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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TURKEY AND IRAN :

A SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH

BY

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SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE FOR ATATÜRK'S
PRINCIPLES AND THE HISTORY OF TURKISH RENOVATION
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE DEGREE OF M.A. IN ATATURK'S PRINCIPLES

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

1994

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TURKEY AND IRAN :
A SOCIO-POLITICAL APPROACH

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my father and mother

This study was conducted under the supervision of Dr. Şebnem Gülfidan who worked through several versions of this study. I would like to express my sincere gratitude for her invaluable guidance, support.

I also extend my gratitude to Dr. Lütfullah Karaman and Dr. Nevin Coşar and my father Dr. Ali Milani for their helps.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye ve İranda 1920'lerden sonra yaşanan batılılaşma hareketlerinin ve bu hareketler doğrultusunda Türkiyede Atatürk ve İran'da Rıza Şah devresinde gerçekleştirilen reformların, bu iki ülkeyi günümüzde farklı noktalara getirmesinin sebeplerini incelemektir. Bu sebeplerin önemli bir kısmının, adı geçen ülkelerin geçmişlerinde yaşanan sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel tecrübelerde yada modernleşme hareketlerinde, yattığı varsayımı ile bu hareketler incelenmiştir.

Bu doğrultuda giriş kısmında modernleşme öncesinde her iki ülkenin genel sosyal ve ekonomik yapıları incelenmiş, 2. bölümde ise 19. yüzyılda yaşanan modernleşme hareketleri anlatılmıştır. Daha sonra 3. bölümde Türkiye'de Atatürk, İran'da ise Rıza Şah zamanında batılılaşma yolunda yapılan reformlar ve 4. bölümde de her iki ülkenin sosyal yapısında önemli bir yer tutan din faktörü incelenmiştir. Sonuç kısmında da bu tecrübelerin benzer ve farklı yönleri ortaya konulmuştur.

PREFACE

In this study, the effects of the westernization movements on the two countries, Turkey and Iran will be evaluated. The economic and political developments which have occurred in the West during the last 400 years, have deeply influenced all the non-western countries in the world. The technological improvements, the large scale increase in production, and the progress in sciences such as medicine, engineering, were the basis of these developments. Consequently, these economic and technological improvements caused the formation of a new social order having its peculiar institutions according to the newly emerging needs.

These developments initiated with reforms in religious field. After the long centuries of repression Protestantism ended the sovereignty of the Catholic church and opened new horizons for the people. The renaissance movement showed a parallel development and became the beginning of the enlightenment period. In this period a lot of philosophers and scientists appeared and fast technological development occurred. As a consequence of the developing trade, the population of the cities increased and this situation contributed to the dissolution of the feudal systems. The western states, after realizing their social and economic modernization, changed their social structure depending on the feudal system and completed the commercial stage of capitalism. During this period, the closed feudal economic structure, producing only for the needs, transformed itself to a system that was producing for the market.

A new social class, namely the bourgeoisie appeared in the political arena and became more and more wealthy each day. After gaining economic power the bourgeoisie class entered into a political struggle with the feudal landlords who were the main actors of

the feudal structure controlling political power. At the end of this struggle the bourgeoisie took over this power in different ways. For instance, in Great Britain a process of a soft turn over was experienced, while in France in 1789 an important revolution occurred. As a result, the newly born ideas of political liberalism and nationalism influenced other countries, which had never experienced the above mentioned economic developments or which wanted to continue their feudal orders. Henceforth, empires collapsed and a lot of new states depending on the concept of national identity were established.

The developments in the political and economic fields forced the western countries to realize colonization policies. Searching for new markets and cheap raw materials was the inevitable consequence of the developing industry. As a result, a lot of countries such as India became colonies.

In this respect, it could be stated that both Turkey or Iran, in spite of the diffusive influences of these movements, neither become political colonies, or members of the western imperialism. Of course they were deeply affected by the economic developments and they both became a market for western goods.

Today, it seems these two states are at two divergent points regarding their political systems and social orders. There are a lot of advantages to knowing the reasons for this differentiation considering that they had both started modernism movements from the same point approximately 200 years ago and lived similar political and social steps throughout these years. Especially if the serious close up between the two countries is considered, during the governments of Atatürk in Turkey and Rıza Shah Pehlevi in Iran, this differentiation becomes more important.

The Ottoman Empire and Iran shared similar backgrounds, they were both similarly lagged behind in the developments in the West, and in a similar way they turned towards the West to realize reforms. Thus, why have these countries gone in different

directions after Atatürk and Rıza Shah. In other words, how have the radical changes in the period of Atatürk become established in Turkey, and how have the ones that Rıza Shah realized, resulted today's Islamic Republic? This study aims at analyzing this query.

In the introductory chapter, the general structures of Turkey and Iran at the beginning of the 19th century, will be evaluated as this period was accepted as the beginning of the modernization movements. In the second chapter, the political and economic developments experienced in these two countries will be studied in order to find out the similarities and differences between these processes. In the third chapter the political and cultural reforms realized by Atatürk and Rıza Shah will be studied. Finally, the evaluation on the factor of "religion" as an important determinant of social structures of these two countries, will constitute the fourth chapter.

In the conclusion, the reasons for today's diversification will be examined and the question why the similar westernization movements realized in the period of Atatürk and Rıza Shah, gave different outcomes, will be answered by determining the similarities and differences between the two countries.

Although, Turkey and Iran have been neighbors for many centuries, they have had weak relations for many reasons. These reasons affect today's relations in a negative manner. Thus, the benefit of making any search, which could help developments in the mutual understanding of these countries, is clear as they will also live as neighbors in the future.

As a conclusion, the main purpose of this study is to determine the influence of western modernism movements on these two states and to reveal the effects of different inner dynamics which directed these countries to different points, although they have had similar experiences.

Of course, there are many other scientifically determined or undetermined causes of this differentiation in the two countries. In this study only some of the causes which occurred up until 1940 can be investigated. Without any doubt, there are a lot of other developments which took place before, after, or during this period and influenced this differentiation. For example, traditional or cultural factors that could have caused these changes have not been investigated because of time limitations. Searching the effects of these changes on the social institutions, would also help this kind of study.



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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION (THE GENERAL SITUATION BEFORE MODERNIZATION)

In this chapter, the traditional social and economic structures of the Ottoman Empire and Iran will be studied in order to clarify the general situation before the modernization movements of the 19th century.

A- THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

If we want to define the political and social structure of the Ottoman Empire, the first thing which must be put forward, is its difference from its western feudal counterparts. The European feudalism was a system where the basic means of production was the land and the political power was exercised by feudal landlords who controlled the land. In these countries the political power was decentralized and there was not any strong central authority. On the other hand, the Ottoman system as Berkes described was an "eastern type despotic empire"¹. In this system there was a central authority and all the land was the property of the state which was controlled by the ruler. Here the term

¹ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Publications, 1978), p. 144. The concept of "Asiatic mode of production" was also used in a similar way with "eastern type despotic empire". See Çağlar Keyder, *Toplumsal Tarih Çalışmaları* (Ankara: Dost, 1983), pp. 11-14.

despot defines the absolute power of the ruler. This power was formed due to the existence of strong armies and reign passes from father to son as a heritage.

This difference was also defined by Kongar as follows:

"..In the first place the existence of a very strong central power is the main difference between the Europe and the Ottoman order. Besides the political control, the Ottoman state used to supervise the production and distribution. Appointing and dismissing the local administrators were also among the rights of the sultan. This right, secures the absolute control of the central authority over the fief holders (timarlı sipahi).

On the other hand the holder of the fief (timar : the unit of land given to subjects by the ruler for cultivation) had only the right of using the land and the property belong to the state. If the fief holder did not plant the land it would have been taken from him and would be given to another person. It was also taken from the fief holder if he could not supply the required number of cavalry during times of war."²

Regarding the political structure and the distribution of political power in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was the absolute ruler and all his subjects were considered as servants (kul). This means that their lives and properties were subjected to the commands of this ruler. Inalcık states that Ottoman society was divided into two major classes and he defines this structure as follows:

"The first one, called "*askeri*", literary the "*military*", included the people to whom the sultan delegated his religious or executive power through an imperial

² Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı* (Istanbul: Remzi Bookstore, 1992), p. 59.

diploma, namely, officers of the court and the army, civil servants and *ulema*. The second included the *reaya* comprising all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but had no part in the government. "³

Sarıbay also makes the same distinction and explains the Ottoman social structure as follows:

"... the social structure of the Ottoman society was somewhat different from the western feudal system. It constituted an example of eastern despotism as it filled its army and administrative organs with people in the status of servant⁴ (*kul*). And it differed from the western type feudalism, as it did not have a heritable aristocracy, an independent church, a strong commercial class and self governing cities."⁵

In this aspect, it was possible to say that Ottoman society was divided mainly into two classes as "military" and "subjects" (*reaya*). The military class was constituted by the administrators of the palace and the army (civil servants and the *ulemas*) to whom the sultan turned over his executive power. The *reaya* on the other hand embraced all the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who had no say in the state issues.

About the "*reaya*" Kongar points out that :

³ Halil İnalçık, "The Nature of Traditional Society" in ed. Metin Heper, *Readings in Turkish Politics* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications), p. 5.

⁴ İnalçık uses the term slaves.

⁵ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Kemalist İdeolojide Modernleşmenin Anlamı" in eds., E. Kalaycıoğlu and A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Beta Press, 1986), p. 191. See also Keyder, *Toplumsal Tarih Çalışmaları*, pp. 67-68.

".. reaya were in a different position from the slaves of Europe in the middle ages. In the Ottoman Empire reaya were not the slaves of the owner of the fief, and they could apply to the "Kadı" (judge) for protection of their rights⁶. On the other side, if the reaya left the fief the sipahi (the holder of the fief, cavalryman) had the right to take him back or make him pay a tax called "çiftbozan". This was a measure which secured the income of the central administration. Moreover the "fief" was not a closed administrative or financial unit as it was seen in the European feudalism. It was open to the tax inspectors for the collection gathering of the tax which was under the responsibility of the state".⁷

The traditional economic structure of the Ottoman Empire was dependent on agriculture, animal husbandry and trade. It was a closed economy where the farmers did not produce more than their own needs. Because, in this period the Ottoman Empire were facing wars, lack of education, lack of knowledge about the market prices, inconvenience in the transportation, a bad climate as well as the widespread domestic insecurity which were the main obstacles for better productivity. These in turn, negatively affected the developments in agriculture⁸. Whereas at that period an impressive development in agriculture could be seen in Europe. The new scientific methods were applied in this field and machines were used instead of human and animal power.

⁶ These rights were much more limited than the fief holder.

⁷ Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, p. 59.

⁸ Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914* (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 25-26.

On the other hand, domestic and international trade were done under the supervision of the state. There were many rules and regulations organizing commercial relations. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire was in a very serious situation as these laws and regulations were not applied. There was a great deal of smuggling. Also the balance between the shares of Ottoman and foreign merchants was uneven as a result of the capitulations given to the western countries.

Çadircı states as follows:

"...Because of the reasons such as capitulations, lack of capital, education and insecurity of human life and property, the Ottomans did not have a strong merchant class. At the beginning of the century, domestic merchants were known as "Beratlı Tüccar" where as the foreign ones were called "Müstemin Tüccar"⁹".

This was a major point in the structure of the Ottoman economic structure namely that, in the empire trade activities were mainly done and controlled by the non-Muslim population and foreign tradesmen. Besides the fact that these people were supported by capitulations, unjust laws and regulations established against the benefits of Muslim tradesmen. There was another obstacle against the improvement of the Ottomans which was the desire of the State for securing the domestic status quo as an unchangeable policy. Kongar, makes the following statement:

⁹ "Beratlı tüccar" was a title given to the merchants who were Ottoman citizens; and "müstemin tüccar" was the title given to the foreign merchants who were doing trade in the empire. See Musa Çadircı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Press, 1991), p. 7.

" The social policy of the Empire aimed to keep every citizen in his proper place in society and the goal of the state was not to let anyone change the current order. Since the Empire was doing this consciously, the administrators were not following mercantilist policies purposely. The aim oriented to secure the traditional ways to get the excess production from the farmer in order to prevent any kind of capital accumulation. That is why, acquiring capital was virtually impossible."¹⁰

In the empire the production and distribution system were under the control of the craftsmen guilds (esnaf loncaları). All the craftsmen and artisans had to be members of these organizations, which had strict rules and regulations. The head of these organizations were called "kethüda's" who were responsible for collecting the taxes, supervising the education of their members and so on. These institutions became obstacles to the Ottoman industry when the effects of the rapid economic development of the west, came to the empire.¹¹

When the beginning of the 19th century came, the Ottoman Empire was one of the biggest in the world regarding population and land, but her institutions and organizations were deprived of supporting this integrity¹². The developments that the western countries realized in the economic, political and military fields during the 18th century, continued into the 19th century. Europe, after the industrial revolution, obtained an important increase in production. Hence, this provoked competition between Western states into taking greater shares from the Ottoman market. Like

¹⁰ Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, p. 54.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları*, p. 3.

Britain and France, Australia and Russia also began to follow imperialistic policies as they became more and more powerful each day. Ottomans, were beaten against these imperialistic and expansionist policies. So they were forced to give more compromises each time. For example, France tried to occupy Egypt but she could not manage it because she entered into a competition with Great Britain. In this case the Ottomans had to cooperate with Britain in order to stop the French army.¹³

During the Egyptian expedition Ottoman administrators once more saw the weakness and insufficiency of their armies as they were defeated several times by the 250,000 troops of the French army. From then on as it was seen impossible to sustain the security of Ottoman lands alone the administrators of the state began to carry out balancing policies against the European powers.

Along with these foreign interventions domestic order depending on central authority could no longer sustain its power. Local powers became stronger and stronger each day and helped towards the dissolution of the Ottoman integrity. Çadırcı notes as follows :

"..In these years Ottoman lands were under anarchy. The local authorities became to be feudalistic in Anatolia and Balkans and incidents of robbery and brigandage began to weaken the internal security. Especially in the Arab lands governors such as Zahir El Ömer, Süleyman Pasha, Cezzar Pasha and Büyük Ali Bey who were supposed to be subjected to the central administration, began to show semi-independent attitudes. The incomes of the central treasury decreased and the collection of taxes (iltizam system) became a problem. In Anatolia strong families took over the top offices such as governorship and

¹³ Tefik Çavdar, *Osmanlıların Yarı-sömürge Olması* (İstanbul: Ant, 1970), pp. 28-31.

"mütesellimlik" and they gained political power along with their economic powers."¹⁴

All these developments shook the empire deeply and the Ottoman administrators saw the need for reforms in the traditional structure. The serious appearance of these reform movements began after Selim III had ascended the throne. In 1789 he gathered together the notables of the state in order to evaluate the situation. These kind of meetings, referred to as "meclisi meşveret", were held several times for consultation and getting the opinions of the people who were in important posts in the government center and for associating them with the execution of the reforms. The statesmen could have the chance of expressing their opinions in these meetings.¹⁵

Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in a very severe situation, as its traditional institutions were far behind the current world order and could not compete with the developing western powers. As a result of this, the need for broad reforms were on the agenda and the 19th century faced these rapid developments.

B- THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IRAN

Before defining the Iranian social structure, it is important to point out that Iran was not an empire like the Ottoman state and the land under her control was considerably smaller. Regarding the Ottoman social mosaic formed by different religions and different nations, the people living in Iran have a relatively homogeneous structure.

¹⁴ Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları*, p. 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 5.

