

THE GENESIS OF THE LEFT OF CENTER IN TURKEY: 1965-1967

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by

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Title: The Genesis of The Left of Center in Turkey: 1965-1967

In the thesis the discourse of left of center which came onto the agenda before the 1965 elections was scrutinized in the context of the intellectual history and social democracies of Western Europe. The left of center entered Turkish political life as an attributed feature to the Republican People's Party and then with the reception of this definition by İsmet İnönü. In the consequent historical process the left of center has become devolved on the discourse of the Republican People's Party or other parties calling themselves democratic left or social democratic. Thus left of center has been perceived as the beginning of Turkish social democracy.

In the thesis the emergence of social democracy in the Western Europe and its development was investigated, and as a social movement and ideology social democracy's general features were pointed out. Then the genesis period of left of center from the beginning of 1965 to the April of 1967 was examined. This thesis topic showed that the social democracy of Western Europe and the Republican People's Party's left of center have clearly dissimilar features; moreover, in many aspects, they have exactly contrary perceptions.

In the thesis the political, economic, cultural and foreign effects that were influential in the formation of left of center are scrutinized particularly making use of primary sources. In this framework the main claim of the thesis is that the left of center emerged as re-production of Kemalism in the conditions of 1960s' Turkey. This re-production was realized via the hegemonic views of the 1960s, nationalism and developmentalism. Thus the link between the left politics and Kemalism that was socially and culturally constructed was called left of center in terms of a special blend that was peculiar to the 1960s.

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Başlık: Türkiye'de Ortanın Solunun Doğusu: 1965-1967

Bu tezde, Türkiye'de 1965 seçimleri öncesi gündeme gelen ortanın solu söylemi entelektüel tarih ve Batı Avrupa sosyal demokrasileri bağlamında incelenmiştir. Ortanın solu Türk siyasi yaşamına Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ne atfedilen bir tanımlama ve daha sonra da İsmet İnönü'nün bu tanımı kabulü ile girmiştir. Sonraki tarihsel süreçte Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ya da onun izleyicisi olmuş demokratik sol, sosyal demokrat gibi isimler taşımış partilerin tevarüs ettikleri söylem olmuştur ve bu haliyle Türk sosyal demokrasininin başlangıcı olarak anılmıştır.

Bu tezde öncelikle sosyal demokrasinin Batı Avrupada doğuşu ve gelişimi incelenmiş ve hem bir toplumsal hareket hem de bir ideoloji olarak sosyal demokrasinin genel özellikleri belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Daha sonra ortanın solunun doğuşu üzerine 1965 başından 1967 Nisanına kadar olan süreyi kapsayan dönem incelenmiştir. İnceleme konusu göstermiştir ki Batı Avrupa sosyal demokrasisi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde ortaya çıkan ortanın solu söylemi birbirinden çok farklı hatta önemli noktalarda birbirine zıt anlayışlardır.

Tezde ortanın solunun oluşumu sürecinde etkili olan siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve dış etkenler, özellikle birincil kaynaklar üzerinden, incelenmiştir. Bu çerçevede tezin temel iddiası ortanın solunun, 1960'lar Türkiye'si koşullarında, Kemalizmin kendini yeniden üretmesi şeklinde ortaya çıktığıdır. Bu yeniden üretim döneminin hegemonik görüşleri milliyetçilik ve kalkınmacılık üzerinden gerçekleşmiştir. Böylece Kemalizm ve sol siyaset arasında gerçekliğin toplumsal ve kültürel inşası şeklinde ortaya çıkan bağ 1960'lara özgü bir harmanlama ile ortanın solu ismiyle anılmıştır.

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To my father and mother

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## PREFACE

This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether the emergence of “left of center” in the Republican People’s Party, the RPP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*) was the emergence of social democracy in Turkey. This thesis examines the genesis period of the “left of center” movement in the Republican People’s Party that has traditionally been presented as the emergence of Turkish social democracy. The main point of the thesis is to make obvious the unfamiliarity between the western social democracy and the Turkish “left of center.”

This thesis, which is titled “The Genesis of the ‘Left of Center’ in Turkey, 1965-67,” is an investigation of the political culture of Turkey from an historical perspective. The genesis period of Turkish social democracy as the left of center discourse and movement are taken in hand. I should admit that at the beginning of graduate study I considered studying social democracy in Turkey, but with an investigation of the political parties in Turkey. I soon noticed the difficulty studying social democracy in Turkey. This difficulty was not about the lack of sources for study; it was the incongruence between western social democracy and Turkish political culture.

This situation directed me to scrutinize the relation between social democracy and the RPP. I suggest that there might be three historical periods for following this relation. The first one is the single-party period. To investigate this period might give clues for understanding the question of whether this period’s tradition was appropriate for being converted into a western social democratic movement. Second, the period of the 1960s in which the relations between the left and Kemalism were constructed might be elaborated. Finally, the 1980s, a decade which saw the

deliberations leading up to the transformation of the Social Democratic People's Party to the People's Republican Party (*SHP'yi CHP'leştirmek*) might be researched. I suggest that the second one might be the most appropriate period in order to understand the Turkish center left's current impasses, because the years from 1965 to 1967 marked a period of construction of the left of center socially and culturally. After this period the left of center had a clear impact in Turkish political culture. So the aim and agenda of the thesis is to demonstrate how the left of center (as the genesis of Turkish social democracy) emerged. The secondary aim of the thesis is to understand and narrate Turkey's transformation in the 1960s via the micro-cosmos of developments in the Republican People's Party from 1965 to 1967.

As a graduate study the resources of the thesis are important. The primary resources are RPP documents such as Election Declarations and Reports of Party Assembly that were presented to the Congress and any documents that were published by the RPP in this period. The opponents of the left of center in the RPP also published documents, and they were used to investigate the perceptions on the left of center.

The daily newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus* were used in the study. *Ulus* is crucial for the thesis because it was the official newspaper of the RPP, and it was the most appropriate resource for seeing the official views of the RPP and İnönü on the left of center. The magazines *Forum*, *Akis*, *Yön*, and very limitedly *Kim* were also used for the thesis. *Forum* was published by an intellectual circle around Bulent Ecevit in this period. The character of the magazine changed in the mid-1960s and became somehow the publication of the left of center group in the RPP. *Akis* was published by Metin Toker, the son-in-law of İnönü, and it was the magazine that mentioned the RPP and the left of center most commonly in this period. *Yön* also

published many articles on the RPP and left center, as it was somehow the pioneer of the idea that linked the left politics and Kemalism.

As for secondary resources on the RPP, the memoirs of important politicians of the period, publications on the RPP history and treatises on the mentioned period were used. In addition to the first chapter on social democracy the classics of and literature on social democracy were employed.

The thesis is organized in four chapters apart from the conclusion chapter. The introduction is about the emergence and historical evolution of the RPP and political environment of post-27 May Turkey. In the second chapter social democracy is introduced as a political movement and ideology. This chapter first seeks a definition of social democracy in the academic literature. Afterwards, the emergence of social democracy and its differentiation from communism are discussed. Finally the post-war developments in Europe, the making of the welfare-state and lastly social democratic parties' evolution from "class parties" to "catch-all parties" in the 1950s are examined. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the unfamiliarity between western social democracy and the left of center movement in Turkey.

In the third chapter the developments from the fall of the third İsmet İnönü government to the end of the 1965 October elections will be scrutinized. The aim of the chapter is to deliberate how the term "left of center" entered into Turkish political life. This chapter claims the central aim behind the term was to prevent the accusations of supporting the left of the RPP, and stop the youth and literati to move through socialism. So in this chapter the term "left of center," harmonious with İnönü's perception, is conceptualized as a remedy against the left.

In the fourth chapter the developments after the 1965 elections to the elimination of the opponents of the left center in April 1967 are discussed. Just after the 1965 elections, the RPP gave up the term “left of center.” This demonstrated the pseudo-importance of standing on the left of center for the RPP. However, the formation of two groups as the supporters and opponents of the left of center soon revived the term “left of center.” And İnönü’s open support of the supporters of the left of center that were led by Bülent Ecevit changed the inner-party balance, and left of center became the official party policy. This period demonstrates Turkish politicians’ unfamiliarity with the western concepts and categories of politics, so as a term for defining the political differentiation, “left” created an important political discussion in Turkey. Almost everybody understood different things by the term. So this period is called as an ambiguity period for the left of center in the chapter.

In the conclusion chapter the claims and the findings of the thesis are discussed.

This thesis is in an attempt to question one of the main axes of politics in Turkey, the link between the left and Kemalism. It puts forward the effect and strength of the founding principles of the Republic in the Turkish political life. So the left of center is affected and formed by the historical heritage of the RPP rather than the universal principles and ideals of social democracy. The political line from the emergence of the left of center to today, in the name of social democracy, includes many things but not the core of social democracy, the labor movement. Thus this thesis is the pathetic story of “left of center” that is peculiar to Turkey, an attempt to form social democracy without labor.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION: THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND TURKEY'S 1960s

Is there a social democratic party in Turkey? It is not possible to give a positive answer to this question. Several attempts have been made to create social democratic parties in Turkey, but none of them can be defined in the context of western social democratic parties. The social democratic parties of Western Europe emerged as the political organizations of organized labor, and advocated an egalitarian, libertarian and solidaristic way of politics. Turkish social democracy traditionally has been represented in the RPP, but the theoretical tools to define a party as social democratic that are scrutinized in the next chapter do not match with the RPP.

It might be argued that a RPP-centric generalization for social democracy in Turkey would be inadequate. However the RPP, as mentioned above, is the traditional party of Turkish social democracy. And other attempts rather than the RPP that aimed to create social democratic parties were formed by the traditional RPP cadres and based on the historical heritage of the RPP.

So the problem for the RPP in order to align itself with the social democratic way of politics is the problem. The primary source of the problem rises from the historical character of the party. The historical origins of the RPP are very different from those of the western social democratic parties. As mentioned above, Western social democracy emerged as the political organization of organized labor. Although there are clear differences from country to country, social democratic politics have

some common features, symbols and ideals. But the formation of Turkish social democracy was different.

The RPP emerged after the First World War, during the Independence War, as a resistance organization under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. And after the war, it became the political instrument in the establishment and implementation of the single-party administration. This mission of the party was formed by the difficulties involved in the transformation from a multi-national empire to a nation-state. It shared almost none of the common features of western social democratic parties; what's more, it banned any socialist activity.

This historical line of the RPP was revised in the 1960s, and the story of social democracy in Turkey began. In the mid-1960s, the RPP began to define itself as being on the left of center. This was the establishment of Turkish social democracy as a compound of Kemalism. Thus the political baggage of Turkish social democracy was shaped by a synthesis of the values of social democracy and Kemalist practices. After this period, the Kemalist heritage of the RPP and social democracy became the common origins of Turkish social democracy. This attitude was harmonious with the mentioned period's dominant view, because in the 1960s socialism and Kemalism were considered in a similar manner in the context of anti-imperialism and developmentalism. So a causal link was established between Kemalism and left politics via anti-imperialism and developmentalism.

The whole story about the left of center was branded by the confusion that arose from such issues about nationalism, developmentalism, modernism and social injustices.<sup>1</sup> Social democracy has been the political organization of labor in Western

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<sup>1</sup> For a full discussion of the confusions of left of center in the context of nationalism and modernization, see Emin Alper, "Milliyetçilik ve Modernleşme Geriliminde Ecevit ve Ortanın Solu," *Toplum ve Bilim* 93 (Summer 2002), pp.110-141.

Europe, but the labor movement had minimum effect on the emergence of the left of center, despite the fact that it has been called the emergence of Turkish social democracy. Thus it was the result of the above-mentioned causal link between Kemalism and left politics via anti-imperialism and developmentalism.

However, there have been several theoretical oppositions against this causal link between Kemalism and left politics, which it is part of this thesis's purpose to explore. The strongest opposition came from the socialist scholar Idris Küçükömer. Küçükömer refused to regard Kemalism in the context of left politics. Moreover, he defined the Kemalist political heritage as being on the radical right. He investigated the ideational origins of Kemalism in Tanzimat thought and called İsmet İnönü the "last Bureaucrat Pasha." Küçükömer defined his views in four articles in the daily *Akşam* on 14-17 October 1967. Later on, these articles were collected in a book by Küçükömer with the name of *Düzenin Yabancılaşması, Batılılaşma* (The Alienation of the regime, westernization).<sup>2</sup> Küçükömer's views became one of the most influential theoretical approaches that questions the equation between Kemalism and left politics.

However, the emergence of the left of center movement directly affected the formation of Turkish political culture, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and the six arrows of the RPP (Republicanism, Natioanalism, Etatism, Revolutionism, Secularism, and Populism) became the symbols of Turkish social democracy. This event, the perceptions on the RPP as social democratic, came into being very rapidly in the brisk environment of Turkish politics in the 1960s and 1970s. As an example of this rapid change, the reshaping of Turkish center left politics might be considered

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<sup>2</sup> See Idris Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılılaşma* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969).

in the post-1980 coup period. After the coup in 1980, two political parties were established on the center left, the Social Democratic Party, SDP (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP*) and the Populist Party, PP (*Halkçı Parti, HP*). In the SDP, Erdal İnönü was made the leader of the party because he is the son of İsmet İnönü. On the other hand the head of the PP, Necdet Calp, was a former principal clerk of İsmet İnönü. Thus the founder-leaders of these parties, Erdal İnönü and Necdet Calp, reflected the above-mentioned effect of left of center on Turkish political culture, or in other words, the symbolic essence of Turkish social democracy. These two parties merged in 1985 under the name of the Social Democratic People's Party, SDPP (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP*), and then Erdal İnönü became the head of the party. Likewise, as an example of the mentioned rapid transformation that synthesized Kemalism and the left, Idris Küçükömer when he died in 1987, was a member of the SDPP, which was headed by the son of the "last Bureaucrat Pasha."

### The RPP as the Founder Party in Turkey

The Republican People's Party was the founding party of the Republic, thus it has always had an important place in Turkish political life. The founder of the party was Mustafa Kemal, and the party was the continuation of the Anatolia and Rumelia Defense of Right Association, or ARDRA (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafası Hukuk Cemiyeti*).<sup>3</sup> The foundation of the party was the result of Mustafa Kemal's discontent with the opposition group in the first assembly, thus the central aim of the

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<sup>3</sup> The ARDRA was founded as a resistance organization after WWI in order to implement the National Struggle. After the foundation of the RPP, İsmet İnönü, vice president of the party, sent a telegram to the local organizations of ARDRA instructing that it be transformed in to a local RPP office. For the text of the telegram, see Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin'nin Mevkii* (Ankara; Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), p.41.



party's establishment was to create unity in the legislative action via the group action of the party. The group of Mustafa Kemal, called the group of Defense of Right, *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu*, entered the 1923 elections with the declaration of the "Nine Principles" (*Dokuz Umde*).<sup>4</sup> These nine principles formed the base of the party's programmatic priorities. Just after the 1923 elections this group of Mustafa Kemal constituted the party with the name of the People's Party, PP (*Halk Fırkası*).

Through 1924 the opposition movement crystallized and a new party against the PP was established, the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). The People's Party then changed its name to the Republican People's Party on the proposal of Recep Peker.<sup>5</sup> The new party proposed a more moderate way rather than the radicalism of the RPP. Just after the Şeyh Sait uprising all political activities were banned and the Progressive Republican Party was closed down. The Law of Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) constituted the legal base of the new authoritarianism. The Kemalist group consolidated the state power in this period and organized a single-party administration.<sup>6</sup>

In 1927 a congress of the RPP came together and Atatürk declared that he regarded the Sivas Congress<sup>7</sup> as having been the first congress of the RPP, and that the 1927 congress was thus the Second Congress of the party. In this way the Kemalist leadership proposed to link the organization of the party and the National Struggle. It was somehow the source of legitimacy for the party while enforcing the

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<sup>4</sup> For "Nine Principles," see *ibid.*, pp.32-33.

<sup>5</sup> Recep Peker was a very influential personality in the single-party period. He was also influential in the formation of the essence, principles and program of Kemalism.

<sup>6</sup> For the establishment of the single-party rule, see Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999).

<sup>7</sup> The Sivas Congress was the national congress of ARDRA that came together in 1919 in order to discuss how to organize the resistance movement.

single-party administration. In the 1930s the party was affected directly by the rising authoritarian and totalitarian movements in Europe and in one way or another it attempted to emulate them. The party oriented through a party-state administration. For example, the secretary general of the party was made the minister of internal affairs and the governor of the province was made the head of the party in the province.<sup>8</sup>

After the death of Kemal Atatürk in 1938, İsmet İnönü became the president of the Republic as well as the head of the party. The main difficulties of this period rose from the conditions of the Second World War. The conflict had reached the borders of Turkey, but the political elite and most importantly İnönü were reluctant to enter the war. The regime reconciled with the former opponents, and some of them took active positions in the administration. In this period İnönü had tight control of the state power, and the party congress proclaimed him as the unchangeable head of the party.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, İnönü was proclaimed the “National Chief” (*Milli Şef*). In this period the party-state character of the regime continued, and the regime did not allow any attempt directed towards pluralism. The oppressive character of the regime was the source of discontent in society. Moreover, the harsh conditions of the war made the discontent with the regime widespread.<sup>10</sup>

After the Second World War, the conditions in world politics shifted dramatically, so the regime needed to revise itself with two aims. First, it had to harmonize itself with the new environment. The party-state character of the regime

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<sup>8</sup> For the basic features of party-state actions, see Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler: Siyaset Bilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976) pp.77-89.

<sup>9</sup> For the developments in the period of İsmet İnönü, see Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: 1938-1945: Dönemin İç Ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> The discontent was a result of such acts as the National Defense Law, the Capital Levy and the Agricultural Products Law.

was associated with the inter-war period's authoritarian political systems. It was not possible to carry on this type of state organization. Second, Turkey's threat perception had shifted to the North, so in the post-war era the political elite of Turkey were anxious about the expansion of Soviet power. Therefore Turkey anticipated securing the regime with a new orientation to the Western winners of the war. So the Kemalist leaders intended to balance the Soviet threat with the support of the USA and Britain. The single-party, in other words, party-state character of the regime had to be transformed to meet the new conditions. But in the perceptions of the party elite this transformation did not have to create an effect that would result in the loss of the government power. In this frame, the RPP attempted to establish multi-party rule, while assuring that the founders of the new party would share the frame of the old regime. Thus Celal Bayar was allowed to establish the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP), effecting a division of the RPP.<sup>11</sup>

It is hard to call the new period a multi-party democracy as the regime maintained its authoritative character. There were many barriers to basic freedoms; moreover, the 1946 elections showed that there was no election security in the country. Nonetheless, despite all of the deficiencies, the transition to multi-party rule marked the end of the old period that had suppressed all political differences.

At the beginning of the multi-party rule, the RPP administration was tough against the opposition. One of the single-party period's most radical supporters of authoritarian policies, Recep Peker, became the prime minister after the 1946 election. The Peker government pursued a hard and tense political way against the opposition. However, this authoritative tendency was not shared with the younger

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<sup>11</sup> The DP was not the first party that was established in this period. The National Development Party (*Milli Kalkıma Partisi*) had been founded six months before the DP. The importance of the DP came from the founders of the party and the DP's chance at becoming the government alternative.

generation in the party. More moderate politicians such as Nihat Erim and Kemal Satir established an adversary group that was called the 35s.<sup>12</sup> The criticisms of the 35s eroded the Peker government, and Peker asked for a vote of confidence from the RPP parliamentary group. Peker received the vote of confidence, but all of the 35s cast “no” in the voting. Peker assessed these 35 no votes as the will of İnönü, and he resigned. After Peker, Hasan Saka and then Şemsettin Günaltay became the prime ministers, respectively. This was a new period in which RPP likened itself to the Democrat Party because the RPP aimed to minimize the differences that strengthened the DP.<sup>13</sup>

Before the 1950 election, the election law changed and many of the obstacles to free and fair elections were removed. Nevertheless, the majority rule in the election system was maintained despite the proportional representation request of the DP. However, the DP won the elections with an open majority. The majority rule insistence of the RPP had resulted in a small representation for the party in the parliament. The RPP was able to win only 69 seats in the National Assembly while the DP got 408 seats. It was a great defeat for the RPP; the founding party of the regime was now in opposition.

After the defeat, the party members were displeased and sought a new way. Twenty-seven years of government of the party had come to an end and most of the well-known politicians of the party had not been able to enter into the parliament. In this environment the 8<sup>th</sup> Party Congress came together in 1950. The congress elected Kasim Gülek Secretary General. Gülek was somehow different from the traditional politicians of the RPP. He rapidly changed the way of politics in the RPP, and he

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<sup>12</sup> The name of the group came from the number of members in the group.

<sup>13</sup> For this effort, see Hikmet Bila, *Sosyal Demokrat Süreç İçinde CHP ve Sonrası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1987), pp.179-181.

altered the traditional elitist way of politics of the RPP. However, his efforts were not enough to make RPP pose a threat to the power of the DP.

In the late years of the DP, the RPP opposition began to be effectual on the government of the DP. There were two basic reasons for this. First, the DP's tough attitude had created a front against the DP, and the RPP had become the leader of this front. In 1958 the Freedom Party, FP (*Hürriyet Partisi*) came into the RPP.<sup>14</sup> The entrance of the FP into the RPP created a change in the ideational direction of the RPP, because most of the leaders of the FP were prominent intellectuals. Second, the worsening economic conditions and the 1958 devaluation created deep displeasure in the public opinion, and the RPP organized this displeasure. It is crucial that at the end of the 1950s the RPP was such in the horn of the dilemma that the single-party period heritage and the new outlook that emerged after the joining of the FP to the RPP.

This period ended with the coup d'état of 27 May 1960. The political and economic crisis of the period set in motion the bureaucratic tutelage of the regime. The military intervention aimed to revise the economic and political system that was considered the source of the crisis. İnönü had defined the position of the RPP in the intervention as "not in and not out of the intervention." In this environment the formation of the new model that was called the Second Republic was directly effected by the RPP. On the other hand, the RPP had been affected by the intervention in its radical manner. Thus it is needed to demonstrate the main characteristics the coup and the post-coup period.

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<sup>14</sup> The Freedom Party was established in 1955 by politicians who had resigned from the DP.

## Political and Social Environment in the Early 1960s

On 27 May 1960, a junta led a military intervention, and dissolved the government and assembly.<sup>15</sup> At the beginning the essential character and the cadres of the junta were not clear. Within a few days a National Unity Committee was formed with 38 members. The military junta declared that it would transfer the political power to civilians after a free election. However, the political and economic crisis of the period made the junta take permanent measures. The measure for the political question was a new constitution that created a new political regime. For the economic area, the new regime anticipated an import substituting economic model the main investment decisions of which would be based on the volition of a new establishment, the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, DPT).<sup>16</sup> In this section the main characteristics of the above-mentioned political and economic frame will be investigated.

In the formation of the constitution there were two rival groupings. On the one side, there was a group that did not rely on the political parties. This group, led by the rector of Istanbul University, Prof. Sıddık Sami Onar, proposed a model that was based on social groups. The aim of this model was to limit the field of action of the governments, in other words, politicians. On the other hand, there was group that advocated a model based on political parties. In the beginning period, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and İsmet Giritli were the carriers of this opinion, but they were expelled

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<sup>15</sup> See Walter F. Weiker, "1960 Türk İhtilali," in *Amerikalı, Fransız, Rus Gözüyle 1960 Türk İhtilali* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1967), pp.7-35.

<sup>16</sup> Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p.110.

from the Onar Commission.<sup>17</sup> In the later events, a group of academics in the Political Sciences Faculty of Ankara University advocated this position.<sup>18</sup> In the end the new constitution was the compromise of these opposite views.

The main characteristic of the constitution was the aim of limiting the executive and legislative power of the governments.<sup>19</sup> The constitution anticipated distributing this power to other bodies. The parliament was divided into two houses. A constitutional court was established in order to control the appropriateness of the laws to the constitution. The majority system in the elections was changed to a proportional system, to prevent any political party from gaining an open majority in the parliament. The two house character of the parliament limited the effect of the government on the legislation. Consequently, the political regime of the constitution was a reaction against the possibility of the former totalitarian administration. In the 1924 constitution system, the formation of the political power was dependent only on electoral success. But the 1961 constitution limited the administration to the above-mentioned measures.

Another distinctive feature of the 1961 constitution involved basic rights and freedoms. For the constitution, democratic life was not limited only to free, fair and regular elections. The constitution recognized basic freedoms and rights in the western manner. The freedom of speech, freedom of the press and autonomy of the universities were somehow traces of the reaction to the former totalitarianism. However, the new regime reflected the Republican elitism, the sub-district

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<sup>17</sup> The Onar Commission had been established just before the coup by the junta in order to prepare the draft of constitution.

<sup>18</sup> This group was supported by moderate wings and the RPP administration.

<sup>19</sup> For information on the constitution, see Weiker, pp.92-100.

organizations of the parties was closed, as the participation of citizens in political life was seen as dangerous thing.

The 1961 constitution defined one of the characteristics of the state as social.<sup>20</sup> The social and economic section of the Constitution sought a solution to the economic crisis of the system in the pre-coup period. The main character of the new Constitutions' economic measures was to protect the domestic market and to industrialize through import substitution.<sup>21</sup> The import substitution was related to briskness and expanse of the domestic market.<sup>22</sup> Consequently the new economic model was domestic market-oriented, and the main industrialization strategy of the model was import substitution via protecting the domestic market.

The new economic model was somehow a reaction against the economic policies up to the 1960s. Pamuk and Owen define the main criticism on the DP's economic policies as "the absence of any coordination and long term perspective in the management of the economy."<sup>23</sup> So the reaction of the regime was the establishment of the State Planning Organization for the above-mentioned aims, and five years of development plans were the main aim of the economic policy in this period. The main function of the development plans was the determination of investment decisions, thus the plans' direct effect on the economy was shaped by investment decisions.<sup>24</sup>

As mentioned above, the import substituting industrialization model was based on the briskness of the domestic market. The new economic model

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<sup>20</sup> Weiker, p.95.

<sup>21</sup> Pamuk and Owen, p.111.

<sup>22</sup> Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005), p.124.

<sup>23</sup> Pamuk and Owen, p.110.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.



implemented this aim with the distribution policies.<sup>25</sup> This new outlook provided relatively high wages in the industrial and service sectors and high subsidies in the agricultural sector. The demand-oriented policies of new economic model coupled with extended social security system and social rights.<sup>26</sup> The 47<sup>th</sup> article of the Constitution foresaw the right to strike for the industrial labor.<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, the regime attempted to overcome the political and economic crisis in the late 1950s with a new economic and social system. The economic model of this period was maintained until 1980. In the late 1970s, the import substitution model entered into a crisis. The political model of the new regime similarly kept on until 1980, but from 1960 to 1980 the political environment was in instability. Just after the elections it was very hard to govern the country. The main characteristics of this period's political issues and the political parties of the new regime will now be discussed in brief.

In the period from the 1961 election to the 1965 election, four governments were established. The first three of the governments were led by İnönü. The first İnönü government was established as a coalition of the Justice Party, the JP (*Adalet Partisi*) and the RPP. The coalition did not last very long and dissolved in June 1962. İnönü established a new coalition with the Republican Peasant's Nation Party, the RPNP (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) and the New Turkey Party, the NTP (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*), and after the dissolution of this coalition, he established a government with independent deputies with the outside support of the NTP. The main characteristic of this period was the military tutelage on the political regime.

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<sup>25</sup> Boratav, p.123.

<sup>26</sup> Pamuk and Owen, p.112.

<sup>27</sup> Weiker, p.96.

There were two unsuccessful military coup attempts, one led by Colonel Talat Aydemir, in 1962 and 1963. The regime was under the pressure of the military.<sup>28</sup> After the coup 14 political parties were founded, but not all of them became influential. Five other parties apart from the RPP are worth mention here.

The Nation Party, NP (*Millet Partisi*), was re-founded in 1962 by Osman Bölükbaşı.<sup>29</sup> Although it was founded in the post-1960 period the party's origin was in 1948. The Nation Party had been founded in 1948 by conservative politicians such as Fevzi Çakmak, Kenan Öner, and Osman Bölükbaşı who were discontent with the compromising character of the DP after 1947.<sup>30</sup> In 1954 the party was closed on grounds of reactionary activities. But the leaders of the party established a new party with the name of the Republican Nation Party, the RNP (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*). Before the 1957 elections the RNP merged with the Peasants' Party (*Köylü Partisi*), and took the name of the Republican Peasant's Nation Party, the RPNP.

In the 1961 election the RPNP took 54 seats in the National Assembly, and 14 seats in the Senate.<sup>31</sup> It was a relative success for the party. When the first İnönü government collapsed there was a group that intended to enter into the coalition with the RPP. This question divided the party and Osman Bölükbaşı resigned and reestablished the Nation Party. After the collapse of the second İnönü government the RPNP entered into a crisis. In this environment the 10 of 14 radicals of the National Unity Committee that had been exiled abroad in November 1960 joined the

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<sup>28</sup> For the effect of military on politics, see Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye: 1945-1980*, trans. A. Fethi (İstanbul: Hil Yayinlari, 1996), pp.176-207.

<sup>29</sup> For information on Nation Party, see Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku Ve Siyasi Bilimler Açısından 1965 Seçimlerinin Tahlili* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaasi, 1966), pp.183-198.

<sup>30</sup> On 12 July 1947 İnönü had issued a declaration that guaranteed the security of the opposition.

<sup>31</sup> For information on RPNP, see *ibid.*, pp.209-225.

party. Within one year they captured the party, and took the party in an ultra-nationalist direction.

After the 27 May coup d'état two parties were founded for sharing the votes and the heritage of the DP. These parties were the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party. The NTP was founded by Ekrem Alican.<sup>32</sup> The political origin of the party was somehow contradictory. The party leadership had been situated in the DP before 1955, but the discontent in the DP had made them to join in foundation of the Freedom Party. The main difference of the party from the JP was the criticism of the DP. These two parties, the NTP and JP, defined themselves as moderate parties, and they were somehow conservative relative to the RPP. Ekrem Alican had been elected deputy from the DP in 1950 but he had been expelled and joined the foundation of the FP in 1955. Moreover, he had been the minister of finance in the government of the 27 May coup. The party had been unsuccessful in the 1961 elections comparatively to the JP, taking 14 percent of the total votes (the JP had taken 35 percent). The party had 61 deputies in the National Assembly and 27 seats in the Senate. The party had entered the Second Coalition Government of İnönü, and supported the third İnönü Government from outside. The NTP was the most factionalist party of the period and it had four waves of resignations, so the party had lost half of its seats in the parliament. So the process from 1961 to 65 had showed that the NTP lost the struggle to take the votes and social base of the DP. Thus on the level of perceptions the JP was the clear continuation of the DP in 1965.

