

AN ISLAMIST INTELLECTUAL IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE: AN
INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF NECİP FAZIL
KISAKÜREK (1904-1983)

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BY

MEHMET ŞEVKİ TOKER

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Mehmet Şevki TOKER

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ABSTRACT

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek is one of the most important intellectuals of Turkish political and thought life. With his tens of books and the *Büyük Doğu* Journal he published at intervals between the years 1943-1978, he had an important place in Turkish thought life. Besides, he was one of the prominent initiators of the revival of Islamism in Modern Turkey. The aim of this study is to present meaningful findings about the development of Islamic thought in post-Republic Turkish political life by examining the intellectual and political life of Kısakürek. Since the study is conducted through the biography method, an alternative reading for the Turkish Political Life is also presented.

This study argues that Kısakürek was a modernist Islamist who aimed at total transformation of state and society structure according to the *Büyük Doğu* ideology which he designed as an alternative modernization project to Kemalism by taking Islamic principles as the reference point. In that regard, Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* ideology is analyzed in the light of Eisenstadt and Göle's works on 'Non-Western modernity' concept and it is tried to be explained that *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology of which capacity of achieving a conceivable and realizable state and society structure is low.

Key Words: Kısakürek, Büyük Doğu, Islamism, Biography, Turkey, Non-Western Modernity

ÖZET

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Türk siyasal ve düşünce hayatının en önemli entelektüellerinden biridir. 1943-1978 yılları arasında aralıklarla yayınladığı Büyük Doğu Dergisi ve onlarca kitabı ile Türk düşünce hayatında önemli bir yer edinmiştir. Bunun yanında Modern Türkiye’de İslamcılık düşüncesinin canlanmasında rol alan önemli öncülerden biridir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Kısakürek’in entellektüel ve siyasal hayatını inceleyerek İslamcılık düşüncesinin Cumhuriyet sonrası Türk siyasal hayatındaki gelişimi hakkında anlamlı bulgular sunmaktır. Çalışmanın biyografi metodu ile yürütülmüş olması sayesinde, Türk Siyasal Hayatı için alternatif bir okuma da sunulmaktadır.

Bu çalışma Kısakürek’in, İslami ilkeleri referans noktası olarak alarak, Kemalizm’e alternatif bir modernizatin projesi olarak tasarladığı Büyük Doğu ideolojisine göre devlet ve toplum yapısının toplam dönüşümünü amaçlayan modernist bir İslamcı olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Kısakürek’in Büyük Doğu ideolojisi, Eisenstadt ve Göle’nin ‘Batı dışı modernite’ kavramı üzerine yaptığı çalışmalar ışığında irdelenmekte ve Büyük Doğu’nun makul ve gerçekleştirilebilir bir devlet ve toplum yapısı elde etme kapasitesinin düşük olduğu bir ideoloji olduğu ortaya konmaya çalışıldı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kısakürek, Büyük Doğu, İslamcılık, biyografi, Türkiye, Batı dışı modernite

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INTRODUCTION

Biographical study is a rarely applied research method in political science. To put it more precisely, although biographies are frequently used, as a source, by researchers in political science, biographical study is not yet used as a research method. Due to this reason, firstly, it is important to explain why this particular research method has been chosen and opted for in this paper. Finding answers to the two following questions may guide the readers in this regard. The first question is what kind of contribution that biographical study can make to political science? And the second is whether this will be a convenient research method.

First of all, biographical study is a highly significant field of study in terms of political science. The most fundamental reason for this is our approach to understanding and interpreting ideologies, thought currents, and political and social processes through their builder, initiator, participant, or symbolic names. We attempt to understand Turkish modernisation by looking at Namik Kemal, Cevdet Paşa, Said Nursi, Ziya Gökalp, and Mustafa Suphi.¹ It is assumed that the differences in their thought, to a considerable extent, stem from their personal qualities, social experiences, education, and, in short, the things they treasured up in their saddlebags during their lifetime.

From this perspective, Kısakürek is one of the most important names ought to be studied biographically. He is an intellectual of a great transformation process, which witnessed the transformation of a centuries-old empire to a new set up nation-state. The basic pillars of his life were erected in the period of the Ottoman Empire

¹ These names are some of the important intellectuals and statesmen who represent different tendencies in Turkish thought life.

and evolved within the social, economic and political structure of the Republic. Kısakürek began his intellectual career as a famous poet. He had had a bohemian lifestyle until he met with Abdülhakim Arvasi, a *Sufi* sheikh. After this meeting, his life went through a sharp break and he emerged as one of the ardent initiators of Islamism in the Republican era. An important feature of the period, when Kısakürek began to express his thoughts, was that the translation of the books of Islamists from Egypt, Pakistan and later Iran, had not started yet (Duran, 2001, p. 209). In the absence of these books, which were to be very influential through deriving of different paths of Islamism, both in Turkey and in the other Muslim geographies, the works of Kısakürek were, daringly speaking, the most influential ones of the limited sources for readers.² He ideologized Islam around the concept of *Büyük Doğu* (The Great East) as an alternative ideology to both western political ideologies, such as liberalism and communism, and to the Kemalist ideology. He expressed his ideas mainly in the journal of *Büyük Doğu*, which had the same name as the ideological formula he had built up. Due to various reasons such as the closing penalties given by the state, the imprisonments of Kısakürek, and financial problems, the journal were published in 15 periods with a total number of 555 issues during its publication life from 1943 to 1978. In addition, Kısakürek wrote tens of books in literary, political, and theological subjects.

Kısakürek was influential not only in the intellectual field but also in the political realm. He attempted to involve in the political arena by setting up a political party in the late 1940s. Furthermore, he established close relationships with many political party leaders, sometimes even were the spokesman of these parties. He was influential in the establishment of Turkey's first Islamist party which managed to

² This observation has been shared by many Islamists and researchers, see (Beyazıt, 1996; Duran, 2001).

produce a continuing existence. Kısakürek contacted almost all the prime ministers and attempted to influence them on the axis of his *Büyük Doğu* ideology. For a long time, the magazine he published was financed by the state facilities. He was also directly influential in many critical processes of the country. Moreover, his influence in Turkish politics is still going up till today. Many of the political elites of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-JDP), including President Abdullah Gül, the eleventh president, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the twelfth president, publicly stated that Kısakürek had a privileged place in the development of their ideational world. They emphasised how Kısakürek was an important name for their identity through participating in award ceremonies held annually in his name. Looking at the situation more in depth, Nuray Mert stated that in order to understand Kısakürek, it is essential to understand today's Turkey (Mert, 2014). Referring to the increasing conservative tendency in the country under the administration of the JDP, which has been in power since 2002, Fırat Mollaer states that Kısakürek was presented as an idol for the youth by the political elite. To him, although many conservatives and Islamists were on stage, in fact, the one who always spoke was Kısakürek (Mollaer, 2016, pp. 55-56). This density in his life makes his life a laboratorial course in which the development and evolvement of both politics and Islamism in Turkey can be observed.

An additional question about the contribution of biographical study to the political sciences can also be asked. Are studies conducted in the form of the history of political thoughts—even when the general forms of the thinker's identity and life, such as being a statesman or an intellectual, being Eastern or Western, rich or poor, are taken into consideration—insufficient to produce the results needed? In fact, the answer to this question is also related to the question of whether the biographical

study is a convenient research method. It can be argued that biographical work, in some cases, present better results in terms of Kısakürek. For example, given the Burhanettin Duran's Ph.D. study, which can be characterised as one of the most comprehensive studies on Kısakürek and the *Büyük Doğu* ideology, we can come to the conclusion that Kısakürek has an understanding of nationalism that is incompatible with the ultra-nationalist interpretations of nationalism. However, this ideological rivalry, which he sustained for most of his life, was eroded over time, and political realities placed him in a position of supporting a party, which had an ultra-nationalist understanding. These results, which can be obtained with a biographical study in a wider area present significant information in terms of understanding the course of Islamism in Turkey as well. Even, observing this transformation in Kısakürek is quite enlightening in terms of understanding the political position and discourses of the JDP, which is in power today.

When we come to question whether the biographical study is a suitable research model, we come across serious oppositions in the literature. Mary Evans argues that it is impossible to reveal an objective work in biographies. She even sees biographies as a literary equivalent to gossip. To her, contrary to the claim that they present a whole life of a person, they can only present a part that is constructed over the fiction that the author had built. For instance, the chronological narration used in biographies may cause a certain period of the subject's life to be marginalised or ignored in parallel with the author's interest. In addition, biographies have always been a moralistic genre, and biographers tend to judge their subjects based on their own values with regard to the good and bad. Moreover, even when a biographer fictionalised the story he built within the phenomenon such as modernity and capitalism, in order to get objectivity, these value judgments come into play (Evans,

1999, pp. 1, 78-84). Since biographical writing is also a kind of historiography, much of the epistemological and ontological debate on the methodology of history writing is also valid for biographical writing. In his book, 'What Is History?', Edward Hallett Carr refers to biography as a subject of historiography and points out a number of challenges in biography writing through emphasising the subjective position of the biographer. To Carr, in order to understand history, it is necessary to look at the historian first. Besides, he thinks that a story of an individual does not mean much in regard to history. From his perspective, "history is to a considerable extent a matter of numbers" (Carr, 1990, pp. 22-30,44-49). In addition to these, we can also consider the criticisms of names such as Karl R. Popper to the historicism, as the biographer tends to adopt a historicist approach in order to view his subject within the latter's own period and conditions (Popper, 1961).

Hence, do these criticisms lead us to the conclusion that biography is an unsuitable method of research? As a matter of fact, critical concerns of the above-mentioned names are not unjustifiable, especially when some examples of biographical studies are taken into consideration. For instance, in many of the studies about Kısakürek, the political view of the author is so dominant such that many of them present an example of hagiography genre in which the subject is glorified. Yet, the criticisms directed to the biographical study do not prove that it is an unsuitable method of research, but rather they present the limits and weak sides of this method and state the matters that should be taken into consideration by the biographer. Here, it should also be noted that Carr himself is a very important biographer. Besides, there are also some views that consider biographies as alternative narrative of events and argue that they make contribution to political science by presenting new perspectives. According to these views, mentioned challenges do not detract the political biography

from being scientific, but can even enrich them (deMarris & Lapan, 2004, pp. 41,42). For instance, Simone Lässig argued that there is no better way of considering social networks in historiography than biography (Lässig, 2013, p. 51). Underlining that there cannot be a definitive story of any life, Kırmızı argues that biography writing, despite this fact, is a requirement and encourages the authors to get used to living and writing by an epistemological distrust (Kırmızı, 2013, p. 26).

Here, how we will try to cope with these limitations and challenges while revealing what is aimed at in this study and the path followed will be explained. Firstly, this study does not aim to reveal normative, law-like generalisations but to make contributions to the existing literature about the Turkish political life and Islamism with scientific and meaningful findings. Thus, issues such as subjectivity of a biographer become tolerable, especially when we look from post-positivist eyes. In this regard, the research questions around which this study is conducted are: How was Kısakürek influenced by the social, political, economic structure of the society where he grew up, how did the things he accumulated in his saddlebag affect his thoughts and actions, what kinds of reflexes did he produce, were there any change, transformation in his thoughts in the face of the changes in the country and the world he witnessed, and finally what trace did he leave to Turkish political life in general, and to Islamism in particular?

Secondly, according to Gadamer, an interpreter can avoid subjectivity by means of a historical consciousness. He argues that a conscious mind can transpose itself to the historical horizon of the text, thus realizing its own historical position and avoiding misleading of our preventive prejudices. To Gadamer, the crucial issue to be achieved is being familiar with the subject (Gadamer, 2006, pp. 297-304). In this regard, before starting the study, dense reading was done on Islamism and Turkish

political life. Also, In order to get rid of this subjectivity and come as close as possible to objectivity, different sources such as media research, archive documents besides Kısakürek's writing were employed, and a factual framework was tried to be established. In this regard, all issues of *Cumhuriyet* (1930–1983) and *Milliyet* (1950–1983) newspapers were examined. Some other periodicals (such as *Sabah Postası*) were also employed in some part of the study. In addition, secondary studies of competent researchers in literature on Turkish politics, memoirs of the important names of the processes in which Kısakürek involved were also employed in the study in order to provide a comparison. Also, in order to avoid secondary subjectivity, Kısakürek's own writings were used instead of secondary studies done about him. In this regard, all of Kısakürek's writings published in the *Büyük Doğu* journal and all of his books were examined. In addition, his other writings published in various periodicals (*Cumhuriyet*, *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, *Milli Gazete*, *Son Posta*, *Akıncı Güç*) were also examined. Some of his writings published in various periodicals (such as *Sabah*, *Babıalide Sabah*, *Bugün*) could not be reached. These writings were followed from his books (such as *Çerçeve*) in which he re-published them.

Thirdly, this study, contrary to the argument of Evans, does not aim at presenting all Kısakürek's life. The concern of this study, with the description of Lord Acton, is not making an encyclopaedic work but a scientific explanation and conceptualisation endeavour in pursuit of providing new contribution to the literature (Acton, 1907, p. 4). In other words, biographical study of Kısakürek is a case study applied in the process of understanding the Turkish political life. Therefore, this study has gone to some limitations both in the narrative of his life and in his works in compatible with the purpose of this study. Since his political life, to a great extent, begins in 1943, the focus was on parts of his life after that date. However, it does not

mean that his early life was totally ignored. As mentioned in the research questions, it is accepted that the experiences and accumulations he had in his early life constitute a ground to his later life. Similarly, some limitations were conducted in the analysis of his works in the literary genre. Instead of analysing them within the framework of literature analysis, they considered in terms of the political messages they include. As mentioned above, being a literary man is one of the main characteristic of the Islamists in the Republican era, and literature is one of the means by which they express their thoughts.

Here, it is also necessary to mention some of the difficulties faced during the study. Firstly, Kısakürek was a passionate writer and poet. He wrote in so many publications and in different genres, such that all of the bibliographical works done on his works, in a sense, are doomed to be missing. Secondly, Kısakürek used many pseudonyms in his writings besides his own name and the considerable number of these pseudonyms makes it hard to follow his writings. These pseudonyms are as follows: *Büyük Doğu*, *Be-De*, *M.K.*, *Dedektif X Bir*, *Bankacı*, *Muhasebeci*, *İsmini Vermiyen Prof.*, *Ahmet Abdülbaki*, *Ha. A. Ka.*, *Prof. Ş. Ü.*, *Adideğmez*, *Dilci*, *Tetikçi*, *Yazan:?*, *Muhbir*, *Prof. H. H.*, *Gariboğlu*, *Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti*, *Ne-Fe-Ka*, *Rıdvan Bakır*, *Müstensih*, *M. Sarıçizmeli*, *İstanbulu*, *Üç Yıldız*, *Kulak Misafiri*, *Ozan Baş*, *Ozan*, *M. Işıklı*, *Vaiz*, *Zabıt Katibi*, *Sözcü*, *Akıl Hocası*, *Pervasız*, *Lâderi*, *Mürid*, *Diplomat*, *Uykusuz İnsandan*, and *Özcü*, *Gözcü*. Besides, he also wrote using the names of a close circle and young people around him, some of which are Neslihan Kısakürek, Ali Rıza Pişkin, Behçet Bağdatlıoğlu, Şakir Üçışık, Ömer Karagül, Zahir Güvemli, H. Yananlı, Abdürrahim Zapsu, Ali Biraderoğlu, Abdullah Saraçoğlu,

Ahmet Semiz, Rafet ıngıl, Hseyin Arı, and Salih Gler (Ak, Necip Fazıl Bibliyografyası, 2013).³

Fourthly, a biographical study may go beyond the limits of political science and may need a multidisciplinary approach. The researcher may have to take into account the psychological and sociological factors in the background when interpreting the decisions, actions and thoughts of the subject examined. It can be misleading to regard the subject as someone who always makes rational decisions. The fact that Kısakrek was a father and had to make a living for his family has been constantly considered in this study along with his literary and political identity. In addition, various social and psychological issues, such as childhood breaks and the way to cope with difficulties, were taken into account. At this point, it is problematic of that whether right conclusions can be made. It is questionable that as one who has his own prejudices, moral values, and a distinct historical position, to what extent we can put ourselves into Kısakrek's place and how much we can penetrate his ideational world. In addition, the issue of secondary subjectivity is involved in the debate, as a large part of these inferences has been made in the light of information provided by Kısakrek's own biography. When we look at the literature on this subject, we are faced with different opinions in the philosophical hermeneutic debates.⁴ For instance, Although Gadamer argues that the commentator can adapt himself to the period while he was looking at the history, when it comes to the issue of penetrating a person's state of mind, he argues that it is impossible. To him, instead

³ There are also articles written by these names. However, it is also possible to see the traces of Kısakrek's style in some of those articles quite intensively. Therefore, it is considered necessary for these names to mentioned.

⁴ The reason why I applied hermeneutic in this regard is that, ultimately, we are trying to understand Kısakrek through his writings and autobiography. As the general teaching of understanding and interpreting of texts, art objects and expressions, hermeneutic can provide sufficient answers to my problematic (Topakkaya, 2007, p. 75)

of trying to transpose ourselves into the author's mind, if it is necessary, we should try to transpose ourselves into the perspective within which he has formed his views (Gadamer, 2006, p. 292). Similarly, Hirsh also argues that such a psychological approach is not quite possible since we cannot get the knowledge of mental states of the author's mind. However, he does not banish the author and subject from the process of interpretation. To him, we can reach the knowledge of author's intention and it is essential for a sensible interpretation (Hirsch, 1967, pp. 1-14). On the other hand, Schleiermacher, who initiated major transformations in hermeneutic, describes hermeneutic as a process that enables us to understand an author better than he understood himself. To him the best way of establishing a familiarity with the author is considering his work within hermeneutical circle.⁵ Thus, we can see how the author comprehends the facts and incidents, and we can set up some correlations; even, we can grasp the psychology behind the text (Schleiermacher, 1998, s. 98-112). Dilthey, who shared this thought of Schleiermacher, emphasises the importance of familiarity with an author. According to him, empathizing with the mental states of the individuals who carry out the action is a prerequisite for the success of the hermeneutic approach (Dilthey W. , 1996, p. 251). And, this empathy can only be achieved by trying to penetrate the belief systems and concepts of individuals and by an effort to incorporate their concepts into our own concepts (Taslaman, 2011, p. 30). At this point, through being aware of the impossibility of assessing the cases within a tabula rasa mind, it is accepted in advance that all of the inferences about Kısakürek's psychological world cannot be unconditionally true. However, it does not mean that all of those factors can be ignore. It is not a deviation from the scientific process to predict that someone who feels unfairly punished will feel anger.

⁵ According to hermeneutical circle, one work of a writer is a part of all his works.

After handling the methodology, its advantages and constraints have been followed, some conceptualizations used in the study will be mentioned. With regard to the goals of the study, it will be beneficial to focus on the concept of Islamism first. As explained in the introduction section of the second chapter, Islamism is one of the political projects that emerged in the 12th century to stop the regression process of the state. Although I discussed the emergence of Islamism as Ottoman-centred, it is, in fact, a more general reflex to Western progression that also occurred in other Muslim societies. To name this reflex, researchers in Islam and Middle East politics have used different terms such as political Islam, Islamism, fundamentalism, radicalism, reactionism. This situation, in a sense, stems from that as Ayoob points out, this reaction shows itself in different faces, and that we try to treat all of these faces together in a generalisation (Ayoob, 2011).

In this study, the term 'fundamentalism' was not used. Although turning back to the fundamental teaching of Islam constitutes a ground place in the logic of mainstream Islamists, it is an attempt in the way of adapting the Islamic tenets to the needs of the time. This concept, which can be used for organisations such as ISIS, is misleading, and, to some extent, pejorative in terms of defining mainstream Islamist movements. This is why Eisenstadt, who used this term, obliged to produce the term of modern fundamentalism in order to make the mainstream Islamist movements distinct from the marginal ones (Eisenstadt, 2003b). The terms of political Islam and Islamism generally are used in the same meaning. The concept of political Islam was not preferred in this study due to its unfavourable connotation, which tends to restrict the cultural and social dimensions of Islamism to the political zone. As discussed in Chapter Six, Islamism is also a modernisation project which aims not only at

changing the political structure but also at transforming the cultural codes of the society and economic ties.

The term of reactionism, which is also used in this study, to a substantial extent, corresponds to a generalised perception. This term is used in the Turkish political literature for ideas and actions aimed at grounding the state order on religious principles by changing its secular character. This use of the concept in that sense led to the evaluation of many Islamist movements which do not aimed at changing the state order and operate in constitutional limits even when the constitutional and political cards were stacked against them. Therefore, it has become a concept without definite bounds. For example, although Kısakürek was considered one of the symbolic names of the perception of reactionism danger in his period, he himself found many Islamic movements as reactionary. The term 'reactionism' was used in this study to indicate this generalised perception.

Lastly, it may be beneficial to draw a line between conservatism and Islamism. Although Islamism is also a conservative reaction, there is a line, which sometimes becomes obscure, between conservatives such as Peyami Safa and Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and Islamists such as Kısakürek. Generally speaking, the conservatives offer to be downgraded of positivist and secular characteristic of Kemalist modernisation project to an appropriate level while Islamists present Islam as both a way of life and an ideology. In other words, while religion is considered as a necessary component of life by the conservatives, for Islamists, it is the upper structure to which every component of life must be adapted.

Within this framework and under the guide of the research question, the findings that are tried to be reached are as follows: Firstly, Kısakürek was a modernist

Islamist who sought a transformation in both state and society structure which could keep up with the patterns of modernity while protecting cultural and moral values. Secondly, the *Büyük Doğu* system of thought, which he has built to provide this transformation, is an ideology with low self-realization capacity due to its logical paradoxes. Thirdly, Kısakürek conducted his political activities within constitutional limits. Nevertheless, he lost faith that he can achieve the goals he desired in the current functioning of the political system due to the difficulties he faced during his political life. Therefore, he built up a political strategy aimed at taking over the control of the governance mechanism of the state in an indirect way by means of staffing in state institutions. Fourthly, Kısakürek was a pragmatist intellectual and politician who could change his discourses and actions according to the conditions of the time, although he portrayed himself as an intellectual who has transcendent ideals.

In order to understand the contribution of this work to the existing literature, it is necessary to look at the studies about Kısakürek. Not surprisingly, there was a huge number of studies conducted about Kısakürek after 2002 since he had been presented as an ideologue of the ruling JDP. His life and his thoughts have been examined in political, literary, theological aspects. Many symposiums about him were organised and his influence on the Turkish political and intellectual life was discussed in detail. In addition to these, he has been a name that many researchers working on the Turkish political thoughts, Turkish intellectuals, and Islamism took into consideration in their works and interpreted in terms of their own observations. A new study, which will be conducted on a person about whom so much work has been done, is confronted with the danger of becoming a compilation of existing works, and it brings about the question as to the kind of a contribution this study can make to the existing literature. First of all, some of these studies examined Kısakürek through one

dimension. For instance, Ramazan Şanlı ve Nesibe Esen examined him from a theological perspective while İlyas Ersoy examined him from a philosophical perspective (Şanlı, 2011; Esen, 2009; Ersoy İ. , 2007). As mentioned above, this study aims at analysing Kısakürek from a multi-dimensional perspective through a biographical study model. Some other part of the studies took into consideration only a certain aspect of his life although they attempted to reveal a holistic Kısakürek portrait. For instance, in his study about the analysis of Kısakürek's ideational world, Burak Sönmezer mainly focused on his life until 1950 (Sönmezer, 2014). By doing so, these studies fall into a trap that Evans criticises. However, in 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1970s, we encounter different portraits of Kısakürek. The general characteristics of the well-known biographical studies about him which were done by names such as Mustafa Miyasoğlu, Karatekeli, A. Haydar Haksal and Orhan Okay are that they are carried out without an analytical analysis or a critical eye. The subjective positions of the authors were highly reflected in the works (Karatekeli, 2013; Haksal, 2016; Okay, 2009; Miyasoğlu, 2009).

One of the most important shortcomings in the current literature is that the *Büyük Doğu* magazine is analysed by its periods which are restricted with a certain date range, and these periods are limited to the period between 1943 and 1960 in almost all studies. For instance, Ziya Kılıç took into consideration only the years between 1943 and 1951. Similarly, Nazan Üstün took into consideration only the years between 1943 and 1959 (Kılıç, 2006; Üstün, 2011). The only exception to be considered in this regard is the study by Suat Ak, but it is a hagiography genre (Ak, 2016). Drawing attention to this shortcoming in the current literature, Kara emphasised that the examination of the Great East within periods and revealing the differences between them are essential (Kara, 2015, pp. 263-264). In this study, each

period of *Büyük Doğu* Magazine was analysed separately in terms of the political conjuncture of their period and the personal effect of Kısakürek. By this analysis, it is tried to be revealed that each period of the journal had a specific aim, such as supporting a political party or a politician, rather than being solely a mean for expressing the ideas of Kısakürek. Observing the changing among the periods presents highly significant information for understanding the historical evolvement of Islamism in Turkey.

This study is designed in six chapters. In the first five chapters, Kısakürek's life is explored by dividing into certain time periods that were determined by considering the turning points both in his life and in the Turkish politics. In Chapter Six, the *Büyük Doğu* ideology is examined. Since a very long time period is examined and each of the periods has a different dynamics an introduction part was put to each chapter in order to provide a necessary background about the dynamics of that period. Similarly, each section is added with a conclusion section, and the findings obtained during the period examined were indicated. In the first chapter, Kısakürek's life, from the birth to the year 1943, when he began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* magazine, is handled in order to provide both a general background about him and to examine the factors that had a significant impact on the development of his ideational world. In that regard, his family, the social structure in which he grew up, his education and basic turning points are all analysed. In addition, his early writings are also followed in order to observe the evolution of his thoughts.

The second chapter covers Kısakürek's life between 1943 and 1950. The reason for the preference of this time period is that it has a separate political conjuncture because it is a period of transition from a single-party to multi-party system. Besides this, it is also the period when both Islamism and Kısakürek first

manifested itself in Turkish politics. This chapter is handled from the perspective that how an intellectual, who opposed the regime's secular nature, expressed his objection, the kind of reflexes he built, and the kind of response he received in the face of the state's protective reflexes of this nature of the regime.

The third chapter covers Kısakürek's life between 1950 and 1960. The main characteristic of this period is taking over the power, which was being carried out by the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-RPP*) for twenty-seven years by the Democrat Party of which founders were also RPP members. This political change led to a softening in the state apparatus's rigid reflexes on the subject of secularity, as well as in many respects. This is why many researchers associate the revival of Islamism in the Republican era with this period. In this chapter, by analysing how Kısakürek is influenced by this relative softening and liberation environment, we tried to reveal that this softening trend is limited and does not allow a change in the meaning desired by Kısakürek, which, in turn, forced Kısakürek to change his political strategy.

The fourth chapter covers Kısakürek's life between 1960 and 1970. The reason for the preference of this time period is that Turkey's democratic political process was interrupted by the military coup of 27 May 1960 and the political regime underwent a radical change with the new constitution, which was made after the coup. In this chapter, it is tried to be observed the changes and continuities in Kısakürek's political orientations and discourses.

The fifth chapter covers Kısakürek's life between 1970 and 1983. This time period also has distinctive features in terms of Turkish political history. One of the

most important issues of this period is the being set up of Turkey's first Islamic party⁶ which has managed to build a deep-rooted political tradition, unlike the small Islamic parties established in the past. Besides, the political turmoil that had started in the late 1960s was quite high during this period and was one of the main factors shaping Turkish political life. During this period, the Army intervened twice in the political process, one on 12 March 1971 and the other on 12 September 1980. In this chapter, Kısakürek's political life is examined in terms of the relationship between him with the National Salvation Party, the initiatives he made against the political turmoil in the country and his attitude towards military interventions.

In the sixth chapter, Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* formulation is analysed. Conducting this analysis to the last chapter led to some benefits and drawbacks. The drawback is that Kısakürek's intellectual life is obliged to be followed without understanding the formulation he built. In order to partially address this deficiency, a general image of the *Büyük Doğu* was given throughout the study. The benefit is that this analysis could be done by taking into consideration the alterations in Kısakürek's thoughts, actions and discourses during his life. The analysis of the *Büyük Doğu* was done by evaluating it as a Non-Western modernisation project. In that regard, we benefited from Nilüfer Göle and Eisdendath's conceptualisations of non-Western modernity and multiple modernities. In the end of the analysis, it is tried to be revealed that Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology of which capacity of realizing itself is quite low since it does not evaluate the realities of the time with an objective eye.

⁶ National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-NOP), later National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-NSP)

1. EARLY LIFE, EDUCATION, EARLY WRITINGS AND EVOLUTION OF HIS ISLAMIST IDENTITY (1904-1943)

1.1. Introduction

Every individual carries the traces of their past, background, and education. Although people's thoughts, characters, worldviews have undergone a change, an evolution, throughout their life like their bodies, these traces are eager to show themselves at every opportunity. For that reason, for a better understanding of an individual, a researcher has to follow these traces. If the subject is an intellectual like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek whose life story has been subjected to several discussions by both his advocators and his opponents, and whose life story has become a criterion for the credibility of his thoughts, it becomes more necessary to follow these traces.

In this chapter, Kısakürek's life, from birth to 1943, when he began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* magazine will be handled. In this context, firstly, his family and the early environment in which he grew up will be examined. The issue of cultural alienation brought about by the westernisation process both in the Ottoman and the Republican era constitutes a prominent place in his discourses. For that reason, to see how Kısakürek experienced cultural alienation, his early life will be handled in the context of the social transformation brought about by the modernisation efforts in the Ottoman Empire.

Subsequently, his education life, and philosophical and political currents of thoughts which had a significant effect on development of his thoughts will be analyzed. In this regard, firstly, Bergson's spiritualist philosophy, from which he benefited in his discourses about the West and morality issues, and the Anatolianism current, from which he benefited in constructing his nationalism understanding, will

be examined. Later on, the *Naqshbandism*, in which he formed his Islamist identity under the mastership of a *Naqshbandi sheikh*, will be examined and the general frame of his understanding of Islam will be drawn in that regard. After the examination of the building stones of his ideational world, his early writings in the newspapers of *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (National Sovereignty), *Haber* (News) and *Son Posta* (Last Post), and the *Ağaç* (Tree) journal he published in 1936 will be examined in order to observe the evolution in his thoughts.

One of the basic propositions of this thesis is that Kısakürek had a quite western mindset besides his Islamic identity, and his thoughts and discourses were syncretic products of the mixture of these two mindsets. In this regard, in this chapter, it will be illustrated that thanks to both his education and his curiosity of literature he became an intellectual quite familiar with the Western thought.

1.2 Childhood Years and Early Environment

Ahmet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek⁷ was born on 09 June 1904 in the Çemberlitaş District of Istanbul.⁸ He was the first child of Abdalbaki Fazıl Efendi (1889-1920), a law student, and Mediha Hanım (1892-1977), daughter of a poor family who migrated from Crete. Their second child Selma died when she was five years old. The ancestors of Kısakürek connected to the Kısakürek family, a branch of Dulkadiroğullari in Maraş, a city in middle Anatolia (Kısakürek, 2012i, 37-39; Karatekeli, 2013, pp. 15-16).

⁷ Necip Fazıl got the surname ‘Kısakürek’ after the Surname Law and did not use the name ‘Ahmet’ during most of his life.

⁸ The date of his birth has been a matter of discussion that it is possible to see different dates changing between 1903-1907 in research studies conducted about him. Kısakürek indicated his birthday as 26 May 1904 according to the Julian Calendar in his biographical books. Birinci points out to the miscalculation at converting the date into the Gregorian Calendar and indicate the real date as 09 June 1904. See (Birinci, 2015, p. 38)

Kısakürek spent almost all his life in Istanbul. It was a city that had been home to Greek, Roman and Ottoman civilisations during its thousands years of historical adventure (Dönmez, 2017, 93).⁹ After the conquest in 1453 by Mehmet II (reigning 1444-1446, 1451-1481), the city served as the capital of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the city became the centre of all social, political, and economic transformations in the empire. Although Ankara was declared as the new capital by the foundation of the modern Turkey, the city has continued to maintain its importance in economic, social, and intellectual aspects. Accordingly, Kısakürek's life was also shaped in an environment that was directly affected by the political, economic, and social change that the state had undergone. Moreover, the transformation he witnessed was the fundamental issue that he built his discourse upon. Therefore, it will be a sensible approach to examine the environment where he grew in accordance with the transformation that both the empire and modern Turkey had undergone.

After the conquest, the city was redesigned according to an Islamic city model. The working of the social life was also carried out mainly within the frame of religious principles. As İnalçık described, besides constructing majestic mosques, one of the main characteristics of this model was designing of settlement areas in quarter scaled provinces where both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects lived in physically and socially separated areas. In parallel, Islamic principles had an important place in shaping of the traditional life (İnalçık, 2010-2011, s. 5-6). From the beginning of the 18th century, the social, economic, and political structure of the empire, and so of the city, began to change gradually due to the reform movemenst conducted in many fields from the state structure to the societal life. The need for reform emerged as a

⁹ As the archaeological finds obtained in 2008 reveal, the settlement in Istanbul extends to the Neolithic Age.

result of the military defeats in the face of the Russia and Western powers, and shaped on the basis of a winner-defeated psychology. The statesmen tried to render the institutions of the state, especially the army, to a condition able to compete with those of the superior powers of the time. Therefore, the main characteristic of this reform movement, which gained momentum especially in the period of *Tanzimat*, was being Western oriented.

The modernisation adventure of the Empire proceeded within a reactionary chain triggering each other. The institutions that were desired to be modernised needed people with equipment that could carry out this modernisation process (Lewis, 1968). Modern schools, which were opened for this purpose, led to the birth of a new intellectual class who were more familiar with Western civilisation, and, more precisely, led to the birth of the Herodians.¹⁰ Kısakürek would also be educated in these modern schools. This intellectual class had important contributions in the way of the spreading of this modernisation process, which began in the institutional field, to political, economic and social spheres (Berkes, 2002).

The time period when Kısakürek's early years passed was the final phase of this modernisation process that had been carried out for centuries. By the re-enactment of the constitution of 1876 on 23 July 1908, the state entered the Second Constitutional era. Besides, this period was also the final years of the Empire that passed with political turmoil and big wars. Nonetheless, since his age was young and, as will be seen later, he lived a sheltered life in these years, it is not so possible to say that Kısakürek was affected much by the political developments of the period. What

¹⁰ Herodian is a concept that was used by Toynbee for describing the different attitudes showed in the Muslim world towards modernisation. Herodian characterizes a mindset which is familiar with the western civilisation and which benefits from it. Hence, it has a civilisational connection with the west. For detailed information, see Chapter Six.

left permanent traces on him was rather the social transformation that came along with the modernisation process. For this reason, it is necessary to look at what changes were experienced in the functioning of social life and how these changes were reflected on Kısakürek's life.

When reaching the threshold of the World War I, the city, with a population of about one million, of which one hundred and thirty thousand were non-Muslims, became a metropolis capable of sustaining its economic existence without the support of the Empire and attracting foreign capital (Keyder, 2013, pp. 10-11). In parallel with the economic developments brought with regulations over property rights and emergence of educated employees made the middle and upper class (*havas*) became more pronounced. While a great majority of the society kept their traditional life styles, especially the lower class (*avam*); the upper class of the late 19th century, mostly consisted of high ranked officers and bureaucrats, gradually changed its life manner of tenure in accordance with European style (Kuban, 1996).

This European life style appetite manifested itself, in a sense, firstly in consumption habits. The aesthetic objects brought from Europe began to take place in the houses as images determining the status of the upper class. For instance, having a piano, regardless of being played, was a symbol of superiority and difference against the lower class (Işın, 1995, p. 98). This model of transformation on the axis of objectivity was also observed in the praxis of clothing. Stambouline jackets and *fes* (*fez*) replaced the *caftan* and *imamah* of the Ottoman classical age (Mardin, 1996, p. 9). Besides, the modern women's image presented by fashion magazines brought from Europe, adopted by the women of upper class through synthesising with the traditional way of life. The Pera (*Beyoğlu*), mostly consisting of non-Muslim citizens

and the symbol place of a European life style, became a procurement centre for the imported products needed for a westernised way of life (Kazgan, 2004, pp. 766,767).

These preferences, directed to life style, were also reflected in entertainment culture. European style cafés and breweries of the Pera became new places for entertainment. The fun of women and men together as a phenomenon, which was not widespread in Istanbul's traditionalist districts, began to be seen in the Bosphorus with the influence of the garden parties and ballets organised by foreign embassies (Işın, 1995, p. 96; Aydoğan, 2009, p. 210). Also, Western theatres, concerts and cinema began to be widespread activities of entertainment life that appeal to wider masses (Mülayim, 2004, pp. 92-93). The cinema became one of the crowded places of entertainment for Muslims in particular months of Ramadan (Kaya, 2009, p. 211). This new culture of life was quite unfamiliar in terms of the traditional way of life.

On societal basis, this transformation in life manner of tenures which dominantly shaped on the axis of subjectivity, led the emergence of a westernisation portray which Mardin identified as 'extreme westernisation'. This state of extreme westernisation was a situation in which the 'big' traditions and 'small' ones could not be integrated in terms of culture (Mardin, 1991b, pp. 23-30). As a consequence of this situation, the conservative reactions brought about by cultural alienation, westernisation faddishness, and, by Göle's description, 'hybrid patterns' have emerged as the figures of this portrait (Göle, 2000a). This portrait of extreme westernisation has been subjected to many novels such as Rezaizade Ekrem's *Araba Sevdası*, and Ahmet Midhat Efendi's *Felâhâtı Bey and Rakım Efendi*. Since the overhaul modernisation process of Kemalist elites this portrait has maintained its existence also in Republican era, and continued to be a tempting subject for novels such as Peyami

Safa's *Fatih Harbiye*. Kısakürek also narrated his life in his memoirs within the frame of the *Mise-en-scène* in those novels.

Kısakürek spent his childhood in the mansion of his grandfather Mehmet Hilmi Efendi (1841-1916), a high-ranking government official from the upper class. Hilmi Efendi was a well-educated and wealthy man who retired from the position of the chief of the court of appeals. During his tenure, he took over the judgment of some important trials such as the assassination attempt of Sultan Abdülhamit in 1905. Due to his success in his office he was given many professional awards, including the *Légion d'Honneur* Medal awarded by the France government (Mert, 2009). Thanks to the wealthiness of his grandfather, Kısakürek started his life with a luxury lifestyle in this mansion, a symbol of the upper class life model of the period. The mansion, in which servants and a French governess accompanied the residents, was designed by his grandmother, who was a woman eager to have a western life style, with objects symbolising the upper class ways of life compatible with a westernisation-centred understanding of the period. As far as it is understood from Kısakürek's presentment in his memoirs, it was possible to find the inspirations of an aristocratic life model in the mansion (Kısakürek, 2013n, 9-18).¹¹

Again, according to the presentment of Kısakürek in his memoirs, the life in this mansion was an example of 'hybrid patterns', which was seen in the society of that era. It was possible to find an example of two opposite life styles under the same roof; traditionalist and westernised lifestyles. The traditionalist life style was being represented by the good characters of his life story, his grandfather Mehmet Hilmi Efendi and his mother Mediha Hanım. His grandfather was particularly the person he

¹¹ For an example of the mansion life in late Ottoman period and of a type of intellectual grew in this mansion life, we can refer to the biography of Fatma Aliye (Topuz), one of the early representatives of modern women intellectuals.

chose as his role model. On the other hand, the westernised life style was being represented by his grandmother Zafer Hanım and his father Abdülbaki Fazıl Efendi who were the bad characters of his life story. Kısakürek described his father in a manner of ‘*Bihruz Bey*’ character of Rezaizade Ekrem, as spoiled, spendthrift, and irresponsible man that had almost no positive impact on him (Kısakürek, 2012i, pp. 46-47). He also described his grandmother as a woman stereotype of extreme westernisation, like the ‘*Mihriban*’ character of Ahmet Mithat Efendi. Looking at the words by which he portrayed his grandmother is also illustrative in terms of understanding his look to the life style in the mansion:

“Even at that age when the women's hair goes down to the heels, short hair headed, like the ones in today, and always sultanic mannered my granny, with her proverbial diamonds, banquet, harmonious pianos and basket-basket novels translated from most Western languages was one of the most typical examples of exasperated Istanbul lady who transferred from the time of Abdülhamid II to the Constitutional period, East and West slurry, Tanzimat surplus, moved from her center and could not be settle to her new center” (Kısakürek, 2013b, 13).¹²

Kısakürek was a boy whose every wish were realised by his grandfather since he was the only male grandchild. Despite being in such a privileged position, the loneliness that her mother lived in the mansion would leave deep traces in his

¹² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Kadınların saçlarının topuklara kadar indiği o devirde bile, bugünün kesik saçlarına eş; kırpık saçlı başı ve daima sultani edası ile cici annem, bütün İstanbul’da dillere destan elmasları, ziyafetleri, armonikli piyanosu ve çoğu garp dillerinden tercüme sepet sepet romanları ve karmaşık bir dekor içinde, Abdülhamit devrinden Meşrutiyet sonrasına aktarılan, Şark ve Garp bulmacı, Tanzimat artığı, mihrakından oynatılmış ve yeni mihraka oturtulamamış hafakanlı İstanbul hanımefendisinin en tipik örneğidir.

psychological world. In contrast to her husband, Mediha Hanım was a withdrawn, quiet, and devout woman. She came from the lower class and was the ignored member of the mansion. After the death of Kısakürek's sister, Selma, she was dragged into a deep psychological breakdown and had tuberculosis. Her marriage was also very turbulent and ended with divorce, which left her without a source of income, and thus she was obliged to take refuge to her brothers for many years after her divorce.

1.3 Education Life

Due to apathy of his father, Mehmet Hilmi Efendi took over the responsibility of Kısakürek and took care of him personally. He was a modern minded person and paid a special effort to ensure that he had a good and modern education. Hilmi Efendi hired a French governess in the mansion to take care of him and his father. Also, he personally taught Kısakürek how to read and write, and at the age of five or six, he could read daily newspapers (Miyasoğlu, 2009, p. 259). He wanted Kısakürek to be educated in Western-style schools, therefore, after having a short period in a traditional school (*mahalle mektebi*), in which he got a religious oriented education from a turbaned *hodca*, he enrolled him in French and American colleges. But, unable to adapt to these schools, Kısakürek, went on his education in public schools, *Rehber-i İttihad* (Guide for Union), and *Büyük Reşid Paşa* (Great Reşid Pasha).

Kısakürek enrolled in the *Bahriye Mektebi* (Naval School) in 1916, which was one of the educational institutions such as *Muhendishane* (Engineering School), *Tıbbiye* (Medical School) and *Harbiye* (Military Academy) which were founded to provide the educated personnel needed to be employed in the state offices and army that were being modernised (Sakaoğlu, 2003). In parallel with the establishment purpose, the education given in this school was natural sciences oriented, and the

religious lectures was far less than the other lectures in the curriculum (Demir & Şanal, 2012, s. 180-187). As Berkes stated, the first reflections of western thought of the enlightenment were seen in these schools (Berkes, 2002, p. 185).

Some important figures of the period such as Yahya Kemal Beyatlı¹³, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki¹⁴, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver¹⁵ worked as teachers in this school. Although he was to establish a close friendship with Yahya Kemal and Ahmet Hamdi Akseki in a further phase of his life, it is hard to say that he influenced from these names intellectually. In his memoirs, the most influential name among his teachers was İbrahim Aşki. His first acquaintance with *Sufism* was thanks to this name, albeit very superficial (Kısakürek, 2013n, pp. 40-42).

In his memoirs, Kısakürek gave a special importance to this school that he described as the first stage of his intellectual thoughts. He began to write poetry at this school and published a manuscript magazine called *Nihal*. He stated that he spent this period, which he described as “the most beautiful four years of my life”, in an intensive reading program that included important works of Western literature (Kısakürek, 2013n, pp. 44-47). Nevertheless, he criticised the education given in this school because of the worldview that was desired to be adopted by the students. To him, the aim of school administration was to grow officers with advanced vocational ability and elegance behaviour for the French Navy, which was to be given to the Ottoman Empire after the victory of the Germans in World War I. As mentioned in

¹³ Yahya Kemal Beyatlı was a famous poet, writer, politician, both in the Ottoman and in the Republican periods. He became deputy in the National Assembly for several times and employed in diplomatic missions as ambassador.

¹⁴ Ahmet Hamdi Akseki was a famous scholar of religion and served as the head of Religious Affairs in the Democrat Party period.

¹⁵ Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver was a famous writer and politician. He was the chief of Türk Ocakları, which were the centre of the nationalist current. He became deputy in the National Assembly several times during both the single part period and Democrat Party period and served as the Ministry of Education.

his memoirs, the headmaster of the school told the students the goal of school with those words: “you will be the first specimen of a whole new generation who equipped of in every respect and would kiss hands of the princess” (Kısakürek, 2012i, p. 141).¹⁶

In that extent, according to his statements, the students were being trained under military discipline in many fields from table manners to dance classes within the mastership of trainers brought from abroad. Besides, despite all poorness of the war years, the students were being trained under special care. In his words, the students “were able to eat a variety of meals accompanied by music while people were eating bread made by chaff instead of wheat” (ibid, 140). Also, some intellectual events such as foreign film screenings and concerts of foreign musicians were organised to make the students familiar with the western culture.

According to Kısakürek, the idea of westernisation was adopted quite hyperbolically by the school administration; such that, whatever the negative in life, in their eyes, belonged to the East while the West had the all positives. As for Islam, remained only as few rituals like prayers during meals and Friday prayers. He expressed his evaluation about this mind set dominant in the school with these words:

“I could not analyze the funny and dramatic factors in this extinction movement because I was 12-16 years old, but I could feel... According to this movement; true, good, new, and whatever beautiful was in the West; wrong, bad, outdated and ugly was in the East... According to this triangulation base; marshes in each field and a state and nation fluttering in these marshes.... As a result of could not be enlightened from its roots due to being deprived of the

¹⁶ This is the author’s summarised translation. The original text is: İleride kraliçe ve prenseslerin ellerini öpecek, her bakımdan teçizatlı, yepyeni bir nesil... İlk numunesi siz olacaksınız.

roots and molding on dried leaves, this picture was showing itself in a small mirror as the image of the Navy School... Islam, which was a burden that was not possible to be kicked out since its roots reached till bonds, was treated as a stranger whose visit took long time..." (ibid, 142-143).¹⁷

Despite this evaluation, he made by a retrospective eye, the education he got there under a military discipline might have a strengthening effect on his aristocratic and elitist life style and world view, which had begun to be shaped in his grandfather's mansion. As can be observed both from Kısakürek's memoirs, and also from the memoirs of the people around him, Kısakürek was known with his elitist, aristocratic, prescriptive character. The aristocratic and elitist manner of Kısakürek also reflected his ideational world with a Platonian idealism. The '*Başyücelik*' state order that he presented as a state and society project has been shaped by this character of him beside Islamic references, even more than Islamic references.

Another aspect of these years was the development of his literary and intellectual world. According to his statements, reading had become a way of therapy for him since the reading homework given by his grandmother tranquilised him. The tragedies he experienced in those years like the death of his grandfather and his sister, the divorce of his parents, and his mother's on-going disease led him to think about

¹⁷ This is the author's summarised translation. The original text is: Mustafa Reşit Paşa'dan başlayarak Ali, Fuad, Midhat Paşalar koluyla gelen ve bu gelişteki sahteliği sezmiş tek padişah Abdülhamid'e karşı İttihat ve Terakki paşaları elinde inkıraz şartlarını tamamlayan Yahudi imzalı inkılap hareketi, o zamanın Bahriye Mektebinde, son derece net bir röntgen...Ve ben, 12-16 yaşım arası, bu geliş ve gidişteki (komik) ve (dramatik) unsurları, henüz köklü bir tahlil ve terkibe vardırılmaksızın hissetmekteyim... (ideoloji) ve saf fikir adına, niyet kuşlarının çektiği puslacıklar çapında ve hepsi muhasebesiz ve muhakemesiz, sığ ve sefil tekerlemeler... Hülasa... Doğru, iyi, yeni ve güzel, ne varsa Batıda; yanlış, kötü, köhne ve çirkin ne varsa Doğuda...Bu ana mizan üstüne ve nirengi noktasına göre, her sahada bataklık ve bu bataklıklarda çırpınan bir millet ve devlet... Köke inememenin ve kurumuş yapraklar üzerinde kalıp, kök feyzinden yoksun kalmanın neticesi bu hayret tablosu da, küçük bir el aynasından küçük bir akis halinde, kendisini o zamanki Bahriye mektebinde göstermekte...Bağları kemiklere kadar geçmiş olduğu için atılması zor bir yük olan İslam, bu vasatta misafirliği uzun sürmüş bir yabancı muamelesine uğratılmakta, henüz resmen kovulmamış olsa da bodrum veya tavan arasında muhafaza edilmekte...

metaphysical issues such as the purpose of life and existence in melancholy along with engrossing himself in reading. Kısakürek tried to suppress his loneliness with the fantasy world that he created in his mind by the novels he read. Here, it also should be addressed that many of the books he was interested in were the works of western literary (Kısakürek, 2013n, pp. 43-45).

In the last season of the school, the time of education of the school was extended for one more year. Kısakürek left from the school without accomplishing the last year with a certificate of education. After graduating from the naval school, the World War I ended and Kısakürek met with an occupied city. War ships of the occupation forces docked to the Bosphorus and soldiers of victorious countries were walking around the streets of the city. Besides, wealthy and rich days were left behind. His mother began to live with her brother and her mother in Kasımpaşa. His uncle was working as a labourer in a shipyard belonging to the British and had a limited budget. Subsistence became very difficult due to increased inflation in the country and his uncle forced him to get a job that could make money instead of roaming with literature dreams (Kısakürek, 2012i, pp. 47-50). The child in the mansion whose every wish was done, now, had to face up to reality. Kısakürek was planning to enrol in *Darülfünun* (Istanbul University) with the dreams of being a poet.

In 1921, he enrolled in the school of philosophy in *Darülfünun*. Thanks to the philosophy education he received he had an opportunity to recognise the Western thought. Besides this, his curiosity to literature soon led him to meet with the Turkish literature circles. Those years were also the period when his passion of getting a literary reputation increased. He had confidence for his poetry and was ready to take courageous steps. One day, he applied to Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu who was one of the leading figures of Turkish literature to show his talent. He was at the head of

the magazine of '*Yeni Mecmua*' in which the works of important intellectuals were published. His poetry gained the appreciation of the important names of Turkish literature such as Ahmet Haşim and began to be published in the magazine (Kısakürek, 2013n, pp. 55-57). It was his entrance to the literature and art circles of the Republican era, which would shape almost all his life.

The *darülfünun* years were also a period that he got acquainted with some current of thoughts, which would constitute the building blocks of his thoughts and discourses. The first of these was Bergson's spiritualist philosophy, which he met by means of his teacher in the university, Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1886-1958). He was one of the prominent names of the '*Dergah*' magazine, which was published in 1921 by intellectuals such as Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Ahmet Haşim and Mehmet Emin Erişirgil whose main concerns were supporting the National Struggle and contravening to the Gökalp's positivist sociology approach (Ülken, 1979, p. 369). The magazine, which gave priority to the national values and the human spirit, laid the ground for the birth of a new mystic tendency in Turkish literature (Uçman, 1983, p. 82). Tunç was the most important contributor to the recognition of Bergson's spiritualist philosophy that provided the formation of this mystic tendency, in Turkey (Ülken, 1979, p. 370). Kısakürek established a close relationship with Mustafa Şekip that would continue for long years starting from the years of Darülfünun, thus, he was introduced with the Bergson's spiritualist philosophy whose influence was quite explicit on his thoughts and discourses (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 20).¹⁸

¹⁸ Kısakürek stated his interest in Bergson's spiritualism in various occasions. See (Kısakürek, Freud'un Ölümü, 2010, p. 118).

In his prologue article he wrote in translation of Bergson's book 'L'évolution créatrice' (Creative Evolution), Tunç introduced him as a philosopher who was opposed to the positivist, rationalist thinking of the time (Bergson, 1986, pp. II-IX). With this nature of his thoughts, Bergson became a mainstay for Kısakürek's claim that an alternative model of modernisation which does not ignore the existence of the divinely will behind all this worldly issues. Also, Bergson's view of religion as an instrument that “successfully filling the gap, already narrowed by our habitual way of looking at things, between a command of society and a law of nature”, was a resemblance of Kısakürek's understands of morality (Bergson, 2002, p. 13). Bergson was a thinker who was also considered by Nurettin Topçu, a contemporary Islamist of Kısakürek (Topçu, 1998). For Kısakürek, the metaphysic dimension of Bergson's philosophy became the counterpart of the understanding of '*haqiqa*' (the truth) in *Sufism*. For Bergson, only the knowledge of material things are accessible for the reason/intelligence, and the intuition is another ability to access knowledge that completes our knowledge about the life (Bergson, 1986, pp. 214-218). Kısakürek's quest for 'knowing beyond the material' was a resemblance of this view of Bergson about the knowing. We can see the impact of Bergson in Kısakürek's discourses with terms like 'the dominance of reason over the things and incidents' (aklın eşya ve hadiselere tahakkümü), 'life push' (hayat hamlesi) which remind of the conceptualisations of Bergson like *Élan vital* he used in his book 'Creative Evolution'. In his eyes, Bergson was the greatest philosopher of the 20th century (Kısakürek, 2011b, pp. 43-86). Besides this, it seems that he also inspired from Bergson's critics of the intellectuals like Leibniz, Spinoza, Descartes while conceptualising his portray of the West which will be discussed in Chapter Six.

The other current of thought that Kısakürek met was Anatolianism. The prominent pioneers of this current were Hilmi Ziya (Ülken), Mükrimin Halil (Yınanç), Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), Ziyaeddin Fahri (Fındıkoğlu), and Remzi Oğuz (Arık). According to Ülken, who was the initiator of this current which he called as '*memleketçilik*' (homelandism), the basis of this movement was laid under the name of small Turkism or Turkism in response to the policies of Ottomanism, Turanism and Islamism in 1917. In 1918, he published a manuscript journal, '*Anadolu*' (Anatolia), as twelve issues together with Reşat Kayı. In the Republican period, he initiated the foundation of the '*Anadolu Mecmuası*' (Journal of Anatolia) in which the thought of Anatolianism was handled more systematically (Ülken, 1979, pp. 470-479). Kısakürek's getting acquainted with the Anatolianism current was realized by means of the circle gathered around this journal. In his last season of Darülfünun, he established a friendship with some pioneers of this current such as Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Mükrimin Halil Yınanç, and Halit Bayri. Also, some poetries of him were published in this journal (Kısakürek, 2012i, p. 192).

Although the journal published only twelve issues between the years of 1924 and 1925, Anatolianism had a significant impact on Turkish thought life. Since there were intellectuals with different tendencies in the movement, the Anatolianism was divided into different branches in the course of time. The first of these was cultural Anatolianism, which saw Anatolia as the source and destination of the culture that is to be born. The second one was ideological Anatolianism, which wanted to give a political and ideological form to the current (Ülken, 1979). Also, it would be possible to find secular and conservative interpretations of it. These interpretations of Anatolianism were represented in *Dönüm* (Inflection), *Hareket* (Movement), *Millet* (Nation) and *Dikmen* (Peak) journals (Atabay, 2008, p. 518).

Anatolianism was a nationalist current, which identified the Turkish nationalism within boundaries of Anatolia geography. The Anatolianists opposed the Pan-Turkist reading of Turkish history. According to Mükrimin Halil, it was unrealistic to expect the formation of a common historical fate, the most important element of the nation truth, in a large piece of land ranging from Siberia to Balkans (Halil, 1924). Ziyaeddin Fahri also made a similar emphasis. According to him, it was not possible for the pan-Turkist efforts to succeed to vaccinate a national consciousness to the societies of whom history and nation consciousness had not occurred yet. He was in thought that nationalist views of the Ziya Gökalp and Hamdullah Suphi were not compatible with reality (Fındıkoğlu, 1924). According to these intellectuals, the history of Turkish nation began with the entrance of the Turks into Anatolia in the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071, and the Turkish history should be accepted as a whole without a separation between the Ottoman Empire and the Seljuk State (Halil, 1924).

As he mentioned in his memoirs, Kısakürek was impressed from the discourses of those intellectuals (Kısakürek, 2012i, p. 192). Also, he would identify himself as an Anatolianist (*Anadolucu*) in further years, but it was the version of his interpretation of Anadolianism that he called as ‘true Anatolianism’ (Kısakürek, 2010d, p. 60). He criticised these intellectuals' thoughts by claiming they had a feeling of revenge. According to him, the Anatolianism that those intellectuals conceptualised was nothing but a product of a “sense of vengeance and could not pass beyond a border of sorrow”. They were envisaging Anatolia as a place where the nomadic Turks firstly experienced the settled life and firstly learned the cultivation. For this reason, it was the first step of the eternal state (*devlet-i ebed müddet*) ideal. But, it

was always convicted to be the ignored servant, the renunciant slave of the immortal state ideal (Kısakürek, 2012i, pp. 189-191).

Kısakürek attempted to interpret the concept of Anatolianism with a romanticised mystism understanding. According to him, Anatolia, before anything else, is the source of a great civilisation that raised important historical figures such as Hacı Bektaş, Hacı Bayram, Nasreddin Hoca, and Yunus Emre. It is the cradle of a spiritual ideal. Therefore, primarily, the cultural glory of this civilisation should be emphasised, and a sense of nationalism should be established and embraced within the framework of this spiritual ideal (ibid, p. 191). Nevertheless, the arguments that Kısakürek put forward in order to bring a different interpretation to the idea of Anatolianism were not so different. Accepting Anatolia as the centre of a great civilisation was also the basic issue of these intellectuals. Besides, his argument that Anatolian nationalism should be shaped with a spiritual ideal, finds its counterpart with the mysticism that Remzi Oğuz Arık attributed to the concept of homeland. The Antolianists' interpretations of the National Struggle as the victory of the quality (*keyfiyet*) against the quantity (*kemiyet*), of the creative push hidden in the spirit of the Anatolian man against the mechanism, are the same as Kısakürek's evaluation of the National Struggle (Arık, 1969).

Also, although he objected to Anatolia's being described as a neglected geography on the grounds that it feeds a feeling of revenge, actually, he himself also had a similar approach:

“And finally Anatolia...The unprecedented ordeal and torture land, which had lived as orphan, oppressed, devastated, and deprived for four centuries, after serving as a base to the greatest sense and material empire of the world

throughout the history, which has suffered the most pathetic of betrayals during a century, and which has witnessed to the domination of the soul brigand” (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 552).¹⁹

Moreover, he developed a diasporic nationalism discourse that his famous verse, “You are a wretch in your home, a pariah in your land!”, symbolises (Kısakürek, 2013e, p. 399).²⁰ This diasporic discourse presents the Anatolian people as an oppressed mass that has been removed from their culture and deprived of their right to speak. To keep alive this '*injured subject*' he created, he frequently brought the historical memoirs that document the pains they suffered into daylight (Açıkel, 1996, p. 167). Thus, he helped develop a revanchist memory among the Islamist and conservative circles. And, it is possible to say that this memory lives still this day and constitutes one of the basic arguments of political debates.

These arguments that Kısakürek put forward in order to bring a different approach to Anatolianism could not achieve this purpose. He benefited from Anatolianism in composing his nationalist thoughts, at least in terminological base. As will be discussed in chapter six, he also circumscribed his own nationalism interpretation with the Anatolia geography and criticised pan-Turkist thoughts as the Anatolianists did (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 10).

The main point that distinguishes Kısakürek's understanding of nationalism from the Anatolianist and pan-Turkist approaches was his emphasis on Islam. Mükrimin Halil argued that since the people of Anatolia were Muslims, the history of

¹⁹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Ve nihayet Anadolu... Tarih boyunca cihanın en büyük mana ve madde imparatorluğuna dayanak vazifesini gördükten sonra, dört asırdır öksüz, mazlum, harap ve mahrum yaşayan; bir asırdan beri de ihanetlerin en acıklısına uğrayan, derken geleneksel tahammül ve tekevvülün üstünde ruh eşkiyasının çatı kurduğuna şahit olan misilsiz çile ve işkence arsası..

²⁰ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Öz yurdunda garipsin, öz vatanında parya!

Anatolia was the history of Muslim Anatolia at the same time (Yinanç, 1969). However, being Muslim was not the necessary precondition for being a Turk. But, for Kısakürek, it was the precondition for being Turk because, according to his understanding, nationalism should serve for the benefit of Islam. In a dialogue he was to have with Nihal Atsız, one of the prominent pan-Turkist intellectual, he countered Atsız's assessment of Islam that "it is the religion of my nation, I respect" by asking "what if the religion of our nation was shamanism", and went on describing his understanding of nationalism that is in the service of Islam:

"According to Islam, such a compliment was worse than rejecting it totally. The value was being given to the nation and Islam was being subjected to it. However, we were seeking for an understanding of nationalism that appreciates the Turk since he is Muslim and evaluates him at the rate of his Muslimness and we were calling this understanding as 'Anatolianism' ... If the goal is Turkishness, it must be known that Turk is the Turk only after he became Muslim" (Kısakürek, 2013b, pp. 340,341; Kısakürek, 2013c, p. 73).²¹

Specifying Muslimism as the prerequisite for Turkishness is the dominant character of his understanding of nationalism, which he called 'true nationalism', but it is not limited only thereto. According to him, the Turk was composed of a single personality which knitted by the unity of particular faith, sacredness, thought, imagination, memory, temperament, manner and language; and the cover of this composition was Anatolia (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 400). In this comprehension of the

²¹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: İslâma böyle bir iltifat, onu topyekün reddetmekten beterdî. Kıymet, millete verilmiş ve İslâm tâbi mevkiine düşürülmüş oluyordu. Halbuki biz, Türk'ü Müslüman olduğu için sevecek, ve Müslümanlığı nispetinde değerlendirecek bir *Milliyetçilik* anlayışı peşindeydik ve bu anlayışa "Anadoluculuk" ismini veriyorduk... Eğer gaye Türklükse mutlaka bilmek gerekir ki, Türk Müslüman olduktan sonra Türktür.

Turk, common language, historical heritage, and culture come forth besides the Islamic faith as the dominant components of membership to the nation.

This nationalism interpretation has both inclusive and exclusive aspects. Having a heterodox Islam understanding, the Alevi remains out of the nation in this nationalist approach, although they have a significant rate in the population. To Kısakürek, Turkish Alevi should be sunnified by persuasion (Kısakürek, 2013f, p. 79). Moreover, apart from being ethnically rooted Turks, communities with belief systems outside of Islam remain out of this nation. On the other hand, it tries to include the people from different ethnic origins such as Kurds and Arabs to the nation under the identity of Islam. Nevertheless, Turkey was to experience that the Muslimness is not a sufficient source alone for solving identity problems. Another exclusive aspect of his nationalism understanding is being quite xenophobic. In his eyes, all non-Muslims, communists and apostasies were traitor and the dark agents of foreign powers. Therefore, they should be deported as soon as possible (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 334-335).

Kısakürek opposes also being adopted of nationalism as an ideology. With reference to Bergson's expression that nationalism is not a conscience but a mental state, he argued that nationalism is a psychology, not an ideology, because an ideology should have something to say for every nation and for all the humanity (Kısakürek, 2009a, pp. 98-99). In this regard, he criticized the Turkists for adopting nationalism as an ideology. According to him, the thing that the Turkists advocate is racism (*kavmiyetçilik* or *ırkçılık*) which is rejected in Islam and can not present answers for everyone. He argued his thoughts by saying that those who say I am Turk by leaving Islam, gives the right to Kurds to say I am Kurd (Kısakürek, 2009e, p. 17). To him, Turkish nation is a component of Islam nation and there is no superiority among

them. If it is necessary to make a classification, Arabs of the past are the superior (Kısakürek, 2010a, p. 241; 2013l, pp. 52-53). He criticized the Turkists also for replacing the love of race with the religious emotion (Kısakürek, 2013u, pp. 77-78). Kısakürek's ideological competition with the Turkists continued until the late 1970s.

Kısakürek's view of Turkish history was also different. He was opposed to both the Turkish history thesis revealed in the first years of the Republic and Pan-Turkist history readings. Although the Anatoliansits were also opposed to the Pan-Turkist readings of the Turkish history, Kısakürek's reading of the Turkish history was separated from them by starting the history of the Turks from the Ottoman Empire. According to him, the period of maturation and getting its real essence of Turkish culture was the Ottoman Empire. The previous periods of Turkish history were only small movements preparing the Ottoman period:

“Let's state that without giving any importance to the lummo and crude infusions of towheaded dreams belong to tale epoch of the history, we are nothing like space before the creation of the world but a helezonian stream, a fusion of a movement, perhaps headless and infinite but shapeless and unmeaning, that has not yet made its spirit its dome before the Ottoman Empire” (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 68).²²

Certainly, Kısakürek's understanding of nationalism would shape in the course of time and would be one of the basic instruments of his discourses. However, he portrayed an apolitical character in Darülfünun years (1921-1924). The years he spent in Darülfünun was a period including the end of a hundred years of the empire and the

²² This is the author's translation. The original text is: Tarihin masal devrine ait sırma saçlı hayallerin bön ve ham telkinlerine değer vermeksizin kaydedelimki, biz Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan evvel, dünyanın yaradılışından evvelki feza gibi, belki başsız ve sonsuz, fakat kalıpsız ve ifadesiz, hususiyle henüz ruhunu kubbeleştirmemiş mücerret bir hareket kaynaşmasından, helezonvari bir akıştan başka bir şey değiliz.

establishment of a new state in the wake of a National Struggle held in Anatolia. Many Darülfünun students participated in this political process by arranging pro-National Struggle rallies. Also, the faculty members who were speaking to the detriment of the National Struggle were boycotted (Arslan, 2004, p. 14). The most famous rally of these was held in the academic year 1921-1922 due to the lecturers of the Faculty of Literature, Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı), Ali Kemal, Hüseyin Daniş, Cenap Şehabettin and Muallim Barsamyan, known as ‘notorious fivefold’, against the National Struggle (Siler, 1995, p. 183). Although he was also a student in this faculty, Kısakürek did not participate in any of these rallies or boycotts. Rather, as he mentioned in his memoirs, he was interested in literature and was pursuing fads of adolescence (Kısakürek, 2012i, pp. 178-179).

Here, it is also necessary to emphasise that the circle which Kısakürek introduced in *darülfünun* by means of Tunç and Anatolianist was pioneers of a conservative tendency which provided a challenging ideological and political alternative to the dominant positivist and rationalist interpretations of Kemalism by incorporating their Bergsonian and romantic philosophical inspirations into their understanding of Turkish modernity (İrem, 2004, p. 81).

1.4 Bohemian Years and Literary Reputation

In 1924, Kısakürek succeeded in the exam opened by the state to select the students to be sent to Europe for education, and went to France to study philosophy at Sorbonne University. However, he was engrossed in gambling and began living a bohemian life there. He described the few months that he spent mostly in a nightclub where mostly the Turks living in Paris used to go, as follows: “All a season, I did not see the daylight in Paris. I did not know how to daytime was in Paris. I was lying

while the sun was setting, and at the beginning of the night I was leaping out of my bed with palpitations and was running to the club” (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 30).²³ Due to the lifestyle he lived and lack of school attendance, his allowance was cut off and he was obliged to return home without completing his education in 1925.

Necip Fazıl, in his memoirs, deplorably said that he hurled his *fez*, which was a symbol of being an Ottoman, into the waters from the ship while going to Paris (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 26). In his eyes, it was the excitement of meeting with a new civilisation he felt; or, maybe, it was the hope of putting an end to the unhappiness he had had in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the bohemian life style he experienced in Paris would complete his doubts about the fundamental values of the West in later phases of his life (Duran, 2001). Later, he evaluated the West he personally experienced from a retrospective look as follows: “Paris, with whole Western civilization he symbolizes, is such a miraculous of plastic, as the deceptive designs in front of the curtain, that attracts one’s eye, but what disguised behind the curtain is ruin and darkness; it is the civilization that was condemned to hit its head against one wall after another and to scud from one crisis after another” (Kısakürek, 2013n, p. 64; Mardin, 2007, s. 217).²⁴

After turning back to Istanbul, Kısakürek began to work in various banks, but his main propensity was to gain reputation in literature.²⁵ He stated why he chose the

²³ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Bütün bir mevsim, Paris’te gündüz ışığı görmedim. Paris’te gündüz nasıldır haberim olmadı. Gün doğarken yatıyor, gecenin başlangıcında da hafakanlarla yatağımdan fırlayıp klübe koşuyordum.

²⁴ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Paris, remzleştirdiği bütün Batı mâmurasiyle beraber, perdenin önünde aldatici nakışlar olarak öyle (plâstik) hârikası ki, sadece perde gerisindeki karanlık ve haraplıktan heber vermeye memur ve dertli başını taştan taşa vura vura, bunalımsan bunalıma kıyamete kadar köşe kapmaca oynamaya mecbur.

²⁵ The names of the banks he mentioned in his meoirs are Felemenk Bahr-i Sefit Bank (1925), Ottoman Bank (1926), and İş Bank (with intervals, between 1929-1928). Besides, there was another bank he did

banking profession as keeping his poetry from being a means of subsistence, to make it have a reputation (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 93). In 1925, his first book of poetry, '*Örümcek Ağı*' (Spider Web), was published and his literary reputation began to spread. In 1928, his second book of poetry, '*Kaldırımlar*' (Sidewalks), and in 1933, his third book of poetry, '*Ben ve Ötesi*' (Me and the Beyond), were published. His literary works were not only limited to poetry; he also penned many works in theatre, story and novel genres. As Mardin stated, the literature became an "instrument of change" in the hands of the Ottoman reformists beginning with the Tanzimat era (Mardin, 2007, s. 221). Kısakürek, following this intellectual path, was to use the literature, especially the poetry, for exposing his political thoughts. However, in these years when he had not got his Islamist identity yet, his works did not have a political or religious sense. Nevertheless, mysticism, mysticism, metaphysical quests, existential questioning were the basic elements of the poems of Kısakürek also in this period .

Kısakürek continued to live a bohemian life within a circle of friends consisting of leading writers and artists of the period. Instead of living with his mother, he preferred to live alone sometimes in a damp and dirty house, sometimes in a third class hotel room, and other times in his friend's home. He continued to play gambling, and, therefore, he suffered economic strains (Kısakürek, 2013b, pp. 75-92). He described these bohemian years, with a Dostoyevsky mood, on the axis of abandoning himself in something, regrets, and hurlings (Mardin, 2007, s. 217). Nevertheless, his experiences in that period also provided an intellectual stock for his works. He used his personal experiences in the way of exemplification the moral, spiritual, and intellectual crisis both the society and the Turkish intellectuals fall into

not mentioned in his memoirs, that is Ziraat Bank (1928). For detailed info about his banking experiences see (Birinci, 2015, pp. 48,49)

with the westernisation. Especially the damage that gambling addiction gave him was often depicted in his literary works (Kısakürek, 2012k; Kısakürek, 2013s).

