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**IDEOLOGICAL SEARCH, POLITICAL EDUCATION AND HISTORY WRITING:
THE FIRST REVOLUTION LECTURES IN 1934
(International Context, Historical Process, Biographical and Textual Analysis)**

By

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Title:

**IDEOLOGICAL SEARCH, POLITICAL EDUCATION AND HISTORY WRITING:
THE FIRST REVOLUTION LECTURES IN 1934**

(International Context, Historical Process-Biographical and Textual Analysis)

This study examines the Institute of Revolution founded in the body of the Istanbul University after the university reform in 1933 and the first Revolution Lectures given in 1934. This experience, which has not been yet studied in detail, is evaluated comparatively with similar experiences seen in other countries in the interwar period, as a historical process, and in the contexts of relations between party and ideology, biographies of the statesmen-professors and the contents/texts of the lectures.

These lectures serve both as an example of a historical case and they include evaluations on their time on the past and perspectives on the future. They emerged in the special historical conditions of the single-party era. In addition, they are placed within the personal histories of their subjects. Consequently, the lectures present an opportunity for a different historical reading with its assessment of times, subjects and concepts.

In the study, in addition to bringing up detailed information about the subject, it is inquired whether or not that the existing theses/texts on the years of the 1930s and in general the single-party era can be re-evaluated.

Mustafa Göleç

İDEOLOJİK ARAYIŞ, POLİTİK EĞİTİM VE TARİH YAZIMI: 1934'TEKİ İLK İNKILAP DERSLERİ

(Uluslararası Bağlam-Tarihsel Süreç-Biyografi ve Metin Analizi)

Bu tez 1933 Üniversite Reformu ertesinde İstanbul Üniversitesi bünyesinde kurulan İnkılap Enstitüsü ve 1934'teki ilk inkılap derslerini ele alıyor. Bugüne dek ayrıntılı bir inceleme konusu edilmemiş olan bu tecrübe, aynı dönemde başka ülkelerde görülen benzer tecrübeler ile karşılaştırmalı olarak, tarihsel bir süreç olarak, parti-ideoloji ilişkileri, dersleri veren devlet adamı-profesörlerin biyografileri ve derslerin içerikleri/metinleri bağlamlarında değerlendiriliyor.

Bu dersler hem tarihsel bir vak'a örneği olarak karşımızda durmakta hem de kendi dönemi ve geçmişe ilişkin değerlendirmeler ve geleceğe ilişkin perspektifler içermektedir. Tek parti dönemi Türkiye'sinin özel tarihsel şartları içerisinde ortaya konmuşlardır. Ayrıca öznelerinin kişisel tarihleri içerisinde bir yer tutmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla dersler zamanlar, özneler ve kavramların bir tür iç içe geçmişliği ile farklı bir tarihsel okuma imkanı sunmaktadırlar.

Çalışmada konuya ilişkin ayrıntılı bilgilerin ilk kez ortaya konmasının ötesinde 1930lu yıllar ve genelde tek parti dönemi üzerine mevcut tezlerin/metinlerin yeniden değerlendirilebilir olup olmadıklarını sorgulamak amaçlanıyor.

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Naturally, the deficiencies and defects of the study belong to me.

Mustafa Gle

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PREFACE

The 1930s constitute one of the most problematic areas of study in Turkish historiography. One reason for this is the method of first studying and then teaching the history of early Republican Turkey by separating it from the other areas of historiography. Because of this separation, academic standards were left behind in studies of the history of early Republican Turkey and history teaching has been given precedence to research. As a result, our knowledge about the 1930s has not tended to increase, to change or to vary in the past years, but has stayed as a fixed unity of knowledge. This characteristic of knowledge has reproduced itself in the interpretations of the period, with the result that a diversity of interpretations has not emerged. In this context, the first Revolution Lectures, which were given in 1934 by the important names of the Revolution, are interesting in that the lectures were both the subjects/producers of such a knowledge/interpretation manner and the objects directly affected by it.

The Revolution Lectures, which began in 1934 first at the Institute of Revolution in the newly established (after the *Darülfünun* Reform) İstanbul University, and then in Ankara, have not attracted much attention in the Turkish historiography of the Republican era. Neither the decisions of what was to be put on the agenda of the lectures, nor the identities of the statesmen-historians who lectured, nor the contents or outputs of the lectures have been examined. But these lectures are important, both as history texts with theses concerning their time and its near past (secondary sources), and as historical texts, on the grounds that they exhibit the atmosphere of the time in which they were produced. They also can be seen as a set of clues to help in thinking of the works of that time as primary sources. Moving from these lectures, this study moves

towards a view of the ideological search of the single-party era, taking into consideration the special conditions of the 1930s in Turkey and in the world.

The Objectives

This study essentially has two outcomes: First, the 1930s is a period which has not received enough attention. It should be considered important and examined. Here a holistic concern is meant. When the single-party era is in question, Recep Peker, for example, is mentioned often and his book *Recep Peker'in İnkılap Dersleri* (Recep Peker's Revolution Lectures) receives frequent reference. It is also possible to encounter mention of these lectures in books, articles and theses written about the other professors. The Revolution Lectures, the professors, and the texts are not studied in this study as individual parts, but as a relational whole, looking at their place –in front of other persons, texts and discussions– historically.

Second, it is evident that studying the first Revolution Lectures of 1934 has problems in common with studying the 1930s and the single-party era in general. It is possible to reach the generally accepted judgments also from this topic and to consolidate the existing theses. But in this study, the subject is viewed as an opportunity to compare, to interrogate, and to criticize the main approaches and conclusions on the period.

Writings about the Revolution Lectures

A general look at the writings about the Revolution Lectures of 1934 shows that these lectures have been perceived in variant ways in the literature of history and political thought. Although they have been perceived in so many different ways, it is a problem that these lectures have never been a separate subject of study. The various types of perception of the Revolution Lectures can be listed in five categories:

First, the Revolution Lectures are mentioned in the chronologies of the history of the revolution with the date of the beginning of the lectures or the Institute of Revolution's date of foundation/opening. In these chronologies, the Revolution Lectures are the last wave of the Kemalist Revolutions that intensified in the years leading up to 1934. At the same time, they coincided with the University Reform. Though giving ideas about the Revolution Lectures' historical (near past) and intellectual roots, these chronologies overlook their relations with the distant past or the external causes and their place and meaning in world history.¹ Also, chronologies of Atatürk's life in this category give place to the Revolution Lectures. But a problematic knowledge emerges here, and the Revolution Lectures are explained as having been the initiative of Atatürk himself.²

Second, in regard to the question of how these lectures found place in books about the history of the revolution and in Atatürk/Kemalism texts, it is seen that they also show differences in between themselves. The books of the history of the revolution, and of Atatürk/Kemalism on a large scale, give no reference to the first Revolution Lectures given in 1934.³ These books explain the reason for the existence of the History of the Revolution courses as the government regulations of 1942, the Constitution of 1961, or the Constitution of 1980. The books in the other category mention the first

¹ Two examples: Sami N. Özerdim, *Atatürk Devrimi Kronolojisi* (İstanbul: Varlık Yay., 1963), p. 86; and Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi Kronolojisi 1918-1938* (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yay., 1973), pp. 349-358.

² Sadi Irmak, *Atatürk / Bir Çağın Açılışı* (İstanbul: İnkılap Yay., 1984), p. 444. The information is given that on the 4th of March Atatürk put Revolution Lectures in the Faculties and High Schools.

³ Eroğlu does not talk about the beginning (history) of the Revolution Lectures. But in the section the aims of the history of revolution courses, he talks of Recep Peker as "one of the professors of the History of Turkish Revolution." Eroğlu give references to three of the professors' books, except for that of Tengirşenk, but he does not evaluate them in the context of the Revolution Lectures. Hamza Eroğlu, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Devrim Kurumu, 1974). Kongar mentions neither the lectures of 1934 nor the lectures' texts which were published as books later, including Recep Peker's celebrated one as the source of Kemalism. He regards the Association of Turkish History Study, the Turkish Language Council, and the People's Houses as the associates of the RPP in the work of producing the ideology, but not the Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures. Emre Kongar, *Devrim Tarihi ve Toplum Bilim Açısından Atatürk*, second edition (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1994). Timur also, in the political and ideological developments topic of his book, does not dwell on the Institute of Revolution or the Revolution Lectures. He talks about the People's Houses with the Language and History Associations and the periodical *Kadro* in a detailed manner. Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası 1919-1946* (Ankara: Doğan Yay., 1971).

Revolution Lectures in 1934 with a different stress, in the context of the History of the Revolution courses. For example, Kartekin sees Atatürk's *Nutuk* as the first course of the History of the Revolution and he says that Peker, Bozkurt, Bayur, and Tengirşenk gave these revolution courses in later years.⁴ He makes neither a historical explanation nor a separation between these lectures and the courses of the later years. Erol Cihan states that the History of the Turkish Revolution courses were assigned as obligatory courses in universities in 1942, although having been on the curriculum since 1934.⁵

There is also a deficiency of historical explanation. The difference(s) between the regulations of 1934 and 1942 is not in regard to the teaching of these courses as obligatory in the universities. Essentially, this interpretation does not consider the first Revolution Lectures in 1934 as important in the context of the History of the Turkish Revolution, and as such does not take them into consideration. Baykara, who wrote a book about the Revolution Lectures in 1934, states that the aim of these lectures was "to teach the conditions which form and make the National Struggle with the general politics of the Republic of Turkey."⁶ This interpretation also directs an inner view to these lectures. Aybars repeats the same interpretation concerning the aims of these courses.⁷ When Giritli dwells upon the origins of the Principles of Atatürk and the History of the Revolution courses, he touches upon the Revolution Lectures of 1934, without taking the special place of these lectures into consideration. In this interpretation, the origin of the Principles of Atatürk and the History of the Revolution courses were not these lectures, but earlier attempts to write the history of the "National

⁴ Enver Kartekin, *Devrim Tarihi ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Rejimi* (İstanbul: Sinan Yay., 1973), pp. 10-11.

⁵ Erol Cihan, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi Notları I / Türk Devrimi Kavramı ve Yorumları*, second edition (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1983), p. 13.

⁶ Tuncer Baykara, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1981), pp. 7-8.

⁷ Ergün Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme* (İzmir: Ercan Kitabevi, 2000), pp. 18-21. He says that "Starting with the educational year of 1933-1934, in which the 10th anniversary of the Republic was celebrated and the University Reform was realized, 'History of the Turkish Revolution' courses began to be taught to the last year students of universities and high schools with the aims of teaching the 'History of the Turkish Revolution' to newly grown up generations, to explain Kemalism, which systematized this Revolution, to make it accepted, to unite the youth and the nation in a unity of belief and to create a modern nation. With this aim, the 'Institute of Turkish Revolution History' was founded in 1942."

Movement” in 1922.⁸ Some other books in this category are content with quoting explanations, evaluations and remembrances of the subject.⁹

Studies on the professors of the first Revolution Lectures of 1934 as the third category of sources reveal that the Revolution Lectures found little place in these texts, or even none at all in some examples.¹⁰ This demonstrates the importance of these lectures and professorship of the Institute of Revolution in the lives and thoughts of the professors. Another problem with these texts is that the evaluation of the Revolution Lectures is set completely within the context of the persons studied, describing the professors as having had almost absolute initiative about the lectures.

Memoirs constitute the fourth category of sources. Unfortunately, none of the four professors wrote memoirs. In texts about the era, however, it is possible to find some mention of them. For example, Afet İnan, who published studies with Reşit Galip about the foundation of the Institute of Revolution and the notes of Reşit Galip; Aslan Tufan Yazman, who followed the lectures as a journalist and wrote for *Cumhuriyet*; Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, who was one of the assistants of the professors (he was Recep Peker’s assistant) can be regarded. Naturally, these remembrances do not explain the whole process. They include personal observations and can be misinforming. It is another important deficiency that they cannot be confirmed with other memoirs. A more comprehensive view would be possible if observations and recollections of the students who attended the lectures could have been found.

⁸ İsmet Giritli, *Atatürkçülük/Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları* (İstanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 1983), pp. 9-11. In addition to the Revolution Lectures in 1934, Giritli gives place to the regulations of 1941, 1942 and 1946 regarding these lectures. In this interpretation, it seems that there was no development related to these courses until 1980.

⁹ Two examples: Sadi İrmak, pp. 434-437. He quotes Reşit Galip’s rough draft plan about the Institute of Revolution from Afet İnan as “the notes dictated by Atatürk.” Hacı Angı, *Atatürk İlkeleri ve Türk Devrimi* (Ankara: Angı Yay., 1985), pp. 144-147. He quotes Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu’s memories-thoughts about the first Revolution Lectures in 1934.

¹⁰ Theses with volume are included in these studies as well as articles with rather limited scope. These studies are examined separately in Chapter Four.

The fifth category of sources, education history, and in particular texts about the University Reform, relatively abstract the Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures of 1934 from their political and historical contexts.

Method and Framework

The evolution of historiography in the twentieth century brought both a methodological change and enrichment in its areas of interest. First of all, the claim of nineteenth century historiography to depend on “the fact”, and consequently its scientific confidence, began to be debated. This brought about a questioning of the distance which the historian must put between himself and his facts. It at least brought the idea that the historian as subject is inside the “history” with his facts. Second, with the methodological developments, new areas of research emerged, providing historians with new opportunities, which had been overlooked by the state/politics-centered historiographies of the nineteenth century.

The history of thought, because of its close relationship with politics-centered historiography, developed inside the traditional historiography.¹¹ In addition to political thought, the history of thought includes economic, social, scientific and theological ideas, as well as historiographical ideas, and the range continued to expand. The horizon of the developments in historiography that go beyond the limits of political history is seen in the area of the history of thought, which is generally known to be focused on political thought. Both the evolution of the history of thought itself and the evolution in the other areas of historiography merge to arrive at an interdisciplinary, multi-centered and more comprehensive historiographical understanding.

This study, using mainly the opportunities presented by the history of thought, presents a view of the 1930s from the first Revolution Lectures in 1934. The history of

¹¹ John Tosh, *Tarihin Peşinde* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1997), pp. 77-78.

thought can study a historical period by looking at the subjects and, both through an unhistorical evaluation and through the places/ evolutions of the ideas of the period in the historical process. It can also fictionalize the historical period and intellectual structure of the period in a narrative in which the subjects are relatively indefinite by looking at certain concepts and the changing of these concepts in the historical process. Both methods draw us towards the conclusion that the history of thought consists not only of ideas; thought can be studied in the contexts both of the subject that produces it and of the structure in which it exists.

In the writing of this study, a dual method is followed: Narrative is the requirement of dealing with the Revolution Lectures as a historical fact. These lectures were the product of the internal and external conditions of a historical period, and the matter dwelt upon is a process that had a beginning, developments, and an end. Analysis, as a matter of course, accompanies the narrative both in the reading and comparison of texts (between themselves and with other texts) and in understanding and comparing the process, which is the matter of narrative, with similar experiences.

The study consists of seven chapters, in addition to introduction and conclusion parts. The first chapter examines how explanatory it can be to look at the problematics of the literature (written especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s) on the authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes of the interwar era, such as indoctrination (education policies in general), political socialization, and ideology in regards to the Revolution Lectures in 1934. Criticisms (such as their attributing absolute power and autonomy to the state from society and culture) directed towards this literature in the 1980s are also taken into consideration in this context.

In the second chapter, the Revolution Lectures in 1934 are dealt with in a historical narrative beginning with their placement on the agenda, preparations, delivery and results. The main references used in this chapter are the daily newspapers of the era.

A few archival documents along with remembrances and anecdotes are also utilized. No secondary source directly related with the matter exists.

In the third chapter and the following four chapters, the four statesmen-professors who gave the lectures and their texts are examined. These statesmen-professors (Peker, Bayur, Bozkurt, and Tengirşenk) are dealt with in a biographical approach. As a common characteristic of these four men, very little has been written about them. The available biographies, on the other hand (many of these are unpublished M.A. theses and Ph.D. dissertations) are not thematic and problem-centered. By making use of also these biographies, the lives and ideas of the statesmen-professors are taken up in the contexts of their Revolution Lectures. The personal backgrounds of these men first determined their lecturing and influenced their lectures. Examination is also made of how taking part in this project influenced their careers.

The course notes of the four statesmen-professors, which were published later, the books they wrote by expanding their courses, certain shortened parts of the texts and sometimes as the summary of the whole of these courses, which were published in the publication organs of the era, are examined in these chapters. The general theses taught in these texts are given place and central themes are explored. Similarities and differences within the theses are indicated. These courses and texts have problematics similar to many texts written and published in the 1930s. The sum can be called “revolution literature”. They claimed to be creating the ideology of the Revolution. With similar content, but instead of schools, people’s houses or parliament, they existed in the pages of newspapers, periodicals and books. It is necessary to compare these texts with the texts of the Revolution Lectures in 1934 as the official voice of the state, to look at how they approached similar themes and problems. In examining them, we will see to what degree the state was accepted as the absolute and autonomous determiner in the areas of culture and ideology.

Finally, this paper tries to assess to what degree the collected and assembled knowledge about the first Revolution Lectures in 1934, their texts, the statesmen-professors who gave these lectures and similar experiences in other countries of the period alter the common acceptances of Turkish historiography about the 1930s.



CHAPTER ONE

POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION

This chapter examines the ideological, political education and indoctrination experiences, particularly in the European authoritarian/totalitarian regimes between the two world wars (National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union), and of the People's Republic of China in the post-war period, and compares them with the experience of the Turkish Republic during the single-party period. Such a comparison will show us how characteristic a practice the History of Revolution lessons were. Seeing other examples will also provide us with the possibility of illuminating particular points in the Turkish "Revolution Lectures" practice that do not make sense on their own.

The interwar era saw ideological education and indoctrination policies implemented throughout the world. Practical and methodological reasons exist for restricting these experiences to four examples. Too many examples neither fit into the limits of this thesis, nor contain sound specialties. The Austrian (1934-1938) and Japanese cases, however, could be mentioned as interesting examples. Another practical reason here is the inaccessibility of primary sources due to language constraints and the lack of sources dealing with these cases in English or Turkish. The methodological reason, on the other hand, is that these ideological education and indoctrination policies are taken into account to analyse the history of the revolution courses in the Turkish Republic during the single-party period. Consequently, cases whose similarities to this practice were minimum are excluded. However, in England and especially in the USA, ideological education and indoctrination policies were discussed seriously during a period when liberal values were strongly criticized. This was reflected in certain

practices in education, though not as much as they were in the authoritarian-totalitarian examples.

The four examples chosen for this study can be classified to two categories. The primary characteristic of National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, which are in the first category, is the determination of the politics-education relationship by the dominance of practice over theory. Both regimes were totalitarian and owed their totalitarian properties to their ideological bases, National Socialism and Fascism, respectively. Nevertheless, neither National Socialism nor Fascism were well-defined ideologies and thus could have been formulated so that they could be subject to political education and indoctrination. These appeared in the politics-education relations rather on the symbolic and practical levels. There also were certain values, emotions and sometimes ideas to be imposed on the masses, but no way of thinking was imposed in the methodological sense. Here, anti-intellectualism was a determining element of the politics-ideology-education relationship. In this category, the prominent elements were power relations, types of organisation, and educational practices, rather than ideas, texts or history writing in particular.

One other characteristic of National Socialism and Fascism was the political authorities' lack of absolute power and control over education, in spite of their totalitarian claims. The National Socialist and Fascist governments, whose hegemonic powers were limited, and therefore whose survival depended rather on power relations, institutional organisation and new types of political participation, faced serious opposition (naturally at different levels) and sometimes had to reconsider, repair or rebuild their policies. Because of both their intellectual weaknesses and the resistance they faced, the National Socialist and Fascist regimes formed their education policies within a certain process. Consequently, the ideological accumulation that was meant to be subject to political-ideological education and indoctrination was not formulated in

the beginning, but formed within this process of seeking.

The primary characteristic of the two examples in the second category is that much more the weight of ideology, though the theory-practice tension can be observed here (especially in the Soviet Union) as well. In these two examples, ideology was the basic determiner of political education and indoctrination policies, not merely as symbols and certain practices, but as defined and formulated facts. Education policies were shaped according to interpretations of Marxism; Marxist theory was imposed on the masses; scientific studies, in addition to educational activities, were evaluated as to political criteria. In this category, the politics-ideology-education relation was a relationship of more direct determination and had a more totalitarian nature than those in the first category.

The intellectual basis provided the government with a hegemonic power. Politics-ideology-education relations were determined not by institutional organisations and power relations, but by ideological-hegemonic power. They went beyond changes in regulations on education activities or changes in course definitions, as in National Socialist and Fascist regimes, making radical reform in the education system and rebuilding it in accordance with the needs of politics and ideology. From this point, it is seen how a defined-formulated ideology supported political education and indoctrination policies (determining the practice) and what kind of deviations arose from this. In other words, these policies cannot be explained by practical needs or ideological struggle theses alone; the ideology may be able to dictate itself within certain limits.

This examination of exemplary experiences will continue after drawing a theoretical-historical framework of the relations between politics and education.

Politics and Education

In all political systems, education performs a loyalty-producing (citizen-creating) function within the needs of the political system. In the words of one author, “all national educational systems indoctrinate the coming generation with the basic outlooks and values of the political order.”¹² The validity of this judgment is not limited to national educational systems. This function is performed in varying forms in different socio-economic environments, in liberal democracies, and in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Education is thus a political process in a more general sense. In this context, educational institutions can be seen as political institutions.

Harber, arguing a thesis that schools are not only educational institutions but also political institutions, considers three forms of politics-education relation: *Political indoctrination* meets the form of political learning assigned to totalitarian states in which all means of political education (such as schools, mass media, trade unions) broadcast the same political message, the legitimacy of which comes from the hegemonic power. Here the emphasis is not on one ideology more than on others, but one ideology's exclusion of the others.

Political socialization refers to the functionality of schools in the reproduction of the dominating social and political values within which the schools are formed. Schoolbooks perform the primary means of this functionality. Another means of political socialization is the way of organisation of the school and the classroom, and their regulation of the power relations. In this form of political learning, different than in political indoctrination, some alternative points of view may be given place in the society and at school. However, some values have priority and dominance over others.

¹² Edgar Litt, “Civic Education, ‘Community Norms and Political Indoctrination’,” *American Sociological Review* 28, no. 1 (February, 1963), p. 69; and H. Zeigler and W. Peak, “The Political Functions of the Educational System,” *Sociology of Education* 43, No. 2 (Spring, 1970), p. 115. In both articles, while this point is accepted, it is claimed that this idea can be widened and that no one form of political indoctrination can be mentioned.

Political education, on the other hand, is a more visible form of political learning which includes a series of alternatives, gives a broader place to discussion, and thus is more democratic.¹³ Moving from this point, Harber asserts that schools cannot be thought of apart from politics, and reaches this generalization:

There is no “neutral” education but schools transmit political values in a variety of ways. The context for, and types of, political learning vary from one political system to another. While political indoctrination...may be becoming rarer, open and participant classroom political education is also unusual, as is the democratic organisation of the whole school that is conducive to this type of political learning. The political socialization of dominant values is the most common form of political learning in schools. Taught courses, although entitled civic or political education, are in practice often political socialization.¹⁴

A political system has two ways (except coercion) of maintaining legitimacy, the satisfaction of demands and socialization.¹⁵ We cannot talk of a singular form of political socialization as a way of passing political understandings and values that a generation owns as a whole to the next generation. Nonetheless, it can be said that education is the primary means of political socialization before school, at school, and after school.

In the twentieth century, states tried to transform societies with educational policies and indoctrination policies. Newly formed states implemented these policies within the nation-building process in order to create citizens, national unity among citizens, and loyalty to the political power. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes tried to impose their absolute ideologies on the masses. Sometimes ideological searches and the reparation or transformation of ideologies coincided with this process, not only in

¹³ Clive Harber, “International Contexts for Political Education,” *Educational Review* 43, no. 3 (1991). He summarises: “Political Indoctrination: The intentional inculcation of values and beliefs as truths. The process may involve deliberately falsifying or ignoring evidence as well as presenting it in a biased way in order to achieve the desired end. Often associated with totalitarian states, i.e. where individuals have little access to alternative viewpoints. Political Socialisation: The learning of preferences and predispositions towards political values and attitudes though often in context where other viewpoints are available. Political Education: The attempt to create critical awareness of political phenomena by open, balanced discussion and analysis of a range of evidence and opinions. Has an underlying democratic ideology of political choice.” Harber, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁵ Zeigler and Peak, p. 118.

authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but in democracies as well, in order to broadcast and to make accepted the democratic ideals and to produce democratic citizens.

The authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the interwar years radically questioned the traditional and liberal understandings of education. For them, education meant not only a means for the nation to achieve its social and economic goals, but also a means to produce a basic morality that would penetrate all realms of life.¹⁶ This was a view of morality that aimed at substituting the individual with personality. In this sense, the real purpose of education was not merely knowledge exchange, but rather to build character,¹⁷ or to create the “new man” in whom the ideals of the ideology became concrete.¹⁸ This is something beyond the ideology’s simply inculcation as a doctrine. Ideology, besides being a defined element, was a defining and constructing element as well.

The role of ideology as a doctrine was given much importance in totalitarian regimes. The education-politics relations of the interwar years cannot be considered as solely ideology-centered. Here the problem is caused by the ideology’s fixed and defined role and position. As Cassinelli points out,¹⁹ totalitarian leadership put emphasis on ideology not in order to mobilize the masses and direct them toward certain goals, but to limit the mobility of thoughts and to “create maximum insecurity.”

Moreover, the existence of defined and limited doctrines as objects of indoctrination in totalitarian regimes is open to discussion.²⁰ While being more valid in

¹⁶ “Education is...totalitarian not only as an instrument for the achievement of national economic or social goals, but as a means for inculcating a basic morality which governs action in all spheres of life, and to which all types of educational efforts are devoted.” Harold W. Metz and Charles A. H. Thomson, *Authoritarianism and the Individual* (Wisconsin: The Brookings Institution), p. 190.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹⁸ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totaliter Diktatörlük ve Otokrasi*, trans. Oğuz Onaran (Ankara: Türk Siyasi İlimler Derneği Yay., 1964), p. 117.

¹⁹ C. W. Cassinelli, “Totalitarianism, Ideology, and Propaganda,” *The Journal of Politics* 22, no. 1 (February, 1960), pp. 68-95.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75. About Nazi Germany, he asserts: “The concept of a Nazi racist doctrine does not account for all the significant Nazi beliefs and attitudes towards beliefs. The ‘racist ideology’ itself is no more than a conviction that through the use of the ‘organizational weapon’ an undefined new order can be created. This conviction, because of its lack of objective content, is not a doctrine, and it also fails to explain Nazi art, history, and science.”

German National Socialism, this judgment seems problematic for Communism because of its reference to Marxism. Friedrich and Brzezinski's thesis that "important changes in the ideological pattern employed by leaders" may be what makes the existence of a communist doctrine debatable. Cassinelli adds that change does not always have to be decay or corruption, but it might be come in the shape of a "genuine adaptation and meaningful change" as well. However, he reaches the same conclusion by considering the Soviet and Chinese experiences.²¹ In the final analysis, a healthy evaluation of the education-politics relations of the period between the two world wars should take into account that ideology may be both a determining or independent variable and a determined or dependent variable.

The inculcation of ideology as a doctrine (independent variable) happened rather as a more private form of the role given to education by the aim of political socialization, in higher education:

Under totalitarian dictatorship, universities and higher education institutions have expanded on the one hand and been 'politicized' on the other... The policies of communist and fascist dictatorships largely resemble each other in higher education matters... Doctrine inculcation programs were implemented as well. The "real science" of certain laws was being taught to faculties and students within these programs.²²

In the Soviet Union, for example, political education, which was spread through all the phases of education in the beginning, was later on "rationalized" and removed from the early phases of education, while gaining greater emphasis in the later phases.²³ Along with this, ideology may have been constructed, expanded or repaired as a dependent variable within the same process. The educational practices, texts and so forth which emerged in this period were the bases to the ideology, as in the examples.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 75-79. Cassinelli later mentions the difference between Marxism –as a reference– from the concept of a Soviet/communist doctrine: "First, Marxism does not imply Stalinist science, history and art. Second, there is no evidence that they are based on a doctrine other than Marxism. And third, the inconsistency, suddenness, and arbitrary nature of the periodic changes in 'orthodoxy' are incompatible with a relatively fixed system of fundamental ideas." Ibid., p. 86.

²² Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 252.

²³ Ibid., p. 118. Beginning in 1938, *The Short History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union*, which had been prepared by the state, was taught as a compulsory course in higher education.

Now we can look at the ideological education and indoctrination policies of National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union in the interwar period, and of post-war China.

Nazi Germany

Nazi Germany is an example the totalitarian character of which was prominent in educational policies as well. However, it cannot be said that the education-ideology/politics relation was a determination relation in this example. As seen in recent studies on Nazi Germany, different from the mono-typist, estranging, and judging historiography of the post-war period, a much more complicated relation existed. There were two reasons of why this relation was complicated. First, the Nazi government and the elements that formed this block (the party, state bureaucracy, and national socialist ideology) were neither the single subject, nor a unanimous subject, of this historical period (in particular the educational policies of this period). Naturally, the determining power should be attributed to this block. However, the existence of other subjects (such as professional organizations and student organizations), and the inner conflicts of the governing block should not be ignored.

Second, the absence of a well-defined ideology, and educational policies to be formed around that ideology, forces us to think about the totalitarian nature of the relationship between education and politics/ideology separately. By paying attention to both concerns, we can assert that the education-politics/ideology relationship in Nazi Germany was both a determination and counter-determination relationship. In other words, National Socialism had a perspective on education parallel to its general ideological pattern, and educational policies were determined in accordance with this perspective. On the other hand, the National Socialist educational policies were

determined by practice rather than by theory. The written texts, organizational patterns and consequently the whole ideology were created in time, and within the process.

Ideology inculcation or indoctrination in higher education was carried out in two main ways in all authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century. The direct working of the process was possible either by the ideology's being put as the criterion for being accepted into the academy and graduating from the academy, or by the students' being subject to a direct political education. Direct political intervention in education was possible in various ways. The most well known practices of German national socialists can be exemplified as the elimination of Jewish and liberal teachers and instructors and the ban on and destruction of anti-Nazi books.

On the other hand, the indirect and more often-used way, which constitute our main concern, involved attributing new functions to the present educational system and changing course definitions. With re-arranging the curricula, the Nazi educational system put emphasis on the branches which had the capacity to produce references to the Nazi ideology: "ethnography, anthropology, and a folkish reinterpretation of history; the content of these disciplines was severely regulated in terms of the current nazi ideology."²⁴ In an article on the subject, Pine writes,

The primary aim of education in National Socialist Germany (1933-45) was the dissemination of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* (world view). Education was to be functionalized through an emphasis on subjects relating to racial and nationalistic ideas. In essence, Hitler's ideas on the education of both sexes were based on the following: an emphasis on physical training, hostility towards the intellect and the significance of race.²⁵

Cassinelli's article points out other reflections of this attitude.²⁶

²⁴ Metz and Thomson, p. 278. They continue: "Even in those courses where the content was not inherently of interest to the ideology, the Propaganda and Education ministries saw to it that problems and examples were so constructed as to disseminate a nazi lesson."

²⁵ Lisa Pine, "The Dissemination of Nazi Ideology and Family Values through School Textbooks," *History of Education* 25, no. 1 (1996), p. 93.

²⁶ "Nazis rewrote history, explaining in particular the peculiar contention that all great men of the past were Aryans. It must account for the substitution of 'German physics' for the 'Jewish' physics of Einstein and others... In the case of science, biology might appear more closely related to a racist doctrine, and it

The primary object of ideological education and indoctrination policies was young people, especially university students. However, political socialization in the broader sense began at earlier ages. The schoolbooks of the era provide rich data on this process. In an article on how Nazi ideology and family values were disseminated through school textbooks, Pine shows that textbooks were used “widely and blatantly” as representation instruments of the Nazi ideals.²⁷

Pine first mentions education places as sociality before individuality. Aims of creating and strengthening a national society emerged as the main purpose of education. The Fuehrer held a privileged place among the central themes of textbooks. A leader cult was created through texts and illustrations. The basic themes of Nazi thought such as blood, race, family, gender roles inside the family, youth, health, praise of rural and village values, and criticism of urbanization were detailed in these books. There were also textbooks which consisted of a compilation of the speeches, writings and lectures on various subjects of some Nazi leaders.²⁸ History education and history textbooks had priority in carrying out the mentioned functions. On history courses, Pine writes:

History lessons were a way of exciting children’s sense of national pride and concern about the continued existence of the German state and nation, and about future glories to march –or even to exceed– those of the nation’s great heroic past. “For ... we learn history in order to find instructor for the future and for the continued existence of our own nationality.” History was to be looked at “with the eyes of blood,” and its primary function was to serve the “political, intellectual and spiritual mobilization of the nation.” National Socialist history textbooks often dealt only with German history, usually in terms of leaders and the nation they led. Great rulers of Germany’s past, such as Frederick the Great, were used to stress heroic leadership, ceaseless service to the state, military success, and, of course, parallels to Hitler. The ultimate triumphs of National Socialism were given considerable priority in the history textbooks of the period. The issues of care and protection of the race found their way into history textbooks quite extensively too...Historical atlases showed Germany’s greatness in her most historically important and expansive periods, and especially in the Third Reich. They portrayed,

was in fact completely changed and debased... The statement that all people who had ever accomplished anything significant were Aryans is the most important aspect of Nazi ‘history’.” Cassinelli, pp. 73-74.

²⁷ Pine, p. 96 and the following.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 107.

for example, the size of Germany's increase under Hitler. In addition, were used to illustrate –by means of maps, charts and graphs– population policy issues, such as the fall in the German birth rate, the ill-effects of urbanization and the age make-up of the German nation, to show that it was becoming a “nation without youth.”²⁹

As will be seen in the examples of other countries, history textbooks were written under the direct initiative of the Nazi leadership. In compiled history textbooks, there were texts written personally by the foremost Nazi leaders.

The Nazi leaders' effects on, and the importance they gave to education can be seen in their writings. In another article, Pine writes that Hitler put forth his ideas on education and the functions that education should carry out in *Mein Kampf*. Hitler “claimed that the highest task of education was to consist of the preservation, care and development of the best racial elements. Education, in the Nazi state, was understood in terms of racial selection, so that only the elite would reproduce... In Hitler's words: ‘No boy and no girl must leave school without having been led to an ultimate realisation of the necessity and essence of blood purity’.”³⁰ Pine exemplifies other leading Nazi leaders' thoughts as such:

In December 1934, Wilhelm Frick, the Minister of the Interior, announced that “the political task of the school is the education of youth in service of nation and state in the National Socialist spirit.” Similarly, according to Bernhard Rust, the Minister of Education, the purpose of school textbooks was to achieve “the ideological education of young German people, so as to develop them into fit members of the national community ... ready to serve and to sacrifice.”³¹

All these purposes were realized through a tight censorship policy along with a political indoctrination. The Censorship Office, the Ministry of Propaganda, and the Ministry of Education worked in coordination on this subject. Certain subjects were “blacklisted” and removed from circulation. School textbooks and their authors were

²⁹ Pine, p. 103.

³⁰ Lisa Pine, “Nazism in the Classroom,” *History Today* 47, no. 4 (April, 1997).

³¹ *Ibid.*

obliged to detain the approval of the Ministry of Education and the National Socialist Teachers' Association.³²

Especially since the 1980s, new approaches to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and consequently to the ideological characteristics and educational and indoctrination policies of these regimes, have introduced the need to reconsider the existing judgments about Nazi Germany. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the main emphasis of the literature produced on the subject was on the roles of the state and the party. Elements outside these were seen as absolutely dependent objects. Relatively new literature on the subject, however, has put forth the elements outside the state and the party as independent subjects.

In an article on the positions of German professors at the head of the Nazi regime, Kelly questions the foremost prejudices about the educational and indoctrination policies of Nazi Germany.³³ Kelly asserts that the first response of the university instructors towards the Nazi government can be defined best as hesitant. However, the Nazis quickly defined objectives concerning university administrations and professors, aiming to incorporate them into the new regime, along with other institutions and professions. The idea of preserving the traditional educational system, and the threats caused by student groups and the party's paramilitary supporters (storm troopers), made this unification preferable for the university.³⁴ The Association of German Universities (*Hochschulverband*), the professional organisation of professors founded in the 1920s, offers a wealth of data to examine the nature of the university's relations with the regime.

The *Hochschulverband*, which was founded in 1919-1920, aimed to protect the university from socialism and republicanism in the beginning. But under the special

³² Ibid.

³³ Reece C. Kelly, "German Professoriate under Nazism: A Failure of Totalitarian Aspirations," *History of Education Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 261-280.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 262.

conditions of the 1920s, it rather performed as a professional organisation. In 1933, the *Hochschulverband* was face to face not only with the perception of threat from the political left, which had been the reason of its foundation, but also with one from the strengthening political right and from lower ranking academic staff and students. Kelly relates that the reaction of the *Hochschulverband* to these threats was “a fateful mixture of attraction to the ‘national revolution’ promised by the Nazis for Germany, and at the same time, a desire to preserve the traditions and values of the universities in this revolution.” According to this, “the attitude of the older professors seems to have been one of ‘yes’ to the so-called national revolution ‘but’ no to the sacrificing of professional values of academic freedom and the semi-autonomy of the universities to this national revolution.”³⁵

This standing of the *Hochschulverband* was also fed by the relative difference between the priorities of the party and the state, particularly in terms of education. For the state, the Ministry of Education and reconstruction of the bureaucratic order in the universities were prior to ideological objectives. For the party and its leading staff, however, a revolutionary ideological transformation in the university, which was a center of Liberalism, Marxism and generally anti-Nazism, and in the whole social life, would come first.³⁶ In this sense, the *Hochschulverband*, which was in accordance of purpose with the state bureaucracy, reconstructed itself according to the demands of the party. So, the Nazis took control of the association.

In spite of this, the *Hochschulverband* was eliminated and replaced with the *Dozentenschaften* (associations of university teachers of all ranks). It was kind of a desired development in the sense of the articulation of the lower ranking academic staff to the regime. Young academics were obliged to join the *Dozentenschaften* and were

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 263-264.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 265. This interpretation should not lead to the illusion that the party organisation was free from inner conflicts and quarrels. As Kelly shows, the prime opposition to the higher education policies of the regime came from different agencies of the party again.

subject to political indoctrination in summer camps and through other social activities. In June 1934, a party Commission on Higher Education (*Hochschulkommission*) was established. With this development, which led to discussions even inside the party, the goal became “to hold united ideological lines at all German universities.” It also signified that the state’s/party’s role over universities was becoming absolute. Kelly writes that, “in order to define Nazi ideology in learning and to form a network of collaborators among the professors for assessing the ideological and political content of teaching and scholarship,” the party established the National Socialist League of Professors (*NS Dozentenbund*) as an agency of party *Hochschulkommission* in July of 1935. The *Dozentenbund* was authorized to determine *personalpolitik* in order to create a Nazi professoriate and educational/teaching system. Kelly notes that this development faced resistance from the state and university bureaucracy, with the concern about the increase in the political intervention to higher education.³⁷

The power struggle over higher education between the state and the party would continue in the following years, and with the concern to preserve academic standards and with the initiative of the university and professors, the state would become relatively prior to the party.

What cannot be said about this process is that the Nazis succeeded in implementing a defined educational policy in higher education.³⁸ Contrary to the general belief, the efforts to create a Nazi professoriate and educational/teaching system resulted in failure in 1943. Despite that, the idea of a national revolution was positively regarded; political and ideological intervention into higher education were considered

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

³⁸ Kelly concludes with these judgments: “The universities and learning were not saved from an Orwellian nightmare by the strength of the moral convictions of the professors or even particularly by their faith in the professional values and traditions of the universities, but rather by the weaknesses inherent in Nazism –its ideology and organization. All efforts to make over the universities in the image of Nazism –or to define what that meant– were frustrated by endless rounds of conflict between state officials and party functionaries and among the party functionaries themselves. Thus there is no real comfort in the example of the German universities under Nazi rule for those who may look to such institutions to defend against Orwell’s fearful predictions.” *Ibid.*, p. 276

threats. The resistance shown by the state bureaucracy against the educational policies of the party, and then the varying tendencies inside the party itself, brought this result. From this viewpoint, the totalitarian quality of the period seems questionable through educational policies, in particular in the case of the university professors.

Horn points out that the common misinterpretation of the great majority of the studies on the Nazi educational system is to pay the greatest amount of attention to regime and the educational policies of the regime, and to disregard what really happened in the schools.³⁹ The Nazi educational system cannot be explained merely with the educational policies of the regime, nor with theses of political intervention in the educational system in particular. The challenge of Nazi students, enrolled as Hitler Youth, to the traditional German educational system should not be ignored:

Dedicated to the principle that youth must be led by youth and that true education took place largely outside of the school through physical and character training, the HJ functionaries were bound to clash with the schools' more traditional concept of education...rejection of the classical *Gymnasium* and of the conservative faculty members.⁴⁰

In conclusion, these points must be underlined about the education and indoctrination policies and in general politics/ideology-education relations in Nazi Germany: First, political power intervened directly or indirectly into education, especially into higher education. Second, changes and transformations occurred in the form, content and functions of education. Third, subjects within the governing block disagreed with the political will about approving or disapproving these interventions, changes, and transformations. And last, this tense relationship (for instance by means of raising academic standards against political priorities) affected political will and even redefined it.

³⁹ Daniel Horn, "The Hitler Youth and Educational Decline in the Third Reich," *History of Education Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (Winter, 1976), p. 425.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 428.

Fascist Italy

In Fascist Italy, totalitarian policies were not implemented in terms of politics-ideology-education relations, although this contradicted with the aims of the fascist leadership. Political power's being confronted with a different power structure than that in Nazi Germany can be seen as the foremost reason for this. Just as in Nazi Germany, the governing block in Fascist Italy was neither the one nor a unanimous subject when determining politics-education relationships. However, in terms of educational and in general cultural policies, the political power had a rival which did not exist in Nazi Germany: the Catholic Church. One other reason is the fact that the educational policies of the fascist government were produced, at least reformulated, in time and within the process. Even in the early years of the fascist government, the existence of neither a well defined ideology that could be subject to ideological education nor a concrete doctrine that could be subject to political indoctrination was obvious. This is why the attention must focus not on certain central texts or ideological themes, but on organisation and education practices in the case of the politics-education relationship in Fascist Italy.

The educational policies of fascism aimed to centralize and nationalize the Italian educational system. Education had two primary goals: to inculcate Italian culture to the masses, and to produce loyalty and service to the state. For this purpose, the Ministry of National Education replaced the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Fascist educational policies were applied in a dual institutional structure, under the official school system and under the children and youth organizations.

Through this two-fold system, the one universal and inculcating the theory and accomplishments of Fascism, the other selective and embodying this theory into vigorous discipline and militant action, there is developed a singleness of purpose and a unity of spirit.⁴¹

⁴¹ Francis J. Brown, "Social Planning Through Education," *American Sociological Review* 1, no. 6 (December, 1936), p. 941.

The system's way of functioning on the other hand is summarized by Brown as follows:

Throughout the entire system emphasis is laid on national culture and service to the state. National heroes and national holidays are stressed; all songs, stories, and books are strongly patriotic and all textbooks and materials are carefully censored by the State Department. Play is directed to show the value and the glory of the soldier. Even in religious instruction, Italian saints are given more attention than any others.⁴²

Italian fascism proves an interesting example that political will, even if it is totalitarian, can never be absolutely hegemonic on culture. It can neither wholly change nor reconstruct it. Berezin differentiates between culture producers and cultural products in an article in which he defines the relationship of Italian fascism with culture and its institutions as state paternalism. For theatre in particular, he shows that fascism, through the regulations and applications it carried out, controlled culture producers while leaving cultural products alone.⁴³ Theatre, just like education, was considered as a tool for ideology generating or political propaganda by the Fascist regime. This viewpoint, however, did not lead the regime to attributing new functions to censorship and defining a Fascist conception of theatre. The regime was content with founding new organizations for culture producers (such as academies, institutes of education, professional organizations, and guild unities) and controlling these organizations. With this choice, which Berezin calls state paternalism, the regime "absolves the state from direct involvement in the cultural product while giving it indirect control over its final shape. By controlling the organizations of culture producers, the state militates against artistic dissidence because it promotes self-censorship and encourages culture produces as corporate bodies to represent state ideology."⁴⁴

With this form, Italian Fascism differs from other totalitarian regimes by its more complex structure in the sense of state, ideology-culture relations. But, again as

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 939.

⁴³ Mabel Berezin, "The Organization of Political Ideology: Culture, State, and Theater in Fascist Italy," *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 5 (October, 1991).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 642.

Berezin shows, this is determined not by a direct choice of the regime, but by the necessities of settled cultural institutions. Journalism, for example, was a very useful field for a totalitarian control mechanism and took on a more direct role in the spread of fascist ideology to the masses. The regime organized journalists, intervened in what they wrote (censorship), and specified guidelines for them.⁴⁵

Innovations in the realm of education can be qualified as “limited fascistization” in this sense. While discussing state-politics relations in specific to educational policies, Wolff underlines this point:

This schema and the documents from which it was drawn tend to demonstrate one important and recurring fact pertaining to Italian Fascist education: that Mussolini’s schools were never ideologically pure in the sense of Party doctrine. Not only was Fascist education attacked by the Church in terms ranging from hesitant to menacing, but also there always existed within the schools themselves the “ideological crosscurrent” of Catholicism.⁴⁶

Contrary to the goal of fascism to obtain ideological hegemony over education, fascist educational policies resulted in a continual increase of the Church’s effect on education: “Unlike Nazi Germany which could boast of truly ‘nazified’ schools, Fascist Italy despite Duce’s claims was compelled to recognize the considerable influence of Catholicism in education.”⁴⁷

Youth, as the subject of the education and indoctrination policies of fascism and fascist youth organizations at university, has attracted little attention in studies on Italian fascism and the Fascist Party. In studies on Italian university students of the fascist period, there are two basic approaches.⁴⁸ The first approach looks at the existing sources with doubt and focuses rather on evidence of opposition to fascism. The second looks at the sources –and therefore the methodological problems about the use of these sources–

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 647.

⁴⁶ Richard J. Wolff, “Catholicism, Fascism and Italian Education from the *Riforma Gentile* to the *Carta Della Scuola* 1922-1939,” *History of Education Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (Spring, 1980), p. 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

⁴⁸ Luca La Rovere, “Fascist Groups in Italian Universities: An Organization at the Service of the Totalitarian State,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 3 (July, 1999), pp. 457-458.

less critically and stresses rather the theme of creating a new fascist generation or youth. Both approaches misinterpreted the period by paying insufficient attention to the organizational and ideological means used by the regime to rebuild the nation and to create a fascist youth.

In an article on fascist groups in Italian universities, Rovere considers these in their historical context, and tries to go beyond the above-mentioned approaches. According to Rovere, the history of the GUF (*Gruppi universitari fascisti*) consists of three phases. The first phase was the phase of “movement,” from 1919 to 1924. The emergence of a fascist university movement by itself that coincided with the rise of fascism and the first efforts aiming at national organisation were characteristics of this period. An organisation specific to the university came to life by the end of 1921. After its official establishment, the party made the GUF responsible for preparing the new generation of leaders for fascist Italy. The GUF collaborated with FNUF (Fascist National University Federation) in order to reach all of the elite elements from every part of Italy and every social class to direct and administer the Italian nation. These institutions also struggled against the “partisan, anti-university, anti patriotic” studies, carried out by the university organizations, which were called by them “anti-national.” However, the demands of the fascist university organizations for autonomy and for the increase of their weight in the party contradicted with the route of the party. There was one possible type of relationship between the party and fascist university organizations: total control of the party over these organizations.

The second phase saw the institutionalization of these organizations inside the fascist party, between 1926 and 1928. In this period, fascist organizations in the university gained a new status. However, the aim of this development was not only to increase the acceptance of the fascist regime in the university in particular, but also to form the future cadre of fascist leaders. Rovere says about FNUF in this period:

The new statutes reflected the shift from the revolutionary period to a new phase characterized by the conquest of power and represented an attempt to overcome the elitism that had previously characterized fascist student militancy. The explicit call to the GUF to “form and educate the next ruling class from the university students” was accompanied by the instruction to appeal to the student masses through a broad programme of moral and financial assistance.⁴⁹

For this purpose, the university organizations’ position within the party was re-determined. These organizations, whose demands for a political role were suppressed, were disciplined in the new order. The activities of these groups were placed under the guidance of the GUF secretary and under the responsibility of the secretary general of the party. They later were transferred under direct control of the party secretary general as an institution under the party. After the reorganization in 1928, the GUF widened its area of impact. It was allowed to take initiative in every kind of social and political activity. It had the authority to control the existing clubs and institutions and to re-establish them if it was considered necessary. This transformation led to an increase in the number of members, along with the overall effectiveness of the group.⁵⁰

The third phase can be qualified as the totalitarian level. What dominated the period was the will of the party. The GUF performed as the means for the party to shape the youth. It aimed to create a group of “civil servant intellectuals,” which would meet the ideological needs of the regime. Rovere writes:

The 1930s thus saw the creation of the GUF’s Experimental Theatre, the CineGUF and the *Littoriali* of cinema, musical groups, professional societies (lawyers, doctors, engineers etc.), naval and aeronautical branches, colonial, corporate studies, trade unionists, journalistic, demographic and racial branches. The list also includes the School of Fascist Mysticism, the youth sections of the National

⁴⁹ Rovere, p. 463.

⁵⁰ “The increase from 9,215 members in 1927 to 41,680 in 1930 illustrated the distinct shift between both the periods, proving how the reorganization of 1928 had triggered a process of spectacular growth which lasted throughout the 1930s and 1940s.” Rovere, p. 466. The numbers given by Rovere about membership of the GUF and of universities between 1930 and 1943 explain the period well: 1930: 41,680-44,940; 1931: 55,303-46,262; 1932: 56,550-47,614; 1933: 57,509-52,672; 1934: 66,934-57,672; 1935: 68,695-62,020; 1936: 73,143-64,944; 1937: 75,436-71,512; 1938: 93,175-74,909; 1939: 105,883-77,429; 1940: 119,713-85,535; 1941: 137,148-127,058; 1942: 159,297-145,793; 1943: 164,667-168,323. This increase caused a rise in the importance of the GUF in the eyes of fascist leaders, and about 1941, although members of the GUF constituted 3.4% of the PNF list, 54% of the total budget of the PNF was given to students. For detailed numbers that show the distribution of the budget as to years, see Rovere, p. 470.

Institute of Fascist Culture, the Institute for Studies on Universal Fascism, national *Littoriali* and provincial *Prelittoriali*, competitions which allowed students from all over Italy to test their knowledge of the main political, cultural and artistic trends of the day. University journalism experienced extraordinary growth: in addition to the newsletters published by the GUF in the main cities, every local group had several pages in the local newspapers at its disposal. Total monopoly over student activities was completed by control over welfare associations and sport clubs, fundamental aspects of teaching. The sheer number of activities planned for students meant that their free time was entirely devoted to collective occupations organized by branches of the GUF: political activism smacked strongly of totalitarianism. The organization was becoming the only conduit for participation in political life and giving access to public posts, crating a potentially closed society.⁵¹

The mid-1930s saw political education and indoctrination implementations in Italy similar to those in other countries. Even in 1928, a law dictating that state textbooks (*libro di stato*) should be taught in the elementary schools was introduced.

Pine writes:

History, geography, Italian and Latin books, as well as primary readers, became key tools in influencing Italian youth in fascist beliefs and ideals; such as “believe, obey, fight.” Mussolini himself was portrayed as a father figure and a hero.⁵²

In February 1935, “courses in political preparation” were conducted for the higher ranks of the educational system. Its aim was to form the leading staff of the forthcoming fascist nation, by the party. Rovere writes that,

The courses offered the natural progression from the practical experience of leadership students could acquire within the GUF hierarchy. Students between the ages of 23 and 28 who had been members of youth organizations had places reserved for them... In 1936 their administration was entrusted to the secretariat of the GUF, sealing the organic link between the new institution and the university organization. The system was progressively extended to cover more areas both in teaching and in recruitment: the new regulations of 1940 created local courses for students who did not live in the capital of a province. In January 1940, the National Centre for Political Preparation, a school for advanced training for political careers within the regime, was opened by Mussolini.⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 469.

⁵² Pine, p. 92.

⁵³ Rovere, p. 471.

As can be seen, the period was one in which different subjects put forward their initiatives in different periods with different power and emphasis. Although the party was the determiner in the final analysis, there was no mechanical determination relationship between the actors. One other peculiarity of Fascist Italy is that the education and indoctrination policies owed their existence to pragmatic reasons rather than to any ideological motivation. More than an object of education and indoctrination in the eye of fascist policy makers, the Italian youth was attributed symbolic meanings and values, which were always stressed by the fascist thought. Of course, there was an effort to form a fascist consciousness. However, the growth of a fascist leading class and, in this way, the maintenance of the regime and nation's eternity were always given priority.