The Justice Party was founded by General Ragip Gümüşpala.<sup>33</sup> General Gümüşpala was the commander of the Third Army when the 27 May coup made.

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<sup>32</sup> For information on NTP, see *ibid.*, pp.198-209.

<sup>33</sup> For information on JP, see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp.119-148; and Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, pp.226-233.

One week after the coup he was appointed Chief of General Staff. But in August 1960 he had been retired with the program to rejuvenate the military. He established the JP in early 1961. Gümüşpala followed a moderate way, and he prevented radical actions that would create discontent in the military. In 1961 election, the JP took 35 percent of the votes and it became the coalition partner of the RPP in the first government. In this process, the party gradually took the place of the DP in Turkish politics.

In the 1964 senate election, the JP took 50.03 percent of the votes so the electoral base of the DP went towards the JP almost completely. Gümüşpala had died two days before this election. The determination of the new leader was made in the Party Congress six months later. There were two important candidates for the leadership. The first was Dr. Sadettin Bilgiç. Bilgiç was supported by the more conservative and traditional sects in the party. The other important candidate was Suleyman Demirel, the candidate of more moderate and liberal wing. Demirel had been a bureaucrat in the DP period and the head of the State Water Affairs. After the coup he had resigned from office. He had become a businessman and worked for the representation of the US Morrison firm. In the end, Demirel won the congress with an open majority. Demirel provided the fall of the third İnönü government, and led the establishment of a coalition government with other parties except the RPP. He took part in this government as the vice prime minister. Through the 1965 Demirel's JP was the clear continuation of the DP.

In this period of coalition governments from 1961 to 1965, the parliamentary politics varied many times. Almost all parties had the experience of government and opposition. But the way of politics and programmatic priorities of the parties were in a similar channel. The agenda of the parties was determined by the discourses of

traditional Turkish politics. But the coming into the agenda of the Turkey Worker's Party changed this situation. For the first time an alternative economic and social design of politics were introduced with the Turkey Workers Party, TWP (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*). This situation was related to the traditional prohibition of socialist politics in Turkey. The direct result of the absence of socialism in parliamentary politics was the similarities of programmatic priorities between the parties. The parliamentary politics were very confrontational, but this conflict and confrontation between the parties did not come from modern social class conflict. So the TWP's entrance into the parliamentary politics differentiated the agenda and the way of politics in Turkey.

The TWP was founded by 12 trade unionists in Istanbul.<sup>34</sup> In the beginning the party was clearly pro-worker (*ouvriériste*), but in 1962 Associate Professor Mehmet Ali Aybar became the head of the party and he brought together the unionist and socialist intellectuals in the same manner. The party rapidly escaped from its pro-worker character and began to be organized as a modern socialist party. In this period, it was exposed to pressure and political violence from the conservative and right-wing sides of society. The party meetings and congresses were attacked by conservatives in such places as Akhisar and Bursa.<sup>35</sup> Up to the 1965 elections the WTP was unable to have local organization in all provinces. However, the radio speeches of the party in the election campaign made the party known to the public. The language of the party was very different from that of the other parties, and social justice was the essential of the party discourse. Consequently in the early stages of the party, its pro-worker character prevented the party from becoming influential, but the party escaped from this with the leadership of Aybar. The main source of the

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<sup>34</sup> For information on the TWP in early 1960s, see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp.227-247; and Barış Ünlü, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp.174-206.

<sup>35</sup> Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p.230.

TWP's influence did not come from its electoral support, but its new outlook was a deep questioning of the agenda of Turkish parliamentary politics. After this brief assessment of the post-27 May periods' political and economic features, it is crucial to look at the foreign relations dynamics, which were as important as the political and social events of the period.

Foreign relations and foreign policy in Turkey were determined by the cold war dynamics in this period. Turkey was a member of one bloc in the cold war, so its foreign policy priorities were adapted to the western bloc's. But this formula did not work when one of the essential foreign policy issues of Turkey conflicted with the policy of the leader of the bloc. This issue was Cyprus. Therefore in this period the main foreign policy question for Turkey was the Cyprus issue and Cyprus-related issues brought Turkey's relations with the US under question.<sup>36</sup>

Just after the 27 May coup d'état, the junta declared that Turkey was loyal to the alliances of NATO and CENTO.<sup>37</sup> The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selim Sarper declared that Turkey would abide by all treaties.<sup>38</sup> But in the first half of the 1960s some events made Turkey distrustful of the US. The Cuban Missile Crises was the first of them.<sup>39</sup> After the crisis the US removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The US administration did not tell Turkey that this move was the result of bargaining with the USSR. The USA then proposed that Polaris nuclear submarines would provide Turkish security.

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<sup>36</sup> For the relations of Turkey and USA in this period, see Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu Işığında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Türkiye Politikası 1964-1980* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995); and Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001) pp. 681-715.

<sup>37</sup> Oran, p.681.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> For the missile crisis, see *ibid.*, pp.681-685.

Apart from any bloc related issue, the most important decomposition between Turkey and the US rose from the issue of Cyprus. In 1960 the independent Cyprus Republic was established after the Agreement of London and Zurich, but later events made Turkish and Greek Cypriots' co-existence on the island very difficult. In late 1963, a crisis began on the island, and two people died in the ethnic conflict, but the important result of the crisis was the de facto division of the island.<sup>40</sup> At this point Turkey attempted a military intervention to the island. İnönü informed President Johnson about this intervention. However, the answer of the US was unexpectedly harsh.<sup>41</sup> Johnson opposed the intervention; moreover, he implied that in such a situation the US might not help Turkey in a Soviet intervention. This meant that the NATO alliance might not work in all conditions. This situation created deep distress among the Turkish administrators, because Turkey had come closer to the Western bloc with the anxieties of national security, and this event demonstrated that the western alliance would not provide Turkish security if Turkey's and the US's policies conflicted. The Johnson letter had the date of 5 June 1964, and it was not declared to the public-opinion, but it was published on 13 January 1966 in the daily *Hurriyet*.<sup>42</sup> The Johnson Letter created doubts among Turkish politicians and the people about the alliance with the US.

In this environment the doubts about US' policy intersected with the anti-imperialist or in other words, anti-American discourse of the period. The USA at the same time was waging a military campaign in Vietnam, that was creating a deep anti-Americanism throughout the world. This anti-Americanism was becoming

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp.720-725.

<sup>41</sup> For the Johnson Letter, see *ibid.*, pp.686-689.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p.686.

widespread in Turkey because of the above-mentioned discontent about the Cyprus issue. As an example, the head of Turkey Worker Party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, described the US military bases in Turkey as the occupation of the country.<sup>43</sup> Bilateral agreements, the existence of US military staff in Turkey and their privileges were other sources of displeasure in Turkish society.

Turkish foreign policy traditionally had been closed to the public; it was regarded as a technical issue, but the Cyprus issue brought the public-opinion into foreign policy. Thus the American attitude to Turkey created displeasure not only in the administration, but also in society. In this environment the anti-imperialist discourse of the 1960s was related to Kemalism. The anti-imperialist discourse was the main theme of the relations between Kemalism and the left politics of the 1960s.

In the 1960s Kemalism and left politics were joined together. There were several reasons for this situation. The emerging socialist movement was under great pressure and the link with Kemalism might supply legitimacy. The ongoing elections were creating success for the conservatives, so the Kemalist military might be an ally for the total destruction of the conservative parties. The rising Third-Worldism and anti-Americanism were merged with the reaction against the USA because of the Cyprus issue. Above all, the main reason was the confusion of western political categories in Turkey. Kurtuluş Kayalı points to two greatest efforts of this idea as Çetin Altan's *Atatürk'ün Sosyal Görüşleri* and Fethi Naci's *100 Soruda Atatürk'ün Temel Görüşleri*.<sup>44</sup> These two works attempt to demonstrate the similarities between the Kemalism and socialism. At the same time the program of the TWP began with the words of Mustafa Kemal that advocated fighting against capitalism and

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<sup>43</sup> Ünlü, p.242.

<sup>44</sup> Kurtuluş Kayalı, "Türk Entelektüelinin Düşünce Dünyası" *Tarih ve Toplum*, no.121 (September 1995), p.53.



imperialism. Therefore, the Turkish left endeavored to unify its origin with Kemalism. Almost all sects in the Turkish left articulated Kemalism with the discourse of anti-imperialism. So in the 1960s the Turkish left constituted itself via a link to Kemalism that might be called the “invention of tradition.”

In the above pages, the social and intellectual climate of the post-27 May period was summarized. The most important point for the thesis is that the “left of center” emerged as one of the examples of Turkish politicians and intellectuals confusion on the above-mentioned issues.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: AN IDEOLOGY OR MORE?

The history of European social democracy in the twentieth century indicates the history of social democratic parties of Europe rather than a social movement. In political life, the term “social democracy” refers to one of the categories of political parties. However, the early social democratic organizations denoted “a society within a society,” or in other words, a “solidarity community” character.<sup>45</sup> Thus, the central aim of this chapter of the thesis is to demonstrate the transformation of social democratic parties from a class-based solidarity community to a category in the spectrum of political parties.

The studies on the histories of political parties focus not only on the institutional continuities and changes of the parties. Alternatively, the history of the political party should refer to the political and social life of the country. Moreover, Tarık Zafer Tunaya’s emphasis on the historiography of political parties is crucial. Tunaya defines the history of political parties in a country as “the history of governments, oppositions, liberties; in short the history of the civilizations of this country.”<sup>46</sup> And this plurality of civilization for the country occurs in the dimension

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<sup>45</sup> Gøsta Esping Andersen, *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p.6.

<sup>46</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984).

of time and space. The features of social democratic parties in different countries and in different historical periods are dissimilar.

The time dimension of the history of social democratic parties in Europe can be elaborated with the continuity and change in world history which have directly affected the history of social democratic parties. Thus, the history of social democratic parties in Europe might be periodized in a number of historical interludes. These are the emergence period that lasted up to the First World War or the Bolshevik Revolution, the inter-war years that were an age of crisis both for the world and social democrats, the post-war period of transformation (this golden age lasted until the petroleum crisis of the 1970s), and the crisis for social democracy that went from the end of the 1970s to today.<sup>47</sup>

As a possible fifth period in the 1990s, the “Third Way” politics of the British Labor Party and the “New Center” politics of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the SPD, offered a new outlook for social democracy. However, it is disputable that these policies are the revival of social democracy in the conditions of globalization and the unipolar world or the denial of traditional social democratic values.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> For histories on social democracy and left, see David Childs, *The Two Red Flags: European Social Democracy and Soviet Communism since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Stephen Padgett and William Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (New York: Longman, 1991); Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New Press, 1996); Willie Thompson, *The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997).

<sup>48</sup> For a full discussion of third way, see Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Paul Cammack, “Giddens Way with Words” in *Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures and Alternatives*, eds. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell (New York: Palgrave, 2004). David Morrison, “New Labor, Citizenship and the Discourse of the Third Way,” in *Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures and Alternatives*, eds. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell (New York: Palgrave, 2004); Will Leggett, “Criticisms and the Future of the Third Way,” in *Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures and Alternatives*, eds. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett and Luke Martell (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

This important part of the periodization for social democracy for the thesis is the third period, the golden age,<sup>49</sup> because, the golden age of world capitalism forced a transformation for the European social democratic party to become a “catch-all party” rather than an “old class party.”<sup>50</sup> To define this transformation is crucial for the thesis because the change in social democracy from the 1950s to the 1960s might give the opportunity for the emergence of social democracy in Turkey with the emergence of the “left of center.” Accordingly, Europe was the place of the emergence and making of social democracy; and Turkish center-left politics might have been inspired by European social democracy. However, the story was different, as will be put forward in subsequent chapters, so it is clear that the effect of social democratic political thought and practice had minimum effect on the emergence of the left of center in the RPP. At this point, the space dimension of the history of social democracy and this chapter of the thesis intersect in Europe. Social democracy, by definition, is a product of industrial societies, and Europe is the main cultural and political region for the analysis of social democracy.<sup>51</sup> I hope that this indispensability for the space dimension of the thesis overcomes the criticisms of the Euro-centrism of the study.

This chapter has two functions for the thesis. First, it illustrates the unfamiliarity between the European social democracy of the 1950s and the 1960s and the emergence of the Turkish left of center politics in the RPP. Socialism, left or

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<sup>49</sup> For the formation and progress of this golden age, see Eric Hobsbawm, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl 1914-1991 Aşırılıklar Çağı*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Sarmal, 2003), pp.276-483

<sup>50</sup> In the onward pages the term “catch-all party” will be elaborated, for the explanation of catch-all party, see Otto Kirscheimer, “The Transformation of Western Political Parties” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, eds. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.177-200.

<sup>51</sup> For the emergence of social democracy in only European countries, see John Kautsky, *Social Democracy and the Aristocracy: Why Socialist Labor Movements Developed in Some Industrial Countries and Not in Others* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002).

any political definition with reference to the working classes, were damned in Turkey. The historical origins of the RPP were based on an intensive anti-socialist discourse, so the effect of the European working class' political movement on the RPP was minor. Thus this chapter aims to indicate how the left of center was different from and irrelevant to the social democracy of Europe. The second function of this chapter is to sustain a theoretical framework for the thesis. This framework will show the basic features and historical developments of social democracy. Moreover, the agenda of this chapter is to demonstrate the significance of changes in the policies, rhetoric and the symbols of social democracy from the 1950s to the 1960s.

### The Problem of Definition

Social democratic ideology and policies differ in the dimensions of time and space as do other social phenomenon. Thus, twentieth century social democracy was different in different historical periods. For example, the social democracy of the pre-First World War period and the social democracy of the “third way” in the 1990s were the opposites of each other. In the space dimension, for example, Scandinavian politics were more based on class politics than those of the Mediterranean countries.<sup>52</sup> Although these differences, it is possible to attribute some general features to social democracy and to seek a definition in terms of these features.

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<sup>52</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.99.

On the definition of social democracy, a set of features that were introduced by Anthony Crosland are classic.<sup>53</sup> Crosland's consideration illustrates the reliance on Keynesianism and shared the post-war optimism of the theorists such as Kenneth Galbraith or Joseph Schumpeter.<sup>54</sup> Crosland's set of features for social democracy was composed of political liberalism, mixed economy, the welfare state, Keynesian economic policy and commitment to equality.<sup>55</sup> These five proposes reflect the basic character of social democracy in the golden age of capitalism. Two of them, political liberalism and commitment to equality, are political; and three of them, mixed economy, the welfare state and Keynesian economic policy, are economic. For him, the control of economy had been captured by the state as the agent of society, so the necessary result of these features was a system of parliamentary democracy in a market economy.<sup>56</sup> An historical perspective of this model sees it on the rise in the 1960s and demise after the 1970s provides a better understanding on what social democracy is because a comparison of the post-war social democratic model and neo-liberal model of current days demonstrates the meaning of these above-mentioned five commitments and which of them has prevailed up to today.

The social democracy of post-war Europe associated the special relation between the working class and gradual reformism of society through a more

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<sup>53</sup> Anthony Crosland was a British Member of Parliament who became the Minister of Education, and his "Future of Socialism" became one of the most influential studies of the 1950s on social democracy. For his magnum-opus, see Anthony Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London: J. Cape, 1956)

<sup>54</sup> For the classics of these writers, see John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); and Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1950)

<sup>55</sup> See Crosland, pp.100-114.

<sup>56</sup> Padgett and Paterson, p.23.

egalitarian course.<sup>57</sup> The relations between the trade unions and social democratic parties reflected continuity from the pre-Second World War era and the Post-War era. However, the gradual reformism reflected a change, and demonstrated the break-off between social democracy and the apocalyptic social and political actions that were initiated after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.<sup>58</sup> The revolutionary forces claimed the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist mode of production in terms of revolution. The best example of this tradition in Europe was the Spartacus rebellion in 1919 that was led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and this unsuccessful rebellion resulted in a split in the Social Democratic Party of Germany.<sup>59</sup> After the defeat of the insurgents, social democracy not only in Germany but in all of Europe began to be defined in terms of non-communism, so social democrats began to demarcate themselves from communists.<sup>60</sup>

The term “communism” might be used as a negative definition, or in other words, to point what social democracy is not. However, the positive definition of social democracy is a complicated issue. The names of the parties might be a sign for the definition and classification of the parties as social democrat or not. Thus, a party with the label of socialist, social democratic or democratic socialist might be enough to define the party as social democratic.<sup>61</sup> However, this way of classifying is problematic, because there many exceptions. For example, a party named the Social

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<sup>57</sup> Gerassimos Moschonas, *In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation, 1945 to the Present*, trans. Gregory Elliot (New York: Verso, 2002), p.15.

<sup>58</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.135.

<sup>59</sup> Stefan Berger, *Social Democracy and the Working Class in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany* (New York: Longman, 2000), p.124.

<sup>60</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.135.

<sup>61</sup> Gosta Esping Andersen, “Contemporary Research on Social Democracy,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, no.18 (1992), p.189.

Democratic Party might be a conservative right-wing party, as in the case of Portugal.<sup>62</sup> Or the name “Socialist Party” might refer to either a social democratic party or a revolutionary party. Consequently, the labels of the political parties might create misunderstandings about their characters.

Another way of defining or classifying a political party as social democrat or not might be whether it is a member of the Socialist International.<sup>63</sup> However, this approach has some problems also, because the Socialist International is not an organization of accreditation. Moreover, membership in the Socialist International is dependent on the application of the party and the approval of the International. So, while membership in the Socialist International might be a criterion for being classified as social democratic, this definition has some exceptions as do the other ways of definition and classification.

Organizational body, as a distinctive feature, might be another way of classification or definition for social democratic parties. Peter Lösche defines social democratic party as “a solidarity community based on a unity of party program, organizational form and social base.”<sup>64</sup> It is essential that the organization model of social democratic parties is somewhat different than that of bourgeoisie parties. A social democratic party is a component of a historical bloc, and this bloc includes trade-unions, cooperatives, labor associations together with the social democratic party. However, this solidarity community character of social democratic parties altered in the post-war period. The symbols and rhetoric of social democratic parties were transformed, and the community activities of local party organizations began to

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<sup>62</sup> Gøsta Esping Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, p.4.

<sup>63</sup> Gosta Esping Andersen, “Contemporary Research,” p.189. Socialist International is the worldwide solidarity organization of center-left parties that was re-established at the Frankfurt Congress in 1951.

<sup>64</sup> Padgett and Paterson, p.66.



disappear. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the organizational body of social democratic parties was significantly different from that of bourgeoisie parties, and the concept of mass party is a product of socialist, social democratic or labor parties.<sup>65</sup> However, the emulation or assimilation of the organizational bodies of social democratic parties to other parties makes this criterion of classification somewhat invalid.

Adam Przeworski, a well-known scholar of social democracy and its position in capitalist society, argues a definition that formulates the situation of social democratic parties according to their reflections to the three events historically. These reflections are “whether to seek the advancement of socialism through the political institutions of the capitalist society or to confront the bourgeoisie directly, without any mediation; whether to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely on multi- and even supra-class support; and whether to seek improvements, reforms, within the confines of capitalism or to dedicate all efforts and energies to its complete transformation.”<sup>66</sup> For him, the parties that choose to participate in the political institutions of capitalist societies, to seek support outside the working classes and to pursue reformist policy transformed themselves from the early Marxist–Revolutionary parties into the current social democratic parties. In this context, the decision of social democratic parties determines whether the party is a nineteenth century working class party or a contemporary social democratic party.<sup>67</sup> This voluntarism of Przeworski ignores the economic and social conditions that are independent from the intentions of party

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<sup>65</sup> Eley, p.24.

<sup>66</sup> Przeworski, p.3

<sup>67</sup> For the discussion of these three choices, see Przeworski, pp.7-31.

leaders. However, Przeworski approaches social democracy as a process and evaluates it in its historical context. Therefore his approach is helpful understanding the emergence and alteration of center-left political parties.

Przeworski's approach had a significant effect on academic writing on social democracy.<sup>68</sup> Gøsta Esping-Andersen, in his outstanding study on social democracy *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*, discusses Przeworski's three commitments and argues that the first and second conditions of Przeworski's points puts the emphasis on the state and class and that the third proposal is about social transformation.<sup>69</sup> Esping-Andersen recognizes these two conditions as useful for defining social democracy, but objects to the third and argues that some reforms might create a revolutionary action.<sup>70</sup> Thus, Esping-Andersen argues for the revision of the third proposal and put forwards a third proposal of his own as "social democracy is a movement that seeks to build class unity and mobilize power via national legislation."<sup>71</sup> As clearly seen, Esping-Andersen argues a double role for social democracy. In the first point, he emphasizes the "solidarity community" character of social democracy with "a movement that seeks to build class unity." Second, he points to the above-mentioned feature of social democracy "social democracy refers to a type of political party in the parliamentary democratic systems" with the description "mobilize power via national legislation."

To conclude, constructing a definition of social democracy is a complicated issue since it has had a diverse character in different times and places. Scholars have

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<sup>68</sup> For the evaluation of studies that define social democracy in terms of substantive political goals or strategic choices (as Przeworski does) see Gøsta Esping Andersen, "Contemporary Research" p.189.

<sup>69</sup> Gøsta Esping Andersen *Politics against Markets*, p.6.

<sup>70</sup> For the discussion of Przeworski's model by Esping-Andersen, see Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, pp.6-10.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p.9.

attributed various features to social democracy, and the composition of these features created an understanding of social democracy that is substitutable as an alternative of a definition. In the second half of the twentieth century, the term “social democracy” became a type of political party in the political spectrum of western parliamentary democracies rather than a social movement that struggled for hegemony. This model of the party was the inevitable result of the post-war conditions. In the final analysis, study of the social democratic party from the 1950s to 1960s is crucial for the aim of the thesis, and Crosland’s above-mentioned five conditions (political liberalism, mixed economy, welfare state, Keynesian economic policy and commitment to equality) define the frame of the post-war period’s social democratic party.

### The Early Stages of Social Democracy

The direct impact of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution on European social democracy was diffused. Before these events, Marxists and non-Marxists, revisionists or revolutionaries co-existed in the same parties at the national level. However, after these events, the European left was divided into two camps. On the one hand were Leninist revolutionaries and, on the other hand, social democratic worker movements, that is, the later nucleus of European social democracy. The process of these developments is crucial to investigate because they made social democracy a unique and apart ideology in the political environment of Europe.

Many political historians refer to social democracy's Marxist origins.<sup>72</sup> However, it is difficult to say that all left gatherings of Europe in the nineteenth century were Marxist-oriented. The examples of European organized labor movements clearly show the variety in the formation of European social democratic parties.<sup>73</sup> The German Social Democrat Party (SPD) demonstrates this inner-variety of European social democratic parties. The SPD was founded by two allied groups, one is Marxist, the other non-Marxist.<sup>74</sup> The names of these two pioneers of German social democracy were the General German Workers Associations (*Allgemeiner Deutscher ArbeiterVerein*, ADAV) and the Social Democratic Labor's Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei*, SDAP). In 1874, these two organizations merged and established the Socialist Workers Party of Germany in the city of Gotha. Similarly, the British Labor Party, another important example of workers' political organization that included various groups in the mentioned period, was established in 1900, and it included various political groups such as Fabians, Christian socialists as well as Marxists.<sup>75</sup> The Swedish Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti*, SAP) included Marxist and non-Marxist elements in its body.<sup>76</sup> In France, the socialist workers movement was divided into several

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<sup>72</sup> For clear examples, see Eley, *Forging Democracy*; and Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*.

<sup>73</sup> For a study of European social democratic parties, see Robert Ladrech and Philippe Marlière, *Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organization, Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

<sup>74</sup> For the making and development of German social democracy, see Stefan Berger, *Social Democracy and the Working Class in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany* (New York: Longman, 2000); J. Dedeken, "The German Social Democratic Party," in Robert Ladrech; and Philippe Marlière, *Social Democratic Parties in the European Union: History, Organization, Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

<sup>75</sup> For the British Labor Party, see P. Webb, "The British Labor Party," in Ladrech and Marlière.

<sup>76</sup> See Francis Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in Comparative Perspective* (London: Routledge, 1978); Carl Cavanagh Hodge, *The Trammels of Tradition: Social Democracy in Britain, France, and Germany* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); Walter Korpi, *The Working Class in Welfare*

groups; however, the foundation of SFIO (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*, French Section of Workers International) created organizational unity.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, the French socialist movement was also varied, and had two major groups. The group of Jules Guesde was *ouvriériste* and sought doctrinal purity on Marxist vulgate. The second group, led by Jean Jaures, advocated a parliamentary democracy and was optimistic about establishing socialism in terms of gradual social reforms.

The German experience in class politics is central in this issue of containing various political considerations, contradictory reformist pragmatism and Marxist orthodoxy. In the early 1830s German workers began to be organized in Workers' Educational Associations (WEA, *Arbeiter Bildungs Vereine*).<sup>78</sup> Stefan Berger, a well-known historian of German politics, points out two basic feature of WEA: first, WEA was "the most important expression of working class aspirations," and second he asserts the influence of liberals on the associations.<sup>79</sup> In this period, an alliance between bourgeois liberals and the working classes emerged against the absolutism of the aristocratic classes.<sup>80</sup> The close relation and collaboration between the working class and bourgeois liberals was not limited to German political life, the British case was similar. Until the foundation of the British Labor Party, the labor movement was represented mostly by the Liberal Party in political life. After the Labor Party, this

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*Capitalism: Work, Unions, and Politics in Sweden* (London: Routledge, 1978); Klaus Misgeld and Karl Molin, *Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); Tim Tilton, *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991); and Andersen, *Politics against Markets*.

<sup>77</sup> For information on the French Socialist Party, see Ladrech and Marlière, "The French Socialist Party," in Ladrech and Marlière.

<sup>78</sup> Berger, p.37.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p.37.

<sup>80</sup> For the struggle of bourgeois liberals and working classes against the aristocracy, see Kautsky.

tendency continued in a different way. The Liberal party and Labor Party collaborated in some election districts that was called the “lib-lab coalition”, which lasted until 1914.<sup>81</sup> However, the German case of the WEA was different, the disconnection of the liberal and labor coalition emerged in the 1860s, and liberals were unable to control the labor movement thereafter.<sup>82</sup>

The decade of the 1860s was an age of transformation for Germany economically and politically. The political unification of Germany, wars and victories against Denmark, Austria and France and industrial take-off all occurred in this period. The economic development that had made England and France industrial countries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had taken place in Germany in the 1860s. Geoff Eley points out that a “dual revolution” (the industrialization in Britain and political upheaval in France) created capitalist society and made the socialist movement possible.<sup>83</sup> Thus, Germany entered a new era after the emergence of the conditions of the industrial economy. The demands of politically organized workers’ movements came on to the agenda and the coalition between the liberals and workers began to crack. As a result, the WEA was divided and a group of workers and intellectuals left the WEA, and established the above-mentioned ADAV in 1863 in Leipzig by Ferdinand Lassalle and his supporters.<sup>84</sup> Another coalition of liberals and workers in the WEA established the Federation of German Workers’ Associations in 1864 (*Verband Deutscher Arbeitervereine*, VDAV). In this group, a Marxist sect led by August Bebel and Karl Liebknecht eliminated the liberal group and transformed the association into a political party

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<sup>81</sup> P. Webb, “The British Labor Party,” in Ladrech and Marlière, p.131.

<sup>82</sup> For the developments in German social democracy on this issue, see Berger, pp.37-50.

<sup>83</sup> Eley, p.47.

<sup>84</sup> Berger, p.49.

called the Social Democratic Workers Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiter Partei*, SDAP) at the Eisenach Conference in 1869.<sup>85</sup> In 1875, ADAV was banned in Prussia by the Bismarck administration.

This event had two effects, the question of survival for the German workers' movement arose and the tendencies of unification were stimulated. So these two associations were merged in the city of Gotha in the spring of 1874. This merge created a new party called the Socialist Democratic Workers' Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*, SDAP), with a program more directly affected by Lassalle's group. The radicals severely criticized this program, and Marx's famous critic of Gotha program was published. However, these attempts of unification could not avert the repression of the workers' movement and in 1878 Bismarck introduced the famous anti-socialist law. With this law socialist politicians were free to participate in politics individually, but all socialist organizations were banned. So labor - based politics became illegal until the early 1890s, the end of the Bismarck period. Despite programmatic differences, various sections of the left remained in the SPD after this re-opening of the party.

The appearance of working class political organization in Britain happened as a late event in comparison with the other industrial countries of Europe.<sup>86</sup> A social democratic labor movement emerged in England in the late nineteenth century. In 1900, a Labor Representation Committee was founded and in 1906 it became the Labor Party.<sup>87</sup> Traditionally British trade unions had supported the liberal party. But 1909 was a milestone, because the Miners' Federation began to support the labor

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<sup>85</sup> Berger, p.49.

<sup>86</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.1.

<sup>87</sup> Webb, p.131.

party. However, this does not mean there was an acute rivalry between the Liberal Party and Labor Party; contrarily, these two parties continued to cooperate against the conservative party. This cooperation called, the lib-lab coalition, continued until 1914. After this date, the Labor Party began a major power in British politics and collaboration between liberals and labor was interrupted.

The British Labor Party was not founded as a unique organization; it was composed of various groups and traditions. And these traditions have continued to be represented in the party.<sup>88</sup> The sub-traditions were most importantly Fabianism, Christian Socialism and Marxism. Among them, Marxist tendencies were taken into the party by the Social Democratic Federations and Tom Mann was the most influential personality of this Marxist tradition. However, the Labor Party, as a trade union-based organization, carried out a somehow pragmatist agenda for the working conditions of the workers. On the contrary, Marxists argue for the abolition of the class of employers. This difference between Marxist doctrine and trade-union pragmatism is obvious on the issue of wage labor and its relations with society. Marxist orthodoxy claims the abolition of the system of wage labor. Trade-union pragmatism on the other hand bargains for the sale of wage labor.<sup>89</sup> Because of this clear difference and the strength of the trade-unionist effect on the Labor Party, little Marxist impact occurred on the British Labor Party in the emergence period of the party. Later on it gradually disappeared during the First World War.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Geoffrey Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought: A History* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p.17.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> For the limited Marxist effect on the Labor Party, see *ibid.*, pp.22-23.



