

THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DECISION
MAKING PROCESS DURING THE COLD WAR, 1945-1991

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Title: The Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Making Process during the Cold War, 1945-1991

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of decision making in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War through the evaluation of the impact of Turkish domestic politics on Turkish foreign policy. The main objective of the thesis is to elaborate the impact of the actors that were involved in the processes of major decisions, e.g., the Cyprus conflict, the first Gulf War, and the dynamics that shaped the decisions of these actors. The conjuncture of the Cold War and the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union form the contextual framework of Turkish foreign policy. In this contextual framework, the study concentrates on the actors of Turkish foreign policy, e.g., presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, the parliament, the military, the press and the public opinion. The decisions of these actors are analyzed in the light of the impact of the Turkish economy, Turkish constitutional and legal structure, the structure of governments and the parliament, the crises of Turkish politics especially in the period between 1960 and 1980. The thesis concludes that although the Cold War was a rivalry between the capitalist and communist blocs, the foreign policy behaviors within these blocs were not homogenous. Therefore, as a state within the capitalist bloc throughout this struggle, the Cold War perception of Turkish foreign policy was not identical to that of the other members of the Western bloc and it was also influenced by its domestic politics.

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Başlık: Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası'nda Karar Alma Süreci, 1945-1991

Bu çalışma Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türk iç politikasının, Türk dış politikasında alınan kararlarda oynadığı rolü analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezin asıl hedefi, Kıbrıs sorunu ve birinci Körfez Savaşı gibi, Türk dış politikası için önemli olaylar çerçevesinde, dış politika karar alıcılarını ve bu karar alıcıları etkileyen faktörleri analiz etmektir. Soğuk Savaş konjonktürü ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Sovyetler Birliği arasında meydana gelen olaylar Türk dış politikasını şekillendiren kavramsal çerçeveyi oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışma, bu kavramsal çerçeve içerisinde, Türk dış politikasında yer alan aktörlerin, diğer bir deyişle, cumhurbaşkanlarının, başbakanların, dışişleri bakanlarının, parlamentonun, ordunun, basın ve toplumun dış politikada alınan kararlarda oynadığı rolleri; Türk ekonomisi, Türk anayasaları ve yasaları, hükümet ve parlamento yapıları ile Türk iç politikasında özellikle 1960 ve 1980 yılları arasında meydana gelen siyasal krizler ışığında incelemektedir. Tüm bu incelemelerden hareketle, Soğuk Savaş'ın, salt Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Sovyetler Birliği'nin mücadelesi olarak algılanmasına rağmen, bu iki ülkenin liderlik ettiği bloklar içinde dış politikaların tek merkezli ve tek sesli şekilde yönlendirilmediği ve bunun yanısıra kapitalist blokta yer alan Türkiye'nin dış politikasının oluşumunda iç dinamiklerin de rol oynadığı sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

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PREFACE

The Cold War shaped international relations and diplomacy in a way that was different from the pre-Cold War period. The international system turned into a bipolar one in contrast to the multipolar system of the previous period, with the United States as the leader of the capitalist bloc on the one hand, and the Soviet Union as the leader of the communist bloc on the other. Moreover, the role of diplomacy came into prominence because a possible war in this period would have been far more destructive due to the advent of nuclear weapons. The ideological polarization and the nuclear rivalry became the determinants of this period and they prevented the struggle from turning into an armed conflict.

Cold War historiography is founded upon these principles and the foreign policy objectives. By the same token, the strategies of the relatively smaller states are assumed as identical to those of the leaders of the two blocs. In other words, the membering states had to formulate and conduct foreign policies which were limited and controlled by the United States for the capitalist bloc and the Soviet Union for the communist bloc. This approach resulted in the homogenization of these blocs and presented the Cold War only as the rivalry of the two superpowers for domination throughout the world. Nevertheless, when the history of the Cold War is reconsidered with emphasis to these relatively smaller states, as individual actors of international relations with reference to the realist theory, the studies on these states show that, although the Cold War was triggered mainly by the polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union and ended with the collapse of the latter, its story was not just that the two superpowers. Therefore, the relatively smaller states in

either bloc might have had different dynamics that had impacts on the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies.

With reference to the assumption of diversity within blocs during the Cold War, this study analyzes Turkish foreign policy as a capitalist bloc member. The crucial question in this study is: “How and to what extent the country-specific dynamics of Turkey, specifically its domestic politics, were reflected in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War?” Hence, this study argues that Turkey’s internal dynamics played important roles in the formulation and the implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War era. It can also be argued that Turkey’s perception of the Cold War as an individual state was not identical to the perception of other members of the Western bloc to which Turkey was engaged. As a result, this study is an attempt to show the cross-cutting relations between the domestic and foreign politics of a country in a systematic and comprehensive manner.

The crux of the Cold War analysis lies in the periodization of this study. In other words, with the argument that the Cold War was not periodically monolithic, Turkish foreign policy is divided into three periods in order to show how the turning points of the relations between the two superpowers do not match the perception of Turkey and how Turkish foreign policy can be divided into three slightly different periods. The difference will be examined, firstly, through Turkey’s relations with individual states particularly the United States as the leader of the Western bloc, and, secondly, the domestic actors and the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the main emphasis will be on the decisions of the crisis situations because of the necessity to make decisions immediately within shorter periods of time in such situations. Crises are also significant to understand which actors or determinants dominate the processes of decision making. Therefore, the Korean War in 1950; the

Cyprus Crises in 1954, 1964, 1967 and 1974; the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; the Aegean Disputes in 1975 and 1987; and the First Gulf Crisis in 1990 require greater emphasis for this analysis. However, Turkey's diplomatic and economic relations with foreign states are also included to understand the consistency between the implementation of Turkish foreign policy and the motives of the actors.

As the Cold War, "the domestic dynamics" concept seems broad and hard to analyze, while the systematization of this concept enables understanding the factors behind Turkish foreign policy. In this study, domestic dynamics are divided into two groups: the first group consists of the actors who were involved in the decision making processes of Turkish foreign policy. These actors are twofold: those who were constitutionally responsible for the decisions in Turkish foreign policy, namely, presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, the parliament and the military; and those who were not constitutionally responsible, but were involved in this process, namely, the press and the public opinion. The responsibilities of these actors will be analyzed with reference to the 1924, 1961 and 1982 constitutions and some laws that regulated the authorities of these persons and institutions.

The second group of domestic dynamics consists of the factors that might have had impacts on the actors that were responsible for the decisions in Turkish foreign policy. The Turkish economy is the most important determinant in the analysis because of its developing nature during the republican period and its dependence on foreign resources to provide development. Therefore, it can be argued that economic dependence may have played an inhibitor role in the making of independent foreign policy decisions. As the economy, the structures of governments and the parliament are also analyzed because it can be argued that it is relatively easy for the decision makers to act independently during times of single party

governments or parliaments without opposition. On the contrary, the coalition governments or parliaments with strong opposition may have prevented decision makers from formulating and implementing foreign policies as they wanted to do because of the necessity to negotiate and reach a consensus in vital issues. Lastly, the crises in Turkish domestic politics will be emphasized to understand the possible impacts of domestic turmoil such as the right-left polarization in the 1960s and 1970s, the military interventions and memorandums which successively occurred in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In addition to the political crises, the impacts of economic crises will be analyzed in Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War.

The analysis of these actors and determinants of Turkish foreign policy will be based diverse resources. Statements and memoirs by the actors are the main resources because the decision-making process is not something written on documents contrary to the decisions. Moreover, newspapers will be used to compare these statements and memoirs because of possible subjectivities of these actors and distortions of the events. Newspapers reflect the position of the press and the public opinion especially in the period between 1960 and 1980. The source for the agreements which Turkey signed with foreign states is the *Düstur* series which include most of the agreements throughout the history of the republic. As secondary resources, books and articles on Turkish foreign policy will be used to answer mainly “what” questions, but this study also tries to answer “how and why” questions to the extent possible. Consequently, with this methodology and sources, this study analyzes the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process in the Cold War in five chapters.

The first chapter constructs a contextual framework for Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. It briefly analyzes the relations between the United

States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in three periods. Moreover, selected states from the capitalist and the communist blocs, in addition to the non-alignment movement are shortly analyzed in order to show how relatively smaller states acted within these two blocs under the domination of the two superpowers and the non-alignment movement. The perception of the Cold War by these states and the domestic factors behind their foreign policies are the main concerns of this chapter.

After the general framework of the Cold War, the second chapter provides a historical background for the analysis of decision making during the Cold War. It makes an analysis of the single party period in Turkey until the end of the Second World War. The second chapter is divided into two periods; the Atatürk period between 1923 and 1938, and the İnönü Period and the Second World War between 1938 and 1945, with emphasis on the actors and determinants of Turkish foreign policy.

The third chapter includes the first Cold War period between 1945 and 1965 with regard to Turkey's perception of the period of tension and crises between the United States and the Soviet Union. This period is different from the period of superpower rivalry because of the emphasis on Turkey's perception. Between 1945 and 1965, the perception of Soviet threat by the actors of Turkish foreign policy was the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy, and until late 1964 and early 1965, Turkey conducted the United States-centric foreign policy without any effort to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. After 1965, diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union began to develop and Turkey made an effort to conduct a more balanced foreign policy between the two superpowers although it did not abandon its membership in the Western bloc. The actors and determinants of Turkish foreign policy in this period are analyzed under four

subheadings: the Last Years of the Republican People's Party government between 1945 and 1950, the Democrat Party period between 1950 and 1960, the National Unity Committee period between 1960 and 1961, and the Coalitions period between 1961 and 1965.

The fourth chapter offers an analysis of Turkish foreign policy with regard to its perception of the détente between the superpowers between 1965 and 1980. In this period, Turkey sought to provide closer relations with the Soviet Union until the late 1970s. However, the military intervention in 1980 can be regarded as the beginning of the period of Turkey's return to the United States-centric foreign policy when developments in Turkish foreign policy are taken into consideration. The actors and determinants of Turkish foreign policy in this period are analyzed under three subheadings: the Justice Party period between 1965 and 1971, the Transition period after 1971 Military Memorandum and the Coalitions period between 1974 and 1980.

The fifth chapter is the last chapter of this study and covers the last decade of the Cold War for Turkey that began with the 1980 military intervention and ended with the fall of the Motherland Party government in Turkey in 1991. The last chapter is again determined through Turkey's perception of the Cold War in which Turkey returned to its United States-centric foreign policy. This period ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, in addition to the end of the Motherland Party governments in Turkey.

The intended contribution of this study is to analyze the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War from the perspective of domestic politics, which is something rarely done in foreign policy analyses except for in some case studies.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As a student of international relations, I used to think that the Cold War was only a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, international relations during this period consisted of the relations between these two superpowers which were the leaders of capitalist and communist blocs, respectively. This pattern, which is still emphasized during the analyses of international relations in the Cold War period, blurs the differences within these blocs. In other words, it is usually perceived that the relatively smaller states that were engaged in either bloc had to see the ones in the other bloc as their enemies. However, the relations between or within blocs were not as isolated or homogenous as is generally considered. In order to better understand international relations during the Cold War, one has to avoid the reductionism and superpower-centric nature of the international arena.

In addition to the necessity to limit the impacts of the global conjuncture, one has to take into consideration the internal dynamics of the foreign policies of states, because, as this thesis tries to show, the domestic actors and dynamics also should be studied in foreign policy analysis due to the fact that the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy of a state is not independent from its domestic politics. Although I believe that the realist theory can still explain the crux of international relations, i.e., the state-centric mode of explanation and the emphasis on power, it must be developed further to understand the nature of international relations during the Cold War and even today. Main criticism of the realist theory comes from its state centric approach and I can say that state, as a concept, should be redefined. In other words, “what was the state and which actors acted for the state?” are the two main questions that should be analyzed in-depth in order to understand the decisions

and the processes of decision making during the Cold War. Studies in the 1990s and the 2000s seek to find the answers to these two questions especially for the period of the post-Cold War as a result of the rising trends in international relations mainly in the European Union project, which questions the meaning and power of the state in international relations. However, the Cold War seems a bit ignored and the traditional patterns are still used.

On the other hand, although the Cold War period was an era of transformation both in Turkish domestic politics and Turkish foreign policy, no thorough in-depth analysis of Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of Turkish domestic politics exists, either. For example, the literature on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War has not reached the level of the literature, at least in quantity, of Turkish foreign policy before the Cold War and after the Cold War. There are many books on Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk and İnönü periods, most of which are similar to each other and mainly refer to edited books such as *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995* edited by Mehmet Gönlübol or *Türk Dış Politikası* edited by Baskın Oran. These are comprehensive sources for Turkish foreign policy in general, and the period of the Cold War in particular. Thus, the literature on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War remains inadequate and needs more analysis. In addition, studies on Turkish foreign policy tend to ignore the role of internal dynamics in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy except for some books such as *Dış Politika ve Parlamento*, written by Mümtaz Soysal in 1964, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, written by Duygu Sezer in 1972 and *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, written by Melek Fırat in 1997. Despite the insufficiency of literature on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, there are plenty of case studies on topics such as the Cyprus issue which put the stamp on Turkish foreign

policy in 1960s and 1970s, whereas most of these books are politically loaded rather than scientific. My intention is not to criticize these studies, but to put emphasis on the necessity of an in-depth analysis of Turkish foreign policy with regard to its internal dynamics.

Consequently, my main intention in this study is to make an analysis of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, with a great emphasis on some cases, e.g., the Cyprus Issue, the Aegean Problem and the First Gulf Crisis, through its internal dynamics in order to show how and to what extent Turkish foreign policy differentiated from the general trends of international relations during the Cold War. In order to understand Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, the global conjuncture needs to be contextualized, and then, the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy before the Cold War needs to be analyzed as will be done in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS DURING THE COLD WAR

The Cold War of the Superpowers

The Second World War ended with the defeat of fascist dictatorships by liberal democracies in May 1945. However, the end of the war was far from bringing peace and stability to the world because of the inner conflicts of the allied powers, such as the status of Germany after the war, the United States and the Great Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. In time, these problems turned into an unarmed struggle and the world was divided into two blocs again: the capitalist bloc under the leadership of the United States and the communist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union. The struggle between these two superpowers did not turn into an armed conflict in the next five decades because of the changes in war technology through the advent of nuclear weapons which had been used by the United States against Japan in 1945. The atomic bomb caused huge destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, it would have been more destructive to trigger a nuclear war for both the parties in the struggle and for the fate of humanity; hence, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could dare do this. The period between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the collapse of the leader of the communist camp, the Soviet Union, in 1991 was called the “Cold War”.

In order to understand the dynamics of the Cold War, the strategies that the two superpowers implemented towards each other and the strategies that the states inside and outside these two blocs should be analyzed separately because it can be

argued, first, that the strategies and policies of the two superpowers were not constantly monolithic throughout the Cold War because of the changes and inflections in the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, despite the efforts of the leaders of the two camps to provide unity within the two blocs, the policies of the membering states were not homogenous or identical to those of the hegemonic powers. Consequently, this chapter will contextualize the Cold War policies of the two superpowers in the light of certain events and then link this to the policies of certain states, e.g., Greece from the capitalist bloc, Romania from the communist bloc and Yugoslavia from the non-aligned bloc, in order to understand to what extent it was possible for a smaller state to have an autonomously formulated foreign policy in such a struggle.

In order to understand the dynamics and the strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the era can be roughly divided into three periods: the period of tension and crises, 1945-1963; the period for the search for détente, 1963-1975; and the period of the end of détente and the Cold War, 1975-1991.¹ Although the periodization of the Cold War deviates among scholars, Sewell's division will be the context of this study.

The Period of Tension and Crises, 1945-1963

The unease among the allies began as early as the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, where the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union came together in order to discuss the post-war situation of world politics. However, this conference did not come up with any permanent solution especially in relation to post-war Germany, whereas the positions of the allies, the United States and Great

¹ Mike Sewell, *The Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, caused suspicion among the attendees. In the conference, the United States and the Great Britain emphasized the democratization of Germany and the eastern European states, while the Soviet Union insisted that Germany had to remain impoverished so as not to pose a threat to the Soviet Union again.² As a result, the conference did not satisfy any party, but revealed the disagreement among the allies.

After the clash of interests at the Potsdam Conference, a crisis in Iran erupted in November 1945. Although Great Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed upon the withdrawal of their troops within six months after the end of the war when they had invaded and partitioned Iran in 1942, the Soviet Union resisted withdrawing its troops from Iran. However, at the end, with pressure from the United States and the United Nations, Soviet troops withdrew from Iran by May 1946.³ Although the Iranian crisis ended, its impact was reflected in the mutual declarations of Churchill and Stalin towards each other which implied a split and polarization between the capitalist and the communist blocs. In his infamous speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill drew attention to the suspicious actions of the Soviet Union and the split among the allies. He stated that;

“A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies.”

In addition to the unease because of the Soviet attempts in Iran, Churchill overtly underlined the polarization between the capitalist and communist blocs which was divided by an “iron curtain”:

² Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon. *A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), p.54.

³ Sewell, p.25. See also, Judge and Langdon, pp. 58-59.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.⁴

As early as 1946, the polarization among the allies of the Second World War became obvious and, as Churchill argued, the world was about to be divided into two blocs. In Churchill's speech, the Soviet Union was subjected to the main criticism because of its expansionist tendencies.

The Soviet Union was also disturbed and this disturbance towards the allies was declared, but not as obviously as Churchill's speech, in Stalin's election speech on February 9, 1946. In this speech Stalin put emphasis on the success of the Soviet communist system in the social and political fabric of the country. Moreover, he praised the bravery and success of the Red Army during the war which, according to him, had surpassed the expectations of Germany, France, the Great Britain and the United States. In other words, in Stalin's speech, there are some indicators of criticism towards the Great Britain and the United States.⁵ These addresses showed how strained relations had become between the victors of the Second World War in the post-war period. In time, Great Britain withdrew from the world scene as a hegemonic power and left its position to the United States. In the following period, the Cold War became a clash of strategies and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially until the mid-1960s.

⁴ Winston Churchill's Sinews of Peace Speech, March 5, 1946.
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/S460305a_e.htm

⁵ Joseph Stalin's Election Speech, February 9, 1946.
<http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html>

The main strategy of the United States was to prevent Soviet expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East, while the Soviet Union aimed to control its sphere under control and to expand its ideology to the extent possible. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan which were formulated in 1947 were tools to implement the American strategy against Soviet expansionism. President Truman stated in a speech in the congress on March 12, 1947 that Greece and Turkey would be economically supported in order to provide their economic development and protect their territorial integrity. He also put emphasis on the necessity of the maintenance of order in the Middle East.⁶ The Marshall Plan was formulated and declared on June 5, 1947 as a comprehensive economic development program in order to provide the economic recovery of Europe⁷ and the plan was implemented from 1948 onwards. These programs can be regarded as attempts to secure the Balkans and the Middle East against the Soviet Union until the membership of these two states in NATO in 1952. In other words, only economically and militarily powerful states could resist Soviet expansionism in order to maintain status quo in the Middle East.

In addition to these doctrinal counteracts, the Soviet Union and the United States founded organizations in order to strengthen the unity within their blocs. In September 1947, Cominform was founded in the communist bloc and the Warsaw Treaty Organization of 1955, complemented the project of the unity of the communist bloc. However, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in 1948, just after the formation of the organization, and its maintenance of a non-aligned position in the following period showed how loose the ties were in the communist bloc. On the other hand, in April 1949, NATO was founded under the leadership of

⁶ Harry Truman's Speech, March 12, 1947.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

⁷ George Marshall's Speech, June 5, 1947.
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html

the United States in order to protect especially the North Atlantic area against communist expansionism.⁸

During the efforts to divide blocs through organizational structures, new crises and developments shaped the future of the Cold War. The main problem that increased the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was a blockade that was imposed on Berlin between June 1948 and May 1949. Berlin had been divided between the allies right after the war in 1945, however, the status of the city was not permanently decided. On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union cut the link between Berlin and zones under Western control. However, the United States did not back down and provided the needs of the blockaded zones through an airlift. The blockade lasted until 1949 and ended up with, first, the failure of the Soviet attempt to challenge the Western bloc and, second, the formation of the West German state.⁹ The Berlin blockade can be regarded as the first confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Like the Berlin blockade, which increased the tension between the two superpowers, the production of the first Soviet atomic bomb on August 29, 1949 changed the direction of the Cold War. Since the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear technology was under the monopoly of the United States. However, the production of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949 terminated the monopoly of the United States and increased the possibility of severe destruction

⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>

⁹ W.R.Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany* (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.75-87.

in a nuclear war.¹⁰ Moreover, the nuclear rivalry among these two powers 1949 onwards increased the power of deterrence in certain crises in the following period.

The Korean War, which began with the attack of North Korea on South Korea on June 25, 1950, was an armed struggle that confronted the United States and the Soviet Union because the United States supported South Korea while the Soviet Union supported North Korea. The United Nations intervened and the Security Council passed a resolution that called on North Korea to cease-fire on the same day.¹¹ After three days, North Korean troops took Seoul and upon the inability of the United Nations to end the struggle, president Truman authorized the use of American forces in support of the south Korean army. Therefore, the conflict between North and South Korea turned into a global one.¹² Moreover, in October 1950, the People's Republic of China became involved, which had signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in February 1950, and the conflict expanded and lasted until the signing of an armistice on July 27, 1953.¹³

In the meantime, leadership changes occurred both in the United States and the Soviet Union. Dwight Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman as the president of the United States on January 20, 1953.¹⁴ Right after Eisenhower's presidency, Joseph Stalin died, on March 5, 1953. He was replaced by George Malenkov. Despite Eisenhower's effort to continue the status quo in foreign policy against the United

¹⁰ Sewell, p.41.

¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution no.82, June 25, 1950.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/95/IMG/NR006495.pdf?OpenElement>

¹² Judge and Langdon, p.106.

¹³ Robert C. Grogin, *Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917-1991* (New York: Lexington Books, 2001), p.176. See also, Judge and Langdon, pp. 115-117, Sewell, p.47.

¹⁴ Grogin, p.179.

States, Malenkov's leadership in the Soviet Union aimed a sharp break in the aggressive Stalinist foreign policy.¹⁵ However, although Malenkov was the prime minister in the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the secretary of the communist party, dominated the foreign policy of the Soviet Union especially from 1955 onwards.¹⁶

After the death of Stalin, the dynamics of the Cold War seemed to change because of the conciliatory approaches of not only Malenkov and Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, but also the Eisenhower administration in the United States.¹⁷ However, the first Taiwan Straits crisis, which erupted in Southeast Asia in 1954, and the West Germany's membership in NATO in 1955, in addition to the signing of the Warsaw Pact¹⁸ within the communist bloc in the same year, showed that polarization between the two blocs was hard to conciliate. On the other hand, the twentieth congress of the Soviet communist party (CPSU), which was held on February 1956, was important to understanding the change in the perception of the Soviet leaders. During the party congress, Khrushchev came up with the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence", which formulated the possibility of peaceful relations among different states which had different social and political systems. Moreover, he wanted to get rid of the "cult of personality", which had been created by Stalin. As a result, the Khrushchev period was regarded as "the deStalinization period" in the Soviet

¹⁵ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), p.146.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.147.

¹⁷ Judge and Langdon, pp.118-127. See also, Sewell, pp.57-58.

¹⁸ The Warsaw Pact, May 14, 1955.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp

Union.¹⁹ Despite the efforts to ease the tension between the capitalist and communist systems, new crises that erupted in the late 1950s postponed the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union until the 1960s.

1956 saw social uprisings in the countries within the Soviet bloc, which shattered the alliance that had been strengthened by the Warsaw Pact. The intervention of social uprisings in Poland and Hungary and the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet forces revealed that, despite the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev would pursue the Stalinist legacy of repression within the Soviet bloc.²⁰ Despite the tension in the Soviet bloc, Khrushchev tried to normalize relations with the United States and his trip to Washington in 1959 and the meeting with Eisenhower in Camp David were an attempt to shift to the détente period between the two superpowers. However, the Camp David Summit did not result in the normalization of relations as it had been intended.²¹ The building of the Berlin Wall, which separated the West and East Berlin, in August 1961, was an indicator of strained relations between the capitalist and the communist blocs.

By the same token, the Cuban missile crisis, which occurred one year later, marked the peak of tension during the Cold War. It became a turning point in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The crisis erupted upon the detection of launcher construction for Soviet missiles in Cuba by an American U2 plane on October 16, 1962. President Kennedy met his advisers in order to decide what would be done in order to deter the Soviet actions in Cuba, which posed a threat to the security of the United States. On October 22, president Kennedy declared a blockade on Cuba. Moreover, Soviet ships would be sunk if they challenged the

¹⁹ Judge and Langdon, p.127.

²⁰ Grogin, pp.210-216.

²¹ Judge and Langdon, pp.143-144.

American blockade. In the first instance, Soviet prime minister Khrushchev did not take the American decision seriously, but later on, he ordered that the Soviet ships not challenge the blockade. The tension remained until the Soviet Union accepted the detachment of Soviet missiles in Cuba and ultimately, the blockade was lifted on October 28, 1962.²² The crisis ended up with an agreement, but it had an impact on the Cold War strategies of the superpowers in the following period. As Sewell argues:

The significance of the crisis lies in the fact that the world has never been closer to a nuclear exchange. It was also hinge, or turning point, in the history of the Cold War. Among the experiences that shaped policymakers' approaches to any issue in the post-1962 period was a memory of the way in which crisis management was now crucial to the very survival of life on earth..... Crises, by their nature, are unmanageable. Within months the hot line had been created to facilitate communication between the White House and the Kremlin. Kennedy and Khrushchev moved in 1963 to complete and secure ratification of the partial test ban treaty that had been the subject of complex negotiations.²³

The Search for Détente, 1963-1975

The period between 1963 and 1975 can be divided into two; the search for détente until 1969 and the rise of détente after 1969. Coral Bell's definition of détente suits best the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in this period:

Détente should be seen as a diplomatic strategy for the control of the adversary power. The heart of the problem of the adversary's military power, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, is the other's capacity for nuclear strike. The effort to control the size, nature and mode of deployment of that capacity is what we are essentially concerned with in looking at the arms control measures of the détente, though conventional forces have also entered the arguments and are coming to be more important

²² Grogin, pp.243-250.

²³ Sewell, p.88.

in them. There is, however, a slight ambivalence, even a paradox, in the relationship of arms control measures to détente in general. The strategy as a whole rests on, and demands, a reasonably stable balance of power and ceases to be viable if that essential infrastructure is weakened.²⁴

In this period, both superpowers focused on balancing the nuclear powers of each other and controlling nuclear armament throughout the world. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was signed on August 5, 1963, can be regarded as the first attempt to control and reduce nuclear armament. The treaty was called “limited” because it mainly banned nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water or in the high seas and it was signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union at the very beginning. Nevertheless, in time, several more states participated in it.²⁵ In addition to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed on July 1, 1968. This can be regarded as complementary to the Limited Test Ban Treaty because the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to control the provision of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. In other words, the two superpowers would be the safeguards of the world and monopolize the nuclear technology.²⁶

After the banning of nuclear tests and the control of the provision of nuclear technology by non-nuclear states, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, which would pose a threat to their security due to the long-range targeting of these missiles with the treaty of Strategic

²⁴ Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era* (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), p.54.

²⁵ The Limited Test Ban Treaty, August 5, 1963.
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ltbt1.html>

²⁶ The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968.
<http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt>

Arms Limitation Treaty which was signed on May 26, 1972, and also known as the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty.²⁷

In addition to the efforts to control nuclear armament, diplomatic efforts to reduce the tension and normalize the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified especially in the first half of the 1970s. United States' secretary of state Henry Kissinger visited China in July 1971 although the relations between these two states had been strained especially in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Furthermore, president Nixon visited China in February 1972.²⁸ As the efforts to ameliorate relations with China progressed, the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union entered into the agenda of the United States. Therefore, between 1972 and 1974, president Nixon met Soviet prime minister Brezhnev three times.²⁹

Consequently, the control and reduction of nuclear armament and the development of relations between the capitalist and communist blocs were the main concerns of the détente period between 1963 and 1975. Despite the crises in Southeast Asia, e.g., the intervention of the United States into the Vietnam War that lasted between 1965 and 1975, and Eastern Europe, e.g., the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union cooled off during the détente period. The normalization of relations stemmed from the lack of direct confrontation between the two superpowers because neither in the crises in Southeast Asia nor in that in Eastern Europe, did the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union clash. Nevertheless, the détente

²⁷ The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, May 26, 1972.
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html>

²⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1994), pp.705-710.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.727-739.

period came to an end as the result of new problems that erupted in the second half of 1970s.

The End of Détente and the Cold War 1975-1991

After a twelve year détente period, the late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed several crises in the form of armed conflicts, revolutions and administrative changes especially in the communist bloc. Upon the economic crisis, strikes erupted in Poland in June 1976 and intermittently continued until 1980. In the meantime, a new pope was elected from Poland in 1978 and his desire to visit his home country caused unrest in that country because of his opposition to the communist regime. During his visit in 1979, massive public demonstrations happened.³⁰ The crisis that erupted in Eastern Europe spread to Asia in the late 1970s. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and in return, a war erupted between China and Vietnam in February 1979. In the war between China and Vietnam, Sewell argues, the United States provided military and intelligence assistance to China and this caused resentment in the Soviet Union.³¹

In the midst of these crises in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the second treaty of Strategic Arms Limitation in Vienna on June 18, 1979 in order to limit the quality and quantity of strategic offensive arms, and to restrain the development of new types of nuclear arms.³² Despite these efforts to provide cooperation between the two superpowers, another

³⁰ Sewell, p.121.

³¹ Ibid., pp.115-118.

³² The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, June 18, 1979.
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html>

crisis erupted along the southern border of the Soviet Union: the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to topple Hafizullah Amin regime which had come to power in September 1979. At the very beginning, he was perceived as pro-Soviet, but in time, he marked to put distance between his government and the Soviet Union and sought to keep close relations with the United States. Therefore, as Sewell writes, the Soviet Union perceived him as a threat and invaded Afghanistan in order to keep control of that country. However, this Soviet act brought an end to the détente between the two superpowers and changed the direction of the Cold War from 1980 onwards.³³

The last decade of the Cold War began with leadership changes both in the capitalist bloc and the communist bloc. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan was elected as the president of the United States. His election intensified the anti-communist campaign and during his presidency, as LaFeber writes, movements against communism, especially in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s were financially supported.³⁴ On the other hand, in the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982 and was replaced by Yuri Andropov. However, the presidency of Andropov was short-lived because he died in February 1984. He was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko, who acted as the president of the Soviet Union until his death in March 1985. The period of short-lived presidents ended when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. Gorbachev's presidency became a turning point not only for the Soviet Union, but also for the Cold War.³⁵

³³ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2007), pp.564-568.

³⁴ Sewell, pp.124-125. See also, LaFeber, p.302.

³⁵ LaFeber, p.317.

The presidency of Gorbachev came up with the necessity of transformation both in Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy. The changes in the domestic politics were aimed to recover the economic collapse and to democratize the society. Gorbachev introduced *Perestroika* (Restructuring) and *Glasnost* (Openness and Democratization) policies in order to reach these goals. As Grogin writes, perestroika included the abandonment of the centrally planned economy and the introduction of market mechanisms, the efficient employment of labor and the use of new investment and technologies in industry.³⁶ In short, Gorbachev sought to adapt neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s. On the other hand, his policy of glasnost aimed to democratize society through the encouragement of self-criticism and freedom of expression.³⁷

Similarly, the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy changed in this period towards a peaceful stance in the international arena. Gorbachev made a speech at the UN which emphasized the necessity of the deideologization of foreign policy. This was a sharp break in Soviet foreign policy which had been conducted since the very beginning of the Cold War and its impact became visible in the following period; in December 1988 Soviet troops began to withdraw from Afghanistan which had been under Soviet occupation since 1979.³⁸ The conciliatory role of president Gorbachev in Soviet foreign policy coincided with the end of the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and through successive unrests and revolutions, the Eastern Europe disengaged from Soviet influence. In addition, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990, the end of the Cold War drew near. Ultimately, the Soviet Union disintegrated on December

³⁶ Grogin, p.324.

³⁷ Ibid., p.325.

³⁸ Sewell, p. 130. See also, Grogin, p.326.

25, 1991 and the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the communist bloc about five decades after the beginning of war.³⁹

So far, the main emphasis has been on the relations between the leaders of the capitalist and communist blocs, the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, in order to understand how the Cold War evolved between 1945 and 1991. However, this does not mean that the foreign policies of all states within these blocs were identical with the strategies of the leading ones. In other words, many states within each bloc followed unique paths; thus, the capitalist and communist blocs were not homogenous within themselves. The foreign policies of three states, namely Greece from the capitalist bloc, Romania from the communist bloc and Yugoslavia from the non-alignment movement will be analyzed as examples in order to show the deviations within these blocs and movements clearly. The analyses of these three states, which can be considered as small or middle powers, will help in the analysis of the foreign policy of Turkey, which also can be considered as a middle power and was part of the capitalist bloc during the Cold War.

The Cold War of Greece

Throughout its history, Greece has been susceptible to the invasion and control of great powers due to its strategic location in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Therefore, political scientists classify Greece as politically dependent or penetrated due to its vulnerability to the domination of any great power which controls these areas.⁴⁰ With the rise of polarization between capitalism and

³⁹ Sander, pp.491-504. See also, Grogin, pp.333-342.

⁴⁰ Theodore A. Coulombis, "Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities" in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.32-33.

communism in the aftermath of the Second World War, Greece was in a difficult position as a small state because of its physical proximity to the Soviet Union and internal instability that stemmed from a civil war which lasted between 1946 and 1949. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which were declared in 1947 and began to be implemented from 1948 onwards, included Greece as well as Turkey in order to support these two countries in their economic and military development in order to survive against Soviet expansionism. In time, Greece became a part of the capitalist bloc and membership in NATO became urgent for the defense of the country until 1952.

The United States was perceived as Greece's natural ally and guarantor, thus, the policies that were set to provide the security of Greece were harmonized with American foreign policy.⁴¹ Ultimately, in 1952, Greece became a member of NATO and the relations with the capitalist bloc and exclusively with the United States were determined in the light of the policies and strategies of the organization. Until the mid-1960s, NATO was the guarantee for Greece against Soviet expansionism in such a fragile location as a small state. Dokos argues that this reliance on NATO brought a certain loss of security autonomy for Greece. Nevertheless, domestically, with the eruption of problems such as the coup d'état by a colonels' junta in 1967, and, internationally, with the ease of tension in the international arena as the result of the détente between superpowers and as a reaction to the position of the United States during the Cyprus crises as a mediator which was perceived by Greece as pro-

⁴¹ Thanos P. Dokos, "Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting" in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou (London : Frank Cass, 2003), p.45.

Turkish, Greece placed increasing importance on its relations with the European Economic Community through its efforts for membership.⁴²

The transition to the civilian regime from the junta regime in the aftermath of the Cyprus Crisis in 1974 became a turning point both in Greek domestic and foreign policies. In order to consolidate the civilian regime, prime minister Karamanlis had to abolish the legal and bureaucratic structure of the junta's seven year régime between 1967 and 1974, punish the leaders of the dictatorship, control the armed forces, prepare a new constitution and regulate the status of the monarchy. However, in order to overcome the problems within his country, he needed to find a solution for the conflict on Cyprus where, according to Iatrides, the Turks appeared intent on expanding the area under their occupation. Needing to reduce the tension in Greek foreign relations in order to focus on domestic issues, Karamanlis told the US president Ford at a NATO summit in May 1975 that if the Turkish troops resumed their advance on Cyprus he would have three choices: to retire from politics, to declare war on Turkey or to withdraw from NATO's military structure. Ultimately, Greece withdrew from NATO's military structure later that year.⁴³ The withdrawal of Greece from NATO's military command was a critical point in Greek-American relations during the Cold War and paved the way for the diversification of Greek foreign policy as a result of its autonomy from the United States and NATO.

After 1974, Greece's external relationships diversified and economic and political integration to the Western Europe and improvement of relations with the Eastern Europe were prioritized. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, Greek foreign

⁴² Ibid., pp.42-43.

⁴³ John O. Iatrides, "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century" in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.95.

policy makers did not perceive any threat of direct attack by the communist bloc, especially on Greek lands in Thrace and Macedonia that were open to invasion and difficult to defend.⁴⁴ Ultimately, Greece became a member of the European Community in 1981, despite the political criticisms especially between 1976 and 1979 from PASOK, the party which was heavily opposed to Greek membership at that time. Since 1981, the membership in the European Community has been accepted by most of the political parties which were important actors in the formulation of Greece's external relationships. In addition to this, Couloumbis states that, it can be argued that membership to the European Community has had a deep and impact on Greek economic, political and social development.⁴⁵

Consequently, Greek foreign policy during the Cold War was not constant as the relations between the two superpowers. As a part of the capitalist bloc and as a small state which was geographically closer to the Soviet Union, Greece harmonized its foreign policy with that of the United States until mid-1960s. After then, with the détente between the two superpowers and the role that its domestic politics played, Greece loosened its ties with the United States especially after the mid-1970s and focused its relations with the European Economic Community. It can be argued that although it was a small country that was vulnerable to Soviet expansionism, Greece acted relatively autonomously in order to maximize its national interests in terms of its political, economic and social development. However, the autonomy that Greece gained despite Soviet expansionism and the role that domestic politics played in the formation of foreign policy were not exclusive for Greece as a member of the capitalist bloc during the Cold War. The same strategy was implemented within the

⁴⁴ Dokos, p.46.

⁴⁵ Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities*, p.34.

communist bloc and Romania is one of the leading examples of a country which sought to pursue a national and autonomous foreign policy despite the Soviet domination in the communist bloc.

The Cold War of Romania

During the Cold War, Romania was part of the communist bloc, and also remaining under Soviet occupation until 1958. At the very beginning of the Cold War in 1945, even the government of Romania was appointed by the Soviet Union. Hale argues that the appointment to the government of communists such as Ana Pauker, who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union and returned to Romania in 1944, caused resentment within the Romanian communist party. Gheorghiu Dej, the first secretary of the party and replaced Ana Pauker in 1952 until Ceausescu came to power in 1965, was regarded as a “front man” who was responsible for the organization of the government. Hale also states that the purge of Ana Pauker in 1952 was a turning point for the development of national communism in Romania.⁴⁶

The next step for national communism came with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958. Hale writes that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was an indicator of the Soviet ambition to show the United States that it was possible for the Soviet Union to end occupation within its sphere of influence because the Hungarian and Polish revolts in 1956 and the Soviet reaction to them had left a bad impression in the eyes of both the Eastern Europeans and the capitalist bloc. Consequently, despite lack of any initiative from the Romanian government or the

⁴⁶ Julian Hale, *Ceausescu's Romania: A Political Documentary* (London: Harrap, 1971), pp.28-29.

Communist Party, the withdrawal of the Red Army mitigated the collective national spirit and increased the popularity of the Romanian Communist Party.⁴⁷

The occupation of Soviet troops until the late 1950s was reflected in the foreign policy of Romania, which could not formulate or implement an independent foreign policy as a result of the strict Soviet control. Therefore, there was no room for maneuver for Romania in its foreign affairs, as was also the case in its domestic politics.⁴⁸ Ceausescu's coming to power in 1965 was a turning point for the foreign policy of Romania because of the efforts for a nationalistic and autonomist foreign policy made by the Ceausescu government. Therefore, Gilberg argues that Nicolae Ceausescu became an element of autonomy within the communist bloc as a result of his criticism of and opposition to the policies of the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ For example, the Ceausescu regime was opposed to Soviet policies such as the Soviet aid to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the location of troops and missiles in any foreign country. Therefore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was not supported by Romania in contrast to many communist bloc members while Romania advocated the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁵⁰

However, the opposition of the Ceausescu regime to the Soviet Union cannot be interpreted as a wholehearted support of the capitalist bloc and the United States. Shafir argues that the Romanians were known as the advocates for the dissolution of

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.30.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.31.

⁴⁹ Trond Gilberg, *Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu's Personal Dictatorship* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p.209.

⁵⁰ Michael Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter, 1985), p.176. See also, Gilberg, p.213.

both NATO and Warsaw Pact.⁵¹ This balanced stance towards the two blocs despite the engagement to the communist one can be regarded as an indicator of the pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy in order to maximize the national interests of Romania. Therefore, Romanian foreign policy, especially in the early years of Ceausescu period, had deeper roots in Romanian domestic politics.

First of all, during the Ceausescu period, Romanian foreign policy had economic components in the sense that the regime sought to develop economic relations with the Western bloc in order to obtain technology and the establishment of hard currency credits for its economic development. Therefore, new initiatives were necessary to reach this goal by means of an autonomous foreign policy and closer relations with the leaders of the capitalist bloc.⁵² In addition to the economic connotations, Ceausescu's personal ambition for his place in world politics as a leader and the place of Romania as a powerful country played a role in the formulation of a more independent and autonomous foreign policy distinct from the Soviet Union. As Gilbert argues, as a small country, the resources of Romania were not sufficient for the great vision Ceausescu had for Romania and himself. Therefore, in order to have a say in world politics, Ceausescu's Romania had to conduct an active diplomacy and provide visibility through well-timed actions and declarations, as can be seen during the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s.⁵³

Romania developed its relations with China after Ceausescu came to power in 1965. The ideological similarity played a role in these friendly relations because both Romania and China agreed upon the fact that it was not required for the communist

⁵¹ Shafir, p.175.

⁵² Ibid., p.191.

⁵³ Gilbert, p.210.

bloc to have a center of communism throughout the world as the Soviet Union had imposed since the beginning of the Cold War. Thus, national interpretations of communism such as those found in China, Romania and Yugoslavia endeavored to establish, should not have been perceived as deviations from communism. Despite this contrast with the Soviet Union on the fundamentals of communism, Romania did not abandon the Warsaw Pact, which was dominated by the Soviet Union, and never challenged or provoked the Soviet Union overtly. On the other hand, as the relations with China developed especially in late 1960s, Romania relied on China as a balance against the Soviet Union within the communist bloc in order to implement its autonomist policies.⁵⁴ Moreover, as the Sino-Soviet split deteriorated especially in the second half of the 1960s and 1970s, Ceausescu perceived that it was time to mediate the two communist powers as a requirement of his grand vision for Romania and himself through active diplomacy in world politics. As a result, the mediator role enabled Romania to act more autonomously within the communist bloc despite its limited success.⁵⁵

The role that Romania played as a mediator between the Soviet Union and China was not limited to the communist bloc. During the Ceausescu era especially until the mid-1980s, Romania was an active participant in the dialogue between the communist and capitalist blocs, which advocated the possibility of coexistence of different political and socio economic systems. As a result, Ceausescu was part of the effort to promote relations between the states from Western Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia in order to provide development in the field of technology and advanced industrial processes. Gilberg argues that these activities aimed to

⁵⁴ Shafir, p.175. See also, Gilberg, p.216.

⁵⁵ Gilberg, p.211.

promote the autonomy of Romania within the communist bloc as an important actor in world politics. Consequently, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the strategy that Ceausescu implemented in Romanian foreign policy succeeded and Romania was able to remain more independent and autonomous within the communist bloc despite the domination of the Soviet Union.

However, in the 1980s, the efforts of differentiation within the communist bloc and normalization of relations with the capitalist bloc came to an end in Romania. Gilberg writes that the deterioration of conditions inside Romania and the tendency to a more repressive regime isolated the country in time and Ceausescu turned into an ardent supporter of anti-Westernism because, according to him, the West was destroying the achievements of socialism and eroding the structure of the socialist system. Therefore, rather than the differentiation and nationalization of communism, Ceausescu emphasized the necessity for the unity of the communist bloc against Western imperialism. Gilberg states that this dramatic shift might have been tactical due to Romania's need of economic support from the communist bloc for its survival. On the other hand, it might have stemmed from the change in the nature of Ceausescuism, which became more ideologically orthodox and anti-Western than it had been in the late 1960s and 1970s.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it can be argued easily that Romanian national communist ideal during the Ceausescu era eroded in the 1980s and Romania changed its strategy to a more pro-Soviet stance in the last decade of the Cold War.

Consequently, as a small country which was vulnerable to Soviet expansionism and even remained under Soviet occupation until 1958, Romania could act more autonomously and independently within the communist bloc. The mediator

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.214-222.

role that Romania played in Sino-Soviet conflict and the relations between the capitalist and communist blocs showed that a small country could play a role beyond its power through diplomacy. More importantly, it can be argued that domestic politics such as the economic situation and political leadership had impact on the formulation and implementation of Romanian foreign policy as happened in the case of Greece which was a part of capitalist bloc throughout the Cold War. In addition to the cases from two blocs, the case of non-aligned Yugoslavia must be taken into consideration in order to understand the evolution of Cold War politics outside the capitalist-communist polarization.

The Cold War of Yugoslavia

The position of Yugoslavia during the Cold War was different from that of Greece and Romania although Yugoslavia was also a relatively small state which was closer to the Soviet Union and open to the Soviet expansionism, like Greece and Romania. Remington argues that Yugoslavia was the dividing line between the East and the West not only physically, but also ideologically and economically.⁵⁷ At the very beginning, Yugoslavia was in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and its membership in Cominform, which was established by the Soviet Union in 1947, was an indicator of the collaboration between the two states.

However, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform as a result of a Yugoslav-Soviet dispute just one year after its establishment. Dedijer argues that the problem between these two states had three dimensions: firstly, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union could not agree on the relations between states in Cominform,

⁵⁷ Robin Alison Remington, "Yugoslavia and Foreign Affairs", in *Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese and Yugoslav Models*, eds. Gary K. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1976), p.421.

especially the small and large ones. Secondly, the way to establish socialism and, thirdly, the international working class movement separated the two states.

Therefore, Stalin exploited these problems in order to present the clash as ideological and to present Yugoslavia as deviationist. As Dedijer writes Stalin wanted to use the Cominform to control the communist parties throughout the world, but Tito thought that Cominform would be the consultative body for the international working-class movement in which views and experiences would be shared.⁵⁸

It can be argued that Cominform was perceived by the two sides differently, on the one hand, Stalin wanted to control the communist bloc through Cominform. On the other hand, Tito perceived it as a platform for the communist bloc for the development and spread of communism throughout the world. Ultimately, the clash between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which can be regarded as a power struggle through Cominform, caused the expulsion of Yugoslavia and, both the capitalist and communist blocs adjusted to a non-aligned Yugoslavia from 1948 onwards. Therefore, as Remington notes Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito did not choose non-alignment, but rather it was forced to do so. As a result, Yugoslavia was left alone as a non-aligned state in such a strategic location. On the other hand, he states, the pro-communist stance of the leadership in Yugoslavia and the possible demoralizing impact within the Yugoslav communist party prevented Tito from changing sides.⁵⁹

By the same token, non-alignment caused vulnerability to a possible Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. The deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union and the vulnerability to a possible Soviet attack enabled Yugoslavia to normalize relations

⁵⁸ Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953* (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p.118.

