

**BETWEEN COLONIAL AND NATIONAL DOMINATIONS:
ANTIOCH UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE (1920- 1939)**

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by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Between Colonial and National Dominations: Antioch under the French Mandate (1920-1939)

This study examines the gradual and uneven transformation that Antioch, as one of the three towns of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, underwent under the French mandate. The following thesis will argue against the perspective, which usually identifies the region with inherent ethnic hostility and sectarianism. Rather, it will state that the ethno-religious segregation in the city in social, political and spatial terms corresponds to the intensification of the nationalist ideology. In this sense, it will direct its attention to the early years of the mandate in presenting “continuity” with the late Ottoman times and during when Turkish and Arab nationalisms were not considerably popularized yet. The class structure and the patronage relations will be displayed as significant indicators reifying the continuity under the French mandate. This thesis will also pay attention to the emerging critiques against the status-quo by a marginal group among the frustrated sections of the society and try to elaborate their discourses and claims on the future of the Sanjak. The main argument of the thesis will be that the Turkish party involved in this anti-traditionalist movement was gradually centralized and standardized by Turkey and transformed into a statist, ethnic-nationalist movement primarily struggling for the annexation of the Sanjak by Turkey. A critical reading of French and Turkish sources together with the oral interviews displayed some significant insights on the nature of the conflict of the period under scrutiny. Accordingly, this research will emphasize the contest for domination in the public sphere between the rivalling political factions in the city in order to create consent with an emphasis on their employment of “traditional” networks for a modern discourse.

ÖZET

Sömürgeci ve Milliyetçi Tahakkümler Arasında: Fransız Mandası Döneminde Antakya (1920- 1939)

Bu tez, İskenderun sancağının üç kazasından biri olan Antakya şehrinin manda dönemi boyunca geçirdiği dönüşümler üzerine yoğunlaşacaktır. Çalışma, bölgeyi etnik düşmanlık ve etnik temelli ayrılıkçılık ile özdeşleştiren bakış açısına karşı eleştirel bir mesafe taşımaktadır. Hatta; sosyal, politik ve mekansal düzeylerdeki etnik ayrışmanın, ancak milliyetçi ideolojinin gücünün artmaya ve kitleleri etkilemeye başladığı döneme denk düştüğünü iddia edecektir. Bu bağlamda, erken manda dönemi tezin iddiaları açısından önemli bir yerde durmaktadır. Arap ve Türk milliyetçi ideolojilerinin henüz popülerleşmediği bir dönem olan bu yıllar, Osmanlı son dönemiyle süreklilik arz etmektedir. Bu çalışma, sözedilen sürekliliği gösterebilmek için kentteki sınıf yapısı ve patronaj ilişkilerinin yapısına vurgu yapacaktır. Bu tez aynı zamanda, 1930'ların ortalarına kadar henüz çok marjinal olan ve kentteki statükoya karşı örgütlenen grubun söylemini ve Sancağın geleceğine dair iddialarını da analiz edecektir. Tezdeki ana argümanlardan biri, bu anti- gelenekçi grubun Türk bileşenlerinin zamanla Türk Devleti tarafından merkezileştirme ve standardlaştırma yoluyla, Sancağın Türkiye'ye katılması için mücadele eden etnik milliyetçi bir gruba dönüştürüldüğüdür. Fransız ve Türk kaynakları; ve sözlü kaynaklar bu dönemdeki mücadelenin doğası üzerine önemli ipuçları sunmaktadır. Bu kaynaklara dayanarak, bu çalışma rakip siyasi grupların kamusal alanda hegemonya kurabilmek için aralarında süregiden mücadeleye ve "modern" bir yönetim kurmak için başvurdukları geleneksel ilişki ağlarına vurgu yapacaktır.

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I would also like to take this chance to express my deep gratitude to all the members of my family and my friends, for extending their support in every possible way during the entire course of this study.

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INTRODUCTION

Antioch, founded in between two splendid mountains, is the home of scarred eagles. Behind it extends the boundless violet colours of Anti-Lebanon. In front of it fuses the rugged and steep sight of humbly leaning Musa Dağ and Kızıl Dağ. For centuries, Antioch has been the home of grieved scarred eagles. When the sun rises from her back, the scars bleed; the violet colour of anti-Lebanon blows up in a flame. When the sun sets in front of her, the hard face of Musa Dağ blurs.

“All the Towns, villages and everyone are Turkish”
Mümtaz Faik, correspondent of *Tan* in Antioch¹

The Autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta, extending at the western end of the Turco-Syrian border and situated in the north-western corner of Syria, was established in the process of colonial remapping of the Middle East following World War I in 1920. It comprised one of the autonomously administered regions of Syria under the French Mandate. The Sanjak is one of the least studied areas in the historiography of French mandated Syria. Conventional Arab and French literature focus mostly on the main inner Syrian cities of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus. These narratives, with diverse political agendas and interests, examine Syria on the axis of Arab nationalism where they check and classify the society upon its existence or absence. Accordingly, they tend to lay emphasis on the inner Syrian cities, the seats of Arab nationalism, where the ethnic make-up of the populations are composed mostly of Arabs, and which held nearly eighty percent of Syria's total urban population during the Mandate.² In this sense, the peculiar characteristics of

¹ *Tan*, 5 October 1936, p.1. “Antakya iki muhteşem dağın avucu içine kurulmuş, yaralı bir kartal yuvasıdır. Arkasında AntiLübnanın engin morlukları dalgasına dalgasına uzanır. Önünde Musa dağının, Kızıl Dağın haşin ve yalçın manzarası secdeye yatarak erir. Antakya asırlardan beri kan ağlayan yaralı kartalların yuvasıdır. Güneş sırtından doğduğu zaman yarası kanar, antiLübnanın morlukları bir alev içinde kaynar, güneş önünden battığı zaman Musa dağının sert surati sarhoşlaşır.”

² Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate, 1920- 1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 10.

the Sanjak of Alexandretta become instrumentalized and are viewed as only the *obstacles* to the rise of Arab nationalism. The *mélange* ethnic composition and heterodox religions,³ small urban population, and either “backward” (tribal, local) or arbitrary political loyalties are the primarily addressed issues.

The Turkish literature, despite the presence of a substantial historical literature and a feverish production of knowledge, adopts a *sui generis* perspective towards the Sanjak.⁴ The published materials are selective in terms of their plot and the period under scrutiny. They are mostly pro-Turkish diplomatic and political history accounts written from above rather than social histories, which privilege different social groups in the society. While Antioch receive the most attention in the Turkish narratives compared to the Sanjak’s other towns, Alexandretta and Kırıkhan, it is described indirectly through the light of the political disputes surrounding the Sanjak of Alexandretta during the French Mandate.

The contest between Syria and Turkey for the imposition of political power and the final Turkish annexation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta (1939) form the watershed in the historiography of the region. It brought about a decrease in the scholarly interest in the region on the part of French or Syrian historians; and the squeezing of the history of the Sanjak between the irredentist claims of Turkey and Syria. It was under the ideological prerequisites and political agenda of this highly nationalist context that both scholars and non-scholars have constructed a history of Antioch. The historical accounts on Antioch have been turned into tools in the hands of nationalist elites in their efforts to prove their claims to the contested “territory”.

³ Despite the numbers became a contested domain after the World War, I rely on French High Commissariat census results as the most reliable ones. Accordingly, there was no majority of any ethnic or religious group in the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

⁴ See George Haddad, *Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon* (Beirut: Dar-al-Hayat, 1950); Abdullatif Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria Including Lebanon and Syria* (London: Macmillan, 1969).

In order to legitimize their territorial claims, studies from both sides spent great efforts to scientifically prove the Turkishness or Arabness of the region throughout the *whole* history and to sustain the sentiment that all of the Sanjak people share a national past, initiatives which went hand in hand with the invention of tradition aimed at constructing an “imagined community”.

This study will positively exploit the scholarly neglect or emphasis of this border area and the official narratives in such ways that their authors surely did not intend. On the one hand, this thesis will acknowledge that their ideological priorities silenced, surpassed and erased many of the local histories argued to be “improper” both in the pre 1936 and post 1936 periods. On the other hand, these very discourses will help to unveil the metropolitan imagery upon which the minorities of Hatay have constructed their memories of the French Mandate rule. The oral history interviews I conducted in Antioch with people from different classes and social backgrounds and with the Sanjak émigrés in Anjar (Lebanon) will be extensively utilized for both conceptions. In turn, the common and peculiar characteristics of the ideological environment in which the respective Turkish, Syrian and western historiographies are embedded will be unveiled.

The implicit feature underlying the Turkish and Arab historiographies is “exceptionalism”, which Lindesfarne defines as “a part of a class ideology...is a particular form of patriotism and an adjunct of nationalism through which regional, class, ethnic or sectarian differences within the nation state may be denied, and the dialectical processes that produce and sustain such differences may be hidden.”⁵ This aspect is revealed in their approach towards the frontier areas as politically

⁵ Nancy Lindesfarne, “Exceptionalism”, p. 3. To be published in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Milliyetçilik (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol. 4.

“wayward” and economically backward regions.⁶ Historical knowledge has been viewed as another instrument in the hands of the central authorities to “authorize” and “tame” these volatile regions. This concern, which goes hand in hand with the attempts at political domination over the region (the politics of nation building), brought about a state-centred and elitist historiography where the role and intentions of the politically marginal factions and subaltern classes are marginalized but not totally disqualified because as in Swedenburg’s words, “in order to win popular consent, dominant history must always appeal to the people by including them in its narrative.”⁷

This thesis is consciously focused on the study of Antioch rather than the other parts of the Sanjak. It was, firstly a practical preference since most of the Turkish published material is Antioch-biased due to its harbouring the majority of the Turkish population in the Sanjak. Therefore, the population of the city has remained rather stable; the number of emigrants from Antioch was relatively low in comparison to other *kazas* of the Sanjak; and the symbolic significance of the city was greatly increased after the Turkish annexation. These aspects facilitated my research, especially in the as yet unfulfilled attempt to reconstruct the social life of the city. My choice further fit and thrived from the fact that the nationalist politics of the late 1930s were inscribed on the city space, on the streets, neighbourhoods, souqs and statues more than anywhere else in the Sanjak.

Human beings encounter and mediate space by certain concepts and mediators.⁸ In order to introduce the “systems of meaning”, (the phrase originally

⁶Stephen Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London: Octagon Books, 1958), p. 212.

⁷Ted Swedenburg, “Popular Memory and the Palestinian National Past” in Jay O’Brien and William Roseberry, *Golden Ages Dark Ages Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p.156.

⁸Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geobody of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 36.

employed by Zachary Lockman), in the everyday politics of pre- and post-1936 years in Antioch, a geographical recontextualization of the region which acknowledges the social, economic and cultural networks is necessary. The most significant meta-narrative surrounding and sustaining the myth and map of a nation is the essentialist and ahistorical view towards the national frontiers. This thesis will adopt a deconstructionist perspective towards frontiers and view them as recent inventions evolved within the context of the colonial and national rivalry. The discursive displacement of the frontiers will facilitate the identification of those people whose economic and social activities and spatial behaviour were restricted within what had once been a continuous geographical space. The irritation and fear of the Aleppins regarding the good relations between Turkey and France after the signing of the Franklin Bouillon Agreement (1921) becomes meaningful in this context since the improvement of economic conditions in Aleppo was dependent on the regular movement of goods and people between these two centres.⁹ Chapter 1 recognizes the adaptation of people to the new political realities and the redirecting/reorganizing of their activities under the pre-demarcation process of the western end of the Turco-Syrian boundary. It will also try to surpass the superficial portrayal of the cultural, social and political interaction between Alexandretta and Northern Syria. It is only in the context of the trade routes that northern Syria was included in the picture and that Antioch was recognized as having been on the trade routes linking the Middle East to Anatolia over the Taurus Mountains. However, these references comprise an anecdotal or tale mode in the description of trade routes, merchants, caravans, and *khans*. Neither of the descriptions was diffused into the general

⁹ *Tarikat-al- Suri* (Aleppo, 19 December 1923) quoted from Philip Khoury, *Syria*, p. 111.

structure of the Turkish narratives of Antioch and was not employed in the building up of the economic and social history of the city.¹⁰

The Setting

An attempt to write a social history of Antioch under the French Mandate should acknowledge the global developments in which the city was caught. The age of neo-colonialism and the two interconnected processes of the nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire underwent are intrinsic to the shaping of the history of Antioch in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The integration of the Empire into the periphery of the capitalist world economy accelerated the integration of the local economies into the broader market economy. The spread of market economies was assisted by the centralization efforts of the Ottoman Empire, which indeed started in the early nineteenth century. In Ottoman Syria, the diffusion of the state was through roads, railways and telegraph lines, which improved the transportation and communication networks linking Syria to Iraq and Arabia, and to Istanbul. The increase in agricultural production and the pacification of the countryside through the sedentarization of certain Bedouin and Kurdish tribes led to the increase of the rural population. As will be seen in Chapter 1, the sedentarization of the Turcoman tribes of the Amik Plain around Antioch significantly changed the class structure of the region through transforming the tribal chieftains into big landowners. World War I added to their wealth with the great increases in the price of wheat. The widespread decline of the urban native handicraft industries, which

¹⁰ From the mainstream Turkish point of view, the Turco-Syrian border, in ideological terms, is conceived as the line that separates Turkey from its past, order from chaos. See Martin Stokes, "Hybridity, Heterotopias, Arabesk on the Turkish Syrian Border", in Wilson Thomas M. and Hastings

brought urban productive forces to a near standstill and the gradual introduction of capitalist agriculture made people in the towns increasingly conscious of the need to intensify their exploitation of the countryside.¹¹

The strengthening and diffusion of the state control and the expansion of market relations were uneven in development in the Empire, and therefore generated different economic, political and social consequences in various parts and on different groups of people dispersed in the empire. The transformation of the Ottoman Empire affected the expansion of the public space and modified state-society relations; it changed the role and composition of the local elites, redefined the existing patron-client relationships and made possible the emergence of a middle class. In the Middle Eastern context, the origins of both Ottomanism and Arabism are linked to these broad changes. The standardization under the expansion of the market and the state broadened the domain receptive to the “cultural system” of nationalism. However, the uneven distribution and impact of these broad changes on different sections of society bifurcated society into separate and increasingly distinct subcultures that articulated various responses to socioeconomic change.¹²

In Syria, the landowning bureaucratic class benefited from the modernizing reforms and “this class came to identify with the ideology of Ottomanism and emerged as the agent of Ottoman centralization and modernization.”¹³ After 1908 and the suppression of the counter coup in April 1909 till the outbreak of the First World War, serious political differences between the CUP and the Syrian Arab

Donnan (eds.), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 268.

¹¹ Khoury, *Syria*, p.7

¹² James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties, Nationalism and Mass politics at the Close of the Empire in Syria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 52.

¹³ Philip Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860- 1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 53.

notables emerged. It was under the centralizing policies of the CUP that Arabism evolved as a literary and cultural movement composed of young intellectuals.¹⁴

Dawn and Hourani and, following them, Khoury favour the role of urban based, landowning bureaucratic notability who, in Khoury's words, "had failed to achieve power and influence commensurate with their expectations"¹⁵ in the development of Arabism (the precursor to Arab nationalism), whereas Khalidi ascribes the rise of Arabism to the middle class elites, mostly journalists.¹⁶ According to Khoury, Arabism reflected the interests of a growing number of politically active members of an urban absentee, landowning bureaucratic class in disillusionment. The first generation of Arabists were the products of the Ottoman state educational system. Like the Ottomanists of the period, they were Istanbul trained, spoke Turkish and held high posts before the CUP prevented them from holding any posts in the next elections. However, the post-1914 Arabists were less the products of Ottoman educational system and more trained in liberal professions. The class origins and social status of the pre-1914 Arabists were composed of individuals from powerful landowning bureaucratic families as well as several personalities from less prominent families whereas the second generation of Arabists was composed of young men from prominent families as well as social climbers.¹⁷

The discussions on the social roots and the rise of Arabism and Ottomanism in Syria will be utilized for Antioch as offering a comparative perspective on the roles the urban elite and middle classes played in the foundation and appropriation of

¹⁴ This movement was directed by the Arab Renaissance Society (*Jamiyyat el- Nahda el- Arabiyya*) where people like Shukri al-Asali, Abd al- Rahman Shahbandar, and Rafiq al- Azm, the first generation of Arabists, were active members of the club who were later affiliated with the Ottoman Party of Decentralization.

¹⁵ See Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 122-123; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 67-68.

¹⁶ Rashid Khalidi, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism: Introduction", in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* Rashid Khalidi et.al., eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. ix.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 72-73.

the Arabist and Turkish nationalist ideologies in the city. Even though the ideological parties in Antioch were not crystallized in the same way as those in Damascus, and the meanings and social connotations attached to the Turkish and Arab nationalist ideologies differed to a great degree from their counterparts in Syria, still they reflected the nature of intra-elite conflict in Antioch. Similar to Khoury's argument for Damascus, the political factionalism in Antioch between the supporters of the CUP or the Freedom and Entente did not rest on class conflict. Rather, the intra-class conflict, rivalry for public office and scarce resources between the politically active elements of the landowning bureaucratic class were influential factors in Antioch, too. Khalidi's advocating of the new middle classes in the promotion of Arabism is rather a relevant argument for Antioch in the context of the development of belated Arab and Turkish nationalist movements in late 1920s and early 1930s.

The Agents

This takes a deconstructionist view towards nationalist accounts of the history of Antioch through converting the historiographic axis of the conventional narratives. It will not necessarily rely on a dichotomous categorization such as Turk and non/anti-Turk; rather it will maintain a more dynamic perspective by privileging the concepts of notables, peasantry and middle class. This will help overcoming the ethnic-biased narratives on the city, displaying the contextual nature of identities, and examining the gradual redefinition of these categories.

The exploitative relationship between the peasants and the notables was reflected in the public sphere as patronage and paternalism, the elements of which provided the ideological basis for rule by the notables. Accordingly, the politics of

the notables, the patron- client relationship and the change and continuity in the composition of this cohesive class under the French indirect colonial rule and the subordination of the local economy to the needs of the capitalist economy will be emphasized as significant kinds of relationships in the organization of the social life of the city. In particular, this thesis will examine the change in the power relations within this very class under the French Mandate, during which time the rules of membership in the notables' club were redefined and the cultural resources of distinction were transformed.

The discussion will not be confined to the politics of the bureaucratic landowner class. Another task will be to examine the non-elite population of the Sanjak, those who did not derive their power from superior birth or noble lineage. The late 1920s and early 1930s in Antioch marked the crystallization of a middle class whose organizations would bring about the marginalization, recontextualization and integration of traditional and parochial modes of organizations. The ethnic segregation and sectarianism within this class soon reconfigured the power relationship between them, the notables and the peasantry in the context of the imperialist power games of pre-World War II.

Local newspapers, which exploded in number during the French rule, would have contributed greatly to the process of reconstructing reconstructing the daily life in Antioch. They would have provided the necessary hints to observe the development of public space in the city and, most of all, elaborate the constitution of different publics and the contest for domination between them. Unfortunately, because of a fire in the 1960s, all of the local papers and journals were burned except for those of the pro-Turkish newspaper *Yenigün*. The Journalists Association of

Antioch preserved nearly all of the issues of *Yenigün*, which was utilized in this study.

This thesis will abstain from retrospectively projecting massive ethnic seclusion and conflict along Turkish and Arab nationalist lines onto the early years of the Mandate. On the contrary, it will provoke and sometimes fall into the trap of naively overstating the rather harmonious period of the 1920s, about which Arnold Tonybee claimed that, “the Sanjak had been happy in having scarcely any history at all”¹⁸. The inherent tendency of official national historiographies that is inventing the pre-1936 years, is embedded in the tradition of what Zachary Lockman describes as “the dual society model”.¹⁹ According to this model, the communal identities are natural and pre-given, an aspect that ignores the fact that ethnicity is as imagined as the nation. These various religious/ethnic groups in the society are presupposed to be essentially separate and distinct with disconnected historical trajectories. The influence of each group on the other is assumed to be marginal and extraordinary. Moreover, this model allows “for a single significant mode of interaction: conflict, violent or otherwise.”²⁰ Lockman displays the deficiencies of this model, which was deeply diffused into the narratives and practices of the Arab nationalists and he seeks to overcome this bias through emphasizing areas of activity in which Jewish and Arab people interacted with each other. In *Comrades and Enemies*, in order to carry out his relational history project, he dwells upon the working class in Palestine where the class-consciousness at times predominated the ethnic identity of the Jewish and Arab workers. I intend to undertake a similar, yet a much more moderate version in this study in Chapter 3. Particular attention will be paid to the spatial effects and

¹⁸ Arnold Tonybee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 768.

¹⁹ Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 4.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.6.

reproduction of interdependent and interactive relationship between different ethnic and religious communities.

Peripheralization of the City and Popular Politics

The remapping of the Turco-Syrian boundary, the French indirect colonial rule, and particularly the years of increasing local conflict in the Sanjak together with the economic, social and ideological domination of the competing nation states, which resulted in the final annexation of the region by Turkey, can be interpreted as the gradual peripheralization, parochialization and marginalization of Antioch. Indeed, the rivalry between Turkey and mandated Syria was an attempt to subordinate the local dynamics of agency and penetrate deeply to the social and cultural life of the Sanjak inhabitants. However, the marginalization of Antioch was not a phenomenon imbued with an alien and hostile ideology introduced completely from outside. Rather, its “success” lay in its power in translating the existing discomfort and uneasiness in the Sanjak into the terminology of official nationalisms and making people imagine their liberation at the hands of the nation state. The Turkish and Syrian attempts at social, cultural and ideological domination did not only target the politicized, frustrated urban Arab and urban Turkish youth, but were also directed towards the dissemination of their respective nationalisms among the remaining majority of the population.

The articulation of the local discomfort of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Antioch is significant in unveiling the nature of the domain popular politics, “the manifold attributes that cannot entirely be ascribed to elite designs.”²¹ This thesis will rely on the theoretical standpoint of Gelvin and juxtapose it for the case of

Antioch. Gelvin, in his contributory book *Divided Loyalties*, argues that the rise of Arabism and later Arab nationalism should not necessarily be attributed to the inter-elite rivalry between the bureaucratic landowner class or to the rise of the western-style educated, new middle class. Instead, Faysal's short-lived Arab state demonstrated the foundation of another kind of Arab nationalism, a popular nationalist movement which mastered a different discourse, set of symbols and ritual than Faysal's official nationalist ideology. The popular nationalist movement of the masses was organized through popular national committees against both the French invasion and the "treacherous" Amir Faysal with whom the petit-bourgeois merchants, neighbourhood toughs, unemployed youths, refugees from the Biqa' valley and recently demobilized soldiers from the regular Arab army together with the popular leaders and ulama were involved. They comprised a different discourse than that of the official Arab nationalism of Faysal. While the central cleavage of the educated, cultured elite and the "ignorant" masses was the essential component in the discourse of Faysal as well as many other elite designed nationalisms' all over the world, the popular version carried more local tones and was less occupied with the Eurocentrist modernist terminology.

The theoretical framework of Gelvin on mass politics in Syria and Lockman's study on the contextual and contingent nature of nationalisms and Palestinian Arab nationalism in particular inspired me to conceptualize Antioch of 1930s in an alternative way. The early 1930s witnessed the crystallization of a group of disappointed male youth from different ethnic groups comprised of the Antioch Lycée students and recent returnees from Syria and Turkey. They were similar in their social backgrounds; there were those from notable families but there were also young men from more modest merchant or middle class families. Together with a

²¹ Gelvin, p. 9.

marginal group of artisans of the city, they were frustrated by not attaining a life commensurate with their expectations and they employed a modernist language when articulating their ongoing uneasiness. They blamed the power and influence of the notables of the city and their supporters, the Sunni ulama for the “backwardness.” The expression of this apprehension turned into a cultural clash in the public sphere around the issues of the latinization of the alphabet, the eschewing of European-styled hats instead of *fez*, the establishment of a carpenters syndicate in 1928, and the declaration of Sunday as the day of rest instead of Friday.²² Most of the time, these efforts were crushed by the *ağas* and the Sunni ulama with a mass of Sunni support behind them. This movement carried the potential for a populist civic nationalist movement. However, soon both the Arab and Turkish youth began to identify with the dominant ideologies of Turkey and Syria and Iraq, respectively. This process culminated in the second half of the 1930s and it explicitly converged on to the popular and official Turkish and Arab nationalisms. The Sanjak could not realize the ascendance of an Arab/Turkish popular nationalism, which diverged from and comprised a different discourse from the official nationalisms of Syria and Turkey. Instead, the local political discomfort was contained and co-opted under the framework of established ideologies.

Chapter 4 will discuss the issue of the “nationalization of the masses”²³ in its various aspects where the expansion of a modern public sphere resulted in the standardization and establishment of ideological parties in the city. This chapter, together with Chapter 5, will pay attention both to the dissemination of the nationalist ideology to the “crowd/mass” and the repercussions of it in the

²² Pierre Bazantay, *Enquête sur l'Artisanat à Antioche* (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), pp. 76- 79.

²³ George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: 1975).

subordinate classes. The population was nationalized by propaganda (with newspapers, hand books, conferences, maps, direct interviews, rumours, stories, ceremonies and direct force), through manipulating complex ethnic and religious networks in youth clubs, cafés, schools, shops, houses at first by Turkish youth with the material and ideological aid of the Turkish state in Antioch, which was reproduced with the creation of symbols utilized in every day life. This thesis will explore how the local pro-Turkish organizations in the city mobilized the non-Turks through the employment of traditional networks but with a “modern” discourse. It will also examine to the channels through which the Turkish and Arab nationalist ideologies were inserted into the local dynamics and the relation of the new form of identity to older conceptions of kinship, religion, village and regional ties. The appropriation of the nationalist ideology by the non-elites and the contention over the meanings and symbols of it will form other issues that will be discussed in the thesis.

CHAPTER I

A 'TRAGIC' HISTORY?

Antioch has more to offer the traveller than the mere memory of splendour loving Seleucid tyrants and their successors, the Roman Emperors, who raised the city, with its wonderful array of temples baths, theatres huge circus and colossal fortifications to the highest rank in the ancient world; of St. Paul and of the countless early Christian martyrs who perished in the arena of this, the first gentile Christian city, of a long line of famous patriarchs or of the Crusaders who captured the city after one of the greatest sieges in history.²⁴

There are various factors in a city's process of gaining visibility by both the state and societal actors. The dynamics that helped in the increase in the visibility of Antioch are diverse in the Ottoman, French, Turkish and Syrian contexts. What is common to all is that each different representation of Antioch is embedded in a certain socio-political context, equipped with and revealed through the cultural constructs of the ideological projects of Ottoman modernization, neo-colonialism of the late nineteenth century and belated Turkish and Arab nationalisms, respectively. The attention of different groups of people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the region were reflected in the form of missionary activities and primarily German and the French archaeological excavations in the context of increasing western colonialism in the Middle East. The Ottoman appeal to the region can be considered as an aspect of the Ottoman effort of modernization together with a response to the western concerns in the area. Likewise, in the twentieth century, the Armenian massacres and deportations of 1915, the legendary resistance in Jabal Mousa in 1915 in a world of colonial rivalries and uncertainty, and later the dispute over Alexandretta in an atmosphere of ascending/establishing nationalisms oriented Western attention to the city in the form of their states, relief organizations, and

²⁴ Evert Barger, *In the Track of the Crusaders* (London: Nash and Grayson, 1931), p. 227.

intellectuals. The late Mandate years marked a turning point for Turkish and Syrian nationalists and pulled them both symbolically and physically to the region.

The socio-political context has been the decisive factor in the way the history of the city has been written. Each perspective has built its representations of Antioch around certain characteristic of the city are invented and exalted. Selectiveness in terms of period and event, and a teleological construction of history around the glorified sections of the history of the city are the defining characteristic of the imperial, colonial and national narratives. It is no coincidence that most of the contemporary western literature on Antioch dwells on the pre-Arabic/Islamic period of the city and overstresses its archaeological and religious aspects, whereas the Turkish and Arab historiographies are occupied more with the political history during the late mandate years of the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

The plurality of histories of Antioch has engendered an inevitable clash of historiographies. Aware of the relational nature of knowledge and the relationship between power and knowledge, the Syrian and Turkish nationalist writings have sought to counterbalance the micro-hegemony of western historiography through a process of “silencing the past”.

Western Historiography

The narrative employed by the western historiography idealizes the city in its Seleucid, and Roman and later Byzantine times as the “fair crown of the Orient”. This idealization of the city goes back to the glorification of the war made during the foundation of Antioch between Alexander the Great and Darius in the year 333 B.C. around Issus. The city is depicted as a city of splendour and luxury and held to be the

finest in the Greek East. A special place is reserved for Daphne²⁵ in the western studies on Antioch. Accordingly, the suburb Daphne with its baths and villas of the rich and the place where Hellenistic kings and Roman emperors spent their summers is represented as one of the most celebrated spots in these accounts. Antioch is portrayed as a western oasis in the midst of the orient. Yet this magnificence began to decline beginning with the Arab invasion in the seventh century. The capture of the city by the Arabs in 638 marks the beginning of instability. The captures and retaking of the city by the Byzantines and the Arabs, which continued until the foundation of a Crusader principality centred in Antioch in 1098, are portrayed as years of material and cultural decline for the city. Until the final invasion of the city in 1268 by the Mamluk sultanate, the city tried to regain its old prosperity. However, the ineluctable end comes with the appearance of the “uncivilized and backward” Arabs in the scene. The size of the city dropped to one tenth of that of Justinian’s time, and the economic and cultural significance of the city sank into degeneration.

Labelling the history of the city a tragic history and linking this tragedy to the occupation of eastern Christian cities by fanatic Islam is a typical aspect of the early writings on the city as well as the underlying perspective inherent to the travel literature. This essentialist and Eurocentric approach can easily be seen in a brief scan of the titles of travellers’ accounts.²⁶ The religious aspect merged with the

²⁵ Daphne, today *Harbiye*, is the name of a nearby suburb of Antioch

²⁶ Pococke was the first who had first given topographic information about Antioch in 1737. R. Pococke, *Beschreib. Des Morgenlandes*, 1797. Streck, *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 456- 459. Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie D’Asie* (Paris, 1891); Jean Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur d’Aramon Ambassadeur par le Roy en Levant* (Paris, 1897); Francis W. Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Chaldea and Armenia* (London, 1842); Victor Langlois, *Voyage en Cilicia and dans les montagnes du Taurus* (Paris, 1891); V. H. Barlett, and William Purser, *La Syrie, La Terre Sainte, L’Asie Mineure* (Londres, Paris, Amerique, 1838); Maurice Barres, *Une Enquete aux Pays du Levant* (Paris, 1923); Evert Garder, *In the Track of the Crusaders* (London, 1931); H. V. Morton, *Through Lands of the Bible* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1938); Harry Charles Lukach, *The Fringe of the East* (London, 1913); Lord Kinross, *Europe Minor: Journeys in Coastal Turkey* (London: John Murray, 1956); Freya Stark, *Letters*, (ed.) Lucy Moorehead (Salisbury: Compton Russell, 1974), 5 vols. H. V. Morton, *In the Steps of St. Paul* (New York: Dodd Mead, 1946); Helen Cameron Gordon, *Syria As It Is* (London: Methuen, 1939).

colonial interests of the imperialist states in the Levant were the most important motives essential to the “adventures” of the travellers to northern Syria, the Euphrates valley, Kurdistan and Armenia. Antioch was a point that they visited and where they lamented a lost paradise. More often, they stopped in the holy city and climbed Mount Silpius (*Habib-i Neccar*) carrying in their pocket the key of St. Peter’s and St. Paul’s cave, handed to them by the Capuchin monks of Antioch. None of them left Antioch without visiting the monastery of Saint Paul, who had been one of the apostles of Christ. Their very visits to the church reveal their mentality such that it was the place where they remembered the fragments of the historical sources of the glorious western civilization, either through Alexander the Great or the Crusades, or Christianity as a whole. In fact, the travellers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seem to form a “community of travellers”. They seem to have read each other’s accounts that it cannot be a mere coincidence to find the same metaphors employed in different records. Freya Stark, in her pilgrimage to Antioch in December 1927, is not the only one to describe the *poşu* (male headscarf) as “the countrymen who travel with their donkeys wrap up their heads so that the first impression is a population all suffering from toothache and nothing like the dignified turban of the Arabian Nights.”²⁷

More importantly, they shared similar orientalist and eurocentric presuppositions embedded in the genre. Alexander the Great, the Crusades or Christianity served as symbols around which such discourse is formed.

with the morning sun shining on minarets, I saw Antioch for the first time, mother church of gentile Christianity...Antioch, the Beautiful and the Golden still deserves her ancient titles but her beauty is no longer the splendour of temple and colonnade, and her gold is no longer that of wealth, but the sunshine lying over desolate hillsides... Race courses, famous theatres, baths, temples, they have disappeared with the world that created them.²⁸

²⁷ Stark, p. 129.