Kısakürek, who was in an apolitical attitude in the 1920s, began to deal with political issues in the 1930 as an extension of his pragmatic preferences. In 1929, he passed the exam opened by the *İş* Bank and began to work as an accounting officer at the bank in Ankara. This bank was founded by the order of Atatürk as a state bank and was being managed by Kemalist circles, such as Celal Bayar. Now, he had a regular job and income. With the settlement in Ankara, his environment also started to change. The intellectual circle he shared his bohemian life with in Istanbul was now replaced by Ankara's Kemalist intellectual circles. As mentioned in the memoirs, he established very close friendships especially with Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Falih Rıfki Atay, and almost every day he would visit them in their homes (Kısakürek, 2013b, pp. 93-94).²⁶ He had close friendships also with important names of *Kadro* (Cadre) movement circle such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. Probably with the help of those names, he began to write articles in an RPP's semi-official newspaper *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (National Sovereignty) under the headings of 'zaviye' (angle) and 'fikir' (idea).

In an economic stagnation environment caused by the global economic crisis in 1929, developing a good relationship with the Kemalist intelligentsia, and taking advantage of a regular income under the guarantee of a state bank might be seen as a good opportunity for this 25-year-old young poet who was already suffering from economic troubles and was quite eager to gain literary reputation. Actually, it was a common attitude seen among the intellectuals of the Republican era. As Karpaz

²⁶ To emphasise his close relationship between those names, Kısakürek mentioned an anecdote passed between Falih Rıfki and his wife: One day, when I get home, I will see this young man dressed in my pajamas and slippers, saying 'would you make me a coffee?'

delineated, in the early periods of the republic, there was not a suitable condition for many of the intellectuals to have a self-sufficient economic life at all. Thus, most of the intellectuals found employment in state institutions. According to Karpat, the seeing of these intellectuals themselves as the agent of the state, and even identifying themselves with the state, caused not to develop independence and objective thoughts (Karpat, 2010, p. 217).

With the same impulse, Kısakürek wrote his early articles in politics in a way that would please the regime and those Kemalist circles. One of those articles was about the adoption of Latin alphabet. In May 1928, Western numerals replaced Arabic numerals. Following this reform, the parliament passed a law introducing the new Turkish alphabet in November 1928. As Ahmad stated clearly, one of the purposes of this revolutionary measure was to accelerate the process of literacy and education in new Turkey. Besides, he also drew attention to another dimension of the reform which has been subject to on-going fevered discussions among intellectuals till today that “it, more than virtually any other, loosened Turkey’s ties with the Islamic world to its east and irrevocably forced the country to face west” (Ahmad, 2003, pp. 81-82). As for Kısakürek, he showed an attitude in favour of Kemalism in these discussions. In his article titled ‘*I Harfi*’ (the letter I), in which he advocated the reform, he characterised the Arabic alphabet as a reflection of indolence, which came along with Eastern mysticism: “Arabic alphabet, the miserable of a great and diseased sensitivity, the representative of a confidential, shamefaced, and apprehensive disposition”. On the other hand, he described the Latin alphabet as a “Roman wrestler with a clear, loud voice, combative”; and, in his eyes, what was necessary for Turkey and for the whole world was that of Roman wrestler, the Latin alphabet: “While the Indian poor was immersed in the soul play of their own depths, it is the Roman wrestling that suits

the world and the working life” (Kısakürek, 1930a).²⁷ Furthermore, he stated that it was an aspiration of his adolescence years with a Bergsonist style as follows:

“When I imagined the billboards, which I could see with a pinched look while the ferry passing in front of the big buildings in the dock, with the alphabet of Western countries, I saw that the images in the harbors and the streets suddenly changing, that the trams, the automobiles moving with sharper movements, that the cranes, the motors working more enthusiastically, that the human flood in the streets leaking younger, hotter like the blood in veins, that the almost asleep city, woke up with a new life push” (Kısakürek, 1930a).²⁸

Kısakürek also presented a similar attitude against the reactionary movement occurred in Menemen, a town in Izmir, in 1930. The incident, known as Menemen Incident, had a traumatic effect on the regime, because it occurred not in a backward region of Anatolia but in one of its most advanced provinces (Ahmad, 2003, p. 60). Atatürk evaluated this incident in the commiseration letter he sent to the General Staff with those words: “In the face of the brutality of the reactionaries, the being in approbance of some people in Menemen by applauding is shameful for all republicans and patriots” (Ersel, Kuyaş, Oktay, & Tunçay, 2005, p. 150).²⁹ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, a close friend of Kısakürek, in his article in *Hakimiyeti Milliye* newspaper, evaluated the incident in these words:

²⁷ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Hint fakiri kendi içinin derinliklerindeki ruh oyununa dalmışken, dünyaya ve ameli hayata yakışan Roma pehlivanıdır.

²⁸ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Vapurum rıhtımdaki büyük binaların önünden geçerken gözlerimi süzerek gördüğüm levhaları garp memleketlerinin yazısile tasavvur eder ve o zaman liman ve caddelerdeki mananın birdenbire değiştiğini, tramvayların, otomobillerin daha keskin hareketlerle gidip geldiğini, vinçlerin, motörlerin daha heveskâr çalıştığını, sokaklardaki insan selinin damarlardaki kan gibi daha genç, daha sıcak aktığını, adeta uyuşuk şehrin yeni bir hayat hamlesiyle uyandığını görürdüm.

²⁹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Mürtecilerin gösterdiği vahşet karşısında Menemen’deki ahaldiden bazılarının alkışla tasvipkar bulunmaları bütün *Cumhuriyetçi* ve vatanperverler için utanılacak bir hadisedir.

“...Who were the passive, silent observers of this tragedy? Citizens of this secular, contemporary Republic of Turkey. That is the true calamity... It means the prevailing climate and environment, the moral climate, the moral environment was not that of the revolutionary, republican and patriotic Turkish youth; it was the climate and environment of Dervish Mehmed, a devotee of the Naqshibandi [Sufi] Order which we have described with such adjectives as ‘rebellious’ ‘brutal’, ‘thieving’ and ‘reactionary’. Had it not been so, this man could not have found twenty minutes to do his work... Shaykh Mehmed is just a symptom, a shadow” (Ahmad, 2003, p. 60; Kadri, 1930).³⁰

Yakup Kadri paid attention to anger and bewilderment aroused among Kemalist circles and emphasised the potential of reactionism. Two days after Yakup Kadri’s article was published, Kısakürek penned an article about the Menemen Incident in *Hakimiyeti Milliye* and described the reactionism as a “poison mixed to a glass of water at the head of our bed” (Kısakürek, 1931). On January 2 1931, a memorial ceremony was organised in the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) Conference Hall in Ankara and a speech was given in this conference by Kısakürek. The speeches were then published on 5 January in the *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (Kocahanoğlu, 2013). The theme and style that Kısakürek used in that speech was so similar with that of Yakup Kadri and it was reflecting the impact of the incident on the regime. It seems that Kısakürek shared the same anxiety with the Kemalist elites:

³⁰ I took the english translation of the article from Ahmad. The original text is: Bu trejediannın hareketsiz, sâmit seyircileri kimlerdir? Laik, muasır Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin vatandaşları. İşte asıl fecaat buradadır. Demek oluyor ki, orada hava, muhit, manevi muhit, inkılapçı, *Cumhuriyetçi* ve vatanperver Türk gencinin değil; ‘şerir’, ‘vahşi’, ‘haydut’, ‘mürteci’ sıfatlarıyla tevsim ettiğimiz ‘Tarikatı Nakşibendiye’ saliklerinden Derviş Mehmet’in havası ve muhiti idi. Öyle olmasaydı bu insan kasabası işini tamamlamak için yirmi dakikalık vakti bulamazdı... Şeyh Mehmet, bir işaretir, bir gölgedir.

“Neither March 31, nor the *Sheikh Said* Rebellion, nor the Movement of *Ağrı* can compete with the Menemen Incident with regard to nature and spirit. But there was more blood in them. The treachery has risen in a wider area... But, this time, in the heart of a district center, in the middle of a square in which the government house represents the authority of the state, a young man who left his detachment, who walked over the reactionaries on his own by shaking his arms, and who representing the youth, the mastership, the soldiership, a whole idea is being shut with a gun in front of the eyes of people, his platoons, and the whole world... Who is responsible? The responsible is not Dervish Mehmet and his accomplices. The obscurantism raised a tip on the surface of the water like the icebergs in the ocean. The responsible is not this tip, but the whole of the ice mountain” (Kısakürek, 1930b, p. 5).³¹

The articles he wrote for this newspaper are a few of the most discussed texts, though they constitute only a small part of the intellectual life of Kısakürek in terms of amount. He penned this article to get the sympathy of the Kemalist circle. The interesting thing with this period was his stating in his memoirs that he was defending different ideas. According to his memoirs, he advocated that the adoption of the Latin alphabet caused a significant intellectual loss and aimed at breaking the Turks off their roots in the debates he entered with his friends from the Kemalist circle. Kısakürek published the articles he wrote in *Hakimiyeti Milliye* as a book titled ‘*Bir Kaç Hikaye, Bir kaç Tahlil*’ (A few stories, a few essays) in the publishing house of

³¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: ...Ne “31 Mart”, ne “Şeyh Sait İsyanı”, ne “Ağrı Hareketi” mahiyet ve ruh olarak “Menemen hadisesi” ile boy ölçüşemez. Halbuki bunlarda daha çok kan aktı. Hıyanet daha geniş bir sahada ayaklandı... Halbuki bu defa bir kaza merkezinin göbeyinde, hükümet konağının, hükümet otoritesinin telkin ettiği bir meydanın ortasında, müfrezesini bırakan kolumu sallaya sallaya bir başına mürtecilerin üzerine yürüyen ve gençliği hocalığı askerliği bütün bir mefküreyi temsil eden bir genç, halkın, askerinin, bütün dünyanın gözü önünde evela tabanca ile vuruluyor... Binaenaleyh mesul kimdir? Mesul Derviş Mehmet ve avanesi değildir. İrtica Bahrimuhitteki buz dağları gibi suyun yüzüne sivri bir uç çıkardı, mesul bu uç değildir. Buz dağının heyeti mecmuasıdır.

the newspaper. Nevertheless, he did not give place to these articles, which can be considered a deviation from his intellectual route, in the subsequent prints of the book.

Between the years 1931 and 1933, Kısakürek paid his military service as a reserve officer with intervals in Istanbul. After his military service he turned back to İş Bank and worked in different bureaus of the bank in Trabzon, İstanbul, and Edirne for short periods. In 1934, Kısakürek resigned from the Bank and began to work in *Milliyet* (Nationality), and *Tan* (Dawn) newspapers for a while. In 1935, he began to work in İş Bank again until 1938 (Birinci, 2015, p. 49).

1.5 Entering the *Sufi* world and evolution of his Islamist Identity

Kısakürek did not have an institutional religious education on Islamic sciences such as *fiqh* (Islamic law), *hadith* (Prophet Muhammad's sayings/deeds), *kelam* (theology) *siyer* (prophetic biography) during his educational life. Furthermore, he tended to learn French and English instead of Arabic and Persian. His familiarity with *Sufism* was quite superficial until 1934. Since, the development of an Islamic identity on him and the development of the equipment that would cover this identity could realise after that date.

In his memoirs, Kısakürek stated that his life passed throughout a spiritual depression and an internal reckoning about his place in the world. His introduction to *Sufism* via Abdulhakim Arvasi, a *Naqshbandi sheikh*, in 1934, was a turning point in his ideational world. In his autobiographical book, 'O ve Ben', he divided his life basically into two parts: before (1904-1934) and after his meeting with his sheikh (1934-until his death in 1983) (Kısakürek, 2013n; 2013e, p. 35). He found the answers he had been seeking for years, and, in a sense, *Sufism* filled the gap that he

felt within himself. In his famous poem, *Çile* (The Ordeal), he described this mental state with those verses:

“A voice is heard from the invisible world: This man
Is to carry around emptiness with him in the nape of his neck!
Suddenly the top of my head flew away;
The sky collapsed; fettered and fettered...

An iron sledgehammer on the anvil of my neck,
I lay as a last resort face down on the bed.
The speckled rooster at flaming dawn,
Gave me a brand new world “ (Kısaküre, 2013e, pp. 16-17).³²

This transformation in his life presented Kısaküre a goal that he would never leave during his life though many ordeals he would suffer. He described what this goal means for him in his theater work *Siyah Pelerinli Adam* (Black Caped Man) through a long dialogue between the chief character, who was a poet like him, and the devil. In the work, the devil offers all the blessings of the world such as wealth, fame, and sovereignty to the poet, but the poet does not accept any of them. The new

³² The English translation of the poem is quoted from (Wordpress, 2016). The original text is:
Gaiblerden bir ses geldi: Bu adam,
Gezdirdin boşluğu ense kökünde!
Ve uçtu tepemden birdenbire dam;
Gök devrildi, künde üstüne künde...
Ensemin örsünde bir demir balyoz,
Kapandım yatağa son çare diye.
Bir kanlı şafakta, bana çil horoz,
Yepyeni bir dünya etti hediye.

identity and worldview he had obtained after meeting with *Sufism* was in his eyes more valuable than anything he could earn in this world (Kısakürek, 2011e).

Kısakürek spent approximately nine years with Arvasi until his death in 1943. As far as his memoirs were concerned, he did not have a *Sufistic* life in this dervish lodge belonging to his sheikh during his nine years of connection with his sheikh. Especially in early years, Kısakürek could not adapt himself much to the Islamic way of life. (Kısakürek, 2013n, pp. 93-145). Nevertheless, his *sheikh* became a guide in his adventure of *Sufism* that along with teaching him some general doctrines of *Sufism* he also drew a road map that he could follow by himself. This road map was drawn mainly according to *Naqshbandi* tradition, a *Sufi* path in Islam, and Kısakürek grew himself in *Sufism* to some extent through reading the works about this tradition, like Sirhindi's *mektubat* (letters). Therefore, to understand the influence of this meeting on Kısakürek's ideological makeup, it is necessary to take a look at *Sufism* and *Nakshibendi* teaching, because what he learned from his sheikh was the doctrines of the *Naqshbandi*'s interpretation of Islam.

Although there is no single approach and a single definition, *Sufism* can be described as a mystic path in Islam that represents “the living heart of Islam, the inner dimension of the Qur’anic Revelation, and not an arbitrary form of occultism” (Geoffroy, 2010, p. 1). On the basis of *Sufism* lies a comprehension regarding to the existence of things that cannot be understood or explained by any normal mode of perception; as in mysticism³³ (Schimmel, 1975, p. 4). The methods and teachings of the *Sufis* who have aspired to reach this knowledge, conceptualised as '*haqiqat*' (the truth) in the terminology of *Sufism*, have shown a wide variety.

³³ For detailed information about mysticism see (Underhill, 1920)

The institutionalisation of this mystical aspect of Islam has been established by the institution of *tariqa*,³⁴ denoting a *Sufi* brotherhood, or any of its offshoots. Through history, several tariqas have emerged ranging from orthodox and heterodox interpretations of Islam. One of the most deeply rooted and widespread one among them, *Naqshbandism*, has an orthodox understanding of Islam (Weismann, 2007, pp. 3-4). The eponymous founder of the *Naqshbandi* order was Bahaeddin Naqshband (1317-1389) (Hourani, 1981).³⁵ But, the intellectual maturation of Naqshbandism took place with Ahmad Sirhindi (1563–1625), known as Imam Rabbani (Algar, 2007, pp. 32-34ü). He brought a new understanding to Naqshbandi's tradition with his reformist writings; thus he was called the *Mujaddid* (renovator) of Islam. Sirhindi's main goals were the elimination of illicit innovations (*bid'at*) from Islam (Yavuz, 2003). He accepted the need for reclamation of Islamic teaching, but strictly within the bounds of Qur'an and *Sunnah*, and he was strongly opposed to Shi'ism. He taught the *Sufi* spiritual progress towards experiential knowledge of God, but distrusted mystical intoxication (Hourani, 1981, pp. 79,80). Unlike many other *Sufi* teachings, he did not draw a rigid segregation between the temporal and material world of the present and that of the hereafter (Yavuz, 2003). According to him, the true believer has to return to earth and engage in the realities of the world, and this world is one where one's task is to establish the reign of *Sunni* morality (Mardin, 1991a, p. 126). This approach seen in Sirhindi has constituted a basic orientation in *Naqshbandism* that most of the murids of this order have been closely involved in earthly issues, especially politics.

³⁴ Tariqa literally means path or method.

³⁵ The order was not founded by Naqshband himself. In modern times its members have traced its chain of genealogy from the Prophet along three lines of descent. While the two of these chains of genealogy followed mainly Shi'i imamet chain beginning with Ali ibn abi Talib (the fourth caliph), the third chain, which was also accepted by Kısakürek as the true path, begins with Abu Bakr (the first caliph) and goes on Salman al Farisi and Abu Yazid al-Bistami (Hourani, 1981, pp. 76,77). Mainly followed the third chain of genealogy, Kısakürek finished off this chain with respectively Seyyid Taha, Seyyid Fehim (Arvasi), and his sheikh Seyyid Abdülhakim Arvasi after Mawlana Khalid (Kısakürek, 2012e).

Kısakürek gave a special importance to Sirhindi. He spoke of Sirhindi as follows: “His work is the greatest of the religion after Allah and his Resul's (messenger) books...Himself is the horizon of the sainthood climate” (Kısakürek, 2012e, pp. 298,312,318).³⁶ He also published Sirhindi's three-volume work, *mektubat* (letters), through simplifying (Kısakürek, 2013j).

As it was for Sirhindi, also for Kısakürek Islam should be rediscovered, cleared from *hurafas* (superstition) and illicit *bid'ats* (Kısakürek, 2013l, p. 233). According to him, the actual reason behind the decline of the Turks in the face of the West was leaving the essence of true Islam. Therefore, he would frequently speak of a renewal in understanding of Islam. However, Kısakürek put himself into a different place from many other Islamists who advocated a renewal in the understanding of Islam with the same reason, and criticised them very severely. Kısakürek's understanding of renewal in Islam will be elaborated in more detail in chapter six.

Naqshbandism has been divided into many branches over the years. In Turkey, Khalidi (Halidiye) a branch of *Naqshbandi* order has been influential, and contemporary *Naqshbandi* orders are all diverse branches of the *Khalidi-Naqshbandis*. This branch was tied to the teachings of Mawlana Khalid (1776-1827) and represented in the Ottoman Empire by Gumushanevi Ahmed Ziyaeddin (1813-1983) (Algar, 2007, pp. 403-404). Khalid's goal was the revitalisation of the Muslim community gathered around the Ottoman caliphate through promoting the moral and spiritual rebirth in society in order to strengthen its cohesion against external attack (Algar, 2007, p. 44). Khalid, like Sirhindi, argued that the Muslim community as a whole was following a path of decadence, and, as a cure, he called for the restoration

³⁶ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Eseri, Allah ve Resulünün kitaplarından sonra dinin en büyüğü... Zatı da, velilik ikliminin ufku...

of the *Sunnah* and *Sharia* through an imaginative “imitation” of the Prophet’s life (revitalising the golden age of Islam); thus he sought to identify the universally applicable intentions of the Prophet in order to learn how to cope with prevailing problems (Yavuz, 2003, p. 136). Compared with other *Sufi* orders’ spiritual exercises, the forthcoming character of *Khalidi-Naqshbandi* tradition is its “strict observance of the divine law and the normative example of Prophet Muhammad” and his caliphs (Mardin, 1991a, p. 124). According to this tradition, implementation of *Sharia* both at a state and at a societal level is the *sine qua non* criteria for the righteous life. Following the path of *Khalidi-Naqshbandi* tradition, Kısakürek’s Islamism also emphasised the *Sharia* strictly. For Kısakürek, “the fixed and absolute axis around which everything will turn, exist and found is *Shariah*” (Kısakürek, 1946s).³⁷

Another distinguishing dimension of *Khalidi-Naqshbandi* order is its strong emphasis on *rabita*, a kind of relationship between *murid* (student) and *murshid* (master) corresponds to binding the heart with the master. Although it has also been seen in other *Sufi* sects, this murid-murshid relation has been preserved in *Khalidi-Naqshbandi* order quite tightly (Algar, 2007, pp. 45,46). Necip Fazıl had his religious training within this mystical tradition and paid a great esteem to his sheikh. He called his sheikh using expressions such as 'my saviour' and 'my master'. The dialogues passed between them constituted a permanent part in his journal of *Büyük Doğu* with the title of ‘*Tanrı kulundan dinlediklerim*’ (the things I listened to from the servant of God). Later he published those writings in a book with the same title (Kısakürek, 2011d).

³⁷ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Herşeyin etrafında döneceği, olacağı ve bulacağı, kıl kadar yerinden kıpırdamaz, sabit ve mutlak mihver şeriattır.

The *Naqshbandis* treated the state as a necessary instrument both for preserving Islamic ideals and the survival of the Muslim community. *Sheikh* Khalid asked his followers to pray for the survival of “the exalted Ottoman state which the victorious existence of Islam depends on” (Algar, 2007, p. 44). Many *Naqshbandi sheikhs*, including Gumushanevi, volunteered to military service in the 1977-78 Russo-Ottoman War and were directly involved in the Caucasus front to protect the homeland, religion, and the state. Also, during the National Struggle, many *Naqshbandis* gave support to the Ankara government; especially some names had critical role in struggle (Yavuz, 2003, p. 139). This state-centred approach can be considered as a counterpart of Metin Heper's conceptualisation of ‘transcendental state’, which can also be seen in Kısakürek’s understanding of the state (Heper, 2006).

Besides, as an extension of this state-centric comprehension, the governors and state officials were expected to promote Sunni teaching and strict observance of the *Sharia*. Therefore, the *Naqshbandi* order had been actively involved in social and political affairs and had always been on the alert for opportunities to use power for the interest of Muslims both in Ottoman and Republican era. For instance, Mehmet Zahid Kotku, one of the most influential *Naqshbandi sheikhs*, was influential on many prominent statesmen and bureaucrats such as Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the National Order Party (Mardin, 1991a, pp. 133-134). In parallel with the *Naqshbandi* tradition, Kısakürek also sought an Islamic state and wanted the strict observance of *Sharia* by the statesman. Besides, additively to the religious motive, his political goals were also nationalism oriented. He bounded the salvation of Muslim world to the destiny of the Turkey, as Khalid and Gümüşhavevi did. In that extent, firstly, he took action himself and established the *Büyük Doğu* Association, which aimed to acquire a political party identity in the future. Besides, as it will be tried to be illustrated during

the study, he also paid great effort to influence the political leaders, especially the prime ministers.

The political attitudes and choices of the *Naqshbandis* had shown a wide variety, especially when considering the existence of quite different *tariqa* structures following the *Khalidi-Naqshbandi* tradition, it became very difficult to characterise the methods of intervention of the *Naqshbandis* to the politics in a distinctly circumscribed framework. They sought to establish a balance between orthodoxy and activism in the face of the radically altered environment by modernity (Weismann, 2007). Gümüşhanevi Ahmed Ziyauddin, to protest the establishment of an Ottoman Bank, founded a community chest in his lodge, which was to be used for loans to small business (Mardin, 1991a, p. 132). Besides this action, which can be regarded as relatively passive, traces of *Naqshbandism* have been seen in violence-contained reactions such as the *Kuleli* incident in 1859 and 31 March incident in 1909. Also in the Republican era, almost all of the reactionary movements, such as Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 and the *Menemen* Incident in 1930 were initiated by *Naqshbandi Sheikhs*. Nevertheless, it should be addressed that it will be misleading to characterise the political orientation of *Naqshbandism* only with those reactionary movements without considering the political, social, and economic reasons motivating those movements. To put it more precisely, although the full restoration of Islamic law was the pivotal demand in discursive basis in these movements, there were also some other motivating reasons such as the negative response felt against the model of the new officer educated in military schools, brought about by the transformation in the army, in the March 31 Incident or ethnic orientation in *Sheik* Said Rebellion.

Kısakürek did not approve these violence-contained reactionary movements. In his eyes, those who initiated these movements had nothing to do with

Naqshbandism or Islam. According to his argument, the 31 March incident was a Jewish, Masonic conspiracy organised against sultan Abdülhamid II. *Sheikh* Said rebellion occurred as a consequence of incitement of the soldiers who did not take into consideration the cultural characteristic of the geography (Kısakürek, 2013p, pp. 33,44,45). Moreover, he used these incidents as an opposition argument against the RPP. He argued that the RPP benefited from these incidents in order to suppress and oppress the true Muslims, such as *Sheikh* Esad Efendi in Menemen incident. Besides these, he advocated the non-violent anti-revolution reactionaries such as the one shown against the hat reform by İskilipli Atıf (Kısakürek, 2013p, pp. 85,164).

Kısakürek's preferences in his political struggle would be shaped within a pragmatist mind set and would be quite contextual with the conjuncture. Besides, as can be observed during this study, he carried out his political activities through standing within constitutional limits. In his understanding of politics, any attempt without considering the internal and external dynamics would be betrayal to the success of the main goal (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 213).

After wearing his Islamist identity, Kısakürek wrote many theological books. Some of those, such as his sheikh's *Rabıta-i Şerife* (The Order of Nobles), are reprinting of the works of some important names of *Naqshbandi* tradition with his contributions. Besides these, he wrote also many books, such as *İman ve İslam Atlası* (Atlas of Belief and Islam), in which he expressed his understanding of 'true Islam'.³⁸ This transformation in his life has deeply affected his literary works. The metaphysical quests in his earlier poems have resulted in Islam (Kısakürek, 2013e). The same transformation is reflected in the theater works. Besides the works that

³⁸ Theological analysis of these works has been excluded because it is not one of the goals of this study. To see the list of all these works see Appendix E

portray the life of famous names of Sufi tradition, such as Yunus Emre and İbrahim Ethem, he wrote many theatrical works written with Islamic motifs such as *Kanlı Sarık* (Bloody Imamah) (Kısakürek, 2012o; 2012p; 2010j).

1.6 Journal of *Ağaç*

While continuing his banking career in *İş Bank*, in 1936, Kısakürek began publishing the *Ağaç* (Tree) Journal. His close relations with the Kemalist elites became very helpful in publishing the journal. The finance of the magazine was provided by two state banks paying a one-year advertisement fee in advance upon his ask to Celal Bayar, the Trade Minister of the RPP government (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 35-36). The journal was printed in seventeen issues. The first six issues were printed in Ankara while the remaining ones were printed in Istanbul.

The '*Ağaç*' was a magazine where literary and artistic writings were predominant, as expressed by the slogan of the journal: art, idea, and action. Besides this, the thing that gave the magazine its character was its stance representing a spiritual, *Sufistic* worldview in the face of cultural and artistic activities connected to the positivist-materialist worldview. (Uçman, 2015, p. 84). Kısakürek presented this *Sufistic* character of the journal with these words he penned in his introductory article in the first issue of the journal:

“The tree appears to us in a terrifying anatomy of understanding and searching troubles that fill ourselves from the day we came to the world to today. When our eyes fall to him, we see the skeleton with thousand arms of our soul under a strange x-ray light. As if, a secret path emerges between the order in the

geometry of this extraordinary personality and the order our soul, in which the secrets of Allah lay, sekking for” (Kısakürek, 1936a).³⁹

According to Duran and Uçman, the journal can be considered as an early example of conservative, nationalist and Islamist journals, such as *Hareket* (1939), (1943), *Türk Düşüncesi* (1953), *Serdengeçti* (1947), *Diriliş* (1960), *Edebiyat* (1969), and *Mavera* (1976) (Duran, 2001, p. 208; Uçman, 1983, p. 86). However, it should also be addressed that all the names who participated in the journal did not adopt the same worldview. As Mardin states, most of those names, who were distinguished writers and poets of 1920s and 1930s, were ambivalent in their quest for a new root for the Turkish society and later stand in the left or the right wing of Turkish political structure (Mardin, 2007).⁴⁰ As Karsakürek's discourse began to harden and his emphasis on Islam gained weight in the coming periods, most of these names began to separate their ways with Kısakürek.

The *Ağaç* journal can be considered as a preparation phase before the period of *Büyük Doğu* journal. In this journal, Kısakürek started to present his spiritualist/Islamist ideas in their soft, ambiguous and general forms without directly emphasising Islam and *Sharia*. The article ‘*Allahsız Dünya*’ (Godless World), published in the second issue, was one of the best illustrative articles portraying his style. In this article, he spoke about the spiritual crisis/depression that modern societies were dragged into while achieving a technical development thanks to the natural science. Kısakürek ended his words with these statements: “Now we see that

³⁹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Ağaç bize, dünyaya geldiğimiz günden bugüne kadar içimizi dolduran anlama ve arama sıkıntısının dehşetli anatomisi halinde görünüyor. Gözlerimiz ona daldığı zaman, garip bir röntgen ışığı altında ruhumuzun bin bir kollu iskeletini görmüş oluruz. Sanki bu fevkalade şahsiyetin hendesesindeki nizamla, içimizdeki Allah’ın sırları yatan ruhumuzun hasret çektiği nizam arasında gizli bir yol meydana çıkıyor

⁴⁰ Some important poets and writers participating in the writing cadre of the journal were: Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Ahmet Kutsi Tecer, Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar, Sabahattin Ali, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Sabahattin Rahmi Eyiboğlu, Ahmet Muhip Dranas, Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı, Fikret Adil, Falih Rıfkı Atay

Allah is pulled out of our world. This is not the Allah that of in the 'ilmihal' (catechism) books. This Allah is an understanding of merveilleux that senses a universe above the simple and natural” (Kısakürek, 1936b).⁴¹

In his writings, Kısakürek spoke of the weakness of morality, which he observed in the Turkish intellectuals and in the society. He provided a kind of basis for his critical discourse that will be used in the *Büyük Doğu* by linking his critics of moral corrosion to the modernisation programs that have been carried out since the *Tanzimat* period in the articles wrote on the understanding of literature and art in the Ottoman and Republican periods.

Kısakürek also bagen to give place to the criticism of communism, which was to be one of the most important issues he dealt with during the *Büyük Doğu* years. In his anecdotic article he penned, ‘*Hırsız, Polis ve Komünist*’ (thief, police and communist), he described communism as a detrimental current that only weak-minded people could trail (Kısakürek, 1936c).

Unable to get the sales success he wanted, Kısakürek closed the magazine and continued his intellectual life via working as a columnist in *Haber* (News) and *Son Telgraf* (Last Telegraph) newspapers after putting an end to his banking career in 1938 (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 36). When looking at his writings he penned between 1939 and 1943 in these newspaper, it is possible to see the traces of Islamic identity. Nevertheless, he drew a portrait of artisan who had relative conservative demands rather than sought for a *Sharia* based Islamic state; and his wording was quite

⁴¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Artık Anlıyoruz. Allah dünyamızdan çekilmiştir. Bu Allah ilmihal kitaplarındaki Allah değildir. Bu Allah basit ve tabiinin üstünde bir alem sezen bir (fevkalade), bir (merveilleux) telakkisidir.

moderate. In an article written in 1939, '*Ben Buyum*' (This is I am), he declared the major corners of his worldview as follows:

“Nationalist-Anatolianist (opposite to imitative Europeanism and European imperialism), spiritualist (opposite to materialist), mystic (opposite to fanatic and atheist), personalist-qualitatist (opposite to unlimited freedom and standard scales), restrictive in property (opposite to huge individual capital), abstractive and essentialist in art, idea and science (opposite to rootless and non-detailed analyze systems), supportive of class in terms of elitism in mind and spirit (antidemocratic), interventionist (antiliberal). In sum, with regard to the regimes of the time: in a personal view, antifascist, anticommunist, anti-liberal” (Kısakürek, 2010d, p. 60).⁴²

One of the leading issues he was interested in was Turkish thought life. He penned many articles on this issue and advocated that unless the Turks could not achieve a national and advanced thought system, they would continue to be a '*düyunu umumiye*'⁴³ state (Kısakürek, 2010d, p. 56). Although he was to be criticised severely in later years, Ziya Gökalp, in his eyes, in these years, was the unique intellectual who could achieve this understanding (ibid, p. 132). In that regard, he offered some modernisation methods such as sending students to Europe for education; but these students should be selected among young people whose national personality developed, bound up with Turkish tradition and culture. Also, to him, another basic qualification that the Turkish thought system should possess was that it had a

⁴² This is the author's translation. The original text is: *Milliyetçi-Anadolucu* (Kopya Avrupalılığına zıd, Avrupa emperyalizmasına zıd), *Ruhçu* (Maddeciye zıd), *Maveracı* (Ham softaya zıd, dinsize zıd), *Şahsiyetçi-Keyfiyetçi* (Başboş ferdi sermayeciliğe zıd, standart ölçülere zıd), *mülkiyette tahditçi* (Büyük ferdi sermayeciliğe zıd), *Sanat, fikir ve ilimde tecridci-safiyetçi* (köksüz ve kabataslak teşhis sistemlerine zıd), *kafa ve ruh mümtaziyeti bakımından sınıfçı* (antidemokrat), *tek görüş etrafında müdahaleci* (antiliberal). Bugünkü dünya rejimlerine nispetle öz: Hususi bir görüş zaviyesinden antikomünist, antifaşist, antiliberal.

⁴³ *Düyunu umumiye* was a institution which was set up for the administration of Ottoman Public Dept

spiritualist conception besides its nationality. By a Bergsonian view, he argued that the understanding of science and art in Turkey should be rescued from the strictness of positivism (ibid, p. 66-68).

Another significant part of his writings was about the Second World War. It was a widespread tendency among the intellectuals of the period to make estimates about the course of the war. In a survey held by journalist Reşad Mahmut in 1942, titled 'When the War Will End', Kısakürek argued that the war would probably result in the defeat of Axis powers in 1943 due to the attacks of the Axis powers to Russia. (Ersel, 2005b, p. 46). For Kısakürek, this war was to lead to a new world order that no one could stay outside (Kısakürek, 1939b). For this reason, his main focal point was the benefiting of Turkey from political conjuncture that would emerge after the war in maximum level. From the beginning of the war he criticised the political orientation of Germany (Kısakürek, 1939a). Along with supporting Turkey's policy of neutrality, it had shown an attitude in favor of allied forces. As the course of the war became clear, he argued that Turkey should take sides with the democracies in order to be profitable from the world order to be established after the war.

In that period, Kısakürek refrained from criticising the government. He even supported firm intervening measures taken by the government (Kısakürek, 1940). In a series of articles he wrote about the capital law of 1942, he argued that this law also had a psychological effect in terms of revealing that "now there is a government of Turkish Republic that had a tremendous state will on the tops of the ones assuming that the government was far away from the power, courage, enterprise, knowledge and worldview" (Kısakürek, 1942b; 1942c). It is interesting that, as he stated in his memoirs, he saw this law, in reality, in those days as a way of formal theft and extortion that not compatible with any sect and method (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 28).

Also, it can be said that something were shaped in his mind about his famous ideological formulation, that he named the poem which he wrote as the new national anthem in 1938 upon the demand of Falih Rıfki (Atay) to be presented to Atatürk as *Büyük Doğu* (Kısakürek, 1943h, p. 12; 2013d, p. 36). As can be understood from this demand, he kept his good relationship with Kemalist establishment and intelligentsia in late 1930s and early 1940. He wrote a book about Namık Kemal for the Turkish Language Institution (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) in 1940. Thanks to his good relations, he could find a job in high educational institutions of the state. Furthermore, according to his statements, he was even nominated as a deputy candidate for the parliament by Refik Saydam in the late 1930s and by Memduh Şevket Esendal in 1942, but was vetoed by İsmet İnönü,

In 1941, Kısakürek got married with Fatma Neslihan who was a niece of Babanzade Ahmed Naim, an Islamist of the second constitutional period. The couple was to have five children named Mehmed (1943), Ömer (1944), Ayşe (1948), Osman (1950) and Zeynep (1954).

1.7 Conclusion

Kısakürek was born to a very wealthy family. Compared to his time, he had a life that could be described as aristocratic. However, the tragic events, such as the death of his sister and his grandfather, the divorce of his parents, dragged him into a completely different course of life surrounded by loneliness and economic problems. This drift brought along a bohemian life. Sufism appeared to him as a prescription for escaping this bohemian life he led because whatever good he had had from his past came from the ones who were devout. Besides, being a rooted son, being the grandson of an important judge of the Ottoman era, would be an identity that he would proudly

bear during all of his life. The aristocratic accumulation that this identity kept alive would have been reflected to his thoughts with the imagination of a society, which was surrounded by courtesy, etiquette and decency rules in a totalitarian shape in the name of Islamic morality.

Kısakürek grew up as an intellectual who was quite familiar with the Western culture. His family, the education he received, his early intellectual circle all provided this for him. For this reason, even when he was wrapped up in an Islamist identity, he did not have a monolithic mindset. Even when crowning himself with not being a European, it is also possible to talk about an emulation of him towards the West (Kısakürek, 2010d, p. 123). Besides this, Kısakürek adopted a strict orthodox interpretation of Islam, but without an institutional and systematic education in Islamic sciences. This transformation caused an intellectual to emerge criticising the Western oriented modernisation process of the state and putting a conservative reaction to changes in the society brought by these modernisation efforts.

2. THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMISM AND THE RISE OF THE *BÜYÜK DOĞU* IDEA AS A COMPETITIVE IDEOLOGY (1943-1950)

2.1 Introduction: The Revival of Islamism in Modern Turkey

In this chapter, the beginning period of the intellectual and political struggle of Kısakürek on the axis of *Büyük Doğu* will be examined. The basic determinant, which characterizes this period, encompassing the years between 1943 and 1950, was that Turkey was in a process of transition to democracy. Therefore, it was a tense period in terms of the competition between the actors holding the state apparatus and the new actors looking for a change. In addition, this period was also the stage of the revival of Islamism in the Republican era, and Kısakürek was one of the earliest representatives of this movement. In order to understand the role of Kısakürek in the flourishing of Islamism in modern Turkey, it is necessary to understand the political position of Islamism in the Turkish political life. For this reason, it would be beneficial to take a retrospective look at the development of Islamism in the Turkish political life by opening a parenthesis before beginning.

Islam in the Ottoman Empire was one of the most effective elements constituting the social ethos, the basic determinant of identity identification, and one of the most prominent sources of reference that the state structure and laws were shaped around. Therefore, Islamism could emerge as one of the most assertive political prescriptions, which were Westernism, Turkism, and Ottomanism, applied for a solution to put an end to the derogation of the state. In spite of including some members of the *ulema*⁴⁴, the common characteristic of the early Islamists was occupying with journalism. To name a few, Eşref Edip Fergan, Mehmet Akif Ersoy,

⁴⁴ *Ulema* is the plural form of the *alim*, who is a scholar representing the Islamic learning in the Ottoman ruling class.

Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Said Halim Paşa, Elmalılı M. Hamdi, Said Nursi, and Musa Kazım can be mentioned. One of the main characteristics of these intellectuals distinguishing them from the early Islamists of the Republican era was that they were equipped with advanced knowledge in Islamic sciences in the theoretical and methodological bases. *Sebilürreşad*, *Beyanü'l Hak* and *Islam Mecmuası* were the prominent intellectual agents of the Islamists where they articulated their thoughts (Kara, 2014a, p. 17).

The main consideration of the Islamists was to reveal that Islam provides all necessary equipment to stop the decline that the state was dragged into. According to them, Muslimness could be a convenient identity to keep together the necessary elements of the state (Tunaya, 2007, pp. 80-82). Besides, Islam is not an obstacle to progress; on the contrary, it is a religion that encourages scientific and technological progress. Already, the main reason behind the decline of the state was getting away from the essence of true Islam. Islam had been filled with *bidats* and superstitions for centuries and what is behind the name of Islam was just an obscurantism that dominated the understanding of the Islam adopted by people. The remedy was to turn back to the golden age of Islam when it was taught by the Prophet with its all purity (Kara, 2014a, pp. 53-61). They also paid a great effort to reveal that democracy was not incompatible with Islam. They attempted to illustrate that whatever was brought from the west on behalf of modernising the state already existed in Islam. Therefore, the state could establish its own way to progress just by following the path of Islam (Kara, 1994, p. 108). However, these discussions, which can be pronounced mostly in the period of the Second Constitutional era, could not be carried much to the political arena due to the political turmoil and wars that took place during the short history of the period. Besides, the fact that the call of *jihad* in the World War I was largely

unrequited, revealed that it was not so easy to realise the prescription recommended by the Islamists.

The World War I ended with a result that could be regarded as an unmitigated disaster for the Empire. The Allied forces began issuing troops to the country, with the pretext of some items of the Armistice of Mondros signed at the end of the war. In 1919, just after the Greeks landed in Izmir, Atatürk initiated a National Struggle against the foreign invasion. The nationalist movement was built on the unification of the resistance groups, calling themselves as Defence of Rights Associations (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*); later formed a parliament called Grand National Assembly in Ankara. As Ahmad stated, the movement was comprised of military-civilian bureaucracy, the rising bourgeoisie, the landlords, the notables of Anatolia including clericals; and was socially conservative. The majority had strong affiliation to the dynasty either for their personal and commercial interests or for religious authority of the sultan, and saw the National Struggle as a vehicle to restore the sultan back to power (Ahmad, 2003, pp. 52-56). Political disagreements could be resolved by prioritising the problems of survival from enemy invasion in the years of National Struggle, but once the war was won and when the time came to decide on the future of the state, political disputes were to come to the surface.

Atatürk was always modernist and westernized; and, in his eyes, what would ensure a rapid progress was a state and nation model which could get rid of the traditions of the past that could hinder modernisation, and exalt the virtues of the Western civilisation and of the positivism. In this regard, he envisaged some reforms in his mind to realise this model of the state and nation model. As many researchers who worked on the history of Turkish modernisation such as Ahmad, Lewis, and Berkez stated clearly, almost all of the reform movements that Atatürk envisaged had

been subjected to debates for long years in Ottoman time, but they had not been able to be put into practice due to their unfamiliar character with the tradition which was shaped to a great extent around of Islam. Niyazi Berkes pointed out the influence of tradition on the political minds through mentioning debates about the cover of the women compatible with the rules of Islam in Grand National Assembly in National Struggle years when a struggle for existence was also given at same time (Berkes, 2002). The nation and state model that Atatürk designed in his mind was aiming for a total and radical transformation in the structure of the traditional state and society, and the implementation of this model needed a strong political authority. However, Atatürk faced a severe opposition in the process of removing both the Sultanate and the Caliphate, which were the very early steps of this process.

Despite consisting of different groups such as liberals and the ones who were opposed to the monopoly of power in the hands of Atatürk while being modernist, the opposition in the parliament, called as the second group⁴⁵, was also conservative colored, and gathered under the roof of Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası-PRP*) as an opposition party in 1924, which also provided a means of making heard their voice of the Islamists in the parliament. The reactionary Kurdish rebellion, Sheikh Said rebellion, which broke out in eastern Anatolia in February 1925, provided a political atmosphere that would enable Atatürk to suppress the opposition. The rebellion seemed to confirm the fears of religious reaction and counter-revolution, a fear which was real enough in a society in which the memories of the old order still flourished (Ahmad, 2003, p. 58). The assembly passed the Law for the Maintenance of Order, which provided an extraordinary power to the government to take any measure needed. Armed with such powers, the government

⁴⁵ For more information on the ideas of the second group see (Demirel, 1994)

closed down the PRP and suppressed all opposition. All political activity outside the ruling party, RPP, ceased. Many of the regime opponents were stand trial in specially authorised courts known as Independence Tribunals. The law for the Maintenance of Order remained in effect until 1929, but the government continued to resort to tough measures in every event that threatened the regime. The article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, dated 1926, served as the backbone of the control of the state apparatus over anti-regime movements until it was abandoned in 1991.⁴⁶ Besides, with the press law of 1931, the government continued to oversee the press that no publication that the regime did not approve could be published. These events culminated in the monopoly of political power by Atatürk and his party RPP.

Although getting armed against anti-regime movements with legal instruments, it is wrong to say that the regime sought a total exclusion of the religion. Atatürk wanted to settle Islam in a position that is compatible with his nationalisation and modernisation program. In this regard, the first step was establishing the state monopoly over religious affairs. Concomitantly with the abolishment of the centuries old Caliphate, the Directory of Religious Affairs was founded at the same day and the control of all religious institutions was left to state apparatus. Also, by the law on unification of education in 1924, all educational institutions were bound to the state and only the state employees allowed teaching Islam. After establishing the monopoly, the regime allowed the development of religious publication under its supervising. But, it should be addressed that it was a poor period in terms of religious intellectuality. The number of books was published and distributed without payment by the Presidency of Religious Affairs until 1950 was only thirty (Kara, 1985, p. 159).

⁴⁶ According to the article, any movement or person that aimed to change social, economic and political and judicial system of the state even partially based on religious principles and beliefs would be imprisoned up to fifteen years. Appealing to religion, religious books and sentiments for personal power would be punishable as well (Hafizoğulları, pp. 213-217).

In terms of the Islamists, despite the coalition carried out in the National Struggle years, it became certain that establishing an Islamic state was now out of consideration in the minds of Kemalist ruling circles. In the face of this political conjuncture, the attitudes of the Islamists showed variation. While some of them chose to participate in Kemalist intelligentsia and promote secular reforms such as Şemsettin Günaltay and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, the some chose to show passive resistance along with taking part in the state officials or chose to lapse into silence such as Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Ö. Ferit Kam, and Elmalılı M. Hamdi Yazır (Duran, 2001, pp. 186,187). The only oppositional voice that can be considered as direct rose from the outside of country. Mustafa Sabri Efendi, who participated in Damat Ferit Paşa cabinet as *Şeyhülislam* (shaykh al-islam) and opposed the National Struggle, published a newspaper called 'Yarın' (Tomorrow) in Greece and wrote books. In his articles and books, he criticised the Kemalist rule for abolishing of the caliphate and for following irreligious policies. (Mert, 1996, p. 148; Kara, 2014b, p. 916). Another that can be mentioned was the 'Müsavat' (Equality) Journal, which was published by Hafız İsmail Efendi in Egypt. The magazine, which started publishing in 1927, conducted a more moderate opposition than the magazine of *Yarın*. The magazine criticised the regime in Turkey for not implementing a democratic administration and neglecting religion (Mert, 1996, p. 141).

It is possible to say that there was an unproductive period for Islamism until the end of the World War II. After the War, political atmosphere of Turkey began to be gradually liberalised in line with the changed circumstance in the world. The foundation of the Democrat Party in 1946 was a prologue of a big transition in Turkish politics. Within this relatively liberalising political environment, religious

circles which could achieve to hold on some sectors of the society began to articulate their thoughts and claims in intellectual field via various publications⁴⁷. The *Hareket* (Movement) journal of Nurettin Topçu, and Kısakürek's the *Büyük Doğu* journal were the early representatives of those publications.

2.2 The Rise of the *Büyük Doğu* Idea as a Competitive Ideology

The thoughts of Kısakürek who had begun to gain an Islamic identity under the mastership of Abdülhakim Arvasi, began to be evolved, crystallised, and sharpened gradually in the course of time, and culminated in the construction of an ideological formulation namely *Büyük Doğu*, which aimed at the construction of an Islamic state and society, though indirectly.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kısakürek's life was divided into two phases as before and after through regarding his meeting with Arvasi as the milestone. With the emergence of 'new Kısakürek', he attributed himself a missionary responsibility that he conceptualised as 'true/expected intellectual'. He described the true intellectual with a Platonian view as the one who had a true worldview capable of evaluating world, society and state with their all dimensions, material and over material, and the one who has the capacity of leading the society from darkness to a righteous order through putting the ideology into action. To him, whatever the Turks experienced damaging was because of not being able to grow up a true Turkish intellectual since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire (Kısakürek, 1943n). Beginning with the *Ağaç* journal, in various occasions he criticised the intellectuals of both the Ottoman and the Republican era. Especially, intellectuals and statesmen such

⁴⁷ Some of these publications emerged in the 1940s and the 1950s were *Büyük Doğu*, *Sebilürreşad*, *Hareket*, *Allah Yolu*, *İslam*, *Müslüman Sesi*, *Din Yolu*, *Fetih*, *Hilal*, *Hür Adam*, *İslam*, *Serdengeçti* and *Ehli Sünnet*

as Mustafa Reşit Pasha, Ali and Fuat Pashas, Namık Kemal, and Ziya Gökalp who emerged by the Tanzimat era as innovators, in his eyes, were all false heroes/intellectuals who could not achieve anything but imitating the West (Kısakürek, 1943g). He also criticised the religious scholars of the Ottoman time for their backwardness and called them as rude fanatics (*ham softa, kaba yobaz*). To him, they filled Islam with superstitions and bid'ats, and removed Islam from its essence. In an interview in 1941, after pointing out to the lack of a true intellectual in Turkish society, Kısakürek stated his missionary role with those statements: “So, I, as a passionate artisan, decided to accept this mission heroically and to fight for it. For this, before all, it is needed to a brand new worldview and a comprehension of a community system. When the day comes, my struggle will be seen. I put the name of this comprehension as *Büyük Doğu*” (Ak, 2009).⁴⁸

When Kısakürek's works examined with a hermeneutical consciousness, it is possible to see that the 'expected intellectual' conceptualization as a saviour has a very central place in his ideational world. In his many literary works, the main characters with a sophisticated Islamic understanding can change the destiny of the country by emerging unexpectedly with their superior intelligence and comprehension skills (Kısakürek, 2009b; 2009i). Throughout his life he expected the society and political elites to discover this enlightened personality and fulfill his recommendations.

He began to express his ideas in the *Büyük Doğu* journal, which had the same name as the ideological formula he built up. When the journal began to be published in 1943, the World War II was still going on and the political context of Turkey was

⁴⁸ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Ben de muhteris bir sanatkar olmak itibariyle bu misyonu kahramanca kabul etmeye ve bu uğurda savaşmaya karar verdim. Bunun için herşeyden evvel, yepyeni bir dünya görüşü ve cemiyet sistemi telakkisi lazımdı. Günü geldiği zaman mücadelem görülecektir. Bu telakkinin ismini *Büyük Doğu* koydum.

being shaped in accordance with the war conditions. The years of World War II were quite tough for the newly established state. Although significant progress had been made, the economy did not yet reach a self-sufficient level (Ahmad, 2003, p. 100). The government took some extraordinary measures such as the National Defence Law of 1940, Capital Tax Law of 1942 to cope with war-caused economic bottleneck. Besides, trying to stay out of the war in the midst of the combating parties required quite complicated political manoeuvres. Therefore, the government was obliged to intervene even more drastically in almost every aspect of life. This mechanism of control was also effective in intellectual field that the growth of any kind of political discourse incompatible with the policies of the state was not allowed. For instance, considering the racial German progress and the potential of the Germans to occupy Turkey, the state elites allowed the Pan-Turkish thoughts to be heard, but, once the Germans were stopped in Stalingrad in 1943 and the balance of the War turned in favour of the Allies prominent pan-Turkists, including Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan (1890 –1970), Hüseyin Nihal Atsız and Alparslan Türkeş, (1917 –1997) were accused of establishing secret organisations to take down the government, but were subsequently acquitted (Poulton, 1997, p. 135; Balcı, 2011, p. 148). It was certain that this concern of the political elites was valid also within pan-Islamist discourses and movements. Besides, the guarding reflexes of the state apparatus of the principles of the Republican revolutions were still quite strong and severe. In a paper released by the General Directorate of Press and Publication in 1943 the attitude of the regime towards religious publications was described by those words: “No matter what form and manner, we are not in favor of creating a religious atmosphere and of engendering

a seedbed of religious mindset for the youth through religious publications in the country” (Başgil, 1985, p. 16).⁴⁹

Actually, the political environment was not convenient for a publication that would criticise the secular character of the regime at all, but Kısakürek was already decisive to initiate an intellectual struggle. In addition, as also can be seen in his definition of the ‘true intellectual’, Kısakürek believed that an intellectual struggle should be transformed into action by being carried to the political sphere. Nevertheless, since Turkey had not passed into multi-party political system yet, he would not be able to carry his intellectual struggle into a political movement. For that reason, he tried to affect the political elites of the era to initiate a political movement. In this regard, he planned to unify Celal Bayar, who had been Prime Minister between 1937-1939, with Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of General Staff. He had introduced with Fevzi Çakmak by means of his son-in-law Burhan Toprak, who was his friend since the years of France, and he was visiting him time to time. In an article he penned in 1942, Kısakürek referred to Fevzi Çakmak as "a person that I love as much as my grandfather" (Kısakürek, 1942a). Çakmak was known as a devout person by the public (Karpata, 2010a). Thus, Kısakürek could talk to him about the issues such as moral deterioration in the society, strict secularism policies of the RPP. Kısakürek offered him to take the initiative by making a military coup and ending the corruption in the state (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 41,42). Çakmak was a general with a hard attitude that soldiers should not be interested in politics as well, and he refused the proposal of Kısakürek by stating that he was not a janissary (Ahmad, 2003, p. 9).

⁴⁹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Bizler ne şekil ve ne suretle olursa olsun memleket dahilinde dini neşriyat yapılarak dini bir atmosfer yaratılmasına ve gençlik için dini bir zihniyet fideliği vücuda getirilmesine taraftar değiliz.

Kısakürek could not get the answer he desired from Çakmak, but was decisive in his thoughts. This time, he applied to Celal Bayar with the same purpose. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he had constituted a good relationship with Bayar since his banking profession years and was also able to publish the ‘*Ağaç*’ journal with his support. In that period, Celal Bayar did not take an active role in politics apart from deputyship since he fell into disagreement with President İnönü. According to memoirs of Kısakürek, he was engaged in an intellectual effort that he was working on a study about the National Struggle.⁵⁰ Kısakürek visited him in his home and offered him to initiate a political movement with the support of the youths who were to be organised around the idea of *Büyük Doğu* (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 44-45). Celal Bayar, who would take on one of the most important roles of Turkey in the transition to the multi-party political system with the change of political conjuncture in the following years, rejected the proposal of Kısakürek by stating that his political life is over.

2.3 The Rudimentary Period of the Journal

Being aware of severe reflexes of the government towards anti-regime movements, Kısakürek followed a cautious publishing policy for not facing with sanctions of the state and refrained from emphasising on Islamic state and *Sharia* directly in the first period of the journal. Rather, he expressed his thoughts in a softer sense compared to the further periods via the terminology of spiritualism and *Sufism*. He avoided portraying a regime-threatening image and sought to reflect a conservative intellectual type that draws attention to the moral decadence that he observed in the society, as he had done between the years of 1939-1943. He was to

⁵⁰ The book that Kısakürek mentioned was the work of Celal Bayar's eight-volume commemorative book, ‘Ben de Yazdım’ (I also wrote).

describe the publication policy of this period in the following years with those words: “In the first period of the *Büyük Doğu*, there was a compulsive stuttering, an attempt to hide the bean under the tongue, and the obligation to keep up appearance until the day of removing the veil” (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 265).⁵¹

This self-preservation reflex was also reflected on the prequel article he penned to introduce the *Büyük Doğu*. In this article, taking into consideration the political structure of the period, Kısakürek emphasised that he and his magazine had no revisionist, racist, pan-Islamist orientations and he was seeking only a spiritual transformation within the borders of Turkey:

“Great East (*Büyük Doğu*) is the name of an idea... Great East is, also, a mark to the East together with the name of the birth incident... In so far as, the East, pointed out by the Great East, does not embrace any geography except the borders of the Turkish homeland. Great East is a case that will take place in time frame, not in place frame. We are seeking for the Great East within the boundaries of today’s and tomorrow’s Turkish fatherland at a plan of spirit. We, along with our entire nation cadre, have to be something, become a thing, get an arrival within the borders of the Turkish homeland; here, the name of this existence, to us, is the Great East. If one day, within the borders of the Turkish homeland, we see the good tidings of our faithful dreams as pervaded to the objects and incidents, the total expression of the sight that will crystallize in our face will be as follows: Great East” (Kısakürek, 1943i).⁵²

⁵¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: İlk Devre *Büyük Doğu*’larında mecburi bir kekemelik, baklayı dil altında gizleme gayreti ve peşesini topyekün atacağı güne doğru vaziyeti idare mecburiyeti vardır.

⁵² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: *BÜYÜK DOĞU* bir mefkurenin ismi... *BÜYÜK DOĞU*, doğuş hadisesinin ismile beraber Şarka da işaret... Şu kadar ki, *BÜYÜK DOĞU*’nun işaret

Also, a systematic critical publication policy towards the RPP and the İnönü, which would be one of his main matters in further periods, cannot be seen in this period. Rather, to show his obedience to the values of the regime, he put a picture of Atatürk opening a gate with the statement of “The gate of the last factory which Atatürk opened with a golden key...Now his spirit is at the gate of the victory of the Turk with the same key” to the cover page of the journal. Also, in another issue, he wrote an article about Atatürk calling him to duty to allow Turkey to gain the rights it deserved in the political conjuncture that would emerge after the war in these words:

“One day Atatürk will revive... One day we will see him gripped the hilt of his sword with his sculpted from camphor noble and shapely fingers, leaned on the table with his elegant and subtle stature, and sifting the world map with his blue eyes...Today, in the accounting and the balancing of the world, it is the moment when the rights of the Turkish nation will appear on the pan of scales... Here, that day, the person who will be at our head, according to qualities of the savior that the day will bring about, will be no one else than Atatürk with his soul as much as his substance”⁵³ (Kısakürek, 1943c).

ettiği Şark, Türk vatanının sınırları dışında her hangi bir coğrafya planını kucaklamıyor... *BÜYÜK DOĞU*, kendisini mekan çerçevesinde değil, zaman çerçevesinde gerçekleştirecek bir dava... Biz, *BÜYÜK DOĞU*'yu, Türk vatanından başlayarak güneşin doğduğu istikameti yalayan bir madde zemininde aramıyoruz... Biz, *BÜYÜK DOĞU*'yu Türk vatanının bugünkü ve yarınki sınırlarile çevrili bir ruh zemininde arıyoruz... Biz bütün millet kadromuzla beraber, Türk vatanının sınırları içinde, bir şey olmaya, bir oluşa varmaya, bir varışı oldurmaya muhtacız; işte bu oluşun ismi, bizce, *BÜYÜK DOĞU*... Eğer bir gün Türk vatanının sınırları içinde, sadık rüyalarımızın müjdesini eşya ve hadiselere sinmiş görürsek karşımızda billurlaşacak manzaranın topyekun ifadesi şu olacaktır: *BÜYÜK DOĞU*

⁵³ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bir gün Atatürk dirilecektir... Bir gün onu, kâfuriden yontulmuş asil ve mevzun parmaklarile kılıcının kabzasını kavramış, zarif ve ince endamile bir masaya eğilmiş ve gök gözleriyle dünya haritasını süzmeye başlamış olarak göreceğiz... Bugün, dünya muhasebe ve muvazenesinde Türk milletine ait hakların terazi kefesinde görüneceği andır... İşte o gün başımızda bulunacak olan şahsiyet, günün getireceği bütün kurtarıcılık vasıflarına göre, ruhile olduğu kadar maddesile de Atatürk'ten başkası olmayacaktır.

In addition, he stated that his limited criticisms of Kemalism should be regarded as a constructive criticism: “If a man criticizes a revolution on the behalf of this revolution, he should be regarded as the purest and the most devoted servant of that revolution” (Kısakürek, 1944e).⁵⁴ In a discussion he entered with Falih Rıfkı Atay upon an article published in the seventeenth issue of the journal in which was demanded to be read of *mevlüt* (Islamic memorial service) in the Ankara Radio for the ones who lost their life in earthquake, he expressed his loyalty to secular character of the regime, and accused Falih Rıfkı Atay of skewing the essence of secularism by not tolerating any of religious value (Kısakürek, 1944d).

Kısakürek had revealed the *Büyük Doğu* formulation as an alternative ideology to Kemalism. He put nine principles of the *Büyük Doğu* against the six principles of Kemalizmin (Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism/Reformism) which were also incorporated into the constitution in 1937. This nine principles of *Büyük Doğu* were spiritualism (*ruhçuluk*), qualitativism (*keyfiyetçilik*), personalism (*şahsiyetçilik*), moralism (*ahlakçılık*), nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), regulationism in capital and property (*sermaye ve mülkiyette tedbircilik*), communitarianism (*cemiyetçilik*), orderism (*nizamcılık*), interventionism (*müdahalecilik*). Nevertheless, in this period, the contents of these principles filled by Kısakürek in a way that would not strongly contradict with the values of the regime. The most distinctive reflection of this is seen in the explanation of the nationalism principle. He set out an understanding of nationalism in accordance with the regime's citizenship-centred secular nationalism definition. In his definition, nationalism was considered as a consciousness and anyone who shared this consciousness was

⁵⁴ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bir inkılâbı, o inkılâp adına tenkit edem adam, aynı inkılâbın en saf ve en sadık hizmetçisi bilinmek gerekir.

accepted as the member of Turkish nation, whereas he was to accept Muslimness as the prerequisite of being a Turk in a later stage:

“It is the soul which we draw the topography as the enclosure of the Anatolia envelope, crystallizes a tightly framed soul with its all laws and diseases; each element, approaches the Turk at the rate of it is mortal in the unity of this soul; thus, the Turk, without falling into the obscurantism of defending the narrow and rugged customs of the egg shells in his origin, sculpt his own particular cadres in the width of the entire humanity; and, this view, which forbids every asset in the oneness of the Turkish spirit **without saying 'forbidden' to any foreign element**, expresses true and true nationalism” (Kısakürek, 1944a).⁵⁵

As also can be seen by a semiotic analysis of cover pages of the journal, the World War II was one of dominant issues of this period. The developments in the course of the war were closely followed in the journal. According to Kısakürek, the war entered the third and final phase. The first period had begun with the German attack on Poland in 1939 and had ended with the German attack on Russia in 1941. This period was the phase in which the axis states were superior. The second period had ended with the stopping of the Germans in Stalingrad in 1943 and the third period was the phase in which the democracies were moving towards the victory, and probably it was the final phase of the war. By the end of the war, a new world would be established under the leadership of democratic regimes (Kısakürek, 1944b). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kısakürek defended a pro-Great Britain policy

⁵⁵ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Anadolu zarfının mazrufu olarak topografyasını çizdiğimiz ruhtur ki, bütün kanunları ve illetleriyle sınıksız çerçeveli bir ruhu billurlaştırır; her unsur, bu ruhun birlik mihrakında fani olduğu nispette Türke yaklaşır; böylece, Türk, menşindeki yumurta kabuklarının dar ve haşin gümrüğünü müdafaa etmek softalığına düşmeden, kendi hususi kadrosunu, bütün insane kadro genişliğinde heykelleştirmiş olur; ve yer yüzünde hiç bir yabancı unsura 'yasak' demeksizin, her kıymeti Türk ruhunun vahidinde yasaklaştıran bu görüş, öz ve gerçek *Milliyetçiliği* belirtir.

since the early years of the war and maintained his attitude in this period. He advocated that “every nation that carries a spark from the eternal human ore, liberty, and the fire of independence are obliged to embrace British politics with all its strength and to keep British politics” (Kısakürek, 1943m).⁵⁶ He kept his attitude also in this period and frequently stressed that Turkey should follow a foreign policy that in the direction of democratic regimes. In his eyes, if the Axis won the war, the only choice that would remain for the Turks was to be slaves (Kısakürek, 1943k). He clarified the ones who had fascist or communist attitudes as traitors (Kısakürek, 1943l). In this regard, by presenting an early example of McCarthyism, he published a part titled ‘*İç Yüzleri*’ (Inner Faces) in which some names of Turkish intellectual life (M. Zekeriya Sertel, M. Emin Erkilet, A. İhsan Sabis) were denounced as communist and were criticised for being supporters of Soviet Russia .

Probably to mould a public opinion and gain an audience mass, Kısakürek, beginning with the first issue, published a series of a public survey in which he asked attention grabbing questions to the prominent scholars, writers, and bureaucrats of the period. It is worth mentioning the question he asked in the survey since they summarised general frame of his discourses. He began to survey with the question of ‘do you believe in Allah?’ and went on with these questions: ‘do you believe in the way of seeking our personality in the West and Westernization?’, ‘Do you believe in the righteousness of a racism and nationalism orientation that transcends our boundaries for us?’, ‘Do you believe that we have experienced a deep spiritual and moral crisis?’, ‘Do you believe that the revolutions we have made since the Tanzimat have brought us a rooted occurrence in the basis of spirituality?’, ‘Do you believe that we must achieve a great revolution on the basis of spirituality?’, ‘Do you believe that

⁵⁶ This article was published first in the ‘Son Telgraf’ newspaper on 5 July 1940.

Turkish society can find its future in one of the examples of liberalism, communism and fascism?’, ‘Do you believe that the new social architecture can only emerge from the maturation and the metamorphosis of democracies?’, ‘Do you believe that the most perfect consciousness of preserving the self is to join the path of the democracies for the Turkish society's account?’ (Kısakürek, 1943o).⁵⁷

These questions, in a sense, were the headlines/milestones of his ideological formulation that he designed in an ensuing series of articles published under top title *İdeolocya Örgüsü* (Ideological Web)⁵⁸. As also can be understood from the questions of the survey, Kısakürek, built up his discourses and his formulation on a history of decline and critics of western oriented reforms held to reverse this trajectory of decline in axis of Eastern-Western problematic, as the early Islamists had done and the next generation of the Islamists would do. According to his historical narration (to be examined in detail in Chapter six), Turkish nation, as the flourished representative of Muslim World, began to experience a decline by reigning time of Sultan Süleyman the Lawful (reigning 1520-1566), whereas the West began to progress in material achievements thanks to the modern science in the same periods. To him, the main reason of the decline was alienation to the true Islam due to bigotry of the *ulema* (scholars trained in Islamic theology and jurisprudence). This alienation brought about a total deterioration in the state, law, education, and society structures. The

⁵⁷ This is the author's translation. The original text is: ‘Allah’a inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Benliğimizi garpte ve garplılaşmakta aramak gidişine inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Bizim için sınır dışı bir ırkçılık ve *Milliyetçilik* temayülünün doğruluğuna inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Derin bir ruh ve ahlak bunalımı geçirdiğimize inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Tanzimattan beri yaptığımız inkılapların bize ruh planında köklü bir tekevvün getirdiğine inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Ruh planında büyük bir inkılap zorunda olduğumuza inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Türk cemiyetinin, davasını, Liberalizma, Komünizma, ve Faşizma örneklerinden birinde bulabileceğine inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Yeni cemiyet mimarisinin ancak Demokrasyaların bir tekâmül ve istihalesinden doğabileceğine inanıyor musunuz?’, ‘Türk cemiyeti hesabına, en mükemmel nefis muhafazası şuurunun, Demokrasyalar yoluna katılmak olduğuna inanıyor musunuz?’.

⁵⁸ In this first period of the magazine, the title of 'ideological web' was placed under the heading 'towards the *Büyük Doğu*' as a subtitle.

incompetent sultans and their statesmen who wanted to put an end to the bad going saw the solution in imitating the West. But this reform could not succeed in bringing anything but a moral corruption in society and the Ottoman state collapsed. (Kırsakürek, 1943r; 1943s). As for the Republican era, while the Turkish nation could save itself in material ground with the National Struggle, on the flip side, it lost its essence and roots via western-oriented, positivist and secularist reforms (Kırsakürek, 1943t).

Kırsakürek tried to produce an alternative modernisation project over this historical narrative of decline. Firstly, he argued that the western civilisation, which was chosen as the direction of modernisation was in a spiritual crisis itself, therefore, it was not a right direction for progress. The two great wars were also a result of this spiritual crisis and moral corruption (Kırsakürek, 1943d). Therefore, considering westernisation as the only path to pursuit in the way of progress could not be a convenient remedy. According to him, the Turks should first remember that they are Easterner and determine a model of progress that is consistent with their own values. This model should be a synthesis of both Eastern and Western civilisation. Therefore, he compared the *Büyük Doğu* to an orchestra playing a symphony which synthesised the Eastern and Western civilisations:

“A Symphony of ideal is being played, rises over the spiritual roots of the East, fosters the tree of West’s material achievement and, thus, aiming the rise of a Great East from within the East... The East, listen to the melody of its salvation in this symphony...and the West, give ear to its most precious dawah also in this symphony... this symphony consist of the world view of the Great East, and this world view is, solely, consist of the dawah of pure and true

Islamic spirit embracing the both the eastern and western worlds, together with their pasts, today's, tomorrows, truths and experiences” (Kısaakürek, 1944f).⁵⁹

This framework constituted the backbone of the *Büyük Doğu* formulation without being altered in essence, while being discussed in more detail in the following periods. However, while he was filling the contents of this modernisation project, he showed different orientations depending on the political context of periods. In this period he did not make a revolutionary appearance like the establishment of Islamic state. Instead, he proposed a moral transition that prioritises ethical values:

“Applying to the moral of Islam with a homogenous community and state consciousness that embraces everything, the Turkish homeland, the Anatolia, the Thrace, the village, the town, the province, the house, the school, the temple, the street, the square, the state office, the shop by their all material and spiritual plans; here is the secret of our salvation” (Kısaakürek, 1943b).⁶⁰

Besides, while explaining why this moral transformation should take shape on the axis of Islam, he resorted to a philosophical analysis in the context of Bergson's work of ‘two sources of morality and religion’ instead of referring solely to religious sources. In this debate, he tried to prove why philosophical descriptions were insufficient to compose a true morality, but it was a very superficial consideration:

⁵⁹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Doğunun ruh kökü üzerinde, öz gövdesi ve dallarile iç içe, Batının madde ağacını yetiştiren, böylece Doğu alemlerinden bir *Büyük Doğunun* fişkırmasını hedef tutan bir mefkure senfonisi çalınıyor... Doğu, bu senfonide kurtuluşunun bestesini dinlesin... ve Batı, yine bu senfonyada en aziz davasına kulak versin... Bu Senfonya, *Büyük Doğu*'nun dünya görüşünden ve bu dünya görüşü, sadece saf ve gerçek İslam ruhunun dün, bugün ve yarın; halkları, hakikatleri ve tecrübeleriyle bütün Doğu ve Batı dünyasını kucaklamış olan davasından ibarettir.