The general social structure of Iran was not very different from that of the Ottoman Empire. The argument that the Ottoman state had an eastern type semi-feudal structure with a strong central government, was also true for the Iranian case. The land was also the main source of income and it was also the property of the state which was controlled by a ruler.¹⁶

Nevertheless there was an important difference between the two countries when we considered the division of political power. In Iran we can not see the dichotomous division of society as in the Ottoman state. Different from the statute of ulema in the Ottoman Empire, in Iran the men of religion could be specified as a clergy class. Although it was argued that there was no clergy class in the religion of Islam (as opposed to Christianity, Islam do not accept the existence of any class or person between man and God), the men of religion had traditionally established a social class in the shiite sect of Iran. This clergy class in Iran had a traditional political power in the society. As they were economically independent from the central authority they maintain this power by collecting religious taxes which did not exist in the Ottoman State.¹⁷

As a result it could be stated that the political power in Iran was shared by the ruler and the clergy jointly. So the society was divided into three as central authority, clergy and the peasants. The clergy traditionally was an intermediary factor between the ruler and

¹⁶ Rameş Sanghvi, *Aryamer: Iran Şahı (Siyasi bir bibliografi)* (Istanbul: R.C.D. Publishes no 32, 1971), p. 8.

¹⁷ Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 7-9. See also Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar* (Kum: Ensariyan, 1991), pp. 42-53. This will be further elucidated in the last chapter on religion.

the peasant which strengthened the position of the peasant. The reason for that could be the religious taxes which they were collecting from them.¹⁸

The administrative structure, which controls the land order in Iran had very similar characteristics with the Ottoman Empire. In Iran, there were systems called "ikta" and "tüyul" which looks like the Ottoman "fief" system meaning giving land to cultivate and taking tax and cavalry in return¹⁹. "Ikta" was an Arabic word which literary means "the money of feeding" and it was the name of the system which divided the land and gave it to someone to cultivate. The Ikta system was established in Iran after the Religion of Islam was accepted by the Iranians and continued its existence until the Mongolian invasion²⁰. Then the name of the system was changed to "tüyul" with the establishment of Seljucian Empire. It was a Turkish word literary meaning "part". This system in Iran continued during the periods of Safevis and the Qajars, until the establishment of constitutional monarchy in 1909. The tüyul like the fief system was given to some

¹⁸ Mansur Muaddel, "İran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", in ed., Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi, Din Anti-emperyalizm ve Sol* (İstanbul: Belge, 1992), pp. 151-152. See also, Gulan Hüseyin Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi* (Tahran: Intişarat-ı Franklin, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 1531-1536. (Translated From Persian by Dr. A. Milani.); Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harward University Press, 1961), p. 57.

¹⁹ Gulan Hüseyin Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, p. 183.

²⁰ Under the Mongolian administration the system was like the western feudalism for a period. The land was divided into independant units named "hanlık".

privileged people called "tüyuldar" (the holder of the tüyul) for cultivating it. The tüyuldar, in return had to give tax and soldiers to the central authority.²¹

Ağaoğlu describes another system about the collection of taxes in the period of Safevis and Qajars, which looks like the Ottoman iltizam system and notes as follows:

".. The administrative structure was the same as the "Safevi" period, that means Iran was divided into provinces, the provinces were divided into districts, and the districts were divided into sub-districts. There were 340 branches in this system and there was a "şufi" (accountant) in charge of each branch who was subjected to the "şufi ül memalik" (head of the accountants) in Tehran. Each şufi was given a booklet which was hundreds of years old, containing the amounts of the taxes...

In forms times the chiefs of the tribes used to become the head of these provinces, districts and sub-districts. But later on, this procedure was changed and these offices were subjected to bargaining in such a way that every year in "nevruz" (new year) these offices were put auction and the highest bidder would be appointed to the office"²²

As can be seen this fiscal system of Iran resembled the Ottoman "iltizam" system. Iltizam was a tax collecting system which depended on hiring the public incomes. This

²¹ Hasan Amid, *Ferhenge Amid* (Tahran: Sazıman-ı Çab İntişarat-ı Cavidan, 1971), p. 125,337. See also, Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran*, p. 7.; Ann K. S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 20-21.

²² Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Iran Devrimi: Yeni Türkiye Yeni Iran", *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul daily, 9 June 1934. See also, Ann K. S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, p. 32, Hasan Amid, *Ferhenge Amid*, vol. 2, pp. 665,976; Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 155.

system was initiated by the holders of some "dirlik"s in the 16th century, who abandoned their fiefs (tumar's and zeamet's) against payments in advance. In time it spread out to all public resources²³. Similarly, the division of the country into provinces (eyalet), provinces into districts (sancaks) and districts into villages in the Ottoman system, is also similar to Iran.

As in the case of the Ottomans this system was corrupted and gave rise to the strengthening of the tüyuldars or other local administrators, to become semi-feudal landlords. Hasan Arfa explains this system as follows:

"The structure and political institutions of Iran at the beginning of the 19th century did not differ much from what they had been under the Safevi dynasty which reigned from 1502 to 1736, and there was little change up to the first world war and the appearance of Rıza Shah. Administration did not exist, the towns and provinces were ruled by governors, some hereditary, some sent from the capital, whose absolute and arbitrary power was only limited by that, more absolute and arbitrary, of the shah in Teheran. In particular most of the border regions were under local hereditary chiefs who, although acknowledging allegiance to the Shahinshah, were practically independent, and had their courts, their armed forces, regular and irregular, who more often opposed the Shah's forces than marauding tribes of robbers."²⁴

The two economic structures also resembled each other. The main source of income was agriculture and animal husbandry as in the Ottoman case and there was also a

²³ *Ana Britannica Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Ana Publications and Encyclopedia Britannica Inc, 1986), vol.11, p. 530.

²⁴ General Hasan Arfa, *Under Five Shahs* (London: John Murray, 1964), p. 1.

closed economy which was carried on by using traditional methods and technics for production.²⁵

It must also be stated that the craftsmen organizations named "teşkilat-ı esnaf" also existed like the Ottomans. Each organization, as in the "lonca" system strictly controlled its members and was responsible for their professional education's and for collection of their taxes. The heads of these organizations were called "kethuda".²⁶

The tradition which prevented the establishment of a merchant class in the Ottoman structure, was not seen in Iran and the domestic merchant class was effective in the internal and foreign trade. This was one of the main differences between Ottoman and Iran, in the economic field.²⁷

The effect of the West on Iran was also very intensive like the effects on the Ottomans. From the late 18th century under the Western influence the two countries proceeded on a parallel line through the 19th century. It was very obvious that Iran was also deeply affected by the military defeats at beginning of the 19th century. Her northern neighbor, Russia, wanted to expand and reach warm waters. Similarly Britain was interested in the southern regions of Iran including the Iranian Gulf and Indian sea trade routes. The economic goals of the Western countries caused these foreign

²⁵ Ann K. S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, pp. 4-5

²⁶ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 455.

²⁷ For examining the existance and power of the Iranian merchants see, Mansur Muaddel, "Iran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", in ed., Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi, Din Anti-emperyalizm ve Sol*, pp. 170-171; also Nikki R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran-The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London: Frank Cass,1966), pp. 65-66.

pressures and from then on Iran was turned into a chess board upon which Britain, Russia and France played this game according to their benefits.²⁸

Peter Avery²⁹, in his book "Modern Iran" explains that the Anglo-Russian competition played an important role in the modernization movements in Iran. Feth Ali Shah³⁰, the second ruler of the Qajar Dynasty (1797-1834) fought against Russia with the support of Britain, but he failed to defeat them and shared the same destiny with Ottomans³¹. Avery³² also states that, the treaties of Gülistan (1813) and Türkmənçay (1828) signed between Iran and Russia were humiliating for Iran, hence they had a great affect on the people and administrators of this country and her modernization attempts.

During this period, at the end of long wars, the Iranian army under the command of Prince Abbas Mirza (son of Feth Ali Shah) was defeated by the Russians. So Iran lost the land on both sides of the Caspian sea. This war was lost despite the declaration of "cihat" (the holy war) by the religious leader of Isfahan, Imam Jum³³ and Iran was forced to sign the treaties of 1813 and 1828.

Abbas Mirza, associated the reasons of these defeats to: 1) the superiority of the Russian fire arms; 2) using their contemporary knowledge of engineering in the war; 3)

²⁸ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation*, pp. 4-7.

²⁹ Peter Avery, *Modern Iran* (New York: Jenkins Publishing Co.,1965), p. 3.

³⁰ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, pp. 1842-1843.

³¹ *Ana Britannica Ansiklopedisi*, vol.11, p. 613.

³² Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 15-16.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 38.

also using their knowledge of medicine in the treatment of wounded soldiers.³⁴ This situation directed him towards the idea of modernizing the Iranian army. Mirza was a modern person who was educated in Europe and impressed with the new ideas and developments. He informed his father that it was necessary to make certain reforms in the army, education system and administrative structure. He also added in his report that without attaining the superiority of the Russians it was impossible to defeat them with the old war systems"³⁵ .

As a conclusion it could be stated that, both Ottomans and Iranians suffered their first serious defeats against the armies of technologically and economically developed western countries and saw that they could not overcome these powers with out improving their existing systems. So the need for reformation appeared in both countries. But how will the change came about and which factors are going to play the most important role? Naturally, some strong forces was needed for a change. Köker states these crucial factors as follows :

"What are the important roles of individuals and institutions in the societies during the transitional periods? The answer for that lies in whether the society was a Western one or not. The modernization in the West lasted for about 400 years and it processed naturally. In other words, the West developed because of its internal dynamics."³⁶

³⁴ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, p. 1983.

³⁵ Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 38.

³⁶ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: İletişim Publications,1993), p. 126.

However, the progression or modernization in the non-western societies happened in a shorter time period with the help of outside forces. The obvious result of this evaluation, was that, the non-western societies wanted to achieve this modernization faster. Therefore, a group to bring about the change was needed. In the Ottoman Empire it was the bureaucratic intelligentsia who were educated abroad. In Iran, on the other hand, this group was the class of clergy (Ruhban) who worked collectively with the bourgeoisie. These internal factors showed themselves in both countries. The other major factor which had influenced the modernization process was the West's need for cheaper natural resources and new markets. This was the basic dynamic of their foreign policies which was applied to the Ottoman Empire and Iran.



CHAPTER 2 : THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION MOVEMENTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND IRAN :

As it was mentioned in the first chapter, both the Ottoman Empire and Iran had unnegligible similarities in their social and economic structures at the beginning of the 19th century. Departing from this point the influence of the West and the westernization movements on these countries will be studied in this chapter. It is quite clear that the West had a deep political and economic influence on the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Also the internal dynamics of these countries have played an important role in the development of the 19th century reformation movements. So both countries had faced important changes which would carry them into the 20th century.

A- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD :

I- Political modernization in the Ottoman Empire :

The 19th century witnessed many developments in the Ottoman Empire, which were defined as modernization. But as we mentioned above, it is not possible to explain these developments with internal dynamics or external influences alone. This modernization process was the consequence of these two factors and different from the experience which the West had lived through during the last three or four centuries. When the Ottomans like the other non-western countries were confronted with this new order, there was an important gap between them. Western technological and

economic superiority was irresistible and the Ottomans had to import this new order under the name of modernization or westernization. This was a totally different process experience as western countries were using their power for their economic and political interests. These influences were first seen with the military conquests of Ottoman lands then with free trade policies (capitulations) and imperialism.³⁷

It is quite clear that the reformation movements in the Ottoman Empire began with needs of renovation in the military field. Selim III, first of the modernizing sultans, lost his life and throne when he wanted to modernize the army, as he was confronted with the traditional forces of resistance. Then Mahmud II tried to establish a new army and he was eliminated by the Janissaries. But these military reforms could not be sufficient to stop the military defeats.³⁸

At this period Ottoman diplomats and bureaucrats were sent to Europe to get a new type of education. By the time they returned these people had seen and learned about the western culture and its superiority.³⁹ Also new schools were established in the country in order to train enlightened statesmen such as "Maarif-i Adliye" (1838) and "Valide Mektebi" (1849)⁴⁰. This had resulted in the formation of a new bureaucratic class which was going to play an important role in the Ottoman administrative system

³⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey In Historical And Comparative Perspective" in ed., K. H. Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (London: Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 94.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 96.

³⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 87.

⁴⁰ Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition* (Michigan: Syracuse University, 1971), p. 113.

and modernization process. For those people who had confronted alone the power of the West it soon became clear that realizing military reforms would not be enough to stop the western countries. So the need to make renovations in political and economic fields was accepted by the Ottoman administrators⁴¹.

So a political struggle which would continue from then on was started in the Country. The Ottoman bureaucrats in the Bab-ı Ali (Capital) became an important political power and they undertook the role of modernizing the empire. On the one hand, these people had to struggle against the traditional Ottoman Islamic society and its institutions, and on the other hand they had to fight against the western states imperialistic goals. In other words, the political incidents were the outcomes of the struggle of internal and external forces, which was continued until the foundation of the Republic.⁴²

The first aspect of the political struggle was against the interventions of western countries. As a consequence of their economic and political aims they were using several methods for making the Ottoman state a market for the western products and a cheap raw material warehouse for their industry.

The internal dynamics on the other hand which were the causes of Ottoman failure could be summarized as follows: The main internal factor influencing the political incidents was the political struggle between the local administrators and the center. The local administrators such as the Ayan (notables), Eşraf, Mültezims and Voyvodas wanted to obtain political positions using their economic powers. These people gained this power after the destruction of the traditional Ottoman (timar) fief system. So they

⁴¹ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), pp. 13-14.

⁴² Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, pp. 118-123.

began to control the lands permanently, which were formerly considered as state property and endowed to them under the fief system. As a result, they achieved a semi-feudal position, despite the fact they were not as powerful as their counterparts in Europe. With this power, they challenged the authority of the Sultan and got into struggles against him.⁴³

Hence, we could say that, the basic purpose of the political renovations realized by the Ottoman bureaucracy, was to rescue the empire and to stop the riots and rebellions from increasing as a result of nationalist ideas inspired by the French revolution, and also as a result of the demands of the strengthening *Ayans*. Thus they wanted to reestablish central authority. Despite the changes in the political trends, this idea continued to be the basic argument of the Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats until the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.⁴⁴

In a context where the Ottoman empire began to lose its position against European powers it became evident that trying to solve the problems within the system was useless, and they indeed had roots deep inside, thus external remedies were examined for a possible solution. This meant a basic shift for the Ottoman administration, since up to that time all the problems were attached to the idea that the rules of the system were not sufficiently exercised. Now, the administration was trying to examine a

⁴³ Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", in ed., Metin Heper, *Readings in Turkish Politics* (Boğaziçi University Publications). pp. 83-84. See also, Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, pp. 62-67.

⁴⁴ Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", p. 86.

structure which had been continuously despised and to try to find out the reasons why the western structure was victorious against them.⁴⁵

So, Ottoman intellectuals and executives put forward several political views and realized several renovations with the aim of "rescuing the Ottoman Empire". The hard core of these ideas was to integrate western technology to the traditional and institutionalized Islamic social order which had been in existence for centuries. This type of modernization was defined as "defensive modernization" or "limited westernization"⁴⁶.

The most important outcomes of these westernization movements in the Ottoman Empire, were the announcements of "the decree of Tanzimat" (regulations)" in 1839 and the "decree of Islahat" in 1856. These two documents were important as they were securing the rights of private property and guarantee for life security. The decrees also brought new laws and regulations in the judicial field by the enforcement of Western Powers, but it was not possible to accept it as a constitution.

Rustow summarizes the reforms of "Tanzimat" as follows:

"Meanwhile, by a compelling logic the program [of autocratic reform] slowly spread. The army could not be reformed in isolation from the rest of the body politic. The new soldiery needed officers schooled in mathematics, French and Geography and army surgeons with *allafranga* medical training. Military

⁴⁵ Şükrü Hanioglu, "Baticılık", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, İstanbul, 1985), vol. 5 p. 1382.

