

POPULISM, SOURCES OF RURAL DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE  
IN TURKEY IN THE 1970s

by  
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## ABSTRACT

An Abstract of the thesis of Aykut Tunç Kılıç for the degree of Master of Arts in the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History to be taken September 2004

Title: Populism, Sources of Rural Domination and Resistance in Turkey in the 1970s

This study attempts to delineate what “populism” means for rural subjects in 1970s’ Turkey, especially after the 1974 world recession that has created immense social and economic turbulences in the so-called Third World countries. Investigating sources of domination and several rural resistance practices of petty commodity producers in various parts of the country usually led by socialist movements and parties, I try to argue that the distinctive character of the relationship between populism and development has characterized the short history after the Second World War. Identifying developmentalism as the chief legitimating function of ruling regimes and the most important “reason of state”, which conceals social inequalities and contentions, my main contention is to depict how the discourses of development have played a central role in shaping the evolution of these rural resistance practices at the local level. One of the most important ways in which discourses of development have affected the everyday lives of people in rural Turkey is through populist policies and programs. In this study, rather identifying populism as an elite preference to mobilize subaltern classes, we tried to illustrate it as a mode of reproduction both for ruling bloc and subaltern classes with reference to market relations.

## ÖZET

Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Aykut Tunç Kılıç tarafından Eylül 2005'te teslim edilen tezin kısa özeti

**Başlık:** 1970'ler Türkiye'sinde Popülizm, Kırsal Tahakküm ve Direniş

Bu çalışmanın amacı 1970'ler Türkiye'sinde, özellikle 1974 dünya ekonomik krizinden sonra, uygulamaya konan populist kırsal politikaların toplumsal özneler için ne anlam ifade ettiğini anlamaya çalışmaktır. Kırsal politikaların yarattığı tahakküm biçimleri ve genel olarak sosyalist hareketler tarafından yönlendirilen küçük üretici direnişleri incelenerek kalkınmacılık ile populist politikalar arasındaki özgül ilişkinin niteliği ele alınmıştır. Kalkınma ideolojisinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra toplumsal eşitsizlikleri ve çelişkileri gizlediği ve iktidardaki rejimlerin en önemli meşruiyet kaynağı olduğu varsayımdan hareketle yerel düzeydeki direnişlerin ortaya çıkışında kalkınma söyleminin nasıl merkezi bir rol üstlendiği araştırılmıştır. Bu söylemin kırsal kesimde yaşayan insanların gündelik yaşamlarını en etkili olarak populist politikalar ve programlarla şekillendirdiği belirtilmiştir. Son olarak popülizm madun sınıfların elitler tarafından mobilize edildiği bir strateji olmaktan çok, iktidar bloğu ve madun sınıfların piyasa ilişkileri aracılığıyla kendilerini yeniden üretmelerinin bir biçimi olarak kavramsallaştırılmıştır.

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## PREFACE

This study attempts to delineate what “populism” means for rural subjects in 1970s’ Turkey, especially after the 1974 world recession that has created immense social and economic turbulences in the so-called Third World countries. Investigating several rural resistance practices of petty commodity producers in various parts of the country usually led by socialist movements and parties, I try to argue that the distinctive character of the relationship between populism and development has characterized the short history after the Second World War. Identifying developmentalism as the chief legitimating function of ruling regimes and the most important “reason of state”, which conceals social inequalities and contentions, my main contention is to depict how the discourses of development have played a central role in shaping the evolution of these rural resistance practices at the local level. One of the most important ways in which discourses of development have affected the everyday lives of people in rural Turkey is through populist policies and programs. In this study, rather identifying populism as an elite preference to mobilize subaltern classes, we tried to illustrate it as a mode of reproduction both for ruling bloc and subaltern classes with reference to market relations.

In this respect, the first chapter of this study intends to present a theoretical discussion of various approaches to populism. Aside from the problematic of modernization theory, which undertakes populist mobilization as a deviation in the standard path from traditional to modern society, or from the framework of dependency school, where populism has been associated with a particular strategy of capital accumulation –namely the import substitution industrialization, we tried to argue populism as a specific reconfiguration of class struggle, which is the constitutive

principle of different alliances and interests. Here, the emphasis on linking capitalist economic growth with political democracy as a natural couple becomes crucial to govern the discontent sectors of society. Especially, patterns of consumption and income distribution to subordinate classes are interpreted as necessary steps in capital accumulation process, even as a political precondition for it, and are necessitated strictly from a class position. In other words, populist policies and programs are employed as strategic moves that identify specific class interests to generate an ideological and political hegemony of the ruling bloc.

Following this theoretical point of view, in the second chapter we tried to identify sources of domination in the countryside generated by market mechanism, where increasing floor prices and annual purchasing quotas enhanced the overall consumption of peasant households. Employing Chayanovian framework, we claimed that the peasant household were forced to increase their productivity either by working harder and self exploiting them or by hiring they may rent more land, buy livestock and equipment and perhaps even hire few extra workers, simply to expand production. However, two important factors; small landownership and the restricted credit facilities rendered extra economic factors to operate more effectively, among which usury mechanism had drastic impacts on the daily lives of peasants. The prevalence of usury among petty commodity producers deepened producers' dependence on the market conditions, which roughly corresponds to a situation of primitive accumulation. In some places, such as Black Sea and Aegean, where valuable export crops are produced, this process has escalated due to high floor prices after 1973. For instance, in Ordu nearly 95 % of producers had remarkable amounts of debts to usurers. Producers deprived more



and more in order to consume more in order to raise their productivity, either buying new production inputs or by accumulating to open new field, to hire new workers.

The last part of this thesis will be devoted to the empirical investigation of various rural resistances starting from 1969. In the first section, land occupations and producer demonstrations were understood as effective moves of peasantry to uphold their demands for a probable land reform and to force governments to execute more effective welfare practices. In the second part, a specific case has been handled: The hegemony of a radical socialist movement, *Devrimci Yol*, over hazelnut producers in Ordu. We tried to comprehend the underlying motivations and interests of producers, whether they supported a socialist movement due to its ideological and political hegemony or its physical force over usurers and merchants, which regulate the market. The latter seems to be the case in Ordu, where a more stable actor has come to the stage on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1980; producers had preferred it.

Consequently, in this study populism has been evaluated as a market strategy employed by ruling bloc through various means, but also subverted by subaltern classes to adopt themselves to changing market conditions.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION: POPULISM AS A CONCEPT SOCIAL HISTORY

Populism is a regular entry in our political lexicon, however its conceptual stability and relation with everyday political practices is densely ambiguous. This is partly due to the contested status of populism as a political concept. One only needs to look at the cluster of meanings associated with the term. The account offered by the sociology of modernization prevailed throughout the sixties, at least in the developing world. A classical exponent of this approach is Germani, who sees populist mobilization as a deviation in the standard path from traditional to modern society.<sup>1</sup> Torcuato Di Tella proposes a modified yet equally functionalist interpretation.<sup>2</sup> For him, populism is the result of the convergence of two anti status quo forces, the dispossessed masses available for mobilization and the educated elite that resent its status incongruence –i.e. the gap between rising expectations and job satisfaction- and broods on ways of changing the current state of things. More generally, theoretical interpretations range from this functionalist view of populism as a road to modernize class-divided, traditional societies, to Lasch’s claim that populism is a traditional/conservative response to the crisis of modernity; from Ernesto Laclau’s neo-Gramscian approach to populism as a dimension of the popular-democratic imaginary whose class-nature varies in accordance with contending discursive constructions, to Paul Cammack’s revival of a Marxist standpoint that associates the phenomenon with resistance to neo-liberal capitalism,

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<sup>1</sup> For a summary and critique of Germani’s approach to populism see Ernesto Laclau, “Towards a Theory of Populism” in *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: NLB, 1977), pp. 147-58.

<sup>2</sup> Torcuato di Tella, “Populism and Reform in Latin America” in *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, edited by Claudio Véliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 47-74.

albeit with a functionalist twist whereby the close association of neo-populist policies with the capitalist reproduction and the changing role of state has been totally ignored.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover as Peter Worsley maintains, the term is wide enough to include right and left-wing variants, to appear in advanced and in developing countries, in towns and in the countryside, and amongst workers and the middle classes as well as peasants.<sup>4</sup> It includes political phenomena ranging from the Russian *narodnichestvo* of the nineteenth century to William Jennings Bryan and small farmer movements in the USA during the thirties and the classical Latin American populism of the forties and fifties. The latter, exemplified by Argentina under Peron and Brazil under Getulio Vargas, was characterized by “strong nationalism; the perception of the state as both a political gift and the prime mover of economic activity; economic programs based on subsidies and price controls, import substitution and the protection of local industry; a high-handed allocation of government resources to reward followers and punish opponents; the use of public spending to build networks of patronage disregarding criteria of fiscal or monetary responsibility; the enfranchisement of the urban underclass and their mobilization against the oligarchy; the creation of mass political parties; the growth of trade union militancy shadowed by governmental control of organized labor and its use as a reserve army for mass-demonstrations in support of the party or the leader; the cult of personality that exaggerates the importance of the leader and turns him or her into a

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<sup>3</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Paul Cammack, “The Resurgence of Populism in Latin America”, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19, no. 2 (2000), pp. 149-61.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Worsley, “The Concept of Populism” in *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 242-3.

quasi-messianic figure; and the role of leaders as political frauds that bypass formal mechanisms of representation whenever it suits them.”<sup>5</sup>

On the political side of the disagreement, those who have focused on the more discomfoting features like the messianic nature of its leaders or the submission of trade unions to the government see it as a negative phenomenon. Others find it hard to reject many of its avowed goals when taken at face value, as they read like a wish list for a socialist and radical-democratic agenda. Among them: the continual appeal to the people, the claim to empower the “common man”, the capacity to motivate largely excluded citizens to participate, the emphasis on welfare policies, or the professed aim of restoring some dignity to politics etc. This, together with the anti-liberal bias discussed below, helps to understand why parts of the Third World intelligentsia saw populism as a positive phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly socialist intellectuals who championed nationalist and anti-imperialist demands.

If we are to complicate matters further, the populist drive seems to be virtually indistinguishable from the “politics of faith” –as Michael Oakeshott names it- that has characterized a wide range of reform movements throughout modernity. For example, the will to renew politics, the vindication of “the people”, and the assumed closeness of with the party leader are present in political movements that are not usually branded populist.<sup>6</sup> One cannot fail to notice that the terms we have been using –populism, modern politics, democracy, and reform- do not cease to overdetermine or contaminate

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<sup>5</sup> Benjamin Arditi, “Populism, or Politics at the Edges of Democracy”, *Political Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 17-19.

<sup>6</sup> Michael Oakeshott, *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism*, edited by Timothy Fuller (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1996), p. 18.

one another, also the conceptual frontiers between them are rather unstable. This puts limit on any pretension to comprehend populism fully “as such” in comparison with modern politics.

This does not mean that the phenomenon is intractable. Worsley puts it quite aptly when he says that “since the word has been used, the existence of verbal smoke might well indicate a fire somewhere”<sup>7</sup>. Ever since the pathbreaking essay of Ernesto Laclau published in late seventies, there is a growing recognition that populism might be less of a stand-alone phenomenon than one that intertwines with actual politics. Following this direction, some political theorists evaluate the phenomenon as a response to the failures of elitist democracy<sup>8</sup>; whereas for Margaret Canovan populism emerges in the ever-present gap between the pragmatic and the redemptive faces of democracy<sup>9</sup>, drawing from Michael Oakeshott’s Arendtian claim that political modernity is characterized by the interplay of two distinct styles –the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. In a recent paper, Laclau has taken this idea further, suggesting that we should regard all politics as populist to some extent:

If populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space, a choice in the crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Worsley, p. 219.

<sup>8</sup> John Hayward, “The Populist Challenge to Elitist Democracy in Europe” in *Elitism, Populism, and European Politics*, edited by John Hayward (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 10-32.

<sup>9</sup> Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, *Political Studies* 175, no. 1 (1999), pp. 2-16.

<sup>10</sup> Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name?”, Unpublished paper, University of Essex, 2002. This article will be published as a chapter of *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, edited by Francisco Panizza (London: Verso, 2005).

Only on a discursive level there can be some truth to this view. However, one needs to say something more in order to avoid a simple and direct conceptual overlap between politics and populism as well as to account for radical and non-radical instances of the populist appeal. However, including post-Marxists such as Laclau and Mammack, populism has been solely perceived as a mobilizing strategy of ruling elites, where “people” has been portrayed as passive receivers. In this chapter, while illustrating the divergence between different populist appeals on a discursive and theoretical level, we will try to pursue different social consequences by heeding Francisco Panizza’s advice to distinguish between “populism in power” and “populism in streets” in terms of their positions vis-à-vis power structures.<sup>11</sup> In other words, the notion will be handled within the context of a particular historical form of social struggle that arises and also reproduces new social tensions. Here E.P. Thompson’s identification of class can be insightful. Thompson insists that “class is not a structure or a category; it is something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships”, and he adds that “these relationships are always embodied in real people in a real context.”<sup>12</sup> In its effort to restore meaning to the activity of the common people, *The Making of the English Working Class* regularly takes aim at the reifying tendencies of mainstream historical analysis. When history is presented as a series of interlocking events each of which is fully determined by the other, “we arrive at a *post facto* determinism”, Thompson writes. “The dimension of human agency is lost and the

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<sup>11</sup> Francisco Panizza, “Neo-populism and its Limits in Collor’s Brazil”, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19, no. 2 (2000), p. 190.

<sup>12</sup> E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 9.

context of class relations is forgotten.”<sup>13</sup> And, as so often, he gives us a beautifully illustrated example of how events are saturated with the social relations of class:

The raw fact –a bad harvest- may seem to be beyond human election. But the way that fact worked its way out was in terms of a particular complex of human relationships: law, ownership, power. When we encounter some sonorous phrase such as “the strong ebb and flow of the trade cycle” we must be put on our guard. For behind this trade cycle there is a structure of social relations, fostering some sorts of expropriation (rent, interest, and profit) and outlawing others (theft, feudal dues), legitimizing some types of conflict (competition, armed warfare) and inhibiting others (trade unionism, bread riots, popular political organization)<sup>14</sup>

It is the recognition that these issues –law, ownership and power- were always contested and never merely given that distinguishes *The Making* as a piece of Marxist historiography. Thompson refuses to fall for the myth of the working class as essentially passive, as simply reacting to external events which determined its fate. Even when discussing the role of religion –in this case Methodism- in absorbing class struggle, he is careful not to portray working people as mere playthings of religious leaders. “No ideology is wholly absorbed by its adherents: it breaks down in practice in a thousand ways under the criticism of impulse and experience: the working-class community injected into the chapels its own values of mutual aid, neighborliness and solidarity”, he notes.<sup>15</sup> These insights that can easily be generalized about the relationship between ideologies (class consciousness) and social formation offers important blueprints to clarify the vagueness of theories of populism, especially Laclau’s neo-Gramscian

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<sup>13</sup> E.P. Thompson, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup> E.P. Thompson, p. 205.

<sup>15</sup> E.P. Thompson, p. 392.

approach, which discusses the issue with reference to the formation social structures. In the next section, we will elaborate neo-Marxist theories of populism in details.

### Neo-Marxist Theories of Populism

Either the problematic of modernization theory (depicting populism as a Third World phenomenon, where a particular region is experiencing a transitional stage from traditional to modern society) or the framework of dependency school (populism has been associated with a particular strategy of capital accumulation, namely the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, where it is defined as a form of state characterized by an inter-class alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie, the working class and the middle class against the hegemonic position of the oligarchy within the power bloc) were insufficient to explain the complexities of populism. However, Ernesto Laclau's approach is the most theoretically rigorous work done in the field. What makes his theory more useful than other theories of populism is that he deals with populism as a political and ideological question and does not simply reduce it to socio-economic, anthropological or socio-psychological causes of which it is taken to be the superstructural political expression. To achieve this, Laclau spends efforts against repeating the class reductionism that weakens Marxist theory in general. As a consequence, Laclau provides possibly the most plausible and complex accounts of Fascism and Peronism as different political forms of populism. He tries to tackle the problem of class reductionism by arguing that "a class has no predetermined political or ideological content" and by introducing what he calls "a second objective contradiction of the concrete social formation to the fundamental class contradiction namely the



contradiction between the people and the power bloc”<sup>16</sup>. He specifies the category “the people” in terms of adopting “popular-democratic interpellations” borrowing the concept from Althusser. He stresses how individual subjects are addressed and placed in non-class modes in the ideological positions from which they work in and make sense of the world.<sup>17</sup> With this system of dual contradictions determining the social formation and an extended concept of hegemony derived largely from Gramsci, Laclau describes a situation where, “classes exist at the ideological and political levels in a process of articulation and not of reduction”<sup>18</sup> which enables him to account very plausibly for left, as well as right, populisms. Laclau argues that if individual ideological elements have no necessary class belongingness then, for example, “the people” do not exist in “the real” –an economic real- as antagonistic to a dominant ideology. That is they do not exist as already and essentially tied to the interests of dominated classes because, having no necessary class belongingness, this category may equally be articulated by the dominant ideology. Class is specified not by any particular content, but as an activating principle.<sup>19</sup>

Within this framework Laclau establishes the categories of popular-democratic positionalities or interpellations. Thus a democratic positionality is constructed when the division between the dominant and dominated is discursively organized as a set of differences and not as an antagonism. This ensures that the dominated classes are

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<sup>16</sup> Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, *ibid*, p. 105.

<sup>17</sup> Ernesto Laclau, *ibid*, p. 107.

<sup>18</sup> Ernesto Laclau, *ibid*, p. 161.

<sup>19</sup> Ernesto Laclau, p. 162-6.

integrated into the power bloc and their own interests and resistances neutralized. A popular positionality is constructed when a discourse divides society between the people and the power bloc and this operates as a fundamental antagonism, as a dynamic point of confrontation that structures the society. This is historically linked to one of two ways throughout which a class can become hegemonic in Gramsci's sense: "transformism". The latter, "expansive hegemony" refers to the articulation of popular ideologies and ideological elements so as to fully develop the antagonisms they express. One of the most plausible definitions of popular ideologies is defined by Stuart Hall. "The practical ideologies, which make the conditions of life intelligible to the masses, and which exercise a practical and material force by organizing their actions"<sup>20</sup>

However, we will try to illustrate two important problems associated with Laclau's definition of "class hegemony". One example will clear this problem in a very appropriate fashion. Laclau identifies Hitler, Mao and Peron all as headed populist regimes "not because the social bases of their movements were similar; not because their ideologies expressed the same class interests but because popular interpellations appear in the ideological discourses of all of them, presented in the form of antagonism and not just of difference."<sup>21</sup> Here, it is somewhat difficult to identify how the popular positionality or ideology ever exists in its own right. However it seems that the main purpose of this self-referential argument is to cover both populisms –the dominant and the dominated classes. This problem stems due to the identification of class as a category

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<sup>20</sup> Stuart Hall, "Popular-Democratic vs. Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of 'Taking Democracy Seriously'" in *Marxism and Democracy*, edited by Alan Hunt (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p. 173.

<sup>21</sup> Ernesto Laclau, p. 174.

that is not specified by any particular content. Here, a correspondence theory of truth in terms of class interests is not advocated, however he fails to notice that the importance he attributes to the “specificity of the political” also determines the interests. Ellen Meiksins Wood, while criticizing late Laclau’s “radical democracy”<sup>22</sup> exclaims that “not only is there no absolute determination, there are no determinate *conditions, possibilities, relations, limits, pressures*”<sup>23</sup> Here, Wood also neglects that it is the work of politics to “constitute” interests, but it is obvious that the *preexistent* social positions will directly influence and determine the course of social struggles that are fought for these interests.<sup>24</sup> While depicting “socialism as the highest form of populism”, Laclau is prescriptive:

Classes cannot assert their hegemony without articulating the people in their discourse; and the specific form of this articulation in the case of a class which seeks to confront the power bloc as a whole, in order to assert its hegemony, will be populism<sup>25</sup>

In this sense, “socialist populism” is not the most backward form of working class ideology but the most advanced –the moment when the working class has succeeded in condensing the ensemble of democratic ideology in a determinate social formation within its own ideology. At this point, his differentiation of populist socialism (where he locates a fully potentialized democracy) from authoritarian populism

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<sup>22</sup> Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985).

