

PRINCE SABAHATTIN (1878-1948) AND HIS PLACE IN OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT

by
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This thesis examines Prince Sabahattin's place in Ottoman intellectual development that started to flourish in *Tanzimat* era. Prince Sabahattin is portrayed with his intellectual capacity, besides his stance in politics as a liberal and his lead in social sciences. As an intellectual, Prince Sabahattin was misunderstood in his own period due to his close association to Anglo-Saxon system with decentralization and private initiative issues that were pillars of liberalism. Although he did not involve actively in politics, he influenced the formation of opposition party, *Ahrar* (Liberal Party). But his main impact was putting individual development to the core for the advancement of the society, which, according to him, was possible only by inner dynamics, rather than applying top-down reforms. For this, he outlined a social program, *Meslek-i İctimai* (Profession of Sociology), which was the first attempt to look for the solutions of social problems, like administration, education and village development in a systematic way that he learned from the French sociologist, Le Play. In this program, which was shaped around the belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon system, he emphasized the importance of individualistic form of society, rather than communitarian one and put the British type of education to the core, which led the prospering of individual by himself rather than kinship ties or community bonds for the advancement of society. The Village Institutes of the 1940s could be traced back him, since he was the first one to mention the importance of village development, which became one of the main issues in 1940s. Although his lack of knowledge of Ottoman society could not be ignored because of his belonging to the Ottoman dynasty, as a son of Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa and Seniha Sultan (Abdulhamid II's sister), compared to his contemporaries, his program was a permanent and a projectionist one, which left an imprint in both Turkish politics and social sciences.

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Başlık: Prens Sabahattin (1878-1948) ve Osmanlı Entellektüel Gelişimindeki Yeri

Bu tez Prens Sabahattin'in Tanzimat ile başlayan Osmanlı entellektüel gelişimindeki yerini incelemektedir. Bir liberal olarak siyasetteki duruşuna ve sosyal bilimlerdeki yerine göre bir aydın olarak ele alınmıştır. Liberalizmin ana maddeleri olan adem-i merkezîyet ve şahsi teşebbüse inanarak İngiliz sistemiyle yakından ilgilendiği için Prens Sabahattin kendi zamanında anlaşılammış bir aydındır. Siyasette aktif olarak yer almamasına karşın düşünceleri liberal bir muhalefet partisi (*Ahrar*) oluşturmuştur. Sabahattin'in asıl etkisi, toplumun gelişimi için yukarıdan uygulanan ihraç edilmiş reformların yerine, kişisel gelişimi savunmasıdır. Fransız sosyolog Le Play'den etkilenecek yönetim biçimi, eğitim ve köy gelişimi gibi sosyal problemlere çözüm aramış ve *Meslek-i İçtimai* programıyla Osmanlı aydınları arasında ilk defa sistemli bir program uygulamıştır. Anglo-Sakson sisteminin üstünlüğünü savunduğu programında, *tecemmüi* (komüniter) yerine *infiradi* (ferdiyetçi) toplum yapısını benimsemiş ve aile ve toplum ilişkileri yerine bireysel gelişimi ön planda tutan İngiliz eğitim sisteminin önemini vurgulamıştır. Prens Sabahattin köylerin gelişimini göz önünde tutan ve programında bunu da kapsayan ilk aydın olduğu için 1940larda gelişen Köy Enstitülerinin oluşumu Prens Sabahattin'e kadar getirilebilir. Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa ve II. Abdülhamid'in kız kardeşi Seniha Sultan'ın oğlu olarak kendisinin Osmanlı toplumuna mesafesi gözden kaçırılmaz, fakat çağdaşlarına göre sosyal programı kalıcı ve ileri görüşlü olması sebebiyle Prens Sabahattin, Osmanlı/Türk siyasetinde ve sosyal bilimlerinde iz bırakmıştır.

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*To my parents,
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The development of an intelligentsia in Turkey has a short past and limited influence in society compared to Europe. It came into being with and as a result of long political and social conflicts within the elite and within the masses. Beginning from the Tanzimat and through the Republican period, Turkish society encountered radical break ups, revolutions and new political and economic systems, but most importantly a new mentality which they needed for setting by these hard transition periods. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the new political entity and the struggle to place the new state in the Western world paved the way for leading state figures and the intelligentsia to act and “think” in accordance with daily political activities and short-term political concerns with superficial knowledge of the West. Even in the eighteenth century, the political and social thought lying behind the façade of the French revolution had not entered into the Empire. Ottoman intellectuals, not many in number at that time, were stuck in discussions regarding the near future and were not deeply moved by this spurt. Beginning from that period, the Western thought was impervious to Ottoman society and the Ottoman intellectuals were tenacious in dispersing Western ideas by their own means, rather than the recognized and reputable Western discourse.

Not only in the Ottoman/Turkish modernization period, which still continues; as sole elements of modernization, “enlightenment” and “progress” are problematic ever since “liberated” minds of the West started to question the accustomed ways of thinking and maintained a critical attitude toward inherited authority. “The

Enlightenment occasioned nothing less than the transformation of learned Western culture with consequences for all aspects of Western thought, society and culture.”¹ Şerif Mardin stated in a symposium of Enlightenment that it is characterized by three elements: 1. There are ideas. 2. Within the light of the ideas, there is a structure, which showed itself embedded or formulated in state institutions. 3. A group of people with a common bond of evolutionary or revolutionary ideas.² Enlightenment thoughts do not come out of one source and has indirect influence over the masses with their imposition of “change.” Hume, Voltaire and Rousseau have different codes in explaining the individual in politics, philosophy and ethics. But there are two common points in their seeking “the reality” and “the truth.” The driving force of all the enlightenment philosophers was their finding resemblance of nature and human and rejection of arbitrary authority.

The cosmopolitan and universalizing nature of Enlightenment did not prevent it to coexist in particular national or provincial contexts. Mardin notes that the Turkish modernization process, influenced by the first Austria, then by France, started to occur in three ways: Positivist applications of the state, publishing and development of study of medicine. These three elements shaped the Ottoman modernization which has profound importance in understanding the dichotomies of the present Turkish modernization, between the members of dispossessed classes who had failed to become integrated into the social system and the ones who determine the rules and the roles.

In Europe, these were determined earlier than the Ottoman Empire, in which Ottoman intellectuals started to flourish later than the Western ones. They were influenced mostly by the French, but it is arguable that whether they learned the

¹ Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, s.v. “Enlightenment.”

² Enlightenment Symposium, 11 May 2007, Ottoman Bank Museum, Istanbul, Turkey.

West from primary sources of Kant, Rousseau or Hume or involving in a popular wave of the “culturization,” they embraced these Western notions to position themselves apart from the masses. Although beginning from the late nineteenth century, in the short history of Ottoman intellectual development, intellectuals understood some Western notions, however superficially and it is sure that they worked whole-heartedly to close the gap. One of the leading social scientists who has worked on Turkish intellectual development, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, states that Ottoman intellectuals did not live in ivory towers and used all possibilities to present Western ideas and led new social movements³. They developed some ideas of their own from political representation to social science and questioned the accustomed ways of the Ottomans in each sphere of life from politics to literature and language. They watched the political developments closely and tried not to fall behind them. They were self-made men and more than aware of their responsibilities for society, a concept which had been formulated in accordance to social science that had been learned from the French. This approach, however, distanced them from the people and confused the minds of those who wanted to be Western and modern at the same time as Ottoman and Muslim.

Prince Sabahattin (1878-1948) was one of the prominent intellectuals with these features. Like his colleagues, he, too, focused on the advancement of society from politics to community problems, from education to administration. The disintegration of the Empire and the oppressive regime of Abdulhamid II, his own family background, education and wide interest in social problems shaped his thoughts and led him to develop a more comprehensive approach to Westernization with a social program of his own. He was different from the Ottoman intellectuals

³ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1979), p.3.

who believed that “western civilization was inherently good and superior based upon entirely new foundations”⁴ in the sense that he applied science to social problems for the first time and outlined a social program for the transformation of society. His social program, published with a title of *How Can Turkey be Recovered? (Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?)* was a comprehensive one that included solutions to social problems like village development, education and administration, and sought answers in sociology, which was taken from the French.

Instead of concentrating on short-term political concerns and solutions for the salvation of the Empire, like his colleagues, Sabahattin’s program offered a radical change rather than a transition period. Besides emphasizing the importance of free administration and systematic education, he proposed the British system of decentralization. His proposal of decentralization and private initiation was not welcomed by the leading Ottoman figures, but Sabahattin left an imprint in social thought with his revolutionary ideas that were new for that period. Thus, he became an important intellectual of that time, mainly in the newly developing area of social science.

Sabahattin opened the path for the development of the social sciences and labeled it *Meslek-i İçtima*, which in the following years, was followed by new social scientists. Although he did not involve in politics and draw attention of large scale of masses, his name was widely recognized with his intellectual activities. His name is referred to even today in many novels about Ottoman and Turkish modernization period, like Orhan Pamuk’s *Cevdet Bey and His Sons*⁵ and Zülfü Livaneli’s *Leyla’s House*.⁶ Prince Sabahattin was put forward as an illustration of an atypical Ottoman

⁴ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 297.

⁵ Orhan Pamuk, *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006).

intellectual with wisdom and capacity in these novels. In many newspaper articles, importance of his ideas and his attitude towards modernization was covered by Taha Akyol,⁷ Çetin Altan,⁸ and Derya Sazak.⁹ Also, recently, he has become a subject of the discussions on decentralization and private initiation which have gained weight in Turkey regarding the representation of minority groups, and he is admitted as the first liberal intellectual. However, his contribution to social science is more important than his liberal stance in politics, since different from his contemporaries, he believed a social program, centered around education, would yield advancement.

Maintaining an important place, Prince Sabahattin has been studied by some prominent social scientists like Cavit Orhan Tütengil and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, and has been included in the studies of leading historians such as Şerif Mardin and Şükrü Hanioglu. In these studies, Prince Sabahattin is only subject of sociology, in which his stance and leadership in the development of sociology could not be ignored. Not undermining his stance in the development of social science, in this thesis, I would like to elaborate on Ottoman intellectual development and his place in it. His social program, which was the first attempt to enlighten society with a scientific approach which have been undertaken by Ziya Gökalp in the following years and his understanding of liberalism will be the main part of the thesis. The first two chapters will focus on the Ottoman intellectual movement prior to Sabahattin, since in Şerif Mardin's words, "the rise of the first organized intellectual opposition"

⁶ Zülfü Livaneli, *Leyla'nın Evi* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2006).

⁷ His newspaper articles about Ottoman modernization in *Milliyet* were collected in a book, *Gelenek ve Türk Aydını* (Istanbul: Kadim Yayınları, 2006).

⁸ Çetin Altan, "Adem-i Merkeziyet'çi Prens Sabahattin ve Türkiye'de Yaşam Kalitesi," *Milliyet*, 3 March 2007.

⁹ Derya Sazak, "Meşveret," *Milliyet*, 11 December, 2004.

to the political powers occurred in this era.¹⁰ They formed the backbone of the Ottoman Enlightenment period with their approaches towards modernization and nationalism. Due to the extent of this period and the complexity of the stances maintained toward the Tanzimat, with three important movements, Westernization, Islamism and Turkism, there was a diversity in approaches for securing the regime in the Ottoman Empire. In the first two chapters, I will briefly explain the stances maintained towards modernization and will cover the suggestions of intellectuals. The next chapters will present Prince Sabahattin's stance among intellectuals and the Young Turks of which he took the leading role for some time. The main part of the thesis will be concerned with his social program and his understanding of liberalism. Then, his influence on the development of sociology will be covered and this will be followed by a conclusion.

The abundance of material regarding the Young Turks induced me to narrow the sources in accordance to the influence and imprint of the works in academia. In addition to major academic works, memoirs and newspaper articles were examined in a way that would illustrate an objective study. For the development of Ottoman intellectuals and development of the Young Turk ideology, the books and articles of prominent academicians, Şerif Mardin and Şükrü Hanioglu, were used. In placing Sabahattin in the historical context, I referred to Enver Ziya Karal, Feroz Ahmad and Eric Zürcher; for the development of Turkish intellectuals, prominent social scientists Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Niyazi Berkes were referenced. The main task of evaluating Sabahattin as an intellectual and understanding his intellectual development depends on his book *How Can Turkey be Recovered?* and a colleague of Sabahattin and personal associate, Nezahat Nurettin Ege's collection of articles as

¹⁰ Şerif Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 1.

well as the leading sociologists Cavit Orhan Tütengil and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu's research on Sabahattin. Although the thesis aims to elaborate on the Ottoman intellectual development and Sabahattin's place in it, the historical background of the Young Turks with the First and Second Congresses and Sabahattin's stance on the politics were covered in order to position Sabahattin corresponding to his intellectual development.

CHAPTER II

WESTERNIZATION AND OTTOMAN INTELLECTUALS

The First Generation of Ottoman Intellectuals

Ottoman intellectuals started to have a say in the Westernization process of Ottoman society beginning with the Tanzimat reforms (1839). The nineteenth century political and social reforms and the Western powers' intervention to Ottoman reforms have always been matters of discussion, but from the middle of the nineteenth century on, as the name of Niyazi Berkes' book *Development of Secularism*, reveals, secularism started to prevail and the Western values started to be questioned. The Tanzimat reformers and Ottoman intellectuals had realized the importance of Western technology and the Western understanding of politics much earlier, but their ways to implement and adapt reforms to Ottoman society differed from each other. As social scientist Şerif Mardin notes, "the changing structure of Turkish society itself and the establishment of certain institutions modeled after the West prepared the ground for ideological permeation by the West."¹¹ Ottoman intellectuals tried to understand the West and place it at the core of their

¹¹ Ibid., p.4.

recommendations; however, their relation with the West was problematic since they did not comprehend it as a whole, but from behind a veil. They tried to take the necessary and required elements of the West, which consisted of equality, centralization and modernization and symbolized their meaning in the opening of the Parliament. İlber Ortaylı writes that Tanzimat era was a tragic one which paved way for the transformation of Ottoman foundations in which tradition was replaced by modernization and it was in this period that enlightenment and conservatism reached their peaks.¹²

The Ottoman intellectuals admitted the superiority of the West, which came from a long process that started with the Enlightenment and culminated in the French Revolution. This period had brought science, positivism and critical thinking and had ushered in political reforms by introducing Western concepts like egalitarianism and liberalism. Questioning the reasons for Ottomans' lagging behind in the modernization period and losing their reputation both in the Western world and in internal affairs, in the political sphere Ottoman bureaucrats like Reşit Paşa, Ali Paşa and Mithat Paşa supported and championed Westernization at the state level. In the economic sphere, Westernization corresponded to the existence, continuation and security of private possession regardless of the Sultan and local notables, a delayed concept compared to the West, individual possession was brought to the test. It is ironic, as İsmail Cem mentions, that, for an Oriental society, the West brought judicial justifications, like the Tanzimat, and they provided the basis for guaranteeing economic rights.¹³

¹² İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1995), p.31.

¹³ İsmail Cem, *Türkiye'de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Cem, 1974), p.232.

“The Tanzimat achieved progress in the general conditions of society, but it failed to produce a social organization capable of steady, natural and genuine progress and development.”¹⁴ The intellectual development of the last quarter of the nineteenth century was influenced by this austere reform process. The intellectuals of that period formed the backbone of the Young Turks and were labeled the Young Ottomans. Three figures were the most important ones in the development of ideas with their concrete stances: Namık Kemal (1840-1888), Şinasi (1826-1871) and Mustafa Fazıl Paşa. They led this innovation process with their criticism of the reforms, which they believed illustrated the surveillance of the Western Powers over the Empire, which at that time was struggling with debt and was obliged to push through the reforms in order to regain its old strength. As the backbone of the Young Turks, the Young Ottomans initiated “a link in the historical chain of Ottoman Westernization and bureaucratic modernization and represented the modernist wing of the Ottoman intelligentsia and bureaucracy.”¹⁵

These three figures agreed on the aim of saving the Empire, but they had different approaches to how the Empire could regain its power. Their understanding of modernization was at stake with Westernization, but their limits to this imposition varied along with their positioning Islam in the reform process. For example, Namık Kemal focused on the Islamic character of the state and tried to merge Islam with Westernization by saying that consultation (*meşveret*) and representation (*bay'a*), actually existed in Islam. He referred to the glorious past of Islam in which representation and consultation occurred in convenient ways to Islam and believed that representation for every segment of society would yield Ottoman salvation.

¹⁴ Berkes, p.311.

¹⁵ Mardin, *Genesis*, p. 7.

Kemal was neither a traditionalist conservative nor an imitative Westernist. On some points, like the economic penetration of the West, he did not believe in Tanzimat reforms, but he was the first Ottoman intellectual who “discussed the problems faced by the Muslims according to a coherent intellectual system.”¹⁶ He did not refer only to the Golden Ages of Islam, between the eighth to twelfth centuries, he also referred to the term “civilization” in accordance to industry, technology, economy, the press and education. According to Kemal, Islamic civilization was born out of the union between the Empire and religion and it could play a role in integrating Ottoman society, which did not possess certain “natural rights” as did Western ones.

Natural rights, which were the basis of the theory of liberal doctrine, acquired a state system that was based upon the consent of its citizens. The function of the state was to preserve these rights. Kemal was the first Ottoman intellectual to expound liberalism and constitutionalism, with his advocacy of the sovereignty of the people. His conciliation with the West, Islam and nationalism and preserving individual rights was a milestone for Ottoman intellectuals, who stem from Tanzimat and the impact of the West. His belief in the victory of liberty and progress over fatalism did not make him an unconditional Westernist; on the contrary, he thought some elements of the West, like economic penetration and privileges, could be obstacles to Ottoman advancement. However, these features could not prevent him from being a confused intellectual who stood between reversing the decline of the Ottomans, opposing the West and conciliation with Islam.

Different from Namık Kemal’s Islamic approach, which featured religion and liberalism as devices for modernization, the second figure, Şinasi, advocated a more positivist perspective that put science at the origin. He established the first Ottoman

¹⁶ Berkes, p. 209.

newspaper of opinion, *Tasvir-i Efkar*, in 1860 and introduced foreign publication methods.¹⁷ As an intellectual watching modernization closely and taking part in it, he was a realist and genuine intellectual. Şinasi did not take the issue of ruling from a romantic perspective like Namık Kemal, rather he believed in the supremacy of law over the Sultan and in the sovereignty of the people. However, this did not prevent him from saying that the uneducated and unenlightened masses should be governed by an educated authority and it was the intellectuals' task to educate the people. Şinasi's approach to science and his looking at "the masses" was taken on by Ahmet Rıza, who devoted himself to positivism in the following period. His expression of fatherland, nation, citizens' rights, public opinion and freedom of expression were very radical and encouraging for that period, but it took a long time for these to build into a political wave. The first Ottoman liberal party, *Ahrar*, embraced some of these values occurred in the World War I era. However, the party presented itself more as an opposition party, rather than pointing out the importance of these values, which had been firstly spoken by Şinasi, who was the first one to understand their core. He was the father of the early constitutionalist movement and a "Man of Enlightenment."¹⁸

The third leading figure of the reactionaries was Mustafa Fazıl Paşa. His importance comes from a letter he wrote to Sultan Abdulaziz in 1867, which is considered to have been the first manifesto of the liberals.¹⁹ In this letter, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa stressed that it was not sufficient to make reforms; what was needed was a liberal regime with a Constitution which would create a common bond among the

¹⁷ The first newspaper in Turkish, *Ceride-i Havadis*, was founded in 1840, by William Churchill. The second one was *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, founded in 1860 and Şinasi was its leading writer, before he set up his own newspaper, *Tasvir-i Efkar*.