²⁸ H. V. Morton, *In the Steps*, p. 93

Similarly, a rather late account by H. V. Morton is significant:

As we made our way across this bleak landscape, I found myself thinking of the lost cities of North Syria... They were Christian cities which existed and flourished from the peace of the Church in 4th century until they were swept away by Arab conquest in the 7th century²⁹.

Such mentality was also reflected in the archaeological excavations in the region starting with the eighteenth century, especially by the Germans and later the French at an increasing rate after the Mandate. The foundation of the *Service des Antiquités* and recognition of the conservation of the ancient as one of the aims of education is a concrete sign of this effort.³⁰ Thus, the recoil of the traveller from the incompatibility between the imagined Antioch and the reality reveals the western superiority discourse charged with the enlightenment ideology. In other words, the representation of the “imagined” history of Antioch can be contextualized in the macro and hegemonic narratives of colonialism and religion by which the French were deeply influenced after World War I.

Ottoman Roots of Attention

The motives underlying the Ottoman interest in Antioch and its surroundings were inspired more by political intentions, namely the centralization efforts of the empire. The attempt of the Ottoman government to reassert its authority greatly altered the socio-economic order of the region. The efforts of the state resulted in the forced settlement of long-range nomadic herders in their *kışlak* (winter camping grounds). The first attempt to do this in the nineteenth century came in 1825,

²⁹ Morton, *Through Lands*, p. 7.

³⁰ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 73.

followed later in 1865 by the *Fırka-i Islahiye* (Reform Division).³¹ It was during this expedition that the towns of Hassa, Islahiye and Reyhaniye were founded. The granting of land titles in 1859 and the settlement of herding groups on the Amik plain marked the beginning of the rise of large private estates in the region.

The advance of American Protestant missionary activities among the Alawite population of Dersim and Erzincan, Sivas and Anatolia, and Antioch and Latakia was another factor that directed the attention of the Ottoman state to the area, more specifically to the Alawite populations of Antioch and Latakia in the 1890s.³² The Ottomans undertook a series of policies such as opening up schools to teach and reinforce Sunni Islam. Although, the state policy aimed at the conversion of the Alawites to Sunni Islam was successful to some extent, it was perceived as a disturbing threat to the prevailing class structure by the Antiochean notables on whose lands the Alawite peasants worked as sharecroppers in very poor conditions. For that reason, the *mufti* (mufti) of the *kaza* (town) of Alexandretta did not accede to recognize the converted Alawites.³³

Antioch had been a *kaza* (district) of the sanjak (sub-province) of Aleppo since its occupation in 1517. The Sanjak of Aleppo together with those of Maraş and Urfa comprised the *vilayet* (province) of Aleppo. Despite after the Province Regulation of 1867, when the frontiers of the *vilayet* of Aleppo had changed, both Antioch and Alexandretta had continued to be two of the ten *kaza* of the sanjak. Based on the findings of the Vital Cuinet in 1890, Antioch was one of the twelve

³¹ Andrew Gould, "Lords or Bandits? The Derebeys of Cilicia", *IJMES*, no. 7 (1976), p.497. *Fırka-i Islahiye* was a great expedition with 9000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 6 pieces of artillery under Derviş Pasha and Cevdet Pasha to bring mostly the Turkoman the nomadic tribes of Southern Anatolia under government control.

³² Selçuk A. Somel, "Osmanlı Modernleşme Döneminde Periferik Nüfus Grupları", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 83 (Winter 1999), p. 186.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

kaza of the *vilayet* of Aleppo.³⁴ It had four *nahiye* (commune)- Kuseyr, Karamurt, Sueydiye, Harbiye- and 310 villages. According to the 1897 and 1908 Aleppo *vilayet salnamesi* (province yearbooks), the number of *nahiyes* in Antioch had stayed the same but the number of villages had increased to 175 in 1897 and later decreased to 173 in 1908 . In 1897, 74 of the *nahiyes* were in Kuseyr, 55 in Karamurt, 22 in Sueydiye and 24 in Harbiye.³⁵

The demographic composition of the Sanjak was one of a patchwork of diverse religious elements and cultures with at least five different languages and sixteen different religions. There are, however, no exact population figures available for the period. This is partly because of the insufficient technical capacities of the time and the fact that the censuses were new, threatening and alien for the people, who were forced to identify themselves with only the categories offered. However, as population/numbers became an area of contention between communities/states especially after World War I and when the Wilsonian world system of nation states created an obsessive concern with numbers, categories and numbers came to be manipulated greatly. A direct relationship came to be drawn between the nationality of the region and the majority of the population. Political leaders started waging a war of numbers, arguing that their respective communities represented the majority. Therefore, a sceptical approach should be taken towards the population figures about the region, which vary greatly depending on the source.³⁶

³⁴ Cuinet, p.19. The other *kazas* of the *vilayet* were as follows: Aleppo, Ayıntab, Kilis, Iskenderun, Antakya, Idleb, Harim, Jisr al- Shughur, Ma'arrat ul-Nu'man, al-Bab-Jabbul, Beylan, Jabal Sam'an, Manbij, al-Rakkah.

³⁵ *Halep Vilayet Salnamesi* (Province of Aleppo Year Books) 1897, 1908.

³⁶ For the impact of nationalist ideology on numbers and territory, see Sam Kaplan, "French Mirrors in the Middle East: The Armenian and Turkish Documentation of Cilicia", p. 1- 29 trans. in Esra Özyürek, *Hatırladıklarıyla ve unuttuklarıyla Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Hafızası* (İstanbul : İletişim, 2001).

According to Cevdet Pasha's *Tezâkir* (1867), there were 8,775 Muslim and 1,129 non-Muslim households in the *kaza* of Antioch.³⁷ In Vital Cuinet's population estimates on the basis of religion, there were 20,000 Arab Syrians, 10,000 Nusayris, 10,000 Turkish Ottomans, 3,000 Kurds, 3,000 Circassians, 2,500 Uniate Greeks (Melchite), 2,500 Armenian Catholics, 200 Christian Syrians, 2,000 Chaldeans, 1,000 Greek Orthodox, 2,084 Armenian Gregorians, 2,500 Syrian Jacobites, 2,000 Non-Uniate Chaldeans, and 266 Jews. Altogether there were 62,850 inhabitants in Antioch including the *kazas* and the villages. But in the city centre there were 10,000 Arabs, Syrians, and Turks; 6,000 Nusayris; 3,500 Uniate Greek Orthodox; and 3,784 Armenian Catholics and Gregorians; or a total of 23,550 residents.³⁸ According to the 1897 Aleppo *vilayet salname* (provincial yearbook), one can observe a "cosmopolitan" Alexandretta with 11,413 Muslims, 1,120 Orthodox Armenians, 260 Catholic Armenians, 42 Protestants, and 25 Jews. Antioch had a dominant majority of 60,083 Muslims out of a total of 66,786.

The information about education in Antioch is much better documented thanks to the records of the missionary schools.³⁹ Accordingly, the majority of the schools in the city were *écoles coraniques* (Quranic schools). There were thirty-four *écoles coraniques* for boys, seven for girls.⁴⁰ As indicated by Cuinet, there were 10 *medreses* (Muslim theological schools) with 128 students, 1 *rüşdiye* (high school) with 140 students and 26 *sibyan mektebi* (primary schools) with 690 students for the

³⁷ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, Ankara, 1963 quoted from *Yurt Ansiklopedisi Türkiye İl İl Dünü Bugünü Yarını*, "Hatay", (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayıncılık, 1981) p. 3397).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

³⁹ For a detailed survey of the education in the Sanjak before and during the Mandate; see Pierre Bazantay's at the same time PhD thesis for the Sorbonne, Pierre Bazantay, *La Pénétration de l'Enseignement dans le Sandjak Autonome d'Alexandrette*, (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1935). He had been the chief inspector of public education in mid 1930s with his wife Madame Vieux as the principle of the Antioch Lycee.

⁴⁰ Mesud Fani Bilgili, *Manda İdaresinde Hatay Kültür Hayatı*, (Antakya: İktisat Basımevi, 1939), p. 116-19.

Muslim population, and five primary schools, with 90 students for the Christian population of the city.⁴¹ According to the 1903 Education Yearbooks (*Maarif Salnamesi*), there were only twelve *medreses* with 460 students and one *Mekteb-i Rüşdiye* with 80 students and an English Protestant college with thirty-five boys.⁴²

The missionary activities and their education institutions were of special importance to the region and the city.⁴³ The Italian Capuchins were the first to settle, with Father Basile in 1846. In 1851 they established a mission with the help of the Italian consulate of Aleppo.⁴⁴ Saint Pierre of Capuchins also had a school in Antioch.

The English missionaries of the Irish and Scotch reformed Presbyterian Mission were the first arrivals in 1846. They opened schools in Suveydiye (1846)⁴⁵, Antioch (1876), and Alexandretta (1902).

The Catholic Mission of Kırıkhan (Lazarists and Trappists) founded a monastery near Ekbez, Kırıkhan, in 1884. Yet, Trappist- French Catholic missionaries had already been residing in a nearby village called Şeyhli. The monasteries and schools were destroyed during the Armenian massacres but were reconstructed on the land of a Turkish owner with the addition of a clinic after the arrival of the French to the Sanjak in Soğuksu near Kırıkhan with the participation of the Jesuit priests of Lyon, whose *Mission d'Arménie* was constructed then.⁴⁶

Les Soeurs de St. Joseph de l'Apparition (St. Joseph Sisters) first arrived in 1887 in Alexandretta and in 1905 in Antioch, where they opened a school, a clinic and an orphanage. The hospital they founded in Antioch was one of the biggest and

⁴¹ Cuinet, p. 191.

⁴² *Maarif salnamesi* (Education Yearbook), 1903.

⁴³ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 43-50.

⁴⁴ Paul Jacquot, *Antioche* (Beirut : Imprimerie Catholique, 1931), 1: 311. In fact, Capuchins had first arrived in North Syria in 1626, but they did not establish a mission until 1846. In Maurice Barres, *Une enquête aux pays du Levant* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1923), vol. II, p. 50.

⁴⁵ The building of the English Protestant School in Suveydiye survives, although it is no longer in use.

⁴⁶ Bilgili, p. 23.

most advanced in the region. Most of the elite and local French officials' children attended this primary school.

Les Frères des écoles Chrésiennes (the Catholic Brothers) also founded a school in Alexandretta in 1912 to counterweight the Italian and German influence in the region with the help and influence of the French consulate in Alexandretta. Like other missionary activities, their work was interrupted during the war but flourished again under the Mandate regime, during which time their school was the most influential and prestigious in Alexandretta. The number of students (388) even exceeded the students at the Lycée.⁴⁷

The Kessab branch of the *La Lepsius Deutsche Orient Mission* (Lepsius German Orient Mission Corporation) was established by the German missionary Dr. Lepsius, who had opened an orphanage in Urfa in 1896 during the Armenian massacres.⁴⁸ After the war, his orphanage was moved to Beirut with the Near East Relief Society in 1918. Following his death in 1927, his followers transferred this orphanage to Kessab in 1930, where they were still active in 1939, teaching students practical concepts of agriculture.⁴⁹

L'école Italienne des Pères Carmes (Father Carmes Italian School), established in Alexandretta in 1860, was reopened after World War I by Father Carmes in 1918. The school's buildings and archives were demolished by a fire in

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.24.

⁴⁸ Dr. Johannes Lepsius is the phil-Armenian doctor who met with Enver Pasha for the Armenian politics in Franz Werfel, *Musa Dağ'da 40 gün* (Istanbul: Belge yayınları, 1997), p. 122-146.

⁴⁹ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 48.

August 1927 as was the *Mission Franciscains de Kessab*. (Franciscan Mission of Kessab).⁵⁰

Before the Mandate: Territorialization of the Region

It was the end of World War I and the following French occupation that brought the area under one administrative rule.⁵¹ Before the French, Alexandretta, Belen, Reyhaniye and Antioch were *kazas* of the *vilayet* of Aleppo, whereas Payas and Hassa were attached to the *vilayet* of the Fertile Crescent. It was after the signing of the Treaty of London on 15 September 1919 between France and Great Britain, leaving Syria and Cilicia to the French by the British, that Alexandretta, Antioch, Harim⁵² and Belen were attached to each other under the name of the Autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta. The Sanjak of Alexandretta was divided into three *kazas*, Alexandretta, Antioch and Kırıkhan with the centre at Alexandretta. The *kaza* of Kırıkhan included the *nahiyes* of Kırıkhan, Reyhaniye, Hajilar and Beylan; the *kaza* of Alexandretta those of Iskenderun and Arsuz; the *kaza* of Antioch those of Karamurt, Ordu, Kessab, Suveydiye, Bityas, Kuseyr, al-Fawqani, Kuseyr al-Tahtani and Harbiye.⁵³ On 1 September 1920, the French High Commissioner in Beirut set up the state of Aleppo and incorporated the Sanjak of Alexandretta within it.⁵⁴

The turning of the Alexandretta region into a territory was in itself a political process, which was contested and involved rivalry. In the background of the

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵¹ The territorialization of Alexandretta is a point discussed at length in Stefanos Yerasimos, *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* (Edisud 1988), No. 48-49.

⁵² Before 1914, Harim was a *kaza* but the Unionist vali of Aleppo, Abdülhalik Renda, transferred the *kaza* from Harim to Reyhaniye where Turcoman Beys dominate contrary to Harim where 90% of the population is Arab.

⁵³ Jacquot, p. 31.

⁵⁴ Edward Weisband, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta, 1920-1939: A Case Study", in R. Bayly Winder ed., *Near Eastern Roundtable, 1967- 68* (New York: NYU Near Eastern Studies Center, 1969), p.156.

formation of the autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta lay the imperialist rivalry in the Middle East between France and Great Britain. The region was involved in the allied power's secret wartime councils and agreements, in their post-war rivalries and in the international settlement of political and territorial problems.

The classic way to portray the formation of the modern Middle East is with the three significant agreements made during the war: First, the Hussein- MacMahon correspondence between July 1915 and March 1916 in which the English made a promise to the Hashimi Dynasty for a great Arab empire bounded on the north by Mersin and Adana up to the 37th parallel, on which fell Birecik, Urfa, Mardin, Midyat, Jazira ibn Omer and Diyarbakır up to the border of Persia". The second agreement, which concluded the destinies of the Near Eastern territories, was the secret Sykes- Picot Agreement of April-May 1916 between France, Great Britain and Russia, which was kept secret from Italy and Sharif Hussein. Accordingly, Cilicia and the coastal strip of Syria were earmarked for France and southern Mesopotamia with Baghdad and the ports of Haifa and Acre for Great Britain. The zone between the French and British territories was to form a confederation of Arab states, or one independent Arab state. Alexandretta was to be a free port for Allied use.⁵⁵ The third agreement was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 promising land to Jews in Palestine. Although not directly related to the Sanjak affairs it was very significant in the formation of Arab nationalism and the beginning of the Arab- Zionist conflict.

It is the highly touted "Arab Revolt" which occupies a great place in Arab and Turkish historiographies. In 1916, the British encouraged the rebellion of Sharif

⁵⁵ Avedis Sanjian, *The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay), A Study in Franco-Turco-Syrian Relations*. Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1956, p.12.

Hussein and his sons against their Ottoman overlords.⁵⁶ One of the Sharif's sons, Amir Faysal, was placed in charge of the Northern Arab Army, which participated in the British led campaign that drove north from the Hijaz through Palestine to present-day Syria. When Anglo- Arab army entered Damascus on 3 October 1918, Amir Faysal proclaimed the formation of an independent Arab government in the name of his father, King Hussein. From Damascus the Sharifian army marched to the north and west. On October (26) 27, both the British cavalry and the Arab regulars marched into Aleppo and later to Antioch.⁵⁷ In spite of the fact that the issue of the extent of occupation of Antioch by the Sharifian Arab troops remains as a highly contested issue between Turkish and Arab historiographies, Antonious and Gautherot, who was formerly *Chef du Bureau des Opérations des Troupes Françaises du Levant*, argue that Arab troops occupied Antioch where Ibrahim Hananu proclaimed the Sharifian government. Later, they occupied Beylan and advanced on Alexandretta.⁵⁸ Due to the symbolic significance attached to the subject, a closer look at these events will be undertaken in the following pages.

Meanwhile, the armistice of Mudros was signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers on October 30, 1918. France had moved in to occupy Antioch on December 7, 1918 with the authorization of General Allenby who also ordered the Sharifian official ar-Rikabi to undertake the immediate withdrawal of all Arab troops from the district. But these orders were ignored and armed bands terrorized the villages of the mountainous region of Harim, Beylan and Antioch, recruiting

⁵⁶ Mary Wilson, "The Hashemites, The Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism" in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 204- 221.

⁵⁷ Sanjian, p. 14; Mehmet Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi* (Antakya: Zirem Basınevi, 1999), pp. 90- 91.

⁵⁸ George Antonius, *Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939), p. 239- 240; also Gustave Gautherot, *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie* (Courbevoie, Seine: Librairie Indépendante, 1920), pp. 50- 55, 123- 131.

volunteers and distributing arms to the people. On December 20, Ibrahim Tannus Bey, the Sharif's representative, arrived in Antioch on an "inspection" tour. The French headquarters issued orders to Tannus Bey to quit the region immediately.⁵⁹ By February 1919, Ibrahim Hananu and İbrahim Edhem Bey, the last Sharifian officials, had left the region, hesitantly concluding the drama of Arab occupation in the region of Alexandretta and Antioch. In November 1919, General Allenby formally handed over the administration of the district of Alexandretta to French High Commissioner General Gouraud.

The anti-French struggle between the French occupation of Antioch and its environs and the Franklin Bouillon agreement of October 1921 form one of the two most stressed periods in the Turkish historiography of the city under the Mandate. It also occupies a substantial place in Arab historiography in which, similar to the Turkish version, the heroes of local anti-French struggles in the prelude to the Mandate are represented as glorious nationalist figures. As indicated in the introduction, the irregular armed bands, militias (*çetes*) fighting against the French occupation in the region characterized the political scene in this "phase" of the post-World War I period. The next section attempts to reconstruct the activities of *çetes* in and around Antioch in comparison with similar and simultaneous anti-French struggles in rural parts of northern Syria in the same period. This effort will primarily try to escape from the ahistorical and homogenising categories offered by official and Turkish historiographies. In order to comprehend the *çete* activities, one has to take into account the social and political atmosphere of those years, which corresponds to the highly unstable, uncertain and fluid period of the First World War and its immediate aftermath. It is a time when the political, military as well as

⁵⁹ Jacquot, *Antioche*, vol. II: 230 and 319.

discursive limits of none of the parties can accurately be drawn. A brief overview of the city of Antioch and the surrounding mountains will reveal both the changing and unchanging environment and the emergence of new forms of politicization in the region under the war conditions.

Arabism, Turkism and Antioch in the Immediate Aftermath of World War I

The social and economic distress of the war years had a devastating effect on the shaping of the activities of the irregular militias of the post-war period and on the transformation of the local social, economic and cultural dynamics of Antioch during the Mandate period. The stagnation of commerce due to the disruption of the trade routes between Antioch and its natural hinterland; the recent exodus of Armenians from the city due to the massacres in 1909 and 1915; and the outstanding problems of food, hoarding and profiteering, especially of wheat, were important determinants in this context.

The structure of ownership in Antioch was big landownership in the two fertile areas surrounding the city, the Orontes valley, and the Kuseyr plateau, respectively. The land was owned mostly by Sunni-Turkish speaking *ağas* (notables) employing Arab-Alawite peasants, although Alawite and a few Sunni Arab *ağas* were also present in the immediate areas of Antioch, such as in Daphne (*Harbiye*) where most of the Alawite peasantry of Antioch resided, and Sueydia (*Samandağ*),

also where a big part of the population was formed of Alawite peasants.⁶⁰ The Armenians of the legendary Jabal Mousa, whose villages were under the administrative influence of Sueydiye, formed the only rural group who bore the relevant characteristics of small peasantry. Interestingly enough, the other Alawite and Christian peasants of Suveydiye and its dependent villages, even of the neighbouring Alawite villages of the Jabal Mousa, were sharecroppers on the lands of mostly Sunni Turkish speaking Antiochean notables or the famous Alawite Sheikh Cilli family.

The class structure of Antioch and its hinterland changed to a great extent after the settlement of Turcoman tribes with their *kışlak* (pastures) in the Amik region, located in the east of the south-eastern Taurus Mountains. Before this, both the Amik plain and the Gavur Mountain had remained outside the economic and political influence of the notables of Antioch. Following the settlement, the tribal leaders gradually turned into big landowners known as the Amik Beys and began to cultivate mostly wheat in the Amik plain.

The 1908 revolution and the 1909 and 1915 Armenian massacres brought about new divisions in the general picture of the city. A group of notables supporting the CUP (The Committee for Union and Progress) started to gain power against the traditional “liberal” notables.⁶¹ This group did not necessarily completely correspond to the Sunni Turkish notables of Antioch. Although mostly comprised by them,

⁶⁰ Harbiye and Samandağ are considered to be the peripheral areas by the urban population. However, they are strongly connected to the city centre because they are the towns that provision of the city and where the wealth of the urban notables lies. In any case, like Jacques Weulersse writes, it would be misleading to study Antioch apart from its immediate areas “*Pays d’Antioche est d’ailleurs assez difficile a définir. Ce n’est point en effet une région naturelle, mais une région économique groupant l’ensemble des divers pays dépendant plus ou moins du centre urbain. Cette dépendance des régions rurales vis a vis de la ville est essentielle : le contrite tacite qui lie la campagne a la cite est en effet singulièrement différent en orient de ce qu’il est dans notre Occident actuel.*” See Jacques Weulersse, “Antioche Essai de Géographie Urbaine”, *Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales*, no. 4 (1935), p. 30.

⁶¹ Türkmen, p. 910.

interestingly enough, a priest of the Antioch Orthodox Christian Church was a member of the CUP together with the some other Christian notables of the city.⁶² The memory of World War I was a breaking point in terms of the poverty and famine, especially for the Alawite peasantry.⁶³ In Antioch, except for the Orontes valley, the city and its close rural hinterland were dependent on the countryside for the supply of provisions. This supply was reimbursed with silk cocoons that were grown in the Orontes Valley. However, due to the war, these cocoons could not be exported to Europe.⁶⁴ In addition, owing to the great increase in the price of wheat during the war, the Amik Beys was suddenly enriched and the conflict between the residents of Amik and the impoverished Alawite tenants became intensified. These conditions prepared the ground for politicization but not necessarily along the lines of rivalling nationalist parties as viewed in Turkish and Arab nationalist accounts. This animosity did not essentially stem from or correspond to an Arab national or an Alawite ethnic consciousness. It neither took the form of a peasant uprising in the context of an anti-ağa discourse thanks to the patrimonial and populist policies of the notables, though the Turkish nationalists after 1936 undertook such a line of propaganda. As will be discussed in the next section, the participation in *çetes* was organized through traditional loyalties and networks.

The Great War and its consequences for Antioch, especially for those who were incorporated into the Ottoman army, had prepared fertile ground for a nationalist mobilization by the Turkist notables of the city. However, nationalist

⁶² M. A. Alexandre, "Le Conflit de l'Arabisme et des Nationalismes Voisins, Le Conflit Syro Turc du Sandjak d'Alexandrette d'Octobre 1936 à Juin 1937, vu d'Antioche", *L'Afrique Française*, Supplement to vol. 68I, (April, 1938), p. 106; and Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001.

⁶³ Although the argument that World War I was the most important watershed in the memory of the peasant Alawite population of Antioch is a tentative one, nearly all of the Alawite peasants with whom I conducted interviews periodized the early 20th century with reference to the living conditions prevailing during World War I.

⁶⁴ Türkmen, p. 913.

politicization among the “masses” was still very marginal in both the Arabist and Turkist factions, although a clear-cut line of differentiation between these ideologies is also hard to draw for the time concerned. For the Turkist line of politicization, the opening up of *Türk Ocağı* (the Turkish Hearth Organization) in Antioch in 1914 by Dr. Abdurrahman Melek and three of his colleagues, who were university students then, is regarded as the first Turkist political organization of the city. Rumours about the Armenian resistance in Jabal Mousa in 1915 formed one of the peculiar characteristics of the Turkish national/local struggle in Antioch.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, politics was not a domain only of elite design but was also elite dominated in terms of activity, unlike in the cities of Damascus or Beirut.⁶⁶

Arabist activities endowed similar characteristics to the Turkist movement.⁶⁷ There were no Arabist secret societies in Antioch before World War I, if one does not fall into the trap of identifying the proponents of the *Entente Liberale* with the supporters of Arabism, or even more with Arab nationalists.⁶⁸ The Arabist political activity that started during World War I remained very moderate, and culminated with the foundation of Faysal’s Arab State.

There is evidence that, although contradictory in the dates given, Najib Arsuzi, the father of Zaki Arsuzi, who was the head of the Pan-Arabist party and of the club *‘Usbat al- ‘amal al-qavmi* (League of National Action) in Antioch in 1936 and also one of the founders of the Ba’ath party in Syria, was the local leader of a

⁶⁵ Interestingly enough, nearly all of the interviewees had heard about the 1915 “affairs” in Jabal Mousa independent of their closeness to the mountain and Suveydiye. These same people would not have heard about some very rare events.

⁶⁶ Except the violent popular movement of the Armenian massacres in the city in 1909 and death of at least 500 Armenians. See Avedis Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 280

⁶⁷ Abdurrahman Melek, *Hatay Nasıl Kurtuldu?* (Ankara: TTK, 1966), p. 27.

⁶⁸ A critical survey of Arabist and Arab nationalist movements until World War I is done by Hasan Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

secret Arab organization. There is disagreement among the sources over the secret society with which he was affiliated, whether it was *al- 'Ahd* (the Covenant), *al Na 'di el- Arabi* (the Arab Club), or *Al-Fatat*.⁶⁹ Most probably, he was a member of *al-Fatat*, as argued by his son, Zaki al-Arsouzi. Zaki al-Arsouzi wrote "My father formed a political society which sought the establishment of an Arab government instead of a Turkish one. It was the Syrian branch of al-Fatat. My father worked against the Ottoman State".⁷⁰ In 1915, during a search of Najib Arsouzi's house by Ottoman soldiers, who chewed up and swallowed the list of Antiochian members of this cell. He was arrested and sentenced in Damascus, and exiled to Konya. After a year of exile in Konya, he and his family returned to Antioch, where he continued to be an activist for the Arab cause. He supported the Arab revolt of Sharif Husayn and he was the one who took down the Ottoman flag from the government house in Antioch to replace it with the Hashemite flag.⁷¹

Türkmen sets Shukri al- Asali⁷² at the head of Arabist activity in Antioch under *al Nadi al- Arabi*. As a civil inspector in the *vilayet* of Syria, he had the opportunity to travel to Antioch whenever he wanted.⁷³ When al-Asali was in

⁶⁹ *Jam 'iyyat al-umma al- 'Arabiyya al-fatat* (the Young Arab Society) was a secret society founded in 1909 in Paris. It had considerable impact on the development of Arab nationalism. The members of *al-Fatat* would form the post-war Arab nationalist groups of Syria such as the Camil Mardam Beys and al-Bakris. The members of *al-Fatat* were mostly educated but unemployed young upper class Arabs. They provided significant support to the Faysal government until the end of 1919. Watenpaugh predicts it was al-Ahd on 1915. Türkmen argues that it was al Nadi al Arabi led by Shukri el Asali after the war. But, Zaki al-Arsouzi states it was al-Fatat. From Antoine S. J Audo., *Zaki al-Arsouzi: un Arabe face a la Modernité* (Beirut: Dar-al- Machreq, 1988), p. 6.

⁷⁰ Zaki al-Arsouzi states it was al-Fatat. From Antoine S. J Audo., *Zaki al-Arsouzi: un Arabe face a la Modernité* (Beirut: Dar-al- Machreq, 1988), p. 6. "Mon père a forme une société politique secrète qui cherchait a établir un pouvoir arabe a la place de pouvoir turc. Cette société était d'une certaine façon, une section du parti Suriyya al-Fatat. Mon père déjà travaille en politique contre l'état Ottoman."

⁷¹ Audo, *Zaki al-Arsouzi*, p. 8. Taken from *Complete Works of Zaki al- Arsouzi*, 6 vols., ed. (Antun Maqdisi, Sidki İsmail et. al. Damascus, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 277-331.

⁷² For a detailed biography of al- Asali, see Samir Seikaly, "Shukri al-Asali: A Case Study of a Political Activist", in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Rashid Khalidi et.al. eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

⁷³ Türkmen, vol. 4, p. 916-197.

Antioch, his treason case was heard by the Istanbul government and members of the secret club began to be arrested, exiled to Konya or executed. Among those executed were Najib Arsuzi and Sakir Kavvas.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ He prepared the committee in Antioch that would meet the King- Crane commission in Alexandretta in December 1918. Şakir Kavvas was exiled to Konya due to his Arabist activities. Later by Cemal Pasha (Mersinli), he was exempted and returned to Antioch where he worked as the translator and fiduciary of a French military judge following the occupation of Alexandretta by the French in November 1918. Türkmen recalls the first period of French occupation as the “Şakir Kavvas Sultanate”. Türkmen, vol. 4: 931- 936. Şakir Kavvas, who was stated by Türkmen to belong to the Arabist notables of Antioch, is celebrated along with some *ağas* of Harbiye and famous *ağa* of Suveydiye, Shayk Maruf Cilli, owing to his contribution in sustaining unity among the Alawites of Antioch. Muhammed Emin Galib et-Tavil, *Arap Alevilerinin Tarihi, 'Nusayriler'* (İstanbul: Çivi yazıları, 2000), p. 317. The original name of the book is Muhammed Emin Galib et-Tavil, *Tarihü'l-Aleviyyin* (Lazkiye, 1924).

Çetes, by Whom, against Whom and How?

The term *çete* is adapted here to imply a local, irregular and armed organization against the French occupation between January 1919, when the French and British expelled the Arab government from Antioch, Harim and Beylan, and the Franklin Bouillion agreement of October 1921. The Turkish description of these irregular forces is highly charged with ethnic and nationalist connotations. These practices are conceptualized linearly and in an evolutionist manner, as the struggles that paved the way to mass nationalist movements. This period is constructed as the first stage in the liberation of Hatay, as the precursor of the Turkish nationalist movement of post-1936. It is drawn out as if the motivations of these irregulars were solid from the beginning, and as if they were well coordinated, regular, disciplined and well-equipped forces like an apparatus of a central organization. In fact, the activities of the *çetes* have achieved a retrospective homogeneity and coherence through the written works of scholars and non-scholars, which they never achieved in actuality. Besides, these accounts, most of which were written during and after the incorporation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey, helped in the establishment, institutionalisation and articulation of the memory of the *çete* activities. The efforts of the recontextualization and remembering of historical reality greatly contributed to the construction of a Turkish nationalist identity in the city for the years following the annexation of the region.

The point of contention about these *çete* disturbances revolves around their nationalist character. Any absolute answer to this question would be incomprehensive due to the highly complex nature of the guerilla bands. Still, one should look for answers to the following questions: the motivations of the participants, the forms of participation of these people, the kind of relationships

between them and the leaders of the militias, the propaganda methods employed by the leaders in order to mobilize soldiers and their near-peripheries, and the level of exposition of the masses to these bands.

While contemporary Turkish Arab and French writings put emphasis on the anti-French aspect in the struggles of these *çetes*, this paper contends that local dynamics, conflicts and hostilities rather than Turkish national concerns played a major role at every level of activity of these irregulars. Therefore, it would be misleading to represent these organizations as the emergence of mass politics or nationalization of the masses. This is due to the low level of participation of the “masses” as well as their lack of imprinting a popular trace on the manner of organization, propaganda and activities of the *çetes*.