⁵⁹ Remington, p.423.

with the United States. Hence, the economic loss that stemmed from the economic blockade imposed by Cominform was compensated for by the economic aid from the Western bloc. However, Yugoslavia did not cut its ties with the Eastern bloc because of, as Remington argues, the psychological need for ideologically acceptable allies within the communist bloc. Moreover, non-alignment enabled Tito to develop and implement the Yugoslav model of communism and his non-aligned allies, such as Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India, did not force him to cut especially the economic ties with the West.⁶⁰

The determinants of Yugoslav foreign policy had shifted by 1953-1954 from the fear of Soviet invasion to the Trieste problem, with Italy dominating the agenda. Ultimately, the problem ended with the involvement of the West in the problem between the two states. Remington argues that the Western involvement in the solution of the problem showed that non-alignment was beneficial for the security and foreign policy interests of Yugoslavia. Moreover, non-alignment would also satisfy the domestic policy needs through the achievement of the compromise between the ones who were in favor of closer ties with the Soviet bloc and the ones who were in favor of a more West-centric foreign policy. Therefore, non-alignment provided balance in Yugoslav domestic politics. By the same token, despite the division within the society for the orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy, the security and territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state was the highest priority for the majority of Yugoslav population. When the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, which were the states in the communist bloc, are taken into consideration, the Yugoslavs believed that security system of the time, that was based on the spheres of influences divided among the two superpowers and military-

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.423.

political blocs that were balancing each other, was necessary to protect the Yugoslav state's security and territorial integrity. The domestic support for the policy of non-alignment enabled Tito to implement its strategy throughout the Cold War.⁶¹

Although the rivalry between the capitalist and communist blocs dominated the agenda of the Cold War, the non-aligned movement which was seen in Yugoslavia, Egypt and India showed that there could be a third way outside these two blocs. The Yugoslav case was more conspicuous than that of the others because of the possible threat from the Soviet Union due to the physical proximity. On the other hand, Tito put emphasis on diplomatic relations between the non-aligned countries to find a common denominator to hold together their coalition. The non-aligned conferences and Tito's mini summits with Nehru and Nasser provided a visible platform for Yugoslav foreign policy and enabled Yugoslav policymakers to have an influence in the international arena.⁶² As a result, domestic factors, e.g., the necessity of economic and social development and the role of the leader in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, played roles in the formulation and implementation of Yugoslav foreign policy, which was based on non-alignment, as happened in the cases of Greece and Romania, which were parts of the capitalist and communist blocs, respectively.

Consequently, when all these three cases are taken into consideration, it can be concluded that the foreign policies of the member states of different blocs were not homogenous and not identical to the strategies and policies of the two superpowers because of their different perceptions of the dynamics of the Cold War. As the cases of Greece and Romania show, their relations with the leaders of their

⁶¹ Ibid., pp.422-424.

⁶² Ibid., p.425.

respective blocs played important roles in the formulation and implementation of the foreign policies of these states. By the same token, although Yugoslavia was a non-aligned state after 1948, the foreign policy of Yugoslavia was strongly affected by the relations with the Soviet Union, the leader of the bloc to which Yugoslavia had belonged, and the Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe.

Besides the impact of the relations with the leading countries and the general conjuncture of the Cold War, domestic and country specific factors played roles in the decisions made in these three countries, too. For example, as a result of the necessity to focus on domestic turmoil, Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO in 1975. In addition to this, it also concentrated on its membership in the European Economic Community in order to provide its socio-economic development in the 1970s, and hence, loosened its ties with the United States. In the case of Romania, the Ceausescu regime, which was established in 1965, did not challenge the capitalist bloc despite its membership in the communist one, in order to provide its economic development until the 1980s. Moreover, Ceausescu played a role in Romanian foreign policy, in order to have a say in world politics as the leader of Romania and satisfy his personal ambition as a world leader. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, Ceausescu's Romania turned its back to the capitalist bloc in order to obtain financial aid from the communist bloc in order to ameliorate its economic situation. Lastly, Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito pursued a balanced foreign policy towards both sides after its expulsion from Cominform and in this case the role of political, social and economic dynamics of Yugoslavia in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy cannot be ignored, either.

As happened in these three cases, country specific factors played roles also in the Turkish foreign policy decision making process during the Cold War. In other

words, Turkey, as a member of the capitalist bloc, was not an exception to the rule. This study will concentrate on the country specific factors of Turkey during the Cold War. However, firstly, the period between 1923 and 1945 should be analyzed in order to contextualize the historical background for Turkish foreign policy in the period between 1945 and 1991.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS BEFORE THE COLD WAR, 1923-1945

The Atatürk Period (October 29, 1923-November 10, 1938)

After the establishment of the republic on October 29, 1923, Turkey entered into a period of revolutionary political, social and economic transformation under the leadership of president Atatürk. In the political realm, the capital had been shifted from Istanbul to Ankara on October 13, 1923 just before the establishment of the republic. The caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924, which had been divided from the dynastic rule on November 1, 1922 in order to cut the ties with the former norms of rule.

In addition to these political changes, the new constitution of the republic was prepared in 1924. In the social realm, a new way of dressing was introduced during Atatürk's visit to Kastamonu, and a new clothing law was passed on November 25, 1925 in the parliament. In the same year, the calendar was replaced by the one which was officially used in foreign countries. The law system was also reformed and the Swiss Civil Code was adopted on February 17, 1926. Moreover, the Latin alphabet was adopted and Nation Schools (*Millet Mektepleri*) were opened in late 1928. In 1930, Turkish women were given the right to vote in municipal elections and this right was extended to the right to vote and to be elected in general elections in 1934. Furthermore, a law making surnames mandatory was passed and the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave Mustafa Kemal "Atatürk" as surname in 1934.⁶³

⁶³ Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004), pp.260-288. See also, Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), pp.504-552.

The political and social transformation in the early years of the republic was complemented with the project of the economic reconstruction of the new nation state. The economic policies of the Atatürk period can be divided into two periods: reconstruction under the conditions of an open market economy between 1923 and 1929 and protectionist-statist industrialization between 1932 and 1939.⁶⁴ During the first period, which lasted until the great global economic depression throughout the world in 1929, the main aim of the decision makers was to nationalize the economy because the new republic could not be politically independent unless it was economically independent. In other words, as Atatürk stated in a speech at the beginning of the Economy Congress in Izmir in 1923, economic independence was a requirement for the new nation state's political independence and autonomy.⁶⁵ However, it was not easy to provide economic independence because of the backwardness of the Turkish economy that was based solely on agriculture and the lack of necessary infrastructure such as a transportation system.

On the other hand, despite the abolition of capitulations with Lausanne Treaty in 1923, the fixation of custom duties to the level in 1916 until 1929 prevented the economy from providing the capital for the efforts to reestablish Turkish economy.⁶⁶ Therefore, in this period, the main aims of the new national economy were industrialization and strong money and a balanced budget. (*Sağlam para, denk bütçe*) A balanced budget would save the new republic from being

⁶⁴ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2007), pp.39, 59.

⁶⁵ Oktay Yenal, *Cumhuriyet'in İktisat Tarihi* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2003), p.46. See also, Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisat Tarihi 1923-1950* (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 1982), pp.139-140.

⁶⁶ Tefik Çavdar, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi 1900-1960* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), p.167.

economically dependent on any foreign country and facing the revival of capitulations.⁶⁷ Therefore, despite the deficit in its foreign trade, the Turkish economy did not face budget deficit in the period between 1923 and 1930, except for the year 1925. Çavdar relates the deficit in this year to the Sheikh Said rebellion and the costs for its suppression.⁶⁸

Within the context of the national economy, the railways were nationalized and extended in this period in order, first, to consolidate the control of the new nation state and, second, to provide linkage between different parts of Anatolia. Railway construction was a burden for the new republic, but it was overcome mainly through national capital.⁶⁹ However, the efforts to nationalize the economy did not exclude foreign capital although the accumulation of capital in the hands of the national bourgeoisie was the priority of the new nation state. Thus, foreign investors were bound to the laws in Turkey and they did not seek capitulatory privileges in order to be a part of Turkish economy.⁷⁰ Consequently, the Turkish economy in the period between 1923 and 1929 was the sum of the efforts of nationalization and self-sufficiency. However, the relatively liberal economic policies of the new republic were forced to change with the impact of the great depression that erupted throughout the world in 1929 because Turkey was meeting its needs through imports. With the fall of Turkey's exports as a result of the crisis, decision makers had to

⁶⁷ Bilsay Kuruç, *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), pp. 29-30.

⁶⁸ Çavdar, p.216.

⁶⁹ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *20. Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi* (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2002), p.23. See also, Kuruç, pp.21-27, Yenal, p.53.

⁷⁰ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005*, p.42. See also, Tezel, pp.139-140.

change the strategies of the economic reconstruction and Turkey entered a phase of protectionist-statist industrialization, especially after 1932.⁷¹

All the efforts to establish an independent, national and industrialized economy and an independent state found were reflected in Turkish foreign policy. The decision makers, especially president Atatürk, aimed to solve the problems that remained from the Lausanne Treaty in order to consolidate the new nation state. In other words, after the establishment of the republic, Turkey entered into an intense period of revolutionary reforms in all spheres of life. For the consolidation of these political, social and economic reforms and the new republican regime, Turkey needed peace and stability in its foreign relations.⁷² Atatürk's principle of "peace at home, peace in the world" reflected the devotion to peace for the benefit of international relations of Turkey and the necessity for the consolidation of internal reforms for the development of the Turkish nation state. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy in Atatürk's period was formulated and implemented according to this principle of the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Armaoğlu divides Turkey's foreign relations into two phases in this period : Turkish foreign policy in a "temporary period of peace" in the world in which efforts to resolve Turkey's disputes with foreign countries remaining from Lausanne between 1923 and 1931,⁷³ and, Turkish foreign policy in the period of crises between 1931 and 1938, when Turkey became an active participant of international

⁷¹ Çavdar, p.212. See also, Yenal, pp.62-68.

⁷² Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, "1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası" in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, eds.Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p.60.

⁷³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2005), p.321.

relations and tried to protect status quo through regional pacts and cooperation with other countries.⁷⁴

The pursuit of the protection of the status quo in foreign affairs had impacts in the cadres which formulated and implemented Turkish foreign policy, and thus, the main actors of Turkey's foreign relations remained unchanged during Atatürk's presidency. İsmet İnönü served the country as the prime minister except for two short interruptions, until the end of 1937.⁷⁵ Besides the prime ministry, it is possible to see the status quo in foreign ministry because Tevfik Rüştü Aras served as the minister of foreign affairs from the beginning of the İnönü government, which was formed in 1925, to the Bayar government, which was formed in November 1938 right after the death of Atatürk.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Fevzi Çakmak, who was one of the commanding trios of the army with Atatürk and İnönü during the National Struggle served as the chief-of- general staff until the end of the Second World War.

Atatürk's principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and the protection of the status quo are evident in the government programs throughout his presidency. The first İnönü government's (October 30, 1923-November 20, 1924) program allocated a short passage on the foreign affairs of Turkey and stated that the main objective of Turkey's foreign relations was to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey in addition to the protection of peace and stability in international relations.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.335.

⁷⁵ Fethi Okyar formed the government which acted between November 1924 and March 1925. İsmet İnönü replaced him upon the Sheikh Said rebellion in south-eastern Turkey in February 1925 and governed Turkey until Celal Bayar formed the successive government in late 1937 until the death of Atatürk.

⁷⁶ In the first republican government which was formed by İsmet İnönü, prime minister İnönü was also the minister of foreign affairs. In Fethi Okyar government, Şükrü Kaya served as the minister of foreign affairs. After the formation of İnönü government upon the rebellion in south-eastern Turkey, Tevfik Rüştü Aras was appointed minister of foreign affairs and uninterruptedly served as minister until 1938. Therefore, Tevfik Rüştü Aras is still the longest stayed minister of foreign affairs in the republican history.

Moreover, the new government sought to develop relations with the neighboring countries and conduct relations with the countries with which there had not been diplomatic relations before.⁷⁷

The first government's program was not a systematic one although it provided the crux of the objectives of the foreign policy of the new republic. Beginning with the second republican government which was formed by Fethi Okyar, government programs became more systematic and detailed. In Okyar government's program, after an emphasis on peaceful relations with foreign countries, the development of relations with the former enemies was systematized. The Mosul problem with Great Britain was to be resolved through peaceful settlement by the League of Nations. The problems with France and Greece were to be resolved and the relations with Italy, Balkan and Middle Eastern countries were to be developed. Moreover, the new government aimed to protect friendly relations with the Soviet Union which had supported Turkey since the beginning of the nationalist movement.⁷⁸

The Okyar government, however, was short lived and it was replaced by the İsmet İnönü government upon the Sheikh Said rebellion in South-East Turkey. İnönü kept office until the end of 1937. His government programs put emphasis on the peaceful resolution of disputes and development of relations with foreign countries as had its predecessors.⁷⁹ During the last government during Atatürk's presidency by Celal Bayar, besides the development of diplomatic relations, the economic side of foreign relations was also included in the government's program and Bayar

⁷⁷ Kemal Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız* (Ankara: Dışişleri Yayınları, 1993), p.12.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.12-13.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.14-17.

government aimed to integrate ministry of economics and ministry of foreign affairs in order to develop Turkey's economic relations with foreign countries.⁸⁰

Consequently, governments during Atatürk's presidency formulated their programs in the light of Atatürk's principles about the foreign policy of Turkey and, in this period, Turkey solved its problems, especially those that remained from Lausanne and joined the international community.

In the period of dealing with the problems remaining from Lausanne negotiations between 1923 and 1931, the first problem that the new republic had to deal with was the Mosul dispute with Great Britain. Mosul was within the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*), which had been passed by the last Ottoman Assembly in 1920 and had defined the borders of the Turkish state, and during Lausanne negotiations, Turkey and Great Britain endeavored to keep their control of this territory. British representative Lord Curzon argued that Mosul belonged to Iraq, which was a mandate of Britain, and he advocated Iraq's territorial integrity.⁸¹ Therefore, he was in favor of the solution of problem by the League of Nations because, for him, the problem was not Mosul, but the Turkish-Iraqi border.⁸² On the other hand, the Turkish representative, İsmet İnönü, argued that Mosul belonged to Turkey and that a plebiscite had to be held. He based his arguments on the ethnic, political, social, military and strategic background of the issue because İnönü was in favor of the solution of the problem through bilateral negotiations rather than the League of

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.18.

⁸¹ Hasan Berke Dilan, *Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası 1923-1939* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınevi, 1998), p.29.

⁸² Mim Kemal Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992), pp.104-107.

Nations.⁸³ Despite the reaction and criticism in Turkey, especially in the Grand National Assembly⁸⁴, against the discussion of the Mosul question in the League of Nations, at the end of the conference, it was agreed that the dispute would be resolved by the League of Nations unless the two states could agree upon the issue within nine months following the end of the Lausanne conference.⁸⁵

Bilateral negotiations began on May 19, 1924 with the Haliç Conference in Istanbul. In the conference, Turkey was represented by Fethi Okyar and Great Britain was represented by Sir Percy Cox. The conference continued until June. During the conference, the two sides insisted on their claims at Lausanne and the conference ended without any solution. Then, on August 6, 1924 upon the request of Great Britain, the League of Nations held discussions on the Mosul issue because of the expiration of the time for bilateral negotiations which had been stated at Lausanne.⁸⁶ The League of Nations formed a three-member commission⁸⁷ in order to investigate and collect all pertinent documents. In July 1925, the commission prepared its report, which stated that for the benefit of the people in the region, Mosul was to be included within the borders of Iraq and to remain under the mandate of the League of Nations

⁸³ Vladimir Minorsky, *Musul Sorunu* (İstanbul: Avesta, 1998), pp.33-34.

⁸⁴ Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, pp.114-118. See also, Zekeriya Türkmen, *Musul Meselesi: Askeri Yönden Çözüm Arayışları 1922-1925* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2003), pp.72-75.

⁸⁵ The Lausanne Treaty Article 3, Paragraph 2, July 24, 1923.
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne

⁸⁶ Durmuş Yılmaz, *Musul Meselesi Tarihi* (Konya: Çizgi Yayınevi, 2003), pp.177-178. See also, Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, pp.134-136.

⁸⁷ The three members of the commission were from Hungary, Sweden and Belgium. Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, p.147.

for twenty-five years.⁸⁸ Great Britain accepted the commission report although Turkey did not recognize it, refusing to abdicate its sovereignty rights in Mosul, thus, the League decided to consult the International Court of Justice.

The court stated that the decision of the League was binding for both sides with reference to the second paragraph of the third article of the Lausanne Treaty through which both sides had accepted the authority of the League on the Mosul question although Turkey had not been a member of the League at the time. In the end, with the decision of the League of Nations, Mosul was left to Iraq and the British mandate was extended for another twenty-five years.⁸⁹ Turkey accepted the solution of the League of Nations because, Tamkoç argues, Atatürk was not in favor of jeopardizing internal reforms and the consolidation of the nation state for the sake of Mosul due to the possibility of war with Great Britain.⁹⁰ On the other hand, Armaoğlu argues that the decision created resentment in the public opinion and instigated opposition against Great Britain in Turkey. In the press, newspapers declared the possibility of a war between Turkey and Great Britain.⁹¹ In other words, despite the reaction in the parliament, press and the public opinion, the Mosul question was resolved contrary to the arguments of these circles.

The negotiations on Mosul and the failure of the Turkish thesis in the League of Nations had impact not only in Turkish foreign affairs, but also in domestic affairs. In foreign affairs, Turkey's efforts to ameliorate its relations with the West

⁸⁸ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk İngiliz İlişkileri 1919-1926* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), pp.295-296. See also, Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, p.153, Minorsky, pp.39-44.

⁸⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk İngiliz İlişkileri 1919-1926*, p. 297.

⁹⁰ Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1976), p.197.

⁹¹ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.322.

were negatively influenced and Turkey had closer relations with the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of negotiations, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the Soviet Union in Paris in December 1925. The treaty was extended until 1945 in time.⁹²

The Mosul issue had significant impact on Turkish domestic affairs. Sheikh Said rebellion in south-eastern Turkey in February 1925, which was against the abolition of the caliphate, was linked to Great Britain. It was argued that Great Britain may have been involved in the rebellion in order to weaken the hand of Turkey in the negotiations despite the lack of any evidence about the involvement of Great Britain.⁹³ On the other hand, Tunçay argues that although the Sheikh Said rebellion was to the advantage of Great Britain, it is not a evidence for the British involvement in the issue because, firstly, Great Britain was not in favor of a revival of the caliphate because of the Muslims in their population and, secondly, they were against the weakness of Turkey against Soviet invasion.⁹⁴

The involvement of Great Britain in the rebellion has never been proven; however, at the time it led to radical measures in Turkey. The Fethi Okyar government was replaced by that of İsmet İnönü and in the aftermath, the Maintenance of Order Law (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*)⁹⁵ was prepared and Independence Courts (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) were established. The rebellion was suppressed and most of the rebels were sentenced to death by the court. In addition, the press was censored and the only opposition party the Progressive Republican

⁹² Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.7

⁹³ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk İngiliz İlişkileri 1919-1926*, pp.310-311.

⁹⁴ Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005), pp. 137-138.

⁹⁵ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.6.

Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), was dissolved on the basis of the Maintenance of Order Law.⁹⁶ Consequently, the opposition within the country was dramatically suppressed and the next opposition party would be established in 1930. The solution of the Mosul question ended the main problem with Great Britain in this period and the new nation state would aim to solve its problems with France and Greece in the following period.

The main contentious issue between Turkey and France was the Ottoman debt because France was the forerunner of the states to which the Ottoman Empire had been indebted. Moreover, France had been one of the main actors that had benefitted from capitulations. Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty was disadvantageous for France because of the abolition of capitulations.⁹⁷ The settlement of the Ottoman debt to France, which the new republic promised to pay at Lausanne, was provided by a treaty on June 13, 1928.⁹⁸ However, as the payment of debt became difficult as a result of the great global economic depression, the clauses of the debt treaty were renewed in 1933.⁹⁹ In addition to the Ottoman debt, the Syrian border, French schools in Turkey and the Lotus-Bozkurt ship accident were the other problems in Turkish-French relations between 1923 and 1930.

Although the Syrian border had been determined by a treaty between the two sides in 1921, this border had become problematic again and the French High Commissioner of Syria, de Jouvenel, came to Ankara in February 1926. After the meeting of the high commissioner with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik

⁹⁶ Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*, pp.149-155.

⁹⁷ Hüner Tuncer, *Atatürkçü Dış Politika* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2008), p.106.

⁹⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.10.

⁹⁹ Tuncer, p.107.

Rüştü Aras, a treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations, which stated the solution of problems between Turkey and France by arbitration, was signed.

Ultimately, the Syrian border problem was resolved with a protocol in August 1929.¹⁰⁰

By the same token, the status of French schools in Turkey prevented the development of relations with France. At Lausanne, Turkey had stated that foreign schools in Turkey were obliged to comply with the rules of the Turkish state although this did not satisfy the foreign countries including France. The Turkish state imposed regulations for French schools which required the education of history and geography in Turkish. Although the decision was protested by the interlocutor states, the imposition of regulations continued.¹⁰¹

The last problematic issue between the two states in this period was the Lotus-Bozkurt ship crash. In August 1926, a French ship called the Lotus and a Turkish ship called the Bozkurt crashed outside of the territorial waters of Turkey. Turkish ship sank and eight sailors died in the accident. When the Lotus came to Istanbul, the Turkish agencies took the captains of two ships into custody and they were judged in the Turkish courts. The French government argued that the case was not under the jurisdiction of Turkish authority because the crash happened in international waters while the Turkish government advocated its jurisdiction. Ultimately, the issue went to the International Court of Justice and the court approved the position of Turkey. Turkish-French relations did not improve in the shadow of all these problems in the 1920s and another decade passed for the solution

¹⁰⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.11.

¹⁰¹ Tuncer, p.107.

of all problems with France until the participation of Alexandretta to Turkish territory on the eve of the Second World War.¹⁰²

As happened in its relations with Great Britain and France, Turkey was preoccupied with the solution of problems from the Lausanne negotiations in its relations with Greece. The main issue was the exchange of populations. The two sides agreed upon the Hansen memorandum, which determined the principles of exchange and a commission was embodied by the neutral states which began to act in 1924. Nevertheless, the identification of *établi* (= the established, the resident) became problematic. The commission applied to the League of Nations and the League decided to consult the International Court of Justice. The court decision on February 25, 1925 identified the *établi* while the two sides could not reach an agreement on the basis of the decision of the court and the problem was ultimately resolved with an agreement between Turkey and Greece in December 1926.¹⁰³

In addition to the population exchange, the status of the patriarchate in Turkey caused a problem in Turkish-Greek relations. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation insisted on the removal of the patriarchate from Istanbul. Despite some discussions between delegations, the proposal of Lord Curzon was approved and the settlement of patriarchate in Istanbul was stated with a clause of non-involvement in politics. The problem arose during the election of the patriarch in 1924 because Turkey deported the new patriarch on the claim that he was not an *établi*. The problem continued until 1925 and was resolved with the election of a new patriarch.¹⁰⁴ With the solution of these disputes between the two countries, the

¹⁰² Ibid., pp.107-108.

¹⁰³ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.8.

¹⁰⁴ Dilan, p.22.

way for the development of relations was paved. Eventually, upon Venizelos' visit to Atatürk in Ankara on June 10, 1930, agreements were signed about the population exchange and friendly relations.¹⁰⁵ Tuncer argues that Atatürk wanted to cooperate with Greece because of the revisionist policy of Bulgaria in the Balkans and Mussolini threat in the Mediterranean.¹⁰⁶ With these agreements, a long *détente* period began until the explosion of the events on Cyprus in 1954.

The first decade of the new republic was preoccupied mainly with the solution of problems that remained from the Lausanne Treaty, especially with Great Britain, France and Greece. On the other hand, the new republic sought to develop its relations with Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan. Despite the development of economic relations between Italy and Turkey, diplomatic relations did not develop as intended until 1928. The main reason for this was the revisionist policy of Mussolini in Italy. Turkey resented the expansionist foreign policy of Mussolini because his plans included the Eastern Mediterranean, which posed a threat to Turkey.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, during the Mosul negotiations, Italy took side with Great Britain, thus, Turkey did not trust Mussolini's Italy. The solution of the Mosul question ameliorated the relations between Turkey and Italy with Neutrality and Friendship Treaty signed on May 30, 1928. According to this agreement, the two sides would not participate in an alliance against each other and they would remain neutral during an attack against one of the parties.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.11.

¹⁰⁶ Tuncer, p.99.

¹⁰⁷ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.327.

¹⁰⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.10.

Turkish-Soviet relations intensified in the 1920s. In addition to the Neutrality and Friendship Treaty, which was signed in Paris in 1925, the two sides signed a treaty of Commerce and Sea Trade in 1927 in order to solve problems in their economic relations that stemmed from the status of Soviet commercial representatives, export quotas and the transit passage for the products of both parties to a third party without customs duties.¹⁰⁹ In 1928, upon the Soviet request, Turkey was invited to the Disarmament Conference by the League of Nations. Moreover, Turkey and the Soviet Union acted jointly in the Kellogg-Briand Pact,¹¹⁰ which denounced war as a tool for the solution of disputes, and the Litvinov Protocol, which put emphasis on total disarmament. In this period, the treaty of Friendship and Neutrality which was signed in 1925 was extended for another two years in 1929.¹¹¹

These efforts to develop friendly relations continued in the relations with countries in the Middle East. The relations with Iraq and Syria remained under the control of their mandatory states, Great Britain and France, respectively. On the other hand, Turkey conducted diplomatic relations with Iran and Afghanistan in the 1920s. The Shah of Iran, Rıza, and the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah Han, played pivotal roles in the development of relations like their counterpart Atatürk in Turkey. Afghanistan had been the first state to recognize Turkey in the international arena during the National Struggle and both sides signed an agreement in Moscow in 1921. After the establishment of the republic, bilateral diplomatic relations were conducted

¹⁰⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.8.

¹¹⁰ The Kellogg-Briand Pact, August 27, 1928.
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm>

¹¹¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.11.

with Afghanistan. In May 1928, Amanullah Han visited Turkey and a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed.¹¹²

Similar to the relations with Afghanistan, the diplomatic relations with Iran were immediately conducted just after the beginning of the National Struggle in 1921. Despite some border violation claims between the two countries because of the entrance of Kurdish tribes from Iran during the Mosul question and the Sheikh Said rebellion, friendly relations were established with a Security and Friendship Treaty on April 22, 1926.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the treaty did not solve the problem between the two countries. Later on, on June 15, 1928, a protocol was added to the Security and Friendship Treaty of 1926, and the parties agreed upon the cooperation against a threat towards their security.¹¹⁴

In the first phase of foreign affairs between 1923 and 1930, Turkey marked to solve the problems that remained from Lausanne Treaty through diplomatic relations. Moreover, Turkey developed its relations especially with its neighbors. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1930s, as Tuncer writes, Turkey was ready to be actively involved in the international arena.¹¹⁵ Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s was heavily influenced by the international conjuncture especially in two realms: Firstly, the great global economic depression in the late 1920s resulted in the reconsideration of liberal economic policies and, thus, state intervention in the economy increased. The transition to a protectionist-statist period was realized as a result of the Great Depression in 1929 and the inability to transform the economy through private

¹¹² Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.10.

¹¹³ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.7.

¹¹⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.10.

¹¹⁵ Tuncer, p.18.

enterprise due to the lack of necessary resources and the shortage of foreign capital.¹¹⁶ Hershlag writes that the success of Soviet-planned economies that were based on statism inspired Turkish decision makers to implement planned and protectionist statist policies.¹¹⁷ Moreover, society was dissatisfied with the economic policies of the new regime despite the fact that the burdens such as the *Aşar* Tax, which had been collected from the peasants and the farmers during the Ottoman rule, were lifted as early as 1924. President Atatürk made a tour in Anatolia in 1931 and recognized that the necessary measures needed to be taken in order to provide economic development and consolidate the regime in the eyes of its citizens.¹¹⁸

In this way, the Turkish economy during Atatürk's presidency entered into the second period, which lasted until the Second World War that erupted in 1939. The main aim of statist economic policy was to provide economic development with industrialization through state enterprises.¹¹⁹ In this period, industrialization efforts intensified in order to provide the self sufficiency of the country. Moreover, protectionist measures were taken in the sense that the Law for the Protection of Turkish Money (*Türk Parasını Koruma Kanunu*) was passed in 1930, a national Central Bank was established to print money in the same year and customs were lifted in the aftermath of the expiry of the duration of the clause in Lausanne Treaty, which had fixed customs to the level in 1916. In addition to these measures, the

¹¹⁶ Korkut Boratav, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1974), pp.137-138.

¹¹⁷ Z.Y.Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p.4.

¹¹⁸ Boratav, *100 Soruda Devletçilik*, p.142.

¹¹⁹ Kuruç, pp.92-105. See also, Boratav, *100 Soruda Devletçilik*, p.158.

decision makers sought to keep a balanced budget as they had done in the first period.

In order to provide foreign trade balance, clearing¹²⁰ agreements were made with countries such as Italy (1934), Germany (1934), the Netherlands (1934) and Sweden (1937) especially after 1932.^{121,122} As a result of protectionist-statist economic policies which focused on the industrialization of the country, Turkey made progress in industrialization until the eruption of the Second World War. Furthermore, it also balanced its budget and foreign trade in this period in order to protect its economic independence while foreign capital was not excluded from its economic development.^{123, 124}

This kind of an economic nationalism, as seen in Turkey, through statist-protectionist policies provoked nationalist sentiments and the rise of fascism especially in Germany with Hitler's coming to power after the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933¹²⁵ and in Mussolini's Italy which was perceived as a threat by Turkey since late 1920s. As a result, Turkey had to choose sides between the two camps to conduct its foreign policy: the one which was in favor of revision

¹²⁰ Clearing was a kind of economic policy which was based on mutual trade between countries through exchange of commodities without paying money for them.

¹²¹ Owen and Pamuk, pp. 28-29. See also, Yenal, p.66, Kuruç, p.92, Tezel, pp.156-157.

¹²² For the clearing agreements with Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, see, Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vols.15, 18.

¹²³ Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, p.8.

¹²⁴ The best example of the use of foreign capital was the credit agreement with the Soviet Union in January 1934. The conditions of the agreement show how the decisionmakers were sensitive to Turkey's economic independence because Turkey provided credit of 8m dollars from the Soviet Union for twenty years of repayment without any interest. Moreover, repayment of the credit was to be made by Turkish lira. Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.15.

¹²⁵ Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası*, p.92.

(Germany and Italy) and the other which was in favor of the status quo (Great Britain, France and later, the Soviet Union)

The most important feature of Turkish foreign policy in the 1930s can be regarded as the efforts to increase cooperation with the states in the Balkans, Middle East and Western Europe against the rise of the revisionist camp. On the other hand, although Turkey was not in the revisionist camp, its relations with Germany and Italy did not radically deteriorate especially in the economic realm. However, the rise of fascism had impact on Turkish foreign policy. Tuncer notes that although decision makers in Turkey especially president Atatürk, were of the opinion that the League of Nations had been under the domination of the Great Britain and France in the 1920s and did not want to be under control of these two states through membership to the League of Nations,¹²⁶ as a result of the developments in Europe, the polarization of states and offensive policies of Italy and Germany, Turkey changed its position towards the League. By the same token, Atatürk wanted to be a member of the League upon an invitation rather than application for membership. Therefore, with the proposal of Spain in the League of Nations' General Assembly on July 6, 1932 and the support of Greece, Turkey became a member of the League on July 18, 1932.¹²⁷ Turkey's membership in the League paved the way for the development of relations with Western European states.

After membership in the League of Nations, Turkey sought to provide regional cooperation with its neighbors both in the Balkans and the Middle East. After four successive meetings between 1930 and 1934 among Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania the Balkan Entente was signed among

¹²⁶ Tuncer, p.127.

¹²⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.13.

Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania in 1934. Through this agreement, the signatories agreed to respect each others' territories, and not to act without consulting each other.¹²⁸ Barlas writes that:

By signing the entente, the four countries declared their guarantee of mutual security over the Balkan frontiers. The pact was of a defensive character in the sense that it only aimed at protecting their boundaries against aggression and it was mainly to guarantee the security over the Balkan frontiers against attack from a Balkan country. Bulgaria was evidently the country in question. According to the members of the Entente, Bulgaria's territorial ambitions could only be realized at the expense of its neighbors and by force. Moreover, it was a strong possibility that a Balkan country could participate in an attack initiated by a non-Balkan country. This danger was possible in the case of Bulgarian cooperation with Italy in an attack on Balkan territory.¹²⁹

Despite the efforts to prevent revisionism in the Balkans, the entente lost its power in the region after the revisionist camp dominated Europe especially after 1936.¹³⁰

The domination of the Axis powers, especially the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy in 1935 brought closer relations among Great Britain, France and Turkey. Especially after Turkey's support to the decision of the League of Nations about the sanctions which would be imposed on Italy after the occupation of Abyssinia and the Italian threatful response to the states, which supported the decision, Great Britain guaranteed to support the Mediterranean states including Turkey against a possible Italian attack. Turkey accepted the British proposal with Greece and Yugoslavia and therefore, the Mediterranean Pact came into existence. However, the mutual guarantee status between Turkey and Great Britain did not last long because Italy resented the agreement and Turkey did not want its relations with Italy to deteriorate.

¹²⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.15.

¹²⁹ Dilek Barlas, *Etatism & Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic & Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939* (Leiden & New York & Köln: Brill, 1998), pp.143-144.

¹³⁰ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.340.

This mutual guarantee ended in 1936, but it had positive impact on Turkish-British relations and the two states signed a cooperation agreement on the eve of the Second World War.¹³¹

On the other hand, as Italy's offensive policies resulted in the Balkan Pact, the failure of disarmament efforts and Germany's decisions towards remilitarization and obligatory military service paved the way for Turkey to change the demilitarized status of the straits which had been determined in the Lausanne Treaty.¹³² Turkey's efforts through its minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras, with the approval of president Atatürk and prime minister İnönü, before the League of Nations and the Assembly of the Balkan Entente resulted in the approval of Turkey's proposal, especially after the inability of the League to provide peace and stability that had been proven by the Italy's attack on Abyssinia and the remilitarization of Rhine Land by Germany. Turkey's position was supported by Great Britain and the Soviet Union because each state wanted to keep Turkey on their side against the revisionist camp.¹³³ Therefore, the Montreux Convention was signed among Turkey, the Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia on July 20, 1936. With this convention, Turkey had the right of full sovereignty on the straits.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Elif Uyar, *Türk-İngiliz Siyasal İlişkileri 1929-1936* (Antalya: Yeniden Anadolu Ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları, 2007), pp.178-180.

¹³² Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003), pp. 101-102.

¹³³ Ibid., pp.102-103. See also, Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin and Steven Morewood, "Turkey's Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey against Soviet Demands 1943 – 47", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no.40 (March 2004), p.25.

¹³⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.17.

In this period, as the Montreux Convention in 1936, the Nyon Conference in September 1937 was another event which reconciled the interests of the Western European states such as Great Britain, France and Turkey. During the civil war in Spain between the republicans and nationalists, Great Britain and France supported the republicans, who were in favor of the status quo, while Germany and Italy supported the nationalists, who were in favor of the change of the regime. On the other hand, Turkey morally supported the position of the republicans which was consistent with the interests of Great Britain and France as well as the Soviet Union.¹³⁵ The conflict between the two camps spread to the Mediterranean and upon the transfer of equipments to the republicans by the Soviet Union through the Turkish straits, the leader of the nationalists Franco asked for help from Mussolini.¹³⁶ In time, the vessels carrying goods for the republicans through the Mediterranean began to be attacked and sunk by pirates that supposedly belonged to Italy. In order to prevent the piracy in the Mediterranean, the Nyon Conference was held on September 10, 1937, and Turkey attended with a delegation headed by the minister of foreign affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras. At the end of the conference, the Nyon Agreement was signed by Great Britain, France, Turkey, Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia determining the principles of joint combat against piracy in the Mediterranean.¹³⁷

However, the agreement was a counteraction against Italy and Germany because both states were supporting nationalists, in contrast to the contracting parties, and Italy supposedly the state responsible for the piracy. Therefore, in

¹³⁵ Yücel Güçlü, "The Nyon Agreement of 1937 and Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no.38 (Jan2002), pp.53-54.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.55.

¹³⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.18.

Turkey, the conflict about the Nyon agreement enhanced the disagreement between president Atatürk and prime minister İnönü. Despite İnönü's position towards the necessity of a more cautious stance against Italy and Germany, Atatürk directly involved himself in the decision making process in the signing of the agreement and ordered Aras to sign the agreement despite the possibility of a conflict with Italy, which prime minister İnönü warned against. The decision making process of the Nyon agreement is an example of Atatürk's direct involvement in Turkish foreign policy issues which bypassed the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. Atatürk's direct involvement was resented by prime minister İnönü and the Nyon issue played a role in his resignation in 1937.¹³⁸

Like the Western European states and the Soviet Union, Turkey was in need of cooperation with its neighbors in the Middle East in order to provide the security and control of its borders and against a possible Italian threat in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed the Saadabad Pact in Teheran on July 8, 1937 and agreed upon the sustainment of friendly relations with each other, devotion to the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and respect for each others' domestic affairs, sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹³⁹

The Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact were the results of Turkey's efforts to provide peace and stability through cooperation in the region despite their limited impacts in the long run. Although Turkey supported the Western camp, which was in favor of the status quo and signed pacts with its neighbors in the region, the last issue of the Atatürk's period had an impact on the status quo in the region: the annexation of Alexandretta to Turkish territory. Alexandretta was a problematic issue between

¹³⁸ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945 v.1* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp.53-54. See also, Güçlü, *The Nyon Agreement of 1937 and Turkey*, p.64.

¹³⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.19.

France and Turkey to which Atatürk attached great importance.¹⁴⁰ Alexandretta was in the territory of Syria, which was a French mandate. However, Syria gained independence through an agreement with France in September 1936 and Alexandretta was left to Syria although there was no clause in the treaty between France and Syria. Turkey rejected the agreement between these two countries and demanded independence for Alexandretta because of the Turkish population in the region, while France argued that independence of Alexandretta would be a violation of the territorial integrity of Syria.¹⁴¹

With agreement between France and Turkey, the League of Nations took up the issue. At the same time, Turkish public followed the issue closely.¹⁴² Atatürk wanted to solve the problem even by use of force and this was another disagreement with prime minister İnönü who was in favor of a more cautious solution to the problem.¹⁴³

The League of Nations determined a status for Alexandretta in which it would be independent in its domestic affairs, but dependent on Syria in its foreign affairs. Moreover, France and Turkey were responsible for its territorial integrity.¹⁴⁴ The decision of the League, however, was not easy to implement and did not solve the problem. France changed its position towards Turkey's demands with the impact of Great Britain, especially with the growing threat from the Axis powers in Europe such as the invasion of Austria by Germany in March 1938. Upon this change in the

¹⁴⁰ Tamkoç, p.200.

¹⁴¹ Serhan Ada, *Türk-Fransız İlişkilerinde Hatay Sorunu 1918-1939* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), pp.107-110.

¹⁴² Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.349.

¹⁴³ Tamkoç, p.186.

¹⁴⁴ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.349. See also, Ada, p.128.

French position, Turkey and France signed an agreement to jointly protect the territorial integrity of Alexandretta with armed forces.¹⁴⁵ After the solution of the conflict between two states, the elections were held in Alexandretta on September 2, 1938. Turks took twenty two seats out of forty in the parliament. The assembly of Alexandretta established close contacts with Turkey and demanded to be made part of Turkish territory.

This demand caused problems in Turkish-French relations, but, ultimately, the threat of war in Europe forced France to accept the Turkish demand. With an agreement between France and Turkey on June 23, 1939; the annexation of Alexandretta to Turkish territory was accepted and in July, Alexandretta became a part of Turkey.¹⁴⁶ The last dispute for the consolidation of Turkey's territories was resolved on the eve of the Second World War, after the death of Atatürk.

Concluding Remarks

In the period between 1923 and 1938, Turkey had intense diplomatic relations with foreign countries. As a legislative body, the conducting of foreign relations such as international treaties and agreements or declarations of war or peace were under the jurisdiction of the assembly.¹⁴⁷ The president was responsible for the appointment of Turkish representatives in foreign countries and the approval of foreign representatives in Turkey. Moreover, the president was the symbolic leader of the armed forces and he could chair the council of ministers if he wished. The

¹⁴⁵ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.350.

¹⁴⁶ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.20.

¹⁴⁷ Article 26 of the 1924 Constitution. Suna Kili and Şeref Gözübüyük, *Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze Türk Anayasa Metinleri* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006), p.132.

prime minister and the council of ministers were responsible for the decisions that were made by the president.¹⁴⁸ It can be argued that the 1924 constitution sought to provide a balance between the legislative branch and the executive branch.

However, in practice, the foreign policy decision making was dominated and formulated by president Atatürk which can be seen on the issues Mosul, Nyon and Alexandretta. His dictum “peace at home peace in the world” was the main principle of Turkish foreign policy because Turkey was in a period of revolutionary transformation in its domestic politics and the consolidation of the new regime needed peace and stability in its foreign affairs. However, Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of Atatürk was also an active foreign policy, thus, Turkey could afford to benefit from the opportunities to maximize its national interests as happened in the Montreux Convention in 1936 and the joining of Alexandretta to Turkish territory in 1939. As Tamkoç argues, Atatürk saw the formation of Turkish foreign policy in his own jurisdiction and intervened in all details related to foreign affairs, although his intervention sometimes disturbed prime minister İsmet İnönü, as happened during the Nyon Conference and on the Alexandretta issue.¹⁴⁹ However, he did not actively participate in the implementation of foreign policy or even make a foreign visit, although he did host many leaders such as Venizelos, King Edward VIII, Shah Rıza Pehlevi and Amanullah Han. Therefore, the implementation of foreign policy was handled by prime minister İnönü and mainly by the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras.

İsmet İnönü as the victorious leader of the Lausanne delegation and the closest friend of Atatürk, served Turkey uninterruptedly between 1925 and 1937. In

¹⁴⁸ Articles 32-37-40 of the 1924 Constitution. Kili and Gözübüyük, pp.134-136.

¹⁴⁹ Tamkoç, p.186.

foreign affairs, Tamkoç argues that İnönü implemented the directives that were given by Atatürk. On the other hand, in Atatürk's period, government programs were consistent with his basic principles of peace and the protection of national interests. Therefore, the practical results of Turkish foreign policy goals were consistent with the principles of government programs.

By the same token, the early republican period, especially until the 1930s saw the construction of the ministry of foreign affairs as the other institutions of the new republic.¹⁵⁰ The new service law was prepared on June 25, 1927 and the status of personnel was regulated with this law.¹⁵¹ However, the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, was the main actor in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy in this period. Aras was a close friend of Atatürk from Salonika and he was an admirer of Atatürk. Tamkoç's reference to an American diplomat about Tevfik Rüştü Aras shows the relationship between Atatürk and Aras:

Dr. Aras was not born to be a diplomat, but he was willing to listen and learn the lessons of the art of diplomacy from Atatürk. His rather vague and radical views on external affairs which he had prior to his appointment as foreign minister had taken definite shape and had become more concise, studied and intelligent as a result of his constant contact with Atatürk and as a result of his continued tenure of office.¹⁵²

And Tamkoç continues with his own opinions:

He had a flexible mind and had gained insight into the pragmatic and flexible mind of his tutor. He viewed his job as fulfilling the directives of Atatürk. At times he misunderstood them, thus causing some confusion in his relations with foreign diplomats. He occasionally perplexed foreign diplomats by retracting his previous promises and statements or by reversing his decisions.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Kemal Girgin, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Hariciye Tarihimiz* (İstanbul: Okumuş Adam Yayınları, 2005), p.212.

¹⁵¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düster*, 3rd series, vol.8.

¹⁵² Tamkoç, p.194.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.194.

These two statements underline the impact of Atatürk in the decision making process and on the minister of foreign affairs. Aras also states that he implemented Turkish foreign policy within the directives and orders of president Atatürk.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, Şimşir puts emphasis on the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy with the signing of the Saadabad Pact with the neighbors in the Middle East and states that the idea belonged to Atatürk and Aras realized this idea through diplomatic efforts.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, the main actors were president Atatürk, who formulated the foreign policy and minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüşti Aras, who implemented Atatürk's principles in this period.

The parliament was composed of the Republican People's Party because two trials of transition to a multi-party regime in this period had resulted in failure. The Progressive Republican Party had been dissolved after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. Moreover, the leaders of opposition such as Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy were pacified especially after their trials by the Independence Courts in relation to the attempt to assassinate Atatürk during his visit to Izmir in 1926. Although they had been acquitted, these political figures remained out of political scene.¹⁵⁶ Another attempt was the Free Republican Party, founded by Fethi Okyar in 1930. Fethi Okyar was supported by Atatürk in the founding of the party, but the new party stimulated resentment and protest towards the policies of the Republican People's Party and the prime minister İsmet İnönü because the Free Republican Party was more liberal and the public, which was in a bad situation due to the economic

¹⁵⁴ Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*, p.194.

¹⁵⁵ Bilal Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p.288.

¹⁵⁶ Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih 1923-1950" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), pp.141-144.

depression supported the new party. The social unrest upon the foundation of the new party warned Mustafa Kemal and the leader of the party, Fethi Okyar, thus, after three and a half months; dissolved his party himself.¹⁵⁷

The failure of the transition to a multi party regime led to the government of Turkey by the Republican People's Party until the 1950 elections. The single party regime made the parliament unable to form an opposition or to check the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. As Soysal argues, even vital issues such as the Mosul question and the Montreux Convention came very shortly into question in the parliament and the parliament was generally informed by the prime minister or ministry of foreign affairs after the decisions were made.¹⁵⁸

Like the parliament, the military was excluded from the decision making process during Atatürk's presidency. In the aftermath of the establishment of the republic, the military staff was prohibited from involvement in politics with a law. The new law forced the military staff to choose whether being an officer in the army or a politician in the parliament.¹⁵⁹ The chief-of-general staff, Fevzi Çakmak, kept his office and the army remained under his command until he retired in 1944. Fevzi Çakmak was an associate of Atatürk and provided the loyalty of the army.¹⁶⁰ In the meantime, a body was formed that brought the civilian authority and the chief-of-general staff together which was called Supreme Defense Council (*Yüksek Müdafaa Meclisi*) in 1933. It was composed of the chief-of-general staff, the prime minister

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.147-149.

¹⁵⁸ Mümtaz Soysal, *Dış Politika ve Parlamento* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1964), pp.106-107.

¹⁵⁹ Kili and Gözübüyük, p.121.

¹⁶⁰ William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), p.78.

and other ministers. Furthermore, the president would lead the council if he wished. The mission of the council was to come together in order to discuss the military affairs¹⁶¹ and it was a civilian dominated council which was a platform for discussion between the civilian and military authority. Consequently, the military was kept out of the decision making process as the parliament.

On the other hand, the involvement of the press in the decision making process of foreign policy was a problematic issue. After the implementation of the Maintenance of Order Law upon the Sheikh Said rebellion, the press was heavily censored by the government beginning from 1925 until the abolition of the law in 1929 although president Atatürk was in favor of the freedom of press.¹⁶² The foundation of the Free Republican Party was regarded as a chance for the freedom of press, but the trial of transition to multi-party regime failed and the press remained under the control of the single party regime again.¹⁶³ On the other hand, the press was sometimes used by Atatürk in order to stimulate public opinion in foreign affairs such as the Alexandretta issue.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, the press was used as a platform especially in foreign affairs to provide the support of public opinion during Atatürk's presidency.

¹⁶¹ For more detailed information about the Supreme Defence Council, see, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/tarihce_1.html

¹⁶² Yüksel Baştuñ, "Basın Özgürlüğü ve Atatürk Hoşgörüsü" in *Atatürk Döneminde Basın ve Basın Özgürlüğü*, ed. Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1982), p.11.

¹⁶³ Altan Öymen's Presentation in *Atatürk Döneminde Basın ve Basın Özgürlüğü*, ed. Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1982), p.37.

¹⁶⁴ Güneri Cıvaoğlu, "Atatürk Döneminde Basın ve Basın Hürriyeti" in *Atatürk Döneminde Basın ve Basın Özgürlüğü*, ed. Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1982), p.19.

The İnönü Period and the Second World War (November 11, 1938-May 8, 1945)

After Atatürk died on November 10, 1938, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was called for an extraordinary session by Abdulhalik Renda, the president of the assembly, in order to elect a new president. At the same time, the group of the Republican People's Party came together in order to decide the nominee for the new president. Despite the expectations towards a decision within the party discipline, prime minister Bayar let the group act freely and his predecessor, İsmet İnönü, in the prime ministry was nominated by the party as the second president of the republic. In the vote for the nominee for the presidency, İnönü won 322 of 323 of votes and the remaining was taken by Celal Bayar.