¹⁸Mardin, *Genesis*, p.261.

¹⁹ Berkes, p.208.

Ottoman citizens. Like all Ottoman intellectuals, he believed that the political system was lacking freedom and the only way to overcome this was through a constitution that would guarantee the lives of the people, their sacred religion, fortune and property. He mentioned that the Tanzimat had only been beneficial to the statesmen, who were interested only in their own benefits. Contrary to Namık Kemal, he asserted that religion and tradition had nothing to do with a constitutional regime, which could be the only legitimate form of government for Turkey. After writing this letter and giving voice to the opposition, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa was appointed to a high rank in the bureaucracy, which he had criticized before. He did not show any consistency by becoming a part of the criticized system, yet his stress on freedom as a prerequisite of progress opened a path to the following generation.

Being his twenty to twenty-five year his junior, Mustafa Fazıl Paşa's criticism of the Tanzimat reforms and of state officers as interest-seekers was augmented by Prince Sabahattin with a large social program. But more than Prince Sabahattin, his opponent Ahmet Rıza was the one who looked to eliminate the state bureaucracy, which did not allow things to move smoothly and made it hard to develop a system when he witnessed the bureaucratic mentality at his post at the Agricultural and Education Ministries.

These three prominent figures of Young Ottomans and Tanzimat reformers, pioneered by Midhat Paşa (1822-84), were the ones who tried to develop a system unique to the Ottomans. They influenced the later generations, who sought radical change and introduced Western concepts. On this base, the Young Ottomans emphasized constitutional ideas for the first time. All of them aimed to make the Empire powerful, but their ways of seeking power ranged in from Islam to Westernization and caused chaos among the intellectuals. Suffice it to say that

despite this variety and unclarity of understanding of the West, the Ottoman encounter with the constitutional experience was implemented by these leading intellectuals, who remained loyal to the Young Ottoman heritage in line with Western civilization.

As Berkes maintains, “the way in which intellectuals of non-Western societies understand Western civilization is influenced by the degree to which minds have been liberated from the traditional institutions.”²⁰ Among the Ottomans, one of the most important institutions apart from the traditional ones was the Translation Bureau (*Tercüme Odası*), in which the first generation of Ottoman intellectuals flourished. The Translation Bureau, founded by Mahmud II, became one of the “highest governmental circles with its correspondence to embryonic European political thought.”²¹ Here, translations made from French literature provided the Ottoman intellectual background for the French Revolution. With this progressive and advanced stance of the Translation Bureau, which led the flourishing of the first Ottoman liberated minds, intellectuals tried to find the best Western model for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. However, they lacked perspective in their recommendations for saving the Empire. While they claimed knowledge of Western concepts, like Constitution, Parliament and democracy, which they had learned from the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau, their knowledge was of a superficial and artificial kind, which excluded monogamy, women’s rights or Latin scripts.

“The Ottoman intellectual was suspicious and cautious of the West. The ones that did not see the West as a peril were the Russian Muslim intellectuals of Turkish origin, who saw Westernization more clearly than the Ottomans. They had been

²⁰ Ibid, p.128.

²¹ Ibid, p.54.

exposed to Westernization earlier than the Ottomans with the Russian reformation” and had started to question, in Dostoyevski’s words, “the love and hate relation” between the West and the Russian Empire.²² Russian Muslim intellectuals including Ahundzade, Ismail Gasprinski and Abdullah Cevdet, became the prominent leaders in their solution suggestions and were ahead of the Ottoman intellectuals, who meanwhile, tried to take on the Japanese reformation example. The Ottoman intellectuals thought that Japan followed the best path by taking only the benefits of the Western culture and leaving out the inconveniences.²³ What they underestimated was the fact that the Japanese had started to becoming influenced by the West with translations earlier than the Ottomans, who had started to get involved in the process in the middle of the nineteenth century. Among the most rooted Empires, compared to the others, the Ottoman Empire was the one which was exposed to Westernization later and expanded it to the establishment of a new state, the Turkish Republic.

In spite of the cautious and suspicious attitude of the Ottoman intellectuals, from the middle of nineteenth century, the Young Ottomans and the Tanzimat reformers took for granted the supremacy of the West. However, distanced from the people, they did not manage a humble attitude towards the people; instead, they complained about more elite subjects, like constitutional reform and sovereignty in regard to their posture in administration, and looked down upon the masses. Zürcher describes them as very distanced from their own people, and were glorified by the

²² İlber Ortaylı, “Batılılaşma Sorunu,” *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, c.3 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), p.138.

²³ This understanding became a pillar in Ziya Gökalp’s ideology in the Republican period. Gökalp made a division between *culture* (hars) and *civilization* (medeniyet) and maintained that regardless of nation and borders, culture was to be international, whereas civilization was to be local and close to the people. Celal Nuri İleri could be seen as one of the supporters of this wave, with his hesitation of change in civilization, while Abdullah Cevdet was more total and radical in his solution suggestions.

West unquestionably.²⁴ They claimed reforms must be adjusted to the Ottoman society, but they took the West only from their own perspective and built the Western concepts on their own understanding without bearing in mind the differences of societies. For example, Namık Kemal, one of the first and leading liberals mentioned above, was oppose to the Civil Code, women's rights and the adaptation of Latin script, at the same time as he maintained Constitutionalism based upon Islam. A distinguished historian of the Young Turks, Hanioglu, maintains that the pillar of the Young Ottomans was based on the appropriation of Islamic symbols and modernism,²⁵ which was typical in Namık Kemal. In spite of their stance as Westernists in the eye of the people, the Pro-Western Ottoman elite never got involved into the West by their own means, rather they acquired knowledge from the books they read and from the people with whom they kept in touch but they remained suspicious of it. Nevertheless, Young Ottomans played a vital role in introducing some general notions of pre-modern political culture and they opened the way to question the existing system.

Second Generation Ottoman Intellectuals

Namık Kemal, Şinasi and Mustafa Fazıl Paşa were the first to initiate reforms from a more society-based perspective, merging Islam with the West and bringing out the importance of constitution. The following figures, contemporaries of Prince Sabahattin, Ali Suavi, Ahmet Rıza, Mizancı Murat and Yusuf Akçura, acquired a more complex understanding of Westernization with new instruments of science and the inherited legacy of the Young Ottomans. They experienced the absolutist reign

²⁴The original is “*Osmanlı tarihinde görülmemiş bir şekilde kitlelerden kopuk*” *Mill Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, p.19.

²⁵ Şükrü Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 14.

of Abdulhamid II and they took part in opposing the regime fiercely. As the oldest one, Ali Suavi (1839-1878) who was involved in Young Ottoman politics for a while in Europe, was an ardent nationalist and Turkist. After his return to Istanbul, he was appointed as an administrator to Galatasaray Lycee by Abdulhamid II, but continued his struggle with the regime. His importance comes from his attempt to merge Turkism, Islamism and Westernization in a melting pot. Akşin maintains that Suavi was the first to advocate secularism and Turkism.²⁶ His Turkism was different from that of modern nationalism from the point that he believed in the supremacy of the Turkish nation with high moral attitudes. Unlike Namık Kemal, who believed in turning back to the Golden Ages of Islam and the contributions of the Turks to Islam, Ali Suavi stressed the unrecognized part played by the Turks in Islamic civilization. This was in contrast to most of the intellectuals, including Prince Sabahattin, who expressed constantly the superiority of Turks and their contribution to Western civilization. Although he did not believe in the superiority of Turks, Ali Suavi supported the unification of Islamic societies living in the Empire, as Namık Kemal did. In this sense, he was more Islamist than the others. Landau calls him an enlightened theologian with his advocacy of Pan-Turkism and becoming a hero and a pioneer of the Pan-Turkists' cause in the first half of the twentieth century.²⁷

Contrary to many of his contemporaries, Ali Suavi touched upon some important issues. He advocated Latin script, depicted the Caliphate as an unessential element and opposed a theocratic state. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, maintains that Suavi tried to awaken Turkist and Islamist feelings; at the same time, referred to Le Play, who was known to be stressed on by Prince Sabahattin for the first time. Preceding

²⁶ Sina Akşin, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi," *Türkiye Tarihi*, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Cem, 1997), p.329.

²⁷ Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Hurst and Company, 1995), p. 30.

Sabahattin, in one of his letters he pointed out that the European, specifically, British political system differed from that of the Ottomans, but he did not expound on it as Sabahattin did. Le Play's influence could be seen on Suavi, with Le Play's implication of Turks being one of the greatest races with their contribution to world civilization, which availed them to do so with their military skills. Contrary to his previous thoughts, influenced by Le Play, Suavi this time maintained that "Most of the nomadic tribes have come out of Turks, who left many civilizations from Rumelia to Egypt. They learned to domesticate animals, open up canals and they expanded to a large area."²⁸ Later on, the theme of superiority of Turks became one of the favorite issues of Ottoman intellectuals, including Prince Sabahattin.

Although Ali Suavi participated in the Young Ottomans in Europe, unlike others, his interests were not limited by regime change or politics. He put his efforts into managing solutions based on education, language, religious reform and Turkish history, which could be regarded as a step towards sociology. Actually, he was the first one who advocated unity in education which would be carried out in 1924. Like Prince Sabahattin, he believed education was the sole element in the development of societies, yet he added more to it by pointing out the importance of language.²⁹ In spite of his unstable intellectual stance, Ali Suavi developed an education program. His education program was a comprehensive one compared to Sabahattin with indication of modern science, including history, maths, geometry and Turkish as core subjects. Ali Suavi participated actively in a large field in the world of philosophy and political thought and he became one of the most enduring intellectuals. Unlike Prince Sabahattin or Ziya Gökalp, who embraced the French way of thinking, Suavi

²⁸ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1979), p.81.

²⁹Related to language, it is noteworthy that sociologist of the Republican era Ziya Gökalp, an ardent nationalist, believed that the Arabic was to be the language of science and the concepts have to remain in the oldest way, on the contrary to many intellectuals.

did not take on any scientific branch, rather he, himself, tried to develop ideas of his own and became a confused intellectual.

CHAPTER III

YOUNG TURKS

Intellectual Background

As an Ottoman intellectual, Ali Suavi did not get involved in political struggles among the Young Turks in Paris, who had gathered around Ahmet Rıza. Ahmet Rıza (1857-1930), has been leading one of the major wings of the Young Turks in Paris and became the main opponent of Prince Sabahattin. Upon his return from studying agriculture in France, Ahmet Rıza was appointed as Ministry of Agriculture, but soon realized that the department was a feeding station for bureaucrats and had nothing to do with rural development.³⁰ For rural development, he thought the ignorance of the peasantry could only be overcome with education, so he became involved as a director in the Ministry of Education. After few years, he resigned from his post to go to Paris, where he stayed for six years before returning and entering into politics. There, he became a fanatic supporter of positivism³¹ and believed that there was no means of saving the nation other than education and the positive sciences.³²

³⁰ Rural development was a major issue for Prince Sabahattin and it was the driving force behind the establishment of the Village Institutions of the 1930s.

³¹ Positivism denied metaphysics and declared the supremacy of science which could explain social events by looking at the psychology of people.

³² Akşin maintains that the saying of Atatürk “*Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir.*” (The Truest Guide in Life is Science) was a sign of positivism, which was advocated by Ahmet Rıza (p. 334).

As a leader of the Young Turks in Paris, Ahmet Rıza published the newspapers, *Meşveret* (Consultation) and *Şuray-i Ümmet* (National Assembly). *Meşveret* was a militant political journal, rather than an opinion piece, in which he collected complaints about the Abdulhamid regime and urged him to change his policies and restore the constitutional regime. Ahmet Rıza believed that there should be an elite class that would be capable of ruling the masses. He was merely influenced by Social Darwinism. “Social Darwinism was based on the inequality of men and was going along with elitism that defended enlightenment from above.”³³ It was advocated by Gustave Le Bon, who viewed the masses as a “crowd” that formed a collective and “inferior” mind. Ahmet Rıza was strongly influenced by him and said that the masses (*avam*) must not be given to assume a role in the future of the state and nation. It should be the intellectual elite who should govern the people, who would be educated in the western way. In his memoirs, he wrote that, “the Ottoman nation was used to being served by someone else, let be the God, the Sultan or the Government. The CUP brought freedom to the country, yet since society was not used to the freedom, and it did not realize the essence of freedom, it could not develop a Western understanding of reform.”³⁴

Ahmet Rıza was the main political opponent of Prince Sabahattin in the Young Turk struggle in Paris. Compared to Rıza, Sabahattin was more conciliatory for a union of intellectuals as it can be seen in his attempts to gather the First and Second Young Turk Congresses in 1902 and 1907, but neither he nor Ahmet Rıza wanted to lose their leading posts and Sabahattin did not prefer to be involved

³³ Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preperation for a Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 314.

³⁴ Ahmet Rıza, *Ahmet Rıza Bey'in Anıları* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet, 2001), p.45.

“Ulusta işlerin görülmesini ve uygulamaları başkasından; Tanrı’dan, padişahın, hükümetten bekleme duygusu alışkanlığı vardır. İttihat ve Terakki ulusa özgürlük getirdi, ama halk bunu anlamadı, çünkü özgürlüğe cidden aşık değildi, hürriyetin değerini bilmiyordu. İslahatı da Batı’nın anladığı şekilde anlamadı.”

actively in politics. Sabahattin did not believe in constitutionalism as much as his colleague and saw a more realistic picture of the post-constitution era, but his solutions were more science based, rather than society based. Sabahattin did not look down on the people as Ahmet Rıza did, but he was very distanced from them. Ramsaur, a historian of the Young Turks, states that Sabahattin, like Ahmet Rıza, took himself very seriously and he appeared to have been motivated by the strongest possible sense of noblesse oblige.³⁵

Prior to Prince Sabahattin, Ahmet Rıza's main opponent for leading the opposition was Mizancı Murad (1853-1912). He was a professor at *Mülkiye*³⁶ and an influential Young Turk who shaped the thoughts of Ottoman intellectuals. Murad taught World History with a new approach of liberal ideas, while at the same time he emphasized the sacredness and universality of the Caliphate. Ramsaur mentions that in contrast to Ahmet Rıza, Murad Bey was extremely popular and his literary efforts gave him a considerable following in society.³⁷ As a Pan-Islamist, Murad wanted to see all Muslims rescued from foreign domination through the Caliphate and he offered an appeal on both nationalist and religious grounds. For Murad, the question of reform was encompassed by two measures: limiting the ruler's absolute authority by *meşveret* (consultation) of Shariah (as Namık Kemal proposed) and restoring mutual trust among the nationalities.

Murad, born in Daghistan and educated in a Russian gymnasium at Stavropole, was one of the best-equipped Ottoman intellectuals with his knowledge of history and literature. Compared to his contemporaries, Ahmed Rıza and Prince

³⁵ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks*, p. 38.

³⁶ *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* was a vocational high school which was established on 28 January 1859. It is the core of the constitution of the modern Ankara University. The curriculum of the school was law, geography, mathematics and accounting. In 1891 the school was attached to Darülfünun'u Istanbul.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.81.

Sabahattin (in spite of a 25 year age difference), Murad was more inclined towards political literary pieces, like Rousseau's *Social Contract* and Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws*, rather than science. Despite their fierce struggle against Abdulhamid II, no agreement was reached between the Rıza and Murad factions of the Young Turks. While the first one ridiculed Murad's pan-Islamism and Caliphatism, Murad accused Rıza of atheism and a lack of religious attachment to Islam. Compared to Prince Sabahattin and Ahmet Rıza, religion was more appealing to Murad, and he was more involved in the political struggles among the Young Turks as well as against Abdulhamid II.

Rather than religion, Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin used more of an Ottomanist approach in spite of their differences on the issue of centralization-decentralization. Mizancı Murat, Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin opposed the nationalisms of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups and did not entertain Turkish nationalism. Having experienced the birth of nationalism in Russia, prior to Ahmet Rıza and Prince, Mizancı Murat was the first to emphasize a new mentality of looking back at history with critical thinking by putting the events, rather than people at the core. His involvement in politics could have led to another wave among the Young Turks with Islamist and nationalist tendencies, which he did not prefer. Ahmet Rıza, born in 1857, and Mizancı Murat, born in 1853, played the most important roles in the transition period in determining the borders of the factions. The fellow intellectuals, 20-25 year juniors were radical change seekers who established the Republic and held power for the next 40-50 years.

The last, but not the least important intellectual, Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933), was born in the same town as Lenin, Simbirsk, six years later, watched the factional struggles among the Young Turks with criticism and, in words of Berkes, "he did not

dare say outright that they were wasting their time.”³⁸ Educated in Paris, he studied political science and history under Albert Sorel³⁹ and Emile Boutmy.⁴⁰ Like Prince Sabahattin, Akçura came to believe that the real problem was the need for a social transformation. In a lengthy article published in a Turkish newspaper in Cairo, “Three Policies”, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, he maintained that Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism could be merged into one pot and came to the conclusion that the only way Turks would go into this disintegration process smoothly was through recognizing their own national aspirations. In his promotion of Turkism, he used his journal, *Turkish Homeland* (Türk Yurdu). This journal was important in the sense that it included solutions to the basis of the economic program besides political and social ones, which were fiercely argued by Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin. Unlike his colleagues, Akçura believed that the foundation of the modern state was the bourgeois class and in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey, the Turkish national awakening would be the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie, which would pave the way to a modern Turkish state. He was the first Ottoman intellectual to talk about a system based upon classes, which was opposed by Ziya Gökalp, who believed in a classless society.

In spite of his tendency toward Turkism, Akçura’s importance comes not only from his distinctive views that were shaped by his past. Thinking on the economic independence and national economy, in his journal, *Türk Yurdu*, Akçura published an article of a foreign socialist, Parvus (1867-1924). As a devoted Marxist of Russian origin, Parvus thought capitalism would destroy itself only if socialists could abolish imperialism; therefore, he believed Turkey should have a bourgeois democratic

³⁸ Berkes, p.321.

³⁹ Albert Sorel (1842-1906), French historian studying French revolution.

⁴⁰ Emile Boutmy (1835–1906), political scientist and commentator on British life and institutions.

regime. Looking at the relations between capitalism and imperialism was new to Ottoman intellectuals. Following the new waves and advocating national economy, Akçura did not hesitate to apply to a foreign economist, who was astonished with the ignorance of the Ottoman intelligentsia who knew nothing about *reel-politik*.⁴¹ He pointed out that the elite was either glorifying the nation and its heroic past or speaking ill of it with the ignorance and conservatism of the masses. (Prince Sabahattin belonged to the first, and Ahmet Rıza, to the second). Because Parvus has participated in the 1905 Revolution in Russia and he fled first to Sibiria and then to Turkey afterwards, his Marxist perspective was based on class struggles and imperialism, which were unknown to the Ottoman intellectuals. Parvus' works could be regarded as one of the most important interventions of the Western understanding to the Ottoman elite, who did not take into account economic relations, and had lost their ways in political struggle and focusing on political independence and internal democracy.