As a result, concerning the education and indoctrination policies in Fascist Italy and in general the politics/ideology-education relations, the following points are valid: First, the political power intervened directly or indirectly into education. The Italian educational system was centralized in form, and nationalized in content and functioning in this period. Second, the totalitarian regime failed to establish absolute control over or an instrumental relationship with education and cultural institutions. Third, resistance to the regime gave rise the need to reproduce the regime's educational and cultural policies. Fourth, politics-education relations in Fascist Italy, partly because of the above-mentioned difficulties, were determined rather by pragmatic than by ideological motives. Raising an elite class that would mobilize the masses and creating a new generation of youth were given more importance as compared to the inculcation of fascist ideals to the masses.

The Soviet Union

The ideological education and indoctrination policies and, in more general

terms, the politics/ideology-education relations in the Soviet Union were determined under the near absolute control of the party and the political governing block. The party and the governing block had a defined and definite ideology and objectives which were determined around this ideology. Educational policies also were determined according to these objectives. However, the party's and the governing block's absolute power and being the only subject did not make the politics-education relationship in the Soviet Union stable, continuous and therefore undoubtedly totalitarian. The continuous tension between theory and practice determined this relationship as well. Consequently, different types of politics-education relationships emerged right after the revolution, from the mid-1920s to the early 1930s, and before the war.

From its early years, what made Soviet education remarkable was not the Soviet education mechanism, but the special political system of the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ In accordance with this, in the Soviet Union, in which every kind of organized activity was politicized, education became important due to its political and ideological aspects. Charques writes that, "education in Soviet Russia has a definite and sharply defined political aim. It is much more than politically 'tendentious'; it is essentially an instrument of revolutionary rule."⁵⁵

Asserting that Soviet education was more than a school system, Charques points out that the precise meaning of the Russian word *Prosveshchenie*, which means "education", is "enlightenment". Charques writes; "the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment' is, indeed, a much juster and more accurate title than 'Board of Education' for the Soviet government department which administers education in each of the constituent republics of the Union."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ R. D. Charques, "Education in the Soviet Union," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 11, no. 4 (July, 1932), p. 494.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 495.

Therefore, in the Soviet Union, the basic determiners of educational policies were the confidence to reason and possibility of the truth, and also the belief that the mind and the will could transform the world.

Implementations similar to the educational policies of other authoritarian and totalitarian regimes were valid in the USSR as well. The primary aim of the educational policies of the revolution was to centralize the educational system. The Commissariat of Education, which was established after the revolution, centrally dominated all educational institutions through regulations aimed to produce a unique Soviet educational system or process from which the political government could expect the function of instrumentality.

As Holmes shows, the party saw educational institutions as a means for meeting the political and economic needs of the Bolshevik regime. Holmes tells us that “the 1919 VIII Party Congress declared that schools should become vehicles for the transmission of the ‘principles of communism’ and that teachers should ‘conceive of themselves as agents not only of general but also of communist education.’”⁵⁷ This viewpoint saw the general primary education as the “most important political campaign.” Here it would be useful to point out the principles which were *dictated* to social sciences education by the Soviet Communist Party:

At a Party Conference on Problems of Education (December, 1920 to January, 1921), a Central Committee session of December 14, 1922; and at the 1924 XIII Party Congress, the communist party dictated basic principles for instruction in the social sciences. First, it demanded that all educational institutions including vocational schools offer and require courses in the so-called “social-political disciplines.” Second, it required that such courses be taught from a definite political and ideological point of view. ... Third, the party called for specific measures guaranteeing such propagandized instruction. It demanded publication of “soviet” texts and the replacement of “old bourgeois professors and professors of the old type” with communists or those with training in special courses of “red professorship.”⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Larry E. Holmes, “Bolshevik Utilitarianism and Educational Experimentalism: Party Attitudes and Soviet Educational Practice, 1917-1931,” *History of Education Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (Winter, 1973), p. 350.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 355-356.

Higher education passed through a relatively different process while the revolution sent after shocks through the traditional power relations in higher education, a new order took time to establish. The academic degrees and requirements that constituted the criteria for academic appointments were abolished just after the revolution. The replacement of those regulations would be possible only in 1934. The Bolshevization of higher education happened not by a radical renewal of academic staff, but rather by its enlargement. During the first five-year plan, the teaching staff in higher education was more than doubled.⁵⁹ In this way, the regime was able to establish the desired structure of power in higher education in the long run, without sacrificing the current accumulation. Rearrangements on this matter would not be made before 1937.

The initial radical policies towards the intelligentsia and university professors did not last long, and from the second half of the 1920s they left their place to a conciliatory policy. According to this policy, which was implemented under the New Economic Policy, the regime sought a de facto collaboration with intellectuals without forcing them to accept the official ideology. This was for two reasons: First, the regime did not have many alternatives for using expertise and intellectual accumulation when preparing its own cadres. And second, without the former intelligentsia it was impossible for the regime to create a new intellectual class. This collaboration continued until the challenge of Stalin in 1928.⁶⁰ After that time, more militant policies were implemented against the intelligentsia. This policy change increased the power of Stalin within the party. It also reflected the changing class structure and power balance of the university, for the benefit of the working class against the upper and middle classes.

⁵⁹ Lisheng Zhu, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia and Radicalism in Higher Education Under Stalin and Mao," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 8 (December, 2000).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

This change involved a weakening of university professors in front of students, along with other class choices concerning higher education.⁶¹

This politicized behavior towards the intelligentsia and university professors was valid for students as well. For example, in 1924, a student purge changed the profile of university students. Studies show that the purge served more than one purposes. According to Soviet historiography, this process aimed to purify “alien elements” from the universities and to increase academic quality. According to Western historiography, on the other hand, “socially alien” elements and Trotsky supporters were purged from the universities in general. But in more recent studies, it has been seen as an action against communist students with opposition tendencies.⁶² The common conclusion that can be reached from all these theses is that higher-educational policies were being made according to political priorities.

The content of education passed through a different process of change from those in National Socialist and Fascist educational policies. Soviet educational policies removed some courses, replacing them with new ones, and gave more importance to some subjects than to the others, just like in National Socialist and Fascist educational policies. However, going further than them, Soviet educational policies made different claims about the methodology of education in particular and of scientific activities in general. Therefore we can talk about a broader and deeper kind of transformation.

With the regulations of 1923, changes were made on the whole curricula according to the political and economic needs of the regime.⁶³ Holmes writes that “courses in religion, ancient languages (Greek, Latin, Old Church Slavonic), and ancient and medieval history disappeared from the curriculum. Activity methods such

⁶¹ In this period, examination of acceptance to higher education for workers who had no secondary education was eliminated. This application, which started in 1928, was ended in 1932. However, priority of acceptance to higher education was still given to workers, peasants, and their children. *Ibid.*

⁶² Peter Konecny, “Chaos on Campus: The 1924 Student Proverka in Leningrad,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 4 (1994). This article, besides containing the main ideas of the different theses on the 1924 purge, discusses the agreeing and conflicting points within the bureaucracy itself and between the centre and periphery over educational policies.

⁶³ Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 117.

as class discussions, excursions, drawing, painting, modeling, singing, and dancing replaced lectures and textbook assignments.”⁶⁴

History as a separate and independent scientific branch was almost totally removed from the curricula. The traditional borders between academic disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities were eliminated in order to make the learning of Marxism easier.⁶⁵ Interdisciplinary studies were given priority, and history was incorporated into social science courses. Zhu writes that, “in this amalgamation of knowledge the factual and interpretive teaching of history was discarded as ‘incorrect, unnecessary, and unimportant.’”⁶⁶

After the failure of this experience, which was called the “experimental educational policy” and was applied in the second half of 1920s, courses like history and literature were added to the curricula again as “separate subjects.”⁶⁷ What happened in fact was not a failure of educational policy, but a change of political choices, which brought about changes in educational policies, which were determined according to political priorities.⁶⁸ Existing courses continued in new forms and with new functions. Metz and Thomson write that “physical education is not confined to the development of bodily skills, but includes ‘the cultivation of communist morality and the traits of Bolshevik character in the pupils,’ and stresses the militarily valuable aspects. History is taught because of its ‘exceptional significance for the education of the growing generation in communism.’ Aesthetics is similarly.”⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Holmes, p. 349.

⁶⁵ Lisheng Zhu.

⁶⁶ N. H. Gaworek, “Education, Ideology, and Politics: History in Soviet Primary and Secondary Schools,” *The History Teacher* 11, no. 1 (November, 1977), p. 58.

⁶⁷ Friedrich and Brzezinski, p. 118.

⁶⁸ Gaworek’s article discusses the changes in Soviet educational policies due to political choices from the beginning to the late 1950s, through history courses particularly.

⁶⁹ Metz and Thomson, p. 191.

Lectures were given only in ideologically determined forms.⁷⁰ Especially when history courses were in question, political leaders were directly involved in the regulations. For example, *The Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* was written personally by (or under direct initiative of) Stalin. Metz and Thomson report that “the major work is done by the political leaders: Stalin himself wrote the Short History of the CPSU, and recast the major lines of Russian history to eliminate early communist errors, to suppress the deeds of early heroes who fell afoul of Stalin in later years, and to re-establish connections with Russian sources of traditional patriotism and love of motherland.”⁷¹

The importance of this work, which gives its mark on one period and is known shortly as *Short Course*, can be understood also by looking at the references given to it in the de-Stalinization period that began with Khrushchev. In his speech of negation to Stalin, made in the closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress on 25 February 1956, Khrushchev referred to this book, too. For him, the book “speaks mainly about Stalin –about his speeches and his reports. Everything, without the tiniest exception, is linked to his name.”⁷²

As the central text of the Stalin era, this book had great importance for Soviet society and Soviet historiography from the 1930s to the early 1950s. Between October 1938 and October 1952, over forty million copies were published in the languages of the Soviet peoples and over eleven million copies in other languages. Besides this, it was published as a series in various journals and reached a broad range of masses. Another party historian of the day, Iaroslavski, says that; “never before in the history of literature had a textbook received such wide distribution.” It is also interesting to see

⁷⁰ Here what is meant by “ideological” is not a directly defined and absolutely stable doctrine, but the political determination of “criteria for scientific rightness.” Political determination can go beyond the orthodox interpretations of an ideology, as well as keeping with them. For known examples of this in the Soviet Union, i.e. genetics and linguistics, see Cassinelli, pp. 80-84.

⁷¹ Metz and Thomson, p. 194 It will be more correct to say that Stalin had the book written and intervened in the process of its being written. Stalin wrote the outline of the book himself.

⁷² Paul H. Avrich, “The Short Course and Soviet Historiography,” *Political Science Quarterly* 75, no. 4 (December, 1960), p. 539.

that such an effective and important book was totally removed from Soviet education system less than four years after the death of Stalin.⁷³ These give some ideas about the importance and function of the book.

The reasons for the book were put forward in Stalin's criticisms of the leading historians of the period, in 1931. In fact, the regime's distanced stand from "history science" can be seen in the policies implemented on history courses throughout the 1920s. Stalin, however, saw the problem not as related to history in general but related to Soviet/Russian historiography, and that the solution could be found by an instrumental form of historiography under his own direct initiative. The thoughts he declared in 1931 generally were based on the thesis that the historiography of the period gave too small a historical role to Lenin and the Communist Party. Stalin said that, what should be done was "to place the study of the history of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik rails, and to concentrate attention on Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party, systematically tearing off their masks."⁷⁴

With the initiative and outline of Stalin and with the additional texts it included, the book successfully substituted other official historical texts, including those related to the history of the CPSU as well. It was debated for whom the book would be compulsory to read as a guideline for political thought and action. Some argued that the book had to be read and perfectly understood by every party activist and every member of the party; others proposed that the book's realm of effect should include non-party citizens.⁷⁵ Within the party, *Short Course* was written primarily for the young intelligentsia and party staff. What was aimed at here was not only ideological education and indoctrination, but also the creation of a new staff to replace the old one after its purge.

⁷³ Avrigh, p. 546.

⁷⁴ Quotation from Stalin, Avrigh, p. 540.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 544.

The book can be considered as a text written both as a component of inner party struggle (against the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinov'evites, Economists, and National Deviationists), and against "enemies" outside the party (the Mensheviks, SR's, Anarchists, landlords, capitalists, kulaks, spies, and all other "hirelings of the capitalist encirclement"). On the one hand, it was a guideline for the removal of the remaining signs of capitalism in the country; and on the other, it had an international aspect as well, proposing revolution models for Asian and Northern European communists.

Stalin's understanding of Marxism-Leninism had a deep impact on the other social sciences and on historical studies.⁷⁶ History was seen not only as a science, but also as a means for inculcating socialism in the masses. Soviet historiography can be understood in accordance with this instrumental mission that was assigned to historical studies in the Soviet Union. This mission stood on the basis of a narration, which was produced directly by, or from the actions and discourses of political leaders. It supposed the socialist revolution as an inevitable result of historical progress and provided legitimacy for it. Afanas'ev writes:

The country's official political leaders (the founders and leading theoreticians) interpreted the meaning of past and current events from the outset, and there was no question: the Socialist Revolution had been successful in accordance with the laws of social and historical development discovered by Marx and Engels, whose ideas had been further developed by Lenin, Stalin, and the Communist Party. Scholars' responsibility was limited to proving what had long since been evident to the founders.⁷⁷

Although the content was changed over time, this instrumental character of historical studies remained the same. Starting from the mid-1930s, along with the rising

⁷⁶ For detailed information, see Iu. N. Afanas'ev, "The Phenomenon of Soviet Historiography," *Russian Social Science Review* 43, no. 2 (March-April 2002), pp. 26-59. For a case study which deals with Stalin's impact on Soviet history writing, see Raymond L. Garhoff, "The Stalinist Revision of History," *World Politics* 5, no. 1 (October, 1952), pp. 66-85. Garhoff sets out certain aspects of Stalin historiography as: Orientation on effect (as a reaction abstract, metaphysical, soul-searching "truth-orientation." No more can there be "history for history's sake."), Objectification of the Alleged Subjective, the Didactic Essence of History, Simplification (for the guidance of the masses), the Instrumentality of Truth, History as the Projection of Politics into the Past, Distinction between Elite and Mass, The Amalgamation of "The Opposition," and the Exaltation of the Leader. Garhoff, pp. 80-85.

⁷⁷ Afanas'ev, pp. 38-39.

war threat, Marxist historiography's universal and anti-national character would be unwanted, and even would be considered dangerous. And historical studies, like other things, would be forced into "the service of patriotism."⁷⁸ History this time would be used not as an instrument of revolution, but as an instrument of war.

In this period, there happened not a quantitative but qualitative recession in historical studies. The general control over historical studies was reflected in individual researchers' works as well. There was strict control both of archival studies and relations with foreign historians.⁷⁹ Therefore it can be said that the dominant tone in historical studies was ideological and political.⁸⁰

These ideological and political effects did not only determine the methodology, subjects and content of historical studies in the Soviet Union, but also created an "historical discourse" or an "historical language." Afanas'ev writes, "stage, process, class, party, revolution, law, Marxism, and proletariat -these served as the foundation of the new historical vocabulary...But perhaps the most popular and the most widespread term in Soviet history...was 'struggle'. This was the starting point for developing the main themes of historical research: the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, the history of the Russian revolutions, the history of class and party struggle, the history of the Bolshevik Party, and the two super-themes that dominated all Soviet history-Lenin and the Great October Socialist Revolution."⁸¹

Afanas'ev shows how the academy was turned into a political mechanism, in the example of historical studies in the Soviet Union. This was possible, first, with the change of the general principles that regulated the relations of the political authority

⁷⁸ In the review she wrote on Maureen Perrie's *The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia*, Nina Tumarkin touches on this matter. *American Historical Review* (February, 2003), p. 298.

⁷⁹ Afanas'ev, p. 27.

⁸⁰ In his article on M. N. Pokrovsky, the forerunner of Soviet historiography, Eissenstat puts forth the political quality of Soviet historiography, especially when reporting the criticisms about Pokrovsky. The absolute control of Soviet historiography over historians, thus its responsibility for the purge of anti-Bolshevik historians, its seeing history as "politics turned to the past" and reading the past as to the needs of the present and many other examples clearly show this. Bernard W. Eissenstat, "M. N. Pokrovsky and Soviet Historiography: Some Reconsiderations," *Slavic Review* 28, no. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 604-618.

⁸¹ Afanas'ev, p. 39.

with the academy (such as the relative autonomy of the academy). And with the formation of new mediating institutions that increased the effectiveness of the political authority over the academy. Itspart (the Commission on Party History),⁸² which was established in 1920; the Marx and Engels Institute and the Institute of Red Professors, which were established in 1921; and the Lenin Institute and the Russian Association of Academic Research Institutes in the Social Sciences, which were established in 1923 can be counted as examples of these institutions related to historical studies.

In 1934, some policy changes were conducted along with the new five-year plan and the 17th party congress. The intensification of ideological indoctrination over students was presupposed. History education also was revised in this context. The previous educational policies consciously had ignored the period before 1917 when history was concerned. The new policy, however, aimed a “revolutionary revision of the historical inheritance of the past” in history education. According to it, ideological indoctrination could succeed only with a popularization of history.⁸³ For this reason, the curricula was rearranged with courses like “ancient world, middle ages, modern history, the history of the class struggle in Russia and in the countries enslaved by world imperialism.” Dorotich says that this change was a tactical one, and claims that the strategy remained the same. Although the emphases would change, history would always be a political weapon of the party. Dorotich writes:

Formerly history had been used as a means of indoctrination and education in communist and Marxist principles and outlook. Now that Stalin had become the unchallenged personal dictator, history was primarily to serve the interests of the party, that is, of its leaders, or, more precisely, of Stalin himself, by explaining and justifying the ever-changing twists and turns of his party line.⁸⁴

⁸² “... which soon monopolized the archiving, processing, and publication of documents and study of the history of the October Revolution and the Bolshevik Party. (It was no accident that Itspart was soon removed from the jurisdiction of the People’s Commissariat of Education and placed directly under the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.)” Afanas’ev, p. 40.

⁸³ Daniel Dorotich, “A Turning Point in the Soviet School: The Seventeenth Party Congress and the Teaching of History,” *History of Education Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (Autumn, 1967) p. 297.

⁸⁴ Dorotich, pp. 297-298.

As a result, these points should be underlined concerning the educational and indoctrination policies and generally the politics/ideology-education relations in the Soviet Union between the two world wars: First, the intervention of the political authority in education is obvious. The educational system was centralized in form, instrumentalized in content, and given the role of meeting the needs of the regime. Second, the political authority succeeded in settling absolute control over and an instrumental relationship with education. Third, although the regime's theoretically or ideologically designed educational policies were subject to changes and regulations because of practical difficulties, the instrumental role of education remained unchanged. Fourth, the ideology did not remain the one and only determiner, but just like before the war, other political concerns from time to time managed to be determining elements before ideology. Nevertheless, ideology, as a defined and definite element, was a much more effective and prominent factor than in National Socialism and Fascism. Fifth, different from in National Socialism and Fascism, politics/ideology-education relations in the Soviet Union can be understood better by considering the content and methodology of lessons and scientific activities and central texts, rather than educational practices, institutions and organizations. In other words, content precedes form in the Soviet Union, contrary to the other two examples. And last of all, the determination of content was not left to professionals or "scientists," but the political leadership was directly involved in, and sometimes even personally took the initiative in, producing course definitions, "scientific" knowledge, and central texts.

China

Next in the discussion are the educational and indoctrination policies of post-war communist China in the Mao era. The People's Republic of China is an interesting and

a special example. Different from the other three examples, the ideological education and indoctrination policies in particular and the politics-ideology-education relations in general to be analyzed are in the post-war period. Therefore, it was a model that was formed apart from the effect of the specific political and ideological struggles of the interwar period. This experience had characteristics similar to and different from the other three examples.

In the PRC, political authority had absolute power and control over education. Educational policies were set early in the establishment of the PRC, and there was no serious deviation from them. The political was the absolute determiner in the politics-ideology-education relations. Education was given such an absolutely instrumental role that it would be under the responsibility of the party's propaganda department. However, the function that was attributed to education was too wide to be limited to propaganda. The counter-effects of education and scientific activities on political priorities in the PRC, on the other hand, were fewer when compared to the other three examples.

The educational approaches of Mao and the Chinese revolution, as they are advocated by modernization theories, reflected the belief in education's power to change or shape reality. Here there is a meaning similar to the use of education in the Soviet Union, for enlightenment. Education is the prime instrument for the political reestablishment of China. Therefore "the so called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' advocated Mao in the 1960s was very much a proposal for the complete overhaul of the Chinese educational system."⁸⁵

Li tells that Mao's educational philosophy had three basic points: Anti-traditionalism, Equality, and Pragmatism.⁸⁶ "Anti-traditionalism" referred to the challenge against traditional culture and values, which fed Mao's revolutionary views.

⁸⁵ Wen Lang Li, "A Comparative Study of the Chinese Educational System," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 22, no. 4 (Winter, 1996).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

This principle opposed the hierarchical structure of China's traditional educational system. According to this, people should be evaluated with respect to their contribution to social mobility, rather than to their level of education. "Equality" referred to the aim to destroy the class difference that was expected from education. By presenting fewer opportunities to higher-class children and more to lower-class children, Mao aimed to reach for a really egalitarian society. "Pragmatism" referred to Mao's principle to see education as the prime factor of economic development (productivity).

The regime's educational policies after the revolution had two non-debatable judgments concerning the nature of knowledge: Scientific knowledge was to be placed on a dialectical basis, and to be about life or derived from practice.⁸⁷

Considering both judgments, politics were evaluated as the primary determiner of educational policies. In the whole educational process, the prime criterion for selection and evaluation was "political consciousness." However, there was no department in the Communist Party organisation that regulated or implemented educational policies. Decisions and applications concerning educational policies were under the initiative of the Department of Propaganda. Hu writes that, "the obvious implication is that education in so far as the party is concerned, is primarily a propaganda function, with indoctrination of the population as its ultimate aim."⁸⁸ Thus, theory dominated practice in determining politics-ideology-education relations in the PRC. Ideology was the basic determiner, but it can be said that practical concerns and pragmatic priorities were not totally ignored.

The term "Red and Expert" seems to summarize the aim of the regime's educational policies: to raise an ideologically reliable and technically competent generation. Concerning the ideological education practices in China, Hu writes that,

⁸⁷ The latter can be said to be the common denominator of all totalitarian/mobilising regimes.

⁸⁸ C. T. Hu, "Communist Education: Theory and Practice," *China Quarterly*, no. 10 (April-June, 1962), p. 91.

broadly speaking, however, these methods fall under two categories, the formal or doctrinal part and the informal or action part, which, according to the Communist scheme, complement each other and unify theory and practice. On the formal and doctrinal side there are the political subjects of instruction which consist of Dialectical Materialism, Foundations of Marxism and Leninism, History of the Chinese Revolution, Political Economy, and the like...Moreover, instruction is given, in most cases, by Party cadres operating in educational institutions...The informal and action part of indoctrination takes many forms, mostly in organized political activities of one sort or another.⁸⁹

History education was one of the central concerns of the regime's educational policies. After the revolution, party history was taught in all universities. Attendance was compulsory in this course, which aimed at political education. According to the educational and examination system, students were responsible for the political studies lessons (including party history) at every level of their educational careers.

Early in 1945, an institutional party historiography in the PRC appeared. One of the heads of this institutionalization said:

The word "party historiography" (*dangshi*), as a name for a university course, was first mentioned in the "Resolution on Huabei University" which the Chinese Communist Party formulated in May 1945. Before that time we had taught modern and contemporary history of the revolution (*gemingshi*), but there had not yet been a course called "party history"...We established a team of researchers under the leadership of Wu Yuzhang with me as the team leader...asked me to write a textbook on party history. So I started teaching and at the same time wrote the teaching materials.⁹⁰

In 1949, a department of party historiography was established within the Chinese People's University. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik assumes a similarity between party historiography in China and Stalin's *Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. This time Mao Zedong and his thoughts were at the center. With time, Mao would become the only reference.

Just after the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the positive character of the general relations with the Soviet Union showed itself in the realm of

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 91-92.

⁹⁰ Reported by Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Party Historiography in the People's Republic of China," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 17 (January, 1987), p. 79.

history as well.⁹¹ Historical studies and history education were institutionalized, by inspiration of the Soviet experience and with direct contribution of the Soviet Union, on a large scale. The common denominator of these works was Marxism and Marxist historiography. Translations held an important place in the activity in the realm of history. After the foundation of the PRC, masterpieces of Soviet historiography were translated into Chinese. Many of the Chinese historians were introduced to Marxist historiography with these works. The works of Lenin and Stalin as classical interpretations of Marxism excited Chinese historians.⁹² Stalin's *Marx and Historical Materialism* and *Marxism on Nation and Colonies* raised interest among them. Like the other doctrine books of the Soviet Communist Party, the well-known *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks); Short Course* was translated into Chinese, too. This closeness continued until a nationalistic attitude began to appear in Chinese historiography and Soviet historiography began to be seen as not only alien, but also "eurocentric."

The historiographical discussions in the People's Republic of China put forward the political motivations behind historical studies. Evaluating the PRC historiography from data-theory conflict, Weigelin-Schwiedrzik shows how politically coded this conflict was.⁹³ This conflict led to three different historiographical standings; the first of which advocated the priority of theory against data. It called for the verification of the Marxist viewpoint by means of historiography and its reproduction. The second argued for a kind of composition between theory and data, in which Marxism was used as some kind of methodology. And with its application to Chinese history, specific laws of historical development were sought and explained. And the third, arguing that the

⁹¹ For the effect of the Soviet Union and Soviet historiography on the People's Republic of China, see Q. Edward Wang, "Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese Historiography and the Soviet Influence, 1949-1963," *Journal of Contemporary China* 9, no. 23 (March, 2000).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "On Shi and Lun: Toward a Typology of Historiography in the PRC," *History & Theory* 35, no. 4 (1996).

interpretation of history had to be derived from data, referred to a non-theoretical standing. Therefore the conclusions reached may falsify as well as verify Marxist predictions. The theory-data duality, which was discussed by Chinese historians as a historiographical problem, gained new meanings beyond a methodological problem after the Communist Party of China took control of the government. The duality was most of all considered not related to the quality of historical studies, but as a sign of loyalty to the regime and the party for historians.⁹⁴ Political government was obviously in demand for a political methodology.

Last of all about historical studies, just as in the Soviet Union, Marxism's effect on historical studies showed itself both in determining the subjects of study and in the appearance of a new language of history in China as well. Marxist historiography reconstructed the history that had been constructed by traditional historiography, substituting the old history with a new one. This new past concentrated on themes like "peasant revolts, urban commercial developments and popular literature," which had been formerly ignored. And these themes were re-written using key terms of Marxist historiography, such as "progress", "revolution", "class" and "class struggle." In Feuerwerker's words, Chinese history was put into a "Marxian dress."⁹⁵

Political intervention showed its effect not only on history but also on other realms, in particular on the humanities. In an article on moral education in the PRC, Maosen Li writes that moral education performs a function of political indoctrination, just like history education. It is an educational process in which political leaders find the opportunity to spread their views and thoughts to the masses; a process which is for the state, in the final analysis, not for individuals.⁹⁶ The content of moral education was fed by the criticism of traditional values, Marxism, and the thoughts of Mao. The

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Albert Feuerwerker, "China's History in Marxian Dress," *The American Historical Review* 66, no. 2 (January, 1961), pp. 323-353.

⁹⁶ Maosen Li, "Moral Education in the People's Republic of China," *Journal of Moral Education* 19, no. 3 (October 1990).

Communist Party held control of moral education as it did education totally, and communist ideology was the prime guide.

Political intervention into education was related to forms (institutions and formal practices) as well as with methodology and content in the PRC. Like Stalin, Mao thought that the intelligentsia and the academy were not “politically neutral” or above politics. And like Stalin, Mao gave place to “coercion” in educational policies. For him, the academy’s being not politically neutral could be explained by class bounds. In his purges, campaigns and regulations related with the academy, he always emphasized class themes. Therefore, he did not abstain from making class roots an important criterion in acceptance to higher education. Workers, peasants and their children were given privileges in and acceptance priority to higher education. With the aim of creating cadres of worker and peasant origin in higher education, special preparatory schools were founded for them.⁹⁷ Therefore, as Lisheng Zhu points out, while it was a fact that political elites and professional elites share the same social and educational backgrounds in modern societies, in the early periods of the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and China, the intelligentsia came from the upper and middle classes while the political elite came from the lower classes and their education levels were relatively low.⁹⁸ Therefore the official ideology’s defining professional elites as bourgeois and political elites as proletarian, and aiming to create a group of elites (i.e. a new group of professional elites) from the lower classes, seems understandable.

Difficulties similar to those that the Soviet educational policies faced in the beginning met the People’s Republic of China, too.⁹⁹ For this reason, Mao chose not to purge non-party intellectuals, especially from the university, in the educational reforms made in the first half of the 1950s. From time to time, he even invited their constructive criticism. However, the harshness of the criticism and the unhappiness with social and

⁹⁷ Lisheng Zhu.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ For comparisons of educational policies and standings against the intelligentsia, see *ibid.*

political developments led to anti-rightist campaigns by the end of 1956. In the beginning of 1957, anti-rightist campaigns turned into campaigns against “bourgeois academic ideas.” These campaigns were aimed not only against the humanities and social sciences but also against natural and engineering sciences:

The campaign was not confined to the social sciences and humanities, and many professors of sciences and engineering were also attacked. A Professor of biology at Wuhan University studied the theories of Michurin. Therefore, he was on the right side in the early 1950s, when the theories of Michurin were regarded as the biology of the proletariat, and those of Morgan were regarded as the biology of the bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁰

Changes were made in the contents of lessons. Political interest held a prior place in content choices. This attitude was more prominent in the humanities and social sciences. Especially in history lessons, like in the Soviet experience (the first five-year plan), ancient history was given less importance and place, while modern history was studied with an increasing emphasis. Students were encouraged to write the histories of factories and villages.¹⁰¹

The primary application in the early years of the People’s Republic of China was the removal of traditional educational policies and introduction of new policies instead. Li writes that, “in order to establish a new educational system, the new government first suspended the Guomintang’s military training and courses such as Citizen, Party Constitution, and Boy Scouts, and tried to inculcate determination to follow the party and serve the people. They offered Marxist courses, set up a commission on political teaching in colleges, and organized ideological-political work in accordance with political campaigns.”¹⁰²

Academic priorities were with time replaced by political priorities. In 1957, the Ministry of Education demanded the introduction of political courses in secondary schools and normal schools. In 1963, political courses began in secondary schools. The

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Maosen Li, *ibid.*

texts and textbooks studied in these courses are similar to those of other authoritarian and totalitarian examples: “Textbooks, such as General Knowledge of Politics, A Brief History of Social Development, and General Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism, were published and used in full-time six-year secondary schools. Educational courses on current policies were allotted a quarter of the time given to political courses.”¹⁰³

Just like in other authoritarian and totalitarian examples, after secondary school political consciousness became the prime criterion of acceptance to higher education: “The three tests fixed for admitting secondary students into higher learning institutes in 1965 revealed the importance of politics in Chinese education. Listed in order of importance, they were: political consciousness (open-book test plus daily work), academic quality (in professional subjects only) and health.”¹⁰⁴

The Great Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 had a profound impact on the regime’s educational policies. Political intervention into education reached its peak in this period. Schools were considered fields of war, “bourgeois intellectuals” were purged, and the last remains of the past were removed.

With the educational policies of the period, the party’s influence over students was increased. Party representatives in schools were strengthened and, in the most general sense, state control over education was made absolute. Hu writes that, “in virtually all schools, the party secretary, with the party machinery functioning at the lowest level and covering all ranges, now wielded absolute power over all essential aspects of school life, ranging from curriculum designing and examination procedures to student selection.”¹⁰⁵

Academic and intellectual freedoms were limited and politically directed. Qinglian He tells us that “in 1957 the Chinese regime labeled its cultural and academic policy ‘Cultivating Thousands of Flowers and Encouraging Hundreds of Voices’. But

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ C. T. Hu, p. 95.

the so-called thousands of flowers and hundreds of voices did not have anything to do with freedom of speech or academic research; instead, the slogan was intended to encourage praise of the totalitarian system in China through various means, from poem, novel, and movie, to drama.”¹⁰⁶

Education was popularized, and for this purpose, the regime made use of the mass media, especially television. The report given to the State Council in 1955 during the establishment of China Television wrote that the development of Chinese television sector should be a part of the “Five-Year Culture and Education Plan.” As a former journalist himself, Mao made use of the media as an instrument to mobilize the masses later on.¹⁰⁷

In the final analysis, these points must be underlined about the educational and indoctrination policies, and in general the politics/ideology-education relations, in the People’s Republic of China in the post-war period: First, the political government did not only interfere in the educational system, but re-established it. Therefore it had absolute power and control over education, and education performed an instrumental role according to political priorities. Second, this instrumental role was not simply political/ideological education and indoctrination. The aim was to transform society and create the ideal society (and besides this, maintain economic growth). This was what caused tension between theory and practice in the PRC example. Third, while being the absolute determiner, ideology was not an unaffected element. Outer effects, responses to these effects (like in the example of exposure to Soviet historiography, which was accepted at first, but found alien and eurocentric later), and the theory-practice tension within affected ideological searches. In the PRC also, politics/ideology-education relations point to a mutual determination relationship, though at a different rate.

¹⁰⁶ Qinglian He, “Academic Freedom in China,” *Academe* 88, no. 3 (May/June, 2002).

¹⁰⁷ Yu Huang, Xu Yu, “Broadcasting and Politics: Chinese Television in the Mao Era, (1958-1976),” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio & Television* 17, no. 4 (October, 1997).

These four sample experiences provide us with some conclusions at two levels of evaluation. On the first level, the similarities and differences between the two categories and, at the second level, the similarities and differences between two sample experiences in each category can be examined. The conclusions arrived at can offer valuable insights into the politics/ideology-education relations, political education and indoctrination policies of the single-party era of the Turkish Republic and into the ideological developments of the period.

Here, by setting out four sample experiences, an attempt was made to find some resemblances and reach some inferences about the Revolution Lectures of the single-party era. While more inferences can no doubt be made, the aim here was only to sketch a road map. In conclusion, it can be said that politics-ideology-education relations, which were examined in these four samples, provide important clues to understand and evaluate the Revolution Lectures of the single-party era.

CHAPTER TWO

THE REVOLUTION LECTURES

Historical Process

The 1930s were years in which ideological searches intensified in Turkey, as in the rest of the world. The economic troubles of the post-war period and the weakening of liberal ideas and democratic ideals as a result of these troubles showed their effects on Turkey. The rising values of the interwar years (related with the fall of liberalism), which are known as “the catastrophe age,” became rising values in Turkish politics, economy and intellectual life as well. Turkey managed to continue its parliamentary regime with some experiments and regulations, contrary to the general tendency in Europe. But it also implemented some of the institutionalizations and political practices of the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes of that period, even taking them as its model in some cases.

A common characteristic of the authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes of the interwar years was that they based their legitimacies on new socialization forms instead of on democratic consent. These regimes did not invent political socialization. These kinds of policies had been implemented before them for the politicization of the masses. But the most developed forms of these policies were seen as the most widespread in the interwar years. The Revolution Lectures in 1934 can be evaluated in the most general sense as such a form of political socialization (in the same category with the courses of citizenship/civics before and after these lectures). In this context, it can be pointed out that the idea of founding of a Ministry of Propaganda came onto the agenda in the

single-party period in Turkey, similar to those of the interwar totalitarian regimes.¹⁰⁸

After the first lectures in the second semester of the 1933-1934 educational year, (the History of) the Revolution Courses undertook the gradually increasing function of political socialization, from the 1940s to the present day (especially when these lessons began to be taught in high schools in 1943).

In the beginning, the Revolution Courses were not the subject of general/mass education. Some attempts were made to transmit these courses to the masses via the radio and press, but in the final analysis it is clear the courses began to be given with an elitist choice as they were taught to university students, and their academic cadres (professor cadres) were formed by political elites.

Moving from here, the Revolution Lectures in 1934 should be read basically as an attempt to create an ideology rather than a form of political socialization. Although looking from a comparative perspective may make the matter more comprehensible, it may also make fail to see the motives under these attempts as identical with the motives and conditions in authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes, in which similar practices can be seen.¹⁰⁹ For this reason, it is necessary to look at the original conditions of Turkey, too, and to consider the near past that preceded the Revolution Lectures in 1934. In fact, any approach that does not pay attention to the different dynamics of the matter will remain defective. For example, seeing the Revolution Lectures as a reflection of the search for

¹⁰⁸ Hakkı Uyar, "Tek Parti Yönetimi'nde Halka Yönelik Propaganda: İnkılap ve İstiklal Konferansları," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 17 (May 1995), p. 53. This idea came on to agenda in 1935. The individual that was first thought to be Minister of Propaganda was one of the four professors who gave the Revolution Lectures in 1934, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. Hakkı Uyar, "Türk Devrimi'ni Teorileştirme Çabaları: Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Örneği I," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 119 (November 1993), p. 11.

¹⁰⁹ The People's Houses, with their function of such a political socialization, are a more useful example when considered together with their European counterparts. See Neşe G. Yeşilkaya, "Halkevleri," *MTSD Kemalizm*. In any case, when he was saying "while the rules and regulations of the People's Houses were being prepared, similar organizations of many other countries, far or near, were examined" (*Halkevleri yönetmeliği hazırlanırken uzak yakın birçok memleketlerin benzer örgütleri incelenmiştir*), Reşit Galip gave the idea that this being influenced was a conscious preference. Tevfik Çavdar, "Halkevleri," *CDTA*, p. 879. But the broadcast of the courses in their advanced stage by the radio can be interpreted to mean they undertook also the function of educating the people. Similar experiences can be encountered in different places. Mete Tunçay lists "Radiyo Dersleri Dinleme Klüpleri" among organizations that People's Houses affected. Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1999), p. 330.

an answer to the question of “what is Kemalism?” as against the *Kadro* periodical’s searching for development of “an anti-fascist and left interpretation as independent from governing elites”¹¹⁰ of Kemalism is to overlook the multi-dimensionality of these courses’ reasons of existence.

The Republic of Turkey entered the 1930s claiming that it had completed the political phase of the Revolution. Attempts to consolidate the regime, internal political struggles and purges occurred from time to time, the economic policies shaped after the 1929 crisis and with the invalidation of the obligations remaining from the Lausanne Conference and, of course, the political elites’ preferences created a Kemalist single-party regime. The revolution literature of the period also processed the theme that the political phase of the Revolution had been completed, but its intellectual and ideological aspects remained frail. From then on, preserving the Revolution, strengthening it intellectually and ideologically, and inculcating its values to the masses were to be given importance. In this way, official (the People’s Houses, the periodical *Ülkü*) and private attempts (the periodical *Kadro*) were parts of the same impulse.¹¹¹

The single-party regime implemented some new institutionalizations about the Revolution and supported intellectual and artistic studies about the Revolution.¹¹² News related to these frequently appeared in the pages of newspapers.

The People’s Houses, which were founded in 1932 in place of the Turkish Hearths that had been abolished with a decision in the RPP Congress of 1931, was an important example of these institutionalizations. As “carrier of the state-founder mission,” its aim in essence was to be a bridge between the regime and the people, to transmit the values of the Revolution to the masses and to inculcate these values to the

¹¹⁰ Ahmet Yıldız, “Recep Peker,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 58. We can say that this interpretation exaggerates the independence of *Kadro* from the political elite, and it attributes excessive power to *Kadro* by placing the political elite “as against” *Kadro*.

¹¹¹ *Cumhuriyet*, “İnkılabı Koruma Kanunu Çıkıyor,” 8 Şubat 1933.

¹¹² For a document which shows the period’s Minister of Education Reşit Galip’s attempts to process the revolution intellectually and ideologically, see Appendix 1.

masses by means of common education.¹¹³ But the values of the Revolution did not constitute a concrete ideology.

The University Reform can be evaluated within this framework. In the third Congress of RPP in 1931, the Kemalist elites gave place to the idea of undertaking a reform in the university in accordance with the rules and regulations (*tüzük*) of the party.¹¹⁴ The Darülfünun was closed on the 31 May in 1933. Dating from the 1 August 1933, studies about the foundation of a new University were made the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. A new university was founded in accordance with the values of the Revolution and the concrete needs of the country.¹¹⁵ In the body of the new university, which consisted of the Faculties of Medicine, Law, Science and Literature, eight Institutes were founded. One of them was the Institute of the Turkish Revolution (*Türk İnkılap Enstitüsü*).

¹¹³ Yeşilkaya, p. 113.

¹¹⁴ Reşit Galip depicts this idea with these words: "Darülfünun of İstanbul has not been able to attain the liberation, improvement and progress expected by the Turkish intelligentsia. Great political and social revolutions have happened in the country. The Darülfünun has remained an impartial observer of these. Fundamental movements have taken place in the area of the economy. The Darülfünun has seemed uninformed about these. There have been radical changes in the law. The Darülfünun has contended only with taking the new laws into the instruction program. The Revolution of the Alphabet has occurred; the movement of "pure language" has been started. The Darülfünun has not considered them seriously." *İstanbul Darülfünununu Türkiye münevverliğinin beklediği salaha, inkişafa ve terakkiye eremedi. Memlekette siyasi, içtimai büyük inkılaplar oldu. Darülfünun, bunlara karşı bitaraf bir müşahit kaldı. İktisadi sahada esaslı hareketler oldu. Darülfünun bunlardan habersiz göründü. Hukukta radikal değişiklikler oldu. Darülfünun yalnız yeni kanunları tedrisat programına almakla iktifa etti. Harf inkılabı oldu, özdil hareketi başladı. Darülfünun hiç tınmadı.* İlhan Tekeli, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Eğitim Kurumlarının Gelişimi," CDTA, p. 650. We encounter similar criticisms in the press of the period. For an article in which becoming loyal to the Universities in Russia and Italy to their revolutions is given as example, see Şevket Süreyya, "Darülfünun İnkılap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığı," *Kadro*, no. 14 (Şubat, 1933). Şevket Süreyya says: "However, the chairs of our Darülfünun, from the first day of the Turkish Revolution to the present, have not produced a single work, realistic or original, a single brochure or even a single page in the area of all of the social sciences, which processed the foundation and creation matters of the Turkish Revolution." *Halbuki, bizim Darülfünunumuzun kürsüleri, Türk inkılabının ilk gününden bugüne kadar bütün cemiyet ilimleri sahasında, inkılabın kuruluş ve yaratış davalarını işliyen, reel olan, orijinal olan bir tek eser, bir tek broşür hatta bir tek sahife vermemiştir.* (p. 8). The new university, on the other hand, is considered as positive, again with similar themes. Tahir Hayrettin, "Türk İnkılabı Kürsüleşiyor," *Kadro*, no. 19 (Temmuz, 1933).

¹¹⁵ See Yunus Nadi, "Yeni Bir Meşale İstanbul Üniversitesi," *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Temmuz 1933. In an editorial published in *Cumhuriyet* at the time of studies to found the new university, he said that science should be busy with "concrete realities of life," not with "*kuru nazariye*" (useless theory); and he applauds the news that an Institute of Revolution would be opened in the new University. M. Mermi, "Gazi Türkiyesinde İnkılap ve Üniversite," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Temmuz 1933.

The Institute of Revolution

The Republic of Turkey celebrated its tenth anniversary on 29 October 1933. 1933 was considered in the public opinion of the period the year in which the Republic “completed its first golden age and it passed to new periods.” The anniversary allowed for an account-taking of the previous ten years. This was also an opportunity to put forward the Revolution’s achievements, and for the political government to present itself inside the country and to world opinion. Seeing similar practices in the other countries of the period and with the knowledge that the Republican elites followed these practices with much interest proves that they also had the opportunity to compare themselves with the other countries and regimes.¹¹⁶

The idea of founding an Institute of Revolution first came in 1932 from Dr. Reşit Galip Bey, the Minister of Education.¹¹⁷ The idea was put forward both in the context of the History of the Turkish Republic that was prepared as the fourth volume of the Turkish History by the Turkish History Association (*Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*) and in the context of the University Reform, the intellectual preparations of which were continuing. He introduced the idea in 1932 in a commission of the Ministry of Education at which Afet İnan was also present. İnan wrote, “there is a necessity for an organization to investigate the subjects of our revolution and it will be proper to prepare a plan for this.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Nadir Nadi, “Türk İnkılabını Nasıl Göstereceğiz?” *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Eylül 1933. Nadi says: “The exhibition opened in Roma related to the tenth anniversary of the fascist revolution will be closed soon. In the next two months, we will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. In relation to this, we are also preparing a great exhibition.” *Romada faşist ihtilalin onuncu dönüm yılı münasebetile açılan sergi yakında kapanacak. İki aya kadar da Türk Cumhuriyetinin onuncu yılını kutluyacağız. Bu münasebetle biz de büyük bir sergi hazırlıyoruz.* Of course, Turkey did not resemble them only in “demonstration” forms. These forms produced the need for new studies in the other areas, such as in architecture. Such comparisons are expressed also in an article of Yunus Nadi about a new exhibition building established before the tenth anniversaries of the Republic in Ankara. Y. Nadi, “Yeni Milli bir eser: Ankara’da Sergi binası,” *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Nisan 1933.

¹¹⁷ Nejat Göyünç, “İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüleri ve Yeni Yayınlar,” *Uluslararası İkinci Atatürk Sempozyumu Cilt II* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1996), p. 739.

¹¹⁸ *İnkılap mevzularımızı tetkik etmek için, bir teşekküle lüzum var ve bunun için de bir plan hazırlamamız yerinde olacaktır.* Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler*, second edition (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yay., 1968), p. 209.

Afet İnan wrote that the commission prepared a program scheme about the matter and delivered this scheme to the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, she quotes from Reşit Galip's ideas about the Institute of Revolution from his notes. In addition to the Institute of Revolution's reasons of existence and methods of its foundation and working, a "work-plan" took place here. According to this, with the idea that university education would reach perfection at the Institute, graduation from the Institute was the preliminary condition of graduation from the university for all students. Reşit Galip thought that the Institute of Revolution was a step that should be passed before the beginning of the university education. This was an idea parallel with the politicization of the criteria of acceptance to and graduation from the university in the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes of the period.

The Institute of the Turkish Revolution, according to Reşit Galip, would have instruments like "the Turkish Museum of the Revolution," "the Turkish Library of the Revolution," "Academic Tours," "Academic Inquiries," "Academic, Polemic and Publication," and "Publication of the People." After stating that the activities of the Institute would be both practical and theoretical,¹¹⁹ Reşit Galip presented a detailed work-plan (under the headings of Before the Revolution, At the Revolution and After the Revolution) for the economic dimension of the Turkish Revolution.¹²⁰ But the process followed a different way from how Reşit Galip had foreseen it. Reşit Galip also

¹¹⁹ Tension between the theoretical and practical was also a component that makes the Revolution Lectures in 1934 comparable to the similar experiences in the world. This tension, which was shaped by the dominance of the practical in National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy and by the dominance of theoretical in USSR in the interwar years (and in the PRC in the postwar period) was solved by the cooperation and division of labor logic of the University Reform in the single-party period of the Turkish Republic. The theoretical/ideological needs of the revolution were to be covered with the Institute of Revolution established in the body of the university.

¹²⁰ Afet İnan, pp. 210-211. Baykara states that the preliminary condition of being a Turk for the professors who would give these lectures was put forward in Reşit Galip's work-plan. Tuncer Baykara, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1981), pp. 7-8.

remained outside of the process as he resigned from the Ministry of Education in August 1933.¹²¹

During the reform studies that began after the decision to close the Darülfünun on 31 May 1933, the decision was taken to found an Institute of Revolution on 20 June 1933. In opening oration of the University, the following was related to the Institute of Revolution:

The very first quality of the New University is its national character and revolutionism. The new university will process the ideology of the Turkish Revolution. The Institute of the Turkish Revolution, established with this aim, is the most important apparatus of the University, an apparatus which is owned not only by the people who work there and by the faculty to which it belongs, but it is the property of the whole University, from its students to the professors and all intellectuals of the Republic and the whole country. Everyone is its student.¹²²

In the day of the Darülfünun's closure, Reşit Galip, the Minister of Education, made the following declaration to the press:

The Institute of Revolution will examine the causes which gave birth to the Revolution, the main elements of the Turkish Revolution, its principles and the Turkish future caused by that, in its every stage in the areas of politics, law, society, economy and finance and generally in the areas of national culture. At the same time, the Institute will work for the foundation of a Turkish Library and Revolution Museum. The comprehensive study-programs of the Institute of Revolution and the other institutes for different areas will be published separately.¹²³

Developments at the foundation of the Institute of Revolution show that the idea of founding such an Institute was not that old, or at least it was not an idea that had been processed sufficiently. The foundation of the Institute was an expression of the

¹²¹ As a strange coincidence, the newspapers on 5 March 1934 gave the news about the beginning of the Revolution Lectures in large font and photographs, but gave short place to the news of Reşit Galip's death. Also his relation to the Revolution Lectures, which had had repercussions, is not mentioned.

¹²² *Yeni Üniversitenin en birinci vasfı, milliliği ve inkılapçılığıdır. Türk İnkılabının ideolojisini yeni üniversite işleyecektir. Bu maksatla kurulu Türk İnkılabı Enstitüsü, Üniversitenin en mühim cihazı ve bu cihaz yalnız orada çalışanların değil, yalnız bağlı olduğu fakültenin değil, talebesinden profesörüne kadar bütün Üniversitenin, bütün Cumhuriyet münevverlerinin, bütün memleketin malıdır. Herkes onun talebesidir. Şevket Süreyya, "İnkılap Kürsülerinde, İnkılap İlmileşmelidir," Kadro, no. 28 (Nisan, 1934).*

¹²³ *İnkılab Enstitüsü siyasi, hukuki, adli, içtimai, iktisadi, mali alanlarda ve genel olarak milli kültür alanlarında Türk inkılabını doğuran sebepleri, Türk İnkılabının ana unsurlarını, prensiblerini, inkılabdan doğan Türk geleceğini her safhasında inceleyecektir. Enstitü aynı zamanda, Türk kütüphanesi, İnkılab Müzesi kuruluşlarına da çalışacaktır. İnkılab Enstitüsünün ve diğer enstitülerin muhtelif alanlara ait geniş çalışma programları ayrıca yayınlanacaktır. Necdet Öklem, Atatürk Döneminde Darülfünun Reformu (Bornova: Ege Üniversitesi Rektörlük Yay., 1973), pp. 55-56.*

Republic's ideological insufficiencies and aspirations (before its tenth anniversary) rather than a project with a plan and a program. Weak ideas about the program of the Institute appear both in the statements of the political elites and in the press. There was no concrete program. Furthermore, there were uncertainties also about the academic cadre. It was known that leaders of the Revolution would give the courses, but there were uncertainties about how the system would be processed or how its permanent cadres would be formed.

The affair of determining the academic cadre of the Institute of Revolution continued together with the foundation studies of the Institute. At the beginning of August, newspapers wrote that professorship in the Institute of Revolution had been proposed to Minister of Education Reşit Galip and that Reşit Galip had accepted this proposal.¹²⁴ In November 1933, it was announced that the Institute of Revolution planning had been completed and that the Institute's field of activity, its academic cadre

¹²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, "Reşit Galip Beye dün İnkılap tarihi kürsüsü teklif olundu," 4 Ağustos 1933.

Cumhuriyet, "Üniversite Kadrosu Tamamlanmak Üzere/Maarif Vekili İnkılap kürsüsü profesörlüğünü kabul ettiğini Üniversite Eminliğine dün bildirdi," 6 Ağustos 1933.

These two letters were published in the newspapers:

"To the high rank of the Ministry of Education,

It is requested by the official certificate of the Presidency of the faculty (dated 2 August and number 1) that the Chair of History of the Turkish Revolution in the cadre of the Faculty of Literature of İstanbul University be undertaken by Reşit Galip Beyefendi, who personally lived our revolution life and has conducted comprehensive research about our revolution history. I wish that this request, which is shared sincerely by the Presidency of the University, will be realized and I present my regards, sir.

Neşet Ömer, President of the University."

"To Neşet Ömer Beyefendi, President of the University,

It was a pleasure to receive your letter regarding the Chair of the History of the Turkish Revolution. It will be a great honor for me to be among the men who made and will make this sacred as well as very important voluntary duty. I express my esteem with my gratitude to the Faculty of Literature and the Presidency, sir.

Reşit Galip, the Minister of Education."

Maarif vekaleti yüksek makamına, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi kadrosunda, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi kürsüsünün, inkılap hayatımızı bizzat yaşamış ve inkılap tarihimiz hakkında ihatalı tetkikatta bulunmuş olan Maarif Vekili Reşit Galip Beyefendi tarafından deruhte buyurulması, fakülte riyasetinin 2 Ağustos tarih ve 1 numaralı tezkeresiyle rica edilmektedir. Eminliğin yürekten iştirak ettiği bu ricanın tahakkukunu diler ve yüksek saygılarımı sunarım efendim. Üniversite Emni Neşet Ömer. Cumhuriyet, 3 Ağustos 1933

*Üniversite Emni Dr. Neşet Ömer Beyefendiye, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi kürsüsünün tarafımdan deruhte edilmesine dair olan mektubunuzu memnuniyetle aldım. Bu çok mühim olduğu kadar çok aziz fahri vazifeyi yapanlar ve yapacak olanlar arasında bulunmak benim bir iftihar olacaktır. Edebiyat Fakültesine ve Eminliğe teşekkürlerimle saygılarımı teyit ederim efendim. Maarif Vekili Reşit Galip. Cumhuriyet, 6 Ağustos 1933. See Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, "Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Ölenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 10 (Ekim, 1984), p. 15.*

and their working system had been determined.¹²⁵ According to this, it had been decided that professorships at the Institute would be made for periods of two months at a time. The duty of professorship would be proposed to leaders in the revolution movements, to be chosen by the Council of Ministers and who would work as honorary staff.¹²⁶ It was stipulated that not only university students, but also the academic cadres of the university were to follow these courses and would receive certificates.