Aydemir explains the presidency of İnönü as the result of the conditions of that time, e.g., the threat of the Second World War and argues that as an ardent supporter and friend of Atatürk and his reforms, İnönü was the leading nominee of the presidency although he withdrew from politics and acted only as a member of the parliament in the period between the end of 1937, with his replacement by Celal Bayar as prime minister, and the end of 1938.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, İnönü's election to presidency did not face serious impediments in the aftermath of Atatürk's death. Lewis states that İnönü's election was supported by prime minister Celal Bayar and the chief-of-general staff Fevzi Çakmak because all these actors agreed upon a smooth transition period after Atatürk and İnönü was the person who could achieve this goal.¹⁶⁶ In other words, İnönü's election as the president of the republic mainly stemmed from the necessity of the consolidation and protection of the regime after Atatürk.

¹⁶⁵ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, pp.18-20.

¹⁶⁶ Lewis, p.293.

After the election of İnönü, Bayar resigned from the prime ministry and İnönü reappointed him with the formation of the new government. Bayar formed his new government on November 11, 1938. In this new government, there were some important changes with the one that had been formed during Atatürk's presidency. The minister of interior, Şükrü Kaya, and the minister of foreign affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, were replaced by Refik Saydam and Şükrü Saraçoğlu, respectively. The replacement of ministers was an important indicator of İnönü's attempt to hold on to the power in his hands because Şükrü Kaya and Tevfik Rüştü Aras were opposed to İnönü's presidency.¹⁶⁷ Vanderlippe states that Aras was afraid of the disruption of the Kemalist reforms because of the conservative nature of İnönü.¹⁶⁸ However, Aras' fear about İnönü's conservatism is not convincing because İnönü was a supporter of the Kemalist reforms, although he was in favor of a more gradual process for the consolidation of the regime than Atatürk.

The decision related to the former ministers was not the only attempt to hold power by İnönü, and, in an extraordinary congress of the Republican People's Party on December 26, 1938, İnönü was elected as the "permanent leader of the Republican People's Party" and the "national chief" while Atatürk was called as the "eternal chief" of the party and the regime. After a while, in January 1939, Celal Bayar resigned from the prime ministry after the declaration of the renewal of the elections by the party council.¹⁶⁹ Bayar's resignation can be explained by the decision of the party congress while the corruptions during his government put him

¹⁶⁷ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945 v.1*, pp.145-147.

¹⁶⁸ John M. Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), p.29.

¹⁶⁹ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.40.

on the spot.¹⁷⁰ Koçak writes that İnönü as the president was directly involved and played a role in the resignation although he had suffered from the involvement of Atatürk in governmental decisions during his own prime ministry.¹⁷¹ Upon the resignation of Celal Bayar from the prime ministry, Refik Saydam was appointed by İnönü with the formation of the new government and he acted as the prime minister until his death in 1942. Refik Saydam was close to İnönü. Vanderlippe describes the division of labor in the state apparatus during İnönü's presidency as follows:

The drive that shaped domestic and foreign policy initiatives was the establishment of accountability. Accountability was meant to increase the legitimacy of the government to generate stability and to control the opposition. İnönü, as president, continued Atatürk's practice of very close involvement in the workings of the cabinet and the party. In terms of the cabinet, İnönü's vision of responsible and efficient administration that would advance the nation while retaining economic and social control was reflected in the policies adopted by the government of Refik Saydam during its first year in power. These policies to strengthen the central administration and the military were a response to the crisis in the administration, as well as a response to the growing tension in Europe, as Germany annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia and as Italy invaded Albania in the spring of 1939.¹⁷²

Therefore, it can be argued that the period between the election of İnönü as the president and the outbreak of the Second World War was a period of political transition and consolidation of İnönü's power in Turkey. The clouds of war in the horizon after the increase of tension with the actions of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy in Europe resulted in the concentration of Turkish statesmen in Turkey's foreign affairs and Turkish domestic and foreign affairs were heavily affected by the war time conditions until the end of the war in 1945.

¹⁷⁰ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950*, pp.35-36.

¹⁷¹ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945 v.1*, pp.227-228.

¹⁷² Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950*, p.37.

During the Second World War, İsmet İnönü acted as the president of Turkey. Prime minister Refik Saydam died in 1942 and Şükrü Saraçoğlu, who had been the minister of foreign affairs in Saydam governments, became the prime minister until the end of the war. After the formation of Saraçoğlu government, Numan Menemencioğlu, who formerly had been the general secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, became the minister of foreign affairs until his replacement by Hasan Saka in 1944 just before the end of the war. The chief-of-general staff, Fevzi Çakmak, kept office until he retired in 1944. Thus, Turkish foreign policy was formulated and implemented by a limited circle during the war.

The main principle of Turkish foreign policy during the war was to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey. This ultimate principle necessitated a cautious foreign policy which was far from adventurous.¹⁷³ Decision makers were aware of the geopolitical fragility of Turkey in the sense that its geopolitical position might result in an active foreign policy as a small state, but, on the other hand, it might whet the appetites of powerful states to exert their influence on Turkey. Therefore, through diplomacy, Turkey had to try to avoid the influence of the international system and broaden the scope of its foreign policy objectives.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War can be regarded as pragmatic and cautious in order to maximize the national interest of the country which was to protect its territorial integrity and independence, and not to gain any territory to the disadvantage of any neighboring country.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007), p.3. See also, Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London: John Murray, 1949), pp. 147-148.

¹⁷⁴ Tamkoç, p.72.

¹⁷⁵ Edward Weisband, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İnönü'nün Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974), pp.31-32.

In order to protect its territorial integrity and independence, Turkey had to play a “balance game” as Deringil writes, and unconditionally became a part of the war neither with the revisionist Axis powers nor with the protectionist Allied powers. The motive of Turkish foreign policy at that time had been stemmed not only from the pragmatic approach of decision makers, but also from the economic realities of Turkey. When the war exploded in Europe, Turkey was in a process of economic reconstruction through statism since the early 1930s. The war in Europe forced the decision makers to mobilize troops against a possible threat. Therefore, the mobilization of troops caused a decrease in the labor power and production within the country. Although Turkey remained out of the war, the Turkish economy, which had already been in a backward situation, was heavily affected.¹⁷⁶

By the same token, although Turkey mobilized troops against especially a possible threat from the Balkans, the Turkish army was also in a backward situation. As Aydemir writes, with the end of the war of independence, Atatürk concentrated on the political, social and economic reconstruction of Turkey, thus, the priority of political and economic transformation prevented the modernization of the army. Moreover, Atatürk avoided creating a “military atmosphere” through putting emphasis on the modernization of the military because Turkish nation was sick and tired of wartime conditions due to the uninterrupted struggle between the Balkan wars in 1912-13 and the war of independence in 1922.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, the modernization of the armed forces was ignored and the Turkish land, air and sea forces were out-of-date on the eve of the Second World War.

¹⁷⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005*, pp.81-82.

¹⁷⁷ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.206.

Germany had created a powerful army by the beginning of the war, thus the power and the revisionist attempts of that country and, later on Italy, convinced the Turkish decision makers to stay out of war.¹⁷⁸ Under the influence of these internal and external dynamics, the Turkish decision makers played a balance game between the Axis and Allied powers until the end of the war and saved Turkey from the possible negative impact of the war through diplomatic relations.

The effort to seek a balanced foreign policy and to adopt Turkish foreign policy to the changing conditions of the war can be seen in government programs during the Second World War. In Refik Saydam government's program remaining loyal to existing treaties and alliances with other countries was emphasized. Moreover, the necessity to provide peace was underlined and, more importantly, the program put emphasis on the avoidance of action that might endanger the national interest and welfare.¹⁷⁹ During Saydam's government, the war was in progress for the benefit of the Axis powers. Turkey had signed a treaty with France and Great Britain in 1939 just after the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression treaty with Turkey in 1941 just before its attack on the Soviet Union. Upon the death of prime minister Refik Saydam in 1942, Şükrü Saraçoğlu formed his first government and the program put emphasis on loyalty to the treaties with Great Britain and Germany at the same time, maintenance of relations with both sides and protection of neutrality in the war.¹⁸⁰

As was stated in the government program, Turkey kept up its relations with the two sides especially in the economic realm. Nevertheless, as the balance of power

¹⁷⁸ Deringil, pp.31-37.

¹⁷⁹ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.19-20.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.20.

shifted to the Allies after the defeat of Germany in Stalingrad by the Soviet Union in late 1942, Turkey's approach also shifted to the Allies despite the lack of an official and dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy. In March 1943, the second Saraçoğlu government was formed and the government program indicates a pro-Ally foreign policy, although Turkey stayed out of war until its end. In the new government's program, friendly relations with Great Britain and United States were stressed and the role of İnönü and the military as guarantors of the survival of the regime were emphasized.¹⁸¹ The government programs, as had been seen in Atatürk period, reflected the spirit of Turkish foreign policy during the war. In other words, Turkey handled its foreign relations as was formulated in government programs in this period.

Although Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War was seen as an oscillation between the Axis and the Allies, it can be regarded as a pro-Ally policy even though this never concretized as an official policy. Aydemir argues that İnönü emphasized the necessity of participating in the Ally camp because he believed that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had ambitions involving Turkey and when Germany dominated the Balkans, İnönü's fear seemed to be realized.¹⁸² On the other hand Vanderlippe argues that:

İnönü always believed that Germany would lose the war and was personally committed to the Allied cause from the beginning. But as the war began, his concern was to remain outside the war and to minimize the economic impact of the conflict. In 1939, the Turkish military was still equipped mostly with the World War I weapons, which precluded any military effort beyond trying to deter an invasion. Thus, Turkey's contribution to the Allied effort would have been minimal, while the danger of German retaliation was great. To offer serious assistance to the Allies, the Turkish military required

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p.21.

¹⁸² Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, pp.106-107. See also, Knatchbull-Hugessen, p.147.

considerable investment in new weapons, technical support and training, which in the first years of the war the British were unable to supply.¹⁸³

Although participation with the Allies seemed a better strategy for Turkey, economic and military backwardness and the domination of Nazi Germany played important roles in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy, which was not to join the war with any side in order to maximize its national interests throughout the war. By the same token, Turkey's economic relations with the Allies and the Axis powers before and during the war also played a role in the decision making process. For example, Germany was Turkey's economic Ally due to its portion in Turkey's imports and exports. In 1943, Germany was still the leading Ally for the Turkish economy while the Allied powers avoided importing products from Turkey because the fall of the prices of Turkey's import products, the scarcity of Turkey's export products, and shortages and factory shutdowns in Turkey.¹⁸⁴ As a result, Turkey needed to play the balance game in order to acquire the necessary resources for its economy as well as maintain its territorial integrity. Therefore, Turkey could not cut the ties with Nazi Germany especially in the economic realm due to German domination in the Turkish economy. Moreover, Turkey continued to sell chromium, which was an important element for the weapons industry, to Germany as well as to Great Britain until it was understood that the Allies would win the war.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ John M.Vanderlippe, "A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II", *The Historian*, no.64 (September 2001), p.64.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p.66. See also, Cenan Çakmak, "Turkey in the Second World War: "Evasive" or "Active" Neutral", *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, no.26 (2005), p.70.

¹⁸⁵ Çakmak, p.70.

Despite the continuity of its neutral¹⁸⁶ position in the Second World War, Turkey's diplomatic relations can be divided into two phases with the impact of external dynamics: the first phase was the German domination in the war until the end of 1942, when the penetration of Nazi troops was stopped in Stalingrad by the Soviet army, and, the second phase was the domination of the Allies and pressure on Turkey for its active engagement in the war until the end of the war in 1945. Just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Germany on September 1, 1939, Turkey signed a treaty with France and Great Britain. It can be argued that, in addition to İnönü's pro-Ally position, the Nazi-Soviet Pact which was signed in August 1939 and an inconclusive visit by prime minister Saraçoğlu to Moscow in October 1939 accelerated the cooperation of Turkey with France and Great Britain. With the tripartite treaty, Great Britain and France assured Turkey that they would assist and cooperate with Turkey in an armed conflict with any other European power. In return, Turkey guaranteed to provide France and the Great Britain with assistance in an armed conflict with a European power in the Mediterranean.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, in Protocol 2, the contracting parties agreed upon the fact that Turkey would not enter into an armed conflict with the Soviet Union in the fulfillment of its obligations.¹⁸⁸

Despite the efforts to have closer relations with the allies, a dramatic change in the balance of power in mid-1940 forced Turkish decision makers to implement a

¹⁸⁶ Although Turkish foreign policy is sometimes called as "non-belligerency", in this study it will be called as "active neutrality" with reference to Deringil's conceptualization because Turkey was not isolated from the war as a "non-belligerent" state and played an important role especially in diplomatic negotiations for its engagement into the war with the allies in the period after 1943.

¹⁸⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.21.

¹⁸⁸ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.130.

more cautious and balanced foreign policy. Italy declared war against the Allies on June 10, 1940, and France stayed out of war after a cease-fire signed on June 25, 1940.¹⁸⁹ Although Italy's declaration of war meant an armed conflict in the Mediterranean, Turkey stated that it did not have to implement its obligations in the tripartite treaty because one of the parties, France, had been defeated. Furthermore, the Axis powers invaded the Balkans by the end of 1940: Germany invaded Romania on October 7, 1940 and Italy invaded Greece on October 28, 1940.¹⁹⁰ In 1941, Germany invaded Bulgaria and reached the Turkish borders, but a non-aggression pact was signed between Turkey and Germany on June 18, 1941 and Germany guaranteed that it had no claim on Turkish territory.¹⁹¹ At that time, Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union and Turkey was not a priority target for the Nazi troops.

The attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union and the resistance of the Soviet armies changed the fate of Second World War. The Nazi penetration was stopped by the Soviet army in Stalingrad in 1942 and Soviet armies began to drive the Nazi troops back in November 1942.¹⁹² On another front, as the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 resulted in the entrance of the United States.¹⁹³ These two attacks changed the balance of the war to the benefit of the Allies and a new phase began in Turkish foreign policy in

¹⁸⁹ Liddell Hart, *II.Dünya Savaşı Tarihi* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), p.93. See also, R.A.C Parker, *II.Dünya Savaşı* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2005), p.52.

¹⁹⁰ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, and Oral Sander, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türk Dış Politikası" in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, ed. Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p.148.

¹⁹¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.22.

¹⁹² Hart, pp.257-280. See also, Parker, pp.120-127.

¹⁹³ Hart, pp.226-233. See also, Parker, pp.98-106.

which, between 1943 and 1945, conference diplomacy among the allies and the efforts to force Turkey to enter into the war intensified. In the meantime, prime minister Saydam died and the new government was formed by Şükrü Saraçoğlu in July 1942. In the new cabinet, Numan Menemencioğlu was appointed as the minister of foreign affairs.

After the shift of balance to the advantage of the Allies, British prime minister Churchill and American president Roosevelt insisted on Turkey's entrance into the war in order to attack Germany from the Balkans.¹⁹⁴ Turkish decision makers stated that Germany was still powerful enough to attack and invade Turkey and in successive conferences, İnönü and Menemencioğlu used the backwardness of the Turkish army as a reason for Turkey's neutrality during negotiations.^{195,196} Bilateral negotiations continued between the two sides with the same claims until the declaration of war against Germany and Japan by Turkey on February 23, 1945¹⁹⁷ in order to be a founding member of the United Nations right after the war. Turkey had already cut its diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944, and with Japan on January 3, 1945.¹⁹⁸

Consequently, although Turkey did not enter the Second World War, the decision makers conducted Turkish foreign policy within the parameters of the war.

¹⁹⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye 1939-1945" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.450.

¹⁹⁵ Deringil, p.183.

¹⁹⁶ The allies came together at several conferences in order to decide on their war and post-war strategies. The ally conferences were the Casablanca Conference in late 1942, the Moscow Conference in October 1943, the Teheran Conference in November 1943, the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and the Potsdam Conference in June 1945. On the other hand, Churchill visited İnönü in Adana in January 1943, Eden met Menemencioğlu in Cairo in November 1943 and İnönü met Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo in December 1943.

¹⁹⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.26.

¹⁹⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.27.

Turkey kept its neutrality from the beginning to the end of the war despite the rising pressure especially after 1943 with the shift of the balance to the advantage of the allies. The decision makers saved their country from the war through diplomatic efforts both with the Axis and the Allies and as Deringil writes, through diplomacy Turkey reached its foreign policy goals even in a critical period of war.¹⁹⁹

Concluding Remarks

Before and during the war, the ultimate goal of the Turkish decision makers was to remain neutral and benefit from the balance of power between the two sides. When the government programs are taken into consideration, this aim become more conspicuous and it can be argued that they reached their goal during the war. As the external and internal dynamics, the structure of the decision making enabled Turkey to avoid the possible negative impacts of the war. The structure of decision making mechanism during the war was like a pyramid in which president İnönü was at the top and the parliament was at the bottom, with the cabinet was located in between. In other words, the circle of decision making was narrow; thereby this enabled the leading elite to implement their decisions and to resist the pressure from outside.²⁰⁰

President İnönü was the ultimate decision making authority during the war because the cabinet and the parliament were strictly controlled by him as both the head of the state and the head of the party in a single-party regime.²⁰¹ In the extraordinary congress of the party upon the death of Atatürk, he was elected as the “permanent leader” and the “national chief” of the party and the country. Weisband

¹⁹⁹ Deringil, p.1.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.38.

²⁰¹ Weisband, p.20.

writes that Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War reflects the personal character of İnönü; therefore, Turkey formulated and implemented a cautious foreign policy within the parameters of the war.²⁰² However, Turkish foreign policy was not passive and through diplomatic relations Turkey ended the period of war without entering into an armed struggle. Although İnönü put emphasis on diplomatic relations, he was ready to fight if Turkey were attacked despite the fact that the Turkish army was not ready for such a war.²⁰³ In the Second World War, through İnönü's foreign policy, Turkey benefitted from changes in the balance of power between the Axis and the Allies in order to maximize its national interests.

In addition to the formulation of foreign policy, İnönü was directly involved in the implementation in the sense that through summit diplomacy, he was able to voice his opinions to foreign political leaders, as happened at the Adana Summit of 1943 with Churchill and the Cairo Summit in 1943 with Churchill and Roosevelt. Nevertheless, although İnönü strictly controlled the cabinet and put his stamp on the foreign policy decisions of Turkey, he consulted with his prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs before he made the ultimate decisions. Therefore, he worked with the people who internalized his foreign policy objectives and principles.²⁰⁴

Prime minister Refik Saydam was involved in the implementation of policy and Tamkoç writes that he maintained his close relations with president İnönü, who was mainly responsible for the decision making of Turkish foreign policy. After Saydam died in 1942, Saydam cabinet's minister of foreign affairs, Şükrü Saraçoğlu,

²⁰² Ibid., p.23.

²⁰³ Tamkoç, p.205.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., pp.220-221.

was appointed prime minister. Saraçoğlu served as both the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs in the years of war. He was regarded as the second man of İnönü's "brain team"²⁰⁵ which included Numan Menemencioğlu, who became the minister of foreign affairs in the Saraçoğlu cabinet. Saraçoğlu was regarded as pro-Ally,²⁰⁶ but his so called "pro-Ally" view did not change the direction of Turkish foreign policy in a way through which Turkey would enter into the war.

Numan Menemencioğlu was another key figure in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War. Before he was appointed as the minister of foreign affairs, Menemencioğlu had acted as the secretary general in the ministry since 1933. Therefore, he dominated the foreign ministry. Deringil states that Menemencioğlu played a more vital role than Şükrü Saraçoğlu in the decision making process of Turkey.²⁰⁷ Although Menemencioğlu was perceived as a pro-Axis statesman, he internalized the principles of İnönü with regard to foreign policy. He was aware that Turkey was in a fragile position and if it entered the war, it would eventually be destroyed. Therefore, Turkey should act independently to the extent possible and should benefit from the balance of power between the two sides of the war.²⁰⁸ The signing of pacts with France, Great Britain and Germany and the selling of chromium to both sides until the cutting of relations with Germany are the indicators of the diplomatic efforts to maximize Turkey's interests and the protection of territorial integrity without entrance in the war. During

²⁰⁵ Yılmaz Saracoğlu, *Şükrü Saracoğlu ve Dönemi: Hakkında Basında Çıkan Yazılardan Bazıları* (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayıncılık, 2000), p.48.

²⁰⁶ Knatchbull-Hugessen, pp.201-202.

²⁰⁷ Deringil, p.49.

²⁰⁸ Yücel Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of the Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu* (Ankara: MFA, 2002), pp.73-74.

the war, as Güçlü writes Menemencioğlu was İnönü's senior diplomatic adviser.²⁰⁹ However, despite his importance in Turkish foreign policy, he lost his position as a result of a crisis in which German warships passed through the straits as trade ships and this was detected by the Allies in June 1944. At the time, the Allies were about to win the war and, Deringil writes, Menemencioğlu was forced to resign in order to ameliorate the relations with the Allies.²¹⁰ Therefore, the ultimate decision was made by president İnönü. It can be argued that the limits of the prime ministry and the ministry of foreign affairs were set by president İnönü during the years of war.

In addition to the executive branch, the parliament was also involved in the decisions that were made despite the limitations of its impact on the ultimate decision. During the war, Turkey was in a single-party regime and the Republican People's Party was the only party in the parliament. President İnönü also dominated the parliament, but he did not ignore the legislative body.²¹¹ It is possible to argue that during the war the executive and legislative branches were in close cooperation and the president, the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs were aware that their proposals would not be refused in the parliament. The parliament legitimized the decisions of the executive branch because legally it was responsible for the decisions especially the declaration of war to foreign countries.^{212,213} However, the support of the parliament of the executive branch does not mean that

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p.93.

²¹⁰ Deringil, p.48.

²¹¹ Weisband, p.56.

²¹² Ibid., p.59.

²¹³ Article 26 of the 1924 Constitution regulates the responsibility of the parliament and parliament was responsible for the declaration of war or peace as well as the treaties and pacts with foreign countries. Kili and Gözübüyük, p.132.

there was no discussion of issues related to foreign affairs, although the nature of these discussions were not to change the framework of decisions, but to attract attention to some points related to these issues.²¹⁴ Consequently, during the war, the parliament was a platform of discussion although its impact was limited on the ultimate decisions.

The military was important for Turkish foreign policy because Turkish statesmen took advantage of the backwardness and insufficiency of the Turkish army as a strategy to remain out of the war, especially during negotiations with the Allies after 1943. During the war years, martial law was declared and the army waited for a possible attack, especially from the Balkans.²¹⁵ The chief-of-general staff Fevzi Çakmak, had supported the election of İnönü as the president. However, Hale writes, that although the president and the chief-of-general staff declared loyalty to each other, İnönü undermined Çakmak's position by bypassing him and controlled the army through his assistant chief-of-staff, Asım Gündüz. Eventually, Fevzi Çakmak retired in 1944.²¹⁶ The backwardness and dependence on foreign resources of the army prevented it from actively participating in the decision making process.

Lastly, the press and the public opinion were other parts of the decision making process although they were closely controlled by the state. The press was spread across on a wide spectrum in which there were not only supporters of the Axis powers, but also supporters of the Allies.²¹⁷ For example, the newspaper *Ulus* was perceived as the newspaper of the government. Some journalists at *Cumhuriyet* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* were perceived as pro-German during the war. *Tan* was opposed to the

²¹⁴ Soysal, p.114.

²¹⁵ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.82.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.82.

²¹⁷ Weisband, p.71.

Axis powers and consistently continued its opposition throughout the war.²¹⁸ In other words, in the press, it was free to criticize the states that participated in the war, but the Turkish president, government and the Republican People's Party were exempt from these criticisms and the counter acts were punished and the news was heavily censored.²¹⁹ Despite some exceptions, the press remained loyal to the state apparatus and the state controlled the press in order to consolidate the regime. It is important to note that important figures in the Turkish press, such as the editor of *Ulus*, Falih Rıfki Atay; the editor of *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi, were also members of the parliament from the Republican People's Party. Therefore, the membership of these journalists in the party enabled the government to control the press during the war years as had happened during Atatürk's period.²²⁰

The main objective of the press was to affect the public opinion, but Weisband states that the mainstream of public opinion was against participation in the war and distrustful of the Soviet Union.²²¹ Therefore, the public opinion did not react against the decisions that were made by the officials except for some pan-Turkist movements which aimed to join the Axis powers in order to fill the power vacuum in the Turkic lands of the Soviet Union after a possible defeat of the Soviets by Nazi Germany. Özdoğan argues that pan-Turkism was a strategy of Nazi Germany in order to cut Turkey's ties with the Allies and encourage fighting against the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany by using the distrust of public opinion against

²¹⁸ Deringil, p.9.

²¹⁹ Weisband, pp.72-73.

²²⁰ Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan 21.Yüzyıla Basın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2006), p.118.

²²¹ Weisband, p.90

the Soviets.²²² Pan-Turkic efforts were mainly in the form of publications and these publications cried out upon the German attack against the Soviet Union in late 1941.²²³ However, the diplomatic efforts and pressure from Germany on decision makers such as president İnönü, prime minister Saraçoğlu and minister of foreign affairs Menemenciöđlu and the propaganda of the pan-Turkists within Turkey did not lead to any changes in Turkish foreign policy, which prioritized neutrality.²²⁴

As a consequence, during the Second World War, the decision making mechanism was monopolized by a small circle in which the ultimate decision making authority was president İnönü. The single-party regime and the governments and political cadres that were loyal to İnönü enabled him to make the ultimate decisions. The military, press and the public opinion did not have much impact in this process; therefore, İnönü did not have any restriction outside the political spectrum.

²²² Günay Göksu Özdođan, "II.Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde İç ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkizm" in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezođlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), p.140.

²²³ Jacob M.Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p.112.

²²⁴ Özdođan, pp.146-147.

CHAPTER 4

THE PERCEPTION OF CRISES BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS 1945-1965

The Last Years of the Republican People's Party Government (May 8, 1945-May 14, 1950)

During the Second World War, Turkey stayed out of the war although it declared war against Germany and Japan as a last minute move to be a founding member of the United Nations, which was established just after the war. Nevertheless, the end of the war represented a change in the status quo not only in the world, but also in Turkey. The impact of the victory of Allies in the war was twofold on Turkey. Firstly, Turkey had to abandon the neutral foreign policy that had been conducted since the establishment of the republic in its foreign relations. Secondly, it had to transform its domestic political structure into a democratic multi-party regime that was also a change of status quo in Turkish domestic politics.

The status quo in Turkish foreign policy had to change due to the new dynamics of international relations. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union remained the major powers. Moreover, the Soviet Union abandoned its friendly relations with Turkey and posed a threat towards its territorial integrity and autonomy. The Soviet Union unilaterally abolished the 1925 non-aggression pact with Turkey on March 19, 1945 with a diplomatic note that was given to Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper in Moscow. In this note, the Soviet Union claimed that the 1925 non-aggression pact no longer satisfied the dynamics that had

appeared in the aftermath of the Second World War, thus, it had to be restructured.²²⁵ In the first instance, the Turkish government declared that Turkey was ready to negotiate in order to make the necessary changes in the treaty. However, upon the Soviet conditions for the renewal of the treaty, Turkey perceived that it needed to take necessary measures to protect its territorial integrity and autonomy. In a diplomatic note that was given on June 7, 1945, the Soviet Union demanded three cities in north-eastern Anatolia, Kars, Ardahan and Artvin; bases in the straits; changes in Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Bulgarian borders; and changes in the status of the straits that had been determined in Montreux Convention of 1936.²²⁶ The Turkish government held a session under the leadership of president İnönü and refused the Soviet demands upon the renewal of the non-aggression pact.²²⁷ The Turkish press also harshly criticized the Soviet demands and described Soviet Union as the new imperial power in the wake of the Second World War.²²⁸

On the other hand, during the Potsdam Conference of July 17 and August 2, 1945 among the Allies, Stalin demanded the change in the status quo that had been determined in Montreux Convention, and added bases in the straits in addition to his territorial demands. President Truman supported the renewal of the provision for free passage of Soviet ships from the straits during war and peace in the Montreux Convention, but argued that territorial changes were a matter between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the allies did not make a decision about the Soviet

²²⁵ Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Girişi III. Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeler* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000), p.71.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.72-73. See also, Bilgin and Morewood, pp.33-34.

²²⁷ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.283.

²²⁸ Nilgün Gürkan, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın 1945-1950* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1998), pp.108-110.

demands while these discussions about Turkey forced Turkish statesmen to adopt a new strategy in Turkey's foreign relations against the Soviet threat.²²⁹ Hale writes that, firstly, the İnönü administration had to maintain that the United States and other Western powers did not support Soviet demands and, secondly, it had to maintain financial support from the West in order to modernize the Turkish army, and thirdly it had to be involved in an alliance against the Soviet threat with the West.²³⁰

On November 2, 1945 the United States approached Turkey with a proposal for an international conference at which the free passage of warships that belonged to the countries around the Black Sea would be discussed. In this proposal, Soviet demands for bases in the straits were not included. Hale states that the American proposal was consistent with Turkey's interests although military aid from the West was not mentioned.²³¹ However, the Soviet invasion of Iran and its expansionist efforts towards Europe and the Middle East worried president Truman and paved the way for the extension of financial support by the United States to the countries in these regions, especially Greece and Turkey.

Before the financial and military support, the United States had showed its support to Turkey in some instances. For example, when the Turkish ambassador in Washington Münir Ertegün died, his body was sent to Turkey on a warship called the Missouri on June 1946. Bağcı writes that this symbolic action symbolized the support of United States to Turkey against Soviet territorial demands. However, 1945 and 1946 were difficult for Turkey because the relations with the United States did

²²⁹ Melih Aktaş, *1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü* (İstanbul: Şema Yayınevi, 2006), p.26.

²³⁰ Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.113.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p.114.

not develop as intended.²³² The relations with the United States began to intensify especially after 1947 because Turkey was ready to be a part of the Western camp and the Soviet expansionist policy urged the United States to be actively involved in international relations against the Soviet threat due to the collapse of Europe in the Second World War.²³³

President Truman's speech in the congress on March 12, 1947, emphasized the need to support Europe, especially Greece and Turkey against communism and Soviet expansionism. Moreover, his address hinted at American policy in the Middle East:

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece and during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government informed us that owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.²³⁴

The Truman Doctrine was important for Turkey's integration to the West because with emphasis on Turkey's territorial integrity, which was threatened by the Soviet Union and the need to modernize Turkish army against this threat, the United States, as the sole power which could balance the Soviet threat at that time, recognized that Turkey needed to be a part of the Western camp. However, this

²³² Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2007), p.3.

²³³ Ibid., p.4.

²³⁴ Harry Truman's Speech, March 12, 1947.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp

decision was not independent from the interests of the United States in the Middle East as president Truman stressed. In addition to becoming a part of the Western camp against the Soviet threat, the second argument of Hale was also realized for Turkey because Truman's doctrine was consistent with the Turkish statesmen's, especially president İnönü's, aims to modernize army and to improve Turkish economy through financial support. The Truman Doctrine was also welcomed by the press, except for leftist journalists like Mehmet Ali Aybar, who argued that Turkey had to pursue a non-alignment policy in the new international system. On the other hand, Asım Us from *Vakit*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın from *Tanin* and Nihat Erim from *Ulus* and Necmettin Sadak from *Akşam*, who was also the minister of foreign affairs, wrote articles in favor of the necessity of American financial support to Turkey.²³⁵

American efforts to provide financial support to the countries of Europe and the Middle East were not limited to the Truman Doctrine. The Marshall Plan, which was contextualized during Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, was a comprehensive economic aid program which aimed to support the European economic and financial recovery. Marshall emphasized the destruction of the economic infrastructure of Europe as the destruction of social fabric as a result of the Second World War. He also pointed out the shortage of food and raw materials, and said, therefore, the United States had to support Europe to stand on its feet.²³⁶ Turkey was also included in the American aid program because although Turkey had stayed out of the war, its economy had suffered. The mobilization of the male population in the army had resulted in a decrease in the production and the costs of the mobilization against a possible threat

²³⁵ Gürkan, pp.128-133.

²³⁶ George Marshall's Speech, June 5, 1947.
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html

from outside had increased. By the same token, like the domestic production, imports also had decreased due to war time conditions and as a chain effect, the decrease in imports had led to shortages, black marketeering and inflation.²³⁷ However, despite the deterioration of the economy, Turkey had not faced foreign trade deficit until 1946 due to the decrease in imports during the war and had not faced a budget deficit except for the year 1944 that had required any foreign aid.²³⁸ In addition to the economic recession, the implementation and abuse of strict laws such as the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) in 1942²³⁹, and the National Protection Law (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) in 1940²⁴⁰ had instigated resentment against the İnönü government and played a role in the victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections.²⁴¹

Although the Republican People's Party government prepared plans in 1946 for industrial development and in 1947 for the comprehensive development of the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the Second World War which were based on economic planning²⁴² that was similar to the policies before the war, it did not have the chance to implement the program because of the changing and liberalizing international system and domestic politics. Therefore, the Democrat Party government which came to power in 1950 represented a turn away from the economic policies of Turkey that had been implemented from 1930 onwards and a

²³⁷ Yenal, pp.73-74. See also, Boratav, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, pp.291-302, Çavdar, pp.310-328, Tezel, p.162.

²³⁸ Çavdar, pp.364-365.

²³⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.24.

²⁴⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.21.

²⁴¹ Owen and Pamuk, pp.41-42.

²⁴² İlhan Tekeli, and Selim İlkin, *Savaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1974), pp.1-26. See also, Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, p.17, Çavdar, pp.335-338.

transformation in Turkish foreign policy that focused on the relations with the United States.

Consequently, during the transition period, Turkey was able to provide the support of the United States against the Soviet demands in the straits and north-eastern Anatolia, in addition to the financial and military support for the reconstruction of the economy and the army. This represented a turn from policies that had aimed to protect the economic independence of Turkey since the establishment of the republic. However, despite financial support, the integration to the Western alliance system, another goal that Hale pointed out, could not be reached until the replacement of the Republican People's Party government by the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections.

These years also saw an increase in tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. This became visible especially after the Berlin Crisis in 1948-49.²⁴³ In the meantime, Turkey applied and became a member of OEEC (the Organization of European Economic Cooperation) on April 16, 1948.²⁴⁴ Moreover, Turkey sought to become a part of the Atlantic pact of economic cooperation and mutual assistance for defense that had been signed by Great Britain, France and Benelux countries in Bruxelles in March 1948.²⁴⁵ However, its application was rejected. In August 1949, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe,²⁴⁶ although its application for membership as a founding member of NATO, which had been established on April

²⁴³ Smyser, pp.75-87.

²⁴⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.30.

²⁴⁵ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.29.

²⁴⁶ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.31.

4, 1949, was rejected as was its application for Atlantic pact.²⁴⁷ The Republican People's Party government applied in May 1950 for membership to NATO, and this application was also rejected.²⁴⁸ From 1949 to 1952, Turkey's main aim was to become a member of NATO during the Republican People's Party and Democrat Party governments because the objectives of both sides in Turkish foreign policy remained unchanged: to be closely integrated into the Western alliance for the protection of territorial integrity and to provide economic development.

The efforts of the İnönü administration to be integrated into the democratic camp right after the Second World War coincided with the transition to democratic multi-party regime in Turkish politics between 1945 and 1950. In relation to Turkey's transition to democracy, there are two main arguments: one side argues that Turkey had to change its regime into a democratic one because the Western liberal democracies did not accept an autocratic, single-party regime in their camp. Therefore, Turkey's transition to democracy was an enforcement of external dynamics.²⁴⁹ The other argument is that Turkey's transition to democracy was a project that had been postponed because of the Second World War. Toker argues that İnönü had been ready for the introduction of a democratic regime to Turkey in the aftermath of its election as the president in 1939, but the outbreak of the Second World War had forced him to delay his goal of the transition to democracy. The war time conditions required an authoritarian regime, thus, the way to transition to

²⁴⁷ Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, pp.116-117.

²⁴⁸ Mehmet Gönlübol, and Haluk Ülman, "İkinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası 1945-1965" in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, ed.Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara : Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p.228.

²⁴⁹ Necdet Ekinci, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Sonra Türkiye'de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkenler* (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2004), p.8.

democracy was seen as a natural outcome of the end of the war.²⁵⁰ It is not easy to conclude that İnönü was in favor of a democratic regime when Turkey's domestic politics such as the Wealth Tax in 1942 and the heavy control of the press during the war are taken into consideration. However, it is obvious that the decision makers aimed to save Turkey from the war and democracy was not on the agenda at that time. As a result, Ekinci's argument seems more convincing because after the Second World War, external dynamics, such as the Soviet threat against Turkey's territorial integrity, necessitated the transformation of Turkey's neutralist foreign policy to a Western centric one and authoritarian regime to a more democratic one to find a place in the democratic camp.

As the result of the necessity of democratization, the transformation in Turkish politics began especially after the appearance of an organized opposition from the ranks of the Republican People's Party. In a speech on May 19, 1945 president İnönü pointed out that as the impact of war time conditions had disappeared, democratic principles could dominate the political life of Turkey.²⁵¹ He declared that he was in favor of a democratic regime in Turkey, but he put emphasis on a gradual transition to democracy as a result of the cautious and calm strategy both in domestic and foreign politics of Turkey that he had followed since the establishment of the republic.

The establishment of the Independent Group (*Müstakil Grup*) within the Republican People's Party during the war had aimed to organize opposition although it had been directly responsible to the president and closely controlled by the

²⁵⁰ Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1970), pp.21-22.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.76.

party.²⁵² On the other hand, an organized opposition emerged within the Republican People's Party that was different from the Independent Group during the discussion of budget in May 1945. The Saraçoğlu government's budget for 1945 was rejected by seven members of the Republican People's Party: Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, Adnan Menderes, Emin Sazak, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur and Recep Peker.²⁵³ The opposition of these party members continued during the discussions of the Land Reform especially by Refik Koraltan and Adnan Menderes, who was also a landowner.²⁵⁴ The opposition within the party intensified and a memorandum was declared by four members of the Republican People's Party on June 7, 1945. These members Bayar, Koraltan, Köprülü and Menderes, demanded that the National Assembly must use its authority to search for measures to fulfill not only the wording, but also the spirit of the constitution. The ability of citizens to exercise their political rights and liberties according to the guarantees of the constitution had to be ensured and all endeavors of the Republican People's Party had to be put in order from a new beginning to conform to these principles.²⁵⁵ The main objective of the memorandum seemed to be to liberalize politics and a change within the party.

On the other hand, Hilmi Uran argues that these opposing members of the party did not demand change in order to reform the party, but to have a reason to leave the party in order to found a new one.²⁵⁶ It is not easy to decide what their real

²⁵² Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945* v.2, pp.72-82.

²⁵³ Ibid., p.85.

²⁵⁴ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998), pp.28-29.

²⁵⁵ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950*, p.120.

²⁵⁶ Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), p.435.

objective was, however, these demands were rejected by the party group and, in time, the ties of these members with the party were cut in time.²⁵⁷

A speech of İnönü on November 1, 1945 at the opening of the parliament paved the way for the establishment of an opposition party when he put emphasis on an opposition party in Turkish politics.²⁵⁸ Although the first opposition party was formed before İnönü's speech on September 22, 1945 with the name of National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*), the Democrat Party, which was officially established on January 7, 1946, accelerated the transition of Turkey to democracy with its role in multi-party politics.²⁵⁹ The program of the new party was consistent with the trends in the world and in Turkey: they put emphasis on liberal economy, democracy and the extension of freedoms.²⁶⁰

Upon the demands for liberalism and democracy in the Democrat Party program, the Republican People's Party, under the leadership of president İnönü, took some measures so as not to lose power to the advantage of the new party. In an extraordinary congress of the Republican People's Party on May 10-11, 1946, a single ballot voting system was accepted and the "permanent leadership" and "national chiefdom" of the party were abolished. On June 13, the law for the autonomy of universities was passed and the press law was liberalized.²⁶¹ In an atmosphere of competition for liberalization within the country, general elections

²⁵⁷ Menderes and Köprülü were dismissed from the party on September 21, 1945 with unanimity. Koraltan was dismissed on October 2, 1945. Ultimately, Celal Bayar resigned from the membership to the parliament, but remained as a party member in late September while he resigned also from the party in December. Eroğul, p.31.

²⁵⁸ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p.105.

²⁵⁹ Eroğul, p.31.

²⁶⁰ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.445. See also, Eroğul, pp.33-34.

²⁶¹ Eroğul, p.35. See also, Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, p.446.

were held on July 21, 1946, although Democrat Party failed to complete its organizational structure.²⁶² The Democrat Party would criticize the elections later on the grounds²⁶³, first, the elections should have been held in 1947 and, second, Democrat Party leaders argued that the elections were corrupted due to the ballot system of open voting- secret counting. They used this in their propaganda against the Republican People's Party until the elections of 1950.²⁶⁴

Between the two elections in 1946 and 1950, four successive governments were formed by the Republican People's Party. Recep Peker acted as the prime minister between August 7, 1946 to September 9, 1947 until he was replaced by Hasan Saka, who formed two governments between September 10, 1947 and January 16, 1948. The last Republican People's Party government, formed by Şemsettin Günaltay and active until May 22, 1950, was replaced by the Democrat Party. The period between the two elections can be regarded as the period of rivalry between the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party. In this period, Democrat Party intensified its opposition and the Republican People's Party governments tried to defeat the opposition from the Democrat Party.²⁶⁵ Aydemir argues that the exhaustion of the Republican People's Party that stemmed from uninterrupted rule since the establishment of the republic, its failure to implement of post-war programs

²⁶² Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, pp.446-448. See also, Eroğul, p.37.

²⁶³ In 1946 elections, the Republican People's Party gained 395 seats; the Democrat Party obtained 66 seats and independents won 4 seats in the parliament. Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih 1923-1950" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), p.183.

²⁶⁴ Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950*, p.143.

²⁶⁵ For more detailed information about the domestic affairs and inter-party competition, see, Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, pp.421-495; Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multiparty System 1938-1950*, pp.144-209; Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, pp.177-350.

for the economic reconstruction of the country and the boredom of the society with the Republican People's Party paved the way for the removal of the party from power and the support of the Democrat Party by the people²⁶⁶ as the 1950 general elections' results pointed out. Hale summarizes the reasons that enabled the Democrat Party to replace the single-party rule in Turkey:

They were generally liberal in their political inclinations, but in practice drew together the large and diverse range of people who for one reason or another had come to resent the Republican People's Party's long monopoly of political power – farmers who felt neglected by the regime's concentration on industrialization, businessmen who hoped to end the dominant role of the state in industry, urban workers and clerks who had suffered severely from wartime inflation and some religious conservatives who wished to soften the official emphasis on secularism.²⁶⁷

Therefore, the Democrat Party provided support from a wider range of groups within society when it ended the Republican People's Party long rule.

Concluding Remarks

The post-war period was one of transformation, not only in domestic politics, but also in the foreign affairs of Turkey. On the one hand, Turkey had to change the neutralist foreign policy it had pursued since the establishment of the republic and sought to integrate to the Western camp in order to protect its territorial integrity and independence against the Soviet Union. Western support was needed both for the modernization of the army and reconstruction of the economy. On the other hand, Turkey made the transition onto the multi-party politics in 1946, and the new party ended the uninterrupted rule of the Republican People's Party. Nevertheless, the decision making of the post-war period can be regarded as a continuity of the status quo during the Second World War because president İnönü and the Republican

²⁶⁶ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, pp. 393-394

²⁶⁷ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.89.

People's Party were still in power although the efforts to act with the United States and democratize the country were intensified.

In this period, president İsmet İnönü was still the ultimate decision making authority both in the domestic and foreign affairs of Turkey. He was aware of the need to change the orientation of Turkey's neutral foreign policy towards a Western-centric one in order to protect his country through involvement into the Western alliance system and economic development through financial support. However, as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plans showed, the objectives of the United States were a determinant of Turkey's foreign policy. In other words, the United States accepted Turkey into the Western camp with the help of its interests against the Soviet Union, especially in the Middle East and the Balkans.

In this period, the governments in Turkey were not stable and in four years, four governments were formed and their main intention was to remain power under the pressure of the opposition party. Therefore, it can be argued that the prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, Hasan Saka and Necmettin Sadak, did not play major roles in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy. Thus, they sought to implement the decisions that were ultimately made by president İsmet İnönü.

The parliament was composed of the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party after the 1946 elections. The opposition party agreed with the Republican People's Party on the principles and implementation of foreign policy²⁶⁸ because both parties were in favor of integration into the Western camp and against Soviet expansionism.

²⁶⁸ Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, p.113.

The military was again a part of foreign policy, but not as an actor as had happened during the Second World War. Against the Soviet threat, both the United States and Turkish statesmen emphasized the need for the modernization of the Turkish army. Therefore, the Turkish army became a part of the implementation of foreign policy in order to provide the survival of the country.

The press was also relieved after the change in the press law in 1946 just before the elections. It was an ardent supporter of the integration to the West despite some exceptions that advocated the non-alignment policy for Turkey. Therefore, the press supported the official policy and did not attempt to change the objectives and direction of Turkish foreign policy in the post-war period.

In this period, the public can not be regarded as having been an important part of the Turkish foreign policy decision making process because the society sought to recover the wartime economic losses in the aftermath of the war. It can be argued that especially after the appearance of an organized opposition party, the Turkish public was preoccupied with the inter-party rivalry because of their aim to make up for their wartime losses. However, the Soviet threat can be regarded as the main stimulant of public attention in Turkish politics as it shaped the objectives of the statesmen and the press.

The Democrat Party Period (May 14, 1950-May 27, 1960)

In the general elections on May 14, 1950, the Democrat Party took the majority of votes and seats in the assembly and came to power as a single-party government.²⁶⁹ As Uran argues in his memoirs, the election results surprised both the

²⁶⁹ In the 1950 general elections, the Democrat Party obtained 53.3% of votes and 408 seats in the parliament, the Republican People's Party gained 39.9% of votes and 69 seats in the

Democrat Party and the Republican People's Party because the Republican People's Party had been expecting to come to power again and the Democrat Party had been expecting to get about one hundred and fifty seats in the parliament.²⁷⁰

After such a victory, the Democrat Party government was formed by Adnan Menderes on May 22, 1950. Celal Bayar was elected as the third president in republican history while Refik Koraltan was elected president of the assembly and Fuat Köprülü was appointed ministry of foreign affairs in the new Democrat Party cabinet. Celal Bayar argues that although Menderes nominated Köprülü for the prime minister, Bayar asked Menderes to be the new leader of the Democrat Party and the cabinet.²⁷¹

The four founders of the Democrat Party made the division of labor among themselves in the administration. However, they were afraid of the reaction of the Republican People's Party after such a disappointment in the elections.²⁷² The Democrat Party government was also afraid of the reaction of the military due to their loyalty to İsmet İnönü. The chief-of-general staff, Nafiz Gürman, declared the respect of the army to the elections right after the election, but a colonel visited Menderes in the prime ministry on June 5, 1950, and declared that the generals loyal to İsmet İnönü would take the government over on June 8, 1950. Upon this

parliament, the Nation Party won 3.1% of votes and 1 seat in the parliament and independents gained 9 seats in the parliament. Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih 1923-1950" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed.Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), p.193.

²⁷⁰ Uran, p.570.

²⁷¹ İsmet Bozdağ, *Celal Bayar: Başvekilim Adnan Menderes* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), pp.103-104.

²⁷² Eroğul, pp.97-98.

possibility, the members of the general staff were replaced by the new ones.²⁷³ In the meantime, the Menderes government took the vote of confidence on June 2, 1950 and İsmet İnönü returned to parliament as the leader of the opposition party. After the new government overcame the initial difficulties for the consolidation of its power, the Democrat Party ruled the country for a decade with the efforts of economic development within the country and integration to the Western camp especially the United States in its foreign affairs.

The program of the Menderes government which ruled the country until 1954²⁷⁴ elections emphasized the government's loyalty to the United Nations and the aim to develop relations with France, Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, the United States was appreciated because of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan that included Turkey. The need to protect the security of the Mediterranean and the development of relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors were given emphasis.²⁷⁵ These principles can be regarded as the framework of Turkish foreign policy because the development of the relations with the United States and the neighbors in the Middle East were the main objectives of the Democrat Party governments.

