

***YÜZELLİLİKLER* and SÜLEYMAN ŞEFİK KEMALİ:  
A LEGITIMACY AND SECURITY ISSUE**

by

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## ABSTRACT

An Abstract of the Thesis of Şerife Özkan for the degree of Master of Arts at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, 17 January 2004

Title: *Yüzellilikler* and Süleyman Şefik Kemali: A Legitimacy and Security Issue

This thesis studies the *Yüzellilikler*, the 150 names decided upon by the government to remain outside of the general amnesty included in the Treaty of Lausanne, and the case of Süleyman Şefik Kemali Söylemezoğlu, who was on that list for having assumed the command of the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye* (Caliphal Army). The period under study, the last years of the Ottoman Empire, was a special period in Ottoman history because after 23 April 1920 there were two centers of power: İstanbul and Ankara. These fought each other and both were active in diplomacy until the Peace Conference at Lausanne. Throughout the Turkish War of Independence the struggle between Ankara and İstanbul was one of legitimacy. But after the war an internal security problem arose for the new regime, for the enemies of the new regime might have taken some actions against the young Turkish Republic. To keep those potential enemies away, the new government decided to send into exile some politicians, military, journalists, and policemen. A total of 150 persons, called the “*Yüzellilikler*”, were excluded from the general amnesty stipulated by the Treaty of Lausanne.

## ÖZET

Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde yüksek lisans derecesi için Şerife Özkan tarafından 17 Ocak 2004 tarihinde teslim edilen tezin kısa özeti.

Başlık: *Yüzellilikler* ve Süleyman Şefik Kemali: Bir Meşruiyet ve Güvenlik Meselesi

Bir siyasi tarih çalışması olan bu tez, Kurtuluş Savaşı (1919-1922) boyunca Ankara hükümetinin meşruiyet ve güvenlik meseleleri, bunun bir sonucu olarak “*Yüzellilikler*”, hükümet tarafından Lausanne Barış Antlaşmasıyla ilan edilen genel affın dışında bırakılmasına kara verilen 150 kişi, ve “*Yüzellilikler*”e bir örnek olarak, Kuvva-I İnzibatiye kumandanı olduğu için listeye konulan Süleyman Şefik Kemali Söylemezoğlu’nu ele almıştır. Çalışma için seçilen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun son yılları, Osmanlı tarihinde oldukça özel bir dönemdir çünkü 29 Ekim 1920’den sonra resmi olarak Osmanlı Devletinin iki iktidar merkezi olmuştur, Ankara ve İstanbul. Bu merkezlerin her ikisinde Lozan Barış antlaşmasına kadar hem birbirleriyle hem de dış siyasetin dayatmalarıyla mücadele ettiler. Savaş boyunca Ankara ve İstanbul arasındaki mücadele meşruiyet meselesine dayanıyordu fakat savaşın ardından bu mesele yeni Türkiye rejimi için bir iç güvenlik sorunu haline geldi çünkü bazı tedbirler alınmazsa yeni yapının düşmanları genç Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne karşı bazı hareketlerde bulunabilirdi, bunları uzakta tutabilmek için yeni yönetim, politikacılar, askerler, gazeteciler, güvenlik güçleri ve Osmanlı halkı içinde bir tasfiyeye giriştiler. 150 kişilik bir liste hazırlandı ve bu listede isimleri geçenler “*Yüzellilikler*” olarak adlandırılarak, Lozan Barış Antlaşmasıyla ilan edilen genel affın dışında tutuldu.

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## INTRODUCTION

There can be no doubt that the first important event that changed the worldwide balances in the twentieth century was the First World War. Expected at the beginning to last a maximum of six months by the European states, the conflict lasted for four years. Naturally, this war remained at the top of the agenda of both the victorious and the defeated states and that of the entire world for a long time.

The Ottoman Empire was among the defeated states and it started to struggle with new problems both internal and external, following the signing of the armistice, just as the other defeated states did. The chain of events that occurred in this period called the “Armistice Period” or the “National Struggle” began with the occupation of Anatolia by Entente forces and continued with the formation of the Turkish National Forces. The process reached the climax with the Turkish War of Independence.

Parallel to this war there started yet another struggle between İstanbul and the national forces in Anatolia, whose leadership seized this opportunity to usher in a change of regime. This situation continued from the summer 1919 to 1922 November, by which time the winner was Anatolia.

When the winning side became definite, naturally a period of settlement followed. With the signing of the Mudanya Armistice (11 October 1922) a new armistice period began but this time it was for Ankara not for İstanbul. From the beginning of that process two important subjects were on the agenda. First of them was naturally the negotiations for peace, and the second was the settling of the accounts with the internal opposition. Actually the opposition was going to be purge the generic indictment “treason to fatherland.”

All people who had been against the National Struggle were defined as traitors and the most important reason of that definition was the legitimacy struggle between Ankara and İstanbul. Ankara was the winner of the National Struggle but its success was military. It had to complete this military victory by founding a new regime. The abolition of the sultanate on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1922 was the first and the most important step of that process thereby Ankara got a rid of a major obstacle on the way to the establishment of a sound basis for its legality. As a sequel to this step, many people who had sided with the sultan had to be delegitimized as well. Other source of danger was the persons, families -like Çapanoğulları-, or groups that had fought actively against the National Struggle. They had been practically in cooperation with İstanbul the enemy and therefore they could be a threat on the way to the establishment of the new regime.

Actually while the Turkish National Assembly was doing its best to achieve victory, it also began to judge the persons who had been acting against it through the *Ankara Bidayet Mahkemesi* (Tribunal of First Instance) and the *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (Independence Court). However, in absentia verdicts had to be postponed. After the abolition of the Sultanate, the Treaty of Lausanne was to give a new opportunity to purge the opposition. One of the implementations was to exclude 150 persons from the general amnesty decided at the Lausanne Peace Conference as a result of long discussions. Thus, the subject that is known today as the “*Yüzellilikler Meselesi*” (the issue of the 150s) appeared.

The 150s, which are the subject of this study, have not been the subject of a thesis before. Articles and books on this subject are only a few. One of the best studies among these works is undoubtedly, *Yüzellilikler yahut Milli Mücadele'nin*



*Muhasebesi* by Kamil Erdeha.<sup>1</sup> The most important characteristic of this book is the fact that it is the most analytical one about the subject. Other important sources on the topic are minutes of the Assembly debates, memoirs and newspapers.

This thesis, as the subject is taken up from different points of view, seeks to clarify the points reached in the fight for legality between the *ancien*, İstanbul, and the *nouveau*, Ankara. The method of solving the argument between Ankara and İstanbul with the number 150, the choice of the persons who were included in this list by the Ankara government and the possible underlying reasons for the preparation of the list will be discussed. Were these 150 persons on the list the victims of a settlement between two sides or did they pose a threat to the new regime as they had to the National Struggle in the past? In this direction, the first part of the study is focused on the issue of the 150s. The sub-headings of this section are as follows: who were the 150s? How was this subject put on the agenda of the Lausanne Conference? What were the material factors of the crimes which had been committed by the persons included in the list of 150s? What were the arguments during the preparation of the list in the Assembly? The section concludes by providing some examples.

The second part of this study looks at the life of one of the men included in the list of the 150s, Süleyman Şefik Paşa. There are two reasons for this focus, the first of which is to study one of the main actors of the event in closer detail and to establish the points of the foundation for the thesis. The second, reason is beyond the scope of this thesis, Süleyman Şefik Paşa lived in the periods of Abdülhamid II, the Second Constitutional Monarchy and the Turkish National Struggle, mostly in positions of power. When he died in 1946 he left some private papers and his

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1- Kamil Erdeha, “Yüzellilikler” *Yahut Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2001).

memoirs. His private papers, which are kept in the archives of Yapı Kredi Bank, and his memoirs, which are kept by his family, could constitute the basis for a more detailed study. It is my hope that this thesis will be the first step on the way to a more extensive study of Süleyman Şefik Paşa's life. In the second part, the roots of the Söylemezoğlu family and the father and brothers of Süleyman Şefik Paşa are briefly mentioned, and a family portrait is drawn as well. After that, his duties as a military commander until his resignation from *İttihat ve Terakki* Cemiyeti (The Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) in 1914 are discussed. His professional past and his opinions relating to the government are given together with some hints. After that, the duties he performed in the National Struggle period and the chain of events, which led him to be included in the list of the 150s in are explained. The reasons for his forced exile abroad and his being declared a traitor to the fatherland are also examined.

This thesis is a study of the 150s that attempts to explain the identities of these persons and how and in which context they became part of the list.

## CHAPTER I

### The Issue of *Yüzellilikler*

With the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, a new period started for the Ottoman Empire. Together with the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans had been fighting for six years and had finally and definitively been defeated. The state signed the Armistice, which contained heavy conditions, including the acceptance of military occupation that began as early as November 1918 in various regions of Anatolia. The Ottoman people showed a great reaction against these occupations and then started to organise their own national movement in different ways. The civil resistance was then united under one structure by means of the progress of congresses and circulars that started in mid-1919. This resistance, which continued for about three years, finished with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on 24 July 1923.

Like many international treaties, the Lausanne Peace Treaty too contained a sub-heading that was relative to a general amnesty. Most peace treaties include provisions relating to amnesty, not for ordinary crimes, but for war-related, namely military and political, crimes. This kind of amnesty is based on the principle of a combatant side not prosecuting collaboration with the opposing side. Cemil Bilisel explains this situation as follows:

If the doings which are carried out during war are followed and punished after the peace, then the wounds of the wars are recalled and bleed again. The pains that should be forgotten once and for all between two countries are experienced once more; this may involve two countries that have ceased fire with the decision of living with peace in war again, too. Because peace which is judged or sentenced is established on closing and forgetting yesterday as it is full of the painful memories of war. The crimes and losses suffered due to the war also have to be forgotten with peace in order to erase yesterday. Amnesty and forgetting become one of the principle provisions of peace treaties in this way and are included in such treaties accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

This principle was followed in the Lausanne Peace Treaty as well. The declaration relative to the amnesty that was appended to the treaty brought the obligation not to prosecute, and to announce a complete and absolute general amnesty for, activities of a military or political nature which had been carried out by people who had resided in Turkey and Greece between 1st August 1914 and 20 November 1922, that is, between the beginning of the First World War to the opening of the Lausanne Conference. According to the document:

Nobody residing in Turkey and mutually nobody residing in Greece will be disturbed and/or offended either in Turkey and Greece for his military or political behaviour between the dates 1 August 1914 - 20 November 1922 and because of his assistance

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2- “Harp içinde yapılan işler, barıştan sonra takip edilir ve cezalandırılırsa, harbin yaraları yeniden değil ve kanar. İki memleket arasında unutulması lazım gelen acılar yeniden yaşanır. Bu, artık dost yaşamak kararıyla silahı bırakan iki memleketi yeniden harbe sürükleyebilir. Çünkü muhakeme veya mahkum edilen sulh, acı harp hatıraları ile dolu dünün kapanması ve unutulması üzerine kurulur. Bu dünü silmek için de, harpte yapılan bütün suçlar ve zararlar üzerine sulh ile bir sünger geçirilmesi lazımdır. Af ve unutmama, işte bu suretle barış antlaşmalarının genel hükümlerinden olmuş ve antlaşmalara geçmiştir.” Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933), pp. 288-289.

to a foreign country or citizens of such country that sign the Peace Treaty dated today by any kind of excuse either in Turkey or in Greece.

In accordance with this Peace Treaty, nobody residing in lands that are separated from Turkey will be disquieted or offended, because of his political or military behaviour against Turkey or for Turkey within the period of time between dates 1 August 1914-20 November 1922 or because their nationalities will be determined in compliance with this treaty.

In respect to all of crimes which were committed within the same period of time and with the clear connections with the political events happened within this period, the Turkish government and the Greek government will announce a complete and absolute amnesty mutually.<sup>3</sup>

As can be seen, not only the chronological limits, but also the qualities of the crimes committed of those who would benefit from the amnesty were stated clearly. However, on 24 July 1923, an additional protocol was signed, according to which, Turkey prohibited not only 150 persons who had committed military and political crimes within the determined time interval to enter Turkey or to reside in Turkey, but also reserved the right to expel those living currently in Turkey and to prohibit those living in foreign countries to return to the country.

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3- "Türkiye'de oturanlardan hiç kimse ve karşılıklı olarak Yunanistan'da oturanlardan hiç kimse, 1 Ağustos 1914 ile 20 Kasım 1922 tarihleri arasında askeri ya da siyasal davranışı yüzünden, ya da bugünkü tarihli Barış Antlaşmasına imza koymuş bir yabancı devlete ya da böyle bir devleti uyruklarına bir yardımda bulunmasından ötürü, Türkiye'de ve Yunanistan'da, hiç bir bahane ile rahatsız edilmeyecek ve incitilmeyecektir. Bu Barış Antlaşması uyarınca Türkiye'den ayrılmış topraklarda oturanlardan hiç kimse gerek 1 Ağustos 1914 tarihinden 20 Kasım 1922 tarihine kadar geçen süre içinde Türkiye'ye karşı ya da Türkiye'den yana siyasal ya da askeri davranışı yüzünden gerekse bu antlaşma uyarınca uyr ukluğunun saptanması yüzünden, tedirgin edilmeyecek ya da incitilmeyecektir. Aynı süre içinde işlenmiş olan ve bu süre içinde cereyan eden siyasal olaylarla açıkça bağlantılı bulunan bütün suçlar bakımından, Türk hükümeti ve Yunan hükümeti karşılıklı olarak tam ve eksiksiz bir af ilan edeceklerdir." *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, Seha L. Meray (trans.), vol.4 (İstanbul: YKY, 2001), pp. 210-213.

It has been decided that, while the first paragraph relating to the notice concerning the General Amnesty remained in force, the Turkish government reserves the right to prohibit 150 persons included in the category of persons stipulated in this article able to enter to Turkey and to reside there. As a result, the Turkish government can expel the persons among the mentioned persons that lived in the country and can prohibit those living in foreign countries from returning to Turkey as well the names of these persons will be added to the announcement of the general amnesty to be published by the Turkish government in order to put into force the General Amnesty Notice on its behalf when the peace treaty dated today comes into force.<sup>4</sup>

The Turkish Republic published a decree on 1<sup>st</sup> June 1924 exercising the right recognised by the treaty. With this decree, the list of 150 persons to be excluded from the amnesty was approved. The persons whose names appeared on this list came to be known as the “*Yüzellilikler*” (or the 150s) in Turkish political literature from that time. Why did the Turkish government need such an application and exclude some names from the general amnesty and prohibit them from entering Turkey?

As we know, the National Struggle had two facets. The first was the war between Ankara and the occupation forces and the second was Ankaras’ legitimacy issue vis a vis İstanbul. From İstanbuls’ point of view Ankara and the struggle which it directed were illegal. Against this Ankara produced its own view and declared the İstanbul government and its collaborators traitors. The first move came from İstanbul and on 10 April 1920, the government had the Şeyhül-islam Dürri-zade Abdullah

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4- “Şurası kararlaştırılmıştır ki, Genel Affa ilişkin bildirin birinci paragrafı yürürlükte kalmakla birlikte, Türk Hükümeti, bu maddede öngörülen kimseler kategorisine giren yüzelli kişinin Türkiye’ye girişini ve orada oturmalarını yasaklama hakkını saklı tutmaktadır. Bunu sonucu olarak, Türk hükümeti söz konusu kimselerden şimdi kendi ülkesinde bulunanları yurtdışı edebilecek ve yabancı ülkelerde bulunanların Türkiye’ye dönüşlerini yasaklayabilecektir. Bu kimselerin adları bugünkü tarihli barış antlaşmasının yürürlüğe girişinde, Genel Af Bildirisi’ni kendi açısından yürürlüğe koymak üzere, Türk hükümetince yayınlanacak genel af ilanına eklenecektir.” Ibid. p. 214.

Efendi<sup>5</sup> issued a *fetva* (fatwa). According to this, Ankaras' *Kuvva-yı Milliye* (National Forces) were infidels the slothering of whom was necessary. The fetwa was published in *Takvim-i Vekayi* and other İstanbul newspapers.<sup>6</sup>

Ankara answered back in the same fashion and had a fatwa issued by the pen of Rıfat Efendi (Börekçi), müftü (mufti) of Ankara, on 16 April 1920. According to Rıfat Efendi İstanbuls' fatwa did not reflect the realities and thus was not worth obeying according to the *şeriat*. Afterwards hundreds of religious officials approved Ankaras fatwa which was published in various Anatolian newspapers.

The war of the fatwas was all the more important since it took place at a time when the anzavur rebellion had begun. Moreover, on 18 April the İstanbul government established the *Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye* (also known as Caliphal Army) to crush the Kuvayı Milliye. A week later Mustafa Kemal issued a declaration and called the nation to unity and warned them against the lies of the enemies.<sup>7</sup> It is in this chaotic atmosphere that the Grand National assembly opened in Ankara. April 23 has thus become a turning point in the legitimacy struggle because Ankara had found an important basis to solve his legitimacy problem. Since the Grand National Assembly represented the public will all possible activities against its existence had to be punished. Therefore the Grand National assembly issued a *Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu* (High Treason Law) the second law issued by that assembly, on 29 April

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5 - Dürrizade Abdullah Beyefendi, the Şeyhül islam, was born in İstanbul in 1867. He bore the title "bey" because he came from a family of viziers, and the title of "efendi" because he came from the scholarly class. He received his education at the medressah. After becoming teacher in İstanbul medrese for a while, he was appointed as high official of Anatolia. While he was undersecretary of the Şeyhülislam, he was brought to the position of directorate of religious affairs in government of IV. Damat Ferit cabinet (5 April, 1920). His duty was ended upon the resignation of Damat Ferit (30 July, 1920). He took part among those taking refuge in the British embassy after the Independence War and then escaped to Egypt. He went to Hicaz together with Vahdettin from there. He died in Mecca on 30 April 1923. If he had been alive, he would have been on the list of a hundred and fifty. Mehmet İpşirli, "Dürrizade Abdullah Beyefendi," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol.4 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1994), p. 36.

6 - "Padişah ve Halife kuvvetlerinin dışındaki, milli kuvvetler kafirdir ve katilleri vacibdir." Yahya Akyüz, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuoyu (1919-1922)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1975), p.162.

7 - *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol.1, p.60.

1920. According to the law all acts, publications, declarations against the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly would be considered as treason to the fatherland. The Grand National Assembly, which the İstanbul government tried to portray as a gathering of gang activists and an illegal organisation, passed on 20 January 1921 a book of rules which can be considered as a type of constitution, stating that “Sovereignty belongs to the nation unconditionally and absolutely. The mode of administration consists basically of the administration by the nation of its destiny personally and actually”.<sup>8</sup> By this time the Grand National Assembly had won the battle of Inonu on the Western Front. The Greek advance was broken. The forces of Ethem the Circassian were dissolved; Ethem and his brothers had taken refuge in Greece. The British, seeing that Greece could not ensure a quick victory, convened a conference in London in order to have Ankara accept a revised version of the Treaty of Sevres.

Invited along side İstanbul to the conference, Ankara had thus achieved its first milestone, even if partially, on the way to being accepted as legal in the international arena, as one of the powers representing the Turkish nation. It was therefore quite natural for the members of the Ankara government to make plans for punishing in due course of time those persons who, in their opinion, had sided with the Entente Powers. Although the type of punishment and the number of persons to be punished were not on the agenda in this period, the idea was strongly there. It surfaced later in the year, while the French Army was leaving Anatolia, following the treaty of Ankara of 20 October 1921. As a matter of fact, people like Celal Kadri<sup>9</sup> and Hasan Sadık<sup>10</sup> fled with the retreating French and left the country. The fact that they kept

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8 - Suna Kili, Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri “Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze”*, (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), p. 91.

9 - His name appeared in the category of civil and military officials as number 36.

10 - His name appeared in the category of journalists as number 108.



acting against Ankara in Aleppo was a matter of concern. Those who later escaped with the Greek Army in the same manner got organized in western Thrace and the Aegean Islands.

The people, who left the country with the French and the Greek armies, may have been willing to return to the country following the signing of a peace treaty. On the other hand Ankara had to protect itself and its citizens from their harmful activities. Moreover, in addition to those who left the country, there were “collaborators” who had not been able to escape and Ankara had to deal with.<sup>11</sup>

Before the beginning of the negotiations in Lausanne, Yusuf Kemal Bey (Tengirşek), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) that the pending peace treaty would most probably contain provisions for a general amnesty.<sup>12</sup> Upon this warning, Mustafa Kemal Paşa held a special meeting and asked his colleagues and especially İhsan Bey, the chairman of *İstiklal Mahkemesi* (Independence Court) their opinions. During this discussion, İsmet Paşa (İnönü) called the attention to the verdicts, which had been given in abstentia as early as 1920, and also to some persons who had been sentenced to capital punishment for treason to the fatherland. They would be forgiven by means of an amnesty to, and those who did not deserve to be included in this amnesty had to be determined. This brought on to the agenda the matter of who was to be excluded from the amnesty. After İsmet Paşa declared his own opinion in this way, İhsan Bey asked how, by whom and with which authority would those to be excluded from the amnesty be determined and what would the time interval for criminal activities be?

When İhsan Bey approached the case in this manner, Mustafa Kemal Paşa asked Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak), the Chief of the General Staff about his opinion on the

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11 - Erdeha, pp. 57-58.

12- İlhami Soysal, *150'likler; Kimdiler, Ne Yaptılar, Ne Oldular?*, (İstanbul, Gür Yayınları, 1988) p.44.

matter. Fevzi Paşa's answer was definite. He said that the persons in the army who had acted against the National Struggle and had fled abroad in particular should not be allowed to enter to Turkey during their lifetimes. Thereupon, Mustafa Kemal Paşa said that this should be bound to a rule, as had been proposed by İhsan Bey.<sup>13</sup> Although no definite conclusion was obtained from the exchange of views relating to the subject that day, it is understood that the subject was reflected in the council and some lists were prepared during the discussions about the pending peace conference.

