhibit Chilean concern about Turkey and the internal political environment which was under the influence of political violence, Cyprus issue, political developments around Middle East are evaluated under the lights of Chilean diplomatic documents written by the Embassy of Chile in Ankara. The diplomatic documents emphasizing on the Kurdish issue for the first time belongs to this period.

¹⁷ Clark V., who wrote the life of Allende in his book *Salvador Allende-Revolutionary Democrat* as a short critical biography, defines Chile as follows: Chile, the land of Salvador Allende's birth, is a long and narrow country that stretches 5,000 kilometres from the desert border with Peru down through a warm central region, onwards through a temperate southern zone where it begins to break up into islands and fjords. Far to the South, a short distance from Antarctica, it ends in the windswept and rainy plains of Tierra del Fuego. Isolated from the rest of Latin America by deserts and the mountainous spine formed by the high Andes and facing the vastness of the Southern Pacific Ocean (2013: 7).

Chapter 6 includes the diplomatic relationship between Chile and Turkey as a process beginning with the fall of Berlin Wall in 1990 until the present day (2016). Within this period, the end of the Cold War, both countries' national and international political developments, specifically the end of Pinochet years in Chile, are examined within the contemporary political agenda. This period is specified by the acceleration of political and diplomatic relationship of both sides. As the Cold War came to an end, Turkish decision-makers, no longer limited by the geopolitical frame set by bloc politics, changed course and adopted some new foreign policy strategies. Foreign policy objectives, which had previously been centred on Europe and North America, increasingly shifted their focus to Central Asia, the Balkans, as well as other geographies. Also Latin-America, the Far East, and North Africa gained greater importance in Turkish foreign politics. Accordingly, this chapter also includes both countries' presidential visits, mutual signed agreements and treaties descriptions and examinations. It also tries to investigate political developments in both countries and global politics on an international scale as well as their effects on their foreign policy making processes. Additionally this chapter covers the period of changing priorities of both countries' foreign policies in contrast to Cold War era. Within this chapter, interviews with both countries' ambassadors who served in Ankara and Santiago take place in a chronological order. The chapter ends with the summary of current Chile and Turkey relations.

The conclusion evaluates the research broadly. The final chapter provides an overall assessment of the current state of the relationship between Chile and Turkey. The importance of both countries' foreign ministries archival documents are interpreted by the help of interviews with key figures, people played important roles in both countries diplomatic relations with each other. Thereby the conclusion puts into light the strength and weaknesses of this thesis research.

The unique and characterizing facets of Chile and Turkey's diplomatic relations founded after the World War I are discussed by emphasizing their geographical and 'lebensraum'¹⁸ distinctions. The Republic of Turkey, descendent of Ottoman Empire, started its political relations with Chile by the inheritors of Ottoman Empire who immigrated to Latin America. These processes are examined within the research following the foundation of Republic of Turkey as well as the changing political environment. Since there has not been written any doctorate level research covering this theme, this research seems to be a primary and pathfinder example for academic purpose. Therefore this research is able to enlighten further researches.

In order to learn and discover how the young Turkish Republic build its presence in the international arena by constructing diplomatic relations with other states after her independence, one has to know *what* really happened in the past in order to make useful judgements about it. In this case, an examination of Chilean-Turkish diplomatic relations provides a key example in the young Turkish republic's attempt and desire to be recognized internationally, establishing relations even to the most remote geographies.

¹⁸ The term "Lebensraum" was first used in its classic sense in the 1890's by the renowned Leipzig University geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). Ratzel defined Lebensraum as the geographical surface area required to support a living species at its current population size and mode of existence. The history of any species, including man, was thus the story of its changing patterns of adaptation of its Lebensraum. A state for example was simply the result of a particular people's adaptation to an environment. The form that a state or an entire culture took was therefore shaped by the relationship to Lebensraum and the struggle for it. Smith, W. D. (1980). Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum, *German Studies Review*, Vol.3, No.1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 51-68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1429483?seq=3#page_scan_tab_contents

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Theoretical Approach

2.1.1 Foreign policy.

The relation between foreign policy and international politics is one closely interlinked. Namely, the framing and formulating foreign policy, in particular objectives and capacity, considers the contemporary international political environment. Then, as these policies invite a response or feedback, they are again recalculated and revised from its implementers to the decision-makers (Rosenau, 1961: 14). Rosenau has argued the foundations of the study of international politics as follows. Firstly, one cannot understand international politics without an understanding of states' foreign policies. Secondly, these foreign policies in turn require an understanding of the history and governmental structure of the actors involved. In order to understand history of governance, we must understand the social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the respective societies. Thus, studying international politics ultimately requires studying domestic politics, as well as economy, culture, and society (Rosenau, 1961: 13-14).

An international political relationship takes place and formalizes when “policies of two or more states are brought into contact; when they are discussed, debated, argued, compromised; when representatives of two or more states interact and (attempt to) affect one another’s policies” (Rosenau, 1961: 15). Bilateral diplomacy is a significant figure of the system of international relations in a sense that the relations of a pair of countries with each other. Bilateral diplomacy is an important mechanism in developing and fortifying relations between states. The main focus of bilateral diplomacy is to provide political relations. Bilateral diplomacy is the act

when one state opens and retains an embassy in the capital city of another state. In the case of bilateral relations between nations (states) that recognise each other but whose interests are just in different spheres, the frequency and intensity of interactions can become slower and more predictable. They will both “be members of the international community and therefore may be actively seeking the other’s support in matters relations to multinational diplomacy. They will each know that there may come some future time when they will need to call on each other for support” (Langholtz, 2004, 9).¹⁹

The sphere of foreign policy is often used to solve problems in internal politics. This necessarily implies that the realm of foreign policy is seen as secondary to the sphere of domestic politics, and the international consequences of the actions that a government takes are seen as of less direct importance to itself than those consequences that most nearly touch its citizens (Calvert, 1986: 14). The foremost purpose of foreign policy is to protect a country’s independence and sovereignty over the pieces of land it reigns with its diplomatic ability. Generally, it is difficult or impossible to affect external dynamic factors. Hence, it is mostly more reasonable to try to affect internal dynamic factors when it is intended to have an impact on the reasons of an incident. It is necessary to look at the interrelations of domestic and foreign politics of the country so as to understand the reasons of an incident. The rule here is that foreign politics is determined by the order in the domestic politics in general terms. Besides this, it is possible to say that security concerns geopolitical structure brings in, that is foreign policy concerns, affect domestic politics especially at extraordinary times.

There are a number of factors that direct a country’s foreign policy. It is widely accepted that a country’s geographical position is one of the most important of these, since it impacts national strength. Geography is not only the physical territory a state inhabits, but also offers

¹⁹ *The Psychology of Diplomacy*, Ed. Harvey Langholtz and Chris E. Stout, 2004.

continual specifications that seriously affect a country's foreign policy, such as natural and raw sources, access to water, etc. These all inform the strategic design and subsequent implementation of international politics. It is said that a country's potential national strength is an important indicator of her efficacy in foreign policy. More concretely, her military capacity will shape and direct foreign policy. This capacity is a product of a set of parameters, such as historical background, cultural values, geographical position, demographics, and economic power. Each of these establishes a limited framework in which foreign policy will be deliberated. Military capacity functions as a deterrent force against external threats and is a strategic tool in furthering national interest (Mor, 2016: 117).

Not states, but governments are ultimately responsible for the formulation of policy. Both domestic and foreign policy is made under pressure of numerous internal as well as external factors, including but not limited to the structure of government, international events, and a continuous information flow. Foreign policy making is both an institutionalized and highly organizational process, particularly in the developed world, where "it is extremely rare for foreign policy decisions to be the responsibility of a single individual, or a small group. The need for information, interpretation and advice, and the necessity of coordinating policies between different areas and different ministries, involve a larger number of men and agencies in the evolution of policy" (Wallace, 1971: 26). Foreign policy is not simply the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, but also relies on government intelligence agencies, other ministerial departments such as defence and trade, and the central decision-making organ.

In the creation of policy, a government considers its position, status, and role in the world, the available resources, and its national interests and objectives abroad, which each direct the degree of importance given to other governments' statements and actions. The latter term,

national interest, has garnered political and academic attention alike. For politicians, it legitimizes their actions and objectives and can be used to discredit opposition. Critics of a certain policy may reveal a decision-maker as disloyal, working in favour of some external, international morality rather than 'national interest'. Indeed, the documents written by Chilean and Turkish diplomats that form the core of this research directly illustrate and are a product of the dominance of the concept of 'national interest'. The term implies the existence of a list of relatively permanent foreign policy goals that can easily be identified and understood by both politician and public. Yet, the actual definition of the national interest constitutes a true challenge and a subject of (academic discussion). On this topic, Morgenthau expressed that "political realism' is to be found in the 'concept of interest defined in terms of power'" where power is "in practice not merely a goal but is also a means to an end", used to further other goals (Wallace, 1971: 31). These goals are most fundamentally national survival and national security, but also involve economic objectives and international status.

Turkey's foreign policy has been and continues to be in part shaped by its geographical location. As Aydin quotes Rosenau, Turkey's position "contributes both to the psychological environment through which officials and publics define their links to the external world and the operational environment out of which their dependence on other countries fashioned" (Kedourie, 2000: 157). Turkey, located at a crossroads between Asia, Europe and the Middle East, thus sheds light on the extent to which a country's foreign policy is determined by its geography. Situated at the nexus of major air, land and sea routes, Turkey was also in the middle of the Cold War fronts, both wishing to expand their spheres of influence in the Mediterranean. Despite many changes in Turkey's domestic sphere her geographical importance always remained and today the strategical importance of Turkey is growing because instability in the region.

2.1.2 The difference between diplomacy and foreign policy.

A common misunderstanding persists that sees diplomacy studies as a subfield of foreign policy analysis. However, diplomacy studies is a distinct, although interrelated, field from foreign policy analysis, studying political actors' approach to foreign policy²⁰ 1) *after* it has been formulated rather than during its making and 2) on an *international* rather than domestic level. That said, diplomacy remains a highly interdisciplinary field of study with connections to international relations, history, economics, law, philosophy, and sociology. Okman defines foreign policy as the intended declinations to the external environment as well as the methods and techniques used to this end. In this sense, foreign policy is, he says, a general process which spans the negotiations in the international arena and, more specifically, is the art and science of diplomatic bargaining (i.e. negotiations), known as diplomacy (2010: 15). In other words, diplomacy is a part of and highly correlated with foreign policy, but diplomacy is not equal to nor simply an interpretation of foreign policy. Studies of diplomacy are gained from an understanding of how policies are formulated, no matter whether this formulation takes place on the domestic level only or whether there is input from the international level as well. Hedley Bull (1995) had it exactly right when he argued that the study of diplomacy has to pay attention to policy formation (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2013: 6).

²⁰ Lerche and Said (1970) defines the "foreign policy" of a state as the general principles by which a state governs its reaction to the international environment. A policy always involves both *decision* and *action*, with decision perhaps the more important ingredient. The formalized decision (the "policy paper") normally includes at least three elements of clarification and guidance for anyone concerned with its implementation: (1) formulation of the objective in the most precise terms possible; (2) the nature off the action to be undertaken, stated with sufficient clarity to guide and direct the state's other officials; and (3) the forms and perhaps the amounts of national power to be applied in pursuit of the objective (p.31).

Diplomacy²¹ as a method of communication between various parties, including negotiations between recognised agents, is an ancient institution and international legal provisions governing its manifestations are the result of centuries of state practice (Shaw, 1997: 751). For Bjola and Kornprobst diplomacy is the institutionalised communication among internationally recognised representatives of internationally recognised entities through which these representatives produce, manage, and distribute public goods (2013: 4). Diplomacy is an instrument of statecraft. How statecraft is used towards the outside world is expressed in a country's foreign policy (Kleiner, 2010: 1). Diplomacy is used to manage the goals of foreign policy. But as Neack (2008: 9) reminds us, "the study of foreign policy, however needs to consider more than what states declare to be their goals and how they attempt to achieve them. The study of foreign policy needs to consider how certain goals arise and why certain behaviours result". More specifically diplomatic communication, as internal and classified information, can shed light on the motivations and decision making process behind the publicly stated foreign policy goals.

Diplomacy has always been a privileged aspect of general systems of information gathering, representation, and negotiation. In this sense, it is not the approach enshrined in the classic analysis by the British diplomat Sir Ernest Satow, who retired in 1906. He defined diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their reactions with vassal

²¹ The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics briefly describes diplomacy as follows: Diplomacy originated in the system of conducting relations between the states of classical Greece. It revived in medieval Europe and grew in importance in the relations between the city states of Renaissance Italy and the emerging states of post-Reformation Europe. The Congress of Vienna, 1815, regularized a system of permanent diplomacy between states. The great powers exchanged embassies and ambassadors, while relations involving smaller powers were conducted through legations and ministers. A recognized diplomatic profession developed, characterized by the aristocracy of its members and the secrecy of its methods. After the First World War more open or 'democratic' diplomacy flourished for a short while. At the end of the Second World War the distinction between embassies and legations was abandoned, and ambassadors proliferated, especially when new states were formed from the European colonies.

states, or more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means (Satow, 1917). One important aspect of diplomacy – and inherent in its nature – is the collecting, gathering of information. Diplomacy became an invaluable tool in the hands of states to establish their own security and subsequently “diplomacy was designed to use force to ensure profit” (Black, 2012: 5) for the state. Receiving, collecting, and processing every kind of accurate information is fundamental to the success of any diplomatic system of a state, of an entity. Where diplomacy is integral to information-gathering, and also representation, it does not serve as the sole means. Certainly part of diplomatic history must be to explain how far these processes have been conducted through or under the control of the formal foreign policy mechanisms (Black, 2012: 11).

As far as content is concerned diplomacy is a dependent variable of foreign policy. Diplomatic work proceeds along the same norms, rules, and practices that are appropriate to reach the target (Kleiner, 2010: 1). Diplomacy strives to realize foreign policy aims. It distinctly attempts to reach these goals through communication. As in the Chilean-Turkish case, both countries declared their readiness and willingness to communicate and thus to enter diplomatic relations; in other words, the diplomatic relationship required, first, communication, contact, between the two states. A distinct form of communication is negotiation. Negotiation means reaching an agreement or compromise by discussion, most evidently demonstrated in the form of a bilateral treaty. Negotiation – and thus the job of the diplomat – is easy when both parties have shared or similar interests.

Diplomatic communication is highly institutionalised not only because of the official natural agents involved such as ministries and embassies but also because of the norms and rules to which these agents are subjected. Communication in this sense refers to a dialogue between

governmental and non-governmental actors, who each must be recognised. Although traditionally limited to states such recognition today also includes non-state actors such as the UN Secretariat or INGOs. Who is and is not recognised continually changes due to the political, economic, and social agenda of a certain historical period. Moreover, the traditional concept of declaratory recognition, i.e. through treaties as the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, has proven insufficient. Entities like Northern Cyprus, Palestine, and Crimea who meet the official terms of state sovereignty but do not enjoy full legal personality, have prompted the constitutive theory of statehood, which argues the need to acquire consent for the creation of a state as well as its inclusion in international law. Without such collective recognition, then, states are unable to engage in diplomatic affairs and establish political, economic, and legal relations with other countries.

Finally, in essence, diplomatic communication aims to secure the provision and management of a public good. Similar to the concept of recognition, the definition of these public goods has changed throughout history. Particularly over the last century, the public goods produced, managed, and distributed by diplomacy have expanded from more single-state interests such as security to goods that are highly interrelated and require action on a global level, i.e. environment, development, and migration control – and therefore, the scope of diplomacy has expanded as well.

2.1.3 Studying diplomatic history.

In order to understand what historically happened in politics and international relations, historians and political scientists join forces to make sense of the past. Rather than contradicting, they are supplementing each other's fields in complementary rather than competitive ways.

Although they may frequently misinterpret one other, scholars from both disciplines provide the necessary background and lessons people and nations can take away for the study of the political and diplomatic past. For example, policy makers continuously use history in the decision-making process, drawing lessons from past events in international relations. State leaders consider the range of possible scenarios through evidence of situations that have occurred in the past. In the words of Robert Jervis, “we cannot make sense out of our environment without assuming that, in some sense, the future will resemble the past” (Lauren, 1979: 9). The diplomatic historian, then, in a sense is simultaneously a historian and a political scientist; uncovering and enlightening the history of diplomatic relations, he or she requires knowledge of and draws from both fields. Diplomatic historians are in a unique position to provide certain support to decision-makers practicing and directing diplomacy.

The close intersection between history and political science is evident considering the key position of events like World War I, persons like Bismarck, and processes like the formation of NATO in both disciplines. In other words, both rely on events, individuals, and processes of the past in the pursuit of their ultimate scholarly goal. No discipline holds a monopoly over concept, method, or theory; both historians and political scientists rely on comparisons, use general theories, and offer explanations in order to understand and make sense of bilateral and international relations. No one summarizes the interdisciplinary nature of scholarship better than Edward H. Carr when he wrote: “Scientists, social scientists and historians are all engaged in different branches of the same study: the study of man and his environment, of the effects of man on his environment and of his environment on man. The object of study is the same: to increase man’s understanding of, and mastery over, his environment” (1961: 111).

Acknowledging the interconnected nature of the field, diplomatic history, in itself, is the study and analysis of the official relations and communication between states. The diplomatic historian tries to discover relationships of states with one other and their dynamics, motives, and evolution in an orderly manner. The aim of the diplomatic historian is to construct a chronological and organized record of the formal relations between recognized political entities (most often, and in this case, two states), analysing and interpreting the states' policy-making, the national and international factors that shape their behaviour, the techniques and methods they use, and the path and products of their pursuit.

Diplomatic historians have explained various events in a descriptive way and, generally, in a chronological order. They use archival documents to support their views and ideas. As they wish to evaluate the exact events and phenomena of the past, they try to highlight the unique character of the discussed issue. Diplomatic historians mostly deal with war and peace; bilateral and multilateral relations, especially among big powers; and the tactics and strategies the world's important leaders and decision-makers follow. For this reason, for the diplomatic historian, studying foreign policy and diplomacy is an art rather than a science (Sönmezoğlu 2005: 103).

From the very first bilateral agreement, namely the Friendship Treaty of 1926, both the Chilean and Turkish missions played an equally crucial role in the negotiations of Chilean-Turkish relations. Here, the researcher analyses original correspondence from both sides, aiming to understand their respective positioning. It is therefore crucial for the researcher to thoroughly understand the historical context in which the letters and reports were written, rather than to study them as an isolated source. While the documents present a reality, it is a *reality of the past*, and as such should be considered in their own right instead of in light of today's changed worldview. A researcher runs the risk of using their own perspectives and worldview, or a dearly

loved theory, and therefore may only see what this deems important. As Trachtenberg puts it, “you might fall in love with a certain way of looking at things and interpret the past accordingly” (2006, 33). The researcher must continuously push himself to be critical and fight the labels and their meanings that have been established (and changed) throughout the course of history.

Regular diplomatic correspondence signals an effective diplomatic system; for example, all major powers made a concerted effort to send regular reports updating on the situation of the ‘host’ country as to continuously review the condition of the country and of relations with it. Such reports have tremendous value to historians in particular, offering new insights into domestic politics. The researcher’s aim is to explain such data, resources; i.e. the continuous diplomatic records sent from and to the Chilean and Turkish embassies since 1926. These reports may not always be completely objective, yet to their own ministries, they were assumed as truth, and therefore hold a unique and invaluable importance to any scholar of international relations and diplomatic history. When dealing with a historical narrative, one must “understand the logic that underlies the course of events” (Trachtenberg, 2006, 33); that is, to always consider the context in which the documents were written. Here, the diplomatic records serve as the evidence of a historical study and, told through the lens of hundreds of original documents, create a heavily documented, grounded work of research. The wealth of original resources provides a unique character to the research, and value that has previously been untouched.

Every bilateral relationship presents a unique story and without the study of diplomatic reports, one cannot understand and appreciate the uniqueness of the relationship between Chile and Turkey. The researcher therefore deems it necessary to study both sides’ documents in parallel. The dissertation, however, is not a chronological narration of the foreign policies of the two countries but rather an examination of the motivations and effects of these foreign policies

as illustrated by the diplomatic documents. It is not a foreign policy analysis, yet acknowledges the vital position of foreign policy in the study of diplomatic history and vice versa.

The researcher argues that a simultaneous reading of both sides' reports provides a unique perspective that allows for a well-founded interpretation of the issues at hand. The opportunity to examine sources from both the Chilean and Turkish archives presents a huge advantage and added value to the dissertation. Throughout the process, the research has somewhat changed direction as the documents heralded new questions to be answered and aspects to be analysed, which in turn strengthened the work as a whole.

2.2 Key Concepts

In order to provide the reader with the necessary framework, it is important to discuss and define key terminology in the field of diplomatic history which are of particular relevance to this research.

2.2.1 Treaty.

A treaty is basically an agreement between parties on the international scene. Although treaties may be concluded between states and international organisations, they are primarily and most often concerned with relations between states (Shaw, 1997, 903). According to the United Nations, treaty means an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.²² According to Calvert (1986), a treaty is simply an agreement between two or more sovereign states made in the most formal manner

²² <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>

possible to indicate their joint intention that it should endure either in perpetuity or for such a lesser period as may be specified in the treaty. In order to make ‘valid’ treaties, the agents and diplomats have to be appointed by their governments with full powers to negotiate and to sign on their behalf. They must be recorded in a form of parallel texts in the respective languages of the negotiation, each of which, or one of which, is declared to be the definitive text (Calvert, 1986: 43).²³

The Vienna International Convention on the Law of Treaties was concluded in Vienna on 23 May 1969.²⁴ The Vienna Convention considered the basic and principal role of treaties in the history of international relations. The convention recognised the ever increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional and social systems, noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the *pacta sunt servanda*²⁵ rule are universally recognised.²⁶

Treaties may carry different names and may function under different terms such as international agreements, conventions, pacts and general acts. All these terms refer to a similar transaction, the creation of written agreements whereby the states participating bind themselves legally to act in a particular way or to set up particular relations between themselves. A series of

²³ The Treaty of Friendship and Consular convention between Chile and Turkey has been written in Spanish and in French. During the archive researches at General Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile in Santiago, the original official treaty was seen and copied by the researcher.

²⁴ Came into force on 27 January 1980.

²⁵ A treaty is based on good faith. A bunch fo belief that states perform their obligations emerged from treaties, in a good faith. Few rules for the ordering of society have such a deep moral and religious influence as the principle of the sanctity of contracts: *Pacta sunt servant*. In ancient times, this principle was developed in the East by the Chaldeans, the Egyptians and the Chinese in a noteworthy way. According to the view of these peoples, the national gods were, so to speak, the guarantors of the contract and they threatened to intervene against the party guilty of a breach of contract (Wehberg, 1959: 775). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195750?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

²⁶ <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>

conditions and arrangements are laid out which the parties oblige themselves to carry out (Shaw, 1997: 94). Treaties are the most important sources of international law.²⁷

One particular important treaty to this research is the 1961 Vienna Convention. The 1815 Congress of Vienna inaugurated a taxonomy of diplomatic representation, which was later simplified at the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The latter divided the chiefs of diplomatic missions into three categories: 1) ambassadors, accredited from one Head of State to another; 2) envoys extraordinary or ministers plenipotentiary, accredited to the host Head of State; and 3) charges d'affaires, accredited to the host Foreign Minister. (Fry, Goldstein & Longhorne, 2002: 545) Consular personnel, i.e. Consul-General, Consul, Vice-Consul, and Honorary Consul, constitute a different level of representation. They usually assist in commercial and citizen services such as travel documents, and are based in addition to the embassy or in other important cities of the host country.

The 1961 Vienna Convention²⁸ summarizes the goals of a diplomatic mission, such as representation of the sending state, protection of her citizens in the host state, negotiation, reports, and, possibly, the establishment of economic, cultural, and scientific ties (Fry, Goldstein & Longhorne, 2002, 555). In order to realize a mission, both countries must sign an agreement that recognises the proposed chief of the mission. At times, the same chief of mission may represent the sending country in a number of countries. The host country has the right to reject a proposed chief without providing any explanation, as well as other consular staff, whose affiliation with the mission shall immediately be ended.

Diplomatic representation serves an important function in the international system of nation-states. While diplomacy can be achieved by means other than diplomatic representation,

²⁷ For Turkish readers Melda Sur, *Uluslararası Hukukun Esasları* (İstanbul, 2010) would be a good source to understand the Essentials of the international law.

²⁸ http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf

the presence of an ambassador or chargé d'affaires greatly facilitates 'the management of relations between states and between states and other actors' (Barston 2006, 1). Hosting diplomatic representations by foreign nations in one's own country is generally not any less important than establishing one's diplomatic representation abroad (Neumayer, 2007: 228).

Two years after the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Convention on Consular Relations was signed, similarly in Vienna, on April 24, 1963 as a result of the UN International Law Commission. The commission had identified a need to modernize the legal terms of consular affairs. The 1963 Convention on Consular Relations gave consular staff the right to protect their government as well as their fellow citizens' interests abroad. The functions of consular staff were defined as "look after the interests of nationals who are in the country where the consular officer is stationed ... [and] the development of friendly relations among nations" (Fry, Goldstein & Longhorne, 2002: 557).

2.2.2 Sovereign statehood.

States are the most important legal persons for international law to write and make treaties, which begs a need to define a state and statehood. A 'state' is an organized political community on a territory (Renouvin, 1970: 1). According to McLean and McMillan (2003), the most influential definition of the modern state is that provided by Weber in *Politics as a Vocation*. Weber emphasizes three aspects of the modern state: its territoriality, its monopoly means of physical violence, and its legitimacy.²⁹ The Montevideo Convention has also discussed the definition of state and statehood. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States was signed at the International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay on December 26, 1933. It entered into force on December 26, 1934. The treaty discusses the

²⁹ 'State', *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*

definition and rights of statehood. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, states the most accepted definition of a state. The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.³⁰ Article 3 continues to define the political existence of the state as independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.³¹ In theory as mentioned, a state is a political community organized for political purposes. It should therefore seek the common good and seek to involve its citizens as far as possible in the making of decisions (Calvert, 1986: 29).

The behaviours of states are based on rational reasons. This rationality is generally embodied in the concept of interests which refers to economic interests in this context. Therefore, in the quest for the fundamental impulse of a behaviour in relations between states, it would be more accurate to look for interests rather than ideals. When foreign policy is concerned, the concept of national interest becomes the name of their attitude. Since diplomats namely ambassadors are appointed by their heads of state, the very first mission of a diplomat is representing his or her own head of state. Each and every head of state, ideally takes the national interest and the good of his or her citizens as a primary mission. So those ambassadors who represent directly their heads of state are also taking national interest as their priority. Bilateral ambassadors are accredited, while the appointments of other diplomats are notified. Diplomats receive their instructions from governments, but they do not represent governments but states

³⁰ <http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897>

³¹ Ibid.

(Kleiner, 2010: 3). The ambassadors of both the Republic of Chile and Turkish Republic in Rome who were at post in 1926, have also worked for the prosperity of their countries. It would be reasonable to evaluate the Chilean-Turkish relations as a rapprochement for the sake of national interests and a search for a new partner.

According to realistic approach, the state is the leading actor in international relations. There is no other supreme actor apart from the state. Realists think that the structure of international relations is anarchic. Thus, every state is responsible for maintaining its own safety. Foreign policy is one of the most important tools that states use while they are shaping their behaviours within the international system and trying to maintain their existence.

Apart from the exceptions, the attitudes of states, similar to humans, are based on rational reasons. This rationality generally becomes concrete with the concept of benefit. Although it is not always in this way, the notion of benefit mostly means economic interest. Therefore, while searching for the main motive of an attitude in the interstate relations, not looking for the ideals but the interests will be a more accurate approach. When foreign politics is in question, the national interest becomes the name of the attitudes states assume. It will be a true determination if the diplomatic relations of Chile and Turkey is recognized as an intimacy or a partner seeking for the sake of national interests.

Although sovereign states may theoretically be isolated from one another and enjoy non-interference from other states in their domestic policies, in practice, states continuously attempt to influence and change each other's behaviour either in order to make hostile governments more friendly or to evoke a sense of mutual responsibility in friendly governments. It therefore urges us to look at the concept of recognition more closely.

2.2.3 Recognition.

Much like individuals, states create and hold a 'personal' identity or self-definition and, in order to assert this identity, struggle to be recognized within the international political sphere. To be recognized means to be noticed, to be respected. The history of all hitherto existing international society is the history of the struggle for recognition (Ringmar & Lindemann, 2014: 11). Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, the state has increasingly become defined as a "sovereign, self-directing actor constrained only by the actions of other states" (Ringmar & Lindemann, 2014: 5). In fact, statehood continues to be the primary and dominant political entity and, as such, the most desirable identity in world politics. As Ringmar states, "the state is the persona of international law in much the same way as individuals are the persona of civil law and corporations the persona of commercial law." (2012: 5) According to international law, states carry both rights and responsibilities.

Recognition is a statement by an international legal person as to the status in international law of another real or alleged international legal person or of the validity of a particular factual situation. Upon recognition, the recognizing state may expect pertinent legal consequences, including reciprocal recognition. As such, recognition pertains participation in the international legal process generally, while also carrying importance within the context of bilateral relations and, of course, domestically (Shaw, 1997: 445). Article 6 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933, notes that the recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

International society is not an unchanging entity, but it is subject to the ebb and flow of political life. New states are created and old units fall away. New governments come into being

within states in a manner contrary to declared constitutions whether or not accompanied by force. Insurgencies occur and belligerent administrations are established in areas of territory hitherto controlled by the legitimate government. Each of these events creates new facts and the question that recognition is concerned with revolves around the extent to which legal effects should flow from such occurrences. Each state will have to decide whether or not to recognize the particular proposition and the kind of legal entity it should be accepted as (Shaw, 1997: 444).

There are basically two theories as to the nature of recognition. The constitutive theory maintains that it is the act of recognition by other states that creates a new state and endows it with legal personality and not the process by which it actually obtains independence (Shaw, 1997: 445). Recognition defines and determines recognition, as “a state that is not recognized may exist in itself but never for itself; that is, it has no status as a subject of international law and diplomacy” (Ringmar & Lindemann, 2014: 10). For example, while Northern Cyprus has unilaterally proclaimed independence, it does not enjoy statehood because it fails to be recognized internationally. The second theory, the declaratory theory, adopts the opposite approach and is little more in accord with practical realities. It maintains that recognition is merely an acceptance by states of an already existing situation. A new state will acquire capacity in international law not by virtue of the consent of others but by virtue of a particular factual situation (Shaw, 1997: 446). There are various written, legal criteria or “minimal requirements” of statehood, including permanent population, a defined territory, and a government with the ability to govern itself and to establish relations with other states (Ringmar & Lindemann, 2014: 10). In the case of Turkey and Chile, the latter offers a more suitable approach, as the Chilean-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1926 was an acceptance, rather than a creation, of a new political reality. Chile’s history of independence dates back to the beginning of the 19th century and

Turkey's independence was recognized by European powers with the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed in 1923 and came into effect in 1924.

Recognition is much more significant and important to new states than it is to existing states. The capacity to enter into relations with other states is an aspect of the existence of the entity in question as well as an indication of the importance attached to recognition by other countries (Shaw, 1997: 446). The capacity to build legal, diplomatic relations with other countries is essential for a sovereign state. It is important for a sovereign state to be treated and seen equally by another existing sovereign state. This treatment signifies the state recognition. Recognition in short, is an action and a treatment which is extended from existing states to new states. The more powerful countries are, the more they wish to be recognised as such by other countries. Being represented in a large number of foreign countries as well as hosting a large number of foreign countries' embassies in one's own country symbolises and represents power (Neumayer, 2007: 231). In consequence diplomatic recognition is something which is highly valued. Recognition is always more important to new states than to older ones, and to unstable states than to those with stable political institutions. It is thus passed on "from existing important states to new unimportant states or regimes" (Calvert 1986: 88).

2.3 Discussion

This research is trying to use approaches of international relations and political science with respect to writing diplomatic history and shed a light on the diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey through a historical perspective. The task of the diplomatic historian is to construct a clear and accurate record of the formal relations and interactions among sovereign nations, analysing and interpreting the ways in which they formulate their policies, the foreign

and domestic factors with which they must contend, the techniques and modalities they employ, and the result they achieve in attempting to realize their objectives (Lauren, 1979: 13). Based on this point, this work attempts to reveal the cause-effect relation in Chile-Turkey relations and in light of existing theories, it is discussed whether the relations between two countries can be put forward meaningfully.

In this case both ambassadors, the Ambassador of Chile present in Rome, Italy and the Ambassador of Republic of Turkey present in Rome, Italy, had “full powers” to construct and conduct the Friendship Treaty between Chile and Turkey on January 30th 1926. Full powers means a document emanating from the competent authority of a state designating a person or persons to represent the state for negotiating, adopting, or authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the state to be bound by a treaty or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.³² Diplomats are not independent to write and follow their own foreign policy. Diplomats, namely ambassadors, are following the instructions coming from their capital cities as occurred in Rome relating to Chilean and Turkish negotiation process of friendship treaty. Before the official negotiations start to sign a treaty between both states, in this case a friendship treaty, both should declare most importantly the willingness and the readiness to start to communicate. In this process the essential point is keeping the communication lines open between parts.

As explained above, diplomacy is correlated with foreign policy but is shaped also by domestic and other factors. It is required to determine the internal and external dynamics of an occurrence when searching for the reasons of an incident in disciplines of international relations and political science. An incident can be affected by both internal factors like the structure of the country, public order, interests of the groups and classes, and external factors such as the

³² Article 2, Use of Terms, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.

structure of the international system, historical background, strategic location, relations with the neighbours, and so on. The researcher has to place the due importance to both of them separately by sorting out these two dynamics from each other.

The Turkish Republic was established as a nation state, which was based on common citizenship, within certain geographical boundaries in accord with Europe model following the fight of Anatolia against the Western occupying forces after World War I. The 1926 Friendship Treaty between Chile and Turkey has to be considered as a mutual recognition agreement and can briefly be described as two nation states' recognizing of each other. As a newly established state, with a complicated history of Western interference, it was important for Turkey, at the time, to be recognized as a state; the more states recognize you, the greater your impact is in international relations and the neighbouring region. Turkey, in order to strengthen the defence of her borders and her newly institutionalized state, sought to be recognized, specifically, by stable states with a tradition of independence and democracy. Indeed, establishing such diplomatic relations is, first and foremost, a signal to the world, in order to be recognized as a member of the international community.

To sum up, the motive behind the Chilean – Turkish diplomatic relations and the treaty signed between the two was Turkey's widespread search of international recognition and commitment to building diplomatic relations with more and more countries in order to make her name known as Turkey. For Chilean decision makers, the motive was constructing new relations with the young Turkish Republic who inherited the heartland of Ottoman geography that Chile was interested in before the fall of the empire. The Turkish side was in need of having diplomatic relations with more countries in its context whereas Chilean side had a tendency to have diplomatic relations with emerging new Turkish Republic.

CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND

3.1 Diplomatic Relations between Chile and the Ottoman Empire

The diplomatic relations between Chile and the Ottoman Empire officially started when the two governments signed a consular protocol in Madrid, the capital city of Spain, on March 10, 1913. After signing the consular protocol and completing the formal process, Chile demanded an official approval from the Ottoman administration of the appointment of consul Mr. Felipe Farao to her consulate opened in Beirut on April 14, 1914.

While the signing of the protocol is considered to be the starting date of the diplomatic relationship between the two states, the first official correspondence between Chile and the Ottoman Empire in fact dates back to December 26, 1910. A second report written prior to the consular protocol, dates March 5, 1911. Both documents are about presidency and presidential elections in Chile (Kaygusuz, 2012: 280). Moreover, Ottoman interest in the Latin American continent and Chile in specific existed as early as July 1891. An official document found in the Ottoman Archives of the State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, shows that the Ottoman administration evaluated Chile as one of the most stable countries in Latin America, and appreciated the military victory of Chile against Peru and Bolivia (Kaygusuz, 2012: 282). Such early relations formed the backbone of Chilean-Turkish diplomacy over the next century.

3.2 A Brief History of Chile (1810-1926)

Despite its isolated and remote geography, Chile has long been a place of fascination and significance to the Western world. As one of its most distant and inaccessible corners, Chile received little attention from the Spanish Empire during its colonial history. Throughout the

nineteenth century, however, Chile³³ witnessed great political and economic change. During the colonial era, it became valued for its agricultural potential, distributing fertile land to a limited number of powerful landlords. Although Chile has been one of the main copper producers in the world, its strategic value was reduced to its control over the Strait of Magellan after World War II. Instead, the high interest in Chile is largely driven by the country's political history as one of the oldest constitutional democracies in the world. From 1833 to 1973, Chile witnessed regular constitutional procedures, rule of law, and popular elections for a bicameral legislature and the presidency – interrupted only by a short civil war in 1891 and a period of plebiscitarian rule between 1925 and 1932. Since the Second World War, the elected governments have made various attempts to recover the Chilean economy, giving rise to a socialist tradition encapsulated in Salvador Allende's presidency.

In 1808 Napoleon invaded Spain. The King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, and the royal family were taken to France as prisoners. In Chile, as in all the Spanish colonies in the Americas, the '*criollos*'³⁴ were sincerely and absolutely loyal to the king of Spain. The Spanish king was respected and venerated as the head of the empire within which the kingdom of Chile found its *raison d'être* and historical identity (Villalobos, 2007: 81). The Chilean *criollos* decided to form a junta, an organisational body that would rule on behalf of the Spanish king while he was in prison. The junta held its first meeting on September 18, 1810. The most successful decision by the junta was the establishment of a congress in the name of people's sovereignty. With Spain

³³ Chile is a country with a population of approximately 17 millions of inhabitants, located at the southwest of South America. Its territory is spread lengthwise in an area of 4,329 kilometers with an average width of 180 kilometers. The neighbors are Peru by the north, Bolivia and Argentina by the east, the South Pole through the Antarctic by the south, and by the west the Pacific Ocean. For administrative purposes, the country is divided in 15 regions, which include the islands on the Pacific Ocean, as Easter Island, Salas y Gómez, Juan Fernández Archipelago, and the Saint Ambrosio and Saint Félix islands. Thus, Chile has presence in three continents: America, Oceania, and Antarctic. <https://www.armada.cl/armada/geographical-location/2017-04-04/151445.html>

³⁴ *Criollos*, or Creoles, are those of full or partial European, primarily Spanish, ancestry, and often upper class. In the early 19th century, changing policies of the Spanish Empire towards her colonies led *criollos* to be the main supporters of Latin American Wars of Independence from Spain.

under control of the French, the Chilean people started to seek independence from the Spanish Empire, but Spanish forces again gained control of Chile for a short period. With the defeat of Napoleon in Europe, Ferdinand VII returned to the Spanish throne. The Spanish king re-established all his powers and governed with extreme harshness. All those in Spain and South America who had expressed reformist intentions were persecuted (Villalobos, 2007: 93).

Arbitrary colonial ruling caused more sympathy for independence. The *criollos* were divided between those who supported Chilean independence and royalists who continued to stand behind the King of Spain. Following the Battle of Rancagua in October 1814, which resulted in a huge defeat for the patriots, Chilean leaders met in Argentina with Jose de San Martin, the renowned military strategist of South America who believed that the continent's independence could only be secured if the royalist support in Peru was defeated. Chile and Argentina joined forces to attack Peru by sea with the aid of the British navy. Upon the royalists' defeat in Chacabuco, Chile declared independence from Spain on February 12, 1818. Chile's independence heralded a strong historical tradition of democracy over the coming two centuries, interrupted by violent regime breakdown.

Immediately following independence, politics in early Chile were characterized by political instability and was divided by two camps: the Conservatives, who favoured a centralized, presidential administration and continuing traditions from the colonial era, and the Liberals, who promoted constitutional governance, land reform, and limitation of Church powers. In 1830, a civil war between the two sides, left the Conservatives in power for the following thirty years. In 1833, a constituent assembly wrote a new constitution that laid the foundation for its political system the coming decades. The constitution was highly influenced by the beliefs of Diego Portales, who, although never president, effectively ruled Chile between

1830 and 1837. The 1833 constitution instituted a centralized government with a powerful presidency, placed the military under civilian control, and put economic power in the hands of large landowners. It led to a history of authoritarian democracy until 1891. Presidents were elected by property owners for a term of five years. Contemporary Conservatives still look back to the 1830s as the ideal political model, with a centralized state and strong presidential powers. In their view, this legacy of the Spanish kingdom and the rule of Castillian-Basque landowners prevented the loss of authority and military intervention that plagued other Latin American countries in the 19th century (Sigmund, 1977: 169).

Although never officially named, Diego Portales rose as the strongman of the Conservative Republic, until he was assassinated in 1837. Agriculture and commerce were still the leading sectors of Chilean economy, but failed to inspire significant growth. Portales' legacy continued well after his death in 1837. In the 1840s, General Bulnes, who served two terms as president between 1841 and 1851, maintained the centralized and autocratic political system established in the 1830s. More importantly, Bulnes also expanded the mining, agricultural, and foreign trade sectors of the Chilean economy and invested greatly in the public construction of railroads, a telegraph system, and other public utilities.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Chilean politics split, much like other countries on the continent, between Conservatives and Liberals over the question of centralism versus federalism and Church-state relations. The Liberals, reflecting the interests of miners in the North and medium-sized landowners in the South, gained power in the 1850s in opposition to the great landowners concentrated around the capital, Santiago. In 1861, their rule was solidified in the Liberal Republic that limited the presidential term to five years and granted voting rights to all men regardless of property ownership. Although Chile was relatively stable in comparison to

other Latin American countries at the second half of nineteenth century, the conflicts in politics between liberals and conservatives eventually resulted in a civil war in 1891. Meanwhile, the leading force behind Chile's economic transformation was the development of the mining industry. Chile witnessed the rise of a capitalist mining industry, which became the essence of the Chilean economy in future decades. In particular, the country grew reliant on exports of copper and nitrate to European states, especially after Chile's victory over Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific between 1879 and 1883.

In 1879, the Conservative-Liberal rift subdued with the onset of the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia, one of the most significant events in Chilean history that would have an effect on Chilean (foreign) politics for decades to come. Peru and Bolivia threatened to nationalise the nitrate plants that were (partially) owned by Chileans on their soil. When Bolivia prepared to confiscate Chilean nitrate plants in Antofagasta, the Chilean military intervened and occupied the province in 1879. Bolivia, followed by Peru, declared war on Chile, heralding the War of the Pacific that lasted until 1883. After a battle of four years, the Chilean forces declared their victory and Chile gained a sizable territory in the North, rich in copper and nitrate. This decisive victory remains a great source of national pride and as a result of the newly gained mining sources, Chile became one of the primary actors in South America.

The nitrate boom as a result of Chile's victory increased government revenues and allowed the government to increase spending on infrastructure development. Chile was able to solve the domestic economic crisis it was facing in the early 1970s. Even well before the Pacific War, Chilean entrepreneurs and workers had participated in nitrate mining in Peru and in Bolivia. After the conflict, when nitrate provinces passed into Chilean hands, the country held the world monopoly of nitrate (Villalobos, 2007: 155) and, as for many Latin American countries

mining especially nitrates became the country's leading sector. Despite the initial successes, this inspired the inflation problem that pestered Chile over the next century. Combatting inflation proved difficult; when President Balmaceda attempted to depreciate the currency, he was met with fierce resistance from landowners and foreign companies and eventually died in a bloody civil war in 1891. The civil war dramatically transformed Chilean political life with power passing from the president to Congress, now controlled by the local bases of notables.

The independence struggle across Latin America was inspired by the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. Decolonization in the early 19th century gave rise not to democratic regimes, but elitist states controlled by factions of native Creoles (Oppenheim 1999: 9). In 1818, Chile gained independence and after an unstable start, ushered in a centralized political system with great presidential powers with the constitution of 1833. Chile proved to be a relatively stable regime within a volatile continent, despite occasional disputes between the liberals and conservatives over the role of religion and the constitutional political system. It was not until 1891 however that such conflict was so great that it induced systemic change; with a weakened presidency, Chile shifted to a parliamentary system in 1891, which would be in place until the 1920s.

The second half of the 19th century also saw important demographic changes. When Chile became independent in 1818, '*mestizos*', people of mixed European and Amerindian (indigenous) descent, formed the majority of the population, in large part because most of the indigenous population had died of diseases brought by the colonizers. Although Western immigrants constituted but a small group of the Chilean population, their impact on Chilean political, economic, and social life has been remarkable. These migrants, arriving in Chile in the mid-nineteenth century, generally belonged to the upper and middle class, while the lower class constituted primarily of local *mestizos*. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, also

non-European groups, mostly of Middle Eastern origin, migrated to Chile, often establishing their own businesses and working in retail. The development of the mining industry attracted foreign businessmen to the country, predominantly from Great Britain and North America.

Perhaps more significantly, though, is the emergence and organization of the working class as a result of the economic development. The growth of mining and the expansion of transportation and communication systems across the entire country drastically and permanently changed Chile's social structure. The emergence of an urban middle class and a proletariat created new social complexities and challenges. The rural sector contained a traditional landowning elite, a peasantry tied by labour obligations to the estates where they lived, and a small but mobile workforce that provided wage labour for the large commercial haciendas. There were mining and industrial elites, many of whose members had kinship ties to the landed aristocracy. There were middle classes as well and a growing, native born working class (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 274). The social question was on the rise.

Chile's labour class started to be active in 1890. Workers expressed their discontent in strikes and organized themselves in unions; in 1909, railroad workers, and later other transport and mining workers, formed Chile's first workers' federation. Initially, the growth of a new elite of mine-owners did not challenge the power of the traditional landowners, as the two groups were often closely connected. But later, during President Balmaceda's term (1886-1891) Santiago was hit by huge protests and strikes leading up to the 1891 civil war between conservatives and liberal factions and resulted in the establishment of a parliamentary republic.

During the parliamentary republic, between 1891 and 1925, the growth of the mining export-economy created a sharp divide between the urban and rural parts of Chile as the oligarchy remained traditional and desperately tried to maintain aristocratic privileges.

Furthermore, the copper industry became increasingly reliant on foreign investments and effectively was in the hands of American companies. This “foreign enclave” (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2013: 272) did little to boost Chilean economy and returned its profits to the United States. As a result of both these developments, the emerging middle classes protested through strikes and public agitation, culminating in the bloody clashes in the capital city during the so-called ‘Red Week’ in October 1905. Between 1890 and 1910 over 250 strikes took place. The left consolidated itself with the establishment of the labour movement, socialist parties as well as the anti-clerical Radical Party. These early developments in the Chilean labour movement eventually contributed to the emergence of the Chilean Communist Party, which was founded in 1922 and would eventually become the “most powerful of all the communist parties in Latin America” (Williamson, 1992: 487). The parliament’s failure to maintain harmony created a legacy of distrust in parliamentary political systems in Chile that continues until today (Silva, 2015: 412).

The economy had quickly grown dependent on raw materials like coal, nitrate, and copper. An increase in nitrates export during World War I was followed by a decrease. During the war, the demand for nitrate in the world market had reached a level that could hardly be surpassed. Some countries were trying to find a substitute and were experimenting with the manufacture of artificial nitrate. Already during the war itself, Germany succeeded in producing its own synthetic nitrate, sparking a huge change in the weapon industry and agricultural sector. The First World War was decisive for the decline of the nitrate based economy. Still, by the 1920s, the Chilean nation would witness modernization of communication, developments in transportation, new industrial labour forces, accelerated energy production, and industrialization.

Rapid modernization, urbanization, and an economic 'boom and bust' after World War I set the stage for the rise of Populist candidate Arturo Alessandri Palma. Chile gave way to middle-sector political participation and candidates increasingly realized the importance of the working class voter. Appealing to the lower and middle classes, Alessandri, a Liberal and reformist, was elected president in December 1920, the beginning of modern era in Chile, according to Merrill (1982: 20). Although Alessandri won by a narrow margin, it was a major victory over the old aristocracy and the upper classes of the Chilean society. However the waves of hopes from Alessandri's victory soon disappeared as Congress largely resisted his proposals for the expansion of social welfare and labour rights. A Liberal facing a Conservative congress, Alessandri was unable to truly implement change and both the right and the left attacked him for inadequately managing the labour issue. Alessandri pushed his proposals for a labour code and social welfare package, introduced in Congress in 1921. Conservatives balked at this ideas, since they preferred the existing system in which labour unions had no legal status. Some conservatives also feared that liberals might pick up new voters among urban workers. The impasse between the liberal president and conservative Congress continued until the military intervened in 1924 (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 277).

On September 5, 1924 the armed forces launched a *coup d'etat* in favour of progressive Alessandri. The military played a crucial role in implementing the new Constitution of 1925. Alessandri enjoyed such great support among the military, to the extent that, during the Congressional vote over Alessandri's proposed constitutional reforms, they "rattled their sabers in the galleries of Congress" (Oppenheim, 1999, 12). Despite the fact that Alessandri had won the congressional battle, he felt that he lost the political war by compromising his political independence to the military (Oppenheim, 1999: 12). He refused to rule by grace of the military

and left Chile. A second military coup in January 1925 brought to power a group of young officers led by Carlos Ibanez. Alessandri was invited back and he proceeded to frame a new constitution. The constitution of 1925, which was to remain in force until 1973, was intended to strengthen the hand of the president and enhance powers of the state to intervene in the economy and in society (Williamson, 1992: 488). The Constitution of 1925 laid ground rules within which political conflict was to take place. It established a strong presidency, along with a two-house legislature, a Senate and a 100 member Chamber of Deputies. Both bodies were to be elected by proportional representation (Oppenheim, 1999: 13). The Constitution of 1925 was by no means a complete return to presidentialism. It did, however shift the balance back toward the executive. The president was now to be elected every six years by direct popular vote, the Congress every four under a system of proportional representation (Collier and Sater, 2004: 213). It was clearly stated in the Constitution that church and state were separated and freedom of worship guaranteed.

Yet, Alessandri's rule would again be brief. He resigned later that year and Emiliano Larrain was elected president. When the military clashed with the working class in a new series of protests, Carlos Ibanez del Campo, a former military officer and Larrain's minister of war, rose to presidency in a rigged election in May 1927. Ibanez served briefly but brutally and, significantly, commenced a lasting economic partnership with the United States financing his massive campaign of public works with American loans. Ibanez proceeded to consolidate a dictatorship that lasted until 1931. This unsettled most Chileans, who had prided themselves on their nation's democratic rule (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 278). The global economic depression of 1929 solidified the transformation of Chilean politics and economy from a traditional oligarchy to statism and economic nationalism that Alessandri and Ibanez - backed

by the military - had started. But the depression had dried up the Chilean economy and opposition to dictator Ibanez now grew among white-collar workers as well. In July 1931, he resigned when the military forced him out of power in the aftermath of the 1929 New York stock market crash (Oppenheim, 1999: 12).

As illustrated above, the 1920s presented a highly volatile period in Chilean history. It was during this economic and political instability that Chile and Turkey signed their first agreement, the Friendship Treaty in 1926.

3.3 Emergence of the Turkish State (1923-1926)

On July 24, 1923, Turkey and the countries that won World War I. signed the Treaty of Lausanne. With the treaty, Turkey gained international recognition of her sovereignty and borders and acquired international recognition of its independence. At the time, there were only a handful of states in Asia and Africa that had the semblance of independence; the rest were colonies or dependencies of the imperialist powers (Ahmad, 2014: 85). Moreover, the Lausanne Treaty made peace between Turkey and Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. With the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the new Turkish state passed its most critical test. It had at last achieved a degree of security and international recognition that its Ottoman predecessor had lacked ever since the last quarter of the eighteenth century (Hale, 2013: 41). The troubled post-war period was symbolically closed with Mustafa Kemal's 36 hour speech before the congress of the Republican People's Party from 15 to 20 October 1927 (Zürcher, 2012: 175).

The route to Lausanne took five years. After the occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia, the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, by Allies after the First World War, Turkish nationalists began an armed struggle for independence. After a successful period of struggle,

Turkish forces launched a general offensive against the Greek army in August 1922. As Turkey's War of Independence was chiefly a protracted series of blood-drenched battles with the Greeks, Mustafa Kemal's planning involved not only a military struggle, but a political one as well. A master of *Realpolitik*, Mustafa Kemal frequently appraised the necessary factors required to achieve central national objectives (Landau, 2004: 129). As a result of a total Turkish military offensive, the Greek army surrendered. Nationalist forces victoriously entered Izmir on September 9, and the Armistice of Mudanya was signed on September 11. The war of national liberation had been won; now it was a question of reaching a consensus on the nature of the new state and society the nationalists would agree to (Ahmad, 2014: 82).

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, victorious Turkish nationalists turned their attention to the internal reconstruction of Anatolia. Despite opposition to Mustafa Kemal and his followers, Ankara was quickly declared the capital of new Turkey as Istanbul had become equated with the old regime, the Ottoman dynasty. Mustafa Kemal 'Atatürk'³⁵ and his colleagues started to transform the nation according to modernist thought. Their aim was a total social, economic, and political transformation. On October 29, 1923, the Turkish Republic was formally proclaimed.³⁶ The Grand National Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as president. Making a modern Turkey required a turn to the West:

On 29 October 1923, a few hours before the republic was proclaimed, Mustafa Kemal explained his ideas to a sympathetic French writer, Maurice Pernot. In France he said, had inspired the struggle for freedom throughout the world; he

³⁵ Grand National Assembly bestowed Mustafa Kemal the name Atatürk – 'Father of the Turks' or 'Father Turk' on November 26, 1934.

³⁶ For further reading about the ideological and conceptual foundation of the modern Turkish State please see Bernard Lewis *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, Ankara, 1998; Halil İnalcık, *Akademik Ders Notları 1938-1986* Istanbul 2016; Niyazi Berkes *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* Istanbul 2002; and Suna Kili, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, Istanbul 2014.

himself had briefly attended a French school. Turkish nationalists were not xenophobic: they were the friends of all civilized nations, while remaining jealous of their independence. Throughout history, the Turks had moved from east to west, a modern government meant a Western government. ‘Can one name a single nation that has not turned to the West in its quest for civilization? He asked (Mango, 2004: 396).

By establishing a republic, the Kemalists were proclaiming their commitment to modernity and equality rather than the modernization and hierarchy of the old order (Ahmad, 2014: 85).

One should stress that Western states acted slowly and reluctantly in establishing diplomatic relations with the government of Grand National Assembly of Turkey and in the accreditation and permanent appointment of ambassadors. This reluctance continued for several years after the establishment of the republic. In 1921, there were only two embassies in Ankara, namely of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. In addition, in 1922, Azerbaijan appointed an ambassador to Ankara. Naturally, the position towards foreign countries (and particularly Western powers) and the will to be accepted dominated the General Assembly of Turkey from its first days onwards. Since the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the young Turkish Republic committedly made certain efforts to be recognized internationally. Mustafa Kemal used every available opportunity to employ foreign relations to obtain the assistance required for survival and for enhancing Turkey’s political status (Landau, 2004: 127).³⁷ According to Inalcik, Atatürk’s life philosophy was inspired by social Darwinist ideas of survival. Atatürk always referred to life as a struggle and that one’s success in life thus depends on their preparedness for

³⁷ For a broader view on ‘Foreign Policy in Mustafa Kemal’s Great Speech’ and about ‘Institutions and Parties in the Republic of Turkey’ see J. M. Landau, *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History*, London, 2004.

the struggle. These views did not only influence his personal life, but also his politics and *inkılab* (revolution). In 1923, during a speech in Akhisar, he said that “every nation in the world wants to survive and survival depends on struggle. This country shall definitely become a modern, progressive and developed one. This is a struggle of survival for us” (İnalçık, 2008: 102).

One issue the Lausanne Treaty could not resolve was the dispute over Mosul Province. On December 16, 1925, the League of Nations Council, which was referred to as an arbitrator regarding the conflict, declared a decision against Turkey; the Turkish representative was unable to attend the meeting but only able to send a letter.³⁸ As the United Kingdom and Iraq signed a new agreement, Mosul was included in the territory of Iraq under the British mandate (Sönmezoğlu, 1994: 60). The Turkish government was forced to accept the decision given by the League Council – which it was then not a member of – as it could not afford another war to regain Mosul. This undesirable result may have further motivated the Turkish state to increase its efforts of self-expression and self-promotion to the outside world.

With complete domination of the political scene assured, Mustafa Kemal and his government embarked on an extensive programme of reforms.³⁹ Cutting all ties with the old Ottoman regime, the caliphate⁴⁰ was abolished on March 3, 1924.⁴¹ This was particularly important as Turkey hereby became the first Islamic country to establish a state based on the principle of popular sovereignty. It was this, rather than the introduction of secularism, that required the abolition of the Caliphate. As Berkes explains, “it was that new principle [of popular

³⁸ Asserting that the League of Nations exhibited an arbitrary attitude in making a decision regarding the solution of the Mosul Question, Turkey decided not to attend the council meetings as a protest.

³⁹ For those reforms and especially for the secularism process of the young Turkish Republic in English see Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred Stepan ed. *Democracy, Islam, Secularism in Turkey* (New York, 2012).

⁴⁰ Caliphate is a form of Islamic administration, led by a ‘caliph’, a person who is considered a political and religious successor of the prophet of Islam, Mohammad, and the leader of the entire Muslim population. Through conquering Muslim lands, Sultan Selim I of Ottomans, became the defender of the holy lands, today’s Saudi Arabian geography, which further strengthened the Ottoman claim to the caliphate in the Muslim world. Ottoman Sultans gradually came to be viewed as the de facto leaders and representatives of the Muslim world.

⁴¹ For abolishing caliphate and history of secularism in Turkey see Kemal H. Karpat’s *Elites and Religion* (2012).

sovereignty], not a brand of secularism that had yet to mature, which necessitated the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate” (2013: 481). With the end of the Sultanate, it quickly became clear that the Caliphate and new republican state could not coexist.

Although Article 2 of the constitution, denominating Islam as the state religion, was taken out as early as 1928, it took a few more years until Kemalism was officially adopted and written into the Constitution as a state principle in 1937 (Berkes, 2013: 482). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk maintained a rationalist approach to religion, understanding its importance in the lives of the Turkish people. While he recognized the dangers of fanaticism, he also respected religion’s role as “a spontaneous expression of popular unity in consolidating national efforts” (Berkes, 2013: 483) He considered Islam to be corrupted by ignorant religious interpreters and articulated the need for an enlightened and humanized Islam instead.

In September 1925 the religious shrines and dervish convents were closed down and in November the turban and fez, the red felt cap that had been the Ottoman gentleman’s traditional headgear since the days of Sultan Mahmut the Second were prohibited and replaced by the Western-style hat or cap. In the first half of 1926, the European calendar was adopted as were the Swiss civil code and the penal code from Italy. The Kemalist days also played an important role in women’s rights: in 1931, women were granted the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections; in 1934, this was extended to all elections and women were given full political rights. Turkey’s transformation was admired abroad. On May 20, 1928, the Afghan King Amanullah Han visited Ankara. He followed the developments and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms in Turkey with huge admiration. He saw Atatürk as an example for change in his own country, but, like Iran, Afghanistan had not been able to build a modern state as Atatürk had successfully done. Both Iran and Afghanistan were among the few friendly states of the young Turkish

Republic. According to Inalcik, the reason for their lack of success in their modernization attempts, was that, unlike Ottoman Turkey, they did not have a long history of (administrative) experience, they did not experience ideological transformation, and their societies shared strong tribal traditions (İnalçik, 2013: 178).

Economic issues are highly crucial for less developed and developing countries. Their foreign policy strategies are closely linked to the need to preserve resources as well as the project of nation-building and nationalism. Likewise, in Turkey, in the years following the establishment of the republic in 1923, the most important issues surfacing politics were national security, border securitization, nation-building, and constructing an industrial and sustainable economy. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions understood that an independent foreign policy as well as the construction of the Turkish nation require a stable economy, then predominantly based on Turkey's agrarian society. The founders of the Turkish Republic thus pursued a path of complete economic but also political independence, although in some cases, dependency on a bigger power may benefit rapid modernization more greatly and allow to take a key international role more quickly. In the early years of the republic, however, the decision-makers preferred autonomous decision-making in line with (or, limited by) the country's domestic political programme.

