

DIVERGING PATHS OF TURKISH CONSERVATISMS DURING THE
COLD WAR ERA:

A STUDY ON CEMİL MERİÇ AND TARIK BUĞRA

AHMET HINÇALAN

Boğaziçi University

2011

DIVERGING PATHS OF TURKISH CONSERVATISMS DURING THE COLD

WAR ERA:

A STUDY ON CEMİL MERİÇ AND TARIK BUĞRA

Thesis submitted to the

Atatürk Institute For Modern Turkish History

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

by

Ahmet Hınçalan

Boğaziçi University

2011

“Diverging Paths of Turkish Conservatisms in the Cold War era: A study on Cemil Meriç and Tarık Buğra”

a thesis prepared by Ahmet Hınçalan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in History degree from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University.

Assoc. Prof. Cengiz Kırılı
(Thesis Advisor)

Assoc. Prof. Duygu Köksal

Asst. Prof Berna Yazıcı

An abstract of the thesis of Ahmet Hınçalan for the degree of Master of Arts from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University to be taken in May 2011

Title: Diverging Paths of Turkish Conservatism in the Cold War Era: A study on Cemil Meriç and Tarık Buğra

This thesis sheds light on the divergence that happened during the Cold War era between Turkish conservatisms. Most of the conservatives went on the anti-communist and nationalist road, but some of them went on unique roads, a “civilizationist” (*medeniyetçi*) and “conservative nativist” roads. Tarık Buğra is studied as an example of the former and Cemil Meriç of the latter. Cemil Meriç may be the only example of the latter one. Meriç’s and Buğra’s themes sometimes intersected and sometimes differed from each other. Their attitudes vis-à-vis religion, laicism and Kemalism intersected, but they differed in many issues thematically. The main themes of Buğra’s writings were anti-communism and hostility towards politics/politicians/politicization. Meriç’s dominant themes were “civilizationism” and “conservative nativism”. Tarık Buğra was a figure that represented the nationalist-conservative orthodoxy. The main themes of nationalist-conservatism were valid in its most sophisticated form, unlike, for example, the vulgar nationalist-conservatism of Serdengeçti, especially in the novels of Buğra. Meriç was a forerunner of the post-1990s conservative understandings. His “civilizationist” and “conservative nativism” themes are very popular in conservative circles today.

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Ahmet Hınçalan tarafından Mayıs 2011'de teslim edilen tezin özeti

Başlık: Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Muhafazakarlığın Ayrılan Yolları: Cemil Meriç ve Tarık Buğra Üzerine Bir Çalışma

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türk muhafazakarlıklarında yaşanan ayrılmayı incelemektedir. Soğuk Savaşın bitimine kadar çoğu muhafazakar anti-komünist ve milliyetçi bir yol izledi, ama bazı muhafazakarlar kendilerine özgü bir yol izlediler. Bu kendine özgü yol “medeniyetçilik” ve “muhafazakar yerlilik”ti. Ben Tarık Buğra'yı birinciye ve Cemil Meriç'i ikinciye örnek olarak verdim. Hatta denebilir ki Meriç ikinciye tek örnektir. Meriç ve Buğra'nın işlediği temalar bazen kesişir bazen de ayrılır. Din, laiklik ve Kemalizm konusunda birleşirler ama pek çok konuda da ayrılırlar. Buğra'nın yazılarının ana temaları anti-komünizm ve politika/politizasyon/politikacılara husumettir. Meriç'in başat temaları “medeniyetçilik” ve “muhafazakar yerlilik”tir. Biz, Tarık Buğra'yı milliyetçi-muhafazakar ortodoksiyi temsil eden bir figür olarak görüyoruz. Örneğin Serdengeçti'deki vulgar milliyetçi-muhafazakarlığın aksine, milliyetçi-muhafazakarlığın temaları en sofistike şekilde Buğra'nın yazılarında bulunabilir. Meriç, 1990-sonrası dönemin muhafazakarlık anlayışlarının bir öncüsüdür. Onun “medeniyetçi” ve “muhafazakar yerli” temaları bugün muhafazakar çevrelerde çok popülerdir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Cengiz Kırılı for his guidance during my thesis writing process. I also thank Assoc. Prof. Duygu Köksal and Asst. Prof. Berna Yazıcı for their presence in my jury. Besides them, I thank Assoc. Prof. Yüksel Taşkın for helping me understand the importance of ideological discourses in Turkish politics and supporting me during my thesis. Another person who deserves special thanks is Kathryn Kranzler for editing my thesis.

I am grateful to Tracy Lord for her support. It would have been very hard to write this thesis without her advice. I also thank Alaattin, Ataman, Ceren, Çiğdem, Deniz İlhan, Deniz Pelek, Gülseren, Hüseyin, İbrahim, Mehmet Baki, Sinem and Volkan for their warm friendship.

My mother, my father, my aunt and my sister deserve special thanks. I could not write this thesis without their support.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: EUROPEAN CONSERVATISMS AND DIFFERENT CONSERVATIVE DISCOURSES IN TURKEY IN THE COLD WAR ERA.....	9
The Genesis of Conservatism in Europe.....	9
Different Discourses of Conservatism in the Cold War Era.....	14
Cultural Conservatism.....	15
Conservatism as Islamism.....	18
Liberal Conservatism.....	21
Conservative Revolution.....	23
Conservative Republicanism.....	24
Nationalist-Conservatism.....	26
CHAPTER 3: CEMİL MERİÇ: A SUI GENERIS TURKISH CONSERVATIVE.....	34
Meriç as a Civilizationist: Reference to Civilizational Differences and Demonizing the West.....	38
Orientalism/Orientalism in Reverse.....	42
Conservative Nativism Instead of Nationalism.....	44
Religion.....	46
Marxist Elements.....	48
Idealization of the Ottoman Past.....	50
Anti-Liberal Elements.....	54
Criticism of the Language Reform/Revolution.....	55
Critique of Kemalism and Its Laicism Principle.....	56
The “Issue” of Student Protests.....	58
Gender.....	59
The Oscillation between Populism and Elitism.....	61
CHAPTER 4: TARIK BUĞRA: A FIGURE OF NATIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE ORTHODOXY.....	64
Hostility towards Minorities.....	65
Hostility towards Democracy.....	70
“Where are the Women?”: The Place of Women in Buğra’s Novels.....	74
Anti-Communism.....	77
A Quest for a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.....	79
Buğra as a Critique of Modernization and Westernization.....	82
Critique of Republican People’s Party and Kemalism.....	85
Anti-Intellectualism.....	88
A Conservative Islam: The Role of Religion as a means of Social Cohesion.....	89
Fear of Mobs/Elitism.....	91
Critique of Laicism.....	92
Hostility towards Politics/Politicization/Politicians.....	93
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	97
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	102

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Conservatism, the antecedents of which can be traced back to the post-1789 era, has been on the rise at the global level. It has taken the shape of a hegemonic force in the world, especially from the 1980s on with its New Right and Neo-Conservatism versions that were especially initiated by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in England and in the USA, respectively. Turkey is no exception, because it went with that conservative tide with the Motherland Party (MP) in the 1980s. My generation experienced that conservative attack in their daily lives. The New Right meant the recession of the state's role and responsibilities and the collapse of the Welfare Regime.

Since the transition to a multi-party regime in Turkey in 1950, there has always been a conservative hegemony, but the conservative attack was never as powerful as today. Turkey has been governed by conservative parties for more than 60 years, from the 1950s on starting with the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*). According to Yüksel Taşkın, today the biggest parties of the system are either conservative parties or define themselves as conservative parties. There is the Islamist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) which defines itself as a conservative democrat party. Besides the JDP, there is the Nationalist-Conservative Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*) and Republican-Conservative Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*).¹ Those parties' relations can be seen as an intra-right debate in which democratic and leftist ideals

¹ Yüksel Taşkın, 29.12.2008, *AKP Hükümeti Alevilere İş Vermiyor*, <http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-yuksel-taskin-akp-hukumeti-alevilere-is-vermiyor.htm>, [26.02.2011].

play no role. This conservative hegemony directed me, as a person who wants to work on Turkish intellectual history, to work on Turkish conservatisms.

This thesis examines the works and lives of Cemil Meriç and Tarık Buğra. They best exemplify the diversion that happened in the Turkish conservatisms during the Cold War era. That diversion was that most of the conservative figures went on a nationalist and anti-communist road like their European counterparts, but some of them went on a different road until the end of Cold War. That different road was a “civilizationist” and “conservative native” road in today’s popular terminology.

The nationalist-conservative Tarık Buğra is an example to the former group and Cemil Meriç was an example to the latter. I could have chosen a different nationalist and anti-communist figure, because there were plenty of them in the Cold War era. Tarık Buğra was chosen, because after his death the left took up his works. The leftist *İletişim Yayınları* published some of Tarık Buğra’s books, so we have become accustomed to them. Other books of his were published by Ötüken Yayınları. Another reason why Buğra was chosen is that the themes of nationalist-conservatism are found in its most sophisticated form in his novels. The last reason is that because of his bad reputation in the leftist and democratic circles, his works have not been studied much. And, even, we can say that he has been very much neglected. For a person who wants to understand the Nationalist-Conservatism of the Cold War era, Tarık Buğra is a very suitable figure to examine.

In my search for a thesis topic, I read about many conservative figures. Despite many differences in their discourses, I noticed that two themes were constant, nationalism and anti-communism. When I started to read Meriç, I found him very interesting in that he was neither nationalist nor anti-communist. His themes differed from his conservative co-nationals. For example, he talked about the

important role of civilizations which was a theme of the 1990s. He also talked about conservative nativism, which is an important theme of today's nationalist conservatism and the *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Diary of Turkey) circle. He can be seen as an early-comer, in this, he mentioned many themes before they become widespread. He and his themes have become very popular, especially since the second half of the 1980s, because they have been suitable for the quests of the post-1980 era.

I chose to work on the Cold War figures of conservatism because the origins of today's conservative discourses can be found in the Cold War era. The era which I am analyzing is the Cold War era, because after the 1990s there occurred immense developments in Turkish conservatisms. For example, Nationalist-Conservatism changed very much. Today Nationalist-Conservatives tend to the New Right, popular culture criticism and conservative nativity discourse. Today's nationalist-conservatism can be exemplified in the Diary of Turkey (*Türkiye Günlüğü*) Journal which is led by Beşir Ayvazoğlu and Ahmet Turan Alkan.² A New Rightist Nationalist-Conservative is Taha Akyol.

I will locate my research in the intellectual history discipline. Intellectual history has been very important in the world for decades. The intellectual history of modern Turkey is, also, a very important field of research in the history discipline. Economic history and social history are important fields, but in recent years they have started to be given much more prominence to the field. Political Thought in Modern Turkey (*Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*) volumes³, which are published by the İletişim Yayınları, are very important in this respect. One of the founders of

² For the *Türkiye Günlüğü* see Yüksel Taşkın's book. *Anti-komünizmden küreselleşme karşıtlığına: milliyetçi-muhafazakar entelijensiya, (From Anti-Communism to Globalisation Opposition: Nationalist-Conservative Intelligentsia)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

³ Murat Belge, ed., *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001-2009).

the field is Şerif Mardin. His studies on Young Turks⁴ and Young Ottomans⁵ were realized in the 1960s. He used the hermeneutical method. After him there were many monographs, until the 1990s, which glorified certain intellectuals. For example, Islamists studied Islamist intellectuals. Their flaws should be discussed in order to open a discussion for the scope of my study.

First of all, many intellectual historians do not take the environment in which the intellectuals lived adequately into consideration. That is, they write the ideas of intellectuals without considering the context. Secondly, they are written as history of ideas texts, that is, they only describe what the thinker said. They miss the opportunity to show the complex relation between intellectual and the power structure of society. Last, they do not approach their subject in an objective manner. Opposed to them, I will give adequate attention to the environment in which Meriç and Buğra lived. I will locate them in a context and approach them in an objective manner.

There are also many well-qualified studies published after the 1990s, such as those of Günay Göksu Özdoğan⁶ and Yüksel Taşkın⁷. Günay Göksu Özdoğan's work is on Turkism in the Single-Party era and Yüksel Taşkın's work is on Nationalist-Conservatism in Turkey.

My research is composed of both primary and secondary resources. The primary resources are the essays and books of Meriç and the articles and novels of Buğra. My analysis will be constructed on Tarık Buğra's novels the *Küçük Ağa*

⁴ Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-908* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983).

⁵ Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996).

⁶ Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *Turan'dan Bozkurt'a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006).

⁷ Yüksel Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizm'den Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına: Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijensiya*.

(Little Agha), Gençliğim Eyvah (Alas My Youth), Yağmur Beklerken (While Waiting for the Rain), Firavun İmanı (Pharaoh Faith), Dönemeçte (In the Turn), Osmancık (Little Osman) and Siyah Kehribar (Black Amber). I will also analyze Tarık Buğra: Söyleşiler (Tarık Buğra: Conversations), Düşman Kazanmak Sanatı (Art of Making Enemies), Politika Dışı (Out of Politics) and Bu Çağın Adı (Name of this Age).

I will analyze Meriç's books *Bu Ülke (This Country), Saint Simon: İlk Sosyolog İlk Sosyalist (Saint Simon: First Sociologist First Socialist), Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization), Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1), Kırk Ambar: Cilt 2 (Forty Hatches: Volume 2), Mağaradakiler (Those in the Cave), Jurnal: 1. Cilt (Diary: Volume 1), Jurnal: 2. Cilt (the Diary: Volume 2), Sosyoloji Notları ve Konferanslar (Sociology Notes and Conferences) and Işık Doğudan Gelir (Light Comes from the East).*

The secondary resources are the works that are written on Meriç and Buğra, especially the works of Duygu Köksal, Tanıl Bora and Nurdan Gürbilek. I also use theoretical material on conservatism. In them Klaus Epstein's *The Genesis of German Conservatism*, and John Weiss' *Conservatism in Europe, 1770-1945: Traditionalism, Reaction and Counter-Revolution* are important.

The study has five chapters. The second chapter examines European conservatism and different conservative discourses in Turkey. The third chapter focuses on Cemil Meriç and the fourth chapter on Tarık Buğra. The final chapter is the conclusion.

Chapter two provides a historical background. I will first introduce conservatism in Europe in its genesis years which shaped Turkish conservatism very much. Many themes of Turkish conservatisms can be found in the European conservatisms. I will analyze English and French conservatisms, which are ideal

types, and German conservatism, which is a deviation from these ideal types. I will then introduce different discourses of conservatism in Turkey. An analysis will be made of the cultural conservatism of Yahya Kemal, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, Samiha Ayverdi and Nihad Sami Banarlı; the Islamic conservatism of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek; the Liberal-conservatism of Ali Fuat Başgil and Ahmet Ağaoğlu; the Conservative-Revolution of Nurettin Topçu; the Conservative Republicanism of Mustafa Şekip Tunç, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Peyami Safa and the Republican Trust Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*) and the Nationalist-Conservatism of Ahmet Kabaklı, Erol Güngör, Nevzat Yalçıntaş, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Osman Turan, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Remzi Oğuz Arık and Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti.

The third chapter is on Meriç. I start with an analysis of Meriç's life story and his thought. I then make a literature review and introduce the important sources that are written on Meriç. My subsections start with the Meriç as a civilizationist. His civilizational understanding differentiates him from many conservatives of the Cold War era. In the Orientalism/Occidentalism subsection, it is argued that Meriç is both an Orientalist and an Occidentalist, because of the fact that he both works on the East and the West, respectively. He is also Occidentalist in the sense that he sees the East as superior to the West. He prefers conservative nativity to nationalism. He can even be categorized as an anti-nationalist. In his stance on religion issue, he is very conservative. Like Tarık Buğra, he sees religion as a means of social cohesion. He has Marxist elements in his discourse. They can be seen in his quest for a bourgeoisie for economic development. He idealizes the Ottoman past. His ideal Ottoman is the Ottoman warrior and conqueror. He has anti-libertarian elements in his discourse which is very suitable to the Zeitgeist. He criticizes the language reform/revolution

of Turkey. He sees this reform as a disaster. He also criticizes Kemalism and its laicism principle like many conservatives. In the gender issue, he protects his conservative stance. Despite the fact that he does not write directly on this issue, his ideas can be understood between the lines of his texts. He is both a populist and an elitist. These seemingly contradictory ideas are suitable to his thought and I explain why this is so.

The fourth chapter focuses on Buğra. We start with an analysis of his life story. Then, a literature review is provided. Anti-communism, hostility towards minorities, hostility towards democracy, the women, Turkish-Islamic synthesis, critique of modernization/westernization, critique of Kemalism, anti-intellectualism, religion, elitism, anti-politics/politicization/politicians and critique of laicism are all discussed. As a nationalist-conservative intellectual, anti-communism is the most dominant discourse in Buğra's writings. Hostility towards minorities is especially valid in the novel *Küçük Ağa* (Little Agha), but there is also an anti-minority discourse between the lines in his other novels and articles. He also best exemplifies the conservative attitude vis-à-vis women in his novels, where women's secondary role in social relations is very visible. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis is another characteristic of his writings. It is a modern quest which can be traced back to Ziya Gökalp and it can be found in many other rightist intellectuals like Buğra. Kemalism is the "other" of nationalist-conservatism. That is, despite having common characteristics with the Kemalist intelligentsia, they define themselves as anti-Kemalist. Buğra's writings have a very interesting characteristic. Buğra is both elitist and anti-intellectualist. Having these two characteristics can be seen odd, but it is not so. He is elitist, that is, he does not want the "everyday man" in political affairs. He is also anti-intellectualist, in that, he does not want theories, especially the theories of

Marxists. Criticism of Kemalist laicism is also valid in Buğra. In the Kemalism criticism Buğra and Meriç do not differ much. He is also against politicization, which is kind of disaster for him.

The fifth chapter is a conclusion chapter in which I make final remarks on my thesis. I draw conclusions from my main chapters in this chapter, that are the third and fourth chapters, and I relate my theoretical background with my findings in the main chapters. In this chapter, I explain why I categorized Tarık Buğra as a Nationalist-Conservative and Cemil Meriç as a sui-generis conservative of the Cold War era depending upon my theory.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN CONSERVATISMS AND DIFFERENT CONSERVATIVE DISCOURSES IN TURKEY

This chapter discusses conservatisms in Europe and analyzes the English, French and German models. This is followed by an examination of different conservative discourses in Turkey.

Genesis of European Conservatisms

Conservatism, as a modern political ideology, emerged right after the French Revolution, which was a major turning point in world history. The roots of the French Revolution were seen in the mind of the Enlightenment by conservatives. Conservatism was shaped against that rationalist Mind. The reason why it started after the French Revolution is that the birth of conservatism needed a major radical change like French Revolution or “Turkish Revolution” that uprooted all society. Society must undergo major transformations in order for conservatism to be flourished. It took its real shape in the Restoration Period.

Conservative thought was shaped against liberalism and socialism, which are Enlightenment ideologies, throughout the nineteenth century in Europe. Before being an anti-socialist ideology, conservatism was an anti-liberal ideology despite the fact that one of the founders and first representatives of the ideology was Edmund Burke who was a liberal conservative. According to Zeynep Güler, “the basic difference of liberalism and socialism can be found in their approach to human nature. Against

liberal thought, conservatives adopt the ‘original sin’ understanding of Christianity and because of this, they think that human are not free and good from birth.”⁸

Zeynep Güler sheds light on the relation between Conservatism and the Industrial Revolution. According to Güler, “besides the Enlightenment thought and French Revolution, another target of Conservative reaction was the Industrial Revolution. They oppose mechanization, dissolving of rural structure and social order and proletarianization”.⁹

Conservatives’ criticisms have changed in time. They have shifted from a criticism of the symbols of the French Revolution to criticism of democracy and the Welfare State. According to Güler;

Conservative, firstly, reacted against the freedom before law and citizen rights, which were initiated by the French Revolution. Then, conservatism opposed widening of the democratic base that was symbolized by the poll suffrage from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of World War II, and then objected to Welfare State and its practices.¹⁰

Conservatism differs from traditionalism. In Klaus Epstein’s words, “the novelty and intensity of the Radical attack meant that age-old, inert traditionalism developed into an alert and self-conscious conservatism.”¹¹ That is, traditionalism had already been valid before the birth of conservatism and it can be accepted as the root of Conservatism. The term “conservative” was first used in a right-wing newspaper by François-Rene de Chateaubriand in 1818, but it does not mean that there was no conservatism between 1789 and 1818. For example, Edmund Burke

⁸ Zeynep Güler, “Muhafazakarlık: Kadim Geleneğin Savunusundan Faydacılığa,” in *Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler (Modern political ideologies)*, ed. H. Birsen Öz (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), p. 121.

⁹ Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 125.

¹¹ Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

wrote the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*¹² in 1790. It is one of the major texts of conservatism. The first representatives of Conservatism in Europe were Edmund Burke of England and Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald of France.

It is difficult to define conservatism, because it is different everywhere and if we refer to Tanıl Bora it is in the element's gas situation.¹³ It can be defined rather than a strict political doctrine; it is a taste, an attitude of mind. This situation creates the possibility of combining with different ideologies like socialism, nationalism and liberalism. It must be said that there are different conservatisms. The ideal-types are English and French conservatisms. German conservatism is a peculiar conservatism that is a deviation from the English and French ideal-types.

English conservatism is mainly represented by Edmund Burke, the classical and most referred to figure of Conservatism. As will be seen in the contexts of Meriç and Buğra s below, many conservatives, such as Burke, see religion as a means of social cohesion. In John Weiss' words, "Burke was not a Catholic, but he vehemently defended the rights of the French church. The spirit of religion, he argued, held men's pride, lust and vicious appetites from tearing apart the social fabric."¹⁴

English conservatism is a liberal conservatism, stemming from the fact that it accepts the English revolution, which was a liberal revolution, as a tradition. That is, it accepts democratic rights as important, but it is hostile to equality. It is a moderate and evolutionary conservatism that influenced the conservatisms in different countries such as Spain. In R. Robinson's words, "Canovas is the early figure of

¹² Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, (Indianapolis, Ind. : Bobbs-Merrill, 1955).

¹³ Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

¹⁴ John Weiss, *Conservatism in Europe, 1770-1945: Traditionalism, Reaction, and Counter-Revolution* (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 20.

Spanish conservatism. He is very close to the liberal conservatism of Edmund Burke.”¹⁵

He was later followed by Maura in Spain. In Robinson’s words, “Maura’s rhetoric was reminiscent of what in later times and in other countries would be called appeals to the “silent majority.”¹⁶

French conservatism is radical compared to English conservatism. In its founding moments, it was hostile to the status quo that was created with the French Revolution and wanted to turn back to the status quo ante. That is, it accepted the pre-Revolutionary era as a tradition and a Golden Age and sought to return to that era. It was represented by de Maistre and de Bonald. They were followed by Maurras and Barres, who were radical rightists. When we talk about conservatism in France, we are talking about a reactionary and unrespectable movement opposed to the English one. English conservatism is a “respectable” ideology, which is also the name of a political party. French conservatism is a religious conservatism. Catholicism is an important part of French Conservatism.

German conservatism is different from English and French conservatisms in that it has been a nationalist conservatism from the very beginning. That is, from the very beginning conservatism and nationalism were combined. Klaus Epstein makes a differentiation between three types of conservatisms in Germany in the foundation years of the conservative discourse, Defenders of the Status Quo, Reform Conservatives, and Reactionaries.¹⁷ Later, there emerged the Revolutionary Conservatives as the fourth.

¹⁵ R. Robinson, “Political Conservatism: The Spanish Case, 1875-1977,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 4(October, 1979), pp. 561-580.

¹⁶ Ibid.

The French Revolution created not only liberal conservatives such as Burke, but also reactionary conservatives such as Adam Müller.¹⁸ Müller insisted on returning to the medieval past. There was also Reform Conservatives such as Otto von Bismarck who diverged from the old/reactionary conservatism and represents a new conservatism. He did not want to return to the status quo ante, but to protect the status quo by whatever means, including industrialization. Bismarck saw the most intellectual support from the German historian and politician Heinrich von Treitschke. In John Weiss' words, "Treitschke's work forms a bridge between nineteenth century traditionalism and the revolutionary conservatives of the twentieth century."¹⁹

Revolutionary conservatism was not peculiar to Germany, but it was very important there. In Klaus Epstein's words;

The Revolutionary Conservatives during the Weimar Republic were an offensive group dedicated to the overthrow –not the conservation– of the German political, social and cultural status quo. That status quo was determined by the triumph –however temporary– of the "modern fraud" of egalitarianism, democracy and secularism in 1918 –a belated triumph which had been preceded by more than a hundred years of unusually tenacious and successful conservative defense of the survivals of the ancien regime.²⁰

Hans-Jürgen Puhle deals with different aspects of German conservatism thoroughly in his article;

In the German states, as in other western European countries, the impact of the French Revolution had transformed a hitherto unspecific traditionalism into an articulate politically conscious conservatism.