Meanwhile, speculations about the professors' names continued. It was written that İsmet and Fevzi Pashas would be among the lecturers. However, uncertainties continued to exist. News articles said that the members of the Turkish History Association would give conferences and the courses. New candidate names were put forward. According to these rumors, the courses would be given in the first semester by the deputy of Sivas, Şemsettin Bey, and by the deputy of Balıkesir, İsmail Hakkı Bey. In the second semester, Yusuf Akçura and Sadri Maksudi Beys would give the courses.¹²⁷ But even the matter of when the courses would begin was indefinite.

On 15 December, news was published that the courses would begin at the beginning of January.¹²⁸ On 1 January 1934, on the other hand, it was said that the courses would begin on 16 February, different from how it had been planned. But conferences on Turkish History would begin earlier, on 1 January. Speculations about the academic cadre continued. It was announced in the newspapers that Şemsettin and İsmail Hakkı Beys, whose names had been mentioned more before for the Revolution Lectures, would give conferences on Turkish History. The Revolution Lectures, on the

¹²⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü/Üniversite İçin Yeni ve Mühim Kararlar/ İsmet ve Fevzi Paşalar da hocalık edecekler, Enstitünün faaliyet esasları tesbit olundu," 12 Teşrinisani 1933.

¹²⁶ It was emphasized many times in the preparation stage that professorship at the Institute would be honorary. But this contradicted the aim of academic institutionality. By the way, the courses were not completely left to the initiative of the political elite. Assistant cadres from academic careers were established. All of these made problematic the honorary character of professorship at the Institute. For information about the conference wages paid to professors and assistant professors at the Institute, see Appendix 2.

¹²⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsünde konferans şeklinde dersler," 28 Teşrinisani 1933.

¹²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü derslere başlıyor/İlk konferans gelecek ay başındadır," 15 Kanunuevvel 1933.

other hand, would be given by Hikmet Bey, the Minister of Education; Yusuf Akçura, a professor of Faculty of Law in Ankara; and Sadri Maksudi Bey in sequence.¹²⁹ When the courses did not begin on that date, it was then said that classes would begin on 1 March.

The organization of the Institute of Revolution, on the other hand, was completed.¹³⁰ According to this, only last semester students in the first year would follow lectures at the Institute. The secretary general of the RPP, Recep Bey, would give the first lecture. A further, different list of professor names emerged.¹³¹ But from the notification of the lists of participant students to the faculties it is clear that the preparations had come to last phase. Nevertheless, the last and definite knowledge about the Institute's program, professors of the Institute, and followers of the lectures at Institute were determined only a few days before the Revolution Lectures began.

According to this, at the beginning of March, only a one-month program of the Institute could be determined. The Institute's opening ceremony would be held on 4 March. The Minister of Education, Hikmet Bey, Recep, Mahmut Esat, and Yusuf Kemal Beys would be lecturing. Assistant professors with academic careers would help these professors coming from political careers. These assistant professors were Enver Ziya Karal, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Yavuz Abadan, and Rüçhan Naci (and later Ömer Lütfü Barkan).¹³² The students who would follow the courses, on the other hand, were determined as final semester students of all faculties of the University with last semester students of the War Academy, the School of Engineering and the Higher

¹²⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, "Üniversitede/İnkılap Enstitüsü," 1 Kanunusani 1934. For the new idea, two chairs formed the Institute of Revolution: Chairs of Turkish History and Turkish Revolution. *Milliyet*, "Üniversitede/İnkılap Enstitüsü/Bugünden itibaren tedrisata başlanıyor," 1 Kanunusani 1934.

¹³⁰ *Milliyet*, "İnkılap Dersi/İlk açık dersi Recep Bey verecek," 4 Şubat 1934. It is written that following the courses would be compulsory for all university students and that the Institute would have almost three thousands students. A Revolution Library would be established near the Revolution Museum, which would be established by the municipality, in Beyazıt. *Milliyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü açılıyor/Recep ve Hikmet Beyler bu günlerde geliyorlar," 21 Şubat 1934.

¹³¹ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü," 21 Şubat 1934.

¹³² Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, "Devrim ve Tarih," in *Yazarlarımız Atatürk'ü Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Uygurluk Yay., 1981), p. 209. From: *Cumhuriyet*, 25 Ocak 1981.

School of Commerce. It was stated that over three thousands students would attend the lectures,¹³³ which would be given four afternoons a week.¹³⁴

The Revolution Lectures

The roots of these courses in the Republican era can be traced back to 1925. A course on the History of Revolutions given by Mahmut Esat in the Faculty of Law in Ankara can be seen as a pioneer course in which the Turkish Revolution was examined comparatively with other revolutions.¹³⁵ Cevdet Kerim's (İncedayı) Conferences on Turkish Independence Fighting (*Türk İstiklal Mücahededesi Konferansları*), which were held in 1927, were also forerunners.¹³⁶ People's Chairs, which were established in relation to the tenth anniversary of the Republic, and also the Revolution and Independence Conferences, which were held by these chairs, laid the way for the Revolution Lectures of 1934.¹³⁷

¹³³ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü/Bir aylık ders programı tesbit edildi," 2 Mart 1934. Later this claim would be falsified.

¹³⁴ *Milliyet*, "Maarif Vekili Maarif erkanile birlikte bu sabah geliyor," 28 Şubat 1934.

¹³⁵ Neslihan Doğru, "Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Derslerinin Dünü-Bugünü-Geleceği" (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 1989), p. 77. The course was given the first and second semesters one hour a week. Ahmet Mumcu, *Ankara Adliye Hukuk Mektebi'nden Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi'ne 1925-1975* (Ankara: AÜ Hukuk Fakültesi Yay., Sevinç Matbaası, 1977), p. 126. Besides, the writings of Mahmut Esat under the title of "Türk İhtilalinin Düsturları" (the Principles of Turkish Revolution) published in the newspaper of *Sada-yı Hak* as twelve parts in 1924 can be accepted as pioneer texts theorizing Kemalism. Hakkı Uyar published these writings with the new alphabet in *Tarih ve Toplum* in 1992.

¹³⁶ These conferences were given at the Ankara Turkish Hearth, the Darülfünun Conference Hall in İstanbul, and in the Course for Teachers in Ankara. These conferences, which were published as book in 1927 by the Ministry of Education, were presented under the sub-title of "Halk Konferansları" (People Conferences). Hakkı Uyar, "Tek Parti Yönetimi'nde Halka Yönelik Propaganda: İnkılap ve İstiklal Konferansları," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 17 (Mayıs 1995), p. 52 and 56. Transcription of these conferences to the new alphabet was made and published: Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, "Türk İstiklal Mücahededesi Konferansları," ed., Hüsamettin Ünsal, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, nos. 21, 22, 24 (Temmuz 1991, Kasım 1991, Temmuz 1992).

¹³⁷ Uyar. People's Chairs were the product of the single-party government's propaganda studies. Uyar writes that on the tenth anniversary of the Republic, 5,885 speeches were made in 356 cities and towns, in 882 People's Chairs, in three days. Revolution and Independence Conferences were the work of the party both in theory and in practice. Conferences were given in People's Houses, cinema halls or public squares of cities. Lecturers generally were the political elite (deputy, heads of the party in the provinces) but there were also lecturers from the university, high schools, people's houses and different levels of bureaucracy. For a direction of the secretary general of the party, which was signed by Recep Peker, about the Revolution and Independence Conferences, see Appendix 3. It is interesting here that the content of these conferences consisted of Recep Peker's Revolution Lectures notes as a stipulation. The direction contains detailed information about how the content of Peker's course notes should be processed in both conferences.

The newspapers on 4 March 1934 repeated that courses at the Institute of Revolution would begin and that Minister of Education Hikmet Bey had traveled to İstanbul for this reason.¹³⁸ No ceremony would be made for the opening of the Institute and the courses would begin immediately.¹³⁹

On the next day, it was announced on the first pages of the newspapers in headlines that the Institute of Revolution had been opened and that Minister of Education Hikmet Bey had given the first lecture.¹⁴⁰ Photographs from the Institute's opening and Hikmet Bey's speech accompanying the news show that the prominent listeners in the pictures were military officers and university professors rather than students. The conference hall was chock-full. All together the audience sang the March of the Republic. Playing the "*Ömüncü Yıl Marşı*" (The march of tenth anniversary of the Republic) on a phonograph before each lecture became a ritual by the first lectures.

The lectures at the Institute began at 17:30, but the conference hall began to fill up earlier in the afternoon. Newspapers were not in accord on the number of people attending the lectures. Estimates ranged from "thousands of listeners" to "at least one thousand five hundred persons."

Hikmet Bey gave some information about the Institute of Revolution at the beginning of the first lecture. He described the activities of the Institute, its academic cadre, and its course program. The first lecture ended at 18:30.

In the following days, the lectures were given great place in the newspapers. Not only the students, but also people from outside interested in these lectures. Even considering the productivity of the lecture, it was made clear that only students who had examination cards would be allowed into the hall in which the lectures were given. Students of the lower classes showed great interest in and attended the lectures by

¹³⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "Maarif Vekili dün geldi/İnkılap Enstitüsünde bugün ilk ders verilecek," 4 Mart 1934.

¹³⁹ *Milliyet*, "Sessiz sedasız bir geliş/İnkılap enstitüsü Bugün açılıyor," 4 Mart 1934.

¹⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü açıldı/İlk Dersi dün Maarif Vekili Hikmet B. Verdi," 5 Mart 1934. *Milliyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü Açıldı/Hikmet Bey İlk Dersini Verdi," 5 Mart 1934.

slipping past the guards at the door.¹⁴¹ In the next days, the news emerged that disciplinary precautions would be increased at the door so that only final semester students would be at the lectures.¹⁴²

Except for the students, deputies in İstanbul, faculty deans and professors, members of the Ministry of Education and members of the War Academy attended the lectures.¹⁴³ However, the interest in the lectures of the first days waned with time.¹⁴⁴

News about the lectures at the Institute continued to be reported in the newspapers. The arrival of professors to İstanbul to give lectures and their return to Ankara were matters of news.

After Hikmet Bey, who dwelt upon the political and international political dimensions of the Revolution, former Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bey began lectures on the Revolution's justice and law dimension on 8 March.¹⁴⁵ The interest of the press in the lectures continued.¹⁴⁶ On 12 March, former Minister of Justice Yusuf Kemal Bey started lectures on the economic dimension of the Revolution.¹⁴⁷ On 15 March, secretary general of the party, Recep Peker started lectures on the political dimension of the Revolution.¹⁴⁸ The courses were so popular that proposals were made for their dissemination. Yunus Nadi, for example, advocated that the courses, which

¹⁴¹ *Milliyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsünde.../Bütün Gençlik Dersleri Dinlemek İstiyor," 9 Mart 1934.

¹⁴² *Milliyet*, "İnkılabımızın Adli Cephesi," 10 Mart 1934.

¹⁴³ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsü/Maarif Vekili Hikmet Bey, dün ikinci dersinde Türk İnkılabı demek Gazi demek olduğunu söyledi ve Gazi büyük adamların en mümtazıdır, dedi," 6 Mart 1934.

¹⁴⁴ Aslan Tufan Yazman, *Atatürk'le Beraber*, second edition (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yay., 1984), p. 359. Yazman writes that in the work of writing these lectures for the newspapers, in which he also took part as a correspondent, *Cumhuriyet* remained alone after the first few lectures. But, also *Milliyet* for example, continued to report on the lectures daily with a detailed content inventories.

¹⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri," 8 Mart 1934.

¹⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Tarihi dersleri/Sabık Adliye Vekili 'Gazi Türk milletinin önünde ilerliyen bir zafer bayrağıdır' sözile derse başladı," 9 Mart 1934.

¹⁴⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsünde dünkü ders/Yusuf Kemal dün ilk dersini Verdi/Sabık Adliye Vekili inkılabı iktisat bakımından anlattı, eski devirlerle bugünü mukayese etti," 12 Mart 1934.

¹⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Tarihi konferansları/Recep Bey, yarın ilk dersini verecek," 14 Mart 1934. It is clear that there is false information. It is said that Recep Bey would discuss the revolution from the perspective of its military dimension.

were given at the Ankara and İstanbul Chairs of Revolution, should be broadcast on the radio.¹⁴⁹

On 9 March, news about the decision to found a Chair of Revolution also in Ankara was reported in the press. Students of the Faculty of Law and other faculties would be registered under this Chair. At the same time, people who requested to follow the lectures from the outside would be accepted. It was announced that the professors who gave lectures at the Institute of Revolution in İstanbul would give lectures in Ankara as well. Its opening lecture would be made by İsmet Pasha. It was written that Atatürk himself would give lectures, and that the broadcast of the lectures by radio was probable.¹⁵⁰ A written Decree of the Council of Ministers on 10 March partly confirmed and partly modified this news. According to this, the demand for those lectures to be given also in Ankara came from the Ministry of Education. As in the case of İstanbul, the time of the lectures would be 17:30, “the hour, at which everyone would be free.”¹⁵¹

İsmet Pasha, the Prime Minister, gave his lecture on 20 March in the building of the People’s House in Ankara. The lecture was broadcast on the radio; some technical regulations were even created on radio broadcasts for the lecture.¹⁵²

İsmet Pasha’s lecture, titled “General Views on the Turkish Revolution” (*Türk İnkılabı Üzerinde Umumi Görüşler*) found interest among the high-level state bureaucracy. The lecture was widely reported in the press as well. Kazım Pasha, the Chairman of the TGNA; ministers; members of the parliament; bureaucrats of the ministries; members of the High Military Council; members of the Turkish History Association and the Turkish Language Association; ambassadors; the mayors of Ankara and İstanbul; professors of the Faculty of Law; last-semester students of the Faculty of

¹⁴⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi, “İnkılap kürsüsü Dersleri radyo ile Tamim edilmelidir,” 12 Mart 1934.

¹⁵⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, “Ankara’da da bir inkılap kürsüsü açılıyor,” 10 Mart 1934. *Milliyet*, “Ankarada inkılap kürsüsü,” 11 Mart 1934. *Cumhuriyet*, “Ankara İnkılap Kürsüsü bu hafta açılıyor,” 18 Mart 1934.

¹⁵¹ For the written decree, see Appendix 4.

¹⁵² *Cumhuriyet*, “İsmet Paşanın vereceği ders,” 19 Mart 1934. Radio Ankara would broadcast this lecture at 1500 Mhz.

Law, Institutes, High Schools and Teacher Schools with teachers in the Teacher Schools and the Middle Schools were among followers of the lecture.

All of the people who wanted to attend could not fit into the building of the People's House of Ankara because of the great interest. They listened to the lecture from radios, which were placed in front of the People's House building and various places around the city.¹⁵³ The text of the speech was also published in the newspapers and periodicals. In addition, writings and interpretations related to this lecture found place in the newspapers and periodicals.¹⁵⁴ Later, recordings of the lectures in Ankara would be listened to in İstanbul from loudspeakers placed in the public square of the university and around the city.¹⁵⁵

With the lectures of Hikmet Bey on 22 and 23 March, the first program of the Institute was completed. Notification of the following program from the Ministry of Education to the university was expected. Meanwhile, other than the last-year students of university faculties, along with the Higher Commerce and War Academies, it was decided that the last-year students of the Faculty of Political Sciences (Mülkiye) would also attend the lectures. In this way, the number of students to attend the lectures would reach seven hundred. It was circulated that beginning on 15 March, primary and middle schools teachers along with high school history, geography and civics teachers would be required to attend the lectures. It was announced that a guest-book would be opened for these teachers.¹⁵⁶

The Ministry of Education would collect the conferences given in the Institute at the end of the year and would publish them. At the same time, the matter of examinations at the Institute was solved. The examinations would be held at the Faculty

¹⁵³ *Cumhuriyet*, "Başvekilin İnkılap dersi/İsmet Paşa Türk İnkılabını derin, yüksek bir görüşle, cidden pek güzel bir şekilde anlattı," 21 Mart 1934.

¹⁵⁴ -, "Dünkü ders," *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 21 Mart 1934; Sadri Etem, "İsmet Paşanın dersi," *Vakit*, 22 Mart 1934; Ahmet Asım, "Türk İnkılabının Mana ve Mahiyeti," *Vakit*, 22 Mart 1934; Falih Rıfki, "İnkılap Dersi," *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, 24 Mart 1934; *Ayun Tarihi* (Nisan 1934). *Cumhuriyet*, "Hem Nalına Hem Mihına/İsmet Paşanın dersi," 22 Mart 1934.

¹⁵⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, "Ankaradaki İnkılap dersleri buradan dinlendi," 6 Mayıs 1934.

¹⁵⁶ *Milliyet*, "Recep Bey derse başladı," 16 Mart 1934.

of Literature and would be performed by the faculty's assistant professors of general history. According to this, students who failed to earn a certificate from the Institute would not be graduated.

At the same time, the building of the Institute of Revolution was one of the problems on the agenda.¹⁵⁷ Newspapers gave place to news and articles related to this matter.

On 25 March, the office of the President of the University announced the April and May program of courses of the Institute of Revolution.¹⁵⁸ News about the courses and course texts were published (as detailed summaries) in the newspapers. News about the courses given at the Chair of Revolution in Ankara (under smaller titles and shorter columns) accompanied these texts.¹⁵⁹ The shortcomings of the Institute of Revolution and the lectures were not seen as only technical matters and were not left to the responsibility of the Ministry of Education or the Presidency of the University. They had been a matter of discussion also in the TGNA.¹⁶⁰ Other than articles about the lectures, readers' letters about the lectures also appeared in the press.¹⁶¹ A newspaper tells that they received many letters from cities and towns in Anatolia. According to this, the Revolution Lectures were followed with interest in the newspaper and its publication in book form was demanded. In addition, the newspaper reported that finally the Revolution Lectures would be published as a book¹⁶².

¹⁵⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Tarihi konferansları/Recep Bey, yarın ilk dersini verecek," 14 Mart 1934. Meanwhile, it was stated that the Ministry of Education definitely decided to construct a building for the Institute of Revolution and it would be realized in the fiscal year of 1934. According to this, the conference hall of the Institute would have a capacity of five thousand. *Milliyet*, "İnkılap kürsüsü," 15 Mart 1934.

¹⁵⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "Üniversite Rektörlüğünden," 25 Mart 1934. *Aydın Tarihi*, "Hadiselerin Takvimi/Bu ay zarfında Ankara ve İstanbul'da verilen İnkılap derslerinin sırası..." no. 5 (Nisan, 1934).

¹⁵⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, "Ankara İnkılap Kürsüsünde ikinci ders," 3 Nisan 1934.

Cumhuriyet, "Yusuf Kemal Beyin ikinci dersi," 9 Nisan 1934. *Cumhuriyet*, "Ankaradaki dersler," 15 Nisan 1934. *Cumhuriyet*, "Hikmet Beyin dünkü dersi," 18 Nisan 1934. *Cumhuriyet*, "Recep Beyin Ankarada İnkılap dersleri," 19 Nisan 1934.

¹⁶⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, "Dünkü Meclis içtimai/İnkılap Tarihi dersleri için bir müzakere," 6 Nisan 1934.

¹⁶¹ *Cumhuriyet*, "Karilerimiz Diyorlar ki/İnkılap dersleri," 23 Nisan 1934.

¹⁶² *Milliyet*, "İnkılap enstitüsünde üçüncü ders," 8 Mart 1934.

On 16 May, Mahmut Esat Bey completed his lectures, to restart in the next winter semester.¹⁶³ With Recep Bey's lecture on 19 May, the first year lectures in the Institute of Revolution finished.¹⁶⁴

Discussions

Essentially, it is not possible to say that the establishment of the Institute of Revolution in the body of the newly founded İstanbul University and then the activation of a Chair of Revolution in Ankara created serious discussions. But they did find reflections in public opinion.

Different from the matter of revolution literature, there was no wide discussion about these courses. Interpretations of these courses and reactions to them carried similar content. Circulation of thought about the matter remained limited. All of these were caused by the fact that the courses came on to the agenda by the initiative of the political elite, and that the political elite undertook them, again, in person. In the process, a multi-voiced and participatory form was not sought. From the determination of the professors of the Institute to the decision of who would attend the lectures, elitist tendencies were dominant.

We can take discussions about the Institute of Revolution back to the discussions which were made before and after the University (*Darülfünun*) Reform. Criticisms directed towards the *Darülfünun* were collected under two titles. The first contained criticisms, like that the university was not creative and dynamic, so that it was not productive; but it was merely a translator, performing education from encyclopedic

¹⁶³ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Dersleri/Mahmut Esat Bey din, laiklik, ekalliyetler ve manda meselelerini izah ederek derslerini bitirdi," 17 Mayıs 1934.

¹⁶⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Kürsüsüne bu yılın son dersi/ İç ve dış düşmanları alteden şerefli mücadelelerin tarihçesi," 20 Mayıs 1934.

knowledge.¹⁶⁵ These were the common concerns of the interwar years' regimes about higher education. The second heading, which was certainly of greater weight, included questions of the university's loyalty to the Revolution before and after, and the claim that it did not carry out its duties and responsibilities to the Revolution. The second thesis emerged at the time of the *Darülfünun* Reform as the idea of foundation of the Institute of Revolution as a bridge between the new university and the Revolution.

The second thesis found its theoretical bases in a report presented to Esat Sagay, the Minister of Education, on 1 June 1932, which had been prepared by Professor Malche from Switzerland on the request of the government for the *Darülfünun* Reform.¹⁶⁶ In this report, Malche stated that the İstanbul University did not have the dynamism required by the Turkish Revolution, with its theory-dominant tradition. Theory-domination (*nazariyecilik*) put a distance between science, thought and life. According to him, the universities should be busy with matters in a country like Turkey that was undergoing a deep transformation and had been entirely re-formed.¹⁶⁷ Ahmet Şükrü discussed the necessity of a Chair of Revolution with these words: "A university is not only a school in which the definite sciences are taught. At the same time, it is a source of culture and the cultural laboratory of a country. The History of Revolution will constitute the most important of these culture lessons."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ The political elites agreed with these criticisms, as did Mustafa Kemal, as is seen in his notes on Professor Malche's report, for example. Burhan Göksel, "Atatürk'ün Eğitim Konusunda Görüşleri ve Misak-ı Maarif," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* I, no. 3 (Temmuz, 1985), p. 946.

¹⁶⁶ The Ministry of Education published this report later. Albert Malche, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hakkında Rapor* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1939). Malche notes that the autonomy of the university caused scientific activity to be broken off from life and so from society and politics. Needless to say, this was the reflection of the dominant understanding of higher education in the interwar years: "It is necessary to prevent the transformation of *autonomy* into a kind of alienation and becoming isolated." *Muhtariyetin bir nevi uzaklaşış ve kendi kendine kalış mahiyetini almasına mani olmak lazımdır*. Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁶⁷ Utkan Kocatürk, "Atatürk'ün Üniversite Reformu İle İlgili Notları," *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* I, no. 1 (Kasım, 1934), p. 4.

¹⁶⁸ *Üniversite yalnız muayyen ilimlerin okutulduğu bir mektep değil, aynı zamanda bir memleketin kültür kaynağı ve kültür laboratuvarıdır. İnkılap tarihi bu kültür derslerinin en ehemmiyetlisini teşkil edecektir. Milliyet*, "Üniversitede İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri," 7 Mart 1934.

“Academic Sociality” also was given a special place among the proposals in Malche’s report.¹⁶⁹

Another early advocate of this thesis was the periodical *Kadro*. Şevket Süreyya expressed this thesis by finding the exclusion of scholars and artists who contradicted the values of the revolutions in Russia and Italy as understandable: “If this sensitivity did not exist, if the things which are called science, art, etc., and are dressed up with abstract values here and were not tied to the daily matters of the Revolution in these countries, the swamp fields called the *kampani di Roma* would not have been transformed into green fields similar to flower beds and the biggest industrial zone in the world would not have been born on these shores where the Cossacks of Dinyeper played pipes.¹⁷⁰

Burhan Asaf agreed with Malche’s idea that the university remained loyal to two principles of the university concept of the nineteenth century: Science was made for science and intervention into science from the outside could not be accepted.¹⁷¹ This opposition to the theoretical and praise of the practical were the dominant stance of the period.¹⁷² It seems possible to compare this with the anti-intellectualism¹⁷³ of National

¹⁶⁹ Horst Widmann, *Atatürk Üniversite Reformu* (İstanbul: İÜ Cerrahpaşa Tıp F. Atatürk’ün 100. Doğum Yılı Kutlama Yay., 1981), p. 33.

¹⁷⁰ *Eğer bu hassasiyet olmasa idi, eğer isimlerine ilim, san’at ve saire denilen ve bizde her birinin üstüne maverai bir gaze giydirilen şeyler, bu memleketlerde inkalabın günlük davalarına bağlanmasaydı kampani di Roma denilen bataklık tarlaları, tarhlara benzeyen bir yeşil mamureye dönmez, Dinyeper kazaklarının kaval çaldığı sahillerde dünyanın en büyük sanayi muntikası doğmazdı.* Şevket Süreyya, “Darülfünun İnkılap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığı,” *Kadro*, ?

¹⁷¹ Burhan Asaf, “Üniversite’nin Manası,” *Kadro*, no. 20 (Ağustos 1933).

¹⁷² In the time of the Darülfünun Reform, Nermi wrote in *Cumhuriyet*: “Great and real revolutionists, in more proper words, true revolutions, know to clean their roads from the great many birdlimes of theory.” *Büyük ve gerçek inkılapçılar, daha uygun bir sözle, tam inkılaplar, yollarını binbir nazariye öksesinden temizlemeği bilirler.* M. Nermi, “Gazi Türkiyesinde İnkılap ve Üniversite,” *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Temmuz 1933. In fact, discussions on Darülfünun about theory-domination goes back more. Mehmed Emin Bey in an article titled “İdealistik tehlikesi ve Darülfünun” which was answered by Fuat Köprülü, said: (education in the faculty of literature) “...should evolve around the axis of Turkey, then a bit more heat should enter the instruction. Those who do not look at their surroundings and do not base their scientific studies on the needs of the vicinity, at most become imitators of other scientists.” *Türkiye mihveri etrafında dönmeli, sonra da tedrisata bir parça daha hararet girmelidir. Muhitine bakmayan, ilmi tedkikleri muhitin ihtiyacı esasına istinat ettirmeyenler, olsa olsa başka alimlerin mukallidi olurlar.* Köprülüzade Fuad, “Darülfünun’un Vazifeleri,” in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı II*, eds. M. Kaplan, İ. Enginün, Z. Kerman, N. Birinci, A. Uçman (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1981), p. 557; from *Hayat*, C. II, nr. 28 (9 Haziran 1927), p. 23.

Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. On the other hand, the intellectual support of the Institute of Revolution which came on to the agenda after the University Reform was not limited to the idea that a bridge was necessary between the Turkish Revolution and the university. To make the science of the revolution with sociological methods, by studying cause-result relations and by determining their rules (there were longings beside the idea of making the ideology of the revolution here) were attempts expected from the University Reform and the Institute of Revolution:

The Scientification of the Revolution... Making the science of the Revolution... While doing this, dealing with the morphologic qualities means, for example, making something like ethnography. This is spending of labor in vain does not approach the quality of finding the rules that are sought by the real concept of science. Investigating the sociological, namely the essential qualities, thinking hard on the rules... This is just what the Revolution expected from the scientist.¹⁷⁴

Nevertheless, at the beginning at least, this attempt remained insignificant.

The writers of *Kadro* at the beginning also gave importance to the Institute of Revolution and its courses. The aims of the courses coincided with their own. But no role was proposed for them to undertake about the Institute of Revolution and the courses. About these courses and other efforts of the political elites to create an ideology of the Revolution, *Kadro* was hesitant. In principle, it was put forward that this attempt was regarded positively and it should be supported. But the political elites' not giving place to anyone other than themselves in this project and even their developing exclusionary attitudes set a distance. For this reason, "allusive" writings, built on the theme of the insufficiency of the political elites to make the ideology of the Revolution, appeared in *Kadro*.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ This tension between the theoretical and the practical throughout the 1940s determined the agenda of education policies. "Antagonistic attitude against the abstract knowledge" (anti-intellectualism) showed itself in the experience of the Village Institutes. M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Köy Enstitüleri," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 287.

¹⁷⁴ *İnkılabın ilimleşmesi... İnkılabın ilmini yapmak.. Bunu yaparken morfolojik vasıflarla uğraşmak, mesela, etnoğrafya gibi bir şey yapmak demektir; bu, asıl ilim mefhumunun aradığı kanuniyet vasfına yanaşmayan, beyhude bir emek harcamaktır. Sosyolojik, yani asli vasıfları tetkik etmek, kanuniyetler üzerinde kafa yormak.. İnkılabın alimden beklediği işte budur.* Tahir Hayrettin, p. 38.

¹⁷⁵ Mustafa Türkes, *Kadro Hareketi/Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), pp. 208-209.

While hailing the foundation of the Institute of Revolution, *Kadro* noted that its readers would remember the periodical's early wishes related to the foundation of a revolution institute. *Kadro* also reminded them of their ideas and proposals for the founding of a revolution museum as well.¹⁷⁶

From the perspective of the discussions they caused, the Institute of Revolution in İstanbul and the Chair of Revolution in Ankara were discussed for different reasons and with different themes, especially in the press. Related to its academic institutionality, the Institute of Revolution in İstanbul was discussed in the context of the Revolution's ideology, and relations between the Revolution and the university. In the writings about the Chair of Revolution in Ankara, the explanations made by politicians and their activities received focus. The courses given, except for distinctive examples like İsmet Pasha's lecture, did not include new ideas or anything different and can be considered to have been repetitions of the lectures in İstanbul.

It is difficult to evaluate the writings about the Revolution Lectures as discussion. Quotations in general, from time to time proposals, and in the extreme examples, constructive criticisms appeared.

The Institute of Revolution and the RPP

On the tenth anniversary of the Republic, when the idea of the Institute of Revolution emerged, the Turkish Republic was a Kemalist single-party state. This had been officially declared during the third congress of the RPP in 1931 when the six principles of Kemalism had been inserted into the party program. These six principles contained the Kemalist ideology's views as a whole, which "were inculcated" through the press, schools, and the army.¹⁷⁷ The Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures can be seen as a special form of this indoctrination. The entrance of these six

¹⁷⁶ Şevket Süreyya, "İnkılap Kürsülerinde İnkılap İlmileşmelidir," *Kadro*, no. 28 (Nisan, 1934), p. 6.

¹⁷⁷ E. J. Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, fourth edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 1999), p. 265.

principles into the Constitution occurred in 1937. These principles as essential components of the RPP program thus became identical with the state.

Also, the Institute of Revolution cannot be thought of separately from the RPP, which was accepted as identical to the Revolution. Alaettin Cemil, a deputy from İstanbul, reminds us of this in the period in which the Institute of Revolution was established. Cemil wrote that the RPP was not a party of politics and that all of the principles of the party as a whole formed the Revolution itself. Therefore, the guide for the Institute of Revolution should have been the Program of the RPP.

While talking about the Institute of Revolution, there is a compulsion to put the program of the RPP, which made the Revolution and is governing Turkey today at the top of the list... The program of the RPP is based on all the highest scientific and modern principles. For the Institute of Revolution, which will be opened during the public celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Republic, the RPP program will be the most important lesson and even the basic part of the Institute.¹⁷⁸

Not a theoretical-ideological, but rather a practical demand is in question here. The quality of demands can also be read as an indicator of the separation between the state and the party. Different from the examples given above, the education policies of the period do not confirm the identity of the party with the state bureaucracy, which is stressed somewhat abundantly. A struggle between the political/ ideological priorities of the party or government and the academic priorities of the education bureaucracy/ academics was a shared characteristic of the education policies of the period's authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Contrary to the situation in the USSR and the PRC, political and ideological demands remained behind the educational standards and academic priorities in National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy. The single-party government in the Republic of Turkey, on the other hand, preferred a kind of

¹⁷⁸ *İnkılap Enstitüsünden bahsederken İnkılabı yapan ve bugün Türkiyeyi idare eden CHF hükümetinin programını ilk sıraya koymak mecburiyeti vardır...CHF programı bütün ilmi ve muasır en yüksek prensiplere istinat etmektedir. Cumhuriyetin onuncu yıl şenliklerinde açılacak İnkılap Enstitüsü için CHF programı en mühim bir ders, ve hatta Enstitünün belkemiği olacaktır. Alaettin Cemil, "İnkılap Enstitüsü ve Gençlik," Cumhuriyet, 23 Ağustos 1933.*

cooperation or division of labor in its relations with education and university members, especially after the University Reform. The separation that developed between the party and education bureaucracy was caused by the political government's taking special place both over the party and over the state bureaucracy.

Proposals

Proposals for both the Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures basically were not directed towards the program and the content. Rather, technical matters were mentioned and how the lectures could be transmitted to the broader masses most common received a good deal of attention.

The proposals involved suggestions about the broadcast of the Revolution Lectures over the radio. The spread of the Revolution's values by courses at first, and later on by books, was regarded positively. It was advocated that with this form, the courses addressed only the youth, while the whole nation should have been the target. Radio represented an unprecedented opportunity for this work. It would be possible to reach the masses in the People's Houses, their homes, and even in coffee houses and casinos. With a little more effort, this scope could expand.¹⁷⁹ In response to the increase in the number of similar demands, the Ankara and İstanbul Radio stations broadcast İsmet Pasha's oration given at the Chair of Revolution at the Ankara People's House on 20 March 1920. The newspapers reported that people listened to the speech from radios placed in front of the People's House and various places throughout the city.¹⁸⁰

To transmit the lectures to the wider masses was a wish that was repeatedly expressed. On 5 April 1934, the deputy of Denizli, Mazhar Müfit Bey's question in the

¹⁷⁹ Yunus Nadi, "İnkılap kürsüsü Dersleri radyo ile Tamim edilmelidir," *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Mart 1934.

¹⁸⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, "Başvekilin İnkılap dersi/İsmet Paşa Türk İnkılabını derin, yüksek bir görüşle, cidden pek güzel bir şekilde anlattı," 21 Mart 1934.

TGNA of why the people were not accepted to the courses at the Institute of Revolution at İstanbul University, was answered by Hikmet Bey, the Minister of Education:

The desire shown for the lectures given in the Chair of Revolution deserves endless gratitude. Thus, both the Ministry of Education and the university are pleased. Yet the hall of İstanbul University can take in 1500 people. Officially, the number of students and teachers attending here is about 100-1200. Because of excessive demands in the first days, the administration of the university had to put limitations...The level of the lectures is in the style that can be understood by enlightened people. In Ankara also, the people are coming together in places where radio exists, and listening. Because of that, we are broadcasting on the radio, everyone can profit from the lectures. In addition to this, books will be published and will be sold at cheap prices.¹⁸¹

Truly, the conferences were printed and published as books and presented to meet the demands of the masses. The books were presented for sale at affordable prices. At the same time, libraries received multiple copies throughout Anatolia. Recep Peker's book was in a privileged position. Two to four copies of his book were sent to the ministries, the presidencies of the RPP in cities and towns, the chairmanships of the People's Houses in the cities and towns, some associations (like the Turkish Language Association) and newspapers. We know that high school directorates also procured the book. In addition, copies were sent to influential people such as deputies, writers, and artists.¹⁸² Hikmet Bey continued: "Thousands of citizens listen to the radio. If this Sublime Assembly wishes, it will have a Conference Hall for 5-6 thousands people built."¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ *İnkılap kürsüsünde verilen derslere gösterilen istek son derece şükranla layıktır. Bundan dolayı maarif Vekaleti de, Üniversite de memnundur. Ancak İstanbul Üniversite salonu 1500 kişi alır. Buraya usulen devam eden talebe ve muallim adedi 1000-1200 kişidir. İlk günlerde o kadar tehcüm olmuştur ki Üniversite idaresi tedbir almağa, tahdidat koymağa mecbur oldu...Derslerin seviyesi münevver halkın anlayacağı tarzdadır. Ankarada da halk, radyo olan yerlerde toplanıyor, ve dinliyorlar. Radyo ile verdiğimiz için herkes istifade edebiliyor. Bundan başka bunlar kitap halinde basılacak ve çok ucuza satılacaktır.* For the text of Mazhar Müfit Bey's question, see Appendix 5.

¹⁸² For detailed information about this matter, see Appendix 6.

¹⁸³ *(Radyo ile on binlerce vatandaş dinliyor. Meclisi alileri arzu buyurursa 5-6 bin kişilik bir konferans salonu yaptırır. Cumhuriyet, "Dünkü Meclis içtimau/İnkılap Tarihi dersleri için bir müzakere," 6 Nisan 1934.*

Mazhar Müfit Bey, who began to speak after Hikmet Bey's answer, said that the Revolution Lectures had an importance from which all citizens benefited. Following these lectures was necessary for people who had experienced the Revolution themselves. So, when the Revolution Lectures were in question, a separation could not be made between the intellectual and the un-intellectual. Mazhar Müfit Bey also proposed that the courses be broadcast by radio in Ayasofya Public Square, by placing a loudspeaker in front of the İstanbul University.¹⁸⁴ Mazhar Müfit Bey's ideas found their reflections in the university. During the lecture of Yusuf Kemal Bey on 1 April 1934, the doors were open, so those who wished could listen.¹⁸⁵

Mention of the Revolution Lectures appeared in the newspapers on a daily basis. Sometimes a long summary of the lectures and sometimes parts of them verbatim were published. Transmitting the lectures word for word in the daily newspapers was technically impossible, but this could be done in publications, which had a more special purpose. Proposals were made that these lectures be published verbatim in the periodical *Ülkü*.¹⁸⁶

Places and Forms of Lectures

The lectures were given at the Institute of Revolution, which had been founded in the body of İstanbul University after the University Reform, and later in the Chair of Revolution that was established in Ankara. Where the lectures would be held was always a subject of debate. In the time of the University Reform, the idea of founding the Institute of Revolution came onto the agenda together with that of constructing a new building for the Institute. Hikmet Bey, the Minister of Education, in a declaration on 13 November 1933, said that "the construction of a new building in University

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, "Konferansları Halk ta takip edebilecek," 2 Nisan 1934.

¹⁸⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, "Karilerimiz Diyorlar ki/İnkılap dersleri," 23 Nisan 1934.

Square is not on the agenda and the Institute of Revolution will be inside the University.”¹⁸⁷ This subject continued to be discussed both in the press and in the TGNA.

Professorship at the Institute was not permanent. Important persons who had vital parts in the revolution movements, in sequence, gave the lectures. At the beginning, it was thought that the courses would be conducted in two-month segments. The professors for each period, who would work as a volunteer, would be determined by the Council of Ministers, who would then inform the university. Targets were both the university students and the academic cadre of the university. But together with the other members of the education bureaucracy, members of the military and civilian bureaucracies would be included in this mass, later. The education would be both practical and theoretical. It would continue until 15:00 every day and roll also would be taken.¹⁸⁸ Later, it was announced that the lectures would be given as conferences.

In December 1933, the Ministry of Education prepared regulations about the Institute of Revolution. Students of the Institute who were required to follow the courses would be considered to have failed to pass the examinations in the Faculty if they had not earned a certificate from the Institute. The courses would be given three days a week. The times of the lectures also were re-determined and now would be held between 17:00 and 18:00 or 20:00.¹⁸⁹

Preparations for the courses took their final form a short time before the beginning of the lectures. According to this, only last year students would attend the

¹⁸⁷ *Üniversite meydanına yeni bir bina yapılmasının sözkonusu olmadığı, İnkılab Enstitüsünün Üniversite içinde bulunacağı.* Öklem, p. 63.

¹⁸⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, “İnkılap Enstitüsü/İsmet ve Fevzi Paşalar da hocalık edecekler, Enstitünün faaliyet esasları tesbit olundu,” 12 Teşrinisani 1933.

¹⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, “İnkılap Enstitüsü derslere başlıyor/İlk konferans gelecek ay başındadır,” 15 Kanunuevvel 1933.

Institute, which was bound to the Faculty of Literature. Examinations would be made at the end of the year, by the professors of history.¹⁹⁰

The Institute was opened with a lecture by Hikmet Bey, at 17:30 on 4 March 1934, on a Sunday. Photographs reveal an atmosphere of ceremony in the news articles about the lecture. *Cumhuriyet* reported on the beginning of the Revolution Lectures on its first page, as follows: “People who filled up the hall sang the March of Republic as chorus.” (Salonu dolduranlar hep bir ağızdan Cumhuriyet marşını terennüm ettiler.) The newspapers reported that the *Omuncu Yıl Marşı* was played before the lecture.

The courses continued to begin at 17:30. The newspapers reported that in the next days also, the conference hall began to be filled from 15:30. Having the lectures at 17:30 might have had practical reasons. In this way, the normal program of the university did not coincide with the lecture hours. Conferences in the Institute of Revolution for students were different from a typical course with its time. Other than students, military and civilian bureaucrats and members of the university attended, so this hour made their participation easier. From the second lecture on, some limitations were brought to attending the lectures to prevent the crowd of the first lecture, and only the students who had roll cards were accepted to the hall.

The stories report that the professors of the Institute went to the chair and ended their lectures with applause. Each was a perfect orator. For example, a conference by Recep Peker, who is known to have been as a fiery orator, was frequently interrupted by applause, even though he told the audience that applause were not necessary as he was giving a lecture.¹⁹¹

There was no standard form for the lectures. Each professor lectured in his own style. The style differences are reflected also in the course texts, as will be examined later in detail. The courses were given as conferences in general and played the role of

¹⁹⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, “İnkılap Enstitüsü,” 21 Şubat 1934.

¹⁹¹ *Cumhuriyet*, “Recep B. İnkılap kürsüsünde/Recep Bey bu dersinde Türk İnkılabının her bakımdan tam, kamil ve cihanşümül bir inkılap olduğunu ispat etti,” 16 Mart 1934.

courses from time to time. In some cases they were transformed into scrutinizing (*mütalaa*) some sources as will be seen later. For example, at the end of each lecture, Recep Bey made time for audience questions.

Some materials also were used in the lectures, among them quotations from speeches made by Atatürk were most frequent. The leader's speech, *Nutuk* received frequent reference. In addition to this, some documents related to the years of the National Struggle, such as telegraph copies were presented. These documents served to prove these lectures were "history courses" that covered and surpassed their prior ideological aims. Images of a map and of a professor using that map in the large photographs which accompanied the news articles about the first lectures can be mentioned in this context.

When the Chair of Revolution was established, it was announced that university students would be registered, but that the opportunity to follow the lectures would be provided to those who desired to attend. The broadcast of the lectures by radio was also planned. On 20 March 1934, İsmet Pasha gave his first lecture in the Chair of Revolution in Ankara at the conference hall of Ankara People's House, and it was the first lecture broadcast on the radio.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IDEOLOGUES AND THE IDEOLOGY

The Party and the Ideology

The establishment in 1934 of an Institute of Revolution after the University Reform and the conduction of the Revolution Lectures were aimed to create the ideology of the Revolution. However, the first Revolution Lectures in 1934 and the contents of those lectures were not the beginning in the formation of the ideology of the Revolution, but rather constituted an important stage. They did not bring brand-new ideas or principles in this sense. The Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures, rather, performed the role of transforming the current principles and ideology of the Revolution into an intellectual narrative.

No explanation of the ideology of the Revolution is complete without reference to the Six Arrows. The revolutionary elite were hesitant about the idea of a defined, and therefore “frozen/concrete” ideology. This was the reasoning behind the ideological dimension of the Revolution that has been considered weak or lacking in the literature throughout the 1930s. The Six Arrows, on the other hand, were a point of consensus both for being an attempt to systematize the Revolution, and for its avoidance of absolute definitions and concretization.¹⁹²

The formation of the Six Arrows as the central element of the ideology of the Revolution can be examined in the context of the ideological evolution of the RPP as the central power of the Revolution. The great congresses (*kurultay*) of 1927, 1931 and

¹⁹² “Essentially, calling them the six arrows and not calling them for example the six principles, in a strange way, may be to emphasize some dynamic concepts which are only guiding and also quite fluid.” *Zaten garip bir şekilde altı ok denip, örneğin altı ilke denmemesi, dinamik, fakat yalnızca yön gösterici ve hayli de seyyal bazı kavramları vurgulamak içindi belki de.* Sina Akşin, “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin Siyasal, Toplumsal ve İdeolojik Kökenleri,” *CDTA*, p. 2039.

1935 are of great significance in this respect. A detailed reading of these congresses reveals the ideological transformation of the single-party era beyond the Six Arrows.

In the second great congress of the RPP in 1927 (the Sivas congress being reckoned the first), the Six Arrows, “except revolutionism as a principle of general quality,” were roughly included in the RPP program, without being defined in detail.¹⁹³ The republican, populist and nationalist qualities of the RPP were underlined, laicism (though not stated by name) was mentioned, and maintaining the economic interest of the nation (a point of departure for etatism) was declared as one of the duties of the party.¹⁹⁴ As Giritlioğlu states, were not “inclusive and in depth” speeches on the code during the congress.¹⁹⁵ This might have been because the first six days of the congress passed with Atatürk’s great speech (*Nutuk*), and the business of the congress was concentrated into two days.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, more conditions were required to be

¹⁹³ The Six Arrows’ being literally pronounced for the first time as a core was one of the four important results of the 1927 congress. The other three were Atatürk’s great speech occupying the first six days, regulations indicating the regime’s becoming authoritarian, and discussions on the position of the RPP as a political party within its similars in Europe. Zafer Toprak, “Radikal Sosyalist ‘Enternasyonal’ ve Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası 1927 Kongresi,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 106 (October 2002), pp. 42-49. On the other hand, in an official almanac dated 1933, this thesis was expressed about the first code of the party in 1923: “The obvious quality of these rules and regulations (*nizamname*) is that they have noticed in that time the main ones of our party’s program principles, which are expressed definitely and with ripe statements today.” *Bu nizamnamenin bariz vasfı bu gün fırkamızın sarih ve kat’i şekilde ifade edilmiş bulunan program esaslarından başlıcalarını daha o zaman açık ve olgun ifadelerle ilan etmiş olmasıdır. T.C’nin 10. Yılı Rehberi: 1923-1933* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1933), pp. 8-9. Being partly true, however, the thesis was stated in barely “clear and mature words.” Actually, in another official almanac dated 1948, this thesis was refuted. These were written about the 1927 code: “The new rules and regulations (*nizamname*), in their essentials, depart from the old rules and regulations by proving the foundation aim of the RPP clearly and definitely and accepting republican, populist, nationalist qualities and also separating religion and world affairs.” *Yeni nizamname, esaslarda Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin, kuruluş gayesini açık ve kesin bir şekilde tesbit etmesi ve cumhuriyetçi, halkçı, milliyetçi vasıflarını kabul etmesi, bir de din ile dünya işlerini kati bir şekilde ayırması yönünden, eski nizamnameden ayrılıyordu. C.H.P.: 25 Yıl* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), p. 20.

¹⁹⁴ Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, Cilt 1 (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), pp. 71-72. For the Kurultay record in which these qualities were stated one by one, see pp. 423-424.

¹⁹⁵ “The same persons, in limited number, took promise and generally contended with raising objections against the usage of some words and their meanings without touching on the essence. Saffet Arıkan, the secretary general, responded to the opinions.” *Sayıları belirli ayın kimseler söz almışlar ve umumiyetle esasa girmeden bazı kelimelerin kullanılış yerleri ve manaları üzerinde itirazda bulunmakta yetinmişlerdir. Mütalaaları, Genel Sekreter Saffet Arıkan cevaplandırdı.* *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁹⁶ Toprak also points out how short the Kurultay records were compared to others. He explains this with Atatürk’s great speech, which occupied the first six days of the congress, and was not recorded. Toprak, pp. 42-43.

fulfilled before the basic principles of the RPP, namely the Six Arrows, were shaped and their contents made clear.

In the third general congress of the RPP in 1931, the Six Arrows were accepted as the main principles of the party and were declared so. What predetermined the 1931 congress was not only the inheritance of 1927, but also certain historical turning points in the period from 1927 to 1931 that had made their mark deeply on Turkish political life. Among these, the Ağrı Revolt, the Menemen Incident, the 1929 Great Depression, the FRP (SCF) experience, the railway policy, and the revolutions undertaken in the social sphere can be counted as the most important examples. Therefore, the six basic principles accepted and declared in 1931 gained more concrete grounds, and were thus defined in more detail. Interestingly, no speech or discussion was made on the second part of the party program, which included the main characteristics (the six principles) of the party. Upon the subject, Giritlioğlu wrote:

Unfortunately, no discussion was made about the second part, which included the main principles of the Party. In this way, because of that the six principles were accepted exactly as in the prepared project: In the next years and even after 1960, it was seen that different ideas were always fought over in the definition and explanation of the principles. We accept as a great defect that the six principles, which we qualified with the word *Kemalism*, were not discussed in detail in 1931 when it was taken into the party program, and especially that Atatürk did not explain his personal views and ideas on this matter.¹⁹⁷

The dissemination of these principles was attempted through broadcasts and conferences in the same period. In his conference on the subject, Recep Peker said:

These qualities are expressed in the program as short formulas. Nevertheless, the dominant meanings of these main qualities are felt in the whole of the principles written in the other sections of the program. While explaining the perspective of the Party about every quality, I will take the other ideas, which are written in the other parts

¹⁹⁷ *Partinin ana prensiplerini ihtiva eden, ikinci kısım üzerinde, maalesef konuşmalar yapılmamıştır. Bu suretle, altı prensip, hazırlanan projede olduğu şekilde, aynen kabul edilmiş bulunduğu için: İlerdeki yıllarda ve hatta 1960 yılından sonra dahi, prensiplerin tarif ve izahlarında, daima ayrı fikirlerin çarpıştığı görülmüştür. Amme hukukumuzun mal edilen ve Kemalizm kelimesiyle vasıflandırdığımız altı prensibin, parti programına vaz edildiği 1931 tarihinde, etraflı şekilde müzakerelerinin yapılmaması ve bilhassa Atatürk'ün, bu konuda kendi şahsi görüş ve fikirlerinin ne merkezde olduğunu açıklamamasını büyük bir eksiklik kabul etmekteyiz. Giritlioğlu, p. 94. Mete Tunçay points at the lack of quality in the speeches on the program in general, and gives examples. Tunçay, p. 319.*

of the program, and which are useful to enlightening the essential idea. Furthermore, I will try to establish the matter, framed by the basic qualities, as can be seen at a glance by studying sincerely the ideas of men whose thoughts do not fit our thoughts and connecting all the inharmonious points of our principles.¹⁹⁸

At the beginning of his conference, Peker states that the new code of the party stipulated that the party organization arrange conferences on revolution subjects. He continued, stating that his conference was “a beginning for the duty that his friends will carry on.”¹⁹⁹

The 1931 congress, according to Mete Tunçay, should be seen as the beginning of a new period as well as the end of one. The results of the congress, the code, and the program that it put forth pointed to a new era for the young Turkish Republican regime. The political character of a period that would last until 1945 was determined with this congress: single-party rule. As well as political regulations and new institutions that shaped the whole political life, single-party rule also meant the end of uncertainties in the ideological realm. The six principles, which entered the party program as the main characteristics of the party, were put forward as the reference for all ideological matters. These principles were formulated in brief instead of being defined in detail to serve this kind of inclusive purpose. In time, naturally, efforts would be done to fill this gap and an important body of literature would emerge in this context. The establishment of the Institute of Revolution in 1934 and the first Revolution Lectures marked the highest point in the efforts in this direction.

During the 1935 congress, the six principles of the party were declared as Kemalism in the preface of the party program:

¹⁹⁸ Bu vasıflar programda kısa formüller halinde ifade edilmiştir. Maamafih programın diğer fasıllarında yazılı prensiplerin hey'eti umumiyesinde bu ana vasıfların hakim manası hiss olunur. Ben her vasıf hakkında Fırkanın noktai nazarlarını izah ederken programın diğer taraflarında yazılı bulunan ve esas fikrin tenvirine yarayan diğer fikirleri de alacağım. Bundan başka sırası geldikçe fikirleri fikirlerimize uymayanların düşüncelerini samimiyetle mütalea ederek ve prensiplerimizin bütün tebarüz noktalarını birbirine bağlayarak programımızı ana vasıflarla çerçevelemiş ve bir bakışta mütalea edilebilir bir levha haline koymağa çalışacağım. Recep Peker, Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Programının İzahı Mevzuu Üzerinde Konferans (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931), p. 5.

¹⁹⁹ Peker, p. 3.