⁶⁰ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Maddi ve manevi bütün planları ile Türk vatanını, Anadoluyu, Trakyayı, köyü, kasabayı, şehri, evi, mektebi, mabedi, sokağı, meydanı, dükkanı, resmi daireyi, her şeyi, herşeyi içine alan yekpare bir cemiyet ve devlet şuru ile İslam ahlakının, kapısını çalmak; işte kurtuluşumuzun sırrı.

“There are two sources of the morality; religions and philosophical denominations... As a matter of morality that is communal and practical, the philosophical denominations have been unable to build any kind of establishment in the world and throughout history, apart from stoicist morality of the ancient Greek and the Roman Empire, and materialist moral values of the present Soviet Russia; this two system exceptional, they all were in theory; the first of these two systems benefited from the mytholocity, and the second from the remnants of Christian morality; consequently they revealed that the morality of true and Abrahamic religions (semavi dinler) is an uncompetitively whole” (Kısakürek, 1943a).⁶¹

Again, as it is understood from the survey questions, another subject that characterised the period was Kısakürek's emphasis on democracy. In his eyes, democracies were the “real civilization heirs, banner-bearers of rights and freedoms” (Kısakürek, 1944c; 1943j). He met with pleasure that the intellectuals involved in the survey were in the same opinion that neither communism nor fascism would be a remedy (Kısakürek, 1943p). This positive view of Kısakürek towards the Western countries and democracy was to change within the course of time.

Besides the part where he built up his ideological formulation, Kısakürek also wrote some sections that can be classified as theological. The first one was titled *Tanrı Kulundan Dinlediklerim* (What I Heard from God Servant) in which he mentioned to dialogues between him and his master, *sheikh* Abdülhakim Arvasi,

⁶¹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Ahlakın iki kaynağı vardır; dinler ve dinler yerinde felsefi mezhepler... Felsefi mezhepler, umumi ve ameli bir ahlak mevzuu olarak dünyada ve bütün tarih boyunca eski Yunan ve Romanın İstoizma ahlakile bugünkü Sovyet Rusya'nın maddecilik ahlakından başka hiçbir tesis bina edememişler; bu iki system müstesna, baştan başa nazariyede kalmışlar; bu iki sistemin birincisinde mitolocya, ikincisinde de Hristiyanlık ahlakının artıklarından faydalanmışlardır; netice itibarile hakiki ve semavi dinlere bağlı ahlakın rekabet kabul etmez bir bütün olduğunu göstermişlerdir.

within a *mise en scène* he mount in his mind. The other part is entitled '*Halkadan Priltılar*' (Twinkles from the Circle) in which legends about some saints and words of the prophet were given place. It should be indicated that almost all of those parts, which are about theological issues, were quoted from several religious book, and except a few, such as *Tanrı Kulundan Dilediklerim*, were not written directly by Kısakürek.

The journal also carried an important identity of art, literature, science and thought magazine besides its political and Islamic character. Kısakürek reflected this nature of the journal with the subtitle of 'thought-art-incident-job'. Works of many famous names of the thought, literature and art circles of the period such as Bedri Rahmi (Eyüboğlu), Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca, Salih Murat Uzdilek, Semiha Ayverdi, Fikret Adil, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Salih Zeki Aktay, Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Burhan Toprak, Peyami Safa, and Burhan Belge, were published in the journal. Besides, Istanbul's art agenda was closely followed and the readers were being informed about the new exhibitions and theatre plays. One of the attractive parts of the journal was the part entitled 'One from the East, One from the West'. In this part, famous classical works of Western and Eastern civilisations were given side by side.

Although Kısakürek tried to beware of portraying an anti-regime publishing policy, the journal was perceived as potentially detrimental by the regime's security reflexes. In the report, dated 17 February 1944, prepared by the Directorate General of Press and Publication, it was stated that upon the investigation conducted about the issues of the journal between the first and ninth, it was detected that on the one hand, Kısakürek made religious propaganda, on the other hand, he made the propaganda of a country where millions of Muslims living in her colonies (Great Britain). According

to the report, Kısakürek was warned several times in the direction of changing the publication policy of the journal. Since he did not change his publishing policy, a new investigation conducted about the issues between the 10th and 18th, and it was detected that he was instilling impiety to the youths under the religion mask, and disinclining Turkish nation from regime. In the meantime, in the 13th issue of the magazine, it was given place to a hadith of the prophet stating that ‘there was no obedience to those who did not obey God’. The report was viewed in the meeting of the Committee of Ministers, and by decision of the committee, dated 8 May 1944, the journal was closed down temporarily (National archives, 1944).

His good relationship with Kemalist establishment had also begun to deteriorate, and concomitantly he was removed from his post in the art academy upon the instruction of Hassan Ali Yucel. Then, he was sent to Eğirdir to accomplish his military service, which was postponed for his appointment to the academy (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 29). According to his statements, the regime wanted to keep him under control also during his military service and sent a message about his anti-regime thoughts to the brigade where he was paying his duty (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 273).

2.4 The Relative Liberalization in Turkish Politics and the Beginning of True

Büyük Doğu

When Kısakürek turned back after completing his military service, the political climate of Turkey had begun to change. The political conjuncture of the post-war era which began to take form dominantly by Western Democracies forced Turkey to adjust his political system in line with these democratic regimes. The internal dynamics of the Turkey also required a multi-party political system in which the

demands of different sections of the society could be defended. The private sector had grown considerably during the republic time, and was no longer willing to endure the status quo (Ahmad, 2003, p. 103). The arbitrary measures had been taken by the state during the war era caused alienation of the bourgeoisie, the landlords and the peasants. The increased discontent made a safety valve essential (Karpas, 2010a, p. 229). President İnönü gave the signal of a transformation in a speech he had in the opening ceremony of May 19th celebrations. The opposition expressed their criticisms of the mono-party system distinctly in approval process of Charter of the United Nations. Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), who was to be the prime minister of 1950s, stated that Turkey would certainly be entered into the practice of real democracy by signing Charter (Yalman, 1947, p. 53).

The gradually grown discontent found its representatives in the debates about Land Reform Bill in the Assembly. Some members of the RPP criticised the bill for both violation of the private property right and it would cause decline in production. Four names of the opposition Celal Bayar (1883-1986, businessman-banker), Refik Koraltan (1889-1974, bureaucrat), Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966, historian), and Adnan Menderes (cotton-growing landlord) tabled a motion to the party group demanding the full implementation of the principle of national sovereignty as stated in the constitution and carrying out the party business in accordance with the principles of democracy (Ahmad, 2003, p. 103). As Lewis stated, the criticism of the system led by the opposition found positive response also in the public opinion.

Seeing the increasing discontent and the change in the international system, President İnönü, with reference to the victory of democracies over fascism, expressed the necessity of an opposition in his speech opening the new session of the Assembly on 1 November 1945 (Cihan, 1992). Nevertheless, the government was still cautious

about the strong opposition against the regime. In that regard, even though the war ended, the government extended the time of martial law in several cities, including Istanbul, with the aim of maintaining the insurance of an extraordinary power that has become a traditional method since the early years of the republic. With this law, the government could have the opportunity to suppress the rising opposition against itself, even when the law of publication was inadequate (Koçak, 2010, p. 312). Actually, with the amendments made in various years, the Printing Law of 1931 was already providing an effective control and supervision mechanism on the press. Also, with the amendment in 1943, the Directorate General of Press and Publication was tasked with observing the publication activities that could have harmful effects on national interests and to investigate and inspect such activities (İskit, 1943, pp. 336-355). And, it had been proven by the closure of the *Büyük Doğu* that this mechanism was working. In 1945, the proposal by Celal Bayar about the softening of some articles of the Press Act was also rejected by the same internal defensive motive.

Although the government continued to embrace these protective measures, events that developed over time could not prevent the emergence of opposition parties and critical voices. Apart from the *Büyük Doğu*, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti's '*Serdengeçti*' magazine (1947), II. Nurettin Topçu's '*Hareket*' magazine which was one of the first Islamist publications of the Republican era but suspended its publications after a brief publication period of 12 issues, and Esref Edip Fergan's '*Sebilürreşad*' magazine which had been the main publication organ of the Islamists of the second constitutional period, '*Selamet*' (Salvation) journal (1947) published by Ömer Rıza Doğrul who was one of the writers of the *Büyük Doğu*, '*Millet*' (Nation) Newspaper would be the other publications of this period in which conservative reactions to be articulated. Nevertheless, Kısakürek and his journal would be at the

centre of the political agenda at every stage of this transition period more than these publications where conservative voices rose.

Besides, at least nine of the twenty-three political parties founded between the years of 1945 and 1950 had some religious coloured promises in their party programs (Sitembölükbaşı, 1995, p. 16). Although it would be relegated without showing any success in the elections, the first opposition party was the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*-NDP) which was founded by Nuri Demirağ, a millionaire businessman (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976, p. 14). The party emphasised on ethics and national values, and defended the 'Islamic Union Orient Federation' project in its program (Tunaya, 1995, p. 325). Cevat Rifat Atilhan, who was one of the founders of the NDP, founded the Turkish Conservative Party (*Türk Muhafazakar Partisi*-TCP) in 1947. '*Mücadele*' (Struggle) and '*Milli İnkılap*' (National Revolution) were the publication organs of the party (1950, p. 459). After repealing itself without an important activity, the party which defended politics like dependence to ethics and traditions, the Turkish and the Arab Union, Atilhan joined the *Büyük Doğu* and took office in the *Büyük Doğu* Association. The Party for Refining Protection (*Aritma Koruma Partisi*-PRP) (1946), The Farmers' and Peasants' Party (*Çiftçi ve Köylü Partisi*-FPP) (1946) and the Islamic Protection Party (*İslam Koruma Partisi*-IPP) (1946) were other parties with religious colours in the party programs, but they all closed without having any significant influence (Tunaya, 1995, pp. 695, 708; Tunaya, 2007; Sitembölükbaşı, 1995, pp. 17,18).

Despite the inflation in the number of political parties, the only effective representative of the opposition was the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP). The party was founded by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuad Köprülü, who presented the above-mentioned proposal called memorandum of the

four on 7 January 1946. The party leader, Celal Bayar, was considered by everyone as a Kemalist and pro-revolution statesman (Koçak, 2010, p. 790). The central organisation was also mostly comprised of former Republicans. The party reported its commitment to the CHP's 'six arrows', Yet promised a more liberal attitude towards secularism, while declaring that religion would not be an instrument of politics (Sitembölükbaşı, 1995, p. 25). As the DP organisation began to grow and spread into provinces, the party became home to the ones whose main concern was hostility to the mono-party state and taking a revenge on their tormentors by ending the Republicans rule (Ahmad, 1977, p. 14). The rush in the process of organisation of the grassroots also made it possible for conservative people such as the ones who were advocating the return to Arabic letters and women's chador, to enter to the party (Sitembölükbaşı, 1995, p. 32). On the other hand, the party had difficulty in convincing the masses that it was a party different from the RPP (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976, pp. 16,17). Many people, such as Kısakürek, were seeing DP was as the junior partner of the RPP.

It can also be said that there was a doubt in the minds about whether this transition process will succeed or not. Some names in the Kemalist circles such as Nadir Nadi and Falih Rifkı Atay expressed that it was too early for the transition to democracy (Koçak, 2013, p. 23). The first elections, seen on the horizon, would be in nature confirming these doubts. The RPP decided to hold the elections in 1946 rather than its usual time of 1947 to get an advantageous position against the opposition in the elections by giving little time to organise (Ahmad, 2003, p. 105). These elections would be interpreted as the insincerity of the RPP and would cause great debate.

In November 1945, Kısakürek began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* once again in this political contexture of relative liberalisation. This was also a new opportunity for him to articulate his thoughts within a more Islamic discourse and to criticise the

regime more severely. However, it would be a gradually proceeding process. He kept his cautious attitude especially in the early issues of this period of the journal. Because, he had doubts for the success of transition to multi-party political system as many political minds had. Although, he had been advocating the participation of Turkey to the new world order besides the democratic regimes in the war years, he expressed the reason of his distrust because of being dictated of this transition by foreign powers. To him, it was not so possible for a country, which had not testified democracy before, to pass into a democratic system; especially in an environment where there was not any sophisticated, original worldview (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 48).

He stood aloof from the political parties that started to be set up. He believed that the DP would not be able to sustain a genuine opposition. He described the formation of the opposition as the competition of two unrighteous (Kısakürek, 1945d). According to him, rising of an opposition from within the ruling party would be nothing but a continuation of the same mindset. Although, it was given place to an interview with the founder of the National Development Party, Nuri Demirağ, in the first issue, he did not show any positive tendency also to this party. Besides, he denied news claiming that he would be an independent candidate from Maraş and would support the NDP. He announced that he would not be a member of parliament independently or depending on a political party (Kısakürek, 1946i). In his eyes, the main contradiction with those parties was lack of a distinct doctrine and idea. They did not reveal anything sensible except rewording the motto of 'bringing the democracy' (Kısakürek, 1946w). Also, in a different article, he depicted the emerging context in these words: "Yesterday, the 'one' was destroying us, now the 'many' tend to destroy us" (Kısakürek, 1946x). In fact, the reason behind why Kısakürek refrained from showing tendency to any political party was that he was planning to launch his

own political movement by means of a political party: “There could be a *Büyük Doğu* Party, as the enemy of the idea of Party itself and as bound to a 'whole' tightly; if the abstract party concept had not cheapen as the bonitos that spoiled in a short time!.. Once these days of inflation gone by!” (Kısakürek, 1946x).⁶²

On the other hand, he thought that it was too early to move on to a political party founding phase. As will also be mentioned in the coming periods, Kısakürek adopted a strategy that was proceeding with slow and sure steps without attracting the attention of the regime's protective reflexes. In this regard, firstly, there was not enough time for establishing the grassroots of a party before the general elections of 1946. Secondly, for Kısakürek, these elections were the ones whose winner was obvious in advance because of the unequal competition conditions (Kısakürek, 1946m). In his eyes, such a preterm birth would cause nothing except attracting attention in a time when he and his party was in a defenceless position.

Although he thought that it was too early to launch his own movement, the option of influencing the political elites was still on the table. He applied to Celal Bayar once more to establish a political cooperation. He was planning to give political support if they could reconcile around the same opinion. After their meeting in Celal Bayar's home, it became clear that they were in a deeply dissensus (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 62,63). And, it was also the end of his political project of establishing cooperation between Bayar and Fevzi Çakmak, although this cooperation would realise with participation of Çakmak in the DP. He expressed this dissensus in his journal in these statements “the small one is not Celal Bayar, but the big one is the

⁶² This is the author's translation. The original text is: Parti, bizzat parti fikrine düşman, ve bir 'bütün'e sınıksız bağlı olarak *Büyük Doğu* Partisi olabilirdi; eğer mücerret parti mefhumu, tez vakitte kokmuş palamutlar kadar ucuzlamış olmasaydı !.. Hele şu enflasyon günleri bir geçsin!..

idea” (Kısakürek, 1946k). After this gentle farewell, Kısakürek would begin to toughen his critics also towards the DP.

Put off the phase of setting up a political party, Kısakürek concentrated on composing of the *Büyük Doğu* idea, on which he was to construct his movement. He managed to build the backbone of this idea by his writings he penned throughout this period of the magazine. Now, he was speaking of an Islamic revolution and an Islamic state model named '*Başyücelik*' (Head Noble) state order which was to be established via this revolution (Kısakürek, 1946h). The Islamic nature of the state was symbolised with the statement of 'sovereignty belongs to god' (Kısakürek, 1946y). The laws were to be enacted in accordance with *Sharia* and all policies carried out were to be supervised by the Supreme Council of Religion, which was bonded directly to the head of the state. Crimes such as robbery, prostitution, and murder were to be punished according to *Sharia* with the punishments of execution and cutting of the hand (Kısakürek, 1946f).

Kısakürek designed this state model as a syncretic system consisting of a mixture of different political systems such as democracy and socialism. His approach is based on the presumption that Islam constitutes a perfect superstructure that incorporates the good aspects of all political systems and ideologies. According to Kısakürek, “equality and justice aimed at socialism, equality of opportunity and private property on which liberalism is constructed, freedom of thought which is the main pillar of democracy, exist together in unity and harmony in Islam” (Kısakürek, 1946s). On the other hand, as will be examined more specifically in Chapter Six, the system he revealed had serious contradictions and it was a totalitarian utopia in its essence.

The societal morality matters were one of the other important issues that Kısakürek dealt with. Alcohol and gambling, which are incompatible with Islamic values, were frequently discussed in the journal. Especially, the issue of women, one of the most visible symbols of the Islamic way of life, was handled predominantly. Half nude women's pictures were often presented on the cover page of the journal as symbols of moral corruption. The demonstrations of the schoolgirls wearing shorts and short skirts at the stadiums in 19 May celebrations were being criticised heavily. Besides, the role of women in social life and their clothing were one of the frequently discussed issues. A very conservative approach in this regard was exhibited by Cafer Seno. He argued that women should be removed from the workplace by stating that they had neglected their maternity duties by participating in working life. According to Seno, "it was the catastrophe of the community in which women began to share the whole male business" (Seno, 1946).

However, Kısakürek had a more moderate understanding. According to Kısakürek, in Islam, women could work in all types of professions except non-moral professions such as night-life (Kısakürek, 1947e; Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 264,265). His moderate approach also shows itself in women's clothing. The women's clothing models from the fashion magazines published in Europe and America were presented as: "we believe that we can determine our own measures with the finest touches on these pictures that appeal to the highest degree of elegance" (Kısakürek, 1946t). Besides, in various occasions, he criticised women wearing chador. The following words summarise Kısakürek's view of the role of women in the society:

"It is not a measure of Islam to imprison the woman to the cages and the harems, not to show her to anyone, to put it in a black pouch from the heel to the hair and to pass her from the corridors of the society just for a moment

with this appearance... The woman, who is in the scale of Islam, is a decency and virtue sculpture open to all eyes in the great square of the Islamic society and in the fields of any kind of work” (Kısakürek, *İslam ve Kadın*, 1947e; 2013i, pp. 137,138).⁶³

Generally speaking, the argument of Islamists with Kemalism has often been polemical due to Atatürk's symbolic value in the eyes of the people. Although they had heavily criticized strict secular nature of Kemalizm, they refrained from criticising him personally, whereas some did not, such as Mustafa Sabri Efendi. In the same way, Kısakürek also refrained from directing his criticism to Atatürk. Rather, he developed a discourse that excluded him from the debate. To that, the construction of the new state had been initiated by Atatürk with a sense that was more tolerant with Islamic values (Kısakürek, 1947f). Besides, after the establishment of the RPP, Atatürk did not interfere with the political arena (Kısakürek, 1947c). For this reason, it was the RPP and İnönü who were responsible for all the corruption and deterioration. With such a formulation, Kısakürek penned many articles which heavily criticised both secular reforms such as abolishment of the caliphate, removal of religious schools and courts, closure of dervish lodges, and the nationalisation programs held by the Kemalists such as performing the *adhan* (call to prayer) in Turkish, Turkish history thesis, language reform. (Kısakürek, 1946a; 1947a; Kısakürek, 2010e, pp. 68, 86). His discourses were quite parallel to Mustafa Sabri Efendi's criticism made from abroad. As Duran stated, Mustafa Sabri Efendi provided

⁶³ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Kadını kafes aralarına ve haremlere hapsetmek, hiç kimsenin karşısına çıkarmamak ve topuğundan saçına kadar simsiyah bir torba içine sokup öylece ve bir an için cemiyet koridorlarından geçirivermek, İslami ölçü ve gereklerin emrettiği bir iş ve ölçü değildir... Şer'i ölçülere bürülü olarak kadın, İslam cemiyet ve beldesinin büyük meydanında ve her türlü iş ve faaliyet sahasında, bütün nazarlara açık bir edep ve ismet heykelidir

intellectual materials for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's deconstruction of the Kemalist discourse (Duran, 2001, pp. 188,189).

Besides its Islamic and political identity, the journal kept its identity of being a charming art, literature and thought journal.⁶⁴ Many of the writers of the first period continued to write also in this period, and new many prominent names of Turkish intellectual life including scholars, musician, artist, man of letters began to write. The interesting point is that the names on the very different wings of the political spectrum continued to take place in the writer cadre of the magazine, even though the magazine's Islamic nature became more apparent and the journal had subjected to sanction of the state apparatus for this reason. This richness of the writers, which can be regarded as a blessing of the Bohemian years of friendship capital, brought an attractive intellectual character to the journal. Salih Murat Uzdilek's articles about physics such as *Atom ve Yıldızlar* (Atom and Stars), *Yeni Fizik* (New Physics), *Süreklilik ve Süreksizlik* (Continuity, Discontinuity), Cemal Reşit Rey's article about the theory of Music such as *Musikimiz* (Our Music), Mustafa Şekip Tunç's philosophical articles such as *Hayat Yapısı* (Life Structure), *Madde ve Ruh* (Material and Spirit) can be articulated as illustrative writings in terms of reflecting the intellectual perspective of the journal. As the Islamist emphasis on the journal increased and Kısakürek's discourses became tough in the following years, many of these names would leave the journal; and the journal would lose this intellectual richness to a great extent later on. In the following years, Kısakürek was to describe his togetherness with these names as a tactic:

⁶⁴ Okay sees this period as the richest period of the journal in terms of the contents (Okay, 2014, p. 28). However, it should be addressed that many of the further periods of the journal had such a nature.

“The method, strategy and policy is clear. While designing the *Büyük Doğu* ideal as a non-contradictory ideology under the title of ideology web, to benefit from those notables some of who are supposed important but actually nothing; to give them some roles whether from the edge of the ideal or from the side of antithesis; even they are communist, to publish their works with pleasure as long as they are not opposed to the ideal not from their inner side but their outward side; thus, in spite of handing over the *Büyük Doğu* to them, benefiting from them as far as possible; and to wait the generation of the future, the generation of the *Büyük Doğu* which would occur at least twenty years later” (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 280).⁶⁵

It can be said that the discourses of Kısakürek had started to find a response in the society. It can also be said that the discourses of Kısakürek had started to find a response in the society. The incidents that resulted in the plundering of some publishing houses, including the Tan Newspaper, in November 1945 presented the first sign of this. The *Tan* newspaper was one of the prominent publications where the opposition gathered around, such as the Ahmet Emin Yalman's *Vatan* Newspaper (Karpat, 2010a, p. 237). The newspaper, managed by the couple of Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, was known for its socialist views. Zekeriya Sertel had already been declared as a communist by Kısakürek in the first period of the *Büyük Doğu*. The newspaper published articles dealing with social and economic problems from a socialist point of view. Besides, it advocated the development of good relations with

⁶⁵ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Metod, (strateji) (taktik) ve politikası açıktır. *Büyük Doğu* idealini tezatsız bir fikriyat halinde ve 'İdeolocya Örgüsü' başlığı altında gerçekleştirirken, bir şey sanılan çoğu kof şöhretlerden faydalanmak, bunlara davanın kısıcılığından, köşeciğinden, anti-tez tarafından olsun, roller vermek; komünist olsalar bile, gizli içleriyle değil, açık dışlarıyla ideale ters düşmeyecek yazılarını memnurlukla neşretmek, böylece onlara *Büyük Doğu*'yu teslim etmek yerine onları görünebildikleri kadarı ile teslim almak ve istikbalin yeni neslini, o tarihten en aşağı 20 yıl sonraki *Büyük Doğu* neslini beklemek.

Soviet Russia (Koçak, 2010, pp. 773-777). They also started to publish a journal named '*Görüşler*' (Opinions) where liberal and leftist intellectuals were expected to come together. Also, some prominent names of the newly emerging opposition such as Celal Bayar were expected to write in the journal (Sertel, 1987).

On 3 December 1945, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who had also been involved in the writing cadre of the *Büyük Doğu* in the first period, penned a provocative article pointing to the journals of *Görüşler* (Views) and *Yeni Dünya* (New World) in his newspaper, *Tanin* (Yalçın, 1945). And one day, another provocative article was published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, known by pro-government publication policy, titled '*Bizim Yoldaşlar Nihayet Maskelerini Attılar*' (Our Comrades Have Finally Thrown off Their Masks) (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 December 1945). In the same day, a group of demonstrator, mostly consisted of university students, marched to the printing houses of *Tan*, *Görüşler* and *Yeni Dünya* with the slogans 'long live Atatürk, long live İnönü, long live democracy', then, ransacked these printing houses and two bookstores with the slogans 'down with the communists, down with Sertels' (Koçak, 2013, p. 294). The incident was reported with sympathy for the demonstrators in press (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 December 1945). Falih Rıfkı Atay interpreted the event as an excited reaction to the attacks against national sentiments (Atay, 1945).

For many observers and Sabiha Sertel, this incident was the result of the government's disguised incitements (Sertel, 1987, pp. 308-314). On the other hand, some students, involved in the demonstration, also came to the printing house of *Büyük Doğu* and shouted supportive slogans for Kısakürek. In response to the enthusiastic cheers of the students, Kısakürek also made a short speech and admitted them to the office (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 269). In the subsequent issue of the journal after the incident, he reported the incident in the journal with the statement of "this

country will not die as long as this youth exists".⁶⁶ According to his statements, some young people had come to him prior to the incident and asked for his opinion about the journal of *Görüşler* when the first issue had just been published. In response, he advised them to be cautious and restrained. Nonetheless, the young people demonstrated a national unity against the danger of communism, which encouraged as result of the recently tolerant attitude of the government (Kısakürek, 1945c). The students, also, gave some papers they got from the office of *Tan* Newspaper to Kısakürek and he delivered these papers, which he saw as the evidence of Sertel's secret activities such as making provocations via Armenian issue, to the relevant authorities (Kısakürek, 1946l). Kısakürek saw this incident as a reflection of the success of the *Büyük Doğu* idea and as the countenance of sacradist and nationalist youth (*mukaddesatçı ve Milliyetçi gençlik*) towards him (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 269).

Another reason why Kısakurek could come into prominence in this incident was that his discourses were shaped around an intense nationalism and a tough anti-communism besides Islamism. As mentioned in the previous chapter, anti-communism was one of the main themes of his writings. The political context of the period also made anti-communist rhetoric more popular. Soviet Russia announced that the Friendship and Neutrality Treaty of 1925 would not be renewed but renegotiated (Koçak, 2010, p. 114). The Soviets argued that the conditions of the pre-war era changed. This change in circumstances also included the case of the Straits, and the Soviets demanded new amendments in the Montreux Convention of Straits. Foreign Minister Molotov, who accepted Turkey's Ambassador to Soviet Russia Selim Sarper on 7 June 1945, brought the border treaty of 1921 to the agenda while conveying the Soviet demands (Oran, 2006, pp. 501,502). Relations, strained through

⁶⁶ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bu gençlik var olduğu sürece bu devlet ölmez.

mutual diplomatic notes, also showed their influence among the society in the case of *Tan*. The incident was described by the Soviets as anti-Russia movement (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976, p. 16). A few weeks later, a few articles published in Georgian newspapers reinforced the perception that Russia was in demand for land. In the articles, it was claimed that Kars and Ardahan should be restored to Soviet Georgia (Oran, 2006, p. 503). Whether the Soviets had such an intention officially, it was enough for this perception to occur in Turkey. The news was described as a ‘cold joke’ in the press and the response of the Assembly was reported as “The straits are the throat of our nation, Kars tableland is the backbone”⁶⁷ (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1945). Turkey was drifting towards a cold war with the Soviets, and communism threat became a catalyst that brings together the people of different views. In this extent, anti-communist rhetoric became an instrument that was quite favourable on the political language, and it affected Kısakürek's influence in the society positively. Kısakürek was speaking with a chauvinistic language that called the Turks to die against Moscow threat when necessary (Kısakürek, 1946v).

The emergence of a mass among the youth people who appreciates himself at such an early phase undoubtedly encouraged Kısakürek. He continued publishing the magazine by toughening up his criticisms towards the RPP and the regime day by day. However, the hard opposition he carried out also led to the opening of many trials against him. Some of these trials were the ones that were individually initiated by some Republican bureaucrats such as Former Trade Minister Fuat Sirmen. Kısakürek accused him of making corruption in the sale of a factory (Kısakürek, 1946j). Similarly, he lived a judicial process with Cemal Hüsnü Taray, Turkish Ambassador of Rome, due to the news that Kısakürek made about him in the 49th

⁶⁷ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Boğazlar milletimizin boğazı, Kars Yaylası belkemiğidir.

issue of the journal. Besides these individual cases, Kısakürek began to face judicial sanctions also of the government. Another trial was initiated against him since he criticised the *Sümerbank*⁶⁸ for using monopoly on goods by selling them at prices above their value (Kısakürek, 1946p). In several articles he wrote under the pen name *Bankacı* (Banker), he accused this institution of making corruption. Kısakürek was acquitted of all these claims (Kısakürek, 2012j, pp. 11-27; *Cumhuriyet*, 07 January 1947). But, upon publishing an ear picture in the cover page of the 58th issue of the journal with the statement of ‘we want an ear to our head’ (*başımıza kulak istiyoruz*), he was accused of encouraging regime disobedience, and the journal was closed for six months by the martial administration.

It is misleading to read Kısakürek's relationship with the government only on the basis of measures taken against an intellectual criticism of the values of the regime with an Islamic discourse. It was also very contextual with political atmosphere of the country at the same time. The hard reaction that a political party, which had been ruling the country for twenty-three years alone, showed in the face of the fact that it had to hand over or at least share the authority dominated the political atmospheres of the country. In order to force the government to make some amendments which would ensure a fairly held elections and a peaceful transition, the Democrats frequently threatened the government with boycotts and the importance of the press increased gradually especially in this period. For many observers, the Tan incident was a reflection of this competition conducted via press. As far as Kısakürek mentioned in his memoirs, he was known by some Republicans as the man of Celal Bayar and, therefore, was perceived as an actor in this competition (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 25). In that extent, to get Kısakürek to their side, the Republicans offered him bribes. The

⁶⁸ Sümerbank was a state institution by which the state provided monopoly for the sale of many goods.

first offer came from the chief of the RPP's provincial organisation of Istanbul, Alaaddin Tritođlu. According to Kısakürek's claim, Tritođlu offered him to found a new printing house for him on the condition of changing his publishing policy (Kısakürek, 1946n). The second offer came from Prime Minister Recep Peker. Again, according to Kısakürek's claim, he was invited to Ankara with the Prime Minister's special request by paying for travel expenses in advance in the period when the journal was closed by martial administration. In their meeting in the Prime Ministry, firstly, Peker threatened him with new sanctions that would be about his theatrical work *Sır* (The Secret) which began to be published in the journal. But he refused to change his publication policy. Upon his refusal, Peker offered him a great amount of money on the condition that if he was to direct his criticism towards DP instead of RPP. Kısakürek refused also this offer, but he would not escape being subject to new sanctions. The court of martial law filed an execution about his theatrical work. He was being accused of making propaganda to overthrow the economic, legal, and political administrative regimes formed within the country. He was acquitted in this case, but his theatrical work would not be published anymore (Kısakürek, 2013d).

In the meantime, the 1946 elections resulted with an overwhelming victory of the RPP.⁶⁹ But, because of the necessary amendments did not hold, especially concerning election control, the elections could not decrease the tension. According to Lewis, if the party and government officials in the various cities of the country had not been able to intimidate voters and adjust the votes, the DP would be able to achieve much greater success (Lewis, 1968, p. 307). Based on a report given to Celal

⁶⁹ As Karpat stated the results of the election had been declared recurrently different due to the number of independent candidates selected from party lists. According to the results declared on the official website of Turkish Grand National Assembly, the distribution of the number of seats the parties won was as follows: the RPP 397, the DP 61, independents elected from the DP list 4, independents 3 seats (21 Temmuz 1946 Milletvekili Genel Seçim Sonuçları).

Bayar, Kısakürek claimed that if the elections had been fair, the DP would win 279 seats instead of 65 in the parliament. Kısakürek described the transformation that the country was experiencing in these words: “Freedom that could not come freely” (Kısakürek, 1946o).⁷⁰

As Karpat pointed out, although the elections were held in a way, the process until 12 July 1947 was still critical in term of the success of the transition to democracy (Karpat, 2010a, p. 263). The tension between the RPP and the DP broke out in the budget talks, and the DP members left the session. Boycotting the parliament for eight days, the DP returned to parliament by the efforts of President İnönü (*Cumhuriyet*, 19, 27 December 1946). Despite this, the tense atmosphere, in which the choices of party closure were being discussed as well, continued to exist. Especially, the attitude of the groups, known as hardliners, in both parties, was bringing the situation to a deadlock. The ones in the RPP were in favour of retaining the mono-party state structure (Ahmad, 1977, p. 10). On the other side, the group in the DP was advocating the boycott of the Assembly until necessary amendments were done (Yalman, 1971). İnönü, who intervened in the situation, guaranteed the promise of the multi-party system with the declaration of 12 July. This declaration brought the ruling and the opposition parties on equal footing (Karpat, 2010a, p. 278). This meant a more effective opposition.

The RPP's parliamentarians admitted that a new epoch in politics had begun (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 June 1947). The growing opposition, like many other issues, forced the RPP to review its stance against religion. In 1947, the party administration allowed the opening of private teaching institutions for children who wanted to learn the principles of Islam and the worship. The Congress of the CHP in 1947 also

⁷⁰ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Özgürce gelemeyen özgürlük

became a scene for hot debates on the issue of secularism. Proposals such as the reopening of the tombs of some saints and Turkish elders to visit, to be given an elective course on religion to students in schools, the opening of *imam hatip* schools⁷¹ were discussed in the Congress. The parties, competing for the power, would continue to develop policies and discourses promising freedom in religious fields in order to win public support. The Nation Party, founded by a group separated from the DP ranks, came to the fore with its conservative identity and Fevzi Çakmak, who was declared as the honorary president, was representing this conservative character of the party. While it was emphasised in the party program that the secularism should be protected, it was also stated that the establishment of organisations and foundations would support the religious groups to represent themselves. To fill the gap in the party which occurred by the foundation of the NP, Celal Bayar had also begun to apply to religious-coloured discourses. In his speech he gave in the second congress of the party, he emphasised that the Turkish nation was Muslim and would remain one. (Karpat, 2010a, p. 317).

This political atmosphere, where the content of secularism was discussed, would also manifest itself in the increase of Islamic publications in the country. Many Islamic publications mentioned above started to be published in this period. On the other hand, the secularism debates were being carried out in a very stressful atmosphere, as it is usual, and this tension developed to the detriment of the *Büyük Doğu*. Atatürk rallies were being organised in various cities of the country to protest appeasements from the principles of the revolution such as secularism and Kısakürek, in a sense, became the focus of reactionary, anti-regime movements. There were slogans against Kısakürek in the demonstrations, and the copies of the *Büyük Doğu*

⁷¹ *Imam Hatip* schools are educational institutions founded by the state to educate young men to become imams and preachers.

were being torn apart by the crowd (*Cumhuriyet*, 13-23 June 1947). According to Kısakürek, the RPP spent more than a hundred thousand TL (Turkish Lira) to organise these rallies. In addition, he criticised the DP's passive attitude in the face of the heavy insults in these rallies in which they were also stigmatised as the enemy of Atatürk (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 100,101). But, in fact, the Bursa rally was organised by the RPP and DP together (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 June 1947).

The reason behind the fact that Kısakürek came to the fore as the enemy of Atatürk was a trial which was opened upon the publishing of a poem belonged to Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı), titled 'Abdülhamidin Ruhaniyetinden İstimdat' (Hope for help from the spirit of Abdülhamid), in the 65th issue dated May 30, 1947 (Tevfik, 1947).⁷² The publication of this poem had caused a great anger among the people. On 9 July, Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu* were protested in the demonstrations organised by the youth organisations and Kısakürek was arrested in the same day. In the same days, published articles that were humiliating Atatürk in another journal, titled *Meşale* (Torch) fuelled anger in society (*Cumhuriyet*, 7, 9, 12 June 1947). Thus, the reactions grew in demonstrations across the country during July.

Kısakürek's trial was carried out in secret sessions in the military court of the martial administration and he would remain in custody for about two months during the trial (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 July 1947). There was also a warrant for arrest about Neslihan Hanım, Kısakürek's wife, since she was officially the owner of the magazine, but she could not be arrested, thus saved from going to jail (Kısakürek,

⁷² Rıza Tevfik was a person who was mostly known for his literal aspect although he was a doctor in his main profession. He participated in CUP and served as deputy of Edirne in the Assembly after 1908. He was sent to exile in 1922 because of the presence in the signatory committee of the Treaty of Sevr and the opposition to the National Struggle. In this poem, Rıza Tevfik expressed his regret for the political struggle conducted against Sultan Abdulhamid, in which he also participated. In the poem in which a very strict style prevailed, (possibly) the political elites of the time who made various accusations against sultan Abdulhamid were being criticised.

2013d, p. 118; *Cumhuriyet*, 22 July 1947). The journal was also closed for four months (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 June 1947).

Kısakürek was accused of insulting Turkishness and the Turkish nation by the prosecutor. Besides, he was also witnessed to the accusations that he had made propaganda for the sultanate. In his defence, Kısakürek stated that he never became an advocator of neither sultanate nor monarchy, but criticised sultanate in many articles. Besides, he argued that in no way neither Turkishness nor the Turkish nation was insulted in the poem. According to his statement, this poem was sent to him from a reader of the journal to be published and that he had no knowledge about it before. He expressed why he preferred to publish the poem as, because of it, historical realities, which were ignored, were reflected. He stated that articulation of these realities in a regretful sense by a participant of the CUP, seemed meaningful (Kısakürek, 1947g, pp. 5,6; 2012j, pp. 35,47). In the scope of the trial, Rıza Tevfik was also questioned and he stated that he had not written this poem with the aim of insulting to Turkish nation, but to denounce the ones in the CUP who brought the Turkish nation to the death. On the other hand, he did not permit Kısakürek to publish this poem since it would cause such a trouble (Kısakürek, 2013p, p. 17; *Cumhuriyet*, 7, 8 June 1947).

Since the incidents that occurred following the publication of this poem and the jurisdiction process were followed by the press, a perception that Kısakürek insulted Atatürk occurred in public opinion. The expressions, which caused the emergence of such a perception, were these: “The ones who rejected kissing tail groveled to the dingy headgear of a rebellious officer” (Tevfik, 1947).⁷³ Although no name was mentioned in the poem, the expression ‘rebellious officer’ was interpreted

⁷³ This is the author’s translation. The original text is:

Etek öpmeyenler secde ettiler,
Asi bir subayın pis külahına

as Atatürk. Kısakürek stated that he also questioned this expression of which subject was unclear, and to prevent any possible misunderstandings, he published the poem without giving place to this expression (Kısakürek, 2012j).⁷⁴

The trial resulted in acquittal on 5 August 1947 and the decision was also approved by a higher court (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 August, 11 October 1947). Because of Kısakürek's imprisonment and publishing ban, the journal was obliged to hold publishing for four months after its 66th issue. After the approval of decision by the higher court, the journal went on its publishing with the 67th issue on 10 October 1947. Nevertheless, Kısakürek could not get rid of being the focus of anti-regime movements.

In the articles titled '*Anadolu ve Anadolulu*' (Anatolia and Anatolian) and '*24 Madde'de 24 Yıl*' (24 Years in 24 Article) published in the 69th and 70th issues of the journal, Kısakürek severely criticised the Republican revolutions and the RPP (Kısakürek, 1947b; 1947a). Upon the publishing of these articles, Kısakürek was accused of propagating sultanate and of resurrecting the enmity of Turkishness in the years of truce by the newspaper of *Memleket* (Homeland). Besides, the youth was called to react against 'the enemy of the revolutions'. Similar reports were also made in *Cumhuriyet*, *Tasvir* (Depiction) newspapers. It is interesting that *Son Posta* (The Last Post), *Yeni Sabah* (New Morning) and *Son Saat* (The Last Clock) newspapers were also involved in this propaganda process although Kısakürek had a good relationship with those publications (Kısakürek, 1947d).⁷⁵

⁷⁴ In the version of the poetry published in the magazine, the expression of 'rebellious officer' was pointed out with points. Probably with the same concern, this expression had been published in some ontology books and websites, similarly, with points.

⁷⁵ Kazım Nami Duru, the owner of the *Son Posta* Newspaper, was one of the writers of *Büyük Doğu*.

On 8 November, a small group of students were gathered in the garden of the Istanbul University but dispersed without any action. Two days later, a more organised group after gathering in the Istanbul University began to walk towards the office of *Büyük Doğu* with slogans and protested the Journal and *Büyük Doğu*. The demonstration was welcomed by some press that the incident was reported with the title of ‘Demonstration of the youth against the enemies of the revolutions’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 9, 11 November 1947). In connection with the events, Kısakürek called to the prosecutor's office to be taken his statement, and, in the meantime, the publishing house was closed in terms of the interlocutory injunction and the 72th issue of the journal was collected without distributed. Kısakürek was judged with the accusations of humiliating the national feelings, threatening the social order, insulting to the ministers and the Committee of Ministers by unfounded allegations. He was charged with six-month imprisonment but his punishment was postponed since he had not got any punishment before (*Cumhuriyet*, 15, 26 November, 12 December 1947).

As a symbolic name of the threat of radical reaction, Kısakürek had also come to the agenda of the Assembly. At the session of the Assembly dated 26 November 1948, Remzi Yüreğir, the RPP deputy, presented a parliamentary question about the publications against the revolution and the regime. In his speech, Yüreğir, by implying the *Büyük Doğu*, stated that the penalties given to these publications were insufficient, and argued that new laws had to be enacted if necessary (*TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi*, 1947, p. 205-217).

In the period when the journal was closed, Kısakürek published the journal of ‘*Borazan*’, a political humor magazine, for three issues. Although it was announced that this magazine would continue to be given to readers together with the Great East, it would not be published anymore. After his sentence was postponed, Kısakürek went

on publishing the journal by republishing the 72nd issue which had been collected. In April 1948, decision of acquittal of the higher court about the trial of insulting to the Turkishness was reversed by the court of last resort again and Kısakürek and his wife faced with threat of going to jail (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1948). Upon this decision of the court, Kısakürek decided to close the journal after the 87th issue. The journal would then remain closed for about a year.

2.5 Setting up a Political Party: The *Büyük Doğu* Association

The year during which the journal was closed was a very tough period for Kısakürek and his family. He had been already having difficulties with collecting magazine fees from the dealers, and his economic situation was quite bad. He had been able to continue the publication of the journal thanks to the debts he had received. And, it became even harder to collect the fees because the magazine was closed. Therefore he began to sell his household goods and belongings to make a living for his family, and after a while, he and his family had to settle in a hotel room (Kısakürek, 1949e).

There was not much choice in front of Kısakürek, who had stopped publishing his journal in the face of the danger of going to jail with his wife. It was no longer possible to work in state institutions as it was in the banking era, and he had no capital to occupy with trade. Actually, it can also be said that these options did not appeal to him because of his strong desire to live as an intellectual since his youth. Writing in literature without mentioning the political issues was a choice, but this choice would tarnish the reputation he gained among conservative circles. Although an important public opinion had been formed against him, he still had a broad reader mass. Consequently, he decided to go on conducting his struggle but this time he believed

that he should have taken more systematic steps such as setting up a political party. He thought that if he had succeeded in establishing a political party with its wide grassroots, he would have stood strong against the sanctions of the RPP. The events he witnessed during his visit to Maraş in February 1949 encouraged him in his decision. He resided there in the house of his cousin, who was the founder of DP province organisation, and could have political discussions with the people who was coming to this home almost every night. The impression he got from these discussions was that the Democrats was getting stronger day by day (Kısakürek, 2013d). Although he believed that the DP was still too weak for taking over the government, a possible change in the power could present more suitable conditions for him to carry out his project.

On the other hand, still there were some obstacles that prevented him to take into action. First, his objection appeal about his sentence of imprisonment had to be resulted positively. Second, he had to find some support to finance this project. Third, he had to keep the party alive until the election time. Not before long, his appeal about sentence of imprisonment was accepted and the acquittal decision was approved again; thus the first obstacle was overcome. Without losing time, Kısakürek began to work to realise the project of setting up the party by means of publishing the *Büyük Doğu* in March 1949. Since he had not had enough capital to finance the journal and the party yet, this 25-issued period was in only a four-page weekly newspaper format. He used this period of the *Büyük Doğu* as a means that would provide his calls about the party reach to people. Firstly, he tried to learn that if a political association was to establish, would it get the necessary support from the public. In the article, titled ‘*Tarihi Soru*’ (Historic Question), he asked people to send their reply via mail if they accepted to be a member of the association (Kısakürek, 1949u). It was also an

invitation. About a month later, the number of participant letters reached eight thousands (Kısakürek, 1949b).

After being sure that he found the support he sought, Kısakürek founded the party under the title of ‘*Büyük Doğu Association*’ on 28 June 1949. In the article in which the action plan of the association was presented, it was stated that since there was no any expression of party in the law, this association also would be regarded as a political party (Kısakürek, 1949f). Besides, in the charter of the association, it was stated that the association reserves the right to conduct its activities as a political party. Besides, the organisational framework was designed with considering a political party. The organisational scheme of the association was as follows: General Council, Chairman, Central Executive Committee, Central Administrative Committee, Bureaus Executive Committee, Bureaus Administrative Committee, Central Dignity and Discipline Committee, Dignity Bureaus and Discipline Committee, and Temporal representations (Kısakürek, 1949g). Until 1961, the organisation and workings of political parties were regulated by the Law on Associations, which was more of the field of private law. Kısakürek, benefited from the gap that the law presented in a very pragmatic manner, in order to prevent the organisation he founded from being seen as a competitor by other political parties and not to draw attention.

The purpose and objectives of the association were described in a highly ideological way. Spiritualism (*ruhçuluk*), moralism (*ahlakçılık*), nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), communitarianism (*cemiyetçilik*), personalism (*şahsiyetçilik*), qualitativism (*keyfiyetçilik*), orderism (*nizamcılık*), interventionism (*müdahalecilik*), regulationism in capital and property (*sermaye ve mülkiyette tedbircilik*), which were also the basic principles of the *Büyük Doğu* ideology, were defined as the basic

principles of the association. The main issues that the association would struggle against were juxtaposed as follows: All kinds of godlessness (*her türlü Allahsızlık*), all kinds of immorality (*her türlü ahlaki kayıtsızlık*), cosmopolitanism (*kozmpolitlik*), uncontrolled and unsupervised imitation (*teftişsiz ve murakabesiz taklitçilik*), superficiality in idea and science (*fikir ve ilimde posacılık ve kısırcılık*), fake and rootless revolutionism (*sahte ve köksüz inkılapçılık*), snob western admiration (*züppe garp hayranlığı*), favouritism and social injustice with all moral reflections (*bütün ahlak dışı tecellileriyle eyyam güderlik ve içtimai adaletsizlik*) (Kısakürek, 1949f). As can be seen, the association portrays a totalistic and religious character, but a remarkable issue with the charter was that there were no expressions, such as the establishment of an Islamic state, or adjusting of statutes according to the *Sharia* that would stipulate changing of political and social statutes of the state on the basis of religion.

According to the charter, the main fields of activity of the association were publishing magazines, brochures, declarations, books, and organising meetings, conferences, and festivals. Sufficient organisation was to be achieved to participate in elections, and to work solely to obtain power through statutory procedures (Kısakürek, 1949g). Kısakürek behaved very cautiously to prevent the closure of the association before reaching the second step. For that reason, he stressed that the charter of the association was prepared in such a way as not to contradict with any law article again and again. In addition, he indicated the most important strategy of the association as operating within the limits of the law. Also, in order to avoid the image of the association in the eyes of the public affected negatively in that process, Kısakürek wanted neither his name nor the name of the association to be subject to any judicial processes. In this regard, even if various assaults against him and the

association were to be done, as had been done before, they would not be applied to the way of going to court as long as possible. Instead, they were to be answered by publication (Kısakürek, 1949f).

It is certain that the effect of the sanctions that he had been subjected to was huge on Kısakürek's cautious attitude. Moreover, he was uneasy about the possibility of the RPP's winning the 1950 elections. Therefore, he also joined the opposition campaign against the RPP, while carrying out grassroots organisation activities on the other side. In this period of the journal, he directed his criticism on mostly real political issues rather than criticising Kemalism, which would be able to cause to a judicial process. The high inflation, brought along with '7 September Measures', had presented an incomparable opportunity in that extent. The cost of living index, which was 100 in 1938, soared to 412.9 after these adjustments (Ahmad, 2003, p. 107). Like the other parties of the opposition, he also used economic issues, such as corruption assertions, as a basic tool of the attrition campaign.

Here, it is also needed to address that bringing Şemsettin Günaltay to the prime ministry in 1949 became a relieving development in terms of Kısakürek. Günaltay was one of the prominent Islamists of the Ottoman time. Choosing Günaltay for Prime Minister was a tactical step taken by the RPP to nullify the criticisms of the opposition about the strict secularism attitude of the party. Major modifications such as providing religious education in schools were also done on this axis. Now, Günaltay was being able to meet the criticisms of the opposition with the following expressions:

“I am the head of the government which inaugurated the teaching of religion in elementary schools. I am the head of a government which opens imams and

preachers courses in this country for Muslims to teach them how to pray and how to wash their dead. I am the head of a government which opened the Faculty of Theology to teach the high principles of Muslimism in this country” (*TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi*, 1949, p. 598).⁷⁶

These expressions were a sign of that the government would follow a more moderate politics. Even Kısakürek appreciated some of the Prime Minister's decisions (Kısakürek, 1949d). Within such a political climate, Kısakürek thought that he could maintain his activities safely. In order to carry party project to a more advanced stage, he organised a campaign journey to Anatolia. Concomitantly, he ended the publications of the journal with the 25th issue in order to publish in a better format (Kısakürek, 1949a)

The first station of Kısakürek on his journey of Anatolia was Samsun where he came by seafaring. Amasya and Sivas cities followed Samsun. It is interesting that this route was the same as the route of the Anatolia journey that Atatürk made with the aim of starting a National Struggle against enemy invasion. Although Amasya and Sivas were the obligatory stations of the railway transportation starting from Samsun, it was meaningful that Kısakürek began this journey from Samsun. Ömer Karagül, who accompanied Kısakürek during this trip, interpreted this situation as an unexpected coincidence. Probably, either not to prolong the length of the journey or to avoid the misleading perceptions that this coincidence would cause, Kısakürek passed Amasya and Sivas stations by just having a brief speech to the people who came to the station. However, he had been welcomed by a gorgeous organisation and an

⁷⁶ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Ben, ilk mekteplerde din dersleri okutturmaya başlayan Hükümetin başkanıyım. Bu memlekette müslümanlara namazlarını öğretmek, ölülerini yıkamak için imam, hatip kursları açan bir Hükümetin başkanıyım. Bu memlekette, müslümanlığın yüksek esaslarını öğretmek için İlahiyat Fakültesi açan bir Hükümetin Başkanıyım.

enthusiastic crowd in Samsun. Kısakürek, who gave a conference here, regarded the interest of people towards him as splendid as he would imagine (Karagül, 1949c). Following Samsun, he was also welcomed with great enthusiasm in Malatya, Adana and Kayseri stations (Karagül, 1949; 1949b).

From Kısakürek's perspective, Anatolia journey was quite successful. He believed that he could manage to reach somewhere with this support behind him, although he might have exposed to new sanctions. He began republishing the magazine again in its original format in October and stated that the target of the association in the first issue as participating in the 1950 elections: "The growth tendency that the association has gained is at such a level that the 1950 elections may be our first target together with the First General Council" (Kısakürek, 1949c).

The first establishment process of the association began in a very promising way in terms of Kısakürek. The number of those who declared support to the association had reached approximately ten thousand. However, when it came to official membership, Kısakürek could not find this count that he determined as the necessary number to get into action. In order to increase the number of members, he commenced a membership campaign and wanted each member to find two more members to the association (Kısakürek, 1950o). Besides, he brought the opportunity of paying the monthly membership fee, which was two TL, at a later date in bulk (Karagül, 1949a). But, none of these efforts could bring the required reaction.

There were only a few months left to the elections and Kısakürek did not have time to wait for the completion of the membership process. Moreover, with the beginning of the fourth period, he began to be faced with new judgments and sanctions. One of these trials resulted in six months' imprisonment and he would have

been able to go to jail if his objection appeal resulted negatively (Kısakürek, 1949i). Beside this, distribution of eight issues of the journal, between the 8th and 13th issues, was banned by decision of the Committee of Ministers (National Archives, 1950). Moreover, some dealers were being exposed to pressures. Afyon and Uzunköprü dealers stopped the distribution of the journal (Kısakürek, 1949t). He wanted members to keep away from obtrusive actions and to operate within the borders of the legal frame (Kısakürek, 1950o). Besides, it asked members to retain the activities of the association even if he was to go to jail (Karagül, 950b).

The success of the association in the elections was vital for the survival of both him and his struggle. In that extent, he expedited the set up process of the association. As the first step, he determined the central administration committee. The committee was comprised of: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Haluk Nur Baki, Ömer Karagül, Şakir Üçışık, Muhip Akışık, Cemal Bilgin, Said Çekmegil, Ziya Uğur and a person whose name was not declared yet (Kısakürek, 1950u). The average age of the members was thirty-three and they had no experience in politics. Kısakürek stated why he chose young and inexperienced persons for the committee as to keep the movement dynamic. According to his statement, there were approximately forty famous names willing to participate in the association but they had potential of nonconformity with the movement (Kısakürek, 1950x). Besides this, another possibility is that Kısakürek did not want to have people in the administration cadre who would be able to challenge his leadership role and authority.

Secondly, he accelerated the opening process of the provincial offices. He began to work with the opening of Kayseri office where he had gotten the greatest support. Despite the fact that the association was having trouble with finding members in general, the enthusiasm he met in Kayseri strengthened Kısakürek's

hopes. He thought that it was possible to participate in the election only from Kayseri, and, through this, a few seats could be obtained in the parliament. He stated his intention to the audiences who came to the meeting in these words:

“Say, Kayseri's comrades (gönüldaşlar). If the association is to be concentrated on Kayseri with all its material and spiritual existence and if we are to decide to participate in the elections only from Kayseri, do you agree to penetrate this movement with an unprecedented move up to the villages” (Kısakürek, 1950s).⁷⁷

Nevertheless, according to Kısakürek, the enthusiasm he met in Kayseri was more attention-grabbing than necessary. Reading of his *Sakarya Türküsü* poem, which expressed revolutionary sentiments, at the meeting would give the reason that his rivalries required to send him to prison (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 115-116). And it happened so. According to his claim, President İnönü ordered the Minister of Justice to stop Kısakürek no matter how (Kısakürek, 2012j, p. 99). Before long, the approved decision of acquittal in the case of insulting to the Turkishness was quashed again. It was reported in the journal that the *Büyük Doğu* would be able to close and Kısakürek would be able to send to the prison. Besides, it was stated that the activities of the association should continue to be carried out whatever the circumstances would be (*Büyük Doğu*, 24 February 1950, p. 9). The journal was closed after its 21st issue dated 3 March by the force of the confirmed decision of the court. On the other hand, another sentence of imprisonment was required to send Kısakürek to prison because it

⁷⁷ It is the author's translation. The original text is: Söyleyin Kayseri'li gönüldaşlar. Eğer cemiyet maddi ve manevi bütün mevcudıyla seçim zamanı Kayseri'de temerküz edecek ve seçimlere tek yer olarak mesela Kayseri'den iştirak kararını verecek olursa, bu davayı görülmemiş bir hamleyle, ta köylere ve davarlara kadar nüfuz ettirmeyi kabul ediyor musunuz?

was a suspended decision. For that reason, another trial was initiated against him on 19 April 1950. He was being accused of insulting to the spiritual personality of the government through the article titled ‘altı parmak’ (six fingers) he penned in the 16th issue of the journal. In the article, he criticised the six principles of the Kemalist revolution (Kısakürek, 1950c).

In his memoirs, Kısakürek stated that he was arrested as soon as he came back to Istanbul from Kayseri (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 117). But, the opening meeting of Kayseri office was held at the beginning of February and, as stated in the journal, he had to be back on 10 February (*Büyük Doğu*, 10 February 1950, p. 13). Although he did not mention in his memoirs the period between February and April, it appears that he wanted to stay away for a while and follow the developments.

After being arrested in April, many new trials were initiated against him but he could manage to be acquitted in the prosecution phase. It appears that some governmental mechanisms did not want to leave it to luck; but, on 26 April 1950, he was acquitted also from the accusation of insulting to the spiritual personality of the government (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 118). It can be said that to be released of Kısakürek just before the elections was perceived as an unacceptable development for the some Republican. In the day when he had to be released, Kısakürek was dispatched to another trial in which the accusation of insulting to Turkishness would be re-conducted. In order to prevent Kısakürek from being acquitted again, this time all legal requirements were to be fulfilled. Therefore, his wife, Neslihan Hanım, was hastily brought to court by police force from the hospital where she was under control due to her pregnancy. Although she was officially seen as the owner of the journal, she had not participated in the previous courts since she had not been found. In his memoirs, Kısakürek stated that witnessing his pregnant wife being brought to the

court hall in a rough manner by the police was quite an indignity for him. To save his wife, Kısakürek stated in the court that he had imitated his wife's signature and she had no responsibility for the publication of the journal (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 118). Kısakürek was sentenced to 8-month imprisonment. Neslihan Hanım was acquitted but she was obliged to stay in prison until the verdict date (*Hürriyet*, 11 May 1950). This situation was a serious blow to the activities of the association. Maraş, Malatya, Samsun and Afyon branches were planned to open after Kayseri (Karagül, 1950b, p. 13).

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the beginning period of the intellectual struggle that Kısakürek embarked upon to build the *Büyük Doğu* formulation he designed as an alternative ideology to Kemalism, is discussed. What determines the basic dynamics of this period is that he started this struggle directly against the founding cadre of the Republic. The rivalry with this cadre, who had developed harsh reflexes on the preservation of ground principles and values of the regime, caused the start-up phase to be quite challenging and depressing in terms of him. In the course of this competition, the most important reason for the intellectual struggle carried out by Kısakürek to survive was the rise of another political opposition, which emerged from within this founder cadre itself. The growing opposition forced the government to make liberal reforms in some areas. Thanks to the amendments made in the Press Law, one of these reforms, Kısakürek had the opportunity to defend himself in the judicial authorities instead of being subjected to direct close penalties. This allowed the journal to continue its publication life even if interrupted.

The pragmatic approach of Kısakürek was also an important factor that enabled him to survive in this competitive process. The first period of the magazine worked to bloom under the expressions of obedience on the values of the regime. In the following periods, the journal tried to survive with a publication policy which constantly watched the political atmosphere and took care not to create a crime on a legal basis. This approach, of course, has caused the emergence of quite interesting contradictory pictures. While the Republican revolutions were castigated, Atatürk, the architect of these revolutions, was put in a place that was abstracted from all confusion. However, thanks to this approach, he could survive although he was introduced with many trials.

The struggle initiated by Kısakürek had not progressed in a process that confined itself only to the intellectual realm. As mentioned in the first chapter, through retaining the tradition of Naqshbandism, he consistently searched for a political movement by which the thoughts he revealed in his intellectual struggle could be put into action. In this regard, first, he tried to influence the political elites of the era to initiate a political movement instead of him. When this project failed, he embarked on establishing his own political movement. Besides, the girding on legislative immunity to protect himself against the sanctions he had been exposed to was the most important trigger in the beginning of party work. Nevertheless, he waited until ripening of the conditions for such a movement. Such as many political minds, he was in doubt that this process of transition to the multiparty system would be able to succeed. The year 1949 was an appropriate time because of the approaching general elections of 1950. Even if the party had not achieved a significant success, he could have entered the parliament, so he would have continued his struggle with the legislative immunity he achieved.

By 1950, he had almost completed the construction of his ideological formula. The first period of the magazine was hesitant in terms of a revolutionary emphasis like the establishment of an Islamic state. In the following years, the fact that his discourses found a response from a certain segment of society encouraged him to articulate his more radical thoughts. As he became a symbolic name of an Islamist force in time, his discourse became more acute.



3. THE CHANGE IN KISAKÜREK'S POLITICAL ATTITUDE AFTER THE POWER CHANGE IN TURKEY (1950-1960)

3.1 Introduction

It is highly significant to scrutinise the intellectual and political life of Kısakürek, between 1950 and 1960, within the framework of his relationship with the Democrat Party, especially with that of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. The three of six periods of the *Büyük Doğu* published in this period were published with the patronage of Menderes.⁷⁸ Actually, although he had been perceived as the man of the Celal Bayar by the some Republicans, Kısakürek had not established good relations with the Democrats in 1940s and early 1950s. Basically, besides the ideological discrepancy, it was also related to the fact that he was carrying out his own political movements. In an article, he had defined the DP as “more detrimental than the RPP” because of occupying the true opposition place. Besides, he had argued that if the Democrats were to come to the power, they would suppress the all opposition including the Nation Party (Kısakürek, 1949s). In a sense, Kısakürek's prediction was to be realised. The Democrats did not hesitate to resort to extra ordinary sanctions, such as confiscation of all property of the RPP and party closures, to keep the opposition under pressure during their ten-year rule. As for the *Büyük Doğu*, it would be able to come into leaf again thanks to the helping hand of Menderes although it came to the threshold of total disappearance.

The main goal of this chapter in this regard is to understand the rationale behind the change in Kısakürek's political attitude and the character of the clientelist relationship he established with the DP. As will be revealed during this chapter, as

⁷⁸ Two of the remaining periods were very short periods with a total of 23 issues.

well as the very common reasons such as benefiting from the resources of the ruling party, one of the ground determinants of the relationship between Kısakürek and Menderes was the power structure in the DP. Therefore, laying an emphasis on the issue of in-party dynamics of the DP in advance will be beneficial in terms of better understanding of the issue.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the DP was founded by a faction of the centre elite who had been prominent names of the RPP, and those names were known with their strict loyalty to ground values of the regime such as secularism. On the other side, they aimed at generating a wide-ranging coalition among variegated discontented groups, and this caused people from very different in their profiles to enter the party and the emerging of a difficult situation in terms of managing basically different demands (Sunar & Toprak, 1983, pp. 428-429). The conflicts and confusions experienced in the provincial congresses in the early years were a reflection of this situation (Milliyet, 10, 12, 25 June 1951). While Menderes' politics satisfied some groups, it also caused formation of a fraction in the party that was not pleased with these policies.

Another issue was related to expectations about the party leadership, which was shaped by seniority discussions. Beside Celal Bayar, there were some very senior names in the party such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Mehmet Fuat Köprülü who could be or even expected to be the leader.⁷⁹ Bayar's presidency was met almost with a complete consensus but Menderes' party leadership and Prime Ministry was met with

⁷⁹ Ali Fuat Cebesoy (1882-1968) was one of the important generals of National Struggle and who was the leader of 'Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası' (Free Republican Party) which had been able to receive a support from the people capable of getting the power from the RPP if not had been closed. He directly offered Bayar to choose himself as the president (Bayar, 1986, p. 106). Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966) was one of the quadripartite founders of the party and was seen as the man immediately next after Bayar due to his experience in politics and his age, was expected to be chosen for the Prime Ministry (Yalman, 1971, p. 220).

surprise. As Sarol stated, even Menderes thought that Köprülü should be the leader (Sarol, 1983a, pp. 70,71,121). He was chosen by Bayar since he portrayed a leader who could understand the psychology of the people, especially the Turkish peasant, and possessed the qualities necessary for the leadership (Bayar, 1986, pp. 51,61). Besides, Menderes had performed very well in managing the in-party conflicts between the moderates and the radicals during the establishment period of the party and could succeed in the next period (Sarol, 1983a, p. 48).

According to Ahmad, with no doubt, the fortunes of the party would have been different if Cebesoy had become President and Bayar had become Prime Minister. Bayar's leadership was firmly established and few aspiring leaders in the party had potential to challenge his leadership (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 77,78). He alone could provide the stability, but his choice to assign Menderes as Prime Minister along with the party leadership created a rivalry within the party. Menderes shouldered a big responsibility through coming to the fore for the prime ministry among these names. It was also meant that he gained many eyes seeking for his mistakes.

These eyes manifested themselves first in the determination process of the cabinet. Menderes founded the first cabinet without taking into consideration of the power structure in the party. As he told Sarol, Menderes tried to form an impartial cabinet in accordance with the promising of the party, which was "devr-i sabık yaratmayacağız" (we will not question the ancient regime). According to Sarol, the cabinet was made up of bureaucrats without excitement, without fighting fire who came to the Party from out, who had not lived the rigours of the foundation process (Sarol, 1983a, pp. 125-128).

The formation of the opposition against this first mistake of Menderes did not take long. Some names in the Party like Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, Celal Fuat Türkgeldi, Hüsnü Yaman, Füzünan Tekil began to organise a front among party members against Menderes. It was interesting that there were also some names close to Menderes like Sarol among them. To tone down the opposition, Menderes made some changes in the cabinet and got its yield in the vote of confidence for the budget. Thought he stabilised his place, Menderes took a new step and tendered his resignation to President in order to found a new cabinet with which he thought he could carry out the reforms faster. The dissents again showed their opposition. There were 61 dissents voted against Menders (*Milliyet*, 31 March 1951).

In his article, Ali Naci Karacan stated that Menderes was beleaguered by three opposition fronts, which aimed at overthrowing him. The first two fronts were comprised of some press organs being led by Ahmet Emin Yalman and the RPP. They were criticising Menderes for his indifference towards everybody, straying from Atatürk revolutions, and making concessions to reactionism. As to the third front, Karacan identified it as some Democrat Party members through referring to the 61 dissents. According to him, this group was trying to determine their own Prime Minister and to form their own cabinet (*Milliyet*, 29 March 1952). Rıfık Salim Burçak found this kind of interpretations of 'sixty-one' only partially true. According to him, one of the factors of continuing dissension was the spirit of the opposition in which the party had been formed in 1946 and which carried into the post-1950 period through the stimulation of provincial organisations (Ahmad, 1977, p. 81). Although the thoughts about power and influence of the dissents in the party are relatively changing, it is certain that they remained as a challenging factor for a long time and manifested themselves in several occasions like resignation of Refik Şevket İnce in

1952 and in-party crisis in 1955. This disgruntled faction, who was to set up the Liberty Party (Hürriyet Partisi) in 1955 under the leadership of Ekrem Alican, argued that the party should pursue a liberal, democratic and secular politics.

These differences of opinion and competition within the party, by Aydemir's words, dragged the party into the quarrels, which did not come to an end (Aydemir, 2000, p. 141). As Ahmad pointed out, due to this power structure in the party, Menderes obliged to much more concentrate on maintaining a hold on his own party than managing the country (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 76-78); and Kısakürek created a space for himself by taking the side of Menderes in this power equation.

3.2 The Dissolution of the *Büyük Doğu* Association

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kısakürek's imprisonment was a serious blow for the party activities. While in prison, it was detected that Kısakürek was caught to diabetes and, thanks to the help of some doctors, who believed that he was unfairly imprisoned, he could spend his conviction in the hospital (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 120). Nevertheless, his imprisonment did not take long. With the amnesty law enacted by the DP on July 14, 1950, the imprisonment of Kısakürek ended. He was the first person released and a new period began both for him and his struggle (*Milliyet*, 16 July 1950). Since this compulsory residence was short-lived, it became possible to retain his political movement without losing the fronts he had won. The experienced incidents revealed one more time that it is not so possible to retain such a struggle without taking shelter of the parliamentary immunity. The general election of 1950 had been missed but the new goal was determined as the general election of 1954. Kısakürek announced the new target of the association through putting a dawn

picture with the expression of 1954 on the cover page of the 46th issue of the journal, dated 2 February 1951 (see Appendix D).

Kısakürek continued to publish the magazine with the 22nd issue, and in the first issue, it was announced that the general management committee of the association was re-determined. This time Kısakürek preferred a more experienced cadre. Especially, participation of Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, who was one of the founders of the Turkish Conservative Party (*Türk Muhafazkar Partisi*), was an important step. As it was reported in the journal, Atilhan invited the members of his party to join the *Büyük Doğu* association (Karagül, 1950e). The other members of the committee with Kısakürek were: Abdürrahim Zapsu (author), Ömer Karagül (high chemical engineer-author), Celaleddin Sığındere (retired soldier), Şükrü Çelikalay (deputy in the first Assembly), Şakir Üçışık (artisan), Haluk Nur Baki (doctor), Lütfi Bilgen (doctor) (*Büyük Doğu*, 27 Oktober 1950, p.13). Şakir Üçışık and Haluk Nur Baki were kept in the cadre since they were close disciples of his sheikh Abdülhakim Arvasi.

In order to extend the grassroots, Kısakürek arranged a new Anatolia tour. Primarily, he focused on Western Anatolia region. The first journey, which was encompassing Bandırma, Balıkesir, Tavşanlı, Kütahya, Eskişehir, and İzmit stations passed in a quite promising way (Karagül, 1950a). Then, trips were held without waiting and it provided the association to be reached till Diyarbakir, a city in the Southeastern Anatolia. The goal was the completion of the grassroots all around the country until mid-1951, then walking to the power in 1954 general elections (Karagül, 1950d). Within few months, the association succeeded in completion its provincial organisations in Afyon, Kayseri, Kütahya, Malatya, Tavşanlı, Soma and Diyarbakır.

In the meantime, various newspapers such as *Vatan*, *Ulus*, *Yeni İstanbul* were carrying out an intense criticism campaign for Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu*. Kısakürek claimed that all this black propaganda campaigns were being initiated collectively by some secret hands (Kısakürek, 1951). Before long, it turned out that there was dissatisfaction also within the association. A group of members of the association in Izmir, sent a complaint petition about Kısakürek to the other offices of the association. It was detected that these names did not have any serious relation with the association, but the fact that the all provincial organisations, except for two, were silent in the face of this incident was carrying a message that there was displeasure with the Kısakürek in the association (Sözcü, 1951a). Later, it was understood that the one who organised this attempt was Cevat Rifat Atilhan. He was thinking of founding his own political party, Islam Democrat Party (İslam Demokrat Partisi-IDP), and had planned to benefit from the grassroots of the association in this founding process (Şentürk, 2015, s. 216). Trying to create a schism in the association of a person in the general administration committee was a sign of an end; and he was not the only member of the committee that left the movement. Abdurrahim Zapsu also resigned from the membership without even reporting his resignation to the association (Sözcü, 1951b).

The association received the biggest blow with the detection of Kısakürek in a casino raided by the police. In the statement he gave to the police, Kısakürek told that he had been there because of observation for his new work which was about gambling (*Milliyet*, 24 March 1951). He told the incident in his memoirs more detail. According to his statements, the association and the journal had been exposed to some pressures in those days. Besides the demonstrations against the association and the journal, one night, some people had brought into the central office of the association secretly and

had gotten some papers. Therefore, it was required to employ someone trustable to protect the office in nights. Kısakürek stated that he was there in order to find a person he met in prison to guard the office of the association. Besides, when he entered the casino to find this name, the place was not opened yet and there was no one gambling right at that moment, and only five minutes had passed when the police conducted the raid (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 189,194).