These leading figures, in the first and second generation of the Ottoman intelligentsia, displayed a number of different approaches towards Westernization and were confused about their roles and duties in the modernization period. While a new philosophy that was dominated by science and rationality emerged, religion was not to be undermined by some and Islam was contemplated to be in reconciliation with reforms. This diversity paved the way for the emergence of valuable Turkish literary pieces and ideologists, like Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920) and Halide Edip (1884-1964), who determined the line of the Turkish Republic. The intelligentsia of all times was critical of the existing system and tried to improve political thought by acquiring a Western

⁴¹ Berkes, p.69.

perspective. It was in this period, in the history of Turkish intellectuals, when Ottoman intellectuals began to prosper and began to question, criticize and compare the Ottoman thought with that of the West. Findley mentions that “The Young Ottomans became the first and the most highly elaborated example in the Islamic Middle East of a political and intellectual movement with goals articulated in terms of state and nationality.”⁴² Prince Sabahattin wrote in *Terakki* (Progress) in 1906 that “an intellectual renaissance has occurred since we established relations with Western civilization, one generation ago. Prior to this relationship, our society lacked any intellectual life.”⁴³

As seen above, the intelligentsia of Abdulhamid II era sought to destroy the Hamidian regime, but they neither embraced any consistent solutions, formed an elite consensus, nor became a unified front against the Sultan. Hanioglu writes that since “they had not been able to find common ground in their opposition, the most they could accomplish together was to strike tactical alliances to destroy the regime.”⁴⁴ They promoted Ottomanist, Turkist and Islamist policies together with a modernization program to build a state that was based on “scientific” justifications, like Le Play’s or Durkheim’s programs. They did not give attention to the necessity of the emergence of a new middle class, which in Europe, was the pillar of a modern state. Instead, they referred modernization, which was “a pillar in the ideology of this new materialist intelligentsia and was presented as a scientific necessity.”⁴⁵ Most of them admired authoritarian theories that defended a strong government and

⁴² Carter Findley, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East,” *Studia Islamica*, no.56 (1982), p.174.

⁴³ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks*, p.16.

⁴⁴ *Preparation for a Revolution*, p.314.

⁴⁵ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks*, p. 17.

enlightenment from above and intended to enlighten the masses, who were incapable of deciding for themselves.

Politically, the opposition of the Ottoman intellectuals beginning from the Tanzimat stemmed from the state and the system from which they were excluded. They were against the political intervention of Europe and they thought the representative government would make the Empire regain its former strength. Following this period, they witnessed the absolutist regime of Abdulhamid II, which compelled them to form a united front. However, from this short past of Ottoman intellectuals and Young Turks, it could be seen that they did not form an intelligentsia that was independent from the state or from the West. In spite of this, they became the main pillar and driving force of ideology of the Young Turks, who introduced the concept of constitutional rights, elections, political parties as well as nationalism. Findley names the Young Turks and its ideology as the representation of one of the most advanced manifestations of that time in a number of respects, and sees them as sophisticated by Middle Eastern standards that were determined by Russo-Japanese War of 1902.⁴⁶

The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War gave hope to Ottoman intellectuals for the possibility of constitutional governments, since following the war, constitutional governments enjoyed success in some countries. In Iran, a revolution took place in 1906 and aimed at the promulgation of a constitution. Like the Ottoman reformation process, the Iranian state underwent a reform process which was carried on by intellectuals like Mohammad Kazem Khorasani⁴⁷ (1839-1911) and

⁴⁶ p.178.

⁴⁷ Politician, philosopher, reformer.

Farrokhi Yazdi⁴⁸ (1887-1939), that belonged to a second generation of reformists. Likewise the Iranian reformists, the third generation of Ottoman reformists, the Young Turks, traced their political ideology to the Young Ottomans and the subsequent generation followed the same path in the modernization period. They had less respect for the monarchy and adopted an eager attitude towards the rupture from the past. It was these elite, the Young Turks, who formed the backbone of the ideology of the Turkish Republic and continued to rule until 1950.⁴⁹

The Young Turks and Social Science

Between 1870 and the 1900s in Europe the foundation of a science of society was labeled as sociology. In this period, programmatic books were published, journals created and academic societies founded in seeking the best community model. Sociology started to flourish and was supported by a systematic and positive approach to understanding social development. In France, Le Play and Durkheim pioneered models in society development, while in Germany Schaffle and Tönnies took the lead with books like *Anatomy and Life of the Social Body*⁵⁰ and *Community and Society*.⁵¹ Wagner mentions that embracing “the self-satisfied cult of material progress” and calling it positivism, starting from the last quarter of the nineteenth

⁴⁸ Poet and senior politician of the Rıza Pahlevi era.

⁴⁹ Zürcher extends the Young Turk period to 1950. He maintains that “the years 1908-1950 reflects the belief that in spite of the break-up of the empire in 1918 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, politically, ideologically and economically, there is a great deal of continuity.” (*Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 4.)

⁵⁰ Schaffle, 1875.

⁵¹ Tönnies, 1887.

century, European intellectuals started to work on the social realities and tried to depict the necessities for ideal societies in the light of progressive science.⁵²

For Ottoman intellectuals, the major source of inspiration was France. As seen above, some of them tried to reconcile Western concepts and practices with traditional Islamic or Turkish values, while others tried to scrutinize the West with scientific aspect. This second one was popular among the Young Turks, who tried to approach society with a scientific explanations and advocated reforms by mobilizing and manipulating the masses. The solution seeking in sociology has been the major tool to understanding the causes of the regression of the Empire. Influenced by the European scientific wave in the understanding of society, Ottoman intellectuals like Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin thought of society as a body which would be explored using biology and medicine and the society was to be explored in the same way of the body. In order to put a diagnosis, first it was necessary to understand the causes of the illness. For the suffering Ottoman Empire, first its society had to be comprehended with its pros and cons, from its material and inspirational possessions to traditions and family manners. They thought the Sick Man had been exposed to a communitarian illness and the only way to recover from this was to give a diagnosis and to cure the disease with treatment. Elaborating on the social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, Taha Parla writes that the Young Turks' understanding of social science was "highly eclectic and consisted of indiscreet borrowings from European schools of thought."⁵³ They were influenced by a number of sources, including Le Bon's theories on mass psychology, Gabriel Tarde's theory of imitation

⁵² Peter Wagner, *A History and Theory of Social Sciences* (London: Thousand Oaks, 2001), p. 11.

⁵³ Taha Parla, *Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp* (London: E.J.Brill, 1985), p. 20.

in explaining social change, August Comte's motto of "order and progress" and Herbert Spencer's organicist social theories.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century in France, positivism evolved into sociology, which was established by French sociologist, Durkheim (1858-1917). As a new branch, sociology aimed to explain society in a systematic way based on data about societies, classifying and putting these to theory. At this time, French sociology was dominated by the Durkheimian school. Durkheim was committed to the idea that society was an organic unity and was like an organism which was capable of living, dying, changing and evolving. Organisms were composed of cells that co-operated to function properly. His views were taken by Ziya Gökalp in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Gökalp was introduced to the works of Durkheim in Salonica in 1910 during his teaching experience in the Young Turks' youth department. He adjusted Durkheim's concepts to Turkish culture with a synthesis of cultural Turkism, ethical Islamism and Durkheimian solidarism. Meanwhile, like Durkheim, Le Play a French researcher, sought to establish the relationship between society and the individual and he developed in contrast model to that of Durkheim. Among the Ottomans, his path was emulated by Prince Sabahattin. The waves of this new science, sociology, were watched closely by Ottoman intellectuals, yet there was no attempt to apply them to politics. Politics had always been in the hands of the few and it would still be many years before Ottoman intellectuals would become involved in politics until The Young Turks came to power.

Prince Sabahattin and the Young Turks

Jeune Turks, as a notion, was used by the Europeans for The Young Turks, and it became synonymous with fighting against oppression and advocating

independence. Most of the sources, including members of the Young Turks, mentioned that the Committee of Union and Progress and the Young Turks were used interchangeably. Kuran maintains that the period, the events and the people that took place in his *Inkılâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* and *Inkılâp Tarihimiz ve İttihat Terakki* were the same, but from the 1890s on divisions were more visible. Since he was on Prince Sabahattin's side, his memoirs included more of an insider view, with his depictions of how he joined to Union and Progress and how he chose Prince Sabahattin's side. Hanioglu, like Karal, mentions that even though until 1890s the common ground of the Young Turks was fighting against Abdulhamid II, they did not form an organic body; but their struggle was of a symbolic meaning that became an example to other nations.⁵⁴

The reign of Abdulhamid II saw the most durable struggle from abroad against the politics of Istanbul. There were ninety-five Turkish, eight Arabic, and twelve French newspapers in the struggle against the Sultan. The most famous of these were Ahmet Rıza's *Meşveret* (Consultation), Prince Sabahattin's *Terakki* (Progress), Mizancı Murat's *Mizan* (Balance), and Abdullah Cevdet's *İçtihad* (Caselaw). When we look at the newspaper names, we see that, influenced by Western concepts, the last quarter of the nineteenth century was dominated by words like "union", "order" and "progress" as an influence from the French.⁵⁵ Newspapers provided a strong organizing focus and setting up a newspaper was a step towards forming a political body. Members of this group gathered around these publications and in 1889 that they started to form a secret political unit in the Military Medical School in Istanbul. The unit was revealed in a short time and its members fled the

⁵⁴ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.8 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), p.511.

⁵⁵ "Order and progress" was August Comte's famous motto and influence the discourse of Young Turks as well as Mustafa Kemal very much.

country and continued their activities in four centers, Bucharest, Paris, Geneva and Cairo.⁵⁶ In the face of increasing opposition and attempts at revolution Abdulhamid II sent Mahmut Celalettin Paşa to Europe to conciliate with the Young Turks. The ones who were offered good posts in state offices and embassies in the exchange for withdrawing their opposition, returned to Istanbul or took duties in the administration. Mizancı Murat agreed to return İstanbul, while leading figures like Ishak Sükuti, Abdullah Cevdet and Tunalı Hilmi accepted posts in embassies.

While these were taking place, in December 1899, Damat Mahmut Paşa fled the country with his two sons, the Princes Sabahattin and Lütfullah. Damat Mahmut Paşa, born in 1855 to Admiral Halil Paşa and a daughter of Sultan Mahmut II, was a man of some intelligence and education. He had served in the Embassy in Paris in his youth and had occupied the Ministry of Justice for about eight months. “He had repeatedly urged the Sultan to restore the Constitution of 1876 and after meeting with no success in his endeavors, he finally decided that his only alternative was to put himself outside the jurisdiction of Abdulhamid.”⁵⁷

They were welcomed by the Young Turks in exile, who had gathered around Ahmet Rıza. Ahmet Rıza wrote in *Meşveret* in January 1900 that “We consider this courageous act of Mahmut Paşa as a most happy event, not only for the party of Young Turkey, but for the people in its entirety; it will find an echo in the hearts of all those who are sworn to serve the sacred cause of the fatherland.”⁵⁸ Along with the Young Turks, other non-Turkish subjects of the Empire were getting organized. Armenians, Albanians, Kurds and Arabs devoted their associations to find a protector and, like the Young Turks, they were divided into various factions. Despite this, the

⁵⁶ Karal, p.515.

⁵⁷ Ramsaur, p.55.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 58.

attempt to coordinate the activities into one unit was welcomed. Damat Mahmut Paşa was expected to undertake this duty; however, his health, which compromised by an illness which would cause his death in 1903, paved the way for another leader, his son Prince Sabahattin, who was in his mid twenties at that time and had started to develop some ideas of his own.

Prince Sabahattin's entry into the movement created new factions among The Young Turks. Ahmet Rıza has become a follower of Auguste Comte during his stay in Paris, while Sabahattin became the disciple of rival school, Le Play's, a French sociologist. He was influenced by one of Le Play's disciples, Edmond Demolins (1852-1907). Le Play's admiration for the English administrative system, which was based upon local self-government influenced Sabahattin. He used some of his concepts in deriving solutions for the Ottoman system and these will be covered in the following sections.

The First Congress of The Young Turks

Princes Sabahattin and Lütfullah called on all Ottomans to meet in a congress to "discuss the means of reestablishing liberty and justice in Turkey."⁵⁹ The appeal was received favorably and attempts to gather a congress resulted in February 1902. The congress addressed not only different segments from the Young Turks, but also the nations that were fighting suppression. Petrosyan says that the movement towards meeting the Young Turks and other representatives reflects the aim to form a political association with financial support of non-Ottoman bourgeois.⁶⁰ The congress gathered in February 4-9, 1902, in the home of one of supporters of the Young Turks, Pontalis and Prince Sabahattin in the following days. Besides the

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 65.

⁶⁰ Yuriy Aşatoviç Petrosyan, *Sovyet Gözüyle Jön Türkler* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974), p.216.

leading figures, like İsmail Kemal, Hoca Kadri, Halil Ganem, Ali Haydar Mithad (Mithad Paşa's son), Yusuf Akçura, Doktor Nazım and İbrahim Temo, there were around 60 delegations from all nations living in the Ottoman Empire. Prince Sabahattin was elected to be the president and chair, while a Greek, Sathas, and an Armenian, Sissian, were elected vice-presidents. The opening speech was made by poet Hüseyin Siret, who maintained that the only way to destroy the recent power holder was to form a unified association. After his speech, Prince Sabahattin held the chair. He declared that the Ottoman Empire had never failed to respect the language, customs and religion of other nations, yet the only way to secure a more mature regime was to fight against oppression. Although decisions for maintaining integrity varied, the common ground was “the reestablishment of order and peace in the interior and respect for the 1876 Constitution, which guaranteed general reforms, and the rights and political liberties of the Ottoman peoples against the arbitrary power.”⁶¹

Discussions regarding politics related to centralization between the two main opponents Prince Sabahattin and Ahmet Rıza were the major imprint of the congress. Ahmet Rıza was the most influential intellectual among the Young Ottomans in Paris, with leadership skill and charisma. His newspaper *Meşveret*, which started to be published in 1895 and continued until 1908, acted as an assembly point for the Young Ottomans who had discrepancies among themselves, too. The first issue, as İsmail Kemal, one of the supporters of Prince Sabahattin, mentioned was that propaganda and publications were not sufficient to hold a revolution and that the military should be satisfied to be involved in the movement. The second issue was the increase in the engagement of non-Muslim subjects in politics and ensuring

⁶¹ Ramsaur, p.68.

support from foreign powers. Prince Sabahattin supported engagement of non-Muslim subjects more into politics and he thought cooperating with European powers' would help the Empire gain strength by allocating sources, whereas, Ahmet Rıza opposed the idea of support from European powers to dethrone Abdulhamid II.

“All factions of the Young Turks rejected the use of revolutionary, conspirational methods as well as pressure from the European powers.”⁶² However, in this First Congress, there was no agreement in the questions of unity or confederation of Ottoman millets, who sought either independence or supervision from a state. Hanioglu maintains that the Committee of Union and Progress was an umbrella organization until 1902, “overflowing with member groups whose only common agenda was the dethronement of Abdulhamid II.”⁶³ Thus, until 1902, the party did not maintain a common identity, yet it aimed to unite with the common goal of instituting constitution and parliament. Although their ways of achieving this goal were distinct from each other, there were some points on which most of them agreed.

Like their predecessors, the Young Ottomans, *Jeune Turcs* including Prince Sabahattin, were “the product of small, brilliant circles of exceptional people who drew deeply on the civilization, which they revered and revived, and who lived ahead of their contemporaries.”⁶⁴ Karpas writes that “unlike The Young Ottomans, who belonged to the middle and upper ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy, the new intellectuals of the Hamidian period came from provincial towns and professional

⁶² Berkes, p.312.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 320.

⁶⁴ Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: Penguin, 1993), p.76.

schools, which helped to expand the size of the intelligentsia.”⁶⁵ Their common ground was that they were against the regime, but their ways to attain a revolution differed. Findley mentions that the awareness of Western thought helped to differentiate the ideological map of the Young Turks from that of the Young Ottomans, when “gradually certain trends of European thought started to interact with elements of Ottoman tradition to produce a dilution of liberal admixture in The Young Turk ideas.”⁶⁶

In this factional division, Prince Sabahattin thought the major problem was not the dethronement of Abdulhamid II, but a sequence that would follow his abdication would be important. Sabahattin saw that it was not only the Sultan, but the entire system and the communitarian structure of society on which the state depended that had to be changed. Contrary to Ahmet Rıza and the The Young Turks, he saw the depth of the subject, and he articulated the modification of the understandings of which he had learned from the French. Unlike Ahmet Rıza, he did not believe that Parliamentarism would solve the problem and save the Empire, yet he thought it could delay the problem and would entail new actors to deal with the same problem. Unless the masses were enlightened, he thought, the system would prevail in the accustomed way.

Both Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin believed that the loss of financial and political independence was the result of the Hamidian regime. In spite of the difference in the limits of seeking Western support for a fresh start (Sabahattin believed more interventionist policies would help recovery, while Ahmet Rıza opposed these), they both had hopes of Western support. In the economic field,

⁶⁵ Kemal Karpat, “Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.3, no.3 (July 1972), p.276.

⁶⁶ Findley, p.158.

however, Sabahattin had understood that the key to progress was economic development and rather than inviting Europeans to teach certain skills in maintaining a system, he thought revolutionizing the economic system would be a permanent solution. For this, he developed his Private Enterprise Program. He used concepts like constitution and parliament in his discourse, but his liberalism was stuck in the framework of strengthening the dying empire. Neither Ahmet Rıza's nor Prince Sabahattin's solution "aimed to refer to the people, but only had recourse to the opinion of "wise men."⁶⁷ They tried to create a new identity for the Ottoman citizen and, seizing Ottomanism, tried to define its content according to the Young Ottoman heritage.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCE SABAHATTIN AND SOCIOLOGY

Le Play School

Among the Ottoman intellectuals, the ways to analyze modernization differed along a wide spectrum, from merging it with Islamism (like Ali Suavi) to maintaining a nationalist discourse (like Yusuf Akçura), as discussed above. However, there was a common point in all of the perspectives at the beginning of the twentieth century, which was that the solutions were always suggested on the basis of history, not on sociology. Turkish intellectuals did not look for the solutions *in* the history, since the Ottoman historiography contained the state/Empire-based incident explanation (*vakanüvislik*). The revolution in history writing which occurred in the nineteenth century in Europe, had not occurred in the Ottoman Empire. This induced the intelligentsia and the elite to look for the solutions in a totally different

⁶⁷ Mardin, *Genesis*, p.42.

area full of scientific explanations for community problems: sociology. From Prince Sabahattin to Yusuf Akçura, their modernization solutions were based upon the realities of European societies, like the French or the Russian, and were generated from the precondition of the dissolution of the communitarian behavior of society. Yet their life stories, education, family backgrounds and experiences of Europe shaped the differences in solution seeking. In his book, *Ottoman-Turkish Modernization*, Georgeon writes that whether influenced by Comte or Le Play, Ottoman intellectuals applied sociology in order to understand the decay in the Ottoman system and to struggle against European imperialism.⁶⁸

Between Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin, the revealing of different views in politics more accurately in the congress, the polarization and lack of unity among the Young Turks rendered their division into two; as Union and Progress (*Terakki ve İttihat*) and the Decentralization and Private Initiative (*Şahsi Teşebbüs*)⁶⁹. While Ahmet Rıza founded a new organ carrying the name of the Society of Union and Progress, Prince Sabahattin distanced himself from politics, but continued to write his views regarding politics in his newspaper, Progress (*Terakki*). One of his admirers, Demetra Vaka⁷⁰, mentions that “After the congress Sabahattin realized his lack of preparedness to assume the role of leader of the anti-Hamidian movement and commenced to devote himself to the study of social and political science.”⁷¹

⁶⁸ François Georgeon, “Ulusal Hareketin İki Lideri: Z.Gökalp ve Y.Akçura,” *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2006), p.94.

⁶⁹ See Appendix C.