In the preface of the Party, the sentence “all principles which are the fundamentals of the Party are the road of Kemalism” has been added to the part which is the base of the party program. The reason for adding this sentence is to express that the party program is not dependent on this or that ideology among the ideologies fighting in the world, and it has a national program appropriate to the conditions in which the Turkish nation lives.²⁰⁰

This congress was also the one at which party-state identification was established. From then on, the principles of the party were, by definition, parts of an ideological whole.²⁰¹ These principles would enter the constitution, and thus become unassailable, in 1937.

In the period from 1927 to 1935, parallel to the general ideological evolutions of the young Turkish Republic and the RPP, the roots, growth, completion, discussion and definition of the Six Arrows, and finally their inclusion in the constitution can be historically observed. The first Revolution Lectures in 1934 must be assessed considering their place within this historical process. In 1934, the Six Arrows were included in the party program as the main characteristics of the party and had their concrete responses in the policies of the party. However, in the literature of the period, there was a general idea that they were not sufficiently defined or explained. “Private” and official efforts to this purpose have been mentioned above. The first Revolution Lectures in 1934 were the highest point in these efforts in terms of both their form and their content.

²⁰⁰ *Partinin ön sözünde parti programına temel olan kısıma ‘Partiye esas olan bütün bu prensipler Kemalizm yoludur’ cümlesi ilave edildi. Bu cümlelerin ilave edilmesine sebep parti programının dünyada çarpışan ideolojilerden şu veya bu ideolojiye bağlı olmıyan, Türk milletinin içinde yaşadığı şartlara uygun milli bir programı olduğunu ifade etmek içindi. C.H.P.: 25 Yıl, p. 25.*

²⁰¹ About the 1935 congress, Giritlioğlu writes: “In the third Great Congress, the required explanation of the party principles was not made and no clarity was given to these principles. The fourth Great Congress compensated for this defect relatively.” *Üçüncü Büyük Kurultayda, parti prensiplerinin gereken izahı yapılmamış ve bu prensiplere açıklık verilememişti. Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay, nisbeten bu noksanlığı telafi etmiştir. Giritlioğlu, p. 102.*

The Professors

The statesmen who gave the Revolution Lectures in 1934 will be examined in this study. First, the process of determining the individuals to give the lectures will be described. Then, lives of these four statesmen-professors will be taken up with a biographical approach. One shared characteristic of these four men is that no significant biographical studies have been conducted about them.²⁰² The existing biographies, the majority of which are M.A. theses and Ph.D. dissertations, on the other hand, are not problem-centered. Still, by using these biographies, the lives and thoughts of these men will be evaluated, taking their relations with the Revolution Lectures as criterion to reach a more comprehensive perspective on the lectures. The personal experiences of these men first affected their lecturing and the form and content of their lectures, and then their functions performed by these lectures, which affected their political careers.

When the idea of the Revolution Lectures first emerged, an institutional structure was imagined. In Minister of Education Reşit Galip's rough draft as idea, proposition, and program, a much more comprehensive academic institution was envisioned. But with the beginning of study into the matter, it was seen that no intellectual or institutional preparation had been made. Problems in the determination of the professor cadre were the indicator of this, although it was known that the leaders of the Revolution would give the lectures.

First, a professorship at the Institute of Revolution was proposed to Reşit Galip. Although Reşit Galip accepted this proposition, he left the Ministry of Education after a short time and remained outside of the process. Then the idea of not having permanent professor positions at the Institute of Revolution was adopted. Instruction would be made in two-month periods and professorship would be proposed to the leading names of the Revolution movements for these periods. The professors of every period would

²⁰² Mahmut Esat Bey, with recent writings of Hakkı Uyar, remains relatively outside of this judgment.

be chosen by the *Heyet-i Vekile* (Council of Ministers) and their names presented to the university. The position would be honorary. The newspapers of the period speculated that İsmet and Fevzi Pashas would be among those who would give lectures at the Institute of Revolution.

Afterwards, it was announced that the courses at the Institute of Revolution would be conducted as two semesters and as conferences. Members of the Turkish History Association (*Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*) would lecture. According to this, the first semester courses would be given by Sivas deputy Şemsettin Bey and Balıkesir deputy İsmail Hakkı Bey. Yusuf Akçura and Sadri Maksudi would give the second semester courses. Then, it was announced that Şemsettin and İsmail Hakkı Beys would give Turkish history conferences while Yusuf Akçura and Sadri Maksudi Beys would give the Revolution Lectures. It was also decided that the new Minister of Education, Hikmet Bey, would give lectures.

The final list of the professor cadre was completed only a short time before the instruction began. According to this, Recep Bey, secretary general of the RPP, Hikmet Bey, the Minister of Education, Yusuf Kemal and Mahmut Esat Beys from among the old deputies and Faculty of Law professors would give the lectures.

The Texts

The Revolution Courses put forward perspectives on the past, present, and future of the Republic. Here, only the courses and course texts of 1934, the beginning year, will be examined. But first, a general view will broaden our comprehension.

First, it should be stated that history lecture and textbook concepts have a problematic relationship with academic historiography beyond reception and

reflection²⁰³ because the lecture and textbooks (especially when the history and the history of the revolution are in question) carry much more practical concerns. This encourages their being examined not as the subjects but as the objects of academic study. Copeaux writes that, “from now on, the course textbook will be seen step by step as a source and the used language will be examined from various perspectives, like studying its communication language, identity discourse, history pedagogy, etc.”²⁰⁴

In Turkey, academic interest in history courses and course textbooks has been gradually increasing in recent years. Symposiums are being organized, studies are being published as books, special issues in periodicals are being published and these are written in universities on the subject. Despite this, there has been limited interest in the History of the Revolution courses. The primary reason behind this is that the History of the Revolution courses and their textbooks are relatively stable and do not include dramatic changes or differences as history courses and textbooks often do. Moreover, the discourse and methodologies of these books do not show diversity over time as the others do.

The textbooks of the History of the Revolution courses from the beginning to the present have displayed definite characteristics. After a study undertaken by a commission formed by participants from the Higher Education Council and from the Institutes of the Principles of Atatürk and the History of the Revolution, at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Bosphorus University, the following conclusions about the textbooks taught in the History of the Revolution courses were made.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Mutlu Öztürk, “Halil Berktaş’la Söyleşi/Tarih eğitimi ve ders kitapları,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 100 (Nisan, 2002), pp. 42-43.

²⁰⁴ *Artık ders kitabı giderek bir kaynak olarak görülmekte ve iletişim dilinin, kimlik söyleminin, tarih pedagojisinin vb. incelenmesi gibi çok çeşitli açılardan, kullanılan dil irdelenmektedir.* Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1998), p. 2.

²⁰⁵ Mim Kemal Öke, “İnkılap Tarihi Anabilim Dalı: Kapsam, Metodoloji ve Yaklaşımlar,” *I. Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Semineri*, Samsun, 1985. Quoted from Neslihan Doğru.

First, the textbook authors based their studies on general works written on the subject. Second, their bibliographies consisted of books rather than articles. Third, memoirs, autobiographies, and other subjective sources were not given much place. Fourth, sufficient use of primary sources, i.e. the newspapers and periodicals of the examined era as well as archived reports of the parliament was not made. Fifth, foreign sources (current ones or ones of the examined eras) are not sufficiently used. Sixth, archival work remains insufficient. Finally, academic requirements, such as footnotes and bibliographies, are disregarded; therefore, the texts that have emerged are problematic.

The Revolution Lectures in the educational year of 1933-1934 at the Institute of Revolution at İstanbul University and in Ankara by four leading participants of the Revolution put forward the sum of texts consisting of summaries of the courses, which were then published in newspapers, periodicals, and books compiled through the use of student notes. Aslan Tufan Yazman wrote the following about the courses from which he compiled the course texts for his newspaper:

The newspapers (especially the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, of which I was a correspondent during that time) gave space to the history of revolution lectures in their pages and charged their writers to attend the conferences. After a few lectures, *Cumhuriyet* remained alone in this duty. I also undertook this duty for a long time (from Mekki Sait Esen) in the name of the newspaper. This was a job that required quite a bit of responsibility. In those times, stenography was almost nonexistent. Recording the speeches on tape was also unknown. After taking notes on the speeches, it was necessary to summarize them, remaining faithful to their essence, because almost all of the students were cutting these pieces from the newspapers published the next morning and were preparing for examinations with these pieces...After the lecture, the administrators of the Student Union (*Talebe Birliđi*), who were assigned, would collect these notes from me. After making a fair copy of them and a proofreading by the professor, they were printed with mimeograph and distributed to the class... Of my notes, those of Recep Peker's class were published the following year as a book.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ *Gazeteler (özellikle o sıralar benim de muhabiri bulunduđum Cumhuriyet Gazetesi) devrim tarihi derslerine sayfalarında yer veriyorlar ve konferanslarda yazarlarını hazır bulunduruyorlardı. Birkaç dersten sonar Cumhuriyet bu görevde yalnız kalmıştı. Bu ödevi ben de (Mekki Sait Esen'den devren) gazete adına uzun bir süre için yapmışım. Bu oldukça sorumluluk taşıyan bir işti. O zamanlar stenografi*

These texts are given a special place in the textbooks of the History of the Revolution courses today, mainly for having been the first texts, for the identities of their authors, and for their methodologies and contents. Recent studies on the textbooks of the History of the Revolution courses do not see these texts in the category of the History of the Revolution textbooks and exclude them from examination.²⁰⁷ The main reason for this is that while the aim of political socialization receives priority in the History of the Revolution textbooks, the aim and function of the texts in the earliest years was not political socialization, but ideological research.

pek yoktu. Söylenenleri banda almak da henüz yaygın değildi. Komşularını not ettikten sonra onları, fikirlere sadık kalarak özetlemek gerekiyordu. Çünkü hemen hemen bütün öğrenciler ertesi sabah çıkan gazetelerden bu kısımları kesiyorlar ve sınavlara bu kesiklerden hazırlıyorlardı... Dersten sonra Talebe Birliği'nin ilgili yöneticileri bu notları benden alarak temize çekiyor, profesöre düzelttirdikten sonra şapografla basıp sınıfa dağıtıyorlardı... Tuttuğum bu notlardan Recep Peker'inki ertesi yıl kitap olarak basılmıştır. Yazman, pp. 358-359.

²⁰⁷ An example: Murat Bolat, "Siyasal Toplumsallaşmada Ders Kitaplarının İçeriği ve Etkileri [İnkılap Tarihi Kitaplarının İçerik Çözümlemesi]" (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 1989) Here, the books from 1943 in which the courses started to be taught in high schools to 1989 are examined.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECEP PEKER AND THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTION

Mehmet Recep Peker was born in İstanbul in 1889, the child of an immigrant family from the Caucasus. He completed his education at the Military School in 1907 and began his military career as a lieutenant. His education progressed intermittently, disrupted by the wars in which he participated (the Trablusgarp and Balkan Wars, World War I) and culminated with his graduation with first rank from the Military Academy in 1919.

After World War I, Peker traveled to Anatolia in February 1920 and became part of Mustafa Kemal's circle of colleagues. His political life began at this time. When the TGNA (Turkish Great National Assembly) opened, he was voted secretary general of the parliament. He entered the second parliament as deputy from Kütahya. He was a member of parliament continuously till the eighth period, when he withdrew from political life.

He became secretary general of the RPP on 12 September 1923. At the same time, he was in charge of the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty). He was Minister of Finance (21 May 1924-22 November 1924) in the second İnönü cabinet. After his short-term duties as Minister of Public Improvement and Housing (*İmar ve İskan*) and as Minister of Interior Affairs, he returned to his duty as the secretary general of the party. He criticized the attitude of the Fethi Bey government after the rebellion of Şeyh Said. After the fall of that government, he became the Minister of National Defense. This gave him the opportunity to implement his authoritarian thoughts. He criticized PRP (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) and the İstanbul press for their role in the rebellion. This speech, made on the discussions about

Takrir-i Sükun, gives an idea about his authoritarian and radical (*sertlik yanlısı*)

thoughts:

As a result of the tolerance shown for the name of state power in Turkey, the State has come to the condition of not working. Some laws, made for very high names, also caused this. The press, especially the İstanbul press, has made all of the holy places and ranks which are called the state power the illegitimate means of quarrel. These make attacks with lies and aspersions on whatever is called a state foundation and destroy the whole state. Infected phlegm gushes out on the face of the nation every morning, inculcating innocent people with the idea that the state power is not a valuable thing. According to the condition created by the İstanbul newspapers, the state does not exist in Turkey; also the parliament, which is basis of the government, does not exist. Everyone is accepting the press, wrapped with the sacredness of the concept of liberty, as the sole entity powerful enough to make everything; and from ingesting the insults of the press, they regard the state as a miserable being which really deserves this.²⁰⁸

Throughout his political life, Peker was a ruthless critic of the concept of opposition. He processed these ideas in his *Recep Peker'in İnkılap Dersleri Notları* (Notes of Recep Peker's Revolution Lectures), which is accepted to represent the main lines of the single-party ideology. He opposed not only the concept of opposition, but that of polyphony, as well. His reaction to the periodical *Kadro*, which claimed to create and propagate the ideology of the Revolution, clearly shows this. For him, the duty of creating the ideology of the Revolution was that of the political elite (more specifically, the elite of the Revolution). The role he performed in the closure of the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*) shows his devotion to set institutions and individuals to the service of the state and the Revolution.

²⁰⁸ *Türkiye'de devlet nüfuzu adına gösterilen hoşgörünün sonunda Devlet işlemez hale gelmiştir. Çok yüksek adlar adına yapılmış bazı yasalar da buna yol açmıştır. Basın, özellikle İstanbul basını, Türkiye'de devlet gücü diye ne kadar kutsal yer ve makam varsa hepsini ite kaka meşruluk dışı bir çekişme aracı yapmıştır. Bunlar devlet kuruluşu diye ne varsa hepsini birden yalan ve iftiralarla saldırıp tüm devleti tahrip etmektedirler. Her sabah milletin yüzüne fişkıran mikroflu balgamlar, masum halka devlet gücünün değerli bir şey olmadığını aşulamaktadırlar. İstanbul gazetelerinin yarattıkları duruma göre Türkiye'de devlet yoktur, hükümetin dayanağı meclis de yoktur. Herkes özgürlük kavramının kutsallığına bürünen basını her şey yapmaya kudretli olan tek varlık kabul ediyor; ve devleti de basının hakaretlerini içine sindirdiği için de gerçekten buna layık bir zavallı sayıyor. Nilgün Nurhan (Peköz) Kara, "Türk Siyasi Hayatında Recep Peker" (Ph.D. dissertation, DEÜ, 1999), p. 19.*

Peker was brought to the deputy chair of the RPP Parliament Group on 3 April 1928 and to the Ministry of Prosperity on 11 October 1928. With his election to the position of secretary general of the RPP for the third time on 9 March 1931, the process that established his importance in Turkish political life began. In this period, he had great influence both on the party and on state institutions. He undertook important roles in the foundation of the single-party rule. He was the architect of the state's identification with the party. In his duty as secretary general, he joined İnönü's excursions to Russia and Italy; and he conducted investigations in those countries, as well as in Germany and Switzerland. Together with these investigations, he made studies on the party's organization and ideology. The program he prepared made its mark on the congress of 1935. Yıldız writes that, "rather than being a party program, it was a program of the state regime and because of this quality, its basic principles would be inserted into the Constitution in 1937."²⁰⁹

On the other hand, these studies are interpreted as the nearing of the radical right wing of the party (Peker was a member of this group) to fascism and eventually led to the fall of Peker. Elected secretary general of the party in 1935, he was dismissed from this duty in 1936. Yıldız says that this dismissal was because of Peker's patronage of Italian and German sympathizers rather than for ideological reasons and the actualization of the Italian threat directed towards Turkey. This is a contradictory approach in itself.²¹⁰ But an ideology-based explanation in essence contradicts the historical process, because just after his dismissal, Peker's ideological beliefs were called to be put into practice.

²⁰⁹ *Bir parti programı olmaktan çok bir devlet düzeni programıydı ve bu niteliğinden dolayı da, programın temel esasları 1937'de Anayasaya dahil edilecekti.* Ahmet Yıldız, "Recep Peker," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 60.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Peker was the creator of many of the key ideological symbols of the single-party period, among them the Six Arrows symbol of the RPP.²¹¹ He first used the term “National Chief” in reference to Mustafa Kemal.²¹² He played an important role in the foundation of the official ideology with his lectures and publications.

From 1934 to 1942, he gave History of the Revolution courses at İstanbul and Ankara Universities and at the Military Academy. *Ülkü* (the publication of which he initiated) published the notes of these courses in the first year. These notes were published separately in 1936. Gül writes that the publication of these courses in book format was realized on the demand of Atatürk himself.²¹³ *Ülkü* was published as a periodical of the People’s Houses (of which Peker played a central role in founding) in place of the *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Fatherland), which had been the publication organ of the now defunct Turkish Hearths.²¹⁴

Peker also published a book on Atatürk’s views on citizen rights and responsibilities.²¹⁵ He was one of the main forces behind the coining of the term “Turkish Revolution.” Ahmet Yıldız writes that “if there is a second man of the Kemalist Revolution, the third one is certainly Peker.”²¹⁶

After Atatürk’s death, Peker was appointed as the Minister of Interior Affairs in 1942, during World War II. He came to this position as the preference of a government that no longer had patience for laxity, six years after he had been dismissed from his political post.²¹⁷ With this preference, National Chief İnönü emerged as the balancing element among different tendencies. Peker’s position in the war years was that Turkey should participate on the side of Germany and the Axis.

²¹¹ Teoman Gül, *Türk Siyasal Hayatında Recep Peker* (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yay., 1998), p. 27.

²¹² Yıldız, p. 61. Peker processed these themes also in his Revolution Lectures.

²¹³ Gül, p. 5.

²¹⁴ M. Bülent Varlık, “Ülkü: Halkevleri Mecmuası,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 268.

²¹⁵ Gül, p. 17. (From Afet İnan)

²¹⁶ *Eğer Kemalist inkılabın bir ikinci adamı varsa, üçüncüsü hiç şüphesiz Peker’dir.* Yıldız, p. 63.

²¹⁷ Gül, p. 46.

Later, Peker served as the first prime minister of the multi-party period, between August 1946 and September 1947. In fact, as the ideologue of the single-party government, Peker showed resistance to the process of passing to a multi-party regime and opposed the foundation of the Democrat Party. He performed a special role in the process of passing to the multi-party period, although he viewed the developments as the RPP's departing from its revolution principles. He resigned from office in 1947. This meant a "preponderance of the moderates to the extremes" in the RPP and in Turkish politics, and the Turkish Republic's preference for democracy and the Allies, who were victorious in World War II. After resigning from the prime ministry, he attempted to found political party called the Kemalist Party, which proved short-lived.²¹⁸

His exit from political life coincided with the progress of his illness. He died on 2 April 1950. His death made little noise among the political elites and the press. Only a few post-humous articles about him in the press aimed to understand Peker within the context of the period of special conditions of passage to democracy, or to rationalize the authoritarian aspect of his ideas.²¹⁹ He was buried in Edirnekapı Şehitler Cemetery with a modest ceremony.

After his death, the political and intellectual legacy of this strong man of the early Republican era was considered nonexistent and the people of the democratic era sought to put the ideas he represented behind them. The incineration of Peker's remaining documents²²⁰ was part of this impulse and remains a profound loss for anyone attempting an evaluation of the period. The importance of Peker and his ideas about the era in which he lived cannot be overlooked. Peker was re-discovered in the 1990s, and made the subject of a number of studies. His *İnkılap Dersleri Notları* was re-

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 92.

²¹⁹ In Gül's book, a short part is devoted to these writings. Ibid., pp. 95-98.

²²⁰ Nilgün Nurhan (Peköz) Kara gives this information based on her interview with Recep Peker's daughter, Emine Şehriyar Peker. But she does not give detailed information about its reasons. Kara, p. 4.

published and presented as the “main lines of the single-party ideology.” The interest in Peker can be evaluated in the context of the ongoing critique of the modernization project of Kemalism.²²¹

His Thought

Unlike the other figures discussed in this paper, like Mahmut Esat Bozkurt and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Recep Peker did not have a productive intellectual life separate from his political life. Writings about him generally dwell on his place in Turkish politics.²²² But this strong stress on his political life should not preclude his reputation as a man of action. The nickname “Jandarma Recep” in Turkish political history and the evaluation of his political identity with reference to his military career, although he resigned from military in 1925 when he was a major, are the indicators of this fact. At the time of the intellectual and institutional preparation for the Revolution Lectures, when the first news about the subject appeared in the newspapers, it is written that Peker would dwell upon the military dimension of the Revolution. The military dimension, however, made up only a small part of his lectures and remained outside of the book.

Two reasons can be given for the insufficiency of evaluations at this point: First, Peker, who had a strong ideological attitude, expressed this attitude with symbols rather than depending on theoretical bases, which led to his thought remaining relatively backwards. Second, Peker’s thought was basically of a political character. His intellectual aspect was not subjected to a separate, deep study from his political life

²²¹ On this matter and to explain the interest on Kemalism texts and their writers, this article is informative: Çağlar Keyder, “1990’larda Türkiye’de Modernleşmenin Doğrultusu,” in *Türkiye’de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, eds. S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba, second edition (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1999)

²²² Two Ph. D. dissertations about him written in recent times made the same preference: Nilgün Nurhan (Peköz) Kara’s *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Recep Peker* and Teoman Gül’s *Türk Siyasal Hayatında Recep Peker*.

because his thought was formed along with his political career and his practice (action) dominated his theory (writings and speeches).

The centerpiece of Recep Peker's thought can be summed up in the symbol of the Six Arrows, which he created. Peker's ideas coincided with the basic principles of the Republic (the single-party government is intended here, as it was shown in the context of the Revolution Lectures). Discussions on these ideas focus on the ideological climate of the Republic and its evolution, rather than on Recep Peker's intellectual evolution. On the other hand, Peker, although he was the architect of the Six Arrows, was not the sole interpreter of the basic principles of the Republic. His was only one (though the strongest) of the interpretations of the new Republic. Because of this, his ideas should be evaluated with regard to other ideas, especially in terms of the ideology of the Revolution.

Peker's ideas are first evaluated with respect to his political career. His political struggle and his speeches as a great orator can be used as the keys to his intellectual world. *İnkılap Ders Notları* is the main source. His writings are composed of his published course notes, published conferences and articles which appeared in some periodicals. Peker's ideas were processed and published by a wide cadre in *Ülkü*.

For Peker, the political was prior to the social and economic. His political thought found its expression in its most general form in the authoritarian single-party government. This was an approach built on social ideas aiming at a classless society and economic ideas that brought forward etatism against the struggles between classes.

His thought presents an organic structure in which the internal dimensions support each other. His political ideas were determining for his economic ideas. His etatism gave reference to the strength and meaning attributed to the concept of state as well as it was a way of release for the economic problems of the Great Depression years. The basis of Peker's political thought was an understanding of a strong state. He

also advocated an economically strong state model. His populism, opposition to social classes, and ideal of a classless society formed the basis of his social thought. At the same time, he assigned a supra-classes political role to the state. The organization of the classes (especially workers and tradesmen) by the state in a solidarist-corporatist model was the economic reflection of his populism. His understanding of secularism was part of his authoritarian world view. He advocated an interpretation of secularism that differed from a liberal understanding based on the absolute separation between religion and state.

Three components were at the fore in Peker's intellectual world: Revolutionism (*inkılapçılık*), Nationalism, and the tension between liberty and authority. His Revolutionism was the key component of his political ideas, as seen in his Revolution Lectures. His conceptualization of revolution claimed legitimacy for the new regime and to the Revolution on which the regime was based. In addition to this, he built a kind of political philosophy and political sociology, with which he explained different regimes, their legitimacy claims, and social bases.

Nationalism formed the basis of his intellectual world, in addition to being a dimension or a part of it. As a politician and intellectual, Peker did not see nationalism as a political preference. He did not feel the need to dwell upon nationalism separately, as a given concept. Long discussions on nationalism, as seen with Mahmut Esat, for example, do not exist in Peker. The clarity and certainty in his speeches and writings on nationalism stand out. His nationalism definitely stressed blood, although it was not a nationalism of blood. In an order in which everything became corrupted, the one thing that remained pure was the Turkish blood. Yıldız evaluates this as "the expression of an ethnicist discourse, rather than a racist one."²²³

²²³ *İrkçı olmaktan çok etnisist bir söylemin ifadesi.* Yıldız, p. 63.

Racist nationalism received direct criticism in Peker's speeches. In his opening speech at İstanbul University, he said:

Every individual of this mass which constitutes an indivisible whole with unity of language, ideals and fate is completely equal from the points of right, duty and honor. We embrace with affection the Christians...Shiism (Alevilik and Kızılbaşlık)...and our Kurdish speaking citizens. Racist nationalism is completely anti-democratic, irredentist and imperialist...The most effective means of being protected from Communism and racism is a noble, pure and crystallized sense of nationalism. It is necessary to believe first that nationalism remains the most effective moral power which keeps human societies alive within the borders of state.²²⁴

Nationalism, although it was a supra-political concept, was not a concept outside of politics. He made a right-wing interpretation of Kemalist nationalism.²²⁵ The authoritarian character of his political ideas brought him to a conceptualization of an authoritarian nationalism.²²⁶ His nationalism, as in the majority of Kemalist elites, also had an economic vision.²²⁷ In every respect, he opposed internationalism.²²⁸

²²⁴ *Dil birliği, âlkâ birliği ve kader birliği ile bölünmez bir bütün teşkil eden bu yığınun her ferdi, hak, vazife ve şeref bakımından tamamen eşittir. Hıristiyanlar... Alevilik ve kızılbaşlık... ve kürtçe konuşan vatandaşlarımızı sevgiyle göğsümüze basıyoruz. İrkçı milliyetçilik tamamen anti-demokratiktir, irredantisttir ve emperyalisttir... Komünizmden... ve ırkçılıktan korunmanın en tesirli vasıtası asil, temiz ve billurlaşmış bir milliyetçilik duygusudur. En önde inanmak lazımdır ki insan cemiyetlerini devlet sınırları içinde ayakta tutan en tesirli manevi kuvvet olarak milliyetçilik ayakta kalmıştır.* Gül, p. 37, from *Aydın Tarihi*.

²²⁵ Example of its left wing interpretation can be seen in *Kadro*. This can also explain Peker's stressful relations with *Kadro*.

²²⁶ Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih/Türkiye'de 'Resmi Tarih' Tezinin Oluşumu 1929-1937*, second edition (İstanbul: Afa Yay., 1996), p. 162. Behar says that Peker's nationalism made attributions to national socialist values and she quotes from *İnkılap Ders Notları*: "It is necessary to say that the state founded by us in place of the corrupted liberal state is like a national state. If the liberal type is the coalescence of the politicians, each of them is withdrawing to one side; the national state is the union of the people living in a native country on common benefits, by gathering the powers and values of the nation." *Bozulan liberal devlet yerine bizde kurulan devletin -Ulusal bir devlet gibi- olduğunu söylemek lazımdır. Liberal tip hepsi bir tarafa çeken politikacıların kaynaşması ise; ulusal devlet bir yurttan yaşayanların, ulusun kuvvet ve kıymetlerini biraraya toplayarak müşterek faydalar üstünde birleşmesidir.*

²²⁷ He says: "A difference should not be imagined between setting foot in the domestic market of a nation by foreign manufacturer and setting foot in the lands of the country by an enemy platoon." *Bir ulusun iç pazarlarına yabancı manüfaktürün ayak basması ile, bir düşman müfrezesinin ülke topraklarına ayak basması arasında bir fark tasavvur olunmamalıdır.* Ahmet İnel, "Milliyetçilik ve Kalkınmacılık," *MTSD Milliyetçilik*, p. 770.

²²⁸ He puts forward his nationalism by saying: "Friends, with saying we are nationalist...From the point of nationalism also there are various meanings used in the world today. For example, some apply blood nationalism. This kind of nationalism, with active and passive qualities, is being used in some places. Excluding the people who are not from his own blood and race to the outside of the native country or depriving them of the citizenship rights is the application of passive blood nationalism. In addition, there is a widely framed irredentist nationalism which included the political unity of the people from his own blood, exist in the places which go beyond the borders even beyond the continent and sea. This is an active view of blood nationalism. There are further many ideas and forms of nationalism. But the main

Peker's ideas and implementations about the concepts of liberty and authority are the most well known and most often stressed aspects of his career. Criticisms of liberalism and parliamentary democracy are the dominant themes in *Recep Peker'in İnkılab Dersleri Notları*. Liberty, in essence, is regarded positively. His understanding of liberty and the revolution of liberty, however, did not coincide with liberal philosophy; it rather fit into a rough opposition to monarchy. The Turkish Revolution, according to him, was a revolution of the people, as a type of revolution of liberty. He regarded the revolution of liberty as negative in general, for its non-national character. He was aware of the opposite nature of the revolutions to authority and he did relinquish the idea of authority. He declared that the Turkish Revolution began from the people as a movement against the authority and then it continued towards the people. He advocated etatism not only as an economic policy, but also as "a regime of political discipline and order."²²⁹

Recep Peker and the Revolution Lectures

Together with Hikmet Bey, Minister of Education of the period, Peker was the first chosen to give the revolution courses. It was declared that Peker would dwell upon the military and the domestic political dimensions of the Revolution. However, in the first year, the military dimension was given more weight, while in the next year,

quality of our nationalism is stated in the other judgments of our Constitution and in the regime principles of the RPP. Every internationalist movement is an opponent of the nationalism understanding." *Arkadaşlar, milliyetçiyiz demekle... Milliyetçilik bakımından da bugün dünyada kullanılmış çeşitli manalar vardır. Mesela, kan milliyetçiliğini tatbik ederler. Bu nevi milliyetçilik, bazı yerlerde aktif ve pasif vasıflarla tatbik sahası buluyor. Kendi kanından ve kendi ırkından olmayanları yurt dışına atmak veya yurttaş hakkından mahrum etmek, pasif bir kan milliyetçiliğinin tatbikidir. Bir de sınırlar aşırı yerlerde, hatta kıta ve deniz aşırı yerlerde mevcut ve kendi kanından olan insanların siyasal hudut ve birlik içerisine girmesini ihtiva eden geniş çerçeveli irredentist milliyetçilik vardır. Bu da kan milliyetçiliğinin aktif bir görüşüdür. Daha birçok milliyetçilik fikir ve şekilleri vardır. Fakat bizim milliyetçiliğimizin ana vasfı, Anayasamızın diğer hükümlerinde ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin rejim prensipleri içerisinde de belirtilmiştir. Beynelmilelci her cereyan, milliyetçilik telakkisine muhaliftir. Cemil Koçak, "Kemalist Milliyetçiliğin Bulamık Suları," *MTSD Milliyetçilik*, p. 39.*

²²⁹ Taha Akyol, "Liberalizm ve Milliyetçilik," *MTSD Milliyetçilik*, p. 738.

domestic politics became dominant. The course notes of the second year were published in the following year.

At the beginning of February 1934, the newspapers announced that Peker would give the first lecture at the Institute of Revolution (although it was Hikmet Bey who gave the first lecture). Peker's name was mentioned as often as the name of Hikmet Bey in the foundation studies of the Institute.

Peker began his lectures on 15 March 1934. The newspapers wrote that interest in his lectures was much greater than that in the other lectures, although information about them was not detailed. Peker devoted the last half hour of each lecture to answering the questions of students. When applause interrupted his lecture, he reminded them that he was not giving an oration, it was a course, and applause was not necessary. He made use of materials like maps, charts and sketches, especially when he was talking about the military dimension of the Revolution. Documents about the National Struggle and Atatürk, codes, and parts from *Nutuk* received reference.

Peker's place and importance in Turkish political life stemmed from his duties as secretary general of the RPP. Peker was appointed to this position first in 1923. After his third tour of duty in this position in 1931, he conducted studies that provided his place and importance in Turkish political life. Peker was in executive posts for a very short period of his political life. His greatest focus was the party. In authoritarian and totalitarian systems, the party went to the fore as the symbol of faithfulness to the ideology while the governing elites, who undertook execution, moved to pragmatism.²³⁰ Peker, who was acknowledged as the "third man" of the Kemalist Revolution for his strength and position in the party, gave the greatest importance to the matter of ideology and exerted the most effort to write about and to spread the ideology among the Kemalist elites. In this context, for Peker, the idea of the revolution courses that

²³⁰ Juan J. Linz, *Totaliter ve Otoriter Rejimler*, trans. E. Özbudun (Ankara: "S" Yay., 1975), pp. 35-36.

emerged with the need to study the problems of the Revolution was transformed into the idea of creating the ideology of the Revolution (with the hands of the political elites, as Peker envisioned). The published notes of Peker's Revolution Lectures given in 1935 contain in essence the ideas that dominated the party program and the party congress of 1935.

The Political Dimension of the Revolution

Peker's lectures and book give the most attention to the political dimension of the Revolution compared to the works of the other men examined in this study. There may be two reasons for this: First, Peker was the secretary general of the RPP when he was giving these lectures. He had put his mark on the party programs of 1931 and 1935. Although the other individuals who gave lectures were part of the political elite, Peker represented to some degree "the voice of the revolution." In addition, he was ahead of the other elites of the Revolution in the initiatives (such as the periodical *Ülkü*) taken to promote the ideology of the Revolution. Second, different from the other professors' lectures, Peker did not focus on only one dimension (history, law or economy) of the Revolution, but presented instead a more total (holistic) interpretation of events. For this reason, his book was received with great interest. A new edition of the book was presented as the main lines of the single-party ideology.

Recep Peker'in İnkılab Dersleri Notları was published by Ankara Ulus Basımevi in 1936²³¹ as a large format book of 118 pages. It consists of nine lectures. This is the text used as the main source of this study. It was re-published by İletişim Yayınları in 1984.

The text was a compilation of the notes taken by the students who attended the lectures in the academic year of 1934-1935. In addition, texts of the lectures in the first

²³¹ Ulus Basımevi published the course notes of Recep Peker in 1935 as separate parts, not as a complete book.

year appeared in the newspapers, and the summaries of the courses were published daily in newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*. *Ülkü* also published them. These are the second category of resources at hand. Generally some discrepancy between these resources can be seen, although their contents and styles of expression are similar.

The Concept of Revolution

Peker discussed the (domestic) political dimension of the Turkish Revolution in his lectures. History was used in these courses not as a type of knowledge, but as a means of ideological formation. He said, “enumerating the events one after the other, not examining them like a history course, we will make our duty which will make us attain the aim that I have declared...The thing intended with the Revolution Lectures is to inculcate the main direction of Turkish belief to you and to place it in your heads.”²³²

This instrumental role attributed to history was a shared characteristic of the interwar era regimes’ ideological historiographies. The past was viewed in order to understand the present. The past that was not related to the present or an opposite past, was considered nonexistent or was subjected to harsh criticism and made “nonexistent.”

For Peker, the past was “before the revolution” and when he looked at the past, he saw not the historical process, but the symbols (the press, for example). Reading history from symbols is another common characteristic of ideological historiographies. Symbols can be functionalized by assigning positive or negative values. For example, while National Socialist German historiography symbolized themes like blood and race, pre-war Soviet historiography stressed the symbol names and periods of Russian history (the cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia, for example) by putting forward the concern of patriotism in place of Marxism’s universal themes.

²³² *Vakaları birbiri ardına sıralayıp, onları bir tarih dersi gibi mütalaa etmiyerek, bizi söylediğim amaca ulaştıracak bir metodla vazifemizi yapacağız... İnkılab dersleriyle amaç edinilen şey, türk ana inanis istikametini, sizlere aşlamak, sizlerin kafalarınıza yerleştirmektir.* Recep Peker, *Recep Peker'in İnkılab Dersleri Notları* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936), pp. 1-2.

Peker described revolution. Revolution was not a defined or agreed upon concept. To fill its inside and to present it in an intellectual narrative was necessary. Revolution, according to Peker, meant to remove the things that could be qualified as negative from the social metabolism (*bünye*) and substitute them with positive ones. This definition reveals the dominant characteristic of the ideological narrative that was in the process of establishment: This narration was founded on contradictions and was the product of a world of black and white. So it was a narrative that found its confirmation and legitimacy in itself. With this characteristic, it carried marks from the Enlightenment tradition.

There are definite truths and a change in accordance with these truths was sought. But Peker did not see revolution as merely a change. His essential argument was to settle the change, to systematize it, and to stabilize it. The change had to find new bases for its legitimacy. The consent-coercion tension of the interwar period regimes and ideologies is revealed here. The change was in the search for a kind of consent, which was the reason for these lectures (and revolution literature in general). But coercion, too, was a main element of revolutions for Peker.²³³ The failure of coercion in the application forced the political elites to produce new education, indoctrination, and political socialization policies. Compromise as the product of the liberal democracy culture could not have been the choice of the Kemalist elites. Mete Tunçay writes, “the ruling elites of the early Republic were very sure of their truths. They were not thinking to compromise with traditions to make these truths accepted by society, and were aiming to ‘guide’ and ‘persuade’ the masses by the means of secular education.”²³⁴

The necessity of coercion, on the other hand, was stressed by the revolution literature. In Vasfi Raşit’s words, the consent-coercion tension expressed itself like this:

²³³ See Peker, pp. 7-8.

²³⁴ *Erken Cumhuriyet’in yönetici seçkinleri, kendi doğrularından çok emindiler. Bunları topluma kabul ettirmek için, geleneklerle uzlaşmayı düşünmüyorlar, halk yığınlarını laik eğitim yoluyla ‘irşad’ ve ‘ikna’ etmeyi amaçlıyorlardı.* Mete Tunçay, “İkna (İnandırma) Yerine Tecebbür (Zorlama),” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 96.

There are many who advise the Revolution to make consent support its laws, namely, to use human hearts as the basis of its laws. Increasing the revolution in hearts, making the desires felt more in minds and hearts, in advance of a law which would be made by the revolution; making the revolution laws missed and awaited like a lover is doubtless a dazzling and pleasing good thing... If in every revolution such a move was applied, if humanity awaited the birth of theory forever, it would be ruined a thousand times. Education needs a long time; revolutions, on the other hand, do not wait. Because of that, heads become crushed before obtaining hearts.²³⁵

Peker at first categorized revolutions according to their impacts and reasons for existence. Holistic tendencies dominated his conceptualization of the revolution. He asserted that the Turkish Revolution was not a movement that changed one or a few aspects of social structures, but was a total revolution. The concept of the people, too, was influenced by the same tendencies. The people, in his mind, were equivalent to a single and homogeneous mass.²³⁶ Ahmet Yıldız also notes the “identity of nation-people-race (etni)-culture” in Peker. With this indefinable characteristic, the concept of the people cannot be a means of sociological analysis and emerges as an object of analysis. Many examples of this “out-of history” conceptualization of the people can be found in the period’s revolution literature. For example M. Saffet Engin writes:

the concept of the people can be powerful, resisting and permanent when its common and general meaning is combined with the concept of nation. It is sufficient for us to show this in the panorama of the city-state republics of history which are distant from each other, of different eras and rivals. If we go back more, we can see this situation in the Sumerian city-states.²³⁷

An interpreter points out the instrumental characteristic of this conceptualization:

²³⁵ *İnkılabın rızaları kanunlarına destek yapmasını, yani kanunlarına temel olarak insan kalplerini kullanmasını tavsiye edenler çoktur. İnkılabı kalplerde artırmak, inkılabın yapacağı bir kanunun daha evvel zihinlerde ve yüreklerde iştiyakını çektirmek; inkılap kanunlarını hasreti çekilen ve gelmesi beklenen bir sevgili haline sokmak hiç şüphesiz ki göz alıcı ve gönül avlayıcı güzel bir şeydir... Eğer her inkılapta böyle hareket edilmiş, insanlık nazariyenin doğumunu daima beklemiş olsa idi şimdiye kadar bin kere mahvolmuştu. Tahsil uzun bir zaman ister; inkılaplar ise beklemezler. Onun içindir ki kalpler kazanılmaya kadar kafalar ezilir. Vasfi Raşit, *İnkılapların Öğrettikleri* (İstanbul: Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık T.A.Ş., 1934), p. 33.*

²³⁶ Yıldız, p. 63.

²³⁷ *İşte halk meşhumunun, müşterek ve umumi manasının ulus meşhumile birleştiği zaman, kuvvetli, mukavemetli ve paydar olabileceğini, bize, tarihin birbirinden uzak, ayrı ayrı iki devrindeki, birbirine rakip site cumhuriyetlerinin manzarası göstermeğe kafi gelir. Biraz daha geriye gidersek, Sümer sitelerinde de bu hali görebiliriz. M. Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938), pp. 111-112.*

The Kemalist discourse, defining the national will as identical with the state and the party in the single-party era, by changing the concept of the “people” as a political and social existence with an abstract, unhistorical concept of “nation,” eliminates the differentiation between public and private.²³⁸

The concept with this condition had a symbolic meaning, rather than a social category. With such a conceptualization, Peker stated that the Turkish Revolution had been made against the authorities coming from the people, but that after achieving power, it had continued from the authority to the people. It did not make the antagonism between the people and the authority chronic.²³⁹

Peker dwelled upon two dimensions of the Turkish Revolution, *İnkılap* (Revolution) and *İstiklal* (independence), which were seen as components which could not be thought of separately.²⁴⁰ The Revolution succeeded within the country, while independence succeeded on the international level. But both concepts were within each other and reproduced each other. Independence was thought not only as a political or military issue, but also in economic terms. Independence lent the Revolution its anti-imperialist characteristic and presented it as an anti-imperialist model. This two-dimensional quality coincided with the two bases of Republican ideology: anti-Ottomanism and anti-imperialism.²⁴¹ The Revolution (on the inside) fit the anti-Ottomanist base, while independence (opposed to the outside) fit the anti-imperialist base. The dimension of independence (anti-imperialist thought) has been stressed less because it was ideologically politicized and based on an anti-colonial reaction rather than the criticism of anti-imperialism; so the dimension of revolution (anti-Ottomanist thought) went to the fore. This can be observed in the texts of the other lectures as well as in Peker’s.

²³⁸ *Kemalist söylem, ulusal iradeyi devletle ve Tek Parti döneminde partiyle özdeşleştirerek, siyasal ve tarihsel bir varlık olarak ‘halk’ kavramını soyut, tarih-dışı bir ‘ulus’ kavramıyla değiştirerek kamusal/özel ayırımı ortadan kaldırır.* Nur Betül Çelik, “Kemalizm: Hegemonik Bir Söylem,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 85.

²³⁹ See Peker, pp. 10-11.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

²⁴¹ Cumhuriyet Arslan, “Halil Nimetullah Öztürk,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 200.

Peker went some length to make clear the difference between the concepts of *ihtilal* and *inkılap*. According to him, while *ihtilal* meant the rebellion of the masses, willing and resorting to violence, *inkılap* coincided with the periods in which the intellectual principles/ doctrines behind the Revolution were put into practice.²⁴² That is to say, *ihtilal* was a movement from the bottom to the top (moment), while *inkılap* involved regulations (process) from the top to the bottom. In this distinction, Peker's and the Kemalist revolution's conceptualizations of *ihtilal* and *inkılap* with this form (not "revolutionist" but "reformist") were in fact a continuation of the Young Turk tradition.²⁴³

The concepts of *ihtilal* and *inkılap*, however, do not have exclusive meanings. They may follow each other. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Revolution according to Peker was an *inkılap* with *ihtilal*. But Peker's concerns about authority and discipline led him to stress the separation between the two. Such a separation can be found in other ideologues of Kemalism in that period. Tekin Alp, for example, preferred the term "*ihtilal*" to express the great changes in the new Turkey. He discussed different forms of *ihtilal* and states that whatever its character, *ihtilal* could exist with chaos, disorder, confusion and various uprising movements. Although he accepted such character of "*ihtilal*," Tekinalp calls the Turkish revolution an original "*ihtilal*" that was the only one of its kind:

But, in the Kemalist movement, it is obvious that there was no situation similar to this. In that movement, returning back to the conditions of savagery or any of the anarchic epochs by itself were not seen. Unlike in every other revolutionary movement, the law was never interrupted or broken... With the phrase of 'conscious *tehevvür*,' Atatürk wanted to point out that in the Turkish Revolution (*inkılap ve ihtilalinde*) a situation or state of affairs like the awakening or uprising of savage and animal instincts as it was seen in all of the other revolutions was not seen.²⁴⁴

²⁴² *Cumhuriyet*, "Recep B. *İnkılap* kürsüsünde/Recep Bey bu dersinde Türk İnkılabının her bakımından tam, kamil ve cihanşümül bir *inkılap* olduğunu ispat etti," 16 Mart 1934.

²⁴³ Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 51

²⁴⁴ *Kemalizm hareketinde ise, buna benzer hiçbir vaziyet bulunmadığı aşikardır. O harekette, vahşet haline avdet veya binefsihi anarşi devrelerinden hiçbiri görülmemiştir. Her ihtilal hareketinde olduğu*

In this context, Peker placed the concepts of rebellion (*isyan*) and *ihtilal* side by side, and cited the uprising of Şeyh Sait as an example of a rebellion. His stress on *inkılap* rather than *ihtilal* (different from Mahmut Esat, for example) resulted from this sensitivity. In any case as will be seen, Mahmut Esat's stress on the concept of *ihtilal* is a unique example. As Zurcher points out, the Kemalist elites carefully avoided using the term *ihtilal*, which was used by them in their references to the French Revolution.²⁴⁵

There are other examples of people who saw *inkılap* as not different from *ihtilal*. For example, Vasfi Raşit, in his work printed in 1934, takes up *inkılap* and *ihtilal* together and indicates their difference from reform (*ıslahat*): "Every quake which changes the bases, namely, the principles upon which society is based, is a revolution. *İnkılap* and *ihtilal* in our language are synonymous words which express the same concept. They are nothing but two different translations of the same foreign word. Without changing the principles upon which institutions are based, the corrections which are made in society are called reforms (*ıslahat*)."²⁴⁶

Types of Revolution

Peker divided revolutions into two, as revolutions of liberty and revolutions of class. Revolutions of liberty were understood positively as revolutions carried out by the

gibi, kanun, hiçbir zaman fasılaya veya sekteye uğramamıştır... Atatürk 'şuurlu tehevür' tabirile şuna işaret etmek istemiştir ki, Türk inkılab ve ihtilalinde diğer ihtilallerin hepsinde görüldüğü gibi vahşi ve hayvani sevki tabiielerin uyanması veya ayaklanması gibi bir hal ve vaziyet görülmemiştir. Tekin Alp, Kemalizm (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazete ve Matbaası, 1936), pp. 11-13, and p. 16.

²⁴⁵ Zurcher, p. 51.

²⁴⁶ *Cemiyetin düzenlerinin dayandığı temelleri yani prensipleri değiştiren her sarsıntı bir ihtilaldir. İnkılap ile ihtilal lisanımızda aynı mefhumu ifade eden müteradif kelimelerdir. Aynı yabancı kelimenin yabancı dil ile yapılmış iki muhtelif tercümesinden başka bir şey değildir. Müesseselerin dayandıkları prensipler değiştirilmeksizin cemiyette yapılan düzeltmelere de ıslahat denir.* Vasfi Raşit, p. 15. But the Kemalist elites' preference of *inkılap* over *ihtilal* cannot be explained only by their evolutionist tendencies. They argued that, as compared to *ihtilal*, *inkılap* was deeper and more comprehensive. Ergün Aybars, quoting from Atatürk, states that *ihtilal* is the action stage of *inkılap*: "This word *inkılap* expresses a broader change than in the meaning of *ihtilal*." *Bu inkılap, kelimesinin ilk anda akla getirdiği ihtilal anlamından başka, ondan daha geniş bir değişmeyi anlatır.* According to this, "*İnkılap* includes the stages of first thought, second action and third establishment, institutionalization and development." *İnkılap -devrim-revolution- '1. Düşünce 2. Eylem 3. Yerleşme, kurumlaşma ve gelişme' aşamalarını içerir.* Ergün Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme* (İzmir: Ercan Kitabevi, 2000), p. 235.

people against the administrators or sovereigns. Peker and other Kemalist elites evaluated revolutions of liberty as having an anti-monarchist character. But the liberal values behind it were not acknowledged. On the contrary, the degeneration and corruption of the revolution of liberty were thought together with their closeness with liberal values. According to this, the main diseases caused by the revolution of liberty were liberal economics and free trade. These two “diseases” were harshly criticized during and after the Great Depression. Although the revolutions of liberty (bourgeois revolutions) were positively understood in the eyes of the Kemalist elites, they were criticized because of the complex class character of the economic and social structure caused by them.²⁴⁷

Parliamentarism, with its liberal content, was another concept that Peker criticized. He thought it obstructed the workings of the state mechanism while causing class struggles, class revolution and, consequently, authoritarian states against democracy.²⁴⁸ This negative opinion of parliamentarism can be seen in the period’s other ideologues of Kemalism. For example, Falih Rıfki wrote, “yes, you will not find French democracy in Italy. Fascism is from the regimes which revolted against the individualist parliamentary democracy: ‘A principle that makes nations weak, it is not the true one.’”²⁴⁹ He continued: “Why do democracies fall? First of all comes the inability of parliamentarism, the incapability felt in overcoming difficulties, interior disorder (as in Italy and Spain), nationality struggles (as in Yugoslavia)”²⁵⁰

Parliament could not be approved of as a representation mechanism in the liberal sense for these ideologues. As Çelik writes, from the perspective of the Kemalist elites, the

²⁴⁷ For an example, Şeref Aykut, *Kemalizm -C. H. Partisi Programının İzahı-* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936), pp. 13-14.

²⁴⁸ See Peker, pp. 17-18.

²⁴⁹ *Evet, İtalya’da fransız demokrasisi bulamayacaksınız. Faşizm, ferdi parlamento demokrasisine karşı ayaklanmış rejimlerdendir: “Bir prensip ki milletleri zayıflatır, doğrusu o değildir.”* Falih Rıfki, *Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran ve Kaybolmuş Makidonya* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931), p. 12.

²⁵⁰ *Demokrasiler neden düşüyor? En başta parlamentoculuğun aczi, zorlukların yenilmesinde hissolunan kudretsizlik, dahili kargaşalık -İtalya ve İspanya’da olduğu gibi-, milliyet kavgaları, -Yugoslavya’da olduğu gibi- geliyor.* Falih Rıfki, p. 34.

relation between national will and parliament was a relationship of identity rather than representation.²⁵¹ Parliament, in Peker's intellectual world, could be understood positively only as the concept without its liberal content. Parliamentarism, with its liberal meaning and associations, was the common enemy of the Kemalist elites. The period's deputy from Edirne, Şeref Aykut, wrote in 1936:

Just because of this, we are not parliamentarist. Our party, taking every part of the state with its exact meaning into its hands and consideration, is creative and constructive. The party gave its total attention here. The party does not differentiate these powers from each other. The one is the partner of the other, the complementary of the other. Also it does not mix the one with the other. It continuously protects the balance and order between them. For this reason, no work stumbles; the judicial power does not contradict the administrative power. The progress and life of the nation develops with the speed received from its own history –because it is populist– and for this reason, there is no contradiction or disagreement caused by parliamentarism nor class struggles, power and authority confusions.²⁵²

Class revolution with socialist movements was one of the main concepts to which Recep Peker attributed negative meaning. According to him, the problem was the inability to nationalize the revolution of liberty. Peker placed nationality above class. The Kemalist ideologues who used the concept of class either stressed nationality against class or went to some kind of eclecticism between these two concepts (as in the case of *Kadro*). In the eyes of these ideologues, the class contradiction always lay beneath the contradictions between nations or between the industrialized and unindustrialized countries.

Peker viewed revolutions of liberty as historical facts. By exposing their positive and negative aspects, he sought to put forward the place of the Turkish Revolution

²⁵¹ Çelik, p. 88.

²⁵² *İşte bunun için biz parlamentocu değiliz. Bizim partimiz, bütün anlamile devletin her yanını elinde ve gözü önünde tutarak yaratıcı ve yapıcıdır. Parti bütün dikkatini buraya vermiştir. Parti bu kuvvetleri birbirinden ayırmaz. Biri ötekiniin eşi, birbirinin bütünleyicisidir. Birbirine de karıştırmaz. Aralarındaki denkliği, düzenliği Kamutay bir düziye korumaktadır. Bunun için hiçbir iş sürçmez, tüzel kudret yönetim kudretle aykırı gitmez. Ulusun gidişi ve yaşayışı kendi öz tarihinden aldığı hızla –halkçı olduğu için– yürür ve bu sebeple parlamentarizmin doğurduğu karışıklıklar, ayrılıklar olmadığı gibi sınıf kavgaları, erk, iktidar gürlütleri de yoktur. Şeref Aykut, p. 9. Aykut, underlines the claim that Kamutay is not the parliament, ibid., p. 11.*

compared to them. According to him, the Revolution (the Turkish Revolution) was a special concept; it could not repeat and could not be copied. But some characteristics can be mentioned. Here we see the bases of the attitude of “we resemble only ourselves.” For Peker, “the Turkish Revolution is a revolution of the people, which is of the revolution of liberty type.”²⁵³ With revolutions of liberty, as stated before, it did not have a liberal meaning, but was to oppose monarchy. The Revolution of the People (*halk ihtilali*), on the other hand, was a concept used against class characteristics and may be attributed to the Turkish Revolution.