When the Lausanne negotiations started on 20 November 1922, the subject of general amnesty was also taken up in the sub-commission of minorities under the presidency of Montagna, the Italian representative. The Allies presented a draft containing a general amnesty to the commission. Montagna asked both the Turkish and Greek sides what they understood by the term "general amnesty" mentioned in the draft in the session of 15 December.<sup>14</sup> Rıza Nur Bey, who declared his opinion on behalf of Turkey, said that this term was accepted in its full meaning of implementing a general amnesty for all military and political crimes. In response to Montagna's question about the time interval for which to implement the amnesty, Rıza Nur Bey answered that the interval between the signing of the Armistice of Mudanya, 11 October 1922, and the signing of the peace treaty would be considered as appropriate.

In the second session held on the subject, on 22 December, the Turkish side came with its own draft on the general amnesty. The draft of the Allied states was objected to on three points. First of all, this general amnesty should not cover Muslim-Turkish citizens who had betrayed Turkey during the war. The amnesty had to be mutual and had to stipulate the return of Turkish citizens who had been arrested

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13- Ibid, pp. 43-45.

14- Seha L. Meray, vol.2, p.150-151

and transported from Turkey by the Allied forces as well. The Allied states and Greece accused Turkey of reducing the scope of the amnesty; however, the objection was taken into account on the insistence of the Turkish side, and France prepared a new draft.

Rıza Nur accepted this draft in the meeting of the commission held the next day, but also stated that Muslims had to be kept outside the scope of the general amnesty. The Turkish government could not accept that those who had acted treacherously against its citizens would be forgiven in this way. Upon the objections of the Allied states, Rıza Nur Bey stated that the announcement of general amnesty was an affair of each country and that no Allied state should intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey just as Turkey did not intervene in the internal affairs of other states. He gave the example of the request of the Turkish government to exclude the Muslim people of France, which had not included all of its citizens in the amnesty it had announced at the end of the war. It was decided that the drafts of both sides should be evaluated by the by the commission of legal affairs.

The legal affairs commission stated that there were some fundamental differences in principle between the drafts of Turkey and that of the Allied states. While the Allied states stipulated a general amnesty without any exception for crimes which had been committed from 1<sup>st</sup> August 1914 to 20 November 1922, the Turkish representatives insisted that the crime of treason against country, which was described as a disgusting crime, should be punished, even if the determined time interval were accepted.

The reasons for the mutual insistence became clearer in the hearing of the commission on 2 January 1923. Rıza Nur stated that the Turkish delegation could not accept a general amnesty with regard to the Muslim people for this would have

endangered Ankara's fundamental interests. No desire to take revenge was present in the taking of this decision, but the Turkish side was worried about the future of the Ankara government. E.Ryan, the English representative who spoke in reply to Rıza Nur, defended that a general amnesty can not have exceptions. The Allied states had entered into a moral liability, from which they could not escape under any circumstances. While putting an end to their military presences in Turkey, the Allied states could not abandon their supporters. This was an ethical duty, the performance of which was a matter of honour. The reaction of Rıza Nur was clear when Montagna said that the discussion on this subject should be continued at a later date: "No discussion on the subject will be useful at this point."

The next day, while Rıza Nur Bey stated that there had been no change in the attitude of the Turkish side, a definite change was observed in the attitude of Greece. Greece, which had pretended to accept the draft of the Allied states until that day stated its opinion that a complete amnesty would not be equitable for military and political crimes. Thus, the two addressees of the amnesty were in accord on this subject. As can be understood from these points of objection, both countries raised objections to the idea of a general amnesty by insisting on the definition of war-time crimes. This attitude would be an important criterion in determining those to be excluded from the amnesty later.<sup>15</sup>

Turkey was determined to protect her rights in the conference, but to achieve peace at the end, there were questions more important than the general amnesty to be solved: territory, the question of the straits, the capitulations, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, and the minorities. For this reason Turkey had to reconsider her position on the subject of general amnesty as well.

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15- Erdeha, p.17.

In the session of 11 January 1923, Rıza Nur stated that his government accepted the principle of general amnesty. In addition, the request of the Turkish government to exclude 150 Muslims from this provision was also presented to the attention of the British representatives:

The Turkish government does not act against these persons with the feeling to take revenge. In spite of this, for the good of general benefits, it is appropriate not to allow those among these Muslims who left Turkey to return to the country. About those living now in Turkey, the Turkish government will impute no difficulty for these persons to leave the country. The Turkish government accepts the obligation not to offend them in any manner.<sup>16</sup>

It was visible in Rıza Nur's statement that, the Turkish side was trying to soften the worries of the opposite side with respect to the minorities by means of emphasising the case of Muslims. At the same time they were bringing the number 150 into the agenda with the thought of ensuring agreement with the opposite side. Rıza Nur later described the determination of the number 150 in his memoirs as follows:

Finally, the news came from Ankara: we would approve the general amnesty protocol, but the exceptions were imperative. We did not know the number of the exceptions exactly or definitely. Most of them had already left the country and gone away. Even if we had forced them to return, they could not have come anyway. Their number was not known totally. What persons would be punished to return to the country under

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16- "Türk Hükümeti, bunlara karşı öcalma duygusuyla davranmakta değildir. Böyle olmakla birlikte, genel çıkarlar yararına olarak, bu Müslümanlardan Türkiye'yi bırakıp gitmiş olanların Türkiye'ye dönmelerine izin verilmemesi uygun düşmektedir. Bunlardan halen Türkiye'de bulunanlara gelince, Türk hükümeti bunların yurt dışına gitmelerine izin vermekte hiç güçlük çıkarmayacaktır. Türk Hükümeti, onları hiç bir bakımdan incitmemeyi yükümlenir." Seha L. Meray, vol 2, p.160.

the same criteria of punishment? This also was not known. Among all of these unknown points, the only remedy found for the matter and the only way of behaviour was quite attractive and interesting. They would accept the number. The right of the determination of the names would belong to the government to included in the declaration and the protocol of general amnesty. Now, the question became simplified. Ankara signalled that this number could be lowered if it caused some additional problem. It's called 'a hundred and fifties.'<sup>17</sup>

When the Lausanne Conference was interrupted on 3 February 1923, the subject of general amnesty was also suspended. Three committees were formed for the proper examination of the counter proposals of the Turkish side in the second period meeting that started on 23 April 1923. The notice about the general amnesty was taken up first. The Committee was under the chairmanship of Sir Horace Rumbold. The main argument in this committee, especially in the meeting held on 17 July, concerned the rights of return of those Armenians who had fled with the retreating occupation armies. The Turkish delegation tried to explain that the political and economic situation in Turkey would not permit the Armenians who had escaped with the occupation armies to return. If the Allied states liked the Armenians that much, then they could give them the right to reside in their own countries.

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17- "Nihayet bir gün Ankara'dan haber alındı: genel af protokolüne onay verecektik fakat istisnalar şarttı. Bu istisnaların sayısını tam ve kesin olarak bilmiyorduk. Birçokları, zaten memleketi kendiliğinden bırakıp gitmişlerdi. Kollarından gel diye çekseydik bile gelmez, gelemezlerdi. Bunlar kaç kişiydi tam olarak bilinmiyordu. Aynı ceza ölçüleri içinde kimlere vatan toprakları yasak edilecekti? O da bilinmiyordu. Bütün bu meçhuller içinde meseleye bulunmuş olan çare ve davranış tarzı oldukça dikkat çekiciydi. Genel af beyanname ve protokolüne, isimleri tesbit hakkı hükümete ait olarak bşr rakam kabul ettirecektik. Şimdi mesele daha basitleşmişti: az geldiği zaman yeni dertler çıkarabilecek olan bu rakamı Ankara bildirdi. "Yüzelli" dediler." Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıraları*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1968), pp.1071.

Finally, an agreement was reached conforming to the Turkish desiderata. The treaty and a separate protocol were signed on 24 July 1923.<sup>18</sup>

After the texts which were accepted at the Lausanne Peace Treaty were approved with laws numbered 340, 341, 342, 343 in the session dated 23 August of the Turkish National Assembly,<sup>19</sup> a list of 150 persons started to be drawn up by the government. Investigation was started in the Ministry of Internal Affairs for this purpose.<sup>20</sup>

The subject began to be discussed in October 1923. The arguments, which had started on the general amnesty for petty crimes, shifted to include the general amnesty including the acceptance of political and military crimes in Lausanne in November.<sup>21</sup> The 20 October 1923 issue of *Vatan* newspaper refers to a council meeting dated 19 November under the headline “The list of persons to be excluded from the amnesty is being prepared” in a column in which the latest news from the council was given. The following report appeared:

Ferit Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, made the following statement about the 150s to be excluded from the amnesty in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty to journalists today:

- We are preparing the list of 150 persons now to be excluded from the amnesty. The news stating that the list has been sent to the Council of Ministers is not correct.<sup>22</sup>

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18- *Düstur*, third series, vol. 5 (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi) pp. 13-157.

19- *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol.1, (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1961), pp.264-285

20- *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 4 (Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1986), p. 435.

21- *Vatan*, 26 September 1923, 18 October 1923, 20 October 1923, 31 October 1923, 4 November 1923, 7 November 1923, 20 November 1923 and 28 November 1923.

22- “Dahiliye vekili Ferit Bey’in bugün gazetecilere Lozan Antlaşması gereğince aften istisna edilecek yüzelli kişi hakkında şu beyanatta bulunmuştur. - Aften istisna edilecek yüzelli kişinin listesini hazırlamaktayız. Listenin bakanlar kuruluna sevk edildiği yolundaki haberler doğru değildir.” *Vatan*, 20 October 1923

First of all, a general law of amnesty was legalized with the proclamation of the Republic. Petty crimes were amnestied to a certain extent with this law, dated 26 December 1923 and numbered 391. However, Article 4 of the law said that, “it does not cover the persons who are named in the declaration and the protocol of general amnesty as mentioned in the Lausanne Peace Treaty, dated 24 July 1923”.<sup>23</sup>

After that, Turkey started the inquiry for the general amnesty for military and political crimes that had been committed between 1<sup>st</sup> August 1914 and 20 November 1922 on account of the Lausanne Treaty just following the amnesty announcement about petty crimes on 26 December 1923. Although reference was made to the 150s in this article, no definite list was prepared at that time, even though five months had passed since the signing of Treaty. The most important reason for this was the slow actions of the states that had taken part in the Lausanne Peace Treaty to ratify the treaty. By the beginning of April 1924, this situation had mostly been resolved. Thus, the list of the 150s began to take shape. The daily *Vatan* gave, on 3 April 1924, the following news under the headline “The list of 150s takes its final shape”:<sup>24</sup>

Because the Treaty is to be approved by England and Japan, and since Italy has already approved and it will be definite after the approval of the three of them, the list of 150s is about to take its final shape. The Minister of Internal Affairs and the Police General Directorate examined the previously prepared list in detail today. The persons who have died have been excluded. The examination is continuing to put replacement persons on the list. It will be finished in one or two days. It will be completed after approved by the cabinet. It is kept very confidential.<sup>25</sup>

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23- *Düstur*, third serious, vol. 5, pp.508-509.

24- “Yüzellilikler Listesi kati şeklini almaktadır”, *Vatan*, 3 April 1924.

25- “Antlaşma İngiltere ve Japonya’da onaylanmakta olduğundan, İtalya tasdik etdiğinden ve üçünün tasdikinden sonra antlaşma kesinlik kazanacağından Yüzellilikler Listesi kesin şeklini almak üzere deir. Dahiliye Vekili ile Emniyet Genel Müdürü eskiden yapılan listeyi bugün uzun müddet defalarca incelemişlerdir. Vefat edenler çıkarılmıştır. İncelemler listeye yeniden



While the announcement of an amnesty may have been rather easy, it was difficult to determine the 150 persons who would not benefit from it. At this point, it is important to state that the Lausanne Treaty did not give any rights to the Turkish side in order to carry out investigations for the 150 or to sentence them in any manner. However, as Rıza Nur also emphasized in the meeting of the sub-commission of amnesty on 11 January 1923, the persons to be excluded from the general amnesty could be banned from returning if they lived outside the borders of Turkey, or could be expelled from Turkey if they lived inside Turkey at that time.<sup>26</sup>

It was not easy for the Turkish government to determine the 150 names. Although there were some names in the minds of the men preparing the list, the members of the committee were obliged to establish clear-cut categories in the list to be prepared. In this way, the initial list containing up to 600 persons could be reduced properly. What was the method and time interval for determining these categories? This second part of the matter was solved with the text of the amnesty announced by the Lausanne Treaty, which stated that the individuals to benefit from the amnesty were to have committed their crimes between 1<sup>st</sup> August 1914 and 20 November 1922. As explained above, when the subject came on the agenda during the negotiations about the amnesty, the Turkish side had emphasized that crimes committed in the period of the National Struggle were to be excluded from amnesty in particular. In this way, Ankaras definition of crime was made clear. However, new problems appeared at this point: what was the difference between a political and military crime and what made a crime “petty”.

It can be understood from the list prepared that the formation of the *Kuva-yı Inzibatiye*, the signing of the Sevres Treaty, the rebellion of Ethem “the Circassian”,

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konulacakların belirlenmesi için devam etmektedir. İki üç güne kadar bitirilecektir. Kabinece tasvip edildikten sonra tamamlanmış olacaktır. Çok gizli tutulmaktadır.” *Vatan*, 3 April 1924.  
26- Erdeha, p. 17.

the Circassian nationalistic activities form the backbone of the political and military crimes that were to be excluded from the general amnesty.

The characteristic of these crimes was the questioning of, and the rebellion against the authority of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Thus they all corresponded to High Treason as defined by *Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu*. Thus, political and military offences were all melted into one single offence: Treason. As a matter of fact during the process of the preparation of the list of 150s and discussion in the assembly, Ferit Bey (Tek), the Minister of Internal Affairs, explained the principles retained in preparing the list in a secret session of the Assembly on 16 April 1924:

Well, what do you mean by principles? A traitor is a traitor, and there is no principle for this definition. But it is possible to classify treachery by its forms. There is no other principle. As I have already presented, they are the cabinet that signed and accepted the Sevres Treaty, and *Kuvay-ı Inzibatiye* and Ethem “the Circassian” and his entourage, the persons that participated in the İzmir Circassian Congress as delegates, the officials in the action of treason against the country, and similar soldiers, police chiefs, journalists, and namely all of other persons in the action of treason against the country.”<sup>27</sup>

By the spring of 1924, important developments of a revolutionary nature had accrued in the country. The republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924 and by the time Ferit Bey was speaking in the secret session in the assembly, the new constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*)

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27- “Efendim, prensip diye ne istiyorsunuz? Hain, hain, ne prensibi? Yalnız hıyanetin şekli itibariyle tasnifi mümkündür.Yoksa prensip nedir? Demin arzetmiş olduğum şekilde Sevres Antlaşmasını kabul ve imze eden kabine, Sevr Antlaşmasını pariste imzalayan heyet, sonra Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye, sonra Çerkez Ethem ve yakın çevresi, İzmir Çerkez Kongresine delege olarak katılanlar, hıyanet-i vataniyede bulunan mülki memurlar, askerler, polis müdürleri, gazeteciler ve yine hıyanet-i vataniyede bulunan diğer şahıslar.” *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 4, pp.438-439.

was practically completed. In spite of all these achievements, ensuring internal peace remained as an important matter on the agenda, all the more so since there existed now the additional threat of counter revolution. As a matter of fact, members of the Ottoman dynasty and other exiles were carrying on propaganda campaigns against the new regime. In such an environment it was quite natural for the new regime to act in the logic of the National Struggle years and consider the opposition in light of High Treason Law. By doing so the new regime was also warning those who were inclined to indulge in similar activities against the new order.

## Rebellions in Anatolia

Many rebellions were experienced with British support and encouraged especially by Damat Ferit Paşas İstanbul governments throughout the National Struggle. The rebellions that broke out in the spring of 1923 meant great trouble for Ankara, for they caused the expenditure of restricted resources and sources in a period when foreign occupans had to be defeated. For this reason the heaviest sentences were issued for those who had participated in these rebellions.

The cabinet of Damat Ferit, which was established on 5 April 1920, became one of the most important provocateurs of these rebellions. The fatwa issued by Dürrizade Abdullah Efendi on 10 April was one of the most important spiritual inspirations behind these movements. In the fatwa, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues were characterized as persons who were deceiving the people, with there thirst for power, forcefully conscripting soldiers and collecting taxes, killing the people of some villages and towns, dismissing officials, cutting communications between İstanbul and Anatolia and corrupting the order and security of the state.

Those who killed them would be called *gazi* (holy warriors) and those who died for this purpose would be called martyrs.<sup>28</sup> The fatwa was distributed throughout Anatolia by means of planes and other vehicles which belonged to British and Greek forces. The fatwa was very efficient, for people more than ready to listen to it due to exhaustion from war.

Other important factors in inciting internal rebellions were newspapers that carried out articles or declarations against the National Struggle. The following list shows newspapers with their owners and editorialists whose names appeared on the list of the 150s.<sup>29</sup>

Table 1 Newspapers and their staff during the National Struggle

City	Name	Owner	Editorial Writer
Adana	Ferda	Fanizade Ali İlmi	—
İzmir	Musavat	İzmirli Hafız İsmail	—
Balıkesir	Köylü	İzmirli Refet	Ferit
Balıkesir	İrşad	Trabzonlu Ömer Fevzi	—
Bandırma	Adalet	Bahriyeli Ali Sami	—
Edirne	Temin	Mustafa Neyyir	—
İstanbul	Alemdar	Refii Cevat	—
İstanbul	Peyam-ı sabah	Pehlivan Kadri	Ali Kemal

28- İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1998), pp. 2054-2055.

29- Data gathered from Erdeha, op. cit.

It would not be incorrect to say that the role of *Peyam-ı sabah* and its columnist among the publications and its editorial writer Ali Kemal<sup>30</sup> very much further instrumental in the opposition to the National Struggle. Some of the headlines of the articles written by Ali Kemal in *Peyam-ı sabah* were as follows: “False claim of nationality is contrary to Islamic law” (11 April 1920), “Death sentence! Mustafa Kemal will be punished” (25 April 1920), “Disgraceful actions of Mustafa Kemal” (7 May 1920) and “Damnation, damnation, damnation!” (15 May 1920).<sup>31</sup>

A number of other writers, politicians, bureaucrats and religious teachers to publisized such opinions. A resolution passed by the Grand National Assembly on 3 July 1920 according to the High Treason Law was a response to this problem.as mentioned by the Ankara Tribunal Court of first instance, was a good response to this question.<sup>32</sup> According to this decision, persons politicians, bureaucrats and writers who had caused internal rebellions would be accused of “actually preventing the making of decisions proper for the real desires of the nation, intervening in the right of judgement of the nation, showing the Turkish National Assembly as bandit to the Sultan, and performing all kinds of opposition and defeats purposing revolt against the legality of this assembly”

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30- The real name of Ali Kemal, who would have been one of the names on the list of 150 if he had been alive, was Ali Rıza. He was born in 1867. He developed a passion for journalism at a young age and became famous with the nickname Ali Kemal. Following the 1908 revolution, he took a stance against the *İttihat* (Union) forces with his writings. As a result of the pressure applied by *İttihat* on opponents, he fled to Europe. He returned to İstanbul like many of opponents after the Mudros Armistice. He evaluated the national resistance as a trick of *İttihat* supporters. He became the Minister of Education between 4 March-18 May 1919 and the Minister of Internal Affairs between the dates 19 May-26 June 1919. He took the reaction of the *Kuva-i Milliye* (National Forces) because of his writings in *Peyam-ı Sabah*. Following the war, he was arrested on 5 November 1922 on the order of government of Ankara and was brought to İzmit to be sent to Ankara to be judged in court. However, after he was interrogated by Nurettin Paşa in İzmir, he was lynched on 6 November. Mustafa Uzun, “Ali Kemal,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2. (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989), pp. 405-408.

31- Yalancı milliyet davası şer-i şerife aykırıdır. (11 April 1920)  
İdam, idam, idam! Mustafa Kemal Cezasını bulacak. (25 April 1920)  
Mustafa Kemal’in maskaralıkları. (7 May 1920)  
Lanet, lanet, lanet!.. (15 May 1920)

32- The original of the decree was taken from the issue dated 5 July 1920 of *Millet Yolu* (Path of Nation) newspaper which was published in Bursa. Cemil Topuzlu, *İstibdat, Meşrutiyet, Cumhuriyet Devirlerinde 80 Yıllık Hatıralarım* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1994), pp. 182-183.

In addition, Damat Ferit had committed the crimes of using the caliphate in a manner contrary to the provisions of Islamic Law and deviating the opinions of Muslim people by means of the fatwa issued by Dürriade Abdullah Efendi. He was also accused of supplying Ahmet Anzavur and the like with money and guns, forming the army of the Caliphate and establishing the *Fevkalade Umum Müfettişlik* (Extraordinary Public Inspection Office) for this purpose. However, the Ankara Tribunal Court of First Instance did not consider only Damat Ferit, Ahmet Anzavur and Dürriade Abdullah Efendi guilty of these crimes; many other people who had been used by these leaders were also considered as taritors to be punished in absentia.

Taking into consideration the above decision and the period in which it was made, the political motivations can be seen clearly. In addition to the matter of internal security, which was caused by the rebellions, efforts were made by Ankara to legalise its presence by means of responding to the decisions of capital punishment and imprisonment which had been passed against the leaders of the National Struggle by the İstanbul government and the İstanbul Court Martial. This particular episode was so significant for Ankara that the Grand National Assembly put 25 names out of the 38 mentioned in the decision of Ankara Tribunal of First Instance in to the list of 150s.