The second group, Christian socialists, carried out an ethical and emotional response to the capitalist mode of production.<sup>91</sup> The third group, Fabianism, was the most influential and important faction in the Labor Party.<sup>92</sup> The Fabian society was founded as a middle class intellectual group in 1884 during the tea parties at the home of Mrs. Charlotte Wilson. At the beginning there were two groups within the Fabians. On the one hand, Bernard Shaw argued an economic model that was based on Marxist terms such as relations of production. On the other hand, Jevons argued a model that took into account the needs of consumers. However, the most important person in the Fabian society in this period was Sidney Webb, who argued a gradually and peaceful economic development model that he called “industrial democracy.”<sup>93</sup>

The British case is one of the significant examples of the emergence of a politically organized working class, because Britain as an early industrialized country had a labor movement so late in comparison with other countries. It is important to be industrialized in order to have organized labor movement; however, it does not seem to be enough. At this point, Donald Sassoon puts forth a remarkable proposal on the history of the country and the party: the electoral success of the party is independent from the date of the creation of the socialist party, the level of industrialization, and the size of the working-class electorate.<sup>94</sup> Universal male suffrage and whether or not there is a rival party that meets the demands of the working class are important in the electoral results.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, p.32.

<sup>92</sup> For the emergence of Fabianism and its effect on the formation of Labor Party, see *ibid.*, pp.24-32.

<sup>93</sup> Bülent Ecevit tried to use the term “industrial democracy” before the discussions on the “left of center.”

<sup>94</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.9.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

In the previous pages, the inner variety of European working class political organizations was described. The radical and moderate tendencies of the European left co-existed in the same political organizations until the First World War. The most important example of this situation was German social democracy. In Wilhelm Germany, the SPD that had been cancelled after the anti-socialist law of Bismarck was re-opened with a new program that was prepared in Erfurt in 1891. This new program included a dichotomy between Marxism and Lassallian pragmatism. It contained Marxist catastrophism that argued the inevitable collapse of the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, this Erfurt program foresaw some practical reforms for the working classes such as universal suffrage, freedom of association, a progressive income tax, an eight-hour working day and the creation of employment offices.<sup>96</sup> This dichotomy lasted until the First World War. It is possible to characterize these tendencies, the first of which was Karl Kautsky's Marxist orthodoxy and the second of which was the Eduard Bernstein's revisionism.

Karl Kautsky claimed the inevitable collapse of the capitalist mode of production in the Marxist sense.<sup>97</sup> Kautsky argued a mechanical understanding of history, and strongly opposed revisionism. For Kautsky, the inevitable collapse of capitalism showed its inevitability in terms of "social progress." This "social progress" was the increase in exploitation and class struggle, the monopolization of capital, the proletarianization of the middle classes and the collapse of capitalism.<sup>98</sup> In Kautsky's political theory, this mechanical social progress came into being with

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<sup>96</sup> Ladrech and Marlière, p.78.

<sup>97</sup> For detailed information on Karl Kautsky, see Eric Stephen Bronner. "Karl Kautsky and the Twilight of Orthodoxy," *Political Theory* 10, no.4 (November 1982); and Paul Blackledge, "Karl Kautsky and Marxist Historiography" in *Science and Society* 70, no.3 (July 2006).

<sup>98</sup> Ladrech and Marlière, pp.78-80.

two revolutions; he defined these revolutions as political and social. For Kautsky, political revolution only meant the conquest of the state power; however, the social revolution referred to the mechanistic course of history and the progressive classes' success in social progress.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Kautsky argued that social revolution would occur in the early industrialized countries. At this point, Kautsky supports the position of Marxist orthodoxy on this issue of where the social revolution is indispensable first. All these argumentations referred to the Marxist catastrophism of the Erfurt program of the SPD.

On the other side, Eduard Bernstein, as the founding father of revisionism, represented the pragmatic part of the 1891 Erfurt program of the SPD.<sup>100</sup> Bernstein opposed the claim of the inevitable collapse of capitalism. He made some empirical assessments on the capitalist mode of production and proposed the revision of some of predictions of Karl Marx. For Bernstein, class conflicts were not getting worse, and middle classes were not vanishing.<sup>101</sup> A gradual model was offered by Bernstein rather than apocalyptic actions. Coser differentiates Kautskian Marxist orthodoxy and Bernstein's revisionism as "the conflict between Marxist catastrophism and positive empirical investigation."<sup>102</sup> In the course of the late nineteenth century through the First World War, political developments justified Coser's above-mentioned differentiation, and the revisionism of Bernstein grew stronger. The insurrectionist ways of establishing socialism became ineffectual, and optimism

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<sup>99</sup> Bronner, p.585.

<sup>100</sup> For the political thought of Bernstein, see Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

<sup>101</sup> Lewis Coser, "Marxist Thought in the First Quarter of the 20th Century," *The American Journal of Sociolog*, 78, no. 1 (July 1972), pp.172-201.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p.176.

because of the growth of suffrage led socialists to foresee the peaceful establishment of socialism including, surprisingly, Frederick Engels.<sup>103</sup>

Elections and universal suffrage were the essential reasons for change in the first half of the twentieth century. Engels, as co-founder of the communist ideology, changed his position on the issue of democratic competition in his last years. Adam Przeworski describes Engels's position on the democratic competition as "the only recourse available to the workers, because the technological changes in war made insurrections and barricades ineffective."<sup>104</sup> The protection of the workers' movement from repression was the main reason for parliamentary representation for this point of view.<sup>105</sup> In this electoral story, in the beginning SPD had 35 deputies in 1890 and 110 (one of three of the whole electorate) in 1914.<sup>106</sup> This electoral progress occurred with the emancipation of workers at the same time. The emancipation was not limited to wages, it also included cultural and social emancipation. For example, the German daily socialist press had reached one million in 1909.<sup>107</sup> The success of the German working class is similar to that of other European countries.

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<sup>103</sup> In the introduction chapter of Marx's work "*Class Struggles in France*," written by Engels, Engels refers to the importance of suffrage as "thanks to the intelligent use which the German workers made of the universal suffrage introduced in 1866, the astonishing growth of the party is made plain to all the world by incontestable figures: 1871, 102,000; 1874, 352,000; 1877, 493,000 Social-Democratic votes. Then came recognition of this advance by high authority in the shape of the Anti-Socialist Law 11; the party was temporarily broken up, the number of votes dropped to 312,000 in 1881". Karl Marx. 28 January 2007. *Class Struggles in France* (London: Electrix Book Co., 2001). Available [online]: <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bogazici/Doc?id=10015089&ppg=20> [28 January 2007], p.18.

<sup>104</sup> Przeworski, p.12.

<sup>105</sup> On the issue of repression and new ways of political struggle Engels writes that for here, too, "the conditions of the struggle had changed fundamentally. Rebellion in the old style, street fighting with barricades, which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, had become largely outdated. Let us have no illusions about it: a real victory of insurrection over the military in street fighting, a victory as between two armies, is one of the rarest exceptions." Marx, p.22.

<sup>106</sup> Coser, p. 174.

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*

It is possible to construct a causal relation between suffrage and the votes for the labor movement. In this perception, the number of proletariat will grow so when the rate of suffrage grows they will vote rationally and elect working class representatives for the parliament.<sup>108</sup> This rational point was supported by Kautsky and had been made the official party policy of the SPD. However, as is clear, this point reflects the Marxist orthodoxy of inevitable collapse of capitalism. Moreover, the politicians that lived through the illegality of the period of anti-socialist act might have seen the elections and democratic competition as guarantees of survival for the socialist movement in the conditions of imperial Germany.<sup>109</sup>

Nineteenth century class politics did not take place only among the bourgeoisie and the working classes. The aristocratic classes were still effectual in the political life of some countries. Thus, universal manhood suffrage was the product and a crucial means of this struggle. However, if the working classes took the power with universal suffrage, and used public authority in order to demolish private property, the bourgeoisie would either continue the democratic struggle or would use illegal means.<sup>110</sup> This question was open-ended for the late nineteenth century industrial countries. The Kautskian orthodox Marxist point on elections and democracy argued the absolute majority of labor parties when suffrage increased. It was true at the beginning, and the votes of those parties increased. However, at the brink of the First World War, the increase of workers in society began to stabilize and Marxist prediction of the proletarianization of the middle classes did not come

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<sup>108</sup> Przeworski, p. 12.

<sup>109</sup> David Crew, "A Social Republic / Social Democrats, Communist and Weimer Welfare State 1919 to 1933" in *Between Reform and Revolution : German Socialism and Communism From 1840 to 1990*, eds. David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), p.242.

<sup>110</sup> Przeworski, p.79.

true.<sup>111</sup> The reasons for the stabilization in the numbers of the proletariat in these societies are several. However, the resources for this stabilization that were cited by Przeworski seem to be adequate. They are “extended compulsory education, forced retirement, large standing armies and effective barriers to economic participation of the women.”<sup>112</sup>

It is not so possible to argue that social democratic parties were successful in forming economic policy before the Second World War. Social democrats did not create their own economic policy, the economic policy of the left and the criticism of capitalism were somehow the same thing.<sup>113</sup> The nationalization of the means of production was the only political program of European social democracy before the Second World War, and the social policy reforms were a questionable area for the advanced capitalist societies in the interwar period. However, there were some successful examples among them the Swedish model, the New Zealand model and the popular front of France. These examples implemented some basic social welfare system features: in Sweden, the state subsidized insurance, new pension benefits and health services: in New Zealand, legislation for a 40-hour week: and in France, holidays with pay implemented.<sup>114</sup>

The Swedish model was a different social democratic way of government that emerged in the inter-war period and has many of the features of post-war European

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<sup>111</sup> For the statistical data on the working class formation in Europe, see *ibid.* pp.17-23.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p.35.

<sup>114</sup> John Callaghan, “Social Democracy and Globalization: The Limits of Social Democracy in Historical Perspective,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 4, no. 3 (October 2002), p.432.

social democracy.<sup>115</sup> In the 1920s, the SAP came to power with three short coalition governments in 1920, 1921-23 and 1924-26, but the formation of successful Swedish social democracy did not occur until the 1930s.

The prominent figure of Swedish social democracy was Ernst Wigforss in this period.<sup>116</sup> The vision of Wigforss was a system of government that would transform capitalist society into a classless society. However, he suggested that this aim would be realized gradually and with non-revolutionary methods. Tim Tilton concludes that Wigforss' reformist aims were based on "social welfare policy, progressive taxation, economic planning, industrial democracy and socialization of industry."<sup>117</sup> It is possible to suggest that the post-1929 crisis period was an age of insecurity for the people, so everybody sought social security. This solidaristic approach referred to a social security system that was based on insurance.

The Swedish example was difficult to finance in the conditions of the interwar crisis. But Swedish society was successful because of the exportation explosion of some raw materials. Therefore, Sweden sold steel and timber to Britain and Germany, and was able to finance the welfare expenditures in this catastrophic age.<sup>118</sup>

Another example of the social protectionist way of government in the interwar period was the New Deal of Roosevelt in the USA. It is not clear that the New Deal was a well deliberated plan of actions that was able to be classified as a

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<sup>115</sup> For Swedish social democracy in the inter war period, see Timothy Tilton, "A Swedish Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy," *The American Political Science Review* 73, no.2 (June 1979).

<sup>116</sup> Ernst Wigforss was the Minister of Finance in the 1930s he exercised a full employment strategy with Swedish welfare expenditures.

<sup>117</sup> Tilton, *Political Theory*, p.39.

<sup>118</sup> Callaghan, p.433.

social democratic political action. Moreover, Callaghan points out that Roosevelt's administration did not use monetary policy or budget deficits as ways of recovery.<sup>119</sup> So, the post-war Keynesian economic recovery programs or inter-war Wigforss politics in Sweden can not be estimated in the same context as the New Deal of Roosevelt.

To conclude, the social democratic parties of Europe emerged as movements of workers' organizations. Up to the Bolshevik Revolution the socialist parties of Europe had embraced both revisionist and orthodox Marxist views, and the period after the Bolshevik Revolution European socialism was divided into the two camps between the social democrats and communists. Thus the term social democracy referred to the parties that tended to struggle in parliamentary ways. However, this period was an age of crisis for Europe, including social democratic politics, and the social democracy of Europe could not implement an alternative and successful outlook for economic and social problems. So the social democrats became onlookers in the events that yielded the rise of fascism. But the new environment of the post-war period created new opportunities the social democratic parties.

### Post-War Europe and the Welfare State

Karl Polanyi begins his well-known book, *The Great Transformation*, with the sentence "the nineteenth century civilization has collapsed."<sup>120</sup> According to Polanyi, "nineteenth century civilization rested on four institutions which are the balance of power system, gold standard, self-regulating market and the liberal state,"

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p.3.



<sup>121</sup> These words are important in order to point out the effect of the way through the Second World War. Moreover, post-war Europe was severely affected by this collapse. The substitute for the nineteenth century civilization was a “counter movement” that took place in order to stop the annihilating effects on human life of the self-regulating market system. It is possible to call this “counter movement” a welfare state or social policy perception in the post-war period.

Arthur Marwick defines welfare state as a system in which the state is responsible for the four sectors of the human-being: social security (including sickness, injury, old age or unemployment), health, housing and education.<sup>122</sup> Thus, this way of government became the hegemonic discourse of post-war Europe, and welfare was the key word of the period. Moreover, the main function of the welfare system was the production of consent, and the welfare measures and full employment strategy were the material base of the consent.<sup>123</sup>

The importance of the post-war welfare policies came from the memories of the previous years, because the Second World War was the most destructive event in history. No other war had ever reached the geographical scope of the Second World War. Moreover, the core of the war was Europe, and the process that began with the First World War (including the interwar crisis and the Second World War) had brought the European societies to the edge of dissolution. Devastating effects prevailed at the same time as the above-mentioned counter-effects that wished to

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Jürgen Hess, “The Social Policy of Attlee Government,” in *the Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850-1950*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen (London: Billing and Sons Limited, 1981), p.296.

<sup>123</sup> See Przeworski, pp.133-171.

tighten the social ties and keep society together. This effect showed itself first in Britain with the Beveridge report.

The Beveridge report was the most significant example of this new solidaristic approach. In the era of the Second World War, William Beveridge published “Full Employment in a Free Society,” a report which included the bases of the welfare state.<sup>124</sup> The three basic assumptions of the plan were full employment, comprehensive health care services and family allowances.<sup>125</sup> These policies were prepared with the approach of the essence of egalitarianism and collectivist state interventionism.<sup>126</sup> This new environment made the state responsible for the welfare of the citizens and introduced insurance systems that were based on state funding rather than individual contributions. After the plan was printed some important acts were introduced in Britain. They were the Family Allowances Act (introduced before 1945), the National Health Service Act, the National Insurance Act and the National Insurance Act for industrial injuries (introduced in the parliamentary session of 1945-46 after the labor victory in the 1945 elections).<sup>127</sup> As clearly seen, British social policy attitude and social security system were transformed in the period of the Attlee government on the basis of the Beveridge report. The 1945 Attlee government’s reform plan included not only social welfare, it also inclined the

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<sup>124</sup> For the report, see William Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1944).

<sup>125</sup> For the Beveridge report, see Hess, pp.300-305.

<sup>126</sup> Hose Harris, “Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain during the Second World War,” in *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850-1950*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen (London: Billing and Sons Limited, 1981), p.247.

<sup>127</sup> For the effects of these laws, see Nicholas Barr, *The Economics of the Welfare State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.30-32.

establishment of effective economic controls, public ownership of vital parts of industry and full employment.<sup>128</sup>

On the national level, the above-mentioned consensus differed in some aspects according to the political preferences of the governmental bodies. For example, the composition of government bodies directly affected the conditions of the welfare regime in the post-war Germany. After the 1948 elections, the coalition parties of the CDU, the FDP and the GP were engaged in the system of traditional German social security.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, the SPD's position was effected mostly by the position of the Beveridge plan. One of the important officers of the SPD, Walter Auerbach, prepared a plan in 1952 that was called the SPD plan.<sup>130</sup> This plan failed to be introduced because of the majority of the government parties. The SPD plan was different from the traditional German social security system in two points that this plan aimed to include all citizens and was to be financed by taxes rather than contributors. The CDU's position was support of the traditional German social security system and the basic level of contribution was individual because of the need to seek self-security and the CDU argued to limit the extent of government interventions.<sup>131</sup>

The meaning of welfare reforms is a contested issue. On the one hand, it is possible to conceptualize welfare reforms as an extension and modification of the existing social services; on the other, a way of social revolution.<sup>132</sup> However, it is

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<sup>128</sup> Hess, p.296.

<sup>129</sup> Hans Günther Hockerts. "German Post-War Social Policies against the Background of the Beveridge Plan: Some Observations Preparatory to a Comparative Analysis," in *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850-1950*, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen (London: Billing and Sons Limited, 1981), p.320.

<sup>130</sup> For the details of the SPD plan, see Hockerts, pp.323-325.

<sup>131</sup> For the social policy and welfare views of CDU and other government parties, see *ibid.*, p.325.

obvious that the welfare state created a new age of social protection, and introduced a new understanding of citizen rights. This new understanding of rights was broader than that of civil and political rights, and was called social rights.<sup>133</sup> Thus, political rights and civil rights were added to employment and social security rights. Moreover, the strong social solidarity, as the product of the sufferings of the war, led to a powerful state intervention.<sup>134</sup> Illness, unemployment and starvation were seen as the troubles of the old age.

Consequently, in post-war Europe the programmatic priorities of social democracy were dominant. On the other hand, social democracy's electoral and political difficulties were based on the ambiguities that were raised by the cold war. Thus the ideological hegemony of social democratic parties in post-war Europe or, in other words, consensus on the social structure of European societies created a new difficulty for social democracy. In the new environment the perceptions of the political parties on the social formation of societies became similar. Thus people became indifferent as to whether the social democratic parties were in the government or not. Moreover, this effect combined with the economic boom of 1950s, so the electoral support of social democracy gradually decreased. Thus a new course for the transformation of European social democracy opened.

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<sup>132</sup> The term de-commodification that was conducted by Esping-Andersen is useful in order to identify the meaning of welfare system. And it refers to the livelihood without reliance on the market, so the persons were emancipated from market dependence. For the full discussion on de-commodification see Gøsta Esping Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp.21-23.

<sup>133</sup> See Thomas Humphrey Marshall, *Class Citizenship and Social Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1964).

<sup>134</sup> For a detailed discussion of this solidarity and state intervention, see Ivan Berend, *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe: Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.191-213.

## The Transformation of European Social Democracy

The main character of post-war Europe was uncertainty, and a solidaristic approach was used to try to repair the destructive effects of the war. The destruction was not only physical. The production process had been plunged into an impasse particularly in the sectors of fuel, transportation and food.<sup>135</sup> In these conditions, the economic program of the left featured the transformation of capitalism in terms of the nationalization of key industries, welfare and planning.<sup>136</sup> With these programmatic priorities, the left parties of Europe took on very influential and powerful positions. Socialists and labor parties enjoyed sole power in Britain, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, in other European countries they shared power. But in Germany, the SPD was excluded from the government.<sup>137</sup>

The preeminent example of post-war solidaristic governments was Attlee's Labor government in Britain. Labor declared that "the labor party is a socialist party and proud of it" in its election program, the motto of which was "let us face the future."<sup>138</sup> Having won the elections in 1945, the core of Labor's economic policy was nationalization. The Attlee government rapidly nationalized the key industries of the economy. Industries that employed roughly ten percent of the labor force, including the Bank of England, civil aviation, coal mines, electricity, gas, iron and steel, transport, railways, road haulage, and road passenger transport were

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<sup>135</sup> Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, *Capitalism since 1945* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p.6.

<sup>136</sup> Carl Cavanagh Hodge, "Politics of Programmatic Renewal: Postwar Experiences in Britain and Germany," in *Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe*, eds. Richard Gillespie and William Paterson (London: F. Cass, 1993), p.6

<sup>137</sup> In German politics, the SPD had been excluded from the government by the other parties. See Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.117.

<sup>138</sup> Childs, p.25.

nationalized in this period.<sup>139</sup> The social policy of the Attlee government, based on the Beveridge Report, transformed the character of the British welfare regime. The short-term result of Labor's control of parliament was the most comprehensive free health service and complex system of social protection in Europe.<sup>140</sup> However, the success and effect of the democratic socialists did not last very long.

1947 was a turning point in European politics. And after this date, the success of the left in elections and its effect in the political composition of Europe began to decrease. This crisis and election defeats of European social democracy continued until the 1960s. The reasons for this failure were several, among which the leading factors may be stated as having been the sustained economic boom and the escalating cold war.<sup>141</sup> The economic boom created a harmonization of wages and benefits, so a compromise was established between the bourgeoisie and workers. Moreover, the affluence of the working class had its source in a high demand for labor, so the direct outcome of this demand was full employment. Full employment was also a result of Keynesian demand management policies. So, the social democratic parties' old rhetoric was not harmonious with this new environment. In the 1950s, the social democratic parties were unable to win any elections in the four big countries of Europe (Britain, France, Germany and Italy).

Thus series of election defeats forced a programmatic change. The only successful point of post-war social democracy, the welfare state measures, became the central point of focus for social democrats. The post-war economic boom made it

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Donald Sassoon, "Politics," in *Europe since 1945*, ed. Mary Fulbrook (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.21.

<sup>141</sup> For a detailed discussion of sources of election defeats, see Hartmut Kaelble, "Social History," in *Europe since 1945*, ed. Mary Fulbrook (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp.62-63; Padgett and Paterson p.22 and pp.112-137; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.241.

possible to apply Keynesian demand management for full employment, so the social democratic parties could no longer pursue Marxist-oriented class party politics. The new programmatic priorities of social democracy were a comprehensive social security system, full employment, increases in wages, equal benefits of the education and health system and progress in public infrastructure.<sup>142</sup> This new outlook was the conformation of Crosland's predictions and proposals, as mentioned above.

However, the institutional apparatus that was used in order to supply the necessities of this new welfare regime varied in different countries. The most common way was social corporatism. Moschonas defines this new corporatism as consultation, negotiation and decision making between social partners (employers, unions) under the auspices of the state.<sup>143</sup> This corporatism was exercised in several countries under different names, such as German co-determinism, French economic planning, and Japanese industrial policy.<sup>144</sup>

The above-mentioned transformation of European social democracy was seen obviously in the SPD. When the Second World War had finished, the SPD was re-founded in West Germany, and the new founders in the local party offices had been members of the pre-Nazi period's SPD.<sup>145</sup> Surprisingly, the break of the Nazi period and illegality did not alter the circumstances for the SPD very much; therefore the party took the support and votes from the places that had supported the SPD before 1933. Moreover, the SPD's new program was based on the 1925 Heidelberg Program, so the party continued to use Marxist rhetoric. On the other hand, the division of Germany into two created two SPDs, and in the eastern zone the SPD was

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<sup>142</sup> Moschonas, p.63.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., pp.63-66.

<sup>144</sup> Armstrong, p.131.

<sup>145</sup> Berger, p.180.

merged with the Communist Party. Later on, the tough cold-war conditions made the East German social democracy disappear and it was orbited by the communist rule.

After 1948, the SPD in Federal Germany suffered three successive election defeats. The reasons for and meaning of these defeats are crucial in order to understand the transformation of European social democracy in the 1950s. These defeats created the necessity of revising German social democracy according to the post-war conditions of Europe. After the death of Kurt Schumacher in 1952, the reform attempts for the party rapidly grew. The declaration of the Socialist International in 1952 and the 1954 Berlin program of the SPD might be seen as signs for the future transformation of the party. The 1956 Hungary intervention of the Soviet Union proved problematic for the SPD, because of the party's quasi-pacifist and neutralist position.<sup>146</sup>

The events of the 1950s initiated the SPD to the 1959 Bad Godesberg conference.<sup>147</sup> At this conference, the SPD adopted a new program, and made a clear difference between Marxism and itself. This program was largely the work of Heinrich Deist, Carlo Schmidt and Herbert Wehner.<sup>148</sup> With this new program, the SPD declared its obedience to political pluralism and the market economy. However, it aimed to embed democratic principles into the political and social life of the country. The party gave up its traditional aim of common ownership of the means of production. Moreover, the Bad Godesberg program defined the origins of democratic socialism as Christian ethics, classical philosophy and the humanist tradition.<sup>149</sup> The

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<sup>146</sup> Childs, p.37.

<sup>147</sup> For Bad Godesberg, see Padgett and Paterson, p.29; Childs, p.37; and Berger, p.188.

<sup>148</sup> Childs, p.37.

<sup>149</sup> Stephen Padgett, "The German Social Democratic Party: Between "Old and New Left" in *Conflict and Cohesion In The Western European Social Democratic Parties*, eds. Eric Shaw and David Bell (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p.11.



party clearly changed its political outlook with this program. Three crucially important policies that had been opposed by the SPD pre-1959 were adopted into the program. They were a social market economy, the remilitarization of West Germany, and integration into the European community.<sup>150</sup>

The effect of this transformation was not limited to the programmatic change. One of main distinctive feature of the SPD was that it was a solidarity community from the very beginning of the party.<sup>151</sup> This solidarity community needed some symbols to create a common memory and understanding between the members of the party. The Bad Godesberg program not only changed, but it also changed some important symbols of the party, such as the red cover of the party membership book, which was changed to blue, the traditional address term of “comrade” was changed to “party friend.”<sup>152</sup> The flag of the Federal Republic of Bad Godesberg was flown alongside the traditional red flag above the party head quarters.<sup>153</sup>

This SPD example shows the social democratic parties’ indispensable attempts to represent other social groups with the working classes. The unsuccessful results of the elections were the main reason for this search for ideological overhaul, and the concept of a “catch-all party” was the product of these conditions. The creator of the concept was German political scientist Otto Kirscheimer, who wrote that, “the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all people’s party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the

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<sup>150</sup> Berger, p.188.

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*, p.180.

<sup>152</sup> Berger, p.188; and Padgett and Paterson, p.73.

<sup>153</sup> Padgett and Paterson, p.73.

masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.”<sup>154</sup> Kirscheimer’s catch-all party, or people’s party (*volkspartei*), was related to the electoral defeats of European social democratic parties, so the defeated party made to emulate the successful party by de-emphasizing class politics, and emphasizing electoral success rather than ideological purity.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, the new social democracy was transforming its agenda not only in terms of its economic program and electoral base, but also its rhetoric and symbols. For example, social democracy now sought rapprochement with organized religion and the nation-state.<sup>156</sup>

The seeking of support from the other clienteles was the basic character of this new kind of party. However, Przeworski argues a trade-off between the recruitment of the middle classes and of workers.<sup>157</sup> From this point of view, the political behavior of workers was the cumulative consequence of strategies pursued by the political parties of the left.<sup>158</sup> From this point of view, the social democratic parties were unable to maintain the support of workers while directing the efforts for new allies. So the concept of trade-off for the political parties and classes is crucial on the issue of the transformation of social democratic parties.

Consequently, the meaning of all these changes was the transformation of the social democratic party from working class socialism to welfare capitalism. As

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<sup>154</sup> Kirscheimer, p.184.

<sup>155</sup> Padgett and Paterson, p.73; and Padgett, p.11.

<sup>156</sup> Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, p.243; and Berger, p.189.

<sup>157</sup> Przeworski, p.106.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p.100.

pointed out in the introduction, the historical evaluation of European social democracy from the nineteenth century to the 1960s demonstrates a transformation from a social movement character to a category in the spectrum of political parties. However, the developments in Turkish political life and the emergence of the left of center as the genesis of Turkish social democracy are unrelated to the above-mentioned evolution of European social democracy.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE LEFT OF CENTER OF İNÖNÜ: LEFT OF CENTER AS A REMEDY FOR SOCIALISM

Mehmet Barlas: “Whereby your party has been on the left of center since it was established, why do you declare it in 1965 while you have not used this wording up to now in any elections?”

İsmet İnönü: “They have assaulted us because of the social justice policy, have called us communist. We should say it.”<sup>159</sup>

After the 27 May coup d'état the first elections were hold on 15 October 1961, and İnönü led three governments in the period from 1961 to 1965. The first İnönü government was established as a coalition government between the JP and RPP.<sup>160</sup> The second government of this period was led again by İnönü and it was the coalition of RPP, NP and NTP. And finally, the third government of İnönü was established with the support of independent deputies, and endured until 1965.<sup>161</sup> The

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<sup>159</sup> From the interview of Mehmet Barlas with İsmet İnönü in *Cumhuriyet* 19 October 1965.  
-Partiniz madem ki kuruluş itibarıyla ortanın solundaydı, şimdiye kadar hiçbir seçimde bu sözü söylemezken, neden 1965'te açıkladınız?  
-Sosyal adalet politikası yüzünden bize saldırdılar. Komünist dediler. Bunu söylemek zorundaydık.

<sup>160</sup> The establishment of this government created a deep reaction in the RPP. Moreover, the government program defined its inspiration as Atatürk reform (*Ataturk Islahatı*) and this term was enough to produce displeasure in the public opinion of the party. This government did not last so long, after six months from establishment it dissolved on 30<sup>th</sup> of May 1961 because of the disputes on the issue of discharge of the condemned of the Democrat Party trials.

<sup>161</sup> The NTP had not attended the government, but had supported the government in the vote of confidence.

budget of the government was not approved by the parliament, so İnönü was obliged to resign. The resignation of the third İnönü government on 12 February 1965 strengthened the radical views in the RPP. At the same time the successive three coalition governments created disappointment both in the party administration and in local party organizations.

The 27 May coup d'état opened a new phase for public life, and the first half of the 1960s was a period of orientation for this new environment. The three coalitions that were led by İnönü should be considered in the context of this orientation or, in other words, the transition from the military to civil rule. Moreover, two military uprisings were attempted against these governments 22 February 1962 and 21 May 1963.<sup>162</sup> So the main motive of the İnönü governments was to maintain the stability and to establish civil rule.

In this age of İnönü governments, the RPP included both radical and conservative views and debates on topics such as land reform, foreign capital and planning created chaotic decompositions in the inner-party politics. The party administration was divided into conservatives and radicals. İnönü sought the integrity of the party, so he was umpire in the formation of groups. Furthermore, the party organization was discontented with the actions of the governments, because the governments did not meet the party organizations' demands.<sup>163</sup> So the displeasure

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<sup>162</sup> Colonel Talat Aydemir had attempted two unsuccessful coup d'états on 22 February 1962 and 21 May 1963.

<sup>163</sup> İnönü defined partisanship as an important problem of Turkey, and declared that his party would abstain from partisanship. İnönü and the RPP charged the DP with partisanship in the whole 1950s, so RPP's nepotism would make İnönü unjustifiable. Thus this attitude of İnönü created great displeasure in the party organization. For the position of İnönü on the issue of partisanship, see İnönü's speech during the 17<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP. CHP, *C.H.P. XVII. Kurultayı 16 Ekim 1964: Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün Açış Konuşması / İsmet İnönü* (Ankara: n.p., 1964).

with the İnönü governments was common among almost all social groups including the supporters of the RPP.