While discussing class revolution, Peker entered into an economic analysis. Although the theoreticians of Kemalism frequently expressed their desire for a classless society, they did not abstain from making class analysis. These ideologues, from Peker to the periodical *Kadro*, discussed classes in their analyses of political, economic and social change. They fundamentally opposed not class analysis, but the idea that there were classes and class differences in Turkey, as in the West. For example, *Kadro* stressed the existence of pre-capitalist classes in Turkey.²⁵⁴ It will be appropriate here to point out some Kemalist ideologues who, though refusing the existence of economic classes, acknowledged the existence of *cultural* classes.²⁵⁵

²⁵³ *Türk inkılabı, hürriyet inkılabı tipinden bir halk ihtilalidir.* Peker, p. 26.

²⁵⁴ Mustafa Türkes, *Kadro Hareketi / Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), p. 57. Türkes writes this: “Contrary to the claims of Gülp and Trak, the *Kadro* writers were defining the society of Turkey as a class society, but, sliding the discussion from the class analysis dimension to the point of international struggle, put forward the idea that the basic contradiction of the twentieth century is between industrialized and unindustrialized countries.” *Gülp ve Trak’ın ileri sürdüklerinin aksine, Kadrocular, Türkiye toplumunu sınıflı bir toplum olarak tanımlamakta, fakat tartışmayı sınıf analizi boyutundan uluslararası çatışma noktasına kaydırarak yirminci yüzyılın temel çelişkesinin sanayileşmiş ülkelerle sanayileşmemiş ülkeler arasında olduğunu ileri sürmektedirler.* Ibid., p. 146.

²⁵⁵ We can give an example from Falih Rifkı on such a cultural conceptualization of class: “Kemalism will prevent the settling of democracy waves in a country in which class struggle has not been born yet. There are two classes here: Western and Eastern classes. We want to westernize all classes, but without taking the diseases of the classes in the western countries.” *Kemalizm, henüz sınıf kavgası doğmamış bir yurttadır, demokrasi salgınlarının yerleşmesini menedecektir. Bizde şimdilik iki sınıf vardır: Garplı ve Şarklı sınıf. Biz bütün sınıfların garplılaşmasını, fakat garp memleketlerindeki sınıfların hastalıklarını almamasını istiyoruz.* Falih Rifkı, p. 30. Another ideologue of Kemalism, M. Saffet Engin, also stated the inevitability of social differentiation also in complete equalitarian society (“utopist” communism and socialism ideals are intended). The criteria that Engin used on social differentiation were Vitality/*hayatiyet* (peasantry-town dweller-city dweller), Personality/*şahsiyet* (creators-intellectuals-defects) and Socialness/*içtimailik* (according to national consciousness: completely social class-semi

Peker returned to the industrial revolution when he was talking about class revolution. On an evolutionary-progressive plane he wrote the emergence of factories at first, then the working class and, in the end, labor unions as revolutionary elements. He stated that the working class, by defining itself as proletariat and together with the peasantry, occupied a position against the bourgeoisie. But, he continued, the peasantry could not be socialist. He wrote these lines as a spokesman of a new nation-state the overwhelming majority of which was formed by peasants.²⁵⁶ According to him, the solution of the peasants' problems that had been caused especially by liberalism was not the doctrine of socialism, but cooperative organizations.

In the Republican era, the concept of cooperatives, which had begun to be discussed and written about in the second constitutional era, aroused increasing interest and sympathy. The concept of cooperative²⁵⁷ as a method to resist the destructiveness of capitalism and to intervene in private property was examined in a detailed manner by the theoreticians of Kemalism. Cooperativism as a concept was positively regarded by Mustafa Kemal as well. In a speech made at the Izmir Commerce Association on 1 February 1931, he said:

Some opinions have been put forward in favor of and against cooperativism, in general, the politics of alliance in economic area... Making is to combine material and moral powers, intelligence and skills. Otherwise, we are not talking about an alliance between a weak one and a strong one. Such an alliance means the captivity of the weak one to the strong one... While happening such an initiative, there may be some complainants. Of course, the people who think their benefits

social class-disloyal people). In all these evaluation of social differentiation, economic analysis is not given any place and economics are not seen as a reason for social differentiation. Engin, pp. 89-94.

²⁵⁶ "Socialism is not a defender of ownership... socialist is internationalist... However, the peasantry does not think like this, in any part of the world. The peasant is nationalist, considers his own benefit as identical to the benefits of his own nation." *Sosyalizm mülkiyetçi değildir... sosyalist beynelmilelidir... Halbuki dünyanın hiç bir yakasında köylü böyle düşünmez. Köylü ulusçudur, kendi faydasını, kendi ulusunun menfaatleri ile bir görür.* Peker, pp. 38-39.

²⁵⁷ Aykut Kansu, "Türkiye'de Korporatist düşünce ve Korporatizm Uygulamaları," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 265. Ahmet Cevat, as the founder of cooperativism in Turkey in the second constitutional monarchy, continued his studies in the Republican era. Another important cooperativist of the era was Muhittin Birgen. Kansu writes that cooperativism was intensively discussed between the advocates of state socialism and professional representation in the early Republican era.

will be injured because of the alliance of the producers, will complain... I am not imagining any harm for real trade experts.²⁵⁸

The thought of cooperativism in this era developed not only in theory, but also in practice.²⁵⁹ A sympathetic regard towards the thought of cooperativism and Robert Owen's patriarchal socialism can be seen in Peker.²⁶⁰ According to Peker, class revolution that coincided with socialism, though owing its existence to the revolution of liberty, stood in an opposite position from it.

Peker developed an anti-liberal concept of national-unity in regards to the security of the state. Peker shared the fear of disorder along with many other statesmen. The individual was not a positive value. The slogan of unity and togetherness was constantly repeated. Two sources of this fear were liberalism and class movements. Fascism and National Socialism emerged as reactionary movements opposing the ideas of both liberty and class revolutions: "Fascism is a way of politics which is the opposite of class struggle, internationalism and political beliefs recognized by other classes and which denies the democracy, parties, and parliamentarism brought by the revolution of liberty... fascism is the revival of cesarism in the twentieth century."²⁶¹

There are comments which are sometimes interpreted as revealing Peker's thoughts as fascist, and his understanding of politics as similar to fascism. Some explain his dismissal from politics with these comments. But it is clear also that Peker saw fascism as a reactionary movement. His acquaintance with the developments of the interwar years in Germany and France, his admiration of the achievements of these

²⁵⁸ *Kooperatifçilik, sureti umumiyede iktisadi sahada birleşme siyaseti hakkında lehte ve aleyhte bazı mütalealar ileri sürüldü... Yapmak, maddi ve manevi kuvvetleri, zeka ve maharetleri birleştirmektir. Yoksa bir zaif ile bir kuvvetlinin birleşmesinden bahsetmiyoruz. Birleşmenin böylesi zaıf olanın kuvvetliye esir olması demektir... Böyle bir teşebbüs olurken birtakım şikayetçiler olabilir. Müstahsillerin birleşmesinden şahsi menfaatleri haleldar olacağını düşünenler tabii şikayet edeceklerdir... Hakiki ticaret erbabı için hiçbir zarar tasavvur etmiyorum.* Fethi Naci, *100 Soruda Atatürk'ün Temel Görüşleri*, fourth edition (İstanbul: Gerçek Yay., 1978), p. 73.

²⁵⁹ In this era cooperativism courses were given in schools and one consumption-cooperative was founded in every school. Suphi Nuri, *Günün İktisadi İşleri* (İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1934), p. 181.

²⁶⁰ Peker, p. 31 and p. 33.

²⁶¹ *Faşizm, sınıf mücadelesine, beynelmileciliğe ve diğer sınıfların tanıdığı siyasal inanlara zıd olan ve demokrasiyi, firkaları ve hürriyet ihtilalinin getirdiği parlamentarizmi inkar eden bir politika yoludur. ...faşizm, yirminci asırda sezarizmin dirilişidir.* Peker, p. 48.

movements in the fields of economy and the mobilization of the masses, may have been the reason for such opinions. On the other hand, Peker separated the Turkish Revolution from these reactionary movements against the revolution of liberty and class revolution. According to him, the Turkish Revolution was populist and this populism coincided with the understanding of a classless nation/ society.

Political Parties

Peker examined political parties from a perspective of political history. He established a line of economic development with a Euro-centric view. According to this, the feudal and monarchical state was transformed into a liberal type of state, and political parties emerged as a result of this transformation. He defined the new Turkish state as a national state and differentiated the national state type from the liberal one by dubbing it one of the two reactions (the other was dictatorship) that emerged after the liberal type had lost its founder function.

Peker formulated a problematic definition of political party that was excessively state-centered. He claimed that political parties emerged not as the result of the increase of differences in civil society (a liberal understanding), but as the result of the state works' becoming more complex.²⁶² Peker's political party definition, like the definitions of the other Kemalism ideologues of the period, was a definition of political party without its liberal content and it indicated rather what it was felt a political party should be. Tekin Alp wrote, "let us say immediately, the word "party" here is used purely in its symbolic meaning. In any case, it is not used in its usual meaning as in

²⁶² Peker, pp. 61-62.

other languages. It is also not considered in its etymological meaning, which is rousing in that it represents the ideas or benefits owned by one part of a nation.²⁶³

On the other hand, the Kemalist elites' political party definitions, especially in their liberalism and democracy critiques, were not always state-centered. They stressed also the economic and intellectual differences. Mustafa Kemal on 7 February 1923 said: "This nation has felt much pain from political parties. Let me argue that parties in other countries were and are being founded absolutely with economic aims, because there are various classes in those countries. In response to a political party established to protect the interest of a class, a party can be established to protect the interest of another class. This is quite natural... However, when we say 'the people's party,' not a part, but the whole of the nation is included in this."²⁶⁴

The Kemalist elites' understandings of political party cannot be thought of as separate from their understanding of class. Atatürk, on 27 January 1931, said:

As you know, political parties are established for limited aims. For example, the merchants of Izmir can form a party which will be able to satisfy only their interests. Or there may be a party made up of only farmers. But our party is not a foundation following such a limited view. On the contrary, it is a foundation aimed at providing benefits to the people from every class in an equal way, without harming one another... There is no need to search for a similar organization in other countries.²⁶⁵

It should be pointed out here that the theme of a classless society provided legitimacy to the single-party system. Karaömerlioğlu discusses the legitimacy provided by Populism to the single-party system: "Truly, when the speech of Atatürk, in which

²⁶³ *Derhal söyleyelim ki, parti tabiri burada, sırf işari manada kullanılmıştır. Herhalde, diğer lisanlardaki muted manasında kullanılmış olmadığı gibi, parti denilen şeyin, bir milletin bir kısmına aid fikirleri veya menfaatleri temsil ettiği zannını uyandıran etimolojik manada da alınmamıştır.* Tekin Alp, p. 77.

²⁶⁴ *Bu milletin siyasi partilerden çok canı yanmıştır. Şunu arz edeyim ki, başka ülkelerde muhtelif sınıflar vardır. Bir sınıfın menfaatini muhafaza için kurulan siyasi bir partiye karşılık diğer bir sınıfın menfaatini muhafaza maksadıyla bir parti kurulur. Bu pek tabiidir... Halbuki Halk Fırkası dediğimiz zaman bunun içinde bir kısım değil, bütün millet dahildir.* Fethi Naci, p. 64.

²⁶⁵ *Malumu alinizdir ki, siyasi partiler, sınırlı maksatlarla kurulurlar. Mesela; İzmir tüccarları yalnız kendi menfaatlerini tatmin edebilecek bir parti yapabilirler. Yahut yalnız çiftçilerden ibaret bir parti olabilir. Halbuki bizim partimiz böyle sınırlı bir nazar takibeden bir kuruluş değildir. Bilakis her sınıf halkın menfaatlerini eşit bir surette, bir diğerini zarara uğratmadan temin etmeği amaç edinen bir kuruluştur... Diğer memleketlerde bu kuruluşun bir benzerini ramağa lüzum yoktur.* Fethi Naci, p. 65.

he explained the project of the People's Party, is examined, it is observed that he gave the clues of the political understanding defending the single-party from an early date, like in 1923, with messages such as that the country had suffered much from party struggles, that the people were in fact a whole in one single piece, and that partisanship harmed the country."²⁶⁶

In addition, such an understanding of political party provided legitimacy to the components of the single-party system. Tekin Alp showed that there was a direct relationship between such an understanding of political party (the single-party system in general) and the understanding of "chief":

In Turkey, it cannot be imagined that a party whose president is the Great Chief is a party which would not be representing the whole nation, just as it cannot be imagined a party which would be opposed to the party of the Great Chief...the principle of single-party has never been imposed on the nation with force, with a law, or a method of any dictatorship. This system has made itself accepted by the nation. Because of that, Atatürk, possessing the absolute confidence of the entire nation, is the president of the single-party, and the party represents the interests of all of Turkish society without considering class and group differences.²⁶⁷

Peker also dwelled upon political party programs. A basic characteristic of Kemalism attracts attention here. For Peker, detailed and bulky party programs were worthless. Clarity and brevity made party programs valuable.²⁶⁸ This was related to being a pragmatic ideology as the sum of attitudes and opinions rather than a formulated doctrine of Kemalism. In the words of Karaömerlioğlu, "Kemalism was not an ideology whose main lines were drawn by universalistic and definite principles like Marxism or

²⁶⁶ Gerçekten de Atatürk'ün Halk Fırkası projesini anlattığı konuşması incelendiğinde ülkenin parti mücadelelerinden çok çektiği, aslında halkın yekpare bir bütün olduğu ve partiliğin ülkeye zarar verdiği türünden mesajlarla tek partili bir siyasal anlayışın ipuçlarını daha 1923 gibi erken bir tarihten itibaren verdiği gözlemlenmektedir. M. Asum Karaömerlioğlu, "Tek Parti Döneminde Halkçılık," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 281.

²⁶⁷ Türkiye'de Büyük Önder'in Partisine muhalif bir parti tasavvur edilemeyeceği gibi, yine Büyük Önder'in başkanlık ettiği bir partinin bütün milleti temsil etmiyen bir parti olacağı da tasavvur edilemez... tek fırka prensipi, millete, hiçbir zaman, bir kanunla veya herhangi bir diktatörlük usulile zorla Kabul ettirilmiş değildir. Bu sistem, tek partiye, bütün milletin mutlak itimadını haiz adamın, Atatürk'ün riyaset etmesi ve partinin, sınıf ve zümre farkı gözetmeksizin bütün Türk camiasının menfaatlerini temsil eder olması dolayısıyla, kendi kendini Kabul ettirmiştir. Tekin Alp, p. 80.

²⁶⁸ This attitude can be observed in the 1931 and 1935 party programs and in the literature about the Six Arrows.

liberalism. Rather it was a mentality in which real political understanding was infinitely important, and on which pragmatism and nationalism put their marks.”²⁶⁹ Consequently, for Peker, a theoretical party program should not be loaded with the function of determining the practical (realpolitik). The priority of practice over ideology or some kind of anti-intellectualism was stressed much in the Kemalist literature of the period.

Tekin Alp wrote:

The new Turkey has been created not with principles that came into existence in different eras and under different conditions, which are old and have become null, but with an alive brain, a genius who knew what he wanted and arranged its plan at the first step, and determined the way to be followed, the ideal the Turkish nation pursued with its desires and efforts. Just because of this, the system or regime of the new Turkey can be described not with any formula, but only with the name of its creator and realizer...Although the six symbols of the party, its six arrows were existent, as we have seen above, Kemalism cannot be considered with words and formulas. The reason for the existence of the words and formulas is to indicate the direction to be followed, drawing the line of movement. But the life itself is the one that describes the work and orders it...Just for this reason, the People's Party has always abstained from explaining more fully its program.²⁷⁰

Related to his understanding of political party, Peker had a special understanding about the role of chief. He was the first to use the term “national chief,”²⁷¹ and was among those who sought to give the term meaning.²⁷² According to him, a chief was necessary for all social structures, from the family to the state. The

²⁶⁹ *Marksiizm, liberalizm türü evrenselci ve belirli ilkelerin ana hatlarını çizdiği bir ideoloji değildi Kemalizm. Realpolitik anlayışın son derece önemli olduğu pragmatizmin ve milliyetçiliğin damgasını vurduğu bir zihniyetti daha çok.* M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “Türkiye’de Köycülük,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 296.

²⁷⁰ *Yeni Türkiye, başka başka devirlerde ve başka başka şerait içinde vücud bulan eski ve hükümden sakat düsturlarla değil, ne istediğini bilen ve daha ilk adımda planını tertip eden, takip edilecek yolu, bundan böyle, bütün Türk milletinin emelleri ve mesaisile peşine atıldığı ideali tesbit eden canlı bir dimağ, bir deha tarafından yaratılmıştır. İşte bundan dolaydır ki, yeni Türkiye'nin rejimi, sistemi herhangi bir formülle değil, fakat sadece onu yaratanın ve tahakkuk ettirenin adile tarif edilebilir... Gerçi partinin altı remzi, altı oku mevcuddu; fakat, yukarıda da gördüğümüz gibi, Kemalizm, kelimelerle ve formüllerle ölçülemez. Kelimelerin ve formüllerin hikmeti vücudü, takip edilecek istikameti göstermek, hattı hareketi çizmektir; fakat yapılacak işi tarif eden, emreden hayatın kendisidir... İşte bu sebeple, Halk Partisi, programını çok fazla tavzih etmekten daima çekinmiştir.* Tekin Alp, p. 21 and p. 91.

²⁷¹ Yıldız, p. 61.

²⁷² “The system of chief has never been the subject of ideological explanation as well as a constitutional or legal basis has never been settled on it.” *Şeflik sistemi, hiçbir zaman anayasal ya da yasal bir temele oturtulmadığı gibi, yine hiçbir zaman ideolojik bir açıklamaya da konu olmadı.* Cemil Koçak, “Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şeflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef / Milli Şef,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 123.

leader cult of authoritarian thought coincided with this understanding of chief. Peker wrote that “chief represents all of the main ideas of a political party, its will, power to make and honor.”

Adjectives used by Peker for the chief are interesting: “The chief, as I said, is in the lead with all his heating, nutritious and charming qualities.”²⁷³ References given and not given by Peker in explaining the concept of chief make the generally accepted opinion that the concept of chief was inspired by the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s problematic.²⁷⁴ Although the concept of chief arrived at its real effectiveness in Turkey in the 1930s, it is misleading to regard it as a product of the 1930s.²⁷⁵

Types of Political Parties

Peker produced a text about political parties that can be regarded as a well-arranged text in a period in which no meaningful literature had emerged on political parties, and also because of the nature of the single-party rule. Generally, his writing is descriptive, but superficial analyses can be seen as well. His essential aim was not to make explanations and analyses about political parties and sample practices in different countries; he sought to place the Turkish experience between similar and different experiences and so provide legitimacy to the political party practices of the single-party era.

²⁷³ *Şef bir siyasal partinin bütün ana düşüncelerini, iradesini, yapış kuvvetini ve şerefini temsil eder.*

Şef, dediğim gibi bütün ısıtıcı, besleyici, alıp götürücü vasıflarile baştır. Peker, pp. 63-64.

²⁷⁴ Gül İnanç, “Yarım Asırlık Bir İmaj: Milli Şef,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 8 (Ağustos 1994), p. 40.

²⁷⁵ “The word ‘chief’ entered the political discourse in 1930 and became accepted... For example, Mustafa Kemal expresses that he himself is ‘the reason of a general sense, its expression and representative.’ For ‘being aware of the thoughts and emotions’ of the Turkish Nation, he did not make anything other than ‘the expression of its competence and needs.’” *Şef sözcüğü 1930’da siyasi söyleme girer ve yerleşir. Bu etkilenme ile İtalya ve Almanya gibi şeflik rejimlerinden etkilenmenin sözkonusu olamayacağı 1923’de, Mustafa Kemal’in bazı konuşmalarında bulunan şeflik ilkesinin epistemolojik temaları öne çıkarılır. Örneğin, Mustafa Kemal kendisinin ‘bir hissi umuminin amili, ifadesi, mümessili’ olduğunu, Türk ulusunun ‘efkar ve hissiyatına yakından vakıf olmakta’, onun ‘kabiliyet ve ihtiyacını ifadededen başka bir şey yapmadığını’ ifade eder.* Hasan Ünder, “Atatürk İmgesinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 145. So the concept of the chief in the Turkey of the single-party era can be explained regarding both its inner and outer effects.

A relation of causality existed between political developments and general progress (technical improvement is intended by this) according to Peker. For him, the change coincided with nationalization in all areas. Professional politics, the army and the economy had been transformed into national politics, a national army, and a national economy. In this context also, the legitimation of the single-party regime can be found. Peker wrote: "While all things are nationalized, the party also should be nationalized." He continued: "We are in an epoch in which instead of the dispersed parties of the liberal type of state, a national party administration will be successful that carries all the desires of the nation, resists all dangers, feels and understands the needs of all of the people with the producers, sellers, buyers, workers on the land, in the factory, laboratory, with the villagers and townspeople, and gave them place and value in its bosom."²⁷⁶

Peker's putting forward the types of political parties and categorizing them was in essence not a scientific activity. His aim was to make obvious the incompatibility of the different political parties by showing the political parties' cluttered condition. Thus, the single-party regime was both an outcome created by real needs and a choice that had no acceptable alternatives.

Peker examined political parties in five categories: Liberal, democratic and radical parties that were founded after the revolution of liberty and that remained faithful to liberal ideals made up the first category, along with reactionary and conservative/moderate parties as opposing the revolution of liberty. Peker dwelled upon this category in a detailed manner because he viewed the Turkish Revolution as a type of the revolution of liberty. He made subjective comments, especially about the parties that opposed and criticized the revolution of liberty.

²⁷⁶ *Her şey uluslaşmış iken, parti de uluslaşmalıdır. Liberal devlet tipinin dağınmak partileri yerine ulusun bütün isteklerine omuz vermiş, bütün tehlikeleri göğüslemiş, yapamı ile, satamı ile, alanı ile, toprakta, fabrikada, laboratuvarında çalışanı ile, köyde ve kende yaşayanı ile, bütün halk yığınlarının ihtiyaçlarını duyup anlıyarak çalışma sinesinde bunlara yer ve değer vermiş, ulusal bir partili idarenin muvaffak olacağı devirdeyiz.* Peker, p. 69.

The parties of class revolution were in the second category. These were evaluated as opposed to nationalist and liberal parties. Religious parties and nationalist parties formed the third and fourth categories. Last, the complicated political parties were examined.

In his views on political parties, Peker departed from his general methodology. Although his understanding of history was economy-centered, when political parties were in question, it seems the determiner was ideas. Political parties were not explained on economic bases. On the other hand, when he criticized concepts like liberalism, democracy, parliamentarism and the multi-party system, he, like the other Kemalist elites, taught the thesis that political parties were founded according to economic interests. In his explanation of the principle of populism, Peker claimed that the social class structure in Europe had caused multi-party systems and he produced legitimacy for the single-party system of Turkish Republic from this principle. But here, Peker did not categorize political parties on a class basis (also for the class revolution parties) as with the economic bases.

Complicated political parties for Peker were formed with the incorporations of the parties of four main categories. He aimed here to make a kind of sociology of political parties. Political parties, however, continued to be seen as intellectual movements. He did not refrain from putting forward his position and his subjective evaluations as opposed to these intellectual parties. Social democrats, Christian democrats, radical democrats, Christian socialists, and such made up this category. National socialist and profession parties were given a special place. With this opportunity, the populist themes of the Republic were repeated.

Peker was not an analyst when he looked at the application types of political parties. From this matter he wanted to show that the liberal types of state and parliamentarism could not meet the needs of the day. Peker looked at the examples from

different countries, but did not follow a comparative methodology. With a selective logic, he related his subjective observations and evaluations, and derived observations about his experiences. For example, he looked at the political party practices in Poland and hailed pragmatism. These examples can be multiplied. For instance, he wrote that what was dominant in France was not political parties in the liberal sense, but a kind of “national spirit.”

Generally, it can be said that Recep Peker, the secretary general of the RPP and the founder of 1931 and 1935 party programs, had an accumulation of knowledge about European politics and political parties that far exceeded his literal information. He insisted on the originality of the Turkish experience. However, he did not abstain from comparing this with similar European experiences, and underlining the similarities and differences. His writings and evaluations show that the single-party era and the single-party system of Turkey should be studied by giving place to international effects and from a more comparative perspective.

Independence

In his first lecture, Peker said that the Republic had two bases. While the revolution coincided with the internal transformations, independence was about the transformations related to other powers and concepts. According to him, independence should not be thought of only with its meaning as given in the dictionary. He attempted to present a long and detailed subject of independence. He dwelled upon the different dimensions of independence, and how it could be protected in each of these dimensions. In this context, he mentioned history, the economy, diplomacy and some technical issues as well. Such an expression can be understood taking into consideration both the life story of Peker and the conditions of the period. Peker did not talk about abstract themes. His examples were derived from experience.

Peker did not always discuss the concept of independence on a rational level. The irrationality of the period's authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies affected him. While talking about independence with concrete examples, he replied a student's question about the secret of the point that was arrived at despite all the impossibilities, with a saying of "Gazi Hz.leri": "This is a national secret; I discovered this secret in the blood of the Turkish nation, of which I am an individual and a son."²⁷⁷

The concept of independence for Peker, as for many other statesmen of the period, was a point of excessive sensitivity. In his lectures, he was at pains to stress that his occasional analyses of the regimes of other states and their political parties did not mean interference in the internal affairs of another state.

Peker returned the subject of the revolution and the theme of national unity as such a central concept that independence could not be considered without them. National unity was the sole concern in his political, economic and social analyses. His definition of national unity had its roots in the authoritarian/totalitarian discourses of the interwar years rather than in the nationalism literature of the end of previous century: "National unity means the unity and togetherness of the citizens, who have reason and consciousness. One of them completes and loves the other; the one protects the rights and honor of the other."²⁷⁸

Before the beginning of the Revolution Lectures in 1934, it had been reported in the newspapers that Recep Peker would talk about the military aspects of the Turkish Revolution. In the course notes of the first year, this topic appears in detail, but in the notes of the 1934-1935 academic year, which were published as a book, omitted this aspect. In the book, Peker claimed that this was due to the lack of time. But the content

²⁷⁷ *Bu bir milli sırdır, ben bu sırrı, bir ferdi, bir evladı olduğum Türk milletinin kanında keşfettim! Cumhuriyet, "İnkılap Tarihi Kürsüsünde Recep Bey İstiklalın Ruh ve Manasını Anlattı," 13 Nisan 1934.*

²⁷⁸ *Ulusal birlik demek, akı ve şuru yerinde olan, biri ötekini tamamlayan ve seven, biri ötekinin hakkını ve şerefini kollayan yurddaşların birliği ve beraberliğidir. Peker, p. 117.*

of the first year lectures on the military aspect of the Turkish Revolution do not seem concordant with the book based on the course notes of the second year.

Aiming to create the ideology of the Revolution (especially in the area of domestic politics), Peker spoke rather as a founder subject than as an observer. But in military matters, his observer and analyst identity were more prominent. For example, when he told of the period before the National Struggle, he felt compelled to describe his lecture as “rather than being a subject of literature and feeling, it is the work of determining the details of a historical reality.”²⁷⁹

Evaluation

The content of Recep Peker’s Revolution Lectures formulated the main lines of the single-party ideology. Peker was involved in creating the ideology of the single-party period rather than an ideology of the Revolution. The idea of history was left behind in his text. Between these courses, the general aim of which was determined to be discussing the different dimensions of the Revolution from a historical perspective, Peker, of all the lecturers, showed the greatest tendency to make the ideology of the Revolution. He discussed political thought, ideologies and institutions rather than historical processes and developments.

Peker’s text represents not only an analysis of the past and present, but also aimed to give direction to the present and future. With this consideration of time, Peker’s text departs from the texts produced by the other speakers. On the other hand, key concepts, such as people, classes, and authority in Peker’s text coincide with the use of these concepts in other texts. As the secretary general of the single-party, Peker’s text cannot be examined in the context only of the other texts produced by the lecture series. On the most general level, it can be seen as a contribution to the attempts to make the

²⁷⁹ *Bir edebiyat ve his mevzuu olmaktan ziyade tarihi bir hakikatin inceliklerini tesbit işi. Cumhuriyet, “Recep Beyin dünkü dersi/mütareke değil zillet vesikası,”* 15 Nisan 1934.

ideology of the Revolution. Attributions to the revolution literature of the period can be seen in *Peker* more than in the other texts.



CHAPTER FIVE

YUSUF KEMAL TENGİRŞENK AND THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTION

Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk was born in the village of Sakız, outside of the small town Boyabat in the province of Sinop on 17 July 1878. He belonged to a notable family, one side of which came from the *ilmiye* (intelligentsia) class. He began his education at the elementary school (*Sıbyan Mektebi*) in Boyabat, and started middle school (*rüştiye*) there too, but completed it in Taşköprü. In the spring of 1889, he was taken to İstanbul to continue his education, registering at the *Şehzadebaşı Numune-i Terakki* School. Two years later, he passed to the Topkapı (then Fatih) Military School (*Askeri Rüşdiye*). Graduating from the military school in 1892, he then attended the Kuleli Military High School (*İdadi*).

This period saw liberal and constitutionalist ideas spread quickly in the newly established, modern high schools of the Ottoman Empire. Yusuf Kemal was influenced by these ideas and participated in some of the activities of the constitutionalist organizations of the period.

For health reasons, he transferred from the Military High School to the Military School of Medicine. Materialist ideas were strong in this school and his intellectual development gained a new direction there. He later entered the School of Law, from which he graduated in 1905.

After a number of short-term official posts, he decided to become a lawyer. He undertook important roles in the Revolution of 1908 and afterwards. Elected to

parliament as deputy in 1908 from Kastamonu, Tengirşenk remained in parliament until October 1909. He witnessed the 31 March Event²⁸⁰ from inside. He took part in the investigation of the Adana events.²⁸¹ He was appointed to the position of undersecretary of the Minister of Justice. When he was a member of parliament, with a commission from the Ministry of Justice, he traveled to Europe for education at the end of 1909.

He completed his education at the Faculty of Law at Sorbonne University in Paris in 1913. He then took doctorate courses on political and economic science. He began a thesis study on political decentralism (*siyasi adem-i merkeziye*). In 1913, he traveled to London to continue his studies. During this time, he continued his political activities. Leaving London to go to Germany, he was forced to return home with the outbreak of World War I.

In the elections held on 7 October 1919 after the Truce of Mondros, Tengirşenk was elected deputy from Kastamonu for the second time and participated in the parliament. After the occupation of İstanbul and the abolition of the parliament, he traveled to Ankara on 2 April 1920. He participated in the first Turkish Great National Assembly as deputy from Sinop and Kastamonu. He became the Minister of Economy in the first Council of Ministers (*icra vekilleri heyeti*). In this period, he played an important role in relations with Bolshevik Russia, traveled to Moscow two times with committees to conduct investigations and negotiations. He was the architect of the Moscow Agreement, the first agreement between Turkey and Soviet Russia. Back in Ankara, he was brought to the Ministry of Justice on 30 January 1921. He played a prominent role in the Entente (*itilafname*) with France on 20 October 1921. He traveled to European capitals as the minister of foreign affairs in 1922. Through the agreements

²⁸⁰ Monarchist uprising in 1909, against the constitutional monarchy and in particular against the Committee of Union and Progress.

²⁸¹ The massacre of the Armenians in Adana in 1909, related to the Uprising of 31 March. For detailed information about Yusuf Kemal Bey in these two events, see Ömer Akdağ, "Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk'in Hayatı, Faaliyetleri ve Eserleri," Ph.D. dissertation, Selçuk University, 1997, pp. 24-41. Two other sources used for this biography were Oktay Aslanapa (ed.), *İlk İnkılap Tarihi Ders Notları* (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997), pp. 15-16; and "Kayıplar/Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk," *Türk Kültürü*, no. 79 (Mayıs, 1969).

with other states made in his time at the ministry of foreign affairs, the international legitimacy of the new Turkish state was secured. He was the London representative of the Turkish Republic for five months in 1924.

Tengirşenk became a professor of economics in the first academic cadre of the Faculty of Law in Ankara, established in 1925. In 1926, he was transferred to teach courses in the History of the Turkish Revolution at the same school. This was eight years before his lectures at the Institute of Revolution at İstanbul University.²⁸² He continued this duty until 1941, when he left academia for a seat in parliament.

Between September 1930 and May 1933, Tengirşenk served as the Minister of Justice. He did not participate in the parliament in the elections of 1943, because he had been removed out from the RPP list. He returned to parliament in 1946 from the list of the DP, from İstanbul. He was expelled from the DP in March 1948. He remained independent for a period, before taking a place in the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) and, after its closure, in the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*).

After the military intervention of 27 May 1961, Tengirşenk was elected member of the constituent assembly. He was then chosen to act as the president of the constituent assembly as its oldest member.

He died on 14 April 1969 at the age of ninety-one. No state ceremony was organized for his funeral.

His Works and Thought

Tengirşenk, both in his works and in his thought, generally focused on economics and international politics. The Turkish Revolution was one of the basic subjects in his writings and speeches. He earned a doctoral degree in political and

²⁸² Bozkurt was also a professor of the History of the Turkish Revolution at the Faculty of Law in Ankara.

economic sciences in Paris, and then took up the position of professor of economics at the Faculty of Law at Ankara University. He gave courses on the Turkish Revolution in Ankara and at İstanbul University. An examination of his works reveals no one-to-one parallel between his political life and his intellectual life. Excluding his short term at the Ministry of Economy in the first Council of Ministers, his achievements in the area of international politics provided his place and importance in the history of Turkish politics. He was in the Ministry of Justice for a short term. Tengirşenk is also considered important from the perspective of the history of law in Turkey.

From his work, it is evident that his identity as an economist dominated that of politician.²⁸³ His being talkative, a man who preferred speaking to writing, may have caused this.²⁸⁴ Three of his works were based on his course notes. His works included²⁸⁵ *Layiha-i Tatarcıkzade Abdullah Molla Efendi* (The Project of Tatarcıkzade Abdullah Molla Efendi),²⁸⁶ *İktisat Notları* (Notes on Economics),²⁸⁷ *Türk İnkılabı Dersleri Ekonomik Değişmeler* (Lectures on the Turkish Revolution Economic Changes),²⁸⁸ *İktisat Ders Notları* (The Course Notes of Economics),²⁸⁹ *İktisad* (Economics),²⁹⁰ *Millet Ekonomisi* (The Economy of Nation),²⁹¹ *Vatan Hizmetinde* (In the Service of the Motherland).²⁹²

Together with these, some articles also should be noted: “Carwes’e Göre milli İktisad,” (The National Economy According to Carwes),²⁹³ “Tanzimat Devrinde

²⁸³ Ahmet Şükrü, in an editorial in *Milliyet* in the days when the Revolution Lectures began, stressed the roles of the other three men in the revolution, who gave these lectures. On the other hand, he introduced Yusuf Kemal Bey like this: “He is a scientist of ours who concerned closely with the economic front of our revolution life and has followed its phases.” *İnkılap hayatımızın iktisat cephesile yakından alakadar olmuş, onun safhalarını takip etmiş bir ilim adamımızdır.* Ahmet Şükrü, *Milliyet*, “Üniversitede İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri,” 7 Mart 1934.

²⁸⁴ Akdağ, pp. 178-179.

²⁸⁵ The list of his works, except for one article, is taken from Akdağ.

²⁸⁶ (İstanbul, 1914)

²⁸⁷ (Ankara, 1927)

²⁸⁸ (İstanbul, 1935)

²⁸⁹ (Ankara, 1937)

²⁹⁰ (Ankara, 1937)

²⁹¹ (Ankara, 1940)

²⁹² (İstanbul, 1967)

²⁹³ (*İktisadiyat Mecmuası*, Kanun-u evvel 1332-1333)

Osmanlı Devletinin Harici Ticaret Siyaseti,” (The Foreign Trade Politics of the Ottoman State in the Tanzimat Era),²⁹⁴ “Milli Mücadelede Ruslarla İlk Temaslarımız,” (Our First Contacts with the Russians in the National Struggle).²⁹⁵

Tengirşenk’s ideas cannot be thought of as independent from the political and social atmosphere in which he grew up. The effects of the Young Turks on the Kemalist political elite and relations between the Unionists and the Kemalists are well known. He was one of the few who went through the two periods as political elite.

Tengirşenk grew up during the final years of the declining Empire in the modern high schools with constitutionalist ideas. During his higher education, he developed constitutionalist ideas as a political agenda. Witnessing the slow collapse of the Empire fed his nationalist ideas, which influenced to his economic ideas.

The National Economy was Tengirşenk’s main focus. He was among the writers of *İktisadiyat Mecmuası* (The Periodical of Economics), a theoretical periodical of the doctrine of national economy in the war years.²⁹⁶ He published an article titled “Carwes’a Göre Milli İktisad” (The National Economics according to Carwes) in which he discussed the period of the National Economy after mercantilism and Lizst.²⁹⁷ In a book called *İktisad Ders Notları* (Economics Course Notes), published in 1934, he used the concept of the nation’s economy in the place of the national economy, writing, “whatever exists related to the economy in a nation, we describe all of them as the economy of the nation.”²⁹⁸ During his Revolution Lectures, he argued that the Turkish economy should be national. Because, Tengirşenk’s generation had newly learned how economic benefits occupied a place in the life of a nation. Tengirşenk continued:

²⁹⁴ (*Tanzimat*, vol.1, İstanbul, 1940.)

²⁹⁵ (*Yakın Tarihimiz IV*, 1962)

²⁹⁶ Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat-Milli Burjuvazi/Türkiye’de Ekonomi ve Toplum 1908-1950* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1995), p. 13. We learn that there was Yusuf Kemal Bey’s sign also in the process of the abolition of the capitulations. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁹⁷ Akdağ, p. 184.

²⁹⁸ *Bir millette iktisadi olarak neler varsa bunların topuna millet iktisadı deriz.* Akdağ, p. 183.

This generation is clearly declaring to the world that while the last moment of the Ottoman Empire was approaching and while arranging the National Oath (*Misak-ı Milli*), which included the living and survival conditions of the new state during the establishment of the new Turkey, the basis of the economic independence was “living and survival” and for this reason it “opposed the restrictions preventing its political, judicial, financial, etc. improvements.”²⁹⁹

Tengirşenk published the book, *Millet Ekonomisi* (The Economy of the Nation) in 1940. From the perspective of the national economy, he criticized economic liberalism. In addition to nationalism, the criticism of liberalism was a point shared by the four statesmen who gave the Revolution Lectures.

Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk and the Revolution Lectures

When the plans for the establishment of the Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures first emerged, Tengirşenk was not among those considered to give courses. This was mentioned in press. However, because he was both a member of the Kemalist political elite and an academic, he was selected in the end.³⁰⁰

Tengirşenk was to give courses on the economic dimension of the Revolution. He gave his first lecture on 11 March. In this lecture, he noted that he had given courses at the old *Darülfünun* fourteen years earlier. The changes that had occurred in the past time were enormous. The new university, which had been established in İstanbul, was one of the innovations. In this lecture, Tengirşenk declared his general thoughts on the Turkish Revolution, to which he added his subjective comments. His later lectures were based on economic history texts, which were enriched from time to time with anecdotes from his personal experiences. His diplomacy experiences influenced his ideas as an

²⁹⁹ Bu nesil, Osmanlı Devleti son demine varıpta yeni Türkiye kurulduğu zaman bundan sonraki devletin hayat ve baka şartlarını ihtiva eden Misakı Milliye tertip ederken ekonomik istiklalin ‘üssülesası hayat ve baka’ olduğunu ve bu sebeple ‘siyasi, adli mali ve sair inkişafatına mani kuyuda muhalif’ bulunduğunu açıkça dünyaya ilan ediyor. “Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Harici Ticaret Siyaseti,” in *Tanzimat* Vol.1, pp. 319-320.

³⁰⁰ The newspaper *Milliyet* on 28 February 1934, wrote that three people who would give the courses had been determined. However, Yusuf Kemal Bey’s name appeared in the newspapers of 2 March *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*.

economist, as significant parts of the Revolution's economic problems were related to international politics. In his second lecture, he outlined subjects that he would talk about:

I want to enumerate briefly the topics I will address. In our lectures after this, the financial and economic capitulations, the weakening of the country because of this reason, the gradual decrease of our population, the struggles against imperialism, the economic and financial judgments of the Sevres Treaty, the foreign pressure on the Ottoman Empire, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the truce and the occupation of Izmir.³⁰¹

Yusuf Kemal Bey ended his lectures on 8 May.

The Economic Dimensions of the Revolution

Tengirşenk's lectures on the economic aspects of the Revolution were collected into a book from students' notes and were published in 1935 by the Student Association of the Faculty of Literature Publications at Resimli Ay Basımevi in İstanbul. The book consisted of sixty-four pages divided into ten chapters. In 1934, summaries of these lectures were sometimes published in *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* newspapers, and from time to time, direct quotations from Tengirşenk's speeches.

An Overview of the Revolution and Its Economic Principles

Tengirşenk began his lectures with a definition of the concept of revolution. His understanding of revolution was not based on the subjective contrast of values (good and evil) as it did for Peker. Revolution meant a change, but the reason and form of this change was taken differently. Tengirşenk saw this change as an evolutionary and

³⁰¹ *Bundan sonra söyleyeceğim bahisleri kısaca sıralamak isterim. Bundan sonraki derslerimizde mali ve iktisadi kapitülasyonlar, memleketin bu yüzden zayıf düşmesi, nüfusumuzun gittikçe azalması, emperyalizm kavgaları, Sevr muahedesinin iktisadi ve mali hükümleri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna karşı harici tazyik, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun inkırazı, mütareke ve İzmir'in işgali. Milliyet, 13 Mart 1934.*

progressive process that should be understood by looking at its inner and organic reasons.

Tengirşenk had a clearly methodological concern. The ideological motivation and pragmatic approach of Peker was not his way. Unlike the essentialist texts that claimed to express the nature of the Turkish Revolution in one paragraph just at the beginning, Tengirşenk first discussed methodology, which he thought as important and determining as reality itself: “I want to say in short that how we can control the method firmly, we can examine at that degree the inside and outside of our revolution and find the typical events in our revolution and assign them to true causes.”³⁰²

This dominant idea about methodology of his, however, did not coincide with a strong methodological position as his approach was interdisciplinary. He introduced the methods used by different schools, such as induction, deduction, psychology, and history. According to him, all of these methods should be used in order to find what is sought in economy. Both international and domestic formations should be examined. What is striking is not the methodology that Tengirşenk followed in his lectures, but his eclecticism. This “methodological” attitude went together the claim that the character of the lecture was “scientific,” not ideological.

Tengirşenk’s first argument was that the era of individualism was over. This argument was the reflection of the political understanding in Peker’s lectures in the area of the economy. Economic activity was attributed to the nation beyond the individual and society. Tengirşenk based his argument also on the economic conditions in the other places of the world. In the years following the Great Depression of 1929, the tenets of liberalism in the economy were proven false and no longer accepted. Liberal individualism was harshly criticized. Etatism and nationalist economic policies were

³⁰² *Hulasa demek isterim ki metodu ne kadar sıkı tutarsak inkılabımızın içini dışını o kadar iyi tahlil etmiş ve inkılabımızda tipik hadiseleri o kadar iyi bulmuş ve doğru sebeplere bağlamış oluruz.* Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, *Türk İnkılabı Dersleri/Ekonomik Değişmeler* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti Neşr., Resimli Ay Basımevi, 1935), p. 5.

adopted. Interestingly, Tengirşenk's criticism of economic individualism referred not to etatism, but to nationalism: "Economic work will be with the whole nation and this condition will give the most happiness to the individual."³⁰³

In this sense, traces of F. List can be found in Tengirşenk's thought. Actually, Tengirşenk had been a writer on the staff of *İktisadiyat Mecmuası* (Periodical of Economics), which had been the "theoretical periodical of the national economy doctrine" during World War I.³⁰⁴ Therefore, it is misleading to try to link this argument of him solely to the conditions of the 1930s. In the process from the second Constitutional Monarchy to the Republic, the idea of National Economy came onto the agenda, was formed and applied, and then its outputs were received.

Tengirşenk conceptualized production (*istihsal*) as the creative part of the revolution. Economy, first of all, was the activity of working and production. Consumption received little mention. Here also, influences of the thought of National Economy can be seen. Different from the "cosmopolitan economy," the National Economy stressed saving as opposed to consumption. In the republican era, the Kemalists continued the Unionists' policies of encouraging saving during World War I. The Association of National Economy and Saving (*Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti*), founded in 1929, was an indicator of this concern.³⁰⁵ Beyond this, production was favored over consumption in an ethical manner. National Economy also had an ethical understanding that advocated and encouraged the preference of national and general

³⁰³ *Ekonomik çalışma ulusça olacaktır ve bu hal, ferde en çok saadet verecektir.* Tengirşenk, p. 6. The concept of National Economy had two bases: As a collective structure the nation (instead of the individual) should be the determining factor of the economy and the non-national (*gayri milli*) economy should be nationalized. This second item may coincide with individualism. Şeref Aykut described the etatism of Kemalism like this: "Nationalizing the working capital in the whole of the country, activating the capital in the hands of the Turks and without grudging its high protection for keeping the general condition in order, forcing the nation forward always, continuously and without resting." *Bütün ülkede işliyen hareketli kapitali uluslaştırmak, Türkân elinde duran kapitali harekete geçirmek ve bunların üstünde genel durumu düzende tutmak için yüksek korumasını esirgemiyerek ulusu hep ileri, durmadan ileri, dinlenmeden ileri yürütmek.* Aykut, p. 33.

³⁰⁴ Toprak, p. 13.

³⁰⁵ Türkes, p. 69. Türkes wrote that this association was dependent on the Ministry of Economy and it encouraged the use of domestic products. Türkes, p. 90. This association both brought the writers of *Kadro* periodical together and "played an important part for their joining in the milieu of Kemalist bureaucrats and intellectuals."

interests to personal interests.³⁰⁶ The efforts of the Unionists to create a Muslim bourgeoisie with economic policies during the war years,³⁰⁷ and economic developments during the Great Depression had already revealed an understanding of economic ethics that has been discussed extensively in studies of the era. This understanding put criticism not on saving or enrichment, but on consumption.³⁰⁸ When he exalted production, Tengirşenk considered consumption detrimental in economical terms to saving and in ethical terms to contentment (*kanaat*).

Examination of the final years of the Ottoman Empire is necessary in order to illuminate the economic aspect of the Revolution. It was generally claimed that corruption had permeated the Ottoman economy. The proof of this statement and its explanation, however, was based neither on historical causes nor on economic ones. We meet here the reflection of the idea that thought determines reality. The corruption of the Ottoman economy was seen as the result of the corruption of the *şeria* (religious law). Modernism theses on the Ottoman economy gained strength, especially in the second half of the century. The intellectuals of the second constitutional monarchy and early Republican eras were not strangers to these theses. While the economists of the second constitutional monarchy explained the corruption and decline of the Ottoman economy, for example, with the lack of a national bourgeoisie and the non-capitalist character of the Ottoman economy, the Republican era's anti-imperialist discourse was presented on economic bases (an example in this case is the periodical *Kadro*). Tengirşenk, on the other hand, insisted on this idealist explanation of the corruption of the Ottoman economy.

³⁰⁶ Toprak, pp. 20-21. Toprak cites the stress of the Unionists on professional ethics and the movement from here to solidarism and populism. Professional ethics also might be an ethics that exalts production over consumption.

³⁰⁷ A discourse processed much in the literature on the second constitutional era related to the policies of the CUP creating a Muslim bourgeoisie under war conditions.

³⁰⁸ Also in the application of *Varlık Vergisi*, this understanding continued to be dominant, and not wealth but living wealthy was taken as criterion.

Tengirşenk referred to written sources in his lectures. When he was describing the years before the Revolution in his first lecture, he read some passages from Şemsettin Bey's *Zulmetten Nura* that describes those days as too lively.³⁰⁹ He also quoted Mecelle and Fıkıh on religious law.

The Ottoman Economy

Tengirşenk made a non-historical analysis of the Ottoman economic order. First, the Ottoman *millet* system was criticized on the grounds that it had not provided, but had prevented, the emergence of the modern concept of nation. The discourse expanded, taking in criticism of the Tanzimat (and *Osmanlıcılık*). This method of analysis approached historical events with a selective logic and arrived at unhistorical conclusions. Second, the Ottoman understanding of conquest (*fütuhât*) related to personal power (administration) was put forward and criticized as an economic institution. According to this, the Ottoman economy had been completely one of consumption and expenditure. Consumption was regarded as a negative concept, and was attributed to the already negated Ottoman State and economy. Here, Tengirşenk's analysis lacked a comparative base, too. The Ottoman economy should be evaluated as the economy of an empire, and it should be considered that this economy had its own history.

Tengirşenk questioned why capitalism could not be established in such a rich country, without looking at the class and production relations. According to him, capitalism could be explained as simply the result of the capital accumulation. On the other hand, as pointed out by Lewis and Ahmad, there was a wealthy class, and also capital accumulation by this wealthy class in the Ottoman Empire. But this class, which

³⁰⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, "Yusuf Kemal Bey Dün İnkılap Enstitüsünde ilk dersini verdi," 12 Mart 1934.

functioned economically as a bourgeoisie, cannot be seen as a bourgeoisie in terms of political and social power.³¹⁰

Tengirşenk looked at the relations of the Ottoman economy with the economies of other states. The conclusion inferred from all these relations was the dependence of the Ottoman economy and thus the Ottoman Empire. The Revolution, on the other hand, had been fought to gain independence from other nations. Economic independence, for the Kemalist elite like their Unionist predecessors, was the main determining factor of the concept of independence. According to Tengirşenk, Ottoman economic history consisted of concessions such as the capitulations and monopolies. Historical processes (also of these concepts) did not exist. The economic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire was assessed as the result of intellectual and political preferences: the dominance of liberal ideas and the lack of mercantilist thought. Tengirşenk's idealist approach to the determining power of thought on reality was a key point.

Tengirşenk presented here a classical expression of the process from the capitulations to the General Debt Administration (*Düyun-ı Umumiye*). As a person who had lived through the monarchy, the constitutional monarchy, and the Republic, he could not examine the issue as a neutral observer. His style of expression implied that there were lessons which should be inferred for the Republican era from the historical experiences (path-dependence).

This is an issue and a style of expression common to the literature of the period. The capitulations and the *Düyun-ı Umumiye* (General Debt Administration) as two indicators of economic dependence cannot be thought of as independent from each

³¹⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, third edition (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1996), p. 25. Ahmad makes this quotation from Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Türkiye'de de, Yunanlı Mihail Kantakuzenos ve Portekizli Yahudi Joseph Vasi –Braudel'in deyimiyle, Şark'ın Fugger'i- gibi zengin tüccarlar ve bankerler vardı. Ama bunlar hiçbir zaman Avrupa'daki benzerlerinin oynadığı mali, ekonomik ve siyasal rolü oynamayı başaramadılar...mali işlemlerinin çapına ve genişliğine karşın, ticaret açısından daha elverişli siyasal koşulları yaratamadılar.*

other, nor as the products of different historical contexts.³¹¹ The Kemalist elite, as the bases of their anti-imperialist claims, processed these two issues. In Kemalist economic literature, international trade occupied a weighty place.

Tengirşenk frequently touched upon international customs agreements, because Republican Turkey was able to apply its own customs and tariffs only in 1929. He repeatedly stressed the importance of the import-export balance. The Kemalist elites' ideas about how the economic dependence of the Ottoman Empire had been transformed into political dependence and the remaining Ottoman debts as a problem for Republican Turkey caused this consciousness.³¹² The economic policies of the 1930s shaped by this consciousness resulted in the eventual removal of the foreign trade deficit.³¹³ The literature of the period discussed matters like the importance of consuming domestic products and promoted events like Domestic Products Week, and theses against excessive and luxury consumption and imports.

Tengirşenk did not hesitate to explain economic backwardness with what can be termed mentalities. Spoils of war as the sole source of wealth, according to him, had

³¹¹ *Dâyun-ı Umumiye* (General Debt Administration) is mentioned in the Kemalism texts of the period as an indicator of the difference between the Ottoman Empire and the new Turkey, rather than a subject of an academic inquiry: "The Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are different from each other from the point of economy as well as politics and society; two completely different states regarding their characters. The Republic of Turkey cannot be considered as the continuation of the Ottoman State, although is its principal heir. For this reason, we wanted not to take into account the economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire in our study. But it is necessary briefly to look at the foreign debts of the old regime caused the *Dâyunumumiye*, because one of the important problems of the foreign payment affairs in the present Republic of Turkey is the Ottoman debts." *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu siyasi ve içtimai bakımlardan olduğu kadar ekonomik bakımdan da birbirinden farklı karakter itibarile tamamiyle farklı iki devlettir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, belli başlı varisi olmakla beraber, bahsettiğimiz farklılardan dolayı hiç bir veçhile Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun devamı addedilemez bunun içindir ki tetkikimizde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun ekonomik durumunu hiç nazarı itibara almamak isterdik; fakat Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin bugünkü harici tediye işlerinde mühim meselelerden biri de Osmanlı borçları olduğundan, Dâyunumumiye'yi bize yükleyen eski rejimin harici borçlarını kısaca gözden geçirmemiz lazımdır.* Refii Şükrü Suvla, *Türkiye'nin Harici Tediye Meseleleri* (Ankara: CHP Yayını, Ankara Halkevi, 1938), p. 11.