<sup>23</sup> Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Retreat from Class: A New “True” Socialism* (London: Verso, 1986), p. 85. Emphasis belongs to the author.

<sup>24</sup> For more on this debate see Norman Geras, “Post-Marxism?”, *New Left Review* 163 (1987), pp. 40-83; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies”, *New Left Review* 166 (1987), pp. 79-106.

<sup>25</sup> Ernesto Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*, p. 196-97.

ultimately rests on taking his class framework as an objective determination of the social formation and therefore ultimately directive of political forms, where he totally ignores the specificity of the political and how different interests are constituted. Consequently, as an objective determination –a residue of Althusserian scientism- class contradiction makes a problematic starting point for political analysis and Laclau’s theory of populism decontextualizes particular historical class configurations.

Relatedly, another significant problem emerges with Laclau’s definition of populism while comprehending Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, closely related with the above mentioned debate about the particular contents of class formation. Laclau’s interest is therefore in populism as the breaking up of prevailing class hegemony and the assertion of a different hegemony, where hegemony consists of articulating “different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized”<sup>26</sup> However, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony extends the Leninist sense of the term as a simple class alliance (the proletariat leading the peasantry) by introducing the concept of a moral and intellectual leadership as necessary to the formation of any hegemony or counter-hegemony. At the same time he displaces the reductionist view of hegemony as the domination of one world-view over others and which thus can only be challenged by its total destruction. Rather, Laclau understands these world views as neutral and detaches them from their material bases. Similarly, Chantal Mouffe argues that for Gramsci, “hegemony involves the creation of a higher synthesis, so that all its elements fuse in a ‘collective will’, which will function as the protagonist of political action during that hegemony’s entire duration. It is through ideology that this collective will is

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<sup>26</sup> Ernesto Laclau, p. 161.

formed since its very existence depends on the creation of ideological unity which will serve as ‘cement’ welding together a historic bloc. Then, the formation of the collective will and the exercise of political leadership depends on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadership.”<sup>27</sup> Here, Chantal Mouffe identifies “collective will” as the cement welding together a historic bloc. This collective will is nothing other than the hegemonic position of an ideology that is perceived as a neutral world-view, detached from its material base. However, as Geoff Eley reminds us, one of the most comprehensive description of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony we have encountered, that “hegemony is to be conceived as a conjuncturally specific set of fluctuating class *relations*, permeating all levels of social and economic life, capable of decay and of sustaining damage, and requiring a constant ideological and political labor for its renewal and reproduction.”<sup>28</sup> In order to avoid essentialist assumptions about Gramscian analysis, either anti-reductionist or culturalist, he makes an all-encompassing definition of the notion:

Hegemony constitutes, in our reading of Gramsci, a *process* of class relations in which concrete and determinate struggles for cultural, economic and political power or jurisdiction represent the decisive terrain of specific historical analysis. It is a notion, therefore, which convenes a number of areas of concentration... for example, the state and civil society as *organizing* instances of social life; the political constitution of class relations; and the historical and conjunctural specificity of the content of politics itself.<sup>29</sup>

Consequently, we should stress that Laclau’s theory of populism is more useful and less reductive than other attempts. Rather than a general theory of populism, his

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<sup>27</sup> Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci” in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, edited by C. Mouffe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p.184.

<sup>28</sup> Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, “Why Does Social History Ignore Politics?”, *Social History* 5, no. 2, (1980), p. 269. Emphases belong to authors.

<sup>29</sup> Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, *ibid.*

account deals with the way populist calculations arise and are carried out in political strategies. But his identification of class as a category that is not specified by any particular also leads to two important methodological drawbacks. Initially, Laclau's trajectory cannot sufficiently overcome Gramsci's essential distinction between state and civil society that should be perceived as organizing instances of social life in Geoff Eley's words.<sup>30</sup> Secondly, "the people" as an abstract category –an "empty signifier" in Laclau's words- has not been historically specified and constructed. These impediments stems from the ignorance of understanding class struggle as a founding principle of both classes and interests. In the next section, the relationship between populism and Marxism will be undertaken by focusing on the political constitution of class relations.

### Marxism and Populism: A Question of Category

In the previous section, we have identified the existence of a popular positionality or ideology in its own right as the most important weakness of Laclau's chain of articulation, while construing populism. Adopting this logic, many political theorists advice not only to evaluate the moments of crisis, they maintain that the only reference to "crisis" narrows down the scope of the populist experience to moments when mainstream politics fails to address participatory or other demands. One could plausibly argue that the emphasis on the exceptional moments does not allow us to differentiate populist politics in opposition from populism in government since populist style as a mode of persuasion remain in place all the same. The most important example

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<sup>30</sup> Many recent studies have demystified the conception of a West as characterized by a strong civil society and a weak state, a society in which state power is based primarily on popular consent. Frank Trentmann, "Introduction: Paradoxes of Civil Society" in *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British History*, edited by Frank Trentmann (New York, Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. 3-47.

is Michael Kazin's study of populism in the USA, which refers to it as a style of political rhetoric or as a mode of persuasion whereby "everyday expressions, tropes, themes and images are employed to convince large number of Americans to join their side or to endorse their views on particular issues."<sup>31</sup> In the USA, as in elsewhere, Kazin says that this language has undergone many transformations. The nineteenth century heritage of *Americanism* and its virtues –the producer ethic constituting "the people", and an elite that opposes and exploits them- drifts into a more conservative territory in the late twentieth century with the appearance of the moral majority, the criticism of the "Big Government", the scorn for the cultural elite, and so on.<sup>32</sup> However, while investigating populism as a mode of persuasion, we should not neglect inspecting why people are persuaded to comprehend the relation between crisis and the state of their persuasion to be able to stress their role as social actors precisely. Only such, we can overcome the problem of measuring the intensity of different appeals by using mode of persuasion as appropriate lenses.

In this section, we will try to investigate the specificity of the political and how politics constitutes interests without avoiding the structured totality within which these interests operate to evade a kind of reductionism usually associated with theories of populism. Bonapartism is an excellent example, where populism is understood as situation where a single charismatic leader claims to rise above class divisions. Here, the existence of any intimate connection between governing elite and a definite phase of capitalist accumulation and, therefore a definite stage of class contradiction has been

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<sup>31</sup> Michael Kazin, *Populist Persuasion: An American History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> Michael Kazin, pp. 12-7.

denied. However, these material conditioning factors do not have “something to do” with populism, but that they are precisely what gives it its main characteristics. An imprecise reference to a certain connection between the dissolution of populist coalition and the crisis of ISI model can be considered as a similar example.<sup>33</sup> Sharing same Orientalist / Eurocentric presumptions of modernization theory presented in terms of dichotomies such as strong state vs. weak civil society, traditional vs. modern, progress vs. underdevelopment; dependency school also associates the rise and fall of populism with a particular elite formation. The corruption of progressive national bourgeoisie or the increasing power of comprador factions of bourgeoisie led to the authoritarian tendencies within ruling bloc, where in this narrative class struggle is most likely linked to the political crises of elite factions experienced in terms of authoritarian efforts at cooptation of the lower classes and regime institutionalization, where social reform and political incorporation generally have not been the result of grassroots pressures.<sup>34</sup> When such incorporation threatens to go too far and / or the development model is perceived as entering into a crisis, the weak dominant classes are dependent on the state to succeed excluding lower classes and lay the foundations for a new model of capitalist

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<sup>33</sup> This approach is usually evaluated within the conceptual framework of the dependency school, which claims that the crisis of ISI has paved the way for political regimes from oligarchic populism to bureaucratic authoritarianism. Most important examples are Guillermo A. Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1973). For refined interpretations of this approach see *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, edited by David Collier (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

<sup>34</sup> For a classical account that excludes class struggle and evaluates the existing social turmoil in Turkey throughout 1970s as an inherent crisis of the ISI model see Çağlar Keyder, “İthal İkameci Sanayileşme Stratejisi ve Çelişkileri” in *Kriz, Gelir Dağılımı ve Türkiye'nin Alternatif Sorunu*, edited by Korkut Boratav, Çağlar Keyder and Şevket Pamuk (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1987), pp. 13-36.



development.<sup>35</sup> These arguments have tended to give Turkish politics a notoriously elitist character that has been reflected in the focus of the great majority of the scholarly works on the subject. In his brilliant critique, Nadir Özbek illustrates how the self-reflexivity and omnipotence attributed to the role of elites in modernist epistemology restricts the unfolding of history to the ideological contentions of power holders – nationalism or liberalism in Ottoman / Turkish history- and the role of masses as historical agents has been eradicated.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, in this study we will attempt to focus on the role and political activities of social actors while investigating rural resistance practices in 1970s Turkey by examining “set of fluctuating class relations” in Eley’s words.

Our analysis interprets populism initially as a disempowerment and governance strategy of subordinate classes by historically specific factions of power bloc, which assign an essential importance to increase consumption and income distribution by means of which capital accumulation process has been maintained. Secondly, it corresponds to a very specific form of socio-political response to the global reproduction of capitalist social relations mostly emerged as a variety of anti-imperialism which at the same time insistently defends a national capitalism. If we are to begin with the former, although we will offer a detailed account in the next chapter, populist strategy’s politico-ideological characteristic is very crucial to govern the discontent sectors of society.

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<sup>35</sup> The most prominent example of this approach is Çağlar Keyder’s refined interpretation of 1970s Turkey, where a bourgeois ideology could not rise due to the unexpected political rivalry and competition that goes hand in hand with the crisis of national developmentalist model, which we will discuss in details at the end of this chapter. Çağlar Keyder, “Burjuva İdeolojisi Neden Yükselmedi?” in *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), pp. 267-291.

<sup>36</sup> Nadir Özbek, “Alternatif Tarih Tahayyülleri: Siyaset, İdeoloji ve Osmanlı-Türkiye Tarihi”, *Toplum ve Bilim* 98 (2003), p. 249.

Namely the widespread legitimacy of appeals such as development, welfare and economic growth has become crucial for ruling bloc, where the aspects of consumption and distribution are situated in an unusual way. Here, the distribution of income to subordinate social classes, when it actually takes place, is a political precondition for the capital accumulation process and necessitated strictly from a class position –that is, not only to the extent that increasing popular consumption and income distribution can help to reduce social tensions and bolster the security factor for capital accumulation. Increasing popular consumption and income distribution are not acts of “social justice” – although the bourgeoisie may experience as such. Nor are they mere political instruments that may be resorted to in order to reduce the level of social conflict – although they may be used to that end. Finally, they are not simply displays of populist demagoguery. By the way, denying the existence of such things as “distributivist” demagoguery, anticipatory reformist maneuvers or good intentions of noble souls prevents us to comprehend their residual impact on the mobilization of broad popular support.

Harry Harootunian, in his recent account on modern imperialism states that “the disparity between the signature of modernity, namely a developmental program bringing about capitalist consumption and the local circumstance this was designed to transform could never actually be closed or even directly acknowledged.”<sup>37</sup> Convincingly, he declares that the postwar liberal Anglo-Saxon social science and its beloved paradigm – modernization theory- displaced the “uneven” and conflicting temporalities produced by

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<sup>37</sup> Harry Harootunian, *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), p. 4.

the capitalist mode of production and commodification by something called modernity.<sup>38</sup> While assessing populism as a very specific form of socio-political response, we will put this “temporal unevenness” at the center of our analysis. We will strive to understand populism as a response to various social and political inequalities maintained by such unevenness. Indeed, the blueprints of such an historical-materialist approach can be found in Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*<sup>39</sup>. In order to understand the nature of a political regime that claims to rise above “the people”, he emphasized three key aspects: Firstly, the contingency associated to modern politics and its relative autonomy from class relations that we repeated above many times; secondly the centrality of conflicting historical temporalities and the accompanying sense of socio-economic response; and thirdly, the role of “residual”, pre-capitalist classes such as peasants, farmers, aristocrats, lumpenproletariats or petty bourgeois in the unfolding of modern history. These insights should also be envisaged as the most plausible ripostes both to facile mainstream critiques such as modernization theory and to their vulgar Marxist counterparts that caricature historical materialism. Besides dogmatic, “stagist” views of historical evolution such as Second International Marxism or the famous 1859 “Preface” to the *Critique of Political Economy*, there is a strong legacy of both theoretical and concrete Marxist analysis which highlights the uneven and contradictory patterns of unfolding of history, especially when transferred onto a world scale. Marx’s

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<sup>38</sup> For the production of uneven temporalities see Harry D. Harootunian, “The Benjamin Effect: Modernism, Repetition, and the Path to Different Cultural Imaginaries” in *Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History*, edited by Michael P. Steinberg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 62-87.

<sup>39</sup> Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publications, 1963). Harootunian also claims that Marx, in *Eighteenth Brumaire* “tried to imagine history as always incomplete precisely because the present would seek to reveal the past that had gone on before, like an original text, in a different register.”, p. 75.

famous correspondence with Vera Zasulich<sup>40</sup>, where he claims that Russia can bypass the capitalist stage on the road to socialism served as a reference point for a whole range of Marxist engagements with the “simultaneity of the unsimultaneous” –most important example is Trotsky’s theory of combined and uneven development, which on a broader level examines the socio-political responses to the concrete articulation of global capitalism in different social formations.<sup>41</sup>

It is therefore, perfectly possible to reconcile a dialectical, dynamic understanding of historical change which recognizes structural turning points with the recognition that history often unfolds “against the grain”, with the recognition of synchronic constraints on these structural changes.<sup>42</sup> Understanding historical change as such can also be applied to the objections concerning Marxist categories such as “class”, “value” or “labor” in the analysis of social formations. By insisting that an ideal-typical, homogenous proletariat cannot readily be identified empirically in many parts of the

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<sup>40</sup> Teodor Shanin, “Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen” in *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and “The Peripheries of Capitalism”*, edited by Teodor Shanin (New York: Monthly Review, 1983). Shanin illustrates the situation by quoting Marx’s own sentences as such: “Specifically, Marx came to see the decline of the peasant commune in Western Europe and its crisis, in Russia, not as a law of social sciences –spontaneous economic process- but as the result of an assault on the people, which could and should be fought. The consideration of the Russian commune in the drafts of the Marx-Vera Zasulich correspondence brought all this to the surface. It will be best to present the essence of the message in Marx’s own words. To begin with, ‘what threatens the life of the Russian commune is neither historical inevitability nor a theory but oppression by the State and exploitation by capitalist intruders whom the State made powerful at the peasant’s expense’ The type of society in question was singled out by its international context, ‘modern historical environment: it is contemporaneous with a higher culture and it is linked to a world market in which capitalist production is predominant’ while the country ‘is not, like the East Indies, in the prey of a conquering foreign power.’ The class-coalition of peasant destroyers –the power block in societies with rural predominance was defined as ‘the state... the trade... the landowners and... *from within* [the peasant commune] the *usery* [italics added], in that order state, merchant capitalists, squires and kulaks.’ The whole social system was referred to as ‘a specific type of capitalism fostered by the state at the peasants’ expense.’” (pp. 19-20).

<sup>41</sup> For an excellent account of Trotsky’s understanding see Michael Löwy, *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981).

<sup>42</sup> Alejandro Colas, “The Reinvention of Populism: Islamist Responses to Capitalist Development in the Contemporary Maghreb”, *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 4 (December 2004), p. 242.

world; such critics miss the crucial distinction between the structural logic of capital and its accompanying abstractions, with their concrete expression in actual societies. Once we respect the distinction between abstractions such as class, value or free labor, which are all structural properties of the capitalist mode of production, from their concrete manifestations such as specific social movements, forms of property or modes of exploitation within particular social formations, it is entirely feasible to accommodate for an elusive socio-political phenomenon such as populism.<sup>43</sup> We can figure out how the abstract logic of capitalist mode of production unfolds in concrete social formations through contingent political antagonisms, contradictory historical temporalities and the persistence of pre-capitalist classes. For instance, similar to debates on the process of proletarianization that is identified as an inescapable, structural property of capitalist development but nonetheless manifests itself in diverse concrete forms such as underemployment, petty commodity production, the “informal” economy etc. These latter phenomena cannot be reduced to some ideal-typical proletarianization which everywhere and always creates an industrial, salaried “free” worker; but neither can such realities be explained without reference to the dynamics of capitalist reproduction. Something similar happens with populism –although it cannot be read off as mechanically corresponding to the political representation of a particular class, it cannot equally be read without reference to specific class antagonisms generated through capitalist development. Here, populism appears not to be of capitalism, but it certainly is in capitalism, and as such must be explained with reference to forms of crisis, socio-

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<sup>43</sup> Alejandro Colas, pp. 245-246.

political mobilization and socio-economic cleavages which are unique to this mode of social reproduction.<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, to grasp the nature socio-political phenomenon that fall under the rubric of “populism”, we should modestly add a fourth dimension to Marx’s analyses, that is developmentalism as the chief legitimating function of ruling regimes that conceals social inequalities and contentions; it also acted as the most important “reason of state” in the so-called Third World countries during the postwar era. In the next section, we will explore the distinctive character of relationship between development and populism that is mediated by the imperative on democratization and prosperity.

### Developmentalism and Populism

To outline the exclusivity of the relationship between developmentalism and populism appropriately, we need to give a brief account about how they are mediated. Harootunian vividly summarizes this situation in one sentence:

It might be recalled that the explicit goal of developmentalism sought to yoke capitalist economic growth with political democracy; linking the two as a natural coupling and thus defining the vocation of development itself which aimed to concretize an elaborate theory of modernization and convergence.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Alejandro Colas, p. 249.

<sup>45</sup> Harry Harootunian, *The Empire’s New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained*, p. 8.

In its evolutionary assumptions that found its apex in W.W. Rostow's "stage" theory<sup>46</sup>, developmentalism essentialized cultural and historical differences, whereas at the same time its stagist view of historical change concealed social inequalities and contentions. Concurrent with the arguments, which criticize developmentalism as an imperialist discourse that aims to recolonize the Third World<sup>47</sup>, we argue that the global and national discourses of development have played a central role in shaping the everyday political practices. One of the most important ways in which discourses of development have affected the everyday lives of people is through populist politics, policies, and programs. Populism not only has been the medium in which the discourses and practices of development are conveyed to people but has also proved one of the critical axes along which oppositional groups and political movements have organized support for their political actions. The failure of development forms the rallying cry for oppositional groups to flourish. Then, we should investigate how developmentalism conceals social inequalities under the guise of particular discourses such as prosperity, welfare, democracy etc.

Post-developmental literature unexceptionally employs Foucauldian notion of governmentality<sup>48</sup> to illustrate that developmentalism enters a series of relationships

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<sup>46</sup> W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: University Press, 1960).

<sup>47</sup> Most important studies from post-developmental literature are as follows: Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); James Ferguson, *The Anti-politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Wolfgang Sachs (ed), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London, N.J.: Zed Books, 1996).

<sup>48</sup> Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87-104.

instituting a new form of government rationality and invents novel institutional modes for the regulation of population. Nonetheless, this existing literature on post-developmentalism fails to explain how development has become a desirable goal for masses. The most important drawback is employment of Foucauldian power / knowledge nexus in a very reductionist fashion. Foucault explains his concept of governmentality with the rise of industrial capitalism that gives birth to a newly emerging governance technique that involves a new mechanism of power which does not rest on a notion of right, as does the theory of sovereignty in which power works as a pure limit set on freedom within the terms of the relationship sovereign-subject. This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they achieve and its products. It is a mechanism of power which permits time and labor, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies. It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a system of obligations distributed over time. It presupposes a tight network of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. It is ultimately dependent upon the principle, which introduces a genuinely new economy of power, that one must be able simultaneously both to increase the subjected forces and to improve the force and efficacy of that which subjects them.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, Foucault argues this subjection as two-fold process: initially subjected to someone else by a relationship of

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<sup>49</sup> Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" in *Power/Knowledge*, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 104.



control and dependence, and tied to one's own identity through self-knowledge.<sup>50</sup> This dual process of subjection also illustrates the impasse of Foucauldian paradigm of governmentality and the post-developmental literature that employs it without giving attention to historical agents and social struggles.<sup>51</sup> What these discursive-theoretical accounts of development tend to highlight embodies a duality. Primarily, development discourse, always (re)productive of power relations, miscasts its targets and does not lead to an improvement of the lives of those who are supposed to be beneficiaries of these interventions; secondly, this discourse tends to further the interests of the interveners –the state, development agencies, international financial institutions and becomes an exploitative project. Leander Schneider, while criticizing James Ferguson's influential study *Anti-Politics Machine* rightly states that Ferguson's study oscillates between structural determinism and functionalism. She states that initially, structure is not always functional as they strictly put, mostly "dysfunctional", secondly a functionalist reading of discourse runs the danger of ultimately being driven back into a reductionist position: discourse then essentially becomes a mere polish on "underlying factors" (interests).<sup>52</sup> Here, what seems crucial is to detect how social agents operate within this discourse / structure pair. There is an uneasy switch between structural determinism and functional role, the issue of structure and agency has not successfully

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<sup>50</sup> Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" Afterword to *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 212.