¹⁷ Epstein, p. 7.

¹⁸ For more information on Adam Müller, see John Weiss, *Conservatism in Europe, 1770-1945: Traditionalism, Reaction, and Counter-Revolution*.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²⁰ Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism*, p. 11, footnote 7.

German conservatism differs from its Anglo-Saxon and French counterparts: it has a certain one-dimensional quality, derived in general from its close connections with the landed aristocracy and in particular with the Prussian Junkers.

By inclination, German conservatism remained anti-liberal, very largely anti-bourgeoisie and initially, in the rhetoric at least, even anti-capitalist.²¹

Different Discourses of Conservatism in Turkey in the Cold War Era

Like every other ideology, we cannot talk about a monolithic Turkish conservatism. Rather, we can talk about Turkish conservatisms. The usage of plural form is also true for Turkish nationalisms, socialisms, liberalism and Islamisms. Tanıl Bora identifies five types of conservatisms:²² the cultural conservatism of Yahya Kemal, Samiha Ayverdi, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi and Nihad Sami Banarlı; the conservative revolution of Nurettin Topçu, the conservatism as Islamism that is mainly represented by Mehmet Akif and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, the liberal conservatism of Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Fuat Başgil and the nationalist-conservatism the main representatives of which were Ahmet Kabaklı, Erol Güngör, Nevzat Yalçıntaş, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Osman Turan, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Remzi Oğuz Arık, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti.

Conservative republicanism as an alternative Kemalist discourse can be added to them. The main characteristic that describes both in the Cold War era was their intrinsic nationalism and anti-communism. Cemil Meriç, a sui-generis conservative figure, will be discussed in a separate chapter.

²¹ Puhle, *ibid.*

²² Tanıl Bora, "Muhafazakarlığın Çatallanan Yolları ve Türk Muhafazakarlığı'nda Bazı Yol İzleri," in *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), p.95.

Cultural conservatism

Cultural conservatism in Turkey is represented by Yahya Kemal, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, Samiha Ayverdi and Nihad Sami Banarlı. Yahya Kemal was a poet and classical example of non-political, cultural conservatism. The Ayverdis are the founders of the Yahya Kemal Institute (*Yahya Kemal Enstitüsü*) and they continued his legacy. Nihad Sami Banarlı also continued the legacy of Yahya Kemal. Their conservatism was not as alarmist nationalist as nationalist-conservatism, but it was very close to the definition of conservatism as a taste and as a state of mind rather than a strict political doctrine. Anti-communism was also visible in their discourse.

Yahya Kemal was born as Ahmed Agah in Yenimahalle District of Üsküp, which was a very important city in the Ottoman Balkans, in 1884. He was a Balkan migrant of the then shrinking Ottoman Empire. He had the same sociological background as many of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members. He escaped to Paris as a Young Turk in 1903 in the Abdülhamit II era like many Young Turks. He was, initially, influenced by socialism. He later influenced from Cahun's book *Introduction a l'histoire de l'Asie* and became a Turanist.²³ He then "discovered" conservatism. Yahya Kemal gave special emphasis to the Ottoman and Seljuk past. Actually, he saw the beginning of the crystallization of Turkishness with 1071 Battle of Manzikert. In that, he criticized Ziya Gökalp for his abstract, bookish and synthetic understanding of homeland. Yahya Kemal died in 1958. He influenced Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, Samiha Ayverdi and Nihad Sami Banarlı. His main books were *Bizim Gök Kubbe* (Our Canopy), *Eski Şiirin Rüzgarıyla* (With the Wind of

²³ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, "Yahya Kemal," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık (Political thought in modern Turkey: conservatism)*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p. 417.

Old Poem) *Aziz İstanbul* (Beloved İstanbul) and *Sessiz Gemi* (Quiet Ship). He also wrote many essays which contributed to conservative understanding.

Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi was born in 1899 in the Şehzadebaşı District of İstanbul. He founded the İstanbul Conquest Association (*İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti*). He was an architect. According to Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “besides many mosques and madrasahs, he made the restoration of some parts of Topkapı Palace between 1935 and 1945”.²⁴ “Ekrem Hakkı contested the destruction of historical İstanbul in the name of development and, for example, he was one of the few conservatives who protested the construction of Bosphorus Bridge.”²⁵ In Beşir Ayvazoğlu’s words;

He was against the Humanist movement²⁶ in history. In his studies he developed his history and civilization view, especially harshly contested the intellectuals and culture policy which disregarded Seljuk and Ottoman era and gave importance to the antique civilizations that was in Anatolia under the name of “Anatolia Civilization.”²⁷

He was a member of Intellectuals’ Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) like many conservative intellectuals. He died in 1984. His main book was *Fatih Devri Mimarisi* (Architecture of the Fatih Era).

Samiha Ayverdi was the sister of Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi. She was born in 1905. She gave importance to the Ottoman past. Unlike nationalist-conservative intellectuals’ giving prominence to Anatolia, she gave prominence to İstanbul where she saw the crystallization of the Ottoman past. Umut Azak says that; “According to

²⁴ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, “Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 238.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 239.

²⁶ Humanist movement was the cultural policy that was pursued in the National Chief era by Hasan Ali Yücel.

²⁷ Ayvazoğlu, “Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi,” p. 240.

Ayverdi, one of the most important things of the past is the “Ottoman Family” which she identified with past district life and mansion culture of Istanbul.”²⁸

She identified herself with Islamic mysticism. She was a member of the Rifai sect and one of the founders of the Turkish Housewives Association (*Türk Evkadınları Derneği*) in 1966. Her participation in the Turkish Housewives Association tells us a lot about her understanding of the role of women as a conservative woman intellectual. She saw the role of women as housewives. In addition, she could not escape from the anti-communism of the Cold War era. For her, “communists were trying to overthrow the Turkish State”.²⁹ Her books were *Kenan Rifai ve Yirminci Yüzyılın Işığında Müslümanlık* (Kenan Rifai and Islam in the Light of the Twentieth Century), *İstanbul Geceleri* (Istanbul Nights), *İbrahim Efendi Konağı* (İbrahim Efendi Mansion), *Misyonerlik Karşısında Türkiye* (Turkey Against Missionary Work), *Mabette Bir Gece* (One Night at the Temple), *Yaşayan Ölü* (Living Dead) and *Türkiy’nin Ermeni Meselesi* (Armenian Issue of Turkey).

To conclude, cultural conservatives were also nationalist and anti-communist in the Cold War era. They wanted to conserve the Ottoman Istanbul culture unlike the nationalist-conservatives’ emphasis on Anatolia and the Turkish world. Nationalist conservatives as “Anatolian boys” wanted to conserve the Anatolian culture in the Cold War era. The Cold War figures of Cultural Conservatism were natives of Istanbul and they lived the Empire times of Istanbul. So their emphasis on Istanbul culture is understandable.

²⁸ Umut Azak, “Samiha Ayverdi,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*. p. 250.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Conservatism as Islamism

Conservatism as Islamism was widespread in Turkey in the Cold War era. Some Islamists were also conservatives. That is, they were not revolutionary like the Iranian radical Islamists. Today, there are still conservative remnants in the Islamist discourse, because Islamism was under the nationalist-conservative umbrella in the Cold War era. The boundaries between these two ideologies became and remain blurred. Most of the Islamists did not give to their current Islamism in the Cold War era. In Yasin Aktay's words;

Essentially, for years, it should be noted that despite the fact that Islamism considered itself free of conservatism, its name was never put as Islamism in the political level. In the political party movement level its name was National Outlook and between 1980 and 1995 it articulated itself over the Just Order imagination.³⁰

There were also some groups who declared themselves Islamists in the Cold War era. Conservatives' relation with them was not good. In Yasin Aktay's words; "conservative literature was shaped with a jargon which defines Islamist movement with shallowness, with its root in the outside, without being indigenous and being a provincialist movement lacking esthetics."³¹ The main representatives of conservatism as Islamism were Mehmet akif Ersoy and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.

One of the early representatives of Conservatism as Islamism was Mehmet Akif Ersoy. Mehmet Akif Ersoy was born in 1873 in the conservative Fatih district of Istanbul. He was a reformist Islamist who followed the line of Cemaleddin Afgani

³⁰ Yasin Aktay, "İslamcılıktaki Muhafazakar Bakiye," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 350.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

and his disciple Muhammed Abduh in the Islamist movement. He wrote in Islamist journals such as *Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Sebilürreşad*. In Murat Yılmaz's words; "Akif, who hated Abdülhamid II, because of despotism, besides being a member of CUP after the declaration of constitutional monarchy, he resigned from the *Darulfunun* and his journal was shut one or two times because he criticized CUP and the government."³²

He worked for the Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*), which was the intelligence service of the CUP. His role in the Special Organization shows us also the complex relation between nationalism and Islamism, because Akif as an intellectual who had Islamic sensibilities could cooperate with the nationalist CUP. He wrote the *Safahat* which was very popular in rightist circles. According to Yasin Aktay, "his personality and poems became a figure which articulated the common sensual space between Islamism and conservatism and even he undertook the conservative remnants in Islamism."³³

He was one of the first representatives of admiration of the "Japan Miracle", a very conservative theme. For the conservatives, Japan represented modernization without losing its genuine character. As will be seen below, the same theme was valid in Tarık Buğra. Ersoy accepted the conservative civilization-technique distinction. His main book was the *Safahat*. His other books were *Süleymaniye Kürsüsünde* (*In the Süleymaniye Platform*), *Fatih Kürsüsünde* (*In the Fatih Platform*), *Asım, Hatıralar* (*Memories*) and *Hakkın Sesleri* (*Voices of the God*).

Another important representative of Islamism as conservatism during the Cold War was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. He was born in 1904 in Istanbul. In Yasin Aktay's words, "he was the pioneer name in the Turkish Islamism's that tendency that can

³² Murat Yılmaz, "Mehmet Akif Ersoy," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 318.

³³ Aktay., p. 354.

easily turn into conservatism or nationalism.”³⁴ He had a “vulgarizer and popularizer”³⁵ character. He made harsh criticisms on many important issues. Murat Güzel asserts that, “in the basis of the affinity of the rightist circles especially Turkish conservatism, besides Islamism, to Kısakürek’s views is his hard-core, unchanging and unshaken criticisms towards Republican People’s Party, İnönü, Westernization and Communism.”³⁶

In Murat Güzel’s words, “Kısakürek assumed the spokemanship of the “national and conservative” Islamisms with Mehmet Şevket Eygi, who was also one of the important Islamist figures, against the modernist and *Selefi*³⁷ Islamisms that showed their effect from the 1960s on”.³⁸

He published *Büyük Doğu (Great East)* journal from 1943 to 1978. For him, the *Great East* was not only the name of a journal. In his words; “I name this view the ‘Great East’: A view which is Asianist, a supporter of Europe only in their positive sciences, ..., Godist, personalist, hostile to fascism, liberalism and communism and restrictionist in property (but not communist).”

His main books were *Ideolocya Örgüsü (Knit of Ideology)*, *Bir Adam Yaratmak (Creating a Man)*, *İhtilal (Revolution)*, *Sosyalizm, Komünizm ve İnsanlık (Socialism, Communism and Humanity)*, *Benim Gözümde Menderes (Menderes in My Eyes)*, *Namık Kemal, Yeniçeri (Janissary)* and *Vahdettin*.

To conclude, conservatism as Islamism is the important current that showed the relationship and the affinity between conservatism and Islamism. Actually, as

³⁴ Aktay, p.356.

³⁵ I borrow these terms from Tanıl Bora.

³⁶ Güzel, p. 335.

³⁷ Selefism is an Islamic sect.

³⁸ Güzel, p. 340.

was said before, nationalism, conservatism and Islamism create a whole in the Turkish rightist discourse. There are many transitions between them. The most important Cold War figure was Kısakürek, who was adopted by the many factions of the Turkish right.

Liberal Conservatism

The main representatives of liberal conservatism were Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Fuat Başgil. Ahmet Ağaoğlu made his works in the first phase of the Republican era and Başgil was in the second generation of liberal-conservatism. They were very close to the English conservative tradition. They accepted democratic parliamentary rights as a tradition that could not be changed, but as can be guessed, they were very hostile to the concept of equality.

Ahmet Ağaoğlu, whose real name was Ahmet Agayef, was born in 1869 in the Karabagh of Azerbaijan. He was both influenced by Ernest Renan and Cemaleddin Afgani. The former was an Orientalist and the latter was an Islamist. That shows us the eclecticism in his thought. His life can also be divided into two eras, the early-Ağaoğlu and late-Ağaoğlu eras. He lived a transition from liberal-nationalism to liberal conservatism. According to Mustafa Erdoğan, “the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) defended a solidarist, nationalist and Unionist liberalism which is founded on the citizen rather than the individual. The representative of that kind of liberalism was Ahmet Ağaoğlu”.³⁹

He then evolved into conservative-liberalism in the Republican era. The Kemalist reforms were too exaggerated for Ağaoğlu.

³⁹ Mustafa Erdoğan, “Sunuş,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalizm*.

His main books were the *Üç Medeniyet* (Three Civilizations), *Hindistan ve İngiltere* (India and England), *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde* (In the Country of Free People) and *Devlet ve Fert* (State and Individual).

Ali Fuat Başgil was born in 1893 in the Çarşamba district of Samsun. He was a Cold War figure of liberal conservatism. Ali Fuat Başgil's intellectual life can be divided into two, the early Başgil and the late Başgil eras. In Tuncay Önder's words, "in the single party period he had "authoritarian" and "reformist" inclinations that were far away from a liberal perspective, but it can be explained with the general climate of the era."⁴⁰

Tuncay Önder goes on to say that, "in the late Başgil era, that is from the multi-party period on, he took a liberal conservative position that defended democracy and rights and in this context that criticized the political-legal regime in Turkey."⁴¹

He prepared the constitution of Hatay. This indicates that he was very close to the Kemalist elite in the single-party era. He founded the Dissemination of Free Thoughts Association in 1947. That means his liberalism started to emerge with the Cold War era. It can be explained with the general climate of the era, because the victory of the USA and its allies were seen as a victory of liberalism.

According to Tuncay Önder, "after the 27 May 1960 coup d'état his first reaction was to approve the movement."⁴² It can be explained by his quest to make himself pleasant to the makers of the coup d'état, but it was not enough to protect him from getting purged. He was one of the 147 academics who were purged from the University in 1960. He died in 1967.

⁴⁰ Tuncay Önder, "Ali Fuat Başgil," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 291.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., p. 292.

His main books were *Din ve Laiklik* (Religion and Secularism), *Demokrasi ve Özgürlük* (Democracy and Freedom) and *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri* (27 May Revolution and its Reasons).

To conclude, liberal conservatism is a current that had its antecedents in the first phase of the Republican era, but its real emergence was with the Cold War era.

Conservative Revolution

The Conservative-Revolution, which was mentioned in the German context above, is a peculiar conservatism which is most closely represented by Nurettin Topçu. He diverged from the other conservatives by his harsh criticisms of capitalism and technology. Conservative Revolution was only one aspect of Topçu.

He was also an Anatolianist, but differed from the Pan-Turkists in the sense that he saw Anatolia rather than the Turan as the motherland. He talked about an Islamic socialism and supported land reform.

He was born in 1909 in Istanbul. He got a doctorate degree from Sorbonne University. He published *Hareket Dergisi* (Movement Journal) from 1934 on. In Beşir Ayvazoğlu's words, "the *Movement* was the first journal which has Islamic sensibilities after the closure of *Sebilürreşad* and in that context it comes before the Great East (*Büyük Doğu*) journal."⁴³ In Beşir Ayvazoğlu's words;

He represented Anatolianist nationalism with his close friends Remzi Oğuz Arık and Ziyaeddin Fahri (Fındıkoğlu – A.H.) and he was influenced by Bergsonism and even Christian mysticism, but after being introduced to the head of an Islamic sect his views gained an Islamic mystic and "indigenous" character.⁴⁴

⁴³ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, "Nurettin Topçu," in *Siretler ve Suretler*, (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 75-76.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

To conclude, Topçu was the sole representative of Conservative-Revolution in Turkey. Topçu also tried to fill a gap in the absence of capitalism and technology criticism in the conservative political thought. He was revolutionary in the sense that revolution had to be done only once. It should not be continuous. After the Conservative Revolution, the new status quo had to be conserved according to Topçu.

Conservative Republicanism

Conservative-Republicanism as an ideological current was shaped in the 1930s. It was the conservative version of Kemalism. It was shaped as an alternative to the left-Kemalism of the *Kadro* (Cadre) circle. Nazım İrem says that, “in that environment, everybody was Kemalist; everybody’s Kemalism aimed at the refoundation of state, nation and personality. The main problem was what Kemalism really was.”⁴⁵

They were influenced mainly by Bergson. The main representatives of conservative-republicanism were (early) Peyami Safa, Mustafa Şekip Tunç, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and Hilmi Ziya Ülken and the Republican Trust Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*).

Peyami Safa was born in 1899. His intellectual life can be divided into two, the early-Peyami era, in which he was a conservative-republican; and the late-Peyami era in which he was a nationalist-conservative. In his early-Peyami era, he wrote in *Cumhuriyet* which was a Kemalist newspaper. He then wrote in *Milliyet* newspaper, which was writing close to the conservative Democratic Party. He had

⁴⁵ Nazım İrem, “Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığının Kökenleri,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 74 (Autumn 1997), p. 60.

polemics with important leftists of his era such as Nazım Hikmet, Nurullah Ataç, Sabiha Sertel, Zekeriya Sertel and Aziz Nesin.

He wrote the *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Insights on Turkish Revolution) which is the reference book of Turkish conservatism. His other important books were the *Fatih-Harbiye*, *Atilla*, *Matmazzel Noraliya'nın Koltuğu* (Armchair of Matmazel Noraliya), *Felsefi Buhran* (Philosophical Crises), *Millet ve İnsan* (the Nation and Human Being), *Mistisizm* (the Mysticism), *Nasyonalizm* (the Nationalism), *Sosyalizm* (the Socialism) and *Doğu-Batı Sentezi* (East-West Synthesis).

İsmail (İsmayıl) Hakkı Baltacıoğlu was born in 1886 in Istanbul. He was a member of the Free Republican Party in 1930, and then he became a member of the Republican People's Party between 1942 and 1950. He had a very conservative understanding of religion. According to Vural Göral, "Baltacıoğlu approached religion as a social institution by saying that there cannot be a nation free of religion."⁴⁶ His most important books were *Demokrasi ve Sanat* (Democracy and Art), *İçtimai Mektep: Nazariyesi ve Prensipleri* (the Social School: Its Theory and Principles), *Felsefe* (the Philosophy), *Sosyoloji* (the Sociology), *Türk'e doğru* (Towards the Turk), *Batı'ya Doğru* (Towards the West), *Ziya Gökalp*, *Atatürk*, *Hayatım* (My life) and *Yeni Adam Günleri* (Yeni Adam Days).

Mustafa Şekip Tunç was born in 1886 in Istanbul. His most important books were *Bir Din Felsefesine Doğru* (the To a Philosophy of Religion), *Felsefe-i Din* (the Philosophy of Religion), *Psikolojiye Giriş* (the Introduction to Psychology) and *Üç Zihniyet* (the Three Mentalities).

⁴⁶ Göral, p. 611.

Hilmi Ziya Ülken was born in 1901 in Istanbul. He published the Human (*İnsan*) Journal. His main books were *Umumi İctimaiyat (General Sociology)*, *Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi (the History of Turkish Thought)*, Ziya Gökalp, *Dini Sosyoloji (the Religious Sociology)*, *İslam Düşüncesi (the Islamic Thought)* and *Tarihi Maddeciliğe Reddiye (the Refusal of Historical Materialism)*.

In the Cold War era the Republican Trust Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*) represented Republican-Conservatism. That party was founded by leaving the RPP. Its leader was Turhan Feyzioğlu. They accused RPP of leaning towards the left and said that they represented the true Kemalism.

To conclude, in the context of the 1930s, all intellectuals were influenced by Kemalism and they were trying to make their version of Kemalism the true Kemalism and became organic intellectuals of the state. In the Cold war era, there was an intra-Kemalist debate between left-Kemalists and conservative-republicans.

Nationalist-Conservatism

Nationalist-Conservatism in Turkey is an ideological current the antecedents of which can be traced back to the post-1945 period. Actually, the combination of nationalism and conservatism occurred much later in Turkey compared to the European examples. Different types of European nationalist-conservatisms were seen from the 1850s on. Before passing to Turkish nationalist-conservatism as a peculiar one, I should say that European nationalist-conservatisms were top-down and state-led projects as opposed to the Turkish one.

As I said before, Turkish nationalist-conservatism took shape in the 1950s. It was a by-product of the transition to democracy and the Cold War era. The nationalist-conservative discourse was shaped in reaction to Kemalism. The Nationalist-Conservative intelligentsia viewed the Kemalist elite as an alien elite and

themselves as the indigenous elite. That is, the relation between them and the Kemalists was an intra-elite struggle. Both sides had been educated in Kemalist schools, but there was a difference between them, that is the Kemalist elites came mainly from Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir and Nationalist-Conservative elites came mainly from the periphery in the Cold war era. The families of the Kemalists were also Kemalists and the Nationalist-Conservatives' families had Islamic sensibilities. This family background and center-periphery distinction are keys to understanding nationalist-conservatism.

In the Gramscian sense, Nationalist-Conservatives wanted to be the organic intellectuals of the state in the Cold War era. They wanted to replace the Kemalist elite. Actually it can be said that they accomplished their aims after the 1980 coup d'état. The military junta put emphasis on a Turkified Islam against the left and the Iranian Revolution. There had been a very strong left before 1980, but they were made weaker by the coup d'état. In order to make society more conservative they adopted Turkish-Islam synthesis. Another reason for the emphasis on Islam was the Iranian Revolution. Against the radicalism of the Iranian revolution, a conservative, nationalist and statist Islam was supported. As noted above, the junta used Turkish-Islamic synthesis to create a more "stable" Turkish society in the 1980s. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is the most doctrinaire form of Nationalist-conservatism, which is an umbrella term. It was developed by the Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) and its most important ideologue was İbrahim Kafesoğlu. The first half of the 1980s became the golden years for the Nationalist-Conservative elite. They came to higher echelons in state institutions. They were very optimistic in the 1980s, but their optimism faded away in the 1990s with the rise of a different intelligentsia that was the Islamist intelligentsia. In the 2000s, the Nationalist-Conservative intelligentsia

made coalitions with the Republican-Conservatives against the Islamist intelligentsia, because Justice and Development Party (JDP) in its march to the center sent away the Nationalist-Conservative intelligentsia from the center. That is, political Islamism created its own organic intellectuals and those intellectuals rose to higher echelons. The main representatives of nationalist-conservatism were Ahmet Kabaklı, Erol Güngör, Nevzat Yalçıntaş, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Osman Turan, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti in the Cold War era.

Ahmet Kabaklı was born in 1924 in Harput. In Hasan Saim Vural's words, "he started his writing career in 1947 in the Movement (*Hareket*) Journal which was published by the Conservative-revolutionary Nurettin Topçu and his circle."⁴⁷ He is especially known by his writings in *Tercüman* newspaper. He then started to write in *Türkiye* newspaper in 1991. He was one of the founders of the Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), which was a nationalist-conservative organization. In Vural's words, "he was given the honor of "*Şeyh-ül Muharririn*" in 1996 by some civil society organizations led by the Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*)."⁴⁸

Like many rightist intellectuals, he had a very eclectic understanding. He was influenced by the Islamist conservatives, cultural conservatives and conservative revolutionists at the same time. Hasan Saim Vural says that;

The real aim which gave his life and his work was being an "*Alperen*" in 20th century Turkey and educating people accordingly. He was both influenced from Turkish Islamic mysticism and the writers such as Namık Kemal, Mehmet Akif, Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal, Necip Fazıl, Nurettin Topçu, Cemil Meriç, Mümtaz Turhan and Erol Güngör and tried transmit his views to a large public in an understandable manner.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Hasan Saim Vural, "Ahmet Kabaklı," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p. 390.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 391.

He died in 2001.

Erol Güngör was born in Kırşehir. He was a sociologist and social psychologist. He wrote in diverse journals like *Yol, Türk Yurdu, Hisar, Töre, Türk Edebiyatı, Yeni Sözcü, Ülkücü Öğretmen* and newspapers like *Ortadoğu, Yeni Düşünce* and *Millet*. It means that he wanted to appeal both to Turkist and nationalist-conservative audiences. According to Yüksel Taşkın, he wanted to go beyond the Nationalist-Conservative orthodoxy.⁵⁰ He was a forerunner of the Islamization of Nationalist-Conservatism after the 1980 coup d'état.