³¹² Although the Ottoman debts were the common obligations of the states established in the frontiers of the empire according to principle decision accepted at Lausanne, how these debts would be shared was a problem. The Republic of Turkey came to an agreement with the creditors first in 1928. This first agreement was later revised in 1933 and 1936. Payments were completed in 1954. Seyfettin Gürsel, "Dış Borçlar," *CDTA*, pp. 470-471.

³¹³ Removal of the foreign trade deficit by eliminating half of the imports rather than increasing exports, explains Tengirşenk's opposition to consumption. Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985*, sixth edition (İstanbul: Gerçek Yay., 1998), p. 56.

prevented economic development like that of the West. Another problem of mentality was the understanding of contentment (*kanaat*). Tengirşenk's conceptualization of contentment, however, was unique. It was not an understanding of contentment in a sense that was criticized by Protestant ethics: "Contentment is the mentality of the stage of consuming ones own products which is the primitive form of economy."³¹⁴ Contentment as the antonym of consumption was not stressed often, but its character of not encouraging production and the flow of excess production to the market and thus not making the economy capitalist, was regarded as negative. This situation, which might seem contradictory at first, can be understood when the theories of national economy and cooperativism that were dominant in the period are taken into consideration. These ideas were fed by collectivist concerns. They took ordinariness and generality as their bases. Cooperativism had emerged in an industrialized country like England as a form of release for capitalism's unjustly treated classes. However, in an agrarian country like Turkey, it was a movement that criticized luxury and excessive consumption, as well as encouraged production. Tengirşenk confronted this dilemma inherent in the concept of the contentment and formulated an original conceptualization.

In his fourth lecture, Tengirşenk continued to talk on the period before the Revolution. It is interesting that the economic condition of the pre-Revolution era and the economic transformation that had been realized occupy such a great space in the text. Truly, the Ottoman legacy influenced the Kemalist elite's economic thought to such a degree that the economic policies of the Republic seem to have taken their legitimacy from this past experience.

The Tanzimat was subjected to harsh criticism. Tengirşenk examined the theses that the Tanzimat had caused the development of capitalism in the country, and while he regarded the modernization effects of the Tanzimat as positive, condemned it on

³¹⁴ *Kanaat, iptidai ekonomi şekli olan yapıldığı kendi istihlak etmek merhalesinin zihniyetidir.* Tengirşenk, p. 21.

economic and non-economic grounds. Nationality was the basic criteria of these criticisms. The general logic of the Tanzimat and in particular its economic policies were criticized by the Kemalists, as they had been by their Unionist predecessors, as lacking a national character (*gayrı milli*).³¹⁵ Tengirşenk also criticized the era of the second constitutional monarchy on the grounds that it was not sufficiently radical. In essence, with this approach, he confirmed the theses of continuity between the Unionists and Kemalists.³¹⁶ The difference between them, according to Tengirşenk, was not of direction, but of stress.

The Treaty of Sevres was another key theme that appears in the literature of the period under examination and among Kemalism theoreticians. Tengirşenk, however, did not dwell upon the economic judgments of Sevres. For him, the capitulations, the Ottoman tariff policies, and the *Düyun-ı Umumiye* (General Debt Administration) had to be considered in order to understand the full economic ramifications of Sevres. In analyzing the economic judgments of Sevres, Tengirşenk claimed that the nation existed on an economic base: “Only the Turks suffer the troubles of the country, will the others change their nationality when the tax is asked for. The nation almost completely disappeared at Sevres.”³¹⁷ From this perspective of the National Economy, he regarded the National Struggle as a political and military search for a solution to the economic

³¹⁵ The Tanzimat was reassessed and regarded positive in studies from the perspective of law in 1940s; but with the 1960s, with the spread of anti-imperialism and dependency theories, it came under criticism again.

³¹⁶ The relations of Kemalism with the Tanzimat and the second constitutional monarchy were a problematic that was processed much by Kemalist ideologues. It is not possible to talk about a single view on these periods. However, it can be generally said that these ideologues carefully made a separation between Kemalism and these. Their evaluation of the Tanzimat and the second constitutional monarchy include mainly political/ ideological themes rather than economic matters. Tekin Alp, for example, assumed both the Tanzimat and the second constitutional monarchy were positive. He praised especially the Unionists for their nationalist policies. But Kemalism according to him could not be seen as the follower of the preceding reform movement. He wrote that, “while giving them their deserved place in the history of the Turkish nation by the national awakening movements before the Kemalism, especially the Turkism of Ziya Gökalp and his followers, we cannot consider the beginning of the real history of Kemalism to be before 19 May 1919, when Atatürk set foot at Samsun to lead the independence movement.” *Kemalizmden önceki devrenin milli uyanış hareketlerine, bilhassa Ziya Gökalp’in ve tilmizlerinin Türkçülüğüne, Türk milletinin tarihinde ihraz etmeğe layık oldukları mevki vermeye beraber, asıl Kemalizm tarihini, Kemal Atatürk’ün, istiklal hareketinin başına geçmek üzere Samsuna ayak bastığı gün olan 19 Mayıs 1919 dan evvele alamayız.* Tekin Alp, p. 36.

³¹⁷ *Memleketin meşakkatini yalnız Türkler çekecek, diğerleri vergi isteyince milliyetini değiştirecek. Sevresde millet tamamıyla ortadan kalkıyordu.* Tengirşenk, p. 24.

problem. For him, the National Struggle carried economic concerns even from the period of the congresses.

Tengirşenk gave wide place to the speeches of Atatürk in which the economy was given importance, by pointing out the difference of the modern mentality from that of the Ottoman elites. He also quoted from the last book of Friedrich List, and from an issue of *Tanin* published in 1934.³¹⁸

Economic Change in the New Turkey

Tengirşenk lectured on the economic change in the new Turkey, noting that changes in the political and social realms had been rapid and that the Turkish Revolution had succeeded at making these profound changes. But economic change for him was the product of centuries, and the achievement of the new Turkey was to start out on a path of deep transformation. With the legal, human and physical dimensions of the economic change, the Turkish Revolution had removed all obstacles in front of economic development:

We have thrown out the obstacles blocking the nation and killing its abilities. For example, the *medreses* (muslim theological schools) have been removed, education has been united. The thing which was called the Caliphate also has been abolished. The Caliphate as an institution had interests in those economic activities. The sultanate also has gone away. The Ministry of Religion (*Şeriye*) has been removed. The dervish lodges (*tekkeler, zaviyeler*), all sorts of reputations, have been abolished. All of these consequently influenced economic activities...Everything which was obstacle to the economic prosperity has been removed.³¹⁹

According to Tengirşenk, economic dependence had resulted in political dependence. But now, political independence had brought independence also in the area

³¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri/Büyük Şefimiz iktisadi sahada da bir dehadır," 13 Mart 1934.

³¹⁹ *Milleti bağhyan, kabiliyetlerini öldüren manileri attık. Mesela medreseler kalktı, tedrisat tevhit edildi. Hilafet denen şey de kalktı. Hilafetin o iktisadi faaliyetlerle alakası vardır. Saltanat ta kalktı. Şeriye vekaleti kaldırıldı. Tekkeler, zaviyeler, türlü türlü ünvanlar hep kaldırıldı. Bütün bunlar dolayısıyla iktisadi faaliyetlere tesir ediyordu... İktisadi refaha varlığa mani olan herşey kalktı. Milliyet*, "Yusuf Kemal B. dün milli iktisadiyatımızın geçirdiği değişiklikleri anlattı," 2 Nisan 1934.

of economics. He made it clear that the relations of the Turkish national economy with other states had been increased. In this period, when the capacity of foreign trade was relatively low, he gave importance to the foundation of economic relations based on the principle of independence.

The Population Revolution

The economy of a country is related not only to production and consumption, through goods, but it is an activity in which the human is the fundamental component. Consequently, population policies must be considered together with the revolution's achievements in the area of the economy.

The population policies of the period under examination were aimed to increase the human potential of the young Republic.³²⁰ The direction of the National Economy principles required that this human potential was national and homogeneous: "The purpose that the new Turkey and the national economy followed first in the component of population is making the environment homogeneous."³²¹

Tengirşenk explained also the Exchange (*Mübadele*) policy in this base: "The new Turkey has been aiming at a nation that thinks like it owns one brain, one heart. When one of the people of two villages living side by side in the past was Muslim while the other was Orthodox, some disagreements emerged."³²²

³²⁰ "Happiness, prosperity is very much related to the conditions of human kind. Whatever the amount of population, the economic activities go like clockwork to that degree." *Saadetin, refahın insanın keyfiyeti ile şiddetle alakası vardır. Nüfus ne kadar çok olursa iktisadi faaliyet o kadar yolunda olur.* Ibid. He said in his following lecture: "In population affairs, the real matter is increasing the population. This is possible with the increase in births and the decrease in deaths... An increase in births is possible with the increase in marriage. For this reason, it is necessary to make marrying easy. If we look at our history of revolution, it can be seen that this affair has become easy." *Nüfus işlerinde asıl mesele nüfusu çoğaltmaktır. Bu da doğumun artması, ölümün azalması mümkündür...Doğumun ziyadeleşmesi, evlenmenin ziyadeleşmesi olur. Bunun için de evlenmeyi kolaylaştırmak icap ediyor. İnkılap tarihimize bakarsak bu işin kolaylaştırılmakta olduğu görülür.* *Milliyet*, "Yusuf Kemal Beyin dersi," 3 Nisan 1934.

³²¹ *Yeni Türkiye'nin, milli iktisadın, nüfus unsurunda, ilk takip ettiği gaye, muhiti mütecanis yapmaktır.* *Milliyet*, "Yusuf Kemal B. dün milli iktisadiyatımızın geçirdiği değişiklikleri anlattı," 2 Nisan 1934.

³²² *Yeni Türkiye bir dimağ sahibi, bir kalp sahibi gibi düşünür bir millet istiyordu. Tarihte, yan yana yaşayan iki köyün, iki ev halkının biri müslüman, biri ortodoks olduğu vakit, arada münazaalar çıktığı görülüyordu.* Ibid.

About inconvenience of the exchange according to the law of individual, he said: “The era of individualist law and economics is long past. It is the time of national and social existence. Therefore, there might be people who have trouble in that *mübadele* (population exchange) affair for national existence. But the national existence should be considered in the first place.”³²³

The health polices of the state were the main indicators of population policies which were seen not only as an “issue of quantity.” Population growth was sought through health and soundness. Although discourses in which an ideological/ethical stress on health were dominant, especially in the interwar period, Tengirşenk hardly mentioned them: “It is required to be vigorous, not only regarding physical powers, but also with morals.”³²⁴

He pointed out that laws had been passed declaring that the protection of the health of the population was the duty of the state, such as The Law of General Protection of Health (*Umumi Hıfzıssıhhat Kanunu*) of 1930, which had been issued before the law of inhabitance (*iskan kanunu*) that formed the essence of the population policies.³²⁵ He also counted the Law of Municipalities (*Belediyeler Kanunu*) and the Village Law (*Köy Kanunu*) as among the official attempts to protect health. He touched upon the importance of the Red Crescent (*Hilal-i Ahmer*) association and discussed the nationalization of health affairs: “After the Turkish Revolution happened and the national government was founded, a non-national doctorate became impossible, it could not be allowed.”³²⁶

Sports activities were also, by taking an ideological function, seen as part of health affairs: “The goal in the organization of scouting and sports is not only ornament

³²³ *Ferdi hukuk, ferdi iktisat devri çoktan geçmiştir. Milli varlık, içtimai varlık zamanıdır. Binaenaleyh milli varlık için, belki bu mübadele işinde sıkıntı çeken olmuştur. Fakat milli varlık evvela düşünölmek lazımdır. Ibid.*

³²⁴ *Dinç olmak yalnız fiziki kuvvetler itibarile değil, ahlak itibarile de dinç olmak lazımdır. Ibid.*

³²⁵ Tengirşenk, p. 34.

³²⁶ *Memlekette Türk inkalabı olduktan, milli hükümet kurulduktan sonra Türkiyede gayrimilli bir doktorluk olamazdı, buna müsaade edilemezdi. Cumhuriyet, “İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri/Yusuf Kemal Bey...” 3 Nisan 1934.*

and show, but to strengthen the body and the moral quality of the Turkish nation. The purpose of the affairs of training (*terbiye*) is bringing the Turkish nation to its real structure with inspirations brought by deep history.”³²⁷

Tengirşenk, by pointing out the relationship between the economy and the idea of nation from time to time, stated that the population policies in the new Turkey were made according to this idea of nation. He said, “the formation of the new Turkey by a nation in a single piece, owned one brain, one heart, one vision and thinking unique was necessary.”³²⁸

Revolution in Agriculture

Turkey in the 1930s was an agrarian country. Agriculture was the “natural economy front” of the National Economics. The institutions established relevant to agriculture, along with so many publications and congresses, are the certain indicators of this. The industrialization rhetoric of the period did not favor industrialization over agriculture or the peasantry either.

Tengirşenk took up the discussion of agriculture separately in his evaluation of the economic aspects of the Revolution. First, he analyzed the agricultural revolution in Europe, quoting technical developments. His evolutionist and progressive understanding of history shows itself here. Then he turned to the case of Turkey. The legacy inherited by the new Turkey and its achievements were described. Among these achievements, he counted first the removal of the *Aşar*,³²⁹ the Village Law, the establishment of new institutions and their studies. He did not claim, however, that a

³²⁷ *İzci ve spor teşkilatından gaye de yalnız sūs ve gösteriş değil, Türk milletinin bedenini, Türk milletinin seciyesini sağlamlaştırmaktır. Terbiye işlerinden maksat, Türk milletini derin tarihin verdiği ilhamlarla asıl bünyesine ulaştırmaktır. Ibid.*

³²⁸ *Yeni Türkiye'nin bir dimağ, bir kalp, bir görüş sahibi, bir tek düşünür, yekpare bir millet tarafından teşkili zaruri idi. Cumhuriyet, “İnkılap Tarihi Dersleri/Dün...” 2 Nisan 1934.*

³²⁹ A tax on the peasantry. Although provided the huge part of the state revenues, it was a heavy load on the peasantry and agricultural development.

revolution had been achieved in the area of agriculture. He claimed that the intellectual preparation for an agricultural revolution had been completed. Here he showed again his idea that thought was the vanguard of reality. In contrast to his treatment of the population issue, he did not explain the agricultural change with numbers and statistics. Instead he cited legislative regulations and new institutions.

The importance given by the new Turkey to the peasantry shows itself here as well. He described the problems of the peasantry in regard to agriculture techniques, the below market quality of the production, and tax load. The system of leasing out (*iltizam*) was regarded as negative, not because of the fiscal and economic harm it incurred, but because it made the classes visible in a country in which no classes had existed before.³³⁰ The solutions brought by the Republic and its reforms were described.

Tengirşenk also made exaltation of the peasantry, so common in this era. He presented himself as a member of the peasantry, and said, “the Turkish peasantry, who have been exploited forever and have never been supported, have worked by preserving their calm. They became poor and miserable. But the nobility in their blood and the strength in their souls have not been injured. The Turkish peasantry has never been reactionary.”³³¹

This idealized portrait of the peasant is a dominant theme in the period’s literature and is known as peasantism. But it is an important idea that the economic development of the new Turkey, the population of which was made up of ten million peasants, was possible only with their development. Although an industrialist understanding was dominant, no bud of an urbanism ideology was encountered in that period. Cities and ideas of urbanism that were regarded negative politically and socially

³³⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, “Zirai inkılabın ruhu,” 16 Nisan 1934. He says that a part of the notables’ place of origin in Anatolia was this system.

³³¹ *Kendinden daima alınmış, hiç kendine verilmemiş olan Türk köylüsü sükunetini muhafaza ederek çalışıyordu. Fakir sefil düşmüştü. Fakat kanındaki asalete, ruhundaki kudrete halel gelmemişti. Türk köylüsü hiçbir zaman mütereddi olmamıştır.* Ibid.

in the other Revolution Lectures, were veiled by rural economics in the lectures of Tengirşenk.

Revolution in Industry

Tengirşenk applied the method followed in examining agriculture also to the subject of industry. First, the industrial transformation of Europe was related from an evolutionist/ progressive understanding of history. While this part occupies a large place in the book, it is briefly mentioned or omitted from the texts presented in the newspapers. From there, he began to discuss the situation in Turkey beginning with the capitulations and Turkey's agrarian nature.

He criticized the Tanzimat once again here, saying that the Tanzimat had strengthened the bureaucratic and military mentality, while holding trade and industry as negative values. This differed from the anti-imperialist criticisms directed towards the Tanzimat in the Republican era. The Tanzimat was criticized not because its economic policies had integrated Turkey as an open market into the world economic system or it had accelerated the process of semi-colonization of the Empire. Rather it was criticized because it had put the political prior to the economic and it had not encouraged economic activities (trade and industry).

The era of Constitutional Monarchy, on the other hand, was considered as positive. This was different from the other texts. This may have the result of a personal preference of Tengirşenk as well as of the fact that the legacy of the second Constitutional Monarchy from an economic perspective included definitely positive qualities in the establishment of a national economy. For example, the 1913 first Law of Encouragement of Industry (*Teşvik-i Sanayi*) was given importance as the origin of the

existing law, although he commented that this law had not been fully implemented before the Republican era.³³²

Tengirşenk outlined the main industrial developments and policies in the Republican era. The basic factor that determined these policies was the fundamental claim of the period's economic mentality: self-sufficiency. It is understandable in this context that he left the discussion of this issue to "the three whites" (*üç beyazlar*) policy.

Revolution in Transportation and Commerce

In discussion of the economic importance of transportation, Tengirşenk examined the railway policies of the Republic. He touched upon the discussion of individual enterprise-state enterprises, the basic axes of the discussions on the determination of the period's economic policies from the perspective of the railway policies. The revolution in transportation, besides the common benefits of Kemalist economic policies, performed important political functions: "An investment program which was carried on with building an average of 200 km railway each year between 1924 and 1937/38 and the "nationalization of line" in addition to this realized several goals at a time like opening the agricultural zone and keeping the agriculture alive, giving continuous economic support to the building sector, providing the arrival of the nation state to its political borders and to own them, and the formation of an influential control network."³³³

The railway policies of the Republic had symbolic meaning as an indicator of the achievements of the period's economic policies and it became a popular theme in

³³² Tengirşenk, pp. 47-48.

³³³ 1924 ile 1937/38 arasında yılda ortalama 200 km'lik demiryolu inşaatı ile sürdürülen bir yatırım programı ve bunun yanı sıra yürütülen 'hat millileştirmeleri' kırsal kesimi açmak ve tarımı canlı tutmak, inşaatla sürekli bir ekonomik etki kazandırmak, ulus devletin siyasal sınırlarına erişmesini ve sahip olmasını sağlamak ve etkili bir kontrol şebekesi oluşturmak gibi birkaç hedefi birden gerçekleştirmiştir. Bilsay Kuruç, "Kemalist Ekonomi Görüşü: Kesitler," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 299.

the period's literature. The understanding of National Economy was dominant here. Tengirşenk criticized the Ottoman railway policy, especially its non-national character. The non-economic character (not based on profit) of this policy, on the other hand, was not criticized. The non-economic railway policies, undertaken according to political and military criteria, were accepted, but he asked that political and military criteria be determined according to the principle of nationality. In the other fields of transportation, such as in maritime transportation, the Ottoman State also had not followed national policies. The achievement of the Republic was to nationalize these policies. Etatism, seen as a means for this, was not considered the principal purpose: "Let's hope that capital in Turkey will improve; that Turkish technicians will incorporate and seek a government concession...The state, I am sure, will not give them a negative response."³³⁴

In essence, Tengirşenk also, as a member of the generation that had seen all three periods, gave importance to the railways for political reasons as well as for economic ones: "We can say to those who claim that our present lines are for military concerns: Military benefit, the affair of defense comes at the lead of the economic interests."³³⁵ From this perspective, the Kemalist political elites resembled their predecessors and did not perform a railway politics with only economic concerns.

The method Tengirşenk had followed in discussing the topics of revolutions in agriculture and industry, was applied also to the subject of commerce. First, the development of commerce in Europe was covered, from an evolutionist/ progressive understanding of history. Then, discussion of commerce in the new Turkey was begun. Revealed here were the sensitivities of an observer who had lived through the past two periods. Themes like giving importance to the domestic market, transforming the

³³⁴ *Temenni edelim ki Türkiyede sermaye ilerlesin, Türk teknikçileri birleşsinler ve devletten imtiyaz istesinler..Devlet onlara eminim red cevabı vermez. Tengirşenk, p. 58.*

³³⁵ *Bugünkü hatlarımızın askeri olduğunu ileri sürenlere şunu söyleyebiliriz: İktisadi menfaatların başında askeri menfaat, müdafaa işi gelir. Ibid.*

country into an economic whole, the balance between domestic and foreign trade, and opposition to the luxury were examined. The concept of National Economy was again dominant. The state was the means for providing this. He said, “the establishment of the state authority in the stock exchange is necessary. Because while such and such foreign currency exchanges, bonds, share certificates are bought and sold, the individuals must take care of the interests of the nation to which they belong as well as the procedure itself.”³³⁶

Evaluation

Tengirşenk’s lectures at first glance can be seen as an economic interpretation of the political ideas examined in Recep Peker’s lectures. Tengirşenk’s lectures, however, differed from those of Peker in both his goals and methodology. In his lectures, he limited himself to describing the economic dimension of the Revolution from the perspective of history. Unlike Peker, he did not seek to create the ideology of the Revolution or to shape the direction of it. This may be caused by his place in between the Kemalist elites and his professional formation. Tengirşenk, as an active member of the old CUP, except for short terms, did not occupy a leading place among the Kemalist elite. So, different from Peker, who was a voice of the revolution, Tengirşenk only talked from inside the revolution. His education in law, his doctoral studies on the social and economic sciences, and his professorship in the university made his lectures different from those of Peker.

From the perspectives of aim and method, Tengirşenk’s text offers a superficial, selective view of the past; a detailed narration of the near past and its exaltation; and from these, explaining the present and legitimating the economic policies of the

³³⁶ *Borsada devlet otoritesinin tesisi elzendir. Çünkü falan kambiyo, falan tahvil, falan hisse senedi alınıp satılırken, fertler yaptığı muamelenin kendisine olduğu kadar mensup olduğu milletin menfaatlerini de gözetmek mecburiyetindedir. Cumhuriyet, “İnkılap Tarihi dersleri/Yusuf Kemal Bey dün kredi siyasetimizi anlattı,” 9 Mayıs 1934.*

Republic. The themes used in the narration, the meaning attributed to certain historical events and topics, and the symbolic language created, are characteristics shared with those of the other Revolution Lectures. Although its interaction with the period's Revolution literature cannot be followed, the economic problems discussed in the texts can be encountered in the daily newspapers, periodicals related with economics, and books of the era.



CHAPTER SIX

YUSUF HİKMET BAYUR AND THE FOREIGN POLITICS DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTION

Of the four men examined in this study, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur was the only one whose identity as a historian was more pronounced than his identity as a politician. As both a historian and politician, he was regarded as representative of a tradition, which can be seen in Ottoman history, in the Republican period³³⁷ in that he was a productive historian who led an active political life. It is a loss for both Turkish political life and Turkish historiography that he did not write his memoirs as there has been little written about him.

Bayur was born in 1891 in İstanbul. His family, from both sides, was member of the Ottoman high bureaucracy. The loss of his father in his childhood caused that his grandfather, Kamil Pasha of Cyprus, had a deep influence on his life. Bayur's experiences and observations gave him particular ideas about the last era of Ottoman society early in his youth. It is quite like he began to gain a political consciousness at an early age.³³⁸

Bayur attended Galatasaray High School between 1900 and 1909. This was when his ideas of liberty (i.e., opposition to the monarchy) were roughly formed.³³⁹

³³⁷ Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Ord. Prof. Y. Hikmet Bayur 1891-1980," in *Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985), p. 1.

³³⁸ In Yusuf Hikmet's letter written to his mother in 1905 from İzmir, we see that a fourteen year-old boy passed information he had heard about the activities of the Armenians there. He wrote that the target had been higher officials and how his grandfather, Kamil Pasha, had been protected. Hilmi K. Bayur, "Hikmet Bayur'un Yaşantısından Bazı Çizgiler," in *Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan*, p. 37.

³³⁹ His two memories about these years were related by Hilmi K. Bayur. When students in Galatasaray High School shouted things like "Long live my Sultan!" (*Padişahım çok yaşa!*), Yusuf Hikmet was among the other students, who shouted "Fall down my Sultan!" (*Padişahım başaşağı!*) Also it is noted that when he wanted domestically produced clothes, his mother (the daughter of a high bureaucrat) said:

After graduating, he went to Paris and attended the Sorbonne from 1909 to 1913, the Faculty of Science.³⁴⁰ He became acquainted with Europe, but he never lost his attachment to Turkey and Turkish politics. He followed closely the political and military developments of the period.

Bayur returned to Turkey in 1913 and began to lecture at Galatasaray High School. He witnessed World War I and then the years of truce. He went to Ankara with the aid of his friend Adnan Adıvar in 1920 and participated in the National Struggle. His first appointment was at the General Directorship of Political Affairs (*Umur-ı Siyasiye*) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wrote his first book in this period, which indicated that Turkish intellectuals found the Treaty of Sevres as unacceptable.³⁴¹ Bayur, who held positions at different bureaucratic levels of the new Turkish Republic, was elected to parliament in the mid-term elections of 1933 as deputy from Manisa and he remained in parliament until 1942.

He succeeded Reşit Galip as the Minister of Education from 27 October 1933 to 8 July 1934. He completed the University Reform that had been started under Reşit Galip. He gave the keynote speech at the opening of the new University on 18 November 1933. He also played a role in the foundation of the Institute of Revolution at İstanbul University and he gave the first lecture at the Institute on 4 March 1934. In his lectures there, he discussed the foreign politics of the new Turkish State. These lectures formed the content of a book titled *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti* (Foreign Politics of the Turkish State), published in 1934. In addition to these lectures, he gave courses on the History of India at Ankara and İstanbul Universities until 1942.

“The Hereke factory is owned by Abdülhamid, do you want to give money to him?” (*Hereke fabrikası Abdülhamid’indir, ona mı kazandırmak istiyorsun?*) Hilmi K. Bayur, p. 38.

³⁴⁰ Arar points out that Bayur completed his education neither in the political sciences nor in history. İsmail Arar, “Prof. Hikmet Bayur ve Yayınlanmamış Bir Araştırması,” in *Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’a Armağan*, p. 43.

³⁴¹ Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, p. 2. According to this, it attracts attention that this book is not encountered in any bibliography.

After leaving the RPP, Bayur founded the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) in 1948. In the same period, he directed harsh criticisms towards the governments in newspapers for which he was the editorial writer. He passed to the DP in 1952. He was elected to parliament in 1954 and 1957 as deputy from Manisa from this party's quota as an independent deputy. He left political life with the military intervention of 27 May 1960 and devoted himself history studies. He died on 6 March 1980. No state ceremony was held for him.³⁴²

His Works

Bayur was a productive writer in the exact meaning of the term. His extensive body of work was published in various formats.³⁴³ He wrote from the perspective of both historian and politician, these two disciplines coloring his writings, sometimes separately and often together. Writing from the early 1920s to the late 1970s, the evolution of his intellectual life in this long span of time led to a diversity of form and content in his works.

Bayur's formal education was not in history and his historiographical understanding had a clear political direction. He played an important role in the development of scientific historiography in Turkey with his studies at the Turkish History Association and his method, which was based on the use of archives and documents. Familiar with European languages and cultures, he studied with reference to them.

His work produced by his historian identity can be considered in two categories. The first category includes works related to Turkish history in general and to the

³⁴² About his death, Perihan Arıburun talks with reproach, especially about the university, of which he was one of the founders: "There was no one from the university at his death and his coffin was not wrapped with a Turkish flag. He remained alone, as in his healthy days." *Ölümünde Üniversiteden kimse yoktu ve tabutu Türk bayrağına sarılı değildi. Sağlığında olduğu gibi yalnız kalmıştı.* Perihan Arıburun, "Hikmet Bayur," in *Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan*, p. 79.

³⁴³ In each of these two sources, a bibliography is given: Şakiroğlu; and Yurder Yanık, "Ord. Prof. Dr. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'un Biyografisi," (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul University, 1999).

Turkish Revolution in particular. A part of these works were written completely with actual agendas. So rather than history texts, they are historical texts in which the historian made clear his subjectivity about his topic. For example, his first work, titled *Türk Muahede-i Sulhiyyesi ve Mahiyet-i Hakikiyesi* (Turkish Agreement of Peace and Its Real Character), was published anonymously and was evaluated as “a publication of Anatolia against Sevres.”³⁴⁴ His work *Yeni Türk Devletinin Harici Siyaseti* (Foreign Politics of the New Turkish State), published first in 1934, merged his historian identity with his politician/diplomat identity. In other works of this category, he also had a political agenda. His most lengthy work, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* (History of the Turkish Revolution), was published in three volumes in 1940, 1943 and 1953. In this work, Bayur looked at the near past of Turkey and presented a historical narrative of the period from the Berlin Agreement to the end of the National Struggle. With this work, he came to be seen as the person who put forward the concept of the History of the Turkish Revolution and put it into practice.³⁴⁵ But this is an overstatement. In this work, which deeply affected the following works on the history of the revolution, Bayur took up a historical process in which he had lived and by which he was indirectly and directly affected, without giving much place to his personal observations. The Revolution Lectures he gave at İstanbul University and in Ankara were a part of this mission. The book titled *Atatürk Hayatı ve Eseri* (Atatürk, His Life and Work), published in 1963; and the book titled *XX. Yüzyılda Türklüğün Tarih ve Acun Siyaseti Üzerindeki Etkileri* (Influences of the Turks on the History and the World Politics in the Twentieth Century), published in 1974, which is an ideologically weak example of the attempts of the 1930s to universalize the Turkish Revolution, can be regarded in this category.

³⁴⁴ Mete Tunçay, “Sevr’e Karşı Anadolu’nun Bir Yayını” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 34 (Ankara, 1980).

³⁴⁵ Yamk, p. 107.

In the second category, there are his studies on the history of India, which can be seen as a reflection of the dazzling vision of the early Republican era's historical studies. Bayur, who gave courses on the history of India at Ankara University, was the founder of the Urdu Language and Literature department there. Three volumes of Bayur's *History of India* were published in 1946, 1947 and 1950. Unlike in his studies on Turkish history and the Turkish Revolution, Bayur wrote here on a very long time period. This study is important for it indicates both the early Republican era's historiographical and political vision.

His writings and articles which emphasized his political identity, on daily events and social subjects, were published mainly in the newspapers *Kudret*, *Hürses*, *Akm*, *Akşam*, *Kırvet*, and *Milletin Sesi*.³⁴⁶

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur and the Revolution Lectures

As the period's Minister of Education, Bayur put his signature on some very important works, among which the university reform was foremost. He continued the studies that had begun before his term about the university reform and completed them. The opening of the Institute of Revolution, which was seen as the main indicator of novelty of the university, was made by him.

Reşit Galip, who had first put forward the idea of the Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures, had accepted the proposal of the Chair of Revolution when he was continuing his studies as the Minister of Education. But this was forgotten after he left the Ministry of Education, and remained outside of the process. The name of the new Minister of Education, Hikmet Bayur, came up in the preparation stage as someone who might give lectures. Bayur was the first name that became definite among the four men to give the lectures.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 120.

Bayur made the official opening speech at the Institute of Revolution on 4 March 1934 and gave the first lecture. News about his lecture often also contained information about his other studies. From the first day, each lecture consisted of a history narration and they continued in a course manner. The courses can be evaluated as detailed examples of national historiography. As seen in the other courses, he did not stray from the subject. Personal observations and impressions were not given place. But it cannot be said that his personal experiences did not influence the discourse and content of the courses. Bayur's lectures were completed on 12 May 1934.

The meaning and importance of these courses for Bayur was evident in the following years of his life. His interest on the History of the Turkish Revolution continued and he wrote his most lengthy works about it.

The Foreign Politics Dimension of the Revolution

The first edition of the book based on Bayur's lectures was published in 1934. Divided into three parts, its first part constituted two-thirds of the book and examined the period and process before the Lausanne Treaty. Moving from this, the claim made about Tengirşenk and about the economic dimension of the revolution can also be made for Bayur and the foreign politics dimension of the Revolution: the foreign policy of the Revolution, its principles and implementations took their legitimacy fundamentally from the near past.

General View on the Near Past

Bayur believed that a historical perspective was necessary to understand the foreign politics of the new Turkey. For this reason, in his introduction, he described the situation of the Ottoman State before World War I. This description began with praise of the human and geographical wealth that the Ottoman State had possessed. There were

two motives behind this: First, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, this human and geographical legacy remained intact. Therefore, the values regarded positive in essence were also the values of the new state. The character of nationalist historiography, on the other hand, was the second motive. Nationalist historiography tells a story of success. Failures are explained as the result of disobedience to the rules of the game.³⁴⁷ Bayur, by praising just in the beginning the human and geographical values possessed by Turkey, implied that the origins of the problems should be sought in other places.

Bayur continued by listing the reasons for the situation before the Great War, among them a state that could not follow the progress of the world, the caliphate, colonialism, the politics of the foreign states, and their ambitions concerning the Ottoman Empire. Bayur's conception of the past was not different from those of Peker and Tengirşenk in that while "the past" is the same, "the present" is various from the different perspectives. The past was not discussed in detail, but rather was made use of to establish the legitimacy of the present.

The Truce of Mondros (*mütareke*), according to Bayur, was a turning point for the Turkish Revolution. He noted that, among its allies, the Turks were the last nation to seek a truce, because of the defeat of its allies. Bayur interpreted the situation of the Turks after the truce with the entente states as follows: "Solidarity and being based on the each other are required between the Bolsheviks, an evil model to workers, and the Turks, considered as an evil model to the nations of Asia and Africa."³⁴⁸

The anti-imperialist theme was examined as the basic support for the Turkish Revolution. Another conclusion that can be inferred from Bayur's comments here is related to the historical background of the closeness between Turkey and the USSR

³⁴⁷ İlhan Tekeli, "Ulusçu Tarih Yazımı Üzerine," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 42 (Haziran, 1997), p. 48.

³⁴⁸ *Ameleye suimisal olan Bolşeviklerle Asya ve Afrika milletlerine suimisal addolunan Türklerin müşterek mütaarrızlar karşısında tesanüdünü ve birbirine dayanmasını mucip olmuştur.* Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Milli mecmua Basımevi, 1938), pp. 19-20.

during this period. The Turkish Revolution (*inkılabı*) and the Soviet Revolution (*ihtilali*) agreed on the common point of rising up against the political and economic hegemony of the West. Keeping in mind Bayur's interest in the history of Asia and India and that the texts were written in 1930s, it can be seen here that the National Struggle was assumed pioneer in the independence struggles of Third World countries. Bayur would examine this theme further in his later work. But his ideas seem from time to time like a proposal of guardianship in addition to the claim that Turkey was a pioneer and model. He wrote:

We considered it useful to make a comparison on the matter of training other nations and inculcating consciousness and the concept of right to the people. If the political law recognized by the French administration to the people or some native groups in Algeria, Tunisia and Syria, which separated from the Turkish administration in 1830, 1882 and 1918, or the determination and effort for the sake of independence shown by the inhabitants of these countries and even the prosperity of people stratum there are compared, it can be seen that those who separated later from the Turkish body are superior to the others, relatively, and the power of the Turkish administration in nation-training can be immediately understood.³⁴⁹

Hikmet Bey expressed his thoughts on this in the lecture with these words:

They were saying that Turks could not administer well... This shows that the country that remained more in Turkey has gone the farthest. Syria, for example. Algeria, however, has remained the most backward. The best administrator of countries is us. They were propagandizing against us, saying we could not administer well... It is seen that foreigners administer more easily the ones that separated earlier from us. We are superior to Englishmen in nation-training.³⁵⁰

Who the audience was for the Turkish message is another matter of discussion.

While Kemalism ideologues, on the one hand, forwarded the thesis that the Turkish

³⁴⁹ *Burada diğer milletleri yetiştirmek ve halka şuur ve hak mefhumu telkin etmek hususunda bir mukayesede bulunmayı faydalı addettik. 1830, 1882 ve 1918 tarihlerinde Türk idaresinden ayrılan Cezayir, Tunus ve Suriyede Fransız idaresinin halka veya bir kısım yerlilere tanımakta olduğu siyasi hukuk ve oralar ahalisinin istiklal uğrunda gösterdiği azim ve gayret ve hatta halk tabakalarının refahı mukayese edilirse görülür ki Türklük camiasından en sonar ayrılanlar diğerlerine nisbeten çok üstündürler ve Türk idaresinin millet yetiştirmekteki teffevvuku derhal göze çarpar.* Bayur, p. 33.

³⁵⁰ *Türkler iyi idare edemez diyorlardı... Bu gösteriyor ki Türkiyede en fazla kalan memleket en ileri gitmiştir. Mesela Suriye. Halbuki Cezair en geri kalmıştır. Memleketleri en iyi idare eden biziz. Aleyhimize propaganda yapıyorlar, iyi idare edemez diyorlar... Görülüyor ki, ecnebler bizden en evvel ayrılanları daha kolay idare ediyorlar. Millet yetiştirmekte biz, İngilizlere faikaz. Milliyet, "Maarif vekili Hikmet Bey dün geldi ve dersine başladı," 18 Mart 1934.*

Revolution was the model/pioneer for Third World independence movements, on the other hand, they placed themselves within Western Civilization and for this reason they did not consider themselves to have any political proximity to those Third World countries:

Relations with the other Muslim countries that are in the colony statute and have entered the struggle for independence were more distanced than relations with the independent/semi-independent countries mentioned above. The reason for this is the will of Turkey, which is coming closer to the West, to show Europe that it does not have pan-Islamist aims and it is not interfering in the interior affairs of the colonial empires. As a result, Turkey gave priority in its foreign propaganda not to the countries which were seeking independence, but to introducing the reforms to European public opinion.³⁵¹

Different from these real-political justifications, a more ideological explanation also can be made. Kuyuş writes that,

Although they were conscious of being a model to the colonial world, not attempting to export their revolution outside of the native country of the generation that worked for the complete independence of Turkey...is the result of their belief that national independence is a first step taken for the milieu of Western civilization and afterwards that a critique directed to the Western world related to the essence is unnecessary.³⁵²

The manner in which Bayur took up the Mondros armistice and the following period displays the characteristics of the nationalist historiography of the era. A documentarist understanding of history is dominant throughout the text. The articles of the truce, documents about it, and the documents of the different reactions are all discussed in the narration.

³⁵¹ *Sömürge statüsünde olan ve kurtuluş uğraşına giren diğer Müslüman ülkelerle olan ilişkiler, yukarıda sözünü ettiğimiz bağımsız/yarı bağımsızlarla olan ilişkilerden daha da mesafeli olmuştur. Bunun nedeni, Batıya yaklaşan Türkiye'nin Avrupa'ya panislamist amaçları olmadığını ve sömürge imparatorluklarının içişlerine karışmadığını göstermek istemesi idi. Neticede, Türkiye dış propagandasında önceliği kurtuluşlarını arayan ülkelere değil, yapılan reformları Avrupa kamuoyuna tanıtmaya veriyordu. Ali Kazancıgil, "Anti-empyralist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu olarak Kemalizm," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 245.*

³⁵² *Türkiye'nin tam bağımsız olabilmesine çalışan neslin, sömürge dünyasına örnek olduklarının bilincinde olmalarına karşın, yaptıkları 'devrim'i yaymaya, yurtdışına ihraç etmeye kalkışmamış olmaları...ulusal bağımsızlığı Batı uygarlığı çevresine doğru atılan bir ilk adım olduğuna ve ondan sonra Batı dünyasına karşı yöneltilen öze ilişkin bir eleştirinin yersiz olacağına inanmalarının sonucudur. Ahmet Kuyuş, "Yeni Osmanlılar'dan 1930'lara Anti-empyralist Düşünce," *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 249.*

Narrative, as a form preferred by nationalist historiography, adopts a historicist explanation when founding a story that provides continuity between the past events, selected one by one.³⁵³ Bayur also, with a selective logic, founded his narration on some turning or breaking points. The Mondros armistice and Mustafa Kemal Paşa's passing to Anatolia were such turning points following each other. The events between these two turning points, on the other hand, were seen as secondary developments, as non-founder components of the narration.

Examining the National Struggle by focusing on the foreign policy dimension, however, did not oppose the dominant narration; it created a different narration by bringing forward different aspects. Arranging in order the developments related to foreign politics, discussing articles from relevant texts of documents such as treaties and congress communiqués as separate (even as abstracted) from other events and articles bring a different perspective. Approaches that claimed to be more comprehensive could seem to be evaluating the different dimensions of the National Struggle, for example, by sacrificing the details, but this was not a preference. It was rather the result of the fact that the literature about the National Struggle accepted the dominance of the narration that formed in the center and was even nourished from this narration. Consequently, it could not create a richness of discourses or perspectives.

The main reference of this narration established in the center was without doubt *Nutuk*. Bayur's study, however, which evaluated the National Struggle from the perspective of foreign politics, did not repeat the dominant narration, although it did contribute to it. This was in no way an attempt to establish a narration independent from that of the center. The difference between them stemmed from Bayur's examination of the National Struggle with a microscope instead of a telescope and it is only a

³⁵³ Tekeli, p. 48.

perspective depth. In Bayur's narration, the discourses and texts of the leaders of the National Struggle (Mustafa Kemal in the lead) remained as the main bases.

The Treaty of Sevres

The Treaty of Sevres constituted one of the landmarks of the ideological codes and discourses of the new Turkish state. It continued to be a central theme in the 1930s in the writings and discussions on the ideology of the Revolution. From this perspective, Bayur's approach to Sevres, the language he used, and the evaluations he made may help us to understand him and the ideological debates of the 1930s, as well as to understand the Treaty itself.

Bayur left his emphasis on the foreign politics dimensions of the National Struggle in evaluating Sevres and evaluated the event in its all dimensions. In essence, this consisted of a detailed narration of the historical process throughout the diplomatic negotiations of the treaty and also a detailed inventory of the treaty's conditions.³⁵⁴

While writing about Sevres, Bayur seems hesitant. Subjective reflexes appear in the attempts to evaluate Sevres as a historical event.

The Treaty was not read as a political text, the parties to which are said to be the Ottoman State and the other states. The important entity is the nation, the Turkish Nation (*Türklük*).³⁵⁵ The content of the document was evaluated not directly according to its articles, but according to its possible results. Thus, the text was different from that of a treaty and it was seen as a "a very excellent poem of precautions,"³⁵⁶ established with negative aims concerning the Turks. He said, "if the treaty of Sevres had been

³⁵⁴ These conditions were examined as nine parts.

³⁵⁵ Bayur, p. 49.

³⁵⁶ *Çok mükemmel bir tedbirler manzumesi. Ibid.*

applied, the Turks would have come to the condition of the Jews in the Middle Ages. The Treaty of Sevres was prepared with this aim.”³⁵⁷

Before passing to a discussion of the content of the treaty, Bayur described the negotiations that had been carried out between England and Greece before Sevres and cited examples from their correspondences, such as the secret telegrams of Venizelos. This approach, which decreased the number of the parties at Sevres, allowed for a view of Sevres not as a multi-sided struggle between powers but as a kind of planned and intentional conspiracy of “a party” that did not accommodate contradictions and disagreements within itself, against “the Turkish Nation.” It also read the developments with a selective view and so rendered them unhistorical. This approach implied that the opposite party at Sevres was the same as the opposite party in the National Struggle (Greece, together with England).

Another characteristic that strengthened the ideological stress and weakened the historical analysis in Bayur’s evaluation of the Treaty was the evaluation of Sevres without considering the treaties that marked the end of the war with the other allies.

Bayur then went on to examine the conditions of the Treaty of Sevres, part by part. Compulsorily, this examination was made by a selective method. In essence, Bayur supported his arguments with quotes of the articles that he saw as important. From time to time, subjective judgments appeared, but for the most part, he limited himself to making prognosis about the possible results of these articles.

An important aspect of the dominant narration on Sevres is it criticized and considered the objection of the Ottoman government towards Sevres insufficient as well as to regard Sevres as negative. Bayur repeated this consideration, but refrained from making generalizations. He made reference to the memorandum presented by the representatives of the Ottoman government to the conference. He showed that they

³⁵⁷ *Sevres muahedesi tatbik edilseydi, Türkler kurunuvüsta’daki yahudiler haline geleceklerdi. Bu maksatla Sevres muahedesi hazırlanmıştı. Milliyet, “Hikmet Bey ikinci dersini de verdi,” 6 Mart 1934.*

comprehended the real meaning of Sevres and he stated how burdensome they found Sevres. Bayur's strongest criticism was directed towards Damat Ferit Pasha and his government in his personality.³⁵⁸

The Foreign Politics of the Government of Ankara

Sevres was a critical starting point for the foreign politics of the new Turkish state, according to Bayur. By preferring Sevres over Lausanne, Bayur set an equation between Sevres, the existence of which was seen as identical to the Ottoman Government, and Lausanne, the existence of which was made possible by the national government in Ankara.³⁵⁹ Lausanne was presented as a historical breaking point. Events were separated into a periodization of before and after it. Thus, Bayur followed a historical method in dealing with Lausanne that was very different from that in his discussion of Sevres.

³⁵⁸ This attitude can be seen also in other studies of the period on Lausanne or Sevres. For example, M. Cemil (Bilsel) mentions some Ottoman bureaucrats, such as Tevfik Pasha or Ali Rıza Pasha, with appreciation for their position against Sevres. M. Cemil, *Lozan* (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933), pp. 344-345. In this study, the process from Sevres to Lausanne is narrated from the perspective of the Turkish side. But different from the texts of Bayur or Ürgüblü on the same themes, Sevres and Lausanne are not taken as components of an emerging ideology with their symbolic meanings. We should point out here that M. Cemil's study was published before the texts of Bayur and Ürgüblü.

³⁵⁹ Truhy, beyond being a treaty, Lausanne gained a symbolic meaning in the Turkish literature of the period. We know that its anniversary was celebrated with enthusiasm in the early Republican era. Ürgüblü described the symbolic meaning of Lausanne like this: "For the noble Turkish nation, the word 'Lausanne', even on its own, has a meaning and a whole speech. Just as only saying that I am Turk is happiness and strength, pronouncing the word 'Lausanne' alone is to speak strongly and comprehensively at that degree. In any case, the word 'Lausanne' has been transformed from a geographical name for Turks into a concept and monument of independence." *Asil Türk ulusu için 'Lozan' kelimesi başlı başına bile bir manadır ve bütün bir hitabettir. Nasılkı sadece Türküm diyebilmek bir mutluluk ve güçlülükse tek başına 'Lozan' kelimesini telaffuz etmekte o derecede kuvvetli ve geniş konuşmaktır. Zaten 'Lozan' kelimesi Türk için bir Coğrafya ismi olmaktan çıkmış, bir istiklal mefhumu ve abidesi halini almıştır.* Münib Hayri Ürgüblü, *Lozan* (Ankara: Ankara Halkevi Neşriyatı, 1936), p. 5 and pp. 7-8. We mentioned the different characteristics of the studies on Lausanne of M. Cemil and Ürgüblü. When they talk about the capitulations, M. Cemil and Ürgüblü differed from each other, too. Ürgüblü wrote the followings about the removal of the capitulations: "The capitulations were removed first and finally with the Treaty of Lausanne." *Kapitülasyonlar ilk olarak, kat'i olarak Lozan ahidnamesile kaldırılmıştır.* Ürgüblü, p. 24. M. Cemil on the other hand, gives place to other efforts to abolish the capitulations from the Tanzimat to the constitutional monarchy, although the absolute success was in Lausanne. M. Cemil, pp. 46-75.

Before the Conference of Lausanne

Bayur commenced his examination of the foreign politics before the Lausanne Conference of the National Government at Ankara by looking at its relations with the East. Truly, the first important achievement of the Ankara government in the arena of foreign politics involved developments in the East. The main audience of the East politics of the Ankara government was Soviet Russia. The biggest problem in this region was the Armenian issue. In addition to discussing these, Bayur covered some military and political developments with Georgia, Armenia, and Afghanistan in a detailed manner in this chapter.

The relations of the Ankara government with Soviet Russia presented a double structure. According to Bayur, the foreign politics of Soviet Russia had two important bases:³⁶⁰ The first was the working class of the Western industrialized countries. Their sensitivities about the Armenian issue formed the problematic side of Turkish-Soviet relations. The second one was the slave nations in the colonies. This anti-colonial discourse coincided with the claim of the Ankara government to be a model to Third World independence movements.³⁶¹ The Moscow Treaty was signed after long negotiations. Bayur, as a historian of Asia, described this treaty as “one of the greatest events of the Near East.”³⁶²

The basic problem facing the Ankara government in terms of politics towards the West was Sevres. Bayur wrote that the western states, after the first political and military achievements of the Ankara government, tended to receive acceptance from

³⁶⁰ Bayur, p. 64.

³⁶¹ It should be noted here that this claim was not limited to being a model to Third World countries and their independence movements. Especially other Muslim countries, according to Kemalism ideologues, took Kemalism as their models. There was a new atmosphere for the relations between Turkey and these Muslim countries. So, this claim can be understood as related to some Kemalist policies, such as the elimination of the caliphate. Tekin Alp for example, gives little place to other eastern countries' views on Kemalism as compared to those of Muslim countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Afghanistan. Tekin Alp, pp. 326-335.

³⁶² *Yyakun şarkın en büyük hadiselerinden biri*. There was much work and contribution of Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk also, a professor of the Revolution Lectures of 1934, in this treaty.

Ankara for Sevres by softening its conditions. He quoted from *Nutuk* about this. The response of the Ankara government against this attitude was the emphasis on the *Misak-ı Milli*. Bayur, who presented the London Conference as an important break before the Lausanne Conference in a detailed manner, evaluated this conference and the agreements signed at this conference as placing them against the *Misak-ı Milli* from the perspective of the unacceptable character of Sevres. He said, “the aim of the national struggle is not to modify this or that article of the Treaty of Sevres, but to provide whole jurisprudence, which the French and English nations owned within their national borders, to the Turkish nation. In this matter, the success will be obtained absolutely and without considering its cost.”³⁶³

He also made long quotations from *Nutuk* (as related to the negotiations made with France after London Conference); “I stated the principle that the point of the movement for us was the contents of the National Oath... Even during this speech; I do not want to utter the Treaty of Sevres. We do not attempt procedures based on the principle of confidence with nations who have not banished the Treaty of Sevres from their brains.”³⁶⁴

Afterwards, Bayur said the followings about the Ankara Agreement (*itilafname*) signed with France after the Victory of Sakarya: “These were meant the acceptance of our national oath tacitly by one of the winners of the world war and therefore were a great political victory.”³⁶⁵

Bayur moved on, looking at the other political and military developments of the period. He presented examples of the correct and consistent foreign politics followed by the Ankara Government. He praised the institutions and agents of this foreign politics in

³⁶³ *Milli mücadelede maksat Sevr Muahedesini şu veya bu maddesini tadil ettirmek değil, Türk milletine, milli hudutları dahilinde Fransız veya İngiliz milletlerinin haiz oldukları bircümle hukuku temin etmektir, bu hususta behemehal ve ne pahasına olursa olsun muvaffak olunacaktır.* Bayur, pp. 92-93.

³⁶⁴ *Ben, bizim için noktai hareketin, Misaka Milli muhteviyatı olduğu esasını vazettim... Bu mükalememiz esnasında dahi Sevr Muahedesini telaffuz etmek istemem. Sevr muahedesini, dimağından çıkartmayan milletlerle, itimat esasına müstenit muamelata girişmeyiz.* Ibid.

³⁶⁵ *Bunlar misaka millimizin cihan harbi galiplerinden biri tarafından zımnen kabulü demekti ve dolayısıyla büyük bir siyasi zafer idi.* Bayur, p. 103.

between the lines, such as the government's dealing with the international news organization Reuter's disinformation by establishing the Anatolian Agency. In this part, a detailed inventory of the political and military developments from 1921 until the Truce of Mudanya was given.

The Conference of Lausanne and the Peace

Bayur presented a long and detailed evaluation of the Conference of Lausanne after discussing the process that led to the truce. This was a comprehensive view, from the positions of the participant states to their representatives' personal characteristics. Lausanne also was evaluated in light of the tension between Sevres and the *Misak-ı Milli*. Bayur put forward his last judgment before passing to the analysis of the conditions of the Lausanne Treaty: "Lausanne, in the political area, is a great Turkish victory."³⁶⁶

The conditions of the Lausanne Conference were examined under the titles of the border issue, the problem of the straits, the problem of the minorities, the problems of the *Düyun-ı Umumiye* (General Debt Administration), and compensation.

After dwelling on these one by one, Bayur quoted parts from *Nutuk* in which a comparison of the four proposals (Sevres was the first and Lausanne was the last) of peace, made by the rival states to Turkey in the process that went from Sevres to Lausanne. This comparison focused on the tension between Sevres and the *Misak-ı Milli* that was the determining factor of the new Turkey's foreign politics. However, it also included the first signs of the transformation of this tension into the tension between Sevres and Lausanne. This comparison, quoted from *Nutuk*, was more comprehensive than Bayur's evaluation of Lausanne.