The memoirs of Cemil Topuzlu, who was sentenced to capital punishment by the Ankara Tribunal of First Instance but was not included in the list of 150, can be considered as a good example of this sensitivity. Topuzlu held two important posts during the National Struggle Period: he was first major of İstanbul and than Minister of Public Works in the third Damat Ferit cabinet. This duty, which he had accepted upon the insistence of Ahmet Resit Bey, a close friend and Minister of the

Interior in the same cabinet caused him to be punished by the Ankara Tribunal of First Instance because it was this cabinet that had established the Army of the Caliphate. The episode is related in the memoirs of Topuzlu as follow: Cemil Paşa, who had resigned from his duty in July 1920, had gone to Nice. While he was there, a copy dated 5 July 1920 of *Millet yolu* (The Path of the Nation), published in Bursa by the former deputy for Bursa and lawyer Bahaeddin Taha, was sent to him. He was confused when he saw his name on the list of persons sentenced to capital punishment, and the name of Ahmet Resit (Rey) in the list of the persons sentenced to imprisonment. Aproximately four years later, he returned to the country on 5 August 1924. He ran into Bekir Sami Bey in the street one day. During the conversation, they finally talked about the verdict of capital punishment. Bekir Sami Bey said:

You were sentenced for capital punishment because you entered the cabinet of Damat Ferit in that period, yes. However, when you retreated from the cabinet after several months and overthrew the cabinet the manner you assumed against Damat Ferit changed the opinion on your account. A copy of the letter of resignation was sent to Anatolia and published in all of the newspapers published in Anatolia. For this reason, you were not included in the list of the 150s.<sup>33</sup>

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33- “Evet o zaman, Damat Ferit kabinesine girdiğinizden dolayı sizi de idama mahkum etmişlerdi. Fakat aradan birkaç ay geçmeden kabineden çekilmeniz, kabineyi düşürmeniz ve Damat Ferit’e karşı aldığınız hakkınızdaki yanlış fikirleri düzeltti. İstifanamenizin bir kopyası Anadolu’ya geldi ve Anadolu’da çıkan tüm gazetelerde yayınlandı. Bu yüzden “Yüzellilikler” listesine konulmadınız.” Ibid, pp. 183-184.

## The *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye* (Army of the Caliphate)

The *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye* known also as the Army of the Caliphate, was the name given to the special task force formed by two decrees issued on 18 April 1920, with the purpose of destroying the National Forces. According to the first article of the first of these decrees, the essential duty of the Army of the Caliphate was to arrest and to suppress evil people committing acts of banditry under the appalation of National Forces.<sup>34</sup> According to these decrees, the Army of the Caliphate would be responsible of the Ministry of War. But in this period, Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Paşa was also Minister of War. Süleyman Şefik Paşa was appointed as the commander of this task force and Colonel Refik Bey was his chief of staff.<sup>35</sup>

The regiments of the Army of the Caliphate, which were composed of what Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe describes as dishonest, dishonourable, gullible, shrewd, unemployed and vagrant people,<sup>36</sup> were taken to a ship on 29 April 1920 and transferred to İzmit. Two persons with high ambitions were to attain their desires in this action. One of them was İbrahim Hakkı the Circassian<sup>37</sup>, the governor of İzmit.

İbrahim Hakkı had become imbued with a passion for establishing a Circassian state in and around İzmit with the wink of England. He was certain that if he could take command of the Army of the Caliphate that had come to him by itself, he could realize his dreams. Although he applied to and received from Damat Ferit consent for

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34- *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 24 April 1336, no. 3835.

35- Süleyman Şefik Paşa was entered on the 18<sup>th</sup> and Colonel Refik entered on the 20<sup>th</sup> line for this duty.

36- Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahı Vahidettin Mütareke Gayyasında*, (İstanbul: Sebil Press, 1994), pp. 280-283.

37- Number 67 on the list.



this purpose, he was unable to attain his desire because of the opposition of Süleyman Şefik Paşa.<sup>38</sup>

The second person who had set his heart on gaining control of the units of the Army of the Caliphate was Ahmet Anzavur.<sup>39</sup> When the units of the Army of the Caliphate arrived at İzmit, he went to meet them with his entourage. He was appointed commander of an auxiliary force. He went to see Süleyman Şefik Paşa, who had established his headquarters on board the Battleship of *Yavuz*, and told him that he was authorized to request soldiers and money from the commander. Süleyman Şefik Paşa, who got very annoyed with this situation, first made a complaint about Anzavur to the Ministry of War, then resigned from his post and returned to İstanbul.<sup>40</sup>

Following this development, Anzavur seized his opportunity. Taking soldiers, guns and money from the Army of the Caliphate, he occupied Adapazarı on 10 May 1920 and Kandıra on 13 May. He was stopped by Ali Fuat Paşa after a battle which lasted for three days and three nights after he advanced in the direction of Geyve Pass on 15 May. When Damat Ferit Paşa, who had come to İzmit to celebrate the success of Anzavur on board the yacht *Ertugrul* on 19 May 1920, saw that the Army

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38- Göztepe, pp. 285-286.

39- Ahmet Anzavur was from the Circassian community. He founded some close relationships with this society by giving a girl (for marriage) to the Palace. Anzavur was taken into army as an official of gendarme and sent for retirement while he was at the rank of major as a result of the arrangements realized in the army by Enver Paşa. This was the most important reason for his hostility against the *İttihat* supporters and the National Forces that he considered as a feature of the *İttihat*. He returned to duty as other enemies of *İttihat* in the period of Armistice and was appointed as the İzmit governor. With the support of the palace and the British forces he organized the first rebellion against the National Forces around Balıkesir on 21 October 1919. This rebellion was suppressed on 16 November 1919. He then started the second rebellion in the Biga region on 16 February 1920 and was successful. He was given the title "Paşa" by the palace on 11 April 1920. When his movement was suppressed by the National Forces on 16 April, he escaped to İstanbul on a British battleship and finally came to İzmit with the Army of the Caliphate and started the Geyve rebellion, but he was defeated again and escaped to İstanbul. Capital punishment was decided by the Court of Independence for Anzavur and he was killed in an ambush on 15 April 1921; see Erdeha, p. 27.

40- The details of this subject will be taken up later in the section relating to Süleyman Şefik Paşa

of the Caliphate was not a match against the National Forces he returned to İstanbul<sup>41</sup> and the Army of the Caliphate was desanded with a decree issued on 29 June 1920.<sup>42</sup> But this was not the end of the issue for Ankara. People who worked for the foundation of, and participated in, this army and were declared taritors by Ankara. Some men who had been cabinet members during the establishment of this task force or took part in its comentment were also put on the list of the 150s. The obvious reason for this was the difficult situation in which the National Forces were pushed while fighting against the Greek army.

## The Treaty of Sevres

The cabinet members who had accepted the Sevres Treaty and the persons who actually signed it were declared traitors by the Ankara government not only because this treaty contained very heavy conditions for the Ottoman state, but also because this treaty had been accepted and signed without the prior consent and approval of the Grand National Assembly. Thus, İstanbul had acted as the representative of the Ottoman state alone once again and, by doing so, had stated that the Assembly in Ankara and the resistance movement carried out were illegal. The Ankara government expressed its firm refusal on this matter the in a verdict dated 7 October 1920 by the the Ankara Court of Independence as well. According to this verdict, Damat Ferit Paşa and the commission members who had signed the Treaty of Sevres were sentenced to capital punishment because they had not taken the permission of the Grand National Assembly to discuss the conditions imposed by the treaty and to

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41- “İç Ayaklanmalar”, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı*, vol.6,( Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1964), pp. 81-84.

42- *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 6 July 1336.

sign it. Because of their actions, territory had been captured by the enemy, the country had been destroyed and Ottoman people had been murdered, and their properties had been plundered.<sup>43</sup>

As in the above mentioned decision of the Ankara Tribunal of First Instance, the people who had acted contrary to the authority of the Grand National Assembly were identified in the case of the signing of the Treaty of Sevres as well. The verdict was once again given in absentia. However since the general amnesty prevented the investigation and punishment of the guilty, the names of the latter to found their way into the list of the 150s.

### The Rebellion of Ethem “the Circassian”

The rebellion of Ethem “the Circassian” is undoubtedly one of the most interesting events of the War of Independence. The path of Ethem Bey from national hero and “treachery” fell into the second half of the year 1920, which can be called the period of rebellions in the National Struggle.<sup>44</sup>

As part of the plans to establish a regular army at the end of 1920, the forces of Ethem Bey were supposed to be under the command of the Western Front headquarters under the name of the “Mobile Forces” (*Kuva-yı Seyyare*). However, Tevfik Bey, the elder brother of Ethem Bey, and the member of Grand National Assembly refused this scheme. As the deputy commander of the mobile forces, he knew well that their former freedom of action would come to an end if they were incorporated in a regular army with a formal chain of command. When the

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43- Ergün Aybars, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1982), p. 251.

44- Zekeriya Kurşun, “Çerkez Ethem,” in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol.8, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1993), pp. 275-276.

atmosphere became strained, Mustafa Kemal Paşa travelled to Eskisehir to solve the conflict peacefully on 4 December 1920. Ethem did not participate in the meeting out of fear of being arrested or killed. This gave rise to a serious crisis of confidence between Ankara and Ethem Bey.<sup>45</sup>

A group of five parliamentarians, among who were close friends of Ethem Bey, was then sent to Kütahya from Ankara to put an end to this disagreement without bloodshed. When the efforts of this group failed to succeed, Mustafa Kemal Paşa gave orders to Colonels İsmet Bey (İnönü) and Refet Bey (Bele) to solve the problems of the Mobile Forces by military means on 27 December 1920. Meanwhile, on 29 December, Ethem Bey sent an open telegraph accusing the Grand National Assembly of pursuing political aims and of not performing its duty to the nation properly. After the telegraph was read in the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal's order was made into a government decision that was also approved by the assembly. The subsequent order issued to the command of the Western Front was accusing Ethem Bey's telegraph of rebellion against the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly. Ethem Bey was proclaimed a vatan haini, traitor to fatherland. And a warrant of arrestation was issued.

In spite of this order, a large group in the Assembly argued against entering into an armed conflict with Ethem Bey. For this reason it was decided to make a final invitation to peace with Ethem Bey for this reason. However, again Ethem Bey gave a strong response. He put pressure on the Assembly and declared that "history will curse less me but much more you." When it was understood that agreement was not possible, operations began against Ethem's forces on 30 December and continued

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45- Cemal Şener, *Çerkez Ethem Olayı* (İstanbul: Okan Yayınları, 1984), pp. 40-41.

until Ethem and some of his entourage took refuge with the Greek army on 22 January 1921.<sup>46</sup>

The Ankara Court of Independence which judged Ethem Bey and his colleagues by default sentenced twelve persons to capital punishment with a decision dated 9 May 1921 and numbered 573. Two of them died before Lausanne and six of the remaining ten were included in the list of 150.<sup>47</sup>

As seen, Ethem “the Circassian” and his followers not only displayed a negative attitude against the Turkish National Assembly, but also endangered its existence by means of attempting armed fights against it. Consequently they were charged with committing the crime of high treason.

### The Circassian Congress of İzmir

It is observed that throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire discrimination by the central was on religious rather than ethnic grounds among the citizens. One of the most important ethnic groups was the Circassians. The Circassians had entered the Ottoman ruling class first as slaves who replaced the *devşirme*, then as the group that had provided girls to the Palace.

Circassian organizations were established throughout the Second Constitutional era. *Çerkes Teavün Cemiyeti* (Circassian Association of Solidarity) and *Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti* (Circassian Women’s Association of Solidarity) were the most important of these organizations. None of these groups, however, had any claim for autonomy<sup>48</sup> at the beginning of the National Struggle. As

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46- Yaşar Bağ, *Çerkesler’in Dünü Bugünü*, (İstanbul: Kafkas Derneği Yayınları, 2001) p. 93.

47- Kurşun, p. 276.

48 - Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. II, (İstanbul, 1999), p.587.

it can be seen above, the Circassians were to be found on all sides during the National Struggle. A part of them were still supporting Sultan and his policies like Ahmet Anzavur while some others like Rauf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey were among the supporters of the National Struggle. Ethem “the Circassian” and his two brothers, too, were also in the latter group.

As mentioned, the rebellions against the Grand National Assembly during the spring of 1920 were mostly in the area where Circassians lived, like Bolu, Adapazarı, Bandırma, Balıkesir and Kütahya and they joined these movements against the National Struggle especially with Ahmet Anzavur. The most important reasons of this support to rebellions were the *fetva* of Dürrizade Abdullah Efendi, and the provocations of the Circassians who were loyal to the sultan. After the rebellions were crushed, some of the Circassian leaders, who had been among the rebels, became anxious about eventual relation and punishment by the Grand National Assembly. Their anxiety had some solid reasons. First, people who were responsible for the exactions committed in districts of Biga, Gönen, Düzce, Gerede, Bolu, Yozgat were sentenced to death in absentia by the Ankara Tribunal of First Instance on 3 July 1920. Moreover, some news started to circulate about the forced exile of Circassians upon attacks on Circassian villages. The newspaper *Serbesti* (Freedom) was the most important source of that kind of news. For example according to a piece of news, which was published just before the Yozgat rebellion, eighteen villages around Biga were destroyed by artillery fire, and the turn of other Circassian villages was about to come.<sup>49</sup>

After the case of Ethem “the Circassian”, relations between Ankara and western Anatolia Circassians became more strained. Because Ethem Bey had taken

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49 - Muhittin Ünal, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü*, (Ankara: Kafkas Derneği, 2000), p. 290.

refugee with the Greek army, the Ankara Court of Independence judged him and his collaborators in absentia and sentenced them to death on 9 May 1921.<sup>50</sup> These developments increased the worries of the Circassian circles and as a result of this, they followed the example of Ethem Bey and got in touch with the Greek army. This situation was not suitable only for Greece but also for Britain because the British needed small buffer zones on the east of the Marmara Sea. As a result a Circassian congress was convened in İzmir on 24 October 1921, and the *Şark-i Karib Çerkesleri Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (The Association of Providing the Rights of Near Eastern Circassians) was founded by representatives of various Circassian communities.<sup>51</sup>

At the end of the congress a declaration was issued. According to that declaration, the Circassian population which amounted nearly to two million on the year 1921, should have been around six million, and the only responsible for this plight was the bad administration of the Ottomans. The report, which was simplified, depending on *Patris*, a Greek newspaper, published by *Yoldaş* (Comrade) on 18 January 1922 in Bursa:

The delegates of all of the Circassians, who were living in towns such as Balıkesir, Bandırma, Erdek, Gönen, Payas, Kirmastı, Karacabey, Bursa, İnegöl, Yenişehir, Aydın, Eskişehir, KütahyaAfyon, İzmit, Adapazarı, Hendek, Düzce, Bolu under the occupation of the Greek Armies in Western Anatolia, convened in İzmir, and decided to unite with the Greek nation to protect the existence and the rights of Circassians and also decided to send the arranged declaration to the High Commission in İzmir, to the Great Powers and to other European states...<sup>52</sup>

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50 - Erdeha, p.234.

51 - Tunaya, 585.

52 - "Batı Anadolu'nun Yunan işgali altında bulunan Balıkesir, Bandırma, Erdek, Gönen, Manyas, Kirmastı, Karacabey, Bursa, İnegöl, Yenişehir, Aydın, Eskişehir, Kütahya, Afyon, İzmit, Adapazarı, Hendek, Düzce, Bolu gibi şehirlerinde bulunan tüm Çerkesler'in delegeleri İzmir'de

The echoes of the congress and the declaration remained on daily newspapers nearly for a year from November 1921 to end of the October of 1922. Delegates at the congress and founders of the association were defined as traitors and many messages and declarations that came from other Circassians were published at the newspapers.<sup>53</sup>

After the National Struggle and Lausanne Peace Conference, the anger felt against this congress was expressed in the following manner in a secret session on 15 April 1924 by the Minister of Internal Affairs Ferit (Tek) Bey during the discussions performed for preparing the list of 150s:

Gentlemen, we see in the most difficult period of our country the Circassian congress which was held in İzmir and desires to break our country to pieces and states that the Turks are the most traitor the most tyrannical and most inferior nation of world and on the contrary the Greeks are the most civilized, most humanist nation acting with the loftiest ideals and wants to expel Turks from Turkey and claim that there are no original Turkish people currently in Turkey. Those that organized this congress came from their countries in order to participate in the congress and the bandit chiefs that made great trouble for us in the negotiations until Lausanne was signed.<sup>54</sup>

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toplanaarak, Çerkesler'in varlık ve haklarını koruyabilmek için Yunan ulusu ile birleşmeyi kararlaştırarak, düzenledikleri bildiriye, İzmir Yüksek Komiserliğine, büyük devletlere ve diğer Avrupa devletlerine göndermeyi kararlaştırmışlardır..." Yaşar Bağ, *Çerkeslerin Dünü Bugünü*, (İstanbul: Kafkas Derneği Yayınları, 2001), p.97.

53 - Zeki Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü*, vol. 6, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), pp. 46-76.

54 - "Efendiler, memleketimizin en müşkül devrinde, memleketimizi parçalamak arzusu ile ve Türkler'in dünyada en zalim, en hain, en adi bir millet olduğunu ve bilakis Yunanlılar'ın en medeni, en insani ve en ulvi mefkurelerle hareket ettiğini ve Türkler'i Türkiye'den kovmak isteyen zaten Türkiye'de Türk olmadığını iddia eden ve İzmir'de toplanan bir Çerkez kongresi görürüz. Bu kongreyi düzenleyenler ve ona katılmak için memleketlerinden gelenler ve Lozan'ın imzalanmasına kadar bizi zor duruma sokmak isteyen çetelerin resileri..." *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 4, p.435.



At the end of the sessions for preparation of the list of the 150s, most of the founders of the *Şark-i Karib Çerkezleri Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* were included in the list.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DRAWING OF THE LIST

#### Discussions in the Assembly Relative to the 150s

It was discussed above how Rıza Nur, who spoke on behalf of Turkey, related to the matter of general amnesty in the 11 January 1923 session of the Lausanne Conference. He had suggested that a number of persons be excluded by the Turkish government from the amnesty. Although it was accepted more by the negotiating states that the definite number be given for the persons to be excluded from the amnesty, especially Britain continued to express objections whenever this subject was put on the agenda. Despite the fact that Britain looked for a complete general amnesty, nevertheless Britain approached in a moderate manner the Turkish demand for the exclusion of 150 persons from the amnesty. Finally an additional protocol appended to the general amnesty was accepted along the line of the Turkish insistence in mid-May 1923.

Sir Horace Rumbold, who spoke in the 19 May 1923 session of the commission of the general amnesty, put forth his conditions related to the attitude of the Turkish side and the additional protocol to be added to the amnesty as follows:<sup>55</sup>

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55- "Türk Temsilci heyetinin, Türk uyruklarından 150 kişiyi genel affin dışında bırakmakta direnmesinden büyük üzüntü duyduğumu bir kez daha belirtmeliyim. Müttefik temsilci heyetleri geçmişin tamamıyla unutulmasını istemekteydiler; ancak Türk hükümeti isteğinde ısrarcı olduğu için müttefikler de, bu tedbirin yöneltmiş olduğu kimseleri gösteren çizelgenin bildiriye eklenmesi şartıyla bu talebe karşı çıkmayacaklardır. Öte yandan, bu kimselere, Türkiye'deki işlerini düzene koyabilmeleri için oniki aylık bir süre tanınması uygun olacaktır." Meray, Second Set, vol.1, book 1, p.125

I should state once again that I feel upset deeply because committee of Turkish representative insisted upon excluding 150 persons among the Turkish nationalities from the general amnesty. The Allied representation committees wish to forget the past completely however the Allied states will not also raise any objection to this demand with the condition of adding the schedule showing the persons for this said measure into the declaration because the Turkish government was insistent upon its request. On the other hand, it will be proper to recognise a 12 month period of time for these persons to put their works in order in Turkey.

General Pelle, who talked on behalf of France after Rumbold, said that he agreed with what had been said and that he was of the opinion that the list of the persons to be excluded from the general amnesty should be published at the same time as the declaration. M. Montagna, who spoke as president of the minorities sub-commission, first stated that it would be better to apply no exception, and declared that he agreed with the opinion of the previous speakers. İsmet İnönü who answered the speech is said that the Turkish government was not very enthusiastic on the issue either, and it ultimately excluded some people from the amnesty unwillingly. Finally when the general amnesty took its definitive shape on 31 May 1923, Turkey obtained the right to not only apply the amnesty to 150 people. The protocol which was added to the declaration of general amnesty also read: “The names of these people will be appended to the general amnesty that will be declared by the Turkish government when the present peace treaty will be ratified.”<sup>56</sup>

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56- “Bu kimselerin adları, bugünkü tarihli barış antlaşmasının yürürlüğe girişinde, genel af bildirisini kendi açısından yürürlüğe koymak üzere, Türk hükümetince yayınlanacak genel af ilanına eklenecektir.” Ibid. p. 172.

The signing of the Lausanne Treaty meant that the War of Independence had been concluded. The document was a legal proof for the victory of the National Struggle and the Grand National Assembly. However this important step in international politics was not the end of the all problems of the Turkish administration. As a matter of fact, during the peace negotiations the government had strived with strong opposition in the Assembly.

As mentioned above, the sultanate was abolished just before the Lausanne Conference to end the unsettled situation at the administrative level that prevailed since the opening of the Grand National Assembly. However, this move had created yet another crisis over the future regime of the national state. There was a group of deputies in the first assembly, who, known as the “second group”, did not consent with a change of regime and was determined to work for a return to the sultanate by giving political prerogatives to the caliph.

The first act of this opposition was an attempt to oust Mustafa Kemal Paşa from the Assembly. They submitted to the Assembly a motion to change the *İntihab-ı Mebusan Kanunu* (Electoral Law) on 22 December 1922.<sup>57</sup> According to the project of law it was impossible for Mustafa Kemal Paşa to be elected as deputy. But the motion ignited a great reaction not only in the Assembly, but also throughout the nation and the project was taken back.

By the beginning of the year 1923 another important political problem appeared in the agenda of the Assembly and the nation. The “second group” started its caliphate-centered activities. The deputy for Afyonkarahisar Hoca Şükrü Efendi published a treatise, which was named *Hilafet-i İslamiye ve Büyük Millet Meclisi* (The Muslim Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly), on 15 January 1923. The

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57- *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 25, pp. 159-161.

treatise was distributed in Ankara.<sup>58</sup> The following day Mustafa Kemal made a meeting with İstanbul journalists in İzmit. In this meeting he showed his reaction to that kind of activity and said that the basis for a powerful foreign policy was a powerful internal policy.<sup>59</sup> But the “second group” carried on his actions, and to make their opposition more effective with the support of the population they decided to use the press. Ali Şükrü Bey, deputy for Trabzon, started to publish *Tan* (Daybreak) on 20 January 1923.<sup>60</sup>

While the tension was high enough in Ankara, the conference in Lausanne was cut on 4 February 1923. İsmet Paşa (İnönü) returned to the country. From 21 February to 6 March he informed the Assembly about the conference and articles of the draft treaty. These open and close meetings showed the lack of harmony in the Assembly again. Therefore the renewal of the assembly became imperative for the administration. On April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1923 decision for a general election was taken in the Assembly.<sup>61</sup> In relation with the decision, the Electoral Law was changed according to the principle of universal suffrage.<sup>62</sup> After those steps to purge the opposition, another important change in the High Treason Law was effectuated on 15 April 1923. The Assembly amended the first article of the High Treason Law and added the following sentence to it: People who act against the decision of November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1922 or the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly are considered traitors.<sup>63</sup>

On 16 April 1923, the first session of the Grand National Assembly ended and a few days later the Lausanne Conference resumed; but a new government crisis came to light. This time it was between İsmet Paşa, head of the Turkish delegation in

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58- *Nutuk*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1961), p. 705.