⁷⁰ Demetra Vaka Brown (Prinkipo1877-Chicago 1946) was one of the first Greek immigrant women from the Ottoman Empire who joined American mainstream culture and society. She was considered an authority on the subjects of oriental women and on the Eastern Question. She worked as a journalist and foreign correspondent in the USA and the Balkans, especially in Ottoman Turkey. She wrote 14 books, the most important two being, *Haremlik* (1909) and *Unveiled Ladies of Istanbul* (1923).

⁷¹ Demetra Vaka, “Prince Sabahattin as a Free-Lance Liberal,” *Asia*, n. 25 (February, 1924), p. 120.

Sabahattin's program, Private Initiative and Decentralization Association (*Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*), which was framed in the period following the Congress, was published in *Şuray-ı Ümmet* (National Assembly) in July 1906. The program consisted of 10 articles, mostly focusing on the administrative type of entities. The first article issued that the Private Initiative and Decentralization Association did not erupt out of disintegrating the Empire, rather it followed the foot prints of the First Constitution of 1876, which constituted in the 108th article as equal and conciliatory administration that would represent all subjects living in the area. The provinces would be entitled to the equal rights and duties which would be included in education, military and taxation.

In this period, apart from politics, Sabahattin devoted himself to developing a program for Ottoman progress and placed it on a sociological framework. After the congress, in 1903, he was introduced to *science sociale*, which had been founded by Le Play, and he began to develop some ideas of his own. He described his acquaintance with the sociology of Demolins, to Nezahat Nurettin Ege, who had a congenial relation with the Prince over intellectual issues and she collected his articles in a book as a result of meticulous research. Here, he mentioned that he came across Demolins' book, *Anglo Saxon Superiority: To What It is Due?* in Paris and after reading it in one night, he found the answers in this particular movement which had been pioneered by Le Play and Tourville (1842-1903).⁷² As a pro-Western Ottoman elite, Prince Sabahattin started to work on a program and developed one which was the first attempt to explain problems of Ottoman society with sociology. This study was new to the Turkish scene in the sense that he took on the thoughts of the French sociologist Le Play (1806-1882), as the pillar of his

⁷² Nezahat Nurettin Ege, *Prens Sabahattin: Hayatı ve İlmi Müdafaları* (İstanbul: Güneş Neşriyatı, 1977), p. 36.

studies and was influenced by one of his disciples, Edmond Demolins' (1852-1907) family and property doctrines for the development of society.

Le Play was born into a village in southern France in which fishing was the major source for living. He became a mining engineer and got involved in sociology as a result of the chaotic environment of France with the 1830 revolution. He traveled throughout Europe from 1830 to 1848 in order to develop theories regarding family life and its impositions on society. He died in 1882, but his theories were taken up by many others, led by Tourville and Demolins. Findıkoğlu mentions that Le Play's past and his character, which were shaped by village life with deep national tendencies, along with society's understanding of work, labor and accomplishment as sacred, played important roles.⁷³ Also, having grown up in a Catholic environment, which was devoted to work and ethics as well as family values, could have played a minor role in revealing these concepts, which centered on a peaceful and strong society. His witness of the 1830, 1848 and 1870 revolutions made him lean towards a more comprehensive view in examining societies to find a common point in European families. His leaning on family was a result of a belief that a strong family would lead to a strong society. While doing this he tried to eliminate the antagonism within society, and rather tried to unite them under two concepts, labor and morality. He thought that society must rely on traditions, which must be supported in an applicable manner by education in order to gain strength, and family was the first and the most important unit in gaining this strength. Even law was not as influential as family rules and traditions.

Le Play's school emerged in the post-revolutionary period in the first quarter of nineteenth century, when European intellectuals were concentrating on the society

⁷³Z. Fahri Findıkoğlu, *Le Play Mektebi ve Prens Sabahattin* (Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1962), p. 7.

problems which gave birth as a result of the radical break with the past. It was in this period that sociology arose as a science, embodying technical methods like observation, data provision and comparison. Following the same line as Comte, who emphasized the necessity of the positive sciences in every field of life, Le Play, too, thought that science could solve the problems of society and divided it into the smallest parts in order to comprehend the subject by unit analysis. He started to work on the working class and collected his work in 1855 in a book called *European Working Class*. In this book, he worked with families as the basic unit of society and classified them according to geography. He divided the family types into three according to occupations: stock-breeding, agrarian and fishing. He categorized these according to geography and included other variables, such as family earning, spending, and accumulation of wealth. He believed that to understand and predict society's needs, it would be necessary to work on the structure of the smallest unit, which he depicted as the family.

When we apply this to Prince Sabahattin, we see that he did not study the Ottoman family as the basic structure. He did not divide Ottoman society into classes regarding occupation, rather he maintained the importance of the structure of Ottoman society as a whole. Demolins divided society into two according to their structure: Communitairian and Individual. The first one contained of a system which was dominated by community, which was based on tradition, family and religion and usually appeared in Eastern societies. It was characterized by a tendency to rely, not on the self, but on the community, family and public powers. The second one was formed of individuals, who were able to develop themselves by their own effort regardless of society's manipulation. This system appeared in the Western societies.

Belonging to the newest sociological wave of that time, Le Play and Demolins, Sabahattin brought a new division type to Ottoman society different from class-based. The French sociologists divided societies into two, according to their status: Achieved and ascribed (*tecemmüi ve infiradi*). In the achieved one, an individual relies upon himself in attaining a goal, and he makes a person out of himself as a self-made man; whereas in the ascribed one, the individual gains a position not by his own means, but by a supporter of either family or a particular social group, like a tribe. Demolins mentioned that “societies of a particularistic formation are characterized by a tendency to rely, not on the community, but on self.”⁷⁴ The Anglo-Saxon model was an example of the first one, in which family and status did not account for acquiring merit, rather it was the individual who gained his own status.

Sabahattin used some of his concepts in deriving a certain thesis for the salvation of Turkey. His program contained a view that was new to the Turkish scene. Prominent social scientists in the Tanzimat era and modernization, Niyazi Berkes and Şükrü Hanioglu mention that his social program was the first attempt to make a social diagnosis of the troubles lying behind the façade, which had been the main target of reformers in the past.⁷⁵ Prince Sabahattin, on the other hand, different from his contemporaries, offered a social reform program for the first time and put different concepts at the core, like family, occupation and education, rather than the mainstream themes of nationalism, ideology and Islam. He maintained the importance of family in society building, but unlike Le Play, he did not expand it to

⁷⁴ Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It is Due?* (Ayer Co. Publishing, 1972), p. 50.

⁷⁵ Berkes, pg. 211 and Şükrü Hanioglu, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Meslek-i İçtima Akımı,” *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.2 (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), p.83.

an influential analysis on Ottoman family. He told that Ottoman family and the manner holding had to be rebuilt in accordance with time necessities, like relying on the self, not on the state. However, he did not offer any realistic solutions to dissolve this collectivity. Nevertheless, Prince Sabahattin embarked upon a new attempt by delineating a program of his own which provided the spurt for intellectual development by opening a new era in the social science.

Prince Sabahattin's *Meslek-i İçtima* Program

Although Sabahattin had been working on his social program since his arrival to France, his program, including suggestions for education, the development of villages and the advancement of society, which was completed in 1911, but was not published until 1913. His program of *Meslek-i İçtimai* (Profession of Sociology) of a 55-page piece, published with the name of *How Can Turkey Be Recovered? (Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?)* included adaptations from French sociologists who were influenced by self-instruction and the acquisition of individual ideas on the face of majority, under the light of science. As a follower of Le Play, in understanding society and trying to find the system of society from education, to administration and government style, Prince Sabahattin looked for the answers in science. His program consisted of five chapters: 1) Explanation of *La Science Sociale*, 2) *Meslek-i İçtima* (Profession of Sociology), 3) Property Possession in the Ottoman Empire, 4) Governing in the Ottoman Empire, 5) Military and Politics.

The first chapter explained how science had been utilized in the development of the society in the West by a system of knowledge in harmony with the reality of things inferred from observation and how sociology had become a new field of science. He tells of his acquaintance with the Le Play school as follows: “While I

was deeply desperate and wandering in the Parisian streets, in a book store I came across Demolins' provocative book *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It is Due?* Thinking about the progress and development of a society for a long time, I have not encountered similar methods to those of Demolins. After reading the book, I found all the answers and thought that these could be adapted to our society.”⁷⁶

In this first chapter, Sabahattin focuses on the importance of sociology and refers Le Play, Henri de Tourville and Edmond Demolins as important contributors for sociology's becoming a science. As an introduction to his program, he puts the importance of classification in science and says that even in nature, the animals and plants are classified according to their types, shapes and needs; so the societies need to be explored and classified in accordance to their characters, like geography and occupation. It would be only by comparison that the Ottomans would be able to realize where they wanted to be placed in the developing world and could catch up with those. Here, Prince Sabahattin mentioned that sociology appeared as a science to find a route, in which Le Play stood apart from the others by his simple explanation of societies which divided society according to dependence to the self or to the community. Sabahattin noted that in the communitarian system, which was based on community solidarity rather than individual achievement, the law, economics, governing and morality were based on the communitarian system, which ignored individual character development. However, even though the community sought benefit with this solidarity and adherence, he said, society could not progress, because customs and traditions blocked individual initiative to take responsibility.

⁷⁶ Prens Sabahattin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?* (Istanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1950), p. 11.

“Birgün, manen, maddeten çok yorgun, çok üzgün bir halde Paris'in meşhur caddelerinden birinde giderken bir kütüphanenin vitrininde Edmond Demolins'in eseri gözüme ilişti. O zamana kadar sosyoloji neşriyatında tesadüf etmediğim, müsbet ilimlerin metodlarına benzeyen bir ilmi metodun mevcudiyetini sezmiştim. Bu metodla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu camiasının içtimai tahlilini yapabilmek, icabeden ıslahat programını da hazırlayabilmek imkanının mevcut olduğuna kanaat getirdim.”

For him, the society must be comprehended as a distinctive body with different characters and different aims which would give diversity, rather than a unitary entity with the only common goal of becoming a state officer. Consistent development models, Sabahattin said, could be embraced only if the society was put in a scientific framework.⁷⁷

The main and the longest second chapter focused on a wide range of issues based on the question of why reform process had failed in the Ottoman Empire. Prince Sabahattin thought the Tanzimat reforms, which had induced building up a legal system to guarantee the freedom and equality of the people and encouraged the development of modern cultural institutions had not influenced the main target; society; rather they had been beneficial only to the state officers. He mentioned that if the major task was to be in the same path as that of the West, first the features of the society had to be examined with its past and previous reform experience, then a reform program which suited the society best, must be adapted. Following this, Sabahattin noted, the reforms had to start from below, rather than above. His first prerequisite for reforms was the examination of society, and since family was the basic unit of a society, first the family had to be examined. Then, he expanded the inspection to the small community evolving around the family, which would give the main data to see the occupation type. After determining the occupation type, like agriculture, mining or trade, Sabahattin thought that a convenient education program would stipulate advancement and this would result in community's bettering of.⁷⁸

As an agrarian society, Sabahattin wrote, the Ottomans in the villages did not get the right type of education and, combined with the communitarian structure with

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 15.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 20.

common property and tribal rules, they were not involved in the decision taking mechanisms. Although the Tanzimat had paved the way for change in the state institutions with the aim of replacing this communitarian structure with state instruments, like introducing bureaucracy and state administration, he wrote, it did not have a great impact on society. The main impact, Sabahattin argued, could only be attained through a systematic education reform which would stipulate progress by training the youth. Thus, education stood aside from the other issues in his program and in his later work, Sabahattin sought to find the most convenient education program for the Ottomans. He examined the Western systems and compared the French and the British. After visiting a British school, *Ecole des Roches* in northern France, the Prince approved of the training system, which enabled the students to learn their subjects by practice. The British system appealed to Prince, who said that rather than the theoretical training of the French, because the British system required practical knowledge with experience and proper training, they were ahead of the Ottomans, who must adopt this in order to overcome their less development and catch up with the Europeans.⁷⁹

In explanation of the British system, Sabahattin made a comparison with the French and said that in spite of the superficial and practical system of the British schools, British students became more well-prepared for life when they were exposed to practical information rather than heavy mathematics, whereas, the French, were equipped with unnecessary information, that made the labor to forget reading when they returned to their villages. The Ottomans, Sabahattin mentioned, were exposed to the same problem and this problem could not be solved only by saying

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 26.

that the villagers were ignorant and unskilled.⁸⁰ He advocated “instituting schools that would apply Anglo-Saxon teaching methods, which would produce men fit for the struggle for life, instead of passive, dependant individuals.”⁸¹ He maintained that the Ottoman education system did not prepare the youth for seeking the reality beneath things, rather it formed a barrier to human development which was initially based on acquiring an occupation, instead of maintaining an identity independent from the family.⁸² For this, according to him, the whole system which availed some elected people to become state officers should be replaced by a new one that would encourage these people to join the community, not in the consumption scale, but in the production scale.⁸³

In explaining society structures, after education, Prince put private property in an important place. The third chapter in his program focused on this issue and explained the property type of the Ottomans, who were mostly farmers and living a community life in villages. He explained that because power was dispersed among the land owners of influential families, community problems were solved in accordance to the benefits of these power holders, which blocked the individual development regardless of property possession. Since Ottoman state tradition did not allow the accumulation of wealth, citizens were not seen as respected subjects with equal rights or freedom. They had no say in problems related to land and agricultural income and this prevented them from developing identities of their own. The only leader in the countryside was the *ayan*, or landowner, who owed his power to wealth

⁸⁰ This saying belongs to Ahmet Rıza and it shows how their approach to problems differed: Destructive vs. Constructive.

⁸¹ Berkes, p.295.

⁸² *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, p. 33.

⁸³ *Ibid*, p.37.

and inherited social position. The *ayans*, often with the support of local *ulema* and the janissaries, helped strengthen local autonomy and thus weakened the hold of the central authority over the provinces.⁸⁴

Even though the Tanzimat aimed at a centralized and functionally oriented state, Sabahattin wrote, it did not aim to change this mentality. The Tanzimat reforms did not and could not change this situation, which resulted in a decline in productivity and income in the villages in the face of an increasing number of urban merchants.⁸⁵ The only way to change the mentality, Sabahattin thought would be to form a socio-economic order based on private property and free trade. This socio-economic order would be maintained through an education program which would allow for the emergence of a new political and economic order with private initiative.

However, in his program, Sabahattin did not include private initiative at the core in the economic framework and he did not derive different methods to render liberalism in Turkey, rather he referenced it shallowly and tried to supplement it politically with local administration. For him, private initiation was to be complemented by a decentralized administration, which would take the initiative by its own means independent from the centre for local issues, but dependant on the state administration in regional relations.

In the fourth chapter of the program, Sabahattin discussed how the self-discipline of individuals would induce development, which would give responsibility and which would undermine religious and traditional ties. For him, this would be sustained only by dispersing central power to local entities. He knew that religion and tradition were the major dominant tools in Ottoman villages; however, unlike Le

⁸⁴ Karpat, "The Transformation," p.251.

⁸⁵ *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, p. 33

Play, who emphasized the importance of these in building society, Sabahattin ignored this and tried to construct society and administration on a totally new foundation of self-discipline, which would start with the family. In a society in which family was important not only in the traditional sense, but also as an administrative and economic unit, such as *ayan* families or clans (*aşirets*), Prince Sabahattin did not suggest a solution to break these strong community bonds. His solutions resembled fitting into the developed Western societies, which had undergone this process long time ago, with industrialization and political liberalization, which ensured representation and security of property, but for the Ottomans, this need of self-discipline to pave the way for decentralization was not initial. The Ottoman reality in villages differed from the Western examples. Unlike the West, their initial needs were not administrative issues like decentralization or education, but a consistent system that would insure security in the face of the land owners. Sabahattin wrote about the position of military in the state and said that when the system changes from communitarian to the individualistic one, the role of military in politics would decline by itself.⁸⁶ According to him, the power could not be in the hands of a few including military and state officers and the only way to overcome this monopoly in politics was through village development, which would evolve around education. He rightly pointed out that as long as becoming a state officer was the only goal of the Ottoman individual, the decadent system would bring the end of the state.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 49.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p.33.

Berkes maintains that the most significant contribution of Prince Sabahattin was his encouragement to look for the reasons behind the events (*nokta-i istinat*).⁸⁸ It is true that in theory, education was one of the most important pillars of society, and must involve all subjects, rather than a few privileged ones; however, all problems could not be reduced to education alone. Sabahattin's first deficiency appears here: He based on his program on education, in stead of politics. He did not offer any solutions to expand education to society; rather he approached the issue from a more theoretical perspective by choosing the most suitable system for the Ottomans. He did not see that what the society needed was not a model, but a system which would secure them and make them useful to himself and to the community. In spite of this, his contribution in placing education at the core of society development was notable for contemporary Ottoman intellectuals at that time, who started to cross the path to modernity.

Sabahattin's second deficiency was his lack of knowledge of Ottoman society. He knew how the French and the British differed from each other, but he could not see how far-reaching it was to change the whole character of Ottoman family and community relations, which were tied each other with strong bonds, and in fact, the state used these bonds in its relations with society. In other words, the state had internalized this relationship throughout a long past and did not want to change it by educating the masses, until the Republican period. Without knowing Ottoman society, Sabahattin could not see that even the best system in the world could not overcome the situation in the Ottoman Empire. The superiority of the British system could be regarded as out of discussion for him, however it was naïve to talk about a Western curriculum at a time when education was not seen as a

⁸⁸ p. 312.

necessity, but an engagement for a few upper class students who were able to enter the state schools.

Even if the Ottoman education system was renovated and superseded by the British system, the problem was to support and secure it with a comprehensive system. The only way to ensure this was through a political program, which the Ottoman/Turkish system lacked. It must be noted that even during the absolutist reign of Abdulhamid II, the education system was supported by a political doctrine of creating a new class loyal to the Sultan, and brought up intellectuals with a particular frame of mind. As Kemal Karpat maintains, “The educational system is the outcome of more basic economic and social factors and it brought along professionalization and specialization, along with politicization.”⁸⁹ The initial need of the Ottomans was a political program, rather than education. Prince Sabahattin’s examinations, analysis and interpretations about education as well as comparisons with foreign systems, for sure, sought the most beneficial application for the Ottomans; however, his belief that only the education would result in the best results for the advancement of society, was not realistic.

Sabahattin did not ignore the importance of family in the formation of society, but his explanations and solutions based on family and individual relations were not realistic for Turkish villages. Sabahattin was the first Ottoman intellectual who put the individual at the core in the face of family in a society which embraced tradition and religion as the explanation of happenings. But since he did not know the structure of the Ottoman family in different places in the Empire, as Le Play knew the French one, his belief in improvement was not realistic. It must be noted that because he was the son of Seniha Sultan, who belonged to the Ottoman dynasty,

⁸⁹ Karpat, “The Transformation,” p.275.

his solutions originated from an “outsider” perspective. Sabahattin could be regarded as one of the most distinguished intellects of the elite class. Ramsaur mentions that his early life in Turkey did not give him an opportunity to study his own country and his education made him more of a European than a Turk.⁹⁰ Likewise, Hanioglu maintains “his self-declared intellectual superiority made him to look down on the others. He accused them of not understanding the realities of Ottoman society from a sociological and scientific viewpoint, which distanced him from the intellectual arena.”⁹¹

When we look at Le Play’s works, we see that he traveled throughout Europe and his derivations of family typologies were the result of complex and constant studies ranging from Norway to western European societies. His division of societies into two, as agrarian (rural workers) and state bureaucrats, as well as his examination of French and British parliaments, were appropriated by Sabahattin at that time, but they were not renewed or adapted to the Ottoman case. Rather they were taken as role models and efforts were made to understand Ottoman society in the light of these comparisons which Le Play observed and experienced himself. Ramsaur argues that Sabahattin’s deficiency was to take Demolins’ main thesis simply, which did not present complications regarding Islam and nationalism.⁹² Sabahattin, compared to Le Play, never traveled that far in order to make observations and he did not have a personal impact as an intellectual to sociology in the world arena. However, it must be borne in mind that another prominent sociologist, Ziya Gökalp, also took on another figure’s (Durkheim) ideology in

⁹⁰ Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*, p. 87.