The administration of the RPP intended to pass the responsibility to others for the failure of the governments. The leaders of the RPP and particularly İnönü blamed the USA for the fall of the third government. Moreover, İnönü accused his opponents in 1966 of putting forward that the Americans had found a new PM instead of him and might again find a new head of the party.<sup>164</sup> The Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter were the main bases of these charges, and İnönü as well as Turkey's political elite were very displeased with the relations with the USA.<sup>165</sup>

Furthermore, the RPP claimed that the JP and its leader Suleyman Demirel were being directed and controlled by the USA. These claims were formed by two points, the first of which was the Morrison Suleyman and the second the masonry of Demirel.<sup>166</sup> Furthermore the official newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*,<sup>167</sup> published a leaflet prepared by Erdogan Tamer with the title *Masonry, Zion Protocols and the Practice of the DP-JP*.<sup>168</sup> This series was a clear example of the RPP's mentality that the masonry of Demirel indicates the effect of foreign countries on him.

On the other hand, RPP held the conservative sects of society responsible for the fall of the government. In this understanding, the RPP was the pioneer of the

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<sup>164</sup> Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye 1945-1980*, trans. Ahmet Fethi (Hil Yayın: İstanbul, 1996) p.221.

<sup>165</sup> İnönü kept on at this position until the end of 1967, and sought to be clear of the USA and asked Erim if it were possible. Nihat Erim, *Günlükler, 1925-1979*, ed. Ahmet Demirel, vol.2 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), p.865.

<sup>166</sup> Demirel was the representative of an American firm called Morrison Co. The opponents of the JP called Demirel "Morrison Suleyman" with reference to American capitalist circles. However, the most interesting charge on Demirel was about Masonic lodge. Just before the JP congress during which Demirel was elected head of the party, the rivals of Demirel claimed that Demirel was a Mason. In the congress, Demirel declared that he no relation with Masonry with a document taken from the Masonic lodge.

<sup>167</sup> *Ulus* had been founded by Kemal Ataturk in 1935 as the continuation of the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*.

<sup>168</sup> See *Ulus* 21-24 September 1965, "*Masonluk, Siyon Protokolları Ve DP-AP Tatbikatı*"

reforms so the opponents of the reforms had ensured the fall of the government. The third İnönü government had labeled itself a reform government, but the main reason for this label had not been the implementation of reforms. Some politicians in the RPP had strongly pushed for a new coalition with the JP; however, İnönü had preferred to establish a minority government with the support of the independent deputies.<sup>169</sup> Consequently, the RPP and its supporters had assessed that the government's disconnection as a product of a consortium composed of conservatives and pro-Americans. Thus the response of the RPP was formed by the new radicalism that had emerged after the fall of third İnönü government, and this new radicalism gradually became influential in the rhetoric and activities of the RPP.

Turkish political life was deeply influenced by the advances in the cold war, as the “ghost of communism” stalked the whole world as well as Turkey. In this environment,<sup>169</sup> the JP blamed RPP's new radicalism a way through the communism; moreover it made anti-communism central in its election campaign. By the 1960s Turkish society had been conditioned by the cold war rhetoric and anti-communism for twenty years, so the campaign of the JP disturbed İnönü and he needed to construct a new discourse that points the demarcation of RPP's radicalism and communism.<sup>170</sup> Therefore İnönü required proclaiming the term *left of center* in order to demarcate RPP and communism. Thus the aim of this chapter is to identify the left of center policies of İnönü that were considered by İnönü as a remedy for the left.

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<sup>169</sup> İnönü had put forward that the opposition of the JP to the reforms as the main reason for his choice.

<sup>170</sup> It should not be forgotten that İnönü was as one of the founding founder of anti-communism in Turkey.

## Radicalism after the Fall of the Third İnönü Government

There was nobody around that advocated the 27 May. We had turned into persons who were ashamed and repented of what we did. Anyway we learnt and believed in that it is only possible to be arbiter and helpful in the fate of the country in a political cadre.<sup>171</sup> *Orhan Erkanlı*

After the fall of the third İnönü government, the RPP Executive Board and later Party Assembly issued declarations that pointed to a future struggle against the conservatives and the anti-reformists and the public opinion anticipated a transformation in the RPP.<sup>172</sup> The best example of this anticipation was depicted by Ecvet Güresin, the editorial writer of *Cumhuriyet*, with these words; “this declaration (the declaration of executive board) is the effort of the party for giving up extreme centrism, and taking place as a radical socialist rather a social democratic party. Although the party seems central relatively extreme left and right, party is moving through the left of center.”<sup>173</sup> Güresin was pointing to a possible transformation in

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<sup>171</sup> 27 Mayıs'ı savunan kimse kalmamıştı ortalıkta. Bizler yaptığımızdan utanan, pişman olan kişiler haline gelmiştik... artık memleket kaderinde söz sahibi ve faydalı olmanın ancak siyasi bir kadro içinde mümkün olacağını öğrenmiş ve buna inanmıştık. Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar Sorunlar Sorumlular* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972) p.231

<sup>172</sup> For the entire versions of the documents see The Declaration of RPP Party Assembly on 9 February 1965 (9 Şubat 1965 tarihli CHP Parti Meclisi Bildirisi). The Announcement that was published by the RPP Executive Board about the Resignation of the Third İnönü Government on 16 February 1965 CHP, III. İnönü Hükümetinin İstifası Üzerine CHP Merkez Yönetim Kurulu Tarafından Yayınlanan Tebliğ 16 Şubat 1965.

<sup>173</sup> Bu, partinin bir bacağı solda, öteki sağda, aşırı merkezçiliten kurtulup, radikal sosyalist, daha doğrusu sosyal demokrat bir parti hüviyetine girebilmek için çaba göstermesidir. Aşırı sola ve sağa oranla ortacı görünmekle birlikte, parti uygulamada, merkezin soluna doğru gidiyor. *Cumhuriyet*, 10 February 1965.



the RPP; however, he constructed a causal link between the support of reforms and left politics. His attitude was harmonious with this era's dominant view that equated radicalism with left politics. So Güresin's point, or, in other words, the causal link between the left and radicalism, became central in later debates on the left of center and RPP. Thus the 1960s in Turkey was a period in which the words "reform," "radicalism" and "nationalism" referred to the left or socialism.

The key word for the RPP and the progressive politics of the 1960s was "reform." "Reform" referred to various areas from land reform to the nationalization of oil.<sup>174</sup> The discourse of this period's reformism was formed by radicalism and conviction in developmentalism and modernism. The reference of the reformism of this period was in the radicalism of 27 May, because 27 May was the most fundamentalist implementation of this radicalism.

The most radical sect of the 27 May junta was the fourteen officers who were called the fourteens.<sup>175</sup> These officers had insisted that the transition to the civil administration should have been made after the completion of the reforms. For these opinions, they were excluded from the Committee of National Unity and sent into exile abroad. Before the 1965 elections these former officers returned Turkey, and reappeared in Turkish political life.<sup>176</sup> Three of these men, İrfan Solmaz, Orhan

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<sup>174</sup> The main component of this period's radicalism was nationalism, and several campaigns were arranged with this motive. The best example of these campaigns was the campaign regarding national oil. The campaign began with Muammer Aksoy's articles in the magazine *Forum*. Muammer Aksoy published a series of articles against the Minister of Energy and Raw Sources on the topic of national oil on the 15 May, 1 June and 15 June, 1 July, 15 July, 1 August of 1965. Another important campaign was arranged by the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* during May 1965 with the name Nation Does (*Millet Yapar*). The aim of this campaign was to provide financial support for the construction of military ships.

<sup>175</sup> The names of the 14s were Alparslan Türkeş, Orhan Kabibay, Orhan Erkanlı, Muzaffer Özdağ, Rifat Baykal, Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Ahmet Er, Dündar Taşer, Numan Esin, Mustafa Kaplan, İrfan Solmaz, Şefik Soyuyüce, Muzaffer Karan and Münir Köseoğlu.

<sup>176</sup> Frank Tachau connects the radicalism and Demirel's leadership in the JP because of his anti-communist rhetoric. He concludes that Demirel perceived the radicalism as a major target. See Frank

Erkanli and Orhan Kabibay, joined the RPP which is a preeminent example of the above-mentioned causal link between radicalism and left politics. Soon after, another ex-officer Mustafa Ok joined the RPP.<sup>177</sup> Mustafa Ok had been judged in the Mamak trials for taking part in the 21 May military coup attempt.<sup>178</sup> Thus their joining the RPP was assessed as an indicator of the radicalism of this period's effect on the RPP in the public opinion.<sup>179</sup> Thus the radicalism somehow was the result of the political environment of this era. Simultaneously with joining three of fourteens into the RPP, Muzaffer Karan, one of the fourteens joined the TWP.<sup>180</sup>

These events were indicators of confusion and ambiguity of the times, and the best example of this confusion was Münir Köseoğlu, who was expected to join the TWP, but entered the RPNP on 23 June 1965.<sup>181</sup> All other members of the fourteens joined the RPNP. This group led, by Alparslan Türkeş, captured the party administration and transformed the party into an ultra-nationalist and anti-communist organization.<sup>182</sup> So these events and the existence of members of the National Unity

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Tachau, "The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. Edited by Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp.107-108.

<sup>177</sup> For the accession of the three former officers, see *Cumhuriyet*, May 8 1965 and for the enrollment of Mustafa Ok, see *Cumhuriyet* May 9 1965. For the accession of former officers the RPP Administration had arranged a ceremony. For the text of the speech of İnönü at this ceremony, see "Eski MBK Üyelerinden Orhan Kabibay, Orhan Erkanlı ve İrfan Solmaz'er'in CHP'ye katılma töreninde yapılan konuşma" *Ulus*, 8 May 1965.

<sup>178</sup> Colonel Talat Aydemir had attempted two coup d'états on 22 February 1962 and 21 May 1963. The cadre of the 21 May 1963 coup attempt was judged in Mamak, and two of the officers including Aydemir were executed.

<sup>179</sup> Ahmad, *Demokrasi sürecinde Türkiye*, p.247.

<sup>180</sup> Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* (Ankara : Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p.291.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p.292.

<sup>182</sup> These former officers were Muzaffer Özdağ, Rifat Baykal, Fâzıl Akkoyunlu, Numan Esin, Mustafa Kaplan, Şefik Soyuyüce, Münir Köseoğlu, Dündar Taşer and Ahmet Er.

Group in the Senate as natural senators made the radicalism of 27 May move onto parliamentary representation.

The complicated part of these developments was the constructed relationship between the radicalism of the period and left politics. It was not so obvious what was the main counterpart of these reforms, but the agenda of the reformers was somehow acknowledged. The main agenda of this radicalism was land reform, national oil and struggle against the sect of divine light (*Nurculuk*<sup>183</sup>), so attributing leftist politics to the radicalism of this period was somehow irrelevant.<sup>184</sup> One week after the former officers joining the RPP's parliamentary group, various deputies claimed the party had moved to the left. The toughest reaction came from Amasya deputy Kemal Karan, and he argued that "three radicals' joining is a sign of moving to the left, the party administration had invited the leftists to the party."<sup>185</sup> And last he proposed to "demarcate the border of etatism of the party, because the new etatism might go through the state collectivism."<sup>186</sup> However, confusion on the terms of western political life prevailed in the 1960s, even in the parliament.

On the other hand, in spite of rightist pressure both from the outside and inside of the party, there were groups in the RPP that put pressure on behalf of reforms and radicalism. In the Youth Congress of the RPP in Ankara, on 23 May 1965, Congress demanded social justice, revolutionism and reforms be given precedence.<sup>187</sup> Another remarkable event in this Congress was a speech by Bülent

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<sup>183</sup> An Islamic sect that has been influential since the early twentieth century.

<sup>184</sup> For an analysis of the RPP and radical politics in the first half of the 1960s, see Ahmad, *Demokrasi sürecinde Türkiye*, pp.244-250

<sup>185</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 14 May 1965.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>187</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye'de çok partili*, p.156.

Ecevit that called for nationalizations.<sup>188</sup> It is crucial to understand that the nationalization of key industries was being considered as a component of the political left in this period. Nationalization was being aligned on the agenda of 1960s' radicalism with the above-mentioned land reform, national oil and struggle against Nurculuk. So it is possible to deconstruct the rhetoric of this radicalism with its mentioned programmatic priorities. It is clear that the agenda of this new radicalism had been shaped by the developmentalist outlook of the postwar period, and it was fully confused on the terms and categories of western measures.

In this political environment, İnönü intended to construct a new discourse which was harmonious with the new direction of the party. In this way, his first action was a message sent to the Istanbul Youth Congress and published in *Ulus*. In this message, İnönü declared, “you know that the Republican People’s Party adopts total reform on social issues. I say in your presence that we are resolute and determined to pursue and to solve society’s social security problems immediately and courageously.”<sup>189</sup> İnönü carried on this rhetoric of reformism through the end of July, when he put forward the term “left of center.”<sup>190</sup> Likewise, the second man of the party hierarchy, the Secretariat General Kemal Satir wrote an article in *Ulus* on the economic policy of the RPP and stated similar points.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> *Sosyal davalarda Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin bütün islahatı benimsediğini bilirsiniz. Sizin huzurunuzda söylüyorum ki biz cemiyetin sosyal güvenlik meselelerini cesaretle ve sebat ile takip ve halletmek azminde ve kararındayız. Ulus*, 10 September 1965

<sup>190</sup> İnönü used this discourse in several platforms such as “speech delivered in the RPP Ankara Youth Congress” (*Ankara Gençlik Kolu Kongresinde Yapılan Konuşma, Ulus*, 24 May 1965); “the message sent to the RPP Sakarya Youth Congress” (*Sakarya Gençlik Kolu Kongresine Gönderilen Mesaj, Ulus*, 13 June 1965); “The Article; The Political Issues of the Day” (*Makale; Günün Siyasi Meseleleri, Ulus*, 9 May 1965).

<sup>191</sup> *Ulus*, 13 June 1965

The RPP's new reformism and radicalism was shaped by the political composition and electoral alignment of the forthcoming 1965 elections. Thus İnönü had initiated a tough opposition with slogans of reform and etatism. However, the RPP spokesmen swore that the reformism of the RPP remained independent from doctrine and was embodied by the traditional RPP pragmatism.<sup>192</sup> As discussed above, the aim of the putting forward the discourse of the democratic reforms was intended to control the 1960s' radicalism and to direct it to the RPP. The motive of İnönü while presenting democratic reforms was to use them as a remedy to prevent the intellectuals and youth from being inclined to socialism.

The discourse of democratic reforms, however, did not create enough influence on public opinion to fulfill these aims. Thus İnönü needed to speak more clearly. This was the beginning of the new direction that was embodied in the slogan of left of center. At the same time, the JP, the main rival of the RPP, put anti-communism at the top of the agenda in the course of the election.<sup>193</sup> The primary cause of this approach was the belief that an anti-communist stance would attract votes.<sup>194</sup> So İnönü was under pressure from two sides; on the one side the anti-communism of the JP accused the RPP of backing communism, and on the other İnönü was in danger of losing the support of the youth and intellectuals to the TWP and others. This situation created the need for a formula that functioned first as a demarcation between communism and the RPP, and second as a means of conciliation between the party and youth and intelligentsia.

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<sup>192</sup> İdris Küçükömer defines the pragmatic attitude of the RPP as the suspicious and balanced action of the bureaucrat. Küçükömer, p.130. For the examples of this attitude, see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp.154-155.

<sup>193</sup> For the JP of this period, see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp. 119-148; and Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, pp. 226-236.

<sup>194</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye'de çok partili*, p.294.

The JP was not alone in its anti-communist rhetoric. The Association of Struggle against Communism (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*, KMD) was a leading organization directing violent actions against the rising left.<sup>195</sup> President Cemal Gürsel was the honorary head of the association. İnönü declared that the association and its activities were obstacles to free elections, and demanded the resignation of Gürsel from the honorary presidency.<sup>196</sup> However, a statement by Gürsel to the press one month earlier indicates that Gürsel was not on the same parallel as the association. In this statement Gürsel evaluated the danger of the extreme-left as artificial. He said, “there were not so many leftists as argued in the deliberations. And some strayed persons were retained for making this noise and politicians were attending these efforts. Rightists were using this situation as a tool for their interests with the aim of straining the political environment for the forthcoming elections.”<sup>197</sup> In spite of this position Gürsel surprisingly acted as honorary president of the association. İnönü, as mentioned above, demanded that Gürsel resign from the position. It was an instrument for the formation of camps in Turkish politics, and İnönü was placing his party on the progressive side in this anti-communism debate. At last İnönü brought up the issue in an official meeting with Gürsel and after this meeting, Gürsel declared his resignation from the honorary presidency of the Struggle against Communism Association on 16 July 1965.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> For the actions of the KMD, see Süleyman Genç, *12 Mart'a Nasıl Gelindi: Bir Devrin Perde Arkası* (Ankara: İleri Yayınları, 1971).

<sup>196</sup> İsmet İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, vol.2 ed. Ahmet Demirel (İstanbul: YKY, 2001), p.906.

<sup>197</sup> *Tartışmalarda ileri sürüldüğü gibi, ülkede bahse değer sayıda solcu yoktu. Bazı yoldan sapmış kimseler bu güürültüyü çıkarmak için parayla tutulmuştu ve politikacılar da bu çabalara katılıyorlardı. Sağcılar, gelecek seçimler için havada gerginlik yaratmak amacıyla bu durumu kendi çıkarları için kullanıyorlardı.* Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, p.292.

<sup>198</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye'de çok partili*, p.293.

In this environment, the JP was attacking the RPP with charges of backing communism. This campaign, which might be called a form of neo-McCarthyism, reached its peak with an article on 16 June written by Sadun Tanju, a columnist of *Ulus*, titled “Infidel”(Kafir) in which he approached socialism as a normal issue rather than a danger and sought to legitimize it.<sup>199</sup> The article set off a great debate in the public opinion, and the JP and the right accused the RPP of backing communism; moreover, they accused the RPP to give communism place in the *Ulus*.<sup>200</sup> Although the party administration fired Tanju and published a new article by Nihat Erim that discredited socialism, the RPP was added to the list of those associated with communism or backing communism for the right.<sup>201</sup>

In summary, the era from the resignation of third İnönü government to the preparation of the election campaign of 1965 was a period of seeking a new course. This new course was affected by the political and social conditions of the era in which the creed of development and modernism was merged with the magic of the word *reform*, and it was suggested as the key to solve all social and political problems. However, the applicability and the methods of reforms were problematic areas and the radicalism of the 1960s arose from the problem of how the reforms were to be implemented. The joining of the former military officers to the RPP was a clear example of this radicalism, and this action was interpreted as moving through the left. Accordingly the conviction in reforms and radicalism was considered as left-wing politics in this period.

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<sup>199</sup> See *Ulus*, 16 June 1965.

<sup>200</sup> For the reflections of the event in the public opinion see *Yön*, no.117, (25 June 1965).

<sup>201</sup> Erim, p.812.

Consequently, the RPP was in trouble that took root from the necessity of defining the new course. At the same time the RPP had to demarcate itself from communism in order to disprove the accusations of the JP. Thus the left of center emerged in order to fulfill the above-mentioned aims of the definition of the new course and the will to demarcate the RPP and the left. But the later developments did not give this anticipated result. However, before the explanation of the first proclamation of the left of center, the inner-structure of the RPP should be explained in order to make clear the political environment of the period.

### Two Sects, Two Leaders: Melen and Feyzioglu

I rupture the mouth who calls Ecevit communist! (Turhan Feyzioglu)<sup>202</sup>

Political parties, by nature, contain different sects, groups or wings. The reason for these groupings differs from ideational distinctions to logrolling in the process of candidate determination. Thus these groupings that sought solidarity in inner-party power politics had always existed in the RPP as well other parties. These grouping had taken different names in different periods. For example, in the process from 1961 to 1965 RPP officers had been divided into two wings that were called conservatives and progressives.<sup>203</sup> These groups had a political sect character, and

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<sup>202</sup> Feyzioglu delivered these words during the Youth Congress of the RPP in 1964 because of some participants calling Ecevit a communist. “*Ecevit komünist diyenin ağzını yırtarım.*” See Kayhan Sağlamer, *Ecevit Olayı: Bir Başbakanın Doğuşu*, vol.2 (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1974), p.232.

<sup>203</sup> Normally I dislike the labels of conservative or progressive because of the ambiguity of these terms for the RPP officers. However, these terms are dominant in the literature on RPP, and these mentioned officers tended to identify themselves with these terms. For this reason these names for the groups are used in these pages.



they conducted common group actions at times of congresses and of determination of candidates for elections.

The conservative side was led by Ferit Melen and included opponents of the above-mentioned radicalism and issues such as land reform and national oil. Turhan Feyzioglu was the leader of the progressive sect. Most of the other younger representatives took part in the progressive sect such as Ali İhsan Göğüş, Bülent Ecevit and Turan Günes. The three İnönü governments were the arena for the struggle of these groups. İnönü, who acted as umpire in the course of this rivalry, strove to balance the alternative groups. As the prime minister, he had to consider the survival of his coalition governments. It is obvious that he was closer to the conservative side because he had assessed it as auxiliary in order to harmonize the policies of his party and the right-wing coalition partners. Moreover, he considered that the dissolution of the second government was the result of the struggle between Turhan Feyzioglu and Ekrem Alican.<sup>204</sup> As a vindictive politician, he did not forget the opposition of Feyzioglu to the establishment of the third government. So from the İnönü's point of view, Feyzioglu was an unreliable politician and his tendency to radicalism and reforms was the source of the disconnection with the coalition partners. However, after the fall of the third government, the whole perception of İnönü regarding inner-party policy rapidly changed. From that point he assessed the USA and the conservatives as the main reasons for all kind of evils, including the fall of the government.<sup>205</sup> In these conditions, he broke the balance slightly in favor of the progressive wing.

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<sup>204</sup> See Saglamer, pp.82-91.

<sup>205</sup> As pointed out in the previous pages İnönü was very displeased with the policy of the USA, and he was suggesting the fall of the third government as a US-led operation.

The best example of competition with the RPP came into being at the beginning of 1962 during a party assembly session.<sup>206</sup> Turan Günes and Bülent Ecevit, as members of the Feyzioglu sect, declared that the RPP had turned into a conservative party and that it should renew itself.<sup>207</sup> The target of their position was clearly the conservative group in the party that was called the Melen sect. As mentioned above, the Feyzioglu sect and the Melen sect were used by İnönü to preserve the balance of power in party politics. After the speeches of Güneş and Ecevit, Ibrahim Öktem made a motion that pointed out the new conditions forcing the party to determine its direction. The word “direction” in the Turkish language, *yön*, was the same as the name of a new magazine,<sup>208</sup> and the name of this new radical magazine, *Yön*, was enough to make the conservative side angry. Moreover, it was a reason for accusing Öktem and his friends of moving the party in a socialist direction.

After the reactions, Öktem immediately withdrew his suggestion and proposed to revise the word *yön* with *istikamet*. *Istikamet* is the synonym of *yön*, but is free from the association with the radical *Yön* magazine. The conservative side had the majority on the board; for this reason, the party assembly rejected Öktem’s new proposal. This case was not the only example of confrontation between the groups, Melen and the associates of his group charged others with tending to the left on

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<sup>206</sup> The term “Party Assembly” (*Parti Meclisi*) began being used after the 9<sup>th</sup> Congress of the RPP in 1951 instead of the term “Party Board” (*Parti Divanı*). The aim of the term Party Assembly comes from the political necessities of the period, because the 1950 election had made most of the former party officers out of the parliament. This new term Party Assembly (as the executive organ of the party elected in the Congress) aimed to constitute the self-esteem of the party officers.

<sup>207</sup> For the story of this session, see Sağlamer, p.171.

<sup>208</sup> *Yön* was first published in 1961 and continued until 1967 with 222 issues. One of the founders and financiers of *Yön* was Cemal Resit Eyüboğlu (the other founders were Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mümtaz Soysal), who was a member of the Party Assembly of the RPP.

several occasions.<sup>209</sup> Thus all these events were indicators of the divided character of the RPP between the two camps.

Consequently, the main difference of the groups in the RPP was on the issues of reform and radicalism, or, in other words, a new direction. The main groups were formed in terms of either the party need of a new direction or not.<sup>210</sup> So the RPP of 1965 was a party in search of a new direction, but it was not able to find on. At this crossroad İnönü invented a new direction, left of center. It was not clear, however, whether it was a new direction or a pseudo-new direction.

#### The Emergence of the Left of Center - 17 to 29 July

The emergence of the left of center in 1965 was the result of several events after February because of the rising radicalism in the RPP and the charges of communism. In this part, the emergence of the left of center will be illustrated in terms of discussions on the term and its constructed relation with the RPP. As pointed out above, radicalism and reformism were the distinctive features of progressive politics in the 1960s, and the RPP were directly affected by this situation. Thus the emergence of the left of center should be considered in the context of a course through the 1965 elections. And the main motivation of the term was to demarcate the RPP and communism because of the charges of the JP.

In 1975, Ecevit described the emergence of the left of center in an interview in *Cumhuriyet* as “İnönü’s an interview with Abdi İpekçi was published in *Milliyet*.

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<sup>209</sup> See Saglam, pp.106-112.

<sup>210</sup> This point is crucial that the main motive of the radicalism that was suggested as left politics was nationalism and modernism. Issues such as land reform or national oil were a distinctive feature of these attitudes.

İnönü with his own words firstly were saying that the RPP is a party on the left of center. Later on, Nihat Erim and Ismail Rüstü Aksal gave out that they had previously used these words. I remember that when I was in the government I had said in a panel discussion that was held at the Ankara Medicine Faculty that we are on the left of center. The term did not resound at all when we used it, but it created a deep discussion when it was used by İnönü.”<sup>211</sup>

Undoubtedly, Ecevit was right that the left of center was not a significant term in Turkish politics until İnönü said it. The terms “left” and “socialism” had always been perceived as dangerous and had been banned in Turkish political life traditionally; moreover, the bloc politics of the cold war and Turkey’s place in this state of affairs had strengthened this perception. However, the meaning and symbolic implications of left in Turkish politics were confusing. For example, a member of the Senate from the JP described his party as left of center in a session on the budget of the transportation ministry in early 1965.<sup>212</sup> But later on the JP attacked the RPP for backing communism after its declaration of left of center. So the relative terms of politics such as “left,” “right,” “liberal” and “socialist” were very obscure in the perception of the party elites of the age. Moreover, the charges of communism or

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<sup>211</sup> İnönü’nün Abdi İpekçi ile yaptığı bir mülakat Milliyet gazetesinde yayımlandı. Orada sayın İnönü kendi ağzından ilk kez CHP’nin ortanın solunda bir parti olduğunu söylüyordu. Daha önce bu sözü Nihat Erim ve Ismail Rüstü Aksal kendilerinin ifade ettiklerini sonradan söylemişlerdi. Ben de hükümette bulunduğum sırada Ankara Tıp Fakültesinde yapılan bir açık oturumda ortanın solunda olduğumuzu söylediğimi hatırlarım. Fakat tabii bizim ağzımızdan çıktığı vakit hiçbir yankı uyandırmamış olan bu terim, İnönü tarafından kullanılınca büyük gürültüler kopardı. Ecevit Siyasi Hayatını Anlatıyor. Cumhuriyet, 22 January 1975.

<sup>212</sup> Sağlamer, pp. 156-157. The term “left” always caused confusion. For example the head of the Free Party, Fethi Okyar, defined the place of his party as follows “my party will work on the left of People’s Party as a liberal and secular republican party. The scale of the tendency through the left will be the level and inclination of the people”. (*Partim, Halk Partisi’nin sol tarafında, liberal ve laik cumhuriyetçi bir parti olarak çalışacaktır. Sola yönelimin ölçüsü halkın düzey ve eğilimine kamuoyunun karşılayış ve yükselişi olacaktır*). Moreover Menderes defined the place of the DP when he was declaring the program of the party as two fingers to the left of the RPP. *Hurriyet*, 25 October 2006.

inclination to the left were such a confused issue that a deputy of the JP, Osman Turan, accused Demirel of moving to the left.<sup>213</sup>

It is not clear how the term “left of center” came into Turkish politics, but the first known usage was made by Nihat Erim in 1962 in an interview in *Yön*. In this interview, Erim states “I believe in the value of the individual’s ambition for profit in economic life and the role of the entrepreneur. But I also believe in the necessity of taking measures for providing social justice. That is to say, I am on the left of center.”<sup>214</sup> But as Ecevit pointed out above, this utterance of Erim like that of others did not create as great an influence on the public opinion as İnönü did by saying it.

As mentioned above, the emergence of the term “left of center” was the product of İnönü's usage of this term and the following debates on the term. It is not clear where or when İnönü first used the term. But the common view, as stated above by Ecevit, is that İnönü employed this term first in an interview with Abdi İpekçi for *Milliyet* on 29 July 1965. However, this is incorrect. With time, after the defeat in the 1965 elections, the term “left of center” came to be considered as the source of the defeat by the conservative sect, and was criticized strongly. In these debates, İnönü said that he had used the term in the Besiktas RPP office in Akaretler after a party assembly meeting.<sup>215</sup> After the meeting a journalist had asked İnönü, “The parties like your party in western democracies are defined as parties that are on the left of center. Can we define your party like that?” And İnönü answered “Yes, you can.”<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye'de çok partili*, p. 329.

<sup>214</sup> *Ferdin kazanç hırsının ekonomik hayattaki değerine ve müteşebbisin rolünün önemine inanıyorum. Ama sosyal adaletin sağlanması için gerekli tedbirlerin alınması lazım geldiğine de inanıyorum. Yani ben ortanın solundayım.* Sağlamer, p.156.

<sup>215</sup> For the story of this event, see *ibid.*, pp.155-160.

