

GRASSROOTS ACTION AGAINST GECEKONDU RENEWAL  
PROJECTS: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL BAŞIBUYUK  
AND ANKARA DIKMEN VADI

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“Grassroots Action Against Gecekondu Renewal Projects: The Case of Istanbul Başbüyük and Ankara Dikmen Vadi” a thesis prepared by Mehmet Baki Deniz in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree at the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History of Boğaziçi University.

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Title: Grassroots Action Against Gecekondu Renewal Projects: The Case of Istanbul Başbüyük and Ankara Dikmen Vadi

This thesis scrutinizes the interaction between the organizing in places where people live and the formation of working class identities in the post 2000 period in Turkey by focusing on two *gecekondu* neighbourhood resistances against gecekondu renewal projects. The first is in Istanbul Başbüyük and the second is in Ankara, Dikmen Vadi. Both of the neighbourhoods organized against the urban transformation project, which aim to move them to high rise apartments with long term credit payments and build zones of consumption for middle and upper-middle classes to the places cleared from gecekondu dwellers. The research first asks the question whether the movements against the gecekondu renewal projects in Dikmen Vadi and Başbüyük can be labeled as collective working class movement which aim to transform the social position of the working class and second whether the local movements in the neighbourhoods could transform the class subjectivities of the members of the movement. The answer to these questions is given in a comparative perspective within two neighbourhoods by employing field research method on two neighbourhoods together with the theoretical discussions around urban social movements. The research concludes that due to the different patterns of the history of the social context of gecekonduzation in Ankara and Istanbul and the organizational factors between the two movements, the trajectory of the movement in Dikmen Vadi caused the formation of the class identities by forming alliances with other class movements in Ankara however the movement in Başbüyük stuck in its locality and dealt more with the individual property preservation motives of the people in the neighbourhood rather than establishing ties with other class movements in Istanbul to change the social position of the working class in general.

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Mehmet Baki Deniz tarafından Haziran 2010'da teslim edilen tezin özeti

Başlık: Gecekondu dönüşüm Projelerine Karşı Mahalle Örgütlenmeleri: İstanbul Başbüyük ve Ankara Dikmen Vadi Örnekleri

Bu tez 2000 sonrası Türkiye'sinde, yaşam alanları üzerinden giden bir örgütlenmeyle sınıfsal kimlik kurulumu arasındaki ilişkiyi iki *gecekondu* mahallesinde yaşanan gecekondu dönüşüm projelerine karşı mücadele üzerinden incelemektedir. Her iki mahalle de uzun vadeli kredi ödemeleriyle kendilerini yüksek katlı apartmanlara yerleştiren ve kendilerinin terk etmesiyle boşalan arazilere orta ve üst orta sınıf tüketim alanları oluşturan gecekondu dönüşüm projelerine karşı örgütlendiler. Araştırma ilk etapta Dikmen Vadi ve Başbüyük gecekondu yenileme projelerine karşı gelişen bu hareketlerin genel anlamda işçi sınıfının toplumsal konumunu dönüştürmeye yönelik hareketler olup olamayacağını sormaktadır. İkinci etapta bu yereldeki mahalle direnişlerinin hareketin içindeki insanların sınıfsal öznelliklerini değiştirip değiştiremediklerini incelemektedir. Bu soruların cevapları karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde iki mahalle üzerinden giden alan araştırmasıyla birlikte kentsel toplumsal hareketler literatürünün çevresinde dönen tartışmalar üzerinden verilmiştir. Araştırma gecekondulaşma tarihinin Ankara ve İstanbul'daki farklılıkları ve iki hareketin örgütlenme farklılıkları sebebiyle Dikmen Vadi'deki hareketin, kolektif sınıf kimliği oluşumunu diğer sınıf hareketleriyle bağ kurarak sağladığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Bununla birlikte Başbüyük hareketinin işçi sınıfının toplumsal konumunu değiştirecek sınıf hareketleriyle bağ kurmak yerine yerelde sıkışarak ve mahalledeki insanların bireysel mülk edinme motivasyonlarıyla meşgul olduğunu da savunmaktadır. Bu yönüyle de çalışma gecekondu dönüşüm projelerine karşı verilen mücadelenin yereldeki yapısal ve örgütsel farklılıklara bağlı olarak ne şekilde farklılık göstereceğine ışık tutmaktadır.

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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is written with the motivation of contributing to the discussion on how the contemporary urban poor have become the agents of social change by the process of collective action in their living spaces. It is in a way a reaction to a pessimistic look which suggests that the contemporary urban poor are deprived of the conceptual tools to rise against the neoliberal economic system which is at the core of their poverty. The pessimist tone in these critiques leaves no space of hope for the collective action of the poor to transform their social position within society. With an implicit grievance against these analyses, my first academic encounter with the people living in the lowest social and economic strata of the society was in Küçükçekmece Ayazma Istanbul. It was a neighbourhood which was demolished by the urban transformation decision of Küçük Çekmece Municipality I visited the 18 families who had been the tenants of the neighbourhood before it had been demolished. As they are tenants, the urban transformation protocol did not allocate them any house and they could not afford to live in another neighbourhood as tenants. Thus they had decided to stay in the field by erecting tents and popularizing the public policy of the urban transformation decision which had been signed by the mass housing administration(MHA), Küçükçekmece Municipality and Metropolitan Municipality and left them without places to live. It was November 2008 and cold outside.



I was there only three days after the removal of their tents by the police who literally cried for the desperateness of the people.<sup>1</sup> I was deeply touched by seeing the people standing on the open land and trying to re-erect shack-like shelters. I visited the place six times and interviewed eleven families and reached a conclusion that in spite of all the hardships and deprivations they faced, they were still hopeful to collectively oppose the public policies exacerbating their lives (Deniz, 2009). I was, because of the misery observed in the place and an urge to find a solution, quick to assume this conclusion yet what I saw in the field and my encounters with the various political groups directed me to the issue of the resistance against the urban transformations in the *gecekondu*<sup>2</sup> neighbourhoods. The issue affected the livelihood of the contemporary working class in Turkey and the structure of their resistance should be understood.

*Gecekondu* transformation projects are basically the destruction of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and construction of a new built environments for the upper middle classes such as shopping malls, luxurious gated communities, tourism or financial centers (Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008). They are the projects which aim to re-create the city space for the upper middle class and relocate the poor mostly to the outer parts of the city in segregated housing compounds with monthly credit payments around 150 TL for 15 years (ibid.). Considering the current informal working scheme and the new urban poverty in Turkey (Bugra and Keyder, 2003), it is not surprising that the residents of these projects resent the projects on the basis of their inability to meet the credit payments. They are losing their houses which they use for shelter. However, this point is not the sole basis for the resident's resentment of the project

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<sup>1</sup> In a public statement of the people in April 2010 in front of Küçükçekmece municipality, I spoke one of the police chiefs (*komiser*) who was in service in the destruction of tents. She said it was the first time she cried in service.

<sup>2</sup> *Gecekondu* literally means constructed overnight. It is the enformel housing solution of the poor which flourished in big cities of Turkey after one950s similar to slums in developing countries.

since after the 1990s, in some places, the gecekondu owners also have used gecekondu and its land for its exchange value. The possibility of building high rise apartments by subsequent amnesty laws in the late 1980s gave the gecekondu holders the incentive of upward mobility in a social economic environment which squeezed the possibilities of a socially secure life through employment and redistributive policies. Therefore, the causes of collective action in these neighbourhoods revolve around these two conflicting poles.

There are some lost cases of this resentment such as the one in Ayazma (Pérouse, 2008), Sulukule (Turan, 2009) transformation projects which the residents could not provide a unified neighbourhood actions against the demolition of their neighbourhoods yet there are others which have been able to form neighbourhood action against the transformations such as the ones in Istanbul, namely, Başbüyük, Sarıyer, Maden, Tozkoporan; and in Ankara, namely, Dikmen Vadi and Mamak. These are mostly the gecekondu neighbourhoods and the struggle against the transformations on the neighbourhoods are part of the story of the incorporation of gecekondu to the urban system of Turkey.

Reflections of the social and economic life of Turkey on the working class can be well read through the first emergence in 50s and secondly the transformation of gecekondu in 90s. Basically, gecekondu are houses built on mostly state land by the immigrants to big cities of Turkey, namely, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Until late 1970s, the mushrooming of gecekondu mostly occurred with the tacit approval of the state due to the demand of labor that was necessary for industry and the failure of the state to implement social housing projects for the new immigrants. Therefore, the neighbourhoods were built near the factories which were mostly far from the center of the cities. In this period, the land of gecekondu contributed to the

livelihoods of the people and the gecekondu were used for their use value that is for shelter. The liberalization period after the 1980s also transformed the structure of gecekondu and introduced them to the commercial formal urban land market by the subsequent amnesty laws that passed in late the 1980s. Especially Istanbul witnessed the transformation of the built environment of one storey gecekondu neighbourhoods to multiple storey apartment houses which is similar to housing stock in a typical middle class neighbourhood. Some of the gecekondu which had political ties with the local governments, lost their use value character and were transformed into assets to gain profit through urban rent in this process. The important point is that the incentive of upward mobility via commercializing the gecekondu were in the minds of the gecekondu residents. The popularization of conservative politics in gecekondu neighbourhoods is also elaborated within this framework.<sup>3</sup> However, by 2000 the new urban politic of both the local and central government towards gecekondu neighbourhoods changed. Now the state presented the gecekondu as places of illegal activity and social degradation inhabiting all kinds of illegal activity and due to their pure quality, both the local governors and MHA<sup>4</sup> officials declared that the neighbourhoods were prone to collapse in an earthquake. With these two “urgencies” starting by 2004 both Istanbul and Ankara went through massive urban transformation projects, one type of which were gecekondu transformation projects. In the literature, there is almost a certain consensus that the motivation behind the implementation of the projects is the accumulation of capital for the construction sector in tandem with the government through construction projects for the upper middle classes rather than ameliorating the social and the build environment of the

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<sup>3</sup> For examples on the the research of the transformation of the gecekondu, see Bugra(1998), Erder(1997), Işık and Pınarcıklıoğlu(2001), Keyder (2005).

<sup>4</sup> MHA stands for mass housing administration and it became the instrument of the state to control the urban rent.

space in which the gecekondur residents live (Erder, 2009). Therefore, the projects halt the hope of upward mobility for the gecekondur holders who built their gecekondur before 1985 by having entitlements for their land. In addition, it also dispossesses mostly the emigrants of the post 1990 period who do not have any legal right to land and therefore are subject to long term credit payments which they can not afford. Therefore the different position of these two groups constitutes the causes of the resistance against these projects.

Erder (2009) argues that the literature on urban transformation mostly focuses on political economy. Furthermore, she remarks that the gecekondur transformation projects point to a fracture in the links between the gecekondur neighbourhoods and political Islam by the resistances which are mostly held by neighbourhood associations. The academic accounts do not state what political structures fill the gap left by this fracture since the researchers disregard the resistances and focus on the political economy of urban transformations. Thus, she proposes that the urban researchers should focus on the resistance organized around neighbourhood associations. The study at hand also aims to contribute to the discussion on the resistance front against the gecekondur renewal projects by comparing two places. The first is in the Istanbul Maltepe Başibüyük neighbourhood and the second is in the Ankara Çankaya Dikmen Vadi neighbourhood.

Başibüyük is a gecekondur neighbourhood founded in the 1970s. With the amnesty laws in 1980s, the gecekondus of the 1970s in Başibüyük with one storey buildings transformed into four to six storey buildings yet the inhabitants were not able to utilize the wave of full legalization titles which many of the neighbourhoods in Istanbul enjoyed. In addition to the multiple storey buildings, there are also the post 1990 emigrants who due to their late arrival in Istanbul were only able to

construct one storey buildings with gardens used as livelihood farming. The neighbourhood is a strong hold for conservative politics. In 2004 local elections, the neighbourhood voted overwhelmingly for the AKP by 75% which is much higher than the general share of votes received by the AKP in the elections. Before 2004, the liberal conservative Mother Land party had held the majority. In exchange to votes to these parties, Başibüyük people fought to obtain their entitlement deeds which had been promised to them before the elections, yet the promises were not kept until 2005 and the Maltepe Municipality(Maltepe Municipality) declared Başibüyük urban renewal area in 2005 clearing the hopes of the people of obtaining entitlement deeds. It also meant the loses of sheltering for people who emigrated in post 90 period and therefore who had no legal right to land. In 2007 the Başibüyük people aggregated around Beatification and preservation of Nature of Başibüyük Association<sup>5</sup> and formed a movement against the implementation of the project protocol which was signed between IMM(Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), the Maltepe Municipality and MHA(Mass Housing Administration).

Dikmen Vadi is a neighbourhood in Ankara which was founded by the left in 19the 1970s. In Murat Karayalçın's term in 1989, the neighbourhood was declared as urban renewal area and The first two stages of the project were implemented in his term and the terms of the project were mostly acceptable for the people. However, by 2000 in the reign of Melih Gökçek, rent seeking terms were added to the project and the fourth and fifth stages of the project attracted massive opposition from the neighbourhood's residents. Although the post 1985 emigrants to Dikmen Vadi mostly fell on the side of political Islam, due to its roots in the 1970s the left held authority in the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the people who opposed the project

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<sup>5</sup> *Başibüyük Güzelleştirme ve Doğayı Koruma Derneği*

mostly was composed of post 1985 immigrants without any legal rights to the land who were mostly under the influence of political Islam. The part with whom the left was popular left the field due to the better terms presented by Melih Gökçek. However, the remaining people headed by an organization called bureau for right to housing(BRS) struggled against the transformation protocol starting from 2006 and became a major center of struggle against the market based policies of the Melih Gökçek led AMM.

The two neighbourhoods have both similarities and divergences in terms of social structures and the built environments. However, Dikmen Vadi in Ankara and Başbüyük in Istanbul emerge as the most militant and visible ones within the neighbourhoods resisting the gecekondu renewals in the two cities. They have been able to achieve to form strong social movements to reject the terms of the urban renewal protocols in their neighbourhoods. They also have pulled the attention of the left to their cause by the high militancy of their movement to a degree not experienced for a long time in a gecekondu neighbourhood.

The militant action in gecekondu neighbourhoods is not new. *Gecekondu* neighbourhoods were sources of militancy for the left in Turkey in the 1970s. The Gültepe, Güzeltepe, 1 Mayıs, Gülsuyu/Gülensu neighbourhoods in Istanbul, Mamak and Dikmen Vadi in Ankara were built by various fractions within the left<sup>6</sup>. These were the neighbourhoods which stood the exceptions to the general pattern of gecekonduzation with the tacit approval of the state. The construction of these neighbourhoods occurred in direct clash with the local authorities and therefore the left in these neighbourhoods were highly respected as they helped them to provide shelter in an urban market which could not deliver formal house in parallel to their

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<sup>6</sup> For a brilliant account of the history of one Mayıs neighbourhood see Aslan(2004)

wages. The motivation of the left groups to clash with the state to provide houses in those years was in no way out of charity but to popularize their politics in the neighbourhoods. However, my personal interviews with the left activist who attended to the constructions in those times showed that they were hesitant about the correctness of the strategy since the places which they had distributed for use mostly commercialized in the 1980s and the left had lost its supremacy in those neighbourhoods. However, the strategy based on intervention to the process of gecekonduzation succeeded in those years. The subsequent transformation of the social context of the gecekondu which helped to popularize political Islam in the neighbourhoods indicated the fall of the left in the poor gecekondu neighbourhoods but the introduction of the urban transformation projects in gecekondu neighbourhoods brought a new hope for the left to propogandhise in these neighbourhoods based on the right to shelter. However, as mentioned above in most places the gecekondu lost its quality of collective consumption and individual rather than collective benefit seeking demands became present especially in the gecekondu neighbourhoods of Istanbul. In other words, the chances for a progressive movement with demands on the working class within the conjecture of the social context of gecekondu are not high. However, the struggles of these working class neighbourhoods need further study to understand the relation between their organizing in defence of their place and the formation of their desire to act collectively to transform their position within society.

In this respect, this research compares the two neighbourhood movements and examines whether they can be labeled progressive movements of the left seeking the collective benefit of all with its demands for the working class and the alliances it forms with other progressive movements. The research also aims to shed light on the

reasons behind the different trajectories of the movement within the question of the thesis. It also tries to understand how the movements affected the collective class identities of the people within the neighbourhoods. By the category of class identities, I do not imply any kind of class identity with specific demands, such as revolutionary consciousness. I rather try to explore whether the movements against the injustices in the two living spaces have transformed the conceptions of the people for the need to act collectively for the people who have similar positioning within the society<sup>7</sup>.

## Methodology

I solely relied on qualitative methodology for the research. I carried out in depth interviews and focus group discussions in both of the neighbourhoods.

My first term in Başbüyük was in between 29 March 2009, the local election day, and 10 April 2009. In this term, I mostly made interviews with the people close to the influence of the association. I held two focus group discussions and 10 recorded and unrecorded in depth interviews with men. I also attended one of their demonstrations in 2009 after the elections and one of their weekly meetings at which they discussed a possible solution to the urban transformation project after the change of the political structure in Maltepe Municipality by the 29 March 2010 elections. I participated in another mass meeting with representatives from the municipality that was held in June 2010. I visited the neighbourhood both in October 2009 and February 2010 for one week in each to reach the women for interviews. I also interviewed the leaders for the second and third term to get updated on the

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<sup>7</sup> The definition of the class that both embodies structural and agency oriented approaches is similar to Buğra's (2008) discussion on the issue. However, the theoretical discussion on the issue will be made in the next chapter.



neighbourhood. I was able to make three unrecorded interviews and one recorded focus group discussion with the women. Totally I was able to reach five women for interviews. My last visit to the field was in April 2010 when they made a big demonstration with 2000 people against the new CHP municipality.

I went to Dikmen Vadi twice and reached the people with the consent of the Dikmen Vadi the BRS. My first term in the Vadi was in August 2010 and I visited the neighbourhood every day for 10 days. I then visited the neighbourhood in November 2010 for six days. I made five recorded in depth interviews with the leaders two of whom are women. I also held five focus group discussions. I attended one of their weekly meetings. In November 2010 I attended one of their demonstrations with 600 people in the city center in Ankara. I also met a group from Dikmen Vadi on 20 February at the meeting to support the resistance of TEKEL factory workers in Kızılay, Ankara. The last occasion was in 1 May 2010 in Taksim Istanbul, the location for the 1 May Protest for Istanbul.

Their struggle is first and foremost a livelihood strategy of the working class to protect their housing right yet whether it can be interpreted as a conscious working class movement aimed at improving its conditions is the first question that I ask with this research. My hypothesis is that the movement in Dikmen occurred, as a class movement but that Başibüyük's movement did not.

The variables at which I look are of two types. One is the content of the meetings they organized as a community and the other is the influence of the movement on people's subjectivity of class positions.

The second question that I ask is the reasons behind this difference. Why there is a movement with demands transcending the housing problem and dealing with a more general class based agenda against neoliberalism in Dikmen and but had

locally placed demands in Başibüyük which are more about an alliance between the holders of *Tapu Tahsis*<sup>8</sup> who wants to exploit the urban rent and the immigrants of post 90 period who are afraid of losing their houses by the transformation.

To answer the first question (whether their movements are working class action conscious of their position in opposition to the capitalist class), I first analyzed the content of their demands and how these demands are articulated in their protests. There were generally two sources present for this analysis. The first source includes public statements, videos of their protests and the written texts such as newspaper accounts and magazines on their movement in general. For Başibüyük, *Evrensel* newspaper provided a detailed account and for Dikmen Vadi online newspaper [www.sendika.org](http://www.sendika.org) is used. Both of the newspapers belong to different left political organizations. *Evrensel* belongs to EMEP<sup>9</sup> and [www.sendika.org](http://www.sendika.org) belongs to HE<sup>10</sup>. EMEP's presence in Başibüyük occurred through a volunteer lawyer and *Evrensel* newspaper and Hayat TV channel which broadcasted video accounts of the movement. However, HE had a more close relationship with Dikmen Vadi through its members who live in Dikmen Vadi and acted as the leaders of the movement. I also scanned legal papers on the transformation projects such as protocols and petitions between MHA(Mass Housing Administration) and municipalities. The second source includes in depth interviews done by the leaders of the movement.

I need to note something on this point. I have been a member of a group called IMECE, Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi since November 2008.<sup>11</sup> It is a group of young people whose members are without exception university degree holders. Most of them are city and regional planners with grievances to urban transformation

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<sup>8</sup> Legal title to land which is used as a reference point for full legalization of the houses built on the land.

<sup>9</sup> It is a socialist party in Turkey: <http://www.emep.org/>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/>

<sup>11</sup> [www.toplumunsehircilikhareketi.org](http://www.toplumunsehircilikhareketi.org)

projects and with sympathy to grassroots action against the gecekondu transformation projects in Istanbul. The group is open to all but it mostly acts as a professional<sup>12</sup> help group to grassroots organizations and therefore mostly makes academic/visual work which aims to support the movements. The group members share an ideal of a unified working class action together with the middle classes that aims to transform the meaning of the city from exchange value to use value.<sup>13</sup> The group at least until now, has intentionally abstained from organizing in gecekondu neighbourhoods as a group with or without the organizing group that exists in the neighbourhood. It rather backs the neighbourhood associations by organizing panels about urban transformation in Istanbul in addition to the academic/visual works. It also attends various platforms challenging the urban transformations such as 3. *Köprü Yerine Yaşam Platformu*(the platform for existence instead of the third bridge to Istanbul ), *Okuluma dokunma Platformu* headed (Do Not Touch My School Platform) by *6 Nokta Körler Derneği*(6 Points Blind Association ), *Okuluma Dokunma İnsiyatifi* ( Do Not Touch My School Initiative) headed by Eğitim-Sen ( The Teacher’s Union). It also organizes annual meetings of neighbourhoods that aim to bring together various actors in Istanbul that struggles against the projects. The group members periodically visit the neighbourhoods to stay updated on the processes in the transformation projects and ask whether they need any help.

Due to my involvement in İMECE, Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi I met with local leaders in gecekondu transformation neighbourhoods and Başbüyük was one of them. Therefore, my contact with the leaders in Başbüyük was not only through

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<sup>12</sup> The group members are “irritated” by the word “professional” when I shared this paragraph as my account of İMECE to be written in my thesis. They resent to the word saying that this is not what İMECE intends to be. It is a group that wants to be part of the grassroots yet the word professional conveys an academic group that is distant from the subjectivities of the movements. What I mean by the word is that the professional knowledge which the field requires is produced according to the demands of the field. It is through this way İMECE is linked to the movements and this is achieved by being a member in many platforms trying to build resistance against the urban governance of Istanbul.

<sup>13</sup> The principles are still discussed around the issue of the scope and demand of the movement.

tape recorded in depth interviews but also as a member of IMECE. On four occasions, I met with the leaders in Dikmen as part of a movement for the right to shelter. Therefore, I also had the opportunity to observe the demands and the visions of the both Dikmen and Başbüyük leaders in informal settings without the limits of academic encounters. In this way, I had the opportunity to view the positions of the leaders in a setting in which they openly expressed their views.

The second analysis to answer the first question is how the demands of the movement which were articulated in public statements and interviews with the leaders were reflected in the way the neighbourhood residents expressed their class positions. To understand this, I tried to orient focus group discussions to political issues which the left regards to affect the well being of the working classes such as the health, transportation, education and heating systems. I asked whether they perceived any relation with the threat of losing their homes and other problems that affected their livelihood. I asked whether they are willing to organize on these areas even after their housing problem was solved.

In the next chapters I will analyse my findings based on the research yet before that a theoretical discussion will be presented to lay down the relation between the formation of working class identities and organizing in the living places. The social context of gecekondu and its transformation in the neoliberal period will be given importance to understand the structure of the demands of the urban movements.

## CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTIONS

The issue in hand is, broadly speaking, how city space that is created by various actors, can contribute to the formation of resistance against the injustices inherent in capitalism. A quick glance at one of the big capitalist cities shows us to understand the misery of the people under capitalist urbanization. Examples of some of the ills of contemporary urbanization in capitalist countries are the transfer of industry from the center to outer parts of the city and the fall of formal employment possibilities and the rise of precarious working conditions, the invasion of the market economy to areas of social life which were fully/formally or partially/informally protected by the state such as education and health and housing system, the emergence of a new type of urban poor who are stuck in cynical poverty in a world where the link between the country side and urban life has eroded and therefore the seconding of the income in cities with the links in the country has disappeared, large urban transformation projects to make the city competitive as finance or tourism center. In terms of the use of the city land, contemporary urbanization means the extension of the market the use of the city land. This is mostly visible in the introduction of big urban transformation projects which relocate the urban poor to outer parts of the city with unbearable debts and therefore with the continuation of poverty in the new place. These issues have derived and continue to attract the attention of Marxist urban critiques to understand the links between capitalist urbanization and the injustices it creates among people. These writers share one goal despite their political and methodological differences to understand the ways in which cities act as strategic sites for capitalist commodification processes (Brenner,

Marcuse and Mayer, 2009: p. 178). They argue that cities are the major bases for the production, circulation and consumption of commodities (ibid.). Not only is the city the place of commodification, it is itself commodified as long as its socio spatial forms are “sculpted and continually reorganized in order to enhance the profit-making capacities of capital” (ibid., 178). As a result, this commodification is expected to be the reason behind the popular uprisings in the cities of the capitalist world and starting from Castells, an interest has flourished in understanding the meaning of the urban movements.

Due to Castells’ popular focus on the progressive collective consumption scope for urban movements to progressively challenge the capitalist order, the literature on urban movements tends to attach a progressive character to any urban movement (Pickvance, 2003). However, the movements do not occur in a vacuum disregarding of the norms of the social and economic conditions of a society. Therefore the very injustices the urban programs create can give rise to movements which intensify the injustices in society. What the critiques tends to perceive as class based movement of the working class neighbourhood may end up a NIMBY<sup>14</sup> kind of conservative movement which just protects the property relations which are unevenly distributed in a given neighbourhood. Thus, especially sceptics on urban movements which oppose urban transformation projects, degrade any kind of progressive potential that can arise out of an urban movement.