59- Arı İnan (ed.), *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1982), pp. 39-87.

60- Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harb Hatıralarım*, vol.5 (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1951), p. 357.

61- *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 28, p. 253.

62- *Ibid.* pp. 330-334.

63- “1 Kasım 1922 tarihli karar hilafına veya Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin meşruiyetine karşı davrananlar, vatan haini addolunur”; *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 29, pp. 190-191.

Lausanne, and Hüseyin Rauf Bey. The main reason of their conflict was the articles of the draft treaty. It made İsmet Paşa really anxious and he complained of Rauf Orbay to Mustafa Kemal by his telegrams on 24 May 1923 and 18 July 1923. This situation gave birth to a new cabinet crisis and finally Rauf Bey resigned on 4 August 1923.<sup>64</sup>

On 11 August 1923 the second Assembly opened and a new cabinet was formed by Fethi Bey (Okyar). The new Assembly approved the Lausanne Peace Treaty on 23 August 1923. Another important subject came on the agenda in the following fall. The proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923 increased the tension between republicans and the others. The opposition held onto the caliphate that had become the focal point of the opposition. On 3 March 1924 the caliphate was abolished and the Assembly issued a law to send members of the dynasty out of the country. These laws meant the end of the Ottomans in Turkey and also the opposition lost its most important asset.

While the central authority was putting in order his existence European powers started to approve the Treaty of Lausanne. Therefore the announcement of a general amnesty that was accepted at Lausanne became an obligation for the government. The Assembly started to discuss the proposals about the general amnesty at the beginning of 1923. Most of the deputies supported the view that the amnesty should not be a general one.

The longest and most heated discussions related to 150 persons to be excluded from the general amnesty took place during the sessions of the Assembly on 16 April 1924 and 22/23 April 1924.<sup>65</sup> The first speaker on 16 April was Ferit (Tek), the Minister of Internal Affairs. Ferit Bey first described briefly how the list had been

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64- *Nutuk*, vol. 2, p. 664.

65- *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 4, pp. 434-450.

put on the agenda, and then informed the deputies about the preparation of the list of 150 persons to be added to the text of the general amnesty to be proclaimed according to the Treaty of Lausanne. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Directory of Security had worked to prepare the list beginning from the date the subject had been put on the agenda at the Lausanne discussions. In this direction, a list had been formed by means of collecting information from the intelligence service of various states. This list had included about 600 persons. The General Directory of Security had eliminated names by means of different methods, but had been able to decrease the number only to 300. After that, decreasing the number from 300 to 150 had been even more difficult. However, as a result, and as has been mentioned above, taking into consideration the details of the crime in each case it had been possible to determine 150 names on the morning of 16 April. Upon this speech, the deputies requested permission to read the list, but Ferit Bey demanded more time, saying that the final corrections were being made to the list by the General Directory of Security.

Topçu İhsan Bey, the former chairman of the Ankara Court of Independence, that was implicated in the affair took the floor after Ferit Bey. He explained the main criteria according to which people were included in the list of the 150s. According to İhsan Bey, priority had to be given to those persons who had been involved in treacherous actions in the past, and would most probably do the same in the future.<sup>66</sup> Mazhar Bey, the deputy for Aydın, considered the discussions relating to the list from a different point of view. According to him, there was no need to discuss and decide about the names to be included in the list in the assembly. These had to be left

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66 - Ibid, p. 436.

to the government. The government had been working on the issue for months and it alone had to bring to an end what it had been working on.<sup>67</sup>

Ferit Bey once more took the floor, stated that he agreed with Ihsan Bey and explained the method by which the government had prepared the list. Those people whose names were present in the first two lists of respectively 600 people and 300 people and did not make into the list of 150 were individuals who had done harm to the country in the past but unlikely to indulge in similar actions in the future. It was thus understood that the government had considered the issue from a point of view of future internal security as well.<sup>68</sup>

Following this explanation, all the deputies who spoke made the same point. They all said that the definitive list prepared by the government should remain unchanged, but added that the criteria retained during the preparation of the list should be determined by the Assembly. Thereupon, Ferit Bey began to explain the criteria under the headings given at the end of first chapter. The deputies frequently interrupted his speech, to ask for more details. He then read the list. During the reading, Ferit Bey had a difficult time because of the frequent objections of the deputies who suggested other names. Some of those names were new editions to the list whereas some others were supposed to replace some names that were already in the list. Some of the deputies went on in describing the crimes committed by those people whose names they were giving. The deputies also asked why the names of many non-Muslims who had collaborated openly with the enemy were not in the list. As for the non-Muslims who were not included in this list, he said that they would be treated separately and denaturalised in accordance with the decree passed on the morning of 16 April 1924 by the government.

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67 - Ibid, pp. 436-437.

68- Ibid, p. 438.



The other point on which the deputies put pressure on the government was the use of the time interval determined for the general amnesty by the Treaty of Lausanne. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the time interval was from 1 August 1914 to 20 November 1922. Some people whose names were on the list, especially the Circassians who constituted the majority, were still carrying on acts against the Turkish Republic. According to some deputies, the government should amnesty them for their crimes during the time interval, let them return to the country, and then arrest them for their crimes after 20 November 1922. If the government made that kind of pick at the list, they can put on the list more politicians, writers and that kind of organisers of the acts against the National Struggle. Because according to some deputies the government forgot the real traitors who were the organisers of the acts against Grand National Assembly during the National Struggle.

Dr. Fikret Bey (Ertuğrul), Münir Bey (Çorum), and Ahmet Süreyya Bey (Karesi) were the most sensitive members of the Assembly on the subject. Dr. Fikret Bey explained his opinions as follows:

Sir, we have seen your list. In due course, you have said that there are some people who belong to the secret services who have revolvers in their hands. They are probably out in the country. There is no need to put them into the list of 150s, let them in, and let them be punished. I request that you put intellectuals in the list.<sup>69</sup>

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69- “Beyefendi listenizi gördük. Bunun esbab-ı mucibesinde buyurdunuz ki; bir takım insanlar vardır, hafî teşkilattadırlar, ellerinde rövolver vardır. Bunlar herhalde taşradadır. Bunlar hudud dahiline girdikten sonra 150 kişilik listeye dahil etmeye lüzum yoktur, bırakın girsinler ki, tenkil edilsin. Rica ederim listeye fikir adamları koyunuz.” Ibid., pp.445-446.

Münir Bey also agreed with Fikri Bey and underlined the time interval issue:

Sir, it has been seen that, the list which is prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs contains 600 names. It is very hard to choose only 150 among these. Even though Ferit Bey has read many names, some of them are already continue acting against. But, the amnesty is for the crimes committed in a time interval and determined in Lousanne Treaty. Whether these people benefit from the general amnesty for their crimes after the time interval is questionable. It is understood, these people have many revolutionary attempts after the determined time interval of the general amnesty. The legal side of the matter should be checked.<sup>70</sup>

After these objections the most detailed and poignant critique came from, Süreyya Bey, who was a lawyer. He said that the government did not understand well the provisions on the general amnesty. First he explained the main articles of the amnesty and then passed to the additional protocol on the 150s. According to him the government was making a big mistake by misunderstanding the time interval issue. Therefore they were putting into the list some people who were only the tools of the real responsables.

Gentlemen, are we supposed to forgive these people who have acted treacherously toward the country even after 1922. Armed Circassian rebels whose names are on the list that has been read, are still acting against Turkish land and Turkish

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70- “ Efendim görülüyor ki, esasen Dahiliye Vekaleti tarafından tanzim edilen liste 600 ismi muhtevindir. Bunlardan 150sini tefrik meselesi birçok müşkülâtı dai oluyor. Ferit Beyefendi birçok esami okumakla beraber, bunlardan bir kısmı için hali faaliyettedir, dediler. Halbuki af, Lozan muahedesinde beyan olunan ve bir mürur-ı zaman ile tahdit edilen ceraim mahsusdur. Acaba bu adamlar o zamandan sonra irtikap ettikleri ceraim için de aff-ı umumiden istifade edebilirler mi? Anlaşıyor ki bu adamların birçok teşebbüsâtı ihtilalkaraneleri vardır ki: işbu aff-ı umuminin tayin ve tahdit ettiği zamandan sonra vuku bulmuştur. Bu cihet hukuken tedkik olunmalıdır.” Ibid. p.447

nationality in the Islands. There is no need to put them into the list of 150s. They have been traitors to the country and they still are. We have no obligation to pardon these people according to the treaty. But we have forgiven them from 1914 to 1922.

But they are criminals today. The crimes after 1922 can not be forgiven. I wonder why the government is hesitating. Can they not understand this legally clear issue.<sup>71</sup>

Ferit Bey tried to answer all these objections and he said:

Today Ethem “the Circassian” is active all around the Eutope, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. If he is not included in this notebook (list) than he will be coming back into the country. The court can not imprison him just by saying he has been in such countries. Yes, we know that these people are ready to rebel. But in front of the court we must have documents to charge them. If we do not have any documents, we can not banish them for their state of mind, state of opinion, individual rebellions, individual security, in general for their possible crimes in the future.<sup>72</sup>

No tangible result could be obtained from both the closed and open sessions on 16 April, and the discussions were postponed until 22/23 April. In the second round of the discussions, the deputies suggested new names, but this time the list, which had decreased to 149 because of the additions and deletions made by the

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71- “ Efendiler 1922 tarihinden sonra dahi hıyanet-i vataniye cürmü ika etmiş eşhası affa mecbur muyuz? Okudukları listedeki silahlı Çerkes çeteleri Türkiye vatani ve Türklük aleyhine adalarda çalışmaktadır. Onların 150 kişilik listeye konulmasına gerek yoktur. Bunlar dünün de hain-i vatanıdır, bugünün de hain-i vatanıdır. Bunları af için ahdi mecburiyetimiz yoktur. Evet onları 1914’ten 1922’ye kadar affettik. Fakat onlar bugün de mücrimdir. 1922’den sonra yapılan ceraim affedilemez. Hükümet bundan neden tegafül ediyor? Neden bu sarahati hukukiyeyi anlamakta izhar-ı aczediyor?”, Ibid. p.451.

72- “ Bugün Çerkes Ethem Avrupa’nın her tarafında, Yunanistan’da, Bulgaristan’da, Romanya’da icra-i faaliyettedir. Bu defterin içinde olmazsa yarın kalkıp memlekete gelecektir. Buralarda bulunmuş demekle mahkeme bunu mahkum edemez. Bunu memlekete bırakalım mı? Evet biliyoruz ki bu insanlar her zaman isyan etmeye hazırdır. Fakat mahkemenin karşısında onun mahkumiyetini temin edecek vesaiik olmalıdır. Olmadıkça onu halet-i ruhiyesi itibariyle, halet-i fikriyesi itibariyle, müstakil isyanlar itibariyle, müstakil emniyet itibariyle ileride birtakım şeyler yapar diye memleketten çıkaramayız.”, Ibid., p.452.

government, was completed to 150 with the addition of Refet Bey, the owner of *Köylü* (Peasant) newspaper, published in Izmir. The list was then sent to the council of ministers for approval. The official approval of the list took place with a decree passed on June 1st, 1924. Yet, the list was already published in the newspapers on 26 April 1924. The press called it a “blacklist.”

It is understood from the discussions in the Assembly that not only the first draft of the list, but also its definitive version did not satisfy completely the deputies. Discussions took place about people who had been included under the heading of “other persons” and who had actually been actors in minor events. Since some other people who had committed similar crimes did not appear in the list, this was an inconsistency on the part of the government. The only explanation that the government could give on this issue was that those whose names had been selected were people who might be dangerous in the future.

## CHAPTER III

### Some of the 150s

In the previous chapters, the question of the 150s as an important issue at the Lausanne Peace Conference was introduced. The material factors of the crimes and the preparation of the list as well as the sequence of events experienced during this process were also examined. Here, in order to clarify and make more meaningful what has been explained, individual cases from the list are taken in order to show who they were, what they had done and what then happened.

“The Entourage of Vahdettin” was the first headline in the list, and under this headline the first name was *Yaver-i Has* (imperial aide) Kiraz Hamdi Paşa, a graduate of *Mektebi Harbiye*. As a soldier he had different duties in the army. He was promoted a general in the Hamidian period and was retired by the CUP. After Ali Fuat Cebesoy was discharged from the command of the 20th army corps in Ankara, Kiraz Hamdi Paşa was appointed to replace him. But the *Kuva-yı Milliye* did not let him in Ankara, therefore he stayed in Eskişehir and began to work against the *Kuva-yı Milliye* with Hilmi Bey, the governor of Eskişehir. He came to İstanbul after the National Powers captured Eskişehir in October 1919. He was appointed to the 25th army corps in İstanbul. He was also honorary aide (*fahri yaver*) of the sultan.

After the National Struggle he fled to Romania. There he worked for *Tarik-i Salah Cemiyeti* (Assosiation of Way of Improvement). He died in Romania in poverty and he was buried in the cemetery of Anatol village.

The second headline was “Members of the Damat Ferit Cabinet”. Şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri Efendi was an important figure in this group. He appeared on the 9<sup>th</sup> line of the list. He was born in Tokat in 1869. His education was religious and he became *müderris*. He was the deputy for Tokat in the Assembly of 1908. After a short time he joined the opposition and he founded *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* with his friends. After the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa he went abroad and lived there until the First World War. He was arrested in Romania during the First World War and was taken to İstanbul. After a trial he was sent to exile to Bilecik. After Mudros he returned to İstanbul and was active in politics again. He was Şeyhülislam in the first Damat Ferit Cabinet. From March 1919 to July 1920 he held different posts. He saw the hidden hand of the CUP and Zionism in every trouble and according to him *Kuva-yı Milliye* was the CUP itself under a different name. He was one of the persons who fled the country with Vahdettin. His first stop was Egypt, where he started to publish articles against the new Turkish government. When confronted with the strong reaction of Egyptian revolutionists, he fled to Lebanon. In a book titled *Nimet-i Hilafet ve Din Nimetlerini İnkâr Edene Reddiye* (Refusal to Those who Deny the Blessings of the Caliphate and the Religion)<sup>73</sup> published in Beirut at the beginning of 1924. He strongly criticized not only the Egyptian revolutionists, but also the Turkish Republic. He, who accused the Turkish government of irreligion, and also clearly stated that he had taken an oath to fight from the moment that he had seen that Islam was endangered in Turkey.<sup>74</sup> After Lebanon he traveled first to Romania and then to Greece and continued to publish articles against the Turkish Republic in his newspaper *Yarın* (Tomorrow), which he published there for some of years. Ibrahim

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73- The book, which was published with this name for the first time was then published in Arabic by Mustafa Hilmi in 1984 and then in Turkish under the title “*Hilafetin İlgasının Arka Planı*” by Oktay Yılmaz in the year 1996.

74- Oktay Yılmaz, *Hilafetin İlgasının Arka Planı* (İstanbul: 1996), pp. 223-228.

Sabri followed his fathers example and therefore appeared on the 113<sup>th</sup> line of the list.<sup>75</sup> Mustafa Sabri did not accept the amnesty for the 150s and died in Cairo in 1954.

The third headline was “Signatories of the Treaty of Sevres”. There is no doubt that Riza Tevfik, who appears on the 16<sup>th</sup> line of the list of the 150s was one of the most colourful persons under this headline. Known for his intellectual activities during and after the period of the constitutional monarchy, he left a mark on minds with his opponent personality as well. According to the common opinion of the sources related to the period, Riza Tevfik was famous as an opponent of the opinions and manners that the majority supported. He was born in Edirne. He graduated from *Tıbbiye* (Medical School). In the Second Constitutional era he was elected deputy for Edirne in CUP slate. This situation did not go on too long. He changed his side and joined *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*. He worked in the opposition party’s administrative staff. Because of political pressures of the CUP he left politics and worked as a doctor and writer. He returned to politics after the Armistice.

Riza Tevfik was put on the list because he had taken part in the committee that signed the Treaty of Sèvres. He did not understand why his name was on the list. Because the draft of the Treaty of Sèvres had been examined fully by the Imperial Council and nobody had raised objections to it. Other than that, it had been necessary to prevent the Unionist supporters from murdering thousands of innocent people in Anatolia.

Ater he was exiled abroad, he lived in Jordan for many years and even worked as a director of the museum established there. Riza Tevfik realized what he had done after he had lived in exile for long years. He expressed his remorse in the following

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75- Erdeha, “Yüzellilikler,” p.200.

manner, in a eulogy written during Ramadan 1935 to Emir Abdullah as his protector:

You are the most unfortunate person at all! You are a damned, bad one  
What a pity, you were exiled from the capital, became far from there

You yielded temptation and did not support the National Borders  
You are exiled from your heavenly country as you are obstinate on this

While you wanted to lead the public with your science and culture  
Your pride was hurt and you lost your homeland and dwelling

.....  
.....

If you are at fault, it is only an error of interpretation  
But the citizens were sure of your undoubted purity<sup>77</sup>

After the amnesty for the 150s he came back to country on 23 June 1943 and he passed away on 30 December 1949 in İstanbul.

The fourth headline was “Members of the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye*”. Tarık Mümtaz (Göztepe) appeared on the 21<sup>st</sup> line of the list as commander of the mitrailleuse unit of the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye* and aide of Damat Ferit Paşa. He was born in İstanbul in 1897 and was a graduate of *Mekteb-i Harbiye*. On 24 February 1919 he was appointed as aide to the Minister of War. In this appointment he worked for Ferit Paşa, Ahmet Paşa, Şevket Paşa, Mustafa Nazım Paşa, Süleyman Şefik Paşa, Cemal Paşa, Fevzi

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77- “Sen en bedbahtısın insanların!..Mel’un-ü menfisin!..  
Uzak düştün, yazık, Darüsaadet asitanından.

Uyup şeytana iraz eyledin Misak-ı Milli’den  
İnad ettin, cüda düştün vatan bağ-ı cinanından.

Delil olmağı şanın halka, irfanınla, ilminle,  
Zelil oldun gururundan, koğuldun han-u manından

.....  
.....

Kusurun varsa ancak bir hata-yı içtihadidir,  
Vatandaşalar emindirler hulus-u bigumanından.”, Rıza Tevfik, *Serab-ı Ömrüm*, (İstanbul:1949), p. 182.



Paşa, Sait Paşa and Damat Ferit Paşa. While he was aide of Damat Ferit Paşa he was appointed to the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye*.

Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe described the foundation of this unit as “*muvazaa*” (collusion)<sup>78</sup> and put forward that the reason why he had taken part in this work was to escape the unjust punishment of Kara Said Paşa, the Minister of Navy. He said that he had endured into a terrible hell abroad for sixteen years (1922-1938) in order not to submit to this wrong and improper punishment.<sup>79</sup>

After the National Struggle he fled abroad and stayed with Vahdettin until the latter’s death. After the amnesty he came back and worked as a journalist. He gathered his memoirs in his books, *Vahidettin Mütareke Gayyasında* and *Vahidettin Gurbet Cehenneminde*. He died in İstanbul on 24 January 1971.

The fifth headline was “Officers and Bureucrats Opposed to *Kuva-yı Milliye*”. Ali Galip, the former governor of El-aziz (Elazığ), appeared on the 39<sup>th</sup> line of the list of the 150s. He was born in Kayseri in 1871. He graduated from *Mekteb-i Harbiye* on 1895. From 1895 to 1911 he worked at different ranks and positions in the army. After he had left the army while he was a lieutenant-colonel, he was elected as deputy for Kayseri from the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* party in the April 1912 elections. After the dissolution of the parliament in July of the same year, he began to trade between cities. He was appointed to the governorship of Elazığ in May 1919 by the first Damat Ferit cabinet.

The İstanbul government had been unable to prevent the Erzurum Congress from being held; but under British pressure, it decided to act with complete resolution against the Sivas Congress. It was decided that this responsibility would be given to Reşit Paşa, the Governor of Sivas. It is understood that the latter was not a volunteer

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78- Muvazaa: Making a bet on any matter; law: transaction carried out by the parties without believing, but only in order to mislead the others.

79- Göztepe, p.274.

for the job. The commander of the army corps in Sivas was already disobeying government orders. As a consequence of long bargaining between the Minister of Internal Affairs, Adil Paşa and Ali Galip, Ali Galip accepted the duty to dissolve the Sivas Congress, but failed. Thereupon he fled to Aleppo and then returned to İstanbul. He was arrested after the entry of the Turkish army into İstanbul and judged in the martial court of Adapazarı. As a consequence of the hearings, it was understood that he had not supported the Kurdish rebellion in order to obstruct the Sivas Congress. For this reason the British plans had come to nothing. Thus, he was acquitted.<sup>80</sup> He was so sure of himself that he went to Ankara to request a new position from the government, but Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay) recognized him and put him on the list.<sup>81</sup>

It is difficult to make a decision about what Ali Galip did when he was Governor of Elazığ and about his acquittal. In this event, which will be taken up in more detail below, why he was acquitted in the court is an additional mystery. If he had not gone to Ankara and requested a post after the decision of the court, most likely he would not have been recognized and put on the list.

His account of the events was different. He described himself as only a government official. He found it totally meaningless to be accused because he had applied legal orders given by the government at the time. As part of the list of the 150s, he went to Romania and dealt with horse trade until the end of his life. He passed away in Köstence before the amnesty for the 150s.

As mentioned above the Circassians constituted the 2/3 of the list of the 150s. The first headline that contained the Circassians was the sixth one, Ethem “the Circassian” and people close to him. Because we have given sufficient information about Ethem “the Circassian”, another name Kuşçubaşı Eşref who appears on 60<sup>th</sup> line

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80- Kamil Erdeha, *Milli Mücadele'de Vilayetler ve Valiler*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), pp. 120-136.