The first opportunity came to the Menderes government to show good faith in the Western powers especially the United States, the Korean War. North Korea, which was supported by the Soviet Union, attacked South Korea, which was supported by the United States, on June 25, 1950. Upon the request of the United States, the Security Council of the United Nations held a session and on June 27,

²⁷³ Ümit Özdağ, *Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2004), pp. 23-24.

²⁷⁴ Between the 1950 and the 1954 elections, Menderes formed two governments from which the first government acted between May 22, 1950 to March 9, 1951 and the second government acted between March 9, 1951 and May 17, 1954.

²⁷⁵ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.26-28.

1950, the council made a decision which declared North Korea to be an aggressor state and called upon the withdrawal of its troops back to the parallel 38. The decision also included sanctions against North Korea.²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, North Korea did not obey the decision and therefore, the council invited the member states to form a United Nations command under the leadership of the United States.²⁷⁷

On June 30, 1950, minister of foreign affairs Köprülü informed the Turkish parliament on the UN's decision and informed the UN secretary general that Turkey would fulfill the requirements of its membership in the United Nations.²⁷⁸ The decision of the United Nations and Turkey's reply to the call of UN was supported by the press. However, the limits of the support to the UN forces resulted in arguments in the press between the supporters of the Democrat Party and those of the Republican People's Party. Supporters of the Republican People's Party such as Necmettin Sadak from *Akşam* argued that Turkey would support the United States and the support should remain symbolic. Supporters of the Democrat Party, such as Abidin Daver from *Cumhuriyet* argued that Turkey would support the UN not the United States and it should send troops to Korea.²⁷⁹

On July 18, 1950, president Bayar, prime minister Menderes, minister of foreign affairs Köprülü and chief-of-general staff Nuri Yamut met at Yalova. Although they did not imply that they had made a decision on the Korean issue, the

²⁷⁶ UN Security Council Resolution No.83, June 27, 1950.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/96/IMG/NR006496.pdf?OpenElement>

²⁷⁷ John M. Vanderlippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no.36 (Jan 2000), p.97.

²⁷⁸ Erol Mütercimler, and Mim Kemal Öke, *Düşler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004), pp.70-71.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.72.

press was sure that the decision of sending troops was discussed at this meeting. Therefore, on July 25, 1950, the cabinet came together and a declaration was made that 4500 men would be sent to Korea.²⁸⁰ The government decision was applauded by the public opinion and the press except for the leftist writers. Abidin Daver from *Cumhuriyet* and Ali Naci Karacan from *Milliyet* wrote articles in line with the government decision. The youth organizations, such as the National Students' Federation of Turkey (*Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*) and the presidency of religious affairs supported the decision to send troops to Korea because these two were against Soviet communism; thus, any decision against the expansion of Soviet communism was admissible for them.²⁸¹

The opposition Republican People's Party criticized the decision to send troops to Korea. İsmet İnönü argued that there was not a definite front in Korea and the uncertainty of the struggle would pose a threat to Turkey.²⁸² Moreover, the making of the decision of sending troops to Korea was also criticized by the opposition leader. İnönü stated that he should have been consulted as an experienced statesman in foreign policy issues and the support of the parliament should have been taken in order to strengthen the position of the government.²⁸³

Consequently, the Democrat Party government sent troops to Korea in support of UN forces under the leadership of the United States. The Turkish armed forces were first sent abroad for a mission since the establishment of the republic and, moreover, sending troops to the Korean War had an impact on Turkish foreign

²⁸⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.31.

²⁸¹ Mütercimler and Öke, pp.76-77.

²⁸² Sabahat Erdemir, *Muhalefetde İsmet İnönü 1950-1956* (İstanbul: Sıralar Matbaası, 1956), p.18.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.18-20.

policy in the following period. First and foremost, it is argued that participation to the Korean War enabled Turkey to enter NATO in 1952 and be integrated into the Western camp.²⁸⁴ On the other hand, president Bayar argued that the Korean decision represented Turkey's loyalty to the principles of the United Nations and they had not intentionally sent Turkish troops to the Korean War although this decision might have enabled Turkey's acceptance to NATO.²⁸⁵

The Democrat Party government applied for NATO membership again in 1950 and its application was refused for the third time. However, Turkey sought integration to the Western camp as happened in the aftermath of the Cold War because of the Soviet threat. After the refusal of its application, the Democrat Party government proposed the United States to join the 1939 agreement between Turkey, France and Great Britain. However, rather than participating in such an alliance, the United States was in favor of Turkey's membership in NATO and it proposed the full membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO on May 15, 1951.²⁸⁶

The impediment on the way of Turkey's membership came from the other parties in the organization because Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that a new membership to the organization depends on the unanimous agreement of the contracting parties.²⁸⁷ Denmark, Norway and Belgium opposed the membership of Turkey and Greece because they were of the opinion that any struggle in the Mediterranean did not bind them and, as a result of these memberships, the US aid to

²⁸⁴ Vanderlippe, *Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War*, p.98.

²⁸⁵ Bozdağ, p.130.

²⁸⁶ Mütercimler and Öke, p.104-105.

²⁸⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

Denmark, Norway and Belgium would decrease. Moreover, these members argued that, the North Atlantic Treaty was a document of Atlantic culture, to which Turkey and Greece did not belong.²⁸⁸ On the other hand, Great Britain was against memberships because of its interests in the Middle East. It was in favor of a British Middle Eastern Commandership with the participation of Egypt.²⁸⁹ Despite this resistance, the NATO council of ministers decided on the invitation of Turkey and Greece to the NATO on September 16-20, 1951.

On February 18, 1952, Turkey became a full member of NATO with the votes of both the ruling and opposition parties in Turkey and the mission that was followed by successive governments completed in 1952 and Turkey became a part of Western camp that was led by the United States.²⁹⁰ The press, regardless of its political orientation and the opposition, except for the Nation Party, appreciated the membership in NATO²⁹¹ because it was a project of Westernization and a guarantee against the Soviet threat. On the other hand, Turkey's membership in NATO increased the Soviet threat towards Turkey. The Soviet Union protested this membership and Turkey, claiming that NATO was a pact of aggression because of the militarization efforts within the organization. Moreover, it argued, the Western powers had accepted Turkey into this organization in line with their imperialist mission although Turkey did not belong to the Atlantic area. Turkey replied to the

²⁸⁸ Mütercimler and Öke, p.105.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p.106.

²⁹⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.33.

²⁹¹ Mütercimler and Öke, pp.109-119.

Soviet thesis with an emphasis on their demands from Turkey that threatened its territorial integrity in the wake of the Second World War.²⁹²

As a result of the NATO membership and the reaction of the Soviet Union, Turkey harmonized its foreign policy with the United States and tried to develop its relations until the end of the Democrat Party rule. Although Stalin died in 1953 and the successor Soviet government abandoned its expansionist and aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey in line with Khrushchev's doctrine of "peaceful coexistence", which was accepted in the twentieth congress of the Soviet communist party in 1956, the Menderes government did not change the framework of its United States-centric foreign policy and did not try to conduct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.²⁹³

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was appointed the Turkish permanent representative at the NATO headquarters in Paris in 1952. From then on, Zeki Kuneralp argues, Zorlu dominated the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy as an ambitious diplomat because NATO had become the axis of Turkish foreign policy in the Democrat Party period.²⁹⁴ The passive position of the minister of foreign affairs, Köprülü, enabled Zorlu to be so active that he determined the basic principles of Turkey's active foreign relations.²⁹⁵ He was involved actively in the Menderes cabinets after 1954 elections and became the minister of foreign affairs in 1957.

As NATO became the focal point in Turkish foreign policy, its impact on Turkish domestic affairs was felt in time. First of all, closer ties with the United

²⁹² Aktaş, pp.61-62.

²⁹³ Ibid., p.75-79.

²⁹⁴ Zeki Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1999), p.72.

²⁹⁵ Semih Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü, Z Zorro Gibi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), p.47.

States enabled Turkey to find financial resources for its economic reconstruction and development.²⁹⁶ On the other hand, as the Turkish military was engaged in NATO for modernization through mechanization and training, the status of the military in Turkish society changed. Vanderlippe writes that:

During the 1950s, the military became a more important political actor in Turkey because the bulk of American assistance and investment went into military related projects. The increasing status of the military created tension between civilian and military authority which were manifested in the military coup of May 27, 1960 which overthrew the Democratic Party government.²⁹⁷

NATO membership had an impact both on Turkish foreign affairs and domestic politics. İlder Turan and Dilek Barlas write that militarily, Turkey limited itself because without the authorization of NATO, it could not be involved in a military operation. In addition, the modernization of the Turkish army decreased Turkey's economic independence and limited its ability to make its own decisions. Economically, Turkey provided necessary aid for its own reconstruction and development. Lastly and most importantly, Turkey politically bound itself because it could not act independently especially during the Cyprus crisis in mid-1950s.²⁹⁸ On the other hand, the Menderes government attained its first goal in its program, the development of relations with the United States, which paved the way to developing its relations with its neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East.

The efforts to establish pacts in the Middle East and the Balkans were the last two issues with which Menderes government was preoccupied in its first period of government. It sought a more active policy in the Middle East because as Bağcı

²⁹⁶ Vanderlippe, *Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War*, p.99.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p.100.

²⁹⁸ İlder Turan and Dilek Barlas, "Batı İttifakına Üye Olmanın Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki Etkileri" in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed.Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), pp.158-164.

writes it had three basic concerns in the region: the protection of security and stability in the region, the solution of the conflicts between the Arab states and Israel, and the prevention of the spread of communism to the Middle East.²⁹⁹ The Menderes government could not reach a solution in the Middle East during its first period of rule because of the intransigent attitude of Egypt and the lack of necessary support from the United States.³⁰⁰

The Menderes government sought to establish an alliance in the Balkans to provide security and stability in the region. Greece and Turkey were NATO members and Yugoslavia had been dismissed from Cominform and had begun to get closer to the Western camp. The negotiations between three countries accelerated after 1953. Prime minister Menderes proposed the NATO membership of Yugoslavia although Tito was not in favor of an alliance with the West. Ultimately, after diplomatic negotiations the Balkan Pact was signed on August 9, 1954 in Bled in Yugoslavia for a twenty years term to provide security in the region through mutual cooperation.³⁰¹

Consequently, the Democrat Party government reached its main goals in its first period of rule between 1950 and 1954 in foreign affairs. The single-party government and the majority in the parliament can be regarded as factors that enabled the Democrat Party to implement its foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, such kind of power had its repercussions in domestic politics in this period.

The first period of the Democrat Party can be regarded as a continuity of the single-party regime because with the power and support behind the party, the Democrat Party leaders acted in conflict with their demands in their party program,

²⁹⁹ Bağcı, p.40.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p.44-45.

³⁰¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.36.

such as liberalism and democracy. By the same token, the Democrat Party pursued an economic policy contrary to the policies of the Republican People's Party. Industrialization lost its priority to the modernization of agriculture.³⁰² Another transformation happened in the ways of transportation when railway construction was replaced by highway construction.³⁰³

The transformation of the economy in domestic politics was complemented with liberation efforts in the international trade. Between 1950 and 1953, the government pursued a liberal economic policy in which the economic barriers were lifted in import regimes and customs duties were liberalized in order to integrate the economy to the world market. However, the liberation of customs resulted in the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves in the long run.³⁰⁴ The period between 1950 and 1953 can be regarded as the golden years of Turkish economy right after the Second World War because of the boom in agricultural products as the result of abundant rain, mechanization and the use of fertilizers as well as the high reserves of gold that remained from the Republican People's Party period, foreign aid and the rise in the prices of raw materials thanks to the Korean War in 1950, which increased the export revenues of Turkey.³⁰⁵ Although these years saw abundance in agriculture and the exports of raw material, the foreign trade deficit and budget deficits became chronic and began to be financed through foreign aid.³⁰⁶ The relative improvement in

³⁰² Owen and Pamuk, pp.144-145. See also, Yenal, p.78, Çavdar, pp.386-387.

³⁰³ Gülten Kazgan, *Tanzimattan 21.Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), p.83. See also, Yenal, p.79.

³⁰⁴ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005*, p.100.

³⁰⁵ Kazgan, pp.84-86. See also, Yenal, p.78.

³⁰⁶ Yakup Kepenek, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2001), pp.100-102. See also, Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005*, p.102, Çavdar, pp. 421-422.

economic conditions can be regarded as one of the reasons for the increase in votes of the Democrat Party in 1954 elections.

During the years between 1950 and 1954 the Democrat Party struggled with the opposition and the press. In other words, the ideal of democracy also eroded in this period. Eroğul states that in the early Democrat Party period, the party was revengeful in relation to the past.³⁰⁷ At the very beginning, the ban on the Arabic call to prayer, which had been imposed in 1932, was lifted on June 16, 1950³⁰⁸ and most criminals, except those who had committed crimes such as murder, bribery that had been sentenced before the Democrat Party period were released on July 14, 1950.³⁰⁹ In the meantime, the Democrat Party dominated the local elections that were held on September 3, 1950.³¹⁰ The opposition was suppressed. For instance, the People's Houses and People's Rooms that belonged to the Republican People's Party were expropriated with reference to a law that was passed on August 8, 1951³¹¹ and the real assets of the party were seized on December 14, 1953.³¹² The Nation Party was also closed on January 27, 1954 on grounds that it had acted against Atatürk and its revolutions.³¹³ The press was also suppressed in the wake of the 1954 elections through a law that imposed heavy sentences on the press.³¹⁴ Feroz Ahmad states that

³⁰⁷ Eroğul, p.101.

³⁰⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.31.

³⁰⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.31.

³¹⁰ In the 1950 local elections, the Democrat Party held 560 of municipalities out of more than 600 and consolidated its power.

³¹¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.35.

³¹² Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.35.

³¹³ Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: DP'nin Altın Yılları 1950-1954* (Ankara : Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), pp.251-253

³¹⁴ Eroğul, p.136.

the aggressive stance of the Democrat Party towards the opposition stemmed from the İnönü factor. The Democrats believed that İnönü was responsible for all actions against the government and the loyalty of the army to İnönü would bring the end of the Democrat Party rule. Therefore, the relations of the Democrat Party with the opposition remained under the shadow of their perception of İnönü as a threat to their government.³¹⁵

After the 1954 general elections, the new government was formed by prime minister Adnan Menderes. Fuat Köprülü was reappointed as the minister of foreign affairs. Turkey's permanent representative to NATO, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was elected as a member of parliament, and appointed as a minister of state and deputy prime minister.³¹⁶ In the first government program in this period, the membership to NATO was emphasized as the success of the former Menderes government and the loyalty to the organization as well as the loyalty to the United Nations was emphasized. The Baghdad Pact was also one of the issues that were included in the new government's program. In addition to all these, the friendly relations and cooperation with the United States and the developing relations with European states such as Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy were appreciated by the Menderes government.³¹⁷ The third government program of Menderes can be regarded as the evaluation of the policy of the former government in the parliament. The program of the fourth Menderes government that was formed in 1955 was also an evaluation of the events that happened in the period between 1954 and 1955. In other words, the

³¹⁵ Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), pp. 134-135.

³¹⁶ In the period between the 1954 and the 1957 general elections, Adnan Menderes formed two successive governments one of which acted between May 17, 1954 and December 9, 1955 and the other acted between December 12, 1955 and November 25, 1957.

³¹⁷ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.28-29.

Bandung Conference that Turkey attended in 1955 and the Baghdad Pact that Turkey signed as well as the Cyprus Crisis that erupted again in the same year were evaluated in the new government's program.³¹⁸

1955 was a critical year in Turkish foreign policy because of the events that succeeded each other. First of all, the efforts to establish an alliance in the Middle East intensified. Such efforts had not brought any results in its first period of Democrat Party rule, which ended in 1954. Prime minister Menderes was determined to establish such a pact against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Therefore, he made an official visit to Iraq on January 6-14, 1955 and met prime minister of Iraq Nuri Said Pasha. On January 13, 1955 it was declared that on the basis of Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter,³¹⁹ Turkey and Iraq had decided to cooperate against any threat within or outside of the region.³²⁰ Despite the resistance of Syria and Egypt, the Baghdad Pact was signed on February 24, 1955 in Iraq. These two countries were against such an alliance in the region because Syria had closer relations with the Soviet Union, thus, an alliance with the support of the United States might have posed a threat to this country. Egypt was in the pursuit of leadership in the region and the alliance was seen as a possible impediment. In time,

³¹⁸ Ibid., p.29-30.

³¹⁹ Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that “nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

³²⁰ Mütercimler and Öke, p.170.

Great Britain on April 5, Pakistan on September 23 and Iran on November 3, 1955 joined the alliance in the region.³²¹

The decision of Baghdad Pact was generally supported by the opposition and the press in Turkey. It was discussed with budget discussions of 1956 and a member of the parliament from the Republican People's Party stated that Turkey was in the camp of liberal democracies and criticized the position of Egypt towards the alliance. Another member of parliament from the Republican People's Party declared that his party agreed with the Democrat Party on this decision. The Nation Party was in line with the Democrat Party and the Republican People's Party, while the Freedom Party criticized the decision making process, which was limited to the ministry of foreign affairs and the diplomats although the party supported the decision. According to the Freedom Party representatives, the support of the public opinion was a great necessity for the government to conduct its foreign relations.³²² The press, even the ones against the Democrat Party government, applauded the formation of the alliance in the region.³²³

After the formation of the alliance in the Middle East despite some exceptions, Turkey participated in the conference that was held in Bandung in Indonesia on April 18-24, 1955, where twenty-nine newly independent countries from Asia and Africa came together. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu represented Turkey at this conference. Turkey had a pro-Western position which was against Soviet expansionism and consistent with its official foreign policy at that time. Zorlu argued that non-aligned countries were susceptible to Soviet influence and there was no

³²¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.36.

³²² Mütercimler and Öke, pp.177-178.

³²³ *Ibid.*, p.173.

room for non-alignment in the international arena. Zorlu was criticized by Indian prime minister Nehru, who advocated the necessity of non-alignment for the newly independent countries. For him, NATO was an instrument of colonialism and integration to any camp was an insult to these Asian and African countries.³²⁴ At the end of the conference, all types of colonialism, international doctrines, use of force and separatist movements were rejected and in this decision Turkish representative Fatin Rüştü Zorlu played an important role together with the prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, and representative of the Philippines, General Romulo.³²⁵ Turkey's position in the conference reflected the Menderes government's pro-Western foreign policy that can be seen in this period as well in the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East.

In addition to these efforts to provide cooperation in the Balkans and the Middle East, Turkey had to face new problems in its foreign relations such as the Cyprus issue. Although 1955 can be regarded as the year in which the Turkish government decisively handled the Cyprus issue, the problems regarding Cyprus had begun much before that time. The last Republican People's Party government and the Democrat Party governments until late 1954 did not take the events on the island seriously and the foreign minister of the last Republican People's Party governments, Necmettin Sadak and foreign minister of the Democrat Party Fuad Köprülü declared that Turkey did not have such a problem in Cyprus.³²⁶ The Cyprus issue had attracted the attention of the Turkish press and the public opinion as early as the end

³²⁴ Bağcı, pp.59-60.

³²⁵ Ibid., p.61.

³²⁶ Melih Esenbel, *Ayağa Kalkan Adam* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), pp.13-14.

of the 1940s,³²⁷ at a time when integration to the Western alliance and the pacts in the Balkans and the Middle East dominated the agenda of Turkish foreign policy.

The efforts of Greek Cypriots to revitalize the issue of ENOSIS, which was a policy aiming to unite Cyprus with Greece, mainly began in 1950. On January 15, 1950 Orthodox Church on Cyprus arranged a non-official plebiscite in order to unite the island with Greece. After the plebiscite, it was declared that the great majority of the Greeks had voted for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The leader of the Greek Cypriots archbishop, Makarios, demanded the recognition of the plebiscite from the British governor of the island, Sir Andrew Right, with a letter. However, Great Britain did not recognize the result of this plebiscite.³²⁸

The plebiscite caused a reaction especially in Turkish youth and public opinion. Therefore, demonstrations were held and the plebiscite was protested.³²⁹ However, the reaction in the public opinion did not move the government to reevaluate or shift the official policy regarding the island.³³⁰ It can be argued that in this period, Turkey's priority was to be a member of NATO and provide its security against Soviet expansionism. Furthermore, as an ally in NATO, the Turkish government sought to keep its friendly relations with Greece and trusted Great Britain as the governor of the island.³³¹

³²⁷ Mütercimler and Öke, p.291. See also, Erol Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü* (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 2003), p.77.

³²⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu traces the conflicts on the island back to 1947 in his book *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*. However, the plebiscite at Cyprus in 1950 can be regarded as a turning point in the Cyprus conflict. See also, Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.74, Erol Manisalı, *Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2002), p.29.

³²⁹ Manisalı, *Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs*, p.30.

³³⁰ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959* (Ankara: Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963), pp.21-22.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p.40.

The Republican People's Party had been interested in the events in Cyprus and in favor of the status quo on the island. However, they had argued that a possible change in the status quo would be only for the benefit of the Turkish community in the island.³³² 1954 became a critical year in the Cyprus issue because in September 1954, Greece brought the issue to the United Nations. However, Greece did not support Archbishop Makarios' demand before the United Nations on the self-determination right of Greeks in Cyprus because of its intention to keep its closer relations with Great Britain and expectation to solve the problem through bilateral diplomatic relations with this state.³³³ Although the Turkish government continued its passive policy regarding Cyprus, the press and the public opinion actively protested the policy of Greece. From August 1954 onwards, the Turkish government began to move on the issue.

Ultimately, in December 1954, the UN general assembly refused to discuss the Cyprus issue and upon this decision, the Democrat Party government believed that it had come to an end although the events in the following period refuted this hypothesis.³³⁴ The armed conflict on the island began on April 1, 1955, with the attack of EOKA, which was a terrorist organization aiming to realize the ENOSIS, to the Cypriot Turks and in return, the Turks on the island established defense organizations.³³⁵ The Democrat Party government took the issue serious and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was appointed as the head of the commission which was responsible for Cyprus. In addition, prime minister Menderes appointed Zorlu as the minister of

³³² Erdemir, p.307.

³³³ Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, pp.42-43.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.95-96.

³³⁵ Mütercimler and Öke, p.309.

foreign affairs on July 29, 1955 on the eve of the London Conference, which was arranged to find a solution to the problem.³³⁶ At the London Conference, which began on August 29, 1955, Turkey insisted on the protection of the status quo on the island. Zorlu put Turkey's argument on a juridical basis,³³⁷ arguing that:

On the subject of Cyprus and its status quo, (the Turkish government) feels that this status quo was created by an international treaty to which we are all signatories and it must be maintained. Furthermore, if any changes were to take place in the status quo of the island, this island should come back to Turkey. And my government does not think that under present conditions self government in the island is possible. This will not be possible until the Greek government has given up its claims either to the annexation of the island of Cyprus, its union with Greece or to the application of the principle of the self determination of peoples to the island and also, as I have already said, there must be a return to calm in the island before any self-government could be applied.³³⁸

During the conference Turkey did not give up Cyprus although the problem was not resolved at the end. Therefore, both sides of the issue had to wait for another five years for a temporary solution of the problem on the island.

The conference ended without any solution, but it coincided with a crisis in Turkey, 6-7 September events. Upon a report on the newspaper *Istanbul Express* on September 6, 1955 that Atatürk's House in Salonika had been bombed, a meeting was arranged by an association called the Turks' Cyprus (*Kıbrıs Türktür*) and it turned out to be a social insult to the Greeks in Istanbul and Izmir. Their estates and properties were attacked and some Greeks were killed and wounded. The Turks' Cyprus (*Kıbrıs Türktür*) was closed down and its members were arrested. The government declared that the communists were responsible for the events.

³³⁶ Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, pp.90-93.

³³⁷ Günver, p.65. See also, Esenbel, pp.30-32.

³³⁸ Turkish Embassy in London, *Turkey and Cyprus* (London: John Roberts Press Ltd, 1956), pp.63-64.

The main impact of 6-7 September events was the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations during the negotiations on the solution of the Cyprus problem.³³⁹ During the Democrat Party rule until 1957 elections, the Cyprus conflict deteriorated and the events between the two communities continued. Great Britain sought to resolve the conflict on the island through self-determination, but did not refuse a division between the communities. The Turkish government changed its position and took a pro-division stance on the issue,³⁴⁰ which was supported by the opposition and the public opinion.³⁴¹

In the period between 1954 and 1957 elections, it can be argued that the Menderes government had an active foreign policy because it signed the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East, participated in the Bandung Conference and in the final agreement, Turkey's proposal was accepted. Related to the Cyprus issue, Turkey prevented the annexation of the island by Greece. Despite the active position of the Democrat Party government in foreign affairs, the domestic politics descended into a chaos as a result of economic deterioration and the increase of tension in relations with the opposition and the press.

In the period between 1954 and 1957, the economic structure of Turkey deteriorated because the Turkish economy was heavily based on agriculture and in this period, Turkey's exports declined as a result of the fall of harvests. For example, in November 1954, Turkey was forced to import wheat from the United States. Therefore, declining exports and the exhaustion of foreign exchange and gold reserves in relation to the decline in exports forced the government to decrease

³³⁹ Melek Fırat, "Yunanistanla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.601-602.

³⁴⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.39.

³⁴¹ Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.604.

imports in order to balance the foreign trade because, unlike the period between 1950 and 1953, Turkey could not find foreign aid easily in order to compensate its foreign trade and budget deficits. By the same token, declining imports resulted in rising prices and black marketeering. In order to solve the economic deterioration, the government took harsh measures to control the economy. Furthermore, the government applied to the United States for financial aid and it was declined. Upon this situation, in July 1955, the National Protection Law was implemented by the government.³⁴² In other words, the Democrat Party had to transform its liberal economic policy into a controlled one at the end of the second period of its rule.

Besides the worsening economic conditions, the relations between the government, opposition and press became strained in the period between 1954 and 1957. In reaction to its support to the Nation Party, Kırşehir was downgraded from a city into a district on June 30, 1954 as Malatya, which was divided into two districts because of its support to the Republican People's Party. The successive laws intensified the pressure on the opposition, officials and the universities. The rights of officials such as those to retirement and social security were removed and the autonomy of universities was restricted. The press was also suppressed and the limitations and sentences regarding the journalists and press were increased.³⁴³ In the meantime, the Republican People's Party stiffened its opposition and this instigated the pressure of the Democrat Party on the judiciary, press, universities and unions as well as the opposition.³⁴⁴

³⁴² Yenal, pp.82-83. See also, Owen and Pamuk, pp.146-147, Çavdar, pp.395-399.

³⁴³ Eroğul, pp.161-169. See also, Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Bir İktidar Bir İhtilal 1955-1960* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), pp.54-67, 88-96, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1950-1964* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), pp.163-175.

³⁴⁴ Eroğul, pp.187-192.

The events showed that the front against the Democrat Party rule expanded and the cleavages became explicit within the party, too. One of the founders of the Democrat Party, Fuat Köprülü, resigned from the party on September 6, 1957. Upon all these events, the date of early election was declared as October 27, 1957 and the opposition parties agreed to cooperate in the elections. However, the government changed the election law and the possibility of inter-party cooperation failed.³⁴⁵

Under these circumstances, the 1957 elections were held on October 27. The Democrat Party obtained the majority of the votes although it lost power in comparison to the general elections in 1954.³⁴⁶ After the 1957 general elections, the third period of the Democrat Party rule opened with the fifth cabinet that prime minister Adnan Menderes formed. In the new government, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was appointed minister of foreign affairs. In its program, the increase of tension between the two sides of the Cold War was emphasized and it was emphasized that despite the end of the Second World War and the passage of time, a peaceful system had not been established. Loyalty to the alliances such as the United Nations and NATO was also included in the new government's program and it was stated that Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union would not be conducted independently of its Western alliances especially with the United States. However, despite the change of the dynamics of the Cold War after 1954 and the abandonment of Soviet claims on Turkey during Stalin's period, Turkey did not seek to conduct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

³⁴⁵ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1950-1964*, pp.168-171.

³⁴⁶ In the 1957 general elections, the Democrat Party gained 47.91% of votes and 424 seats in the parliament, the Republican People's Party obtained 41.12% of votes and 178 seats in the parliament, the Republican Nation Party won 7.08% of votes and 4 seats in the parliament, the Freedom Party won 3.84% of votes and 4 seats in the parliament.

http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=3

On the other hand, the relations with the Arab neighbors were evaluated and the importance of the Baghdad Pact in the region was emphasized. Lastly, the project of the European Coal and Steel Community and the common market was applauded by the new Menderes government.³⁴⁷ The new government program can be regarded as an evaluation of the developments in the former period rather than as a systematic programming of the goals of the government in foreign affairs. The last Democrat Party government between 1957 and 1960 was preoccupied with the domestic turmoil, which resulted in a coup d'état in May 1960 and in this period, the revolution in Iraq in 1958 that affected the Baghdad Pact and the Zurich-London agreements in 1959-1960 were the main developments in Turkish foreign policy.

On July 14, 1958, king Faysal and his prime minister Nuri Said were deposed and assassinated in Iraq. The military takeover in Iraq affected the Baghdad Pact because the pact initially had been signed by Turkey and Iraq. Therefore, the Menderes government recognized the military regime in Iraq. Iraq withdrew from the pact on March 24, 1959. In August, the Baghdad Pact was turned into CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization)³⁴⁸ and, thus, like the Balkan Pact which would officially dissolve in 1960, the Menderes government's second attempt to form a regional alliance failed just four years after the signing of the pact.

On the other hand, the Cyprus issue was taken seriously during the ministry of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Upon the detention of archbishop Makarios in the Seychelles in March 1956, EOKA triggered an uprising in Cyprus. Makarios was released in April 1957, but the struggle turned into a Turkish-Greek conflict rather than a struggle between Greece and Great Britain, which was the governor of the island. For the

³⁴⁷ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.30-33.

³⁴⁸ Bağcı, pp.99-101.

solution of this inter-communal problem, Turkey was in favor of a federal state on the island while the Greek side was in favor of ENOSIS. In order to find an alternative solution, such as an independent state which was based on the sharing of power in the island, on February 5-10, 1959 Turkish prime minister Menderes and Greek prime minister Karamanlis met in Zurich as the initial stage of bilateral negotiations.³⁴⁹ At the end of the same month, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Fazıl Küçük, and the leader of Greek Cypriots archbishop, Makarios, accepted the solution as an independent state which was based on the sharing of power in the meeting in London.³⁵⁰ Eventually, the constitution of Cyprus republic, which was based on the agreements in Zurich and London, was declared in April 1960³⁵¹ and the independent republic in Cyprus was declared on August 16, 1960. In addition to the establishment of the Cyprus republic, Great Britain, Turkey and Greece became the guarantor states who were responsible for the protection of status quo in the island.³⁵²

The Zurich-London Agreements were criticized by the opposition and the press in Turkey. Both sides emphasized the lack of guarantee in these agreements that prevent Greece to realize the ENOSIS project.³⁵³ The criticisms after these treaties from the opposition and the press also reflect the polarization and discontent between these groups that peaked in the last Democrat Party period.

³⁴⁹ Esenbel, p.124.

³⁵⁰ Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.133. See also, Manisalı, pp.37-40.

³⁵¹ The Cyprus Constitution which was declared in 1960.
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/cy00000_.html

³⁵² Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.134.

³⁵³ Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959*, pp.532-545.

In the last period of the Democrat Party between 1957 and 1960, the Turkish economy collapsed. Inflation increased and the foreign trade and budget deficits widened.³⁵⁴ In order to improve the economy, the Democrat Party sought to find foreign aid, while due to the cooling off the relations with the West the resources for financial aid could not be created or benefited from. By the same token, in order to obtain financial aid, Menderes went to the Far East on April 24, 1958, while the expectations for the development of economic relations with the countries in this region failed and did not come up with a solution for the economy. Ultimately, the OEEC (the Organization for the European Economic Cooperation, from 1961 onwards OECD) and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) were involved in the recovery of Turkish economy. As a result of the agreement with the IMF, the Turkish lira was devalued and the limits on imports were lifted. Furthermore, limited financial aid was provided although the crisis could not be overcome.³⁵⁵

In addition to economic crisis in the country, the social fabric also deteriorated and the front against the Democrat Party expanded. This social polarization reflected in the policies of the Democrat Party such as the Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*), which was founded in 1958. The people who supported the Democrat Party would join the front against the opposition to the Democrat Party rule.³⁵⁶ At this time, the military was also involved in the opposition. This can be regarded as one of the factors that accelerated the first military intervention in Turkish politics.

³⁵⁴ Çavdar, pp.421-422. See also, Kepenek, p.119.

³⁵⁵ Yenal, p.84. See also, Owen and Pamuk, p.148, Çavdar pp.395-399, Kepenek, p.122.

³⁵⁶ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1950-1964*, pp. 361-363.

On January 16, 1958; nine officers were arrested on suspicion preparing for a military coup against the government. These officers were released, but this event deteriorated civil-military relations.³⁵⁷ Özdağ traces the deterioration of relations back to 1954 and argues that the scornful stance of the Democrat Party government from that point on towards the army disturbed especially the low ranking officers especially after 1954.³⁵⁸

Like the relations between the government and the military, the relations between the government and the opposition were dramatically strained in late 1959.³⁵⁹ On April 12, 1960; the Democrat Party group in the parliament made a decision for the establishment of an investigation commission against the Republican People's Party in order to prevent their party congresses, meetings and political activities.³⁶⁰ The investigation commission can be regarded as the ultimate decision to exterminate the political opposition. However, university students mobilized and protested the Democrat Party government on April 28-29, 1960³⁶¹ and upon these protests, martial law was declared in Ankara and Istanbul.³⁶²

In the meantime, on May 3, the commander of Land Forces, Cemal Gürsel, wrote a letter to the minister of National Defense, Ethem Menderes, which demanded such things the resignation of the president, a change of government, the abolition of suppressive laws and the release of criminals such as journalists and university students imprisoned for political activities. Moreover, general Gürsel warned the

³⁵⁷ Eroğul, p.214.

³⁵⁸ Özdağ, *Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, pp.52-53.

³⁵⁹ Eroğul, pp.225-234.

³⁶⁰ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.41.

³⁶¹ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007), p.361.

³⁶² Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 3rd series, vol.41.

minister to take these measures as soon as possible in order to save the nation, the country and even the party and the government.³⁶³ These measures were not taken and the last clue for the military intervention was seen on May 21 with a demonstration of the officers and students of military school in Ankara presenting the demands in a letter of general Gürsel to the minister of National Defense.³⁶⁴ Ultimately, on May 27, 1960 the military took the Democrat Party government over and then ten-year Democrat Party rule came to an end.

Concluding Remarks

The Turkish foreign policy which was based on the protection of Turkey's territorial integrity and independence through neutrality during the Atatürk and İnönü periods until the end of the Second World War began to transform with the Soviet threat against Turkey right after the war. In the rivalry between the liberal democratic United States and the communist Soviet Union, Turkey had to choose its side and integration to the Western alliance system for survival and economic development became a priority for Turkish decision makers. In other words, the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy were mainly set during the post-war Republican People's Party governments. The Democrat Party generally implemented these principles although the Soviet threat decreased after the death of Stalin in 1953. On the other hand, the decision making process, and the actors that were involved in this process, were transformed during ten-years Democrat Party rule.

President Bayar was not an ultimate decision making authority in the Turkish foreign policy like Atatürk and İnönü, although he was not excluded from the decision making process. It can be argued that the monopoly of the president in the

³⁶³ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, pp. 391-393.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.404.

decision making process until 1950 evolved into a system of collaboration in Turkish foreign affairs. Tamkoç argues that,

Adnan Menderes shared president Bayar's vision of grandeur. He had supreme self confidence and had predicated himself the mission defined by his leader....At no time in the history of the republic was such mutual trust, close cooperation and understanding established between a president and prime minister as between Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Bayar, the decision maker and supervisor, particularly in domestic affairs, preferred to remain behind the scene most of the time and let Menderes run the affairs of the government. Inspired and directed by his leader, Menderes became for all particular purposes the single most important person in the country.³⁶⁵

This statement can be interpreted to mean that Bayar was the ultimate decision making authority, like Atatürk and İnönü, and prime minister Menderes played a significant role especially in the implementation of the Turkish foreign policy. However, it can be argued that Tamkoç overestimates the role that president Bayar played in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy because this position results in ignorance about the roles that prime minister Menderes and especially Fatin Rüştü Zorlu played in the formation and the implementation of Turkish foreign policy.

During the early period of the Democrat Party government, Menderes was interested in Turkish foreign policy although he was not well-informed on the issues, but he was in close contact with the ministry of foreign affairs.³⁶⁶ In other words, although he benefitted from the experiences of the ministry of foreign affairs, he always took the initiative in the decisions that were made in this period.³⁶⁷ It can be argued that during the Democrat Party period, the balance of power in the decision

³⁶⁵ Tamkoç, p.243.

³⁶⁶ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p.63.

³⁶⁷ Meltem Yetener, "Adnan Menderes" in *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, ed. Ali Faik Demir (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007), p.56.

making process began to shift to the advantage of the government and the prime minister in comparison to Atatürk and İnönü periods.

On the other hand, during the Democrat Party period, the role that the ministry of foreign affairs played in the decision making process increased especially after the appointment of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu as the minister of foreign affairs in 1957 until the end of Democrat Party rule in 1960. Fuat Köprülü acted as the minister of foreign affairs until he was appointed minister of state and deputy prime minister by Menderes in the eve of Cyprus negotiations in July 1955. In the Cyprus negotiations, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu represented Turkey as the deputy minister of foreign affairs because the ministry of foreign affairs was under the jurisdiction of prime minister Menderes at that time.³⁶⁸ Günver argues that Köprülü was in favor of a static foreign policy and was not competent in his role as the minister of foreign affairs because he did not take the Cyprus issue serious as he was not interested in financial issues as Zorlu was.³⁶⁹ Turkey needed an active foreign policy during the conflict in Cyprus and needed for foreign resources to improve Turkish economy. After Cyprus negotiations Fatin Rüştü Zorlu resigned from his post in January 1956 and Fuad Köprülü was reappointed and acted as the minister of foreign affairs until he was again replaced by Zorlu after the elections in 1957.³⁷⁰ However, the impact of Zorlu in Turkish foreign policy traces back to his post as permanent representative to NATO in 1952. Beginning from Turkey's NATO membership, it became the axis of Turkish foreign policy and, as Kunalalp argues, Zorlu had significant influence on the decision making process. Moreover, as the minister of foreign affairs, Zorlu was

³⁶⁸ Mehmet Arif Demirer, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Gerçeği* (İstanbul: Profil Yayınları, 2009), p.16.

³⁶⁹ Günver, p.47.

³⁷⁰ Demirer, p.16.

also responsible for the Cyprus policy of Turkey and it is argued that the Zurich-London agreements were a result of Zorlu's determined and active foreign ministry because he set the principles of Turkey's Cyprus policy.³⁷¹ In this period, the ministry of foreign affairs was also reconstructed after 1955. After the establishment of a department that was responsible for the relations with NATO in 1952, the department that was responsible for Cyprus was expanded from 1955 onwards. Moreover, the ministry of foreign affairs was also responsible for the economic policy of Turkey and departments were established to conduct Turkey's economic relations.³⁷² Consequently, the roles of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in decision making process increased.

The participation of other actors such as the parliament, the press and civil society in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy did not go beyond their evaluation or criticism of decisions that had already been made by the government. Furthermore, the military became an actor of Turkish politics especially after its involvement with NATO, which shows that during the Democrat Party period, the efforts of Atatürk and İnönü to keep the army out of politics came to an end.

Despite the conflict and struggle between the government and the opposition in the parliament, the opposition parties, especially the Republican People's Party, generally supported the foreign policy decisions of the government. The main contention appeared during the Korean War in 1950 and about the Zurich-London agreements on the Cyprus issue in 1959. The Korean War decision was not criticized although the decision making process and the Democrat Party's stance were issues of

³⁷¹ Kunalp, p.73.

³⁷² Temel İskit, *Diplomasi* (İstanbul: İstanbul bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), p.421.

opposition. The Republican People's Party criticized the Democrat Party for having not discussed the issue of sending troops in the parliament although it had informed the parliament. Moreover, the Republican People's Party called the decision unconstitutional because Article 26 of the 1924 constitution regulated the declaration of war as the responsibility of the parliament. Soysal writes that the article was obvious, but the act of war was vague therefore, the criticism of the opposition could not be justified within the framework of the constitution.³⁷³

Other discontent in the parliament stemmed from the Zurich-London agreements of 1959 and the opposition criticized that the agreements did not guarantee the status of Turks in the parliament. To sum up, during the Democrat Party period, the parliament was not a platform of discussion for decisions before their implementation. The government informed the opposition and the opposition generally supported the government because the principles of the Democrat Party were consistent with those of the Republican People's Party and other parties.

The main principles of Turkish foreign policy in this period were integration to the West and the modernization of the army, one of the pillars of its West-centric foreign policy. However, the modernization of the army brought its politicization especially the low and middle ranking officers. Hale states that:

The younger officers were differentiated and radicalized by reforms in the military training system. Foreign contacts were also important. For the first time since the First World War, relatively junior officers were in fairly regular contact with their opposite numbers in Western armies. They were bound to notice that foreign commanders gave much more scope for individual initiatives by middle ranking officers than had ever been allowed in Turkey, where Prussian style traditions of hierarchical authority continued and that pay and living conditions in other NATO armies were much better than in their own. In their early days, they had often seen service as the most remote and poverty stricken parts of Turkey. The primitive life style of the peasants shocked them and in many cases convinced them that political

³⁷³ Soysal, p.199.

liberalism would never be able to cure their country's problems. Such officers sometimes became convinced that some more radical and totalitarian alternative would be needed whether of the Left or Right was usually unclear. The result had been aptly described as a 'revolution of rising frustrations.'³⁷⁴

Although the Turkish army, especially the middle and low ranking officers began to be politically active, their integration to the foreign policy had to wait until the replacement of the Supreme Defense Council³⁷⁵ by the National Security Council in which the military authority dominated the civilian authority and extended the scope of its responsibility after the military takeover in 1960.

During the Democrat Party period, the press generally appreciated the foreign policy decisions of the government because in this period, for the press the main enemy was the Soviet Union and the government could afford to integrate Turkey to the Western camp. The integration to the West was only criticized by the leftists because they advocated a non-aligned foreign policy for Turkey. During the Cyprus crisis, the press supported the stance of the government especially after 1955 because from then on, the government took the Cyprus issue seriously and took initiatives.

Cyprus was the main issue that mobilized the public. Especially the Turkish youth protested the events on Cyprus beginning from the late 1940s and, as the government took initiative on the issue, the public opinion supported the government's policy. However, neither the press nor the public opinion played a role in the decision making process. Furthermore, the Democrat Party government intensified its control and suppression on the press and public opinion in the following period of 1954 elections until the military intervention on May 27, 1960.

³⁷⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.98.

³⁷⁵ The Supreme Defence Council was established in 1949. It replaced the body that had been formed in 1933 and had extended the scope of the former. However, the military was not a part of the decision making process within the constitutional framework until the establishment of the National Security Council in 1962.

National Unity Committee Period after the Military Intervention
(May 30, 1960-November 20, 1961)

On May 27, 1960, the military took over the Democrat Party government, which had been ruling Turkey since 1950. However, the only goal of the military junta that had been dominated by low and middle ranking officers was to end the Democrat Party rule; they had not planned what they would do next.³⁷⁶ The National Unity Committee³⁷⁷ accumulated all administrative powers in its hands. The new government³⁷⁸ was appointed by the committee with the prime ministry of General Cemal Gürsel. Moreover, Gürsel became the president of the republic, the commander-in-chief and minister of national defense in the new cabinet.

In relation to foreign affairs, the National Unity Committee was in favor of the maintenance of the continuity in Turkey's foreign relations. Therefore, the declaration in the aftermath of the intervention stated that:

...We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbors and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Atatürk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we are faithful to them. We repeat: Our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁶ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.121.

³⁷⁷ The National Unity Committee was composed of thirty-eight officers who participated in the military intervention. However, this was not a homogenous group. There were moderates and radicals. The moderates were in favor of delegating power to the civilians as soon as possible while the radicals were in favor of governing the country as long as possible. The rivalry between these groups ended with elimination of the radicals on November 13, 1960.

³⁷⁸ The new government was composed of eighteen technocrats including two officers from the National Unity Committee: prime minister and minister of National Defense Cemal Gürsel, Minister of Transport Sıtkı Ulay.

³⁷⁹ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.120.

In the aftermath of the intervention the National Unity Committee was perceived to be in favor of the West-centric foreign policy of the Democrat Party period. Moreover, in the new government, Selim Sarper, who was a former, well-known diplomat and a close friend of former minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was appointed minister of foreign affairs.³⁸⁰ These developments were regarded as the continuation of the status quo in Turkey's foreign relations. Nevertheless, in its program, the new government declared that it would try to improve Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, the non-aligned countries in Africa and the countries in the Balkans, the Far East and Latin America. All these efforts can be regarded as evidence that the new government would try to expand the scope of Turkey's foreign policy.³⁸¹

In practice, Turkey's relations with the West reflected the status quo because Turkey, firstly, was in need of financial aid from the West and, more importantly, members of the National Unity Committee were refraining from a reaction against their intervention from outside. In return, in the first instance, the United States recognized the military regime in Turkey because of the new regime's tendency to provide continuity in its foreign relations.³⁸² The hope of the military regime to ameliorate the relations with the Soviet Union failed because of the Jupiter Missiles that were deployed in Turkey. The Soviet Union protested the deployment while Turkey replied that as an autonomous entity, it could make its decisions independently.³⁸³ Relations with the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries did not

³⁸⁰ Melek M.Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), p.31.

³⁸¹ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.33-36.

³⁸² Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.44.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.48.

go beyond hope because in this period, domestic problems such as the economy and reconstruction of the system after the coup d'état dominated the agenda of the National Unity Committee government. Therefore, the government that was appointed by the National Unity Committee did not focus much on foreign relations.

In addition to these developments, a new constitution³⁸⁴ was prepared which is still regarded as the most liberal constitution by many scholars in Turkey's republican history with the freedoms it introduced especially for the press and civil society.³⁸⁵ In the new constitution, the decision making in foreign policy was regarded as mainly the responsibility of the prime minister and the government. The president was symbolically the head of state. He was not excluded from the decision making process despite his symbolic power and unaccountability of his actions except treason.³⁸⁶ Moreover, the National Security Council, where civilians and military high commanders came together to discuss domestic and foreign affairs, was introduced as an advisory body to the government in the new constitution.³⁸⁷

Besides new constitutional arrangements, the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs was reconstructed in this period. The economic and financial issues which had become a part of its responsibility in the Democrat Party period in order to integrate

³⁸⁴ The 1961 Constitution was prepared by a commission composed of professors from Istanbul and Ankara Law Faculties under the chairmanship of Prof.Dr. Sıddık Sami Onar.

³⁸⁵ The 1961 Constitution was ratified on July 9, 1961. Article 22 of the 1961 Constitution regulates the freedom of press and states that "press can not be censored unless it poses a threat against the integrity of the state, social order and the national security". In addition to this, Article 28 of the 1961 Constitution regulates the right of meeting and states that "without any permission, everybody has the right of meeting without violence".

³⁸⁶ Kili and Gözübüyük, pp.224-228.

³⁸⁷ Article 105 of the 1961 Constitution regulates the duties and status of the prime minister and the government, Articles 97, 98 and 99 regulate the duties and status of the president, Article 111 regulates the status of National Security Council. Kili and Gözübüyük, pp.224-226, 229.

Turkish economy into the free market economy were taken away.³⁸⁸ The State Planning Organization was established in order to formulate the social and economic policies of the state, to provide coordination between ministries that were responsible for the implementation of economic policies, to prepare long and short term economic plans and to control the private sector.³⁸⁹ Thus, the scope of the impact of ministry of foreign affairs was limited to the formation and implementation of the foreign relations of Turkey.

Consequently, in this period, the National Unity Committee was the sole authority in foreign affairs as in domestic affairs. Therefore, this period can be regarded as one of transformation, even in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy with the reconstruction of the ministry of foreign affairs and the preparation of the new constitution. After the National Unity Committee completed its mission, in January 1961, the ban on political actions was abolished and the election that was held in November 1961 opened a new political era in Turkish politics.