Because of the private-regarding nature of their attachment to the community, they are likely to collaborate when each person can see a danger to him or to his family in some proposed change; collective action is a way, not of defining some broad program for the benefit of all, but of giving force to individual objections by adding them together in a collective protest (Wilson, 1973: 414; in Bennett, 2002).

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<sup>14</sup> NIMBY stands for not in my back yard.

That is, unlike what most USM(urban social movement) researches expect, the movements can be quite non progressive and this again needs careful scrutiny by researchers at least to learn the lessons that can be extracted from these movements

Whether progressive or not, the urban movements against the urban transformation mostly affect the poor working class neighbourhoods and their response to it, that is the movements against it reside as important variables for the formation of working class subjectivities. Therefore, instead of disregarding the conservative movements of the masses, we should investigate what the various urban movement forms mean in terms of the formation of the class identities. In this regard, Ira Katznelson's (1993) call to researchers to shed light on the organizing in the living place to conceptualize where it stands in the formation of working class identities stands at the core the question of understanding the movements against urban transformations. First I will briefly lay down Harvey's viewpoint to link urban politics with capitalism in an attempt to understand the injustices embedded in urban transformations. Then I will discuss Castells' optimistic research agenda on urban social movements which only focus on progressive character of the urban movements of the working class. To Castells' surprise, the urban movements of post 1980 period in relation to neoliberal governance policies cautions researchers assumptions of urban movement's progressive character. Pickvance's contextual factors regarding the neoliberal shift and Katznelson's framework will be used to cut across these two views and will be adopted as motivation to look further at the urban movements whether progressive or not.

Harvey remarks that the capitalist city rests on the circulation of surplus value. In this regard urbanism is defined as the concentration and circulation of socially defined surplus value (Harvey, 1973). He asserts that no arrangement in a city within

a capitalist economy can be accomplished if it is in contradiction to the accumulation and especially circulation of wealth. All arrangements in the city are performed with the limitation of the necessity to create, consume and circulate surplus value.

Although Harvey concludes that the urban structure poses some limitations on industrial society and therefore it has certain independence from it, he also marks the dominance of most aspects of urbanism by industrial society. First, the urbanization process serves for the creation and maintenance of the effective demand which is governed by industrial capitalism. Urbanization also creates new wants and needs and as far as these needs achieve autonomous status, urbanism pressures industrialism yet Harvey claims that “limits of response and the rate of evolution are governed by the conditions relating to industrial capitalism rather than to urbanism” (ibid., 311). Secondly, the appropriation and circulation of surplus value also are governed by the dynamics governing industrial capitalism and it is this circulation of surplus value which Harvey insists on looking at to understand contemporary urbanism. He also admits that he could not achieve the analysis of the circulation of capital in the full sense in social justice and the city to understand the ways in which urbanism works (ibid.).

*The Limits To Capital* by Harvey (1985) was “an attempt to supply this missing text” (Katznelson, 1992: 108). In this book Harvey explores rent, land markets, the mobility of capital spatial infrastructure and uneven urban development (ibid.). He writes that it is “the built form of the city that is necessary to capitalism and to its accelerated development” (ibid. : 111). Nevertheless it can also act as an impediment to it since it can never respond to the pace of economic demands (ibid.). Thus, it is constantly destroyed and rebuilt to keep up with the tempo of the capitalist accumulation. This conclusion also tells us the logic behind the urban



transformations in capitalist countries. Overall, Harvey does not believe that a capitalist city can be just.

This urgency of capitalism to reshape the city constantly according to its surplus circulation motives should result in the opposition of the people yet Harvey's literature offers no clues on how urban movements are built for this purpose (Katznelson, 1993). We need a theory which manifests the link between organizing in the living place with the formation of class subjectivities since it is this link which makes an urban movement research valuable for the Marxist urban sciences. Katznelson's framework is a major tool for this.

Katznelson argues that the new Marxist urban work by Castells and Harvey in the 1970s fails to point out the questions of structure and agency in a sense to contribute to Marxist social theory (Katznelson, 1993). They were unable to show the various possibilities inherent in political activity in places where people live for the formation of the working class.

Harvey reduced the consciousness of the people to capitalist production and reproduction (ibid.). For him the distinctly urban consciousness of the people was anomalous to interpositions between the revolutionary potential inherent in capitalism and its realization. Castells, on the other hand, pointed to the questions of agency but abandoned Marxist social theory due to its supposed inability to explain the relationship between the making of the city and the grassroots.

Katznelson argues that Marxism neglected the issue of urbanism in the formation of working class. Nevertheless the working class experienced capitalism in cities in their neighbourhoods, public places as well as in factories. Therefore politics in a neighbourhood is a variable in the formation of working classes. Katznelson uses Engel's outlook to understand the formation of working classes in relation to cities:

For Engels, it was not only the concentration of workers in the factory that facilitated the development of such mass working class movements as trade unionism, Chartism and socialism but also the concentration of workers in autonomous working class communities where free from the direct supervision of their employers or the state they could create such institutions as reading rooms and working men's clubs and societies. The organized working class movement utilized the semi free space of the neighbourhoods to meet (in the pubs friendly societies and other venues) to proselytize to organize. In the sharply class divided spaces of cities like Manchester, workers become conscious of the fact that they form a separate class and have their own interests, policies and points of view which are opposed to those of the capitalist property owners (ibid.: 151).

Katznelson critiques Engel's view on the quick assumption on the natural and inevitable passage of working classes in miserable neighbourhoods to the formation of working class with revolutionary potential. However, he finds Engel's placement of city space at the center of the capitalist development and class formation as a different and logical line of investigation which Marxists neglected after Engels. That is why Katznelson argues that Marxism's project of social theory which mainly focuses on the formation of working class is best treated in terms of "representation of *urban space* and *developments of forms of collective action* appropriate to these namings"<sup>15</sup>(ibid.: 210).

Here is the formulation of Katznelson on class which embodies the living space dimension. For Katznelson, the formation of the working class encompasses four lines of development. One is the Marxist structural class analysis explored in *Capital* in terms of the relations of exploitation in the production process. The second level is "how actual people live within determinate patterns of life and social relations... at work and *off work*"(italics are mine) (ibid.: 208). The third level is on the linguistic and cognitive dispositions, the ways people represent their experiences: "As actors, members of a class are constituted only within a given cultural order and its distinctive set of preferences, cognition, and possibilities" (ibid. : 208). Class exists

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<sup>15</sup> Italics are mine

at the fourth level, “if its members act self consciously through movements and organizations to affect society and the positions of the class within it”(ibid.: 209). Katznelson does not view class formation as a specific outcome of a particular consciousness such as *revolutionary* consciousness. He rather investigates under what conditions a class understanding of social life experienced at the second level of class can develop. He seeks to find the urban roots of this question. “The meaning, making and uses of urban space”, he holds, strengthens Marxist social theory in discussions of structure and agency (ibid.: 213).

Katznelson’s main hypothesis on the relation between class formation and city space is the spatial economy of industrial cities which segregate working place and residential place. Moreover, it also segregated the neighbourhoods of working class families from those of upper class based on income, styles of life and consumption of housing. In the early years of nineteenth century industrial capitalism, the place of residence and work place were still very near but by the end of the century with the improvements in communication and transportation the two places separated and this led to the coming together of big working class neighbourhoods from different work places and it was in these places that the working class created new institutions new relationships and new patterns of life (ibid.). He compares and contrasts the influence of residential spaces in the formation of American and English working classes and reaches the conclusion that in English case, neighbourhood organizations in working class districts were a prime power for the empowerment of labour unionism which demanded rights both at work and off work. English workers who were suppressed in the work place in regards to political organizing found the neighbourhoods refuges for developing collective identities. Nevertheless, political activity in the neighbourhoods caused a split consciousness in American case due to the ethnic

segregation of workers. There, formation of class demands at the production level was impeded by the ethnically segregated neighbourhoods. Katznelson links this impediment to the silence of American labour unionism to problems outside the production. That is to say American labour unionism tried to distance itself from any political activity outside the sphere of production. Because of this difference in neighbourhood politics, Katznelson argues, labour party does not exist in the US but a strong one does in England.

Katznelson, therefore, does not bestow a determinist approach which suggests a *positive* effect of neighbourhood politics for working class formation which exists at the fourth level (the level which working classes come to act together). He, quoting E.P. Thompson, remarks that “history knows no regular verbs” (Thompson, 1963; in Katznelson, 1991: 74). That is why he censures both American and English historiography which attach positive meaning to residential segregation for class formation in the English case and negative meaning in the American case. What he suggests is that “the construction of class as a category of social action across the divide of work and community is a conditional matter that demands explanation” (ibid. : 133). In other words, without understanding the political activity in the place where people live, the occurrences of class at the fourth level can not be conceptualized.

Katznelson is an urban historian who tries to trace the urban roots of working class formation. As he traces the urban roots of working class formation by comparing the American and English cases, he also lays out a perspective for people who study USMs from a Marxist social theory perspective. If nothing, he advises to lay down the reasons behind the different trajectories that exist for an urban movement and his four level class definition serves to link these trajectories in terms

of transforming class subjectivities for the formation of collective identities. Whereas a conservative movement which intensified in neoliberal period may drive the individualistic and particularistic incentives among the participants as in the American case which is driven by ethnically-based demands and hinder the formation of solidaristic class based identities, a progressive urban movement based on collective demands for all may open up the way to aggregation in other working class based movement for the members. Thus, we may divide the urban movements into progressive and conservative and deal with them with different theoretical tools.

### Discussion on Progressive Urban movements

Castells is the most prominent urban researcher to touch upon this issue with his famous thesis of collective consumption. Concerning the progressive urban movements, his views are essential.

Castells has a class-based theory of the production of the city according to which the state is a battle ground for the demands of capitalist production and the masses (Castells, 1977). His concept of politicization, outlined in his famous article *City, Class and Power* is the major thesis in his theory of the city in his earlier work. Castells starts his thesis by stating that for the reproduction of the working class, spaces of collective consumptions in the city have to be established. He argues that without collective consumption such as transportation, public light, and social housing projects, the reproduction of the working class can not be established (ibid.). To wit, Castells ask whether a labour market could be imagined without a transport system capable of distributing workers to factories each day. Thus, the instalment of the collective consumption units is first and foremost a demand that is created by the

production necessities of capitalism yet he also states that the quality of the collective consumption units also respond to the demand of the popular mass and as they gain power in the class struggle, “their direct wage are also supplemented by an indirect wage, socially levied”(ibid.) and it is these collective consumption units that increase the living standards of the working class: hence, various working class districts form movements for the better management of collective consumption units.

Castells asserts that the capitalist class can not afford collective consumption for the reproduction of labour; therefore the state intervenes to sustain these provisions. In other words, the state is the instrument of the sustenance of collective consumption units, yet this is only one part of the story. The working class also demands better management of collective consumption units by the state. Therefore, the intervention of the state is the result of the class struggle between capitalists and the working class. Castells calls this sphere of collective consumption the secondary contradiction of capitalism after the one in production and argues that state intervention in the city for the clearance of this contradiction politicizes the urban conflicts by articulating the class content of state policies. Thus, the intervention of the state in collective consumption units is the so called politicization thesis of Castells and it is this dialectic struggle of capitalists and the working class for collective consumption which make the city.

Castells calls the movement for collective consumption in living spaces as the collective consumption trade unionism and asserts that the democratic road to socialism can flourish from these circles if combined with other left movements of trade unions and socialist parties. It is at this point that Castells deviates from his position in *City, Class and Power* in his later work. Castells modified his arguments in his voluminous book *The City and Grassroots* (Castells, 1983). He radically

changed his view on the prospect of a social change that occur through urban social movements (USM) (Pickvance, 2003). He is more pessimistic about the revolutionary potential of USM and claims that USMs are doomed to be stuck in their utopian localities.

In this book, Castells draws a theoretical framework to answer the question how an urban movement may achieve to become an urban social movement (Castells, 1985). In his definition, an urban movement becomes an urban *social* movement if it can transform the meaning of the city land from market based exchange value to use value. To achieve this, it needs to adopt three goals: the preservation of collective consumption, the preservation of community against the belittling of the media and the call for local democracy of the neighbourhood as opposed to state's decisions. Beside these, the movements need to collaborate with unions and other class based organization with an autonomous relationship. At this point, it is beneficial to stress a certain point in Castells' definition, that is, Castells' continuing insistence on looking to progressive movements which at least aim to transform the meaning of the city land even if it is not successful. It is hard to claim that all the movements are progressive yet for the progressive ones, Castells' framework can be used as a starting point. If we only search for an urban movement which aims to be an USM with the hope of transforming the class subjectivities of the people, that is to say, affecting the members even if it can not achieve to affect the use of city land, then certain points of the framework are quite beneficial. The first one is the Castells' call for the preservation of the community and the second one is the need for collaborating with other class-based movements. Around these two points, Nicholls (2008) and Harvey (2000) will be discussed to stress the importance of these two points in the formation of a progressive urban movement.

## Construction of Community In Relation Alliance with Other Urban Movement

Harvey asserts that community is a dialectically constructed body (Harvey, 2001). On the one hand, it calls for the construction of the rules of inclusion in the community and therefore a growing body. On the other hand it excludes the people who are not proper according to these rules and therefore a weakening body. Harvey claims that only if the movement moves on to broader problems instead of being stuck in its locality, it can counter the tendency of the community to shrink in size due to its rules of inclusion and exclusion and adds that it is the duty of the leadership to translate the militant particularism of local movements into broader problems and researchers have to analyze and theoretically provide how this translation may occur. This motivation brings the issue of exploring the construction of community in neighbourhoods as a result of urban movement militancy in interaction with other communities. In other words, strong-weak tie group formation in conjunction with cities is quite helpful in this sense.

### Strong-Weak Tie Group Formation

Nicholls argues that cities facilitate the generation of strong and weak tie groups with two processes (Nicholls, 2008). First, it enables the formation of resource rich groups bound by strong norms, trust and solidarity to each other. Second, by the spatial proximity of different groups, cities also enable the proliferation of these strong resources with other social movements by weak tie networks. Discontented with common problems such as work, neighbourhood renewals, schools and hospitals, people meet repeatedly about their concerns and



when this happens “there is a greater likelihood that strong norms, trust, emotions and interpretive frameworks develop” (ibid.: 845).

The strong tie groups is useful for the formation of social movements the members of which risk their time, energy and wellbeing for other members, but without the weak tie networks the movements will not utilize the collective power of the strong tie groups’ resources and, moreover, as Nicholls writes “the multifaceted character of urban issues (i.e. redevelopment, housing, transit) can serve as a useful ‘*push*’ for developing these types of connections” <sup>16</sup>(ibid.). In other words, without the collective action of these strong tie groups, individual groups can not create a socially just city. Here comes the important questions: how do these weak ties form? And how do they gain importance for the movements?

Tarrow and McAdam put the importance of brokerage in the formation of weak ties ( Tarrow and McAdam, 2005; in Nicholls, 2008). They define brokerage as the “connections between two or more unrelated agents (which) are created through the mediation of a third-party broker.” Brokers can be common acquaintances, a mediating organization or meetings for a common cause. The spatial proximity of these unrelated communities in an urban system may facilitate the formation of brokers and the more they meet in these events, the more they develop connections between themselves for a common cause and this causes the accumulation of knowledge in a range of political and geographical terrains and It is this knowledge which Nicholls says shifts of the focuses on particular issues to a focus on multiple issue areas.

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<sup>16</sup> italics mine

## Conservative Urban Movements

As repeated many times, Castells turns a blind eye to the urban movements which even do not intend to change the meaning of the city and only push their energy to preserve the property rights of a sub division within their communities.

In this regard, Pickvance's criticisms of Castells for only focusing on strategies of leadership for a successful urban movement are enlightening (Pickvance, 1985). Furthermore, Pickvance does not assume a progressive nature for urban movements and asks the question of under what contextual conditions an urban movement can become militant and its incidence transcend the locality (ibid.). Against this motivation, Pickvance's categorization of the urban movements into four types is valid than Castells's narrow category of collective consumption for urban movement causes. These types are: Type 1 movements for the provision of housing and urban services, Type 2 movements over access to housing and urban services, Type 3 Movements for control and management and Type 4-defensive movements. Defensive movements are important concerning our topic since it is the physical threat to the "housing and neighbourhoods such as demolitions, urban renewal, or commercial redevelopment" (Pickvance, 1985: p 40). Pickvance asserts that there is no assumption here that "movements of these four types are progressive from a Left point of view." This is also true for Type 4 movements which include the movements against urban transformations: "Territorial conflicts may take on anticapitalist overtones when the threat is from developer, but that may be coincidental to the concern to preserve the status quo" (Wieviorka, 1980 and Mayer, 1982. in Pickvance, 1985).

He rather proposes to set sub models when various contextual factors are present, a certain level of urban movement incidence and militancy will be reached. an this point, Pickvance maintains, the decision of which contextual factors has to be given to assess the militancy and incidence of urban movements. These factors are rapid urbanization, state action, political context, middle class and the general economic and social condition. To understand the reactions against the physical threat by contemporary urban movements in the neoliberal age, the general economic and social conditions of a country needs further scrutiny, especially for Turkey's social context of gecekondu which will be discussed later on.

The general economic and social condition refers to “the level of demands placed upon the state by citizens, or of expectations of state intervention” (ibid.). Therefore, Pickvance contends that the neoliberal shift which calls to shrugs off the responsibility from the state in collective consumption units transforms the conception of people for the demands that can be made upon the state. In this regard, the neoliberal shift that redefines the role of the state in sustaining the collective consumption units should be considered.

### Neoliberalism and Its Effect on General Social and Economic Conditions

Neoliberalism is primarily a political economic system which asserts that human wellbeing can best be achieved by individual entrepreneurship and the liberation of individual talents through a competitive market economy and individual property rights (Harvey, 2005). It also holds that the liberation of trade and the market guarantees individual liberty (ibid.). The State's role is to establish and protect this framework (ibid.).

This framework of Neoliberalism has reached the entire world from China to the USA, from England to Sweden in certain degrees (ibid.). Although It started as a utopian movement in the 1970s that was politicized by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, it reached full implementation in the self-styled “Washington consensus” of the 1990s. (Peck and Tickell, 2002)

Neoliberalism can be divided into two phases: the first is roll back and the second is roll out Neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) What Peck and Tickell mean by roll back Neoliberalism is the first phases of Neoliberalism in the 1970s and the 1980s when the intellectual hegemony of Neoliberal thinking was established and also state power was mobilized for the marketization and deregulation of markets and to weaken the social-collectivist institutions of Keynesian-Welfarist settlements. The second phase, the roll out Neoliberalism was the phase starting in the the 1980s when the governments started to ask themselves about the messes they had created in the 1970s and the 1980s with Neoliberalization policies (Fine, 2009). Various market led social policy regimes, incarceration policies, “welfare reforms, urban order and surveillance and community regenerations” were implemented to fix the ills that had been created by the Neoliberal turn (Peck and Tickell, 2002) yet the very roots of the problem especially in regard to the cities were not problematized. Therefore we saw a rise of the incidence of violence in the core Neoliberal states like France, Britain and the USA (Wacquant, 2006).

It is for these reasons that Byron critiqueizes Castells’ insistence on looking at progressive leftist movements and disregarding the conservative movements of the suburbs (Byron, 2005). According to him, this omission of conservative suburban movements which seeks the preservation of the property rights of some of its members caused the failure of his theory to understand the link between Neoliberal

policies and its electoral relationship with the suburban area. It also failed to understand the conservative movements in the suburbs in relation to Neoliberalism which was centered on private consumption and exchange value rather than collective consumption and use value. To reiterate, Byron argues that in the Neoliberal age, private consumption rather than the collective was promoted and movement trajectories changed accordingly. In other words, the collective consumption perspective of the pre 1980 urban movements lost its significance and the radical urban movements which radically opposed the state policies were co-opted by the new governance of the local municipalities (Mayer, 2005).

Beside this co-option of radical movement, the urban movements of the marginalized occurred with difficulty due to the degeneration of neighbourhood solidarities as a result of to the neoliberal public policies. This changing structure of the neighbourhoods also should be discussed in terms of its impediment to urban movements.

### Changing Structure of Working Class Neighbourhoods:

#### Territorial Stigmatization

Living places are not virgin places untouched by Neoliberalism. One can hardly claim that Neoliberal policies affect the social life in living places less than in working places. Wacquant points to the transformation in the living places of urban outcasts in contemporary Paris and Chicago and claims that territorial stigmatization is seen even in the countries known best for their handling of advance marginality such as the ones in the Nordic region (Wacquant, 2007). Before passing to territorial

stigmatization, urban marginality in contemporary advanced capitalist countries will be defined.

Neoliberal urbanism creates a new urban poverty that is neither cyclic or residual nor transitional (ibid.). Urban marginality is formed by two forces of violence: violence from below and violence from above (Wacquant, 2006). The first one is the riots which are misleadingly called by the media and the state race riots, as seen in Britain, France and the USA. The eruptions of violence in those neighbourhoods are a physical violence at which the state only shows its punitive face: the police (Wacquant, 2006).

Counteracting these riots through punitive methods is legitimized by showing these riots as the result of the immorality of the lower levels of working class which only seek public disorder. Although seen as race riots, they are-Wacquant calls them as bred riots, a response to the violence that are seen from above  
Deproletarianization, Relegation, and Stigmatization.

This violence has three causes.

Mass unemployment creating deproletarianization and material deprivation for the whole family “combined with ethno racial segregation and welfare state retrenchment;”

Relegation in working class neighbourhoods due to weakening public and private services;.

The psychological burden of living in a degraded and degrading neighbourhood with a public discourse that heightens the stigmatization (ibid.).

These reasons also provide the background for the territorial stigmatization experienced in these neighbourhoods. Both the Neoliberal policies and also the public discourse which perceives these places as zones of illegal trading territorially

stigmatizes the urban precariat which Wacquant defines as a unifying term for the various informal workers who experiences territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2007). This view is formed by the state officials together with the media and it shows the neighbourhoods which the precariat live as the no go areas where only “the rejects of the society live” (Wacquant, 2006). Wacquant calls this process the loss of place and transition to void space in which all the projects consequences of which are contrary to public morality can be easily implemented. e.g. regeneration projects that throw the precariat out of the town to new stigmatized spaces (Wacquant, 2007).

Wacquant argues that the denigrating discourse on the place where precariats live is also internalized by the precariat. This points to a transformation in the ghettos of 1960s and the 1970s when the working class had strong ties belonging to their neighbourhood. Ghettos were places where the workers who had lost their jobs could have relief by the reciprocal relations that exists in the neighbourhood. They could develop a common identity against which they can resist class and race injustices. As the result of his research in Paris’ banlieus and Chicago’s ghettos, Wacquant labels the current banlieus and ghettos hyper-ghetto for banlieue and no ghetto places for Chicago due to losing its past meaning of 1960s and the 1970s. Right now, these places are no longer a common ground for collective action, but rather belittled spaces in which even the residents are ashamed of living. This means that today’s hyper/no ghetto places have become an impediment to collective action.

Nevertheless, Wacquant is not mute on the urgency of building collective action and asks how can we forge collectivities when social and economic necessities are diversely configured and the neighbourhood solidarities have eroded. As he puts the problem of representation of precariat at the core of the problem, he prioritizes

“cognitive, iconographic, and dramaturgical” re-presentations of the precariat. In effect, he proposes a new method of political representation of precariat for the formation of working class identities for collective action against the social and economic injustices of Neoliberalism.

### Concluding Remarks for Theoretical Discussion

To reiterate the major point, neoliberalism functions on two levels in affecting the structure of the neighbourhoods for collective action against urban policies. One is the changing conceptualization of the state in the expectations of the people in collective consumption units and second is the marginalization of the marginalized by the discourses in the media fueled by state and the people internalize this denigrating discourse. The first is also responsible for the rising of conservative movements trying to preserve their individual property rights rather than preserving their collective consumption units. This issue annihilates the possibility of providing a collective movement which transcends the locality and provides class identities eager for connecting the injustices that are experienced in the living place due to class based social relations and the urge for collective action to transform these relations. Besides these impediments, there are still newly progressive urban movements flourishing in the western world that promise hope for challenging the social economic system (Mayer, 2009). There are still hopes for progressive urban movements in mainly places where property incentives are homogenous and social solidarity ties are not corroded in the way Wacquant delineates. These movements seek to preserve the collective benefit of all its members with calls to enlarge the movement with other localities. The effect of these two movements that exist side by



side in contemporary cities on the formation of the class collective identities should be laid down. However, before that, what needs to be done is exploring general social economic condition of Turkey to understand the reflection of these two movements into the urban movement context of Turkey.

The changing social economic conditions that are materialized in property relations, are situated at the core of this discussion. However, the affect of neoliberalism on the formation of solidarities should be discussed in the Turkish setting to understand to what extent the advanced marginality affects and explains the structure of the contemporary gecekondu districts. It is for these reasons that we should investigate the social economic context of the housing question of the working class around the gecekondu, first in its formation in 1960s and the 1970s and then second in its transformation after the 1980s. Following is a a discussion of the changing social context of gecekondu organized around these theoretical discussions.

### CHAPTER 3 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF GECEKONDU IN TURKEY

Gecekondu is the informal house which is built illegally to public or private land. It is the solution of the immigrating labour in the face of absence of the social housing policy in Turkey. In this discussion the changing meaning of gecekondu, its perception by the middle classes and the state will be held in relation to its history. What I aim to convey here is the observation that the general social economic condition of Turkey and its effect on gecekondu owners through accounts of the 60 years long history of informal housing in Turkey.