Nevzat Yalçıntaş was born in 1933 in Ankara. He became the general manager of Turkish Radio Television (TRT) for a while in the 1980s. This shows us that the Nationalist-Conservative intellectuals were very close to their aim of being organic intellectuals' of the state. He was the head of the Intellectuals' Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) between 1988 and 1998. As Yüksel Taşkın puts it; "besides being a representative of the restorationist conservative understanding that gained prominence with the 1950s; he was distinguished in being an important actor of the traditional Islamic structures' transformation to cope with the modern world".⁵¹

Osman Turan was born in 1914 in Bayburt. He was a student of Fuat Köprülü in his years of education. He then became a member of the nationalist-conservative historians' generation. In the same generation, there were İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Mehmet Altay Köymen and Bahaeddin Ögel. He had also a political career. He was the spokesman of nationalist-conservative wing in the Justice Party. He became the head of the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*) for a while. His book *Türk Cihan*

⁵⁰ Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına: Milliyetçi-Muhafazakar Entelijensiya*.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Hakimiyeti Mevküresi Tarihi (History of the Ideal of Turkish World Domination) has become a bedside book of the Turkish right.

Anti-Semitism can be traced back to the nineteenth century in Europe when it became powerful from Austria to France. In Turkey Anti-Semitism can be seen in its most vulgar form in the writings of Cevat Rifat Atilhan during the Cold War era. He was fed from diverse sources. Rifat Bali says that,

The basic sources which fed the world thought of Atilhan were the anti-Semitism which was internalized by the Christian ideology, the Nazi ideology which he was in contact in the Second World War and Turkism which was influential in the same era.⁵²

Against the usually stated argument, there was a strong anti-Semitic tendency from the Republican era on in Turkey. In Bali's words;

It was not possible to come across an Islamic current in the society, because the elites of the Republic were giving the most importance to secularism principle in order to found a secular nation-state, opposed to that, Islamic demands were taken under supervision in an authoritarian manner. So there were important distinctions between the anti-Semitic publications and the anti-Semitic discourse that was came across in the campaigns that was against the Jews in the single Party era and the anti-Semitic discourse that was come across in the Islamic and nationalist circles that awake after passing to the multi-party democracy.⁵³

In Rifat Bali's words, "there were two main themes that were valid in the single party era: Jews' bad Turkish and their domination of the commercial affairs of the society."⁵⁴ In that environment, Atilhan published *National Reform* journal which disseminated anti-Semitic thoughts. As Bali puts it;

After the transition to the multi-party era, the thoughts that fed the nationalist and Islamist currents were different from the one party era. In the multi-party era the hostility which was because of the belief that the Jews dominate the commercial life was valid like the one-party era, but there were also reasons

⁵² Rifat N. Bali, "Türk Anti-Semitizmi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, p.405.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 402-403.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 403.

that were peculiar to Islamist and nationalist currents. The most important of them is the taken from the throne of the Sultan Abdulhamid who is called as the Supreme Khan by the nationalist and Islamist circles.⁵⁵

İbrahim Kafesoğlu was born in 1914 in Burdur. He was a historian from the same generation of nationalist-conservative historians such as Osman Turan, Bahaeddin Ögel and Mehmet Altay Köymen. They were the students of nationalist writers such as Fuat Köprülü, Zeki Velidi Togan, Sadri Maksudi Arsal and Reşit Rahmeti Arat. He was the main ideologue of the journal *Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürü)* which was a nationalist conservative journal. In Yüksel Taşkın's words, "the intellectual circle which was matured in *Turkish Culture* would gain efficiency in the nationalist-conservative organizations such as the *Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı)* (which were reopened in 1987) and the Intellectuals' Hearth in time."⁵⁶ He was the founder of the Nationalist-Conservative *Türk Edebiyatı Vakfı (Foundation of Turkish Literature)*.

His main books were *Macaristan Tarihi (History of Hungary)*, *Türkler ve Medeniyet (Turks and Civilization)*, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Meseleleri (Problems of Turkish Nationalism)*, *Selçuklu Tarihi (History of Seljuk)*, *Türk Milli Kültürü (the Turkish National Culture)* and *Türk-İslam Sentezi (the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis)*.

Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti was born in 1917. He participated in the 1944 Turkism events that created enthusiasm in many nationalists from diverse political stances and he was jailed with Nihal Atsız and Alparslan Türkeş. He published the journal *Serdengeçti*. He made a combination between Islamism and Turkism which can be dated back to the Second Constitutional Era. According to Beşir Ayvazoğlu;

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 406.

⁵⁶ Taşkın, *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına: Milliyetçi-Muhafazakar Entelijensiya*, p. 140.

“it was very hard to draw lines between Turkism and Islamism in the Second Constitutional era. There were Turkists who were far away from Islamism. There were Islamists who were totally against nationalism. There were also people who played intermediary role.”⁵⁷

His phrase “As Turk as the Tanrıdağ, as Muslim as the Hira Mountain”⁵⁸ has been very popular in rightist circles up to this day. He then became a member of parliament as a representative of the conservative Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*).

His main books were *Mabetsiz Şehir (City without a Temple)*, *Bu Millet Neden Ağlar?(Why does this Nation Cry?)*, *Bir Nesli Nasıl Mahvettiler?(How did they Ruin a Generation?)*, *Ayasofya Davası (Hagia Sophia Case)*, *Mevlana and Mehmet Akif, Türklüğün Perişan Hali (Wretchedness of the Turkishness)*, *Gülünc Hakikatler (Absurd Truths)*, *Kara Kitap (Black Book)*, *Müslüman Çocuğun Şiir Kitabı (Poem Book of the Muslim Child)*, *Radyo Konuşmaları (Radio Talks)* and *Akdeniz Hilalindir (Mediterranean Belongs to Crescent)*.

To conclude, in this analysis on the Cold War figures of nationalist-conservatism, it has been seen that they were born mainly in the periphery. Anti-communism was very important in their discourse, but we cannot talk about an ideal-type of nationalist-conservatism. There was the anti-Semitist Atilhan, but there was also the representative of a combination between Turkism and Islamism, who was Serdengeçti.

Today, nationalist-conservatism is still very strong as an ideological discourse in Turkey, but we cannot say the same thing for the power of Nationalist-Conservative intellectuals. That is, independent of the power of nationalist-

⁵⁷ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, *Tanrı Dağından Hira Dağına: Milliyetçilik ve Muhafazakarlık Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2009), p. 86.

⁵⁸ Tanrıdağı kadar Türk, Hira Dağı Kadar Müslüman.

conservative intellectuals' vis-à-vis the state and power structure, the nationalist-conservative discourse protects its important role. It seems that they have lost the power which they enjoyed in the 1980s and they have become increasingly aggressive in the JDP era. The JDP uses its own organic intellectuals who are mainly Islamist. So there is no reason to be optimistic for the nationalist-conservatives. The main representatives of today's nationalist conservatism are Beşir Ayvazoğlu, Durmuş Hocaoğlu, Mümtazer Türköne, Ahmet Turan Alkan and Taha Akyol. Ayvazoğlu, Hocaoğlu, Türköne and Alkan are gathered around the *Türkiye Günlüğü* (Diary of Turkey) Journal.⁵⁹ They adopt the conservative nativity discourse which was developed by Cemil Meriç a couple of years ago. Taha Akyol is a new-rightist nationalist-conservative who reflects the Zeitgeist in that the New Right has become very powerful in Turkey since the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) era. The Justice and Development Party has continued this legacy.

⁵⁹ For a good study on these intellectuals, see Yüksel Taşkın. Yüksel Taşkın, Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına: Milliyetçi-Muhafazakar Entelijensiya.

CHAPTER 3

CEMİL MERİÇ: A SUI GENERIS TURKISH CONSERVATIVE

Cemil Meriç was born in 1917 in Hatay. His family had migrated from Greece. His surname came from the Maritsa River in Greece. He was born during the last year of First World War. Hatay was an Ottoman province until 1918. It became a French Protectorate in 1920. It was a very interesting place in those years. The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, but Hatay protected its soul as an Ottoman city until 1939 despite the French rule. Actually, French rule and the Ottomanness created Hatay as a peculiar city. Turks were an ethnic minority in Hatay. Cemil was very different from the other children growing up. His family was city-dwellers in Greece, so he was raised with a sense of city culture. Even his clothes were different from those of his provincial friends. This made him isolated from his peers and so he read a lot in his early years.

Hatay's peculiarity also came from its unique education system. There were some teachers from a group of people known as the 150s⁶⁰ (*150'likler*) in the schools. There were also French teachers who taught French thoroughly to the students. Meriç thus was exposed to Westernization in his education years by French curriculum, but all of the Westernization was confined to that in Hatay. The reforms of the Turkish Republic such as the Hat Reform or the Language Reform were not applied in Hatay. So *Hatay* did not lose its Ottoman character until its annexation to Turkey in 1939.

⁶⁰ 150s were exiled from Turkey after the foundation of the Republic.

Meriç was a nationalist in his high school years. He was mostly influenced by Tark Mümtaz. Tarık Mümtaz and Cemil Meriç worked at *Karagöz* journal for a while. Cemil wrote the article “Turkish Youth do not Forget and do not Forgive” in those years. He had also some socialist years after high school, but they were not long. He was arrested for being a communist in those years. His socialism intersected with his Istanbul years. In some of his diaries, he criticized his socialist years. He says that he had not believed in socialism, in spite of being a socialist. That is, his socialism was not an internalized socialism.

His early years as an intellectual passed with literary criticism and translations mainly from the “West”. In the 1960s, he discovered the Orients⁶¹. He wrote the *Hint Edebiyatı (Indian Literature)* in 1964, but his curiosity towards the “West” did not finish. He wrote the *Saint Simon: İlk Sosyolog, İlk Sosyalist (Saint Simon: First Sociologist, First Socialist)* in 1967. In the 1970s, he was directed towards his country. He wrote *Bu Ülke (the This Country)* and *Umrandan Uygarlığa (the From Umran to Civilization)* in 1974. He died in 1987.

The literature on Cemil Meriç is a divided one. Both rightists and non-rightists have studied him. There are many books and articles that are written by nationalist-conservatives and Islamists, that is, the Turkish right. Mustafa Armağan, Beşir Ayvazoğlu, Ali Bulaç and Düccane Cündioğlu are examples of that literature. The Islamists want to show Cemil Meriç as an Islamist and the nationalist-conservatives want to show Cemil Meriç as a nationalist-conservative; that is, both of them adopt Meriç. According to Tanıl Bora “in the conservative discourse, there are many examples that see the real characteristic of Meriç in his reversion to his

⁶¹ I will explain below why I use “Orients” rather than “Orient”.

Muslim-Turkish core by becoming purified from the Western culture which gives him his formation.”⁶²

For example, Ali Bulaç, an Islamist intellectual, says that;

Cemil Meriç’s ability to return to his own country –to This Country- after his long journeys towards the West and the India constructed his strongest and weakest sides. His familiarity towards the West with her peaks, finally, helped him to stand against the European reality and made him lose time because he had to learn his country’s and territory’s culture codes.⁶³

According to Ahmet Turan Alkan, a nationalist-conservative of the post-Cold War era, he was “one of us.” Alkan says that, “despite his admirable accumulation and his miraculous attention, Cemil Meriç was one of us.”⁶⁴

There is also another literature which is outside the rightist-circles. Of that literature, Duygu Köksal, Zeynep Sayın, Tanıl Bora, Nurdan Gürbilek and Kadir Cangızbay are examples. This literature approaches Cemil Meriç in a more objective manner.

For example, Tanıl Bora says that “it is not possible and true to exhaust Cemil Meriç with conservative identity imprint.”⁶⁵ By that, he refers to the Marxist elements in Meriç’s thought. I agree with Bora on the fact that Meriç was influenced by the Marxism, but as we will show below, it is not enough to be accepted as a non-rightist intellectual.

⁶² Tanıl Bora, “Cemil Meriç,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*), p. 518.

⁶³ Ahmet Turan Alkan, “Düşünce Alışılmışın Dışındadır,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 127 (July 1994), pp. 43-45.

⁶⁴ Ahmet Turan Alkan, “Cemil Meriç ve Hür Düşünce: RES NON VERBA!,” *Türkiye Günü* 1 (April 1989), pp. 27-29.

⁶⁵ Bora, “Cemil Meriç,” p.516.

Duygu Köksal, like I do, describes Meriç as “a prominent yet heterodox figure of Turkish conservatism.”⁶⁶ Köksal sheds light on the phenomena of Meriç attracting a wider audience from the 1980s on.

The kinds of dilemmas that preoccupied Meriç throughout his life are what we would today describe as questions of “identity”. This is why Meriç’s writings have begun to attract a wider audience over the past decade and a half. Until then, his work held little appeal beyond the circles of the intellectual right, as clearly indicated by the articles about him, the interviews he gave, and the audiences and organizers of his lectures.⁶⁷

Köksal, also, deals with the relationship between his life story and his later thought;

Three observations are relevant to this early phase of his life. First are the colonial environment in which he grew up and the nationalist milieu in which he later found himself. Meriç was exposed to the cultural and intellectual influences of late Ottomanism, French colonialism and flourishing Turkism – all of which helped shape the “synthesis” he developed in later years. Second, during these years, he was exposed to Western knowledge and culture, and to socialism as an intellectual current, mostly through a process of reading books. Third, he encountered state repression and political intolerance through the experience of arrest and dismissal from several jobs.⁶⁸

Köksal strengthens my thesis by saying that “his conservatism was not founded on the typical anti-communism of most conservative positions.”⁶⁹ She also strengthens my views on Meriç’s Ottomanism by saying that,

Ottomanism is represented in four main platforms in Cemil Meriç. Firstly, a Tanzimatist reformist Ottomanism is represented in Cemil Meriç. Secondly, we should talk about an Ottomanism which tries to be Occidentalist and it also encompasses Orientalism. Thirdly, a tense

⁶⁶ Duygu Köksal, “The Dilemmas of Cultural Synthesis: Cemil Meriç as a Conservative Intellectual,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* (Fall 1999), p. 80.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

and paradoxical Easternism model of Ottomanism can be observed. Finally, the Ottomanism in the language of Meriç must be considered.⁷⁰

The following discussion is divided into section as follows: Meriç as a Civilizationist: Reference to Civilizational Differences and Demonizing the West, Orientalism/Orientalism in Reverse, Anti-Nationalist Themes, Religion, Marxist elements, Idealization of the Ottoman Past, Issue of Student Protests, Critique of Language Reform/Revolution and Critique of Laicism.

Meriç as a Civilizationist: Reference to Civilizational Differences and Demonizing the West

Talking about civilizational differences has become very popular in the world, as well as in Turkey. Samuel Huntington wrote *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* in 1996. According to that book, the Cold War and the clash between the West and the Soviet Union and the East Bloc was over. The new clash would be between the civilizations according to this thesis. In recent years, a naïve civilizationist project has emerged and co-sponsored by Zapatero of Spain and Erdoğan of Turkey in 2005. It was the Alliance of Civilizations. The aim of that Alliance, which was between Islamic and Western civilizations, was to fight terrorism and extremism. Against the good faith of Zapatero, the term Alliance of Civilizations reflects a civilizationist mentality.

The term is also popular in Turkey. As it can be guessed, it is very popular in rightist circles because it necessitates an essentialist outlook to interpret civilizations as a whole and by their religion in spite of many innate differences. The term can be

⁷⁰ Köksal, “Zaman, Osmanlılık ve Cemil Meriç”, *Cogito* 11 (1997), p. 195.

traced back to Ziya Gökalp and his famous distinction between culture and civilization. By this, he meant that culture is/must be local and national, but civilization is global. Gökalp says that there is only one civilization and denies the plurality of civilizations.

The first thing that can be said about Meriç's civilizationist understanding is that he saw the plurality of civilizations. For him, there was no single civilization, but multiple civilizations. In his diary, he wrote in 1963 that, "there is no world civilization. There are several civilizations. And progress can only happen by that diversity. That is, civilizations have to complement each other."⁷¹

He also made a distinction between culture and civilization, but there was a nuance in his definition. He saw the latter as more general. He thought that cultures belonged to societies while civilization belongs to multiple societies. In his diary, he wrote in 1963 that "if we compare cultures to civilizations, a society can play in two ways: everybody plays separately, everybody plays collectively."⁷²

He also saw the plurality of cultures. In the *Işık Doğudan Gelir* he said that, "there are many cultures not a single culture in the world; cultures that are equal in value. Every big culture is single and speaks its own language in every sphere, a language that no other culture can understand."⁷³

His civilizational understanding, sometimes, come to the point of demonizing the West. He showed the West as enemies to the Islamic Orient. In *Bu Ülke*, he said

⁷¹ "Dünya medeniyeti yok. Çeşitli medeniyetler var. Ve ilerleme ancak bu çeşitlilik sayesinde. Yani medeniyetler birbirlerini tamamlamalıdır." Cemil Meriç, *Diary: Volume 1* (Jurnal: Cilt 1) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 170.

⁷² "Kültürleri oyunculara benzetirsek, bir toplum iki şekilde oynayabilir: herkes ayrı ayrı oynar, kolektif halde oynar." Ibid., p. 169.

⁷³ "Bir değil birçok kültürler var dünyada; değerce birbirine eşit kültürler. Her büyük kültür tektir ve her alanda kendi dilini konuşur, başka kültürlerin anlayamayacağı bir dil." Cemil Meriç, *Işık Doğudan Gelir (The Light Comes From the East)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009).

that, “Europe exports clergyman to the Ottoman territory. In order to convert to Christianity? What connection. Its only aim is to irreligionize the Ottoman.”⁷⁴

He says in *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1* (the Forty Hatches: Volume 1), which he wrote in 1980, that, “a hostile civilization that rests on a different basis; and that the novel, which is this civilization’s most complete, most encompassing form, cannot be conquered, understood, adopted by a civilization at one blow.”⁷⁵

He saw the common denominator of the Western/Christian civilization as Christianity. In *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (the From Umran to Civilization), he said that, “Europe is Christian despite its materialism; it is Christian by its leftist and rightist. We (the Muslims-A.H.) are the only enemy of the Christian. We are a fearsome and mystical force that defeats the Crusaders’ armies.”⁷⁶

He said in his diary in 1974 that, “there are two competing civilizations: Turkish-Islamic civilization made conquest for a thousand years, it has obvious measures, obvious victories and obvious achievements. It became old. (The other one is Western Civilization- A.H.)”⁷⁷

In *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (the From Umran to Civilization), he said that, “contemporization is surely Europeanization. Europeanization, that is,

⁷⁴ “Avrupa, Osmanlı ülkesine papaz ihraç eder. Hristiyanlığa davet için mi? Ne münasebet. Tek emeli Osmanlı’yı dinsizleştirmektir.” Cemil Meriç, *Bu ülke* (This Country) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 178.

⁷⁵ “Farklı temellere dayanan düşman bir medeniyet ve bu medeniyetin en bütün, en kucaklayıcı ifadesi olan roman, başka bir medeniyet tarafından bir hamlede fethedilemez, anlaşılabilir, benimsenemez.” Cemil Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1* (Forty Hatches: Volume 1), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p.334.

⁷⁶ “Avrupa maddeciliğine rağmen Hristiyandır; sağcısıyla, solcusuyla Hristiyan. Hristiyan için ise tek düşman biziz. Haçlı ordularını bozgundan bozguna uğratan korkunç ve esrarlı kuvvet.” Cemil Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (From Umran to Civilization), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 9.

⁷⁷ “Çarpışan iki medeniyet var: Türk-İslam medeniyeti bin yıl fetihler yapmış, belli ölçüleri, belli zaferleri, belli başarıları var. İhtiyarlamış.” Cemil Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2* (Diary: Vol. 2.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 202.

disappearance.⁷⁸” This quotation sheds light on the engagement of Meriç with the Islamic Orient. He, as a conservative, thought that all civilizations were sui generis and that they would lose their character if they Europeanized.

He says in *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (the Forty Hatches: Volume 1)*, which he wrote in 1980, that “East and West, Cross and Crescent, a magnificent past and a dark future were quarrelling. But the fight was not over yet. The last word was not said.”⁷⁹”

In *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 2 (the Forty Hatches: Volume 2)*, which he wrote in 1980, he said that, “yes, the Christian world’s perspective on Islam has always been hostile. European’s scientific and global curiosity stops at the borders of Islam. From the Crusaders on, the aim of the European is not to know Islam, but to destroy it”.⁸⁰

To conclude this section, it can be said that, the dominant characteristic of Meriç’s conservatism was its “Civilizationism” (*Medeniyetçilik*). He diverged from other conservatives of the Cold War era by his multiplication of the Orient. He saw the common denominator of the Islamic Orient, despite many Christian Arabs, Atheists and so on, as Islam. The same thing is true for the Western civilization, which he viewed as a monolithic entity.

He demonized the Western civilization, not any one of the Orients, in his engagement of himself in the Islamic Orient. He never said that West is the enemy, but instead he said that they were the enemy of the West. He diverged from the culture-civilization dichotomy of Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp said that there was only one

⁷⁸ “Çağdaşlaşmak elbette ki Avrupalılaşmaktır. Avrupalılaşmak yani yok olmak.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygurluğa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p.25.

⁷⁹ “Doğu ile Batı, Haç’la Hilal, muhteşem bir maziyle karanlık bir istikbal boğaz boğaza idiler. Ama kavga sona ermemişti henüz. Son söz söylenmemişti.” Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1)*, p. 377.

⁸⁰ “Evet, Hristiyan dünyasının İslam’a bakışı düşmanca olmuştur hep. Avrupalı’nın ilmi ve cihanşümul tecessüsü İslamiyet’in sınırlarında durur. Haçlılardan bu yana Avrupalı’nın amacı İslam’ı tanımak değil, İslamiyet’i yıkmaktır.” Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 2 (Forty Hatches: Volume 2)*, p.188.

global civilization, but Meriç said that there were many civilizations, both of which were defined by their religion.

Orientalism/Orientalism in Reverse

In the late eighteenth and during the nineteenth centuries, Orientalism was used for the artists who depicted the Orient. In the twentieth century, especially with Edward Said's important work *Orientalism*,⁸¹ which was written in 1978, the term's meaning changed. It has started to mean a pervasive western tradition especially shaped by the European imperialism.

Occidentalists, in James Carrier's words, "turn the world upside-down"⁸². They see the West as antithetical to the East. Occidentalism can be termed Orientalism-in-Reverse. While the Orientalists assert the superiority of the West, the Occidentalists assert the superiority of the East. Occidentalism has double meanings. It also means studying the West. Meriç was an Occidentalism in both senses.

Orientalists see rationality as a European asset. The Eastern countries are depicted as non-rational in Orientalist works such as those of Bernard Lewis. Meriç turned that upside-down. In *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (the *From Umran to Civilization*) which he published in 1974, he said that, "non-western countries, especially the Islamic countries, are, maybe, more rational than the West. They do not enter capitalism, because their rationality is not commodification."⁸³

⁸¹ Edward Said, *Şarkiyatçılık: Batı'nın Şark Anlayışları* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2003).

⁸² James Carrier, "Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside Down," *American Ethnologist* 19, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 195-212.

⁸³ "Avrupa dışı ülkeler bilhassa İslam ülkeleri, belki de, Batı'dan daha çok akılcıdırlar. Kapitalizme girmemişlerdir, çünkü onlardaki rasyonalite eşyalaşma değildir." Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (*From Umran to Civilization*), p.21.

He went on to say that in *Bu Ülke* (This Country) which was published in 1974; “we are the children of a different civilization; of an enemy civilization, of a civilization that has different measures, older, gentler, more humane.”⁸⁴

In *Bu Ülke* (This Country), he says that, “Montesquieu mentions Eastern despotism. The ultimate form of despotism is in England which he worshipped and France, of which he is a citizen.”⁸⁵

He asserted the difference of Islam, but he still saw the superiority in the Islamic Orient. In *This Country*, he said that;

Yes, Islam is the dominance of law and order (nomocracy). Long ago conquered the equality which West wants to accomplish. Islam is the very democracy. But it is a democracy which developed in a very different climate of soul, and rests on different principles.⁸⁶

In his diary, which he wrote in 1959, he said that; “Europe is East and the Asia is West in the middle ages. Ibn Haldun is more Westerner than Bergson.”⁸⁷

To conclude this subsection, Meriç engaged himself with the Islamic Orient in his quest for superiority over Western civilization. He used an Occidentalistic language which changed the assets which were given to the West by the Orientalists and gave them to the Islamic Orient. For example, he asserted that Islam was more democratic and more rational than the West.

⁸⁴ “Biz apayrı bir medeniyetin çocuklarıyız; düşman bir medeniyetin, bambaşka ölçüleri olan, çok daha eski, çok daha asil, çok daha insanca bir medeniyetin.” Meriç, *Bu ülke* (This Country), P. 97.

⁸⁵ Montesquieu doğu despotizminden söz eder. Despotizmin alası perestişkarı olduğu İngiltere’de ve tebaası bulunduğu Fransa’dadır.” Ibid., p. 192.