³⁶⁶ *Lozan, siyasi sahada, büyük bir Türk zaferidir.* Bayur, p. 122.

Bayur summarized Lausanne in one sentence: “This treaty realized and introduced to the whole world the national oath, the principles of which had been determined in 1919 by Mustafa Kemal and accepted by the parliament at the beginning of 1920.”³⁶⁷

He cited three lessons from this treaty and the following developments:³⁶⁸ The first was related to the nature of the Turkish Nation (independence, not submission). This formed the basic material of the nationalist discourse, on which the new Turkish state was founded. The second was presented rather as a result than as a lesson and showed the emergence of a leader cult. Bayur said: “The great leader made this work, too. He gave direction to the nation. That great leader has gained the absolute confidence of the nation. The nation was convinced that he would obtain wonderful things if it went with him.”³⁶⁹ But this result can be perceived as having represented a lesson, when the gradually rising “leader cult and chief understanding” of the 1930s is considered. The third showed the bases of the new Turkish state’s sensitivity about independence. He said; “the third lesson was the appearance of the fact that the nations that expect the realization of national aims from the aid of others rather than their own efforts and especially threw themselves into fire by building high hopes, cannot obtain anything with this behavior. Like the conditions of the Greek, Armenian and Assyrian nations.”³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ *Bu muahede, esasları Mustafa Kemal tarafından daha 1919da tespit edilen ve 1920 başlarında Mebusan Meclisince kabul olunan misakı milliye tahakkuk ettirmiş ve bütün cihana tanutturmuştur. Ibid., p. 145.*

³⁶⁸ *Ibid., p. 146.*

³⁶⁹ *Büyük baş, bu işi de yapmış, millete istikamet vermiştir. O büyük baş, milletin mutlak itimadını kazanmıştır. Millet, onunla beraber gittiği zaman harikulade şeyler elde edeceğine kanıdı. Milliyet, “İnkılap kürsüsünde Hikmet B.in dersi,” 23 Nisan 1934.*

³⁷⁰ *Üçüncü ders, milli gayelerin tahakkukunu kendi gayretinden ziyade başkalarının yardımından bekliyen ve bahusus bu bapta hüyalara kapılarak başkaları uğrunda kendini ateşe atan milletlerin bu tarzı harekette felaketten başka bir şey elde edemeyeceklerinin tezahürü olmuştur. Yunan Ermeni ve Asuri milletlerinin hali gibi. Bayur, p. 146.*

After Lausanne

The Treaty of Lausanne became the basic criterion of the new Turkish state's foreign politics, with the idea that it had realized the *Misak-ı Milli*. The *Misak-ı Milli* as a one-sided communiqué presented a different quality from the Treaty of Lausanne, which was a multi-sided treaty in addition to the differences in their contents. However, the Ankara government attributed meanings to the Treaty of Lausanne that went beyond that of a treaty, regarding it as living proof of the nation, and attributing a value to it just as it did to the *Misak-ı Milli*.

The basic concern of the new Turkish state's foreign politics was to stress its novelty. The Ankara government insisted on defining itself as outside of the patterns of Ottoman foreign politics, and evaluated its foreign politics issues from this perspective. The attitudes taken by the rival states in problems, such as the locations of the foreign embassies, the letter about the problem of the Caliphate written by two Indians, the foreign schools, and the election of the patriarch caused suspicion in the Ankara government that it was perceived as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. In response to this, the "complete independence" sensitivity of the foreign politics followed by the new Turkish state was brought to the fore and "the manner of Ottoman foreign politics" was refused. In addition to these, Bayur examined the foreign politics of the new Turkey, especially on the problem of Mosul and the relations with Italy in the Mediterranean, in this part.

"The new epoch" was in question in foreign politics. Bayur explained this: "The intention with the new epoch is that the one that began with the time in which the foreign states began or were compelled to understand and accept our right to be held at the same degree or treated in the same manner with the European states."³⁷¹ He

³⁷¹ *Yeni devirden maksat ecnebi devletlerin bizim Avrupa devletleriyle aynı ayarda tutulmak ve aynı tarzda muamele görmek hakkımızı anlamıya ve kabul etmeye başladıkları veya mecbur oldukları zamandan itibaren başlayan devirdir. Ibid., p. 170.*

continued: “The principal quality of the new epoch is this: this is the epoch in which all states understood that Turkey consists of not only the continuity of the empire and that it is a brand-new state. The Turkish state is like a normal state. It has its independence. There are not negotiations for its division. It is included in the family of independent nations. The acceptance of this is in the new epoch.”³⁷²

Bayur explained the international relations of the new epoch, first by dividing the countries of the world into four groups and by looking at the relations of Turkey with these groups. Second, he evaluated Turkey’s new policies from the perspectives of the countries, regions, and problems directly related to Turkey.

At the end of the book, Bayur offered a kind of summary of the book in the form of a comparison: “One success of the government of the Republic is that it has completed the matter of determining borders with all of its neighbors, except for Bulgaria. The Ottoman government was unable to determine the borders of Persia in six hundreds years.³⁷³ Then he puts forward the claims of the Turkish state to be a pioneer and a model: “In the other eastern countries, among those who think independently and sincerely, the Turkish nation is considered as a great existence which will be admired and imitated in every matter.³⁷⁴ He wrote these as a man devoted to historical studies on eastern countries.

The essence of the book stands on the Revolution Lectures in 1934. After the dates of these lectures, the Montreux Agreement of 1936, which was another determining factor in the development of Turkish foreign politics, was signed. In the 1938 edition of the book, Bayur gave place to this agreement.

³⁷² *Yeni devrin vasfı mümeyyizi şudur: Bütün devletler, Türkiyenin imparatorluğun devamından ibaret olmadığını anladıktan başka, yepyeni bir devlet olduğunu kabul ettikleri devirdir. Türk devleti, laalettayın bir devlet gibidir. İstiklali vardır. Taksimati için görüşmeler yoktur. Müstakil milletler ailesine dahildir. Bunun teslim edilişi yeni devirdedir. Milliyet, “Hikmet B. musul meselesinin geçirdiği safhaları anlattı,” 13 Mayıs 1934.*

³⁷³ *Cumhuriyet hükümetinin bir muvaffakiyeti Bulgaristan müstesna bütün komşularile hudut tesbiti meselesini ikmal etmiş olmasıdır. Osmanlı Hükümeti 600 senede İran hududunu tesbit edememiş idi. Bayur, p. 173.*

³⁷⁴ *Diğer şark memleketlerinde ise samimi yalnız düşünenler arasında Türk milleti her hususta gıpta edilecek ve taklide çalışılacak büyük bir varlık addolunur. Ibid.*

Evaluation

Bayur, as the Minister of Education of the period, was a professor whose lectures can be considered to have been the most historical according to their perspective and contents, when compared to the lectures of the other professors. He performed an important role in the realization of the project of the Revolution Lectures. He continued his historical studies until the end of his life, contributing to the efforts in the foundation, studies and publications of the Turkish History Association. He explained the reason for his leaving the Ministry of Education after so short a time as his wanting to give more time to his history studies.

Bayur's text aimed to evaluate the foreign politics dimension the Turkish Revolution from a historical perspective. It did not aim to create the ideology of the Revolution, although it did provide legitimacy to the present foreign politics and its principles. Being a history text made it different from the texts of the other lecturers. As an example of nationalist historiography, it reflects the period's historiographical understanding.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MAHMUT ESAT BOZKURT AND THE JUDICIAL (LAW) DIMENSION OF THE REVOLUTION

Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the fourth of the lecturers under examination, was the son of a big landowner family. The story of his family coincided with that of the process of the collapse of the Empire. His grandfathers migrated from the south of Greece (Mora). Many in his family were distinguished figures in the Empire. His grandfather on his mother side, Hacı Şakir Efendi, had been educated in France. He rose to the rank of *kolağası* in the Ottoman army. After leaving the army, he became the sheikh of a dervish convent that he founded in İzmir. Ubeydullah Efendi,³⁷⁵ a leading Young Turk figure, was his mother's brother.

Bozkurt completed his primary education in Kuşadası. Afterwards, he went first to İzmir and then to İstanbul for high school. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at the *Darülfünun* in 1908. The history of the modernization attempts of the Empire that had begun a century earlier gained speed and entered a more intense phase of transformation. He attended the Faculty of Law at Freiburg University in Switzerland, and with his Ph. D. dissertation on the regime of Ottoman capitulations, he became doctor of law. These were the years in which Ottoman Empire was in World War I.

³⁷⁵ Ubeydullah Efendi was one of the first members of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was of *medrese* (Muslim theological school) origin. In one period, he attended to the School of Medicine (*Tıbbiye*). He was seen in the movement as the representative of the *ulema*. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, he had an official post for a short term and then he went abroad. He was active in the publication of many newspapers of the Young Turks and meanwhile became familiar with Western languages and thought. He was a deputy in the second constitutional monarchy. In the Republican era, he was in the parliament in the fourth and fifth periods. He died on 11 August 1937. For a note that Mahmut Esat was affected deeply by his mother's brother, see Tarık Ziya Işırtman, *Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Hayatı ve Hatıraları 1892-1943* (İzmir: Güneş Basım ve Yay., 1944), p. 9.

After the Armistice, Bozkurt returned to İzmir during the occupation and involved in the National Struggle. This can be accepted as the beginning of his political life as well. He joined the writing staff of the newspaper *Yeni Gün* (New Day). His articles in this period were also published in *Hakimiyeti Milliye* (National Sovereignty) and *Ulus* (Nation). He wrote in the newspapers *Ahenk* (Harmony), *Sada-yı Hak* (Voice of Justice) and *Anadolu* (Anatolia) in İzmir. At the same time, he took part in the official Communist Party of Turkey, which had been founded on the initiative of Mustafa Kemal.

After his participation as a member in the first TGNA, he remained in the parliament for seven consecutive periods, until the end of his life. He was the Minister of Economy between July 1922 and October 1923. He contributed efforts to the İzmir Economic Congress, made between 17 February and 4 March in 1923. He was appointed Minister of Justice on 22 November 1924. In the following two governments (of İsmet Pasha), he continued at this post. He was a central figure in the justice system of the Republican era. The essential dimension of his identity was based on his being a jurist. He is considered to have been “the first founder of Republican justice.”³⁷⁶

He made important contributions to the establishment of the Faculty of Law at Ankara University, where he lectured there during his time as minister. His course, called the “History of Revolutions,”³⁷⁷ in which he took up the Turkish Revolution using a comparative method with other revolutions, can be seen as the forerunner of the

³⁷⁶ Fahrettin Karaođlan, *Adliye Ceridesi/M.E.Bozkurt Nüshası*, no. 1, 1944. From Gün Bozkurt Tekant, “Babam Mahmut Esat Bozkurt,” available [online] at <http://www.add.org.tr/dergi/ocak01/16.htm> One of the old Ministers of Justice, A. Rıza Türel, greets Bozkurt as “the first founder of Revolution’s Administration of Justice (*adliye*).” A. Rıza Türel, “İnkılap Adliyesi Ve Mahmut Esat Bozkurt,” in *İştman*.

³⁷⁷ The curriculum of the course was as follows: “Preface. Fundamentals; the English Revolution and Its Principles; the French Revolution and Its Principles; the Renovation Movements in Germany, Italy and the Central Europe; The Revolutions of Turkey, The Russian Revolution and Its Principles.” *Medhal. Esaslar; İngiliz İnkılabı ve Prensipleri; Fransız İnkılabı ve Prensipleri; Almanya, İtalya ve Merkezi Avrupa’da Teceddüt hareketleri; Türkiye İhtilalleri; Rusya İhtilali ve prensipleri.* Ahmet Mumcu, *Ankara Adliye Hukuk Mektebi’nden Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi’ne 1925-1975* (Ankara: AÜ Hukuk Fak. Yay., Sevinç Matbaası, 1977), p. 141. As seen, this was very similar to the content of his Revolution Lectures he gave in 1934.

Institute of Revolution and the Revolution Lectures. Bozkurt was appointed professor of Law of States in both the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara in addition to his professorship at the Institute of Revolution.

The Institute of Revolution was the expression of new Republic's ideological quest. Bozkurt as one of the creators of Kemalism doctrine played an important part in this quest through his professorship and works. His writings under the title of "The Principles of the Turkish Revolution" (*Türk İhtilalinin Düsturları*) were a novelty from this perspective.

Bozkurt died on 21 Birincikanun 1943 in İstanbul. An official ceremony was held for his funeral. Military and civilian bureaucrats, members of the Party, academics, and university students and representatives of the press attended. The leaders of the RPP sent wreaths.³⁷⁸

His Works and Thought

Bozkurt reached the peak of his political career at an early age, becoming Minister of the Economy when he was only thirty. But it can be said that he produced his best intellectual work at a relatively late period. His works are *Beynelmilel Bozkurt-Lotus Davasında Türkiye-Fransa Müdafaaları* (Turkey-France Defenses in the International Bozkurt-Lotus Trial),³⁷⁹ *Du Regime des Capitulations Ottomanes Leur Caractare Juridique d'apres l'histoire et les textes*,³⁸⁰ *Türk İhtilalinde Vatan Müdafaası* (The Defense of Motherland in the Turkish Revolution),³⁸¹ *Hukuku Düvel, Yardımcı Talebe El Notu* (The Law of States, Hand-Note for Students),³⁸² *Türk Köylü ve İşçilerinin Hakları* (The Rights of the Turkish Peasants and Workers),³⁸³ *Devletler*

³⁷⁸ From the newspaper *Vakit*, Işıtman, pp. 68-70.

³⁷⁹ (Ankara, 1927)

³⁸⁰ (İstanbul, 1928)

³⁸¹ (İzmir, 1934)

³⁸² (Ankara, 1939)

³⁸³ (İzmir, 1939)

Arası Hak (Justice between the States),³⁸⁴ *Atatürk İhtilali* (The Atatürk Revolution),³⁸⁵ *Aksak Demir'in Devlet Politikası* (The State Politics of Aksak Demir).³⁸⁶ In addition to these were articles published in various daily newspapers.

His Nationalism

Bozkurt was a member of a family that directly affected by the nationalisms rising in the Balkans, had migrated from Mora (in the south of Greece), as noted above. He was not in Turkey during the years of the second constitutional monarchy and World War I. For this reason, although he developed a nationalist identity, his nationalism was not identical to that of the Union and Progress' dominant understanding of nationalism.³⁸⁷ But in his work, themes can be encountered frequently which show that the intellectual background of his nationalism had been established during the second constitutional monarchy.³⁸⁸ His nationalism included a harsh criticism of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, on the grounds that they had impeded the progress of the Turkish Nation. We encounter occasionally racist discourses.³⁸⁹ The National Struggle, in which he participated after the occupation of İzmir, was central to his understanding of nationalism.

He defined his nationalism as "total Turkism" (*topyekun Türkçülük*). He wrote:

³⁸⁴ (Ankara, 1940)

³⁸⁵ (İstanbul, 1940)

³⁸⁶ (İstanbul, 1943)

³⁸⁷ But because of their roles in the emergence and spread of Turkism after the Balkan Wars, he regarded the Turkish Hearths positive. M.E. Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, third edition (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995), p. 251. At the same time, he was a member of the Turkish Hearths.

³⁸⁸ "From Siberia, from the shores of Baikal Lake and from Persia, the Azerbaijan of Russia, the whole of the Eastern Turks and the Western Turks who spread to the shores of the Mediterranean have no difficulty understanding each other." *Sibiryalardan, Baykal gölü kıyılarında tutunuz da, İran, Rusya Azerbaycanlarından, bütün Doğu Türklüğünden Akdeniz kıyılarına kadar yayılan Batı Türkleri birbirini anlamakta zorluk çekmezler*. Bozkurt, p. 197. He says that the Turkish Revolution was expressed in the lines of Mehmet Emin's poetry: "I am a Turk, my religion and race is sublime/My bosom, my essence is filled with fire." *Ben bir Türküm dinim cinsim uludur/Sinem özüm ateş ile doludur*. Bozkurt, p. 229. To prove the existence of Secularism in old Turks, he used again the themes of the second constitutional monarchy, such as the characteristics of the Cengizliler. Bozkurt, p. 260.

³⁸⁹ Cihan Yamakoğlu, *M. Esat Bozkurt* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yay., 1987), p. 20. "The definite direction of the Atatürk Revolution is Turkish Nationalism, being Turk." *Atatürk ihtilalinin belirli yönü Türk Milliyetçiliğidir, Türk olmaktır*. Bozkurt, p. 268.

What I understand about total Turkism is this: the Turk and being Turk is above everything. From the Turks of North...The worst of the Turks is better than the best one of non-Turks. For this reason, in the land of Turks, everything is for the Turk. And will be for him... Art is for Turks. The state administration, the state affairs should absolutely be in the hands of the Turk. From the point of economy; being rich in these lands, being happy and owning everything. Living like masters and rulers is the right of only and solely the Turk.³⁹⁰

Işıtman summarizes his political thought as “secular Republican and extreme nationalist” (*layık cumhuriyetçi ve müfrit milliyetçi*).³⁹¹

Two important characteristics of Bozkurt’s nationalism should be pointed out.³⁹²

First, Bozkurt had an understanding of nationalism in which the economic dimension was dominant: He said, “We are not nationalist for land and sky, grass and water. We want a happy life for the Turkish nation whose large part is worker and peasant.”³⁹³

Second, his nationalism understanding did not completely coincide with that of Kemalist nationalism. While Kemalist Nationalism as a cultural nationalism depended on the French model, Bozkurt, with the racist tendencies of his nationalism understanding, was closer to the German model. Bozkurt’s thought has been evaluated

³⁹⁰ *Topyekun Türkçülükten ne anlıyorum. Anladığım şudur: Türk ve Türklük her şeyden üstündedir. Şimal Türklerinden...Türkün en kötüsü, Türk olmuyanın en iyisinden iyidir. Bunun içindir ki; Türk ilinde, Türkler içinde her şey Türk içindir. Ve onun için olacaktır...Sanat Türklük içindir. Devlet idaresi, devlet işleri mutlaka, Türkün elinde olmalıdır. İktisadi bakımdan; bu topraklarda zengin olmak, mesut olmak her şeye ve her şeye sahip olmak. Efendiler, beyler gibi yaşamak yalnız ve sadece Türkün hakkıdır. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, “Topyekün Türkçülük” Yeni Sabah, 23 Birincikanun 1943. From Yamakoğlu, and Işıtman. A more harsh text, a speech that he made to voters in Ödemiş on 17 September 1930, was published in *Anadolu* on 18 September: “I am from the RPP because this party with its actions until the present day has given back its position to the Turkish Nation, which is essentially the master. My idea, opinion, both friends and enemies should know that the master of this country is the Turk. Those who are not pure Turk have only one right in the Turkish motherland, being maidservants, being slaves.” *C.H.Firkasındanım, çünkü bu fırka bugüne kadar yaptıkları ile esasen efendi olan Türk Milleti’ne mevkiini iade etti. Benim fikrim, kanaatim şudur ki, dost da düşman da bilsin ki bu memleketin efendisi Türk’tür. Öz Türk olmayanların Türk vatanında bir hakka vardır, o da hizmetçi olmaktır, köle olmaktır. Hakkı Uyar, “Sol Milliyetçi” Bir Türk Aydını Mahmut Esat Bozkurt 1892-1943 (İstanbul: Buke Yay., 2000), p. 117.**

³⁹¹ T. Z. Işıtman, p. 21. Ali Agah Dinel, whose article about Bozkurt took place in Işıtman’s book, says: “We confess that Mahmut Esat was a (too extreme and chauvinist) nationalist. His (racist nationalism) is a nationalism which does not fit into (our National structure).” *İtiraf ederiz ki, Mahmut Esat -Çok müfrit ve şoven- bir milliyetçi idi. Onun -İrki milliyetçiliği- bizim -Milli bünyemize- uymayan bir milliyetçiliktir. Işıtman, p. 74.*

³⁹² Hakkı Uyar, “Mahmut Esat Bozkurt,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 218.

³⁹³ *Biz yer ve gök için, ot ve su için milliyetçi değiliz. Büyük bölümü işçi ve köylü olan Türk ulusunun mutlu yaşamasını istiyoruz. Ibid.*

as the “reactionary nationalism” of a member of a generation that saw the collapse of the Empire.³⁹⁴

His Understanding of Socialism

Bozkurt, who was closer to the left wing of the Unionists, advocated professional representation as a member of the moderate socialist wing in the first TGNA. He tried to put this view into practice as Minister of Economy and spoke of this during the İzmir Economic Congress. He saw cooperatives and the guild system as the solution to Turkey’s economic problems. In this respect, he was close to Peker’s ideas. He was a member of the official Communist Party of Turkey. When he was Minister of Economy, he attempted a translation of Marx’s *Kapital* in Turkish. After leaving the Ministry of Justice in 1930, he published the “left-nationalist” newspaper *Halk Dostu* (Friend of the People), for which he wrote.

Bozkurt remained loyal to Marx’s economy-based methodology. Uyar writes that he has been described by different writers as a “moderate socialist,” “socialist of the petit bourgeoisie,” and “Historical Materialist or Economic Determinist.”³⁹⁵

Bozkurt’s class understanding from time to time forced the limits of Kemalism’s well-known texts. The understanding of a society “without privilege and without class” was not pronounced. He did not have the idea of a classless society that was frequently depicted in that period. His understanding of Populism recognized the existence of classes, especially the existence of Turkish workers against capitalists, and it expressed their rights. Different from the dominant acceptance of the period again, he wrote that class struggle was unavoidable (he criticized communism for being distant from reality, because it aimed to remove class struggle) and said that efforts should be made not to end this struggle but to arrive at a compromise. He wrote, “the working class and the

³⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 117.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 105.

capital must compromise. The rights of the Turkish workers should be recognized to be a real nationalist, revolutionist, and civilized nation.”³⁹⁶

In this way, Bozkurt accepted the dominant understanding, but with a corporatist solution.

Nationalism and leftist tendencies formed the two main axes of Bozkurt’s thought. He found Kemalism an eclectic ideology. Together with this, he presented it also as a third way, especially when discussing his economic ideas. When he was Minister of the Economy, he talked about the founding a *Yeni Türk İktisat Okulu* (The New Turkish Economics School) that would be neither socialist nor capitalist. But as Zürcher states, the details of this school remained vague and the project never materialized.³⁹⁷

Because of his thought’s double axes, a “left nationalist” identity is attributed to Bozkurt. But Uyar’s evaluation of this identity as reference to the present “national left” may cause the misunderstanding that a strong relation existed between these “similar” views fed by very different sources. Uyar points out that from the “liberal” Kemalism of Ağaoglu to the “left nationalist” Kemalism of Bozkurt, the shared point of all Kemalisms was their being authoritarian and eclectic.³⁹⁸ These two characteristics were dominant in Bozkurt’s thought and are present in his economic, social and political ideas.

Last, it should be indicated that the main references in Bozkurt’s thought were Western history and Western thought. The West represented more than an opportunity

³⁹⁶ *İşçi sınıfı ile sermaye uzlaşmak zorundadır. Gerçek milliyetçi, inkılapçı ve uygar bir ulus olabilmek için Türk işçilerinin hakları tanınmalıdır.* From his writing published on 20 August 1931, *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³⁹⁷ Zürcher, p. 284. There were also approaches which held that Bozkurt’s economic views carry a reactionary character rather than being a third way. Aykut Kansu writes that, “Mahmut Esat Bozkurt has been claiming that abandoning the guild system at the beginning of the nineteenth century is the cause of the disorganizations and problems of the economy of Turkey in the twentieth century.” *Mahmut Esat Bozkurt 20. yüzyılda Türkiye’nin ekonomisindeki aksaklıkların ve sorunların kaynağında 19. yüzyıl başında lonca sisteminden vazgeçilmiş olmasının yattığını iddia etmekteydi.* Aykut Kansu, “Türkiye’de Korporatist Düşüce ve Korporatizm Uygulamaları,” *MTSD Kemalizm*, p. 252.

³⁹⁸ Uyar, p. 219.

to think comparatively. While he positively regarded and wanted the West on the one hand, he criticized the West, related to his excessive nationalism on the other hand.

Mahmut Esat Bozkurt and the Revolution Lectures

Bozkurt was one of the first men thought of to give the Revolution Lectures. He was a member of both the political elite and academia. The subjects in which he was interested, and his writings and lectures about those subjects, support this idea. But his name was not definite as professor of the Institute of Revolution, together with Tengirşenk, until a short time before the beginning of the lectures.

Bozkurt's lectures differed from the other lectures in form and content. The first part of his lectures focused on the judicial dimension of world revolutions; the second part on the Turkish Revolution. His references were again Western sources. His personal experiences remained in the background. The documentarist attitude exhibited by Bayur and Tengirşenk is almost nonexistent in Bozkurt. His being lively orator also affected the form of his lectures. The reports in the press noted the excitement of the students and their reactions during the lectures.

Bozkurt gave his first lecture on 8 March. He began by saying, "My Great Chief has approved my lecturing on the judicial history of the revolution to the Turkish youth" (*Büyük şefim ihtilalin hukuk tarihini Türk gençliğine anlatmamı tasvip buyurmuşlar*). This sentence is one of a few signs which show that Mustafa Kemal intervened personally into the experience of the Revolution Lectures in 1934.

Bozkurt ended his lectures on 16 May. Bozkurt, who expounded on the ideology of the Revolution in his lectures, writings and speeches, was the first to die (1943) among the professors who gave the Revolution Lectures in 1934. The Revolution Lectures and efforts to create the ideology of the Revolution which emerged under the

conditions of the single-party government thus did not influence much his career as his political life was limited to the single-party era.

The Judicial Dimension of the Revolution

Tanyol assessed the book based on Bozkurt's lectures twenty-seven years after its first publication. According to him, Atatürk founded an institute of revolution with the aim of making Kemalism a doctrine. Bozkurt was one of the leading Kemalism ideologues. His name had come up when the foundation of Ministry of Propaganda was in question, as an application seen in the fascist regimes of the period. *Atatürk İhtilali* (the Atatürk Revolution), which was made up by the collection of his lectures in the Institute of Revolution, was the product of his studies to doctrinize Kemalism. The claim that this was "the first effort to systematize Kemalism,"³⁹⁹ however, seems too pretentious when the revolution literature of the period is considered.

Bozkurt, in the introduction of his book, gives the idea that he wrote a history book. He aimed to tell of the Revolution of Atatürk, which began with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, stage by stage. He stated that he wrote this book to tell the Turkish Nation about the Revolution of Atatürk. His methodological claim reflected the Rankean understanding of history: "I have tried to tell the facts and events as they happened, as far as possible."⁴⁰⁰

As understood in Bozkurt's "Beginning," the work was planned as three books. This first book presented the philosophy of all revolutions in general and of the Atatürk Revolution in particular.⁴⁰¹ The other two parts included problematics about which the

³⁹⁹ *Kemalizmi ilk sistemleştirme çabası*. Cahit Tanyol, "Önsöz" in Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, third edition (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 1995), p. 17.

⁴⁰⁰ *Olguları, olayları elimden geldiği kadar, oldukları gibi anlatmaya çalıştım*. Bozkurt, p. 31.

⁴⁰¹ For a summary of this book, see Yavuz Abadan, *İnkılap ve İnkılapçılık* (İstanbul: CHP Yayını, Eminönü Halkevi, 1938). Yavuz Abadan, who was the assistant of Bozkurt for the Revolution Lectures in 1934, touches upon the same themes in this conference, with almost the same examples and references. His remaining in the discipline of law makes this book more useful and understandable.

historical perspectives were more definite. He declared that he would discuss the National Struggle and its phases, and then the economic, social and political positioning of the new Republic of Turkey.⁴⁰² The curriculum of the Revolution Lectures showed that Bozkurt would take up the law and justice dimension of the Revolution, but he did not limit his lectures to this.

The first part of this work, *Atatürk İhtilali*, was published in 1940, but the second and third parts were not published. Sixty-three years after the first publication of the first part, the second volume of the book was found, collected and first published by Kaynak Yayınları in 2003.

Revolutions from the Judicial Perspective

The Philosophy of Revolutions

Bozkurt began his book with a discussion of the concept of revolution. He cited the meaning of revolution from dictionary and presented encyclopedic information about the phenomenon. According to this, revolution contained both political and nonpolitical meanings. It was not the gradually changing of the present situation, as is expressed with the term “evolution,” but a sudden and fundamental change.

As a professor of the Institute of the Revolution (*İnkılap Enstitüsü*), Bozkurt underlined his preference of the term ‘*ihtilal*’ instead of ‘*inkılap*’ for revolution: “*İhtilal* is the replacement of something, and placement of a brand-new one in its place. *İnkılap*, however, is not this. *İnkılap*, is the transformation of something into a different mold, a different condition by preserving its essence...In that case, there is making in the meaning of ‘*ihtilal*’; but ‘*inkılap*’ comes from moving.”⁴⁰³

⁴⁰² Bozkurt, pp. 31-32.

⁴⁰³ *İhtilal, bir şeyin esasından değişerek, yerine yepyenisinin konulmasıdır. İnkılap ise bu değildir. İnkılap, bir şeyin aslını muhafaza ederek başka bir kalıba girmesi, başka bir hale geçmesidir...Şu halde ‘ihtilal’in anlamında yapmak, ‘inkılap’ ise, infial babından gelir.* Bozkurt, pp. 163-164.

This preference reveals him in a different place from that of the other ideologues of Kemalism, who carefully avoided using the term '*ihtilal*' because they conceptualized it as having a different meaning. They understood '*ihtilal*' as a short-term transformation that contradicted the concepts of authority and discipline. Bozkurt's preference of '*ihtilal*,' on the other hand, was basically caused by that '*ihtilal*' had a more radical emphasis.

After the definition of revolution, Bozkurt began a chronological discussion of its historical counterparts: the Magna Carta, the declaration of 1791, the Tanzimat, the Socialist Revolution and the declaration of the Soviets, the Turkish Revolution, Fascism, and National Socialism. In this understanding of history, the main component of history, the perception of time, was kept in the background. History was read not as processes (implying continuity), but as singular events and as great breaking points. These ruptures also were read as abstracted from their histories, as unhistorical texts (as only judicial texts, it should be kept in mind that Bozkurt was a lawyer). Such an approach coincides with the documentarist understanding of history. Bozkurt focused on the so-called breaking points and examined the contents of the declarations, documents, programs, and speeches.

Bozkurt, who expounded on the different meanings and examples of revolution, gave his own definition: "For me, revolution in its complete and ripe meaning, is a movement succeeded by force and mostly with an armed power, a new and progressive order which is again political, social and especially economic instead of an existing political, social and economic order. If revolution is only political, we can not call this a complete revolution."⁴⁰⁴

Two characteristics of this definition should be pointed out. The first is the conceptualization of revolution as having multi-components. Revolution cannot be only

⁴⁰⁴ *Bence, tam ve olgun anlamıyla ihtilal; mevcut bir politik, sosyal ve ekonomik düzenin yerine; yine politik, sosyal ve özellikle ekonomik, yeni ve ileri bir düzeni zorla ve çoğu zaman silah gücüyle başaran harekettir. İhtilal sadece politik ise, buna tam bir ihtilal diyemeyiz.* Bozkurt, p. 71.

political, economic or social. The second is the definite line it placed between the old and the new: “The oil lamp compared to the candle, public utility gas compared to oil lamp, and electricity compared to public utility gas is an innovation. The new compared to the old is beauty and goodness. Revolution is such goodness that the nation with its new condition entered a better situation compared to the old one, both materially and morally.”⁴⁰⁵

In this way, Bozkurt put forward his linear understanding of history, which was a source of his authoritarian thought for which the historical process has the aims determined beforehand. “A nation has no right to regression and decline by depending on sovereignty rights... An individual, a nation, has only and merely the right to say, ‘I will be free’... Do not peoples and nations use their own rights as they want? They use them, but this usage is possible only on one condition: To go forward, to rise and to live.”⁴⁰⁶

In this sense, Mahmut Esat’s definition of ‘*ihtilal*’ was not too far removed from, for example, Recep Peker’s definition of ‘*inkılap*.’

What were the criterion of the old and the new, or the criterion of evil and good? Bozkurt answered this question: “The common sense of the time in which the revolution was made distinguishes it. There is a common sense special to every age and this is related to the shared civilization of this age.”⁴⁰⁷ Here an understanding of the Hegelian spirit of the age (including the intellectual effects of the interwar period) can be seen. Bozkurt, who had emphasized scienticism and reason, preferred at this point an irrational explanation.

⁴⁰⁵ *Muma nispetle gaz lambası, gaz lambasına nispetle havagazi, ve havagazına nispetle elektrik bir yeniliktir. Eskilere nispetle yeniler, birer güzellik ve iyiliklerler. İhtilal öyle bir iyiliktir ki, millet yeni haliyle eskisine göre gerek maddi ve gerek manevi, daha iyi bir duruma girer.* Bozkurt, p. 73.

⁴⁰⁶ *Egemenlik haklarına dayanarak bir milletin gerileme, geri gitme hakkı yoktur... Bir ferdin, bir milletin yalnız ve ancak ‘ben hür olacağım’ demek hakta vardır... İnsanlar ve milletler kendilerine ait olan hakları istedikleri gibi kullanamazlar mı? Kullanırlar, fakat bu kullanma bir şartla mümkündür. İleriye, yükselmeye ve yaşamaya doğru.* Bozkurt, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁰⁷ *İhtilalin yapıldığı çağın sağduyusu ayırt eder. Her çağa özgü bir sağduyu vardır ve bu o çağın ortak uygarlığına bağlıdır.* Ibid., p. 73.

Perception of the Chief

One of the bases of Bozkurt's conceptualization of the revolution was his perception of the Chief. He wrote, "the width and comprehension of revolutions is a reflection of the brains of chiefs to the outside. The Turkish Revolution of 1919 is not anything other than a photograph of Atatürk's brain."⁴⁰⁸

According to him, no matter whether positive or negative, revolutions were nourished from the perception of the chief. He gave examples of successful and unsuccessful revolutions and their chiefs, among them the Spartacus revolution, the Sahibüzzibh movement, Kerensky, Lenin, Jesus, and Mohammed. The chief in Bozkurt's intellectual world remained only a political concept. Different from Peker, it was not a concept built upon the concern of (social) authority and was valid for all social groups from the family to the state. The historical examples given reveal that his perception of the chief can be read roughly as a leadership perception and in this context differentiated from the totalitarian ideologies of the interwar era.

The chief perception and authoritarian thought in Bozkurt developed with the idea of elitism. The elite class determined the faith of a society, a country. He quoted from an Italian historian, Ferrero: "The number of those who succeeded the French Revolution is not more than two hundred." And he continued: "For me, even this is excessive. This number can be reduced to two or three people."⁴⁰⁹ Then, he mentioned the elite and chiefs of some revolutions; among them Danton, Robespierre, Marx, Reşit Pasha the Great, Mithat Pasha, and Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha.

Atatürk was placed in a special position among the great men of history. "For his ideas not remaining personal," he made a comparison between Atatürk and them. He

⁴⁰⁸ *İhtilallerin genişliği ve kavrayışı şeflerin kafalarının dışı yansımasıdır. 1919 Türk İhtilali, Atatürk'ün kafasının bir fotoğrafından başka bir şey değildir.* Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁰⁹ *Fransız İhtilalini başaranların sayısı iki yüzü geçmez. Bence bu bile fazladır. Bu sayı iki üç kişiye indirilebilir.* Ibid., p. 81.

compared Atatürk with Hannibal, Cesar, Alexander the Great, Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Washington and with the great men of the period (Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler) on the questions of what he found and made. This is certainly a problematic method of comparison and it is unhistorical. Also the question of who makes a revolution brings forward the elitism of Bozkurt:

The intellectuals make the revolution together with the nation. The results of the actions and work of these intellectuals is nothing, but the expression of the high benefits of the nation... Even the most advanced groups of humans, if they are left by themselves, no doubt are not able to come to an agreement to find and distinguish their benefits. Whatever the essential character of the group is, it has absolutely a need for chiefs. These chiefs are those who give direction to a revolution and make it successful.⁴¹⁰

The idea of authority is the key concept of the perception of the Chief. This idea, according to Bozkurt, did not contradict that of democracy. The original contribution of Kemalism to democracy stemmed from this point. Bozkurt makes this quotation from an article published in *Times*: “This regime is democratic. But it has completed the defects of our democracies; that, this defect is the authority. If we could have completed this defect, the world today would not be separated into opposed regimes and in the condition in which they are going to start quarrelling.”⁴¹¹

Kemalism was defined as an authoritarian democracy. It was stressed that the authority of the chief came from the public. The perception of the chief was explained by likening the nation (not society) to a pyramid. The bottom was the public and the top was the chief.

⁴¹⁰ *İhtilali Aydınlar Yapar, Milletle Beraber/ İhtilali o aydınlar yaparlar ki; hareketleri, çalışma sonuçları milletin yüksek menfaatlerinin ifadesinden başka bir şey değildir... En ileri halk kümeleri dahi kendi başlarına bırakılırsa, kendi menfaatlerini bulup ayırmakta anlayamayacaklardır şüphesiz. Kümenin mahiyeti ne olursa olsun, mutlaka şeflere ihtiyacı vardır. İşte bu şeflerdir ki, ihtilale yön verirler ve onu başarılı kılarlar. Ibid., pp. 148-149.*

⁴¹¹ *Bu rejim demokratiktir. Yalnız bizim demokrasilerin eksiğini tamamlamıştır ki, bu eksik, otoritedir. Eğer biz, bu eksiği tamamlamış olsaydık, bugün dünya birbirine zıt rejimlere ayrılmaz ve birbirine girecek halde bulunmazdı. Ibid., p. 107.*

The Right to Make a Revolution

Bozkurt conceptualized revolution as a right in the liberal tradition. This liberal conceptualization of revolution coincided Peker's evaluation of the Revolution of Liberty. Bozkurt took Locke as reference. He assumed the idea of an agreement (social contract) between the administrators and the people. According to this, the people, who had been in war conditions in the pre-state, had ended this condition by founding the state.

Bozkurt's idea that Locke's understanding of the state was based on "national sovereignty, the will of the nation" can be qualified as unhistorical. To base the Turkish Revolution on the ideas of Locke is methodologically problematic. According to this, Locke mentioned the oppressed nation's right to revolution and explained when these nations could use this right. Bozkurt, who recalled these item by item, gave examples from the Turkish experience: the periods of Abdülhamid II and Vahdettin.⁴¹² Another conclusion that can be inferred here is that Bozkurt definitely considered the Revolution of 1908 and the second constitutional monarchy positive.

Bozkurt claimed also to criticize Locke, but he stopped short of an evaluation of his place in the liberal tradition. For example, he did not compare him with Hobbes, or mention his place in the history of political thought. He conducted an unhistorical analysis of Locke based on pragmatic reason, writing, "Locke's mistake for me is not in approving the right of revolution for nations, but in tightening this right to limited conditions."⁴¹³

Bozkurt arranged in order the different thoughts about whether the revolution was right or not, from the etatist tradition, to the liberals, and the anarchists. Then he looked at what "the history and realities" said: "Nations attain their rights with

⁴¹² *Milliyet*, "İnkılap Enstitüsünde dün Mahmut Esat Bey derslerine başladı," 9 Mart 1934.

⁴¹³ *Bence Locke'un hatası, milletlere ihtilal hakkını kabul etmesinde değil; bu hakta, sınırlı hallere sıkıştırmasıdır.* Bozkurt, p. 130.

revolution. This may be true or false, but it is product of history. A product which does not go back or deviate. We can look at this even as a kind of determinism and we will not be mistaken from the perspective of science.”⁴¹⁴ Here, the other components of Bozkurt’s understanding of history emerged: Reliance on the nature of the truth (reality), and scienticism.

When he gave place to different views and ideas, and applied these to Turkey and Turkish history on an unhistorical plane, Bozkurt needed to stress his position: “Now, we are going to read the ideas of socialist thinkers about revolution. Here, first of all, I want to say this: I am a Turk and a nationalist.”⁴¹⁵ In this way Bozkurt showed that, in essence, he spoke from inside the Revolution.

Thoughts on Revolution

Under the title of “Appendixes,” Bozkurt touched on different themes with the concept of revolution in the center. His understanding of history also had an economic perspective. He adopted Barnav’s economist approach that divided the history of humanity into four ages. Bozkurt enumerated these as the natural age of the nations, the age of the shepherd nation, the age of the farmer nation and the age of the merchant and industrialist nation after the French Revolution. These ages were defined on the basis of economic relations. Nationalist motivations and a kind of conceptualization of nation over history can be seen in this categorization. The list that is made coincides with an evolutionist-linear understanding of history. Bozkurt put the new Turkish state’s economic/political preferences against Marx’s idea that the fifth age, after the proletarian revolution, would be the age of absolute equality: “The fifth age for us will

⁴¹⁴ *Milletler haklarına ihtilal ile kavuşuyorlar. Bu, doğru veya eğri olabilir. Fakat, tarihin verimidir. Dönmez ve şaşmaz bir verim. Buna bir nevi determinizm gözü ile de bakabiliriz ve bilim yönünden aldanmış olmayız.* Ibid., p. 148.

⁴¹⁵ *Şimdi de ihtilal hakkında sosyalist mütefekkirlerin söylediklerini okuyacağız. Burada herşeyden evvel şunu söylemek isterim: Ben Türküm ve milliyetçiyim. Milliyet,* “Mahmut Esat B. inkılap kürsüsünde ikinci dersini de verdi,” 11 Mart 1934.

not be the age of communism. It will be a firm etatism; and not an age of absolute equality, but an equality which is appropriate to human nature will begin.”⁴¹⁶

In the final analysis, Bozkurt had a pragmatism understanding of history. His narration had contradictions and a kind of eclecticism in itself. This is evident in his ideas about national history, which exhibited tension between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. He said: “I am Republican and I will die a Republican. This is absolute and certain. But my Republicanism does not mean the denial of the honors and conquests of my national history and national epics.”⁴¹⁷

He regarded Ottoman history with a selective logic and an unhistorical approach. Then, he processed his nationalist themes with symbolic figures from the Ottoman past. On the topic of the Revolution also, he read and explained history with selective logic, focusing on single events instead of processes. When national history is in question, on the other hand, Bozkurt wrote that history is a whole (*küll*): “I adopt even the faults belonging to my history. History is a whole. I adopt this inheritance completely. Fatih, Selim are pride and honorable legends of the Turk. Even of the humanity as humans.”⁴¹⁸

Bozkurt did not follow a certain systematic in this part. He made a comparison between the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution. He dwelt upon the language-history issues of the early Republican era. He discussed some interesting events from Ottoman history. He peppered his discussion with anecdotes. This was the methodological result of Bozkurt’s attributing to history the function to take lessons from it. Bozkurt compared Kemalism with the new regimes of the period. These were thematic comparisons that contained no historical analysis. Various interpretations of

⁴¹⁶ *Bize göre beşinci çağ komünizm çağı olmayacak, sıkı bir devletçilik devri olacak ve mutlak eşitlik değil, insanlığın cıbilliyetine uygun bir eşitlik çağı başlayacaktır.* Bozkurt, p. 172.

⁴¹⁷ *Ben Cumhuriyetçiyim ve Cumhuriyetçi olarak öleceğim. Bu mutlak ve muhalkaktır. Ancak benim Cumhuriyetçiliğim, milli tarihimin milli destanlarımın şereflerini, fetihlerini inkar etmem anlamına gelmez.* Bozkurt, p. 183.

⁴¹⁸ *Hatta tarihime ait kabahatleri de benimserim. Tarih bir küldür, bu mirası toptan benimserim. Fatihler, Selimler, Türk’ün birer övünme, şeref destanlarıdır. İnsan olarak insanlığın bile.* Ibid.

some themes, such as nationalism, imperialism, individual, and the state in these regimes, were compared. A historical view was not directed towards these regimes. Also non-systematic ideas on topics like Turkism, Caliphate and secularism were processed.

In his lectures, Bozkurt put forward a text with the most extensive bibliography of those of the Revolution Lectures in 1934. In this text, the views and ideas of many thinkers and statesmen from different historical and geographical backgrounds and many historical anecdotes were transmitted from these sources. *Nutuk*, as an application resource, was used less by Bozkurt than by the other three professors. Most likely this stemmed from the content of his lectures on a larger scale. In the other lectures' texts, *Nutuk* functioned as "the indicator." In Bozkurt, while it was not referred to often, it was continuously "indicated/ pointed out." He said:

Lenin is making half and writing half. Rousseau is only writing. Our Chief is making completely and then writing. The book *Nutuk ve Vesikalar*, written by the chief, is an important work and I believe this so much that if any nation loses its independence, it can learn to regain it by reading this book, I contend. He should take this book in his hands one day, take it in his hands like a divine light in the darkness, read and find himself.⁴¹⁹

The Turkish Revolution with its Judicial Dimension

Historical Inheritance

In this book, Bozkurt wrote from a more historical perspective. He began with looking at the events preceding the Revolution of Atatürk. These, as some historical breaking/turning points, were processed without an idea of process, taken up not as

⁴¹⁹ *Lenin yarım yapıyor, yarım yazıyor. Rousseau yalnız yazıyor. Bizim Şef tam yapıyor, sonra yazıyor. Şefin yazdığı Nutuk ve Vesikalar kitabı o kadar mühim bir eserdir ki buna o kadar samimiyetle inanıyorum ki herhangi bir millet istiklalini kaybederse o kitabı okuyarak tekrar elde etmesini öğrenebilir, kanaatindeyim. Bir gün o kitabı eline alsın, karanlıklar içinde eline bir nur gibi alsın, okusun, kendini bulsun. Milliyet, "Mahmut Esat B. inkılap kürsüsünde ikinci dersini de verdi," 11 Mart 1934.*

events which had before and after, but as points in history. They then were subjected to superficial evaluations regarding only their results. The foundation and legitimation of the historical discourse of the new state was sought in the final analysis, not the attempt at historical explanation.

The Tanzimat was a starting point. The hesitant attitude of the Kemalist intellectuals towards the Tanzimat can be seen also in Bozkurt. He was indecisive between the Westernist claims of the Tanzimat and the idea that it accelerated the decline. The Westernist claims of the Tanzimat and its liberal character (in the sense of anti-monarchism) were considered positive, while the thesis that it accelerated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with its economic and political results was repeated. Bozkurt's nationalist reflexes basically caused his indecisiveness toward the Tanzimat. "For me, the sole but so principal fault and even sin of the Tanzimat, which continued until the Atatürk Revolution, is its not having given the required importance to nationalism. Not only this, but also it considered Turkish nationalism a crime. However, the age of the Tanzimat were the years in which nationalism all over the world was strengthened."⁴²⁰

The cosmopolitanism of the Tanzimat was evaluated as unacceptable. But different from the Turkish historiography after the 1960s especially, an economic criticism of the Tanzimat was not made. He pointed out the removal of the differences between the different components of the Empire, assuming no priority or privilege for the Turkish component.

The Constitution of 1878 was taken up as another breaking point. The process that led to the Constitution was told with long quotations from the works of the period's witnesses. Bozkurt, by intervening in these quotations from time to time, pointed to

⁴²⁰ *Bence Tanzimat'ın ta Atatürk İhtilali'ne kadar sürüp giden, biricik fakat çok esaslı hatası, hatta günahı, Türk ulusçuluğuna lazım olan önemi vermemiş olmasıdır. Yalnız bu kadar da değil; Türk ulusçuluğunu sanki bir suç saymasıdır. Halbuki Tanzimat çağı bütün dünyada ulusçuluğun şahlandığı yıllardır.* Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali I-II* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yay., 2003), p. 252.

some unhistorical similarities of the present day. Historical events and positions were encoded not as themselves but as symbols or meanings and they were said to be similar to symbols or meanings.⁴²¹ This was the result of Bozkurt's reading of the past from the present and inside his world of meanings.

As another breaking point, the Revolution of 1908 was discussed in brief. Although a certain sympathy can be seen in between the lines, the Revolution of 1908 was not dwelt upon or praised as much as the Tanzimat and the first Constitution. This attitude may have been caused by the position of the relation between the Revolution of 1908 and the Kemalist Revolutions.

Bozkurt, then examining the Balkan Wars and World War I, continued to derive lessons from history for the present. With these lessons, he produced ideological (nationalist) perspectives.

Bozkurt's account of Mehmet Vahdettin's ascent to throne is interesting. Here, Bozkurt made a detailed narration and used literary style of expression. This is an example of the presentation of the last Sultan as a symbol by Kemalist historiography. In this presentation, again not the historical processes but the meanings/symbols are stressed.

Bozkurt reserved his evaluations about the Committee of Union and Progress to the end of his narration on World War I. This was a conscious preference. While a distance to the Unionists was preserved, the second constitutional monarchy was considered positive. First, the Unionists were characterized with this sentence: "This party which succeeded the Second Constitutional Monarchy was the end of the school of Midhat Pasha."⁴²² In this way, a line was drawn between the Unionists and the Kemalists, shortly after Bozkurt revealed the reason for the sympathy towards the CUP: The rise of Turkish Nationalism. He said: "If we leave to one side the movement of

⁴²¹ Bozkurt, p. 255.

⁴²² *İkinci Meşrutiyet'i yapan bu parti Midhat Paşa okununun sonu idi.* Bozkurt, p. 268.

Turkish nationalism which began just after the Balkan War, we think that any other radical work cannot be written down to the account of the 'Union and Progress,' which monopolized the fate of Turkey except for three or five months of interruption from 1908 to 1918."⁴²³

From the Truce to the National Struggle

The Truce of Mondros occupied the widest place in this part. Bozkurt reproduced Tengirşenk's method of evaluating Sevres. The conditions of the truce were enumerated without comment under a different title. Then, different views on the truce were given place and subjected to more criticisms than the conditions of the truce. As opposed to these views, the discourse of the new state against the Truce of Mondros was built. This attitude was a characteristic one that can be seen as the text proceeds. For example, Bozkurt, who touched upon the Armenian issue, put forward not the issue itself, but the ideas related to it. He built a discourse from the question of who stood where.

Bozkurt discussed the Truce of Mondros from the perspectives of the Law of States and the Law of Constitution. Going off on a tangent, he described the incompetence of the Ottoman delegates during the negotiations in a detailed manner. The criticisms included some attitudes and behaviors that can be read as detail as well as the judicial and diplomatic themes. For example, Bozkurt indicated that the Truce was signed in an English ship. This was at the same time praise of the new Turkish state's diplomatic principles (Mustafa Kemal, in the National Struggle had not accepted such an unequal status) and achievements.

⁴²³ *Balkan Savaşı'ndan hemen sonra başlayan Türk milliyetçiliği hareketini bir yana bırakırsak, 1908'den 1918'e kadar üç beş aylık musalaha müstesna, Türkiye'nin mukadderatını elinde tutan "İttihat ve Terakki" hesabına radikal başka bir iş kaydedilemez düşüncesindeyiz.* Bozkurt, p. 268.

The achievements after the Truce of Mondros were subjected to an original interpretation of the nationalist historiography in the text of Bozkurt. Although he discussed the achievements in brief and in general terms, Bozkurt examined the national resistance at length and in detail. Another point of originality in Bozkurt's text is these details. Nationalist historiography tells of the national resistance movements as the struggle of a nation. In this sense, it does not give place to details and overlooks the differences. Despite all his nationalist motivation, Bozkurt did not avoid telling the parts played by individuals. He reproduced the nationalist historiography, which was centrally produced, by looking at the periphery.

This preference was also related to Bozkurt's personal experience. He had participated in the National Struggle not from the center (Ankara), but from the resistance in Western Anatolia. He told of the National Struggle from the perspective of the resistance of Western Anatolia, even from that of a man in the resistance. In this way, Bozkurt's text, with its content especially on the period before the orderly army, stands apart from the narrative established in the center. This was an understanding of history that emphasized the human component instead of armies and states. But this was not a realistic or multi-sided human component. It looked only at the heroes and villains. In this part, Bozkurt's sources were varied, including personal observations, hearings, and memoirs among others.

Bozkurt did not see the truce itself as an object of historical analysis in the end. This was valid also for other historical periods and topics before the Turkish Revolution. These were taken up in the context that they presented meaning and importance for the Turkish Revolution. The Revolution Lectures and the ideology produced and processed in these lectures drew their legitimacy from this point. In the final analysis, the details contained in the texts and secondary themes processed remain behind the nationalist motivation of the Revolution. Kuyaş shows this for anti-

imperialism in particular. The anti-imperialist character of the Turkish Revolution in essence is the product of its nationalist character. Meanwhile, the marks of such anti-imperialism can be seen also in Bozkurt, who said, “with this victory of Mustafa Kemal, the oppressed nations experienced the taste of their rights and independence. The Turkish youth: This is an act accomplished by your brothers and sisters.”⁴²⁴

Bozkurt also discussed the Wilson Principles. After enumerating the principles article by article, Bozkurt went into a long discussion of inter-state rights. Although there was a strong perspective of the law here, Bozkurt preferred history to law. He made a kind of “criticism of orientalism” without so calling it. On this topic in particular, he said that the Western texts both produced and legitimized the Western forms of ruling over “the others.”⁴²⁵ Then, he attempted to refute the claims of these orientalist texts; he even attempted to produce a reverse-orientalism (occidentalism). Just as in the orientalist texts, Bozkurt made his analyses from the perspective of “civilization.” As opposed to the Western claims, he argued that civilization was not of Western origin. He tried to prove “historically” that the Turks were civilized and even carried civilization to the West. This historical approach did not recognize the limits of time and space: It went from the Crusaders to the Byzantine Empire, then to the effects of Kemalism on Fascism and National Socialism.