In the gecekondu literature, the history of gecekonduzation in Turkey is mostly divided into two phases (Aslan, 2004): the first is between 1950-1980 and the second is the post 1980 period. The first period encompasses the emergence and the incorporation of gecekondu by the influx of rural populations to the big cities of Turkey, namely, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and the second phase is the one in which the established order of gecekondu was legalized by the subsequent laws and the gecekondu started to lose its legitimate ground in the eyes of the middle classes due to its transformation in its meaning, that is due to commercialization. I add one more period by dividing the the post 1980 period into two and I will analyse the period starting with 2000 by the introduction of urban transformation projects in the big cities of Turkey which aim to deconstruct the gecekondu neighbourhoods and use the cleared land for the commercial projects of the construction companies. The process is held by the authority of the local municipalities and the central government through MHA and epitomizes all the conflicts that reside within and outside the gecekondu neighbourhoods. It is this period in which the gecekondu

owners remobilize for the established order of the pre 2000 period. This means individual property rights for some gecekondu owners and demands for the right to housing depending on their terms of gecekondu ownership. To understand and thoroughly discuss this two-tiered situation, we need to understand the first two periods of gecekonduzation. These two periods form the background of the contemporary discussions on the gecekondu renewals and the resistance to it.

First Period of 1950-1980: Construction of *Gecekondu*  
As Collective Consumption Units

Many accounts of the making of gecekondu in Istanbul link the process of mechanization of the agriculture in 1950s as the initiator of the rural to urban immigration (Tugal, 2008) which caused the rise of gecekondu in big cities of Turkey. The city served growing employment opportunities for the Import Substitution Industrialization period of Turkey. In the ISI period, not all the immigrants had the opportunity to be formally employed in the cities in the time of their arrival but after a brief period of informal sector employment, the prospect for formal employment in industry was high (Keyder, 2005). If we look at the statistics of the period, there was a net growth of Industry (Keyder, 1987). This would not have been achieved without the supply of labour that became possible with the influx of labour to big cities of the country (Keyder, 2005). Thus for the period, the influx of the people to the city was desirable for the functioning of ISI period.

Turkey never had fully functioning formal and universal social policy provisions (Buğra, 2008) and the state did not implement any formal social housing

project for the benefit of the poor.<sup>17</sup> Beside this, the workers could not afford the formal houses in the housing market for the middle class which were built by small entrepreneurs. In this regard, the gecekondur solution to housing problem filled this gap between the state and the market (Işık, Pınarcıođlu, 2001). In this process, the state conceded to the illegal occupation of urban territory that was due to the history of urban land in Turkey, mostly belonged to the state. There were three reasons behind the tacit approval of the state for gecekonduzation. First, industry was in a steady expansion therefore the need for fresh labour existed which means that the immigrants were desirable for the state. Second, it could not offer any other mechanism to provide a protective space from the commodification processes of the market and it had to concede the establishment of gecekondur areas to fulfil the housing need in the absence of solid social housing projects. Last, the growing number of immigrants became an important constituency in terms of electoral power and consequently the various governments issued amnesty orders for the territories of the gecekondus exchange for votes.

The gecekondur had a clear class content within it preserving the immigrating poor people from the market relations (Pınarcıođlu and Işık, 2001). As Keyder puts it this was one of the crucial mechanisms of the incorporation of the immigrants to the city beside employment in formal sector (Keyder, 2005). The gecekondus in this period were built by the people who would live in them and therefore were constantly modified by the habitants (Pınarcıođlu and Işık, 2001). One crucial point to remark for this period is that the gecekondur lands and the houses built on them were used for their use value instead of its exchange value. As the owners built the house, the surrounding of the house and the spaces of daily use were adjusted

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<sup>17</sup> There are a few exceptions to the situation. One example is the Istanbul Güngören Tozkoparan housing compound which was built in 1967 for workers in congruence with gecekondur Law No : 775

according to the daily needs of the residents. Most of the gecekondus had gardens for subsistence farming and as they were built in neighbourhoods in which the immigrants had relatives, the place served as strong solidarity networks in hard times when one of the residents lost his job. Thus, gecekondu areas not only fulfilled housing need of the immigrants but also protected the new workers from the commodification processes of the market and the land was constantly modified for the daily use necessities of the owners.

Although the gecekonduzation period mostly occurred in tandem with the state's tacit approval, there were cases in which this patronage based mechanism was broken (Aslan, 2004). Aslan argues that by 1975 the socialist left groups both in Istanbul and Ankara decided to intervene in the gecekondu construction process. Their aim was to break the illicit links which pushed the poor workers to pay informally for the bare state land to mafia-like organizations backed by the local representatives of the state such as the police and the local municipalities. The intervention of the left into the gecekonduzation in late the 1970s was an example of the squatting in Latin America which occurred in tandem with left parties (Castells, 1983). The left in Turkey in those times tried to sustain the sheltering right of the workers as a form of collective consumption unit. According to them, the working class needed houses thus they had all the rights to build on public land without the mediation of the mafia. Both in Istanbul and Ankara, the left created neighbourhoods by mobilizing collective action among the workers who had no prior houses. The intention behind politicizing this housing necessity was to popularize their socialist agenda among the working class by showing a small niche of a socialist way of life which would be possible after the revolution. Therefore, the neighbourhoods became the emerging cores of the socialist movement in the late 1970s and not only broke the

patronage relations in constructing gecekondu, but also the smooth legitimization of gecekondu within Istanbul's urban system. That is to say, the left organizing in the construction paved the way to the state's reaction and there occurred various violent clashes between the neighbourhoods and the police. The number of neighbourhoods constructed in this way, however, grew. In Istanbul, 1 Mayıs Mahallesi (1 May Neighbourhood) was the first and the most popular neighbourhood that the left constructed. Gültepe, Nurtepe Gülsuyu/Gülensu followed 1 *Mayıs Mahallesi* (Aslan, 2004). In Ankara, Dikmen Vadi and Mamak were the examples of such neighbourhoods<sup>18</sup>. However, the intervention of the left and popularization among the working class through building gecekondu occurred late in the gecekonduzation of Turkey that started in 1960s. It could have happened in an environment in which the left and the labour unions were strong and the gecekondu was believed to be the legitimate solution to housing problem of the poor. However, by the end of the 1970s, with the crisis of the ISI period, these conditions start to erode.

As mentioned at the beginning, the smooth incorporation of the immigrants into the big cities by the tacit approval of gecekondu construction occurred within the framework of ISI industrialization. The ISI development strategy assumed a strong state presence both for industrial development and labour relations. The bourgeoisie was unable to achieve to be independent from the state because of the strong relations with the state due to the dependency on state in industrial production processes (Keyder, 1987). The state also stood as the mediator between the interests of the bourgeoisie and the workers by constitutionally granting strong labour union rights (ibid.). On the one hand, the state owned enterprises (SOE) and the private industry were able to absorb the immigrating masses some period after they arrived.

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with the founders of the neighbourhoods

However, through the end of the 1970s, the world oil crises pointed to the fall of the ISI period for Turkey in parallel with other developing countries and the 24 January 1980 decisions of the government signaled the initiation of the new economic liberal period. The constitution written by the government following the 12 September 1980 coup d'état ensured the smooth political environment to enforce the 24 January decisions. The fall of the ISI period also signaled the end of one period for the gecekondu neighbourhoods. In the next section, this transformation in the gecekondu neighbourhoods and its meaning in our context will be discussed.

### The Second Period: A Conflicting Structure of Gecekondu as Both the Place of Collective Consumption and Individual Property

This period should be understood by the fall of ISI period and introduction of a new type of management of state society relations. By the period after the 24 January decisions the state had withdrawn from its role as mediator role in which it mostly favoured the workers against the bourgeoisie. Although not fully privatized, the SOEs ceased to absorb new labourers as it had used to do before 1980 and the opportunities for employment in formal sector declines. Moreover, the new bourgeoisie started to become more independent from the state and it seeks more profit possible in the real production regime of the ISI period. For the new bourgeoisie, the high rents were not rooted in the production sector, but rather in the finance sector based on speculations (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001).

The new period could be argued to have put an end to the wide interclass alliance mediated by the state and strengthened the conflicts between the classes. Data on income equality shows that the income gap between quintiles widened from 1978 to 1994 (ibid.). In addition, the increase in the share of informal employment in

total employment created considerable challenge against the employment-based social security system in Turkey (Buğra, 2008). That means the decline of the possibility for access to retirement benefits and health care provisions for a considerable portions of the workers. All in all, the new people immigrating to Istanbul lost their relatively socially secure environment in the 1970s and have left with their own destiny.

One could expect a rise of militancy among the working classes in this environment of neoliberal policies yet the urban land reforms concerning gecekondu settlers were able to achieve to regulate the expected social unrest among the gecekondu settlers (Öncü, 1994; in Buğra, 1998). The changing meaning of gecekondu which was the characteristic of the period was the story of how the working class were incorporated into the existing neoliberal system (Tuğal, 2008). This changing meaning can be found in the incorporation of gecekondus into formal urban land market which could be used for its exchange value and in this regard, the subsequent amnesty laws for gecekondu neighbourhoods are the key to understanding the process.

The amnesty laws which legalized the old gecekondu neighbourhoods had been passed by the National Assembly of Turkey since 1949 yet until 1984, all of the amnesty laws legalized the existing building stock of one storey gecekondus (Bugra, 1998). However, the 1984 amnesty law was quite different from the previous ones. It permitted the re-construction of existing one storey gecekondus on 400m<sup>2</sup> land up to four storey gecekondus and added that this right to re-construction would be used to fully legalize the buildings in the coming amnesty laws causing the popular name of the law to become Tapu Tahsis law. The people who owned up to 400 m<sup>2</sup> land with



the gecekondu before the law, were entitled to own Tapu Tahsis for their gecekondu which will be an important variable for our discussion on the trajectory of the urban movements in Dikmen Vadi and Başbüyük. The subsequent amnesty laws in 1985 legalized the gecekondu that were built before November 1985 to the decision of local municipalities and caused the legalization of the uninhabited land even for the ones that had been built after 1985 (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 200) and by the modifications in the local municipality law in 1989, the local municipalities became the arbitrators of the decision on legalizing the newly built gecekondu.

It is these laws which opened the urban periphery land to the encroachment of both the middle-upper, middle- classes and the gecekondu owners and the difference between these two groups, Buğra argues, became quite marginalized (Buğra, 1998). It is this process of the commercialization of gecekondu neighbourhoods which Erder depicts in the foundation of a neighbourhood in Istanbul called Ümraniye and Pınarcıoğlu and Işık in Sultanbeyli-Istanbul. Instead of utilizing the positive view of the society on the gecekondu owners by implementing formal redistributive policies on housing, the state left the issue on the urban land market and therefore the public view on the legitimacy of the gecekondu declined.

The changing economic order which I briefly discussed above, in the absence of declining formal sector and welfare state provisions left the new arrivals to the big cities impatient to become wealthier with amnesty laws legalizing the multiple storey gecekondu. Like all the other classes in society, the gecekondu owners strived to become better off even if it meant transferring the misery of poverty to newcomers. Poverty in turns (*nöbetleşe yoksulluk*) is the term which Işık and Pınarcıoğlu created to theorize how the new immigrants of post 85 period adjusted themselves to the new order of gecekondu and the economic system in the case of Sultanbeyli. The

smoother solidarity ties of the 1970s eroded and much more rigid networks of home town based networks defined who were eligible to enter to own gecekondu (Erder, 1996). The construction of the gecekondu is a violent game in which the first comers to the field set the rules. The people who came earlier enclosed the publicly owned land more than their household needs with their political relationship with the local authority in Sultanbeyli. He divided the land into parcels and sold these new parcels to new comers. In addition, he built multi storey buildings to one of his parcels which then were legalized by modifications to urban plans done by the local municipality and also sells or rents it to new comers. The new comers also repeated the process and the system worked as long as there was available land for invasion and commercialization for new comers. That is why, the late arrivals of the late 1990s which were mostly composed of internally displaced Kurds due to war in east of Turkey could not reach this wave of getting wealthier. They were the ones at the bottom of the system who had no choice but to rent the apartments of the earlier comers since in the time of their arrival, the previous emigrants utilized all the lands that are available for invasion. It is this system of poverty in turns which had occurred in mostly newly founded gecekondu neighbourhoods in Istanbul such as Sultanbeyli and Ümraniye in Istanbul.

Buğra asserts that under the absence of a formal housing policy and liberalization of urban land by laws enacted in the post 1980 period, the positive reciprocity given to gecekondu in the 1970s by society inevitably has transformed into negative reciprocity. Whereas in the 1970s, the gecekondu were legitimate solutions to the housing problem of the poor and the conceding of public land invasions was seen in terms of positive reciprocal relations, the commercialized character of the gecekondu in 1990s led the public opinion to view gecekondu as

places of illegitimate gain and the gecekondu owners as thieves exploiting the urban land. There is another major change in the image of gecekondu for Turkish public; that is the so called discussions evolving around the term *varoş*. This term also constitutes the construction of the negative attitude towards the gecekondu owners.

The term *varoş* indicates the denigrating discourse of the middle classes on the people living in gecekondu. *Varoş* expresses the time and space dimension of the paupers of the 1990s (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008). *Varoş* are neighbourhoods which inhabit the new paupers both in gecekondu and also in central places such as Tarlabası which are infilled by the new paupers in the face departure of the middle class from the center of the city (Yılmaz, 2008). *Varoş* epitomizes the fear and sometimes the hatred of paupers of the post 1990 era by the middle classes. The poor are supposed to be inclined to make all illegal activity such as drug dealing, woman trafficking and organized theft. The gecekondu neighbourhoods, the *varoş*, are the center of such activities. The book, *Yoksulluk Halleri*, edited by Necmi Erdoğan (Erdoğan, 2001); and Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder's work on the new poverty (Buğra and Keyder, 2003), are full of stories of the poverty experience by the people who live in *varoş*. In this respect, the term *varoş* is similar to Wacquant's depiction of the new neighbourhood affected by double violence: One from the neoliberal policies materially worsening the livelihood of the people and second the marginalizing stigmatizing lexicon used to delineate the neighbourhood by the media and the state. According to Wacquant, the term not only is created and used by people outside the *varoş* (hyper ghetto in Wacquant's example) but by people living inside these places and therefore the emergence of the term is a precluding factor on forming collective identities to oppose the state's policies.

To understand the effect of the state in fueling this image of *varoş*, Şükrü Aslan scanned Istanbul metropolitan municipal magazines for the articles analyzing the *gecekondu* from 1989 to 2007 and found that in the 1990s, the magazines pointed to the illicit gain the *gecekondu* owners had enjoyed and the corruption of the ‘good old’ *gecekondu* people into potential criminals. Articles mostly in the ones in post 2000 period call for the removal of these neighbourhoods and construction of “modern” buildings (Aslan, 2008). Serpil (2005) also scanned mid 1990 newspaper discussions around *gecekondu* in newspapers and notes the fear and hatred of the commentators from the people living in *varoş*. She also presents her conclusions from the interviews with the people living in Gülsuyu/Gülensu which is a *gecekondu* neighbourhood in Istanbul Maltepe and finds how the people express outrage against the term *varoş*. The insulting feeling of living in a *varoş* exacerbates their life as much as the material worsening of their lives due to rise of informal labour with inadequate wages and social state provisions.

The denigrating discourse *varoş* and the commercialized character of some of the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods will be manipulated by the MHA (mass housing administration) which took the control of the commercial use of urban land in post 2000 period and will be discussed in the next section in relation to urban transformation projects. Before that I want to return to the consensus of *gecekondu* literature on the integration of *gecekondu* to urban land market.

The increasing commercialization of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods is a theme mostly visited in *gecekondu* literature of 90s. However, not all the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods lost its character in the 1970s due to the subsequent amnesty laws passed in 90s. These neighbourhoods were not put into formal urban land market and acted as centers to protect the paupers from the ills of the lack of employment and

social security benefits. However, especially the neighbourhoods in Küçükçekmece Istanbul namely, Başakşehir, Şahintepe and Ayazma constructed by the Kurds who emigrated to Istanbul in the 1990s are the examples of such neighbourhoods. As Ayazma/Küçükçekmece were subject to urban renewal in 2004 and demolished in 2007, researchers went to the field to analyse the social structure of the neighbourhood. Among these people, Cihan Uzunçayırılı Baysal who works in the field since 2005 and wrote a masters' thesis on the subject puts that the gecekondu in Ayazma catered to the livelihood necessities of its residents as in the the 1970s and although commercial activity were limited but not absent, the use value of the neighbourhood was the prime factor to maintain their presence in the field (Baysal, 2010). Another example can be the huge "gecekondu planets" in Ankara mainly in Dikmen Vadi and Mamak where one can see with her bare eyes the preservation of gecekondu with one storey buildings and gardens to grow vegetables for daily use. Besides, the same process occurs for the parts of gecekondu neighbourhood which were constructed after 1985 without any legal right to stay and which uses its one storey building for its sheltering purposes. These neighbourhoods-Başibüyük is one of them- inhabit residents holding Tapu Tahsis waiting for fully incorporation to formal urban land market to build high rise apartments as promised in the law and the ones without any legal right to land due to coming after 84 with their one storey building. That is why the gecekonduzation of the 1990s did not create all out commercialized gecekondu but a hybrid structure that is composed of both the gecekondu as "usual" and the ones built in commercial terms by the subsequent amnesty laws. This hybrid structure is an important variable in the formation of the resistance between different neighbourhoods and within the same neighbourhood against the gecekondu transformation projects.

Post 2000 period marks the end of the opportunities for the new immigrants to share the rent value of urban land. Now the state mostly succeeds in checking the encroachment of its land and claims full control over the commercial rights of its land. This also means the introduction of urban transformation projects which aim to clear the gecekondu neighbourhoods and create empty land for commercial use in the hands of MHA and local governments. How this is translated to the social context of gecekondu in terms of the reaction against the transformations will be analysed right after discussing the last period of gecekondu journey of Turkey: the urban renewal projects.

### The Third Period: Post 2000, the Direct Intervention to the Gecekondu by the Urban Transformations

This period is not the first intervention of the state to spoil the integrity of the social structure of gecekondus. The second period also caused the fragmentation of the social structure of the gecekondu based on eligibility to enter the urban land market which I explained above. In the second period, the urban rent that the gecekondu land has is permitted to be used by some if not all of the gecekondu owners. However, in post 2000 period marked by AKP party leadership, the legal reforms made regarding the regulation of urban land has meant that the distribution of urban rent is controlled by the government. In this period, the state no longer sympathizes with gecekondu inhabitants and claims full control of the land's exchange value. Now the gecekondus are, according to the prime ministry Tayyip Erdoğan, "the tumors that surrounds the cities" (Aslan, 2008: 79). *Gecekondu* renewal projects that are only one type of urban transformation projects are the tools to materialize this purpose in post 2000 period.

Turkey witnessed the first examples of gecekondu renewal projects in 1989 in Ankara. The then Ankara municipality leader Murat Karayalçın implemented urban renewal projects both in Portakal Çiçeği Vadisi and Dikmen Vadi. Especially for Dikmen Vadi, commentators argue that the transformations occurred with minimum harm to the people (Uzun, 2002). However, in the post 2000 period, both Ankara and Istanbul have gone through big urban transformation projects both in gecekondu neighbourhoods and in old historical sites as in Istanbul's case. These projects have catered to the capitalist investment motives of the neoliberal urbanism rather than the needs of the people as claimed by the government (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008; Kurtuluş, 2009; Erder, 2009; ökten, 2006; Menaf, 2010). The urban transformations have occurred in two fields (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008). In the first field are the mega projects in the center of the city such as Galataport and Haydarpaşa port to create tourism centers serving international conferences and fairs or the renewal of historical neighbourhoods of Istanbul which are filled with urban poor since the 1980s. In Ankara, we have seen shopping centers have mushroomed all around the city mainly in the land of the public enterprises which have been privatized in AKP period (Yaşar, 2010). In the second one are the gecekondu renewal projects which is to demolish the gecekondu neighbourhoods, the land market values of which increased due to being near middle-upper middle class neighbourhoods with the expansion of the city. The cleared land is left to the trading decision of the MHA and the municipalities. Examples from Istanbul are the gecekondu renewal projects that have occurred or are due to occur in Maltepe Başbüyük, Maltepe Gülsuyu/Gülensu, Küçükçekmece Ayazma-Tepeüstü, Kurtköy-Conkbayırı, Sarıyer-Maden, Hacıhüsrev-Beyoğlu, Esenyurt-Şen, Kartal-Yakacık, Kartal-Hürriyet, Ataşehir-Yenibosna. The ones from Ankara are Dikmen Vadi, Mamak and Ankara Protocol

road transformation projects. Projects are made according to the new political economy of urban management.

The dominant ideology in transforming the two cities is the world city argument which is the urban manifestation of neoliberalism (Harvey, 1986; Brenner, 2001; Öktem, 2006; Türkün and Yapıcı, 2008). According to this argument, the city needs to be marketed for international tourism and financial flows to foster its economy and to create employment for its residents and the AKP led Ankara and Istanbul municipalities furthered the idea that both Istanbul and Ankara need to be transformed to have a share of international money flows. However, as Harvey asserts, neoliberalism is not a structural force which the international institutions enforce on governments but rather an alliance between international associations such as the World Bank and the IMF and the bourgeoisie within a given country materializes neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). Therefore, to understand the neoliberal restructuring of Turkey's cities, the AKP's operations on restructuring the cities should be analysed (Türkün and Yapıcı, 2008).

The full control of the urban rent in the post 2000 period by the government led by the AKP has been achieved by the modifications done to MHA and the municipality laws. MHA was founded in 1984 for the purposes of building affordable housing for the poor yet it mostly served the housing needs of the middle and upper classes (Bugra, 1998). In the AKP's reign by subsequent modifications to the MHA law in 2003, 2004 and 2007 (Şengül, 2008) the MHA acquired massive authority over the regulation of urban land. These are the ability to expropriate the urban land for urban transformation projects, cooperation with private companies for construction projects, cooperation with municipalities for gecekondu transformation



projects, and the ability to take over state owned land without any cost (Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2008).

The MHA mostly implements housing projects for high income groups and claims that with the revenue generated from these projects, it subsidizes housing compounds for the poor and therefore remains a social housing agency as dictated in the MHA law. Volkan Yılmaz rebuts this argument in his research on the current structure of urban poverty and contemporary activities undertaken by the MHA (Yılmaz, 2010). He argues that this regime of social housing undertaken by the MHA is not in line with the redistribution ideal of the welfare state. First, the MHA needs new land for the sustenance of this income generation policy from either open state land or clearing gecekondu neighbourhoods by gecekondu renewal projects and this causes the relocation of the urban poor to places which are away from the place where they make their living and therefore deteriorates their living conditions of the poor. Second, the terms of payment of the social houses together with the monthly housing compound payments of the houses are more than the payment capabilities of the contemporary urban poor. In sum, the MHA model despite its claim to the contrary deteriorates the living conditions of the urban poor by moving them to the outer parts of the city with unbearable debts.

If the projects are openly counter to the benefit of the urban poor, how are the demolitions legitimized which would have been impossible in the pre 80 era except some cases. As put above, Şükrü Aslan reviews the monthly free magazines of the Istanbul municipality and the public statements of the MHA and municipality high rank managers on the manifestations of gecekondu in the articles and comes to the conclusion that in line with the political economic shift of the urban management an exclusionary discourse has been created towards gecekondu owners (Aslan, 2008).

This exclusionary discourse starts by the reign of Tayyip Erdoğan in the Istanbul municipality in 1994 and intensifies by Ali Müfit Gurtuna and Kadir Topbaş who are respectively the mayors of Istanbul after 1999. The *gecekondu* is portrayed as the type of dwelling which is contrary to a modern city and contrasted with the modern houses of MHA. In addition, the changing structure of *gecekondu* which was discussed in the previous section, the illicit gain of *gecekondu* residents, is also furthered to delink the image of *gecekondu* as the dwellings of urban poor. Therefore, the construction of *gecekondus* in previous periods is lamented and the mayors promise not to permit the construction of new *gecekondus*. For the existing ones, set of urgencies are created to legitimize the demolitions. In the first years of 2000, the issue of “terrorism” was forwarded (Şen, 2010). According to these statements, the *varoş* act as the sources of terrorism and hence to be eradicated. Later on, Kadir Topbaş declared that the urgency of earthquake should be used to legitimize the projects. The *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were supposed to be more prone to earthquake due to their poor quality.

Erder asks whether the silence of the middle classes and academics towards the projects is because of their tacit approval of the demolitions of *gecekondus* which they assume are places of unjust gain or as spaces which look contrary to the good aesthetics of the city (Erder, 2010). As Erder suspects, the discursive shift in the state’s manifestation of *gecekondu* together with the media representation of the term *varoş* may well be reflected on the middle classes. The silence of the media and academia against the projects except the ones in historical sites such as Tarlabası or Sulukule projects (ibid.) are the signs of the success of the government in persuading the public. However, the projects have created response from the *gecekondu* residents in most places.

The urban transformations is a physical threat to the social structure of the neighbourhoods and as Pickvance argues the response of the neighbourhoods to the demolitions of houses by the projects should be understood within the context of the changing social context of gecekondu from the 1970s to the 1990s. That is why the two-tiered structure of the social context of gecekondu is an important variable to understanding the various responses within different neighbourhoods. To reiterate, by 2000, we had two types of gecekondu neighbourhoods. The first type is the one which still resembled the gecekondu of the the 1970s with gardens and one storey building. They are the ones which stand as examples of the neighbourhoods that were not commercialized by the Tapu Tahsis law and development plans which legalized the high rise buildings. The second type is composed of neighbourhoods which have a heterogeneous type of building stock with one storey buildings of emigrants of post 1985 period and the four to six storey buildings the residents of which hold Tapu Tahsis meaning that they wait for the full legalization of their buildings to increase their market value. The two types of movements have two different ways of inclination to responding against the projects. Where as the first type is more inclined to form progressive movement based on collective consumption, the second one is more involved in preserving the individual property rights of some of its members.