The notables of the city as well as the countryside could easily turn out to be the leaders of the irregular bands. These people could mobilize a great number of their clients, as the irregular militias were organized through patron-client networks and through kinship. It would not be an exaggeration to view the people in the mountains as dispersed members of some affiliated clans. Therefore, the subtext of the organization of and participation in the *çete* reveals the politics of the notables in Antioch as well.

Following the Great War, in the green mountains of the region, there were groups of peasants, soldiers, irregulars, deserters, mostly Armenian emigres, missionaries, bandits, nomadic tribes and shepherds. Retrospectively, the years following World War I can be observed as a period of plurality, with the absence of a singular authority or ideology, and increasing politicization among the society. However, one should be alert against falling into another kind of essentialism while trying to “rescue history from nation” and not overlook the general hegemonic

structure, which was diffusing throughout the societies, albeit at different speeds and times. The celebrated ideology of the twentieth century was nationalism, and it was inseparable from the dominant administrative structure of nation states in a capitalist world order. In the Turkish context, this “void” of fluidity, uncertainty and decentralization was filled by the premises of the very nationalist paradigm after 1937, one of which was closely intertwined with the Turkish political claims about the region.

Resistance to French in Syria

The nationalist and elitist bias inherent to the Turkish and Arab official historiographies underscore both the interrelationship and mutual communication between the anti-French *çete* struggle in southern Turkey and Northern Syria as if national boundaries were eternal entities and were not imposed on once continuous geographical spaces as late as the 1920s. However, a critical reading of the Turkish conventional narratives about the period offers significant insights about the corresponding affinity between the two, which also depicts the nature of the resistances to French occupation in the pre-Mandate period.

Philip Khoury evaluates the early resistance movements against the French in Syria as emanating from the Arab nationalism of the countryside rather than from the interior towns such as Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Hama. Much of the Syrian nationalist leadership in Damascus had moved to Transjordan and Palestine and from there many moved to Cairo, to a life of political exile.⁷⁵ The two regions that resisted occupation were the *Jabal Ansariyya* (Alawite Mountain) and the northwestern districts of Aleppo.

Syrian nationalists, like the Turkish nationalists, attributed nationalist motivations to the rebels against the French in the pre-Mandate period. Although some of the anti-French revolts carried an Arab nationalist tone, especially the Alawite rebellion was not motivated by the Arab nationalist movements emanating from Damascus, on the contrary were inspired primarily by local considerations. Sheikh Salih, the leader of the revolt, was interested in protecting the Alawite district from all external interference.⁷⁶ However, what distinguished this uprising from previous ones was the need and opportunity to coordinate their activities with other resistance activities in Syria in a common struggle against foreign rule for the first time.⁷⁷ By July 1920, Sheikh Salih's guerilla bands were in control of much of the mountain and their success owed much to the external factors. One such factor was the Dandashi clan, whose chiefs supported Amir Faysal and seized Tall Kalakh, southeast of Sheikh Salih's fief, forcing the French troops to withdraw southwards to Tripoli.⁷⁸ The other event indirectly effecting the destiny of Sheikh Salih took place when the Turkish irregulars in the Antioch region, armed and financed by the Kemalist movement which was fighting the French for control of Cilicia, marched toward Latakia.⁷⁹ Turkish bands had managed to distract the French army long enough to divert it from its original aim of pacifying the central part of the Alawite Mountain.⁸⁰ Yet, the decisive failure of the rebellion in the Alawite Mountain came with an agreement between the French and the Turkish nationalists over Cilicia in March 1921.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 98.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

⁷⁷ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 102

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 100

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Jacques Weulersse, *Le Pays des Alouites* (Tours: Institut Français de Damas, 1940), p. 118.

Another struggle against the French invasion was the north Syrian revolt, whose leader was Ibrahim Hananu. A former Ottoman bureaucrat of Kurdish origin, he was born in Harim as the son of a wealthy rural notable. He was educated at the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*. Later, he joined Faysal's Arab army as an officer. He was a member of the secret nationalist society *Al-Fatat* and had become Harim's representative to the Syrian Congress in Damascus.

Tayfur Sökmen's memoir, which was written in a highly careful style so as not to offend anybody who was involved in the struggle of independence, gives a narrative account of those years during which he was active as the leader of a *çete* in collaboration with the Turkish *Kuvay-i Milliye* in the pre-Mandate period. Reading between the lines of his apparent state-centred approach, which is diffused throughout whole book, reveals the close collaboration between Hananu and his guerilla bands.⁸¹ The Turkish *Kuvay-i Milliye* was fighting the French for control of a large area of northern Syria stretching from Urfa through Maraş and down to Antioch and Alexandretta. The northern Syrian resistance movement originated within this area, an alliance developed with the Kemalist movement, and it was far more influenced by the Turkish nationalist movement than it was by the Arab nationalist movement.⁸² Paradoxically, Hananu's revolt and its dynamics reveal the "natural" social frontiers of the region before it was re-mapped under the interests of the imperial states. Accordingly, Aleppo stood in the hinterland of southern Anatolia and its livelihood and prosperity depended on free commercial access to Anatolia. Aleppo's social and economic ties to Anatolia were largely the products of its long-standing economic orientation toward its north. Anatolia was its major market and

⁸¹ Tayfur Sökmen, *Hatay'ın Kurtuluşu için Harcanan Çabalar* (Ankara: TTK, 1978).

⁸² Khoury, *Syria*, p. 103-105.

greatest source of raw materials and foodstuffs.⁸³ However, at the same time, the Hananu revolt was a decisive point for the Aleppine Muslim elite to assume gradually an Arab national identity. The growing disillusionment of the Aleppine nationalists with the Kemalists obliged them to reorient their politics and turn towards the south rather than the north. In addition, the new border between Aleppo and its natural hinterland forced the Aleppine elite to take greater interest in Syrian affairs.

Like the Damascene political elite, the Aleppine political elite had served the Ottoman state as an “aristocracy of service”, and it had absorbed even more of the Ottoman-Turkish trappings of language, culture and style than the Damascene political elite had. Turkish had been commonly spoken in Aleppo since the Ottoman conquest of northern Syria in the sixteenth century. Because of Aleppo’s geographical proximity to Anatolia and its links to Istanbul, a high proportion of the Aleppine notability possessed a partly Turkish lineage. Marriages with Turkish and Turco-Circassian families were not only normal but also preferred. Consequently, the Aleppine political elite, although interested in greater political autonomy for the Aleppo province at the time of the Arab revolt, maintained a stronger attachment to Istanbul and to Ottoman temporal authority than the Damascene elite. The Faysal era contributed to the reluctance of Aleppine notables to develop an Arab nationalist identity. Under the Sharifian government, they found themselves subordinate to the new national capital, the highest authorities in Aleppo being Iraqis and Damascenes. Yet it was a mistake to assume, as many French officials did, that Aleppo was to remain politically quiescent.⁸⁴

⁸³ Ibid., p.103

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.104

In relation to these developments, the Aleppine political elite was drawn into Arab nationalism more slowly and deliberately. The contribution of the Aleppine elites to the rise of Arabism was slight, as was the role of the Aleppines in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916.⁸⁵ Thus, when the French moved into northern Syria, the Aleppines turned to the Turkish “nationalist” movement for support. Some did so with the aim of reuniting their territory with Turkey; others, who were in the majority, aligned themselves with the Kemalist forces when it became obvious that the French had paralyzed the Arab nationalist forces in Damascus. The overwhelming sentiment in Aleppo in July 1920 was distinctly pro-Turkish and anti-French.⁸⁶

Hananu recruited young men into his own *League of National Defense* with the support of several prominent merchants, religious leaders and members of liberal professions. Alongside the League of National Defense, the Aleppo branch of the *Nad-el Arab* (Arab Club) emerged to propagate the idea of Syrian national unity.⁸⁷ Hananu’s revolt depended on aid from Turkish nationalists. The Kemalist *Kuvay-i Milliye* contributed men, money and arms to Hananu’s forces. In addition, the Turkish side supported a wide network of political committees and organizations in northern Syria for the dissemination of pro-Turkish and anti-French propaganda.⁸⁸ Although there existed a degree of mutual suspicion between the Aleppine nationalists (Hananu and his closest aides, some of whom were Turkish army officers) and Kemalists, both parties recognized that they faced a common enemy. At

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.103

⁸⁶ A. Hokayem and M. C. Bittar, *L’Empire Ottoman, Les Arabes et Les Grandes Puissances 1914-1920* (Beyrouth: Editions Univ. de Liban, 1981), p. 295; and Khoury, *Syria*, p.105

⁸⁷ For the Arab club of Aleppo (Nad- el Arab), see Elizier Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London: Portland, Or. F. Cass, 1993).

⁸⁸ Orhan Koloğlu, *Gazinin Çağında İslam Dünyası* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1994), pp. 143-144; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 106

the popular level, there was significant support for the Turkish independence struggle. One such instance occurred in 1922 when demonstrations in Aleppo broke out in favor of a Turkish victory over the Greeks as a victory of Islam over Christianity.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the Arab nationalist elite was hostile to the Turkish government thanks to the signing of the peace treaty with France in 1921.

Several individuals supporting the Hananu revolt were also regular emissaries to Mustafa Kemal in 1920 and 1921. In fact, Longrigg describes Hananu as a man of authority and attainments who could place himself at the head of former or fugitive Turkish soldiery and in concert operations with the regular troops of Badri Bey.⁹⁰ One of the most influential liaisons was provided by Jamil Ibrahim Pasha (an arabized Kurd, like Hananu, who had studied at the *Mülkiye*, joined the CUP, fought in the Balkan Wars, and worked for the unity of the empire until the end of WWI) who had visited Mustafa Kemal in Antep for a joint military campaign against the French at the end of the summer of 1920. By December, a Turkish financed anti-French propaganda campaign was underway in Aleppo. Famine and food riots in some quarters prompted the population to supply Hananu with money, men and arms. Hananu's bands included Aleppine volunteers and conscripts, villagers and Bedouins.

⁸⁹ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 107. Most probably, Khoury quotes this news from the pro-Turkist newspaper *El-Belag* published in Beirut.

⁹⁰ Longrigg, p. 121.

Turkish officers supplied by Mustafa Kemal also led some bands. Although Hananu was in command of the largest bands between Aleppo and Antioch, his authority did not extend to a number of smaller bands of Turkish irregulars operating in the region or to the small Syrian bands organized specifically for pillaging and looting that had become a common feature of the Aleppine countryside in this period. However, a sustained urban revolt never materialized.

The *Çete* in Antioch and in its Environs

Distinguishing the *çete* period as a self contained and separate phase and charging it with nationalist references went hand in hand with the geographically isolationist perspective. In the Turkish context, such conceptualization was another way of linking and co-opting the anti-French struggle (liberation process) in the city to the “National Independence War” ongoing in Anatolia. The political implication of this argument was that Antioch and its surroundings have naturally/essentially formed an integral part of Anatolia and Turkey as observed in the *çete* struggles following the World War I, thus Turkey’s irredentist claims are legitimate.

Although there are slight differences in the classification of the *çete* period in Turkish historiography, the activities of the *çetes* are narrated within the dynamics / dichotomy of Arab and Turkish patriotism and the eventual refinement of the Arabist faction of the irregular bands. The whole periodization of those catastrophic years and the selected instances within it are signs of the tension between these two factions.

As indicated before, in spite of the insufficiency of original written material regarding these activities and the common implicit agenda of which they consist, a

critical elaboration of these works provides the reader with some significant aspects about the nature of the *çete* activities. Sökmen's account starts from the 1820s, when the Ottoman state attempted to settle the tribes of the southern Anatolia region, and continues with the accomplishments of the *Fırka-i Islahiye* (Reform Division) (1865). In doing so, he glorifies his own past as his grandfather, a Turcoman tribal chieftain who had negotiated with the Ottoman government, was the first to come down and join the Ottoman army. The tragic death of his father following his judgment by the *Divan-ı Harp* (court marshal) with the "unjust" accusation that he had been involved in the Armenian massacres in Kırıkhan in 1909 marks the beginning of his political engagements. He constructs an analogy between his grandfather and himself, claiming that "it is an honor and pleasure for me to serve the state and the nation."⁹¹

Ahmet Faik Türkmen's voluminous books also give valuable insights regarding the "unofficial/private" aspect of what he calls "The Anarchy Period", the rivalries between notables, the rumors, the backgrounds of the *mujahidun* (the participants of the bands), the plan of action of the *çetes*, the roads they covered, the mountains they lived in; in short, Türkmen provides the reader with everyday but real details about the period.⁹² Muhammed Emin Galib et-Tavil's book on the history of the Nusayris, *Tarihü'l - 'Aleviyyin* (History of the Alawites), offers a comparative perspective for the reader presenting a pro-French position as well as important details on the side of the Alawites involved in the guerilla activities.

Accordingly, Ahmet Faik Türkmen divides the *çete* period into sub-periods as follows (he employs the term "armed struggle" instead of *çete* because he identifies the later Mandate years as the period of "unarmed struggle"): The first stage includes

⁹¹ Ibid.,p. 16-17.

⁹² Türkmen, p. 943.

“disturbances and irregular skirmishes against French in various districts of Antioch”⁹³ and the second stage is the nationally conscious struggle of Hatay’s populace. The second stage starts from the summer of 1920 and continues until the Ankara agreement of 20 October 1921. The exact starting point of the second period corresponds to the end of May 1920, when Tayfur Mürsel for the first time communicated with Mustafa Kemal from *Sam*, a village 1.5 hours north of Antep. What differentiates the two sub-periods from each other is the communication (yet temporary) between the Turkish *çetes* and the Arabs in northern Syria in the first stage. Accordingly, Türkmen depicts the second stage as hierarchically superior to the first one because of the national consciousness and related cohesion of the participants it involved.

The two significant issues that both Türkmen and Sökmen underline in the first stage of Hatay’s “armed national struggle” are those of the Armenians and the Arabs. In fact, it seems that in this period the struggle was directed more against the Armenians than the French. The Turkish attacks on the Armenians were legitimized on the grounds that the occupation of Antioch by the French had given confidence to the Armenians to settle in Islahiye and Dörtöyl; and to attack the Turkish residents and their property there. Moreover, the French forces in Dörtöyl were formed mostly of Armenians who were hostile to the Turks of the region. The first *çete* was founded in a village of Payas called Özerli and was organized against the Armenians under the leadership of Hakkı Bey, a member of the notable Sunni families of the region who had been exiled to *Niche* by the *Fırka-i Islahiye* but later had returned to his homeland.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 944.

With the arrival of Hakkı Bey in Özerli, the Turkish notables of the nearby villages and armed Turkish youth gathered around him and began to discuss possible attack plans against the Armenians, who were continuously disturbing the Turkish population. The participants in this gathering were the cousins of Hakkı Bey. It was decided that four or five men be sent to the mountain. Baba Mustafa Derviş from Körtil, Ali Ömer Ağa, Mehmet and Ahmed Kadri from the Hocoğulları family and Hadji Mustafa joined these forces. The first bullet shot at the French transportation forces is accepted as the symbolic beginning of the struggle.⁹⁴ After small, irregular and discrete attacks, the Armenians became afraid to set foot on the mountain.

Simultaneously, the French introduced oppressive measures, such as the replacement of the *mudir* (communal head) of the district with a man called Değirmendereli Ahmet, because the former had been helping the Turkish *çetes*. In time, the number of armed men in the mountain drew near to sixty with the addition of the *ağas* of the villages of Jabal Sincan and their men. Yet, since the “enemy”/threat was more the Armenians than the French, the activities intensified in the towns of Dörtyol and Ekbez where the Armenians lived in large numbers. The youth in this region “took refuge” in the mountains to escape “Armenian tyranny” and armed themselves with the Mauser rifles left by the deserters. Yet some of these men abused this situation and began to pillage the peasants. Nevertheless, the *çetes* of Gavur Dag (Jabal Sincan) never turned into a centralized guerrilla band; instead, from time to time, they joined the irregulars of the Amik plain or sometimes helped the Hassa and Ekbez combatants (*mujahidin*) and fought under the command of Tayfur Mürsel.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Türkmen, p. 946.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 949.

What is depicted as hierarchically superior in nationalist tone and becomes more visible in later writings is the struggle against the French on the Amik plain under the leadership of the Amik Beys. The significance of the struggle in Amik is, firstly, due to the size and regularity of the bands fighting against the French but also to the increasing power and influence of the Amik Beys in the political sphere during the late Mandate period and later under the Turkish Republic. (The leader of the *çete* in Amik became the president of the new Hatay State in 1938.)

Comparatively new settlers in the area, the Amik beys are regarded as carrying a “pure and uncorrupted” Turkishness since they could keep themselves outside the “artificial divisions” of supporting either the CUP or the Entente Libérale.⁹⁶ Mostly, their hegemony over the narrative of the Hatay struggle is strongly related to their finally becoming the winning party.

As mentioned above, the memoir of Tayfur Sökmenoğlu (Mürsel), provides well-documented information regarding the “details” of the success story. When one looks at the subtext, the tension between him and the traditional urban notables of Antioch can be observed clearly. The tension arose from the fact that the Amik Beys had money, land and men but not the merits of membership in the aristocracy. Sökmen’s memoirs may as well be interpreted as the process of consensus-making, the incorporation of these rural landowners into the traditional elites occurred through marriages, geographic displacements and the fulfillment of the necessary conditions for membership.

This tension shapes the structure of his narrative in such a manner that while most of the Turkish sources instrumentalize the activities of the irregular bands and represent them as organized forms of a nationalist awakening, Sökmen reserves room

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 914.

for the role of the elites and the intra-elite conflict in the discussion of the *çete* activities. In his account, the elites are the leaders and their political and social networks determine the people to be involved in the struggle. Therefore, based on his account, it is to be claimed that there is more shared between Ibrahim Hananu and Tayfur Sökmen, as notables of Kafr Takharim and Amik, respectively.

The political tension between the traditional and the future urban notables (Amik Beys) went back to the foundation of Amir Faysal's government in Damascus at the end of 1918. According to Türkmen, it corresponded to the time when the Turkish commander Asım Bey was at the head of the Arabist movement in Antioch but could not diffuse into Amik or the town Reyhaniye in particular where the Turcoman Amik Beys dominated. At the same time, a series of attacks was undertaken by "desert Arabs" (Bedouins), who were provoked by the Aleppine Arab nationalists. With the occupation of Amik by the French under the leadership of an Aleppine Arab named Mustafa Cerrah, Reyhaniye was tied to Harim. No authority was left for the Amik Beys to refer, neither the French in Harim nor the Arabs in Damascus, nor the Turkish *Kuvayi Milliye*.⁹⁷ So, the struggle in Amik plain had to begin with a regional character. The Amik Beys had formed a local administration. The first step in the organization of an armed band was to make peace between the family (household) members and to act as a unified body. It was under these conditions that Tayfur Mürsel, his brothers, his uncles (Mürselzade), his aunts (Bahadırlı), their sons and grandsons decided to form an armed band. They established contacts with the irregulars in Gavur Dag and tribes in Kurd Dag.

Tayfur Mürsel and his brothers met with the King-Crane commission as the

⁹⁷ Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*, p. 101. Türkmen, p. 955. Tayfur and his men visited Antep to discuss with the Turkish notables there. However, the *mutasarrif* (governor) of Antep did not back them just like the *Cemiyet-i İslamiye* of Antep.

representatives of the Turkish side, and met with General Capti Celli to give a petition asking for the retransfer of the center of the town from Harim to Reyhaniye.⁹⁸ They were in close communication with the notables, administrators and *Kuvay-i Milliye* of nearby cities like Antep, Maraş and Kilis. They met in the mansions of these people; they formed temporary alliances with tribal leaders in Kurd Dag like Maho. They went strolling in the mountain villages. The fluid atmosphere of the region permitted such instances as when, on their way from Amik to Kilis, they followed the Kurd Dag route, and in the mountain met 5-6 French cavalry. Bahadırılı Mehmet, who was able to speak Arabic, told the soldiers, who were Algerian and Tunisian Muslims, that they were not irregulars but soldiers of Faysal in search of their lost animals.

Struggling against a common enemy, the number of *çetes* around Ahmet Karamürsel (Tayfur Mürsel's uncle) exceeded 500. However, there were individual hostilities between the *çetes*, one of which reached to the point of pillaging one another's villages or threatening Ahmet Mürsel with a raid on his villages. In this chaotic atmosphere, the leaders, Tayfur Mürsel and Ahmet Mürsel got in touch with the ex-unionist Antioch deputy Ahmet Türkmen⁹⁹ and the resulting decision taken among the three was to get in contact with the Turkish forces in Cilicia.

It was in this chaotic, complicated, disorganized and decentralized environment that they planned to build their headquarters, in the areas the French had not occupied yet, especially in Kurd Dag, which was considered to belong to the area of the Aleppo resistance. Türkmen claims that Kurd Dag with all its inhabitants were supporters of the struggle.¹⁰⁰ However, there was no harmony between the *çetes* of

⁹⁸ For the inspection of King-Crane Commission in Alexandretta in 13 July 1919, see Harry Howard, *The King-Crane Commission. An American Inquiry in the Middle East* (Beirut: Khayat, 1963).

⁹⁹ He was the founder of *Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* in Antioch

¹⁰⁰ Türkmen, p. 959.

different places. In February 1919, the Amik *çetes* attacked the French garrisons in Hammam (near Reyhaniye) and later Harim, together with the irregulars of Kurd Dag and Gavur Dag. After the unsuccessful Harim raid, the temporary alliance dissolved on condition of reuniting in the future. However, the tribal leader Maho and his men betrayed the union, as had been expected from such a “bandit” (*çapulcu*).¹⁰¹

In the beginning of August 1920, Ahmet Türkmen and his colleagues prepared a report, and sent it to Amik by the former reserve officer Nuri Aydın and two other men. This group of three *müjahidun* reached Amik by crossing the river Orontes with the help of one of the head-farmers of Abdülgani Türkmen. Later, under the assistance of Inayet Mürsel, they crossed over to Hassa and presented the report to the head of the *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* there.

While the mountains around Antioch were active, the north Syrian resistance against the French was also boiling. As discussed above, there was a high degree of contact and collaboration between the north Syrian and south Anatolian struggles against the French. Tayfur Sökmen, although giving it only minor space, describes the visit of Hananu in his headquarter in Kuseyr in a soft tone. “Since he was our friend and neighbour from Kafr Takharim, he suggested mutual help and struggle against the French...he told us that his aim was to struggle in coordination against our common enemy, the French... He had visited the 2nd Army Corps Commandant, Adil Paşa, in Maraş and received aid from them.”¹⁰² Irregulars under the rule of Tayfur Sökmen and Ibrahim Hananu battled together against the French in Kafr Takharim

¹⁰¹ Sökmen, p. 26

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 41. “Kefertarimli hemşehrimiz ve dostumuz olduğu için Fransızlara karşı karşılıklı yardımlaşmamızı be beraber çalışmamızı teklif etti...Maksadının müşterek düşmanımız olan Fransızlara karşı elbirliğiyle hareket etmek... Daha sonra Maraş’a gitmiş ikinci kolordu kumandanı Adil Paşa ile görüşerek yardım görmüştür.”

with “Allah Allah cries of our men and Hel Helo and scolds of the Arab combatants”.¹⁰³ They were successful in battle because “the Muslim Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian soldiers of the French army were purposely missing in shooting not to give harm to us”.¹⁰⁴ Occasional confrontations and collaborations between Hananu’s forces and Amik irregulars continued until the pacification of Aleppo by the French. After this, the irregulars of the Kurd Dag disbanded. Yet the end of the north Syrian *çetes* would come with the signing of the Franklin Boullion Agreement.

The Struggle against the French in Antioch

Similar to the armed organizations in the mountains, the politics of the struggle against the French in Antioch should be evaluated in relation to the ongoing atmosphere in Aleppo. There occurred some consultations between the notables of Aleppo and Antioch on the issue of coordinated struggle against the common enemy. Captain Asım and Dedebeyzade Hakkı Bey were specially invited to the meeting; Mürselzade Ahmet and the like were in Aleppo coincidentally.¹⁰⁵ Of course, some members of the “Arabist” faction of the Antiochean notables as well as the Arabist Aleppine notables were also present at the meetings. In fact, what Türkmen refers to as “Arabist Aleppine notables”, described themselves as *ansar* (partisans) of Mustafa Kemal and formed the *Higher National Committee for*

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.42. “Bizimkilerin Alah Alah ve silah sesleri Arap mücahitlerinin de Hel helo ve zılgıtları ile”

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., “Halbuki Müslüman Cezair’li, Fash, Tunuslu olan askerler bizleri öldürmemek için mahsus karavana atıyorlarmış.”

¹⁰⁵ Türkmen, p. 969.

Defense.¹⁰⁶ In August 1919, one month before the evacuation crisis in Faysal's Syria, the *ansar* began plotting a Syrian-based military campaign against the French that would coordinate its operations with those undertaken by the Turkish nationalist occupation. According to Türkmen, the result was the "management of the *çetes* from Hatay; the only assistance from Aleppo would be financial and military aid; the head of the irregulars would receive thirty gold pieces and, the recruits five."¹⁰⁷ On 12 November 1919, the armed struggle began in Antioch with the departure of a group from Aleppo with twenty-five guns given from the citadel of Aleppo and monthly salaries for the participants. From this small group Ahmet Mürsel went to Harim, and Asım and Dedebeyzade Hakkı to Jisr-i Sugur and Kuseyr.

The emphasis by Türkmen on the division of labor between Aleppo and Antioch may be due to his intense reaction to the Arabs that is visible in later writings and to his identifying the Arabs directly with Arab national activity. Yet, as in the case of Turkish nationalist activity, a variety of factors would have induced some of the most distinguished men of Aleppo to participate in the founding of the National Committee of National Defense in Aleppo.¹⁰⁸ Some were undoubtedly motivated by the chance to participate in an organization that promised to provide access to power in unsettled times. Others might have been attracted by nationalist sentiment or conversely by the hope that their presence in the committee might

¹⁰⁶ Higher National Committee in Syria was formed obviously for defence. Forming one thousand militia to defend Damascus was only a small part of committee's efforts. The Higher National Committee promoted the organization of guerilla bands, mobilized *çete* and tribes for the nationalist cause and provided assistance to a variety of military and quasi-military formations for the ongoing campaign against the French. Gelvin, p. 121.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 969. According to one French source, the committee provided new *çete* members with five gold pounds, a rifle and one hundred rounds of ammunition and in some cases a horse. Gelvin, p. 133.

¹⁰⁸ Aleppo Committee of National Defence was founded in early November 1919 by the leaders of the Arab Club, by *ansar* and local and provincial administrators and merged the militias into a citywide committee. They sponsored twice-weekly drills under the supervision of officers in the regular army and held armed demonstrations for both militias and tribal levies every Thursday afternoon in the centre of the city. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

moderate nationalist goals. In the case of Jabiris, interfamilial rivalry probably played a role as well: the Jabiris were locked in competition with the wealthy and powerful Shabanis who were involved in pro-Kemalist agitation. It is also possible that less distinguished committee activists solicited the support of the city's notables and placed them in positions of rank to broaden the organization's appeal, legitimacy and fund raising base.

However, by the spring of 1920, a group of influential Aleppine families began to distance themselves from the organization. Instead, a new group of leaders emerged, including Fath al- Maraşli, Rida al- Rifai, and Kamil al- Qassab. The two most important issues that split the committee were fundraising and support for guerrilla bands. The Kemalists had reached an armistice with the French and suspended financial support to their allies in the south.¹⁰⁹

The number of men joining the *çetes* around Antioch had reached 60 in the three months after October 1919 and the French intelligence service had been working seriously to locate the heads of the *çetes* and their relatives. At the same time, the French were also trying to set up militias in the Kuseyr region. Şakir Kavvas was in contact with Hadji Abdulkadir, the *ağa* of the village of Magdele. The irregulars heard about this relationship and attacked the house of the *ağa*, but upon the request of the villagers, the irregulars left him, just taking gold for arms.¹¹⁰ The irregular force in Kuseyr formed of 30 men had small battles with the French forces of nearly 300.

It was in the spring of 1920 that Dedebeyzade Hakkı sitting in the garden of Hadji Hamza with his friends, decided to undertake a raid on Antioch,

It was eleven o'clock. A peasant who came from Antioch gave me a letter. When I opened the letter, I saw the signature of my younger son, who was

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p p. 131-133.

¹¹⁰ Türkmen, p. 971.

imprisoned. I started to weep with tears. I read the letter to friends around me. They were also sorry and began to cry. I felt that it was the right time for a raid on Antioch, which we had been intending for a long time. I expressed my opinions about it to friends and we went to the threshing-floor and planted there the old green flag of the old sheikhs of the village mosque. I gathered my friends there and from the back of my horse, I expressed my ideas to them. After a *fatih*a, the people moved to Antioch before me.¹¹¹

The plan was such that two guards would raid the two police stations in the city, at Meydan and Köprü; Asım Bey¹¹² would hold the military barracks and Hakkı Bey, passing through the Orthodox-Christian neighbourhood, would raid the government offices and free the prisoners. The attack was successful. There were fifteen dead, among whom two were policemen, four Alawites and one Armenian gendarme. The irregular band, leaving two dead and one injured, had obtained twenty-five gendarme animals, ten military horses and thirty Mauser rifles and 10 Turkish gendarmes had passed to the Turkish side with their guns. The city was under the control of the irregulars on 13 March 1920. "The people of Antioch were happy and were sprinkling flowers and rose water from the windows."¹¹³

After the raid, martial law was declared in the city. French patrols were on the streets but only on the avenues; the dead ends, the narrow streets were still controlled by the Antiocheans. Asım Bey was able to come down to the city and meet the Arabist notables of Antioch and collect money from them under the name of *iane*(donation). Asım Bey had sent information about the Antioch raid to Aleppo.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 972. "*Vakit tam saat 11 idi. (Alaturka 11 akşama yakın bir zamandır.) Antakyadan gelen bir köylü bana bir mektup verdi .Zarfı yırtarak açıp imzasna baktığımda mahpus bulunan mini miin oğlumun imzasını gördüm ve ağlamaya başladım. ..Mektupu okudum. Bütün arkadaşlarım müteessir olarak ağladılar. Zaten öteden beri zihnimizde tasavvur ettiğimiz Antakya baskınının tam sırası geldiğini hissedip fikrimi arkadaşlara kısa bir nutuk ile anlattım. Yemekten sonra köy camiinin eski meşayihine ait yeşil bir bayrağını harman yerine dikip arkadaşları bayrağın altına cem ederk at sırtında kısa bir nutuk ile fikrimi umum arkadaşlara anlattım... Bir fatihadan sonar efrat benden önce Antakyaya doğru hareket ettiler."*

¹¹² Türkmen argues he could not resist being on the same side with the Arabist notables of the city. Ibid., p. 980.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.973-974. "*Türk halkı bilakis sokaklardan geçen çeteleri alkışlıyor, onlara dua ediyor, pencerelerden çiçek demetleri ve gül suları serpiyorlardı."*

However, according to Türkmen, the Aleppines did not believe it and sent “a man” for a survey called Ali Maraşlı¹¹⁴ to Idlib.

According to a survey made by Türkmen in 1938, “in fact, the Aleppo government” did not give any financial aid as expected; instead, the people of Hatay who were enriched after the war (most probably Türkmen inserts the Amik Beys into the picture), financed themselves through extortion, *aşar* (agricultural tax), forced taxation, and the licensing of monopolies (especially of wheat). This argument corresponds to the immediate aftermath of the evacuation crisis of Faysal in the beginning of 1920 when the economic conditions had deteriorated and voluntary donations to the committee fell precipitously. In addition, complaints had arisen from the large landowners in Aleppo, who were worried about guerilla depredations.