<sup>216</sup> -“*paşam. Sizin görüşlerinizi savunan partilere batıda ortanın solunda derler. CHP'ye de ortanın solunda diyebilir miyiz?*”

This above-mentioned story was transmitted by İnönü after the criticisms in the party in order to demonstrate the spontaneous character of the event. In this expression, the left of center was made known first with this event. It is crucial that the journalist who asked this question is a mystery. Nermin Abadan, who wrote a treatise on the 1965 elections, looked for this journalist but was unable to find him, although she gave newspaper announcements.<sup>217</sup>

As clearly seen from the statements of İnönü, the first proclamation of left of center by İnönü was somehow accidental. On the agenda of the party assembly session in Besiktas was the *White Book (Beyaz Kitap)* in which RPP defined its economic and social views before the elections. The sessions had begun on 25 July and continued four days.<sup>218</sup> The interesting part of the story is that the day after this event no newspapers reported anything about the left of center.<sup>219</sup> In his bestseller book, *Ecevit Olayı* (The Ecevit event), Kayhan Sağlamer claims that İnönü asked Nihat Erim after the proclamation of left of center “where are you? we are blazing! I said a word and the world around mixed up.”<sup>220</sup>

Afterwards İnönü asked Erim for an article describing left of center in the daily *Ulus*. Erim published an article with headline “Left of Center” and introduced the term. This story is narrated by Sağlamer in order to demonstrate the confusion and flurry of İnönü. Properly with İnönü’s will, Erim published an article on 17 July in *Ulus*. The diaries of Erim and İnönü agree that they met on 15 July in the house of İnönü, so the story that was transmitted by Sağlamer is reasonable. From the diaries

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-“*evet, diyebilirsiniz.*”

<sup>217</sup> Sağlamer, p.157.

<sup>218</sup> For the party assembly sessions, see *Ulus*, 29-30 August 1965.

<sup>219</sup> Sağlamer, p.158.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155.

of Erim, we learn that the debates on the place of the RPP were a disputed issue, and in the June of 1965, some events like above-mentioned article by Sadun Tanju made İnönü clarify where the RPP was in order to prevent the charges of communism.<sup>221</sup> Again from the diaries of Erim, we learn that İnönü first said this term in June in order to demarcate his party from the accusations of communism or of backing communism.<sup>222</sup> So it is obvious that the first proclamation of left of center by İnönü was somewhat slapdash and coincidental. The main motivation was to demarcate the RPP from the rising left, and if possible, to change the youth and intellectual's attitude from socialism to RPP pragmatism.

As mentioned above, Erim published an article in *Ulus* on 17 July 1965. The aim of the article was to demonstrate that the word "left" did not refer to the same thing as with communism. Moreover, he wrote this article prudently, without mentioning the name of the RPP. He introduced left of center as

If I do not remember mistakenly, this word became well known after its usage by Franklin Roosevelt who was the president of the USA from 1932 to his death in 1945. ....Roosevelt also became the first operator of Keynesian full employment policy. There are persons who believe that even Leon Blum is inspired by Roosevelt. Opponents, conservatives, called him communist, socialist, leftist in order to denigrate him. Roosevelt answered them that at the utmost I might be assessed as left of center, but do not forget that with the reforms that I made, the radical measures that I took, rescued private enterprise from dying, gave capitalism a new elasticity. But at the same time they rescued millions of American citizens from being suppressed, from exploitation, from hunger, from living contrary to humanity.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Erim, p.812.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., p.818.

<sup>223</sup> "*Ortanın solu, hatırımda yanlış kalmadıysa, bu söz 1932 yılından 1945 yılında ölümüne kadar, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Cumhurbaşkanı Franklin Roosevelt'in kullanmasıyla meşhur oldu..... keynes'in tam çalışma gibi konulardaki düşüncesini de ilk uygulayan da Roosevelt oldu. Leon Blum'un bile Roosevelt'in Amerika'da yaptığı reformlardan ilham aldığına inananlar vardır. Muhafızları muhafazakar kişiler, Roosevelt'i kötülemek için ona komünist, solcu, sosyalist dediler. Roosevelt onlara cevap verdi: olsa olsa ben ortanın solunda sayılırım. Ama unutmayın ki benim yaptığım reformlar, aldığım radikal tedbirler özel teşebbüsü ölümden kurtardı, kapitalizme yeni bir*

Erim wrote that left of center was not a dangerous thing, furthermore it was a sustainable remedy for dangers. It is obvious that Erim was emulating Roosevelt's New Deal, and this emulation points that the source of their solidaristic approach was the USA rather than Soviet Russia or anywhere else.

Erim's definition was not sufficient to prove that left of center was not the same as communism. The coalition partner of İnönü in the second government Ekrem Alican, the head of the New Turkey Party, had declared that İnönü would put the badges of hammer and sickle on their collates.<sup>224</sup> So İnönü needed to identify what the left of center was, or, in other words, what he understood by these words. As a consequence, he gave an interview to Abdi İpekçi that was published on 29 July 1965 in which he concluded his views on left of center:

Left of center became a means of an election environment that attempts to transform our political struggle into an ideological struggle. (He points out that the most correct comment was made in Erim's article). Professor Erim said that the New Deal of Mr. Roosevelt that had been applied after a great economic crisis in America, Roosevelt said that I am on the left of center. I also remember such a wording. My wording both comes from the People's Party's political structure and has a resemblance to the conditions of America in some aspects. The resemblance to America is that America entered a recovery period after a great economic crisis. Now we are in a hard effort of development in the face of great economic need. We suggest that we are able to accomplish this development with hard measures. So much suffering is needed. We can not accomplish this with conservative measures. The measures that are needed apart from the normal measures are called on the left of center. Development plan, fiscal reform, land reform, oil action and similar measures are the efforts that are required by extraordinary times...the RPP in consideration of its structure is a statist party and with this character it has surely a left of center economic mentality. In the way that etatism was the

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*esneklik verdi. Fakat aynı zamanda milyonlarca amerikan vatandaşını da ezilmekten, sömürülmekten, açlıktan, insanlığa aykırı yaşamaktan kurtardı.” Ulus, 17 July 1965.*

<sup>224</sup> *Ulus, 28 August 1965.*



only development remedy in the 1923's ruined country, it is an essential component of our economic life today.<sup>225</sup>

As clearly seen, İnönü equated the left of center and extraordinary measures for development. Moreover, he equates the etatism of the RPP with left of center. So İnönü's perception of left of center reflected the conviction in the modernism and developmentalism of the age. However, it was difficult to understand the link between İnönü's points and the universal features of left. So this event on the emergence of left of center clearly demonstrates the construction of the link or in other words, pseudo-link between the left and İnönü's RPP.<sup>226</sup>

This first proclamation of left of center created a deep reaction in the public opinion. It was related to the anti-communist election campaign of the JP, and this term, left of center, become a symbol of Turkish politics with the phrase of "left of center - the way to Moscow" (*Ortanın Solu Moskova'nin Yolu*). This example clearly demonstrates the hysteric hatred of Turkish politicians for left politics. However, the aim of İnönü was similar to the attackers of left of center, because the main motive of his action was to prevent the left. In his diaries, he states that after a meeting with

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<sup>225</sup> "Siyasi mücadelemizi ideolojik mücadele haline getirmek isteyen seçim ortamı içinde ortanın solu sözü yeni bir vesile oldu. Sonra bu konuda en isabetli yorumun, bir süre önce Ulus gazetesinde yayımlanan Nihat Erim'in makalesinde yapıldığını anlattı ve şunları söyledi: "Profesör Erim, Mr. Roosevelt'in büyük bir ekonomik buhrandan sonra amerika'da "new deal" adıyla tatbik ettiği yeni düzen diyebileceğimiz sistem üzerine "ben ortanın solundayım" dediğini söylemiştir. Ben de böyle bir söz söylendiğini hatırlarım. Benim sözüm hem halk partisinin siyasi bünyesinden gelir, hem de amerika şartlarına bazı yönlerden benzer. Amerikaya benzerlik şurada: büyük bir ekonomik buhrandan sonra amerika çok güç bir düzelme devrine girdi. Şimdi biz de büyük bir ekonomik ihtiyaç karşısında, çetin bir kalkınma çabası içindeyiz. Bu kalkınmayı zor tedbirlerle başarabileceğimiz kanısındayız. Çok fedakarlık yapmak lazımdır. Muhafazakar tedbirlerle bunları başaramayız. Normal tedbirler dışında çalışma zarureti duyulunca alınan tedbirler, ortanın solunda sıfat taşır. Kalkınma planı, mali reform, toprak reformu, petrol davası ve bunun gibi tedbirler fevkakalde zamanların gerektirdiği çabalardır.....CHP bünyesi itibariyle devletçi bir partidir ve bu sıfatla elbette ortanın solunda bir ekonomik anlayıştır. 1923'teki harap memlekette devletçilik nasıl tek ve eşi, yardımcısı olmayan bir kalkınma çaresi idiye, bugün de ekonomik hayatımızın temel bir unsurudur. Milliyet, 29 July 1965

<sup>226</sup> Just after the proclamation of the left of center the Yön magazine defined the term left of center as moderate reformism and damned the right-wing intellectuals that accused even the left of center of İnönü. See Yön, no.122 (30 July 1965)

President Cevdet Sunay on 31 October 1966 that “the president understood the aim of the left of center – to bridle the new generations with idea.”<sup>227</sup> This point is crucial in that İnönü says that the aim of the left of center is *to bridle the new generations*. So this point makes clear how the left of center as the genesis of Turkish social democracy was obscure and insubstantial.

Consequently, two happenings in the left of center’s emergence process should be stated that are crucial to clarifying the RPP’s perceptions on left. The first one was a debate in a Senate session and its reflection in the pages of the *Ulus* on 15 July 1965.<sup>228</sup> According to this news, there had been a fight in the Congress of the Turkey National Federation of Teachers, and the fight had been brought to the senate by this period’s leading anti-communist senator, Fethi Tevetoğlu with the claim of a nationalist teacher who had been beaten by leftists in the Congress. Simultaneously, the RPP chairs Fehmi Alparslan, Sırrı Atalay and Rıza Işıtan had shouted that “you can not say teachers are leftist! You can not insult Turkish teachers!”<sup>229</sup> In this case, it is clear that the representatives of the RPP considered being leftist an insult, and insisted Tevetoglu to take back his words. The interesting part of the event is that the official newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*, reported the argument with the above extracted quote. Thus it is crucial that the extracted news reflects the official policy of the RPP on left politics.

The second event occurred next day, 15 July 1965. The RPP Common Parliamentary Group discussed the threat of communism and issued a declaration

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<sup>227</sup> *Ortanın solunu maksadını anlamış. Yeni kuşakları fikir ile zaptetmek.* İnönü, p.980.

<sup>228</sup> For this event, see *Ulus*, 15 July 1965.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, *Öğretmenlere solcu diyemezsin. Türk öğretmenlerine hakaret edemezsin.*

rejecting the charges that claim RPP's protection of communism.<sup>230</sup> Moreover, the declaration described the accusation of being leftist as slander. So the days in which the left of center was proclaimed the attitudes of the RPP members on left politics were in the same way as 1960s Turkey.

To sum up, the second half of July 1965 saw the left of center come onto the agenda, and the motive behind the proclamation of left of center was to demarcate the RPP from the rising left because of charges of backing communism. Thus the main essence of the left of center of İnönü was knitted together by the anti-communism, etatism and pragmatism of the RPP and the developmentalist and modernist hegemonic view of the period. However, the proclamation of the term left of center created an unexpected effect: the opponents of the RPP used this slogan as a sign of the RPP's inclination to socialism.

#### August: The Retreat

The days from 17 to 29 July 1965 was the period of the first proclamation of the left of center. And as explained above, the motive behind the term was to demarcate the RPP from communism, and prevent the charges of the JP. However, the perception of the left of center did not occur as was anticipated. The right-wing public opinion saw the term as the way to communism. Thus after the rising reactions against the left of center, the RPP spokesmen began to retreat from this slogan and began to say that the left of center was not the same thing as communism with using all means. The reactions against left of center came not only from outside of the party. Some members of the RPP strongly criticized the left of center, and they

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<sup>230</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 1965.

claimed that İnönü was taking part in communism. The strongest reaction in the RPP came from Tahsin Banguoglu, parliamentarian from Edirne. In an open letter that to İnönü published in newspapers he accused İnönü as:

The persons who follow the political developments in Turkey obviously have seen that you are in an effort to give another direction to the RPP. While our party takes the shape of a socialist doctrinal party without labeling it, national life also inevitably has become stratified and moved to state capitalism and technocracy. This is something different from Kemalism. This course is contradictory to our party's organization and dispersion within the population.<sup>231</sup>

Banguoglu's statements reflected not only his own views as he was also one of the chief members of a sect in the party that had emerged in the winter of 1964-65, and the other important politicians of this group were Tayfur Sökmen, Falih Rifki Atay and Sedat Çumralı.<sup>232</sup> This group was accusing İnönü of abandoning Atatürk's principles. On the other hand, the former secretary general of the RPP, Kasim Gülek, in a press conference criticized the left of center and said that "we support the reforms, social justice and the most progressive society view. We need neither socialism nor the left in order to expose it. Our own product is populism, etatism and Kemalism that includes them is our way."<sup>233</sup> Thus the left of center was a disputed issue in the inner-party politics as well as in the debates of other parties.

The RPP spokesmen behaved evasively while defining left of center and attempted to clarify the left of center as not related with communism. Until the election of October, the main priority of the RPP spokesmen was to demonstrate that

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<sup>231</sup> The open letter of Banguoğlunun; *Türkiye'de siyasi gelişmeleri takip edenler sizin sarıh olarak 1958den beri CHP'ye başka bir yön vermek çabası içinde olduğunuzu görmüşlerdir. Partimiz adı konmaksızın bir sosyalist doktrin partisi şeklini alırken milli hayatta da zaruri olarak sınıflaşmaya, daha çok devlet kapitalizmine ve teknokras, ye doğru gidilmiştir: bu kemalizmden başka birşeydi. Bu gidiş partimizin oluşmuş bünyesine ve halk arasında sabit kalan dağılışına da aykırıdır. Cumhuriyet, 31 July 1965.*

<sup>232</sup> Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p.160.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161.

the left of center and communism were different things. In Gaziantep, Ali Ihsan

Göğüs represented the left of center as the main remedy of communism:

“communism is not prevented by saying ‘go to the devil’ but is prevented by reason.

Left of center is not the problem of Ahmet or Mehmet, it is the issue of the solution of the problems of the country. The word ‘left’ is not the sign of communism as it had been claimed.”<sup>234</sup> Moreover, Göğüs accused the JP of inviting communism with its non-solidaristic essence.

Thus it is clear that the spokesmen of the RPP, just after the proclamation of left of center, needed to clarify their motives with the left of center because of the accusations of communism. Ironically, the aim of İnönü while proclaiming the left of center was to prevent the accusations of moving to communism and to demarcate its party with the left. Therefore İnönü needed to clarify his position as left of center, and to this end he gave an interview to the magazine *Kim* (Who). In this interview, İnönü concluded his position and aim:

While our country is developing, I wish to give the last dimensions of the phrases of left and right that are used in current civilizations in the economic and social aspects. We were saying the same thing while saying that we were statist for forty years. I said we are on the left of center for this reason. In fact, we have been on the left of center since we said we are secular....you become on the left of center if you are left of center. But you do not mess with anybody else’s religion conviction. Nor you make them communist, nor create insecurity. You are reformist. You are not conservative. Your constitution stands on the social basis. You adopt social justice. Why do you fear the left of center?<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> *Komünizm, kahrolsun komünizm demekle değil, akıl yoluyla önlenir. Ortanın solu, Ahmet, Mehmet meselesi değil, bu memleketin meselelerinin halli davasıdır. Sol kelimesi iddia edildiği gibi komünizmin bir işareti değildir. Ulus, 27 August 1965.*

<sup>235</sup> *Kalkınmamızı yaparken, ekonomik bakımdan, sosyal bakımdan bugünkü medeniyette kullanılan “solcu” “sağcı” deyimlerinin son ölçüsünü verelim istedim. Kırk yıldır devletçiyiz derken aynı şeyi söylüyorduk. Bunun için ortanın solundayız dedim. Aslında, laikiz dediğimiz günden beri ortanın solundayız. ....halkçıysan ortanın solunda olursun. Ama kimsenin ne dini ile ne imanı ile uğraşmazın. Ne komünist yaparsın, ne emniyetini ihlal edersin. Reformcusun. Muhafazakar değilsin. Anayasan sosyal temele dayanıyor. Sosyal adaleti benimsiyorsun. Ee “ortanın solundayız”dan ne korkuyorsun? Kim, no:369, (12 August 1965).*

As clearly seen, İnönü attempted to convince the public opinion that his position of left of center was not a dangerous issue, and that it was a continuation of the RPP's 40 years of historical development. İnönü said the secularism and populism of the RPP with left of center, and equated the left of center with the history of the RPP. Moreover İnönü warned the reformists that they were also left of center, but that they were not aware of their position. The crucial point in the interview was the reference to the constitution, because İnönü claimed that a position to the left of center was the result of the obligation of the constitution.

At the same time, Prof. Bahri Savci, one of the builders of the 1961 constitution, had assessed left of center as harmonious with the social and democratic obligations of the constitution.<sup>236</sup>

Consequently, after the proclamation of left of center in July 1965, the reactions against the left of center both from the RPP and others made the RPP spokesmen apprehensive, and they attempted to demonstrate that the left of center was harmonious with the historical heritage of the RPP and the constitutional structure of Turkey. Thus the RPP claimed that it was on the left of center because of its anti-communist position and pragmatism, moreover, the obligations of the constitution. So this event was the beginning of the social and cultural construction of a direct relation between the left of center and the RPP's Kemalist principles.

### The Election Declaration

On 17 September 1965, the RPP made public an election declaration titled "Republican People's Party Promise" (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Söz Veriyor*). This

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<sup>236</sup> Kili, p.219.

declaration was not the only document prepared for the elections by the RPP, which also published documents titled “What Did RPP Do in the Service of the People” (*CHP Halk Hizmetinde Neler Yaptı*), “Etatism and Populism: Of Essential Principle of the RPP” (*CHP'nin Temel İlkelerinden: Devletçilik, Halkçılık*) and “The Populist Policy of the RPP in the Fields of Working and Social Security” (*CHP'nin Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Alanında Halkçı Politikası*).<sup>237</sup> The election declaration included the priorities and methods of all of these documents.

The aim of these publications was to give the message to the electors that in the period the government had done what it had promised earlier in the “Primary Aims Declaration” (*İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*) of 1959 and 1961 Election Declaration.<sup>238</sup> So the content of the message was that the RPP’s promises in the 1959 and 1961 Election Declarations had been primarily political and that it had accomplished all of them. Moreover, the RPP promised to fulfill an economic and social transformation, and claimed that the coalition governments had not given the RPP opportunity to achieve this transformation. Consequently, the propaganda strategy of the RPP had a narrative that told the voters that the RPP had fulfilled all of its promises in the previous period and had achieved great political reforms. However, on social and economic issues, the election strategy of the RPP claimed that the conservatives had not given the RPP opportunity to carry out reform, and that the land reform was a good example of this attitude of the conservatives.

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<sup>237</sup> *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Alanında Halkçı Politikası* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Sekreterliği Yay., 1965); *20 Kasım 1961 ve 18 Şubat 1965 Arasında C.H.P. Halk Hizmetinde Neler Yaptı* (Ankara, 1965); *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Temel İlkelerinden Devletçilik, Halkçılık* (Ankara; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1965). *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: Millet Hizmetinde 40 Yıl* (Ankara, 1965).

<sup>238</sup> The Primary Aims Declaration had been issued at the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of RPP on 14 January 1959, and foresaw most of the 1961 Constitution’s reforms such as the Constitutional Court, proportional representation, the freedom of speech and autonomy of the universities.

The draft of the election declaration was prepared by a commission that was composed of Bülent Ecevit, Coskun Kirca and Turhan Feyzioglu.<sup>239</sup> This commission acted independent from the party organs, and they worked in the Fahri Hotel Uludag in a winter holiday with their wives.<sup>240</sup> Thus the conservative wing was excluded from the formation of the election declaration harmonious with the new direction of the party. However, it is remarkable that there was no reference whatsoever to the left of center in the election declarations. Ecevit prepared the section of populism and he did not use the term left of center, because Ecevit was opposed to the term in those days. He argued that this term might create misunderstandings, and he preferred to use terms such as “populist economy” and “industrial democracy.”<sup>241</sup>

The election declaration was a detailed work. Economic and social issues took up a hundred pages of the total a hundred and thirty-two pages. The topics of etatism, populism, planned development policy, agriculture policy, and working-social security were the crucial parts of the economic and social issues section of the declaration. The declaration began normally with a statement about the RPP’s reforms in the three successive İnönü governments. The establishment of the constitutional court and the supreme council of judges, the reforms of the autonomous TRT and university were submitted as the primary reforms at which the RPP had succeeded.<sup>242</sup> However, the implementations of all these reforms had been obligation of the 1961 constitution.

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<sup>239</sup> Saglamer, p.184.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p.184.

<sup>241</sup> Kurtul Altuğ, *Umudun Tükenişi* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1979), p.139.

<sup>242</sup> For the statement of these reforms, see *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Söz Veriyor - 1965 milletvekili genel seçimleri seçim bildirgesi / Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayınları, 1965), pp.3-6.



The declaration defined the direction of the 1961 constitution as economic development, social justice and a democratic regime, and describes the political composition of Turkey with attitudes about this direction.<sup>243</sup> In the political composition, the declaration defined three groups. The first group was described as unaware about the social essence of the constitution or denied it. The second group did not believe in the democratic essence of the constitution and suggested that development was only possible by force or coercive measures. After these definitions, the first group was called reactionary conservative, and the second group the supporter of a dictatorial regime. So the claim of the declaration was that there was a third category, and convened that it was in the RPP. This group believed in the democratic and social essence of the constitution. Thus the RPP accused the JP of being unaware of the social essence of the constitution, and moreover, reactionary and conservative; it accused the TWP of being against the democratic ideal of the constitution. These accusations were made without mentioning the names of the parties, but the implications were clear. The declaration claimed that the only party in the political arena harmonious with the social and political essence of the regime was the RPP.

The first chapter of the declaration was on the issue of etatism, which was one of the six arrows of the RPP, and crucial in the RPP's economic mentality.<sup>244</sup> The declaration defined the etatism of the RPP as independent from theory and inspired by the country's reality. So the etatism of the RPP reflected the pragmatism of Kemalism and the post-war conviction of development. The declaration pointed to the belief of the RPP in democracy, and differentiated it from etatism with the name

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<sup>243</sup> For these definitions, see *ibid.*, pp.8-9.

<sup>244</sup> For the views of RPP on etatism that are written by Turhan Feyzioglu, see *ibid.*, pp.11-29.

of Atatürk etatism. Thus the declaration differentiates its etatism from that of the others, most importantly, from the etatism of the USSR. The main point of the RPP on this issue of etatism was the assertion that Turkey was an underdeveloped country. The main problem of Turkey, as an underdeveloped country, was a lack of accumulation of capital. So the function of the RPP's etatism was to contribute to the development and the industrialization of the country.

Furthermore the declaration attributed some new functions to the RPP's etatism such as eliminating the development differences among the regions and orientating the private investments to the aims of the development plan. Consequently the etatism of the RPP perceived society and the state as separated entities, and concluded a developmentalist and modernist function to the economic efforts of the state. These words from the declaration demonstrate this situation: "the etatism of the RPP gives place to the state and private enterprise in the development of the country. The state provides the proceeding of the private enterprise properly with the social aims and the necessities of the national economy."<sup>245</sup> It is clear that the outlook of the national economy (*milli iktisat*) transmitted from the Party of Union and Progress was still valid in the RPP of the 1960s.

The section on populism that was written by Ecevit was the most remarkable part, demonstrating how Turkish politics was far from the categories and approaches of western politics. The declaration defined the people apart from the state and individuals, and categorized two views that first adopted the view of everything for the state, and second everything for the individual.<sup>246</sup> The aim of this categorization was the unlabelled criticism of socialism and liberalism. The mentality of the RPP's

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<sup>245</sup> *CHP'nin devletçiliği, yurt kalkınmasında devlete de özel sektöre de yer verir. Devlet, özel teşebbüsün, milli iktisadın gereklerine ve sosyal amaçlara uygun yürütmesini sağlar.* Ibid., p.20.

<sup>246</sup> For the policy of populism, see *ibid.*, p.29-32.

populism rejected these categories, and reduced them to the embracers of state and individual. Instead of liberal or socialist western categories of ideologies, the declaration proposed the populism of the RPP. The subject of this populism was the people as an abstract concept, and the “people” was considered apart from the state, society or individual. Moreover, the declaration pointed out that the RPP’s populism rejected class differences, and this rejection was not taken from any doctrine. It is obvious that the RPP’s populism attempted to construct social solidarism in terms of the single party period’s solidarism view that was rooted from the Young Turk’s or Gökalp’s solidarism even in 1965.<sup>247</sup>

Another important section in the election declaration was the topic of working and social security.<sup>248</sup> Approximately in eight pages, the social policy actions of the İnönü governments were cited. It is crucial to understand that the reforms of the İnönü governments are the result of the 1961 constitutions’ necessities. Moreover, the new social security and working conditions system were related to the political and social environment and most importantly the economic model of the 1960s. However, the İnönü governments had created a big transformation in the working life and social realm aside all necessities and structural reasons. The declaration stated 18 headings of the government actions, and promised further reforms including the involvement of the agricultural sector in the social security system. The most important acts of the İnönü government were the Act of Working Security and Worker Health (*İş Güvenliği ve İşçi Sağlığı Kanunu*), the Act of Trade Unions (*Sendikalar Kanunu*), the Act of Collective Bargaining Agreement, Strike and Lock-

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<sup>247</sup> Gokalp had contributed to the writing of the RPP’s first program and the architect of the populism view of the RPP with an organic solidarism manner.

<sup>248</sup> For this topic, see *ibid.*, pp.89-99.

out (*Toplu Sözleşme, Grev ve Lokavt Kanunu*), and the Act of Social Insurance (*Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu*).

The acts about the right to strike were introduced in the period of the second İnönü government. These acts created a deep reaction both in the circles outside and inside of the RPP. The Minister of Work, Bülent Ecevit, and the PM İnönü had advocated the acts as the obligation of the constitution; moreover, they represented the acts as a remedy for dangerous ideologies.<sup>249</sup> In reality, the initiation of the acts was somehow independent from the will of Ecevit and others, because organized labor had resisted for these rights for 10 years.<sup>250</sup> The efforts of Ecevit had not been evaluated by the workers as very influential,<sup>251</sup> because the RPP had nominated Ecevit for the MP from the city of Zonguldak in the quota of workers.<sup>252</sup> However, the candidacy of Ecevit had not increased the votes of the RPP in Zonguldak, moreover the votes had decreased.<sup>253</sup> The RPP could only get two of eight Zonguldak deputies.

Consequently, the election declaration of the RPP for 1965 elections should be considered in the context of the three İnönü governments' performances. So the declaration was intended to justify the practices of the governments, and for the unsuccessful topics of the government, the declaration stated that the RPP accomplished what it had promised. So the declaration claims that the unsuccessful

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<sup>249</sup> See Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, p.216.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p.186.

<sup>251</sup> On the other hand, the rate of the organized labor in the labor market was very low, so the people that benefited from the new social protection measures included only a very limited number of the wage earners.

<sup>252</sup> It very attention-grabbing that Turhan Feyzioglu, as the leader of the progressive sect, had proposed the quota for the workers and the RPP had used this quota for Ecevit.

<sup>253</sup> Saglamer, p.192.

topics had not been promised before, but RPP would satisfy all the displeasure in the following period. The economic and social views of the RPP were formed by the traditional populist and statist policies of the RPP that had been shaped in the 1930s. The declaration does not put forward any significant break from these traditional views. Moreover, it does not contain any reference to the left of center and the main motive of the declaration is to base the economic and social views of the party to the constitution.

### The 1965 Elections

The 1965 elections of the National Assembly would have been held on 10 October, and up to this date, all political actions were directed to the result of this election. The participant parties in the elections were the RPP, JP, NTP, NP, RPNP and TWP. The JP and NTP had been struggled for the legacy of the Democrat Party from 1961 to 1965, but the NTP had a crucial disadvantage because of its leaders' political career. The leader of the NTP, Ekrem Alican, was a former deputy of the DP, but he had been expelled from the DP in 1955 and joined in the establishment of the Freedom Party.<sup>254</sup> Moreover, he had attended the government of the 27 May coup d'état, so he was not an appropriate choice for the electors of the Democrat Party. Furthermore, after the death of Ragip Gümüspala, founding head of the JP, Suleyman Demirel was elected as the head of JP in the Congress, and he was unable to create a government alternative without the RPP. The JP of Suleyman Demirel was the main candidate of success before the elections, and at the top of agenda for Demirel in this

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<sup>254</sup> For the NTP and its leader see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp.198-209.

election campaign was anti-communism.<sup>255</sup> The anti-communism of Demirel was so tough that he considered the left of center of İnönü as the way to Moscow. In this environment, the most disputed issue of the election campaign was the left of center, in other words, perceptions on the left of center. The interesting part of the anti-communism of the JP was that the JP was constructing the anti-communism with Islam. Demirel defined his party and stated his position as “we are the enemy of the communist. We are decided to struggle against communism. We are decided to struggle against extreme left movements. Communism can not enter into Turkey because the % 98 of our population is Muslim.”<sup>256</sup>

By the 1965 elections, the rules of election system had been changed. The 1961 elections had been held with the D'Hont method, but the new elections were made with the method of national remainder. The National remainder system was not a widespread method, and the only country that was using this method was Indonesia.<sup>257</sup> The main motive for this system was to prevent a single-party government of the JP with making fully representation of the minor parties. In the Senate elections of 1964 on 7 June, the JP gained 50.03 percent of the total votes to 40.8 percent for the RPP (See Table 1). Four parties, the JP-RPP-RPNP-NTP had participated in this Senate elections, so the six parties that had struggled 1965 elections would not create a single party government for JP with the system of national remainder. This motive of the RPP overlapped with the fears of disappearance of the minor parties, so the law of elections was revised on 13 February in terms of national remainder instead of the D'Hont method. The only

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<sup>255</sup> The JP had applied to the Election Board three times in order to prevent the accession of the TWP to the elections. But none of the applications of the JP was approved by the board. See Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, pp.235-236.

<sup>256</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June 1965.

<sup>257</sup> Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p. 91.

change was not the national remainder in the 1965 elections, compound ballot paper and the consigning of all services to the election commissions were the other technical changes in the election system<sup>258</sup>.

Table 1 The Result of the 1964 Senate Renewal Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	DEPUTIES
JP	1,385,655	50.03	30
RPP	1,125,783	40.8	19
RPNP	83,400	3.00	-
NTP	96,427	3.50	-
INDEPENDENTS	64,498	2.30	1

Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No:513.