<sup>51</sup> For an extensive critique of post-developmentalism see Arun Agrawal, "Poststructuralist Approaches to Development: Some Critical Reflections", *Peace & Change* 21, no. 4 (1996), pp. 464-77; Leander Schneider, "Developmentalism and Its Failings: Why Rural Development Went Wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania", Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2003, especially pp. 109-19.

<sup>52</sup> Leander Schneider, *ibid*, 110-114.

been negotiated. Development discourse, at an extreme level of abstraction, has completely been removed from empirical level at which concrete historical agents can be observed, which negotiates and reshapes existing structures. This is the most important problem of governmentality literature, where O'Malley *et al.* states that “while it is inescapable that we engage in a degree of hypostatization, idealization, and reification of rationalities and programs in order even to talk of them, the cumulative effect of the problematic features of governmentality work arguably create an insular and *episodic* vision of rule.”<sup>53</sup> In particular, a “tendency to separate out programs from the processes of their ‘messy’ implementation” is to be held responsible for the “silencing of the constitutive role of contestation”<sup>54</sup>. Often the subjects of development are also its “creative manipulators” and this cannot be captured when the discourse of development is observed at the level of generality as is frequently the case.

This is what we meant by populism as a means for oppositional groups to organize social support for their political actions. To put it in details, “creative manipulators” were not passive and unwilling subjects but they were actively resisting, accepting or modifying social agents. Therefore, rural resistance practices mentioned in this study articulated their social demands by contesting a particular hegemonic configuration of “development”, and in the process, asserted their own populist strategies to receive a larger share of social benefits than had historically been the case for rural parts.

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<sup>53</sup> Pat O'Malley, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing, “Governmentality, Criticism, Politics”, *Economy and Society* 26, no. 4 (1997), p. 512.

<sup>54</sup> O' Malley *et al.*, p. 514.

Recognizing these difference not only will provide us clues about to what extent an hegemonic notion of “development” was destabilized; this account will also permit whether these social struggles succeeded to manage their own independent ideological and moral hegemony. While discussing the latter, we should pay attention to the disparities between these populist appeals. These differences were not just formal and discursive; the main aim is to depict how different interests were articulated within the same bundle of demands. Then the reception of populist policies; trying to find out how they affected the everyday lives of people becomes crucial. Illustrating “populist everydayness”<sup>55</sup>, borrowing the phrase from Harootunian’s portrayal of post-Mao China, prolifically for 1970s’ rural subjects in Turkey, necessitates scrutinizing developmentalism both as an ideology that interpellates a subject-position and also as a reconfiguration of social contestations. “Allochronism” may help us to substantiate this subject position. By “allochronism”, Johannes Fabian means the denial to the “Other” of a contemporaneity with the West, which means that the Other may then be seen as primitive, underdeveloped, and uncivilized and therefore in need of intervention by the West in order to make it modern, developed, and civilized.<sup>56</sup> This notion also labels the familiar process whereby regions in the Third World are thought to occupy the past, thereby denying that the poverty and underdevelopment of the many might directly be related to the current structures of inequality that result in growing wealth for the few.

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<sup>55</sup> Harry Harootunian, “In the Tiger’s Lair: Socialist Everydayness Enters Post-Mao China (Review essay on *Streetlife China* by Michael Dutton)”, *Postcolonial Studies* 3, no. 3 (2000).

<sup>56</sup> “Anachronism signifies a fact, or statement of fact, that is of our tune with a given time frame; it is a mistake, perhaps an accident. I am trying to show that we are facing, not mistakes, but devices (existential, rhetorical, political). To signal that difference I will refer to the denial of coevalness as the ‘allochronism’ of anthropology” Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 32.

Within the context of Turkish history, the strict emphasis on underdevelopment and belated modernity as a guiding principle, especially its leftist appropriation that matured under the guise of anti-imperialism, contributed to the integration of subaltern classes into capitalist social relations. In Harootunian's words, "during its long history, Marxian modes of analysis have been plagued by a fundamental ambivalence over (and perhaps a contest between) the claims pressed by a theory of modernization that has had difficulty in differentiating between two, often contradictory desires: those centered on the achievement of socialism and those propelled by the desire of 'catching up' with capitalism."<sup>57</sup> In the next section, we will try to offer a substantial reading of existing literature on populism, welfare state and developmentalism about recent Turkish history by making references to the statements pointed out here.

#### Populism Debates in Turkey: A Question of Capitalist Development

In a recent interview, Korkut Boratav while assessing the political tendency of Republican People's Party after 2001 economic crisis, he identifies RPP as a political party that the Turkish bourgeoisie holds in its reserve and points out to the political apathy in upholding a social opposition that supports the discontent and poor sectors of society.<sup>58</sup> Then, Boratav makes the classical statement about social democracy in Turkey, which is quite widespread among the left wing circles of academy:

In Turkey, social democracy has never existed in its true meaning. Since, there never occurred a [social democratic] movement that is integrated with a syndicalist movement, which has its historical roots in a Marxian working

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<sup>57</sup> Harry Harootunian, *The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost and Regained*, p. 19.

<sup>58</sup> Korkut Boratav, "Dünyanın Yeni Dinamikleri", *Birgün*, 10 January 2005.

class”<sup>59</sup> Moreover, Boratav while sharing this standard view on social democracy also points out to an exceptional period throughout the history of RPP in short: “This [failed] movement,” he states “has flourished sometime with the populist wave that Ecevit maintained under the banner of “left of center”.<sup>60</sup>

This exceptional period started with the rise of Bülent Ecevit to RPP’s leadership after the 5<sup>th</sup> extraordinary congress of the party that held in 5<sup>th</sup> May 1972. Political disputes and disagreements after 12<sup>th</sup> March 1971 military intervention led to the most important split within RPP, where İsmet İnönü –the historical leader of the party- was forced to resign and “populist” Ecevit became the new leader. This period until 12<sup>th</sup> September 1980 coup has generally been identified as the “golden age” of social democracy in Turkey. Starting from 1969, party’s growing concern for lower classes became very visible not only in terms of its program, but also the responses that members of RPP has given to incidents such as land occupations, strikes etc. were reflecting this situation. However, in recent Turkish historiography, this situation was comprehended by a series of dichotomies that we will shortly identify and try to criticize the underlying perspective that gave rise to these dichotomies. Initially, we must stress that the political tenets proposed in *Ortanın Solu* and *Ak Günlere* – program for 1973 elections- represent an ordinary example of a coherent social-democrat / liberal program that resembles the Keynesian welfare states of the postwar world order. Ecevit mainly underlines five important points of in these documents: First of all, it opposes an unfettered development of capitalist production relations, where the restrictive socio-

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<sup>59</sup> Korkut Boratav, *ibid.* “Türkiye’de sosyal demokrasi gerçek anlamıyla hiçbir zaman var olmadı. Çünkü bir işçi sınıfı hareketinden gelen, tarihsel dayanakları olan, Marks’tan esinlenmiş bir sendikal hareketle şu veya bu ölçüde bütünleşmiş bir hareket olamadı.”

<sup>60</sup> Korkut Boratav, *ibid.* “O hareket bir ara Ecevit’in ‘Ortanın Solu’ sloganı altında sürdürdüğü bir popülist dalgayla gelişti.”

economic approach resembles Western social democracy. Secondly, it is also against the existence of social classes, where the main endeavor was stated as the conciliation between different classes, solidarist tendency of Kemalism. Thirdly, it proposes to employ state apparatuses with its restrictive and coordinative functions. Fourthly, although this situation can lead to various collisions with official ideology, while fulfilling these duties statist / centrist tendencies were not favored. Lastly, besides encouragement of public property, it stands for broad sector of people's right to acquire private property. Furthermore in the long run, the major intention is to stimulate a passion for collective public property.<sup>61</sup>

We can start with Feroz Ahmad's statement concerning the rise of RPP and Ecevit, where he evaluates the victory of Ecevit in terms of a great plea for a strong government, which would lay the foundations of a social welfare state.<sup>62</sup> Çağlar Keyder has considered the second split in RPP occurred in 1972 as a transition from "bureaucratic reformism" to "populist reformism" where RPP's growing concern for lower classes was deepened in accordance with a new accumulation model.<sup>63</sup> In a similar vein, Atilla Eralp seems quite surprised while denoting that Ecevit's populist program could not contain labouring classes' demands but instead spurred them.<sup>64</sup> All of these three analyses pose to an intense degree of social mobilization before 1973

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<sup>61</sup> Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1968), pp. 27-28.

<sup>62</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 327.

<sup>63</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, pp. 195-202.

<sup>64</sup> Atilla Eralp, "Turkey in the Changing Post-War World Order: Strategies of Development and Westernization" in *Beyond Developmentalism*, edited by Çağlar Keyder, Ayşe Öncü and Saad Eddin İbrahim (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994), p. 121.

elections. However, they could not identify this situation by giving reference to an opposition between military backed reformism of RPP and the conservative political tradition of DP / JP line, which strives to preserve status quo. Feroz Ahmad asserts that the military was against the rightist conservatives in terms of their hostility to proposals such as land reform, planned economic development and the transfer of wealth from agriculture to industry that were indispensable for industrialization and development.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, according to Ahmad, this dichotomy between reform and status quo has become the essential constituent of political field in Turkey since 1960 *coup*.<sup>66</sup> Çağlar Keyder has backdated Feroz Ahmad's trajectory for 1960s and 1970s to DP period. Keyder claims that DP cadres succeeded to combine their nativist and nationalist conservatism with a dream of "Americanization", which generated anti-Westernist – namely anti-European- attitudes that is bound up with a cultural conservatism mediated by market relations and this situation was always comprehended by RPP as a tension between modernization and tradition.<sup>67</sup> Keyder deepens his analysis by introducing similar insights in terms of class relations while interpreting 1960 military intervention as a "bureaucratic restorationism" that carries anti-populist and statist leitmotifs, where it has been understood as a watershed for a new era of state-led industrialization against an unfettered "market society". Accordingly, he concludes that the confrontation

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<sup>65</sup> Feroz Ahmad, pp. 208-212.

<sup>66</sup> Feroz Ahmad, pp. 259-264.

<sup>67</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Modernizm ve Kimlik Sorunu" in *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996), pp. 112-120.

between industrial bourgeoisie and small property owners shaped the ideological and political conflicts between 1960 and 1980.<sup>68</sup>

This conflict between reform and status quo in Turkey has been expressed under the guise of various different names by many sociological and historical accounts. For instance, mainstream 19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman historiography has been shaped around the political contentions of different elite factions whether they favor nationalism or liberal cosmopolitanism. We experience a similar false dichotomy for today's Turkey in terms of integration with European Union, whether nationalism (even fascism) or liberalism. Since Keyder and many other mainstream interpretations of recent Turkish history are mostly inspired from modernization and world-system paradigms, they all detect a pattern of being "latecomer" for integration to the world capitalist system. The most important indicator of this belatedness is the lack of class struggle that is particular to any capitalist social formation, where Turkey has been portrayed as a market society that is dominated by small producers, who could not internalize the capitalist profit logic and occasionally yearn for strategic alliances with urban bourgeoisie against bureaucracy. This typical arithmetical scheme of Barrington Moore school has been delineated by Juan Cole as "shorn of context and culture" while he is discussing the existing literature on social revolutions. Cole convincingly asserts that the "discourse of such analyses, in putting large structures such as social classes in the forefront, only partially hides from

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<sup>68</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, pp. 202-204.



view their continuing dependence on explanatory elements such as organization and ideology.”<sup>69</sup>

Repeatedly, this kind of dichotomies such as reform vs. status quo renders the impact of social struggles invisible. Therefore, we will try to understand this tension throughout the lenses offered by the Keynesian welfare state practices within the historical context of destabilized postwar world order, where social resistances have opposed necessary reordering to adopt liberal reforms. Rather than identifying Keynesian welfare as a set of institutional practices, here Keynesianism has been categorized as a “form of social practice” that implied a “vision of power relations among classes in society”<sup>70</sup>, where its main task has been to neutralize political struggles between different class alliances. One of the most important achievements of economic orthodoxy has been the consistent presentation of historical economic forms of class struggle as if they were technical issues, or “management” strategies to cope with crises. De Angelis asserts that Keynesianism is not about economics but about politics, like any other “bourgeois *-ism*”, Keynesianism is “a form of rationalization of a specific historical configuration of class struggle” in specific geographies.<sup>71</sup> In a similar vein, Nadir Özbek makes a similar stress in his studies about public welfare, where it has been portrayed as a modern state practice that regulates the social field.<sup>72</sup> While offering a

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<sup>69</sup> Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 8.

<sup>70</sup> Massimo de Angelis, *Keynesianism, Social Conflict and Political Economy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 2-3.

<sup>71</sup> Massimo de Angelis, p. 174.

<sup>72</sup> For a general point of view see Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet, 1876-1914* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

brief historical trajectory for welfare practices in republican Turkey, Özbek identifies postwar years as a watershed, where social security system and various welfare practices emerged that has focused on the labor market and work relations.<sup>73</sup> Özbek criticizes the standard idealized argument about welfare state practices and affirms that the quantitative methods dominated the field of welfare studies, which calculates and compares the performance of different welfare regimes created a hierarchical relationship between different historical formations in terms of their sophistication degree. This situation led to a normative depiction of welfare regimes with highly developed social expenditures as a prototype; whereas which do not follow the same route or carry the same characteristics were illustrated as a deviation from the norm.<sup>74</sup>

Another recent interview with Korkut Boratav on the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of 24<sup>th</sup> January 1980 austerity package that is implemented with the advice of IMF and generally recognized as the turning point for the “age of neo-liberalism” in Turkey, illustrates a typical approach for such arguments. While answering a question about RPP’s populism in 1970s, Boratav identifies populism as a stage to achieve democracy in an underdeveloped country like Turkey; as a mode of regulation that embodies common rules for working and dominant classes to make them live together, a *modus vivendi*.<sup>75</sup> And he declares that “historically the European version of representative democracy culminated in welfare state; while underdeveloped version ended with

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<sup>73</sup> Nadir Özbek, “Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Sosyal Devlet”, *Toplum ve Bilim* 92 (2002), pp. 7-33.

<sup>74</sup> Nadir Özbek, p. 21.

<sup>75</sup> Korkut Boratav, “25. Yıldönümünde 24 Ocak: Adım Adım Teslimiyet”, *Express* 45 (January 2005), p. 6.

populism.”<sup>76</sup> Boratav portrays “populist order” as a form of social compromise and envisages this era as an alternative for Turkey, where an historical opportunity to achieve a Western type of social democracy –a democratic order that is based on the representation of social classes- that is realized by Ecevit’s “sincere” efforts has been prevented by dominant classes, which averted the increasing participation of laboring classes to politics. Although his writings on populism and social democracy reserve a little space for the role of actual politics and power relations, Boratav’s classification of Ecevit populism as a deviance from Western social democracy derives from his linear / Eurocentric view of capitalist development, where two important weaknesses emerge: Initially he only sees a compromise and ignore how populist policies regulated the social field and how they were inverted. Namely, his account disregards the implementation of social control mechanisms and it turns out the social actors –people who appropriated and manipulated these policies- to simple electoral puppets. Here, the disregard for social actors points out to another problem, where populism is conventionally associated with ISI policies. Galip Yalman states that Turkish scholars, without developing theoretical arguments on the connection between populism and ISI, used this pair either by including some hypothesis or by changing the meaning of the concepts.<sup>77</sup> Usually with a considerable emphasis on the economic dimensions, the attempts to explain a particular period of Turkey, more or less used populism and ISI. Especially different arguments concerning the periodization of ISI policies render Yalman’s argument credible, where the absence of a theoretical projection leads to *ex post facto* arguments

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<sup>76</sup> Korkut Boratav, p. 7. “Tarihsel gelişimleri sonunda, temsili demokrasinin ‘Avrupalı’ türü, refah devleti; az gelişmiş türü ise ‘popülizm’ ile sonuçlanmıştır.”

<sup>77</sup> Galip Yalman, “Popülizm, Bürokratik Otoriter Devlet ve Türkiye”, *11. Tez* 1 (1985), p. 17.

that match populism with ISI. Most importantly, Yalman asserts that the association of the end of populism either with the dissolution of ISI coalition (Keyder) or with the world recession points out to the fact that populism has generally been understood as a form of state, rather than a political regime.<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, the historical complexity of state formation has been reduced to a simple class alliance, where the contestations between these classes have been erased by an arbeiter. And classes were narrowed down to sectoral organizations, where the working class is measured with the number of workers who are members of trade unions. Here, Keyder's trajectory for the dynamic of crisis in late 1970s is a revealing example. His major argument still explicates the dynamics of crisis in terms of the historical weakness of Turkish bourgeoisie to create a sufficient ideological hegemony over bureaucratic domination of decision making mechanisms. With the diminishing of growth rates in 1970s, this inability gave rise to the monopolization of industrial capital, where ISI coalition with workers from powerful trade unions and a small group of peasantry dissolved and resulted in the polarization of society. This polarization was illustrated as the main reason for political rivalry and instability. Keyder argues that while small parties such as Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and National Salvation Party (MSP) succeeded to keep their popular base, the populist discourse of bigger parties such as RPP and Justice Party became almost identical and tried to create employment and patronage <sup>79</sup> Alongside, Keyder asserts that the predominance of small producers constituted the material basis for populist policies, this social formation also prevented

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<sup>78</sup> Galip Yalman, p. 57.

<sup>79</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, pp. 274-275.

the rise of a pure liberal bourgeois ideology or social democracy, where the rise of Ecevit has been explained in terms of his charisma.<sup>80</sup>

Consequently, throughout these analyses populism, as the underdeveloped version of welfare state, has been reduced to the ideology of petty bourgeoisie since Turkey has been portrayed as a market society that is dominated by small producers, who could not internalize the capitalist profit logic, the conditions were not ripe enough for these producers to spend efforts to overcome the ISI barriers. However, in the following chapter we will try to illustrate how users in countryside tried to overcome ISI barriers and the tendency of “merchantization” among petty commodity producers, where they have accumulated remarkable amounts of capital with the implementation of populist policies. Moreover, in the last chapter where we tried to depict the social tensions in the countryside, it is obvious that the whole issue was not the employment or patronage but the important effects of rural differentiation deepened by populist rural policies.

In this chapter, we have tried to offer an account of populism, which probably turned out to be one of the most elusive and inextractable concepts throughout the long career of social sciences. Intentionally in a very eclectic manner, we have tried to rescue the concept from its notoriously elitist character to employ it as a heuristic device, by means of which it is possible to comprehend the motivations, aspirations and interests underlying behind various historically specific social antagonisms of common people. At the same time, we have identified populism as a mode of reproduction for both ruling bloc and subaltern classes that has unique characteristics, which can prolifically be

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<sup>80</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *ibid.*

analyzed with reference to forms of crisis, socio-political mobilization and socio-economic cleavages.

## CHAPTER 2

### SOURCES OF RURAL DOMINATION IN 1970s TURKEY

In his important article about the different paths of rural transformation in Turkey, Çağlar Keyder argues, contrary to certain crude, still more general models, that rather than “unilateral” transition to capitalism we must acknowledge a variety of possible paths, most of which result not in capitalist concentration in the rural sector, but in more or less stable forms of petty commodity production.<sup>81</sup> To anyone with any first-hand knowledge of rural Turkey such an argument is intuitively plausible, and certainly can be considered as an improvement with regard to analyses, which posit a large, landless proletariat in rural Turkey. Therefore, in addition to many others, challenging the fundamental assumptions of this analysis, the predominance of various forms of petty commodity production that hinders the proletarianization of peasantry and concurrently the capitalist transformation necessitates more first-hand and ethnographically informed knowledge a propos of social relations of domination and exploitation in the countryside. However, it is obvious that these kinds of arguments bend the rod too much to conclude the complete absence of class struggle in the rural sector. Here C. M. Hann’s words are very illuminating: “If some Marxists tend to detect class struggle in contexts, where it is not being prominently waged, Keyder is prone to the opposite extreme, that of exaggerating the harmony and stability of the rural sector in

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<sup>81</sup> Çağlar Keyder, “Paths of Rural Transformation in Turkey” in *Sociology of Developing Societies: The Middle East*, edited by Talal Asad and Roger Owen (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 163-177.