Atatürk's speech to open the parliamentary session at the Turkish Grand Assembly (TBMM) on November 1, 1924 illuminates the foreign policy priorities of the early Turkish Republic. Atatürk emphasized the significance of developing relations with the West, the fair and just resolution of the Mosul Crisis, and declared the League of Nations as a positive influence on nation-states. He referenced the Soviet Union as a longstanding friend. As the speech demonstrates, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was in favour of good ties with the Soviet Union

as well as the West in order to resolve current issues in international politics (Uyar, 2014: 306). According to Tuncer, Atatürk tried to avoid alliances with the great powers, because in such an event the relations between two countries may easily turn into a hierarchical relation in which the weaker state would have to compromise itself. Atatürk meticulously defended the principle of equality in the relations between different states (Tuncer 2013: 20-21).

With its establishment, the Turkish Republic found itself in the midst of numerous international conflicts that had to be resolved. The painful memories of World War I were still vivid in the memory of the founders of the Republic of Turkey, while maintaining the freshness of memory, the main lines of Turkish foreign policy were determined by decision makers by taking into consideration these memories and geographical facts. The general lines of Turkish foreign policy were drawn according to all the political and social events even before the fall of the empire: the wars, loss of lands, and the (often forced) migrations the residents were subjected to in the Ottoman Empire before World War I, and all the incidents that happened throughout the War of Independence. Along with Turkey's geographic position, the facts of the near past played a significant role in setting foreign policy strategies.

By the end of the decade, Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean had raised concerns in the Turkish government, as Mussolini hoped to restore the borders of the Roman Empire and encircle the Mediterranean Sea. Taking on an anti-fascism character, Turkey's foreign policy aimed to establish friendly ties with all, but alliance with none (Ahmad, 2008b: 274). This was formalized in January 1929, when the National Assembly signed the Briand-Kellog Pact, an agreement to outlaw war as a national policy instrument. A year earlier, Turkey had signed a neutrality agreement with Italy, while signing a similar agreement with Greece in 1930. Still, Turkey recognized that the only way she could secure her national interests was by liaising with

one of the Great Powers, and therefore maintained good relations with the Soviet Union while also seeking rapprochement with Great Britain. In 1932, Turkey joined the League of Nations by invitation as a staunch supporter of 'collective security' against security. Turkey's accession to the League of Nations could be considered as an expression of its desire to be recognized in the international arena and to strengthen its sovereignty as well as its power of deterrence. Finally, one of the main motives behind Turkey's membership application to the League of Nations was to secure herself against the Soviet Union who wanted a warm water passage to the Mediterranean.

Although the motto of Atatürk's foreign policy, 'peace at home, peace in the world', may have suggested isolationist policies, in fact, Turkey sought close and friendly relations with her northern neighbours as well as Afghanistan. Turkey wished to end the isolation by the West she had been experiencing since the First World War and transform Western policies towards the new republic. The Turkish government sought new relations and intensified existing ones with the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. Indeed, maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union was a critical aspect of Turkey's foreign policy; journalist Falih Rifki Atay wrote in 1934, as quoted by Feroz Ahmad, "It was clear that [Atatürk] did not want Russia and Turkey to ever be enemies again" (Ahmad, 2008b: 272). In 1934, Turkey suggested to militarize the Straits and in 1936 signed the Montreux Convention. Turkey took an anti-fascist stance and supported the Ethiopians in their struggle against Italy and the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. At the time, a foreign correspondent wrote in *The Times* that "Turkey's foreign policy which had relied on Moscow, and after 1936 on London and Paris, depended on having a regime at home which did not have a fascist colouring" (Ahmad, 2008 a.: 191).

The outline of Turkish foreign policy in the period between 1923 and 1938 can best be

understood from Atatürk's annual speeches⁴² at the Grand National Assembly and his Great Speech (*Nutuk*). During this period the most important concern of the young Turkish republic was to maintain and provide national security and to find peaceful solutions to conflicts as an equal member of the international community. Foreign policy was based on four main elements: 1) maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, demonstrated by the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship signed December, 17, 1925, 2) maintaining good relations with Western powers, illustrated by Turkey's membership to the League of Nations in 1932 and the Montreux Convention signed July 20, 1936, 3) seeking diplomatic relations with other geographies such as Latin America and Asia in order to remain independent from Europe and break the isolation; and 4) building good relations with regional neighbours through agreements such as the Balkan Pact, signed between Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece on February 9, 1934, and the Saadabad Pact of Friendship on July 8, 1937 with Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq (Uyar, 2014: 304).

Up to today, Turkish foreign policy is informed by a set of ideological factors, but two form the cornerstone: Westernization in line with the founding principles of Kemalism on the one hand, and the Islamic religion as the value system of social life. According to Demir, there are two significant behavioural patterns of Turkish foreign policy existing since Atatürk's era until today, namely power politics and pragmatism (2010: 59). From the beginning of the republic, the basis of Turkish foreign policy strategy is to not be excluded/isolated from and to integrate in the international political system. Pragmatism also was on the forefront of Atatürk's foreign policy as he strategically used the (im-) balances in the interwar years in Turkey's interest (Demir, 2010: 59).

⁴² In his chapter, Uyar provides various examples of references to foreign policy in Atatürk's annual speeches at the opening of the new governmental year (2014: 303-325).

The Treaty of Lausanne had enforced a limitation on Turkey's sovereignty regarding the Straits, which Turkey was forced to accept as she found herself in a challenging position at the time. According to some international relation scholars, a country's geographical location constitutes the primary and most constant factor of their domestic situation. Indeed, Turkey holds a key strategic position in East-West relations not only in geographical terms but also symbolically as the bridge between the two. As Mustafa Kemal felt that another great war was approaching - the production of the German war machine surpassed the country's defence needs - and Turkey grew more and more concerned over Italian ambitions in the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts with Italy's invasion of Abyssinia (today's Ethiopia), Turkish decision-makers were led to re-evaluate the current conditions of the Straits. In protection of her territory, Turkey wished to have full control and militarize the Straits.

In 1926, the year the Chilean-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed, Turkey found itself in the midst of the consolidation of the new state and its institutions - through a programme of rampant reforms. The treaty gave answer to Turkey's wish to be accepted and recognized as an independent sovereign actor and was indicative of her vision beyond the European powers. Moreover, it could be considered as an act of promoting itself to a 'new and big continent' at a time when it is in need of creating a better image of itself as a justification of its rightfulness regarding the Mosul Question. As Hill states (2003), ultimately, foreign policy rests on the effectiveness of the state at home and abroad, which is a matter of political sociology rather than of law. The young Turkish republic has forced herself to maintain public order through an enlightenment movement among the nation and to strengthen her borders, providing hope for the masses for the common future in order to be strong in international politics.

CHAPTER 4 FERTILIZATION PROCESS, 1926-1945

4.1 Treaty of Friendship and a Consular Convention, 30 January 1926

On January 30, 1926, the governments of Chile and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and a Consular Convention. Although earlier relations existed between the Ottoman Empire and Chile, as illustrated in Chapter 2, this treaty is considered the starting point of Chilean-Turkish diplomacy as with the signing of the agreement, Chile formally recognized Turkey as a newly independent, sovereign state. Less than two months before, Turkey had also signed a new Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with Soviet Russia in December 1925, which helped to build the new republic's international reputation and may have helped motivate other states to similarly recognize and approach the Turkish state. The treaty with the Soviet Union provided the Republic of Turkey with further legitimacy since the Treaty of Lausanne. Chile was one of the first countries in the world and the first country in the Latin American continent to recognize the Turkish Republic.

Before the actual signing, ambassadors from both sides held an informal meeting in order to discuss the details of the official signing ceremony. An official document of the Embassy of the Republic of Chile in Rome, Italy, shows that Mr. Villegas, the Ambassador of Chile to Italy, requested authorization from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign a friendship treaty with Turkey on January 8, 1926.⁴³ Another official document, numbered No. 7 and written by the Chilean ambassador on January 11, 1926, informs the foreign minister that both ambassadors have exchanged their ideas and discussed the details of the content/text of the friendship treaty.

⁴³ In an interview with the author, Admiral Jorge Arancibia firstly mentioned that the Republic of Chile decided to officially recognize the Young Turkish Republic on January 1, 1926.

Mr. Villegas briefly summarized the main articles of the treaty as “Peace and perpetual friendship between the two nations and their respective citizens, agreed on establishing diplomatic and consular relations - receiving representatives, by way of reciprocity - treatments accepted through general principles of international law, which would take effect 15 days after ratification”⁴⁴.

Reciprocally, one of the very first official Turkish documents regarding the meeting of The Treaty of Friendship between Chile and Turkey is a below.

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Rome, 27th of January, 1926

Mister Ambassador,

I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency that having telegraphically authorized by my Government to negotiate and firm, in the character of Plenipotentiary Delegate, I would negotiate with Your Excellency, a Treaty of Friendship and a Consular Convention between Turkey and Chile.

I request from Your Excellency to give me a date when we would be able to come together to initiate the negotiations for this subject.

Suad Bey.

To Excellent Mister Villegas Ambassador of Chile before the King of Italia.

This copy signed by J. Saavedra Aguero. The Secretary of the Embassy.^{45. 46}


⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Embassy in Roma, 11/01/1926. No:7

⁴⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Historical Archive. This copy is dated 31.3.1926 and sent to the Chilean Foreign Ministry in Santiago from the Embassy of Chile in Rome.

⁴⁶ There is also an original copy of that letter written in French with a stamp of Chilean Embassy to Italia on it.

The above shows that just days before the actual signing of the treaty, Suad Bey called for a Treaty of Friendship and a Consular Convention between Turkey and Chile, and requested a date to negotiate such an agreement with the Ambassador of Chile, Mr. Villegas.

A few days later, on January 30, the Chilean ambassador Villegas writes the Foreign Ministry that he has met ambassador Suad to discuss and draft the treaty, which was subsequently signed by both parties:



Embassy of Chile
Treaty of Friendship with Turkey
Rome, 30th of January, 1926.
No. 10

Mister Minister,

With reference to the telegrams of this Embassy numbered 76 of the date 27th of the near past November, numbered 2 and 7 of the dates 5th and 10th of the current January respectively, and the telegrams of this Department, numbered 45 of the 2nd of the last December, numbered 3 and 7 of the present January, I have the honour to present to you gentlemen the information that today I have formed together with Mr. Suad Bey, Ambassador of Turkey in this Kingdom, a Treaty of Friendship in conformity with the instructions received from you gentlemen via the cited telegraphic messages.

I am thrilled to attach to this message the original text of the Treaty, and likewise, copy of the communications exchanged regarding this issue with the Ambassador of Turkey and the ‘act’ preceding the firming of the Treaty.⁴⁷

As demonstrated by an official diplomatic telegram the researcher obtained from the Historical Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Chile, the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras personally granted the Turkish ambassador in Rome, Suad Bey, the authority to negotiate and sign the Treaty of Friendship and Consular Convention with Chilean authorities on January 26, 1926. An additional original stamped and signed copy of the telegram was delivered to the Chilean Embassy in Rome which subsequently sent the copy to the Foreign Ministry of Chile in Santiago.

Both sides’ ambassadors agreed to come together for the signing ceremony on January 30, 1926.⁴⁸ The treaty was signed in the presence of the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel the Third, at the Chilean Embassy in Rome. Below is a full transcript of the negotiations of the Friendship Treaty and Consular Convention between Chile and Turkey:

To Mister Minister of Exterior Relations

Santiago of Chile

Embassy of Chile in Italy

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Historical Archive. Stamped by Ministry of Relations, received 9th of March 1926, Diplomatic Section, Folio 69/4.

⁴⁸ In an interview in June 2015, the author asked ambassador Marambio about the 1926 Friendship Treaty between Turkey and Chile. Although there is no written source, Marambio suspects that the Chilean ambassador in Rome, where the agreement was signed, received an order from the capital of Santiago to sign a friendship treaty with the Turkish government.

Act of the Session of 30th of January, 1926

The session was opened at 11:30 in the morning.

In Attendance:

Mister Excellent Suad Bey, Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Turkey before the Mister Majesty King of Italy, and Mister Excellent Villegas, Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Chile before the Mister Majesty King of Italy.

Mister Excellent Villegas: Declared that he is authorized by his Government to negotiate and sign a treaty of friendship with the Mister Delegate of the Republic of Turkey to establish and strengthen the ties of friendship and the commercial and economic relations between Turkey and Chile.

Mister Excellent Suad Bey: responded that his Government is animated by this desire to develop good relations between Turkey and Chile and he is also authorized to negotiate and sign a treaty of friendship with the Mister Delegate of the Republic of Chile.

Mister Excellent Villegas: proposed as the text of the new treaty, that of the Treaty of Friendship firmned in Constantinople on the 28th of January 1924, between the Turkish Republic and the Republic of Austria.

Likewise as proposed, it would be more convenient for both Governments to enter immediately in consular relations for the development of their economic relations, which constitutes the 2nd article of this treaty after the words “diplomatic relations” as a Consular Convention.

Mister Excellent Suad Bey: replied that he accepts this proposal. Adds that the 3rd article of the Treaty between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Austria considers the subscription on the same day a commercial convention and a convention of establishment in the sight of replacing with that proposed by the 4th article.

Mister Excellent Villegas: I accept this proposal and we can pass to the signing of the Treaty.

Signed. E. Villegas and Suad Bey

This copy signed by official J. Saavedra Aguero⁴⁹

The negotiations above demonstrate the two sides' intention to start immediate consular relations. In fact, a document from the National Archive revealed the existence of a Chilean consulate – or rather, delegation – prior to the Friendship Agreement between Chile and Turkey. The document, entitled Nota No. 1 and thus likely the very first official communication of the consulate, is dated 19th of December 1925. It provides information about the organisation of the foreign missions settled during the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The note suggests that the Friendship Treaty signed between Turkey and Austria provides a good example for a possible Friendship Treaty between Turkey and Chile – which, indeed, would form the basis of the signed agreement. The note states that the consuls of Portugal, Mexico, and Argentina, despite the change in government, similarly maintained their posts in Turkey in order to continually carry out their tasks. Signing a treaty between Chile and Turkey would facilitate the financial, commercial, industrial, and agricultural relations between the two countries. The note is the first to suggest the treaty to be drafted and signed in Rome – as

⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Historical Archive. This copy of the Friendship Treatment between Chile and Turkey dated 31.3.1926 and sent to the Chilean Foreign Ministry in Santiago from the Embassy of Chile in Rome.

the author recognizes, the consul did not have the full powers at the time to sign it himself. The document then gives information about four Turkish diplomats with whom the Chilean consul had met and who played a key role in Turkish diplomacy and politics at the time. The consul attached to the note a handwritten copy of the Framework Agreement (*Convention d'Établissement*) signed between Austria and Turkey on the 28th of January 1924 detailing all twelve articles and transcription of the signatory meeting as well as a copy of the Friendship Treaty between Austria and Turkey, composed of four articles, signed by the same officials on the same date – recommending it serves as an example to a future Friendship Treaty between Chile and Turkey.

In the 1927 *Memoria*, a type of annual report prepared by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a summary is presented of the ministry's activities in that calendar year. The report highlights the signing of the Chilean-Turkish Friendship Treaty, and notes that the Secretary General of the League of Nations has confirmed that the treaty has been enrolled in accordance with the terms of Article 18⁵⁰ of the League of Nations Covenant which was signed in Geneva on January 11, 1927, registered No.1395. Thus, Chile, a member of the league unlike Turkey at the time, received a confirmation that the treaty had been accepted in the international arena. According to the *memoria*, the treaty was signed in the name of the “His Excellency, President of the Republic of Chile and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Turkey”⁵¹ as represented by the two ambassadors.

Following the signing of the Friendship Treaty, the first official diplomatic document sent from the Chilean consulate in Istanbul, dated 6th of February 1926, provides information to

⁵⁰ According to Article 18 of the League of Nations Covenant, any treaty entered into by one of its members should be registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. A treaty cannot be binding until it is registered as such. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art18

⁵¹ *Memoria De Relaciones Exteriores De Chile 1927*, (1928: 107).

the Chilean Foreign Ministry about the potential agricultural and commercial relations, such as stock breeding, mining, and extraction of raw materials. The document contains, as an attachment, a detailed statistical overview and commentary of the Turkish agricultural sector listing the most important import and export goods, including costs, volumes, and most importantly trade partners. It also specifies other main export goods such as tobacco, raw materials, textiles, and foods such as grapes, and provides information about Turkish ports, navigation, and customs control. The note is so extensive and detailed it even lists the number of bakeries in Istanbul or the volume of tobacco exported from each Turkish harbour. It includes a table listing all important import and export items and their quantities. Thus, we see that as little as a week after the Friendship Treaty, the Chilean consulate actively started its duties with a particular emphasis on possible commercial opportunities in Turkey.

Similarly, another document, numbered 4 and dated April 2nd, 1926, is focused on commercial goods that could potentially be traded between Chile and Turkey, with a particular focus on one of Chile's most significant export product at the time, potassium nitrate (saltpetre). The report shows the practical implications of the national goods of Chile for a new market such as Turkey. Other documents written during the late 1920s between the Chilean delegation in London and Istanbul specified the operational budget and financial security of the missions.

One of the documents the researcher found in the National Archive of Chile was written by the Chilean Foreign Ministry and submitted to *El Congreso Nacional* (Chilean National Congress) to provide its approval for the friendship treaty between Chile and Turkey. The document explains the signatory process and respective articles of the Friendship Treaty. It was written nearly two years after the agreement entered into force, on the 1st of November 1928, possibly due to the instability of Chilean politics at the time. Chile experienced a series of

military juntas and an elected president between late 1924 and 1927. In this period, new political figures, such as Carlos Ibanez, came to the scene and gained power rivalling the former president Alessandri.

Over the coming years we see increasing attention to the political developments in the two respective countries. A Chilean diplomatic document with the aim of providing information on political and military situation in Turkey explains the historical background before and after World War I, the national struggle, and emergence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the Turkish country. It is dated 24th of May 1929. The report summarizes the chronology of the Turkish War of Independence. It then emphasizes the legal and constitutional construction of the new Turkish Republic, including the formation of the Grand National Assembly. There are various reports sent by the Chilean delegation in Istanbul throughout 1929 concerning commercial and agricultural issues. They also provide information about the composition of the existing government, the legislative system, and financial and customs regulations in Turkey.

In another document dated November 2, 1929, numbered as 14, the head of the Chilean mission in Istanbul informs the Chilean Foreign Ministry that Talat Kaya Alp Bey has been appointed as the head of the Turkish diplomatic representation in Santiago de Chile. The decision was officially declared by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and made upon an order of the President of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who ordered the first ambassador in the South American continent to be sent to Chile.

In one of the first most detailed diplomatic document sent from Istanbul to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, dated January 10, 1930, the ambassador urges to maintain cordial relations between the governments of Chile and Turkey, and encourages the Turkish government to appoint a diplomatic representative to Santiago. He speaks of the potential of the Turkish and

Balkan markets, however suggests there is no need for a commercial treaty between the two. It also details the development of Turkey's foreign relations since World War I, highlighting its resolution with France as well as a good friendship with the British Empire, Germany, Italy, and the United States. The ambassador also notes Turkey's interest in developing its already existing relationship with Soviet Russia and a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria. It notes the continuing animosity with Greece after the expulsion of over 1,5 million Greeks (today commonly known as the Population Exchange), but considers both countries to make a sincere attempt to reach a friendly settlement. It says that Turkey has shown greater interest in building relations with South American countries with representatives appointed in Chile and Argentina.

4.2 First Official Reports about Chile from the Turkish Embassy, 1930 and 1931

The first Turkish Embassy was opened in Santiago de Chile in 1930. The young Turkish Republic forced itself to open an embassy under financially difficult conditions. It struggled to survive and functioned less than a year. The Turkish delegation was accredited on August 14, 1930 when the Turkish ambassador presented his letter of credence to Chilean authorities.⁵² The correspondence between Turkish ambassador Talat Kaya Alp and the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which constitute some of the first official reports on Chilean-Turkish relations, not only offer information about the political and economic situation of Chile, but more importantly shed light on Turkey's foreign policy agenda as well as the broader political dynamics of that time. The language used, although formal and so-called 'politically correct', reveals the point of view of Turkish decision makers. In 1931, the Turkish Embassy at Santiago de Chile closed down for a

⁵² *Republica De Chile, Memoria Del Ministerio De Relaciones Exteriores Y Comercio, Correspondiente al año 1930.* Imprenta Chile, 1931.

brief period and the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, took over the works and representation.

Dated August 18, 1930, Turkish ambassador in Santiago Talat Kaya Alp's first official report addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey Dr. Tevfik Rüştü Aras constitutes the oldest diplomatic record written by a Turkish ambassador to Chile. In the report, Kaya Alp comments on his journey to various Latin American cities such as Buenos Aires, Santos, and Montevideo. Kaya Alp continues to describe his encounter with some Syrian Muslims who had maintained their former, Ottoman citizenship in Buenos Aires. As they warmly welcomed the Turkish ambassador, they expressed their sense of belonging and continued allegiance to the Turkish Republic. Without official Turkish state representation in Argentina, these Syrians, as well as Turkish Jews had not been able to identify themselves. The ambassador continues his letter by describing the details of his route from Buenos Aires and Santiago and expresses his surprise when he met five or six Muslims in a remote village called Mendoza.

The second part of Kaya Alp's report focuses on his visit to the city of Santiago. After a detailed description of Santiago, Kaya Alp explains how he has rented a building for the Turkish diplomatic mission to Chile. The ambassador highlights the presence of approximately one thousand Turkish Jewish subjects mostly coming from Izmir. According to information gathered from a lawyer with permission from the consular mission to Chile, the number of Ottoman subjects who have maintained their old identity constitutes up to 11,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Syrians. The ambassador signs off with a pledge that "as soon as an officer of our diplomatic mission works on [the issue of] our subjects", he will provide more detailed information.⁵³

⁵³ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, no: 1, received on 22/09/1930.

In his second report on September 20, 1930, ambassador Talat Kaya Alp comments on the celebration of the Day of the Chilean Independence on September 18 and explains the historical background of Chilean independence from the Spanish administration in 1810. In the report, Kaya Alp provides information about an official dinner to which all *chef de missions* of the embassies operating in Chile were invited at the house of the Chilean president. During this dinner, the minister of foreign affairs gave a welcoming speech and, in the name of all ambassadors, the ambassador of the Vatican spoke and honoured the Chilean president. The dinner was the first diplomatic dinner ambassador Kaya Alp attended.

Then, the ambassador expresses the most important part of his letter, an official invitation to the opera as a guest of the President of Chile, Carlos Ibanez, where he was invited to sit next to the president. In a conversation with the Chilean president during the intermission, Kaya Alp expresses his gratitude in the name of the heroic Turkish nation for being seated next to the president. The Chilean president then spoke about his appreciation for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and asked whether the Turkish president was beloved by the entire Turkish nation. Ambassador Kaya Alp confirmed that all Turkish citizens love the president. As they continued their conversation, they spoke about the Turkish mission and the ambassador informed the president of Chile that due to the Lausanne Treaty around thousand Syrians maintained their Turkish nationality.

Kaya Alp continues his report with details about a military parade and information about a Chilean national day during which all houses' exterior need to be painted. He concludes his letter stating that Chile's neighbouring states, Peru and Argentina, have experienced two coups

resulting in the arrest of the ruling presidents of both countries, yet that Chile has seen no disruption during its two-day celebration of independence.⁵⁴

In the third report dated September 27, 1930, the Turkish ambassador states that his research over the last two months showed that there are approximately 1,000 Syrian Muslims who carry the Turkish nationality. He continued, however, that in reality there are around 20,000 Syrians and Palestinians living in Chile, nearly all of them have accepted the English and French Mandates. He says that there are also some Muslim Arabs living in Brazil and Argentina who don't want to "leave the Turkish flag" and therefore recommends to open an embassy in Buenos Aires, positioning Argentina as the most powerful and commercially significant state in Latin America. Such a consulate can deal with Turkish Jews and Turkish Syrians living there. Kaya Alp concludes saying that Argentina is more important than Chile and that he is willing to take responsibility over a possible embassy there too.

In another report numbered as five and dated November 15, 1930, Talat Kaya Alp comments on the Chilean economy, deeply affected by the economic crisis of 1929. The ambassador writes that Chile, in comparison to its neighbours, has a large army and navy. Thanks to its rich copper and niter (saltpeter) mines, Chile was able to largely maintain a stable economy, yet the depression has also had negative effects there. London and New York have cut the copper prices in half over the last ten months, hurting the Chilean economy further. He continues his report with details on the Chilean economy and state budget.

A report dated November 28, 1930⁵⁵ comments on the 1931 fiscal year of the Chilean government. According to the ambassador, the Chilean government is facing a budget deficit. However, he admires the allocation of 7% of the budget to education, as was done in 1930.

⁵⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, September 20, 1930. No:2. Received on 18/10/1930.

⁵⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 28/11/1930. No:7. Received on 29/12/1930.

Therefore, the Chilean population is almost fully literate. Primary education is tuition-free. Some of Chile's newspapers have a daily distribution of close to 200,000 copies, demonstrating the high education of the Chilean people. Kaya Alp also comments on the budget of the foreign ministry, which now comprises 28 foreign missions, according to information provided by the Foreign Minister of Chile. At the time of writing, the population of Santiago counted 700,000. The report continues with detailed information on the 1931 budget and a comparative review of the previous year's budget.

On December 13, 1930, Talat Kaya Alp informs Ankara that, a day before President Carlos Ibanez del Campo visit to Santiago, a gang has attempted to bomb a bridge that the president was to use during his trip around the city. The bandits are now under custody and have expressed they have no ties or affiliation with a political group. Kaya Alp also shares that a division of the military has unsuccessfully attempted to take-over the government through a coup. The ambassador concludes his report with the information that this was the third coup attempt in the last month and that Chile's [political] future is uncertain.⁵⁶

In order to reduce governmental costs, Turkish ambassador Talat Kaya Alp writes to the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü, and advices to close down the mission in Chile in a confidential letter on February 28, 1931. Similarly, the Chilean representatives consider ending the mission in Turkey due to financial considerations. The report mentions that while Turkish Jews have registered themselves to the Turkish foreign mission, Palestinian Muslims and Arabs, the ambassador believes, weren't equally willing to register themselves. Kaya Alp states that the motivation to open an embassy in Chile was very different. Considering these motivations

⁵⁶ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 13/12/1930. No:8. Received on 13/01/1931.

invalid, Kaya Alp consequently recommends to close down the mission due to financial constraints, as he was in favour of austerity.⁵⁷

Similar to the previous report, the following letter also focuses on the state of the Chilean economy written on June 10, 1931. Kaya Alp notes the harsh impact of the global economic depression on Chile and the increase in cases of bankruptcy. Taxes and customs have increased. The ambassador believes that, day by day, the economic hardships that the Chilean people are facing are leading up to a social uprising.⁵⁸ On July 24, 1931, the ambassador notes that the cabinet has changed three times over the course of one week, there is no stability, and people have taken to the streets to protest. Indeed, two days later, on July 26, 1931, Kaya Alp shares that the uprising has turned “bloody”. Doctors are on strike, the public is in confrontation with police forces, and that around 400 people have died or are wounded. The demonstrations are demanding the president to resign.⁵⁹ A second report that day adds that at 11 o’clock the president has resigned and has taken refuge at the American embassy. People are chanting.

On June 16, 1932, in an official document to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Turkish Embassy in London states that, according to the Morning Post and Daily Express newspapers, Chile is threatened by the rise of a possible Soviet or military dictatorship. The following report dated on June 19, 1931 states that the Communists in Chile are inactive and the moderates have taken over the government.⁶⁰ On June 22, 1932, the Turkish Embassy in London informs that the new government of Chile has installed martial law. In addition, the leader of the Communist movement, Mr. Grove, has reportedly been sent into exile.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 28/02/1931. No:9.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 10/06/1931, no: 190-65. Received on 09/07/1931.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 26/07/1931, no: 79.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 16/06.1932, no:9806-658 and 19/06/1932, no:9877-723.

There is an official document written by the Turkish Consulate in Barcelona to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on December 24, 1933. This document concerns an official letter by the Chilean Consulate in Barcelona about trade opportunities between Chile and Turkey. The Turkish consulate mentions that the private company Yelkenci Zade has been attempting to establish regularly scheduled boat trips between Turkey and Spain. The Chilean consulate believes it may improve Turkish-Chilean trade as the line could be extended until Chile.⁶¹

The Turkish Embassy in Warsaw sent a report to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on May 8, 1934. The report notes that the Chief of the Chilean Mission in Poland, Mr. Madrid, will relocate and take office as the Chief of Mission in Ankara. A day earlier, he had visited the Turkish delegation where he had expressed his happiness and pride for his new appointment. The Chilean government has also tasked him with the Chilean Mission in Bucharest and Sofia. According to the report, at present, his government has informed Mr. Madrid that his location will be Bucharest, Romania. However, Mr. Madrid has kindly requested to be located in Ankara. The report continues with personal information about Mr. Madrid, stating that he is a “charming” person within the diplomatic corps’ society, since he has left his wife and married a Polish woman. According to the Chief of Mission, he will move to Ankara in the coming summer.⁶²

⁶¹ Ibid. 24/12/1931. No: 61. The letter of Chilean Consulate in Barcelona and the list of references from different cities including İstanbul, Paris, Madrid to this opportunity is attached to this document. There is also a letter from Turkish Foreign Ministry which informs the Turkish Ministry of Economy about the situation.

⁶² Ibid. 08/05/1934. No:187/152.

4.3 First Chilean Representative of the Delegation, Dr. Hector Briones Luco, and his Reports from Istanbul

His first diplomatic country report can be seen as follows:

Constantinople, January 10, 1930

Mr. Minister,

In accordance with the instructions noted in the Confidential Circular No. 6, dated 2nd of November 1929, I have the honour to inform you gentlemen on the work accomplished by the undersigned on this and on the international and domestic situation of this country, in summary form as the Department requested.

Regarding the first point, this Legation, having studied in its most varied aspects the commercial potential of our country with very little favourable results which we have informed you about via long and detailed reports, has materialized in the absence of other more interesting topics, the following:

1. To maintain, as much as possible the most cordial friendly relations between the governments of Chile and Turkey. The background to reflect this situation has been reported in two notes to the Ministry;
2. To make this government interested in the appointment of a diplomatic representative in our country with permanent residence in Santiago, a management that had a happy outcome. This representative, whom I mentioned on a previous occasion, will take place, in character of Official of

Trade, according to information of the same Minister of Foreign Affairs of Directors, within short term and its category, within the course of a few months this year, will be elevated to the Extraordinary Envoy and the Plenipotentiary Minister, while retaining his residence in our capital;

3. To achieve for the Association of Producers, products in both this country and those called "Balkan countries", whose foreign trade in general is in transit through a free zone declared as a part of the port of Constantinople, providing at once with all the necessary elements for easy mobilization of the received products. The mentioned Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tevfik Rüştü, has declared to me that for his government there will be not even a minor inconvenience for the realization of such a project deemed beneficial to the country. Since the Association has told me lately that they consider this project neither prudent nor appropriate for their interests, and they will not undertake any serious work in order to conquer this market, I have not been able to drive this work to a further development;

4. Commercial Treaty

Despite the insinuation that I received from the Government to carry out an act of this nature, I have not considered it appropriate, seeing the limited commercial expectations for both countries, addressing this issue, I have limited myself, to communicating this issue for illustrative purposes to the Ministry. If later, due to a constant and accurate propaganda, this country would be in a position to consume normally significant amounts of saltpeter and, for our part, the renowned Turkish tobaccos that, for now, are

the only possible exchange products, brings a need that a treaty of this kind may be necessary, it is already known that we would have the goodwill of the government.

5. Propaganda

This has been done and is being done upon express and verbal instructions of the Department, in a very measured way to avoid waking between these nationals hoping to travel to our country, whose immigration to our country is not recommended. Not all that has been done in this regard has had another purpose than to satisfy our national feeling, often tortured with the almost total ignorance we have here against our value as a South American nation.

The most remote centres of the most civilized cities, whose imperturbable and legendary indolence is held in a state of semi-barbarism, there is nothing to expect and many things to lose.

International situation

In the international arena, Turkey begins to enjoy certain considerations and sympathies, taking into account that her government seeks, in a conciliatory spirit, solving all those problems that have arisen between her and the allied nations, rooting from the Great War.

Therefore, it has been seen that many of the issues that were pending with France received happy solutions. The demarcation of the border with Syria, which, as is known, is under the domination of the above mentioned nation, is recovered, through financial compensation, on the Mersin-Adana

line, problems that during a certain moment provoked serious discussions, have been resolved in agreement; and with reference to trade relations, they have been recently ruled on a Treaty of Commerce, of easy implementation.

The visit recently made to this port by an English fleet, which led to mass demonstrations of joy, is proof of good friendship between the Republic and the British Empire culminating in a Treaty of Commerce and Establishment, whose negotiations were already in fair mode of settlement.

The Treaties that govern good relations with Germany have been likewise on a way to solution, following, among others, developing seamless business transactions with that country.

The relationships of all kinds with the United States of America are in very good standing. A new Trade Treaty has been signed that puts both countries in a position to develop their commercial interests harmonically and usually. With Japan, to which they have sent a new ambassador, nothing divides a current relationships ... Relations with Italy are really friendly and they develop in a spirit of mutual and solid trust.

The visit of a powerful fleet of airplanes of this Kingdom, lately made to this country, was an eloquent declaration of interest between these two Governments to remain united in solving all those problems in the near east, which are also of concern of the Western countries. Within these problems that one related to the domination of the Mediterranean Sea should be noted.

The old and already experienced friendship with Soviet Russia, ally of Turkey, is expressed herein by a desire to strengthen on serious economic basis and purpose, are studied, with hopes of reaching positive results, commercial agreements which will facilitate and promote the exchange between the two countries.

Friendly relations with Bulgaria has had its best expression in the recent conclusion of a nonaggression and arbitration pact that guarantees, politically and legally, the peaceful settlement of all disputes which may possibly arise between the two nations and with Hungary and Persia, which, as above, are neighbours to them, to follow a normal course, here having an obvious interest in improving them every time better.

With Greece a bothersome dispute caused by the expulsion of more than one million five hundred thousand Greeks, keep these countries very close to the hatefulness atmosphere, the relations they have, of course, are very broken. The issues raised in this regard, however have to pass through the sieve of the Joint Commission on Exchange of Greek and Turkish nationals, a neutral institution appointed by the League of Nations which is headed by our compatriot Mr. Rivas Vicuña, and which presents no easy solutions.

However, both the eminent citizen who currently directs the destiny of Greece, Mr. Venizelos, and the Government of Turkey, having a sincere purpose of reaching a friendly settlement, it is expected to occur in less time

than is thought, some incident to allow negotiations to place bases, if no arbitration, more conciliatory.

Relations with South American countries, which until recently have not offered this government a special interest, begin to take greater cohesion, which is proven by the fact that a new Turkish diplomatic representative appointed in Chile, which is aforementioned, and another representative, submitted to the character of Extra-ordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister for Brazil and Argentina, to reside in Buenos Aires. It is hoped that in turn, the latter two countries do the same thing.

Meanwhile, our country, having been the first to spontaneously take this step, here enjoys general considerations and sympathies. I do not think, however, that these representations will have some fruit in the economic sphere, given the great distance, racially and geographically, separates us from this nation.

Interior Situation

Turkey, governed by men of tough energy and bright patriotism, advances, though very painfully, on the path of progress.

The people, especially those living in the Asian regions, constantly receive lessons in civics and government strives to provide, by all means available, good work items for the cultivation of the land, the only thing that shows ability. ...of colonization of the parts of the land by national elements, which were mostly owned or acquired by the State and which, until recently, were considered semi uncultivable. Part of these lands were distributed

during the past year, among the villagers estimated to be best capable, around 110,000 hectares.

The organization of cooperatives is still unknown among smallholders, the government supports and encourages the creation of such groups for agricultural production, but not always successfully. The generality of these owners, dominated by an atavistic instinct of irrational distrust or selfishness refuse to enter that way forward, with prejudice; for their own interests.

Since last year the cultivation of vines suffered greatly because of heavy and untimely rains, the Government intends to mandate the adoption of sheltering shops for such plantations, whose products, converted into raisins, represent one of the most important export trade lines.

The Grand National Assembly, upon initiative of the executive, prepares to discuss various economic laws, the most interesting being the one that creates the State Bank, whose primary purpose will be to stabilize the currency, which has recently undergone some changes on the grounds that many traders who face the recent increase in tariffs, imported with great primacy strong loads of goods, whose value has now been payable in foreign currencies and in an unusual and violent form.

Farmers representing 70% of the inhabitants of Turkey, economic policy pursued by this Government is open protection to this great mass of the population and to fortify them in their interests, for them without having to show signs of other type of activities, tending essentially their action.

In utilizing the State to enrich the citizen, like they call it here, they dedicate everything to the agriculture, they base the public richness on the most –not to say the only– solid basis that exists in the country.

The national budget has been dispatched in the Great Assembly in balance; but it is expected, given the severe economic crisis that goes through this Republic, which does not allow traders more than a very small importation of foreign goods of ordinary consumption– which will not arrive in the same manner at the end of the year, because of the consequent reduction of customs entries.

The diplomatic report that Hector Briones Luco sent on January 10, 1930 from Istanbul to Santiago has detailed information about Turkey's foreign relations at the time, especially issues in and with neighbouring countries. The report evidently pays importance to the commercial issues too. Briones Luco writes that Turkey has recently started to pay greater attention to the Latin American continent, as demonstrated by the appointment of diplomatic representatives in Chile and Argentina. Interestingly, the report highlights the agricultural nature of Turkish society.

In 1941 Chilean delegation moves to Ankara and functions there for a short period of time during the World War II.

4.4 Foreign Policy of Turkish Republic in the Early Years, between 1923 and 1945

After the war of independence, the newly emerged Republic of Turkey's foreign policy was constructed on the concepts of peace and neutrality. Mustafa Kemal's frequently quoted

words, ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’⁶³, and the resolute policies that he followed in this direction may be the most significant evidence of the Turkish Republic’s foreign policy in its early years.

Atatürk approached every kind of issue primarily with rationalism and realism. In this context, his foreign policy vision arose on the same principles as well. Thus, foreign policy stance adopted during the difficult National War of Independence, was first of all consistent with the main goal of establishing an independent Turkish State within national borders. This attitude, which rejected adventurous and expansionist inclinations without compromising independence, left its mark on a set of developments that secured the unconditional independence of the Republic of Turkey. One of those developments was, for instance, announcing that the provisions postulated in the Treaty of Sevres and Armistice of Mudros were unacceptable. Another one was negotiating and implementing the Treaty of Lausanne without compromising national interests.

Gaining independence was Turkish foreign policy’s first objective and when it was acquired following the struggle conducted against the enemy states of that time both in battle fields and in the area of diplomacy, our (Turkish) foreign policy’s fundamental principle was defined as “peace”. This objective finds its expression in our (Mustafa Kemal) great leader’s “Peace at Home,

⁶³ Jacob M. Landau translates the famous words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ‘Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh’ as ‘Peace at home and peace abroad’ whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey uses ‘world’ instead of ‘abroad’.

Peace in the World” maxim and today it continues to be the basic guiding principle of our (Turkish) foreign policy.⁶⁴

On July 24, 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The Lausanne Treaty marked the end of the War of Independence, and established the independent Republic of Turkey. A couple of months later, on October 29, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the Republic of Turkey and became its first president. The Republic of Turkey entered the international political arena on a much lower level of international standing than the level at which the Ottoman Empire had left the scene (Barlas and Güvenç 2014: 49). The Turkish government was focused on maintaining her sovereignty and securing her borders while promoting international peace and non-aggression. It entered a number of treaties and agreements in order to further secure her position. Tevfik Rüştü Aras acted as the Turkish foreign minister until Atatürk’s death. They worked closely together and Rüştü Aras received most of his orders directly from the President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, since he shared a personal interest in foreign politics. The Foreign Ministry also recognizes a great role for Mustafa Kemal himself, “who accurately analysed the period, turned the situation in his favour by waiting for conditions to mature and acted in cooperation with all countries in accordance with the country’s interests.”⁶⁵

In the Great Speech, a six-day long address to the People’s Party from October 15 to 20, 1927, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk presented an overview of the young republic’s struggle to survive and modernize and the policies proposed to do so. The speech also highlighted four characteristics of foreign policies, according to Landau, which can be listed as follows: 1) Turkish foreign policy was divided in two periods, the first being the War of Independence and

⁶⁴ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-Atatürks-era.en.mfa>

⁶⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-Atatürks-era.en.mfa>

the second Turkey's victory and the Lausanne negotiations; 2) strategic use of foreign policy to increase Turkey's chance of military victory and national survival; 3) the use of foreign policy to get the necessary assistance for Turkey's survival and acceptance of Turkey's status as an independent state; and 4) the first period was characterized by military challenges and conflict which made foreign policy a high priority, while foreign relations were less urgent in the second period as modernization at home took precedent (Landau, 2004: 128). The Great Speech could be divided into "two clusters, radical Turkocentrism and stark realism, both bearing the imprint of Mustafa Kemal's own decision-making" (Landau, 2004: 130).

The set of ideas together formed the ideological base of *Atatürkçülük* (Kemalism), which evolved gradually under Mustafa Kemal's governance in the 1930s. The basic principles of *Atatürkçülük* were laid down in the party programme of Republican People's Party of 1931. They were republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism. These six principles, symbolized in the party emblem as six arrows, were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937 and until today remain the symbol of the Republican People's Party (CHP). According to Aydin, Turkey's foreign policy is directed by a set of principles laid out by the country's founder, Atatürk: "establishment and preservation of a national state with complete independence conditioned by modern Turkish nationalism; promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization by means of Kemalist principles; and attachment to realistic and peaceful means in foreign policy actions" (Kedourie, 2000: 171). Moreover, the reform campaign Atatürk envisioned domestically would only be possible with a peaceful foreign policy. With her careful diplomacy, "the Republic of Turkey born from the ashes of an empire

could focus on her future instead of the past, determine her interests calmly and with a common sense and take the necessary steps intrepidly.”⁶⁶

One of Atatürk’s first foreign policy actions was a rapprochement with the Soviet Union so as to guarantee the security of Turkey’s north eastern borders. In fact, the concern of the founders of the republic regarding foreign policy had already started before the War of Independence and matured during the war. Having a strong secularist and pro-Western outlook, Turkey could not focus its foreign policy on its Muslim neighbours only, and Mustafa Kemal promoted good relations with all of Turkey’s neighbours and improving relations with other states and incorporate some aspects of their cultures into Turkish society. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was committed to keep Turkey independent, especially from the big players in the West and the Soviet Union. Although Turkey established ties with both, including a 1925 Friendship Treaty with the USSR, it aimed “not to allow the West to treat Turkey as a semi-colony, as the West had treated the Ottoman Empire, or let the Soviet Union patronize Ankara and act as ‘big brother’ (Ahmad, 2014: 90).

One of the major issues among Turkish nationalists during the War of Independence was the diplomatic relations with Soviet Union. From Ankara, the nationalist forces were looking for military and financial aid and realized that Soviet support was extremely vital for the Turkish struggle against the Allied occupation. At the beginning of 1921, the negotiations between nationalists and Bolsheviks accelerated. On March 16, 1921, Turkish nationalists signed a Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union. It was the first diplomatic treaty concluded by the nationalists. The financial and military supplies the nationalists in turn expected were delayed. It was really only after the nationalist victory of Sakarya (September 1921) that they started to receive an arms supply, and subsequently the Soviets played a crucial role in rearming the nationalist forces

⁶⁶ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-Atatürks-era.en.mfa>

before the general offensive eleven months later (Zürcher, 2004: 153). Taking this into account, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues again sought the Soviet Union's 'friendship' after the Treaty of Lausanne was concluded. One of Mustafa Kemal's major foreign policy aims was having good relationships with the Soviet Union to ensure Turkey's Northeastern territories.

From 1923 to 1926, one of the main issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda was the Mosul question. The status of Mosul could not be defined during the Lausanne Conference, and its resolution was postponed to a later date to be settled between Turkey and the United Kingdom. Upon request of mediation, the League of Nations Council, to which Turkey, then not a member, did not send a representative, but a letter, passed a decision on December 16, 1925, completely contrary to Turkey's demands. It was decided that there would be a new agreement between Britain and Iraq, and Mosul would be a part of Iraq, which was then under British mandate (Alantar, 1994: 60) a decision Turkey strongly contested; it again felt cornered by the British. The border between Turkey and Iraq was determined by the League of Nations in Brussels. Although the Turkish government was angered by the league's decision, it was forced to accept it (Alantar, 1994: 61) as conditions were too dire to fight a war for Mosul. However, on December 17, a day after the League of Nations' resolution, Turkey retaliated by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the Soviet Union (Evans, 1982: 87). The treaty was renewed in 1935 for another 10 years. The Mosul dispute showed that Turkey was wary of isolation, thus seeking closer ties with the Soviet Union, while also turning to diplomacy to solve conflicts. The strategy of diplomacy and compromise would dictate Turkish foreign policy throughout the interwar years.

In the years following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, it is observed that Turkey strives to get recognition as an independent nation from other nations around the world.

When the Mosul dispute was resolved against Turkey's interests, the new republic became even more eager to do so. During its early years, the Turkish Republic mostly enjoyed good relations with nearby countries in the Caucasus and West Asia. The first foreign diplomatic mission – from the Soviet Union – to the Turkish Grand National Assembly Government was opened in Ankara in 1920. It was followed by representatives of Georgia, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan in 1921, Bulgaria in 1923, and a military representative from France throughout the Turkish War of Independence.

By the year 1924, the Turkish Republic had established diplomatic missions abroad in 12 different countries as embassies and charge d'affaires, and in 18 different countries as consulates. In 1930, the total of Turkish diplomatic missions reached 27, and the number of consulates and consulate generals reached 48. Between 1930 and 1950 and especially after the Second World War, due to the changing world map and decolonization Turkey opened diplomatic missions in newly established countries, thereby greatly increasing the number of foreign missions.

According to Oral Sander, analyzing "history" is the analysis of the causes to a large extent. The causes analyzed by historians are both numerous and complicated. The task of historians who encounter such numerous causes is to put them in order of importance and decide which is the most important. The analysis of each historical event revolves around the priority of its causes.⁶⁷ From this point of view, such an approach is thought to be appropriate considering Turkey's assumed efforts to be recognized by other countries in the international platform before and especially after the establishment of the Republic. Turkey has to reach a solution during the Lausanne negotiations and who among the problems left after the solution during the Mosul

⁶⁷ The issue was discussed at a seminar held at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara on November, 28 1973. Edited by Firat, M. 1998.

issue League of Nations, was left alone in the face of United Kingdom, where the decision has not been obstacles to rise to his own detriment. At the time, Turkey's League of Nations was not a member.

It is important to shy away from any generalizations in foreign policy; rather than ascribing to some general behaviour one should analyse each case “located in its specific conditionalities within the international system” (Kedourie, 2000: 154). Depending on the situation and time, foreign policy can take on different forms, and Turkey is but one small, yet unique part of a larger international system that shapes its foreign policies. Indeed, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union should not be mistaken for a shift to the East; in fact, at home, modernization reforms with a distinct Western character were well under way. On April 9, 1928, the Turkish Republic furthered the process of secularization by removing Islam as “religion of the state” from her constitution. Later that year, on August 9, the Arabic alphabet was officially replaced by the Roman alphabet. The language reform had significant consequences, breaking people’s cultural and intellectual ties to the Ottoman past. Mustafa Kemal began an educational campaign to educate the illiterate masses. This language and education reform constitutes a cornerstone in Turkish history and symbolizes Turkey’s break with its Ottoman/Islamic past and a reorientation to the West. In 1931 Turkish women gained the right to vote and be elected in municipal elections, and in 1934 they gained full political rights. They were encouraged to wear Western style clothing and not veil their heads.

It was an advantage for the young Turkish Republic to take over a legacy of acting foreign missions and consulates in Europe, United States and Asia from the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it could be a disadvantage for the Turkish Republic which did not want to associate herself with her Ottoman past. For this reason the new decision-makers had to find a

balance regarding the diplomatic heritage of the Ottoman era (Barlas and Güvenç 2014: 74). Eventually, İsmet İnönü, head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, declared the Representation of the Ankara Government in Paris as the centre that all Turkish foreign diplomatic missions respond to. The declaration was an assignee in fact from the Ankara Government to take over the Ottoman diplomatic missions (Barlas and Güvenç 2014: 76).

Although Turkey was disappointed by the League of Nations' decision regarding the Mosul conflict, it decided to keep its candidacy to become a member of the League so as to keep a closer position and contact with the West. Although there was no progress at first, on July 6, 1932, Turkey was invited to join the organization by the Parliament of League of Nations. The invitation was debated in the Turkish Parliament and the decision to become a member of the League of Nations passed on July 18, 1932.⁶⁸ One of the main motives behind Turkey's membership application to the League of Nations was to secure herself against the Soviet Union who wanted a warm water passage to the Mediterranean. During this course of time, while trying to gain international acceptance, strengthen its independence, and its capacity for deterrence, the Turkish Republic also pursued peaceful political initiatives, which prompted the invitation to membership.

As Aydın states, another factor in Turkish foreign policy is the country's keen interest in promoting her public image in the international community (Kedourie, 2000: 181). Turkey's

⁶⁸ Turkish Foreign Ministry summarizes that invitation as follows; Thanks to a balanced and rational foreign policy, during her weakest period in military and economic terms Turkey reinforced her sovereignty over the Turkish Straits, and the country's geopolitical and strategic integrity was maintained; Hatay which was part of the National Pact was integrated to Turkey without a shot being fired; an improvement which was not witnessed before in Turkish-Greek relations was achieved and a period of friendship and cooperation spread throughout the Balkans. As regards the Mosul Question, the League of Nations' arbitration was accepted instead of unilateral acts. As a result of this, although Mosul was not left to Turkey, this demonstrated very clearly her respect for international law and peace. Thus, Turkey became the only country to be invited to the League of Nations without submitting an application and she joined the organization in 1932. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-Atatürks-era.en.mfa>

concern over her international image may be due to the isolation she suffered at the beginning of the young Turkish Republic. It was important for Turkey to be recognized by other democratic and so-called developed states within but also outside Europe. Especially after the distraught with the Mosul conflict, Turkey felt the need to make itself better known to the world. The amity treaty signed with Chile, at the beginning of 1926, is in reality a diplomatic effort to introduce itself to a big, new continent.

According to Sönmezoğlu (2006: 764) between 1923 and 1945, Turkey was predominantly dealing with the problems that were left by the Treaty of Lausanne with great importance to the principle of statism. Turkey maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, especially when Turkey faced tension with the West. However, as the Second World War approached, Turkey began to position herself closer to the Western European democratic regimes. Throughout Turkish history, it has felt threatened by its Northern neighbour, Russia/Soviet Union. Even when the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1925, Turkey remained distrustful. As Aydın points out, Mustafa Kemal recognized the huge role of the Soviet Union in global politics, predicting a major war in Europe to erupt in the 1940s, with the Soviet Union as one of its victors, as early as 1934: “We Turks, as Russia’s close neighbour, and the nation which has fought more wars against her than any other country, are following closely the courses of events there, and see the danger stripped of all camouflage. The Bolsheviks have now reached a point at which they constitute the greatest threat not only to Europe but to all of Asia” (Kedourie, 2000: 165).

On July 18, 1932, Turkey entered the League of Nations and agreed to support the principle of ‘collective security’ against aggression. Thus, when Italy was facing sanctions because of the abuses in Ethiopia, the Turkish government withdrew from any trading with Italy.

With the signing of the Montreux Convention in 1936, Turkey entered equal footing as the Western powers and was exempted from any limitations of the Lausanne Treaty. The first decade of the Turkish Republic was characterized by a focus on the domestic front, constructing state institutions and strengthening an independent economy and society. With her League of Nations membership, the republic broke this inward policy and re-entered an alliance with the West.

During this decade Turkey also strengthened her regional prestige; Barlas and Güvenç define Turkey as a middle-sized state yet a large regional power in the middle of the 1930s (2014: 37). On February 9, 1933, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania signed the Balkan Entente. The same day a year later, the countries signed the Balkan Pact. The pact declared that in the event of an aggression, the signatory states would help to protect each other's borders. Although Turkey had wished to involve the greater powers in the pact as well, the pact was a success in Turkish diplomacy; with the pact, Turkey became a leading actor in a region where alliances were previously made against the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan Pact was signed at a time when Turkey matured her regional power (Barlas and Güvenç, 2014: 25). On December 1, 1935, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed a Non-Aggression Pact. In 1937, the four countries signed the Saadabad Treaty. They agreed to respect and protect each other's borders, not to intervene in international affairs, and not to commit any act of aggression against one another. Most importantly, the treaty aimed to secure the borders and prevent any future border disputes between the four states.

In the 1930s, Turkey took on a non-revisionist foreign policy in line with its motto 'Peace at home, peace in the world'. The Turkish government was keen to promote peace and non-aggression, demonstrated by her stance in various international conflicts. For example, During the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939, Turkey supports the side of the Republicans. At

the same time, Turkey was concerned about Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean and carefully sought relations with the Soviet Union while also improving her ties with Western powers including the United States. It even got closer to Greece and both governments signed a Treaty of Friendship in October 1930. Turkey aimed to assert her international position and to revise postwar treaties using diplomacy and timing, as in the case of Alexandretta, using bi- and multilateral negotiations to manage her foreign policy interests.

On October 3, 1935, Italy, then under the rule of Mussolini, invades Abyssinia (today's Ethiopia). Consequently, Turkey grows more fearful of Italian aspirations in Western Anatolia. Growing increasingly concerned about Germany and Italy's ambitions in Europe and the greater region, Atatürk and the Turkish government reconsidered the foreign policy objectives. Turkey realized it had to strengthen her position in the Dardanelles and in Thrace and therefore sought to end the demilitarization sanctions of the Lausanne Treaty. She had to improve and expand her military forces. Moreover, Turkey, already enjoying good relations with the Soviet Union, was eager to establish an alliance with France and Great Britain. Aware of the imminent threat, Great Britain realized the benefits of demilitarization. Turkey herself had grown suspicious of Italian ambitions since 1933. The West-European states realized that in the event of Italian aggression, Turkey could play a crucial role defending her own but also greater Western interests. Thus, during an international conference of the Lausanne signatory states, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits was signed on July 20, 1936. According to the agreement, Turkey was allowed to remilitarize the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, while Black Sea states were able to send warships, with limited tonnage, into the Straits during peacetime. Such size restrictions did not apply to other states, and enjoyed triple tonnage limitations. In the event of war, Turkey would be able to close the Straits at its own discretion.

Hatay, a province on the Mediterranean coast in southern Anatolia, becomes the center of Turkey's foreign policy in 1938. On July 5, Turkey occupied the *sancak* (an Ottoman administrative unit, district) of Alexandretta, after France had conceded its separate status a year earlier. In June 1939, the province officially becomes a part of Turkey with the signing of the Franco-Turkish agreement. In the 1930s, Turkey and France saw a short-lived conflict over the province of Alexandretta (today's Hatay). The Lausanne Treaty had ceded the province to France, as part of the Syrian mandate, with cultural autonomy for its Turkish community. When France announced it would grant independence to Syria in 1936, and Alexandretta would remain part of it, the Turkish community brought the case to the League of Nations. Alexandretta was granted special political status but was to remain in economic union with Syria. Turkey was not satisfied, and as France was now more worried about the advance of Nazi Germany than a province it would lose control of either way, it was eager to maintain good relations with Turkey, a possible ally against Germany. In 1938, they established a joint administration shared between the Turks and French. In September 1938, an independent state of Hatay was created in September 1938 and in June 1939 Hatay announced its union with Turkey, an issue that remains contested in Syria up to today. The case shows how Turkey was prepared to strategically use "prudent timing and shrewd diplomacy, rather than unilateral action" (Yılmaz, 2015: 90).

On May 12, 1939, England and Turkey sign a joint declaration of friendship and mutual assistance in case of conflict or aggression in the Mediterranean. Later, also France and Turkey sign a non-aggression pact and France agrees to return Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey on June 26. In October, the three countries come together in Ankara and sign the Anglo-French-Turkish Fifteen Year Mutual Assistance and Alliance. Germany and the Soviet Union sign the German-

Soviet Pact on August 23, 1939. To Turkey, this pact marked the end of a possible tripartite guarantee against fascist aggression.

During the Second World War, Turkey aimed to remain neutral. Turkish decision-makers, recognizing the country's limited resources in the event of a war, were keen to protect Turkey's borders. Despite pressure from both sides, Turkey maintained a neutral position in World War II. With first-hand experiences from World War I, Turkey's leaders at the time were hesitant to repeat the same mistakes and understood Turkey had "nothing to gain and everything to lose by joining the war" (Hale, 2013: 56). They skilfully used diplomacy to stay neutral throughout nearly the entirety of the war and strategically used their "small state status from a liability to an asset by economically benefiting from their situation while trying to remain out of military conflict" (Yılmaz 2015: 103). During the Second World War period, Turkey's foreign policy was directed by key political figures who carefully assessed the existing situation and their past experiences and adapted the country's foreign policy aims accordingly. President İnönü closely followed foreign affairs himself and appointed experienced decision-makers such as Şükrü Saraçoğlu and Numan Menemencioğlu, as his advisors. With this careful diplomacy, Turkey would guard itself from the horrors of war that European countries faced, and was able to maintain her independence without any loss in lives or territory.

On the first day of September 1939, World War II starts with the German invasion of Poland. The Turkish Foreign Minister travels to Moscow for negotiations, but fails to secure a guarantee. While Great-Britain and France declare war on Germany, Turkey decides to remain neutral. On November 1, President İnönü officially declares Turkey's neutrality, while committing to Turkey's friendship with Britain and Soviet Union. In March 1941, Turkey and the Soviet Union formalize their position by signing the Turco-Soviet Mutual Declaration of

Neutrality. When Germany invaded the Balkans in spring 1941 and came as close as 40 miles from the Turkish border, Turkey was forced to enter negotiations with the German government. On March 4, 1941, President İnönü received a personal letter from Hitler, promising that the German occupation of Bulgaria was aimed to threaten the British forces in Greece and would not endanger the Turkish state. A few months later, Turkey and Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, vowing to respect each other's territories, in June 1941. A couple months later, Turkey and Germany sign a trade agreement, signalling Turkish rapprochement with Berlin.

Throughout the war both domestic politics and the press were kept under tight control and they were both manipulated in Turkey's effort to stay out of the conflict. Turkey's policies during the war have often been seen as immoral and as reneging on the treaty of 1939. The country's international reputation was damaged, but keeping out of the war was a great success in the eyes of politicians who had a clear memory of how the Ottoman Empire allowed itself to be used as a German tool during the First World War, and the disasters that this had brought upon their country.⁶⁹

In February 1943, the war takes a turn when the German army surrenders in Stalingrad. The event also signals a turning point in Turkey's foreign and domestic policy. Until 1943, Turkey had maintained a balanced, neutral position in the war. After Germany's surrender, and with the memory of World War I, Turkey realizes Germany's weakened position and decreases the export of raw materials to Germany. Internally, Turkey distances herself from pan-Turkish and extreme-nationalist movements. As a reflection of her changed stance, the government starts the prosecution of anti-Soviet Turkists in May 1944. In December 1943, President İnönü met with President Roosevelt and President Churchill, where he was requested to enter the war by

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 205.