⁴⁶ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey In Historical and Comparative Perspective", p. 94. See also, Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, p. 97.

scription required a tightening of administration in the provinces... The costs of the new army and administration had to be borne by systematic taxation. An entire new school system was instituted to prepare the future officers, administrators and tax collectors for their tasks. The schools required more money- and yet more schools for the training of teachers. These new systems of administration and education were instituted during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) and elaborated during the reign of Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) who strengthened them further through introduction of telegrams and railways- the rudiments, that is, of a modern system of communication. Henceforth young men of talent from all parts of the country were trained in Istanbul as military officers, administrators, tax collectors or school to be transferred from province at regular intervals of two to three years. It was this new military and civilian bureaucracy with tentacles throughout out the empire that consolidated Mahmud's work of political centralization"⁴⁷

As Rustow stated the tanzimat bureaucracy brought lots of renovations which were continued in other fields like literature. But the important point is that these westernization incidents did not influence the whole society, and a substantial number of people remained unaffected. Nevertheless, the modernists were successful in trying to change the political structure. Hanioglu explains this situation as follows:

"..As it might be seen, the action was only about the elites. We cannot really say that the whole society closely followed and supported the modernists movement. As a matter of fact, several upheavals occurred against many of the reformist movements. The Ottoman society was divided into two groups: commoners and elite. The control of the government was in the hands of the

⁴⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey In Historical and Comparative Perspective", p. 99.

elite rather than commoners so it was somewhat easier for them to implement the changes. So, in spite of these reactions, the westernist elite managed to change the profile of Ottoman Empire in a short time."⁴⁸

Thus, the Ottoman Empire found the tendency towards westernization was becoming extreme in particular. The intelligentsia intended to not only bring in the technology but also the organizations and institutions. With such an orientation, they made changes in their daily lives, outlook, cultural and social activities. This situation led to severe reactions from religious people and some intellectuals.⁴⁹

The political influence of the West was increasing each day. Russians and Austrians were competing for the control of the Ottoman lands in the Balkans. Also Russia wanted to control the Dardanelles according to their "reaching warm waters" policy. Things were going worse and the disintegration of the empire was continuing. One other important reason for this was the shift in the British policy aiming to help the integrity of the empire during the tanzimat period. From then on, especially after imperialism began and Germany was included in this competition among the European countries, the Ottoman empire and its division was always on the agenda and became known as the Eastern Question.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Şükrü Hanioglu, "Batıcılık", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, p. 1383.

⁴⁹ Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimattan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma" in eds: E. Kalaycıoğlu and A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Beta Press, 1986), pp. 61-63.

⁵⁰ Tevfik Çavdar, *Osmanlıların Yarı-sömürge Oluşu*, pp. 18-19. See also, Murat Özyüksel, *Osmanlı Alman İlişkilerinin Gelişim Sürecinde Anadolu ve Bağdat Demiryolları* (İstanbul: Arba, 1988), pp. 37-44.

This became a reason for the birth of a new political action called Ottomanism or the Young Ottomans movement. "Ottomanism" was the political ideology which aimed to prevent the movements aiming at independence and autonomy from the empire, by creating a concept of "being Ottoman" among all ethnic nations and reuniting all the subjects of the Empire under a new identity in which the basic human rights were granted equally for all Ottoman citizens. This they thought would stop the ethnic groups from leaving the Empire. The arbitrary ruling of the Sultan also would come to an end, and the Ottoman community would make a quick leap with its constitutional administration. Ottomanists were against extreme westernization, they were supported the protection of Ottoman cultural and traditional institutions. They did not want to bring cultural institutions of the West to the Ottoman structure. The struggles of the Ottomanists resulted from the proclamation of Kanun-i Esasi (The constitution) in 1876.⁵¹

Karpat defines the constitution as follows:

"The constitution of 1876 endeavored to institute a constitutional monarchy in order to limit the sultan's powers and thus, preserve and consolidate the division of labor among the three classical branches of government. The constitution created the legislature and defined its functions according to the western models, though its relation to the executive was justified in terms of the şura (council) and meşveret (consultation), both of which came from Islam. At the same time the constitution recognized the Sultan as the head of the executive and gave him extensive powers in the appointment and dismissal of ministers."⁵²

⁵¹ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, pp. 87-93.

⁵² Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", pp. 102-103.

However the constitutional regime did not last long and Abdülhamit II closed the assembly and suspended the constitution pleading the Russian attack of 1877-78. A period of despotism began and the Westernist Ottoman intelligentsia continued their political activities in Europe. The political movement which emerged during this period was called "Young Turkism". Some important representatives of this movement were Mizancı Murat Bey, Ahmet Rıza Bey, Abdullah Cevdet Bey and Prince Sabahattin.⁵³ During the Abdülhamit period modernization movements were continued on administrative and material aspects. Military training, higher education, telegraphs and railways were the continuing aspects of the modernization process.⁵⁴

The ideas of the Young Turks were not much different than the Young Ottomans'. The main aim also was to rescue the Ottoman Empire but the concept of Turkish national identity was a little bit more emphasized than the other nations within the Empire. Fundamentally they were constitutionists and wanted a constitutional monarchy.⁵⁵ Finally, the Young Turks having forced Abdülhamit II with a coup d'état in 1908, declared the Constitution and attained power through their party named as Union and Progress Party.⁵⁶ When the Union and Progress Party came to power, the Western

⁵³ For a detailed study for the political views of the Young Turks see, Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1989).

⁵⁴ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey In Historical and Comparative Perspective" p. 102.

⁵⁵ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, pp. 95-98.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp.18-19.

countries were trying to share the Ottoman lands among themselves. And in this environment the main purpose was to rescue the empire.⁵⁷

In an environment of freedom coming after the constitutional regime, a sudden explosion in the number of political views and ideas from public opinion was witnessed throughout the country. During this period, the nationalist movements in the Balkan countries and the rebellions emerging as a result of these, seriously affected the Ottomanist policies of the Young Turks. Thus it was obvious to them that survival through an Ottoman identity was no longer valid.⁵⁸

Before World War I, Turkism and a nationalism structure was the official ideology of the Union and Progress Party and eventually of the State, although at first they had liberal and moderate ideas⁵⁹. Members of the party and parliament were severely criticized both by the Ottomanists and Islamists. The main point they were arguing was that, there is only one Islamic community (Ümmet) thus, nationalism and Islamism could not reach an agreement. Nevertheless, according to the Turkists' point of view, one could be both a nationalist and a Moslem.⁶⁰ Ziya Gökalp as a political philosopher, had deeply affected the intelligentsia of both the Unionists and the Kemalists periods. Ziya Gökalp was supporting a Turkish nationalism, based on a cultural unity, instead of

⁵⁷ Tevfik Çavdar, *İttihat ve Terakki* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 103.

⁵⁸ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 419.

⁵⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 209-210.

⁶⁰ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 434-435.

racist views.⁶¹ He also tried synthesize Western civilization with the Turkish and Islamic cultures.

However, these ideas did not helped to the Empire as the problems were severe and the imperialistic pressures were increasing. The result of these pressures were the wars which were continued until the Republic. The Armenian problem in the East and the Yemen war was going on. Also in 1911 Ottoman had to fight with Italians in Trablusgarb after which Ouchy treaty was signed. Balkan War in 1912 followed it and Ottomans lost the Balkan lands. Thus in 1913 the Ottoman lands in Africa and in Europe were totally lost. A short while after the Empire was pushed into the World War I.⁶²

As a result, the Ottoman modernization began in the beginning of the 19th century as a result of the military defeats and the land losses. The Ottoman administrators came across with the increasing power of the Western countries. Whereas in the Empire, the traditional social and economic systems were collapsing. The increasing nationalistic movements and rebellions from the one side, the economic and the political interventions of the West on the other side, made the situation more severe. Hence, the 19th century passed with the process of Ottoman disintegration and the attempts of Ottoman administrators for rescuing the State. These attempts were mainly occurred in the form of reforms for integrating western technology to the traditional structure of the Ottoman state as it was seen the main superiority of the West. A second point was

⁶¹ Niyazi Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), pp. 76-79. Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 428-430. And Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Türkçülük", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, İstanbul, 1985), pp. 1396-1398.

⁶² Tefik Çavdar, *İttihat ve Terakki*, pp. 104-109.

to rearrange the political, legal and educational systems to keep up with west. As a result the regime was transformed to a constitutional monarchy. But these reforms were not enough and the attempts of rescuing the empire ended with the political disintegration of her.

II- Political Modernization in Iran

At the beginning of the 19th century, by Iran was also under the economic pressure of the West and was deeply affected from the political competition which continued between these countries. Hence Iranians were also obliged to accept the military superiority of the West. Iranian administrators like their Ottoman counterparts saw the need for bringing western technology to their Country but there was an important structural difference between the two Countries. The Ottoman Empire was going through a process of disintegration. In other words, the different nations and religions within the Empire which were influenced by the nationalist movements wanted independence. This factor was very important as it forced the Ottoman administrators to find solutions quickly. However, this was not the case in Iran as it did not have such a mosaic structure. In spite of the fact that there were some loses of land, the state was not in a position of disintegration. And also it could be said that its social structure was quite homogeneous.⁶³

⁶³ This idea has been discussed in different works. The Iranian population is composed of different groups and there also exist various groups of religions. Even though we can easily say that this country is much more homogeneous compared to that of the Ottoman society. Another factor is that these groups have lived together under various political structures and formed a common culture for long centuries. For more information about the ethnic structure of Iran see Ann K. S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, pp. 9-18.

At the beginning of the century the most important factor influencing Iran was the political and economic interventions of the West. During this period, Russia, Britain and France were deeply interested in Iranian politics. In the meantime the English took the East India Company under control and started to invade India. Therefore, the status quo and control of Iran was strategically important for them. The Gulf was also a very crucial trade center. Similarly, as in the case of the Ottomans, the idea of reaching to the south and to the warmer seas were the main concerns of Russia, and they intended to attain this goal through Iran. Hence, Iran became an area for the war of diplomacy between England and Russia. In this battle sometimes Russia was superior and affected the internal policies of Iran, at other times the British.⁶⁴

The liberalism and independence movements which had spread throughout the world after the French Revolution had an influence on Iran as well. However the ideas of nationalism which emerged simultaneously did not have an important effect in Iran due to its homogeneous structure. Since the Shiite sect set Iran apart from the other Moslem countries the concept of an Islamic community did not influence Iran as much as it influenced the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵

Due to the above reasons, modernization movements were not as broad as in the Ottoman Empire and the movements proceeded rather slowly and were restricted to the economic and technological fields. Political developments were not very influential until the announcement of the constitution although there were some attempts at realizing political developments. Farmayan talked about Moshir od-Dowleh's views

⁶⁴ Robert A. McDaniel, *The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1974), pp. 4-17. See also, Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914* (London: Yale Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 7-12.

⁶⁵ Hossein Bashiriye, *The State and Revolution in Iran*, p54.

who was the Turkish ambassador of Iran as: "...Some of the subjects to which he gave attention were; politics in Europe, nationalism and the liberal activities in the Ottoman Empire, spread of westernization, the necessity for a parliament, judicial reforms and equality before law, and so forth".⁶⁶

As it was expressed before, the political structure of Iran was based on the centralized authority. At the beginning of the 19th century the authority gap in the country after the "Sefevis" came to an end with the control of the Qajar family. During this period the second sultan of the Qajar dynasty Feth Ali Shah was on the throne.⁶⁷

The reign of this Sultan lasting 38 years, corresponded to the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II in the Ottoman Empire. During his term Napoleon took Iran under his wing against Russia and Britain and due to the Iranian defeat in the Caucasian wars, the education of the army was given to a French general.⁶⁸ An envoy of Napoleon came to Iran in 1806 and the Finkenstein Treaty was signed the following year. According to this treaty General Gardane was to come to Iran with a team of engineers. Thus the westernization of the army was started up, by equipping it with modern arms, engineering technics and military education. Arnakis and Vucinich states that: "... In the spirit of the treaty of Finkenstein, Napoleon sent General Antoine

⁶⁶ Hafez Farman Farmayan "The Forces of Modernization in 19th Century Iran, A Historical Survey", in eds., William R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers, *Beginings of Modernization in the Middle East: The 19 th Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 1968), p. 130.

⁶⁷ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, pp. 1842-1843.

⁶⁸ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 3-4.

Gardane to train the Persian army and to prepare for a campaign against the British of India."⁶⁹

However, Napoleon then allied with Russia against the British and gave up the idea of helping Iran. Thus Iran was left on its own against Russia. On the other hand, Britain also wanted to safeguard Iran against Napoleon for the above-mentioned reasons. A representative of the East India Company namely Sir Malcolm came to Iran and signed a trade treaty with Feth Ali Shah. Feth Ali Shah was very effective on the political development of his country and almost determined the borderlines of today's Iran with the various treaties he signed.⁷⁰

It is crucial to point out that Iran did not have any significant wars during the period following the Türkmençay treaty signed after their defeat of Russia in 1826. This was a point where Iran and the Ottoman Empire differed once more in the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire had to fight against Russia and also with the rebelling provinces like Egypt and Greece. This situation continued also into the beginning of the 20th century when the Ottomans had to fight in the Balkan state, South African wars and also in World War I. All these wars had deeply influenced the Empire both politically and economically. Finally Turkey put an end to the wars with the War of Independence. However, after 1826 Iran did not fight any important war except for its borderline disputes with Afghanistan. Thus she was away from the destructive influences of wars.⁷¹

⁶⁹ George G. Arnakis, and Wayne S. Vucinich, *The Near East in Modern Times, Forty Crucial Years 1900-1940* (New York: Jenkins Publishing Co, 1972), pp. 89-90.

⁷⁰ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 4-6.

⁷¹ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, p. 1843.

Nasreddin Shah who ascended to throne in 1841 reigned for 50 years without making any major political change in the country. The greatest factor influencing the political life during this term was again the international relations. England, Russia, France and Austria respectively influenced the modernization process in Iran.⁷²

The Shah visited Europe three times, in 1873, 1879 and finally in 1889. Ağaoğlu reports that⁷³ he proclaimed life and property security for his people after his return from his first visit to Europe. This proclamation might be considered to be equal to the Ottoman Tanzimat (regulations) but since there existed no political power to balance the authority of the Shah, his proclamation was inapplicable. Similarly, he formed a state parliament after his second visit. In proclamation which he published, the Shah said "...the members of the government, will be completely free in their negotiations, and all the state affairs will be executed according to their decisions. They will be free of censor in all the executions of their duties."⁷⁴ Ağaoğlu expressed the way this parliament functioned as follows: "...this parliament was known as "hamuşan" (Silents) starting from the moment it was established. A parliament where nobody had the right to express anything".⁷⁵

As we observe, except for the tobacco rebellion of 1891. Iran did not have an important political development until the proclamation of the constitution. The Shah was granting privileges to the western countries, which were not approved by the

⁷² Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 6-7.

⁷³ Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Iran Devrimi: Yeni Türkiye Yeni Iran", *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul daily, 15 June 1934.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

newly forming bourgeoisie and the clergy who were in cooperation with them. They were against these privileges and in 1891 a rebellion against the tobacco monopoly - similar to the "regie" system in the Ottoman Empire occurred. The rebellion ended only after the abolishment of the monopoly by the Shah. This event revealed three major points.

1. This case was the first concrete example of the clergy - bourgeoisie cooperation which will be observed during the constitutional period.⁷⁶ We did not see such a cooperation in the Ottoman Empire.

2. The policies of England applied on the Ottoman Empire and Iran were the evidences of the colonization efforts of the western countries.⁷⁷

3. In the Ottoman Empire struggles against this system were made, in which approximately 20,000 people died but nevertheless, the "regie" was applied⁷⁸. This was not the case in Iran and regie was abolished.