⁸⁶ “Evet, İslam bir kanun ve nizam hakimiyeti (nomokrasi)dir. Batı’nın gerçekleştirmeye çalıştığı eşitliği çoktan fethetmiştir. Demokrasinin ta kendisidir İslamiyet. Ama batıdakinden çok başka bir ruh ikliminde gelişen, çok başka umdelere dayanan bir demokrasi.” Ibid., pp. 171-72.

⁸⁷ “Ortaçağ’da Avrupa Doğu, Asya Batı’dır. Ibn Haldun, Bergson’dan çok daha Batılı...”, *Journal: vol. 1*, p. 54.

Conservative Nativism instead of Nationalism

Nationalism is, like conservatism, a modern ideology, that can be dated to the post-1789 era. There are three main approaches in nationalism studies, modernist, primordialist and ethnicist approaches. To start with, the primordialists say that there have always been nations in history. They are eternal. Ethnicists, among whom the most referred figure is Anthony Smith, say that there have not always been nations, but an ethnic core. Smith's approach is called ethno-symbolism.⁸⁸ Modernists say that nations and nationalism are political and cultural construct. The most important modernists are Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner.

Nationalism is one of the dominant ideologies, and the founding ideology, of the Republican era. Nationalists, from very different standpoints, agree on the primordality of the Turkish nation. That is, it is not peculiar to radical Turkish nationalism. For example, the Kemalist nationalist Turkish land forces adopt their date of foundation starting from Mete Khan who is a prehistoric figure of Turkic tribes.

As seen in chapter two on the different discourses of conservatism in Turkey in the Cold War era, one of the common denominators of all conservative discourses was their nationalism in the multi-party era. The intensity of nationalism may have changed as in the case of cultural conservatives' nationalism understanding, but their nationalism was constant. To repeat my thesis once again, Meriç was a *sui generis* figure who diverged from other discourses with his anti-nationalism.

He said in *Umran'dan Uygarlığa* (the *From Umran to Civilization*) which was written in 1974, on the eve of big left-right combat in Turkey, that “the

⁸⁸ For an ethno-symbolist approach in understanding Turkish nationalism, see Nergis Canefe, “Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (2002), pp. 133-155.

supremacy claim of the nations is a poor delusion, a conceit.”⁸⁹ This sentence was radical in the Turkish context and even when a rightist said that its radicalism grows. When one left aside the radical Islamists, all rightists are nationalist. It can be a surprise when we say that Meriç had disciples both from the nationalist-conservatives and Islamists who had nationalist tendencies. This is about a selective reading of Meriç, nationalist-conservatives and Islamists select suitable phrases from Meriç.

Meriç preferred conservative discourse of “nativism” instead of nationalism. He said in his diary in 1963 that “then, he (Cemil Meriç- A.H.-) is jealous of their nativity. All of them are the animals of this soil. None of them are provisory; there are no cliff between their heads and their worlds. ... Only he is rootless, disespoused and different.”⁹⁰

He even wanted the nativity of Turkish socialism. In his diary he wrote in 1974 that “among the Turkish socialists whom I know, the most native and the most honest was Esat.”⁹¹

In *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (the Forty Hatches: Volume 1)*, which he wrote in 1980, he says that, “A clean, warm, friendly manner of telling. Native with her fugitivity and weaknesses.”⁹²

⁸⁹ “Milletlerin üstünlük iddiası zavallı bir vehim, bir kendini beğenmişlik. “Meriç, *Umrandan Uygurluğa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p. 82.

⁹⁰ “Sonra yerliliklerini kıskanıyor. Hepsi bu toprağın hayvanı. Hiçbiri iğreti değil, hiçbirinin kafasıyla dünyası arasında uçurum yok. ... Yalnız o köksüz, o kopmuş, o başka.” Meriç, *Diary: Volume 1*, p. 89.

⁹¹ “Tanıdığım Türk sosyalistleri içinde en yerlisi, en dürüstü Esat’tı.” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2 (Diary: Volume. 2)*, p. 193.

⁹² “Temiz, sıcak, dost bir anlatış. Derbederliği ve zaaflarıyla yerli.” Meriç, *Forty Hatches: Volume 1 (Kırk Ambar cilt 1)*, p. 353.

To conclude this subsection, one of the most important characteristics of Meriç was that he was not a nationalist. In the Cold War era, both of the conservative discourses, and even both of the Turkish right, was nationalist and anti-communist, but were not seen in Cemil Meriç.

Religion

Against the “paganic nationalism”⁹³ of the Turkists and neo-Turkists, who were racist-Turanist, different conservatisms in Turkey were in a search of a Turkish nation the founding pillars of which was Islam in the Cold War era. As seen in Yahya Kemal’s criticism on Ziya Gökalp, conservatives, ranging from cultural conservatives to nationalist conservatives, saw the definition of the Turkish nation of the Turkists or neo-Turkists too bookish and synthetic.

Islam, for Meriç, was not the religion whose defender and the chosen nation was Turks, as asserted by the nationalist-conservatives. In Meriç’s “civilizationist” understanding, Islam was the most important definer of one of the Orients,⁹⁴ that is the Islamic Orient.

He saw faith as a bond in developing countries. In *Bu Ülke (This Country)*, which he wrote in 1974, he says that;

Unity of belief merges human with human, makes mass a nation in developing countries. Islam says believers are brothers. Blood is a biological concept: dark, mysterious, blind. Being a human is to rescue ourselves from the captivity of biology. There is only humanly value. Faith does not separate, but unites. Faith, that is, the thought which is molded with sense, winged with emotion, to be lived and makes us live.⁹⁵

⁹³ With paganic nationalism, different conservative discourses mean that Turkists and neo-Turkists ignore the Islamic past and refer to the pre-Islamic shamanic past.

⁹⁴ In Meriç’s understanding, there was not a single Orient. Instead, there were multiple Orients. These were the Islamic, Persian and Indian Orients, all of which were defined by their civilization.

Meriç said in *This Country (Bu Ülke)* which he wrote in 1974 that “it is the belief, not the blood and soil that makes the citizenship.”⁹⁶ With this sentence he objected to two models of citizenship: the ethnic and territorial models. He objected to ethnic citizenship in that he did not see blood as the core of citizenship. He also objected to the territorial model in that he does not see soil as the core of citizenship. He saw religion as a common denominator for citizens.

Meriç came very close to Nietzsche’s saying “God is dead”.⁹⁷ He agreed that the god was no longer guiding modern man. He thought that godlessness created *angoisse* in modern men. He said in *Sosyoloji Notları ve Konferanslar* (the *Sociology Notes and Conferences*) that;

Humanity has not been able to get used to living in a godless world. It was a soil producer person. No love will continue, no lawlessness will be caused.

Angoisse is freedom’s fear; it is the fear of decision. Church and mosque would guide man.⁹⁸

He said in a letter which he wrote in 1967 that; “Islam makes all of this country’s races one race, one heart, one person. A moral unity, not a biological one. That is the biggest, most sacred unity.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ “Gelişen toplumlarda insanı insanla kaynaştıran, yığını millet yapan, inanç birliği. İnananlar kardeştir, diyor İslamiyet. Kan biyolojik bir mefhum: karanlık, esrarlı, kör. İnsanlaşmak biyolojinin esaretinden kurtulmaktır. Tek insani değer var. İman ayırılmaz birleştirebilir. İman yani hisle yoğrulmuş, heyecanla kanatlanmış, yaşayan ve yaşatan düşünce.” Meriç, *From Umran to Civilization (Umrandan Uygurluğa)*, p. 127.

⁹⁶ “Vatandaşlığı yapan kan ve toprak değil, inanç.” Meriç, *This Country (Bu ülke)*, p. 171.

⁹⁷ We should say that Nietzsche does not care about the godlessness, but Meriç cared about it. Meriç viewed godlessness as a negative phenomena.

⁹⁸ “İnsanlık tanrısız bir dünyada yaşamaya alışmadı. Gübre müstahsili bir insan. Hiçbir sevgi sürüp gitmeyecek, hiçbir hukuksuzluk doğrulanmayacak.

Hürriyetin korkusu *angoisse*, karar vermekten duyulan korku. Kilise ve cami yol gösterirdi insana.” Cemil Meriç, *Sosyoloji Notları ve Konferanslar (Sociology Notes and Conferences)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), p. 38.

Meriç was against atheism and saw it as an illness. In a letter which he wrote in 1967, he wrote that, “atheism is the most unforgiven reaction. It is the plague which creates a miserable herd out of a brave army.”¹⁰⁰

He says in *Bu Ülke* (This Country) that; “the innovation wave that has knocked down every citadel since the Tanzimat lose ground in front of the fortress of Nur.”¹⁰¹

To conclude this subsection, Meriç saw religion as a means of social cohesion like Tarık Buğra. For him, it was a bond that held society together. For him, religion was a must to be a citizen. He denied both ethnic and territorial models of citizenship.

Marxist Elements

Marxism has some credos. One of them is to see the engine of history, while passing from the feudal to capitalist stages, as the social classes. It is a dialectical understanding referred to as dialectical materialism. This understanding is mostly adopted by people on the left of the political spectrum. It is very surprising to see the same understanding in Meriç who was a political conservative. It can be explained by the imprint of his youth experiences. As discussed above, Hatay, where he was raised, was a cosmopolitan place which was experiencing a transitionary era. There were many socialists in exile in Hatay, some of whom became his teachers. So Meriç got accustomed to the doctrines of Marxism, which influenced his later life. It should

⁹⁹ “*Bu ülkenin bütün ırklarını tek ırk, tek kalp, tek insan haline getiren İslamiyet olmuş. Biolojik değil moral bir vahdet. Yani vahdetlerin en büyüğü, en mukaddesi.*” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2* (Diary: Volume 2), p. 156.

¹⁰⁰ “*Dinsizlik irticaların en affedilmezi. En yiğit orduyu en miskin sürü haline getiren veba.*” Ibid., p. 157.

¹⁰¹ “*Tanzimattan beri her hisarı deviren teceddüt dalgası ilk defa olarak Nur kalesi önünde geriler.*” Meriç, *Bu Ülke* (This Country), p.247.

also be said that the acquaintance of Meriç to Marxist ideas were not limited to his youth. As he showed in his book the *Mağaradakiler (Those in the Cave)*, he made a deep reading of socialists from Lenin to Gramsci.

The sentence below best exemplifies his relation to Marxism and the bourgeois class. He says that in the *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)* which he wrote in 1974 that;

We understand better why most of the countries that are underdeveloped are called “undeveloped” after we read *Mukaddime* today. The reason for the political, economic and social failures that have marked North African history for centuries is the absence of a social class (that is similar to bourgeoisie in the West).¹⁰²

Despite the fact that he had Marxist elements in his discourse, he had harsh criticisms on the Turkish left. In his diary he wrote in 1974 that;

The Left is a parrot. It repeats the thought. It is crippled, it walks with crutches. It absolutely needs a Westerner to move. In order to be her friend, you have to speak its language. Its language, that is, the language of the master and guide which it chooses. It is imprisoned to symbols and slogans.¹⁰³

He was also hostile to the bourgeoisie. In *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)*, he says that;

The poor economist, more accurately, the poor bourgeoisie thought that tries to devalue Proudhon by imitating him to Baudelaire. It is a class’ opinion rather than a writer’s opinion.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² “Bugün “az gelişmiş” denen ülkelerden birçoğunun neden az gelişmiş olduğunu *Mukaddime*’yi okuduktan sonra daha iyi anlıyoruz. Kuzey Afrika tarihini asırlar boyu damgalayan siyasi, iktisadi ve içtimai başarısızlıkların sebebi, bu ülkede içtimai bir zümrenin (Batı’da burjuvaziye benzeyen bir sınıfın) yokluğudur.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p. 146.

¹⁰³ “Sol, papağandır. Öğretilenleri tekrar eder. Topaldır, koltuk denekleri ile yürür. Hareket etmek için mutlaka bir Batılıya muhtaçtır. Dost olmanız için dilini konuşmanız lazım. Dilini, yani seçtiği pirin mürşidin dilini. Sembollere ve sloganlara mahpustur.” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2 (Diary: volume. 2)*, p. 198.

His hostility towards socialism was valid in his discourse despite the Marxist elements. He says in *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1)* that, “socialism is also an intellectual illness, like Westernism. A need to be someone else, not to seem like the people, to connect to the far away, to the one that is far away.”¹⁰⁵

To conclude this subsection, there were Marxist elements in the discourse of Cemil Meriç. Despite criticizing the bourgeoisie class, he saw them as necessary for the development of a society.

Idealization of the Ottoman Past

The Kemalist elite, when they came to power and founded the Turkish Republic, started marginalizing the Ottoman Empire as the “other” of the Republic. For them, the Empire represented backwardness and the Republic enlightenment. They constructed their identity on the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic past. For example, The Turkish History Thesis of the 1930s, start Turkish history from the Turkic tribes, of course, for them, those Turkic tribes were the Turkish nation, of the Central Asian steppes.¹⁰⁶

Ottoman history, or the history in general,¹⁰⁷ is an ideological battleground in the Republican era. Everybody had their own version of the Ottoman Empire, of

¹⁰⁴ “Baudelaire’i Proudhon’a benzeterek küçültmeye çalışan zavallı iktisatçı, daha doğrusu zavallı burjuva düşüncesi. Zira bir yazarın değil, bir sınıfın yargısıdır bu.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p.325.

¹⁰⁵ “Sosyalizm de bir aydın hastalığı, Batıcılık gibi. Başkası olmak, halka benzememek, uzağa, uzaktakine bağlanmak ihtiyacı.” Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1)*, p. 355.

¹⁰⁶ Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003).

¹⁰⁷ The history’s battleground status is not peculiar to Turkey. For example, in Germany there was a very important quarrel in the second half of the 1980s known as the Historikerstreit. There was a quarrel on issues such as Sonderweg.

which they highlighted certain aspects. For example, some Islamists gave emphasis to the “sharia”, which is the traditional Islamic law. For those, the Republic represented degeneration. They saw the golden years of Muslim-Turks in the Ottoman era. Nationalist-conservatives yearned for the conquests of the Classical Ottoman Era. They criticized the Republic for its pacifism.

Meriç can be categorized as an Ottomanist. We can say that he was confused in approaching the Ottoman past. Sometimes he highlighted the intellectual legacy of the late Ottoman era, but he sometimes highlighted the Ottoman as conqueror. That Janus-faced oscillation complicates the answer to the question who the Turks were. Were they the children of the “militarist” Ottoman Empire or the children of the intellectuals’ Ottoman Empire?

The Ottoman Empire was accepted as a just state by Meriç. It was compared with France, England and so on and the “uniqueness” of the Empire was stressed. He said in *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)* that;

Why do not we have a Bodin, a Hobbes, a Bousset? Why do not they grow up (in Turkey- A.H.)... If the tough theorists of the absolutism lived in the Ottoman territory, they would be saga-tellers of the Emperor. The dream of a just and magnificent state, which they did not see happening in their country, was only actualized by the Ottomans.¹⁰⁸

Idealization of the Ottoman past sometimes unites with the reverse-Orientalism or Occidentalism, as noted above. Meriç said in *Bu Ülke (This Country)* that;

There is no novel in Divan literature. Why?

One of the first novels of the West is the *Crippled Devil*. The hero opens the roof of his house, lets us into his bedroom. Novel is a disclosure

¹⁰⁸ “Bizde neden bir Hobbes, bir Bousset, bir Bodin yetişmemiş? Neden yetişsin... Mutlakiyetin bu yavuz nazariyecileri ülkelerinde gerçekleştiğini göremedikleri bu adil ve kerim devlet rüyasını, yalnız Osmanlı gerçekleştirmiştir.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p. 196.

from the beginning. The Ottoman neither had wounds nor the illness to show them. The stories literalize a warrior or an anecdote to take share of it.¹⁰⁹

His ideal Ottoman Empire was that of the Ottoman Muslims'. Despite incorporating many ethnic groups from different religions, Meriç talked about a unity of faith. Meriç said in *Bu Ülke (This Country)* that, "religion is a consciousness, solidarity, a love for the Ottoman. Ottoman society depends on human dignity and unity of faith."¹¹⁰

In the *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1)* which he wrote in 1980, he said that;

Ottoman actualizes itself either in faith or in action. It does not regard chat as suitable to its dignity. It does not show its wounds. Its story tellers either make a hero literary or a kind of epic or they give a lesson of morality, that is, it is out of time and geography. It is a caution rather than disclosure, a caution or a mental practice.¹¹¹

He adopted one of the theses of the Kemalists, that is, that there were no classes in Turkey, and adapted it to the Ottoman Era. By that, he further idealized the Ottoman era. In the *From Umran to Civilization*, he says that;

Is it possible not to remember our science-lover madrasahians while reading these lines? Those keen intelligences that make shallow similarities as laws

¹⁰⁹ "Divan edebiyatında roman yok. Niçin olsun?"

Batı'nın ilk romanlarından biri "Topal Şeytan". Kahraman evlerin damını açar, bizi yatak odalarına sokar. Roman başlangıcından itibaren bir ifşadır. Osmanlı'nın ne yaraları var, ne yaralarını teşhir etmek hastalığı. Hikayeleri ya bir cengaveri edebileştirir, ya hisse alınacak bir kıssadır." Meriç, *Bu Ülke (This Country)*, p. 119.

¹¹⁰ "Osmanlı için bir şuurdur din, tesanüttür, sevgidir. Osmanlı toplumu insan haysiyetine ve inanç birliğine dayanır." Ibid., p. 177.

¹¹¹ "Osmanlı kendini imanda veya aksiyonda gerçekleştirir. Gevezeliği vakarına yakıştırılmaz. Teşhir etmez yaralarını. Hikayecileri ya bir kahramanı edebileştirir, ya bir nevi destandır, ya bir ahlak dersi verir yani zamanın ve coğrafyanın dışındadır. Bir ifşa değil bir ikazdır, bir ikaz veya bir zihin temrini." Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: volume 1)*, p. 330.

imagine feudalism in the Ottoman Empire; they try to explain our history by the class combat.¹¹²

As noted above, sometimes Ottoman the Conqueror becomes the ideal

Ottoman for Meriç. He says in a Journal which he wrote in 1963 that;

Everything was in its place in the Middle Ages. Social classes were happy with their circumstances. Nobody deals with that delicacy. The barons were busy either with attacking each other, hunting or chasing after women. Sometimes the Jerusalem dream caught the gentlemen. And the sword of Islam, blood lets the Christian knights, who catch on “plathone” from eating too much, to their castles.¹¹³

He goes on to say in a journal which he wrote in 1963 that;

Life, mostly, was a colorful dream that started with sword and finished with chopper. The contry of the Ottomans was very different.¹¹⁴

To conclude this subsection, Meriç had an ideal Ottoman Empire. His ideal Ottoman Empire was a monolithic empire, composed of Muslims. It can be defined as a fantasia. He sometimes highlighted the classical era’s conquering Ottoman Empire, but sometimes the last phase of the Empire’s intellectual legacy such as Abdullah Cevdet. His classless, organic and harmonious society imagination was a very conservative theme.

¹¹² “Bu satırlarımızı okurken, bilim aşığı medreselilerimizi hatırlamamak kabil mi? Sathi benzerlikleri kanunlaştıran bu keskin zekalar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda feodalite tahayyül eder; tarihimizi sınıf kavgasıyla izaha kalkışır”, Meriç, Umrandan Uygurluğa (From Umran to Civilization), p. 161.

¹¹³ “Ortaçağ’da herkes yerli yerinde. İctimai sınıflar hallerinden memnun. Kimsenin böyle inceliklerle uğraşacak vakti yok. Baronlar ya birbirine saldırmakla meşgul, ya avla, ya da zamparalıkla. Arada bir can sıkıntısına uğrayan beyleri Kudüs hülyası sarar. Ve İslam’ın kılıcı fazla yiyip içmekten “plathone” a tutulan Hristiyan şövalyeleri hacamet edip şatolarına yollar.” Meriç, Jurnal: Cilt 1 (Diary: Volume 1), p. 115.

¹¹⁴ “Hayat çok defa kılıçla başlayan satırla biten rengarenk bir rüyaydı. Apayrı bir dünyaydı Osmanlılarının ülkesi.” Ibid., p. 125.

Anti-Liberal Elements

All intellectuals' thoughts reflect the era in which they live. This was also true for Cemil Meriç. The projection of the political events of his era can be followed in his writings. He was a Cold War figure of conservatism. Despite diverging many issues from other conservatives, he developed a conservative stance to the events of his era. In the 1960s, with the wind of the new constitution, there occurred great politicization. The left-right polarization resulted in an immense struggle especially in the 1970s. So Meriç, just like many other conservatives, blamed the struggle and the “anarchy” in the, relatively speaking, more liberal understanding of the new constitution.

Meriç says in *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (the *From Umran to Civilization*) that;

They wrote in different ages, their countries are different... but they have the same source of inspiration: social shocks. They witnessed the wolfication of the person who was released; they understood that excessive freedom is a door that is opened to anarchy; anarchy that is the law of the jungle. Their pessimism is the fruit of bad experience.

A Tunisian proud faith, a Florencian bitter irony, and an English uneasy consciousness. Ibn Haldun, Machiavelli, Hobbes... Not three people, three symbols.¹¹⁵

To conclude this subsection, there were elements that are not libertarian existed in the discourse of Meriç. This is he had a conservative bias. The “freedom” that came with the 1961 constitution was too much for him, in that it created “anarchy” in society.

¹¹⁵ “Ayrı çağlarda yaşadılar, yurtları ayrı... ama ilham kaynakları bir: içtimai sarsıntılar. Dizginleri gevşetilen insanın kurtlaştığına şahit oldular; anladılar ki aşırı hürriyet anarşiye açılan bir kapı, anarşiye yani cangıl kanunlarına. Bedbinlikleri acı tecrübelerin meyvesi.

Tunuslu, mağrur bir tevekkül; Floransa'lı, buruk bir istihza; İngiliz, tedirgin bir şuur. Ibn Haldun, Machiavelli, Hobbes... Üç insan değil, üç remiz.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa* (*From Umran to Civilization*), p. 199.

Criticism of the Language Reform/Revolution

The Language reform is one of the most important events in the early years of modern Turkey. It was an effort to change civilization. Kemalists brought the Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic alphabet. They also changed the old words, which were Arabic and Persian, by creating new words. On the ideological ground, it became a litmus test between the Kemalists and rightists. While the Kemalists supported the language reform/revolution, the different components of the Turkish right criticized that reform harshly. We will see that criticism also below in Tarık Buğra.

Meriç, as a conservative intellectual, was not an exception in the criticism of language reform. With inspiration from Peyami Safa, who was also a conservative figure mentioned in chapter two, he calls the new language as ‘uydurca’. By that, he referred to the creation of new words by the Kemalists.

He wrote in the *Bu Ülke* that, “and like throwing himself from a cliff, he threw himself into the laps of ‘uydurca’. He could not understand that a poem could not be written with those rootless, musicless, careless carcasses of words.”¹¹⁶

He went on to say in the *This Country (Bu Ülke)* which he wrote in 1974 that;

Slang is the language of the people who escapes from the laws. The invented language is the language of he who escapes from history. Slang is the wall which is constructed by fear; the invented language is unconsciousness. One of them is the veil which hides sins; the other one is the rope which suffocates insight. Slang is the voice of a wounded conscience; the invented language is the voice of a generation which has lost its memory. Slang belongs to all countries; the invented language belongs to the countryless’.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ “Ve kendisini bir uçuruma atar gibi “uydurca”nın kucağına fırlattı. Bu köksüz, bu musikisiz, bu tedbisiz kelime leşleriyle şiir yazılamayacağını anlayamadı.” Meriç, *Bu ülke (This Country)*, p. 152.

¹¹⁷ “Argo kanundan kaçanların dili. Uydurma dil tarihten kaçanların. Argo, korkunun ördüğü duvar. Uydurma dil şüursuzluğun. Biri günahları gizleyen peçe, öteki irfanı boğan kement. Argo,

He referred to language revolution as vandalism in the *Mağaradakiler (Those in the Cave)*¹¹⁸ which he wrote in 1978; “a vandalism which no country has experienced is called a revolution: Language Revolution”.¹¹⁹

In the *Forty Hatches: volume 1 (Kırk Ambar: cilt 1)*, which he wrote in 1980, Meriç wrote that;

How can a nation, that started its alphabet in 1928, give literary masterpieces that express it in 1936? Of course, there is no Turkish novel, because there is no reader, no accumulation and no freedom.¹²⁰

To conclude, he took the common conservative stance on the language issue. He accused the Kemalists of vandalism. The language reform affected him more than any other conservative because the Ottoman language had been used in Hatay until its annexation to Turkey in 1939.