1944. In spring that year, the Allies pressured Turkey to cut all commercial and diplomatic ties with Germany, which she eventually did on August 2, 1944.

In May 1945, the Second World War comes to an end. By the end of the war, Turkey had managed to maintain her independence without suffering any civilian or territorial losses. The İnönü administration had successfully protected her national interests, namely to maintain the Turkish territories gained in 1923 and uphold Turkish sovereignty. That same year, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship ends. In order to renew the treaty, Moscow demands a change in the Turco-Soviet border and the joint defence of the straits. One year later, Turkey rejects the offer to jointly protect the Dardanelles, feeling confident in the U.S.' support to Turkey. Indeed, on March 12, 1947, the United States promises support to Turkey and Greece against Soviet pressure in the scheme of the Truman Doctrine. Consequently, Turkey ends the Cold War as a Western ally.

On November 10, 1938, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk passes away. On December 26, 1938, he is proclaimed as the Republican People's Party's 'founder and eternal leader' at the party's Extra-Ordinary Congress. Mustafa İsmet İnönü becomes the party's permanent national chief. With his death, a new era in Turkish politics is heralded, moving from a single- to multi-party system. In the late 1940s, various dissidents of the CHP, including Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes and Fuad Köprülü, were expelled from the party and established the Democrat Party, promoting the principles of multi-party politics, democracy, and private property.

In summary, the non-negotiable principles of the Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 1945 were that the borders of the nation would be protected, and on the lands within the borders it would exist as an independent and sovereign state. To achieve these ends, Turkish foreign policy during those years chose neutrality in international relations and conflicts. From a

standpoint of view of a newly established nation this was a rational approach. The founders of the nation, who were also the founders of the principles of Turkey's foreign policy, realized that to safeguard the nation's independence and to be a part of the modern world, it was necessary to build close relations with Europe. During that period, all threats directed to Turkey's sovereignty and independence were stemming from European countries. The only way to cope with and eradicate such threats was to understand and learn their political strategies as well as be on the same side with them, in close proximity. Thus, foreign policies to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the Turkish Republic, founded with tremendous sacrifices and difficulties, were set.

In order to achieve these certain goals, the Turkish foreign policy, in general, adopted the principle of neutrality in international relations and international issues in the period in question. When evaluated in terms of a newly established state, this type of approach is very natural. The founders of the Turkish Republic; thus, decision-makers of its foreign policy realized that maintaining the independence and having a place among contemporary nations could be possible if and only if close relations with Europe were established. For that period, the threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and sovereignty was of western origin. The only way to eliminate or avoid this threat could be possible by standing close to the West and getting to know its values and principles of management at close range. In this way, the foreign policies of Turkey could be implemented to protect the sovereignty and independence of a stronger Republic of Turkey, which was established with great effort. The Foreign Ministry considers the early republican Turkey to have been a great model to other countries noting that "it became a successful model testifying that the basic warrant of independence and welfare was peace, not war".⁷⁰

⁷⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-Atatürks-era.en.mfa>

One of the most significant characteristics of the twentieth century is that Europe lost its supremacy on world politics it maintained until the early periods of the century in the course of time. The supremacy of Continental Europe began to pass to America and Asia somehow after the World War I and during and after the World War II. Many former colonies in Asia and Africa gained their independence and new states emerged within that period. Latin American countries, on the other hand, were present at world political scene as countries that had already gained their independence at the beginning of and after the World War I in a large extent. In this setting, the young Turkish Republic, which fought for its independence after the World War I, signed a mutual recognition agreement with Republic of Chile in Rome, three years after the proclamation of the republic. As it is mentioned, at the end of the Second World War, Turkey sought closer relationships with the United States because of economic and security issues. At the same time, the United States had a growing need to establish closer ties with Turkey to carry out her containment policy of the Soviet Union, starting with the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

4.5 Foreign Policy of Chile and Internal Political Situation between 1926-1945

Chile's victory in War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia brought the country prestige throughout the continent. With her political stability Chile was able to reach the end of the century without witnessing any further serious international conflict. But there were still some border disputes with Argentina, an important country in the region. After solving the Andes boundary case with Argentina in 1902, Chile entered a new era of her foreign policy. Fast growing neighbours, the First World War, and the growing hegemony of the United States forced Chile to reevaluate and restructure her foreign policy principles.

After Chile gained Bolivian and Peruvian territories following the War of the Pacific, it experienced an economic boom due to the nitrate found there. With its profits, Chile tried to provide a better life for (a selection of) her citizens, investing in public works, the military and navy, and an increase in bureaucrats' salaries (Falcoff, 1991: 3). Generally speaking, Chilean foreign policy, throughout its history, has been directed by one simple aim, namely to maintain the territorial borders laid out during the Pacific War (Hickman, 1998: 156). In 1904 and 1929 Chile signed peace treaties with Bolivia and Peru respectively. Over the coming decades, her foreign policy would be based not only on such diplomatic interpretations of international law, but also on deterrent armed force, Chile's status as a long constitutional democracy, careful diplomacy, and peaceful negotiations of disputes (Hickman, 1998: 157).

After the First World War, Chile chose to pay more importance to the continental solidarity and international cooperation under the guidelines of international law. Chilean decision makers were also affected by the idealistic vision of world affairs which intensely dominated the intellectual and political life in Europe at the time. Since the United States strengthened her domination throughout the continent and Argentina was rapidly growing socially and economically presenting a potential rival, Chile was forced to follow a peace-seeking and neutral foreign policy. The sense of international cooperation had become a dominant idea among Chilean ruling elite. At the end of the First World War, Chilean statesmen saw how destructive and disastrous an armed conflict among nations could be. Chile could benefit from the rule of international law and peaceful solutions to the international problems. International continental cooperation, keeping strong ties with Europe, alliance policy with Argentina and Brazil and an attentive relationship with the United States were the main pillars of Chilean foreign policy during 1920s and 1930s.

Chile became a member of the League of Nations in 1920. According to Meneses, who wrote his doctoral dissertation about Chilean foreign policy during the twentieth century, Chile joined the league for three main reasons:

First, it was believed that a new international era had begun and Chile could not be absent from a political body that -apparently- was to govern this new international system. Second the best way to counter Peruvian and Bolivian claims at the League was by being part of it. Third, Chile saw the League as likely to counterbalance any U.S. excesses in the Pan-American system (1988: 182).

Recognizing the idealist perspectives dominating the European decision-making scene, Arturo Fortunato Alessandri, a vigorous politician who fought the presidential election of 1920, entered into office with three main international objectives: first, to adopt international law as the main issue for Chile's foreign policy; second, to develop stable, friendly but at the same time careful relations with the United States; and third, to use diplomatic means to solve the border problems with Peru. Alessandri also believed in the need to widen the horizon of Chile's foreign policy, because he understood that even remote geographies are within reach after the First World War. His foreign policy objectives continued to dominate foreign relations of Chile well after he completed his post.

Historically a stable regime, Chile experienced a period of political instability in the 1920s, witnessing various military governments, resignations, and a new constitution in 1925. President Alessandri resigned after a series of extraordinary events in September 1924. Alessandri voluntarily decided to live in exile in Italy. A governing junta was formed by military

officers. Its most active members, Carlos Ibanez and Marmaduke Grove, entered the stage of Chilean politics. Congress was dissolved and the military junta appointed a new cabinet and adopted new legislation that strongly favoured the working class. The military junta was soon overthrown by another faction of the military and navy and upon invitation Alessandri returned as president in March 1925. A new Constitution was introduced and a new Congress was elected by the end of the year in 1925. Alessandri, with the support of General Ibanez as defense minister, ruled by decree. In 1927, General Ibanez forced the president to resign and became vice president and later president himself in a special election. For the first time in the history of Chile, known as a haven of democracy in the Latin American continent, the army took over and assumed the role of creating and overturning governments until 1932.

Between 1927 and 1929, General Ibanez governed Chile as a dictator until he was deposed by the military. Carlos Ibanez, “one of the more enigmatic figure of Chilean history” in the words of Collier and Sater (2004: 214), formed a new government in 1927. The new government under the strong leadership of Ibanez paid attention and try to solve the border problems with northern neighbour Peru. Ibanez re-established diplomatic relations with Peru in order to solve the Tacna-Arica⁷¹ problem and tried to keep relations warm with the United States. The Ibanez administration in many ways resembled the policies and practices of Portales. The opposition was silenced – at times even through imprisonment – and a massive reform programme was instigated. Yet the reforms as well as Ibanez’ authoritarian nature were met with criticism and dissidence. Eventually, nationwide strikes and riots forced Ibanez to resign. Popular elections were called in 1932 and Alessandri, now the candidate of the Radical Party coalition, was again chosen president by the vast majority of the country.

⁷¹ Tacna-Arica dispute was a conflict over the territory of the provinces Tacna and Arica between Chile and Peru.

These post-war difficulties including serious fiscal and monetary problems and consequently social and political instability forced Chile to focus more on domestic issues rather than international ones. The European states, tired by the Great War, were no longer able to or interested in influencing Latin American politics as they had before. The global economic depression of 1929 solidified the transformation of Chilean politics and economy from a traditional oligarchy to statism and economic nationalism that Alessandri and Ibanez - backed by the military - had started. But the depression had dried up the Chilean economy and opposition to dictator Ibanez now grew among white-collar workers as well. In July 1931, he was forced to resign.

Alessandri assumed his second presidential term in 1932. It was a time when Chile was still suffering the effects of great economic depression. Alessandri's greatest achievements from 1932 to 1938 were to restore stability and lay the foundations for decades of widening democracy (Collier and Sater, 2004: 226). Unlike his first term, Alessandri was now more interested in order than in change, and with an orthodox finance minister, Gustavo Ross, managed to recover the Chilean economy. While remarkably successful in reducing unemployment figures, his government was unable to curtail the high inflation rate. With Alessandri, who had previously been the candidate of the lower classes, more conservative in his politics since his return, opposition on the left grew and became more organized. The number of officially recognized unions doubled during Alessandri's presidential term. Encouraged by the Communist International, the Chilean Communists entered an alliance with the Radicals and Socialist Party. By 1938, this 'Popular Front' included socialists, radicals, communists, democrats, and a confederation of Chilean workers. The political scene became even more

divided with the establishment of a Nazi party and an attempted putsch by Nazi leader Jorge Gonzalez on Marees.

For three decades after 1930 - and indeed until the coup, which brought down the government of Salvador Allende in 1973 - Chilean politics were unique in Latin America, as it was the only country in the continent able to sustain an electoral democracy that included major Marxist parties (Drake, 1993: 87). The Chilean economy also partly recovered in mid 1930s when the Alessandri regime restored prosperity. As a result of social and economical progress, Chile also gained confidence in her foreign policy. Chile sought to follow a non-aligned foreign policy or in other words anti-block policy. A quotation from E. Meneses (1988: 189) illuminates Chile's position further:

In 1936 Chile expressed her proposal "for a rational reorganisation of the political structure" of the League, in order to transform it in a universal organisation. Chilean policy makers argued with some reason that it was not an effective international factor because of its lack of universality. Too many countries were not represented and because of its inability to enforce sanctions it was losing prestige amongst smaller nations. Only being universal could it be a coercive organisation, otherwise they argued it was merely an alliance and Chile was against alliances. Unless the covenant included all nations it should remain a *de jure* non-coercive organisation.

Chilean foreign policy sought a balance between United States, Great Britain, and Japan - as a key power in the Asian-Pacific - during the 1920s. This started to change when Germany and Italy came to the stage by the mid 1930s. Both countries became important figures in terms

of trade and exporting political ideologies in the Latin American continent including Chile. Especially Germany emerged as a favourable trade partner with her rapidly growing industry and export capacity and a good possible customer for Chilean export goods such as nitrate.

Still, President Alessandri and Chilean decision makers were careful in their relations with Germany, Italy, and Soviet Union. Chile was trying to find a middle ground between Washington, Berlin, and Moscow. Germany could be a fast growing power but there was still the First World War experience in the memories of Chilean authorities. During the interwar period, communist and national socialist ideas were on the rise and became an important part of the Chilean domestic politics. The European political agenda was very influential during the 1930s in Chilean politics.

The left and centre united in the Popular Front and presented Pedro Aguirre Cerda as their common candidate in the 1938 elections, which he won by a slight margin of 4000 votes. The 1940s again witnessed a wave of state-led development and economic nationalism under leadership of Radical presidents Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1941) and Juan Antonio Rios (1942-1946). The *Corporacion de Fomento* (CORFO), a planning and investment corporation led by the government, became the cornerstone of a campaign of state capitalism and spearheaded the drive for industrialization through protectionist policies and import-substitution throughout the following decades. Meanwhile, a new figure entered the Chilean political scene, who would later play a key role in arguably the most significant events in Chilean history. In September 1939, Salvador Allende was appointed as the Minister of Health thanks to his contribution and hard work on Aguirre Cerda's election campaign.

Cerda's administration tried to build a united politics and to keep the nation together at the heat of Second World War years. But he had limited time at the post. President Aguirre

Cerda was seriously ill. He resigned and then died in November 1941. On November 27, 1941, the Chilean representative of Chilean *Legacion* to Turkey, Hector Briones Luco⁷², officially informs the Turkish government that the Chilean President, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, has passed away. A second report prepared by the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires similarly announces that the Chilean President has passed away. The ambassador writes that the pain is shared by neighbouring countries as the president was loved beyond Chile. He continues by sharing personal information about the president. The Ambassador writes that in the difficult aftermath of the Great Depression, Aguirre Cerda was appointed as a member of the Alessandri Cabinet in 1932 and proved himself a successful deputy during his service. During his presidential term, even his opponents felt sympathy towards him. Lastly, the ambassador states that the late president was one of the most important figures in Pan-American politics and continental solidarity. That same day on November 27, the President of Republic of Turkey İsmet İnönü sent a telegram to Chile expressing his condolences. The Turkish embassy in Buenos Aires informed Ankara about the situation and the death of the President the same day. In that diplomatic document there is a part also provides information about Cerda's term and about his past. That report pictured Cerda as an important figure for the Panamerican politics and for the continental solidarity.⁷³

During the Second World War, the Turkish diplomatic mission in Chile was accredited to the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires and sent its reports from Buenos Aires to Ankara. This process reveals that the Turkish ambassador often travelled between Buenos Aires and Chile's capital Santiago and sent Ankara detailed reports. For example, a message dated July 25, 1940

⁷² According to a 'secret' report at the Turkish Foreign Ministries archive, which stamped with double crescent, Luco's arrival to Ankara train station noticed on June 10, 1940. It must be a common execution to notice all foreigners landing Ankara during the Second World War years.

⁷³ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2102/369, 27.11.1941.

reported that Spain has cut all diplomatic and political ties with Chile. Spain under the leadership of Franco was supporting Nazi Germany but keeping herself out of the war. Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires (which, during World War II, was responsible for the foreign mission in Chile) concerns the break of Spanish-Chilean state relations. The Turkish ambassador states that there has been tension between the two states since the Spanish Civil War and has risen further because thirteen Spanish Republicans have sought asylum at the Chilean embassy in Brazil. The existing Franco administration has demanded the return of the thirteen dissidents. The Chilean government, in response, reminded the Spanish government that during the Civil War the Chilean embassy has also provided shelter to supporters of the Franco regime. Diplomatic relations between the two states have been cut.⁷⁴ The report notes that the Franco regime exerted serious pressure on the Chilean government and eventually decided to suspend relations with Chile after thirteen republican had sought asylum at the Chilean embassy in Spain. The reports sent to Ankara during World War II not only help the reader to understand the progress of the war, but also provide a broader view of wartime politics as reflected in the reports' language. Generally, the reports demonstrate that although Spain did not actively participate in the war, the Spanish government supported Nazi Germany and, moreover, maintained rude and threatening policies against Chile, especially in the early years of the war.

In an official document dated April 24, 1940, addressing the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade announces the instalment of Hector Briones as the Chilean representative in Turkey. The letter wishes for the continuation of Turkish-Chilean state relations. Only few months later, in December 1940, Chilean ambassador Hector Briones requests the Foreign Ministry to return home or resume his post in Central

⁷⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 25/07/1940. No: 879-179.

Europe, as his health and well-being has suffered in Turkey, especially in the aftermath of a former Chancellor's disappearance a year earlier.

After a short time, on October 14, 1940, according to a report prepared by the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Spanish and Chilean government have resumed their diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the ambassador notes that Latin American states give great importance to the plight of asylum-seekers. Perhaps ironically, in a brief note sent December 20, 1940, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs the Chilean ambassador in Ankara about the inappropriate use of diplomatic passports by a former Minister of Chile in Romania. Although he has resigned, he remained in Europe using his diplomatic passport to travel for almost two years. Now on his way to Istanbul, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is asking the embassy to withdraw his passport upon arrival.

The Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires on February 1941, reports that Chile is the only Latin American country governed by a national front (The ambassador defines 'national front' as a unity of socialists and communists). After the collapse of the Republic in Spain and the collapse of the Third Republic in France, right-wing opposition has gained a stronghold against the national front. Moreover, he mentions that Chile, unable to export goods during World War II, faces economic difficulties. The report informs that the existing Chilean President is a member of the National Front, but the opposition holds the majority of the parliament. The ambassador states that the current government is in struggle with the parliament, which mostly consists of liberals and conservatives.

An official report sent from the Turkish embassy in Buenos Aires, dated May 23, 1941 informs that the Nazis have unsuccessfully attempted a coup d'état against the government in Chile. It furthermore states that one out of six Chileans is of German origin. During World War

II, the Chilean government opted to remain neutral due to concerns over the country's German population as well as vulnerability to attacks on the coastline.

The embassy also shows interest in the continuing developments in Europe. A letter, dated November 5, 1941, and directly addressed to Şükrü Saraçoğlu, written by the head of the Chilean mission to Turkey H. Briones Luco, comments on the situation in Western Europe. The Chilean government notifies Ankara that it has requested the German government to cease the execution of hostages in France.⁷⁵

An important report dated November 21, 1941, from the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires to Turkish Foreign Ministry is entitled "A Political Report of Chile." The ambassador mentions that he has previously shared information on the political situation in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. He considers Chile to have a very significant geographic position, because of the Magellan Straits. The Turkish ambassador shares demographic and economic information about Chile. He then continues to comment on the country's interior and foreign affairs. He writes about the incumbent president and government, called the National Front. The ambassador informs Ankara that National Front has a different connotation from those in France and Italy. The Front has no fascist motives and is instead composed of socialists and communists. According to the ambassador the right-wing parties consist of conservatives and liberals. In addition there is a Phalangist party with nationalist motives. As regards economics, their discourse approaches socialists but they take distance from communists.

The report continues with information about Chile's foreign policies, which central aim is to maintain neutrality. According to President Aguirre Cerda, Chile would benefit from remaining neutral like its position in World War I. The ambassador comments that the Chilean president believes that if there would be a continued political alliance between the United States

⁷⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, received on 06/11/1941 and numbered as 132-383.

and Chile it has to primarily be a trade relationship. The ambassador comments that during the First World War, Chile extended its sympathy to the Kaiser's Germany, since the German government had supported Chile during the War of the Pacific by opposing to join the Great States in their pressure on the Chilean government.

The ambassador believes that if the United States were to enter the Second World War, the Chilean government would not be as "uninterested" as during the First World War. He writes that the Chilean people have a deep love for democracy and would therefore support those states promoting democratic ideals. When asked about Chile's position, all state officials the ambassador spoke to were evasive and refrained from giving a definite answer. The former foreign minister of Chile believes that if the United States would enter the war, remaining neutral would not be enough for all Latin American countries. There may be a consultation as stated at the Lima, Panama and Havana Conferences. The ambassador comments that, according to his own understanding, the issue is not only to defend the continent but the true matter is to form an alliance.

The Turkish ambassador believes that the situation is not the same as during the First World War. The ambassador continues, informing Ankara that in case of U.S. entry into the war, Japan will almost certainly stand with the Axis Powers. If the United States enters the war, the first thing Axis Powers would be willing to do is the destruction of the Panama Channel. Then, the only possible strait [to cross the two oceans] would be the Magellan Strait and would thus gain huge importance. If the U.S. deems it necessary to secure the Magellan Strait, the Chilean government would likely cave into cooperation / cooperate. As the Chilean military, navy and air forces are not strong enough to defend against an outside threat, only the United States would be able to guarantee the Strait's security. In conclusion, the ambassador states that either way Chile

will be forced to cooperate with the United States. Economically, Chile is closely tied to the United States. As a former foreign minister of Chile has stated, Chile has been able to export copper and nitrate in massive amounts – more than they need – thanks to the United States. (These are the primary export products of the Chilean economy).

The ambassador continues by information about Germans and Nazism in Chile. One other factor that makes a difference in the Chilean situation today compared to 1914 is the German issue in Chile. Chilean factor has greatly benefited from Germans: German teachers have played a crucial role, the Chilean military has been trained by German officers, and Chile has, in general terms, benefited from the German workforce. Therefore, there has historically been a sympathetic stance towards Germany. However, after the Nazis took to power in Germany, Chile has become fearful of Nazi aspirations in [all] Latin American countries. If the United States enters the war and the Panama Channel would be destroyed, there is a possibility that Germans would pose a threat to the Magellan Strait. Although the Chilean military, admirer of Germany, will not react against its own national interests, it is evident the situation is highly sensitive.

Finally, the report comments on Chilean relationships with other American countries. After the United States, Brazil and Argentina are the most effective countries in terms of Chilean foreign policy. Both states have good economic relationships. Chile is a mine-based society, while Argentina has an agriculture and livestock-based economy. Chile similarly enjoys good relations with Brazil. The relationships between these three countries are friendly, yet their position on the defense of the continent differs. In conclusion, Chile can be said to be neutral at present. However, if the United States enters the war, Chile will reconsider its position in response to a possible invitation to a Pan American Conference and the decisions taken

thereafter. Finally the ambassador signs off noting that U.S.' entry into the war would not sadden the entire continent with the same degree.

At the heat of the Second World War, it is seen that Chile tried to strengthen her economic ties with Turkey. Regarding this issue, according to a letter sent from the Chilean diplomatic mission to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on July 19, 1941, Chile sought a trade agreement with the Turkish state. This decision was in part motivated by Turkey's neutral position in the war. Furthermore, as stated in a report from the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires about Chile's economic situation written on February 7, 1941, like all Latin American countries, Chile, unable to export her products, was in a serious economic position and sought new overseas markets.

After President Cerda, Chile was once again on the route to elect a new president. The famous political figure in Chilean politics Ibanez and a conservative landowner Juan Rios were the two candidates for the presidential post. The existing political atmosphere had an impact on the result of the elections. According to Collier and Sater, the uncharismatic Rios probably did not deserve to win the February 1942 election, but thanks to a feeling that a vote for Ibanez was a vote for fascism, and the public's willingness to believe the propaganda of this supposed "soldier of liberty,"⁷⁶ he triumphed with 55.7 percent of the vote. On February 4, 1942, the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires announces the election of a new president in Chile, Juan Antonio Rios. The ambassador informs Ankara that the situation is sensitive because Chile is one of the two countries in the continent who has maintained its diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. The United States' entry in the war and the Conference in Rio de Janeiro, which has recommended all Latin American nations to cut their ties with the Axis front, have made the situation more

⁷⁶ Quoted by Collier and Sater from Luis Palma Zuniga, *Historia del partido Radical* (Santiago, 1967), p.226.

tense. One of the ambassador's contacts believes that Chile will follow other Latin American countries.

Indeed, the political climate was changing. First the German campaign on Soviet Union, then rising U.S. demands from Chile forced Chile to start questioning her own neutral position during the war. A document dated December 2, 1941, written from the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires, informs Ankara that Chilean authorities, have conducted meetings to prepare the country for a possible war between Japan and the United States. The tension between the two countries, as well as the Second World War in Europe, forces Chile to take measures to defend the Chilean territories. In a cipher telegraph dated the same day, the Turkish representative in Chile, Akşin, informs that in response to the crisis in the Pacific the Chilean government has taken measures to defend its territories and the continent.

On March 20, 1942 the Turkish ambassador has asked one of his contacts, a member of the Chilean Foreign Ministry as well as the parliament about the country's stance in the Second World War. He replied that the Chilean government will continue to maintain neutrality since the country is unable to protect itself against Japanese power. In addition, the United States is at present unable to defend Chilean interests. Moreover, the Chilean President, in an interview with a United Press journalist, stated that the country's policy will remain open and sincere with other American countries and the United States in the name of American solidarity.

On April 1, 1942, written from Buenos Aires by the Turkish ambassador to Chile, the letter concerns a visit to the Foreign Ministry of Chile. The foreign minister personally invited ambassador Akşin and expressed his gratitude for his visit. The minister inquired after the absence of a Turkish ambassador in Chile, and invited the ambassador to stay in the country permanently. The ambassador, in response, told that the Turkish government has the will to open

an embassy but that present circumstances do not allow for it. During the meeting, the Foreign Minister asked about Turkey's political position, which, according to the ambassador, would remain neutral. The Foreign Minister of Chile finally stated that Chile, as a military nation, sends their regards to Turkey.

A cipher telegraph, on April 16, 1942 states that the Turkish ambassador Akşin has returned to Buenos Aires from Chile a day earlier. He presents details of his visit and that he was invited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the representative of Turkey in Chile. Chile maintains its neutrality and has no expectations of any alliances. During their meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Japan has declared that they would respect Chilean interests and that, if Japan would fail to keep this promise, Chile would change its diplomatic position. The ambassador Akşin on October 15, 1942 states that he has the impression that, as a result of his visit to Chile and his meetings with officials there, Turkey's neutrality in the Second World War is deeply appreciated in Chile.

An important report dated November 12, 1942, written from the Turkish Embassy of Santiago, this letter provides information about Chile's foreign policy. The ambassador writes that communist influences have gained momentum in Chile and in the continent. He believes that Soviets are showing interest in the local communist movements and the Latin American bloc, which Peronist Argentina is attempting to build against the United States. Akşin commands that Soviet powers are trying to benefit from Argentinian-U.S. enmity. The ambassador believes that communists will play an important role in Chilean government, whether in the government or opposition. In the current global political environment, the ambassador believes, Chile is growing more important due to its geographic location and strategic resources. In addition, since Chile has the most powerful and organized communist party in the continent, the country is

gaining prominence in the political arena. The ambassador carefully notes that the position of the cabinet appears to evolve in favour of Soviet and against U.S. interests. He continues that the political speeches and statements should be taken with a grain of salt during the electoral campaign, furthering his caution concerning the previous statement. According to the ambassador the cabinet of General Ibanez is diverse in the representation of different political affiliations and that each group is trying to win a stronghold. The president is believed to follow a path between the United States and the Soviet Union and as such maintain neutrality. Lastly, the ambassador states that considering the huge budget deficits, the president's promises are not achievable.

A report dated November 21, 1942, from the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires is entitled "A Political Report on Chile". The ambassador mentions that he has previously shared information on the political situation in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. He considers Chile to have a very significant geographic position, because of the Magellan Straits. The ambassador shares demographic and economic information about Chile. He then continues to comment on the country's interior and foreign affairs. He writes about the incumbent president and government, called the National Front. The ambassador informs Ankara that National Front has a different connotation from those in France and Italy. The Front has no fascist motives and is instead composed of socialists and communists. According to the ambassador the right-wing parties consist of conservatives and liberals. In addition there is a Phalangist party with nationalist motives. As regards economics, their discourse approaches socialists but they take distance from communists.

The report continues with information about Chile's foreign policies, which central aim is to maintain neutrality. According to President Aguirre Cerda, Chile would benefit from

remaining neutral like its position in World War I. The ambassador comments that the Chilean President believes that if there would be a continued political alliance between the United States and Chile it has to primarily be a trade relationship. The ambassador comments that during the First World War, Chile extended its sympathy to the Kaiser's Germany, since the German government had supported Chile during the War of the Pacific by opposing to join the Great States in their pressure on the Chilean government. The ambassador adds that, on the contrary, if United States takes part in the Second World War, Chile may not be as "uninterested" as during the First World War. Chile is a democratic nation and, because most of the population has deep democratic ideals, the country has sympathies towards those countries promoting such ideals.

There is a diplomatic report regarding a Japanese attack threat to Chile, among the diplomatic documents the researcher has found. In a cipher telegraph sent from Chile to Ankara on the 16th of April 1942, the Chilean president officially accepted the newly appointed new chief of the Turkish diplomatic mission in Chile ambassador Akşin. The cipher telegraph states that Chile does not have sufficient military equipment and armament to defend her long coastline, is hopeless about U.S. military aid, and will maintain her neutrality. Finally, the report states that according to the Chilean foreign minister, the Japanese government has guaranteed that Japan will respect the Chilean flag.⁷⁷ Actually Chile was far from the reach of United States military power. It was obvious that Chile could not defend all her Pacific coasts from a possible Japanese attack.

Despite relative economic stability, Chilean politics divided between three blocs: centrist middle-class parties, communists and socialists on the left, and oligarchic parties representing the rural elite on the right. Notably, while this period was marked by military state intervention in the rest of Latin America, Chile's army refrained from meddling with party politics, reflecting

⁷⁷ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, report from the Turkish Ambassador in Chile, 16.04.1942, 10/1774.

the strength of the parliamentary tradition in Chile and the military's acceptance of state-led development (Williamson, 1992: 491). During World War II, Chile attempted to remain neutral, scared that entering any alliance would either have a reaction within the German colony in the south or a Japanese attack on the Chilean coastline. In 1943, the Socialists and Communists successfully pushed the Chilean state to suspend relations with the Axis powers. Chile, originally neutral in the government, fell to U.S. and public pressure to take a stance and lend its support to the Allies. Even though Chile had hesitated to back the Allies strongly after Pearl Harbor, assuming the United States could not guarantee its security against a Japanese attack (Drake, 1993: 116), Chile broke off her relations with the Axis powers in January 1943.⁷⁸ Neither party truly fulfilled their promise, although Chile did provide copper at a reduced price to the United States, boosting her export industry and foreign exchange accumulation (Bethell, 1991: 298). By bringing Chile into the Allied camp, President Rios secured a place for his own country in the United Nations⁷⁹ (Collier and Sater, 2004: 245). It can be said that the socialists acting within the wartime cabinet of President Rios also played an influential role on this decision.

In 1943, amid worsening relations with the United States, Chile altered her position and broke all relations with Axis powers. The decision meant an impetus for Chilean-U.S. relations and aided the recovery of the economy. At the same time, politics had increasingly leaned left and in 1946, Radical Party candidate Gabriel Gonzalez Videla became president of Chile.

In early 1943, most of the reports are focused on Chile's stance in the Second World War. According to a report sent on January 25, 1943, Turkish ambassador Akşin informed the Turkish foreign ministry that the Chilean government has decided to cut its diplomatic ties with

⁷⁸ Actually for Meneses (1988) that rupture with Axis Powers was regarded as a symbolic act to comply with Washington's demands. As a result just two hundred Axis supporters were deported to internal exile, several frontier points and coastal zones declared strategic and restricted areas, Axis nationals were forbidden to carry fire arms, the German Club was forced to close down.

⁷⁹ Chile declared war to Japan in February 1945. On the other side Chile never declared war on Germany.

the governments of Axis Powers. The Argentinian president has announced that Argentina will maintain its current position of neutrality and will hereby remain the sole country in Latin America to be neutral in the war. A cipher telegraph written by the Turkish ambassador to Chile, Akşın and sent from Buenos Aires reports that Chile has decided to sever its relations with the Axis Powers after lengthy discussions, because of the great possibility of the Allies' pending victory and the United States' position in the Pacific.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, seven Latin American countries declared war on the Axis Powers; the only two neutral states in Latin America were Chile and Argentina. A report sent on January 29, 1943 repeats that the Chilean government has cut its relations with Axis Powers in line with the suggested policy of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministries. The report emphasizes that the U.S. remains the most important importer of Chilean products. In addition, Chile feels sympathy to the defenders of democracy. However, the geographical position of Chile and the German population in Chile had forced the government to stay neutral. According to the report, experience shows that it is difficult to remain neutral during wartime. After the resignation of the Chilean foreign minister, Chile shifted its foreign policy direction. Recently, the Chilean president has sent his foreign minister to Washington D.C. It is believed that the foreign minister has returned to Chile with a guarantee of President Roosevelt. Shortly after, the Senate approved the government's proposal to sever relationships with the Axis Powers and as such Chile has taken its position siding the Allies. The ambassador concludes his report by informing that this decision has caused grievances in Argentina. The neutrality of Chile, as one of the important countries within Latin America, was supporting Argentina's interior and foreign politics.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Ibid, 29/01/1943, no: 3035-14. On the report it states that the report sent by air mail. It is not clear which route was taken at the time.

Chile's decision to cut all ties with the Axis Powers means that, other than Argentina, the New World countries (American countries) are in alliance with the United States. After the start of the war in 1939, Great Britain and the United States were the primary customers of Chilean export products, namely copper and nitrate. The U.S. supported the Chilean administration with advance payments. Therefore, it was rather normal that Chile had friendly ties to those who defend democracy. On the other hand, the large German society existing in Chile, its geographic position which is not easy to defend, the military superiority of Axis Powers and Chile's doubts about the Democratic Front's ability to win the war had been reasons for Chile to remain neutral during the conflict. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the U.S.' entry in the war following the attack, seven American countries declared war on the Axis Powers.

As it is understood from the wartime experience, maintaining neutrality is not easy. Thanks to the neutrality of Chile and Argentina, the Axis Powers could continue to act against the Allied Powers. They formed an intelligence unit, which was a great threat to the Allies' navigation safety. This caused a brief strife in Chilean-U.S. relations, leading the Chilean president to postpone his visit to the United States. In May 1943, Chile also breaks diplomatic ties with the governments of Vichy (France), Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as reported in a letter sent by Chilean representative Hector Briones Luco to Turkish foreign minister Menemencioglu on May 22, 1943.

A report sent on April 15, 1943 addresses Chilean interior politics. The Turkish ambassador speaks about the resignation of the government due to domestic factors. He contends that the new foreign minister may lead Chile's foreign policy in a new direction. Secret agents of Axis Powers are moving and acting freely in Argentina, which has upset the United States' administration. The ambassador writes that, according to a U.S. official, the United States is

preparing industrial aid to Latin American countries but both Chile and Argentina will be excluded from the policy. Without this aid, Argentina cannot satisfy its industrialization. Meanwhile, Brazil is becoming industrialized and has organized its army thanks to U.S. cooperation.

On August 4, 1943, ambassador Akşin informs Ankara that he has presented his letter of credence to the Chilean president. The president has expressed gratitude to the Turkish president and government for the formation of a Turkish embassy in Chile. The president welcomed the ambassador to extend his stay in Chile. The embassy, however, was not re-opened until 1945. A cipher telegraph dated September 30, 1944, sent by Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires states that the Chilean government has approved the appointment of Selahattin Arbel as the Turkish ambassador to Chile, as suggested by the Turkish embassy on September 7. On December 9, 1944, the newly appointed Turkish ambassador, Arbel, visited the foreign minister of Chile. In a cipher telegraph sent on December 15, 1944, ambassador Arbel writes that he has presented his letter of credence and the President has invited the Turkish ambassador along with the Foreign Minister of Chile to discuss the current situation in Turkey. The President concluded his speech by expressing his deep gratitude. The Chilean representation expressed gratitude and felt honoured because of Turkey's decision to send an ambassador to the country.

A document sent on August 10, 1943, concerns the economic crisis in Chile. Since the onset of the war, Chile's most important export products are nitrate and copper, with the U.S. as its greatest customer. The U.S. pays in cash payments of U.S. Dollars, although the Chilean government prefers to be paid in the form of machinery. However, since the U.S. has transformed all its industry into war industry, the country is unable to export machines and other industrial items to Chile. The Chilean Central Bank pours 3 to 4 million Pesos in cash into

circulation in order to meet market demands. The cash amount of U.S. dollars is not sufficient to import the machinery which Chilean economic development relies on. The money in circulation is merely used in consumption, raises the cost of living, and leads to inflation. After the severance of relationships with Axis Powers, the Chilean government is enjoying closer cooperation with the United States. The U.S. is still the primary customer of Chilean export goods. On the other hand, the continuity of U.S. import of Chilean products is a vital issue. Since Germans invented artificial nitrate, it became a competitor for Chilean natural nitrate. Therefore, even as early as August 1943 they formed a special commission to continue the export of nitrate after the war. In an interview, the Chilean foreign minister has expressed his wish for strong solidarity between Chile and the United States to continue after the war.

On June 3, 1944, the Turkish ambassador reports that the Chilean government has decided to call back its Chief of Mission from Ankara. According to their investigation, while the Chilean government gives high importance to the ambassadorial post in Ankara, the reason behind the decision is that the acting ambassador did not show enough interest in the mission. According to the report sent to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on August 15, 1944, the Chilean Mission will be out of operation until Minister Hector Briones Luco will return from his travels abroad. Secondly, the personal staff employed in the residence of Mrs. Briones Luco will be temporarily under the supervision of Dr. M. Said Tavakkalna. An earlier document, dated July 18, notes that Said Tavakkalna has been promoted to the translator-interpreter.

On January 7, 1945 the Turkish ambassador to Chile sends a report concerning the former chief of the Chilean mission, Briones Luco, to the ministry of foreign affairs. Mr. Briones Luco, he writes, was previously stationed in Warsaw, from where he moved to Ankara after the Occupation of Warsaw. Due to his health condition, he spent most of his time in Istanbul. The

Turkish ambassador informs Ankara that, after a four month-long journey, Mr. Briones Luco has returned to Chile. The Chilean Foreign Ministry was not satisfied with his performance during the mission and Briones Luco was forced to resign when the Foreign Minister did not meet with him upon his return to Chile. The ambassador tells that Mr. Luco has recently visited the Turkish ambassador and during this visit he explained that he is invited by the Chilean President and explained his stay in Turkey and expressed his deep appreciation and gratitude to Turkey and the Turkish people. The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs is planning to send a new ambassador to Turkey in a couple of months. The ambassador reports that during his visit to the Foreign Minister of Chile, he learnt that Chile will send an ambassador to Ankara to run Chilean relations with Turkey as well as the Near East. Due to budgetary reasons, Chile was unable to send an ambassador until now, but will realize the plan in the next two months.

In a cipher telegraph sent directly from the Turkish embassy in Santiago in December 1944, ambassador Arbel informs Ankara that Chile has constructed a political relationship with Soviet Russia. Chile came to this decision after consulting all American countries. The counsellor of the Chilean Foreign Ministry has told the ambassador that both states will soon open embassies in the respective countries. On March 24, 1945 the ambassador informs Ankara that, except for Mexico, there was no political relationship between the Soviet Union and a Latin American state. Across the continent, Uruguay has established a relationship as of one year ago. The embassy has been informed that also Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Ecuador are negotiating their relations with the Soviet Union. Chile has also re-established relations, but as of now neither party has sent an ambassador. Meanwhile, a report sent in February 1945 indicates that, upon U.S. recommendation, a foreign ministers' conference will be held in

Mexico on February 21. All Latin American countries, in exception of Argentina, have been invited.

On March 8, 1945, the Turkish embassy in Santiago sends an update on the Chilean elections to the Turkish foreign ministry. Although the political tension was high before the political elections, the elections took place in a quiet and orderly fashion thanks to the politeness of the population. Among Latin American countries Chile has one of the most lively, active political scenes. There are fourteen political parties, among them radicals, liberals, conservatives, communists, socialists, democrats and agrarians. In Chile, the issues around Church, kingdom and republic have already been resolved. There is no extremist nationalist movement and therefore both right-wing and left-wing parties are primarily concerned with economic, cultural and social issues. According to this, the parties do not differ in their political goals but in the path they follow and methods they use to achieve those goals. Generally, the right-wing parties aim to develop Chile in an orderly manner by staying true to their traditions. Leftists, however, have a less moderate approach and aspire more radical change. Both right- and left-wing parties are trying to find solutions to economic issues and wish to reduce the cost of living.

The ambassador continues with data about the parliament's composition. The data shows that right-wing parties hold 72 seats, while the left holds 75 out of 147 parliamentary seats. According to the ambassador, there is only a slight majority in favour of leftist parties. In 1941, the majority in favour of the left was greater. The most important issue in Chilean politics is economic issues, which thus shapes the political elections. On May 15, 1945, the Turkish ambassador writes Ankara with further information about the new composition of the Chilean government. The negotiations between the Chilean President and political party leaders has been

occurring for three weeks without any outcome. Therefore, the new government is again composed of left-wing parties. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence will maintain their positions. Probably there will not be any shift in foreign and domestic policy, but economic issues and their critics necessitated a re-composition of the government.

On August 2, 1945, the ambassador writes about the border dispute between Chile and Bolivia, which remains an issue of conflict despite an agreement signed between the two countries in 1904. While Bolivia has lost its access to the Pacific Coast, Chile has granted the Bolivian government exemptions, allowing it to use Chilean ports.⁸¹

In a cipher telegraph sent September 28, 1945, ambassador Arbel informs that the Chilean President has left for Washington D.C. for an official state visit to the U.S. President. Three years earlier, President Roosevelt invited all Latin American presidents, but until today the Chilean president's visit did not materialize. This time, President Truman sent an invitation. The ambassador believes that negotiations will probably be about the relations between the two countries, as well as industrialization and fiscal and economic policies. The Chilean president will stay in the United States for 24 days. During his visit he will also meet with U.S. doctors because of a previous medical operation he has had.

In a cipher telegraph sent from the Turkish embassy in Santiago on October 10, 1945, the ambassador informs the Turkish Foreign Ministry that he has been invited by the Chilean Foreign Minister. The United Nations will establish an economic council according to its principles and hold elections for 12 positions in the council in December, three of which have

⁸¹ During his research visit to Chile, the author conducted a meeting with ambassador, head of Chilean academe of diplomacy and advisor to the Chilean presidency under eleven different presidential administrations, Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago Concha. The Chilean-Bolivian border dispute was one of the topics emphasized during the interview, conducted on March 22, 2014. Mr. Fontecilla mentioned that the Chilean government had requested official sources and documents concerning the agency in the Greek-Turkish border dispute in order to broaden their scope in preparation of the case at the International Court of Justice. In 2014-2015, the International Court of Justice investigated the obligation to negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean between Chile and Bolivia.

been reserved for Latin American states. Chile is one of the candidates. The Foreign Minister of Chile kindly requests the approval and support from their comrade (*dost devlet*), the Turkish government.



CHAPTER 5 MATURATION, 1945-1990

5.1 The Domestic and International Situation of Chile after the Second World War

During the Second World War Chile remained neutral; yet, her economy and politics were affected by the war. In 1943, Chile was forced to cut ties with the Axis powers, pressured by the United States who was the only supplier of arms to Chile. In 1947, Chile broke with the Soviet Union, making alignment with the West and the U.S. practically complete. After breaking relations with Axis powers, Chile started to seek benefits from the United States, which heavily tilted to financial and commercial defence aid. At the end of the war, Chilean decision makers realized that it was in need of even greater U.S. aid and support and therefore centred the United States in her foreign policy.

From the second half of the 1920s up until the late 1940s, Chile underwent a period of political instability as different groups struggled over political power and the country was fractured between the Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, trade unions, and Conservatives. Unlike other Latin American countries, Marxist parties were free to participate in the political life, presenting a unique example in the continent. Following the Second World War, the country remained politically diverse but came together in coalition governments, while the U.S. and Soviet Union competed over involvement in Chilean politics. During this time, the government was composed of multi-party coalition, based on multi-class alliances, and pursued a policy of industrial growth alongside social reform.

The reports sent from the Turkish embassy in Chile to the Foreign Ministry in Ankara reveal that Chile, despite her geographic isolation, was heavily affected by the Cold War politics, with an increasing dependency on the United States. In this phase, Chile and Turkey share a growing concern over the rise of the communist movement in their respective countries.

Domestically, Chile suffered from a polarized political arena with periods of strikes and protest. At the same time, we recognize that after the Second World War, Chile took on a friendly foreign policy supporting peaceful resolution to border disputes and international conflicts.

We not only see an increase in the volume of reports sent from the two foreign missions, but the reports also disclose evidence that the Chilean mission in Turkey physically expanded with the opening of a consulate in Istanbul (which was later temporarily moved to Ankara). On August 22, 1946 the incumbent Chilean consul-general, Manuel Garreton, reports that he has received a telegraph from the Chilean government stating he will no longer continue his position as the consul-general in Istanbul. The government has appointed Mr. Ramon L. Rodriguez as the Primary Secretary of the Mission. He will also, upon the approval of the Turkish government, be in charge of consular affairs until a new consul-general has been elected. On September 14, the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Consular and Legal Department followed up on the situation, confirming that the consulate had been opened on June 4 of that year. However, it is noted that the Chilean government has decided to withdraw the consulate in Istanbul and instead open a consulate by the Chilean embassy in Ankara. The Turkish administration has approved the new plans. This report was forwarded to the Turkish prime minister.

One of the most evident signs of the growing importance of Chilean-Turkish relations is a unique presidential note – from one president to another – in 1947. On April 26, 1947, the Turkish state sent a presidential message to the Chilean administration. In this letter, the Turkish President İsmet İnönü congratulates President Gabriel Gonzales Videla on his success and his service as the president of Chile. He writes that he expects the existing friendship between Chile and Turkey to deepen further. The president concludes by expressing his gratitude for guaranteeing the continued diplomatic relations between Chile and Turkey.

5.1.1 Reporting the domestic political situation of Chile.

Following the Second World War, the Turkish foreign mission in Chile shows increasing attention to the domestic situation of Chile, with a series of very detailed and lengthy ‘country reports’ sent to the foreign ministry. The reports particularly show an interest in the domestic scene’s impact on Chilean foreign relations, particularly with the United States, and the rise of communist activity.

On September 5, 1946, Turkish ambassador Arbel reports on the results of the Chilean presidential elections. According to the report, Radical Party candidate Gabriel Gonzales obtained the most electoral votes. The report continues with background information on Gabriel Gonzales, who had previously worked at the foreign ministry as well. The general image sketched is positive. The report then addresses Chilean foreign politics, which has not seen any significant changes. The most important issues at the time are syndicate movements, the high cost of living, and the continuation of public control over fiscal and economic matters. In a subsequent report on October 24, Arbel confirms that Gabriel Gonzales has been appointed President of Chile. In total, 138 out of 188 congressional members, belonging to socialist, communist, radical, phalangist and liberal parties, voted for the new president. The remaining members, namely conservatives, voted against Gonzalez’ presidency. The new president will take office on November 4. The correspondence is followed by an official document (no: 424) from the Chilean Mission, dated November 6, 1946, to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which contains a list of the Chilean cabinet under President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla.

On September 18, 1946, the General Protocol Chief of Turkish Foreign Ministry, Kadri Rizan, reports on his visit to the Chilean ambassador in Ankara on September 18, Chile’s

national holiday. The protocol chief writes that there will be a congressional vote over the presidency (as none of the candidates was able to obtain 50% of the votes, author) on October 24 and the new president will officially take office November 4. The occasion will be celebrated largely in Chile. In a telegraph from the Chilean foreign ministry, the Chilean ambassador has been ordered to kindly request foreign countries to send large delegations to celebrate the newly elected president. Consequently, the ambassador has asked the Turkish foreign ministry to send representatives to the approaching celebration. Therefore the Chilean ambassador is seeking a meeting with the Turkish foreign minister. On September 30, the Turkish foreign ministry sent a telegraph to the Turkish embassy in Santiago reporting that the Turkish ambassador shall attend and represent the Turkish Republic at the celebration on the 4th of November.

However, Chilean politics would not remain stable for long. On November 6, 1948, Turkish ambassador Arbel reports that the former president General Ibanez and some high rank military officers have been sent to jail because of a possible coup attempt. The incumbent president has decided so as a precautionary measure. According to the Turkish ambassador, there was no real threat to the current government and believes the president may have used the arrest to 'cleanse' the military. On January 24, 1949⁸², the ambassador follows up on the situation. As mentioned before, the former president General Ibanez and high rank officers have been imprisoned because of a suspected military coup attempt. The report continues with information about General Ibanez. The former president is known for his fascist and totalitarian ideas. While he was minister of defence in 1927, he took advantage of the deep economic crisis and, through a governmental coup, took office as president of Chile. In 1931 he was forced to leave his office and escaped to Argentina after taking shelter at the U.S. embassy.

⁸² Ibid. 24/01/1949. No:11/8.

In recent days there have been rumours that Ibanez and his followers have been planning a coup against the current president. The ambassador believes that the collective memory of the coups in Peru and Venezuela could constitute a motivation for the suspected coup d'état. As such, Ibanez and the officers have been imprisoned to prevent a possible overthrow of the government. According to the public prosecutor concerned with the issue, the coup has been motivated by Argentina. Since the 1943 military coup in Argentina, Argentinian authorities have covertly promoted a similar coup attempt in Chile. The current diplomatic relations between Chile and Argentina are cold and suspicious. The Argentinian ambassador to Chile has denied their role and promotion of the possible military coup during a meeting with the Chilean foreign minister.

The Turkish embassy in Santiago sent a very detailed 'Country Report' to the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara on September 23, 1950.⁸³ This source presents the most detailed report since the start of Chilean-Turkish diplomatic relations. The report starts off with a personal biography of former president Arturo Alessandri Palma, whom the ambassador defines as the "most important figure in Chilean politics in the last fifty years." The ambassador speaks of the president's conciliatory and rational character and says he played a vital role in public awareness and the development of human rights. The report then turns to the history of the Chilean War of Independence against the Spanish Kingdom. It details the key events in the independence struggle since September 18, 1810.

The report continues with an overview of reigning presidents, such as President Manuel Montt acting from 1851 to 1861. During his service, he furthered democratic and liberal life and for the first time in history, citizens actively engaged in social and political life. In 1855, Chile introduced the Code of Civil Law. The report comments on the economic, trade and fiscal

⁸³ Ibid. 23/09/1950, no: 123/92.

developments under the Perez regime between 1861 and 1871. In 1871, Chile adopted legislation on press freedom. The report notably mentions that the first clash between state and religion arose as an issue in education in 1873. During Balmaceda's presidency between 1886 and 1891, nitrate, and the wealth it accumulated, transformed Chilean society significantly and positively. In 1891, Chile witnessed an uprising that introduced a parliamentary regime. The report reveals Chile and Argentina's increasing proximity and cooperation at the turn of the twentieth century.

The ambassador again emphasizes Alessandri Palma's presidential post between 1920 and 1925. He represented the middle class and was supported by the labour class. Although willing, he was unable to push social reforms as he faced an unstable and unapt cabinet. The parliamentary regime in Chile had difficulty due to a lack of communal culture and undisciplined political parties. In reality, the military presented the sole disciplined societal group. Therefore, the military was able to intervene in the political and administrative mechanisms at their wish. Military intervention in political life particularly increased after World War I and continued throughout the 1920s. The new constitution, dated September 18, 1925 officially separated state and religion and transformed the parliamentary system into a presidential regime. Alessandri Palma again served as president between 1932 and 1938, when the presidential system had truly taken hold. This period saw important developments and reforms in agriculture, mining and industry, which provided new opportunities for the unemployed to join the workforce and increased the state budget. President Palma followed a consistent pan-Latin American (namely, Latin-American, author) foreign policy. As the report continues, Aguirre Cerda's election as the first Leftist president in 1938 is one of the most noteworthy information. Affordable housing and a reasonable cost of living, followed by education reform, were the first in a series of social reforms.

The following section introduces the social, judicial, and administrative developments of the Chilean state, categorized in the following time periods: the emergence and formation of the state (1810-1831), the autocratic republic (1831-1861), the liberal republic (1861-1891), the parliamentary republic (1891-1924), and finally the presidential republic (1924-1950). On September 18, 1810, the colonial period ended with the establishment of a new state along the Pacific coast. The War of Maipu in 1818 was the last decisive battle in the independence of Chile. Up to 1822, only North America, Mexico and Brazil recognized Chile as a sovereign state. The report continues with detailed information regarding the aforementioned time periods. The report emphasizes the importance of the 1925 constitution as a turning point in Chilean history. Notably, in 1947 a wave of strikes disrupted Chilean society and the administration believed that migrants from Yugoslavia instigated the civil unrest as communists directed by the Yugoslavian embassy. Consequently, Chile suspended its political ties with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Russia. The strike reached its highest peak as it took place at every coal mine in the country. Next, the report comments on the formation of the cabinet and its economic policies. All in all, the report provides a strikingly detailed account of the legislative and administrative bodies of the Chilean state, including municipality administration, electoral registration, the legal rights and duties of the President and sub-branches of different ministries.

The report continues with information on the evolution of political parties and their fractions, i.e. the conservative movement, liberal parties, agrarian political formation and radical-democrats. The report states that more recently, class awareness has grown within Chilean society and transformed political life. At the time of writing, the strongest movements in Chilean politics were liberal, liberal-democrat and radical trends. The report finally comments on electoral results and gives a historical background of all political parties, regardless of size and

popularity, starting from the 1850s. For example, the following is said regarding the Communist Party. On September 3, 1948, the Law of *Defensia Democratica* outlawed the party. (Interestingly, this sentence is the only part underlined by the reader, author; indicating an interest in communist policies in Chile at the Turkish foreign ministry.) The majority of communist supporters reside in the industrial parts of Santiago and around copper and nitrate mines in the North and coal mines in the South. The Communist Party was founded in 1922. The report also mentions the current position of former party members following the ban in 1948.

A report dated September 23, 1950, following the death of former president Arturo Alessandri Palma, again highlights the Turkish embassy's deep appreciation and positive attitude towards Palma's presidency and the political and social developments of Chile during his term.

On February 8, 1952, the Turkish ambassador writes about the upcoming presidential elections⁸⁴ to be held in September 1952 and shares information about the three frontrunners. The first candidate, Arturo Matte, represents the conservatives and traditionalists, as well as capitalists, and is the right-wing candidate. The ambassador continues that Matte and his party have a financial advantage and while expenditure on the right-wing campaign is high, their chances to win the presidency are not very high. The majority of the agrarian party supports General Ibanez, who seeks a close friendship with the Chilean president Peron. He is called a neo-fascist and, at times, neo-nazist. The masses suffering from corruption and rising living costs are leaning towards Ibanez. Finally, Dr. Allende is the communists' candidate as the official socialist party's candidate for presidency (The ambassador reports that after the communist party was banned, they have used socialist movements as a cover to participate in political life). Still, according to the ambassador, Allende, who represents the leftist trend, has prepared the best electoral program in Chile's political history. Allende has openly announced his policies on land

⁸⁴ Ibid. 08/02/1952, no: 10/10.

distribution, nationalization of copper and other mining industries, and introduction of legal reform. Finally, the ambassador comments that the government is unable to proclaim any precautions against the hidden communist movement.⁸⁵

In 1952, General Ibanez was elected president with 47% of the vote. In the 1952 presidential election, Ibanez was able to win the elections thanks to his personal charisma as well as his appeal to a disillusioned public. Dissatisfied, hopeless, and unhappy middle and working class stood behind the old general. His promise of prosperity was however doomed when world copper prices dropped after the Korean War and Ibanez was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund for financial aid. Salvador Allende won a mere 5% of the votes; yet his name would persist in the political arena before becoming the president of Chile in 1970. A report dated September 8, 1952, comments on the electorate results.⁸⁶ Firstly, the Turkish ambassador shares that Carlos Ibanez del Campo has received the majority of the votes for the 1952-1958 presidential term (however, he did not pass the threshold to win the presidency). Ibanez was supported by the agrarian class as well as some socialist parties. The ambassador reports that centre parties (liberals, capitalists, and democrats) are weak in their influence compared to the socialists. The right-wing and the parties previously in power tried to buy votes or – in the words of the ambassador - “voting piracy”. Although they spent millions of dollars of propaganda and mass press advantages, they were unsuccessful in the elections. The nation has rejected, what the ambassador calls, an undisciplined and unprincipled regime. The ambassador describes the result as a self-defensive reaction of a tired nation suffering from huge inflation and high living costs.

⁸⁵ The author wishes to highlight the document’s significance as it reveals the ideological tendency and political agenda of that time. While Turkish Ambassador Şaman admits that Allende has the best political program, he still condemns the presidential candidate for having ‘communist’ policies, such as nationalizing mines.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 08/09/1952, no: 122/100.

A Turkish diplomatic document dated November 12, 1952, shares significant comments and information on the formation of a new government in Chile, namely the cabinet of President General Ibanez, on November 3.⁸⁷ The ambassador describes the new government as a “patchwork”, as it is composed of members of eight or nine different parties. He furthermore notes that a woman has been appointed as the minister of education. Secondly, the ambassador shares detailed information about the primary ministers, including their personal and family background as well as their current position and political ideology. He defines the cabinet as “semi-revolutionary”. He criticizes the communist movement and writes that some members, hiding their true, communist identity, have taken a position in the cabinet as well. The ambassador characterizes Allende, who would later become the president of Chile, as a communist, as well. According to the report, Chile’s political parties are divided also from within and communists have used this opportunity to position themselves, or infiltrate, both within the government and the opposition. On the other hand, some U.S. diplomats and Chilean officials attempt to prevent the rise of an anti-U.S. sentiment. Lastly, the ambassador shares that the minister of defence has visited Germany twice during the wartime years to purchase military arms.

Meanwhile, the end of the Second World War had a great impact on the Chilean economy, which was heavily reliant on the export of nitrate, and later copper, at the time. During World War II, the export of copper, ‘Chile’s life-blood’, to Europe significantly decreased. Chile thus concentrates its efforts on the United States, who, after Pearl Harbor, indeed became the most important buyer of copper. The export-oriented economy – and consequently the Chilean government - grew increasingly dependent on the United States. The U.S. and Chile signed an agreement to fix copper prices and Chile’s profit share at 65%; however, most of the money still

⁸⁷ Ibid. 12/11/1952, no: 161/125.

ended up in the hands of U.S. due to the high exchange rate of the dollar. The agreement also meant a shift in Chilean export industry, with copper replacing nitrate as Chile's main export product. Chile also witnessed increasing investment by the United States, which rapidly became its primary trade partner while German interests diminished. Chile relied on U.S. import for manufactured consumer goods and, increasingly, food and capital goods as well.

U.S. support initially boosted the Chilean economy; however, a decade later, imports grew faster than exports, leading to growing deficit and debts. President Ibanez answered by accepting the New Deal and lowering tax rates for U.S. companies in 1955. Yet, rather than increasing investment and copper exports, it helped U.S. copper firms, Anaconda and Kennecott, to expand and increase their profits. Chile grew heavily dependent on its copper and nitrate industry, and consequently, to U.S. involvement. The economic policies of this period had a continuing and unexpectedly great effect on years to come. When copper prices similarly fell in the early 1960s, the Chilean government, then led by the right-wing Jorge Alessandri, the son of former president Arturo Alessandri, further encouraged government borrowing and investments from foreign governments. Meanwhile, the left pushed for nationalization of the copper industry. Chile, rapidly industrializing and urbanizing, increasingly realized the adverse consequences of the changing economic landscape such as the emergence of slums and persistent unemployment. Alessandri pushed for land reform and authorized the expropriation of unutilized land, a policy heavily criticized both by the left and right. However, the perception that foreign investment and unequal land distribution had drained Chile's economy became widespread and led to a surge in the left's popularity. By the 1970s, the Chilean economy was completely dependent on U.S. as over 40% of its import and most of her credits came from the United States (Bethell, 1991: 317).

Until President Frei's nationalization campaign, the mining and other industries relied heavily on American investments as well as major aid loans and military aid.

After the Second World War, the Turkish embassy in Santiago increasingly reported to Ankara about the Chilean economy. Such reports, commenting on economic policies, infrastructure, and raw materials such as nitrate, continued throughout the 1950s. These documents reveal that, as the Cold War gained momentum, such raw materials became more important and, consequently, the Turkish embassy reported more frequently and more detailed on the Chilean mining industry as well. In example, a report dated October 7, 1951 reports on the discovery of uranium in the north of Chile. At the time, Soviet leader Stalin announced the development of atomic warfare, thereby lauding in the atomic arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In this context, the discovery of uranium in Chile did not solely constitute a domestic or scientific development but was part of a conflict on a global scale. Moreover, the document sheds light on the importance of Chile, and in particular its resources, to Turkish foreign policy interests.