For the second type of neighbourhoods which have residents holding Tapu Tahsis, the projects points to the removal of the local alliance which were formed in 1990s between the new immigrants and the local municipalities with political Islam background (Erder, 2009). It was discussed in the previous section that holding Tapu Tahsis gave the incentive to gecekondu to fully legalize their gecekondu and build high rise apartments which they hoped to gain high profit. The established ties

between the local notables and the municipalities ensured many neighbourhoods in Istanbul the transformation of their Tapu Tahsis to fully legalized entitlements (ibid.). Erder alleges that although in persuading the gecekondu residents for urban transformation projects, the AKP led municipalities tried to mobilize its networks in the neighbourhoods, the dissident voices and organized movements in the neighbourhoods indicate that the established ties of the local politics with the AKP have eroded and a new one has filled this gap. Therefore, for this group, the introduction of an urban transformation project in their neighbourhoods means the loss of the hope for upward mobility by reaching the legalization titlement which they had dreamed since 1985 by observing the subsequent delivery of the entitlements to other neighbourhoods. The urban transformation project protocols which were signed between the MHA and municipalities, only promise them one flat against their 400m<sup>2</sup> Tapu Tahsis land at best with mostly monthly payments extending 10 to 15 years. Overall, the urban transformation projects clear the materialization of the property incentive given by the 1984 Tapu Tahsis law to gecekondu residents by transferring the urban rent to the control of the state via MHA and therefore provoke the residents against it. Therefore, they are the neighbourhoods which are more likely to form conservative movements in line with Byron and Mayer's argument about the causality between neoliberal urban policies and the rise of conservative movements as the introduction of Tapu Tahsis was the main instrument of neoliberal urbanism in Turkey.

As mentioned in the previous section, the neighbourhoods which have Tapu Tahsis holding residents, grew in size after 1985 and the new immigrating poor to these neighbourhoods had no legal titles and therefore called as *belgesiz* (without paper). In addition, there are fully preserved neighbourhoods in spite of having Tapu

Tahsis and *belgesiz* residents, with one storey buildings resembling the old gecekondu of the the 1970s. For these people without Tapu Tahsis, the projects dispossess them from their houses which they only use and expect to use for sheltering since the renewal protocols assumes the people without Tapu Tahsis non eligible for subsidy on the MHA houses. Thus, the movements of these neighbourhoods are likely to base on collective consumption demands and if it succeeds in forming weak ties with other gecekondu neighbourhood movements and progressive movements of the left, with a leadership eager to translate the militant particularism of the local to broader problems, the residents' subjective views on their positioning within the society may be transformed

In this regard, the two fields of this research, namely Dikmen Vadi and Başbüyük fall to the different categorization concerning their response to the transformation. Both of the movement emerged in response to the physical threat to the gecekondu neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, Dikmen Vadi's movement continued with anti capitalist overtones with desire to broaden the movement with other urban movements whereas Başbüyük's movement occurred in tough response to physical threat against the neighbourhood but stuck in its locality with very weak attempts to participate in meetings with class based demands. In fact, both of neighbourhoods was composed of residents with Tapu Tahsis and without Tapu Tahsis. However, the state action as contextual factor to the movements affected the two fields differently since both of the neighbourhoods belong to different political authorities concerning the transformation protocols, to Ankara municipality for Dikmen Vadi, to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, MHA and Maltepe Municipality for Başbüyük.

In terms of contextual factors, the major difference lies in the way the state action manifested itself in the neighbourhoods. One can claim that state action acted

the same in the two neighbourhoods since what we mean by the state action is the physical threat to the neighbourhoods by the gecekondu transformation projects but the way the state manipulated the property relations in the neighbourhoods differed to a certain extent. As stated in the introduction, at the beginning of the movements both of the neighbourhood had varying property relations. First of all in Dikmen Vadi, the transformation is being implemented by the Ankara metropolitan municipality whereas in Başibüyük, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Maltepe Municipality and MHA is responsible agents of the transformation which brings a more hesitant state action to fragment the collectivity of the movements. In other words, Ankara Municipality could enjoy authority without the intervention of MHA or local municipality yet in Başibüyük the three tiered authority structure complicate the implementation of the projects. The way this structural difference in state action is translated into the property relations in the neighbourhood is the major difference in terms of contextual factors in the two neighbourhoods.

Observation of the two neighbourhoods' transformation protocols gives us the content of this difference. Dikmen Vadi's protocol presented more lucrative agreement for the holders of Tapu Tahsis in relation to one who does not have legal paper to hold their houses. Therefore after 6 months of waiting through the end of 2006, most of the Tapu Tahsis holders left the neighbourhood and deconstructed their buildings by themselves as they built them 30 years ago. Therefore by 2007 there were 800 houses and by 2009 650 houses left out of 1800 houses Dikmen Vadi. The remaining ones were predominantly households without Tapu Tahsis. In sum, the property structure was almost homogenous among the participants of the urban movement in Dikmen Vadi.

Başbüyük's protocol, on the other hand, and the oral wordings of the municipality could not succeed in persuading the Tapu Tahsis holders to sign the protocol with MHA. The reason for this will be analyzed in the next chapters but for the time being the fact that the movement continued with heterogeneous property relations is enough for our study. The expectations of the Tapu Tahsis holders is more than just a house since most of them are eager to extract profit from their houses. However, the ones without Tapu Tahsis are anxious to lose their right to sheltering and in various occasions resist to the profit motives of the Tapu Tahsis holders. This conflict between the two groups sometimes translated into open clash in the process of the movement nevertheless the majority of the participants both with and without Tapu Tahsis remained silent until the visible attack of the state by massive force were halted and a change in the ruling of the Maltepe municipality brought hopes of favourable negotiation with the municipality. The details of the process will be touched upon in the next chapter.

This difference between the movements in two neighbourhoods is the translation of state action to the neighbourhoods which seriously affects the path of the movements. Due to the existence and dominance of Tapu Tahsis holders in leadership of Başbüyük, the movement can not be labeled in terms of the right to sheltering and therefore as a progressive movement which communicates for the collective social rights of the workers. Instead, we may label it as defence movement with broader alliance of the varying property based incentives in the neighbourhoods and as it mostly calls for the urban rent motives of the Tapu Tahsis holders with individualistic drives, the movement is an example of the conservative movements which seek the preservation of property structures instead of furthering collective demands. For Dikmen Vadi, due to its homogenous property relations after the

translation of the state action and with its leadership eager to cooperate with other class movements in Ankara, the movement organized around the cause of right to sheltering for all and attended to the meetings and platforms of the left agenda of Ankara.

This difference in the two movements' trajectories could also be observed in the political consciousness of the people in two neighbourhoods. Due to the differences mentioned above, Dikmen Vadi's residents grew awareness towards left political movements which they belittled before. This could not occur in Başbüyük. The expectation of the people could not go beyond satisfaction of their right to sheltering or profiteering from their lands in the field. This difference can be labeled as the result of the both the organizational and the structural differences of the two movements. This also makes us remember Katznelson's caution on the different trajectories which urban movements can result in terms of the formation of working class identities. In this regard Dikmen Vadi movement achieved to form the working class identities to act in the fourth level of class definition of Katznelson that is the members of Dikmen Vadi act self consciously through the movements which HE put forth to improve their class positions within the society. Unfortunately, contrary to all the efforts by some agents in Başbüyük-which I will touch upon- the same is not true for the working class of Başbüyük. The field accounts of this process will be laid down in next two chapters.



### CHAPTER 3 THE CASE OF BASIBUYUK

Understanding Başbüyük is quite complicated given the high voice of the struggle unobserved in a gecekondu neighbourhood for very long time together with its heterogeneous property relations which is usually cited as obscuring collective action. One can observe with an instant look a militant movement that includes demands seek through courts and as well as the tactics of social movements as usual e.g clashes with police, public statements, sit-ins, demonstrations in public spaces. This instant look may indicate that a very strong collective action exists demanding right to housing for its members living in gecekondu. Depending on the ideological lenses one adopts, the movement may be sympathetic as the contemporary upsurge of the working class demanding its housing right or the movement can also be viewed as the movement of wicked gecekondu residents who illegitimately invaded the public land when a typical civil servant works 20 years to own a house. The second view is flourished in the 1990s with the commercialization process of gecekondu after the Tapu Tahsis law and analysed by Bugra (1998) as the immoral economy of housing in Turkey as well as the degenerating discourse of *varoş*. The first view is symptomatic of the times which gecekondu was one of the centers of socialist movement in the 1970s and therefore the rise of a movement in a gecekondu neighbourhood reminds one those days. Meltem Şenyüksel(2009) important research on the subject is in line with this second view and labels the movement as right to housing movement affected by the high militancy of the poor working class families especially the ones who come after 85. The position of this research is between these two opposite poles as the neighbourhood embodies the effect of the

transformation of the social context of gecekondu of the 1970s in the 1990s together with the post 85 settlers with their one storey gecekondu and working in informal precarious labour conditions. The movement headed by the neighbourhood organization (civil association) succeeded to aggregate these two groups by persuading the two groups that collective action against the MHA&Maltepe Municipality (MM) protocol is benefit for all. However, both of the groups participated with different expectations to the struggle. For the holders of Tapu Tahsis, they long waited for the materialization of the promise of legalization of their land by the Tapu Tahsis they held. For the others without Tapu Tahsis, they were anxious to have a legal house to live immune from destruction. Thus for the former, the motives are preserving and furthering the rent value of their houses and for the latter, the protection of their collective consumption from the MHA. In the first two years the differences did not pose a problem nevertheless with the hope of ousting MHA and municipality protocol via the newly elected Maltepe Mayor revealed the conflicts between these two groups.

The movement mostly stuck in its locality which revolves around the fulfilling the expectations of the two groups and as especially the Tapu Tahsis holders had varying individual rent seeking demands, the organization, even in minor cases which it tried, failed to collaborate with other urban movements and provide demands that transcends the problems in housing. In other words, the organization succeed in forming the strong ties between the residents yet it did not attempt to form weak ties with other left movements in Istanbul. The reasons behind this are hidden in the history of the neighbourhood in parallel with the social context of gecekondu in Turkey. Therefore, history of the foundation of Başbüyük will be given before

laying down the field accounts of Başibüyük's resistance against the renewal project

### History of the Neighbourhood

Başibüyük, geographically, is within the borders of Maltepe and it is located in the northern part of E-5 international highway. It is neighbour to other gecekondu districts within Maltepe Municipality namely, Gülsuyu/Gülensu, Zümrüt Evler, Aydın Evler. The neighbourhood is rich in forest and located in high altitude with open view to Prince Islands in Marmara Sea. It is also near to Maltepe University campus and there is a newly built luxurious housing compound, "Maltepe Narcity" nearby Başibüyük.

The highway delineates not only the border between north and south Maltepe but also the spatial segregation of the district based on income (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2009). In the southern part which is near the Marmara Sea, middle and upper middle classes reside and in the northern part, working class neighbourhoods which were built as gecekondu neighbourhoods and legalized by the amnesty laws in late the 1980s like Fındıklı or remained illegal in spite of having Tapu Tahsis like Gülsuyu/Gülensu and Başibüyük.

If we set aside rumors for the existence of Başibüyük back in Byzantine times<sup>19</sup>, Başibüyük's emergence as a neighbourhood within city administration starts with gecekondu settling in the 1970s.

Until the 1970s Başibüyük was a small village. There are conflictual numbers about the size of the village yet the number is not more than 60 houses by 1970.

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<sup>19</sup> There is an old Byzantium church used as a mosque in Başibüyük showing that the rumors are not totally groundless.

Village members had two source of livelihood: One was farming and the other was employment in Sürreya Paşa Tuberculosis Hospital nearby Başbüyük.

The first flux of gecekondü settlers in Başbüyük occurred in the 1970s. Construction of Süreyya Paşa Hospital was the driving force for the enlargement of Başbüyük. The hospital was built in 1951 but grew in size in 1976 with new parts added to the one in 1951. The construction of this new part pulled emigrants to work in the construction of the hospital. After 1976 when the construction ended, the construction workers started to work in the hospital in various services of hospital (e.g cleaning, gate keeping). Therefore, Başbüyük as a small village in the 1970s starts to grow in size by the employment deficit in the hospital. In those years and the 1980s, the first comers of the 1970s pulled their relatives to work in hospital. The nearby factories of TEKEL and Arçelik also supplied labour to new comers but the main source of employment was the hospital.

In parallel with gecekondü settling in Turkey, there was not any formal state control in the construction of gecekondus in Başbüyük. The distribution of the land was done through tacit approval of Kartal Municipality and the village headman (the elected person representing the state in the neighbourhood) and then the district headman after 1983. Most settlers remember to pay some amount of money to the municipality to protect their illegal houses from deconstruction.

The necessities of the neighbourhood were sustained through collective work of the gecekondü settlers as in all other gecekondü neighbourhoods. State intervention in those provisions was also absent. 55 years old man who came to Başbüyük in 1973 tells his account of the years: “The people that come from Anatolia did not have a good life. When we came here 40 years ago, we built our

roads, we set up our own electricity infrastructure. We dig a water well to sustain our water need.’<sup>20</sup>

A woman in her 50s also tells her story of building her house.

My son, I tell you what. We did not have a road. The truck unloaded the sand and bricks for the construction. We, the women, carried the materials up to the hills of Başibüyük because men were working. I have medical problems in my back due to heavy materials that I had carried in those years<sup>21</sup>.

Başibüyük’s extension halted in 1980 after the military take over of Turkey but accelerated again after 1983 when Başibüyük was declared as a neighbourhood headman belonging to Kartal Municipality. This increasing in number of residents caused the decline of employment opportunity from Süreyya Paşa Hospital and the construction sector began to be the sector that absorbed the growing of Başibüyük. The new comers in the 1990s worked in constructions in Başibüyük. In other words, the new comers with less opportunity to integrate into formal employment worked in the constructions of the Başibüyük residents who came in the 1970s and the 1980s and who held Tapu Tahsis for their houses. The new comers of the 1990s was unfortunately without any legal status for their houses and they had no regular jobs as formal employment opportunities in Kartal region declined and short term informal employment in construction sector began to be the norm. Therefore, they were the ones at the bottom of the system of ‘Poverty in Turns’.

By 2000, after the earthquake in 99, a new law on gecekondus has passed which legitimizes all the gecekondus that was built before 2000 and therefore giving the gecekondu holders the status to hold a house even for people without Tapu

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<sup>20</sup> *Anadolu’dan gelen insanların düzgün bir hayatı yoktu. Yollarımızı biz yaptık, elektriğimizi biz çektik. Kuyu kazdık suyumuzu sağlamak için.*

<sup>21</sup> *Oğlum ben sana ne söyleyeyim. Yolumuz yoktu. Kamyon kumu, tuğlayı boşalttı. Biz kadınlar olarak malzemeleri bu Başibüyük’ün tepelerine taşıdık. Sırtımdan hep sorunum var o yıllarda bu malzemeleri taşıdığım için.*

Tahsis in case of a transformation of built environment by the municipalities. This law has caused the decline of gecekondur construction in the region and therefore the major source of income for newcomers of 90s, that is the construction sector in Başibüyük, has also declined. Since 2000, the construction workers in Başibüyük is in difficulty in finding job. The solution came from the participation of women in labour force. According to leaders in Başibüyük's organization, more than %50 of woman work as daily house cleaners in houses of the South Maltepe region where wealthy families reside. The four out of five women that I have interviewed worked as house cleaners and they also told me that house cleaning among women had become prevalent in recent years. The men are visible in the traditional coffee houses that are ubiquitous in Başibüyük. Lütfü Kaya, the standing leader of the neighbourhood organization claims that this challenges the traditional women roles in Başibüyük.

When the men lost their jobs the women started to clean the houses which are dirtied by other people. Working is not something to be ashamed of yet the leader of the house (the man) is without a job. Woman both accomplishes the tasks which as a woman she is supposed to do in the house and earns the family's modest livelihood. What does the husband do? With his broken heart, he sits in the coffee house. The state has no right to let this happen<sup>22</sup>. The effects of this change in gender roles are an important question to delve

into but within the scope of the thesis it has another meaning: it tells how the women became the forerunners in the clashes between the police and the Başibüyük people which will be discussed later.

Most of the pre 1985 settlers constructed four to six storey buildings with the right given by the Tapu Tahsis law in 1984 and enclosed and sold the public land in the field to post-1990 emigrants to Başibüyük. They also rented some of their flats to

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<sup>22</sup> *Kadınların kocaları işsiz kalınca o çile çeken insanlar(kadınlar) birilerinin kirlettiği daireyi temizliyor. He! çalışmak ayıp değil ama ailenin reisi işsiz güçsüz kadın hem evinde kadınlık yapıyor. Ekmeğini kazanıyor hem evini temizliyor. Koca ne yapıyor onuru kırılmış şekilde kahve köşesinde oturuyor. Bunu yaşatmaya kimsenin hakkı yok.*

new comers. There are a few families that became very rich from pioneering the construction of Başbüyük in the 1970s. Therefore, the process partially resembles Pinarcioglu and Işık's (2001) concept of poverty in turns. However, the inhabitants in Gülsuyu/Gülensu and Başbüyük have been unable to obtain legalization titles for their houses from the Maltepe Municipality since 1992 like Fındıklı Neighbourhood. Mother Land Party was in power in the Maltepe Municipality (Maltepe Municipality) from 1992 to 2004 and the headman was also member of the same party. The then mayor Bahtiyar Uyanık promised in every elections to distribute the titles and in 1997 opened a case to the Office of National Estate to transfer the land of Başbüyük to the Maltepe Municipality. In 2001 the court accepted Maltepe Municipality's request and the land was passed to the Maltepe Municipality. However until 2004 that is the due date of Uyanık's term in the office, the Maltepe Municipality did not match Başbüyük's Tapu Tahsis holders's expectation of obtaining the titles. Başbüyük people saw with great pain the legalization of the neighbourhoods in the Asian part of Istanbul which were built after Başbüyük such as Fındıklı in Maltepe, Sultanbeyli, Mustafa Kemal, Yeni Sahra, Örnek Mahallesi in Ümraniye. They thought that it was unjust that the upward mobility opportunities served to these gecekondu neighbourhoods through the land weren't extended to Başbüyük. In sum, due to the non existence of the indispensable element of the poverty in turns, that is the legalization title, the Başbüyük people unable to materialize what was achieved in Ümraniye and Sultanbeyli in 90s.

The story after 2000 includes the declaration of *Gecekondu* transformation project in the neighbourhood. By 2000, the neighbourhood with its forestry environment and high altitude viewing the Marmara Sea increased its urban market value. The upper middle classes started to leave south Maltepe and new spaces of

upper middle class like “Maltepe Narcity Houses” emerged in the northern part (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2009). New connection highways to the first and second bridge highways that passed near Başbüyük also increased its value. Thus the interest of the MHA which sought new spaces of urban land, to Başbüyük was not a coincidence. The introduction of the project points to the failure of the hopes of the people to seize the rent of the land and therefore the response to it should be read against the background of both the formation and extension of Başbüyük in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. For post 1985, the effect made the loss of their houses. Discussing the causes of the movement gives us the common norms upon which the movement was founded upon.

#### Causes of the Movement

Understanding the causes of the movement underlines the points which the community in Başbüyük were formed at the beginning of the movement and deformed through the end of the movement. As stated in the statement of the thesis, Başbüyük’s community was formed in relation to the coalition between the people with Tapu Tahsis and without paper. The leading team of the organization mostly composed of people with Tapu Tahsis who has both time and money to spend for the movement yet it claimed representation both for the Tapu Tahsis holders and the ones without it. The organization presented the movement as the struggle to preserve their right to sheltering yet for the holders of Tapu Tahsis the reason for attending the movement were more than preserving their houses as discussed. A specification is needed to identify the group which is mostly eager for urban rent through their land in Başbüyük. These are the people who have either open land or one gecekondü with



Tapu Tahsis. Legalization and subsequent multiple storey building construction will benefit them the most. Therefore they ardently oppose the project which just gives them one flat at best case<sup>23</sup>. However, there are also 4-6 storey buildings which is built on a land with Tapu Tahsis. The buildings were usually built by the head of the family and distributed to the children who also established family. Besides, they rent one or two flats to new emigrants with costs much lower than formal housing market in nearby neighbourhoods. The legalization process does not serve any profit for these people since they have an established building which they use for sheltering plus for seconding the retirement benefits of the grand father of the family. Therefore, the first group within the Tapu Tahsis holders is the one which complicates reaching an agreement within the neighbourhood. This conflict did not become apparent in the beginning of the movement due to the success of the organization in showing the Maltepe Municipality(MM) and MHA as the common enemy for all yet as the intervention of the Maltepe Municipality (MM) proceeded, the organization lost some of its members due to the problems that arose out of this conflict. One of the forerunners in the organization conveys the problem in the following: “The property relations are really complicated. We used to say to the people without Tapu Tahsis, be tough against the municipality’s offers or else you will lose your house. For the holders of Tapu Tahsis, we said the holders of Tapu Tahsis “be silent, your paper does not mean anything for the state”<sup>24</sup>

However, the responses of the people were not that as smooth as the organization would have them to have been. On the one hand, The organization right

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<sup>23</sup> The meaning of the best case is at the core of the negotiations with the municipality during the movement and will be discussed in next section.

<sup>24</sup> *Bu mülkiyet işi bizi gerçekten zorladı. Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsisi olmayan, belgesiz insanlara, dirençli olun belediyenin tekliflerine karşı diyorduk, yoksa evinizi kaybedersiniz. Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsis sahiplerineyse, “aman ha sesinizi çıkartmayın, Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsisinizin devlet için bi önemi yok” diyorduk.*

from the beginning of its establishment strived to persuade the people that the transformation would bring misery to all the households in the neighbourhood; on the other hand the municipality tried to prove the reverse. The organization at first glance seems to be the winner in this clash. It achieved the aggregation of the people with its cause yet it failed to prevent the construction of the MHA houses in Başbüyük and it could not prevent 150 people from signing the agreement for the MHA houses. In the next section, we will look at the legal process first to understand the content of the project and second to understand this clash between the municipality and the organization.

#### Legal Process of The Başbüyük *Gecekondu* Transformation Project

Başbüyük was declared a region of urban renewal in 2005 by the 1/5000 North Maltepe protocol designed by the IMM (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality) along with other regions belonging to Maltepe namely, Gülsuyu and Gülensu neighbourhoods.

The Gülsuyu headman conveyed the news to political groups in the neighbourhood and the neighbourhood association organized all the people and collected 5000 objection petitions to the local Maltepe Municipality (MM) within the legal objection time of 60 days and therefore the municipality excluded the neighbourhood from gecekondu transformation project which was implemented with the 1000 improvement plan designed by local municipality and endorsed by the metropolitan municipality.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately Başbüyük's headman Ayhan Karpuz did

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<sup>25</sup> I learned the process in gülsuyu/gülensu through my meetings with the then leader of the Gülsuyu Gülensu *Dernek*, Erdoğan Yıldız.

not declare the transformation decision to the neighbourhood and Başibüyük remained within transformation region.

In February of 2006 a protocol was signed between the the Maltepe Municipality, IMM and MHA and according to this protocol, 1/1000 improvement plans of Başibüyük was prepared by the MHA and endorsed by the the Maltepe Municipality in 10.09.2006 and by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 1.11.2007 (İstanbul 5. İdare Mahkemesi Başkanlığı Bilirkişi, 2007/1203). \

#### The Protocol for the Başibüyük *Gecekondu* Transformation Project

The protocol starts with the acknowledgement of reliance of the laws on the Municipality, MHA and It is signed by three parties, namely, the the Maltepe Municipality, IMM and the MHA. The protocol defines two places. One is the gecekondu transformation area that is Başibüyük and construction area, the place where the MHA construction stands. The three parties declared only 400 acre of Başibüyük's land which belongs to the Municipality, as the transformation area. Keçiyatağı Region which is the only empty area, was declared as an area for building the houses.

The protocol defines Başibüyük as a space of illegal buildings and gecekondu invasion. Generally speaking it aims to clear the land and build high rise buildings in which Başibüyük people will be stacked. The transformation proceeds in a step by step process. First it aims to build six high rise buildings in Keçi Yatağı region and gives these houses to eligible people who have accepted the agreement proposed by MHA. The people who accept the agreement have to relinquish their land to MHA. As the first project may only involve limited number of families living in Başibüyük,

a new project will be implemented in the cleared area which was relinquished to the MHA. This also will create a new cleared space after the people move into the new houses. This process will continue until all the households are stacked in those high rise buildings.

The clearance procedure is totally done by the Maltepe Municipality and the cost of the deconstruction work is paid by the MHA in kind-that is the MHA houses. At the end, the entire commercial rights of the remaining empty areas will belong to the MHA. The people eligible into move to the houses are to be selected by the local municipality with the criterion created by the MHA and the local municipality. The article says that a different statue can be announced to define the rules of eligibility. According to this statue, only people holding a gecekondu with or without Tapu Tahsis are eligible to apply for a house. Here comes the problem. How much do people have to pay? How does the amount differ for people with Tapu Tahsis and without Tapu Tahsis? These questions is behind the ambiguity of whether to believe the municipality and sign the protocol or remain on the side of the organization which contends that the municipality tries to deceive the people. Below I will discuss this question in the light of the legal papers. As I pointed in the section on methodology, my interview with Adem Kaya helped me to cross check my findings on this issue.

According to the sixth article of the protocol, the assessment value of the assets of the eligible people proceeds as follows. The MHA determines the price of the house that it will contract to the family. The value of the assets of the household, including the concrete, the land and trees, is compared with the price of the MHA house. If the price of the MHA house is bigger than the value of the assets, the difference is paid by the household in credit limits ranging from 5 years to 15 years

according to its amount. If the reverse is the case, then the MHA offers to make another contract for a new house. Here is the climax of the problem. What is the value of the assets of a household?