81- *Vatan*, 23 Kanunsani 1340

of the list will be retained as a case. As the eldest son of the Kuşçubaşı family, he was born on 1873. He graduated from *Mekteb-i Harbiye*. In the army he became a gendarmerie captain. He also worked in *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. At the end of the First World War he was arrested by the British and was sent to exile to Malta. After he got his freedom he came back to İstanbul. He later organized the *Kuva-yı Milliye* in Kocaeli and contributed to the smuggling of arms and men from İstanbul to Anatolia.

He worked with Ethem “the Circassian”, and went with him when the latter took refuge in Greece. He accompanied him while he was in Germany because of some health problems. He came back to Greece and worked in cooperation with Greek Secret Services. He organized the *Osmanlı İhtilal Komitesi* (The Ottoman Revolution Committee) that was founded in 1923. He prepared the plans of assassination of Mustafa Kemal Paşa, which was to be carried out by Hacı Sami. After the amnesty he came back to the country and died in 1964.

The second headline that contained Circassians was “Participants to the Circassian Congress”. The Governor of İzmit İbrahim Hakkı appeared on the 67<sup>th</sup> line of the list. After the outbreak of the Rebellion of Bolu-Düzce he was appointed to İzmit as governor’s representative. As soon as he began to work, he did his best to help the rebellion to spread out. As mentioned above, he tried to benefit from the *Kuvayı İnzibatiye*. After the defeat of this army, he worked with the British Army that captured İzmit. He rebelled to the İstanbul government because he wanted to have a buffer government which would be loyal to the British administration in İzmit. The government dismissed him on 7 July 1920, but he did not let the new governor, Abdülvahap Bey, enter İzmit. On August 1920, he began to fight with the National Powers and he captured Adapazarı. Until June 1921 İzmit was under the occupation of first the British then the Greek Army. On 26/27 June 1921 the National Powers

took İzmit back and İbrahim Hakkı escaped from İzmit and went over to the Greek Army. He joined the Circassian Congress in İzmir. After the National Struggle he went to Midilli and continued to conduct activities against the Turkish government.

The eighth headline of the list was “Police”. The old chief of the police organization of İstanbul, Tahsin Bey was the first name of this group. He was born in Kalkandelen and he grew up as a *komitacı*. During the Armistice period he worked among the organizers of *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*. He was appointed to the directorate of the police organization of İstanbul by the fourth Damat Ferit cabinet. During this duty he acted in cooperation with the British Corps in İstanbul. Tevfik Paşa who became *sadrazam* instead of Damat Ferit Paşa on 21 October 1920 wanted to dismiss him, but the British High Commission did not agree with this scheme. After the National Struggle he went to abroad. He was famous as *Gavur* Tahsin.

The ninth headline was reserved for “Journalists”. I would like to examine three names under this headline Mevlanzade Rıfat, Refii Cevat Ulunay and Refik Halit Karay.

Mevlanzade Rıfat was a journalist of Kurdish origins. Because he supported the heir apparent Mehmet Reşat, he was sent to exile in Yemen during the Hamidian era. He was amnestied in Second Constitutional Period and came back to İstanbul. He started publishing *Serbesti* (Freedom) and he became really famous with his articles against the CUP.

Mevlanzade Rıfat,<sup>82</sup> was an extreme enemy of the Unionists and the Jews, as reflected in a book on his opinions about Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues:

As a tragic consequence of the Mudros Armistice the Committee, which was charged with signing the peace treaty that had been prepared in Sèvres Palace in Paris for the safety of the country,

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82- He appeared on the 97<sup>th</sup> line of the list.

was then inserted into the list which is called the list of 150 and prepared by Mustafa Kemal. Why? Rauf Bey, who signed the Mudros Treaty, was a Unionist supporter and the persons who were put on the list were Unionist opponents. However, Mustafa Kemal Paşa said at various times and loudly to the public that he was fed up with the injustices, evils and cruelty of the CUP when he was preparing for war in Anatolia that he was not related to the CUP, which had caused some disasters for the state and nation, and also the CUP had no place in this movement as a whole.

But what can we do, these words of the Paşa always disclaimed his action. Because we already see that the leading persons of the present foundation and republic are nobody but the supporters of Unionists and Progress, which we all know caused the Ottoman Empire to enter the war to the account of Germany and broke the state into small pieces and destroyed the same.<sup>83</sup>

Mevlânâ Rifat considered as the only reason for his inclusion in the list that he was not a member of the CUP and the things he had done as an opponent of that organization. But the matter was more important than that and was related to the stance he had assumed against the National Struggle. He had played an active role in the *Kürt Teavün Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Solidarity Society) after the First World War and worked for the foundation of a Kurdish state not only with publications, but also

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83- “Mondros Mütarekesinin feci neticesi olarak, Paris’te Sevres sarayında hazırlanan sulhu imzaya, o zaman ülkenin selameti için mecbur bulunan murahhas heyet, Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından Yüzellilikler tabir edilen listeye konulmuştur. Niçin mi? Zira Mudros mütarekesini imzalayan Rauf Bey İttihatçı, 150’lik listeye girenler ise İttihatçılara muhalif olan zümredendiler. Halbuki Mustafa Kemal Paşa Anadolu’da savaşa hazırlanmaya başladığı zaman İttihat Terakki’nin zulüm ateşinden cinayet ve kötülüklerinden bıkmış olan halka, bu hareketin devlet ve milleti felaketten felakete sürükleyen İttihat ve Terakki zümresiyle alakası olmadığını, milletin ölüm kalım mücadelesi olan bu savaşta İttihat Terakki’nin yeri olmadığını çeşitli zaman ve yerlerde bağıra bağıra söylemişti.

Ne yapalım ki, Paşa’nın sözleri daima hareketini tekzip etmiştir. Zira görüyoruz bugünkü kuruluşun, Cumhuriyet’in ileri gelenleri, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunu Almanya hesabına harbe sürükleyen ve devleti parçalayıp sonunda yıkılmasını sağlayan, hepimizin bildiği İttihat Terakki ricalinden başkası değildir.” Mevlânâ Rifat, *Türkiye İnkılabının İcyüzü*, (İstanbul: Yedi İklim Yayınları), 1993, pp. 204-205.

under the active patronage of Britain. These were the primary reasons for his inclusion in the list.

Refii Cevat (Ulunay) was the son of Ali Muhiddin Paşa. He was born in Damascus in 1890. He graduated from *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Galatasaray High School). Refii Cevat started to work in journalism at a young age. Just as he reached success in this profession, he joined *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*. He was sent to exile by the CUP in 1913 for having written opposing articles.<sup>84</sup> His exile ended with the signing of the Armistice in Mudros. By the end of the First World War he came back to İstanbul with his father, who was retired by CUP in 1915. They started to publish *Alemdar* and they had an attitude against the National Struggle.<sup>85</sup> They considered the National Struggle as a new trick of the CUP to return active policy.

Refii Cevdet, who expressed his hostility in his writings, which were published in *Alemdar*, stated his opinions as follows:

Because the National Forces take their power from İttihat and Terakki, just like a snake takes its poison from the lizard, could not be Forces of the Nation. The National Forces are the new form of *İttihat Terakki*, and could cause warmth only by means of the blood of innocent people.<sup>86</sup>

According to Refii Cevat, the true alternative to Mustafa Kemal Paşa was Damat Ferit.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, Ahmet Anzavur, who caused a number of troubles for the National Forces, was in fact a national hero:

There is no doubt that history will note the name of Ahmet Anzavur at the beginning of the persons who most bravely

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84- Refii Cevat Ulunay, *Menfalar, Menfiler*, (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1999).

85- Erdeha, “*Yüzellilikler*” p. 45.

86- “Kuva-yı Milliye, yılanın zehrini kertenkeleden alması gibi, kuvvetini İttihat ve Terakkiden aldığı için, Kuva-yı Milliye olamaz. İttihat ve Terakkinin yeni şekli olan Kuva-yı Milliye ancak mazlum kanı ile sıcaklık hasıl edebilir.” *Alemdar*, 4 March, 1920.

87- “Ya Mustafa Kemal Paşa!.. Yahut Damat Ferit Paşa!” *Alemdar*, 7 March, 1920.

articulated the hate and curse coming from the united bosom of the all nation against these persons who unjustly took the name of the National Forces and did not hesitate to use the calm name of the nation that has suffered pain in its bloody paws for long years, used the name of nation in order to satisfy their own desires of this last murder.<sup>88</sup>

According to him, the only solution for independence was to agree with the Entente states and to get on with them properly:

When will these stupid people understand that, for the sake of our safety -if available- the only remedy is to reach agreement with the victorious sides, and that every movement to be done against this will do nothing but hasten our death.<sup>89</sup>

There is only one-way of escape for us: it is to come to agreement with the great states under the limit of the mind, foresight and loyalty.

Refii Cevat wrote many more articles on these subjects. Later, when in exile, he recognized his failure to analyze properly the situation. He returned to the country as soon as the amnesty was announced and expressed his remorse in the following manner:

I would never even have dreamt that Mustafa Kemal would achieve victory against these important states. We could not do this. Then I understood that we had been deceived. This was a miracle and only one person can appear in each century that can create a miracle. But we were deceived since we could not

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88- “Kendilerine haksız yere Kuvayı Milliye adını veren, yıllardan beri kanlı pençeleri altında inlettikleri zavallı milletin sakin adını bu son cinayet isteklerinin tatminine de alet etmekten çekinmeyenlere karşı bütün milletin birleşik sinelerinden kopan lanet ve nefret sesine en yığitçe tercüman olanlar başında şüphesiz tarih Ahmet Anzavur adını kaydedecektir.” *Alemdar*, 22 March 1920.

89- “Selametimiz için – eğer varsa- yegane çarenin ister istemez galiplerle uyuşmak ve anlaşmak olacağı ve bunun aleyhinde yapılacak her hareketin ölümümüzü çabuklaştırmaktan başka bir işe yaramayacağı bu kafasızlarca ne zaman anlaşılabilir.” *Alemdar*, 23 March 1920.

believe in this unique consequence. We made the mistake.  
Atatürk was right, and successful.<sup>90</sup>

In the end, Refii Cevat, who understood his failure just like Refik Halit and expressed and confessed his remorse in similar words, returned to journalism after he returned to the country, and wrote many articles praising Atatürk in a column titled *Takvimden Bir Yaprak* (A Page From the Calendar) in *Milliyet*. He passed away on 4 October 1968.

Refik Halit Karay was born in İstanbul in 1888. He graduated from Galatasaray High School. He started to work as a journalist and became very famous with his satirical articles at the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era. The CUP did not like his articles and he was sent to exile in 1913. He spent his years of exile in Çorum, Ankara and Bileceik. In 1918 he came back to İstanbul by private permission. After the CUP leaders fled abroad he wrote his famous article: “Gentlemen, where are you going to?” in *Zaman* (the Time).<sup>91</sup>

Refik Halit Karay was appointed General Director of the Administration of Post and Telegraph from the position of editorial writer in a newspaper, on 12 April 1919. Like many persons who were put on the list and involved in partisan activities in the opposition within the list, he also evaluated the movement which had started to be organized in Anatolia first as an effort to organise the CUP outside of İstanbul. For this reason, he played an important role in publishing the orders against the National Forces and the Congresses and communicating them to all parts of Anatolia.

The war of telegraphs between Refik Halit and Mustafa Kemal started with a circular Mustafa Kemal published on 27 May 1919 in his capacity as the Inspector of

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90- “Mustafa Kemal’in bunca büyük devlete karşı zafer elde edeceğini rüyada görsem hayra yormazdım. Yoramazdık. Sonra aldandığımızı anladım. Bu mucizeydi ve her asırda böyle bir mucizeyi yaratabilen ancak bir iki kişi çıkabilirdi. Biz ise bu ender neticeye inanmamazlık ederek aldandık Hata eden bizdik. Atatürk haklıydı, başarılıydı.” Erdeha, “*Yüzellilikler*,” p. 47.

91- “Efendiler, Nereye?”, *Zaman*, 5 November 1918.



the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army. In the circular, it was requested that mass meetings be organized in every place against the occupation of Izmir and that protest telegraphs to be sent to the representatives of all the important states and the Ottoman government. Upon this situation, Refik Halit expressed the discomfort he felt in publishing this circular without first obtaining permission. However, this reaction was not effective. It was not possible to be so cautious in such a period because the only system used in long distance communication in the territories of the Ottoman Empire in that period was the telegraph.

Following the Erzurum Congress, the government in İstanbul sent notices to all of the telegraph offices with the effort to take a severe stance against the Anatolian movement, and ordered them to prevent communications from being carried out under the name of National Forces. Not content with this, it prohibited coded communications between the army corps, as will be seen in the next parts in further detail. Thereupon, the command posts of army corps seized the telegraph offices on 17 August 1919. The civil war between the centre and Anatolia during the ensuing period continued over the telegraphs wires. Finally, Mustafa Kemal took the decision to discontinue communication with İstanbul on 12 September, following the Sivas Congress. In his telegraph, which was sent to the centre on 3 October:

to give relating the arrest of Refik Halit Bey, who is the General Director of the Telegraph administration, who prevented the special communication of the nation having an immunity according to the Ankara governments and set up the tricks to steal the secrets and codes of the army and then disclosed them.<sup>92</sup>

Refik Halit was dismissed from duty with this telegraph, but reappointed to the same position six months later. However, the telegraphs that were sent from İstanbul

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92- “Ordunun sırlarını, şifrelerini çalmak için düzenler kurarak bunları açığa vuran ve ulusun, Ankara hükümetlerine göre dokunulmazlığı olan özel haberleşmesini engelleyen Telgraf Genel Müdürü Refik Halit Bey’in derhal tutuklanması ile ilgili verilmesi.” *Nutuk*, vol.1, p. 117.

were not very important. Thereupon Refik Halit returned to journalism, which was his main profession, and continued his opposition against the National Struggle with his writings in the newspaper *Aydede* (the Moon).

After the National Struggle he escaped from Turkey and went to Lebanon. He expressed his penitence in his memoirs, written at the end of 1923, in the following way:

This resistance, which I could not understand but continued from the first foundation of the National Forces to the Battle of Sakarya, was obviously the only thing to be done at that time. Those who understood and applied this have to be celebrated! Since we accept it as wonderful and as a miracle, then we hear the wonder and the miracle by our ears and also saw with our eyes and believed it. And we also approve with our heart and repeat in written form.<sup>93</sup>

After the amnesty he came back and carried on his life as a journalist and writer. He passed away on 13 July 1965 in İstanbul.

The last headline and the last name was, “Other Persons” and Madanoğlu Mustafa. As it can be understood from the headline the people under this headline were the rest. They were mostly the Circassian bandits and unfortunately there is not much information about their life. The informations are very limited about them. As it had been pointed out by some deputies, they were people of secondary significance. I chose Madanoğlu Mustafa from the list because he was the father of Major-General Cemal Madanoğlu who was active in the May 27 coup d'état.

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93- “Kuvay-ı Milliye'nin kurulduğu günden Sakarya Savaşına kadar, aklımın almadığı, bu mukavemet meğerse yapılabilecek bir şey ve yapılacak tek işmiş. Bunu anlayıp tatbik edenlere ne mutlu!.. Madem ki bunu bir harika ve mucize kabul ediyoruz, harika ve mucizeye kulağımızla işitip inandık gözümüzle görüp iman ettik. Ve işte kalp ile tasdik ve lisan ile tekrar ediyoruz.” Refik Halit Karay, *Minelbab, İlelmihrab*, (İstanbul: Tan Gazetesi Matbaası, 1964) p.223.

Mustafa Madanođlu was from Eşme, a small town near Uşak. He was a local large land owner. After the Greek invasion in Eşme, the commander of the Greek Army Corps in Eşme appointed him as governor of Eşme. While he was in this duty he tortured the population in cooperation with the invaders. After the National Struggle, he was arrested and put in jail in Kula. He was added to the list of the 150s during the discussions on the matter by suggestions coming from the deputies.

As can be seen, all people which have examined had a common point. According to Great National Assembly, they were traitors and they could carry on his actions against the country in the future. The government had to take the measures before they acted.

Süleyman Şefik Paşa should have been considered as one of the names that presented potential danger, appearing on the list with the title of Commander of the Army of the Caliphate. In the following part, we will try to make determinations related to the issue of the 150s and we will try to scrutinize the life and opinions of a single person.



An exile memoir, from left to right  
Sabit Şevket, Rıza Tevfik, Refik Halid (Karay) Refik Halid's wife,  
Refik Halid's son and Rıza Tevfik's wife.<sup>94</sup>

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94- *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol 10, (December 1988), p.373

## CHAPTER IV

### ONE OF THE 150: SÜLEYMAN ŞEFİK SÖYLEMEZOĞLU

#### Number 18: Süleyman Şefik Kemali Söylemezoğlu

As mentioned above, throughout the preparation of the *Yüzellilikler* list, there were long and serious discussions between the members of the Grand National Assembly and the government about the names that would be on the list. In the end, some categories were determined, one of which was “People who were members of the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye*. Süleyman Şefik Paşa was in this category as the commander of the *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye*. He appeared as the eighteenth person on the list. Who was Süleyman Şefik Kemali and what did he do to deserve this punishment?

#### The Söylemezoğlu Family

Süleyman Şefik Paşa belongs to the, whose origins reach back to the early era of the Ottoman Empire. According to the memoirs of Ali Kemali Paşa (1819-1898),<sup>95</sup> there are two stories about the ancestors of the family. About the subject he says:

Our genesis originates from the Turkish tribes who immigrated from Mohan to Anatolia with the great ancestor of the Ottoman Empire, Ertuğrul Gazi. As told by my father, Ali

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95- He was the father of Süleyman Şefik Kemali. He served the Ottoman Empire as a civil servant throughout his life. His best known post was as governor of Konya. In the *Sicill-i Osmani*, he is described as a virtuous, intelligent, fluent, and chaste person. The memoirs of Ali Kemali Paşa have not been published yet, but his grandson, Yüksel Söylemezoğlu, has been studying them. For further information about Ali Kemali Paşa, see, *Elli Meşhur Vali*, (Ankara: İç İşleri Bakanlığı, 1969).

Teymur Efendi, we are the descendants of Şeyh Söylemez, who was buried in Hınıs.<sup>96</sup> However, according to my father's sister, Şeyh Söylemez was not our ancestor. She said that our ancestors visited Şeyh Söylemez when he was alive or his *turbe* (a large, usually domed tomb) after his death, and prayed for a son. After the birth of the son, to thank him, we took the family name "Söylemez" and accepted Şeyh Söylemez as the spiritual ancestor of our family.<sup>97</sup>



Ali Kemal Paşa

After that, Ali Kemal Paşa continues to narrate the history of the family from the mother's side, and traces the root of the family back to Harput and Şahan Ali, or Ali the Giant at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The brother of Ali Kemal's grandmother, Şahan Ali, was a huge, strong man. One day while he was wrestling with his cousin, he killed him accidentally and then he ran away from his village. After a long search his

father found him in the small village of Haneke, near Erzurum. He tried to convince him to return home, but he was not successful and in the end, his father decided to migrate from Harput to Erzurum.

1638 was a turning point in Şahan Ali's life because in this year, Sultan Murad

96- Hınıs is a small town near Erzurum.

97- "Bizim aslımız ve neslimiz Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin büyük atası Ertuğrul Gazi ile Mohan'dan Anadoluya göçen Türk aşiretlerindedir. Babamın bana anlattığına göre biz Hınıs'ta gömülü Şeyh Söylemez'in çocukları imişiz. Diğer bir görüş babam Ali Teymur Efendi'nin kızkardeşine göre, Şeyh Söylemez atamız değildir. Şeyh Söylemez hayattayken veya ölümünden sonra türbesi atalarımız tarafından ziyaret ile bir erkek evlat için kendisine dua edilmiştir. Erkek evladın doğumu üzerine, kendisine teşekkür maksadıyla Söylemez adı alınmış, soyumuzun manevi atası kabul edilmiştir." Memoirs of Ali Kemal Paşa, copy of the manuscript owned by Mrs. Perizat Perin, the paşa's daughter in law.

IV<sup>98</sup> set out on the Baghdad campaign. When he came to Erzurum, he took a rest. He had heard about Şahan Ali's reputation as a strong wrestler and ordered a wrestling match between his champion and Şahan Ali. Ali the Giant won and the Sultan wanted him to be his first champion, but Şahan Ali did not want to go with Murad IV. His father begged the Sultan to leave him and eventually the Sultan let him free and gave them some money and some presents. The father and the son returned to their village. They bought some land and established a village.

After this story, which tells about Ali Kemali's family on his mother's side, he turns to his father's side, which was also from Erzurum. The grandfather of Süleyman Şefik Kemali, Ali Teymur Efendi, was a great poet and calligrapher. When he was a young man he traded between Erzurum, İstanbul and Trabzon. Throughout this period he met important people from the palace bureaucracy. He worked as the secretary of the governor of Muş for a while, but than he turned to trade. He lived his last years in Trabzon, therefore a part of the Söylemezoğlu family is still there.<sup>99</sup>

Süleyman Şefik Paşa was born in 1866.<sup>100</sup> He spent his childhood in different regions of the Empire because of his father's duties. He travelled to different regions of the Empire throughout his military career. He was the second son of Ali Kemali Paşa and, he chose to be a soldier in spite of his father's opposition. His elder brother, Necmettin Kemali Söylemezoğlu (1860-1942), was a well-educated, 1 Young Turk. He was arrested and charged with revolutionary activities as member of

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98- Murad IV (9 July 1611- 8 February 1640), 17<sup>th</sup> Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. He was the son of Ahmed I and Mahpeykar Kösem sultan; Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Bu Mülkün Sultanları* (İstanbul: Oğlak Bilimsel Kitaplar, 2000), p. 260.

99- From the memoires of Ali Kemali Paşa; Yüksel Söylemezoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete, Erzurumdan İstanbul'a Olaylar ve Portreler*, typed manuscript.

100- Parts of the memoirs of Süleyman Şefik Kemali were published as *Hatıratım: Başıma Gelenler ve Gördüklerim, 31 Mart Vak'ası* but it is full of untrue information. For example, according to this book he was born in 1860, but this was not correct, because he was born in 1866. 1860 the date of birth of his elder brother, Necmettin Kemali. Actually it is very easy to reach to the real date from his memories. For example he says that he was appointed to Yemen in 1893 when he was 27 years old. Not only dates or information but also some translations are false, therefore I used the original version of his memoires while I was carrying out this study.

a committee formed against Abdülhamid, but he was acquitted by the efforts of his brothers. However, he did not feel secure and therefore fled from Turkey to Paris. Disatisfied with the Young Turk representatives there and he returned to the country in thr third year of his exile.