There is an ambassadorial report concerns the military assistance agreement between Chile and the United States dated February 15, 1952.⁸⁸ The Turkish Ambassador shares details about the U.S. military delegation that has visited Chile. He writes that communist groups have tried to manipulate the official visit and held demonstrations against the agreement. Although there is no hidden agenda, the Chilean government has remained silent on the issue. Over the last year, U.S. military delegations have increased their official visits all across the Latin American continent, including Chile. The leftist opposition has voiced its concerns that the U.S.-Chilean military agreement comes with a cost to the Chilean state and believes that the U.S. will have demands, namely the transportation of petrol and other strategic raw materials through the

⁸⁸ Ibid. 15/02/1952, no: 11/11.

Bolivian Corridor, the fortification of the Magellan Strait under U.S. command as well as U.S. control over the Eastern Islands, and the introduction of military administrations in Chilean federal states home to copper, iron, and strategic raw mines.

According to the ambassador, it is evident that the Chilean government keeps its silence since it expects financial and other economic benefits from the U.S. government. The ambassador continues by reporting on the Marshall Plan and says that the United States offered European countries first economic and later also military assistance, but is now offering Latin American states simultaneous military and economic aid. The ambassador also informs Ankara that the U.S. has meetings with officials of all Latin American administrations for these military assistance programs. The Chilean president eventually publicly announced the details of the U.S.- Chilean negotiations after leftist press claimed that the United States is trying to divide Chile and Argentina. President Gonzalez Videla declared that U.S.' military aid is essential to the defense of Chilean territory and national interests. The president also stated that the military agreement has to be considered as mutual assistance between two Americas. Through the technical and military aid, the U.S. has demonstrated that it recognizes Chile as part of the Western hemisphere. While the president and government try to defend the military agreement, the right to send military personnel abroad and permit foreign military personnel to act in Chile belongs to the Chilean Congress according to the constitution. As such, the president attempts to solve this issue with his executive abilities.

The ambassador believes that, rather than commenting on this military agreement from a judicial and international law perspective, one should understand U.S. foreign politics on the entire Latin American continent in terms of economic and strategic interests (namely the provision of raw sources). The most important issue (to the U.S.) is to provide common security

of all raw material sources, mines and transportation. The ambassador continues that after the 1948 Bogota Conference, the aim of U.S. foreign policy is to strengthen European countries economically and militarily through the Marshall Plan, while leaving investments to Latin America in the hands of U.S. private sector investors. By doing so, the U.S. seeks to reach harmony and cooperation on economic development throughout the continent. The ambassador again notes that the military agreement has to be seen as a part of U.S. policy in the Latin American continent as a whole, because the U.S. is building military bases on the coasts of Brazil, Columbia and in Peru. As commonly acknowledged, the U.S. is not willing to participate in a Third World War before 1954 because of the armament of Germany. Therefore, the U.S. seeks the fortification of military bases and the Chilean army. According to the ambassador, a more significant and bigger threat is the possible sabotage and strikes at the mines that the U.S. military relies on, namely nitrate and copper. For this reason, the U.S. officials' demand to form special military organizations to secure mines is justifiable.

The new Turkish Ambassador Şaman sent a detailed report about Chile's current situation on May 3, 1952. This report concerns the termination of the Chilean-U.S. copper trade agreement and the impact of communism in Chile. The President of Chile has unilaterally suspended the treaty on May 2. The Chilean government has thereby decided, the ambassador believes, to take full control of copper export, including which nations they will sell to. This decision's significance extends beyond the Chilean economy and will have a continental, if not global, impact. (At the time, copper was extremely vital to the development of the United States' industry, in particular the weapon industry). The ambassador notes that Chile provides one third of the U.S.' total consumption.

According to the previous trade agreement, Chile was able to export 20% of its copper manufacture independently. It was implied that this 20% should be imported to the developing arm industries in Europe rather than to the Soviet Union and supporting countries. Currently, the Chilean government faces difficulties in exporting copper and therefore suffers a budget deficit and witnesses a rising cost of living. The ambassador exemplifies the issue reporting that German and British companies are offering Chilean copper to Uruguay through the U.S. market at a cheaper rate than Chile itself (This testifies to the extremely low rate at which the U.S. was able to buy Chilean copper).

The ambassador holds that communists are exploiting the financial situation to their own benefit. The ongoing strike in nitrate, coal and iron mines, promoted by the communists, has now spread to the copper industry as well. The ambassador reports that Senator Allende, who is the leader of a hidden communist party, Frente del Pueblo, and is in favour of nationalization of the copper industry, he has sent a telegram to the President supporting his decision to terminate the trade agreement.

The report continues with information that may be related to the president's decision. A couple days earlier, the President proclaimed amnesty for communists who were imprisoned or exiled. According to the ambassador, these efforts may indicate that the president is seeking leftist and communist support. The ambassador believes that the government is currently disrupted and is under the influence of labour unions, which are leaning towards communists. The communists have already successfully established syndicates among public officials, blue-collar workers, teachers, students, and agricultural labourers. The Labour Day celebrations provided the communists an opportune moment to publicly voice their demands, including the

nationalization of the copper and other mining industries, a raise in income, rejection of the U.S. military aid agreement, and building political relations with Soviet Russia and her allies.

The ambassador criticizes the Chilean president for lacking authority and thereby providing the space for communists to present their ultimatum on May 1st in front of the Presidential Palace. He believes that the communists' real aim is to destroy the Chilean economy and weaken the U.S.' power in Latin America. Communists are attempting to manipulate the copper issue and place the burden of Chilean economic grievances on the U.S.' shoulders. The ambassador comments that the trade agreement termination is against the benefit of U.S. shareholders in terms of cost and is harming the reputation of the Foreign Ministry of the United States.

Chile has limited options to export its copper. The owners of the copper industry, de facto and de jure, are U.S. companies. Chile is unable to be a global exporter of copper because it lacks the organizational capacity to do so. The United States does not allow Chile to export its copper products beyond the Iron Curtain. Chilean communists are attempting to reject the U.S.-Chilean military agreement and open up trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. The ambassador suspects that the president is seeking an alliance with the leftists.

The Turkish ambassador continues his report that, on the other hand, there are signals that Chile and the U.S. may have come to an agreement with a new set of conditions. If not, this instability may create political space for leftists, nationalists and extreme and international socialists. He continues that regardless of the final resolution of the copper issue the communist wave is much stronger than previously was suspected. The copper issue placed Chile within the Cold War struggle. Throughout the continent, Soviet propaganda sneakily enters the society day by day. The stronghold of the anti-Communist movement, the United States, needs the New

World, namely Latin America, as a provider of raw and energy sources. Naturally, the communist attack moves through Chile to the Western hemisphere using the copper issue. The dominant Chilean matter has turned into an issue world wide. Concluding, the ambassador expresses his own views on the matter. He believes that the United States will likely offer Chile, which is strategically and geographically significant to the U.S., additional benefits in order to strengthen its reputation.⁸⁹

There is a lengthy, detailed report written by the Turkish embassy in Santiago that is predominantly concerned with economic issues, especially copper, and how they shape Chile's foreign policy.⁹⁰ According to records from 1952, the United States has become the most important trade partner of Chile in terms of both import and export. The Ibanez administration has introduced a new economic plan, which will have evident effects on domestic and foreign politics. The ambassador writes that there is a dilemma between the liberal constitution of Chile and recently introduced regulations aiming to establish state control over the economy, which, the ambassador says, can be considered as "state socialism". As mentioned before, copper carries a vitally important role in the Chilean economy. However, the competitive power of Chilean copper is decreasing due to rising costs and taxes. The new regulations part of the economic plan, attempt to establish statist control over the free market. In short, the plan proves the advance of an economic crisis, because as the government on the one hand favours state socialism and on the other hand expects assistance from the liberal U.S. economy, it will face a dilemma that will polarize the Chilean economy and inevitably lead to a financial crisis.

The ambassador reports that just a few days earlier, the Chilean cabinet decided to form political and economic relations with all countries. Moreover, it decided to abolish some decrees,

⁸⁹ Ibid. 03/05/1952, no: 54/49.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 28/08/1953, no: 114/92.

which promised to sell all strategic raw materials to the United States. The ambassador writes that this will most definitely have foreign policy consequences on an international level. The cabinet's decision acts under the principle of national sovereignty and economic independence. As is evident, it is an attempt to escape from U.S. influence by establishing ties with Soviet Russia and her allies. At the same time, these new political relations have accelerated Communist propaganda within the Senate and Parliament under the umbrella of the National Front movement.

The Chilean economy is suffering as the level of inflation and cost of living are high and there are huge copper stocks that Chile is unable to sell. Communists oppose the export of copper to the United States and instead propagate that Soviets are willing to pay the price of Chilean copper production. The foreign policy followed by Ibanez in regard of copper and the new economic plan is inefficient and laughable, because it is obvious that sooner or later, Ibanez will fail to receive Soviet aid and that Chile can't withdraw from U.S. aid.

After Argentina and Chile signed an economic unity treaty, Paraguay joined the agreement and the three governments declared a regional bloc. Consequently, political tension has risen. In opposition of the unity treaty, Brazil and Peru also signed an economic and political agreement. It is quite obvious that the Brazilian and Peruvian president are supporting U.S. policy to establish a pan-continental identity, opposing the establishment of the regional bloc. Finally, this report reveals the Turkish ambassador's critical stance towards President Ibanez' economic policies and rather appears to favour U.S. arguments.

With growing public concern over the economic challenges Chile faces in the midst of a polarized global political arena, the reports reflect increased social unrest in Chile. On March 24,

1955 Turkish Embassy in Santiago sent a detailed report on current developments in Chile.⁹¹ Turkish Ambassador Tanay starts his report with information about the existing political tension between the president and the opposition. There are huge debates and disputes in the parliament. The ambassador writes that the Minister of Interior Affairs acts as a kind of a prime minister or, in other words, as the president's chief of political affairs within the cabinet. The ambassador shares details about ministers who have resigned from their post. Again, the ambassador writes about a rumour that the military has organized a plot against the president. As a result, the president has been meeting with important figures in the military and some generals have been forced to resign. The ambassador believes that the president has, in that fashion, handled the problem within the army very well.

Opposition against the president is growing. Since the year before, the inflation rate has risen by 74 percent leading to public dissatisfaction. Distribution of Land has been inherited by the era of colonization and for this reason is dominated by large farm houses which decide on the prices of agricultural goods, in favour of these large landowners. Chile is a country of monopolies: mass sectors such as iron, cement, sugar, beer, paper, and clothing are monopolized. The payment balance of Chile is provided 80 percent by copper and 20 percent by nitrate. The decreasing prices of copper have worsened the economic situation. In Chile, 1 to 1,5 million of the total population of 6,5 million lives in a medium level of economic welfare. Since 1950, there has been a budget deficit every year and the economic situation is worsening day by day. At present there is no serious unemployment problem but the opposition expects an economic depression in the coming winter. Consequently, the opposition is gaining support. The most powerful aspect of the president is his personal honesty. According to the ambassador, the democratic regime is well established and traditionalized. The decision-makers always follow

⁹¹ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 24/03/1955, no:32/32.

rule of law during their negotiations and sometimes appeases the administration. The ambassador supposes that both the president and the opposition will maintain their calm.

On July 31, 1955, Turkish ambassador Taray sent a report to Ankara.⁹² This ambassadorial report concerns domestic politics of Chile. Ambassador Taray writes that the Chilean government has realized that the proposal to temporarily install a state of emergency will not receive parliamentary approval and will therefore not insist on the proposal. The government has positively proposed separate, new laws. As mentioned in an earlier report, a type of discontent has risen within the army. An important group within the military has prepared a movement to dissolve the parliament in favour of the president, yet the President has stopped, rather than encouraged, the action. Fierce opposition to the president on the basis of economical and administrative issues however continues.

According to Taray, in one of his speeches, the president also verbally attacked his opponents. He stated that the opposition is trying to apply the parliamentary system to the presidential regime, but it should not be forgotten that a real parliamentary system is one in which the important ideologies of the nation are represented by major, powerful political parties in the parliament. In countries like Chile, the president continued, where ideologies are represented by numerous small political parties, the political environment mandates a presidential system. The president promised to govern the country according to the principles of the constitution and against all personal ambitions.

On April 12, 1957, the Turkish ambassador writes about an uprising in Santiago and Valparaiso, the biggest port of Chile.⁹³ The demonstrations, organized by students and workers, has turned bloody with the intervention of security forces. The government has declared martial

⁹² Ibid. 31/07/1955, no: 126/99-1.

⁹³ Ibid. 12/04/1957, no: 45/33.

law across the country and has asked the military to secure public order. The government has sent a law granting extra-ordinary authority to congress. The ambassador writes that communists are trying to manipulate current events, but that the main reasons behind the public's dissatisfaction are financial grievances and the worsening living conditions. The final straw that led to the demonstrations was the increase in public transportation prices. The increasing price of necessary goods is also a big problem. The population of Chile has been increasing at a yearly rate of 2.4%. Construction and food production has not been able to meet the needs of this population increase. There is no authority able to allocate resources equally among the different classes in Chilean society. Therefore, the ambassador believes, only external aid can provide a solution to the economic depression.

The new law has been adopted despite the opposition of leftist parties. (The following part of the ambassador's report is crucial in revealing the position of a political party leader who later became the president of Chile). The leader of the Phalange Nationale party, Eduardo Frei, has said that he has never been in favour of such legal measures, but that the unstable situation in the country may lead Chile either into a dictatorship or anarchy. He continued that, in both cases, Chileans will find themselves in an even deeper crisis than today's and that therefore, no matter how unsuccessful the legitimate government has been, he supports the adoption of extra-ordinary authority.

In the late 1950s, a new party, the Christian Democrats, entered the political scene in Chile effectively dividing the electorate between three camps which each struggled to win a majority. As the Ibanez movement disintegrated, the election of 1958 proved to be highly contested and indicative of a new political future to come. In the elections of 1958, the three leading candidates were Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, son of the former president and a

Conservative-Liberal, Salvador Allende, the Popular Front candidate, and Eduardo Frei, representing the new Christian Democrat Party. More significantly however was the great success of Salvador Allende, the candidate of Socialist and Communist parties, who lost the presidency by a small margin of 2.7 percent. Instead, Jorge Alessandri, a former businessman and the son of former president Arturo Alessandri, won the election and briefly headed the Chilean government until 1964. Alessandri's presidency ushered in a shift in Chilean politics, in the sense that minority governments attempted to restore socio-economic life with their own, ideology-based solutions. However, the perception that foreign investment and unequal land distribution had drained Chile's economy became widespread and led to a surge in the left's popularity (Vanden and Prevost, 2015: 413). Chilean politics grew increasingly polarized and the left radicalized, frustrated with Alessandri's anti-labour policies. This rise of the left alarmed not only political leaders in Chile, but also abroad. Especially in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the United States "became determined to prevent a growth of leftist influence" in the rest of Latin America and made Chile a "priority of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' foreign-aid programs and covert intelligence operations" (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 2005: 512).

The new Christian Democratic Party, formed in 1957 through the merging of various centre parties, rose to the political scene under leadership of Eduardo Frei and outpolled the Radicals. In 1964, Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat supported by the Right, gained an unprecedented absolute majority vote of 55%. The Christian Democrats sought the support of the Right by vilifying Allende as supporting the communists. Eventually, Frei won 56% of the vote, while Allende got 39%. Their victory was due in part to the fear of Allende, but, still, signalled the rise of a new political party with a new political agenda. However, the right quickly withdrew their support when Frei started to implement his program of agrarian reform, social benefits, and

tax increase. Frei presided over Chile until 1970 and pushed a campaign of ‘Revolution in Liberty’: social and economic reform within the legal framework of parliamentary institutions.

One such attempt was the nationalization of the copper industry through partnerships with the foreign-owned mining companies. Rejected by left- and right-wing parties for being a mere gesture, the economic plan eventually failed to revitalize the Chilean mining industry. Similarly, the Christian Democrats failed to impress with their proposed land reform. The plan to transform massive estates into agricultural cooperatives reached a large but not significant enough number of peasant families and consequently garnered support for the left. Although the agrarian and working class had become richer in absolute terms, the government was unable to fund necessary public goods and services and inflation increased. With another failed wave of reforms, apprehension about the efficacy of the parliamentary system grew more and more.

Throughout the 1950s, the Turkish Embassy in Santiago regularly reported to Ankara on a broad variety of issues, such as the adoption of a law granting the Ibanez del Campo administration extra-ordinary authority on April 12, 1957 (report no. 55/42, dated April 19, 1957). Another report, sent May 21, 1957 (no. 66/53), comments on the Chilean Foreign Minister’s unofficial visit to Istanbul, who has expressed his gratitude and appreciation for the warm welcome and hospitality of the city’s governor and mayor, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay.

In the 1958 presidential elections, Salvador Allende again ran for president with a campaign based on nationalization, agrarian and tax reform, and improving the living conditions of the lower classes. He failed to win the elections, but was commended for his program even by the Turkish diplomats.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ According to an official detailed report about Chilean domestic politics sent by Turkish Ambassador Bedri Tahir Şaman from Santiago, Salvador Allende came to the political stage with a very well prepared political program. 08/02/1952. It is the first Turkish political official document points Allende especially.

Alessandri's speech to Congress in 1961 revealed a continuity in foreign policy goals, which were however bound by Chile's limited resources. In his words, "our foreign policy must be adjusted to the dignity and the sobriety of our traditions, not departing from reality, neither in its sense nor in its proportions. The scarcity of resources and limitations of our means are incompatible with a grandiose diplomatic display, as with resounding attitudes regarding the great world problems" (Meneses 1988: 300). In January 1961, the U.S. asked Chile to end relations with Cuba, as she had done, putting the Chilean government in a difficult position considering the popular support for the Left at home. Thus, it was decided not to take any collective action against Cuba. Chile now understood that she could act more independently from the United States. In 1962, Alessandri visited the United States, and although Chile intended to distance herself from the U.S., at the end of the meeting, the U.S. government decided to continue providing economic and military aid. Relations between the two countries improved.

President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress programme encouraged Chile to institute land reform. It was Kennedy's belief that the rise of Communism could only be prevented if Latin America became more developed and poverty was eradicated. The U.S. lend foreign aid for domestic reform to develop the economy and maintain democracy. Indeed, in 1962, President Alessandri passed a law and established the Agrarian Reform Corporation. Yet, rather than redistributing privately-owned land, the law instead was used to populate remote, government-owned areas.

Caught between two camps, in the 1960s, President Frei initiated an independent foreign policy and made various attempts at Latin American unity. He can be seen as one of the few Chilean world leaders. Yet, at the same time, during this period, Chile accepted over a billion dollars in U.S. aid, which marked the country as the greatest U.S. aid recipient in the continent

(Bethell, 1991: 331). Frei changed the course of Chilean foreign policy: it was based on ideology and the intention to become the dominant power in the Southern Pacific as a respected country with limited capacity. Frei took an active interest in foreign policy and his realist interpretations produced a productive foreign policy together with his foreign minister Gabriel Valdes. This policy was based on two concepts: one, it considered Chile and Latin America as part of the West and Europe specifically, and two, nationalism would not aid the national interest of Chile. Instead, “she had to find her role in a world where bilateral, regional and global levels of cooperation were necessary to overcome underdevelopment” (Meneses, 1988: 333).

5.1.2 Communism.

By the end of the Second World War and onset of Cold War, Chile faced a complicated reality with the advance of the Communist Party. Post-war politics witnessed a deepening rift between the Radicals and Communists who had previously been allies under the Popular Front. In the 1938, 1946, and 1956 elections, leftist Presidential candidates were particularly popular in the northern and southern provinces, which had become disillusioned with the promises of the urban and rural elites (Bethell, 1991: 271). The communists controlled the labour unions and had representatives in key government posts. In the 1947 municipal elections, the Communist Party came in third across the country. When the Radicals and Liberals, threatened by the Communists’ power, withdrew from the government, President Gonzalez Videla requested the resignation of three Communist ministers. After one of the strikes turned violent in June 1947, the president declared an emergency zone in Santiago, resulting in even greater reactions and clashes with the Communists, particularly in the coal mines in southern Chile. In 1948, the situation had escalated so much that President Videla cut all ties with Communist countries and

appointed an anti-Communist government (Collier and Sater, 2004: 248). The Chilean government increasingly distanced itself from the Left, a move much welcomed abroad, considerably by the U.S., which was waging its own campaign to eradicate communist support in Latin America and supported the Conservatives in Chile. Although the Communist Party, founded in 1922, had been quite successful in the past, with as much as 19 elected seats in Congress in 1941, it was banned in 1948. The Law for the Defence of Democracy, enacted in 1948 during Gabriel Gonzalez Videla's presidency, effectively banned the Communist Party. Chile's political climate became once again polarized and witnessed a "witch-hunt" after the Left (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2013: 280).

Much like rest of the world, in the 1950s, anti-communism came to replace nationalism as the strongest tenet of national security in Latin America (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991: 46). After the socialist revolution in Cuba in 1959, Chile, Brazil and Argentina signed mutual defence agreements to protect one another against a communist threat to take over the continent. Throughout the coming decades, the communist movement in Chile would come under attack, but due to its well-organized nature and large support base (largest in the continent) it has managed to survive until today (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991: 272-273). The struggle is reflected in the official reports written from the Turkish embassy in Chile, which show a strong emphasis on the Communist Party and communist threat.

As already demonstrated above, the issue of communism gained increasing momentum among the foreign diplomats and was a recurring topic of interest in the ambassadorial reports. Indeed, some of the reports are focused solely on the issue of left-wing and communist activity in Chile. The Turkish ambassador Arbel reports on September 9, 1947 that the existing strike at coal mines is believed to be organized not by the workers' movement but by the communist

party. It appears as if the strike may soon expand and include nitrate mines as well. According to an official announcement by the Chilean government, hoping to rise the Chilean nation against the United States and weaken the production of underground sources in a possible coming war, the Chilean communist party has received directions from the International Communist Bureau in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. According to the Brazilian ambassador to Chile, the Communist attempts in Brazil is organized not by Soviets but by the Polish Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁵

We see increasing attention to leftist and particularly Communist activity in the reports sent from the Turkish embassy. These reports included such topics as the composition of political parties, headlines in Chilean politics, and the formation of Chilean political life in Cold War years. The diplomatic documents reveal that the Cold War atmosphere shaped the language used to describe political developments. Many of the reports sent in the early years of the Cold War put forth a negative portrayal of leftist and socialist parties and movements. For example, the ambassador's report on Chilean domestic politics, dated April 9, 1951, demonstrates how the embassy informed the Turkish foreign ministry within this global perspective, using critical language to comment on the communist movement in Chile as well as, to a lesser extent, nationalist endeavours.

A report dated June 23, 1951, written by the Turkish Embassy, concerning domestic politics in Chile, starts by sharing information on a meeting the ambassador had with the new foreign minister of Chile. The ambassador tells Ankara that the foreign minister shared positive remarks on Turkey. After personal background information of the minister, the report continues by commenting on the current political atmosphere of Chile. The ambassador emphasizes parliamentary proposals, which may hold negative consequences on shop-owners and traders. The report reveals the ambassador's critical stance towards the proposed reforms because of its

⁹⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 09/09/1947, no: 2902/7.

“socialist and communist motives”. Although the proposal is entitled ‘The Economic Crime Project’, the ambassador believes it has hidden, communist aims.

According to the document, the growing strikes in the mining industry are organized by communists. These strikes are damaging not only Chilean economic life but also threaten the armament of the United States. The ambassador believes Chilean domestic politics are becoming increasingly polarized and are worsening. The ambassador suggests that the United States should secretly and carefully intervene in the Chilean political sphere. The ambassador concludes with a comment that leaves the impression that the presidential party will soon divide. The president’s attempt to slightly change his cabinet – like a patchwork – may solve the situation only temporarily, yet the situation is more urgent than it appears to the outside world. The Turkish Embassy sent a report about the Communist struggle to Ankara on March 30, 1953.⁹⁶ It is a good example to highlight the dominant political perception and discourse at the time. Between the 22nd and 29th of March, the *Confederaciones Trabajadores de America Latina* (CTAL) held their Fourth Congress in Santiago. The ambassador reports that the meeting may not only have an impact on Chilean domestic politics, but may also affect the Communist fronts in other Latin American countries. According to the ambassador, after several labour congresses held in the continent throughout the 1930s and 1940s, communism’s impact on Latin America has increased while U.S. influence has declined. The Congress represents the revolutionary solidarity of the continent and aims to unite all working classes in all of Latin America. In the absence of governmental authority until elections will be held, communists have started a phase of openly anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet propaganda. The ambassador then comments on the Ibanez administration’s effort to distance itself from the communist movement.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 30/03/1953, no: 44/33.

The anti-communist struggle becomes a direct issue in Chilean-Turkish relations with the visit of an exiled Turkish socialist poet to Chile in 1962. In July 1962, the Chilean Workers' Union held a congress. A note sent from the Turkish embassy to the Turkish Foreign Ministry covers the congress in relation to the Turkish poet Nazım Hikmet. The embassy notes that the union, which is under the command of Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, expects 1500 delegates to attend the congress and that, according to intelligence information, Nazım Hikmet (an exiled Socialist poet) will also be in attendance. The diplomat who wrote the note met with the Director of General Political Affairs at the Chilean Foreign Ministry, ambassador Orego, in order to get more information about the congress and to provide information about Nazım Hikmet. The Turkish diplomat believes that Hikmet will be presented as a Turkish poet at the congress, and therefore asked his Chilean counterparts to prevent the congress from promoting him and his propaganda as a Turkish poet. The meeting was also attended by the Head of Political Affairs at the Chilean Foreign Ministry, who told the Turkish diplomat that he knows Nazım Hikmet's story of state betrayal as he previously acted as the charge d'affaires at the Chilean Embassy in Ankara. He added that measures will be taken to prevent Nazım Hikmet's activities.

5.2 Chile as an International Player in the Cold War Era

For the first seventy years of the twentieth century, Chilean foreign policy followed the same framework in order to maintain her international standing gained in the War of the Pacific at the turn of the century. Due to the character of the post-Second World War international system, almost all of the Latin American continent, much like Chile, faced very limited foreign policy options. In specific, the hegemony of the United States forced Latin American states to

construct their foreign policy within these boundaries. Chile's policies primarily dealt with the following issues: her faster-growing neighbours; the emergence of a pan-American organization; the shift in power from Europe to the United States and the U.S.' hegemony; a border conflict with Peru (Meneses, 1988: 394). Moreover, Chile had to decide her position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. Since the United States had surfaced as the world's new superpower, it sought to extend her economic, political, and military dominance and establish a global order based on free trade and collective security. Moreover, the West was now posited against its former wartime ally, the Soviet Union, which similarly tried to expand her sphere of influence, yet based on vastly different values. As the world grew polarized between these two fronts, Latin American countries were pulled into "a highly conflictual, zero-sum international system dominated by the "high politics" of the emerging Cold War" (Fraser, 1997: 162). Foreign policy activism was silenced as the Latin American continent turned into the anti-communist stronghold of the United States in the Western hemisphere.

The first seven decades of the twentieth century were generally successful in terms of foreign policy. Her international, diplomatic status exceeded her military and economic resources and was able to direct multilateral negotiations towards her national interests. Chile was able to defend her position and borders thanks to her stable democracy, and was able to affect her external and regional environment even though her economic capacity was little by defending international law and cooperation (Meneses 1988: 403). Still, Chile was not able to overcome her military and economic limitations which eventually makes them dependent on external powers as it could produce a limited range of products, had few trading partners, and limited military resources. The Chilean experience shows us that such dependency can only be acceptable for a short period of time.

The ambassadorial report of September 8, 1952⁹⁷ explains that Chile is playing a guiding role, directed by the United States, in the Latin American continent, especially in Pan-American politics and the United Nations, for two key, operative reasons: its raw materials and its strategic geographical location. Ibanez' victory evidently shows that Chile will maintain close ties to Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador, who are trying to become fully economically and politically independent. The ambassador believes that in Latin America communists, Nazis, and fascists made an alliance in recent years as the socialist and nationalist, extreme socialist regimes came together against democratic Anglo-American capitalist liberal regime. It is believed that socialists will follow a political program that will harm U.S. investments in Chile and damage U.S. control of raw materials in Chile. Besides, this program includes the unionization of agricultural workers as well as the unification of all labour unions. At present, propaganda is spreading that Ibanez will one day nationalize mines owned by U.S. companies. In conclusion, the victory of the nationalist and socialist bloc in Chile is unfavourable to the United States of America in terms of domestic and foreign politics.

While we see an evident tendency towards the West and the United States in specific following the Second World War, Chilean governments during the Cold War period also showed a willingness and commitment to international cooperation through diplomatic means. Following the Second World War, Chile consistently supported the Organization of American States to guarantee non-intervention, territorial integrity, and collective security. During this period, it became more important for Chile, supported by the West, to maintain her democratic stability and to become a model for other countries in the region who were plagued by military intervention. Meanwhile the domestic sphere started to have a greater influence on Chilean foreign policy, with ideological parties on both sides promoting a reform of foreign policy that fit

⁹⁷ Ibid. 08/09/1952, no: 122/100.

their advocated ideals. These parties were less willing to compromise as “by their very nature, ideologically motivated policies tend to break with the past and to disregard or to abandon long-held and valuable patterns of action” (Meneses, 1988: 400). While such policies do not have to lead to discontinuation they often put pressure on existing policies and do not consider the lessons learnt from past experience.

The foreign policy of Chile, generally speaking, did not change until the beginning of 1960s. Other than a few pragmatic manoeuvres within the international climate of World War II, Chilean foreign policy remained the same. As the 1960s start, there were signals that some issues at Chile’s foreign policy might about to change due to Chile’s interior politics. The Radical Party prepared the most complete party manifesto about the main dimensions on foreign policy of Chile in 1961. The Radical programme of foreign affairs supported Chile’s adherence to United Nations principles, called for establishing relations with all United Nations members, and stressed the defence of human rights and the self-determination of all peoples (Meneses, 1988: 297). The programme promoted more active ties with countries in global south namely developing African, Asian countries. More specifically it outlines policies towards other Latin American countries and confirmed a commitment to collective security, economic integration and democratic development and disarmament in the region. The programme did not take any clear stands about eastern and western bloc polarization.

The reorientation of Chilean foreign policy under Frei also involved establishing closer relations with Chile’s neighbors. Frei and his administration believed Chile had dealt with its border disputes wrongly in the past, without a proper understanding of both sides’ arguments. By offering a resolution to the disputes with Argentina and Bolivia, Frei hoped to turn their relation into one of cooperation rather than conflict (Meneses 1988: 343). Defense affairs came

secondary to multilateral policies, and Chile's military budget remained relatively stable throughout the 1960s. Chile eagerly promoted arms limitation across the continent – in part because of her own small military budget.

With Brazil, Chile had enjoyed better relations, but both countries started to develop polarizing views and perceptions about the most significant issues facing the continent. Brazil, then home to a right wing military government, maintained close relations with the United States in its pursuit against communism, and criticized Chile for establishing closer ties to Europe and more independence from the U.S. Chile and Brazil now saw each other as an ideological threat, in the way of each other's stability and international reputation (Meneses 1988: 348).

During the hemispheric meeting in April 1967, Frei advocated for economic integration in the continent and limitation of armament. The negotiations with Argentina and Brazil were quite successful and they agreed to create a Latin American Common Market in 1970. The meeting showed that Chile had come to realize ideological confrontation would harm her regional and international position and should seek a more compromising foreign policy.

In 1966, Chile withdrew from UNCURK⁹⁸ a pro-Western UN agency dealing with the Korean conflict. Chile was hoping to maintain peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and the non-alignment movement. This step put a strain on Chilean-U.S. relations, who of course hoped to count on Chilean support in the Korean War.

While the Frei administration generally continued existing foreign policy strategies, the Christian Democrats extended their democratic spirit to the realm of international relations as well, namely a preference of democratic governments and opposition to authoritarian regimes. A

⁹⁸ The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established in 1950 to bring about the establishment of an independent democratic government for all of Korea. <https://search.archives.un.org/united-nations-commission-for-unification-and-rehabilitation-of-korea-uncurk-1950-1973>

policy of 'internationalism' rejected ideological motivations (i.e. pro-Western or pro-Soviet) in trade and diplomacy and promoted the strengthening of relations with developing countries across the world. In 1968, Frei proposed a policy of 'latinization' and urged Chile to take a leading role in intracontinental networks and organizations. He also openly supported the economic integration of Latin America. Chile demonstrated dedication to peaceful resolution and promoted disarmament and international cooperation rather than collective security agreements.

According to Frei and his administration, the world was divided not between East and West, but North and South, respectively representing the developed and developing world. The former had the moral duty to support the economic advancement of the latter. Although generally critical of Western intervention, Chile maintained relations with Western European countries for trade, aid, and cultural exchange. The Frei government also re-established relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Frei also commenced commercial ties with China and encouraged the admission of Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS). Chile took an active role in international organizations such as the OAS and UN.

In the early 1960's Chilean decision makers promoted a new international discourse. According to Meneses (1988: 309) those four issues provided the framework of Chile's new foreign policy essentials: first defence and promotion of human rights; second, support for decolonisation with emphasis on self-determination and non-intervention; third, opposition to any kind of discrimination (racial, political and religious)⁹⁹ and fourth new emphasis on international cooperation and disarmament. Even if it did not break with the traditional Chilean

⁹⁹ As Chilean society characterized by national and ethnic diversity with citizens of Spanish, German, Croatian, British, Arab, Palestinians and indigenous background, combatting discrimination was a prominent issue in Chilean politics. This was clearly demonstrated when the researcher visited two more than hundred years old cemeteries in Val Paraiso and in Punta Arenas, two main harbours to attract for the new comers to Chile in order to grasp the historical composition of the population.

foreign policy, Frei's strategy to maintain Chilean power in the region and to prevent involvement in any large conflicts "clearly reflected the orientation of the Christian Democratic movement, which favoured democratic regimes and opposed totalitarianism" (Merrill, 1982: 33).

In his speech to the Senate in January 1965, foreign minister Valdes hinted at a shift in foreign policy, however, in reality, it was a continuation of old policies with a new discourse. Valdes speech can be summarized as follows: North-South relations had replaced the East-West division as the source of international tension; pan-American had served the interests of the United States rather than Latin America; there was an urgent need for a Latin American economic and political union; armamentism in the continent should come to an end; Chile should diplomatically open herself to the entire world; and finally, Chile should seek peaceful resolution of conflicts with its neighbours (Meneses, 1988: 335). Altogether, Chile was to project a positive and role-model image in the continent.

During the Cold War years, Chile placed importance on the national sovereignty of other states and the promotion of human rights. Chile took a leading position among developing states and an active role in the United Nations and Organization of American States, using their voting power in the General Assembly to the (economic) benefit of the newly independent states and promoting cooperation and mutual assistance between Latin American, Asian, and African states. After the Second World War, Chilean foreign policy shifted from an intercontinental focus to greater attention to Europe and the Global South. For example, according to an official diplomatic document written on October 6, 1949, Turkish Ambassador Arbel has learned that Chile will establish relations with Yugoslavia. For the past two years, Chile has cut its ties with the Soviet Union and its allies. The Chilean representative to the UN Council held a speech against Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia, which he considers proof of Chilean rapprochement

towards Yugoslavia. Furthermore, in the near future, Yugoslavia will likely send a delegate to visit Chile.¹⁰⁰ In November 1950, the Turkish embassy in Santiago indeed sent a message to the Turkish Foreign Ministry to inform Ankara that Chile has re-established its diplomatic and political ties with Yugoslavia. Marshall Tito's rapprochement towards the anti-communist bloc is said to have motivated the renewal of political relations. Chile cut its ties with Yugoslavia in October 1947 accusing Yugoslavian diplomats of assistance and cooperation with the Communist bloc in Chile and thereby influencing Chilean domestic politics. The U.S.' influence on Chile's decision to re-establish relations is evident, as Yugoslavia is considered part of the anti-communist bloc. According to the researcher, this report exemplifies how the global political sphere shapes diplomatic relations between countries, even if they appear secondary in the conflict.¹⁰¹

The transformation of the internal and international agenda of Chile can be followed through the reports that the Turkish embassy in Santiago de Chile sent to the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara. On May 28, 1946, the Turkish ambassador reports about the opening of the new legislative year of the parliament. The ambassador shares details of the speech of the Chilean vice president at the ceremony. Because of the Chilean president's illness, the vice president gave the speech in the president's name. In the speech, he mentioned the American Countries' Conference in Mexico as well as the UN Conference held in San Francisco. The vice president stressed Chile's continued dedication to the principles and values of the United Nations and world peace. He furthermore informs that the foreign minister of Chile had meetings in San Francisco with Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, and Ethiopian representatives. They also had friendly meetings with officials from New Zealand and Australia. Australia will send its first

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 06/10/1949, no: 3286/14.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 04/11/1950, no: 142/112.

representative to Chile. The vice president informs that the president suffers from a serious cancer and he therefore suggests all political parties to follow more positive policies and to be cooperative with the existing government.

The Turkish ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Hozar, sent a report to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on October 23, 1947. According to this report Chile has announced that it will cut its relations with Czechoslovakia. The Turkish ambassador considers the decision astonishing.¹⁰² The author has found an additional document on the issue, sent from the embassy in Santiago on March 13, 1948. Ambassador Arbel shares that the Chilean president has ordered the Chilean delegation's president at the United Nations to bring the issue of Czechoslovakia to the Council. Furthermore, the ambassador provides information about the Chilean president's motives to suspend relationships with Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. As of October 21, 1947, Turkish Embassy in Santiago reports that Chile has cut its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The diplomatic relations with the Soviet states have led to the development of a communist party in Chile and acceleration of communist propaganda in the country. As stated before, the ambassador writes, the existing strikes are not simple labour movements but instead are espionage efforts according to the Chilean government. On the day of the report, the ambassador has met with the foreign minister of Chile. The minister stated that the Chilean government came to the decision to suspend its diplomatic ties in order to protect national interests.¹⁰³

On May 21, 1948 Turkish Ambassador Arbel sent a cipher note to the Turkish foreign ministry. This cipher telegraph concerns the declaration of independence of the state of Israel. The ambassador writes that he met with the Foreign Minister of Chile the day before. The

¹⁰² Ibid. 23/10/1947. No: 3072/58.

¹⁰³ Ibid. 22/10/1947. No: 3059/8.

foreign minister noted that Guatemala had recognized the State of Israel at an early stage, but that the Chilean government will wait and consider the current developments before taking a position. The foreign minister continued saying that the Chilean embassy in Cairo has reported that Arab states are powerful and Jews are in a difficult position at present. He also noted that the Chilean ambassador in Ankara will travel to Lebanon, Syria and, finally, Palestine, in order to investigate the current situation. The Turkish Ambassador Arbel writes on February 3, 1949 that, like some of the other South American states, Chile is expected to recognize the state of Israel in the coming days.

The issue continues to be a topic of interest and relevance to the Chilean society. The ambassador's report dated October 29, 1952, sent to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, concerns the influences of people of Arab origin in Chilean and Latin American politics. After the Second World War, the Arab-origin population has become increasingly active in political life across the continent. In all of Latin America, Arabs and Jews are in conflict. The rising tension between Arab and Jewish populations in Chile and in the continent as a whole is in part a result of the rising nationalistic movements in every Latin American country. Moreover, the growing nationalist movements have giving rise to anti-Semitic sentiment. The ambassador is under the impression that the notion of Arab identity is gaining significance across the continent. Most of the Arab population in Latin America carried Ottoman passports and are thus referred to as "Turco". The Arab-Jewish tension has also destabilized domestic politics, already highly polarized, further. The ambassador recommends Ankara to follow the political activity and participation of both Jewish and Arab communities in their host countries more closely.

On July 31, 1950, the Turkish diplomatic mission to Chile sends an elaborate and detailed report about the current political situation between Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina.

At that time, there were two important issues in the political sphere, namely current events in the Korean peninsula, which may lead to a Third World War, and the Bolivian Corridor to the Pacific. It appears that these Latin American countries are approaching the rising tension stemming from the Korean conflict from an economic and trade perspective. The Bolivian issue carries more importance than the Korean issue.

Chile demonstrates a peaceful approach to conciliating the Bolivian dispute. Since the Chilean economy is closely linked with the United States, the role of the U.S. cannot be ignored as well. The ambassador expects that the main stage of the political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Pacific coastline of the Latin American continent is becoming increasingly critical and the dispute over the Bolivian Corridor is no longer an issue of merely Latin American states. The corridor holds extreme strategic importance due to its ocean access and the presence of raw materials. The Bolivian dispute was one of the key issues discussed between U.S. President Truman and Chilean President Videla during his visit to the United States in April 1950. The official report continues with a detailed historical background of the Bolivian Corridor, including judicial, political and military aspects of the dispute. The unprecedented length of the document demonstrates the significance of the matter to the Turkish mission – despite its geographical distance.

According to the report, Chile, stretching from the Southern Pole to the Easter Islands, is gaining significance because of the rising political tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, Chile is also an important country in the economy of Pacific Latin America. The U.S.' interest in Chile is demonstrated by its economic investments in the country. The report stresses that there is a clash between U.S.' investments, domestic attempts to strengthen the national economy, and communist movements. The poverty, low education and

unequal income distribution provide fertile grounds for communist movements in the region (Chile, Peru and Bolivia). Although there is pressure on communist movements in Peru and Bolivia, communist support is growing, especially in Bolivia. Currently, the leftist bloc is putting a lot of pressure on the Chilean president to promise and present the territory to Bolivia, with the hidden aim of strengthening communist ties between both countries. The report concludes stating that the issue of the Bolivian Corridor has led to the emergence of new blocs in the region and has become a dispute, covertly or openly, between Latin American, U.S. and Soviet interests.¹⁰⁴

There is another official report that Turkish Embassy in Santiago comments on the foreign politics of Chile.¹⁰⁵ The ambassador writes to Ankara about a speech by the Chilean foreign minister, Olavarria, on the 23rd of December, 1952. He comments that the speech proves that the new Chilean government is unable to distance itself from the United States regarding foreign policy cooperation. Olavarria's address to the Senate was prepared by the Foreign Ministry's staff and by approval of the President. The speech reveals a shift from former president Gabriel Gonzalez Videla's foreign policies. The foreign minister declared that Chile will be loyal to all treaties signed between Chile and its supreme and close friend, the United States. He continued that Chile will improve and develop its relationships with Asia, Africa and especially Arab countries. With a clear anti-communist stance, the foreign minister directly addressed the Soviets, stating that all politics of Soviet Russia is based on the destruction of non-communist countries and especially U.S.' commerce. He posited any political relation with Soviet Russia as total acceptance or improvement of Soviet politics. During the address, the minister declared that Chile will develop its ties with Asian, Middle Eastern and African states, those less developed countries that provide raw materials to already developed and industrialized

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 31/07/1950. No: 100/76.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 27/12/1952. No: 197/158.

countries. Chile wishes these countries prosperity in their path to independence and their wish to live as sovereign states. In conclusion, Chile will maintain a position in favour of the United States and will follow the anti-Soviet bloc, yet, at the same time, increasing its ties with less developed countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East in order to build a kind of front and reach a more favourable economic position in negotiations with the United States.

The Turkish ambassador reports about the Argentinian president Juan Peron's official state visit to Chile as well as a general image of Latin American politics on March 2, 1953.¹⁰⁶ The Argentinian president has completed a week-long visit. Although it was believed to be beneficial to both parties because of the close ties between the Peron and Ibanez administrations, the visit was not as productive and positive as assumed. While both foreign ministries had prepared a glamorous visit, its goals could not be met. Argentina, trying to take a stance against the United States, is trying to establish a Latin-American political bloc. The presidential visit was not successful in this matter. The existing Ibanez administration, mostly composed of nationalists, communists, and extreme socialists, believed to gain benefit from President Peron's visit in the upcoming elections, but it appears it won't have the desired effect. The ambassador repeats that Argentina is trying to create a Latin-American bloc against the United States. Brazil and Argentina are competing over their influence across the continent. The most important thing to Chilean officials is the unity of the Latin American continent. The ambassador notes that just a couple days earlier, the Foreign Ministry of the United States advised all Latin American governments to address a speech on behalf of the unity of the continent. According to the author, the ambassador here tries to show that Chile, despite all efforts, is in favour to deepen its relations with the United States rather than support Argentina in its attempt to establish a Latin American political bloc.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 02/03/1953. No: 25/14.

In his July 31, 1955 report¹⁰⁷ Turkish ambassador Tanay also shares information on a dispute between Peru, Bolivia and Chile. A group of Peruvian university students residing in Argentina are seeking asylum in Chile after they have been forced to leave Argentina due to the incidents there. The students were sent directly to Peru after they landed in Chile. The ambassador writes that Chilean President Ibanez is a very close friend of Argentinian President Peron and therefore could not disrespect Peron's decision to expel the Peruvian students. The situation has led to large demonstrations by the intelligentsia and university students against the government's decision to send the Peruvian students back. The report then comments on the Chilean economy, noting the high cost of living, low wages, strikes and demonstrations. The ambassador reports the arguments of labour unions and shares information on meetings between the unions and the government, which are continuing positively.

As the relations between Chile and Argentina was always sensitive, the dispute has found also place at Turkish diplomatic documents. There is an example on the issue. On December 29, 1967, the Chilean Ambassador Angel Gonzales visited the Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil to inform, per order of his government, about the recent clashes between Chile and Argentina, which have resulted in the sinking of a Chilean warship. The ambassador said that he doesn't believe the conflict will escalate into a total war, but merely wishes to inform the Turkish government about the recent events and to express Chile's wish to find a resolution.

5.3 The Cyprus Issue

Starting in 1954, we also see the first correspondence over the Cyprus conflict. Turkish Ambassador Sedes, after taking an order from Ankara, has met with the undersecretary of the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 31/07/1955. No: 126/99-1.

Foreign Ministry of Chile on August 25, 1954. The ambassador has explained Turkey's position (in the Cyprus conflict) during this half hour meeting. The undersecretary expressed strong sympathy to Turkey's argument and said that it is not the right time to argue for national self-administration. He continued that Chile will support Turkey and, especially strongly, the United Kingdom in its policies regarding Cyprus.

In a cipher telegraph dated October 30, 1954, the Turkish ambassador in Santiago, Sedes, reports that the Greek ambassador to Chile and Argentina, residing in Buenos Aires, visits Santiago three or four days a year. Greece has no political presentation in Santiago itself. Sedes writes that the Greek ambassador visited Santiago a week ago and held a speech, which was scarcely attended, about Cyprus. The ambassador continues reporting on a meeting with the Chilean foreign minister on the Cyprus issue. The foreign minister told him that Chile is in favour of self-determination and against colonialism. Chile also recognizes the importance of written treaties. The Chilean foreign minister said he will read Turkey's memorandum and that as of now, Chile has not reached any decision regarding the dispute. He also has said Chile will support Turkey's position.¹⁰⁸

The previous report is followed by a second cipher telegraph on November 4, 1954. Ambassador Sedes has visited the embassies of Peru, Colombia and Ecuador and the diplomatic missions of Bolivia and Venezuela, who have each promised to support Turkey's position in the Cyprus dispute. All have sent our memorandum regarding Cyprus to their respective governments between October 25 and 27.¹⁰⁹ On November 24, 1954, the Turkish Ambassador Sedes informs Ankara that he has had a meeting with the Chilean foreign minister over dinner

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 30/10/1954. No: 6.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 04/11/1954. No: 7.

the night before. The Foreign Minister has again expressed Chile's strong support to Turkey in the Cyprus issue.¹¹⁰

On August 18, 1955, Turkish Ambassador Taray has held a meeting with the Chilean Foreign Minister, who has reported that the Chilean government will not come to a decision until Turkey's memorandum on the Cyprus issue.¹¹¹ Turkish ambassador Tanay informs Ankara on September 10, 1955,¹¹² that he has presented the Turkish memorandum on Cyprus directly to the Chilean Foreign Minister on August 31st. The minister and his undersecretary declared that they will be supporting Turkey rather than Greece. During the meeting, the foreign minister also stated that Argentina is in favour of Greek arguments. The ambassador concludes his report kindly requesting that the Turkish President and Foreign Minister send a congratulatory telegram to honor the Chilean Day of Independence, September 18, to Chile, who, he writes, has always been friendly to our requests.

On September 15, 1964, the Turkish Ambassador Dülger in Santiago shares that, as a result of all his relations and contacts with the Chilean Foreign Ministry, he has the impression that the ministry's priority is the right of self-determination and sovereignty of each nation. The ambassador's communication with the Chilean Foreign Ministry has allowed Turkey to explain her position in the Cyprus issue. The Republic of Cyprus, which is institutionalized both de jure and de facto, is constructed on the fate of two nations, Turkish and Greek. The republic has been approved by the United Nations. Özmen reports that his Chilean partners understand the issue. Chile is a country that deems treaties sacred and fully respects their agreements, i.e. the treaty signed with Bolivia in 1904, which the Chilean government continues to respect up to this day.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 24/11/1954. No: 9.

¹¹¹ Ibid. 19/08/1955. No: 10.

¹¹² Ibid. 10/09/1955. No: 17.

On March 2, 1968 the Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil sent a letter to the head of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Ferruh Bozbeyli. The Turkish Foreign Minister wishes to invite the President of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, Alfredo Macario Lorca, to Turkey. Çağlayangil shares that the Turkish Embassy in Santiago has informed the Ministry of Lorca's visit to Europa. The Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil told the head of Turkish Grand National Assembly that Alfredo Lorca's visit would have a great impact on Chilean-Turkish relationships, especially considering Turkey's interest to strengthen relations with Latin American countries and with Chile in that period.¹¹³ Ferruh Bozbeyli, the Head Turkish Grand National Assembly replied him on 7 March 1968. He requested the minister to organise Lorca's visit and as well as to prepare 'in advance' a comprehensive report about the Chilean State.¹¹⁴

5.4 The Domestic and International Situation of Turkey after the Second World War

By the end of the Second World War, Turkey moved from a single-party to a multi-party system, leading the opposition, representing large land-owners and traders, to establish the Democrat Party in 1946. This was in part pushed by the new international order, as the emergence of the United States as a global power promoted a more open political system and more liberal economic policies. The first free elections (i.e. multi-party elections) in Turkey were held in 1946. Four years later in 1950, the Democrat Party came to power, which served as an important factor in strengthening Turkey's connection with the West.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ From Turkish Foreign Minister to the Head of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 02.03.1968, 640/043.

¹¹⁴ From The Grand National Turkish Assembly to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 07.03.1968, 641/37692.

¹¹⁵ For a very detailed account of Turkish foreign policy see, ed. Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I: 1919-1980*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2006.

The end of the Second World War signalled a shift in global politics with the United States taking Europe's former role as a global power and gave rise to a new global conflict between two dominant ideologies defended by the United States and Soviet Union respectively. The polarization between the two camps did not follow World War II immediately. Rather, it came to the surface as a consequence of the Soviet Union's attempt to spread her power and dominate neighbouring geographies. Caught between the U.S. and USSR's struggle over Greece, Turkey and Iran, Turkey became an important player in the region. Before the Second World War, Turkey maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, especially when Turkey faced tension with the West. However, as the war approached, began to position herself close to the Western European democratic regimes. Turkish foreign policy tried to adapt itself to the bloc system which was symbolized by a total ideological polarization in the period between 1946 and 1964 (Sönmezoğlu, 2006: 764). The period between 1965 and 1980 saw a détente; the system kept its polarized character but bloc members enjoyed more autonomy compared to earlier years.

Chile opened her diplomatic mission in Ankara after the Second World War in 1949. One diplomatic record dated 31st of December 1949 is entitled "*La Memoria 1949*" and is divided into three parts: 1) confidential, 2) ordinary, and 3) commercial information. The first, confidential section contains a well-prepared overview of domestic and international policies of Turkey, covering democracy, opposition, political parties, communism, Turkey's relation with the Atlantic Pact and the European Council, the Truman and Marshall Plan, relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, and a lengthy discussion of Turkey's neutrality during World War II. It also speaks about the general situation in the Middle East and the emergence of the state of Israel. The second, ordinary section concerns the diplomatic representation in Ankara, such as security of the delegation, the consular section, the residence of the Chilean delegation as

well as the budget of the total mission. Finally, the third part of the document focuses on the commerce between Chile and Turkey. According to the report, the import and export between the two countries was based on agricultural and industrial goods between 1947 and 1949. It notes that thanks to the Marshall Plan, the Turkish market has gained more significance for the Chilean economy. The following pages provide information on Turkey's economic relations with other Western countries and her position within the Marshall Plan and, in relation, the political economy of the Turkish state. The memorandum presents a clear overview of the direction Turkey would take in the Cold War era.

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, her foreign policy has been dominated by one constant feature: its orientation to the West. Still, in the first twenty years, the Turkish state, adamant to protect her independence and sovereignty, tried to pursue a relatively neutral foreign policy towards the great powers of the time (Sander, 1982: 105-112). Turkey considered the West as the greatest threat it was subjected to, yet continued to follow a Western-oriented economic and political course. Turkey's rapprochement with the West gained particular momentum after the Second World War. At the end of WWII, Turkish foreign policy enters a new phase with increased cooperation and relations with Western European countries and the United States. Collaboration with the West in across all fields and on all levels became the backbone of Turkish foreign policies as it was considered crucial for Turkey's defence and the development of a parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions.

At this time, domestically, Turkey shifted to a multi-party system and allowed the opposition to participate in the 1950 election. The newly formed Democrat Party, led by Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, gained the majority of the vote. This turn to a more open political

system can in part be considered an attempt by Turkey to join the Western bloc, as Turkey increased efforts to present herself as a true democracy.

In 1960, Turkey witnesses her first coup d'état when the military overthrows the Democratic Party's government on May 27. A military junta under the name National Unity Committee rules over Turkey over the next year. The military government closes down the Democratic Party on September 29. Party members are put on trial for violating the constitution. The National Unity Committee (NUC) brought together a variety of factions within the military and consisted of 38 officers. In June 1960, the NUC gained power as an interim government until an assembly would be elected under the new constitution. The junta government had legislative and – indirectly – executive power, while the judiciary remained independent. Cemal Gürsel, a general, was chosen as the president, prime minister, commander-in-chief and head of state. A new constitution was drafted and came into force in July 1961.

On January 12, 1961, the Chilean ambassador in Ankara sent a copy of the speech by Vice Chairman of the National Union Committee and former Minister of Defence, Fahri Özdilek. Most importantly, he notes the Turkish President's wish to remove some members of cabinet and the collective resignation of all Ministers from their posts. Afterwards, only two parties were represented in the Turkish cabinet.

At the end of the Second World War, Turkey sought closer relationships with the United States because of economic and security issues. The United States wanted Turkey, as a southern neighbour of the Soviet Union, to become a model of democracy and private entrepreneurship in her region. At the same time, the United States had a growing need to establish closer ties with Turkey to carry out her containment policy of the Soviet Union, starting with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. After it learned of various Soviet demands to the Turkish government, the

United States started to pay increasing attention to Turkey. The strategic geographical position of Turkey between the Black Sea, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean became a crucial issue to the United States. Under leadership of the U.S., Turkey was to defend and protect Western interests in the region. For this reason, the West aimed to empower and strengthen the Turkish state. Greece and Turkey, which were both considered as frontline members against the Communist threat, became the first substantial aid recipients of U.S. financial and military support. In March 1947, the president of the United States, Truman, held a speech at Congress, now known as the Truman Doctrine, and promised U.S. support to Turkey, heralding the long history of U.S. aid to Turkey. In 1948, Turkey was incorporated in the Marshall Plan¹¹⁶, a year after it had been announced by the Secretary of State, George Marshall. By the end of the Second World War the United States had become a key figure in Turkish foreign relations.¹¹⁷

In 1947, the U.S. Congress passed a proposal to include Turkey and Greece in the Truman Doctrine and approved 400 million dollars in aid to be sent to the two countries by June 1948. This made it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States would not only symbolically but also materially support Turkey. In 1948, this aid was extended by the Marshall Plan and Turkey received over 300 million dollars combined in military and economic aid. Turkey also became part of the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD). Slowly,

¹¹⁶ According to Yılmaz Ş., the Marshall plan coinciding with the Turkish transition from a single-party regime to a multi-party system, had a significant impact on areas unintended and unforeseen by its designers. The Marshall Plan's emphasis on agriculture and the empowerment of the peasant masses due to the increasing importance of the agricultural sector and due to their new attractiveness as a voting power in a competitive multi-party system, seemed to fit perfectly well... The focus on rural development at the expense of the urban elite and military establishment represented the disruption of a delicate political balance, which would be one of the factors setting the stage for the eventual military coup of 1960. Thus, in addition to its economic impact, the Marshall Plan had some indirect and unintended effects in a country that was experiencing political transition (2015: 125).

¹¹⁷ For a closer study of early Turkish-American relations please see Çağrı Erhan *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, Ankara, 2015 and Şuhnaz Yılmaz *Turkish-American Relations 1800-1952*, New York 2015 which is based on her PhD dissertation on the same topic.

Turkey came to realize that it should seek full membership of the Western alliance, yet was disappointed when it failed to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949.

The West's defence against the Soviet Union reached another level with the creation of NATO, an intergovernmental military alliance, on 4 April 1949. Turkey, who had until then forced herself to remain relatively neutral, became a NATO member in 1952 and thereby fully and formally joined the Western alliance in the Cold War. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 in a bid to protect herself from the Soviet Union and establish closer ties with the United States. Turkey considered her membership as international recognition of Turkey as equal to and part of the Western bloc – a clear goal since the founding of the republic. Her NATO membership would have great implications on her developing relationship with the United States, as well as Europe. Thus, the ambition of Atatürk to remain neutral and friendly with both camps was abandoned, and understood its geo-strategic position as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East – formalized with the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. As a loyal ally, Turkey fulfilled the majority of her obligations to the West and, particularly, the U.S., within the highly polarized cold war years. Although the global superpowers dominated world politics in the 1950s and limited the freedom of small states to direct their own policy-making, Turkey took an active role in Middle Eastern disputes.

In the 1950s, Turkey is an active member in the international arena, supporting the Western bloc in international disputes and seeking agreements and pacts with other allies. In this context the U.S. increased its aid to Turkey after the governmental change in 1950 (Karpat, 2013: 183). On March 9, 1950, Turkey and Iran both recognize the state of Israel. In July 1950 Turkey sends troops to Korea after recognizing the Republic of Korea as an independent state in 1949. On February 21, 1952, Turkey and Greece join NATO, soon after which General

Eisenhower, as commander of NATO, pays a visit to Turkey. In 1955, Iraq and Turkey sign the Baghdad Pact on February 24 and promise each other mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in the signatories' domestic affairs. Later, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain join the pact as well. On July 14, 1958, a military coup in Iraq overthrows the monarchy and effectively ends the Baghdad Pact. The pact is transformed into the creation of the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. According to Ahmad, the pact not only meant to contain Soviet power, but was "directed also against the Arab nationalist movement led by Nasser of Egypt" (Ahmad, 2013: 107). Turkey gained a leadership position in the region of conservative regimes, and an important shackle between NATO and the Middle East.

In 1959, Turkey starts the European Union accession process. On July 31, the republic applies for associate membership of the European Community. Turkey submitted her application to the European Economic Community (EEC) and signed an Association Agreement in September 1963. Turkey was more interested in being recognized as a Western power, rather than the economic benefits of the membership. It was also motivated by Greece's application to the EEC, not wishing to be "outflanked" (Hale, 2013: 128).