Turkey”<sup>82</sup>. In this chapter, following section will be devoted to show how petty commodity production can also engender new cleavages within the rural sector and contribute to a wider class struggle. With reference to the terms of Turkish agrarian debate, our major focus will be on the historical formation of petty commodity production and the implicit debate on the “proletarianization of peasantry”. Here, also Keyder’s argument on the consolidation of sharecropping as the dominant pattern of production relation among petty commodity producers, which is cyclical and conducive to the perpetuation of family farms and consequently prevented the process of proletarianization after 1950s, is going to be critically interrogated.<sup>83</sup> We will principally claim that petty commodity production and sharecropping reflect the structural inequalities, which characterize the social relations of Turkish agriculture: poverty, commercialization and class inequalities. The following section is devoted to show how agricultural credit mechanism works and its consequences for petty commodity producers. We will try to illustrate that the producers were put into vicious cycle of debt burden due to the increasing domination of usurers in credit and sales cooperatives in 1970s Turkey. Making concrete references to peasants’ petitions written to Grand National Assembly, news and opinion pieces appeared in daily papers and various articles published in agriculture journals and magazines of the period, we will attempt to highlight the impact of credit mechanism on the flourish of usury mechanism, where many petitions demonstrate that cooperative officers were complicit in these incidents.

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<sup>82</sup> C. M. Hann, “Rural Transformation on the East Black Sea Coast of Turkey: A Note on Keyder”, *Journal of Peasant Studies* 12, no. 4 (1985), p. 101.

<sup>83</sup> Çağlar Keyder, “Türkiye’de Ortakçılık Döngüsü ve Küçük Köylü Mülkiyetinin Pekişmesi”, *Yapıt* 11 (1985), pp. 89-105.



In the last section, by referring to similar sources we will try to understand how usury mechanism has been constituted, its different types, the ways of repayment and finally its drastic impact on the daily lives of producers. Here, it is remarkable to notice that how usurers regulate market relations, especially to follow systematically how they set the prices. We will also try to investigate the role of annually announced agricultural floor prices on the power and domination relations among the peasantry. We will try to depict agricultural floor prices as a complex mechanism increasing the overall consumption of the household that deepens the debt burden of peasantry and enhances the power of usurers. The consequences of the antagonistic relation between big farmers / merchants who lend the money and the petty producers who borrow are two-fold. Initially, the cooperatives, which were designed to protect the small producers from the disruptions of free market economy are slightly turned out to the nutshells of powerful farmers and manufacturers, who usually managed to control the official credit mechanism of State Agricultural Bank (*T.C. Ziraat Bankası*). Secondly, within the light of some concrete examples, we will try to claim that this process has led to an important degree of deprivation. However, while depicting this process of deprivation our reference will not only be the discussions on the land tenure patterns of the period as the agricultural censuses conducted by various state institutions or academic studies strived to observe if there occurred a serious degree of dispossession on land. Here, we will emphasize that the increasing production inputs and the mounting consumption expenditures rendered possible with the high floor prices provided by populist rural policies turned out small producers increased their dependence on the market relations.

However, we do not claim that a considerable free labor force emerged in the countryside that has been employed by big farmers with reference to classical Marxist

standpoint that erroneously associates the emergence of free labor in the countryside with a considerable dispossession on the land. Consequently, we will try to understand different patterns of production relations such as wage labor or sharecropping within the general context of the commodification of social relations in Turkey's countryside. By focusing on the operation of power relations, our main endeavor will be to introduce an outline, a procedure that regulates the market relations and to conduct a debate about the so-called elusive nature of markets in general. Below, we will start with a general overview of the debates in late 1960s and early 1970s carried out on the capitalist transformation of agriculture, especially on the disagreement over the dominant pattern of relations of production in the countryside. Rather than presenting a detailed summary of these debates, we will try to focus on the misleading aspects of the arguments presented in these controversies to strengthen our statements put forward in this study.

#### Turkish Agrarian Debate: Another Lost Avenue

In her short article that elaborates the situation of academic studies on peasantry and rural transformation in Turkey, Nükhet Sirman notes that the changing paradigms and research interests in social sciences has led to a considerable decrease in the number of such studies within last ten years.<sup>84</sup> Sirman claims that the disenchantment experienced with the modernization paradigms and Marxism resulted with a theoretical inability to refashion new questions about peasantry and the transformation of

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<sup>84</sup> Nükhet Sirman, "Sosyal Bilimlerde Gelişmecilik ve Köy Çalışmaları", *Toplum ve Bilim* 88 (2001), p. 251.

countryside.<sup>85</sup> Sirman, correctly points out to the fact that these studies in Turkey mainly focused on the problem of agricultural transformation and theoretically relied on a modernizationist interpretation of Marxist paradigms. Similarly Bahattin Akşit identifies the main foci of these studies as the penetration of capitalist production relations into the rural areas and the social / cultural change prompted since the publications of many rural sociologists such as Niyazi Berkes, Behice Boran, Mübeccel Kıray, İbrahim Yasa starting from 1940s.<sup>86</sup> The main emphasis of these studies has been the polarization of land tenure patterns and the concentration of lands in the hands of few big farmers. However, as Akşit states without paying attention to the diversification within the mechanism of commodity production and the various forms of the appropriation of surplus-value, it will be impossible to depict the social and cultural differences among the petty commodity producers.<sup>87</sup>

One of the most important debates concerning the dominance of petty commodity production has been carried out between Korkut Boratav and Muzaffer İlhan Erdost, which also had an important effect on the politics of socialist left in late 1960s. Boratav has outlined his arguments about the production relations of Turkish countryside in his book *Gelir Dağılımı*<sup>88</sup>. There he argued that three distinctive production relations could be observed in Turkish agriculture: Petty commodity production, capitalist commodity production and feudal and semi-feudal production.

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<sup>85</sup> Nükhet Sirman, p. 252.

<sup>86</sup> Bahattin Akşit, “Kırsal Dönüşüm ve Köy Araştırmaları” in *Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, edited by Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1988), p. 180.

<sup>87</sup> Bahattin Akşit, p. 181.

<sup>88</sup> Korkut Boratav, *Gelir Dağılımı* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1969).

According to Boratav petty commodity production is the most widespread production relation in Turkish countryside, which has been subjected to the exploitation of merchant and usurer capital. Boratav also considered these relations of exploitation as a primitive form of capitalist exploitation.<sup>89</sup> On the other hand, Boratav tries to illustrate the insignificance of feudal and semi-feudal relations; relatedly three criteria in terms of statistical data has been put forward: the number of landless households, the number landless peasants who work as sharecroppers and lastly the number of households or persons who has been the owner of a complete village, all of them has constituted a very small percentage.<sup>90</sup> Boratav also states that if the number of small landowners, who also work as sharecroppers has been added to this aggregate, the figure increases considerably. Moreover, Boratav denotes that although the capitalist production has not been widespread compared to petty production, it is obvious that petty production is to be transformed in favor of capitalist one. After the publication of a short article that summarizes these arguments in *Emek*, the journal of TIP (Turkish Workers' Party), Boratav has harshly been criticized by Muzaffer İlhan Erdost. Identifying pre-capitalist (feudal and semi-feudal) production relations as the dominant mode of production, Erdost criticizes Boratav for using unreliable statistics in arriving at the conclusion that the extent of feudal relations was 5 % of the total rural structure. The most important indicator that Erdost employs is the extent of the production of commodities. He calculated the extent of feudalism as constituting 46 % of the total structure. In his review of this debate, Zülküf Aydın identifies both positions as theoretically

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<sup>89</sup> Korkut Boratav, pp. 117-118; 130-136.

<sup>90</sup> Korkut Boratav, pp. 149-152.

meaningless and empirically lack of sustainability.<sup>91</sup> While deciding whether capitalism or feudalism is dominant in a particular country, Aydın states that “it is extremely misleading to look at the production relations or the immediate process of production”. Therefore, he adds that “it is wrong to identify sharecropping with semi-feudalism and wage labor with capitalism. Both writers confuse production relations with the mode of production”.<sup>92</sup> Mostly inspired from Wallerstein’s depiction of wage labor not as a necessary labor form, but only one of the possible labor forms to be used in capitalism, Aydın criticizes Boratav’s articulationist understanding of mode of production drawing from Jairus Banaji’s thesis, who argues that individual enterprises in an economy can show different relations of exploitation of labor. However, for Banaji the crucial point is that these enterprises are subject to the laws of motion of that economy. Hence, Aydın maintains that the relations of exploitation such as wage labor or sharecropping are basic categories and can occur in different modes of production.<sup>93</sup> Consequently, Boratav’s empiricism leads him to presume mode of production as a static category. On the other hand, Erdost has been criticized by Aydın for similar reasons. Erdost neglects the role of commodity production that does not aim at a profit, for instance on a subsistence level to buy some necessities. Since the small producers do not sell most of their products, Erdost claims that the exploitation of small producers can only be measured by the

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<sup>91</sup> Zülküf Aydın, *Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey: The Household Economy in Gıgıs and Kalhana* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), p. 6. Another account of this debate Zülküf Aydın, “Turkish Agrarian Debate: New Arguments and Old Scores”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 1 (Fall 1987), p. 87. For similar arguments also David Seddon and Ronnie Margulies, “The Politics of the Agrarian Question in Turkey: Review of a Debate”, *Journal of Peasant Studies* 11, no. 3, (1984), pp. 28-59.

<sup>92</sup> Zülküf Aydın, pp. 7-8.

<sup>93</sup> Zülküf Aydın, p. 9.

amount of commodities offered for sale in the market. For instance, this amount does not exceed 10 % of the total wheat production in Turkey.<sup>94</sup> Although Aydın's observations have strong points such as the evaluation of an agrarian structure within the whole mechanism of social production, namely the inspection of how capital comes into relations with the household and through which mechanisms capital exercises its dominance over the household, his conclusions are not sufficient to illustrate the complexities of petty commodity production. Aydın criticizes Henri Bernstein's portrayal of Third World peasants as disguised proletarians, where the capital has extracted the surplus product of the household by controlling the conditions of the household production through the means of family labor and asks if capitalism can impose its will upon the household, then why does not it proletarianize them? Accordingly, Aydın puts forward two options: either capitalism is not able to destroy the household that is completely equivalent with denying the logic of capitalism, or there is an interaction between capital and the household, where capital is trying to appropriate more surpluses and the household is trying to survive and reproduce itself.<sup>95</sup> However, his statement about capital's inability "to get rid of the household and tries to internalize the mode of calculation of the household into its circuit in order to benefit from this mode of labor usage as much as it can" logically concludes with an awkward and unreliable statement:

It is no longer a wonder that, in so many places, peasants refuse to accept innovation introduced by governments in order to improve production. Peasants feel threatened by the introduction of new varieties of crops and seeds, artificial

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<sup>94</sup> Zülküf Aydın, p. 11.

<sup>95</sup> Zülküf Aydın, pp. 12-13.

fertilizers and such like, which raise their production costs and make them more and more dependent on the market.<sup>96</sup>

However, this generalization about peasants' refusal to accept innovations introduced by governments does not seem to reflect the reality especially for 1960s and 1970s Turkey. While delineating the failure of postwar studies on the consolidation of petty commodity production, Bahattin Akşit puts a special emphasis for 1970s, where he states that the predominance of small land ownership was usual admitted as a necessary precondition for the consolidation of petty commodity production throughout 1960s and 1970s.<sup>97</sup> However, Akşit states that especially his own and Keyder's studies<sup>98</sup> neglect the fact that the state policies of these decades strongly affected the course of petty commodity production. Particularly, he mentions the impact of state policies that reinforced the mechanization of agriculture and the commodification of social relations in the countryside due to high floor prices and cheap inputs that augmented the process of social differentiation among petty commodity producers.<sup>99</sup> Even though Akşit qualifies state policies of the period successful until 1979 since they empowered peasantry against the usurer / merchant capital, he explicitly mentions about the

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<sup>96</sup> Zülküf Aydın, p. 13.

<sup>97</sup> Bahattin Akşit, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Köylerinde Dönüşümler" in *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*, edited by Oya Baydar (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları), p. 184.

<sup>98</sup> We can add many studies to this list that inspects the consolidation of petty commodity production throughout 1960s and 1970s. Here are few examples: S. Timur, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı* (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları; Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965); N. Bazoğlu-Balamir, "Restructuring of the Household Division of Labor as a Process Contributing to the Persistence of Small Commodity Producers", Middle Eastern Studies Annual Meeting, University of California at Berkeley, 1984; Bahattin Akşit, *Köy, Kasaba ve Kentlerde Toplumsal Değişme* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1985).

<sup>99</sup> Bahattin Akşit, p. 186.

peasants' increasing recognition for governments' agricultural policies. Accordingly, second important problem with Aydın's conclusion stems from his simplistic and mostly economist comprehension of the market. Although he emphasizes the illusion of focusing solely on the number of wage laborers or on the amount of land owned to grasp the nature of agrarian structure, his "mechanism of social production" or Banaji's "laws of motion of economy" do not satisfactorily give primacy to prevalent power relations and daily political contestations that are constituted with reference to different and conflicting interests.

Additionally Aydın does not employ any conceptual tool to explain peasant refusal –or would not employ if he had asserted the peasant recognition- for governments' agricultural support policies. While refraining to deal with the classical problematic of Turkish agrarian debate that insistently explores the ways and forms of the maintenance of petty commodity production, Aydın presents an insufficient and sometimes naive account of the relations of exploitation in the countryside. Although his emphasis on the unfair credit mechanism and usurers' domination are true, he cannot comprehend the different motivations for the demands such as high floor prices or cheaper inputs. Aydın's total dismissal of Chayanov seems crucial here. He identifies Chayanov's concept of peasant economy as "a static and ideal model of a peasant household"<sup>100</sup> and replicates the classical critique brought to Chayanov's identification of household production as a mode of production *sui generis*. However, Aydın does not take into account the concept of "self-exploitation" by means of which we can adequately trace particular inequalities generated within petty commodity production.

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<sup>100</sup> Zülküf Aydın, p. 3.



C. M. Hann's critique of Keyder's Type Three trajectory of rural transformation is the most illuminating example that employs the concept of self-exploitation.<sup>101</sup> According to Keyder, there are four village types that represent the different paths of rural transformation in Turkey. The first one is the disintegrated villages, where the inhabitants migrate elsewhere. Second types of villages are those which survive through being able to diversify their productive activities outside agriculture. Type Three comprises villages where "productive accumulation" is possible within agriculture. However, in this type farmers do not become capitalists, in the sense that wage labor replaces family labor to any significant degree. Thus, as we have mentioned in the beginning, the countryside as a whole remains largely free of Marxian class tensions, thanks to the way in which modern Turkish capitalism has remained faithful to its Ottoman peasant legacy and allowed undifferentiated, robust, independent petty commodity producers to prosper within the new, market dominated framework and become *kulaks*. And the last type is the villages, where capitalist production is dominant due to their feudal land tenure patterns.<sup>102</sup> In his fieldwork he conducted in Rize region – the most important center for tea production, Hann neatly shows that Type Three village schema of Keyder, featuring petty commodity production with capital accumulation, does not fit for Rize region due to a very complex social formation. Most important characteristic of this type is the expansion of commodity market without an expansion of the labor market in the countryside. Secondly, this type necessitates the expansion of the farms towards an optimum size as determined by the available labor in the family,

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<sup>101</sup> C. M. Hann, "Second Thoughts on Smallholders: Tea Production, the State, and Social Differentiation in the Rize Region", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 4 (1990), pp. 57-79.

<sup>102</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Paths of Rural Transformation in Turkey", *ibid.*

without becoming capitalist.<sup>103</sup> Hann states that due to many reasons such as the existence of absentee garden owners, the scarcity of cultivable land, the request for the non-familial labor, due to outmigration, high-value of tea crop and the strict quota system enforced by state monopoly, surpluses among tea producers in Rize are usually invested in further planting that roughly corresponds to capitalist accumulation (Type Four).<sup>104</sup> And another important consequence of his study is the formation of an underclass composed of sharecroppers and hired laborers on a daily basis, who mostly comes from the poor region adjacent to Rize.<sup>105</sup> Also Nükhet Sirman confirms Hann's analysis for Söke region's petty cotton producers, where rural laborers are recruited mostly from the neighboring regions to Söke.<sup>106</sup> In both of these critiques, the most important drawback of Keyder's analysis has been inspected as the employment of "village" as the main unit of analysis. With paying attention to regional differences, Hann and Sirman, both persuasively recommend utilizing "household" as the main unit of analysis to determine the patterns of differentiation among petty commodity producers both in terms of labor inputs and consumption patterns.

Here, Chayanov's concept of "self-exploitation" becomes crucial, where he claims that family farms always tries to balance the household's total consumption with the overall labor spent. For instance, in order to cope with the increasing consumption needs of the family, the working members must produce more. According to Chayanov,

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<sup>103</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Paths of Rural Transformation in Turkey", p. 171.

<sup>104</sup> C. M. Hann, pp. 76-78.

<sup>105</sup> C. M. Hann, p. 71. Here Hann points out to the regional differences between coastal areas and sub-regions in Rize, where the viability of farm becomes crucial.

<sup>106</sup> Nükhet Sirman, "Pamuk Üretiminde Aile İşletmeleri" in *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, edited by Şevket Pamuk and Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1988), p. 220.

they can do this in two ways: They can work harder for longer hours and increase their rate of “self-exploitation”. Or they may also do things which Lenin interpreted as the evidence of proto-capitalism, where they may rent more land, buy livestock and equipment and perhaps even hire few extra workers, simply to expand production. But in many cases, they usually practice both of these solutions.<sup>107</sup> While trying to comprehend Chayanov’s ongoing popularity among rural sociologists Theodor Shanin points out to two crucial misunderstandings. Shanin points out to the fact that Chayanov’s analysis was the depiction of family farms as an economic form which differs from capitalist farming even in an environment clearly dominated by capitalism. It was the consideration of peasant agriculture “from below”, that is, from the operational logic rather than from the national and international flows of resources, goods, and demands. Most importantly, the capacity of family farms to compete with the well-capitalized farming depends on their flexibility to work at a consistent nominally negative profit and survive, which is an impossibility for capitalist farmers. Consequently, the main aim of family farms is the maximization of total income rather than of profit or of marginal product that guides the production and employment strategies of family farms.<sup>108</sup> Therefore, Shanin states that Chayanov’s “self-exploitation” is often understood simply in its most direct sense of excruciating labor by underfed peasant families damaging their physical and mental selves for a return which is below that of the ordinary wages of labor power. According to Shanin, this is not the whole story since it must be read

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<sup>107</sup> Daniel Thorner, “Chayanov’s Concept of Peasant Economy” in *A.V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy*, edited by Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, R.E.F. Smith (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. xvi.

<sup>108</sup> Theodor Shanin, “Chayanov’s Message: Illuminations, Miscomprehensions and the Contemporary ‘Development Theory’” in *A.V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy*, p. iv.

together with his concept of “differential optimums”, that is, the different agrarian regions and sub-branches of farming and the different optimal sizes of enterprise –at any given stage of technology- where a decrease as well as an increase will make productivity decline. To this the social context of peasant farming and especially the resulting availability of the family, relatives’ and neighbors’ aid and unwaged labor should be added.<sup>109</sup> Shanin deduces two important consequences. Firstly, family economy is not simply the survival of the weak through their impoverishment which serves profits elsewhere, but also, the utilization of some characteristics of farming and of rural social life which may occasionally give an edge to noncapitalist economies over capitalist forms of production in a capitalist world. Secondly, the continuity and relative well being of family farmers under capitalism can be therefore postulated as a possibility while self-exploitation (and indeed exploitation) takes place, even though no conclusion about a necessary survival of such economic forms can be deduced or should be assumed within this line of thought.<sup>110</sup>

Therefore, Turkish agrarian debate underestimates these points and the whole debate has solely focused on the continuance of petty commodity production and ignored above mentioned particularities of family farms while focusing on the labor forms and processes among small peasantry, especially the interpretation of these particularities in the light of the dominant usage of family labor. While criticizing James Scott’s “moral economy” thesis, Tom Brass condemns Scott’s admiration of unfree and bonded labor as a cultural empowerment or a sign of autonomy, where these conceptions

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<sup>109</sup> Theodor Shanin, pp. vi-viii.