The final stage of the political developments in Iran was the announcement of the constitutional regime. During the reign of Muzafferiddin Shah (1896-1907) the merchant class in the country were discontented from the bad administration of the government and high rate of custom duties. So they started up a rebellion against the government in Tehran and the clergy supported them during these movements. The demonstrators wanted the removal of the grand vizier from office and more importantly they wanted the announcement of the constitution. Muzafferiddin Shah

⁷⁶ Nikki R. Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran-The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892*, p. 35.

⁷⁷ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, p. 8.

⁷⁸ Tefik Çavdar, "İktisadi Düzen ve Sorunları, Devralınan İktisadi Miras", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1985), vol.4. p. 1058.

could not resist the pressures anymore and was obliged to sign the constitution just before he died in 30 December 1906. And the first assembly was held.⁷⁹

After Muzafferiddin Shah his son Muhammed Ali Shah ascended to the throne. He was completely against the reformation movements and he wanted to close the parliament and he realized this by bombarding the parliament building. This attack started an uprising in Tebriz which could only be suppressed by the intervention of Russian soldiers. But these movements did not stop. After the establishment of national armies in Rašt and Isfahan, the demonstrators occupied Tehran and dethroned Muhammed Ali Shah in 1909. Thus the constitution again came into force.⁸⁰ From then on the most important political development was the Russian revolution in 1917. This put an end to the imperialistic aims of Russian over Iran.

B- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD :

Before continuing with the economic developments in these two countries we have to put forward some important points. Rapid economic development and structural changes occurred in the western world during the 19th century. The main change was the industrial revolution and the explosion in production as a result of it. After this period industrial capitalism and a process of integration of the world economy started which later appeared as imperialism. These developments deeply affected non-western, non-capitalist or pre-capitalist countries. Thus these countries were confronted with drastic changes. For that reason, as in the case of political modernization, it is not

⁷⁹ Rameş Sanghvi, *Aryamer: Iran Şahu (Siyasi bir bibliografi)*, p. 20. See also, Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 14-16.

⁸⁰ Robert A. McDaniel, *The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution*, pp. 70-88.

possible to explain the economic developments of Ottoman Empire and Iran only within their internal dynamics. Rather they must be seen as parts of the capitalist world economy and the developments must be examined in terms of an complex interaction between internal and external forces.⁸¹

I- Economic Developments In the Ottoman Empire:

The general economic conditions of the Ottomans at the beginning of the 19th century are mentioned above. Now the developments in the 19th century under the efforts of modernization will be studied. The modernization movements started in the military field, soon raised a need for large amounts of money. Thus the Ottoman reformists understood the need for a strong economy for establishing a strong army. Beginning with Selim III a new treasury was founded to realize the "nizam-ı cedid" (The new order). Hence one of the main concerns of this period was that with the westernization movements the Ottoman economic structure should also be strengthened.⁸²

Up to that time, the economic conditions of the Ottoman State was considered as good, if the treasury was full. Şerif Mardin defined the Ottoman culture as "Gaza" (holy war) culture and notes that "the effect of such a culture on the economic concepts was that, it associates the concept of income to the activity and logic of

⁸¹ Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire And The European Capitalism, 1820-1913, Trade Investment and Production* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1-3. See also, İlkey Sunar, "State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire" in ed., Faruk Birttek, *The State and the Economy in the Ottoman and the Republican Periods* (Unpublished), p. 63.

⁸² Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi: 1838-1918", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim,1985), vol. 3, p. 618.

conquests."⁸³ Indeed, during the development period the occupation of new lands had strengthened the state and increased the amount and sources of revenues as well as the military power. Thus, economics for the Ottomans meant a full treasury. And the power of the army was related to the strength of the treasury. This system had continued for centuries, but as the classical revenue sources diminished so the decline of the system detoured into a vicious circle. For this reason when the statesmen wanted to improve military power they faced the need for a new strong fiscal structure to pay for the expenses of the army. So the administrators tried to find solutions to increase the revenues of the state.⁸⁴

The economic developments in the West could not be seen in Ottoman Empire. In time the state lost their internal revenues after the corruption of the old land system of depending on the fiefs. After the West had stopped the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, Ottomans also lost their external revenues which had come from these triumphant crusades. As the army was defeated, they were confronted with high war expenses instead of earning revenues .

Thus, in the first place, Ottoman administrators put forward solutions reestablishing the system according to the rules of the old system. As Mardin notes these remedies : 1. To restore the old Tımar system as in the days of establishment; 2. To increase the taxes; 3. To debase the value of the sikke; and 4. The confiscation (müsadere) system.⁸⁵

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", pp. 80-81.

⁸⁵ Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi: 1838-1918", vol. 3, p. 618.

Thus one aspect of the Ottoman state was that it was a fiscal state whose only aim was to control the central administration by collecting taxes and had no interest in the economic structure of the country. But these policies failed and it was realized that there was a strong European economy behind the military and political superiority of the West. Thus the application of these solutions did not give any results.⁸⁶

On the other hand if we considering the general outlook of the Ottoman economy in the 19th century it could be said that one of the most important factors which affected the system was the goal of the European capitalist states. Developing capitalism and mass production made the European countries the center of the world economy. This center needed new markets to sell their surplus production and buy cheaper raw materials. As a consequence they wanted to supply this need from the non-capitalist or pre-capitalist countries. They tried to transform these countries into the producers of raw material and agricultural goods in other words to put them on the periphery of the world economy.⁸⁷ In this period western goods entered the Ottoman market, and the traditional structure of the Ottoman economy could not keep up with these developments. Industry also could not compete with cheap western products and began to decline.

Western countries realized these aims by exercising political and military pressures on the State. Thus the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign a series of trade agreements which in the end turned the Ottoman lands into a free trade zone. The first trade agreement signed with England in 1838 was an important stage in the Ottoman economic development process as it brought in the system of free trade. After this

⁸⁶ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, pp. 206-207.

⁸⁷ Donald Quataert, "Main Problems of the Economy During the Tanzimat Period", in ed., Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, *150. Yılında Tanzimat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), pp. 212-213.

agreement the Ottoman volume of trade increased relatively, and continued until the late 19th century. Other agreements with France Spain, Sardina, Hamburg, Holland, Belgium, Prussia and Sweden, followed this agreement which all had the similar characteristics of free trade. The rights given to England with that agreement were also given to the other countries and with the similar conditions.⁸⁸ .

Another important method which was very influential after 1850 was acquiring loans from the western countries as the State could not afford its increasing expenses by the traditional methods. Part of these loans was spent on the modernization movements. Another portion was used to finance the wars and the huge central administration which destroyed the economy more and more each time. Although the economic conditions were severe the Ottoman Sultans used some of these loans to build new palaces and finance luxurious living.⁸⁹ The Dolmabahçe palace constitutes an example of these kind of expenses and perhaps this palace which was built and decorated in the western architecture style stands as a nice representative of misunderstanding westernization.

Western capital was also put into the Ottoman economy via direct investments to the infrastructure and to banks for the finance of trade. These investments were developed parallel to the development of imperialism especially after the 1870s.⁹⁰ Henceforth the

⁸⁸ Nejat Kurdakul, "Ticaret Anlaşmaları", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim,1985), vol. 3, p. 666.

⁸⁹ Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, p. 256. See also, Tevfik Çavdar, "İktisadi Düzen ve Sorunları, Devralınan İktisadi Miras", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, pp. 36-39. Murat Özyüksel, *Osmanlı Alman İlişkilerinin Gelişim Sürecinde Anadolu ve Bağdat Demiryolları*, p. 43.

⁹⁰ Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and The European Capitalism, 1820-1913*,pp. 55-56.

increasing loans spoiled the Ottoman economy more and more and pushed it under the political pressure of the West. As a consequence, "the public debt administration" was established, meaning the bankruptcy of the fiscal system of the state. The public debt administration was an organization that collect the taxes which must be collected by the Ottoman state, against the unpaid debts of the country.⁹¹

At that period, in the West the ideas of economic liberalism took some serious criticisms. It was argued that new ideas such as economic development should be realized under the supervision of the State. The State must protect the domestic industry and trade against the effects of external factors. These idea of states protection of the national economy, influenced Ottoman statesmen and the first one to introduce these ideas was Sadık Rıfat Pasha. He sent reports entitled "islahat layihaları" to "Bab-ı Ali from Vienna where he had been an ambassador. In this reports, he said that the "gaza" should be removed from the Ottoman culture and a new one, depending on the principle of efficiency, must be substituted⁹².

The opinions of Rıfat Pasha challenged the ideas of economic liberalism and these two ideas both effected the society in that period. The intelligentsia put forward different reasons for the failure of Ottoman industry. One of these reasons was wrong priorities and the second was the human factor. They said that the Muslim Turkish population of the Ottomans were unfamiliar with these economic activities. The solutions they

⁹¹ About Düyun-ı Umumiye see Çağlar Keyder, "Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Ekonomik Sistemi", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, İletişim , 1985), vol. 3, p. 642.

⁹² Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi: 1838-1918", pp. 622-623.

brought, known as "luzum-u sa'yı amel", were to improve the love of work among the Turkish population and to make them like productive activities.⁹³

Another economic idea which emerged afterwards was put forward by the young Ottomans. They focused on the idea that work alone was not enough, and the creation of a domestic merchant and industrial class was necessary. According to Mardin the young Ottomans have collected their diagnosis and offered two ideas about the Ottoman economy:

"1- Only the call for work (Luzum-u Say-ü Amel) was not sufficient, the economic reforms should be applied from every aspects.

2- The Ottoman empire could not develop by borrowing loans. As a solution it should create a domestic merchant class, establish local banks and support the industry on a strong basis."⁹⁴

With the second constitutional government ideas of economic liberalism and private enterprise and the industrialization concerns in the Ottoman society were still on the agenda. There began activities such as contributing to the industrial institutions, opening exhibitions and fairs. The industrial schools were built an educational lines; trainees and students were sent to Europe for education on technical and professional issues. The industry was reinforced by the introduction of "Teşviki Sanayi Kanunu" (Reinforcing the industry Law). After the years 1915-16 the ideas that nationalism and the national economy should be protected by state gained importance especially after the success of German national economy during the last 45 years.⁹⁵

⁹³ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 199-204.

⁹⁴ Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi :1838-1918", p. 626.

⁹⁵ Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", pp. 85-86.

II- Economic Developments in Iran :

At the beginning of the 19th century Iran like the Ottoman Empire started modernization (westernization) movements with reforms in the military field. Because of the same reasons that were mentioned in the Ottoman case, the need for an economic improvement followed military renovations. As it is a necessity that a newly-formed army needs economic resources, so the idea of making economic reforms established itself among the administrators of Iran.

The economic factors in the region created competition between British, Russia and France which influenced the Iranian economy. However unlike the Ottoman case this competition was aimed to stabilize Iran. The reason for this was that all three states wanted to control Indian trade⁹⁶. At that period the trade route between India and Europe passed through Iran. A stable Iran was necessary for the continuation of this trade. The case was different for the Ottomans. As mentioned before the Western States preferred a dispersed Ottoman Empire rather than a strong one. This point was important for both countries in both economic and political aspects.⁹⁷

As a consequence of this Iran signed many trade agreements with the western countries granting them privileges under the concept of free trade. Both states had opened their economy to free trade with these agreements⁹⁸. Thus, Iran also became a

⁹⁶ For the diplomatic manoeuvres which western states had played on Iran, for exploitation of India see, Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864,1914*, pp. 8-9. And *Meydan Larousse Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6, p. 386.

⁹⁷ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁸ For detailed information about the political and trade treaties Iran signed see, *Mecmuaye Ahnameyi Tarihiyi Iran* (Tehran: Iranian Foreign Ministry Publications, 1970).

"free trade" zone like the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁹ Both countries benefited from free trade, but in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, the merchants in Iran were not only foreigners or minorities. Iran already had a tradition for commerce and a merchant class. Indeed this class could never accumulate enough wealth for capitalist change like its western counterparts but in spite of all this, this point had important social effects on the historical development process of both countries.¹⁰⁰

They also chose the method obtaining loans from western countries. These countries were willing to give more loans as they were aiming to use it as a method of exercising political pressure on the Iranian government. Thus Russia and Britain realized these goals and controlled the Iranian economics.

It was clear that the economic developments in the world affected all the countries. The economic liberalism, in this context, was also criticized in Iran and ideas supporting the state protection of the domestic trade and industry were argued. The rebellion against the tobacco monopoly showed the existence of a bourgeoisie class and it was a sign of economic consciousness against protecting the domestic economy. For this thesis the result of this situation is that the strong merchant class in Iran made a coalition with the clergy class. It could be claimed that the developing and flourishing merchant class gave more tax to the clergy class, thus a cooperation between them emerged.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ See, Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1, pp. 695-752, 326-327.

¹⁰⁰ Mansur Muaddel, "Iran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", pp. 167-168.

¹⁰¹ See Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran-The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892*, pp. 34-36.

CHAPTER 3 : THE REFORMS OF ATATÜRK AND RIZA SHAH

In this chapter, the reforms and the developments realized for westernizing Turkey and Iran which were experienced during the periods of Atatürk and Rıza Shah will be discussed, in order to see what kind of similarities and differences exist among them. Turkey and reforms of Atatürk will be evaluated first and in the second part Iran and the reforms of Rıza Shah analyzed separately comparing with the case of Turkey.

A- TURKEY AND ATATÜRK :

I- The Socio-Political Developments:

At the end of the World War I, many important changes occurred in the world. This war put an end to the multi-national empires such as the Austria-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire. The colonization policies followed by the West, dismembered the Ottoman Empire and she encountered, first the Mondros armistice and then the Sevr Treaty. At this point, Turks, in other words the Moslem Anatolian people, who were the last group in the empire, fought a war of independence against the western states. While this war was being fought, the national assembly was established in 1920 and then in 1923 the 600 years old Ottoman Empire, was replaced by the new Turkish Republic.

Mustafa Kemal, the architect of the War of Independence, organized the Anatolian people and won this war by using his military expertise. In 1923, after the announcement of the Republic, a gap in political authority emerged. Mustafa Kemal took over the control of the country by filling this gap.¹⁰² Thus, between 1923 and 1950 Turkey was under the effect of an ideology named Kemalism until the Democrat Party took over political power. Kemalism has a certain corner in the process of political, economic, and social change which occurred in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey since the 19th century. Some of the characteristics of the Kemalist ideology were the continuation of the ones developed in the 19th century, where as some of them took the Turkish Republic in more radical directions. While the developments in nationalism and populism continued, radical reforms were made on secularism and westernization. At the 3rd general congress of Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) on May 10, 1931,¹⁰³ these principles were formally accepted as Kemalism¹⁰⁴. Now we are going to study the ideological frame of Atatürk's reforms and then continue with the reforms and renovations.

REPUBLICANISM, NATIONALISM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATION STATE :

Republicanism was the most important aspect of the Kemalist ideology. With establishing a republic the traditional patrimonial political monarchy came to an end and a new system was introduced. The important point in republicanism was the issue

¹⁰² Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, pp. 165-167.

¹⁰³ See the Program of CHP (1931), Ankara, TBMM Press.

¹⁰⁴ All of the principles defined as six arrows had been accepted in 1931 and were called Kemalism at the 4th general congress of CHP in 1935.

of sovereignty. In the Ottoman system the sovereignty belonged to the monarch who was accepted as the shadow of the god. In this system the source of legitimacy came from the god. However, in republicanism the sovereignty belongs to the people and they were the source of legitimacy. Hence when Kemalists established the republic they ended the traditional Ottoman system and formed the necessary infrastructure for establishing a modern state.¹⁰⁵ Nationalism, on the other hand was a consequence of the developments lasting from the French revolution. All the groups, living in different provinces of the Ottoman Empire which were having national identities fought for their independence and left the empire. At the end it was inevitable to rescue the empire and the Ottoman identity. Thus, the ideology of Turkish nationalism to unify the people came on to agenda. This ideology developed until the Republic. Nationalism reached its peak after the political abolishment of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic based on the Turkish national identity¹⁰⁶.