⁹¹ Hanioglu, *Preparation*, p. 316.

⁹² Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*, p. 87.

creating sociology in Turkey. In the field of science, the West always dominated the East and Ottoman intellectuals did catch up the Western developments at that time, beginning from 1870s to 1930s; yet they always took a model role in the West and they tried only to make assertions about Ottoman/Turkish society.

CHAPTER V

PRINCE SABAHATTIN AND THE WEST

Embracing the French model in understanding society, at the same time Sabahattin started to announce his ideas to the West in his articles. His examinations of the problems between the West and the Empire were important contributions of an Eastern intellectual and some of them were published in the British and the French newspapers. One of the most notable of these was published in the French political magazine, *La Revue*, in 1905 with a title “Contribution of the Turks to Civilization.” It is important in the sense that it shows how he understood Ottoman history and how he placed Turks in the West beginning from the Asian steppes and ending in the Ottoman Empire. Here, again we see how he was influenced by Le Play in his classification of Turks. According to Sabahattin, the development of Ottoman/Turkish civilization occurred in three phases: “In the first phase”, he wrote, “living a pastoral life on the Asian steppes, Turks followed a paternalist (*pederşahi*) life style, which entailed a community life with a nomadic character. The courage and the strength of the Turks which came from that period allowed them to enlarge their borders. The first occupations of Turks were stock-breeding and the second one was battling in order to find new ways to settle a living. The second phase started with exploring new settlements which started from the seventh century, at the time of

the Golden Era of the Arabs. It was at that time when the communitarian life-style started to change with attachment to the land, which came to be Little Asia. This attachment changed the occupation of society, which was now characterized by agricultural and administrative skills. With these skills the Turks achieved to establish empires, the Gazneian, Seljuk and Ottoman. During that era, the Turks displayed major improvements in science, literature, architecture and art.”⁹³

From these explanations of the two phases, and knowing that the Prince became acquainted with Demolins’ sociology soon after he had arrived France in 1900 and that this article was written in 1905; sociological approach to the problems can be seen easily. We see that he rightly pointed out the facts of nomadic life with its communitarian aspect and importance of property for maintaining security, as well as the importance of occupation. Different from his colleagues, it is noteworthy that he did not appropriate Turkism in order to justify his stance in politics. Rather in a good-intention, he based his thoughts on history and sociology and believed the long history of Turks would provide a firm stance for the Ottoman Empire for regaining a prestigious stance in the Western world. Also, it can not be ignored that, at the age of 27, he was very young to be making such immodest assertions.⁹⁴

⁹³ Ege, p.59. See Appendix A.

“Türk ırkının ilk yurdu olan Asya steplerinde Türkler pederşahi bir cemaat hayatı ile göçebe hayatı yaşıyorlardı. Türk ırkının mertliği ve cesurluğu yavaş yavaş Asya steplerinin hududlarını aşmalarını sağladı. Türklerin birinci meslekleri hayvancılık, ikincisi de yeni geçim imkanları bulabilmek için cengaverlik idi. 7. asırdan itibaren Türkler Müslüman Araplarla temas etmeye başladılar ve Küçük Asya’ya yerleştiler. Bunun neticesinde içtimai hayatlarında esaslı değişiklikler meydana gelmiş oldu. Bu insanlar artık toprağa bağlanmaya, ziraat ile geçimlerini sağlamaya başladılar. Bu sayede yerli cemaat teşkilatı, devamlı mülki faaliyetler göstermeye başladılar ve Gazneliler, Selçuklular ve Osmanlılar olmak üzere üç büyük devlet kurdular; ilimde, edebiyatta, mimaride ve güzel sanatlarda şaheserler meydana getirdiler.”

⁹⁴ Prince Sabahattin could be regarded as one of the most prolific intellectuals compared to his contemporaries. One of his contemporaries, Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), started to write in *Genç Kalemler* in Selanic, in 1909, at the age of 33. Like Prince Sabahattin, Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), started to take steps in the political thought in his early years. He wrote his valuable piece, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, in 1904, at the age of 28. Of course, the impact of a work of an intellectual could not be examined only by looking at the age, regardless of his family background, the place he was raised and

According to Sabahattin the last phase determining the Turkish stance in the history of civilizations started around the 1850s in the Ottoman Empire, when direct relations with the West began.⁹⁵ He started this period with the Gülhane Edict, which declared the equality of Christian subjects in the military, justice and education, abolished the head tax and provided equality for employment in government. Sabahattin examined the edict with a critical approach. Consistent with his sociological views which focused on the decay in the system, he maintained that it was not the law which mattered, but the authorities who would apply these would reveal the intention behind reforms. In fact, in the Ottoman Empire, the application of the law depended on sophisticated elite and wise statesmen, who started to flourish in the new schools, like Imperial School of Civil Servants (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şahane*) (1859), War School (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*) (1834), Medicine School (*Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Şahane*)(1839). They were professional and technical and were designated to train the personnel needed for government service. Sabahattin knew that the reform process in the political and social fields in the Ottoman Empire would take a longer time than in Western societies. He mentioned that the influence of the educated elite in society and in State would not occur in the near future, but in two or three generations' time. According to him, Europeans had taken the same steps earlier than the Ottomans, thus knowing it should take a long time for adapting and prospering, they should not restraint the state for accelerating this hard process, in which results would be apparent in the next fifty years.

the education, but the age is an important constraint to understand how and when the intellectual gained the material.

⁹⁵ Here it is important to note that, although Prince gave accounts of Westernization from the 18th century, his starting point of the direct influence of the West was with the Gülhane Edict to which he gave great attention.

After explaining Turkish/Ottoman advancement and future expectations from the Empire, Sabahattin pointed out the superiority of the Turks in the past. To support this he gave a reference to Elisee Recluse (1830-1905), a French geographer who had published notable works in world geography at that time. Quoted from Recluse's *Geographie Universelle*, "Honesty, courage, generosity and hospitality of the Turks, along with inspirational highness need special attention. Having come from this superior race with an ancestor of Fatih and settling down in the hearth of Anatolia, the Turks left behind elegant architecture in Seljukian Konya."⁹⁶ Prince Sabahattin's close associate and collector of his articles, Nezahat Nurettin Ege and the writer of these lines think that Prince's giving reference to one of intellectual celebrities of the time, and supporting his thoughts with Recluse is noteworthy. It shows that he was following the current developments not only in sociology, but in other branches of science.

Although Sabahattin was not Turkist, he felt it necessary to take the history of the Turks to the Asian past when starting from the beginning of the twentieth century, Turkism and appreciation for Turkish culture, and the simplification and purification of the language was in stake. Findley notes that Turkish nationalism began to influence the Young Turk leadership after the 1908 revolution, even as they attempted to maintain what was left of the Ottomanist synthesis.⁹⁷ Although Prince Sabahattin based his thoughts on sociology and science among Ottomans, for the foreign audience he felt necessity to denote the importance of the Turks in history. Nevertheless, unlike Ziya Gökalp, he did not take the point to the extreme in 1907 or

⁹⁶ See Appendix A. "Dürüst, cesur, cömert ve namuslu Türk milleti bütün müstesna kabiliyetleri ile cidden takdire layıktır. Büyük Han Fatih'in ırkıdan gelen ve Küçük Asya'nın en eski şehirlerinden biri olan Konya'ya yerleşen Türkler, Selçuklular devrinden itibaren gerilerinde abideler bırakmışlardır."

⁹⁷p.159.

in the following period. He did not promote the Turkish nation, Muslim religious community or European civilization, like Ziya Gökalp did. He followed a more conciliatory line in detaching the nations, while he advocated an Ottoman, rather than Turk or Muslim identity. In this sense, his approach was similar to that of Yusuf Akçura, who has published his famous work *Three Policies (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset)* in 1905. He, too, believed in creation of Ottoman nation, but saw it impossible. Like Sabahattin, he developed a program based on long-term solutions with profound ascertains.

Sabahattin believed that the Empire would start to gain power with well-equipped youth, who would flourish in the next 30-40 years with establishment of a new system that would secure a number of liberties. He did not see the West as a threat as other Ottoman intellectuals with a superficial knowledge. In fact, as it could be understood from his stance during the First Congress of the Young Turks, he tended to get foreign support in this austere reform process and establishment of a new system. However, the following incidents, disintegration of Ottoman millets and occupation of Ottoman territories by the Western powers, proved him wrong. In spite of this, he did not hesitate to put forward Islam as another supporting element for the construction of society. In an article published in *La Revue* he said that the entire Islamic world of 300 million believers would continue to be under the supervision of Istanbul, and Pan-Islamism was to maintain solidarity among the believers. The article discussed how Turks were distinctive from the rest of civilizations, but there was no emphasis on Islam. His approach to Pan-Islamism was the subject of another publication and depicted under the Eastern question issue, which was published in *Times* in 1906.

Prince Sabahattin's views first were shaped by the declaration of foreign authorities about the Ottoman and the Eastern questions,⁹⁸ which entailed division of the Empire among the Western powers. As an answer to British Foreign Minister Edward Grey, the Prince composed a letter about this issue and it was published in *Times*.⁹⁹ In this letter, Sabahattin explained that although the Ottoman Empire held an important title of Caliphate, Pan-Islamism had been born outside the Empire and because of the politics followed by the West in order to protect Christians, it continued to rise. According to Sabahattin, the British and the French played an important role in the Muslims' maintaining an aggressive attitude towards the West, who had started to provoke nationalism and undermined religion. The East, as a counter movement, referred to Pan-Islamism as a unifying tool. He wrote that reasons for this threat have not happened in a few years, it has deep roots in the past. The West has always behaved in a hostile manner to the East and because of these changing dynamics, the East has applied this method in order to maintain unity in the face of this cruelty. The West caused the reasons and the East found the Pan-Islamist as a defense.

One more time, Sabahattin's views about Pan-Islamism resemble to Yusuf Akçura's. Akçura has written in *Three Policies* that like national identity, Pan-Islamism, which started to flourish in the reign of Abdulaziz on the face of decreasing solidarity and loyalty to the state, was a Western creation. Different from Sabahattin, he maintained Pan-Islamism as one of the main pillars in the formation of a society with a common bond.¹⁰⁰ Sabahattin did not put Pan-Islamism as one of the

⁹⁸ Eastern question was satisfaction of Western imperialist ambitions without causing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and began to appear after the Crimean War.

⁹⁹ August 12, 1906. See Appendix B.

devices in sustaining unity, but he did not hesitate to depict it as a menace to the West.

He mentioned that it was the Ottoman Empire that had controlled the Caliphate for four centuries, so it would determine its own fate by choosing either Islam or West for instilling loyalty and providing a common bond among citizens. Sabahattin added that the Ottoman Empire had always been closer to the West than it had been to the East, and it would not dare to use Islam in politics. Pan-Islamism was a result of the Eastern question and could be eliminated only by respecting the rights of the societies, including that of the Ottomans. In this article, Sabahattin's strong emphasis on the Ottoman character of Islam and the durable position of the Caliph in Istanbul are noteworthy. He did not himself believe in Pan-Islamism like Ali Suavi or Yusuf Akçura, but it seems like he had a practical aim of preserving Arab loyalty. Ironically, Sabahattin used it in the way that as his aggregator, Abdulhamid II had done, with less emphasis on religion, but more emphasis on sustaining a common bond and maintaining unity.

Sustaining a common bond and preventing the disintegration of the Empire were the issues that became apparent with the Eastern question. In the first decade of the twentieth century, for Sabahattin, the Eastern question and the relations between Ottoman Empire and the West would determine the future of the Empire. In this period, he tried to announce the Ottoman stance in the West more frequently. Regarding this, he sent a convention to the British authorities and it was published in the *Times* in January 1907. In the article Sabahattin explained and examined the recent situation of the Empire and the West, and made clear and to the point assertions, regarding the character of Ottoman society. The driving force of the

¹⁰⁰ Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), p. 7.

declaration was the question of why the Ottomans lagged behind the West and how they were to close the gap, and how the Ottoman superiority of the past had been reversed.

About disintegration, as he has done previously in deriving solutions, Sabahattin reduced this problem to two elements: Central policies of the Empire and lack of education. Sabahattin maintained that the main problem of the relations between the Ottomans and the West was a long period of recession, which disabled Ottomans to get ready for the reforms that were demanded by the West. The recession, according to Sabahattin, ended in 1876 with the promulgation of Constitution and from then on, Ottoman society had become subject to the reforms dictated by the West. This reformation period, combined with the Crimean War was characterized in the Eastern Question and precipitated the disintegration. He said that the only way to solve the Eastern Question lay in the hands of the Ottomans by deciding their government style.¹⁰¹ Heralding the basic elements of his program, *Meslek-i İctima* of 1911, Sabahattin wrote in this article in 1907, that “looking back to the recent Ottoman past, the advancement in education has paved the way for a flourishing of a new well-equipped youth trained in the state schools. They were the ones who have led the villagers and have taught them to look for their rights and duties and have sought decentralization. The only way to achieve advancement in society is to close the gap between the village and the city, which would be by a strong education program.”¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.107.

¹⁰² Ibid, p.108.

“Devlet okullarında okuyan münevver yeni nesiller köylerde yaşayan ehaliye rehberlik ettiler. Gençlerin çalışmaları sayesinde köylülerimiz haklarını ve vazifelerini anlamaya başlıyorlar. Türk köyleri ile şehirleri arasındaki manevi irtibat ancak ittihat ve mekteplerle aşılabılır.”

The Ottomans' relation with the other subjects living in the Empire was another subject of the article. Emphasizing the importance of military and urban settings for Turks starting from the fifteenth century, Sabahattin stated that the Turks had always cared for the other subjects with different religions and in the near future, the West would realize this.¹⁰³ With an optimistic approach he said that the Albanians, Arabs and Kurds had always been loyal to the Ottomans and their secession from the Empire would cause trouble among themselves and in Europe. The only way to keep them within the Empire was by decentralization. He supported his view with economic instruments, like the improvement of railroads and the diminishment of tribal societies and sedentarization which should take place in the eastern part of the Empire. Sabahattin was a projectionist intellectual who knew that the efficient economy would be made possible by maintaining easy transportation. In this way, he thought, new markets could be explored and private initiative could be fostered in the large area of the Arabian lands of *El Cezire*.¹⁰⁴ In the last part of the article, Sabahattin stated that Turkey was in favor of welfare and a just state. With this strong belief, Turkey would sustain development and a liberal Turkey would be entailed when it would make the West to admit that the Ottoman Empire belongs to the Ottomans.”¹⁰⁵

Village development became a major issue beginning from mid-1930s and it reached to the peak with Village Institutes, which will be covered in the last chapter.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.111.

¹⁰² At the time this article was written in 1907, the Baghdad and Hijaz railways were in the agenda on 1899 and 1900, respectively, under the supervision of the German. Ramsaur and Petrosyan mentions that one of the reasons for Damad Mahmud Paşa and his sons leaving the Empire was to give the priority in the railway construction to the German, instead of the British, whom Mahmut Paşa and the Prince watched closely. A close associate to Prince Sabahattin, A.Bedevi Kuran, opposed this and put the absolutist reign of Abdulhamid II as the reason.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p.114.

From the beginning of the declaration to the last part, the Prince insisted on the superiority of the Ottomans, not from the political or economic point of view, but from an historical perspective with the strength and durability of the state. He pointed out the good treatment of the Ottoman government of its Christian subjects and implied Pan-Islamism. His implication of Pan-Islamism is crucial when we bear in mind that the Empire was in disintegration period as the Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Crete incidents of emancipation of 1908 would confirm. As a projectionist intellectual, Prince Sabahattin had known that these events would happen and he tried to delay them by putting Pan-Islamism as a cause, and with the last sentence the last attempts to prolong the Empire could be seen.

CHAPTER VI

PRINCE SABAHAATTIN AND LIBERALISM

Liberalism in Europe

What Sabahattin understood from politics was decentralization and private initiative and he grouped these concepts under the name of liberalism, which was quite different from the Western meanings. Ottoman liberalism was initiated by the Prince, did not have a strong tradition coming from the past, and if it was to follow the European path, it would not give the same results, which Sabahattin could not see. In Europe, Liberalism was defined in accordance to association with the revolutionary process of the eighteenth century. Although European liberals saw themselves as heirs of the Enlightenment, they believed change should take place in a transition period, rather than in the form of radical break ups. They thought that the only acceptable liberal means of changing things was reform and they rejected

revolution as a means. In their view, society was threatened by two kinds of despotism, one from above and one from below. Standing in the midway between aristocracy and democracy, “liberals wanted to create political capacities in vast numbers of people who did not have them.”¹⁰⁶ They were committed to achieving and preserving political freedom and to define an ideal order they advocated educational projects to overcome it.

Specialized in the nineteenth century European liberalism, Kahan mentions that in the nineteenth century, politics, rather than economics, was of primary importance for liberals. For this reason, a strong rhetorical framework was needed to hold them together besides the main aim of political freedom and representation. Their means to achieve this was centered on the task of the decision of who might acquire the capacity to rule the masses. It was liberals who championed the Bill of Rights and the Rights of Man, but who were worried that participation by the wrong people might bring disaster. They put good government and avoiding despotism above universal political participation and believed there was a right to be well-governed. Liberals sought to increase the power of the legislative and the judiciary and limiting the executive power. In the nineteenth century, Europe adhered to the essentials of political liberalism, which were the making of laws by a representative legislature elected by voters, the protection of civil liberty and natural rights, and the right of peaceful opposition to the government.

As an economic doctrine with a slogan of *laissez faire* and *laissez passer*, liberalism sought to prevent the State’s intervening in economic relations between individuals, as a political doctrine, it called for freedom of thought. From the 1830s to the 1870s, liberalism as a political wave and capitalism as its economic

¹⁰⁶ Alan S. Kahan, *Liberalism in 19th Century Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.4.

consequence, moved to center stage in France, Germany and Britain. It declined after the 1880s to First World War. The capitalist system required new administrative rules with new institutions and new understandings. In his *Essays in Sociology*, Weber points out that the capitalist system had a major part in the development of a modern bureaucracy because of its urgent need for stable, strict, intensive and calculable administration.¹⁰⁷ The West captured capitalism with industrial revolution and merged it with the technological and military advancement, which resulted urbanization and change in consumptive habits. This paved the way for the emergence of a new propertied class. In Europe, the middle class started to share the benefits of the industrial revolution and they were the solid supporters of liberalism with their demand on the abolition of the restrictions of feudalism and mercantilism. Chief spokesman of bourgeois liberalism, Guizot (1787-1874), argued that it was the bourgeoisie that constituted the living forces of the nation and liberty could be maintained only when the government was dominated by this class.¹⁰⁸ In the Ottoman Empire, however, “the Turkish-Muslim peasant was isolated from the world as a relic of the past and was not undergoing a revolutionizing social change.”¹⁰⁹

Liberalism in the Ottoman Empire

Beginning from 1960s, Turkish intellectuals tried to understand where the Ottoman Empire stood in the liberal framework and they focused on the Ottoman past in order to position Turkey in the Western world, which was swept by new

¹⁰⁷ Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.45.