<sup>110</sup> Theodor Shanin, p. x.

have solely been understood as a cultural phenomenon in a postmodern fashion and Brass states that Scott ignores different forms of rural labor that have emerged with reference to different contexts due to changing power relations and legal regulations.<sup>111</sup> Here, Brass underlines the impact of power relations and tries to understand different forms of labor within their own contexts. Zülküf Aydın's critique for Boratav's employment of wage labor as a conceptual tool has been trapped in the same dichotomy that Brass mentions: Boratav praises the populist idea, where a homogeneous structure of smallholdings could remain indefinitely viable and provide all families of the region with income levels they would deem satisfactory<sup>112</sup>, on the contrary Aydın sees a similar homogeneous small peasantry that is being impoverished everyday and resists to the existing domination mechanisms. Finally, his counter arguments are not very substantial, but mostly stems from Aydın's political concerns.<sup>113</sup> Nefise Bazoğlu, in her short article, claims that the most visible drawback of this debate is the limitation of entire complexity of rural structures has been limited to state-peasant relations, where household strategies and struggles for survival and reproduction have been ignored. And she claims that the main leitmotif of this survival struggle is the integration with the market without being detached from their class origins.<sup>114</sup> This powerful argument necessitates reconsidering

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<sup>111</sup> Tom Brass, *Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labor: Case Studies and Debates* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 256.

<sup>112</sup> Although Keyder employs wage labor and land tenure as a conceptual categories, Aydın does not mention about Keyder or criticize his arguments. Most plausibly, the same theoretical framework –world system analysis- both Keyder and Aydın use prevents such a critique.

<sup>113</sup> For a fuller account of this debate see the exchange between Boratav and Aydın in the fifth volume of *11. Tez* published in 1987.

<sup>114</sup> Nefise Bazoğlu, “‘İşçileşmeye Karşı Köylülüğün Devamı’ Tartışması ve Düşündürdükleri”, *11. Tez* 7 (1988), pp. 32-33.

the homogeneity of small peasantry and investigating different class (re)compositions by focusing on the power relations and concrete mechanisms that reproduce these relations. Last few words about Keyder's future scenario for small peasantry seem an appropriate point to start discussing above mentioned arguments. According to Keyder, labor shortage is the characteristic production factor in Turkish agriculture that leads to the emergence of sharecropping. Therefore, Keyder claims that any increase in the number of middle and big landowners will inevitably result with the increase in the number of sharecroppers.<sup>115</sup> However, borrowing from Bhaduri, Keyder explains the consolidation of sharecropping as a domination mechanism of land owners with the usury mechanism.<sup>116</sup> Finally, he states that the increasing internal terms of trade in favor of agricultural products would lessen the impact of usury mechanism on sharecroppers and transform them into independent farms.<sup>117</sup> Nevertheless, Gülten Kazgan underlines two important points in her critique presented for Keyder's arguments. She states that family farms and wage labor do not necessarily contradict with each other, whereas family farms and capitalist farming do not also. Secondly, she points out to the usage of free family labor, where small shareholding or the employment of sharecropping is more profitable for landowners.<sup>118</sup> Here, Michael Taussig's article on the fabrication of money economy among small peasants of Latin American convincingly illustrates tendency of agribusiness to withdraw from the process of production in agriculture, focusing their

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<sup>115</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Türkiye'de Ortakçılık Döngüsü ve Küçük Köylü Mülkiyetinin Pekişmesi", p. 92.

<sup>116</sup> Çağlar Keyder, p. 91.

<sup>117</sup> Çağlar Keyder, p. 96.

<sup>118</sup> Gülten Kazgan, "Önder, Kip ve Keyder'in Tebliğlerine İlişkin Yorum" in *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, p. 177.

profit-making activities on credit, supply of inputs, contracting, and selling, while leaving farming to the small holders and “skimming” them rather than replacing them especially with the implementation of developmentalist policies. Taussig successfully shows how the capitalist profit accountancy prevailed over the capitalist form of production.<sup>119</sup>

However, in the next section we will present various news and articles from daily newspapers and agriculture journals of 1970s Turkey about the usury mechanism, where the internal terms of trade incessantly increase in favor of agricultural products until 1977.<sup>120</sup> These documents explain how the usury mechanism functions and what kind of social tensions and cleavages it creates between petty commodity producers and merchant usurers, also among producers themselves. While investigating the usury mechanism together with the official state credits given to producers, we will claim that these credits are mostly directed at increasing the overall consumption of the household. Here, we will emphasize different social factors such as the regional differences, the value of the crop, land tenure, political affinities etc. that generates and reproduces the social differentiation among peasantry.

#### Agricultural Credit Mechanism, Cooperatives and the Cycle of Debt Burden

An easy definition of usury can be fixed as “the unorganized credit extended by the individuals to those in need of cash”. If you consider the debt and its interest within

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<sup>119</sup> Michael Taussig, “The Genesis of Capitalism Amongst South American Peasantry: Devil’s Labor and the Baptism of Money”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19, no. 2 (April 1977), p. 138-140.

<sup>120</sup> Ergün Kip, “Türkiye’de Taban Fiyatları, Destekleme Alımları ve İç Ticaret Hadleri” in *Türkiye’de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, p. 160.

the market mechanism, it will be more appropriate and categorically restricted to identify usury as “the valorization of capital by methods that are not linked to production, where capital feeds itself at no further costs”. Such a definition is important since throughout the legal texts until the Second Development Report (1968-1972), the usury has generally been perceived as an exceptional one, where it has been assumed that only extraordinary expenditures of a peasant household necessitates to borrow extra amounts of money from merchants.<sup>121</sup> However, usury is a structured process that is directly related with market conditions. Mostly prevalent among market-oriented farmers, who produce export crops such as cotton, tobacco, hazelnut, olive etc., usury has been constituted by these farmers’ need to provide their consumption expenditures and production inputs, where it has increasingly been impossible to redress the balance between annual revenues and expenditures.<sup>122</sup> However, the degree of exploitation among these farmers is somehow very high. For instance, Boratav states that the exploitation ratio among tobacco farmers exceeds % 450 due to the exorbitant interest rates applied by usurers nearly in all valued crops like tobacco. Only the interest debts of cotton producers in Söke amount to 75 % of their total revenues.<sup>123</sup> The most important reasons for the emergence of usurers are the insufficiency of existing credit mechanisms, the political and organizational stakes with credit institutions and the village cooperatives and most importantly the informal intermediary agents (*aracı*) as the only

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<sup>121</sup> Hale Asarkaya, “Kırsal Alanda Yatırım Sorunları”, *Ziraat Mühendisliği* 116 (February 1976), p. 23.

<sup>122</sup> Korkut Boratav, *Gelir Dağılımı*, p. 131.

<sup>123</sup> Korkut Boratav, p. 132.



marketing option.<sup>124</sup> Between 1948 and 1960, the credit volume has been multiplied ten times, whereas mostly big and middle holdings has benefited from this expansion.<sup>125</sup> Especially, this unfair situation has increased after 1960, where one third of agricultural holdings have gained the benefits. Although the credit volume has expanded 275 %, only 35 % of credit need has been satisfied in 1969.<sup>126</sup> The most substantial evidence is the successive news appeared in *Milliyet*, where it is claimed that a recent National Assembly report on agricultural credits has registered the distribution of 82 million Turkish liras by *Ziraat Bankası* among 40 big farmers as credit.<sup>127</sup> Two months later, the inspection of 216 million lira credit debt unpaid only by 60 firms confirms this unfair distribution.<sup>128</sup> “A merchant, who sells agricultural chemicals can acquire hundred thousand lira as credit from the special funds of *Ziraat Bankası* borrows this money to poor peasants with 40 % interest rate”<sup>129</sup>, these words are the concluding remarks of İ. Baltacıoğlu’s article appeared in *Cumhuriyet*, who points out to the structural inequalities and political stakes characteristics of credit mechanism. In the same article, it has been stated that % 75 of whole credits can be considered as “frozen”, which means that only the rest can reach to small producers.

Another important point is the institutional and administrative problems with the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (*Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri*) that stem from the same

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<sup>124</sup> *Köy ve Köylü Sorunu* (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Yayınları, 1967), p. 93.

<sup>125</sup> Suat Aksoy, *Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1969), p. 71.

<sup>126</sup> *Köy ve Köylü Sorunu*, p. 48; Suat Aksoy, p. 72.

<sup>127</sup> “Meclis Kredi Rezaletinden Haberdar”, *Politika*, 11 July 1970.

<sup>128</sup> “Kredi Borçları”, *Politika*, 27 September 1970.

<sup>129</sup> İ. Baltacıoğlu, “Tarım Kredisi Sorunu”, *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1970.

pressures made by big farmers and merchant usurers. Since their foundation, these cooperatives have been under the strict control and domination of *Ziraat Bankası*, which officially aim to improve the production conditions, to increase their production supply, to prevent unofficial credits by providing production inputs and devices and finally to increase producers' competition capacity both on the national and international scale.<sup>130</sup> However, it is quite logical to claim that these cooperatives reflect the structural inequalities of the Turkish rural structure. The most important consequence of the pressures exerted by *Ziraat Bankası* is the allocation of agricultural credits mostly for consumption. An important research conducted on the problems of cooperatives states that only 13-14 % of whole agricultural credits were reserved for production. The rest of the credits were given to Agricultural Sales Cooperatives (*Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri*) for annual purchasing of various crops by the state.<sup>131</sup> Both of these cooperatives were directly or not under the control of big farmers, who usually deal with usury. Usurers generally take place in the executive boards of these cooperatives and conduct bank officers' decisions a propos of giving credits to producers that they confirm. Here, producers' deposits or guarantess both in kind or cash, they become crucial to succeed loaning credits.<sup>132</sup> Some concrete examples will be more insightful.

An article in *Karınca* identifies cooperatives as “the reflections of inequalities and unfairness prevailing in the countryside”, where producers find themselves within a vicious circle:

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<sup>130</sup> Ziya Gökalp Mülâyim, *Genel ve Tarımsal Kooperatifçilik* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975), pp. 18-19.

<sup>131</sup> Nabi Dinçer, Necati Mutlu, Kazım Oskay, Belgin Güney, *Kooperatifçilik Sorunları Araştırması* (Ankara: DPT Yayınları, 1972), pp. 19-24.

<sup>132</sup> Dinçer, Necati Mutlu, Kazım Oskay, Belgin Güney, p. 35-37.

The debts of the cooperative are paid by the usurer to be able to request next year's credits. With this money, half of the usurer's debt is paid and the producers, who have loaned credit sign bonds for high interests. This is a vicious *debt circle*, where producers usually lose a substantial part of their fields to usurers for half price it worth. And it is not possible to sense this situation from the cadastral surveys since usurers; they usually do not own it officially until they did not seize the field completely.<sup>133</sup>

Although, author's statements about how producers lose their fields within this debt circle can somehow be a little exaggeration, it is important to notice the impact of usurers in the regulation of the credit cooperatives. We can also give numerous examples from the petitions written to Grand National Assembly by the producers nearly from all parts of the country about the domination of credit cooperatives by the usurers that confirm the above situation. A petition written from Suruç, Urfa by Müslüm Sakınca complains about the abusive and corrupt election of the executive board of Suruç Çüko Credit Cooperative and states that usurer landowners nearly bought all shareholders' votes. Sakınca warns authorities to start necessary investigations.<sup>134</sup> Rasim Yosma shows a different type of grievance from Karabük village of Görele, Giresun. He states that the officers of *Ziraat Bankası* do relentlessly not care about his request for credit although he paid all of his previous debts due to the instructions of usurers in his village, who lead the cooperative by their noses.<sup>135</sup> Another important example is the complaint of Ali Toprak, the headman of Aslankaşı village of Keban, Elazığ from a big landowner (*ağa*) called Rauf Kaya, who had the power to decide the distribution of

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<sup>133</sup> Ahmet Kılıçbay, "Kooperatifler Nedir, Ne Değildir?", Ne Değildir?", *Karınca* 41, no. 450 (June 1974), p. 3-4.

<sup>134</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 5707, 15.6.1976.

<sup>135</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 45, 13.8.1977.

credits with the bank officers.<sup>136</sup> Yılmaz Uçaş from Patnos, Ağrı states a similar complaint about the bank, but points out to a method that the usurers employ to prevent the loans. Uçaş states that although the size of his land satisfies the norm to loan tractor credit, the officers from the Ministry of Agriculture give their decisions according to the statements of usurers in his village.<sup>137</sup> Although, we cannot comprehend from these documents if there exists any different clash of interests between petitioners and the so-called usurers, but the common point of these petitions is that all of the requests were rejected by various state authorities without being inspected. It is also interesting to notice that the complaint made by a headman, Ali Toprak, from a big landowner was also rejected like the others.

However, these situations do not only point out to a bureaucratic clumsiness since from many other documents you can follow the strict control of *Ziraat Bankası* and various state authorities over the peasants who have had loaned credits. In some cases this control approximates to a Foucauldian disciplinary regime. One crystal clear example is from a petition that was written by Mehmet Türkdoğan from Laloğlu village of Kars, where his credit request for 15.000 Turkish liras was rejected by the officers from Minister of Cooperatives since he rejected the credit offer for 4.000 Turkish liras one year later in March 1973 and it was also stated that his “repayment ethic” is not strong enough.<sup>138</sup> Besides, there are countless examples among these petitions asking for repayment according to an installment plan, where all rejected due to various reasons.

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<sup>136</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 1497, 13.5.1974.

<sup>137</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 572, 09.12.1977.

<sup>138</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 12057, 02.5.1973.

We can coincide Siyabent Çiftçi from Diyadin of Ağrı, whose request was rejected due to his sentence after his offence conducted against the head official of the district.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, we can also meet numerous peasants, whose debt record were carefully traced. Here, two examples are crucial to illustrate the extent of control mechanism. One is from Hınıs of Erzurum sent by Ali Solmaz and friends requesting to pay their debts according to an installment plan. This request was rejected since it was verified that although they had plentiful harvests since 1974, they did not pay their debts back.<sup>140</sup> Another same request from Aksaray, Niğde made by Hasip Kestek was rejected since he also experienced abundant harvests for last three seasons and he had also 150 sheep and 3 breeding cows.<sup>141</sup> Within this junction, it is striking to notice that state institutions have a very strict, disciplinary and economist conception of market relations, where the authorities are quite sure that these producers have survived and they should be disciplined since they did not pay off their debts.

Nevertheless, funds that credit cooperatives employ constitute a very small amount of the money seperated from the state budget as agricultural credit. Nearly 85 % of this money were being used by Agricultural Sales Cooperatives, where usurer capital has found more chances to valorize on itself by creating more profitable chances. The sales cooperatives are designed as shareholdings to protect the producers from the disruptions of the free market by means of annual support purchases and the

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<sup>139</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 6728, 30.12.1976.

<sup>140</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 7211, 15.2.1977.

<sup>141</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 6404, 13.1.1977.

enforcement of floor prices that are conducted with various public enterprises (KİT).<sup>142</sup> Since they constitute the only marketing option for producers, their domination by big merchants and sometimes by big capitalist enterprises rendered small producers more vulnerable to the destructive effects of the market and to the ruthless interest rates of usury capital. In an important investigation about the dilemmas of cooperative organizations, it is stated that

There are many important problems, where official prices are declared late or the money is not paid to cooperatives or sometimes paid back to shareholders. Also, at the end of marketing process, producers usually cannot gain any profit due to many corrupt administrators or structural inequalities. Then, they usually search alternative options for marketing, either they have to pay high commissions to intermediary agents or they raise their expenditures for production inputs such as new chemicals, technological assets etc. to increase their productivity.<sup>143</sup>

Among the petitions sent to assembly, there are countless examples complaining about the late declaration of official prices and also about the delay occurred in reimbursement, which is still the biggest financial problem of Turkish agriculture. Especially, we have encountered many petitions sent by the head officers of various Agriculture Chambers (*Ziraat Odası*).

Most interestingly, below examples precisely illustrate why producers cannot make profits. In an article written by Mustafa Saydam, it is claimed that FİSKOBİRLİK (Union of Sales Cooperatives for Hazelnut Producers) have bought to stock producers' hazelnuts from 500 piasters. However, when the union decided to sell the stock hazelnuts, they were sold for 235-250 piasters to GİMA, a nationwide supermarket

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<sup>142</sup> For a detailed investigation of the administrative structures of these cooperatives see Abdullah Aysu, *Tarladan Sofraya Tarım 1980-2000 Türkiye tarımında Yapılanma(ma)* (İstanbul: Su Yayınları, 2002), pp. 255-68.

<sup>143</sup> Dinçer, Necati Mutlu, Kazım Oskay, Belgin Güney, p. 74.

chain, and from GİMA to a big exporter for 300-310 piasters.<sup>144</sup> We can coincide to a similar headline in the pages of *Milliyet* months after, where M. Şükrü Koç puts forth the situation in details for TARİŞ (Union of Sales Cooperatives for Fig, Cotton, Olive and Grape Producers). The annual purchasing was made from 235-240 piasters again for stocking. After cotton was carried and spun, it was sold to exporters for 200-215 piasters. In the meantime, the exporters bought cottons ready to export without paying labor and transportation costs. However, the loss of the union was transferred to the account of each shareholder, where it was added to their previous debts.<sup>145</sup> Annual purchases made by state institutions were usually justified as a control mechanism that regulates the agricultural market in favor of producers by stocking the surplus supply to prevent price decreases, where there is no flexibility.<sup>146</sup> However, there are two drawbacks of this argument. Initially, although it varies according to the crop and year, cooperatives do not buy all the products of a producer and enforce quotas. For instance, while there is a strict state monopoly for tea, cotton producers can only manage to sell one third of their harvests to cooperatives at most. Secondly, this amount changes according to the quotas announced by the state authorities.<sup>147</sup> After 1974 with the impact of populist agricultural policies of governments, these quotas were enlarged until 1977. However, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, the bottleneck of foreign currency that the economy was facing should not be our single reference while

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<sup>144</sup> Mustafa Saydam, “Kooperatifli Sömürü”, *Ziraat Mühendisliği* 69 (March 1972), p. 5.

<sup>145</sup> M. Şükrü Koç, “Asıl Kooperatifler Sömürüyor”, *Politika*, 6 June 1972.

<sup>146</sup> Abdullah Aysu, p. 270.

<sup>147</sup> Abdullah Aysu, p. 258-260.

delienating this situation. As our examples vindicate, nearly all of these stocks were sold out to exporters as soon as possible, where surplus value has been transferred from agriculture under the guise of treasury's urgent need for foreign currency to compensate the deficit of balance of payments. Here, Susan Soederberg's identification of debt as a social discipline mechanism becomes precisely meaningful, where the political strategy was aimed at disciplining labor while capital was trying to overcome the valorization barriers of ISI production by maintaining high levels of capital inflows.<sup>148</sup> For instance, a remarkable information appeared in a daily newspaper represents this situation, where producers stated that "we have many grievances but are deluding ourselves that we are not left to the hands of merchants and usurers"<sup>149</sup>. The transfer of surpluses from these cooperatives can sometimes be more direct and legally bounded. The most visible example is PANKOBİRLİK (Union of Sales Cooperatives for Sugar Beet Producers), which is composed of 24 big sales cooperatives and has nearly 950.000 member that makes it one of the biggest cooperative union in the world.<sup>150</sup> The only option for sugar beet producers to promote their products depends on the membership to these cooperatives unless it is impossible for sugar beet producers to promote their harvests. Because only member producers of these cooperatives can make contracts with sugar public enterprise (*Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş.*) and its factories, where there is an

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<sup>148</sup> Susanne Soederberg, "State, Crisis and Capital Accumulation in Mexico", *Historical Materialism* 9, (Winter 2001), p. 66.

<sup>149</sup> "Üreticiler Kooperatiflerde Huzursuz", *Politika*, 30 July 1972.