Critique of Kemalism and its Laicism Principle

Kemalism and its laicism principle, as seen above, were criticized by many conservative discourses in the Cold War era. Meriç did not see the Kemalists as the

yaralı bir vicdanın sesi; uydurma dil hafızasını kaybeden bir neslin. Argo her ülkenin; uydurma dil ülkesizlerin.” Meriç, Umrandan Uygurluğa (From Umran to Civilization), p. 84.

¹¹⁸ By the term “Those in the Cave”, he made an allegory about the mentality of Turkish intellectuals. He means that the Turkish intellectuals saw the reality outside Turkey, but the reality was in Turkey, according to him.

¹¹⁹ “Hiçbir ülkenin eşine rastlamadığı bir vandalizme inkılap adı verilir. Dil inkılabı.” Cemil Meriç, *Mağaradakiler (Those in the Cave)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 266.

¹²⁰ “1928’de alfabeye başlayan bir millet 1936’da nasıl kendisini ifade edecek edebi şaheserler yaratabilir? Tabii yok Türk romanı. Çünkü okuyucu yok, birikim yok, hürriyet yok.” Meriç, *Kırk Ambar: Cilt 1 (Forty Hatches: Volume 1)*, p. 325.

historical other and he did not seek to be an organic intellectual of the state in Gramscian terms. At the center of the Kemalism criticism of Meriç was the laicism principle.

He had a deep respect for Said Nursi¹²¹. It shows us the conservative aspect of Meriç. Nursi fetishized the state. His Islamism was a conservative Islamism. His followers, such as Fethullah Gülen, can be even categorized as Turkish-Islamic synthesists. As has been repeated many times, conservatives are opposed to Islamic radicalism. They prefer conservative Islam. I think that Meriç's respect for Nursi can be explained by that. Meriç's usage of Nursi in criticizing Kemalism is very understandable in this respect. In the *Bu Ülke (This Country)*, he said that, "when he (Said Nursi) talked, the hollow sets of laicism one by one collapsed."¹²²

He viewed Atatürk as a myth that bound the society. He said in his diary which he wrote in 1955 that, "the community is leaning against a myth: The myth of Atatürk. There is no other bond."¹²³

He goes on to say, in his diary which he wrote in 1963, that;

It is a murder that was combined with stupidity, from the natural law perspective, to arrest 3-5 citizens who were gathered to read Said Nursi treatises. Those are proper for appreciation who read a book that mentions morality and humanity in a country where immorality, egoism and apathy are widespread.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Said Nursi was an Islamist. He, later, influenced many Islamists. There are also Islamic sects that read Risale-i Nur such as New Asians (*Yeni Asyacılar*) and neo-Nur Gülen Movement in contemporary Turkey.

¹²² "O (Said Nursi) konuştuğunda, laikliğin kartondan setleri yıkıldı birer birer." Meriç, *Bu ülke (This Country)*, P.246.

¹²³ "Cemiyet tek mite dayalı: Atatürk miti. Başka bağ yok." Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 1 (Diary: vol. 1)*, p. 109.

¹²⁴ "Said Nursi risalelerini okumak için toplanan üç-beş vatandaşın tevkifi tabii hukuk bakımından hamakete kaynaşmış bir cinayettir. Ahlaksızlığın, kayıtsızlığın, bencilliğin ferman ferma olduğu bir ülkede, bir kitabı, ahlaktan, insanlıktan bahseden bir kitabı okuyanlar ancak takdire layıktır." Ibid., p.62.

Despite criticizing Kemalism, he had a deep respect for the Turkish Republic and Mustafa Kemal. In his diary, which he wrote in 1981, he said that;

The republic is the final act of the modernization movement that started with the Tanzimat and continued with the Constitutional Era. The Turkish nation, which has learnt bitter lessons from history, has accepted its right to live by ramping around a great commander.¹²⁵

To conclude, Kemalism and its laicism principle was criticized by Meriç. His criticism was very conservative in that he did not want to change laicism with the recreation of the caliphate. He just wanted to soften that principle.

The “Issue” of Student Protests

The genesis of the Turkish left can be traced back to the Ottoman era in modern Turkey.¹²⁶ Up to the 1960s, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the Democratic Party (DP) governments prevented a strong socialist movement from flourishing. After the 1960 coup d’etat, the military junta had university professors write a, relatively speaking, more democratic constitution. By that constitution, the chains on the Turkish left were partially made weaker. Many leftist books were published and young people got accustomed to the socialist ideals. The leftist students did not limit themselves to theory, but they also took part in the streets. Ultra-nationalist groups were also in the streets. In the 1970s that situation resulted in a clash between those two ideological groups. That situation was seen as a disaster by the rightists. They labeled socialists as anarchists altogether. The rightists usually favored the ultra-nationalists or, at least, ignored their role in the clash.

¹²⁵ “Cumhuriyet, Tanzimat’la başlayıp Meşrutiyet’le devam eden yenileşme hareketinin son perdesi. Tarihten çok acı dersler alan Türk milleti büyük bir kumandan etrafında şahlanarak hayat hakkını kabul ettirmiştir.” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2 (Diary: Volume 2)*, p. 299.

¹²⁶ Murat Belge, “Türkiye’de Sosyalizm Tarihinin Ana Çizgileri,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Left)*, ed. Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), pp. 19-48.

Despite having some Marxist elements in his discourse, Meriç could not free himself from his “anti-anarchist” and anti-leftist outlook. For him, the socialist student opposition was equated with anarchism. He thought that they were directed from Russia. He ignored the role of ultra-nationalists in that clash. The excerpt below best exemplifies his perspective;

Student movements, which burnt and waned like flash in the pan in the industrialized countries continues, like an important disease in us. The target of the anarchist terror is the state. Students are busy with the struggle; it is an insanity that looks like suicide rather than murder. We see that fire which was made stronger by the alien winds, as the last parody of the Westernization disaster.¹²⁷

To conclude, Meriç took a rightist stance in the leftist student protests issue. He called them all anarchists. This reflects the general climate of the era. This tendency was valid for many rightists of the Cold War era.

Gender

Meriç does not write directly on the gender roles of men and women. His ideas on the roles of men and women can be understood between the lines in his texts. He had a very conservative understanding on the gender issue. For him, the roles of both sexes were fixed.

¹²⁷ “Zira sanayileşmiş ülkelerde saman alevi gibi yanıp sönen öğrenci hareketleri bizde mühim bir hastalık gibi devam ediyor. Anarşist tedhişin hedefi devlettir. Öğrenciler birbirini yemekle meşgul; cinayetten çok intihara benzeyen bir çulğnluk bu. Yabancı rüzgarların köriklediği bu yangını Batılılaşma faciasının son parodisi olarak görüyoruz.” Meriç, *Mağaradakiler (Those in the Cav)*, p. 182-183.

He wrote in the *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)* that “the intellectual is like a woman, inconstant, capricious and lazy.”¹²⁸ By this, if we can disregard his anti-intellectualism here, he gives insulting characteristics to women.

He wrote in the *Bu Ülke* that “The mass is woman. She looks for a hard handed to give their chastity. They are gaggle uneasy without a shepherd.”¹²⁹

He says in the *Those in the Cave* that; “What is the relation of these disloyal and womanish gossips with truth?”¹³⁰

He goes on to say in his diary which he wrote in 1955 that; “Why does the masculine voice of the Lükres start not to resound in the horizon of humanity?”¹³¹

He goes on to say in his diary which he wrote in 1963 that; “bracelets are sometimes more sacred than the cordon of the legion d’honour medal, a cosmopolitan’s effeminate ankles contaminates it.”¹³²

To conclude, Meriç had a very conservative stance on the gender issue. He sublimated virility. For Nurdan Gürbilek, this was about to protecting his masculinity and escaping from femininity.

¹²⁸ “Aydın, kadın gibidir, hercai, kaprisli, tembel.” Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa (From Umran to Civilization)*, p. 28.

¹²⁹ “Yığın kadındır. İrzını teslim edecek bir zorba arar. Çobansız rahat edemeyen bir kaz sürüsü.”, Meriç, *Bu Ülke*, p.287.

¹³⁰ “Bu hain, bu kadınca dedikoduların gerçeğe ne alakası var?” Meriç, *Mağaradakiler*, p. 150.

¹³¹ “Niçin Lükres’in erkek sesi insanlığın ufkunda çınlamaz oldu?” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 1*, p. 34.

¹³² “Kelepçe bazen bir lejyon donör nişanının kordonundan çok daha kutsaldır, bir kozmopolitin efemine bilekleri kirletir onu...” Ibid., p. 63.

The Oscillation between Populism and Elitism

Being a populist and elitist at the same time may seem paradoxical at first, but it is not so in Turkish context. For example, who can argue that Süleyman Demirel, despite his populist discourse, is not an elitist? The examples can be multiplied. The same issue was valid in the discourse of Cemil Meriç. The pendulum of Meriç sometimes moved to a populist position in which direct reference was given to the Turks' characteristics which are assumed to be in themselves.

Meriç's populism went as far as defining himself as a reactionary. For him, reaction, despite all the Kemalist critiques of it, was a characteristic of Turks, which was intrinsic in them. Meriç identifies himself with this characteristic. In *Bu Ülke* (This Country), he said that;

If winging from an impure situation to a magnificent past is reaction, every honorable person is reactionary.¹³³

The label of fanaticism was given to the people who distorted religion by the secularists. Any publicity of Islam can be categorized as fanaticism by the secularists. Meriç described the Turks as fanatics for a criticism of Kemalist hegemony besides a concern to be read in *Bu Ülke*;

Fanaticism is the self-defense of the Orient. Fanatic is conversance; fanatic is the cognition who confines herself to a dogma, to a dogma that is eternity.

Hostility towards the fanatic was the hostility towards history. We are the fanatic with our most beautiful sides.¹³⁴

He goes on to say that in his diary which he wrote in 1974;

¹³³ “*Murdar bir halden muhteşem bir maziye kanatlanmak gericilikse her namuslu insan gericidir.*” Meriç, *Bu Ülke*, p. 80.

¹³⁴ “Yobazlık, Şark'ın nefis müdafaası. Yobaz, samimiyet, yobaz, kendini bir nass'a hapseden idrak, bir nass'a yani sonsuza. Yobaza düşmanlık, tarihe düşmanlık. Yobaz biziz, en güzel taraflarımızla biz.” Ibid, p. 89.

We inherited reaction from the Ottoman. Reaction was a fortress against the attacks of the West. Reaction was escaping to customs. It was not listening to the songs of mermaids. It was fear. Maybe it was going out of time. Intellectuals listened to the mermaids and they were devastated. This new reaction is to stop our ears to the sacred that belongs to us. It is escaping from us.¹³⁵

He says in *Bu Ülke* that;

You can easily deceive the mob, their emotions do not depend on any basis. The mass does not think, it is exposed to something. It believes in any thought like catching cold. When its temperature rises it becomes a lion. It forgets everything sacred when the attack finishes.¹³⁶

Besides being a populist, he had an elitist characteristic. He adopted the Ottoman distinction between *avam* and *havas*, which was literally, the common people versus the intellectual. He says in *Bu Ülke* that;

Big writer is the one who exclaims the voice that comes from him as it is. She does not think whether the *avam* will like or will not like while using the words.¹³⁷

Another elitist aspect of him was, as he said in his diary which he wrote in 1963, that;

That is, there are the books which the common people can understand, the people, which is, large masses and the people that went to primary school. Except them, there are the books which the people who want to be enlightened will read. There are also the books that real intellectuals will

¹³⁵ “Biz Osmanlı’dan yobazlığı devraldık. Batının taarruzu karşısında yobazlık bir kaleydi. Yobazlık ananeye kaçıştı. Deniz kızlarının şarkısını dinlememektir. Korkuydu. Belki zaman dışına çıkmaktı. Aydınlar deniz kızlarını dinlediler ve mahvoldular. Bu yeni yobazlık kendimize ait mukaddese kulaklarımızı tıkayıştır. Kendimizden kaçıştır.” Meriç, *Jurnal*: Cilt 2, p. 198.

¹³⁶ “Yığınımı kolayca kandırabilirsiniz, duyguları hiçbir temele dayanmaz. Yığın düşünmez, maruz kalır. Nezleye yakalanır gibi tutulur bir fikre. Ateşi yükselince arslanlaşır, nöbet geçince her mukaddesi unutturur.” Meriç, *Bu Ülke*, p. 109.

¹³⁷ “Büyük yazar içinden gelen sesi olduğu gibi haykırandır. Kelimeleri kullanırken avamın hoşuna gidip gitmeyeceğini düşünmez.”, Ibid.

contact. Even though the subjects of them are the same, their bringing forward of the issues and the vocabulary which they use are very different.¹³⁸

He goes on to say in *Jurnal: Cilt 2* that;

Not putting title to the writings is the semi-conscious legacy of centuries old Eastern tradition. The wish to have the reader experience a taste of discovery, to address the real friends that deserve, not letting the merchants into the temple that is *avam* to my ivory tower.¹³⁹

To conclude, Meriç oscillated between elitism and populism, but they did not contradict in his discourse. The two complemented each other. While populism made him closer to the common people, elitism guaranteed his important place as an intellectual in society.

¹³⁸ “Yani, halkın anlayacağı kitaplar vardır, halkın yani geniş kalabalıkların ilk mektep tahsili yapanların. Onların dışında aydınlanmak isteyenlerin okuyacağı kitaplar vardır. Sonra, gerçek aydınların temas edeceği kitaplar vardır. Bunların konuları aynı olsa bile, meseleyi ortaya atışları, kullandıkları vokabüler birbirinden çok farklıdır.”, Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 1*, p. 72.

¹³⁹ “Yazılara başlık koymamak asırları aşan bir doğu geleneğinin yarı şuurlu mirası. Okuyucuya bir keşif zevki tattırmak, gerçek dostlara yani layık olanlara seslenmek, bezirganları mabede başka bir deyişle avamı fildişi kuleme sokmamak arzusu.” Meriç, *Jurnal: Cilt 2*, p. 167.

CHAPTER 4

TARIK BUĞRA: A FIGURE OF NATIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE ORTHODOXY

Tarik Buğra was born in the town of Akşehir, which is bound to Konya. Konya is a peripheral city of Turkey. Most of the nationalist-conservative intellectuals of the Cold War era were born in such places. It is a sociological reality of nationalist-conservatism that its proponents are mostly “Anatolian Boys”, to use their own terminology. It is a thing to be proud of for them. They see the big cities as places of cosmopolitanism and corruption. They mostly see the essence, the purity of the Turkish nation in Anatolian towns.

He was born in 1918, the last year of the First World War. He was educated in Konya. He was from the generation that was educated in the Kemalist schools in the High Kemalist era and wrote their works during the Cold War era. He was from the same generation as nationalist-conservative intellectuals as İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Bahaeddin Ögel, and Mehmet Altay Köymen.

His family raised him with Islamic sensibilities. His father, Mehmet Nazım, was a conservative state official. In his personal library, there were many books. In Beşir Ayvazoğlu’s words, “there were the *Mesnevi* of Mevlana, the *Tarih-i Cevdet* of Cevdet Pasha, Namık Kemal’s books and the *Safahat* of Mehmet Akif.”¹⁴⁰ His mother was a member of religious sect”.¹⁴¹ Those oral and verbal ingredients and the Kemalist education system created Tarık Buğra as a nationalist-conservative intellectual.

¹⁴⁰ Beşir Ayvazoğlu, *Büyük Ağa: Tarık Buğra*, (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2006), p. 8.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

Buğra is not studied as much as Cemil Meriç. Nuran Özlük, Fatih Andı and Ertan Örgen are examples to the rightist literature on Tarık Buğra. In the non-rightist circles, there is the single study by Duygu Köksal, some studies by Fethi Naci and a book chapter by Murat Belge.

Köksal's and Murat Belge's studies concentrate on the relation between Buğra and the foundation of the Ottoman Empire problematic. There was a debate between Buğra and Fethi Naci. Naci, generally, liked the studies of Buğra, but he viewed Buğra's novel *Gençliğim Eyvah (Alas My Youth)* as "slogan literature."¹⁴² Buğra accused Naci of being politicized and ideologically oriented.

Buğra's novels and articles reflect the concerns of the rightist intellectuals of his era thoroughly. For example, in his novels which concentrated on the foundation of the Turkish Republic, he mostly criticized the Greek and Armenian minorities of the era. He also criticized the concept of democracy, the role of women, communism, modernity, the Republican People's Party, İnönü and laicism.

Hostility towards Minorities

The minority "issue" is an intrinsic part of all nationalist ideologies. All nationalisms in different countries see the minorities which live in their countries as problematic. Minorities are seen as alien by different majority nationalisms. Turkey is not an exception in this regard. The ethno-regional Kurdish "issue" of Turkey has been a challenging one from the foundation of the Republic on, and was even before. There are also different minorities ranging from Albanians to Greeks and Armenians in Turkey. Seeing the minorities as a problematic is not peculiar to radical Turkish nationalism or another single nationalism. We can see anti-minority discourse in Kemalism, nationalist-conservatism, Turkist-Islamism and Islamist-Turkism and so

¹⁴² *Slogan Edebiyatı.*

on. Kemalism as the founding ideology has shaped other political ideologies with its many facets, in the beginning with its historiography.

Buğra's hostility was shaped by the Kemalist historiography, by which he was very much influenced despite being a critic of that ideology. He was educated in Kemalist schools like other nationalist-conservative intellectuals. In the Kemalist understanding, the minorities, especially the Armenians and the Greeks, shot the Turks in the back in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire. Buğra totally accepted this understanding.

All the fault in the deterioration of relations in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire was given to the minorities by Buğra. Turks were seen as innocent in this regard. There is also an idealization of the relations in the classical era. Buğra says in his novel *Küçük Ağa (Little Agha)* that he wrote in 1964 that;

Niko has become weird these days. The others are much worse. There is something in this, god knows. We grew up like brothers. Everybody shopped with each other, greeted each other and laughed and were amused. What prostitute religion the dishonest people have. Your arm broke away and they showed themselves.¹⁴³

He gave the minorities unchanging and insulting characteristics. He always compared them with "Muslim-Turks." For him, all of the good assets were gathered in Turks and all of the bad assets were gathered in minorities. He saw those differences as primordial and eternal, that is, that difference would not change in time and space for him. As he put it in *Küçük Ağa*;

He made this comparison by nothing in his hand and finally he found "Hodja the Istanbulite"¹⁴⁴ smarter, more knowledgeable and more soft-spoken. The

¹⁴³ "Niko da bi tuhaflaştı bu günlerde. Ötekiler daha beter. Bi iş var bunda ya Allah bilir. Ülen kardeş gibi büyüdük... Herkes birbiriyle alışveriş eder, selamlaşır, güler oynardı. Ne kahpe dinliymiş namussuzlar. Senin kolun koşturdu ya, onların da mayası çıktı ortaya." Tarık Buğra, *Küçük Ağa (Little Agha)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 83.

¹⁴⁴ *İstanbullu Hoca*.

Clergy man was cunning, artificial and intriguer... he was double-faced. Against the Greek big talking, ungratefulness and prostitution, here there were people who are listening; thinking whether it is true or false, and trying to find the true path.¹⁴⁵

There was a “minority humor” for Buğra. It was rat, asocial, egocentric and twofaced. On the other hand, there was the “humor of effendi nation.” It was peace of minded and fair. The effendi nation was the Muslim-Turks. The Muslim minorities could not save themselves from that double-standard. The relation with them is Janus-faced. For example, a Muslim Arab could not find herself a prestigious place directly just because she was Muslim. As stated by Buğra in *Yağmur Beklerken* (the *While Waiting for the Rain*) that he wrote in 1981;

This victim is a doctor of malaria. He is Arab in origin. He is huge in the hip and belly. He is one of the hundred thousands who were uprooted. Country, home, relatives, culture, in sum, this fish’s water is beyond the borders. He has to do up with what and how much he adopts of the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*). That much is, according to Rahmi, will make him effendi, peace of minded and fair or make him adopt the minority humor that is rat, asocial, egocentric and twofaced. Rahmi thinks that which one he will choose cannot be estimated; because he thinks that the smiley and charming face of the doctor is a mask. He is, sometimes, ashamed of his thoughts. But he has nothing to do. He says “I have nothing to do.” And adds. “The Empire is different, being a nation is different.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ “Bu karşılaştırmayı elinde olmadan yaptı ve sonunda İstanbullu Hoca’yı daha akıllı, daha bilgili, daha güzel dilli buldu. Papaz sinsi, hileci ve dalavereci idi... İkiyüzlü idi. Beride Rumların farfaracılığına, nankörlüğüne ve kahpeliğine karşı burada dinleyen; doğru mu, değil mi diye düşünen, doğru yolu bulmak için çalışan insanlar vardı.” Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁴⁶ “Sıtma doktorudur bu seçtiği kurban. Arap asıllıdır o. İri yarıdır, kalçalı, göbeklidir. Misak-ı Milliden sonra kökünden kopan yüz binlerden birisi. Ev, bark, yer, yurt, hısım, akraba, soy, sop, kültür, kısacası, bu balığın suları sınırların ötesinde kalmış. Misak-ı Milli’nin ne kadarını ve nelerini benimseyebilmişse o kadarıyla yetinmek zorundadır artık. O kadarı denilen de –Rahmi’ye göre- onun ya efendi, huzurlu, dürüst olmasını sağlayacak, aya da kalleş, çıkarıcı, bencil, içinden pazarlıklı ve ikiyüzlü azınlık mizacını benimsemesine sebep olacak. Hangisi olduğu veya olacağı –şimdiden- kestirilemez.. Sanıyor Rahmi; çünkü doktorun eksilmeyen güleçliğini cana yakınlığını maske sanıyor. Arada bir utanır gibi oluyor bundan.. bu kötüye yoruşundan. Ama elinde değil. “Elimde değil” der ve ekler “İmparatorluk başka, millet olma çabası başka.” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*, pp. 15-16.

He used a different terminology from the Kemalists when he intellectualized his anti-minority attitude. His terminology was shaped by Islam, which was one of the backbones of Turkish nationalist-conservatism. The Kemalist understanding was much more secular, whereas Buğra and other nationalist conservatives were religious. He thought that shopping with non-Muslims was a sin. It can be argued that this discriminatory understanding can affect different things. Buğra says in his novel *Küçük Ağa* that, “Salih was thinking: It is a fault to sell commodity, selling it to a non-Muslim is a sin. Of course, his mother would not sell.”¹⁴⁷

The “eating the bread” discourse is one of the most important discourses of Turkish nationalist political spectrum from everyday nationalisms to radical Turkish nationalism. Conservative-nationalism is no exception in this regard. In recent years we see that the eating the bread discourse has been used for the Kurdish minorities. It is surprising to see that the same discourse was used more than thirty years ago by Buğra. Buğra says again in *Little Agha* that;

Little Leyla was trying to stop crying in the hall, her mother, who was waiting for news from her, was beating her breast silently. The Little Pilgrim became miserable. Reis Bey was sad and doleful. Minas was thinking about his job before everything. But he had troubles too. He was one of the few Christians who were faithful domain which he ate his bread and shared labor despite the downfall of the empire. Uncle Ali knew it like everyone and felt good feelings even respect for him. They had a friendship that did not come out into the open.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ “Salih düşünüyordu: Mal satmak ayıp, bir gavura satmak ise günah. Tabii Satmayacaktı anası.” Buğra, *Küçük Ağa (Little Agha)*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ “Leylacık sofada hıçkırıklarını boğmaya çalışıyor, ondan haber bekleyen anası aşağıda sessiz sessiz dövünüyordu. Küçük Hacı perişan olmuştu. Reis Bey üzgün ve mahzundu. Minas her şeyden önce işini düşünüyordu. Ama onun da dertlenmeden yapamadığı belliydi. İmparatorluğun çöküşüne rağmen ekmeğini yediği, emek paylaştığı bu toprakla bu insanlara bağlı kalan pek az Hristiyanlardan biri idi o. Bunu herkes gibi Ali Emmi de bilir ve Doktor’a ayrı bir yakınlık, hatta saygı duyardı. Aralarında pek açığa vurulmamış bir dostluk vardı.” Buğra, (*Küçük Ağa Little Agha*), p. 375.

Buğra said in an interview in 1985 that, “among the Tanzimat made us lose, the concessions which the minorities gained in the military and economic spheres takes a large part, I think. Equality in rights and freedoms, of course. But, what about the exemptions in responsibilities?”¹⁴⁹

Sometimes the discourse of nationalist-conservatism was radicalized and it is very hard to differentiate it from radical Turkish nationalism. Actually, there are no walls between different nationalist discourses in Turkey. That is, there can be transitions between different nationalisms, but its radicalism can take the shape of killing minorities which is very awful. Buğra says in his novel *Pharaoh's Faith* (Firavun İmanı) which he wrote in 1976 that;

So, why are you still in Ankara with same faith and belief?