The incident was quite reputation damaging already within itself. In addition to this, the political climate made it more traumatic. The agenda of the country was busy with the reactionist activities of the *Ticanis*. Those who belonged to the *Ticani* order, which began to spread in Turkey in the 1930s, were carrying out various reactionary actions such as vandalising Atatürk's busts, statues, and pictures. The actions of *Ticanis* action brought up to rising tension in the country, especially among the youth. Some student associations, including *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (National Turkish Student Union-NTSU) and *Milli Talebe Fererasyonu* (National Student Federation), organised demonstrations against the Islamist publications such as *Sebilürreşad* and *Büyük Doğu*. In order to reduce the tension, the Minister of State, Samet Ağaoğlu, met with the representatives of these associations (*Milliyet*, 24 March 1951), 1951. President Celal Bayar also tried to reduce public anxiety by stating that there was no general wave of reactionism in the country and that these events were actions of a small group (*Milliyet*, 27 March 1951). The press was reporting that the government drafted a substance, which would be called as 'the law for Ataturk's protection law' in the same issue in which Kısakürek's casino incident was reported (*Milliyet*, 24 March 1951). In such an atmosphere, to be arrested of an Islamists with the claim of gambling was quite sensational.

For some observers, this incident was a plot. In his memorable book, Altan Öymen stated that the raid of the police was politically initiated (Öymen, 2008). Hassan Pular also claimed that it was a plot of the deep state (Pular, 2009). These observers' evaluations cannot be considered wrongful at all. The raid occurred in a late hour of the night, but the incident was reported in the *Vatan* Newspaper in the same morning with the title 'Necip Fazıl busted while gambling' (*Vatan*, 23.03.1951). Actually, it was hard to prepare the report for publication in such a short time. Thus, it seems that someone had informed the newspaper in advance. As Kısakürek stated in his memoirs, Cavit Yamaç, the journalist who prepared the incident to publication, sent him a confession letter stating that he was informed by a person about the raid and he was asked to publish this news. Also, according to the letter, some secret meetings about which he was acknowledged were being held to shut up Kısakürek's oppositional voice (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 196-198).

After the casino incident, a difficult period for Kısakürek started again. The *Vatan* Newspaper, owned by Ahmet Emin Yalman, continued to conduct a campaign against Kısakürek. In a report of the newspaper published few days after the incident, it was claimed that Kısakürek misappropriated the money of the association and spent it on gambling (*Vatan*, 27 March 1951). Upon the publication of this news, the office of the association and Kısakürek's home was searched by the police, and he was asked to declare the counts of the association by the prosecutor office. Concomitantly, a trial was initiated against Kısakürek due to an article titled *Kıyafet ve Şapka* (Apparel and Hat) (*Milliyet*, 29 March 1951). Then, the 54th issue of the journal, in which Kısakürek responded to the news published in the press about the incidents, was collected and he was arrested due to his writings, titled *Sistem* (System) and *Vatan Dışı* (Non-Citizens), published in that issue (*Milliyet*, 31 March 1951). Exposed

to severe sanctions, Kısakürek sent a telegram to Prime Minister Menders requesting his help to be saved from the misfortunate situation he was in (National Archives, 1951a). It was his first request from Menderes but he could not get a positive answer. Kısakürek was not the only one applying to Prime Minister. A group of student in Faculty of Law in Istanbul University sent a telegraph expressing their resentment for Kısakürek's arrest (National Archives, 1951b).

The government was being criticised even from its party group in the Assembly. In his parliamentary question, Bahadır Dülger, Erzurum deputy of the DP, after pointing out to increase in the number of reactionary associations and their publication organs by meaning the *Büyük Doğu* Association, criticised the government for not taking the necessary steps. In his answer to this question, Samet Ağaoğlu stated that any kind of reactionary movement will not be allowed (*TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi* , 1950, 283-285). Besides this, Menderes had tendered his new cabinet to the party group few days ago, and focused on the in-party power structure. In the speech he held in the Assembly session when the government program was read, he said that extreme movements of religion would not be tolerated (*Milliyet*, 01 April 1951). Kısakürek had to wait for a while to find the protection he was looking for.

Whether it was a plot and whatever the intention of Kısakürek was, the casino raid also brought about the end of the association. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it was the last drop of the bad going. The association that Kısakürek tried to organise as a political party was totally ideology oriented and did not have anything to say for the welfare of the people. The plan and program section of the charter of the association, which can be assessed as the party program, was consisted from only one title, and it was expressed in a quite intangible way:

“It believes that the plan and program of the government on all occupational fields represents and expresses the laws and secret basses of the materials and incidents as hints which will be revealed in a style of conquering ideology web in order to avoid not to return to the dull and shallow formulas, not to be consisted of only the rootless and positional reform remedies in the face of the fluidity of the time and of the corrosiveness of the place. The state and government style to which the *Büyük Doğu* idea belongs is the most advanced, real and idealized form of republic” (Kısakürek, 1949e, pp. 2-3).⁸⁰

The speeches he held in the Anatolia journey were also not different at all. The main theme of his discourses, intensively kneaded with nationalism, was replacing western oriented, positivist and secular progress model with a morality oriented one. Nevertheless, he did not put forward any concrete proposals (Kısakürek, 1950v; 1950t). When looking from the perspective of representation of political demands, it can be said that there was no gap that the *Büyük Doğu* Association was expected to fill. The demolition of political monopolism represented by the RPP and to take into consideration the religious sentiments of the people through transforming strict understanding of secularism were represented to a great extent by the Democrat Party. One of the earliest steps of the Democrats after taking over the power was the abolishment of the legal obstacle in way of performing of the *adhan* in Arabic. Even the Republicans were aware of the influence of this step on the masses; therefore they also approved the enactment (*Milliyet*, 17 June 1950). Besides this step, incorporation of elective religious education into education programs in the primary schools,

⁸⁰ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Hükümetin bütün iş sahaları üzerinde plan ve program, zamanın akıcılığı ve mekanın yıpratıcılığına karşı, donuk ve deri üstü formüllere dönmemek, köksüz ve mevzii ıslah çarelerinden ibaret kalmamak için, eşya ve hadiselerin sabit kanunlarını ve mahrem temellerini fethedici bir ideolojya örgüsü içinde teker teker çekip çıkarılacak ipuçları halinde temsil ve ifade ettiğine inanır. *Büyük Doğu* mefkuresinin bağlı olduğu devlet ve idare şekli *Cumhuriyetin* en ileri, gerçek ve mefkureleştirilmiş nevidir.

recruitment of compulsory religious education courses to the curriculum in teacher schools was likewise enjoyed by a significant number of people. The proportion of students who did not want to take religious lessons in the 1951-1952 education period was only 0.7 per cent (Parmaksızoğlu, 1966, p. 30). On the other hand, the Nation Party was on duty in the Assembly for those who were not satisfied enough with these regulations, although Hikmet Bayur was striving to hold a secular line.

Besides caressing religious sentiments, the Democrats also promised to make Turkey a 'little America', with a millionaire in every district. It was charming enough for the people to consolidate around the DP. Also, thanks to the post-war demand for food in Europe as well as the economic boom stimulated by the Korean War, the promising of the DP seemed to be in full swing in the early 1950s (Ahmad, 2003). On the other side, Kısakürek was arguing that the people should be worked even by hitting to their heads if necessary (Kısakürek, 1946g). Actually, there was not much reason for the masses who was bored of the authoritarian rule of the one-party era to vote for a new authoritarianism at all; especially when considering that they began to experience an economic spring period.

When looking at the internal evaluation, which was made by the administration committee in the process of dissolution of the association, it seemed that there was despair about the success of the movement also among the members. Diyarbakır and Soma offices had abrogated themselves. Besides, the association was also struggling economically since it could not receive the membership dues (*Büyük Doğu*, 18 May 1951, p. 12). In the face of the developments, Kısakürek decided to abrogate the association. Before the abrogation, to be able to cover the expenditures had been made until that day, the members were invited lastly to pay their dues, and it was stated that those who did not pay their dues would be removed from the

membership. On 26 May 1951, the association was abrogated by the decision of the general administration committee, and all the fixtures were left to Kısakürek as the provision for his receivables (*Büyük Doğu*, 1951, p. 8).

Despite the abrogation of the association, Kısakürek had not lost his hope yet. He was aware that the association formula was not taken seriously; therefore, he intended to found a political party in real sense. He published the draft document of the main charter of the *Büyük Doğu* Party, which was to be founded, in the 60th and 61st issues of the journal (Kısakürek, 1951j; 1951k). Also, he believed that the *Büyük Doğu* should also be published as the daily newspaper in order to be read much more, and, in order for the party to be perceived as a more serious project by the masses. The first problem in that regard was finding a solution for the financing of the daily newspaper. He stated that he was not in favour of getting the help of a rich merchant or anyone since the acceptance of any help also meant accepting of the intellectual compensation of this aid. As the first solution, he requested readers to be a one-year subscriber to the journal so that necessary capital would have been met to make begin the newspaper to be published (Kısakürek, 1951n). Nevertheless, few weeks later, he could achieve to establish a corporation with Ali Rıza Cansu and M. Raif Organ to publish the *Büyük Doğu* as a daily newspaper. Thus, He ended the 4th period of the journal with the 62nd issue dated 29 June 1951.

3.3 The Analysis of the Fourth Period of the Journal

The fourth period of *Büyük Doğu*, published between October 1949 and June 1951, can be assessed as the best representative period of the image of Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu* in the minds. This period of the journal was republished as a supplementary copy by Star Newspaper, known for his proximity to the Justice and

Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-JDP), in 2012. For this reason, it will be useful to discuss this period by opening an intermediate title.

On the ideological ground, Kısakürek began to talk about the basic components of the Islamic revolution that he presented as the true revolution. Before discussing the issue of Islamic revolution, he put an exclamation statement to the prologue article stating that it is not an effort of offering a different order to any of regimes (Kısakürek, 1949p). Kısakürek handled almost every aspect of state and social life such as state, class, politics, army, family, youth, population growth, art, and aesthetics in terms of the Islamic Revolution through the articles he penned. Subsequently, he discussed the social, political, and economic aspects of the Başyücelik state order, which he formulated on the axis of *Büyük Doğu* ideal, in terms of the Islamic revolution. To be able to discuss the Islamic revolution perspective of Kısakürek as a whole, these writings of him will be examined in Chapter Six.

When looking at the approach of this period towards the political actors, it is possible to talk about two phases. In the first phase, Kısakürek showed a total opposition attitude towards all political parties since he was carrying out his own political movement. On the cover page of the 35th issue of the journal, three horses, symbolising the DP, RPP, and NP, with their jockeys was depicted as competing with each other. In the explanatory writing of the picture, Kısakürek stated his comment of political leaders of the period in these words: “The jockeys you see above the racing horses are Adnan Menderes, İsmet İnönü, and Hikmet Bayur. And these are, in fact, totally one and neck and neck at the point of depending on the root understanding and root rearing of the 27-year catastrophe era. Poor Turk, come and

think now, which of these cavalries will save you” (*Büyük Doğu*, 17 November 1950, p. 9).⁸¹

It should also be stated that his oppositional stance was mainly directed to the RPP and İnönü. It can be said that the second phase began with Menderes’s speech he held in İzmir provincial party congress. As Yücekök pointed out, the words Menderes had in the congress such as “We have rescued our religion under pressure which was under pressure until now. We did not give importance to the fusses of the revolution fanatics and made the *adhan* again Arabic”, were appreciated by the Islamic circles (Yücekök, 1971, p. 93).⁸² In his article he penned addressing to these words of Menderes, Kısakürek also promised to support him on the condition that he was sincere in his words:

“If you are sincere in your declaration in Izmir... We repeat, despite your party, your political situation, your cabinet, your contradictions, and all of things about you that come to mind and do not, please accept our slavery that does not accept to be let out” (Kısakürek, 1951b).⁸³

This article was the first sign of a change in his stance against Menderes. On the other hand, it was a fluctuating relationship. Not long after the publishing of this article, he commenced a process of accusation against Menderes and the DP upon the

⁸¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Yarış atlarının üstünde gördüğünüz (cokey) ler, sırasıyla Adnan Menderes, İsmet İnönü ve Hikmet Bayur’dur. Ve Bunlar, hakikatte, 27 senelik fecaat devrinin kök telakkisine ve kök şahlanmasına bağlı olmak noktasında tamamiyle bir ve atbaşı beraberdir. Zavallı Türk, gel sen artık bu süvarilerden hangisi seni kurtaracak diye düşün dur.

⁸² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Bugüne kadar baskı altında olan dinimizi baskıdan kurtardık. İnkılap yobazlarının yaygaralarına önem vermedik ve ezanı yeniden Arapça yaptık.

⁸³ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Şayet İzmir’deki beyanınızda samimi iseniz... Tekrar ediyoruz, partinize, siyasi muhitinize, kabinenize, tezatlarınıza ve hatıra gelen ve gelmiyen her şeyinize rağmen, en az ve halis tarafından, azad kabul etmez köleliğimizi kabul buyurunuz.

casino raid incident and said that he had made mistake with feeding hopeful sentiments for him (Kısakürek, 1951c). Moreover, in the article addressing to İnönü, titled *İnönü'ye Methiye* (Praise to İnönü), he characterised the DP power as more cruel from the RPP rule: “Mr. İnönü, we have confronted with such conditions while we have been trying to get rid of you, of your achievements, of your spirit, and of your influence that (I ask you to open your ears if possible) we have begun to see the disaster of seeking you as a blessing” (Kısakürek, 1951n).⁸⁴

The Masonic and communist structures in the country as well as corruption news were again the most discussed topics. It can be said that the news made on these issues were successful in attracting public attention. DP deputy Ahmet Gürkan carried the allegations of the journal to the Assembly. He presented a parliamentary question to the Assembly asking the government to explain what he knew about the Mason organisations in the country and what measures were taken, and proposed a law for the closure of masonic associations (*Milliyet*, 30 January 1951). Gürkan also wrote a letter to the *Büyük Doğu* asking to give him documentary support (Kısakürek, 1950m).

The most important factor that characterises this period is the historiography which opposes the official historiography conducted by the supervision of the state elites. This effort of Kısakürek can be assessed as a struggle of gaining a front against the ideological apparatus of the state identified with the RPP. With this intellectual struggle, Kısakürek aimed at destroying the legitimatising ground of the Kemalist revolutions and the RPP. An alternative historiography was one of the major issues

⁸⁴ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Sayın İnönü, Türk Milletinin tek ve aziz gayesi olarak sizden, eserinizden, ruhunuzdan ve tesirinizden kurtulmak isterken öyle şartlara çatmış bulunuyoruz ki (mümkünse kulağınızı iyice açmanızı rica ederim) size aramak felaketini saadet gibi görmeğe başlıyoruz.

that Kısakürek was also engaged in previous periods. In those periods, he mainly focused on changing the despot sultan perception of Abülhamid II in the minds. He presented Abdülhamid as a true moderniser in the face of Atatürk and İnönü (Duran, 2001). With this period, he commenced a more organised and large scaled campaign by discussing critically the different aspects of the National Struggle ranging from Sultan Vahdettin's impeachment to the victory of Lausanne and to the property of Mustafa Kemal, against the Turkish historiography which had been formed in axis of Atatürk's famous Speech, *Nutuk* (The Speech). He expressed his intention with the following words, which he wrote in the 3rd issue of this period:

“The history is not as you teach, the world is not as you show us, the past is not as the one you blacked, politics is not as you conduct, work is not as the one you gave, the spirit is not as you leavened, life is not as you live. The history of this nation did not start in 1923. It was not you who created us from nonexistence... That is enough” (Kısakürek, 1949c).⁸⁵

Kısakürek dominantly benefited from the memoirs and writings of old politicians, soldiers and intellectuals who had fallen into conflict with Atatürk in the early years of the republic, such as Kazım Karabekir (one of the prominent generals in the National Struggle), Hüseyin Avni Ulaş (the leading deputy of the second group), Rıza Nur (doctor and politician, took part in Turkish delegation in Lausanne), while generating this historiography. He published serial parts from the memoirs of Rıza Nur. It is interesting that Kısakürek benefited also from the writings of Arif Oruç who was the founder of the *Müstakil Türk Sosyalist Partisi* (Independent Turkish Socialist

⁸⁵ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Tarih okuttuğunuz; dünya, gösterdiğiniz; mazi, kararttığınız; istikbal, aydınlattığınız; siyaset, güttüğünüz; eser, verdiğiniz; ruh, mayalandırdığınız; hayat, yaşadığımız gibi değildir. Bu milletin tarihi 1923'te başlamıyor. Bizi yoktan var eden siz değilsiniz...Artık bu kadar yeter.

Party) in 1948. Oruç had carried out a strict opposition against the one-party rule by means of the brochures titled *Yarın* (Tomorrow) that he published in Bulgaria (Tunçay, 1991, p. 5). Kısakürek also published various parts from these brochures in the journal.

The first step of this effort of gaining front was eliminating the role of Atatürk and of the founding cadre of the Republic in the National Struggle. He especially stressed that the National Struggle is not the success of only one person (Atatürk) or a certain class (the RPP elites):

“Trying to connect Anatolian uprising, which is totally the product of the national brilliance and obligation of the national dignity, which has not received even greetings from the source of administration with its examples such as Maraş, to a person or persons group is the greatest of the insults that can be made to this nation” (Kısakürek, 1949j).⁸⁶

His first argument in this way was that it was the Sultan Vahdettin who appointed Atatürk to initiate a movement against the occupying powers. To use this argument he applied to the writings of Oruç.⁸⁷ In the article taken from the *Yarın* brochure of Oruç, Atatürk was accused of establishing his personal dictatorship by exploiting the victory of the National Struggle, which carried out through the

⁸⁶ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Tamamiyle milli dehanın malı ve milli haysiyetin ilcası olan, Maraş gibi misalleriyle de teşkilatla sevk ve idare kaynağından hiçbir selam bile almamış bulunan Anadolu kıyamını bir şahsa veya şahıslar zümresine bağlamaya çalışmak, bu millete edilebilecek hakaretlerin en büyüğüdür.

⁸⁷ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Kısakürek improved this argument, which was first expressed by Oruç based on the memories of Kazım Karabekir, in his book, titled ‘Vatan Dostu Sultan Vahidüddin’ (Sultan Vahidüddin, Friend of the Homeland), he penned in very late terms of his life. He argued in this book that the idea of initiating the National Struggle originally came from sultan Vahdettin, not from Atatürk who wanted to become a minister of War in the cabinet after the treaty of Mondros. He was the one who send Atatürk to Anatolia through financing him with his own personal budget and granting authorization in order to save the country (Kısakürek, Vatan Dostu Sultan Vahidüddin, 2014).

authorities that were given him by Sultan Vahdettin to initiate a national movement in the East:

“History would record Mustafa Kemal as grand from this front. On the other hand, the actual defeat has started after that. As it was revealed by the disclosure of Kazım Karabekir Pasha that he was authorized secretly by decedent Sultan Vahdeddin in order to initiate a movement in the East, Mustafa Kemal Pasha wanted to exploit the victory. As the first job, he shed blood in the National Struggle and tried to throw the commanders who made great sacrifices away from the competition field. Because their presence would be an obstacle to his personal views” (Oruç, 1950a).⁸⁸

His second argument based on an assumption that arises from the question why the Western powers consented to accept the demands of the New Turkey of which total destruction had been decided, in Lausanne. Kısakürek claimed that it became possible with the acceptance of the wishes of the secret Jewish organisation who ruled Europe through the negotiations, which were held behind the scenes between the government of the time and a Jew. According to his claims, the allied powers fall into a dispute about their interest over Turkey in the early phase of the Lausanne conference. The Rabbi of Istanbul, Hayim Naum, came out to the scene right on the time when the Turkish delegation could easily make the requests they wanted accepted by the allies. Naum was a famous person who could introduce himself as a friend of the Turks by means of the conferences favouring Turkey he

⁸⁸ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Tarih Mustafa Kemal’i bu cepheden büyük olarak kaydedecektir. Gel gelelim, asıl bozgun da bundan sonra başlamıştı. Kazım Karabekir Paşa’nın ifşaatıyla, merhum Sultan Vahdeddin tarafından suret-i mahsusada (Şark) ta bir hareket yapmaya memur edildiği tahakkuk eden Mustafa Kemal Paşa, zaferi istismar etmek istedi. İlk iş olarak Milli Mücadelede kan dökmüş, büyük fedakarlıklar yapmış kumandanları rekabet sahasından atmaya çalıştı. Çünkü onların varlığı hususi düşüncelerine engel olacaktı.

gave in the USA. Naum, who was being supported by the Jews in Europe, first convinced Lord Curzon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Great Britain, to accept the territorial unity of the New Turkey with the promise of convincing the Ankara government for abolishing the caliphate. He held the same negotiations also with İsmet İnönü and the Ankara government and succeeded in realising of the secret plan of the Jews (Kısakürek, 1949j; 1949k; 1949r). With this narrative of the Lausanne Treaty, Kısakürek comes to the conclusion that the victory gained by Atatürk and his friends was not a real victory; it is a hush-money given by the west as the correspondence of eliminating the grand case which is being the bearer of the banner of all Muslims.

Kısakürek, who strived for his discourses not to be perceived as a direct criticism towards Atatürk in the previous periods, left this anxiety behind with this period. In the article titled *Allahsız* (Godless), by referring to the history book published by the Ministry of National Education in 1931 for high schools, he identified Atatürk as an ardent materialist, going beyond Marx and Lenin and as a godless who claimed that Islam and Qur'an is a fabrication of Prophet Muhammad:

“The First President is not only 'godless' in a general sense, but also a dark and hard materialist who left no room for the least idealistic air in his soul. In this regard, maybe with a predispose that goes beyond of Karl Marx and Lenin, he does not accept any destination except rough material... According to the First President, everything is (far from it) fabricated by the Messenger of Allah. (far

from it for endless time) The magazine of these fabrications the Qur'an; otherwise it is not the Word of Allah as it is supposed" (Kısakürek, 1950b).⁸⁹

Also in another article, he claimed that Atatürk was the first leader of the communist movement in Turkey since he ordered the establishment of the first communist parties, Turkish Communist Party (*Türk Komünist Fırkası*) and People Participation Party (*Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası*). In addition, he asserted that if the National Struggle had failed, he would declare communism in Turkey (Kısakürek, 1950p). In his reading of history, Atatürk was also portrayed as a cruel despot who did not hesitate even from victimising his close brothers in arms for his personal ambitions. In an article titled *Zulüm* (Cruelty), gotten from *Yarın* brochures of Oruç, it was claimed that the İzmir Assassination trial was conducted in order to destroy the ones who had secret knowledge and documents about Atatürk's personal issues (Oruç, 1950b). In order to support this portrait of Atatürk, he opened to the discussion some critical incidents of the single-party period, especially of the first fifteen years that Atatürk was alive. In the serial articles he wrote about the Dersim rebellion, the incident of the execution by shooting of 33 persons by General Mustafa Muğlalı, and some other separate incidents, he claimed that the single-party government under the leadership of Atatürk committed inhuman crimes against the citizens of the country (Kısakürek, 1950a; 1950n; 1950r).

The historiography, which Kısakürek embarked on as a man of letters, is far from scientific endeavour, as it is instrumentalised with an ideological impulse and a

⁸⁹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Birinci Cumhuriyet Reisi, sadece umumi manada bir 'Allahsız' değil, ruhunda en küçük (idealist) havaya pay bırakmayan koyu ve sert bir (materialist) dir. Bu bakımdan, belki de (Karl Marks) ve (Lenin) i aşacak bir istidatta, kaba maddeden başka bir hedef tanımaz... Birinci Cumhuriyet Reisince her şey Allah Resulü tarafından (haşa) uydurulmuştur. Bu uydurmaların (namütenahi defa haşa) mecmuası da Kur'andır; yoksa o, sanıldığı gibi Allahın kelamı değildir.

political goal. As noted by Altun, Kısakürek does not have Weber's concern of discovering causality between empirical phenomena. He looks at the history with "subjective assessment categories" and tries to conduct 'historical actor' centred analyses (Altun, 2015, pp. 338,339). He takes into analysis the phenomena that he discusses, independently of the social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the period, and the motivations of historical actors. The thing that was important to him was how much the things that historical actors put forth to establish their power supports his own argument. For instance, the book titled *Tarih* (History) which Kısakürek benefited in the article, titled *Allahsız*, he wrote addressing Atatürk was prepared with the inspiration of a book entitled *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (Main Lines of Turkish History) prepared by a selected delegation in 1929 with Atatürk's initiative (Ersanlı, 2003, pp. 120,126). Kısakürek aimed to place his arguments on a legitimate floor by arguing that this book was written directly by Atatürk. Besides, this book was prepared with a hurry excitement as a part of nation-building process. It reflects a reaction against European perceptions of the Turks as an inferior race; therefore there is quest for revealing that the Turks are one of the ancient races of the history (Poulton, 1997, p. 101). Inevitably, it brought along the exaltation of the history of the Turks, which is before Islam. Moreover, this book was done as preparation work without a serious concentration in a short time, and could not get the approval even of Atatürk (Ersanlı, 2003, p. 120). This background did not make any sense for Kısakürek, although he witnessed all this process as an intellectual. The only thing that mattered to him was to find some arguments supporting his assertion.

In parallel with this actor-centred look to the history, he fell further into another mistake in historiography. Kısakürek transformed actors into stereotypes such as '*Tanzimat münevveri*' (Tanzimat intellectual), '*sahte reformcular*' (pseudo

reformers) each representing a historical period, and used idiographic facts to produce nomothetic results. To put it more explicitly, as a person, İsmet İnönü was the flesh and bones form of the Republican revolution. His personal mistakes enabled Kısakürek to reach the conclusion that the Republican revolution as a whole was a false formation. Sure, this was also a consequence of instrumentalisation of the history as an ideological tool for his political struggle, and it is not possible to say that it is a scientific approach.

Kısakürek conducted his historiography within religious paradigm. For Kısakürek, the history of the Turks has begun with the acceptance of Islam. Even, it is also an early date. As mentioned in the first chapter in detail, contrary to the Anatolianists (he also identified himself as an Anatolialist), the Seljuk state and other Turkish principalities have almost no significant place in the history of Turks in terms of him. And, all this narrative of history is an interpretation of which course has changed in the scale that to which extent the Turks have applied Islam to their lives. The economic, political, social factors have secondary importance and are the extension of departure from true Islam. In parallel with this approach, the actors such as Jews, apostates, Masons, communists and West lover stereotypes who manifested with their religious identity along with their political identities have become prominent players of the historiography at Kısakürek. The inclusion of these actors into historiography process has led to the interpretation of the history in the context of mutual agreements and conflicts of secret purposes, secret organisations about which there is not too much concrete information. In his biographical work of Abdulhamid, which he writes with the slogan "Abdulhamid is the greatest victim of history and a false knowledge has been constructed on him", Kısakürek defended the thesis that the March 31 incident, which caused to dethrone of the Sultan, was a conspiracy of

Mason collaborator Union and Progress, and their aim was destruction of the Islam by the order of the Jews' (Kısakürek, 2013t, pp. 10,671). Kısakürek was to use these arguments also while defending Menderes in further years. As will be illustrated in coming parts, he would accuse the oppositions of Mendes in the party of being deceived by the Masons.

The historiography of Kısakürek is a voluminous issue that requires a separate study on its own. Here, just a general framework has been drawn. In epitome, it can be said that historiography was used by Kısakürek as an instrumentalised device for his political goals.

3.4 The *Büyük Doğu* under the Patronage of Menderes

As the first step of founding the *Büyük Doğu* Party, the *Büyük Doğu* Newspaper began publishing on 16 November 1951. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Kısakürek had a full authority on the newspaper since he was only one of the shareholders. He was the editor-in-chief but, as he stated in the notary notice he sent to Ali Rıza Cansu, many of his writings were censored by the newspaper administration. Besides, not before long, it was announced in the 14th issue of the newspaper that Kısakürek's relationship with the newspaper was terminated. In his memoirs, Kısakürek argued that he was suspended from the newspaper in an illegal way by forged documents, which he signed earlier (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 207). In the notary notice he sent, Kısakürek explained this forgery as follows: Ali Rıza Cansu, one of the shareholders of the newspaper, came with a proposal of removing the third partner from the newspaper since he did not give the financial support he had promised, and Kısakürek also accepted this offer. In this regard, abrogation paper was signed by all side but when the newspaper established again it was Kısakürek who

was left out (Kısakürek, 1952i). So, the fifth period of the *Büyük Doğu* was ended for Kısakürek although the newspaper continued to be published in the same name for a while.

With the failure of this last attempt, which was actually not promising a success at all, Kısakürek completely abandoned the idea of initiating a political movement on its own. From now on, his basic strategy would be to support the right wing parties against the RPP and to get partial gains by taking advantage of the more moderate attitudes of these parties on secularity. On the other hand, there was also another pragmatic reason of this strategy change. It became no more possible for Kısakürek to afford to publish a journal such as *Büyük Doğu*, which addresses to only a limited part of the society with its hard discourses and ideology, on his own. Kısakürek had already given the signal of this change in this short-lived newspaper. By leaving behind the disappointment he had about Menderes, Kısakürek appealed to him by the adjective of being his slave:

“As much as you continue on this purity, essentialness and sincerity and wisdom, we, with the adjective of your slave who does not accept being liberated, commit to come behind you, and, all sort of bragging to one side, to bring along the Turkish Nation behind. And, with the excitement of this commitment, we announce that our sole hope is you” (Kısakürek, 1951a).⁹⁰

After being suspended from the newspaper, Kısakürek found an opportunity to convey his intention personally to Menderes in his office in the Prime Ministry. As Kısakürek indicated in his memoirs, Menderes welcomed him and his request warmly

⁹⁰ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Siz bu saffet ve samimiyet, asliyet ve halisiyette devam ettikçe, azad kabul etmez bağlınız sıfatıyla arkanızdan geleceğimizi; ve her türlü palavra bir tarafa, Türk Milletini de arkamızdan çekerek getireceğimizi taahhüt ediyoruz. Ve bu taahhüdün heyecanıyla bildiriyoruz ki, bugünden itibaren tek ümidimiz sizdedir.

and assigned Tefvik İleri⁹¹ and Samet Ağaoğlu⁹² to coordinate the publishing of *Büyük Doğu* as a daily newspaper. After several negotiations held under the coordination of Ağaoğlu and İleri, it was decided to provide Kısakürek with thirty thousand TL in advance to begin publishing the *Büyük Doğu* as a daily newspaper. Similar financial assistance would continue to be made later (National Archives, 1953a; 1960b; Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 211-219).

It was a good coincidence for Kısakürek that he applied to Menderes at a time when he was on a quest for establishing a supportive media group around his party. He had fallen into dispute with Yalman, who was the most prominent supporter of the Democrats in the foundation years, and was trying to fill the gap occurred after Yalman. When looking at the memories of Mükerrer Sarol⁹³, one of the most important assistants of Menderes in his relations with the press, it can be observed that the *Milliyet* Newspaper, owned by Ali Naci Karacan, came forth in these alternative searches (Sarol, 1983a, pp. 199-204). When Kısakürek went to see Menderes with the intention of asking for help, Karacan was also in the Prime Ministry for the same reason (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 208). Also, when looking at the records of the Yassıada tribunals, it can be seen that Kısakürek was not the only intellectual who could gain the patronage of Menderes. Journalists and intellectuals such as Burhan Belge, who was the editor of the '*Zafer*' (Victory) newspaper known as the publication organ of the party, Peyami Safa, Orhan Seyfi Orhon were similarly financially supported by Menderes during the DP power period (TBMM, 1960, pp. 117,140,158). Menderes' relationship with the journalists was such intense that

⁹¹ Tefvik İleri (1911- 1961) was one of the prominent politicians of the DP era. He served as Minister of Education (1950-1953, 1957), Minister of State (1957-1958), Minister of Public Works (1958-1960). He was a conservative person and had close friendship with Kısakürek.

⁹² Samet Ağaoğlu (1909-1982) was the son of famous Turkish intellectual Ahmet Ağaoğlu. He served as Minister of Labour, Minister of Industry and Minister of State in DP governments.

⁹³ Mükerrer Sarol (1909-1995) was a doctor and politician. He was one of the close friends of Adnan Menderes. He served as Minister of State in the DP governments.

Ağaoğlu depicted the journalists' position in the party as a shadow government (Ağaoğlu, 1967, p. 137).

As pointed out by Göle, the DP was a political party which aimed at establishing a wide-ranging coalition among motley discontent groups including modern, market-oriented, liberal, small peasantry and religious groups through wide clientelist policies fed by conciliatory and distributive attitudes towards them (Sunar & Toprak, 1983, p. 429). In this regard, it might have been expected of Kısakürek to serve as a channel that the party could reach religious groups. Inasmuch as, Menderes also stated in the Yassıada tribunals that he had given support to Kısakürek since he had a reader mass (TBMM, 1960). On the other side, as mentioned above, Kısakürek was seen as a person threatening the regime with actions and ideas even by some members of the party and he had a very bad reputation due to the casino incident. Besides, the anxieties of reactionism caused by the actions of the Ticani sect were still alive, and the arrestment news towards the religious group and anti-reactionism demonstrations, which were being held in many parts of the country, were going on to be one of the main agenda items of the country (*Milliyet*, 01,30 June, 01-04 July 1951). If Kısakürek's statements were taken into consideration, it would seem that Menderes thought that the casino raid incident was a conspiracy, and, therefore did not care much about Kısakürek's image (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 212-214). Also, the time period of few months that were to pass until the newspaper had been ready for publishing could have been enough for being forgotten of the incident. Besides these facts, another point worth considering in terms of establishing such kind of a patronage relationship was that Kısakürek promised a personal loyalty to Menderes himself. Kısakürek identified the publication policy of the newspaper as advocating

Menderes against his opponents both in and out of the party, and supporting him in the way of founding a new structure from within the party:

“The newspaper, which looks at the world with Islamic goggles and wants to win Menderes in its case ... Yes, our goal is to support only Menderes, and defend him against his enemies both inside and outside the Party... To work towards consolidating the Party and to make it a whole without any contrast in the mace of dough that we try to yeast at him, so as to lead to the emergence of new a structure from within the Democrat Party which will be based on the spiritual root of Anatolian Turks” (Kısakürek, 2013d, p. 219).⁹⁴

It may be possible to say that for Menderes, who were trying to hold leadership against the opposition rising from within the party, Kısakürek's promise of supporting him against the opposition both within and outside might be attractive. Menderes could keep the leadership of the party in the General Congress through taking Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, one of the most prominent names of the in-party opposition, to the cabinet, and through sacrificing Minister of Interior Halil Özyörük (*Milliyet*, 15-21 October 1951; Yalman, 1971, p. 250).

The first issue of the *Büyük Doğu* Newspaper was published on 16 May 1952. By the beginning to the publication of the newspaper rumours had it that Kısakürek was provided with financial aid by the government. According to the news of the Kudret (Puissance) Newspaper known for its proximity to the Nation Party, as a

⁹⁴ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Dünyaya İslam gözlüğünden bakan ve davasında Menderes'i kazanmak isteyen gazete... Evet, gayemiz sadece Menderes'i tutmak, onu Partisi içinde ve dışındaki düşmanlarına karşı müdafaa etmek... Kendisinde maya tutmasına çalıştığımız ruh hamurunun teknesinde Partiyi yekpareleştirmesi ve tezatsız bir bütün haline getirmesi için çalışmak, böylece Demokrat Parti içinden, yepyeni ve milletçe özlenen halis ve Anadolu Türkü'nün ruh köküne dayalı teşekküle yol açmak

provision for three months of official advertisement 90,000 TL had been allocated to Kısakürek through Ethem Menderes and Üzeyir Avunduk in order for the *Büyük Doğu* Newspaper to be published (Kısakürek, 1952k). In order not to damage the image of both the newspaper and the party this kind of news had to be denied. In the article he penned to respond to the allegations, Kısakürek stated that he published the newspaper with the loan received from a merchant, and asked Menderes to give official advertisement to the newspaper in order to pay his debts. However, Menderes had neither promised for official advertisement nor offered money from the implicit fund. Kısakürek also stated that he would support Menderes in whatever circumstances and he would do this without any personal gain, only because he believed in him (Kısakürek, 1952g). The news was denied also by Menderes and the newspaper was forced to publish a refutation. In the refutation text, Mendres stated that he did not know Kısakürek personally and did not have any knowledge about to be given such a support to him (Kısakürek, 1952k).

Although the close relationship between the newspaper and the party was rejected, the publishing policy of the newspaper was based on supporting Menderes. His domestic journeys for the campaign were being followed closely and it was being emphasised frequently that he won complaisance of the people. Besides this, the main issue for the Democrats was the RPP, therefore, Kısakürek carried out a severe defamatory campaign against the RPP and İnönü. According to Ahmad, the reason laid behind the extreme reflexes of the Democrats was the deep fear of İnönü in their minds. To him, İnönü-fobia was based on the conviction that İnönü was determined to undermine the DP, and he still had enough force and influence in bureaucracy, including the army, to achieve this goal (Ahmad, 1977, p. 37). For this reason, Kısakürek had designed his campaign of criticism over discrediting İnönü in the eyes

of the people. He frequently blamed İnönü with accusations such as being a general who left alone his soldiers and escaped from the battlefield in the National Struggle, being a bureaucrat who accepted every demands of the foreigners in Lausanne, a weak-willed politician who could gain post only by flattering to Atatürk, and an authoritarian state leader who made the nation live its worst days (Kısakürek, 1952e; 1952h). It can be said that such kind of news was welcomed by the democrats in the high tensioned atmosphere of politics. In the face of disgraceful propagandas, İnönü filled trial for many journalists including Kısakürek (*Büyük Doğu*, 03 June 1952; see Appendix C).

As he had promised, Kısakürek defended Menderes not only against the opposition parties but also against the opposition against him within the party. During the period when the newspaper was being published, the new move of the dissidents within the party was to put pressure over Menderes through Şevket İnce's resignation. Failed to achieve an effective success in the party congress, the dissidents elected Refik Sevket İnce, who had resigned from the cabinet by reasoning arbitrary attitudes of Menderes, to the head of the parliamentary group of the party in order to establish a control on the party group (Ahmad, 1977, p. 85). However, they also failed in this move and could not constitute a control on the party. Hence, İnce also resigned from that post. In order to create public opinion, İnce delivered his resignation letter to the press before discussed in the party group. In his letter of resignation, İnce criticised Menderes severely. He complained of Menderes's disinterest towards the group and his arrogant attitudes towards himself (Sarol, 1983a, pp. 168-176). Also in an interview, İnce stated that it is not possible for him to accept some general principles of the policy that the government was carrying out. On the other hand, İnce's resignation could not bring the expected response. The party group rejected the claims

that states in the resignation letter by the decision that they reflected not the group but İnce's personal views (*Milliyet*, 18 June 1952).

According to Kısakürek, the claims that İnce stated in his resignation letter like domination, disinterest, negligence were all pretexts of a secret mental state. Those who opposed Menderes were the representatives of the old mentality that passed from the RPP to the DP, and they could not stand Menders' politics of opening a new era: “Those, who cannot do with Adnan Menderes, are doing so only because they understood that Menderes is on to a new action with whole Turkish History and Turkish Nation” (Kısakürek, 1952j).⁹⁵

Kısakürek's criticism was focused on Karaosmanoğlu and İnce. These two names had come front as prominent names of the opposition against Menderes in the group. Even, it was asserted that Karaosmanoğlu and İnce were considering founding a new party (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 March 1951). In the criticism campaign he commenced against them, Kısakürek tried to carve out a common consciousness among religious circles towards support to Menderes through applying to the argument of secret Masonic-Jewish organisations. According to this argument, Menderes was under attacks of the of secret Masonic-Jewish organisations (Kısakürek, 1952m). Besides, these two names who became the spokesman of the opposition in the party, indeed, were deceived by some Jews whose representative was Yalman. The resignation of İnce was also a political manoeuvre of Yalman (*Büyük Doğu*, 18 June 1952). To Kısakürek, the purpose of these secret groups was to steer the government to take political decisions, such as the privatisation of state institutions, the granting of privilege in foreign exchange, the granting of oil concessions to US companies that

⁹⁵ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Adnan Menderes ile yapamayanlar, sırf onun, bütün Türk Tarihi ve Türk Milletiyle yapacak yepyeni bir iş üzerinde olduğunu anladıklarından böyle hareket ediyorlar

they were partners, which they would benefit from while seeking their own interests. (Kısakürek, 1952f). And, it was only Menderes who would be able to ruin the games of these secret power centres, which cause the collapse of the Ottoman state and the alienation of the nation to its own culture and religion through the secret policies they had been conducting since Tanzimat (Kısakürek, 1952m). Therefore, supporting Menderes against all his enemies was the duty of each Muslim Turk: “Oh Turk, the Turkish son with all his historical and true qualities! To stick to and protect Adnan Menderes of whom enemies manifest every day as heresy, betrayal and malignancy, is a duty of religion and nationalism” (Kısakürek, 1952b).⁹⁶

Indeed, the arguments put forth by Kısakürek did not quite match with the reality. The Democrats kept the law to encourage foreign investment on 1 March 1950 to attract foreign capital investment. Besides, they enacted more liberal laws in 1951 and 1954. In March 1954, they even abandoned the state’s monopoly over the oil industry and threw it open to foreign investment (Ahmad, 2003, p. 120). In 1955, they refused, even teased about the idea of economic planning, even in the case of high inflation and property shortages, which were the result of giddy-paced investments and unprotected, liberal policies (Akşin, 2000, p. 216). The economic picture was totally opposite to what was expected of Menderes to follow in terms of Kısakürek.

Kısakürek also opposed those who accuse Menderes and the DP government of being anti-democratic and totalitarian. To him, it is the evidence of having democracy in the country that people from different fronts such as Nazım Hikmet, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Hikmet Bayur, and Kasım Gülek can claim such assertions

⁹⁶ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Ey Türk, bütün tarihi ve hakiki vasıflarıyla Türk oğlu!.. Düşmanları, her gün, dalaleet, hiyanet ve habaset olarak tecelli ve tahakkuk eden Adnan Menderes’e sınıksız yapışmak ve onu korumak, bugünkü şartlar altında din ve Milliyet borcudur.

freely (Kısakürek, 1952c). He even thought that Menderes redundantly bound to democracy in the case of the RPP. He tried to steer the Menderes government towards carrying out a suppressing policy towards the RPP. In fact, the DP could not be said to have been very democratic towards the Republicans. On 8 August 1951, people's houses (*Halkevleri*) were closed and their premises were granted to the state (*Milliyet*, 09 August 1951). In 1953, this time all property of the RPP granted to the state by the claim of the 'undeserved acquisition of property' (*Milliyet*, 15 December 1953). Kısakürek supported the issue of the undeserved acquisition of property, but it was not enough for him. He wanted Menderes the full abrogation of the RPP:

“Democrat Party! Your foremost duty is to kill this rat of pestilence through legal ways in order to represent the national will who elected you for taking the revenge from this rat... If you want to win the unlimited trust of the Turkish nation and wish to connect the intellectuals coming from the light (nur) to yourself, not the intellectuals coming from the hellfire, kill the rat named People's Party” (Kısakürek, 1952a).⁹⁷

Through giving place to the religious issues, the newspaper maintained its religious identity. Kısakürek republished the articles he had written in the previous periods such as the ones published under the title of '*Mümin Kafır*' (Believer and Infidel), '*İmam Rabbani Mektubat*' (Imam Rabbani Letters), '*Dininizi Öğreniniz*' (Learn Your Religion). While the articles on the *Büyük Doğu* ideology continued to be published, they were the repeat of old articles and were not published in every issue. In addition, writings of several names such as Ali Fuat Başgil, who wrote about

⁹⁷ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Demokrat Parti! Biricik vazifen, seni fareden intikam almak için seçen milletin iradesine tercüman olarak, veba sıçanını kanun yoluyla gebertmektir... Eğer Türk milletinin hudutsuz itimadını kazanmak istiyor ve (nâr)dan gelen münevverleri değil, (nûr)dan gelen münevverleri kendine bağlamak diliyorsan, gebert Halk Partisi isimli sıçanı.

Islamic countries that were trying to win their independence in the decolonisation process, took an important place (*Büyük Doğu*, 23 May 1952, pp. 3,4). It is noteworthy that there was no emphasis on an Islamic state contemplated around the religious law, which would put the DP government in a difficult situation, during this period of the newspaper. Also, he dropped speaking against Atatürk and directed his criticism only to İnönü. In an article he was to pen in the ninth period, which was to be published with the support of Menderes again, he would deny İnönü's claim that Kısakürek called Atatürk as a pseudo-hero; even, he would accuse the RPP as the real enemy of Atatürk (Kısakürek, 1959b).

Few months later, Kısakürek made a mistake by undervaluing the role of Bayar in the party dynamics. He began to publish the list of the names who took place in a document captured from a mason lodge and Bayar's son was also in the list. In the periods when the relationship of patronage between him and Menderes had not yet begun, Kısakürek had made black propaganda against Bayar by asserting various claims that the latter was mason and not a real Turk. Bayar had also criticised him with severe terms and the disagreement between the two had also reflected in the press (*Sabah Postası*, 07 November 1949). Nevertheless, with the beginning of this period, Kısakürek's attitude towards Bayar changed and he began to use quite polite language about him. It is also possible to say that this change in attitude of Kısakürek found a positive response also at Bayar. The criticisms and allegations of the past period could have been forgiven but this time the situation was different. Kısakürek damaged the most powerful supporter of Menderes in the Party.

In those days, Kısakürek had applied Ağaoğlu one more time to get new financial aids. The newspaper had reached a certain circulation but it was still insufficient to manage itself. Conveyed Kısakürek's request to Menderes, Ağaoğlu

returned with the instructions of closing the newspaper. As Kısakürek mentioned in his memoirs, financial assistance would continue to be made to ensure Kısakürek's livelihoods but the newspaper would be closed for some time due to the party's grand policy (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 236-239). The grand policy was the in-party power dynamics and Kısakürek had begun to damage these dynamics. Upon this decision, Kısakürek ended this period of the *Büyük Doğu* with the statement 'we are entering the tunnel' (Kısakürek, 1952l). The waiting period for the calm down of the environment would have taken a few years because of an incident that occurred in Malatya.

3.5 The Malatya Incident

While he was in an obligatory resting period, Kısakürek's life was suddenly changed by the news about the assassination attempt to Ahmet Emin Yalman in Malatya (a city in the Eastern region of Turkey) on 22 November 1952. According to news of the *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper, some of those who had organised the assassination were members of *Büyük Doğu* Association (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1952). The first person detected in relation with the incident was Şerif Dursun. The letter he had sent to the *Büyük Doğu* with his brother had been published in the newspaper with the title of '*Vatana Lanet*' (Damn to *Vatan*) on 27 July 1952. After a few days, Hüseyin Üzmez who committed the assassination and those who helped and organised the assassination was detected. It was reported in the press that the suspects were members of the closed *Büyük Doğu* Association and Islam Democrat Party, which was founded by Cevat Rifat Atilhan. The suspects stated that they had influenced from a reactionary publication (*Milliyet*, 27 November 1952). This publication was the *Büyük Doğu*.

Kısakürek had been writing accusing articles about Yalman since 1940s and he had been accusing him of being a Jewish apostate, as the many other Islamist publications did. In 1952 period, he commenced a defamatory campaign against him for having organised a beauty contest by *Vatan* Newspaper. (*Büyük Doğu*, 05 June 1952, see also Appendix C). Such that, for months, one of the two main headlines of the newspaper was about Yalman. Much news was made stating that there is indignance about Yalman in the public. In a reader letter, published in the newspaper on 8 June, it was stated that the people in Malatya were very reactive against Yalman (*Büyük Doğu*, 08 June 1952). Yalman filed a lawsuit against Kısakürek and the editor in chief of the newspaper for this news made in *Büyük Doğu* Newspaper, and Kısakürek was punished with 3-month conviction (*Milliyet*, 18 December 1952).

In his memoirs, Üzmez stated that he was influenced much from Kısakürek in that period. “If I had mentioned to every writings of Kısakürek in the court that I had been influenced from”, said Üzmez, “he would have been imprisoned inevitably” (Üzmez, 1996, p. 85).⁹⁸ Nevertheless, he underlined especially an article of Kısakürek which he wrote under the title of ‘*1001 Çerçeve*’ (1001 Frames): “The greatness of an idea is measured by the size of the blood stains that this idea spilled” (ibid).⁹⁹

The name that featured in the press was Kısakürek. He was being accused of being the one who instigated the assassins through his writings. He had several attempts to convince the DP elites that he had no connection with the assassination incident. Firstly he talked to Ağaoğlu and, later, he went to Ankara with the intention of meeting with important names of the government (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 244-147).

⁹⁸ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Şayet mahkemede Kısakürek’in etkilendiğim yazılarının hepsinden bahsetseydim kesinlikle hapsedilirdi.

⁹⁹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Bir fikrin büyüklüğü, o fikrin toprak üzerine döktüğü kan lekelerinin büyüklüğü ile ölçülür.

There, he met with director general of public security and told him that he was innocent (*Milliyet*, 2 December 1952). Also, he gave an interview to *İstiklal* (Independence) Newspaper, which was published in Ankara, and argued that this assassination would have been organised by the RPP (Ak, 2016, p.117). In the meantime, there was a finalised 9-month and 12-day conviction about him due to some of his articles published in the 54th issue of the fourth period. The imprisonment of Kısakürek had been reprieved by the court due to his health condition. He had made the execution of the conviction reprieved one more time by taking a new medical report but when the incident occurred the time of the reprieve ended. To reprieve the imprisonment again, he applied to hospital but this time his application was refused and he entered prison on 12 December 1952 (*Milliyet*, 13 December 1952).

The incident became a Pandora box for the Turkish public. Many religious associations and publications, whose names had not been heard of before, were being reported along with the decisions of arrest in the press. *Mukadderatçılar Birliği* (Unity of Believers of Fate), *Büyük Dava* (Great Dawah) ve *Büyük Cihad* (Great Jihad) newspapers were some of them (*Milliyet*, 10 December 1952; *Milliyet*, 24 January 1953). It was reported that 600 names were detected in relation to the assassination (*Milliyet*, 06 December 1952). The news that the reactionary movements in the country were supported by Islamic movements in neighbouring countries like Iran also took place in the press (*Milliyet*, 02 February 1953). In the context of the Malatya incident, the issue of reactionism was shaping the political atmosphere of the country. Major metropolitan dailies such as *Milliyet*, *Vatan*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet* and *Zafer* orchestrated a campaign drawing attention to growing reactionary web in the country. It was possible to find news in the media in everyday about the incident from

November 1952 to April 1953. In response to the increasing reactionism, 'Milli Tesevüt Cephesi' (the National Solidarism Front) was founded with the initiative of the intellectuals and journalists (*Milliyet*, 15 February 1953). Over time, the organisation grew rapidly with the participation of various organisations such as youth organizations, chambers of commerce and industry. Shortly after opening the branches in various cities, the union moved away from its original aim by sliding to the right (Ersel et al, 2005a, p. 235).

Nevertheless, it was the *Büyük Doğu* Association, and the IDP, that were being seen at the centre of the reactionism danger in the country. All kinds of individual events were being associated with the *Büyük Doğu* Association (*Milliyet*, 04 January 1953). It was even asserted that some members of the association were planning to kill also Menderes and Bayar (*Milliyet*, 03 January 1953), whereas, it was a year and a half past that the association had liquidated itself. As mentioned above, Atilhan had benefited from provincial organisations of the *Büyük Doğu* Association while founding his party. Therefore, the suspects were being associated with both these two institutions. Here, it should be remembered that the IDP had also been closed in August.

While in prison, Kısakürek prepared a brochure titled '*Maskenizi Yırtyorum*' (I am Tearing Your Mask) in order to convince the public that he had no relations with the assassination of Yalman. In the brochure, he stated that only three of the fifteen suspects were members of the association and they did not have any important office in the association. In addition, he stated that he was the enemy of Yalman in the intellectual field and did not have any intention to give damage physically. To him, there would be only two reasons behind the assassination. First, it would be an independent organisation of a small group who were annoyed of the anti-religion

publications of Yalman. Second, and as the real reason, it was a conspiracy of the RPP and the Masons in order to take down Menderes through carrying out propaganda of having a danger of reactionism in the country. To him, the main target was Menderes because he was the only person who could bring the nation to its true essence, who could spoil hidden games played on the country, and who could provide the required progress of the state. He was chosen because he was the leading intellectual who was supporting Menderes in this way and who articulated to the national and spiritual sentiments of the nation. He also added that the *Büyük Doğu* newspaper was published with the support and promotion of Menderes, and he would continue supporting him (Kısakürek, 2012j). Together with complaining about the stance of the government in the war against him, Kısakürek asked for support of Menderes and government by saying that he did not lose his hope for him.

However, the wind was blowing from a different direction for Menderes. Ultimately, Menderes was a pragmatic politician. He knew how to benefit from the discontentment of the public from strict secularism, which identified with the RPP. Only few months ago from the incident, in his speech he had in Konya provincial congress, Menderes told people that it was the Democrat Party that had abolished the ban of performing of *adhan* in a particular language as soon as it came to power, and it is the Democrat Party that had opened and would open religious schools (*Büyük Doğu*, 23 May 1952). Also, in the morning of the day that Yalman was shot, he said, “there is no religious reactionism in the country; there is political reactionism” (*Milliyet*, 23 November 1952).¹⁰⁰ However, he could not allow his name or his party to be mentioned side by side with reactionism. In a speech after the incident, he indicated his and his party’s stance in the war against the reactionism evil in these

¹⁰⁰ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Ülkede dini irtica yoktur, siyasi irtica vardır.

words: “This country never tolerates the use of a sacred notion, such as religion, as a tool for all sorts of goals of some association debris and politics tricksters” (*Milliyet*, 07 December 1952).¹⁰¹

Menderes continued to state the decisive attitude of the government to the fight against reactionary movements in strict terms. Concomitantly, the scope of the investigations that started with the Malatya assassination expanded over time. A prosecution was also beginning to be carried out for the *Nur* Movement led by Said Nursî, whom many religious movements in Turkey regarded as a pioneer (*Milliyet*, 27 January 1953). With the linking of the Turkish Nationalists Association (*Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği-TNA*) to the Malatya assassination, the process had entered a process that also affected the DP directly, because the president and a very prominent name of the association were the DP deputy.

The primary reason to be attached of the TNA to the assassination investigation by the prosecutor's office was that two suspects of the assassination, named Musa Cağıl and İlhan Civelek who were members of the association. Upon the detection of this situation, the relationship of these two people with the association was cut off, but some other events that had taken place caused the attention to be turned on the association (Kılıç, 2016, p. 194). It was also alleged in the press that the TNA was comprised of the *Büyük Doğu* Association and the IDP's members (*Milliyet*, 06 December 1952). The formation of this perception was caused by the fact that some members of the Bursa branch of the TNA participated in a meeting held by Kısakürek while the Malatya investigation was still going on. Also, a letter,

¹⁰¹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Din gibi mukaddes bir mefhumun bir takım cemiyet döküntülerinin ve siyaset bezirganlarının her çeşit maksatlarının aleti haline getirilmesine bu memleketin asla tahammülü yoktur.

which was sent by Üzmez, was found in the search that was made in the home of Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, who was known for his close relationship with TNA. In the letter, Üzmez stated that Yalman should be killed since he was a Mason and was making anti-religion publications (Kılıç, 2016, p. 195).

Actually, the TNA was not such an organisation that could encourage reactionism or such an extremist act. The TNA was first established as a Turkish Nationalist Federation through the union of various nationalist associations and later became institutionalised as a single association for the joint conduct of activities (Sefercioğlu, 2012, pp. 16-23).¹⁰² According to Kılıç, the TNA was a roof under which different tendencies in Turkish nationalism come together. One of these tendencies was a combination of nationalism with conservatism. The symbol of this mergence, in a sense, was Serdengeçti journal and its famous slogan ‘Turk as much as the Tanrı Mountain, Muslim as much as Hira Mountain’ (*Tanrı Dağı kadar Türk, Hira Dağı kadar Müslüman*) (Kılıç, 2016, p. 54). Anti-communism and reaction against the single-party era were basic common issues in this mergence. According to the second title of the main constitution of the association, the goal of the association was to handle Turkish nationalism based on the principles of God, Motherland, History, Language, Tradition, Art, Family, Morality, Liberty and National Sacrament and organise all nationalists (ibid, 112).

This appearance of the association was compatible with the discourses of Kısakürek. He made supportive news about the association in *Büyük Doğu* (*Büyük Doğu*, 16 May 1952). The dissatisfaction of some members of the TNA towards

¹⁰² These associations were: ‘Türk Kültür Ocağı (Turkish Cultural Center), ‘Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği’ (Turkish Cultural Studies Association), ‘Türk Kültür Derneği’ (Turkish Cultural Association), ‘Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı’ (Turkish Youth Association), ‘Genç Türkler Cemiyeti’ Young Turkish Community

Kısakürek had also reflected to the *Büyük Doğu* (*Büyük Doğu*, 17 May 1952). The closest person to Kısakürek from the association circle was Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti. Some of his famous works, such as *Bir Nesli Nasıl Mahvettiler* (How Did They Overwhelm a Generation), *Kara Kitap: Bir Devrin Yüzkarası* (The Black Book: The Disgrace of an Era) were published serially in the fourth and sixth periods of the *Büyük Doğu*. Kısakürek also was giving intellectual support to his journal of Serdengeçti. The special issue of the magazine (May-June 1952) that published a few months before the Malatya incident brought together prominent names of both Turkists, asuch as Zeki Velidi Togan, Nihal Atsız, and Islamists, such as Nureddin Topçu, Eşref Edip, Kısakürek, and Atılhan. Kısakürek published an announcement in his journal about this special issue of the journal and asked his readers to buy this issue that he depicted as the issue that brought together all *mujahids* and intellectuals of the conservative/sacradist (mukaddesatçı) front (*Büyük Doğu*, 09 June 1952). Sait Çekmegil, the founder of Malatya office of *Büyük Doğu* Association, was also in the writing cadre of this issue and it was reported in the press that a writing of Çekmegil was seen in connection with the incident (*Milliyet*, 08 December 1952).

Such contacts among the nationalist and conservative circles made it possible to emerge a perception towards cooperation between *Büyük Doğu*, IDP and TNA. In a report which was prepared by the Ministry of Interior in December 1952 in order to be submitted to the Prime Ministry, it was reported that these elements, also by establishing a cooperation with the *Nurcus*, were secretly organised to form a party called '*Hak*' (Right) or '*Büyük Türkiye*' (Great Turkey) with the aim of seizing power (National Archives, 1952). Since Chairman Said Bilgiç, and one of the prominent names of the TNA, Hassan Tahsin Tola, were the DP deputy, the debates for Malatya assassination were also carried to the party. The Ankara Prosecutor's Office launched

an independent investigation into TNA. The immunity of Sait Bilgiç and Hassan Tahsin Tola were removed and sent out of the party (*Milliyet*, 01 February 1953).

The TNA was closed with a court order on 22 January 1953, but discussion did not end (*Milliyet*, 23 January 1953). Tevfik İleri was being accused of making financial aid to the TNA from the state budget and a criticism campaign was being carried out against him. Nevertheless, the political atmosphere was not possible for Menderes to protect İleri. The relationship between government and opposition turned to temporal spring weather. The process was described by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in these words: “*brotherly struggle period began among the parties*” (*Milliyet*, 11 February 1953). Tevfik İleri was obliged to resign from the cabinet but he was not alone. Labor Minister Samet Ağaoğlu and State Minister Muammer Alakant also resigned.

It was reported in the press that the resignation of Ağaoğlu was also in relation with the Malatya incident (*Milliyet*, 07 April 1953). In fact, the real reason for Ağaoğlu's resignation was the resumption of friendship between Yalman and Menderes after the assassination of Malatya, and having accused Ağaoğlu by Yalman of mismanaging the government. According to Sarol, Ağaoğlu was chosen as the scapegoat of this friendship (Ağaoğlu, 1965, pp. 161-163; Sarol, 1983a). Ağaoğlu organised a press conference and accused Yalman of undermining the government and misleading the public through the publication policy he was carrying out (*Milliyet*, 05 August 1952). Menderes rapprochement with Yalman meant also moving away from Kısakürek.

These two names that had been helping Kısakürek in the publishing of the *Büyük Doğu*, were no longer in the cabinet. Besides, it was also a sign that Menderes'

agenda was changed. Nevertheless, Kısakürek was still keeping his hopes for Menderes. Upon being associated with the assassination of Malatya by the prosecutor's office, he was transferred to Malatya from İstanbul on 28 January 1953. On 09 March, along with the other suspects, he was brought to Ankara since the scope of the investigation was enlarged (*Milliyet*, 10 March 1953). While in prison in Ankara, Kısakürek wrote letters to Menderes asking his help both for the incident and for the improvement of his prison conditions. According to his deposition in Yassıada's trials, Kemal Aygün was sent to Kısakürek by Menderes to learn what he would say about the incident, and to give him some money. According to statements of Aygün, Kısakürek enumerated the same assertions such as the assassination incident is a conspiracy of the RPP and its Jewish collaborates (TBMM, 1960, pp. 66,67). It was their first and last contact during the Kısakürek imprisonment time.

The Malatya trial lasted about a year and a half, and Kısakürek spent almost all of this time in prison. When he was acquitted on 23 December 1953 along with Serdengeçti and Atilhan, it had been one year and twenty-three days that Kısakürek had spent in prison (National Archives, 1953b). Since the time he spent in prison also covered the length of the sentence he received from the other press cases, there was not any sentence remained.

3.6 A New In-Party Crisis and Calling the *Büyük Doğu* to Duty Again

Immediately after his release, Kısakürek wrote Menderes a letter and asked for help to publish the *Büyük Doğu* as a newspaper again. In his letter, Kısakürek stated that he was much more loyal to him than all of the friends around him were and would support him on any condition. He also advised him to benefit from him since he was the most competent person for the opposition to the RPP. Being aware of the

possible prejudices that could occur in Menderes' mind against him due to the experienced incidents, Kısakürek also said that he could dissemble the truth that he got money from him, and he would not make religious propaganda to prevent the party from being criticised for religion (National Erchives, 1958).

Could not get a positive answer to his letter, Kısakürek began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* again on 7 May 1954 with the help of one of his friends. This period of the journal reflects a disappointment towards Menderes and the DP. In the article, titled '*Milletçe Ağlıyoruz*' (As the Nation, We Are All Crying), he penned in the first issue, Kısakürek reproached Menderes for staying quite in the face of unjust accusations and suppressions against the Muslims in the name of reactionism clamour (Kısakürek, 1954e, p. 3). He also criticised the policies of the DP carried out during the first period of its power, especially that of economy. "In the past", said Kısakürek, "there were neither machines and property nor was the value of money in the country. Now, there are machines and property, but the value of the money lost totally" (Kısakürek, 1954b). According to him, an economic congress had to be convened urgently to discuss the problem of the country (Kısakürek, 1954d).

It can be said that the best words that could express Kısakürek's feelings about Menderes are those which he penned in his article 'Artık Rahmeyle Sevgilim' (Mercy me now darling): "I have a darling. He has done everything in the book. Like every lover, he is my trouble" (Kısakürek, 1954a).¹⁰³ As seen, Kısakürek did not lose his hope for Menderes and left an open door again. In the article, titled '*Heyhat ki Menderes, Bütün Ümidimiz Sensin*' (Alas, Menderes, You are our single hope), he penned with the same intention, Kısakürek stated his hope in these words: "A burning

¹⁰³ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bir sevgilim vardır. Bana yapmadığı kalmamıştır. Her sevgili gibi başımın belası.

smile on our lips, we are declaring that, the ability to quench the fire which burn us is not existed anywhere except your hands, although it was your hands that sparked off this fire” (Kısakürek, 1954c).¹⁰⁴

In the meantime, the general election of 1954 was resulted with absolute victory of the Democrats. The DP increased its representation in the Assembly with 504 seats while the RPP decreased to 31 seats (1954 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları, 2018). Nevertheless, it seemed that despite the election victory, the Democrats had not felt secure yet. The government continued to take serious measures against the opposition. Before the general elections, some tightening amendments had been made in the Press Law on 8 March 1954. The most criticised aspect of the amendment was that journalists were deprived of their right to prove the truth of their allegations (*Milliyet*, 08,09 March 1954). The ‘the right of proof’ (ispat hakkı) became a symbol of anti-democratic attitudes of the government for the opposition both in and out of the party. As Ahmad illustrated clearly, the failure of economy became one of the main reasons behind the authoritarian attitude of the government. The outcome of the haphazard economic policies had begun to surface with rising prices, spiralling inflation, shortage of goods and black marketing (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 52,53). Economic troubles, a very favourable opposition tool in terms of direct reflection to the public, became butter and honey for the Republicans, just as it had been for the Democrats in the 1940s. Increase of opposition both in and out of the party in parallel with economic problems dragged Menderes to an aggressive and intolerant attitudes. This aggression even led him to take irrational decisions such as the punishment of the Kırşehir and Malatya cities, which did not

¹⁰⁴ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Dudaklarımızda yakıcı bir tebessüm, bildiriyoruz ki, bizi yakan ateşi senin ellerin tutuşturmuş olsa bile, onu söndürme istidadı, yine senin ellerinden başka kimsede mevcut değildir.

vote in the general elections in the direction of Menderes' anticipation. The city status of Kırşehir, hometown to Osman Bölükbaşı, the founder of the Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi-RNP*), to the Assembly, was changed to a township Besides, the city of Malatya, hometown to İnönü, was divided into two parts and Adiyaman was given the status of a city (*TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi*, 1954a; 1954b).

The authoritarian attitudes of the Democrats also affected the *Büyük Doğu*. Its issues collected by the government reasoning that it was making a publication incompatible with the values of the Republic and democracy and an investigation was opened against the responsible of the journal (Ersel et al., 2005a, p. 264). In the face of the sanctions imposed, Kısakürek was obliged to close his journal by the 10th issue. He had now had enough experience that he could not make a publication without the consent of the government. Therefore, he attempted to contact Menderes again by means of Tevfik İleri. Kısakürek's calls did not get an answer for a while, but, one day, Menderes' thoughts changed. As Kısakürek mentioned in his memoirs, one night when he was in the cinema with his wife, a policeman came and revealed a secret message, which was calling Kısakürek to Ankara immediately. In their meeting, Kısakürek promised Menderes the total destruction of the RPP. It seems that Menderes required a polemicist like Kısakürek in this highly tense atmosphere of the politics. He instructed the undersecretary to make financial assistance to Kısakürek irrespective of how much he needed; and he was paid ten thousands TL in advance to complete the preparations (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 322-326). But, the project had to be delayed due to incidents in which the workplaces and houses belonging to minorities in the districts where traditionally known as non-Muslim residential and business area like Nişantaşı and Beyoğlu were plundered on 6/7 September.

The incident took place following the demonstrations organised by the various student associations and the Association of Turkish Cyprus (*Kıbrıs Türk Derneği*) in a political environment where the violent tensions between the Turkish and Greek communities living in Cyprus increased considerably. The government had trouble for quelling the incidents and martial law was declared in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir (*Milliyet*, 07,08 September 1955). According to some observers, the incident was an organisation of the government in order to change the agenda of the country. Kısakürek also claimed that the incident was organised by the DP through referring to a telephone conversation between Ahmet Salih Korur, undersecretary, and Namık Gedik, Minister of Internal affairs, he had witnessed illegally (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 327,328). Whether it was organised by the government or not, the Democrats began to use martial law as a weapon to suppress opposition, just as the Republicans did in the 1940s. As Ahmad put it clearly, it was also a sign that the Democrats were no longer able to handle the issue of opposition in normal ways (Ahmad, 1977, p. 89).

The use of anti-democratic means was leading Democrats gradually to collapse instead of success. The aggressive attitude and anti-democratic policies of Menderes gave an opportunity to the in-party opposition to challenge him again by gathering its power. The issue of the 'right of proof' came to force as the reason for the rising voices. The dissidents presented an amendment to the General Administrative Council of the party regarding the issue of the 'right to proof'. The Council refused the proposal and nine dissidents who signed it were expelled from the party before sending to the Disciplinary Committee. Following the expulsion of these nine names, more ten names resigned from the party. These dissidents, began to be pronounced as the nineteens, formed a political group and founded the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*- FP) on 19 November 1955. In the press conference where they announced the

foundation of the party, they stated that main character of the party constitution was in-party democracy (*Milliyet*, 20 November 1955). It was a reference to the authoritarian administration of Menderes in the party.

However, as Sarol pointed out, the displeasure was deeper. The deputies, who gathered for the opening of the new legislative year, came from their electoral districts as bombs loaded with complaints from voters due to the bad results of the economic policy (Sarol, 1983b, p. 542). The disapprobation manifested itself with the interpellation presented to the party group by Hüseyin Ortakçioğlu few days after the announcement of the foundation of the Freedom Party (*Milliyet*, 23 November 1955). Since Menderes was abroad due to his visit to Iraq, the interpellation was discussed on 29 November. Ironically, says Ahmad, it may have saved him because the party group was unable to maintain the pressure for the entire week (Ahmad, 1977, p. 90). On the other hand, the hole that interpellation opened up, led to the discharge of such a massive press that an opposition could ever reach to such a shocking result, and this opposition was coming from within the party. The group criticised the economic policies of the government severely and the resignation of three ministers, who were accused of corruption, was demanded. In the face of strong challenge, three ministers, Sıtkı Yırcalı, Hasan Polatkan and Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, resigned but it was not enough to silent the group. The solution was found in the way of resignation of the all cabinet and the leaving of Menderes himself to the group's vote of confidence (*Milliyet*, 23-30 November 1955).

Menderes could have had the confidence of the group but the reestablishment of the cabinet turned into a long-winded story (*Milliyet*, 01-10 December 1955). The discussions regarding the new cabinet caused a new crack within the party. Sarol,

who proposed the solution that solved the crisis, opposed the acceptance of Köprülü to the new cabinet. He thought that Köprülü was the name behind the opposition to Menderes (Sarol, 1983b, pp. 572,573). Upon Sarol's objection was heard, Menderes was obliged to make a choice between Sarol and Köprülü. It was hard for Menderes to renounce from Köprülü because he was the most powerful name who could challenge his leadership and the disappointment he had in the assignment of the party leader and the prime minister in 1950 would have been able to motivate him in such an attempt. So Menderes decided to sacrifice Sarol although he was one of the closest friends of him. Sarol was sent to the Disciplinary Committee with the accusation of factionalising within the party (*Milliyet*, 3 December 1955).