Meanwhile, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union were less promising. Right before the Cold War, Turkey had sought friendly relations with the USSR. As early as May 1945, it suggested to sign a treaty of friendship, which may have inspired Stalin to demand a base along the Turkish Straits and the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan. The ambitious demands were short lived, and even the commissar for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, agreed that Stalin "had overplayed his hand and had been too arrogant" (Ahmad, 2013: 105). When the Soviet Union and Turkey renewed their Friendship Treaty in November 1935, the USSR did not place any demands.

In March 1945, the Soviet Union withdrew herself from the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, after twenty years of alliance. In order to renew the treaty, Moscow demands a change in the Turco-Soviet border and the joint defence of the straits. When the Soviet Union demanded a new convention allowing free passage through the Straits as well as the establishment of bases along it, Turkey replied that it would not consider the latter and that any changes to the Montreux Convention would have to be negotiated in the international sphere. One year later, Turkey rejects the offer to jointly protect the Dardanelles, feeling confident in the U.S.' support to Turkey. Indeed, on March 12, 1947, the United States promises support to Turkey and Greece against Soviet pressure in the scheme of the Truman Doctrine. Consequently, Turkey enters the Cold War as a Western ally.

Although Turkish-Soviet relations were generally weak during Stalin's regime, in the 1950s, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union slowly decreased. In May 1953, the Soviet Union officially withdrew its claims to Kars and Ardahan (provinces in Eastern Turkey). At the same time, a third bloc was forming as the Yugoslavian leader Tito gave rise to the non-aligned movement. By the end of Stalin's rule, Soviet decision-makers sought a closer relationship with Turkey, as the new Soviet leadership was eager to change the foreign policies from the Stalin regime. In December 1955, Khrushchev addressed Turkish-Soviet relations directly when he said that "it is known when Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were at the top of Turkish leadership, we had very good relationships with Turkey but later on they were darkened. We cannot say that it happened only due to Turkey; there were inappropriate statements made on our side which darkened these relations" (Gökay, 2006: 70). In 1966, the prime minister of the Soviet Union, Kosygin, visits Turkey, demonstrating the return of Soviet-Turkish relations.

On February 27, 1961, the ambassador of Chile to Ankara sent a confidential note to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding rumours over Soviet claims in connection to the establishment of launch bases for medium-range rockets. The bases' vicinity to Soviet borders and NATO's intention to provide Turkey with nuclear weapons has sparked Soviet concern over growing cooperation between Turkey and NATO (i.e. the United States). A year earlier, an American spy plane from the American İncirlik base had been shut down. In response to the Soviet claim, the Turkey government defended her need to protect her safety with all measures, and that the instalment of the launch ramps did not threaten her relations with the USSR in any way. Turkey is calling for a general disarmament across the world and notes that her alliances are only of a defensive nature. Turkey reaffirms her commitment to the cause of progress and welfare in international peace and security.

The U.S. grew increasingly alarmed not only by communism but also the rise of nationalism in Middle East and Asia. Turkey continued its commitment to the West – embodied by NATO – after the 1960 coup, although public opinion started to critique this support to U.S. foreign policies. Eventually, developments in Cyprus brought Turkish-U.S. relations to a head. As Turkey seeks rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the final years of the 1960s present a turbulent period for Turkish domestic and foreign politics. Inspired by leftist student demonstrations in Paris, Turkish students become increasingly militant and protest against NATO and Turkey's alliance with the U.S. The protests escalate on February 16, 1969, when right-wing militants, supported by police forces, attack a demonstration against the U.S. 6th Fleet. The attack leaves hundreds wounded and kills two youth, marking the date as “Bloody Sunday” in Turkish history. Students and workers' demonstrations continue, until the military forces Prime Minister Demirel to resign on March 12, 1971. Over the next two years, Turkey is ruled by an ‘above-party’ cabinets until general elections are held in October 1973.

There is a highly valuable confidential report sent by the Chilean ambassador Angel C. Gonzales from the Chilean embassy in Ankara to the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Directorate of International Relations Department on June 29, 1970¹¹⁸. The researcher found it important in order to catch the perceptions and views of the agenda in the time. According to the ambassador the Turkish-Russian relations appears to become every day more important to public opinion in Turkey. Not only the scope of an apparent rapprochement are discussed, which increased after the visit of Turkish President Cevdet Sunay to Moscow in November 1969, but also it has come to ask, now finally the need to conclude a pact of non-aggression between the Turkish government and the USSR. All this comes in the face of the approaching and most dangerous military actions in the Middle East.

After presenting two opposing views on the subject from the Turkish press, one is under the title "We must conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviets," by Professor Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and the other one is under the title "The struggle of the giants in the Middle East," by Dr. Ferid Ahmet Tek, former ambassador in London, the Chilean Ambassador summarizes his ideas as follows:

Mr. Minister, few more comments could be made to the ideas expressed in both articles: Clearly, they represent two opposite positions.

However, it is interesting to note that in both articles there is a common denominator: The fear of an imminent conflict in the Middle East caused directly and indirectly by the two great powers: The USSR and the USA.

¹¹⁸ Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives, No. 148/27. Dated: 29/06/1970.

We may also add that the idea of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, openly supported by that country and that each day finds more followers in Turkey -a desire of the USSR, of course- could be a way to cancel all defense system that NATO and the US have assembled in this territory.

However, given the current circumstances in which the uneasy coexistence develops between the two blocs and considering especially the overall political and economic dependence of Turkey, I do not think the realization of such a pact conceivable. If successful, it would be a master Russian coup.

However, Turkey is not ready for it. They would not dare to leave the protective nest of the NATO (and economic aid from the West, vital air to her semi-asphyxiated lungs) to be naively tied to the Soviets. Turkey has the bitter experience that the love of the Russians are always full of uncertainties and contingencies.

Finally, I think quite possible that Turkey -malicious and sagacious diplomatically- may be publicly toying with this idea as an effective means of forcing US, NATO allies, the Consortium and other promoters not to stop helping. So far, she has always been successful in this game.¹¹⁹

Turkey continued to be skeptical of Soviet ties until the Johnson Letter ruled out U.S. support in the Cyprus conflict and the country's public adopted an anti-American stance. In the

¹¹⁹ Historical General Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. 29/06/1970. No: 148/27

1970s, Turkey and the Soviet Union finally saw the normalization of relations. Notably, many of the reports written from the Chilean embassy in Ankara pay attention to and include a special section on Turkish-Russian relationships. In a confidential note sent July 29, 1974¹²⁰, Ambassador Rudi Geiger Stahr addresses the development of economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Chilean ambassador shares that a Turkish delegation, headed by Deniz Bakyal, then minister of finance, will visit Moscow to discuss economic and other cooperation between the two countries in the following month. He notes that relations have developed since a series of state visits by Turkish officials in 1964 and 1965. The upcoming talks will focus on the expansion of a refinery in the Izmir area and the iron-steel industry in Iskenderun. They will also concern increased collaboration, trade opportunities, and technological exchange. The talks are also said to be an impetus for the development of economic ties with other countries and to construct the necessary political ties with Russia for the expansion of economic collaboration with the country.

Until recently, the Soviet Union had been indebted to Turkey, but it has recently paid off its loans. Turkey furthermore has allowed Russia to use the country as an air bridge, while maintaining relations with the United States as well. However, the ambassador writes that Turkey has grown suspicious of U.S. support after the coup in Cyprus and allegations that it was planned by the CIA. The U.S. government has spoken out in support of Sampson and the coup, further alienating Turkey. Turkey has carried on an independent policy in the Cyprus crisis, wishing not to fall dependent on either of the two great powers. Ambassador Geiger Stahr then shares rumours about U.S. ambitions to construct a base on Cyprus, strongly opposed by the Soviet Union, as well as the Turkish government.

¹²⁰ New impetus on economic relations between Turkey and USSR. CONFIDENTIAL No. 417/40 Ankara, July 29, 1974

Within Turkey, America (and Canada) and the Soviet Union are competing to install reactors in the country, which has both military and strategic benefits. The ambassador believes that U.S. influence in Turkey is in decline, and the Soviet Union will replace her with increased strategic investment and economic aid. He blames this shift on the American policy regarding Cyprus, which has fuelled an already existing movement in Turkey for greater independence from the United States and NATO. As a result, Ecevit has followed a more independent foreign policy which has subsequently boosted his popularity. Countries in the region, namely Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, have come to Turkey's aid and voiced support for Turkey in the Cyprus dispute. The Syrian government even stated it would fight alongside Turkish troops on the island. The ambassador therefore expects a shift in Turkish foreign policy, albeit slowly.

In the following decade, Turkey slightly changed her foreign politics, as a result of two issues in particular. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Turkish decision-makers realized Turkey's value to the West was not as significant as she believed. Secondly, the Johnson Letter issued on 15 June 1964 prevented Turkey's possible interference in Cyprus. Both instances forced Turkey to reconsider her position and call into question her loyalty to the United States. Consequently, Turkey started to broaden her horizons in order to produce more fertile relationships with other countries, not as an alternative but complementary to the West. Those attempts sought better relations with the Soviet Union, certain Arab states, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded, just after Turkey and the United States agreed on the instalment of 15 nuclear missiles in Turkey. The U.S.' behaviour during the missile crisis – equalizing Turkey with Cuba as a 'bargain' in U.S.-Soviet negotiations – made Turkish decision makers suspicious and concerned about their future alliance with the U.S. and

its realist politics. Indeed, the missiles were removed not much later in April 1963, increasing Turkey's suspicion there had been a "Turkey-for-Cuba deal" (Hale, 2013: 100). As Turkey began to question whether the United States would defend her interests, a space for Soviet-Turkish rapprochement appeared, with the visit of a Turkish, high-rank delegation to the USSR in 1963, the first since 1932, and increased commercial relations between the two countries.

Still, it can be said that Turkey did not fully recognize the shift in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death, and could have made greater efforts to de-escalate its relations with the Soviet Union. But even so, it is not clear how much Turkey would have benefited from closer ties with the Soviet Union, considering it may have led the United States to terminate its aid and the Soviet-Turkish military imbalance could pose a threat to Turkish sovereignty.

Turkey attempted to use the détente period in order to strengthen her ties in the region and relationship with East and West and although Turkey remained fundamentally in favour of the West in her foreign policy, Turkey started to act more independently (Karpas, 2013: 211).

Sander notes that in February 1975, the research department of the American Congress submitted a report to the Foreign Ministry's Committee that demonstrates Turkey's significance to the U.S., as the following extract explains: "Turkey directly impacts U.S.' capability to manoeuvre in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the coastline from Libya to the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States has no alternative as advantageous as Turkey in order to prevent a Soviet military adventure in the region. The United States, even without Turkey, is able to provide efficient support to Israel, albeit at a possibly high cost".

Perhaps the most notable issue in Chilean diplomatic correspondence is the Cyprus dispute. Indeed, it was the U.S. failure to back Turkey that led the Turkish public and subsequently government to distance herself from the United States and take on a more neutral

positioning in the Cold War. As the Greek campaign for Enosis (unification) began to take shape and turn increasingly violent on the island, the conflict over Cyprus was taken to the international arena at the London Conference in 1955. The idea of Enosis was completely unacceptable to Turkey, as it believed that it would change dynamics in the Mediterranean and Greece would encircle Turkey on two sides. The Turkish government supported partition of the island into a separate Greek and Turkish sides, who would both enjoy independence. In February 1959, both sides conceded when they met in Zurich, and agreed on an independent Republic of Cyprus. Greece and Turkey agreed to act as guarantors of the new Republic of Cyprus, and shared leadership with a Greek-Cypriot president and Turkish-Cypriot vice president. In April 1960, Cyprus issued a power-sharing constitution; the President would be a Greek Cypriot, whereas the Vice President would be a Turkish Cypriot, elected by their respective communities. The cabinet would be similarly divided and be composed of seven Greek and three Turkish ministers.

But power sharing proved more difficult in practice, and a few years later, The 1959 London Agreement is paralyzed when violence breaks out between Cyprus' different communities. A constitutional amendment put forth by President Makarios effectively withdrew all Turkish Cypriots from the government which subsequently led to heavy fighting around the island. In February 1964, the United Nations sent peace forces to the island of Cyprus. However, they were not successful in protecting the lives of Turkish Cypriots against deadly attacks of armed, Greek Cypriot militant groups. İnönü even planned a military intervention to protect the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in June 1964. The Turkish air force carried out a limited bombardment on the island, after which U.S. decision makers understood the urgency of the situation. Turkey, threatening to militarily intervene, was let down by NATO allies and the U.S. specifically, as

demonstrated in a letter from president Johnson who stated Turkey, should she choose to intervene, could not count on NATO support in the event of a Soviet reaction – which, considering the Soviet Union’s support of Makarios, was not wholly unlikely. Indeed, in August 1964, following Turkish airstrikes on Cyprus, Soviet news outlets reported that “if Cyprus were invaded the Soviet Union will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend her freedom and independence” (Hale, 2013: 108). Turkey realized she stood alone against the Soviet Union and had grown suspicious of the U.S.’ hesitation to support Turkey in defending her national interests. Consequently, for the first time in its history, Turkey debated whether she should remain a NATO member. However, such a withdrawal would weaken Turkey’s position in the Cyprus dispute, as the U.S. may be inclined to spike up military aid to Greece. Instead, Turkey shifted its focus from the U.S. to Europe and established an independent military division for cases of ‘national interest’. When the Johnson Letter becomes publicly available in 1966, anti-American sentiment begins to rise among Turkish society.

Between 1964 and 1974, Turkey was under pressure of her allies in the Cyprus dispute, since NATO members preferred to keep the conflict under control so that it would not lead to an armed conflict between two NATO states. Specifically, an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece would weaken NATO’s southern front (Sönmezoğlu 1994: 433). The conflict in Cyprus peaked when the Greek military junta attempted to depose Archbishop Makarios and establish Enosis; namely the union with Greece. The junta installed Nikos Sampson, member of the terrorist organization EOKA, as President on July 15, 1974. Although both the United States and Great Britain tried to stop him, Turkish president Ecevit ordered the invasion of Cyprus on July 20. The Turkish army expanded its control over the island following a second military operation in August. The government’s intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 restored popular support for

the incumbent coalition. Ecevit, convinced he would be able to secure a majority vote, called for early general elections hoping to be freed from the limitations of a coalition government (Ahmad, 1981: 16). Negotiations regarding bizonal and cantonal plans were unsuccessful, and on 7 November the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed in the North of Cyprus. The Cyprus crisis had a significant effect on Turkish-American relations, resulting in the U.S. arms embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus proclaims independence but, up to this day, remains recognized by Turkey only.

Throughout this time, the Cyprus issue gained increasing importance and rapidly became one of the core issues of Turkey's foreign policy objectives. Turkey in particular sought support among members of the Non-Aligned Movement for votes concerning Cyprus at the United Nations General Assembly from 1964 throughout the 1970s. In the 1970s, the Cyprus issue became the central focus of Turkish foreign politics and directed nearly all policies. The events in 1974 (Turkish invasion of Cyprus following the Cypriot coup d'état) and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo on Turkey in 1975 were the most important drivers of Turkish foreign politics in addition to classical Cold War politics. In the late-1970s, two major events, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, elevated Turkey's geostrategic importance and boosted Turkey's confidence against the West.

There are many examples among the diplomatic documents that the researcher has found about the Cyprus issue during his archive research both in Chile and in Turkey. Especially those belongs to the Turkish Foreign Ministry shows the importance of it for the Turkish decision makers. As an example, there is a note dated as June 14, 1968 provides details a meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and the Chilean ambassador to Turkey. The ambassador stated that he closely follows the developments in Cyprus and wishes to

get more information on the issue from the Turkish foreign minister. The foreign minister gave a summary of the dispute, including current developments, and said that Enosis (the movement for the unification of Cyprus and Greece) will not bring a solution to the Cyprus conflict, as the global public opinion will understand sooner or later. The conversation continued about the importance of Turkey's relations with Chile and Latin America as a whole.

An another example is an internal note submitted to İlder Turkmen, a department head at the Foreign Ministry, provides a summary of a meeting with the Chilean charge d'affaires in Turkey, M. Russi, at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 13, 1966. In the meeting, they discussed Makarios' upcoming visit to Chile between the 24th and 27th of October, 1966. The Turkish side requested Chilean charge d'affaires Russi to inform his government that Makarios is believed to use this visit for propaganda on the Cyprus issue, both in terms of Greek arguments and his personal beliefs, and to give a subjective, untruthful explanation of the events unfolding in Cyprus. Russi is told that the Turkish population is under pressure and is denied freedom of movement; Makarios' ultimate aim is Enosis (unification with Greece); and the events in Cyprus are unconstitutional. The Turkish ministry requested the Chilean government to be attentive; in response, the charge d'affaires stated that Chile will maintain neutrality in the Cyprus issue and will share the information provided with his government.

When Turkey and the Soviet Union get slightly closer in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was conspicuously accused of being behind the anarchy on the streets of Turkey. In fact, the President of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Podgorny, made a visit to Turkey between April 11 and 17, 1972. Both countries signed a Declaration of Good Neighbourhood, in which Turkey promised that the foreign bases will not be allowed to be used for offensive aims against the

Soviet Union. In return, the Soviet Union accepted not to support communist movements in Turkey.

Following an interview with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Exterior Relations of Turkey İsmail Erez and the former Minister of Exterior Relations of Turkey Haluk Bayülken about the intervention of Turkey in Cyprus, the Chilean ambassador Rudi Geiger Stahr has sent a summary of their conversation to the Foreign Ministry on August 16, 1974. This interview was attended by the ambassadors of Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico. The Secretary General, İsmail Erez, started by stating that Turkey does not attack the independence of Cyprus, her armed forces are not attempting to conquer Cyprus, and Turkey does not want the democratic government of Karamanlis to fall. Erez explained Turkey's interest in an independent, federal or cantonal republic, and opposes the idea of partition. He said the armed forces will withdraw once the security of Turkish Cypriots has been guaranteed.

The former Foreign Minister, Bayülken, continued by saying that the Greek government's request to withdraw Greek officers was merely a legal text that would spearhead a rebellion movement. He states Turkey was forced to intervene having seen the example of Crete, which was, according to him, similarly intervened and annexed by the Greek government too. Turkey now serves, as a guarantor country to Cyprus to assure no Greek annexation shall take place. Both Bayülken and Erez make various references to the violent abuse of Turkish Cypriots and the continuing Greek dream of "Enosis", i.e. unity. They both state Turkey has been cooperative at peace negotiations and wants the establishment of a de-militarized and non-aligned Federal Republic on the island. The ambassador Rudi Geiger Stahr ends his report with a conclusion. In his words:

It is my opinion that, although the Turkish authorities have been emphatic in declaring that no other intention guides them other than to fulfill their obligations as guarantor country of the independence of Cyprus and they are not intended to conquer land on the island, I believe that any solution to be reached on this matter, either a federal state or division of the island into cantons, will be a palliative, not definitive solution.

Following World War II, when the Germans lost the conflict, the Crete and all other islands surrounding Turkey in the Aegean Sea, which were in their hands, had to be evacuated. The German commanders begged from Turkey to take the responsibility of the islands, sending to these, garrisons headed by an officer to do acts of sovereignty, and they did not want to hand the islands to the Allies. The then ruler of Turkey, Mr. İnönü, considering that his country was neutral, refused to act, and was so at the end of the war all these islands became under the power of Greece.

Then Turkey found herself surrounded by a belt of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, some, a few miles off the Turkish coast, and if Cyprus under Greek power might be added to this belt, Turkey's strategic situation would be unsustainable. This geopolitical aberration, I think, will be a focus of future friction that will not be completed until Turkey obtains the full sovereignty of them something which no one speaks for the moment.¹²¹

In a confidential note sent on the 3rd of September, 1974, the Chilean Minister of Foreign

¹²¹ Historical General Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. 16/08/1974. No: 436/46-13473.

Affairs commends the Chilean ambassador to Turkey for his report on Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, including interviews with the Turkish Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On July 29, 1974, the Chilean Ambassador Rudi Geiger Stahr elaborates on the economic relations between Turkey and the USSR, inspired by an upcoming visit of the Turkish Minister of Finance to Moscow. The minister will discuss a number of cooperative projects in the oil and iron-steel industry, as well as increased technological exchange. The ambassador notes that Turkey is indebted to the USSR after the Soviets paid back their debts in the midst of Turkish-Greek dispute. Turkey has tried to maintain an independent policy in Cyprus, not wanting the powers to get involved. Now that Turkey has realized the importance of American influence in Cyprus, the future of U.S. and Turkey relations has become uncertain and as such Prime Minister Ecevit is preparing for Russian aid. The author finds it useful to take one part of the report and present below, in order to have a broaden view on the topic as the report has significant importance and valuable views on Cyprus issue and the Turco-Soviet relations:

Turkey's policy on Cyprus during the crisis was not to pounce on the two superpowers; this would have stopped her in action, if both have opposed her. At the same time, Turkey did not want to rely on the full support of any of them. This position enabled her to conduct an independent policy during the crisis and to take their support up to the point that Turkey had won in the battlefield, so that will also be the winner at the conference table too. It was stated that the US wanted to have a base in Cyprus and the USSR strongly opposed it. This issue can lead Turkey to make a final choice between Washington and Moscow. The only indication we have about it are the words

of President Koruturk, in that Turkey is not ready to make Cyprus a land of foreign bases: "The world must know that no one or no state can conduct their own interests in Cyprus at the expense of Turkey".¹²²

In this confidential note written August 12, 1974, ambassador Rudi Geiger Stahr shares his impressions coming across the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turan Gunes in Beijing. Stahr speaks of Turkey's effort to develop "diplomacy with personalities" and a turn away from the West, as shown by recent diplomatic visits and investments in Romania. The ambassador sees a huge change in Turkish-American relations, as Turkey is reconsidering its military agreements aiming to boost her national security in the face of growing instability within the region. Instead, Turkey has invested in her relations with the Soviet Union, embarking on a good neighborhood policy. Left in between the U.S. and USSR, Turkey now sees new relations as demonstrated by the Foreign Ministers visit to Beijing. Recent developments in Cyprus have led Russia to adopt an anti-Turkish campaign, asking the world to condemn alleged atrocities by Turkish troops on the island. The ambassador concludes with a situation update of the Cypriot conflict and resolution process.

On the 3rd of October, 1974, the Foreign Ministry of Chile sent a note to the Chilean ambassador regarding CIA activities in Chile. The ministry reminds the ambassador to remain silent on the issue and that the current government cannot be held responsible for actions of the previous government. The letter reveals a campaign to counter claims of the opposition, including torture, and encourages the ambassador to only redistribute those reports favorable to

¹²² Historical General Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile. New impetus on economic relations between Turkey and USSR. 29/07/1974. No. 417/40.

‘Chilean’ i.e. junta interests.

A note sent on December 5th, 1974, shows Chile’s interest in Soviet influence as the Ministry of Exterior requests new records about a possible Soviet base in Cyprus. The Ministry asks the Chilean ambassador in Ankara to provide more background “given the importance of the truth of these claims”.

Between 1965 and 1971, Turkey lived a brief period of single-party government under President Demirel, until the military overthrew him in Turkey’s second military coup. From 1968 onwards, student movements in Germany, in the United States and especially in France, influenced the youth movement in Turkey. Turkey was experiencing socially and politically difficult times. Street movements have turned into violent clashes. By early 1971, Demirel’s government weakened by defections, seemed to have become paralyzed. It was powerless to act to curb the violence on the streets and it could not hope to get any serious legislation on social or political reform passed in the assembly. This was the situation when on 12 March 1971 the Military handed the prime minister a memorandum which really amounted to an ultimatum by the armed forces.

In the 1970s, Turkey’s domestic sphere had become highly unstable, with many demonstrations and violent protest, political conflict, economic instability, and volatile global politics. Coalition governments were far from finding solutions to the needs of the Turkish society. People’s frustration grew as their expectations – economically and politically – were not met and in 1971, extreme left and right groups turned to violence, crime, and kidnapping. Islamists were becoming more aggressive too and more and more workers joined strikes. On March 12, 1971, five generals presented a memorandum calling for the Demirel administration to resign. His resignation gave space for the junta government to take power and use anti-

democratic measures in the name of restoring peace and stability. According to Ahmad, “As always, the first task of the military regime set up in 1971 was to restore ‘stability’ and that meant crushing the left because it was held responsible for politicizing the country, especially the workers” (Ahmad, 1981: 14).

Political violence and the economic crisis of the later 1970s went hand in hand in constructing the road to the military coup. By the end of the decade, Turkey’s instability led the country close to collapse, with unstable governments, high inflation and massive debt, and terrorist attacks from the Left and Right. Indeed, Turkey faced another military coup in September 1980, with significant effects for its interior but also foreign politics. As governments were more preoccupied with domestic turmoil, foreign policy “became a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and economic crisis, making effective planning very hard to achieve or implement” (Hale, 2013: 106).

Meanwhile, troubled relations with the United States and a perceived decrease in Soviet threat led President Ecevit to adopt a new foreign policy, which he called “a new national security concept and new defence and foreign policies”. Ecevit argued that Turkey was too reliant on the U.S. and should build its own defence industry and was ready to reduce its alliance with the West if the Soviet Union promised not to endanger Turkish security (Hale, 2013: 117). However, such a shift was rendered improbable when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and set an example of what could happen to a neutral, military weak country along the Soviet borders.

“Ecevit’s foreign policy was equally ambivalent and unpredictable. He did not renounce NATO or go further than Demirel in cultivating the Soviet bloc or the Third World, but his perception of the world and Turkey’s place within it differed sharply from that of Demirel and

the groups he spoke for. The latter see Turkey as an intermediate nation, superior to Third World countries but inferior to the West, which they want to emulate and join” (Ahmad, 1981: 23).

5.5 The Chilean Road to Socialism, the Allende Government, 1970-1973

The polarization in Chilean politics between the left and the right intensified at the end of 1960s. Chile started to face violence-oriented extremist groups from the right and from the left. In October 1969, the Chilean left formed a new left-wing alliance *Unidad Popular*, Popular Unity¹²³ (UP), as the successor of *Frente de Acción Popular*, the Popular Action Front (FRAP) the Chilean left-wing coalition of parties between 1956 and 1969. The 1970 elections gave rise to a coalition government called Popular Unity that brought together the Socialists, Communists, and splinter groups of the Christian Democrats and Radicals and was headed by Salvador Allende. Allende proposed a complete shift to socialism, using constitutional means to change liberal institutions into socialist ones with the support of the masses. This strategy eventually divided the Left in two camps, one which believed in constitutional change and one which promoted a swift change to socialism or, in other words, a revolution. Chile is the one and only country in the world where a Marxist government was elected and ruled. The South American country, which was not subject to wide coverage in the world press until 1970s, immediately drew the world’s attention with the military coup of September 11, 1973 and photographs and movies telling the story.

Allende attempted to implement basic reforms during his brief two-year administration and efforts were made to give Chile a modern image based on liberal aspects that directly affect daily life of the society such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and other political

¹²³ UP, Popular Unity consisted of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the Social Democrat Party and the Independent Popular Action.

practices. However, Allende expressed his belief in a more radical change. At this point, the aspiration of the president for transition to socialism, though through peaceful means, drew attention. During his official visit to Cuba, he said in his address at the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference in new Liberal Havana (former Hilton Hotel) that “Chile is not Cuba; we have a long tradition of democratic freedoms and civilization. It should not be ludicrous to think that we will win the elections”. He used every opportunity to reiterate his belief in votes rather than guns, i.e. violence. Allende’s administration quickly started to face political and economic challenges. The idea of Allende, who was raised in an upper-middle class environment and was respectful toward classic freedoms of democracy, to transform Chile into a socialist state centred on workers and the agriculture-based village population met with reactions both at home and abroad.

5.5.1 A historical election.

By the mid twentieth century, Salvador Allende had rose to the stage as the leader of the Left and was nominated as their presidential candidate in the 1952, 1958, 1964, and 1970 elections. Salvador Allende had long been politically active before becoming president. He was a key figure in the Socialist Party, and served as a deputy for Valparaiso in 1937, was then appointed Minister of Health between 1939 and 1942, before eventually becoming a senator in 1945. In the words of Collier and Sater, “he was a politician to the marrow of his bones” (2004: 330). He promoted a peaceful road to socialism, the nationalization of the mining industry, agrarian reform, and wealth redistribution.

In 1970, his fourth presidential campaign, Allende finally was able to obtain the highest number of votes as the candidate of the Popular Unity coalition of the left. On September 4, 1970, Salvador Allende won, by a narrow margin, the presidency in a sharply divided Chile

(While Allende won 36.6% of the votes, right-wing candidate Jorge Alessandri came in a competitive second at 34.9%). Allende, who had been the Left's presidential candidate three times before, had won the nomination of the Socialist Party by a small margin, illustrating the struggles he would later face with his party. At the time, the Socialists turned to a more Leninist interpretation of politics, were eager to start a popular revolution, and less to a gradual shift towards socialism in Chile's society.

On August 5, 1970, the Turkish embassy in Santiago sent a secret telegram to the ministry of foreign affairs concerning the upcoming presidential elections in Chile, four weeks later.¹²⁴ The ambassador notes that North America and Western Europe have a strong interest in Chile, which is notable for her Western-like democracy in the continent, especially because of her foreign investments. On the other hand, Chile is important for the socialist bloc since the country has strong socialist and communist parties. Before the Second World War, Chilean elections were based on the competition among individuals and 'caudillos' (ruling elites). Since the end of World War II and especially 1958, the focus of electoral campaigns has shifted to doctrines. The right is represented by Jorge Alessandri, who promotes foreign investment, economic stability, and minimum state intervention. The presidential candidate of the *Unidad Popular*, Salvador Allende, and the candidate of Christian Democrats, Radomir Tomić, have completely different positions from Alessandri, while Allende and Tomić share some ideas.

Notably, the Popular Unity government also encompassed communist representatives. Just a few years before the coup, the Communist Party of Chile was the most well-organized in the continent despite being outlawed between 1948 and 1958. Moreover, it was one of the few that stayed true to its goals, namely to politically represent the working classes as well as its allies committed to the Marxist ideal (Falcoff, 1991: 26). The Turkish ambassador provides

¹²⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 05/08/1970. No: 165/132.

remarkably detailed information about Allende and the Chilean Communist Party's trajectory since the 1940s. In 1958, the Socialist candidate Allende lost the elections with a very narrow margin against Alessandri. During the 1964 elections, Allende's victory was prevented through ambiguous and complicated means. According to the Turkish ambassador, in the upcoming elections on 4 September, all three presidential candidates will obtain a similar amount of votes. Following the Chilean constitution, in the event of relative majority, the congress shall appoint the president in an additional vote over the first and second candidate. According to ambassador Kenanoğlu, it is highly likely that either Tomić or Allende will be elected by Congress. Especially in regards to Allende's position, it is rumoured that, in spite of existing democratic principles, the military will intervene and prevent Allende's rule.

5.5.2 Domestic developments between 1970 and 1973.

Salvador Allende took office on November 3, 1970. For the first time in Chilean history, Socialists held the presidential office. Their main objective was structural change in Chilean society through the development of a socialist state. Allende's aims were summarized in his victory speech:

“We shall abolish the monopolies which grant control of the economy to a few dozen families. We shall abolish a tax system which favors profiteering and which has always put a greater burden on the poor than the rich. We are going to nationalize credit. We shall abolish the large estates which condemn thousands of peasants to serfdom. We shall put an end to the foreign ownership of our industry and our sources of unemployment. The road to socialism lies through democracy, pluralism, and freedom” (Livingstone 2009: 58).

At its conception, the Allende government made many promises: nationalization of the economy, income redistribution, eliminating the *latifundia*'s control, establishing a unicameral legislature, an independent foreign policy, and the greater involvement of the people in the economy, politics, and justice system (Bethell, 1991: 340).

The Turkish Ambassador Kenanoğlu, sent a report to the Turkish Foreign Ministry about the recent developments in Chile on October 29, 1970. The report shares that General Schneider, the head of the Chilean army, has been assassinated during a kidnapping attempt that escalated into an armed clash. The ambassador thinks that this assassination was carried out by the extreme right in order to prevent a vote in favour of Allende's presidency in the parliament on October 24 and to provide grounds for a military intervention.

According to the Turkish Ambassador it is thought that there were Americans and Argentinians as well as some foreign companies and governments behind the plot. In this political climate, Allende gained 153 votes out of 200 parliamentary members on October 24. It is clear that Allende wants to calm the public disorder and restore economic stability. It is also obvious that, the ambassador writes, Allende has understood that the only way is to be loyal to democratic institutions, the realities and traditions of the country to realize his leftist principles.

The ambassador writes that in spite of all efforts and attempts to create mutual respect, the future is not hopeful. Chile finds herself in an extremely vulnerable process. Chile follows global developments and therefore adheres flexible policies. In example, Chile was the third country that produced a people's front before the Second World War and the Chilean Communist Party became the third strongest communist party after the Italian and Spanish counterparts. The

wealthy, local and foreign, and companies that dominate the Chilean economy will attempt to hinder Allende.

On July 11, 1971, the Chilean introduced the nationalization of American-owned copper mines, unanimously approved in a Congressional vote.¹²⁵ Allende then tried his hand on land reform as his program of ‘transition to socialism’ grew increasingly contested. July 11 was proclaimed the Day of Economic Independence and National Pride. As part of the celebration, President Allende visited the mining region Rancagua. There, he gave a historical speech in which he stated that the production level of copper must be increased, workers and all technicians should work more hours, and French and Soviet experts will consult to expand the mining capacity. According to Turkish Ambassador Özmen, the nationalization of copper in Chile will greatly affect the economic programme of the *Unidad Popular* government as he mentioned in his message to Ankara on July 20, 1971.

As the leader of the coalition government, Salvador Allende promoted socialism and structural reform, i.e. nationalization of industries and land reform. As such, Allende aimed to shift economic power from the elite to the public masses, and establish greater government control to act in the interest of the poor. Chile is closely following the developments in Turkey with deep interest, especially those in land reform, as one of the reports from the Chilean ambassador demonstrates. In Chile, land reform is also a current issue. Legislation on land reform had already been accepted seven years earlier and slightly changed during President Frei’s term. Under President Allende’s rule, it will be implemented with a new vision in 1972. The Chilean ambassador continued to provide detailed information about land reform.

¹²⁵ Following the nationalization of the copper industry, the Chilean comptroller general ruled that only one of three U.S. companies was eligible for compensation. The other two companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, owed the Chilean state 388 billion Dollars, a sum which Chile never collected (Merrill, 1982, 241).

The Popular Unity government did not hold back and continued its revolutionary aim of dismantling the oligarchy and imperialist power. They wished to limit great landowners, monopoly capitalists, U.S. companies and foreign banks, as well as transnational corporations, promoting instead “people’s power” through a system of people’s councils, nationalization of the economy, and the redistribution of income. The policy was to increase the middle and working class’ purchasing power and thereby raise consumer demand and stimulate industrial and agricultural production. Inflation was fought with low prices. Indeed, the first year witnessed a huge uplift for the Chilean economy, but soon thereafter inflation had risen tremendously and Chile was forced to import materials at high cost. Nationalization policies prompted the U.S. to effectively block Chile and cut off her economy. Popular Unity’s populist policies and nationalization campaign, including foreign companies like ITT and Ford¹²⁶, deeply infuriated and prompted the U.S. government to effectively block Chile and cut off her economy. In secret, the Nixon government and the CIA were promoting a military coup. In a CIA cable, the intelligence communicated that “It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. We are continuing to generate maximum pressure towards this end utilizing every appropriate resource” (Skidmore, Smith and Green: 286).

In September 1971, Turkish President Cevdet Sunay invited the Chilean ambassador for a private meeting. The Turkish president noted that there are a multitude of administrative systems; especially, there exists a variety of socialist administrations, and asked about President Allende’s perspective on socialism. In reply, the Chilean ambassador said that Chile gained independence in 1810. In 1830 the constitution was ratified. Since then, there have been some alterations to the constitution, the most important of them realized in 1927 when the presidential

¹²⁶ For a detailed and lyrical reading of the exploitation of Latin America and Chile in specific by Western powers notably the United States, please see Eduardo Galeanos *Open Veins of Latin America*, 1971, (in Turkish *Latin Amerika'nın Kesik Damarları*).

system was introduced. Since 1833, there is a parliament in Chile. Since then, there were only two military coups, in 1891 and 1927. As is commonly understood, Chile is a democratic nation. The military is absolutely professional and except of 1927 has not been involved in politics. According to the Chilean electoral law, the ambassador continued, the president is elected by the nation. If no candidate receives the absolute majority, the congress will decide and appoint the president among the candidates. The congress always selects the candidate who obtained the highest vote. Consequently, the congress elected Allende as president. President Allende explained his political platform during the elections as *transit vers le socialisme*, namely democracy via socialism. All duties will be fulfilled according to this principle. Besides, the democratic administration has been in place for 143 years and all democratic institutions will remain in function. President Sunay then asked whether it is possible to define the existing government as social-democratic. The Chilean ambassador answered and said that President Allende is more progressive than social-democrats and his Marxists.¹²⁷

The rest of the world too closely followed the developments in Chile, including Western leftist factions and the United States, weary of socialism in its sphere of influence. Naturally, Chile's socialist programme was ill-received in the United States. The *Unidad Popular* realized the potential for confrontation and thus was particularly cautious in her relations with the United States. Allende's victory was made possible by the world context also, as there was a détente between the U.S. and Soviet powers, and the U.S. sought closer relations with China. Still, the U.S. remained committed to fighting communism abroad, demonstrated by the war in Vietnam, and especially in Latin America. Allende's victory in the 1970 election was a big blow to the United States – who wanted to prevent a socialist government in Latin America at all costs. The

¹²⁷ From a detailed report about the meeting. From General Secretary of the Turkish Presidency, Cihat Alpan to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 07/09/1971.

fear that socialism may spread to other parts of the world, including Western Europe, is reflected in Ambassador Korry's words, "Popular front tactics could alter the whole fundamental structure of Western defense, Western ideals. ... The Chilean model could have a certain effect." (Falcoff, 1991: 217).

Naturally Allende's election causes the biggest uproar in the United States – fearful of a socialist country in her 'backyard'. The U.S. had even financed some anti-UP propaganda during the elections, although it had not backed any of the opposition candidates directly (Meneses 1988: 378). U.S. opposition became more covert once Allende was in power, who was considered a direct threat to American national security in the region. As Guardiola-Rivera writes, Kissinger was concerned that Chile may set a precedent for the rest of the continent and world: "The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact in the rest of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomena would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our position in it" (Guardiola-Rivera 2014: 56).

Shortly after Allende's election, the United States decided to cut all economic ties with the country. Two years later, the Chilean economy was near collapse. The Chilean authorities stated that Chile had not been able to receive any loans from the U.S. government or international institutions that were controlled by the U.S. Chile had already renewed relations with the Soviet Union for the past six years, and an official Soviet delegation did visit Chile after Allende took office. Chile was thus hopeful to receive economic assistance from the Soviets, and paid a number of visits to Eastern Europe to negotiate trade agreements. Eventually, Chile was unable to get what she had wished for – or at least in time for the right to stage its takeover.

The Soviets were not very impressed with the socialist experiment in Chile. The Communist were only part of a larger coalition, which was “not sufficiently Marxist in nature” (Meneses 1988: 383). According to the Soviet Union, Chile still had a long path to go until it could define itself as a true socialist society.

Almeyda Medina, the foreign minister under Allende’s administration, believed that the United States grew fearful of Chile’s new role in the continent as well as internationally, as politically volatile places such as Italy and France could follow the country’s example into socialism (1979: 82). Indeed, Henry Kissinger had mentioned the threat posed by Chile’s democratic transition in socialism, thus leaving no room for the ‘totalitarian’ or ‘dictatorial’ argument against the Left. Chile’s geopolitical location in the Western hemisphere and distant from the Soviet bloc required a careful foreign policy in the pursuit of revolutionary socialism. According to Almeyda, Chile thus needed to prioritize the principle of non-intervention, demanding countries not to intervene in her own socialist programme in return (1979: 85).

5.5.3 Foreign policy of Allende administration.

Rather obviously, foreign policies and diplomatic goals of Latin American countries were very much limited and narrowed by the hegemonic constraints during the Cold War years. It is within these narrow margins of freedom that the objectives of foreign policy are usually determined (Clapham & Wallace, 1977, 147). The Allende regime in Chile rapidly located itself in an intermediary position between the neutralist and socialist countries in world politics. While the policy of nationalisation with was expected to be inadequate compensation brought about a confrontation with American multinationals and the Washington administration, it enjoyed a more understanding attitude from the European nations, as shown in their willingness to

renegotiate the foreign debt and the continuation of business like transactions (Clapham & Wallace, 1977: 150). Tensions with the United States prompted close relations with Western European countries, in the possible event of a U.S. economic blockade. Chile also realized Europe's heavy weight on international opinion, thus playing a decisive role in Chile's international incorporation. The trend of leftist and socialist leadership across Europe eased Chile's reproach towards the West.

In a world dominated by Cold War politics, Allende and the Popular Unity's election had far-reaching implications not only at home, but also abroad, and transformed the balance of power in the Latin American continent. The coalition parties of the *Unidad Popular* as well as the Communist Party encouraged debate but generally presented a united rather than divided front on international issues. The new government continued and fortified those policies of the previous, Christian Democrat government it deemed progressive, such as unity across Latin America in economic policy and the establishment of diplomatic relations with socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Although the Allende administration largely continued Frei's policies, it was certainly novel in character too. Indeed, it took socialist ties one step further by initiating ties with Cuba, China, and Eastern Germany, unlike Frei's administration.

The new government took to designing a foreign policy in line with and in support of the domestic plans as well as the international socialist movement. Clodomiro Almeyda points out that the foreign policy of *Unidad Popular* government pursued two objectives: a) to create external conditions favouring the development of a domestic program of social change directed toward the construction of socialism and b) to contribute to strengthening groups struggling in the international arena to transform the worldwide capitalist system into a socialist system (Almeyda, 1979: 79).

The foreign policy objectives of the *Unidad Popular* government constituted of seven main ideas 1) The solidification of Chilean independence and strengthening of national, political, and economic autonomy; 2) Respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention; 3) The significance of diplomatic and economic ties regardless of another country's political system, and expand relations in the Global South; 4) Rejection of "Pan-Americanism" and its institutionalization in the Organization of American States because it exemplified North American domination over other American states; 5) Strengthen Latin American solidarity and promote the creation of institutions that represent the continent's interests and promote Latin American independence from the United States; 6) Resolve border disputes through negotiation; and 7) Support for independence movements fighting (neo-)colonialism, including Cuba, Vietnam, the Arab peoples, and to denounce discrimination based on race or religion, i.e. anti-Semitism (Almeyda, 1979: 77).

During the administration of the *Unidad Popular* between 1970 and 1973, all international activities and policies were framed to support the socialist transformation of Chile domestically. In order not to adversely neighbour and other countries on the Latin American continent, the Allende government stressed the importance of ideological pluralism and peaceful coexistence. Within the spirit of Latin American cooperation, Chile put extra efforts in finding a resolution in the struggle with Argentina over the islands in the Beagle Channel and with Bolivia over the Pacific. The government encouraged trade and economic relations, including the Andean Pact, and paid a presidential visit to Argentina. As the two countries' relations grew increasingly close, Chile diminished the threat of political and economic isolation within the continent.

Few days after Allende's election, Chile re-established ties with Cuba. The countries signed various economic agreements and both heads of state visited each other's capital. Allende's close personal relationship with Castro created a strong cooperation between Chile and Cuba. This alliance had the potential to weaken U.S. hegemony in the region. A broader alliance in Latin America which follows a route to reach socialist goals through democratic institutions could produce leftist, nationalist waves. Chile's renewed interest in Cuba was in violation of the OAS' regulations and Chile thereby officiated her stance in rejection of the sanctions placed on the Castro regime. The Socialist victory was met with apprehension in Brazil, which was eager to isolate Chile across the continent. However, Chile's careful approach towards Brazil and her efforts to neutralize Latin American division appeased the Brazilian government. Within the continent, Chile took a leading role in the transformation of the Organization of American States. During a speech in the organization's Ordinary Assembly, Chile pointed to the U.S.' domination and the lack of a true inter-American structure. The organization consequently sought to reform her structure and abandon the Cold War ideology.

On December 26, 1970, in a brief report, Turkish Ambassador Mustafa Kenanoğlu shares the main directions in Chile's foreign politics.¹²⁸ The Chilean foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, has presented Chile's foreign policy of the newly elected government as follows. The government wishes the most sincere relationships with the United States. Chile wants to reinforce the Andes Pact with Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and wants to maintain close relations with Bolivia, in particular. Chile will remain in the Organization of American States and considers this organizations as the right place to discuss continental affairs. Finally, the administration also seeks to establish ties with continental China.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 26/12/1970, no: 291/201.

The Allende administration sought relations with governments across the world, with a special emphasis on Latin America and the global south. Relations with Mexico and Cuba were especially solidified and Chile participated actively in the Andean Common Market Pact. Chile stressed relations with other developing countries and joined by Peru, Zambia and Zaire, together responsible for 60% of the world's copper supply, was determined to fight "economic or commercial aggression" against her copper sales (Merrill, 1982, 245). During Allende's post, the Chilean government established ties with various communist countries including Cuba, China, Vietnam, and North Korea. As a result of this growing connection to the Communist bloc, relations with the United States deteriorated. One of the primary reasons for U.S. antagonism was Chile's nationalization campaign of copper mines. The Chilean government took a strictly legal approach to the matter, referring to existing bilateral treaties between the two countries as well as UN and OAS resolutions. When the United States threatened to demand financial compensation, Chile relied on the latter's right to freely use one's natural resources without economic pressure to justify her policy. U.S. aid to Chile was suspended following the nationalization of foreign-owned mining companies. Military aid, however, continued. Later testimonies revealed a number of covert attempts to prevent Allende's presidency and material support to opposition groups.¹²⁹

In order to get the Turkish view on Chilean foreign policy, it may be useful to give a place to the Turkish ambassador's report at the time. The report written by Turkish Ambassador Necdet Özmen on March 4, 1971, labelled "Chilean foreign policy" reflects on President Salvador Allende and Foreign Minister Almeida's recent statements regarding Chilean foreign

¹²⁹ In July 1972, the New York Times revealed that ITT, an American company close to the Nixon administration, had submitted a eighteen-point plan to oust Allende within his first six months in Office. The leaked document was one of many verifying foreign efforts to overthrow Allende.

politics.¹³⁰ Firstly, the Turkish ambassador notes the significance of the upcoming local elections. He notes that if the *Unidad Popular* government is able to secure more than 50% of the votes, it will greatly facilitate the government in carrying out its political programme. Ambassador Özmen then summarizes and comments on the foreign policy plans of the new government, as expressed by the Chilean foreign minister, including the restoration of diplomatic ties with Bolivia and the resolution of disagreements with Argentina. The foreign minister continued his speech noting the good relations between West Germany and the Allende government.

In the report, the Turkish ambassador deems it necessary to mention President Nixon's speech about Latin America and U.S. - Chilean relationships. In this speech, President Nixon commented that the United States has always valued good relations with all Latin American nations in exception of Cuba. Regarding Chile, he said that the U.S. government wants to open all opportunities for communication and cooperation between the two countries. The Turkish ambassador also reports on the reaction of President Allende to Nixon's speech. Namely, in his response, he said that while the Chilean government welcomes some parts of the speech, especially concerning good relations between Chile and the United States, Chile's foreign policy is based on non-intervention in other countries' domestic affairs. Therefore, Chile does not recognize President Nixon's belief that the United States and Latin America equally benefit from their relations. Allende furthermore stated that, based on the principle of sovereignty, Chile is going to nationalize copper mines. The Turkish ambassador concludes the report with his personal comments on the speech of Allende, who, he believes, seeks to restore foreign relations. Besides this, in order to increase his voice among the masses, he does not allow for criticism against Cuba.

¹³⁰ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 04/03/1971. No: 49/32.

Chile sought close relations with other developing nations in the Global South and supported anti-colonialist struggles worldwide. The Allende administration established relations with various African countries, including Zambia, Nigeria, Congo, and Madagascar. Chile supported Arab states at the United Nations, declared solidarity with the Palestinian people and the anti-apartheid struggle, and supported independence movements, in particular in Portuguese colonies. Chile encouraged developed countries to economically and socially support poorer countries. Consistent with the aforementioned, Chile became a member of the Non-Alignment Movement in 1971. Chile took an active role and in return received support. In 1973, during a meeting in Algiers, the movement formally declared her commitment against all internal and external attempts to overthrow Allende's regime. Using a retrospective lens, Almeyda believed that Chile successfully promoted a foreign policy of Andean and Latin American unity (1979: 95).

In retrospect, two main objectives stood out in particular. Firstly, foreign policy was designed to support the domestic programme of establishing socialism. Secondly, Chile took on a leading role in the struggle against global capitalism and anti-imperialism (Almeyda, 1979: 79). The *Unidad Popular* understood that the best way to support a global shift from capitalism to socialism was to establish a socialist society at home. Following the principle of non-intervention abroad became a significant part of achieving this goal as it would urge other states to similarly respect and stay out of Chilean domestic affairs. Domestic and international policies thus always worked closely together. Turkey, too, presented an important ally to Chile. Turkish President Cevdet Sunay has welcomed Chilean ambassador to Turkey, Alejandro Jara Lazcano, at the presidential office on September 7, 1971. Foreign Minister Osman Olcay was also present during the meeting. The Chilean ambassador emphasized the close friendly relationship between

the two countries. Before his departure to Turkey he met with President Allende, who sent his warm greetings to the Turkish president. The chairman of Grand National Assembly of Turkey Sabit Osman Avcı visited Chile with a group of Turkish members of the parliament between December 13 and 20, 1972.

5.5.4 Decline and civil unrest.

The nationalization of the mining industry was not as successful as was hoped. While production decreased sharply, supporters of the Allende administration accused the United States of sabotaging the use of equipment. With the economy declining, Allende could not meet the promises of his electoral campaign. The government shifted to an import-based economy, although it did not have the means to fund this. Another strategy was to provide employment to the country's poor in nationalized and public industries. In the first year, this seemed to work and wages increased by 55% (Collier and Sater, 2004: 344). Yet, two years later, the economy was near collapse as production in the nationalized industries and reformed agriculture reached a new low. With this high rate of inflation, a shortage of basic products and an active black market, Chilean society grew more and more unstable leading up to the 1973 coup d'état.

Allende's victory rapidly gave rise to opposition, both parliamentary and armed. His rule divided the congress into a pro- and anti-Allende bloc and induced violent uprisings on both sides, by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and the right-wing *Patria y Libertad*. On October 22, that year, the commander-in-chief of the army, General Rene Schneider, who strongly opposed any unconstitutional act like military intervention, was assassinated by extreme right-wing forces. The government enjoyed little support in the senate and among the judiciary

and civil service. Allende faced serious threats; on March 28, 1972, the Minister of Interior Affairs declared that the intelligence had circumvented an assassination plot targeting President Allende, by a right wing group seeking to take power. Just briefly before the military coup, the ruling Popular Unity government appeared to gain public approval, as the coalition gained 43.4% of the votes in the 1973 parliamentary elections, an increase of nearly 7% since the presidential elections in 1970 (Merrill, 1982, 246).

Also abroad, Allende made enemies as foreign companies and the U.S. government feared the election of a Marxist and the possibility of communist power in the region. Consequently, the U.S. funded opposition groups and suspended financial aid, hoping to destabilize the Chilean government. As has been well documented elsewhere, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were alarmed by Allende's electoral victory by a narrow plurality in September 1970. Covert funding, dirty tricks, and illegal actions to bring down the Allende government were combined with diplomatic manoeuvres and an "invisible blockade" especially of international funding, all of which greatly restricted Chile's economic viability (Green, 2013: 912). President Nixon and Henry Kissinger considered Allende's election a direct threat to American interests and, in consequence, the U.S. funded opposition groups and suspended financial aid. In Kissinger's own words, there was no need for the U.S. to "stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people" (Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 285). In the eyes of the West, a socialist victory in Chile meant a communist victory, intolerable especially in the U.S. own 'backyard'. This support would soon spread over, the U.S. government believed, like a domino effect and neighbouring countries would similarly turn communist. Finally, a popularly elected socialist government did not fit within the West's image of socialism, which was presented as a brutal, tyrannical ideology. In

Chile, socialists had taken power not through violence, repression and dictatorship, but by popular, democratic choice. In Cold War politics, *la via chilena*, the Chilean Way of a freely elected socialist government, posed a dangerous and unacceptable threat. For Latin American revolutionaries, Chile offered an alternative model of taking power and building socialism, not through the bullet but the ballot box (Green, 2013: 912).¹³¹

Although Chilean economy initially increased during Allende's government, it suffered when the U.S. placed an economic boycott on Chile, which significantly harmed Chilean production. The boycott was part of a larger campaign to weaken Allende's power, and the CIA started to provide covert assistance to opposition groups. The U.S.' stance was summarized in Kissinger's now famous words: "I don't see why we have to let a country go Marxist just because its people are irresponsible" (Livingstone 2009: 56). The Chilean society quickly grew divided, with strong opposition on the Right and protest on the Left, growing impatient waiting for Allende's promises. Finally, the U.S. increased its assistance to the Chilean military and established close communication with high-rank officials.¹³² After the military coup, the U.S. government immediately sent a message of support to the junta generals (Livingstone, 2009: 57).

The U.S. publicly maintained some distance, but in secret was prepared to send any assistance. Two days after the coup, the State Department sent a secret note to the U.S. embassy in Santiago:

"We welcome General Pinochet's expression of junta. Desire for strengthened ties between Chile and the U.S. You are requested to convey at the earliest possible opportunity informal response to General Pinochet'

¹³¹ Green writes in a book review about Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

¹³² In his book *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, Davis (1985) provides a detailed account of Chile in the final years before the military coup and U.S involvement in the military coup.

along the following lines and by whatever private means you deem appropriate. The US Government wishes make clear its desire to cooperate with the military junta and to assist in any appropriate way. We agree that it is best initially to avoid too much public identification between us. In meantime we will be pleased to maintain private unofficial contacts as the junta may desire” (Livingstone, 2009: 62).

Popular Unity’s economic reform caused a huge uplift for the Chilean economy in its first years, but soon thereafter inflation had risen tremendously and Chile was forced to import materials at high cost. Price control had distorted the economy, producers, landowners and merchants tried to sabotage the government and Popular Unity proved inexperienced and ineffective to run most of the financial sector. As a new economic crisis rained down on Chile, political life faced instability as well. Opposition grew not only outside, but also within the left, which was sharply divided over strategy. The Communists, in particular, criticized and urged the Popular Unity government to reform Chilean society more slowly and by constitutional means, fearing a military intervention. They believed that the middle class and Chilean-born businessmen should unite and organize against foreign interests, but the bourgeoisie had already become disillusioned and middle-class protest was on the rise.

Threatened by opposition from both left and right, Allende appointed three military commanders in his cabinet to appease the army and prevent a military coup. During the congressional elections of 1973, three years after Allende had been elected president, Popular Unity attracted 43% of the votes, seemingly victorious, but not enough to alter the constitution and establish a “people’s assembly”. Similarly, the opposition had not received enough votes to

impeach the president, but, with 55.7% of the votes, remained relatively strong. With an economic crisis and a political stalemate, Chilean society grew increasingly polarized. Protest, political terrorism and violence rose. Eventually, even factions of the military, which until 1973 had stayed loyal to Allende, turned its back against the government and forced General Prats to resign.

There is an official report, which may enlighten the agenda of Allende's period, prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs West Office, concerns the visit of the Chilean Radical Party leader Anselmo Sule to Turkey between May 10 and May 17, 1972, as well as general information about contemporary Chile. During his visit, senator Sule met with the Turkish foreign minister, deputy prime minister, and the heads of the main parties. He also unofficially met with the head of the Turkish parliament at the house of the Chilean ambassador to Turkey. During his meeting at the foreign ministry, Senator Sule spoke about the democratic left programme of Allende's coalition. He summarized the achievements of Allende's government in their first twenty months, including the nationalization of banks, the nationalization of raw materials, and land reform. The senator said that the coalition is not the "exporter of a revolution", but at the same time shows no tolerance to external intervention in the regime.

The report then provides information about Chilean history and politics, as well as foreign policies. The report indicates that Chile has the oldest and most continual parliament life in all of the Americas, except of the United States.

According to the report, after 1970 Chile has demonstrated efforts to enrich her political and economic relations with the socialist bloc. Ties with Cuba, which had been suspended in 1964, were restored in November 1970. It was also decided to commence commercial relations with North Korea.

The report includes an outline of Chilean foreign minister's Almeida's foreign policy agenda. The foreign minister said that Chile wishes to maintain the friendliest relations with the United States of America. Chile also wants to keep good relations with her neighbours, especially Argentina and Bolivia, and will continue to be a member of the Organization of American States. There is an on going discussion to establish relations with China.

The report follows with details about the nationalization attempts of the Unidad Popular government. Rich in detail, it includes data on the budget deficit, land reform, and other financial numbers. The nationalization of banks and mines takes an especially prominent space. The parliament has unanimously accepted the proposal to nationalize the copper industry on 11 July, 1971.

The report then shifts its attention to Chilean-Turkish relations, describing a meeting between Radical Party leader and senator Sule's and the Turkish foreign minister Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil and a meeting between Sule and Prime Minister Ferit Melen¹³³. During the former, the Chilean senator emphasized his respect for and admiration of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who, he says, is the eternal leader of the Republic of Turkey, and that Chilean high school students learn about his leadership. The Chilean senator then spoke about the existing government under the presidency of Salvador Allende. He said that the aim of the movement, called *la Via Chilena al Socialismo* (the Chilean Way to Socialism), is to provide, through democratic traditions, freedom and social justice for everyone and create social and economic development for the Chilean masses. The senator expressed his deep appreciation of the Turkish country and his fond memories of his visit there.

¹³³ Ferit Melen served as prime minister between May 22, 1972 and April 15, 1973 after the resignation of PM Nihat Erim. The report consistently refers to Melen as "deputy prime minister", arguably because he was appointed, not selected, as an acting prime minister until general elections. Melen is referred to as prime minister hereon after.

In the second meeting, between the Turkish Prime Minister Ferit Melen and senator Sule, Melen said that the Turkish government closely follows the developments in Chile. Since Turkey is also a developing country, the government is deeply interested in the developments in Chile. At present, Turkey faces several challenges, in particular the rise of anarchism in the last year. This is not a struggle between ideas but between armed groups, however, the prime minister believes, Turkey will overcome this situation. The Chilean senator said, in reply, that it is understood that Turkey aims to form an administration based on the constitution and rule of law, which is also a basic principle in Chilean politics. The Turkish prime minister said that with such a sensitive geopolitical position, none of her neighbouring countries enjoys democracy. In spite of this, Turkey has been able to maintain her democratic regime. The March 12 intervention is done not in order to remove democracy but rather to defend it and to help civilian administration. PM Melen stated that social policies and social justice are at the core of his party's programme and that they are not binding those principles with socialism. He said that while Turkey and Chile may share the same objectives, they differ in the method and means to reach them. Senator Sule spoke about the character of the Unidad Popular government and he said that there are non-Marxist and Marxist parties in the coalition who share a common programme. He defined the programme as a common movement of the nation and political parties. According to the report, during the lengthy meeting, both figures spoke about the Chilean nationalization process and state-run enterprises in Turkey.

5.6 Military Coup in Chile, September 11, 1973

Within the continent, Chile had the strongest history of democracy with continuous democratic governments since 1932. Since its independence, Chile had only witnessed three

major military interventions: the 1891 civil war, 1924-1925, and the dictatorship of General Ibanez in 1931-1932 (Falcoff, 1991: 267). The turbulent climate of Allende's brief rule reached its peak on September 11, 1973, when the Chilean army, air force, navy, and *carabineros* (police) forces overthrew the Allende government and gave rise to Augusto Pinochet's one-man rule. The 1973 military coup broke the Chilean tradition of political resilience and civilian control of the military.