The Coalitions Period (November 20, 1961-October 27, 1965)

The 1961 election results did not satisfy the expectations of the military which had predicted that a single Republican People's Party government would be formed.³⁹⁰ Even İsmet İnönü had not expected that the Republican People's Party

³⁸⁸ İskit, p.236.

³⁸⁹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 4th series, vol.1.

³⁹⁰ In the 1961 general elections, the Republican People's Party obtained 36.74% of votes and 173 of seats in the parliament, the Justice Party obtained 34.8% of votes and 158 of seats in the parliament, the New Turkey Party obtained 13.73% of votes and 65 of seats in the parliament, lastly, the Republican Peasants National Party obtained 13.96% of votes and 54 seats in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=4

would form coalition governments with other parties in the parliament because he had predicted that he would be the president of Turkey and İsmail Rüştü Aksal, who was the secretary general of the Republican People's Party, would be the prime minister of a single-party government.³⁹¹

Upon the unexpected result of the election, the radical middle-ranking officers, including the ones from army, airforce and navy signed a protocol among themselves on October 21, 1961 which emphasized the necessity of a new military intervention. Nevertheless, this intervention attempt of the military was prevented by the chief-of-general staff Cevdet Sunay, and on October 24, 1961 Çankaya Protocol was signed between these radical officers and party leaders which determined the fate of political life in the aftermath of the elections. Therefore, the two groups agreed upon the presidency of Cemal Gürsel and the prime ministry of İsmet İnönü.³⁹² Upon this agreement, on October 26, 1961, Cemal Gürsel was elected as fourth president of Turkey. Furthermore, the new civilian government after the military intervention was formed as a Republican People's Party and Justice Party coalition on November 15, 1961. It governed Turkey until the end of May 1962. The new coalition government was mainly preoccupied with domestic affairs because the attempt to topple the government by low ranking officers coincided with the first phase of political transformation in Turkey. In foreign affairs, new and challenging events did not happen during the first coalition government.

The new government declared its loyalty to the United Nations, NATO and CENTO alliances in its program. Moreover, it was willing to develop its relations with Turkey's neighbors in the Balkans, Middle East and especially the Soviet

³⁹¹ Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), p.25.

³⁹² Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1950-1964*, p.540.

Union. Also included was Cyprus, where a new state had been founded in 1960 after the Zurich-London agreements and the new government declared that peaceful relations should be kept between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island.³⁹³ Thus, the new government was in favor of the maintenance of the status quo in its foreign relations.

The new government was a coalition government, something to which Turkey was not used to, which led to some problems between two coalition partners. Nevertheless, the most vital event in this period was a military uprising led by colonel Talat Aydemir, who had been in Korea during May 27 military intervention. Declaring that May 27 military intervention had not brought political stability to Turkey and that the existing parties could not provide the economic and social reforms that Turkey needed, the military college was told to get ready to take political power into the hands of the military on February 22, 1962. In the end, the uprising was suppressed by the military corps loyal to the government, while those who were responsible for the provocation and mobilization of military college students were eliminated from the army.³⁹⁴ However, the trial of these officers turned into an impediment in the way of the coalition government due to the increase in the tension of the parliament. In addition, pro-Democrat Party politicians were arguing that the former Democrat Party members in Kayseri prison should also have been given amnesty like the officers who had participated in an unsuccessful attempt at a military intervention. The Justice Party then threatened to withdraw its ministers from the cabinet unless the former Democrat Party politicians were given

³⁹³ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.36-39.

³⁹⁴ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp.89-90. See also, Aydemir, *İkinci Adam 1950-1964*, pp.551-552.

amnesty.³⁹⁵ Therefore, the dispute between the two partners of the coalition became unbearable and İnönü submitted his resignation on May 30, 1962.

After his resignation, İsmet İnönü was reappointed by president Gürsel to form the new government and a new coalition was formed between the Republican People's Party, the New Turkey Party and the Republican Peasants National Party on June 25, 1962. The new government's program was a continuity of the first coalition government especially in relation to foreign affairs. The loyalty to the United Nations and NATO and CENTO alliances was reemphasized while the necessity to develop relations with neighboring countries as well as the ones in the Far East, Africa and Latin America was emphasized.³⁹⁶ However, the second coalition government had to overcome two main crises which had a serious impact on the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis.

In addition to the developments in the international arena, the National Security Council was established on December 11, 1962 as a place for politicians and officers to come together to discuss domestic and foreign affairs.³⁹⁷ With the establishment of the National Security Council, the military once more became an integral part of politics in Turkey after having been divorced from it by Atatürk in the early years of the republic.

The first challenge in foreign affairs was the Cuban missile crisis. This event set off alarms in Turkey, which forced to scrutinize its foreign policy status quo in the long run: unconditional dependence on the United States. The Cuban missile crisis erupted on October 22, 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union after the United States intelligence service detected the existence of Soviet missiles

³⁹⁵ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.163.

³⁹⁶ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.39-43.

³⁹⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.2.

in Cuba, which were perceived as a threat to the United States. The United States blockaded Cuba in order to prevent Soviet ships which were carrying missile heads that would enable the use of the missiles in Cuba.³⁹⁸ The challenge between the two superpowers was a crisis which might have caused a nuclear war if the Soviet administration had not declared that they would not deploy missiles in Cuba. Ultimately the United States lifted the blockade imposed on the island after the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

What is of importance here is that the agreement had a provision which was directly related to Turkey: the Soviet Union would remove the missiles in Cuba in return for the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey that had been deployed by the United States.³⁹⁹ In the negotiation between the two superpowers, Turkey was a part of the issue despite the lack of any consultation with Turkey. Turkey was avoiding from a Soviet threat in the absence of missiles for its own defense and insisted on the remaining of missiles because as the minister of foreign affairs, Erkin argued, the missiles in Turkey were both a threat and a guarantee for Turkey against the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the United States declared that Jupiter missiles were to be removed. Although president Gürsel and prime minister İnönü declared that they were supporting the decision of the United States,⁴⁰¹ Cuban missile crisis warned political circles about the necessity of reconsidering the unconditional United States-centric foreign policy.⁴⁰² By the same token, the cautious and conciliatory policy of

³⁹⁸ *Milliyet*, 23 October 1962.

³⁹⁹ Çağrı Erhan, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.681-682.

⁴⁰⁰ *Milliyet*, 1 November 1962.

⁴⁰¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1962, *Son Havadis*, 25 October 1962.

⁴⁰² Erhan, *ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler*, p.682.

the İnönü government during the Cuban missile crisis was generally supported by the parliament, the public opinion,^{403,404} and the press. The press supported the Turkish foreign policy during the crisis, while it can be argued that there was a split among the press towards the United States and the Soviet Union. The support for the position of the United States was common among newspapers namely *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* while *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* explicitly and harshly criticized communism and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁵

Some writers at *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, especially İlhan Selçuk from the former and Çetin Altan from the latter argued that Turkey would implement a cautious and more balanced foreign policy between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰⁶ Consequently, the Cuban missile crisis brought the foreign policy issues to the platform of discussion although it did not dramatically affect the orientation of Turkish foreign policy despite different points of view towards Turkey's United States-centric foreign policy.

Until a new crisis at the end of 1963, Turkish foreign policy continued its United States centric direction. In addition to the developments in relations with the United States, the Ankara agreement was signed on September 12, 1963 with the European Economic Community determining the requirements of Turkey's membership in the organization. Upon this agreement, Turkey would be integrated into the community after the implementation of three stages of economic development. The first stage would be the strengthening of Turkish economy for at

⁴⁰³ Public opinion meant mainly the youth and the university students in 1960s and 1970s.

⁴⁰⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1962.

⁴⁰⁵ *Tercüman*, 26 October-5 November 1962, *Son Havadis* 24 October-5 November 1962.

⁴⁰⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 2 November 1962, *Milliyet*, 30 October 1962.

least five years. The second stage was the Customs Union within at most twelve years and the last stage was the coordination of economic policies between the community and Turkey.⁴⁰⁷ However, the relations with the European Economic Community faced difficulties due to the political and economic problems in Turkey especially in the late 1960s and 1970s. Turkey had to wait to apply for full membership until 1987.

By the same token, in domestic affairs, a new attempt at a military intervention was prepared by Talat Aydemir on May 20, 1963. The attempt was more easily prevented by the armed forces and the government. However, at this time, Aydemir and his close supporter Fethi Gürcan were sentenced to death and executed.⁴⁰⁸ This was the last attempt at a military intervention from the lower echelons of the army in the 1960s.

In the local elections held on November 17, 1963 the opposition Justice Party increased its votes.⁴⁰⁹ The results of local elections had implications about the tendencies of the voters and the results of general elections in 1965 because in 1965 general elections, the Justice Party had the majority of votes and formed a single-party government. In the light of election results, political competition between parties continued until the end of 1963. The Justice Party insisted on early general elections with reliance on the increase in its votes in the local elections, while Osman Bölükbaşı's Nation Party insisted a "national government" rather than new elections. Coalition partners New Turkey Party and Republican Peasants National Party were

⁴⁰⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.3.

⁴⁰⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.3.

⁴⁰⁹ In the 1963 local elections, the Justice Party obtained 45.39%, the Republican People's Party obtained 35.66%, the New Turkey Party obtained 3.57% and the Republican Peasants National Party obtained 1.38% of votes while Nation Party held 2.71% of votes and independents held 10.56% of votes. <http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/secimler/?tur=&yil=1963>

in favor of a Republican People's Party-Justice Party government because they were aware of the decrease in their support. As a result, on December 2, 1963 second coalition government dissolved on the eve of a sudden serious crisis in Turkish foreign policy: The Cyprus Crisis.

President Gürsel asked the leader of the Justice Party, Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was the former chief-of-general staff, to form the new government with the support of the chief-of-general staff, Cevdet Sunay.⁴¹⁰ However, he could not form the government so, again, İsmet İnönü formed his third coalition government with independents in the parliament on December 25, 1963. It is possible to argue that the eruption of the Cyprus Crisis just before the formation of the new government enabled İnönü to stay in office.⁴¹¹ Therefore, İnönü became the most prominent figure in the management of the Cyprus crisis as the prime minister of Turkey. The program of the new government touched upon the Cyprus issue and the Ankara agreement besides its loyalty to the United Nations, NATO and CENTO alliances and the development of relations with neighboring countries and those in Latin America and the Far East.⁴¹²

In this period, the main issue on the agenda of the government was the Cyprus issue. The problem on the island went back to the second half of the 1950s although Zurich-London Agreements established a new state for the Greeks and Turks under the monitoring of Greece, Turkey and Britain as guarantor states. Nevertheless, just after the formation of the new republic, two sides quarrelled on the implementation of the articles in the constitution, such as the formation of armed

⁴¹⁰ Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997), p.262.

⁴¹¹ Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık, 1975), pp. 226-231.

⁴¹² Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.43-46.

forces, the collection of taxes and the determination of the borders of municipalities.⁴¹³ Beginning from early 1962, the president of the Cyprus Republic archbishop Makarios offered changes in the constitution with the argument that the Turkish side did not comply with the requirements of the constitution and there was no chance to solve the problem democratically.⁴¹⁴

In addition to this, armed conflicts began on the island. On March 25, 1962, two mosques were bombed in Nicosia, upon which Turkey reacted and asked Greece and Cyprus Republic to find the bombers. Moreover, the Turkish Grand National Assembly held a special session on the issue and the Turkish press harshly criticized the events. Upon this reaction, EOKA was accused and president Makarios denounced the bombers, but the issue could not be clarified. On September 17, 1962, the office of Rauf Denktaş, who was then the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community Assembly, was bombed.⁴¹⁵

Bombings on the island caused harsh reactions in the Turkish press and society and president Makarios was protested by the students of the Language, History and Geography Faculty of Ankara University (*Dil, Tarih, Coğrafya Fakültesi*) during his visit to Turkey on November 22-23, 1962.⁴¹⁶ President Makarios met Turkish prime minister İsmet İnönü and complained about constitutional principles, whereas İnönü replied in a manner that made it clear that Turkey would never accept changes in the constitution and changes in the status quo

⁴¹³ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.116.

⁴¹⁴ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, pp.191-201.

⁴¹⁵ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp.118-120.

⁴¹⁶ *Milliyet*, 23 November 1963.

of the island.⁴¹⁷ Conflicts on the island deteriorated in time and two communities were polarized as “Greek Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriots”.⁴¹⁸ Ultimately, the official proposal of a drastic constitutional change was given to the guarantor states as diplomatic notes on November 30, 1963. The Turkish ministry of foreign affairs directly refused the offer on December 6,⁴¹⁹ but president Makarios replied that the note was only for information not for consultation, thus, they were free to act in their domestic affairs.⁴²⁰

After a while, on December 21, 1963, armed struggle began between the two communities, changing the framework of Turkey’s relations both with Greece and the Greek side on Cyprus. The armed attacks caused a reaction in the press and public opinion. The press demanded a more dynamic foreign policy and a military intervention unless the attacks against the Turks on the island ended.⁴²¹ Youth organizations such as the Turkish National Youth Organization (*Türk Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı*), the Turkish National Students Federation (*Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*) and the National Turkish Students Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) protested the events.^{422,423} Moreover, protest meetings were held in smaller cities in Anatolia in addition to the ones in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.⁴²⁴

⁴¹⁷ *Milliyet*, 24-25 November 1963.

⁴¹⁸ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.123.

⁴¹⁹ Fuat Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2008), p.84. See also, Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa’lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü’nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965*, p.189.

⁴²⁰ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.125.

⁴²¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 22-25 December 1963, *Milliyet* 22-25 December 1963, *Tercüman* 22-24 December 1963, *Son Havadis* 22-25 December 1963.

⁴²² *Milliyet*, 23 December 1963.

⁴²³ These organizations were leftist organizations that supported communism and anti-Americanism. However, the National Turkish Students Union lost its leftist character after

The İnönü government tried to handle the issue cautiously and calmly despite the reaction in the press and the public. Upon the armed attacks against Turks on the island, diplomatic initiatives were taken and notes were given to Britain and Greece as guarantor states on December 23, 1963, in order to provide a cease-fire in the island through the joint armed forces of three states; if not, Turkey would have intervened unilaterally.⁴²⁵ In addition to these diplomatic initiatives, İnönü met the commanders of the armed forces and the bureaucrats of the ministry of foreign affairs on December 24, 1963, in order to decide the strategy in relation to the events on Cyprus. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that unless the armed struggle ended after warning flights, the island would be bombed by the Turkish air forces.⁴²⁶ Upon Turkey's diplomatic initiative, which was supported by military measures such as the warning flights on December 25, 1963,⁴²⁷ cease-fire was provided by the British forces on the island and Britain came up with proposal of a conference in London which would be held among three guarantors and the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus on January 15, 1964.

In the period between the cease-fire and the conference, the Cyprus issue preoccupied the agenda of the press and public opinion. In the press, there was a tendency to support the Cyprus policy of the government despite some criticisms.

Ecvet Güresin and İlhan Selçuk from *Cumhuriyet*, Çetin Altan from *Milliyet* and

the intraorganizational election in 1965 and in the following period Islamic conservatism dominated the organization. Çağatay Okutan, *Bozkurt'tan Kur'an'a Milli Türk Talebe Birliği 1916-1980* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), pp.133-138.

⁴²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1963.

⁴²⁵ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, p.208. See also, Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.126.

⁴²⁶ Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965*, p.191. See also, Aksu, p.85.

⁴²⁷ Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.130.

Ahmet Kabaklı and Kadircan Kafılı from *Tercüman* wrote articles which supported and called the policy of the government as cautious and dynamic. Furthermore, they criticized Makarios, Greece and Great Britain as the main actors of the conflict in the island.⁴²⁸ *Son Havadis*, which was closer to the Justice Party, took a critical position towards the policy of the İnönü government. Especially Mümtaz Faik Fenik and Orhan Seyfi Orhon harshly criticized the policy of the government because, for them, the İnönü government had implemented a passive policy towards the Cyprus conflict.⁴²⁹ The protest meetings were held especially by the university students and the events on the island were denounced in the period between the cease-fire and the London Conference.⁴³⁰

During the conference, the problems between the two communities could not be solved permanently, but the three parties decided that a 10,000 men NATO force headed by an English commander would provide peace on the island. However, president Makarios rejected this proposal because he thought the United Nations rather than NATO should provide peace on the island.⁴³¹ In the meantime, the armed conflict on the island broke out again on January 23, 1964.⁴³² Upon the refusal of the proposal at the London conference by president Makarios and the beginning of armed conflict in the island, Britain applied to the United Nations Security Council. The council made a resolution on March 4, 1964 which stated that all parties were to

⁴²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1963-6 January 1964, *Milliyet*, 26 December 1963-3 January 1964, *Tercüman*, 26 December 1963-13 January 1964.

⁴²⁹ *Son Havadis*, 3-13 January 1964.

⁴³⁰ *Milliyet*, 25, 28 December 1963.

⁴³¹ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.127. See also, Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, pp.237-238, Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965*, pp.192-193.

⁴³² *Cumhuriyet*, 24 January 1964.

refrain from actions which could deteriorate the situation on the island, the Cyprus government was to take the necessary measures and the leaders of two communities were to behave in a manner to relieve the tension between the two communities. In addition to this, a United Nations force would be established to provide peace and security on the island with the approval of the Cyprus administration.⁴³³

Despite the formation of the United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus, armed conflicts accelerated on the island just after the United Nations Security Council Resolution. In the meantime, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey made a decision on March 16, 1964 authorizing the government to send troops to Cyprus.⁴³⁴ After the deterioration of relations between the two communities and the failure of the UN forces to prevent conflicts, Turkey gave a diplomatic note to the Cyprus government in order to establish peace on the island. Unless the armed struggle ended, Turkey would intervene unilaterally.⁴³⁵ In return, Makarios gave a counter diplomatic note to Turkey and Greece with the proposal of the withdrawal of the United Nations' peace forces from the island because, according to him, peace had been established and there was no need for the involvement of the United Nations.

Upon the refusal of Turkey, Makarios unilaterally abolished the guarantee agreements on April 4, 1964 while the Turkish government did not recognize the abolition of the guarantee agreements.⁴³⁶ The relations between the two communities

⁴³³ UN Security Council Resolution No.186, March 4, 1964.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/44/IMG/NR021144.pdf?OpenElement>

⁴³⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.3.

⁴³⁵ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.129.

⁴³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1964.

became worse in the period between the abolition of the guarantee agreements in April 1964 and Turkey's decision to intervene in the island in June 1964. In Turkey, the opposition criticized the government policy and it was supported especially by the newspaper *Son Havadis*.⁴³⁷ Newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Tercüman* supported the policy of the government although they were critical of Makarios, Greece and the international community.⁴³⁸

As a result of the deterioration of the situation on the island, the international community as well as the Turkish community expected Turkish intervention in Cyprus. On June 1, 1964, İnönü met the minister of foreign affairs Erkin, the chief-of-general staff Sunay and the commanders of the armed forces in order to discuss the strategy for the events on Cyprus.⁴³⁹ It is possible to argue that the decision for the intervention on June 6, 1964 was made during this meeting. However, İnönü wanted to inform the United States as Turkey's major ally before the intervention, despite the disagreement of minister of foreign affairs Erkin, with the expectation of US pressure on Greece and Cyprus for the solution of the problem without military intervention.⁴⁴⁰ However, the letter from president Johnson on June 5, 1964 disappointed the Turkish decision makers and played a role in the prevention of Turkey's intervention in the island. In addition to the lack of international support especially from the United States and the Soviet Union, the backwardness of the Turkish army for such an operation had impact on the decision makers, in the first

⁴³⁷ *Son Havadis*, 28 April, 22 May 1964.

⁴³⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April-7 June 1964, *Tercüman*, 8 April- 7 June 1964.

⁴³⁹ *Milliyet*, 2 June 1964.

⁴⁴⁰ Tokar, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965*, p.206. See also, Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.130.

instance, the prime minister İnönü.⁴⁴¹ Internally, the cancellation of the intervention did not result in harsh criticism because at that time the content of Johnson's letter was not known by the press or the public opinion.⁴⁴² The press generally supported the diplomatic solution of the problem despite the existence of criticism of the policy of the İnönü government and the mediation of the United States.⁴⁴³

Despite the support in domestic politics, the lack of international support became obvious with president Johnson's letter. He argued that Turkey could not intervene in Cyprus without the approval of the United States and the two other guarantors of the island. Moreover, Turkey's intervention might cause a war between Greece and Turkey, and the United States would not allow two NATO members to fight against each other. If the Soviet Union had posed a threat to Turkey as a result of its intervention, Turkey most probably would face such kind of a Soviet threat alone. More importantly, in such an intervention, Turkey could not use military equipment that had been given by the United States as military aid. Lastly, president Johnson invited Turkish prime minister İnönü to Washington to solve the problem.

İnönü replied with a letter which explained the legitimacy of Turkey's intervention on Cyprus and his disappointment upon receiving president Johnson's letter. In addition, he accepted president Johnson's invitation to Washington.⁴⁴⁴ Greek prime minister Papandreu was also invited to Washington, but Papandreu did

⁴⁴¹ Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, p.91. See also, Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, p.259.

⁴⁴² President Johnson's Letter was published in the press in 1966. Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.686.

⁴⁴³ *Cumhuriyet*, 16 June 1964, *Milliyet*, 24 June 1964, *Tercüman*, 13-25 June 1964, *Son Havadis*, 6-24 June 1964.

⁴⁴⁴ İsmet İnönü, *Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşileri* (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları: 2004), pp.599-606.

not accept to meet İnönü directly in order to solve the Cyprus conflict because he did not want to give the impression that the Cyprus conflict was a problem between Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, Papandreu was not in favor of NATO involvement in the conflict and he thought that his meeting with president Johnson would be perceived as the Cyprus conflict was susceptible to NATO intervention.⁴⁴⁵

After the failure of negotiations in the United States, İnönü visited Britain and France on June 27 and 30, 1964, respectively, in order to provide support for the solution of the conflict in the island.⁴⁴⁶ However, the diplomatic initiative did not reach a solution and, after a while, the armed struggle between two communities began on July 14, 1964 and accelerated until August 1964.⁴⁴⁷ Upon the failure of Turkey's call to the United Nations in order to intervene in the struggle in the island, the Turkish air force bombed Cyprus on August 8-9, 1964. In the meantime, the United States and the Soviet Union intervened and Turkey terminated the operation. Although the termination of the operation was resented by the commander of air forces, general İrfan Tansel, İnönü ordered him to implement the decision.⁴⁴⁸ The military operation and the dynamic policy of the government were commonly supported by the press and public opinion. Ecvet Güresin and İlhan Selçuk from *Cumhuriyet*, Çetin Altan from *Milliyet*, Ahmet Kabaklı, Kadircan Kafılı and Cihad Baban from *Tercüman* and Mümtaz Faik Fenik and Orhan Seyfi Orhon from *Son*

⁴⁴⁵ Andreas Papandreu, *Namlunun Ucundaki Demokrasi* (İstanbul: Üçüncü Dünya Yayınları, 1977), p.172.

⁴⁴⁶ *Milliyet*, 28 June, 1 July 1964.

⁴⁴⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1964.

⁴⁴⁸ Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, p.90. See also, Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965*, pp.214-215.

Havadis applauded the military operation.⁴⁴⁹ In addition to the press, youth organizations declared their support of the policy.⁴⁵⁰ However, the domestic support in the wake of the military operation turned into criticism from the opposition and the press, which supported the opposition against İnönü government in time⁴⁵¹ because although the bombing of the island calmed down the armed struggle between the two communities, the Cyprus conflict could not be permanently resolved.

By the same token, the prevention of a possible Turkish military intervention in the island by the United States had an impact on Turkish domestic and foreign policies. On the one hand, right after the military operation, anti-Americanism emerged in Turkey and youth organizations began to protest the United States.⁴⁵² On the other hand, Turkey understood its isolation in the international arena and tried to broaden the scope of its foreign policy alternatives in the following period.

Development of relations with the Soviet Union became a priority for successive Turkish governments because İnönü understood that Cyprus issue could not be solved without the support of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵³ Therefore, minister of foreign affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin visited Moscow at the end of 1964 in order to develop relations with the Soviet Union, meeting with high ranking officials including the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. They supported the

⁴⁴⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 9-17 August 1964, *Milliyet*, 10 August, *Tercüman*, 10-15 August 1964, *Son Havadis*, 10-15 August 1964.

⁴⁵⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1964.

⁴⁵¹ *Milliyet*, 8 September 1964, *Son Havadis*, 2-9 September 1964.

⁴⁵² *Cumhuriyet*, 28-30 August 1964, *Milliyet*, 29 August-1 September 1964, *Tercüman*, 28-29 August 1964, *Son Havadis*, 28-30 August 1964.

⁴⁵³ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.784.

Turkish position in Cyprus and the development of mutual relations.⁴⁵⁴ In return, on January 1965, a committee from Soviet parliament visited Turkey and these mutual visits continued especially during successive Ürgüplü and Demirel governments from 1965 onwards. In addition to the development of relations with the Soviet Union, on January 1965, Turkey refused to join multilateral force which was established upon the proposal of president Kennedy during his presidency in order to protect Western Europe.⁴⁵⁵ In other words, the Cyprus conflict paved the way for Turkey to reconsider its foreign policy principles and diversify its options in the international arena.

While these developments happened in Turkish foreign policy, the third İnönü coalition government was toppled during budget discussions in the parliament on February 1965. Suat Hayri Ürgüplü formed a new government on February 20, 1965, which was a coalition of the Justice Party, the New Turkey Party, the Republican Peasants National Party and the Nation Party. This coalition governed Turkey until the general elections of October 1965. The last coalition government of the transition period after 1960 military intervention did not face any difficulty in its foreign relations and followed the principles set by its predecessors.⁴⁵⁶

Concluding Remarks

The period 1961 and 1965 can be regarded as one of transition in Turkish politics in the sense that the administration was transferred from the military to civilian political authority. In domestic affairs, the post intervention period witnessed

⁴⁵⁴ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.166.

⁴⁵⁵ Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.691.

⁴⁵⁶ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.46-49.

political competition and instability, resulting in four successive governments being formed in four years. In foreign affairs, the objective of coalition governments that aimed to develop relations with the Soviet Union or the countries in Latin America and Far East failed to do so due to the preoccupation of the foreign policy agenda with the Cyprus issue. Turkey's efforts at the maintenance of the status quo remained unchanged until the Cyprus Crisis, when Turkey had to reconsider its existing foreign policy framework in the following period. Furthermore, during the coalitions period, different actors were involved in Turkey's foreign affairs.

President Gürsel was not active in the formation and implementation of foreign affairs as the former president of the National Unity Committee. He had been a retired general and inexperienced statesman and diplomat. Moreover, as Yavuzalp writes, the appointment of İsmet İnönü as the prime minister in the aftermath of the military intervention enabled president Gürsel to remain inactive in the foreign affairs of Turkey.⁴⁵⁷

Prime minister İsmet İnönü, as an experienced statesman and diplomat, acted as the ultimate decision making authority although he attributed great importance to the support of the parliament, opposition, military and the ministry of foreign affairs, as can be seen in the decision making process during the Cyprus crisis.⁴⁵⁸ In other words, he did not hesitate to consult the civilian and military bureaucracy before making his decisions. On the other hand, he was in favor of the maintenance of the status quo in Turkey's foreign relations and supported the United States' position even during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, he insisted on informing the United States before the military intervention, which was prevented by president Johnson.

⁴⁵⁷Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p.106.

⁴⁵⁸ Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, pp. 90-91.

After this event, İnönü became aware of the fact that the scope of Turkey's foreign affairs had to be broadened. Therefore, relations with the Soviets began to be developed during the last period of his government and this shift continued in successive governments that were formed by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and Süleyman Demirel. In addition to his ability to control the state apparatus in foreign relations, the military was loyal to him and this loyalty enabled him to prevent two coup attempts from low-ranking officers. Consequently, Turkey's domestic and foreign relations were strictly controlled by prime minister İnönü.

The ministry of foreign affairs was active in the implementation of foreign policy rather than in its formation because decisions were generally controlled by İnönü. During his coalition governments, Selim Sarper and Feridun Cemal Erkin held office. Especially, Erkin's ministry was preoccupied with the Cyprus issue and he held foreign diplomatic relations during this crisis. Nevertheless, when his failure to prevent İnönü from informing the United States about the intervention is taken into consideration, it is understood that the impact of the foreign ministry at the time was limited to the scope of the implementation of the decisions.

The military was integrated into the decision making process with the establishment of the National Security Council in 1962. Although the first years after the military intervention saw unrest in the army, the failure of the second military uprising enabled the generals to control the army. Especially during the Cyprus Crisis, the military became a part of decision making process because it was responsible for the intervention. The military staff was ready to act despite the backwardness of the army, although in the end the intervention was prevented by the United States.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁹ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.170.

In addition to these official actors, the press and the civil society were newcomers to the discussion of Turkish foreign policy despite their limited impact. The extension of freedoms in the 1961 constitution enabled the press to be a platform of the discussion of foreign policy issues and the public opinion to support or oppose the decisions that were made by the governments. The Turkish press gradually became a medium for the discussion of foreign affairs, especially after the Cyprus crisis. Sowervine writes that:

The press has been the single most influential opinion creator about Turkish foreign policy....Writers of editorials, opinion columns and articles which appeared in the open forum section of newspapers played a vital role since they were the first to question the foundations and correctness of foreign policy. Their criticism of government officials and their policies served as an example for other groups to follow. These writers addressed their columns to the public, to decision makers and to each other in an effort to stir public debate and interest. In turn, decision makers came to rely on the press as an important channel of information and a gauge of public opinion. Even inaccuracies due to the limited knowledge or distortion did not diminish the constructive role the press played in submitting to its readers a portrayal of the problems facing Turkish foreign policy.⁴⁶⁰

In the transition period between 1961 and 1965, the press was split in the sense that the foreign policy of Turkey was supported by newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*, while the newspapers such as *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* criticized the foreign policy of the government because of their closeness to the right especially the Justice Party. However, especially during the Cyprus crisis, regardless of individual position towards the government, the Turkish press endeavored to mobilize the public opinion, and thus, the youth, who were mainly the university students began to take an interest in Turkish foreign affairs. As Ferenc Vali states:

In Turkey, speaking generally, foreign affairs is still a stepchild of public opinion on politics. Although the end of paternalism or cabinet decision making on such matters heralded the beginning of widespread discussion

⁴⁶⁰ James E. Sowervine, "Turkish Press and Its Impacts on Turkish Foreign Policy", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, no.4 (2000), p.45.

and critical evaluation in the press, in public meetings and in the institutes of learning, the interest of the average Turkish citizen remained skin deep. It is much deeper, though in the big cities than in smaller towns and is hardly noticeable in the villages. The focus of interest also varies according to the level of sophistication and the topics in question. As already been pointed out, questions affecting national feeling or national sentiment are more likely to arouse deeper interest.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶¹ Ferenc Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971), p.100.

CHAPTER 5

THE PERCEPTION OF DETENTE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS 1965-1980

The Justice Party Period (October 27, 1965-March 26, 1971)

In the elections that were held on October 10, 1965 the Justice Party won the majority of votes and Süleyman Demirel, as the leader of the party, declared a new single-party government on October 27, 1965.⁴⁶² İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil was appointed minister of foreign affairs and remained in that office until the end of the third Justice Party government in 1971.⁴⁶³

The main aim of the Demirel government was to liberalize the economy and strengthen the capitalist institutions⁴⁶⁴ because the economic development which had not been achieved due to the problems in domestic politics and foreign affairs of Turkey during the transition period between 1960 and 1965. Turkey was in need of capital in order to implement the five-year plans which had been set by the State Planning Organization, which had been established right after the 1960 military intervention, firstly, for the period between 1963 and 1967 and secondly, for the

⁴⁶² In the 1965 general elections, the Justice Party obtained 52.87% of votes and 240 seats in the parliament, the Republican People's Party obtained 28.75% of votes and 134 seats in the parliament, the Nation Party obtained 6.26% of votes and 31 seats in the parliament, the New Turkey Party obtained 3.72% of votes and 19 seats in the parliament, the Turkish Labor Party obtained 2.97% of votes and 14 seats in the parliament, the Republican Peasants National Party obtained 2.24% of votes and 11 seats in the parliament and independents won 3.19% of votes and 1 seat in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=5

⁴⁶³ İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil remained in office for ten years, with the addition of his ministry in the Nationalist Front governments in late 1970s to his ministry during the single-party governments of the Justice Party between 1965 and 1971, his ministry is the second longest one in the republican history after Tevfik Rüştü Aras who remained in office between 1925 and 1937.

⁴⁶⁴ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p.53.

period between 1968 and 1972 during the Demirel governments.⁴⁶⁵ At the time, the Turkish economy was a mixed economy based on import-substitution in order to provide industrialization through planned and protectionist economic policies with a mixture of foreign investment.⁴⁶⁶ Monetary policies were heavily controlled by the state and the full utilization of resources through the State Economic Enterprises was the main concern in order not to widen the gap in the balance of the budget and foreign trade.⁴⁶⁷ The new economic policy was a reversal of the liberalization efforts during the Democrat Party period. By the same token, it cannot be regarded to have been like the statism implemented in the 1930s because although the state was involved in the industrialization process, it did not control the economy as strictly as had happened in the 1930s. Consequently, the Justice Party period between 1965 and 1971 were the years of Turkey's ambition to achieve economic development through industrialization in a mixed economy.

Therefore, it can be argued that the economic objectives of the new government played a role in the determination of the framework of its foreign policy in the sense that although Turkey's loyalty to the United Nations and alliances with NATO and CENTO were reemphasized in its program, it was in the pursuit of a broader scope in Turkish foreign relations and the provision of foreign capital from different resources was one of the objectives of this government. As a result, the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and Arab countries were the leading principles of the program.⁴⁶⁸ The need for a broader foreign policy had been better

⁴⁶⁵ Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, p.22. See also, Kepenek, pp.145-150.

⁴⁶⁶ Kepenek, p.144.

⁴⁶⁷ Owen and Pamuk, p.150. See also, Yenal, pp.88-92, Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, p.8.

⁴⁶⁸ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.50-55.

understood during Cyprus Crisis of 1964, especially with US president Johnson's letter to İnönü in the eve of Turkey's intervention in the island. Therefore, the visit by the minister of foreign affairs, Feridun Cemal Erkin, to Moscow in late 1964 can be regarded as the first step in the development of relations with the Soviet Union. The decision that was taken in the United Nations' General Assembly on December 18, 1965 against Turkey's rights on Cyprus as a guarantor state reemphasized the isolation of Turkey in the international arena.⁴⁶⁹ Upon this decision, a general session was held in Grand National Assembly of Turkey with the participation of opposition parties and, as a result of discussions in the parliament, all parties jointly agreed that Turkey should have determined a "national" policy towards Cyprus in order to provide continuity and consistency. In addition, they decided that Turkey should have improved its relations with the countries in the non-Western world to alleviate its isolation in the international arena.⁴⁷⁰ Despite the unity of these decisions in the parliament, the parties were fragmented about the fundamentals of Turkey's foreign policy.

The principles of the Justice Party can be identified with those of its leader, Süleyman Demirel, who was a pragmatic politician. In other words, he was pro-Western, but did not refrain from collaboration with the communist Soviet Union in order to reach his main aim, which was to provide the economic development of Turkey through broadening the sources of financial cooperation and aid.⁴⁷¹ The Justice Party was in favor of the peaceful resolution of disputes, especially the

⁴⁶⁹ UN General Assembly Resolution No.2077, December 18, 1965. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/40/IMG/NR021840.pdf?OpenElement>

⁴⁷⁰ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.208.

⁴⁷¹ Adalet Partisi, *Milletin Hizmetinde Adalet Partisi 1965-1971* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkezi Yayınları, 1972), pp.46-50. See also, Vali, p.81.

Cyprus issue at the time in order to maximize the “national interests” of Turkey although the decision for intervention would be made in the crisis of 1967 between the two communities on the island.

The biggest opposition party in the parliament, the Republican People’s Party, was dominated by İsmet İnönü. The main framework of foreign policy was a pro-Western one without ignorance of the development of relations especially with the Soviet Union in the period of opposition in the parliament between 1965 and 1971.⁴⁷² It can be argued that the approach of the Republican People’s Party towards the foreign relations of Turkey was similar to the approach of the Justice Party in the sense that the relations with the West were the main components although the development of relations with the Soviet Union was on the agenda especially after the Johnson’s letter and the vote in the United Nations General Assembly in 1965 against Turkey’s right to intervene in Cyprus.

During the Justice Party period between 1965 and 1971, foreign affairs became an issue for the smaller opposition parties in the parliament, too. The Nation Party of Osman Bölükbaşı focused its attention on the Cyprus issue, the American bases in Turkey and the status of Turkish workers abroad. The party supported Turkey’s membership in NATO and opposed the development of relations with the communist Soviet Union. In national issues such as Cyprus, the Nation Party supported the parliamentary decisions, but criticized the İnönü and Demirel governments which implemented; it seemed to him, passive foreign policies towards the armed conflicts on the island.⁴⁷³ Bölükbaşı argued that Turkey should have taken

⁴⁷² Vali, p.83.

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p.89.

necessary measures as soon as possible to prevent Greece from reaching its aim of the “Megali Idea” through the realization of ENOSIS.⁴⁷⁴

The New Turkey Party supported the foreign policy of the government during the Cyprus conflict and believed that the membership in NATO as well as the development of relations with the Soviet Union was necessary for Turkish foreign policy.

The principles of the Republican Peasants National Party were similar to those of the right-wing parties in Turkey. The party was preoccupied with the Cyprus issue and anti-communism, especially after Alparslan Türkeş became the leader.

Ferenc Vali states that:

Türkeş believed that Turkey must rely on NATO and the United States, but that the alliance should be employed in conformity with Turkish national interests. He holds very strong views about Greece, which he believes has not abandoned the *Megali Idea* of establishing a Byzantine Empire on Turkish soil. He pleaded for the partition of Cyprus into two almost equal parts..... Russia remained the archenemy, although the present Soviet empire, it is believed, will eventually disintegrate and people’s subjugated by it will regain their independence. Türkeş favored cooperation against Nasser with some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco. He also blamed the government for its leniency toward leftist students and professors. The party favored nationalization of basic industries and mining, although it felt that light industry should remain in the hands of the private sector.⁴⁷⁵

The programs of the smaller right-wing parties in the parliament were similar to those of the Justice Party and these parties generally supported the governmental policies. On the other hand, the main criticism of Turkish foreign policy came from the Turkish Labor Party, which entered the parliament in 1965 elections. As a left-wing party, it can be regarded as the main opposition in the parliament both in

⁴⁷⁴ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Türk Siyasetinde Anadolu Fırtınası: Osman Bölükbaşı* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005), pp.390-396.

⁴⁷⁵ Vali, p.91.

domestic and foreign affairs. It advocated that Turkey should have radically changed its direction in its foreign affairs. For the Turkish Labor Party, Turkey should have implemented foreign policy principles during the presidency of Atatürk which emphasized the independence of Turkey. Therefore, the party emphasized the necessity of independence in the economy through a more cautious policy towards financial aid from and cooperation with the United States in order to seek a more independent foreign policy.⁴⁷⁶ Furthermore, the Turkish Labor Party was in favor of Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, a revision of the treaties with the United States that had been signed especially after membership in NATO, the departure of American troops from and closure of American bases in Turkey.⁴⁷⁷ The Cyprus thesis of the party was a reflection of its approach towards the United States and Turkish foreign policy. Cyprus had to be independent and the armed conflicts in the island had to end.⁴⁷⁸ Moreover, the Turkish Labor Party supported the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lastly, and most importantly, the Turkish Labor Party was in favor of Soviet communism not only in domestic, but also in foreign affairs.⁴⁷⁹

The diversity in the positions of parties in the parliament reflects the pursuit of a broader scope and the pursuit of change in Turkish foreign policy. It is possible to argue that although Turkish foreign policy was determined by the governing party, a vibrant political platform in the parliamentary discussions was the main feature of politics during the Justice Party governments between 1965 and 1971. The relations

⁴⁷⁶ Türkiye İşçi Partisi, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı* (İstanbul: Ersa Matbaacılık, 1964), pp.158-166.

⁴⁷⁷ Uğur Mumcu, *Aybar ile Söyleşi: Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1993), pp.43-45.

⁴⁷⁸ Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi* (İstanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1988), pp.236-237.

⁴⁷⁹ Vali, pp.96-97.

with the United States and the Cyprus crisis in 1967 would be the two main issues that provoked discussions in the parliament in this period.

The military avoided from involving not only domestic politics, but also the foreign affairs of Turkey except for the election of the president in March 1966 and the bill granting amnesty to the former democrats in July 1966. The former democrats were given pardons and the chief of the general staff Cevdet Sunay was elected fifth president of the Turkish Republic. Hale writes that:

Sunay's tenure of the presidency was important for the civilian-military rapprochement, since it gave the army a recognized voice at the top of the political establishment and inclined both sides towards preservation of status quo. This was reinforced by the increased powers which had been given to the National Security Council in 1962.⁴⁸⁰

In the Justice Party period, the main concern in Turkish foreign policy was the reconsideration of the relations with the United States and the development of relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab countries in consistency with the program of the government. More importantly, the Cyprus issue lost its priority in Turkish foreign policy after the crisis in 1967.

The late 1960s saw a reconsideration of Turkish-American relations. In this period, the bilateral agreements with the United States that had been made before the Justice Party period was one of the issues with which the government was preoccupied. Prime minister Süleyman Demirel and minister of foreign affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil declared that the Justice Party government would seek to scrutinize of agreements with the United States. The Turkish government gave a diplomatic note to the United States in April 1966 to scrutinize the agreements between the two countries, and in return the United States accepted this proposal.

⁴⁸⁰ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.173.

Between January 1967 and July 1969, efforts were made to incorporate all agreements that had been signed before.⁴⁸¹

Another issue of Turkish-American relations was the bases in Turkey that belonged to the United States. The existence of American bases caused reactions in the opposition and the leftist groups in the society that were against Turkey's membership in NATO. Through bilateral agreements, the United States military personnel in Turkey had obtained some privileges. For example, American military personnel had a private postal service, duty-free shops and immunity towards Turkish judiciary besides military concessions. The abuse of these privileges instigated anti-Americanism in Turkey.⁴⁸² The most conspicuous example of anti-Americanism was the reaction against the visit of the American Sixth Fleet to Istanbul in 1968. With the reconsideration of agreements, the United States reduced its personnel in Turkey and the remaining military personnel were ordered not to wander within society. In addition to the reduction of military personnel, the United States decided to leave the control of some bases to Turkish government.⁴⁸³

Another issue which had impact on Turkish-American relations was the new strategy of the United States in NATO: flexible response rather than collective response. This new strategy meant that NATO allies would not respond to a nuclear attack against a member state, while such an attack would be responded through conventional forces unless the threat would reach to a level of nuclear war.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸¹ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası 1964-1980* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995), pp.44-45.

⁴⁸² Armaoğlu, pp.822-823. See also, Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası 1964-1980*, pp.46-54.

⁴⁸³ Mehmet Gönülbol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası" in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p.512.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.516.

NATO's new strategy resulted in criticisms against Turkey's membership in NATO and enabled Turkey to seek better relations with the Soviet Union as well as with its neighbors in the region.

Lastly, the role that the United States played in the second Cyprus crisis that erupted in 1967 through the mediation of Cyrus Vance, the former secretary of defense in the United States who had been charged by president Johnson, was also important to Turkish-American relations.⁴⁸⁵

The period between 1964 and 1967 saw the deterioration of relations between the Turkish and Greek communities on Cyprus. With the change of governments both in Greece and Turkey, the possibility of a solution of Cyprus problem through diplomatic relations appeared because the Demirel government was explicitly in favor of a solution to the Cyprus problem through diplomatic relations.⁴⁸⁶ The Demirel government in Turkey and the Stephanopoulos government in Greece as guarantor states began preparations as early as 1966. Firstly, minister of foreign affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil met Greek minister of foreign affairs Toumbas in Paris, but they did not reach a solution. Later on, the prime ministers of the two countries came together in Keşan in Turkey and Alexandropoulis in Greece on September 9-10, 1967, respectively. Nevertheless, negotiations did not bring a solution to the problem.⁴⁸⁷ Demirel stated that in these negotiations, Greek prime

⁴⁸⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p.153.

⁴⁸⁶ Cihat Göktepe, "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no.41 (May 2005), p.434.

⁴⁸⁷ Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, p.123. See also, Göktepe, *The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations*, pp.434-435.

minister made him a proposal calling for the abandonment of the island to Greece in order for them to reach the aim of ENOSIS, but he refused the proposal.⁴⁸⁸

Two months after these negotiations, on November 1, 1967, Rauf Denktaş who was the leader of Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus, was arrested while entering the island. On November 2, 1967, Turkey demanded his release. His detention provoked the reaction of public opinion and on November 9 and 11, protest rallies were held in Eskişehir, Diyarbakır, Istanbul and Ankara to support Denktaş and demand Turkey's intervention to the island.⁴⁸⁹ Ultimately, Denktaş was released on November 13, 1967.⁴⁹⁰ Right after this crisis, on November 15, 1967, the Cypriot National Guard attacked and invaded the two villages, Kophinou and Agios Theodoros. The attack from the Cypriot National Guard caused widespread reaction in Turkey. Students protested the United States and the Demirel government in Turkey due to their inactive position towards the events in Cyprus.⁴⁹¹ Upon these events, the leader of the Republican People's Party, İsmet İnönü, was invited to the prime ministry for consultation about the strategy towards the crisis. İnönü warned prime minister Demirel about the risks of a military operation. He was in favor of the solution of the crisis through diplomatic channels as the government, but he declared that he would support the ultimate decision of the government whatever it would be.⁴⁹² Later on, the National Security Council came together and in the meeting, the military commanders and the ministry of foreign affairs were in favor of an intervention

⁴⁸⁸ Hulusi Turgut (ed.), *Süleyman Demirel: Devran* (İstanbul: ABC Medya Ajansı, 2006), p.618. See also, Papandreu, p.343, Tülümen, pp.117-119.

⁴⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 10-12 November 1967.

⁴⁹⁰ *Son Havadis*, 13 November 1967.

⁴⁹¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 17 November 1967.

⁴⁹² Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.163.

which was consistent with the decision of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on November 16, 1967, which authorized the government for a military operation.⁴⁹³ Despite the military backwardness, which had been the case during the crisis in 1964, too, the National Security Council decided to intervene in the island unless the two villages were evacuated. The decision was declared to archbishop Makarios and upon the evacuation of the villages by the Greek forces, the decision was not implemented.⁴⁹⁴ However, the Turkish Air Force made warning flights over the island.⁴⁹⁵

On November 17, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, minister of foreign affairs, gave a diplomatic note to the Greek ambassador which criticized the position of Greece and declared the necessary precautions in order to ameliorate the situation on the island, e.g., the recall of Grivas who was the leader of the attackers, the disbanding of the National Guard, the withdrawal of Greek troops from the island, the expansion of peace forces and the compensation of the losses of the Turkish Cypriots who had been involved. Greece replied that Turkey and Greece should have acted jointly in order to ameliorate the situation in the island and accepted to negotiate Turkey although this response did not satisfy Turkey.⁴⁹⁶

With the mediation of Cyrus Vance, the crisis on the island was resolved when the Greek government agreed to withdraw its troops from the island, disband

⁴⁹³ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.7.

⁴⁹⁴ Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, p.125.

⁴⁹⁵ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1993), p.89.

⁴⁹⁶ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.224-225.