Waiting for Menderes to go into action for the publishing of the *Büyük Doğu*, Kısakürek sent him another letter stating why he should give support to him. In the letter, Kısakürek enumerated the reasons as follows: “There is an existence in the party which damage the command chain between government, party group, Assembly, and which aimed at ousting Menderes from his presidency position. The opposition in the party was under the command of Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu and the secret Jewish organisation. The tendency of some Eastern deputies to pass to the Liberty Party might cause the DP to lose the Eastern province. And, Menderes have lost almost all of his sincere and trustful friends” (National Archives, 1960a). Kısakürek continued to struggle in order to convince Menderes via sending letters. In the meantime, he established a friendship with Mükerrerrem Sarol and was being in close contact especially after 6/7 September incidents (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 310-313). After a while, he managed to get his consent thanks to the strong support of Tevfik İleri and Mükerrerrem Sarol (ibid, p. 341). It seems that Kısakürek’s warnings about in-party opposition came attractive to Menderes.

Thanks to the financial aid given from the discretionary fund, Kısakürek began the eighth period of the *Büyük Doğu* on 30 March 1956 (National Archives, 1953a, 1960b). It was published in daily newspaper format again. Kısakürek identified the beginning of the *Büyük Doğu* to its publication life again with the statement of ‘we have come out of the tunnel’ (*Tünelden Çıktık*). Now, he did not refrain from masking out Menderes’ support. In the first article, he clearly stated that it was Menderes who sent the *Büyük Doğu* to the tunnel and it was Menderes again who brought the *Büyük Doğu* out of the tunnel (Kısakürek, 1956h).

As prices rose and shortage increased, the public became more responsive to the criticism of the opposition and the opposite parties were eager to benefit from that situation. Besides, the fact that criticisms against the government were made by a group coming from within the ruling party made the situation more interesting to the public; such that the Freedom Party began to behave as the main opposition party (Ahmad, 1977, p. 55). Therefore, Kısakürek ran an unrelenting criticism campaign against the Freedom Party. He tried to reduce the public's interest towards them by presenting them as traitors who betrayed the true representative of the national will by establishing a secret partnership with the RPP (Kısakürek, 1956a; 1956c). His criticisms against RPP also continued over issues such as communism, irreligion, and İnönü again (Kısakürek, 1956b). Continuing to broadcasting in a quite harsh format, the *Büyük Doğu* received temporary shutdown penalties by the martial administration (National Archives, 1956; *Cumhuriyet*, 4 May 1956).

Menderes continued to resort to tough measures to break the influence of the opposition. He tried to prevent the opposition from reaching the people by bringing restrictions on rallies and meetings (*Milliyet*, 1 April 1956). As Ahmad stated, it

became impossible to make political activity outside the framework of the Assembly due to the repressive measures (Ahmad, 1977, p. 55). Kısakürek welcomed such kind of strict measures. He defended the amendment with the argument that the government prevents the opposition parties from showing the country nasty against the outside with untruthful claims (*Büyük Doğu*, 1 April 1956). On the other hand, such kinds of restrictive measures were not sufficient enough in terms of Kısakürek. He continued to provoke Menderes to follow a totalitarian politics.

“I have spoken to him thousands time: Why you are not a wholist (hep’ci, totalitarian)? Why you are not a wholist at least for some issues? When I consider your intelligence and comprehension, I cannot understand the reason why you are not a wholist... The goal of being a wholist, for the one we speak to (Menderes), is to destruction of the opposition both inside and outside of his own party on the ground of both personally and ideologically” (Kısakürek, 1956d).¹⁰⁵

“The Democrat Party and the Government are directly responsible for the internal matter and object that upset the Democratic Party and the Government until now. Because this Party and the Government have neglected the necessity of to be brought to the power by means of a passive revolution scaled coup d'etat by the hatred of the people to the People's Party and as because of representing its exact opposite” (Kısakürek, 1956e).¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Ona bin kere hitap ettim: Niçin Hep’ci değilsiniz? Hiç olmazsa bazı meselelerde olsun, niçin hep’ci değilsiniz? Bu lüzumu zeka ve idrakinize tatbik ettiğim zaman, bir türlü hep’ci olamayışınızın sebebini kavrayamıyorum...Hep’ci olmanın hedefi, muhatabımız için, kendi öz partisinin içindeki ve dışındaki muhaliflerinin ve onların, hem fikir ve hem şahıs planında tahrip edilmeleridir.

¹⁰⁶ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Düne kadar Demokrat Partiyi ve Hükümetini rahatsız eden hangi iç mesele ve nesne varsa bunun müsebbibi doğrudan doğruya Demokrat Parti ve

Kısakürek was also backing up Sarol, who was having trouble in the Party after falling into dispute with Köprülü. An investigation had opened up against Sarol in the Assembly for some allegations of corruption. For Kısakürek, Sarol was one of the few true and sincere names around Menderes such as Tevfik İleri. In his memoirs, Sarol stated that the only real friend around him in those difficult days was Kısakürek (Sarol, 1983b, p. 601). Kısakürek reported Sarol's quittance with giving a very large place in the first pages of the *Büyük Doğu*. It was said in the article that Sarol is the man who is one of the purest, sacrificial examples of the regime, and one who attracts the grudge of those who do not (*Büyük Doğu*, 19 June 1956). In the same days, Köprülü was resigned. Kısakürek pointed out that the party had been cleansed and had gotten rid of the troubler faction by Köprülü's resignation and Sarol's having been freed from the accusations (Kısakürek, 1956g; 1956i). Having criticised Köprülü with a harsh statement in this process, Kısakürek faced with a lawsuit filed by Köprülü and sentenced to eight-month imprisonment (Kısakürek, 1956f). Besides, the issue of the newspaper dated 21 June, in which Kısakürek insulted to Köprülü, was collected (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1956).

It seems that Kısakürek's writings disrupted some circles in the Party. Despite the order of Menderes, Emin Kalafat, Minister of State, refused to give official advertisement from the state budget to the *Büyük Doğu*; so the newspaper began to suffer economic troubles (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 346,347). In addition, there were some other lawsuits opened against him (Kısakürek, 2012f, p. 262). In the face of this situation, Kısakürek had to close the newspaper, which could be published only for

Hükümetidir. Zira bu parti ve Hükümet, Halk partisine halk tarafından duyulan nefret yüzünden ve onun tam zıddını temsil etmek üzere pasif ihtilal çapında bir darbeyle iktidara getirilişindeki icapları, medenilik yüzünden ihmal etmiştir.

three months, but he continued to be provided with money from the discretionary fund to afford his livelihood (National Archives, 1960a, 1960b).

Almost one year later, he entered the prison due to the approval of the imprisonment sentence he got from the Köprülü lawsuit. The postponed six-month conviction he got from the lawsuits opened by İnce and Yalman also added to this punishment. After entering the prison, he was hospitalised and passed his conviction time in the hospital. He frequently called for Menderes to pass an amnesty law while he was in prison (National Archives, 1958). Unable to receive a positive response for a long time, Kısakürek was released after eight months and four days of conviction on 25 February 1958 after his appeal to the Supreme Court suddenly resulted positively. It was happened by the intervention of the government (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 366,368).

3.7 The Road to the Military Coup of 1960 and Kısakürek's Last Advice to Menderes: Run!

After being released, Kısakürek, together with İleri and Sarol tried to convince Menderes in order to publish the *Büyük Doğu* again. In this process, he sent many letters to Menderes, but could not get any positive response for a long time (National Archives, 1960a; 1960b). According to Kısakürek, Menderes became very angry at the political atmosphere increasingly evolved against him, therefore he lost his ability to comment and adapt, and not being able to give the necessary answers to the opposition. For this reason, he attributed himself the duty of demolishing the opposition and steering Menderes for the necessary politics that should be followed regardless of considering what Menderes wants. Thanks to the financial source

provided by Sarol, Kısakürek began publishing of the 9th period of the *Büyük Doğu* in the format of a weekly newspaper on 6 March 1959 (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 378-388).

It can be said that the last years of the DP power became an era that the religion came to fore within its largest margin in politics. As Toker pointed out, as the hardship, shortages, the lack of goods, and high prices worsen, religion began to be seen by the Democrats as a way of decreasing the discontent (Toker, 1966, p. 56). The Democrats were no longer willing to deal with reactionaries as they had done in the earlier 1950s (Ahmad, 1977, p. 372). Even, although some investigations were opened, they were in an attitude of discrediting them, especially those of Kısakürek.

The political atmosphere became more convenient than ever for the discourses of a polemicist such as Kısakürek. On the eve of the publication of the magazine, Menderes had a plane crash while returning from London and was saved from the accident. This incident caused a myth to emerge about the immortality of the Menderes. Kısakürek became one of the journalists who benefited most from this myth. In the article titled '*Yaradan, seni koruduğunu millete açıkça bildirmiştir*' (God clearly indicated to the nation that it is protecting you), which was published in the first issue of the journal, Kısakürek presented Menderes as a man who was chosen by God in order to turn the Turkish nation into its original roots, to protect it against all of its enemies and to bring it to the leadership of the Eastern world (Kısakürek, 1959d).

Compatible with the tension of the political climate, social reactions against *Büyük Doğu* developed very rapidly in this period compared to the earlier periods. On March 17, 1959, a student group in Eskişehir, who stated that Kısakürek insulted Atatürk and revolutions with the expression '*Tanzimattan bu yana sahte*

kahramanlar' (fake heroes from Tanzimat), which took place in the article titled '*Büyük Doğu Nedir*' (What is the *Büyük Doğu*), organised a protest demonstration (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1959). Kısakürek, who applied to the prosecutor's office upon the reflection of the incident to the press, managed to get a refutation text to be published on the newspapers the following day. In the text, Kısakürek denied claims that he insulted Atatürk and its revolutions, and claimed that these youth were provoked by the RPP (*Büyük Doğu*, 19 March 1959).¹⁰⁷ But, the student reactions against the *Büyük Doğu* continued to increase. On 18 March 1959, students of the Faculty of Theology and the other five faculties of the University of Ankara protested the *Büyük Doğu* by stating that Atatürk's spiritual personality was insulted with the statement "God, keep Menderes on our head against the statesmen who had mentioned the name of Allah only as customs until 1923, and who accepted to mention this name as a homicide and had made this customs permanent between 1923 and 1950" which took place in the article titled '*Dua*' (Pray), which was published in the second issue of the journal (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1959).¹⁰⁸ While the National Turkish Student Association decided to put an Atatürk bust in the garden of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University for protest, another youth organisation in İzmir published a protest report. In response to the protests against Kısakürek, 204 students affiliated to the Nur sect, led by Said Nursi, supported Kısakürek by launching signing campaign and saying that they had adopted their writings (*Milliyet*, 20 March 1959). In relation to the incidents, Nadir Nadi stated that

¹⁰⁷ The incident was carried to the agenda of the Assembly by the RPP deputy Atalay Akan via a parliamentary question as to how it became possible for a prosecutor to order to be published of a refutation text (*Milliyet*, 24 March 1959).

¹⁰⁸ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bir asır evvelinden başlayarak 1923 yılına dek, Allah ismini sadece görenek diye ağzına alan, 1923'den 1950'ye kadar da bu ismi anmayı cinayet sayan ve bunun göreneğini temelleştiren devlet büyüklerine karşılık, Hükümet Reisi sıfatıyla ilk defa ve ta can evinden Allah diyen Adnan Menderes'i başımızdan eksik etme.

the 'Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk' became unworkable since the judicial authorities did not fulfil their duty (Nadi, 1959).

The student protest has evolved into a fight between the Republicans and Kısakürek. Indirectly, it also became a new instrument of the fight between Democrats and Republicans. While the RPP group prepared a parliamentary question to be presented to the Assembly, Minister of Interior Nadir Gedik stated that there was no threat of reaction in the country and that such events were a provocation by the Republicans towards their political ambitions. (*Milliyet*, 20, 21, 25 March 1959). Republicans accused Democrats of supporting the reactionism in the country, while Democrats accused the RPP of provoking young people (*Milliyet*, 23 March 1959). Kısakürek continued to take part in this fight. After mentioning that he was not an enemy of Atatürk in the article entitled '*Kolpo*' (Trick), which he penned in the 4th issue of the magazine, he stated that the RPP, who was scared in the face of the spiritual value that Adnan Menderes obtained in the eyes of the nation, and the majesty of the *Büyük Doğu* which became the voice of Menderes in the press, was attacking by showing the *Büyük Doğu* as the enemy of Atatürk, and Menderes as the supporter of the reactionism. Moreover, he argued that the real enemy of Atatürk was İnönü and the RPP (Kısakürek, 1959b).

Not even ten days had passed since the beginning of these student protests, the conviction decision he had gotten from the accusation of insulting Fuat Köprülü via publication was re-approved again although Kısakürek acquittance had been approved by the supreme court, as it had happened in the lawsuit of insulting to the Turkishness in early 1950s. With the suspended six-month conviction he had already received, he would have to stay in prison for a year and a half. It was reported in the press that

Kısakürek disappeared after he had learned the conviction decision, and the prosecutor's office issued a warrant about him (*Milliyet*, 26 March 1959). It should be stated that a rather exaggerated atmosphere was created compared to an ordinary press case. Kısakürek, who learned the conviction decision in Ankara, was caught by the police on his way to Istanbul to meet with Menderes. Brought to İstanbul, Kısakürek was taken into custody by the court for the possibility of escaping although his lawyer objected to the decision of the Supreme Court (*Milliyet*, 27 March 1959). Dilaver Argun, the governor of Ankara, said that on the occasion of Kısakürek's arrestment, Menderes had called him and reprimanded by saying that 'you have caught Kısakürek, who uses the sword in his hand against the RPP and the hypocrites' as if he was a member of the Garibaldi gang (*Milliyet*, 5 May 1961). In his memoirs, Kısakürek said that a deputy called him in the name of the Prime Minister while he was in prison and said that Menderes called all of the responsible departments, including the governor of Ankara, and he would be released a few hours later. It seems that Menderes regarded the arrestment of Kısakürek as a personal issue in the rivalry he had with the Republicans. According to the statements of the same deputy, Menderes said that they had wanted to arrest him, not Kısakürek (Kısakürek, 2012f, p. 268). One day later, Kısakürek was released thanks to the instruction of Menderes (*Milliyet*, 27 March 1959).

With events rapidly developing, the publishing policy of the journal was determined as the direct fight with the RPP. The issues of in-Party opposition and the Freedom Party were left behind. Having defended the DP vehemently as a whole, Kısakürek carried out a harsh campaign against the RPP by discourses such as bringing irreligiousness to the country in the name of secularism. Discourses of the Democrats were also similar to those of Kısakürek. The Republicans were obliged to

organise a press statement to defend themselves against the claims of irreligiousness (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 1959; *Milliyet*, 29 March 1959). The secularism debates, which were shown by soldiers as one of the basic legitimacy sources of the military coup of 1960, became one of the most important agenda items of the country. The parties blamed each other for speeding up brother fight (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 March 1959). And, Kısakürek was at the very centre of this process. Due to the articles in the magazine, many lawsuits were filed against Kısakürek. A number of these lawsuits were about insulting the spiritual personality of the RPP, while some were about insulting various Republicans, especially İsmet İnönü (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1960). In addition to these, he was accused of violating the law of crimes committed against Atatürk via the writings that led to the beginning of student protests and a few other writings.¹⁰⁹ In response to his defence that he did not mean Atatürk in his writings, Kısakürek was accused by the prosecutor of quibbling in the trail (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 January 1960).

Press lawsuits had become another channel of the fight between the Democrats and the Republicans. Some opponent bureaucrats, especially those in the judiciary establishment, also took side with the Republicans in this fight. The Democrats opened many lawsuits against journalists who opposed them and some journalists, such as Selim Akpınar, *Vatan* Newspaper Editor-in-Chief, were sentenced to imprisonment (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 January 1960; *Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1959). In response, many lawsuits were filed against those who were supporting the government by the other side. As the reactionism issue was one of the most important

¹⁰⁹ While he was acquitted of the writings that led to student protests, Kısakürek received 18-month imprisonment for his article '*Unutma Affetme*' (Don't Forget, Don't Forgive), which was placed in the 10th issue, dated May 8 1959, of the *Büyük Doğu* (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1960). It is interesting that this article was published under the name Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti (Serdengeçti, 1959, p. 2). Nothing could be found about this issue in the journal which Serdengeçti was publishing himself.

agenda items, there were lawsuits opened also against Islamist journals like Hür Adam (*Cumhuriyet*, 05 November 1959). However, the symbolic name of this fight was Kısakürek, such that 16 of the 17 cases in the combined press courts in November were about him (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1959). Despite the lawsuits filed, he maintained his fierce style of writing. In the face of this insistent attitude of Kısakürek, RPP's lawyers demanded Kısakürek to be taken under observation by stating that he was not in a position to control his mind since he continued to commit crimes in the magazine despite the lawsuits filed (*Milliyet*, 20 August 1959). However, the trial process psyched Kısakürek out after a while. With the 33rd issue dated 16 October 1959, Kısakürek also ended this period of the journal.

By February 1960, convictions decision began to come in succession (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 February, 3 March 1960). In January, the decision of the conviction of insulting Köprülü was once again confirmed by the high court (*Milliyet*, 16 January 1960). Kısakürek stated that he would have to stay in prison for more than 30 years if all of the lawsuits, which resulted with convictions, were to be approved. He tried to postpone his imprisonment date by prolonging the appeals and process. Ahmet tried to save time through appeal processes and postponing approved conviction until a solution could be found (*Milliyet*, 2, 3 February 1960; *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1960). Kısakürek was expecting remission for the press crimes from Menderes in this distraction process, but the latter was not in favour of such an amnesty since it would also mean releasing the journalists who opposed him (Kısakürek, 1959a). By the end of postponement time, Tevfik İleri came up with a solution; Kısakürek was to be sent to the Niğde Prison whose governor was a Kısakürek's relative, and he was to be a resident there in a comfortable and independent room throughout his jail time (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 395,405,406). In the meantime, applying for his file to be

transferred from Istanbul, Kısakürek had obtained a little more time (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1960).

The political atmosphere of the country has become quite nervous. The excesses in the Uşak and Topkapı demonstrations against İnönü were reflections of this tension. Despite the fact that the Republicans asked for an inquiry into the events, Democrats' rejection of this request caused the tension to increase significantly. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 May 1960). The reflection of the tension between the parties to the society manifested itself through student demonstrations. Youth organisations such as the Ankara Political Science Faculty student association reported a press release in response to this attitude of the Democrats saying that “to wait for benefit from ones who appeal to reactionism, and to see those who have acted against the revolutions make upset we young people. As Turkish youth we want to say that our patience is exhausted” (Feyizoğlu, 2002, p. 89).¹¹⁰ Kısakürek stated that some generals came to him saying that there was a discontent in the army about the politics of the country and asked him to meet them with Menderes (Kısakürek, 2013d, pp. 390,391). He would frequently go to Ankara to discuss the political atmosphere of the country with Sarol and İleri. He asked many times to meet with Menderes, but he could not get a positive response for a long time. Only a few days before the coup, Menderes accepted Kısakürek's request and they conducted a two and a half hour conversation. Kısakürek tried to persuade Menderes in the way of taking strict measures. To Kısakürek, “if one hundred and fifty dead had been given instead of one and a half in the Harbiye demonstration, it would have been understood that there is a government

¹¹⁰ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Gericilikten medet umanlardan fayda beklemek ve devrimlere karşı faaliyette bulunanları görmek biz gençleri üzmektedir. Türk gençliği olarak sabrımızın tükendiğini söylemek isteriz.

and nothing would happen” (Kısakürek, 2013d).¹¹¹ Having considered that Menderes was adopting an indifferent attitude, Kısakürek gave his last advice as follows:

“A coup is coming like the *çengiler* (dancers and musicians in Ottoman Empire) by playing tambourine and cymbal! In all the demonstrations, it is being questioned to what extent the government exists... If nothing is to be done, it means that there is no other way than to escape through getting on a plane with a staff of 40-50 people” (Kısakürek, 2013d; 1967a).¹¹²

Kısakürek and İleri were still talking about the upcoming coup just on the morning of the intervention day. Kısakürek argued that if the Nationalists' Association had not been closed, they would have had a nationalist and spiritualist youth organisation to support the government in the face of the rising provocations against the government. But there was not much that could be done. The last favour of Menderes for Kısakürek was the allocation of four thousand TL from the discretionary fund, but the army had taken over the government before he could get the money (Kısakürek, 2013d).

In one of the earliest declarations released after the coup, which took place on 27 May, it was stated that *Büyük Doğu* Journal was closed. On 6 June, Kısakürek was arrested and put into prison in Balmumcu. As he mentioned in his memoirs, he was treated badly, beaten, and kept in a prison cell for a while. Having transferred to the Davutpaşa military base after a while, Kısakürek stayed in prison for more than four months (Kısakürek, 2012f). Kısakürek was the first one among the people who were

¹¹¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Harbiye gösterisinde bir buçuk ölü yerine yüz elli ölü verilseydi ortada bir hükümet olduğu anlaşılır ve hiçbir şey olmazdı.

¹¹² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Çengiler gibi tef ve zil çalarak bir ihtilal geliyor! Bütün gösterilerde, hükümet acaba ne dereceye kadar mevcut sorusu hakim... Eğer hiç bir şey yapılmayacaksa bir uçağa binip 40-50 kişilik bir kadro halinde kaçıktan başka çare kalmamış demektir

released since they were not proven guilty on 14 October; but, he was arrested again immediately after he was released due to pay his one and half year conviction he had gotten from the acquisition of violating the Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk (*Milliyet*, 15 October 1960). Thanks to the amnesty law declared on 26 October 1960 he had been able to get off all the sentences he got from several trials, but had to stay in prison until 18 December 1961 since the law did not cover the crimes committed against Atatürk (*Milliyet*, 27 October 1960).

3.8 Conclusion

The incidents that Kısakürek experienced between 1950 and 1960 caused a sharp turn in his political strategy. He clearly understood that it was not possible to carry out an independent political and intellectual movement stiffly clashing with the values of the regime. Besides this, another reason for changing in his political strategy was that he could not afford the expenditure of publishing his journal. The ruling DP's moderate attitude towards secularism and its attempt to form a media group to support itself was an important opportunity for Kısakürek. Now, he became a part of clientelist relationships, in-party conflicts, and rivalries in Turkish politics. Besides, it is possible to say that there was a deviation from Kısakürek's self-image which was an intellectual insistently struggling for his ideas without any compromise.

The relationship Kısakürek established with the DP was leader centered instead of an institutional identity. In his writings, Kısakürek was presenting Menderes as a saviour by using religious motifs masterfully. Having the support of the Prime Minister would provide him a shelter. Yet, whenever he began to damage his political position, Menderes did not hesitate to withdraw the support he gave. Besides, although he received the support of a prime minister, various political and

bureaucratic mechanisms continued to hamper Kısakürek. The group within the party, who advocated that Menderes should pursue secular and liberal policies, blocked the financial aid given to Kısakürek through official advertisements. Similarly, despite Menderes' personal intervention, he was tried to be sent to prison by the judicial authorities; such that, in 1959, he was the most prosecuted writer. It should also be noted here that there was a considerable influence of the stiffness of his discourses and the ideas he argued behind this situation. Nevertheless, insistent interventions of various bureaucratic mechanisms of the state caused Kısakürek to lose his belief the goals that he desired can be achieved by using usual political means. As will be tried to be explained in the sixth chapter, Kısakürek would produce an alternative political strategy which aimed at reaching goals by indirect way.

4. FROM ESTABLISHING UNITY IN THE RIGHT-WING TO DIVISION: KISAKÜREK'S POLITICAL QUESTS IN THE 1960S (1960-1970)

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Kısakürek's political and intellectual activities between 1960 and 1970 will be examined. For a better evaluation, it will be beneficial to underline some ground issues, which effected the shaping of political structure in that period in advance.

Firstly, the role of the army should be emphasised. As Karpat and Ahmad revealed in detail, from political turmoil to the loss of social status of the officers, there were many reasons that led the army to intervene in the politics (Karpat, 2010b, pp. 318-326; Ahmad, 1992, pp. 188-202). One of the leading of these reasons was the increase in reactionary movements especially in 1959 and 1960 (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 July-12 August 1960). Since Kısakürek was the most known figure of that period, a serious prejudice was made up against him, especially among the officers. Therefore, he was to suffer troubles especially in early 1960's due to this prejudice although he tried to behave cautiously. Besides, the army's control and influence over the politics continued under very difficult conditions to be managed throughout the sixties. The intervention was not carried out within the command chain, so a process in which different groupings with different tendencies¹¹³ even if were composed of low-ranking officers, attempted to intervene even against the group which held the intervention [National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*-NCU)] was continued to be lived. This, in turn, caused the emergence of the perception that new interventions would be

¹¹³ Although the major tendency was the transition to democracy as soon as possible after establishing the necessary reforms, some had a rigid grip in the way of remaining in power as much as needed.

able to take place at any time in the political minds. This perception would have an important influence on Kısakürek's decisions about publishing the *Büyük Doğu*.

Secondly, the new constitution introduced after the intervention caused the transformation of the political process fundamentally. The 1961 Constitution was radically different from its predecessor. It brought new institutions such as Constitutional Court and National Security Council along with bicameral parliamentary system. Besides, it was the most liberal constitution of Turkey (Parla, 2016, p. 44). On the other hand, while holding forth the promise of a liberal and democratic Turkey, it also radicalised politics at the same time (Ahmad, 1977, p. 186). The liberal nature of the constitution let many political groupings, some of them were quite extreme in their socio economic and ideology outlook, use this opportunity to propagate their views (Landau, 1976, p. 9). One of the most important developments that characterise this period was that Turkish political life introduced with a party, the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*-WPT), which openly represents socialism. In this context, the conflict between right and left-leaning young people became one of the most important issues that would be effective in shaping of the political life and Kısakürek would be at the centre of this process.

Thirdly, the political parties should be taken into consideration because Kısakürek's political activities in this period would be shaped around the coalition and factionalism workings in and among the political parties of the period. The major political parties at the right-wing and centre were the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-JP), New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*-NTP), Nation Party (Millet Partisi-NP), and Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*-RPNP). The RPP, which would adopt a 'left-of-centre' posture, and the above mentioned WPT were the other political parties. Due to divisions in these parties, new ones would also

emerge by the time. For Kısakürek who was one of the political orientation was a strict opposition to the RPP, the prominent matter was establishing a unity among new Democrat Parties which divided the votes of the electorates represented by the closed Democrat Party. However, as will be revealed in this chapter, while trying to fill the gap, which emerged after the DP, he would be dragged into political rivalries among the politicians and will be a figure in dissolutions.

4.2 Efforts to Obtain a Place in the Justice Party

With the end of his imprisonment on 18 December 1961, Kısakürek continued his life by writing column in several newspapers such as *Son Posta* and *Yeni İstanbul*. Kısakürek stated that he had defined the year of 1962 as the period of observing the political conjuncture and of having a decision before launching his struggle again on the axis of the *Büyük Doğu* (Kısakürek, 1964a). It had been a year and a half since the military coup, and National Unity Committee's control and dominance over the political sphere was still quite strong. Even when they let the restoration of the democracy, they had drawn the limits of the politics by getting a protocol to the party leaders signed. With the protocol, the leaders promised not to question and exploit the 27 May Movement for political purposes; to protect Atatürk reforms; not to exploit Islam for political goals; not to exploit the decision of the *Yassıada* trials (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 September 1961). In addition, the group in the army who had suspicions about the transition to the parliamentary regime was still effective. Just a few days before the opening of the Assembly, they threatened to intervene again, to prohibit the political parties, annul the election results, and abolish the NUC (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 170, 178). The unsuccessful coup attempt of Talat Aydemir on 22 February 1962 showed that the waters had not slacked off yet (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1962).

As a symbol name of the road to coup, he preferred to stay silent until political atmosphere became suitable for raising his voice again with the *Büyük Doğu*.

This cautious attitude of him was reflected also to his writings in the newspapers. Because of the strict attitude of the NUC against the criticism of the 27 May movement, he did not write articles criticising the coup. Rather, he preferred to use abstract definitions and expressions: “The 27 May Movement which some calls revolution, some calls revolt, some calls a government coup, but actually none of them, became the disclosure of our moral and spiritual collapse which came from the RPP hill by rolling and went on to the DP ramp by tumbling” (Kısakürek, 1962e).¹¹⁴

The only issue that he criticised the soldiers directly was to be sent 235 generals and 5000 officers, and later 147 university professors in 1960 to retirement. Even in this criticism, he used a very soft style, emphasising only the weaknesses that these arrangements would create within the military and the university. In fact, he had anger and revanchist feelings against the 27 May Movement. By the mid-1960s, he began to stiffen up his discourses. He harshly criticised the NUC by alleging that they embezzled money which was in the discretionary fund of the DP (Kısakürek, 1965r). Orhan Erkanlı, who was one of the fourteen who were dismissed from the NUC, sent a letter to Kısakürek saying that he did not involve in such an illegality and thanked Kısakürek for asking account from the NUC (Kısakürek, 1965o). In the article he wrote in 1969 titled ‘*İhtilalin Otopsi*’ (Autopsy of the Coup), this time, he defined the 27 May Coup as a movement that an idealess group, whose only goal was to overthrow the DP, murdered some people in order to call it a coup. To him, the coup

¹¹⁴ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: İsmine, kiminin ihtilal, kiminin inkılap, kiminin hükümet darbesi dediği, fakat gerçekte bunların hiç biri olmayan 27 Mayıs hareketi, CHP bayırından yuvarlana yuvarlana gelip D.P. rampasında takla ata ata giden ruh ve ahlak çöküntümüzün her saha da ifşacısı oldu.

achieved nothing except dragging the country to worse conditions via letting the rise of communism and increasing the inflation (Kısakürek, 1969d).

During this ‘observation and quest’ period, Kısakürek tried to decide which political party to support and what kind of cooperation would be established. Actually, there was no change in his strategy, which was supporting the strongest party of the right-wing, thus both obtaining limited acquisitions and preventing the RPP’s coming to the power. In that regard, the JP was the most profitable choice. On the other hand, there were two more parameters that affected Kısakürek’s strategy. Firstly, the votes of the right-wing electorates had divided within three parties, and, in terms of Kısakürek, it was a challenge in the face of the RPP- WPT bloc. “Although they are totally unfamiliar to the nation”, said Kısakürek, “the new party sprouts which are seeking life by lengthening their roots to the flooded lands of the overthrown party and the power, are prevailing to the People's Party, but they cannot realize the people's will of unity since they rushed to the pursuit of inheritance piece by piece” (Kısakürek, 1962f).¹¹⁵ Therefore he frequently called out to these parties via his writings to set up cooperation and move together. Secondly, the JP had established a coalition with the RPP. To Kısakürek, the JP should break the coalition with the RPP immediately and establish a triple coalition government with the NTP and the NP (Kısakürek, 1962a).

Kısakürek moved into action by contacting Ragıp Gümüşpala¹¹⁶, Leader of the JP, in order to establish a compromise. According to Kısakürek’s statements, after a

¹¹⁵ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Köklerini devrik Parti ve iktidarın sel basmış tarlasına uzatarak hayat arayan yeni parti filizleri, milletçe tamamıyla meçhul oldukları halde, Halk Partisi malûmuna karşı, bire iki nispetinde galebe çalıyor; fkat parça parça mirasyediliğe çıktıkları için, halkın vahdetine sahip çıkamıyor.

¹¹⁶ Ragıp Gümüşpala (1897- 1964) was a four-star general in Turkish Armed Forces. After the coup, he became the 11th Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. Yet, he was sent to retirement with other 5000 officers shortly after he took office. Then, he became one of the founders of the JP.

long conversation, Gümüşpala answered him in these words: “Necip Fazıl Bey, what you told me is the things that exceed me. I am a soldier. They told me to come and we founded the party” (Kısakürek, 2012g, p. 35).¹¹⁷ Actually, it was not so possible for Kısakürek to establish consensus with Gümüşpala because he was a leader who was wishing success for the re-transition to democracy. For this reason, he believed in the necessity of moving within the boundaries drawn by the soldiers. The army believed in that the future of Turkish democracy could be only secured with an RPP government. Just like the other leaders who read the message of the army, which had come a few days before the opening of the parliament, he also promised to consent to İnönü's prime ministry (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1961). Except the coalition with the RPP, there were many other issues that they were in disagreement as well; especially the issue of amnesty for the Democrats sentenced in Yassıada.¹¹⁸ By stating that “twenty million hearths are still beating for Democrats”, Kısakürek frequently wrote about the amnesty for the Democrats, and invited all political parties to be insisted on the amnesty law (Kısakürek, 1962b). But, the generals had rigid attitude against the former Democrats. They perceived the propaganda for the overthrown democrats as an attack on the legitimacy of the 27 May Movement. Because of an article that he wrote after the execution of death sentences of three Democrats (Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan, F. Rüştü Zorlu), Kısakürek was prosecuted at the heavy penal court with the accusation of making saint (*evliyalılaştırmak*) Menderes (*Cumhuriyet*, 05 April 1962; Kısakürek, 1962g). The accusation seems like confirming the belief that the armed forces wanted also to destroy the myth of immortality of Menderes by executing him (Ahmad, 1977, p. 172). After the ‘Law on Measures’ had been

¹¹⁷ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Necip Fazıl Bey, sizin bu söyledikleriniz beni aşan şeyler... Ben basit bir askerim. İşte gel dediler, partiyi kurduk.

¹¹⁸ Yassıada was a small island close to Istanbul in Marmara Sea.

introduced in 1962, Kısakürek was exposed to many other prosecutions for his writings (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 March, 01 April 1962).

Kısakürek had not been able to reach an agreement with Gümüşpala, but there were some people in the party who defended the same views. The leader of this group, known as the hardliners, was Sadettin Bilgiç (1920-2012). He was the brother of Former DP Deputy Sait Bilgiç who was the chief of the closed Nationalists Association. He was son of a religious family and was known for his firm reaction to Sunay's warning to the Party regarding the increase of reactionary activity (Ahmad, 1977, p. 235; Bilgiç, 1998). Some other prominent names of this group were Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, Ferruh Bozbeyli, Mehmet Turgut, Burhan Apaydın, Hami Tezkan, M. Ali Aytaç, Tahsin Demiray, Cevdet Perin and Fethi Tevetoğlu. The common ground of this group was carrying out hostile and revanchist ideas against 27 May Movement. Kısakürek had contacts with some of these names such as Fethi Tevetoğlu. Besides, he would sustain close contacts with also Bilgiç and his brothers. Both Sadettin Bilgiç and Emin Bilgiç would publish articles in further periods of the *Büyük Doğu*. Within this group there was also a sub-group, called nationalist-sacradist, which consisted of nationalist and conservatives such as Osman Turan and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti. The leader of this group was Osman Turan (1914-1978). He was a professor of history who had served as a deputy also in DP period. From the year 1959, he was the head of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) in which Sait Bilgiç was an active member. Like Serdengeçti, many articles of Turan were also published in the *Büyük Doğu*. Kısakürek was in close contact also with this group.

Here, it should be noted that Kısakürek's influence within this group was limited with some politicians; even, for some, Kısakürek's affiliation with the group was not welcomed. In some articles published in the *Zafer* Newspaper and *Akis*

Journal, it was stated that Kısakürek, actually, damaging Bilgiç Group through giving support (Kısakürek, 1965p). Similarly, Bilgiç also did not mention to Kısakürek's role in the politics of the JP in his memoirs (Bilgiç, 1998).

It is possible to observe that Kısakürek began to give support to the hardliners with his writings since 1962. In February, some members of the hardliners were exported from the party since they threatened the existence of the coalition by insisting on the amnesty for the former Democrats. The exportations caused a crisis in the party. In order to protest, twenty-one other deputies, including Bilgiç, challenged the party administration by resigning. It was said that new exportations would take place (*Cumhuriyet*, 17,21,22 February 1962). Kısakürek supported the hardliners by stating that these names are the best representatives of the great meaning for which the people support the JP, and criticised the exportations by identifying as the biggest crime (Kısakürek, 1962i). The hardliners could survive from the crisis and continued their rigid attitude. When the amnesty law for the rebels of 22 February came to the Assembly to be discussed, the hardliners refused to pass the law unless it was also extended to the former Democrats. This time, the coalition had suffered a serious concussion (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 April 1962). The concussion opened the door for Ecevit's resignation on May. On the other hand, together with bringing the end of the coalition, the hardliners could strength their position in the General Congress held in November 1962. Prominent names of the group such as Sadettin Bilgiç, Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, Mehmet Turgut, Faruk Sükan, Orhan Süersan and Fethi Tevetoğlu could get seats in the administrative board. Süleyman Demirel, who would be the next leader of the party, had been able to enter to the administrative board from the list of the hardliners (*Cumhuriyet*, 04 December 1962). Kısakürek interpreted the

strengthening of the hardliners in the party as a great victory that would transform the party to its real identity (Kısakürek, 1962h).

After the dissolution of the coalition, while advising the JP to form a coalition between the right-wing parties, on the other hand, he penned articles warning the NTP and NP not to set up a coalition with the RPP (Kısakürek, 1962c; 1962d; 1962j). But, for Kısakürek, Gümüşpala was not such a strong leader who could achieve establishing such a union. The death of Gümüşpala in 1964 had presented an opportunity for change in the leadership of the JP. Bilgiç had assumed the temporary presidency of the party and was one of the strongest candidates in the General Congress. One of the other candidates was Süleyman Demirel¹¹⁹. In the meantime, as stated above, Kısakürek had been looking for a suitable time to publish the *Büyük Doğu* again. He said that he had intended to publish in 1963, but due to the martial law, which was declared after the unsuccessful coup attempt of Talat Aydemir, he had given up (Kısakürek, 1964a). It seems that coming General Congress of the JP was seen as a good time for him. Although he did not say anything clearly about his intention, it can be argued that he saw supporting Bilgiç in the Congress as the first step of establishing cooperation with the party, as he had done in the DP period. Because, it can be clearly observed that the main theme of this period of the journal which began to be published few weeks before the Congress was carrying out a campaign for Bilgiç. Kısakürek showed his support by identifying him as the real sun of the Anatolia and adherent of the Anatolia spirit (Kısakürek, 1964f). His photos were published in several issues with the statement of “Bilgiç is the candidate who we are supporting for the leadership of the JP and advising to all of our readers”. Besides, he also gave the articles of some important names of the group, such as Nedim

¹¹⁹ Süleyman Demirel (1924-2015) was an engineer and politician. He began to politics in the JP. Besides, he was the ninth President of Turkey between 1993 and 2000.

Evliyaoğlu, who was supporting Bilgiç (Evliyaoğlu, 1964). In parallel, he carried out a defamatory campaign against Demirel by claiming he was a Mason (Kısakürek, 1964b; 1964c; 1964d). This claim became one of the conspicuous issues of the Congress. It was asserted in the press that Sadettin Bilgiç's supporters underhandedly distributed a paper in the congress stating Demirel's affiliation to freemason lodge. As an answer to the claims, Demirel announced that he was a member of a family who did not sit down to have breakfast before reading *Quran* and presented a paper, signed by the grand master of the freemasons, Necdet Egeran, which indicated that Demirel was not a freemason (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 November 1964; Turgut, 1992, p. 235). Kısakürek claimed that it was him who first propounded this assertion. In fact, it was a debate that had begun much earlier and was considered an issue that would negatively affect the election of Demirel in the Congress. As stated by Bilgiç, this document was first revealed in 1962 by his countrymen Hacı Kadir and Hacı Mehmet Özkan (Bilgiç, 1998, p. 133). This assertion was to be used extensively against Demirel during his political life. Even the Republicans used this claim for their political campaign (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 June 1965).

Contrary to the expectation of Kısakürek, the Congress resulted with the victory of Demirel. Therefore, he had to revise his plan. He found an opportunity to meet with Demirel throughout mediation of some senators. Kısakürek indicated his intention of establishing compromise by stating that he had written those articles in the Congress period upon some knowledge he had attained, but once he got the leadership he did not write any critical article anymore. Again, according to Kısakürek's expressions, Demirel repeated that he came from a devoted family and he was not a mason. Besides, by stating that Turkey needs a nationalist and spiritual

order, he indicated that he would follow a policy compatible with Kısakürek's view (Kısakürek, 1965f). For Kısakürek, it seems like a consensus was established.

Kısakürek was obliged to close the journal just before the Congress day. A new trial had been filed against him with the accusation of insulting to the personality of the government with his article titled '*politikamız*' (Our Policy) (Kısakürek, 1965l). A prosecution had also been opened for the poem titled '*Zeybeğin Ölümü*' (The death of Zeybek) (Kısakürek, Takip, 1964g). Besides, there was a rumour that the army would intervene because of a warning letter sent by the General Staff to the Assembly. The letter was interpreted as a military intervention if necessary precautions were not taken in the Assembly. Having made an announcement in the following day, Sunay stated that the letter was a warning because of the negative speeches made against the Armed Forces in recent times and that a military intervention was not the case (*Milliyet*, 19 November 1964). However, it was enough threatening for Kısakürek and his readers. He ended this period of the journal after expressing the inconvenience he felt with the developments via few articles (Kısakürek, 1964e).

After the closure of the journal, Kısakürek began to write in *Yeni İstanbul* Newspaper. He continued to write articles supporting the JP's policies on issues such as land reform (Kısakürek, 2010f, pp. 119-122). The important feature of the writings of this period was that, as the necessity of the compromise, he thought he had established with Demirel, he did not write articles criticising Demirel or supporting Bilgiç group, although Demirel had begun to re-design the party according to his understanding by expelling the Bilgiç group from the administrative board.

Because of the censorship of his writings, Kısakürek left the newspaper in July 1965. He had intended to publish the journal with 32 pages long in a rotary printing format, and had started to work on it in 1964. However, it seems that he considered beginning to publish the *Büyük Doğu* just before the upcoming elections as a more profitable option. So he would have worked to prevent the RPP from coming to power, and also would have taken a good step in terms of the good relationship he seeking to develop with the JP administration. In the articles he penned after the elections, he frequently tried to draw the attention of Demirel to his efforts in the election period by underlining that he did his best for the JP's winning the elections (Kısakürek, 1965s).

He completed preparations for the journal in a short period of two months and began publishing the journal in September a few weeks before the election. Since the preparation time was limited, the journal was published in the form of a weekly newspaper. In the first issues of the journal, the atmosphere of the election was quite dominant. It can be said that Kısakürek designed the campaign he carried out for the JP over the RPP adverseness. While criticising the RPP with the assertions of communism through identifying it with the WPT and claiming that it generated the 'left-of-centre' discourse as a guise for their real goal, in the slogans he used for JP campaign, he asked people to vote for the JP since the other Parties were communist and the enemy of the country (Kısakürek, 1965d; 1965g). Besides, in order to prevent any division in the votes of right-wing electorates, he asked people not to vote for the NTP, the NP and the RPNP through criticising them by being incapable and weakened. Another aspect of Kısakürek's election campaign was that he had begun to bring Bilgiç and Turan into the forefront again.

The JP won the elections with an overwhelming victory.¹²⁰ In the articles he penned after the elections, Kısakürek argued that the JP should follow a conservative and nationalist policy which would protect spiritual and moral values while providing a substantial progress in material field and it to set up a partnership with the NTP and the NP in order to obtain a strong hold in the Assembly that could suppress the RPP. To him, those would only be achieved if a sacradist cadre was brought to the cabinet. Therefore he offered some names to be brought to the cabinet (Kısakürek, 1965j; 1965k).¹²¹ Through writing articles directly addressing to Demirel, he also asked him to declare he was not anymore a freemason and to follow nationalist and conservative policy as the leader of the party (Kısakürek, 1965s).

Kısakürek was trying to influence Demirel on the axis of his own ideology. He asked him to accept the *Büyük Doğu* as a friend who told the truth. However, Demirel was a rather pragmatist politician (Arslan, 2017). Except for its constant proclamations against the left, Demirel refused to commit himself and his party any kind of ideology (Ahmad, 1977, p. 237). He announced to the press that “We establish our economic view in accordance with the conditions of the day. The JP is not for any of ‘ism’s. We are not for any hard ideology or system” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 1965).¹²² Besides, promising of everything to everyone was his election tactic. He was eager for getting support from every side of the society. Kısakürek was also a voice of the in-party opposition against him. Establishing conciliation with Kısakürek might be useful in his struggle of ending factionalism and of having control

¹²⁰ The election results were as follows: JP: 52.87, RPP: 28.75, NP: 6.26, NTP: 3.72, WPT: 2.97, RPNP: 2.24, Independent: 3.19 (1965 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları).

¹²¹ Those names were as follows: Sadettin Bilgiç, Cevat Önder, Hasan Dinçer, Ferruh Bozbeyli, Hasan Aksoy, Ahmet Dalı, Muammer Baykam, Nedim Evliya, Abbas Ali Çetin, Osman Turan, Hüsnü Dikeçligil, Şerafettin Parker, Seyfi Kurtbak, Aydın Yalçın, Ertuğrul Akça, and Talat Asal.

¹²² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: İktisadi görüşümüzü günün şartlarına göre oluştururuz. Adalet Partisi hiçbir ism’den yana değildir. Hiç bir katı ideoloji ya da sistemden yana değiliz.

ever the party. Nevertheless, once Demirel began to take steps in the way of making his cadre dominant over the party through leaving the Bilgiç group out of the cabinet, it became clear that the compromise which Kısakürek thought they had established was so feeble. Having put a rigid reaction to the cabinet declared, Bilgiç challenged Demirel by stating that the JP party group would not be able to vote 'yes' for the government. The dissidents accused Demirel of acting like a 'single-man' (tek adam) (*Cumhuriyet*, 29,31 October 1965). Kısakürek also criticised Demirel severely through referring to this one-man accusation and stated that if Demirel had not been the party leader, people would not have deemed him worthy even of the deputy (Kısakürek, 1965h).

Although he had been fallen into dispute with Demirel, Kısakürek continued to support the JP. One of the interesting reflections of his support to the JP was related to the *Nur* congregation. The congregation took its name from Said Nursi, the leader of the movement. Having separated into several arms after Nursi's death, some branches of the movement were supporting the JP. In December 1965, the court of cassation adjudicate that Nursi's book and *Nurcu* movement were illegal and disruptive (*Cumhuriyet*, 03 December 1965). Kısakürek severely criticised this decision of the court and published several articles defending Said Nursi and his movement (Kısakürek, 1965m). By publishing a petition written by Nursi to be sent to the Prime Ministry in 1948, he advocated that Saidi Nursi had not any political goal, especially such as overthrowing the regime (Kısakürek, 1965n). Besides, he attempted to change the perceptions of the conservative masses, especially that of *Nurcus*, that it was a move of the JP. He claimed that this decision of the court was a conspiracy organised by İnönü to avoid the JP to follow a religious policy. It was an attempt to damage not only Islam but also the JP (Kısakürek, 1965i). Yet, in contrast to his

efforts, the Ministry of Justice opened an investigation also for those writings (Kısakürek, 1966b).

Kısakürek could not get the yield he desired also from this period of the journal and was having trouble with affording the expenditures. He called for sacradist merchants and the readers to give advertisement and to subscribe to the journal through the announcement he made in various issues of the journal (Kısakürek, 1965b; 1965c). Besides, the relationship that he was seeking to improve with the JP administration did not proceed in the way he thought. He began to face with judicial sanctions and one of the trials was resulted with one year of conviction (*Milliyet*, 22 January 1966). Hence, it became impossible for Kısakürek to go on publishing the journal and he ended also this eleventh period with the 17th issue. He continued to his writings in *Bugün* (Today) and *Babialide Sabah* (Morning in Sublime Porte) Newspapers.

The year 1966 was a new opportunity for the Bilgiç group. They hoped to remove Demirel from the party leadership in the Third General Congress opened on 27 November 1966. While speaking to Demirel from his column in *Bugün* Newspaper, Kısakürek advised him to establish his cadre from the members of the nationalist-sacredist circle in order to put the party into a true direction for which the people had voted for the JP (Kısakürek, 2010g). The Congress had witnessed furious debates. Conservative circles tried to compress Demirel via some symbolic requests such as to be able to live religious people their religion as easily as minorities, the opening of Hagia Sophia to prayer ceremony (*Milliyet*, 29 November 1966). These requests were being frequently mentioned by Kısakürek in the *Büyük Doğu* (Kısakürek, 1966a; 1965a). In order to get the vote of these conservative circles in the Party, Demirel used a mild rhetoric such as saying that he is opposed to the model of

secularism imposed by the RPP and to be used of religious abuse and reactionary threat as a weapon by the Republicans against all their opponents, in his speech. Yet, he faced severe criticisms of Turan, spokesman of these circles. He accused Demirel of tolerating the activities of the communists and the Republicans, sending nationalist youth to court, establishing clientelist relationship with some businessman to improve free market. At the end of the congress, Demirel won the leadership by an overwhelming victory and consolidated its place by not giving any seat in the party government to the hard liners except Sait Bilgiç (*Milliyet*, 28,30 November 1966). After the Congress, Kısakürek tried to negotiate with Demirel once again with the aim of providing reconciliation again, but Demirel refused to meet with Kısakürek this time (Kısakürek, 1967f). It was the beginning of a hostility that would last long years for Kısakürek.

Demirel continued to elimination of the nationalist-sacradist faction with expelling of Serdengeçti from the party in January 1967. In the press briefing he released on the occasion of his expulsion from the party, Serdengeçti stated that a deputy group of 45-55 members had been working to form a new political party, and as the first step of this work a group of 17-22 deputy would have resign from the JP (*Milliyet*, 06 January 1967). This project, which Serdengeçti mentions, was the attempt to be organized of the nationalist-sacradist names in the Bilgiç group who were in a new quest in reaction to Demirel's domination on party. Kısakürek was also in touch with this group but there was a difference of opinion about some names (Çıngıl, 1965). In the same days, Kısakürek met with Bilgiç and some of the JP deputies in Bilgiç's home presented a protocol text (Kısakürek, 2013b, p. 326). According to this protocol, this group within the party would organise and struggle against Demirel in order to take over the party administration. If this could not be

achieved, a separate party would be formed or they would continue to the struggle through passing to another political party. The members of the group would not meet with the party administration or other party leaders without the approval of the group leaders. Kısakürek stated that this attempt was failed since the people could not act bravely (Kısakürek, 1967). Actually, it is hard to say that this faction was not so consolidated at all. At the parliamentary group meeting on 13 June 1967, only three deputies gave support to the Turan's motion of censure given against Demirel (*Milliyet*, 14 June 1967).

Although this factionist movement could not reach a concrete formation, quests for setting up a different political movement continued among nationalist-sacradists circles with the participation of politicians from different parties. The prominent names of this attempt were M. Tevfik Paksu, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, Süleyman Arif Emre, Hasan Aksay, Osman Turan, and Arif Hikmet Güner. The strategy in the early years was that the parliamentarians would stay in their own parties and act jointly in the necessary matters (Emre, 2017, pp. 145-149; Sevilgen, 1980, pp. 13,14). Later on, they decided to set up a joint political party with the participation of NP, NTP and some names from the JP. Although a consensus was established among the leaders of the parties at the beginning, later could not be realised due to opposition of some NP's members. When the united party project failed, attempts were directed to establish a new political party (Emre, 2017, pp. 149-150). It was stated in Serdengeçti's writings in the *Yeni İstanbul* (New Istanbul) Newspaper in June 1967 that the party would be formed by a parliamentary group of 25-35 members (Kurnaz, 2012). Ali Fuad Başgil was thought to be the leader of the party, but, because of Başgil's death, Osman Turan was decided to be the leader.

Moreover, rumours had it in the press that the program of the party was even ready (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 June, 14 August 1967).

In this period when the new party activities lasted, Kısakürek began to publish the 12th period of the *Büyük Doğu* in July. He gave place to the writings of the architects of this movement such as Süleyman Arif Emre, also, severely criticised the expulsion of Osman Turan from the JP (*Milliyet*, 31 October 1967; Kısakürek, 1967g). However, it is not possible to say that Kısakürek began to publish this period of the journal with the aim of supporting this movement. The Bilgiç Group was still in his focus because the JP was the strongest Party of the right-wing against the RPP and it was highly suspicious that this movement would reach to success. This period of the journal was a phase of his other activities, which he was carrying out concomitantly with his efforts in the political arena by means of establishing relationship with politicians. Here, for a better understanding of his role in the Turkish politics in 1960s and also in 1970, it is necessary to look at his other activities by means of putting an intermediate parenthesis.

4.3 The Chain of Conferences and the *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club as the New Instruments of Kısakürek's Struggle

Although Kısakürek was having problems with publishing the *Büyük Doğu* due to financial struggles, he managed to find another way to articulate his thoughts to the masses. The chain of conferences that started with his invitation to Salihli (a town in İzmir) in 1963 spread throughout the country in a short period of time. Kısakürek gave these conferences under the roof of various nationalist and religious associations such as the National Turkish Student Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği-NTSU*), the Association for Fighting Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri*), Turkish

Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the associations for setting up *Quran* courses. The information about these conferences given in many cities of the country was being reported in the *Büyük Doğu*, and by 1965 the numbers reached twenty-nine (*Büyük Doğu*, 22 September 1965). Some of the titles of these conferences were as follows: *Tarih Boyunca Ahlaki Gelişimiz* (Our Moral Development Throughout History), *Türkiye ve Komünizma* (Turkey and Communism), *Yolumuz Halimiz Çaremiz* (Our Way, Our Situation, Our Remedy), *Tarihimizde Sahte Kahramanlar* (Pseudo Heroes in Our History), *Dünya İdeolojileri ve İslam* (World Ideologies and Islam), *Özlediğimiz Neslin Vasıfları* (The Characteristics of the Generation We Miss).

Through these conferences which he would also continue in the 1970s, Kısakürek had the opportunity to convey his thoughts and the ideology, which he had tried to build through the articles he wrote in the *Büyük Doğu* over the years, to the masses in a more systematic composition. It was of great importance in terms of accessibility to masses who were not reading habits. On the other hand, the target group for him was the educated students. The reason of this, as in many other countries, was the development of youth movements as one of the main elements shaping political life in the 1960s and 1970s. And, Kısakürek's role in this organisation process among the youth was one of most tracer areas he left in Turkish Political life. To understand this role of Kısakürek, it is worth taking a brief look at the development of the youth movement in Turkey.

The involvement of young people in political life through various organizations has always been a phenomenon in Turkish political life. For young people seeking participation in the political arena, there were many associations such as the NTSU, Turkish Nationalists Association (*Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği-TNA*), or roof structures such as the National Turkish Students Federation (*Türkiye Milli Talebe*

Federasyonu-NTSF), which were mentioned in previous chapters. Another organisation needs to be mentioned was the ‘intellectual clubs’ (*fikir kulüpleri*) which began to be formed in the universities. The intellectual clubs, which were founded in 1952 by the students of the Faculty of Law at Ankara University, and in 1956 by the students of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, were the first examples of them (Feyizoğlu, 2002, pp. 78,84).

By the 1960s, a change began to occur in the nature of the youth movements. As mentioned in the introduction part of this chapter, the liberal nature of the constitution let many political groupings, some of them were quite extreme in their socio-economic and ideology outlook, use this opportunity to propagate their views (Landau, 1976, p. 9). The most distinctive feature of this transformation was that left-wing people had more active involvement in the political arena. In this context, the opinion clubs became a roof where left-leaning young people gathered around to provide ideological accumulation. The young were encouraged by the *Yön* (Direction) journal circle and the WPT to join these organisations. Established in 1967, the Federation of Intellectual Clubs became a roof organisation that combined these associations (Feyizoğlu, 2002, pp. 110-124). The intellectual absence of the leftist thought was being filled in the first place with the means provided by journals such as *Yön* and *Ant*. In the following years, the Turkish translations of thinkers like Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, Roger Garaudy and Herbert Marcuse, while meeting the ideological need, have brought with also disagreements in terms of action strategies (Landau, 1974, pp. 35,36). Groups that preferred armed action instead of a non-violent strategy such as the National Democratic Revolution would begin to show themselves in the late 1960s.

In the face of rising leftist organisations, besides the existing right-wing associations, new organisations, which would also resort to acts of violence, began to appear. The leading of these organisations was the Associations for Fighting Communism. It is difficult to say that these associations were homogeneous and had an organic bond among them. Inspired from Pan-Turkism, the chief objective of these associations was being opposed to communism. In the political atmosphere of the 1960s, the number of these associations, founded in many of the cities of the country, increased to 110 between 1963 and 1965 by fifteen-fold; and rose to 141 in 1968 (Bora, 1991, p. 47; Landau, 1974, p. 203). Another association that needs mentioning is the NTSU, which played a leading role in the development of the Islamic intelligentsia in Turkey. The association, which had organised many demonstrations against Kısakürek in the 1940s and 1950s, had a secular nationalism sense until mid-1960s. With the election of Rasim Cinisli as the chairman in 1965, the association underwent an ideological change and began to exhibit an Islamic tendency (Duman & Yorgancılar, 2008, pp. 99,100). Particularly beginning from the time of İsmail Kahraman¹²³, who had made great efforts to be elected as the chairman, Kısakürek became very active in this association. In a declaration he wrote to be read in the General Congress of the association, Kısakürek pointed out the transformation that the association underwent and asked to change the slogan of the association to become ‘Allah holds superior the nation which goes furthest in the way of loving his messenger’¹²⁴ instead of ‘God protects the Turk’ (*Tanrı Türkü korusun*) (Kısakürek, 2010g, pp. 69,70). As for Kahraman, he stated in the interview he gave to the *Büyük*

¹²³ İsmail Kahraman (1940-) served as Minister of Culture between 1996-1997 in the government of Necmettin Erbakan. He re-elected as deputy in 2015 from the list of the Justice and Development Party and served as Speaker of the Grand National Assembly between 2015-2018.

¹²⁴ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Resulünün sevgisinde ve yolunda en ileri millet hangisiyse onu üstün tutsun.

Doğu that the nationalism understanding of the NTSU was the same with that of *Büyük Doğu* (Arı, 1967).

Kısakürek also decided to found his own youth organisation to grow (with his terms) a nationalist-sacradist youth generation who would fight off leftist movements. Probably inspired by the opinion clubs established in 1950s, he had stated his intention of setting up an opinion club first in 1959 (*Milliyet*, 12 April 1959). It is possible to say that, at that time, he had aimed at establishing a youth organisation, which would have defended the DP against the student movements had arisen against the government. In the talks with Tevfik İleri, he had often talked about such a need. In 1965, he realised this project under the title of *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club.¹²⁵ He aimed at spreading the branches of the association across the country (*Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1967). The first branch had opened in Kayseri, where Kısakürek had obtained the largest support for the *Büyük Doğu* Association in early 1950, before the head office opened in Istanbul (Biraderoğlu, 1965).

It is possible to see that Ahmet's cautious progress reflex/strategy was also on alert in the establishment process of this association. It was stated in the main directory of the association published in the *Büyük Doğu* that there was no organic relation of the *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club with the political wing of the *Büyük Doğu* Journal and its publications. Besides, it was emphasised that the association would perform its activities only in the intellectual field regardless of political issues. The goal of the association was also expressed in a very abstract manner with the same reflex as 'raising the eastern-originated new people and society of the future

¹²⁵ The founder names of the association were as follows: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (Chairman), Ali Biraderoğlu (Vice Chairman), Salih Güler (Vice Chairman), Reşat Aksoy (Chief Clerk), Refet Cıngıl (Chief Accountant), Ahmet Semiz (Member of Head Office), Bahri Zengin (Member of Head Office), Abdullah Sarımermer (Member of Head Office), Ali Gengenç (Member of Head Office), Mehmet Baydil (Member of Head Office), and Metin Dökmeci (Member of Head Office).

through evaluation of the development distance between the Eastern and Western civilizations with a sense of national spirit' (*Büyük Doğu*, 6 October 1965, p. 15).¹²⁶

However, the groups were determined to struggle against elicited the political nature of the association:

“1. The group of destructive sects that have been brought from the West: Materialists, communists, disguised socialists 2. The group of root dryer internal streams: Disbelievers, imitators, cosmopolites. 3. The groups of misunderstanding fading out internal values: Rude fanatics interpreting religious measures according to their wishes, racists seeking the ore of Turkishness in crust, all kinds of vagabonds and freedom abusers who are in the claim of acting on the behalf of the freedom” (*Büyük Doğu*, 6 October 1965, p. 15).¹²⁷

As Kısakürek targeted educated young people, he set the date of starting to act as November when was the opening date of the universities. Meetings with young people would be organised every Saturday evening. While defining the qualities that young people should have to be a member of the association, Kısakürek also draws a portrait of himself. According to these criteria, young people should have the courtesy and speech style required by aristocratic measures, pay attention to their clothing, adopt the nationalist and spiritual values of the Turk (ibid).

¹²⁶ This is the author's summarised translation. The original text is: Milli ruh kökü üzerinde derinleşme yoluyla, Doğu ve Batı Dünyalarını, bütün tarihi maceralarını, maddi ve manevi müesseseler ve sistemleri içinde muhasebe ve murakabe etmiş, aradaki mahsup sırlarına ermiş, Dünya çapında ve benzersiz bir terkibe varmış, her türlü küçüklük ukdesi ve kopyacılık temayülünden kurtulmuş ve büyük asliyet ve şahsiyet vahitlerine ulaşmış, İstikbalin Doğu kaynaklı yeni insan ve cemiyetine maya tutturmak.

¹²⁷ This is the author's translation. The original text is: 1. Batıdan devşirilme yıkıcı mezhep grubu: Maddeciler, komünistler, kılık değiştirmiş sosyalistler 2. Kök kurutucu iç cereyanlar grubu: İnkârcılar, kopyacılar, kozmopolitler 3. İç kıymetleri karartıcı yanlış anlayış grupları: Din ölçülerini nefslerine indiren ham yobaz ve kaba softalar, Türklük cevherini kabukta arayan ırkçılar, her türlü başboşlar ve hürriyet için hürriyet esnafları.

Besides these meetings, large-scale conferences would be arranged. Young people were called for the opening of Club branches in every city, especially in big cities such as Ankara, Erzurum, Konya, İzmir, Bursa, Maras. A number of 101 members were required to open a branch (Kısakürek, 1965e). The second branch of the Association opened in Ankara. Among the leading names of the Ankara branch, there were important names of the Islamic intelligentsia like Mustafa Yazgan. In 1966, an investigation was initiated for the closure of the club due to the conference, 'Pseudo Heroes in History', organised by this branch. Nevertheless, the association had not managed to reach a sufficient organization structure that Kısakürek envisaged within the last two years (Kısakürek, 1967j). Kısakürek aimed to give an impetus to the activities of the Association with the *Büyük Doğu*, which he started to publish in 1967. He planned to launch a new organising campaign by pressing fifty thousand copies of the main directory of the Association and distributing them in the major cities of Anatolia (*Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1967, p. 16). Besides, by referring to the investigation opened against the Association, it was asked members to be act within the borders drawn by the laws and only in intellectual field (Çingil, 1967). In that period, he also managed to establish cooperation with the NTSU and joint attitude was shown in some issues such as protesting İmran Öktem, President of the Court of Cassation, due to his speech he held for the opening of 1967 legislative year (*Büyük Doğu*, 20 December 1967, pp. 8,9,18). However, Kısakürek could not reach the organisation level he envisaged also in this period and, therefore, closed down the association in 1968.

Although he could not have been able to carry out the opinion club, he continued to work actively in the same route by giving conferences in other associations, especially in the NTSU. During this period, student movements also

began to undergo some transformations. The ideological divergence between the left-leaning youth had begun to manifest itself in their strategy of action. In 1969, the name of the Federation of Intellectual Clubs changes as the Federation of Revolutionary Youth Associations. New groupings, which were aimed at formation of resistance groups for the revolutionary movement and starting to the armed actions, began to emerge and some of them started a guerrilla training in the camps of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Akyol, 1996, pp. 83-114; Feyizoğlu, 2002, pp. 232,233). Likewise, militarist-oriented organisations also emerged among right-leaning young people. The most prominent of these was the commandos formed by young people trained in the summer camps, which were opened under the name of the commando camp for three months in the summer months between 1968 and 1970. This group, associated to the far rightist Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-NAP), was going to be called as Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves) or *ülküçüler* by the time (Öznur, Ülkücü Hareket, 1999, pp. 5,6; Bora, 1991). The tension among the radicalised groups increased by the late 1960 and armed conflicts began to appear (Kabacalı, 1992, pp. 182-237). In this tense atmosphere, Kısakürek was participating in the organisations arranged by these groups and was exhilarating the youth with furious speeches; in other word, he was contributing to radicalisation. In the '*şahlanış*' (rearing) rally made in response to the '*uyaniş*' (awaking) rally, which was organised by the WPT, a person who objected to the talk made by Kısakürek was assaulted by the young people who participated in the demonstration (*Cumhuriyet*, 04 March 1968). Similar brawls were seen also in the conferences he gave (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 May 1967).

The 1967 period of the journal was also reflecting the enthusiasm of Kısakürek forming a new youth organisation and thus a revival. It is possible to characterize this

period as a continuation of the fourth period. In the process of uncertainty in which a formation was being sought both in and out of the JP, Kısakürek published his book, *ideolacya örgüsü* (Ideological Web), by reassessing and compiling articles he wrote on *Büyük Doğu* Ideology for years. In this period of the journal, he published the *Büyük Doğu* ideology in the form of handled in this book. In a sense, it was a re-presenting of the *Büyük Doğu* in the goal of organising a youth mass around him; though the content was not changed. Again, with the slogan of ‘I do not believe the history that I was taught’, he continued to alternative historiography by publishing memoirs from Rıza Nur (Kısakürek, 1967e). A distinctive feature of this period was that İnönü was replaced with Demirel. He began to criticise Demirel with whom all ways of reconciliation consumed. His criticisms were so severe that he sometimes included Demirel's wife in the debate (Kısakürek, 1967c). To Kısakürek, due to the bad economic policy imposed by Demirel, inflation had increased by 35 per cent and budget deficit had increased by 3 billion since the 1965 elections (Kısakürek, 1967k). Besides this, his biggest mistake was to remove the nationalist-sacredists from the administration (Kısakürek, 1967f). The furious mood in Kısakürek's wordings was immediately countered. As soon as the magazine started publishing, the first issue was confiscated by court decision (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 July 1967). Similarly, new investigations were opened for the articles titled ‘*Adalet Devri*’ (Justice Era), published in the third issue, and ‘*Mümin-Kafir*’ (Believer-Infidel), published in the 19th issue. Unable to get the yield he envisaged also from the *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club, Kısakürek closed down this period of the journal with the 27th issue.

4.4 1969 Junction Point

It can be said that the years of 1969 and early 1970s became a junction point for many politician and intellectual, especially those in the nationalist-sacradist circle. When the efforts to establish a party under Osman Turan's leadership failed, some names of the nationalist-sacradist circle such as A. Tevfik Paksu (1926-), Hassan Aksay (1931-) and Arif Hikmet Güner (1923-1975) directed their efforts to the formation of an Islamic party. And, it was Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2005), the Chairman of the TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), who was considered to be the leader of the party to be established (Sevilgen, 1980, p. 14). As for Serdengeçti, who was one of the leading names of the quest for forming a new party, enrolled to the RPNP and became a prominent name of the transformation the party underwent which resulted with the emergence of the Nationalist Action Party (Kurnaz, 2012, pp. 492,493). Lastly, the struggle of Bilgiç Group in the JP was still going on and was about turning into a separation from the Party.

The 13th period of the *Büyük Doğu*, which Kısakürek began to publish in 1969, was in nature of resembling these orientations in Turkish politics. It is possible to observe that Kısakürek gave support to all of these orientations in the journal. However, the main reason leading Kısakürek to publish this period was supporting the Bilgiç group in forthcoming the general elections of 1969. The Bilgiç group's success in the pre-elections in Istanbul against the *yeminliler* (sworn) group was rather promising development (*Milliyet*, 03 September 1969). They would have been able to obtain a strong hold in the parliamentary arithmetic of the party after the election and thus would have been able to be more effective within the party. Kısakürek manifested his support to Bilgiç through publishing his photos with the expression of 'one of the principal persons of the *Büyük Doğu* idea' in the first two issues of the

journal. Together with asking people to vote for the JP, Kısakürek also warned the party administration by emphasising that if the Bilgiç group was to be excluded one more time, the Party would lose the support of the people completely (Kısakürek, 1969c).

The JP had won the elections but Demirel had left the Bilgiç group out of the cabinet again. Bilgiç group manifested their reaction through refusing to participate to the joint meeting of the Assembly group in which government's program was to be discussed. They were preparing to re-challenge in the General Congress (*Cumhuriyet*, 04,07 November 1969). Together with criticising Demirel's decision, Kısakürek advocated that the Bilgiç group should continue to support the government until the General Congress. To him, it was likely possible for Bilgiç group to take down Demirel in the Congress due to the number of the seats they obtained (Kısakürek, 1969f). Kısakürek, who also made a self-criticism here, stated that he might have caused damage to Bilgiç by giving open support to him (Kısakürek, 1969a).

Bilgiç group continued to struggle against Demirel to force him to resign in 1970. In February, they voted against his draft budget and he was obliged to resign (*Cumhuriyet*, 12-14 February 1970). Also, they launched a campaign to discredit him by accusing him of corruption and of peddling influence to get large credits for his brothers (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 June 1970). However, they failed one more time in the Fifth General Congress (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 1970). Their last card was forcing Demirel to resign through convincing the Assembly to investigate the corruption charges; but they also failed in that attempt. Upon the refusal of the investigation, the dissidents formed their own party namely Democratic Party the day after. Through getting Celal Bayar's daughter Nilufer Gursoy, Samet Ağaoğlu's wife Neriman Ağaoğlu, Adnan Menderes' children Yüksel and Mutlu Menderes into the founder cadre, the bond of

the Party with the closed Democrat Party was emphasized. In his speech, Ferruh Bozbeyli, who was selected as the party leader, indicated the reason why they left the JP by stating that 'the right to be single man in Turkey only belongs to Atatürk' (*Milliyet*, 18,19,24 December 1970). Kısakürek stated that he had involved in this separation process through holding meetings in Bilgiç's and Turan's homes, and had the biggest role in taking of this decision (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 117). However, neither Bilgiç nor Bozbeyli mentioned Kısakürek's role in this process in their autobiographical books (Bozbeyli, 1976; Bilgiç, 1998).