Heper states as follows:

"..Freed from the hold of Islamic traditions, a national culture could now be created. The principles of nationalism was to be integrating link substituted for

¹⁰⁵ At this point, Iran was also affected by these developments. When Rıza Khan took over the political power, he wanted to establish a republic before he ascended to the throne. But the clergy (Ulema) who had supported the constitutional movements until that time rejected the idea of establishing a republic instead of a monarchy. Thus, they persuaded Rıza Khan to succeed to the throne by constructing a new dynasty. To be precise, the Iranian religious officials were frightened by the removal of Caliphate as it had come just after the establishment of the Republic.

¹⁰⁶ It must be stated that Turkish nationalism was depending on cultural values and it does not have a racist aspect.

the idea of *ümmet* of religious community and for Islamic *din-ü-devlet* or the unity of state and religion."¹⁰⁷

Thus, Atatürk first tried to realized the nation state and in this way he tried to unify the last group of Anatolia with a national identity for organizing a modern state. He used the slogan "Ne mutlu Türküm diyene" that means: everyone is happy when he says I am a Türk. In this way he aimed to gather up under the same identity all the different ethnic groups living within the borders of the national pact.¹⁰⁸

POPULISM:

The populist views which took its roots from the second constitution, was one of the first ideological elements which were accepted in the Republican era for establishing a new social order. One fundamental source of populism was "solidarism" which had developed in France as a school of sociology in the last quarter of the 19th century. One of the most important theorist of solidarism ideology was Emile Durkheim. Tekeli notes about the ideologies of Durkheim as follows:

"...political philosophers were looking for a third way, against the injustice emerged by the capitalist development and the suggestions of socialism based on the "class conflict". They believed they could reduce the social injustice through corporatism, social laws and state intervention in economy, without spoiling the freedom of enterprise and the institution of private property. In their analyses, for proving the possibility of such a social order they stated that

¹⁰⁷ Metin Hepar, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, p. 174.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

the division of labor in the society should emphasize the social solidarity not the social conflict."¹⁰⁹

In that period, the populists tried to find out answers to three different problems. The first was how the public could be stimulated to take part in political life and. In this context, parliamentarism, centralized and decentralized administration models and the attitudes of the bureaucracy towards the public were argued. The second problem of populism was formulated in the cultural field. They also discussed the value of judgments and needs of the public and also the question of how the characteristics of the Turkish nation could be preserved without preventing the social development. The third dimension of populism was economic. They tried to answer the question of how it could be possible to create a just economic system with a high social solidarity.¹¹⁰

After the defeat in the Balkan war the ideology of the Union and Progress Party went through a big transformation. While Turkism replaced the Ottomanist and Islamist trends, populism lost its social content but gained a Turkist characteristic affected by the syntheses of Ziya Gökalp. He was the most important supporter of solidarism (corporatism) in Turkey who was the ideologist of both Unionists' and Kemalists'. He was the one who transmitted the ideas of corporatism or populism from the period of the Union and Progress Party to the Republic.¹¹¹

Tekeli writes about Ziya Gökalp, as follows:

¹⁰⁹ İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiyede Halkçılık", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Publications,1985), vol. 7, p. 1930.

¹¹⁰ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul Türk Kültür Publications), 79-98.

¹¹¹ Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiyede Korporatizm* (İletişim: İstanbul, 1989), pp. 118-119.

"...A class discrimination between the people and the intelligentsia did not exist in Gökalp's understanding. According to him "all the classes who accept to be legally equal" were in the content of people. The discrimination observed was to disappear when the "elite" goes to people. Having a Durkheimian viewpoint, what was important to him was the social solidarity not the class conflict. All the professional groups in the society emerges due to the division of labor. Social "solidarity" which will be attained with the realization of the social ideal was necessary for the continuation of the division of labor. This ideal after so many casualties and losses started to take its form within the Ottoman Empire. In the common conscience of the public the sense of "being of the Turkish nation, the Islamic community and of the western civilization" is developing. From then on, a Turk does not have to suppress his Turkish identity in the sake of being Ottoman."¹¹²

Therefore populism and Turkism of Gökalp went hand in hand towards the world of ideals. Every Turkist would be a populist in the field of culture.

Populism was also effective during the Independence War where for the first time the administrators and public acted together. Populism, was also affective after the establishment of the republic and became a part of the supports of the new social order depending on the principle of nation state. This support was very important for sustaining the social and cultural unity as the old factor, Islamic society (ümme) which was the unifying element was abolished after the establishment of the nation state. However, this populism movement developing especially after the congress of the Peoples Party in 1931, also turned out to be a theoretical justification for "government for the people" rather than "government by the people". The elitist administrators left the ignorant mass of people outside the policy in order to stop them from preventing

¹¹² İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiyede Halkçılık", p. 1930.

the improvements and used populism as a support for the system of a single party (The idea was that: only one party was enough since there were no classes in society).¹¹³

WESTERNIZATION and SECULARISM :

In cultural reforms, "westernization" and "secularism" were the main movements which took important criticisms. After taking over political power, Mustafa Kemal abandoned the models of west-islam synthesis and the ones aiming to turn back to the Ottoman institutions¹¹⁴. He gave more importance to westernization and secularization ideas. From then on, most of the reforms were made according to these two ideas. Secularization for the young republic meant the abandonment of the traditional social institutions which were established according to the Islamic principles. Westernization meant the establishment of the new institutions according to the western social model.¹¹⁵

Thus westernization which had been continuing from the beginning of the 19th century, gained a new dimension as it was applied together with secularization. Sarıbay states that "As seen here, the formula which was put forward with the regression of the

¹¹³ Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, p. 176.

¹¹⁴ Köker has defined these views as "combining" views and the thoughts that defences the support of the traditional Ottoman institutions completely in his book. See Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, p. 126.

¹¹⁵ Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, p. 168.

Ottoman Empire appears again: Westernization"¹¹⁶. Hence, after adopting the secularism principle the Kemalists forced Islam to stay between the individual and God and wanted to keep religious administrators away from every part of the society so as to realize the reforms. Sarıbay argues as follows :

"Secularism was seen as the most influential way, to destroy traditional bureaucracy. Thus Kemalists aimed to hold the religion conforming to the state, by the exclusion of the laws on religious basis. In other words, the main target expected by secularism was to eliminate the authority and influence of the religion and its representatives from political, social, and cultural fields and to leave them only in the fields of belief and worship. Thus, reduction of the role of Islam into the role of religion of a western nation state and leaving ulema deprived from the means effecting the political authority was provided".¹¹⁷

Thus, the general direction of these revolutions was to bring the institutions of West to Turkey without being anxious about problems of adaptation. According to the defense of the Kemalists, Turkish society had to find the source of ideas and the Islamic traditions could not provide that source of new values and ideals. These must be driven from the secular principles of nationalism, populism, and democracy. Therefore, the Kemalists replaced the educational, legal, political, and social structures, controlled by Islamic rules, with Western ones or at least made serious efforts to do so.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Sarıbay, "Kemalist İdeolojide Modernleşmenin Anlamı", p. 196.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 200.

¹¹⁸ Metin Heper, *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State: An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition*, pp. 173-174.

As a result, Kemalists played an important part of society against themselves by the westernization and secularism movements. They received serious criticisms and reactions from the traditional Islamic society. Thus Kemalists realized their reforms by using authoritative methods and they also used force against the subsequent upheavals. But, they succeeded in getting the traditional authority of religion under the control of state.¹¹⁹

Thus, secularism was the hard core of this political and cultural struggle and basically practiced as a control of the religion by state. However it must be mentioned that there was one other aspect of secularism. This was mainly establishing the freedom of religion in the country.¹²⁰

This struggle of Atatürk against Islam was primarily in the political field and first of all he brought to an end the institution of the Caliphate (1924).¹²¹ This event was of considerable importance both for Turkey and for the other Islamic countries because, until that time, Islamic states, saw the struggle of Atatürk and the Turkish people as an

¹¹⁹ Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (İstanbul: Cem Press, 1992), pp. 127-128.

There were also other oppositions in the country such as communist opposition and liberal opposition. These were also taken under pressure by the Kemalist's.

¹²⁰ There may be many reasons for this approach. One of them may be to gain the support of the Alawi population in the country by decreasing the pressures of the "hanafi" sect over these people. Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 218-225.

¹²¹ Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 84-86. See also, Sina Akşin (ed.), *Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*(İstanbul: Cem, 1992), pp. 93-94.

independence movement in the Islamic world against western imperialism. Thus they showed reactions to this event¹²².

Reactions and oppositions also occurred in the country against these movements. Atatürk controlled the religious, unionist and all other oppositions which were becoming stronger and stronger each day, under the law of "takrir-i sukun" and by the tribunals of independence (istiklal mahkemeleri)¹²³. Islamic institutions resisted to the reforms and some opposition gathered in the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası. However, this party, dervish lodges (tekke) and cells of reclusion (zaviye) were closed in 1925. According to this law all the institutions and publications which were reactionaries, rebellious and giving damage or having intention to give damage to the social order, peace, and security in the country could be forbidden by the confirmation of the President. In addition, the people who attempted to do the above mentioned things would be judged at the tribunals of independence. Depending on this law, the newspapers which were the supporters of the Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası and the other newspapers with left tendencies were closed by the government. A lot of people were judged at the tribunals of independence and a rigid period of a one party system started.¹²⁴

¹²² İskender Gökarp, & Fronciois Georgeon, *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası* (İstanbul: Arba 1990), Translated by: C. Akalın, pp. 32-35. This reform and the others which were made against Islamic institutions deeply affected the international relations between the Turkish Republic and the Islamic world.

¹²³ These law was put into action after the rebellion of "Seyh Sait" in the southern provinces of the country.

¹²⁴ Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 146-149.

The law of "tevhid-i tedrisat (uniting the education system) followed the abolishment of caliphate (1924) in this environment of struggle. During that period the Islamic schools called "medrese" which still had effects on the educational system were closed and an educational system according to the western model was formed by bringing experts from the these countries. The acceptance of Latin alphabet (1928) aimed both at bringing Turkey closer to the West and taking her further away from the old system, was probably the most important of Atatürk's reforms. All of the educational institutions were attached to Ministry of Education (Maarif Vekaleti). The medrese's or schools which were directed by Şeriye (Ministry of Islamic rules), Evkaf Vekaleti (Ministry of Foundations), or by private foundations were transferred to the Ministry of education. For religious education, the laws for the opening of Imam Hatip schools and a Faculty of Divinity were accepted. By putting this law into practice the medrese's were being closed, the Koran lessons in primary schools, the religion education in secondary and high schools, and also Arabic and Iranian lessons were left out of the education programs.¹²⁵

As seen above these laws severed the relation between the Turkish education system and Islam. Kemalist's brought a new educational system regarding two major points. First, this system must adopt to the western norms and secondly it must be taken from the control of religious institutions and taken under the control of the state. Ortaylı states that "a centralized modern state must establish an educational system to impose its own ideology and to train the needed staff for bureaucracy. This system must give

¹²⁵ Sina Akşin (ed.), *Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, pp. 413-414. See also, Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 230-240.

an unbiased education at least it mustn't pay any attention to religion and belief differences among the citizens"¹²⁶

The struggle of the westernization movements continued also in the legal field, the civil law of Switzerland was accepted as the civil law of Turkey (1926). And religious control of religion on the legal structures such as family relations, marriage, heritage rights ended. By accepting the Italian criminal law (1926) Turkey also ended the power of religious institutions about the criminal issues which were established by canonical law (şeriat).¹²⁷ .

Laws followed regarding woman's place in society and giving them the right to vote. These laws tried to change the traditional Islamic role of women in society. The reforms were followed by other reforms, such as the surname law, hat law, law on dress, and wearing religious costumes were forbidden except for the religious officials.¹²⁸

In conclusion, all of these movements have to be seen both as efforts for making Turkey closer to the west and at the same time taking her away from the previous Islamic social order.¹²⁹ However, none of these reforms were accepted immediately in

¹²⁶ İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Devletinde Laiklik hareketleri Üzerine", in eds., E. Kalaycıoğlu and A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Beta Press, 1986), p. 168.

¹²⁷ For detailed information in this subject see also Yıldızhan Yayla, "Adalet ve Yargı" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Publications, 1985), p. 908. See also, Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 225-230.

¹²⁸ Mete Tunçay, *T.C. Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, pp. 230.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 218-219.

the society and became a target for the critics of conservative Moslems and east-west synthesizers. The reaction of the people to these movements appeared partly as harsh and dangerous ones, such as the Seyh Sait and Menemen upheavals, or partly as political responses, such as "Serbest Fırka" (1930)¹³⁰ and "Democrat Party" (1950) examples.¹³¹

II) The Economic Developments.

After the establishment of the Republic it must be stated that the existing situation of Turkey was disastrous. She had experienced long wars in which a young and productive generation had been lost. In addition to this she had also lost many valuable lands. Most parts of the Anatolia were destroyed and the economical resources were restricted. Thus in the first years the new administration could not apply effective changes in the economy trade and agriculture remained as they were in recent Ottoman times.¹³²

The main goal of the Kemalists at that period was to establish a national economy as this was the only way that could stop the economic imperialism of the West. They were aiming to reach the level of industrialization of the western countries. To realize this goal, establishment of industrial complexes, constructing railways, roads, building up energy lines and supplying health and education services were necessary. The general

¹³⁰ Ibid. pp. 127-134, 293-295.

¹³¹ It is not possible to say that all these movements were done for the sake of Islam. They were also representing other types of unrest in the country. However, for the goals of this study this simplification was done for emphasizing the role of religion.

¹³² Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, pp. 263-264.

approach was that, new Turkish republic must be an economic state rather than a conquering one, as economic weakness was seen as the main point in the downfall of the empire. But at that time there was no capital accumulation to realize this industrialization. Thus, at that period, which methods must be applied for realizing such purposes were debated among the intelligentsia. Liberal economic models or collectivist ones?¹³³

In 1923 an economic congress was held in Izmir. In this meeting, all kinds of professional groups were represented and all the opinions were expressed. It was concluded that in Turkey there was not enough capital accumulation, thus the state must encourage and support the establishment of a private sector and capital accumulation in line with a liberal economic model.¹³⁴ During this period "Türkiye İş Bankası" was established (1924) in order to support private enterprise and a law for encouraging industry came into force in 1927. As a matter of fact until the economical crisis the 1930's the policies of supporting the private sector were continued.¹³⁵

The Economic Crisis in 1929 shook many countries in the world. Turkey having trade relations with west was also affected by the crisis but the effect was not as severe as in the West. As a result of this crisis the ideas defending state intervention in the

¹³³ Ibid. p. 264.

¹³⁴ Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", pp. 84-85.

¹³⁵ Ibid. See also, Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, pp. 266.

economy, such as the "Keynesian" model gained importance and played an important role in a lifting Western economies out of the recession.¹³⁶

During this period the Kemalists increased their political authority and managed to control the opposition. Thus they began to direct their attentions over the Turkish economy according to the following points : 1. the harsh rules of Liberal capitalism had caused negative social effects. 2. the help of the state to the economy during the world depression was clearly seen, hence Turkey also must benefit from these experiences. Based upon these points the Kemalists focused on etatism. The State began to intervene in the production and distribution of economic activities.¹³⁷

The adaptation of etatist policies by the government was explained by Çavdar as follows:

" In Turkey there was not a strong capital class as well as a strong labor class. So there could not be a class conflict as in societies where class distinctions were clear. Indeed it was not a situation to be complained but a situation that the state with its industrial and suchlike investments, must take the role of the

¹³⁶ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politik Arayışları* (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi Publications, 1977), pp. 216-217. See also, Melih Gürsoy, *Dünyadaki Büyük Ekonomik Krizler ve Türkiye Ekonomisine Etkiler* (Istanbul, Metis Publications, 1989).