For the Antiochean Christians, the Armenians, and Alawites of Dörtayak the pillaging and murdering of their neighbourhoods by the Turkish irregular bands after the Antioch raid was more crucial and vital for their livelihood. Although this incident is not deemed worthy of mention for the Turkish writers, some space is reserved in both the French accounts and *Et-Tavil*'s narrative. This event also occupies a considerable place in the popular memory, as it determined the settlement patterns of non-Muslims in the later years in Antioch. *Et-Tavil* cited the disturbances in the city after the foundation of the Kemalist irregular bands. He argued that, starting with the attack of these forces against the French military barracks, Antioch remained seventy more days under Turkish siege, during which time, Turkish *çetes* attacked Alawites, Christians and some Turks.¹¹⁵ Turkish bands from the Kuseyr

¹¹⁴ This man is most probably al- Haji Fath al- Maraşlı. He was one of the founders of Aleppo Committee of National Defence who described himself as *ansar* (partisans) of Mustafa Kemal and who was motivated by a combination of pro-Turkish sentiments, distrust of Anglo- Turkish intentions and alienation from Damascus. Jamil İbrahim Pasha was also one of the founders of the committee and İbrahim Hananu was one of the committee-affiliated guerilla leaders.

¹¹⁵ *Et-Tavil*, p. 316.

direction had seized the northern parts of the city where most of the Alawites and some Christians lived. In order to resist these attacks, the Alawites had moved from Dörtayak (the northern Alawite quarter) to Affan (the Alawite quarter in the south). Moreover, the Alawites conjoined their houses by means of passageways and turned the streets into fortifications. They also looked for protection from the French troops staying in the casern, which were located in the south of the city.¹¹⁶

However, the Turks, most of whom were recruited from the Sunni Turkish speaking population of High Kuseir, did not stop and this time attacked and pillaged some Alawite villages in other parts of Kuseyir, to whose help Asım Bey ostensibly came.¹¹⁷ However, he also plundered the village.¹¹⁸ The Turkish attacks on Daphne were stopped by İbrahim Ağa Tuhani; those on Sueydiye, particularly Cilliye by Shaykh Maruf Cilli in 1920, the religious leader of Sueydiye, who ruled Samandag like a feudal lord with his own militia and whose fame had come from struggling against the Turkish bands.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, the raid on the city by the Turkish bands created the obligation for Christians to look for refuge in the other quarters of the city, in particular, those close to the church. Jneyne, along with Sarı Mahmud Hirstiyan, the two oldest quarters of the Orthodox Christian district with their inward-oriented houses, which had been mostly, built for defense purposes in times like this.¹²⁰

Meanwhile, the last Ottoman assembly accepted the *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact) on January 28, 1920. The issue of whether Antioch and its surroundings were demarcated inside the national frontiers or not formed a controversial issue in those

¹¹⁶ Weulersse, *Antioche*, p. 42.

¹¹⁷ Alexandre, "Le Conflit", p. 106.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 325.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 317.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

days, later in the national and international context during the intense days of struggle in the late 1930s and as well as in Turkish historiography.¹²¹ The Turkish *Kuvay-i Milliye* was gaining ground in the context of the Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East. The Ankara government had signed a treaty with French over Cilicia on March 9, 1921 (The Briand-Sami Accord), putting an end to hostilities in Cilicia. Yet the National Assembly in Ankara had not approved it. Nevertheless, this treaty may be accepted as a messenger of the following Ankara agreement in 20 October 1921 that would lead to the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian boundary and the formation of a special administrative regime for the district of Alexandretta.

After the Antioch raid, Asım Bey organized a local committee, much smaller in size than the Aleppo committee of the National Defense. A sub-committee was formed for the collection and administration of the *aşar* and forced taxes, which were collected to finance military operations and sustain payments to the full time guerrillas (*çete efradı*). The guerrillas were divided into two groups, as full time and temporary troops. Full time guerrillas were attached to the headquarters and as cavalymen ready for raids and were responsible for the discipline and security of the region. They received regular salaries. Temporary *çete* were formed of the volunteers from the youth of the villages. They received no salaries and were to join the full time militias in times of a raid with their own rifles. In the summer of 1920, after the occupation of Aleppo by the French on 23 July, the forces of Asım exceeded 2000, with 300 hundred full time men.

Following the Antioch raid, the French began to strengthen the Gabriel Hill between Kuseyr and Kızıl Dag. On the back slopes of the hill, Kızıl Dag stands and the Orontes flows between Gabriel Hill and the Kuseyr plateau. The French were

¹²¹Tayfur Mürseloğlu had even sent a telegraph to Mustafa Kemal asking for whether the Sanjak of Alexandretta and its environs were included or not. Sökmen, p. 34.

using the main street, *Saray* street situated between the military barracks and Gabriel Hill as the road for communication; it was significant that this road passed through the Armenian, Orthodox and Alawite neighbourhoods. Subsequent to the raid, the *çete* forces had not come down to the city from Kuseyr for two weeks. Later, according to Türkmen, Asım Bey came down to the city walls of Antioch on the mountain Habib-i Neccar and planted Faysal's flag.¹²²

Türkmen views the Antioch raid of Asım's *çetes* as leading to the crystallization of a Turkist party in Antioch. The notables, who could not bear a "usurper" personality like the Arabist notables of Antioch (*istismarçı*)¹²³ began to gather around the former-unionist Ahmet Türkmen. The group contained not only urban notables but also youths, Amik Beys, former- unionists, former-Ottoman officials, and reserve officials who had recently returned from the war and "ignorant but able"¹²⁴ men who had been trained in the Ottoman army during the war. However, Asım Beg was increasingly coming under the complete command of the Arabists and in time became closer with them; he made regular visits to these notables' mansions, and after long meetings harassed some people for collecting *iane* (donation) for the good of the organization.¹²⁵

The foundation of the Antioch *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*¹²⁶ provided an

¹²² Türkmen, p. 920.

¹²³ Türkmen, p. 980. Türkmen utilizes the term "usurper" for both their life styles and their abuse of the *çete* activities for their own right as instruments perpetuating their hegemony over the city and Kuseyr as a means of suppressing their rivals and an improvement of their economic positions.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.982.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 980. Asım Bey was from a notable *ulama* family of Antioch, the Hokazadeler. He had graduated from Harbiye in Istanbul. There was controversy around his personality such that the early Mandate period came to be narrated around him and he turned into a symbol of Arabism. He was said to be under the influence of "negative effects" such as Islamism, Arabism and Faysalism. However, according to Türkmen's surveys on which his voluminous books depend, some participants expressed that he was a virtuous patriot, sold out neither to the French or in the service of Arabism; it was jealousy what had created these negative identifications.

¹²⁶ The principle of the club was Ahmet Türkmen, the vice principle and cashier was Gani Türkmen, the brother of Ahmet Türkmen; Ahmet Türkmen had become the mayor of Antioch and a deputy in the last Ottoman Assembly (before Ahmet Ağa's deputy, Bereketzade Rifat was the deputy of Antioch) and Gani Türkmen was a member of the CUP Administration Committee.

institutional framework for the Turkists. The preacher of the mosque, Sheikh Ali, a client of Gani Türkmen, was also a member of the committee. It was an essential strategy for the Turkists to co-opt the popular *ulema*, merchants, and artisans of the city to counterweight the Arabist *çete* members whose propaganda activities focused on Islam.

The incidents during the seventeen-day bombardment of Antioch by the French on 23 May 1920 formed another occasion revealing the tension and rivalry between Asım Bey/Arabist notables and the Turkist faction. French soldiers coming from the direction of Alexandretta met with resistance in the city center, on the bridge over the Orontes River, so that they were prevented from passing over the Orontes in the north-south direction. At the same time, barricades were formed in the narrow streets and at the entrances of the neighbourhoods stood young unarmed guards, some of whom were supported by *Müdafa-i Hukuk*.¹²⁷ Even so, the French succeeded in once again placing their machine guns on the Gabriel Hill behind the Alawite villages of Kuseyr.

The foundation of the committee of *Müdaa-i Hukuk* and the increasing dominance of Turkish nationalist rhetoric corresponded to the arrival of French troops in Aleppo, the subsequent flight of popular leaders, and the end of the Faysal government at Damascus in the end of July 1920. Türkmen and Sökmen argue that the first point of split between the *çetes* under the influence of the Arabist notables and the Turkists who were trying to dominate these militias occurred over the issue of whether to hand over their arms to the French or not after the pacification of Aleppo. Türkmen even divided the period leading up to the signing of the Franklin Bouillon Agreement into two: the second sub-division started with the pacification of

¹²⁷ Türkmen, p. 983.

Aleppo or the “submission” of Asım Bey’s *çetes* to the French and incorporation of the remaining *çetes* into the Turkish *Kuvayi Milliye*.¹²⁸ In the meantime, the *Kuvve-i İnzibatiye* presenting itself as an organization formed “by the people and struggling for the good of the people” under the leadership of “pro-French Halit Çavuş”, was founded. Türkmen, however, claims that it was another game played by the supporters of Arabism in collaboration with the mandatory powers; in other words, two different “others” overlapping and becoming double enemies. Türkmen’s narration of a conference that the *Kuvve-i İnzibatiye* leader gave to the Kuseyr ağas in Kuseyr is significant in terms of revealing the orientalist tendency of the Turkish nationalist discourse. The anti-Arab bias existing in Turkish nationalist historiography is displayed here in the description of the atmosphere of the meeting: “putting the Kur’an to two sides of his shoulders like a baldric, and not neglecting to wear one or two prayer beads on his neck, he began his speech like this; “Hey, Muslim Brethrens...I call you up under the spiritual guiding flag of the Excellency (Faysal) who will save you from the rule of infidel and freemason Turks”¹²⁹

The propaganda of *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* about the *çete mucahids* focused on the allegations of financial abuses committed by the Arabist notables. Three sergeants appointed by Ahmet Türkmen argued that these notables were employing their own men to collect the *iltizam* from the peasants. These three men also had the task of spreading rumors about the Turkish *Kuvayi Milliye* and the rivaling notables such that “it was due the hindrance of the Arabist notables of Antioch that the *çetes* could not come down to Antioch” or “soon Sabahattin Adil would come there with his army whose militias had recently arrived in İslahiye”. Sometimes, they even

¹²⁸ Sökmen; Türkmen; Tekin.

¹²⁹ Türkmen, p. 987. “Hemal vari iki tarafına iki kur’an takarak boynuna dabir iki tesbih asmayı ihmal etmiyen bu zat sözlerine şöyle başlamıştı: Ey müslümanlar, ...sizi kafir, farmasun Türklerin elinden kurtaran bu büyük zatın açtığı hidayet bayrağının altına çağırıyorum.”

exaggerated the power of Sabahattin Adil by portraying him as the little brother of Mustafa Kemal or the highest commander of the Turkish army.”¹³⁰

If one side of the nationalist project is the discursive one usually attributed to elite design, the other is the dissemination of this ideology to the “masses”. Yet, the masses are neither passive recipients nor obedient. They transform and accommodate the imposed discourse and activity. The components of the propaganda activities undertaken by Asım and Hakkı Bey verify this argument. In order to invite the peasants of Kuseyr to national activity, they had to set out some stimulating acts, but these first acts had to be directed against those who the peasants disliked the most: the gendarme and the tax collectors.

Propaganda for domination over the irregulars was also undertaken when the irregulars were moving towards Aleppo just before their pacification. Asım Bey’s *çetes* were moving after Faysal’s flag under the guidance of Ibrahim Hanano. All the way through Kuseyr, from Idlib to Aleppo, the former reserve army officers tried to provoke the irregulars against Asım’s *çete* leaders. They argued that “the corrupted Aleppine notables had sold the city and that their leaders had negotiated with the French. Their object was to keep them back from the struggle and take their arms to return them to the French.”¹³¹ Türkinen argues that the propaganda activities succeed in diverting some *mujahidun* away from Asım Bey, and instead, succeed in turning them into police officers, gendarmes or militiamen or taking side with the Turkish side and joining the guerrilla bands of Tayfur Mürsel and Ahmet Türkmen, who were in close contact with the Turkish *Kuvay-i Milliye* in Maraş.

In the beginning of 1921, the French entered the Amik plain and began to pacify the districts around Amik, like Reyhaniye. In the meantime, Tayfur Mürsel,

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 995.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 996.

the leader of the Amik *mucahids*¹³², was busy with the organization in Kurd Dag and Ahmet Türkmen had moved to Maraş. The natural barrier formed by the river Orontes between Maraş and Antioch and the severe winter and natural conditions prevented any contact between the irregular forces of the two cities. The French tried to make use of this situation and located their forces near Jisr-i Hadid. The “Turkish” irregulars together with Hananu’s forces took up the mountain region in the south. However, the French, with one cannon, two machine guns and 500 soldiers, occupied Jisr-i Hadid. A conflict broke out between İbrahim Hananu and Bedri Bey following a raid on an Italian church when Hananu claimed that Bedri Bey had pillaged a great amount of money and belongings there.

Any skirmishes between the *çete* and French forces were very much dependent on information and propaganda. At the same time, the process of trust and persuasion among the band members was rapid and flexible. For example, at the beginning of 1921, the Turkish forces were defeated by the French General Gourault approaching from Jisr-i Hadid towards Kuseyr because an Arab *ağa* from one of the villages of Kuseyr had been “obtained” by the French and this man had spread the news to the villages that the French was approaching with a powerful army and that they would burn all of the villages of Kuseyr. It was this kind of information that led the Turkish irregular bands from Kuseyr to withdraw and to their eventual defeat. After this defeat, Ahmet Türkmen fled to Maraş. Emin Arifi, the leader of *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* had been in Hassa and Islahiye, and İhsan Mürsel, Tayfur Mürsel’s brother and the former-*kaymakam* of Kırıkhan in Maraş.

In June 1921, the Franklin Bouillon negotiations began and Ankara government notified Antioch not to enter any struggle against the French.

¹³² Türkmen, p. 1010.

Meanwhile, Tayfur Mürsel had received a letter from Ankara via Türkmenzade Ahmet Ağa. The letter included a telegraph stating the names of the five deputies to be sent to the National Assembly in Ankara together with a deputy protocol. The selected deputies were as follows: Türkmenzade Ahmet Ağa; Arifi Paşazade Emin Arifi, the president of the administrative council of the Agricultural Bank of Hatay in 1938; Mürselzade İhsan; Abdurrahman Mürsel, the uncle of Tayfur Sökmen; and Hoja Sadık Efendi, Sadık Abacı, brother of Yunus Nadi.¹³³

The Franklin Bouillon Treaty of 20 October 1921, according to which the French agreed to surrender Cilicia and certain other districts to Turkey and leave the region of Alexandretta under French control with a special administrative regime, was in fact a confirmation of the situation, which had been implemented since September 1920 after the pacification of the Faysal's Arab State. However, the mandate for Syria had been conferred upon France by the protocol of the Supreme Council of Allied Powers at San Remo on 24 July 1922. The terms of the mandate had been prepared there and the draft mandate charter approved by the League of Nations on 12 August 1922.¹³⁴

The signing of the treaty created fear among some Syrian Arab nationalists that the Arab press in Aleppo circulated rumours that the autonomy of the Sanjak was part of a secret clause in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement that allowed for the

¹³³ Sökmen, p. 54, Türkmen, p. 1027.

¹³⁴ Weisband, p. 156.

cession of the entire territory to Turkey in the near future.¹³⁵ They denounced the autonomous status of the Sanjak as a strategy of the French in order to prepare an appropriate ground for handing over the region to Turkey at some favorable future time.

The autonomous status under the mandate regime was later confirmed by subsequent international agreements and regulations: the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923; the Convention of Friendship and Good Neighborly relations between Syria and Turkey, or the de Jouvenel Treaty of 30 May 1926, and the Organic Regulation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta promulgated by the French High Commissioner on 14 May 1930.¹³⁶

The formation of coherent and separate Turkish/Arab nationalist groups as the precursor of the hostile nationalist politics of the late 1930s is very remote from reality. However, it may be argued that the increasing politicization during World War I and the ensuing French occupation rendered many Antiochenes capable of “imagining” a national community. Similar to the historiographical tendency on Arab nationalism, the diversity within this “national” community is underscored; instead, the “Turkishness” or “Arabness” is privileged over other identities. However, the language employed in most of the local correspondences and the published memoirs did not address to Turks and Arabs in ethnic terms. More often, they referred to “Antiocheans”, “Muslims” or clients of certain urban notables. Privileging Turkish or Arab nationalism is to misrepresent the motivations, experiences and aspirations of the majority of the activist and the remaining population.

¹³⁵ Yücel Güçlü, *The Question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), p. 46, quoted from General Gouraud to Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 5 January 1922, vol. 427B, p. 81-82.

¹³⁶ Weisband, p. 156-165.

The imagining of a national community has implications for the structuring of relationships of power and the popular organizations (armed or not) provided an alternative to the customary structures. Although the popular committees took advantage of localized networks of patrons and clients they subverted these networks by organizing on an extra local scale, by rationalizing lines of political authority and by bypassing them to provide services for their constituents.¹³⁷



¹³⁷ Gelvin, p.137

CHAPTER II

ÉMIGRÉS, MIGRANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The years following the promulgation of the Mandate regime in Syria can be properly identified with uncertainty for both France and the indigenous population. The uncertainty prevailed at different levels and in various degrees. On the local scene there was a grave ambiguity and uncertainty for the Turkish exiles, Armenians and Kurdish refugees after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 owing to the problems of starting a new living in a totally new habitat. Similarly, the local urban notables of Antioch were anxious about the fluid nature of the new regime and the resulting power reconfiguration. The years roughly from 1921 to 1926, of the Great Revolt in Syria, was a period of continuous movement of people in terms of both mass-forced migrations (deportations) and discrete movements under the “haphazardly defined and inconsistent”¹³⁸ French mandate policy. It was the memories of these as well as First World War years that was a formative period for the “minorities” of Antioch in constructing an identity shaped around fear, one of which determined to a great extent the attitudes of these minority groups toward intercommunal relations, the nature of the bonds uniting the community, and the relations with the Mandate state and Turkey in the later years. In addition, the topos of fear impinged on the language they spoke, the labels and categories they offered, and played an unavoidable role in telling who they were.

These were also years of considerable uncertainties for the French administration in Syria and Paris. French miscomprehension of Syrian local dynamics, especially the Arab nationalism, coupled with continuous shuffles in Paris

¹³⁸ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 45.

led to constant interruptions, changes, and turnovers in the administrative structure of the mandated territory. Periodic territorial changes undertaken by the Mandate administration continuously altered the map and the ethnic composition of the Sanjak throughout 1920s. A select group of Turkish and Arab nationalist intellectuals and activists viewed these measures as symbolic acts by the French to divide and rule the territory. The intentions of the French in the remaking (remapping) of boundaries and granting different administrative status to each division in Syria stemmed from its view of Arab nationalism, an issue that will be elaborated in the following chapter.

The reconstruction of the early Mandate years will help to unveil the differences between the real and the imagined (by the indigenous groups, refugees, Turkish elites, and the local French) political and social atmosphere that prevailed in the Sanjak. The composition of the people coming in and leaving the Sanjak during this time will be included as a significant illustration revealing the various imaginations about the Sanjak under French rule.

The first group of refugees were the Armenians,¹³⁹ following the withdrawal of French forces from Cilicia prior to the signing of the Ankara Agreement (Franklin Bouillon) in 1921. They were concentrated primarily in Adana, but a number of them were evacuated to Syria, Alexandretta, and Beirut and also to Dörtyol, located just across the Sanjak border with Turkey.¹⁴⁰ This initial movement ended with the recapture of Gaziantep by French on February 1921. By this time, their numbers were not more than 5000. A second and greater migration occurred after the treaty of Franklin Bouillon. Soon after the wealthier had left for Americas, Cyprus and Egypt,

¹³⁹ The settlement of Armenians in the Sanjak was an issue in Turkish official discourse, which was continuously on the agenda throughout 1936-1939. Their collaboration with the French officials, their recruitment in the Special Troops of the Levant and the local militia and their employment as by French as agents in the intelligence gathering operations. From Güçlü, p. 24.

¹⁴⁰ T. H. Greenshields, *The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon, 1915-1939*. Ph.D. diss., Durham: University of Durham, 1978, p. 60.

the remainder was allowed to enter to Syria. In the second half of 1921, 16,500 refugees were transported from Mersin to the different ports of Syria, while 12,000 refugees came by land to Alexandretta and Aleppo. According to the French official statistics, in a fortnight, 30,000 refugees, mostly Armenians, had arrived in French mandated territories.¹⁴¹ Another exodus began in August 1922, as a result of Turkish violence following the Turkish victory over the Greeks. The immigrants came to Syria, especially to Aleppo. While the records reveal a total of 399,088 immigrants, they only refer to the recorded reports at Aleppo. Accordingly, two thirds of the arrivals were Armenians, one third Greek, and 1,000 Assyro-Chaldeans.¹⁴²

Relief for the Armenians was provided by British army funds, by Armenian and phil-Armenian societies and by the American Red Cross and its successor in Syria, the American Committee for Relief in the Near East. The exodus continued from 1921 to 1923 and nearly 175,000 Armenians fled from Cilicia, more than 80,000 of whom settled in Syria under the French Mandate. Several settlement schemes were proposed regarding the settlement and housing problems of the Armenians.

In the Autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta, the Service for Refugees of the High Commissariat settled nearly 100 Armenians in Reyhaniye, 35 Catholic Armenian families in Kırıkhan, 89 Gregorian families in Askeri Çayır (Haichen), 65 Gregorian families in Abdal Höyük, and 50 Gregorian in Soğuksu. Nearly 3,000 Armenian refugees from Dörtyol, Anteb and Maraş were settled in Kırıkhan.¹⁴³ The League of Nations financed the construction of four Armenian villages in 1928 the names of which were Soğuksu, Abdalhöyük, Askeri Çayır (Haichen) in the Central

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 61 quoted from Rapport (1922- 23), p. 13.

¹⁴² Ibid.,

¹⁴³ Jacquot, p. 162.

Amik region, and Nour Zeytoun,¹⁴⁴ near Jabal Musa in the southwestern corner of the Sanjak. Each Armenian refugee family were given five hectares of land.¹⁴⁵

A final exodus of Armenians from Turkey to Syria occurred in 1929-30, from the regions of Bitlis, Van, Harput and Diyarbakır, as a result of Turkish intimidation. The number of refugees would not appear to have exceeded 800 families according to Armenian estimates.¹⁴⁶

In addition, the Sanjak was a place in which the opponents of the new Kemalist regime who were expelled from Turkey could take refuge. They were some of the “150s” (*150'likler*) and displayed a wide variety in their political identities, ranging from Kurdish nationalists to Islamists or the proponents of the last Ottoman Sultan, Vahdettin.¹⁴⁷ Obviously, the Sanjak's relatively more liberal political environment compared to Turkey's, these people could enjoy living in Sanjak through utilizing the advantages of being on the border. Their livelihood in the Sanjak depended mostly on liberal or religious professions. They were employed as writers in some local newspapers, teachers in the Antioch Lycée Boys Section, or officially held religious duties. Some well-known figures among them were Memduh

¹⁴⁴ Nour Zeytoun, which was established by the Armenians from Zeytun (Maraf), is now a Sunni Arab village with an Alawite neighbourhood on the road to Jabal Musa.

¹⁴⁵ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁶ Greenshields,, p. 62 from M. Pachalian, *Representative of the Comité Central des Réfugiés Arméniens to Nansen Office Central Armenian Committee* , August 26 1930.

¹⁴⁷ They were called *150likler*, because they were forbidden to enter to Turkey due to their opposition to the Kemalist regime under the Penalty Law of 150. During Turco-Syrian border negotiations between France and Turkey in 1929, Turkey demanded that the 150's should be sent at least 70 km. away from Alexandretta border of Turkey. In response to this, France demanded Tayfur Sökmen's removal from Dörtyol.

Selim, Ali İlmi Fani, Mesud Fani Bilgili and Tarık Mümtaz.¹⁴⁸ The Sanjak was criticized extensively by the Turkish press and official authorities for sheltering such ‘notoriously anti-Kemalist figures as Memduh Selim and Alexandretan Kurd Mehmed Hodja.’ The Kurdish population in the Sanjak also increased due to the exodus following the Shaykh Said rebellion in Diyarbakir. The immigrants were settled in Hacılar (High Karasu) *nahiye* of Kırıkhan by the Mandate officials.

On the other hand, there were people who had taken refuge in Turkey. One of these people, who would become a key figure in Hatay’s “liberation struggle” between 1936 and 1939, was Tayfur Mürsel, who was sentenced to death in absentia by a French military court. He had been appointed as the deputy from Antalya deliberately by Mustafa Kemal, who believed that eventually “the letter l in Antalya would be replaced by k of Antakya.”¹⁴⁹ A group of Turkish Sanjak immigrants in Turkey who were active Turkish nationalists and not pleased with the new administration under France preferred the destinations of Adana and Mersin. The refugees in Adana, who had later formed “Aid Society for Alexandretta and Environs” (*İskenderun ve Havalisi Yardımlaşma Derneği*) in 1923, were Tayfur Sökmen¹⁵⁰ Samih Azmi Ezer, Şükrü Oğuz, Nuri Aydın (Konuralp), İdris Antaki, Rasim Yurtman and Vasfi Bolat.¹⁵¹ Although they functioned as a loose organization

¹⁴⁸ Mesud Fani and Ali İlmi were brothers and the publishers of an anti-Kuvayi Milliye journal called *Ferda* in Adana. Memduh Selim was one of the founders of the Kurdish society called *Hoyboon*, which was active in the organization of the Agri rebellion of 1930. Bilgili brothers who after 1939 were allowed to enter to Turkey were philosophy teachers, Memduh Selim who could not benefit from this amnesty, had been literature teacher in the Lycee. For the Hoyboon and the activities of Memduh Selim see Rohat Alakom, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması* (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 1998); and Mehmed Uzun, *Yitik bir Aşkın Gölgesinde* (İstanbul: Gendaş Kültür, 2000).

¹⁴⁹ Sökmen, p. 9.

¹⁵⁰ After the establishment of mandate regime, Sökmen obligatorily moved to Adana since he was given a death penalty by the French High Commission and continued his “claim” there

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 67 and Melek, p.38. The committee which was founded in Adana in the shop of Antiochean Affan Afendi in 1923 was officially formalized after it had moved to the building of Adana *Türk Ocağı* (Adana Turkish Heart organization) later was renamed by Mustafa Kemal as the Hatay Sovereignty Society in 1936 and was transferred to the upper floor of National Student Committee in Beyazıt, İstanbul.

in the beginning along with some internal rivalries over the presidency of the club, nevertheless they undertook some media activities in Adana. One such instance occurred during the visit of Mustafa Kemal to Adana on March 15, 1923 when the committee members and their families participated in the celebration with black flags and an 'unknown' Antiochean girl recited a poem loudly, celebrating Mustafa Kemal's achievements for Turkey and the cruel occupation conditions that Antioch and Alexandretta were under.¹⁵²

In addition, there were discrete movements of people in and out of the Sanjak despite the Turkish state's efforts to prevent any Turkish migration from the Sanjak.¹⁵³ In 1928, a total of 375 people emigrated from the Sanjak, 192 for Turkey. Next year, 141 people emigrated, 73 of them for Brazil.¹⁵⁴ In the census in 1930, out of 5,875 Armenian Gregorians, 4,710 were immigrants residing in Alexandretta.¹⁵⁵

Antioch was not as politically and economically affected by these movements as Aleppo or Beirut. Nor did it witness everlasting political consequences such as civil conflicts between the indigenous population and the new arrivals. Armenians, who were the biggest immigrant group, were mostly settled in the villages of Antioch or on the outskirts of the city. Therefore, they were not very visible in the local sociopolitical dynamics of Antioch and did not profoundly transform or accentuate the existing ethnic hostilities. Instead, the new conflicts that they generated were small-scale. One of the conflicts most referred especially in the Turkish sources was that between the landowners in Reyhaniye and the Arab nomadic tribes (most of whom were Bedouins, around 2,500 in number), who had been encouraged by the

¹⁵² For the full text of the poem, see Tekin, pp. 124- 125.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁵⁴ Jacquot, p. 36.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.59.

French to settle in the area permanently as sharecroppers under the Sunni Turcoman beys and live in the reeds of the Amik plain.¹⁵⁶

The autonomous status of the Sanjak displayed a “liberal” and “self-sufficient” image of the city, especially from the perspective of the middle class intellectuals. They were free of the possible oppressions in Turkey, and at the same time, being people of exile, they were not far from their home country and were able to follow the ongoing political agendas, as in the case of Memduh Selim’s intellectual and physical contribution to the Kurdish revolt around Mount Ararat in 1930. The Turkish nationalists in Turkey contended that the habitation of especially the opponents of the Kemalist regime in the Sanjak was a part of the French colonial policy of planting anti-Turk elements and creating enclaves, which would function as a safeguard to nationalist Turkish population of the Sanjak. The silence of the Turkish press regarding the visit of Mehmet Akif to Antioch for a one-month stay on his way to Al-Azhar in Cairo depicts the tendency in this perspective.¹⁵⁷

The French and the Imposition of the New Administration

To the French, Syria had meant the rich Lebanon alone and they neither understood nor particularly wanted the rest. They appeared to accept as a fact that all this northern area was Turkish and they made little attempts to change or reorganize it. The administration, the silver money used, the personnel in many cases, the police and the whole general trend and sympathy were Turkish but it was the old decrepit Turkey of the Sultans before the Republic was declared. The French seemed to feel that Aleppo and its area was a good buffer state against trouble from the north.¹⁵⁸

The French Mandate policy in Syria lacked rhythm and continuity due to the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 183; and Güçlü, p. 24.

¹⁵⁷ *El-Liwa*, September 1930, p.2.

¹⁵⁸ Harold Armstrong, *Turkey and Syria Reborn* (London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1930), p. 107.

fierce political struggles and ideological divisions between right and left wing political parties in France as well as their miscomprehension of Syrian reality. There were several aspects of the conflict in France, of which the financial policy in Syria was one. The French pacification of Syria had cost over one billion francs, most of which had been spent on the Alawite territory, the Antioch region and the districts around Aleppo.¹⁵⁹ The annual budgets and salaries of administrators of the High Commission was another issue of struggle, which continued tensely until the end of the Mandate in the form of a conflict of interests between the Mandate officials and Paris. An additional reason for the French lack of administrative stability was due to the inexperience of the Mandate regime, whose on paper ultimate object was to invest the Mandate power with the legal and moral duty to lead backward nations to a higher level of civilization, but was indeed a system, which was invented to dress up direct colonial rule.¹⁶⁰ Many French administrators of Syria had previously served in Morocco.¹⁶¹ In addition to the contempt for the native attitude of the French colonial officers, the officers in Syria were at the same time low-level state employees, ignorant of local customs. The functioning of the French intelligence service in such a way that all officers were officially accepted as advisors to the *delegue adjoint* in the Sanjak, paved the way to abuses and discredit among the local population.¹⁶²

The moral, economic and political premises of the French policy in Syria had already crystallized well before World War I.¹⁶³ In 1920, the French had made the

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 157.

¹⁶¹ Edmund Burke, III, "A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria, 1912-1915," *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 9 (May 1973), pp. 175-86.

¹⁶² Güçlü, p. 82.

¹⁶³ For a study on the French interests in the Middle East preceding World War I, see W. Shorrock, *French Imperialism in the Middle East, The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

largest financial investment in Syria with the preponderance of its capital in banking, public utilities and transportation sectors and in silk and tobacco production.¹⁶⁴ In addition, new economic prospects in petroleum and cotton production were also decisive factors in French investment projects. Northern Syria was touted as a potential region for cotton production by the French capitalists.¹⁶⁵ Accordingly, the *Union Economique de Syrie* (Economic Union of Syria), an association of seventy-five French banks, joint stock companies and chambers of commerce that was dedicated to the defense and development of the agricultural, commercial and industrial interests of France in Syria, financed a feasibility study which concluded in 1922 that there was over 300,000 hectares of irrigated land for cotton in Northern Syria and the Alawite State on which cotton could be cultivated.¹⁶⁶ In 1923, the High Commissioner Weygand conducted two studies, one of which suggested the development of the Amik plain, which contained nearly 60,000 hectares. The proposal was that owing to the largely state-owned character of this land, it could be sold at a cheap price to a French concessionary company. As for local landowners, they would not hesitate to let a French company develop their lands if the price was right. Furthermore, Armenian refugees from Cilicia, experienced in cotton cultivation, would be a valuable labor force.¹⁶⁷ Although the early responses to this campaign were positive, it was not materialized fully and the cotton production and the area under cultivation declined significantly in the next years.