The cadre, which Kısakürek had supported for years, managed to found their own political party. The profile that the party exhibited was also very decent for Kısakürek who was one of the most important advocates of the closed Democratic Party. In the following days of the foundation of the party, Kısakürek began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* again. In the editorial article of the first issue, Kısakürek penned a memorandum style article against Demirel and criticised him for his politics that led the Democratic Party to separation through repeating the accusations of corruption and incitement that the Bilgiç group had directed towards Demirel in separation process (Kısakürek, 1971e). In addition, in another article, he stated he had great hopes for the party. On the other hand, he criticised Bozbeyli for his emphasis of Atatürk in his speech at the same time (Kısakürek, 1971d). It seems that Kısakürek believed in that the Democratic Party would get the approval of the majority of the JP's electoral, but sadly mistaken. Democratic Party could not get the expected success in the general elections of 1973. Furthermore, after a while, the Party would face with the danger of division, and, later on, Bilgiç and his friends were to leave the party. The fact that Kısakürek encouraged the division within Justice Party also was a deviation from his strategy of union at the right against the left block; and this

division was also one of the first steps of unstable coalition governments that would dominate the 1970s in Turkey. As will be handled in the next chapter, Kısakürek was to understand his mistake and was to support Demirel again in the late 1970s.

Another political party that Kısakürek gave support in 13th period of the journal was Alparslan Türkeş's NAP. As a matter of fact, ideologically, it was not so possible to establish a steady partnership in that period at all. As stated in the introduction part, the RPNP was a movement that was organised around a Pan-Turkist nationalism understanding; and it was an ideological orientation that Kısakürek was severely criticising. Besides, the party had a secularist approach. Türkeş, one of the most important figures of the group that performed the 1960 coup and became the leader of the RPNP in 1965, was known with his strong secular characteristic and loyalty to the Kemalist revolution. In an interview he gave after the coup, he said that one of the ground reasons of their intervention to the politics was the rise of reactionism and the DP's compromise on the reactionaries (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 July 1960). And, as emphasised in the previous chapter, Kısakürek was the symbolic name of that period.

Kısakürek stated that their contacts with Türkeş began in the mid-1960s. They held meetings both in Kısakürek's and Türkeş's houses. In these meetings in which Dündar Taşer, an important name of the party, also participated, Kısakürek submitted a consensus text and stated that they would be able to build consensus on the condition that the party would follow a policy with an Islamic perspective. Yet, his offer was rejected by Taşer for the reason that if they were to publish this text, the party would be closed down (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 77,78; 2013b, pp. 320-324). Nevertheless, there were some rumours in the press that Kısakürek and Türkeş built a consensus. Denying such rumours in the *Büyük Doğu*, Kısakürek declared that he had

been ready to get an agreement if the party had decided to follow an Islamic policy (Kısakürek, 1967i). Hence, what was the reason that brought these two names in that period?

As Bora stated, the CKMP began to pursue an aggressive policy treating communism, sectarianism threats after Türkeş came to the leadership of the party in 1965 (Bora, 1991, p. 45). Being a famous polemicist among the right-leaning youth, Kısakürek might have been seen as a suitable choice to consolidate the youth branches of the party. Beside this, the party was having trouble to get vote with its Pan-Turkist ideological line. Therefore, by the late 1960s, the party inclined to pursue an Islamic line. ‘Turk as much as the Tanrı Mountain, Muslim as much as the Hira Mountain’, the famous motto of Serdengeçti who was brought to the party’s vice chairman seat, became the symbol of this transformation in ideological orientation of the Party (Kurnaz, 2012, pp. 492-494). In the General Congress of the party, which was held in 1969, the party’s name was changed to become NAP, and the symbol of the party (which was a grey wolf) was identified as three crescents on a red background, referring to this transformation. The Turkists such as Nihal Atsız who opposed giving premium to the Islamist discourse, even if it was instrumental (subjected to the Turkishness), were liquidated by the time (Bora, 1991, p. 46). In order to express his pleasure for the transformation that the party underwent, Kısakürek published declarations of Alparslan Türkeş and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti in the journal (Türkeş, 1969; Serdengeçti, 1969). However, it was still not possible to talk about a steady relationship. The NAP was a party with a very low rate of votes and there was another political party on the agenda of Kısakürek. Besides, it is also worth addressing that some Islamic oriented publications such as *Babıalide Sabah* and

Bugün, in which Kısakürek also wrote, were still criticising the NAP (Öznur, 1999, p. 63).

The last political movement that Kısakürek was giving support was the establishment process of the Erbakan's National Order Party (NOP- Milli Nizam Partisi). However, the relationship with the NOP, which would be the main axis of Kısakürek's political activity in the early 1970s, will be covered in the next chapter in order to ensure the integrity of the topic.

4.5 Conclusion

In that period, Kısakürek had to start a new quest because the relationship he had established with the DP was obliged to end due to the 1960 Coup. Since the RPP's failure to come to power was one of the basic elements of his political strategy, he sought a union between the central right-wing parties. Nevertheless, his main orientation became the JP, the strongest party in the centre-right. He attempted to establish a similar relationship he had established with Menderes through getting in touch with both Gümüşpala and Demirel, but he could not succeed this time due to ideological differences. This situation led him to support Sadettin Bilgic who was a powerful person in the party and who shared the same thoughts as his. On the other hand, he established a more intense relationship with a conservative sub-group, known as nationalist-sacradist, in which names such as Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti and Osman Turan were involved. While supporting these groups in the struggles against Demirel within the JP, due to the defeats got in this process, he was also dragged into new quest processes along with these names. As he was struggling against the party factions in the DP period, he was now part of factionalism movements. However, with a pragmatic approach, Kısakürek continued to support the

candidate, which he considered as the strongest, during the period of many different road separations occurred which the 1969 period of the *Büyük Doğu* portrayed. As will be seen in the next section, the change in the power balances would also cause changes in the orientations of Kısakürek.

Another point that should be emphasised in relation to this period is that Kısakürek was obliged to move away a little more from his idealist orientation on the axis of the *Büyük Doğu* ideal. Due to material shortfalls, the *Büyük Doğu* periods in this period were published only to support a political actor in specific periods and all of them were short-lived. The 12th period of the journal published in 1967 and *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club attempt, which we considered as an exception to this situation, once again revealed that the idealistic aspirations of Kısakürek were very difficult to realise.

5. FROM DIVISIONS TO UNITY WITHIN THE RIGHT-WING AGAIN: KISAKÜREK'S POLITICAL QUESTS IN THE 1970S (1970-1983)

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Kısakürek's political and intellectual activities between 1970 and 1983 will be examined. One of the most important issues of this period is forming Turkey's first Islamic party, which had managed to build a deep-rooted political tradition, unlike the small Islamic parties established in the past. The party, established under the name of National Order (*Milli Nizam*) has been able to reach today by changing its name due to various closing penalties. Today, most of the political elites who are ruling the country have begun practicing politics in this party and has grown in this tradition. Kısakürek's relationship with this political party will be one of the ground subjects of this chapter.

Another important issue related to this period is the rising of a political conflict between the left and right leaning young people, which began to occur in the late 1960s. Again, this chapter will focus on how these conflicts, one of the main reasons for the military interventions in 1971 and 1980, affected the political preferences of Kısakürek.

5.2 National Salvation Party as the Miscarriage Child of the *Büyük Doğu* Idea

As mentioned in the previous chapter, political quest in nationalist-sacradist circles, which Kısakürek was also giving support to, evolved to the idea of forming an Islamic party, and, Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011), Chairman of *TOBB* (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), was thought for the leadership of the party. Since there was not sufficient time for accomplishing the organisation

before the general elections of 1969, it was decided to participate in the elections as independent candidates or under the umbrella of existing political parties, then to form a group in the Assembly. An offer had come from Bölükbaşı who was the president of the NP, but it was not accepted because cooperating with him, to some members, did not seem an operable choice (Emre, 2017, p. 170). Erbakan had contacted the RPNP and the JP to participate in the elections from their list but his request was rejected by the leaders of the two parties. Therefore, he participated in the elections from Konya as an independent candidate.

Kısakürek was introduced to Erbakan in 1965 and offered him to write in *Büyük Doğu*. According to Kısaküre's statements, Erbakan did not accept this offer like some of his other demands. Kısakürek stated that he began to feel a kind of suspicion about him in those years (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 115). But, in the very early phase of the forming of this Islamic political party, Kısakürek presented his support by being a voice for this movement. He gave place to Erbakan's declaration in which he could explain his movement. Erbakan responded this gesture of Kısakürek via stating that he saw only the *Büyük Doğu* among publications worth to give this declaration (Erbakan, 1969). Upon the request of Erbakan, Kısakürek also penned a declaration for the independent group of Erbakan to be used in the election campaign, but due to the lack of organisational problems, the text could not be used even though it was published. In the text titled '*Mukaddesatçı Türke Beyanname*' (Declaration to Sacradist Turk), it was requested from nationalist-sacradist people to give support to this political movement. Kısakürek stated that giving support to this sacradist group was the spiritual debt of the Muslims to Allah and His messenger (Kısakürek, 1969e). Kısakürek also participated in Erbakan's election campaign in Konya with Mustafa Yazgan and made a speech there. Karsakürek's standing next to Erbakan in his

election campaign was, also, in a sense, an approval of the Islamic identity of Erbakan who had not been recognised much by the electorate. However, on the other hand, Kısakürek also stated that he had been uncomfortable with Erbakan's attitude during the campaign process and had wanted to leave the campaign (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 116-118).

In his statement to the *Büyük Doğu*, Erbakan stated that they aimed at entering the Assembly with at least twelve deputies throughout nominating a candidate in each one of the sixty-seven provinces. But only eleven candidates had been able to enter the elections and only Erbakan managed to be elected. After the elections, Erbakan was invited to the NP by Bolükbaşı, but, according to statement of Bölükbaşı, this collaboration could not be set since Erbakan wanted the party leadership (Bölükbaşı, 2000, pp. 408,409). Then, Erbakan focused his efforts on forming the party. A wide support of the conservative circles was sought. In that regard, a wide ranged consultation assembly was established in order to discuss the party program. Important names of Islamist circle such as Kısakürek and Eşref Edip participated in this council. As Emre stated in his memoirs, Kısakürek helped them by advising that the party program should be prepared by a commission consisting of proficient in that field (Emre, 2017, p. 166). Following the completion of the preparations, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi-NOP*) was founded on 26 January 1970. One of the most striking speakers of the party's founding meeting was Kısakürek (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1970). In his speech, Kısakürek expressed that he had great hopes for the party in the direction of being the expected party of the Turkish nation (Kısakürek, 2010a, p. 222).

The party managed to complete the organisation of the grassroots in sixty-three provinces in one year. Few weeks before the First General Congress of the

party, held on 24 January 1971, Kısakürek began to publish the *Büyük Doğu* once again. Some founders of the party such as Hassan Aksay and Saffet Solak also participated in the writer cadre of the journal. Kısakürek also participated in the Congress as a respectable guest and had a speech there. He appealed to the party members as “the first political actioners of the case of the revival of the spiritual roots of the Turkish nation”¹²⁸ and expressed his hopes for the party as to be a party that would be a remedy for the problems of the country both spiritual and political (Kısakürek, Hitabeler, 2010a, p. 224). Nonetheless, it is hard to say Kısakürek supported the NOP as he had done for the DP. In his speeches, he did not appeal to the audience such as a party member, rather he was in a position of a respectable guest expressing his hopes for the success of the party. Furthermore, in the articles he penned about the NOP in the 14th period of the journal, together with appreciating the fast organising performance, and expressing his hopes for the party, he also addressed that it was time which would show whether this movement would deserve the countenance of people or not. In addition, he also stated that he did not get any responsibility in the action plan of the movement in which he had the greatest part in its ideological plan (Kısakürek, 1971a; 1971k). Kısakürek indicated in the following years that he thought that it was not right to proceed without seeing the progress of the party, and, therefore, he acted restrained and never stood a guarantor for the party (Kısakürek, 2009e, p. 35). This was a manifestation of the strategy that Kısakürek had followed for years. Nonetheless, it can be said that the main reason underlying the mistrust of him for the party was the lack of confidence he felt for Erbakan personally. Bedii Faik, who was accused in the declaration given by Erbakan about his dismissal from the TOBB presidency to the *Büyük Doğu* published in 1969, had

¹²⁸ This is the author’s summarised translation. The original text is: Türk milletinin ruh kökünü ihya etmek, ağacını yeşertmek, meyvesini devşirmek ve ruh gıdasızlığından sürünen insanlığa muhtaç olduğu nimeti göstermek davasının ilk siyasi aksiyoncuları...

filed a lawsuit against both Erbakan and Kısakürek. According to Kısakürek's statement, Erbakan accused Kısakürek of stating that he had not given such a declaration himself and that it had been written by Kısakürek apart from his knowledge. Hüsamettin Akmumcu and Hüseyin Abbas, who were to be two important names of the faction, which would struggle against Erbakan in the party in the following years, also was witness to the detriment of Kısakürek in the court. In the following years, these two names would say that they had given that statement upon the request of Erbakan. As a result of the lawsuit, Kısakürek was sentenced to pay a substantial amount of compensation but Faik renounced damages (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 140-142). This trial was the first reason for a never-ending mistrust between them.

While the NOP was being established, the support of the Islamic structures in the country was to be obtained. In particular, great importance was given to the support of Mehmet Zahit Kotku, an influential Naqshbandi sheik and the leader of the *Iskenderpaşa* congregation (Emre, 2017). The congregation in the leadership of Kotku had a well-educated group of people from various fields ranging from students, academics to technocrats, merchants (Yaşar, 2005, s. 328). However, despite its open Islamic identity, the party was not supported by all Islamic congregations. This situation has been one of the main characteristics of Islamism in Turkey. While some groups had had a direct relationship with the NOP and its future versions, some groups had supported centre-right parties such as the JP. For example, while the group gathered around the *Yeni Asya* (New Asian) Newspaper, which was one of the groups emerging from the division occurred in *Nur* congregation after the death of Said Nursi, was having a pro-JP attitude, another group under the leadership of Husrev Altınbasak, which was also coming from the same source, participated in the NOP through resigning from the JP (Şentürk, 2015, s. 334). One of the most interesting

manifestations of this situation was the negative attitude of the group, known as *Işıkçılar* and coming from the same *Sufi* tradition with Kısakürek, towards the NOP. Like Kısakürek, Süleyman Hilmi Işık, the leader of the group, also affiliated to *Sheik* Abdulhakim Arvasi, adopted the Islamic understanding of Sirhindi, and wrote a book inspired by Sirhindi's famous work *Mektubat* (Letters). The group, which would have its own national TV channel, publishing house, newspaper and a wide network of organisations in the following years, started publishing a newspaper named *Hakikat* (the Truth) by Enver Ören, son-in-law of Işık, in 1970 and manifested a clear Pro-Justice Party stand (Tekin, 2005, pp. 341,342). They carried out their campaign against the NOP over Kısakürek because of the active role that he played in the organisation of the party. In a cartoon published on 14 January 1971 in a half-page size in the *Hakikat* Newspaper, Kısakürek was portrayed sitting by Erbakan on a gambling table, on which it was written *Büyük Doğu*, among alcohol bottles and prostitutes, and while Jews and Arabs were putting money into their pockets (Kısakürek, 1971g).

The other reason of this fight between the *Işık* group and Kısakürek was Kısakürek's severe criticisms for Demirel. Advocating Demirel by stating that he was not a freemason, the newspaper declared Kısakürek as an infidel slandering to Demirel. As also mentioned in the previous chapter, Kısakürek was continuing to support the Democratic Party and having been criticised Demirel severely. However, those new political formations that Kısakürek was supporting were the first steps of a period of unstable coalitions' period, and it was also significant blow to the strategy of unity in the right-wing. After the separation of the Democratic Party, there were more leavings from the JP and Demirel lost the majority in the assembly. His position had been completely eroded and he became a factor of instability (Ahmad, 1977, p.

247). He was not in a position anymore that could solve the acute problems of the country such as rising violence-contained movements, economic reforms. Press, including Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu*, continued to blame Demirel for failing to solve these problems (Kısakürek, 1971e). The on-going instability set the generals into action one more time on 12 March 1971. They released a memorandum to President Sunay, to the Chairman of the Assembly and to the Senate; and Demirel was forced to resign.

Kısakürek's interpretation of memorandum was quite interesting. While interpreting the intervention of the generals as a 'tremendous right', he interpreted presentation of the memorandum to the Assembly, to which the army was bounded, as a contrast, and stated that it was an 'unfair intervention' in terms of the way the movement followed. To him, it would be a totally rightful intervention if the memorandum had been presented only to President Sunay (Kısakürek, 1971f). Another reason for the intervention of the generals was also forestalling the movement that was possible to come from below. Many officers and generals were retired before and after the intervention (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1971; Ahmad, 1977, pp. 202,205). Kısakürek's comment on the retirement of the army officers was also striking. He argued that the reason of the retirements was not preventing of a factional group planning a tougher intervention as it was asserted, but since they were left-leaning gutters. Also, he appreciated the generals for their nationalistic attitude (Kısakürek, 1971b). Judging from the comments on military intervention, it is possible to say that Kısakürek's belief in both the Democratic Party and the NOP was very weak.

This process also affected the future of the NOP. Two days later after the first congress, an investigation was opened by the prosecution office for the speeches held

in the congress (*Milliyet*, 27 January 1971). After the intervention of the generals, the file, which had been opened for the party, was sent to the Constitutional Court. On 20 May, the court decided for the dissolution of the party on the ground that it was seeking to restore a theocratic order in the country (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 May 1971). Kısakürek stated that one day before the decision to close, he had called Erbakan and warned him to pay attention to his discourse. To him, Erbakan's emphasis on Islam was a so reckless step that would be able to cause the party to be closed (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 118). As revealed in this work, Kısakürek's political strategy was to proceed with sure steps without attracting attention of the protective reflexes of the state apparatus. Kısakürek stated that he had been arguing with Erbakan many times for this issue in the following years and had warned him not to talk too much (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 68,69).

Until the elections in 1973, the 12 March regime tried to govern the country by supra-party governments of Ferit Melen and Naim Talu which were expected to carry out the necessary reforms to establish the law and order but were based on unworkable compromise. Three governments were squeezed into this short period of time, and, tranquillity and order was to be established with the constantly extended martial law and extraordinary measures (Hale, 1994, pp. 193-214). Kısakürek strongly criticised the election of Nihat Erim as Prime Minister by saying that he would not be able to demonstrate an impartial management since he was a member of the RPP (Kısakürek, 1971c). Besides, he stated that he had seen the cabinet insufficient to realise the promised reforms since it was formed with ministers who did not know each other, therefore could not produce a harmonious work (Kısakürek, *Hükümet*, 1971h).

Following the dissolution of the party, Erbakan had gone to Switzerland until the situation calmed down, but this situation was hidden even from many of the members of the closed party (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 September 1971). As Sevilgen, one of the prominent founders of the party, stated that it created distrust for Erbakan among the party members (Sevilgen, 1980). The future of the party was uncertain. Thinking that it is unnecessary to carry out activity around the *Büyük Doğu* in the political conjuncture of the 12 March regime, Kısakürek ended the 13th period of the journal with the 17th issue. The years between 1971 and 1973 were a silent period for him. In 1973, he founded the *Büyük Doğu* publishing house with the aim of gathering up his works published in various publishing houses and publishing new works. In fact, since the mid-1960s, he had been stating that he was not able to afford the expenditures of the journal and to form the youth organisation he had envisaged. Therefore, he thought that it was a better option for him to hand down his thoughts to the next generations through gathering them up in books. However, he had to publish the journal for some periods more since he did not want to stay silent in the face of the changing occurred in the political arena. This silent period gave him the opportunity to realise this delayed project. Kısakürek provided the financial source of the publishing house from Kemal Ilıcak who was the owner of the *Tercüman* Newspaper. Ilıcak was helping Kısakürek to provide his livelihood through purchasing his poetries for large sums (Kısakürek, 2013b, pp. 298,299). Going on giving conferences, Kısakürek also gave some conferences in various cities of Germany in this period. Besides, he fulfilled the pilgrimage duty in 1973 and wrote a book about his memoirs in that journey (Kısakürek, 2013h).

On 11 October 1972, the party was founded again under the disguised name of the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*-NSP), by nineteen members, many

of whom had involved in the NOP. In the first phase, leadership of the party was carried out by S. Arif Emre. Actually, it was a cover for preventing any connection that would be able to be established with the previous party. As Landau stated, pioneers of the party were careful to disclaim any connection whatsoever with the dissolved previous party. Erbakan continued to call himself an independent deputy until his official joining the party in May 1973. Even in the *Milli Gazete*, founded as the publication organ of the party, only very little was reported about the NSP in the first two months (Landau, 1976, p. 11). It seems that the founders of the party learned some lessons from their previous experience.

In 1973, upon the invitation of Hassan Aksay, the owner of the newspaper, Kısakürek also began to write in *Milli Gazete*, so his relationship with the party was re-established. Again, together with stating that he did not have any organic relationship with the party, he identified himself as a respectful wise man of the party of which he had the greatest part in the formation of its ideological ground (Kısakürek, 1973k). As a necessity of the publication policy of the newspaper, in the first months, Kısakürek published a series of articles about the thirty-year publication history of the *Büyük Doğu*, instead of writing directly related to the party. Some of these articles in which he mentioned disagreements and conflicts among the Islamic groups, were not published because they were incompatible with the party's politics at a time when the support of all the Islamic groups was required (Kısakürek, 1973a; 1973b; 1973c; 1973d).¹²⁹ Upon this censorship, he stopped writing in the newspaper until the election period.

¹²⁹ Full text of these articles was published in his book titled 'Türkiye'nin Manzarası' (Kısakürek, 2013r, pp. 115-122).

The result of the 1973 elections did not give a sufficient majority to any of the parties to form the government on their own. Dismissed by the military memorandum, Demirel lost a great prestige and his party's votes declined considerably from 256 seats in 1969 to 149 in 1973. Besides, newly founded parties (45 seats Democratic Party and 48 seats National Salvation Party) caused division in right-wing votes. On the other side, Bülent Ecevit's Republican Party revealed an unpredicted success and increased its seats from 143 in 1969 to 185 in 1973. In the long-drawn-out marathon of coalition negotiations (such that the first coalition government could be established months later on 24 January 1974), the NSP and the Democratic Party had emerged as the key actors of the coalition equations. Demirel decided to stay in opposition by which he thought that the party would regain the popularity of the electorate rather than involving in a coalition, which would be obliged to make unpopular decisions that would affect the man in the street (Ahmad, 1977, p. 332). Hence, as with any possible RPP-JP coalition, establishing a unity on the right became impossible as well.

Having started to rewrite in the *Milli Gazete* shortly after the elections, Kısakürek interpreted the NSP's getting the eleven per cent of the votes in the first election it participated, as a great success. His attitude toward the Democratic Party was also quite changed. He stated that the party had hoped for help from a closed down party (Democrat Party), but frustrated as a result of the combination of the forgetfulness of the people and the party's deficiency in comprehending this result. As for the success of the RPP, it was people's pinning their hopes on a political party, which had turned its back to İnönü. According to Kısakürek, only the voters who voted for the NSP voted by knowing what they wanted and it was Islam they voted for (Kısakürek, 1973e; 1973i).

At the end of October, coalition talks between the RPP and the NSP began (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 October 1973). Kısakürek was in the belief that this coalition would not be a good choice in terms of the NSP (Kısakürek, 1973g). Although it was reported in the press that the parties said yes to the coalition, the General Executive Committee opposed the coalition decision (*Cumhuriyet*, 06-07 November 1973). Ecevit, who could not establish a coalition also with the NSP, announced that he had left the task of forming a government. President Korutürk negotiated with party leaders and tried to persuade them for a coalition government and later gave Demirel the duty of forming a government. Although he had criticised the idea of forming a supra-party government like that of Nihat Erim, Kısakürek had to change his view with the cause of the emerged deadlock. In the articles he wrote addressing to Korutürk who he appealed as 'my classmate in the Naval School', Kısakürek stated that the only choice was a 'national government' to be established under the prime ministry of a person who was outside the current political parties (Kısakürek, 1973f; 1973h). Besides, he continued to advise the NSP not to participate in any coalition (Kısakürek, 1973j). Demirel's coalition works could not be successful due to the oppositions to Demirel's presidency in the coalition government to be established. After efforts to form a government led by Naim Talu also failed, the possibility of an RPP-NOP coalition was re-emerged with Ecevit being given the task of forming a government.

It can be said that Erbakan was one of the most volunteer leaders to form a partnership. As the leader of a party which was the new version of a dissolved one, having a seat in the government could have provided him and his party legitimacy and respectability. A similar circumstance can be also considered for Bülent Ecevit who participated in his first election in the head of the RPP (Ahmad, 1977, p. 334). Despite

many common points in their election programs, such as loyalty to the democracy that guaranteed the fundamental freedoms and mixed economy, there were also many differences between the two due to their ontological natures. Especially for many Salvationists who had grown in an intellectual atmosphere fed by a strong opposition to the single-party period, such a coalition would be a betrayal of their reason for existence. Being aware of the opposition that would rise against this coalition, Erbakan first had tried to form a coalition with right-wing parties. When he had begun to talk with the RPP in October, he also sent a letter to Demirel to convince him to form a government (*Milliyet*, 03 November 1973). As Sevilgen stated, Erbakan even attempted to get the duty of forming the government by convincing fifty-one deputies of the JP to affiliate to his party. By doing so, he would have had more seats than Demirel in the Assembly, and Korutürk would have given the duty to him instead of Demirel. Thus, he could form a coalition under his leadership (Sevilgen, 1980, pp. 71-72). Since all choices of a coalition were eliminated, the RPP-NOP coalition emerged as the sole choice. Actually, the negotiations between these parties had already begun secretly by means of each two parties' representatives (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1974). On January 13, the parties announced that they got an agreement for forming the government (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 January 1974).

Erbakan paid a great effort to convince his party members for this coalition. He talked to them one by one and convinced many of them (Sevilgen, 1980, p. 77). Kısakürek stated that the impressions he had received from these meetings, which he attended to some of them, obviated the doubts he had about party leadership and party cadres. The reactions of the deputies, of whom he saw himself as their 'milk-father', and Erbakan's efforts to persuade them, positively influenced him and reinforced his confidence in the party (Kısakürek, 1974f). Upon the emergence of this coalition,

Kısakürek also changed his discourse and gave support to the decision of the Erbakan by stating that this situation, which he had identified before as a betrayal to the truth and God, became an obligation of the political conjuncture and the NOP was obliged to make choice between the synagogue and house of heathenism (Kısakürek, 1974d; 1974e).

According to Kısakürek, once such a coalition had been formed, the party should be utilised as much as possible from this work. Firstly, the leftist tendencies of the RPP must be avoided. Then, Erbakan had to show itself more by being more proactive than Ecevit. Continuing to warn the party frequently also in the following years of the coalition period, Kısakürek advised Erbakan not to approve every politics that Ecevit wanted (Kısakürek, 1974a; 1974c).

This decision of forming a coalition government, which could not live even one year, had also triggered the formation of a dissident faction in the party. This faction manifested itself first in the debating and voting of the Amnesty Law in the Assembly. The dissidents were strongly opposed to the inclusion of convicted leftists to the scope of the Law. Twenty NSP members voted against the inclusion of the articles of 141 and 142 to the scope of the Law (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1974). In the twenty-four signed petitions submitted to the party management just before the voting, the dissidents declared that if the mentioned articles was not left out of the scope of the law, they would vote 'No' (Sevilgen, 1980, p. 130). Although Erbakan had tried hard to pass this law smoothly, he managed to change the opinion of only four deputies. The decision of this group, to be called as the 20's in the following years, had also put the coalition in danger. Ecevit thought to resign, but the party's administration convinced him against it until more favourable conditions for the resignation occurred (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 May 1974).

Erbakan was making great efforts to maintain the coalition government but the demands of the dissidents in the party continued to be a problem as well. In June, they decided to give support to the opposition's no-confidence motion for Mustafa Üstündağ, Minister of Education. They had some demands such as the young people who graduated from the Imam Hatip schools could enter the universities in the same conditions as the young people who graduated from other high schools and to be given equivalency to those who completed their education in religious education institutions abroad. The withdrawal of the minister of education from the post would not be able to undermine the government but could have given pretext to Ecevit to break the coalition. The crisis could be prevented through giving some guarantees to the dissidents in the way of their demands would be met (Sevilgen, 1980, pp. 152,153).

A short while after the establishment of the government with the RPP, Kısakürek also fell into dispute with the party administration. According to Kısakürek, Erbakan was damaging the image of the party by making serious mistakes such as giving the news of the government's price hikes on television himself and defending them. Also, basic institutions such as the education had been left to the RPP (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 122). Kısakürek fell into dispute with the administration of the newspaper as well. He criticised the attitude of the newspaper supporting every policy of Erbakan and abstaining from mentioning his mistakes. Just four months after the government had been established, he left the newspaper by releasing an article stating that the newspaper did not pursue a policy of publication that he had envisaged (Kısakürek, 1974b). However, He had not ended his contact with the party yet. He stated that he had met with the party administration dozens of times, had face-to-face

meetings with Erbakan, even had criticised them with severe words such as ‘you are the miscarriage child of the *Büyük Doğu* (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 68,69).

In July, Ecevit acquired a tremendous prestige with taking a courageous step on the long years of problem of Cyprus. After a successful military operation, now he could take the step he had refrained before. With an early general election, which would be held in few months, he could have gained the necessary majority to establish the government on his own. He had had an agreement with the Democatic Party before in the way of supporting the RPP’s decision of early general election. Now, the problem was how to destroy the coalition while making the NOP bear the responsibility. The Salvationists was aware of Ecevit’s intention and played for the time until they increased their prestige in the eyes of their electorate. In order to share the Kıbrıs victory, they claimed that it was Erbakan who persuaded the cabinet to intervene in Cyprus. Besides, Erbakan used more aggressive and expansionist statements such as the partition of the Island. Their Islamic discourses such as interest-free economic system also increased. In order to force Erbakan to abdicate from the coalition Ecevit began to snubbing his partner in public (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 343,344). His last step was appointing Orhan Eyüboğlu, who was Minister of state and the Secretary-General of the RPP, as the Deputy Prime Minister to deputise him while he was abroad for an official visit. Some Salvationist found the solution in sending Erbakan to abroad at the same date. Thus, Eyuboğlu problem would have been solved without a loss of reputation. But, since it was understood in the negotiations with Ecevit that he was determined to destroy the coalition, they responded to Ecevit’s move with refusing to sign the decree (kararname) sanctioning Ecevit’s visit (Sevilgen, 1980, pp. 156-159). On 18 September, Ecevit resigned by accusing Erbakan of making the coalition unworkable. Kısakürek continued to

criticise Erbakan also for his efforts to maintain the coalition in the following years. To him, the only choice was resigning of Erbakan first by accusing Ecevit of safeguarding communism.

After the collapse of the coalition, the country was again dragged into a government-building crisis. Ecevit was wrong in his plans. No party wanted to form the government with him. On the other hand, the right-wing parties were unable to reach the necessary number of seats to form the government since they did not manage to form a unity. Because of the antipathy they felt to Demirel, the Democratic Party did not want to take part in a government that would be led by Demirel. Instead, they proposed a government under the leadership of Naim Talu. Kısakürek found this demand absurd and criticised the uncompromising attitude of the Democratic Party which he had been provoking against Demirel in the past (Kısakürek, 2009c, p. 25).

Actually, all small parties of the Assembly were aware of that in case of an early election they would be swept away. On the other hand, they could have lost their identity if they had established an alliance with the JP; but sabotaging the formation of the government in the hard days of the country was another responsibility, which was difficult to bear. Demirel used the dilemma of those small parties very effectively. He threatened them with accepting the choice of an early election if he failed to form a government (*Milliyet*, 05 December 1974). The Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi-RRP*), the NSP and the NAP were already accepted to form government with the JP, but their total seats were still not enough to form the government. During months of crisis, Bilgiç and the other nine people in the Democratic Party attempted to convince Bozbeyli, but did not succeed. Upon this, twelve deputies, including some symbolic names such as Nilüfer Gürsoy, Mutlu Menderes, resigned from the party and decided to support the coalition from the

outside (Bilgiç, 1998, pp. 236-239). Thus, the government was founded in March 1975 under the name of 'Nationalist Front'. This government model, which resembled the *Vatan Cephesi* (Fatherland Front) of the 1950s, created a right front against the left. Under present conditions, it was the best solution also for Kısakürek. However, Erbakan was often trying to remind himself to the public by criticising Demirel because he did not want to be wiped away in this coalition, and Kısakürek was encouraging him in that way. Partial senate elections in 1975 had signalled this. As Demirel's star glowed again, small parties, including the NSP, suffered serious vote loss (Ersel et al., 2005c, p. 389).

Erbakan's attitude caused discussions in the party. The dissidents thought that Erbakan wanted to dissolve the coalition and establish a new government with Ecevit again. The statements of the head of the Assembly group accusing the JP after the election of the president of the assembly created an impression that MSP had the intention of withdrawing from the coalition. The dissidents had made it clear that they would not stay silent for such a development. Upon this, the group vice-governors issued a declaration stating that they were not thinking of forming a coalition with the RPP (Sevilgen, 1980, pp. 189-203). In the General Congress of the party, held on 24 November 1976, Erbakan managed to remove the dissidents from the party's administration. The dissidents responded to move of Erbakan, with the resignation of Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, the only person elected to the general executive council, from his position in the cabinet. And new resignations followed and they also revealed the division within the party (*Cumhuriyet*, 25-28 October 1976).

Kısakürek had close contacts with this group, many of whom were members of the general executive council. In 1975, there were some rumours in the press that Kısakürek was forming a Kısakürek group in the party against Erbakan. Published a

declaration, Kısakürek denied these rumours by stating that he had been delivering his criticism to Erbakan and the party's administration personally and that forming a fraction in the party had not compatible with his frame of mind (*Milli Gazete*, 28 September 1975). However, after breaking his ties with the party in the following years, Kısakürek would argue that Tevfik Paksu, Gündüz Sevilgen, and Abdülkerim Doğru, who he described as the only notable names in the NSP, should build a formation against Erbakan through convincing the other deputies (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 96,97).

Kısakürek's displeasure with the party's administration had increased considerably by the time. In that period, he planned to publish the *Büyük Doğu* one more time. The writing cadre had established, and the advertisements even had been published (Kısakürek, 2009c, p. 7). It comes to mind in the first sight that Kısakürek aimed at initiating a new political movement again. He had renounced in that period since the political atmosphere had not seen him convenient for such a movement, but, in November 1976, he published the main directory of the *Büyük Doğu* Association which he designed to act as a political party in the late 1940s (Kısakürek, 2009c, pp. 129-144). Beginning to appeal to his audiences by means of small brochures, titled 'Rapor' (Report), instead of a periodical journal, Kısakürek aimed at measuring the reaction of the public to this movement. However, he could not get the answer he desired to this announcement he made in the 'Rapor-2' brochure (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 74). It is also not possible to know whether he intended to set up a cooperative movement with the dissidents in the NSP or not.

The year 1977 became a period of breaking off with NSP both for Kısakürek and for the dissidents. Kısakürek gave a list consisting of 10-15 names to the party's administration and stipulated that in order to continue to support the NSP, those

people should be put on to the top of the election list of the provinces where the party was most powerful. He stated that if those names were to put into the candidate lists he would have worked for the campaign of the party through visiting all cities of the country (Kırsakürek, 2009d, pp. 69,70). There were no politicians in the list from the dissident fraction. The list was comprised of young people between the ages of 30-40 who were close to Kırsakürek. Some of them were founders of the *Mavera* (metaphysical world) Journal who would be important names of the Islamist intelligentsia in the future. However, the party's administration did not put those names into the election list and Kırsakürek's bond with the NSP was ruptured completely.

Kırsakürek began to criticise the NSP severely both in the brochures he published from 1977 onwards and in his articles in the *Sabah* (Morning) Newspaper he began to write. In his first article, he wrote that the NSP's discourses such as 'heavy industrial move' or 'great Turkey' were nothing but a dream (Kırsakürek, 2010g, p. 169). Generally speaking, his criticisms were concentrated on Erbakan and some people around him; and were in parallel with the complaints of the dissidents. To him, Erbakan had established a tyranny in the party by means of ignoring the opinion of the members of the executive council while taking the decisions, establishing pressure on dissenting opinion, and taking the newspaper of the party under his control. Nevertheless, he was quite incompetent in terms of politics. He stonewalled the realising of some opportunities that would benefit the religious people because of his untimely booms for many times (Kırsakürek, 2009d, pp. 69-72). To give an example of this situation, Sevilgen stated that the JP had planned to open a small part of the Hagia Sophia to worship before the 1977 elections in order to get the support of the religious people, but it gave up on this idea because Erbakan had used

this news in his campaign (Sevilgen, 1980, p. 227). Besides this, he was using extreme expressions that would cause the party to be closed. To Kısakürek, the party had to protect itself with camouflage until it got its place secure, but, Erbakan was harming the party and Islam in general in that regard (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 118). In sum, Kısakürek came to the conclusion that the NSP was a political party damaging Islam in the name of Islam due to the personal ambitions of a man. Therefore, the true *Milli Görüşçüs*¹³⁰ should have removed Erbakan from the party (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 20,30,31). Also in the following years, Kısakürek would continue to criticise Erbakan. He mentioned his political rhetorics such as ‘national vision’ (*Milli Görüş*), ‘Western club’ (*Batı kulübü*), ‘heavy industry move’ (*ağır sanayi hamslesi*), ‘silver engine’ (*gümüş motor*) in a ridiculous style (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 111,165).

For the dissidents, getting the support of a respectful intellectual and symbol name of the Islamist circle like Kısakürek was very important in their struggle against Erbakan. When they decided not to participate in the general elections of 1977 from the list of the NSP to protest Erbakan, they published a brochure indicating the reasons of their opposition against Erbakan. In their first pages of the brochure, they laid a large place to the critics of Kısakürek about Erbakan (Abbas & Akçeel, 1977, pp. 7-12). Besides, the title of the brochure also seemed to be inspired by Kısakürek. The 'Documents are Talking' (*Vesikalar Konuşuyor*) phrase was one of the clichéd titles that Kısakürek used in his magazine. It should not be a coincidence that the ruling Justice and Development Party elites, who are being remembered with their opposition to Erbakan's leadership in the 1990s, elected Kısakürek as the ideologue of their party.

¹³⁰ Followers of the National Vision (*Milli Görüş*) political stance produced by Erbakan in order to describe the ones who were in the line of the NSP

Those who had been separated from the NSP had set up a party to which they had put the name Nizam (Order) by referring to the past. This party did not perform much and remained a signage party. Despite the separation of the dissidents, factionalism within the party continued. Korkut Ozal, a former NAP member, was being told that he led one of these groups (Albayrak, 1989, p. 195).

5.3 The Rising Political Turmoil and Kısakürek's Efforts to Establish a Joint Front against the Leftist Movements

One of the striking matters of the 1970s was the rising of the political turmoil again. Although the extremist movements had received a serious blow after the 21 March intervention, political conflicts among the left-leaning and right-leaning groups began to re-emerge by mid 1970s.

Kısakürek was keeping on his guiding role to the conservative and nationalist young people under the roof of the NTSU. After the NSP had been founded, the association began to be seen as a youth branch of the party. However, Kısakürek did not want the party to become active in the association and made effort to prevent the influence of the party on the members of the association. In the General Congress of the NTSU in 1975, Kısakürek went up to the rostrum after the speech of Oğuzhan Aslıtürk, Minister of Internal Affairs and Vice-president of the Party, and criticised him severely; especially for his words that were 'state can be secular but individual never' (*Cumhuriyet*, 04 August 1975). On the other hand, together with embracing the association strictly, Kısakürek was criticised for its passive attitude towards the student movements as well.

The political killings that started in 1974 had started to increase rapidly in 1976. Three hundred nineteen people lost their lives in 1977 as a result of large-scale

incidents such as the May Day celebrations, where 37 people died (Ersel et al., 2005c, p. 428). The *Ülkü Ocakları* (Idealist Hearths)¹³¹, reconstituted in 1974, was the centre of the violence against the leftists movements and were also protected by security forces during the Nationalist Front government (Kabacalı, 1992, pp. 240-244). According to Kısakürek, NTSU and *Ülkücüs* were two youth organisations coming from the same source and completing the deficiencies of each other. While *Ülkücüs* were eliminating NTSU's deficiency of action, NTSU was eliminating *Ülkücüs'* deficiency of worldview. For this reason, the two organisations had to come together and act jointly (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 18). The polemic-centric style of Kısakürek's discourses brought him an attraction, and his militant rhetoric, which advocated the reconciliation of Faith and Action, had provided him a very easy settlement mean to the psychological intellectual world of the *Ülkücü* youth (Bora, Devlet Ocak Dergah, 1991, p. 255). Kısakürek, who gained a certain reputation between both groups, was able to establish such togetherness. However, there was an ideological conflict between two organisations. The rivalry between *Ülkücü's* and the *Akıncılar* (Raiders) organisation, established by the young people left from the NTSU and acting in line of the NSP, had turned into armed conflict in 1976. In 1977, it was alleged that a member of the *Akıncılar* association, Erdoğan Tuna, was killed by the *Ülkücüs* (Öznur, 1999, pp. 164-194). For that reason, Kısakürek's, having given an interview about the Presidency of the Religious Affairs to the *Hergün* (Everyday) newspaper, a publication close to the *Ülkücüs*, was severely criticised by the NTSU youth (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 18-21). However, despite the opposition of the youth circle gathered around the NTSU, Kısakürek continued to support the *Ülkücü* Movement during the 1970s.

¹³¹ The *Ülkü Ocakları*, also called *Bozkurtlar* (Grey Wolves), was a ultranationalist organisation known with its close links to the NAP.

Kısakürek's attitude towards the *Ülkücüs* caused to some sort of coldness between him and the conservative youth groupings (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 91-94). However, in 1979, a small group, calling themselves Akıncı Güç, emerged from within those circles by stating their loyalty to Kısakürek. This group consisted of ones who left the Akıncılar organisation. One of the leading names of the group was Salih İzzet Erdiş, known as Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, who was to found an organisation, named Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (*İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi-İBDA-C*), by adopting the *Büyük Doğu* idea in the 1980s. The group published a short-lived journal under title of *Akıncı Güç* (Raiding Force). In the first pages of the journal articles inspired by *Büyük Doğu* idea were being published under the title of *İdeolocya*. In the first issue of the journal, the group described themselves with those words:

“*Akıncı Güç*, who comprehend its spirit dough in the kneading trough, has squirted from the circle of *Akıncı* that has been organised by National Salvation Party; has declared its way, target, base, and source without giving no way to any doubt. And *Akıncı Güç*, with its specialty of being far from narrow frameworks, has found its way to the *Büyük Doğu* without any sign of guidance” (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 130,131).¹³²

An article written by Kısakürek for this group was published as the cover of the 3rd issue of the journal. In the article, Kısakürek stated his happiness for the emergence of such young people from the NSP circles for which he lost his hope

¹³² Ruh hamurunu Büyük Doğu teknesinde ve onun mimarı elinde idrak eden Akıncı Güç, Milli Selamet partisi'nin teşkilatlandığı Akıncılar çevresi içerisinde fişkırmış, yolunu hedefini, temelini ve kaynağını açıkça belirtmiştir. Ve Büyük Doğu idealine, dar çerçevelerden kurtulmuş hususiyetiyle Akıncı güç tek güdüm işareti olmadan yolunu bulmuştur.

(Kısakürek, 1979). There were some other articles of Kısakürek published in this journal, which published only eight issues.¹³³

Kısakürek was praising the actions of the youth people of the *Ülkücü* and *Akıncı Güç* associations in the student movements, even sacralising them by indicating that they were martyrs who lost their lives in this struggle. Besides this, he also warned them when they clashed with each other by stating that those who attacked their friends were ones who eat his brother's meat (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 84,85). In the meantime, the violence in the country was increasing day by day and in the end of 1978, and bigger and organised actions started to appear. On September 2-3, 1978 in Sivas and other Anatolian cities, 20 people were killed and 121 injured in the attacks against *Alevi*¹³⁴ (*Cumhuriyet*, 2-3 September 1978). After the *Alevi* massacre in Kahramanmaraş on December 21-22, the Ecevit government declared martial law on 25 December (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1978). The increase in violence, especially towards the *Alevi*, worried even Kısakürek who was criticising the *Alevi* severely. Therefore, he supported Ecevit's decision of martial law. Besides this, in the article titled '*Ülkücüye 9 Öğüt*' (Nine Advise for the *Ülkücüs*), he penned for the *Ülkücüs*, he asked them to withdraw from violence, not to enter into conflicts even if they were attacked (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 56,57, 132-135). This withdrawal of Kısakürek, who had a very militant rhetoric, is striking in terms of understanding the political atmosphere of the period. Increasing violence constituted one of the legitimating foundations for the military coup in 1980 in terms of the generals.

¹³³ In the 2nd issue: '*Müjdelerin Müjdesi*' (Gospel of the Gospels), in the 3rd issue: '*Işık*' (Light), in the 4th issue: '*İslamı Yenilemek*' (Renew of Islam), in the eighth issue: '*Akıl ve İman*' (Reason and Belief).

¹³⁴ Alevism is a heterodox interpretation of Islam.

5.4 Kısakürek's Relationship with the NAP and Turkish-Islam Synthesis

In 1977, there was only one party to be supported for Kısakürek, who ended his relations with the NSP; the NAP. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first rapprochements between Kısakürek and the NAP had started in 1969 when the party began to use an Islamic rhetoric. This transformation process also continued in the following years. This transition within the party manifested itself in explanation of the nine lights, which were the main principles of the ideology of the party. The morality section was explained without mentioning Islam and only referred to the Turkish traditions, spirit and to beliefs of the Turkish nation. In 1972, the expression of Islamic principles was added to this section; and in the prologue part, it was stressed that Islam made important contributions to the civilisation of Islam. The period of 1977 was an important leap in the rise of Islamic motifs in the NAP's discourse (Bora, 1991, p. 246).

The productive period of the relationship between Kısakürek and the NAP also started from this period onward. Kısakürek met with Turkeş shortly before the election period, after stating his principles, promised to support the party with his all efforts if the party accepts these principles. After this meeting, in the declaration, titled 'Declaration to the Turkish Nation', released by the NAP on 3 May 1977 it was stated that “the worldview of the Turkeş and his party is Islam in an understanding of nationalism which bounded to the spiritual content” (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 82,83).¹³⁵ Instead of the *Ülkücü* youth definition, the expression of nationalist-sacradist youth, filled with Islamic motifs, was used. The Declaration, which was written directly by him, was very pleasing to Kısakürek. In the declaration he penned in response to this

¹³⁵ This is the author's summarised translation. The original text is: Alparslan Türkeş ve Partisinin dünya görüşünün, ruhi muhtevaya bağlı Milliyetçilik olarak metbuluğu ruha ve tabiliği Milliyete bağlı bir anlayış içinde tek kelimeyle İslamdır.

declaration, Kısakürek stated that the NAP, as the community, which was a nominee to give the true rights of the Turkish Nation and Muslims, was a community, which would be able to give the harvest of his 40-years struggle (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 83-85).

Getting the support of Kısakürek was a serious opportunity for the party. Although it was one of the leading determinants of the shaping of political life with its youth branches, the NAP could not reflect this capacity to the Assembly. Therefore, it designated its election strategy as gaining the electorate who voted for the NSP in the Middle and Eastern Anatolia. Kısakürek with his both nationalist and Islamic rhetoric was one of the ideal people to be the campaign face of the party. However, in terms of NAP, the most precious thing about Kısakürek was that one of the symbolic names of the Islamist circles was passing to its side through leaving the NSP. Thus, they would have been able to change the ideas of the NSP voters they were aiming at; and this was exactly what Kısakürek did. He participated in the public meetings organised by the NAP in Kayseri on 20 May, in Konya on 22 May, in Istanbul on 2 June and asked the support of the people to the NAP (Öznur, 1999). He was going up to the rostrum before Türkeş' speech, warming up the crowd by attacking to the NSP, and helping the party to show its Islamic face. As for Türkeş, he was trying to win the votes of the NSP voters by frequently talking about the Great Turkish-Islamic civilisation (*Milliyet*, 23 May 1977). Turkish-Islamic synthesis approach of the NAP was popularised with the slogan of 'the goal is Turan, the guide is Islam' (Hedef Turan, rehber Islam) in the campaign.

The transformation process that the ultranationalist NAP underwent brought along an ideological production process as well. To put it more precisely, the discussions on the definition and the content of the nationalism which were being held

between Islamist and Turkists since the Second Constitutional era, now was being settled to the centre of the political field through being taken from their courses. As Çetinsaya stated, these discussions, which is related to issues such as modernisation and secularism, were reduced in the discursive base to a matter of hierarchy (Çetinsaya, 1999). The apparent face of this matter was that whether the religions would be accepted as a sub-factor strengthening the ties of nationalism or nationalism would be accepted as a sub-element serving to Islam's transcendent struggle. Nevertheless, as Bora stated, Nationalism, despite the differences in grammar, has been the meeting point of Islamists and conservatives with nationalists who constitute the Turkish right wing (Bora, 1999). And, the political realities forced the partners to find a solution to these differences in grammar.

Türkeş found the solution to this discursive matter by drawing an analogy of a bowl filled with *kevser*¹³⁶ in the declaration he released in 1977. While the bowl was identified as nationalism, *kevser* was identified as Islam, and it was stated that the more valuable one was not the bowl but *kevser* (Kısakürek, 2009d, p. 82). A similar equilibrium had to be established by Kısakürek. As stated in the first chapter, Kısakürek was an Islamist who put his weight in the hierarchy matter between Turkism and Islamism in favour of religion by the understanding of nationalism, which was in the service of Islam. He was constantly criticising the NAP line of nationalism because of its racist and Turanian tendencies with the definition of 'hollow nationalism'. Kısakürek used his mastery over the words while deleting the traces of the critical past that he had brought for years in his speeches to the NAP members. The speech he held in the General Congress of the Party quite illustrative in this context:

¹³⁶ *Kevser* is a river believed to exist in the paradise.

“They are regarding you as Turkist and skullist (kafatasçı)... You have to show them that you are the Turkist and headists (kafacı) of the Turk after he had accepted Islam and he melted in it... There are those who stigmatise you with the fascist stamp. You owe to let them know what is the power that explodes with spiritual and ideological beliefs, and shout them out with those words: If Ferhat, who pierced the mountain to reach to his love, is fascist, I am more fascist than him” (Kısakürek, Rapor 5-6, 2009e, p. 81).¹³⁷

Kurdish nationalism, which rose parallel to the development of the leftist thought, also opened a field for Kısakürek to defend his understanding of nationalism. According to Kısakürek, the primary reason for the rise of Kurdish nationalism was to being forgotten of the religion in the Republican era. He argued that religion was the strongest glue among the different ethnicities by stating that no Muslim element rioted by ethnic nationalist drives in the Ottoman period. To him, if one says I am a Turk, by leaving aside the religion, he gives the right to the Kurd to say I am a Kurd as well. The second reason was lack of strong state authority. To him, the rise of Kurdish nationalism was inevitable with this period when the country was dragged into anarchy and the state lost its power (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 16,17).

The attempts of reconciling Islam and nationalism led to the emergence of a conceptualisation, Turkish-Islamic synthesis. This conceptualisation would begin to be used by the state agents against the radical leftists movements and Kurdish nationalism after 1980. For many researchers like Özdalga, Kısakürek was one of the architects of this conceptualisation (Özdalga, 1997). This assessment cannot be

¹³⁷ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Sana Türkçü ve kafatasçı göziyle bakıyorlar. Onlara sen, İslama girdikten sonra ve onda eridikten sonraki Türk’ün Türkçüsü ve kafacısı olduğunu göstermek borcundasın... Sana faşist damgasını vuranlar var. Böylelerine ruh ve fikir şerraresiyle patlayan gücün ne olduğunu bildirmek ve şöyle haykırmak borcundasın: Eğer sevgilisine kavuşmak için dağı delen Ferhat faşist ise ben ondan daha faşistim.

considered too unfair. As stated by Ayvazoğlu, Kısakürek was one of the prominent writers read by both conservative and nationalist youth (Ayvazoğlu, 1991). Kısakürek's polemical, enthusiastic rhetorics shaped around Islam and nationalism gave him an attraction. However, both as pointed out by Bora and as revealed in the first chapter of this work, Kısakürek's conceptualisation of nationalism (namely Anatolianism) was rather complicated, and had a serious dilemma such as not regarding the Turkish history as a whole.

To name some important intellectuals and institutions that had the leading role in conceptualisation of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, we can mention the works of Osman Turan, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Erol Güngör, and Dündar Taşer, and the institutional activities of *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Intellectuals' Hearth), *Milliyetçiler Derneği* (Nationalists' Association) and *Türk Edebiyatı Vakfı* (Turkish Literature Foundation) (Çetinsaya, 1999, pp. 372-374). Besides these, the most comprehensive and systematised work done in this area can be considered as the S. Ahmed Arvasi's three-volume work '*Türk İslam Ülküsü*' (Turkish Islamic Ideal) (Arvasi, 1998). As stated both by Bora and Çetinsaya, Arvasi, a respected figure in the ranks of the movement, expressed the best form of the *Ülkücü* mindset in 1970s by means of harmonising the basic components of both nationalism and Islamism such as pan-Turkish inclinations of the Turkists and moral emphasis of the Islamist (Bora, 1991, pp. 256-257; Çetinsaya, 1999, pp. 373,374).

5.5 The Leader Who Evolved From Coal to Diamond

Kısakürek was working for the NAP's campaign in the 1977 general elections but there was a problem. It was a marginal party with a low rate of the vote, and had no chance to come to the power. Moreover, the National Front government had not

been able to put a serious success, and it was very likely for the RPP to win the elections. Therefore, as well as involving in the NAP's campaign, he also began to support the JP one more time. In an interview he gave to the *Tercüman* Newspaper, he asked people not to vote for a party except the JP or the NAP. Besides, he argued that polling to the RPP or the NSP was meaning treason in a sense (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 104,105).

The participation rate in the elections held on June 5 increased. People went to the ballot to make an exchange. The winner of the election was Ecevit who received 41.4 per cent of the votes. The JP, to which Bilgic and his friends turned back, raised its votes to 36.9 per cent, but could be the second party. While there was a serious decline in the number of NSP's votes, the RPP and the Democratic Party suffered a complete collapse. As for the NAP, it made a huge leap, raising its votes to 6.4 per cent and the number of seats to 13 (1977 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları, 2018). According to Kısakürek, the reason lay behind the success of the NAP was that the party found and adopted the true ideology by giving priority to Islam, and he had a great part in this success (Kısakürek, 1978d).

The elections had not resulted in a way that would provide a strong one-party power that many wanted. Despite winning 213 seats, Ecevit needed 13 more votes to receive vote of confidence. Demirel, who took on the task of forming a government after Ecevit's minority government could not receive vote of confidence, formed the second Nationalist Front government, which was also attended by the NAP and the NSP. However, this government also would not last long. The statements that Erbakan gave on various occasions made it clear that this government was standing up by force. Kısakürek thought that this government could not succeed with the NSP. To him, a new election had to be held and the JP should have built a strong

government together with the NAP by increasing its votes. For that reason, Demirel should have passed to the opposition and to wear out Ecevit until the election period. In that regard, Kısakürek knocked the door of Demirel one more time to convince him to follow such a strategy. It seems that both of them had broken the ice between. Kısakürek stated that Demirel was the only prime minister among the ones he had met such as Recep Peker, Celal Bayar, and Adnan Menderes who listened to him in real sense (Kısakürek, 2009d, pp. 111,112). In the meantime, some deputies resigned from the JP reasoning Demirel's harsh politics and failure of the National Front government. Since these deputies voted against Demirel, the National Front government fell in January 1978. Ecevit founded the new government with the support of other small parties and independents.

Now, Demirel was in the opposition and the first step of Kısakürek's strategy had realized. As indicated by Arcayürek, Demirel had already begun planning the new government he would establish (Arcayürek, 1986, p. 228). And, Kısakürek moved into action to support Demirel in this way by publishing the *Büyük Doğu* again. In the first issue of the journal he stated that the extraordinary conditions of the time forced him to take initiative one more time (Kısakürek, 1978b).

The first article of the first issue was attributed to Demirel. Through setting the title of the article as '*Kömürden Elmasa*' (From Diamond to Coal), Kısakürek emphasised that Demirel had undergone a great transformation and, now, he became the leader who would be able to solve the problems of the nation in real sense (Kısakürek, 1978c). In all the other articles of him published in other issues, Kısakürek continued to advocate the idea that the peace and confidence needed by the country could only be established with the JP and NAP (Kısakürek, 1978a; 1978f). In the article, titled '*milletin Hakemliği*' (the justiceship of the nation), published in the

fifth and the last issue, he tried to convince people in the direction that the extraordinary conditions of the country made an early election indispensable. According to him, since the people saw the consequences of the votes they gave in the 1977 general elections, they would vote for the JP in order to be establishment of a strong government. According to his estimates, if the elections were to be held in 1978, the JP would gain at least 200 seats and the NAP would gain at least 40 seats. Thus, a strong bipartisan government would have been able to be established (Kısakürek, 1978e).¹³⁸

Some of his followers condemned Kısakürek for starting to support Demirel again who he had accused of being a Mason for years. In his reply, Kısakürek defended himself by stating that Demirel became mature during the past thirteen years and understood that the only way of the salvation of the Turks was reviving of its spiritual roots. To him, Demirel could not be regarded as a Mason anymore (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 26-30).

Kısakürek continued to support Demirel while he was in the opposition by means of the brochures, titled Report, he was publishing. Defending the fact that Demirel was carrying out a good opposition, Kısakürek asked people to support Demirel and to poll for him in the first election to bring him to the power. Partial Senate Elections, held on 14 October 1979 were the first opportunity for this. He stated that “who were side with the God, His Messenger and the spiritual root of the Turks” should have voted for the strongest party of the right-wing (Kısakürek, 2009e, pp. 73,94-99,114-119).

¹³⁸ Kısakürek ended this period of the journal with the 5th issue because the founders of the *Mavera* journal (Cahit Zarifođu, Erdem Beyazıt, Bahri Zengin, Akif İnan, Rasim Özdenören, Reşit Aksoy), who Kısakürek had asked the NSP to put those names into the election list of the party in 1977, asked Kısakürek not to publish their writings in the *Büyük Dođu*. The reason for this was the dispute Kısakürek having with the NSP.

According to the result of the election, the RPP's percentage dropped to 29 per cent while the JP's share rose to 54 per cent. The NAP and the NSP could not reveal any success. The elections had regarded a kind of vote for confidence, and Ecevit resigned on 16 November. Many people thought that Turkey needed a strong government set up by a RPP-JP coalition in those hard days (Ahmad, 1992, pp. 452-453). Kısakürek stiffly opposed the RPP-JP coalition proposals. To him, Demirel should establish the government and take the country to the elections immediately (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 63,64). Demirel established a minority government by means of getting the support of other right-wing parties, so Kısakürek's expectation was realised. In order to support the Demirel government he increased the frequency of the publishing of the reports. For the first time since 1950, he followed a publication policy that supports the power vehemently. The Reports (7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) that he published after Demirel came to power reminds the *Büyük Doğus* of the 1950s. Kısakürek continued to support the NAP, but it was being mentioned only by the number of *Ülkücüs* who lost their lives in student movements, and by the number of seats to be awarded to the JP government at a possible election (Kısakürek, 2009h, p. 42).

Although Demirel got the support of the other right-wing parties, the government was still precarious. All the parties continued to make political manoeuvres in order to avoid being wiped away in a possible election. Demirel was having problems especially with Erbakan. He created a perception with his declarations that the NSP could withdraw his support from the government at any time (*Milliyet*, 14 February, 25 April, 14 May 1980). Kısakürek shouldered the duty of carrying out the struggle against the NSP in the name of Demirel. It can be said that Erbakan had gotten the place of İnönü in his criticism. His criticism for Ecevit was

even limited by compared to the ones about Erbakan. He accused the Salvationists of making corruption while in government, of spending the money they collected from Muslims in Germany for their own interest, of supporting the *Shi'ism* and Khomeini (Kısakürek, 2009e, p. 32). In the meantime, it should be noted that there were still some names such as Mustafa Yazgan and Kadir Mısıroğlu, who were elected to the general executive council in the 7th Ordinary Congress, in the NSP (Albayrak, 1989, p. 244). Kısakürek continued to call for these names in the way of taking over the party administration from Erbakan, if not managed, passing to the Order Party and strengthening it.

There were very serious issues to be dealt with, such as the violence and economic depression in front of the Demirel. He asked for 100 days to resolve the main issues (*Milliyet*, 20 November 1979). Especially during this period of 100 days, Kısakürek had an ultra-tolerant attitude for Demirel. He frequently expressed his hopes about him. Besides this, he was giving some advice especially about the security issues in his writings. He argued that some harsh measures should have been taken immediately in order to stop violence. To him, a secret organisation should be established like Abdulhamid II had done, and the state should be able to stop everybody who passes and ask them to prove that they were not a communist. Notions such as democracy and freedom should be left aside and the communists should be arrested wherever found. Demirel should not make the same mistakes with the Menderes and should close all organisations feeding up the communist, including the RPP (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 139,161,163).

However, the problems were too complicated to be solved by a precarious minority government. Therefore, Kısakürek frequently called for Demirel to go to elections before losing the prestige he gained on 14 October (Kısakürek, 2009f, p.

137; 2009g, p. 73; 2009h, p. 20). In parallel, he also continued to carry out propaganda for Demirel by arguing that he was the only leader who would be able to boost the country again (Kısakürek, 2009f, p. 133; 2009g, pp. 46,47). Kısakürek's support for Demirel was so strong that he interpreted even the uncompromised attitude of Demirel in the deadlock of the presidential election, which occurred after Korutürk's expiring term in Çankaya, as a subtle policy. To him, the issue of electing the president could have been postponed with this kind of manoeuvres until the election time, and so Demirel could have chosen the one whoever he wanted (Kısakürek, 2009g, pp. 34,42). And this person should have been a leader who would take responsibility and initiative like De Gaulle (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 108-110).

The periods during which Kısakürek supports a ruling party also reveal his pragmatic side beneath his idealistic discourses, and the analyses of these periods give very critical clues in the way of understanding him. One of the most illustrative matters of this period in that regard was the country's passing into neo-liberal economic politics by the decision made on 24 January and the difference in views of the NSP and Kısakürek about this transition.

By the economic program, which was prepared by Turgut Özal, appointed as Undersecretary of the Economy by Demirel, import substitution supported national industrialization model was replaced with export-oriented economy that would be compatible with the free-market system (Öniş, 2004, p. 118). Erbakan began to oppose Demirel's economic model from the very beginning. He was arguing that Turkey was made dependent on foreign capital, and that it was not possible to recover by establishing cooperation with the IMF; the country was inserted into a situation needy to the Western club (*Milliyet*, 27 January, 24 February 1980). In fact, Kısakürek had also defended the similar arguments for years. But, this time, he was

arguing that by the export-based economic policies adopted by the January 24 decision the economic barriers, which were blocking Turkey's trading capacity and the overall economic activities, would be eliminated. Besides, he criticised Erbakan by stating that the ones who interpreted the IMF as a vehicle of the Western imperialist to kill Turkey economically are ignorant (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 72,73). In the following months, he also indicated that this economic policy was a success because it provided the basic goods in the country, even if it was too expensive (Kısakürek, 2009h, p. 24). While presenting his own eco-political solutions, Kısakürek offered proposals within the same axis of Özal's neo-liberal policies, such as taking precautions to make the public economic enterprises profitable and privatising them if they cannot become profitable. In contrast, the measures to be incompatible with these economic policies, such as the redemption of asset tax, radical devaluation, the 200-fold increase in salaries and wages, and the closure of customs to the goods other than compulsory items, were offered as well (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 74-78).

Another example that can be mentioned in that regard was the difference in views of Kısakürek and the NSP about the nature of the relationship Turkey established with the Western world. The détente period of the 1970s was ended by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Besides, the loss of the Iran outpost after Islamic Revolution in 1979 enhanced Turkey's strategic position in NATO. Having lost its bases zones in Iran, the US wanted to continue to its activities against the Soviets such as U2 flights in their bases in Turkey. The negotiations held with Ecevit government resulted negatively (Arcayürek, 1986, pp. 218,219). Critical decisions such as Turkish-US defence and cooperation treaty, facilitating Greece's return to NATO, allowing US to use the bases in Turkey for Rapid Deployment Force

were waiting to be dealt with in front of Demirel (Ahmad, 2010). The NSP, which supported the Iranian Islamic Revolution and followed a hard-line anti-US policy, was also criticising Demirel on these issues: although he did not accept these demands (*Milliyet*, 12 December 1979). Kısakürek severely criticised MSP for this attitude, as well as stating that the NSP betrayed Islam by supporting the Shi'ism. He also argued that it was following a policy on the axis of Moscow communists with cooperating with the RPP. According to Kısakurek, cooperation with the US in the face of the Soviet danger was a necessity of the conditions of the time. The discourses such as being at the side of the downtrodden Islamic countries instead of establishing cooperation with the US were baseless for Kısakürek. He called trying to unite with weak Islamic states instead of cooperation with the US in the face of the danger of the invasion of Iran by the Soviets, which were struggling to destroy the liberal, capitalist, and democratic world as being foolish. (Kısakürek, 2009f, pp. 57,58,68,69).

5.6 The Last Years of a Turbulent Life

Demirel could not stop the violence since he needed the NAP to prop up his minority government. Özal's program, which started to be implemented to get the economy out of depression, also needed a stable government and political atmosphere. Nevertheless, people were tired of antics of politicians thanks to their failure in the process of the election of the President, which could not be solved for months, and many were ready for a military takeover (Ahmad, 2010, p. 181). Even Kısakürek began to articulate that the military should intervene to the politics. To him, unless the elections did not be held, the intervention of the army was compulsory (Kısakürek, 2009g, pp. 72,73). Demirel's government lived a quake in June due to the Ecevit's censure motion but survived by the support of Erbakan. It was also the

postponement of the generals' decision of intervention who did not want to be seen in cooperation with Ecevit. However, in August, Ecevit and Erbakan agreed to introduce a censure motion against Demirel's foreign policy, and managed to get Hayrettin Erkmen, Demirel's foreign minister, resigned. The rally of 'Save Jerusalem' which was organised by the NSP in Konya presented another reason to the generals who interpreted this rally as an insult to the secular state (Ahmad, 2010, p. 182). And, On 12 September, the army intervened to politics one more time.

In the first declarations, after mentioning social division, economic breakdown, and violence, the generals stated their intentions as restoring the authority of the state in an impartial manner (*Milliyet*, 13 September 1980). Their first step was setting up an administrative mechanism. In that regard, while setting up the National Security Council, which was composed of the Chief of Staff and four force commanders, they also suspended the Assembly, closed down the political parties, disqualified all members of the Assembly from the political activity for five years, and all party leaders for ten years. On 21 September, the new cabinet was founded under the leadership of Bülent Ulusu, a retired admiral. One of the important members of the cabinet was Turgut Özal who would be the next prime minister of the country after the regime turned back to democracy again.

The 12 March regime did not avoid resorting the harsh measures in order to stop the violence. Martial law was declared. All of the leftist movements were oppressed regardless of looking at they were radical or not. The Junta had chosen the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the ideology of the political life but oppressed also the NAP linked rightist movements. The activities of all trade unions and professional chambers, such as the Turkish Medical Association, were suspended, and strikes were banned. People who were thought to have political affiliation at the state level were

changed (Ahmad, 2010, pp. 186,187). The generals aimed at reconstructing the political structure from top to down. For that reason, they prepared a new constitution instead of the liberal 1961 constitution. The new constitution gave extraordinary powers, such as vetoing legislation, dissolving the parliament, and appointing administrators of almost all constitutional institutions, including the judiciary to the head of the state (Parla, 2016).

In his first impression of the coup, Kısakürek, by pointing out that this intervention was held against the communist and anarchists, and the reactionary fanatics who were damaging to the blessed Islamic action (he meant the NSP), stated that he fully approved the movement. If, says Kısakürek, this movement had not been done, the state would not have existed, the nation would not have stayed in place (Kısakürek, 2009h, p. 39).

In the articles following the coup, Kısakürek continued to support the coup. To him, while the 27 May intervention had been done 'despite the nation', the 12 March intervention was made 'for the nation'. In contrary to the 27 May Coup, generals identified the mistakes and deficiencies truly; and intervened in order to correct the deficiencies on the right time (ibid, 117). Kısakürek also appreciated the path that the generals followed after the intervention. To him, it was a very gentle thought to send party leaders to a compulsory residence. Again, it was very pleasing to him that the new cabinet had a politician like Turgut Özal (ibid, 111,112).

In terms of Kısakürek, the coup was as legitimate as that the generals would not need even to form a provisional constitution in order to legalise their status. It can be said that a regime that Kısakürek had been looking for till that day, had been established. The 12 September regime, in a sense, was a very close form of his

Başyücelik state order for him. Therefore, he stated that he was expecting generals to realise a revolution; and enumerated the steps that this revolution should follow (ibid, 131-133).

After publishing the last brochure (Rapor-13) where Kısakürek's articles were penned after the coup, Kısakürek retired to pasture in his home. In this period he worked on his book, titled *İman ve İslam Atlası* (The Atlas of Faith and Islam). However, his turbulent life continued to follow him until his last days. He had been grappling with a judicial process since 1968 due to his famous work '*Vatan Haini Değil, Büyük Vatan Dostu Vahidüddin*' (Vahidüddin is not a Traitor, but a Great Patriot). The book was first published in 1968 and it was also published in Bugün Newspaper with serial articles.¹³⁹ In this book, Kısakürek argued that in contrary to what was written in the history books, it was Sultan Vahdettin who encouraged and assigned Atatürk to initiate a National Struggle in Anatolia against the occupying forces. Therefore, he was not a traitor as it was claimed but a great patriot (Kısakürek, 2012n). Kısakürek's argument was interpreted by the judicial authorities as insulting Atatürk by humiliating his role in Turkish history. Therefore, a lawsuit was filed against him in 1968 and he was sentenced to imprisonment. However, he was freed thanks to the amnesty law declared in 1974 by the RPP-NSP coalition government. Another lawsuit was filed in 1977 upon the third edition of the book and resulted in Kısakürek's imprisonment again (*Milliyet*, 27 April 1982). Kısakürek's conviction was postponed due to his health condition (*Milliyet*, 03 June 1982). His close circle applied Kenan Evren, the president, for the cancellation of his punishment but could

¹³⁹ The name of the first edition of the book was '*Son Osmanlı Padişahı 6. Mehmet Vahiddün Vatan Haini Değil Büyük Vatan Dostu*' (The last Ottoman Sultan Mehmet Vahiddün the sixth is not a Traitor, but a Great Patriot).

not get a positive reply. When he died on 25 May 1983, there was still an approved conviction decision about him.