Bozkurt, who examined the Wilson Principles from the perspective of inter-state rights, arrived at this judgment: the parts of these principles which were in favor of the Turkish side were not applied, while the remaining parts against the Turkish side were applied.⁴²⁶ Moving from here, he presented “some documents” about the activities of the minorities and arrived at this verdict:

⁴²⁴ *Mustafa Kemal'in bu zaferi mazlum milletlere hakkan ve istiklalin lezzetini tattırdı. Türk genci, bu senin ağabeylerinin, ablalarının başardığı bir iştir. Milliyet*, “Mütarekenin ilk günlerinde ayan ve mebusanın hali,” 10 Nisan 1934.

⁴²⁵ Bozkurt, pp. 301-303.

⁴²⁶ Bozkurt, p. 301.

The most direct side of this affair, in my opinion, is removing the minority matter in Turkey. If the minorities want the rights that the Turks have benefited from until the present day, they should say not only legally but also sincerely “we are Turk!” and be Turk. The way of this: Language unity and culture unity. There is no possibility with any other way. Do not believe. The troubles we suffered, the lessons we have learned throughout history are too excessive than is required.⁴²⁷

It should be stressed that these lines, in the context of Wilson Principles, were written in the 1930s. The motivation behind them was the consciousness developed by the new elites about being in the last phase of the nation-state creation process.

The Erzurum and the Sivas Congresses

Bozkurt began his evaluation of the Erzurum Congress with a theory different from those of his successors. The theory that the Turkish Revolution and its ideology emerged in the process by the pragmatic elites’ attitudes and actions regarding changing conditions had been widely accepted in the literature of the period and afterwards. Bozkurt, however, declared that the Turkish Revolution was the realization of a thought, even of a program.⁴²⁸ According to him, the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses were important as historical events at which the “thought and program” had been determined.

Bozkurt presented the opening speeches of Atatürk in the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses verbatim. He also quoted the decisions of the congresses from *Nutuk*. In addition, he reported information that he received from Atatürk about the congresses. Bozkurt’s text said nothing new about the congresses in content or discourse.

⁴²⁷ *Bence bu işin en kestirme yanı Türkiye’de artık azlık meselesini yok etmektir. Eğer azlıklar bugüne kadar Türklerin faydalandığı hakları istiyorlarsa yalnız kanun bakımından değil iç bakımından da “Türkünüz!” demeliler ve Türk olmalıdırlar. Bunun yolu: Dil birliği ve kültür birliğidir. Başka türlü imkanı yoktur. İnanmayınız. Çektiğimiz dertler, tarih boyunca aldığımız dersler lazım olduğundan çok fazladır.* Bozkurt, p. 319.

⁴²⁸ *Milliyet*, “İnkılap Enstitüsünde/Erzurum Kongresi Türk kurtuluşunun kaynağıdır,” 25 Nisan 1934. He said: “This congress became a plan which determined at the beginning the principles of Turkish history and of the whole of the Turkish revolution and a reference to a whole internal and external independence struggle.” *Bu kongre, Türk tarihinin bütün Türk ihtilalinin prensiplerini iptidadan tesbit etmiş bir plan, dahili ve harici bütün kurtuluş davasına bir kaynak olmuştur.* Bozkurt’s description of the Revolution of Atatürk as “a photograph of Atatürk’s brain” (*Atatürk’ün kafasının bir fotoğrafı*) can be evaluated in this context.

Bozkurt, who did not make evaluations of either of the congresses, wrote in detail on the Mandate issue, which had touched off heated discussions during the Sivas Congress. He pointed out that the source of the legitimacy of the Mandate was civilizationist theories. After this important statement, he went on to critiques of the Mandate and civilizationist ideas. He said, “from the perspective of the Turkish Revolution, it is not possible to accept the thesis of any nation being inferior than another nation. One of the products of our revolution is the living of every nation freely and independently. With these theses, legitimizing the exploitation of the strong over the weak was sought. These are masks, masks!”⁴²⁹

Bozkurt opposed the idea of the Mandate and its civilizing claims. He did not, however, interrogate the “civilizationist” perspectives. On the contrary, he reproduced and used them in the direction of his thought.⁴³⁰ That is to say, although he was against the idea of Mandate, he thought the fundamental problem was related to the question of where the source of the legitimacy of mandate should come:

Yes, if a nation decides to enter the mandate of a state by making a plebiscite, this can be explained to a degree from the perspective of right. But who is the “Society of Nations” that, by considering and recognizing itself the owner of that or this nation, is giving to it a mandate of another. Notice that these nations under mandate contended with such a policy of the “Society of Nations” about them. This is the real handicapped side of the affair for me, from the perspective of right. Can a human give the proxy of anything that is not owned by him or not under his use? If he gives it, what judgment does such an action express? No doubt nothing.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ *Türk İhtilali bakımından herhangi bir milletin diğer bir millettan küçüklüğü tezini Kabul etmek mümkün değildir. İhtilalimizin verimlerinden biri de her milletin hür ve müstakil yaşamasıdır. Bu tezlerle kavinin zayıflar üzerindeki istismarları meşrulamak istenilmiştir. Bunlar maskedir, maske! Milliyet, “Mahmut Esat B. dün ekalliyetlerin vaziyetinden bahsetti,” 17 Mayıs 1934.*

⁴³⁰ “It would not be proper to pass without mentioning a small point which is a reason of pride for the Turkish nation. The nations which are the most advanced, modern and nearest to civilization are those who separated from Turkey, among the nations entered under the mandate by the ‘Society of Nations’.” *Şuracığa Türk milleti için övünmek vesilesi olan bir noktacıyı kaydetmeden geçmek doğru olmayacaktır. “Uluslar Sosyetesini”nce manda altına giren milletler içinde en ileri, modern, medeniyete en yakın görülen Türkiye’den ayrılan yerler olmuştur. Bozkurt, p. 330. This was a claim processed in a detailed manner in the lectures of Bayur.*

⁴³¹ *Evet, bir millet plebisit yaparak kendi kendine manda bir devletin mandası altına girmeye karar verirse belki bir dereceye kadar hak bakımından izah olunabilir. Fakat “Uluslar Sosyetesini” kim oluyor ki, kendini şu veya bu milletin sahibi sayarak, sahibi tanıyarak onu bir başkasının mandasına veriyor. Bakalım manda altında bulunan milletler, “Uluslar Sosyetesinin” kendi haklarında, böyle bir tasarrufuna razı mıdır? Bence işin hak bakımından asıl sakat yanı budur. İnsan sahip olmadığı,*

Bozkurt applied here the method he followed on the issue of the Mondros Armistice. The matter was not what was said, but that who said what. Quotations were made from the speeches of Kara Vasıf, Rauf Orbay and Halide Edip supporting the Mandate. Excerpts from the speeches of those against the Mandate were given. The issue of the Mandate, just like that of the Mondros Armistice, was a means for making division between good and evil.

The National Oath and its Afterward

When Bozkurt turned to the *Milli Misak* and its aftermath, his style changed a little. From then on, he did not follow an understanding of history that looked at the periphery. Nor did he give place even to personal observations of other witnesses. The events instead of the people passed to the fore. In essence, he presented the texts of Mustafa Kemal's speeches, or parts from *Nutuk*, and some documents about the event in question under the titles of *Milli Misak*, the Collapse of the last Ottoman Parliament, the TGNA, Internal Rebellions, the first *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye* Law, the Wars, and Atatürk as Commander-in-Chief.

In his last evaluations, Bozkurt defined life as a fight. According to him, there existed only the conquerors and the defeated people. Here, we see the evolutionist character of his worldview. Bozkurt saw the disintegration of an empire, great wars, great defeats and victories. He was present during the process of a rebirth. What makes his *Atatürk İhtilali* important and original is that he enriched the dominant narrative with his personal observation and without claiming to look at this process from the outside. The final words of his book reveal the fears and reflexes of the new Turkish

tasarrufu altında bulunmayan bir şeyin vekaletini bir başkasına verebilir mi? Verirse böyle bir hareket ne hüküm ifade eder? Şüphesiz yok ki hiç. Bozkurt, p. 330.

state and its founders.⁴³² These fears and reflexes are important to understand the intellectual background that formed not only the political but also the economic and social politics of the new Turkish state.

Evaluation

Bozkurt's text on the judicial dimension of the Revolution was divided into two parts according to their methods and content. In the first part, he claimed to make a philosophy of the Revolution of Atatürk and of all revolutions. He dwelled upon the judicial bases of the Revolution. The legal regulations of the Revolution, on the other hand, were not discussed in the lectures or in the text. His ideas in this part are similar to the writings of Recep Peker on the political dimension of the Revolution. In the second part, on the other hand, he put forward a clearly historical agenda and made an interpretation of the National Struggle that from time to time differed from the dominant narration.

Regarding the aims of the text, the first part presented the ideology of the Revolution and puts forward its basic principles. With this aspect, it was similar to Peker's text. But in the second part, certain historical events of the near past were subjected to a detailed judicial evaluation. The text in this part was more similar to the texts of Tengirşenk and Bayur. The text gave no reference to the period's revolution literature. Rather it was directed towards the revolution literature of the West.

⁴³² "Do not pay attention to the international gossip, the softening, loosening and degenerating propaganda of our time. Freemasons, communists, etc., talk about honesty and humanity, but we should know that those who believe this gossip and propaganda and who give up their arms are unlucky ones who will carry first the chain of slavery on their necks. This is true. Because they separate from reality of humanity by giving up their arms. The right of those who are not human is the slavery." *Zamanımızın arsulusal dedikodularına, yumuşayıcı, gevşetici, dejenere edici propagandalarına kulak asmayınız. Farmasonlar, komünistler vesaire istedikleri kadar dürüstlükten, insanlıktan bahsededursunlar, bilelim ki, bu dedikodulara, bu propagandalara inananlar, silahı ellerinden bırakanlar, esaret zincirini en önce boyunlarında taşıyacak olan bahtsızlardır ve bu doğrudur. Çünkü silahını bırakmakla, insanlık realitesinden ayrılmaktadırlar. İnsan olmayanların hakkı esarettir.* Bozkurt, p. 402.

Bozkurt, in his writings about the judicial bases of the Revolution, referred to the liberal quality of the Turkish Revolution. He meant what Peker meant by the term “the revolution of liberty.” This liberal quality came from the opposition to the monarchy. In fact, neither the individual nor the other tenets of political and economic liberalism were adopted. It should be stressed that main point of reference here was Locke. Instead of the individual and society (Locke placed them as opposed to the administrators), Bozkurt used the term “the nation.”



CONCLUSION

The Lectures

The experience of the Revolution Lectures in the single-party period of the Turkish Republic is important for different reasons. Two of the five articles that will be discussed here are about the position of the Turkish Republic across Europe and the World and Turkey's relations with their histories. The following two articles are about the problematics of the single-party era. In the last article, an evaluation of the subject from the perspective of politics-education relations is made.

First, the Revolution Lectures were a special and original component of the historical manner that the Republic of Turkey followed. It found its reasons of existence in the political and social conditions in which it emerged. It was formed, institutionalized, and gave its products in the environment, which arose in these conditions.

Second, it is clear that this historical manner was nourished from historical references, which were not compulsorily particular to the Republic of Turkey in the single-party era. Although a direct relation of taking as a model or setting an example cannot be talked about, the conditions which caused to the experience of the Revolution Lectures were not the conditions particular to Turkey in that period. Therefore, similarities with the practices seen in other experiences of the same period can be seen in the Revolution Lectures' coming onto the agenda, in the discussions about them, in their formation and institutionalization, and their products.

Third, the experience of the Revolution Lectures sheds light on the single-party era's political decision-making and implementation processes. The limited multi-voiced character of the process, the existence of different actors and power struggles (power

relations in general) between these actors presents the opportunity to question well-known prejudices about the single-party government.

Fourth, the Revolution Lectures present a general snapshot of the education policies of the period, including their requirements, aims, policy determinations and results. This general picture gives the opportunity to question theses about whether the dominant tone was practical or ideological/political. The foundation of the single-party government in the Republic of Turkey in essence implies that the struggle and search for ideology had ended.⁴³³ But hesitant attitudes between the practice and ideology caused the need to re-think on characteristics of the single-party government.

Finally, the Revolution Lectures are a special example of the relationship between politics, ideology and education, indoctrination. No doubt that the Revolution Lectures were not an experience that was thought of, discussed, demanded and put into practice inside the university. On the other hand, it was not a process that the political government decided upon and implemented. Therefore two sides and two types of relationship (to determine or to be determined) between these sides existed around the idea of the Revolution Lectures. From the perspective of its aims, on the other hand, it seems not possible to say that the political government attributed a kind of political indoctrination as a basic function to the Revolution Lectures. At the beginning, it was stated that these lectures could be seen as a means of political indoctrination and political socialization. But as emerged clearly when the texts are dwelt upon, the real aim was creating an ideology of the Revolution. The expectation from these lectures was to transform the ideological acceptances and practical orientations of the political power into an intellectual narration and to present this not only to the masses but also to the political elites.

⁴³³ For this idea, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems" in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, eds. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 23-24. If we use the conceptualization of Huntington, the established single-party system was the following of a revolutionist single-party system. But at the same time, it was a new and different system. It required compromise and consensus rather than contrasts and divisions.

The Professors

The professors who gave the Revolution Lectures in 1934 form a productive beginning point for understanding the Revolution Lectures and their contents, and to make evaluations about the single-party rule and its political-ideological elite. The comparison of the works of the four professors revealed similarities and differences. Similarities can be read as indicators of being produced in the center and inclinations to uniformity, while differences can be read as indicators of inclinations of plurality.

Their life stories were similar. Except for Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk (born in 1878), the professors were younger than Mustafa Kemal (Recep Peker, 1889; Hikmet Bayur, 1891; and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, 1892). This situation coincided with the profile of the single-party rule of the Kemalist political elite. It was a community of political elite who were younger than their leader and who generally rose in their careers along with Mustafa Kemal on a large scale.

Although they began their careers in the last period of the Ottoman military and civilian bureaucracy (at least they completed their education during this period), they were not part of the Unionist movement and were not commissioned in the upper level bureaucracy during the second constitutional monarchy. Although Tengirşenk forced the limits of this definition with his place in the CUP, it is certain that his political career also reached its peak in the Republican era.

As members of the same generation and as witness of a certain period with similar ages and positions, these men experienced similar processes in gaining historical consciousness. Tengirşenk took part in the Revolution of 1908 and became a member of parliament with the first elections of the second constitutional monarchy. But except for a short term, he passed those years not among the political elites of the period, but in foreign countries until the beginning of World War I. The other three, on the other hand,

were present during the Revolution of 1908 as students or recent graduates. The second constitutional monarchy years were passed for Bayur and Bozkurt for the most part as students in foreign countries. In this aspect, they resembled Tengirşenk. Peker, on the other hand, graduated from the Military School in 1907 and began his career as a young military officer.

Therefore, for the four professors of the Revolution Lectures, there were at least three forms of gaining historical consciousness. The first was valid for Tengirşenk, whose education was in the modern schools of the reign of Abdülhamid II. Although he took part in the Revolution of 1908, he observed the years of the second constitutional monarchy for the most part from foreign countries. His relations with the political elite, on the other hand, remained constantly sound. The second was valid for Bayur and Bozkurt, whose years of education and graduation coincided with the Revolution of 1908. They observed the years of the second constitutional monarchy from foreign countries as students. The third was valid for Peker, who went through the second constitutional monarchy and the military and political developments afterwards in the inside, although his education and graduation years coincided with the Revolution of 1908. These three different forms of gaining historical consciousness were revealed in the Revolution Lectures that they gave in 1934.

Intellectual concerns, which were important for three of the professors, were overshadowed by political concerns in Peker's lectures. The aim of the other three professors to analyze some aspects of the Revolution in essence included also the claim and implication that their subject matters would be approached objectively. Peker, on the other hand, was not concerned about objectivity. He did not analyze the Revolution as a historical, social or economic process. He spoke from inside the Revolution and showed what the Revolution was and what the Revolution should be.

Comparing their class origins, Peker came from an immigrant family from the Caucasus living in İstanbul. Tengirşenk came from a notable family from the countryside. Bayur was from a family that had served in the upper-level Ottoman bureaucracy for generations. Bozkurt, on the other hand, was from a big landowner family in western Anatolia.

Despite their different socio-economic backgrounds, their classes of origin did not affect deeply the forms and contents of their lectures. As an ideology that claimed Turkey was a classless society, Kemalism's ideologues carefully avoided to base their existence and ideas on classes and class analyses. Even their stress on peasants and the peasantry can be read not as a kind of class understanding, but as a product of practical requirements and nationalist themes. But some inferences (as reflections) can be made from their class origins. For example, Peker, who came from a town-dweller family, talked about some of the problems of the peasantry and their solutions (not socialism, but cooperatives), but he did not engage in the widespread exaltations of the peasants and peasantry of the period. As a child of village, Tengirşenk had frequently exalted the peasant and peasantry. Bozkurt, as a member of a big landowner family, viewed the village and the peasantry not as concepts about economy or class, but as sources or support for nationalism. Bayur, who came from a high level bureaucratic family, did not mention villages or the peasantry. But the thesis that Turkish society was not a society with classes in the Western sense was a shared point that three of the professors –with the exception of Bayur– underlined. Bayur, on the other hand, did not touch upon the concept of class in his lectures and writings.

The participation of these professors in the Kemalist elite became possible with their being in Ankara at the beginning of the National Struggle. All four participated in the National Struggle, arriving in Ankara in 1920. Tengirşenk and Bozkurt were members of the first TGNA. Peker was the secretary general of the first TGNA, and he

was a deputy in the second TGNA. Bayur was elected late in 1933 as a deputy, but he rose quickly, became Minister of Education in 1934. The four took up duties in various ministries over the years. Except for Peker, their positions in the ministries (and thus their privileged places among the Kemalist elite) were in periods before the Revolution Lectures in 1934. After the lectures, Peker proved unable to maintain his position in the Party and was relieved of duty in 1936.

This image of purge (in fact not a purge, but more of a passification) can be explained differentiation made by Linz between governing groups and the party or party elite. According to Linz, the positions of political elite in front of the ideology may vary. Generally, unlike the pragmatism of the governing elite, the party is the symbol of loyalty to the ideology.⁴³⁴

Although this idea partly seems true, there is no sign of this kind of clear differentiation between the governing elites (or leadership) and party organization for the single-party experience in Turkey. The passification of Peker, Tengirşenk, and Bayur took different forms. Their political positions also went in different directions. So this theory only holds for Peker as Tengirşenk and Bayur did not spend much time among the party elite.

In conclusion, it can be said that a comparison between the professors who gave the Revolution Lectures in 1934 reveals no definite similarities or differences. Neither a picture of typical Kemalist elite or ideologues, nor a picture of elites-ideologues who cannot be taken as a common group emerged. In the texts, however, a “picture of professors,” in which similarities in tone or content were evident. Consequently, these lectures cannot be understood with easy or clear cut inferences. A narration should be

⁴³⁴ *Yönetici grup veya liderle parti örgütü arasındaki ilişkide meydana gelen değişmeler, ideolojide de bazı değişmelere yol açabilir; yönetici grup içinde, çabalarını kendilerine örgütsel bir taban yaratmaya değil, ideolojinin ve ondan kaynaklanan politikaların fikri yönden işlenmesine adanmış olanlar, görevlerinden uzaklaştırılabilir.* Linz, p. 36.

put forward that regards the complex character of the Revolution Lectures and the process, and that it applies different types of explanation.

The Texts

It is possible to evaluate the texts of the Revolution Lectures of 1934 from four perspectives. First, these texts should be evaluated according to their aims and results. Second, they should be subjected to a comparison between them and their similarities and differences evaluated. Third, the places of these texts in the intellectual life and revolution literature of the period should be examined, and their mutual effects mentioned. And finally, these texts should be evaluated from the perspective of the similar education practices in different countries of the interwar period.

In the emergence of the idea of the Revolution Lectures, the aim of these lectures was to study the issues of the Revolution. The idea of founding a Revolution Institute by the University Reform required the establishment of bridges between the Revolution and academy, and the emancipation of the university from the theoreticism or pure scienticism (*nazariyecilik*) and its interest in the problems of the country and the Revolution. When viewed from the perspective of the tenth anniversary of the Republic, it was thought that the ideology of the Revolution had not yet been exposed while the political phase of the Revolution was completed.

Evaluated with these general aims in mind, these lectures met their objectives to a great degree. In any case, the issues about the Revolution had already been discussed in the newspapers and periodicals. In addition, we can talk about a revolution literature, ranging from brochures to books. However, with these lectures, the issues of the Revolution with their dimension of politics, economy, foreign politics and law, were revealed first as collected entities and furthermore, by the leaders/elite of the

Revolution. Today, these texts continue to be the main references for studies on the period.

The idea of establishing bridges between the Revolution and academia was realized with the University Reform. Both the organic character of the relationship established by the Revolution Lectures between the state and the university, and political claims of their texts made null and void the criticisms of the university made before the Reform of 1933.

An important achievement was made on the point of creating the ideology of the Revolution. In essence, it cannot be claimed that the ideology of the Revolution was produced in these lectures or with the mediation of the period's revolution literature. The ideology of the Revolution (as principles) was put forward by again the elites of the Revolution in practice and appeared place first in texts like party programs, rules and regulations, and the constitution. In these lectures, on the other hand, it was transformed into an intellectual narrative. Today also, these documents (especially that of Recep Peker) are accepted as the main texts of the single-party era.

The four texts of the Revolution Lectures deal with four different dimensions of the Revolution. Consequently, the expectation from these different texts was to complete each other and to function as different parts of one narrative. Regarding their content, this seems to have been realized. The political (internal) dimension of the Revolution was examined in Peker's text, its economic dimension in Tengirşenk's, its foreign politics in Bayur's and its legal/judicial dimension in Bozkurt's.

Regarding their aims and methodologies on the other hand, these texts revealed some differences. Peker's text in essence explained not the Turkish Revolution, but the political tendencies of the single-party rule. The text was written in early 1930s and was related to its time. The aim of making the ideology of the Revolution is seen most clearly in this text. Besides being an explanatory and legitimizing text on the point that

the Revolution had arrived, this text contains foresights and goals for the future of the Revolution. The texts of Tengirşenk and Bayur, on the other hand, had more historical agendas. Their views were directed basically towards the near past. The attempt of historical understanding was made together with the aim of writing the ideology of the Revolution. While the near past was taken up in detail and in a narrative format, the far past was built with a holistic and generalizing view, not with historical processes but with the symbols and meanings. In this way, an example of nationalist historiography is revealed with a story of success.

A duality appears in the text(s) of Bozkurt, however. First, philosophical explanations about the Revolution of Atatürk, and then on all revolutions, were discussed. Although their stresses were different, Bozkurt put forward a version of Peker's political ideas here. Then, the breaking points of the Turkish Revolution were dealt with from the perspective of law and with a historical agenda. Bozkurt here came closer to Tengirşenk and Bayur. The near past was related in a detailed narrative as separate from the far past. Although these texts followed different aims and methodologies, their common characteristic was the creation of a discourse. The different perspectives attributed the same meanings to the same events and concepts; therefore, a hegemonic discourse emerged. It is possible to say in the end that maybe not an ideology, but a language of a discourse emerged and was established.

Looking at the place of the Revolution Lectures' texts within the context of the period's revolution literature, one judgment cannot be reached for the four different texts. But as a result of the revolution literature's nature, there was basically no relationship of tension between them. Peker's text had the most intense interaction with the period's revolution literature. This may have been caused by his determination to create the ideology of the Revolution. When his relations with *Kadro* are considered as well, it confirms the view that Peker believed that the revolutionary elite should make

the ideology of the Revolution. His text's inclusion of problematics which were intensively processed in the period's revolution literature was caused partly by the political dimension of the Revolution being the main theme of this literature. Tengirşenk's and Bayur's texts consisted of the themes of this literature from the perspectives of economics and foreign politics. In Bozkurt's text, on the other hand, references and attributions to the period's revolution literature are not encountered very often. He built his philosophy of the Revolution using Western sources. When evaluating the Turkish Revolution from the perspective of law, however, he made a criticism of Western sources and their civilizationist ideas.

Nutuk was a key work for the place of these texts in the period's revolution literature. Both in the texts of these lectures and in the revolution literature, *Nutuk* was accepted and exalted as a document besides a basic and primary historical source. Peker's text, because of its lack of historical agenda, gave less reference to *Nutuk*. Tengirşenk's and Bayur's texts, on the other hand, used *Nutuk* as a document for the periods they examined and as the basic source for their themes. As a requirement of its subject, Bozkurt, who did not give reference to *Nutuk*, especially in the first part of *Atatürk İhtilali*, delivers an exaltation of *Nutuk*. In his text, *Nutuk* was transformed from being "the indicator" into being "the indicated."

From the perspective of the interwar period's political education practices, reaching one judgment for the four different texts is not possible. These political education practices can be divided into two parts with respect to curriculum and content of political education. The political education practices of National Socialism and Fascism can be seen in the first category. First, because of their natures, National Socialism and Fascism did not determine a well-defined ideology as the aim and subject of the education. They rather gave weight to the practice and aimed at the emergence and spread of symbols, values, and attitudes by the education. Second, they did not

claim to put forward a completely new curriculum and content, and changed the existing curriculum and content according to their political and ideological aims. The USSR and the PRC after World War II in the second category, on the other hand, first had well-defined ideologies, and their education policies were determined under the dominance of the theoretical. Ideology determined both the aim of education and its subject. Second, educational practices in this category contained radical criticisms of the existing education practices (related to content here). They were not content with reforming the existing curriculum and content or adding appendixes to them, but they neglected them by using ideological criteria and re-created them afterwards.

In this context, it is possible to say that, first, a well-defined ideology did not determine the method and content of these lectures. These lectures aimed both to praise the practice of the Revolution, to transform it into an intellectual narrative, and to create an ideology from this practice. With this aspect, they came closer to the education practices of National Socialism and Fascism. Second, the same closeness can be mentioned with respect to the curriculum or content. The practice of the Revolution Lectures and the University Reform were not radical criticisms of the existing education practices, but rather a kind of reform aimed at them. It was a case of the new built upon the old. The content of these lectures in 1934 re-wrote an already existing narrative as collected-gathered and in a comprehensive form with some stress and detail differences.

The first Revolution Lectures, given by four statesmen-professors in 1934, present a productive area for different fields of historiography. In this study, these lectures are examined comparatively with similar experiences seen in other countries, as a historical fact, in the contexts of their texts and their subjects. Different contexts increase the diversity of knowledge and interpretations on the subject. The primary aim of this study has been to produce this diversity of knowledge and interpretations in a

problematic of the history of Republican Turkey which has been overlooked and has not been examined sufficiently. Second, this study introduced a criticism towards evaluations of the single-party and its institutions in Turkish historiography, and sought how the inadequacy of the existing texts could be surpassed with respect to method and content.

The propositions of this study can be gathered in four categories:

First, the Revolution Lectures in 1934 had an international context. Every effort for historical explanation which does not give reference to this context will be lacking. This is the most important problem of the writings and articles related to the subject. Dealing with the subject, these texts do not take into consideration the similar experiences of other countries. They insist on the peculiarity and originality of the historical experience. International context implies not only that similar practices were seen in other countries in the same period. In more general, it is related to the questions of whether or not the historical and ideological conditions which created the Revolution Lectures in 1934 were peculiar to Turkey and to what degree the practices that these conditions put forward are similar or different. Knowledge and interpretation diversity emerges with comparative evaluations. But as similar practices undertaken by the countries under comparison could not be examined using primary sources, the study utilized a more superficial view of the relations between politics/ideology and education. Each of these examples offers useful data for comparative studies. These also should be examined in a detailed manner with primary sources.

Second, the first Revolution Lectures in 1934 was examined by deepening our comprehension on its historical context. Texts written about the single-party era give place to such subjects as parts of a macro-narrative. However, it is certain that these parts also had their own histories. The lectures should not be examined only as a part or stage of a historical project's process of realizing itself. It should be taken up as a

historical process by itself and with its own causes and results. In this way, the lectures will be transformed from being a supplementary part of a historical narrative into the subject of a different historical narrative. This micro-narrative will be made possible by the use of sources which are overlooked by macro-narrative.

Third, the first Revolution Lectures in 1934 should be examined by taking into consideration both their own texts and other texts of the period as primary sources. The existing studies on the period do not present textual diversity. Primary sources (*Nutuk* was in the lead) are used in limited number in these studies. Even encyclopedic information about the lectures do not take into consideration these texts. It should be asked first, what these texts include, what do they actually mean and what their position is considering the other texts of the period related to the subject. The diversity of texts under examination not only increases the quality of the studies, but also makes possible some content changes.

Fourth, the subjects who made the history should return and take their place in the history narrative. This may be in the form of bringing back the subject which lost or did not take place in the history narrative or in the form of questioning the place of the existing subject in the history narrative and re-fictionalizing it. The first alternative is valid for a historiographical understanding which removes or makes insignificant the subject by explaining the historical process from ideas, institutions and events. The second alternative, on the other hand, is valid for a historiographical understanding which, although it gives place to the subject in the history narrative, sees the subject in absolute categories alike determining or determined variable. Examples of both forms can be seen in the studies on the single-party era and its institutions. A historical view on the first Revolution Lectures in 1934 requires a historical view also on the subjects of the process. Their own histories present important data to explain the whole of the process. The subjects should not be seen as absolutely determining or determined

variables particularly in these lectures. The relation between the subjects and historical process is a relation of reciprocal interaction. Determination and being determined occur together.

Together with its answers and explanations related to the subject, this study brings new questions and indicates some problems of Turkish historiography. The single-party era and its institutions have not been examined comparatively. A meaningful photograph on the period cannot be formed by comparing one part with similar cases. Increasing the number of compared parts and the emergence of a macro-frame will strengthen the views on each part. In this context, the subjects which are mentioned in brief in this study, like the university reform, the revolution literature, and usage of the means of mass communication in the single-party era should be examined comparatively as separate subjects.

In this study, together with secondary sources, primary sources related to the subject are used which had not been utilized before. It was shown that primary sources can alter incomplete information and opinions. Moving from here, two propositions can be made: First, new sources related to the subject can produce new information and consequently different perspectives. In addition to the sources used in this study, particularly about the first Revolution Lectures in 1934, examples can be increased with the personal observations of the students and members of the university and bureaucracy. In addition, the accounts of the people who attended the lectures can be applied by individual interviews. Second, this renewal and variety of sources in the writing of the history of some institutions and concepts of the single-party era which are mentioned superficially in this study can both broaden the perspective on the subject and complete blanks in the Turkish historiography.

This study directed me to look at the other historical problems of the same period and at the appearances of similar problems in other historical periods. I hope that

it will be a contribution to the studies made until now, and some questions for further studies will be made.



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APPENDIX

Ankara 13/7/ 1933

Hülasa

T.C.
Maarif Vekâleti

M.T.T. DAİRESİ

Umumi No. : 3276

Hususi No. :



Başvekil İsmet Paşa Hazretleri

Ankara.

Aziz Cümhuriyetimizin 1933 birinci teşrininin 29 uncu gününe tesadüf edecek olan onuncu yıldönümünü, Büyük Türk Kurtarıcısının Başkumandanlığı altında dünyaya hayret veren bir hızla yol almış olan Türk İnkılâbının manasını, gayesini, genişliğini ve güzelliğini halkımıza anlatmak için fikir ve kalem adamlarına emsalsiz bir fırsat verdiğine kani olduğum için bütün Türk mütefekkir, edip, şair ve muharrirlerini Türk İnkılâbının herhangi bir cephesi hakkında yazılar yazmağa, Türk sanatkarlarını resim, heykel gibi sanat eserleri yaratmağa davet etmeyi muvafık buldum. Türk mütefekkir ve muharrirlerine yazdığım mektubun bir suretini ilâştirerek takdim ediyorum. Yazılacak eserleri topluca bir kitap halinde bastırmak arzusun-dayım. Bu kitabın, Türk İnkılâbının büyük yapıcılarından ve liderlerinden olan Zatı Devletlerinin de bir yazısıyla zinetlenmesine yüksek müsaadelerini rica ile derin saygılarımı sunarım, Efendim.

İhan
R.

Maarif Vekili

İ. P. P. P.

Lef.1

Takdim
15-7-1933

7.3.1934

BAŞBAKANLIK ARŞİVİ		
Tarih	4	1
15-7-1933	4392	1

İ. Ka. 13/7/1933

Hangi daire evrakına cevap teşkil ettiğinin tasrihi rica olunur.

Ankara II/7/

1933

Hülasa

T. C.

Maarif Vekâleti

M. T. T. DAİRESİ

Umumi No.

Hususi No. 3200

T. C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
CUMHURİYET ARŞIVI

Muhterem Efendim,

Aziz Cümhuriyetimizin 1933 Teşrinievvelinin 29 uncu gününe tesadüf edecek olan onuncu yıldönümü münasebetile bütün Türk edip, şair, muharrir ve mütefekkirlerinden Türk İnkılâbının herhangi bir cephesi hakkında yazılar yazmaları için rica ediyorum. Cümhuriyetin onuncu yıldönümünü, Büyük Türk Kurtarıcısının Başkumandanlığı altında dünyaya hayret veren bir hızla yol almış olan Türk İnkılâbının manasını, gayesini, genişliğini ve güzelliğini halkımıza anlatmak ve kalplerde heyecan yaratmak için fikir ve kalem adamlarımıza emsalsiz bir fırsat veriyor.

Türk köylüsü ve bugün mekteplerimize devam eden yüz binlerce Türk yavrusu başta olduğu halde bütün millet, Türk İnkılâbının yarattığı binbir mucizenin yaşamış heyecanını Türk yazıcılarının kalemlerinden çıkmış eserlerde de okuyarak duymak ihtiyacındadır.

Maarif Vekâleti Türkiye Cümhuriyetinin onuncu yıldönümü münasebetile Türk muharrirlerinin Türk İnkılâbının herhangi bir cephesi hakkında vücuda getirecekleri eserleri neşre vasıta olmağı kendisi için büyük bir şeref ve mühim bir vazife sayar.

Sizin Türk İnkılâbına karşı duyduğunuz samimî heyecanı yakından bildiğim için Türk edip ve muharrirlerine teveccüh eden yüksek millî vazifede sizinle birleşmeği münasip gördüm. Bu davete yürekten gelen bir atılışla icabet buyuracağınızdan eminim. Binaenaleyh sizden Türk İnkılâbının herhangi bir cephesine ait bir mevzu üzerine şiir, hitabe, manzum ve mensur piyes, roman, küçük hikâye, monolog, etüt gibi yazılardan

2

Hangi daire evrakına cevap teşkil ettiğinin tasrihi rica olunur.

T. C.
Maarif Vekâleti

Ankara

1988

Hülasa

233
28

DAİRESİ

Umami No. :

Hususi No. :



hangisini tensip buyurursanız bunlardan birini veya bir kağıdı yazıp Vekâlete göndermenizi ehemmiyetle rica ediyorum.

Bu yazıları ilkmektep çocukları veya ortamekteplere ve daha yüksek mekteplere devam eden gençler veya köylü ve halk kütlesi için yazabilirsiniz.


Yazılacak eserlerde meselâ yobazlık, skolastik zihniyet, muzır ve batıl fikir, itikat ve an'aneler, yanlış telâkkiler, âşar usulü gibi Türk İnkılâbının yıktığı şeylerin memlekete yaptığı mazarratları tebarüz ettirmek için mizahî bir yoldan gidilmek de mümkündür. Her halde mevzuun icabına göre bu mevzua ve sizin edebî meslekinize ve zevkinize en uygun gelecek edebî nev'i seçmekte tamamen serbestsiniz.

Eserinizi ve bilhassa mektepler için yazdıklarınızı biran evvel bastırmak ve Cümhuriyetin yıldönümünden evelki hafta içinde mekteplerde inşat veya temsil ettirmeğe imkân olmak üzere nihayet eylül başına kadar Vekâlete göndermenizi rica ederim.

Eseriniz satın alınarak Vekâletçe bastırılacaktır. Hangi mevzu üzerine hangi neviden bir eser hazırlıyacağınızı birkaç gün içinde Vekâlete bildirmenizi bilhassa temenni ile saygılarımı sunarım, Efendim.

Maarif Vekili

Aline mutabıktır



T. C.

AŞVEKÂLET
ELÂT MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

KARARNAME

Şube:

Sayı: 2

2278

İstanbul Üniversitesi ile Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinde konferans şeklinde verilmekte olan İnkilâb Tarihi Dersleri için 1934 mali yılı bütçesinin 599 uncu faslının 8 inci konferans ücretleri maddesine konulan tahsisattan, bu dersleri vermekte olan profesörlere, işe başladıkları tarihten itibaren ders başına 25 er ve bu profesörlerin yanında çalışmakta olan doçentlere de 10 ar lira ücret verilmesi; Maarif Vekilliğinin II/3/935 tarih ve 7813 sayılı tezkeresi ve Maliye Vekilliğinin 4/4/935 tarih ve 7971/250 sayılı mutaleanamesi üzerine İcra Vekilleri Heyetince 7/4/935 de onanmıştır.

7/4/935

REİSİCÜMHUR

K. Atatürk

Bş.V.

Ad.V.

M.M.V.

Da.V.

İ. İsmi

S. Sarıoğlu

K. Özalp

S. Kaya

Ha.V.

Ma.V.

Ml.V.

Na.V.

S. B. Rivas

E. Çiğdem

B. Özyer

A. Çetinkaya

İk.V.

S.İ.M.V.

G.İ.V.

Zr.V.

E. Zeynep

S. R. Saydam

Rana Erdem

Muhlis Kınay

080 13 01 02 53 24 16

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti
 Maarif Vekâleti
 Yüksek Tedrisat Umum
 Müdürlüğü
 No. 7817

Hâlâca:

İnkılap Tarihi derslerini vermekte
 olan profesörlerin ücreti Hak:

Ankara 17. 3 / 1935

Başvekalet Yüksek Makamına

İstanbul Üniversitesi ile Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinde konferans
 şeklinde verilmekte olan İnkılap Tarihi dersleri için 1934 bütçe-
 sinin 599 uncu fıslının 8 inci " konferans ücretleri" maddesine
 konan tahsisattan, bu dersleri vermekte olan profesörlere işe
 başladıkları tarihten itibaren beher ders için 25 şer lira ve bu
 profesörlerin yanında çalışmakta olan doçentlere de beher ders
 için onar lira ücret verilmesi hakkında bir karar ittihazına
 müsaade buyurulmasını derin saygılarımla dilerim.

Maarif Vekili

A.K.

B. Öymen

Maliye Vekilliğine

14. 3. 1935

RA. ES. 12/3/1935
 7.E.

MALİYE V. UM. EVCAK AD.	
Tarih:	Numarası:
19/3/1935	429

BASVEKALET İBRAKİ		
Tarih	Numara	İş
14-3-1935	1090	

BAYLEK ANKARA GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ANKARA

B = 5

175586

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
Genel SekreterliğiSayı
5/656

Ankara: 24/12/935

Parti genyönetkurulunun bu yıl (İnkılâp ve istiklâl) konuları üzerinde tertip ettiği konferanslara ait hazırlanmış olduğu talimatın bir örneğini bağı olarak sunuyorum. Bundan başka sizin de ayrıca göz önünde bulundurmanızı lüzumlu gördüğüm noktaları aşağıya yazıyorum:

1- Her konferansçıya gösterilmiş olan yerde verilecek iki konferansın hazırlanmasında şu esaslar şarttır :

A) Verilecek konferansların metni parti Genel Sekreterinin geçen seneki inkılâp derslerinin basılmış ve bağı olarak sunulmuş notlarında yazılıdır .

B) Birinci konferansın konusu (İnkılâp) tır . Notların birinci ile 14 üncü sayfası arasındadır . 54 üncü sayfanın sonu ile 57inci sayfaya kadar olan kısımlar da bu birinci konferansa girer. İkinci konferansın konusu (İstiklâl) dir . notların 104 üncü sayfasından 118 inci sayfasına kadar sürer . 63 üncü sayfadan 65 inci sayfaya kadar süren Şef ve usal Şef bahsi de konferansın uygun yerine katılmalıdır .

C) Konferansçı arkadaşlar bu notların talebeye hitap edilir tarzındaki şeklini halka söylenir şekle getirmek, konuşma tarzını kendine uygun gelecek özel konuşma şekline çevirmek yollarında önceden bizzat kendini hazırlar .

- 2 -

5/656

24/12/935

Konferans baştan başa yazılmış bir metnin okunması şeklinde değil ; bizim halkımızın dinleme meyline uygun olan hazırlanıp , bilinip, sindirilmiş fikirlerin serbestce ve sözle söylenmesi tarzında olmalıdır.

Bazı yerlerde konferansçı lüzum gördükçe metin parçalarını da okuyabilir.

Bu konferansların iyi hazırlanması için malzeme verilmiş yeter zaman bırakılmış olduğuna göre götüğümüz fayda emacını tam temin etmesi için vazifeli erkadaşların kendi hazırlıklarında emek sarfetmelerini Genyönkurul bilhassa rica eder .

2- Konferans işlerinin yerlerinde iyi düzenlenebilmesini temin için , konferansçılardan Ankarada bulunanlar , konferans vereceği yerde bulunacağı günü hareketinden bir hafta evvel yazı ile ve diğer yerlerde bulunanlar da telgrafla Genel Sekreterliğe bildireceklerdir . Bunun üzerine yerlerine ayrıca yazacağız . Konferansların en geç Şubatın yirmisine kadar verilmiş olmasını bilhassa rica ederiz .

Parti genyönkurulunca önem verilen bu işe inandığımız değerimizi katarak gideceğiniz yerdeki yurtdaşları en çok derecede faydalandıracağınız hakkındaki kanaatimizi arz ile sevgi ve saygılarımı sunarım.

C.H.P. Genel Sekreteri
Kütahya Saylavı

A. Peker

Not:
Gidip gelme ve kalma günlerinin yol parası ve gündelikleri parti muhasebesinden yolu ile ödenecektir .

T. C.
BAŞVEKÂLET
Kararlar Müdürlüğü
Sayı:

Dosya işaretleri

138
57



T. C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Evrakın	Numarası	Tarihi	Yazan memur	Yazı tarihi	Muavin	Beyaz eden	Beyaz tarihi	Karşılaştıranlar	Sadıra No.	Merbutatı	Sevk tarihi	Kaydeden	Düşünceler	Kararname
	8123	10.3.934		21.5.934	<i>Ömür</i>	<i>Ömür</i>	21.5.934	<i>Ömür</i>	1934	1	22.5.34	<i>Ömür</i>		<p>Maarif Vekilliginden yazılan 10/3/934 tarih ve 8123 sayılı tezkere de ; İstanbul x üniversitesinde okutulup mezkûr üniversiteye merbut bütün fakülte ve enstitülerle yüksek mektepler son sınıf talebesi tarafından imtihan mecburiyeti ile takip edilmekte olan Türk inkilap tarihi derslerinin Ankara Yüksek tahsil talebesi için de aynı şartlarla mecburî kılınması faydalı görüldüğü bildirilmiş ve zaman ve mekân imkânları nazara alınarak bilâhare diğer muallimlere de teşmil edilmek üzere Ankara ve İstanbuldaki bütün kültür zümrelerine mensup orta tedrisat muallimlerinin devam mecburiyeti vekâletçe kararlaştırılmış olan bu derslerin imtihan mecburiyeti ile x Ankarada Maarif Vekilligine bağlı Gazi terbiye enstitüsü , Adliye Vekilligine bağlı x Hukuk fakültesi ve Ziraat Vekilligine bağlı Ziraat enstitüsü son sınıf talebesi tarafından ve yalnız devam mecburiyeti ile de liselerin son sınıf talebesi tarafından takip x edilmesi ve derslerin aynı zevat tarafından Halkevinde ve herkesin serbest bulunacağı x Saat 17/30 da verilmesi hakkında bir karar ittihazı istenilmiş ve bu iş İcra Vekilleri Heyetince 20/5/934 te görüşülerek teklif ve hile muamele yapılması tasvip ve kabul olmuştur .</p> <p>Maarif Vekilligine : K Adliye " " Ziraat " "</p>
													2 682	

APPENDIX I

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti

Maarif Vekâleti

Yüksek ve Mesleki Tedrisat Umum M.

No. : 8123

Hüda:

Türk İnkilâp tarihi derslerinin Ankaradaki yüksek mektep talebelere ve Ankara ve İstanbuldaki orta tedrisat muallimlerine ve imtihan mecburiyeti olmaksızın Ankara liselerinin son sınıf talebelere teşmili hakkında:

Ankara 10 / 3 / 1934

Başvekâlet yüksek Makamına

İstanbul Üniversitesinde okutulup mezkûr üniversiteye merbut bütün fakülte ve enstitüler ve İstanbuldaki ekser yüksek mektepler son sınıf talebesi tarafından imtihan mecburiyeti olmak üzere mecburî takip edilmekte olan Türk İnkilâp tarihi derslerinin Ankara yüksek mektepleri talebesi içinde aynı şerait tahtında mecburî kılınması pek faydalı olacağından keyfiyeti yüksek tasviplerine arz ederim.

Ankarada yüksek mektep olarak Maarif Vekâletine merbut Gazi Terbiye Enstitüsü, Adliye vekâletine merbut Hukuk fakültesi ve Ziraat vekâletine merbut Ziraat Enstitüsü vardır.

Ankara ve İstanbulda bulunan bütün kültür zümrelerine mensup orta tedrisat muallimlerinin dahi bu derslere devana mecbur olmalarını Maarif Vekâleti kararlaştırmıştır. Zaman ve mekân imkânları nazarı dikkate alınarak bilâhara bu mecburiyet diğer muallimlere de teşmil olunabilir.

Bundan maada Ankara liselerinin son sınıf talebesini dahi imtihan şartı olgadan bu derslere sevketmeyi muvafık görmekteyim.

Merkezî vaziyeti ve büyüklüğü itibarile bu dersler için en muvafık yer Ankara Halkevi ve en muvafık saat her kesin serbest bulunacağı 17,5 tur. Bu suretle hariçten bir çok dinleyici dahi derslere gelebilir.

Dersler tabii aynı zatlar tarafından verilecektir.

Bu hususlar tasvip buyurulduğu takdirde bu bapta bir H eyeti vekile kararı alınmasına müsaadelerini rica ederim efendim.

V. ES. 10/3/1934
7.E.


Maarif vekili

At.

Jera V. H. me

10-3-934

Kabul
20-5-34



20-5-934

ÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ

Rizaseti

C*	T. C. BAŞBAKANLIK CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ	PV 8	Ankara	31. III. 1934
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Katibi Umumiliği

Kanunlar Müdürlüğü

No

Yüksek Reislige

6
774

İstanbul Üniversitesindeki inkilâp enstitüsü derslerine talebeden maad bütün halk büyük bir heyecanla alâka göstererek dersleri dinlemek ve bu suret le inkilâbımız tarihine vukuf peyda etmek üzere enstitüye gittikleri halde manaata uğruyarak bu mühim derslerden halk istifadeden mahrum kalıyor . Halbu ki halkımızın bu heyecan ve dersleri takip hususundaki emel ve arzuları ne kadar gayanı şükran ise bu mümanaatla halkı inkisara uğratmak ta o derece şayan teessüftür . Binaenaleyh halkın istifadesini temin için Vekâletçe ne düşünülü yör ? bu hususta sualime Mecliste şifahen cevap vermesini Maarif Vekâletinden rica ederim .

Denizli Mebusu
Mazhar Mifit

I. IV. 1934

Aslına uygundur .

Verzül 12.5

030	10			8	49	7
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İstanbul 25 Mart 1935

Bay Receb PEKER

C.Halk Fırkası Genel Kâtibi

ANKARA

Sayın Bay Receb PEKER,

İnkilâb Dersleri notlarınızın kitab şeklinde basılmış bir sayısını teşekkürle aldım. Bu derslerin birçoğunda bizzat bulunmak fırsatını bulmuş, ötekilerini de gazete sütunlarında istifade ile okumuştum. Şimdi, bu istifadeli dersleri tekrar okumak ve derslerimde mehzaz, yazılarında da direktif olarak kullanmak fırsatını bana verdiğinizden dolayı size bilhassa müteşekkirim.

Bu vesile ile ellerinizden öperim.



Ahmed Şükrü ESMER

Kopyası
27. III

H. a.

Kaydedildi

57

GELEK ARAŞTIRMALARI GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

16-4-885

Müftö

Sayın beyim.

İnkilâp dersleri, kitap ha-
linde çıkmış. Bize fiyatı-
nı bildirdiğimiz anda hemen
sipariş edeceğiz. Sizden bu
ricayı beklemekteyiz.

Selâm ve hürmetler.

Yahya KemalAdres:

Yahya Kemal

69

Orta mektep s: 3 no: 198

Muğlas

BOYABAT

HALKEVİ REİSLİĞİ

SAYI

30

Boyabat

30/3/935

C.H.F. Umumî kâtipliği yüksek makamına

A N K A R A

14/3/935 günlü ve 462 sayılı yüksek yazınız karşılığıdır:

Ankara Huku Fakültesiyle İstanbul Üniversitesi-
nde 934 - 935 ders yılında şimdiye kadar verdiğiniz sekiz
inkilâp konfransının basılmış notlarından iki danesinin
alındığını sonsuz saygılarımızla bildiririz.

Halkevi Başkanı

M. can

*Kaydedilerek
dosyasına*

Kaydedildi

Sinob
Vilâyet İdare Heyeti

27/3/935

sayı

119

C.H.F.kâtibiumumiliği Yüksek makamına

14/3/935 tarihli ve 462 sayılı yazının karşılığıdır.
Ankara Hukuk fakültesile İstanbul Üniversitesinde vermiş ol-
duğunuz kıymetli konferansın basılmış iki tanesini aldık.
Yeni yıl devam edecek derslere ait eserlerden mümkün olduğu
takdirde bir az fazla gönderilmesini memleket gençliği namına
diler saygılarımı sunarım.

Sinob:C.H.F.kurumu

Başkanı

Y. Kaly

Kaydedilerek
dosyasına
1. IV.

Kaydedildi

7

ADLİYE VEKİLİ
TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ

24/3/935

HUSUSİ

135

Cumhuriyet halk fırkası
genel kâtibi ve Kütahya
saygınlı bay Recep Peker'e

12/3/935 günlemeç ve 462 sayılı
yazı ile gönderilen konferans notlarını
aldım .

Teşekkürler eder bu vesile ile de
saygılarımı yenilerim .

Adliye vekili



Kaydedildi

**Gümrük ve İnhisarlar
Vekâleti**

Ankara 14 / 3 / 1935

Hususi Kalem Müdürlüğü

Sayı

U

H. 11/41

Sayın Bay Recep Peker

Kütahya Saylavı

C.H.F.Genel Kâtibi

Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinde ve İstanbul Üniversite-
sinde vermekte olduğunuz çok değerli konferansların basıl-
mış notlarını şükranla aldım. Hem kendim okuyacağım hem de
arkadaşlarım istifade edecektir.

Teşekkürlerimi ve saygılarımı sunarım.

Gümrük ve İnhisarlar Vekili

Rana Tarhan

Kaydedildi

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

T. B. M. M.

Azasna mahsus

Ankara

18-IV-935

Bay Recep Peker ;

İnkılap konferanslarınızın basılmış,
notlarını aldım, zevk ile okuma ettim.

Şükranlarımı, sonsuz saygularımı
sunarım, Hürmetlerimin kabulünü
dilerim.

Turgut Türkoğlu

Mamisa sayıları.

dosyasına

18.4.

kayıtlı

H. a.

32

Sayın Bay Receb Peker

C.H.F. Genel Kâtibi

Kütahya Saylavı

Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinde ve İstanbul Üniversitesinde Türk gençliğine verdiğiniz inkılâp derslerini içinde toplıyan iki fasikülü göndermek kayrasında bulunmanızdan dolayı içten ilgilerimi bildirir, hepimize ders olan bu değerli konfranslar gibi daha bir çok seçme eserlerinizi görmek umudiyle içten saygılarımı sunarım, Sayın Bay.

Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu
Genel Kâtibi
Burdur Saylavı

Y. C. Kılıç

dosyasına
21-4

Kaydedildi

49

T. C.

AŞVEKÂLET

Yazı İşleri Müdürlüğü

Sayı: 812

Sayın R. Peker

Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Genel Kâtibi

Kütahya Saylavı

Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinde ve İstanbul Üniversitesinde vermiş olduğunuz değerli konferansların basılı notlarından gönderilen beş tanesinin alındığını ve Yüce Başbakana sunulduğunu teşekkür ve derin saygılarımla bildiririm. 13.4.1935

Başbakanlık Müsteşarı

Kemal Gedeliş

R. P.

*Kayıtlara
dosyasına
14-4-*