By September 1973 the situation in Chile was very volatile.¹³⁴ The opposition, both in Congress and in the press, was sharply voicing its objections. Part of the public was expressing discontent while some trade associations, including the truck owners and the copper workers trade union, were openly challenging the government. Under these circumstances the armed forces decided to intervene with a violent coup d'état.¹³⁵ The economic turmoil and political unrest finally consolidated in the military coup of September 11, 1973 – or “*el once*, the eleventh” as known among Chileans – that “represented the worst political breakdown in the history of the republic (Collier and Sater, 2004: 359). Exactly seven years later, on September

¹³⁴ As Kaufman states under the headline of “Domestic penetration by external actors” (Clapham and Wallace, 1977) for the White House, in the case of a problematic regime, it could be realistic to draw a scenario in which the State Department may opt for maintaining a policy of correct relations with a radical elite in a Latin American country, together with some low-level contacts with the more conservative opposition circles. The Department of Defense meanwhile may encourage the local military to prepare a coup. A multinational company may decide to support a moderate candidate in the next elections, supplying him with Money and local press coverage. The Treasury may apply an undeclared economic blockade or try to stop other countries trading with the regime in question or halt private and official credits to that country, cut the supply line of spare parts, or refuse to re-negotiate the foreign debt acquired during the previous pro-USA administrations. The CIA may try to maximise the use of covert operations including attempts at political assassination, training and arming extreme right terrorist groups, encouraging general strikes, creating panic and destabilising the country in general. Student organisations, trade union movements and women's associations may be stimulated or even artificially brought into being and then manipulated in order to serve American purposes. The United States Information Service may work actively through the opposition mass media, projecting about the danger of communism. Such a heterogeneous and conspiratorial Picture may be assembled by combining the facts revealed in Chile about the activities investigated by the American Congress.

¹³⁵ The *Politics of Latin America* published by Oxford University Press written by Vanden and Prevost defines the coup as ...Chilean democracy was shattered by a brutal United States-supported and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored military coup. The workers had lost. The coup displaced all progressive forces and instituted a repressive military regime run by Augusto Pinochet that lasted until 1990. Thousands were murdered by the state security forces. A return to free market economics was one of the primary goals of the military dictatorship.

11, 1980, a plebiscite was held on a new constitution to formalize Pinochet's rule. The plebiscite passed with 67% of the votes, as the opposition had not been given a fair chance to campaign. Pinochet took presidential office on March 11, 1981 for a term of 8 years.

The 1973 military coup abruptly put an end to Chile's constitutional democracy.¹³⁶ The coup, which initially aimed to save democracy from Marxism, instead solidified General Augusto Pinochet's rule as the dictator of Chile. Pinochet effectively closed down the political system. In June 1974, a law by decree appointed Pinochet as President of the Republic and Supreme Chief of the Nation. Leftist parties were banned, universities were put under military control and 'cleansed' from left-wing supporters along with the press, and labour unions were disbanded. The military government also broke diplomatic relationships with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

On August 13, 1973, Allende spoke on public radio and warned the Chilean people of the imminent threat of a civil war. Not much later, he appointed General Augusto Pinochet as the new commander in chief. Augusto Pinochet had become commander-in-chief after the resignation of Carlos Prats, who personally recommended Pinochet as his successor to President Allende. Allende could not have foreseen what was next, as Pinochet, across the leadership, was considered a true constitutionalist. He was thus appointed and granted access to the government's defence plans.

Little did he know, the same general would replace him as the leader of Chile's military government. The military coup of 1973 broke forty years of uninterrupted democratic rule as well as Chile's long general history of democratic tradition. With the military coup of 1973, and

¹³⁶ For Vanden and Prevost, Chile developed strong democratic practices and even had a parliamentary form of government in the 1890s. It had a well seated democratic tradition and a vibrant multiparty system by the 1960s. It was in this democratic tradition that Salvador Allende hoped to organize a democratic socialist revolution when he was elected president in 1970. He, his coalition of socialists, and members of the Radical and Communist Parties were able to do so for three years (2015: p. 193).

the death of President Allende during a bombardment on the presidential palace, Chile's "unique experiment in making a socialist revolution by constitutional means" truly came to an end (Williamson, 1992: 505). Within hours the coup leaders issued decrees – later turned into irreversible laws – that formally established the Military Junta Government of the Republic of Chile. In June 1974, General Pinochet became the President of Chile, rather than of the military junta, confirming his personal rule over the country. The military junta considered itself the "crusader in the forefront of a struggle against the 'Marxist cancer' that threatens not only Chile but the entire world" (Merrill, 1982: 146). Marxism – and by extension socialism – was discredited as an antinationalist, foreign ideology. To be loyal to the Chilean nation thus meant to be anti-Marxist and anti-Allende. The junta government was characterized by respect for authority, hierarchy, and a sense of morality, all inherent to military principles.

The United States grew increasingly interested and, consequently, involved in Chilean politics due to the popular character of the Communist Party. The U.S., vigilant of communist influence in the Western hemisphere, overtly and covertly supported or opposed Chilean regimes depending on their political affiliation and played a direct role in the overthrow of Allende. As Kornbluh emphasized in the aftermath of the coup, the CIA was not the only U.S. actor involved in the military coup.^{137, 138} The U.S. Department of Defense had frequent contact with the generals and even met with Pinochet and his companions in the Panama Canal Zone a year prior to the coup. An intelligence report recorded how Pinochet believed that "Allende must be forced to step down or be eliminated", supported by the U.S. Army who promised to "support a coup

¹³⁷ For Turkish readers to have a broaden view about the U.S. role in the September 11 coup in Chile written directly in its aftermath *Kara Kitap-Şili'de Amerikan Darbesi*, 1975 translated from Armando Uribe's book originally named *Le livre noir de l'intervention Americaine au Chili*, 1974.

¹³⁸ In his book *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, Davis N., provides a detailed account of Chile in the final days before the military coup and, drawing from his personal experience as American ambassador to Chile, U.S. involvement in it.

against Allende with ‘whatever means necessary’ when the time comes” (Kornbluh, 2014, 170). In his memoirs (1979), the former foreign minister, Almeyda, too stresses the U.S.’ role in the 1973 military coup, through intervention in the Chilean armed forces. Her technical and professional support were a crucial factor in convincing the army generals to initiate a coup d’état.

The newspaper *El Mercurio* was deeply embedded in the coup and movement against Allende. The owner of the newspaper, Augustin Edwards, visited the U.S. capital just a couple of days after Allende’s election. There, he informed Henry Kissinger and the CIA director about military officers and personnel in favour of a coup (Kornbluh, 2014, 171).

Today it is well documented that the United States was covertly – as well as rather overtly – involved in the overthrow of President Allende. At the time, the Turkish Ministry interpreted his fall as follows. An official report dated January 29, 1974, details a meeting between the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Chilean ambassador to Turkey Alejandro Jara. The Chilean ambassador will leave the country and told the Prime Minister that he is going to work at the ministry upon his return to Santiago, where he will witness the new regime. The ambassador shares that although he is a leftist person, he also feared the escalation of civil war since Chile faced difficult times including inflation, strikes and illegal actions. According to the ambassador, Chile’s previous president, Allende, truly attempted to stay loyal to the constitution, but his coalition partners acted against the constitution and Allende could not get along with them as such. Under these conditions, the intervention of the Chilean army was inevitable. The leader of the junta, general Pinochet, actually has democratic tendencies, the ambassador stated, and the majority of society is in favour of the military coup. The ambassador thinks that the military government will stay at least two or three years in office. In response, the Turkish Prime

Minister said that the Chilean experiment is emblematic; a leftist government should not have been working in parallel with those who do not believe in democracy. The Prime Minister continued that the ambassador's comments provide hope that the military will be in power temporarily.

In his report Turkish Ambassador Bayaz on March 6, 1974 entitled "Why did the Allende regime collapse?" and sent to all Turkish embassies around the world, ambassador Bayaz writes that the Allende regime fell victim to its own, unsuccessful attempt to reach socialism in freedom, gaining public attention around the world. The reasons behind the failure can be summarized as a) Allende was represented by a weak majority of 36%, b) Allende could not create harmony and cooperation within his own front, c) rightist parties collaborated with "foreign influences" in order to overthrow the government, and d) sabotage of the extreme right and extreme left caused an economic collapse.

The Turkish ambassador quoted a viewpoint from the Dean of Economic and Administrative Sciences Faculty at the University of Chile, Professor Jose Elias Eboit. The Chilean middle class composes around 40% of the population. The economic and fiscal policies followed by the Allende regime were against (interests of) the middle class. The reaction of this class is the primary reason behind Allende's fall. The Turkish ambassador also shared that until today there have been two attempts to reach socialism in freedom, but both became victim of excessive, haphazard behaviours. In Czechoslovakia, the intervention in the Dubcek regime was external, while Allende regime, which was presented as an example of egalitarian society, was met with domestic intervention. After six months of military rule, Pinochet has announced that there will not be an election in the coming elections.

5.6.1 Consolidation of the Pinochet regime.

The Chilean ambassador in Ankara sent a diplomatic note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on September 15, 1973 and reported that the military junta formed a new government and that it wants to maintain the traditional friendly ties between Chile and Turkey. The note was accepted and answered, announcing that the Turkish government too wishes to maintain the close and friendly relations between the two countries.¹³⁹ The note states that the coup is a merely domestic issue and alludes to the recognition of the new military government. The Turkish Foreign Ministry remarks that in such circumstances, there are two criteria (for Turkey to formally recognize the new government): first, establishing total domination, and second, respecting and adhering to the existing international treaties and obligations. For now, the number of countries who have recognized the new regime among NATO and European Economic Committee remains limited, but it is expected to grow soon. Although the military coup in Chile caused critical reactions even from governments who did not sympathize with the previous government (namely Allende), the ministry believes that, according to the two criteria above, there is no obstacle for the recognition of the junta. Still, it can be recommendable to stand with the majority of NATO and EEC members' position.

On September 13, a mere two days after the military coup, the Turkish ambassador in Washington, Melih Esenbel, sent an urgent message¹⁴⁰ to the Turkish foreign ministry informing them about a telephone call he received from the undersecretary of the Turkish embassy in Santiago, İhsan Akay. Akay explained to him that the day before, two Chilean officers had

¹³⁹ In the document, it is said that the Prime Minister himself, Naim Talu, who was acting on behalf of the foreign minister, replied and acknowledged that the note was accepted.

¹⁴⁰ Interestingly, the researcher found the document in the Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives but was not given permission to make a copy of the said file because it belonged to a different collection (i.e. correspondence from the foreign mission in the United States).

visited the Turkish embassy and presented a notice of request asking for the Turkish government's recognition of the new military regime.

The report sent by the Turkish Ambassador Aksoy on September 17, 1973, states that a week after the military coup, the junta government has secured command over the whole country.¹⁴¹ The governments of Brazil, Uruguay, and Costa Rica have formally accepted the new government. In a press conference, the foreign minister, Admiral Ismail Huerta, gave a general overview of Chilean foreign politics and said that Chile will follow her traditional foreign policy and will remain loyal to international treaties and to UN principles. The Turkish ambassador summarized the current situation in the country and noted that airports remain closed and that radio stations announced that some unions and associations support the coup.

In an urgent telegram on September 20, 1973, Turkish Ambassador Aksoy writes that the junta leader and head of the government, Augusto Pinochet, has declared September 11 as the National Day of the Military. Pinochet expressed his gratitude for their loyalty and states that it was not a military coup but an intervention in order to save the homeland. In an interview with foreign journalists, the general also said that the junta government will respect the constitution as well as the rights workers have obtained. According to the telegram, the minister of foreign affairs, vice admiral Ismael Huerta, announced that Chile is not part of the Marxist-Leninist bloc and will maintain relations with Russia (Soviet Union) as long as it will not intervene in Chilean affairs. Until today, fifteen countries have either recognized or announced continuing relations with the new government in Chile.¹⁴² The author has found an additional official document during his research at the Turkish Foreign Ministry archives regarding the recognition of the military regime in Chile, written by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Prime

¹⁴¹ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 17/09/1973. No: 763.

¹⁴² Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives, 20/09/1973, no: 193.

Minister Naim Talu, dated September 20, 1973. In this official letter presented to the prime minister concerning the recognition of the new junta government in Chile, the ministry of foreign affairs reports about the military coup and subsequent events in Chile. The military regime has given the Turkish embassy in Santiago a *note verbale* on Thursday, September 13, states that the military has taken over and is in full control of the administration. The new regime will respect international agreements and wishes to maintain the traditional friendship and close ties with Turkey.

There is a detailed record of a meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister Haluk Bayülken and Chilean ambassador to Turkey Alejandro Jara, just days after the military coup in Chile, on September 22, 1973. This report holds great significance in understanding Turkey's reaction to the coup. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs welcomed the Chilean ambassador on 20 September for a meeting. The ambassador said he was sad to inform the minister that a 160 years old constitutional tradition and political stability has been diminished following the military coup in Chile. The ambassador mentioned that he previously knew the head of the military junta, General Pinochet, whom he first met during his service in Ecuador. The meeting took place days before Salvador Allende entered the presidential office. At the time, Pinochet told ambassador Jara that the military would contest the public vote. This belief was commonly held among military personnel. In the meeting, the ambassador said that the military coup was inevitable and was the final part of a longer process.

The report notes that it should not be forgotten that Chile, if evaluated, was at the verge of a civil war. For this reason, the ambassador explained, it is wrong to say that the government was overthrown by the military; rather, in reality, after all these incidents, a wide range of popular opposition removed Allende from the political scene. The government had already lost

its legitimacy. One should remember the importance of recent developments in Chilean politics. The constitutional court of Chile has formally demanded the president to respect the rule of law and judicial institutions. In addition, a wave of strikes has impacted the economy extremely negatively. Members from numerous occupations, including doctors, engineers, miners and truck drivers, participated and hurt the Chilean economy. These movements, which erupted in response to rapidly rising inflation rates, had created further economic instability. The political climate forced president Allende to seek cooperation among the opposition but he failed to do so because of diverging views and disagreements within his coalition.

The ambassador said that the aim of the junta is to recover economic life. The new administrators openly declared that they will step down as soon as a new democratic government is elected. According to the ambassador, the junta is composed of professionals and therefore will not show sympathy to a certain political tendency. Their one and only aim of the armed forces, the ambassador stated, is to re-establish political and economic order and, then, hold free, democratic elections. The Turkish foreign minister, in response, said that he understands that Chilean armed forces have staged a coup in order to prevent civil war. To recognize the new administration of Chile, the minister first has to consult the government. The Turkish minister assured that the friendship and strong relations between Turkey and Chile will not be affected by “some events” and that it is important that domestic affairs remain domestic.

The Chilean ambassador said that he heard on the radio that France, Denmark, and the Vatican have already recognized the new Chilean government. Two days earlier, on 18 September, a representative of the pope attended the religious celebrations of the 167th anniversary of Chilean independence accompanied by three former presidents of Chile. The ambassador also noted that the new government is in total control of the country. The Turkish

minister then said that the Turkish ambassador was in Argentina when the military coup unfolded. Now, the Turkish ambassador cannot return to Chile due to the closure of the border. The foreign minister said that the ambassador's absence is unfavourable while Turkey is considering recognition of the military government. The ambassador said he will inform his government of the Turkish ambassador's situation. He also wished to express that the rumours maintaining that the military coup was organized by the CIA were far from reality and that, rather, the events in Chile are a solely domestic affair. The ambassador shared more information about the existing economic situation of Chile in order to give a better impression. Finally, he concluded his speech saying that, regardless he deeply regrets losing 160 years of political stability for the aforementioned reasons.

The Turkish Embassy sent a cipher message to Ankara on September 28, 1973. A day earlier, it was announced that the Turkish Foreign Ministry considers the government change in Chile a domestic problem. Since the current relations between Turkey and Chile continue under the new Chilean government, it has been decided that the Chilean government has the right to represent the nation according to international law. Therefore, there was no need to renew the recognition of the government. That same day, the Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Naim Talu, himself sent a note (no. 128.932-12) in response to the ambassador's letter sent September 15. Talu acknowledges the establishment of the military junta and writes that the Turkish government is ready to maintain and to further increase the traditional and cordial relations between Turkey and Chile. Attached to the document is a letter by ambassador Özmen to the foreign ministry on 29 September 1973. The ambassador notifies Ankara that he has visited the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Carvallo, on the evening of 28 September. The ambassador informed Carvallo of Turkey's position on the recognition issue. In response,

Carvallo noted that he had not received any telegram from the Chilean embassy in Ankara and this was the first time he heard from the Turkish government. He expressed his gratitude for Turkey's friendly attitude and understanding.

On November 10, 1973, Turkish ambassador Necdet Özmen sent a report from the embassy to the Turkish Foreign Ministry to inform her that the head of the military junta and government, General Pinochet, has invited the Diplomatic Corps and the Government highest authorities in Chile for a civic ceremony in recognition of the first month of the military regime. In the report, the ambassador provides a summary of the issues Pinochet mentioned during the meeting, namely:

- 1) The events of September 11 “incorporated Chile to the heroic fight against Marxist dictatorship of the people that love their freedom” and committed the Chilean people to fight against international Marxism.
- 2) While the situation is under control, civil conflict persists, from inside and foreign sources.
- 3) Chile is facing its deepest crisis, and the government expects every Chilean to make sacrifices for the peace and justice of the Chilean people.
- 4) Chile needs to be submitted to an orderly effort and shared sacrifice, so to elevate the peoples' standard of living and eradicate poverty and hunger.
- 5) The military government considers Chile a “unity of destiny” and sees no winners or losers; and considers national unity as the most solid aspiration of Chile's recovery.
- 6) The government rejects Marxist conceptions as a divisive and antagonistic force. It is therefore committed to end Marxism, which it deems oppressive and totalitarian, completely in the people's conscience. The government will not pursue anybody merely on their ties to

the former regime but rather expects everyone's contribution to the national reconstruction.

7) Next to the restoration of national unity, the junta's main purpose is to establish economic development and social justice. It has appointed technicians on every subject, and will carry out a pragmatic and realist policy with a reasoned economic planning.

8) True nationalism does not equate to the rejection of foreign investments; rather they should be kept within limits that benefit Chile. The government shall balance private initiative with necessary fiscal intervention in the modern economy.

9) Economic development can only be fully justified if it is reached equitably and there should be no economic difference between the people except for greater working spirit.

10) Priority will be granted to colleges, professionals, trade unions and labourers, to reflect the true thinking of organized people.

11) The government will be looking for greater participation in realism among workers, and respect enterprises as a community of human beings who are subjects of their own destiny.

12) Education must instil nationalist values in the youth, without overt political instruction. Education should also advance Chilean technology.

13) The government promises to uphold respect towards people's honour and dignity, the feeling of Chilean fraternity and the feeling of duty. In order to do so the junta will re-establish the principle of authority, which will be used against any groups disturbing peace of the Chilean people.

14) Once Chile has been restored the Armed Forces will give way to the restoration of democracy, freed from the bad habits of the previous regime. A new constitution will be drafted.

15) As such restoration is demanding and challenging, the government has not set itself any

dates or terms for the recovery. Only when the country has reached the social peace for real progress and development, the mission of the junta will end.

Having summarized Pinochet's words, ambassador Özmen calls the inside policy drafted by Pinochet "of nationalist type, clearly anti-communist, conservative in its ideological principles" but also open to change and progress to carry the country towards social justice. He recognizes that the rule of the military government is expected to last many years as the restoration of Chilean society requires significant time.

Considering Chile's long history of democracy and the active political participation of the population prior to 1973, the military junta initially faced a great challenge in establishing legitimacy. The military junta exploited popular concerns over returning to the political and economic chaos that characterized the end of Allende's presidency. Furthermore, the junta promised to be in power only temporarily until political, economic, and social life was restored and balanced and open elections would be held. The military government's difficult quest for economic liberalism was only possible through repression and violence. Between 1973 and 1980, General Pinochet ruled as president by decree. The regime transformed the system into highly centralized and authoritarian rule personified by General Pinochet. A governing junta¹⁴³ took the command. Congress was dissolved, parties were banned, and state institutions including schools were purged from opposition members. Opposition was crushed with brutal violence, and the poor lived in harsh conditions in shantytowns. Breaking all ties with Chile's socialist past,

¹⁴³ Chasteen defines "junta" as the government of one Latin American country after another was now taken over by executive committees composed of generals and admirals. These are called *juntas*, like the provisional governments founded in Spanish America after Napoleon imprisoned the king of Spain in 1808. The military juntas of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s tried to keep things under collective institutional control, avoiding the emergence of an unpredictable Peron. The nonpersonalist nature of the new military dictatorship led political scientists to speak of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" (2006: 284). Vanden and Prevost (2015) has also used the term "bureaucratic authoritarianism" while discussing *junta* and quoted from Guillermo O'Donnell. It was used to refer to the extended period of military rule where the military actively ran the bureaucratic governmental apparatus (p. 205).

Pinochet's rule witnessed a wave of violence targeted against members and supporters of the Popular Unity as well as armed, revolutionary leftist groups. Left wing forces were vigorously persecuted, imprisoned and tortured. The secret services of the armed forces and DINA acted without restraint. Torture and imprisonment became key tools of repression, and many died and suffered at the hands of the armed and police forces. In 1978 the military government drafted a new constitution, which was then revised and approved in a highly questionable public plebiscite in 1980. The constitution formalized the military as the guardian of democracy and protected property and ownership through free market principles.

The military regime sought a political ideal unique to Chile and found the example in the personality of the founder of the republic, Diego Portales, who ruled Chile during the 1830s. Portales was a conservative, centrist, and nationalist supporter of the Republic. Besides, he was the founder of a well-disciplined Chilean military and therefore has naturally become a role model for the right front. During those days of struggle, the right has indeed chosen Diego Portales as a symbol of the nation and homeland in opposition to Allende's discourse.

The Chilean Foreign Service had always been highly professionalized, but under the military government of General Pinochet it lost efficacy. Still, unlike Argentina, Chile maintained an effective foreign service department and largely continued the foreign policies in place before the military coup. There are marked continuities in Chilean foreign policy between the pre-1973 and post-1973 governments, and these must be attributed substantially to the existence of an efficient career service (Calvert, 1986: 87). Indeed, Chile sent a new ambassador to Ankara. On March 19, 1974, the Turkish Prime Minister welcomed the new Chilean ambassador to Turkey, Rudy Geiger. The ambassador shared information about the domestic and political situation of Chile. According to the ambassador, anarchy has been successfully

prevented and doors are closed to foreign ideologies. The nation is satisfied and content with the existing government. The ambassador expressed the need for a new constitution. The land reform that Allende had promised has worsened the domestic situation yet the new government is making great attempts to restore the economy.

According to an official note dated April 8, 1974, the Turkish ambassador Sakıp Bayaz has visited, according to protocol rules, the head of the military junta, general Pinochet, and later three other junta members: the commander of the navy, commander of the air force, and the commander of the *carabineros*. All the visits were positive and the ambassador expressed his satisfaction with representing the Turkish Republic in Chile. The junta members, in response, praised the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Turkish military. In particular, the head of the air force, General Gustavo Leigh, who is exceptionally cultured and modest, has read about Atatürk since he was a student and considers him the *reformador* of the century.

In the last two months, the ambassador writes, although Chile has a long tradition of democracy, it appears that the current military administration will remain in power (longer than expected). He also thinks that those junta members take Brazil as an example of pro-American politics and free market competition. As is known, the ambassador writes, the military regime in Brazil has been economically successful over the past ten years, but it should not be forgotten that both countries face different conditions.

According to a report sent by the Turkish Ambassador Sakıp Bayaz in Santiago on September 16, 1974, the first anniversary of the military coup was celebrated with great joy.¹⁴⁴ During the celebration, general Pinochet gave a long speech in which he stated that the existing administration will stay in power until a patriotic generation has been brought up. Pinochet also

¹⁴⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 16/09/1974. No: 268/160.

announced that the aim of the junta is to create a strong and free Chile. He also said that some prisoners will be released under the condition that they will leave the country into exile. The martial law will be extended for another six months for the sake of domestic security. President Pinochet (the Turkish ambassador uses the title president to refer to Pinochet) also commented on the economic situation of Chile and noted that the junta government works in order to stabilize the economy. The economic policy of the government is based on free market competition and private enterprise.

The military generals faced a heavily weakened economy when they took power during the coup. When Allende was overthrown and Pinochet started his authoritarian rule, Chile again shifted to a free market economy. The military junta embarked on a neoliberal programme that transformed the Chilean economy developed by the ‘Chicago Boys’¹⁴⁵, a group of economists schooled at the Catholic University of Santiago and the University of Chicago who promoted neoliberal policies. Neoliberal Milton Friedman¹⁴⁶ was inducted as Pinochet’s financial advisor – the Chicago Boys had attended the same school as M. Friedman.¹⁴⁷ The military government aimed to return to economic liberalism and reversed many of the policies introduced in the past forty years, such as land-reform, import tariffs, subsidies and nationalization of the industrial sector. A radical programme of free market policies was introduced to insert Chile into the international economic order. The policy of state control was reversed with private property,

¹⁴⁵ The former President of Chile from 2000 to 2006 Ricardo Lagos, defines the Chicago boys as – an elite group of about two dozen Chileans who had gone to learn the Chicago way and who by then were just old enough to be returning home aiming turning Chile into a neoliberal economic paradise. Lagos Ricardo, *The Southern Tiger*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 40.

¹⁴⁶ For Turkish readers to gain a better understanding of the Friedman model and its impacts on the Chilean economy from an alternative critical perspective, please see Calderon H., Ensignia J. and Rivera E., *Friedman Modeli Kıskaçında Şili*, 1982 and Klein N., *Şok Doktrini*, İstanbul.

¹⁴⁷ Those Chilean academics, advisers were known as the “Chicago boys” because most of them had received graduate degrees from the economics department of the University of Chicago, where many studied with Milton Friedman, a Nobel Prize-winning monetarist. To wring inflation and other price distortions out of the economy they implemented an orthodox economic stabilization program between 1975 and 1979, along with radical privatization of state enterprises and trade and financial sector liberalization (Vanden and Prevost, 2015: 414).

foreign investment, and free competition. Not only the economy but society as a whole was to be deregulated. These economic policies forced many to lose their job and put the working class under terrible living conditions. Still, the regime, which was largely educated at the University of Chicago, then leading in liberal economic theories in support of free market and monetary control, believed that only neoliberal policies could restore and revive the Chilean economy. For the first time since the 1920s, a Latin American country followed a classic liberal economic model.

Social state policies were terminated. Almost all mines nationalized during Allende's period were put up for sale again. A new financial class who gained advantage from the military coup, primarily the former owners of the mines, emerged. Public expenditures were continuously reduced. Collective redundancies in public and private sector occurred. Education and health services were privatized and were to a great extent charged to the public. The Chilean market became widely available for foreign capital. Starting with the agricultural sector, production decreased and imports increased. Salaries and wages remained constant but nonetheless taxes were imposed on the workers. The system was totally based on finance. As the unions and agricultural organizations which stated that the 'market should be freed from the pressures' were shut down, the proletariat and peasants who suffered from the new financial order had to keep silent against the happenings.

The Chicago Boys, however, faced further challenges when oil prices dropped after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and copper prices dropped in 1974. It was in this context, and with the visit of staunch monetarist Milton Friedman, that the Chicago Boys were able to implement their reforms: a 'shock treatment' to fight rampant inflation. These neoliberal policies have had a divisive effect: while the economy did grow, unemployment remained high, and inequality

became larger with the lower and middle classes become poorer. Still, the growing economy gave rise to many new enterprises while older businesses entered the international market. Over the coming years, the economy appeared to recover, but simultaneously grew highly unequal. Economic growth favoured the upper and upper-middle classes who were now able to buy imported luxury goods. The global recession of the early 1980s hit Chile hard and left the economy highly vulnerable and unstable. As a result, capital flight, borrowing and speculation increased while investment stalled. The economy crashed and the regime saw no choice but to nationalize private banks and conglomerates. Chile became one of the most indebted nations (Williamson, 1992: 507).

5.6.2 Foreign policy of the military junta.

Following the military coup, all communist countries withdrew their foreign missions from Chile and terminated diplomatic relations with the country. Only the People's Republic of China, which Chile had officially recognized as one of the first in the Americas, maintained relations and quickly recognized the junta regime (Hickman, 1998: 157). Also Latin American states, such as Brazil, Argentina and Peru, continued their ties with Chile, although Mexico broke all relations in 1974. While most Western European countries condemned the military takeover, France, Germany and eventually Great Britain continued their trade, including arms, with Chile despite pressure from the public about human rights abuses.

The military government also presented a shift in foreign relations. The 'internationalist' character of the Frei and Allende administrations that emphasized the North-South imbalance was replaced by a focus on the East-West divide. The anti-communist and anti-Marxist programme embarked domestically was similarly followed on an international level. In a public

speech, Pinochet declared “direct war against international Communism and its Marxist-Leninist ideology” (Merrill, 1982: 176). The junta expelled Cuban diplomats and cut relations with Cuba and North Korea. Subsequently, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, East Germany, and other Soviet republics in Eastern Europe broke ties with Chile. China however remained a significant trading partner and relations between the two countries remained.

In the 1970s, Chile and Argentina experienced a phase of tension after Argentina rejected to cede the three islands in the Beagle Channel, which it had lost to Chile nearly hundred years earlier, to Chile. The islands furthermore played a crucial role to the trade opportunities of both countries, as well as providing a possible base to natural resources such as oil and minerals. Negotiations were unsuccessful, and in December 1978, military confrontation seemed more likely than ever. Both countries had ordered troops to march to the frontier and Argentina’s navy was headed to the islands. The conflict, which escalated so much it almost led to war, was mediated by Pope John Paul II in a day-long mediation in December 1978 (Hickman, 1988: 164), who granted the islands to Chile. Two weeks later, both sides signed an agreement not to intervene militarily on January 8, 1979. Now the military regime in Argentina turned its focus to the Falkland Islands, then under British control. In 1982, Argentina invaded the islands, but was immediately called to withdraw her forces by the UN Security Council. Chile, worried to come under attack herself, eagerly supported Great Britain to maintain the Falklands under their control. Tensions between Argentina and Chile remained volatile until they signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1984, heralding a phase of cooperation between the two states.

During Pinochet’s administration, Chile witnessed gross human rights violations that were condemned across the world. Supporters of the Allende government were detained, tortured, and killed, while foreigners were expelled from the country. The military junta left

many Chileans displaced and in exile. On February 18, 1974, Turkish Ambassador Sakıp Bayaz reports that he has presented his letter of credence to the head of the military junta government, Augusto Pinochet. He has also visited various foreign missions in Santiago. During his meetings with foreign ambassadors serving in Santiago, he witnessed different types of attitudes towards refugees who sought shelter during the military coup. The United Kingdom and the United States have closed their doors to refugees, but the embassy of France and of Germany have provided shelter to hundreds of refugees. Even the ambassador of Nicaragua welcomed around thirty refugees to his private home. Furthermore, the ambassador says, those refugees who were allowed to leave Chile sought asylum in Western countries like Mexico, France and Germany rather than in socialist countries. This is known as the dilemma of Allende's supporters. Even in the early 1980s, Chilean authorities were still suspicious about the possible threat coming from exiled Chileans. Even in Turkey far away from Chile, the Ambassador of Chile in Ankara sent a notice about the exile question in Turkey to Santiago. On June 17, 1980 the Chilean ambassador sent a secret notice to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of nationalization of Chilean exiles. The ambassador explains that no such threat to the Chilean regime exists in Turkey, where no more than three Chilean citizens reside none of whom comply with political exile.

The violation of human rights provoked reactions throughout the world and Chile was ostracised by the International community. Relations with France and Sweden grew particularly estranged, while Italy suspended relations for years after Italian refugees had been denied safe passage out of Chile. Despite the U.S. initial support for the junta government – wary of a socialist stronghold in the region, relations worsened by the end of the decade with a sharp change in U.S. policies towards the Chilean military regime. Illustrative of this shift in attitude is the visit of opposition leaders Eduardo Frei and Clodomiro Almeyda to the United States. Nixon

and Kissinger had now left the scene, and the newly elected president, Jimmy Carter, made human rights a pillar of his foreign policy. The Carter administration repeatedly criticized Chile for its human rights record and pressured her to end abuses such as torture. Congress passed an embargo on arms and military sales to Chile, heralding a shift from “realpolitik of Henry Kissinger” to “naïve if well-intended idealism” (Hickman, 1998: 160).

In September 1976, Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean ambassador and minister of state during the Allende administration, was assassinated during his exile in Washington D.C. The U.S. Grand Jury launched an investigation and found a group of Chilean officials/agents guilty of the incident. Consequently, the U.S. requested the extradition of two officials but the request was denied by the Chilean Supreme Court in October 1979. Following this decision, the United States declared economic sanctions against Chile. The sanctions, in place until 1981, also reduced the U.S. diplomatic mission by 10 to 15%, ended all military sales, removed the U.S. military mission in Chile, and prohibited Export-Import Bank financing or Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees¹⁴⁸ (Merrill, 1982: 179).

The report prepared by the Turkish Embassy in Santiago on August 20, 1979, presents an overview of contemporary Chilean foreign politics and Chilean-Turkish relations. The report starts with information about modern Chilean history, stating that the first Chilean constitution came to power in 1833 and remained in power until 1973. In these 140 years, the constitutional regime has been interrupted two times, namely the parliamentary and military take-over in 1891 and the struggle between parliament and the president in the name of the constitution, as a consequence of World War I, in 1924. After both crises, Chile was able to return to normalcy.

¹⁴⁸ During the researcher’s interview with the former head of the Chilean navy and aide of General Augusto Pinochet, Admiral Arancibia, Arancibia referred to the U.S. sanctions on arms and military sales. Moreover, during his research at the Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives, the researcher discovered a written offer of arms sales from a Turkish company to the Chilean embassy in Ankara. The researcher has documented the offer per photograph which can be shown upon request.

The military junta, which has ruled the country since the 1973 coup, proposed a new constitution in 1978, which was accepted by a majority vote in a national referendum. After relations with Argentina, Bolivia, and the United States grew tense, the military government has announced various steps to liberalize, including a general amnesty for political prisoners, lifting martial law, allowing civil members in the government, on 20 April 1978. One important interior reason is, the ambassador believes, that the referendum has revealed a weak point of the military junta, since the commander of the navy and of the air force were openly against the referendum and distanced themselves from Pinochet. The commander of the air force, who was later dismissed from his post, announced some recommendations for the (political) liberalization of Chile. The institution of the Church has also voiced criticism against the junta because of mass arrests and torture allegations.

In February 1975, the Turkish Ambassador in Santiago Sakıp Bayaz, sent a country report to Ankara. According to the report, Chile had entered the seventeenth month of the military government. Although the military has assured its efforts for domestic security and a stable economy, the military regime has not been successful in recovering the economy, politics, and foreign relations, and returning the country to normalcy. As known, Chile has become isolated, facing international criticism especially from socialist countries, international organizations, and international intelligentsia. The regime could not attract the foreign investment it expected. Besides, the price of copper, Chile's most crucial export product, has been decreasing.

Following, the ambassador explains why the Allende regime has fallen. According to Bayaz, Allende came to power with 36% of the votes, but was unable to reach harmony and cooperation even within his own circles. On the other hand, the opposition was united with the

support of foreign powers like Brazil and the United States to overthrow Allende's regime. Moreover, sabotage from the extreme left and right destroyed the established order and harmed the national economy. Chile has a long tradition of democracy that made the country a positive example throughout all of Latin America. However, Chile has never been as polarized as it was during Allende's regime. Although Allende gained more than 50% of the total vote during the 1971 municipal elections, he could not maintain these "days of light and hope".

The Turkish ambassador continues with his comments on the attainability of 'socialism in freedom'. He writes that, until today, there have been two attempts to reach socialism in freedom, but both have ended in frustration because of their excessive and haphazard character. The first attempt, the Prague Spring, was unsuccessful and subdued due to such overly optimistic and unrealistic attitudes. As in Czechoslovakia, the reason behind the collapse of Allende's administration is the same immoderation. While the Chilean middle-class chose to identify the rightist front, leftists' strikes and irresponsible behaviour, such as the occupation of factories, brought Allende's fall more speedily. Thus, the ambassador argues, the military was left with no other option than intervention, but, while she should have remained neutral, chose the rightist front and as such caused a bloody coup. The military junta has found a natural ally in the right. The regime has followed the principles that the right camp promotes politically, socially, and economically. At last, an authoritarian regime emerged in Chile which shattered all democratic institutions. The military junta did not want to leave the administration to politicians after the bloody events of September 11, 1973 because Allende's socialist regime was considered a totally foreign ideology, imported from abroad, the ambassador writes.

The other significant part of the country report concerns Chile's foreign politics and foreign relations. It is evident that the ousting of Allende, who had come to power through

democratic means, with a bloody coup invited criticism across the world. Bayaz reports that Pinochet actively attempts to counter this reaction, but, in Latin America, Chile has faced no opposition, other than Mexico, since most of the continent is ruled by military regimes. Chile's foreign relations with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Bolivia are much friendlier today than in Allende's period. The issue in Peru should be separated, however, because the military regime in Peru has a leftist and populist character. Soviet military aid to Peru and Peru's developing political relations with Cuba led to suspicion within the Pinochet regime.

Finally, ambassador Bayaz comments on contemporary Chilean-Turkish relations. After the September 11 military coup, in exception of human rights issues, there has been no change in the two countries' relationship. Chile declared her kind support to Turkey as long as it is not in conflict with her own interest. Regarding the Cyprus issue, unlike Western countries and Turkey's Western allies, Chile has maintained a neutral position. The most important Chilean newspapers like *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera*, and *Ercilla* covered the issue in favour of Turkey's rightful arguments. The geographical distance between the two countries largely eliminates the possibility of trade. In contrast, 1974 was an extremely fertile year for cultural relations between Chile and Turkey, peaking with the visit of Turkish pianist, Verda Erman, for a series of recitals. Her visit was particularly effective in constructing a Western image of Turkey.

The 'country report 1975' about Chile that the Turkish Ambassador Sakıp Bayaz sent to Ankara to the Turkish Foreign ministry is an important document to understand and evaluate the agenda of the time.¹⁴⁹ Ambassador Bayaz, points that the military junta's doctrine has been found according to principles of the extreme right. In 1974, the most important issue challenging the military regime was public order and domestic security, which it successfully maintained. Meanwhile, however, human rights abuses were widely criticized at the United Nations, leading

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. 15/03/1976.

the military regime to adopt a smoother stance and release a number of political prisoners. Criticism and scepticism had also arisen in Chile itself. Among them, the most important figure was Eduardo Frei, the former president of Chile. As a well-respected and appreciated statesman in the entire continent, Frei condemned the military regime's applications as well the extreme right and extreme left in the Chilean political arena. According to the Turkish ambassador, Frei's criticism of Chilean politics is a significant step and is worth of attention.

The ambassador continues with an overview of the economic situation in Chile and references the collapse of the economy during the Allende administration. According to him, the heaviest fist weighs on the middle class both during Allende's rule and due to the open market policies and competition that the military government promotes today.

Then, the ambassador turns to the foreign policy of Chile. Ambassador Bayaz writes that Chile is becoming alienated by Western democracies and is continuously criticized for human rights abuses. The ambassador notes, however, that there is no democratic alternative in the Latin America and that, before the coup, Chile was the only libertarian democracy in the continent. Chile receives indirect support from the United States and Brazil. Chile maintains a strong relationship and friendship with Spain. Some other Western countries hesitate to provide aid to the military government due to critical public opinion. Again, the ambassador dedicates significant attention to Chilean-Turkish relations in his report. Chilean governments have always been kind and demonstrated goodwill to Turkey. But, since Turkey voted against Chile on human rights issues at the UN General Assembly, Chilean foreign ministry's diplomats are upset, the ambassador writes. They have been surprised by Turkey's adverse behaviour since Chile has always supported Turkey in the Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes. The Chilean delegation was among the few "friendly" countries when the Cyprus issue was negotiated at the

General Assembly of the United Nations. The ambassador states that it is evident that, thanks to propaganda, the junta regime is presented much more violent than it is in actuality.

The military rule of Pinochet can be considered in two phases: the first, from 1973 to 1977 being the consolidation of power, and the second, from 1977 to 1981, the institutionalization of economic and political reforms, eventually embedded in a new constitution introduced in 1981.

According to an official document written by the Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, on September 1, 1977, the Chilean permanent representative in Geneva and the Chilean ambassador in Ankara have visited the Turkish foreign ministry, where they met with several Turkish diplomats. This document which covers the details about the meeting shows the main direction of the Chilean foreign policy perspectives. The Chilean permanent representative in Geneva, who is also the coordinator-ambassador between Latin American countries, introduced himself. He said that the difference between political ideals and between regimes should not be an obstacle to international cooperation. He has met with representatives across the world to overcome the unjust campaigns against Chile, orchestrated by Soviets, as Chile is ready to cooperate in economic and technological issues with all countries including the Soviet Union. The Chilean official expressed that the accusations against Chile regarding human rights abuses are unjust and invalid, and that, for this reason, Chile seeks cooperation with Turkey.

Mr. Subaşı, deputy undersecretary of general political affairs at the Turkish foreign ministry, said that Turkey is against the usage of strong language against and condemnation of countries in international organizations. He explained that there are several factors affecting Turkey's votes at the General Assembly, i.e. as a result of Greek and Greek-Cypriot votes. Sometimes, Turkey is, for this reason, forced to support resolutions that are using strong

language. As is commonly known, for Turkey, the most important issue at the United Nations is the conflict in Cyprus. The Turkish side similarly expects supports from “friends” at the United Nations. Subaşı expressed his gratitude to Chile for supporting Turkey’s candidacy in the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The Chilean ambassador to Turkey noted that he has visited Turkey on six earlier occasions, during the Korean War. Since then, the ambassador has contacts and a great interest in Turkey. The ambassador continued with additional information about pre-coup conditions, political violence and assassinations, and developments after the military coup in Chile. Chile hopes to receive Turkey’s understanding and support at the United Nations and is willing to support and help Turkey to her best ability. The ambassador shared detailed information about the violent activities by members of terror organizations and guerrillas.

The Chilean representative requested a special favour, seeking contact and cooperation between the Chilean and Turkish delegations in Geneva. In completion of this meeting, the Chilean ambassador also met with the directorate general for multilateral political affairs at the Turkish foreign ministry. The Chilean ambassador kindly asked Turkey to evaluate the current human rights situation in Chile from a neutral as well as broad perspective. The ambassador again expressed his wish to establish contact and cooperation between Chile and Turkey at the United Nations in New York and Geneva.

In October 1978, Turkish officials received a note from Chilean Embassy in Ankara. According to a report dated October 4, 1978, the Directorate General for Bilateral Economic Affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry confirms it has received a note from the Chilean embassy in Ankara. In the note, Chile proposed a trade agreement between the two countries and invited the Turkish Minister of Trade to Santiago in March 1979. It is believed that such a trade

agreement will have a limited economic effect, but rather a political significance. Since Chile has been criticized in international forums, the country is forcing itself to sign agreements and pay official visits to foreign countries in order to demonstrate the approval of the military regime. The directorate general concluded that this matter should therefore be evaluated on political grounds.¹⁵⁰

Regarding foreign politics of Chile, the Chilean government currently faces problems with the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. It is evident that the reason behind the deterioration of Chilean-U.S. relations is the case of Letelier, Allende's foreign minister, who was assassinated in Washington D.C. With Argentina, Chile struggles over control of the Beagle Channel. The resolutions were not fruitful and the dispute almost turned into an armed conflict. However, the Pope, eager to prevent a potential war, sent Cardinal Samore to the area, who helped to resolve the dispute. Finally, Chile and Argentina signed an agreement in Montevideo on 8 January 1979.

Finally, the report turns its attention to Chilean-Turkish relationships. The two countries have had amicable relations. The Turkish government joins the condemnation of human rights abuses at the United Nations, yet continues to enjoy economic negotiations with the Chilean government. In September 1978, the Chilean embassy in Ankara sent a diplomatic note to the Turkish foreign ministry with a draft version of a commercial trade agreement attached, officially offering the agreement to the Turkish government in September 1978.

Another report prepared by the Turkish Foreign Ministry's West Office in October 1979 provides general information about Chilean politics, foreign policy, and relations with her neighbors, and concludes with a segment on Chilean-Turkish relations. The report sketches Chile

¹⁵⁰ Turkish Foreign Ministry Archives. 04/10/1978. No. 405.

as a stable democratic country with high literacy rates. There is a special emphasis on socialist parties and the socialist movement in Chile. According to the report, the United States did not prefer another ‘Cuban experience’ and therefore was in favor of Frei’s candidacy during the presidential elections. However, after being elected, Frei was unable to provide the expected welfare, and the United States somewhat lost her confidence in his presidency.

The report continues to say that the three big Latin American powers - Argentina, Mexico and Brazil – are displeased with Chile, having a western democratic administration, is presenting herself as a regulator in the region. According to this report, Turkey sent an acting chief of mission (*charge d’affaires*) to Santiago in 1930, but the mission closed down one year later in 1931. An honorary consulate was formed in 1942; in 1945, Turkey opened the doors of her diplomatic mission in 1945 and reciprocally, Chile upgraded her mission in Turkey to an embassy in September 1953.

5.7 Turkey in the 1980s – From the September 12 Coup to the End of the Cold War

In 1980, Turkey had become a politically and economically unstable place, facing terrorist attacks from the Left and Right, an unemployment rate of over 20%, massive foreign debt and state bankruptcy, and an underperforming export industry (Ahmad, 1981: 11). On September 12, 1980 Turkey experienced yet another military coup, justified in order to protect the Turkish state from social and economic turmoil and to restore state authority. Generals seize political power, urging the need to strengthen the state and end anarchy across the country. Led by General Kenan Evren, the four chiefs of the armed forces, namely the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie, established the National Security Council, which would rule Turkey until November 1983. The military generals proclaim martial law, marking the start of one of

Turkey's most violent periods. With its promise of stability and a return to law and order, the junta was able to appeal to the public, disillusioned by the high rate of inflation and the inefficacy of the parliament. Similar to the Chilean junta after the military coup in 1973, the NSC suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned political parties, and suspended trade unions. The junta changed all aspects of Turkish society, but continued the previous government's foreign policy and economic stabilization programme. The junta government's main concern was the total restructuring of Turkish politics and institutions. On September 21, a little over a week after the coup, the NSC announced its cabinet led by Bülent Ulusu, a former admiral and instigator of the coup. The cabinet was primarily composed of bureaucrats, academics, and retired officers.

In an interview with the researcher, former ambassador of Chile to Turkey, Jorge Arancibia, notes that he well remembers September 12, 1980, the date of the Turkish military coup. He said that Pinochet was, as usual, informed about global affairs that day and was told there had been a military coup in Turkey. Arancibia stated that Pinochet did not react at that moment, but that, when it became clear the coup was backed by the U.S., he appeared to welcome the coup. One and a half month later, on October 29, Pinochet sent a congratulatory telegram to the leader of the military coup, General Kenan Evren. Arancibia's significance to Chilean history was his appointment as the adjutant (aide-de-camp) of General Augusto Pinochet. They worked together for a long period. In 1999, during Pinochet's house arrest, Arancibia flew to the United Kingdom and visited Pinochet there.

At the beginning of 1980, the Demirel government presented a radical shift in economic policies that promoted stabilization and liberalization, overseen by Turgut Özal as undersecretary of the prime minister. Turgut Özal, the government's economic advisor, came to the stage as one

of the key political figures. He aimed to create a new export-based economy and to open Turkey up to the global market, completely transforming the Turkish economy as well as society. The new economic policies aimed to establish a free market economy and penetrate Turkey in the global capitalist order through austerity measures. In order to make sectors more globally competitive, state support to small industries was suspended. Economic power was to be concentrated in large businesses and holdings. The key figure in this austerity program was Turgut Özal, the undersecretary and head of the State Planning Organization, who designed the program and consolidated its implementation as the deputy prime minister of the military government after the 1980 coup. Özal would stay in politics until he died of a heart attack on April 17, 1993.

Similar to the Chilean practice, the rules of laissez faire economy appeared in Turkey with the 24 January 1980 decision under the tutelage of Turgut Özal, and put into practice thanks to the implementation force of the 12th September military coup d'état. On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government introduces a radical economic programme to combat inflation rates. The Turkish Lira is devalued by 33%. The programme is designed to put Turkey in line with globalization and is to be enacted under an authoritarian regime. In order to recover the Turkish economy, Turkey relied on support of the International Monetary Fund. However, its implementation required harmony between the existing political parties, something that seemed impossible in the wake of the 1980 military coup. While the government was unable to draw enough popular support for the new economic policies, the military government that came to power after the coup vowed to implement the package, and maintained the appointment of Turgut Özal as deputy minister of economic affairs.

Turkish foreign policy tried to adapt itself to the bloc system which was symbolized by a total ideological polarization in the period between 1946 and 1964 (Sönmezoğlu 2006: 764). The period between 1965 and 1980 saw a détente; the system kept its polarized character but bloc members enjoyed more autonomy compared to earlier years. It is in this context that Turkey changed her foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, as a result of Turkish domestic political affairs (Sönmezoğlu, 2006: 764). As Tuncer quotes from Gönlüböl and Kurkçuoğlu (2015: 21) the head of the September 12 coup d'état, the Commander in Chief, General Kenan Evren announced in a televised speech on that same day that the Republic of Turkey has decided to respect all agreements and alliances, including NATO, and to maintain good relations with all countries and primarily with Turkey's neighbours that are based on mutual respect, sovereignty, and non-interference, and to develop economic, social and cultural relations under equal conditions. According to Tuncer (2015: 33), President Özal was in favour of establishing a foreign policy by prioritizing economic issues. In his view, Turkey should follow a foreign policy guided by her economic needs.

The post-coup regime not only continued Özal's neoliberal economic policies but also turned to a more pro-Western foreign policy, and lifted the veto against Greece's return to NATO. In October 1980, with the extraordinary powers granted by the coup, the NSC lifted the veto against Greece's return to NATO military command. Foreign policy was largely overshadowed by domestic issues, until the Gulf Crisis in 1990. Özal single-handedly decided to support President Bush and against Iraq, lifting Turkey's status in the United States and elsewhere around the world. Soon, Turkish troops had crossed the border. The Chief of Staff, Necip Toruntay, resigned in protest, stating that he "cannot continue to do my duty with the principles I hold and with my understanding of state affairs" (Ahmad, 1991: 201).

Starting in the mid-1970s, Turkey and the West grew increasingly at odds. According to Sander (1982), the conflict was not the result of the Turkish government's deliberate politics, but rather of the U.S. embargo on Turkey and other Western sanctions such as the refusal to grant Turkey necessary credit and to export military warfare. In particular, the Cyprus conflict caused a rupture between Turkey and the West, and Turkish decision-makers realized the necessity of building alternative alliances to the West.

Before the coup, Turkey suffered from a U.S. arms embargo. The motivation behind the U.S. embargo between 1975 and 1978 was the Turkish position and approach on the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek military balance, then skewed to the Turkish side. However, the United States grew aware that the military embargo did not impact Turkey's position in the Cypriot conflict. During the following period, U.S. governors believed that the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 would lead to a domino effect within the region. Turkey's significance as a stable ally to the West grows, but the Turkish government fails to provide stability as she finds herself in political turmoil at home. The Turkish domestic sphere had been far from stable, and in 1980, then president Demirel refused the use of Turkish bases by U.S. forces and rejected Greece's return to NATO. It was not clear to the U.S. government that "under Demirel, Turkey could not play the regional role that was being assigned her: it seems that only the military could" (Ahmad, 2014: 145) – paving the way for a third military coup in Turkey.

The probability cost of Turkey's move to the left shaped U.S. decision-makers' attitude towards the Turkish military coup of September 12, 1980. The importance of Turkey's geographical position between the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus increased in the eyes of the United States in the early 1980s. Namely, Turkey, providing a secure

passage of Middle Eastern oil to Europe and a possible “channel” to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries, grew more important to the United States (Sander 2000: 198). In addition to the aforementioned reasons, Turkey’s geographical proximity to the Soviet Union made Turkey an irreplaceable ally.

In the aftermath of the coup d’état of September 12, 1980 the Chilean embassy in Ankara sent an update on the Turkish political situation on September 30, explaining the motivations and objectives of the military intervention. The note shows how the Chilean mission interpreted the events unfolding in Turkey. According to ambassador Emilio Ruiz Tagle, as Turkey appeared on the brink of a civil war, the military intervention was generally welcomed by the public, while extremist minority groups and religious fanatics have been pushed out of the political arena. Although the coup led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Demirel, it was not directed against him, but rather aimed to return a compromising coalition of centrist forces. As the Congress came to a standstill, extremist forces became more vocal and violent, risking a civil war in the country. Secondly, Emilio Ruiz Tagle names religious fanaticism, inspired by Iranian and pan-Islamic movements, as the “real trigger” of the military intervention. The ambassador addresses rumors of U.S. and Western involvement, but is vigilant to affirm this. The new government’s priorities are now to eradicate violence and overcome the economic crisis, which makes Turkey so dependent on western aid. Finally, the ambassador expects a change in constitution, and for the new administration to seek reconciliation between the two main blocks in Turkish politics.

In another notice, one month later, the ambassador shares an update on the political situation, and changes since the military coup of 1980. The ambassador repeats his impression that there was no viable alternative than the military intervention considering the degree of instability in the country. He notes the appointment of Turgut Özal as the Deputy Prime Minister

as a demonstration of Turkey's will to reform her economy, and has put an end to the rampant strikes prior to the coup. The ambassador does not foresee a big change in foreign relations, expecting the new government to continue its pro-Western position while maintaining special ties with Islamic countries. He shares his surprise with the reaction of the West and especially the U.S. to the coup, who have been largely sympathetic and favourable to the new government. Ambassador Arturo Yovane Zuniga agrees that Chile too should recognize the new government, and sees space for improvement in bilateral relations.

A report sent on October 24, 1980 from the Embassy of Chile in Ankara to the Chilean Foreign Ministry, sheds light on the Chilean perspectives on the September 12 military coup in Turkey. The author deems it necessary to incorporate a translated copy of the report, due to its significant value in revealing the Chilean position vis-à-vis Turkish politics at the time. The ambassador Arturo Yovane Zuniga presented his views as follows:

Intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces. New Military Government.

The Turkish Armed Forces, headed by the Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, took control of the government on the passed 12th of September, through a bloodless coup d'état.

Through the reserved notice No. 97/38, this Mission conducted an analysis of the direct and indirect causes that motivated the military intervention, the basic objectives of the new government and the first measures taken. In addition, in previous political reports to you gentlemen, the extreme instability affecting the government of Süleyman Demirel was underlined, which eventually resulted in the current circumstances. The growing process of wearing of the basic

institutions of the state and the severe economic crisis and the situation of anarchy, so often described on previous occasions, gave the result that military intervention was the only viable solution for the country, for avoiding a civil war with unpredictable consequences that had clearly loomed on the horizon.

There has been a complete turnaround in the Turkish political scene. While there is consensus that the intervention was inevitable and necessary, it is still premature to assess their chances of success given the magnitude of the crisis that this country has experienced in recent years.

Economic policy of the new government.

The new authorities expressed that overcoming the economic crisis was considered a primary goal for their administration, and the procedure done within a few days, the designation of former Deputy Secretary of State Turgut Özal as Deputy Prime Minister, made this intention very clear. Indeed, Özal was the ideologue and manager of the economic program launched by the deposed Demirel; it was he personally who has conducted the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, obtaining fresh foreign loans, renegotiating the massive debt and setting guidelines for economic policy. This is a man respected on the international level (former World Bank official), and many of the achievements in the recent times –especially long-term credits of the international financial organizations– are attributed, in part, to his personal credibility.

Therefore, his appointment demonstrates the will of the new government not to make changes in this area. The restrictive economic program driven by

Demirel will continue, with the difference that now there will be limited by determinants of political nature.

As has been transpired, the nomination of Özal as Vice-Prime Minister corresponds to the will that he oversees all the measures taken by various ministries that have some economic implication. All resolutions must have the approval of the pioneer of the economic program, who would enjoy the broadest powers in his missions. This will avoid some incidents that occurred in the past, some of the commitments made to the IMF - finishing with the subsidies to the state enterprises, periodical devaluations - were delayed or simply suspended for political considerations.

The first step taken by the new authorities was to order the immediate return to their tasks of the striking workers - estimated at over 40,000 in those moments - readjusting the situation of 70% of the employers, reflects the intention to intensify the economic recovery program, taking advantage of the favorable political circumstances in which the government began its management.

Foreign Policy. External Reactions to the Intervention.

From the moment of taking the power, General Evren said that no change would occur in the country's foreign policy. Over the past days, that statement acquired a more explicit character: The commitment to NATO and the Islamic Conference was expressly ratified, also signaling the intention to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union, "a country that plays an important role in

maintaining the world peace", in the words of Evren. It seems that the intention of the new regime is to continue the same foreign policy conducted by Demirel, meaning the clear reaffirmation of the pro-Western position of the country, while maintaining special ties with the Islamic countries. This differs from the policy followed by former Prime Minister Ecevit, somewhat more oriented towards Third-World positions.

Reactions to the intervention from the various sectors of the global spectrum have exhibited a common pattern: A kind of understanding of the particular circumstances requiring the intervention. Just as the Soviet response was extremely discreet, merely recording the facts without judgment, the American attitude was surprising because of the total lack of criticism, despite the policy of the US government being known against ruptures of democratic systems. The State Department, along with pointing out that the flow of aid to Turkey might not be interrupted, said the deposed government had "few successes in addressing the growing social and economic problems", which almost came to endorse the intervention of the Armed Forces.

The reactions in the countries of Western Europe have been generally quite similar to the US although in some cases the "concern" expressed for the prompt restoration of the democratic system, with varying degrees of emphasis according to the nature of the respective governments. In this sense, the most critical attitudes, but always with discretion, came from Scandinavian countries and Belgium.

The reaction in the Muslim world was equally sympathetic and friendly, with Libya and Saudi-Arabia - representatives of two extremes - as the first countries to congratulate the new authorities. In Iran, however, the Islamic Republican Party said that "the United States had prepared the coup to prevent a new Islamic revolution like that of Iran", a clear demonstration that the recent religious fanatic incidents had been promoted from the neighbouring country.

Just as happened in the domestic sphere, the new authorities have had an extremely favourable reception in the international arena. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the situation will be complicated later on by both pressures for early restoration of democracy, and the implications of the fight against terrorism, which in this country has obvious international ramifications.

Bilateral Relations

Taken into account the circumstances in which the military coup occurred and also the political orientation of the new authorities, this mission fully agrees with the resolution adopted by our country to give tacit recognition to the new government.

In the first contacts with the new authorities, making an appointment with General Evren and the National Security Council, together with the Heads of Missions accredited in Ankara on the 20th of September (which all the Heads of Missions attended) the undersigned ambassador noted the willingness of our country to strengthen bilateral ties and expressed best wishes to the new government.

Overall, it can be noted that the new Turkish political situation provides favourable conditions for progress in bilateral relations. Although it is early to assess the receptivity that the new authorities would have, the situation of stability and order will allow us to make the work of rapprochement in better conditions, without the limitation of the chronic instability of the previous government and the existence of sectors of the Parliament frankly opposed to our country.¹⁵¹

On November 26, 1980, the Chilean ambassador to Turkey, Arturo Yovane Zuniga, wrote to the Chilean Foreign Ministry about armed violence namely political terrorism in Turkey and the possibility of a civil war.¹⁵² The report aims to describe the activities of terrorist groups in Turkey, their scope and organization, as well as the possibility of it to turn into a civil war. The ambassador writes that Turkey has become the country with the highest number of deaths caused by political violence in the world, in exception of those in a state of war. Until October 1980, nearly 2,500 people have been killed, while 2,000 people had died as a result of terrorist activities in 1979. The ambassador notes that “the Turkish race is violent” and such aggression dates back to the time of the Crusades and Ottoman invasions.¹⁵³ He writes that violence has become normalized on both the left and right side of the political spectrum and that the political polarization of the country has therefore led to a war-like situation. As such, the military was forced to intervene and restore public order in September 1980.