National Guard and recall Grivas on November 30, 1967.⁴⁹⁷ Consequently, the Cyprus crisis in 1967 was appeased through diplomatic relations and in the solution of the crisis, the actors in the decision making process such as the prime ministry, the opposition and the military acted jointly. However, in the press, there was a split although it was commonly argued that Turkey should have militarily intervened in the island. On the one hand, İlhan Selçuk and Ecvet Güresin from *Cumhuriyet* and Abdi İpekçi and Metin Toker from *Milliyet* supported the decision of intervention, but they also criticized the Demirel government for acting passively on the issue.⁴⁹⁸ By the same token, Ahmet Kabaklı, Kadircan Kafılı and Cihad Baban from *Tercüman* and Mümtaz Faik Fenik and Orhan Seyfi Orhon from *Son Havadis* supported the policy of the Demirel government and criticized the opposition parties and press with the claim that “national unity” was needed in order to handle the crisis on the island successfully.⁴⁹⁹

In the Cyprus crisis of 1967, as the positions of domestic actors, the positions of foreign actors and especially the Soviet Union deserve attention in addition to the mediator position of the United States. The Soviet Union opposed the junta in Athens and did not criticize the expected Turkish invasion of the island.⁵⁰⁰ The support of the Soviet Union can be regarded as an outcome of developing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the first Cyprus crisis in 1964. The efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union had intensified especially during the last coalition of İnönü governments and the Justice Party followed the way to

⁴⁹⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p.153. See also, Aksu, *Zorlayıcı Diplomasi*, p.127, Tülümen, pp.126-127.

⁴⁹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 23-30 November 1967, *Milliyet*, 16-25 November 1967.

⁴⁹⁹ *Tercüman*, 23-25 November 1967, *Son Havadis*, 18 November-1 December 1967.

⁵⁰⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p.154.

obtain the required assistance for Turkey especially in the economic realm. Therefore, Turkish-Soviet relations exceeded the scope of political cooperation and included economic collaboration between the two countries. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil argued that despite ideological difference between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the two countries could cooperate and have good relations.⁵⁰¹ Turkey and the Soviet Union signed bilateral agreements in order to broaden the limits of trade and technical assistance, such as the one that was signed on February 18, 1966.⁵⁰² Moreover, the Soviet Union sponsored heavy industry investments in Turkey, such as iron and steel, refinery, aluminum and alcohol facilities with an agreement that was signed on March 25, 1967.⁵⁰³

Political relations continued through reciprocal visits between two countries. For example, in July 1966 a Turkish delegation visited Moscow, which was succeeded by Soviet prime minister Kosygin's visit to Ankara in December 1966. During his visit, Kosygin declared that the Soviet Union was against ENOSIS on Cyprus and this declaration caused a denunciation by the Greek Cypriots on the island.⁵⁰⁴ Turkish prime minister Demirel visited Moscow on September 19-29, 1967 on the eve of the second Cyprus crisis. In the final declaration of Demirel's visit, the two countries agreed upon the protection of peace and security, disarmament especially as a joint reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, the Vietnam War and the Cyprus conflict. In the following years, Turkish-Soviet relations continued to develop not only in the economic field, but also in the political

⁵⁰¹ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.231.

⁵⁰² Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.5.

⁵⁰³ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.6.

⁵⁰⁴ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp.232-233.

field. However, the development of Turkish-Soviet relations did not mean that Turkey distanced itself from the Western bloc. Demirel's ambition for economic development and the decrease of financial aid from the United States resulted in the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. In other words, relations with the Soviet Union were not an alternative to Turkish-American relations, but a complementary for Turkey's relations with the other superpower of the Cold War.⁵⁰⁵

In addition to the development of relations with the Soviet Union, the second component of the Justice Party government's efforts to broaden its foreign policy was the improvement of relations with the Arab countries. The first opportunity came with the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 during which Turkey declared that the United States could not operate its bases in Turkey against the Arabs in support of Israel. Moreover, Turkey gave aid to Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the form of food and clothing. Turkey supported the Arab countries in the negotiations and sessions in the United Nations. For example, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil declared that Turkey was against the territorial gains and changes imposed by Israel in the region. Turkey's efforts in favor of the Arab countries in the Arab-Israeli War gained sympathy in the Middle East.

In addition to its position in the conflict, Turkey obtained another opportunity to affiliate with Muslim countries as well as Arab ones with the fire in *Mescid-i Aksa*, which is a holy place in Jerusalem and important for Muslims, on August 21, 1969. Upon this event, Turkey took a position with the Muslim world and participated in the Islamic Summit Conference in the capital of Morocco on September 22-25, 1969 with its minister of foreign affairs.⁵⁰⁶ Turkey's participation

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., pp.234-237.

⁵⁰⁶ The Final Declaration of the 1st Islamic Summit Conference, September 22-25, 1969. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/1/DecReport-1st%20IS.htm>

at the conference was harshly criticized by the opposition and society with the claim that as a secular state Turkey should not have participated in such a conference.

Despite these efforts to affiliate with the countries in the Middle East, Turkey did not have an active regional policy until the fourth Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973 as the result of domestic conflicts and instability in Turkey especially after 1968.⁵⁰⁷

The efforts to expand the scope of Turkish foreign policy intensely continued between 1965 and 1968. However, as the result of domestic instability stemming from political polarization and radicalism, the Justice Party government had to focus more on domestic politics in need of the protection of its power. In the 1969 general elections, the Justice Party gained the majority of vote despite an overall decrease in votes.⁵⁰⁸ The election results showed the fragmentation in the political spectrum and, more importantly, that smaller parties had become more marginalized and polarized. Furthermore, in 1970, Necmettin Erbakan from the religious wing of the Justice Party founded his own party: the National Order Party. The Republican Peasants National Party was turned into National Action Party in 1969 under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş.

In the late 1960s, the fragmentation of politics reflected in society with the impact of an economic crisis. Despite the high rate of economic development, the high rate of inflation and unemployment occurred due to the negligence of the Justice Party government in the implementation of the planned economy. In other words, the

⁵⁰⁷ Armaoğlu, 20. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.847-849.

⁵⁰⁸ In the 1969 general elections, the Justice Party gained 46.55% of votes and 256 seats in the parliament, the Republican People's Party obtained 27.37% of votes and 143 seats in the parliament, the Reliance Party won 6.58% of votes and 15 seats in the parliament, the New Turkey Party gained 2.18% of votes and 6 seats in the parliament, the Turkish Labor Party obtained 2.68% of votes and 2 seats in the parliament, the Nation Party gained 3.22% of votes and 6 seats in the parliament and lastly, the National Action Party, which replaced the Republican Peasants Nation Party, held 2.2% of votes and 11 seats in the parliament.

http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=6

lack of control over monetary policies and the rise of public expenditure especially in the form of subsidies resulted in an economic crisis.⁵⁰⁹ In addition to the economic crisis, the ideological polarization between leftists and rightists peaked in early 1971. The universities were in chaos and students became militant, who were attacking American staff as well as looting and killing each other. Factories were on strike and production facilities were about to stop.⁵¹⁰

As a result of all these, the Demirel government was in a desperate position and in addition to this, Demirel lost the control within his party. Ultimately, the general staff decided to force Demirel to resign and sent a memorandum to president Cevdet Sunay and the presidents of the senate and grand national assembly demanding Demirel's resignation. They were determined to take over the government unless Demirel resigned. Upon this demand from the military, Demirel resigned and the Justice Party period came to an end. It was succeeded by weak caretaker governments actively supported and controlled by the military.⁵¹¹

Concluding Remarks

It can be argued that president Cevdet Sunay was not actively involved as his predecessor president Gürsel was not involved in the foreign policy decision making process with reference to his inactive position during the Cyprus crisis because he was a former chief of general staff and not experienced in foreign policy issues. Therefore, he was not involved in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy except for his ceremonial duties and visits to foreign countries.

⁵⁰⁹ Yenal, p.92.

⁵¹⁰ Ahmad, pp. 172-175.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., p.176.

Prime minister Demirel as a pragmatic politician was involved in foreign affairs especially for the extension of the scope of Turkey's foreign policy options stemming from the importance ascribed to the economic development of the country. Nevertheless, as Ercüment Yavuzalp argues, Demirel was not preoccupied with the daily routine of Turkish foreign policy. Demirel pursued a cautious and moderate foreign policy which was far from adventurous for the benefit of the country and did not attempt to change the traditional agenda of Turkish foreign policy. His position was not as an ultimate decision making authority like that of İnönü, but as a kind of a coordinator between the different actors involved in foreign policy because he was well-aware of the necessity of consultation in the formation of foreign policy.⁵¹²

In the Justice Party period, the daily routine of Turkish foreign policy was determined by the ministry of foreign affairs and the minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil. Çağlayangil was a former bureaucrat in contrast to his predecessors Selim Sarper and Feridun Cemal Erkin who were diplomats. Nevertheless, as an experienced statesman, Demirel says, he worked for ten years in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy thanks to his success in personal relationships and played a significant role in the extension of Turkey's foreign relations.⁵¹³ On the other hand, Temel İskit states that despite the efforts of Çağlayangil to open up the ministry, the ministry of foreign affairs tried to keep its autonomy and monopoly in the formation of foreign affairs and perceived politicians as the signatories of the decisions made by the bureaucrats of the ministry.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹² Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p.146. See also Aksu, pp.129-132.

⁵¹³ Nil Tuncer, "Süleyman Demirel" in *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, ed. Ali Faik Demir (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007), p.152.

⁵¹⁴ İskit, p.442.

Consequently, the role of the foreign ministry and minister in the decision making process was enhanced in the Justice Party period.

Although the Justice Party period ended with a military memorandum, the role of the military in foreign policy decision making process, except the Cyprus crisis in 1967, was minimal. Demirel's cautious policy towards the military and Sunay's presidency as a former chief of general staff might have prevented the military from getting involved in foreign affairs. Regardless of all these possibilities, it is clear that during the Justice Party period, the military was not an active participant of foreign affairs despite its role in the National Security Council.

On the other hand, the parliament became a platform of policy discussion. The main opposition came from the Turkish Labor Party especially until the 1969 elections. The Turkish Labor Party was in favor of a radical transformation of the principles of Turkish foreign policy and its policy can be regarded of an anti-American or pro-Soviet in character. The Turkish Labor Party was critical of the American bases and personnel in Turkey in addition to the Cyprus policy of the government. Moreover, the party was also critical of the domestic policy of the government which was based on liberalization and free enterprise as opposed to the other parties in the parliament. On the other hand, İsmet İnönü, as the leader of the main opposition party, was an important figure with whom prime minister Demirel consulted on critical foreign policy issues such as the Cyprus crisis. The fragmentation in the parliament reflected the fragmentation and polarization in society and the press with the rise of radical right and the radical left in the late 1960s.

In the late 1960s, social mobilization peaked especially among workers and university students. Sezer argues that university students were important for the

formation of public opinion because they were reckless thanks to their dynamism, thus they were able to voice their opinions and demands.⁵¹⁵ With the intensification of the efforts to reconsider Turkish foreign policy in the Justice Party period, university students were easily mobilized and polarized. In the late 1960s, the majority of university students were involved in public meetings, demonstrations, press releases and such kinds of activities. The main opposition was towards American military bases and personnel in Turkey and the main issue was Cyprus in this period on the ground that Turkey's foreign policy was not in keeping with Kemalist principles. As university students, university professors and intellectuals voiced their opinions on foreign policy issues.⁵¹⁶

Like the public opinion, the press was another medium for the discussion of foreign policy issues in this period and there was a division of opinions in the press. *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* were the newspapers which were closer to the Republican People's Party and they were critical of the government's policy as can be seen during the Cyprus crisis although they were in favor of the status quo in Turkey's foreign relations. On the other hand, *Tercüman* and *Son Havadis* were closer to the Justice Party and supported the policies of the government and the status quo in Turkish foreign policy.

Consequently, during the Justice Party period, many actors were involved in Turkish foreign policy although their impact on the ultimate decisions is a matter of question because when the official state policies, the ideologies and positions of political parties in the parliament, the mobilization of the public opinion and the press are taken into consideration and compared with each other, it can be argued

⁵¹⁵ Sezer, p.347.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., pp.346-353.

that the foreign policy of this period was open to discussion although ultimate decisions were mainly consistent with the objectives of the government rather than with those of the actors outside the government.

The Transition Period after the 1971 Memorandum
(March 26, 1971-October 14, 1973)

On March 12, 1971, the Turkish armed forces staged a coup and forced prime minister Süleyman Demirel to resign. In the declaration of the general staff, it was stated that parliament and the government were responsible for the anarchy and unrest in the country, thus, a new government had to be formed to save the country from its chaotic situation and to carry out the necessary reforms. The military was in favor of a non-partisan government for the preservation of law and order in the country, but they would not be directly involved in the government. Feroz Ahmad argues that the military did not actively participated in the government because they had taken a lesson from the military intervention in Greece in 1967.⁵¹⁷ Therefore, to provide the balance between the military and civilians, president Sunay appointed Nihat Erim, who had resigned from the Republican People's Party, in order to form the new government.

On March 26, 1971 Nihat Erim formed his first government which was composed of five MPs from the Justice Party, three MPs from the Republican People's Party, one member of the National Unity group and fourteen technocrats outside the parliament.⁵¹⁸ The Erim government had an assertive program not only for domestic, but also for foreign affairs. Therefore, the government aimed to provide

⁵¹⁷ Ahmad, p.178.

⁵¹⁸ Hikmet Özdemir, "Siyasi Tarih 1960-1980" in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed.Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), p.262.

law and order in the country in addition to undertake socio-economic reforms in terms of land reform, land tax, the nationalization of the mineral industry and the protection of Turkish industry.⁵¹⁹ The Erim government aimed at pursuing a realist, scientific and active foreign policy in which the relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, neighboring countries in the Middle East were to be developed. The loyalty to the principles of the United Nations and NATO were restated.⁵²⁰

Nevertheless, the instability and unrest within the society prevented the Erim government to seek an active foreign policy as was intended in its program. In April 1971, the attacks from the Turkish People's Liberation Army (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*) which was a supporter of a communist and anti-American ideology intensified. In response, on April 27, the National Security Council proclaimed martial law in eleven provinces including the big cities⁵²¹ and the military began to arrest people who were suspected of terrorism. On May 22, the Israeli consul in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom, was kidnapped and killed by the Turkish People's Liberation Front (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi*).⁵²² In this chaotic situation, on May 20 and July 20 1971, the National Order Party and the Turkish Labor Party were banned.⁵²³

⁵¹⁹ Zürcher, p.271.

⁵²⁰ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.63-65.

⁵²¹ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.10.

⁵²² The Turkish People's Liberation Army and the Turkish People's Liberation Front were different fractions which were common in their communist ideology and anti-American stance. For more detailed information see, Jacob M.Landau, *Türkiye'de Sağ Ve Sol Akımlar* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1979), pp.61-63. See also, Aclan Sayılğan, *Türkiye'de Sol Hareketler* (İstanbul: Otağ Yayınları, 1976), pp.534-558.

⁵²³ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.11.

Although the Erim government did not achieve any progress on the reforms, it made amendments to the 1961 constitution, which had been called “radically democratic”, to curb the scope of freedoms. Through these amendments the government was given the power to suspend civil liberties under certain circumstances. The autonomy of radio, television and the university system were ended. Freedom of the press was limited and, more importantly, the role of the National Security Council was extended to give “binding” advice to the cabinet in the decision making process.⁵²⁴ These amendments realized the political reforms that were aimed by the new regime, although socio-economic reforms such as the land reform and the land tax did not come into existence. Ahmad argues that Süleyman Demirel caused a crisis situation in the cabinet upon the possibility of socio-economic reforms through the attempt to withdraw the Justice Party ministers from the cabinet because he was not in favor of land reform or a land tax which would possibly result in a decrease in the votes of his party.⁵²⁵ As a result of the reconciliation of the armed forces and Demirel, the ministers of the Justice Party stayed in the government, while the first Erim government resigned in December 1971. The new government was formed again by Nihat Erim, who stayed in power until April 1972.

Between April 1972 and January 1974, the formation of the coalition government between the Republican People’s Party and the National Salvation Party after the first elections after the military memorandum, three successive governments were formed. Ferit Melen (May 22, 1972-April 15, 1973) and Naim Talu (April 15,

⁵²⁴ Amendment to Article 121 of the 1961 constitution regulated the status of radios and televisions, Article 120 regulated the status of universities, Article 22 regulated the status of press and Article 111 regulated the status of the National Security Council.

⁵²⁵ Ahmad, p.182.

1973-January 1, 1974) served as prime ministers. All were closer to the Justice Party tradition. In the meantime, a dramatic change occurred within the Republican People's Party: İsmet İnönü lost the intra-party election to Bülent Ecevit, the former secretary general of the party, in 1972. Ecevit was critical of the military memorandum and in favor of the civilianization of the regime.

The presidential elections became a contentious issue between the civilians and the military. The military was in favor of the succession of Cevdet Sunay by Faruk Gürler, who was the former chief of the general staff. The Justice Party, headed by Demirel, and the Republican People's Party, headed by Ecevit, agreed that it should not have become traditional to elect the president from the chief of the general staff. Ultimately, after repeated ballots, Fahri Korutürk, who was a retired admiral and senator, was elected sixth president of Turkey.⁵²⁶ The transition period, which was full of internal political instability in the post-memorandum era, ended with a return to party politics with the October 1973 general elections.

In this period, the main issue that Turkey had to face in its foreign relations was the pressure to ban of cultivation of opium in Turkey by the United States. Opium was legally cultivated in Turkey for use in the production of painkilling drugs. The Nixon administration was preoccupied with the heroin addiction in the United States and determined to prevent Turkey and some other source countries from cultivating opium. The main aim was to restrict the illegal market and Turkey was one of the main countries which cultivated opium.⁵²⁷ Although it was an income source of farmers in Turkey, the Nihat Erim government implemented a ban on the production of opium poppies completely in Autumn 1972 in return for financial aid

⁵²⁶ Zürcher, p.274.

⁵²⁷ Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, pp.702-703.

from the United States.⁵²⁸ Besides the opium issue, the Erim government was in pursuit of traditional Turkish foreign policy in which the United States was the main ally and the Soviet Union was a big neighbor of which Turkey had to be cautious.

Consequently, Turkish politics in the period between the 1971 military memorandum to the 1973 general elections were inward-looking, which allowed successive coalition governments that were formed by Nihat Erim, Ferit Melen and Naim Talu to establish order in the country and to pursue political and socio-economic reforms. In foreign affairs, despite the aim of governments to seek an active policy, it was a period of status quo without any drastic development.

Concluding Remarks

President Sunay played a conciliatory role between the military and civilian actors especially in domestic politics while prime ministers Nihat Erim, Ferit Melen and Naim Talu acted as the leaders of transition governments in which there was no development in foreign policy objectives and implementation.

The military was the main actor in the post-memorandum period and the civilian authority acted under its influence. In this period, the main objective of the military was the formation of governments which could implement the provisions of the memorandum. In this way they controlled the political agenda of Turkey.

The domination of the military in politics can be regarded as an impediment to the role that the parliament played in Turkish domestic and foreign politics. Moreover, the banning of the National Order Party and the Turkish Labor Party negatively affected the parliamentary democracy in Turkey and subdued the opposition in the parliament, especially the Turkish Labor Party.

⁵²⁸ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.11.

Moreover, the amendments to the 1961 constitution curtailed the freedoms of civil society and the press as the main platforms of discussion for policies. Therefore, especially with the declaration of martial law, the civil society and press lost their dynamism in the period between 1965 and 1971.⁵²⁹

The Coalitions Period (January 26, 1974-September 12, 1980)

In the elections on October 14, 1973 the Republican People's Party won the majority of votes although it could not form a single-party government. The Justice Party became the second party and it was expected that the Republican People's Party, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, and the Justice Party, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, would form a coalition government because they obtained a 3/4 majority in the parliament together.⁵³⁰ Nevertheless, as Ahmad states, Demirel refused to join a coalition with Ecevit because the new government had to deal with the global economic crisis which might have necessitated taking severe measures to the disadvantage of political support behind the coalition partners. Therefore, Demirel positioned himself to the opposition in the parliament.⁵³¹ After a three month lag for the formation of the new government, a coalition between the Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party on January 26, 1974 was formed in which Bülent Ecevit was the prime minister and Necmettin Erbakan was

⁵²⁹ Sezer, p.539.

⁵³⁰ In the 1973 general elections, the Republican People's Party obtained 33.29% of votes and 185 seats in the parliament, the Justice Party gained 29.82% of votes and 149 seats in the parliament, the National Salvation Party won 11.8% of votes and 48 seats in the parliament, the Democratic Party gained 11.89% of votes and 45 seats in the parliament, the Republican Reliance Party won 5.26% of votes and 13 seats in the parliament, the National Action Party gained 3.38% of votes and 3 seats in the parliament and the independents obtained 2.8% of votes and 6 seats in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=7

⁵³¹ Ahmad, p.191.

deputy prime minister. Zürcher points out that the Republican People's Party-National Salvation Party government was "a marriage of convenience" which, nevertheless, had some common basis in distrust of European and American influence and of big business.⁵³² Despite some common principles that two parties shared such as the protection of civil rights and liberties, economic development based on social justice, the protection of small business, the nationalization of minerals and oil and the establishment of heavy industry, there were many differences between the coalition partners especially regarding foreign policy. The National Salvation Party was against the involvement of the United States, Europe and Common Market in Turkey and, therefore, thought that the ties with the West had to be cut and Turkey should have cooperated with the Islamic countries in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Republican People's Party did not share this position in the sense that it was not against the involvement of the United States and Europe in Turkey. As a social democrat, Ecevit was fond of Scandinavian social democracy and he was in pursuit of the development of relations with the countries in this region.

The program of the new coalition government stated that the government would seek a foreign policy program within the framework of the United Nations' principles. Moreover, the development of relations with allies and neighbors was a priority for the new government. The independence of former colonies and the efforts at peace in the Middle East were applauded. The rights of Turks in foreign countries had to be protected. In addition to all these, the Cyprus issue and the Aegean dispute were emphasized by the new government.⁵³³ The new government

⁵³² Zürcher, p.274.

⁵³³ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.74-75.

received a vote of confidence in February 1974. In May 1974, an amnesty law was passed and the people who had been sentenced before the Republican People's Party -National Salvation Party government for ideological or political crimes were released. In addition, on July 1, the ban on the cultivation of opium poppies was lifted, which was imposed during Erim government right after the military memorandum on March 12, 1971, despite the pressure from the United States.⁵³⁴ The freedom of opium cultivation was supported by the press.⁵³⁵

Ecevit almost resigned right after the formation of the new government when the tension arose between coalition partners. However, the new Cyprus Crisis changed the course of events in Turkey's domestic and foreign affairs.⁵³⁶ The negotiations between the two communities on Cyprus had not reached a solution and the relations deteriorated until mid-1974. In the meantime, a new dispute emerged between Greece and Turkey over the oil exploration of the Turkish ship *Çandarlı* in the international waters of the Aegean Sea between May 29 and June 4, 1974 with the authorization of the Turkish government based on permission granted on November 1, 1973. The Greek government sent a naval force to the region and on June 14, protested Turkey's action with the claim that its rights on its continental shelf had been violated. Turkey rejected the Greek protest.⁵³⁷

In addition to the continental shelf, territorial waters became an issue when Greece declared it was expanding its territorial waters from six to twelve miles. In

⁵³⁴ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.13.

⁵³⁵ *Milliyet*, 3 July 1974, *Tercüman*, 6-8 July 1974.

⁵³⁶ Ahmad, p.195.

⁵³⁷ The Document on the Aegean Dispute between Turkey and Greece to the International Court of Justice-Application by the Greek Government on August 10, 1976, p.7. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/9481.pdf>

return, Turkey protested the Greek attempts to change the status quo in the Aegean Sea.⁵³⁸ However, the problems in the Aegean had to wait until 1975 to dominate Turkish-Greek relations because of the eruption of the Cyprus crisis in July 1974.

The junta government in Greece, opposed to Makarios on Cyprus, sought to topple his government because they saw him as an impediment to their realization of ENOSIS. Therefore, on July 15, 1974, the National Guards Union (*Milli Muhafız Birliđi*) on Cyprus, which was under the control of the junta government in Greece, bombed the palace of president Makarios. Nikos Sampson, who was a member of EOKA, the organization that acted to realize ENOSIS, declared the foundation of the Hellenic Cyprus state with himself as president.⁵³⁹

The military coup on Cyprus forced Turkey to take action because it was an unexpected attempt to change the status quo on the island. In the same night, the National Security Council came together under the leadership of president Korutürk and Ecevit authorized the Turkish armed forces to make the necessary preparations for a military intervention on Cyprus. The intervention was necessary to prevent Greece from controlling the Mediterranean and to save the Turks on the island. Birand writes that in the meeting of the National Security Council, Korutürk was not involved in the decision making process, but he finally declared his approval for the intervention.⁵⁴⁰

After the decision for a military intervention, Ecevit met the leaders of the opposition parties on July 16, 1974. Ferruh Bozbeyli, the leader of the Democratic Party, supported the decision for a military intervention because he thought that

⁵³⁸ Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1923-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.751.

⁵³⁹ Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.187. See also, İnanç, p.25.

⁵⁴⁰ Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.198.

Cyprus was an issue between Turkey and Greece, not between the two communities in the island. More importantly, he argued that the Zurich-London agreements had been violated. On the other hand, Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party, and Turhan Feyzioğlu, the leader of the Republican Reliance Party, were in favor of the solution of the problem through diplomacy because a military intervention might cause the deterioration of Turkey's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁴¹

The press uniformly supported the military intervention on the island. The editor of *Cumhuriyet*, Nadir Nadi, writers Ali Sirmen and Oktay Akbal; the editor of *Milliyet*, Abdi İpekçi, and writers Mümtaz Soysal, Sami Kohen; and the writers Ahmet Kabaklı and Güneri Cıvaoğlu from *Tercüman* agreed on the necessity of the military intervention and supported the policy of the government.⁵⁴² *Son Havadis*, however, while it supported the necessity of military intervention, it put emphasis on the criticisms of the opposition parties of the government policy.⁵⁴³

Besides the developments in Turkey towards the crisis on Cyprus, in the international arena, the European states had agreed that the constitutional order had deteriorated on Cyprus and they denounced Greece. The Soviet Union and Third World countries explicitly blamed Greece for its support on the Sampson regime. The United States did accept the deterioration of constitutional order on the island, but did not denounce Greece or Sampson. Therefore, Turkey was in a position to legitimize its intervention on the island as a guarantor state.

⁵⁴¹ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), pp.54-58.

⁵⁴² *Cumhuriyet*, 17-18 July 1974, *Milliyet*, 19 July 1974, *Tercüman*, 17-19 July 1974.

⁵⁴³ *Son Havadis*, 17-20 July 1974.

In order to take a joint action with Britain, Ecevit visited London and met prime minister Wilson and minister of foreign affairs Callaghan on July 17, 1974. In the meantime, US secretary of state Henry Kissinger sent his representative Joseph Sisco to London in order to meet Ecevit.⁵⁴⁴ Ecevit, however, was unable to acquire support for a joint intervention from either the guarantor state Britain or the United States.⁵⁴⁵ Armaoğlu states that England was of the opinion that the developments on Cyprus would be discussed at NATO and in the United Nations; therefore, English politicians had not presumed a unilateral Turkish intervention on Cyprus. Despite the pressure on Greece by the United States, the junta government did not accept the resignation of the Sampson regime in the island because Greece had not presumed a Turkish intervention to the island, either.⁵⁴⁶

After the failure of diplomatic efforts, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey made a decision on the intervention in the island on July 20, 1974.⁵⁴⁷ Turkish troops landed on Cyprus with the support of the air force. Ecevit declared that Turkish intervention was aimed to bring peace to the island both for the Turks and Greeks living together.⁵⁴⁸ The military operation lasted two days, until Turkey accepted the calls for cease-fire by the United Nations' Security Council Resolution on July 22, 1974⁵⁴⁹ and attended the Geneva Conferences. The cease-fire was

⁵⁴⁴ Tülümen, pp.39-40. See also, Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*, p.85.

⁵⁴⁵ Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.742.

⁵⁴⁶ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.803.

⁵⁴⁷ Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 5th series, vol.13.

⁵⁴⁸ Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*, p.128.

⁵⁴⁹ UN Security Council Resolution No.353, July 20, 1974.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/72/IMG/NR028972.pdf?OpenElement>

supported by the press except for some criticisms. *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Tercüman* emphasized the success of the government and the military. Furthermore, the majority of the writers at these newspapers stressed the necessity of “national unity” in order to reach the intended outcome through the realization of government’s federation thesis for the future of Cyprus.⁵⁵⁰ *Son Havadis* continued its criticisms of the policy and especially the writer Tekin Erer criticized the decision of cease-fire. Moreover, the newspaper continued to emphasize the position of the opposition and published the opinions of the opposition leaders Demirel and Türkeş, who criticized the government.⁵⁵¹

After the military intervention, the first Geneva Conference was held between July 25 and 30, 1974 with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs of the three guarantor states England, Greece and Turkey, under the monitoring of the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conference, Turkey was represented by minister of foreign affairs Turan Güneş. Turkey’s aims in the conference were an agreement both on cease-fire and the establishment of peace on the island, a federal state including two distinct communities, a Turkish security force to protect the Turkish community, no binding schedule for Turkish troops’ withdrawal from the island, no United Nations’ security force around Turkish military forces, the appointment of Denktaş to the vice-presidency in Cyprus administration and a Cyprus conference with the participation of the two communities on the island in addition to the guarantor states within a week. Greece attended the Geneva conference in order to reach its aims that only the ceasefire should be discussed at the conference, Turkish troops should be withdrawn

⁵⁵⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 23-26 July 1974, *Milliyet*, 23-26 July 1974, *Tercüman*, 23-26 July 1974.

⁵⁵¹ *Son Havadis*, 26-30 July 1974.

immediately from the island and any discussion should be held with regard to peace and constitutional order on the island.⁵⁵²

At the end of the first Geneva Conference a protocol was signed which stated that some vital measures needed to be taken before the reestablishment of constitutional order: the parties were not to expand the territories which were set at 12.00 pm on July 31, 1974, United Nations forces were to control a security area between the two communities, the areas belonging to Turkey were to be controlled by the United Nations, and Greek forces were to withdraw from these areas. In order to reestablish constitutional order on the island, the foreign ministers of three guarantors were to come together in Geneva for a second time. Until that time, Rauf Denktaş was to act as president of the island.⁵⁵³ As Fırat states, the first Geneva Conference was a diplomatic success for Turkey because the legitimacy of military intervention was recognized and the status of the island as a bi-communal state was accepted.⁵⁵⁴

The second Geneva Conference was held between 8 and 14 August, 1974 to discuss the constitutional order of the island with the participation of the representatives of the island's two communities, Denktaş and Klerides. Before the conference, Turkey completed its federation thesis and Ecevit declared to minister of foreign affairs Turan Güneş the possibility of a second military intervention unless an agreement was reached at the conference. The Turkish army was in favor of a second operation due to the fact that Turkish troops were gathered in a small area and

⁵⁵² Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.391. See also, Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.744.

⁵⁵³ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.805. See also, İnanç, p.33.

⁵⁵⁴ Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.746. See also, Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.391.

open to any threat from the outside. At the second conference, Denktaş made his proposal in order to establish a federal and bi-communal state. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs declared to his English counterpart that Turkey was not insistent on a federation and, thus, a cantonal state was also acceptable. Klerides, as the representative of Greek Cypriots, was opposed to a radical change. He was in favor the re-establishment of constitutional order on the island.⁵⁵⁵

Consequently, as a result of these three irreconcilable theses from parties, the second Geneva Conference ended without any solution. Upon the failure to reach a solution at the second Geneva Conference, Turkey launched the second military intervention on August 14, 1974. Within two days, Turkish troops reached the Magosa-Nicosia-Lefke-Kokkina line and controlled the 40% of the island.⁵⁵⁶ Upon the United Nations' Security Council Resolution No.360,⁵⁵⁷ Turkey terminated the operation on August 16, 1974. The second operation and cease-fire were also supported by *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Tercüman*.⁵⁵⁸ Although *Son Havadis* supported the second intervention, the writers Ziyad Ebüzziya and Tekin Erer argued that Turkey should have invaded all of the island rather than accepting a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal state. Moreover, they attributed the success of the military intervention to the Justice Party for its role in the preparation of the army for such an operation after the failed attempt of military intervention in Cyprus in 1967.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁵ Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.747. See also, Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Öyküsü*, p.392.

⁵⁵⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 August 1974.

⁵⁵⁷ UN Security Council Resolution No.360, August 16, 1974.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/79/IMG/NR028979.pdf?OpenElement>

⁵⁵⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 15-18 August 1974, *Milliyet*, 15-17 August 1974, *Tercüman*, 15-17 August 1974.

⁵⁵⁹ *Son Havadis*, 16-23 August 1974.

At the same time, in contrast to the reaction after the first intervention by the international community, which had accepted the legitimacy of the operation by Turkey, the second military intervention resulted in significant outcomes for Turkey in the international arena because Turkey's second operation was regarded as "invasion" and Turkey was denounced at the end of the second operation.⁵⁶⁰ In the long run, the most important reaction in the international arena was the US arms embargo that was imposed on Turkey from 1975 onwards.

Despite the reactions in the international arena, Ecevit became a national hero. His partner in the coalition, Erbakan, resented his rising popularity and began to strain their relations. Even though the two coalition partners agreed on the intervention on Cyprus, after the operation, the relations between two parties deteriorated. Erbakan began to criticize the Cyprus policy of the Republican People's Party and said that all of the island should have been invaded.⁵⁶¹ Moreover, rather than a federation, the division of the island between the two communities was the alternative policy of the National Salvation Party because of doubts that a federation could be a permanent solution in the island.⁵⁶²

Ultimately Ecevit's visit to Scandinavia in September 1974 became a turning point in the coalition. Ecevit did not give the procuration to Erbakan while he was away because of his distrust of his coalition partner; in return, Erbakan did not approve Ecevit's visit as the deputy prime minister. As a result of the break off between the two coalition partners, Ecevit tendered his resignation with a call for early elections on September 16, 1974. He believed that the Republican People's

⁵⁶⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet: Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Üzerinde Uluslararası Pazarlıklar 1974-1980* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1987), pp.24-25.

⁵⁶¹ Özdemir, p.272.

⁵⁶² Mümin İslamoğlu, *Erbakan Ecevit'e Karşı* (İstanbul: Tüba Yayınları, 1974), p.23.

Party would increase its votes in a possible general election. The other parties in the parliament did not approve the decision for general elections.

The end of Republican People's Party-National Salvation Party coalition started a period of governmental crisis which ended with the appointment of Sadi Irmak by the president to form a government run by technocrats. Irmak formed his government on November 17, 1974, but his government failed to win a vote of confidence from the parliament. Even so, it governed Turkey until the end of March 1975.⁵⁶³ In the Irmak government's program, the development of relations with the United States and the European Economic Community as well as relations with the states in the Balkans and Middle East were emphasized. Moreover, the severity of the conflicts with Greece, especially the Cyprus issue, was emphasized.⁵⁶⁴ It can be argued that the Irmak government had a pro-Western foreign policy framework in comparison to that of the Republican People's Party-National Salvation Party coalition which had put emphasis on the independence of Turkey in its foreign relations.

The impact of the Cyprus intervention was felt deeply during the Irmak government in terms of the relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and conflicts with Greece in the Aegean Sea. Under the pressure of the Greek lobby in the United States, the Senate and the House of Representatives made decisions in order to terminate the military aid to Turkey on September 19 and September 24, 1974. Although president Ford vetoed these decisions, the voting in the House of Representatives against the president's veto resulted to the advantage of the president. Nevertheless, as a result of an inquiry conducted by the Congress Library

⁵⁶³ Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1973-1983" in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, ed. Mehmet Gönlübol (Ankara : Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), pp.552-553.

⁵⁶⁴ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.76-79.

into the weapons used in the intervention proved that Turkey had used the weapons given by the United States as financial aid, which was a breach of the American Foreign Aid Law of 1961. In the aftermath of the inquiry, another embargo decision was taken in the House of Representatives in October 16 which was again vetoed by president Ford in October 17. Yet, the Congress did not give up taking embargo decisions despite resistance of president Ford and state secretary Kissinger. Ultimately, with the pressure of Congress and civil society, on December 30, 1974, president Ford ratified arms embargo decision against Turkey which came into force on February 5, 1975.⁵⁶⁵

Turkey did not react to this decision because of the government crisis, but Turkish diplomats tried to persuade American politicians and members of Congress not to make such a decision with the claims that Cyprus intervention had been a legitimate act based on agreements and it was unfair to impose an embargo against Turkey. An embargo decision would encourage the Greek side and they would continue their irreconcilable attitude during negotiations. They maintained that the Cyprus issue and Turkish-American relations were independent from each other, the military aid was a necessity for Turkey as a NATO member and that embargo decision would weaken the southeastern wing of NATO against the Soviet Union. Despite these efforts, the embargo decision was taken and, in return, the Turkish ministry of defense stated that the American bases in Turkey would be closed.⁵⁶⁶ The arms embargo was the main issue in Turkish-American relations during the Irmak government.

⁵⁶⁵ Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.706.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.707.

The Soviet Union did not support the second intervention, either. In a declaration on August 23, 1974 the Soviet Union declared that the Cyprus issue should have been discussed in the United Nations. Moreover, Turkey had to withdraw immediately from Cyprus; the guarantee agreements were invalid, so the guarantor states did not have the right to intervene on the island.⁵⁶⁷ Armaoğlu writes that the attitude of the Soviet Union had an impact on the United Nations General Assembly because in the decision which was held in the General Assembly on November 1, 1974,⁵⁶⁸ it was stated that all states should have refrained from intervention, all foreign troops should have withdrawn from the island and the necessary measures should have been taken for the return of Greek refugees from the north of the island to the south and the situation of the island should have been determined only by the two communities. The decision of the General Assembly was supported by the Security Council.⁵⁶⁹ Like the arms embargo decision of the United States, Turkey could not react to the Soviet efforts to “internationalize” the Cyprus issue due to its domestic problems.

After a period of caretaker government, the Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel formed a new coalition with the National Salvation Party, the Republican Reliance Party and the National Action Party on March 31, 1975. This first “Nationalist Front” coalition government was in action until the 1977 general elections. Thus, it was the longest lasting government in this period.

⁵⁶⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.807.

⁵⁶⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution No.3212, November 1, 1974.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/14/IMG/NR073814.pdf?OpenElement>

⁵⁶⁹ UN Security Council Resolution No.364, December 13, 1974.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/83/IMG/NR028983.pdf?OpenElement>

In the program of the Nationalist Front government, the loyalty to the United Nations, NATO and EEC alliances were restated. Moreover, the development of relations with neighboring countries, e.g., the Soviet Union, the Balkan states and Arab states were included. The solution of the Cyprus issue was regarded as a bi-communal federation and Greece was blamed for its “irresponsible” attitude in the Aegean Sea. More importantly, it was stated that the status quo in territorial waters and on the continental shelf, with reference to the beginning of the dispute in 1974 during the Republican People’s Party-National Salvation Party government, would be protected unconditionally.⁵⁷⁰

The Nationalist Front coalition government brought parties from different ideological backgrounds together. The senior partner Justice Party aimed at the liberalization and development of economy as in its single-party government between 1965 and 1971. Therefore, it did not have prejudices against any state that could provide any assistance for Turkish economy. The National Salvation Party was in favor of cutting ties with the West, especially with the common market, and forming an Islamic Union with the Arabs in the Middle East. Moreover, it had a pro-Arab tendency in the Arab-Israeli conflict due to its antagonism against “Zionist” Israel.⁵⁷¹ The other coalition partner the Nationalist Action Party had a different perspective of foreign policy according to which “nationalism” was the main principle and “communism and communists” were the main enemies that had to be fought. The Nationalist Action Party was not against the “West” or “Israel”, but had a balanced tendency towards them.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷⁰ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.79-82.

⁵⁷¹ Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), pp.235-265.

⁵⁷² Alparslan Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), pp.271-289.

The Republican Reliance Party, which was headed by Turhan Feyzioğlu, had a more conservative Kemalist ideology different from that of the Republican People's Party.⁵⁷³ Although these parties had different perspectives especially on foreign policy issues, as Zürcher says, they had a "marriage of convenience". As a result, because the junior partners were well aware that Demirel depended on them, they had disproportionate influence in the government. Especially in the ministries, the National Salvation Party and the Nationalist Action Party had control of the personnel.⁵⁷⁴ The ministry of foreign affairs was isolated from partisanship because it required professionalization and expertise to conduct relations. Moreover, the minister of foreign affairs was appointed by the Justice Party.⁵⁷⁵

Nevertheless, although the late 1970s was an inward-looking period for Turkey due to polarization and marginalization in the political arena, Turkish foreign policy did not diverge from its main direction especially with the efforts of prime minister Demirel and minister of foreign affairs Çağlayangil in the Nationalist Front government.⁵⁷⁶ The Aegean dispute preoccupied the agenda Demirel and Çağlayangil were in favor of bilateral negotiations with Greece for the solution of the dispute. Therefore, between May 17 and 19, 1975 Çağlayangil met his Greek counterpart, Bitsios, in Rome. However, the two ministers did not agree upon a solution and the issue was delayed to Demirel-Karamanlis meeting in Bruxelles on May 31, 1975. The two prime ministers agreed upon a peaceful solution before the

⁵⁷³ Özdemir, p.274.

⁵⁷⁴ Zürcher, p.274.

⁵⁷⁵ Ahmad, p.199.

⁵⁷⁶ Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.754.

International Court of Justice.⁵⁷⁷ However, after the meeting the Turkish government gave a diplomatic note to its Greek counterpart which stated the priority of bilateral negotiations before the application to the International Court of Justice. The Greek government rejected this proposal.⁵⁷⁸

In addition to the territorial waters and continental shelf, “the demilitarization of the Aegean islands” and “Flight Information Region” became components of the Turkish-Greek dispute in the Aegean Sea. Upon the remilitarization of the islands by Greece that traced back to the 1960s, Turkey established the Fourth Army in Izmir against a possible threat from the Aegean Sea in 1975. Moreover, the Fourth Army was not allocated to NATO. Fırat writes that it was a repercussion of Turkey’s resentment towards the arms embargo from 1975 onwards.⁵⁷⁹ The remilitarization of the islands and the establishment of the Fourth Army reflected the feeling of insecurity between the two states.⁵⁸⁰

In the meantime, former prime minister Ecevit declared that what Turkey had gained in the Aegean during his prime ministry was about to be lost by the Demirel government especially in relation to the continental shelf issue. In the meeting of the National Security Council on July 13, 1976, the vessel *MTA-Seismic-I* was authorized to search for oil in the Turkish territorial sea and high seas. On August 6, 1976, *MTA-Seismic-I* started its research in the region and, in August 7, the Greek

⁵⁷⁷ The Document on the Aegean Dispute between Turkey and Greece in the International Court of Justice-Application by the Greek Government on August 10, 1976, pp.4-5. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/9481.pdf>

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., p.5.

⁵⁷⁹ Fırat, *Yunanistan’la İlişkiler*, p.762.

⁵⁸⁰ Fuat Aksu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri* (Ankara: Stratejik Araştırma Ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 2001), p.92. See also, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri & Büyük Güçler* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000), p.182, A.Suat Bilge, *Büyük Düş: Türk-Yunan Siyasi İlişkileri* (Ankara: 21.Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), pp.244-248.

government protested the violation of its rights with the claim that the *MTA-Seismic-I* acted within Greek continental shelf and requested that the Turkish government to take the necessary measures. The Greek protest was rejected with the claim that the action was legitimate.⁵⁸¹ Upon the Turkish rejection of the Greek protest, Greece applied to the International Court of Justice, but the court did not make a binding decision. Later on, Turkey and Greece began negotiations to limit the continental shelf, but did not reach a solution.⁵⁸²

On November 11, 1976 Çağlayangil and Bitsios decided to start negotiations between Greece and Turkey and the Bern Declaration was agreed upon. The Bern Declaration determined the framework of negotiations and stated that negotiations were to be held confidentially and the parties were to refrain from humiliating each other in the international arena.⁵⁸³ Çağlayangil and Bitsios came together on January 28, 1977 for negotiations about air traffic control and on January 31-February 6 in London for negotiations of continental shelf. They did not reach any solution, again. The Republican People's Party accused the government of making a secret agreement with Greece in order to satisfy the United States and, more importantly, the commanders in the National Security Council had a hardliner policy towards Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts which hindered the government from solving the problem through negotiations. Despite the resurrection of meetings

⁵⁸¹ The Document on the Aegean Dispute between Turkey and Greece to the International Court of Justice-Application by the Greek Government on August 10, 1976, pp.7-8.
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/9481.pdf>

⁵⁸² Fırat, *Yunanistan'la İlişkiler*, p.755-757.

⁵⁸³ Aksu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, pp.78-79.

between ministers of foreign affairs, no progress was achieved in the Aegean dispute.⁵⁸⁴

The Turkish minority in western Thrace became another component of conflict between Greece and Turkey in this period. Both the Turkish government and opposition parties accused Greece of oppressing the Turks in the region, which was a breach of Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This was a counteraction for a report published by the European Commission of Human Rights in which Turkey was accused of human rights violations during the 1974 military intervention. However, Greece tried to refute the accusations about the oppression against Turks in western Thrace with the claim that Turkey was discriminating against the Greeks in Turkey. Mutual accusations did not have significant impacts in the relations between the two states.⁵⁸⁵

During the Nationalist Front coalition government, Turkish-American relations remained in the shadow of the arms embargo which had begun to be imposed in February 1975. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement which was ratified on March 26, 1976 was not passed in the US Congress and the solution of the Cyprus issue was determined as a prerequisite to for the approval of the agreement.⁵⁸⁶ However, the Turkish government insisted that the Cyprus issue was a dispute between Greece and Turkey and Turkish-American relations were distinct from Turkey's relations with Greece.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁴ Aryeh Shmuelevitz, *Republican Turkey: Aspects of Internal Affairs and International Relations* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1999), pp.44-45.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid., p.46.

⁵⁸⁶ Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası 1964-1980*, pp.109-112.

⁵⁸⁷ Shmuelevitz, p.48.

Like its relations with the United States, Turkey's relations with the European Economic Community did not reach a satisfactory level of progress. The main problem stemmed from the Additional Protocol, signed in 1970. Turkey demanded better terms for its export products as other countries had acquired, while the EEC refused to revise the protocol. Moreover, Turkey was in need of the protection of its developing industry and demanded complete freedom for the movement of its workers. However, the EEC refused these demands; in return, Turkey threatened to freeze the association agreement.⁵⁸⁸ Although some progress was made in the area of financial aid, it was far from meeting Turkey's demands. Therefore, the problematic relations with the EEC weakened the hand of Demirel in the coalition and Erbakan intensified pressure against the EEC.⁵⁸⁹

The stagnation in the relations with the West enabled Turkey to improve its relations with the Arab states, as Shmuelewitz writes, thanks to the pressure of Erbakan in the coalition.⁵⁹⁰ In May 1976, in Istanbul, the Seventh Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers was held of which Turkey intended to become a full member. In return for Turkey's recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1976, Turkey gained support of the Arab states for its Cyprus policy during the conference.⁵⁹¹ Moreover, Turkey supported the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict and made bilateral trade agreements with Libya and Iraq to develop relations. In addition to improving relations with neighbors in the Middle East, the Nationalist Front government aimed to and succeeded at developing its economic

⁵⁸⁸ Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.184.

⁵⁸⁹ Shmuelewitz, p.50.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.51.

⁵⁹¹ The Final Declaration of the 7th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, May 12-15, 1976. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/All%20Download/Frm.07.htm>

relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain credits for the investments in Turkey in the following period.⁵⁹²

In this period, Turkey's domestic politics were as problematic as its foreign relations. Political polarization and violence against the leftists escalated. In addition to the political unrest, economic problems became more severe with the rise of inflation, unemployment and the fall of incomes. The public, especially workers, supported the Republican People's Party, which had turned to social democratic policies under the leadership of Ecevit. In order to benefit from his rising popularity, Ecevit agreed with Demirel, who sought to be rid of the boundaries imposed by his coalition partners, on early elections to be held on June 5, 1977.⁵⁹³ In the elections, the Republican People's Party won the majority of votes, although it could not form a single-party government, as had happened after 1973 elections. The Justice Party became the second party while its coalition partners, the National Salvation Party and the Nationalist Action Party, weakened.⁵⁹⁴

After the 1977 elections, Ecevit was appointed by the president as leader of majority party, and he formed a minority government although it failed to obtain a vote of confidence in the parliament.⁵⁹⁵ After Ecevit, Demirel was appointed again to form a new government and despite the expectations from different circles, for

⁵⁹² Shmuelewitz, pp.52-53.