¹⁶⁴ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 42.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

The Unmaking of Syria

The misperception of the dynamics of Syrian society led to the misinterpretation and underestimation of Arab nationalism by the French. Several legal and territorial adjustments undertaken in the Mandate period were closely related to the French perception of Arab nationalism and its immediate consequences. The main interest of French was to prevent Arab nationalism from infecting the coastal and rural areas. So as to isolate and contain the nationalist movement in its centre, the French transformed Syria into a summation of segregated units. They divided geographical Syria into small territories along religious and ethnic lines. The objective of greatest interest to the French was to keep the main nationalist centers of activity, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, in a single state. In addition, through granting a certain degree of autonomy to the minority inhabited areas of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Alawite State and Jabal Druze, they could cut off these areas from the nationalist agenda of four nationalist cities and show themselves as a benevolent master. The other strategies in order to achieve this end were exploiting the minority differences, collaborating with some of the traditional elite.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Burke, p. 182.

and setting the rural areas against the nationalist centres. First, on 27 November 1918, by combining the former Ottoman *kaza* of Alexandretta, Antioch, Harim and Beylan, the French created the Sanjak of Alexandretta under the control of the French military governor of Alexandretta.¹⁶⁹ In September 1920, France created five separate states: The states of Aleppo and Damascus, the state of Lebanon, the state of Alawites, the state of Jabal Druze, and the Autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta, which was granted financial and administrative autonomy. Dayr- al- Zur was attached to state of Aleppo and Homs and Hama to the state of Damascus. The same year, the territorial limits of the Sanjak were enlarged through the incorporation of *Jisr as Sugur* and the *nahiyes* of Baer (Bayır), Boujakm (Bucak) and al- Akrad (Kinsiba). It was on 12 September 1921 that the boundaries of the Sanjak were fixed. The *kaza* of Harim, with its 90% Arab population, was attached to the State of Aleppo with the exception of the *nahiye* of Reyhaniye with its predominantly Turkish population, while the two Armenian *nahiyes* of Baer, Boujakm; and al- Akrad were attached to the Alawites State.¹⁷⁰ This “readjustment” of the frontiers had a significant impact on the ethnic composition of the population of the Sanjak as the rate of the Turkophones instantly increased from 28.52% to 38.90%.¹⁷¹

In 1922, the Jabal Druze and the Alawite states were proclaimed as separate units. Then later the same year, a Syrian federation that included Aleppo, Damascus and Alawite state was proclaimed. Soon after, on 5 December 1924, this federation was dissolved and replaced by a Syrian state in which were merged the states of Aleppo and Damascus. Accordingly, the autonomous Sanjak of Alexandretta was detached from the state of Aleppo through which the administrative authority of the

¹⁶⁹ Jacquot, vol. 1, p. 29

¹⁷⁰ Sanjian, p. 27.

¹⁷¹ Adnan Aita, *Le Conflit D'Alexandretta et la Societe des Nations* (Cairo : Editions Librairie Universelle, 1949), p.3.

Sanjak was recognized and the ultimate responsibility was put in the hands of French High Commissioner.¹⁷² Later in 1936, the Alawite State and Jabal Druze were incorporated in the State of Syria.

The autonomy of the Sanjak was administrative and financial but not political. The speech of Mr. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon before the Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations in the weeks following the promulgation of the Organic Regulation, about the special status of Latakia, Jabal Druze and the Sanjak is illustrative in this respect "I wish to remind you that Alexandretta is neither a state nor a government but a Syrian province enjoying certain privileges, the existence of which can in no way be prejudicial to the unity of Syria....I wish to remind you that this is a purely Syrian province."¹⁷³

In the Sanjak, the *kaza* was administered by *kaymakam* (town governor) appointed by the *mutasarrif* (governor) and directly responsible to him; while the *nahiye* (commune) was administered by *mudir* (commune governor) responsible to the *kaymakam*. According to the autonomous status, it retained its own budgetary powers, allowing local residents to determine expenditure levels for education and public works. A twelve member administrative council (nine elected, three appointed)¹⁷⁴ was placed under the executive authority of the governor (appointed by the president of Aleppo until December 1924, later by the president of Syria) upon the advice of the French High Commissioner in Beirut. District courts were set up in Alexandretta and Antioch, justices of the peace sat at Antioch and Beylan. The

¹⁷² Weisband, p. 160- 161.

¹⁷³ Weisband, p. 167.

¹⁷⁴ The administrative council was elected according to the electoral laws of the State of Syria. An *arrête* issued on 8 December 1931 prior to the Syrian elections in January 1932 determined the seats as follows: Among the elected members in Alexandretta: one Alawite and one Sunni; in Antioch: three Sunnis, two Alawites and one Greek orthodox and in Kırıkhan one Sunni. The appointed members from Alexandretta were one Greek Orthodox; from Antioch one Sunni and from Kırıkhan one Armenian. Sanjian, p. 30.

Sanjak maintained a regional court of appeals until October 1921, when local jurisdiction was transferred to Aleppo.¹⁷⁵ In addition, on 5 March 1923, the post of *délégué adjoint* was created which helped to strengthen the autonomy of the Sanjak. The *délégué adjoint* was the resident representative of the High Commissioner in Beirut, who lived in Alexandretta and Antioch in winter and summer, respectively. The real power rested with the French *délégué adjoint* (assistant delegate), who was under the direct orders of the High Commissariat in Beirut regardless of the powers delegated to the *mutasarrif* by the High Commissioners' decrees and the *Règlement Organique* (Organic Regulation) of 1930¹⁷⁶.

Another strategy adopted by the French against Arab nationalism was to change the land ownership in the countryside close to the nationalist centres. Through weakening the system of big landownership and promoting small peasant proprietorship, they supposed that they could break the power and influence of the urban absentee landowners from which they believed the nationalist leadership was drawn. They sought to co-opt the small peasantry through establishing cadastral surveys and breaking up the unproductive *musha*' tenure. The tactic of France in the countryside of the nationalist centres was to stress the family unit instead of the communal village organization or tribe as the prime socioeconomic unit.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, through standardization of the landownership and undertaking land reform, they sought to break up the material base of the urban absentee landowners.

This strategy depended on the imposition of a new taxation system on the land that was covered by cadastral survey and had clearly established property rights.

¹⁷⁵ Robert Satloff, "Prelude to Conflict: Communal Interdependence in the Sanjak of Alexandretta 1920- 1936", *MEJ*, no. 22 (2: 1986), p. 151, quoted from Haut Commissariat de la République Française, *La Syrie et le Liban en 1922* (Paris: Emile Larose, 1922), p. 84.

¹⁷⁶ Sanjian, p. 31-32.

¹⁷⁷ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 62.

As a result, the High Commission tried to undertake land reforms as widely and quickly as possible.¹⁷⁸ The land surveys were first conducted in the fertile coastal plains of Lebanon and Latakia, in the Ghuta oasis around Damascus, in the plains of the Orontes River in central Syria and in the districts around Aleppo and Antioch. The lands designated for cotton development projects on the Amik plain and the Ghan plain were surveyed. In 1930, a new code was enacted which attempted to reinforce the compulsory registration of all immovable property and standardize different forms of land ownership.¹⁷⁹ Besides, the process of tribal sedentarization was another strategy favoring the small peasantry especially in the low populated areas such as Euphrates province. However, little was turned into practice due to high investment costs and inability of the High Commission to attract the capital investment it hoped to.¹⁸⁰

On the other hand, strategies towards destructing the material base of the urban elites were certainly a general strategy neither applied throughout the Mandate homogenously nor meant the total neglect of the landowner bureaucratic class. Instead, the French played the traditional power politics of cooptation and negotiation with the elite through creating rivalries between the notable families and playing these rivalries to the benefit of itself. In order to materialize indirect colonial rule, they found sympathizer groups in towns mainly, minorities and Muslim urban notables who had been the aristocracy of service during the Ottoman period.

The next section will deal with the dialectical relationship between the local French administration in the city and the local notables, how they were articulated by the French to the Mandate administration, and the strategies undertaken by these

¹⁷⁸ Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche Orient* (Paris, 1946), pp. 194- 95.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 188; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 63.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 497.

notables in order both to perpetuate their power and influence in the city and in the Mandate administration. In short, it will be an effort to elaborate the process by which, in the end, these notables were turned into Levantine colonial Francophile elites under the Mandate rule in the Sanjak. The implicit presupposition underlying such characterization of the urban elites of the Sanjak is contextualizing it in relation to other “modest”, peripheral and autonomously administered territories of Syria.

The Politics of Notables in Antioch

The politics of notables in Antioch is essential to the understanding the “real” political practices in the city under the Mandate. This section will focus on the notables of Antioch in their relation to the Mandate power in the early Mandate period. It will try to understand the processes of change in the strategies of the urban notables of Antioch, the legacy of the pre- and post war years in the change of the elite structure of the city, the articulation of new groups such as settled Turcoman tribes and the “alien” Sunni Arabs (Syrians) to the existing notables and the changing rules of membership in the notables’ club. It will specifically concentrate on the cooption of these elites by the local French administration and illustrate the changing terms of negotiation between the mandatory power and the local notables. In this way, the traces of a possible comparative perspective for the Sanjak can be obtained one of which would capture the commonalities and peculiarities of the Sanjak with the rest of Syria and figure out its social, economic and cultural position in the whole French mandated territories.

The urban notables, first conceptualized in the late 1960s by Lapidus and Albert Hourani, are a political concept denoting those who could play a certain

political role as intermediaries between the government and the people and, within certain limits, as leaders of the urban population.¹⁸¹ These groups of families were both necessary for the central power but at the same time had an independent area of action. The basis of power of urban notables was rooted in their either religious position like the local *ulema*, utilizing the land or the land tax in the countryside, urban real estate, local handicrafts, regional and long distance trade and *awqaf* (foundations). The urban notables holding secular positions as *ayan*, *ağas*, *amirs* or the leadership of the local garrisons such as military corps were not only military bodies but also organizations for the defence and political action.¹⁸² In short, “access” and “patronage” were the code words of the politics of notables.¹⁸³

The “*eşraf*” of Antioch can be conceptualized as “urban notables” in Hourani, Dawn and Khoury’s sense. These families of mostly Sunni Turcophone origins resided in the city and possessed their material wealth in the countryside in the form of land and had clients in the city like merchants, artisans, religious minorities and *sufi* orders, but most importantly the Sunni *ulema*. They used to employ “traditional” clientelistic horizontal relations in order to mobilize the local society and play their traditional role of articulating popular interests and demands. They had considerable influence on the Sunni *ulema*¹⁸⁴ that played an important role in shaping public opinion throughout the decade.¹⁸⁵ Türkmen provides a good descriptive account on the notables of Antioch; however, there is no mentioning of the Alawite and the non-

¹⁸¹ Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”, in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 89; and Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

¹⁸² *Ibid*, p. 90.

¹⁸³ Philip Khoury, “The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited”, *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, No. 48-49 (Edisud 1988), p. 215.

¹⁸⁴ The *ulama* would have formed a distinct yet a part of the same notables. However, relying on Türkmen and oral interviews, the religious leaders seems to have fallen under the periphery of the *eşraf*.

¹⁸⁵ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 103.

Muslim local *ağas* (*hevaca*). Although they held comparatively less economic and social power, their influence in the overall network of the urban notables of the city should not be underestimated. This neglect derives mainly from his modernist orientation, which tends to silence the power and visibility of the “traditional” and “non-Turk” elements, especially the Arabs. The notable families in Antioch were as follows: Kuseyr, Yahyaoğulları, Bereketzade, Civelekzade, Müftüoğulları, Adalı, Semseddinzade, Melekzade, Halefzade, Miskioğlu, Türkmen, Huri¹⁸⁶ as well as Cilliye and Hevaca Hanna from Suveydiye.

The residential settlement of the notables in the city space was a determining factor in the formation and sustainment of the relations between them and the merchants, the *qabadayı* (urban tough), guilds, artisans in local handicraft production and the mob. The notables of Antioch were not concentrated in specific quarters, rather were dispersed throughout the city. The neighbourhoods were under the social and economic patronage of the notable residing there, the *qabadayı* of the quarter was a client of the notable household. The economic patronage worked in such a way that the peasants of the *ağa* were also the customers of the small merchants of the city who were dependent on the notables for the on-credit dealings that were made in the time of harvest.

The basis of the wealth of these notables came from the land in the surrounding countryside. Until the land code of 1858, they had acquired wealth in terms of hereditary tax farms, but especially after the Mandate, they had all the rights to privately own the land. The lands of the Antiochean urban elite were concentrated in three outlying rural areas: the Orontes valley, the Kuseyr plateau and the Amik plain. The Orontes valley was valuable for its mulberry orchards but also for

¹⁸⁶ Jacquot, p. 209.

vegetables and fruit growing. Most of their revenues came from the production of silk cultivated by Alawite peasants as sharecroppers.¹⁸⁷ The silk cocoons were fed by the traditional methods. The vegetable gardens on the two sides of the Orontes valley were near to Antioch.¹⁸⁸ The fruit and mulberry orchards in the valley contained also the summerhouses of the owner *ağas*. They would visit their lands either in the summer or during the period of cocoon collection for inspection. Therefore, there was a greater degree of attachment between the Alawite peasants of the Orontes and their respective *ağas* than between the Sunni Turkish peasants of Kuseyr and Amik.

The land on the Kuseyr plateau where mostly olives were grown was owned by the notables in Antioch but also by the rural *ağas* that lived in the surrounding villages. The peasants of Kuseyr were used to work at a variety of jobs in addition to being *maraba* (sharecroppers).¹⁸⁹ In general, they had closer ties with the city due to the transportation of the root of the liquorice plant, grapes or olive oil to Antioch.

Apart from the Orontes valley and the Kuseyr plateau that were divided among the Sunni Turcophone urban notables of Antioch, on the Amik plain, the most fertile region of the rural hinterland of the city, the Sunni Turk Amik Beys dominated. The sharecroppers here were mostly Sunni Turcophones, yet there was also a considerable number of Arab villages. As mentioned in Chapter I, these beys had turned into big landowners after they were settled by the Ottoman Empire in the 1850s. They had become enriched, especially after the Great War, as a result of the great increases in the price of cereals during the war.

¹⁸⁷ Türkmen, vol. I, p. 51.

¹⁸⁸ In *Aleppo salnamesi* (1324) the number of the vegetable gardens were 255. In Orontes valley, except the mulberry orchards, the prevailing form of production is sharecropping. In mulberry orchards, the owner gets two-thirds of the product.

¹⁸⁹ *Maraba* literally means "a quarter" (1/4) in Arabic. But in local saying it is used to denote the Alawite peasant working on the land usually of a Sunni Turcophone *ağa* who got a quarter of the product.

Nonetheless, the expansion in the local composition of the urban notables especially after the First World War was not without contradiction. The new additions, the big Turcoman *ağas* of the Amik plain, could never become “urban” elites in the sense of the traditional notables although they undertook conventional methods of membership and perpetuation like marriage alliances.¹⁹⁰ This was not due to their staying in Amik in certain months of the year unlike the traditional elite like the Berekets, Adalı or Kuseyr, but because of their lack of having an “urban culture and its necessities”. That is to say, they had economic capital but were lacking the cultural capital as in the words of an Antiochean Christian Arab, a member of a notable Christian family who had been educated at St. Joseph University in Beirut and had left Antioch in 1937:

“Tayfur Sökmen, an ignorant man, he had come down from Amik, he was a Turcoman, I mean, not an urban man.”¹⁹¹

Türkmen described the notables of Hatay as a class that flourished around the personality of the Bereketzade family and which went into decline after 1908. “They did not abstain from showing generosity to get hold of the impudent mob of the city. They were 70-80 houses composed of the close and remote relatives of the Bereketzades and they were able to preserve their life styles until the promulgation of the Second Constitution.”¹⁹² Bereketzade Rıfat *Ağa* was a characteristic figure of the notables of Antioch and later a member of the bureaucratic landowner class. Being close to Hamid II, his brother had married the daughter of the governor of Aleppo.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ The mentioned process of adaptation of the Amik beys is totally an intra-elite struggle not a problem between the Amik beys and their clients.

¹⁹¹ Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. “*Tayfur Sökmen, cahil adam. O Amik'tan indi. O Türkmen. Yani şehirli değil*”

¹⁹² Türkmen, *Mufassal*, vol. 4, p. 908. “*Şehirdeki cüretkar ayak takımını elde etmek için sahavet ibraz etmekten çekinmezlerdi...Meşrutiyete kadar umumi vasıflarını muhafaza eden bu aileler, Bereketzade Rıfat Ağanın uzak ve yakın akrabalarındanmürekkep ve Antakyada ikamet eden 70-80 haneden ibaret idiler.*”

¹⁹³ Ibid.

He was deputy to the first Ottoman Parliament from Antioch but the notables he represented were never in sympathy with the CUP. The death of Rıfat Ağa, the advance of the CUP after the 31 March affair, and the economic impoverishment during the war marked the change in the power balance of the *eşraf* of the city, the period which Türkmen calls the “ascendancy of the second group noble families”. The Amik beys had entered the scene and Türkmenzade Ahmed Ağa had become deputy from the CUP list against the Freedom and Entente party (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*) supported by the “traditional” *eşraf*. There were fierce political struggles between the supporters of the CUP and Entente in the city. Yet the struggle was less on ideological grounds than on the rivalries among the notable families.

The career of Halefzade Mustafa Süreyya is illustrative as a young member of a notable family at the end of nineteenth century. Born in 1880, his mother was a *Müftüzade*, another *eşraf* family of Antioch. He finished the *Mülkiye* in Istanbul and later the *Dar-ül fünün*, or Law Faculty. In 1902 he began working as an official in the Ottoman Ministry of Interior Affairs. After the 31 March affairs, he returned to Antioch permanently. He was chosen as the head of the local administration council of Antioch. He was an opponent of the CUP policies and among those founders of the Ottoman Democrat Party in Antioch.¹⁹⁴

He stayed in the local administration council until his appointment as the mayor of the city in 1921. Before his term as mayor, Türkmenzade Ahmet Ağa, Civelekzade Hacı Ethem and later Hüsnü Ağa, the brother of Halefzade Süreyya Bey (1918) had been the mayors of the city respectively. In 1920, Hüsnü Ağa became the *kaymakam* of the city but resigned from this post before the signing of Treaty of Ankara. During his service for 2 years, he was accused by the Turkish irregular

¹⁹⁴ Mehmet Tekin, *Antakya Tarihinden Yapraklar ve Halefzade Süreyya Bey* (Antakya: Kültür Ofset Basımevi, 1993), p. 26

forces around Antioch of collaborating with the French and his mansion was raided.¹⁹⁵ Cemalizade Mustafa *Ağa*, an ex-Unionist and a Turkish nationalist, was the mayor when Hüsnü *Ağa* was the *kaymakam*. After Mustafa *Ağa*'s departure, Halefzade Süreyya Beg became the mayor of Antioch and stayed in this post until May 1934, when he was replaced by Muhtar Eyyübi from the Duma district governorship.¹⁹⁶

“Politics” under the Mandate

An obvious and visible political factionalism was still marginal among the cohesive class of the urban notables without being colored by any dominant ideology. On the contrary, they continued to act as a fused urban bureaucratic class. However, an exception was the Amik Beys who were less involved with the French Sanjak officials in the every day life of Antioch. Political factionalism within the notables would start to intensify, though incrementally after 1936.

It was under the new indirect colonial rule that the past prestige and power of the *ağa* was fattened through administrative posts and material benefits. Unlike the urban notables of Syria from whom the nationalist leadership was drawn and who were opponents of the French rule in varying degrees, the urban notables of Antioch generally collaborated with the French and “were permitted to partake in the colonial benefits”.¹⁹⁷ Aswad argues, “this elite emerged as the new commercial landowning upper class during the last century... Under a form of French colonialism, they were allowed to evolve into a local branch of the national bourgeoisie.”¹⁹⁸ Those notables,

¹⁹⁵ Tekin, *Halefzade Süreyya*, p. 26.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁹⁷ Barbara Aswad, “Women, Class and Power: Examples from the Hatay, Turkey”, *Anthropological Quarterly*, p. 477.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 477

who were former Ottoman bureaucrats, demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with French staff, who offered posts in the local bureaucracy. Similar to inner Syria, these traditional leaders took high offices and filled those further down the scale with their relatives and clients.¹⁹⁹ Possessing economic power and cultural capital through their increasing exposure to French culture, the urban notables of Antioch emerged as the Francophile instruments of the indirect colonial rule. They were accommodated to the new regime through which the “traditional” prebendial relations were perpetuated. No matter there occurred changes in their life styles under French rule, it was certain that they succeeded to evolve as the winning party under the new regime as the bureaucratic landowner class holding economic and cultural power in local affairs. Although power creates its counter resistances, one has to wait until mid-1930s for the beginning of an organised questioning and opposition against their influence in the society, interestingly enough, not from the most impoverished sections of the society but from relatively better off, young middle class intellectuals.

In contrast, the Syrian political elite, in general, and the Aleppine nationalists, in particular, embraced the idea of a unified Syrian struggle for national independence after the collapse of the Hananu revolt, after which the Muslim majority tended to conceive of the French as illegitimate rulers. Arab nationalism provided the kind of ideological cohesion and emotional appeal urban leaders needed to be politically effective between the wars.²⁰⁰ They had the support of the vast majority of the population; France had a narrow base among the traditional elite and excluded this nationalist elite from government in Syria. Those Syrians selected by

¹⁹⁹ Khoury,

²⁰⁰ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 5.

the French to serve as window dressing were pro-French and anti-nationalist.²⁰¹ The nationalist urban leadership that was concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama denounced the notables for their collaboration with the High Commission as traitors. Though, “the traitors” and the nationalists belonged to the same social and economic class, they differed in their political tendencies.

The underlying reasons of the difference between the outlook of elites in Syria and the Sanjak should be sought in the difference between the politics of the French administration in these two mandated areas and the dynamics of Arab nationalism, two aspects of which are mutually determinant. It was no mere coincidence that Arab nationalism did not flourish in autonomous administrations where compact minorities lived and Arab nationalism was not perceived as a “threat” to the French in those territories like the Jabal Druze in the southeast, or the Alawite State in the northwest or the Jazira with its low level of urbanization or the Sanjak with its 35-40% Turkophone population. In these areas French did not attempt to cut down the power of the indigenous notables, instead preferring either to collaborate with the traditional notables, who had an independent area of action or in some cases “created” notables in order to incorporate them. The collaborator group of notables did not necessarily represent the majority of the population despite the fact that they belonged to the great landowning bureaucratic class. In the Alawite State, the French strengthened the rural based Alawite elite (they constituted 62% of the province and were impoverished farmers on the lands of Sunni elite) against the Sunni elite (they were the great landowning families of Latakia and formed the bureaucratic elite of

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 112- 113. These bureaucrats in Syria were unsympathetic to Arab nationalists for during the Faysal era they had been shunted aside in favour of nationalists from Damascus and elsewhere. They were a suitable choice for office, desiring to recreate the type of political and economic stability to resume their traditional role.

the pre-Mandate period.)²⁰² Unlike the French politics in the Sanjak, the French weakened the economic base of the Sunni latifundia and promoted certain Alawite tribal leaders.²⁰³

The common aspect of these specially administered, nearly autonomous (from Damascus) areas was the low density of urban population. A view to the demographic and spatial composition of the Sanjak will reveal, according to Bazantay's statistics, that three urban centers in the Sanjak contained only 28 percent of the total population. Sunni Turks, Christian Arabs and Armenians constituted the bulk of the urban population. The remaining 72 percent of the population lived in the countryside, mostly formed of Sunnis (both Arabs and Turks) and Alawites.²⁰⁴

Antioch, as the largest city of the Sanjak, with a population of 34,000 scored as the seventh largest city in Syria in terms of urban population. In Antioch, the Sunni Turcophones constituted the majority with 58%, while the Alawites followed with 25.5%, and Christian Arabs with 14.5%.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, Alexandretta had a majority of Christian groups (71%) with the remaining Sunnis and Alawites. In Kırıkhan, population was mostly Armenian (73%) with the remainder Arabic speaking communities.

The marginality of the proponents of both Arab and Turkish nationalisms in the Sanjak can be attributed to the relatively low number of urban middle class residents in affiliation with the nationalist centres. Moreover, the continuity and power of the elite chain, the absence of a disappointed young generation who were hindered from partaking in the power bloc due to some external factors might be another reason underlying the rather late realignment of society in national terms.

²⁰² Khoury, *Syria*, p. 520- 521.

²⁰³ Weulersse, *Alaouites*, p. 58- 59.

²⁰⁴ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 12.

²⁰⁵ Satloff, "Prelude", pp. 156-157.

The Sanjak's autonomous status, its relative distance from Damascus and Beirut, and a relatively silent Turkey (until the mid-1930's) in the northeast led to the harmonious adaptation of the notables to the new regime which can very well be observed in the composition of the local administration of the Sanjak during the mandate. Except for the following posts controlled by the mandatory French officials, the administrative ranks were filled by the indigenous Sanjak notables - Safety Inspector, Customs Control, Public Work Inspector, Technique Service of Hygiene and Public Assistance, Forestry Inspector, Public Instruction Inspector, Agriculture and Economics Inspector. In 1927 the administrative commission of the Sanjak was composed of the following people: the *mutasarrif* was İbrahim Edhem Müminzade (in 1936 replaced by Hüsnü Barazi), the general secretary was Alaaddin Bey, the *kaymakam* was Zekeriya İdris Bey (before him was İbrahim Edhem Civelek), the mayor of Antioch was Süreyya Halefzade Bey (he resigned in 1934 and was appointed to Kırıkhan *kaymakam*, İbrahim Edhem Civelek replaced him), the Director of Public Instruction was Mithat Kuseyri, the Director of Hygiene and Public Assistance was Zeki Bey (later Rasim Bey Bereket), the Director of Finance was Hasan Bey Cebbare,²⁰⁶ the Chef of Agricultural Services was Şekip Beg Müftüzade (who later became the Director of Economic Services), and the Inspector of Finance was Fuad Selim Efendi. The members of the Administrative Commission of the Sanjak were Paşacıkzade Nuri Bey, el-Sheikh Abdülhamid Efendi Hayyat, Anton Filip, Vahram Efendi Papazyan, Salaaddin Bey Baki, Şemseddinzade Cafer Beg, Hacı Mohammed Efendi Adal, Antonious Huri, Selim Efendi Cezairli and Raşid Efendi Şakir. The deputies of the Sanjak sent to the assembly in Damascus were also from the same notable families, such as Mustafa Ağa Kuseyri, Yahyazade

²⁰⁶ An Alawite notable who had migrated to Syria and later to France after the annexation by Turkey. His lands near Alexandretta today are trying to be nationalized by the state.

Adalı Hacı Mohammed, (the oldest deputy in the Syrian assembly) Izzeddin Maruf Cilli, Halefzade Süreya Bey, Mürselzade Ahmet Bey, and Moses der Kalosyan.²⁰⁷

As a result of the “harmonious” relationship between the French and the local notables of the Sanjak, no significant popular resentment was observed against a fraction of the elite based on their degree of collaboration with the “alien” force. The only visible change in the Sanjak after the arrival of the French was the addition of local French officials at the balls, city clubs, or opening ceremonies of archaeological exhibitions. Adalı Mahmud Bey’s declaration on his appointment as a Cabinet member in the Syrian Chamber illustrates the symbiosis between the colonial power and the local elite: “No separation, but strict application of the Organic Statute.”²⁰⁸ In contrast, it was already normal and valid in Syria to label the ruling elite under the French Mandate a group of traitors or anti-nationalists at least in the eyes of most of the people who were excluded from power.²⁰⁹ However, this background should not lead to the underestimation of French economic, political and cultural domination in the Sanjak, particularly to the argument that French did not attempt to disseminate the idea that they used the best French standards and the most prestigious institutions for the public well-being.²¹⁰ In the Sanjak, compared to inner Syria, the French domination was less visible but as much fused and accommodated in the local dynamics and everyday life of the city. The water project during Halefzade

²⁰⁷Dr. L. Castillon *Antipaludique dans les états du mandat Français, Alexandrette 1919- 1929*, n.d, p. 50.

²⁰⁸ Sanjian, p. 47. A longer version of this declaration in petition form can be found in Sökmen, , pp. 87- 88.

²⁰⁹ Although I tend to escape homogenizing concepts and try not to underestimate diversity, I think this is a tentative argument with a serious generalisation. Nevertheless, methodologically speaking, one is locked when he/she tries to keep away from elitist and ethnicist conventional national and colonial narratives while at the same time try to build up categories, which I believe is indispensable for the production of knowledge. In short, by the above argument, I mean, regardless of their ethnic identities, the Syrian society in general deceived those “collaborators”. (The extent of collaboration changed from time to time). Therefore, the development of Syrian nationalism should be evaluated in relation to French colonial rule

Süreyya's term as mayor and when he was at the same time deputy of the assembly in Damascus, was one of the significant instances revealing how work was dished up to all levels during the Mandate period. The whole process of the water project as well as the later electricity project give an idea about how public projects were undertaken, how the urban and rural elites/participants/liables were involved in its construction, the bureaucratic maneuvers, and the social networks utilized for its achievement.

In 1929, a water project was undertaken to bring water from Daphne (Harbiye) to Antioch. After the approval of the project by the administrative council of the Sanjak and the assembly in Damascus and after the water was sent to Beirut American University for analysis, finally the project was put out to tender respectively in the Antioch Municipality, the Ministry of Public Works in Damascus, the Beirut High Commissariat, and lastly in Paris (*Müfevvidi Sami Mümessilliği*). Adjudication was taken over by a French firm.²¹¹ A public advertisement was given in order to facilitate the borrowing of money from the people of Antioch. The project was welcomed by the people. After the pipes arrived in Antioch, the 10 kilometers construction started as soon as possible. They also utilized the ancient Roman canals near Daphne.²¹² During the construction of the pipes, a big temple door was found near the water source in Daphne. Estimated to belong to the door of Hadrian's temple of Zeus, it was greeted with enthusiasm and immediately, the *mutasarrıf* (Sanjak governor), *délègue adjoint* (assistant delegate), Sanjak Director of Public Section, *kaymakam* (district governor) and mayor arrived on the spot.

²¹⁰ Archaeology was one of the areas in which French concerted great effort in Antioch. Related to the colonial and western superiority feeling, they undertook important excavations and had a special ministry for this purpose.

²¹¹ *Yeni Mecmua*, 15 Feb 1929, no. 19; and 1 Mar 1929, no. 20.

²¹² Tekin, *Halefzade Süreyya*, p. 40-51.

While the pipes were being paved, the main streets of the city were also excavated. The local newspapers made fun of the condition of the streets full of holes claiming that “for the safety and security of our people, an “Acrobatics school” will be opened by the municipality. The first class in the school will teach tightrope walking and jumping over ditches.”²¹³ The paving over the pipes was finished in October 1930. Unfortunately as soon as the water was pumped, muddy and dirty water began to flow because the pipes had been unused for a long time and therefore were full of dirt. Another problem became apparent when holes in the street filled with rain.

People were still using traditional water sources like the artesian wells in their gardens. Thereupon, the municipality applied to the Directorate of Hygiene and Public Assistance to analyse the well water and determine criteria for potable water. On the other side of the division of labour, the *mufti* declared that according to the hygiene conditions for Islam that “the wells should be at least seven meters distanced from the drinking water. Otherwise it is not permissible.”²¹⁴ However, the centralization of the distribution of water in the city disturbed especially the peasants of Daphne, who demanded the municipality let some amount of water for free use in the irrigation of their crops.

The above scene was interpreted differently by the nationalists of Aleppo and Damascus from the loyal Sanjak guardians of the Mandate regime in such a way that in general Aleppines feared that the French policy in the Sanjak would eventually lead to its union with Turkey. In 1923 elections, the Sanjak returned five deputies, four of whom were Turks from Antioch and one an Alawite from Alexandretta. They were all nominees of the French delegate in Alexandretta, M. Prune, and they were

²¹³ *Yenigün*, 5.Dec 1930.