From left to right Necmettin Kemali, Galip Kemali, Süleyman Şefik Kemali



When he graduated from *Mekteb-i Harbiye*

According to Süleyman Şefik Paşa, he was really an optimistic man and this optimism sometimes led him to naivite.<sup>101</sup> The youngest of the three brothers was Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu (1873-1955), who was well educated like his brothers. He chose the civil service. He worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. After the First World War he joined the National Struggle and continued his job in the ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Turkey.

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101- Yüksel Söylemezoğlu, *Asım Paşa Konağı*, typed manuscript.

Süleyman Şefik Paşa described himself as a smart and canny child; he boasts about his memorizing capacities.<sup>102</sup> He was graduated from the Military Collegue (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*) in 1883/1884 (1301) with the rank of first lieutenant of artillery and then he served as aide-de-camp to the commander in chief of the Arsenal. He worked in various artillery regiments as a major. He served in Yemen as lieutenant colonel and then he participated to the Greece War (1897) as a colonel. He was appointed to Asir and then to Basra as a military governor. During the Balkan Wars he fought as an army commander at Çatalca, later in Damascus served as commander of yet another army corp. After he came back to İstanbul he had an early retirement at 1913, during the epuration of the army by the CUP. After the Armistice of Mudros, he returned active service in the army and was sent in mission to Anatolia twice, the first time with Prince Abdurrahim as part of the *Heyet-i Nasihâ* and second time as an inspector in the region of Konya.<sup>103</sup>

Upon his return, Süleyman Şefik Kemali was appointed Minister of War through the efforts of Damat Ferit Paşa. He held his position for approximately one and a half months until a cabinet crisis, which brought about his resignation. He was appointed as the commander of the *Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye* at 1920.

Having spent most of his life in state service, Süleyman Şefik Paşa happened to be on duty where trouble and action took place. mostly in the troublesome areas with respect to his era and the places of duty. For instance he worked in Yemenite during the most chaotic period of Yemenite rebellion. He was charged with a coup d'état attempt against Abdülhamid II and he was exiled to Arabia. He was the commander of the district of the Üsküdar at the time of the March 31 Event. He carried out his duty as the district commander of Üsküdar in the course of the 31 March Event. He

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102- Memoirs of Süleyman Şefik Paşa, typed manuscript, owned Perizat Perin.

103- *İkdam*, 15 August 1919.



was succesful in keeping the soldiers of the Selimiye barrack from joining in the rebellion and according to Burhan Felek, he prevented the destruction of İstanbul by removing the breech mechanisms of the cannons.<sup>104</sup> He was nevertheless sent into an honorable exile when he was appointed as military governor of Asir (1909-1912).<sup>105</sup> In spite of the fact that his achievements in the course of this event were appreciated, he was disbarred from duty and appointed commander and administrator of Asir (1909-1912).

In this period in Asir, a man named Seyyid İdris declared himself to be the messiah. He forced the people of Asir to give their allegiance to him, commanding them and punishing those who resisted to his commands. The administration in İstanbul, based on their concern about the possible transformation of this movement into a full scale rebellion, sent Süleyman Şefik Paşa to Asir accompanied with a troop of soldiers. His performance throughout the course of his duty in Asir, is a matter of controversy in our sources. But the central government was satisfied with the results he obtained. He seems to have been among the Otoman forces which advanced on Edirne during the second phase of the Balkan Wars when he commended the 8<sup>th</sup> army corps. His last duty before his retirement was the military governorship of Basra. He tried to initiate a *reapproachment* between the Ottoman Government and the Saudis, the prominent tribe of the region, and tried to secure latter's loyalty to the central government. Although it is thought that he crossed the line in his relationships with the Saudis and misused the authority which had been given by the government, none of the accusations on these issues was ever proven. After being summoned to İstanbul, he was forced to retire.

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104- Burhan Felek, "31 Mart Vak'ası," *Milliyet*, 20 April 1980.

105- The bank archives of Yapı Kredi Bank, Personal archieve of Suleyman Şefik Kemali, File 1, Document number 3.

As far as we can understand from his memoirs and our conversations with his daughter, Mrs. Perizat Perin, staying home throughout the First World War wounded his pride. He was a soldier in the first place and he has never forgiven the CUP administration for this.



Süleyman Şefik with his family at the villa of Marko Paşa, 1916

After the First World War he was reinstated as a general in active service and performed a few duties of which and detailed account will be presented below.

### The *Heyet-i Nasiha* Membership

After the Armistice of Mudros, grand viziers and cabinets changed frequently, and created a chaotic atmosphere in which governmental activity was very difficult. Not only changes at the governments, but also existence of the CUP at the Anatolia was an important for the palace. The governments expectations were clear:

Strengthening its position vis-a-vis the CUP in various cities and towns that had been the main motivation to send Prince Abdulhalim and Prince Cemaleddin to Erzurum and Trabzon at the respectively beginning of March.<sup>106</sup> As a matter of fact, in addition to their efforts to keep the Anatolian people attached to the palace the delegations spread the word that the CUP had undermined the constitutional government in the recent past.<sup>107</sup> In addition to self confidence problems of the İstanbul government, the Entente Powers had started to occupy various regions and the popular reactions to this occupations made this task even more difficult. The popular reactions grow stronger when Greek minorities in several districts started to indulge in banditry activities. This situation was all the more alarming since the country seemed to be on the verge of strife. Sultan Mehmed VI. and grand vizier Ferit Paşa decided to form delegations to be sent to Anatolia and Rumelia in order to a peace the population.

The delegations were to be headed by Otoman princes like before. One such delegation known as *Heyet-i Nasiha*, in mid March 1919 in order to come down the Greek population in and around Şile. The delegation was sent to the region on 20 March 1919.<sup>108</sup> In its meeting of March 31, 1919 the cabinet took the decision of forming larger delegation of diskind endowing them with more power.

Before implementing this measure Damat Ferit, visited Admiral Webb. He explained the project set up two delegations with executive powers to various regions. He also sounded Admiral Webb as to whether British officers might join these delegations. Admiral Webb stated that cooperation was not possible, but he

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106- Gothard Jaeshke, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1970) pp. 21-27.

107- Lütü Simavi, *Son Osmanlı Sarayında Gördüklerim: Mehmet Reşat Han'ın ve Halife'nin Sarayında Gördüklerim*, (İstanbul: Örgün Yayınları, 2004) pp. 232.

108- Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Milli Mücadele Başlarken, Mondros Mütarekesinden Sivas Kongresine*, Vol. 1, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959), p.64.

would send orders to local inspection officers of the British Army to extend their help to the delegations.<sup>109</sup> Thus two larger delegations were established and sent to Rumelia together with Prince Cemaleddin, and to Anatolia together with Prince Abdurrahim, respectively.

Alongside Prince Abdurrahim Efendi there were seven people in the Anatolia committee: Ali Rıza Paşa; Ferit Mahmut Hayret Paşa; Ömer Fevzi Bey; the Mufti of Bursa Halil Fehmi Efendi, the former mufti of Pazarcık Ohannes Ferit Efendi; Yanko Kovenidi (Tuanidi?), and Süleyman Şefik Paşa. This delegation left İstanbul by train on 16 April 1919, traveling to Bursa, Balıkesir, İzmir (26-30 April), Afyon, Antalya, Isparta, Konya, and Eskişehir. It returned to İstanbul on 18 May 1919, that is, after the occupation of İzmir.<sup>110</sup> The Rumelia delegation left İstanbul on 28 April under the management of Prince Cemaleddin. Other important names among the delegation were Cevat Paşa, the Minister of War, and Fevzi Paşa. They returned on 9 May.<sup>111</sup>

According to the *İrade-i Seniyye* (Will of the Sultan) issued on the day the other delegation left İstanbul for Rumelia, “The goal of the delegations was a declaration of the tenderness and consideration of the Sultan” to the “*sumuf-u teba-yı şahane*” (public of the sultan) that had been damaged by all disasters.<sup>112</sup> The official reason for the existence of the delegations explained in this manner, but contemporary comments were more direct. Such an example is found in the columns of the daily *Alemdar* who wrote that, “The aim of the delegation is to inspect the situation and bring harmony to inter ethnic relations.”<sup>113</sup> It was headed that this opinion was shared by Mehmet Ali Bey, the Minister of the Interior. In its

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109- Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, vol.1, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976) p. 58

110- “Heyeti Damat Ferit uğurladı, emrine 3 milyon lira ve 80 asker verildi.”, *Alemdar*, 17 April 1919.

111- Jaeschke, pp. 28.

112- *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 28 April 1919

113- “..... Heyetin amacı durumu teftişat icrasıyla beynelanasır muhadenet ve mevedetin iade ve temini.”, *Alemdar* 12 April 1919.

concluding remarks, the paper defended that the presents of American and Greek members in the delegations was the guarantee of the latter's succes.<sup>114</sup> Lütfi Simavi, insistantly notes that seems the Christian population loyal to the Patriarchates were reluctant to join the delegations the latter would never be able to achieve their objectives.<sup>115</sup>

The Turkish people greeted this delegations with great expectations and welcomed them with magnificent ceremonies. However it is obvious that the delegations did not get the positive responses from the minorities. Likewise after the *Heyet-i Nasiha* arrived in İzmir, it was observed that the provocative publications of the Greek papers increased.<sup>116</sup>

As mentioned above, Süleyman Şefik Kemali was a member of the *Nasiha* delegation and traveled with Prince Abdürrahim. Sometime after he returned to İstanbul, he received a summons from the secretary of the Ministry of War to meet the minister. He went to the meeting and the minister told that Damat Ferid wanted to see him. Damat Ferid Paşa received him in the *Sadaret* (the prime minister's office). He said to Süleyman Şefik:

- We have decided to send you to Konya and İzmir to get an idea of the general situation in Anatolia.<sup>117</sup>

Süleyman Şefik answered him, but there was a tone of objection in his voice.

- But my Paşa, the head of the snake is here, in İstanbul!<sup>118</sup>

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114- *Alemdar* 18/4/1335 – 117-1427.

115- Simavi, pp. 232-4.

116- M. Şefik Aker, “*İstiklal Harbinde 57. Tümen ve Aydın Milli Cidali*,” *Askeri Mecmua*, no 104, (Ankara, 1973), p. 52; Çelebi, pp. 583-585.

117 - “Anadolu'daki genel durumla ilgili fikir edinmek amacıyla sizi Konya ve İzmir havalisine göndermeye kara verdik.” Yüksel Söylemez, *Asım Paşa Konağı*, typed manuscript.

118 - “Fakat Paşam, yılanın başı burada İstanbuldadır.” Ibid.

This answer annoyed Damat Ferid and he could not understand what he meant. He invited him to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the evening. Possibly Damat Ferid had time to think on Süleyman Şefik's words and in the second meeting his first question was the following:

Paşa, this morning what did you mean by the words “the head of the snake”?<sup>119</sup>

Süleyman Şefik explained his words thus:

- My Paşa, the head of the snake is in İstanbul. The chaos throughout the motherland is arising from İstanbul, and therefore first we have to reform the center, then the provinces. Our state is in trouble now and everyone has a word on every subject. In this case, how a state can be managed? And How can we achieve the stabilization of it?<sup>120</sup>

Damat Ferit was shocked. He had not heard a speech of that kind before. It was really couragess and he said to him:

- Let us benefit from your experience.<sup>121</sup>

### Süleyman Şefik Paşa as Minister of War

As mentioned above, Damat Ferit Paşa played an important role in Süleyman Şefik Paşa's appointment as Minister of War. In the memoirs related to the era this subject was dealt with on different occasions. For this reason it is trying to comprehend first why and how Süleyman Şefik was appointed a minister in such a

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119 - “Paşa, bu sabah yılanın başı diyerek neyi kastettiniz.” Ibid.

120 - “Paşam, yılanın başı İstanbul'dadır. Anavatandaki karmaşanın asıl kaynağı burasıdır, bu yüzden önce burayı arkasından eyaletleri düzeltmeliyiz. Şu an devletimiz bir felaket içerisinde ve her kafadan bir ses çıkıyor. Bu durumda bir devlet nasıl yönetilebilir ve ıslahatları nasıl başarabiliriz.” Ibid.

121 - “Tecrübelerinizden faydalanalım.” Ibid

troublesome period for İstanbul, when the de facto occupations as well as the first signs of the Anatolian revolution had begun to appear. Understanding these developments will shed light on the reasons why Süleyman Şefik Paşa appeared on the list of 150.



Süleyman Şefik

According to Ali Fuad Cebesoy's memoirs, after Süleyman Şefik went to Konya as inspector, he sent a report to Damat Ferit Paşa, which mentioned that the Anatolia movement was not a serious fact at all, it was only an attempt by the CUP members and the population did not join them. If he had been Minister of War, he could have eradicated this movement. As a result of this report, Damat Ferid became very happy

for he had found a suitable candidate for the ministry, because at those times there was a crisis in the cabinet between the Minister of Internal Affairs, Adil Paşa, and the Minister of War, Nazım Paşa. He recalled Süleyman Şefik Paşa and offered him the Ministry of War.

In some of the sources in which his name appears, Süleyman Şefik Paşa is presented as the man who said, "I will finish off the *Kuva-yı Milliye*! According to Sıtkı Aydınel's work on this period Süleyman Şefik Paşa made an interview with daily *İkaz* on 11 August 1919, while he was went back to İstanbul.<sup>122</sup> According to the interview, "Mustafa Kemal Paşa is responsible for the current situation in Anatolia. He has evidently rebelled against the government of our country. These sorts of actions ruin our country."<sup>123</sup> The August 14 issue of the same newspaper

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122- Sıtkı Aydınel, *Güneybatı Anadolu'da Kuva-yı Milliye Harekatı* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), p.260.

123- "Anadolu'nun bu halinden Mustafa Kemal Paşa mesuldür, memleketin hükümetine karşı açıkça isyan etmiştir, bu gibi hareketler memleketi mahveder." *İkaz*, 11 August 1919

stating that “Nazım Paşa, the Minister of War and Adil Bey, the Secretary of Internal Affairs quarreled on the way that should be followed against the Anatolia movement.” it also read “Süleyman Şefik Paşa, who said that he could defeat the National Forces, has become the Minister of War.”<sup>124</sup>

There was a significant reason underlying Süleyman Şefik Paşa’s declaration. He perceived the National Forces movement as a movement of the CUP. Increasingly from late 1918 onwards, and completely after the British occupation of İstanbul in March 1920, the real political struggle was fought in Anatolia. The ground had been prepared by the wartime CUP leadership before they had left the country. This ground was the basis for their plan of establishing a national resistance movement in Asia Minor, drawn up when everyone, including the CUP leaders, expected the British and French navies to break through the Dardanelles in March 1915. If this had come to pass, the Ottoman government was prepared to live İstanbul for Konya.

The *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*<sup>125</sup> reconstituted in October 1918 as the *Umum Alem-i İslam İhtilal Cemiyeti İttihadı* (General Revolutionary Organization of the Islam) sent out emissaries with instructions to form guerilla bands in the country. Another important step taken by the Unionist leadership before the end of World War I was the creation of the *Karakol Cemiyeti* (Committee of Karakol). Its purpose was to protect the Unionists in the post-war situation and shield them against the revenge of the Entente, the Liberal Union Party (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Party*) and the Christian communities, especially the Armenians.

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124 - “Anadolu hareketine karşı takip edilecek yol hususunda Harbiye Nazırı Nazım Paşa ile Dahiliye Vekili Adil Bey kavga etti” başlığı altında “ Kuva-yı Milliye’nin hakkından gelirim diyen Süleyman Şefik Paşa Harbiye Nazırı oldu” denmekteydi. *İkaz*, 14 August 1919, Aydınel, pp. 260-261

125- *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* was a secret intelligence service founded by some CUP members.



While the CUP was prepared an armed resistance movement in Anatolia, they also prepared a public defense of the rights of the Turkish-Muslim population in areas perceived to be in danger of occupation by the Greeks, Armenians, French, Italians or the British. This initiative took the shape of the formation of regional societies for the defense of national rights, which were to play a vital role in the establishment of a national resistance movement in Anatolia and Thrace after the war.<sup>126</sup> As a conclusion, this last step was successful, as shown by the militia movements observed in Anatolia after the *de facto* occupations. It is hardly possible to think that as an experienced soldier, Süleyman Şefik, who had traveled throughout Anatolia and then was sent to Konya as inspector general was unaware of what was going on. From this point of view, it is clear that just like Sultan Vahdeddin, Süleyman Şefik perceived the organization in Anatolia as the new efforts of the remnants of the Unionist organisation after their leaders left the country in ruin and fled rather than as a movement of independence. Because Mustafa Kemal was the most prominent figure of this movement, he attacked him, and claimed that he could impede the militia organization in Anatolia in order to save the country from a new calamity which would be brought about by the Unionists.

Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, who witnessed the era and events closely as a figure included in the list of 150s, described Süleyman Şefik Paşa's appointment as Minister of War as follows:

Damat Ferit Paşa appointed Süleyman Şefik Paşa, who was former governor and commander of Basra, instead of the Minister of War Nazım Paşa. The new minister had spent many years in the different regions of Arabia. He was really a successful governor and commander, which made him famous. He was not known by the opposition and he was also stranger for *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* (The

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126- Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B Tauris, 1998), pp. 141-142.

Party of Freedom and Entente). He was mostly a Unionist<sup>127</sup> and had a personal relationship with ex-Minister Enver Paşa. This political attitude could have been a serious difficulty being appointed to a position of this kind. In spite of all obstacles, in the grand vizier felt that he was capable of taking on this responsibility and made him the Minister of War.<sup>128</sup>

Another witness of this period, the chief secretary of *mabeyn* Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, described the events which took place during the appointment with a keener look. He elaborates on the events from a different perspective. One of the most important of these dimensions was the partisanship that was often experienced in the cabinet of the Armistice. As is known, on 30 November 1918, when the Ottoman Empire demanded an armistice with allies, the CUP cabinet, with Talat Paşa as its head, was in charge of the government. Talat Paşa declared that he resigned from the government. Within the period until the signing of the Mudros Armistice transitory cabinets were constituted basically with the statesmen who had not been precisely dealing with politics and were secondary names in the CUP. After

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127- Actually his manner towards the CUP was a mystery, because although he became a member of the party, but he tried to stay at the same distance between the CUP and the opposition. He tells the story of his membership of the CUP in his memoirs. After the establishment of the *Ahrar* Party, the main opposition to the CUP appeared at the beginning of the second constitutional period, İsmail Hakkı Bey from Manastır and Celal Bey, who had become Minister of Internal Affairs, took Süleyman Şefik to *Bab-ı Ali* and presented him to Fatih Hodja, the director of observatory. They wanted him make an oath of fealty the *Kuran* and a weapon. Süleyman Şefik asked the meaning of that oath and they answer, you are going to swear to follow the orders of the CUP. Süleyman Şefik was not satisfied with the answer and said I am going to do only legal orders of the committee "and the others accepted his thought. After the ceremony he become a member of the CUP. One day İsmail Kemal Bey from Avlonya, who was an important name of the *Ahrar* Party, invited Reşit Bey and Süleyman Şefik Kemali to dinner. After the dinner he met with the cheaf of the *Meclis-i Mebusan* Ali Rıza Bey. Ali saw him with İsmail Kemal Bey by chance and he asked Süleyman Şefik, if he was a defender of the Ahrar Party and the answer was "I am not a defender of the both CUP and Ahrar, which means I am not depend on any of them." Typed manuscript of memoirs of Süleyman Şefik

128- "Damat Ferit Paşa, bu sırada Harbiye Nazırı olan Nazım Paşanın yerine eski Basra valisi ve kumandanı Süleyman Şefik Paşa'yı tayin etti. Süleyman Şefik Paşa Arabistan'ın farklı bölgeelrinde görev yapmış, valilik ve kumandanlığı sırasındaki başarısı ona şöhret kazandırmıştı. Muhalefet aleminde hiç tanınmayan, Hürriyet ve İtilaf muhitinin de tamamen yabancı olan bu zata daha ziyade bir İttihatçı gözüyle bakılabılırdi. Eski Harbiye Nazırı Enver Paşa ile şahsi dostluğu ve hukuku vardı. Bu poitik eğilimi böyle bir zamanda bı tarz bir göreve gelmesi için ciddi bir engel sayılabılırdi fakat tüm bu engellere rağmen sadrazam onun bu göreve uygun olduğunu düşündüğünden, Harbiye Nazırı yapıldı." see Göztepe, p. 208.

the signing of the armistice, the tendency shifted towards *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*, which was the old enemy of the CUP. Consequently, both the Sultan's and *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*'s doubts about the CUP and its remnants constituted significant obstacles for the presence of the members of the CUP in the cabinets and this situation was only one side of the issue. On the other hand after the First World War the Sultan was trying to get back monarchy therefore he mostly wanted to see persons who were loyal to sultan and monarchy in the cabinet, especially on the important ministries like Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and War.<sup>129</sup> The events which took place during the appointment period of Süleyman Şefik present a good example of the situation. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi described this period in his memoirs as follows:

One day the grand vizier Ferid Paşa came before the Sultan in the palace in Harem and then he summoned me to Küçük Mabeyn and said that there was a conflict between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of War and it could not continue as it was; therefore he was going to appoint Süleyman Şefik Paşa as the Minister of War instead of Nazım Paşa. After this conversation, on the same day, he sent me a petition and I gave it to the Sultan and sent the approval of the petition. After these events Tevfik Paşa, the former grand vizier, came to meet the Sultan. After a short meeting, I was called before the Sultan. He said that Tevfik Paşa had said that, Süleyman Şefik Paşa had been an old Unionist and also some ministers of the cabinet were disturbed by his appointment, and Vahidettin did not want a new trouble in the cabinet rooted from the Unionists. He ordered me to call the grand vizier and to repeat his words to the grand vizier and inform him of the delay of the order about the appointment if it had not been declared yet. I called Ferit Paşa and conveyed to him what the Sultan had told me, but he stated that the delay of the order was impossible since Süleyman Şefik Paşa had already been appointed.