Akif talked like whispering with his spotless and heart stealer smile, because he only gave prominence to the intentions; he was neither blowing nor getting angry.

If the destiny, as was happened so far, turns its back on this grand nation... If it is that much fickle, if Ankara falls, in order to be a martyr by killing 3-5 Greek dogs in the door of assembly.¹⁵⁰

To conclude this subsection, not the Kurdish minorities of his era, but the Armenian and Greek minorities of the National Liberation War (*Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı*) era were seen as problematic by Buğra. It is about the fact that for a very

¹⁴⁹ “Tanzimatın götürdükleri arasında azınlıkların askeri ve ekonomik alanlarda elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklar da, bana göre, önemli bir yer tutar. Haklar ve hürriyetlerde eşitlik, elbette. Ama ya yükümlülüklerdeki bağıkslıklar?” Tarık Buğra, *Politika Dışı (Out of Politics)* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1995), p. 242.

¹⁵⁰ “Öyle de siz neden hala Ankara’da ve aynı iman, aynı inançtasınız? Akif tertemiz ve gönül çelen; çünkü ancak niyetlere önem veren gülümseyişi ile, fısıldar gibi konuştu; övünmüyor, yiğitlik taslamıyor; paylamıyordu da. Felek, eğer; bugüne kadar ettiklerinin gösterdiği gibi, bu ulu milletten yüz çevirdiyse... O kadar kahpeyse, Ankara da düşecekse, Meclis’in kapısında üç, beş Rum itini gebertip şehit olabilmek için.” Tarık Buğra, *Firavun İmanı (Pharaoh's Faith)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), p. 21.

long time Kurds are accepted as “mountain Turks”. The existence of Kurds as a separate group from the Turks was denied.

The minorities of the National Liberation War era were seen as traitors and intriguers by Buğra as the tools of alien forces. There was an oscillation in Buğra’s discourse between killing minorities and seeing them as faithful. Seeing them as faithful was a statist approach in that it explained their relation vis-à-vis the state. It cannot be said that Buğra totally trusted the minorities. He used a religious/Islamic terminology in otherizing them. He differed from the Kemalist secular understanding in that respect.

Hostility towards democracy

Hostility towards democracy is one of the most important façades of nationalist-conservatism. The ideology emerged with the transition to democracy. So, as stated above, democracy and nationalist-conservatism are very much interrelated. First of all, in order to express themselves, political ideologies, whether they are rightist or leftist, need freedom of the press, which is an integral part of liberal democracy. The nationalist-conservatives published many books and wrote in newspapers in the post-1945 period, especially from 1960 onwards. Their discourse could not be shaped in the 1925-45 period, because there was not freedom of press in that era. Secondly, despite being a by-product of transition to democracy, their discourse was shaped with a critique of democracy. For them, “the freedoms were too much.” Those freedoms were giving way to the birth of the left, which was an alien and hostile ideology to them.

Buğra had a tendency to bind all the troubles to party struggle. He used that as a scapegoat in a sense. He says in *Küçük Ağa* that;

Losing was because of all of them. But Salih did not know any one of them. The things he knew were from the “Read” book which he read at the *Rüştiye* and the few sentences which he remembered from his father. He remembered one of them by giving importance, because his father and his father’s friends were repeating it frequently.

“These party fights will sink us”

Losing meant sinking, and maybe it is, as they said, because of the parties. Maybe the coming of Italian soldiers to Akşehir was because of party fights, who knows?¹⁵¹

The passing to the democracy was seen as the cradle of all evils by him. It would change the social order as well as the state order. Buğra says in *While Waiting for the Rain* that;

Poor Halid drank in the state, the tradition which does not separate it from its accountable and authorized not from the *rüştiye* education but from the Islam and the sect education which he was bound. He felt that radical and rooted change, he was upset. For him, the accountabilities and authorizations would be dispensed, would be abused and the state order would be get out of order. He had another and important fear: he thought that everybody would say an expression. For him, no one would listen to anyone else, everybody would say different things; undeserved wants would be accepted as deserved, silly wrongs would be accepted as truths. Maybe lumpens would be honored men, the noise of the unenlightened and careless would intimidate enlightened and careful people.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹“Yenilmek galiba bunların hepsi birdendi. Fakat Salih bunların hiçbirini bilmiyordu. Bütün bildikleri *Rüştiye*’de okuduğu “oku” isimli kitabından ve babasının söylediklerinde kafasında kalan bölük pörçük cümlelerden ibaretti. Bunlardan birini şimdi bile mühimseyerek hatırlıyordu. Çünkü babası da babasının arkadaşları da bunu sık sık tekrarlarlardı. “Bu fırka kavgaları bizi batıracak!..” Yenilmek batmak demektir ve belki de bu, dedikleri gibi fırkalar yüzünden olmuştu... Belki de “Kıçı kırık İtalyan askerinin ta Akşehir’e dayanması fırka kavgaları yündendi, kim bilir?” Buğra, *Küçük Ağa*, p. 47.

¹⁵²“Fakir Halid, *rüştiye* öğreniminden değil elbette, İslam ve bağlı bulunduğu tarikat eğitiminden sindirmişti içine Devlet’i, onun sorumlu ve yetkililerinden ayırmayan geleneği. Böylece bu köklü ve kökten değişikliği seziyor dertleniyordu. Ona, yetkiler ve sorumluluklar bir yana itilecekmiş, kötüye kullanılacakmış, devlet düzeni bozulacakmış gibi geliyordu. Bir başka ve daha önemsiz olmayan korkusu vardı: Söz ayağa düşecek sanıyordu. Ona göre kimse kimseyi dinlemeyecek, her kafadan bir ses çıkacak hak edilmemiş istekler hak sayılacak, en budala aldanışlar ve yanlışlar bile hakikatlerin, gerçeklerin yerini tutmaya başlayacaktı. Belki de ayaklar baş olacak, bilgisiz ve düşüncesizlerin yaygarası saldırganlığı, bilen ve düşünenleri sindirecekti.” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*.

He goes on to say in *While Waiting for the Rain (Yağmur Beklerken)* which he published in 1981, that was right after the 1980 coup d'etat of Turkey that;

He says that it was for nothing. For him, what will happen with the foundation of the party?

He thinks that it may not have a danger. That is, the time is not the Progressive Republican Party's time.. They neither hang a man nor exile him. And Free Party can win. Well, what will change if they win? The Gülbeyaz and the mayor will change and different men will come in their place.

Is it something to be desired?¹⁵³

Party membership seemed foolish and childish to him. In that issue, he says in *While Waiting for the Rain* that;

Rahmi also lit his own cigarette. Rıza Efendi was waiting this ritual to be over. While Rahmi was sitting:

He started by saying that as if I am learnt my mother's brother is a party member: It seems that I have not thought before. If the word of the Free Party was not here.. Just me? Who can think about it? The ones who was playing ball in *Harman Yeri*, that children.. Not trying to compare, but they were same with eight, ten party members.. Only they knew each other. Now.. Now the thing is changed. Another party has emerged and, the thing is now turned to the fight between *Altinkalem* District and *Eskikale* District. It will happen as we win-you win fight. If god lets, people will not fight with each other. I think that, I know from my as a soldier, *İttihatçıs* and *İtilafçıs* era will come back. One portion of the people will be *halkçı* (pro-Republican People's Party) and other portion will be *serbestçi* (pro-Free Republican Party). I say to the non-believer, do not forget it will absolutely happen.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³*Bir hiç için diyordu o. Ona göre, fırka kurulacaktı da ne olacaktı?*

Tut ki diye düşünüyordu hiçbir tehlikesi yok; yani zaman Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası zamanı değil.. Adamı asmazlar da, sürmezler de. Ve Serbest Fırka kazanabilir. İyi de, kazansa ne olacak? Gülbeyazların dımızı kırılacak, belediye reisi düşecek veee, onların yerine başkaları ve başkalarının adamları kabarcak hindi gibi!"
Heves edecek şey mi bu?" Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁵⁴*"Rahmi kendi sigarasını da yakmıştı. Rıza Efendi de bu merasimin bitmesini bekliyor olmalıydı. Rahmi yerine otururken:*

He goes on to say in *While Waiting for the Rain (Yağmur Beklerken)*

that;

They are eye-to-eye. He cannot do without adding; accurately, he cannot say the thing he actually wants to say, but hesitates.

Political partisanship is very dangerous. I have seen it. Don't enter the party.¹⁵⁵

Being a party member was related to God's curse. It was understood in religious terms by Buğra. He said that;

Güldane:

Do the people suffer from their own nazar?

Rahmi came to his sister in the morning, because he said go and have a look. After drinking the water which his cousin Aslı had brought, he went on to say that.

I have suffered from my own nazar. If it is not a nazar, I have annoyed God by saying that my husband do not seem anyone else, he does not go to coffeehouses, winehouses.¹⁵⁶ Are you the proud one, the god give us party membership.. Just him? I lost my son too. I also make people huffed to me and make them enemies. From the Gülbeyazs? Leyle does not come to my house anymore.¹⁵⁷

“Dayımın fırkalı olduğunu şinci öğrenmiş gibiyin,” diye başlayıverdi: Meğer heç alıma gelmezmiş. Şo Selbes Fırka lafi çıkmasaymış.. bi ben mi? Kimin aklına gelirdi? Hani Harman Yerinde top oynayanlar çıkmış ya, ha o yeni yetmeler.. benzetmek gibi olmasın.. ha fırkacı olan sekiz, on kişi.. Kendilerini bi kendileri bilirdi. Emme şincii.. şinci iş değışti gaari. Ortalığa bi fırka dha çıktı ya, iş şinci Altınkalem Mahalesiyle Eskikale Mahallesinin, şu bizim zamanımızdaki sapantaşı kavgasına dönecek. Biz yendiydik, yok biz yendiydik olcek. Onun gibi kafa göz patlamaz inşallah ya, bi bizdir sizdir zıtlaşması alıp gidcek! Bana öyle gelir hani: Eskerlik yıllarından bilirin ben, İttihatçılar, İtilafçılar dönemi geri gelcek. Halkın bi kısmı Halkçı, bi kısmı Selbesçi olcek. İnanmayana derim; ciz şoraya.. unutma bu dediğim.. olcek.”Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁵⁵ “Göz göze geldiler. Eklemeden yapamadı; daha doğrusu, asıl söylemek isteyip de çekindiğini öbleyemedi:

Tehlikelidir fırkacılık.. çok. Gördüm ben. Girme” Buğra, Yağmur Beklerken (While Waiting for the Rain), p. 100.

¹⁵⁶ *Meyhane*

¹⁵⁷ *Güldane:*

Heç insanın gendine nazarı değer mi gız? Diyordu.

In conclusion, Buğra viewed democracy as the cradle of all evils. His views are very suitable to the soul of the 1960s and 1970s, because in those years a strong left emerged and it was seen as a threat by the conservatives. Turkey was not a very democratic country in those years, but that little democratization was enough for the Turkish right to react.

Where Are the Women? The Place of Women in Buğra's Writings

The issue of women is an important part of conservative-nationalism as it is of other rightist ideologies like Islamism and Turkism. The perspective on women is contradictory. They are praised because they have children, which are very important for the future of nation, and they are insulted just because they are women and are seen as inferior. Women are approached within gender categories. Men are seen as breadwinners, as the heads of families and women are seen as subordinate to their husbands.

It must be said that as recent studies on gender and politics have shown us, the nation-building process and gender cannot be considered of separately. Women are thought to represent the homeland, which must be protected from assault like women's body. Women represent what is inside and what is outside, like the borders of nation-states.

Buğra thought that the presence of women in social life had to be restricted. He tried to remove women from the public sphere and confine them to the private

Rahmi, sabahleyin, git bir bak dediği için, öğleye doğru, bacısına gelmişti. Yiğeni Aslı'nun getirdiği kalaylı maşrapadaki suyu, başındaki tülbent'in kıyısı ile süzerek içtikten sonra devam etti. "Benim deydi vallaha. Nazar değilse bilem, benim gocam ellerinkine benzemez, gayfelerde, meyhanelerde sırtımez deye övüne övüne Allah'ı gızdırdım. Sen misin övünen, al da gör işte.. sarıverdi fırkacılığı başımızca.. yalnız onu mu? Oğlanı da gaptırdım. El alemi güstürüp de düşman ettiğim de bedavası. Hani Gülbeyazlardan ya? Leyle bile evime gelmez oldu gız." Buğra, Yağmur Beklerken, p. 164.

sphere. Women were thought to violate the morality of the nation. That is, their participation in public life could violate public morality. Women figures were in secondary role in his novels which depicted the public sphere. the public sphere. Women had almost no role there.

The phrase “the place of women is in their homes” was said directly in Buğra’s novels, which he made say to one of woman character. He says that in *Dönemeçte* (the *In the Turn*) which he published in 1980 that;

All of them is word, sister.. The place of women is their home. Do not regret because you cannot have education. Breed fine in your laps. Others are unimportant. I tried to be a teacher. It has finished. Where is the teaching job? I submitted the petition. But there were more than three hundred people waiting for appointment.¹⁵⁸

Women were thought to lack understanding. More accurately, they were thought to not understand from men’s affairs. Buğra believed that women only understand from child-breeding and housework. He put it in *Küçük Ağa* (*Little Agha*) like that;

However, Emine would run to his mother after shutting the door after him and say that there was something she could not understand and she fear it. Even she would cry quietly with her eyes full of tears.¹⁵⁹

He went on to say in the *Yağmur Beklerken* (*While Waiting for the Rain*) like that; “the women and young men could not understand, but Rıza Efendi could understand”.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ “Hepsi laf acım.. Kadının yeri evidir. Hiç hayıflanma okuyamadım diye. Sen kucağındakini iyi yetiştirmeye bak. Gerisi boş. Öğretmenlik diye didindim durdum. Bitti işte. Nerde öğretmenlik. Verdim dilekçeyi. Ama diğer mezunlardan tayin bekleyen üç yüzden çok arkadaş var.” Tarık Buğra, *Dönemeçte* (*In the Turn*), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 17.

¹⁵⁹“Halbuki Emine onun ardından kapıyı kapar kapamaz ansına koşacak ve dolu dolu gözlerle, “Aklının ermediği bir şeylerin döndüğünü, bundan çok korktuğunu söyleyecek, hatta sessiz sessiz ağlayacaktı.” Buğra, *Küçük Ağa* (*Little Agha*), p. 215.

Buğra assigned women a passive role in social relations. They again had to know their place in social relations. They could not behave or talk like men. He puts it in *Dönemeçte* like that;

There were five years between Orhan and her. It is impossible not to understand where the girls come from, how the boys pass from one stage of mentality and behavior in fifteen years. Could a girl make humor with a boy in their time? Could she talk giffgaff? Could it happen? If it happens it happens like that, the people who see think immediately bad things like him.¹⁶¹

He says, in the *While Waiting for the Rain*, that;

Rahmi, then, understood that the world consisted not only of bazaar, market and the positive and negative relations between them; there are also the homes; there are the streets which are left by men in the morning, there are neighborliness, kindred, friendship , membership of religious sects; in short, there are women.¹⁶²

To conclude, Buğra did not diverge from the rightist orthodoxy of his era in understanding women. Conservatives, Islamists and Turkists (and even Kemalists) see women inferior. Women were to be confined to the private sphere according to them.

¹⁶⁰ “Kadınlar ve genç erkekler değil ama Rıza Efendi bal gibi anlamıştı.” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken* (While Waiting for the Rain, p. 14.

¹⁶¹ “Orhan’la aralarında beş yaş vardı. On beş yıl içinde kızların nereden nereye geldiğini, delikanlıların hangi anlayıştan ve davranış tarzından geçip hangi noktaya ulaştığını anlamamak imkansızdı. Kendi zamanlarında bir kız bir delikanlı ile dalga geçsin? Böyle senli benli konuşsun? Olur muydu öyle şey? Olursa işte böyle olur, gören hemencecik kötü şeyler kurmaya başladılar, işte böyle.. yani kendisi gibi”. Buğra, *Dönemeçte*.

¹⁶²“ Rahmi de o zaman anladı ki, Dünya çarşidan, pazardan ve erkekler arasındaki olumlu ve olumsuz ilişkilerden ibaret değildir. Bir de evler vardır; Gündüzleri heriflerin bırakıp gittiği sokaklar, akıllarına bile gelmeyen komşuluklar, akrabalıklar, ahretlikler, kardeşlikler vardır; kısacası, kadınlar vardır.” Buğra, *Yağmur beklerken* (While Waiting for the Rain), pp. 172-173.

Anti-communism

Communism was a fear for rightist ideologies in the Cold War era both in Turkey and in other Western countries. They thought that Soviet Russia would support leftist groups outside Soviet Union and it would result in a socialist revolution in their homeland. Nationalist-conservatives in Turkey also had an intrinsic anti-communism. According to Yüksel Taşkın, it was born out of both fear and pragmatism.¹⁶³ They had a fear, because Soviet Russia was a neighbor of Turkey and it had made demands from Turkey. They demanded Kars, Ardahan and Artvin and a military base in the Straits. The anti-communism of the Turkish rightists was also a pragmatic attitude, because the left was not powerful enough to make a socialist revolution. Their anti-communism was combined with an anti-Russian racism. Russian people were seen as the historical rivals of the Turks. They referred to historical wars in historicizing anti-Russian sentiments. Being a Russian and being a communist were equalized.

Buğra considered Communism and Marxism to be identical and used the terms interchangeably. Marxism, which is a term that can be used in the plural, cannot be confined to Communism. Using them as identical is a mystification. The Euro-Marxism of the Cold War era shows us the reality that Marxists are not necessarily Communists.

Communists are deprived of their humanity. For example, the Bolsheviks, which ultimately became the Communist Party in Soviet Russia, are portrayed as inhuman creatures. He said that;

Hodja Effendi knew many things on that issue. He told one by one by giving examples from Russia how the Bolsheviks were hostile to religion, to

¹⁶³ Yüksel Taşkın, "Anti-Komünizm ve Türk Milliyetçiliği: Endişe ve Pragmatizm," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, pp. 618-634.

conscience, to property and to chastity and how they made humans worse than a herd. The fantastic assaults of ogres which were worse than Çakırsaylıs, Timurlenk and Hülagü and the Crusaders woke in the minds.¹⁶⁴

He went on to say in *Firavun İmanı* (the *Pharaoh Faith*) which he published in 1976 at the very 1975-1980 interval in which left-right fighting made top that;

Before all, what communism was and what it was not was explained to the people thoroughly. The nation knows the difference between obedience to an authority and attachment herself to it absolutely. Freedom of conscience and sacredness of family was more. They do not care about promises of welfare. Bolshevism meant the collapse of the world.¹⁶⁵

In *Bu Çağın Adı*, he said that;

Communism came by making Tsarist Russia's depressed people believe that they would found an earthly heaven. And it has founded the biggest jail, biggest isolation camp, biggest propaganda holding of the world. It has burnt millions of people in ovens, and killed millions of them in work camps. It has enslaved the people with "For the Society" lie. It has become obvious that equality folksongs were to bring a minority, to smash harshly. And it is cracked. It is cracked, but after the devastation of Basra. Will a generation's lifespan be enough for this destruction?¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ "Hoca Efendi bu konuda çok şey biliyordu. Bolşeviklerin nasıl bir din, iman, mal, mülk ve ırz namus düşmanı olduklarını, insanı nasıl insanlıktan çıkarıp koyun sürüsünden beter hale getirdiklerini, hem de Rusya'da olup bitenlerden örnekler vere vere bir bir anlattı. Kafaların içinde Çakırsaylılara, Timurlenk ve Hülagü ordularına bin kere rahmet okutturacak, Haçlılara taş çıkartacak bir korkunçluk taşıyan canavar sürülerinin fantastik saldırısları canlanmıştı." Buğra, *Küçük Ağa* (Little Agha), p. 219.

¹⁶⁵ "Her şeyden önce komünizmin ne olduğu ve ne olamayacağı halka ve halkın benin önemsemeyeceği şekilde ve iyi anlatılmıştı: Bir otoriteye itaat ile, ona mutlak surette bağlanmanın arasındaki korkunç farkı bilen millet, araya bir de vicdan hürriyetini ve aile kutsiyetini kaybetme tehlikesi girince derhal en kesin tavrını takınıyordu. Artık en büyük refah vaatleri bile onu ilgilendirmeyen oluyordu. Bolşeviklik lafının halk arasında dünyanın yıkılmasından başka bir anlamı vardır denilemezdi." Buğra, *Firavun İmanı* (Pharaoh's Faith), p. 134.

¹⁶⁶ "Komünizm Çarlık Rusya'sının sıkıntılı halkını, onlara yeryüzü cenneti kuracağına inandırarak ayaklandırdı. Ve Dünya'nın en büyük hapisanesini, en büyük tecrit kampını, en büyük propaganda holdingini kurdu. Milyonlarca insanı fırınlarda yaktı, milyonlarcasını da çalışma kamplarında öldürdü. Bir "toplum için" yutturmacası ile insanı köleleştirdi. Eşitlik türkülerini bir azınlığı getirmek içinmiş daha gaddarca ezmek içinmiş belli oldu. Ve iflas etti. Etti, ama Basra harab olduktan sonra. Bu yıkımı kaldırmaya bir neslin ömrü yetecek mi?" Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı* (Name of this Age), p. 26.

He considered Communism and Fascism to be similar. In the *Bu Çağın Adı*, he wrote that; “I do not like freedom criers who attacks opposite thoughts and insult rather than explicate, explain and disseminate. I hate them. They are either communist or Fascist. I hate them both.”¹⁶⁷

To conclude, the dominant aspect of Buğra like many other conservatives of the Cold War era was anti-communism. In his discourse anti-communism was combined with anti-Russian racism. We argue that how the novels of Nihal Atsız create an “understandable” literature for common Turkists, Buğra’s novels provide the same for nationalist-conservatives.

A Quest for a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

Turkish-Islamic synthesis is a quest which tries to create a symbiosis between Islam and Turkishness. It differs from the Turkish-Islamic synthesis of İbrahim Kafesoğlu, whose synthesis is the most doctrinaire form of nationalist-conservatism and was constructed in the 1970s. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis that we deal with is a different stuff, which cannot be confined to nationalist-conservatism. A quest for a Turkish-Islamic synthesis has been valid since Ziya Gökalp in Turkey. Nationalist-conservative intelligentsia has been very important in developing Ziya Gökalp’s theories, but as stated above, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis cannot be confined to them. They try to combine Turkishness and Islam, which cannot be thought separately for them. For them, Turkishness took its ultimate shape with the acceptance of Islam as the Turks’ official religion.

¹⁶⁷ “Benimsediği düşünce sistemini anlatacak, açıklayacak, yaymaya çalışacak yerde, karşı düşüncelere saldıran, sövüp sayan özgürlük tellallarını sevmiyorum. Tiksiniyorum onlardan. Öyleleri ya komünisttir ya faşist. Tiksiniyorum ikisinden de.” Ibid., p.303.

They differ from pan-Turkists in that regard. While pan-Turkists refer to the pre-Islamic Turkish civilization, nationalist-conservatives refer to the Islamic Turkish civilization. Nationalist-conservatives also differ from Kemalists, who make reference to pre-Islamic Turkish civilization as the cradle of the modern Turkish nation.

In their quest of synthesis, the dominant role is in Turkishness. Islam has a complementary role. As will be discussed below, Islam is thought as a means of social cohesion. In that regard, they differ from mainstream Islamists, for whom the dominant role is in Islam. For them, Turkishness has a secondary role and it is a complementary of Islam. He wrote in *Yağmur Beklerken (While Waiting for the Rain)* that;

He was trying to explain at the expense of last crumbs of his power: According to him, if Islam's deposits, that is, some rules, principles and values which remained intact can be used for Turkey, it is a trump card that few countries could have.¹⁶⁸

He went on to say in the *While Waiting for the Rain (Yağmur Beklerken)* that;

Kenan Bey says that Islam and old Turkish customs were suitable to this understanding, Ottomans kept the important fiscal, civil, military decisions open to discussion before the community in the mosques before the corruption. For him, the thing which founded that longest and long standing empire was that combination of the rulers and the ruled.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ "Ve, gücünün son kırıntıları pahasına anlatmaya çalışıyordu: Ona göre İslam'ın tortuları yani bozulmadan kalan bazı kuralları, ilkeleri ve değer yargıları bile Türkiye için -kullanılabilirse- çok az ülkenin elde edebileceği bir büyük kozdur." Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken (While Waiting for the Rain)*, p. 118.

¹⁶⁹ "Kenan Bey, İslam'la birlikte, eski Türk törelerinin de bu anlayışa uygun olduğunu söylüyor, Osmanlı'nın, bozulmadan önce önemli mali, mülki, askeri kararları camilerde, cemaat önünde tartışmaya açık tuttuğunu anlatıyordu. Ona göre dünyanın en uzun ve köklü imparatorluğunu da kuran işte bu yönetici ve yönetilen bütünleşmesiydi." Ibid., p. 119.