¹³⁷ Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, pp. 266-68. Faruk Birtek states that it is not possible to explain the etatism policies only with economic reasons. The political factors and influence of bureaucratic intelligencia on the economy were also important. Faruk Birtek "The rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950", in ed., Faruk Birtek, *The State and the Economy in the Ottoman and the Republican Periods* (Unpublished), pp. 407-408.

capitalist and therefore build the basis for a prosperous society where there was no class conflicts¹³⁸.

As a consequence of all these ideas the Kemalists planned to establish state industrial enterprises from the surplus moneys which would be collected from the agricultural sector. So the liberal economic model depending on the state protection and support for the private sector which was applied in the first years of the republic was losing its place to the etatism. Çavdar argues for that period as follows:

" All the economists and state authorities were in favor of etatism whether they were liberal or defending the centrally planned economy. Obviously the meaning they attached to this concept has changed according to their perception of the world. Where as no negative arguments have emerged about the state intervention to economic life."¹³⁹

The reason for this was that during the situation of the economic crisis, state intervention in the economy had made important contributions in many countries of the world. Such as the Roosevelt's "New Deal" program suggesting that the state had the duty to refresh the economy. On the other hand the Keynesian ideas which appeared after the crisis put duties on the state¹⁴⁰.

In this aspect the Turkish Republic have put etatism as an article in the constitution (1937). Thus, in this period, the Ottoman economy and Turkish economy developed in

¹³⁸ Tevik Çavdar, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk İktisadi Düşüncesi", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları,1985), vol. 4, p. 1078.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

a manner following each other and they both were influenced by the global economic events and ideas in the world.

B- IRAN and RIZA SHAH :

I- The Socio Political Developments

During the period when the Union and Progress Party was in power in the Ottoman Empire, Iran also had a constitutional regime. The central authority had been considerably weakened as the last Shahs of the Qajar dynasty were inefficient in the political management. Iran like the Ottoman Empire, was an important country for the west because of its geopolitical position and natural resources. Thus, foreign influence had always been an important factor for Iran. During World War I Britain and Russia had divided Iran into two parts upon which they exercise political influence. While Russia was controlling the northern part, Britain was holding the southern part. Russia organized an army for Iran named "the Cossack Brigade", which in fact was under Russian influence. In the same manner Britain organized some tribes who were living in the southern parts of Iran. Thus, by the help of these forces, Britain and Russia were protecting their benefits in the region.¹⁴¹

The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 put an end to the traditional imperialist aims of Russia. Hence, the new Russian administration abolished the former treaties signed between Russia and other countries about Iran including the one signed with Britain in 1907. They also abolished the privileges and capitulations granted to the Russian

¹⁴¹ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 7-9.

citizens and canceled the Iranian debts to Russia. This was a new period for Iran as one of the major influential states was withdrawing. After that, the only Russian impact was developed as an effort to carry the Bolshevik views to Iran¹⁴².

While the war of independence was being fought in Turkey, Iran was dealing with the problems remaining from the World War I. Although they had not participate in the war they had been deeply affected by the developments. As a result the central authority was weakened, local tribes in the southern provinces were threatening the internal security, and a political gap was occurring in the country.¹⁴³

In that period, Rıza Khan was a commander in the above mentioned "Cossack Brigade". In this environment of political chaos, he entered Tehran with the forces under his direction. Thus, on February 21, 1921 he made a coup d'état and took over the political control of the country without blood shed. He became the Commander in Chief of the army and the Defense Minister. During this period he organized an army of 40,000 troops and fought against the rebelling tribes. In the end he was successful in sustaining the internal security of the country and took the tribes under the control of the central authority.¹⁴⁴

After these developments he summoned parliament and in October, 1923 announced himself as Prime Minister. This was an transitional period for Iran as in the case of

¹⁴² Rameş Sanghvi, *Aryamer: Iran Şahı (Siyasi bir bibliografi)*, pp. 24-25. See also, Meliha Anbarcıođlu, *Gazi Mustaf Kemal Atatürk ve Iran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, p. 11.

¹⁴³ Ann K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant In Persia* (Norwich: Oxford university Press, 1969), p. 181.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

young Turkish republic where the traditional Ottoman monarchy had come to an end and the 600 years old empire had been dissolved with great land losses. Thus, as a result the new republic was established. In Iran, similarly, discussions for establishing a republic were made. Anbarcioğlu summarizes these debates as follows:

"..Rıza Shah even tried to establish the Iranian Republic in 1924 but, then he changed his mind. In reality he did not realize his thoughts because of the objection of religious officials..... in October 31st, 1925, the parliament decided to cease the former government of Qajars. Rıza Khan Pehlevi was assigned to form a temporary government and decided to convene a constituent assembly in order to determine the final type of the government. At this point the idea of establishing an Iranian Republic came on to the agenda. Mohammed Rıza Shah¹⁴⁵ explains the decision for continuing the monarchy in Iran and says that before his father became Prime Minister, the Turks had removed the Caliphate a short time after they had established the Republic under the leadership of Atatürk. He also added that some environments had a tendency for the idea of establishing an Iranian Republic under the effects of these movements but in the end public opinion turned towards the traditional idea of monarchy."¹⁴⁶

However these debates did not last long and after a short period, by the decision of the Iranian parliament Rıza Khan ascended the as the Shah of a new dynasty instead of Ahmet Sah-i Qajar.

¹⁴⁵ The last Shah of the Pehlevi dynasty.

¹⁴⁶ Anbarcioğlu, *Gazi Mustaf Kemal Atatürk ve Iran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, p. 13. See also, Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 47-49.

Thus, a new period began in Iran. The main characteristic of this period was that Rıza Shah was also a reformist like Mustafa Kemal. He was sharing the same ideas about establishing a new social order and modernizing his country. So that they could stop the western countries and their imperialistic goals. Thus he wanted to make quick reforms, but the society and the Islamic order resisted against the possible cultural reforms although they had previously supported the constitutional monarchy showing a reformist attitude. The most important reason for that resistance was possibly the speed of the reforms or their extreme western character. One other reason was that, the clergy had a traditional political power besides their control over the educational and legal structure. Naturally they did not want to give up this power, thus like Mustafa Kemal, Rıza Shah saw the religion of Islam and the clergy in Iran as an obstacle against the necessary changes (he believed) for reaching west. Hence, both of them believed in the centralization of authority, the one-party political administration, and being autocratic instead of democratic for realizing the reforms.¹⁴⁷

As a result with regard to the developments during the period of Rıza Shah, it could be said that Iran in many aspects went through the same steps as the Turkish Republic. Both States Turkey and Iran were ruled by autocratic regimes in this period under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Rıza Shah respectively. Both leaders tried to replace their own social structures with western models, thus they had to fight against the Islamic social order. In that context it could be stated that these similarities were largely dependent on the effect of Mustafa Kemal on Rıza Shah. In personality Rıza Shah was resembled Mustafa Kemal. Both of them had military backgrounds and were pragmatic and fast in putting their decisions into action. He was also deeply affected by the reforms of Mustafa Kemal and the developments Turkey.

¹⁴⁷ Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 56-57.

In general, it could be said that Rıza Shah, like Atatürk, was not contented only with social, and political reforms, he also wanted to change the life styles of Iranians. Anbarcıoğlu puts forward the effects of Atatürk and Turkey on Rıza Shah during the realization of these changes as follows:

"As I said before, he was not affected only by the West; he especially had a deep interest in Turkish revolutions. While the founder of modern Iran, Rıza Shah was reestablishing a lot of institutions in his country, he was affected by his visit to Turkey in 1934. Rıza Shah was deeply affected by his visit to Turkey and by the revolutions of Atatürk and as soon as he turned back to his own country, he decided in making similar changes by the belief of success which was coming from the experiences of Turkish People. It can be said that he awaited impatiently to bring these new ideas and reforms to Iran".¹⁴⁸

Anbarcıoğlu states that the reforms that Rıza Shah wanted to realize in Iran were similar to the ones that were realized by Atatürk in Turkey. He also added that the reason for Atatürk's practicing many of these changes before Rıza Shah was due to his important relations with West as he was living in Selonica and due to his western education. Another reason was related to the geographical features of the country which caused late interactions between the West and Iran.¹⁴⁹

As Haas¹⁵⁰ also points out, Rıza Khan was deeply influenced by Mustafa Kemal. He made his only foreign visit to Turkey which had a great influence on the reforms he aimed to realize. And after he returned to Iran he took many measures to decrease the

¹⁴⁸ Anbarcıoğlu, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve İran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, p16.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ William S. Haas, *Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 25.

authority of religion. Thus, Westernization and secularization movements in Iran started and a political struggle occurred between the political authority and the clergy.

Anbarcıođlu presents the attitudes of ulema and argues as follows:

"...the reactionaries were against every kind of changes as Rıza Shah seeing that Turkish reforms could not be realized in the same manner in his own country, tried to make the opposition movements non-influential and succeeded in it to a degree." ¹⁵¹

Emphasizing the ideology of nationalism was one of the methods brought by Rıza Shah to weaken the power of clergy. However until recently nationalism in Iran was not a very strong ideology. It meant they had to eliminate the Islamic characters of the Iranian culture and emphasize more on the pre-Islamic and zoroastrianism properties. But on the other hand Iran being the only country from the Ja'fari Shiite sect of Islam, nationalism the distinctive language and religion was affirmed. Thus regarding the Ottoman social identity depending on ümmet system, it was more easy for the Iranian ulema to accept the national independence.¹⁵²

Hence Rıza Shah tried to replace the shiite identity with the Iranian identity. These nationalist movements were also influenced by German nationalism due to the close relations of the two countries. This influence continued until World War II. He also supported a new religion named "Pakdin" created by Kesrevi again for the sake of realizing the same goal¹⁵³. But it was debatable to what extend he managed this aim.

¹⁵¹ Anbarcıođlu, *Gazi Mustaf Kemal Atatürk ve İran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁵² Leonard Binder, *Iran* (California: University of California Press, 1962), p. 79.

¹⁵³ Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1 p. 571-573. See also, Binder, *Iran*, pp. 199-200.

Binder states as follows:

" But most Iranians did not take these efforts too seriously ... Nevertheless, the glorification of the nation, the attempt to romanticize its history, the idealization of zoroastrianism and the partial effort to purify the language..... did lay the foundation for a wider awareness of the distinctive basis of Iranian nationalism."¹⁵⁴

Thus, he started to make a series of reforms for realizing his goals. First he made primary education compulsory. Thus a new order was rapidly introduced into education, which became almost entirely state controlled and entirely uniform. Students in all the national schools organized examinations administered by the ministry of education in Tehran. At the end of sixth, ninth, and twelfth grades. successful candidates received an official government certificate. ¹⁵⁵ This was a movement for putting an end to the authority of clergy in the field of education and also controlling it by the state institutions as in the case of the Turkish Republic.

He provided the opening of museums and libraries for the protection of historical values. He supported sports. He provided working rights for women although it did not include the political, judicial and scientific fields. He also established an administration of justice according to the French example and opened civil bureaus for marriage which were aiming to decrease the religious authorities in the legal fields.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Binder, *Iran*, p. 80.

¹⁵⁵ Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 276.

¹⁵⁶ Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, p. 62.

Rıza Shah could not introduce language reform to the same extent as Atatürk. He thought about secularism, replacement of Arabic letters by Latin letters, changing weekend holidays from Friday to Sunday, changing to the Christian calendar but he preferred to act more slowly against some of the old religious and social institutions because of the discrepancy between Iran and the Western world. He established "Ferhengistan"¹⁵⁷ to protect Iranian language from the influences of Arabic but did not change the alphabet. One of the Ministers of Iran for Foreign Affairs, Ali Asgar Hikmet reminisces about Ferhengistan: "Shahinshah ordered giving Iranian names to the institutions instead of old terms and said : "our neighbor Turkey removed Arabic terms from their language, so we must change the Arabic terms into Iranian in our own language."¹⁵⁸

Rıza Shah's idea to establish Ferhengistan originated from his visit to the Turkish Language Institution in 1934. During this visit he was also impressed by the development of women's rights in Turkey. On his return to Iran he suggested giving more freedom to Iranian women and as an indicator of their social status he supported women in removing their veils. But he was unsuccessful as he was confronted with serious upheavals.

Arnakis and Vucinich also talk about the reforms as measures taken against Islamic tradition and nobility as follows:

"... Rıza never succeeded in revolutionizing his country. It was true that he made some headway in the secularization of the Shiite Islam and in destroying the medieval prerogatives of the nobility. The imams and mullahs became civil

¹⁵⁷ It was the name of the cultural institution established to work on Iranian language and culture.

¹⁵⁸ Anbarcıoğlu, *Gazi Mustaf Kemal Atatürk ve İran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, pp. 14-15.

servants, the wandering dervishes found that the police interfered with their movements, the inspired devotees of Ali could no longer hold their weird processions and indulge in frenzied self-punishment. The nobility too lost their official positions, their titles, and much of their wealth. The new life was symbolized by the hat, which took the place of the brimless cap and turban. An attempt was even made to emancipate Iranian women from the bondage of the harem and the obligations to wear a veil. In the thinking of Rıza and Mustafa Kemal the emancipation of women was sure to reduce the influence of the clergymen. In the same spirit, polygamy was officially abolished and French civil law took the place of the Sharia (Sacred Law of Islam) in the state courts. But in the long run, none of these measures proved effective, and Iranian conservatism, enhanced in Moslem institutions and feudal vestiges, survived Rıza's dictatorial regime. The constitution, though changed in other points, remained unaltered with regard to the Muslim establishment. Shiite Islam continued to be recognized as the state religion and the obligation of the Shah was to preserve and propagate this faith."¹⁵⁹

However, at the end of these social and cultural reforms Rıza Shah reduced the influence of clergy to some extent, but was unable to bring secularism to Iran to the same degree which Atatürk had provided in Turkey.

Anbarcıoğlu has written as follows:

"...in spite of the fact that both of the countries were Moslem, being from the Sunnite faith in Turkey and Shiite faith in Iran had effected the relations of the countries. The religious reforms realized by Atatürk were more effective and

¹⁵⁹ Arnakis, and Vucinich, *The Near East in Modern Times, Forty Crucial Years 1900-1940*, pp. 98-99.

strict because he removed the Caliphate, closed the dervishes lodges, gave political and social rights to woman. On the other hand, Rıza Shah blocked the actions of conservative religious officials which were against the benefit of people."¹⁶⁰

As seen above, during 1920's and 1930's both Atatürk and Rıza Shah started to make similar reforms that caused radical changes in their countries and tried to replace a their traditional systems with a western model. Both of them had used radical methods to realize these movements and gave more importance to the centralization of the government as they aimed to provide the acceptance of the society about the changes. As a result of this they received various reactions from society. At the end these two states had gone through different directions. Nowadays, Iran has become an Islamic Republic, in spite of the reforms of Rıza Shah, whereas Turkey maintains Atatürk's model in spite of the existing opposition groups.

II- The Economic Developments

The main point in the economic structure of Iran after Rıza Shah was that, this country was deeply affected by the economical developments and ideas which appeared in the western world. In this context liberal economic thoughts continued to affect the country until the 1929 world depression. But at the same time, the ideas of economic self-sufficiency as a nation state were gaining importance. Rıza Shah, after he came to power, favored also national independence and a strong national economy. Avery explains this point as follows:

"...The keynote of Rıza Shah's economic policy was nationalist protection. Had not this inspiration been, as described in the *Survey of International*

¹⁶⁰ Anbarcıođlu, *Gazi Mustaf Kemal Atatürk ve Iran'da Yapılan Reformlar*, p.16.