¹⁰⁸ Jacob Salwyn Schapiro, *Liberalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958), p.52.

¹⁰⁹ Karpat, “The Transformation,” p.249.

models of imperialism and dependency theories. In Turkey, some of them, like Doğan Avcıoğlu, developed dependency theories and put the relation between European imperialism and Ottoman state and saw that so-called liberalism went back as far as the Tanzimat era. In fact, as Berkes maintains, the years 1840-70 were revolutionary in bringing Turkey and Europe into closer contact.¹¹⁰ In this period, with the lowering of tariffs, industry as well as agriculture was brought into relations with the market and the methods and institutions of modern economy began to enter the Empire. Although those who benefited in Ottoman society were the urban Muslims, one can not speak of a rising Turkish bourgeoisie of the European kind.

Beginning from the Tanzimat, Ottoman intellectuals advocated a political liberalism that promoted political participation, representation and freedom of the press. However, they did not seek these with the people, in the words of Berkes, “who remained with no means, no power, no representation in national affairs and were ignored between European campaign and Ottoman intellectuals.”¹¹¹ Admitting European superiority in ensuring political rights and freedom in liberalism, they tried to find ways to be included in the league and they promoted different ideas to catch up with the Europeans.

One of the most important ways to achieve progress was put as maintaining a social transformation and letting classes occur. Previously it was mentioned that Yusuf Akçura and Parvus touched upon this social transformation issue, on the basis of classes, which would precipitate liberalism by the formation of a bourgeoisie class. Liberalism, in this sense, “served as a screen for the political emergence of a new propertied class, the business aristocracy and bourgeoisie, which the Ottoman

¹¹⁰ Berkes, p.138.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.272.

state and later Turkish Republic was devoid of.”¹¹² As a liberal and promoter of a radical social transformation rather than a gradual one, Prince Sabahattin realized this difference earlier than his colleagues, who were busy with political schisms and science. Sabahattin, borrowing from Western examples, understood the importance of this class in society, and tried to find ways to allow this class flourish among the the Ottomans, which later on became the main goal of the CUP and Republican period. But his aim was a difficult one to achieve, since as an intellectual, he was not influential with no attempt to involve in politics actively and overall, the system was so settled, it was not a scientific program that would make it dissolve. Berkes maintains that, since “Ottoman intellectuals as well as politicians, including Prince Sabahattin, did not belong to any class that possessed real or potential power, they did not know how to place themselves into the society.”¹¹³ It is sure their education separated them from the impoverished peasants, yet since there was no middle or professional class in the empire, their influence was of a limited one in a society which was composed of two groups: mainly Muslim, the agrarian wing in the villages, and non-Muslim commercial-entrepreneurial wing in the cities. There was not a middle class as in Europe, and the Ottoman intellectuals, followed by the Young Turks, aimed to enable the emergence of a new class based on economic production, which continued through the Republican period.

Among the Ottoman intellectuals, Prince Sabahattin was one of the first to advocate the involvement of this new class in politics and economics, and he put it within the framework of a systematic program, rather than ingenuous political discussions. In his program, which was included in his book *How Can Turkey be*

¹¹² Ibid, p.330.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Recovered?, he made a social diagnosis of the troubles lying behind the reforms and for the first time he offered a social reform program. He explained the ways to transform the society with sociology that he had learned from the French and the history of the Ottomans, which distanced him from the people and he interpreted liberalism by his own means, rather than applying to a universal discourse.

The liberalism promoted by Prince Sabahattin was in compliance with the Western one only in one aspect, which was putting individual liberty at the core. He maintained that the real need was to transform society from a collectivistic formation to an individualistic order. He thought the institutions, administration system, as well as intellectual culture should be shifted from a collectivistic to an individual form and this would be possible only by educating individuals to rely upon themselves, rather than on the community or the state. The second requisite for progress was private initiative and enterprise, which were extensions of the local administration. While politically, he advocated decentralization by saying local governments should be in charge of administration, municipality and judicial affairs, economically he thought, finance and public works also should be handled locally, as was the case in India and Egypt of the British.¹¹⁴

For the beginning of the transformation, Sabattin's program issued one of the most important proponents, possession of private property. The traditional Ottoman society in villages was dominated by common property and since the land was not owned by the peasants, problems related to land were to be solved by the community, which delayed the evolution of communal property to individual property. Although this property issue was not unknown to Ottoman intellectuals, Prince Sabahattin was the first to depict a program centered on this issue. He knew

¹¹⁴ *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, p.51.

social transformation was necessary and he thought radical change instead of evolutionary process was required. His definition of the problem of the lack of private property was followed by a very solid solution: education. He related the issue to education by saying that the only way to the development of villages was to change the education system, which would encourage the youth to be individuals. In his proposed reforms, Sabahattin depicted private life as the second part. He argued that a transformation from collectivistic property ownership to private ownership could be realized only through training the youth with the spirit of initiative and enterprise.¹¹⁵ He thought the country's resources had to be utilized by individual enterprise, which was based on private ownership and initiative. Again, he put this suggestion under the heading of education, which for him, was the panacea for most problems.

As an essential element of liberalism, private property has always been blocked in the Ottoman Empire and the accumulation of wealth did not take place. It was with the Tanzimat decree, which accelerated centralization and bureaucratization, although the Land Code of 1858 was more important for acquiring wealth, which provided "the liberalization of transfer of state lands to individuals and the regulation of economic relations through a European system of codes and courts"¹¹⁶ For the Ottomans, compared to the West, it took a long time for reforms to merge with a partly liberal economic policy of laissez-faire. It was in the late nineteenth century that economic activity increased and a primitive Ottoman capitalist system started to emerge in urban areas, while in rural areas a step towards private property had yet to occur.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.55.

¹¹⁶ Karpat, "The Transformation,"p. 260.

Economically, the liberalism that was supported by Prince Sabahattin was not Adam Smith's classic liberalism, with an emphasis on commerce and industry to promote national prosperity. In the Ottoman case, in spite of the small steps toward trade and commercial activities after the Tanzimat, one can not talk about industrialization since industry was not developed and wage or labor problems were not visible or even argued about among the Ottomans as they were in Britain. It was certain that some elements of this school were utilized, but the main problem of that time intellectuals was regarding politics, which was keeping the integration of the Empire; rather than appropriating an international discourse.

Prior to Prince Sabahattin, the main tasks were addressed towards politics, with economics in the second place. The liberalism of the Ottomans focused on the issue of representation, the borders of which were determined by Abdulhamid II and, later, the CUP. Until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1908 and the dethronement of Abdulhamid II, liberalism aimed to focus on these; after the Constitution, in the face of the Young Turks' power strategy of remaining the only party, liberalism took on a different meaning. It meant to struggle against this monopoly of power, besides keeping integration of the Empire by their own means, with decentralization and free enterprise. The liberals, who were devoted to Sabahattin's line, supported liberal economic policies and demanded freedom of private enterprise. The Unionists, on the other hand, believed that they could make the central government strong enough to enforce union and it would be the state, rather than separate local entities, that would carry out the necessary policies. Different from this accustomed dilemma of centralization-decentralization, Prince Sabahattin focused on the administration style of Empire, saying that distant entities

must be administered through decentralization to allow them to make their own decisions over local issues.

In spite of his embracing liberalism, however, in Sabahattin's articles and books, we do not see any resemblance or reference to classic Western liberals, like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. Neither the state of nature of Man, pursuing equal rights, nor the establishment of new political parties or maintaining a many-sided system of argument, were on Sabahattin's agenda. Rather, bi-polar struggles of power and polarization took place and representation and constitution were labeled as the main problems. Prince Sabahattin did not refer to liberalism, as a world doctrine, with encounters from French Enlightenment through the writings of Montesquieu or the American Declaration of Independence, even if Prince Sabahattin was ahead of his colleagues in understanding the West. Since the political developments of the Ottoman Empire were not implemented at the same time as the British or French ones, the intellectuals did not think one step further.

The liberals' and Prince Sabahattin's assertion of liberalism resembles to some extent to Locke, in the sense that, he, too, defended principles of a government that originated in the consent of the governed. Also, "Locke's account of idyllic state of nature from which man emerged voluntarily to form companionable society"¹¹⁷ was one of the ideas that Le Play mentioned in his derivations in sociology. In spite of this, in Sabahattin's writings, we do not see any analyses taken from Western liberals, who saw the problems formed around disclaiming freedom, rights, liberty and the property of individual. He used these as far as Le Play had referred. Sabahattin asserted importance of private property; however, he did not support this with the hard-line elements of liberalism, like having equal rights and

¹¹⁷ Mark Kishlansky (ed.), *Sources of the West* (New York: Longman, 2003), p.37.

liberty, promoting freedom and an unregulated free market. He pointed out liberalism in order to explain his sociological stance, rather than maintaining a comprehensive liberal tenure in politics.

As a liberal, Sabahattin believed that an individual must be at the core of the development of the society. But his individualism was not like Mill's, who delineated relations between the state and the individual and advocated individual rights over the state with personal and social liberty. Mill wrote *On Liberty* (1859) that "Where not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress."¹¹⁸ Prince Sabahattin did not take the individual for human liberty, as Mill did, rather he took the individual from the sociological perspective in order to strengthen his stance in sociology. His views including the individual must be the controller of his life and pursue his own end, liberty of expressing and publishing opinions, liberty of pursuits resembled more of Mill. However, he did not examine the inherited vision of individual liberty like a philosopher, by putting it at the core. Nevertheless, like Mill, he designed an individual with the terms of civilization, instruction, education and culture. It is important to note that he did this on the conditions of a dying Empire and he was able to reach a reasonable public sphere with his education program.

Prince Sabahattin did not point out the importance of individual liberty as a political philosopher, but as dissident elite who had problems with the system. His inclusive program that outlined the dilemma of individual and community was noteworthy, but left no trace in politics. While the Young Turks fought roughly to

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.152.

assure liberty in the political arena, leaving no space to non-politics, Prince Sabahattin chose to make his struggle not in politics, but in society. His program was more of a scientific one, rather than a political manifesto and since he was an outsider, distant from society's needs and realities, it was not taken seriously, to his disappointment. However, its importance comes not from his maintenance of a totally new solution, but from his putting it in a systematic framework. Hilmi Ziya Ülken writes that Sabahattin's reluctance to be involved politics, and his will to put sociology to the fore left him behind the scene at a time, when politics was a means to achieve an end.¹¹⁹

CHAPTER VII

PRINCE SABAHAATTIN AND POLITICS

1906-1908

The Second Congress of the Young Turks

By 1906, Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahattin were the two most important leaders of the movement in exile, each leading his own lines. Although, in Ramsaur's words "neither his age nor his knowledge of affairs secured Sabahattin a commanding position in the ranks of Turkish reformers,"¹²⁰ he attempted to gather the Second Congress of The Young Turks again, in Paris. It took place in December 1907, at a time when the Balkan entities were about to break away from the Empire and the French had occupied Tunisia. The Congress, did not take a step to unify the

¹¹⁹ Ülken, p.201.

¹²⁰ p.129.

two wings and the distinction and discrepancies appeared more visible. While Ahmet Rıza addressed a reign of “order” and “progress,” Sabahattin declared that individual effort and initiation with less state intervention would lead the greatest and strongest society. Different from the First Congress, at the Second one, Sabahattin realized that the Western powers would not take “wholehearted” or “through-going action” to intervene in Ottoman politics and he dedicated himself more to social studies, which he formulated with a program. From this time on, he continued his studies in Paris and stayed there until the dethronement of Abdulhamid II (1908).

In September 1908, concentrating on the social program of Demolins and trying to merge it with a political framework, Sabahattin traveled to Istanbul with the remains of his father, Damat Mahmut Paşa, who had died in 1903 in Paris. As the newspaper *İkdam*¹²¹ announced, he was welcomed and escorted by a large crowd, who followed their ship, *the Princes Maria*, from Izmir and Çanakkale. Up until this time, he had not been involved in any political discussions with the Young Turks and depicted a political program, which was called the Explanations (*İzahlar*). He started to think about introducing his social program into the political and economic arena and focused on Private Initiation (*Teşebbüs-i Şahsi*). In *İzahlar*, he aimed to frame his political program under liberalism which was a response to the politics of Committee of Union and Progress (October 1908), his stance opposing the Young Turks and among intellectuals was clear. *İzahlar* consists of three articles and eight letters to the CUP. Written for the same purpose as his *Meslek-i İçtima*, the articles aimed to explain solutions to the problems that the Ottomans and the political authorities encountered in the face of the West. The main purpose of this program was to depict the political framework with reference to decentralization and private

¹²¹ September 8, 1908.

initiative. Different from his previous work with a sociological approach to problems, this book seems to be a defense of Prince Sabahattin and his decentralization program including the polemics of that time, one of them being Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın.

The articles in the book explained decentralization (*Adem-i Merkeziyet*) and defended it by saying that it did not aim to break up the Empire, rather it aimed to improve the condition of the provincial units with a body that was elected by the local people. Sabahattin gave an example to explain the disadvantage of centralization in Bolu township, where the town authority had given up building a road when it took about six years to inform the related unit at the centre to give the necessary payments and equipment. The Prince mentioned that distant provinces had different characters and different needs, thus, they should be administered by authorities who know the region and problems. He wrote “the province of Yemen and Selanik are distinctive from each other and it is not the state officers in Istanbul who would realize the necessities. It is the ones who live there knew what would function best for the wealth of the community. Thus, decentralization in administration would help the development of the regions. In this way tax revenues would be beneficial to the community living there, rather than having no clue where it goes.”¹²²

With a more sociological analysis of the structure of Ottoman society, complementing his program *Meslek-i İçtima*, Sabahattin put forward the requirements of a developed country and made a comparison with the Ottoman

¹²² *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, p.71.

“Yemen vilayeti ile Selanik vilayeti ahalisinin maiyet tarzları arasında muazzam farklar var. Her iki vilayetin hakiki ihtiyaçlarını en iyi idrak edecek, İstanbul’daki memurlar değil, fakat Yemen ve Selanik’te bulunanlardır. Şu halde, idari adem-i merkeziyet mahalli vergileri en muvafık surette tayin ve teftişini sağlar.”

Empire. He mentioned that maintaining a position in State offices because of underdevelopment in agriculture, industry and trade, was the main reason for underdevelopment. In this way, the individual did not seek to stand on the face of difficulties by his own experience and personal skills, but by relying on the community and the State. Sabahattin pointed out that the absence of personal initiative incapacitated the most capable and well-equipped part of society to state offices, where they remain under state protection. In spite of their knowledge and skill, he says, they did not make an attempt to change the situation or introduce progress. Sabahattin thought the reasons why this class did not take part in reforming society was due to the deficiencies in child rearing and public education.¹²³

Prince Sabahattin believed in a world where rough competition took place, the only way for the improvement of societies lay in private economic initiative and that the Ottoman society needed to take necessary steps toward this development so as not to fall behind the world. Sabahattin rightly remarked on the deficiencies of Ottoman society and the importance of maintaining an office in the state. However, he ignored the character of Ottoman society and the difficulty of encouraging private initiative in a state where the accumulation of wealth was not independent of the notables. Sabahattin directly adapted the French way of thinking to the Ottomans, who did not experience seeking their rights from below and were far behind in accumulating personal wealth.

After Hamidian era in 1908, contrary to what was expected, Prince Sabahattin did not involve in politics actively in the face of Committee of Union and Progress. The Unionists, who were mainly professional men, teachers, lawyers, and journalists,

¹²³ Ibid, p.74.

were not advantaged by the political changes, yet were determined to carry the revolution further. However, they lacked the training and experience necessary to take over the administration and were unanimous about what to do with their newly acquired power.¹²⁴ On the other hand, the liberals, encouraged by Sabahattin's stance, came largely from the prosperous and conservative elements in Ottoman society, whom were appealed to private initiative. With the innovations in the political sphere, which included "the resurrection of the parliament and an enormous outpouring of legislation in addition to the emergence and proliferation of political parties,"¹²⁵ the CUP had always been supported in the face of the struggle with the Palace. But when the struggle was over with the dethronement of Abdulhamid II, some of the opposition broke away and formed the Ottoman Liberal Party (*Ahrar Fırkası*) in September 1908. the liberals wanted decentralization in government, with virtual autonomy for millet system, while the Unionists wanted to maintain the status-quo and wanted centralized government controlled by an elected assembly that would be independent of traditional institutions.

Although having close associates in the Liberal lines, Prince Sabahattin did not get involved in party politics or political polemics with the Unionists, but his views created a wing among the Ottoman youth and were embraced by the Liberals. Ideological proximity of Sabahattin's views with the Liberal Party and their insistence on Sabahattin's participation did not cause Sabahattin to get involved in politics. The party program was planned by the Sabahattin's group, the League of Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative (*Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet*) in Paris. Its framework was the same as his former social program:

¹²⁴ Feroz Ahmad, "The Young Turk Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol.3, no.3 (July 1968), p. 21.

¹²⁵ Findley, p.165.

Individualism and liberalism in the political sphere, private enterprise in the economic sphere and decentralization in the administrative sphere. This approach was ahead of the contemporary politics of the Unionists, since, in Tunaya's words, "decentralization brought equality and self-administration and it created cosmopolitanism."¹²⁶ The Unionists accused *Ahrar* of dividing the state. The party was less nationalist than the CUP with its exclusion of the Turkish, Ottoman and Muslim elements in the face of a more universal approach that included self-decision making authorities.

In the elections of the autumn of 1908, the Liberal Party took part only in Istanbul, without a single representative, however. The party's association with the Prince did not prevent Prince Sabahattin, Mizancı Murat and Sadrazam Kamil Paşa to get votes in the elections, yet the party did not get into the Parliament. In the early months of 1909, the CUP had to contend with two types of opposition: One, from *Ahrar* and the other from conservative religious circles, notably the lower *ulema* and sheiks of the dervish orders. The insurrection of religious-conservative reaction against secularism and modernization of April 13, 1909 "was an acute phase in the power struggle between the Liberals and the Unionists."¹²⁷ The Action Army, reinforced by volunteer units led by Niyazi Bey, one of the heroes of the revolution of 1908, organized a military campaign by the commanding force of the Third Army, Mahmut Şevket Paşa. Feroz Ahmad wrote that "The Third Army and Mahmut Şevket Paşa were averse not to the Liberals, but to the methods they had used to overthrow the Committee."¹²⁸ Zürcher writes that, "*Ahrar*'s opposition to what they

¹²⁶ T.Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, c. 3 (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı yayınları, 1984), p.183.

¹²⁷ Ahmad, p.30.

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 36.

saw as the Unionists' irresponsible policies and monopoly of power helped to create an atmosphere in which the revolt could take place.”¹²⁹ In this sense, following this counter revolution, although the Liberals were stronger, they were unable to consolidate their success and acquire legitimacy.