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128- Akşin, vol.I, pp.618-620

I informed the Sultan about the speech and Tevfik Paşa. In the evening of the same day Ferid Paşa invited me to his house and told me that he had spoken with other members of the cabinet and that nobody had a problem with the appointment and he added: We are going to try him for a week and if something negative happens we will replace him with someone else.<sup>130</sup>

Without drawing the borders of the familiarity between Süleyman Şefik and Adil Bey, Refik Halit gives another clue which shows they were not strangers to each other. Refik Halit Karay gives us another clue with respect to the appointment of Süleyman Şefik Paşa as Minister of War. According to him the factor that tilted the balance in favour of Süleyman Şefik Paşa was Adil Bey, the Minister of Interior.

Süleyman Şefik Paşa was appointed to the Ministry of War. Why him? I guess the Minister of Internal Affairs had an impact in this matter, wouldn't they work together, hand in hand? Of course, they must have known each other and agreed in theory in order to be united in practice.

In the last period of general war Adil Bey was a servant of the Union and Progress and for me, he was one whom Talat Paşa valued much. Süleyman Şefik, on the other hand, was sent to Iran borderlands as the head of a delegation; that is, neither of them

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130- "Bir gün sadrazam Ferid Paşa Harem dairesinde huzura kabul olunduktan sonra beni Küçük Mabeyne celp ile Harbiye Nazırı Nazım Paşa ile Dahiliye Nazırı arasında bir anlaşmazlık olduğunu bunun bu şekilde devam edemeyeceğini belirterek, Nazım Paşanın yerine Süleyman Şefik Paşa'yı Harbiye Nazırı olarak atayacağını söyledi. Bu konuşmanın ardından aynı gün bana yolladığı dilekçeyi padişaha ilettim ve onaylanmış dilekçeyi yolladım. Bu olayların ardından eski sadrazam Tevfik Paşa Padişahı görmeye geldi. Kısa bir görüşmenin ardından huzura çağırıldım. Padişah Tevfik Paşanın Süleyman Şefik Paşa'nın eski İttihadçılardan olduğunu ve kabinedeki bazı bakanların da bu atamadan rahatsız olduklarını söylediğini belirtti. Vahidettin kabinede İttihatçılar yüzünden yeni bir sorun yaşanmasını istemiyordu. Bana sadrazamı telefonla aramamı söylediklerini tekrar ettikten sonra eğer henüz atamayı tebliğ etmedilerse ertelemelerini söylememi emretti. Ferit Paşa'yı arayarak ona padişahın söylediklerini ilettim fakat bana ertelemenin mümkün olmadığını Süleyman Şefik Paşanın atandığını söyledi. Ben de Sulatan'ı ve Tevfik Paşa'yı konuşmayla ilgili bilgilendirdim. Aynı gün akşam Ferid Paşa beni evine çağırdı ve bana kabinenin diğer üyeleriyle görüşüğünü ve kimsenin atamayla ilgili bir probleminin olmadığını söyledi ve ekledi: Kendisini bir hafta kadar tecrübe ederiz, eğer olumsuz birşey olursa başka biriyle yer değiştiririz." Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İştiklerim*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), pp. 234-235.

was an extreme oppositionist or traditionalist; they were civil servants; every time they could benefit from their activities. Now the period of armistice had come. United activity began immediately. The Minister of War, coming to the office of Internal Affairs, was holding discussions and consultations. This was something unique in the history of the Sublime Porte.<sup>131</sup>

In the words of Refik Halit there is something more important than the appointment of Süleyman Şefik as the Minister of War: the matter of being the man of the period. Indeed, when Süleyman Şefik's life is surveyed it is clear that there are many examples of this. This man, seeing himself as a soldier at the service of the state, rather than engaged in the games of power, pondered on the reflections of the power in İstanbul outside İstanbul, struggled to strengthen the central authority while carrying out his duties, and never avoided making criticism at times against the wrongdoings. It was possible for him to be under the command of this or that person only when it was in a service to the Sultan even it means acting against Kanun-i Esasi; without the order or endorsement of the Sultan any movement could only be an attempt to revolt. Likewise the cost of a regime change as a result of a revolt was paid bitterly during World War I.

Süleyman Şefik Paşa was a magnificent and pompous man. He was one of the rare paşas who dressed elegantly and thought what he wore became him. Nothing else mattered when fame was added to this. With his medals across his chest, his most elegant clothes and brightest boots he entered the office of Minister of War on 14 August 1919,<sup>132</sup> Thursday, saluting everyone around.<sup>133</sup>

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131- Karay, p. 166.

132- Kazım Özalp, in his memoirs, under the title "Kuvay-ı Milliye Aleyhinde Propaganda ve Tertibat" mentions a letter that was sent by Damat Ferit to Süleyman Şefik Paşa, the Minister of War on 3 August, 1919 ordering him to stop the activities of Nationalist Forces in Anatolia. However Süleyman Şefik Paşa was not the Minister of War yet. The author has a lack of knowledge here. Indeed, such a letter might have been sent to Süleyman Şefik Paşa, but the Paşa

Süleyman Şefik Paşa's declaration, dated 14 August, was published in the newspapers the next day. In his declaration, after briefly stating that he would work day and night in order to achieve the security of the state in this important and delicate process which the nation was experiencing, he touched upon what he intended to do. For him, the main reason for the current situation of the state was the intervention of the army into politics; therefore, first this should be eliminated, and to achieve this, the soldiers should be called to mind their own business.<sup>134</sup> Apart from this, because the public indignation in the Ottoman Empire were being examined by the European countries, the security and order of the country had to be given greater importance. Thus, close cooperation and unity should be established with the local administrations and the information obtained there would be treated as a frame of reference for the actions.<sup>135</sup> Copies of this declaration were sent to all army corps.

After taking office, the first thing Süleyman Şefik Paşa undertook was a serious cleansing within the Ministry of War. To comprehend the level this cleansing reached, the following assessment by Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe will be sufficient:

The new Minister, before settling into his office completely and receiving the congratulations, began to execute an immediate and powerful performance. With his first movement

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was carrying out his duty as an inspector then; see Kazım Özalp, *Milli Mücadelede (1919-1922)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988)

133- Göztepe, p. 208.

134- These words explicitly reflect Süleyman Şefik Paşa's point of view of the developments in the Eastern parts of Anatolia in this period.

135- *İkdam*, 15 August 1919. Süleyman Şefik's mention of the cooperation with the local administrations is compatible with what was described by Refik Halit as the cooperation between Adil Bey and Süleyman Şefik. The then 15<sup>th</sup> Army Corps commander Kazım Karabekir, criticizing the new Minister of War regarding the examination of the civil status of the nation by the Great States, says that the civil status of the nation was not at the level of indolence and helplessness. Stating that everybody agreed that the army was not to intervene in politics, Karabekir claimed that the movement in Anatolia was not the intervention of the army in the politics, but actions that the great commanders of the army performed in order to save the honor of the nation. Despite their efforts, in the newspapers published in İstanbul they were accused of partisanship. Kazım Karabekir, *İstiklal Harbimiz* (İstanbul: Merk Yayıncılık, 1988), p. 116.

he dismissed the valuable elites of the Ministry of War and even of all the Turkish army.... Regarding this matter, the Minister of War appeared to be somewhat clumsy.<sup>136</sup>

Süleyman Şefik Paşa's first important order to the army was the prohibition of encrypted messaging between the army corps. According to the Paşa's order,<sup>137</sup> that shocked Anatolia on 18 August 1919, army corps commanders and the other commanders in the corps would be able to send encrypted messages only to the Ministry of War. Encrypted messaging with each other was prohibited strictly and when this was necessary, all telegrams should first be sent to the Ministry of War. As a justification of this order the condition of war was pointed out and it was stated that the order should be obeyed in any circumstances.

It was not first attempt of İstanbul to obstruct the encrypted messaging between the army corps. About the subject first act had come from Minister of Internal Affairs, Ali Kemal on June 1919 and after this time that kind of orders carried on. Süleyman Şefik Paşa's telegram was met with protest telegrams from Anatolia. Now that the country was in a condition of war, banning encrypted messaging would create a greater danger for this order could not serve anything but the disclosure of the correspondence between the corps to the enemy. Among those who reacted most strongly to this order were Kazım Karabekir, the commander of the 15<sup>th</sup> Army Corp, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, the commander of the 20<sup>th</sup> Army Corp. Both of them insisted on the necessity of the withdrawal of this decision in their telegrams of protest. The

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136- Göztepe, p. 209.

137- " Kolordu kumandanlarıyla kolordu ahz-ı askeri ruesası ancak nezaretle şifre ile muhabere eyleyebileceklerdir. Bunlar yekdiğeriyle şifreli muhabere için nezaretin vesatetine müracaat mecburiyetinde olduklarından aralarında şifre ile muhabere edecekleri hususat-ı mühimmeyi doğrudan doğruya nezarete yazacaklardır. Hal-i harb zail olduğu cihetiyle kumandanlar maiyetleriyle şifre ile muhabere icra etmeyeceklerdir. Hususat-ı mebsutaya hasr-ı dikkat ve tevfiik-i hareket olunması tamimen tebliğ olunur." Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, DHKMS, 55-1/33, 15 August 1335.

prohibition of encrypted telegraphy could work especially to in favor of the Armenians and the Entente, and would pave the way to serious threats to Anatolia.

In fact, both sides had legitimate worries. While İstanbul was trying to prevent the communication between west and east for the Sivas Congress, for which the preparations were being made, Anatolia, under no circumstance whatsoever wanted to be under the control of İstanbul. From the point of view of Süleyman Şefik Paşa, there was one more dimension: It was Damat Ferit Paşa's and Adil Bey's opinion.

Damat Ferit Paşa, after returning from the Paris Peace Conference, came to hold the idea that the movement in Anatolia had to be stopped upon the observations he had made there. Therefore, at the very beginning of August, in a telegram he sent to the Ministry of War, he ordered the Ministry to do what was necessary to stop the National Forces. Adil Bey, on the other hand, within the limits of his authority, ordered some of the telegraphy offices which were providing the communication between the west and the east –one of the most important of these was Bursa- to prevent the use of the telegraph offices by those who were acting under the title of the National Forces. As the then General Manager of the Postal and Telegraphy Services, Refik Halit stated, the war of telegraphs between İstanbul and Anatolia appeared from the first stirrs of the Anatolian movement and became more intense with the Erzurum Congress. What Süleyman Şefik did was to contribute to the existing policies of the cabinet of which he had become a member.

Despite all the insistence, Süleyman Şefik Paşa did not withdraw the order; thereupon the reaction of Anatolia was severe and many telegraph offices were seized in Anatolia. In the end, Süleyman Şefik Paşa withdrew his order. Meanwhile, again with the order of the Ministry of War, army inspectorships were removed. This move met with content in contrast to the previous one. According to the general



conviction it was much better to do away with the inspectorships than to appoint “scoundrels” to these positions.<sup>138</sup>

Another event that engraved Süleyman Şefik Paşa’s name in the minds of the leaders of the National Forces was the Ali Galip event. During this event which can be described roughly as an effort to prevent the Sivas Congress by İstanbul, he cooperated with Adil Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, as he had promised to do when he took office.

One of the most detailed accounts of the matter, which is referred to widely, is Yunus Nadi’s *Ali Galip Hadisesi*.<sup>139</sup> According to this book and, as mentioned in the previous section Ali Galip was appointed to the governor of Elazığ in May 1919. Setting out for Elazığ, Ali Galip visited Reşit Paşa, the Sivas governor, on his way. The main theme of their discussion was the order of the Sublime Porte expressing the dismissal of Mustafa Kemal from the inspectorship of the 3<sup>th</sup> Army and requestordering that his commands not be obeyed. When Ali Galip asked Reşit Paşa what he would do about the matter, the reply was “nothing”. For Reşit Paşa, the central government only had stated that Mustafa had been dismissed and ordered nothing more than that. For Ali Galip, on the other hand, Mustafa Kemal had to be arrested if he came to Sivas. According to Reşit Paşa, the reason underlying Ali Galip’s attitude was his hatred for the Unionists. Although Ali Galip, having been elected as an independent deputy from Kayseri in 1912 elections, did not join *Hürriyet ve İtilaf*, he let others know that he had the spirit of the Party. Many of the words of Ali Galip, who talked too much and meaninglessly, consisted of oaths to Union and Progress.<sup>140</sup>

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138- Sami Önal (ed.), *Hüsrev Gerede'nin Anıları: Kurtuluş Savaşı, Atatürk ve Devrimler* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003), p. 68.

139- Yunus Nadi, *Ali Galip Hadisesi* (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955).

140- Ibid pp. 9-10.

The days during which Ali Galip was in Sivas were also the days on which Mustafa Kemal had intended to set out for Erzurum via Sivas.<sup>141</sup> The news that Mustafa Kemal had been dismissed had been announced to the public with posters on the walls in Sivas before he had left Amasya.<sup>142</sup> The most significant aim of this attempt of organization of the Liberal Union Party was to decrease Mustafa Kemal's reliability in the public sphere. When Mustafa Kemal arrived at Tokat, he telegraphed Reşit Paşa to say that he was on the way to Sivas and he was welcomed in Sivas by the governor. Mustafa Kemal had knowledge about the conversation between Ali Galip and Reşit Paşa, therefore he approached the governor cautiously in order to understand which side he had taken. When he was sure that Reşit Paşa was on his side, he summoned Ali Galip before him with the men who had accompanied him from İstanbul to Sivas. Mustafa Kemal, scolding Ali Galip severely, let him go due to his respect for his being a retired soldier.

After this conversation, Ali Galip, who was expected to return to İstanbul immediately, went to the place where Mustafa Kemal was staying the same night and they had a long conversation. Mustafa Kemal relates this private meeting as follows:<sup>143</sup>

Gentlemen, Ali Galip came to me at night telling that he wished to have a private talk after the bad treatment he had been subjected to.... He asked me not to consider the appearance of my actions important and said that the reason for his acceptance

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141- Mustafa Kemal and his friends, leaving Amasya on 26 June 1919 arrived at Sivas on 27 June; *Nutuk*, vol.1, p. 39.

142- Here again Yunus Nadi referring to Reşit Paşa's memoirs, said that the governor ordered the removal of the posters and this that was done by Halit Bey, the leader of Liberal Union Party in Sivas. The interesting thing was that after the order for the removal of these posters was issued, none of them could be found during the searches by the police. Nadi p.15.

143- "Efendiler, bu Ali Galip, gördüğü suimuameleden sonra, mahrem beyanatı olduğunu söyleyerek gece yalnız olarak yanıma gelmek istedi. Harekatın zevahirine ehemmiyet vermemekliğimizi rica ile Mamüratülaziz vilayetini kabul ederek gelmekten maksadının benim nokta-i nazarıma hadim olmak bulunduğunu ve Sivasta tevakkufu, beni tutuklamak değil, bana mülaki olup bizzat talimat almak için olduğunu izaha çalıştı ve bizi sabaha kadar işgal etmek suretiyle, muvaffak dahi olduğunu itiraf etmeliyim." *Nutuk*, vol. 1, p. 43 and Nadi, pp. 28-29.

of the governorship of Mamuratulaziz had been to come to Anatolia and serve me. And the reason why he had waited in Sivas was not arrest me, but to meet me and receiving my instructions. He tried to convince me till the morning. I have to confess that he succeeded.

After this speech Ali Galip, who met Mustafa Kemal under such circumstances, was allowed to go to his place of duty. This part of the event constituted the first part of the Ali Galip event. Mustafa Kemal left Sivas for the Erzurum Congress on 28 July. Meanwhile, Ali Galip set out for Elazığ. These two names were going to be mentioned together nearly two months later during the Sivas Congress and this time Süleyman Şefik Paşa too would be one of the actors.

As a matter of fact Süleyman Şefik Paşa's name appeared next to Adil Bey's name as the signature of a telegram send on September 2 to Ali Galip, to instruct the latter to prevent the congress to be held in Sivas.

The last factor that was taken into account in the inclusion of Süleyman Şefik's name in the list of 150s for this period is Süleyman Şefik's dismissal of Ali Fuat Paşa from the command of the 15<sup>th</sup> Army Corps. The reason for this was Ali Fuat Paşa's not conforming with the ministries orders. Ali Fuat Paşa was called back to the capital city and Ahmet Hulusi Paşa was supposed to replace him.<sup>144</sup> At the end Ali Fuat Paşa remained in office because of Ahmet Hulusi Paşa's "health conditions" but Süleyman Şefik's initiative was not forgotten by those who prepared the list of 150s.

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144- Karabekir, p.149

## *Kuva-yı İnzibatiye* and Süleyman Şefik Kemali

When he formed his forth cabinet on 5 April 1920, Damat Ferit wanted to have good relations with Britain. He hoped to put an end to movement in Anatolia, which was provoking the Entente Powers to take a stance against the Ottoman Empire. He sought to find a way to make a treaty with Entente States on better terms. He started the application of his plan without loosing any time. On 11 April, three documents about the illegality of *Kuva-yı Milliye* were prepared: a fetva from the *Şeyhü'l-İslam* Dürrizade Abdullah that proclaimed the National Struggle irreligious, a declaration from Damat Ferit's government, and a ferman, which was given to Damat Ferit by the sultan on 5 April.<sup>145</sup> These documents were printed together and copies thrown from British planes over the Anatolian landscape. In reaction to this, the Anatolian movement issued a fetva by Mehmet Rifat (Börekçi), the *müftü* of Ankara.<sup>146</sup>

Britain was not satisfied with Damat Ferit's action and insisted on the establishment of an army against the National Struggle. In the end, on 18 April 1920, the Ottoman government approved the decision about the establishment of an army, and a budget of 1,250,380 liras was allotted to the unit to be established. A decree which was issued on the same day made provisions for propaganda to call for volunteers in the regions of Bolu-Kocaeli. The decree also mentioned that some of the taxes collected in the region would be transferred to the budget of the new unit.<sup>147</sup> Damat Ferit had to find a commander for the army and he chose Süleyman Şefik Paşa, whom he knew from his third cabinet. The decree came into force on 24 April 1920.

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145- *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 11 April 1920.

146- Jaeschke, p.154.

147- *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 24 April 1920.

Süleyman Şefik Paşa described his appointment to this post as follows:<sup>148</sup>

When I had resigned from my post as Minister of Wars and was residing in my house in Kuzguncuk, a high official was sent by Damat Ferit Paşa to my house one night and told me that the grand vizier was waiting on the steamboat quay and then we went to meet Damat Paşa. Paşa said to me as soon as he saw me that you are appointed commander of the Army of the Caliphate and all of the equipment and establishment have already been prepared, and you must get prepared as soon as possible. It was impossible for me to refuse the order of the Padishah for whom I worked as *yaver-i ekrem* (head military assistant)<sup>149</sup> with the title of a solider. When I accepted this difficult post, I told the grand vizier that I had some conditions. My conditions, that were accepted by the grand vizier exactly, were as follows;

- I will be completely independent on the matter of order and command.
- I will be authorised to get in contact with commander and responsible persons of the National Forces in Anatolia and to make the amnesty decisions for the required persons.

These authorities were officially written with the other authorities which were given to me as personally by the grand vizier.<sup>150</sup>

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148- It was taken from letter which was sent for the purpose of correction and contribution to the memoirs of Süleyman Şefik Paşa published in *Yeni Sabah* (New Morning) newspaper by Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe. Göztepe, p. 293.

149- This title was given to Süleyman Şefik because of the fait accompli of Damat Ferit during his duty as Ministry of War. When the head assistantship was given to Süleyman Şefik Paşa, this important position was filled by two persons despite it should be special to only one person and the Padishah became very annoyed due to this situation. Likewise, the duty of Minister of War ended, and this title of Süleyman Şefik Paşa was taken back; for further information, see *Türkgeldi*, pp. 240-243.

150- "Harbiye Nezaretinden istifa etmiş ve Kuzguncuk'taki evimde otururken bir gece evime Damat Ferit Paşa tarafından bir yaver gelerek, İstimbüt İskele'de sadrazamın beni beklediğini söyledi. Damat Paşa'nın yanına gittik. Paşa beni görür görmez, Kuva-yı İnzibatiye Kumandanlığına tayin edildiniz. Tüm tertibat ve teşkilat hazırlanmıştır. Hemen yola çıkmak üzere hazırlanmanızı rica ediyorum dedi. Yaver-i Ekremligini yaptığım padişahın emrini bir asker sıfatıyla reddetmek bence imkansızdı. Bu cetin ve nazik vazifeyi kabul ederken Sadrazama bazı şartlarım olduğunu bildirdim. Sadrazam tarafından aynen kabul edilen şartlarım şunlardı.

In my opinion, acceptance of the duty was a hard decision for Süleyman Şefik Paşa. According to his daughter the family was living some economic problems and the post could be a solution for them but on the other hand his father did not want to fight with *Kuva-yı Milliye*. He was loyal to Sultan but also he was a patriot and he did not like invasion of the Anatolia.

Units of the Army of the Caliphate were sent to İzmit by means of a steamship on 29 April. The command headquarter of the units that reached İzmit on 4 May were the battleship *Yavuz*. The following events are described by Süleyman Şefik Paşa as follows:

I set off 2 days after my appointment and reached İzmit. When I realised and saw that Ibrahim, who was appointed as İzmit governor and was basically an Egyptian Circassian at that time and had developed passion for founding a government inside the government there, I sent my assistant to the grand vizier instead of a telegraph.

Because Ibrahim the İzmit governor tried to found government within the government there, honestly tried to found a kind of Circassian government, when I saw this situation, I wanted to remove this man from this place and wanted to appoint a more trustworthy person in place of him.

Damat Ferit Paşa stated on my request that dismissal of Ibrahim Bey could cause the anger of the Circassians and deemed it necessary to give me an answer of refusal and appointed Anzavur Paşa as commander of the Mobile Forces.

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- Emir ve kumanda hususunda tamamen bağımsız olacaktım.

- Anadolu'daki Kuva-yı Milliye kumandanları ve sorumlularıyla temasa geçmeye ve icap edenler hakkında af kararları vermeye yetkim olacaktı.

Sadrızam tarafından şahsen kabul edilen bu yetkileri bana verilen diğer yetkiler arasına da resmen yazdırmıştım.” When he requested all of the authorities relating to the forces formed, Süleyman Şefik Paşa should be unaware that Ahmet Anzavur was also sent to Adapazarı on the head of a force which was composed of Abazha and Circassians.