A commission composed of five people representing MHA, Maltepe Municipality and IMM is also formed to assess the values of the assets of the eligible people that have applied to acquire a house from the project. According to the assessment value of this commission, there is one thing for sure: a household without Tapu Tahsis is liable to pay a huge amount of money and this makes them very motivated to join the militancy of the organization yet the major objection of the organization is on the ambiguity of the assessment values for holders of Tapu Tahsis. Moreover, there are people holding four storey buildings with eight flats built on a land with Tapu Tahsis. As mentioned above in most of the cases, the relatives of the Tapu Tahsis holder stay in those buildings and some of the flats are rented to people who have moved to Başibüyük. The project only gives one house for Tapu Tahsis holders at best and this brings a problem due to uncovering the households residing in multiple storey building. Furthermore, it also hinders the drive of Tapu Tahsis holders with open land for profiteering from their houses via the improvement plans (legal right for construction building) like the other gecekondu neighbourhoods. Giving the land with legal right for construction to contractors is much more profitable than obtaining one MHA flat in the best case. However, the organization strived to provide a legally binding agreement with the municipality to ensure that at least the “best case” will apply for all Tapu Tahsis holders.

I reviewed one example of an assessment paper which the commission gave to one of the households with Tapu Tahsis which had been demolished because it had been standing in the construction area of the MHA houses. In the paper, the

municipality promises to pay the difference which the MHA asks from the owner of the house yet the problem is, according to the organization, whether this exemplary paper will be applied to all the holders of Tapu Tahsis. This was the major point in which the organization used as a cause to hold the support of the people with Tapu Tahsis. The statements of the then municipality leader Fikri Kse also fostered ambiguity and paved the way for a quite militant movement that included six months of hot clashes with the police. In addition, the organization met with the residents of Halkalı Bezirganbahe MHA houses who moved there after their neighbourhood in Kkekmece Ayazma was demolished by the urban renewal protocol. The experiences of the people of Ayazma which I will convey in the next sub section, were the primary reason behind their suspicion towards the mayor's oral promises.

In sum, the grievance is first about the threat of losing their right to shelter for people without Tapu Tahsis and the quest for upward mobility in an economic environment ,in which there is no hope to get wealthier beside their valuable land.

### The Resistance

The sequence of events is composed of three phases. The first phase was the phase in which the late news of gecekond transformation in Bařıbyk were heard in the neighbourhood and judicial action together with the formation of the organization occurred. This phase started by the spring of 2006 and finished by November 2007 when the MHA construction site workers backed by the police tried to unload the construction site to the housing area of Bařıbyk. The third phase was the phase that started by the March 2009 local municipality elections which superseded AKP with CHP in Maltepe Municipality and continues to the present.

Relative silent waiting for a solution from the CHP led Municipality is prevalent in this period.

### The first phase

This is the phase in which the roots of the movement were established. The form of the community in Başbüyük in response to urban renewal also was decided in this phase. The common norms and mutual trust between the members were formed in this period. The question of whether they would lose their houses was at the center of their forming. In the first instance, the notable people started to gather to understand what is going on in Başbüyük. They formed a commission of 12 people whose members were mostly composed of AKP supporters. Adem Kaya who would become the leader of the organization was again the leading person to form the character of the movement. He proposed and persuaded people that those who have connections with the AKP should be in the commission since what they aim was to advocate for better terms in the transformation agreement.

As mentioned above, people were very lately informed about the project through a resident who worked in the municipality. They learned that the process had started in 2004 and Gülsuyu neighbourhood had cancelled the project on their part to be cancelled by collective action. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Eder points out that gecekondü transformations are implemented in conjunction with the political Islam's networks within the neighbourhood. Başbüyük was no exception. The then headman of *Başbüyük* was in alliance with the AKP reigned Maltepe municipality. He was known as supporter of the Mother Land Party (ANAP), yet he also had good connections with the Maltepe AKP reigned municipality. A woman that I

interviewed remembered to having asked Ayhan Karpuz in 2005 if there was any transformation plan in Başbüyük as in other neighbourhoods in Maltepe namely, Gülsuyu-Gülensu and Fındıklı, but he had told her not to meddle in these issues. As discussed above, 2006 was a very late date for informing the neighbourhood since the declaration of Başbüyük as the transformation area had occurred in 2004 when Gülsuyu and Fındıklı immediately took action:

We learned about the process coincidentally. Ayhan Karpuz worked for the municipality when Başbüyük was taken into the transformation plan. While doing this, he did not let us know about the declaration. This issue was also in Fındıklı neighbourhood. Fındıklı headman made a meeting with the residents, he informs them. Fikri köse (the then major of Maltepe Municipality) orders him not to make this meeting but he says no (to Fikri Köse). He says that he is the muhtar of Fındıklı and he is supposed to make this. 4500 objection petitions (to 1/5000plans) were collected and Fındıklı were removed from the transformation plans. (Lütfü sel-standing organization leader)<sup>26</sup>.

As the statement suggests, Başbüyük headman always remained supporter of the acceptance of protocol claiming that it would not put the people in unbearable debt as the organization contends. Therefore here is the point which complicated the formation of the organization. On the one side there was the AKP led municipality which had 75 % of the neighbourhood in 2004 local municipality elections. In addition, Ayhan Karpuz who had been the headman of Başbüyük since 1994 also motivated the people to accept the terms of the protocol. The problem was to persuade the people that the municipalities offer was not convenient for them.

The issue of “convenience” was as I said a complicated issue. On the one hand it meant the preservation of their houses used as shelter. This was valid for people without Tapu Tahsis plus the households that informally owning a single apart in a

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<sup>26</sup> *Bir tesadüf eseri öğrendik Başbüyük mahallesinin kentsel dönüşümle ilgili kapsama alındığını. Dönüşüm kapsamına alınca muhtar belediyeye beraber hareket ederek belediyeye destek vermiş. Belediyeye destek verirken bize haber vermemiş. Bu konuyla ilgili Fındıklı mahallesine de geliyor. Fındıklı muhtarı mahallede toplantı yapıyor bilgilendirme yapıyor hatta bu yaptığı toplantıya fikri köse yapma diyor. Ben fındıklının muhtarım diyerek yapıyor. O dönemde 4500 imza toplanarak fındıklı bunun dışına itiliyor ve Fındıklı dönüşümden çıkarılıyor.*



four to five storey building constructed in a land with Tapu Tahsis. For other people renting the flats of their four to five storey buildings, the issue was somewhat different: the protocol only promised in the best possibility -if the value assessment promises of the municipality was valid for all- single flats for people holding Tapu Tahsis for their 400m2 land. Although the issue of convenience for the two groups was quite different, what the organization tried to achieve was to show MHA as the common enemy for all of them. Therefore they needed to spread verbally the practices of the MHA in other gecekondu transformation areas in Istanbul on the part of Başbüyük which was subject to the renewal. They needed to transform the image of MHA house from the solution for their housing problem to a monster against their sheltering and/or property right.

First to fully understand the MHA led transformations and present it to the neighbourhood, they decided to visit gecekondu transformation neighbourhoods in Istanbul. They first went to Küçükçekmece Ayazma and then to Bezirganbahçe MHA houses which were the housing compounds to which Ayazma people moved after their neighbourhood had been demolished due to Ayazma-Tepeüstü urban transformation project. They made video taped recorded interviews with the people living first in Ayazma and then in Bezirganbahçe at that time:

We formed a commission and went to Ayazma. He told us that they counted their house for 6 billion TL (6000 TL in today's Turkish currency). Then they went to Ankara and increased the value of their house to 12billion TL. The injury in ayazma had to be removed. In fact the cause of the resistance in gecekondu is the victimization of the people. We also seek to remove the injuries. We then decided to go to Bezirganbahçe. There were wonderful buildings with security guards.... We went into an upper apart. I thank them that they welcomed us. We saw that they were still busy with refurbishment. They said that they had wished to live in the tent rather than coming there. He had his own house (in Ayazma). They counted his house as 12billion TL and

put them into 40billion TL debt .... Workmanship in the house was very bad. We saw all these. 27

The commission videotaped the interview and showed it to the people in the organization. Most of them remained suspicious on the commission's account.

What is the source of our reliability? We first went to Ayazma to houses which was still intact yet in waiting list for demolition so that they could reach to a conclusion. We showed it in the organization. They said that the interviewed people are our relatives. Noone was victimized (in Ayazma). Noone had debt more than 5-6billion TL. We said no they had 40000tl debt<sup>28</sup>.

Then the organization repeated the same process in another transformation neighbourhood called Cambaz Bayırı in Kurtköy and presented to the people that a similar tragedy exist in Cambaz Bayırı.

Hearing different stories with similar conclusions, a wave of mourning spread through the neighbourhood. The organization received an invitation to a debate program on Meltem Tv in which the head of the organization Adem Kaya disputed with the neighbourhood headman, Ayhan Karpuz. This last event pushed a wave of people to register to the organization and the organization assigned 350 households into its account.

Another major event also fostered the popularity of the *Dernek* and intensified the trust between the people towards the legitimacy of the movements. In January 2007, after the registration of 350 households to organization, a commission of 300 people decided to go to Ankara to the Turkish parliament to meet with opposition

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<sup>27</sup> *Bi heyet kurduk baktık, ayazmaya gittik. Dedik kardeşim ya bizim evi 6milyara saydılar dayı. İşte Ankara'ya gitmişler konuşa konuşa one2 milyara saymışlar. Ordaki maduriyetin ortadan kalkması lazım. Zaten gecekondunun direndiği nokta maduriyet biz de maduriyet ortadan kalksın diyoruz. Bi de bahçegte gidelim dedik gittik baktık muhteşem bloklar dikmişler kapıda güvenlik bi de bi eve girelim dedik. O zaman memnun olanlar ne düşünüyorlar. En üst kata çıktık adam sağolsun bize evi açtı içeri girdik adamlar taşınmışlar ama hala tadilatla uğraşıyorlar. Keşke ahırda yaşasaydık bizi kandırdılar. Yerim yurdum vardı one2 milyara saydılar 40 milyar borçlandım. 7milyar masraf ettim four milyarda masraf ettim 50 milyar verene satıyorum zararına. 15 katlı binanın gideri çalışmıyor, çok kalitesiz. Berbat işçilik var. Gittik onları gördük çekim yaptık.*

<sup>28</sup> *İnanırcılık nereden geliyor. Önce Bezirgan'da kalan adamlar öbür tarafta hala yıkılmamış ama yıkım bekleyen vatandaşlar. İki grubu da mukayese etsinler diye. dernekte gösteriyoruz, diyorlar bunlar sizin akrabalarınız. Orda herkes hak sahibi oldu kimse five 6 milyardan fazla borçlanmadı, ya etmeyin eylemeyin kardeşim adamın borcu 40 milyar dedik. Interview with Adem Kaya*

parties represented in the parliament in that time, namely, CHP(Republican Party of Turkey) MHP(National Movement Party) ANAP. During their visit they heard that the first attempt to install the construction site in Başibüyük had occurred with massive police force. The people composed of mostly women clashed with the police and attacked to the office of the headman. This was the first success of organization. It was the organization's first success in the way to break the reliability of Ayhan Karpuz who had been the neighbourhood headman since 1994.

The attempt of the MHA to establish the construction site failed in the face of the reaction of the people and by the networks of Adem Kaya in Minister of Interior Affairs through CHP MPs. As I said, this was a major success for the organization. The voters of the AKP now questioned the reliability of the AKP reigned Municipality. However, Kaya argued that although more than 2000 people had appeared as supporters of the cause of the organization, they did not want to oppose strictly to the municipality. They were still unsure about the reliability of the municipality. Adem Kaya cites the voting results of 22 July 2007 MP elections in Başibüyük to prove the hesitance of Başibüyük people:

We told the Başibüyük people that they should not vote for the AKP. They should vote for other parties. We considered that if the voting share of a party which got 75% of the total vote in Başibüyük decrease to 40%, then the head of that party would reprehend the (Maltepe Municipality) mayor. We believed to that idea yet my people voted to AKP and the party got 62% of all the Başibüyük's vote. I had 1297 members (at that time) but the AKP got 62% of all the votes.<sup>29</sup>

This ambivalence was mostly eradicated by an important event that pulled the support of most of the people to the side of the organization's position. The municipality mayor Fikti Köse held a meeting attended by 300 Başibüyük people.

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<sup>29</sup> *Başibüyük halkına temmuz seçiminde dedik ki sakın ola ki AKP'ye poy vermeyin. Hangi partiye verirsiniz verin. Oradaki düşüncemiz şuydu. %75 olan oy partinin belediye başkanı %40a düşerse bunun kulağını başkanı çekecektir. Biz bunu güttük ama halkım gitti %62 oy verdi. one297 üyem var ama yine AKP %62 oy aldı.*

The mayor started to explain the Project. He said “thank god we managed to get over all the difficulties after going to Ankara. We discussed the issue with the head of the MHA. Good luck with your house. No one will suffer in this process”. One of us asked what not being a sufferer exactly means. He said that they were building 350 houses 12 of which are 110 m2 costing 67 billion TL and others are 85m2 costing 52 billion TL. our houses will be counted 20 billion TL and our debt wouldn't exceed 30 35 billion. That was exactly what we had been saying. We had never told anything else. We said our houses would be counted 10 12 and the debt wouldn't be more than 30 40. Some Başbüyük people used to say that the debt would not exceed five or six billion TL. Beside this, the mayor told that they would give 96 months long credit. The people started to murmur and they wanted their leader (Adem Kaya) to talk, but the mayor said that I am not the leader. Then I left the building. After that everybody left the hall. The hall was completely empty because the rightfulness of the organization was proved. Right after the event the supporters of the organization increased to 2000 2500 4000. It turned into a social movement. Commissions were set up. Street representatives were selected and the organization were full of people. I thank Fikri Köse (the mayor). He achieved what we could not achieve in two years. (Ironically laughing) 30

The confession of the mayor that the people would pay 30000 TL for the MHA houses proved the stance of the organization. Therefore through the end of 2007 the organization became an important center of power against the implementation of the project. Now the organization obtained legitimacy under the eyes of the people. Moreover, the organization was able to surpass the hegemony of AKP in the region where the renewal was planned to be held. They achieved to unite the people with varying property structures by creating the norm which sketches MHA and the Maltepe Municipality as the enemy of all.

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<sup>30</sup> *Belediye başkanı başladı projeyi anlatmaya çok şükür ki ankaraya gittik bu işi bitirdik sayın toki başkanıyla konuştuk herkesin evi hayırlı olsun biz burada kimseyi madur etmeyeceiz. Sorduk madur etmemek nedir? O da dedi ki 350 konut yapıyoruz bunun one2 tanesi one10 bunlar 67 milyar. bi de 85 m2 var onlar da 52 milyar. İşte sizin evleriniz 20 sayılacak en fazla borçlanma 30 35i geçmeyecek. Biz de zaten bunu diyorduk başka bişi söylemedik ki. Biz de bunu diyorduk bizim farklı bir şey demedik. Bizim evler one0 one2 sayılacak borçlanma 30 40 milyarı geçmeyecek. Başbüyük halkı yalan söylüyorsunuz borçlanma five 6 milyarı geçmeyecek diyordu. Bir de başkan sunu dedi 96 ay vade yapıyoruz. Millet homurdanmaya başladı. Bunun üzerine bir dakika başkan bizim başkan da konuşsun. O dedi ki sen başkan değilsin dedi. Öyle mi dedik bir çıktık salon bomboş. Herkes bizle çıktı. Çünkü derneğin doğruluğu çıktı. Bir randa yanımızda olan sayı 2000 25000 4000e çıktı olay halk hareketine döndü. Komisyonlar kuruldu. Sokak temsilcilerdi falan derken dernek doldu taştı. Bizim derneğin haklılığı ki biz başkana teşekkür ettik*

All in all, strong solidarity ties were formed in this period and now it was time to physically oppose the commencement of the construction in Başbüyük housing area by the command of the organization. This necessitated direct confrontations to the police. Therefore, in September 2007 the long period of harsh clashes with the police began. The clashes last until April 2008. The power of the organization in the charismatic authority of Adem Kaya were well entrenched in this period as the clashes with the police intensified.

### The Second Phase

Scenes of people living in gecekondu fighting with the police for their houses are not a peculiarity in the history of gecekondu, as Aslan points out (Aslan, 2004). We still hear news of clashes between police and newly built buildings in the gecekondu neighbourhoods which were mostly expanded in 90s<sup>31</sup>. They are mostly spontaneous actions in reaction to the demolitions. However, In Başbüyük's case we see an organized militant resistance against the erection of construction site in an open area that has used as the water source of the neighbourhood when city water works had not been not set up. In other words, these nine months of clashes were not against the destruction of their houses as usual. The successful propaganda of the organization had convinced the people that to protect their houses they had to prevent the construction of the MHA housing compound. The very presence of the MHA protocol in Başbüyük was now seen as the real enemy against their right for

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<sup>31</sup>The contemporary pattern still follows the deconstruction of buildings which are illegally built prior to local elections. Here is an example of destruction of 60 illegally built buildings in Sultanbeyli just before the last local elections. (Sultanbeyli'de Yikim Gerginligi, June 2009)

sheltering for the majority and hope for economically moving up for the Tapu Tahsis holders.

As implied above, the clashes were not the typical unorganized spontaneous gatherings to prevent the instantaneous threat of demolitions. A certain tactic and motivation decided by the organization was behind the clashes. The organization instrumentalized the clashes with the police to strengthen the organization's hand at the negotiation table with the Municipality. Moreover, all of the militancy of the neighbourhood was used as a way intimidate against the authorities to establish the terms of the organization. Through the end of the period it became to be a legitimate agent on the eyes of Maltepe Municipality to have a word on the future of the neighbourhood. The organization even gained the support of CHP Maltepe branch which had won the last local election.

The clashes with the police were also the main reason behind the attention of the various left groups in Istanbul and the left media besides being decisive in forming the legitimacy of the organization on the eyes of the people. However the clashes were full of pain for the people. It was also a process during which the people cited, as "they understood AKP protects the rich and suppresses the poor". This is the process manifests the potential of militarization not only against the MHA but also a militancy directed against the state to protect the rights of themselves as the poor as the working class. Why this potential could not be materialized by the organization will be analysed below but before that a brief chronology of events in this second period will be given as a sign of respect for the struggle of Başbüyük people and to show the effort of the organization in manipulating the militancy of the people.

The first attempt to establish the construction site occurred in September 2007 and failed. This seriously frightened the contractor of the MHA houses, namely Evyap and he asked for a meeting between Başibüyük people and Fikri Köse. The meeting which I cited above as the key event to the establishment of the hegemony of the *Dernek*, was held and the contractor witnessed the power of the organization in affecting the people. After this meeting several times the contractor tried to establish the construction site escorted by massive police force. In all these clashes the police failed. According to the videos and the accounts of the people, they did not attack the police but threw stones to the trucks carrying construction material. In one of the instance the people even dig a representative grave for the contractor, Fikri Köse and the headman, Ayhan Karpuz (Başibüyük'te yıkım gerginliği, March 2007). It was at this point the contractor, Evyap withdrew from the project accusing the resistance that occurred in the neighbourhood. The following newspaper excerpt from Zaman newspaper explains the anger of the contractor.

The contractor Inan Gözgül wanted his removal from the project. Gözgül said that he can not understand the negative reactions for a project which would re-style Başibüyük...Gözgül gave up starting the construction after seeing the grave digged for him, the district muhtar and the municipality mayor. (Kentsel dönüşüm projesi gecekondu lobisine takıldı; 10 2007).

This news irritated the people a lot due to the remaining part which to use Wacquant's expression, was used to territorially stigmatize the people of Başibüyük. As Wacquant remarks, to legitimize implementations contrary to the customs of the public such as eradicating the houses of the people, the place has to be presented as a space of illegal activity (Wacquant, 2007). The head of MHA, Erdoğan Bayraktar makes a statement for this aim and Zaman inserts this statement into the news of the contractor's withdrawal in Başibüyük.

MHA faces obstacles from gecekondu lobbies in its projects in different city and towns. The head of MHA Erdoğan Bayraktar stated that the illegal

organizations fed by the gecekondu environment try to hinder the implementation of urban transformation projects. Bayraktar told that the people making dirty business such as Marijuana and woman trading and terrorist groups tries to hinder the urban transformations in gecekondu neighbourhoods by using innocent people and added that the issue of illegal housing also feeds the terrorism.

I have frequently observed the grievance this news had created especially in the gecekondu neighbourhoods subject to transformation. The people not only in Başibüyük but also in Istanbul Küçükçekmece Ayazma, Ankara Dikmen Vadi and Gülsuyu Gülenso were all saddened by this image of drug and prostitution attached to their place. Almost in all these neighbourhoods, the people sued Bayraktar for defamation. Başibüyük was not an exception. All the men I have interviewed expressed at some point their hatred of Bayraktar due to this statement. All the cases were lost. However, the continuous introduction of this subject in my interviews had a meaning: the people wanted outsiders disregard the way the dominant media presented the gecekondu. In other words they tried to preserve their community against the one sided representation of the media. This is a sign that the discussions around *varoş* in the 1990s did not cause the full fragmentation of people's attachment to their place as in the extreme cases of Wacquant in Paris and Chicago. Despite the insulting of Bayraktar the people living in gecekondu, the cancelling of the contract between the MHA and Evyap was a good news for the organization. They had been able to intimidate the MHA despite the police support yet the project was legally in force. The second good news came with the visit of the court committee which was about the case opened by the organization in the first period to cancel Başibüyük's transformation protocol between the three parties. Their visit was just after the publication of the news in *Zaman* newspaper. The organization stressed the need for silence in the visit of the court committee and 2000 people welcomed the committee with applauses. The good news was that the committee implied that they would



accept the request of the organization-that is they would cancel the protocol. These two event led them believe that at least until the 2009 local elections there would be no attempt to initiate the construction. However three months after the visit, 28 February 2008, the new contractor escorted by a huge police force in numbers unobserved before, entered the district and installed the material to the construction site. This time the people were not able to resist the police who deployed to the construction area and started to guard it day and night. The two months long clashes with the police started on this day. Immediately a women's commission was set up and the organization erected two tents one for the men and one for the women just in front of the police station waiting in the construction area.

The clashes lasted day and night. The two months period which the people called the "police occupation" (*polis işgali*) can be viewed in the news account of Evrensel and *Hayat Tv*'s video records, which I obtained from Adem Kaya. Moreover, the people remember these days with horror. The accounts of people are full of stories in which Police helicopters lightening up the district at night and orders commanding the police corps to throw gas bombs at the people. I also watched videos of clashes that took place at night. People were severely beaten by the police. The people constantly attacked the trucks of the contractor in those days. In most of the time the trucks received heavy damage and making the truck owners and drivers refuse to enter Başbüyük (Başbüyük'te yıkım gerginliği, 03 2008). Many people have memories of some time that they spent in hospital due to the clashes.

The worst horrible thing was the gas bombs. I have a breathing problem and once I stayed at the hospital for a weak. They were so harsh...We weren't able to stop our youth. They threw stones at the police day and night and the police beat the boys very bitterly. In one of those accounts police beat my son and then sued him for throwing stone to him. His trial still continues. In fact he was not throwing on that moment but the police chose him<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> En kötüsü gaz bombalarıydı. Benim nefes darlığım var bu yüzden bir hafta hastanede kaldım. Çok serttiler...gençleri de durduramıyorduk, polise gece gündüz taş atıldılar ve polis çocukları hep dövdü.

Evrensel's news in that period is also full of horrifying details on the clashes:

While the construction machines were able to enter the district under police escort, the police attacked Başbüyük residents who opposed the construction. A woman lied under a police car and three people were affected by gas bombs and taken to a hospital (Başbüyük'te polis yine saldırdı 03 20 2008)

It is learned that a person called Şeref Sel had a heart attack and Habibe Zenik was taken to hospital due to a gas bomb that stuck her chest (Polis Başbüyük'te pervasızca saldırdı, 04 2008).

The citizens living with police invasion in Başbüyük were beaten in the mosque after having been beaten in the streets. After the cutting of the four trees in the construction area, the people reacted. The police responded with violence to the people who reacted to the cutting of the trees. seven women and three children were severely affected by the intervention of the police with gas bombs, plastic bullets and batons. Nine people were taken into custody. A young man called Naim had injury in his hand due to the plastic bullets threw by the police(ibid.)

Before these fierce clashes, the municipality denied the legitimacy of the organization in representing the people. The extent of the clashes forced both the police and the municipality to consider the organization's power in clearing the resistance in Başbüyük. Moreover, in these days the word of the organization was almost absolute in the neighbourhood. Adem Kaya even remembers the police chief to negotiating with him to drive two trucks on to the site.

However, the clashes also were exhausting exhausting and de-motivating for the people and the organization's leaders were under threat of being sued for their actions. Those days, The municipality arranged several meetings with the municipality. The primary demand was the enactment of a legal decision to fix the assessment values of the lands with Tapu Tahsis. The negotiations failed until May 2008 when the organization meets with Fikri Köse. Fikri Köse asked the organization to issue its demands based on a solution with MHA. He firmly stressed that a solution based on the legalization of their houses by development plans should not be

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Bunlardan birinde polis benim oğlumu dövdü sonra da taş attığı için mahkemeye verdi. Mahkeme hala sürüyor. Ashında o anda taş atmıyordu ama polis onu seçti.(focus group interview)

in the agenda. This was the time when several trucks were unloaded in Başibüyük both by force and with consent of the organization in several times. Moreover, there was a newly founded organization headed by the people from Kars who started to campaign for the acceptance of the protocol.<sup>33</sup> This was a major crack in the resistance in Başibüyük which started to intimidate the organization.