The election campaign of the RPP was led by the Secretariat General of the Party, Kemal Satir, because of the health problems of İnönü. Politicians such as Suphi Baykam, Turhan Feyzioglu, Nihat Erim, Coşkun Kırca, Emin Paksüt and Cihat Baban served primarily in party meetings and the campaign.<sup>259</sup> İnönü attended a limited number of election meetings. He kicked off the campaign in Malatya on 21 September, and also attended meetings at Elazığ, Trabzon, Samsun and Istanbul.<sup>260</sup> İnönü did not use the term “left of center” in his visit in the Anatolian cities except in Samsun and Istanbul. Moreover, when he used the term in Samsun and Istanbul the main point was to emphasize that the left of center was not communism. The important part of the trips was that it was only in Istanbul that the left of center was supported, in other places there was no support for the left of the center.<sup>261</sup> So the

<sup>258</sup> For the changes see *ibid.*, pp. 91-98.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161.

<sup>260</sup> More information on the speeches and visits of İnönü, see *Akis*, no.588 (25 September 1965).

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, p.162.

social and political base of the party was demonstrating its response to left of center with quietness.<sup>262</sup>

In the course of elections, İnönü identified the JP as the second iron-white horse (*Demirkırat*) party. For İnönü, the first *Demirkırat* party (the Democrat Party) had taken the votes of the uneducated population by accusing the RPP of atheism.<sup>263</sup> The second *Demirkırat* party was accusing RPP slander of being communist, and İnönü claimed that the victory of JP in the elections would be a back turn and described the politicians of the JP as persons who did not have any aims rather than to share the heritage of the *Demirkırat*.<sup>264</sup>

It is clear that the election strategy of İnönü was to equate the JP with the heritage of the DP. Thus İnönü was alerting the voters that a potential victory of the JP might create a new coup d'état like 27 May. This position of İnönü makes it obvious that the political environment of the 1960s was dominated by the fear of a military intervention. On the other hand, all of the contributors of the RPP's election campaign were not polite like İnönü. Some of them were advising people "not to choose the outlander's animal" (*Vatandaş Oy Kutsaldır, Elin Hayvanına Oy Verme*) in articles in the *Ulus*.<sup>265</sup> This slogan referred to the new emblem of the JP that had been changed from a book and the sun to feature a white horse.<sup>266</sup> The aim of this

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<sup>262</sup> Apart from the meeting speeches İnönü delivered four speeches on the radio. In the first three speeches he did not use "the left of center" at all. Last in the fourth speech on 8 October 1965, he used the term in order to differentiate his party from communism.

<sup>263</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 July 1965.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>265</sup> Celal Bozkurt, *Siyaset Tarihimizde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: Dünü, Bugünü, İdeolojisi : (Siyaset İlmî Açısından Bir İnceleme)* (Istanbul, 1968), p.113.

<sup>266</sup> Demirel expressed his astonishment about the debates on the white horse "why there such fear of the horse, in one way or another I do not understand. The horse does not harm anybody. We came to the country from Central Asia on the back of the horse. (*neden attan bu kadar korkuluyor, bir türlü*



discourse had two motives that first implied the effect of the USA on the JP, and the heritage of the DP. Moreover, the motive of insulting was not so covered in this slogan of “not to choose the outlander’s animal”. The election struggle was so hard that one of the RPP leaders, Suphi Baykam,<sup>267</sup> the vice Secretariat General, implied that the JP used American money in the election campaign.<sup>268</sup> For the RPP leaders, the USA was responsible for the fall of the government, thus the RPP considered Demirel as non-national and they were evaluated Demirel as having been appointed by an American operation.

The main criticism on the RPP in the election process was the claim of the failure of the three successive governments that had been led by İnönü. Furthermore, the JP accused the RPP and İnönü of keeping on the mentality of the single-party and the single chief.<sup>269</sup> Instead of the single-party and single chief, Demirel proposed the discourse of national sovereignty. In Demirel’s national sovereignty conceptualization, the RPP depended upon the elite groups, so the JP, before the DP, was the carrier of this national sovereignty.

In the election campaign and the direction of the party, it was not possible to suggest a consensus between the RPP administrators. The political structure of the period, the inner-party policy and the historically original character of the RPP made exactly different views defensible in the party. Despite the scrappy character of the party, there were two main axes: the conservative and progressive camps.

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*anlamadım. At kimseye bir zarar vermiş değil ki. Ortaasyadan yurda atların sırtında geldik.)* Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p.124.

<sup>267</sup> For the life of Suphi Baykam, see Alptekin Gündüz, *En Sevdiği Güneşti: Dr. Suphi Baykam'ın Fırtınalı Yaşamı* (İstanbul: Piramid Yayıncılık, 2004).

<sup>268</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, p.297.

<sup>269</sup> Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p.152.

In the organizational level, the conservative side was stronger, but the young generation was mostly on the progressive side. The main point of the progressive side concerned social justice issues. This group was not homogeneous on the issue of social justice. The first group that was represented by the İsmail Rüştü Aksal and Nihat Erim considered that social justice occurred at the distribution of income.<sup>270</sup> The second group, led by Turhan Feyzioglu and Coşkun Kırca, considered that social justice occurred at the realization of income. This clearly illustrates the confusion of the issues such as social justice, income distribution or social policy. Even party sects did not have single positions on issues. Thus it is clear that in the period in which the left of center emerged Turkish political and social life was unfamiliar with the main social policy concepts and categories of post-war Europe.

Anti-communism was at the center of the JP's election campaign. As mentioned above, the leaders of the JP claimed the RPP's slogan of left of center as being the way to Moscow. The claims of the JP were not limited to the left of center being the way to Moscow, the campaign included some details such as meals should not be eaten with the left hand, the person who wakes up on his left side becomes bad-tempered, and the angle who writes evils stands on the left shoulder.<sup>271</sup> All of these expressions were used by the JP spokesmen to demonstrate how the left was terrible, harmful and dangerous in all fields of life, including the politics. On the other hand, the RPP use similar political discourses and rhetoric in defending its position. For example, one of the RPP candidates, Kamuran Evliyaoglu, sought to enhance his communication with the voters with a poem that claimed the innocence of the left of center. He described his party's position and direction as "we are on the

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<sup>270</sup> For this argumentations, see İffet Aslan, *İktidar Adaylari* (Ankara: Gerçek Yayinlari, 1965), pp.156-158

<sup>271</sup> Sağlamer, p.185.

left of center; we are on the way of the nation; know that remises; we are on the way of Ata.”<sup>272</sup>

Evliyaoglu pointed to the forty year of history of the RPP and the Kemalist heritage as harmonious with the left of center. Moreover, he represented the left of center as the remedy of the communist threat as İnönü did with these verses in the same poem: “party of forty years; we are statist and populist; precisely against the communism; we are on the left of center.”<sup>273</sup> Suphi Baykam tried to verify that the left was not a dangerous policy with the evidence facts that the ablution began with the left hand, and the heart was on the left side of the body.<sup>274</sup> Another important politician of the RPP, Kasim Gülek tried to define the place of the left of center with metaphors.<sup>275</sup> He closed down his thumb and pinky, and pointed his forefinger, so demonstrating to the voters that his forefinger was on the left of center but on the center. With this show, he pointed that the left of center was no more dangerous than his forefinger.

All of these events might be seen as humorous now, but they were the hard political debates of the age. The main political instrument or weapon for the elections was to accuse the other. In the course of 1965 elections, the RPP invented the discourse of the left of center in order to parry the accusations of moving towards the communism. However, this slogan could not prevent the charges of the JP. On the contrary, the accusations took on a rhetorical base with the left of center. The RPP was not standing idle, and against the blackening of the JP, the RPP spokesmen tried to create an alternative slogan for indictments of the JP. In this new formula of the

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<sup>272</sup> *Ortanın solundayız; milletin yolundayız; biliniz ki gafiller; atanın yolundayız.*

<sup>273</sup> *Kırk senelik partiyiz; devletçiyiz halkçiyiz; komünizme tam karşı; ortanın solundayız.*

<sup>274</sup> Saglamer, p.185.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

RPP, the JP was being equated with the right of center and harmonious with the debates on national oil, the candidates of the RPP used the alternative slogan of the “right of center, the oil of Mobil”.<sup>276</sup> They were unable to use this slogan very skillfully, so Turkish politics was devoid of enjoyment in this slogan. The efforts that sought prove the innocence of the left of center were overdone, and the newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*, claimed that the prophet Mohammed had been on the left of center, thus the aim of this claim was to prove the sublimity of the position.<sup>277</sup>

The elections were held on 10 October 1965. The results were not satisfactory for the RPP (see Table 2). The RPP had polled 28.7 percent of the total votes and got 134 seats in the National Assembly. The JP had polled 52.9 percent and got 240 seats. The result of the elections was the single party government of the JP, thus it was a great defeat for the RPP. The first response of İnönü was to reflection the surprising character of the free elections with these words: “when we accept democracy faithfully, to accept such a result is natural.”<sup>278</sup>

Table 2 The Results of the 1965 Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	DEPUTIES
JP	4,921,235	52.90	240
RPP	2,675,785	28.70	134
RPNP	208,696	2.20	11
NP	582,704	6.30	31
TWP	276,101	3.00	14
NTP	346,514	3.70	19
INDEPENDENTS	296,523	3.20	1

Source: 1950-1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Seçimleri Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1966) Yayın No:513.

<sup>276</sup> *Ortanın Sağı Mobilin Yağı*. Sağlamer, p.188.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, p.185.

<sup>278</sup> *Demokrasiyi samimiyetle kabul ettiğimiz zaman böyle bir sonucu kabul etmek de son derece tabiidir.*

To conclude, the election campaign of the RPP had emphasized that the JP was the continuation of the DP; in other words, the second *Demirkırat*. So the possible success of the JP would create a danger for the democratic life in Turkey. Alternatively the JP had accused the RPP of backing and moving towards communism. Thus the course of the elections clearly shows how the political life in Turkey developed in the 1960s. During the election campaigns, throughout the country there were 187 fights, and four people were killed. These events were assessed as normal in the atmosphere of the elections.<sup>279</sup>

This period clearly shows how Turkish politics was withdrawn and unfamiliar with western political categories and terms. The proclamation of the left of center created an intolerant reaction among the right-wing public opinion. On the other hand, the RPP's perception of the left of center was an adaptation of the solidarism and etatism of the single-party period to the conditions of the 1960s. The charges of the JP forced them to base the left of center on the obligations of the 1961 constitution. Moreover, the emergence of the left of center had a sociological background that the RPP had been supported traditionally by the rural areas and the patronage relations were influential in this electoral behavior. However, the 1950s and 1960s saw the beginning of a demographic transformation; urbanization and rapid population growth made the old electoral politics no longer feasible. The party needed a new electoral base, and the left of center was related to this new demographic structure. The historical background and the cadres of the RPP and, most importantly, the motivation behind the proclamation of the left of center were

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<sup>279</sup> Abadan, p.357.

extremely inadaptable to the demographic changes. As defined in this chapter, the left of center of İnönü was not capable of adapting to a western-oriented social democratic movement. The left of center of the other politicians could not escape from this dilemma and was ambiguous, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE LEFT OF CENTER OF OTHERS: THE LEFT OF CENTER AS AMBIGUITY

My generation got to know Left Doctrine and Leftist politics after the age of forty. We were brought up as nationalist and statist.<sup>280</sup>

The words failure and displeasure might summarize the whole story of the developments for the RPP from the beginning of 1961 to 1965. The electoral support of the party gradually decreased and the government experience of the RPP created great discontent from the outside and inside the party. Under these circumstances the defeat in the 1965 elections crystallized the dissatisfactions and the party administration became unable to control the inner-party structure. Moreover, the opponents of the party administration blamed the term “left of center” for the defeat, and the party administration sought to bargain away this position. As mentioned in previous chapter, the term “left of center” had been used by İnönü to demarcate the RPP and the left. The main aim of the slogan had been to prevent the charges of communism. However, the proclamation of the slogan had created an unexpected effect and the accusations of the JP had escalated.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> *Benim kuşağım, Sol Doktrini ve Solculuğu kırk yaşından sonra öğrendi. Bizler milliyetçi ve devletçi olarak yetiştirildik.* Cahit Kayra, *38 Kuşağı: Anılar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), p.316.

<sup>281</sup> The best representation of this hysteric anti-communism and accusations was delivered by Fethi Tevetoğlu, a well known anti-communist senator of the JP, who published a book with the name of *Türkiye’de Komünist ve Sosyalist Faaliyetleri*. See Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Türkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faâliyetler* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1967). In this book even the RPP was presented as in this

The party officers divided into several camps and inner-party politics focused on the future struggle after İnönü. The RPP was in an acute crisis after the 1965 election defeat. The divisions in the party were based traditionally on the expectations of future political careers. Thus the formation of the groups of Ecevit and Feyzioglu, and the struggle between these groups should be examined in this context. The aim of this chapter is to explain the events that determined the formation of the groups formed around Feyzioglu and Ecevit, and to discuss the meaning of the left of center in the context this struggle. It is obvious that the post-1965 election developments in the RPP and the left of center's becoming the official party policy were the products of an inner-party power struggle of these groups that reflects the ambiguous character of the perceptions of the left of center.

### The Abandonment of the Left of Center and the 1966 Senate Elections

Did the RPP give up the left of center when it comprehended its mistake? It should be explained. Do not deprive the nation of this good news. (Talat Asal, Vice President of the JP)<sup>282</sup>

After the defeat of 1965 election, a disturbance began in the RPP. Right after the elections, İnönü declared this intention to leave the chairmanship of the party and held some consultations with the top-ranking party officers and asked them who might be the best alternative for the leadership of the RPP. It is not clear whether

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camp. Moreover, this book was bought by the Ministry of Tourism and distributed to the members of the parliament. As a classical example in Turkish politics, this event created contested disputes in the Parliament.

<sup>282</sup> *CHP hatasını anlayıp ortanın solundan vaz mı geçti? Açıklasın. Milleti bir müjdeden mahrum bırakmasın.*



İnönü was decisive about leaving or intended to determine his opponents. He held 22 consultations about leaving the leadership.<sup>283</sup> Only İlhami Sancar endorsed his resignation. All of the other politicians, most importantly Kemal Satır, rejected the resignation of İnönü.<sup>284</sup> İnönü gave an interview to Mehmet Barlas in *Cumhuriyet* that demonstrated that he intended to leave, but that the party administration opposed him because of the fear of the influence of Kasım Gülek in the party.<sup>285</sup> The reasons for rejection were several, but the covert reason was the unwillingness to share the responsibility of the election defeat.<sup>286</sup> The name of Ecevit was not on the list of the persons with whom İnönü discussed the matter, thus it is possible to consider that İnönü did not regard Ecevit as influential in party politics. In other words, the group of the left of center had not been organized, and Ecevit had not been determined as the leader of this group yet.

The aim of the discussions was not only the retreat of İnönü. Moreover, İnönü was asking which name was appropriate for the head of the party to succeed him. There were several possible candidates such as Nihat Erim, Kasım Gülek and Turhan Feyzioglu. His notebooks show that while he had intended to retreat, this was not possible because of the ambiguity regarding the chairmanship. Feyzioglu was the strongest candidate because of his influence in the parliamentary groups. The view of İnönü on Feyzioglu is noteworthy, and it explains why İnönü did not resign. İnönü

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<sup>283</sup> İnönü had met with these names for the issue of retreat; Fuat Sirmen, Kemal Satır, İsmail Rustu Aksal, Turhan Feyzioglu Nihat Erim, İlhami Sancar, Ferit Melen, Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, Kemal Demir, Turan Şahin, İbrahim Öktem, Nüvit Yetkin, Cihat Baban, Turan Güneş, İlyas Seçkin, Hudai Oral, Muammer Erten, Tahsin Bekir Balta, Orhan Öztrak, Cahit Zamangil and Fethi Çelikbaş.

<sup>284</sup> Sağlamer, p.195.

<sup>285</sup> For the interview, see *Cumhuriyet* 19 October 1965.

<sup>286</sup> There was immense displeasure in the election results, but the patronage structure of the party administrations in Turkey does not give the opportunity to revive this displeasure. For the place of patronage in the party administrations in Turkey, see Arsev Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi: CHP ve AP (1961-1980)* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993).

noted on the discussion with Feyzioglu that “Turhan can not assume anybody after me rather than himself”.<sup>287</sup> These words were indicators of the future inner-party struggle and move to eliminate Feyzioglu.

The election defeat was discussed in the RPP Party Assembly meeting in late November, just after these sessions the agenda of the Parliamentary Group was the same. The debates took 12 days in the party assembly and 14 days in the Parliamentary Group.<sup>288</sup> The result of the debates was the crystallization on two sides of supporters and opponents of the left of center. At first look, the right wing seemed to be stronger, and politicians like Turhan Feyzioglu and Emin Paksüt attempted to be close with opponents of the left of center.<sup>289</sup> The most striking speech was delivered by Emin Paksüt. He pointed to the ambiguity of the left of center, and claimed that it was used for 22 different purposes.<sup>290</sup> Moreover, he claimed that the word “left” referred to communism in Turkish politics, so the left of center was to be blamed for the election defeat. The debates and, most importantly the charges of Paksüt, caused İnönü to walk out of one of the sessions.<sup>291</sup> It was his first walk out of a Party Assembly session, and İnönü described his opponents in his diaries as ill-mannered, deprecating and aggressive.<sup>292</sup>

In those sessions the official party policy was determined to be harmonious with the proposal of Turhan Feyzioglu. Feyzioglu defined himself as a supporter of the reforms, but said that for the interests of the party, the left of center should be

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<sup>287</sup> *Benden sonra galiba kendinden başkasını düşünemiyor.* İnönü, p.925.

<sup>288</sup> Saglamer, p.196.

<sup>289</sup> Erim, p.818.

<sup>290</sup> For the speech of Paksüt, see Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku*, p.161.

<sup>291</sup> Saglamer, p.197.

<sup>292</sup> İnönü, p.930.

forgotten because of its negative role in the elections.<sup>293</sup> Thus Feyzioglu proposed that the left of center be forgotten and this be approved unofficially. Feyzioglu concluded his speech with these words: “what is the slogan? The people should say I wanted that when they hear the slogan. Accept that the slogan of the left of center is creating problems for us in several places and events. We should attempt to escape from it.”<sup>294</sup>

The debates were dominated by issues of radicalism such as nationalization, land reform or national oil. The supporters of the slogan of the left of center advocated these issues and the opponents stated harsh criticisms on the same issues. Bülent Ecevit’s speech was a clear example of this attitude and he presented land reform and national oil as the main agenda of the left of center. The only person that expressed the difference of the left from such issues was Turan Günes, but he was not so noticeable among the sharp contests in the Party Assembly session.<sup>295</sup> Consequently, the debates were formed by such issues as national oil and land reform. So it is clear that the debates on the left of center were far from the political and socio-economical priorities of the left in terms of western origins.

Erim’s diaries conclude the meaning and the course of the inner party debates:

The party assembly is continuing. I will not speak. The issue of why we lost the election is prattle. While there are a hundred reasons, a group concludes only the mentioning of the left of center. İnönü said that against the accusations of the RPP is conducting communism propaganda. The RPP was on the left of center when it was established. What should be done for tomorrow. This is the most important point. This is the most difficult. We the high-ranking politicians are divided between at least five candidates who do

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<sup>293</sup> For the speech of Feyzioglu, see *Yön*, no:134 (28 December 1965)

<sup>294</sup> *Slogan nedir? Halk sloganı işitince ben bunu istiyordum demelidir. Kabul ediniz ki ortanın solu sloganı bizi bir çok yer ve hallerde sorunlar karşısında bırakıyor bundan kurtulmaya çalışmalıyız.* Ibid.

<sup>295</sup> For the speeches of Günes and Ecevit, see *ibid.*

not like each other and each and his supporters seek to become leader after İnönü and their supporter.<sup>296</sup>

The accusations that charged İnönü with the election defeat began with the delivery of a statement by Tahsin Banguoglu “in order not to see such an open reality there should be in greed of old age or becoming in an interest team around an aged.”<sup>297</sup>

In those days, an article was published about a declaration by the youth unit of the party that demanded the retreat of İnönü, and that he give his seat to a young person.<sup>298</sup> *Ulus* immediately confuted the existence of such a statement or letter, but the public opinion discerned that İnönü and the left of center were the target of opponents because of the election defeat. After all these debates in the party, the spokesmen of the party abandoned the slogan of the left of center as Feyzioglu had proposed. From the beginning of 1966 to the July senate elections, all of the RPP cadres seemed to have forgotten about the left of center, thus no party officer used the term “left of center.” The main reason for this situation was that the left of center discourse was seen as the main source of the election defeat.<sup>299</sup>

The above-mentioned proposal of Feyzioglu was being implemented unofficially. This view was common not only among the opponents of the left of

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<sup>296</sup> *Parti meclisi devam ediyor. Ben konuşmayacağım. Seçimi niçin kaybettik meselesi bence boş laflar. Yüz sebep varken bir kısım yalnız ortanın solu sözüünün söylenmiş olmasına bağlıyor. İnönü bunu haziran ayında CHP komünistliğe götürüyor propagandalarına karşı söylemiş. CHP kurulduğu an ortanın solundaydı. Yarın için ne yapmalı. En önemli nokta bu. En zoru bu. Üstkademe birbirini sevmeyen, her biri İnönü'den sonra lider olmak isteyen en az beş aday ve onların taraftarları ile bölündük.* Erim, p.818.

<sup>297</sup> *bu kadar açık bir gerçeği görmek için ya bir yaşlılık hırsı içinde olmak, yahut bir yaşlının etrafında bir menfaat takımı içinde bulunmak lazımdır.* Ahmad, *Türkiye'de çok partili*, p.247.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p.304.

<sup>299</sup> On the contrary, the left wing intellectual circles had opposed to this view, but it did not grab much attention. For example, Mumtaz Soysal had pointed to the source of the defeat of the elections as being not the use of the left of center, but the late use of the left of center. Mumtaz Soysal, “Ortanın Solu Sorumlu Mu?”, *Yön*, no.133 (15 October 1965).

center, but also among some of the supporters of the policy. For example, Abdi Ipekçi, the chief editor of *Milliyet* which had supported the left of center, claimed that “the left of center had not brought the votes that directed to the TWP; moreover, it had deprived the RPP of the votes that might have been taken by the RPP.”<sup>300</sup>

The course of the 1966 elections and the change of attitude in the RPP were remarked upon by Turan Güneş with these words: “The RPP was not fortunate in the 1965 elections. Taking advantage of this, the opponents of the ‘left of center’ moved to erase this slogan. Soon İnönü kept up with them. And the slogan ‘left of center’ was desired to be forgotten in the 1966 elections.”<sup>301</sup> These words of Güneş indicate two points, that, the causal link between the left of center and the election defeat prevailed even among the supporters of the left of center, and how obvious it was that the RPP rapidly gave up the left of center. In the course of the election İnönü had delivered speeches in Kayseri, Niğde, Adana, Milas, Muğla, Denizli, Uşak, Afyon, and Diyarbakır and in none of them had mentioned the term “left of center.”<sup>302</sup>

The only person who used the term “left of center” in the 1966 election campaign was Bülent Ecevit. He used the term in the official election speech on the radio, but this was the result of officiousness. The party speaker on 2 June, Turan Sahin, was unable to return to Ankara from Muğla, and the election commissioner, Ali Ihsan Göğüs had called Ecevit to speak on the radio.<sup>303</sup> While speaking, Ecevit mentioned the left of center, and claimed that the JP benefited from the ignorance of

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<sup>300</sup> *Milliyet*, 13 October 1965.

<sup>301</sup> *1965 seçimleri CHP'ye hiç uğurlu gelmedi. Ortanın solunun muhalifleri bunu fırsat belleyip bu sloganı hepten kazımak için harekete geçtiler. Sonradan İsmet paşa da onlara ayak uydurdu ve 1966 senato yenileme seçimlerinde ortanın solu sloganı adeta unutturulmak istendi.* Akın Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Siyasal Kavgalari* (İzmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975), p.87.

<sup>302</sup> For the speeches of İnönü, see *Ulus*, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31 May and 1, 4 June 1966.

<sup>303</sup> For the story of this event, see Saglamer, pp.199-201.

the people by defining the left of center as the way to Moscow. This speech created a double effect in the RPP. On the one hand, the opponents of the left of center charged Ecevit with violating the official party policy. Just after the elections, in the parliamentary groups of the RPP, one of the opponents of the left of center had evaluated the speech of Ecevit as rusty.<sup>304</sup> And on the other hand Ecevit was perceived as the chief champion of the left of center by the supporters of this policy.<sup>305</sup>

The RPP had abandoned the term left of center; however, it hardened its opposition to the JP, and accused the JP of backing *Nurculuk*. İnönü put forward that the most critical threat for the regime was *Nurculuk* rather than communism, and that the government had inaccuracy.<sup>306</sup> The narrative of the RPP's new position was that there was not only the danger raised by the extreme left and the extreme right - reactionary groups also constituted some dangerous political activities.<sup>307</sup> This position was somehow a response to the neo-McCarthyism of the JP, because the JP administration created immense pressure on the left. The best example of this neo-McCarthyism was the internment of a student (Gürbüz Şimşek) who was only fifteen years old<sup>308</sup> who had compared the leadership of Lenin and Atatürk in an essay for a lesson. This event had a symbolic importance that aligned the JP and RPP to the fronts. In the course of the elections the political environment hardened and on 7

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<sup>304</sup> Ruhi Soyer described the speech of Ecevit as discordant; Fortunately we did not make the same mistake in this election we did in last elections, only one out discordant sound come out among us. (*çok şükür ki bu seçimde geçen seçimde yaptığımız hatayı yapmadık aramızdan sadece bir çatlak ses çıktı*) *Akis*, no.627, (25 June 1966).

<sup>305</sup> For the making of the groupings, see *Yön*, no.169 (24 June 1966).

<sup>306</sup> For this new position of the RPP, see *Akis*, no.625 (11 June 1966).

<sup>307</sup> İnönü equated the reactionary politics as the uprising of Patrona Halil in almost all election speeches.

<sup>308</sup> For the event of Gürbüz Şimşek, see *Akis*, no.613 (19 March 1966).

May, the police had descended on the parliamentary group rooms of the RPP to look for illegal declarations and documents İnönü described the Minister of Internal Affairs, Faruk Sükan, as a brigand (*eşkıya*).<sup>309</sup> Moreover political violence started up in the parliament, as a member of the National Unity Group, Sıtkı Ulay, was beaten by the deputies of the JP on 6 May 1966.<sup>310</sup>

The senate elections held on 5 June 1966 and the election results of the RPP were not very different from those of the 1965 election (See Table 3). The RPP took 29.6 percent of the total votes in comparison with 56.2 percent vote of the JP.<sup>311</sup> The RPP had left out the term “left of center”, but the election results had not changed very much. There were two opinions in the party. One group claimed the one point increase in the votes with retreat of the left of center, and the other group claimed that the unchanged election results demonstrated that the reason for the electoral defeat had not been the term “left of center.” The story from that point to Ecevit’s left of center was the struggle between these two groups.

Table 3 The Result of the 1966 Senate Renewal Elections

PARTIES	VOTES	PERCENTAGE	DEPUTIES
JP	1,688,316	56.90	35
RPP	877,066	29.60	13
RPNP	57,367	1.90	1
NP	157,115	5.30	1
TWP	276,101	3.00	1
NTP	70,043	2.40	1
INDEPENDENTS	980	0	-

Source: 5 Haziran 1966 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Üyeleri Kısmi Seçim Sonuçları (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1967) Yayın No.525.

<sup>309</sup> For the full story of the event, see *Forum*, no.291 (15 May 1961).

<sup>310</sup> Ahmad, *Türkiye’de çok partili*, p.311.

<sup>311</sup> For the analysis of this elections, see Nermin Abadan, “1966 Kısmi Senato Seçimlerinin Tahlili,” *Forum*, no.295 (15 July 1966), pp.7-8.

## The Rising Confrontation: The Left of Center and the 76s

Ibrahim Öktem came and joined Ecevit's group. The program is basic.<sup>312</sup>

Just after the senate elections, the RPP common parliamentary group issued a resolution on the election results.<sup>313</sup> This resolution is crucial in demonstrating the essence of the left of center. The first paragraph affirmed that İnönü and other party administrators did not use the term “left of center” in the 1966 election campaign at all. For the resolution “this disuse does not mean a retreat from the reformist and progressive views.”<sup>314</sup> However, it is obvious that these words in the resolution were a retreat from the term “left of center.” Moreover the resolution declared that “through the 1965 elections the term ‘left of center’ had been used to define the place of the RPP in the spectrum of the parties, so it was not a new principle or a way nor could it be.”<sup>315</sup> This declaration seemed to be the end of the left of center policy for the RPP until the new change in the balance of power of the inner-party policy.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>312</sup> *Öktem geldi Ecevit'in grubuna girmiş, program esas* (from the diaries of İnönü) İnönü, p. 961.

<sup>313</sup> See CHP. 17. ve 18. CHP Kurultayları arası dönemde CHP TBMM Gruplarınca Yayınlanan *Bildiriler* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966), pp.26-28.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> *1965 seçimlere girilirken, çok partili hayat içerisinde CHP'nin partiler yelpazesindeki ve siyasi parti eğilimleri arasındaki yerini ifade etmek için kullanılmış olan “ortanın solu” deyimi, elbette CHP için yeni bir ilkenin ve yeni bir yolun ifadesi değildi ve olamazdı.*

<sup>316</sup> On those days *Yön* described the RPP as close to the JP and pointed out that the rapprochement between the progressives had been broken because the RPP had left the progressive front. *Yön*, no.171 (8 July 1966), p.4.



Developments before and just after the 1966 Senate elections demonstrated that the party had abandoned the left of center policy, so the opponents of the left of center achieved a provisional success.<sup>317</sup> The struggle, however, was not over. Before the 18th congress of the RPP, the Party Assembly gathered to discuss the Party Assembly Report that would be presented to the Congress.<sup>318</sup> The main topic of disagreement was that of the left of center. The term divided the party into two camps. In this Party Assembly session, Turan Günes concluded the inner-party structure and his position on the left of center as follows:

Maybe most of us agree with this idea with the prescience that İsmet Pasha would not anyway retreat from this idea. But we should determine whether we are sincere with the idea of the left of center? Let us look at that. It has come out that there are three groups in the RPP. One is the group of 76s, the second is the left of center, and the third group is the store of statesmen. It is requested to give a direction to the report. A uniting formula does not give a result.<sup>319</sup>

Günes thus referred to the scrappy character of the party. The Party Assembly had issued a resolution, and the left of center had been mentioned in this resolution. The following names had voted against the term: Turhan Feyzioglu, Fehmi Alparşlan,

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<sup>317</sup> It is not possible to argue the existence of a left-wing in the RPP, but some of the politicians like İnönü or Erim defined the others as the right-wing. So this categorization is useful in order to point out the groupings in the party.