Even in his last days, Kısakürek was not away from politics. One of his last visitors was Turgut Özal. They had met in many occasions and a friendship was made between them. In Özal's visit, they talked about the party, which Özal was about to set up, and Kısakürek gave him some advice on how the party could be found (Ak, 2016, pp. 262,263). Özal, the prime minister and president of the future, was at the forefront line in Kısakürek's funeral, which was attended by thousands of people.

5.7 Conclusion

After the Democratic Party and the National Salvation Party, whose Kısakürek encouraged their establishment, came to the political scene, the votes of the right-wing electorate were further divided. In fact, in terms of Kısakürek, this was a deviation from his strategy of unity on the right. Moreover, he became a part of the political manoeuvres during the period of precarious coalitions by encouraging the uncompromising attitudes of the politicians. However, the political turmoil and economic trouble that the country dragged him into brought him back to his strategy of unity on the right and began to support Demirel again. Similarly, this period also became a scene to a compromise with the ultranationalist NAP with which he was in an ideological rivalry and defined himself and his ideology over the codes of this rivalry.

Kısakürek's relationship with the NSP also followed an interesting path in that context. His way with this party, which he had been supporting starting with the NOP era that was established in 1970, fell apart sharply in 1977. He became also a symbolic name for the opposition formed against Erbakan with his disagreement,

which was shaped mostly on Erbakan's leadership. According to Kısakürek, the NSP was actually a party that harmed Islam with its politics far away from reality and timeless discourses of its leader.

Finally, it can be said that Kısakürek found the political regime he was seeking during his life with the coup of 1980. In his eyes, the junta, which held the 12 September Coup, was the sole government which could diagnose Turkey's problems with the correct shape and which had the will and determination to solve these problems. Even, it was the right time for Turkey to realise the true revolution. However, nothing was changed in his life. Even when he died, there was an approved conviction sentence about him.

6. THE ANALYZES OF THE *BÜYÜK DOĞU* IDEOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter aims at analyzing Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* ideology in terms of its capacity of realizing a sensible and realizable state and society structure. Kısakürek's claim that *Büyük Doğu* presents a better modernity than its Western one leads us to think in the frame of conceptions such as multiple, alternative, and local modernities. Drawing attention to the limits within themselves and contradictions that their content may bring out, Göle preferred to use the concept of 'Non-Western' modernity as a kind of top concept that would be associated eclectically with these definitions (Göle, 2007, p. 59). In that regard, Kısakürek's thoughts will be analyzed in the light of Eisenstadt and Göle's works on Non-Western modernities.

Non-Western modernity idea bases on the claim that modernity is not identical with the West and culturally specific forms of modernities are exist. They hold very different views on what makes societies modern (Eisenstadt, 2000, pp. 2,3). Göle and Eisenstadt studied the dynamics of modernization programs of Non-Western societies and attempted to reveal similarities between them. The most obvious of these similarities is that all of them are modern. As Eisenstadt pointed out, many of the movements that developed in non-Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or even anti-modern themes, yet all were distinctively modern (Eisenstadt, 2003b, p. 536). In addition, Göle indicates that Non-Western societies perceive the modernization history of the West as a reference point in order to understand their experiences (Göle, 2007, p. 60). Nevertheless, the dynamics of their modernization programs vary greatly depending on the nature of their contact with Western civilization. Göle underlines that the nature of this relationship established by

modernity is injured as much as it is dependent. As a consequence of this injured nature of the relationship, components of modernity such as basic human rights in the concept can be excluded and, thus, the claim of universality of modernity can be meaningless (Göle, 2007, pp. 58, 61).

Within this framework, firstly, it will be emphasized how Kısakürek understands and conceptualizes Western civilization and thus modernity. Then, the dynamics of the modernization program he offered will be evaluated on the axis of this relationship. Besides this, in parallel with the goal of the study, the effects of the personal factors on making of the *Büyük Doğu* and approaches in Islamism also will be taken into consideration.

Another issue that will be addressed in this chapter is whether the *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology or a current of thought. First, it should be stated that there is not a consensus in the literature as to what the ideology is. If Shils' classification of thought systems is considered, it is possible to say that *Büyük Doğu* is more likely a "program". Although it carries almost all of the characteristics of an ideology enumerated by Shils, in its essence, it is just an interpretation in Islamism (Shils, 1968, pp. 66,67). As the *Büyük Doğu* analyzed from the perspective of its capacity of presenting a realizable modernization program, in this study, Mannheim's classification of ideology and utopia is taken as the conceptual reference point. In Mannheim's classification, the ground difference between two thought systems emerges in their capacity of realizing their content. Although both are incompatible with the system they are in and have transcendental ideals, ideologies cannot realize their goal because they try to change the historical realities of the moment. Unlike ideologies, utopias read the historical realities of the moment in its natural form and try to realize themselves by considering those realities. Therefore, their capacity of

realizing their content is higher than ideologies (Mannheim, 2009, pp. 215-219). It is tried to be revealed that Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology of which capacity of realizing itself is quite low since it did not evaluate the realities of the time with an objective eye.

6.2 The Blurry Nature of the *Büyük Doğu* Appellation

The basic feature of the *Büyük Doğu* formulation which makes it modern is the fact that it is shaped within paradigms that the modernity brought along. One of the most prominent examples of this is that the idea of the *ummah*, one of the most basic elements of Islamic political thought, is replaced with the nation-state phenomenon. However, this does not show a full acceptance image. The teaching of Islam contains also a kind of resistance against the changes that took place in time and space due to its nature of transcendence. This is the most fundamental issue of Islamism thought. The reinterpretation of Islamic principles according to changing circumstances in history constitutes a very difficult tension to solve for Islamists (Rahman, 2003a, pp. 4,5). The fact that Kısakürek named the ideological formulation he constructed as *Büyük Doğu* is a reflection of the tension I mentioned when considered the connotations that this naming has. Thinking on the *Büyük Doğu* conceptualization does not only help us to understand in which scope that Kısakürek designed his ideology, but also provides an important route as to how he solved this tension. As Altun stated, the production and articulating of the thoughts is directly proportional to the characteristics of the concepts used, because they are contextual in terms of historical, social, economic, political processes. They gain a kind of identity within the framework of those contexts they emerge from and concept maps are a kind of identity cards of thoughts, ideologies, teachings (Altun, 2002, p. 17).

Basically, the conceptualization of the *Büyük Doğu* is related to Kısakürek's grounding his formulation over a civilizational comparison based on the issue of Eastern-Western problematic. He began to conceptualize his thoughts with a serial essays about comparison of Western and Eastern civilizations both in the journal and in his book *İdeolacya Örgüsü* (Ideology Web); and, as mentioned in the second chapter, he metaphorically depicted his formulation as an orchestra playing a symphony which symbolize a synthesis of Eastern and Western civilizations. Besides this, he also stated that he was not voluntary to use such a separatist denotation since it contradicts with universal call of Islam, yet he was obliged to use such a definition which put him in a position advocating only the East since the differentiation between the East and West civilizations became a historical fact (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 15-17; 1945b). At this point, it can be argued that the *Büyük Doğu* concept corresponds to a civilizational identity representing Islam. Here a question arises, does this civilizational identity involves a political goal; if so, what is or are they.

In the same articles about the East-West dualism, Kısakürek stated that the 'East' conceptualization he made was nothing more than a connotation to a spiritual worldview that found its true expression in Islam and there was no geographical correspondence of it (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 16,17). Besides, as stated in the second chapter, in his identification of *Büyük Doğu*, he clearly stated that he had designed and conceptualized his ideology by considering only the borders of the Turkish homeland (Kısakürek, 1943h). In the further articles he penned to identify the *Büyük Doğu*, he stated more emphatically that, in no sense, his ideology has not revisionist, expansionist or any kind of pan-ist aspirations (pan-Islamic, pan-Turkish), on the contrary, determined to operate within the borders of Turkey:

“Don’t the most banal identifications and makes of often pester to the most sublime abstractions and makes of? In order to protect ourselves from this, lets repel the apprehensions seeking for similarities with the most contradict and the most rude of cases owing to a prosaic name similarity. The East, which the Great East (Büyük Doğu) embraces and integrates, does not have an eye on any geographical or racial plan except the borders of the Turkish homeland” (Kısakürek, 1945a).¹⁴⁰

Some cover pages of the journal also reveal clearly this nature of the *Büyük Doğu* (see Appendix D). However, when his different writings were followed up, it can be observed that the definition of the *Büyük Doğu* is not limited to a civilizational identity. In the article he gave place in *ideology örgüsü* part of the journal, titled *Asyacılık* (Asianism), he attributed a political goal to the *Büyük Doğu* which was realizing an Islamic revolution that would begin in the geography of ‘Great Asia’ (comprised of Asia and Africa continents) then would spread to the whole world:

“The big political, national, spiritual matter, which is outward sampler of inner formation, integrative and staffing, of Islamic revolution beyond the daily politics is the Asianism... On this most sensitive point, glints are gathering from the meaning branch of the ‘Great East’ idea which embraces Great Orient, that is Great Asia (involves the Africa); and one of the main pilings of our name signification is emerging... The name of Great East’s place and field signification is solely the Great Asia... The remaining field is opposite and enemy field... Asianism matter of Islamic revolution is to take the positive

¹⁴⁰ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: En ulvi tecrid ve manalandırmalara, çok defa en suflî teşhis ve maksatlandırmalar musallat değil midir? Kendimizi bundan korumak için, sadece yavan bir isim delaleti yüzünden davaların en çıkmazı, en kabasile aramızda benzerlik arayacak vehimleri kovalım: *BÜYÜK DOĞU*’nun kucakladığı ve bütünleştirdiği Şark, vatan sınırları dışında herhangi bir ırk ve coğrafya planına göz dikmiyor

(*müspet*) sides of the West from the hands of the West itself and to spread to the whole Asia through adding the spirit it lacks, thus to put forth the Asia in the face of the synthetic and cruel ‘*mandarens*’ (imperial states) of the world with its all winner cadre” (Kısakürek, 1950d).¹⁴¹

Similarly, in the articles on Islamic revolution, he attributed to the Turkish nation a missionary responsibility of realizing this Islamic revival. According to his essentialism of the decline in the Muslim world, the Turks had become the unique representative of the Muslim world after the fall of the Arabs, and, therefore the fall of the Muslims had bonded to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That means, the Western attack over the Ottoman Empire in the World War I not only caused to fall of the biggest Turkish state but also to demolish of the unity of Muslims under the leadership of the caliphate. Accordingly, the reunification of the Muslim nations could be realized under the leadership of the Turkish nation, and it is not only a historical responsibility of the Turks but also a divinely responsibility appointed by the God. Kısakürek frequently articulated such kind of discourses also in his conferences. In one of his speeches, he identified the Turks as *seyf-ül İslam* (sword of Islam) (Kısakürek, 2010a, p. 240). So, where does the difference between the two attitudes comes from? It will be beneficial to reveal the reasons and stimulations lay behind through handling political conjuncture.

¹⁴¹ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: İslam inkılâbının günlük politika üzerinde, iç oluşu dışarıya doğru örnekleştirici, bütünleştirici ve kadrolaştırıcı büyük siyasi, milli, ruhi davası Asyacılıktır... İşte bu en hassas nokta üzerinde, *Büyük Doğu* mefkûresinin Büyük Şark, yani Büyük Asya’yı kucaklayan mana şubesinden pırıldılar toplanmakta ve isim delaletlimizin temel direklerinden biri, tepesinde en aydınlık vuzuh feneriyle meydana çıkmaktadır. Evet; *Büyük Doğu* isminin mekân ve saha delaleti, sadece Büyük Asyadır... Geriye kalan saha zıt ve düşman saha... İslam inkılâbının Asyacılık davası, müspet Garbı, olduğu gibi Garplının elinden almak, ona malik bulunmadığı ruhu ilave etmek ve birdenbire bütün Asya’ya teşmil edip sun’î ve zalim olan cihan (Mandaren)lerinin karşısına, hem keyfiyet hem keymiyette en galip kadrosıyla çıkartmak gayesinin mekân ideali olarak aziz meselelerimizden biri belki başlıcası oluyor.

The time period that Kısakürek designed the backbone of the *Büyük Doğu* idea was the years of the World War II. The war was meant to him a new world order along with its chaos. Some of his earliest articles were about this and stated in these articles that it was an opportunity for Turkey to be able to turn back to its flourished days by revising its worldview (Kısakürek, 1944b; 2013i, pp. 84-87). Although these flourished days were an attribution to the future, they were also a yearning for the past. In that regard, the *Büyük Doğu* attribution was a good choice to represent this dualist mentality.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the impact of the '*hakim millet*' (dominant nation) code in the mind of Kısakürek, who experienced both the Ottoman and the Republican period. Öğün addressed that Turks' having possessed a privileged position in the Ottoman Empire caused to formation a cognitive structure in the minds of the Turkish intellectuals and left some traces in their conceptualization of Turkish nationalism (Öğün, 1997, pp. 238-271). The impulse of fictionalizing the Turkish nation in its privileged position in the past is rather strong also in Kısakürek; and although the *Büyük Doğu* conceptualization takes the borders of the Turkish Republic as the reference to itself, it also meets a transboundary aspiration.

This paradoxical situation is also related to the dirty nature of presenting ideas in ideology format, as Geertz points out (Geertz, 1973, p. 199). Kısakürek tried to build an ideological discourse and like every ideology it needed motivating, promising, enthusiastic and emotional messages and goals. Besides this, as Bora stated, Islamism and conservatism in Turkey is also an issue of emotion and retrospective enthusiasm (Bora, 1999). The *Büyük Doğu* conceptualization satisfies the emotional need of the devout and nationalist minds thanks to being filled its content with the emphasizes on the golden age of the Islamic civilization and Ottoman

Empire, and with the enthusiasm that comes along with the emphasis on the ‘Great’ as a motto. His discourses that he built on the basis of the ancient Islamic civilization and the Ottoman Empire-centred Turkish history provided a considerable intellectual accumulation for those who want to consolidate the masses by taking advantage of nationalist and spiritual sentiments as well. Yet, on the other hand, Kısakürek was also a pragmatist and realist person. He was clearly aware that however brilliant these ideas seem they had almost no chance to be realized, and this is why he confined his political goals within the borders of Turkish nation-state. It will be beneficial to look through this issue in more detail.

The great transformation in international political structure experienced during the period, which began with the World War I and continued with the process of decolonization era after the World War II, have brought about a huge change in the arithmetic of independent states. The notion that international system is composed of multiple territorial and nation states have internalized by the mainstream Islamist movements and the political elites of the Muslim world; and this consensus on the nation-state paradigm has deeply influenced designing of political projects, especially in terms of articulation of pan-Islam ideas as a grand strategy (Piscatori, 1986). Pan-Islam ideals now have been obliged to express themselves within the framework of independent states of which political orientations begun to be formed within the framework of nation-state centred policy designs (Bowering, 2015, p. 3). Forasmuch as, the first serious and systematic step towards the idea of bringing together all Muslims under the same roof has been able to be realized in 1969 only by a form of political forum (the Organization of the Islamic Conference) in which Muslim states represent themselves as independent states which seeking for their own interests (Dursun, 1999, pp. 136-138). In parallel, the preferences in the state-building process

of Muslim states that gained their independence also had an important influence. Many of these states inclined to a secular direction in the hands of pro-Western leaders (Black, 2011, p. 304). Besides, the rise of the Arab nationalism blended with socialism took the idea of union to ethnic-centred and pushed the global project of the Islamic union into the background (Landau, 1990, pp. 217,218). As a consequence of the territorial, ethnic and cultural divisions within the Muslim world, institutionalization of a cherished universal caliphate has been doomed to indefinite future (Ayoob, 2005, p. 954).

In this context, the institution of the Caliphate needs to be addressed as well. The abolishment of the sultanate in 1923 and the caliphate in 1924 by the Kemalist ruling circles in Turkey was the prelude to a new epoch for the Islamists in both Turkey and the other Muslim geographies. The loss of the political authority representing Islam opened the door to new debates about how Islam should be politically expressed (Black, 2011, p. 298). The future of the institution of the caliphate and the political unity of Muslims began to be discussed by Islamists in the Muslim geography such as Rashid Rida (1865- 1935) and Ali Abd el-Raziq (1888-1966) in Egypt, Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938) and Abu A'la al-Maududi (1903-1979) in India and later in Pakistan; it is possible to talk about an alienation and silence among the Islamists in Turkey (Landau, 1990, pp. 220-228).¹⁴² On the other hand, it is not possible to talk about a concrete achievement in that regard. As a manifestation of this, the meetings held in 1926 and 1931 to discuss the future of the institution of the caliphate failed to set forth a common view, and the claim of Abdulmecid, the last caliph, that he was still the caliph was not approved by other

¹⁴² Rashid Rida *al-Khilafa aw al-imama al-uzma* (The Caliphate or the Greatest Imamate), Ali Abd el-Raziq *al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm* (Islam and the Foundations of Government). For more information about the discussions over the caliphate and pan-Islam idea both in Turkey and in the world see (Landau, 1990)

Muslim leaders (Özcan, p. 552). When looked at Turkey, it is possible to talk about a silence. Due to the radical transformation project of the Kemalist elites, and rigid secularization program that conducted in this process, Islamists of the Early Republican era receded from political arena; and the idea of pan-Islam lay dormant in Turkey for a generation or more (Landau, 1990, p. 181). Besides, it also should be addressed that the disappointment caused by the failure to find the expected response from the call for Islamic solidarity toward Muslim geographies in the World War I, and rebellions and independence demands that occurred among Muslim subjects of the Empire were still alive in the minds. Although he regarded the removal of the caliphate as a big mistake, Kısakürek was aware of the impossibility of restoration this institution and therefore never regarded it as a political goal.

The modern Turkey was also a product of this transformation process, and it can be daringly expressed that Kısakürek internalized the state-nation form of the new state and prioritized its interests shaped around nation-state paradigm. Even, it can be said that this pragmatic approach of him was quite sharp. For instance, he had written many chauvinistic articles for years about Cyprus which has been one of the ground national problems of the Turkey. Yet, in the end, he came to the conclusion that if Cyprus had not been a matter of prestige for Turkey, it would have meant nothing at all. To him, the Cyprus problem is an unnecessary encumbrance that the political elites loaded to shoulders of Turkey; and struggling for 70-80 thousands Turk living in Cyprus instead of sixty million living under captivity in other countries is a nothing but a show (Kısakürek, 2009c, pp. 30-32). Kısakürek reflected this approach also the *Büyük Doğu* ideology. From his point of view, the top priority target is that Turkey should achieve a self sufficient economic, political, moral and social structure first under the guide of the *Büyük Doğu*. Historical responsibilities such as leading the

Muslim world can only be considered after this is achieved: "... to have an eye on out without accomplishing of our inner existence, is to betray to this inner formation. The beyond is the think what I will think about after come to existence" (Kısakürek, 1967b; 2014i, p. 10).¹⁴³

Kısakürek did not change his attitude also during rest of his life. Developments in Muslim geography, such as independence movements in the decolonization period, were closely followed in the *Büyük Doğu*. However, he also frequently criticized these countries for their political preferences, such as Arab nationalism blended with socialism. To him, Muslim countries succumbed to the Western cultural imperialism and lost their ideals due to the transformation they tried to go through under the lead of pro-western rulers (Kısakürek, 2012h, p. 385). Therefore, nothing could be expected from any state of Islamic geography on the axis of the pan-Islam ideal:

"Today, all the existing Islamic states can be likened to such a strange pyramid that its pedestal, namely its people is *mu'min* (believer), its summit, namely its rulers are opposed to it. The deterioration in the Turks, the dominant nation, has spread to other elements and has revealed the present situation. As long as they are in the hands of the leaders who are slave of the West, nothing can be expected from these states" (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 472-473).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Kendimizi, kendi içimizde; fert ve cemiyetimizi içinden ve dışından kucaklayarak kendi içimizde tamamlığa erdirmeden kucaklayarak kendi içimizde tamamlığa erdirmeden dışarda gözü olmak, bu iç oluşa ihanettir. Ötesi olduktan sonar düşünülecek iş.

¹⁴⁴ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Bugün mevcut bütün İslam devletleri öyle garip bir ehrama benzetilebilir ki, kaidesi, yani halkı mü'min, zirvesi, yani güdücüleri ona zıt. Hakim millet olan Türkler'deki bozulmuş diğer unsurlara da sirayet etmiş ve bugünkü hali ortaya çıkarmıştır. Batı kölesi liderler elinde bu devletlerden bir şey beklenemez.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, he interpreted Erbakan's idea of forming a union among the Muslim states as a vain dream. He criticized him also for supporting the Islamic revolution of Iran. It can be argued that, to him, in the political conjuncture of the Cold War era, being a member of the United Nations and NATO is a more realistic and utilitarian way than seeking for an Islamic unitization (Kısakürek, 2010b, pp. 243, 244). For him, security concerns of Turkey were much more essential than the idea of Islamic union. Therefore, he advocated that Turkey should take side with Great Britain in the face of the German attack in World War II, and should collaborate with US in the face of the Soviets threat in Cold War.

The coexistence of a *Büyük Doğu* conceptualization that confines itself with the borders of the nation-state with a *Büyük Doğu* conceptualization aimed at an Islamic revolution in the Muslim geography is a good example that reveals the mechanism of Kısakürek's thought world. Kısakürek tries to preserve the universalism and transcendence claim of the teaching of Islam with a traditional impulse and presents it as an ideal. However, when historical, political, economic, social realities contradict these ideals, he tries to overcome this tension by producing various formulas. The formula he presented in this regard is the superior political understanding of the *Büyük Doğu*.

The basic strategy in this supreme political understanding, which he thought that Abdulhamid II successful performed successively, is taking advantage of the opportunities available within the existing conditions as much as possible by a pragmatic way until reaching the high ideal (ensuring Islamic unity) which was postponed to an undefined time; and, protecting himself by not attracting the attention of the competing world until reaching sufficient strength (Kısakürek, 1967d, p. 4).

As a result, Kısakürek's Islamism reads the world behind the glasses of nation-state paradigm and prioritizes the interests of the nation-state. The idea of an Islamic union, as a rhetoric addressing people's emotions, is a postponed ideal until an indefinite time.

6.3 A Critical Narrative of Decline

It can be said that modernization projects in Non-Western societies, in a sense, are constructed themselves on a retrospective narration that reveals the mistakes of the past and the consequences of those mistakes in order to constitute a legitimizing ground of the trajectory to follow. For example, Kemalism envisaged a radical transformation in the structure of society through the argument that the Turkish nation was stuck within traditions that caused to being moved away from reason and science in the historical process.

As it is in mainstream Islamist discourse, Kısakürek also saw the reason of decline in Muslim geography and Turkey as a process of alienation to the essence of true Islam by adaptation of pre/un-Islamic traditions and understandings. Within this perspective, the turning point of the deterioration of Islam and the decline, in his eyes, began with the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Lawful (1494-1566). In his reigning, un-Islamic traditions of Byzantine and Persian began to be influential at the highest level. To him, the ground reason of this deterioration in the understanding of true Islam was the losing of the *ulema* their competence and transforming into an ‘immature fanatic, rude bigot’ (*ham softa, kaba yobaz*) who sacrificed Islam to their self-interests in the name of *Sharia*. A prominent phase of this process was the appointment of *şeyhülislam* (supreme religious authority) as a civil servant by Sultan Suleyman the Lawful. In parallel with this appointment, *ulema* lost their autonomic status and,

concomitantly, lost their idealistic stands in the course of the time by enacting fetwas according to the whims of the sultans and pashas. The ignorantness which took root among Islamic scholars reflected also to the *madrasah*.¹⁴⁵ The education in *madrasah* lost its depth in thought and in its essence, so, it became an institution that did nothing but make students memorize the divine revelations. Whereas, in the same centuries, through the move of Renaissance, the West was systematically advancing in “the domination of reason over the things and incidents” (*eşya ve hadiselere tahakküm*) which was originally an order of Islam (Kısakürek, 1948a, p. 2; 2013i, pp. 146-148; 2013f, pp. 114,115).

According to him, because of this false mentality that perceives Islam as merely memorizing the divine revelations, the Islam could not be adapted to necessities of time. Therefore, while Western communities began to gather the fruits of the great struggle that they had entered, Muslims were left out of all these new formations and developments. In Kısakürek’s narration of decline, it was just the beginning because, the epochal move of the west shook up all life of the old man from its root. In his eyes, the greatest responsibility of this situation belonged to the ulema who claimed to have acted in the name of *Sharia*:

“Every invention and movement that delivers a new benefit and value to the human and community life -if not against to the *Sharia*- is a confirmation and service for *Sharia* itself. Although we knew this comprehension with the thousands of orders of the Bearer of the *Sharia* (Prophet), how to understand the rude fanatics, who called automobile as the car of devil, who called the print as the device of profanity; as the servant of religion and the truth or as the

¹⁴⁵ *Madrasah* is a kind of school which has been institutionalized in Muslim countries. One of the distinctive characteristic of the *madrasah* is that there are courses in Islamic theology and religious law, but it is not a requirement.

murderer of religion and the truth?.. This backward type who was the most terrible assassin of religion and who betrayed to the pride of the universe (prophet) without knowing and without understanding, was known as the true representative of the religion, and the religion was regarded as a thing which merely composed of what he said and understood; and, the poor man and community of the time, unaware of the fact that the deep loyalty in its yeast was made an instrument to infidelity, did not find any other way except waiting sadly and thoughtfully against all the troubles that he would go through” (Kısakürek, 1948b, p. 2; 2013i, pp. 148-150).¹⁴⁶

According to his narration of the decline, the deterioration in the understanding of the religion in the hands of the ignorant *ulema* was also the beginning of a reaction chain triggering each other. Incompetent sultans remained to be unconcerned with the falsifications of the *ulema* who supposed to act on the behalf of them. The soldiers dethroned their sultans on the behalf of *Sharia*. The sultans tried to dissolve the army on the behalf of *Sharia* too. Some also, rebelled by filling the squares in the name of *Sharia* and distorted the state and social order. Eventually, since not been able to make rise of a worldwide intellectual and for the misunderstanding of the true Islam, the state went ahead to be destructed in the hands

¹⁴⁶ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: İnsan ve cemiyet hayatına yeni bir fayda ve kıymete ulaştıran her buluş ve hamle –eğer Şeriata aykırı değilse- bizzat Şeriata yönelik bir teyid ve hizmettir. Bu inceliği bizzat Şeriat Hamili’nin bin bir emriyle tanıdığımız halde, otomobile şeytan arabası, matbaaya küfür aleti ve daha bilmem nelere bilmem ne hükmü veren ham ve kaba softayı, din ve hakikat hizmetçisi mi, din ve hakikat katili mi telakki etmek gerekir?.. Dinin, en korkunç suikastçısı olan ve Kainat Fahri’ne, bilmek ve anlamaksızın ihanet eden bu tavla zarı kafalı tip, hakikatte dinin mümessili bilinmiş, din hakikatte bu tipin söylediklerinden ve anladıklarından ibaret sayılmış; ve o devirde zavallı insan ve cemiyet, mayasındaki derin sadakatin sadakatsizliğe alet edildiğinden habersiz, başına ve dine gelecek bütün belalara karşı mahzunve mütevekkil beklemekten başka bir yol bulamamıştır.

of the riotous who asserted that they all acted in the name of the religion (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 149,150).

When came to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the deterioration of Islam entered into a new phase in the hands of a new type of fanatics who maintained the same fanaticism with the imitation of Europe, and this phase began with the *Tanzimat* era.¹⁴⁷ In his eyes, “*Tanzimat* was the first and stabber period of Islam by removing it from all remedies gradually, and by discrediting it” (Kısakürek, 1948c).¹⁴⁸ Both the modernizing statesmen of the *Tanzimat* era (Mustafa Reşit, Ali and Fuat pashas) and their opposition, Young Ottomans (Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa), with a psychology of defeat, saw the way of salvation in the totally imitation of the West though they stated their allegiance to Islamic principles. In spite of appropriating the all ingenuity in the material achievements (good aspects) of the West into Islam, they were fascinated by the west within a whole (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 150-152). Kısakürek described the understanding of the *Tanzimat* statesmen as *Felix Culpa* (happy guilt), something good in appearance, but disastrous in essence. To him, *Tanzimat* had to be made, but in the form of a greater and fundamental movement in the service of Islam. The reform movement had to be based on Turkish spiritual roots, because imitation was the declaration and acceptance of the defeat against the rival world and removing of Islam from being an alternative way of progress (Kısakürek, 1969b; 2013i, pp. 423,424).

In his narration of decline, the second constitutional era, a product of Jewish and Masonic intrigues, was the first period directed to demolish “the spirit and unity of Islam” consciously. Although it came with a dazzler slogan of 'liberty, equality,

¹⁴⁷ The *Tanzimat* era was a period of reform in the Ottoman Empire that began in 1839.

¹⁴⁸ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Denilebilir ki, İslamın, gitgide bütün çarelerden uzaklaştırılarak, gözden ve itibardan düşürülmek metoduyle bozulduğu ilk ve katil devir, Tanzimattır.

and justice', this period was the era of disposing of Islamic and Turkish morality, tradition and history. The constitutional era was the period when the harvest of the imitative reform movements, started from *Tanzimat*, was gathered. All immoralities of the West spread into the Turkish society in the name of Westernization in this period; the woman left the Islamic covering for the first time in this period, the prostitution spread in this period (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 152-154). By bringing the ideal of Turkism instead of Islam and by shaping nationalism with the ideas of Durkheim who they read in reverse, The Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti-CUP*) not only took the state away from a true ideal but also provided the ground for alienation of the nation to its own values (Kısakürek, 2009c, p. 82).

When came to the Republican era, it was not only a phase of deterioration of Islam but also the being targeted of Islam directly. Islam was seen as an obstacle for development by politicians and the 'assumed intellectuals'. In their eyes, the Muslim was the one who was ignorant, fool, hidebound, bigot and rude. The deterioration of Islam was completed in every direction (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 154-156). To him, while the Turkish nation was saved in material ground with the National Struggle, it was also removed from its roots with Kemalist reforms. He argued that the Kemalist reforms ranging from laicism to the alphabet, hat, and civil law reforms were "spurious fruits" which grow on the branches of rootless revolution. The Kemalist intelligentsia, gathered around the RPP, rooted out the historical, cultural, spiritual bonds of the Turks from their past; and replaced with atheism, communism, materialism, immorality and non-nationality (*Milliyetsizlik*). To him, in the absence of the true ideology and true intellectuals, Turkey became a country which is morally degenerated, alienated to its cultural roots, could not achieve to form a national

economy, education, policy, and industry, therefore dependent to alien powers (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 154,155).

It should also be noted that modernization projects' looking back at the past is not made up of just the enumeration of the faults and the times that ought to be cut off. As Cemil Oktay stated, they also involves a mythic time of which recovering is desired. This period refers to 'the first time' (*ilk zaman*), 'the founding time' (*kurucu zaman*), 'the holy time' (*kutsal zaman*). It is pure and unspoiled. It is a reference model for the construction of the future, and whatever the strength of the desire for the recovering of it is, the strength of the faith being felt towards the future is the same (Oktay, 2017, pp. 55-57). Generally speaking, this mythical time emphasis is stronger and more fundamental in Islamism than as it is not in any other ideology. To turn back to the early years of Islam (the prophet and four caliph period) is seen as the unique way of finding out the true Islam.

When looked in case of Kısakürek, we can say that this mythic time is not stuck in a certain period of the past; rather, it has manifested itself repeatedly in the course of history by new mythical times that represent it. In addition to golden age of Islam, the reigning period of Sultan Mehmet (the Conqueror) is also one of these mythic times for him. In his eyes, Sultan Mehmet was the first and greatest ruler who could comprehend Islam with its real essence and could carry it to his own time without distorting its essence, thus established the sovereignty of Islam over the Western civilization (Kısakürek, 2010a, pp. 153-158). Similarly, the reigning period of Sultan Abdülhamid II is also one of these mythic times. He saw him as the advocator of true Islam, the true representative of Turkism, and a genuine modernizer. The dignified and genuine understanding of the civilization found its first expression in the statesmanship of Abdulhamid II who managed to synthesize the spirit of the

East and the reason of the West through appropriating into the national roots. Thus, it was Abdülhamid II who brought the cores of all material achievements that Turkey had; railways, roads, technical schools, industry and so on. All the schools established in the framework of positive sciences were his work. Even the buildings in which the first movements of the National Struggle initiated were made in his reigning (Kısakürek, 2013t, pp. 259,260). Moreover, with a definite internal and foreign policy, he was the only ruler who could manage to postpone and would have been able to stop the decline of the state if he had not been dethroned (ibid, 269-280). As also pointed out by Duran, Kısakürek presents Abdulhamid II as a true revolutionary against Atatürk for being able to establish a balance between material achievements and keeping national, spiritual, moral values (Duran, 2001, p. 229).

When we evaluate Kısakürek's narration of decline in general, it can be said that for him, the fundamental issue that must be abandoned is the Western-centred, secular and positivist modernization approach adopted by Turkish statesmen and intellectuals to progress. And, his argument that 'in the absence of the true ideology and true intellectuals, Turkey became a country which is morally degenerated, alienated to its cultural roots, could not achieve to form a national economy, education, policy, and industry, therefore dependent to alien powers' constitutes the legitimizing ground of his ideological prescription in his eyes. Kısakürek's view of decline, for its some dimensions, was shared by many intellectuals of his period. The "cumulative incompetence of the Ottomans in the last two hundred years" was the main theme for almost all of them (Mardin, 1991b, p. 241). But differences arise on the qualitative and quantitative causes of the problem. Berkes, for example, not only took into account the influence of qualitative issues such as traditions, but also quantitative issues such as economic relations (Berkes, 2016). As for Kısakürek, he

essentialized the issue to an abstract cause such as the absence of true worldview. This mental state, in the sense we mentioned above, led him to an inability to evaluate the society and problem with an objective eye, and, therefore, to run in the pursuit of an unrealizable ideology.

In terms of our analysis, the much more important aspect of the narrative Kısakürek presented is the linear relation he established between modernity and the rediscovery of true Islam. One of the mythical times of Kısakürek produced modernity itself by understanding Islam correctly and interpreting it according to the needs of the time. The other one, in a state of being late, managed to keep up with the modernity as it should be by means of the same comprehension. The main issue in this regard is how Kısakürek understands and conceptualizes modernity and how the rediscovering of the true Islam can be realized. Now, these issues will be addressed.

6.4 A Herodianist Civilization Perspective

Civilizational comparisons are one of the ground components of the modernization programs of the non-Western societies because they perceive the modernization history of the West as a reference point in order to understand their experiences (Göle, 2007, p. 60). Looking at these comparisons gives important clues about how these societies understand the modernity. We can analyze also the Kısakürek's understanding of modernity from this perspective. However, it will be beneficial to mention to some characteristics of the civilizational comparisons in advance.

As Göle points out, the civilizational comparisons are the result of an injured but dependent relationship that modernizing societies established with modernity (Göle, 2007, p. 61). It is injured because most of the Non-Western societies

introduced with modernity via a traumatic process. Especially in Oriental societies, while the modernity is perceived as a European thing, the European is identified with colonialism. Therefore, their comprehension of modernity has gained an occidentalist nature as well. When a number of distinguished Japanese scholars and intellectuals gathered in Kyoto for a conference seven months after the Japanese bombardment of the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, their topic was 'how to overcome the modern' (Bruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 1). On the other hand, it is also dependent for the same reason. 'To overcome the modern' has become a question of survival and led the Non-Western societies to become modern via following a similar path with their European rivals. However, the injured nature of this relationship may cause also to bruise of modernity. Societies that move with a winner-defeated psychology are able to tend towards hasty, Jacobin political preferences for a quick closure of the development gap between them and the West. As a consequence of this, they may ignore some basic components of modernity, such as the inalienable rights of the individual (Eisenstadt, 1999).

Nevertheless, it is not only a passive learning and understanding process but also an active production process. Again, with Göle's description, they also aimed at production of an "extra-modern" (Göle, 2007, p. 60). We can say that this production process of the extra-modern manifest itself in two dimensions. In the first dimension, the modernizing societies accept the western definition and values of modernity as normative and claim that they produced more modern patterns than their counterparts in the West. For instance, having been granted the right to choose and be elected to the women very before than many of the Western countries was an extra-modern development for Turkish statesmen (ibid, 60).

In the second dimension, the modernizing societies accept the western definition and values of modernity as a reference point but claim that they could produce more advanced or more suitable modernity. This impulse bases on the claim that modernity is not identical with the West and culturally specific forms of modernities are exists (Eisenstadt, 2003a). Through criticizing the western form of modernity, sometimes with reprehension, they argue that a better form of modernity which can conserve their cultural institutions and values while providing the progress can be produced. To them, this form of modernity is more modern than its western form in many aspects.

It should also be stated that the dosage of the severity in the critical stance of the non-western societies shows diversity. In Muslim societies, approaches contain within itself several shades, ranging from a full synthesis between East and West, through a partial accommodations, to a mere clothing of Western institutions in Islamic words or total rejection (Rosenthal, 1965, p. 5). For instance, due to the introduction of the seats of Western learning after the advent of British in the subcontinent, the *Ulema* boycotted all modern learning and imposed a total isolation upon themselves (Rahman, 1966, p. 116). Arnold Toynbee used Zealot and Herodian concepts when analyzing attitudes of Muslim societies in their interrelation with modernity. He defined the Zealot as “the man who takes refuge from the unknown in the familiar; and when he joins battle with a stranger who practices superior tactics and employs formidable newfangled weapons, and finds himself getting the worst of the encounter, he responds by practicing his own traditional art of war with abnormally scrupulous”. As for the Herodian, he is “the man who acts on the principle that the most effective way to guard against the danger of the unknown is to master its secret; and, when he finds himself in the predicament of being confronted by a more

highly skilled and better armed opponent, he responds by discarding his traditional art of war and learning to fight his enemy with the enemy's own tactics and own weapons" (Toynbee, 1962, pp. 167, 172). What makes them different in their attitude of response was their familiarity with the West. According to his essentialism, the distinctive characteristic of Islamic Zealots is that their strongholds lie in sterile and sparsely populated regions which are remote from the main international thoroughfares of the modern world and which have been unattractive to the Western enterprise. For that reason, their confrontation with the pressure of the alien realized in a total obscurity, without an earlier relationship of benefit. On the other hand, Islamic Herodians situated around the main international thoroughfares thus could establish a relationship of benefit.

Kısakürek was a Herodian intellectual as well. As it is tried to be revealed in the chapter one, he was so familiar to Western civilization and intellectually benefited so much from it. Educated in a Western education system, studied philosophy in university, and developed his literary profession through a long reading marathon in Western literature. And, fighting superior power with its own tactics and own weapons is very centre to his mindset. Therefore, he emphasized that understanding the West with an unprejudiced comprehension is a great importance (Kısakürek, 1945f; 1943f).

According to Kısakürek's civilizational essentialism, the West essentially is a Greek-Latin civilization constructed over Greek philosophy, Roman state order, and Christian morality. The German and Anglo-Saxon nations are the improving agents of this tripartite civilization whereas the Slavs are the backward ones (Kısakürek, 2013c, p. 46). In classical studies of modernization, it's accepted as a nomothetic fact that the modernity first crystallized in Western Europe and then expanded to most other parts

of the world from there (Eisenstadt, 2003b, p. 537). Kısakürek also followed the same path and geographically confined the West into the boundaries of the Western Europe, and put Soviet Union and US apart as the wrong derivations of the Western civilization. He depicted the US and the Soviet Union as two dragons threatening European civilization (Kısakürek, 1967h). He sees America as a shoal understanding of intrinsic values of the Western civilization due to her extreme materialistic and pragmatic comprehension, and criticized her for being neutral to moral and spiritual values in favour of liberty. According to him such an understanding of liberty is nothing else except idleness (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 46; 2013c, p. 78). As for Soviet Union, due to cradling to communism, it is the biggest enemy of both Western and Eastern civilizations.

Kısakürek's reading of the modernization history of the West as follows: Firstly, he attributed a great importance to the philosophical quest of the ancient Greece era. To him, Ancient Greek includes the first nucleus of seeking beyond the material such as Pythagoras' philosophy of numbers and Platon idealism, even though it is also home to ideas that are incompatible with monotheistic beliefs, such as those Ionian and Xenophon schools. To him, the West was able to pass to the seeking of the truth from the hollow mythological world thanks to the ancient Greek philosophy. Then, the West combined this achievement with the Roman order. In his eyes, the Rome is a genius of societal order. Lastly, introduced the moral, spiritual truth with Christianity (Kısakürek, 2013c, pp. 19-32). Yet, later, the West leaved its civilization, built upon this triune constituent element, into the dark corridors of the scholasticism in the Middle Age. Catholicism and the church distorted the religion of the Prophet Jesus, wiped out the love and veil in its essence and the reason. The church, as the concrete image of bigotry, tyrannized every side of life and transformed

into such a deviance that even Western men would not tolerate. As for feudalism, it became the gendarmerie of this heresy (Kısakürek, 2013c, pp. 41,42; 2013i, p. 44). The West succeeded in overcoming church bigotry by realizing a ‘creative evolution’ with the Renaissance. According to him, the Renaissance was not only the result of the need for the revival of reason and domination over nature but also the desire for purification of suppressed spirit itself in a new composition. However, the Renaissance, which was named as the victory of reason, found its solace in degrading its spiritual quest to individual morality level while gathering its harvest at modern sciences (Kısakürek, 1946z). And, as a result of overrating to the reason and ignoring spiritual necessities, it fell into crisis in spiritual, political, economic and social fields in the 20th century (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 25,44,45; 1943d). The world of Western thought, where pure thought and rationality prevailed, created a mentality that confined itself to the material world and ignored metaphysical issues. This mental state, which he called the ‘cheapness of the West’ (*Batının Ucuzluğu*), turned out to the sharpest shape with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels, which reduced every religion, political and moral subjects to the branch of economy, and reached to pick with the rise of communism and United States’s stray freedom after total destruction of the World Wars (Kısakürek, 1943d; 2013i, pp. 57-59). Although artists such as Bodler and Rembo in the 19th century, philosophers such as Blondel, Bergson, Haydeger, Rosenberg and artists such as Charlie Chaplin in the 20th century pointed to this deterioration, the West was dragged into a total collapse (Kısakürek, 2013c, pp. 78-87; 1943d).

With this narrative of the modernization of the West, Kısakürek also emphasizes the basic characteristics of his own modernity understanding. He attaches great importance to the Ancient Greek philosophy because modernity is a level of

development that can only be achieved with a good ideology and worldview. As for good worldview, it is something that intellectual minds seeking for the truth can reveal. There is a great intellectual plan in the background. As will be illustrated ahead, this view of modernity is a reflection of the elitist mind structure of Kısakürek and directed him to an intellectual despotism.

The order represented by Rome also constitutes one of the pillars of Kısakürek's understanding of modernity. The modern society conceived by him lives in an area built by strict rules in which every area of life is determined by the intellectual despotism. It is in a complete order. With emphasize on the Christian morality, he states that his modern society must have the ethical values endowed by the divine ordinance. How the Western civilization has been built on this tripartite element, the society of the future also must be a morally undistorted society which lives in discipline in a set of rules laid down by intellectuals in the guide of the values of the divine teaching.

One of the main reasons why Kısakürek identifies modernity with Western Europe and sees America and the Soviet Union as the wrong variants of this modernity model is that he believes that the Western thought has not only an understanding in which the reason is absolutized but also a metaphysical dimension. He argued that the West maintained its development in two paths which are seemingly alike but different in essence. One of them takes its roots from the logic of Aristo, goes on with Descartes' scepticism, Leibniz and Spinoza's rationalism, Comte's positivism and Hegel's dialectic and ends with a total destruction of World Wars. The other one takes its roots from idealism of Plato, goes on with Michael Servetus, Giordano Bruno, Luther and Calvin's antagonism of superstition and bigotry of the church, Pascal and Kant's ambition of going beyond the material, and

ends with Blondel, Rembo and Bergson's sentiments of spiritual decadence (Kısakürek, 2013c). Kısakürek's goal with this distinction is the criticism of materialism and positivism, because, he presents an ontological objection to Western conceptualization of modernity. As Eisenstadt stated out, ontologically, the roots of modernity reaches to attempts of the bridging the chasm between the transcendental order and the mundane order, of the conceptualization and institutionalization of the tension between transcendental and the mundane order (Eisenstadt, 2003a, pp. 197-200). By rejecting the western narrative of the evolution of the modernity that is the tension between transcendent order and mundane order can be solved only by promoting the human reason and, concomitantly, secularism, Kısakürek claimed that this tension has been solved in a wrong way. He argues that man should accept the existence of the transcendent power of God beyond what he perceives as matter. To him, the western thought, advancing with the absolutization of the reason, created a society structure that morally corrupt and suffering spiritual crisis and the World wars were result of this situation.

Kısakürek conceptualizes Bergson's 'intuition' concept as 'understanding the beyond of the material' (*maddenin ötesini anlamak*) and offers a thinking frame namely *Tasavvuf* (*Sufism*) which has a metaphysic dimension. According to him, a system of thought that accepts the divine power which is beyond the material will also enable the human being to find the moral and spiritual order that he needs while progressing in the path of development. With the second path mentioned above, he tries to point out that this system of thought actually exists in the West as well, and it is the true aspect of the West that should be taken as the example.

The East participates into Kısakürek's synthesis at this very point. In his civilizational essentialism, the East is the world of the seeking of the truth beyond the

material world: “Spirit, miracle, tale, sorcery, poetry, science of beyondness, inaccessibility, and complexities exist in the East with their true and evil poles” (Kısakürek, 1952d).¹⁴⁹ Mystic sense of Indian, Chinese, Persian, pre-Islamic Arab and pre-Islamic Turkish civilizations constitutes the core of Eastern civilization. However, the East got its real essence with Islam, and after the fall of Arabs, the Turks, especially in the Ottoman time, became the unique, flourishing representative of the East (Kısakürek, 1946u, p. 2; 2013i, pp. 46-48). To him, Islam presents the knowledge of both mundane and otherworldly truth, and the *Sufism*, corresponds to understanding the beyond of the material in his eyes, is the only way of grasping this truth (Kısakürek, 2013c, pp. 10-13). The West, with its passion to explore the material world, and the East, with its impulse to search for the transcendent will beyond the material world, are the two fundamental components of Kısakürek's civilization perspective, and so of his understanding of modernity. And, Islam, as the only knowledge of the truth, is the subject of this perspective.

What led Kısakürek to such a synthesis is, as mentioned above, the ontological objection he presents to the Western conceptualization of modernity. He argues that if the mankind explores the material world by means of a metaphysical/*Sufic* eye instead of pure reason, it will realize that the order it has been exploring has been set up and being followed up by the transcendent will of God. From this point forth, he comes to the conclusion that the true shape of the modernity has been given as *a priori* by God by means of its messengers. And, since Islam is the only undistorted religion, everything that we know in the name of modernity should be rediscovered according to the Islam.

¹⁴⁹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Ruh, mucize, masal, büyü, şiir; ve ötelere, giriftlerin, sarmaş dolaşların, bilmecelelerin, varılmazların ilmi ve ruhu, mizacı ve şahsiyeti bütün hak ve batıl kutuplarıyla Doğudadır.

Kısakürek presents a modernity surrounded by religious references. The fundamental difference between this approach and the modernity we understand in the classical sense is that God is replaced with the individual, the main subject of modern society. Here, we are talking about a change in specific and social value of the individual, and we understand that it is limited to the place given by the divine ordinance. If we consider that the value given to the individual determines almost all areas of the modern society, from the political to the economic, social and legal structure, we see that a total differentiation is in question. Besides, the issues such as whether the divine ordinance leaves an adequate space for the individual to realize himself and be happy, in its essence, are relevant to what the divine ordinance is or, to put it more precisely, how it is interpreted. For this reason, it is not yet possible to fully understand what kind of a modernity Kısakürek envisaged and it is necessary to look at his interpretation that he conceptualizes as a true understanding of Islam.

On the other hand, his civilizational analysis continues to give some other clues on his comprehension of modernity. It is clearly observed that the traumatic influence of the winner-defeated psychology is at the very centre of his civilizational analysis. According to Göle, antagonistic attitude of Non-Western societies in their look at the Western civilization can led them to understand the modernity with an injured conscious. As a consequence of this, they may incline to establishing authoritarian political regimes with a nationalist and fundamentalist rhetoric (Göle, Winter 2000). Similarly, Eisenstadt also emphasizes on this injured nature of the relationship that Non-Western societies established with modernity and states that the impulse of filling the development gap as soon as possible can led them resort to authoritarian methods such as achieving total transformation of society in jacobin sense (Eisenstadt, 1999, pp. 51-68). Another aspect of this situation is that modernity

is reduced to a technology accumulation that will provide material advancement. As Kara pointed out, making the necessary things to be done through taking into consideration the urgent and practical targets in order to reverse the bad trend has been the fundamental strategy of the Islamists (Kara, 2001, p. 41). In this mind set, while the issues such as strengthening the arms of the army in order to stop military defeats, developing the industry to achieve economic independence are noticed as priority targets, the issues such as gaining importance of the individual in social life, the unchangeable and inalienable rights of the individual are pushed into a secondary position.

The psychology of winner-defeated led also Kısakürek to an antagonistic and revanchist attitude which completely affected his comprehension of modernity. In his mind, modernity turned to an entity that ought to be obtained in order to overcome economic and cultural hegemony of the West and degraded to technological and industrial development regardless of its intrinsic values. As will be seen ahead, he designed the state structure in his imagination with this comprehension of modernity and reached at a totalitarian, interventionist regime motivated with filling the development gap with the West.

6.5 Discovering the True Islam

One of the core proponents of Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* formulation is the claim that Islam is a belief system, ideology, worldview, and state system which has rasped the extreme poles of every ideology and system, and contains the most accurate form of everything (Kısakürek, 2013i, 105-107). It is understood from this proposition that instead of considering Islam as a phenomenon on its own, he evaluates Islam within the patterns, relations, systems, and facts of the modern time

that has developed via modernity. Nevertheless, the backwardness in the Muslim world led him to ask the question of ‘which Islam’. As also stated above, following the main path of the Islamism, Kısakürek saw the reason of decline as the alienation to the true form of Islam, and came to the conclusion that something should be changed in the Muslims’ experience of Islam.

The challenge of modernism has got an inducing effect on Islamists to bring etymological and ontological questioning of historical background of classical Islamic thought and its practices. The main problematic was formulated in terms of a renaissance project (Ismail, 2010, p. 579; Tunaya, 2007, p. 2). According to the main line Islamist logic, in order to cope with the challenge of modernity, classical Islamic thought and traditions should be reinterpreted in accordance with *Quran* and *Sunnah* (Duran, 2001, p. 102). By doing so, Islamists intended to reveal the progressive essence of Islam which produced advanced civilizations in the past.

Reinterpreting process brought the conception of the ‘golden age’¹⁵⁰ of Islam and revitalized seeking of the true Islam. The notion of golden age, as a primitivist utopia, symbolizes the inviolate and pristine epoch of Islam. This notion has provided a suitable environment where Islamists intellectuals might have justified their claim that modernity has been a requirement of the essence of Islam and has helped them through getting rid of the beliefs and convictions which has been considered as an obstacle to modernization (Kara, 1998, s. 34).

It can be said that, this logic of Islamism also led to democratization of religious knowledge; various actors can lay claim to the interpretation of scriptural orders. The interpretation of the detailed issues of personal, social, economic and

¹⁵⁰ The notion of golden age is limited to the time of Prophet Muhammad and first four caliphs.

political life, such as the veiling of women, the penalties of crimes, the functioning of the market place, etc. are no longer in the monopoly of traditional religious authority namely the *ulema* (Göle, Winter 2000, pp. 97,98). Interpretation of Islam with different perspectives has put different models of Islam into service of believers. Hidayet Şevkat Tuksal, a female theologian writer, has deeply challenged the general views on the position of women in Islam by re-arguing almost all layers of Islamic teaching (Tuksal, 2012). Here remarkable point, although the principle that there is a single Islam is defined as a precondition by every interpreter, the spectrum that this interpretation process revealed is quite wide. As Kara stated, the detection of the limits of the renovation (*ijtihad*) is still the one of the ground problematic of the Islamist discourses (Kara, 2001). In general, this situation has two reasons. The first is the differences in the methodology to be followed in the interpretation process (Sifil, 2004). Secondly, it is about how modernity has been accepted by the Muslim community in terms of ideas and values (Rahman, 1966, p. 117). In other words, it is, to a considerable extent, about the worldview of the interpreter and proportional with the needs of its worldview.

Actually, this is an issue which is as older as the Islam. As Zerrin Kurtoğlu indicated, the history of Islam (after the death of Prophet Muhammad) has become the history of gradual departure from the ideal and Muslim theologians and philosophers have tried to find the true way of understanding the Islam for centuries (Kurtoğlu, 2013, p. 209). The positions of mind and revelation in the understanding process of religion have been the main axes of these discussions for centuries. The feelings of hesitation and courageousness in interpreting a divine teaching have been influential in the determination of positions in this historical process and have increased the fervency of controversy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan even participated in the

debate which is continuing within its highest enthusiasm by stating that Islam cannot be reformed but should be updated (*Milliyet*, 09 March 2018). Erdoğan's point of view reflects Kısakürek's prudent position in the issue of renewal in Islam.

Kısakürek conceptually opposed to the idea of reform, since it contradicts with his claim that Islam, ontologically, already contains everything within their true forms. According to him, the word reform means restructuring something that had lost its form by adding new things to its body; and this, inevitably, means the destruction of its truth. Therefore, Islam should be rediscovered, not reformed (Kısakürek, 2013f, p. 161). In parallel, he advocated that Islam is not the one to be renewed, but the current understanding and application of Islam. From his point, the reformists are as detrimental as the infidel, and the immature fanatic, rude bigot (*ham softa, kaba yobaz*) for Islam (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 565,566).

As mentioned in the first chapter, Kısakürek adopted the Naqshbandi understanding of Islam, and saw himself as the follower of the line of Sirhindi. With this positioning, he also aimed at manifesting his understanding of the issue of reforming Islam. In his eyes, Sirhindi, as the renovator of the second millennium of Islam, revealed the single true path of discovering the true Islam. It is a renewal without losing any roots and essence of Islam. Speaking with Gencer's classification of reformist approach among Islamic scholars and Islamists, this is an orthodox comprehension that advocates self-sufficiency of *fiqh* through criticism of modernity that led to doubt as to the sufficiency of *fiqh* (Gencer, 2008). Yet, understanding Kısakürek's approach of rediscovering the true Islam needs a more detailed scrutinizing.

Kısakürek puts two groups under the title of false reformers against the renewal line which he objectified with Sirhindi. The first group is comprised of the intellectuals and Islamists who try to make Islam compatible with the Kemalist modernization project. Kısakürek emphasized especially on a report which was prepared as a reform program by some academics in *Darülfünun* in 1928. In their program, they argued that religious life should be reformed based on scientific ideas. Nonetheless, some of their suggestions such as the introduction of pews and instrumental music into the mosques, encouraging of people to enter mosques with shoes; performing prayers and sermons in Turkish language were highly radical in terms of traditional Islam understanding (Kara, 2014b, pp. 1162-1164). He interpreted this report as the first attempt of destructing Islam (Kısakürek, 1971i; Kısakürek, 1971j). Besides, he criticized also regulation of reading the *adhan* and *Quran* in Turkish in worship which encouraged by Atatürk (Kısakürek, 1950w). Similarly, he criticized the efforts of many theologians of his time such as Süleyman Ateş to interpret Islam from the perspective of scientific laws and theories or needs of the modern era (Kısakürek, 2009c, pp. 111-116).

The second group is comprised of the modernist Islamists such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Cemaleddin Afgani, Muhammad Abduh, Abu Al Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. He criticizes Afgani-Abduh line, who tried to accommodate Islamic principles and values with modernity, for making Islam dependent on its hostile worldview. As for Ibn Taymiyyah, he is the first representative of the materialistic look at Islam with his emphasis on the reason. For Kısakürek, his approach of interpreting Islam which considers the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* with their mere appearance (*zahir*) and which does not accept the way of *ijma*¹⁵¹ and *qiyas*¹⁵², was an attempt of bringing a kind of

¹⁵¹ Consensus of Islamic scholars.

materialism and mere rationalism (*kuru akılcılık*) into Islam; and provided background for wahhabism. With this comprehension of Islam, he is the “greatest fundamentalist” (Kısakürek, 2013r, pp. 127-129; 2013f, pp. 108,109; 2012g, p. 83). *Sufism*, besides the *Sharia*, is essential foundation for his conceptualization of true Islam. From his point of view, Islam cannot be understood in its true meaning without considering the inner dimensions (*batın*) of two ground sources of Islam (*Qur'an* and *Sunnah*). Those who claim that he can construe Qur'an only by means of the reason are in heresy (Kısakürek, 2013c, pp. 10-13). Therefore, what he criticized most about Taymiyyah's methodology was his exclusionary attitude of *Sufism*.

From these evaluations of Kısakürek we understand that he is opposed to the radical change of Islamic teaching on the name of modernization. He opposed having an apologetic attitude in the face of modernity. On the other side, he criticizes only the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* centric interpretations for being reductionist. Instead of this, he offers a *Sufic* interpretation of Islam. However, it is still not clear what kind of a methodology he presented. There are various questions to be answered. For instance, does *Sufi* interpretation of Islamic teaching (considering the inner dimension of the verses) present a limitless area since it is open to subjective evaluation? What are the inner dimensions of the verses? Who can grasp the knowledge of truth?

In common forms of *Sufism* it is believed that the true interpretation of the inner dimension of the *Quran* can be done only by the people who have distinct spiritual and mental features. Truths are visible not for the whole religious community but only for contemplatives (Burckhardt, 2008). These features can be gain via following a long-time suffering path in *Sufi* order through which the believer will be freed from the bonds that bind him to this world and will be directed to God with full

¹⁵² The use of analogy as precedent in *Sharia* jurisprudence.

devotion; or they can be bestowed by the God. In other words, the Islam becomes a language of the elected, distinguish people. Here a paradoxical situation arises. The subject presented as an interpreter is a person who is purified from worldly affairs. On the other hand, he is expected to interpret the earthly one correctly. Besides this, metaphysical abilities such as miracles that are bestowed by God can be attributed to the qualities of this commentator (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 109-127). Almost all of those whom Kısakürek regards as the right interpreters of religion are separated from ordinary believers with their supreme abilities some of which can go beyond the reality (Kısakürek, 2012d; Kısakürek, 2012l). On the other hand, *Sufism* gains a more extend meaning in Kısakürek's mind set. It can even be part of the daily life of ordinary people. For the Naci character, a devoted believer in his novel *Aynadaki Yalan* (Lie in the Mirror) Name novel, *Sufism* is a system of thought that helps him to understand the world. At the same time, it is a measure by which he assessed the intimacy of love that Mine felt for him (Kısakürek, 2013a). Or, it might also be a point of view that a judge should have in providing justice (Kısakürek, Reis Bey, 2013o). To put it simply, *Sufism*, for Kısakürek, is not just a language spoken by elites. If they have the right conscious, ordinary believers also can reach the truth.

According to Kısakürek, there are three means for the conscious believer, who he named as 'real and deep Muslims' (gerçek ve derin Müslüman), in order to reach the true Islam: *Sharia*, *Sufism*, and reason (Kısakürek, 1949o). To him, the conscious believer is fully bound to *Sharia*, but he does not read it as a pure text. He or she knows that there are inner dimensions and tries to discover them (Kısakürek, 1949m; 1949n). Reason helps the conscious believer in this process of discovery, but it is not an unlimited inquiry tool. In his logic, the philosophy which is the basis of the Western thought is just a process of refutation trying to find out what is wrong. In

Islam, the truth is definite and revealed by God (Kısakürek, 1949). Therefore, the quest for knowledge is not an endeavour to reach at the unknown but the discovery of the known. In this sense, the limits of the reason are drawn by the *Sharia*. The reason has to discover the true forms of the truth by staying within the limits of *Sharia*. With this mentality, Kısakürek tries to protect the orthodox understanding of religion while evaluating all the values derived from the progress of the humanity. In this regard, he opposed the general approach of the Islamists by arguing that the *ijtihad* door is closed since it is not possible to make it in present time; as the founders of law schools (*Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali*) did in the past. Besides, the things that had to be done already had done by great *ulema* of the medieval age like Sirhindi. The duty of today's Muslim is to rediscover what is there (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 565-567).

The systematic Kısakürek presented is highly paradoxical in itself. It is a product of his mental state which considers the things which have ontological distinctness in their essence can operate in an intermingling way on the name of transcendence of the Islam. While presenting the knowledge of truth as thing that an ordinary believer can reach, on the other hand it becomes a language of the contemplatives.¹⁵³ While seeing the *Sharia* as the limits of the reason, on the other hand, he ignores that it is the *Sharia* that needs to be re-evaluated. Also, it is still unclear that what the inner dimensions of the verses are. If we think that the *Sharia*, as the rules of Islamic law, has some inner dimensions which cannot be seen by a textual look and this inner dimensions can be found by the reason -no matter it is committed to God or not- we can come to conclusion that Kısakürek -contrary to his argument- presents an interpretation model of which limits are highly blurry. The

¹⁵³ Actually, when looked at the mysticism issue also from the perspective of the Christianity and Judaism, we can observe that it becomes an inevitable tendency to create a class of contemplatives which is comprised of ones who have some capacity to reach to knowledge that ordinary believer cannot possess (Green, 2015).

conceptualization of 'rediscovering' in that regard turns to an ideological rhetoric that, with Geertz's depiction, is shaped in the blurry river of the ideology that overlay the facts (Geertz, 1973). For a better understanding of the subject, a few examples can be emphasized.

While explaining the dimensions of the Islamic revolution the *İdeolacya Örgüsü*, Kısakürek stated that he envisaged an Interest-free economic structure since the interest is one of the most important sins in Islam (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 129,130,217-220). Nevertheless, as a former banker, Kısakürek was aware of the fact that interest, which is one of the basic instruments of the economic systems of modern societies, cannot be excluded totally. He tried to find a solution to this situation in his work of '*İman ve İslam Atlası*' (Atlas of Faith and Islam) which he penned in the *fiqh*-catechism work style and dealt with this kind of issues in more detail. Kısakürek argues in this book that banks having a large role in economic systems as a guide of the capital can resolve the issue of interest, which they require to keep at a minimum level, with a change of name and meaning. To him, it is enough for the banks to call the money they receive in exchange for the loans as 'cost' and to call the money they pay the depositors as 'fixed profit share' (Kısakürek, 2013l, pp. 245,246).

We can see a similar approach on marriage issue. Although he opposed to regulation of societal issues by means of a civil code prepared aspired from the law text of the Europe, struggled to maintain continuity with the existing *de jure* practices by means of stretching the Islamic provisions. For example, when dealing with polygamy issue he argued that that it is no longer valid provision of Islam since it is not possible to maintain justice among wives in today's world conditions. Similarly, by stating that marriage is a contract which should be performed in the face of the witnesses, and the ones who carried out this procedure should not be religious

officials, he comes to the conclusion that solemnizing of marriage by the state authorities is valid in terms of religion. The only thing that needs to be done is to pray in solemnizing process. In addition, many of the legal provisions in civil code such as the women's right of divorce and practice of alimony are also compatible with true Islam comprehension from his perspective (Kısakürek, 2013, pp. 316-324).

The thing that tried to be addressed here is not whether Kısakürek interpreted the religious provisions correctly or not, but understanding logic of his interpreting method. If we think within Kısakürek's approach, we come to conclusion that interest institution has already existed in Islam ontologically in different forms. Or, we can come to conclusion that polygamy was a permission which was given for only a certain period of time. Similar conclusions can be made for many other issues, such to be cut of the hand as the theft penalty. Actually, contrary to his claim, Kısakürek opened a very wide interpretation field for himself. Indicating that some Islamic provisions have validity in relation to a certain period of time opens door to removal of all Islamic provisions by examining them in the same filter. If we go back to the words of Kara, the question of where the *ijtihad* door is opened is not the answered yet.

Another issue that can be observed from Kısakürek's interpretation of Islamic principles is that his modernity comprehension, and, in parallel, his interpretation of true Islam is stuck in the patterns of the period that he was in. For example, high production potential that the modern era needs has increased the participation of women in the working life. The social position of the woman who participated in the working life has also changed in parallel. In that regard, Kısakürek also argues that a state of equality between men and women in almost every area of social life is a necessity of true Islam understanding, but, when it comes to the institution of

marriage, this principle of equality is distorted in favour of men (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 136,137; 2013l). The point to be noted here is that there was a similar approach in the Turkish Civil Code up to the amendment made in 2002. It was accepted in the law that the leader of the family is the husband, and there is the supremacy of the man in family decisions such as the place where to live, guardianship of the children (Şıpka, 2015, p. 49). Therefore, there was no need for Kısakürek to reargue the principle of equality between men and women in marriage, so he continued to stay in traditional patterns. From this aspect, we can argue that the model Kısakürek presented also not seems capable of producing of extra modern patterns. We can make a similar judgment in his claim that Islam presents the true values of the virtuous society. It is expected from his perspective that the use of the mind with a *Sufi* conscious will lead us to discover the highest values of the virtuous society. However, he ignores the question of the morality of the nuclear weapon, while he is in a call for scientific mobilization to produce a nuclear weapon.

Lastly, it will be beneficial to discuss the question that the use of the mind with a *Sufi* consciousness, which accept that the knowledge of the truth belongs only to God, enables the human being to operate in the scientific field adequately. As mentioned above, Kısakürek put forth *Sufism* as a way of thinking that opposes to positivism. In his eyes, positivism is mere rationalism (*kuru akılçılık*) which discovers the earth from a materialistic eye. The idea that the reality cannot be reached only by the methods which base on observation and experiment and there is a dimension of the reality that we cannot perceive by means of our sense has been argued by many intellectuals, such as Kant and Bergson, for centuries. This mental quest also reflected to the relationship between the reason and revelations. The human being is still trying to establish a balance between reason and scriptural revelations by means of several

approaches to determine this relationship such as compartmentalism (or two truths), represented by Duns Scotus and William Ockham, and complementarity, represented by Augustine and Aquinas (Gencer, 2008, pp. 562-567). Besides, it also worth to mention that, there are many serious attempts aimed at proving that there is no any contradictory between the Islamic teaching and the knowledge that is produced with positivist methods, such as Caner Taslaman's works on relations between modern science, philosophy and God (Taslaman, 2008). Instead of exhaustively discussing this topic which is still being discussed intensively here, I will consider the approach of Kısakürek.

Kısakürek thought that he allowed enough place to the mind for operating adequately in its scientific quest. In this comprehension, God is located far enough not to interfere with the functioning of the mind. He does not see a problem in this regard since he has identified the idea of progress, to great extent, with access to technology. In other words, the mind is free to act freely in the scientific processes that result in the invention of the locomotive. The only thing that should be taken into consideration for a believer is to believe that the knowledge needed for the invention of the locomotive bestowed by God (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 182-185; 2013m). However, this mindset does not give enough place to the reason in its scientific quest, as Kısakürek assumed. First of all, it has a potential of filling the gap which are not determined by scientific knowledge yet by means of scriptural revelations. Secondly, religious value judgments are still pushing believers away from many scientific enterprises. Many issues such as abortion and genetic parenthood are also met with reaction in different religions. Since Kısakürek advocates an orthodox understanding of Islam, it is more possible to come across with such kind of resistance. For him, even the literature must be a product of *Sufi* consciousness. He imaginary judged

many intellectuals in the courts of literature he fictionalized and convicted even a prominent Islamist like Mehmet Akif since not having a *Sufic* conscience (Kısakürek, 2013g).

In addition, the scientific process that leads the societies to modernity cannot be reduced only to technological progress. From the discussions on the nature of the knowledge to the limits of our knowing ability and the existence of a transcendent power, many discussions are indispensable parts of the scientific process. Philosophy is, in this sense, one of the most important tools of human scientific inquiry. Yet, Kısakürek excludes philosophy from the understanding process of the human being by arguing that there is not any single point except wrongs that the philosophy can grasp (Kısakürek, 2013c; 2013m). If we think by means of Kısakürek's system, our struggle to understand even in very basic question such as whether the religion is a fact produced by the human being is blocked from the very beginning.

6.6 *Başyücelik* State Order

In the framework of *Büyük Doğu* idea, Kısakürek offers a state and society model, named as *Başyücelik* state order, which is designed according to principles of his true Islam understanding. In other words, it is a manifestation of his *Büyük Doğu* ideology shaped in flesh and bones. Examining this state and society model provides an opportunity to evaluate his thoughts in concrete terms.

According to Kısakürek, there is no state model like sultanate or republic in Islam. Instead, there is a spirit of governance. He indicated that the state model he offered represents the governance spirit in Islam (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 119). However, it should be stated in advance that he designed this model within frame of the patterns of modern time. *Başyücelik* state is a nation-state and, in the institutional sense, it is a

re-adaptation of the state model of Turkey defined in 1924 Constitution from his own ideological perspective. According to the organizational structure, the head of the state is the *Başyüce* (Head Noble) who corresponds to the President (Kısakürek, 1946b). The legislative authority, which has been conducted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, has been given to *Yüceler Kurultayı* (Congress of Nobles) (Kısakürek, 1946y). The government is comprised of one prime minister, appointed by the president among the members of the Congress, and eleven ministers. Each ministry is divided in three undersecretaries each of which responsibility area is determined according to the ministry's function areas.¹⁵⁴ Head of Religious Affairs and Chief of General Staff are the natural members of council of ministries with their supra-governmental natures. These two institutions were directly connected to the president. He set also independent institutions in the governmental mechanism of the state, such as court of cassation, chamber of accounts.¹⁵⁵ All branches of the government are subjected to the inspection of the Congress (Kısakürek, 1946e).

On the other hand, instead of a democratic system he re-fictionalized the structure and function of these institutions to his mindset. As stated also by Duran, Kısakürek adopted a Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy. Like, he had an elitist and technocratic vision (Duran, 2001, p. 278). According to Schumpeter, democracy, unlike the argument of utilitarian fathers of democratic doctrine, is not a

¹⁵⁴ The list of the ministries with their sub-function areas are: 1. Ministry of Education (Science and Arts, Public Nurture and Educatory Homes, Public Education) 2. Ministry of War (Land, Navy, Air) 3. Ministry of Economy (Industry, Trade, Agriculture) 4. Ministry of Finance (Budget and Public Equilibration, Taxes and pictures, Banks and Monopolies) 5. Ministry of Health and Care (Improvement, Beautification, Reproduction) 6. Ministry of Justice (Courts, Reformatories, Laws) 7. Ministry of Print and Propaganda (Print, Propaganda, Tourism) 8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (East, West, Intelligence) 9. Ministry of Internal Affairs (Administrative Organization, Municipalities, Public Police) 10. Ministry of Public Works (Facilities, Roads, Transportation) 11. Ministry of Regulation (Organization Plan, Business Plan, Insurance and Retirement).