He again said in the *Pharaoh's Faith* that;

We must afraid of traitors. We must be afraid of the people who lost their faith and who give the issue of Turks to the people that are not friends to Turks and never will be friends to Turks.¹⁷⁰

Religion and nation are intertwined. In this issue he said in the *Pharaoh Faith* that; “and that man, like all of their co-religions and co-nations, were living to be ambitiously convinced”.¹⁷¹

He goes on to say in Pharaoh's Faith that; “as they said, there is not one more person who is more knowledgeable, nationalist, modest and more religious than him. He was an Ottoman Efendi. That is the situation. ”¹⁷²

The term “Muslim-Turk” passed in many places both in the works of nationalist-conservatives in general and in Buğra's works in particular. Muslim was the adjective of the Turk here. That is, Islam had a complementary role here. He said Pharaoh's Faith that;

Their lack of knowledge cannot be criticized. People can regret, because they did not have education. They could lose the fight; even they could be proud of leaving the challenge to the rats and the dissolute; but their loss could never be accepted as contempt, leaving the challenge as a surrender of the benefits; because their acceptance of the challenge is not limited with their honor. More accurately, the dimensions of honor were born out of the civilization which they were born into the legacy; it was associate. In summary, the majority of national assembly was Muslim Turk.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ “Biz asıl ihanetlerden korkmalıyız, acze kapılıp da Türk'ün davasını hiçbir zaman Türk'e dost olmayanlara ve olmayacaklara devretmekten korkmalıyız.” Buğra, *Firavun imanı (Pharaoh's Faith)*, p. 65.

¹⁷¹ “Ve bu adamcağızlar da bütün kandaşları ve dindaşları gibi akıllarının bir şeye yatmasını hürsle istedikleri günler yaşıyorlardı.” Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁷² “Söylenenlere bakılırsa ondan daha alim, ondan daha vatanperver, ondan daha dinine imanına bağlı ve alçakgönüllü insan bulunmazdı. Tam bir Osmanlı Efendisiydi o.” Ibid, p.76.

Being a Turk and being a Muslim which is not necessarily the same are equalized. A “Turk” which is a contesting term, can be atheist, Christian and so on, but for Buğra those possibilities were not valid. In *Küçük Ağa* he said that;

A very youthful, very young body, a rare brain... He was a man who was expecting a baby and there was not passed a year since he married. He was a pure Turk; he was a devoted and knowledgeable Muslim.¹⁷⁴

To conclude, Buğra was on a quest for a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. For him, Islam was the adjective of Turkishness, that is, Islam complemented Turkishness. There was a single Islam and a single Turkishness in his mind and he used them for the ideal Turkish nation.

Buğra as a Critic of Modernization and Westernization

The critique of modernity is very important for the anti-modernist ideologies like conservatism, fascism and Islamism. Of course, these ideologies are modern, but being modernist is a different issue. By being modernist, we refer to an attachment to Enlightenment principles. Modernity criticism shows its face with the criticism of Enlightenment, the principles of which is rationality and the French Revolution, the principles of which were equality, fraternity and freedom. They are also against to

¹⁷³“Bilgisizlikleri kınanmaz, olsa olsa okumadıkları, ilim yapmadıkları için üzüntü duyulabilirdi. Mücadelelerini kaybedebilirler; daha fenası onu bırakacak, meydanı kalleşlere, ahlaksızlara bırakacak kadar gurura kapılabilirlerdi; ama hiçbir zaman yenilişleri zillet, mücadeleyi bırakışları çıkarlardan ümit kesiş sayılamazdı; çünkü mücadeleyi kabul edişleri asla gururları, şerefleri, izzeti nefisleri ile sınırlı olmaz, hele çıkarları ile katiyen ilgili bulunmazdı. Asıl doğrusu gurur, şeref, izzeti nefis ve menfaat ölçüleri mirasından doğdukları o medeniyetin geleneklerinden, öfkelerinden doğardı; ortaktı. Kısacası millet meclisinin çoğunluğu Müslüman Türk'tü.” Ibid., pp. 182-183.

¹⁷⁴ “Dinç mi dinç, genç mi genç bir beden, eşine çok az rastlanır bir kafa... Evleneli yıl olmamış, bugün yarın çocuk bekleyen bir adam! Türk'se Türk hem de en katıksızından, Müslüman Müslüman hem de en inanmış ve bileninden!” Buğra, *Küçük Ağa (Little Agha)*, p. 236.

the by-products of modernity, those are, technological improvements and new institutions and to everything that is new in general.

For example, a park is a modern issue. It has nothing to do with the traditional social order. It is a symbol of a new social order. Buğra used that symbolism very well in his novels. An example to that is the below statement from the *While Waiting for the Rain (Yağmur Beklerken)* novel of Tarık Buğra. He says that;

He saw Gülhane Park, Yıldız Park, Bahri Baba Park. But he did not talk about them. He did not want to seem to be a wise guy, he did not want to contaminate his honor. He looks the issue from a different angle. The important thing is that we don't need a park, because everywhere is park: When you walk up to the Dereözü, there are walnut, oak, juniper, plane, willow trees, which are as old as my grandfather.¹⁷⁵

Buğra appreciated Japan's "modernization without Westernization miracle," like Mehmet Akif and many other conservatives. It is a very conservative theme. Today, this theme is still valid in different conservative discourses. He said in the *Bu Çağın Adı* that;

Japan conceives that education is the most important issue for development and undertakes it with all its power. They sent to developed countries not five, five hundred but more than one thousand selected students. They waited for their education with patience. Those who returned after completing their educations were used not in bureaucracy but in education. What have we done? We solved our issues altogether and got into Westernization ambition, we have made laws, we have taken their clothes, we have continuously changed constitution, that is we have imported. That was not enough; we were behind class and labor union, we went to streets, squares. Even we took guns.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵“Gülhane Parkı’nu, Yıldız Parkı’nu, Bahri Baba Parkı’nu görmüştür o. Ama bunun lafını bile etmiyor; çok bilmiş görünmek, onuruna toz kondurmak istemez. Konuya bambaşka açıdan bakıyor: Ona kalırsa, asıl önemlisi, parka ne gerek, çünkü, her bir yanımız park: Dereözü’nden yukarı doğru bir yürüdüün mü, dedem yaşında cevizler, meşeler, ardiçlar, çınarlar, söğütler!” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*, p. 10.

¹⁷⁶ “Japonya kalkınmak için en önemli meselenin eğitim olduğunu kavradı ve bütün gücüyle buna yükledi. Her yıl gelişmiş ülkelere beş değil, beş yüz değil, bin küsür seçilmiş öğrenci gönderdi. Onların yetişmesini sabırla bekledi. Eğitimini tamamlayıp dönenleri de bürokraside değil, yetiştiricilikte kullandı. Buna karşılık biz ne yaptık? Biz bütün meselelerimizi birden halledip

Buğra portrays his traditional people in a mood of disharmony with the “new”, modern Turkish society. The traditional people’s age-old institutions had been changed. From eating habits to smiling and walking, in sum, everything is changed for them in the Turkish society. In that issue he wrote in *Dönemeçte (In the Turn)* that;

He was hearing words and phrases from the Esmâ’s sons, who came to the town in summer holidays that he was startling and was imagining as if he was talking to the people of another nation, another umma. Even the words and phrases were constantly changing. They could not continue talking to some people, mostly depressed, sometimes angry quietness was happening. Age-old muselles’, murabbas, ehrams and zaviyes’ names were changed.

For sure, the changes were not confined to those: clothing had changed. The foods, the eating were changed. The sittings, the greetings, the walking on the road were like that. He said to the doctor one day the people were smiling and getting angry in another way like asking why and what will happen.¹⁷⁷

In *Bu Çağın Adı*, he wrote that; “for example, I say, we should not remember that Japan achieved its development this way and it achieved its development by wasting all its efforts for educating teachers, we must understand that”.¹⁷⁸

Buğra wrote in the *Bu Çağın Adı* that;

I guess it is the longest journey in history; it is our journey to the West.

Batılılaşma hırsına kapıldık, yasalar aldık, kılık kıyafet aldık, hababam anayasa değiştirdik yani ithal ettik. Bunlar da yetmedi sınıf, dernek peşine düştük, sokaklara meydanlara döküldük. Silaha bile sarıldık.” Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı*, pp. 96-97.

¹⁷⁷ “Yaz tatillerinde kasabaya gelen Esmâ’nın oğullarından artık öyle sözler, hatta öyle kelimeler işitiyordu ki, irkilir ve bir başka milletin bir bakla ümmetin insanları ile konuşuyor sanırdı kendini. Sözler ve kelimeler bile boyuna değişiyordu. Birtakım insanlarla artık konuşmayı sürdürülemez, çoğunlukla canı sıkkın, arada bir de öfkeli, suskunlaşır olmuşlardı. Kırk yıllık müselleslerin, murabbaların, ehramların, zaviyelerin adı bile değişmişti.

Değişmeler o kadarla kalmıyordu elbette: Artık giyim kuşam, kılık kıyafet de başkalaşmıştı. Yemekler bile, yemek yiyeşler bile değişmişti. Oturup kalkmalar, selamlaşmalar, yolda yürümeler de öyle. Bir gün doktora: gaari insanlar bir başka güler, bir başka öfkelenir oldular demişti, neden ve sonu ne olur diye sorar gibi.” Buğra, *Dönemeçte (In the Turn)*, p. 40.

¹⁷⁸“Mesela, diyorum, Japonya’nın kalkınmasını bu yolla, ve başlangıçta bütün gücünü iyi öğretmenler yetiştirmek için harcamak suretiyle gerçekleştirdiğini hatırlamamalı kavramalıyız.” Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı*, p.232.

During this journey our cuisines have changed, our wardrobes have changed, our calendars, our measures have changed, our alphabet, dictionary, holidays, way of sitting and standing have changed. *Okka* has gone, the kilogram has come. The meter has taken the place of the *arşın* and *endaze*. Friday has shifted to Sunday. All these renewal, reformation and revolution are to arrive at the West.¹⁷⁹

To conclude, Buğra, like many conservatives, yearned for the good old days. He wanted to protect the Turkish traditions. He was against the many things that were new, but all of them are only in his discourse. As an intellectual, he was a product of modernity. He was also against Westernization. He prefers development without Westernization, which is, not losing Turks' genuine character.

Critique of the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) and Kemalism

The Republican People's Party and Kemalist ideology, which is represented by it but cannot be confined to it, are historical others of nationalist-conservatism. Kemalist ideology can be defined as an Enlightenment ideology which seeks to mould and create a Turkish nation out of the remnants of the Ottoman past. Nationalist-conservatives are in an intra-elite struggle with the Kemalists to shape the nation. Nationalist-conservatives give reference to religion whereas Kemalists give reference to secular values in defining the nation.

It may be expected that they also see Mustafa Kemal as an "other", because he was the founder of Republican People's Party, but it is not so. More accurately they cannot directly criticize Mustafa Kemal, because they are afraid to counter the

¹⁷⁹ "*Tarih'te en uzun yolculuk sanırım budur; bizim Batı'ya yönelen yolculuğumuzdur. Bu yolculuk boyunca mutfaklarımız değişti, takvimlerimiz, ölçülerimiz değişti, alfabemiz, sözlüğümüz, tatil günlerimiz, oturup kalkmamız değişti. Okka gitti, kilo geldi. Arşın'ın endaze'nin yerini metre aldı. Cuma Pazar'a kaydı. Bunca teceddüt, bunca ıslahat, bunca inkılap ve reform ve devrim, hepsi Garp'a varmak için.*" Ibid., p. 74.

state. They choose to criticize İsmet İnönü, another Kemalist, instead. They say that Turkey deteriorated with the İnönü era. They define that era as a fascist era.

Buğra sometimes made direct criticisms of Mustafa Kemal, but it was a shy criticism which had a fear to touch Mustafa Kemal's leader cult which they thought as instrumental in holding the society still. In that issue he wrote that;

One day –that was very far away, from the first years of advocacy- in post-yatsı talk the towns attitude to the notables was criticizing by the uncle, mother's big brother and other elders of the family. Rahmi was angry like that yellow stubbornness issue: There are many Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, İsmet Paşa, Fevzi Paşa.

He wanted to say that in spite of how few party or state power do a man has, they wanted to locate Ankara, which was the five-year capital, in the town and they could even accomplish it.¹⁸⁰

In the late 1980s, in an article in the *Türkiye* (Turkey) newspaper, he showed his deep respect to Mustafa Kemal. We have seen above that he sometimes made small criticisms of Mustafa Kemal. It can be explained by the fact that writing in a newspaper necessitates speaking the language of the political establishment partially. In that article, he said that;

Maybe, my mentioning Atatürk is so sudden. It is not so because when you were talking about the people and the nation in the agenda of Turkey, you cannot help but think of Atatürk. He is the man who bound all his success to his nation and was successful because he was based on the people.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰“Bir gün –ki, bu da çok eskiden, avukatlığının ilk yıllarında- bir yatsı sonrası sohbetinde, kasabanın ileri gelenlere karşı tutumu eleştiriliyordu.. amcası, koca dayısı ve ailenin öteki büyükleri tarafından. Rahmi, tıpkı o sarı inat konusundaki gibi parlayıvermişti: Ne kadar da çok Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Fevzi Paşa, İsmet Paşa varmış.

Bu sözle, eline kırk paralık Devlet veya fırka yetkisi geçirenin Ankara'yı, yani beş yıllık başkenti kasabaya taşımaya kalkıştığını, hatta taşıdığını söylemek istiyordu.”

¹⁸¹ “Atatürk'ü anışım belki de damdan düşer gibi oldu. Değil; çünkü halk deyince, millet deyince, Türkiye gündemi içinde Atatürk'ü anmadan geçemezsiniz. Bütün başarılarını milletine bağlayan ve halka dayandığı için başaran adamdır o.” Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı (Name of This Age)*, p. 68.

He was comfortable in criticizing İsmet İnönü. He described İnönü as an obsessive person who could not criticize himself or listen to others' beliefs and thoughts. He said in *Yağmur Beklerken* that;

Naki Bey passed to criticize İsmet Paşa after this event:

For him, the Prime Minister had the attitude and belief of "I am the state". It was born out of the obsession that he thinks that only he could do it, the honest one, the only one who loved his nation and country was him.

According to Naki Bey, İsmet Pasha had a humor which could not criticize himself and his attitudes and which disregarded opposite beliefs and attitudes.

Naki Bey –and his friends- think that Gazi Paşa's incentive and conservation of the foundation of Free Party, born out of the need that only and only to alarm and control that humor of the Prime Minister.¹⁸²

Buğra viewed the National Chief Era as one of despotism. A despotic order is one in which a sovereign holds absolute power. For him, İnönü was the despot of the National Chief era. Although Mustafa Kemal had held the same power earlier, they concentrated on the National chief era. He said in the *In the Turn* that;

They had other conversations in his shop and at length. And, in one of them, while Halid criticized the young prosecutor, who was talking negatively and in public about religion, for belief, for God, in shame Şerif roared:

Agha, Agha; leave those dogs. They cannot open their mouths for National Chief's despotic and cringing order.¹⁸³

¹⁸² "Naki Bey, bu olaydan sonra İsmet Paşa'nın eleştirisine geçti:
Ona göre Başbakan Devlet benim inanç ve tutumdadır. Bu da ancak ben, yalnız ben yapabilirim, dürüst olan memleketini seven yalnız benim saplantısından doğmaktadır.
Gene Naki Bey'e göre İsmet Paşa kendi kendini ve eyleme yönelen düşüncelerini eleştirmeyen ve eleştiremeyen karşı düşünce ve anlayışların üzerinde durmaya yanaşmayan bi mizaca sahiptir.
Naki Beye –ve arkadaşlarına öyle gelmektedir ki Gazi Paşa Hazretlerinin serbest fırkanın kuruluşunu teşvik ve himaye etmesi sadece ve sadece Başbakan'ın bu mizacını uyarmak ve denetlemek gerekliliğinden doğmuştur." Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*, pp. 177-178.

¹⁸³ "Daha başka sohbetleri de vardı. Dükkanında. Uzun uzun. Ve bunların birisinde Halid, din için, iman için, Allah için ulu orta konuşmaktan büyük bir tad alan genç savcıyı, utana utana kınarken kükreyivermişti Şerif:

To conclude, Buğra used İsmet İnönü and the RPP as scapegoats and did not directly criticize Mustafa Kemal. In Turkey, criticizing Mustafa Kemal could mean imprisonment, so he avoided that criticism. In addition, Buğra saw Mustafa Kemal cult as the unifier of Turkey and found it useful to uphold society.

Anti-Intellectualism

Despite the fact that the nationalist-conservatives are an intellectual group and mostly came from literature circles, they have an anti-intellectualist attitude. They want to speak to the “common” and “everyday” man. They do not like educated and westernized people. They see westernization as alienation from the Turkish nation. Their “others” in westernization issue are Kemalists, liberals, socialists and non-Muslim minorities.

Intellectuals were portrayed as an alienated group in Buğra’s novels. They did not care common men’s living styles, customs and traditions. It is meant social alienation by the term alienation in Buğra’s novels. It referred to an individual’s estrangement from the traditional community and others in general. Here the traditional community was defined as the Turkish nation. He said in *While Waiting for the Rain* that;

If Rıza Efendi was talking to civil servants and literate, it was not because of he liked it. It was not because of he was proud of it. Rahmi knew: Rıza Efendi neglect that that literate group’s negligence of the town’s life style and negligence of the people’s customs and traditions and even their taking an opposite direction to it.¹⁸⁴

“Ağa, ağa; bırak şu itleri. Sıkıysa bir de Milli Şef için, şu despot, şu köpekleştiren düzen için açsınlar ağızlarını.” Buğra, *Dönemeçte*, p. 38.

¹⁸⁴ “Rıza Efendi memurlarla, okumuş yazmışlarla konuşuyorsa hoşlandığı için değildi bu. Hele övünmek için hiç değildi. Biliyordu Rahmi: Aldırmazdı Rıza Efendi bu okumuş yazmış takımının kasabadaki yaşayış tarzını, halkın görenek ve geleneklerini umursamayışlarına; hatta onlara zıt bir yol tutturmalarına.” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*, p. 53.

He went on to say in *Dönemeçte* that;

There was not a well thought and well chosen aspect of the newspaper except the day of its issuing and selling. Before all, the articles and editions were enlightened people's priggery. Albeit they were instructive, must be known, and telling the era in which is lived. But they were to be written in order to show how knowledgeable they were and they were written in a language and style in which no one could understand any one sentence.¹⁸⁵

To conclude, Buğra was against intellectualism (or *entellik* in today's popular terminology), but not against intellectuals. He could not be against the intellectuals, because of the fact that he was an intellectual. He criticized the intellectualism of the left.

A Conservative Islam: The Role of Religion As a Means of Social Cohesion

No matter how secular they are in outlook, all nationalisms refer to a religion. In Turkish nationalisms, the reference is to Islam. The nationalist-conservatives' reference to Islam is directly. It is not "shy" like Kemalist nationalism. Religion, in the nationalist-conservative case Islam, is seen as a social-bound, as a means of social cohesion. Islam is seen as the secondary element in Turkish identity. The dominant element is Turkishness as discussed above.

He said in the *Yağmur Beklerken* that;

And, there was also another trouble. At the beginning, gendarmerie, municipal employees, village headmen, even prosecutor were behaving harshly towards the people who were supporting the Free Party. Rahmi was

¹⁸⁵ "Gazetenin bu çıkış veya satılış gününden başka iyi düşünülüp seçilmiş başka bir yanı yoktu. Her şeyden önce yazılar ve derlemeler hepten aydın kişi ukalalıkları idi. Gerçi öğretici hem de gerçekten bilinmesi gereken, içine girilen dönemi anlatan şeylerdi. Ama çevredekilerin bir kelimesini bile sökemeyeceği bir üslup ve dille anlatan ben işte bu kadar bilgili biriyim demek için yazılmış şeyler." Buğra, *Dönemeçte*, p. 46.

running to them, dealing with the people in charge, talking to becalm radical supporters by calling the wise people to help:

They are not enemies. You know, that is Ese's son, your field, garden neighbor. Do not you make the same prayer with him?¹⁸⁶

In the *Dönemeçte*, he said that;

They drank their soup without talking. They thanked God. After washing out his mouth, Fakir asked what would be bought and then went to road by saying god's charge. He looked from the door with a belt while passing through the City Club and saw Şerif; his heart hurted:

He likes him; He said he is not like the others. He knew that he did not perform namaz like the other high officials. But there was a serious difference; Şerif did not see it well. The real important thing is that he did not insult them.¹⁸⁷

Buğra had an orthodox understanding of Islam. He was against the Islamic sects and that kind of excessive interpretations of Islam. In a interview, which he gave in 1983, he said that, "One must avoid behaving like members of religious order and sectarians that are the dominant reason for the Islamic world's biggest losses"¹⁸⁸.

He said in the *Name of this Age* that;

¹⁸⁶“Ve bir başka dert daha vardı: Başta jandarma, belediyeciler, muhtarlar, hatta savcı, Serbest Fırka'yı tutanlara karşı, haşin denecek kadar sert davranmakta idi. Rahmi bir yandan bunlara koşturuyor, görevlilerle cebelleşiyor, bir yandan da akli erenleri yardıma çağırarak ateşli yandaşlarını yatıştırmak için dil döküyordu: Düşman değil len onlar.. Bildiğin Ese'nin oğlu, işte şo.. Tarla, bahçe gomşun len. Aynı duayı etmen mi onla?” Buğra, *Yağmur Beklerken*, p. 171.

¹⁸⁷“Çorbalarını hiç konuşmadan bitirdiler. Hamd ettiler. Fakir ağzını çalkaladıktan sonra alınıp verileceği sordu ve Allah'a emanet diyerek yolsa çıktı. Şehir Kulübünün önünden geçerken kemerli kapıdan baktı ve Şerif'i gördü; içi sızladı:

Severdi onu; Ötekilere benzemez o derdi. Gerçi bilirdi o da öteki yüksek memurlar gibi namazdan niyazdan kopmuştu. Ama arada ciddi bir ayrılık vardı; Şerif bunu bir marifet sanmazdı. Asıl önemlisi de, namazında niyazında olanlara hor bakmazdı.” Buğra, *Dönemeçte (In the Turn)*, p.37.

¹⁸⁸“İslam dünyasının en büyük kayıplarının başlıca sebebi olan mezhepçiler ve tarikatçılar gibi davranmaktan kaçınılmalıdır.” Mehmet Tekin, Tarık Buğra: *Conversations (Tarık Buğra: Söyleşiler)*, p. 212.

There cannot be thought a Christian house without a Bible, a Jewish family without an Old Testament. This is neither about conservatism nor reaction; because in its most valid meaning culture –and societies- cannot be thought of without religion. On the opposite religion is the backbone of all cultures.¹⁸⁹

He said in *Politika Dışı* (the *Out of Politics*), which was published in 1992, that;

Akif was civilized and a civilizationist. He always propagated the positive sciences; he was like a warrior against ignorance and backwardness. He explained what we should take from the West and how we should take it, he fought a war against reaction.¹⁹⁰

To conclude, Buğra had a very conservative understanding of Islam. He saw Islam as a means of social cohesion, as bond that upheld Turkish society. He diverged from many radical Islamists in that he does not want the recreation of the Caliphate, but he just gives symbolic importance to Islam.

Fear of Mobs/Elitism

As stated above, nationalist-conservatism targets the “common” and “everyday” man, but it also fears the masses. It may be seem paradoxical. It is about establishing their power and not sharing it with any other group. The masses are related with ignorance and they prefer their rule as an intellectual group instead.

In *Dönemeçte*, he said that;

¹⁸⁹ “İncil’siz bir Hristiyan evi, Tevrat’sız da bir Musevi ailesi düşünülemez. Bu da ne tutuculuktur, ne yobazlık veya gericiliktendir; çünkü, en geçerli manasında kültür-ve toplumlar-dinden ayrı düşünülemez. Tam aksine din bütün toplumların bel kemiğidir.” Buğra, *Name of this Age* (*Bu Çağın Adı*), p. 206.

¹⁹⁰ “Akif medeni ve medeniyetçi idi. Daima müspet ilim propagandası yapmış, cehalete ve geriliğe karşı savaşçı gibi çıkmıştı. Batı’dan almamız gerekenleri ve nasıl almamız gerektiğini anlatmış, yobazlığa, softalığa karşı savaş açmıştı.” Buğra, *Politika Dışı*, p. 9.