<sup>150</sup> Abdullah Aysu, p. 166.



absolute state monopoly and cooperatives were organized as joint companies.<sup>151</sup> And these contracts nearly determine every step within production, delivery and marketing processes. How much sugar beet seedling will be planted to where and when, when they will be picked and delivered to the sugar firm and most importantly when the producers will have their money; all of these decisions are taken by the firm officers without producers' any intervention due to the strict control mechanism that is maintained with the bylaws of the cooperatives and the articles of the contracts.<sup>152</sup> Also the subscription dues paid nearly by one million sugar beet producers has brought billions of Turkish liras, by means of which union and the sugar firm have been joint shareholders of many private sugar factories, of Yeniçelttek Coal Firm, of Massey Ferguson Tractor, of Pancarmotor, additionally eight oil factory, three milk factory and six feedstuff factory are important entries from the list. The collaboration of sales cooperatives' administrators with big exporters and merchants prompted small producers' abstinence from being a shareholder to these cooperatives, where anti-democratic mechanisms of cooperatives were also influential.

When the consequences of this collaboration are reconsidered with the huge number of households<sup>153</sup>, which cannot benefit from credit facilities, it will not be very difficult to guess the suitable environment for usury capital to be operative. In the next

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<sup>151</sup> M. Tanju Akad, "Kırsal Kesime Devlet Müdahaleleri ve Kooperatifler", *11. Tez 7* (1988), p. 149.

<sup>152</sup> M. Tanju Akad, *ibid*, p. 150. Especially Amasya, Yeniçelttek and Suluova have witnessed immense struggles of sugar beet producers, who resisted against the decisions of the sugar firm and cooperatives.

<sup>153</sup> Besides the apparent control of usurers over credit mechanism, many households do not satisfy the land criterions to loan credits.

section, we will try to elaborate different forms of usury and their social consequences with respect to social differentiation among petty commodity producers.

### Usury Machinery and Floor Prices: Deepening of Inequality

Throughout agricultural sector credits that are not regulated by state authorities are identified as “unorganized credits” (*teşkilatlanmamış krediler*). Usury belongs to this category, where many other forms of unorganized credit also exist. James E. Blalock identifies four different categories of unorganized credits according to their sources: Big landowners, merchants giving credits with interest rate, relatives and lastly close neighbours and friends.<sup>154</sup> However, Blalock’s distinction between landowners and merchants was not clearly substantiated in his study. It is not clear if he intends to mean the rental of fields to landless households, where they work as sharecroppers and the foundation of usury mechanism over sharecroppers’ revenues by providing their production inputs and consumption items. This situation is one of the cases that will be investigated in details within this section. However, usurer typically refers to the persons, whose profession is lending money to producers with high interest rates that is legally prohibited.<sup>155</sup> These people are frequently merchants and they mostly engage with the purchase and sale of export agricultural goods. Here, we should insistently stress the fact that it is not possible to differentiate usurers, merchants and intermediaries

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<sup>154</sup> James E. Blalock, *Capital and Finance in Turkish Agriculture* (Ankara: Economic Planning Division, USAID, 1969), p. 43.

<sup>155</sup> Mehmet Bülbül, “Türkiye Tarımında Kredi Sorunları”, *Ziraat Mühendisliği* 114 (December 1975), p. 17.

since one merchant, for instance deal with all of these three professions.<sup>156</sup> Although the forms of usury highly differ within each other especially in terms of the repayment depending on the type of the crop, agricultural sector, customs, the situation of the harvest etc., we can identify two major forms of usury: Lending money or providing commodity.<sup>157</sup> Producers usually need cash money to compensate their production needs (inputs and consumption expenditures), which led to their search for credits. If they could not supply these credits from official ways, they usually go to the big merchants of the town and ask for cash money. More often, they reimburse their debts with the market goods they produce. However, the value of crops is usually calculated very low compared to market prices. Here, producers not only lose this price difference, they also pay an interest rate after the harvest.<sup>158</sup> The role of intermediary agents also become crucial here since they settle down the prices first, make the deals with producers and give them some money called *alelhesap* (urgent calculus), which has been given to prevent the producer making a deal with another merchant/usurer.<sup>159</sup> These agents perform a constitutive role for the market by reaching producers before cooperatives and setting the price. We will discuss their roles broadly right through the examples presented below.

Before delving into concrete examples, it is necessary to mention a little bit about the other form of usury and especially about the different ways of reimbursement to be

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<sup>156</sup> Mehmet Bülbul, p. 18.

<sup>157</sup> Alper Aktan, “Teşkilatlanmamış Kredi Piyasası”, *Kooperatif Dünyası* 10 (January 1972), p. 8.

<sup>158</sup> Alper Aktan, pp. 8-9.

<sup>159</sup> Alper Aktan, “Teşkilatlanmamış Kredi Piyasasının Türkiye Tarımında Oluşumuna Yardımcı Olduğu Gelişmeler”, *Kooperatif Dünyası* 11 (February 1972), p. 11.

able to illustrate the multifaceted impact of this mechanism in terms of social differentiation among petty commodity producers. The other form of usury is the provision of commodities by usurers, which materializes in two ways. Either usurers supply means of production such as necessary equipments, devices or sometimes seeds, fertilizers etc. or they provide the necessary consumption items of the household, when producers cannot afford them. Producers experiencing the former situation usually pay their debts back with very high interest rates, whereas in the latter one they can repay their debts with the goods they produce.<sup>160</sup> Erdoğan Güçbilmez, in his study about two villages of hazelnut producers, Yenimahalle and Kayadibi of Ordu, gives an important example for the latter situation. Güçbilmez asserts that throughout the years following bad harvests, producers were striving to make barter instead of shopping with money to protect themselves from the usurers.<sup>161</sup> Lastly, the most dramatic impacts of usury mechanism can be observed on the living conditions of sharecroppers, where it enhanced the domination of landowners. The tangible impact of intermediary agents over the market through setting the prices stimulates panic among producers, which creates an underprivileged bargaining atmosphere for sharecroppers. Consequently, landowners usually instigate quite harsh conditions to sharecroppers, while offering less portions from the final harvest, they also compel them to share the debt burden by providing their production inputs and consumption items.<sup>162</sup> This situation got worsened for

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<sup>160</sup> Süleyman Gökeer, “Hayat Pahalılığı ve Kooperatifler”, *Kooperatif Dünyası* 11 (February 1972), p. 2.

<sup>161</sup> Erdoğan Güçbilmez, *Yenimahalle ve Kayadibi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Köy Araştırması* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972), p. 137.

<sup>162</sup> Alper Aktan, “Teşkilatlanmamış Kredi Piyasasının Türkiye Tarımında Oluşumuna Yardımcı Olduğu Gelişmeler”, p. 12.

sharecroppers after 1974 within an atmosphere, where the augmentation of both floor prices and purchasing quotas became more important for the agricultural sector.

Some concrete examples will be more insightful to demonstrate above mentioned statements concretely. An article appeared in *Milliyet* claims that cotton producers annually lose approximately 800-1000 Turkish liras, where this deficit has been recovered with the money taken from the usurers. Consequently, the cumulation of annual debts became intolerable within two, at most three years' time, which led to the disposal of fields sized 10 *dönüm* at a price between 15.000-20.000 Turkish liras.<sup>163</sup> Ziya Gökalp Mülayim also underlines the fact that the progress in the planting technique necessitates new production inputs that are usually imported by the merchants/usurers, where producers forced to buy these items consume more and more for each unit of planting at the end.<sup>164</sup> İlhan Selçuk describes the organization of “exploitation machinery” for cotton, which “regulates the export mechanism” precisely, in five steps:

1. Credits allocated by the cooperatives amounts to one third of whole expenses.
2. Governments intentionally declare the official prices late, where sales cooperatives could not find the cash to sell the products of their shareholders.
3. The gossip mechanism of intermediaries that are employed by merchants and exporters. The most important of these gossips are “This year, there will be abundant amounts of cotton. You won't be able to sell all of them” and “Cotton prices have decreased in the world market, this year cotton does not work out.”
4. These rumors stimulate panic and direct producers to merchants and exporters.
5. Lastly, the usurers who have already bought the cotton while it was on the land by giving cash money to producers.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> M. Şükrü Koç, “Pamuk Sömürüsü”, *Politika*, 4 April 1973.

<sup>164</sup> Ziya Gökalp Mülayim, “Pamuk ve Tefeciler”, *Cumhuriyet*, 12 April 1973.

<sup>165</sup> İlhan Selçuk, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 June 1973.

Here, the impact and function of intermediary agents within this mechanism can easily be discerned. We can give similar examples from hazelnut sector. In his same article İlhan Selçuk states that hazelnut export conveys huge sums of foreign currency that amounts nearly to 500 million Turkish liras. Selçuk states that this situation brings forth two important consequences: Initially, hazelnut production has increased immensely in last ten years and the control of credits by *Ziraat Bankası* and FİSKOBİRLİK has been tightened.<sup>166</sup> An interview conducted with hazelnut producers of Ordu specifically about usurers confirms Selçuk’s observations. An old producers says that

It is nearly impossible to get credits from the bank since they request a merchant bondsman. Why does a merchant sign my credit? Instead, he gives cash to me. Also most our lands are not recorded in the cadastral, we don’t have titles. So, we go to usurer and write down whatever he says, give the interest rate he decides. If he says 40 %, all of us cheer “God bless you!”<sup>167</sup>

Çetiner states that nearly half of average revenue that is approximately 450 million goes to the usurer for each household and the interest rate varies in a very huge range between 300 % and 1000 %.<sup>168</sup> And he claims that nearly % 95 of hazelnut producers in Ordu have debts to usurers. According to Çetiner’s observations, this situation is due to the collaboration of FİSKOBİRLİK officers with intermediaries, the union ignored producers’ price demand that was around 600-650 piasters in 1973 and the hazelnut price in the market was settled around 470-580 piasters. After the hazelnuts were put into the stores, from where they will be exported, the price eventually rose to 720

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<sup>166</sup> İlhan Selçuk, *ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> Yılmaz Çetiner, “Fındık Tefecileri”, *Cumhuriyet*, 8 September 1973, p. 10.

<sup>168</sup> Yılmaz Çetiner, *ibid.*

piasters.<sup>169</sup> Here, it becomes clear that the alleged state intervention to market via floor prices depends mainly on the daily contestations or alliances between intermediaries and state officers rather than the so-called laws of economy. Furthermore, an article assessing the declaration of floor prices in 1975 points out to the structural inequalities pertaining to petty commodity production, which at the same time provides important hints to elucidate the complex social consequences engendered by usury mechanism. Initially, this article states that the high floor prices in 1973 were mostly due to the rising growth rates in the world economy since 1972, where producers paid their debts and succeeded to make some savings for the first time.<sup>170</sup> The author mentions about the floor prices in 1975 and claims that except hazelnut and tobacco, nearly prices of all crops fell down. Moreover, he reminds the fact that average inflation has increased thirty percent at the same junction, where the prices of agricultural commodities did not decrease due to the political choices. Therefore, agricultural enterprises accomplishing large or middle scale production have benefited at the end, where small producers experienced more and more debt burden due to the high inflation in consumption items.<sup>171</sup> Nearly two months later after this article, news from the same paper can illustrate this situation precisely. Olive oil producers from Edremit, Balıkesir complain about the inattentiveness of officers from Ministry of Commerce, where they did not

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<sup>169</sup> Yılmaz Çetiner, p. 11.

<sup>170</sup> Kenan Bulutoğlu, “Taban Fiyatları Açıklanırken”, *Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1975, p. 8. Nükhet Sirman also shares this point and mentions about the producers of Söke who succeeded to buy tractors and were called “the riches of 1973”. Nükhet Sirman, p. 221.

<sup>171</sup> The author also mentions about the decrease in fertilizer prices, where he claims that it did not matter so much due to the amount small producers consume. The price of fertilizers has also been a controversial issue in 1975, where it was claimed that industrialists can acquire fertilizers for the half of the price producers pay since they are allowed to import as raw material. Kenan Bulutoğlu, “Gübrenin Üçte Biri Sanayi Hammaddesi Olarak Tüketiliyor”, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 December 1975.

reduce export floor price timely and TARİŞ missed an important bid in Libya that is an important market for olive oil producers.<sup>172</sup> While, another one appeared next week was carrying the same headline but completely in a different manner, recounts the complaints of cotton producers in Çukurova, who could not pay their debts to ÇUKOBİRLİK and *Ziraat Bankası*.<sup>173</sup> This dilemma reflects the deepening inequality among petty commodity producers. Here, we should mention about two important factors, which transform floor prices to an effective mechanism threatening social justice and consolidating inequalities especially among producers of valuable export crops such as tobacco, hazelnut, cotton, olive and grape. The most important one is the differentiation in landownership. For instance, in his article Ali Balaban points out to the inequalities created by the imbalanced land distribution. He states that the inability of floor prices to rehabilitate structural inequalities has not been recovered by the enlargement of purchasing quotas and he proposes a quota system that should be based on the land size.<sup>174</sup> Balaban correctly underlines the fact that sometimes minuscule differentiations on the land size can lead to important discrepancies in cash returns, where producers usually strive to increase their productivity.<sup>175</sup> Relatedly, second important factor turns out to be the capital, where more cash money means more production and more profit. In Michael Taussig's words, profit accountancy –deepening commodification of social relations- increasingly prevails and becomes the most dominant value within social

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<sup>172</sup> “Zeytinyağı Taban Fsiyatının Üreticinin Zararına Olduğu İleri Sürüldü”, *Politika*, 4 October 1975.

<sup>173</sup> “Pamuk Üreticisi Bu Yılki Taban Fiyat Politikası Yüzünden Borcunu Ödeyemez Durumda”, *Politika*, 11 October 1975.

<sup>174</sup> Ali Balaban, “Tarımsal Üretimde Devlet Desteği”, *Cumhuriyet*, 15 October 1975.

<sup>175</sup> Ali Balaban, *ibid.*



relations. In valuable production sectors especially cotton, hazelnut and tea, all the ways of acquiring cash money (floor prices, usury capital, official credits etc.) become very crucial. M. Ali Akalın, in his important article, stresses the need to request more from state authorities and explains why producers only respond to the low floor prices.<sup>176</sup> Akalın explains the situation with the tendency of “merchantization” among producers in these sectors, where they have become important actors in agribusiness trying to accumulate more capital.<sup>177</sup> Lastly, Hasan Aksoy makes a similar analysis and explains the prevalent domination of usury among hazelnut producers in Ordu with this tendency leading to newer cleavages and generating important tensions among petty commodity producers and with sharecroppers, which we will try to handle particularly in the next chapter.<sup>178</sup> Aksoy resembles this situation to a gamble, where hazelnut producers are making good profits but can lose any moment due to their escalating dependency to usury capital.<sup>179</sup>

In this chapter, by illustrating the sources of rural domination, which are very complex and intermingled mechanisms, we tried to demonstrate that the dependence of rural households and producers on the market conditions increased dramatically in 1970s Turkey, especially with the emergence of an inflationary spiral after 1974. While they are mobilized in Chayanovian fashion to provide commodities cheaper from the market, they did not only increase their overall consumptions and exploit them, but also

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<sup>176</sup> M. Ali Akalın, “Tarımsal Destekleme Politikası ve Taban Fiyatı”, *Ziraat Dünyası* 324 (1977), p. 14.

<sup>177</sup> M. Ali Akalın, p. 22.

<sup>178</sup> Hasan Aksoy, “Taban Fiyatlarının Tarımsal Üretime Etkileri”, *Ziraat Dünyası* 325 (1977), p. 30.

<sup>179</sup> Hasan Aksoy, *ibid*, p. 31.

reproduced and deepened the social inequalities. Here, another important point we would like to stress is the impact of structural opportunities (or differences) and quotidian politics such as daily contestations and alliances over the constitution of political field, which will be handled out in the conclusion section of this study with reference to the regulation of the market mechanism.

## CHAPTER 3

### RURAL GRIEVANCES: RESISTANCE OR COMPLICITY IN CONSERVATION?

Since late sixties, Turkey's countryside witnessed important rural struggles, which mainly stemmed from small producers' grievances over many state policies such as low floor prices, corrupt cooperative officers, late declaration of floor prices, the complicity of state officers with usurers, high prices of production inputs, strict and uniform purchasing quotas a propos of which we have given a comprehensive account in the previous chapter. Besides, it would be wrong to assume that only producers carry out all these rural struggles. Although property structure in Turkish agriculture has chiefly been dominated by small landownership, rural unrest of landless peasants crystallized in land occupations and frequent violent offences against big landowners (*ağa*) especially in Southeastern Anatolia starting from sixties also comprises a vital experience that we will try to discuss below. However, massive demonstrations of cash crop producers in late seventies shape the most important part of this story. In the previous chapter, we have tried to stress the impact of various state policies such as support purchases of cooperatives; enforcement of floor prices over the identification different interests that deepened structural inequalities and generated new tensions in countryside.

In this chapter while trying to offer fragments from various rural struggles, initially we will try to present an outline, an historical sketch delineating the evolution of these struggles and try to understand underlying motivations and interests of the actors. Most importantly, by tracing the nature of demands and deeds performed within these struggles, we will try to comprehend whether cash crop producers tried to consolidate / protect their interests and deepened the process of differentiation or resisted against

market mechanism. The answers provided will offer important clues for grasping the nature of these struggles, whether producers struggled to preserve the existing status quo or to halt and get rid of their increasing dependence on market conditions especially after 1974, where the consequences of populist policies began to be more concrete in the countryside. Within this junction, this question becomes important to shed a little light on the crucial failure of existing arguments concerning state-producer / peasant relations, where whole its complexity has been limited to a simple reciprocity, i.e. peasants vote for populist politicians. These arguments ignore the impact of social actors, where they have been reduced to passive receivers and their aspirations, interests, contestations etc. have been erased. Here, we can employ Nefise Bazoğlu's statement as an important departure point, where she identifies the main aspiration of household strategies and peasant struggles as the integration with the changing market conditions.<sup>180</sup> In this chapter, following Bazoğlu's statement, we will principally try to illustrate that the producers' efforts to adopt themselves to changing market conditions have mainly shaped the course of these struggles. However, we think that it is not possible to mention about a unique form of adaptation, where we will attempt to exemplify these different modes with experiences chosen nearly from a decade.

In the first section, we will discuss some instances from the rural struggles of 1969 and 1970 that range from the demonstrations of petty commodity producers to land occupations, where we will intend to make an outline for the demands introduced by producers and landless peasants. In addition, various forms of direct actions performed by the producers / peasants will be inspected and we will try to understand why they

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<sup>180</sup> Nefise Bazoğlu, p. 32.

were preferred. Here, we will claim that these rural grievances deepened the hegemony crisis of the ruling bloc and forced the governments to implement populist agricultural policies after 12<sup>th</sup> March intervention. Following section will be devoted to the period after 1974 until 1977, which can be considered as a better period especially for producers. We will comment on a number of petitions sent to National Assembly about floor prices and support purchases throughout which we will try to discern the underlying causes of these complaints. Accordingly, we will claim that these petitions signal out the increasing pattern of rural differentiation among petty commodity producers. In the last section, we will investigate a concrete case about hazelnut producers in various districts (Fatsa, Bulancak, Aybastı, Çamaş) of Ordu, where the militants of a radical socialist movement, *Devrimci Yol* (Revolutionary Path) organized important activities. Here, the extraordinary success of a radical socialist movement building a strong hegemony –even the independent candidate of the movement succeeded to become mayor in Fatsa in local elections- among small producers, who are historically considered as conservative due to their individualism and land dependence, will be scrutinized. We will claim that the impact of deteriorating market conditions due to the economic recession had important effects on the consolidation of this hegemony, where ideological and moral hegemony of socialists were not powerful, as it has mythically been praised. As we have mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, we can clearly detect the consequences of agribusiness among hazelnut producers, where the tendency to increase productivity and to accumulate more in order to acquire bigger fields escalated their consumption expenditures and therefore their debts to usurers and to *Ziraat Bankası*. Within this conjuncture, the efforts of socialists against usurers and merchants dealing with the black-market were important reasons for producers to side

with them. However, it is not clear whether they were just pursuing their interests, or believing the maintenance of social justice since these actions were stabilizing the market relations at the same time, in other words preventing conditions to get worse.