²¹⁴ Tekin, *Halefzade Süreya*, p. 45.

opponents of Subhi Barakat, the president of the new federal council. Moreover, there was a perception in Syria as well as in the Sanjak that the French were neglecting the welfare of the *liwa* (Syrians called the Sanjak of Alexandretta *liwa al-Iskanderun*), in any case France would cede the region to the Turks. In addition, the separatist decision taken in the Sanjak in 1926 created among the Syrians a considerable fear, which was fueled by an Iraqi diplomat who warned of Turkish expansion toward Aleppo and even into northern Iraq.²¹⁵

The composition of the wealth of the notables began to undergo a transformation in the 1920s. Although land formed the primary basis of wealth, but long distance trade and wholesale trade especially the exporting of soap became additional sources of income.²¹⁶ New commercial agreements were signed with the Levantines in Alexandretta for embarking on oil and soap trade with France, Italy and Marseille. The Adalı family was the outstanding figure in this export trade and in order to strengthen their commercial bonds, they undertook marriage alliances with their counterparts in Lebanon.²¹⁷ On the other hand, the economic power base of the traditional elite of Antioch was slightly deprived owing to the mortgage agreements with the Christian merchants of the city in the early Mandate period. Nevertheless, “Rich or not, the *ağa* benefited from the prestige of the past and an indisputable moral authority.”²¹⁸

As a result of the French cooptation of the traditional elite (both urban and rural) and the expansion and change in the composition and wealth of these notables, the “minorities,” especially Christian urban minorities, gained visibility in the public sphere through their over-representation within the bureaucracy that was coupled

²¹⁵ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 498.

²¹⁶ Türkmen, vol. I, p. 66.

²¹⁷ Ahmet Ateş., interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001.

²¹⁸ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 85.

with the enrichment of those big merchant families.²¹⁹ Their overrepresentation is linked to the high rate of literacy and resulting affiliation with Western culture. Still, being Christian did not necessarily lead to natural recruitment by France as there was no inherent love relationship between the Arab Christians of Antioch and the French, as can be seen in Edvard Huri's words,

My father did not like also the French... I was an activist against French, but I know French history perfectly and I love it. But France is a colonial state. My father bears the same feelings, too. His culture was Ottoman. He had imperial decrees of the status of *efendi* from his grandfathers. French had arrested my father at his arrival to the city. They did not like him. In 1928 elections, my father was the primary elector but French illegally appointed an Armenian instead of my father.²²⁰

While the Sunni Turcophone elite of Antioch were over-prominently discussed in the aforementioned narrative, only a minor indication is reserved for the Arabophone (Christian, Sunni and Alawite) elite. This, obviously, did not stem from a deliberate attempt to silence the non-Turk and non-Muslim elements. In any case, ethnic or religious based categorizations of the society were yet anachronistic for the early Mandate years. In Gelvin's words, "the fundamental ideological divide within the Middle Eastern society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not separate Ottomanists from Arabists; rather the fundamental ideological divide separated Ottomanists, Arabists and their ilk from the remainder of society, whose transformation and integration had been less thoroughly accomplished or whose experience of transformation was less felicitous."²²¹ It was with this concern in mind that a section of the thesis is reserved for the notables alone. However, the immigration of most of the non-Turkish elements out of Turkey and the deprivation of the remaining, after the Sanjak was annexed by Turkey, paved into such a bias. A

²¹⁹ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 101.

²²⁰ Edvard Huri, interview by the author, tape recording, June 2001.

²²¹ Gelvin, p. 16.

more detailed study utilizing Arabic sources as well as French archival material carries the potential of re-staging the elite and non-elite of Arab habitants of the Sanjak who used to number more in population than the Turkish speaking residents of the Sanjak even as late as 1936.

The Christian *ağas* (*hevaca*) were mostly concentrated in the *kaza* of Suveydiye. They owned 300- 400 acres of land on which the Alawite and some Christian sharecroppers worked. The famous Alawite *ağa*, Sheikh Maruf Cilli, who is depicted as a feudal lord in the accounts of the interviewees, owned half of Suveydiye souq and half of the Suveydiye plain. Cilli family also possessed a private militia, which collected regular tributes from the Alawite peasantry.²²² Harbiye (Daphne) was also characterized by Alawite *ağas* some of whom were Sheikh Fadıl Tuleyli, Sheikh Şerif Abdullah Gali, Şakir Kavvas İbrahim *Ağa* Tuhani and Fadıl *Ağa*.²²³

Despite the fact that the descriptions of the interviewees refer to the period (which they claim to have ended with the beginning of Turkish rule) under the authority of the *ağa* with oppression and poverty, the *ağa* by himself was mentioned in a rather positive tone. The words of Albert, an Orthodox Christian from Altınözü is illustrative in this sense:

Here lived a Kemal *ağa*, from Karsu,²²⁴ in the past *ağa* was like a chief, pasha or president whose orders were realized immediately. They care about people... This man was such a good man that you can't imagine. He stood as a protector to us. He was some kind of a *mudir* in the gendarme station in el-Ham. We obeyed him with pleasure... In the plebiscite, we voted in favor of Turkey for the sake of Kemal *Ağa*. He used to protect us from brigands.²²⁵

²²² Talat Koku, interview by author, tape recording, Samandağ (Antioch), June 2001.

²²³ Et-Tavil, p. 317.

²²⁴ Karsu is famous for its people carrying pure Turkish nationalist feelings. This name recurs in the Turkish newspapers after 1936 due to French oppressive measures in the town for the reason that they were Turks.

²²⁵ Albert, interview by author, tape recording, Altınözü (Antioch), June 2001.

The relation between an *ağa* and a peasant was not purely an economic oppressed-oppressor relationship; it had dynamics that are more complex. The peasants, especially those who had personal contact with the *ağa*, identified themselves in relation to the *ağa*. Since being a farmer on the lands of the *ağa* was a hereditary job, which passed patrilineally from generation to generation, to be known personally by the *ağa* was a prestigious thing. Nevertheless, this approach did not exclude the inherent conflict of interests between the two. One can see the antagonism of the farmer peasant towards the *ağa*, yet expressed implicitly within the language of everyday interactions.

Kuseyri had also property here, farms and plenty of lands. *Our* Semra hanım (Kuseyri) is here. Where do you know her? We lived with them altogether. She was here yesterday. I used to repair their mills. They are four brothers. The kindest of them was, may he sleep in radiance, was Alaaddin Kuseyri... The daughter of Semra Hanım had married to a man from Kilis. I was used to go to Kilis to bring stone for cracking olives... The deputy Kuseyri was a very benevolent man; he looked after the poor. Mithat Kuseyri was a doctor; people loved him. Sabahattin Adalı married the daughter of Dr. Mithat.²²⁶

However, the submissiveness of the peasants towards the *ağa* had varying tones depending on the ownership profile and the economic conditions of the peasant. The Alawite peasants of Harbiye and Suveydiye were the most impoverished sections of the city population. Therefore, their narratives underlined more the poverty and landlessness and disapproval of landowning *ağa*.

The Separatist Decision of March 1926

While the separatist decision of March 1926 is the kind of event expected to deserve a glorious place in the Turkish nationalist writing, it is either omitted or underemphasized. Such authors as Melek, who was a Sanjak resident at the time,

presented it as a strategic manoeuvre that paved the necessary ground for the final realization of independence. In the French sources, the same event was denounced as an exceptional instance that disturbed the harmony between the inhabitants of the Sanjak and the prevailing regime.

At the end of December 1925, fourteen political leaders from Alexandretta petitioned the High Commissioner to declare the Sanjak an independent unit from Syria and put it under the administrative authority of the High Commissioner de Jouevenel.²²⁷ After the elections of January 1926, five of the six deputies of the Sanjak who were elected to the National Constituent Assembly in Damascus and three additional deputies were permitted to form a Representative Council on February 22.²²⁸ On March 9, they proclaimed the independence of the territory as a separate state under the name of the "Independent State of Alexandretta."²²⁹ The new council voted a constitution and proposed to the High Commissioner that his deputy at Alexandretta, P. Durieux, should be appointed as the president, by whom the Sanjak was named as "The State of North Syria."²³⁰

Melek argues that those elected deputies were the ones claiming Arabness and the proponents of Damascus as well,²³¹ which explained why, in June 1926, they voted in favor of reunion with Damascus. The Representative Council of the Sanjak abandoned the previous decision of independence with a vote of nine to one in 12 June 1926, and decided that the Sanjak be reunited with Syria, maintaining its

²²⁶ Albert, interview by author, tape recording, Altınözü (Antioch), June 2001.

²²⁷ Güçlü, p. 75.

²²⁸ The deputies were 3 Sunni, 2 Alawites, 1 Armenian and 1 Christian Orthodox. From Melek, *Hatay*, p. 45.

²²⁹ *Correspondance d'orient*, 6, (March 1926), p. 155- 156.

²³⁰ Sanjian, p. 46.

²³¹ Melek, p. 45.

autonomous status.²³² What the underlying motives were behind such a radical change in the deputies' decision remains a mystery.

The historical circumstances surrounding the issue are crucial in terms of shedding light on this mysterious instance owing to the radical and fast shift in the voters' political tendencies. The Great Revolt had begun the year before, on 18 July 1925, with the opening fire of the Druze highlanders on a French airplane circling the Jabal Druze. The Druze uprising spread to Damascus under the leadership of Shahbandar's nationalist "People's Party". The price of the revolt was 1416 killed Damascenes under the two-day French bombardment. By the end of November 1926, the revolt had come to end, except for in Hama and Jabal Druze. It was under these circumstances that the French policies such as "war with war, peace with peace" were formulated; just another version of divide and rule. Accordingly, elections were held to form a Constituent assembly in the districts the French had not placed under martial law, that is except Damascus, Hawran and Jabal Druze. Despite boycotts in Aleppo, Homs and Hama, the elections proceeded in peace in the Sanjak and the Alawite State, so it is no coincidence that the popular, anti imperialist and nationalist revolt did not involve these two areas.²³³

The news of the separation of the Sanjak was greeted with anxiety in Syria. It was generally believed in nationalist circles that when the Alexandretta council had decided for separation from the Syrian state under a Syria of upheaval and nationalist control, it had done so under the instructions of French authorities. The story was told that after the vote was taken, a member of the Council had gone to Aleppo to protest the circumstances against which he and his colleagues had been forced to

²³² Elizabeth P. MacCallum, *The Nationalist Crusade in Syria*, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1928, p. 187.

²³³ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 205-206.

act.²³⁴ They did not worry about the activation of Turkey's irredentist claims for Alexandretta, relying on the incident that the nationalist organization of Alexandretta and the Environs Aid Society had been closed down due to some personal rivalry at the end of 1925.²³⁵ However, the French were not ready to deal with the situation yet. Therefore, the *délègue adjoint* and the new Syrian president, Ahmed Nami Bey, collaborated with each other. Ahmed Nami Bey made assurances during his visit to the Sanjak in the spring of 1927 for the respect and guarantee of the inhabitants' rights within the Syrian unity.²³⁶ Nevertheless, this incident demonstrated the roots of a certain political tendency among the notables, one of which favoured the autonomy of the Sanjak. Yet it was not a precursor of the foundation of the irredentist Turkish group. Nevertheless, to view this incident gaining the characteristics of a political movement, one must wait for the pre- World War II conjuncture and the establishment of Turkey's political claims over the Sanjak, during which time, the Sunni Turcophone elite of the Sanjak was transformed into Sunni Turkish nationalists in close relation with the irredentist organization in Turkey. Nevertheless, this incident demonstrated two important aspects: The failure of the advancement of the Arab nationalist movement in the Sanjak became clear once again when the Antioch branch of Shahbandar's "People's Party" was founded by Zaki Arsuzi.²³⁷ Second, it pronounced the Arab nationalists' view of French policy towards the Sanjak. Third, whatever the underlying motivations for such a decision, be they economic or anti-Syrian (which did not necessarily lead to favouring Turkism), they could not form a popular and a mass group of followers whose identity was formed around being a common Sanjak inhabitant.

²³⁴ MacCallum, p. 55.

⁹⁸ Sökmen, p. 82.

²³⁶ Sanjian, p. 47.

²³⁷ Melek, *Hatay*, p. 43. For the "People's Party", see Khoury, *Syria*, p. ??

It is obvious that the politics of the era were not based on essentialist categories but on the “higher interests” of the Mandate rule. However, these power politics could not last too long. This decade prepared the ground for the ascendancy of a new class of elites whose wealth was not based on the land and the traditional politics of notables but on liberal professions. They would blame the existing order in the Sanjak on “the sultanate of *medrese* (theological school), dervish lodge and of the *ağas* in Antioch and the dominance of a cosmopolitan culture in Alexandretta, which altogether worked for the alienation of the Turkish community.”²³⁸ Above all, the existing order stood as a great obstacle in the upward mobilization of this new class for whom the ranks of local administration were not opened. This feeling of disappointment materialized and spread among other sections of the society, especially among the younger members of the notable families as well as a small fraction of the impoverished artisanal class. Under the heavy “external” effects, this frustration was blended with Turkish and Arab nationalist feelings and turned into a violent ethnic hatred. The following chapter will investigate more closely those years, which at the same time resulted in the disturbance of the status quo.

²³⁸ Melek, *Hatay*, p. 27. “Antakya’da medrese, tekke ve ağalar saltanatı...İskenderun’da ise kozmopolit bit muhit hakimdi ve Türkleri boğmaya çalışıyordu.”

CHAPTER III

BEFORE THE STORM, THE CITY

This chapter covers the years starting from the late 1920s until 1936, specifically focusing on the various forms of relationships between “enclosed” communities. In fact, it is an attempt at comprehending to what extent these communities were enclosed and to what extent they were not. Satloff conceptualizes these years as “the period when there was a trade-off between the maintenance of traditional political power in exchange for across-the-board economic prosperity.”²³⁹

This chapter will elaborate on the impact of the new patterns of economic interdependence prevailing in the Sanjak, the city space. By way of introducing space into the narrative, particularly, buildings, streets, cafes and neighborhoods, a more subtle and total picture of the period under scrutiny can be rendered. Privileging the physical aspects of the city also creates the opportunity to observe the *new* movements of people in the city through the inscription of resulting cultural clashes in the city space. The movements in the city may be the result of the various changes ranging from external interventions in the city space to changes in the financial resources of people or some ideological reasons under the French colonial context. This chapter will also pay attention to the extent of intrusion of the French rule in the city. Aware of the fact that neither Damascus nor Antioch carries the characteristics of a colonial city in the same way as Rabat or Algiers, answers to the following questions will be sought in the following chapter: In what ways did the French colonize the city space and were they able to create a colonial center and *cordon sanitaria*?

²³⁹ Satloff, p. 147.

I do not view space solely as representing and reproducing existing relations of power. Additionally, I believe that space gains meaning in its relation with the human. The human agency, ranging from individual experiences to collectively held rituals, is the inevitable aspect through which space attains its different representations. That is to say, experience occupies an important place in the inscription of meaning onto the space. In this sense, expressions of individual experiences in the form of travel writings, diaries, and newspaper articles will be utilized as significant sources to grasp the reconfiguration of power relations inside the city.²⁴⁰

As discussed in the introduction, there is an important gap in the Arab and Turkish sources regarding the “pre-struggle” years, the underlying motives of which were discussed above. Robert Satloff is one of the few writers who put emphasis on these silenced years and reconstructed this period in a highly optimistic manner using mostly French sources. Being aware of the serious divergence of perspectives about the “pre-struggle” years between French and British sources, this chapter is a moderate attempt to introduce the local residents’ voices into this neglected period for which Sattloff argues that the Sanjak residents were wealthier and happier after a decade of their special administrative regime.²⁴¹ In addition, I will point out through which media different communities in the Sanjak remembered or forgot those years,

²⁴⁰ For the interactive perspective on space see, Donald Preziosi, “The Mechanism of Urban Meaning” in Irene Bierman et. al *Ottoman City and Its Parts* (New York: 1991) pp. 3- 11; Ibid., “Power, Structure and Architectural Function”, pp. 103- 109; Gülru Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The Topkapi Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

²⁴¹ Satloff, p. 158.

how they periodized the Mandate years, and whether those years represented a distinct period for them.²⁴²

The years between 1925 and 1936 formed perhaps the most dynamic years of the Sanjak in terms of economic activities. It was this very “dynamism” and its results that led to the “stability” or “communal compromise and cooperation” that was characteristic of the years leading up to the mid-1930s, characteristics which would not function in an atmosphere of ethnic sectarianism and isolation. Paradoxically yet classically at the same time, this coalition paved the way for divisions within the various communities, the emergence of rival factions in big families, or more broadly, the emergence of inter-generational conflict in modern-traditional terms. The *intra*-communal divisions of the early 1930s turned into *inter*-communal violence after 1936. Even in the beginning of 1936, the supporters of a new regime were still marginal, and comprised only a small fraction of the population.

Putting emphasis on these years will also demonstrate that the ethnic conflict was not an inherent and essential feature defining the relationship between the communities, contrary to the nationalist premises of the Turkish press as well as western claims, which are well represented in an article in the journal *Great Britain and the East* as “these Syrian communities were always at loggerheads and seemingly always will be so.”²⁴³ To give another example, A. Alexandre’s argument

²⁴² During the oral interviews, I first approached the people first and foremost of “representative” personalities of each of the remaining ethnic groups in the city and choosing representative personalities from among the Sunni Turks, Alawites, Christian Arabs, and Armenians. However, I soon realized that it is *my* ethnic labeling to approach people as Alawite or Turk and fill them into the slots I prepared for them. I know that I can not totally avoid this but it is not only more “correct” but also less restrictive to listen to people speaking for themselves. For the problems of subaltern writing, see Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak”, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988), pp. 271- 313.

²⁴³ *Great Britain and the East*, 21 Jan. 1937, p. 81.

that “Arab Turkish rivalry in the Sanjak of Alexandretta is a product of the fact that the population of this region is composed of two important linguistic populations.”²⁴⁴

The tendency to conceptualize every tension between individuals/ households/ communities as an ethnic conflict undermines the visibility of other channels of conflict. This is not to draw a rigid line between the traditional and modern forms of conflict and insert religion as the traditional; class, and ethnic conflict as the modern. Aware of the impossibility of pure and authentic tradition and the blending of “tradition” with the instrumental reason of modernity, the situation observed in Antioch was re-presentation of some essentialist characteristics in a totally new context.

“Those were the years...”

Satloff’s general claim for the Sanjak between 1925- 1936 is that the domestic peace was founded upon general economic prosperity.²⁴⁵ This argument accords well with the official discourse of the colonial party in France, which can be followed from the journal *L’Asie Française*, the mouthpiece organ of the colonial party.

The French sources argued that the priority of economic considerations could be clearly observed in the Armenian Settlement Schemes. Detailed proposals had been prepared for the settlement of the local Armenians in the Sanjak based on a study made by the chief officer of the *Service des Renseignements* (Office of Inquiry) of Antioch. Five farms in the Sanjak would be purchased to settle 150 families while

²⁴⁴ Alexandre, p. 66.

²⁴⁵ Satloff, p. 158.

a number of landowners had expressed willingness to take Armenians as tenant farmers (*métayers*).²⁴⁶ Ultimately, only one farm was able to be purchased in 1927, that was Nour Zeytoun. Although Burnier attempted to purchase two other farms from an Armenian landowner, interestingly enough the Armenian landowner lost out thanks to better offers made by the local Muslim landowners.²⁴⁷

The same sources on the Mandate years bear an implicit assumption that the tragic history of Antioch ended with the French Mandate. Accordingly, “the city returned to its Christian and Western origins and a new golden age started in the Sanjak as one of the richest and most fertile provinces of the Syrian republic.”²⁴⁸ This idyllic age was said to have come to end with its final cession to Turkey in 1939.

Contrary to the French perspective on the economic, social and cultural well-being of the Sanjak, no such optimism can be found among the British and Turkish press or by “some” residents of the Sanjak.²⁴⁹ The British and French sources disagree over the prosperity of the Sanjak in the 1920s because each side tends to over or underestimate the achievements. British sources claim that the French neglected the development of the Sanjak except for a certain amount of road construction, land reclamation and some smaller public works.²⁵⁰ Similarly, the Turkish newspapers in the post-1936 period criticized the projects that the French undertook as opportunistic and spatially selective. Those critics argued that the heavy taxation, mortgages, road constructions projects, drainage projects and other such

²⁴⁶ Greenshields, p. 313.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁴⁸ Sanjian, , p. 33.

²⁴⁹ The discourse employed by the contemporary residents of Antakya on French times varies greatly depending on their class, ethnicity, and social position then and now. For the French views see, Raymond O’Zoux, *Les Etats du Levant sous Mandat Français* (Paris: Larousse, 1931); Paul Du Véou, *La Désastre d’Alexandrette* (Paris: Editions Baudineire, 1938), p. 34.

²⁵⁰ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 497.

endeavors had all been arranged in favor of the non-Turkish elements. They contended that the Turkish small peasantry and artisans had been the targets of the French laxity and oppression.

The experience of Harold Armstrong, who was a typical supporter of the high British claims and therefore expected to be watched by French spies in Syria, presented an opposite view of the city, a view shared by most of the travelers who visited Antioch:

In the narrow, cobbled alleys and streets of poverty-stricken shops the air was stifling... Now I would not have advised my worst enemy even to visit it, much less build a house and live there. Nor were there even the modern signs of past greatness- ruins, hotels and tourists.²⁵¹

Raymond O'Zoux's account, full of statistical estimates of the High Commissariat, argued that in 1926 Alexandretta registered a thirty percent budget surplus, compared with nineteen percent for the rest of the State of Syria and five percent for Lebanon.²⁵² The value of agricultural production increased fourfold between 1919 and 1924 and transit trade through the port of Alexandretta showed a steady increase.²⁵³ The concession for trade in the port of Alexandretta that France had taken over from Germany through the establishment of the *Société Française du Port d'Alexandrette* in 1918, suffered greatly after the demarcation of the Turco-Syrian frontier established in 1921.²⁵⁴ However, the construction of *chaussée* (road) connecting Aleppo and Alexandretta created new links between the economies of North Syria and the Sanjak.²⁵⁵ At the end of the 1920s, both Antioch and

²⁵¹ Armstrong, *Turkey*, p. 113.

²⁵² O'Zoux, p. 153.

²⁵³ Paul Du Véou, *La Desastre*, p. 34.

²⁵⁴ Jacquot,

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Alexandretta had 375 km of roads and 9 km of canals in operation.²⁵⁶ In just one year following the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, the value of Turkish goods entering the Sanjak increased 363 percent and Turkey remained Alexandretta's fourth largest trade partner.²⁵⁷ In addition, public projects increased the value of agricultural production fourfold between 1919 and 1924 and transit through the port of Alexandretta showed a steady increase.²⁵⁸

The expenditures on public works such as land reclamation, electrification, and road construction projects rose from 7.47 percent in the Sanjak's budget in 1921 to 54.86% in 1928, and to twenty-five percent in the mid-1930s.²⁵⁹ Most of the public expenditure went to land reclamation, electrification and road construction projects. Almost half a million square meters of swampland was drained and 20,000 hectares of land were recovered on the Amik plain for agricultural cultivation. The result of the drainage efforts was a decrease in the rate of malaria.²⁶⁰ Yet while the French High Commissariat demonstrated French achievements with scientific statistical data and visual material, these graphics leave unexplored how these roads were opened, what conflicts arose with the settlement of "alien" laborers, or who were the consumers of these public expenditures.

A critical view towards the civil administration in the Sanjak would help to moderate the above narrative of Satloff and other French sources. In practice, civil service jobs were distributed in proportion to the population of the communities. The Christian Arabs of Antioch were over-represented in the civil administration of the Sanjak compared with the population of the community. This was due to both their

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 33-34.

²⁵⁷ Satloff, p. 158

²⁵⁸ Du Véou, *La Désastre*, p. 34.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

²⁶⁰ For a detailed analysis of the land drainage efforts and malaria see; L. Castillon, *La Lutte Antipaludique dans les états du mandat Français, Alexandrette 1919- 1929*, n.d.

relatively high literacy rates and the abundance of their occupations in liberal professions. The Sunni Turks, who were the dominant community in the Sanjak's economy as large landholders and leading industrialists were represented in proportion with their population but they were recruited mostly for low-level jobs.²⁶¹ The least represented section of the city was the Alawites due to their low level of literacy. Their underemployment and "*fellah/tarik*" (*worker*) status could have been altered by conscious official policies, which French had never touched upon as these efforts carried the potential of creating a result, which could shake the status quo and upset the French and notables' authority in the Sanjak.

In the case of the local armed services, Sunni Turks increased their share in two of the Sanjak's four public safety units. Between 1924 and 1931, they jumped from 46 percent to 62 percent of the rural gendarmes; between 1927 and 1931 they rose from 51 percent to 55 percent of the urban police while the Armenians were only 4 percent.²⁶² The police was formed of fifty-five percent Turks, thirty-one percent Arab and fourteen percent Armenians whereas the mobile guards were composed of twenty-eight percent Turks, seventeen percent Arab, fifteen percent Kurds, and thirty percent Armenians. The gendarme was staffed by sixty-two percent Turks, twenty-eight Syrians and four percent Armenians.²⁶³

The Mobile Guard was composed of equal numbers of Sunni Turks and Armenians and lesser numbers of Arabs and Kurds. In the case of Syria, the French-directed Levant Battalion defending the frontier with Turkey consisted of minorities; in the case of the Sanjak, of Armenians, Alawites and Circassians. Stories of

²⁶¹ Satloff, p. 163. The administration throughout the mandate period was one of the issues, which was heavily stressed by the Turkish press in the late 1930s. The news about filling of the posts with "alien and hostile" persons was a cliché of the newspapers.

²⁶² Jacquot, p. 33.

²⁶³ Ibid.

annually paid Alawite soldiers (*Asker Suri* in the local colloquial) can frequently be heard in the memories of the Alawite peasants concerning the Mandate years. For example, being recruited to the army and receiving four pieces of gold as the salary was remembered as a relative release from the starvation they had been suffering.²⁶⁴

Nevertheless, I argue that it would be unrealistic and totalizing to consider the “well-being” of these years as absolutely and equally diffused and responded by every group in the Sanjak. On the one hand, with a little dose of exaggeration, it may well be true that “Alexandretta was one of the richest regions in Syria... Although it contained just one tenth of Syria’s total population, the Sanjak produced more than one seventh of the state’s gross domestic product.”²⁶⁵ On the other hand, this general welfare was not shared by all sectors, did not transform/modernize the city and its residents as a whole. What should be stressed is that during these years under French rule, the beneficiaries in the city were nearly the same households as before, although the sources of their wealth might have changed and the visibility of some groups in the public sphere could have increased or decreased. The cultural and economic capital was monopolized almost by the same families especially until the mid-1930s; the majority of peasants were still Alawites of Antioch, and the city was as moderate and peripheral as before. In particular, the benefits of the prevailing communal interdependency in the Sanjak favored the Sunni Turcophone and Christian elites as evidenced by the fact that the Sunni elite still preferred to sell their lands to Christians instead of their Alawite *maraba* in order not to facilitate their emancipation.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ Talat Koku, Interview by author, tape recording, Suveydiye, June 2001 from.

²⁶⁵ *L'Asie Française* “La Question d’Alexandrette”, no. 363, (September/October 1938), p. 242.

²⁶⁶ Jacquot, p. 448.

However, at the same time this “stability and status quo” carried the seeds of change, which became so more traumatic than ever with the involvement of Turkey and France. It changed the rules of the game; it intervened with the local dynamics of the society and the “change” turned out to be a violent ethnic hatred and distrust.

The City, the Quarter, Ethnicity

Belonging is a privilege, and has its price. All this is determined by an arbitrary line. What is the nature of this line?

Spiro Kostof, *The City Assembled*²⁶⁷

Western and westernist perspectives inherently view Middle Eastern societies as ensembles of self-sustained and enclosed ethnic/religious groups, and Middle Eastern politics as a conflict between these ethnicities/religions. This perspective is manifested in the city space, such that the city is seen as a totality of autonomous, self-sustained, religious based quarters of dead-end streets, and crooked alleys in which Islam is depicted as the sole and essential determining factor both in the architecture and in the social organization in the residential area, which is sharply separated from the commercial space.

According to this point of view, there existed minimum contact, mobility and movement between the “compartmentalized” neighborhoods. The homogenous ethnic or religious group, in general, flourished around a religious center: a mosque, synagogue, church, *mescid*, a public fountain and a few shops catering to basic needs

²⁶⁷ E. Bastéa, “Etching Images on the Street”, in *Streets, Critical Perspectives on Public Space*, Z. Çelik, D. Favro, R. Ingersoll eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 111.

of the community.²⁶⁸ However, the residential quarters of Antioch were by no means homogenous units or neat special embodiments of social groups. The make up of each locality reflected the workings of several choices and constraints which tended to pull in different directions. The desire to live close to members of one's religious or immigrant group effected the choice of neighborhood but so also did the practical need to live in proximity to one's place of work and affordable housing.

A critical elaboration of this perspective should be undertaken within the framework of Islamic city discussions. In this sense, Janet Abu Lughod's article "Territoriality in the Arabo-Islamic City; Turf and Juridical Classes; Gender Segregation and Arabo Islamic City Form"²⁶⁹ helps in the political contextualization of this tradition which began to evolve in and contribute greatly to the formation of an ideal definition of an Islamic city in the late 1920s and 1930s. In addition, it gives valuable insights into the foundation of an alternative theoretical framework for the Middle Eastern cities. Sadly, not every aspect of this tradition will be undertaken here at length and in detail. The focus will be more on the neighborhoods and the

²⁶⁸ Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi referred nostalgically to the *mahalle* structure of Istanbul as follows: "What place did this perfect fraction, the *mahalle* have within the city, what impression did it leave on the eyes, covered by trellises of vine and wisteria, what spiritual values did the influence it produced on the souls form, with its school, fountain or sebil in one corner, its *mescid* nearby and, right next to it, those cemeteries adorned with trees where came to rest eternally those who had lived their childhood, and who, after living through their maturity left their place to their sons and grandsons?" from E. Eldem, D. Goffman and B. Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West Aleppo, İzmir, İstanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.153. Against this religious building centered, ethnically and religiously homogenous *mahalle* conceptualization, Kafescioglu demonstrates some *mahalles* in Istanbul which were not formed around a mosque. These *mahalles* are founded generally around *bedestans* and commercial centers; near central and monumental Byzantium buildings; and the places where the exile communities have arrived. In addition to this, using 1546 *tahrir*, she questions the homogeneity component of traditional construction of *mahalle* till the middle of sixteenth century.

²⁶⁹ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City- Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance", *JMES*, no. 19 (1987), p. 155- 176.

streets in Antioch so as to distinguish the spatial reflections of the urban politics. As Kafescioğlu maintains, “for sixteenth century Istanbul there exist two maps, one formed by the rulers in order to record population, *waqf*; and the other is determined by the people themselves, *mahalle* (neighbourhood) members’ identity and sense of belonging, their way of perceiving their daily environment, and the spatial and mental limits of these residents... These formal and informal settlement maps never overlap and are constantly changing for the observed time period.”²⁷⁰ A similar perspective can be endowed in order to scrutinize the changing borders between the topographic and cultural frontiers in Antioch. In this way, it is possible to observe the “conventional” as well as “new” movements of people, which work against the stereotypic classifications regarding the activities within the city.

Movements like the regular visits of Orthodox Christian women to the *ziara* (tomb) of Sheikh Hamza, an Alawite holy personality, located in the Alawite neighborhood of *Mahsan*²⁷¹, or the meeting of some of the Muslim elite women in certain houses in the Jewish quarter to purchase exclusive clothes provided by the Jewish merchants of the city, are only few instances blurring the rigid borders between neighborhood, ethnicity and commerce. The change in the forms and motivations of people in their relation with the city space will mostly be dealt with within the framework of the ascending ideology of nationalism peculiar to the youth; and the changing terms of prestige in the French colonial context.

The hierarchy of the residents within the city was determined by their proximity to the Orontes River and distance from the mountain Habib-i Neccar. As expected, the residences of the Sunni Turcophones of the city, being the politically

²⁷⁰ Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, 15. yy. *Belgeleri Işığında Mahalleyi Yeniden Düşünmek*, p. 10, forthcoming.