The organization listed its demands with three major terms, the first one is to allow more than one house for the Tapu Tahsis land. The second was considering the tenants in the protocol and the third one was fixing the value of the Tapu Tahsis land into the protocol. Giving more than one house for the Tapu Tahsis holders was not out of profit motives but more because of the existence of four to six storey buildings in a single Tapu Tahsis holders house. Therefore, giving one house for Tapu Tahsis does not exclude the households living in these buildings. As I discussed in the legal process section, the organization complained about the informality of the value of the houses. There were value assessment papers for the ones who had signed the agreement, yet whether the same assessment criteria would be applied to other households was not defined in any of the legal papers. That is why the organization asked for a fixing of the value assessment forms and this request was one of the main requests of the organization.

In return the municipality asked the organization to let the construction site work without any intervention. The municipality passed a bill as a modification to the protocol on the 5 May. However, the bill did not cover the organization's demands yet Fikri Köse still promised to accept the bill if they do not hinder the construction of the buildings. In the mean time, in September 2008 the court announced its decision: the protocol is to be cancelled due to first its inconveniency

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<sup>33</sup> All the other people close to Başibüyük Beatification *Dernek* claimed that this new *dernek* was founded with the support of the municipality yet as I could not speak with the people from this *dernek*, I do not have solid information.

for the social economic conditions of the Başbüyük people and second its disrespect to planning rules.<sup>34</sup> Of course, the three actors applied to the higher court with minor modification in the plan and the court reversed the previous judgment.

The organization halted the militancy of the neighbourhood by the 5'th may decisions of the municipality. After that, a smaller police force stayed in the neighbourhood until summer of 2009. Except a meeting in front of IMM in November 2008 for its aversion on the court decision, the neighbourhood drew into silence.

In spite of all the negotiations backed by the bitter clashes the organization lost the first round of the game. By the end of 2008, six high rise buildings stood in Başbüyük blocking the sea view for many gecekondu settlers and the municipality did not meet the demands of the organization. Moreover, 153 households in the sphere of Kars *Dernek* signed the agreement with MHA. The the Maltepe Municipality was successful in finishing the first round of the urban renewal yet with its 1700 buildings; this number still accounted a minor portion of Başbüyük. Therefore, for the new rounds the game between the municipality and the organization continued. Therefore, The organization had to announce its new tactic.

### The Third Period

Adem Kaya is a member of CHP since 1995 and during the events he together with the other leading members expressed the distance to the parties which they supported yet this time Kaya's connection with the CHP had a different meaning as the local elections approached. As expressed in the theoretical part, the political

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<sup>34</sup> According to planning hierarchy, 1000 plans of local municipality should match with 5000 plans of metropolitan municipality. The 1000 plans of the Maltepe Municipality were not in accordance with 5000 plans of IMM.

context had a determining factor for the movement. The movement's uprising was in response to a belief in the neighbourhood that the standing mayor (political context) was not conducive to negotiation. This firm belief first formed the organization second politicized the neighbourhood with the organizing of the organization. The counter propaganda of the municipality sought to persuade the people that the organization had "ideological" intentions and they wanted to overthrow AKP. This anti propaganda did not work as the organization registered many active members who voted for the AKP. This was the environment which the struggle has flourished. That is why the up coming march 2009 local elections were key for the cause of the organization. The political context concerning the Maltepe municipality and the muhtar could have changed in favor of Başbüyük since the clashes created a strong dislike for the AKP even for former supporters of the AKP. In this context, the organization had to make a choice of a party to call for voting in the elections. They announced the CHP as the party to support even though the people's historical aversion to it was strongly embedded. The main hypothesis of the organization was that the AKP led the Maltepe Municipality had not hold its promise of legalizing the gecekondu and instead introduced a gecekondu renewal project to their field. Thus, in spite of all the negative connotations of CHP in the neighbourhood, they campaigned for the CHP in the neighbourhood. In the campaign, the CHP candidate visited the district multiple times and promised that the urban renewal processes would stop if he was elected. In return for this promise, they needed to make sure that the neighbourhood voted CHP. This was not an easy task if we keep in mind the AKP got %75 of all votes in 2004 local elections and 58 % of all votes in general elections in 2007. At least, they needed to increase the votes of the neighbourhood for the CHP.

The elections were held on 29 of March 2009 and This was the first day of my involvement in Başbüyük. Contrary to what I had seen in the school that I voted in my silent neighbourhood, the one in Başbüyük was full of people eager to see the election results. There was one armoured police vehicle waiting in the garden and there were at least 20 police waiting in the door of the school beside the ones near the construction area. I could see that the organization's authority was not absolute since beside the muhtar candidate of the organization there were two groups campaigning against Ayhan Karpuz, the 15 years long muhtar of Başbüyük. However, it was also clear that majority of them voted CHP for both the Maltepe Municipality and IMM. They were also distressed to vote for a party which they perceived as *allahsız* (atheist).<sup>35</sup> A man even told me in a bitter voice that he is sorrowful to vote CHP. "I wish that my hands had been broken so that I did not vote CHP. We are members of *milli görüş*<sup>36</sup> but AKP is such a corrupt party that even forced us to vote CHP"<sup>37</sup>. The fear of losing their house or the rent forced them vote the party which the organization addressed.

The CHP won the elections in Maltepe by a margin of 30000 people against AKP. CHP Adem Kaya was elected as an MP in the Maltepe Municipality assembly and Yılmaz Atak the candidate of the organization was elected as headman and IMM remained in AKP. 40% of all the votes were again in the AKP's side and CHP got 25% . Although the AKP's votes decreased in the neighbourhood from 75% in 2004 to 40% in 2009, the AKP votes still surpassed the CHP in the district because of the

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<sup>35</sup> I found out that CHP which is disliked among Turkish socialist, is perceived in a conservative place like Başbüyük as the "left" party . However, it is also strongly disliked due to its historical roots and contemporary attachment in politics of secularism. That is why the conservative people in the neighbourhood feel to commit a sin by voting CHP .

<sup>36</sup> the political Islamic movement that started in the 1970s which AKP takes root.

<sup>37</sup> Ellerim kırılıydı da CHP'ye oy vermeyeydim. Ben milli görüşten geliyorum ama bunlar o kadar adiler ki bizi CHP'ye mecbur ettiler.

part which still respected AKP due to their exclusion in the project. This is the part which watched the struggle from afar during the clashes.

The people's cheerful remarks delineated the emergence of a new hope for reaching a solution through the change of government in the Maltepe Municipality and besides, their organization leader was elected as an MP in the Maltepe Municipality assembly. This meant that a political structure favourable to Başibüyük established in the municipality. I was in the meeting when the new Maltepe Municipality mayor Mustafa Zengin visited Başibüyük. There were more than 2000 people and the mayor announced that "Başibüyük belongs to people of Başibüyük".<sup>38</sup> Although the mayor did not use explicate remarks on the future of the neighbourhood, the people were quite hopeful at the prospect of a solution via the new municipality.

The trajectory of the movement dramatically changed after the elections. Adem Kaya was quite tenacious in our first meeting which was held one week after the elections on the sustainability of the movement in the new period. He claimed that the militancy of the people would not decrease. He even had a romantic dream of revival of the example of a local autonomous democratic governance model in Başibüyük like the one Fatsa in 1980: "we will emulate the Fatsa Model as it was before 12 September (the coup d'état in Turkey in 12 september 1980)".<sup>39</sup> Unfortunately the reverse occurred. Lütfü Sel the then vice president of the organization became the head of the organization and the regular meetings of pre-election period ceased. The organization even closed its office due to financial problems until February 2010. All the former leaders accepted that the movement fell down since 2009 march.

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<sup>38</sup> *Başibüyük Başibüyükçüleri*dir.

<sup>39</sup> *İki Eylül öncesi Fatsa örneği neyse biz bunu yapacağız*

The people were relieved by the change of political structure favourable to them. The attitude of the people that I interviewed was quite positive in my first term in the field right after the elections. All the hopes were on Adem Kaya who is an MP in the Maltepe Municipality assembly. I attended one key meeting which was held in organization's office. However, the fall of AKP and the reign of CHP which is favorable to them, brought the order of pre-2004, the date of urban renewal declaration, to the neighbourhood. That is to say, now the people no longer solely opposed the MHA but the hopes of legalizing the houses through development plans again rose to the surface. The municipality not only had to cancel the MHA protocol but also deliver the legalization titles to the neighbourhood. "The municipality leader Mustafa Zengin proposed to build collectively constructing houses and giving one house for all the households, but Başbüyük people dislike this solution, they want their entitlement deed"<sup>40</sup> said Lütfü Sel, the standing organization leader. So, indeed I was able to observe the issue Sel mentions in the meeting which was organized two weeks after the elections. I could see that after the common enemy were seen to be ousted from the field, the threat of different property relations to divide the unity of the neighbourhood came into existence. Below is the content of the meeting.

During the meeting all the people had one assumption: the new leadership in the municipality would favour them. In other words, it would legalize all the buildings by making modifications in the development plans of Maltepe region. The problem was how to reconcile the various property incentives in a place like Başbüyük. Lütfü Sel opened the discussion by the solution which he had in mind:

He invaded a territory of 400 m<sup>2</sup>. He sold 100m<sup>2</sup> and he sold the other 100m<sup>2</sup> to another person and built a house for himself in a 150 m<sup>2</sup> land. This is the structure here. There are other people who were just satisfied with the 400m<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> *Belediye başkanı Mustafa zengin burada kolektif bir şekilde herkes tapusunu koysun ortaya ev yapıp herkese dağıtalım dedi ama Başbüyük halkı kabul etmez böyle bir şeyi. Başbüyük Halkı tapusunu istiyor*



land which the state gave him and he never used even 100m<sup>2</sup> of this land for rent. They just used it for their necessities. There is no problem in solving property problems of the people who used the land for their necessities. However, the biggest problem is the existence of these small territories as the people bought 100m<sup>2</sup> by 100m<sup>2</sup> and built three storey buildings<sup>41</sup>. Some people will pay a price in this process. These fragmented lands will be subject to amalgamation.

This created a great murmur in the place since by the amalgamation Lütfü Sel offered a less favourable solution to the people who have four to ten storey houses.

The prospect for a solution between a person with one storey gecekondu and a person with five storey gecekondu on the same land seemed very complicated

A: Now, in this solution, you are in a profitable situation but it harms me. While that harms me, it also harms the household staying behind mine. A person normally has 200m<sup>2</sup> of land. You may not have money and you just built one storey gecekondu. Another person may have money and build 6 storeys. What will he do ? you say that this six storey building should be disregarded.

Lütfü Sel: my friend, you misunderstand me.

A: We should consider the storeys. Do you have seven storeys? Then legalization should be for 6 storeys. Do you have one storey? Then it should be for one.

Lütfü Sel: Wait a minute. There is a misunderstanding here. Isn't it that we try to solve the problem of property via development plans. Development plans would be done for the six storey you have... you will have the certificate of ownership for this six storey in 200 m<sup>2</sup>. What else can be done? Did we mean that it has to be demolished.

B: we can't agree. I have 200m<sup>2</sup> land. I have six storey building and my neighbour next to my building has one storey gecekondu on his 200 m<sup>2</sup> land. How can I agree with my neighbour?

Lütfü Sel: Do you have 200m<sup>2</sup> land ? You will buy the ownership certificate with your neighbour and you will see you ownership status then later on you make an agreement<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> Lütfü Sel: 400 mt Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsis belgesi ile işgal etmiş, 100 mt2sini satmış, başka bir 100 mt2yi de başka bir vatandaşa satmış 150 mtsine kendi konuşlanmış... böyle bir yapı var ortada. Bir de, devletin hak olarak vermiş olduğu 400 m2 lik Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsis belgesi ile yetinmiş, bunun 1 m2 sini bile rant olarak düşünmemiş, kimseye satmamış, yalnızca kendi ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda kullanmış. Bu ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda kullanan insanların mülkiyet sorununun çözülmesinde bana göre bir sıkıntı yok. Ama en büyük sıkıntıyı hani o 100 m2 100 m2 almış da three kat kondurmuş ya, bu insanlar noktasında bir sıkıntı var. Birileri de bir bedel ödeyecekler bu süreç içerisinde. Bunları tevhid yapacak, birleştirecek kaç kişi var? İşte 400 m2 üzerinde three kişi hak sahibi ise o 400 m2 işgal ettikleri yer ölçüsünde tevhid yaparak, onlara bir müşterek tapu çıkartacak, onların mülkiyet sorunlarını o şekilde çözecek. Yani buradaki genel eğilim imar ve tapu noktasında. Islah imar plan çalışması ile beraber o noktada. Başka talep yok, %95 diyebilirim yani.

<sup>42</sup> A: Şimdi senin dediğin takdirde, sen karlı çıkıyorsun ama ben zararlı çıkıyorum. Ben zararlı çıkarken benim arkamdaki insanlar da zararlı çıkıyor. Normalde vatandaşın var 200 m2 arazisi. Sende para yoktur, tek kat yapmışsındır. Adamda para vardır, gitti 6 katını dikti. Ne yapacak? Sen gideceksin o 6 katı tarafsız bir şekilde, yansın gitsin diyeceksin.  
Lütfü Sel: Arkadaşım yanlış anlıyorsun...

This even rose the discontented sounds in the meeting room. They were discontented by the idea of sharing an ownership certificate for their valuable three to four storey buildings with the households of one storey gecekondus. This discussion revolved around five to ten people and the others just murmured. While I am not interested in the legal details of the discussion the discussion clearly shows the property incentives again flourished by the removal of the AKP municipality.

More than one year passed yet no solution was reached to solve the housing problem of Başbüyük. I met with Adem Kaya in this period multiple times and it seems that the legal problems and the negative attitudes of some groups within the the CHP led the Maltepe Municipality is behind the on going problem in Başbüyük yet I do not expand on this topic since it is a subject of the relationship between the MHA and the local municipalities in cases of different political structures. What concerns us here is that the cause of the movement was at the local level with a combination of property and right to sheltering demand and the organization which was composed of the grand alliance between these opposite poles, lost its activity in the changing political structure in Maltepe Municipality. In the analysis part, I will discuss the reasons behind it and its effect on people's subjectivities for the idea of collective action. Besides, I will comment on the emergence of a local politics both in Başbüyük by the reign of CHP.

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*Mah B: Kat hesabı yapalım, 7 katın mı var 7 kata göre, tek katın mı var tek kata göre...*

*Lütfü Sel: Bir dakika burada bir yanlış anlaşılma oldu herhalde. Burada bizim derdimiz ıslah planı ile mülkiyet sorununu çözmek değil mi? İslah imar plan çalışması yapılıyor, senin 6 katın üzerinde... 6 katlı apartmanın mı var 200 m üzerinde, 200 m<sup>2</sup>'nin tapusunu alacaksın. Başka nasıl olacak? Yani biz yıkılsın mı dedik o?*

*Mah B: Anlaşamadık. Bende şimdi 200 m<sup>2</sup> yer var. Bende şimdi 6 kat var. Yanda da komşum, 200 m<sup>2</sup> arsası, üzerinde de tek katlı gecekondusu var. Komşumla nasıl anlaşacağım?*

*Mah C: Senin 200 m arsan mı var, alacaksın onun tapusunu komşunla, koyacaksın önce tapuyu sonra zaman içerisinde anlaşsınız.*

## Analysis and Concluding Remarks

As expressed in the previous chapter, the urban renewal projects was not an exception in Başbüyük but all the gecekondu neighbourhoods in Istanbul were in danger of urban renewal which dispossesses them of their houses and as Nicholls argues one can expect that the multifaceted character of the urban system may force the local strong tie groups to realize that they needed to form alliances to oppose MHA led urban transformations in Istanbul. However, in spite of all the efforts on the contrary, Başbüyük leadership refused the necessity to form alliances between different neighbourhoods. Adem Kaya visited demonstrations of different neighbourhoods and established relations with them. He also attended various conferences and presented the movement in Başbüyük. Nevertheless, the motivation was to gain support from the NGOs and universities on finding a solution for the housing problem of Başbüyük. As an individual, he was keen to attend mass demonstrations on the agenda of the left yet he together with the other leaders did not connect the militancy of the neighbourhood in service of other urban movements. The leadership intentionally kept away from “politicizing” the movement with a broader cause speaking to the urban transformation of the city. Firstly, they believed that translation of the militancy of the neighbourhood to broader political terms could harm their cause by the anti propaganda of the the Maltepe Municipality in AKP's time. Secondly, they assumed that people are ignorant for such a cause. Here is an example from an annual meeting of IMECE which intends to act as a broker to create interactions between different neighbourhoods.

In December 2009 IMECE, *Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi* held its third annual forum which various groups discussed the current position of the city movement in

Istanbul. The forum invited the neighbourhood organizations in Istanbul which struggle against the urban transformations in their localities. Various political parties and organization such as Halk Evi(HE) and *Ezilenlerin Sosyalist partisi* ESP (socialist platform of the oppressed, ESP) was also invited. Başbüyük's organization which was represented, by Adem Kaya and another man was among them. In the discussion part, Representatives from IMECE, ESP and HE outlined the status of urban transformations in Istanbul. They delineated how the on going discussions on the 3'rd bridge in Istanbul, the new protocol of the Minister cabinet, the mega projects of Haydarpaşa and Galata Port and the gecekondu transformation projects were all interconnected with each other and the struggle must be in a way to address all these issues and protect all these fronts instead of our localities. They emphasized the urgency to form a unified struggle between diverse local movements. After these discussions, Adem Kaya stood and made a conversation in a nervous tone.

What do you think about us? Who do you think we are? We are just ignorant people. We have problems in our right to sheltering. Why do we care about other things? We are not as conscious people as you imagine. We first have to solve our problem. We want help for this cause. After solving our problem then we may think of others.<sup>43</sup>

I observed many times in common meetings with Adem Kaya the inherent desperation in Başbüyük for any organization to transcend the local politics. According to him, the people living in gecekondu act out of the motivation of their interest. They are ignorant people due to their political Islamic roots. He repeated many times that he would also like to create a neighbourhood in which he could demand better roads, transportation system for Başbüyük or which the neighbourhood actively attends meetings concerning the movement against the

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<sup>43</sup> *Bizi ne sanyyorsunuz? Biz nasıl insanlarız sizce? Biz cahil insanlarız. Daha bizim barınma hakkımızla ilgili sorunlarımız çözülmemiş. Neden başka meselelerle ilgilenelim. Sizin hayal ettiğiniz gibi bilinçli insanlar değiliz. Kendi sorunumuzu çözmez için yardımınıza ihtiyacımız var. Sonrasında diğer alanlara da yetişebiliriz*

transformation of the city. In fact he attended as the representative of Başibüyük to many meetings which the neighbourhood representatives from Istanbul gathered to discuss the current status of urban transformations in Istanbul like the one held annually by IMECE. However, he regularly repeats impossibility of creating a community in Başibüyük which are willing to act consciously to transform the social position of working class within society.

There are few but important occasions during the heyday of the movement between February 28 2008 and May five 2008. These occasions prove the reverse. They show that a group of women who previously had been the voters of AKP supported the left agenda of those days in Istanbul. The first occasion was the attendance of 80 women from Başibüyük at the mass protest meeting of the new social security law. The law brought retrenchments to the health care system and was perceived by the left as standing in the way to privatization of health care system. The issue was seriously related to the livelihood of the Başibüyük people since most of them depended on health care system with their green cards<sup>44</sup> or the work based social security system related to their pension benefits. A woman from Başibüyük who was a member of a socialist party persuaded the 80 women to attend the meeting. She remembers the excitement of the women in the meeting area, namely, Kadıköy-Istanbul, when the entire people welcomed them with the slogan “Başibüyük people are not alone”.

The second occasion was visiting Hayat TV channel when it was shut down by RTÜK.<sup>45</sup> Hayat Tv channel together with Evrensel newspaper were in the field in all the stressful days of clashes in the spring of 2008. The two media organization is known to be affiliated with a socialist party, namely EMEP. Their presence received

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<sup>44</sup> Green card is given to poor people who can't be covered by the work based health care system in Turkey.

<sup>45</sup> RTÜK stands for Radio and Tv Supreme Council.

suspicion in the first period since they were the “communists” representing all kinds of wickedness on the eyes of the people yet as time passed they experienced how conservative newspapers which they read such as *Zaman* and *Vakit* supported the Maltepe Municipality and showed them as terrorist, they started to develop a sympathy towards a newspaper and TV channel which broadcasted their struggle from their side. Therefore, when the channel were shut down by *RÜTÜK*, 80 women from Başbüyük visited the channel to express their solidarity with the channel.

Unfortunately, they were highly disillusioned by the fall of the movement after the election of the CHP mayor. Especially the six women that I interviewed in February 2010 that is almost one year after the elections were furious with the pacifism of the organization against the incapability of the Maltepe Municipality in solving the problem. They even blamed Adem Kaya for disregarding them after obtaining a seat on the municipality assembly. A woman whose husband worked as an office boy in a furniture shop was offended by the apathy of both the organization and Adem Kaya. That woman who is a close Muslim was among the leaders in the woman’s commission.

When the organization conceded the the Maltepe Municipality’s decision (in five may 2008), we cried a lot. When I turn back to those days, I realize that I have only strived for my house not for the houses of others. Then I told myself why I should exhaust myself for others. Why I should go everywhere as those times.<sup>46</sup>

All the six woman reside in one storey gecekondus without Tapu Tahsis. they were the mostly visible parts of the movement and the most militant ones who attended on a couple of occasions the demonstrations of other movements with placards exposing their class based grievance rooted in Başbüyük within the content of the

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<sup>46</sup> Burada biz ne eylemler yaptık hepsi yalanıymış. five mayıs kararı alındığında çok ağladık hüngür hüngür( yanında annesi vardı o da aynısını dedi). Bak ben o zamana dönüp baktığımda görüyorum ki ben sadece kendi evim için çalışmışım başkası için değil. Ben o zaman neden kendimi yorayım ne gereği var o zamanki gibi her yer gidip geleyim.

demonstrations. These women, mostly conservative and quite poor, lost their hope in attending an organized action for their social rights. The organizing committee did not lead them for such a purpose.

However, this was mostly the best the organization was able to achieve in a neighbourhood like Başbüyük which was fragmented by different property relations and denigrated by the discussions around varoş which usually precluded collective action as in Tarlabası (Yılmaz, 2008). It also surpass the hegemony of the home town organizations within Başbüyük and it was able to create an identity that takes its spatiality from Başbüyük instead of the towns which the people emigrated. The municipality helped the organization to popularize with its failure to provide a convenient solution, especially for the Tapu Tahsis holders and the dernek achieved to form a strong movement against the common “enemy”. However the presence of Tapu Tahsis holders who due to the social context of gecekondü inherited in 1990s, seek individual rent based benefits for themselves, kept the organization constantly busy with holding the integrity of the neighbourhood. That is to say, the community was constantly in formation due to the presence of different property relations. They constantly needed to reassure the people that MHA is against their benefit and as, the common demands of the movement were not only on collective consumption of housing for use value, the transcendence of local demands to broader terms could not be possible by such a neighbourhood structure. In other words, the social context of gecekondü that transformed in the 1990sprecluded the formation of collective identities that exists at the 4'th level class definition of Katznelson's methodology that is, the level which working class desire to act collectively for its right by combining the injustices they experienced both in working environment and living environment.

In the next chapter, the case of Dikmen Vadi will be discussed. It stands as the complimentary example of both the organizing strategy of the movement in Başbüyük and in terms of the property structure of the neighbourhood. The effect of the property structure on the trajectory of the movement will be better analysed by the case of Dikmen Vadi.



## CHAPTER 4 THE CASE OF DIKMEN VADI

This is the story of a neighbourhood which is small in number of residents but which has influenced deeply many observers working on urban transformation projects and also the left activists especially in Ankara. What compromises the Dikmen Vadi movement is just people living in 650 houses for the time being. At their maximum they are 650 people attending demonstrations, but normally they are just 350 people at most of the meetings. However, with that small amount of people, they have inspired and continue to inspire many neighbourhoods trying to organize against gecekondu transformation. Furthermore, they are a center of place for the left to oppose the highly embedded governance of Melih Gökçek, who has been the mayor of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality since 1994. The movement is also a source of romanticism for the left in Ankara in general and for the members of HE since it reminds the “good” old days in the 1970s when the left was strong in gecekondu neighbourhoods.

What has been achieved in Dikmen Vadi gives hopes for repeating the process in other living places, however concerning the movements against the gecekondu transformation projects in Turkey, what has been achieved in the valley has not been able to be emulated even in places which the HE has support. In this respect, the movement is unique for its militancy and incidence on the subjective class identities of the people. Therefore, there are certain features of the neighbourhood which are peculiar and which have acted as the contextual factor for the success of the movement and there are other features to be considered in the organizing strategy of movement for the success of the movement. As discussed in the introduction chapter,

what is meant by “success” is first effectively opposing the gecekondur renewal project and second the formation of a community of people who are eager to act collectively for the social rights of the working class due to the injustices which they have observed both at work and in the living place. In this field account both of the factors affecting the success of the movement will be discussed.

There are two contextual factors. One is the social context of gecekondur within Dikmen Vadi. Dikmen Vadi is one of the gecekondur neighbourhood which is composed of completely one storey gecekondus and therefore the expectations of individual profit seeking motives within the neighbourhood are limited. Second is the structure of state action, the urban transformation which has affected the composition of the neighbourhood different from Başbüyük. The AMM became successful in persuading the Tapu Tahsis holders of the neighbourhood to sign the renewal protocol and leave the place. Thus, the property structure of the neighbourhood became homogenous with people without any legal title to land and therefore unlike Başbüyük with people who are only afraid of losing their houses and seek their right to shelter from the AMM.

In terms of the organizing body, the neighbourhood also differs from Başbüyük. The leadership which due to the history of the neighbourhood includes people with left organizational background has strenuously strived to translate the strong ties formed in the neighbourhood to the service of the formation of weak ties with other left progressive movements both urban centered and not. They have formed strong ties with mutual trust and solidarity feelings between the members keeping in mind the belittling of the left in the parts of the neighbourhood without Tapu Tahsis. In this regard, I will also analyze the organizing body in Dikmen Vadi.