¹⁵¹ General Historical Archives of Foreign Ministry of Chile. 24/10/1980. No: 101/39.

¹⁵² Since the report provides unique information about the September 12, coup and reveals his position through the language he uses as diplomat of a military regime himself, the author deems it necessary to include the reports *text* in full. See in Appendix.

¹⁵³ General Historical Archive of Foreign Ministry of Chile. 26/11/1980. No: 114/44.

The ambassador writes that the terrorist activities cannot be classified into a number of terrorist groups, but are of a more complex nature different from other countries. As an example, he speaks of neighbourhoods that, without any correlation to socio-economic status, are defined as left or right and are patrolled by armed youths, who attack and raid the opponent sides. University and high schools are likewise classified as either exclusively leftist or rightist. It is said to be worse in the provinces, where cities have become virtually divided in two zones. The situation is further complicated by the element of religion. The ambassador calls Islam a “combative religion”¹⁵⁴ that is divided into different sects that are historically hostile to each other. The various religious communities of Turkey have also identified themselves with either the left or the right and are fighting each other. According to the ambassador, it is therefore difficult to understand whether the clashes are political or religious in nature. Unlike other countries, terrorist activity is not centralized by one actor but carried out by small, primitive, but effective groups. The ambassador writes that, according to information of the Turkish Interior Ministry, there are around 90 Leftist terrorist groups active in Turkey. The most organized and noteworthy one is Dev-Sol, which was responsible for the assassination of the former Prime Minister Nihat Erim. There is less information regarding rightist groups, which are generally accepted to be headed by the Nationalist Movement Party.

Since the military coup, the government has found arms that could equip a force of 60,000 people. The weapons are said to come from Bulgaria and Lebanon on the left, and Israel and Italy on the right, which have used the traditional route for drug smuggling for the import of illegal weaponry. According to the ambassador, the aims of the Leftist terrorist groups are to weaken Turkey as a Western satellite and possibly evoke Soviet intervention in the country. The

¹⁵⁴ General Historical Archive of Foreign Ministry of Chile. 26/11/1980. No: 114/44.

objectives of the Right are less evident, and could be a reaction to the left, or act on behalf of third countries such as Israel to preserve the regional balance.

The military coup has radically changed the situation, and has decisively acted against all terrorist groups. Therefore, the ambassador does not expect Turkey to return to such a violent state and considers the threat of civil war gone.

A year later, an assembly was formed to draft a new constitution, heralding the political transformation of Turkey. The constitution was presidential in nature, centralized power in the hands of the president, shared with the prime minister. According to the constitution, the president can dissolve parliament and call for a general election, rule by decree in the event of a national emergency, and select nominated members of the constitutional court. General Evren would serve as president for a term of seven years, whereas former members of parliament were banned of any political activity for a period of five to ten years. The junta launched an intensive campaign for public approval of the draft constitution, which was immediately met with criticism. Opposition against the constitution was actively repressed. Finally, the constitution was accepted by an overwhelming 91.3% of the votes. On November 9, 1982, Kenan Evren officially took office as president.

Following the announcement of general elections to be held in October 1983, the army generals attempted to create political parties following the spirit of the military coup. Encouraging voter turnout by imposing a fine on those who remained home, Turkey went to the ballot box on November 6, 1983 and elected Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party as the new government. Özal was committed to economic liberalism, inspired by Western examples, and opened Turkey's economy to the rest of the world. The Motherland Party brought together rightist principles and incorporated philosophies from all former parties: "conservative like the

Justice party, traditionalist (a code word for Islamist) like the National Salvation Party, nationalist like the Nationalist Action Party, and it even believed in social justice like the social democrats” (Ahmad, 1993: 192). The Motherland Party government continues the neo-liberal economic policies introduced after the coup as well as martial law to maintain law and order. It is not until September 1987 that banned party leaders are allowed to participate in politics again and political rights are restored and the ban on political parties was lifted. Demirel and Ecevit take charge. In 1991, the True Path Party, under leadership of Süleyman Demirel, won the general election and formed a coalition government with the social democrats.

Under increasing pressure to restore the political rights of the opposition, Özal called for a public referendum. With a ‘yes’ victory of a margin of merely one per cent, he nearly succeeded in convincing the public to vote against the restoration of rights. The parties and leaders banned by the junta government returned to political life. However, Prime Minister Özal remained uninterested and unwilling to amend the restrictive laws enacted during the military rule, believing in “first the economy, then the democracy” (Ahmad, 1993: 197). As Özal grew increasingly unpopular and would lose in a future election, he ran for presidency in 1989. With the opposition boycotting the election, Özal became the eight president of Turkey.

In the second half of the 1980s, relations with the European Community (now European Union) improved. Europe continued to be Turkey’s most important trade partner, and Turkey applied for full EC membership in April 1987. Turkey’s application was denied but it was offered to join the customs’ union, which set in motion lengthy negotiations between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU have a long history. The Turkish government applied for EEC membership in 1946 and ties with Europe grew stronger with

increasing trade opportunities and the arrival of Turkish labour migrants in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Turkey slightly distanced herself in response to anti-European sentiment domestically. In August 1982, the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig paid an official visit to Turkey. The Chilean ambassador of Ankara sent a note to the Chilean Foreign Ministry summarizing his visit. Haig's visit served as a testament to improved U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkey's NATO membership. The U.S. expressed concern over damaged Turkish-Greek relations over disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus but continues to provide military aid to the country and assistance in modernizing her military and air defense especially.

In the final years of the Cold War, Bulgarian-Turkish relations came to a head when the Bulgarian communist leader Todor Zhivkov launched a campaign against the ethnic Turks in his country. Thousands of them were arrested, taken to prison, or internally displaced, and eventually mass deported over 300,000 people to Turkey. The crisis came to an end when in November 1989 Zhivkov was overthrown.

In the period 1981-1991, specifically in the second half of the decade, Turkish foreign policy was predominantly and personally influenced by Turgut Özal. His vision was more active use of economic tools in foreign policy, while he paid less attention to the perspectives of foreign ministry's representatives and of expats (Sönmezoğlu, 2006: 764). Although Turkey's geostrategic importance faded after the fall of the Soviet Union, it again resurfaced with the onset of the Gulf War.

With Turkey and Chile going through drastic domestic changes of government, still we see a strengthening of relations. Below is a unique message from Kenan Evren, head of the military government after the September 12 coup, to General Augusto Pinochet, with attention to the personal lives.

The Turkish Embassy salutes the Honorable Foreign Relationships Ministry -Protocol Direction-warmly and has the honor to submit the original of the telex in English, sent by His Excellency, General Kenan Evren, Chief of State of the Republic of Turkey, to his Excellency, Army General Mr. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, thanking to the received condolences on the death of his wife. The text of the message in Spanish is as follows:

“Your Excellency General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, President of the Republic of Chile, I am deeply moved by your attentive message of condolences and regret for the death of my wife for which I would like to extend to Your Excellency my sincere thanks.

General Kenan Evren
Head of State of the Republic of Turkey

The Embassy of Turkey, while thanking for the delivery of this message to your highest recipient, also uses the opportunity to renew to the Honorable Foreign Relationships Ministry -Protocol Direction- to give the assurances of its highest consideration.¹⁵⁵

Santiago, March 10, 1982

¹⁵⁵ General Historical Archive of Foreign Ministry of Chile. 10/03/1982. No: 65/27.

5.8 Military coup in Chile, September 11, 1970 and Military Coup in Turkey, September 12, 1980

The economic condition of a state does not only affect the domestic affairs of that country but also its relations with the outside world and other countries. For centuries, the power of countries was measured by the size of their armies, the number of soldiers and their weapons. However, it was realized, in time, that the possession of an army was in fact an economic factor. Moreover, it had become more obvious that wars did not only start and end in battlefields. Economic factors played a major role in the relations among states and their attitudes. Thus, the behaviours and foreign policy decisions of states increasingly continued to be determined according to economic conditions.

This general rule also applied to Turkey and Chile. The economic hardships confronted by both countries as of the mid-1920s, followed by the 1929 world economic crisis and finally the economic realities faced after World War II, are crucial factors in the two countries' Western-oriented foreign policies. When the Second World War came to an end, both Chile and Turkey came to realize that a new era was to be born, leaving both countries' decision-makers with many questions and concerns. The main concerns were based on defence and economic issues. The destruction of the war had reached even the most remote geographies of the world such as the bloody war in the Pacific. Although Chile and Turkey did not participate in Second World War, both countries understood the importance of and challenges in maintaining national border security and state sovereignty. At the same time, both Chile and Turkey found themselves in serious financial and economic difficulty. Thus, as the United States entered the stage as the primary customer for both countries' goods and underground sources and as the biggest potential supplier of machinery and industrial products, it was vital for both Chile and Turkey to maintain close relations with the United States.

Throughout the research and writing process of this dissertation, the author observed many similarities between the political and social developments of Chile and Turkey following World War II. The military coup on September 11, 1973 in Chile and the one in Turkey on September 12, 1980 interrupted democracies with the same pretexts: they were carried out to set the foundations for and enable the free market economy to flourish in both countries. In both countries, to establish their legitimacy, the military governments prepared a new constitution and called a referendum to establish their legitimacy and demonstrate the nation's acceptance of the newly established regimes.

During the study conducted at the Chilean Foreign Ministry archives, an original message was found, in which Augusto Pinochet, the leader of the military government in Chile, congratulated Kenan Evren, the head of the military intervention in Turkey for the Republic Day celebrations on October 29, 1980, a month and a half after the September 12, 1980 coup. In the message, Pinochet notably addresses Evren as his equal.¹⁵⁶

In the period starting with the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall¹⁵⁷, there was no clear, unique direction in Turkish foreign policy. Rather, in a world with two poles, the leader of each block would determine the foreign policy of its members. Thus, the relative inactivity in foreign policies that dominated the Cold War era was not unique to Turkey.

Starting from the mid-1970s, Turkish relations with the West deteriorated. This was due not to the Turkish government's deliberate policies, but rather to the Western interventions such

¹⁵⁶ A statement by Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Arancibia - Pinochet's aide who was with him in person in the morning of September 12, 1980 when Pinochet was informed about the coup in Turkey- is worthy of note. Arancibia stated that Pinochet was unresponsive when he received the first news during breakfast. First, it could be considered that he lacked knowledge about which political wing caused the incident and of which opinion the responsible army members were. According to Arancibia, Pinochet was given more detailed information on the military coup in Turkey in the evening of the same day. The time difference between Chile and Turkey should be taken into consideration.

¹⁵⁷ For an analytical discussion of the global conflicts and their resolution processes between 1918 and aftermath of the Berlin wall including its consequences, Turkish readers may see Oral Sanders *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*.

as the U.S. embargo on arms sales and Western European withdrawal of loans which Turkey was dependent on as well as weapons she had already paid for (Sander, 1982: 94). The Cyprus issue, in particular, led to a political rupture between Turkey and the West, and rulers of Turkey became aware of the necessity to seek alternative friendships from those with the West.

The reason for the arms embargo that the U.S. imposed on Turkey between 1975 and 1978 was primarily the deterioration of the Turkish-Greek military balance in favour of Turkey as a result of the attitude exhibited and the position taken by Turkey. The United States realized that the arms embargo would not lead to a change in Turkey's policy on Cyprus. More importantly, the U.S. authorities considered the possibility that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would create a domino effect – thus shifting the Cold War power balance against her. Towards the 1980s, Turkey's significance, in the eyes of the U.S., increased due to its location among the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Specifically, Turkey's role in the free transmission of oil from the Middle East to Europe and constituting a beneficial “channel” in the U.S. relations with Middle Eastern countries increased the importance of Turkey in U.S. foreign policy (Sander, 1980). In addition to all these factors, the geographic proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union would render Turkey indispensable. As such, the cost of Turkey's orientation to the “Left” and a possible uncontrollable state guided U.S. decision-makers' approach to the September 12 military coup.

Kenan Evren, the head of the military coup in Turkey, officially became president with the adoption of the 1982 Constitution. As for Chile, Pinochet, the leader of the military junta in Chile, continued his mission in the army, even after losing the 1988 referendum. In both

countries, the ones leading the military interventions sought to extend their leadership under different titles after the interventions.

After the September 11, 1973 and September 12, 1980 military coups, the Chilean and Turkish economy both entered a steep transition period shifting to free market economy conditions. 'Neoliberalism' was incorporated as the new economic order under the auspices of military dictators Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Kenan Evren in Turkey. As for Chile, it employed an elite group called 'Chicago Boys' who returned to Chile after studying in the U.S. and shared an economic viewpoint within the framework of the Friedman model to reform its economy, and subsequently accelerated privatization through the sale of previously nationalized businesses. Similarly, in Turkey, it was seen that, after the September 12 military coup, a favourable environment was created for the comfortable implementation of the January 24, 1980 decisions by suppressing any critical public reactions.

In both Chile and Turkey, the military coups were carried out by a hierarchical military, unlike the May 27 coup that occurred in Turkey in 1960 or the Argentinian coup in 1976. The military junta in Chile and the National Security Council established by a group of generals in Turkey formed governments and public administration composed of bureaucrats, technocrats and military officers, including retired officers as well.

The two military interventions aimed to suppress the Leftist wave that was taking place in both countries. In both cases, politicians were unable to come together to solve the growing civil unrest, and it can be argued that this situation of societal chaos provided a justifiable ground for the respective armies to intervene and re-establish public order.

Both leaders of the coups, namely Augusto Pinochet and Kenan Evren, later consolidated their rule as presidents of the country (Pinochet, however, was not the leader of the Chilean

military coup from the very start but quickly solidified his position.) Both military regimes sought to introduce a new constitution.

The primary difference between the two military coups is their legacy; in Chile, Pinochet continued to stay in power for 16 years. In Turkey, however, civilian rule was restored much more quickly.

5.9 Turkey is Facing Problems during 1980s through the Chilean Eyes

Official Chilean diplomatic documents emphasizes on two disputes, the Kurdish question and the Armenian issue during 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, the issue of minorities plagued Turkey as some militant minority groups took to violence. Armenian groups such as ASALA executed terrorist attacks and assassinations of Turkish public officials, and diplomats in specific.¹⁵⁸ Those assassinations defined as ‘terrorism’ in related Chilean official documents. At the same time, during 1980s and 1990s, groups of Kurdish origin such as the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) carried out bloody terrorist attacks and entered a war with the Turkish government.

In the 1980s, Turkey faced an ethnic war at home with the militarization of the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, the PKK. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was organised and directed its activities first from Beqaa Valley in Lebanon and then from Syria, where he set up training camps to join the armed separatist Kurdish movement. In 1984, the party turned to violent, terrorist activity, and it has engaged in activities since. Meanwhile, Turkish-Syrian relations also deteriorated over water resources and PKK activity in Northern Syria. Syria promised to cut off the PKK in return for water supply, but was left empty-handed when it met her side of the

¹⁵⁸ For Turkish readers, to have a broader perspective about the Armenian question, see Uluç Gürkan, *Ermeni Sorunu’nu Anlamak*, İstanbul. Destek. 2011 and Mehmet Perinçek, *150 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi*, İstanbul. Kırmızı Kedi. 2016.

promise. According to Ahmad (2014: 163) the Kurdish question in its modern form had emerged in the 1960s, when the ‘peoples of the east’ demanded greater cultural freedom and questioned the state’s policy of assimilations.

It is striking that the Chilean diplomatic mission in Ankara differentiated the Kurdish question from PKK terrorism. The Kurdish question refers to the underdevelopment and the issue of social and cultural rights of Kurds living in Eastern Turkey. It could be solved by economic policies designed to contribute to better development of the region and by social policies extending cultural and linguistic rights to Kurdish members of Turkish society (Ahmad, 1977). However, this position was abandoned by PKK, who resorted to terror and violence rather than peaceful democratic means in late 1970s. Not surprisingly, PKK terrorism gave Kurdish intellectuals and politicians a priority in their assassination lists only because they wanted to remain peaceful and democratic in their struggle against the establishment. PKK militants also mercilessly slaughtered Kurdish villagers, who were ‘loyal’ to the Turkish state. Since then, PKK terrorism is blockading any effort for economic and democratic reforms in the region. As a result, Kurdish question has turned into PKK question, which has only harmed Kurdish people’s peace and welfare (Heper, 2007).

The first Chilean official diplomatic document sent from the Chilean Embassy in Ankara dealing with Kurdish question dated as July 19, 1970. The second report, which examines the question in detail dated as March 21, 1974. Both documents define the Kurdish question as an issue between Iraq and Turkey.

5.10 Chile between 1980 and 1990

The military government transformed Chilean politics by creating a centralized and authoritarian system. It closed Congress, banned political parties, and persecuted opposition groups, particularly on the left. Quickly, power was consolidated in the hands of just one person, General Pinochet, who declared himself president of Chile. Still, the junta wanted to feign legitimacy and organized a referendum in 1980 to pass a new constitution. The constitution articulated the transition to civilian rule, while prohibiting Left parties to participate in politics and solidifying Pinochet and the military's power for another decade – with possible extension until 1997 decided upon in a public plebiscite. This second referendum was to be held in 1988, which would extend Pinochet's rule with a further 8 years. In March 1981, Pinochet took an oath and presidential office for an eight years term. Rising unemployment figures alongside Pinochet's strict authoritarian rule inspired a wave of protests starting in 1982.

During Pinochet's reign, the state organized two 'national consultations' to feign democratic support for the government. The first plebiscite, in 1978, asked the Chilean people whether they supported the policies of Pinochet, who had been accused of human rights violations by the United Nations. 75% of the votes were in favour. In 1980, a second plebiscite was held to approve a new constitution that would allow Pinochet to gain executive power over a period of eight years and be re-elected for an additional eight years afterwards. The constitution had slowly been drafted over a period of six years. The new constitution¹⁵⁹ was announced to the public on August 10 and the plebiscite scheduled for September 11; during that period, Chile was placed under a state of emergency, creating an insecure and unsafe environment for the

¹⁵⁹ For more information and a better perspective about the 'new constitution' of Pinochet's Chile, see Robert Barros *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship – Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution*, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

opposition to campaign. Again, the plebiscite passed in a questionable election; state propaganda and complete control over the referendum, if not fraud and intimidation, contributed to a victorious 67% of the votes. The results were widely contested. Indeed, according to Arriagada, “the 1980 plebiscite was a fraud that lacked the minimum qualifications of validity” (1988: 45) but such criticism was silenced and the constitution passed. The new constitution was authoritarian in nature: members of the Senate were to be nominated rather than elected, the president gained greater executive control, a Council of National Security was formed to institutionalize the power of the armed forces, and civilian control over the military was eliminated (Bethell, 1996: 369). According to the decrees of the new constitution, Pinochet will assume his post as president on March 11, 1981.

Shortly after the 1980 referendum, the Turkish ambassador sent a country report to the Foreign Ministry. The official country report Turkish Ambassador Bayaz sent on January 19, 1981, starts by commenting on Chile’s current political climate. The ambassador notes Chile’s long democratic tradition of 150 years, unique among all Latin American countries. In spite of this, since the 1973 military coup, Chile faces extreme antipathy and accusations “from all sides”. Even the Soviet leader Brezhnev has attempted to use Chile’s negative image, stating that he won’t “allow Afghanistan to become a second Chile” and defending Soviet intervention.

The ambassador assumed his post in Santiago in 1974 and has followed the political, economic, and social developments attentively since. The ambassador briefly references his previous correspondence and notes that this report, since he is reaching retirement age, will be his last and most detailed report to Ankara.

The Turkish Ambassador’s letter briefly references the 1980 military coup, noting that Turkish army generals have overthrown the government because of the demise of the functioning

of the democratic regime. Similarly, there has been military governance within the responsibility of our diplomatic mission (namely, Chile and Peru). In Peru, after a period of twelve years, following new constitutional regulations and general elections, the democratic regime has been restored in July [1980]. On the other hand, the military junta in Chile demanded an eight-year “adaptation period” after seven years of military administration before transitioning to democracy. The new constitution prepared for this reason and submitted for referendum last September has been accepted by a huge majority. Next, Ambassador Bayaz provides information on the characteristics of the military regimes in both countries [Peru and Chile]. He mentions that Chile naturally holds much greater significance to Turkey.

The ambassador believes that, to some extent, the existing scene in Turkey in advance September 12, 1980 is reminiscent of the situation in Chile before the 1973 military coup. The military intervention in Chile was bloody and caused much uproar. The coup faced opposition not only in socialist countries, but also from the Western world. In Turkey, however, the military intervention shed no blood and occurred silently. The opposition of press and statesmen across the world has been limited. Another difference between the Chilean and Turkish military intervention is the rightist character of the Chilean military regime, while the Turkish military has remained neutral. The ambassador writes that both military interventions may have different characteristics, but they are largely motivated by common reasons.

The ambassador continues with information about Chile’s political climate right before the coup. He mentions kidnappings, bombings, arson, and rising tension and clashes between leftist and rightist groups. Consequently, state authority and public order was compromised. Extreme leftist and communist groups from all around the world, especially Cuba, landed in

Chile and intensified the violent clashes. As the parliament was paralysed and clashes and violence reached the level of a civil war, the military staged a coup.

Beyaz writes that, while it is said that the Chilean military coup is identical to others in Latin America, it is in fact very different. One of the highly disciplined officers had always been respectful of the country's democratic regime and existing government. As a matter of fact, the chief of staff of the Chilean armed forces, General Schneider, had the utmost respect for Allende's administration and paid his respect for the democratic regime with his life.

The ambassador poses the question whether the military coup was truly necessary to end three years of Allende's rule. According to the ambassador, in order to stay objective, he referenced the famous French intellectual and professor of constitutional law, Maurice Duverger, who wrote in *Le Monde* newspaper that the Chilean military coup was inevitable and that the French military would, under the same conditions, respond similarly. Still, the military coup has been received negatively across the world for a number of reasons. Firstly, Allende's movement of realizing socialism with democratic means had gained sympathy from intellectuals world-wide. Secondly, Allende's death during the coup made the political leader a martyr. Furthermore, Chilean socialists in exile pursue propaganda with the help of other socialists and socialist media across the world. Finally, the military junta in Chile does not want to leave leadership until the regime has raised a patriotic generation and established a new institutional public order. The new Chilean Constitution, which will be enacted on March 11, 1981 after seven years of preparations, has been drafted for this purpose.

According to the ambassador, the current public opinion is as follows: Allende's presidency, using the slogan "Socialism in freedom", brought merely chaos and has rendered Chile a pawn of international Marxism. And as the nation wished, the military was forced to

intervene to establish a new institutionalized public order, prioritizing first Chile, then politics, and finally democracy. Bayaz continues that during the seven years of military rule, the economy has developed, national production has increased, and social life has been disciplined.

The ambassador provides information about the formation of the military junta. Then, he mentions the two most important priorities of the regime: maintaining national security and public order, and recovering the national economy. In a short time, the military regime has succeeded in establish public order and providing national security. Recovering the economy has been more time-consuming. Early on, the liberal economic policies posed difficulties for the labour and lower classes, but it has improved since 1977. The regime promoted production and export by decreasing the value of the national currency, *peso*.

The ambassador follows with other economic measures taken by the regime. The most important reason behind Chile's economic development is the political stability. Although there is criticism over human rights issues, many convention delegations regularly visit Chile. The nation prefers the military regime in order to maintain stability and calm. Ambassador Bayaz writes that, personally, the leader of the regime, General Pinochet, was always in close contact with the public. Whenever he deemed it necessary, he asked the public opinion. For example, when Chile was seriously criticized for human rights violations in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1977, Pinochet held a referendum in January 1978 in order to show public support for his administration. In this referendum, the electorate was asked to approve or reject the existing regime, gaining a majority vote of 75% in support of the regime.

The ambassador continues. On September 11, 1980, Pinochet again held a referendum in which the Constitution was approved with 66% of "valid" votes. The new constitution was composed of two parts: the former a classical constitution, and the temporary part aiming the

continuation of the existing regime and adaptation to the new constitution. The new constitution will be in function March 11, 1981, and General Pinochet will remain president for another eight years. In this eight-year period, his membership to the junta will come to an end the highest general of the army will replace him as a junta member. According to the decrees of the new constitution, Pinochet will assume his post as president on March 11, 1981.

With the new constitution, the regime is not only guaranteed another eight years of power, but the permanent parts of the constitution also impose limitations to the formation of political parties, associations, and labour unions. All publications promoting doctrines and class struggle are banned. The new constitution gives extraordinary powers to the president in order to prevent chaos and anarchy. Finally, the ambassador draws attention to a specific part of the constitution in Section 10, Article 09. The article stipulates that the armed commands of the military are not only the guardians of national security, but moreover are responsible for the institutional order of the republic. Section 11 of the new constitution concerns the National Security Council, which is composed of both civilian and military members.

Significantly, the country report was written a mere couple of months after the 1980 military coup in Turkey. As can be seen, using respectful language, ambassador Bayaz attempts to justify the military coup. In the report, ambassador Bayaz continuously makes comparisons between the Chilean and Turkish military interventions. He presented detailed information and number about the development of the Chilean economy. The part regarding the new constitution in Chile holds large significance because it shows many similarities to the adoption of the 1982 Constitution in Turkey.

In 1983, the economic growth came to an end as a result of the international recession. Chile's economy too suffered with growing foreign debt, a plunging GDP and unemployment as

high as 33%. Economic collapse led to social unrest and protest and the cabinet introduced a 5-year period of liberalization – proposed by the formerly dismantled parties on the right. The opposition saw a brief period of mobilization between 1983 and 1986, but was again silenced when the military government tried to redeem itself with a liberalization policy and successfully recovered the economy. In 1985, when Hernan Buchi was appointed as minister of finance, Chile's economy finally witnessed some growth. Significantly, Buchi managed to diversify the Chilean export markets, decreasing the country's dependency on copper and finding new trade partners overseas. The economic successes came at a human cost, however, and eventually were not enough for Pinochet to gain popular support and win the 1988 plebiscite that would have granted him presidential power for another ten years.

The free market-oriented economic policies later encouraged a more pragmatic approach as international trade relations required a more peaceful image abroad. Commercial relations were exploited in order to prevent Chile's diplomatic isolation following the military coup. For example, trade relations with Italy restored diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1982. Similarly, after a five year interruption, British-Chilean relations were resumed with the appointment of a new British ambassador in 1980. Relations with Spain were generally good and General Pinochet visited the funeral of General Francisco Franco in 1975. In the Middle East, Chile sought relations with Egypt and Israel, the latter becoming an important arms supplier to the Chilean military. Chile and South Africa enjoyed a good relationship, notably based on significant commercial relations.

Although supportive of Pinochet's leadership in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States took distance from the Chilean government in 1985, as "Chile's aging (and patently undemocratic) dictator was becoming something of a political embarrassment."

(Skidmore, Smith and Green, 2014: 293). As Arancibia expressed in his interview with the researcher, the United States' relations with the military and the right grew worse after the U.S. government placed sanctions on Chile. As the United States had placed an arms embargo on Chile, the military government had to seek new suppliers, which it found in South Africa and Israel, and began to produce some arms on its own. Still, the Pinochet regime was particularly frustrated with the U.S. embargo, especially because it had lifted a similar sanction on the Argentinian government in 1983. Even though President Reagan sought some resolution with Chile, informing Pinochet personally about the decision to lift the Argentinian embargo, relations would not improve and in fact worsen further until the defeat of Pinochet. During Reagan's second term, the United States adopted a new bilateral foreign policy, in line with demands voiced by Chilean society.

The continuing human rights abuses “turned Chile into a kind of international pariah during the late 1970s” (Merrill, 1982, 177). Even Latin American countries, no stranger to military governments themselves, were reluctant to establish ties with a country so isolated. By 1980, even relations with her neighbours, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, had fallen dramatically. During this period there was a significant interaction between domestic and external actors that eventually led up to the 1988 referendum. Most notably, under Reagan, the United States shifted from quiet diplomacy to open advocacy for human rights and democracy abroad. Alarmed by the 1983 crisis, the U.S. was eager to restore stability and start the Chilean process of liberalization. According to Tulchin and Varas, the Chilean transition to democracy was an integral part of the long-term endeavour by the United States in the second Reagan administration to achieve, in good faith, a consistent and coherent economic and political approach to the region (1991). But as the world turned against Chile, the administration saw a window for partnership when Turkey

too witnessed a military coup and welcomed a military government in 1980. This is shown by a report written In 1981, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a note concerning human rights and international disputes to its embassy in Ankara. The message addresses the following topics: human rights, the Cyprus question, Afghanistan, the Non-Aligned Movement, and multilateral relations. The ministry asks the ambassador and mission in Ankara to intensify her efforts to strengthen multilateral ties with Turkey with the aim of changing Turkey's stance at the UN General Assembly. Since the Chilean military coup, Turkey has consistently voted against Chile except for one abstention. In light of Turkey's regime change (i.e. the military government), the foreign ministry sees a window for convergence and urges the ambassador to try and change Turkey's position. To this end, the ambassador has been sent various reports detailing the "necessary arguments to demonstrate the inconsistency of the attitude at the United Nations".¹⁶⁰

The foreign ministry notes that the Cyprus question has been stalled at the UN General Assembly since the question could not be resolved in over forty sessions. Chile has maintained diplomatic ties with the Greek side of the island and does not endorse "the Turkish invasion and occupation"¹⁶¹. More notably, it expresses to be against the participation of Turkish Cypriot representatives at the United Nations, as this could be used as an argument for the inclusion of Chilean opposition members living in exile at the UN. Regarding Afghanistan, the UN has passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the country. Chile too voted in favour of the resolution and condemns the Soviet Union for violating laws of coexistence and endangering global peace and security. Chile supports any initiative for peace-building in the country, such as those by the European Council, and is proud of its leading role in drafting the

¹⁶⁰ 1981 Note No.xx

¹⁶¹ 1981 Note No.xx

approved resolution. The foreign ministry writes that it has been excluded from the upcoming Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Chilean ambassador in Ankara is encouraged to approach the Pakistani government and other moderate countries in the movement, and reiterate Chile's commitment to the non-aligned movement. The ambassador shall follow the preparation and development of the conference through this contact with Pakistan.

Lastly, the foreign ministry asks the ambassador to Turkey to share information on the Turkish view on the issues in the Middle East and the development of the Cyprus conflict. It then points to the contradictory stance of the NATO countries regarding Chile and Turkey, having defended the military regime in Ankara despite claims of human rights violations by the European public. The ambassador therefore is also asked to share updates on the human rights situation in Turkey and intensify contact with the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

The U.S.' gradual intervention – although never at the cost of stability and therefore not threatening the regime altogether – allowed for the introduction of neoliberal economic policies. Even other Western democracies that actively promoted human rights rarely took economic or military policies against the Pinochet regime – in fact, European countries such as Great Britain became the main suppliers of arms to the Chilean military government. In response to international criticism, the military government would carefully evaluate its significance. It was willing to make changes in her economic policies to please external actors, yet it made sure to strengthen the state of emergency at the same time. While international factors were important they were not decisive. They helped to maintain internal opposition, to ensure the liberalization process, and to create the conditions for the 1988 referendum. Moreover they fostered the

presence of 'softliners' both among supporters and opposition of the regime to pave the way for democratization (Drake and Jaksic, 1991: 270).

As planned, in 1988, Chile voted over the continuation of Pinochet's presidency with another 8-year term. Pinochet and his supporters assumed another victory and a popular vote in favour of his renewal would legitimize his presidency. He was the only nominee of the military junta, igniting protest across the country. In advance of the election, the military junta took measures to legitimize its fairness. 92% of the eligible voters registered and even exiles were allowed to return home to participate in the referendum. In advance of the 1988 plebiscite, as planned by the one in 1980, the opposition parties came together to vote against the proposed extension of Pinochet's rule. Politicians on both sides of the spectrum, well aware of the dangers of authoritarian rule, were committed to establish rule and law and bring back constitutional rule and civil liberties. They were thus more eager to cooperate. Through compromise and consensus, the opposition was able to form an unprecedented coalition and brought about the necessary stability for the Chilean political system. The *Concertacion de Partidos por el No* comprised of 17 different parties and other political groups. The *Concertacion* successfully campaigned for the 'no' vote and won by 54% with an exceptionally high turnout of 97%. This meant that Pinochet's presidency was finally to come to an end with free elections to choose a new government in 1989. The referendum more importantly shifted Chile from an autocracy to a democracy, albeit limited at the time. While the coalition was generally welcomed and lauded for her campaign, it was not void of criticism altogether: Carlos Portales, the former foreign policy director of Chile, emphasized that the coalition's participation in the plebiscite implicitly supported the formal framework of the military regime (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 61).

One year later in December 1989, Chile again went to the ballot box to vote for their new president. Some of the opposition parties recognized the coalition as a long-term plan to restore Chilean democracy and social justice. The Christian Democrats spearheaded the formation of a Democratic Alliance, which, unlike the left, showed willingness to negotiate and collaborate with the military to transition Chile back to a democracy. In the advance of the 1990 elections, the *Concertacion* released a platform advocating political and legal reform, the *Bases Programaticas Politico Institucionales*. The main objectives included the protection of human rights, empowering the role of Congress, modernizing the judicial system, control of the military, proportional representation, labour reform and increased public spending on healthcare, education and housing, and the solidification of pluralism. In terms of foreign policy, a pragmatist and realist approach should promote economic integration in Latin America, universal relations of cooperation, an open and sovereign international economy, human rights, and participation in multilateral organizations.

The opposition nominated Patricio Aylwin, who had led the ‘no’ vote in the 1988 plebiscite and was a former senator and PDC politician. Aylwin won over half of the votes with 55%. Aylwin moved Chile towards “a consensus between the armed forces and the bulk of the civilian opposition” (Williamson, 1992: 510). Aylwin and his government assumed power over a changed Chile, amid a changed world. The new Chile was sharply different from the one before the coup; the left had lost its popularity, while the right and centre had become the strongest political currents. Aylwin’s administration held the majority in the chamber of deputies, but not in the senate, where nine seats had been reserved for conservative candidates. Still, all parties now agreed on the important role of the free market and private sector for economic development, and the fall of the Berlin Wall heralded new foreign policies.

As explained by Jorge Arrate, then secretary general of the Socialist Party, presidential systems necessitate a “winner-takes-all” system, which, he argues, damages political stability (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 56). Political leaders and parties are little inclined to compromise and form coalitions. In a parliamentary system, however, political actors are encouraged to build coalition. The role of the president in Chile’s return to democracy is to serve as a head of state, rather than head of government (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 57). The election of the new government on March 11, 1990, did not restore democracy in itself, as institutions such as the National Security Council, the Supreme Court, and the Central Bank, which all had Pinochet-supporters in key positions, continued to enjoy a degree of autonomy.

The democratic transition was far from easy, however, and the coalition government faced a number of challenges, primarily concerning human rights. Following their victory, the *Concertacion* pushed for constitutional reform, yet the military regime exploited the use of constitutional organic laws to maintain the structure of the authoritarian regime. With Pinochet still heading the army, a right-wing Senate, political violence by all sides as well as the people’s memory of human rights abuses, Aylwin’s task to restore democracy in Chile came with many challenges: to restore democracy and normalize civilian-military relations, to provide justice and deal with the past regime’s human rights violations, and to maintain economic growth. He also attempted to reduce the armed forces’ influence on politics and changed the existing power balance between the army and parliament. The governing coalition managed to hold onto power in the 1993 presidential elections, which elected Eduardo Frei, the son of former president Frei, as Chile’s new leader. Frei, a centrist candidate, won the presidency with 58% of the vote, and was inaugurated on March 11, 1994 – marking the second president of the coalition movement. His government continued Chile’s path to democracy and, notably, inspired remarkable

economic growth. After a challenging first year, the economy started to recover under the policy of ‘growth with equity’, attempting to contain inflation and pay off Chilean debt. For the first eight years, a steady GDP growth rate of 6.7% was the highest in Latin America and one of the highest in the world.

One of Chile’s most impressive developments is her record of dealing with past human rights abuses. The victims and relatives of victims of death, torture and other abuses of the Pinochet regime now sought justice. The *Concertacion* strongly advocated transition according to three principles: truth, justice, and reparation, and established a commission charged with investigating and documenting the abuses of the security forces and police forces as well as the neglect of the judiciary powers. Aylwin recognized the limitations in providing real justice and said the commission would “aim to achieve justice within the limits of what is possible” (Hickman, 1998: 207). In March 1991, the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation published the Rettig Report investigating unlawful deaths and disappearances during the military dictatorship. Families of victims were compensated. The commission’s findings were announced in a public address in March 1991 and stated that there was no justification for the grave abuses that had taken place in the name of restoring peace and stability.

The Rettig Report was welcomed by most political parties as well as the public, but was, naturally, met with resistance among the military. Pinochet, who still served as commander of the army, defended the army’s practices as “suppressing subversion” (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 6). Carlos Portales, the foreign policy director of the General Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile during the democratic transition period, criticized the permanence of the military’s top leadership. Although Pinochet lost the 1988 referendum, he continued to serve as commander in chief. Similarly, the chief of the navy, air force, and police force could not be removed for a

period of eight years and, upon retirement, could only be replaced by the five upper-ranking generals (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 61).

Pinochet stepped down as military commander-in-chief in 1998. He became a senator-for-life, and visited London in September that year. He was warmly welcomed by the British conservative government, as he had been an important arms purchaser to the British Aerospace. During his visit, Pinochet attended the hospital for an operation for his hernia. Instead of returning home after his surgery, he was placed under arrest on October 16, 1998. A Spanish judge, Baltasar Gazon, had requested his extradition to stand trial in Spain for the killing and torture of Spanish citizens, which was approved a year later. However, Pinochet and his supporters had lobbied in the British government to release him – including tea with former Prime Minister Thatcher - and he was released due to his poor health. The Chilean left as well as certain members of the coalition government and international human rights advocates, who had celebrated the arrest, were thus let down when the British government sent Pinochet back to Chile on the grounds of being mentally unfit for trial. The British government's attitude to Pinochet's arrest cannot be understood without Chile's role in the Falklands War. During the Falklands War, Chile had given covert support to Britain in her struggle against Argentina. General Pinochet – discretely – had granted landing rights at Chilean airports. The British troops also received intelligence information from Chilean radars, which some have said has been vital to the British advances. Thus, when Pinochet was arrested during his visit to London, Margaret Thatcher felt outraged, referring to Chile as a “good friend to Britain” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 4).

Pinochet's arrest also surfaced in interviews with Chilean ambassador to Spain, Francisco Marambio, and foreign policy actor, Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago Concha, who worked with eleven Chilean presidents. They both expressed that they were in favor of Pinochet's return to

Chile because he should be tried on Chilean ground and did not support his house arrest which they considered improper for a – former – Chilean president to be kept in captivity abroad. Instead, they said, he should face a trial back home. Arancibia, as an old and loyal friend to Pinochet, told the researcher in an interview, he had visited Pinochet during his forced stay in England several times.

Pinochet was eventually held a year and a half until he was authorized to return to Chile on the basis of poor health. Back home, human rights cases slowly but surely appeared before court and in November 2004, the commander of the army admitted to institutional responsibility of the army for the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime. Although the attempt of a Spanish prosecutor to try Pinochet under international law was unsuccessful, it set the stage for justice; various military officers were prosecuted for their crimes, while others admitted publicly to institutional excess. With their actions and policies, governments play, by intent or accident, a principal role in political transformation. Throughout the Latin American continent, states and political institutions have been challenged by their capacity in self-induced change and the successful conclusion of change (Tulchin and Varas, 1991: 11).

The *Concertacion* was limited not only by the legacy of the Pinochet regime, but also the international order at the time. By 1990 it was clear that the U.S. had become the world's hegemonic power, and communism had been discredited almost completely as a viable governing system. Across the world states took on a neoliberal economic policy, and Chile, commended worldwide for her free market economy, had thus no choice but to retain the economic policies of the military government (Oppenheim, 1999: 199). The new administration clearly understood that the best way to restore good relations with the world, was to first insert herself in the world economy. Economic relations with the rest of the world are vital to Chile, a

small country at the southern periphery of the Americas. Developing such ties would minimize Chile's isolation within the international arena – as it had experienced by the end of the Pinochet regime. According to Oppenheim, the leaders of the post-coup government believed that “their legitimacy rested in part on whether or not they could manage the economy well” (1998: 242) and they thus shied away from any overt economic reform and would maintain the economic policies of the past regime.

The coalition thus build on the openness of the economy while trying, as voiced in its electoral promises, to close the inequality gap within the Chilean society. Economic growth was driven by export trade and foreign investment, and Chile eagerly sought new free trade agreements across the world. State enterprises were again privatized with a reasonable amount of government control. Aylwin explained the importance of private enterprise as “the motor of economic growth in Chile” which would only be possible “within the context of economic and political stability” thus reinforcing consensus-style politics (Oppenheim, 1998: 240-241). While securing an open, free market economy, President Aylwin and subsequently President Frei also recognized a role for the state in regulating the market and its social consequences, or, for “putting a ‘human face’ on capitalism” (Oppenheim, 1998: 242).

The U.S., along with a host of other countries, supported Chile in its political transition and its quest to achieve development through democratic and peaceful means. In Chile itself, political leaders from right to left, weary of the continuing military rule and with the trauma of the military coup, demonstrated greater willingness to compromise and a more pragmatic rather than ideological approach to politics. This new approach eventually contributed to a consensual investigation of human rights abuses during the Pinochet regime.

Aylwin prioritized the development – or rather, restoration – of foreign relations and paid a number of visits to Western states, hoping to restore Chile’s position as part of the democratic world. Within the continent too Aylwin was met with support, as all Latin American states, except Cuba, sent their head of states to his inaugural ceremony. Chile was eager to quickly enter free trade agreements, most notably NAFTA, and started negotiations for a bilateral agreement with the United States during President’s Bush visit to Chile in December 1990. Later that decade, Chile signed an association agreement with MERCOSUR, a Free Trade Agreement with Canada, and a framework agreement with the European Union, making true her promises of greater collaboration in the Americas and West. Up to today, Chile has become a more and more important figure in the region, especially after the 1990s and her return to democracy. Governments were successful in placing Chile as a ‘Western democracy’ on the world map, even after suffering from the military coup.

As Kamel argues, it is evident that Asia, as a continent, has gained political and economic importance in the global order in the past decades and that this is a continuing trend (2014: 324). For this reason, he recommends, as a respected retired diplomat, to widen and deepen relations with Asian powers. Indeed, this is the case for Chile, as Asia is the most important importer of Chilean products, with China as its biggest customer.

Kamel provides a clear explanation of Chile’s independent foreign policy. According to him, Chile’s strategy does not mean “acting like Don Quichotte”, but rather that every country can follow an independent policy according to her own economic, political, and military power and to her geographical position in order to defend her national interests. (Kamel, 2014: 312) Acting beyond the country’s capacity, however, may jeopardize any previous gains and result in loss of power.

Since the end of military rule in 1990, Chile has restored its democratic tradition. The elected governments have resumed the neoliberal policies instigated by the military government and have successfully sustained economic growth despite the global financial crises in 1998 and 2008. The *Concertacion*, the coalition between centre and left-wing parties established to counter pro-Pinochet, rightist support, dominated politics between 1990 and 2010. During this period, the four *Concertacion* governments undid many of the antidemocratic legislations imposed by the Pinochet regime, although the neoliberal economic model was largely untouched. The economy slowly recovered and the U.S. lifted its embargo on military aid. The Communist Party was legalized and political prisoners were freed.

During the 1999 elections, Lagos and Lavín won an almost identical share of the vote – a marginal difference of 0.4% - and thus required a second round of voting. Ricardo Lagos, a socialist within the *Concertacion* alliance, won this second round with 51%, thus making him the next president of Chile. Although maintaining an open market economy, Lagos significantly increased public spending, especially in the education and health sector. He also made serious attempts to eradicate the Pinochet legacy, still pestering the Chilean society. The head of the Chilean army, General Emilio Cheyre, admitted to the military's systematic use of torture and promised that the military would never again violate human rights. In 2002, Cheyre came to Turkey in a successful and fertile visit that led to closer relations between the Chilean and Turkish army. A series of constitutional reforms were introduced in 2005 and contributed to another presidential victory of the *Concertacion*. With a very symbolic victory in 2006, Michelle Bachelet, whose father, a pro-constitutionalist army general, had been killed during the Pinochet regime, became president of Chile. The Chilean economy recovered as foreign investments poured in. The Chilean government signed trade deals with the EU, South Korea, and the United

States. While the rest of Latin America faced inflation and corruption, Chile's economy fared peculiarly well, balanced between market-friendly policies and social state measures to reduce poverty and inequality. In 2010, Sebastian Pinera, a centre-right candidate, succeeded her as president. The peaceful turnover from a centre-left to centre-right administration demonstrated Chile's successful democratic transition.

Chile's return to democracy is often lauded as a positive example of democratic change. Indeed, it shows the potential of consensus and cooperation, but one should also recognize the important role of class and other socio-economic factors. As Vanden and Prevost explain:

The Chilean example demonstrated that democratic rule in Latin America in the twentieth century was based on cooperation among elites. Only when the traditional oligarchy has been willing to support democracy have there been long periods of rule without military intervention to protect their wealth and property. This also suggests the importance of the idea of "pacted democracy" whereby the political elites make varied agreements to share power or alternate rule for a given period, and thus discourage and exclude new political leaders or political movements from challenging their power (Vanden and Prevost, 2015: 223).

The councillor of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Col. Valdez visited Turkey as a guest of his Turkish counterpart Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Tugay Özçeri in October 1989. Özçeri thanked Chile for being the only Latin American country to condemn the Bulgarian treatment of its ethnic Turkish minority. Özçeri also lauded the recent United Nations General Assembly address by the Chilean foreign minister who once again condemned the Bulgarian

policies concerning ethnic Turkish minority.¹⁶² This visit accelerated unmediated political and diplomatic negotiations between the Turkish and Chilean foreign ministries. Following the visit, the respective governments signed an Agreement on Trade, Economic, Technical and Scientific Cooperation. The technical cooperation agreement is expected to provide Turkey with modern mining technology that has been advanced in Chile.

On November 15, 1989, the Chilean ambassador Francisco Martinez B. to Turkey reviews Turkish press coverage of Chile with the visit of the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations of Chile. Two newspapers, Milliyet and Hürriyet, portray and refer to President Pinochet as ‘dictator’ and call the National Center of Information a political organ of the secret police, an organ of torture and intelligence, therefore lauding its dissolution, as well as the presidential pardon of labor strikes. Meanwhile the Turkish Daily News shared a positive impression of Chile on the occasion of the two countries 63 years of bilateral relationships. The report is as follows:

1. On the 11th of October, Cumhuriyet and Milliyet newspapers gave information about the withdrawal of twelve generals of army, mentioning among them Genral J. Zincke, Vice-Commander General and the appointment of General Jorge Lucar in his place.

The same daily newspapers published on the 15th other political articles which refer to the declarations of President Pinochet, qualified as “dictator”, that he will not permit the new government to accuse the generals which participated the current government. Likewise they mentioned, same as the newspaper Turkish Daily News, on 16th of October, the expressions of the President of the Republic about the dissolution of the National Center of Information, evaluated

¹⁶² Turkish Daily News. 10/10/1989.

negatively in the articles as a political organ of the secret police, an organ of torture and intelligence.

The newspapers Hurriyet of 25th of October and Turkish Daily News of 28th-29th of October included short articles originating from Santiago about the presidential pardon of the labor unionists M. Bustos and A. Martinez detained for organizing protest strikes, on requests of the Polish leader Lech Walesa and the Church.

2. News from the Local Sources: The newspapers Cumhuriyet (3rd of October) and Turkish Daily News (3rd, 10th and 13th of October) gave information about the official visit of the Undersecretary of the Exterior Relations of Chile as the guest of his Turkish counterpart, and the signing of the Convention of Commerce and Technical, Scientific and Economic Cooperation. The daily newspaper Turkish Daily News gave a positive image of Chile from the offered reception and with information regarding the 63 years' bilateral relationships, they stated that the expectations for bilateral interchange are increasing and Turkey can receive technical cooperation on the field of copper mining. About this last point, the visit of four engineers of Etibank realized to Chile was there. On the other side, the newspaper underlined the words of the Undersecretary of the Exterior Relations of Turkey welcoming Chile for being the only Latin American country to refer to the situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the expressions of the Minister of Exterior Relations of Chile during the General Assembly of the UN.

The only negative local news story was that of the newspaper Milliyet, regarding the local presidential elections, using the photo of President Pinochet.

3. Political analysis of the information: The Turkish press made a positive image of our country, with the visit of Mister Undersecretary of the Exterior Relations of Chile, the signing of bilateral Convention in the field of commerce and technical, scientific and economic cooperation and the existing relations between the two countries. With this I send you some political articles elected from the international press agencies which use negative terms and qualifications about the government.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ General Historical Archive of Foreign Ministry of Chile. 15/11/1989. No:153/89.

CHAPTER 6 TURKEY AND CHILE

FROM THE END OF THE COLD WAR UNTIL TODAY

6.1 The End of the Cold War and Turkey

With the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy now tackled five main arenas: the United States, the European Union, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the former Soviet countries including Central Asian republics. In the twenty first century, Turkey's foreign policy largely continued this path, but also began to concentrate on further corners of the world, including South and East Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa. The Turkish government sought to establish ties with new economic markets and play a greater role in international politics. Not only did this increase her presence but also presented her as a model, as "Turkey could project itself as a nation with a Muslim culture, but a modern and relatively democratic political system, which could act as a mediator or bridge between the Muslim world and the west" (Hale, 2003: 246). Consequently Turkey has gained more strategic and political importance in the region compare to twenty years earlier, functioning as a interwoven three sub-systems, the Balkans which is an inseparable part of Europe, the eastern Mediterranean as the southern wing of NATO and the Middle East threatening the West's defence with possible instability (Sander, 2006: 258).

As the Cold War came to an end, Turkish decision-makers, no longer limited by the geopolitical frame set by the Cold War, changed course and adopted some new foreign policy strategies. Okman describes Turkey's position at the end of the Cold War era as a triangle of instability with the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East at its axes (2010: 44). As these regions each faced various conflicts in the 1990s, Turkey was the only state facing all three sides simultaneously. As a loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since

1952, Turkey's foreign policy objectives, which had previously been centred on Europe and North America, increasingly shifted their focus to these geographies. Latin-America, the Far East, and North Africa, too, gained greater importance in Turkish foreign politics.

Turkish foreign policy is characterized by important elements of continuity and change. Following the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey sought to maintain neutral relations with all European countries and, lesser so, the USSR. Turkey, a young republic, was most concerned with the defence of its new state, her borders, and providing security to its people despite a scarcity of resources. Thus, Turkey was eager to maintain a power balance and establish security in its neighbouring regions, i.e. the Balkans and Mediterranean. History had made this a significant priority, as decision-makers including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the time did not forget the Western threats that contributed to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and were committed to prevent any such threat from the West in the future. Even during the Second World War, although pressured to take a stance, Turkey was able to maintain its neutrality. In the post-war world though, "faced with the classic choice between alliance and non-alignment" (Hale, 2003: 251), Turkey had little choice but to pick sides, and started a long and relatively carefree alliance with the West. Turkey's membership of the European Economic Community and accession negotiations with the European Union are another testament to her turn to the West.

Turkish foreign policy is directed by a few constant predominant principles, but also by temporary changes that have had a significant effect on foreign policy strategies. As an example of such changes, Sönmezoğlu highlights Turkey's interest in the African continent in the last couple of decades, as well as more interest in Asian and some Middle Eastern countries as a result of tensions with European states following the September 12 coup (2016: 794). This reorientation can be seen as an example of a country's need to shift her dimension in foreign

policy and find alternative interest areas. Similarly, Turkey increased effort to establish relations within the Latin American continent as a result of this shift. As Turkish decision-makers felt slightly rejected by the European powers, they were inspired to seek (closer) relations to other geographies including a strong focus on Latin America.

Turkey was an important member of the Western alliance during the Cold War and was therefore particularly affected by its end. The new international environment provided new opportunities as well as a measure of unpredictability for Turkey. As a result of the loss of control of hegemonic powers over their allies, the role of regional powers in international politics increased (Fuller & Arquilla, 1996: 610-611).¹⁶⁴ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey too tried its hand and appeared as a regional power in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia, where she has deep historical and cultural ties. Despite idealistic, nationalist aims, Turkey's foreign policy would return to more realistic policies as it understood her power cannot be compared with that of Russia or the West (Zürcher, 2012: 332).

6.2 Turkey Seeks New Foreign Policies and New Horizons

Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself at the juxtaposition of the Balkans, Caucasians, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Until then, Turkey had generally tried to resolve its foreign policy issues within block policies. Although foreign policy was generally determined under the umbrella of NATO, which Turkey joined in 1952, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey was forced to define its policies through close relations with its neighbours.

¹⁶⁴ Fuller G. and Arquilla J. (1996). The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers. *Orbis*, 610-611 in Kasım, K. (2015). Turkey-Taiwan Relations in the Context of Turkey's Asia Pasific Policy, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 12(45), 83-100. This article considers Turkey as a rising regional Power. A regional power ...has a significant impact on security and livelihood of its neighbours and thus demonstrate the extent to which power is devolving to new, more autonomous regional system.

Moreover, Turkey started to establish and expand relations with the outside world, i.e. more remote geographies, as well.

Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey had stood out with its critical geostrategic position. Yet with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new conviction, namely that the need for Turkey had decreased, arose. This and the emerging global conditions pushed Turkish foreign policy in a new direction and take on a more active and global strategy. Namely, Turkish decision-makers increased their efforts to establish relations with Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to develop existing relations, especially in terms of culture and economy, much in the same way that it was trying to be influential in Caucasians, the Middle East and the Balkans. These endeavours to reach and access alternative geographies through international diplomacy channels in part stemmed from the uncertainties over Turkey's pending accession to the EU. Especially in recent years, Turkey's increased focus on Africa and Latin America should be considered within this context.

As for Turkey's relations with the United States, throughout the Cold War period, one of the most important elements of Turkish foreign policy was the economic and military assistance it received from the United States. Turkey continued to be a significant player due to its geopolitical position between the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Middle East. Moreover, Turkey had gained total control over the Straits with the Montreux Convention, which were not only of importance to the United States but also occupied a significant global place in international relations and led Turkey to pursue a careful and prudent foreign policy. Later, following the rapid changes in the second half of 1980, Turkey's geographical position again gained importance, located at the intersection of not only the rapidly eliminating East/West division, but also the slowly emerging North/South (Sander, 1982: 241-242). The Fall of the Berlin Wall and

the dissolution of bloc-based foreign politics truly forced Turkey to reposition herself, not just geopolitically but also conceptually.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, within a changing global order, the Turkish foreign ministry faced various international disputes in its neighbouring regions, which became the focus of the ministry's agenda: the Turkish-Bulgarian dispute over the oppression of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria under the Jivkov regime, the war in Yugoslavia and Bosnian War, ongoing crisis with Greece, instability in the Caucasian region, and the First Gulf War and the collapse of state authority in Northern Iraq, and the accelerating negotiations with the European Union. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Turkey became an active supporter of the U.S.-led UN coalition. Turkey, eager to maintain her strategic importance in the region, considered her role in the coalition "as a way of emphasizing Turkey's status as a Western stronghold in the Middle East and perhaps even of forcing Turkish entry into the European Community" (Zürcher, 2012: 327). Finally, Turkey also reinforced accession talks for full membership to the European Union.¹⁶⁵

After the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkish foreign policy makers also turned their focus to the newly established, ethnically Turkish republics in Central Asia. Five new republics were established in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These states had been isolated from the international sphere for more than a century, and Turkey was presented as an economic and political model for democracy and free market economy. The West and United States specifically encouraged Turkey to have an active presence in the region. The U.S government was worried the fall of the Soviet Union would lead to a political vacuum and considered Turkey apt to fill that place. Indeed, the new states seemed eager to establish ties with Turkey, and Turkey came to play an important economic and cultural

¹⁶⁵ For an account of EU-Turkey relations, see ed. Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II: 1980-2001*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2006.

role in Central Asia, although her political power in the region remained limited. Turkey's commitment to the Turkic people of Central Asia stood in contrast with its relations with other Turkish minorities in Iran and Afghanistan, who could not count on such support, and the more complex case of Uyghur Turks in China.

As Sander points out, the Turkish-speaking communities in Central Asia did not shape their worldview according to a religious ideology nor did they interpreted themselves as part of the Islamic world (Sander, 2013: 271) While pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism was gaining momentum among some intellectuals and part of the public, Turkish leaders and foreign policy makers were aware that such ideologies were an ineffective approach in Turkey's relations with the new republics in Central Asia. Quoting Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev, Sander writes: "Pan-Turkism turned into a political movement as a reaction against Soviet rule in the region. Personally, I am against the pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist ideas which may mold the [Turkic] people. These ideologies have no chance. What we witness today is a product of common values and Turkish affinity between Turkish-speaking communities; however, this rapprochement will not lead to dangerous chauvinism" (Sander, 2013: 271-272). Turkey's historical relation to the Central Asian republics is clarified by Kushner:

"The term Turk, when it first regained respectability at the end of the nineteenth century, was indeed understood to apply not only to the Turks of Anatolia or the Ottoman Empire, but to the larger Turkic world stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia. This was the result of new works appearing in Europe on the history of the Turkic peoples and their languages, the racial and linguistic theories prevalent at the time, and the actual contacts established

between Turks in and outside the Ottoman Empire” (Kushner, 1997: 226).

While there were feelings of kinship with Turks outside the Republic, pan-Turkism never rose as an effective political doctrine, as Turkish policy-makers were aware of its possibility to antagonize the Soviet Union and other states with large Turkish populations (Kushner, 1997: 226). After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Turkey more openly and deliberately showed its support for Turkic populations abroad, from the Balkans to East Asia. Indeed, “the new Turkic republics and other Turkic communities generally proved to be greatly interested in strengthening their bonds with Turkey, and the relationship which has developed between them has been both intensive and multi-faceted” (Kushner, 1997: 228). This shift in foreign policy, namely the embrace of pan-Turkism as a political approach, were driven by both political and economic factors. The new Turkic republics in Central Asia provided new trade and investment opportunities, as well as an important source of raw materials. Secondly, as the world grew more isolated, Turkey had a chance to present itself as a leader of a culturally and ethnically akin bloc, presenting herself as a role model in secular democracy and open market policies and bringing political and economic stability to the region (Kushner, 1997: 228).

Meanwhile, Turkey took a precarious course in its relations with Russia, advocating the newly established republics in Central Asia and their sovereignty, while also promoting commercial relations with Russia. Indeed, we also see numerous Chilean reports showing interest in Russian-Turkish relations.

A little before the fall of the Soviet Union, violence erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia when hundreds of Azeris were killed during the Soviet occupation of Baku in 1990. In

August 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence, closely followed by Armenia in September that year. Meanwhile, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, had also declared independence, leading to a violent conflict between the two nations. Here, Turkey again got caught between domestic and external pressures, like in the wars in the Balkans. The public favoured the side of Azerbaijan, as an ethnically Turkish and Turkish speaking community, but the Turkish government understood that it could not get military involved as this could worsen relations with Armenia and drag Turkey into a conflict with Russia. As Turkey sought to develop economic relations with all republics in the Caucasus, it was mostly interested in fostering peace and stability in the region. It was therefore limited to symbolic and economic assistance.

Since the 1990s, Turkey has increasingly turned to alternative geographies, such as Latin America, within its foreign policy strategy. The Foreign Ministry of the Turkish Republic provides a summary of Latin-American relations; hereafter follows an alike overview of relations between Turkey and the continent since the end of the Cold War.