⁵⁹³ Ahmad, p.200.

⁵⁹⁴ In the 1977 general elections, the Republican People's Party obtained 41.39% of votes and 213 seats in the parliament, the Justice Party gained 36.89% of votes and 189 seats in the parliament, the National Salvation Party won 8.57% of votes and 24 seats in the parliament, the Nationalist Action Party obtained 6.42% of votes and 16 seats in the parliament, the Republican Reliance Party gained 1.87% of votes and 3 seats in the parliament, the Democratic Party won 1.85% of votes and 1 seat in the parliament and the independents held 2.49% of votes and 4 seats in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=8

⁵⁹⁵ Ahmad, p.201.

example TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association), towards a Justice Party-Republican People's Party coalition government, a second Nationalist Front Government was formed by the Justice Party, the National Salvation Party and the Nationalist Action Party.⁵⁹⁶

The program of the new government was similar to that of the first Nationalist Front government. Nevertheless, the second coalition was preoccupied with internal conflicts both in the coalition and in Turkey. The failure of the Justice Party in the local elections and the coalition with the National Action Party, which was regarded as a neo-fascist party caused unrest within the party.⁵⁹⁷ The opposition within the party resigned and with the support of twelve independents in the parliament, this government was toppled with an enquiry on December 31, 1977.

A new government was formed by Bülent Ecevit with the independents from the Justice Party and the other smaller parties on January 5, 1978. In its program, Ecevit government emphasized the necessity of the development of relations with its neighbors in the Balkans and Middle East. The Cyprus dispute should be solved on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. More importantly, the new Ecevit government sought an independent defense and security policy in order not to be in need of foreign aid from powerful countries and put emphasis on the development of bilateral economic relations especially with the EEC in order to find a solution to the economic crisis.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid., p.202.

⁵⁹⁷ In the 1977 local elections, the Republican People's Party obtained 48% of votes, the Justice Party gained 36.43% of votes, the National Salvation Party won 4.76% of votes, the Nationalist Action Party obtained 3.94% of votes and the independents won 5.02% of votes. <http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/secimler/?tur=&yil=1977>. See also, Ahmad, p.202.

⁵⁹⁸ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.91-93.

In this period, negotiations over Cyprus intensified with the importance that Ecevit attributed to the solution of the conflict in the island. Moreover, Ecevit gave great effort to solve the Aegean dispute and called Greek prime minister Karamanlis for a summit. The leaders came together in Montreux on March 10-11, 1978. Nevertheless, the Montreux meeting did not go beyond the declaration of good hope for negotiations.⁵⁹⁹ Ecevit's move was criticized strongly by the opposition Justice Party because there had been no concrete result for the solution of the problem. Diplomatic relations continued and Ecevit and Karamanlis met again on May 29, 1978 during the NATO summit in Washington. They declared their desire to find a peaceful solution for the Aegean dispute and agreed on the meeting of secretary-generals of foreign ministries in Ankara in July 1978.

In the meeting of the secretary-generals, a joint declaration was prepared that stated both sides would continue the dialogue in Athens in September, to make efforts to reconvene the committees which were responsible for the Aegean continental shelf and air space issues, to prepare a document for the prime ministers covering aspects of bilateral relations. Bilateral negotiations at the technical level continued in Ankara between July 31 and August 3, 1978 and in Athens between August 28 and September 3, 1978. No solution to the dispute in the Aegean was reached.⁶⁰⁰ Diplomatic relations continued in the following period of Ecevit government, but the parties still could not reach an agreement.

Like the failure to solve these problems and the development of Turkish-Greek relations, relations with the United States were strongly affected by the arms embargo which had been imposed on Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus

⁵⁹⁹ Shmuelewitz, pp.83-88. See also, Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.757.

⁶⁰⁰ Shmuelewitz, p.89.

intervention. Ecevit was not in favor of Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, but he insisted that Turkey pursue an independent foreign and defense policies. Moreover, he criticized the involvement of the United States in the Cyprus issue on the grounds that US involvement against the Turkish position encouraged Greece to insist on its irreconcilable position.⁶⁰¹ Bilateral relations continued to solve problems such as the status of the American bases in Turkey and the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the arms embargo was lifted in September 1978 by president Carter. This action was ratified in the Congress in August. In return, Ecevit announced that US bases in Turkey would be reopened in October 1978.⁶⁰² However, the relations between the United States and Turkey did not return to their former level despite the military and financial aid from the United States.

The stagnation of Turkish-American relations coincided with the developing of relations with the Soviet Union especially in the economic realm. Diplomatic relations intensified with the Soviet Union and prime minister Ecevit visited Moscow between June 21-25, 1978 and signed an agreement with Soviet prime minister Kosygin which stated that the two states would develop their relations and cooperation respectful of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and autonomy in internal affairs. During his visit, Ecevit provided also increase in economic and technical aid from the Soviet Union.⁶⁰³ Nevertheless, despite the development of relations in the economic realm, political relations did not improve because the Turkish government could not dare to intensify political relations because of the

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., p.90.

⁶⁰² Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.707-710. See also, Shmuelevitz, p.93.

⁶⁰³ Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.780-781. See also, Shmuelevitz, pp.100-101.

antipathy among the public against the Soviet Union. The Turkish public generally held the Soviet Union responsible for the anarchy especially from the left, which intensified in the late 1970s. As a result, although both Ecevit and Demirel were in favor of the development of relations with the Soviet Union, they could not reach the level in Turkish-Soviet relations as they had intended.⁶⁰⁴

Like the relations with the Soviet Union, the relations with the European Economic Community were mainly based on economic cooperation and Turkey's membership in the community. The Ecevit government did not achieve any progress in relations with the EEC. Nevertheless, bilateral diplomatic relations between Turkey and the EEC intensified. On the other hand, Ecevit founded close relationships with the leaders in Western Europe and visited Norway, Germany, Britain and Austria to obtain economic assistance although his efforts did not result in the necessary financial aid for Turkey's economic recovery.⁶⁰⁵

The Ecevit government needed to improve its relations with the Arab world because necessary the financial aid was not secured from the United States and Western Europe. Ecevit supported the Palestinians' struggle and Turkey voted for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held in Dakar between April 24 and 28, 1978. In return, the Arabs adopted a resolution which affirmed their resolutions in the preceding meetings in Istanbul in 1976⁶⁰⁶ and in Tripoli in 1977⁶⁰⁷ which supported

⁶⁰⁴ Armaoğlu, 20. *Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.832. See also, Tellal, *SSCB'yle İlişkiler*, p.781.

⁶⁰⁵ Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, "AET'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.850-851. See also, Shmuelewitz, pp.94-96.

⁶⁰⁶ The Final Declaration of the 7th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, May 12-15, 1976. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/All%20Download/Frm.07.htm>

the legitimacy of Turkey's intervention in 1974 and Turkish stance for a bizonal, bicomunal federal state in Cyprus dispute.⁶⁰⁸ Moreover, during Ecevit's tenure, economic agreements were made with Iraq, Iran, and Libya for financial cooperation especially on energy resources.⁶⁰⁹

While the Ecevit government was in pursuit of expanding the scope of Turkish foreign policy, it had to deal with a severe economic crisis, political violence and terrorism within the country. Although the planned economy based on import-substitution continued in the 1970s as in the 1960s, the Turkish economy went through a deep crisis because of the budget and foreign trade deficits and dependence on foreign resources for economic recovery, especially in the late 1970s.⁶¹⁰ The oil crises in 1973-74 and 1978-79 and the cessation of exchange transfer from the workers abroad after the mid-1970s exacerbated the situation for Turkey because oil prices quadrupled in the international market and this increased the gap between Turkey's imports and exports due to its dependence on oil as an energy source. The rising energy prices and haphazard economic policies of successive governments resulted in skyrocketing inflation. The government tried to control inflation by controlling prices, which caused black marketeering due to the scarcity of products. At the same time Turkish lira was devalued. The crisis in the economy could not be overcome despite these measures.⁶¹¹ The Ecevit government negotiated with the

⁶⁰⁷ The Final Declaration of the 8th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, May 16-22, 1977. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/All%20Download/Frm.08.htm>

⁶⁰⁸ The Final Declaration of the 9th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, April 24-28, 1978. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/9/9%20icfm-final-en.htm>

⁶⁰⁹ Shmuelevitz, pp.98-100.

⁶¹⁰ Kazgan, p.106.

⁶¹¹ Yenal, pp.93-95. See also, Owen and Pamuk, pp.154-156, Kazgan, pp.110-120, Hershlag, *The Contemporary Turkish Economy*, pp.38-40.

IMF, World Bank and OECD for new credits in return for drastic measures such as abolition of imports and export controls, freedom of interest rates, an increase in prices and decrease in government expenditure. However, these negotiations did not come up with a solution and the Ecevit government could not cope with the economic crisis.⁶¹²

Besides economic crisis, political violence and terrorism escalated during this period. The anarchy in the country increased and was not limited to the left-right polarization. Besides ideological anarchy between leftists and rightists, sectarian anarchy on the basis of religious differentiation and ethnic anarchy on the basis of ethnic differentiation emerged. In the sectarian anarchy, Alevis who had leftist political tendencies were targeted by the rightists, especially the “Grey Wolves” from the Nationalist Action Party. The most dramatic event occurred in Kahramanmaraş on December 22, 1978, during the funeral of two Alevi teachers. The events began upon the interference of the Grey Wolves in the funeral with the claim that Alevi Muslims could not be buried like Sunni Muslims. In the violence that ensued, many people were killed and wounded.⁶¹³ Also in this period, the PKK, a Kurdish separatist movement, appeared under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan in south eastern Anatolia.⁶¹⁴ However, this movement accelerated in the second half of the 1980s. In this atmosphere of violence, hundreds of people were killed including some important figures such as the editor of *Milliyet* newspaper, Abdi İpekçi.

The Ecevit government could not control these events and had to resign on October 16, 1979 upon the results of midterm-elections, winning only one-third of

⁶¹² Zürcher, p.281. See also, Kazgan, p.116.

⁶¹³ Ahmad, p.204.

⁶¹⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, pp.225-226.

the seats in the senate and five vacant seats in the lower-house. The Justice Party gained all the vacant seats in the lower house.⁶¹⁵ With the resignation of Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel, formed a new minority government with the external support of right-wing parties in the parliament and won a vote of confidence on November 25, 1979.

The last Demirel government stayed in power until the military intervention on September 12, 1980. Although it aimed to develop Turkey's foreign relations with its neighbors and to solve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes in its government program,⁶¹⁶ it was unable to achieve its goals due to its preoccupation with internal struggles that peaked in this period. This government concentrated on the solution of the severe economic crisis and therefore took some measures to reduce inflation and the budget deficit with the guidance of Turgut Özal, who was the deputy chairman of State Planning Organization. The decisions which had not been implemented by the former Ecevit government were made in order to reach an agreement with the IMF. Finally, after the devaluation of the Turkish lira, an increase in prices and deregulation of interest rates in order to provide balance of budget and foreign trade, a decrease in inflation and the transition to free market economy based on export orientation, a new standby agreement was signed with the IMF in June 1980.⁶¹⁷ Despite these measures, neither the economic collapse nor the political terrorism could be controlled by the Demirel government.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., p.231.

⁶¹⁶ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, p.93.

⁶¹⁷ Owen and Pamuk, p.159. See also, Yenal, p.95, Kazgan, p.120.

⁶¹⁸ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.234.

In addition to the economic and social crises in Turkey, the political crisis that stemmed from inter-party competition continued. The main indicator of the political crisis was a disagreement between Demirel and Ecevit on the election for Fahri Korutürk's successor as the new president. They were unable to reach an agreement despite 115 rounds of voting. Therefore, the speaker of the senate, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, acted as the president until the military took the government over in September 1980. The presidential elections showed the bitterness of governmental paralysis in Turkey. The only alternative for the solution of governmental problem was a grand coalition between the Justice Party and the Republican People's Party. In order to form this grand coalition, Demirel and Ecevit came together on July 24. Ecevit was in favor of the coalition, but Demirel rejected it and proposed Ecevit support a government under Demirel's own leadership for the legislation of laws to suppress terrorism and a general election. Upon Ecevit's refusal of Demirel's proposals, the governmental crisis could not be resolved and this accelerated the military's preparations for the third military intervention in the republican history.⁶¹⁹ In addition to the governmental crisis, Erbakan's refusal to participate in the Victory Day observance and a massive demonstration in Konya on September 6, 1980 where open calls for the establishment of an Islamic state were made, warned military commanders of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, Ecevit made a speech at a meeting of petroleum workers and called on them to take to the streets. These all legitimized the military intervention in the eyes of the general staff, who had already planned the coup d'état.⁶²⁰ Ultimately, the Turkish army took the

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., p.236.

⁶²⁰ Ibid., pp.237-238.

government over on September 12, 1980 and the civilian regime was replaced by a military junta for the next three years.

Concluding Remarks

The period between 1973 and 1980 can be regarded one of weak coalition governments and domestic turmoil due to the economic crisis and socio-political polarization. Domestic instability had some repercussions on Turkey's foreign policy although Turkish foreign policy did not diverge from its traditional direction.

President Korutürk was not involved in the decision making process of foreign policy as can be seen during the military intervention on Cyprus although he closely followed the developments in the international arena. He cooperated with the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in the implementation of foreign policy, but did not directly influence the ultimate decisions. Korutürk's attitude in Turkish foreign policy was in line with Turkey's traditional direction and he advocated that Turkey should refrain from hostility and adventure in its foreign relations. In return, the prime ministers did not exclude him from the decisions in order to show the collaboration between the presidency and the government. Therefore, president Korutürk acted as a main pillar for the consistency of the state apparatus in foreign policy rather than an active participant of decision making in which prime minister played the key role in the formation of decisions.⁶²¹

In this period Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel took turns as prime minister. Bülent Ecevit was an active participant in the decision making process. As Yavuzalp writes, Ecevit was followed foreign affairs thanks to his perfect English, his earlier work experience in the Turkish embassy in London and his participation in

⁶²¹ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, pp.199-201.

İnönü's talks with former statesmen, diplomats and journalists.⁶²² Moreover, Ecevit appointed ministers Turan Güneş and Gündüz Ökçün, who were not former diplomats and experienced in foreign policy issues in order to dominate the decision making process as prime minister.⁶²³ Turan Güneş, the minister of foreign affairs during the Republican People's Party- the National Salvation Party coalition and military interventions in Cyprus, also stated that the prime minister was the ultimate authority especially in foreign affairs and during his ministry of foreign affairs the decisions that were made by the prime ministry were implemented.⁶²⁴ On the other hand, Ecevit sought to provide cooperation with the state bureaucracy, army and opposition in the decisions even though he stated that the formation of foreign policy was the responsibility of the government.⁶²⁵ His approach towards other actors in the decision making process was consistent with his principles in the sense that he believed foreign affairs should be open to discussion, especially in public, because public opinion was a significant component of foreign policy in order to prevent the government from making mistakes and enable it to increase its power in negotiations with other states.⁶²⁶

Ecevit also stated that it was necessary to refrain from emotional and ideological perceptions in the formation and implementation of foreign policy

⁶²² Ibid., p.191.

⁶²³ İlhan Uzgel, "TDP'nin Oluşturulması" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1923-1980*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.80.

⁶²⁴ Akın Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Siyasal Kavgaları* (İzmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975), p.312.

⁶²⁵ Gökçen Kesgin, "Bülent Ecevit" in *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, ed.Ali Faik Demir (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2007), p.276.

⁶²⁶ Bülent Ecevit, *Dış Politika* (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık, 1976), pp.9-12.

decisions.⁶²⁷ Therefore, during his governments, he was in pursuit of the maximization of the national interests of Turkey. For example, Ecevit as prime minister was in favor of a federal state on Cyprus despite criticism from his coalition partner, Erbakan, who was in favor of a division. Moreover, during his second government, Ecevit tried to develop relations with Arab countries due to the need for financial cooperation and support in the international arena although he was essentially keen on Western social democracies. Ecevit's pragmatism in foreign policy issues was a commonality with Demirel, with whom he competed for the leadership in Turkish politics.

On the other hand, prime minister Demirel did not interfere with the daily routine of foreign affairs as he had done during the Justice Party's single-party government between 1965 and 1971. Demirel again appointed İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil as his minister of foreign affairs, except for in his last government. The appointment of the minister of foreign affairs from the Justice Party can be regarded as the domination of this party in the foreign policy of Turkey. However, Demirel faced difficulties in decision making because he was the prime minister of coalition governments with ideologically motivated partners in the period between 1973 and 1980. Erbakan pursued an anti-Western foreign policy and insisted on the necessity of cutting ties with NATO, Israel and European Economic Community in return for cooperation with Islamic countries. On the other hand, Türkeş was in favor of a "nationalist" and "anti-communist" foreign policy although he was not against NATO and Israel unlike Erbakan.

Demirel as a pragmatic politician did not pursue ideological foreign policy, but he had to provide the continuity of his coalition and, thus, he was bound to his

⁶²⁷ Ibid., pp.15-17.

coalition partners. Yavuzalp criticizes Demirel in the sense that Demirel did not apply European Economic Community for full membership in 1975 as a result of political ambitions and most probably the resistance of his coalition partner Erbakan.⁶²⁸ On the other hand, the last Demirel government stayed in power from October 1979 until the September 1980 military intervention. In this government, Demirel appointed Hayrettin Erkmen as his foreign minister. Because of the domestic turmoil, the foreign affairs of Turkey were not systematically handled in this period.

At the time, the ministry of foreign affairs implemented the daily routine and endeavored for the persistence of traditional direction of Turkish foreign policy. The ministers of Ecevit governments were not from diplomatic backgrounds and this enabled Ecevit to dominate the formation of foreign policy. He made visits to foreign countries during his second prime ministry and had close contacts with his counterparts. During the Demirel governments, the ministry of foreign affairs acted more independently from governmental politics.

On the other hand, the military intervention turned the civilian regime into a military one. As Hale writes, the military stayed behind the scenes in the formation of politics especially between the years 1973 and 1978. In the meantime, the involvement of military staff in the decision making process and the success in the Cyprus intervention increased their confidence and prestige. Especially with the economic and social collapse after 1978, the military staff began to plan the third military intervention.⁶²⁹ Ecevit and Demirel as prime ministers were in the pursuit of collaboration with the army and, thus, as seen in the Cyprus case, the army became a

⁶²⁸ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p.145.

⁶²⁹ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, pp.215-218.

more active component of Turkish foreign policy in comparison to the earlier periods especially with the role that it played in the National Security Council. For example, in the negotiations with Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean disputes in March 1977, the military commanders recommended that prime minister Demirel take a “tough stance” in the issue and this hindered the Demirel government to solve the problem through negotiations.⁶³⁰

The parliament was composed of mainly four parties after 1973 and 1977 general elections. The Republican People’s Party and the Justice Party became senior partners in the governments that were formed with the National Salvation Party and the National Action Party. Therefore, parliamentary opposition was not involved to a great degree in the decision making process because, despite criticisms against governmental policies, parties did not have offers for drastic changes like the Turkish Labor Party had tried to impose on the Justice Party governments between 1965 and 1971. After the military takeover in 1980, the parliament was closed and political activities were disbanded, and thus, the parliament as a platform for political discussion was excluded from the political scene until the restoration of political life with the 1983 elections.

Public opinion and the press were not involved directly in foreign policy decisions except for the Cyprus issue as they had been during the Justice Party period. Fiona Adamson writes that “public opinion favoring an aggressive stance on Cyprus and outpouring of nationalist sentiment in the press” were some of the limitations made the Turkish government unable to reach a peaceful solution for the crisis and encouraged the imposition of a military intervention on the island.⁶³¹

⁶³⁰ Shmuelevitz, p.45.

⁶³¹ Fiona Adamson, “Democratization and Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, *Political Science Quarterly*, no.2 (2001), p.278.

Nevertheless, on the Cyprus issue, although the role that public opinion and press cannot be ignored, it is important to take the Republican People's Party- the National Salvation Party coalition's pro-interventionist tendencies, as a result of their principles regarding foreign policy, into consideration.

CHAPTER 6

THE PERCEPTION OF NEW CRISES AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 1980-1991

The National Security Council Period (September 12, 1980-November 7, 1983)

After a period of economic, social and political crisis, the military took over the government for the third time in republican history on September 12, 1980. The parliament was dissolved, the leaders of political parties were taken into custody by the military, the immunity of the members of parliament was abolished and martial law was declared throughout the country. Moreover, mayors were replaced by martial law commanders in the cities.⁶³² In other words, political activities were totally abolished and the military regime was established. A National Security Council was formed as a five member body by the chief-of-general staff and commanders of the army, air force, navy and military police forces. As Karpat argues, the National Security Council which had been formed in 1962 was turned into a “super government” in the hands of the five commanders because it had broad authorities as a legislative and executive body until the transition to the civilian regime at the end of 1983 elections.⁶³³

The military junta declared that the intervention was based on Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law which states that the military was responsible for the protection of the integrity and law and order within the country. Therefore, the main aim of the military junta was to suppress the terrorism and anarchy which had accelerated on the eve of the military intervention. Unlike Cemal

⁶³² Bülent Tanör, “Siyasal Tarih 1980-1995” in *Türkiye Tarihi 5: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), p.31.

⁶³³ Kemal Karpat, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi 1876-1980* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2007), p.279.

Gürsel, who had been the head of the National Unity Committee after the 1960 military intervention, Evren as the head of the National Security Council did not directly form a government. Retired admiral Bülend Ulusu was appointed to form the post-intervention cabinet. On September 21, the Ulusu government was formed and approved by the National Security Council.⁶³⁴

Although the main goal of the military intervention was to rectify the domestic instability and crises, the foreign affairs of Turkey were not ignored as had happened during the preceding military interventions of 1960 and 1971. In the new cabinet, a former diplomat, İlder Türkmen, was appointed minister of foreign affairs and he was responsible for the diplomatic relations of the new junta regime. Moreover, in order to provide continuity in the economic relations with foreign institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in order to recover economic crisis, Turgut Özal, who was the creator of the January 24 decisions and the deputy chairman of the State Planning Organization, was appointed the deputy prime minister in the new cabinet to implement the economic program which the last Demirel government had failed to do. During the military regime, Özal had the chance to implement the economic reforms that were contextualized with the January 24 decisions and the Turkish economy began to be integrated into the world economy. Therefore, until the transition to the civilian regime in 1983, the stability in the Turkish economy was provided by a decrease in inflation, a decrease in public expenditures and a termination of black marketeering through the liberalization of imports and tariffs.⁶³⁵ Özal directly managed the economy and economic relations

⁶³⁴ Ulusu government was composed of twenty-seven non-party technocrats in whom there were five retired military members including prime minister Ulusu.

⁶³⁵ Taner Berksoy, “1980’lerde Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler” in *Bırakınız Yapsınlar Bırakınız Geçsinler: Türkiye Ekonomisi 1980-1985*, ed. Bilsay Kuruç (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), p.136. See also, Yenal, pp.96-97, Kazgan, pp.132-137.

with the IMF and the World Bank and obtained the support of these organizations. Therefore, a two-headed mechanism appeared in Turkish foreign policy: the ministry of foreign affairs, which was responsible for the diplomatic relations, and the State Planning Organization, which was responsible for the economic relations of Turkey.

The new government's program reflected the desire for the continuity of status quo in Turkey's foreign affairs and it was declared that Turkey's relations with the United States and NATO would be developed and that Turkey's membership in the European Economic Community was of great importance for Turkey. The relations with the Islamic countries would be developed and the support to Palestinians in their struggle would continue. The problems with Greece in the Aegean and on Cyprus aimed to be solved through bilateral negotiations and Turkey was in favor of a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal state on the island.⁶³⁶ It can be argued that Turkish foreign policy in the post-intervention period was handled within the framework of the government program although some goals could not be reached, especially in terms of the relations with the European states and the solution of the problems with Greece.

After the military intervention, relations with the United States intensified and financial aid became the main issue during the military regime for the modernization of the Turkish army. As a result, financial aid was provided with the approval of Defense and Cooperation Agreement by the Ulusu government in November 1980. The agreement had a broad program for the rise of the Turkish armed forces to NATO standards including the modernization of army, air force and navy.⁶³⁷ The modernization of the Turkish army was a necessity for the southern wing of NATO

⁶³⁶ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.95-96.

⁶³⁷ Shmuelewitz, pp.218-219.

because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian revolution changed the balance in the Middle East to the disadvantage of the United States.⁶³⁸

The amelioration of Turkish-American relations had impact on the Rogers Plan, which enabled Greece to return to NATO. General Rogers visited Evren on October 1980 and warned him that as a result of the elections in Greece within six months, a socialist party would win the elections and Greece would become susceptible to the influence of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Greece was to be approved by NATO again and Turkey was not to resist to this decision stemming from the problems between Turkey and Greece. Despite Evren's reservations about the attitude of Greece towards Turkey, Rogers persuaded Evren with a "soldier promise" for the amelioration of relations between Turkey and Greece although both sides did not sign any official agreement.⁶³⁹ Greece's return to NATO was approved two weeks later, whereas Rogers' soldier promise did not prevent the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations, especially after the election victory of Papandreu's PASOK in Greece.

In the decision making process of the Rogers Plan, Evren and Rogers excluded the civilians especially the ministries of foreign affairs. The plan is a significant case in which, Evren as the leader of the National Security Council and the state, behaved as the ultimate decision making authority.⁶⁴⁰ Although Turkey did not gain what it had expected from the return of Greece to NATO, Evren defends himself in his memoirs about this decision and blames Greek prime minister Papandreu for the failure of the solution of the problems in the Aegean Sea between

⁶³⁸ İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2003*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.39.

⁶³⁹ Ibid., 41.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., p.43.

the two countries.⁶⁴¹ The Papandreu government demanded the withdrawal of troops from Cyprus in order to negotiate the problems in the Aegean Sea. On the other hand, the return of Greece to NATO weakened Turkey's hand at the negotiations table because Turkey did not gain anything from the reapproval of Greece to NATO. In relation to the Aegean dispute, Greece was in favor of the control of the Aegean islands by the NATO with the claim of the Turkish threat against Greece in the Aegean. Moreover, Greece sought to increase its territorial waters to twelve miles, but Turkey replied to this attempt with a claim that an increase of territorial waters was a *casus belli* between the two countries.⁶⁴² Consequently, during the military regime, problems in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus were not resolved, thus, relations with Greece did not develop like relations with the European states.

Turkey's relations with Europe, especially with the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe remained under the shadow of the lack of democracy and human rights violations under the military regime. In the wake of the military intervention, the EEC and European countries continued their financial aid to Turkey with the expectation that Turkey would return to democracy as soon as possible.⁶⁴³ However, as the democratization schedule for Turkey was delayed, the European states changed their attitudes towards Turkey. The European Economic Community postponed the ratification of the fourth economic protocol with Turkey with a clause that said Turkey should return to democracy and human rights violations against the people in custody should be terminated. In addition to the European Economic Community, the Council of Europe threatened to suspend

⁶⁴¹ Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları v.2* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p.98.

⁶⁴² Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2003*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.106.

⁶⁴³ Shmuelewitz, p.220.

Turkey's membership in the organization for the same reasons of EEC pressure. The military regime refrained from taking the steps which had been determined by the EEC as it was felt that a politically more favorable atmosphere should be waited. ⁶⁴⁴

Besides the problems with the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe, Turkey faced difficulties with the European states separately. For example, West Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland and Switzerland introduced visa restrictions on Turkish citizens and they granted short term visas only for Turkish industrialists, businessmen, students and workers. However, later on, as a result of economic decline and hostility against Turkish workers in West European countries such as West Germany, France, Nordic and Benelux countries, workers were encouraged to return home country. ⁶⁴⁵

The relations with Europe were limited to the economic cooperation because of Turkey's repressive military regime. As the relations with Europe worsened, Turkey tried to broaden its foreign relations and focused on its relations with the Islamic countries in the Middle East. The military regime was in pursuit of the development of relations with the Islamic states in the wake of the military intervention mainly because of the need for financial resources and economic cooperation for the economic recovery of the country. The United States supported the modernization of Turkish army and in this period the main emphasis was the development of Turkish army to the NATO standards. Two other options remained for Turkey in the absence of financial support from the United States and Europe: the Soviet Union and the neighboring countries in the Middle East. During the military regime, relations with the Soviet Union stagnated mainly because the National

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., pp.284-285.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid., 286.

Security Council held the Soviet Union responsible for the rise of anarchy on the eve of the military intervention. Diplomatic relations, thus, neither deteriorated nor developed in this period, whereas economic cooperation and Soviet investments continued in Turkey.⁶⁴⁶

The military regime sought to develop its diplomatic and economic relations with the Islamic countries. Turkey participated in the Third Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca and Taif on January 25-28, 1981. Although this participation was criticized because of the principle of secularism in Turkey, Turkey continued to participate in the successive summits.⁶⁴⁷ As Kenan Evren states, Turkey had to keep closer relations with the Islamic World in order not to remain alone in the international arena because of the deterioration of relations with the European countries. The National Security Council decided to participate at the summit at the level of prime minister.⁶⁴⁸ In addition to the relations with the Islamic Conference Organization, Turkey took sides with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. After the invasion of Golan Heights in Lebanon in 1981 by Israel and the evacuation of Palestinians, Turkey denounced Israel and explicitly supported Arab position in the conflict.⁶⁴⁹ Moreover, Turkey limited the diplomatic relations and reduced its diplomatic mission to the level of Second Secretary as a temporary Chargé d’Affaires.⁶⁵⁰ In his memoirs, Kenan Evren states that the ministry of foreign affairs

⁶⁴⁶ Erel Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2003*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.161-163.

⁶⁴⁷ Atay Akdevelioğlu, and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Ortadoğu’yla İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2003*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.127.

⁶⁴⁸ Evren, *Kenan Evren’in Anıları v.2*, p.224.

⁶⁴⁹ Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu, p.128.

⁶⁵⁰ Shmuelevitz, p.235.

insisted on the suspension of the relations with Israel, but the National Security Council did not support the position of the ministry of foreign affairs. Therefore, the level of diplomatic relations with Israel was reduced, but not terminated.⁶⁵¹ Turkey maintained its neutrality in the war between Iran and Iraq between the years 1980 and 1988.⁶⁵² In addition to this, Turkey participated in the Islamic Goodwill Mission with its prime minister and minister of foreign affairs to end the war between two countries.⁶⁵³

In the military regime period, several economic cooperation agreements were signed with countries in the Middle East such as Libya and Syria in order to provide necessary financial resources for the recovery of Turkish economy. Nevertheless, some problems occurred with these countries, too. For example, after the bombing of Esenboğa Airport by Armenian terrorists, it was understood that they had come from Syria. Despite some obstacles in the development of relations with its neighbors, Turkey sought to keep its friendly relations.

Between 1980 and 1983, it is obvious that Turkey's relations with the United States and Islamic countries developed at a greater pace than its relations with the European states and the Soviet Union. The difference in development can be explained through the support of the United States and Islamic countries of the military regime, in return for the military junta's positive perception of the United States and the neighbors in the Middle East. In this period, the maintenance of the status quo in foreign relations reconciled with a broad transformation of domestic politics in Turkey.

⁶⁵¹ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* v.2, p.133.

⁶⁵² Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu, p.130.

⁶⁵³ Shmuelewitz, pp.289-290.

In the wake of the military intervention, martial law was declared throughout the country. Political activities were banned and no other political actors remained in the political arena except for the military, especially after the dissolution of all political parties in October 1981. In addition to these, many laws were passed in order to suppress terrorism and anarchy within the country. Many people were arrested and most of them complained about torture in custody.⁶⁵⁴ Trade unions and strikes were banned and the High Education Law was passed in order to control universities because these two groups, workers and students, were the dynamic forces of the public opinion before the military intervention not only in Turkish domestic politics, but also in Turkish foreign affairs.⁶⁵⁵ Moreover, the economy was liberalized through the implementation of the January 24 decisions supported by the military junta. Therefore, the budget deficit of Turkey was narrowed down, the shortages and black markets disappeared as a result of the economic development.⁶⁵⁶ More importantly a new constitution was prepared by the constituent assembly, which had been established in June 1981. After a referendum held on November 7, 1982 it was accepted with 91.4% majority. The referendum was also made for the election of the president and Kenan Evren was elected as the seventh president of Turkey at the same time.⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.252.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.253.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.254.

⁶⁵⁷ In the 1982 constitution the freedoms that had been expanded in the 1961 constitution and amended in 1971, were totally removed and strictly controlled by the state. The limitations on these freedoms prevented the public opinion from being a part of the decision making process again. Moreover, limitations on the press prevented it from criticizing the state mechanism and being a part of decision making process especially in the aftermath of the acceptance of the new constitution. Article 26 regulates the freedom of expression, Article 28 regulates the freedom of press, and Article 34 regulates the freedom of meetings and demonstrations. All these freedoms can be enjoyed with the permission of state authorities and can be limited by these authorities under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the new

After the referendum for the constitution and the president, Kenan Evren declared the parliamentary elections would be held in November 1983. A new election law was prepared and ratified in April 1983 and the ban on political activities was abolished. However, the National Security Council had the authority to veto any members within the parties without making any explanation. Three parties met the requirements to participate in the elections in November 1983: the Nationalist Democracy Party as a right-wing party which was supported by the military junta, the Populist Party as a left-wing party, and the Motherland Party as a center party. After the elections, Turkey returned to a civilian government which had been suspended for three years and a new era began in Turkish domestic and foreign policies. John McFadden encapsulates the three-year reconstruction period of the military regime:

During the thirty-eight months it ruled Turkey, it made changes in three areas. First, it reordered the legal structure of the government, strengthening institutions responsible for public order. Second, it took steps to ensure that the new legal framework would not be filled with the old political actors and finally it left itself in a position to observe and if necessary to influence the performance of the new Turkish Republic.⁶⁵⁸

Concluding Remarks

During the military regime between 1980 and 1983, the National Security Council was the ultimate decision making authority both in the domestic politics and foreign affairs of Turkey. Kenan Evren as the head of the state and, after his election

constitution broadened that authority of the president and the National Security Council. Article 104 regulates the authority of the president and it can be argued that although the president is neutral and unaccountable, his authority is broader than the ones in previous constitutions. Moreover, Article 118 regulates the authority of the National Security Council and the body's decisions were set prior for the government. See, Kili and Gözübüyük, pp.333-335, 377, 387.

⁶⁵⁸ John McFadden, "Civil Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic", *The Middle East Journal*, no.1 (1985), p.70.

as president, dominated the decision making process. Moreover, the legislative and executive decisions of the National Security Council were protected by the new constitution and members of the council were provided immunity later on.⁶⁵⁹ In relation to the decision making of the National Security Council and Kenan Evren, Yavuzalp takes a more positive approach and puts emphasis on Evren's consultative and coordinative character in the decision making mechanism,⁶⁶⁰ although the decisions of the military regime such as the acceptance of the Rogers Plan show the hegemony of the National Security Council and Kenan Evren.

Prime minister Uluşu played an active role in the implementation of foreign policy and was involved in the decisions that were made, although ultimately the decisions were taken by the military junta. Moreover, according to Nahit Duru, the editor of magazine *Arayış* at that time, the hegemony of the military on the decisions disturbed prime minister Uluşu due to the limited power of his government.⁶⁶¹ In an official interview, Uluşu stated that his government had the autonomy to decide and implement policies.⁶⁶² When these two statements are taken into consideration, the first possibility dominates the other because, firstly, under a military regime, it is not easy for an appointed government to act autonomously in the decisions and, secondly, a prime minister does not explicitly criticize the state apparatus during an official meeting.

⁶⁵⁹ Provisional Article 15 of the 1982 constitution regulates the status of the National Security Council and the government appointed by it and provides immunity for both against any judicial action afterwards. Kili and Gözübüyük, p.370.

⁶⁶⁰ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p.246.

⁶⁶¹ Veli Özdemir, *12 Eylül Darbesi ve Özgürlüğün Bedeli: Arayış* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2004), p.110.

⁶⁶² Bülend Uluşu, *Başbakan Bülend Uluşu'nun Konuşma, Demeç ve Mesajları* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1983), p.8.

Like the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, İlder Türkmen, was also involved in foreign policy implementation and accompanied Kenan Evren on his visits to foreign countries such as Pakistan, Bulgaria and, furthermore, Evren's meetings with presidents and diplomats. Yet, the role that the foreign ministry played in the decision making process was limited, as can be seen during the return of Greece to NATO. Evren agreed with Rogers on the reacceptance of Greece without consultation to the prime minister and ministry of foreign affairs. Moreover, the foreign ministry had to deal with the solution of problems that the military intervention had created in the relations with the European States.⁶⁶³

Besides the limited role of prime ministry and ministry of foreign affairs, there was no political arena for the formation and discussion of policy decisions, either, because the parliament and parties were dissolved, the press was heavily censored⁶⁶⁴ and civil society was heavily suppressed and controlled. Therefore, the National Security Council acted as the ultimate decision maker in the absence of all possible oppositions.

⁶⁶³ İskit, p.423.

⁶⁶⁴ Hasan Cemal was the editor of *Cumhuriyet* newspaper in the aftermath of the military intervention. In his memoirs *12 Eylül Günlüğü: Demokrasi Korkusu* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986), he describes how the press was heavily controlled and censored by the military regime. Moreover, the book *Basın '80-84* (Ankara: ÇGD Yayınları, 1984) published by Modern Journalists' Association analyzes the history of journalism in Turkey and puts emphasis to the suppressive military regime.

The Motherland Party and the Özal Period
(December 13, 1983-November 20, 1991)

In the 1983 general elections, the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal unexpectedly won the majority of votes and the seats in the parliament.⁶⁶⁵ The leader of the military regime, Kenan Evren, had made a speech which implicitly supported the Nationalist Democracy Party, which had been known as the party of the generals before the 1983 general elections.⁶⁶⁶ However, although the Motherland Party won the elections, Özal had to wait until December 7, 1983 to be appointed by president Evren to form the new government. The delay of the appointment worried Özal because of the possibility for a new military intervention right after the elections.⁶⁶⁷ Prime minister Özal's cabinet received a vote of confidence on December 13, 1983. The new government was mainly composed of Özal's close associates, whereas Özal could not appoint İhsan Dođramacı as the minister of foreign affairs because president Evren proposed Vahit Halefođlu for this post.⁶⁶⁸ The appointment of Evren's candidate for the ministry can be regarded as president Evren's attempt to dominate the foreign policy in the following period. Gencer Özcan states that the foreign policy was dominated by the military bureaucracy in the first Özal government until 1987 because prime minister Özal concentrated more on the

⁶⁶⁵ In the 1983 general elections, the Motherland Party obtained 45.14% of votes and 211 seats in the parliament, the Populist Party gained 30.46% of votes and 117 seats in the parliament, and the Nationalist Democracy Party won 23.27% of votes and 71 seats in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=9

⁶⁶⁶ Ahmad, p.224.

⁶⁶⁷ Hasan Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), p.66.

⁶⁶⁸ Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları v.4* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p.464.

economic development.⁶⁶⁹ Uzgel argues that Özal accepted the candidate of president Evren because he had to keep sound relations with the military bureaucracy in the early years of his government.⁶⁷⁰ When both arguments are taken into consideration, the pillars of the Özal government can be understood: to keep sound relations with the military bureaucracy and to achieve the economic reconstruction of Turkey.

The Turkish economy was the highest priority for prime minister Özal. Ahmad puts emphasis on the importance of the economy for him: “first the economy and then democracy”.⁶⁷¹ Özal as the creator of the January 24, 1980 decisions which aimed to stimulate the Turkish economy, implemented neo-liberal economic policies that were based on liberalization of exports, imports, tariffs and privatization through foreign investment and capital.⁶⁷² Özal emphasized the economic policies of the Motherland Party governments. He said:

It (Motherland Party) put an end to price control and liberalized imports and the exchange regime. The general opinion at the time these measures were taken was that prices would increase indefinitely and that the liberalization of foreign trade would cause a dangerous deficit in the balance of payments. The pessimist factions waited obstinately for their predictions to come true, but it did not happen. It took some time for them to understand the effects of a realistic exchange rate and a positive interest rate. Market stability was established little by little and they saw with surprise that the laws of the market did function. In due course Turkish private enterprise crossed frontiers and penetrated the markets of the Middle East.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁹ Gencer Özcan, “Türkiye Dış Politikasında Oluşum Süreci” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed.Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), p.867.

⁶⁷⁰ İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004), p.159.

⁶⁷¹ Ahmad, p.232.

⁶⁷² Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2005*, pp.152-155.

⁶⁷³ Turgut Özal, *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey* (Nicosia: K.Rustem & Brother, 1991), p.306.

However, the economic development of Turkey was not a success story, as Özal argued during Motherland Party governments between 1983 and 1991. In this period, the aim of governments to increase Turkey's exports was reached especially to the countries in the Middle East. The increase in exports did not balance the budget and the foreign trade because of the freedom of imports and the excession of expenditures to the revenues. Moreover, fictitious exports, corruption in the state mechanism and the financing of the struggle against terrorism after 1984 resulted in further economic deterioration.⁶⁷⁴ The rise of deficits in the budget and foreign trade caused a search for foreign aid and debts and, therefore, Turkey had to pay its debts by obtaining new ones.⁶⁷⁵

Therefore, diplomatic relations and foreign policy were the tools for Özal to conduct economic relations and obtain financial resources. Özal stated that Turkey had to follow a more active foreign policy and he criticized the diplomatic bureaucracy. According to him, Turkish diplomacy was following the strategy of İnönü, which was static and in favor of status quo without taking any risk at any time. Turkey needed to follow the strategy of Atatürk which was more active and required some risks if necessary.⁶⁷⁶ Moreover, Özal argued that no problem, in domestic politics or in foreign relations, could be solved through conflict and struggle. Negotiations and bilateral friendly relations should be implemented to solve problems.⁶⁷⁷ Consequently, during his first government, Özal sought to maintain sound relations with the military bureaucracy who dominated foreign relations. As

⁶⁷⁴ Owen and Pamuk, p.162.

⁶⁷⁵ Berksoy, pp.152-155. See also, Owen and Pamuk, pp.163-165, Yenal, p.183.

⁶⁷⁶ Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 2001), pp.120-121.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.117.

the prime minister of Turkey, he tried to follow active diplomatic relations in the region, and especially with the United States, which mainly aimed to provide the resources necessary for the economic reconstruction of Turkey.

The government program of the first Motherland Party government reflected the principles of prime minister Özal. In the new government's program, it was stated that Turkey would follow Atatürkist foreign relations based on the protection of security and cooperation. Loyalty to NATO and the alliance with the United States were emphasized. The new government aimed to normalize its relations with the Council of Europe that had deteriorated because of the military intervention and the military regime in Turkey. The goal of full membership in the European Community was emphasized. Like the relations with the West, the relations with the countries in the Balkans and the Middle East were included in the new program. The new government sought to develop its relations especially with Greece in the Balkans and the need for a solution that was based on a federal state on Cyprus was emphasized. The necessity for cooperation in the Middle East and the necessity for the termination of the war between Iran and Iraq since 1980 were also mentioned in the program. Lastly, the relations with the Soviet Union were also part of the foreign policy objectives of the new government.⁶⁷⁸

During the first Motherland Party government, Turkish-American relations were at the center of Turkish foreign policy. Armaoğlu has a critical point of view about the Turkish-American relations in this period. He states that the Özal government based its foreign relations on the United States although it was a unilateral relationship for the maximization of the interests of the United States.

⁶⁷⁸ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.96-97.

Therefore, Turkey did not gain much from the relationship.⁶⁷⁹ Özal explained why Turkey had an American-centric foreign policy at the time and argued that the United States was a powerful state and any problem with it could cause other problems in Turkish foreign policy.⁶⁸⁰ The statements of the American ambassador Robert Hupe at that time show that Özal was the ultimate decision making authority in Turkish-American relations. Moreover, before the formation of the Motherland Party, Özal had met with American officials in Istanbul because he attached great importance to Turkish-American relations in order to consolidate his party and government and provide assistance for Turkey's economic development.⁶⁸¹ Therefore, after the formation of the government in 1983, Özal instructed the ministry of foreign affairs not to cause any problems in foreign relations especially with the United States in order to stabilize and consolidate the economic structure of Turkey.⁶⁸² Although Özal's efforts to have relations with the United States free of problems, Turkish diplomacy had to deal with the problems of American financial and military assistance and the demands of Armenians from the American government to recognize the events in 1915 as "genocide" in this period.

The duration of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement that was signed in 1980 would expire in 1985. For the renewal of the agreement, Turkey demanded United States accelerate the modernization of the Turkish army, American economic assistance be determined by an agreement, assistance not be linked to other problems such as the Cyprus issue, the debts of military assistance be written off,

⁶⁷⁹ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.965.

⁶⁸⁰ Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi*, p.289.

⁶⁸¹ Ufuk Güldemir, *Texas-Malatya* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992), pp.49-50.

⁶⁸² Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi*, p.288.

there be cooperation in the defense industry, the United States support Turkish lobbies and the barriers on Turkish exports be lifted in order to diversify economic relations. These demands were not accepted by the United States.⁶⁸³ After negotiations until March 1987, the ministers of foreign affairs exchanged position letters to prolong the agreement until 1990, which mainly encapsulated the modernization of the Turkish army.⁶⁸⁴ The disappointment in the renewal of the agreement indicates that as Armaoğlu argues, the United States gave priority to its own interests in its relations with Turkey.

The demands of Armenians from the American government were another issue that Turkey had to deal with in its relations with the United States. Although prime minister Özal did not take these demands seriously, the positions of the ministry of foreign affairs and the military forced him to act in order to prevent the recognition of the events in 1915 as “genocide”. The draft law of Man’s Inhumanity to Man Day was passed in the House of Representatives on December 10, 1984. Then, another draft law which stated that “in the formation and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States, actions that were similar to Armenian genocide had to be prevented” was passed in the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the US Senate. However, despite these two laws, the demand for the recognition of events in 1915 as “genocide” was thrown out in the House of Representatives on June 4, 1985 with the efforts of sixty-nine US scholars and specialists in the United States, who objected to the demands of the Armenians. However, on April 23, 1987, the demands were renewed in the subcommittee of Postal and Civil Services of the House of Representatives and they were handled in the House of Representatives.

⁶⁸³ İlhan Uzgel, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.56.

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.57.

Upon this decision, Turkish ambassador in Washington, Şükrü Elekdağ, was recalled to Ankara. Prime minister Özal warned US president Reagan and Turkish president Evren cancelled his visit to the United States in May 1987. Evren wrote that the reaction to the Armenian demands from the American government had been decided through discussions between the president, prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs.⁶⁸⁵ Therefore, the demands of the Armenians were rejected in the House of Representatives on August 8, 1987.⁶⁸⁶ Consequently, Turkish-American relations in the first period of Motherland Party government between 1983-1987 remained under the shadow of problems despite prime minister Özal's objectives to develop relations with the United States.

Turkey's relations with its neighbors in the Balkans were also problematic in this period. Turkish-Greek relations became strained as early as August 1984 with the attempt of NATO commander-in-chief general Rogers to establish new NATO bases on the island Limnos in order to set up a defense line against the Soviet Union. The Greek prime minister Papandreu embraced Rogers' plan and with the support of Greece, the United States put pressure on Turkey. However, upon Turkey's rejection of the remilitarization of the island, the plan could not be realized.⁶⁸⁷ In this period, the Aegean dispute could not be resolved between Turkey and Greece.

Another crisis erupted in 1987. The Greek government passed a law which authorized an international consortium to search for oil on the high seas close to the island of Thasos on March 6, 1987. Upon the decision of the Greek government, the National Security Council met and deputy prime minister Kaya Erdem represented

⁶⁸⁵ Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları v.5* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), pp.114-115.

⁶⁸⁶ Uzgel, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, pp.62-63.