²⁷¹ Weulersse, , p. 57.

and economically dominant group within the city, were the closest to the river. As Weulersse states, “the Turkish quarter is the heart of the city, it also forms the major part, comprising twenty-seven of the total forty-five quarters.”²⁷² However, the Turkish quarter was not homogenous. It was divided along class lines, which Weulersse separated into three. The quarter where the “aristocrats” lived had the *souqs* and the Christian quarters on the one side and the *Antique Grande Route* /The Herode road, on the other²⁷³. The second group was situated against the mountain Habib-i Neccar and was situated on the opposite side of the Grand Road. The third party, “the poor neighborhood”, was on the periphery of the city, sloping up to the mountain.²⁷⁴ Although common to all were houses with no windows, narrow, and torturous and dead-end streets, the social life in these streets differed greatly. It was not only the noise and number of residents or passers-by outside on the street which marked the differences between these quarters, but obviously the quality and size of the houses. While the life in the aristocratic Turkish quarter was peaceful and quiet, meaning the life took place tightly inside their houses behind high walls, the neighbourhoods of the poor and laborers had streets that were busier, more crowded and more brightly colored.²⁷⁵

The Christian quarters, specifically the Orthodox Christian quarter in the vocabulary of the city, of Mahsan, Günlek, Maqbel and Qastel developed at the expense of their Turkish counterparts. Over time, the oldest Christian quarter, Sari Mahmud Hiristiyan, fell into poverty and turned into a neighborhood where the

²⁷² Ibid., p. 43.

²⁷³ This road was the “Grand Rue” of the Roman period in 2nd century A.D. It used to be 4 m. wide, marble pavement floor and 3200 columns on both sides. In the Aleppo exit of the road, there was a monument with 4 legs and a statue of Apollo marking the center of the city. Tekin, *Halefzade*, p. 54.

²⁷⁴ The distinction between neighborhoods of high intermediate and low housing price is uneven in distribution. An expensive house in an ancient quarter would have a rent of 3000- 4000 francs a year, yet an artisan’s house would be 250-800 francs a year. Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 16.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 58.

poorest Christians lived. It was also very close to the poor Turkish and Arab neighborhoods. What distinguished Sarı Mahmud Islam from Sari Mahmud Hirstiyan was just the number of windows and the number of doors opening to the street. The economically prosperous position of the Christians began to disturb the existing *mahalle* livelihood and a movement started towards the southwestern part of the city viewing the Orontes. Ordu and Hamidiye were the two recent well-to-do and modern Orthodox Christian and Armenian quarters of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The poorer Christians, the artisans and laborers moved to a suburb of the city on the road to Suveydiye. However, 305 households out of 348 remained in their ancient quarters.²⁷⁶

Although Antioch did not extend outward physically except for very few new quarters, the number of quarters increased somewhat by the subdivision of existing neighborhoods. Mahsan was a typical example of the separation of a residential district from the established neighborhoods. At the beginning of the century, Mahsan was divided into three: Mahsan Islam, Mahsan Hirstiyan, and Mahsan Arab. Due to the fluctuation of population for various reasons, the old quarter was split into pieces. However, a section of Mahsan Islam like Dört Ayak Ermeni, disappeared; the residents of that quarter were absorbed by Mahsan Hirstiyan, but the old neighborhood names remained in common usage. In the south of the city were Maqbel Islam and Qastel Islam; on the opposite side of these neighborhoods stood Qastel Hirstiyan and Maqbel Hirisitiyan. There were also Qanaat Islam and Sofular Islam, and two Arab neighborhoods with the same name. Furthermore, when the number of inhabitants in the neighborhood increased, an adjoint quarter was formed

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

and received the prefix *Tabi'* (dependent) such as *Tabi' Sofular Islam*, *Tabi' Sofular Arab* or *Tabi' Mahsan Arab*.²⁷⁷

Perhaps Jneyne was an ideal type, drawing near to a romantic definition of a *mahalle*, a special embodiment of religious group located around its religious center. Jneyne, comprising 50 houses, was one of the "traditional" centers of Orthodox Christians. The traditional identity of this neighborhood was consolidated with the Orthodox Church appearing as an urban castle where the Christians fled for refuge during the disturbances in 1921 by the Turkish irregular bands.²⁷⁸

The "traditional" Christian and Alawite quarters seemed more inward oriented than the Muslim Turkish quarters. The inward orientedness revealed itself both in the architecture of the houses that opened towards their interiors and with the gates of the *mahalle* protecting the neighborhood in times of trouble.

The Alawite quarters were located on the northern and southern outskirts of Antioch, generally near to the Christian quarters. To the south, were the quarters of Sari Mahmud Arab (later named Cebbare after an Alawite notable family of which Hasan Cebbare, the Director of Finance of the Sanjak was a member), Mahsan Arab, Tabi Mahsan Arab, Günlük Arab, Jidide, and Küyhat (Şaredek). The northeastern quarters were the traditional residence of the Alawites whose population had decreased due to the population movement towards the south after the pillage of Dörtayak (Tetraphyl) by the Turkish irregular bands in 1921. These neighborhoods were Kanaat Islam, Sofular Arab, Tabi' Sofular Arab and Orhaniye. Orhaniye was the old famous Great Dört Ayak, the quarter where most of the population and notables (not the big landowners, but respected persons nevertheless) used to live

²⁷⁷ Weulersse, p. 43-44.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 52.

before the Great War. The Armenian section of Dört Ayak was greatly damaged during the 1909 massacres and then more so after the deportations of the Great War. It was later filled exclusively by Alawites. The only thing that remained was the name of the neighborhood and a ruined Armenian church. Marcus argues this was a typical feature of Middle Eastern cities, that even in quarters named after social groups the composition was inconsistent with the labels. These names tended to identify only one identity in the locality and were even at times anachronistic as in the case of Dört Ayak Ermeni.²⁷⁹

For the Orhaniye quarter, Weulersse argues that the border between interior and exterior of the *mahalle* were so sharply drawn that it was like a small village whose livelihood had wholly turned inside, when the ports were closed it was like a small fortress.²⁸⁰ From the gardens and roofs of the houses, one could pass from house to house.²⁸¹

This scene is a very rigid analytical construction, leaving no room for choice and constraints, which pulled people in different directions in their choices of locality. Though certainly not the rule, rather it is a broad generalization labeling the quarter with the name of the most dominant group in that neighborhood. Because even the non-Turkish groups who felt the threat and terror of the dominant groups and states at different times, did not enclose themselves in exclusive ghettos. They certainly lived among their own kind but most of the time in mixed neighborhoods with large Muslim populations. The dynamics of daily life gradually introduced variety into their midst and eroded their original character. For example, the Turkish quarter housed only a fraction of the Turks and some Jews. The Alawite

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 50. Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 317.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 61; and Bazantay, *Enquete*, pp. 59-60.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 59.

neighborhood might seem like an exclusive ghetto, nevertheless, especially in Affan, the list of the owners whose properties were expropriated by the municipality for the construction of the Herod Road displays the diversity of social backgrounds and religious groups, which had pushed them into an atmosphere of shared interests and responsibilities.

Analyzing the impact of the French Mandate policy on the city space demonstrates that the French did not intend to construct a dual structure in Antioch similar to their urban policies in Algiers, Casbah or Rabat. In these cities, French colonial urban design was based on difference. Difference, with a high dose of superiority over the indigenous population, was the basis of both the establishment of *cordon sanitaire* and the conservation of the *old* city. In Antioch, they did not attempt to “preserve” or confine the local population in the “traditional” city and create a distinct “modern” city. However, this was not due to their kindness or difference of perception towards local Antiochenes. Most probably, this was because of the inherent financial problems in the Mandate policies, which recurred in almost every kind of investment projects as well as the fact that Antioch was a very small, modest and insignificant city compared to other French colonial cities. Nevertheless, the French had an ideal Antioch in mind, inspired by the golden days of Antioch during Roman times. The construction of the Herod Road and the pattern of plans for public works in the 1930s under the guidance of French urban engineer Danje Fibis are indicative of this line of thinking. According to Fibis’s city plan, the *tour de ville* and a stadium were the primary endeavors to be undertaken along with big parks and avenues, which would be impossible to realize without the demolition of old workshops and residences.²⁸²

²⁸² Yenigün, 14 June 1932.

The French did attempt to create a colonial center in the city, be it dispersed and unsuccessful or not. This time not the *cordon sanitaire* distinguished the center but the “Tourism Hotel” belonging to the *Society of Grand Hotels of Levant*, at which most of the travelers, French officials, high Syrian bureaucrats, and consuls stayed during their visits and to which the first electricity in the city was given on 3 November 1931.²⁸³ It was one day later that the offices of the governors and the Bank of Great Syria and Lebanon were electrified. The account of Lady Russell, whose reservation at the Tourism Hotel was made by one of the members of the Commission of the League of Nations, and who was at that time in Antioch for the inspection of elections, demonstrates the vague and permeable borders of the new Antioch:

The town has spread over both banks of the river united by a fine bridge which leads to the new *faubourg* (suburb) on the farther side, where the French commissioner’s house (it was called *Serail* and belonged to Suphi Bereket), the hotel, the *lycee*, the electrical plant and a very large white-painted cinema: the most prominent building in the town were located.²⁸⁴

However, once again, very few of these projects were realized. The wishes of Dr. Cemil Süleyman could not be achieved such that:

I was in Antioch 28 years ago. I remember that summer night under the moonlight when we were passing over this same bridge over the Orontes on the narrow and stony way to the mansion of Bereketzade... The appearance of the city seems to have remained the same for twenty-eight years... Antioch situated all along the Orontes with a wide harbor would be one of the beautiful cities in the world. I wish I was able to glimpse the elegant kiosks or grand hotels, which are constructed in the place of dilapidated buildings

²⁸³ Tekin, *Halefzade*, p. 52.

²⁸⁴ Gordon, *Syria As It Is*, p. 16.

surrounding the Orontes... No matter how, the ancient city walls could be demolished to give the city the light and freshness it so needed.²⁸⁵

From the perspective of travelers of the period, the general appearance of the city was not transformed greatly with the above mentioned efforts, as observed by Gordon: "It is more or less the same as the Turks after the war...except for a squadron of colonial cavalry out at exercise or a Syrian policeman in French khaki drill, there is little to indicate that Antioch is ruled under the French Syrian mandate."²⁸⁶

Subsequently, the increasing visibility of the ancient ruins of Antioch through restorations and archeological exhibitions as objects representing the roots of western civilization, the opening up of the famous Archeology museum close to the hotel, the construction of western style 3-storey apartments along the Herode road and movement of the notables' residences to this road were aspects of the formation of a new and modern center associated with the high French culture. The discourse celebrating the greatness of this culture and manifesting its "difference" with the local culture presented itself through the code words of health, hygiene, humidity, and smell. Accordingly, the old (and poor at the same time) were referred to as anti-hygienic, disordered, and foul smelling.

The metaphor of "distance" revealed the attitude of the French towards the indigenous, the people and the city. This metaphor was also valid for the western travelers regarding the city. But, unlike the local French, they could maintain a

²⁸⁵ Yenigün, 25 March 1931."Tamam yirmisekiz sene oluyor. Asi nehrindeki aynı köprüden geçerek Bereketzadelerin konağına giden dar ve taşlı yollar üzerinde atlarımızın...sakin ve mehtaplı bir ağustos gecesini hatırlıyorum. Önünde geniş bir rıhtımla Asi boyunca uzanıp giden Antakya heralde dünyanın en güzel memleketlerinden biri olur. Bütün nehir boyunca işgal eden köhne binaların yerinde insane zarif yalıların, muhteşem otellerin memleketeye biraz hatay biraz neşe veren kulüplerin gazinoların sıralandığını görmek istiyor...Hangi şekil olursa olsun surları yıkıp biraz havaya biraz ışığa çıkmak Antakya için bir ihtiyaç halindedir."

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 93.

certain physical distance rather than putting social distance like the French. That is to say, the idealization and glorification of the city on their way to Antioch turned into a feeling of disappointment as soon as they entered the city as such,

From afar the modern town looks very picturesque, with its deep green orchards and tall white minarets set in relief against the black rocks of the hillside, which seem to overhang the huddled mass of flat rooted houses. But within, the town has a dirty, somber aspect... the stuffy and ill-lit interiors of the Turkish eating houses...the dilapidated Syrian town of today does not contain works of art of a forgotten age such as those that we had seen at Konia.²⁸⁷

The Status Quo and Trade

Trade and local market transactions acted as a ground for interaction between different communities in the Sanjak. The *souq* (covered bazaar), the *han*, and the shops were meeting points for the producers and consumers of various ethnic and religious urban groups in the city and the peasant Alawites and Armenians residing in the immediate neighborhoods of Daphne (Harbiye) and Suveydiye (Samandağ). . “It was the reciprocity of needs that makes the economic life in the city,”²⁸⁸ states Bazantay. The personal experience of an Armenian peasant from Jabal Musa verifies this statement: “Starting out from Suveydiye at night with three mules and arriving at Antioch in the morning, we immediately used to go to the open bazaar on the left of the Orontes in the Han of the Municipality to sell our fruits”²⁸⁹

Not only the every day transactions but also the product preferences of the people suggests an idea about the people’s mental quality and prestige hierarchies,

²⁸⁷ Barger, pp. 223-224.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p.3.

²⁸⁹ Aram Muhtarciyan, interview by author, tape recording, Istanbul, January 2002.

which is something deeply ideological and closely intertwined with the socio-political environment of the period. In fact, it was not the prevailing preferences of the people but the change in their preferences such that quitting purchasing or selling the Syrian or Lebanese made products that distinguished the significance of ideology on the market relations. It was after 1936 that an ethnic seclusion and compartmentalization in the city entered the scene, and discrimination in terms of the origins of the products became visible in Antioch:

I never forget it. It was the days when a lot of Antiochean people were released from Turkey to arrive in the Sanjak. So, they were able to buy the French goods here at a lower price. One day my father told to my mother "Never buy these French goods, I will buy you pure and original Turkish silk."²⁹⁰

The ethnic division of labor was the basis of communal cooperation in the Sanjak. As seen in Table I, there was a specialization of certain ethnic/religious groups in certain crafts.²⁹¹ The occupations that the Sunni Turks dominated were joiner, carpenter, wagon-maker, leather dealer, felt maker, saddle maker, boot maker, cobbler, saw maker and weaver of carpets and cloth. The Alawites were dominant especially in hard occupations such as woodworker, cocoon drier, wool carder, wool spinner, knife maker, goat hair weaver, baker, butcher, tanners, lime maker; whereas the Christians and Armenians were stone cutters, silk weavers,²⁹² jewelers, bricklayers, potters and made small wooden art objects like combs and spoons.²⁹³

In the 1930s, the ethnic division of labor started to weaken as new groups of people penetrated into various fields. Although increasingly in the 1930s there began

²⁹⁰ Ayşe Eşraf, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001.

²⁹¹ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 8-9.

²⁹² There were 11 soap factories in 1931 whose owners were Glyptis Strati, George and Anton Khoury, Richard Michel Khoury, Sabuni and Yavrum, Sarraf Iskender and sons, Zeki Sikias (the electric generator was constructed in the garden of their houses in Kantara in December 1930 from Mehmet Tekin, *Halefzade*, p. 49.

²⁹³ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 14.

a penetration of communities in diverse forms of crafts, those engaged were few in number and were regarded as immoral by the members of the guild of the craft. Prior to 1934, all the butchers and bakeries were Alawites. However, after a boycott of Arab merchandise by the Turks and Turkish merchandise by the Arabs broke out in April 1934, when some Sunni Turks set up bakery and butcher shops.²⁹⁴

The spatial and social organization in the souq persisted with slight improvements until the mid-1930s. Sixty-five percent of the small workshops were privately owned, mostly by the Sunni Turks, and then by Christian Arabs, Alawites and Jews, while the remaining thirty-five percent belonged to *waqfs* (foundations).²⁹⁵ Contrary to the big landownership in the countryside, there were no urban latifundia in the city; the biggest owner did not own more than 40 workshops in the souq and those he did own were dispersed among the different trades and located in separate places in the souq. This differed significantly from Aleppo and Damascus, where the ateliers were located in the grand souq, the artisans of which were organized by and affiliated to certain notables of the city.²⁹⁶

All of the trades were undertaken in small workshops under the direction of a patron employing six or seven workers. There also existed some considerably small factories employing around thirty workers such as a tannery on the shore of the Orontes, a soap factory,²⁹⁷ a cocoon drying factory (*étouffoirs de cocoons*), and brick and tile factories. On the west shore of the Orontes, there were nine small brick and tile workshops, most of which were owned by Christians and Armenians and whose workers were mostly Alawites. In 1930, a cement workshop was opened on the east

²⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 15.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 16.

²⁹⁶ Weulersse, *Antioche*, p. 64.

²⁹⁷ Some owners of the soap factories were Abdullah Necib Abdullah; Asselji Ahmed, Hacı Yusuf İskif, Kusseyri Mustafa, Kuseyri Reşid, Melekzade Faik and Sons, Mufti Sıdık, Sabuncu Beşir and sons, Zeki Sikias, Assaf Yahya from Jacquot, *Antioche*, p. 210.

side of the Orontes whose owner and workers were Sunni Turks.²⁹⁸ In addition, gas and petroleum sellers under the license of foreign gas companies were also present in the city: Abdul Messih Bassus and sons (Standard Oil Company of New York), Gabriel Joseph Ahur (*Société du Naphte*), Hacı Bekir Sabuncu and sons (*Société du Naphte*), Ismet Asılcı (Vacuum) and Ubert Falanga (Shell).²⁹⁹

The significance of soap factories was in decline in the mid-1930s but still held an essential place in the economy of city. The production of soap declined after 1930 from 400,000 kg to 265,000 kg in 1931 and to 238,000 in 1932.³⁰⁰ Most of the factories belonged to notable families, who were like the informal bankers of the city.

Although the social and economic life in Antioch displays an image of a cosmopolitan city for the 1920s and the early 1930s, it seems that “multicultural coexistence” would better fit to describe the city. As Sami Zubaida argues, “cosmopolitan is not the fact of multi-cultural coexistence but the development of ways of living and thinking, styles of life which are de-racinated from communities and cultures of origin, from conventional living, from family or home-centredness, into a culturally promiscuous life, drawing on diverse ideas, traditions and innovations.”³⁰¹ A cosmopolitan culture would at best be used for Antioch as a class sensitive term. In other words, a cosmopolitan identity developed among the men of the elites of the Sanjak during the French Mandate regardless of their ethnic identities through clubs, cafés, house meetings and French-made occasions.

²⁹⁸ Türkmen, vol. 1, p. 86.

²⁹⁹ Jacquot, p. 210.

³⁰⁰ Weulersse, *Antioche*, p. 68.

³⁰¹ Sami Zubaida, *Cosmopolitanism in the Middle East: History and Prospects*, Unpublished Conference Paper in NYU, 1999.

However, this social life included a vigorous system of exclusion for the non-elite Antiochenes, including segregation and exclusion in the public spaces (especially valid for the Alawites), and certainly from many social milieus. The communal interdependence and its peaceful/harmonious coexistence were certainly valid arguments for the city nevertheless; this does not necessarily lead to the presupposition of cosmopolitanism as illustrated in the lack of resonance of various instances of elite designs on the Sanjak society.

Disturbance of the Harmony

The atmosphere of the times when stability or status quo could be obtained with the proportional representation of elites of each community began to be disturbed when the new youth started to question the social position of those very representatives and the system upon which they rested. The rapid expansion of the education system had produced a new generation of youth with social and economic aspirations that the existing system could not accommodate. The incommensurability between the expectations of these young people and the status quo was the basis of their dissatisfaction. They demanded their rightful share in the distribution of the economic and political power in the Sanjak. However, the traditional politics of the notables united with the global economic depression that began in the 1929s had greatly diminished the potential possibilities; gross revenue from the Alexandretta port facility dropped by seventeen percent between 1930 and 1933 and net receipts by twenty percent. The administrative budget of the Sanjak fell thirty-five percent between 1928 and 1936 as seen in Table 2. In addition, there was a ninety-six percent drop in the percentage of the Sanjak's revenue put aside for future use.

This contraction of the public sector aggravated the difficulty of the discontented youth. That is, social dynamics similar to those in the period of the rise of Arabism and Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the century arrived in Antioch in late 1920s and early 1930s. The new coffee houses, where the youth spent hours reading newspapers and discussing their various grievances, were especially a microcosm of the atmosphere prevailing in metropolis like Istanbul, Cairo and Damascus at the beginning of the century. This argument is especially valid for the frustration of the discontented youth whose aspirations were the fruits of the system's own social and political conditions. Although a very marginal section of the population was being affected by these changes, a close pursuit of Turkey in the region and later the internationalization of the Sanjak affairs would turn the Sanjak upside down, bringing about irreversible hostilities.

Those Who Read

Both oral accounts and the historical accounts of the city emphasize the reading activity of the male students of the Lycée as an important signifier in describing the atmosphere of the early 1930s. Indeed, they themselves attached great value to reading and its interactive sharing in certain public spaces as formative in shaping their political and social identities.

In this sense, the development of the political struggle for the future of the Sanjak between 1936- 1939 spatially around the Antioch Lycée's Arab and Turkish sections is no coincidence. The students of the Lycée made up the most politicized group in the city. Both Arab and Turkish youth organizations had supporters in the school. Not only the students of the Lycée but also former students, who were studying at university in Ankara or Istanbul by means of the opportunities provided

by the Turkish state, were undertaking significant propaganda activities in the Lycée and the souqs as well.³⁰² The Lycée did not have a function similar to *Rüştiye* of Istanbul or the *Maktab 'Anbar* of Damascus where the idea of Arabism in and out of the classroom was promoted by a circle of young teachers and students before the coup of 1908.³⁰³ On the contrary, the Turkish or Arab national identities were developed as being *against* the Lycée because it represented the French power in the city. In addition, the Lycée was a gathering place especially for the girls that sought to form a network between the Turkish, Arab and Christian students.

Ayşe Eşraf, a girl from one of the notable families of the city, described life in the Lycée as “normal like everything else” before the struggle. Beforehand, they had been very eager to learn French, and were not worried about the dominance of French in the whole education.” It was their “consciousness” which changed their feelings towards the Lycée.

Public education was one of the highest priorities in the French policy. An important part of the investments was spent on education and even when the expenditures on education fell by twenty-six percent between 1930 and 1934, its share in total budget increased by ten percent. The number of public schools in the Sanjak increased from twenty-one to sixty-nine between 1921 and 1933. Private education was also available for Christians and Armenians and there was also a private school in Affan for Alawites opened in 1928 by the Charity Foundation of Alawites.

In 1933, there were 11,016 students enrolled in primary and secondary education in the Sanjak; twenty-two percent of them (2,432 students) studied at

³⁰² The number of students who were studying in Turkey with a scholarship from the Turkish government were 71. Bazantay, *La Penetration*,

³⁰³ Khoury, *Urban Notables*, p. 71.

foreign schools of which there were twenty-seven in the Sanjak such as the French, English, Italian or German schools where most of the students were Christians.³⁰⁴ In the case of public education, there were sixty-five public schools in the whole Sanjak, with thirty-four Turkish (2,593 students), twenty-six Arab (1,871 students) and five Armenian (481 students) schools respectively. In 1931, there were ten Arabic primary schools and eleven Turkish schools in the whole *kaza*. In Antioch, the Arabic primary schools were located in Affan, Dörtayak, the Turkish primary schools were in Kastal, Habib-i Neccar and Köprübaşı. The foreign private schools in the city were the Capuchins, Soeurs and Freres de St. Joseph and primary school of British Presbyterian School; local private schools were the Greek Orthodox primary and secondary schools for girls and boys, funded by the patriarchate, and the primary Gregorian school of Bogassian.³⁰⁵

The curriculum of the primary schools was the same as that of the Syrian one except for the program of the Turkish primary schools, where students were allowed to receive education in Turkish in accordance with the Ankara agreement (1921). In these five-year schools, it was obligatory to have Arabic courses three hours a week.³⁰⁶

Secondary education at the Lycée until 1925 was only in Turkish. It was only after this date that an Arabic section was added. What distinguished the Turkish section of the Lycée from the Arab section was the number of Arabic and Turkish courses in the week respectively. Also, the ethnic backgrounds of the students and the teachers differed in each section. In the Turkish section, among the students were 108 Sunnis and one Armenian whereas in the Arab section of the lycee, among the

³⁰⁴ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 42-43.

³⁰⁵ Jacquot, pp. 448- 449.

³⁰⁶ For the curriculum of the primary and secondary public schools in the Sanjak, see Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 79-88.

students were thirty-five Orthodox, five Protestant, twenty-six Alawite and one Sunni student.³⁰⁷ The ethnic origins of the teachers in the Turkish section were as follows: Eight Sunni Turks (İlmi Bey Fani, Turkish; Mesud Fani, geography), one Sunni Circassian, one Sunni Kurd (Memduh Selim) and one French woman (Madame Vieux, wife of Bazantay). In the Arabic section were one Sunni Arab, five Orthodox Greek and one French teacher.

There was no institution for higher education in the Sanjak. Students were encouraged to go to abroad for higher education. Turkish students usually preferred to go to Turkey: The varied facilities and the scholarships provided by the Turkish government were important factors in their preferences. Arab students attended university education in Syria or in France. In 1936, sixty-five Turkish students were attending higher schools in Turkey, with thirteen of them in military schools.³⁰⁸

Ethnicity was generally the determining factor in school preference; however, in some cases, class overrode ethnic differences. Most of the time, the sons of the Turkish speaking Sunni Turcophone urban elite were sent to the *Frères* instead of Turkish primary schools like the majority of the Turkish community of the city.

Teaching books were a problem in the Sanjak, a problem related to the “in-between” political status of the Sanjak and its yet unstable nature. The book problem concerned mostly Turkish books. Until 1932, all of the books used in the Turkish schools had been brought from Istanbul. But, there arose problems regarding the content of the books due to the highly nationalist and imposing tone inherent in the 1930s Turkish textbooks. It was in 1932 that the first schoolbook for Sanjak students by local Sanjak teachers was published. This book, called *Kıraat Parçaları* (Reading

³⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 56-58.

³⁰⁸ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 126.

Passages) was followed in 1933 by three small books titled *Küçük Suriye Tarihi* (A Short History of Syria) written by Ata Derviş, a Turkish teacher of the Lycee; in 1934 Memduh Selim and Lami Cankat, two teachers of the Lycée produced two books named *Küçük Coğrafya* (Petite Geography) and *Benim Kitabım* (My Book).

These schoolbooks are significant in the sense that they were concrete efforts to construct an identity on being a local Sanjak inhabitant, led by the underlying liberal view to education. The books had a strong sense of locality in their emphasis on the multiethnic demographic composition of the Sanjak, the equivalent of place and geographical names in both Arabic and Turkish, and everyday details about the city. In this way, it included every “visible” community in the Sanjak, thereby provided the resources to allow inhabitants to imagine themselves as a part of the constructed locality with its fixed boundaries. The employment of geographical and historical knowledge was an essential aspect of this imagined construct. Still, the western roots of Antioch were celebrated by using the Latin names of the geographical places, such as “Oront” instead of “Nahr al-Asi”, or “Silpius” instead of “Habib-i Neccar”.³⁰⁹

Short poems by Tevfik Fikret, Ahmet Emin and Cenap Şahabettin were also presented in the books. However, the emphasis was more on French humanist writers such as Montaigne, Victor Hugo, Lord Byron, Baron de Tott, Virgil and Cicero, Fenelon, and Bichett. The translators of these short stories were either the Lycée teachers or young members of the Francophile elite of the city. Moreover, an aspect of the anti-nationalist and pluralist stress displayed itself in the short stories on topics such as good behaviour and the virtues of solidarity. The names of the characters in

³⁰⁹ *İzahlı Kıraat Parçaları*, İskenderun Sancağı Maarifi, İlk Mekteplere Mahsus Ders Kitapları Serisi, no. 1, 5, Sınıf, p. 27.

the short stories vary with names, such as Ismail Lehdi, Leman, and Vahan. All of the names in the translated texts first appear in French and then in parentheses is written the Turkish spelling.

Notwithstanding, the French disciplinary methods were employed in addition to more “liberal” undertakings. The signal system was the most commonly used instrument in the schools, of both Antioch and the towns.³¹⁰ In this kind of discipline system a man would walk around the students in the school and punish anyone who spoke a language other than French. This was a memory recalled by most of the interviewees to demonstrate the French domination and oppression.

Üzaktakiler (Those Far Away) and the Attraction of Rejuvenation

The metaphor of “*uzaktakiler*” (those far away) fits well to describe the mindset of “those who read” in Antioch in the early 1930s. “Those far away” were physically distant but socially very close. It was an ideal type since it comprised every positive aspect associated with modernity. “Those far away” were acknowledged as new, young, fresh and independent. In this context, the Republic of young Turkey and the Kemalist reforms were admired particularly by the Turkish youth around Young Sports Club (*Genç Spor Klubü*) in Antioch relying on the recognition that it possessed just the opposite characteristics of the old-fashioned and clumsy Sanjak under the French Mandate. Similar attributions regarding the atmosphere of the Sanjak were also presumed by the Arab youth of the city, however their affiliation was less towards Turkey due to linguistic and cultural reasons. They celebrated more Egypt and especially Iraq after it gained independence in 1936.

³¹⁰ Ayşe Eşraf and Albert, interview by author, tape recording, Altınözü and Antioch, June 2001.

Anti-traditionalism and anti-colonialism rather than ethnicity were the stressed issues in this new movement. The power of the *ağas* and the influence of the Sunni *ulema* were conceived as the drawbacks of the Sanjak against which to fight. The Turkish Republic by the Turkish youth and independent Iraq and Egypt were perceived as states, which had already achieved these democratic ideals. The activity of reading and the presence of some Sanjak born families or their relatives in Turkey especially in the nearby cities like Adana and Mersin had contributed much to the idealization of the westernizing reforms in Turkey. Education facilities in Turkey also helped to develop a nationalist identity in the Sanjak.

The same years witnessed the expansion of public space in an explosion in the number of newspapers and magazines published in the Sanjak; the opening up of youth clubs³¹¹, libraries³¹² and sport teams by the youths of each community; the new syndicates replacing older forms of artisan organization like the guilds, and related with this the new life styles with their new spaces both nourished and paved the way for increasing politicization among the youth and frustrated sections of the society such as the artisans.

The Youth Sports Club (*Genç Spor Klubü*) was founded on 26 August 1926 by Ahmet Sırrı and Şükrü Fehmi (Balcı), a young Turkish man who had received his secondary education in Turkey. It was the meeting place for middle class liberal professionals, the students of the Turkish Lycée and some artisans as well. Although it was continuously under the threat of shut down by the Mandate officials and faced

³¹¹ The youth sports clubs in Antioch were the following: *Gençspor*, the French Military Football team, the Lycee Football team, the Nadi Fünun-u Cemile Football team, İdman Yurdu and Ossim Nasiras. There were also 3 teams in Kırıkhan, 2 in Beylan, 3 in Reyhaniye and 4 in Alexandretta. From Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*, p. 153.

³¹² The libraries were the Libraries of the French Alliance in Alexandretta, Youth Sports Club Library in Antioch founded in 1931 with 500 books and Arab Club Library also in Antioch. From Bazantay, *La Pénétration*, p. 103.

material difficulties, it did not close down thanks to the support of the Turkish state and the activities of its passionate members who called themselves “progressives”. Although the majority of the artisans or holders of small lands in the plain of Antioch still appeared to be conservative and did not shift to the “collective ideas” of the new youth, a small number of apprentices and small artisans under the influence of the youth favored the Kemalist reforms. In fact, most of the critiques of the *novateurs* (progressives) focused on the inequality of power and the prestige between *démodé aghas* and their Sunni *ulema* (religious establishment) and the intellectual and labor efforts of the middle class youth and artisans respectively.³¹³

The striking effect of this club through its various intellectual and artistic activities in creating and nourishing a Turkish national identity is summarized in the words of one the attendants of this club.

There was a club called the Youth Sports Club. This club instilled in us Turkishness. We had already known what Turkishness was but it was instilled more. I once went to the club and saw people reading books with Latin letters. I was astonished when I saw that script. To my surprise, hundreds of primers had come from Turkey to the club and were distributed to its members. From then on, I began regularly to visit the club and learnt the Turkish alphabet there.³¹⁴

Some of the intellectual figures that influenced the Young Sports Club members, whose ages revolved between 17 and 25, were Aka Gündüz, Necdet Rüştü, Falih Rıfkı, Reşat Nuri, Yakup Kadri, Refik Halid, Nazım Hikmet, Faruk Nafiz, Etem İzzet and Halide Edip. The newspapers and magazines that were read were *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Vakit*, *Akşam*, *Son Posta*, *Haber* and the magazines *Kadro*, *Varlık*, *Çığır* and *Yedigün*.³¹⁵

³¹³ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 85.