1908-18

In the years following March 31, 1909, Prince Sabahattin tried to lead a counter movement to that of the CUP with a liberal tendency. Young devotees of his discipline from *Darülfünun* initiated a club with a name of *Nesli Cedid Klubü*, which sought solutions in liberalism and decentralization. Prince Sabahattin's book *Üçüncü İzah* was published in 1911 and it included articles and letters he had written in Paris. In the book, he continued to define the problems the Empire was facing in the light of sociology that he learned from Demolins. Here, different from his previous views, he touched upon the military, saying that it was not and would not be the military which would save the state, but it would be the state that would expand on it. This note by the Prince might have been a response to the discussions about the role of the military in politics and their relationship with the Parliament which the CUP has dominated. “The interference of military men in politics and the politicization of the army were among the chief grudges of the opposition.”¹³⁰ According to Sabahattin, the only way for the state to regain its old strength was to reduce the military power in politics through decentralization, which would make small entities independent from the centre on economic issues. In administration, the state, again would be

¹²⁹ Eric J.Zürcher, *Modern Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p.103.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.107.

responsible for the village, but would not appoint an authority from the center, rather it would be the entity which would decide for itself.

In 1910, in Albania and Syria, and in 1911 in Crete and Yemen uprisings took place followed by the Tripoli War in 1912. Meanwhile, in the Ottoman government of the CUP, Sait Paşa resigned in July 1912 and Gazi Muhtar Paşa replaced him. In October 1912, the allied Balkan states issued a joint ultimatum to the Porte demanding far-reaching reforms under foreign control. Zürcher writes that “the inner circle of the CUP, led by Enver and Talat, had decided to force the government out of office by the end of 1912.”¹³¹ When the government gave in to the great powers, the Unionists had found their justification and launched their coup, in which the War Minister Nazım Paşa was killed and Kamil Paşa, the CUP’s old enemy, was forced to resign. A new cabinet was formed and Mahmut Şevket Paşa became Grand Vizier and War Minister.

After the January 1913 coup, the CUP was in complete control and did not persecute the opposition until the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa by a supporter of the Liberals in June 1913. Following this incident, widespread arrests took place and a number of people, including Prince Sabahattin, were sentenced to death. The Unionists tightened their hold on the government, when Talat Bey became Minister of Interior, Enver Bey was promoted twice in quick succession and became a pasha and Minister of War. Finding his life in danger, Sabahattin left the country and immediately afterwards, as a wise and just attempt as a result of facing such autocratic use of power of the CUP, denounced the unfair policies of the CUP in the international arena with an article in French *Le Temps*. Here, he declared that the CUP had made so many mistakes that they could not be undone and they had

¹³¹ Ibid, p.113.

distanced the Empire from the West and because of their high ambitions they had drawn major perils to the country. Meanwhile, tackling the debt problem, the Unionists send Ministry of Finance, Cavit Bey, to hold concessions with the Prince and wanted his support to find endowments from abroad. Refusing his request, Sabahattin tried to distance himself from the CUP and tried to work on the prevention of war.

For this purpose, he proposed a peace addresse to the Greek president, Venizelos and it was found to be a wise attempt for replacing the Turks living in Crete; but the CUP did not want to take a step towards peace and Turkey came one step closer to the Balkan Wars. In response to this delinquency and the Young Turks' arbitrary use of power, Sabahattin wrote a letter to Sultan Reşad and mentioned that "our biggest enemy is neither the Italians, nor the Balkans, our enemy is ourselves, who is committing a suicide by this war. Because of surviving centralization, we suffer so severely that we have satisfaction and happiness in neither our private life nor our community life."¹³² Being aware of the elusive position of the Empire, the Unionist government tried to interest the major powers in the conclusion of an alliance. "The Balkan War had shown up the empire's diplomatic isolation and the Unionists were convinced that continued isolation would mean the end of the empire."¹³³ Compared to the other powers, Germany was ready to sign an agreement with the Ottomans as equal partners and this attracted the Unionists, who wanted to emancipate the country from its semi-colonial status.

¹³² Ege, p.280.

"Ne kadar feci olursa olsun, itiraf edelim ki en büyük düşmanımız ne İtalyan, ne Balkan, ne de Avrupa, fakat biz, doğrudan doğruya kendimiz! Çünkü, merkez-i asli-i seyyiat, hayat-ı hususiyemizde ruhu terakki, hatta mahz-ı ruh olan şahsiyeti kül kömür eden bir atalet, hayat-ı umumiyemizde ise, tekmil Vatan ile birlikte merkezin de mezarını kazan bir merkeziyet! Demek ki Türkiye ölmüyor, sadece intihar ediyor!"

¹³³ Zürcher, *Modern*, p.116.

The decision to enter the World War was taken on by the leading Unionists in October 1914 in the face of increasing German pressure and financial guarantees. The Ottoman military, encouraged by the Germans' offensive strategy, envisaged attacks on the Suez canal and Russian Transcaucasia in January 1916. But the most important move to force the straits was made in March 1915, in which the Ottomans gained victory over Britain at Gallipoli. Constant campaigns outside of Ottoman territory, like at Baghdad, Palestine and Gaza, reduced the strength of the military in numbers, which was halved to 300,000 from 800,000 by 1917 and to 100,000 in October 1918.¹³⁴ At this time, Prince Sabahattin was working on his social program, which was discussed above, and had given up hope for the recovery of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the aftermath of the Armistice of Mudros that was signed in October 1918.

1918-24

After the signing of the Armistice, Sabahattin's book, *How Can Turkey be Recovered?*, was republished in November 1918, after a long time, since it had been banned from the scene by the Unionists. Witnessing this period, an associate of Sabahattin who had collected his articles in a book, Nezahat Nurettin Ege wrote that the entire *Bab-ı Ali* and *Bayezid Library* had been lighted up with Sabahattin's book.¹³⁵ The Ottomans facing the most difficult period hoped to get rescued from this situation by Prince Sabahattin and, predicting his return to the country, some newspapers claimed him to be either speaker of the Parliament or Grand Vizier to Sultan Vahdettin, who had succeeded Mehmet V after his death in July 1918.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p.123.

¹³⁵ p.321.

Meanwhile, Tefvik Paşa was appointed Grand Vizier and sent a letter to Sabahattin, who was in Switzerland, and invited him to return his country. Sabahattin returned to Istanbul towards the end of 1919 and witnessed the hard times of the occupation of Istanbul and Izmir. During his stay in Istanbul he emphasized his impartiality in politics and distanced himself from any political movements. He watched the military victories in the Independence War closely and supported the national resistance movement in Anatolia.

From March 1919 on, the anti-Unionist *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi* (Freedom and Understanding Party) was fully in power and started to arrest numbers of important Unionists. “In a number of provincial centres, societies for the defence of the national rights had come into being on the initiative of the local CUP branches and CUP representatives of the region in the capital.”¹³⁶ These organizations came into being towards the end of 1918 in Kars, Erzurum, İzmir and Edirne, followed in February 1919 by Trabzon. Although local Unionist leadership remained the driving force behind these organizations, local notables and religious dignitaries were recruited as behind the scene figures. These societies for the defence of the national rights tried to arouse and mobilize local Muslim public opinion and convened regional congresses in order to prove their legitimacy as representative bodies. Prince Sabahattin supported the independence movement of Mustafa Kemal and sent a number of telegrams and manifestation to be published in newspapers which was called Adressee to the National Conscience (*Milli Vicdana Hitap*). Here, he mentioned that from twenty years on, he has been working on the ways to develop individualism both for private and public spheres, but his views had always been underestimated by government offices who held the monopoly for few years.

¹³⁶ Eric J.Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic-The Progressive Republican Party,1924-25* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), p.13.

On October 29, 1923, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed by the Great National Assembly, which would lead to the founding of a fully independent opposition party almost a year later. On March 1, 1924, the new parliamentary year was opened, Caliphate was abolished and the Ottoman ruling family expelled from the country. Following this, Sabahattin was dismissed from the country in March 1924, on the basis of a decree in exiling the Ottoman dynasty to abroad and until his death in 1948, he stayed in Switzerland and continued his studies constantly for the wellbeing of his country.

1924-48

After the establishment of the Republic, Sabahattin was dismissed from the country in 1924 by the fact that he belonged to the Ottoman dynasty. Although he would not get involved in the establishment of an opposition party in the next few years, his understanding of liberalism made his followers to emulate his way. The abolition of the Caliphate triggered the efforts to form an opposition party. Until his death in 1948, he worked hard to bring solutions to Turkey's and as a whole, the East's, less developed position. Even a month before his death on June 30, 1948, on May 29, in his last letter, he maintained that Turkey's salvation was a matter of making a choice between democracy and non-democracy and this required a conscious society, that would be reached by scientific methods. A total change in family structure would pave the way to possess an individualistic approach with stress on the importance of profession and occupation. "A transformation from collectivistic property ownership to private ownership was required."¹³⁷ However, these would be the secondary steps toward development, he wrote "democracy has

¹³⁷ Berkes, p.312.

never been acquired in this country and if it goes like this it would never flourish under these circumstances. If Turkey has had followed the individualistic society model, she would now be among the West and would earn respect. The only way to improve Turkey is to attain the requirements of democracy.¹³⁸

Died in 1948, Prince Sabahattin did not write his memoirs, but his brother Prince Lütfullah (1880-1973) shed light on his and his brother's views about the republic. He responded to Cavit Orhan Tütengil's questions in 1951 by consequent letters and these were published in 1977 with a name of "The Case of Prince Lütfullah."¹³⁹ Here, the most notable answer was given to Tütengil's question, "What do you think about Mustafa Kemal and his Republic?" Prince Lütfullah answered "First, I need to put forward one point. I am not the one who believes there could be miracles in less developed societies. To replace a regime by another is neither a change, nor a rebirth. In this sense, how could a political regime that had a long and enduring past be utterly destroyed to consolidate another regime. (...) Mustafa Kemal is neither a superior human being nor a genius. He is a perfect man of action and a revolutionary. His healing potential, self-confidence and projectionism saved the nation. To transform the society he used the oldest devices of modernization: Republic, emancipation of women, clothing reform and Latin scripts. For many people, these were unexpected and new. However, there are superficial and exterior implications."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ *Vatan*, July 4 1949.

"Bu ülkede demokrasi hiç bir zaman gelişmedi ve bu şartlar altında gelişemez. Eğer Türkiye hususiyetçi teşekkül mahsulü olan teşebbüs-i şahsiyi tatbik etmiş olsaydı, Batı medeniyetinde faal ve azimli bir yer edinmiş olacaktı. Türkiye ancak demokrasi ile ilerleyebilir."

¹³⁹ Cavit Orhan Tütengil, Vedat Günyol, *Prens Lütfullah Dosyası* (İstanbul: Çan yayınları, 1977)

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid* pg. 25-30. See Appendix D for the original response.

Lütfullah remarked that the regime change in a less developed society would not give the expected results in the long run. The form never changed the content. The content kept itself in deceptive and dangerous way and shows itself in a lively form. Responding to question of placing Prince Sabahattin in development of social science, his brother mentioned that Sabahattin has not been understood in his life time, but time reversed his position and proved his examinations true. From these answers, it could be derived that, tackling the hard problems of adjusting a totally new life and broken away from his motherland, Prince Sabahattin did not think about coming back to his country and he distanced himself from the Republic and his colleagues. Only, Ege mentions that he kept in touch with Dr. Tevfik Remzi Kazancıgil and poet Tevfik Nevzat Çağdaş.¹⁴¹ Sabahattin's remaining has been brought to Istanbul in 1952 after 4 years of his death and he was buried in family cemetery at Eyüp.

CHAPTER VIII

PRINCE SABAHAATTIN'S INFLUENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

In addition to his political stance, Prince Sabahattin was more prolific compared to his contemporaries in promoting new educational, cultural and moral manners, which were generated by the question of Le Play's, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It Is Due?* Fındıkoğlu mentions that rather than maintaining a political stance and struggling for power, Prince Sabahattin did not become a politician, yet he tried to bring permanent solutions regarding socio-political arena,

¹⁴¹ Ege, *Prens Sabahattin*, pg. 499.

beginning from educational and moral values.¹⁴² In the economic sphere, he advocated liberalism and tried to supersede the heavy state economy of the Ottomans to a more flexible liberal one encouraged by free enterprise. Without a settlement of the question of the shape and role of government and the structure of economics, of course, Prince Sabahattin's views on educational advancement and moral values could not be pursued.

It is unlikely to be surpassed that Ziya Gökalp had a deep influence on the inception of Turkish sociology, but Prince Sabahattin's impact in sociology could not be ignored even after his death. Fındıkoğlu divides Prince Sabahattin and his protégées into four periods: 1899-1908, 1908-14, 1919-24 and 1931-60s.¹⁴³ In the first years, the Prince himself took an active role in advancing his ideas along with the line with of Demolins. It was in this period that he started to develop his social program. In the second phase, there were translations from Demolins by Ahmet Sanih, Fuat and Naci Beyler, Rüştü İbrahim and Mehmet Ali Şevki in 1913-15. The most important among these was Mehmet Ali Şevki (1881-1963). He established association *Mesleki İctimai* in 1918 and published Prince Sabahattin's *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, which was written in 1911, but could not be published until that time. He continued his publications related to *science sociale* until the 1940s; however different from Prince Sabahattin and his period, he renewed his ideas and adapted them to the 1930s on the basis of family and self-education. Like Sabahattin, he believed that previously all reforms aimed at strengthening the state, but ignored the individual.

¹⁴² Fındıkoğlu, *Le Play Mektebi*, p. 82.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

In 1946, *Istanbul Muallime Birliđi* (Female Teachers Association), which was active in 1918-36, started to publish Prince Sabahattin's articles and the works of close friends' of the Prince, one of them being Ahmet Bedevi Kuran. Even before his death, Sabahattin's views on education were embraced by Ismail Hakki Baltacıođlu as it can be seen in his weekly journal *Yeni Adam*. In this journal, he advocated articles about how the high schools should be reformed. He remarked that it was not the information to be gained from school, but it must be the skill to assure a profession in order to develop the society.¹⁴⁴ In the 1930s, questions regarding "interest in village life, the contradictions between urban and rural life, anti-intellectualism, how rural populations prosper"¹⁴⁵ were launched and peasantist discourse began to enrich the literature, which brought villages to the core of the issues.

Related to Prince Sabahattin's emphasis on education and improving village life, there were many attempts to understand, discuss and readapt a new system. The most important of these were sociology conferences held at Istanbul University beginning from 1960, pioneered by Z.F. Fındıkođlu. In one of these, in 1961, Salahaddin Demirkan, state officer of an important post in the State Railways (*Devlet Demiryolları*), gave a speech about how he was acquainted with Prince Sabahattin's views and what could be done to put this heavy knowledge into practice in the villages.¹⁴⁶ Demirkan was a bureaucrat in the State Railways and in his travels around Turkey, he tried to shed light on how the villages would develop, in a time

¹⁴⁴ "Liseler Nasıl Islah Edilmelidir?," *Yeni Adam*, 29 November 1934.

¹⁴⁵ M. Asım Karaömerliođlu, "The Village Institutes Experience in Turkey," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.25, no.1 (May, 1998), p.51.

¹⁴⁶ The title of speech is "Memleketimizi Tanıma Meselesi ve Prens Sabahattin Çıđırır."

(the 1960s) when many development models started to pave way for Turkish intellectuals to find out advancement of the West.

Here, Demirkan maintains that the village had never been the main centre for the state, for applying economic reforms in the face of urban areas, when budget share of agriculture remained three per cent.¹⁴⁷ In order to place data into a theoretical framework, Demirkan had started to read Ziya Gökalp until he came across an article in *La Science Sociale* of 1911 by Paul Descamps, who maintained that the first and the necessary step for a new life in Turkey, stemmed from education, not from parliament or politics, and this was tried to be applied by Prince Sabahattin.¹⁴⁸ In 1935, Demirkan was appointed as a state officer to the Village Bureau and started to conceive of new village monographies combined with polls. In this work, he tried to outline data a new branch in sociology, which had been undertaken in the US as “rural sociology.” It must be borne in mind that in the 1930s Turkey was undergoing a profound change in urban life, and “lively discussions on how to improve elementary and adult education in general and the agricultural education in particular”¹⁴⁹ were taking place. In the 1940s, village development was at stake and a Village Affairs Commission was formed. The village was seen as the centre for community advancement in society, and sociology in Turkey in 1930s were based upon the needs of villages. A similar movement had taken place in Europe at the beginning of nineteenth century in an attempt to upgrade the villagers to working class.

¹⁴⁷ Z.Fahri Fındıkoğlu, *Sosyoloji Konferansları (1960-61)* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1962), p.82.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Karaömerlioğlu,p.53.

Beginning from the mid-1930s, Turkey was influenced by the Anglo-Saxon education model, which gave experimentation and experience priority. In the 1940s, the establishment of the Village Institutes and the British education system, which concentrated on vocational and practical education, were leading issues and they were defined within the limits of nation-state building. For this, the British system was watched closely and the Anglo-Saxon education system, which endorsed “learning by doing,” became a model for the Village Institutes. The village development program was shaped around the objective of “education for work or education for production.”¹⁵⁰ From this point, the Village Institutes resembled a model that Prince Sabahattin advocated at the beginning of the twentieth century.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p.57.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In the 1950s, as a new actor in politics, the “liberal” wave, paved the way for reemergence of Prince Sabahattin’s views. As seen above, he was remembered and taken into account by many social scientists. However, all these activities could not undermine the fact that as a wise intellectual trained in Western manners, Prince Sabahattin was not understood by the leading Ottoman figures in his own time. Tütengil put the main reason behind Prince Sabahaddin’s overshadowed stance in Turkey as the posture of the State, which tried to pull all the subjects together, instead of breaking them into parts or providing a decentralized pattern of government and administration.¹⁵¹ Second, the discrepancy among the The Young Turks and the struggle for power distanced the Prince from politics and because of his political stance proposing decentralization; he was maltreated by his opponents and very much distanced from the Turkish intelligentsia.

Sociology as a new branch in social science, appeared in France “when the sphere of social relations began to be conceived as a reality of the same order as physical reality.”¹⁵² Application of positive method to social theory and make use of this new science to understand the underdevelopment of the Eastern societies was the major attempt of Sabahattin. He was the first Ottoman intellectual to offer a complete social diagnosis of the underlying causes of Ottoman deterioration. He argued Western individualism, private ownership, and governmental decentralization were responsible for the success of modern European states and he advocated this

¹⁵¹ p.59.

¹⁵² Robert Marjolin, “French Sociology- Comte and Durkheim,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, n. 5 (March, 1937), 693-704.

kind of Westernization for Turkey. The major theoretical and methodological contribution of Sabahattin was his emphasis on the family as the basic unit of society. Although he adopted the theory from Le Play and Demolins, he was the first to attempt to collect data of Ottoman society in accordance to geography and occupation type, which later on opened the path for works of village development.

Bearing in mind that he was educated in Paris and had been exposed to modernism prior to the others, Prince Sabahattin was the most distinguished intellectuals with his distinctive contributions to the Ottoman intellectual world formulated as long-term solutions as well as to the opposition, which was gathered around *Ahrar*, at the beginning of the 1900s. His proposals regarding the improvement of the educational system and society were ahead of the Ottoman intellectuals with their long-term implications in the sense that he did not rely heavily on political matters or ideologies, like Turkism or Islamism, which had swept the Young Turks, but scientific and sociological ones. This fact distanced him from the people and his solution seeking remained inapplicable.

Hanioğlu mentions that Sabahattin claimed since it was impossible to change the laws of nature, the only thing for the Young Turks to do was to understand and apply these laws to the social events in which they participated.¹⁵³ Sabahattin was the primary example of this with his reliance on science alone. His reliance on science and sociology brought difficulties along with it, since he attempted to adjust these aspects to the politics, which were not based on theories, but practices. The individualism he acquired from Anglo-Saxon model was reflected as decentralization in politics and as liberalism in economics. This suggestion did not fit at that time, when the Young Turks held the power and advocated centralized policies, rather than

¹⁴⁴ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks*, p.22.

granting autonomy to the regions. Thus, as a brilliant and reformist intellectual, Prince Sabahattin could not show the same success in politics, where power was essential in the face of science and knowledge and although he showed a strong presence, he was not understood by intelligentsia.