After this man came to İzmit, I returned to İstanbul 12 days after my arrival at İzmit.<sup>151</sup>

Above the relationships of Süleyman Şefik Paşa with İbrahim Bey and Ahmet Anzavur were discussed. Ahmet Anzavur also did not have pleasant feeling about to the Paşa, and complained of the Paşa in a long letter to Damat Ferit Paşa, and requested that this man who had not moved out of his battleship and did not give the soldiers the order move to be removed from the duty, on the same issue İbrahim Bey also sent a report to İstanbul.<sup>152</sup> Because Süleyman Şefik Paşa thought that he no longer had anything to do in İzmit as a consequence of this situation after visiting Damat Ferit Paşa following his return to İstanbul, and explained his return in this manner, thereupon Damat Ferit Paşa mentioned the inappropriate behaviour of Anzavur and requested him to return to his place of duty. Süleyman Şefik Paşa replied that he could not return and went home instead. Two days after this event he received a document stating that he had been dismissed from the post of Minister of War, and thus the adventures of the Army of the Caliphate ended for the Paşa as well.

The truth of the matter is that, considering that the names of the members of cabinet that had made the decision for the formation of the Army of the Caliphate were included in the list of 150s except for a few names, it was a very natural situation to include the name of the man who that had performed the duty of

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151- “Tayinimden iki gün sonra yola çıkarak İzmit’e geldim. O sırada İzmit mutasarrıflığına tayin edilmiş olan ve aslen Mısır Çerkezlerinden olan İbrahim’in pek şımarmış ve adeta oralarda hükümet içinde bir hükümet kurmak sevdasına düşmüş olduğunu görünce, Sadrazama telgrafla değil yaverimi göndererek: İzmitte mutasarrıf olan İbrahim’in orada hükümet içinde hükümet kurmaya çalıştığını daha doğrusu bir nevi Çerkes hükümeti kurmaya çalıştığını gördüğümden, bu herifin derhal buradan kaldırılarak yerine daha güven telkin eden birinin atanmasını istedim. Damat Ferid Paşa bu talebime karşı İbrahim Beğ’in görevden alınmasının Çerkezlerin öfkesine sebep olabileceğini bildirdi ve bana red cevabı verdiği gibi heber vermeye lüzum dahi görmeden Anzavur Paşa’yı Kuva-yı seyyare kumandanlığına tayin etti. Bu adamın İzmit’e gelmesinin ardından İzmit’e gelişimden tam 12 gün sonra İstanbul’a geri döndüm.”. Göztepe, p. 294.

152- Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, DH.EUM.AYŞ, 41/76, 27 Ramazan 1338/ 15 June 1920

commander of this force in the list. However, as mentioned, if there were persons in the cabinet of Damat Ferit that made the decision for the formation of this unit that were not put on the list, which opens the question of if Kuva-yı İnzibatiye was the only action of Süleyman Şefik, against the National Struggle, was included on the list?

Two of the persons that had taken part in the cabinet that had founded the Army of the Caliphate but were not taken in the list were Ahmet Resit Rey, the Minister of Internal Affairs; Cemil Topuzlu the Minister of Public Works. Although the decision of capital punishment was made by default for these two persons, no formal accusation was made against them after the war. Both of memoirs of these old ministers confirming, the overt role of Damat Ferit in this business is another side of the coin. However the essential opinion about what had caused the birth of the Army of the Caliphate was different.

The English forces occupied İstanbul alone on 16 March 1920. No armed force was present from the İstanbul government. Because the cabinet of Salih Hulusi Paşa had been withdrawn from duty, İstanbul was without any government at all. If this situation lasted any length of time, then it would be inevitable for England to put an end to the legal presence of the Ottoman state. A new government had to be established, but the government to be formed should seem neutral in order to avoid the obstacles of the Allied states.

The first work to be carried out by the government to be established should be to reply to the notation given condemning the foundation of the National Forces by the Allied forces. If this note were refused, then the chance would be given to the Allied states to finish the Ottoman state. If the national movement was condemned then Britain would want more and would demand some definite remedies to suppress




this movement. If İstanbul stated that it did not have enough soldiers, a greater danger was waiting for Anatolia because this work would be given to the Greek army in İzmir and Anatolia will be occupied because National Forces were not organised completely at that time. But if the İstanbul government had armed forces, it could pretend to suppress the National Forces with these forces in order to save some time.

Although this was the plan, it did not go as expected. A neutral cabinet could not be established and the duty of grand vizier was given again to Damat Ferit Paşa. When Damat Ferit Paşa also took the authority of Minister of War, issued the famous fatwa first and then wanted to use the Army of the Caliphate truly as an instrument against the National Forces. As a result of all of these deviations, a group which had benefited from his visit to Paris and headed by the above-mentioned ministers cut the allocated pay to the Army of the Caliphate with a decision made from the cabinet, then annulled this force completely and then overthrow the cabinet. For this reason, the names of these individuals were not put on the list of 150. However Süleyman Şefik Paşa was included on the list because of his duty in this unit when he was not very different from them in terms of actions which he did not perform. The reason for including him on the list should have been traced from his former duty as Minister of War. The duty of commander of the Army of the Caliphate was only an addition to others.

Because of decision of the capital punishment which was carried against Süleyman Şefik who had returned to home as he had told Ferit Paşa, the grand vizier, he was among the persons who took refuge in the British embassy on 6 November 1922 after the victory of the National Struggle and was among, those exiled from the country on an Egyptian steamer.




Mecca 1926



Beirut 10 February 1936

His life in exile was spent in a known geography and among known persons. He worked as the consultant and general inspector of them depending upon his older acquaintance with the Saudi people, returned to the country just after the general amnesty which was announced for list of 150s. Süleyman Şefik Paşa that spent the last years of his life with the children from his first wife, in İstanbul, Moda and died in Italian Hospital on 13 February 1946, at the age of 80 and his tomb was being sacrificed for destruction of a way.



Pasteur Hospital, İstanbul 18 February 1945

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The list of 150s appears as a special subject in the process of the passage passing empire to the nation state in the history of Turkey. It is special as an exception springing from the insistent efforts of the Turkish side in an international agreement like the Lausanne Treaty. There were two reasons for the insistence of the Turkish side to exclude at least 150 persons from the general amnesty, which was viewed as an internal matter. First, as İsmet İnönü stated during the discussions, the government had to perform its responsibility as the conscience of the public. More important than this was keeping individuals who were deemed to pose a threat to the internal security of the country away from Turkey.

However, when we look at the list, it is impossible not to experience confusion, just as the deputies themselves experienced during the discussions about the list in the Assembly. It is striking that some of the best-known individuals who had acted openly against the National Struggle were not on the list. Some of them, it should be noted, like Damat Ferit, Dürrizade Abdullah Efendi, Ahmet Anzavur, and Ali Kemal were not on the list because they had died before it was made. It is also interesting that none of the member of the Ottoman dynasty were included, but this can be explained by the fact that a law dated 3 March 1924 and numbered 431 had been passed with the title of “The Abolition of the Caliphate and the Exile of the Ottoman dynasty outside the Turkish Republic.” According to this law, the male and female

members of the Ottoman dynasty, their son-in-laws and persons that had been born to women who were dynasty members were forbidden to reside within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. Their Turkish nationality status became null and void, and they were obliged to leave the country within ten days beginning from the date of 6 March 1924. Thus, some members of the dynasty were not included in the list, which had been decreased from 600 to 150 with great difficulty.

As mentioned in the first part of this study, one of the most important characteristics of the list was that it did not include any non-Muslim people. This was the subject of heated debate in the Assembly, as there was no such compulsion in the protocol added to the declaration of the general amnesty in the Lausanne Treaty, which stipulated only “150 persons.” There are two important reasons why non-Muslims, especially Armenian and Greek, were not included on this list: a separate protocol had been signed with Venizelos agreeing that Greeks would not be included on the list, and the efforts during the Lausanne negotiations not to cause new reactions because of the pressures relating to Armenians. The Turkish government found the solution for this problem, as it had solved the problem of the dynasty members by sending them into exile. Non-Muslim people were thus not included on the list of 150 to be announced to all of the states that were parties of the Treaty, but they were included on a list prepared for persons to be denaturalized.

Finally, another characteristic of the list was that one-third of the individuals whose names appeared on it were peasants; this provoked heated discussions in the Assembly. Ferit Bey noted that the number of peasants on the list had been higher in the list prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that these persons could become involved once again in banditry they had indulged in the past if they were released.

Another subject on which attention was focused was the number 150. Was this the actual number of traitors to the National Struggle? Why did they not start with a higher number at the beginning of the negotiations? First, it should be stated that, no source related closely or even remotely to the subject was able to furnish a satisfactory explanation for this number. All that is known is that the number was put on the agenda by Ankara. It was shown that Riza Nur offered explanations for this subject in his memoirs, according to which, Ankara had just declared 150 as an average number that would set off debate in Turkey as low, but would not create problems at the conference. Although this explanation seems reasonable, it is not sufficient to remove the question mark about the number. For this reason, I will try to create at least an idea relating to the subject in accordance with the limited clues available from similarities noted during the research phase of this study.

Although the Lausanne Treaty seems to have been signed as a consequence of the War of Independence, because the participants were the same and because the Sevres Treaty had not come into force, it is understood that solutions to the problems of a seven-year war were sought. In spite of this, the Turkish side made efforts to evaluate some of the subjects within the frame of the War of Independence. One of these subjects was the general amnesty. For example, when the Turkish side was first asked its opinion related to the time interval for the starting point, the answer was given on 11 October 1922, the date of the signing of the Mudanya Armistice. But because this limit was not broad enough for the opposite side and because they thought of all of the matters in terms of the First World War, the subject was not opened again. But it is a fact that if the Mudanya Armistice Treaty had been accepted as the starting point, then we would not be discussing the list of 150 today, because everybody on the list of those accused of acting against the National Struggle could

have been punished easily. This point is very important, first of all in terms of understanding the point of perspective of İsmet İnönü on the matter of the general amnesty.

The following information is also important in understanding the mentality of the Turkish side regarding the general amnesty. It was shown in the main text that İsmet İnönü stated at Lausanne that this was a matter of internal security. In a telegraph he sent on 17 December 1922 to Ankara telling that Turkey would announce a general amnesty after signing the treaty in any case, he concluded that it was therefore unnecessary to include such an article in the treaty document. The discomfort about including the subject of a general amnesty on the agenda of the conference can be understood from this telegraph as well. In the response to this telegraph sent by Ankara on 21 December, it was stated that Britain had promised the persons who had founded the Army of the Caliphate would benefit from the general amnesty during the foundation of the Turkish National Assembly and, for this reason, if the matter of amnesty was included in the treaty, then not only would these persons be set free and allowed to return to their provocations in the future, but also Britain not have kept its promise. Thus the efforts that were being made to exclude these two groups from the amnesty and its fundamental reasons were revealed by the talks at Lausanne. In a telegraph sent on 8 January 1923 to İnönü, Rauf Orbay asked whether the news stating that Britain desired that Ethem the Cirassian and his supporters be included in the coverage of the general amnesty was correct or not. Thus, another cause for the disquiet about the list emerged.

It is understood from this exchange of telegraphs that the leaders of the National Struggle already had in mind some of the categories that were mentioned in the first part. Yet the number limitation relating to them remained the essential

problem. Two similarities attract attention at this point. First, the number of the persons exiled to Malta by the British forces in 1919 was approximately 150. Second, the number of persons that had left Turkey and found refuge in Britain was also about 150.<sup>153</sup> If we evaluate the subject only by considering the Malta exiles, first it should be noted that all of them were released by the time the conference started. As a consequence, the number 150 must have been established after the estimated number of person who had escaped abroad with the assistance of Britain and other states in autumn of 1919. As a matter of fact people such as Refik Halit (Karay), Süleyman Şefik Paşa, Adil Bey, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, and İbrahim Sabri, Rıza Tevfik were not the only people who left the country with the assistance of the British forces.

The Turkish Republic had gone through much pain in its transformation from a community state into a nation state by the end of the 1930s. In this process, all of the establishments of theocratic order had been eliminated, reforms had been implemented, the efforts of industrialism had spread throughout the country, both internal and external problems had almost been completely solved, and the problem of legality had been concluded. The Turkish Republic was now a member of the international community. The generation that grew up in this era full of renovations, that had not experienced the previous fifteen years, did not harbor the same animosities as the generation that had established the Republic and effected so many changes. When the 150 jointly requested an amnesty, the youngest of them had reached the age 50. The government carried out an investigation into their request, and determined that nearly half of them had already died and that some of the remaining individuals were very old and others were ill. It was decided that they no

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153- Jaeshke, p. 9

longer posed a threat the Republic and the decision to pardon them in was the first indicator of the confidence felt in the existence of the regime, and of generosity. It remains unknown whether it was an interesting coincidence related to the pardon of the 150 or it was done intentionally, but the matter was discussed and accepted in the justice commission of the Turkish National Assembly on 1 June, the same date on which condemnation had been announced fourteen years earlier.

When the grounds underlying the approval that was given by the government for the announcement of this amnesty are interpreted, two reasons appear, as emphasised throughout this study. The matter of the 150s was a reflection of the efforts made to take measure, even if with a limited number, to prevent potential crimes against the existence of the Assembly, by some names only. For this reason, it is more important to understand who this people were and why were they put on the list.



## THE LIST OF 150

### THE ENTOURAGE OF VAHIDETTIN

1. Yaver-i Has Kiraz Hamdi
2. Hademe-i Hassa Kumandanı Zeki
3. Hazine-i hassa müfettişlerinden Kayseri'li Şaban Ağa
4. Tütüncübaşı Şükrü
5. Serkarin Yaver
6. Yaverandan Erkan-ı Harp Miralayı Tahir
7. Seryaver Avni
8. Esbak Hazine-i Hassa Müdürü ve Defter-i Hakani Emimi Refik

### PEOPLE WHO SIGNED SEVRES TREATY AND WERE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE *KUVA-YI İNZİBATIYE* (ARMY OF THE CHALIPHATE)

9. Esbak-şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri
10. Adliye nazır-ı esbakı Ali Rüşdü
11. Ziraat ve Ticaret nazır-ı esbakı Cemal
12. Bahriye nazır-ı esbakı Cakacı Hamdi
13. Maarif nazır-ı esbakı Rumbeyoğlu Fahrettin
14. Esbak Ziraat ve Ticaret nazırı Kızılhançerci Remzi

### OFFICIAL DELEGATION OF THE SEVRES TREATY

15. Maarif nazır-ı esbakı Hadi
16. Ayan'dan Şura-yı Devlet reis-i esbakı Rıza Tevfik
17. Bern sefir-i esbakı Reşat Halis

### MEMBERS OF THE *KUVVA-YI İNZİBATIYE*

18. Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye Başkumandanı Süleyman Şefik
19. Yaveri süvari yüzbaşısı Bulgar namıyla maruf Tahsin
20. Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye Erkan-ı harbiye reisi miralay Ahmet Refik

21. Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye mitralyöz kumandanı ve Damat Ferit'in yaveri Tarık Mümtaz
22. Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye kumandanlarından İzmir Kolordu Kumandan-ı Sabıkı Ali Nadir
23. Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye mensubinden ve Nemrut Mustafa Divan-ı Harbinden Kaymakam Fattan
24. Kuvay-ı-İnzibatiye mensubinden Çopur Hakkı

#### PEOPLE FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE AND ARMY

25. Esbak Bursa valisi Gümülcüne'li İsmail
26. Ayan'dan Konya'lı Zeynelabidin
27. Cebel-i bereket mutasarrıf-ı esbakı bulunan Fani zade Mesut
28. Hürriyet ve İtilaf fırkası lideri miralay Sadık
29. Malatya mutasarrıf-ı sabıkı Bedirhani Halil Rami
30. Esbak Manisa mutasarrıfı Girit'li Hüsnü
31. Esbak Dıvan-ı harp reisi Nemrut Mustafa
32. Uşak belediye reisi Hulusi
33. Adapazarı kaymakam-ı esbakı Hain Mustafa
34. Tekirdağ müftü-i esbakı Hafız Ahmet
35. Afyonkarahisar mutasarrıf-ı esbakı Sabit
36. Gazi Ayıntap mutasarrıflığında bulunmuş olan Celal Kadri
37. Hürriyet ve itilaf katib-i umumisi Adana'lı Zeynelabidin
38. Mülga Ayan'dan Evkaf nazır-ı esbakı Vasfı Hocat;
39. Harput vali-i esbakı Ali Galip
40. Bursa vali vekil-i esbakı Aziz Nuri
41. Sabık Bursa müftüsü Ömer Fevzi
42. İzmir kadı müşavir-i sabıkı Ahmet Asım
43. Esbak İstanbul muhafızı Natık
44. Dahiliye nazır-ı esbakı Ayan'dan Adil
45. Dahiliye nazır-ı esbakı Mehmet Ali
46. Esbak Edirne valisi ve Şehremini vekili Salim
47. Kütahya'da Yunanlılara mutasarrıflık eden Hocarasih zade ibrahim
48. Adana'da valilik eden Abdurrahman
49. Karahisar-i Şarki mebusu esbakı Ömer Fevzi

50. İşkenceci namıyla maruf mülazım Adil
51. İşkenceci namıyla maruf mülazım Rıfki
52. Esbak Kırkağaç kaymakamı Şerif
53. Esbak Çanakkale mutasarrıfı Mahmut Mahir
54. İstanbul Merkez kumandan-ı esbakı Emin
55. Kilis'de kaymakamlık eden Sadullah Sami
56. Esbak Dahiliye nezareti dava vekili ve Bolu mutasarrıfı Osman Nuri

#### ETHEM "THE CIRCASSIAN" AND PEOPLE, CLOSE TO HIM

57. Çerkes Edhem
58. Edhem'in biraderi Reşit
59. Edhem'in biraderi Tevfik
60. Kuşcubaşı Eşref
61. Kuşcubaşı Eşrefin biraderi Hacı Sami
62. İzmir'li sabık Akhisar kumandanı yüzbaşı Küçük Edhem
63. Düzce'li Mehmet oğlu Sami "Aço Fumpat"
64. Burhaniye'li Halil İbrahim
65. Susurluk'dan Demirköprülü Hacı Ahmet

#### PEOPLE WHO WERE DELEGATES OF THE CIRCASSIAN CONGRESS

66. Hendek kazasının Sünbüllü Karyesinden Bağ Osman
67. İzmit Mutasarrıf-ı Sabıkı İbrahim Hakkı
68. Brau Sait
69. Berzek Tahir
70. Adapazarı'nın Harmantepe karyesinden Maan Şirin
71. Söke Ereğli'sinin Tekeli karyesinden Koca Ömer oğlu Hüseyin
72. Adapazarı'nın Talustanbey köyünden Bağ Kamil
73. Hamete Ahmet
74. Maan Ali
75. Kirmastı'nın Karaorman Karyesinden Harunurreşit
76. Eskişehirli Sefer Hoca
77. Bigalı Nuribey oğlu isa
78. Adapazarı'nın Şahinbey karyesinden Kazım

79. Gönen'in Tuzakçı karyesinden Lampaz Yaku
80. Gönen'in Bayramiç karyesinden Kumpat Hafız Sait
81. Gönen'in Keçe karyesinden mütekaid binbaşı Ahmet
82. İzmir'de Dava vekili Bazaduruğ Sait
83. Şam'lı Ahmet Nuri

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84. Esbak İstanbul Polis Müdürü Tahsin
85. Esbak İstanbul Polis müdür muavini Kemal
86. Emniyet-i umumiye müdür muavini Isparta'lı Kemal
87. Esbak İstanbul Polis Müdüriyeti Birinci Şube müdürü Şeref
88. Esbak İstanbul Palis Müdüriyeti Birinci Kısım başmemuru Hafız Sait
89. Sabık Arnavutköy Merkez memuru Hacı Kemal
90. Polis başmemurlarından Namık
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93. Adana'da Polis müdürlüğü eden Polkeçen'li Yusuf
94. Unkapanı Merkez memur-u sabıkı Sakallı Cemil
95. Büyükdere Merkez memur-u sabıkı Mazlum
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97. Serbesti gazetesi sahibi, Hürriyet ve itilaf azasından Mevlanzade Rıfat
98. Türkçe İstanbul gazetesi sahibi Sait Molla
99. İzmir'de Müsavat gazetesi sahibi ve muharrir-i sabıkı Darülhikme azasından  
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101. Bandırma'da Adalet gazetesi sahibi Bahriyeli Ali Sami
102. Edirne'de Te'min ve elyevm Selanik'de Hakikat gazeteleri sahibi Neyyir  
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103. Eski Köylü gazetesi sermuharriri Ferit
104. Alemdar gazetesi sahibi Refii Cevat
105. Alemdar gazetesinden Pehlivan Kadri

106. Adana'da Ferda gazetesi sahibi Fanizade Ali İlmi
107. Balıkesir'de irşat gazetesi sahiplerinden Trabzonlu Ömer Fevzi
108. Halep'de Doğruyol gazetesi sahibi Hasan Şad
109. Köylü Gazetesi Sahip ve Müdürü İzmir'li Re'fet

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110. Tarsuslu Ramilpaşazade Selami
111. Tarsuslu Kâmilpaşadaze Kemal
112. Süleymaniyeli Kürt Hakkı
113. Mustafa Sabri Hoca'nın oğlu İbrahim Sabri
114. Fabrikatör Bursalı Cemil
115. İngiliz casusu meşhur Çerkeş Ragıp
116. Fransız zabıtlığı yapan Haçınli Kazak Hasan
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121. Uşak'ta Madanoğlu Mustafa
122. Gönen'in Tuzakçı karyesinden Yusuf oğlu Remzi
123. Gönen'in Bayramiç karyesinden Hacı Kasım oğlu Zühtü
124. Gönen'in Balcı karyesinden Kocagöz'ün Osman oğlu Şakir
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142. Manyas'ın Değirmenboğazı karyesinden Kadir oğlu Kamil
143. Gönen'in Keçidere karyesinden Hüseyin oğlu Galip
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146. Gönen'in Keçeler karyesinden Abdullah oğlu Deli Kasım
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Kazım Efe
149. Gönen'in Kızık karyesinden Pallaç oğlu Kemal
150. Gönen'in Keçeler karyesinden Tuğ oğlu Mehmet\*

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\* The list was taken from *Ceride-i Resmîye*, 7 Kanunsani 1340

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