### Peasant Struggles in Late Sixties

We can certainly claim that the period after 12<sup>th</sup> November 1969 elections until 12<sup>th</sup> March 1971 was a critical period not only for the ruling bloc to reconsolidate its political hegemony, but also for the socialist left forces to get out of the universities and strengthen their status within ascending working class movement and slowly emerging peasant resistances. These movements were also deepening legitimacy crisis of the ruling bloc, where rural struggles started in 1967 reached to its apex between 1969 and 1970, where the land occupations and demonstrations in villages, which people never heard occupied the national agenda strongly. The increasing interest of leftist university students to peasant struggles mostly stemmed from the intellectual atmosphere of the period<sup>181</sup> rapidly turned out to an alliance, where they went to the villages to organize demonstrations.<sup>182</sup> The first remarkable and probably the most notorious peasant struggle was carried out by the landless peasants in Atalan village of İzmir, who occupied the lands of treasury at the end of January 1969. Mentioning about the similar attempt of Atalan peasants initiated previous year, Hikmet Çetinkaya's observations are noteworthy to cite at length:

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<sup>181</sup> Especially the impact of Maoism on 1968 movement throughout the whole world and the predominance of National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*) thesis among leftist university students, according to which peasantry should be emancipated from feudal remnants with democratic revolution to participate the struggle for socialism.

<sup>182</sup> Gün Zileli, *Yarıлма (1954-1972)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 171.

“We, the peasants of Atalan have occupied the 5.000 *dönüm* lands of six big landowners (*ağa*)... We will start to plow these lands; we will produce grain, cotton, tobacco. A peasant without land?” peasants say. Declaring the endorsement of cadastral officer, Sabri Güleç (village headman) states: “We are not against the laws. According to the cadastral registers, six *ağas* own only 1.500 *dönüm* of whole land. The rest of the lands have been embezzled illegally. If they look, they will notice easily. Rest belongs to the treasury, *ağas* are against the law” Peasants announce that they will go on occupying more lands.<sup>183</sup>

Nearly one week later, Çetinkaya was reporting that the occupation in Atalan has spread to a near village Göllüce, where peasants occupied the fields of Adnan Menderes’s aunt Mesude Evliyazade, or with her nickname *Hanım Ağa*.<sup>184</sup> İlhan Selçuk, in his article published in the same day stated that “*Hanım Ağa*, there is no such pair of sentences to illustrate the order of Turkey, where state lands were confiscated and cultivated by *Hanım Ağa*. This was not only confined to Göllüce. Starting from Viranşehir, state is under the *mütegalibe* sultanate, who confiscated state lands from east to west, north to south.”<sup>185</sup> One day later, it was mentioned that peasants added 300 *dönüms* to the occupied lands, where Kazım Ataman obliged to meet with peasants. It was also stated that the peasants decided to share crops equally since they took equal risk throughout the occupation.<sup>186</sup> Nearly one month after, pressures started over peasants thanks to big landowner Süleyman Gölcüoğlu’s demands from state authorities, where seven peasants were arrested by gendarmeries on 24 February.<sup>187</sup> Moreover, nearly one month after Atalan, Göllüce occupation was crashed after a clash with peasant women, where four of

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<sup>183</sup> Hikmet Çetinkaya, “İşgalci Köylüler İçin Tahkikat Açıldı”, *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1969.

<sup>184</sup> Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Toprak Reformu Dudaklarda Bir Türkü Gibi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1969.

<sup>185</sup> İlhan Selçuk, “Hanım Ağa ve Göllüce Köylüleri”, *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1969.

<sup>186</sup> “Atalan Köylüleri, 300 Dönüm Toprağı Daha İşgal Etti”, *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1969.

<sup>187</sup> Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Jandarma İşgalci Köylülere Baskı Yapıyormuş”, *Cumhuriyet*, 24 February 1969; “Atalan’da Yedi Kişi Tutuklandı”, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1969.

them and a 3-year-old child were wounded.<sup>188</sup> At the outset, these occupations induced a heated debate especially among leftist university students and within RPP circles. Bülent Ecevit, the General Secretary of RPP, denounced the attacks and stated that “this order must change and should be replaced by another one, where honest people can live in humane conditions”<sup>189</sup> Then, the first words of this sentence had been the title of Ecevit’s famous book *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir*, where he wrote similar sentences after the land occupation of Elmalı peasants that assured him for the necessity of a comprehensive land reform.<sup>190</sup> Ecevit’s first visit to Atalan and Göllüce after October 1969 elections demonstrated his conviction about the importance of gaining the hearts and minds of peasantry where he promised to struggle until bringing justice for all landless peasants.<sup>191</sup> The “peasant question” has acquired an important place in RPP’s new populist program –*Ak Günlere*- and afterwards. RPP promised for an effective land reform, democratic cooperative movement, high floor prices, more productivity while maintaining social justice.<sup>192</sup> However, these populist policies of RPP somehow resulted with different and unexpected consequences, which we tried to investigate with

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<sup>188</sup> “Göllüce’de Jandarma Kadınlara Hücum Etti”, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1969.

<sup>189</sup> “Bülent Ecevit Baskı Tedbirlerini Yerd / Silahların Gölgesinde Köylüye Meydan Okunuyor”, *Cumhuriyet*, 24 March 1969.

<sup>190</sup> “I saw peasants of Elmalı, who were arrested for weeks, beaten by gendarmeries for only they wanted to till their land, to live and, demand their rights, whose villages were surrounded by gendarmeries and whose lands were separated by enclosure of wire fences. I saw in the faces and eyes of all men, women and children brightened by the gas lamps in the night, the dawn of the liberation days. I saw the fearlessness and decisiveness of the people who became aware of their rights”. Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1974), p. 144 quoted by Emin Alper, “An Indigineous Social Democracy: The Democratic Left Thought in Turkish Politics, 1972-1975”, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, 2003, p. 9.

<sup>191</sup> Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Atalan ve Göllüce Köylüleri Ecevit’i İlgiyle Karşıladi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 31 October.

<sup>192</sup> For a comprehensive account of the main features of Ecevit’s “neo-peasantism” see Emin Alper, pp. 43-97.



reference to the domination mechanisms of the market. Consequently, Ecevit and RPP's growing concerns for the rural problems provided considerable support for RPP from countryside.<sup>193</sup>

After Atalan and Göllüce, other land occupations also took place. In April 1969, peasants from Karadibek of Gaziatep confiscated 3.000 *dönüm* land, which was about to hire by the landowner. After the clash between peasants and soldiers in Çolaklı village of Manavgat, Antalya that emerged due to the landowners' attempt to confiscate 300 *dönüm* land, 13 peasants were arrested by the gendarmeries.<sup>194</sup> Although we do not have enough evidence to identify the underlying motivations, interests and contestations of the actors of these occupations, an assessment appeared in the same encyclopedia seems to draw the boundaries of these actions well. It is stated that the two categories of peasantry, landless peasants and small producers demanded land to cultivate and fair conditions of exchange from state authorities against landowners and usurers / merchants. Within same comment, it is rightly mentioned that the struggle of landless peasants never took the form of a direct offensive action against the properties of big landowners; instead, peasants mostly confiscated treasury lands or tried to take village commons back. Similarly, small producers' demonstrations were mostly in the form of crowded protests and their most visible response was rejecting to pay their debts to usurers.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Tekeli and Gökçeli make a spatial analysis of the distribution votes in 1973 and 1975 elections, where average rural votes of RPP increased nearly 40 % percent in two elections. İlhan Tekeli and Raşit Gökçeli, *1973 ve 1975 Seçimleri: Seçim Coğrafyası Üzerine Bir Deneme* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), p. 11.

<sup>194</sup> *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, edited by Ertuğrul Kürkçü, vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1988), p. 2137.

<sup>195</sup> *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 2136.

However, their impact and the degree of their radicalism hastened with the austerity measures taken by Demirel government in the beginning of 1970, which brought heavy taxes for commercial capital and for revenues acquired from lands and private estates. We can easily conclude that these measures both altered the distribution relations within dominant classes and the political composition of the ruling coalition, which, according to Yalman, meant a crisis of representation for bourgeoisie similar to the one that the laboring classes were already experiencing.<sup>196</sup> Within this junction, especially in various districts of Southeastern Anatolia escalating rural unrest concomitant with the Kurdish question, turned out to offences against big landowners such as Araplar village of Adıyaman, Irmakbaşı and Küçükkaldırım villages of Adana, and various villages of Pazarcık, Maraş.<sup>197</sup> Similar occupations happened in Kızılcaavlu village of İzmir, where peasants ignited landowners' warehouses and used dynamites to damage machines.<sup>198</sup> With an important degree of labor activism that found its apex in 15-16<sup>th</sup> strikes in all over Marmara region, it was obvious that the escalating radicalism of rural unrest was an important factor that deepened the hegemony crisis of ruling bloc. However, we can easily associate these occupations with the political hegemony of an anti-imperialist and nationalist populism that was highly prevalent among not only socialists and RPP, but also favored by the conservative right. Therefore, peasants who occupied various state lands insistently claimed that the occupation was not against

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<sup>196</sup> Galip Yalman, "Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi: Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi" in *Sürekli Kriz Politikaları: Türkiye'de Sınıf, İdeoloji ve Devlet*, edited by Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2002), p. 63.

<sup>197</sup> Ali Gevgili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), pp. 466-470; Also Ali Gevgili, *Türkiye'de 1971 Rejimi: Tarım Toplumundan Sanayi Toplumuna Geçiş Aşaması* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1973), especially Introduction.

<sup>198</sup> *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 2136.

private property and completely legal. If we consider zealous land reform debates of the period between RPP and Justice Party in the assembly, we can elaborate these occupations as strategic moves of peasants to uphold their demands, rather than direct assaults on the properties of landowners. Probably, peasants were striving to prevent the appropriation of treasury lands by landowners in a probable circumstance of land reform.

On the other hand, these occupations triggered massive producer demonstrations that quickly spread to all country.<sup>199</sup> Concurrent with the occupations, the first demonstration was organized by tobacco producers of Akhisar in 7 February 1969. Gün Zileli exactly describes the cycle of debt burden from the complaints of the peasants that we have tried to identify in the previous chapter:

The most important problem of producers was the low floor prices for tobacco that rendered them more vulnerable to the domination of merchants and usurers. After official prices have been declared, they went to the merchants to sell their tobaccos for a higher price. However, their offer was a little more than the official one. They have knocked the doors of all merchants, since they have made a deal, instead of increasing they were diminishing the prices. Hopelessly, they have gone back to the first merchant, but he gave under the official price... It has been a privilege for producers to sell their tobaccos in the first run even at a very low price, otherwise if they did not have to deliver the tobacco to the usurers owing to their debts.<sup>200</sup>

Nearly 3.000 peasants have joined the open-air demonstration, where a small right wing group organized by Justice Party and usurers from has attacked to the crowd. However, the crowd was quite angry, where aggressors were hardly saved by the police. Most importantly, producers demanded state authorities to take urgent measures against

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<sup>199</sup> Abdullah Aysu, *Türkiye’de Tarım Politikaları* (İstanbul: Özgün Yayıncılık, 2001), p. 201.

<sup>200</sup> Gün Zileli, p. 342.

usurers or *yemekçi* as they have named them.<sup>201</sup> Harun Karadeniz similarly mentions about the tendency of usurers to use violence against tobacco producers in Gerze, who were preparing to make a demonstration in February 1970. Before the demonstration, he recounts how usurers have threatened them and they were kept illegally in the police station. Karadeniz states that the anger of producers was so great that it became harder to calm them in front of TEKEL building that halted purchases this year due to the deficient budget. However, producers were claiming that they have bought the same amount, but this time only from usurers, who confiscated their crops.<sup>202</sup> One month later, again Zileli gives an important account of tobacco growers' demonstration in Alaçam in *Türk Solu*. Zileli also mentions about how his friends were arrested and humiliated by soldiers with the appeal of usurers or *çorbacı* as Alaçam producers call them. Again, the biggest problem was usurers and the way they controlled tobacco prices and controlled the market (sometimes even from 15-50 liras to 25-30 piasters). Another important aspect of Zileli's account was the predominance of anti-imperialist slogans in the demonstration, where he directly associated them with freedom and justice.<sup>203</sup> Although these demonstrations got more and more radical and crowded in the second half of 1970, for instance 135.000 cotton producers from Samandağ and Adana protested low floor prices and thousands of hazelnut producers gathered from various districts of Ordu in 1970 to protest usury rates in hazelnut production. In this demonstration, an old man was

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<sup>201</sup> Gün Zileli, p. 345.

<sup>202</sup> Harun Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1995), p. 132-134.

<sup>203</sup> Gün Zileli, "Alaçam Tütün Mitingi", *Türk Solu* 123 (March 1970), p. 12.

shot dead by a merchant, who was a member of Justice Party.<sup>204</sup> Naci Sönmez, the youngest son of Fikri Sönmez –Fatsa mayor of *Devrimci Yol*- remembers this night: “We were taken to my mother’s village Çaka. I remember that my father had quickly run down to the basement, when house was raided late at night. This was the first time our mother had pushed us under sofa, but not last. Nearly all members of RPP and people known as patriotic, revolutionary, leftist etc. were all arrested that night. Later, we learned that my father was also socialist and a member of Turkish Workers Party (TİP).”<sup>205</sup> Throughout all of these examples, we can easily see how antagonistic relations between producers and usurers easily turned out to violent offensives especially against social democrats and socialists.

While making an overall assessment of these demonstrations we should not overlook two important factors. The former is the sudden decline of terms of internal trade for agricultural goods in 1970<sup>206</sup> that highly diminished floor prices. The second corresponds to the successful opposition of RPP insisting on proposals such as land reform, agricultural social insurance, democratic credit system etc., especially with the impact of TWP’s electoral success in the countryside. In addition, this impact had increased with university students’ explicit support for rural struggles. Nevertheless, we can easily claim that the rural struggles of the period succeeded to make an important effect on the national agenda, where every antagonism between usurers and producers also reflected in the National Assembly between RPP and JP.

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<sup>204</sup> *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 2152.

<sup>205</sup> Mahmut Memduh Uyan, *Toplumsal Dalganın Kırılışı: Fatsa (1978-1980)* (Ankara: Arayış Yayınları, 2004), p. 25.

<sup>206</sup> Ergün Kip, *ibid*, 159.

## Rural Conflicts in 1970s: The Problem of Socialist Hegemony

As we have mentioned in the first chapter, Feroz Ahmad associates the notable appeal for a strong welfare state after 12<sup>th</sup> March takeover by the military's insistence on many proposals such as land reform, planned economic development and the transfer of wealth from agriculture to industry. Although there is some truth in this view, we should not underestimate the impact of intensifying social mobilization that forced ruling elite to execute more effective welfare policies. Especially, with the political alliance of JP and the industrial bourgeoisie of İstanbul after 1973 elections rendered RPP's growing concerns for lower classes more and more visible. In this sense, Ecevit and his agricultural policy minister Ziya Gökalp Mülayim's efforts to make Turkey a "paradise of small producers" were crucial. Emin Alper effectively shows the in-betweenness of Ecevit and Mülayim among two set of proposals recommended for land reform within RPP circles. Çelik Arıoba, who claimed that the any increase in the revenues of peasants was closely related with high productivity in land, represented the more capitalistic tendency in RPP. Arıoba also affirmed that the distribution of big parcels to peasantry could not achieve social justice alone. On the other hand, Necdet Tuna, who represented the collectivist tendency, was proposing that the production cooperatives were indispensable to raise peasant productivity.

However, Ecevit and Mülayim were critical of both of these views, where the former corresponds to the arguments of landowners, the latter was proposing *kolhoz* – Soviet type state owned farms.<sup>207</sup> Here, it is very remarkable to notice Ecevit's naïve and

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<sup>207</sup> Emin Alper, pp. 74-76.

simplistic conception of market, where he did not want give concessions to the popular developmentalism mentality of the period that favored rapid industrialism. Ecevit's agrarian populism dreams a "happy, politically active and hardworking peasant" that would be the base of Turkish modernization and the forerunner of economic development.<sup>208</sup> Alper precisely stresses that Ecevit believed –under the influence of Kemal Tahir- that the peasants were alien to greed, enthusiasm for profit making and individualism. In *Ak Günlere*, it was stated that the peasants are the ones who saved the most, unlike the private entrepreneurs who tried to increase their standard of living first and then save. According to Ecevit, these peculiarities of Turkish peasants prove that they could be the carriers of a social democratic modernization like in the Western countries.<sup>209</sup> Alper interprets Ecevit's agrarian populism as a third way between socialism and individualistic capitalism, where Ecevit imagines a country of small producers on the rural areas and shareholders in the industrial regions who will be organized in "people's sectors", a third sector completely different from state and society sectors. İlhan Tekeli identifies Ecevit's proposal of "people's sector" as an impossible dream and claims that "in an environment, where Turkish bourgeoisie increases its power everyday, it is not possible to empower marginal classes only with economic democracy."

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<sup>208</sup> Emin Alper, p. 77.

<sup>209</sup> Emin Alper, p. 86. Also for an interesting article with reference to "invention of tradition" that explains how Ecevit imagined the peculiarities of Turkish people, while oscillating between Westernism and Third Worldism see Emin Alper, "Milliyetçilik-Modernleşme Geriliminde 'Ortanın Solu' ve Ecevit", *Toplum ve Bilim* 93 (2002), pp. 110-141.

Although not intentionally, Tekeli somehow estimates the end of Ecevit and asserts that “it is not possible to persuade bourgeoisie for land reform by insisting that “If peasants gain more, they will spend more and this will increase the demand for industrial goods”<sup>210</sup> According to Tekeli, Ecevit was completely denying the logic of capitalism since bourgeoisie does not have to give to raise the demand.<sup>211</sup> Although Ecevit denies the logic of capitalism, he was right since peasants gained more, spent more and tried to accumulate more in late 1970s. Especially with the high inflation rate for consumer goods after 1974, this situation led to an important degree of deprivation among small producers as we have tried to illustrate in the previous chapter. In this section, we will try to depict several different forms of resistance maintained by the producers against this situation. Throughout petitions written to National Assembly after 1974, we have encountered a sample requesting similar demands. A petition sent from Solhan, Bingöl represents a good example. Here, Ahmet Uçar and his friends had complained about the floor prices for the tobacco they have produced. They claimed that their cotton had a high quality, but the floor prices were set in contrast to low quality tobacco. They demanded from TEKEL to be registered under Bitlis / Muş subdivision, where prices were set for high quality tobacco.<sup>212</sup> In the answer given to Uçar and his friends, it was stated that responsible experts would investigate the quality of their tobacco as soon as possible. However, we can plausibly estimate that such situations

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<sup>210</sup> İlhan Tekeli and Erdoğan Soral, *Halk Sektörü Sorunu* (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayınları, 1976), p. 23. Also İsmail Cem criticizes the idea of “people’s sector” in a similar vein in the pages of his own paper, *Politika*, throughout March 1974.

<sup>211</sup> İlhan Tekeli and Erdoğan Soral, p. 31.

<sup>212</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 5793, 23.06.1976.



usually correspond to deceptions performed by producers since we have come across various petitions demanding the dismissal of pecuniary punishments. The petition sent by Osman Var and his friends was significant in this sense. They demanded the dismissal of fines they obliged to pay due to their deceptive acts while selling tobaccos. They claimed that they did not do anything deceptive and stated that experts and usurers were slandering. Although, experts and usurers generally have close patronage relations, in this case it was quite impossible since in the petition Var his friends signed as the head officers of Doğanca, Yeşilyazı and Şeyhören villages of Bafra, where it is quite unexpected for usurers and experts to disagree with head officers.<sup>213</sup>

Another important consequence of high floor prices is the widespread tendency of peasants to cancel or ignore their debts as we can follow from the answers given to the complaints concerning the advance payments. In a petition written from Beşiri, Batman of Siirt, İbrahim Batit claims that tobacco producers in his district, including him, could not get advance payments this year. The answer provided from TEKEL was interesting to show the control capacity of state apparatus. It was stated that this year the distribution of payments had been accomplished by drawing lots and the villages that had previous debts were not included to lots. It was also mentioned that İbrahim Batit had annually sold quite important amounts of tobacco to TEKEL; it was incomprehensible for him not to pay back his debts.<sup>214</sup> Last important point that we can associate with high floor prices is the complaints of peasants, who only produce for the internal market that illustrates a significant insight not only for social stratification

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<sup>213</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 5793, 24.02.1976.