The chapter starts with a historical account of the neighbourhood before moving to the resistance. The resistance will be analysed in three major sections which are divided into three phases according to Nichols discussion on weak and strong ties and Harvey's remarks on the translation of militancy of the local to broader struggles.

### History of the Neighbourhood

Dikmen Vadi is located in the southern Ankara development zone between Dikmen and Çankaya (Türker-Devecigil, 2009:198). The valley starts from the city center, Kızılay and extends to the southern city (Figure 1). It is an important air corridor for the city Ankara and therefore in all the development plans of Ankara starting from 1953 it is designated as open area immune from construction (ibid.).




Figure1: The position of Dikmen Valley in Ankara (ibid.)

Contrary to the plans, the gecekonization process started in the 1960s and in 20 years 1916 gecekondu were built housing 10000 people (ibid.). The gecekondu construction in the 1970s occurred in clash with the state under the leadership of Dev-Yol which was one of the fractions within the left in the 1970s. It was similar to the emergence of gecekondu neighbourhoods in Istanbul in late the 1970s which Aslan depicted as the intervention of the left to provide the housing for the working class in direct clash with the state (Aslan, 2004). Tarık Çalışkan who is the leader of the movement in Dikmen that started in 2006 was also among the people that organized the construction process. He states that in those years until the coup d'état in September 1980, they provided the materials and the man power for the construction of gecekondu and delivered it to workers without houses. The presence of the left in late the 1970s was, therefore, strong in all the Dikmen Vadi yet Çalışkan remarks that in line with the social economic change after the military coup de'eta in 1980, their presence in the valley weakened. In the years after 1985 a new wave of gecekondu settlers arrived, 800 of whom is included in the part of Dikmen Vadi which is included within my field research. They are called *belgesiz* (without legal paper) like most of the squatters of post 85 period. They were mostly in influence of the political Islam and Islamic communities until the movement of right to housing that started in 2006. So the political map of the neighbourhood in the 1990s was fragmented between the people with Tapu Tahsis under the influence of ÖDP(liberty and solidarity Party)<sup>47</sup> and the people who came to the district in post 1985 period under the influence of Islamic communities and political Islam.

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<sup>47</sup> The socialist party which was founded in 96 by a Grand coalition of the left. As Dev-yol members were among the coalition, the representation of ÖDP in the neighbourhood was high.

For the new comers of the post 85 period, the living possibilities were harsh. Necmi Erdoğan's book *Yoksulluk Halleri* provides an account of the poverty in Dikmen Vadi. The book is based on 250 in depth interviews in five cities of Turkey in 2000 and Ankara is one of them. There are one published interview with teenagers working as street worker and who live in Dikmen Vadi at the time. The interview shows the chronic poverty with which the people can not cope (Erdoğan, 2001: 817). Thus the children of Dikmen Vadi become the victims of hazardous working conditions as street vendors (ibid.).

In my interviews, my focus was not on the livelihoods of the people, yet even if I did not intend to mention about it most of them told stories about the harsh conditions of "surviving" in Ankara. Especially, the families whose members were below 35 had more difficulty in finding employment. Five people out of the 30 people that I interviewed had long time unemployment and managed to live with the help of relatives and short term jobs. Due to Ankara's low employment demand in industries, the men work in the service sector in jobs such as waiters in restaurants or cleaners in offices. Beside this, the men visit the construction worker market nearby Dikmen Vadi to find short term construction work. What is important in this discussion is that the post 85 arrivals to Dikmen Vadi are the people at the bottom of the neighbourhood in terms of living conditions and they were the one who formed the movement against the transformation as will discuss in the coming sections.

When I write Dikmen Vadi, I actually mean the part of Dikmen Vadi which the fourth and fifth stage of urban transformation project of the Dikmen Vadi is planned to be done. Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, Dikmen Vadi is a huge valley that stretches from the city center in Kızılay to the south of Ankara and plans to renew

the valley started in one984. Below I will give a brief summary of the transformation history of the valley.

### The History of the Renewal of Dikmen Vadi

The first attempt to renew the valley was due to its importance as a green stream zone for Ankara (Türker-Devecigil, 2009). The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (AMM) tried to implement the project in 1984 which will move all the households to the outer parts of Ankara and leave the valley as green stream zone. The project could not be implemented due to high expropriation costs and strong resistance by the residents(ibid.). Therefore, the municipality cancelled the project.

The election of Murat Karayağın as mayor of AMM in 1989 opened a new phase for Dikmen Vadi. The municipality declared Dikmen Vadi Transformation Project (DVTP) in 1989 on 290 hectare land along five km long north east corridor of the valley (Uzun, 2005). The project was composed of five stages, two of which were completed in Karayağın's period. This project was different in nature than the one in 1984. First, it aimed to replace the residents living in gecekondus to newly built five storey apartments that is located in the valley. Second, representatives from the municipality organized meetings with the residents and considered their requests that is to say the participation of the gecekondus settlers were taken into consideration to a certain degree (ibid.). The gecekondus settlers paid an amount of money according to their size of land and gecekondus. Most of them were pleased with their payment schedule. Beside the apartments for gecekondus settlers, the municipality also built luxurious houses to finance the project. This is the brief pattern of transformation for the first two stages of development for Dikmen Valley.

In the 1994 municipality elections, Melih Gökçek replaced Karayağın as the mayor and continued the implementation of the project. In his term, Rent seeking terms were added to the project and favoured the contractors by enabling the construction of more luxurious buildings (Uzun, 2005). The terms of the project especially for the people without legal right to the land were quite harsh and this time the reaction from the people were not smooth (ibid.).

In the fourth and fifth stage of the project the municipality was met with a strong resistance from the people. The opposition was organized by the Bureau for Right to Housing (BRH) which was founded by the Dikmen Vadi people in 2006. As in Başbüyük, at the beginning of the movement there were two groups of households residing in Dikmen Vadi: the people with Tapu Tahsis composing of 1084 houses the people without Tapu Tahsis (*belgesiz*) 1200 houses<sup>48</sup>. The municipality could use this difference much better than Maltepe Municipality by giving better terms for the holders of Tapu Tahsis. Thus, through the end of 2006 the valley was left with only people without Tapu Tahsis who holds gecekondu with one storey used for sheltering. As the movement was popularized by the participation of *belgesiz* and exclusion of people with Tapu Tahsis, the legal process of the transformation was not as important as the Başbüyük in determining the trajectory of the movement. I will briefly mention about the varying terms of the protocol of the municipality to lay down the more successful manipulation of AMM the property relations in Başbüyük.

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<sup>48</sup> Obtained from one of the leaders who read a statement of the municipality to me on the numbers.

### Legal Process of the 4th and 5th Stage of the Transformation

Contrary to Başibüyük's protocol there was only one authority in the protocol of the fourth and fourth stage of the Dikmen Vadi Transformation Project, that is the municipality. The MHA and local municipality Çankaya is not included in the project. This simplified the power sharing in the implementation of the project and more lucrative terms for the holders of Tapu Tahsis, land Tapu (the building on the legal land is not authorized) and *imarlı* Tapu (legal property right of both the land and the building). There are a small number of people with higher legal property. One of them was made up of those who owned the land but has illegal housing units built on it and the other group is the people who legally own land and the housing unit. They signed the protocol with the municipality since the protocol promises them houses in size between 120m<sup>2</sup> and 225 m<sup>2</sup> according to the size of their land and therefore most of them relinquish their place to the municipality and leave the place.

The terms for the holders of Tapu Tahsis were also better than the ones in Başibüyük. The ambiguity embedded in the protocol of Başibüyük was not present here. The protocol promised for the holders of Tapu Tahsis with 400 m<sup>2</sup> a house of 100m<sup>2</sup>. If the land of the household is smaller than 400 m<sup>2</sup> then the difference will be paid according to the cost of the 100m<sup>2</sup> houses to be built in Dikmen Vadi with partial payments that extend to 48 months. In return the people would relinquish their houses to the municipality and rent a house until the project finished. The protocol also promised to make rent allowance of 250 TL until the delivery of the houses. Although for many people that meant paying both the partial payments and the difference of the rent cost since a house that is suitable for a family of four to five



people for less than 400 TL was hard to find, almost all of them signed the protocol through the end of 2006.

The remaining part of Dikmen Vadi was composed of people with no legal right to the land that is the *belgesiz*. The terms of the project for these people were also clear nevertheless quite harsh compared to the holders of Tapu Tahsis. The protocol asked these people to pay the value of the one parcel land without a house on it from Doğu Kent a remote district of Ankara. They were supposed to build their own houses these lands. In sum, they paid both the cost of the land which was quite far from the city center and the house to be built on it. Thus they resented to these terms. They were the material roots of the resistance in Dikmen Vadi. Due to terms of the protocol, the people who had no legal right to the land but only one storey gecekondus stayed in Dikmen Vadi and uprooted to this project which removed their right to housing and below is the course of their resistance which started in February 2006 due to grievance against the gecekondu transformation project and transcended this local centered caused by the weak ties it formed with the left Ankara.

### The Resistance

As I stated in the theoretical framework the Dikmen Vadi's movement falls into fourth type of Pickvance's typology of urban movements, namely defence movements against the physical threat of the urban transformation projects to the municipality like the one in Başbüyük. The movement created a community of people with eagerness to participate protest in meetings that is in the socialist agenda of the Ankara left. In all these meetings they showed up with flags representing their community.

Strong and weak tie group formation will be analysed together with the structure of the leadership to translate the militant particularism of the local with the

broader problems of the working class. Therefore I divide the movement into three phases: first- the formation of strong tie groups within the community against the imminent threat of demolitions second the formation of weak groups with other movements concerning the use of public land and provision of municipal services in a cheaper way and more country wide protests concerning the livelihood of the working class in Turkey such as the new social security law, presence in one may protest and HE's massive annual meeting. Last I examine attempts to proliferate the model of organizing in Dikmen Vadi to other neighbourhoods willing to struggle against the urban transformation in their neighbourhoods.

#### Formation of Strong Tie Groups: The Rise of Dikmen Vadi Movement

The municipal decision of urban transformation in Dikmen Vadi occurred in February 2006. Unlike Maltepe Municipality, Melih Gökçek led Ankara Metropolitan Municipality was quite successful in terms of relations with the public. They set up an association in Dikmen Vadi to persuade people to sign the protocol. A woman in her fifties:

The municipality opened a bureau through a company. They collected our papers via the headman-that is all the papers such as Tapu Tahsis and a paper proving your presence in Dikmen. Most of the people called us not to hand these papers but some said that if we did not give these papers then our right in Dikmen Vadi would be lost. Due to this threat, they gave their papers to the headman. To my surprise, we learnt that this was a trick. They collected all the papers via muhtar to understand the (property) structure in the field.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Yıldız son durakta bir şeyle o sitenin içine kurum açtılar belediye bir şirket aracılığıyla büro açmış yani işte burada anlaşma yapacaksın derken muhtarlıktan evrak toplattılar elinizde ne varsa kaydın tapu orda oturduğuna dair elinde ne varsa. Çoğu insan bunu vermeyin dediler kimisi verin dediler hakkınız gider dediler bu şeyle insanlar topladı muhtarlığa verdi meğerse anlaşmalıymış senin ne olduğunu anlamak için bu tür belgeleri bizlerden muhtarlık aracılığıyla toplamışlar buradaki yapıyı öğrenelim tapusu. Recorded interview with a woman.

In some of the instances, there were agitations between the people and the representatives of the association<sup>50</sup>.

The response within the neighbourhood against this propaganda started to emerge in those days. Tarık Çalışkan who was just the leader of İlker HE (the HE branch responsible from Dikmen Vadi) first tried to mobilize the movement as an initiative of İlker HE but realized that this would not be a fruitful tactic since the HE could only popularize among the people with sympathy towards the left. They also tried to meet in a *cem evi*<sup>51</sup> in Dikmen Vadi. This also failed. Then not only with HE members but also together with the politically active six people in the neighbourhood started to meet on what to do in the neighbourhood. four of these people were members of HE and the others were ÖDP<sup>52</sup> members. The first meeting of the people occurred on 14 May 2006 and in this meeting 50 representatives were elected (İlker Halkı Evleri için bir arada, 14 May 2006) most of which were ÖDP members<sup>53</sup>.

The ÖDP was more organized than HE in Dikmen Vadi due to its roots with the pre-80 gecekondization period in the place and these people were mostly holders of Tapu Tahsis. Therefore, the more Tapu Tahsis holders left the place the less the affect of ÖDP members existed in the field.<sup>54</sup> This also meant that the affect of HE also intensified in the field. This was a process which the influence of the ÖDP members in Dikmen Vadi was eradicated through the end of 2006 when most of the Tapu Tahsis holders left the place. In the mean time, *Barınma Hakkı Bürosu* (bureau for right to sheltering (BRS) ) was built in an open space just in the center of Dikmen

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<sup>50</sup> In an unrecorded interview, a man told me the story of a fight that ended up in police station.

<sup>51</sup> *Cem Evi* (Cem house) is the religious house of Alevi sect of Islam in Turkey. The sect is known as a center of protest culture within the social life of Turkey.

<sup>52</sup> A socialist party in Turkey.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with Tarık Çalışkan

<sup>54</sup> I have heard a lot about the tension between ÖDP and HE in the field yet these remained one sided due to my ignorance of this tension therefore I do not convey them more deeply.

Vadi in July 2006 (İlker’de yıkımlara karşı “Barınma Hakkı Bürosu” açıldı, 15 July 2006).

### Bureau for the Right to Sheltering (BRS)

This building was like many gecekondu in the place, an illegal building constructed for the movement. Besides, the leading group chose not to bind the place to association law. Tarık Çalışkan was the person behind this decision. He strictly opposed the time consuming legal processes of legal associations (organization). He also chose to close the HE branch in İlker due to its inefficiency to popularize in the neighbourhood in 10 years that it functioned and instead a place which is autonomous from HE, should be opened. The assumption was that the remaining people who are in the influence of political Islam would abstain from a political organization with left political background:

Who comes to Halk Evleri? Democratic socialist progressive people come to HE. But who lives in Dikmen Vadi? All the paupers with different political background live. They are poor people. Their conservative sentiments do not change this fact. Then why should we insist on HE in such a social structure which dislikes the left.<sup>55</sup>

Therefore this was a tactic to overcome the negative image of the left in the field. Nevertheless, HE presence was firmly established with the HE members who started to live in Dikmen Vadi and spent all their time and energy in the field. The lawyer of the movement, Ender Büyükçulha is also the standing vice president of HE right now.

Nicholls remarks that to build strong ties which were indispensable to create a community of people who risked their time and energy for the cause of the

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<sup>55</sup> Unrecorded interview with Tarık Çalışkan.

movement, the people should trust in the members of the movement. I asked people how they had felt about the presence of a socialist group in BRS at the very beginning of their movement and their answers were in parallel with Çalışkan. One of them said as “it was like embracing a snake when you fall in the sea”<sup>56</sup>. Most of them pointed to the presence of Tarık Çalışkan who lived in Dikmen Vadi as a member of Halk Evleri in their trust towards Halk Evleri. They also appreciated Ender Büyükçulha and other HE members for their devoted work for their cause. In effect, these were the times in which all the people felt the desperate and lonely in front of the image of their neighbours demolishing their houses due to the favourable terms which the AMM had given. An account of a woman vividly shows the fragile mood of the people in these days:

When we first heard about the project, the people with Tapu Tahsis became quite delightful. They believed that Melih Gökçek would elevate them to a pavilion. There was a desperateness and ambiguity for us. What would we do? Would we stay when they left? There was loneliness. Everyone went through psychological illness. I used to open the door and see that all of the houses were demolished. Three to five houses were destroyed every day. It has been 23-24 years; I told myself, that we heard the sounds of the construction of the houses. I used to tell myself that we saw the stereobate of the buildings at day light and the roof were built at night. I see that the house of my neighbors are demolished after 23 24 years. It started at spring and finished at autumn. They were all destroyed and the people left.<sup>57</sup>

It was this environment that the same woman had described the reception of

Halk Evleri with the metaphor of “embracing the snake when you fall into the sea”:

“It was a very hard period. We did not have our bureau in those months. We met

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<sup>56</sup> Denize düşen yılana sarılır hesabı. Focus group one.

<sup>57</sup> *ilk duyduğumuzda Tapu Tahsis Tapu Tahsisi olanlar bir sevindirir oldu diyelim halk dilinde. Melih gökçek bizi alacak köşke oturtacak devlet kuşu gibi. bir belirsizlik çaresizlik ne yapacağız? kalacak mıyız bunlar gidince? yıkacaklar mı? dedim ki bir çaresizlik bir yalnızlık herkes bir psikolojik bunalıma girdi kapıyı açıyorum karşımdaki bütün evler yıkıldı günde three five ev yıkılıyor 23 24 yıl oluyor diyorum kendi kendime ev sesi duyardık akşam temel atılmış olurdu evin çatısı kapanmış derdim bir komşu daha olmuş. 23 24 yıl sonra bakıyorum komşumun evi yıkılmış. Baharı başladı sonbahara kadar devam edildi yıkılan hep yıkıldı giden gitti.*

with the bureau later and we teamed up. We embarked upon this road by saying that we were not alone and we would succeed”.<sup>58</sup>

In sum, the formation of solidarity and trust among the remaining members of Dikmen Vadi was first due to the feelings of desperateness in the face of a powerful municipality with a project to demolish their house. The grievance was well directed by the BRS which was established by the Dikmen Vadi people with the support of Halk Evleri. Therefore, the choice of the BRS to be autonomous from political groups and the Halk Evleri’s sudden yet powerful support of a group of people who felt they had been ousted by the state and their religious communities was vital for the formation of strong ties among the people. This cause of protecting their right to sheltering was the primary reason behind their gathering. Nonetheless, as one of the Dikmen residents told in August 2009 that is 3.5 years after the commencement of the movement, their movement has transcended this cause: “our endeavor has ceased to be a struggle for our houses. We will continue to resist in other areas. We do not think about the houses. Our purpose was our houses yet as we observed other things our ideas changed”.<sup>59</sup> This change was of course due to the successful political organizing the BRS had done in the neighbourhood. The tactics of organizing in this living place should be mentioned but before that we need to note a dramatic event during which the community tested its strong ties. That was, as they call it, the “1 February attack”.

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<sup>58</sup> *Çok zor bi süreç geçirdik. O zaman daha büromuz yoktu. sonradan tanıştık o büroyla tanışınca yalnızlık duygusundan sarıldık birbirimize. Biz yalnız değiliz bir şeyleri başarabiliriz diyerek yola çıktık.*

<sup>59</sup> *Biz bunu şöyle bizimki ev alma işinden çıktı biz müca. Her türlü devam edeceza. Ev felan bizim aklımızda yok. Maksudımız evdi ama bazı konuları gördükçe düşüncelerimiz değişti*

## 1 February Attack

From the foundation of the BRS in July 2006 to November 2006, the BRS organized two meetings in Kızılay one of which contained 3000 people, the highest number of people in a meeting for Dikmen Vadi people (*Gecekonducular Gökçek'e Dur Demek İçin AKP'ye Yürüdü*, 2006 August). We should remember the structure of the neighbourhood in this date: AMM could persuade almost all the Tapu Tahsis holders to sign the protocol by November 2006 yet it could not prevent the establishment of BRS which flourished a community from the poorest strata of Dikmen Vadi who was previously the voters of Melih Gökçek run AMM. In other words, by the terms of the protocol it could annihilate the resistance of people with a experience of resistance yet the same protocol created an agitation among the post 85 residents without Tapu Tahsis and this agitation was absorbed by the proper organizing established by Dikmen Vadi residents in tandem with HE. Therefore Melih Gökçek started to clash with this organization which impede the commencement of the transformation project. The 1 February 2007 attack should be read against the background in which the BRS was active in the neighbourhood.

In November 2006, the municipality issued a decision to demolish the seven houses in Dikmen Vadi. Not coincidentally of course, all these houses belonged to the leading people of the BRS. The BRS quickly spread the news that the decision aims to eradicate the leaders from the field so that the people would be forced to agree on the municipality's terms, which aimed to throw them onto a bare land, namely, Doğukent, a remote place of Ankara.

The BRS organized public statements to protest the decision and declared that they would physically oppose the demolitions of the houses and as the demolition

day of November one8 2006 approached they started to prepare for a possible attack by the police (Dikmen Vadisi Halkı Bu Gece de Nöbette, 25 November). The attack did not occur in the declared day yet Melih Gökçek started to make public declarations in the TV to terrorize the field so that a massive violent attack would be legitimized to a place known as the *varoş* of Ankara. In this moment, he just claimed that the organized groups deceive Dikmen Vadi people (*Gecekonducular Gökçek'e Dur Demek İçin AKP'ye Yürüdü*, August 2006). We will witness how his tone of speech hardened as the movement transforms into a center of opposition against his reign in Ankara Municipality in the post February 2007 period.

The attack occurred quite late- that is three months later than the announcement. As expected, a huge numbers of security force entered the field.<sup>60</sup> The clashes started at 6 am and finished at 5 pm. The videos of the clashes are embedded in video sharing internet sites and one can see the extent of the police force and the organized attack of the people against the demolition units. Moreover, the BRS through the sound system which distributes all the commandments to the entire Dikmen Vadi, directed the clashes. An example of these commandments is below:

Friends at the upper side! We learned that five trucks are entering from the upside. Block the trucks! Block every truck that belongs to the municipality. Unless there is intervention by the police, you do not touch them. We just stop İ. Melih Gökçek and his gang seeking rent (Dikmen *Gecekondu* Direnişi 1 Şubat 2007)

The destruction team failed to remove the houses. Due to the clashes, the police chief in command conceded to the stance of the BRS that the destructions were not legal because the municipal decision had been sent to court by the BRS. Melih Gökçek immediately sued the leaders people for damaging state property and

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<sup>60</sup> The BRS gives a number of 5300 security personnel 3000 of which are city police (*zabıta*) and the remaining part is central government police. They say that they obtained the information through their networks in the police organization



opposing the municipal decision of demolishing the houses of seven people.<sup>61</sup> The court sentenced them to one year imprisonment in November 2008 and froze the sentence if they did not commit a crime for five years starting from 1 February 2007.<sup>62</sup>

The event was a source of honour for the Dikmen Vadi people. Almost all the people mentioned this day in the interviews. The difficulty of struggling against the state and the possibility of challenge it if they acted together was epitomized in “1 February”. They frequently keep his in their stories as a sign of trust in the power of their struggle:

I should just tell you this. One day guests would come to us. They would come here for support. We woke up in the morning and there was a snowstorm. They were about 80 to 100 people. We weren't able to move a small amount due to the snowstorm. My elder brother said that he would call Tarık (Çalışkan). This is what Tarık told us: “brother, we are children of ‘1 february’. The snowstorm does not mean anything.” We got our guests in that stormy weather.<sup>63</sup>

The event is also responsible for the high percentage of feelings of self sufficiency among the Dikmen Vadi people according to a research conducted by Turkish Doctors Association (Turkish Medical Association, June 2008). The research relied on quantitative and qualitative interviews done by psychiatrists and social scientist who had sympathy towards the Dikmen Vadi. They tested the level of depression, anxiety and self-sufficiency in Dikmen Vadi people and contrasted this with the people living in Ankara Mamak-Saime Kadın which is a neighbourhood with social and economic conditions similar to Dikmen Vadi. The research found that due to the ambiguous situation in 2008 about the future of their houses the

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<sup>61</sup> *Gökçek Dikmen Vadisi'ndeki direniş ideolojik dedi 04 06 2010*  
[http://www.sendika.org/english/yazi.php?yazi\\_no=9587](http://www.sendika.org/english/yazi.php?yazi_no=9587)

<sup>62</sup> Unrecorded interview with Tarık Çalışkan.

<sup>63</sup> *Benn sadece şunu diyim gideyim şimdi birgün bir misafirimizgelecek misafirimiz bize destek amacıyla geliyor sabah bir kalktık ki kar buda bir tipi var. 80 one00 kişi gelecek. Var ya biz şurdan şuraya gidemiyoruz tipiden. Beim abim dedi ki ben başkanı arayım. Tarık abinin söylediği şu oldu:kardeş biz one şubatların çocuğuz bize bu ne ki. o tipi de gittik o misafirlerimizi aldık*

anxiety and depression rates are quite high compared to Saime Kadın however feelings of self sufficiency are much higher than that among the Saime kadın. The research also suggest that based on in-depth interviews with the Dikmen Vadi residents together with the survey, the “1 February” attack was behind the reason for their belief in achieving their goal of preserving their right to shelter. By 1 February 2007, the mutual trust between the members of the movement closely formed and the trajectory of the movement changed. The movement starts to collaborate with other movements from this day on.

#### Second Period: Formation of Weak Ties with the Left in Ankara

Dikmen Vadi's movement ceases to be solely on their right to sheltering:

None of us had faced with police before. There was a lack of consciousness among the people. We managed to get over it until “1 February”. We learned that when we get out to the streets we may defend our rights. When you are right, the police do not say a word.<sup>64</sup>

The effect of the confidence they obtained in the first period and the presence of strong trust ties among themselves was immediately reflected upon the content of the meetings they attended. These were mostly the meetings on which the Halk Evleri political agenda bestowed importance in those days. Here is a small list of the meetings the Dikmen Vadi people attended: Construction of crossroads at Kuğulu Park which is a green leisure area in Ankara in February 2007; attendance to a mass meeting to protest the charging of health care in neighbourhood health care centers together with the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), the Union of Health Care and Social Service Workers (SES), Dev Sağlık İş( union of Health Care blue collar Workers) and Turkish Dentist Association (TDB); joint meeting to seek the right to

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<sup>64</sup> “Komşularımın hiç biri ben dahil hiç birimiz polisle karşı karşıya gelmemiş insanlardık. bir bilinçsizlik var toplumda ne oldu one şubata kadar bunu aştık. bir şeyleri sokağa da çıksak hakkımızı savunuyoruz. Haklı olunca Polis de bir şey demiyor kimse de bir şey demiyor nihayetinde sen oturduğun evi savunuyorsun. “ a woman from focus group one.

shelter with other neighbourhoods subject to urban renewal from all over the country with which HE had ties; protesting by making fire in Dikmen Vadi against the demolitions in Tuzla Şifa Neighbourhood in September 2007 and Küçükçekmece Ayazma in November 2008 as a sign of solidarity with other gecekondu neighbourhoods; attendance at “the society has social rights” mass meetings of HE in 2008 and 2009<sup>65</sup>; a mutual meeting with ODTU students and instructors to protest Melih Gökçek is for his announcement which implied that some parts of ODTU Campus could be illegal and subject to demolition.