<sup>318</sup> The reports of the Party Assembly that were presented to the congresses and other congress documents are convenient sources in order to understand the inner structure and political tendencies of the party. For some of these documents see CHP, *C.H.P. XVII. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu, 16 Kasım 1964* (Ankara: CHP Ulusal Basımevi, 1964); CHP, *C.H.P. XVIII. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu, 18 Ekim 1966* (Ankara: CHP Ulusal Basımevi, 1966); CHP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi XIX. Kurultayı: Ankara, 18 Ekim 1968* (Ankara, Ulusal Basımevi, 1968); CHP, *C.H.P. 1966 İstanbul İl Kongresi* (İstanbul: Şevket Ünal Matbaası, 1966); CHP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi İstanbul il kongresi 12-13 Ekim 1968* (İstanbul, 1968); CHP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi İstanbul İl Kongresi tutanağı: 1968*, ed. Tarhan Erdem (İstanbul: 1984).

<sup>319</sup> ...Belki de pek çoğumuz, İsmet paşaa nasıl olsa ortanın solu fikrinden dönmeyecek önsezisi ile bu fikre katılıyorruz. Ama önce şuu hususu tespit edelim. Ortanın solu fikrinde samimi miyiz? Ona bakalım. CHP içinde üç grup olduğu anlaşılıyor. Bunlardan bir grup 76'lar, ikinci grup ortanın solunda olanlar, üçüncü grup ise devlet adamları deposudur. İşre parti meclisinin bu şekliyle rapora bir yön verilmek istenmektedir. Ortaya çıkacak bir birleştirici formül sonuç vermez. Böylece, devlet adamları deposu yeniden görev almak için bir oyun içine girmiştir. Simav, p. 90.

Sedat Çumralı, Asım Eren, Ferda Güley, Şevket Raşit Hatiboğlu, Hilmi İncesulu, İhsan Kabadayı, Ferit Melen, Emin Paksüt, Nüvit Yetkin, Coşkun Kırca, İlyas Seçkin, Ekrem Özden and Cemal Yıldırım.<sup>320</sup> So the leaders of the 76s were determined, but the group of the left of center had not been organized yet.

The making of the left of center group had begun with home meetings. The first participants of these meetings were Bülent Ecevit, Muammer Aksoy, Turan Günes, Sadi Pencap, Nazif Aslan, Sükrü Koç, Muammer Erten, Orhan Birgit, Hayrettin Uysal, Murad Öner, Selahhattin Hakkı Esatoğlu, Lebit Yurdoğlu, Mustafa Ok, Cemal Reşit Eyüpoğlu and Fikret Ekinci.<sup>321</sup> This group had needed a leader, which was the most complicated issue for the formation of a sect. There needed to be a consensus on the name of the leader in the formation process of the sect, so Ecevit was the best candidate because of his unpretentious character.<sup>322</sup> Thus in a home meeting of the sect in Muammer Aksoy's house, Ecevit was determined as its leader.<sup>323</sup> The designer of the project was Turan Günes, and he contributed of the all technical and ideational necessities of the sect with another academic, Muammer Aksoy. Fikret Ekinci described the reason for the selection of Ecevit as "he had to be such a man whose existence does not disturb the Pasha, and are whom the Pasha trusts. Because of these features of him, we set on him."<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> It is possible to follow the making of this group in the notes of İnönü. On 3 August 1966 a group of deputies come to İnönü and put forward a memorandum with 50 signatures. İnönü points that this group had reached almost 80. He described the essence of the memorandum as a tour de force. İnönü, p. 968.

<sup>321</sup> Altuğ, p.134.

<sup>322</sup> For the position of Ecevit in the sect see Orhan Koloğlu, *Ecevit ile CHP: Bir Aşk Ve Nefret Öyküsü* (Istanbul: Büke Yayinlari, 2000), pp.78-79.

<sup>323</sup> Sağlamer, p.204.

<sup>324</sup> "Öyle bir adam olmalıydı ki, Paşa varlığından rahatsız olmasın, itimat etsin. Ecevit bu niteliklere sahip olduğu için ona göz koyduk" Altuğ, p.133.

In the first days, Ecevit was displeased with being made the leader of the sect, and he accepted the position only with the pressure of Günes and Aksoy. Ecevit had his own candidate instead of himself, Turhan Feyzioglu. Ecevit advanced the name of Feyzioglu in the sect, and was delegated to persuade Feyzioglu. A few days later, Ecevit visited Feyzioglu and offered him the leadership position.<sup>325</sup> Feyzioglu answered with a question about the cadre of the sect. While Ecevit was listing the names in the group, Feyzioglu harshly rejected the names of Mustafa Ok and Sükrü Koç. Feyzioglu reminded Ecevit the political career of Mustafa Ok.<sup>326</sup> In the words of Feyzioglu, Mustafa Ok was a man who had drawn a gun on the state. Koç had been a known communist from the beginning of the 1960s. Feyzioglu asked Ecevit if it would be possible to have democracy with this cadre. Ecevit understood that Feyzioglu was reluctant to take on the leadership of the left of center sect because of the power of the right-wing 76s.

Thus the formation of the groups in the process from the June 1966 Senate elections to the October 18<sup>th</sup> Congress was completed. On the one side there was the group of 76s that was led by Cemal Yıldırım, but later Feyzioglu would be the leader of this group. This group was principally proposed to the policy of the left of center with the claim that it was communism. On the other side was the group of the left of center, led by Bülent Ecevit. This group passionately supported the left of center discourse; moreover, they were willing to transform the social composition of the party. Under normal circumstances, the chances of the group of the left of center would have been quite low, because the majority in the parliamentary group and among the top ranking party organization officers supported the group of 76s.

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<sup>325</sup> For the story, see Saglamer, pp.205-209.

<sup>326</sup> Ok had taken part in the 22 February coup d'état and charged with death penalty.

However, İnönü assessed the 76s' group against him and took position on the left of center group's sight.<sup>327</sup> He concluded his views on these events six months later as "during these days this Bülent and a few friends of him had become savior for me."<sup>328</sup> So the views of Bülent Ecevit on the left of center became important as one of the founders along with İnönü. Thus the next part attempted to demonstrate the main considerations and policy suggestions of Bülent Ecevit on the issue of the left of center.

### The Left of Center of Ecevit as Poetic Imagination

The aim of this part is to examine Ecevit's perception on the left of center as he was the first and only person who attempted to define this political position. The elaboration of Ecevit's thought might indicate what the left of center was thought to be and at the time of its introduction. The most important effort of Ecevit on the definition of the left of center was the act of writing the book *Left of Center (Ortanın Solu)*. The book was published in 1966 just before the 18<sup>th</sup> congress of the RPP, thus it should be considered in the context of the preparation of a sect for the congress.<sup>329</sup> The book was somehow a collective work, but mention was made of the name of one of the writers, Bülent Ecevit. The book appeared in public on the morning of the congress, so it is possible to suggest that this book was an action for the sake of the

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<sup>327</sup> İnönü, pp. 964-967.

<sup>328</sup> *İşte o günlerde bu Bülent ve birkaç arkadaşı kurtarıcı olmuştur benim için. Ulus*, 6 February 1967.

<sup>329</sup> The book was published four days before the Congress on 14 October by the publisher of *Kim*. *Kim* was the name of a magazine that was directed by a member of the left of center group, Orhan Birgit, an Istanbul Deputy. The speech of Ecevit in the congress was on the ideas of the book, and the book was prepared by the contributions of almost all members of the left of center group. The book was committed to paper by Ecevit in the office of *Forum* magazine.

congress. However, besides the intention debates, the congress and the book gave results that crucially affected Turkish political life.

Ecevit began the book by defining a person who was on the left of center.<sup>330</sup> For him, the left of center was “a type of human nature and a person whose nature is on the left of center feels the pain and responsibility of a poor child. Moreover, the person on the left of center should struggle for the change of this child’s fate. Feeling the sufferings of persons such as peasants or mineworkers and to strive for them is another important characteristic feature of the person on the left of center.”<sup>331</sup> As seen, Ecevit defines the left of center with the characteristic features of a virtuous person, so the left of center perception of Ecevit rose from ethical responsibilities. In other words, his position was formed by industrial society’s disturbing results, and he sought ethical solutions to these problems. In this perception, the main emphasis was on social justice, and this social justice was shaped by feeling responsibility. So as a poet, Ecevit tried to construct social reality with poetic language, and the genre of the book reflects Ecevit’s poetic language rather than a theoretical or social base.

Ecevit dealt with the problematic of the industrial society with such problems as education, working conditions or alienation.<sup>332</sup> However, he was not so familiar with the traditional RPP discourse, and opposed the perception of the harmonious interests of the members of society. He claimed that these questions would not be solved with social aids; and that the only solution was social security and a social justice regime that would not create the need for social aids.<sup>333</sup> Thus Ecevit offered a

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<sup>330</sup> For Ecevit’s definition of a person on the left of center, see Bülent Ecevit *Ortanın Solu*, (İstanbul: Kim Yayınları, 1966), pp.8-10.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8.

<sup>332</sup> Ecevit takes in hand such issues in *ibid.*, pp 42-50.

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, p.9.

reform model that claimed to eliminate social injustices with social security measures. Therefore Ecevit defined the model he inspired as *contemporary social democracy*.<sup>334</sup> However, he did not omit reference to the constitution, and claimed that his model came from the obligation of the constitution.<sup>335</sup> To link the constitution and the left of center was one of the most common tactics of this idea's supporters for the charges of the right.

He concluded the programmatic proposals of the left of center in the last chapter of the book. These proposals were extracted from the 1965 election declaration and the program of the RPP.<sup>336</sup> Thus Ecevit's group had no programmatic change, and argued the implementation of these documents. So it is clear that Ecevit's left of center was somehow the continuation of the left of center of İnönü in the programmatic sense.

As discussed above, the 1965 election defeat was interpreted in two ways by the RPP. The-right wing also had assessed the major source of the defeat as the discourse of the left of center. Ecevit rejected this claim, but accepted that there was a reaction against the RPP that had resulted in the defeat.<sup>337</sup> For him, the source of the reaction to the RPP had come from the initiated reforms and social justice measures that had disturbed some groups that were in the habit of exploiting the people and the state. In this way, Ecevit sought to construct an abstract confrontation

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<sup>334</sup> It is crucial that Ecevit have always avoided using the term "social democracy" because of its Marxist origin. He preferred the term "democratic left," however, in this process he use the term "social democracy." It is obvious that the usage of the term "social democracy" was the effect of Turan Günes who would prefer to use the term against the term "democratic left" in the future debates.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., p.46.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., p.96.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., p.11.

between the RPP and others, thus he abstaining from a detailed discussion of the 1965 elections.

The most interesting part of Ecevit's thought is his perceptions on politics and the categories of left and right. He attempted to construct a party spectrum in which the main concept was change.<sup>338</sup> In this model, the extreme right wing was attempting to take to society back behind its current position. The right of center sought everything constant and was frightened of change in the social structure. The centrists only approved of slow changes in the social structure. The extreme left was committed to strict doctrines and rejected private property and entrepreneurial freedom. However, it is strange that Ecevit related the *danger of communist and reactionary movements* as "communitarianism came to us from the world of the Arabs; nationalism came to us from the world of the Arabs, it is possible communism comes to us from the world of the Arabs."<sup>339</sup> Thus Ecevit constructed all wings of the political spectrum, and ascribed meaning and essence to all of them. Then he defined the features of the people who were on the left of center as humanist, populist, progressive, revolutionist, reformist, etatist, devoted to freedom and lined up with social democracy.<sup>340</sup>

Thus for Ecevit the right was the political practice of the resistance to change. For him, the center was extremely determinist and not able to take voluntary action. The extreme left was shaped by doctrine and closed to change. At the last stage, Ecevit presented his golden formula as the left of center against the center, right and the dangerous extreme left and extreme right. Ecevit's objective is to celebrate his

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<sup>338</sup> For this spectrum, see *ibid.*, pp.11-27.

<sup>339</sup> *Bize ümmetçilik arap aleminden geldiğine göre; bize milliyetçili arap aleminden geldiğine göre, bize komünizmin de arap aleminden gelmesi mümkündür.* *Ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>340</sup> For the content of these features, see *ibid.*, pp.17-20.

group's view, and in this context he ascribed meaning to the other views. Thus Ecevit constructs a model for the analysis of politics in the dichotomy between left and right, or progressive and reactionary. The attention-grabbing point is that Ecevit defines Turkish political life according to this model.

Ecevit suggests that the JP might be evaluated as on the right of center according to its program, and pointed out that the JP party administration defined itself as conservative.<sup>341</sup> Ecevit noted that the JP was moving continuously through the right of its program, including all varieties of politics from the right of center to the extreme right.

Ecevit normally defined the RPP on the left of center. For him, the party had been on the left of center for a long time in both attitude and program, but he noted that the consciously and coherent positioning on the left of center had been the issue of recent years. Ecevit's views on the RPP and JP are interesting because it is obvious that the only determiners of Ecevit's views on politics were modernism and developmentalism. Ecevit saw politics as a conflict between the progressive and reactionary, and thought that the struggle between the progressive and reactionary wings dominated the political life.

Ecevit concluded with a section the NTP, NP and RPNP under the same heading and labeled them as parties whose place was not so clear.<sup>342</sup> He gave some features of these parties and noted that it was impossible to determine their places in the political spectrum. On the other hand, for the TWP, Ecevit emphasized the difference between this party and the RPP and said that the TWP was on the left of

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<sup>341</sup> For Ecevit's points on the JP, see *ibid.*, pp.22-23.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.24-25.



the RPP.<sup>343</sup> But he implicitly condemned the TWP, and claimed that it was early to know how much the TWP was on the left of the RPP. Moreover, Ecevit charged the TWP with not being devoted to democracy. On the other hand, Ecevit claimed he agreed with some of the economic and social policies of the TWP, such as the issues of progressive politics and social justice. He criticized the JP rather than the TWP, because the JP was the government party and the main rival of the RPP. It is crucial that Ecevit had proposed a political view in the whole book in the context of progressive-reactionary and social justice. Thus it is obvious why Ecevit focused on the JP rather than the TWP. As a result Ecevit constructed the place of the RPP with a negative definition based on the JP's place.

After the model about Turkish politics, Ecevit constructed the international context of the left of center. For him Turkey faced left pressures from four sides:<sup>344</sup> the North (USSR), the South (some Arabian countries particularly Egypt and Syria), the West (western social democracy), and the Far East (China).<sup>345</sup> The only way to prevent these threats was the left of center. He defined the left of center as the pressure from the west among the above-mentioned pressures. He described the difference between the left of center and others in the dimension of being devoted to democracy. Thus Ecevit stated the democratic character of the left of center as giving place to the freedom of thinking, giving importance to the honor of the human, the most peaceful and the most reliable. These views of Ecevit were affected by

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<sup>343</sup> For the views of Ecevit on the TWP, see *ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>344</sup> See *ibid.*, p.27.

<sup>345</sup> The 1960s was a period of rise and diversification for left politics. The communist camp had been divided into Chinese and Soviet communism. On the other hand nationalist administrations in Arabian countries such as Baathism in Syria and Nasserism in Egypt had been established. Lastly western social democracy was organized in the fabric of the Frankfurt International. Thus Ecevit claimed that the left of center represented the last one among them.

intellectual circles around *Forum* magazine and the modernism and developmentalist views of the 1960s.

As mentioned above, for Ecevit the most important factor that differentiated the left of center from the extreme left was its democratic character in western terms. For Ecevit there were two important bases for democracy: property and inheritance rights and the freedom of private enterprise, and public interest.<sup>346</sup> For Ecevit the abolition of one meant the abolition of democracy and the lack of the first meant the dictatorship of the state, and the lack of the second meant the dictatorship of wealth. The left of center was against both of these dictatorships. It was on the side of democracy in the western manner that included both bases.<sup>347</sup>

Ecevit attempted to tell why the dictatorships of state and wealth should not be. He explained why state dictatorship had not been possible in the traditional Turkish-Ottoman social regime because of its pluralistic character.<sup>348</sup> The Turkish people had a tradition of limited power, but in the late Ottoman Empire, the administrators had begun to see the people as inferior, and their ties with the people had been broken. For him, this contradiction between the state and society had continued into the Republican age. For this reason, the people had been become angry with the state even in the Republican period and the DP and later JP had exploited this anger.

As seen, Ecevit tried to construct a model that explained why the RPP was not able to win elections. Ecevit constructed his ideas in the course of the social structure of the Ottoman Empire, the way through the Republic, the single-party and

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<sup>346</sup> For these definitions, see *ibid*, p.34.

<sup>347</sup> In Ecevit's thought it was not so obvious the extent and the meaning of the public interest. However the two-sided view of democracy was the reflection of the 1960s' "golden age" for capitalism.

<sup>348</sup> For the points of Ecevit on this issue, see *ibid.*, pp.36-39.

multi-party periods. Thus he approached the traditional RPP history and policy narrative critically. With this criticism, Ecevit tried to demonstrate why and how the left of center was devoted to the principle of democracy.<sup>349</sup>

Consequently *Left of Center* is an effort directed to the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress that was the work of a group of intellectuals that came together in the magazine *Forum*. The main point of this group was that only the left of center could save parliamentary democracy. This point of *Forum* was initiated just after the 1965 elections, and the magazine claimed that the RPP's moving to the right brings the end of the RPP as British Liberal Party. Moreover, the magazine asserted that the existence of the TWP made it compulsory for the RPP to advocate the left of center.<sup>350</sup> After the 1966 senate elections *Forum* claimed that if the RPP kept on moving to the right, the party would become a satellite of the JP, like the NTP. It magazine claimed that thus the masses would have no political organization to resist to JP, so the continuity of the democratic regime was endangered.<sup>351</sup> Just before the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress, Cahit Talas declared that the RPP was a social democratic party like the SPD or the British Labor Party, but it that it was ashamed to admit it.<sup>352</sup> In the same issue, Muammer Aksoy proclaimed the left of center as the only way of saving democracy in Turkey.<sup>353</sup> Consequently, the position of Ecevit might be concluded with his words: "how and what should be done by RPP in social, cultural and economic regards are written in the program of the RPP, the Declaration of Progressive Turkey Ideal, Development

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<sup>349</sup> The critical view on the RPP's history was formed by the persons who joined the RPP from the Freedom Party, particularly Turan Günes.

<sup>350</sup> See *Forum*, no.280 (1 December 1965), p.5.

<sup>351</sup> See *Forum*, no.294 (1 July 1966), pp.3-7.

<sup>352</sup> *Forum*, no.301 (15 October 1966), p.12.

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*, p.16.

Plan and the Constitution.”<sup>354</sup> So it is clear that Ecevit’s left of center was based on the main policy documents and priorities RPP, and reflected the above-mentioned ambiguities of the left of center.

### The 18<sup>th</sup> Congress

“Will anybody believe İnönü’s saying ‘we are on the left of center’ this İnönü has regarded being socialist and leftist as being communist and impeached the persons who publicized this idea for 40 years?” (Tayfur Sökmen)<sup>355</sup>

The congress of the RPP met biennially according to the RPP statute, and was the most authorized organ of the party.<sup>356</sup> The 18th congress of RPP began on 18 October 1966, and continued four days.<sup>357</sup> The congress became the arena for the struggle of the groups of the left of center and the 76s. The left of center group had been prepared for the congress beginning from the congress of the districts. The members of the group were spread out among almost all of the local congresses. If they were unable to attend a district congress, they made sure to send messages.<sup>358</sup>

The other group was not idle and pursuing the efforts for the congress. This group had been formed after the June 1966 elections, and they had given a

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<sup>354</sup> CHP’nin soysal, kültürel ve ekonomik bakımdan neleri ve nasıl yapması gerektiği Programda, İleri Türkiye Ülküsü Bildirisinde, Seçim Bildigesinde, Kalkınma Planında ve Anayasada yazılıdır. Akis, No.629 (9 July 1966).

<sup>355</sup> 40 sene, solculuğu ve sosyalistliği komünistlik sayan ve bu fikri yaymak isteyenleri mahkemelere sevkettiren İnönü’nün <<ortanın solundayız>> demesine kimse inanacak mıdır?

<sup>356</sup> See the statute of the RPP, CHP, *CHP Tüzüğü* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi 1966).

<sup>357</sup> For information on the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress, see *C.H.P. XVIII. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu*, 18 Ekim 1966 (Ankara: CHP Ulusal Basımevi, 1966).

<sup>358</sup> Kili, p.229.

memorandum to İnönü on 3 August seeking the impartiality of İnönü in the struggle.<sup>359</sup> As mentioned in the previous pages, if İnönü had been impartial, the success of the 76s group would have been possible.<sup>360</sup> However, İnönü had perceived this movement against him, and attempted to balance between the group of the left of center and the 76s. The majority in the parliamentary group supported the 76s. They had 76 members comparatively to the 45 supporters of the left of center.

In his diaries Nihat Erim concludes that the ostensible leaders of the 76s were politicians such as Cemal Yildirim and Ekrem Özden, but the actual ones in control were Turhan Feyzioglu, Coskun Kirca, Emin Paksüt and Ferit Melen.<sup>361</sup> Through the course of the congress, names such as Turhan Feyzioglu, Ismail Rüstü Aksal and Coskun Kirca began to be mentioned with the opponents of the left of center.<sup>362</sup>

İnönü supported the left of center group, but he did not want to lose the support of the 76s. There was another candidate for the chair of İnönü, former secretariat general of the party, Kasim Gülek. Thus the main reason of İnönü's balanced action was the threat that was raised by Gülek's group. İnönü should have guaranteed the support of the 76s, and it was not possible for him to use up the 76s group and their demands. So while preparing his address to the congress, İnönü decided to include the words that the RPP was not a socialist party.<sup>363</sup> From the diaries of İnönü, we see that he discussed congress affairs with the left of center

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<sup>359</sup> For the memorandum of the 76s and its reflections in the RPP, see *Akis*, no.635 (20 August 1966), p.14.

<sup>360</sup> The name 76s comes from the number of the participants of the group.

<sup>361</sup> Erim, p.835.

<sup>362</sup> İnönü states the direct relation and control between the 76s and these names four months later. *Ulus*, 6 February 1967.

<sup>363</sup> İnönü, p.977.

group, and he demanded that they make sacrifice on the position in order to maintain integrity.<sup>364</sup>

The opening of the congress showed how the rivalry was sharp between the groups with the election of the presidential board of the Congress. The two groups nominated two different candidates for the board. The candidate from the left of center was Muammer Aksoy, and the candidate of the 76s was Sırrı Atalay. The election started at 9:00 and lasted until 15:30; because of the objections it took 6.5 hours.<sup>365</sup> Muammer Aksoy received 640 votes and Atalay 566. The election of the presidential board of the Congress thus indicated the sharp struggle between these groups. There were two fights in the congress. The first one was begun by the supporters of Gülek with the demand of an agricultural commission. The second one was over an accusation of the left of center being communist. The most interesting document of the congress was a booklet was presented by Tayfur Sökmen with the titled “The RPP Is at the Center and the Left of Center on the Way to Moscow” (*CHP Ortadadır, Ortanın Solu Moskova'nın Yoludur*).<sup>366</sup> Sökmen was the former president of the former Republic of Hatay, so his position had symbolic importance. He censured the left of center politics, and claimed that the party had abandoned the way of Atatürk.<sup>367</sup>

The congress lasted four days, and was viewed in the public opinion as a struggle between the left and right wings of the party. On the second day of the

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<sup>364</sup> He noted in his notebooks that “for days I have been working my speech. They accorded. On the words of we are not socialist. The continual affliction of Bülent.” (*Kaç gündür beyanatomla uğraşıyorum. Mutabık oldular. Sosyalist değiliz sözü üzerine Bülend'in mütemadi üzüntüsü.*) İnönü, p.977.

<sup>365</sup> İnönü, p.976.

<sup>366</sup> Tayfur Sökmen, *CHP Ortadadır Ortanın Solu Moskova Yoludur* (Ankara: n.p., 1966).

<sup>367</sup> Falih Rıfkı Atay resigned from the RPP for the same reasons.

congress, the supporters of left of center and others delivered speeches. The most influential speakers of the day was Turan Günes of the left of center; on the next Turhan Feyzioglu of the right of center.<sup>368</sup> Ecevit delivered his main congress speech on the third day of the congress and tried to explain what the left of center was for their understanding.<sup>369</sup> His speech was appreciated by the congress, and grabbed the attention of the public opinion.

The highlight of the Congress was İnönü's statement; he delivered two speeches, one of the opening and one of the closing of the Congress.<sup>370</sup> He maintained the inner-party balance of power in his speeches, and noted the left of center character of the party. However, he indicated while the discussions on the left of center had begun with a mistake that had passed his lips, and then stated that the congress had changed this into a meaningful policy.<sup>371</sup> Then he said "the RPP is not a socialist party; moreover, it will not be socialist."<sup>372</sup>

The election was the most critical part of the Congress. Kasim Gülek was a candidate against İnönü for the chairmanship, and received 230 votes compared to İnönü's 929. İnönü was elected president of the party for the fourteenth time. The more critical elections however, were for the Party Assembly. In the bargaining,

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<sup>368</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 20 October 1965.

<sup>369</sup> The speech of Ecevit was based on the book "*Ortanın Solu*."

<sup>370</sup> İsmet İnönü, *Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün 18. Kurultayı Açış Konuşması: 18.10.1966* (Ankara: C.H.P Ulusal Basımevi, 1966) and "CHP 18. Kurultayını Kapama Söylevi." İnönü's speeches had significant effects in the congresses of the RPP. For the speeches of İnönü in the RPP congresses in this period, see *CHP Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün İstanbul-Ankara-İzmir İl Kongreleriyle Ankara İl Merkezinde Yaptığı Konuşmalar* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1966); *C.H.P. XVII. Kurultayı 16 Ekim 1964 : Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün Açış Konuşması* (Ankara: 1964); *C.H.P. Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultaydaki açış-kapanış konuşmaları: 28-29 Nisan 1967* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967).

<sup>371</sup> *Bu ortanın solu meselesinde, bir seçim esnasında belki dalgınlıkla, nasılsa ağızdan çıkmış bir hata gözüyle başlayarak, bir tartışmaya girdik. Ulus*, 22. October 1966.

<sup>372</sup> *CHP sosyalist bir parti değildir ve olmayacaktır. Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün 18. Kurultayı Açış Konuşması*, p.6.

İnönü asked Ecevit to take into their list the names out of the left of center group such as Nihat Erim, Kemal Satır, Turhan Feyzioglu, İsmail Rüstü Aksal, Fuat Sirmen, Kemal Demir, Turhan Sahin, and Tahsin Bekir Balta.<sup>373</sup> Ecevit's group resisted this request, and Ecevit was not inclined to challenge to İnönü. Ecevit accepted the names that İnönü offered, except for Feyzioglu and Aksal. İnönü come together the two groups, and attempted to go to the election with a unified list. The congress issued a resolution for the election of party assembly with the method of sheet listing.<sup>374</sup> In this sheet list, the chances of the well-known politicians were higher than those the young members of the left of center group. At this point, it was crucial that the left of center group had invented a method that gave them an advantage in the congress, a key method. The key list was a method in which the order numbers of the candidates of the group were written on a small sheet, and the delegates who were close to group are advised to select those names.<sup>375</sup>

The Congress constituted a commission called the Commission of Main Issues (*Ana Davalar Komisyonu*), which issued a declaration. The declaration was put to vote at the end of the congress, and it was accepted unanimously.<sup>376</sup> The declaration indicated the bilateral character of the party between the left of center group and the others. In the opening of the declaration, it was declared that the left of center was not a new attempt and that it was the general character of the RPP. Moreover, the content of the left of center was determined by the program of the RPP as follows:

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<sup>373</sup> Saglamer, p.229.

<sup>374</sup> Sheet list is a method of a unique list in which all names of candidates are stated in alphabetical sequence, and the voters elect the names they prefer. So there is only one list in the elections.

<sup>375</sup> The method of the key list was invented by Lebit Yurdoglu.

<sup>376</sup> *CHP 18. Kurultay Bildirisi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basimevi, 1966).



The 18th Congress of the RPP exactly has determined that our party is on the left of center among the political movements with its ideas, ideals, practices and general character.

The foundations in the program of our party displays the content of the term left of center that demonstrates the general character of the RPP.<sup>377</sup>

As clearly seen, the declaration announced that the left of center was not a departure from the traditional RPP policies. Moreover, the RPP guaranteed the public that the left of center policy would not go beyond the program. The program of the RPP had been revised in 1961, and this reference to the RPP program indicated that the left of center was not a break off.

As discussed above, Turkish politics was very unfamiliar with the concepts and categories of western political life. Moreover, a reference to these concepts might have been evaluated as destructive or harmful. Thus the RPP was not out of this tradition, and the party was indicating its distance from socialism or any other western-oriented ideology with these words:

The program of the RPP is not a copy or an imitation of the program or doctrine of any current parties in the world. The program of the RPP is measures that have risen only from the necessities and problems of Turkey. In these principles, the RPP is not a socialist party and it will not be.<sup>378</sup>

This attitude of the RPP Congress reflects the intellectual and social environment of 1960s' Turkey. To follow the same direction with a western political party or to share a common worldview with another foreign party would have been seen as a disgraceful act from this point of view. Moreover, the declaration stated clearly that

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<sup>377</sup> *CHP 18. Kurultayı, CHP'nin kuruluşundan beri izlediği fikirler, ülküler ve icraatı ile genel karakterinin, siyasal akımlar arasında Partimize ortanın solunda yer verdiğini kesinlikle tespit etmiştir. CHP'nin genel karakterini göstermek ortanın solu deyiminin kapsamını, partimizin programında yer alan esaslar ortaya koyar. Ibid.*

<sup>378</sup> *CHP'nin programı, dünyada mevcut partilerden herhangi birinin programının, doktrin kopyası veya taklidi değildir. CHP'nin programı, yalnız başına Türkiye'nin ihtiyaçlarından ve sorunlarından doğmuş tedbirlerdir. Bu esaslar içinde, CHP, sosyalist bir parti değildir ve olmayacaktır. Ibid.*

the RPP was not a socialist party, and the future development of the party was closed to socialism. The RPP emphasized that the left of center policy was not a new direction for the party towards socialism. The RPP had never been a socialist party, and it would never be one.