<sup>214</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 6619, 20.12.1976.

among petty commodity producers, but also for the regional differentiation. These kinds of complaints usually had come from pulse producers such as bean, lentil, pea etc. In a petition signed as Mehmet Akçer and his friends, it was stated that they still could not get back the money of lentils that they have sold. Although it seems like an ordinary complaint petition, the answer given points out to an important point. It was stated that *Ziraat Bankası* had loaned 30 million Turkish liras for paybacks and it was none of this commission's business to answer your questions about the injustice produced by a uniform floor price mechanism.<sup>215</sup> Here, the question probably mentioned about the unfairness generated by an uniform floor price mechanism, where the amounts had been determined according to same life conditions (inflation, average consumption expenditures etc.), but market conditions were not taken into account.

The last point we have mentioned above is very crucial to understand various concrete rural resistance practices took place in late seventies, which will be the last concern of this chapter. As an important example, we will shortly investigate various political activities of *Devrimci Yol*, the most widespread radical socialist movement of 1970s in Turkey.<sup>216</sup> While investigating *Devrimci Yol* journal, we will particularly try to understand how this movement could be too prevailing in the countryside. Especially, the letters came to the journal from various parts of the country will be insightful to shed a little light on this question. Lastly, we will specifically take a glance at the activities of the movement in Ordu among hazelnut producers and try to understand the meaning of

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<sup>215</sup> T.B.M.M. Dilekçe Karma Komisyonu Başkanlık Divanı Haftalık Karar Cetveli, no. 5793, 21.02.1977.

<sup>216</sup> There is a myth about the prevalence of *Devrimci Yol* that, in one of his speeches after 1980 *coup d'état*, Kenan Evren exclaimed "If we did not come, they will come. *Yıldız yumruklular* will come!". "*Yıldız yumruk*" was the symbol of this movement. For a short account of *Devrimci Yol* that confirms this analysis, see *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, p. 2256-2261.

these political actions for producers with reference to market conditions. We can start from a letter that came from Göncü village of Afşin, Maraş, where peasants clashed with landowners, who tried to confiscate their common land, had written to express their commitment to the struggle of landless peasants and to *Devrimci Yol* to “solve their economic problems.”<sup>217</sup> In the same page, another letter written from Topardıç village of Bolu employs the same sentence and expresses the peasants’ commitment to *Devrimci Yol* that will solve them by defeating the imperialism of EEC and US.<sup>218</sup> Next letter is probably going to clear the ambiguity of the statement about “solving economic problems”: The revolutionaries from the villages of Kocahıdır and Hasköy request articles about floor prices (especially sunflower) to be published the journal for their struggle.<sup>219</sup> Another good example is from Başoba village of Hopa, where *Devrimci Yol* supporters reported that they have struggled against the prohibition about providing wood from the forest to use in the winter, expelled fascist gatekeepers from the forest and confiscated two trucks carrying woods illegally.<sup>220</sup> Letter from Güldere village comprises one of the numerous examples, where peasants have expressed their wishes for water, electricity, village clinic etc<sup>221</sup>. We can enumerate these examples, where there are even letters that requested house from *Devrimci Yol* after an earthquake, or letters that demanded help from *Devrimci Yol* to chase some men from their villages,

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<sup>217</sup> “Göncü Mezrası”, *Devrimci Yol* 3 (1 June 1977).

<sup>218</sup> “Topardıç Köyü”, *Devrimci Yol* 3 (1 June 1977).

<sup>219</sup> “Kocahıdır ve Hasköylü Devrimciler Dergimiz İçin Bağış Kampanyası Açtı”, *Devrimci Yol* 9 (19 September 1977).

<sup>220</sup> “Başoba”, *Devrimci Yol* 14 (3 February 1978).

<sup>221</sup> “Güldere Köyünden Devrimci Yola”, *Devrimci Yol* 15 (21 February 1978).

which were denounced as immoral and corrupt (also fascist to capture attention), where the issue was not mentioned completely.

Consequently, *Devrimci Yol* perfectly satisfies the criteria of a “practical ideology”, which “makes the conditions of life intelligible to the masses, and which exercise a practical and material force by organizing their actions” as it is identified by Stuart Hall. This kind of movements were usually branded as populist, for instance Necmi Erdoğan also discusses *Devrimci Yol* comparing with Ecevit populism by employing Laclau’s trajectory, where populism has completely been reduced to a discursive level.<sup>222</sup> However, Erdoğan and many other analyses do not take into account the importance of this “practical ideology” in terms of market relations, also in terms of analyzing the true nature of this movement’s hegemony. Since, such a big appeal for a socialist movement (for any political movement, party etc) cannot only stem from its ideological plausibility, but also its practical capabilities and physical presence also matter. While analyzing the prevalence of *Devrimci Yol*, the latter emphasized factors become very crucial. Especially, the relation of the militants of this movement with petty commodity producers is probably the best example illustrating this situation. Another myth for *Devrimci Yol* is Fatsa, a small district of Ordu, where most of the population make their living by producing hazelnut. Before the movement’s candidate has been elected as mayor of Fatsa<sup>223</sup>, the militants of *Devrimci Yol* has organized three important demonstrations with producers called “End to the Exploitation of Hazelnut” (*Fındıkta*

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<sup>222</sup> Necmi Erdoğan, “Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol’a: 1970’lerde Sol Popülizm Üzerine”, *Toplum ve Bilim* 78 (1998), pp. 22-36.

<sup>223</sup> The story of this election has elegantly been written by Pertev Aksakal, *Bir Yerel Yönetim Deneyi* (İstanbul: Simge Yayınları, 1985).

*Sömürüye Son*) in Fatsa, Ünye and Çamaş. Although we could not acquire, they have published a special issue of the journal that was completely separated for hazelnut production, the exploitation mechanism in hazelnut sector and petty commodity production in general and proposals for solution. From the oral history study of Mahmut Memduh Uyan –an old guerilla of the movement, we can learn how they did get into contact with producers and also how they were treated and perceived by them. Mehmet Gümüş claims that “one of the most important activities of *Devrimci Yol* was the struggle against black-marketing and usury, where producers had unbelievable amounts of debt” and asserts that “we gained respect and prestige when we raided cache and confiscated the goods that were stocked. It was a little bit different for usury. We usually went to the usurer and threatened him.”<sup>224</sup> Kadir Özyurt describes in details the revolutionaries’ attitude against usurers: “*Devrimci Yol* had nearly eliminated usurers. They had warned everybody just to pay the principal to usurers, not a piaster more. Nobody could courage to accomplish usury explicitly. I had experienced a similar situation. With one of my friend, I had gone to Fikri Sönmez and mentioned about the situation. Sönmez uttered, ‘It is impossible. He is aware our decisions?’ and assigned this situation to one of his friend. We went together to usurer’s office and told him the situation. Usurer threatened us. Then, we went again with the revolutionaries and he apologized as if nothing happened. He requested the interest and could not exaggerate. Later, I had only paid the principal. Most of these usurers were members of Justice Party or fascist Nationalist Action Party. They gathered and went to Ankara to speak to some

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<sup>224</sup> Mahmut Memduh Uyan, p. 31.

important people.”<sup>225</sup> Although Özyurt identifies the situation broadly, Naci Sönmez touches upon a very important point in his account: “Producers work only one month and solve their financial problems with usurers in the remaining times by borrowing money with high interest rates. Nevertheless, I can now understand that it was their preference to live like that. *Devrimci Yol* tried to prevent parasitic groups to earn illegitimate profits and at the same time tried to create a new life by defending the rights of the people. However, as you can guess, it is not possible to create a new world in one night.”<sup>226</sup> Sönmez seems to be more aware of the preferences of common people, but his account does not provide us any hints about producers’ inclination to *Devrimci Yol*. Yaşar Durmuş’s account is more crucial in this sense: “We begin to get crowded more and more everyday among hazelnut producers as we had started to deal with their concrete problems such as usury, floor prices etc.” and states that “they were seeing us as the insurance of their lives.”<sup>227</sup> It is obvious that *Devrimci Yol* movement had exercised a practical and material force while organizing their actions. However, while offering some blueprints for a new life, this force seems to be trapped within the boundaries of the narrow interests of hazelnut producers. Although, it is not possible to evaluate the whole complexity of a movement from a single standpoint like the one Erdoğan did by employing Laclau’s articulationist logic, where Ecevit’s hegemonic project was articulated to the hegemony of bourgeoisie and the hegemonic project of

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<sup>225</sup> Mahmut Memduh Uyan, p. 32.

<sup>226</sup> Mahmut Memduh Uyan, p. 37.

<sup>227</sup> Mahmut Memduh Uyan, p. 47.

*Devrimci Yol* was articulated to the hegemony of proletariat.<sup>228</sup> Nevertheless, such an argument overlooks the content of the social bases of these movements and how and why they were mobilized. Here, the question is not the dichotomy between consent and resistance derived mainly from a basic understanding of hegemony, but what interests constitute this hegemony. In our opinion, hazelnut producers that were badly in need of market stability due to the deteriorating market conditions strongly effected the consolidation of the socialists' physical hegemony, whereas their ideological and moral hegemony were not powerful as the various testimonies illustrated here delineate. Although we could not find enough evidences to verify this situation, the lack of resistance against and afterwards 12<sup>th</sup> September *coup d'etat* can be evaluated as an important blueprint to reconsider the class nature of leftist hegemony before 1980<sup>229</sup>, especially the decade between two military takeovers. If we are to reconsider the class hegemony of *Devrimci Yol* in the countryside, it was mainly composed of petty commodity producers perceiving revolutionaries as “the guarantee of their lives”, but who have also chosen a more stable alternative, the military to regulate the markets. Since they were pursuing their interests synchronically, they were hiring more sharecroppers and opening or buying new fields to accumulate more at the same time.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Necmi Erdoğan, pp. 21-22.

<sup>229</sup> Alev Özkazanç and Süreyya Tamer Kozaklı, “Hegemonya Siyaseti, Sol ve Devrimci Demokrasi”, *Mürekkep* 14 (2000), p. 25.

<sup>230</sup> Similar to Hann, Abdülkerim Sönmez has also inspected this situation in his article about the structural transformation of big landownership among hazelnut producers. Sönmez claims that due to many reasons like impact of outmigration, dividing of lands by marriages, enhancement of other economic opportunities, diminishing export quantities and most importantly, the scarcity of familial labor brought a relative equal share of lands with the emergence of a remarkable sharecropper segment working with daily wages with the second half of 1970s. Abdülkerim Sönmez, “Doğu Karadeniz Bölgesi Fındık Üretim Kuşağında Toprak Ağalığı, Köylülük ve Kırsal Dönüşüm”, *Toplum ve Bilim* 88 (2001), pp. 92-93.

Lastly, we should always remember Murat Belge's statement on the inability of socialist left before 1980 to change the daily lives of subaltern classes since being always candidate to govern, not to sublate.<sup>231</sup>

In the conclusion section, we will try to present a short theoretical snapshot, which tries to consider all of these accounts together with reference to populism, market and power relations.

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<sup>231</sup> Murat Belge, "The Tragedy of Turkish Left", *New Left Review* 126 (1981), pp. 60-61.



## CONCLUSION: POPULISM AS A MARKET STRATEGY

Welfare state, populism, and most importantly developmentalism, all of these concepts gained their hegemonic meanings within the politically stabilized atmosphere of Cold War era, where a certain logic economy has been invented –economy as an isolated sphere of reality. According to Polanyi, this “great transformation” was that the economy was “disembedded” from the social relations in which they had been previously contained. Polanyi notes that with the emergence of the market economy, land and labor, which previously could not be detached from their natural and human contexts, started to be treated as market goods.<sup>232</sup> From the work of Karl Polanyi to some of the last writings of Michel Foucault, there have been several accounts of the emergence of the economy as a sphere of government or self-regulation in Europe during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Timothy Mitchell claims that all of these accounts, from the emergence of economy as the separation of market relations from the wider social networks in which they were previously embedded and constrained (Polanyi) to depicting the economy as a field of political regulation formed by governmental practices (Foucault) overlooked an unexpected fact. No political economists of 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century wrote about an object called “the economy”, in fact political economists of the middle decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century expanded its meaning to refer to this proper management at the level of political order, where “the economy came into being as a self-contained, internally dynamic, and statistically measurable sphere of social

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<sup>232</sup> Karl Polanyi, *Büyük Dönüşüm: Çağımızın Sosyal ve Ekonomik Kökenleri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), pp. 114-124.

action”<sup>233</sup>. Beside Mitchell’s exceedingly doubtful points on the origins of political economy, his illustration of economy in terms of calculability and autonomy has some valid consequences if we are to reflect on the formation of strong national economies and nation-states before and during the postwar era. Mitchell argues that the construction of economy in this way made it something that can only be “intervened by an externally situated state”. He underlines that the state was no more considered an actor directly participating in the economic processes, it was no more considered within the economic field. Rather, economic activities of the state were thought to be intervention from outside to the economic field, which had its particular dynamics.<sup>234</sup> This situation is also related to a second theme, that of human agency. Here, what seems politically more crucial is how the discourse of various economic models –most importantly Keynesianism and developmentalist models- constitutes and changes human experiences and actual power relations. However, the class nature of these models was subsumed under a utilitarian-materialist perspective on politics, where some rational, interest-seeking social actors gather for their own interests and engage in political action. Conversely, the supposed inability of certain actors –mostly peasants- to calculate their situation provided the justification for an entire politics of social improvement.

Existing literature on Turkey’s Republican era and postwar period reflect a similar kind of thinking, where the emergence of welfare state practices or the implementation of developmentalist policies were elaborated retrospectively departing

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<sup>233</sup> Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), p. 4.

<sup>234</sup> Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, State” in *State Formation After The Cultural Turn*, edited by George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 76-97.

from the necessity to formulate a fair set of solutions for the escalating amounts of poverty, social exclusion and societal destruction accompanied with neo-liberalism. Although presenting a comprehensive historiographic critique of this literature is an important task especially in terms of these arguments' political implications, in this study we tried to show that the utilitarian discursive structures of these models conceal the class nature of quotidian politics. In his article about the welfare state practices in Turkey, Nadir Özbek presents an important critique of this understanding and identifies social welfare policies and Keynesianism in particular both as the formal intervention of modern state and as the main source of legitimacy for these interventions that conceals existing asymmetric and unequal power relations to maintain sustainable governance.<sup>235</sup> Second problematic feature of similar approaches is about their general definition of market or market relations, where states and markets are separated from each other and the eternity of market relations are emphasized with reference to above mentioned rational, interest-seeking social actors that exactly means the inability of calculation Mitchell denotes.

Studying this inability of calculation necessitates defining existing power relations among human beings as social agents, where economic activity has not been disengaged from the social relations within which they are embedded. Here, we should certainly investigate what the market is and how the market tools –which we exactly do not know- operate that was legitimized in terms of ahistorical, universalized laws of economy. “The economy must”, as Michael Callon has convincingly suggested, “operate

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<sup>235</sup> Nadir Özbek, ““Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Sosyal Devlet”, *Toplum ve Bilim* 92 (2002), pp. 29-30.

as a series of boundaries, distinctions, exceptions, and exclusions.”<sup>236</sup> Depicting how the field of economy is enframed, how it is decided what should be taken inside of the frame, and what should be left outside is to reflect on social power relations and the conflicts they inevitably generated. This focus on how the market mechanism works, what kind of power relations does it constitute and how does it alter the prevailing ones –ethnography of market relations- will highlight the political motivations behind popular mobilizations –consent or resistance. Moreover, it will also shed light on the identification process of different class interests within a structured totality.

You can identify market as a domain of economic interaction where prices are responsive to what they call supply and demand. Unless impeded by non-market forces, all markets emerge because of a natural inclination to exchange, and have a natural and spontaneous inclination to evolve into a perfect self-regulating one, in which resources are distributed efficiently, if not justly. You can also claim that this approach cannot come close to account for the historical and social conditions that create and sustain the conditions of possibility of such a market, then markets require an institutional structure such as the state. In this perspective, institutions directly affect economic outcomes and market agents use them to reach certain ends. However, as Callon argues both of these accounts fall short of providing an explanation of actual market practices, their emergence, and the non-institutional relations of power, which together inform how agents make a market. Moreover, this idea links the agents with an

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<sup>236</sup> Michel Callon, “An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by Sociology”, in *The Laws of the Markets*, edited by Michel Callon (Oxford, Madlen: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), pp. 265-269.

a priori identity endowed with a set of fixed and stable preferences to a rigid structure within which the framework of individual actions are situated.<sup>237</sup>

Consequently, these debates became meaningless in the late 1970s when the neo-liberal free market reform started throughout the world. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a number of new interdisciplinary approaches to the market challenged the terms of the debate. These developments also provided new theoretical opportunities in field research. Opening up the black box of markets revealed that it was no more than a blank space, occupied by a diversity of changing social relations both in the West and in non-West.<sup>238</sup> It was argued that the assumed characteristics of markets, which facilitated economic analysis –such as information or rationality–, were highly relative and contextual and that it was very difficult not only for market agents but also for social scientists to acquire information.<sup>239</sup> Many of these studies argue that many existing analyses, drawing on formal economic models, continually reproduce and discover their own assumptions in actual market relations. These studies, especially Callon’s writings dwell on the embeddedness of markets and illustrate some important common points. Initially, two statements have been criticized harshly: The presence of invisible borders of markets and the unstableness of the object of exchange. Secondly, law plays a major role in creating the conditions for maintaining a network of relations and exchange. Law guarantees, to a certain extent, the success of what Callon calls framing, and thus makes

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<sup>237</sup> Michel Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics” in *The Laws of the Markets*, edited by Michel Callon (Oxford, Madlen: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 8.

<sup>238</sup> Koray Çalışkan, “Market Maintenance: Cotton, Power and Poverty in Egypt, Turkey and Abroad”, Unpublished paper, International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University (November, 2003), p. 18.

<sup>239</sup> Koray Çalışkan, p. 19.

possible the transfer of ownership. All markets rely on juridical, administrative systems and tools, which govern the conduct of sellers and buyers. The institutionalization of private property, without which selling and buying is impossible, has the greatest impact on the capacities of agents of a market. Without this framework, it is simply not possible for the two lines of demand and supply to intersect with one other. Another constitutive part of the markets is the market specialists and economists. They define and analyze markets, calculate prices and become instrumental in shaping it. Hence, markets become visible in the technical pictures drawn by these specialists. Without mapping the market, it is not possible to talk about it, at least for the majority of specialists.<sup>240</sup> In Callon's words, "The regularities, related to the stabilization and particular forms of organizations of market relations, remain limited in time and space. However, the experts seem to be working according to quasi-natural laws, independent of time and space."<sup>241</sup> Consequently, the act of buying and selling is the outcome of political contestations waged outside of the place of exchange. The price summarizes the outcome of the exchange in a particular instance. Çalışkan vividly illustrates that the webs of dynamic relations of power, which transcend local, regional, and scientific boundaries determine the market price. And with reference to the infamous Foucauldian question: "What means are available to us today if we seek to conduct a non-economic analysis of

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<sup>240</sup> Koray Çalışkan, pp. 20-21.

<sup>241</sup> Michel Callon, "Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics" in *The Laws of the Markets*, edited by Michel Callon (Oxford, Madlen: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 47.

power?”, he claims that the study of markets is not essentially different from studying power.<sup>242</sup>

Following above insights on the constitution of market relations, this study tried to understand populism as strategy that is concomitant with the capital accumulation logic of different developmentalist models, particularly Keynesianism, and regulates the unevenness of capitalist power relations. This strategy has been rendered effective with a variety of economic democracy that initially increases consumption and income distribution, not as acts of social justice, rather as a requirement for capital accumulation, where capital tries to overcome ISI barriers throughout 1960s and 1970s, in the heydays of developmentalism. Secondly, populism has been evaluated as an important medium, throughout which the discourses and practices of development are conveyed and the differentiation of interests are reproduced, it is always prone to be a counter-discourse of oppositional groups who can accomplish the same by contesting a particular hegemonic configuration of “development”. However, when the constitution and regulation of market has been investigated, comprehending these reproduction processes necessitates understanding the contestation of existing power relations, whether it is a real resistance or just a form of an adaptation to changing market conditions.

In today’s Turkey, the common illusion about the government of Justice and Progress Party (AKP) as the defender of social justice is particularly related with the prevalent understanding of populism that is reminiscent of modernizationist approaches. However, with the hegemonic reconfiguration of the contradiction between capital and

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<sup>242</sup> Koray Çalışkan, p. 24.

labor in different realms other than that of national level makes it hard to sustain these kind of policies.



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