APPENDIX A

Türklerin Medeniyet Aleminde Kaydettikleri Terakkiler (*La Revue*, December 15, 1905)

Zamanımızda ırklar ve milletler hakkındaki tetkiklerin rağbette olduğu memnuniyetle görülmektedir. Bütün bu tetkiklere rağmen Türklerin hiç anlaşılmamış olduklarını, hatta çok defa meçhuller aleminde kaldıklarını kabul etmek mecburiyetindeyiz. Osmanlı Türklerinin ictimai sahadaki tekamülleri üç merhale arz etmektedir.

Birinci merhale: Türk ırkının ilk yurdu olan Asya stepleri mutlak surette hiç bir değişikliğe elverişli olmayan bir karakter taşır. Bu merkezi yaylada hava tazyiklerindeki iniş çıkışlar, hararet derecesindeki ani değişiklikler...tufan gibi yağmurlarla serpilip büyüyen...yeşil bir derya teşkil eden otlar...

Asya steplerinde bir hükümet mevcut olamazdı. Sadece tam manası ile pederşahi bir cemaat hayatı hüküm sürmektedir. Türkler bu step imparatorluğunun tesiri altında sadece sürülerini otlatabilecekleri yerlere gidip çadırlarını kurmak sureti ile toplu bir halde göçebe hayatı yaşamağa mecbur idiler. Bu tarzi hayatın insanlara bahşettiği bir çok boş zamanları da tahayyulat ile geçiriyorlardı. Tabiatle mücadelede birbirlerinin yardımını koşmakta, daima mert ve cesur olan bu namuslu ve azimli Türk ırkı yavaş yavaş Asya steplerinin hududlarını aşarak İran ve Fırat, Dicle mıntıklarına kadar gelmişlerdi. Türklerin birinci meslekleri hayvancılık, ikincisi de yeni yeni geçim imkanları bulabilmek için cengaverlik idi.

İkinci merhale: Miladi yedinci asırdan itibaren Türklerin ikince tekamül safhası başlar. Nihayet Türklerin Küçük Asya'ya yerleşmeleri neticesinde ictimai hayatlarında esaslı değişiklikler meydana gelmiş oldu. O zamana kadar uçsuz bucaksız yaylalarda göçebe olarak geçinen bu insanlar artık toprağa bağlanmağa,

ziraat ile geçimlerini sağlamaya başladılar. Bu sayede yerli cemaat teşkilatı, devamlı mülki faaliyetler göstermeğe başladılar ve devamlı hükümetler kurmağa muvaffak oldular. Bu üç büyük devlet: Gazneliler, Selçuklular ve en sonunda da Osmanlılardır. Bu devletler zamanında Türkler ilimde, tababette, edebiyatta, mimaride ve güzel sanatların her şubesinde kıymetleri bütün dünya alimleri tarafından takdirle karşılanan şah-eserler meydana getirmişler idi.

Üçüncü merhale: İnsanlık medeni hayattaki bu mertebeye Avrupada ulaşabilmiştir. Çünkü orada tabiat tenbih edicidir. Orada latif tabiat içinde, insan iradesi zafer kazanmıştır. Türk milleti garb ile doğrudan doğruya münasebetlerde bulunmaya elli seneden beri başlamış bulunuyor. Bu münasebetler onsekizince asrın ikinci yarısından itibaren, üçüncü Sultan Selimin tahta çıkması ile gelişmeğe başlamıştı. Türkiye işte bu esnada garb düşüncesi içinde tekamül etme gayretini göstermekte idi. Halk bu hususta hala alakasız kalıyordu. Fakat hiç olmazsa onun hükümeti bunu ele alıyordu. Üçüncü Selim- siyasi anarşiye kendini kaptırmış bütün cemiyetlerde rastlandığı gibi- bir ayaklanma neticesinde tahtından indirildi. Fakat bu neticeye rağmen halefleri İkinci Sultan Mahmud ve Abdülmecid, açılmış olan bu yolda yürümeğe azimli idiler. Her yeni teşebbüse engel olan Yeniçeri grubunun tazyikinden kurtulduktan sonra Türkiye, Avrupa tarzında yetiştirilmiş bir ordu ile siyasi ve sivil bir çok müesseselerini islah etti.

(...) Yazmış olduğu ilmi eserlerden meydana gelen bir abide bırakarak yakın zamanda hayata veda eden büyük Coğrafya alimi Elisee Recluse Türklerden şöyle bahsetmektedir:

“En menfi şartlar altında bile manevi hasletlerinden hiç bir şey kaybetmeyen bu millet bütün müstesna kabiliyetleri ile cidden takdire layıktır. Türkler aramız üzerinde yaşayan insanların en namuslusudurlar. Dürüst, cesur ve cömert olan bu

insanlar mütevazî hayatlarında malik oldukları her şeyi seve seve başkalarına ikram etmeğe daima hazırdılar. Buna mukabil bu iyi kalpli insanlar, başkalarının lütfuna hiç bir zaman intizar etmezler. Bahşiş suistimali Türkiyeden ziyade Avrupada görülmektedir. Şarkta yani Türkiyede olsa olsa Lavantenlerin yaşadıkları büyük şehirlerde böyle bahşiş suistimaline tesadüf edilmektedir.

Türkler büyük Hakan Fatih'in ırkından gelmiş olmalarına rağmen Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun diğer unsurlarından daha az tazyike maruz değildiler. Üstelik ecnebi sefaretlerden, Hristiyanların hukukunu müdafaa maksadı ile bir çok müteşebbüsler alınırken Türk ırkının hukukunun müdafaa eden hiç bir ses yükselmemiştir.

Küçük Asya'nın en eski şehirlerinde biri olan Konya, Ortaçağdaki abideleri ile, şimdiki yeni sanayi faaliyetlerinden daha çok dikkatle tetkike layık bir şehirdir. Selçukilerin camileri, Arabesk zerafetleri ile, çinilerinin emsalsiz güzellikleri ile Anadolu yarımadasının şaheserleridir.”

Yarım asırdan beri Türk vatanseverleri aziz yurdumuzda mümtaz bir gençliğin yükselişini derin bir takdirle müşahade etmektedirler. Bugün Şark aleminde konuşulan hiç bir dil Türkçemiz kadar terakkiye mazhar olmamıştır. Bu edebiyat sayesinde, Asya kıtasında Avrupa rönesansını meydana getiren fikirleri tanıtmak imkanı hasıl olmuştur.

(...) Şu hakikatı teslim etmek mecburiyetindeyiz ki, İslam alemi 300,000,000 bir insanlık camiası ile İstanbul'un manevi nüfuz ve tesiri altındadır. Uzun müddetten beri derin bir uyku halinde bulunduğu zannedilen Türk topluluğunda bugün büyük bir vatan aşkı ve millet sevgisi ile dimdik, uyanık bir halde ve aziz vatandaşlarımızın yükselişini temine muktedir yeni bir nesil mevcuttur.

Herkesi memnun edecek bir Şark meselesinin halli, her türlü müşkillerin ve düşmanlıkların kaynağı olan müsavatsızlıkların ortadan kaldırılması ile temin edilebilir. Siyasi müsavatsızlık ve bunun tevlid ettiği bilhassa Türk ve Müslüman vatandaşlarımızın mağdur oldukları iktisadi müsavatsızlık... Garb medeniyetini vatanımızda tatbika muktedir bu yeni Türk münevverlerinin gayretleri ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda süratli bir inkışaf müşahade olunacaktır. Bu sayede Türkiye’de huzur ve sükun teessüs edecek, Avrupa Devletleri de Şark meselesinin adilane bir şekilde halledilmekte olduğuna şahit olacaklardır.

APPENDIX B

Sir Edward Grey’in İttihad-ı İslamı medeniyet alemi için büyük bir tehlike olmak üzere gösteren ve memleketimizi mesul addeden nutkuna karşı, Sultanzade Sabahaddin Beyefendinin nazıra gönderdikleri ve *Times* gazetesinin 12 Ağustos 1906 tarihli nüshasında basılmış olan mektubun tercümesi

Asalet meab,

Bir kaç hafta evvel Avam Kamarasında irad ettiğiniz nutuk, mühim İttihad-ı İslam meselesini mevzu-bahs ediyor. İngiltere dünyanın en büyük İslam Hükümeti olduğundan zat-ı alilerinin beyanatı da bittabi umum islam memleketleri ve bilhassa müstakil bir Devlet ve Hilafet merkezi olmak hasebiyle Türkiye için büyük bir ehemmiyeti haizdir.

(...) Şüphesiz, İttihad-ı İslam bir hurafe değil, Garbın Şarka karşı tatbik etmekte olduğu siyasetin pek tabii aksül-amelidir. Çünkü Garb’ın Şark’a karşı tatbik etmekte olduğu siyaset, daima sulhperverane olmadıktan başka bazı defalar pek haşin ve taaruzkarane oluyor.

Haklı veya haksız kendini, soyulmakta ve izrar edilmekte gören Şark, İttihad-ı İslam fikrine meyl ederek bu fikirle islam memleketleri arasına bir kardeşlik ve

birleşme hareketi koymayı ve o sayede muhtelif unsurların milliyetlerinin muhafazasını temin edeceğini tasavvur ediyor. Fakat şu politika zannedildiği gibi dini bir taassub neticesi değil, Avrupanın yapmakta olduğu tedrici istiladan mütevellit bir memnuniyetsizlik hissinin izharıdır.

Yalnız, Şarkta din hissi, Garbdakinden daha kuvvetli olduğundan, bir umumi maksada hizmet eden her siyaset Şarkta dine istinat ediyor ve bu din hissidir ki, mütecanis unsurlara mensub olmayan milyonlarca insanlar arasında hissi bir rabıta tesis ediyor.

Bugün karşı karşıya gelen bu iki alemin istikbaldeki münasebetleri ne olacak? Avrupa siyasi mehalifinde İstanbul, Pan-İslamizm merkezi addediliyor. Hakikati izhar zamanı çoktan geldi. Dört asırdan beridir ki, Osmanlı Hükümeti Hilafet merkezi olduğu halde bu son senelere gelinceye kadar İslam memleketlerinin siyasi ittihadına çalışıldığı görülmedi. Askeri satvatinin zirvesine vardığı sıralarda bile bu fikri düşünmeyen Osmanlı Devleti nasıl olur da bu gün bunun tatbikine kalkışır?

Asırlarca evvel Yavuz Sultan Selim mukaddes emanetleri İstanbulla nakletmiş, fakat siyaset sahasında bir İttihad-ı İslam davasına tevessül etmemişti. Son zamanlara kadar Osmanlı Padişahları Hilafet ünvanını sırf bir şeref ad etmekle iktifa ederlerdi. Yalnız Sultan Abdülhamid saltanatının son devresinde ruhani iktidarına fazla bir ehemmiyet vermeğe başladı. O da İstanbulda, yalnız dahildeki müslümanlar üzerinde bir tesir icrası maksadiyle dini politika takip ediliyor. Bunun sebebini izah içinse Türkiye’de tecelli eden fikri terakkileri icmalen gözden geçirmek icab ediyor.

Türkler, coğrafi mevkileri dolayısıyla diğer islam milletlerinin hepsinden daha büyük bir süratle Garb medeniyetine doğru tekamül ediyorlar ve garbın terakkilerine mükavemet edilmez kuvvetli bir cazibe ile alaka gösteriyorlar.

Garbdaki hiç bir ictimai hadise yoktur ki, uzakan bile olsa Türk münevverlerinin dikkatini çekmiş olmasın. Bu devirde Türklerin iktisadi hayatı pek durgun olduğu cihetle faal gençlerimiz fikri meselelerle daha sıkı temasları sayesinde bu terakki asrına yakışacak bir fikri inkışaf gösteriyorlar.

(...) Esasen Devletimizin teb'ası tamamen islam olmayıp içlerinde diğer dinlere mensub bir çok unsurların bulunması tarafsız, adil, cismani ve meşruti bir idareye malikiyei istilzam eder. Bundan maada Bab-ı Ali diğer Hükümetlerle iyi münasebetlerde bulunmak ihtiyacında olduğundan tabii olarak islam teb'aları bulunan Devletlerin husumetini celb etmeden müslüman milletleri tevhide kalkışamaz. Hatta bu siyaset oralardaki müslümanların da menfaatlarına uygun olamaz. İşte bu dahili ve harici sebepler bizi Tevhid-i İslam politikasından uzaklaştırıyor. İstanbul'un bugün islam alemi üzerindeki ruhani tesiri; ancak hürriyet fikirlerinin galebesiyle bir fikri tesir olmaya başlayacak...ve o zaman bu tesir Şark ile Garb arasında dostane bir münasebet kurulmasına büyük mikyasta yardım edecektir. Fakat yalnız Şarkın arzusu bu ali maksadın husulüne kafi gelmez. Temenniye şayandır ki, Avrupanın Şarktaki siyaseti daha insafli, ve insanlık haysiyetine karşı daha hörmetkarane olsun. Şark aleminin sulh ve terakkisi sırf bu şartla temin edilebilir. Fakat bu şart, Avrupa müstemlekeler idarelerinin hepsinden ziyade milletlerin serbestisine müsait bulunan İngiliz milletinin müstemlekeler idaresindeki üstünlüğünü itiraftan da bizi hiç bir suretle alıkoyamaz.

APPENDIX C

Teşebbüs-i Şahsi, Meşrutiyet ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyetinin Programı, *Şuray-ı Ümmet*, 27 Temmuz 1906.

Madde 1- Osmanlı memleketlerinde tatbik edilecek siyasi ıslahat: sınıfların ve tebeanın istisnasız kaffesine şumüllü olmak üzere, mevcut vilayetlerin usul ve

kaidesiyle idaresi esasına müstenit olacaktır. Adem-i Merkeziyet ve Tevsi-i Mezuniyet usulü 1876 senesinde neşrolunan Kanun-ı Esasi'nin 108inci maddesinde görüldüğü gibi, yani (İntihab Usulü) üzerine müesses olacak ve bu Kanun-ı Esasi dahi muhtelif hal ve şeraitte lüzum hissedildikçe tadilata uğrayabilecektir.

Madde 2- İntihab ile teşkil edilen belediyeler, nahiye meclisi, meclis-i idare-i belediye gibi bütün heyetler, nahiye ve vilayetlerin işlerinin görülmesi ve tesviyesine iştirak ve müdahale edebileceklerdir. Gizli rey ile intihab edilmiş aza ile bunlara terfîk edilecek daimi azadan mürekkeb bir meclis: vilayetin mali işlerine, kanun ve nizamlarına ait bütün mesail ve muamelatta tam ve geniş bir salahiyyete malik bulunacaktır. Bu heyetin müzarekeleri aleni olacaktır. Bu umumi vilayet meclisi, birçok meseleler arasında vergilerin, tarh, tevzi ve tahsili hakkında reyini kullanacak ve vergi hasılatının vilayet ve hükümet merkezi arasında kararlaştırılacak miktarı, mahalli ihtiyaçlara sarf edilmek üzere terk olunacaktır.

Madde 3- Bir taraftan vilayetler arasında münasebetler temin ve tevsi edilirken diğer taraftan vilayetlerle hükümet merkezi arasında ittihat ve irtibatı takviye için, 1876 senesinde ilan edilmiş olan Meşrutiyet idaresi, cemiyetimizin derpiş ettiği şartlar dairesinde gelişmiş olacak, hükümet merkezinde ise umumi vilayet meclisi azaları arasından halk tarafından seçilerek gönderilen murahhaslardan mürekkeb bir mebusan meclisi kurulacaktır.

Madde 4- Muhtelif ırkları birbirinden ayıran kavga ve mücadelelere çare bulmak ve vilayetlerin meclislerinde her camianın kendi adetleriyle mütenasip aza veya murahhas temin edebilmeleri için tedbirler alınacaktır.

Madde 5- Vatandaşlar, herhangi camiaya mensup olurlarsa olsunlar, aynı hukuk ve imtiyaza mazhar olacaklar ve dolayısı ile de aynı şartlarla mükellef

bulunacaklardır. Askeri mektepler de dahil olmak üzere, bütün yüksek mektepler, devletin bütün teb'asına açık bulundurulacaktır.

Madde 6- Memleketin asayiş ve inzıbatı bir jandarma teşkilatı ile temin olunacak ve bu teşkilat kadrosunu o mahallede yaşayan muhtelif ırkların nüfusları nisbetinde seçilecek. Jandarmaların tahsil ve talimi için muvakkat bir zaman ecnebi muallim ve zabıtlar istihdam olunacaktır.

Madde 7- Valilerle mutasarrıflar, defterdarlar, Bidayet ve İstinaf mahkemeleri reis ve müdde-i umumileri, hükümet merkezi tarafından nasb ve tayin olunacak, diğer mülki ve adli memurları valiler, teşkil ettikleri ekseriyete göre de muhtelif unsurlar arasında intihab ve tayin eyleyeceklerdir.

Madde 8- Zabıta kuvvetleri mülki memurların emrine tabi olacaklardır.

Madde 9- Alelumum vergiler, tadil ve tesbit edilerek makul bir tarzda tahsil usulü tesis edilecek ve gayr-i menkul emlakın emniyet altına alınması hususunda yeni bir tedbir olarak, cari ve meri kanun ve nizamlar değiştirilecektir.

Madde 10- Devletlerarası muahedeler ahkamı her türlü tecavüzden masun olacaktır.

APPENDIX D

Prens Lütfullah'ın C. Orhan Tütengil'e verdiği röportajdan:

Soru: Mustafa Kemal ve eseri olan Cumhuriyet hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Cevap: Bakın, bu konuda önce şunu belirtmek isterim ki, az gelişmiş toplumsal bir ortamda mucizeler yaratılacağına inananlardan değilim. Bir rejimin yerine bir başkasını koymak değişiklik değildir; nitekim doğmak olmadığı gibi, dirilmek de değildir. Bu koşullar altında, aslında, bir görüşten başka bir şey olmayan politik rejim, ağırlığı olan bir geçmişi, önceden tasarlanmış köklü değişiklikleri

sağlamak için nasıl ortadan kaldırılabilir; hele bu geçmiş, yüzlerce yılın belirli etkenlerinden oluşmuşsa? (...) Mustafa Kemal ne üstün bir yaratıktır, ne de bir dahi. Üstün bir eylem adamı ve gözü pek bir ihtilalcidir o. Kelimenin iyi anlamında bir iyileştiricidir. Kendisine olan güveni ve ileri görüşlülüğü ulusu yok olmaktan kurtarmıştır. Pratik bir insan olarak, toplumsal ortama yeni bir hayat vermek için dünya kadar eski olan ve onları eskiden kullanan araçları kullanıyor: Cumhuriyet, kadının özgürleşmesi, erkekler için şapka ve Latin harfleri. Bunlar, birçok insan için beklenmedik bir şeydir. Bunlar, daha çok ilerlemenin dışsal ve yüzeysel belirtileridir. Birtakım kanıtlara dayanılarak, toplumsal bakımdan gelişmemiş bir ortamda yapılan rejim değişikliği, kendinden bekleneni vermez. Biçim hiç bir zaman öz'ü değiştirmez. Bu öz, hastalığını, aldatıcı, dolayısıyla de tehlikeli bir canlılık görünümü altında saklar.

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