Affairs for 1925, the ideal of effective national independence as against foreign powers, and effective national sovereignty at home, the system of state monopolies evolved by the new regime in Russia would in itself have been both a spur and an example for the Shah's protective policy".¹⁶¹

This principle was in demand in Ottoman and Iran as both of these countries did not want to be subjected to the political influences of western imperialism. Although, the West did not manage to transform these countries into political colonies. They deeply controlled their economies with the privileges and capitulations they had granted. Thus the principle that Iran must have her own industry, as in the case for Turkey, was supported in Iran. In this context Rıza Shah abolished the capitulations in 28 May 1928.¹⁶²

However Rıza Shah did not have much influence on the economy of the state until 1929. Up to that period he had serious security problems and also there was internal disorder. Like Mustafa Kemal Rıza Shah had to spend large amounts on defense expenses in order to sustain external and internal security and to control the rebellions possible to break out against the reform movements. To support these heavy military expenses, Rıza Shah directed his attention to the fiscal system of the country. He brought American financial experts to the country and tried to reorganize the fiscal system. The general economic structure continued as it was before Rıza Shah until 1929, except for some tax regulations¹⁶³.

¹⁶¹ Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 241.

¹⁶² Mushahip, *Dayeretul Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1, pp. 695-752, 326-327.

¹⁶³ Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant In Persia*, p. 182. See also, Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, pp. 53-54.

The second important idea which was common in both Iran and Turkey was that there was not enough accumulation of capital and expertise to realize this industrialization. Avery states the situation of Iran, at the time when Rıza Shah took over the power, as follows:

".. he found within the country, especially in the neighborhood of the capital, the debris of a number of, often foreign inspired, ventures to promote local manufacture. Wrong siting of the factories, poor communications, the pressure of cheaper manufactured articles from abroad, of far better quality than home products, the lack of efficient labor, lack of experience, local apathy were among the causes of their failure. Iran's political weakness had meant foreign tariff dictations and deprived her of the means to stem the tide of foreign imports."¹⁶⁴

After the 1929 depression the tendency was for the government to play a more active role in directing the economy of the country. In February 1931 under a new law foreign trade was made into a government monopoly, and various other monopolies were subsequently established under the general authority of this law. Thus, the idea of state intervention in the economy in order to realize these industrial investments gained importance.¹⁶⁵

A third point was that, Iran also accepted the constitutional system and the lives and properties of the people were guaranteed. So the rights which came to the Ottoman by Tanzimat also showed up in Iran.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 242.

¹⁶⁵ Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant In Persia*, p. 184.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 185.

Under the effects of these ideas Rıza Shah made a lot of reforms in the economic field. Textile, sugar and cement factories were established partly by the State and partly by Rıza Shah himself and new banks were opened in order to financially support these developments. He also brought foreign experts for important positions into the state administration. Moreover new methods developed by the West in agriculture and animal husbandry instead of classical methods were introduced. In addition to this the construction of new railways and roads were started.

Arnakis and Vucinich talks about the Iranian economic reforms comparing Shah and Mustafa Kemal to some extend as follows:

"..Borrowing another page from Mustafa Kemal's experience, Rıza Shah introduced a monopolistic economy. It included foreign trade, except oil. He nationalized various public utilities and did his best to encourage new industrial enterprises with public or private capital. He himself acquired an enormous fortune, especially in landed estates and in hotels, and used some of his wealth to implement his program. But he lacked the simple-mindedness and vision of Mustafa Kemal and he also had an non-heroic regard for money." ¹⁶⁷

At this point it was necessary to talk about another factor, petroleum, which was going to influence the Iranian economy more and more each day. In this period a British company named Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was managing the Iranian petroleum and giving a share to the Iranian government from the revenues. This share although not as

¹⁶⁷ Arnakis, and Vucinich, *The Near East in Modern Times, Forty Curicial Years 1900-1940*, pp. 99-100.

important as today, was contributing to the state budget. According to Ağaoğlu¹⁶⁸ on those days Iran had a balanced foreign trade and a budget.

As a result it could be said that the economic goals and their methods to achieve these goals, which were to reach West or to get away from her economic exploitation by establishing a strong national economy, were similar in both countries. Also it was an important point that the economies of both countries were severely affected from the global economic developments in the world.

¹⁶⁸ Ahmet Ağaoğlu, "Iran Devrimi: Yeni Türkiye Yeni İran", *Cumhuriyet*, Istanbul daily, 15 June 1934.

CHAPTER 4 : THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION AS THE DETERMINING FACTOR OF THE SOCIAL LIFE

In this part the role of the Islamic religion in Turkey and Iran will be studied separately. In the modernization movements of both countries it has a crucial role and the struggle between the modernists and traditionalist has been seen in every period of this process. Islam was the determining factor in the social order by its traditional control over various institutions. Both in Iran and the Ottoman Empire the essentials of the traditional society which were established since the out coming of Islam, were formed according to this religion. However, there was a major difference between the two countries. As it was known, the Ottoman Muslim population and also a large proportion of the Turkish nation was from the sect of Sunnite on the other hand a large population of Iran was from the sect of Shiite. Although they were both sects of Islam they had different influences on the religious cultures and the social structures of these countries. Thus, Iran and Turkey were confronted with different reactions from their societies when Rıza Shah and Mustafa Kemal wanted to establish westernization and secularization movements.

The religion of Islam had put forward a lot of worldly rules more than the rules for the next world. In this aspect it could be said that Islam tried to organize the daily lives of its believers. The education and legal system were under the control of religious institutions in the Islamic societies. And also the Islamic laws "şeriat" (canonical law) were the basis of the legal system which organize heritage, marriage and the criminal laws. Apart from these, Islam also brought rules affecting the economy such as encouragement of trade and forbidding interest on capital. With these properties, Islam

deeply influenced the political lives of the Muslim countries. As a result the religious leader became the ruler himself, or he shared the political authority with the ruler. If this was not the case, at least he had become a power of legitimizing this authority.

As it will be mentioned below, it was accepted that the dominance of the two sects of Islam brought the two societies into two different positions. And by this approach it was estimated that one of the important reasons why the ways of these two societies separated after Atatürk and Rıza Shah was this differentiation.

A- Ottoman Tradition and Sunnite Faith (Sunnism)

As it is known, Sunnite sect represents the orthodox aspect of Islam and basically regards the Sunnite which means that the prophet's own habits, sayings and the developments in his time are the main principles of Islam. And Islamic rules developed after this period cannot be accepted. This Sunnite faith was the religious culture of the Ottoman system, adopted by the majority of the population. It was also the only sect recognized by the government after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

From the time Islam appeared, it was spread throughout the world within the rules brought by the prophet and the interpretation brought by (sehabe) perseverance without any disagreement, during the first 200 years. During this period Islamic rules were interpreted according to the emerging conditions which were not accepted by some of the religious authorities. Thus, at this time new schools or sects of Islam appeared. There were mainly four schools of Sunnite sect as Hanbeli, Shafi, Maleki and Hanefi and also one major school of shiite as Ja'fari. The first school called "Hanbeli" formed by Ibn-i Hanbel because of the extreme deviations of Harun Reşit and Mamun's government and demanded the re-establishment of the Prophet's holy words with no compensation or interpretation. Although Ibn-i Hanbel was sent to

prison during the Mamun period, he refused to accept the policy of Mamun giving way to all sorts of open-minded changes during El Mütevekkil's reign. He said the last words on the matter of "içtihad" (meaning interpretation of Islam) according to the conditions of the time. For this reason, a Hanbeli cannot interpret the changes in a society for exactly 1200 years and he was only in a position to accept the status quo during a prophet's reign, as a way of life.¹⁶⁹

Another religious school which appeared after the prophet was the school of Shafi (Şafi). Opposing Ibn-i Hanbel's principles, it interprets the matters which were not mentioned in the Koran or in Sunnite by way of comparison (kıyas). But it cannot totally ignore Sunnite.¹⁷⁰

Again, at the same time Ibn-i Malik reveals a tendency towards shiism. Opposing the two strict sects, shiism was led by Imam Cafer-i Sadık which was theoretically close to the school of "itizal" believes that Koran was the words of Mohammed and that it was eternal. Thus, it considers logic as an essence for religion and it does not agree to anything without understanding it¹⁷¹. It was then that the scientific research and interpretation centers that could not exist before Islam were founded and Zarathustrian (Zerdüşti) books from Iran, Greek philosophy, Indian ballads and Buddhist philosophy and all other literature stuff were translated into Arabic during the reigns of Harun

¹⁶⁹ For a confirmation of these views see, L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Modern Iran*(London: Butler & Tanner, 1941), p. 43. And Gulan Hüseyin Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, pp. 1531-1536.

¹⁷⁰ Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁷¹ Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, p. 228-233.

Reşit and Mamun. Thus the Islamic world became one of the leading scientific centers¹⁷².

Under the influence of El Mütevekkil's dictatorship, were abolished all these institutions. The school of Hanbali was announced as the legal religion and other sects, especially Shiism, was subjected to immense political pressures. This led to the "Batnilik" movement in Islam. According to this sect, there was another aspect of the Koran apart from the sayings and all other sacred concepts, which was its hidden meaning. What was important was its spirit, (hidden meaning) and worship was its reflection and it is an exercise to comprehend that spirit.¹⁷³

With this doctrine, the Caliphate of Fatemi was founded and started to rule the Islamic world with a system of broad-minded capability for interpretation after the Abbasis. However, this situation changed when Yavuz Sultan Selim went to Egypt on a crusade and brought the holy belongings of Mohammed to Istanbul. Then he announced the Hanafi sect as the official sect which also had had the final word as had the other four sects (except the Shiites). For this reason, Selim closed the institution of içtihad, and from then on Seyh-ül Islam could only issued fatwas according to the juridical system put into practice by Ibn-i Hanefi.¹⁷⁴

Depending on these points, we could say that one of the main characteristics of Sunnism which dominated the Ottoman people was that the institution of "içtihad". In

¹⁷² Sutton, *Modern Iran*, p. 41.

¹⁷³ Haas, *Iran*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁷⁴ *Ana Britannica Ansiklopedisi* vol. 10 p. 302, vol. 17 p. 215.

this sect, interpretation of Islam and interpretation of juridical rules applied to them did not exist.

Another significant point was that in Sunnite Ottoman tradition, after Yavuz Sultan Selim took the title "caliph", the ulema became politically more powerless. The Ulema, as mentioned before were subject to the authority of the Sultan and were in the statute of servants. In spite of the fact that education and law were in the hands of these men, their political power was unable to go beyond that of issuing fatwas legitimizing the authority of the Sultan¹⁷⁵. Berkes argues as follows:

"..in the Ottoman Empire even though the ulema kept the belief of being the watchmen, the protectors and moreover the caliphates of Islam, alive among themselves, they indeed did not have the authority to have their own governing body. They could only use such authority when the governing body forced them to take action. There were times when they interfered in beliefs, doctrines or dogmas of governing body but these were rather caused by inadequacies in government policy or by the government's own wish."¹⁷⁶

In this way, Islam in the Ottoman Empire adopted itself to this system and conservatively was opposed to changes throughout the centuries of patrimonial feudalism. Consequently, it was one of the factors that prevented capitalism from replacing western feudalism in Ottoman society as the ulema cooperated with the central government against any kind of changes in the society.

¹⁷⁵ It is possible to think that the Ottoman ulema had some what economic resources under their control such as the foundations. But these affects were limited as the incomes of these foundations could not be spent freely as where the money would be spent was predetermined.

¹⁷⁶ Berkes, *Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 24-25.

Islam in Ottoman times was unable to update itself but it could be seen in political developments that Islam until the Turkish republic looked for a way out within itself for the salvation of the country. Among these arguments, Cemalettin Afgani (1839-1897), opposing the idea that Islam was an obstacle for the developments, strongly believed that Islam was not against the positive sciences and that every Muslim should study them. Together with that, he suggested an extended educational reform. Another idea of his was that Islamic countries should first strengthen themselves as nation states before they faced the western world¹⁷⁷. In this context, it could be stated that he supported nationalism in Islam. In his opinion, one by one all Islamic countries would unite after they had completed their national salvation movements.¹⁷⁸

This point of view was competing with Pan-Islamic movements, which were aiming to unite all the Islamic countries under the concept of "ümme" (Islamic religious society) during the reign of Abdulhamit II. Thus, Pan-islamism refused nationalism.¹⁷⁹ One other view in this context was reestablishing the institution of içtihad again. The importance of this institution had been discussed by Sunnite Muslims during the search for a way out for the Ottoman Empire. Ortaylı expresses the situation as follows:

"Namık Kemal, Seyid Ahmet Han, Cemalettin Afgani defend that the conditions leading up to modernity were quite possible within the system or institution of "İçtihad" in Islam every Muslim can suggest an interpretation. The

¹⁷⁷ Şerif Mardin, "İslamcılık", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1985), vol. 5, p. 1401.

¹⁷⁸ İsmail Kara, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e İslamcılık Tartışmaları", *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, İletişim, 1985), vol. 5, p. 1413.

¹⁷⁹ Bernard Lewis, *İslamın Siyasal Söylemi* (İstanbul: Cep, 1992), p. 61.

interpretation (conviction) put forward by a council in the name of Islam will not be eliminated and if it is met with majority's approval then it becomes an Islamic interpretation."¹⁸⁰

Islam's search for a way within itself came to an end when Atatürk came to power and Islamic ideas were suppressed by such ideologies as westernization and secularism. After the war of independence he had to struggle with Islamic tradition because he thought that this system was closed to technological developments and modernity, and it would be an obstacle for the renovation movements. Thus, Atatürk established secularism in the Turkish Republic. The term "secular" was so debatable that its meaning used in the West must be examined. Secularism is an institution which separates the administrative system from government and religion. Regularly changeable and decision seeking matters must be in the hands of the government. and, the church should be in charge of social matters such as marriage, worship, metaphysical beliefs and so on. Single-handed administration of Catholicism changed when Protestantism came onto scene and daily matters were left to the government to deal with, whereas permanent matters arranging one's spiritual life continued to stay within the field of religion.¹⁸¹

Contrary to that, such a concept of secularization was impossible in Turkey as Islam could not agree to that (though Christianity did) due to above mentioned characteristics. Thus, what Mustafa Kemal did was, trying to get Islam, which was the major opposing group, controlled by the government, together with bringing western

¹⁸⁰ Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Devletinde Laiklik hareketleri Üzerine", in eds., E. Kalaycıoğlu and A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelişimi*, p. 168.

¹⁸¹ For different definitions of Laicism see, Berkes, "Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma Olgusu", pp. 137-139.

institutions to the Turkish Republic. He started struggling with all those Islamic institutions politically and culturally to carry out the revolutions.

B- Iranian tradition and shiism:

Shiism is the dominant faith in Iran and differs from Sunnite Hanbeli, Şafi, Maliki and Hanefi sects structurally. In Islamic belief; 1. God is one and he rules over everything; 2. The Prophet is his messenger; 3. Believers will go to heaven and non-believers will go to hell on judgment day. In Shiism, two more beliefs could be seen: one is leadership (imamet), the other is justice.¹⁸²

Imamet means leadership¹⁸³ which means if a shiah does not believe in the leadership and shows disobedience then he is not considered as shiah. In the same way, if there is no equity in the rules made by the leader then those rules do not count. These two basic principles were taken from Ali's speeches, his behavior and especially from "Nahcel Belage" (thought to be written by him)¹⁸⁴.