These meetings turned into an opportunity to express the growing hatred for the leadership of Melih Gökçek and therefore aggravated Melih Gökçek against the BRS. The tone of critiqueism turned into open insults against the BRS in parallel with the popularization of the movement. Here is an example from a TV program which Melih Gökçek attended in 16 August 2007: “They are called by the media ‘the citizens’. They are not citizens. They are ideological people who are against me.” (Bunlar da Şovenist *Gecekonducular*, August 2007)<sup>66</sup> He also tried to marginalize the Halk Evleri members in the BRS saying that “they do not believe in God.... They are professional protestors.... These are left groups which aim to provoke the people.... Look carefully at Ender Büyükçulha (showing photos of him, the lawyer of Dikmen Vadi) I suppose he is a lawyer in both Dikmen Vadi and Halk Evleri. He is a professional protestor.” (İ.Melih Gökçek’ten, Halkevleri’ne ve TTB’ye Karşı Çirkin Kışkırtma, August 2007).

In August 2008 the conflict between Gökçek and the BRS engendered a violent event: the sabotaging of the BRS building. Two ducks living in the building died and

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<sup>65</sup> I was in the meeting field in 2009 and there were 600 people from Dikmen Vadi and this made one0% of all the people that attended the meeting.

<sup>66</sup> “Basında ‘vatandaşlar’ deniyor. Vatandaş değiller, bana karşı ideolojik bir grup bunlar” bunlar da şovenist gecekonducular

many documents were burnt. The BRS immediately announced that the sabotage had been planned by Melih Gökçek and Melih Gökçek accused the BRS of sabotaging the building for provocation and announced that it was alleged that the *cem* house in the neighbourhood could also be sabotaged by the BRS. The BRS made a public statement that if the sabotaging continued in the *cem* house, the country would be in flames (implying the power of Halk Evleri). Gökçek was not late to respond:

We, as the municipality said that fourth and fifth stage of Dikmen Vadi were turned into a space of terror by the people who came to Dikmen after 1984 and therefore who did not have any right together with the terrorist that comes outside Dikmen Vadi (implying HE members). The leaders said that they would not only fight legally but with every means and if we dare to demolish Dikmen Vadi, they would destabilize Turkey.... The illegally constructed BRS building is used as a center of preparation to clash with police and construction units.

The BRS issued the event to court yet the attorney general dismissed the case.<sup>67</sup>

The Dikmen Vadi people and the left in Ankara firmly believed that Melih Gökçek was behind the event. Like “the First February attack” this event reminded Gökçek’s brutality for the people.

In 15 May 2009, the municipality assembly announced that the project was cancelled. In the decision, the reason for the cancellation was given as court decision which had abolished the transformation protocol like the one that had happened in Başbüyük. A person who held land Tapu and unsatisfied with the expropriation value of the protocol had opened the case. The court decision canceled the protocol, not the urban transformation decision. The AMM decision announced that it had abolished the urban transformation decision. Melih Gökçek announced that because of the court decision, they would not be able to enforce the project which they planned (Gökçek’in Son Umudu TBMM, 22 October 2009). The BRS argued that the decision had been made due to the militancy of the movement of the people. I

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<sup>67</sup> Interview with Tarık Çalışkan

also believe that the municipality's inability to clear the remaining people from the place was part of the reason behind the cancellation because the same court decision had been given for Başibüyük's protocol yet with small modifications, the then Maltepe Municipality held the validity of the protocol by issuing the case to higher court. The municipality chose not to continue the project and Melih Gökçek had asked for a new law on urban transformations to be able to continue urban transformation projects. (ibid.)

The cancellation of the protocol mostly injured the holders of Tapu Tahsis who had deconstructed their houses and rented houses with the hope of obtaining 100m2 municipality houses. For almost three years they had both paid rent on the houses and the credit payments of the municipality houses. With the cancelling of the protocol, the municipality promised to pay the payments made to the municipality for the houses by the holders of Tapu Tahsis yet the people had lost their gecekondus and therefore were obliged to live in their rented houses. The BRS declared that the first phase of their struggle had finished yet their right to shelter was not guaranteed. Therefore they would not halt their militancy. Furthermore they would embrace their former neighbours with Tapu Tahsis who had been "deceived" by Melih Gökçek:

We state that we are ready to embrace our neighbours who were forced to sign the protocol and leave their house. We are ready to unite with them again. Helping our neighbours who had the biggest injury from the project is an indispensable task for us. Unite with us; return to your valley and to your house. let's build our neighbourhood, sisterhood again. (Dikmen Vadisi 4. VE 5. Etap Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi İptal Edildi, June 2009).

If we recall the feelings of desperation when these people left the place, we can understand that the people who remained in the field view the "deserters" as the betrayers. However, the people that I interviewed expressed their solidarity for the ones who return to the BRS to seek legal help. By August 2009 in the time of my field research, the BRS lawyers (affiliated with Halk Evleri) had opened 40 cases

against the AMM to pay the full cost of the rents that the people paid and the cost of a gecekondu to build to the land. In sum, the BRS still tries to enlarge its base to its members who left them by 2007.

The cancellation of the project implied to a termination of a period for the movement. What is expected in terms of Pickvance's formulation, the movement should lose its militancy. However, the BRS leadership firmly asserted that their movement would not cease until they had legally obtained their housing right. They keep on informing the people in common weekly meetings. I attended one of them in October 2009, that is, four months after the cancellation. In the meeting, they repeated why they should still show that they were not satisfied with the status quo and they still urged the authorities to sustain their housing right.

The date on which the BRS learned the news of the cancelling coincided with the festival of Dikmen Vadi in June 2009. All the political groups that had supported the BRS for four years came to the festival and had an enjoyable time that included various left themed documentary and film presentations, live concerts, drama presentation, field games and open discussions. The names of the games had connotations of their struggle with Melih Gökçek (e.g. Rope Pulling Competition of "Gökçek! we are united and we will win!"<sup>68</sup>). The festival lasted seven days and on the third day of the festival, the number of people was estimated to be 1500 showing the power of the formation of its weak ties in the second period. The crowd that gathered at the festival field was reminiscent of the greater community which the movement succeeded to form. This was the success of the movement- it was successful to form a grand alliance with various groups in Ankara. Therefore, the

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<sup>68</sup> "Birlik Olduk, Biz Kazanacağız Gökçek" Halat Çekme Yarışması

third phase started with a new trajectories that was quite different from their starting point. The movement aimed to become an example for other movements as such.

### Third Phase: Proliferating the Model to Other Neighbourhood Movements.

The same sort of collaboration to meetings within the agenda of the left continued. For instance, the BRS attended the annual mass meeting of HE with Dikmen Vadi BRS flags with 600 people making more than 10 % of the total number in the meeting. The BRS also organized the people to protest Melih Gökçek's permitting the illegal construction of his son's villa. They attended the trial days of the case and made public statements proclaiming that they wanted their right to housing not villa as he had given his son.

Beside these regular protests, they initiated a project of proliferating their model to other urban movements. This was not a fully defined project by the BRS but rather occurred due to the rising popularity of the BRS especially after its "success" of cancelling the project and the spontaneous emergence of two neighbourhood movements due to physical threat to their neighbourhoods by the gecekondu transformation projects.

The first one was in Izmit Gebze, Cumhuriyet and Adem Yavuz neighbourhood. The Izmit municipality declared the gecekondu neighbourhood to be an urban renewal area and like Başibüyük, the notables in the place gathered people to act together against the decision. They decided to reach the BRS which they had heard before and found their contact information from the BRS's website. The BRS forwarded the people to the Halk Evleri members in Istanbul which was geographically nearer to Gebze than Izmit. The lawyer of BRS and the standing vice

president of Halk Evleri, Ender Büyükçulha attended a panel in the neighbourhood in July 2009 with the title of the Dikmen Vadi lawyer and conveyed what and how they had achieved in Dikmen Vadi in four years (Gebze Çayırova'da Kardeşlerimizin Yanındaydık, four June 2009). After that, 25 people from Dikmen Vadi went to Gebze to attend the meeting of Çayırova and Adem Yavuz people (ibid.). In this meeting, they made public speeches and declared the need for collective action. One of the woman I interviewed had been there and had been quite proud to address the crowd because in the meeting she had met one of her relatives who had reproved her because of her participation to the BRS. She put that when they faced the same problem, they could also understand that they needed to organize to oppose it.

The second incidence was the evacuation decision for the Izmit Arızlı Earthquake Mass Housing residents. The housing site had been built for the sufferers of 1999 earthquake with the permission to stay by the ten million dollars grant given by the Iraqi government. They did not own the houses and ten years after the earthquake, the city governor issued a decision to evacuate the residents and locate the state high rank officials coming to Izmit. However, the people that had settled there had lost some of their family members in the earthquake and most of them did not have regular incomes to rent a house. The Izmit Halk Evi directly intervened into the issue and aggravated the people to protest the settling of state officials to the site. The BRS made public statements in Ankara and declared that they would support the Arızlı people (“Arızlı Halkı Yalnız Değildir”, 26 June, 2009).

The third occasion on which the BRS expressed its desire to create a common front against the threats to right to sheltering was the Right to Shelter Forum in October 2010 which was organized by the Union of Turkish Engineers and Architects (UTEA) Chambers of Architecture Engineers, the UTEA Chamber of City



Planners, UTEA Chamber of Environmental Engineers<sup>69</sup> together with the Mamak BRS and the Dikmen Vadi BRS. The forum lasted three days<sup>70</sup>. Both academicians and movement representatives made presentations on the forum. Arızlı people had walked all the way to Ankara from Izmit in nine days and together with Cumhuriyet-Adem Yavuz neighbours they stayed in the houses of Dikmen Vadi people for three nights. In the closing speech, Tarık Çalışkan expressed the need for mass demonstrations to preserve their right to sheltering: “in the coming periods, we should plan to make effective protests and big demonstrations”.<sup>71</sup>

What the BRS aimed could not be materialized since the closing of the forum. Nevertheless, the movement in Dikmen Vadi stood as an example for political actors for both Istanbul and Ankara. Furthermore, failed or not, these attempts were occasions for the Dikmen Vadi people on the way to meet and experience the commonalities between working class in diverse geographies. All of these were mentioned by the Dikmen Vadi people regarding their desire for collective action.

As mentioned before, these are just a subset of the meetings that the BRS attended. What is important is that all of these meetings encompassed an explicit intention to oppose the Ankara Municipality in the personality of its mayor Melih Gökçek and the central government, both of which were represented as the supporters of capitalist class benefit. It is these meetings which is responsible for the belief on Dikmen Vadi residents for an urge on a unified working class action to transform their social economic conditions. In other words, the class based inequalities they experienced in their living environments concerning their right to

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<sup>69</sup> All these chambers have HE influence in its administrative board in that period.

<sup>70</sup> I was there both as a panelist representing IMECE, Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi on the status of Urban Movement in Istanbul and participant in other panels

<sup>71</sup> . *Önümüzdeki süreçte ne yapacağımızı konuşmalıyız, vurucu eylemler ve büyük mitingler koymalıyız önümüze”*

sheltering is abstracted towards broader terms for class demands with an urge for collective working class action. How this is achieved is hidden in the organization of the BRS and in the next section I will briefly discuss this organizing with the examples of the practices they made in the field.

### Translation of the Militancy in Dikmen Vadi: The Organizing Strategy

The BRS leadership was not in the field out of their good will for the people. Even Tarık Çalışkan, who had a gecekondü in Dikmen Vadi, was not motivated by the preservation of his house with the resistance; his family even tried to persuade to demolish their house and accept the offer of municipality. Their presence in the field had only one purpose: that of contributing to the struggle of working class by forming a community willing to oppose the neoliberal policies of the state. This motivation as I argued, was the primary reason for the trajectory of the struggle in Dikmen Vadi.

As repeated at the beginning, the leadership in the BRS was composed of people in affiliation with Halk Evleri except one who was a CHP member. The leadership never let the Halk Evleri image to be present in the neighbourhood more than the people would accept. Especially Çalışkan objected in any moment to open a HE branch that is independent from the BRS. This caused resentful voices within the HE which I first heard from Çalışkan and then witnessed in the organizing meeting of Right to Shelter Forum held in Istanbul in IMECE's office. At this meeting, a Halk Evleri member accused Tarık Çalışkan of bestowing too much importance to the BRS. He argued that the BRS should not meddle with issues apart from the right to shelter. It should lead the people who are eager for militancy in other areas to a nearby Halk Evi. Tarık Çalışkan strictly rejected this idea, remarking that their aim

was not to strengthen Halk Evleri branches but the political line of HE and in Dikmen Vadi's case directing people to a Halk Evi branch would hinder this cause.

As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the people embraced the BRS as their own place representing their organizing. They were fully aware of the Halk Evleri dominance in the place. In addition to Tarık Çalışkan and Ender Büyükçulha, there were two other HE members who had been inserted to the neighbourhood by the decision of Halk Evleri. They were chosen after multiple tries by Halk Evleri to find people that would be accepted by the neighbourhood.<sup>72</sup> They lived in a *gecekondu* that previously had been owned by a person holding *Tapu Tahsis*. They were the people who worked day and night for the daily problems of the neighbourhood and therefore the people highly respected them for their efforts.

The BRS in the neighbourhood not only meant organizing the protest meetings and writing the public statements. It also meant the effort to sustain the daily necessities of the people. The most vivid example was the dealing with the telephone service cut off in the place. After many individual tries, they made a public statement in front of the Turkish Telecom Company in March 2008 and immediately after the statement, infrastructure in the neighbourhood was renewed and the phones started to work again. They also protested the cancelling of the public transportation in the valley and the cheap bread selling kiosk. The kiosk had been closed and the municipality buses do not stop in Dikmen Vadi bus station since their struggle started. These services are still absent in the field.

The BRS never used a direct Marxist propaganda to motivate the people for left agitation. Through weekly meetings and public statements it proliferated the

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<sup>72</sup> I learned the process through my contacts with HE members in Istanbul.

vivid examples of how the economic system creates a class-based society which directly affects the livelihood of the people yet apart from that, education programs like the ones in labour unions did not occur at least in the first four years. Although Dikmen Vadi was not a neighbourhood where social solidarity ties were fully eroded, Wacquant's depiction of the advanced marginal neighbourhoods with disrespect towards left politics is reflected in this strategy of silencing the Marxist education programs in the neighbourhood. They intentionally lowered this voice and worked strenuously to increase social solidarity ties in the neighbourhood.

Sustaining security in the neighbourhood was one of these. The BRS believed that the security of the neighbourhood was at stake; the lines were cut off by people who sought to make life unbearable in Dikmen Vadi and periodically various construction materials were delivered to Dikmen Vadi. Besides, the BRS building was sabotaged and the BRS alleged that Melih Gökçek was behind the act. Because of all these kinds of events, the BRS made a decision that the place would be checked against strangers. In some months which they suspected trucks coming for excavation, they checked almost all the vehicles passing through the place. Moreover, every stranger coming to the place were repressed to the BRS and asked whether there should be any intervention to the person.<sup>73</sup> All in all, the place was in full control of the BRS.

Another practice was creating a joyful environment for the children. They constructed a playground in an open place near the bureau and declared publicly that they provided a service which the municipality should have done. They organized various free courses such as drama, English, the guitar and primary school

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<sup>73</sup> In my wandering alone in the field, the BRS knew that I came before I visited the bureau. I was also interrogated by the people whether the BRS is informed about my visit.

curriculum assistance courses for the children in a building constructed for these purposes near the bureau. In all these courses, the volunteer teachers who were mostly university students at a university in Ankara with sympathy to the movement worked. The few children that I chatted with informed me that they wished the bureau always stood there because they really enjoyed spending time there. In fact, the festivals, open discussion sessions with academicians, welcoming of graduate students like me to the field, the visits of foreign left groups from Brazil to India working on evacuations all served to make the neighbourhood worthwhile to live in without the feeling of loneliness which had prevailed at the beginning in 2006.

Right now, the neighbourhood waits for a new gecekondur renewal declaration by AMM nevertheless the cause of the struggle is terminated. That is to say, the threat of demolition to their house does not exist right now. However, the political activity of the neighbourhood is still vibrant. They attended with 100 people to '1 May' celebrations in 2010 in Istanbul, Taksim square which has a historical meaning for the Turkish left and designated as one may protest area after 32 years by Istanbul Mayor. Moreover, they decided to use the open land in Dikmen Vadi for collective livelihood farming and try to extend to it people of Ankara who has a hobby of cultivating organic crops. They also persuaded UTEA and the confederation of public sector workers (*KESK*) to plant trees and label it with their names. So far 5000 trees are planted and waiting to grow.

### Concluding Remarks

As mentioned in the beginning, Dikmen Vadi is a unique case of political organizing against gecekondur renewal projects. It is an example for the left how gecekondur renewal projects can be used as an opportunity for the re-popularization

of the left in gecekondu neighbourhoods. However, there are two major points to note to avoid over generalization of what has been achieved in Dikmen Vadi to be emulated for other gecekondu neighbourhoods. First is the homogenous property structure of the households who attend the movement after the evacuation of the households holding Tapu Tahsis. Therefore, the varying property structure embedded in Başbüyük did not exist in Dikmen Vadi. All of them were people without any legal title to land and therefore who believe that they are mostly prone to losing their houses. The property incentives of the Tapu Tahsis holders in Başbüyük did not exist in Dikmen Vadi. Second is the historical peculiarity of the neighbourhood as it is one of the neighbourhoods which were constructed in the 1970s by a socialist group to provide the collective consumption of sheltering due to the incapacity of the state to fulfill it. Therefore, although weakened by the influx of the people after 1985 and desertion of the people with left affiliation due to the terms of the project, the neighbourhood embodied people with affiliation to a left organization who act as leader for the movements. Among these people, a leading group affiliated with HE which is one of the strongest group within the left in Ankara emerged. The organizing of this group in the neighbourhood served to the success of the movement. What I mean by the success is first, it contributed to the cancelling of the transformation project and second it created a community of people who are willing to affect society and try to transform the class positions within it by attending organizations and movements. In other words, the movement in the living environment of Dikmen Vadi could create the existence of 4<sup>th</sup> level of class in Katznelson's methodology that is to say it could create the link between the social injustices experienced in living environment with the need for collective action to transform it.

## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to assess the militancy of the movements in terms of their purpose, what they achieved concerning the urban renewal protocols in the neighbourhoods and how the two movements affect the formation of working class collective identities for militancy in other areas which the market encroaches the workers lives.

The research reaches two major conclusions to the discussion on collective action in gecekondu neighbourhoods against the urban renewals. The first is that the collective action against the urban renewals in gecekondu neighbourhoods encompasses the challenges which inherited from the social context of gecekondu in 90s. Başibüyük's movement is a case which delineates the reflection of the challenge on the formation of anti gecekondu renewal movement which aimed to transform its residents with eagerness to participate class based movements. The gecekondu, that emerged as collective consumption unit in the 1970s turned into a space of rent for the ones who had the hope of transforming their one storey gecekondus into multiple storey buildings. These were mostly people, who constructed their gecekondus before 1985 and therefore holds Tapu Tahsis which promised them land with entitlement deed for constructing multiple storey buildings in a period. In this thesis, it is argued that the introduction of the urban transformation projects points to the loss of the hope for the neighbourhoods which failed to utilize the urban rent before 2000. Therefore, the drive for the acquisition of urban rent is an important point which drives the collective actions of the Tapu Tahsis holders in gecekondu neighbourhoods. However, for the post 85 emigrants the projects clearly indicates the dispossession of their houses which they use for shelter since the terms of the

projects, in the best case, favours the holders of Tapu Tahsis rather than tenants and the post 1985 emigrants.

Başbüyük's movement is explained within this context of the transformation of gecekondu neighbourhoods. It is an example of how the social context of gecekondu in Turkey which created heterogenous property relations within the neighbourhoods, impedes the construction of collective action based on right to sheltering and the formation of collective identities eager to extend the militancy to issues affecting their livelihood. The movement occurred in grand alliance between the Tapu Tahsis holders and the people without legal right to land. The association achieved to connect the two groups. It was able to show the MHA and the Maltepe Municipality as the common "enemy" and the projects which they implemented as contrary to their benefits. The movement also embodied the shelter right of the tenants and people without Tapu Tahsis. It proceeded in negotiation with the the Maltepe Municipality for better terms for the Tapu Tahsis holders. It is thought that the problem of the other group would be resolved after the fixation of assessment value papers for the Tapu Tahsis holders. The dernek was not able to prevent the construction of the first stage of the project and the agreement between the MHA and 153 households which opposed the association's tern yet it could halt the opening of new etapes since for the MHA, there is a risk that people do not sign the agreements and beside that, the dernek received the support of the new municipality mayor which strictly opposes the gecekondu renewal projects implemented by the MHA.

Although the dernek was able to achieve to form a grand alliance to oppose the transformation of the neighbourhood based on the MHA's terms, the militancy of the neighbourhood were not transferred to a grand coalition between the neighbourhoods



of the poor against the urban transformation of Istanbul. It also did not motivate the people to establish connections with the movement that was on the agenda of the left in Istanbul. The association firmly insisted on the urgency of their local problems to be solved before the formation of weak ties with other neighbourhoods. They were highly preoccupied with the sustenance of the strong ties within the neighbourhood based on the different property relations. In order to protect this, they constantly sought to revise their arguments according to the new offers of the municipality. That is why the dernek was not transform into a center of neighbourhood politics where the people mobilize against the marketization policies of the government in areas apart from housing.

The second conclusion is that in gecekondur neighbourhoods with homogenous property structure which did not promise entitled deeds for multiple storey building construction and the intervention of a left organization may turn the transformation of a highly conservative community into one which makes alliances with the movements struggling against the privatization of health care education system, the rise of city water price, costly transportation, as well as with other anti gecekondur renewal movements. Dikmen Vadi's case is an example of such militancy which in certain occasion acted as center of resistance against the governance of Melih Gökçek in AMM. Abandoned alone by the Tapu Tahsis holders, the community of the movement was composed of people without Tapu Tahsis or tenants. The successful organizing of the leading structure which composed of people with affiliation to Halk Evi and the autonomous but close relation with it, were the reasons behind the success at the macro level. However, at the micro level one observes the mobilization of an organizing in a gecekondur neighbourhood which the Turkish left could not achieve after the the 1980s except in number of occasions. The BRS did

not only mobilize the people for various demonstrations but for activities which created a living environment worth to live especially for the children. It also used both legal channels and demonstrations to provide the municipal services such as transportation and cheap bread kiosks to the neighbourhood. Collective livelihood farming in the open fields which were also publicized to all the people of Ankara for organic farming and forestation with 5000 trees financed by various left organizations such as TTB, KESK and UTEA were all done for one purpose: to create a neighbourhood whose members adopt collective identities with eagerness to attend class based movement. In sum, the movement headed by the BRS was initiated as a movement of right to sheltering and the organizing of the BRS acted as a leverage to transcend the local centered demands of the movement. The case of Dikmen Vadi clearly shows that organizing in a neighbourhood whose property relations homogenous and built environment is used for its use value can still be a base for the popularization of the left which lost its base in production space.

The two neighbourhood movements which are both quite militant shows us that the resistance against the gecekondü renewal projects should not always be viewed as progressive political organizing of right to sheltering which contribute to the formation of working class identities for collective action. The two case shows that the property structure of the neighbourhood may act as an impediment for a left group to hold the leadership of the movement if the heterogeneity of the property structure paves the way for individual rent motivations as in Başbüyük. In this case, the chance for collective action which transcends the demands based on housing, is low since the motivation is on the individual gain rather than collective. In the opposite case where the property structure is homogenous and a left organizing

taking place, a re-popularization of the left in gecekondu neighbourhoods may happen as we see in Dikmen Vadi's case.

In this thesis, an approach which tries to define a good city by critiqueizing both the movements and the state by laying down the alternative policies is strictly avoided since as Castells (1983) stressed it is the people which make the city and therefore the reaction of the people within two fields were analysed to have results for the popularization of class based movements in relation to living places that can arise out of the contemporary conflicts in Turkey's urbanization politics. Although the tone of the conclusion is rather pessimist for gecekondu neighbourhoods, structure of which is transformed in 90s, the critiqueal look is still needed for the analysis of neighbourhood movements to come in coming years in places similar to Başbüyük and Dikmen Vadi. Not the movement organization in general but various points may exist during the movement process which a fraction within the movement may happen to collaborate with class based movements as occurred in Başbüyük in two cases which I mentioned in the related chapter. Therefore, the research concludes the complications of progressive politics that can arise in neighbourhoods with similar urban history of Başbüyük yet the movement may also create spaces of political mobilization which communicate with the left in the city. The thesis reached by comparing the two cases needs to be tested by looking emerging movements such as the one in Gebze-Izmit representing the case of Başbüyük in terms of property structure but this time with a different organizing and Ankara-Mamak, representing Dikmen Vadi for some parts of the district. The furthering the effort of neighbourhood comparison will contribute our understanding of the form of class formation in relation to the contemporary neoliberal urban politics of Turkey.

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