Turkey's relations with the Latin American continent have always been friendly, but largely remained stagnant until the 1990s. Naturally, the biggest obstacle to Turkish-Latin American is the geographical distance between the two. Nevertheless, since the 1990s and 2000s in particular, we see an upsurge in ties between the Turkish state and Latin American states. The visit of President Süleyman Demirel to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in April 1995 presented a turning point in Turkish-Latin American relations, as it was the first time in history a Turkish president visited the region.

Since President Demirel's visit, in line with its multi-dimensional foreign policy, Turkey pursued a more active policy towards the region with the aim of strengthening its relations. To this end, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs held various meetings with its ambassadors

stationed in Latin America in order to define how and in which areas bilateral relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) could be improved. The meetings resulted in the "Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean", which was put into effect in 1998. The Action Plan became the strategic vision for Turkey's political and economic engagements in the region.

Turkey has continuously and committedly progressed the Action Plan. Since the 2000s, the legal framework of the relations between Turkey and LAC countries has largely been completed. The government has formed political consultations with 14 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela). Moreover, to strengthen parliamentary ties with the region, the Turkish Grand National Assembly created 12 Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Groups countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Many of these countries opened a Turkish Friendship Group in return. The number of Turkish diplomatic missions has also steadily increased. Latin American countries have reciprocated by increasing their representations in Turkey.

In order to develop Turkey's economic and trade relations with the countries in the region, one of the objectives of the Action Plan, the Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has embarked on a Strategy for Increasing Trade since 2006. To this end, Economic and Trade Cooperation agreements have been signed with 13 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay).

Throughout this process, Turkey has increasingly given priority to high level visits and meetings; concluding trade, economic, military, cultural, and technical cooperation agreements

to consolidate the current legal framework; establishing business councils, participating at fairs, initiating promotional activities to increase trade; and increasing diplomatic representation and cultural interaction to ensure better and more accurate presentation. Especially after the year 2000, presidential and ministerial visits accelerated between Turkey and the countries in the region. During this period, the administration also conducted regular political consultations with the governments of Latin American countries.

Within the frame of the 1998 Action Plan, the year 2006 was declared as “the Year of Latin America and Caribbean” in Turkey.¹⁶⁶ In this context, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade, and Economy, representatives of business organizations, and academics from the region were invited and met with government institutions and private sector representatives during “the Latin American and Caribbean Week” that was organized in Istanbul and Ankara between June 5 and 11, 2006. In 2009, the Latin America Research Center opened at Ankara University, which is believed to make significant contributions to the cultural and academic exchange of Turkey and the region.

Turkey is also attentive to the numerous existing multilateral organizations existing in the region. It has observer status in two such organizations, namely the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and closely follows the development of other regional initiatives such as the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUR), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the AND Union, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).¹⁶⁷ The Turkish Foreign Ministry stresses that, like Turkey, all countries in the region play an active role in international organizations such as the UN.

¹⁶⁶ About Turkey’s possible future in Latin America. See Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi’s article *Turkey and Latin America: A New Horizon For a Strategic Relationship*.
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-american-and-the-caribbean-countries.en.mfa

6.3 Chile and Turkey 1990-2017: From Friendship to Partnership

The liberalization of Turkey started gradually with Turgut Özal. During the 1980s, Turkey was relatively stable, socially and politically. During the 1990s and 2000s, however, it faced various issues such as the growing, unofficial influence of Islam over Turkish politics, Sunni-Alevi tensions, financial crises, the war against terrorism in south eastern Turkey, European Union negotiations.

Like Turkey, Chile too entered a new phase. Following the fall of the military regime, Patricio Aylwin became president on behalf of the democratic coalition *Concertation* in 1990. The return to democracy was challenging however, and, as Oppenheim argues (1999: 195), it was debatable whether “Chile was an authoritarian state with a democratically elected president or a democracy with authoritarian enclaves.” Chile was on the right path, however, and within time, democracy was restored. At the same time, Turkey similarly found itself in a multi-dimensional place, with many opportunities as well as risks and challenges.

With the Gulf Crisis, Turkey approached a difficult period in her history under the leadership of Turgut Özal. As president, Özal forcefully inserted himself in the arena of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and tried to direct the country’s foreign policy before and after the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. In reaction, two foreign ministers, Mesut Yılmaz and Ali Bozer, resigned consecutively within the span of just one year. According to Gürbey, former minister Yılmaz claimed that Özal’s efforts were focused on the Turkish politics towards the Turks living in Bulgaria. Ali Bozer resigned in response to Özal’s refusal to let Bozer, then foreign minister, attend the meeting he had with President Bush (Gürbey, 2003: 79).

In the parliamentary elections of 1991, Suleyman Demirel and his True Path Party, a centre-right party succeeding the Justice Party, won the majority of the votes and formed a

coalition government with the centre-left Social Democrats, instead of the – maybe more obvious - centre-right Motherland Party. Such a coalition was promoted by the business community and, virtually, Turkish society as a whole. Demirel returned to his role as the principal leader of the right, which the army had taken from him. Prime Minister Demirel governed Turkey until his death on April 17, 1993.

During the 1990s Turkey suffered heavily from an economic crisis due to unstable political conditions. Formation of different coalitions by various political parties could not bring a proper solution to the stage. Economically motivated social unrest was growing. Religiously motivated political groups and separatist Kurdish terrorism which spread from south eastern Turkey to the big cities and Mediterranean coast further surged the political, social, and economic disorder. Turkey's relations with Syria were less peaceful and tensions over Syria's support to the Kurdish terrorist organisation PKK and Turkey's control of the Euphrates continued to exist.

In 1996, Turkey's accession process to the EU accelerates when she signs the Customs Union Agreement. The treaty heralds a shift in economic policy and increases Turkey's trend towards globalization. The negotiations gain momentum and European Union membership appears more possible than ever. Between 1990 and 2000, Turkey also developed greater relations with Middle Eastern countries including Israel as Turkey was hopeful trying to solve political disputes around her and maintain good relationships with her neighbours.

Turkey's relations with the Latin American continent have always been friendly, but were largely stagnant until 1990, mostly due to the geographical distance between the two. Chile and Turkey signed a Visa Exemption Agreement in 1989 which went into effect in 1990. In 1993, the counsellor of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Rodrigo Diaz, paid an official visit to

Turkey. The Agreement on Trade, Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation signed between Chile and Turkey came into effect on June 28, 1994.

In April 1995, President Demirel visited Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It was the first official visit to Latin America by a Turkish President in history, and the first presidential visit between Chile and Turkey. President Demirel invited by President of Chile Eduardo Frei who won December 11, 1993 elections with nearly 58 percent of the total vote. Demirel's visit presented an important cornerstone in Turkish-Latin American relations. As Turkey was going through dynamic changes in the 1990s, the concept of national interest and the geographies of interest was also changing. President Demirel's visit to South America should be considered in this light.¹⁶⁸ Demirel was in Chile between April 6 and 9. During this visit, the countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation and Mutual Protection of Investments.

Following the presidential visit we see an upsurge in cooperation between the two countries. A year later, the Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Education Cooperation came into force. In 1997, the counsellor of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Mariano Fernandez, visited Ankara and heralded the next round of political negotiations. A year later, the counsellor of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Korkmaz Haktanır, visited Chile and introduced the next level of diplomatic negotiations between the two states. That same year, in 1998, Turkey and Chile signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, the Agreement on Cooperation between İGEME¹⁶⁹ and PROCHILE¹⁷⁰ as well as a Memorandum of Understanding

¹⁶⁸ Various diplomatic documents were sent to the Chilean Foreign Ministry by the Chilean ambassador in Ankara, Fernando Cisternas Matus, regarding the presidential visit. They show the significance of Demirel's visit to the Chilean administration. The report sent February 3, 1995 in particular provides information about the Chilean preparation to his arrival in Chile two months later, which recommends the Foreign Ministry, in detail, how to approach issues between the two countries and how to improve future relations. Following his visit, another report by the Chilean Foreign Ministry on 24 of April 1995 is also particularly illustrative.

¹⁶⁹ The İGEME - Export Development Center has contributed to Turkey's export's quantitative and qualitative development and the variation of products and markets by making research development studies for creating new markets and employment opportunities to help Turkish exporters increase their shares in foreign markets and

on the Establishment of a Political Consultation Mechanism. The Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, came to Chile on an official state visit between November 7 and 9. This was the first visit of a foreign minister between the two countries. Before his arrival in Latin America, İsmail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister, held a press conference regarding the objectives of his upcoming visit. Cem stated that Latin America is a vital target for Turkey to broaden her global horizon. He also said that he met with Turkish ambassadors stationed in the region in order to construct a political base for economic relations to be built on.¹⁷¹

On March 27, 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Department of Europe, Africa and the Middle East, prepared a lengthy, detailed report titled “Reunion de Consultas Politicas Chile – Turquia” regarding political consultations between Chile and Turkey and, specifically, a visit of Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Korkmaz Haktanir, to Chile, Peru and Mexico.

The report starts off with the objectives of Haktanir’s visit. The report states that this should be considered a strategic, official visit in line with Turkey’s new foreign policy vision, one of the key factors being Turkey’s relationship with Greece and the EU. Haktanir’s visit is also a retribution of the visit of the undersecretary of Chilean Foreign Affairs, Mariano Fernandez, to Turkey one year earlier.

The principal themes of the visit are listed in the report as follows: signing of a consultation protocol between the two countries’ foreign ministries; establishing a common economic and commercial commission to take place in Santiago on August 20 and 21, 1998; cooperation in the military industry; assessment of earlier economic relations and, specifically,

organizes education, publication and promotion activities, also provides trade informatics in domestic and foreign business cycles. <https://international.igeme.com.tr/about-us/>

¹⁷⁰ PROCHILE is the equivalent of IGEME an official export development center for Chilean products.

¹⁷¹ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/09/02/siyaset/siy04.html>

the PROCHILE delegations' visit to Turkey in 1994 and 1997; multilateral issues such as UN Security Council membership and the Iraq issue; as well as more general themes such as Chile's participation in international organizations, Chile's relations within the Latin American continent, Turkish relations with Greece and the European Union, economic cooperation in the Black Sea region, and developments in the Middle East.

It is believed that the Aegean question between Greece and Turkey was of special importance during these consultations. Indeed, attached to the report are letters written by Turkish foreign minister Ismail Cem to the Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos and letters from the Turkish foreign ministry to the Greek foreign ministry. The letters show that the dispute over the Aegean waters was taken to the International Court of Justice. Since Chile also experienced land and maritime disputes with Peru and Bolivia, these additional documents were included in the reports.

In October 1998, Turkey started to send troops to the Syrian border. The terrorist organization PKK had found shelter since the early 1980s by the Syrian government. It directed and organized its activities and attacks from Damascus, where its leader Abdullah Öcalan was residing. In October 1998, the head of the military land forces, Attila Ateş, threatened Syria with the use of force, from his position at the Turkish-Syrian border. A couple of days later, Turkish President Demirel announced to the world from the Turkish Parliament that Turkey maintains her rights to respond directly to the hostile attitudes of Syria. Turkey and Syria were at the brink of a war. In October 1998, the Chilean embassy in Ankara sent numerous urgent messages to Santiago regarding the issue, explaining Turkey's motivations behind its decision to start an

armed struggle against Syria. It seems that Chilean ambassador Pardo considered a war between Turkey and Syria highly possible.¹⁷²

As a result of Turkey's threat, Syria expelled Öcalan. After he had been to various other countries, Öcalan appeared in Italy. In November 1998, the Chilean ambassador Pardo informed his foreign ministry about the Turkish-Italian crisis that resulted, with a detailed report. It was not until February 1999, that the leader of terrorist organisation PKK is captured in Nairobi, Kenya, by the Turkish intelligence service and brought to Turkey. When President Necdet Sezer visited the funeral of Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad in 2000, constituting the first presidential visit to Syria since its foundation in 1946, the two countries entered – a quite short-lived – period of rapprochement.

The councillor of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Christian Barros, paid an official visit to Turkey in 2002. In addition, the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, Juan Emilio Cheyre, visited Ankara between November 10 and 15, in 2002. According to the Turkish ambassador to Chile, Ayşenur Alpaslan who served from 2002 to 2005, this visit signified a turning point in the relationship between the two countries' militaries and military industries. Chilean ambassador Barros, who was at the time serving his post in Ankara, similarly expressed that he heard and witnessed the Chief of Staff's satisfaction during Cheyre's visit to Turkey. During his trip, Cheyre visited the facilities of the Turkish army and military factories, as well as privately-run companies of military equipment and arms. Alpaslan believed that Cheyre was deeply impressed with the Turkish military industry. The visit opened new trade opportunities. Turkey offered the

¹⁷² The official documents the author found at the Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives, numbered 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 202, and 205, each revealed the urgency of the situation through the eyes of the Chilean ambassador as an experienced diplomat. All these documents were sent in October 1998 and labeled as priority.

alternative and relatively independent source of armament that Chile was seeking at the time, while Chile presented a new market for the Turkish military sector.¹⁷³

The report sent by Chilean Ambassador Barros in Ankara on March 13, 2002, comments on going negotiations between Chile and Turkey predominantly regarding cooperation in the military industry, cooperation in agricultural sector, cooperation in international organisations and cooperation on maritime and naval issues.

Written shortly after the Turkish general elections in November 2002, the Chilean embassy sends a summary of the results and proclaims a victory for the “Justice and Development Party”, the AKP. The report gives an impression of reactions from national and international organizations and Turkish interest groups like TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association). Ambassador Barros adds that nearly 50% of the voters’ preferences will not be represented in the parliament due to the constitutional threshold, calling this “a distortion by the electoral system”.

Nearly all diplomatic documents sent by the Chilean embassy in Turkey regarding political issues were marked classified or secret. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, their focus was on bilateral and multilateral relations, highlighting Turkey’s relations with neighbouring states and in the region in terms of security, terrorism, and strategic relations. They address Turkey’s position in international politics and security. Many of them emphasize the Kurdish issue and terrorism, political issues with Armenia, movements of the extreme left, and Islamic fundamentalism. Most political reports include a sub-section on foreign policy, followed by the Cyprus issue, relations with Middle Eastern country, and Turkey’s influence and interest in former Soviet states in Central Asia and Russia. What’s more, as stated in a report dated January 29, 2002, some reports point to Turkey’s relations with other Latin American countries and in

¹⁷³ From interview of the author with Ambassador Ayşenur Alpaslan.

specific with Argentina. It can be seen that Chile is not only trying to benefit from her strategic partnership with Turkey, but is also trying to understand Turkey's relations with 'rival' states such as Argentina.

On March 13, 2002, Chilean ambassador Pedro Barros sent a lengthy report to the Department of European Relations in the Foreign Ministry of Chile. The report begins with a historical overview of Chilean-Turkish relations and then turns to a section entitled "Turkey's global vision". In this section, ambassador Barros speaks of Turkey's global objectives, such as international cooperation and security, and the geography of strategic interest, her *lebensraum* so to speak, namely the Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eurasia at large. In the report, Barros presents Turkey as a regional power with far-reaching influence, stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia.

The report summarizes Turkey's relations with European and Middle Eastern countries. Other than previous reports, Barros also writes about the importance of the Black Sea region. The ambassador highlights Turkey's interest and relations with former Soviet Republics in Central Asia with which Turkey shares cultural, ethnic and historical ties: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

The report continues with a section on bilateral issues between Chile and Turkey, mainly based on defense industry cooperation. The ambassador also noted that among Latin American states, Turkey also has military cooperation with Brazil and Argentina. The other issues include ongoing cooperation in agriculture, commerce, tourism, anti-seismic construction, drug traffic prevention, and between PROCHILE and IGEME (the Chilean and Turkish agency for export development). It also considers maritime and aviation cooperation, cultural relations, and visa exemptions.

There are various events that are considered milestones in Chilean-Turkish relations, such as Demirel's visit to Chile in 1995 and Lagos' visit to Turkey in 2004. As the researcher demonstrates, Chilean-Turkish relations gained momentum especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As mentioned before, the head of the Chief General Staff of the Chilean Armed Forces, General Cheyre's visit in 2002 had a significant impact. Another milestone the researcher deems necessary to highlight is the visit of Turkish Foreign Ministry's undersecretary, Korkmaz Haktanir, to Chile in 1998. Here, he met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Jose Miguel Insulza, as well as other high officials of the Chilean Foreign Ministry. Their meeting was considered important in the eyes of the Chilean government and it is believed that it played a key role in the development of the relations between the two countries. The visit predominantly focused on commercial and economic issues.

Attached to the report on the aforementioned visit, written March 27, 1998, the researcher found various documents about the Aegean dispute between Turkey and Greece, seeking possible resolutions to the conflict through peaceful means. There is no apparent reason why the documents would be attached to the report and it is probably by mistake. The documents show the involvement of the International Court of Justice in the Greek-Turkish issue.

During an interview with Ambassador Mariano Fontecilla de Santiago Concha, who worked in the Chilean Foreign Ministry for over 60 years and served as an advisor of the Chilean presidency on foreign relations – a key figure in Chilean diplomatic life - in March 2014, Fontecilla spoke about the Aegean dispute. He noted that Chile supported Turkey's side, since Chile also has maritime and aviation conflicts with Peru and Bolivia, which similarly saw involvement of the International Court of Justice. For this reason, according to Fontecilla, at

various times, Chile asked Turkey for her arguments in the Aegean issue, as demonstrated by various ambassadorial correspondence.

A series of reports by the embassy from October and November 2002 addresses the visit of the General Juan Emilio Cheyre to Turkey, demonstrating its importance to the Chilean government. Specifically, the reports suggest increasing cooperation between the armed forces and the pursuit of common defence programs. During the researcher's interview with former Turkish ambassador Aysenur Alpaslan, who is at present a high-rank officer in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, she called General Cheyre's visit as an unexpected cornerstone in Chilean-Turkish relations, as the general was highly impressed with Turkey's military industry. At the conclusion of his visit, it was decided that the then Chilean minister of defense, Michelle Bachelet, should visit the Turkish state too. As such, Alpaslan considered the general's trip to Turkey an accelerator in bilateral relations and military relations specifically.

The head of the Carabiniers of Chile (Carabineros de Chile), the Chilean national police force, General Alberto Cienfuegos, paid an official visit to Turkey in September 2003. At this time, the Turkish and Chilean government also started negotiations about cooperation between the Turkish gendarmerie and the Chilean Carabiniers, which eventually resulted in the Declaration of Intention on Cooperation between the General Command of Turkish Gendarmery and the Carabineros of Chile in 2006.

Chile sent a military delegation, headed by Juan Carlos Salgado, to Turkey in March and April 2004. That same year, Chile opened a military attaché in Ankara. Between April 18 and 20, the Chilean Minister of Defense, Michelle Bachelet, came to Turkey on an official visit. The two governments signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Military Training, Technology and Science

in 2004, which came into power April 9, 2007. Pedro Barros, a former Chilean ambassador who served between 2000 and 2006, called Bachelet's visit very successful.¹⁷⁴

In a report sent by the Chilean embassy in Ankara on April 21, 2004, ambassador Barros details a three day-long official visit of the minister of defence of Chile, Michelle Bachelet (at present, president of Chile). Firstly, it explains the reasons for Bachelet's visit. According to Barros, Chile would benefit from a broadened and deepened relation with Turkey. To be in dialogue, he continues, with Turkey as a strategic military power located between the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, would bring advantages to Chile. The report includes a copy of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on Cooperation in Military Training, Defense Industry, Technology and Science, which was signed April 19, 2004. The report summarizes Turkey's relations with European and Middle Eastern countries. Other than previous reports, Barros also writes about the importance of the Black Sea region. The ambassador highlights Turkey's interest and relations with former Soviet Republics in Central Asia with which Turkey shares cultural, ethnic and historical ties: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Defence Minister Bachelet had an interview during her visit. Bachelet's appointment was symbolic not only as the first female defence minister and a member of the Socialist Party, but moreover as the daughter of a former general, who was accused of treason and tortured to death during the Pinochet regime. Bachelet spoke about her own appointment as "very symbolic of the fact that in our democracy, there is no longer prohibition or discrimination against anybody on gender or ideological basis."¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ The author conducted a face-to-face interview on the 1st of April, 2014.

¹⁷⁵ Turkish Daily News, 11/2004

During the visit, Turkey and Chile signed a military cooperation agreement committing to collaborate in military training and defence industry. Michelle Bachelet herself signed the agreement on behalf of the Chilean government. Bachelet spoke at the signing ceremony and called the agreement “the highest point of relations that has taken place between the Turkish and Chilean defence institutions.”¹⁷⁶ She expressed that Chile and Turkey shared similar international values and foreign policy principles. After the agreement, Bachelet also met with Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gönül, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, and members of the Turkish parliament.

As reported by Turkish Daily News, Bachelet’s primary aim is to consolidate democracy so that Chile may never return to a dark period like that. As a defence minister, she expressed the wish to develop the armed forces into a professional military, of which the Chilean nation can be proud and with whom they can self-identify. She said that relations between the public and military have largely been normalized, but there is still room for respect and acceptance. She notes that the professionalization of the army, namely their training in human rights, development, and relations with the society, is indicative of Chile’s emphasis on democracy, gender equality and social development.

Bachelet also stressed Chile’s role in peacekeeping across the world, including missions in Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as “no place in the world is free from threat.”¹⁷⁷ International rights come with international duties, she stated, and Chile, including its military, aims to play a crucial role in assuring international security.

The Chilean president Ricardo Lagos accompanied by Chilean Foreign Minister Ignacio Walker, came to Turkey between October 11 and 14, 2004, as the first Chilean presidential to

¹⁷⁶ Turkish Daily News, 11/2004

¹⁷⁷ Turkish Daily News, 11/2004

visit Turkey. A detailed schedule of his visit is included in an official report sent from the Chilean embassy to the Foreign Ministry on October 1, 2004. The program was highly condensed and organized and presents even the smallest details of his stay in Ankara and Istanbul, including the exact proceedings of his honorary doctorate ceremony at Bilkent University. During his visit, Lagos met with all important political figures, including the Turkish President Sezer as well as the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and President of the Turkish Parliament. The visit symbolized the wish for greater mutual commercial activity and demonstrated Chile's willingness to enter international trade agreements. During the visit, under the Turkish Foreign Ministry's "Plan to Further Relations with Latin America" the two Presidents have exchanged views about regional and international issues as well as the relations developing in the recent years between Turkey and Chile

Ricardo Lagos became President in March 2000, Lagos played a fundamental role in his country's return to democracy. In his memoirs Lagos speaks about surprised encounter with Henry Kissinger. Many years after the coup, former president Lagos came across Henry Kissinger at a seminar in Berlin. By then, declassified sources had made clear that the United States and Kissinger specifically were adamant to prevent socialist power in Chile and that Kissinger personally developed close relations with General Pinochet. Yet, during the seminar, Kissinger quickly – and without precedent - turned to Lagos and strikingly told him that “President Lagos, I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the coup d'état” (Lagos 2012: 32). Lagos was left amazed, remembering Kissinger's support for the opposition against Allende and for general Pinochet in power. As he recalled the transcript of a private meeting between Pinochet and Kissinger, in which Kissinger told the general not to worry about his public remarks to improve his human rights record, Lagos thus confronted him and asked: “And what

about the human rights violations that took place under Pinochet?" (Lagos 2012: 32).

During his visit, Lagos praised Turkey for her role in the fight against terrorism and fundamentalism and said the EU would benefit from Turkey joining the union, supporting the Turkish bid for membership. Considering Turkey's population and total volume of international trade, Chile considers Turkey an important economic and political partner.

President Sezer similarly praised Chile, expressing satisfaction over the two countries' developing relations, as part of the government's Action Plan for Latin America. During the meeting, Sezer also presented Chile with a free trade agreement, while foreign ministers Gul and Walker signed an agreement to foster exchange in terms of education, science and culture.

In a guest column in Turkish Daily News, an English-language newspaper, Ambassador Pedro Barros shared his views about Chilean-Turkish relations.¹⁷⁸ Barros recognizes the long history of mutual relations and trade, and expresses the wish to increase such commercial ties. He explains the growth of the Chilean finance and tourism sector, having opened to the global market, and speaks of the many shared aspects between Chile and Turkey, including its geography. Barros writes that due to Chile and Turkey's longstanding diplomatic relations since the Friendship Treaty of 1926, they two countries have been able to cooperate in other areas too, such as the arts, education, and culture. Barros closes with an 'imaginary tour' across Chile, describing its scenery and most important sights and expressing his gratitude to the hospitable Turkish people.

President Lagos' visit to Ankara as the first Chilean president to come to Turkey can be seen as a milestone in Chilean-Turkish relations. On the 25th of October 2004, the Chilean Embassy in Turkey sent a press review of Turkish coverage of the presidential visit to the Foreign Ministry. The selection of articles provides a positive image of Chile and President

¹⁷⁸ Turkish Daily News. 12/10/2004.

Lagos and suggests increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. For example, an interview published in Milliyet newspaper on October 14 is titled “Let us work together”. President Lagos says he is satisfied with his visit and believes that “in a period during which the notion of clash of civilizations is critiqued, we can learn a lot from a country which carries fingerprints from many civilizations. We share many things in common.” Lagos mentions possible areas for cooperation and explains the “Chilean model” where democracy and economic growth can successfully exist hand in hand. Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the President of Chile, is to be awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters by Bilkent University.¹⁷⁹

In 2004, Marambio served as the Chief of Protocol of President Ricardo Lagos and joined the president during his official visit to Ankara. During an interview with the researcher, the ambassador said that from the moment of landing the Chilean delegation was very impressed. He remembers that he was continuously asked about the progress of the free trade negotiations between Chile and Turkey. During his post as ambassador (2006 – 2010), Marambio also recalls meeting with former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. The preparation of the free trade agreement surfaced as the most important issue during their meeting. Carlos Furche, today’s Minister of Agriculture, served as the Director of International Economic Relations between 2004 and 2010. He was tasked with international negotiations and agreements of Chile and visited Turkey in 2007 in this capacity. According to Marambio, Furche was deeply impressed with Turkey’s dynamic foreign trade potential and recognized the potential of Turkey as a political and economic partner in the region. Furche’s visit, Marambio believes, has been key to the rapid progression of the Chilean-Turkish free trade agreement. In the interview, the ambassador detailed the steps of the Turkish-Chilean free trade agreement. First, Carlos Furche personally

¹⁷⁹ http://bilnews.bilkent.edu.tr/archive/issue_11_4/index.html

composed a delegation tasked with the preparation of the agreement. Then, Turkey and Chile created a joint study group, which in the conclusionary phase met in Santiago as well as Ankara with affiliated ministries. Upon these meetings, the agreement was ready to be signed.

Enrique Accorsi, the former head of the Chile and Turkey Interparliamentary Friendship Group, too accompanied President Lagos during his official visit to Turkey. In an interview with the researcher, Enrique Accorsi¹⁸⁰ stated that Turkey and Chile have a lot in common and both understand the realities of their existing geography. He said that, as OECD members, both countries have common goals in social, economic and educational development. As a member of the World Economic Association, he received an invitation to Turkey. Since then he has close ties with Turkey and Turkish politics. He met with Turkish ambassador to Chile Ayşenur Alpaslan and then embarked on the establishment of a Chilean-Turkish Friendship Group in the Chilean Parliament. Since 2002, almost all Chilean defense ministers and commanders of the army, navy and airforce have visited Turkey. He deems it necessary to state that it is not only the success of the Turkish military industry but also Turkey's respected image in the eyes of Chilean decision-makers, which makes it a reliable arms supplier to Chilean defense forces. He has visited Turkey many times, but two visits remain the most important. He accompanied President Lagos in 2004 and President Pinera in 2012 as part of the Chilean delegation.¹⁸¹

According to Accorsi, Turkey, as a member of the Council of Europe and with its geographical location, is an essential partner to Chile. Accorsi said that there were wonderful diplomatic relations between Augusto Pinochet and Kenan Evren. Although he is not in favor of the political figures themselves, he understands the crucial role of this relationship for the

¹⁸⁰ The interview was conducted on March 26, 2014 at the National Congress in Santiago. Enrique Accorsi was the former head of the Chile-Turkey Interparliamentary Friendship Group and a Chilean parliamentary member between 2002 and 2014.

¹⁸¹ https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=123361

broader history of Chilean-Turkish relations. The 1973 military coup in Chile and 1980 military coup in Turkey had many similarities and were both not accidental in nature. For example, he explained, those managing the post-coup Chilean and Turkish economies were educated in and “directed” by the United States. Accorsi continued speaking about a U.S. military base in Panama called Comando Sur. He mentions that, peculiarly, all Latin-American military leaders of the 1970s received training on the base.

In April 2005, the commander of Turkish Armed Forces Hilmi Özkök visited Chile. Chilean ambassador Pedro Barros sent a very detailed report to Santiago about the visit. The report includes a special part about Turkish Army and Turkish military industry.¹⁸² In a report dated April 15, 2005, sent from the Chilean embassy in Ankara to the Foreign Ministry of Chile, provides a detailed impression of Turkey’s social, economic and political figures. It presents a summary of bilateral relations between Chile and Turkey, including a section focused on human rights and women’s rights in the two countries. The report then continues to provide information about Chilean high officials’ visit to Turkey and the current Chilean President Michelle Bachelet’s visit as then Minister of Defense. Although this report touches on social and economic issues, its predominant focus is on common military agreements, defense programs, and visits of military officials between Chile and Turkey. It mainly presents Turkey as a potential partner in the military industry to Chile, despite the vast distance between the two countries. One can see this in the ambassador’s stress on Turkey’s strategic geographical location and a background of her military bases and industry. The ambassador mentions the country’s position as a NATO member and strategic location vis-à-vis energy lines. He writes that Turkey is facing multi-dimensional and asymmetrical threats such as regional conflicts, terrorism, separatist movements, religious extremism, and the presence of weapons of mass destructions near its

¹⁸² From Barros to the Foreign Ministry of Chile. 01/04/2005. P1. No: 105.

borders. The ambassador adequately describes Turkey's motivations to strengthen its defense industry demonstrating a need to minimize the effects of regional conflicts on its own society. The report continues with more information about Turkey's geographical position, her relations and possible conflict areas with separate sections dedicated to the Balkans, Greece, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia and finally, Cyprus. The report concludes with a presentation of relations between the two countries' militaries and detailed information of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Chile was the first country of the two to send a military attache in 2006. Ambassador Arancibia¹⁸³ explained the motivation to send a Chilean military attache to Turkey in 2006. He stressed that there is a "natural admiration" of Turkey within Chile and that there are many similarities in the societies. He said "we admire what you have done earlier in history." In his eyes Turks are brave and tough people like Chilean people.¹⁸⁴ He believes that the decision-makers' respect towards Turkey was also the most important reason behind Chile's early recognition of Turkey in 1926. According to Arancibia, there are no significant differences between the social composition of Turkish and Chilean society, but that the economic (i.e. class) composition does slightly differ.

Another benchmark was in 2009, when the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Chile signed a free trade agreement in Santiago on July 14. The agreement came into force on March 1, 2011 and was the first free trade agreement Turkey signed within the Latin American continent. The Chilean side, wishing to show the importance and value given to the agreement,

¹⁸³ On March 31, 2014, the researcher conducted an interview with Jorge Arancibia Reyes, who served as the Navy Commander-in-chief between 1997 and 2001 in Lliu LLiu, Limache, Valparaiso.

¹⁸⁴ Arancibia's opinions are suited well with what Whitaker and Jordan quoted from Raul Marin Balmaceda, a Chilean congressman whose mother was niece of the President Jose Manuel Balmaceda, when he describes Chile proudly "Formed by the Indians of America and by the best soldiers that Spain had to send to the most rebellious of its colonies; forged as a race in an incessant battle against men, against nature and against the poverty of the soil, a natural selection of men was formed that should us (Chileans) the exception of America and an example to the world." *Derechas o izquierdas?* (Santiago, 1945), 7. in Whitaker and Jordan, *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*, The Free Press, a division of the Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 114.

demonstratively held the signing ceremony at the presidential palace, La Moneda. Speaking at the ceremony, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet stated that Turkey is an important country with its geographical position and its vast potential for economic development. She continued saying that Turkey and Chile, both developing countries, are facing similar challenges. Thanks to her position between East and West, Turkey has been able to overcome certain barriers and has successfully become one of the fifteen largest economies of the world. Consequently, Bachelet urged Chile and Turkey to support each other and practice foreign policy accordingly. She also said that in the midst of an economic crisis, cooperation with Turkey carries a special importance and she believes it will strengthen the historical ties between the two countries. Former Chilean Ambassador in Ankara, Fransisco Marambio,¹⁸⁵ during the interview with the author, spoke about the details of three well-attended meetings between both countries' delegations in advance of the free trade agreement. As the Chilean government wished to show the importance and value of the agreement with Turkey, the Free Trade Agreement was signed at the Presidential Palace of Chile, for the first time in the country's history. According to ambassador Marambio, Turkish ambassador Ayşenur Alpaslan made significant achievements during her service and played a crucial role in the two countries' relations.

High-end state visits have continued up to today. Turkey's current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then prime minister, came to Chile on an official state visit on May 30, 2010. This signified the first visit of a prime minister to Chile. However, the visit was abruptly interrupted and came to an end one day later, when the Mavi Marmara incident occurred in the Mediterranean and led to an international crisis between Turkey and Israel. One year later, Mehmet Şimşek, the Turkish Minister of Finance, visited Santiago in November 2011. Between

¹⁸⁵ Chilean ambassador to Turkey 2006-2010, Chilean ambassador to Spain 2014-present. The interview conducted in Madrid. 03/06/2015.

November 18 and 20, 2012, Chilean President Sebastian Pinera accompanied by the Foreign Minister Alfredo Moreno, visited Turkey. Abdullah Gül, the president of Turkey, invited Pinera for a dinner where both gave a speech. President Gül noted the long history of Chilean-Turkish relations and said he is proud to celebrate, in 2013, its 100th anniversary in memory of the Consular Relations Convention of January 26, 1913. He called South America “one of the most important locomotives of the global economy”¹⁸⁶ and how Chile presents an example of a well-functioning market economy. He confidently spoke of the economic and trade opportunities between the two countries. Chilean president gave a speech and thanked the Turkish nation for her hospitality. He also praised Atatürk as “undoubtedly one of the most important world leaders” and visited his mausoleum in Ankara. He and the Chilean people, he said, are particularly impressed with Atatürk’s role in the independence struggle and the modernization of Turkey including the drafting of a new civil code – and one of the central squares in Santiago has therefore been named after him. He also praised Turgut Özal for opening up the Turkish economy to the world, comparing it to the developments in Chile at the time. In addition to official state negotiations, the president was honoured by İstanbul University’s Faculty of Economics with an honorary doctorate degree for his critical role in developing economic and diplomatic ties between Chile and Turkey despite their geographical distance and his efforts to further democracy and economic and social welfare in Chile.

As time passes, both countries officials, day by day, realized there are many issues and spaces for cooperation on a global level. For example, Sebastian Marin, former deputy head of mission in Ankara¹⁸⁷, placed a lot of importance on the common aspects between Turkey and Chile, namely the free market and democratic values. He expressed that both countries

¹⁸⁶ <http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/politika/27794.aspx>

¹⁸⁷ On February 13, 2014, the author met with Sebastian Marin at the Embassy of Chile in Ankara. Sebastian Marin served as the temporary Deputy Head of Mission and Consul of Chile until the installment of a new ambassador.

experienced a similar path to a free market economy and democracy since World War II, referring to the 1980 and 1982 constitutions of Chile and Turkey respectively. The political realm in Turkey is institutionalized, including political parties and labor unions, and has a long and meaningful history.

Marin openly stated that the Asian-Pacific region, Pacific alliance is one of the main priorities of Chilean foreign politics. In addition, Turkey and the surrounding region present an important trade market to Chile. Due to her strategic geographical location, Turkey provides the most reliable base to reach markets in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Therefore, Chile wants to add a service chapter to the 2009 Free Trade Agreement. Finally, Marin said that Turkey is and will remain a significant partner to Chile.

Erdoğan again visited Chile between January 31 and February 2, 2016, this time as President of the Turkish Republic. Having started his visit to Chile by attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the Bernardo O'Higgins monument in Santiago, President Erdoğan held a bilateral meeting with his Chilean counterpart Michelle Bachelet. After co-chairing a meeting between the delegations, President Erdoğan and President Bachelet held a joint press conference. President Erdoğan also addressed the businesspeople at UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).¹⁸⁸

Another crucial aspect of cooperation is the military sector. In September 2005, the Minister of Defence of Chile, Jaime Ravinet, came on an official state visit to Turkey in order to strengthen and expand military cooperation between the two countries. Military cooperation was further strengthened with the visit of the head of the Chilean navy, Admiral Rodolfo Cadina in September 2007. In May 2012, Turkish Defence Minister İsmet Yılmaz visited Chile. During his

¹⁸⁸<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-mevlut-cavusoglu-is-accompanying-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-during-his-latin-america-visit.en.mfa>

visit, Turkey and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Industry. His visit was reciprocated a few months later, when, between October 18 and 21, the Ministry of Defence of Chile, Andres Allamand, paid an official visit to Turkey.

According to the author, Chile has a distinctive importance to Turkey as it has not recognized the so-called Armenian genocide. Official documents speak of “the suffering of the Armenians and loss of innocent lives during the First World War”, yet the Chilean parliament has not accepted it as genocide. It is noteworthy to present the views of former Chilean ambassador Marambio here. On June 3, 2015, the author conducted an interview with Francisco Marambio, then Chilean ambassador to Turkey, at the Chilean embassy in Madrid, Mr. Marambio’s current post. During the interview, the ambassador stated that he only once faced a problem throughout his service in Ankara before the free trade negotiations. In 2007, he received a phone call from the Chilean Embassy in Ankara during a visit to Istanbul regarding the Armenian question. He learned that a small group of senators had sent a letter to the lower wing of the senate about the Armenian question. According to the ambassador, it was neither a presidential statement nor a state policy, but rather an issue raised merely within the senate. He made various phone calls and eventually called the Foreign Ministry in Santiago to clarify the situation. Marambio told that President Bachelet had sent a letter to Ankara to give a full explanation of the events and the Turkish authorities understood the events. The ambassador said that foreign policy is a matter of the president and presidency. According to Marambio, the “misunderstanding” was resolved after President Bachelet’s letter.

In addition, Enrique Accorsi shared his views on the same issue during an interview with the researcher. He spoke about the Armenian Question. According to Accorsi, presenting a letter about the Armenian question to the sub-wing of Chilean parliament was a mistake of a small

group of parliamentary members. As soon as he was informed about the issue, Accorsi directly contacted the government, which in turn decided to take a position favoring the Turkish argument. In relation to this, the author found an official document sent in July 2007¹⁸⁹, numbered 125, written by Ambassador Marambio. Attached to the report is a letter written and signed by the then president of Chile herself, Michelle Bachelet, to the then president of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Bachelet wants to clarify the issue at the parliament. In her letter, she spoke of “tragic facts” when mentioning the Armenian Question. President Bachelet would like to reaffirm Chile’s greater interest in further strengthening the “excellent” existing relations between Chile and Turkey and renew her commitment to continue towards this end.

On the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Chilean - Turkish diplomatic relations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Heraldo Muñoz, visited Turkey between January 12 and 14, 2016 to address the Ambassadors’ Conference. On the occasion, an exhibition was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey composed of the visit’s documents and archival documents of the two countries. During his visit the two countries’ foreign ministers set together to discuss the possibility of increasing the existing relations to an even higher level.

6.4 Chilean Foreign Policy Objectives

Since independence, Chile’s foreign policy has been based on a few guiding principles: “respect for international law, the inviolability of treaties, the juridical and peaceful resolution of controversies, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the search for peace and international security” (Embassy of Chile, Washington D.C., 2017). The Chilean Foreign Ministry reiterates this stating that its foreign policy is based on three principles: respect for

¹⁸⁹ Chilean Foreign Ministry Archives, No. 125.

international law, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the responsibility to collaborate.¹⁹⁰ More precisely, it names its respect to international law and legal mechanisms as its most important resource and views its instrumental to the maintenance of global peace and security. It values treaties as diplomatic tools for international cooperation and believes in the peaceful settlement of conflicts while respecting national and territorial sovereignty. It also states that social and economic equality, tolerance, and social cohesion can best be achieved within a democratic society that respects rule of law. Therefore, it pays respect to international instruments to protect human rights as a complement to existing national mechanisms. As the world's current challenges ask for globally coordinated responses, it sees the cooperation between international state and non-state actors as a vital means to find and implement solutions.

The principles above aim to enhance Chile's socio-economic and political development. The last Chilean government (Bachelet) therefore placed great value on participation in the global economy, mutual cooperation, and engagement in international organizations. It sought to expand the number of economic treaties and to develop the Chilean economy according to international guidelines, such as working conditions and environmental standards. It promotes the free market economy and encourages bilateral and multilateral commercial engagement. As such, the Chilean Congress, unanimously, accepted the establishment of the World Trade Organization.

The Chilean Foreign Ministry shows a wish to build relations across the world, with a focus on the continent. It aspires economic and political integration of Latin America and wants to establish a Free Trade Area across the Americas, as an extension of Chile's current membership to MERCOSUR. Chile, Argentina and Brazil entered this common market trade

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.minrel.gob.cl/principles-of-chile-s-foreign-policy/minrel/2014-09-17/130041.html>

agreement in 1996. The MERCOSUR agreement has led to better relations with Chile's neighbours, which had previously been strained by political and international disputes. Cooperation of Latin America, according to Chile's Foreign Ministry, should not be limited to economic issues alone, however, but also includes environmental concerns, human rights, democratic development etc. Such a climate of tolerance and mutual respect will in turn lead to increased opportunities for social and economic development. Chile also actively participates in the UN and regional summits, on issues such as gender, the environment and social cohesion. It was a temporary member of the UN Security Council between 1996-1997, between 2003-2004 and between 2014-2015. Chile's membership inspired her to define her multilateral policy as follows: promote preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of disputes; seek regional solutions to regional conflicts; promote transparency and equality in Security Council; maintain special concern for victims of wars and conflicts.¹⁹¹ The Chilean Foreign Ministry states it is, in principle, against sanctions, and should they be used, the protection of vulnerable groups and sectors should be guaranteed.

Chile seeks a balanced foreign policy with presence throughout the world. Chile has long enjoyed good relations with Europe and the European Union is one of Chile's main trade partners. In 1996, Chile and the EU signed a framework agreement. As a Pacific country, Chile now hopes to expand her engagement with the Asian Pacific region and to that end has signed a trade agreement with South Korea. As an APEC member, Chile has worked intensively in the Asia-Pacific area to create effective political and economic ties¹⁹². It also hopes to expand bilateral relations with the United States, particularly in the areas of democratization, non-proliferation, sustainability, inequality, and the war on drugs. As a result of Chile's increased

¹⁹¹ <http://www.chile-usa.org/forpolicy.htm>

¹⁹² Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, *Chile en el mundo*, Santiago, 2013, p.7.

presence in the global economy, Chile signed a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in early 2003. That same year, a Free Trade Agreement was signed with the United States of America.

6.5 Turkish Foreign Policy Objectives

Today's world characterised by rapid changes. Accordingly, foreign policy issues have also gained a more complex and complicated character. Today, taking the necessary steps in keeping with the speed of these changes and developments is the most important task laid before decision makers. In such an environment, developments show us that international legitimacy, economic interdependence, respect for human rights, pursuing a sustainable environmental policy and harmony between people belonging to different religious and ethnic origins stand as the most important tools to build lasting peace, stability and prosperity. The realities of our time also compel us to analyse international dynamics with a global perspective of peace.

Located in one of the important intersections of different foreign policy dynamics, this extraordinary process also shapes Turkey's basic foreign policy issues. In light of the many opportunities created by globalization, we were in fact hoping for the emergence of a new environment conducive to lasting peace. However traditional security issues as well as new and evolving risks and threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime and illegal immigration continue to overshadow our optimism. The Afro-Eurasian geography where Turkey is situated at the epicenter is an area where such opportunities and risks interact in the most intensive way. Under these circumstances, to follow a stable and constructive Turkish foreign policy has become all the more important. History has shown us that great civilizations has prospered in peace in our region when the correct steps are taken and

the existing potential is appropriately utilized, while the cost of mistakes can be devastating for the entire world.

It is with this understanding that Turkey pursues a dynamic and visionary foreign policy with a view to steering the developments in a positive direction, in a region where the impact of global changes is greatest. In this context, Turkey's multi-dimensional, constructive, proactive, realistic and responsible foreign policy is one of the most important assets in realizing its national and international goals.

As a result of this principled approach and its continued efforts, as well as thanks to its increasing means and capabilities Turkey has in fact become a leading country that works to expand the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region; generate stability and security; help establish an order that paves the way for prosperity, human development and lasting stability.

Rise of Turkey to such a prominent position is also a consequence of Turkey's solid stance that vigorously seeks legitimacy and of the belief that its own security and stability can only be achieved through the security and stability of the region. Behind this stance lies intensive efforts and major initiatives intended for the creation of an environment of sustainable peace, security and tranquility in the region and beyond.

Thanks to this foreign policy vision, Turkey is today considered as a country that not only safeguards but also disseminates human rights, democracy, rule of law and social equity. Turkey's deep-rooted tradition of statehood and democracy, its advantages emanating from geography and history, its young and educated population and dynamic economy plays a key role in the success of this policy.¹⁹³ Turkish foreign policy is pursued by mobilizing many and complementary political, economic, humanitarian and cultural means and its sphere of interest has achieved a global scale.

¹⁹³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

In this framework, Turkey is determined to become a full member of the European Union as part of its bicentennial effort to reach the highest level of contemporary civilization. Furthermore, believing that an ever enlarging NATO has much more to do in serving global peace, Turkey is striving to keep the spirit of alliance high at all times.

On the other hand, attaching particular importance to its Transatlantic ties Turkey is strengthening its relations both with the US and the European countries; while further developing its relations with the countries in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa, Southern Caucasus, South Asia and Central Asia by making use of its close ties. In a world where globalization renders distances increasingly insignificant, Turkey is also deepening its policies of reaching out to Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific regions that is home to many emerging powers.

In other words, Turkey does not only develop its bilateral and regional relations in its close neighbourhood, but seeks to create a positive synergy on a much wider scale and thus aims at contributing to global peace, stability and security.

Cognizant of the fact that global problems can only be resolved through cooperation on a global scale, Turkey is also conducting an active diplomacy in the multilateral forums, notably within the United Nations, the unique universal forum in which such cooperation is realized through broadest possible participation and on a robust basis of legitimacy. As regards the UN, for instance, after concluding its non-permanent membership in the Security Council during 2009-2010, Turkey announced yet again its candidacy for a non-permanent seat in the Council this time for the years 2015-2016. The aim is to bring an added value to the work of the Council and shoulder more effectively its global responsibilities. On the other hand, taking account of the direct relationship between security and development, Turkey has started assuming an active role

in global development diplomacy efforts, too. In this regard, Turkey hosted the Fourth United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, between 9th and 13th of May in Istanbul and contributed to the adoption of the Program of Action for the decade 2011-2020.

In sum, Turkey is aware of the necessity to foster the linkages between political stability, economic welfare and cultural harmony in order to attain sustainable global peace. To this end, Turkey is committed to further enhance political dialogue with all countries, search for new economic and commercial areas of cooperation and increase its humanitarian aid and assistance to the developing countries. As an emerging energy hub and a major transit country, Turkey plays an important role with respect to global energy security. Likewise, as an active member of the G-20 which gave a new impulse to the quest for global governance Turkey is pursuing a more representative and democratic global system. Turkey also assumes active role in endeavors to foster mutual respect and common values among different cultures and religions. In this regard the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, cosponsored by Turkey&Spain, represents the strongest response ever to the scenarios of the so-called “clashes of civilizations”.¹⁹⁴

On the other hand, Turkey has added a relatively new aspect to its foreign policy in recent years which indeed complements its global vision via helping third countries in resolving their domestic as well as bilateral problems through facilitation and reconciliation. Indeed Turkey is now playing a more active role compared to the past in mediation and resolution of

¹⁹⁴ The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) was launched in 2005 by the then Prime Minister H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey, and by H.E. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, former Prime Minister of Spain. The AoC became a UN initiative upon its endorsement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Unfortunately, various extremist elements exploit the mutual suspicion, fear and polarization between the Muslim countries and Western societies. The Alliance aims to overcome this tendency by enhancing mutual respect between cultures bearing in mind that only a comprehensive coalition can prevent the deterioration of this situation, which threatens international peace and stability. The Initiative is based on the idea that all societies are interdependent on the matters of development, security, environment and welfare. It aims at establishing a common political will in order to overcome prejudice, misperception and polarization. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-alliance-of-civilizations-initiative.en.mfa>

conflicts. While doing so Turkey prioritizes opportunities and initiatives improving cooperation and friendships between states based on a win-win principle rather than perceived problems and threats.



CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

This research has focused on the relations between Chile and Turkey through an archival study of diplomatic records. The dissertation has followed those periods important to the countries' bilateral relations and uncovered the motives that shine through the diplomatic messages and reports. It shows that, although Chile and Turkey are geographically remote from one another, both countries have experienced relatively similar political processes since World War II. Moreover, in a globalized world, the geographical distance between countries no longer constitutes an obstacle for the development of diplomatic social and economic relations.

A study of foreign policy should be multi-disciplinary in nature and consider a multitude of aspects including the history and geopolitical location, the external environment and the restrictions it places on decision makers, the domestic political structure, and the decision making process. Therefore, the diplomatic reports are continuously intertwined with a discussion of Chilean and Turkish social, political, and economic development in relation to their foreign policy aims. In the disciplines of international relations and political science, it is essential to determine the internal and external dynamics of an event while searching for its cause. An event is influenced by both internal factors such as the structure of the country, public order, group and class interests, as well as external factors such as the structure of the international system, historical background, geostrategic location, and relations with neighbours. Researchers should make a distinction between these two dynamics and attach equal importance to both.

More precisely, in order to grasp the causes of an incident to occur in relations among states; be it a treaty, problem or even a conflict, it is essential to analyse the domestic and foreign policy relations in those countries. The principle here is that foreign policies are generally determined by the order in domestic policies. For instance, by invading the Falkland Islands –

Islas Malvinas - the military government in Argentina hoped to mobilize the patriotic feelings of the Argentinian society and to divert public attention from the country's economic problems and the military regime's human right violations. At the same time, it is possible to say that, especially in times of emergency, the security concerns are predominantly caused by a country's (and its region's) geopolitical structure; in other words, foreign policy concerns affect domestic policies. It is relatively more difficult to influence the external dynamic factors affecting or likely to affect relations among states. Therefore, it is more rational to adapt – or attempt to – the internal dynamics that are a factor in causing a certain event.

Turkey's tendency to the West and the intensification of Chilean-Turkish relations since the 1990s, as demonstrated in this research, should be considered in the context of the greater global system and the grouping of nations. According to Wallace, grouping of nations is an issue to be understood in order to comprehend the global system. The global system of Wallace segregated into three as a) Western Europe and Atlantic Core b) middle ranked states, c) peripheral states. In terms of membership to international organizations, Wallace sets forth that this middle-ranked states are not as unduly attached to international organizations as the states in Atlantic Core but they cannot be counted around the group structure.¹⁹⁵ Nearly without any exception, the alterations in the groupings of nations appear extremely slowly and the large grouping patterns are long-standing. Another finding of Wallace is highly determinative in terms of the foreign policy attitudes of Turkey. On the contrary to what is generally claimed, geographical proximity, as a factor determining grouping patterns, is losing its significance. Other, numerous connections decrease the importance of physical closeness. For instance, many

¹⁹⁵ W. Wallace, *Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, Review of International Studies, 22(3) in S. Burchill, A. Linklater, J. Donnelly, *Theories of International Relations*, Hampshire, 2009, p.405.

of the South Asian, Middle Eastern, and West African states attach greater importance to the groupings in spite of geographical distance rather than to the states in their region.

In this light the permanent membership of Turkey to the western system and to the organizations established by the 'West' becomes clearer. The proof of this is explicit with regard to Turkey. Almost all regional security cooperation efforts of Turkey failed (such as Balkan and Baghdad Pacts) whereas membership to the international group of 'Western countries' has not been completely unsuccessful.

The domestic political structure has great impact on the construction of foreign policy. While political actors in a pluralistic and developed country may be greatly influential, decision making power in smaller autocratic regimes is concentrated in the hands of the president and often by extension the United States. In general a foreign policy in Latin America is formulated by the executive power particularly by the president who is responsible for decisions on international issues and appointment of the foreign minister as well as foreign services staff. In short as Kaufman explains, in Latin America foreign policy decisions made by the president are usually influenced by the constraints of the external setting rather than a response to domestic cleavage (1977). Similarly, rather than ethnic, religious, sectarian, and ideological belonging, Turkey's foreign policy, which spans a large geographical area and has a long historical tradition, is shaped by strategical and economic interests (Sanberk 2010: 104).

The meaning and significance of financial constraints and opportunities in the foreign policy of a state is a fact that those who deal with international relations accept immediately. Financial factors and economic objectives are universal elements for the attitudes of states. Because, beyond the financial residuals, thus the minimum necessities of the society, the main problem of domestic and foreign politics is how to distribute the produced services and goods in

the world and time of constraints we live in. States would like to control and organize their financial relations on this line. Turkey and Chile are both subject to this general rule. The financial difficulties both countries faced in the mid-1970s are significant factors that affect the Western-biased foreign policies of both countries.

The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, was a relatively young country in comparison to other foremost members of the Western bloc, which had enjoyed status as a sovereign nation-state for long. Since her establishment, Turkey's foreign policy has been dominated by the motto of the republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Peace at home, peace in the world". Also Chile follows a foreign policy led by peaceful resolution of international conflicts and promotes international cooperation.

As Mustafa Aydın explains, it is difficult to place Turkey in any geographical, cultural, political or economic category; predominantly located within Asia, its elite considers itself European; most of its population is Muslim, yet the country is decisively secular; culturally, it shows similarities with the Middle East, but also echoes Europe (Kedourie, 2000: 152-153). It lies on the nexus of the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans, and is affected by developments in all three regions.

Like the Turks, Chileans find themselves at an interesting and complex crossroads of cultures and identities. Today, one could say that in some ways Chileans are more northern in spirit than Latin. Their Hispanic instincts are not primarily Andalusian but closer to the Basque and to the spirit of Galicia in north-western Spain (Hickman, 1998: 233). With an ethnically mixed population of Northern Spanish, German, French, Slav, and British heritage, she is easily associated with Europe, yet she does not share the same pursuit of global wealth and lacks a strong current of consumerism and materialism. In the words of Hickmann (1998: 234),

“Chileans will always attach as much importance to football, to dancing their *cuccas*, to *vino tinto* and empanadas, to beaches and the sea, to horses and to love in all its shapes and forms.”

The two states that are the subjects to this research are, in fact, located in very different geographies in terms of their vital fields of interest. Nevertheless, global developments forced countries to seek alliances even with remote countries, in spite of the geographical distance. The following example illustrates this trend in the Chilean-Turkish case. In an interview the researcher conducted in Chile, the former Chilean ambassador, Jorge Arancibia, who served in Ankara between 2011 and 2013, stated that Chile started looking for possible alternative weapon and armament suppliers outside the continent and which are not under U.S. influence. At the time, Chile was suffering from the U.S. embargo on arms in 1980 and the U.S. embargo on arms, vehicles, and other industrial equipment in 1985. It should be noted that Ambassador Arancibia served for the Chilean navy and worked closely with Pinochet as his aide/adjutant. During the interview, Arancibia stated that Turkey’s name was mentioned as an alternative source of weapons without giving a clear date of this information.¹⁹⁶ Indeed, at the beginning of 1980, when Chile was suffering from the U.S. arms embargo, Turkey offered to sell some armaments. In return, when Turkey needed weapons to fight against terrorist groups in her south eastern provinces, Chile offered special arms from her own arsenal.

The Chilean return to democracy¹⁹⁷ following Pinochet’s regime is unique across the continent. Only here did the military step down in confidence, proud of the economic and social

¹⁹⁶ Regarding this issue, during the research conducted at Chile's foreign ministry archives, classified documents dating from the end of the 1980s and sent to Santiago from the Chilean Embassy in Ankara revealed that a Turkish foreign trade company made a written proposal of arms sales to the Chilean embassy. When the weapons and ammunition types in the documents in question were analysed, it was seen that some of them were of the type and caliber produced by an official organization in Turkey and that although some of them possessed the NATO standards, information on their production place was not found. The original copies of these documents and the correspondence they were attached to were photographed during this research.

¹⁹⁷ For those who interested in personal views and observations about Chile’s past and present, a valuable memoir from Isabel Allende *My Invented Country*, Harpercollins, New York, 2003.

policies they had implemented during their rule. Moreover, the newly elected government did not change or amend the constitution introduced by the military in 1980. The combination of their economic progress and position provided by the 1980 constitution legitimized the military's position, and their continuing role in protecting the constitution, by force if necessary (Bethell, 1994: 293-294).

Chile's return to democracy after the military regime has been an inspiring example to other states. Turkey too may learn from the Chilean example. While Turkey continues to use the September 12 military coup as - somewhat legitimately - an excuse for its ongoing efforts to consolidate a democratic society, Chile has successfully faced its military past and has been able to restore and improve the democratic standards of the country.

Chile as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for a various times is an active and engaged member of the international community. With her stable economy and well-established political institutions Chile can be a model for other less developed countries in her region and around the globe as well. Chile as a full member of APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation since 1994, hosted one of the key APEC milestones in 2004 in Santiago, has a global vision that reaches beyond Europe.

Both Chile and Turkey would benefit from greater economic cooperation by more effectively using each other's commercial potential and geostrategic positions as well. For Chile Turkey serves as a bridge to Central Asian and Middle-Eastern markets.

The documents show that not only the language and foreign policy aims have changed over the course of the twenty first century, but also the global order in which the two countries exist. Namely, the concepts dominating world politics were vastly different before the Second World War, during the Cold War, and today. Especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chile

and Turkey, much like the rest of the world, were able to carry out a more independent foreign policy as the global political agenda transformed from one dominated by bloc politics. With the end of the Cold War, the global order became less stable and predictable, and made it harder to foreshadow the new political agenda.

The starting point of this study was to discover the historical background of Chilean and Turkish diplomatic relations and uncover the similar developments that both countries have faced especially after the Second World War. Moreover it aims to serve as a knowledge base for future studies on the topic.

During the archival study the researcher was surprised with the wealth and the volume of the sources indicating closer relationship between the two countries than he and others previously assumed. Such studies are time consuming and pose different challenges such as access and categorization.

In terms of content Chile considers herself in a special position as the first country to recognise The Republic of Turkey, which fought for her independence and was able build a modern from the ashes. In turn Turkey looks Chile as a reliable partner in international conflicts.

During the research, the author found many potential areas of study for future academics such as migration, the establishment of economic relations as a positive model and democratization wounded society and how to effectively deal with difficult pasts. Furthermore the study hopes to inspire other research based on diplomatic records and their portrayal of contemporary events according to such factors as the world order of the time but also personal views of any ambassador.

The researcher has witnessed that the topic is much wider than it is assumed. The diplomatic official sources has been found, the interviews has been held both in Chile and

Turkey and all the data gathered in total, exceeded the expectations at the beginning of this research. It is believed that other researchers who is interested on these issues, would take further steps in the field.

In a future research, the author would classify the studied official documents by topic as well as time frame. The reports covered a wide range of issues and topics, which embody a scope too wide for one research to discuss. Since, from the beginning, the focus of the research was the diplomatic relations as seen through official documents, a future study could be conducted on domestic politics through the counterpart's eyes. Another possible angle could be a closer focus on commercial relations within a certain time period, or migration waves between the two countries.

The research proves the importance of diplomatic documents in enlightening how the relations between two countries have started, matured, and developed since. The documents are crucial in understanding how the countries respond to each other's policies reciprocally and have helped to widen the researcher's perspective from both sides as such.

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Ambassador Fransisco Marambio Vial

Ambassador Luis Palma Castillo

Ambassador Mariano Fontecilla De Santiago Concha

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