⁶⁸⁷ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.956.

prime minister Özal, who was in the United States for a medical operation. The council decided to authorize the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (*Türk Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı*) to explore oil on the high seas.⁶⁸⁸ The leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party, Erdal İnönü, supported the decision for oil exploration in the Aegean Sea.⁶⁸⁹ Upon Turkey's decision, Greece claimed that Turkey had violated the sovereignty rights of Greece with entrance to its continental shelf and warned Turkey to take the measures necessary to protect its rights. Turkey prepared to send the ship *MTA-Seismic-I* to carry out search in the Aegean. The secretary general of the general staff stated that any action against *MTA-Seismic-I* would be a *casus belli* (cause for war) between Turkey and Greece.⁶⁹⁰ Özal supported the decision of the National Security Council, but he also stressed that war was not the solution of the crisis in the Aegean. Moreover, he contacted the president, the deputy prime minister, the chief of general staff and the minister of foreign affairs and insisted on the alleviation of the tension with Greece. On March 28, 1987, Greece withdrew its demands for the search of oil in the Aegean and the threat of war was overcome.⁶⁹¹ In the first period of Özal's prime ministry, the relations with Greece did not develop as had been intended and two crises were overcome through diplomatic relations.

In this period, relations with Bulgaria also became strained due to the pressure of the Jivkov government upon the Muslim Turks living in that country

⁶⁸⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1987, p.177. See also, Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları v.6* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), p.63.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1987, p.177.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1987, p.182.

⁶⁹¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, March 1987, p.185. See also, Kutlay Doğan, *Turgut Özal Belgeseli* (Ankara: Türk Haberler Ajansı, 1994), pp.150-151.

especially after 1984. Muslim Turks were forced to change their names and their freedom to pray was curtailed. In other words, an assimilationist policy was implemented towards Muslim Turks.⁶⁹² In order to solve the problem, president Evren sent a letter with his representative to the Jivkov government on January 10, 1985, after he had discussed with the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs,⁶⁹³ but his initiative did not come up with a solution. In addition to president Evren, Özal declared that Turkey was ready to accept 500,000 Turks to Turkey in February 1985. However, the issue of Bulgarian migrants had to wait until 1989 to be resolved.⁶⁹⁴

In the first period of the Motherland Party government, Turkey had relations as intense with its neighbors in the Middle East as those in the Balkans. The Özal government based its relations with its neighbors in the Middle East on the economy. For example, Turkey did not suspend its economic relations with either Iraq or Iran during Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988.⁶⁹⁵ In the Middle East, Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria were deeply affected by two main issues: the Kurds and water. The separatist Kurdish movement intensified after 1984 and Turkey signed bilateral agreements with Iraq on October 15, 1984 and Syria on March 5, 1985 to provide the security of borders against terrorist activities. Despite the diplomatic relations with Iraq and Syria, terrorist activities accelerated and Özal visited Syria in June 1987. Turkey sought to solve the problem of terrorism through diplomacy with

⁶⁹² Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.176.

⁶⁹³ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* v.5, pp.165-166.

⁶⁹⁴ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.968.

⁶⁹⁵ Melek Fırat, and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler: Arap Devletleriyle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.131.

Syria because Abdullah Öcalan and the militants of PKK were protected by the Syrian government. Syria proposed to sign a treaty in order to solve water issue. Ultimately, two protocols were signed during Özal's visit in June 1987, one of which was related to the security issues and the other was related to economic issues, especially that of water. However, these two protocols did not permanently solve the problems between the two countries.⁶⁹⁶ The beginning of the construction of the South Eastern Anatolian Project was also an impediment to the solution of the water issue because of the reactions of Iraq and Syria.⁶⁹⁷ The efforts to develop economic relations with the countries in the Middle East also failed because of the economic crisis in Iran and Iraq right after the war.⁶⁹⁸

In the program of the first Özal government between 1983-1987, besides the development of relations with the United States and the neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East, full membership to the European Community was another main objective. Özal regarded the membership in the European Community as a condition for the development of the Turkish economy and the infrastructure. He stated that:

Most of the members of the European Community are developed countries. Their population does not increase and they resolved their infrastructural problems. On the other hand, Turkey's population is about the reach seventy million, but it needs infrastructure. It is necessary to make more investments on highways, stations, irrigation and telecommunication. Therefore, Turkey is a good province for Europe. We can act as a bridge between the European Community and the Islamic world thanks to our relations with the Islamic countries. Turkey will play an important role in the solution of possible problems in the future.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid., pp.134-137.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., p.143.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., p.148.

⁶⁹⁹ AT ülkelerinin çoğu gelişmiş ülkelerdir. Nüfusları artmıyor. Altyapı sorunlarını çözmüşler. Türkiye ise 70 milyon nüfusa giderken, altyapı ihtiyacı ile karşı karşıya. Daha birçok otoyol, santral, sulama ve haberleşme alanlarında yatırımlar yapılması lazım. Demek ki Türkiye AT için iyi bir iş sahası. İslam ülkeleriyle ilişkilerimiz sayesinde, AT ülkeleriyle

Özal made an evaluation of the Turkey's membership in the European Community in his book and stated that:

The(se) forecasts enable us to assert with confidence that when the time comes for our full and complete membership to the community, we shall not be an economic burden on the other members. On the contrary, we shall represent a vast market for its high technology products and we shall offer enormous opportunities for productive investments for its enterprises because we have many major projects to undertake. You have in large measure completed your infrastructures: you are now in a position to help us. Your companies will be able to invest in this area and create a great deal of employment, both in your countries and in ours. Bearing in mind the differing wage costs of Europe and Turkey, you will be to employ Turkish labor more economically in Turkey.⁷⁰⁰

When these two statements are taken into consideration, membership in the European Community was an economic mission for the Özal government. In other words, Özal's principle of economic diplomacy was again on the agenda of the Motherland Party government and Evren agreed with Özal on the application for full membership to the community.⁷⁰¹ Ultimately, Turkey applied for full membership in the European Community on April 14, 1987. However, the community rejected the membership of Turkey because of Turkey's structural problems such as human rights violations, lack of respect for the rights of minorities, economic problems and instability, the problems with Greece as a member state, such as on Cyprus and in the Aegean.⁷⁰² Although the membership in the European Community was a goal for the Özal government, Güldemir argues that the rejection of Turkey's membership did

İslam ülkeleri arasında köprü vazifesi görebiliriz. İleride çıkabilecek meselelerin çözümünde Türkiye önemli rol oynayacaktır. Doğan, p.152.

⁷⁰⁰ Özal, p.314.

⁷⁰¹ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* v.6, p.98.

⁷⁰² Çağrı Erhan, and Tuğrul Arat, "AT'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed.Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.100.

not disturb Özal because he valued the relations with the United States more than he did those with Europe.⁷⁰³

Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union were mainly limited to economic relations in the period between 1983 and 1987. Turkey and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for Turkey's natural gas imports on September 18, 1984. Moreover, Turkish companies were involved especially in construction projects in the Soviet Union.⁷⁰⁴ Consequently, Turkey sought to obtain financial cooperation from its relations with the Soviet Union as it did with the European Community during the first Özal government between 1983 and 1987.

The first Motherland Party period was dominated by efforts to reconstruct Turkey's economy and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, it was also a civilianization period in Turkey's domestic politics. Firstly, the True Path Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Welfare Party were allowed to be involved in the local elections that were held on March 25, 1984.⁷⁰⁵ As the result of the elections, the Motherland Party consolidated its single-party rule. However, a problem of political legitimacy appeared in the parliament because the Social Democratic Party and the True Path Party became second and third major parties in local elections, respectively, although they were not represented in the parliament. As Tanör writes,

⁷⁰³ Güldemir, p.102.

⁷⁰⁴ Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.163.

⁷⁰⁵ In the 1984 local elections, the Motherland Party gained 43.24% of votes, the Social Democratic Party obtained 24.85% of votes, the True Path Party won 11.8% of votes, the Populist Party obtained 7.78% of votes, the Nationalist Democracy Party gained 5.45% of votes, the Welfare Party obtained 3.75% of votes and the independents won 3.14% of votes. <http://www.yerelnet.org.tr/secimler/?tur=&yil=1984>

the period between 1983 and 1987 enabled the Motherland Party government to act and legislate freely because of its dominance in the parliament.⁷⁰⁶

Despite the lack of political constraints, the Özal government felt that it had to keep sound relations with the military at the very beginning of the Motherland Party period. However, in the end, prime minister Özal tried to keep the military under his control and the appointment of the chief of general staff in 1987 can be regarded as an obvious attempt to reach this goal. Hierarchically, the commander of land forces, Necdet Öztorun, was expected to be appointed as the chief of general staff, but Özal appointed Necip Torumtay as the new chief of general staff on July 25, 1987.⁷⁰⁷ President Evren supported Necip Torumtay's appointment as the chief of general staff, too.⁷⁰⁸

The transformation in the military staff also was seen in politics and the bans on politician participation of the pre-intervention period such as those on Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş, were abolished with a referendum that was held on September 6, 1987.⁷⁰⁹ Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş were elected as the leaders of the True Path Party, the Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party, respectively. In such an

⁷⁰⁶ Bülent Tanör, "17.Dönem TBMM 1983-1987" in *Türkiye Tarihi 5: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003*, ed.Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), p.66.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid., p.65.

⁷⁰⁸ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları v.6*, p.98.

⁷⁰⁹ In the referendum, 50.16% of voters were in favor of the abolition of bans while 49.84% of voters were in favor of the continuation of bans. Tanör, *17.Dönem TBMM 1983-1987*, p.73.

atmosphere, the early elections were held on November 29, 1987, and the Motherland Party won the elections.⁷¹⁰

The second Motherland Party government was formed by prime minister Özal on December 21, 1987 and in the new government, Mesut Yılmaz was appointed minister of foreign affairs. In the program of the new government, the main objective was to conduct an active foreign policy that was based on economic interests within the context of the foreign policy principles of Atatürk. The program of the second Motherland Party government included the goals that had not been reached during the first government, such as the full membership in the European Community, the mediator role in order to terminate the war between Iran and Iraq, the migration of Bulgarian Muslim Turks and the efforts to secure the support of the United States against the demands of Armenians.

The development of the relations with the United States and the Soviet Union especially in the economic realm were the objectives of the new government. Furthermore, to play a role in the termination of the Israeli occupation and the independence of Palestine as a mediator, the solution of the Cyprus dispute within the jurisdiction of the United Nations and the development of relations with the countries in the Far East, Latin America and Africa were other objectives that the new government would seek to reach.⁷¹¹

As happened during the first Motherland Party government, Turkey's foreign relations had an economic basis. The main objective of Turkish-American and Turkish-Soviet relations during second Motherland Party government was the

⁷¹⁰ In the 1987 general elections, the Motherland Party gained 36.31% of votes and 292 seats in the parliament, the Social Democratic Party obtained 24.74% of votes and 99 seats in the parliament and the True Path Party won 19.14% of votes and 59 seats in the parliament. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=10

⁷¹¹ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.98-100.

development of economic relations. However, the United States decreased the sum of financial assistance in the form of credit, especially after 1987. Uzgel writes that the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union after Gorbachev's coming to power in the Soviet Union played a role in the decrease of financial assistance.⁷¹²

Despite the recession in Turkish-American economic relations, Turkish-Soviet economic relations developed during the second Motherland Party period. In addition to the agreement for natural gas in 1984, Turkish construction companies won contracts in the Soviet Union from 1988 onwards. In time, many Turkish workers were employed in the companies in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the diversity of trade products increased between the two countries. On July 6, 1989 the two countries signed the Front and Seafront Trade Agreement (*Sınır Ve Kıyı Ticareti Anlaşması*) which enhanced the potential of trade through the Sarp border gate and suitcase trading.⁷¹³ Turkey's political relations with the Soviet Union also improved to a limited extent. The mid-range missiles in the Soviet Union that could reach Turkey in any struggle were removed.⁷¹⁴ While relations with the Soviet Union improved, Turkey's relations with the Economic Community did not develop as was intended during the second Motherland Party government.

In addition to the failure in the development of relations especially with the United States and the European Community, Özal's efforts to solve the problem with Turkey's neighbors in the Balkans through dialogue and negotiations failed. In the first instance, Özal intensified his efforts for the solution of disputes in the Aegean Sea and met Greek prime minister Papandreu in Davos on January 30-31, 1988. The

⁷¹² Uzgel, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, pp.54-55.

⁷¹³ Tellal, *SSCB'yle İlişkiler*, p.164.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.165-166.

countries signed the Davos Declaration after this meeting which included nine clauses that determined the principles of foreign relations between the two countries although the problems could not be resolved. These principles were good faith, joint action, economic cooperation and the permanent solution of disputes which mainly reflected Özal's principles of foreign policy. At this meeting, the establishment of an economic committee in Ankara and political committee in Athens was decided in order to enhance cooperation between the two countries.

In the solution of the problems with Greece through cooperation, it is possible to make a differentiation between the prime minister Özal, and the president Evren and minister of foreign affairs Yılmaz. Contrary to the positive expectations of Özal from these meetings, Evren and Yılmaz did not expect much for the solution of disputes with Greece.⁷¹⁵ Therefore, the Davos meeting did not enable the solution of disputes between the two countries. Later on, Greek prime minister Papandreu lost the elections in November 1989 and April 1990 and the new government abandoned Papandreu's crisis policy although it did not come up with any solution for the disputes between the two countries.⁷¹⁶ The second Motherland Party period can be regarded as a stagnation period in Turkish-Greek relations compared that between 1983 and 1987, which was shattered with two crises in the Aegean Sea. However, the problems that were inherited from the past could not be resolved, either.

In this period, another problem reappeared in the Balkans: the Muslim Turks in Bulgaria. The assimilationist policies of the Jivkov government during first Özal government continued until 1989. Muslim Turks in Bulgaria were forced to migrate to Turkey from May 1989. The Özal government lifted visa restrictions so that

⁷¹⁵ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* v.6, p.302.

⁷¹⁶ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.958.

between June and August 1989, about 300,000 Turks migrated to Turkey after having sold all their property in Bulgaria. However, as the number of migrants rapidly increased, the Turkish government closed borders to the newcomers on August 21, 1989, although Özal had declared that Turkey was ready to accept 500,000 migrants.⁷¹⁷ Furthermore, Özal made some aggressive declarations towards Jivkov government which were resented even by the president Evren.⁷¹⁸ However, the migrant problem with Bulgaria could not be solved until Özal became president.

Like Turkey's relations with its neighbors in the Balkans, relations in the Middle East also remained problematic. The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 and despite the revival of economic relations, Turkey could not resolve its problems with Iran, Iraq and Syria that had been inherited from the first Motherland Party period. Nevertheless, the relations with Palestine and Israel extended the scope of relations in the Middle East. After a meeting in Algeria, the Palestinian National Council declared the establishment of the Palestinian state On November 15, 1988. Turkey quickly recognized the new Palestinian state although the new state was not recognized even by the Arab states because it was not legitimate according to the international law due to the lack of its autonomy on its territories.⁷¹⁹ Turkey's recognition and support of the Palestinian state conflicted with its aims to develop its relations with the Israel. However, in the late 1980s Turkey took a more balanced

⁷¹⁷ İlhan Uzgel, "Balkanlarla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.180. See also, Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, p.176, Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.967-968.

⁷¹⁸ Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* v.6, pp. 443-444. See also, Uzgel, *Balkanlarla İlişkiler*, p.180.

⁷¹⁹ Fırat and Kürkcüoğlu, *Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler: Arap Devletleriyle İlişkiler*, p.129.

position towards Palestine and Israel while Turkish-Israeli relations had to wait for more time to reach the intended level.⁷²⁰

Consequently, it can be argued that during the second Motherland Party government under the leadership of Özal until his election as president, Turkish foreign relations that aimed to solve problems through the development of economic relations did not reach the intended level in the government program. At the same time, the power of the Motherland Party began to decline in Turkish domestic politics due to the deterioration of the economy, which led the Özal government to seek foreign financial assistance. The inter-party rivalry escalated after the 1987 general elections.

The local elections in 1989 showed that the Motherland Party was in decline because in these elections, the governing party became the second party in the competition.⁷²¹ Its decline in local elections instigated the inter-party rivalry in the parliament and the impact of this rivalry was seen in the election of the president on October 31, 1989. Demirel was in favor of the election of the president by the public; on the other hand, İnönü was opposed to election of Özal and the reelection of Evren with a change in the constitution which was proposed by Özal. Despite the opposition by Demirel and İnönü, Özal became a candidate for the presidency and he was elected as the eighth president of the republic on October 31, 1989, after the

⁷²⁰ Çağrı Erhan, and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Ortadoğu’yla İlişkiler: Arap Olmayan Devletlerle İlişkiler” in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.152.

⁷²¹ In the 1989 local elections, the Social Democratic Populist Party obtained 32.76% of votes, the Motherland Party gained 23.74% of votes and the True Path Party won 23.48% of votes.

third ballot in the election.⁷²² Özal's election as president opened up a new era in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy.

After Özal was elected president, he appointed Yıldırım Akbulut prime minister to form a new government. It is argued that Akbulut's appointment stemmed from his lack of authority in the party because Özal did not want to lose his control over the party or the government. Therefore, the ministers in the cabinet such as the minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yılmaz and the program of the Akbulut government were prepared by president Özal himself.⁷²³ The new government's program, which was formed in November 1989, was similar to the two previous Özal governments' programs in terms of the principles of the foreign policy of Turkey. The foreign policy was based on the principles of Atatürk. Moreover, economic interests and the importance of national defense were emphasized. The new government aimed to secure Turkey's full membership in the European Community although a report that was prepared by the European Commission on December 18, 1989 stated that the community would not accept a new member before the completion of the common market in 1992, and that Turkey would have to reach economic, social and political development in consistency with the principles of the community before it could be accepted for membership.⁷²⁴

The development of relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Islamic countries and Greece were included in the new program. In the new

⁷²² Bülent Tanör, "18.Dönem TBMM 1987-1991" in *Türkiye Tarihi 5: Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-2003*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2007), pp.81-83.

⁷²³ Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kışkacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası* (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000), p.162. See also, Tanör, *18.Dönem TBMM 1987-1991*, p.84.

⁷²⁴ The Decision of the European Commission, December 18, 1989.
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/turkiye_-_ab_kronoloji.pdf

government's program, it was stated that Israel should withdraw from the Palestinian territories and the Cyprus issue should be resolved within the framework of the United Nations. Lastly, Akbulut government put emphasis on the development of relations with the countries in the Far East, Latin America and Africa.⁷²⁵ The impact of Özal was seen not only in principles of the new government's foreign policy, but also in the formation and implementation of foreign policy, which can be exemplified through Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf crisis, which erupted with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

On August 2, 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. The UN Security Council held a session and condemned this act and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and called upon the two parties to solve their problems through negotiations.⁷²⁶ However, as the Security Council decision was not implemented, the council held a new session on August 6, 1990 and decided to impose an embargo upon the Iraqi government, which had failed to comply with the decisions of the previous resolution.⁷²⁷ At the time, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was on vacation, thus a session could be held through calling for an extraordinary session by the president. Rather than a parliamentary session, the National Security Council held a session on the issue of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.⁷²⁸ On August 7, 1990 the cabinet met under the leadership of Özal and decided to close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık

⁷²⁵ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.100-102.

⁷²⁶ UN Security Council Resolution No.660, August 2, 1990.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution No.661, August 6, 1990.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷²⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1990, p.71.

pipeline in line with the embargo decision of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, the imports, exports and transit trade with Iraq and Kuwait were suspended.⁷²⁹

Although the decision was made by the cabinet, Uzgel writes that this was a personal decision of Özal.⁷³⁰ This argument can be supported with Özal's control of the government and the lack of a parliamentary session in the decision making process. Uzgel also states that the United States demanded the use of airbases, the mobilization of land forces on the Iraqi border and the sending of troops in order to support powers which were struggling against Iraqi government.⁷³¹ The land forces were mobilized in South East Turkey against a possible threat from Iraq or a possibility to support US troops from north.⁷³² However, Özal wanted to play a more active role in the crisis and he emphasized the need to conduct a more dynamic foreign policy in order to have a say during and after the crisis in the region in a speech that he made in the Grand National Assembly on September 1, 1990.⁷³³ After three days, permission for the implementation of Article 92 of the constitution⁷³⁴ was demanded by prime minister Akbulut for the second time.^{735,736} The second

⁷²⁹ Ibid., p.79.

⁷³⁰ İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.254.

⁷³¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1990, pp. 84-86. See also, Uzgel, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.255.

⁷³² Necip Torumtay, *Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994), p.102.

⁷³³ Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2001), pp.8-11.

⁷³⁴ Article 92 regulates the sending of troops to foreign countries and the mobilization of foreign troops in Turkey. Kili and Gözübüyük, p.327.

⁷³⁵ Arcayürek, p.23.

⁷³⁶ For the first time, the implementation of Article 92 of the constitution was demanded on August 12, 1990 and it was accepted with the votes of the Motherland Party. However, the

permission was also accepted with the votes of the Motherland Party despite the reaction of the opposition against the permission.⁷³⁷ The majority of the Motherland Party in the parliament enabled president Özal to lead the parliament in line with his goals. In the meantime, president Özal met with president Bush in the United States on September 25, 1990. Although secretary-of-states, James Baker, was involved in the meeting, Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ali Bozer was not involved.⁷³⁸ Upon the exclusion of minister of foreign affairs in the meeting in the Oval Office, Ali Bozer resigned on October 11, 1990 and Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptempoçin was appointed minister of foreign affairs. The resignation of the minister of foreign affairs was the first reaction to president Özal's monopolistic decision making mechanism in foreign policy. One week later, the minister of National Defense Safa Giray resigned, too.

Although the mobilization of troops on the Iraqi border was provided, the issue of the use of airbases and sending troops became problematic and faced resistance especially from the ministry of foreign affairs and the military. The general staff was opposed to being involved militarily in the crisis because the military was not prepared to be involved in such a war. Moreover, Özal's personal contacts and declarations caused resentment in the general staff. On the other hand, the American ambassador in Ankara demanded an appointment from the chief-of-general staff Torumtay and in the appointment the ambassador told Torumtay that president Özal had identified him (Torumtay) in his meeting with president Bush in

first permission was limited with a clause of the implementation if Turkey was exposed to an attack from outside. Gözen, p.168.

⁷³⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1990, p.88.

⁷³⁸ Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu* (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992), p.192.

Paris as a contact who would help the American officials during the crisis.⁷³⁹

Ultimately, as the minister of foreign affairs, Bozer, and minister of national defense, Giray, the chief-of-general staff Torumtay resigned on December 3, 1990 with the claim of the degeneration in the decision making process of the country's foreign policy.⁷⁴⁰ The resignation of a chief of general staff was unprecedented in republican history until the presidency of Özal. Moreover, Necip Torumtay was appointed by Özal during his prime ministry through changing the hierarchy of the general staff. After the resignation, Doğan Güreş was appointed chief of general staff.

Turkey was not militarily engaged in the Gulf crisis due to the resistance from the military and the ministry of foreign affairs. However, Gözen argues that Turkey's position in the crisis was determined by external factors such as the strategy of the coalition forces rather than the internal resistance that derived from the institutions.⁷⁴¹ In short, Turkey remained out of the war, but it supported coalition forces with the decision that was made by the parliament which allowed the use of air bases on January 17, 1991.⁷⁴² Ultimately, the Gulf crisis ended with the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in March 1991.

In this period, Turkey's relations with other countries remained under the shadow of the Gulf crisis and did not develop radically as intended. Although Akbulut government's program aimed to conduct a multidimensional foreign policy, the relations with the United States became the focal point in this period. Full membership to the European Community was one of the goals of the Akbulut

⁷³⁹ Torumtay, p.118.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., p.119, 130.

⁷⁴¹ Gözen, p.266.

⁷⁴² Gökmen, pp.197-198.

government. However, the relations with the European Community did not develop as intended, especially before Turkey's membership to the Customs Union in 1995. On the other hand relations with the neighbors in the Balkans were not problematic as they had been in the earlier Motherland Party governments. Although the problems with Greece were not resolved, the tension during Papandreu governments was reduced.⁷⁴³ On the other hand, the tension with Bulgaria that derived from the Muslim Turks also decreased after Jivkov's loss of power in 1989.

The relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors especially with Iraq were affected from the Gulf crisis and the Kurdish issue and the water dispute with Iraq and Syria remained unresolved in this period.⁷⁴⁴ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War were the most important factors that shaped Turkish foreign policy afterwards. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system turned into a unipolar one with the domination of the United States. In addition to this, with the disintegration of the Soviet regime in Caucasia and Central Asia, Turkish decision makers aimed to extend the scope of Turkish foreign policy to these regions.⁷⁴⁵

In addition to the transformation in the international system and Turkish foreign policy, Turkish domestic politics also were transformed during the presidency of Özal. In June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz replaced Yıldırım Akbulut in the party congress and was elected as the leader of the Motherland Party. Thereafter, president Özal appointed him as the prime minister. Although the Yılmaz

⁷⁴³ Armaoğlu, *20.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.958 .

⁷⁴⁴ Melek Fırat, and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler: Arap Devletleriyle İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp. 551-554.

⁷⁴⁵ Mustafa Aydın, "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler" in *Türk Dış Politikası 1980-2001*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.366-372.

government had assertive foreign policy objectives similar to those of the previous Motherland Party governments,⁷⁴⁶ he did not have enough time to implement these policies because of the pressure of early general elections from the opposition leaders Demirel and İnönü. Yılmaz was not dependent on Özal as Akbulut had been and he agreed with opposition leaders on early elections and the elections, which were held on October 20, 1991.⁷⁴⁷ These elections became the end of the Motherland Party rule after the military intervention and opened up an era of coalitions.⁷⁴⁸ With the loss of support in the parliament, the dominance of Özal in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy also ended.

Concluding Remarks

The Motherland Party period between 1983 and 1991 can be divided into two phases in terms of the decision making process: the prime ministry of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1989, and the presidency of Turgut Özal between 1989 and 1991.

In the period between 1983 and 1989, the main actors that were involved in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy were president Evren, prime minister Özal and minister of foreign affairs Vahit Halefođlu. President Evren can be regarded as a limiting factor on the role of Özal in foreign policy because he was not excluded from the decision making mechanism and he intervened when he thought that it was necessary, as happened during the appointment of Vahit Halefođlu to the ministry of foreign affairs, or Evren's involvement during the

⁷⁴⁶ Girgin, *TC Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız*, pp.103-107.

⁷⁴⁷ Tanör, *18.Dönem TBMM 1987-1991*, pp.87-88.

⁷⁴⁸ In the 1991 early general elections, the True Path Party gained 27.03% of votes and 178 seats in the parliament, the Motherland Party obtained 24.01% of votes and 115 seats in the parliament, the Social Democratic Populist Party won 20.75% of votes and 88 seats in the parliament, the Welfare Party gained 16.88% of votes and 62 seats in the parliament and the Democratic Left Party gained 10.75% of votes and 7 seats in the parliament.

problem with Bulgaria that stemmed from pressure on Muslim Turks in that country. Although he was not the ultimate decision making authority in the decision making process in comparison to the period between 1980 and 1983, Evren played a role in the process by limiting Özal's initiative.

Prime minister Özal determined the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy as economic diplomacy and a dynamic policy in response to the events that happened in the region and the world. However, even during his prime ministry, his declarations put the ministry of foreign affairs on the spot because of some inconsistencies with traditional Turkish foreign policy. Yavuzalp states that during his prime ministry, Özal was not well informed on the issues of foreign policy. However, as time passed, foreign policy became his priority, especially during his presidency.⁷⁴⁹ When Özal's dominance in the decision making process is compared, his presidency was his time of hegemonizing the process more than his prime ministry. He sought to have sound relations with the military and the president Evren in order to consolidate his power during his prime ministry.

During Özal's prime ministry, the ministry of foreign affairs was actively involved in the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy because the Özal government aimed to extend the scope of Turkish foreign policy through more active relations with its neighbors, the United States and the European Community.⁷⁵⁰ Minister of foreign affairs Vahit Halefoğlu was appointed upon the insistence of president Evren and the minister was able to keep his independent position during the first Motherland Party period. However, after 1987 general elections, prime minister Özal appointed Mesut Yılmaz as the prime minister and

⁷⁴⁹ Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, p.323.

⁷⁵⁰ İskit, p.423.

was involved in the decisions in Turkish foreign policy and the mechanism of the ministry which disturbed the minister Mesut Yılmaz. After Özal was elected as president, Yılmaz kept his office in the Akbulut government. However, as the intervention of Özal in the mechanism of the ministry, he resigned on February 20, 1990.⁷⁵¹

At the same time, during the prime ministry of Özal, the parliament was dominated by the Motherland Party. The Populist Party and the National Democracy Party were unable to play their roles as opposition parties in parliamentary decisions. Although after the 1987 general elections leaders such as Demirel and İnönü were involved in the parliament, the majority of the Motherland Party enabled prime minister Özal to act without important pressure from the parliament. Furthermore, as a charismatic leader, Özal had control of the party.⁷⁵² He was an authoritarian leader who acted as an ultimate decision maker as party leader, prime minister and president, but his prime ministry was more recessive than his presidency.⁷⁵³ Especially after the 1987 general elections in which the majority of the Motherland Party was enhanced and he was elected president in 1989, Özal could act more freely than he had in the period between 1983 and 1989.

By the same token, the appointment of Torumtay instead of Öztörün as the chief of general staff also strengthened the hand of prime minister Özal in the decision making mechanism because the appointment disrupted the hierarchy within

⁷⁵¹ Faruk Bildirici, *Hanedanın Son Prensi* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003), p.184.

⁷⁵² Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Motherland Party: A Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party” in *Political Parties in Turkey*, eds. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp.45-47.

⁷⁵³ Feride Acar, “Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation” in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayarı and Metin Heper (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), p.170.

the ranks of the military, although this did not cause a reaction from the military.

During the prime ministry of Özal, the military was not involved in Turkish politics in comparison to the post-intervention period. Hale states that:

The (this) process of disengagement had two aspects. In the first place, the army gradually backed away from trying to control the political system and withdrew from involvement in the day-to-day administration of the country. In the second place, by the beginning of the 1990s it was apparent that armed forces chiefs were beginning to abandon their traditional position of semi-autonomy within the state structure, in which defense policy was regarded as their private preserve, outside the control of the elected politicians.⁷⁵⁴

However, the process that can be regarded as the civilianization of the decision making mechanism both in domestic politics and foreign affairs of Turkey did not come up with the democratization of this process, especially during the presidency of Özal.⁷⁵⁵ During Özal's presidency, the decision making mechanism of Turkish foreign policy degenerated, as was seen during the Gulf crisis. President Özal played an important role, but he tended to exclude the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs from the decision making process. Prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut was appointed by president Özal in order to facilitate his control over the party and the parliament. Akbulut was not expected to be actively involved in Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, prime minister Mesut Yılmaz, who replaced Akbulut in June 1991, did not have time to implement his foreign policy objectives because he lost his office four months later in early general elections in 1991.

Three ministers of foreign affairs acted in the Motherland Party governments during Özal's presidency. Mesut Yılmaz and Ali Bozer resigned because of their resentment of Turgut Özal's involvement in the mechanism of ministry of foreign

⁷⁵⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p.288.

⁷⁵⁵ İlhan Uzgöl, 'Türk Dış Politikasında Sivilleşme ve Demokratikleşme Sorunları: Körfez Savaşı Örneği'. *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*. no.53(1998). p.325.

affairs and exclusion of ministers. However, as was seen during the Gulf crisis, Özal's aim to send troops to Iraq was prevented by the joint efforts of the ministry of foreign affairs and the military. Although the military was not involved in politics except for the Gulf crisis, it played a role in the formation of decisions during the crisis. However, the chief of general staff Necip Torumtay resigned due to his resentment of Özal's attitudes in the decision making mechanism.

During Özal's presidency, the majority of the Motherland Party in the parliament continued until 1991 elections and the parliament supported the decisions that were made by the president. Although the leaders of the opposition parties Demirel and İnönü reacted to the formation of Turkish foreign policy by president Özal during the Gulf crisis, they could not prevent the parliament from making legislations, which were consistent with Özal's policies, because of the majority of the Motherland Party.

During the period between 1983 and 1991, the changing position and effectiveness of the actors such as the presidents, prime ministers, ministers, parliament and the military can be divided into two phases, as was mentioned. However, it can be argued that the role of the press and public opinion did not change dramatically. The press was fragmented towards Özal's foreign policy formation and implementation. During the Gulf crisis, some journalists supported Turkish foreign policy while some were critical of it.⁷⁵⁶ However, the Turkish press took position after the formation and the implementation of foreign policy decisions; thus, it did not play a role in stimulating the public interest as had happened in the 1960s and 1970s before the formation of policies.

⁷⁵⁶ Gözen, pp.176-177.

Businessmen and Özal's personal contacts played important roles in this period because Özal was critical of bureaucratic politics. Moreover, his domestic or foreign personal contacts were involved as mediators or advisors during the formation and implementation of foreign policy decisions.⁷⁵⁷ As a result, it can be argued that during Özal period between 1983 and 1991, the interest groups especially the business circles were involved in Turkish foreign policy decision making process. On the other hand, there was not any opposition from the public because of the lack of an organized opposition, e.g., the youth and university students as had happened in the 1960s and the 1970s who were interested in and critical of Turkey's foreign policy objectives.

⁷⁵⁷ Güldemir, pp.107-108.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War was not periodically monolithic like the relations between the two superpowers. However, the periodization of Turkish foreign policy was slightly different from the periodization of the general trends of the Cold War. Turkey perceived the Soviet threat until the end of 1964 although the Soviet Union had abandoned its territorial claims as early as 1953 after the death of Stalin. The Justice Party period from 1965 onwards witnessed efforts to develop diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Turkey tried to conduct a balanced foreign policy until the 1980s, but the military intervention in 1980 marked a return to United States-centric foreign policy. The domination of relations with the United States continued in the 1980s.

This periodization of Turkish foreign policy does not match the periodization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, e.g., the period of tension and crises between 1945 and 1963, the period of a search for détente between 1963 and 1975, and the end of détente and the Cold War between 1975 and 1991. The difference between the two can be explained by Turkey's perception of the Cold War which stemmed from its country-specific dynamics besides the impact of its relations especially with the United States as the leader of the capitalist bloc. In other words, internal dynamics, e.g., the Turkish economy, structures of governments and the parliament, the crises in Turkish domestic politics especially in the 1960s and the 1970s, and the actors of Turkish foreign policy, e.g., presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, the parliament, the military, the press and the public opinion, also played different roles

in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy, as happened in many other members of the capitalist and communist blocs.

Firstly, the economic policies of the governments and the economic crises that Turkey faced during the Cold War were critical for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy. In the early years of the Cold War, the Republican People's Party governments aimed to liberalize the Turkish economy and to modernize the Turkish army, which had been backward during the Second World War. The necessity of economic development, together with the Soviet threat in the wake of the Second World War, accelerated Turkey's engagement with the Western bloc because the required financial assistance was partly provided through the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and Marshall Plan, which was declared in 1947 and began to be implemented in 1948.

The Democrat Party, which came to power in 1950, was an ardent supporter of liberal economic policies and provided economic development which was based mainly on agriculture until the mid-1950s. However, the economy deteriorated in late 1950s and this had impact on the foreign policy of the Democrat Party government. Prime minister Menderes visited even Far East to obtain financial support because the United States had given up supporting the Democrat Party government financially.

With the military intervention in 1960, Turkey shifted to economic policies based on import-substitution, but waited for a half-decade to concentrate on economic development. The Justice Party period from 1965 onwards was important because of prime minister Demirel's emphasis on economic development. Until the 1971 memorandum, the Demirel governments provided a high rate of economic development which went hand-in-hand with industrial investments. As had happened

during the late 1950s, although the Justice Party was a right wing-party that was anti-communist, Demirel visited the Soviet Union to obtain economic assistance. In other words, ideological commitments did not determine Turkey's economic and foreign relations. After his visit to Moscow, economic relations with the Soviet Union began to develop as diplomatic relations that had begun to develop after 1964 and especially from 1965 onwards. The financial crisis of the late 1960s became one of the reasons for the widespread social unrest, and a memorandum in 1971 paved the way for instable governments until 1980. The repercussions of the oil crises in 1973-74 were seen in Turkey in the late 1970s and, ultimately, Turkish economy went bankrupt on the eve of 1980 military intervention.

Again in this period, Ecevit and Demirel as prime ministers, tried hard to stimulate the economy despite their failure. The economic agreements, which were signed during Ecevit's tenure in 1970s, with Libya, which was an Arab state and perceived as backward and eastern, in order to obtain financial assistance is important to show how the economic situation played a role in the foreign policy orientation of the actors because Ecevit was a prime minister who was a social democrat and an admirer of Scandinavian democracies.

After the 1980 military intervention, the first civilian government was formed by Turgut Özal after the 1983 general elections. The priority of Özal was economic recovery and development, thus, Turkey turned its face again to the United States as the main creditor during his first government. However, especially after 1987, economy again deteriorated and prime minister Özal extended the scope of Turkish foreign policy in order to provide financial assistance from the Soviet Union and the neighbors in the Middle East. The economic policies of the Özal period show his emphasis on the necessity of the unity of economy and diplomacy. To sum up, the

economic policies of governments and economic crises were significant components of Turkish foreign policy orientation during the Cold War.

Like the economy, the structure of governments and the parliament during the Cold War played limited roles in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In the period between 1945 and 1991, the structure of governments can be divided into two groups: single party governments, the Republican People's Party between 1945 and 1950, the Democrat Party between 1950 and 1960, the Justice Party between 1965 and 1971 and lastly, the Motherland Party between 1983 and 1991, and successive coalition governments, between 1961 and 1965, between 1971 and 1980. In addition, governments were directly formed by the military juntas in the periods between 1960 and 1961 and between 1980 and 1983. In comparison to coalition governments, single party governments were more successful at implementing their foreign policy objectives. Coalition governments were preoccupied with their internal struggles or the unrest within society. Interestingly, however, when the periods of coalition governments are taken into consideration, it can be concluded that the struggle in these governments mainly stemmed from the differences in their domestic policy objectives rather than the differences in foreign policy objectives. Hence, the parties were able to reach a consensus to a certain extent on foreign policy issues.

As partners in coalition governments, opposition parties in the parliament generally put emphasis on the "national unity" on foreign policy issues despite their criticisms of the policies of the ruling party. In this period, the conspicuous example of parliamentary opposition was the Turkish Labor Party, which acted in the parliament as an opposition party between 1965 and 1971. Despite its limited power in the parliament, it strongly criticized the foreign policy objectives of the ruling

party and advocated the necessity of change in the West-centric orientation of Turkish foreign policy. However, the foreign policy orientation was not altered by the ruling party. Thus, it can be concluded that the parliament did not dramatically influence foreign policy during the Cold War.

The crises in Turkish domestic politics especially between 1960 and 1980 influenced Turkish foreign policy, too, because these crises necessitated concentration on internal problems rather than foreign policy issues especially in the late 1960s and 1970s. The unrest within society as a result of the right-left polarization had political implications as well as the social ones. Governments had to deal with social crises as well as economic ones and their objectives on foreign policy issues became secondary. Therefore, the social and economic crises dominated the agenda of politics, especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Moreover, these socio economic crises ended up with a military memorandum in 1971 and a military intervention in 1980.

Although the military juntas emphasized the continuity in the principles of Turkish foreign policy objectives, these efforts were partly a search for legitimacy in the eyes of foreign countries, mainly the United States. The junta years were periods in which domestic politics dominated the agenda and prevented Turkey from reaching its foreign policy objectives such as membership in the European Economic Community. After the 1980 military intervention, the Council of Europe threatened to suspend Turkey's membership in the organization. The years of crises especially between 1960 and 1980s negatively influenced Turkey's prestige in the international arena and made it difficult for the actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives.

In this period, the roles of presidents in Turkish foreign policy varied. President İnönü was the ultimate authority in the decision making process between

1945 and 1950, as he had been in the period of his presidency after the death of the Atatürk and during the Second World War. “One man” rule in politics, but specifically in foreign affairs, was the main characteristic of Atatürk and İnönü periods.

The Democrat Party period between 1950 and 1960 was different in the sense that the authority was more dispersed between the president, prime minister and even the minister of foreign affairs after the ministry of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu from 1957 onwards. The presidency of Celal Bayar can be put somewhere in between his predecessors and successors because although he was not a “one man” in foreign affairs as Atatürk and İnönü had been, he was not as passive as Gürsel, Sunay and Korutürk.

Presidents Gürsel, Sunay and Korutürk were not actively involved in the decision making process, which was dominated by the prime ministers and the ministers of foreign affairs. The position of presidents in the period between 1960 and 1980 can be described by either the dominance of the governments or the military background of these three presidents who were unfamiliar with the issues in foreign affairs. Moreover, the 1961 constitution allocated a limited space of maneuver for the presidents who were regarded as the symbolic heads of the republic.

The 1980 military intervention and the 1982 constitution became turning points for the role of presidents in foreign affairs because the 1982 constitution broadened the authority of the presidents including their role in this area although they were not accountable for their actions except for acts of treason. Therefore, the presidents of the last decade under discussion, Evren and Özal respectively, sought to dominate Turkish foreign affairs. As the head of the military junta, Evren did not

face any resistance in his effort and acted. However, president Özal faced great resistance, both from the opposition and, more importantly, from the military as the result of his risky actions, especially during the first Gulf crisis, thus, he could not act freely.

The roles of prime ministers in foreign policy changed in inverse proportional to the roles of presidents. The relationship between the two can be explained through the constitutional structure of the authorities of presidents and prime ministers. However, the dominant personalities of prime ministers played a more important role in this situation. The dispersion of authority began with the Democrat Party rule and prime minister Menderes, who was involved in the decision making process especially until the foreign ministry of Zorlu in 1957. The role of Menderes can also be explained by the indifferent stance of Fuad Köprülü as the minister of foreign affairs towards his ministry. After 1957, the decision making process was dominated by minister of foreign affairs Zorlu.

During the transition period after 1960 military intervention, İnönü acted as the prime minister until 1964. In this period, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis erupted and when these two events are considered, the dominance of İnönü, as had happened during his presidency in the period between 1938 and 1950, becomes visible. During the Justice Party period as a single-party government between 1965 and 1971, Demirel was involved in foreign policy, but did not act in as dominantly as a dominant manner as İnönü, and in this period, minister of foreign affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil played an important role in foreign policy.

The transition period after 1971 military memorandum ended with the government of the Republican People's Party-National Salvation Party in 1974 and Ecevit acted as the prime minister until the dissolution of coalition right after the

military intervention in Cyprus. In the light of the role Ecevit played during the Cyprus crisis, it can be concluded that he dominated the decision making process as the prime minister. The period after 1974 saw short-lived governments that were formed by Demirel and Ecevit, respectively. Major developments did not occur in foreign policy due to socio economic unrest, especially after 1978. After the military intervention in 1980, the ambitions and constitutional authorities of Evren and Özal during their presidencies disabled their prime ministers, to be dominantly involved in the decision making process of foreign policy, as happened in the years between 1960 and 1980.

In contrast to the dominance of presidents and prime ministers in foreign policy in crisis situations, the conduct of the daily routine of foreign policy was allocated to the ministry of foreign affairs. The ministry and the ministers were mainly responsible for the implementation of foreign policy rather than the formulation of it. However, there were some exceptions of this situation where ministry of foreign affairs dominated the formulation of foreign policy. For example, the ministry of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu extended the scope of the authority in foreign affairs after 1957. He was the permanent representative of Turkey at NATO after 1952 and was regarded as the person who directed Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the integration of economic relations to diplomatic relations after 1957 extended the authority of the ministry of foreign affairs. His success and dominance during Cyprus crisis after 1955 is an indicator of the role that the minister and ministry played in foreign policy. In addition to Zorlu, the ministry of İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil was a case of dominance of ministry in foreign politics. The power vacuum that was left by president Sunay and prime minister Demirel was filled by the minister of foreign affairs, Çağlayangil. These two examples show that, from

time to time, the ministry of foreign affairs dominated the decision making process in addition to its role in the daily routine.

After the presidents, prime ministers and ministry of foreign affairs, the parliament was also constitutionally responsible for foreign policy as the legislative body. During the Democrat Party period, the government did not tend to consult foreign policy issues in the parliament and this caused resentment in the Republican People's Party and its leader İnönü. The decision to send troops to Korea in 1950 was a great example of this tendency. Membership in NATO and the policy of government on the Cyprus issue were supported by the opposition in the parliament.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the parliament consisted of many parties, but the general tendency was to underline the necessity of "national unity" in foreign policy issues regardless of the inter-party struggle in this period. The main exception of this was the Turkish Labor Party, which criticized the pro-American stance of the government and offered dramatic changes in foreign policy. However, its opposition did not find repercussions in the policies of governments. With the banning of the Turkish Labor Party in 1971, the parliamentary opposition against governmental policy was silenced. Lastly, the parliamentary opposition appeared against the policy of the Motherland Party during the Gulf crisis in 1990. The True Path and the Social Democratic Populist Parties were critical of the governmental decision, but the majority of the Motherland Party in the parliament enabled the government to pass its decisions. In short, the parliament was not actively involved in Turkish foreign policy decisions during the Cold War.

Like the parliament, the military was not an active participant in Turkish foreign policy although the military took governments over three times and dominated Turkish politics during the Cold War. In 1962, the National Security

Council was established on the basis of the 1961 constitution. The main objective for the establishment of this body was to bring the civilian and military authorities together in order to discuss the problems, strategies and objectives of politics including foreign affairs. However, as can be seen during the Cyprus crises in 1964, 1967 and 1974, and the Aegean dispute in 1975 and 1987, the decisions were mainly consistent with the stance of the civilian authority. For example, despite the insistence of the commander of the air force to continue bombardment during the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, Turkey terminated bombardment which had been triggered in August 1964, with the initiative of prime minister İnönü. In addition, in the decision of Cyprus intervention in 1974, prime minister Ecevit dominated the process. Although the military was sensitive and concerned with the crisis situations such as Cyprus conflict, the ultimate decisions were made mainly by the civilian authority.

Among the constitutionally authorized actors, presidents, prime ministers and the ministry of foreign affairs played important roles and the role of the parliament and the military can be regarded as having been secondary during the Cold War. On the other hand, there were two other actors in this process, which did not have any authority, but engaged in the process through their positive and negative reactions: the press and the public opinion.

During the single party era until 1945 and the Democrat Party period between 1950 and 1960, the press was closely controlled and censored by the government. However, the press was punished mostly for news about domestic politics. In foreign affairs, the press was a tool for the mobilization of public opinion and until the 1960s, the press seemed supportive of the policies of governments with regard to foreign affairs. After the preparation of 1961 constitution, the strict control on the press loosened and news that was critical as well as supportive of foreign policies of

the governments began to be seen. The freedom of press continued in the 1970s despite the amendments to the constitution after 1971 military memorandum. However, the freedom of press did not bring dramatic changes to the formulation or implementation of foreign policy, but stimulated the public opinion especially in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. With the military intervention in 1980 and the 1982 constitution that was prepared during the military junta regime, the freedom of press was restricted just as was the freedom of public opinion.

The period between 1960 and 1980 can be regarded as the “golden years” of public mobilization in Turkey through youth and student movements. Although the Cyprus problem in the 1950s drew the attention of these groups, it did not reach the level of public interest as it did during the 1960s and the 1970s. The main issues of public reaction were the Cyprus conflict and anti-Americanism especially from the leftist movements. The youth and student movements were critical of the policies of the governments towards Cyprus and American presence in Turkey. The reactions increased especially during Demirel governments because the main criticism was coming from the left. However, the 1971 military memorandum and the governments that were heavily controlled by the military in the aftermath of the memorandum hit these organizations and groups. After the military memorandum, the movements changed their direction and turned into right-left polarization in the 1970s. Despite the mobilization of public opinion, they were not influential in Turkish foreign policy decision making process in 1960s and 1970s. Ultimately, the ideological polarization of 1970s was exterminated by the military intervention and the junta regime in the period between 1980 and 1983. Therefore, the public opinion, which consisted mainly of the youth and the university students in the 1960s and the 1970s, disappeared. Then, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the integration of “civil

society”, which was mainly composed of interest groups and business associations, to Turkish foreign policy decision making process.

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