¹⁵⁵ Kısakürek did not give the all names of those institutions. Probaply, he considered all independent institutions existed in the Republic in 1940s.

system introducing the will of the people to the political sphere by means of the common good. First of all, it is not possible to reach the common good which is conceivable for every one of the society. The common good is a so relative entity for everyone. Ultimately, democracy is a system of competing politicians, not the rule of the people. The committee or body of delegates (an assembly or parliament) which is expected to voice, reflect or represent the will of the electorate, just represent the things that dictated to the electorate by advertising means and other methods of persuasion. The human nature is also amenable to such kinds of influences. Besides, democracy in which very diverse interest groups are in competition is often unsuccessful in solving critical issues. On the other hand, military dictatorship, established by Napoleon in France, was more successful in solving the most pressing needs of the moment, such as the issue of religious settlement that was left as a chaos by the revolution (Schumpeter, 1994, pp. 250-257).

Kısakürek grounded his theoretical opposition to democracy to a similar approach with Schumpeter. To him, political power should be conceded to an aristocracy of idea (*fikir aristokrasisi*) who can determine the rights and needs of the society better than society itself, because ordinary people are easily manipulable entities. Their nature is inclined to make mistake. How the patient does not have the right to choose medication in the place where the doctor is, the people also have limited say in the administration of the state (Kısakürek, 2013c, p. 200; Duran, 2001). Moving from that point, Kısakürek opposed to the idea of national will as well. To him, “the nation does not want anything, it can want after it becomes ready to want, it is made want. Like a doctor and his patient. There is nothing for the patient to

demand, but the doctor has something to give” (Kısakürek, 2012g, p. 37).¹⁵⁶ The nation is an entity that needs to be trained first.

Kısakürek tries to support his arguments also by a religious perspective through attributing a *Sufi* sense. To him, since the truth is the knowledge belongs to God it can be found by submission to it. In that regard, freedom also has to be understood in a limited way that it was confined within the principles of Islam. Freedom cannot be a goal, but a vehicle. It can be a right of the ones who are the slaves of the divinely truth. In addition, the ultimate sovereignty does not belong to the people but God (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 497). In that regard, the western understanding of freedom is nothing but a brutish freedom (*hayvani hürriyet*) which would be detrimental for sovereignty of the truth:

“There is no distinct word for everyone, no distinct idea for everyone, no distinct decision for everyone, and no distinct truth for everyone. The truth is one. One person finds the truth and makes it confirmed by one million people. Thus, order and harmony emerge. So the votes are collected in one person. If this person’s truth was wrong, another person comes to find the truth and makes it confirmed by the people, again by himself. And so again the votes are gathered in one person without discussion”.¹⁵⁷ The real matter is finding these one persons and bringing together (Kısakürek, 1946c; 2010f, s. 241).

¹⁵⁶ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Millet istemez, isteyecek hale geldikten sonra ister, ona istetilir...Hasta ve Doktor gibi...Hastanın isteyeceği bir şey yoktur. Doktorun vereceği vardır.

¹⁵⁷ This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Herkese mahsus bir söz, herkese mahsus bir fikir, herkese mahsus bir hüküm, herkese mahsus bir hakikat yoktur. Hakikat birdir. Onu yine bir kişi bulur, bir milyon kişiye tasdik ettirir. Böylece nizam ve ahenk dediğimiz şey doğar. Ve böylece, ister istemez oylar tekde toplanır. Eğer bir kişinin bulduğu şey eğri ve yanlışsa, başka bir kişi çıkar, yine tek başına bulur, yine bir milyon kişiye tasdik ettirir. Ve yine böylece reyler, mırınkırın olmadan, hakkın zorunda toplanır.

With this logic, Kısakürek comes to the conclusion that state should be governed by competent elites who can concentrate on the real matters instead of seeking their interest. In his *Başyücelik* state, members of the Congress are chosen from notables of the society who aged between 40 and 65, has superior qualities, and far from every kind of worldly deficiencies. Losing of these qualifications is the reason of expulsion. For him, the meaning of this congress is “summarization the nation within the contexture of the best thinkers and the best ones”.¹⁵⁸ Its mission is represented as ‘the pressure of the true intellectuals’. In order for a person to be a candidate for the Council membership, he must first be nominated by the congress, and must be approved by the *Başyüce*. Once the congress established, it will prevail forever (Kısakürek, 1946y). Similarly, the president (*Başyüce*) also is expected to be the most virtuous, wise, and clever one of the nation. He is elected by the citizens via mono-grade election for five years but among the candidates nominated by the Congress (Kısakürek, 1946b). The government is also set up by the Prime Minister who is elected by the President among the members of the Congress. For Kısakürek, the ground goal in terms of organization is to carry out the state administration by a board established by the most qualified and distinguished members of the nation (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 296).

Kısakürek's philosophy of administration, which he offered as the spirit of government in Islam, is based on the application of the common will given as a priori for all, since it is based on the premise that truth has already been presented by God, as mentioned above. In that regard, the most intolerable thing for the governors and legislators in his *Başyücelik* state order is to think in a liberal way regarding what the people wants. In parallel with this comprehension he gives very large authorities to

¹⁵⁸ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Yüceler Kurultayı'nın manası, milleti, en ileri düşünenlerin ve en iyi yapanların kadrosunda özleştirmektir.

the leaders. The council is obliged to make all necessary legal regulations in each area, from public to individual. Personal freedom areas are very limited (Kırsakürek, 1946y). The President, as the head of the executive power, governs the country under these laws. If there is a gap that not clarified by the laws, his orders become law without the approval of the Congress. Moreover, the president determines the government and has right to overthrow. It assigns the head of all state institutions, including the independent ones, such as court of cassation, chamber of accounts (Kırsakürek, 1946b; 1946d).

It can be argued that one of the reasons lay behind Kırsakürek's distrust of democracy and adopting an elitist approach can be his experiences in politics. We can see a similar interaction in Vilfredo Pareto who was one of the prominent names of classical elite theory. He was an enthusiastic Italian liberal in his youth. Entering politics to achieve his ideals, Pareto convinced in the course of time that the politics were degenerate due to some reasons such as politicians' seeking of their own interest. Consequently, Pareto adopted a complete antidemocratic approach. (Pareto, 1966, pp. 4,5; Marshall, 2007, pp. 11-21). From the very earliest times of his life, Kırsakürek was in close contact with important political actors of the country. He met with almost all of the prime ministers. He could observe the operation of the political process in person. Moreover, he became a part of clientelistic relationships, schisms in politics. For him, some principles of democracy such as the will of people were meaningful to some degree in the period of the Democrat Party rule, but country's dragging into political turmoil and economic crisis in the post-1960 unstable coalitions period destroyed the last crumbs of his belief in democracy. He frequently advocated that Turkey needed a leader like Napoleon who could overcome the chronic and acute problems. Besides, he ardently supported the Coup of 1980 since it established a

military dictatorship by which the problems of the country could be solved rapidly without sticking into quandary of democratic functioning (Kısakürek, 2009h).

Together with regarding the influence of his personal experiences in politics, the much more important factor that should be taken into consideration is his mental state. As tried to be explained in the first two chapters, Kısakürek believed in that only a small group of people has the capacity of evaluating the things and incidents in a sensible way. In his many literary works, the intellectual stereotype he identified with himself is the only actor who can lead the country to salvation. Intellectual elitism is one the basic pillars of his ideational world. Therefore, he advocated that the political power should be conceded to an aristocracy of idea (Kısakürek, 2013c, p. 200). In parallel with this elitist mindset, in his *Başyücelik* state, he designed also a state institution, namely *Başyücelik Akademiyası* (Academia of Başyüce), through which the intellectuals will be under patronage the state. There are three branches in the academia: “Lore (ilim) and contemplation (tefekkür) branch, science and discoveries branch, literature and arts branch”. All the intellectuals who have works in world-wide scale and well known are accepted to the academy in their branches. All the needs of these intellects are met in the most luxurious way and a life of prosperity is provided. They cannot be assigned with any vocation except teaching (Kısakürek, 1946).

In relation to Kısakürek’s elitist approach, it is also possible to mention the effect of religious nature of the state. As mentioned above, *Başyücelik* is an Islamic state and the sovereignty belongs to God, not to the people. All the rules are regulated under the guidance of *Sharia* and *Yüce Din Dairesi* (Supreme Religious Office), an institution bound directly to the president, supervises all the enactments in terms of *Sharia* (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 299,300). Eisenstadt puts a correlation between

religious teachings which regulate the earthly issues as a whole with the claim of transcendency and Jacobin attitudes of the modernizing projects in Non-Western societies (Eisenstadt, 1999, pp. 94-105). We can say that there is very considerable effect of Kısakürek's insistent claim on the transcendence of Islam on this state and society design. From his *Sufic* perspective, the truth which makes everything -mundane or otherworldly- meaningful belongs only to God. And this truth includes the true sides of all ideologies, thoughts, and worldviews without any contradictions since it comes from God. In this regard, there is no need to ask people about what is good for them. Some people -notables of the society or contemplatives in *Sufi* order- must discover these good things already existing in the essence of Islam and must offer to the society.

While building this state system, Kısakürek also tries to put into practice his claim that Islam includes the good sides of all the ideologies, worldviews and government systems. In that regard, although he designed the state in an authoritarian sense, he also aimed at establishing a check and balance system between legislative and executive powers as it is in Western democracies. In this system, while the president represents the will of the nation as an elected institution, the congress as a nonelected institution represents the truths above the politics. The congress has the right to depose the *Başyüce* with the seventy-five percent of its all member's votes; and can assign a new one until the elections hold. By the same token, *Başyüce* also has the right to dissolve the congress; but he can use this right indirectly that he has to ask the nation to give a decision between him and congress. As a precondition of this process, he has to get the approval of the forty percent of the all members of the congress. Also the government which determined by *Başyüce*, can be fallen by the votes of the absolute majority of the members of the congress. To Kısakürek, it is a

kind of a balance system that the contemporary democracies could not achieve; and to name, it is an ordered and disciplined freedom (Kısakürek, 1946d, p. 2).

Besides this check and balance system, in the direction of the people to participate in the political process, Kısakürek also established an institution, called 'People's council', as a mechanism by which the people can directly convey their demands to the President. In a similar way with the model applied in the ancient Greek city states in which the people directly participate in politics, it is thought that the people can directly and comfortably defend their interest and rights within the scales of respect, propriety, and politeness in this order. On the other hand, Kısakürek's mistrust over the ordinary people led him to take same measures. The ones who will be participated in the people's council are determined by a commission, connected directly to the president, several times in a year. Those people, first, have to persuade the commission that they are right in their demands. Although the people are envisaged to be free in conveying their demands, they might be subjected to the severe sanctions if they tell a lie or abuse this opportunity (Kısakürek, 1946r).

Kısakürek argued that, in economic terms, he could achieve a balance also between socialism and capitalism in *Başyücelik* state order. The basic logic of this system is based on the adoption of the consciousness that all property belongs primarily to God (*malik-ul mulk*; Lord of the earth). To him, the boss, acting with this consciousness, while providing capital accumulation on the one hand, also compensates his worker's labour in a fair way on the other hand. Besides, the boss has to distribute a piece of his income to his worker as *zakat*¹⁵⁹. In parallel, the worker, who has been given a fair compensation for his labour, fulfils his responsibility without interruption. Thus, the concept of the exploitation of the capital class on the

¹⁵⁹ *Zakat* is a form of alms-giving which is obligatory for all Muslim.

worker will come to an end. (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 377-283). Nevertheless, the state retains the authority to intervene and the limit of this intervention may reach until the confiscation of property. Even the capital that is not converted to investment can be taken under control of the state (Kısakürek, 1959c).

As compatible with the totalitarian nature of the state, Kısakürek aimed at making of a social structure of which every aspect is regulated in accordance with Islamic way of life. In the articles published in the form of a manifesto under the title of '*Başyücelik Emirleri*' (orders of *Başyüce*), he summed up the rules and the prohibitions which must be obeyed strictly. Some of these rules, such as gambling, prostitution, theft, alcohol and drug use, interest, are directly quoted from *Sharia* (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 319-329; 1950g; 1950l; 1950i). Besides these, he also imposed bans on some issues which he thought incompatible with the Islamic way of life. These rules encompass a wide range of the daily life ranging from “polluting around to breaking the queue, speaking loudly in public areas, and picking a quarrel”. However, it is not so possible to say that these rules are set by considering religious sources. To put it more precisely, they are products of his aristocratic, elitist character. To give more examples, the ones “who wear an unceremonious and shameless attitude, who make rude remarks about someone within his hearing, who dressed inappropriately (like a doxy, hippy, rowdy, vagabond artist, wanton woman or a tatterdemalion villager), who make inopportune jokes” are incongruous members of the society. To him, they should be taken under supervision of the state by “the nurture and aesthetics police” (*terbiye ve zevk zabıtası*) and should be sentenced to punishments which will discipline their rude attitudes (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 317,318; 1951f; 1951h).

With Cemil Oktay's definition, the society that Kısakürek envisaged is a *kışlalaştırılmış*¹⁶⁰ society (Oktay, 2017, p. 61). As can be seen from the above statements, everyone in the *Başyücelik* state order is surrounded by definite rules and these rules are not limited to personal and moral issues. They cover also economical, cultural, intellectual matters. For instance, every man in the society has to be occupied with a certain job. He sees the ones who panhandle, who waste time in cafes, who afford his living by means of his parents or by inheritance as the leeches of the society; and they are forced to work by state authorities (Kısakürek, 1950h; 1951g; 2013i, pp. 307-309). The state keeps its supervision on also intellectual fields. Dance and sculpture arts are prohibited (Kısakürek, 1951e; 1951d). There is not the understanding of freedom of publication. Every kind of publication needs state permission. The scenarios and the cast of all domestic and foreign film and theatre works have to go through state control (Kısakürek, 1950j; 1950k). Moreover, he does not hesitate to apply to the strict measures when these rules are violated.

“The soul of our understanding of law which is firmly attached to the main measure (*Sharia*) is that: If necessary, to scythe the whole community until the last woman and man who will be the core of the new society which is in our imagine; and accepting this move as the most advanced degree of mercy in the face of the superior benefit of the new society to be established following this step” (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 320).¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ The concept of '*Kışlalaştırılmış* society' corresponds to a social structure which is put under the rule of military order.

¹⁶¹ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Kanun ruhumuzun, ana ölçüye sınıksız bağlı özü şudur: Vatanda, hayalimizdeki cemiyete çekirdek olacak tek kadınla tek erkek kalıncaya kadar, gerekirse bütün topluluğu tırpandan geçirmek ve bu hamleyi takip edici yeni cemiyetin üstün selamet şartları karşısında, hamlemizi, adalet ve merhametin en ileri tecellisi şeklinde kabul etmek lazımdır.

It is also possible to follow up the traces of the injured and dependent relationship that Kısakürek established with modernity in the designing of this state and society structure. The main goal of the *Başyücelik* state besides creating a moral society is to close the gap of development with Western civilization as soon as possible. As stated above, the state is authorized to take all kinds of compulsory measures for the continuous operation of the economic system. The economic goal is to get rid of the economic and cultural hegemony of the West by setting up as many factories as the number of mosques in the country (Kısakürek, 1971f). In that regard, individual rights are suspended and people are forced to a strict work discipline in line with this objective. In *Başyücelik* state, no individual can live without working. Workers do not have rights like strikes or lockouts. Any kind of trade relationship that can disrupt the economic system such as black marketing is harshly punished. All capital has to be converted into investment. Otherwise, the state has the authority to intervene in private property (Kısakürek, 1946g). With a Herodian reflex, Kısakürek also gives great importance to sending students abroad. University youth was assumed as an agent to bring the technique and technology of the West to the country (Kısakürek, 1950f). However, the interaction established with Western civilization should be one sided. Therefore, the entry of non-Muslim specialists to the country is prohibited. Moreover, a xenophobic approach prevails. All non-Muslims would be deported (Kısakürek, 1950e; 1951i).

When we look at the whole picture, we face with a totalitarian, technocratic state structure which aimed at transforming the society from top to down by means of authoritarian tools. One of the basic deficiencies in Kısakürek's *Başyücelik* state model is that there are many uncertainties as to functioning process of the state. For instance, working procedures of the Congress are not identified. Actually, it is not

possible to say that Kısakürek cares about such kind of issues because he only aims at revealing governance logic. Yet, the most critical problem arises here. There is a complete confusion in terms of authority and responsibility relationships. It can be said that this confusion stems from his endeavour of explaining everything within a religious perspective which bases on the presupposition that the Islam includes the best sides of every worldly field ranging from ideology to economic policies. This logic brings him to the conclusion that political and economic systems with different dynamics can operate together without conflict. According to the emerging picture, the people has the right to participate in the political process directly- as it is in the ancient Greek city states- and to question the president who has extraordinary authority while being ruled by a totalitarian regime which involves in every layer of life. With the same logic, he also assumes that it is possible to overcome the complicated economic problems of modern time by means of people's voluntary submission to God with a *Sufi* sense and *zakat* institution in Islam. Fazlur Rahman, one of the prominent modernist Islamists, criticizes such approaches by stating that they are unrealistic in terms of coming over the challenges of the modern era (Rahman, 2003b, p. 76). Another paradoxical issue in his logic is that while people's voluntary submission to God is seen as a basic instrument in solving many of the problems on the one hand, he also aware that a considerable part of the people may not incline to such kind of a *Sufi* way of life. Moreover, he is ready to "scythe the whole community until the last woman and man who will be the core of the new society" (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 320).

6.7 Revolutionary Nature of the *Büyük Doğu*

The notion of revolution was one of the most pioneering motivations that shaped the minds of the Turkish political elites and intellectuals especially in early Republican era. While the succession and maintenance of the Kemalist revolutions constituted the backbone of the Turkish political life, the 'Kadro' movement aiming to develop the revolutions by indoctrinating them, the limited conservative critiques such as Peyami Safa's '*Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*' (Gazes on the Turkish Revolution), and the total oppositions such as the Kısakürek's *Büyük Doğu* formed the milestones of Turkish political life by taking position in axis of this backbone in those years.

Kısakürek also determined the basic notion of *Büyük Doğu* idea as 'revolution-reform' (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 194). The idea of revolution is such essential for his ideational world that he wrote a book titled '*ihtilal*' (revolution) to express his evaluations on the characteristic of the true revolution (Kısakürek, 2012h, p. 7). Examining Kısakürek's approach of revolution also helps us to understand his political strategy.

Kısakürek identified the concept of the revolution in the first place within a very generalizing way:

“Every movement in each structure which unsettles its own order and seeks a new path for a new order is a revolution; and this attitude is single in its essence and abstract for every existence embodying a community from a single man of whose inside is crowd as much as the humanity, to a family of

three to five, a tribe comprised of family of eight to ten, and a huge community” (ibid, 7).¹⁶²

Concomitantly, he goes to a classification among the revolutionary movements. In this classification, the prophetic movements (he circumscribed these movements with Islamic teaching) are ‘the most lofty absolute revolutions’, saintly movements such as the struggle of apostles of Jesus ‘lofty absolute revolutions’, the large scaled worldly revolutionary movements such as Renaissance, the French Revolution and the Communist Revolution are the ‘relative and land based revolutions’, lastly, rebellion oriented movements such as *Yeniçeri* uprisings, and some reactionary movements such as *Şeyh Bedrettin* uprising are the servile (*süfli*) and most servile revolutions (Kısakürek, 2011b, pp. 21-23; 2012h, pp. 361,362).¹⁶³ From his perspective, the core of the revolutions is a quest for the new, and action (*aksiyon*). However, revolution is not solely “a metamorphosis, a change of shape, but a case of building a society of the idea (*ide*)” (Kısakürek, 2009a, p. 103). Because, change in the name of change is nonsense and action (*aksiyon*) is not simply an act. Action should have a supreme idea, and the quest for the new should be a in the guide of this supreme idea (Kısakürek, 2013k, pp. 10,11). With such a grounding of the notion of revolution, Kısakürek comes to the conclusion that Islamic revolution is the unique true revolution. Because only Islam has the knowledge of the true truth and

¹⁶² This is the author’s translation. The original text is: Bir bünyenin, kendi içinde, kendi öz nizamını sarsıcı ve yeni bir nizama yol arayıcı her hareket ihtilaldır ve bu davranış, içi beşeriyet kadar kalabalık tek fertten, üç beş kişilik aileye, sekiz on ailelik kabileye ve koskoca cemiyete, hasılı topluluk belirten her varlığa kadar, esasta ve mücerrette birdir.

¹⁶³ As also can be seen from this clasification, Kısakürek could use different terms such as reform, rebellion, uprising under the concept of revolution. However, it is not his general comprehension of revolution. In another work of him, he stated that his comprehension of revolution is not destructive sense but constructive, and the closest counter of his understanding of revolution is reform (Kısakürek, 2011b, p. 10).

only Islam can be accepted as the true ideal, world view (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 120,121).

In addition, Kısakürek enumerated some characteristics of the true revolution. Firstly the revolution can be sensible phenomenon if it has a supreme idea, a world view; and this supreme idea should be conceptualized and systematized with some works. In his eyes, although they are not in the direction of the true truth, the French Revolution and the communist revolution can be evaluated as a revolution since their world view are well conceptualized with some works. On the other hand, he states that the Kemalist Revolution cannot be settled in the class of true revolution because it does not have such a work (Kısakürek, 2012h, pp. 364,365). He identified the second character of a revolution as ‘art, science and discovery’. According to him, together with basing on some principles made of scientific reality, a revolution also should have an artistic view that goes beyond conventional patterns, and with this view, it should reveal something new (ibid, 366-368). Thirdly, a revolution should have a leader and cadre. To him, the Kemalist Revolutions cannot be regarded as a true revolution since it did not have a cadre; rather it is a movement of a single leader (ibid, 369-371). Fourthly, a revolution should have the senses of daringness and temerity (*cür’et ve gözükaralık*) (ibid, 371-373). Fifthly, a revolution should have the values of morality and self-sacrifice. The morality that Kısakürek means is the morality of revolution. By referring to Lenin's words "a communist does not have a personal life", he advocates that the revolutionaries must possess a revolutionary morality that gets them make every kind of sacrifice (ibid, 373-378). Sixthly, he advocates that a revolution should be carried out under a certain order and discipline. To him, the strongest of the tripartite elements that generated the Western civilization (Greece reason, Roman order, and Christian morality) is the Roman order.

Revolutionaries should work with a strong discipline, love, and ecstasy (like the Michelangelo's thirteen-years dedication himself to the construction of San Pietro Basilica) under the certain order of the revolution; and the revolution leaders must not tolerate indiscipline and irregularities in any way (ibid, 378-380).

We understand from the Kısakürek's conceptualization of revolution that he envisaged a revolutionary program that aims to transform society from top to down with a totalitarian understanding on the axis of an ideology and program built by a certain elite group that is gathered around a leader. Not only are the elites who ruled the revolution, but also every individual of the society bounded with the discipline of revolution in a sense. That is, we are talking about a process that is largely compulsory rather than a process of willingness. On the other hand, there is a more critical dimension to consider in the modernization project that Kısakürek has designed it as a counter-revolution. He did not present this project as a founder elite of the state or as the official ideology of the state. Besides, he does not have the goal of conceptualizing or revitalizing the official ideology of the state as well, like the *Kadro* movement. On the contrary, it presents itself as a rival ideology. In this sense there is a counter-stance. More importantly, there is a fundamental need such as taking over the control of the state apparatus in order to realize itself. The issue that this will be realized whether via an illegitimate way like an armed revolution, or via a legitimate way like operating in political process emerges as a problematic.

Kısakürek explains his strategy from a broad perspective and points out to the changes in methods that revolutionary movements used in the 20th century through stressing the development in weaponry, strengthening of the authority of the state apparatus, and, concomitantly, making a Weberian emphasis on the state's right of the monopoly of legitimate use of violence (ibid, 381, 384). To him, since the

patrimonial/monarchical regimes have died, it is not a possible to see any massive popular revolutions against the kingdom anymore. Besides, when the development in weaponry and armament is considered, it is not possible to realize a massive popular revolt against the state since the state apparatus had an armed power (ibid, 385-387). With this depiction, Kısakürek came to the conclusion that a revolution cannot be succeeded unless it does not gain the support of the army. From his perspective, the only possible way of gaining the army is gaining the youth. He stated the reason of this as follows:

“The revolution cannot be achieved without gaining the army. Trying to gain the army is a crime in every place and every law; and, lets state with scientific terms, always it is an act that requires being assessed as '*flagrante delicto*', even if there is not a matter of respect and obedience such as crime in the eyes of a revolutionary. None of the revolutionaries' mind attempt to this. When it is not possible to permute the army by means of direct influences, only one way remains to gain which is to work remotely and with the ideas of which criminal side is camouflaged/guised... Since the army means a committee of officers, capturing their souls one by one and directing these souls to the movement by sheaving becomes nothing more than opening a way of attraction from the centre to the periphery, cannot go beyond of theory, and needs to be combined with an external influence coming from the periphery to the centre. This external influence can be no other than youth” (ibid, 388).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ This is the author's translation. The original text is: Orduyu kazanmadan ihtilal başırlamaz. Orduyu kazanmaya çalışmaksa her yerde ve her kanunda suçtur; ve daima ilmi zaviyeden belirtelim, bir ihtilal zümresinin gözünde suç diye bir hürmet ve riayet mevzuu olmasa bile 'cürm-ü meşhut' dedikleri cinsten 'suç üstü' yakalanmayı gerektirici bir iştir. Buna da hiçbir ihtilalci zekası yanaşmaz. Orduyu (direkt) tesir yollarıyla devşirmek mümkün olmayınca, uzaktan ve suç tarafı (kamufle-örtülü) fikirlerle elde etmeye çalışmak kalıyor...Ordu, subaylar heyeti demek olduğuna göre onların tek tek ruhlarını işgal ve sonra bu ruhları demetleyip harekete kalbetmek, ancak merkezden muhite doğru bir cazibe

It is not surprising that Kısakürek emphasized on the army. He witnessed several times that the army did not hesitate to intervene in the politics when it seems the values of the regime are threatened or when the system is locked. Moreover, the army has institutionalized its supervising authority on politics through some institutional amendments after the military coup of 1960 and Kısakürek felt the influence of the generals on the shaping of the politics so strongly like the other political actors. Another remarkable aspect of Kısakürek's assessment is that gaining the support of the officers is essential for the strategy of winning the army, and it can be achieved only by growing a conservative youth that will be constituted the officer cadre of the army. Therefore, the pioneer revolutionaries, for him, are the young people. He frequently emphasized the necessity of growing of a 'nationalist-sacradist youth' (*mukaddesatçı ve Milliyetçi gençlik*) (Kısakürek, 2013i, p. 195). His target group both in *Büyük Doğu* Association and *Büyük Doğu* Intellectual Club was always the youth.

The issue of the formation of this youth organisation has been dealt with in the context of educational activities to be carried out entirely in the intellectual field. In *İdeolacya Örgüsü* book, Kısakürek stated that the ideology of *Büyük Doğu* had built its basic action strategy in the intellectual field (Kısakürek, 2013i, pp. 194,195). In that regard, he divided the methods that would be used while realizing the Islamic revolution in two as strategic and tactic level. He enumerated the methods at the strategic level as follows: all kind of publications (newspaper, journal, book), all branches of art (especially, literature, theatre, cinema), ways of persuasion with strong rhetoric ability (conference, sermon, talks), cultural establishments (clubs everywhere), guiding Islamic capital, and, over this preparation phase, a quest for the

yolu açmakla kalır, nazariyeden ileriye geçemez ve mutlaka muhitten merkez istikametinde gelecek bir teş tesirle birleşmesi iktiza eder. Bu dış tesir de gençlikten başkası olamaz.

way of taking over the governmental mechanism (Kısakürek, 2012h, p. 383; 2013i, p. 201).

Kısakürek also carried out his intellectual and political activities by means of these methods. He primarily aimed at bringing together the people with conservative opinion on the axis of the *Büyük Doğu* Journal. He then tried to make the mass of the supporters that he obtained thanks to the Great East more organized through various associations such as the Great East Association and Intellectual Club. He tried to join the political race by organizing the Great East Association as a political party. He addressed to young people through numerous conferences in various youth organizations such as NTSU. He vaccinated revolutionary sentiments shaped around the combination of belief and action by his strong eloquence ability (Kısakürek, 2013k; 2011b). The height of the chauvinistic and nationalist dosages in his discourse has greatly increased his capacity of persuasion. Kısakürek's strategy can be assessed as a struggle for acquiring counter fronts against the ideological apparatus of the state in the *kulturkampf* (Althuser, 2003). He tried to generate a new historical consciousness which feeds a revanchist sentiment among people (Kısakürek, 2013r; 2012g). In parallel with these methods, he carried his political thoughts to his literary works as well. It is possible to watch all of Kısakürek's thoughts on the theatre stage thanks to his theatrical works. In the work, titled '*Mukaddes Emane*' (Sacred Escrow), he portrayed Turkish modernization history as a rootless movement which caused family breakdowns (Kısakürek, 2010i). In the work, titled '*Künye*' (Identity Disk), he vaccinated the thought that those who opposed to this process of 'degeneracy' have been despised (Kısakürek, 2011c). In the work, titled *Abdülhamid Han* (Abdülhamid Khan), it is stated that foreign agents also involved in this process and dethroned the unique savoir of the Turks by conspiracy (Kısakürek, 2011a). To describe by famous

verses of his poetry *Sakarya Türküsü* (Sakarya Song), Kısakürek aimed motivate the masses with conservative in their opinion in the direction of action by making them believed that they are wretch and pariah in their homeland (Kısakürek, 2013e, pp. 398-400).

When came to the tactical level he enumerated the methods as follows: 1. Identifying the weakest aspects of the management mechanism and targeting them, 2. To have control over communications (radio, TV, telegraph, telephone), transportation (train, ferry, plane) vehicles and power networks (power plants, gasoline warehouses), 3. Waiting as a ready force through staffing in various state institutions by means of camouflaged identities, 4. Benefiting from the influence of sudden attack, 5. To have an effective intelligence and internal assistance network, to develop plans to overcome opposing forces (Kısakürek, 2012h, p. 384).

The methods that Kısakürek enumerated as the tactical level are the steps of the final phase of his revolution strategy and reflects his distrust for achieving a Islamic transformation by struggling in main-stream political process. As tried to be illustrated in this study, carrying out a political movement which had strong Islamic motivations has never been an easy way of politics in Turkey. Kısakürek constantly encountered with the protective reflexes of the state apparatus and failed to operate within the mainstream political process. This situation led him to strategy of staffing in governmental mechanism and acquiring a political power by indirect methods. The main logic of this strategy is based on the thought that young people, who are raised through methods listed in the Strategic level, will staff in state institutions (especially in the army) and will form an effective majority within the years. In order not to be impeded of this staffing activity, methods such as concealment of political identity became the main component of this process. Besides, operating within the borders of

legal framework and not attracting the attention of the guards of the state was a critical part of this strategy. For instance, Kısakürek severely criticized the demands came from his followers in the direction of forcing the state to perform Islamic law (Kısakürek, 2010h, p. 138). Again, as can be remembered from the previous chapter, he criticized also Erbakan since he did not act compatible with this strategy. However, as we see from his reproaches since the late 1960s that he had lost his hope about such a staffing could be achieved (Kısakürek, 2009h, p. 16).

It is very interesting that Kısakürek's strategy of staffing has been successfully used by a movement that has been displaying an Islamic community for many years under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen. Through educated young people who they have educated in various educational institutions, they have carried out a staffing activity for many years in the main institutions of the state, especially in the army. They have achieved a wide range of organizations in the society by supporting their activities in the field of education with various social organizations such as trade ties and charities. They carried out their activities with the confidentiality and guise strategy adopted by Kısakürek as the basic method and established a global network (Yavuz, 2013). Although the movement has established this organizational structure with the same reflexes as the revolutionary strategy presented by Kısakürek, it used this power in illegitimate way such as liquidating the opposing cadres in the management mechanisms of the state by committing organizing crimes with the staffs in the main institutions of the state such as the security and the judiciary. Then, it has made an unsuccessful military coup attempt on 15 July 2016. Detection and dismiss activities of members of the organization which began to be defined as Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO) in the state institutions are still continuing.

However, it should be stated that there is a very fundamental difference between the revolution strategy of Kısakürek and the actions of FETÖ in terms of their results and the methods they used. One of the basic components of Kısakürek's political strategy is a 'strong state' mentality (Heper, 2006). The institutional existence and continuity of the state apparatus is an indispensable precondition for him. Taking over the management of the state with such a violence-oriented way, as the FETÖ did, was not a choice for Kısakürek. Rather, his goal was preventing the army to intervene when the revolution began to realize in a peaceful way.

Another point that needs to be addressed is that Kısakürek, to a great extent, built this strategy with reference to the left-wing student movements in the sixties and seventies. Before enumerating the above mentioned methods in his book, he stated that the tools used by the revolutionary processes in the 20th century has changed and enumerated these tools as syndicalist, anarchist movements, participation in the political process with camouflaged political parties, dissemination of ideology via press and publication means, youth organizations (Kısakürek, 2012h, p. 383). To him, the primary opposite forces was the leftist movements which were using these methods and which were seeking a socialist transformation of the state. Therefore, this staffing strategy was designed also for preventing leftist movements to realize a socialist revolution. His attempts to set up a unity between *ülküçüs* and the NTSU in 1970s were a manifestation of this understanding as well.

6.8 Conclusion

At the end of this chapter in which we analyzed whether the *Büyük Doğu* ideology is a utopia in the sense Mannheim used, if we need to repeat, we face with a totalitarian, tecnocratic state structure which aimed at transforming the society from

top to down by means of severe authoritarian tools. Factors such as his elitist mindset, which is a reflection of his own psychological world, and his experiences in Turkish political life, are mentioned as the personal reasons behind Kısakürek's attainment of such a result. Besides these, it should be added that there is a very large effect of the injured relationship he established with the modernity due to some reason such as historical regression process resulted with the collapse of the Ottoman state in the face of the military and economic superiority of the Western world, alienation to radical transformation that modern Turkey underwent, economic and social crisis the country experienced. As mentioned above on the axis of Göle and Eisenstadt's explanations, this injured nature of the relationship Kısakürek established with modernity led him to adopt authoritarian, Jacobean attitudes. For this reason he designed the *Büyük Doğu* as a revolutionary movement.

By the analyzes made within this chapter, it is attempted to reveal that there were serious logical paradoxes among the ideas that Kısakürek defended. He assumes that democratic and overly authoritarian institutions can work together in a coherent way. He thinks that very complex economic issues can be solved in a simple way by means of some religious applications such as *zakat*. However, as tried to be revealed at the beginning of this chapter, Kısakürek also had a realistic and pragmatist mind that could assess the historical realities with a fairly objective eye while determining the scope of his ideology. The main reason for this is that despite his persistent emphasis on the transcendence of Islam, he could not develop a consistent interpretation methodology. His true Islam approach, which constitutes the backbone of the whole progress program, on the one hand, tries to keep pace with the changes brought about by modern life, on the other hand try to stand against change with a strong orthodox reflex. The effort to interpret Islam, which Kısakürek embarked on without a

systematic education in theology, contrary to his claims, reveals an inconsistent approach of which limits and methodology are unclear. The limits of the tension between change and conservation may go beyond a level of mildness which aimed at a culturally suitable change. Therefore, his approach tends to be away from realizing the modern society of which needs constantly increasing in the rapidly changing world.

Consequently, it can be argued that *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology. It does not have the capacity of achieving a sensible and realizable state and society structure. It should also be addressed that Kısakürek was also aware of this situation. Although they seemed like very bright ideas, he knew that they had no chance of realization. As it was tried to be shown in the previous chapter, Erbakan actually defended the same ideas as Kısakürek with concepts such as national economy, advanced industrialization, silver engine. However, Kısakürek frequently criticized him by stating that he was living in a world of dream. In addition, in contrast to the ideas he defended in the *Büyük Doğu*, he supported Ozal's liberal economic policy in an ardent way. Within this context, it can be said that *Büyük Doğu* should be read only as an ideological discourse giving some clues about Kısakürek's ideational world.

CONCLUSION

One of the ground goals of this study is to reveal that Kısakürek was a modernist Islamist who sought a transformation in both state and society structure which could keep up with the patterns of modernity while protecting cultural and moral values. As tried to be illustrated in chapter one, Kısakürek was grown up by his grandfather to be a modern minded person. He educated in modern schools having Western education system, studied philosophy in university, and developed his literary profession through a long reading marathon in Western literature. Besides, as tried to be illustrated in chapter six, the *Büyük Doğu* ideology was a modernization project which aimed at catching up with contemporary states through benefiting from achievements of the West by a selective appropriation. Although he constructed the *Büyük Doğu* as an alternative ideology to Kemalism and criticized the Turkish statesmen for the westernization project they followed, at the same time, he criticized the traditionalist *ulema* for rejecting the modernity as well. Following the main path of the Islamism, he argued that rediscovering the true Islam provided the desired answers for reaching the level of contemporary states while keeping the cultural values. In that regard, he reinterpreted the many Islamic principles in accordance with patterns of the modern era in order to keep up with modernity. As Göle and Eisenstadt stated, Kısakürek's claim was one of the main characteristics of the Non-Western modernization projects. In the light of these findings obtained in the first and sixth chapters, it can be concluded that both Kısakürek his ideology had a modernist approach.

In relation with this issue, another goal of the study is revealing that the *Büyük Doğu* system of thought, which he has built to provide the transformation he envisaged, is an ideology with low self-realization capacity due to its logical

paradoxes. In chapter six, the *Büyük Doğu* is analyzed in the framework of Non-Western modernization projects. As Göle and Eisenstadt pointed out, the modernization projects in Non-Western societies may have some handicaps in the way of producing a modern state and social structure due to some reasons such as developing injured relationship with modernity as a consequence of the economical and cultural hegemony of the West. These handicaps may lead them to comprehend the modernity with an injured conscious and apply to authoritarian regimes. As tried to be illustrated, the state and society projects that Kısakürek presented under the title of *Başyücelik* state order was also built by a totalitarian, technocratic understanding which aimed at a transformation by means of strict authoritarian tools. Factors such as his elitist mindset, which is a reflection of his own psychological world, his experiences in Turkish political life, the injured relationship he established with the modernity, his insistence on the transcendence of Islam are mentioned as the reasons behind Kısakürek's attainment of such a result.

Another indicated aspect of the *Büyük Doğu* is that it had some logical paradoxes which annihilate its capacity of realizing itself and make it an ideology in Mannheimian sense. The ground reason of this was the syncretism in his thoughts. Based on the argument that Islam contains the best side of all ideologies, worldviews, and economic systems, Kısakürek ideologised Islam and present it as the unique reference point for constructing a modern state without moral corruption. He argued that a state which designed according to principles of true Islam can solve the deep-seated problems stem from Western systems such as capitalism and socialism. This comprehension led him to a conclusion that complex economic and political systems which have ontological distinctness in their essence can operate in an intermingling way on the name of transcendence of the Islam. He tried to overcome the problems

with some Islamic applications such as *zakat* which is a tax system that is determined by taking into consideration the economic structure of the centuries before.

Based on the works of Fazlur Rahman, one of the prominent modernist Islamist, it is tried to be revealed that this kind of an approach cannot realize what it asserted. Rahman stated that Islam must be reinterpreted from a more realistic point of view in order to achieve this. At this point, another paradoxical situation emerges for Kısakürek's approach. Although he argued that Islam should be reinterpreted (re-discovered), the interpretation model he presented had some logical discrepancies. As a product of his syncretic mind set, his model based on Sufi understanding of Islam (seeing the inner dimensions of Islamic revelations), strict adherence to *Sharia*, and using reason. Firstly, Kısakürek failed to notice that it is the *Sharia* itself which is tried to be reinterpreted. Secondly, the tension between reason and the transcendence of divine principles is one of the fundamental problems that theologians have been trying to solve since the death of the Prophet of Islam. Actually, the thing that Kısakürek tried to do was keeping the orthodox understanding of Islam in this reinterpretation process. Yet, it became not so possible even for himself. Although he put the strict adherence to *Sharia* as the ground principles of reinterpreting Islamic teaching, he also obliged to change some Islamic principles regulated in *Sharia* such as the interest. Thirdly, although he tried to put some limits to reinterpretation of Islam, the Sufi understanding of Islam presents a highly large field of interpretation with the emphasis on inner dimensions of Islam. Moreover, it is uncertain that how the inner dimensions of Islamic revelations can be grasped. In the light of these findings obtained in the sixth chapter, it can be concluded that *Büyük Doğu* is an ideology of which capacity of achieving a conceivable and realizable state and society structure is low.

Another ground goals of this study is examining Kısakürek's political strategy he pursuit during his political and intellectual struggle. This examining also provides important findings for understanding the development of Islamism in modern Turkey. As tired to be revealed in the second chapter, Kemalist elites aimed at the overall transformation of the state and society structure from top to down in the light of new values while building modern Turkey. They carried out state administration with a Jacobin attitude because they thought that this radical transformation needed a strong will. Besides, resistance to these new values (especially to secularism), which sometimes manifested itself in violent acts, also brought about a hardening in their authoritarian measures. By the time, staying on alert against counter-revolutionary attempts became a permanent reflex of the state apparatus such that even if the governments changed, various bureaucratic mechanisms (civil, military and judicial) continued to intervene without considering the preferences of the political authorities. These protective reflexes of the state apparatus were the main determinant in the shaping of Kısakürek's political strategy.

Kısakürek wore his Islamist identity by adopting the Naqshbandi interpretation of Islam. One of the common characteristics of Naqshbandi tradition was being actively involved in social and political affairs by being on the alert for opportunities to use power for the interest of Muslims both in Ottoman and Republican era. Kısakürek also adopted the same approach and believed that what was necessary for the interest of Muslims could be achieved by controlling the power or at least having a strong influence on power. Therefore, he carried out his intellectual struggle by combining with political activities.

The ideas that Kısakürek systematized on the axis of the *Büyük Doğu* ideology were definitely counter-revolutionary. Unlike conservative demands such as

degrading the positivist nature of Kemalist modernization project to an appropriate level and moderation in the application of secularism, Kısakürek had envisaged a state and social structure which designed totally according to Islamic principles. For this reason, it was inevitable to encounter a strong contravention and compulsion. Being aware of the severe reflexes of the state apparatus, Kısakürek began his intellectual struggle with timid, cautious steps in order not to attract the attention of political and judicial authorities. In the first period of the magazine, he asked his thoughts to be regarded as pieces of constructive advice of a true friend. Besides, by putting the picture of Atatürk to cover page, publishing laudatory articles about Atatürk, and not mentioning to *Sharia* and Islamic state directly, he tried to convince authorities that he did not aim at changing the regime. For this nature of this period of the journal, he named the first period of the journal as rudimentary. However, his journal was closed down by council of ministers' decision and he was sent to Eğirdir to accomplish his military service; in other words, exiled.

The relative liberalization environment of the post-1945 era had presented a new opportunity. Nevertheless, it became clear for Kısakürek that it is not possible to carry out his struggle without facing up to conflict with political elites. He dropped the style he used in the first period of the Journal and began to speak of Islamic reform and Islamic state. However, his cautious attitude was still active that he hardened his discourses gradually by taking into consideration the political development. The most important parameter of this strategy was operating within the constitutional limits and not giving an opportunity to authorities to introduce judicial sanctions. It is possible to see the most obvious application of this strategy in the political party he tried to set up. By taking advantage of the legal gap in the law on associations, he named the party as *Büyük Doğu* Association. In addition, his

followers were often warned about carrying out the activities of the association in a legal way and avoiding actions which could lead to a judicial process. His objective was accomplishing the organization phase of the party before general elections of 1950 without being exposed to any sanctions in an environment in which political competition had increased and stiffened considerably. However, he could not survive being exposed to various sanctions. It was also possible to see the traces of persistent intervention of the political authority behind various judicial processes such as the 'insulting Turkishness' case in that period. Thanks to some legal regulations in various fields such as the Press law which were realized by influence of the growing opposition, Kısakürek had the opportunity of defending himself in the judicial authorities so the journal could survive being closed directly. Nevertheless, he could not participate to the elections due to his imprisonment sentence and lost the opportunity of getting legislative immunity shelter.

As the number of sanctions increased, the toughness in his style and the dosage of his criticisms increased in parallel. The fourth period of the Journal reflects the anger intensity that Kısakürek felt. He began to criticize even Atatürk with humiliating words although he had known that this kind of criticism would have caused serious troubles for him. Of course, there was also a significant impact of the Democrat Party's coming to power which promised a moderate sense of secularism. As tried to be illustrated in the third chapter, the DP's moderate attitude toward secularism presented an opportunity to the flourishing of Islamist publications. Kısakürek also benefited from this transition. Various sanctions, the Casino raid incident, and events developed after the assassination attempt against Ahmet Emin Yalman in Malatya made this situation quite understandable for Kısakürek. It became very clear that it was not possible to carry out an intellectual and political movement

questioning secularism in extreme limits without having permission of the political authority. Therefore, Kısakürek abandoned the idea of establishing his own political party and established a compromise with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. This also meant the end of the idealistic political struggle that Kısakürek carried out within a framework comprised of strict principles.

The compromise that Kısakürek established with Menderes was leader centred and shaped in a clientelist relationship. The benefit of this relationship for Kısakürek was that he both got capital support for the printing costs of the Journal, which had been a serious problem for him, and obtained an opportunity to influence the political authority in order to achieve partial successes by expanding the boundaries of moderate secularism. Nevertheless, the main determinants of this relationship were in-party power balances and general functioning of country's political structure. Having a considerable influence on conservative masses, Kısakürek's personal loyalty provided Menderes support both in the competition for leadership in the party and against the political rivalry with the RPP. Kısakürek was using his pen to glorify Menderes by using religious motifs masterfully.

Kısakürek had thought that having support of a Prime Minister had been able to provide him a shelter. Yet, whenever he began to damage his political position, Menderes did not hesitate to withdraw the support he gave. Besides, although he received the support of a prime minister, various political and bureaucratic mechanisms continued to hamper Kısakürek. The group within the party, who advocated that Menderes should pursue secular and liberal policies, blocked the financial aid given to Kısakürek through official advertisements. Similarly, despite Menderes' personal intervention, he was tried to be sent to prison by the judicial authorities; such that, in 1959, he was the most prosecuted writer. It should also be

noted here that there was a considerable influence of the stiffness of his discourses and the ideas he argued behind this situation. Nevertheless, insistent interventions of various bureaucratic mechanisms of the state caused Kısakürek to lose his belief the goals that he desired can be achieved by using usual political means. He came to conclusion that an alternative way of politics should be produced.

The 1960 coup exhibited a new conclusion for him. No matter the political strategy followed was, the army could change all the balances. Moreover, the army had assumed the responsibility of protecting the secular character of the regime. Military intervention in 1971 also revealed that the army was determined to intervene whenever necessary. The first Islamist political party of Turkey, National Order Party, was closed shortly after the intervention. In the light of his experiences, Kısakürek systematized the political strategy necessary for an Islamist political movement to succeed as follows: Although they try to reach their goal through operating in usual functioning of the political system, various institutions of the state, especially the army and the judiciary, can block the Islamist movements by reasoning that they intended to change the secular structure of the state. For this reason, primarily, it is necessary to avoid acts and rhetorics that can trigger the security mechanisms of the state as much as possible while operating in the political arena. All kinds of activities should be carried out within the constitutional boundaries and the opportunities offered by the laws should also be utilized to the greatest extent. Simultaneously, the intervention of these institutions in the future should be prevented by staffing in the state institutions, especially the army. The goal of this strategy is to change the rules of the play by playing according to these rules again. Thus, the control of the state apparatus would have been seized indirectly. In order for this staffing strategy to succeed, conservative (nationalist-sacradist) generations must be grown by using

various intellectual tools (such as books, magazines, newspapers), organizational tools (such as social associations), verbal and visual persuasion tools (such as conferences and television programs). Besides, staffing activities should be carried out in secrecy. Therefore, those who will get employment in state institutions should hide their political identities until the right time.

As tried to be illustrated during the study, Kısakürek carried out his political activities compatible with this strategy. On the one hand, while carrying out his activities in political field by trying to influence the political elites or taking part in the activities of various political parties, on the other hand, he tried to create an intellectual accumulation for the growth of conservative (nationalist-sacradist) generations by using various intellectual tools. In that regard, he wrote many books in various genres ranging from literary to theological and political. He established an intellectual club to organize the youth. He gave numerous conferences across the country.

In line with this strategy, the basic tool that Kısakürek used to consolidate the masses was developing a conscious of otherhood. As mentioned in the first chapter, Kısakürek described conservative people as a mass that was excluded and despised in their homeland by using nationalist discourse. In his discourses, religious people are the other of their own countries. By mentioning frequently in conferences and writings that the Muslims were subjected to various pressures especially in the single-party period, he constantly nourished thi perception of this otherhood. As well as emphasizing to his followers that the targets could only be reached by legal means, he also preached them to be organized tightly to reach the goal. This approach has brought with it a serious polarization that has reached today.

The strategy that Kısakürek put forward required him to be very pragmatist as well. More precisely, it was the result of his pragmatist nature. As attempted to be shown in the study, Kısakürek was able to support different political parties in different political conditions. He became the most ardent supporter of Süleyman Demirel, a leader he criticized in the early 1960s in a very harsh manner, when political conditions changed. Or, by exactly the opposite way, he severely criticized the Democratic Party and the National Salvation Party, which he supported in the course of their establishment process, when political conditions changed. In parallel with these pragmatic preferences, his discourses also could change and he could advocate some policies of the party he was supporting, though they contradicts with the thoughts he expressed in the *Büyük Doğu*.

The differences between the periods of the *Büyük Doğu* Journal in terms of their goals also reveal the pragmatist aspect of Kısakürek. As attempted to be revealed, the *Büyük Doğu* Journal was not published only for intellectual purposes, such as spreading an ideology. Many periods of the magazine were published due to periodical needs such as supporting a political party or leader, despite the idealistic intellectual mission attributed to it. The first two periods' main objective was introducing the *Büyük Doğu* ideology. The main objective of the 3rd, 4th and 5th periods was to carry out coordination activities for the *Büyük Doğu* party tired to be set up. The 6th, 8th and 9th periods were published to support the DP government. The 10th period was published to support Saadettin Bilgiç in the general Congress of the Justice Party. The 11th period was published to support the Justice Party under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel in 1965 general elections. The 13th period was published in support of the new party movements that began to form in the late 1960s. The 14th period was published to support the newly established National Order Party.

The 15th and last period, together with the brochures titled *Rapor* (Report), were published to support the Nationalist Movement Party and Süleyman Demirel again.

When looked at the findings obtained in this study the most remarkable result in terms of the development of the Islamism in Turkey is that operating in political field has not been an easy way for the movements which have composed their identity and objectives in the framework of religious values such as *Büyük Doğu* Association. The state apparatus has perceived such movements as a threat to the regime's security and tried to prevent them by various means. It is also observed that right-wing parties, who could use religious values in their political programs also could block such movements, such as the Democratic Party's closing of the Islamic Democratic Party. These obstructions have been able to lead Islamic movements to seek alternative ways, as seen in Kısakürek's revolutionary strategy.

Another remarkable finding is that, if the *Büyük Doğu* Association is taken into consideration, it can also be observed that political movements which identify themselves with a religious identity could not get the support they desired from the electorate and stayed marginalized. As stated in the second chapter, many political which can be classified in this regard, disappeared without showing a considerable success. Many people who have some religious demands were more inclined to support major parties which make promises also for their prosperity. Kısakürek also saw this situation before long and supported the center right parties in most of his life. This situation did not change much even when Turkey's first Islamist party that could provide a continuum, National Salvation Party, was established. Significant differences in political preferences could emerge between Islamic movements coming from the same religious tradition, as seen in the debate between the Işıkçılar group and Kısakürek in the 1970s. Some religious groups have preferred to support major

center right parties such as the Justice Party instead of an Islamic party such as the National Salvation Party. It should also be remembered that Kısakürek also fell into dispute with this party and began to support Süleyman Demirel who he accused him of being a Mason for many years. Even, Kısakürek became the symbol name of opposition against Erbakan. Taking into account the relationship of Kısakürek with various political parties and Islamic movements, it can be concluded that pragmatic preferences were an effective factor in the development process of Islamism in Turkey.

Another point that needs to be taken in connection with this pragmatism is that the ideological stiffnesses worn over time. For example, Kısakürek and the Nationalist Action Party that can be seen as representatives of two different ideological poles in nationalism could meet in the same center in the late 1970s. Similarly, advocating a stiff form of statist economic policy on the axis of *Büyük Doğu* ideology, Kısakürek could support Özal's neo-liberal economic policy in the late 1970s.

“Harmony between the opposites; mercy and sin in competition;

All the opposites in fight, all the opposites in peace...” (Kısakürek, 2013e, 288).¹⁶⁵

With this couplet of his poem titled ‘*Zıtlar*’ (The Opposites), Kısakürek presents a brief summary of his life. A lifetime between opposites. From a Bohemian life to Sufism, from the ivory tower to dungeon. His life passed through seeking a harmony between opposites. The *Büyük Doğu* also was a form of this quest's penned

¹⁶⁵ This is the author’s translation. The original Text is :
Zıtlar arası ahenk, af ve günah yarışta;
Bütün zıtlar kavgada, bütün zıtlar barışta...

on paper. This quest inevitably brought along many contradictions as well. Kısakürek recognize that contradictions are natural parts of the person's life.

“Everything is cut and broken, the time cannot hold solder;

The past is the image in the album, the future is the misgiving in the heart...”

(Kısakürek, 2013e, 289).¹⁶⁶

In this couplet of his poem ‘Vehim’ (Misgiving), which is on the next page of his poetry book Çile, Kısakürek complains about the reading of a person's life within the course of the successive consistencies. To him, the life of a person composed of parts that might not be soldered each other, as the old and new Kısakürek's illustrates. In this study, Kısakürek's life was examined within parts in the axis of transformations, contradictions, and consistencies. Almost every part exhibited a different Kısakürek portrait. The only thing that does not change between these portraits is the abrasive effect of the time that softens all the rigidities and changes everything.

¹⁶⁶ This is the author's translation. The original Text is :
Herşey kesik ve kopuk, zaman tutamaz lehim;
Mazi albümdeki hayal, İstikbal kalbde vehim...

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Newspapers and Magazines

Büyük Doğu

Cumhuriyet

Hakimiyeti Milliye

Milli Gazete

Milliyet

Son Posta

Son Telgraf

Appendix A: Abbreviations

- CUP: Committee of Union and Progress
- DP: Democrat Party
- IDP: Islam Democrat Party
- IMF: International Monetary Fund
- JDP: Justice and Development Party
- JP: Justice Party
- NAP: Nationalist Action Party
- NDP: National Development Party
- NOP: National Order Party
- NSP: National Salvation Party
- NTSF: National Turkish Students Federation
- NTSU: National Turkish Student Union
- NUC: National Unity Committee
- RPNP: Republican Peasants' Nation Party
- RRP: Republican Reliance Party
- TL: Turkish Lira
- WPT: Workers' Party of Turkey

Appendix B

Necip Fazıl Kısakürek

Appendix C: Sample Headlines from *Büyük Doğu* Newspaper

30 May 1952



23 May 1952



21 May 1952

22 MAYIS 1952

BÜYÜK DOĞU YENİ
Hakka ve yeni bir dünya görüşüne bağlı Müslüman Türklerin gazetesi

10 Kuruş

Bugün, Hayâsızca Her Tarafta Konuşan, kendisini Muhalefete Hak Sahibi Gören: Harp Kaçağı İsmet İnönü
Hakkındaki Şahadet ve Vesikaları Nesrediyoruz

Mareşal Merhum Demişti ki:
"Bu hayâsız adam bir harp kaçağıdır ve zaman kurşunu dizilmiştir. Allah firmanı verince, bir gün, onun evini ve komutanlığı barakap on tarafa aradular firar ettigini Türk efkârı umumiyesine bildireceğiz."

Sedat Zeki Örs Diyor ki:
"Müserresimlerinden Abdülminânın ankaralı İsmet Pağınun, şifalı Kuruludun, harp sahasında gıvırdıkun, İsmet'in kaçağına müserresim ve şifalı izaret ederek efendinin ardeşunu barakap serce ve sağduygusunu göstermiş."

Truman Cumhuriyetbaskınına edeceğüne kayı-ya

Astsubay kanunu

Millet Meclisi

Altın Kara Borsacıları
Paha, kendi görüşüne saldırdı ey manas ve ayırtmadan komedyanlı ra gıvırdançaklılara gıvırdıkun ne gıvırdı kadar devam edecekler?

Hayâsız Mütür

22 May 1952

29 MAYIS 1952

BÜYÜK DOĞU YENİ
Hakka ve yeni bir dünya görüşüne bağlı Müslüman Türklerin gazetesi

10 Kuruş

FETHİN 499 uncu YILI

Müseccel Ahmet Emin Yalman
İki Müslüman Memleketi olan Türkiye ile Pakistan münasebetlerini neden kundaklamak istiyor?
Bir Hind gazetesinde yazdığı başmakede Ahmet Emin Yalman Pakistanı bir İslâm Devleti olmakla suçlandırıyor ve dinini terkatmeğe davet ediyor!

Lenin Medhiyecisi Kendisini nasîf müdafîa ediyor

Bugün D. P. Grupunda: Başbakan Mühim İfşaatla Bulunacak



29 May 1952

5 HAZİRAN 1952

BÜYÜK DOĞU YENİ
Hakka ve yeni bir dünya görüşüne bağlı Müslüman Türklerin gazetesi

10 Kuruş

Yeni Fuhuş
"Vatan,, Adına işletilen Avrat pazarı"
Ahmet Emin Yalman'ın, siyaset sahasındaki marifetleri yetmişermiş gibi, şimdiki de o kükür, İsmet bir Ergenek Yılına kadar İhtikâli elini-Türk milletinin harâmına uzatarak Türk kızlarını girilgizlik İshare kabızına karşı ne düşünebilirsiniz?

Güzellik müsabakası tuzağına düşecek müslüman-Türk ailesi, maruz bulunduğu bu korkunç tehlikeyi öğren!


Başbakanın gazetemize beyanâtı
C. H. P.' nin Haksız İktisap ettiği Malları Amme Kanunu Halleder
C. H. P. nin Milyonları
Hak Pertâh'ın... hatlarını İsvra- meğe çalışıyor

VATAN Kahramanlar!!!


SON SARTI C. H. P. Feshediliyor

5 June 1952


Appendix D: Examples from Cover Pages of *Büyük Doğu* Journal




12 November 1943



10 December 1943



15 October 1943



5 April 1946



19 April 1946




11 March 1949



8 November 1950



27 January 1950




2 February 1951



28 May 1954



22 May 1959



4 November 1964




13 October 1965




19 July 1967



1 September 1969



31 March 1971



15 May 1978



Rapor, September 1980

Appendix E: The List of Kısakürek's Books*

| Nu. | Book Name | Publication | City | Year | Genre |
|------------|--|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Ben ve Ötesi | Orhaniye Matb. | Istanbul | 1922 | Poetry |
| 2 | Örümcek Ağı | Necmi İstiklal Matb. | Istanbul | 1925 | Poetry |
| 3 | Kaldırımlar | Numune Matb. | Istanbul | 1928 | Poetry |
| 4 | Ben ve Ötesi | Semih Lütfi Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1932 | Poetry |
| 5 | Birkaç Hikaye Birkaç Tahlil | Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası | Ankara | 1933 | Story |
| 6 | Tohum | Semih Lütfi Matbaa ve Kitapevi | Istanbul | 1935 | Drama |
| 7 | Bir Adam Yaratmak | Semih Lütfi Sühulet Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1938 | Drama |
| 8 | Künye | Semih Lütfi Sühulet Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1938 | Drama |
| 9 | Sabır Taşı | Semih Lütfi Sühulet Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1940 | Drama |
| 10 | Doğumunun Yüzüncü Yıl Dönümü Dolayısıyla Namık Kemal: Şahsı, Eseri, Tesiri | Türk Dil Kurumu | Ankara | 1940 | Monography |
| 11 | Para | Semih Lütfi Sühulet Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1942 | Drama |
| 12 | Vatan Şairi Namık Kemal | Semih Lütfi Sühulet Kütüphanesi | Istanbul | 1944 | Scenario-Novel |
| 13 | Müdafaa | İktisadi Yürüyüş Basımevi | Istanbul | 1946 | Declaration |
| 14 | Halkadan Pırıltılar | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1948 | Theology |
| 15 | Nam-ı Diğer Parmaksız Salih | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1949 | Drama |
| 16 | Çöle İnen Nur | | Istanbul | 1950 | Theology |
| 17 | 101 Hadis | Büyük Doğu Journal Supplement | Istanbul | 1951 | Theology |
| 18 | Maskenizi Yırtıyorum | | Istanbul | 1953 | Declaration |
| 19 | Sonsuzluk Kervanı Şiirler | Serdengeçti Neşriyat | Ankara | 1955 | Poetry |
| 20 | Halkadan Pırıltılar | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1955 | Theology |
| 21 | Cinnet Mustatili | İnkılap Kitapevi | Istanbul | 1955 | Memoirs |
| 22 | Mektubat'tan Seçmeler, İmam-ı Rabbani | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1956 | Theology |
| 23 | At'a Senfoni | Türkiye Jokey Kulübü | Istanbul | 1958 | Essay |
| 24 | Büyük Doğu'ya Doğru | Hilal Yayınları | Ankara | 1959 | Political Writing |
| 25 | Altun Halka: Silsile-i Zeheb | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1960 | Theology |
| 26 | Halkadan Pırıltılar | Türk Neşriyat Yurdu | Istanbul | 1960 | Theology |
| 27 | O ki O Yüzden Varız (Çöle İnen Nur) | Burhanettin Erenler Matbaası | Istanbul | 1961 | Theology |
| 28 | Çile | Bedir Yayınları | Istanbul | 1962 | Poetry |
| 29 | Her Cephesiyle Komünizm | Doğan Güneş Yayınları | Istanbul | 1962 | Political Writing |
| 30 | Türkiye'de Komünizm ve Köy Enstitüleri | Doğan Güneş Yayınları | Istanbul | 1962 | Political Writing |

| | | | | | |
|----|---|---|----------|------|--------------------|
| 31 | Hazreti Ali | Bedir Yayınevi | Istanbul | 1964 | Drama |
| 32 | İman ve Aksiyon | Bedir Yayınevi | Istanbul | 1964 | Political Writing |
| 33 | Ahşap Konak | Journal Supplement | Istanbul | 1964 | Drama |
| 34 | Siyah Pelerinli Adam | Journal Supplement | Istanbul | 1964 | Drama |
| 35 | Reis Bey | Ötüken Yayını | Istanbul | 1964 | Drama |
| 36 | Büyük Kapı (O ve Ben) | Neşriyat Yurdu Yeni Şark Maarif Kütüphanesi M. Hüseyin Tutya Yayını | Istanbul | 1965 | Memoirs |
| 37 | Ruh Burkuntularından Hikayeler | Ötüken Yayını | Istanbul | 1965 | Story |
| 38 | Ulu Hakan II. Abdülhamid Han | Ötüken Yayını | Istanbul | 1965 | Historical Fiction |
| 39 | Bir Pırıltı, Binbir Işık | Uğur Yayınları | Istanbul | 1965 | Theology |
| 40 | Tarih Boyunca Büyük Mazlumlar-1 | Sebil Yayınları | Istanbul | 1965 | Political Writing |
| 41 | Tarih Boyunca Büyük Mazlumlar-2 | Sebil Yayınları | Istanbul | 1965 | Political Writing |
| 42 | Şahsı, Eseri ve Tesiriyle Namık Kemal | Sebil Yayınları | Istanbul | 1965 | Monography |
| 43 | Gönül Nimetleri: El-Mevahib ül-Ledünniyye, İmam Kastalani | Babialide Sabah Newspaper Supplement | Istanbul | 1967 | Theology |
| 44 | Vatan Haini Değil Büyük Vatan Dostu Vahidüddin | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | History |
| 45 | İdeolocya Örgüsü | Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü | Istanbul | 1968 | Political Writing |
| 46 | Türkiye'nin Manzarası | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Political Writing |
| 47 | Tanrı Kulundan Dinlediklerim I | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Theology |
| 48 | Tanrı Kulundan Dinlediklerim II | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Theology |
| 49 | Peygamber Halkası | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Theology |
| 50 | Binbir Çerçeve 1 | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Political Writing |
| 51 | Binbir Çerçeve 2 | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Political Writing |
| 52 | Binbir Çerçeve 3 | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1968 | Political Writing |
| 53 | Binbir Çerçeve 4 | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Political Writing |
| 54 | Binbir Çerçeve 5 | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Political Writing |
| 55 | Piyeslerim: Yunus Emre-Siyah Pelerinli Adam | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Drama |
| 56 | Müdafalarım | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Memoirs |
| 57 | Sosyalizm Komünizm ve İnsanlık | Ak Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Political Writing |
| 58 | Son Devrin Din Mazlumları | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Political Writing |
| 59 | Abdülhamid Han | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1969 | Drama |

| | | | | | |
|----|--|----------------------|----------|------|-------------------|
| 60 | Benim Gözümde Menderes | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Memoirs |
| 61 | Hikayelerim | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Story |
| 62 | Ulu Hakan Abdülhamid Han | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Monography |
| 63 | Yeniçeri | Özbahar Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | History |
| 64 | Yılanlı Kuyudan | Akçağ Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Memoirs |
| 65 | Kanlı Sarık | Akçağ Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Drama |
| 66 | Efendimiz, Kurtarıcımız Müjdecimizden Nur Harmanı | Çile Yayınları | Istanbul | 1970 | Theology |
| 67 | Reşahat Ayn-el Hayat (Can Damlaları), Şeyh Safi Mevlana Ali b. Hüseyin | Eser Kitapevi | Istanbul | 1971 | Theology |
| 68 | Tohum | Akçağ Yayınları | Ankara | 1971 | Drama |
| 69 | Senaryo Romanları | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1972 | Drama |
| 70 | Moskof | Toker Yayınları | Istanbul | 1973 | Political Writing |
| 71 | Esselam | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1973 | Theology |
| 72 | Hac | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1973 | Travel Writing |
| 73 | Rabıta-i Şerife, Abdülhakim Arvasi | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1974 | Legend-Theology |
| 74 | Başbuğ Velilerden 33: Altun Silsile | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1974 | Legend-Theology |
| 75 | Babıali | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1975 | Memoirs |
| 76 | Hitabeler | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1975 | Speech |
| 77 | İhtilal | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Political Writing |
| 78 | Sahte Kahramanlar | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Political Writing |
| 79 | Veliler Ordusundan 333 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Legend-Theology |
| 80 | Rapor 1 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Political Writing |
| 81 | Mukaddes Emanet | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Drama |
| 82 | Rapor 2 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1976 | Political Writing |
| 83 | Rapor 3 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1977 | Political Writing |
| 84 | Yolumuz Halimiz Çaremiz | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1977 | Political Writing |
| 85 | İbrahim Ethem | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1977 | Drama |
| 86 | Doğru Yolun Sapık Kolları | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1978 | Political Writing |
| 87 | Rapor 4 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1979 | Political Writing |
| 88 | Rapor 5 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1979 | Political Writing |
| 89 | Rapor 6 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1979 | Political Writing |
| 90 | Rapor 7 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1980 | Political Writing |

| | | | | | |
|-----|---|----------------------|----------|------|-------------------|
| 91 | Aynadaki Yalan | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1980 | Novel |
| 92 | İman ve İslam Atlası | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1981 | Theology |
| 93 | Esselam-Mukaddes Hayattan Levhalar | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1982 | Theology |
| 94 | Batı Tefekkürü ve İslam Tasavvufu | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1983 | Political Writing |
| 95 | Tasavvuf Bahçeleri, Esseyid Abdülhakim Arvasi | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1983 | Theology |
| 96 | Kafa Kağıdı | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1984 | Memoirs |
| 97 | Dünya Bir İnkılap Bekliyor | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1985 | Political Writing |
| 98 | Mümin Kafır | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1986 | Theology |
| 99 | Öfke ve Hiciv | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1988 | Political Writing |
| 100 | Konuşmalar | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1990 | Speech |
| 101 | Başmakalelerim 1 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1990 | Political Writing |
| 102 | Hücum ve Polemik | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1992 | Political Writing |
| 103 | Başmakalelerim 2 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1995 | Political Writing |
| 104 | Başmakalelerim 3 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1995 | Political Writing |
| 105 | Edebiyat Mahkemeleri | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1997 | Literary Citics |
| 106 | Hadiselerin Muhasebesi 1 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 1999 | Political Writing |
| 107 | Püf Noktası | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2000 | Drama |
| 108 | Hadiselerin Muhasebesi 2 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2003 | Political Writing |
| 109 | Hadiselerin Muhasebesi 3 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2003 | Political Writing |
| 110 | İstanbul'a Hasret | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2005 | Poetry |
| 111 | Savaş Yazıları 1 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2006 | Political Writing |
| 112 | Savaş Yazıları 2 | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2006 | Political Writing |
| 113 | Vesikalar Konuşuyor | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Political Writing |
| 114 | Villa Samer | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Theatre |
| 115 | Deprem | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Theatre |
| 116 | En Kötü Patron | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Theatre |
| 117 | Katibim | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Theatre |
| 118 | Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2009 | Political Writing |

| | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|----------------------|----------|------|----------|
| 119 | Dininizi Öğreniniz | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2012 | Theology |
| 120 | Ufuk Çizgisi | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2013 | Theatre |
| 121 | Canım İstanbul | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2013 | Theatre |
| 122 | Nasrettin Hoca | Büyük Doğu Yayınları | Istanbul | 2013 | Humor |

* Works of Yusuf Turan Günaydın and Suat Ak's on bibliography on Kısakürek's works are benefited while this list was being prepared (Günaydın, 2015; Ak, 2013). The works published after 1983 were published by *Büyük Doğu* publishing company after the death of Kısakürek. An important part of these reprints have been prepared by compiling Kısakürek's writings in both the *Büyük Doğu* Journal and various newspapers.