If you leave the power center by itself, whether it is sultan or president of republic, there is no difference between them. Those new powerful protect the masses too much.¹⁹¹

In *Gençliğim Eyvah* (the *Alas My Youth*), he said that; “I mentioned the mobs to you. But you...both of us see that, you want to be like them, but you lack their courage.”¹⁹²

To conclude, in spite of being an anti-intellectualist, Buğra was also an elitist. This contradiction can be seen in many rightist intellectuals of the era. Buğra was not an exception in this regard.

Critique of Laicism

Laicism is one of the pillars of Kemalism, against which the nationalist-conservative discourse shaped. Laicism was seen as a means of westernizing and secularizing the country by the Kemalist elite. The Kemalist efforts were conceived as de-Islamizing the country by the nationalist-conservatives. Laicism principle has been criticized mostly via the headscarf issue and *İmam-Hatip* High-Schools.

In his novel, *Gençliğim Eyvah* (*Alas my Youth*), which is full of conspiracy theories, he finds conspiracies under everything. That book was published in 1979. For example, when he criticizes laicism principle of Kemalism and the modern Turkish Republic, he saw it as a conspiracy of the *Elder* the socialist;

Laicism principal was one of his cards. In that matter, *Elder* told to the *Young* that:

I want this to be known: No one can say that I do not understand the importance of laicism, which is one of the principals of state and supported by all the governments, that is the sixth arrow whose place is unknown. Just

¹⁹¹ “*Paytahtı başına buyruk bıraktın mı, ha Sultan ha reisi Cumhuriyet ayrısı gayrısı kalmaz. Bu yeni paytahtlılar da hani pek yağlayıp ballarlar ayakta kimini*” Buğra, *Dönemeçte* (*In the Turn*), p. 267.

¹⁹² “*Sana ayak takımından söz ettim. Ama sen.. işte ikimiz de görüyoruz, o ayak takımına özenirmişsin de, onlardaki yürekten yoksunmuşsun.*” Buğra, *Gençliğim Eyvah* (*Alas my Youth*), p. 28.

the opposite, I have got the most from the laicism principle up to today and every time.

He added: “The one who found the expression ‘reaction is awaking’ and made it eternal is me.”¹⁹³

To conclude, it is very important to understand Buğra’s conception of Laicism in order to understand the nationalist-Conservatives’ relation vis-a-vis the laicism issue. As noted above, Buğra preferred a conservative Islam, rather than a radical Islam. He was against an “excessive” understanding of laicism in Turkey. He would not support, for example, recreation of the Islamic Caliphate.

Hostility towards Politics/Politicization/Politicians

Nationalist-conservatives are hostile to politics from the birth of the ideology as an intellectual group to this day, but especially in the Cold War era. It was very much related to the era in which they wrote their works. The Cold War era in Turkey, especially from the 1961 constitution on, witnessed immense politicization. Different rightist and leftist groups took their places on the political stage. That politicization was too much for the nationalist-conservative intelligentsia. They wanted to disregard politics and rule the country with a council of elites. Those elites were, of course, nationalist-conservative intellectuals. Their hostility to politics was gathered with an elitist understanding.

In *Bu Çağın Adı*, he said that;

¹⁹³ “Önemli kozlarından birisi de laiklik ilkesi oldu. Bu konuda İhtiyar aynen şöyle demiştir Delikanlı’ya:

Şunun da bilinmesini isterim: Devlet’in ilkelerinden olan ve bütün hükümetlerce de titizlikle benimsenen laikliğin, yani bu fazladan ve nereye konulacağı pek bilinmeyen altıncı okun benim felsefeme ve mesleğime ne kadar faydalı olduğunu milimi milimine kavrayamadığımı kimse söyleyemez. Tam aksine, mesleğim ve felsefem için en üstün verimi, her dönemde ve bugüne kadar hep laiklik ilkesinden sağlamışumdur.

Ve eklemiştir: İrtica hortluyor deyimini bulan da ülkede ölümsüzlüğe kavuşturan da ben olmuşumdur.” Ibid., p. 66.

Actually, we forgot our streets, neighborhoods, towns, cities. We forgot ourselves. We could not think that that oblivion was captivity to politics, slavery to politician and gradually becoming so.¹⁹⁴

Politics was seen by Tarık Buğra as a psychosis, as a mental illness which was very hard to heal. In *Dönemeçte*, he said that;

In a society in which even the enlightened people in the economy and at the social level which is wanted to be reached, in an era in which it is declared that the philosophy of the state will be changed, the doctor found that politics psychosis caustic, even collapsive. He was afraid of the people and the politicians in a mutual manipulation would make the country a fearsome swamp, when he thought the examples in town with the attitude of the leaders in the capital city and the press' level of style and he came to believe that that end was a fate.¹⁹⁵

He saw politics as an epidemic. In *Bu Çağın Adı*, he says that;

Not only the soil, but also the heads and hearts can be desertified. The arch-source of this danger is, I eagerly repeat, the epidemic of politics.¹⁹⁶

In a interview which he gave in 1984, he says that “politics detach us from the real life; it sends us away from our duties and responsibilities and finally from this logic, it throws us into useless quarrels”.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ “Gerçekten de sokaklarımızı, mahallelerimizi, kasabalarımızı, şehirlerimizi unutup gitmiştik. Kendimizi unutmuştuk. Bu esaretin politikaya esaret, politikacıya kölelik olacağını ve git gide olduğunu düşünemiyorduk.” Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı* (Name of this Age), p. 30.

¹⁹⁵ “Başta ekonomi ve varılmak istenen toplum düzeyi olmak üzere, aydınlarının bile yöntem ve yönetim meselelerinin kutuplar kadar uzağında bulunan bir toplumda, Devlet felsefesinin değiştirileceği iddia olunan bir dönemde bu politika psikozunu, doktor, çürütücü, hatta çökertici buluyordu. Halk ile politikacıların karşılıklı bir yutturmaca içinde, ülkeyi korkunç bir bataklık haline getireceklerinden korkuyor, kasabadaki örnekleri, başkentteki liderlerin tutumu ve Bab-ı Ali'deki basının üslup seviyesi ile ilgilendirince bu sonucun kader niteliği taşıdığına inanacak gibi oluyordu.” Buğra, *Dönemeçte*, p.111-112.

¹⁹⁶ “Yalnız toprak değil, gönüller ve kafalar da çölleşebilir. Bu korkunç tehlikenin baş kaynağı da, ısrarla tekrarlarım, politika salgınıdır. Buğra, *Bu Çağın Adı*, p. 46.

¹⁹⁷ “Politika bizi gerçek hayattan koparmış, görevlerimizden ve sorumluluklarımızdan ve sonuç olarak da bu mantıktan uzaklaştırmıştır, dipsiz kike boş ambar didişmelere düşürmüştür.” Tekin, *Tarık Buğra: Conversations* (Tarık Buğra: Söyleşiler), p.86.

Buğra also was against politicization. He saw politicization as an illness. In an article, which he wrote in *Türkiye Gazetesi* (Turkey Newspaper) in 1991, he said that;

I see politicization which we lived before 1980 and we have started to live again, as the most important illness of a society –nation- because, this is a person’s tearing from herself/himself, her/his activities, responsibilities, possibilities and beauties, it is becoming the satellite of politics’ and politicians’ .¹⁹⁸

In the *Politika Dışı* (*Out of Politics*) which was published in 1992, he wrote that;

I do not depreciate that but, politics, with the multi-party era, caused every value to be forgotten without it, to damp down and to be seemed as the only interest and even the only focus of hope. It caused our people to forget their worlds of the mind and feeling, it diverted them from books. Even it pulled the press and publishing circles into its fight.¹⁹⁹

He saw politics as a scapegoat in a sense. Buğra says in an interview which is made with him in 1985 that;

Politics is what drops the book into the bottomless well in Turkey. Our literature is sabotaged by politics because, politics take the mind a captive. It attached horse glasses to the thought; it has not separated the thought from human’s, society’s, nature’s not only the beauties’ and diversities but also from the realities and real issues. It was erosion, when the sand storm finished, the reader escaped from the

¹⁹⁸ “1980 önceleri yaşadığımız ve yeniden yaşamaya başladığımız politizasyonu bir toplumun –milletin- en ciddi hastalığı olarak görüyorum; çünkü bu, insanın kendinden, kendi meşgalelerinden, güzelliklerinden, imkanlarından ve sorumluluklarından kopuşu, politikanın ve politikacının uydusu haline gelişidir.” Buğra, *Out of Politics (Politika Dışı)*, p.128.

¹⁹⁹ “Küçümsediğim yok onu; ama, çok partili dönemle birlikte politika kendi dışındaki bütün değerleri unutturmayı, küllemeyi ve tek ilgi, hatta tek umut odağı gibi görünmeyi başardı. İnsanlarımıza kafa ve duygu dünyalarını unutturdu, kitaptan uzaklaştırdı. Basın, yayın kesimini bile kendi kavgasına çekebildi.” Ibid, p. 30.

desert. There cannot be any more comment to the 2-3 thousand publishing in a 60 million country.²⁰⁰

To conclude, politics is wanted to be disregarded by Buğra. For him, politics was an illness that must be cured. He also was against politicization which is very dangerous for him.

²⁰⁰ "Türkiye'de politikadır kitabı kör kuyuya atan. Edebiyatımızı politika baltalamıştır; çünkü politika kafayı esir aldı. Düşünceye at gözlüğü taktı, onu insanın, doğanın, toplumun, yalnız güzelliklerinden, çeşitliliklerinden değil, gerçeklerinden ve gerçek meselelerinden de kopardı. Bu bir erozyondur, kum fırtınası diner dinmez okuyucu çölden kaçtı. 60 milyonluk bir ülkedeki 2-3 bin baskının bundan başka bir izahı olamaz." Ibid, p. 68.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study examined the divergence that happened in the political conservative thought in the multi-party era in Turkey. In that divergence, some people adopted an anti-communist and a nationalist stance and some adopted a sui generis, “civilizationist” and “conservative nativist”, path. Tarık Buğra was given as an example of the former one and Cemil Meriç of the latter.

As stated above, conservatism is not a strict political doctrine. It is a mentality that tries to cope with the modernization process. Before everything, it must be said that Turkish modernization is a conservative modernism that left its imprint on every aspect of Turkish society. Turkish modern political thought is not an exception in that regard. Conservatism is the dominant ideology of modern Turkey with nationalism. As was shown, it has many versions. Kemalism, besides being a conservative modernist ideology, has its own right and left versions.

The ideologies that compete with Kemalism are mainly conservative ones. The most powerful conservative ideology of these was nationalist-conservatism in the Cold war era. It was shaped in the multi-party era. It can be seen as an unintended consequence of the transition to democracy in that democratization, in theory at least, should empower liberal ideologies, but it has empowered such an undemocratic ideology like nationalist-conservatism in Turkey. The nationalist-conservatives have a different definition of Turkishness from that of the Kemalists. They have acted as medium-level intellectuals (*orta katman aydınlar*) in Gramscian terms. They strengthen the overall nationalism in Turkey. They write in newspapers so on and

popularize Turkish nationalism. Tarık Buğra was located in the nationalist-conservative orthodoxy.

There are also different conservative ideologies which stood in the conjuncture between conservatism and Islamism in the Cold War era. There were Islamist-Turkisms and Turkist-Islamisms. These generally can be called Islamist conservatisms. Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek are examples of them. They were especially popular between the 1945-1980. After the 1980s radical Islamism “freed” itself of conservatism, at least at the discursive level. In reality, there are still Islamist conservatisms, but there are also radical Islamisms that are behind a counter-Revolution, like the Iranian example.

There are also conservatisms that fit into the English model in Turkey, called “liberal” conservatisms. Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Fuat Başgil are as examples to that conservatism. While Ahmet Ağaoğlu belongs to the first generation of liberal conservatism, Ali Fuat Başgil belongs to the Cold War generation of liberal conservatism. They saw parliamentary rights as a tradition and constructed their conservatism on that tradition.

The cultural conservatism of Yahya Kemal, Samiha Ayverdi and Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi was discussed. Their conservatism had no political aspect. They produced their works mainly on cultural grounds, but nationalism was still not absent in them. Ayverdis especially adopted anti-communism because of the fact that they belonged to the Cold War generation.

Nurettin Topçu is also a very symbolic conservative figure. He is especially important with his criticisms on technology and capitalism. The criticism of capitalism is absent in Turkish conservatisms, Topçu is a sui generis figure in that regard. In conceptualizing Topçu, the concept of conservative revolution which is

very important in German context and was offered for Nurettin Topçu by Tanıl Bora was adopted.

As seen, the common denominator of both conservatisms is their intrinsic anti-communism and nationalism. Cemil Meriç was offered as a unique conservative figure. He mainly related himself to identity issues, which was very early for that era, because identity issues gained prominence after the 1980s, but Meriç wrote about them especially in the 1950-1980 period.

Meriç is very important vis-à-vis his relationship to Orientalism-Occidentalism distinction. In Hilmi Yavuz's words, he was both an Orientalist and an Occidentalist, that is, he both worked the East and the West simultaneously. He both referred to classic Ottoman historians such as Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and to Orientalist thinkers from the West.

Meriç's conservatism reflected itself, especially, in the religion issue. As seen, Meriç and Buğra were very close on the religion issue. They both saw religion as a means of social cohesion, that is, as cement that held the society together. If they diverged in a nuance, it was the fact that Meriç saw all religions as cement, but Buğra gave priority and exclusivity to Islam.

Meriç also had Marxist elements in his discourse. These elements were from his Marxist background from his youth. He had some sentences between the lines that saw the bourgeoisie as the engine of history. That makes Meriç a unique conservative.

Meriç was also important with his idealization for the Ottoman past. His response to the identity question was "we are Ottoman-Turks", but he had many Ottomans in his discourse. He referred to the conqueror Ottoman. It can be said that everybody has his Ottoman Empire and Meriç was no exception in that context.

When we return to Tarık Buğra, we see different themes. For example, hostility towards the Ottoman minorities can be seen in his discourse. In his hostility, he was influenced mainly by the Kemalist historiography. As stated above, nationalist-conservative intellectuals share some similar characteristics with the Kemalist intelligentsia. Stemming from the fact that they were educated in the same Kemalist schools and they were exposed to the same indoctrination.

Another important theme in Buğra was anti-communism. He found Soviet plots behind many issues. For him, communists of the Soviet Union had indigenous collaborators in Turkey. His anti-communism was very suitable to the intellectual climate of the Cold War era. Anti-communist discourse appears in many elements of the Turkish right, except some unique figures, one of whom was Meriç.

This study, for me, is a step to fulfill a responsibility to understand the Turkish right better, even more than the rightists. I sought to show the intellectual roots of some contemporary conservative discourses in Turkey. Besides the deep research on Meriç and Buğra, I also studied the different conservative discourses of the Cold War era. This study on Meriç and Buğra will make understanding the contemporary conservative terminology easier.

Before summing up, I want to express my reflections on contemporary conservative literature. After the 1980s, there has emerged a new phenomenon, the “Salvation Novels (*Hidayet Romanları*)”. These novels were written with an Islamic outlook that is on the rise in the post-1980 era. They have become bestsellers and have been published many times. *Minyeli Abdullah* is an example to these novels. Nationalist-conservative and other conservative novels are today under the umbrella of these “Salvation Novels”. It should be noted that the contemporary Salvation

Novels are very different from the ones of the 1980s and the 1990s. They have left inviting people to salvation and they have gone through an individualization process.

To conclude, in spite of being at the same end of the political spectrum, Meriç and Buğra had different inclinations. While Buğra adopted a reactionary anti-communism like his many nationalist-conservative friends, Meriç related himself to a different problematic. He was in the vanguards of the post-1980s quest for who the Turks are. He gave conservative answers to that question. He idealized a kind of Ottoman Empire and said that the Turks are Ottoman-Turks. He was also the pioneer of the “civilizationist” and “conservative nativism” discourses that are very popular in the rightist circles today.

It should be noted that a single master’s thesis cannot highlight all the aspects of Cold War conservatisms. This study suffers from this handicap too. In order to understand the Cold War conservatism better, there is a need for further research. Post-Cold war conservatisms, these are contemporary conservatisms, in Turkey are also a very good field for study. At the doctoral level, I will study these conservatisms.

Bibliography

- Alkan, Ahmet Turan. "Cemil Meriç ve Hür Düşünce: RES NON VERBA!" *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 1(1) (April 1989): 27-29.
- Alkan, Ahmet Turan. "Düşünce, Alışılmışın Dışındadır." *Tarih ve Toplum* 127 (July 1994): 43-45.
- Altermatt, Urs. "Conservatism in Switzerland: A study in Antimodernism." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14(4) (1979): 581-610.
- Armağan, Mustafa. "Cemil Meriç'i Anlamak için bir Ön Deneme." *Doğu Batı* 11, (May-July 2000): 143-155.
- Armağan, Mustafa. Sezai Coşkun. *Bulutları Delen Kartal: Cemil Meriç ile Konuşmalar*. İstanbul: Da Y.-Ufuk Kitapları, 2004.
- Armağan, Mustafa. *Düşüncenin Gökkuşağı: Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Profil Yayınevi, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Ahmet Kabaklı." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*, İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Ali Fuat Başgil." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*, İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. *Büyük Ağa: Tarık Buğra*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2006.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Erol Güngör." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. *Geleneğin Direnişi*. İstanbul: Ötüken, 2000.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Kültürel Bütünleşme, Harvard'a Osmanlı Tarihi Kürsüsü, Cemil Meriç v.b." *Türk Yurdu* 12 (1992): 5-7.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Münevver Ayaşlı." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Necip Fazıl Kısakürek." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Nihad Sami Banarlı." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Nurettin Topçu." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.

- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Osman Turan." In *Defterimde Kırk Suret*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2008.
- Ayvazoğlu, Beşir. "Peyami Safa." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- _____. *Tanrıdağı'ndan Hiradağı'na: Milliyetçilik ve Muhafazakarlık Üzerine Yazılar*. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2009.
- _____. "Tarık Buğra Küllük'te." *Türk Edebiyatı* 20 (1994): 9-11.
- _____. "Tarık Buğra'nın Farklılığı." *Türk Edebiyatı* (1993):39-43.
- Azak, Umut. "Samiha Ayverdi." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Bali, Rıfat. "Türk Anti-Semitizmi." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Belge, Murat. *Genesis: 'Büyük Ulusal Anlatı' ve Türklerin Kökeni*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Belge, Murat. "Görmeyen Görücü." *Gergedan* 5 (1987): 5.
- Beneton, Philippe. *Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Beyazyüz, Murat. *Cemil Meriç'in Psikolojisi*. Ankara: Aşına Kitaplar, 2007.
- _____. *Bir Entellektüel Tedirgin Cemil Meriç, Hece* 157, January 2010.
- Bora, Tanıl. "Cemil Meriç." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Bora, Tanıl. *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.
- Bottomore, T, Robert Nisbet. *Sosyolojik Çözümlemenin Tarihi*. İstanbul: Kırmızı Yayınları, 2006.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Bu Çağın Adı*. İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1995.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Dönemeçte*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Düşman Kazanmak Sanatı*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2002.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Firavun İmanı*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Gençliğim Eyvah*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1996.
- Buğra, Tarık. *İbiş'in Rüyası*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1996.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Küçük Ağa*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Osmancık*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1996.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Politika Dışı*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1995.

- Buğra, Tarık. *Siyah Kehribar*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1995.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Yağmur Beklerken*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Buğra, Tarık. *Yarın Diye Bir Şey Yoktur*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1996.
- Bulaç, Ali. "Cemil Meriç." *Tarih ve Toplum* 44 (August 1987): 11-12.
- Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Indianapolis, Ind. : Bobbs-Merrill, 1955.
- Cüendioğlu, Düccane." Bir Mabel Bekçisi: Cemil Meriç." *Doğu Batı* 37 (May-July 2006): 89-109.
- _____. *Bir Mabel Bekçisi Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2006.
- _____. *Bir Mabel İşçisi Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2006.
- _____. *Bir Mabel Savaşçısı Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2006.
- Çetin, Göksal. *Sağ ve Sol Karşısında Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Artus Kitap, 2008.
- El Azm, Sadek Jalel. *Orientalism and Inverted Orientalism*. Beirut, 1981.
- Erdman, Howard. "Conservatism in India." *Journal of Contemporary History* 13(4) (1978): 791-802.
- Epstein, Klaus. *The Genesis of German Conservatism*. Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Gürbilek, Nurdan. *Kör Ayna, Kayıp Şark: Edebiyat ve Endişe*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007.
- Güzel, Murat. "Necip Fazıl Kısakürek." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- Göral, Vural. "İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- İrem, Nazım. "Kemalist Modernizm ve Türk Gelenekçi-Muhafazakarlığının Kökenleri." *Toplum ve Bilim* 74 (Autumn 1997), 52-101.
- İrem, Nazım. "Bir Değişim Siyaseti Olarak Türkiye'de Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakarlık." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.
- İslamoğlu, Mustafa. "Cemil Meriç." *Aylık Dergi* 101-3 (May 1988): 29-51.
- Kayalı, Kurtuluş. "İki Kutup Arasında Bir Münzevi Aydınımın Düşünsel Serüveni." *Tarih ve Toplum* 127 (July 1994): 46-56.

- Kayalı, Kurtuluş. *Türk Düşünce Dünyasında Yol İzleri*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Kirk, Russell. *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana*. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1960.
- Koçak, Orhan. "Ataç, Meriç, Caliban, Bandung – Evrensellik ve Kısmilik Üzerine bir Taslak." in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995.
- Köksal, Duygu. "Cemil Meriç ve Kemal Tahir'de Sahnenin Dışındakiler." *Defter* 25 (1995):118-125.
- Köksal, Duygu. "The Dilemmas of Cultural Synthesis: Cemil Meriç As a Conservative Intellectual." *New Perspectives on Turkey* (Fall 1999): 79-101.
- Köksal, Duygu. "Türk Edebiyatı'nda iki Kuruluş Anlatısı ve Milli Kimlik: Devlet Ana ve Osmancık." *Toplum ve Bilim* 81 (Summer 1999): 44-61.
- Köksal, Duygu. "Zaman, Osmanlılık ve Cemil Meriç." *Cogito* 11 (1997):191-199.
- Mannheim, Karl. *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Işık Doğudan Gelir*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Bir Dünyanın Eşiğinde*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Bu Ülke*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Jurnal: Cilt 1*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Jurnal: Cilt 2*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Kırkambar: Cilt 1*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Kırkambar Cilt 2*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Mağaradakiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Saint-Simon İlk Sosyolog, İlk Sosyalist*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Sosyoloji Notları ve Konferansları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.
- Meriç, Cemil. *Umrandan Uygarlığa*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.
- Meriç, Ümit. *Babam Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*. Cilt 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. (edited by) Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001-2009.
- Nisbet, Robert. *Conservatism: Dream and Reality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

- Nisbet, Robert. *The Sociological Tradition*. New York: Basic Books, 1966.
- Örs, Birsen, ed. *19. Yüzyıldan 20.Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008.
- Özipek, Bekir Berat. *Muhafazakarlık: Akıl, Toplum, Siyaset*. İstanbul: Kadim Yayınları, 2005.
- Puhle, Hans-Jurgen. "Conservatism in Modern German History." *Journal of Contemporary History* 13(4) (1978): 698-720.
- Robinson, R. A. H. "Political Conservatism: Spanish Case, 1875-1977." *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no: 4, (1979): 561-580.
- Quinton, Anthony. "Conservatism." In *A companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*. edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Sayın, Zeynep. "Cemil Meriç: İrfan ve Hindistan." *Birikim* 92, (1996): 42-48.
- Scruton, Roger. *The Meaning of Conservatism*. London: Macmillan, 1984.
- Taş, Kemalettin. *Din ve Toplum Karşısında Cemil Meriç*. İstanbul: Artus Kitap, 2008.
- Taşkın, Yüksel. *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına: Milliyetçi-Muhafazakar Entelijensiya*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.
- Taşkın, Yüksel. 29.12.2008, *AKP Hükümeti Alevilere İş Vermiyor*. <http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-yuksel-taskin-akp-hukumeti-alevilere-is-vermiyor.htm>, [26.02.2011].
- Tekin, Mehmet. *Cemil Meriç ile Söyleşiler*. Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003.
- Tekin, Mehmet, *Tarık Buğra: Söyleşiler*. Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004.
- Tuncer, Hüseyin. *Tarık Buğra*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988.
- Türk Edebiyatı* 412, February 2008.
- Türkeş, Ömer. "Romana Yazılan Tarih." *Toplum ve Bilim* 91 (Winter 2001-2002): 166-212.
- Weiss, John. *Conservatism in Europe, 1770- 1945: Traditionalism, Reaction and Counter Revolution*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- Viereck, Peter. *Conservatism Revisited*. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
- Yılmaz, Murat. *Cemil Meriç*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006.
- Yılmaz, Murat. "Mehmet Akif Ersoy," In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Muhafazakarlık*, edited by Ahmet Çiğdem. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.