A shiah believes that being Caliph was the right of Hz. Ali after the prophet and that the other three acquired this position unjustly. Differing from the Sunnite belief at this point and he accepted Hz. Ali and his sons to be the leaders. Eleven of these leaders

¹⁸² Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar*, pp. 42-53. See also, Rameş Sanghvi, *Aryamer: İran Şahı (Siyasi bir bibliografi)*, p. 8.

¹⁸³ For this definition see, L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Modern Iran*, p31-56 and Haas, *Iran*, pp. 70-92.

¹⁸⁴ Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, pp. 1531-1536.

lived up to the 260th year of Islam. The 6th Imam Cafer-i Sadık was the founder of Shiism and was a contemporary to Imam Hanefi. According to shiahs the 12th imam was lost when he was a child and God made him immortal and that he would come back when the world was under cruelty and injustice.¹⁸⁵

Therefore the leadership factor, which does not exist in Sunnite tradition, was an important factor in Shiism which was regarded as a basic principle. Justice (equity) on the other hand was also a very important concept balancing the agitations of social life. This determines the social order. So, the "Imam" or the "leader" takes the Prophet's deeds, the sacred sayings in the Koran and deeds and sayings of Hz. Ali and his sons as a method of ruling the society and giving his fatwas. These fatwas were only valid during his life, in order to conform to the justice system. After his death, his fatwas were put aside and the new leader took the contemporary parts out, leaving others untouched thus maintaining the Islamic law renew itself. This method was called "Mukteziyat-i Zaman" adaptation of Islam to the conditions of the day. Naturally, each leader examined all previous fatwas by interpretation before he issued a new one.¹⁸⁶

In Iranian shiah tradition there is also the institution of *içtihad* which means giving the right of judgment on Islamic laws which was a major point in which Iran differed from

¹⁸⁵ Mansur Muaddel, "Iran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", in ed., Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi, Din Anti-emperyalizm ve Sol*, pp. 151-152. See also, Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁸⁶ Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2, p. 1536.

the Ottoman Sunnite tradition¹⁸⁷. Halliday also describes the clergy and "içtihad" in the Shiite as follows:

".. Strictly speaking, Islam does not have a clergy in the sense of an ordained body of men. But in this text I have used the term clergy interchangeably with the word ulema, literally "those who know" the standard Arabic Muslim term, and the word mollah, the word normally applied to shiite clergy in Iran. Iranians themselves tend not to use mollah, but to talk of the akhund....Higher ranking clergies were called mujtahids (müştahid), meaning that they have the authority of ijthad (içtihad), independent judgment on holy matters, whilst the highest ranking clergies are called ayatollah".¹⁸⁸

The other important characteristic of Iranian Shiism is that it does have a some form of a clerical system as in Christianity. Let us see why this system exists although Islam does not accept this. The reasons why the clerical system exists in Iran depends on the Zarathustrian caste system exercised before Islam. In this religion the Clergy had the same authority as the king. This caste was in charge of protecting the holy fire, being a moral support to the king and assuring the relationships between the king and the public. Therefore they had a sacred position in sharing the political power. When Islam was adopted, Iranians called Islam's equity principle as "justice" and added that to Islamic rules in order to get rid of the Zarathustrian caste system and class distinction.

¹⁸⁷ Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran An Interpretation*, p. 9. See also, Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran*, pp. 56-57. Mansur Muaddel, "Iran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", in ed., Dr Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi, Din Anti-emperyalizm ve Sol*, p. 151.

¹⁸⁸ Fred Halliday, "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism", *Journal of International Affairs* (Fall/Winter, 1982/2), p. 190. See also, Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant In Persia*, pp. 194-195.

In Zarathustrianism there were three different classes having sovereignty: 1) Head of the feudal system (the King) and the landlords 2) Clergymen, offering them moral support and collecting the taxes. 3) The military force responsible from execution. This tripartite agreement paid no attention to people such as artisans and peasants who did not belong to any of these classes. None of the members of these classes would participate in any kind of production, whereas peasants and tradesmen, who had to do the work had to give large amounts to the clergy as religious tax and to the landlords and the king as a state tax. They would generally keep only 25 percent of their earnings.¹⁸⁹

Due to such an imbalance the Iranians adopted Islam easily for its equity principle without any wars. However, this could not end the clergy tradition. This tradition also took its place in Iranian Islamic culture whereas it does not exist in Sunni tradition.

Thus, the religious tax in Zarathustrian has become "homs" (khums) in shiism. Homs in Arabic means 1/5, or in other words the share of the Imam. This tradition has been in use since the period of the prophet. He had the right to get 1/5 of the booty in times of war. Although the prophet expressed in one of his speeches that he would not leave inheritance to any one the shiah considered the imams as the continuation of the prophet's 12 grandchildren, they gave this tax in peace time as well¹⁹⁰. Accordingly, Imam would get 20 per cent. This 20 per cent would get divided into two. So, 10 per cent would go to the Imams in the villages, and the other 10 per cent would go directly to religion education centers in the cities. Judges and Imams would graduate from these institutions. Any who passed the exam and graduated from these schools could go to university which used to be in Necef, and now is in Kum. Whoever graduated

¹⁸⁹ Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 1, p. 1171.

¹⁹⁰ Gölpınarlı, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar*, p. 45.

from here were Ayatollahs. They would make up the leadership team and played a major part in the political structure of the country.¹⁹¹

Garoussian was also relating the power of ulema to their material wealth accumulated from the direct "homs" (Khums) tax. Thus they were less dependent on the government for money than Sunni countries.¹⁹²

In addition to this tax, there was a classical Islamic tax called "Zekat" (obligatory alms). Sunnis would only pay this tax. There was also a tradition of giving away the property of the deceased to a charity. The biggest charities in Iran were of this kind. For instance, the total amount given to Rıza in this way was remarkable. In Horasan quite a lot of land belongs to this Imam¹⁹³. Consequently, the clergy supported by huge financial aids also became politically powerful, preserved its existence from the ruling institution and shared the political authority with the king. "Their interpretations were as dogmatic as the Koran and they were so powerful that they could easily influence political decisions" says Ewell-Sutton¹⁹⁴.

This religious tax system makes the Iranian ulema independent from the central administration. Thus the ulema of Iran became a clergy, not in the sense of being an ordained body but in the sense of having political autonomy.

¹⁹¹ Musahip, *Dayeret-ül Al Maarif Farsi*, vol. 2 pp. 1537. See also, Mansur Muaddel, "Iran'da Şii Ulema ve Devlet", in ed., Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi, Din Anti-emperyalizm ve Sol*, p. 162.

¹⁹² Vida Garoussian, *The ulema and Secularization in Contemporary Iran* (Illinois: Southern Illinois University, 1974). pp. 15-16.

¹⁹³ Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, p. 28.

¹⁹⁴ Sutton, *Modern Iran*, p. 54.

As seen so far, as religious systems, there are two basic differences between the Shiite sect of Iran and the Sunnite sect of Turkey. First, the institution of *iċtihad* which updates the religious rules which exist in Shiism, and do not exist in Sunnite tradition. Secondly, the clergy tradition of Zarathustrian of in the Iranian caste system continued even after Islam. The clergy in Iran shared the political authority with the ruler due to its self-governing body and long-lasting traditions. Because the clergy did not exist in the Ottoman Empire theologians had to cooperate with the ruler as they were not financially independent as the clergy of Iran, and the Ottoman Caliph-Sultans at the same time cut off their influence, using their initiative. When the impact of the renovation movement of this differentiation was analyzed, in general, in the Ottoman Empire religion, being unable to update itself, was thus opposed to the westernization movements.

In Iran, Shiism, updating itself with *iċtihad* supported the some of the westernization movements such as establishing a constitutional monarchy. The clergy supported the Iranian bourgeoisie against central authority as in the case of in the tobacco monopoly, as the important part of religious taxes were paid from the income of city trade. This directed the clergy to give more importance to the cities. This cooperation went on during the debates and demonstrations for establishing a constitutional regime and most of the clergy were in favor of it though not all.¹⁹⁵. Thus they put forward a progressive and revolutionary attitude and, constitution was legitimized by most of the clergy. However after, Shah began to realize reforms for westernizing country, he wanted to abolish or at least decrease the political role of the clergy class as most of his

¹⁹⁵ For the effect of the clergy in Iran to movements of modernization see also: Nouchine Yavari-D'Hellencourt, "Identité et Modernité LA Contribution D'AL-E Ahmed, Shari'ati et Motahhari Au Discours Révolutionnaire Iraniens", in ed., Semih Vaner, *Modernisation Autoritaire en Turquie et en Iran* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991), pp. 83-107.

reforms had conflicts with Islamic social order. Thus he took severe criticisms from this group and their progressive and revolutionary attitude came to an end.¹⁹⁶



¹⁹⁶ One important point here which took our attention is that, the clergy or ulema in Iran abolished the kingdom and established a republic.

CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION

The feudal system of the European states was replaced by drastic changes in trade and industrial capitalism. This, then was followed by subsequent changes in the political system of European countries as well as in the cultural understanding of them. This was the birth of the nation states and the modern western civilization.

When the industry started to develop at an amazing rate, the European states discovered a need to find new markets and cheap raw materials for their productions, Thus, that brought them to the usage of the natural resources in the less developed countries which were still under the effect of the feudal system, so the European states pressured them economically and politically to maintain their goals.

This upraise in the western societies caused other countries to take a deep look into their technological system, and efforts were started in order to catch up with the Europe. As it was studied earlier, even though Turkey and Iran submitted to the economical power of the European states, this submission was newer being involved in the field of political persuasion.

In the 19th century, both countries were militarily defeated by the West, which concluded in the occurrence of similar changes in both societies. But these changes were never so drastic and strong until Mustafa Kemal and Rıza Shah took over power. Both leaders established authoritative systems to start the radical cultural, political and economical reforms in their own countries. In Turkey, the outcome of these reforms remained well after the death of Atatürk even after the establishment of the opposition in the political arena with the multi party system.

Thus, these reforms, Laicism, Republicanism and Nationalism still the dominating ideology and the reforms such as using the Latin alphabet, and the western legal system are still in action today, and it is hard to talk about the existence of any strong opposition to these reforms.

On the other hand, in Iran, these reforms which were quite similar as we discussed earlier, faced a great deal of opposition after Rıza Shah. At the end, this led to the fall of the Shah in 1979. And the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran

By comparing and contrasting the sociological, economical and political developments of those countries, this thesis has tried to find out the reasons for different results of identical revolutionary steps. Now, the results of this study will be evaluated.

POLITICAL RESULTS:

The similarities are as follows:

- 1) Both countries entertained a traditional, patrimonial social order, having a strong central authority unlike the decentralized western tradition.

- 2) Both countries were much behind the developments of the western societies and, they did not realize this fact until they were defeated militarily in several wars. Then, the awakening of the two countries was followed by a rush to the adaptation of western reforms. Briefly, they both realized their shortcomings after facing military defeat.

- 3) Both were heavily influenced by the West and therefore the decisions of the administrators of these countries were strongly manipulated by economic and political pressure from the West such as the agreements of free trade.

4) Both, in the first hand, tried to find some reasonable meeting points between Islam and Western technology and than the aim of the reforms was replaced by total westernization.

The differences are as follows:

1) The Ottoman Empire was a well-woven mosaic of different cultures, nations, races and religions while Iran was a much more homogenous society. Because of these reasons the nationalism movements and ideas adopted from the West affected Turkey negatively whereas its impact on Iran was positive.

2) The economic and political competition among western countries forced them to divide the Ottoman Empire but to sustain Iran's integrity and order. Therefore, during the period of modernization, the Ottoman Empire had to face severe and long-run wars, on the other hand, Iran experienced a period of peace except for the minor border conflicts with Afghanistan.

3) During the 19th century, in the Ottoman Empire the movement towards westernization was acted out by bureaucrats and intellectuals who were educated abroad. In Iran, however, this was done by the class of clergy cooperating with the bourgeoisie class.

4) The opposition against changes came from the ulema in the Ottoman Empire whereas in Iran it came from the Qajar Shahs and the central authority in the 19th century and from Ulema in during the period of Rıza Shah.

5) These events, which were disintegrating the Ottoman Empire, brought the idea of rescuing the country. Thus the Ottomans lived through the period of Tanzimat and

constitutional monarchy. But the changes in the government of Iran was not seen until 1909 which was nearly 70 years after those of the Ottomans.

6) A republic was established after the disintegration of the empire and the traditional monarchy was abolished, where as in Iran it was not possible to establish a republic until very recently.

ECONOMIC RESULTS:

Economic Similarities:

1) They both started reforms by modernizing their military forces. Naturally, both countries soon realized that they needed financial resources to do so. Subsequently, they were aware of the fact that only by successful economy, States reach the optimum level in the military as in other fields. At this point, both countries immediately started to develop their economy .

2) Adam Smith and Ricardo affected both countries with their economically liberal ideas. This, in turn, led to the birth of the free market age. Questioning as well as practicing the liberal economic doctrines led to the ideas of defending the economy by state policies. This process affected both countries in a very similar way.

3) Since the beginning of the 19th century, the establishment of some reforms such as the postal service, railroad system, textile industry and the sugar refinery industries started in both countries at the same time because of the strong foreign impact.

4) During the time when Atatürk and Rıza Shah were in power, each country had a pretty strong belief about self-sufficiency in a nations economy. This was, they believed, the only way to eliminate the imperialistic effects of the West. And after 1929 economic crises the west was to believe that if necessary conditions were aroused, the state shall interfere the economy, only in the purpose of general welfare of the country.

Thus these ideas also affected both countries and especially Turkey which used serious statist policies for developing the national industry.

Differences:

Although there were great many similarities between the two countries, only one major dissimilarity existed: The strong body of existence of the merchant class in Iran whereas in Turkey such a class did not exist and the trade was conducted by the minorities such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks and even by Iranians.

RELIGION :

Similarities:

1) Both countries had the Islamic social order and the education and judiciary were conducted by the religious leaders of each country. Also, religion regulated every aspect of society.

Differences :

1) Even though both were Muslim, each belonged to different interpretations of the Islamic doctrine: Iran was practicing shiism; Turkey was practicing Sunnism.

2) The two major differences between the two were that the class of Clergy in Iran was independent in its own financial matters, and in the institution of *ic̣tihad*, the interpretation of Islamic rules, existed. On the other hand, in Turkey the religious class was subjected to the government and their beliefs refused the institution of *ic̣tihad* to some extent, which had an important impact on the modernization movements. Both religious orders adapted themselves to the feudal system. Thus when they were confronted with the effects of capitalism they had separated their ways. The ulema of

the Ottoman Empire was against the modernization from the beginning with the exception of the few attempts to integrate technology into the Islamic society. On the other hand, in Iran the Clergy class worked closely with the bourgeoisie class for the integration of modernization into the society up to the period of Rıza Shah when he tried to exercise a lot of radical reforms in a very short period of time. At that period clergy resisted to the reforms and got into struggle with the Shah. However, in general Shiism could adapt itself to the process of modernization up to a degree, whereas Sunnism in Turkey lost its social support relatively on the degree that they had opposed the social changes.

3) The other major difference comes from the financial self-sufficiency of clergy in Iran which was like the ones in Europe, independent in its money matters hence having a tradition of political power. However, Sunnite religious system of Turkey and the Ottomans were entirely dependent on the government in monetary matters and did not have any political power. Hence, when Rıza Shah came to power, the Sunni opposition was able to react against him, and was able to survive. On the other hand when Atatürk took power he was successful in his attempts to beat the ulema and demolish the Islamic social order. Certainly, not having a clergy class was not the only cause behind secularism taking root. Other causes should be studied as well, such as the existence of various cultures (especially Alawism). Another reason could be found in the pre-Islamic period in Turkish Culture.

As a result, we can say that these countries, despite having some substantial similarities in the modernization process, a number of structural differences led them to in entirely different directions.

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