Through the end of the declaration, the Congress insisted that the left of center character of the RPP had a progressive and important meaning, and repeatedly mentioned the limits and the fact that the RPP was not a socialist party.<sup>379</sup> Moreover, the function of the left of center was put forward as to prevent extremism. This attitude was not a new attempt, and as discussed above, it was the main motion behind the proclamation of the left of center. This function was defined with this statement: “the RPP, with this identity, is the only establishment that represents the reason and common sense and exactly against the constitutionally banned all extreme right and extreme left movements and the tendencies except for democracy.”<sup>380</sup>

After the counting of the votes it was appreciated that the left of center group had gained 19 memberships in the Party Assembly.<sup>381</sup> But these 19 members did not constitute the majority which was composed of 42 members,<sup>382</sup> so while they had gained a decisive number of seats, they were not the majority. The opponents of the left of center obviously were defeated, but they claimed the success of the left of

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<sup>379</sup> Congress determines with the above mentioned records that the sense and declaration of RPP a party on the left of center connotes an important and progressive meaning. *Kurultay, yukarıda belirtilen kayıtlarla, CHP'nin ortanın solunda bir parti olduğu bilincinin ve bunun söylenmesinin de, önemli ve ileri bir anlam taşıdığını tespit eder.*

<sup>380</sup> *CHP, bu hüviyetle, Anayasamızın yasakladığı bütün aşırı sağ ve aşırı sol akınlardan ve demokrasi dışı eğilimlerin kesin olarak karşısında, aklı ve sağduyuyu temsil eden tek kuruluştur.*

<sup>381</sup> This 19 members were Ihsan Topaloğlu, Bülent Ecevit, Muammer Aksoy, Turan Güneş, Ali İhsan Göğüş, Muammer Erten, Lebit Yurdoğlu, İbrahim Öktem, Mustafa Ok, Kemal Evliyaoğlu, Kenan Esengin, Suphi Baykam, Orhan Birgit, Selahattin Hakkı Esatoğlu, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, Mehmet Delikaya, Kemal Sariibrahimoğlu, Yaşar Akal and Hüsni Özkan.

<sup>382</sup> Nihat Erim was the candidate that took the uttermost votes, and Ecevit entered the party Assembly as the eighth rank.

center was a deceit. They charged Lebit Yurdođlu with abuse for the invention of key list, and called him as *Anahtarov*, a word that was reminiscent of the key, implying communism with the suffix -ov- with reference to the Russian language. However, the new method had not affected the results very much, and the left of center had not been able to gain clear majority. So the making of the party administration and the determination of the Secretariat General of the party was dependent on İnönü's will.<sup>383</sup>

On 19 August, Erim proposed Bülent Ecevit to İnönü for the secretariat general of the party, and İnönü rejected this proposal.<sup>384</sup> It is clear that İnönü did not approve of Ecevit for the position, and that his primary choice was Kemal Satir; moreover, he had declared that to Ecevit.<sup>385</sup> However, it was not possible to re-elect Kemal Satir for two reasons. First, he was not willing to be Secretariat General, and he had admitted the responsibility for the election defeat. And second the composition of the Party Assembly might not give the possibility for the election of Kemal Satir. The other potential candidate of İnönü was Nihat Erim, but he did not want any party responsibility, and commended Ecevit upon his good manners. Turhan Feyzioglu another potential candidate, but he was the rival of the group of the left of center, and İnönü had disliked Feyzioglu for a long time.<sup>386</sup> Thus there was

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<sup>383</sup> It was obvious that İnönü was very annoyed with group of left of center because of their operation in the listing, see Altuđ, p.154.

<sup>384</sup> Erim, p.835.

<sup>385</sup> Saglamer, p.222.

<sup>386</sup> According to İnönü Feyzioglu was responsible for the fall of the second government because of his disagreeable character. Feyzioglu had lots of disputes on the topic of planning with the NTP of Ekrem Alican. Moreover Feyzioglu had opposed to the establishment of the third government, and he had proposed the composition of a coalition with the JP.

only one option for İnönü, Bülent Ecevit.<sup>387</sup> Thus in the first session of the Party Assembly on 24 October, Ecevit was elected as the secretariat general.<sup>388</sup>

### The Elimination of the 8s

This movement is against me. I will do what is necessary. (İsmet İnönü)<sup>389</sup>

After the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress, the opponents of the left of center group were very displeased, and tried to find a new way to overcome the left of center. Nihat Erim defined the inner-party situation after the congress as “the majority in the parliamentary group<sup>390</sup> did not acquiesce, and the group of Feyzioglu, Paksüt, Kirca, Aksal and Melen are constantly disturbing.”<sup>391</sup> Thus the main effort of this group was to win the elections on the administration of the parliamentary groups. This was the only way of balancing the power of Ecevit and the left of center group.<sup>392</sup> They had the majority support in the parliamentary group, and they easily got the administration of the parliamentary groups in the elections on 1 November 1966.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Ecevit had exacted İnönü that he could not approve any other duty rather than the secretariat general.

<sup>388</sup> Ecevit took the 31 votes of 43 members.

<sup>389</sup> *Bu hareket bana karşıdır, gereğini yapacağım* (İsmet İnönü).

<sup>390</sup> The parliamentary group was one of the most influential bodies of the RPP. For some of the publications of the parliamentary group, see *İkinci Beş Yıllık Plan Hakkında C.H.P.'nin Görüşü* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Gurup Yayınları, 1967); and *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Temel İktisadi Görüşleri* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Gurup Yayınları, 1966).

<sup>391</sup> *Kurultay neticelerini ve Ecevit'in Genel Sekreter oluşunu CHP'nin parlamento üyeleri çok iyi karşılamadılar. Feyzioglu, Paksüt, Kirca, İ.R. Aksal, Ferit Melen takımları devamlı tahrir ediyorlar.* Erim, p.840.

<sup>392</sup> Ecevit had been determined as the man of the year by the *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*. Ecevit's effect on public opinion was rapidly growing, so the 8s had to act expeditiously.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, p.840.

Turhan Feyzioglu became the deputy chair of the RPP National Assembly group, and Ferit Melen became the deputy chair of the RPP Senate group. The left of center was unable to present their candidates, and the group of Feyzioglu had all of the seats in the parliamentary group administration and this operation was implemented in spite of İnönü's will.<sup>394</sup> İnönü described these elections as jet-black, and noted his notebooks about this election that "Turhan is on the foul way."<sup>395</sup> Thus the sides of the struggle had taken their positions. On the one side, Ecevit and the left of center group based on the party administration, and on the other side, Feyzioglu's group based on the parliamentary group.<sup>396</sup> From İnönü's point of view, the movement of Feyzioglu was positioned against his administration; moreover he concluded by saying, "there is no doubt that their action is against me" in a conversation with Nihat Erim.<sup>397</sup>

After this confrontation, the session of the Party Assembly was crucial because of the determination of the method of struggle. The Party Assembly began on 24 December and lasted until 31 December.<sup>398</sup> During these eight days, the two sides argued and it was very difficult for them to reach compromise on almost any issue. The group of the 8s accused the group of Ecevit, and the most striking charges came from Ferit Melen, who asked Ecevit whether he was a socialist or not with an

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<sup>394</sup> Ibid., p.840.

<sup>395</sup> *Grup yönetim kurulu seçimi simsiyah. Turhan fena yolda.* İnönü, p.981.

<sup>396</sup> Feyzioglu's group had eight seats in the Party Assembly, and they were called as 8s with the reference of these eight seats. The names of the 8s were Turhan Feyzioglu, Ferit Melen, Fehmi Alpaslan, Coşkun Kırca, Süreyya Koç, Orhan Öztrak, Turan Şahin and Emin Paksüt.

<sup>397</sup> Erim, p.841.

<sup>398</sup> For the meeting of the party assembly, see *Ulus* of these days.

incriminatory wording, and Ecevit avoided the question repeatedly.<sup>399</sup> 25 December was the most nervous day of the meeting and Feyzioglu shouted at Yasar Akal: “You are slandering shamelessly!”<sup>400</sup>

On the last day of the sessions, the Assembly discussed the final draft of the resolution that had been prepared by Turan Günes, Nihat Erim and Kemal Demir.<sup>401</sup> Feyzioglu’s group opposed the resolution and demanded an amendment that said that the RPP was not a socialist party and would not be a socialist party as had been stated in the declaration of the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress and İnönü’s speech at the congress.<sup>402</sup> However, the left of center group opposed this proposal, and Turan Günes claimed that this proposal was malicious because its main motive was to argue that they would have moved the party towards socialism, and they were opposed this operation.<sup>403</sup> This proposal created a deep crisis in the party administration. İnönü obviously supported the left of center group. However, the main crisis began after the reflection of the issue to the public opinion. The administration of the official newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus*, had been changed by Ecevit. A supporter of the left of center group, Altan Öymen, had been brought to the head of the newspaper.<sup>404</sup> Just after the party assembly session, the discussions in the party assembly session were

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<sup>399</sup> Moreover Melen had labeled Ecevit “dogwood” (*kızılcık*) as an insult. Saglamer, p.234. For the right-wing criticisms of Ecevit and the “left of center,” see Erhan Löker, *Ortanın Solu Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ve Türkiye* (Ankara: İsa Matbaacılık, 1969); and Hilmi Perek, *Ecevit Tipi ‘Ortanın Solu’ Sosyalizmdir* (Ankara, Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1967). On the other hand Turkish socialist were harshly criticizing Ecevit for his previous career in the Ministry of Working. For a clear example of this criticisms, see *SBF Fikir Kulübü Açıklar: Ortanın Solu* (Ankara: n.p., 1967).

<sup>400</sup> *Parti Meclisinde Feyzioglu kendine kaybederek Samsun Milletvekili Yaşar Akal’a “Hayasızca itiraf ediyorsun” diye hücum etti. Herkes ayıpladı.* Erim, p.845.

<sup>401</sup> *Ulus*, 3 January 1967.

<sup>402</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>404</sup> Saglamer, p.233.

published in *Ulus*.<sup>405</sup> It was somehow irregular, because the party assembly sessions were closed to the public. The news in *Ulus* reflected the views of the left of center group.

Just after the publishing of *Ulus* and other newspapers, the group of 8s issued a declaration on 2 January that put forward the views of the group 8s and claimed that *Ulus* had published a false representation.<sup>406</sup> The declaration that was based on the Congress speech of İnönü and the Congress resolution stated that the RPP was not a socialist party and would not be a socialist party. Thus the group of Feyzioglu attempted to justify their position with this evidence, and accused the party administration of violating the party program and election declaration. Moreover, this declaration noted the Kemalist heritage of the RPP and put forward that the essential views of the party had been formed by the Kemalist six arrows and the program of the party.<sup>407</sup>

The request of the party administration and Ecevit was to issue the resolution of a Central Administration Board on 8 January.<sup>408</sup> In this resolution, they charged the 8s with collaborating with the opponents of the RPP, and warned the group of 8s against damaging the party.<sup>409</sup> Two days later, the 8s issued an alternative declaration that aimed to raise the tension and charged the party administration with distorting

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<sup>405</sup> “The Summary Of Party Assembly Sessions,” *Ulus*, 3 January 1967.

<sup>406</sup> “CHP Parti Meclisindeki Konuşmalarla İlgili Açıklama,” in *İlk Açıklama Ve Bazı İthamlara Cevap* (Ankara, 1967), pp.1-5.

<sup>407</sup> The declaration put forwards that RPP was founded by Atatürk and Atatürk pointed in 1936 that RPP is not a socialist or liberal party. So the group of 8s points that the historical background and programmatic principles of the RPP contradicts with socialism. *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>408</sup> For this resolution see *15-16 Mart 1967'de Ankara'da toplanan C.H.P. Parti Meclisi Merkez İdare Kurulunun Raporu, Genel Sekreter Ecevit'in konuşması, C.H.P. Parti Meclisinin Bildirisi* (Ankara: *Ulusal Basımevi*, 1967), p.4.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*

reality on 10 January.<sup>410</sup> On the same day, the administrations of the parliamentary groups declared the support of the position of the 8s in a press conference.<sup>411</sup> Thus the party administration, the left of center group, and the 8s group, Feyzioglu's group were in an open struggle, and the battle was going on in the face of the public. On 25 January Feyzioglu advanced a new attempt, and sought a vote of confidence from the parliamentary groups.<sup>412</sup> The vote created a deep debate, however, because left of center group claimed that the vote of confidence was null and void. They argued that there were not enough members in the elections, and the number of absent deputies was more than the ready deputies, so there were not enough deputies for a decision.

This event marked a certain break between the sides, but İnönü was not sure about the discharge of the 8s because of the anxiety that arose from the attitude of the party organization.<sup>413</sup> In order to find out the position of the local party officers, İnönü called a minor congress to come together on 4 February.<sup>414</sup> İnönü told the party organization that he supported the group of Ecevit and he did not want to work with the group of 8s.<sup>415</sup> He noted that he was able to manipulate the party organization for an operation against the 8s.<sup>416</sup> Thus the left of center group opened

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<sup>410</sup> "Ortak Demeç" in *İlk Açıklama Ve Bazı İthamlara Cevap* (Ankara, 1967), pp.7-8.

<sup>411</sup> Kili, p.235.

<sup>412</sup> They had the majority in the vote of confidence, but the group of the left of center did not attend the vote. So the validity of the voting was disputable. For this elections, see *ibid.*, p.235.

<sup>413</sup> *Hurriyet* had published a survey that claimed that 80 percent of the RPP Province chairs were opposed to the left of center. Bozkurt, p.116.

<sup>414</sup> The meeting of the Party Administration and Province Chairs was called a Minor Congress, and this meeting lasted three days.

<sup>415</sup> For the speech of İnönü on this meeting, see *CHP, 4-5-6 Şubat 1967'de Ankara'da toplanan C.H.P. iller toplantısı : Genel başkan İnönü'nün açış konuşması-yayınlanan bildiri* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967), pp.3-15.

<sup>416</sup> The declaration of the minor congress shows İnönü's ability to manipulate the party organization (see *ibid.*, pp.16-17). However, it possible to suggest that İnönü considered being approved by the party organization the left of center and to put an end to the struggle. But the later attitudes of the



an alternative campaign against the 8s that lasted until 15 March. On this day the Party Assembly got together. İnönü and the left of center group were clearly determined to discharge the 8s and Feyzioglu.<sup>417</sup> The best example of this determination was reflected the pages of *Akis* magazine that was directed by the son in law of İnönü Metin Toker. *Akis* likened Feyzioglu and Çerkez Ethem and claimed that these two had several common features, including being ambitious and opposed to İnönü.<sup>418</sup>

It is remarkable that Turhan Feyzioglu, as the former leader of the progressive group, initiated a campaign against the left of center. His conversion indicates how the Turkish political life was far from intellectual consistency. The conversion of Feyzioglu might be assessed as the result of the political career estimation after İnönü, because İnönü had had negative perceptions of Feyzioglu since the end of the second coalition government. As mentioned in the previous pages, İnönü had held Feyzioglu responsible for the fall of the government; moreover, his opposition to the establishment of the third government had made İnönü disfavor Feyzioglu. So it is possible that Feyzioglu would have suggested the impossibility of his success on the side of İnönü. However, no statement can explain the conversion of Feyzioglu.<sup>419</sup> As an example, in May 1965, Pierre Mendes-France came to Turkey and Feyzioglu

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groups such as fighting in the district Congress of Beysehir demonstrated that the impossibility of the co-existence of these groups in the same party.

<sup>417</sup> Until the party assembly session, Ecevit had visited 26 provinces, but the most important advantage of the left of center group was İnönü's open support and his effect on the local party officers.

<sup>418</sup> *Akis*, no.659 (4 February 1967).

<sup>419</sup> Turhan Feyzioglu had resisted the pressure of the DP on the universities, and resigned from the deanery of the Political Sciences Faculty at Ankara University. In his early writings in *Forum* he had advocated libertarian views and as mentioned in the previous chapter he had led the progressive side in his political career in the RPP.

traveled with Mendes-France throughout Anatolia.<sup>420</sup> Feyzioglu was deeply impressed by Mendes-France, and published his impression in a series in *Milliyet* in which he praised Mendes-France's socialism.

In the party assembly session that was opened on 15 March, there was no possibility to create a compromise.<sup>421</sup> Each side attacked the other with arguments that had been used from the beginning of 1967. The group of 8s put forward proposals to the party assembly that might be concluded as repetitions of former suggestions. The party assembly rejected all proposals of these because the left of center group was holding the majority.<sup>422</sup> The group of the left of center concluded all of its views on the issue in the report of the Executive Board that was presented to the party assembly.<sup>423</sup> Moreover, Bülent Ecevit, as the secretary general, delivered a speech in which he accused the 8s of acting like a public prosecutor.<sup>424</sup> The accusations of the 8s were focused on three issues that all might be concluded in the same way as an inclination to the socialism. Two of these accusations were articles in *Ulus* written by Haluk Nurbaki and Yurdakul Fincancı. The third one was a speech by Ecevit in the Beysehir district congress in which he attempted to compare the RPP and British Labor Party.<sup>425</sup> Moreover, the 8s published a memorandum which attempted to adduce proofs for Ecevit and the left of center group's inclination to

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<sup>420</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 19 March 1965.

<sup>421</sup> İnönü could not attend the Party Assembly sessions because of health problems, so the left of center group could act more harshly.

<sup>422</sup> For this proposes, see *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Parti Meclisi'ne sunulan önerge: huzursuzluğun sebepleri ve giderilme yolları* (Ankara: n.p., 1967).

<sup>423</sup> See CHP, *15-16 Mart 1967'de Ankara'da toplanan C.H.P. Parti Meclisi Merkez İdare Kurulunun Raporu, Genel Sekreter Ecevit'in konuşması, C.H.P. Parti Meclisinin Bildirisi* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967), pp.3-45.

<sup>424</sup> For the speech of Ecevit, see *ibid.*, pp.46-71.

<sup>425</sup> For the answers of Ecevit for this accusations, see *ibid.*, pp.58-68.

socialism.<sup>426</sup> In this memorandum the 8s report stated on several news and articles published in *Ulus* that were labeled as the fancies of socialism. In addition, the speeches of Ecevit and some articles in the magazine *Kim* were assessed in the same manner. The memorandum also warned the members of the RPP to be aware of the dangers and to protect the Kemalist RPP from the socialists of the RPP.<sup>427</sup>

In the final analysis, the supporters of the left of center noted that socialism, as a political ideology, differed in the dimension of time and space, so there was not only one socialism. Thus the left of center group attempted to defend itself from the charges of being socialist. The 8s claim that the existence of varieties of socialism did not differentiate the resolution of the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress that said the RPP was not a socialist party, so there was no place for socialists in the RPP.<sup>428</sup> Moreover, for the 8s the final goal of the socialist parties was to abolish the class based structure of societies and to nationalize the means of production, so they argued that the historical development, the structure and the tradition of the RPP was not similar to those of socialist parties.<sup>429</sup>

The only way of solving the problem in the RPP was with a congress, so the Party Assembly called the congress to come together on 14 April to change the party statute. The changes in the party statute were foreseen for Articles 45, 46 and 50 that regulated the procedures for expulsion from the party.<sup>430</sup> Thus the main agenda of the

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<sup>426</sup> *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ndeki Tartışmaların İç Yüzü: Belgeler* (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1967).

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, p.49.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19.

<sup>429</sup> See *ibid.*, p.20-21.

<sup>430</sup> Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, p.253. According to the RPP statutes the deputies' and senators' expulsion process was determined by the parliamentary group, so they could not be expelled by a resolution of the discipline committee. The aim of the changes in the statute was to provide the legal possibility for expelling the 8s.

congress would be the elimination of the 8s and Feyzioglu; however, the official agenda of the congress was not made public. The group of the left of center and İnönü clearly were determined to expel the group of 8s from the party, and the above-mentioned minor congress that had been convened on 4 February demonstrated that the party organization would behave harmoniously with İnönü's will. The party organization also claimed that the policies and accusations of the 8s were in accordance with the other parties and the publications that are close with the JP supported the 8s.<sup>431</sup>

The date of the congress was postponed to 28 April from 14 April because of the health problems of İnönü.<sup>432</sup> The congress began on 28 April with the speech of İnönü. The interesting part of İnönü's speech was the unanticipated resemblance between the views of the 8s. İnönü stated that the limits of the left of center were determined by the election declaration; moreover, he repeated his view that the RPP was not a socialist party, and would not be.<sup>433</sup> And he charged the 8s with subverting the peace in the party, and being at unknown persons' command. In his speech İnönü differentiated socialism and the RPP by stating the differences in the fields of nationalism, republicanism and secularism. He emphasized the historical heritage of the RPP, and noted as a symbol of this heritage the difference between of and socialism. Last, İnönü wanted the congress to make the proposed statute changes, and the congress approved all of his recommendations and the way to eliminate Feyzioglu and his group was opened.

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<sup>431</sup> For a clear example, see CHP Gençlik Kolları Merkez Yönetim Kurulu, *8'lerden Davacıyız* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Gençlik Kolları Yayınları, 1967).

<sup>432</sup> İnönü had a heart spasm. Bozkurt, p.119.

<sup>433</sup> For the speech of İnönü see CHP, *C.H.P. Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultaydaki Açış-Kapanış Konuşmaları: 28-29 Nisan 1967* (Ankara: C.H.P Genel Sekreterliği Basın ve Propaganda Bürosu Yayınları, 1967).

The declaration of the congress said that the 8s would not *share the honor of becoming RPP members*. The meaning of this sentence and the changes in the party statute was the exclusion of the 8s from the party.<sup>434</sup> Just after the congress, however, Feyzioglu's group resigned from the RPP without waiting to be expelled. In the closure of the Congress İnönü stated that the elimination action was limited only to the 8s, and that he had turned over a new leaf.<sup>435</sup> But within a few days the number of resignations reached 48.<sup>436</sup> This was the biggest chain of resignations that had been seen in Turkish political history to that date.

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<sup>434</sup> "CHP 4. Olağanüstü Kurultayı Bildirisi," *Ulus*, 30 April 1967.

<sup>435</sup> C.H.P. Genel Başkanı İsmet İnönü'nün IV. Olağanüstü Kurultaydaki açış-kapanış konuşmaları.

<sup>436</sup> For the basic economic and social views of the RPP after the elimination of the 8s, see Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1968); CHP, *Bozuk Düzeni Değiştireceğiz* (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayınları, 1968); CHP, *CHP'li Gözüyle Temel Sorunlarımız* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1968).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

The last quarter of the twentieth century was a period of defeat for the political left. The neo-liberal hegemony overcame almost the whole globe; the Keynesian compromise of the “golden age” was terminated, the Soviet Union imploded along with most of the utopia; and the market economy and political democracy were considered as resistible phenomena or, in other words, the “end of the history” arrived. In this framework, the possibility of and necessity for left politics began to be questioned in the 1990s.

One of the possible political consequences of the above-mentioned claims was that the left and right had no distinctive meaning. One of the strongest oppositions to this claim came from an Italian thinker, Norberto Bobbio. Bobbio, in his bestselling book, *Left and Right the Significance of a Political Distinction*, argued that these terms, “left” and “right,” are still explanatory for political life.<sup>437</sup> He points to the relationship between the left and right as antithetical terms, and he claimed their distinction proves the existence of each other. Moreover, Bobbio points out that in the predominance of one side the other undermines the importance of the left/right distinction. He calls this behavior expedient for hiding one’s own weakness.<sup>438</sup> He

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<sup>437</sup> Norberto Bobbio, *Left and Right the Significance of a Political Distinction* (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996).

<sup>438</sup> *Ibid.*, p.14.

writes that the fall of Fascism, as considered right, did not give an end to right politics, and after the war the small right groups undermined the distinction.<sup>439</sup> Thus Bobbio concludes that the implosion of the Soviet Union does not mean the end of the existence of left or right antithetically.

The content of this antithetical character of the left and right, for Bobbio, is based on equality and inequality.<sup>440</sup> Thus he says that the universal distinction between the left and right was shaped by an ethical perception of being on the side of equality or not. When we define standing on the left as Bobbio does, as standing on the side of equality, it is clear that despite all of its difficulties, left politics will be and needs to be influential in Turkish political life. However, the recent history of Turkey does not fit Bobbio's model in one sense. Although almost all modern Turkish history has been shaped by right politics, the left has not been able to gain strength. Center-left politics in Turkey, time and again, dissolve and resemble right politics. In this framework, a question arises of whether the traditional party of Turkish center-left, the RPP, has been able or unable to evolve into a social democratic party.

In the thesis work, social democracy and the emergence of left of center in the RPP were investigated. The open result of the study was that the main difference between western and Turkish social democracy is the issue of historical origin. The western social democratic party had emerged as the political organization of the working classes and it carried out a solidarity community character. In the post-war era the social democracy of Europe identified itself with the measures of the welfare state and the pluralistic political regime. The Turkish social democratic movement,

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<sup>439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid., p.60.

however, was the result of a link between Kemalism and socialism in 1960s' Turkey. The analyzed period of the thesis, 1965 to 1967, was the construction period of this project. İsmet İnönü's proclamation that the RPP was on the left of center was the result of preventing the accusations of supporting communism. And after the election defeat, this term was quickly abandoned. But the later events and inner-party power struggle brought this slogan onto the agenda for blaming İnönü for the ongoing election defeats. There were several reasons that made very difficult to transform this left of center into an egalitarian and libertarian social democratic politics. Some of these reasons were the historical heritage of the RPP, the motive behind the proclamation of the left of center by İnönü, the organizational structure of the RPP but most importantly the left politics imagination of İnönü and RPP, harmonious with this period's nationalist and developmentalist views, was formed without working classes. Although social democracy emerged and developed as the political organization of the working classes in the Western Europe, the "left of center" in Turkey was the claim of standing on the left with nationalism, secularism and developmentalism. And the labor movement was perceived with doubts by this political line. This inclination of center-left in Turkey, most importantly the RPP-centric center left, has carried on up to the present day.

On the other hand, the history of the RPP was not deemed appropriate to the criteria that are used in academic writing to classify a political party as social democratic. The dominant methods that were discussed in the second chapter of the thesis are the approaches of Adam Przeworski and Gosta Esping Andersen. Their classifying tools are meaningful examining the distinctive features of the social democratic parties primarily from communist parties and secondly bourgeois parties. But it is difficult to understand Turkish political life with these theoretical tools



because of the formation of Turkish political culture and very different social conditions. The RPP has not faced with the conditions that Przeworski and Andersen stated, so it was not so possible to expect a historical evolution from the RPP as social democratic parties of Western Europe did.

Political parties in Turkey did not emerge as the western political parties did. So the class formation for the political parties is very different in Turkey. Turkish political parties, as the origin “the Party of Union and Progress,” are somehow a coalition of sects that are organized around important political personalities.<sup>441</sup> So the new parties emerged as divisions of the old parties.<sup>442</sup> The Democrat Party was established by a sect in the RPP; the Nation Party was established by an opponent sect in the DP; the Freedom Party also established by sect in the DP; the Trust Party (*Güven Partisi*) of Turhan Feyzioglu was established again by a sect around him.<sup>443</sup> The list might be extended. The Turkish political life and formation of different political parties are thus clearly different from the western counterparts.

Therefore the RPP’s historical evolution does not fit a model that indicates the evolution of western social democratic parties. The RPP was the founding party of the political regime, and it had the mission of state and nation building. Thus the historical origins of the RPP were very different from those of the western social democratic parties. It may be possible to compare the RPP with the Congress Party in India or the Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico. The common features of these parties are that they were established in late-industrialized countries and they are the founding parties of the state.

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<sup>441</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya traces this tendency of Turkish political parties from the beginning of the Union and Progress Party.

<sup>442</sup> Kayalı, pp.52-53.

<sup>443</sup> The only exception was the TWP, but it could not stand very long in parliamentary politics.

As a founder party, the RPP had an obligation to advocate the founding principles of the state as national unity and secularism. However, this heritage impeded the party from creating solutions for the current cultural and identity problems of the country, because a political shift removed the party from its founding aims. So the party advocated the insoluble positions of status quo on such important issues as the Kurdish question and the dichotomy between secularism and Islamism.

Another important effect of the historical roots of the RPP on its current politics presents itself in social and political issues. The agenda of the party was dominated by such issues as nationalism, the threat perceptions of Turkey, the protection of the founding principles or national security. For this reason, the economic and social issues were negligible for the party; in other words, these issues were of secondary importance. For example the protection of the secular regime was always more important for the RPP than public health or education. Thus the criticism of the party, in 2007, against the government of the Justice and Development Party directed at the rising Islamic cadres are in the sectors of education and health rather than the condition of these social services.

The historical heritage of the RPP, in contrast with the western social democratic parties, has a strong anti-communist and anti-socialist discourse. The party, most importantly in the single-party period, suppressed any organized labor movement. In the western examples, particularly in Scandinavia and in Britain, social democratic parties had vertical and horizontal links with the trade unions, and in many places the social democratic parties emerged as the political organization of the working classes. However, there was no such relation pattern in Turkish political culture and the parties tend to approach the trade-unions in a patronage behavioral

pattern. Moreover, the Turkish center-left preferred to become influential in political life via bureaucratic tutelage rather than organized social movements.

The RPP, by its nature, has a strong nationalist discourse. It is clear that in the present conditions the party does not carry on its nationalism of the single-party period. But as a historical continuity the party's nationalist discourse makes the party act on the bases of such perceptions of "national interest" and "*Realpolitik*." So this situation obstructs the party from correlating with the international solidarism of social democratic parties. In March 2007, the head of the RPP, Deniz Baykal, accused the Justice and Development Party of affiliating with western social democratic parties, although he himself was a member of the executive board of the Socialist International.<sup>444</sup>

The main point the thesis study indicated was how the "left of center" as the genesis of Turkish social democracy is different from western social democracy. The agenda, political priorities, organization body, historical heritage of the party and lots of several differences were examined to demonstrate the inability of the left of center's to transform into a social democratic movement.

As a country in which the left was banned up to the 1960s, the left of center had a function to legitimize the left in Turkey. İnönü's left of center, despite all its ambiguities and disparities, made the term "left" a normal category in Turkish politics. However, since the emergence of the left of center approximately forty years have passed and social democratic politics have not been represented in Turkish politics implicitly. These forty years in themselves are the main indicator of how difficult it is to transform Kemalism into a western-oriented social democracy. Almost in all historical currents the Kemalist heritage has overcome the social

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<sup>444</sup> Yalçın Doğan, "Sosyalist'lerden AKP'ye Adaylık Önerisi," *Hurriyet* 14 March 2007.

democratic politics in the RPP. Thus it is crucial for social democracy in Turkey to create an alternative discourse that goes beyond the left of center.

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