³¹⁴ Mehmed Karaoğlu, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001

³¹⁵ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, pp. 124-125.

Although Turkishness maintained an important place in the narrative of the memories concerning the club, football matches with Aleppian teams as well as some artistic performances in the club were significant recurring themes.

We all grew up at the club. We began attending the club in our childhoods. We entered the club as so-called footballers. Of course, it was a political thing, and the French did not like it. The politics were made there secretly... but we used to go to Aleppo for football games with an Armenian team, but we could never win the game... It had a piano where we played the songs of great French composers and a theatre where mostly classical French plays were performed.³¹⁶

The motivations of Christian and Alawite (despite marginal) youth organizations were somewhat different from their Turkish counterparts. The Christian youth, implicitly carrying a western modernist ideology were less submissive towards the Turks compared to the older Christian generation. According to Bazantay, while the older people showed “respect” to the Turks, the young people were hostile towards them. For their own intellectual development, they founded a cultural club and a library in 1929. This club attracted young Alawite and a few Sunni Turk men. In the summer of 1933, the president of the club was a Sunni Arab.³¹⁷

It is interesting to note Bazantay’s interpretations of the intergenerational conflict within each community. It reminds him of the struggle between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in the west. Thus he favors the “progressive” faction in the struggle, accuses the *ouvriers* (worker) of being conservative and lacking “collective ideals”; compares the *ouvriers* (workers) of Antioch with those of France and finds them lacking since they are unable to found a syndicate in western sense.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Selahaddin Taşkın and Yahya Gür, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001

³¹⁷ Bazantay, *La Penetration*, p. 114- 115.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Syndicates were other organizations representing the foundation of new loyalties exceeding traditional vertical ties. However, most of the syndicates were ethnically homogenous. The first syndicate was founded by carpenters in 1928. They were all Sunni Turcophones, like the artisans who formed a weavers syndicate the same year. For the Turkish artisans, forming a syndicate meant at the same time having sympathy with the Kemalist reforms and being against the traditional elites and *ulema* of the Sunni Turcophones. It represented to the artisans *the new*, which included the introduction of Sunday as the holiday instead of Friday,³¹⁹ putting on a *şapka* (hat) instead of *fez*,³²⁰ or going to a café of artisans instead of the *salamlik* of the patron.³²¹ Although in practice, the traditional power of *shaykh al-asnaf* did not diminish, the syndicates acted as a ground on which Kemalist agitation could be organized among the Turkish artisans.

The Orthodox Christian syndicate of masons and bricklayers was also formed exclusively of Christians and located in the quarter Sari Mahmud Hirstiyan.³²² The first ethnically mixed syndicate was of the city's barbers formed in 1931.

The number of newspapers had exploded with the establishment of the Mandate regime. Throughout the whole period, twenty-three newspapers were published, some of these dailies lasting for twenty years.³²³ Most of them were published in three languages: Arabic, Turkish and French. Armenian was at times employed as a print language.

³¹⁹ The carpenters syndicate met with serious Sunni resistance both from the *ağa* and *ulama* when they announced that they would work on Fridays instead of Sundays.

³²⁰ During Ramadan of 1934-35, a conflict arose in the mosque Habib-i Neccar between a Shaykh and a *nouvateur* for the abandonment of *fez* and replacing it with modern hat.

³²¹ Bazantay, *Enquete*, p. 58.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³²³ The newspapers and journals were as following: *Altınöz* (the official newspaper of Antioch and Alexandretta Home Society, closed down by the French in 1927.); *El haliç* (published in Alexandretta by Archimandrite Ignatius, founded in June 1922 and closed in June 1923); *Doğruyol* (the owner was Hasan Sadık an Antiochean Alawite and published by a Turkish escapee Celal Kadri.; Zartunk and *La Reveil du Sandjak Autonome d'Alexandretta*. Mehmet Tekin, *Hatay Basın Tarihi*, Antakya, 1985.

Unfortunately, all of the newspapers published throughout the Mandate period, except for the pro-Turkish ones, were burnt during a fire in the 1960s. Therefore, a very important source for reconstructing the social life of the city disappeared. Among the most well-known newspapers were *L'Echo d'Alexandretta*, which was the official weekly journal of the Mandate power published in four languages; *Yeni Mecmua (Yenigün)* the pro-Turkish daily the first issue of which was published on May 15, 1928 and at which most of the young Turkey returnee nationalists were employed, such as Vedi Münir Karabay (the lawyer of the municipality and a Turkish activist), Lami Cankat (a teacher in the Lycée), Ahmet Sırrı, Abdurrahman Melek, Mahmut Ali, Firuz Hanzad, Şükrü Oğuz, Yahyazade Asaf, Kemal Sülker Hikmet Çinçin, and Naif Miski ; *al-Uruba (Antakiyye)*, the daily of the Arab nationalists or more truly the supporters of *al-Ussat* of Zaki al-Arsuzi; *al-Liwa*, the daily published in Alexandretta and owned by Edvard Noun, which Turkish newspapers after 1936 represented as a tool in the hands of the Mandate power to impose anti-Turkishness; *Dogrüyol*, a daily in Turkish; and *Karagöz*, a comic published by Tarık Mümtaz an escapee from Turkey.

The staffs involved in the publication of the local papers were ethnically mixed. Particularly until 1936, ethnic segregation in the public sphere remained very marginal. This historical reality falsifies the Turkish, Syrian and French accounts, which embody and normalize ethnic loyalty as the superseding identity of a community. The members of an ethnic group whether self proclaimed and/or externally ascribed, also distinguish among themselves on the basis of material interests or idiomatic notions of identity other than ethnicity. However, the roots of identification between ethnic and linguistic communities in the city with their respective states in the north and south, which was indeed the case in late 1930s,

should be sought in the colonial undertakings and external nationalist injections in the context of capitalism.



CHAPTER IV

FES, SIDARAT, ŞAPKA*

National historians, folklorists, and other scholars have been concerned with “proving” the Greek, Bulgarian, Macedonian heritage of the region’s Slavic-speaking population, and thus demonstrating conclusively that the territory legitimately belongs to their respective nation states. But history, it seems, has left us with no one in Macedonia, no single history, no solely legitimate Macedonian people whose name and identity others now to usurp for themselves.³²⁴

The period beginning with the mid-1930s to the end of the Mandate regime can best be defined as years of increasing local conflict and violence based on ethnic hatred. Yet neither of the communities was homogenous a group united for a strict aim. Political factionalism and uncertainty were the defining notions for each ethnic community, perhaps more for the non-Turks than the Turkish population of the Sanjak. The local conflict materialized in the city through corresponding demonstrations of the involved parties in the streets, schools, souqs and neighbourhoods. The civic turmoil was not peculiar to the Sanjak; there occurred similar conflicts and separatist tendencies in other autonomously administered, rural and peripheral parts of Syria, like Jazira, the State of the Alawites and Jabal Druze. The parties involved in the dispute were categorically similar between these regions as the supporters of unionism with Syria and the supporters of autonomy and regionalism. However, unlike the Sanjak, in none of the regions was the discourse of the anti-unionists dominated by an official state nationalism, a factor that helped in the emergence of a third party in the Sanjak feverously favouring the union with

*Fes: fez; Sidara: A boat shaped military hat worn by the pro-Syrians made popular by King Faysal of Iraq; Şapka: a cloth cap worn by the pro-Turks

³²⁴ Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870- 1990* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1997), p. 24.

Turkey. Nevertheless, the course of the separatist movement in the Sanjak was closely watched, particularly by the local minorities in the Jazira with their deep-seated hatred of Turks, and it was hoped that it would form a precedent for them.³²⁵

This chapter will encompass a deconstructionist agenda towards nationalist constructs that draw a line between language and religion on the one hand and nationalism on the other. In this way, it will focus on the process of the construction of national identities and try to elucidate the unheard voices of the violent nation-building process.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, there was no official political Turkish claim on the region until the negotiations and signing of the Friendship treaty between the French *Front Populaire* and the Syrian National Bloc (*Vatani*) in June 1936.³²⁶ The treaty promised to Syria the end of the Mandate after a transitional period of three years. Following the treaty, the Turkish state began to assert claims regarding the future status of the Sanjak and mobilized a campaign at the juridical, diplomatic and local levels. On the diplomatic level, the Turkish claims were based on the judicial interpretation of the Franklin-Bouillion agreement of 1921. Turkey expressed its uneasiness about the future status of the Sanjak before the League of Nations in September 1936 and subsequently direct negotiations began between France and Turkey in October 1936. The entire discussion centred on the question as to whether the Sanjak would remain a part of Syria after the French Mandate expired or become a separate political entity. The annexation of the Sanjak to Turkey was not raised by the Turkish authorities at this time.

Turkey argued that Syria had had no legal standing when the Treaty of

³²⁵ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 529.

³²⁶ For the colonial policy of *Popular Front*, see William Cohen, "The Colonial Policy of the Popular Front", *French Historical Studies*, no. 3 (Spring 1972), pp. 368- 393.

Versailles had been concluded, because at that time it had been under military occupation. When the Mandate over Syria had been conferred upon France at San Remo in 1920, the geographical expression “Syria” had not been defined because the territories to be detached from Turkey were still juridically unknown. In addition, the Ankara agreement in 1921, which had fixed the line of demarcation between Turkey and France-mandated territory, and the Treaty of Lausanne, had renounced Turkey’s sovereignty over the mentioned territories in favour of the parties concerned.³²⁷

Briefly, Turkey asserted that the French obligations could not be transferred to Syria without its consent. In other words, the language of the diplomacy displayed that the “Turkish” district of Alexandretta would never accept the domination of “Arab” Syria. The opening speech of Mustafa Kemal before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 1 November 1936 illustrated the commitment of Turkey and decisiveness in the mobilization of the “whole” Turkish people.

The important topic of the day, which is absorbing the whole attention of the Turkish people, is the fate of the district of Alexandretta, Antioch and its dependencies, which in fact belongs to the purest Turkish element. We are obliged to take up this matter seriously and firmly. This important question is the only one outstanding between ourselves and France, to whose friendship we continue to attach special importance; those who knows all the facts of the case and who respect law and justice and who fully understand the keen and sincere interest which we take in the fate of that district and regard it as perfectly natural.³²⁸

³²⁷ Majid Khadduri, “Alexandretta Dispute”, *American Journal of International Law*, 3, no. 39, (1945), p. 412.

³²⁸ Tarık Mümtaz (Yazganalp), *Hatay Albümü* (İstanbul: Ülkü Matbaası, 1942), p.2. “Bu sırada milletimiz gece gündüz meşgul eden başlıca büyük bir mesele hakiki sahibi öz Türk olan İskenderon ve Antakya havalisinin mukadderatıdır. Bunun üzerinde ciddiyet ve katiyetle durmaya mecburuz. Daima kendisi ile dostluğa çok önem verdiğimiz Fransa ile aramızda, tek ve büyük mesele budur. Bu işin hakikatını bilenler ve hakkı sevenler, alakamızın şiddetini ve samimiyetini iy anlarlar ve tabii görürler.”

Although this thesis undertakes to “rescue history from nation”, the reminders from Turkey before 1936 towards the French and the local Sanjak population that it paid special attention to the development of Turkish culture there should not be underestimated. The education facilities provided to the Turkish Sanjak students in Turkey, the financial aid for the establishment of the *İskenderun ve Havalisi Yardımlaşma Derneği* (Alexandretta and Environs Aid Society) in Turkey, and the financial and material provisioning of the Young Sports Club and its activities in Antioch displayed the efforts of the Turkish state that were used as instruments of domination over the Turkish community of the Sanjak. In spite of their marginality and confinement, they helped in the creation of the potential tools for the diffusion of sectarianism in the local scene. The invention of traditions and the public demonstrations in the city organized under the leadership of Turkey-affiliated young men acted as ideological performances symbolizing social cohesion.³²⁹ After 1936, the Turkish state exerted more effort in the foundation and effective organization of the pro-Turkish institutions in the Sanjak. Accordingly, in addition to the Young Sports Club, the foundation of *Halkevi* (People’s House) in Antioch in 1936 helped in the institutionalization and mobilization of the Turkish nationalist and irredentist movement in the city. The primary aim of these institutions was to build up a Turkish livelihood in the Sanjak and diffuse into the everyday life of particularly Antioch. They attempted to found hegemony in both the private and public spheres where they made an effort especially for domination in the religious area. Accordingly, the People’s House undertook such activities as collecting the sheepskins during the Muslim Festival of Sacrifices or the interment operations of the Turkish community

³²⁹ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 9.

in the Sanjak.³³⁰ The building of the People's House was the residence of the president of the People's House, Abdülgani Türkmen, who belonged to one of the notable families of Antioch.

Other than the Turkish involvement within the spatial limits of the Sanjak, Turkish concerns regarding the future of the Sanjak were also realized in Turkey through various instruments. The Turkish involvement in the region was becoming more widespread, diffused and more centralized in the hands of Turkish governing elites, who were closely watching the international developments of the pre-World War II era. Branches of the Society for the Independence of Hatay (*Hatay Erginlik Cemiyeti*) was established, particularly in those Turkish cities, which bordered the Syrian frontier.³³¹ The club was not only a renamed form of the old Alexandretta and Environs Aid Society, but also it was a secret and paramilitary state organization which was detrimental to the Turkish advance in the Sanjak, especially after 1937. It was taken under direct state control, which helped to defuse the personal rivalries existing among its members. The central branch of the society remained located in Istanbul, in Eminönü Han, one floor below the Turkish Students' Association (*Türk Talebe Cemiyeti*) in Nuruosmaniye. The Dörtyol branch, situated just across the Sanjak-Turkey border, was the most significant and active branch of all. Tayfur Sökmen was appointed head of the organization. The society functioned as the chief mediator between Ankara, Istanbul and the Antioch People's House. The correspondents of the Turkish newspapers usually gathered here and the sources of their news were mostly of Dörtyol-origin.

³³⁰ *Yenigün*, 14 Jan 1938, p.3; *Yenigün*, 17 Feb 1938, p.2

³³¹ Mete Tunçay, "Hatay Sorunu ve TBMM", *Kanun-u Esasının 100.Yılı Sempozyumu Türk parlamentoculuğunun ilk yüzyılı, 1876-1976* (Ankara: Siyasî İlimler Türk Derneği, 1976), p. 264. The general director of the organization was the minister of the Interior Affairs Şükrü Kaya; Şükrü Sökmensüer, the general chief of police was appointed as the general secretary. Tayfur Sökmen was the honorary general director. Tekin, *Hatay*, p. 167; Sökmen, p. 95.

Another measure of the Turkish state was to increase the intelligence activities in the region. The region had already been under the concern and responsibility of the Adana branch of the National Security Service (*Milli Emniyet Teşkilatı*) where, as a result of the political claims of Turkey in the region, agents began to be sent to the region both to gather information but also to stir up the population after 1936.³³²

Still the institutionalization and establishment of the local conflict cannot be fully grasped without taking into account the internationalization of the issue through the involvements of the “powerful” centres like Geneva, Paris, Ankara and, to some degree, Damascus. The Turkish “success” in appropriating and benefiting from the overriding atmosphere of the approaching World War II had a considerable effect in the final ceding of *Hatay*, as called by Turkey, *liwa* to the Syrians, and the “Sanjak” for the French and western diplomacy. It can be argued that the destiny of Antioch and its surroundings was caught between the *sine qua non* interests of the imperialist states, both in the pre-World War I era and during World War II. Yet the international agencies were more active in the mediation of the late 1930s conflict to such a degree that the local Turkish population was shouting out “Long Live League of Nations” during a demonstration before the Inspection Commission sent by the League of Nations in January 1937.³³³ The international involvements of Turkey in the League of Nations will be explained here only as background information, the focus will be more on the repercussions of the international “question” in Antioch. This chapter will try to undertake a critical elaboration to the easy and superficial

³³² Hamit Pehlivanlı, “Atatürk Dönemi Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri Teşkilatı İstihbarat raporlarında Hatay Meselesi”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* no.40, (1984); Sökmen, p. 96; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 500;

³³³ *Tan*, 12 Jan 1937, p.1

evaluations regarding the economic, social, political, cultural and ideological hegemony and incorporation of the region by Turkey.

As mentioned previously in the thesis, the knowledge produced about Antioch and its environs in Turkey increased rapidly after 1936 and these studies on Antioch award a special place for the conflict years. This, it is argued, should be evaluated from the perspective of a power-knowledge relationship, in a context when Turkey assumed political claims for the region. One of the characteristics of this genre is its emphasis on the diplomatic and judicial aspect of the whole process. Written from the conventional state-centred perspective, the utilization of primordial and ahistorical categories neglect the process of the construction of Turkish and Arab identities in the region through various dynamics and their mourning repercussions in the local scene, especially for the non-Turkish segments of the population. Another aspect of the Turkish historiography about Antioch on the post-1936 period is its ethnic stress, the most significant and politically instrumental issues being the racial origin of the Alawites. Voluminous literature has been produced on the Hittite origins and consequently pure Turkishness of the Alawites. They are assumed to be Hittite (*Eti*) Turks rather than Arabs. Accordingly, in the same period, the name of the Sanjak was replaced by that of Hatay, a name recalling the Central Asian and Turkish origins of the region.³³⁴ An extensive propaganda was initiated targeting Alawites to “remember” their Turkish origins and the role of the Ottoman “tyranny” in the change of their languages from Turkish to Arabic. Anyway, the Turkish press claimed that their Arabic was not the “real” Arabic, it resembled Turkish more.³³⁵

³³⁴“Hatay” is a combination of the words Hatti and Katay, implying that the Arab Alawites of the region are in fact Hittite Turks who migrated to Northern Syria after a draught in Katay (old China). This official thesis of the Turkish state found a minor resonance in the society. Still, a few of the interviewees pronounced that they were proud of being real Turks despite the fact that the mother tongue of Alawites is Arabic and they can speak a very poor Turkish.

³³⁵ Peyami Safa in *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Sept 1937, p.3; *Tan*, 10 Sept 1937, p.1.

Whether this invention of the Turkish state contributed to the development of a Turkish identity and left a trace of Turkish identity among Arab Alawites is a sociological question beyond the limits of this thesis; however, it is certain that the basic motivation of the Alawites voting in favour of Turkey in the final plebiscite was certainly not the political implications of the findings of this “scientific” research. Nevertheless, this invention provided Turkey with the necessary figures in the international arena to legitimize its claim that the majority of the region is Turkish.

The Turkish Press

After we departed from Antioch, the well-known *Amiq* was left on the right side, and we soon began to climb up the Belen Mountain. While we were driving to the western direction towards *Kızıldağ*, we saw thousands of Turkish villages oppressed under their loads of *aşar* (tithes).

By a correspondent of *Cumhuriyet*, Naci Akverdi, on the road from Antioch to Alexandretta to monitor the trial of those Turks who had celebrated the 30 August Victory Day of Turkey³³⁶

The narrative employed by the Turkish press drew the outer and informal limits of the Turkish state’s discourse concerning the issue. Namely, there was a division of labour between the newspapers, parliament and the Turkish diplomacy in terms of their functions in the political sphere. While the Turkish state elites were the agents on the diplomatic front employing a formal and “neutral” language, the Turkish press was an instrument in the imagining of a Turkish community. It undertook the job of disseminating and finally establishing a vulgarized version of

³³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Oct 1936, p.1. “Antakya’dan çıktıktan sonra meşhur Amik sağımızda kaldı., bir müddet sonra Belen dağına tırmanmaya başladık, daha garpta Kızıldağ’a giderken aşarın yükü altında ezilen binlerce Türk köyü gördük.”

the official line of thinking within the masses and mobilizing a “sensitive” public opinion. Although, the western as well as Syrian press continually accused the Turkish press of racist and irredentist overtones it rarely decreased its fervor.

Between 1936 and 1939, the Turkish state attempted to take advantage of diplomatic initiatives by launching propaganda campaigns through the media that sought to project its image as a progressive and enlightened participant in the design of the Sanjak’s future and that of the other projects as spent forces unrepresentative of the “peoples” of the Sanjak. It generated this role by giving all kinds of information regarding the various features of the Sanjak. There was no single day that a reference to the region was not made, no matter how repetitive and out of date. An outside observer watching the Turkish press between October 1936 and 1939 would no doubt be astonished by the high concentration of the news, information, and maps, pictures and caricatures of Alexandretta and its environs, Hatay, as called by the Turkish state after 1936. Surprisingly, an account in the journal *Great Britain and the East* presented its anxiety over the Turkish press such that “Those who have followed with gratification the essentially correct conduct of Turkey in international affairs when she entered the League of Nations, were a little perturbed by the violence recently adopted by the Turkish press in connection with the dispute with France over the Alexandretta...this apprehension was the fuller in the Turkish press... is state controlled.”³³⁷

The similarity of the news and photographs in all of the Turkish papers suggests that the Turkish press obtained the news from the state, most probably through Turkish secret agents in the region, or else that there was only one press correspondent in the region with a pseudonom who distributed the necessary

³³⁷ *Great Britain and the East*, 14 Jan 1937, p. 39.

information and photographs to the subsequent newspapers as well as to the state. Despite ample information on the region, most of the factual information was deficient, unorganized and mistaken mostly due to the problem of representation, which stemmed from their nationalist bias, and also the insufficient technical facilities of the period. There was a rivalry of nationalism between the Turkish newspapers; they blamed each other for writing improper information about Hatay.³³⁸

This section will not be a mere survey and narrative of the Turkish press concerning the incidents in the Alexandretta issue. Instead, some remarks will be presented on the nature of the “struggle” through undertaking a critical reading between the lines of the Turkish papers, an attempt which provided me with rich details about the social life, the mounting and intensifying ethnic compartmentalization and the re-forming class networks in the context of French Mandate.³³⁹

“Struggle”: Between Whom, Where and How?

The preceding chapter focused on the dynamics of the disturbance of the “traditional order”. The resulting uneasiness was expressed more within the terminology of anti-traditionalism where the tradition represented the landowning notables, the Sunni *ulema*, and the religious regulations of every day life ranging from dress codes to

³³⁸ *Cumhuriyet* often blamed *Tan* for its ‘inappropriate’ reports such as the following: “The Turkish flag was brought down or Antiochean Armenians behave to the Turkish population in a hostile manner.”

³³⁹ I apply the term struggle because both the pro-Turkish and pro-Syrian parties call the situation in the Sanjak after 1936 as a struggle which was directed towards different domains of power in different contexts.

holidays. This chapter will concentrate on the transformation and decomposition of this *novateur-conservateur* conflict of the early 1930s into a violent Turk-Arab conflict through the nationalization of the masses. In other words, the change “in the systems of meaning within which people made sense of who they were (and were not) and what they were doing”³⁴⁰ after the mid-1930s will form the main axis of attention in this chapter.

The process of nationalization of the Turkish and Arab youth conformed to their relations with the ambitious nationalist elites of Turkey and Syria. This relationship helped in the standardization of the local Sanjak nationalism and in a convergence between the interests, discourse and practices of Sanjak and official Turkish and Arab nationalisms rather than a divergence between the popular and state nationalisms as was the case of Faysal’s Syria. Still, this argument was valid more for the rising Turkish nationalism in Antioch as different interpretations of Turkish nationalism in Antioch were gradually harmonized and integrated into one and dominant version which necessarily converged to the official Turkish nationalism. The anti-notable, anti-establishment and anti-French aspects of the local nationalisms, though in varying tones for the Arabs and the Turks, were marginalized under the dominant versions of Arab and Turkish state nationalisms.

For the Sanjak version of Turkish nationalism, the years particularly after the mid-1930s could be read as the commencement of the process in which Ankara exerted great efforts to dominate the local dynamics and to build up a discursive hegemony among the Turkish nationalists and the Turcophone residents of the Sanjak through moral and material aid. The criticisms of the Sanjak-born Turkish-citizen activists addressed to the leaders of the Turkish nationalist movement in the

³⁴⁰ Zachary Lockman, *Comrades*, p. 11.

Sanjak after a statement by Abdurrahman Melek to the French newspaper *Intrasigeant* are illustrative of the emergent tension between the nationalisms that each party represented in 1935. A brochure published one year after this statement accused Abdurrahman Melek and *Yenigün* of being pro-French.³⁴¹

Incorporating into the borders of Syria and uniting with it? Impossible, no way. How can we be dependent on people who we ruled for centuries? ... We want to return to our mother country. But, if it is not possible, the French wet-nurse will replace our real mother. We prefer an autonomous status under French rule to living under Syrian rule.³⁴²

The Arab nationalism in the Sanjak did not undergo a centralization process in the same way that the Turkish one did, thanks to the “powerless” Syrian nationalist government. Still, there existed representatives of the two different versions of Arab nationalism, namely the supporters of the National Bloc (*Vatanis*) and the supporters of the radical pan-Arab League of National Action (*‘Usbat al-amal al-qavmi*). The inspirations and motivations of both of the group members differed from those of their Syrian counterparts and they were able to keep their peculiarities to a certain degree.

The gradual discursive and physical rapprochement between the centres and the local domains of power inevitably contained the contestation of powers. The process of convergence was a painstaking one and entailed a domination-resistance kind of relationship. In fact, it was this very process in its whole, with its contingencies, which paved the way for the increasing nationalist politicization of the local population. Namely, the effort of dragging the heterogeneous local discomfort

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 65. Taken from Ahmet Sırrı Hocaoglu, *Zindan Bekçileri Yahud Hortlayan Ali Kemal* (Halep: 1936).

³⁴² Tekin, *Hatay*, p. 164. “Suriye hududlarına içine girerek Suriye ittihadına dahil olmak mı? Niçin ve bu nasıl olur? Asırlarca idare ettiğimiz unsura nasıl tabi oluruz? Buna imkan var mıdır? Anavatana Türkiyeye dönmek istiyoruz. Buna imkan olmazsa anamızın yerini Fransa sütünesi tutacaktır. Onun kontrolü altında muhtariyet ile idare edilmeyi, Suriye idaresinde yaşamaya tercih ederiz.”

into the “proper” discourse of the centres; the subordination of Antioch under the political calculations of Paris, Ankara, Damascus and Geneva acted as both a formative and dislocating process in the construction of ethnic identities in the region. The radicalization of the non-elites through incorporation either by the Turkish irredentist or pan-Arab factions should be evaluated within this framework.

The ethnic nationalist standardization process was an obstacle for the groups who did not possess the necessary resources for the membership to the Arab or Turkish club or both. In fact, the autonomists in both groups had corresponded to the majority of the population; however the violent atmosphere prevailing in the Sanjak was gradually becoming more severe and obliged them to choose either of the parties or to leave. Their discourse, although not as institutionalized as that of the others, which carried more local and authentic tones, was losing ground under the local clash and the larger international political interests of France. The losers consisted of both the elites and the subordinate classes. The elites, whose livelihood was disturbed with the new forms of politicization, were the traditional notables and the new rising class who were beneficiaries of the Mandatory regime. The possibility of losing their existing and potential material and cultural capital caused them to feel anxious about the demanding and demonstrating “crowd” and, naturally, the Turkish state. The Turkish Sunni notables soon conformed to the new agenda through utilizing their various networks, but most of the Christian notables left Antioch for France, Syria, Jordan or the Americas. On the other hand, the subordinate classes comprising mostly the religious and aged Turcophone population in the city the Christian and Alawite peasantry in the proximate areas the Armenians and “others” (Jews, Circassians, and Kurds) were relative late comers to nationalism and most probably in confusion, uncertainty and fear. In fact, the winning Turkish party

exerted considerable effort to win the support of the non-Turks, but certainly under the terms it imposed. They were gradually drawn into the nationalist politics. In the end, after the region was ceded to Turkey, the fear of those who had no option other than staying, was transformed into a submissive respect towards the dominant state.

The Agents

The peculiarity of the Turkish and Syrian historiographies is a tendency to totalize and homogenise the Turcophone and Arabic-speaking populations of the city. The employment of such phrases as “all of the Turks of Hatay” or “the Turks, without exception” in very different contexts is indeed an ideological representation which serves the political ends of the respective states and political positions. Each entails a totalitarian presupposition aiming at manufacturing consent from the “nation” for its representation.

However, in the period under question, there were profound divisions within each community in terms of political positioning based on the class structure of the city. Among the Turkophone population, there were three main political factions: The first group was the autonomists, who were willing to cooperate with Damascus as long as the Sanjak retained its existing autonomy. This group consisted of the big landowner Sunni Turkophone notable families, the Sunni religious establishment and were backed by the majority of the Sunni Turcophone population at least until the 1938.³⁴³ They were socially and religiously conservative, hostile and intimidated by the “democratic” and secular reforms of Kemalism. They exhibited their resentment of secular Kemalist changes by continuing to wear the *fez*. The second group was the

³⁴³ Du Véou, *La Désastre*, p.48-49 ; Alexandre, p. 100.

Kemalists, and the third group was the Kemalist irredentists.³⁴⁴ Although, Alexandre, who was an eyewitness of the events in Antioch from October 1936 to June 1937, makes a distinction between the two groups of Kemalists, the increasing permeability between the two allows for their integration into a single group and to call both “those with hat” (*şapkalılar*). The Kemalists gradually increased their numbers and activities, through which they attracted the artisans, small merchants, the youth and the students to their ranks and outnumbered the elder autonomist faction in the city. Their flourishing should be evaluated within the increasing involvement of Turkey within the Sanjak.

The divisions among the Arabic-speaking population in the Sanjak were more complicated owing to the inherent ethno-religious and social diversity. Each of these groups had its own political differences. The pro-French Mandate Arabs (autonomists) favoured the continuation of the Mandate. They consisted generally of the Christian minorities in the towns, the Armenians and the Alawite communal leaders. They rejected the Turkish annexation of the Sanjak but at the same time were wary of the Arab nationalism of the National Bloc (*Vatanis*) due to the fear of a possibility of losing their existing authority and status under a Syrian Sunni Arab domination. The Arab and Turkish autonomist factions, namely the older generation notables of the Sanjak, together formed the party called *İttihad-ı Anasır* (Union of Elements/Communities) to which the Turkish press referred as that party of the moderates against the extremists.³⁴⁵ The Christian, Armenian (mostly *Tashnak*) and Arab Alawite older generation notables were involved in this party. Zaki al-Arsuzi, in an interview with Kemal Sülker, acknowledged that the supporters of this party

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ *Tan*, 13 Aug 1936, p.1.

were those who were not influenced by any of the nationalist currents due to their elderliness and livelihood and whose adherence to the Sanjak was the result of their wealth and social standing.³⁴⁶ The Sunni landowning notables were Syrian unionists, the proponents of the absolute independence of Syria with the Sanjak as an integral part of it. They had organic connections with the National Bloc in Syria.³⁴⁷ The supporters of *Usbat al-'Amal al-'Qavmi* (League of National Action)³⁴⁸, the pan-Arabist organization led by Zaki al-Arsuzi³⁴⁹, formed another faction of the Arabic-speaking population. They drew support from the growing intelligentsia of the Christian, Sunni and Alawite youth residing in the towns of the Sanjak. They displayed their political ideology by adopting the “*sidaralirakiyye*”, the official headgear of the Iraq police symbolizing independent Arabia.³⁵⁰ The supporters of the League of National Action viewed Syrian independence only as a first step toward the creation of a larger Arab nation.

Looking at the program of the *Usbat*, Khoury argues that it was neither socialist nor Marxist-Leninist, and replaced class struggle with pan-Arabism.³⁵¹ However, the local dynamics of Antioch, namely the Arab Alawites as sharecroppers on the lands of Sunni Turcophone landowners who formed the most impoverished section of the city population, introduced a rather different *Usbat* than that of inner Syria. Although, its principal focus was to prevent any Turkish irredentist act on the Sanjak and to continue the anti-imperialist struggle, it also carried a tone of class

³⁴⁶ *Yenigün*, 5 Jan 1938, p.1.

³⁴⁷ For a Unionist pamphlet, see Bureau National Arabe de Recherches et d'Informations, *La vérité sur la question d'Alexandrette* (Damascus, n.d), 12 pages.

³⁴⁸ The League was founded in 1933 in Qarna'il, Lebanon. A conference was held with 50 radical Arab nationalists from all over the Arab East. They were mostly middle class with an average age of 29. For a detailed account of the League, see Khoury, *Syria*, pp. 400-406.

³⁴⁹ There are still a number of folk songs on al-Arsuzi sung by the Arab Alawites of Antioch. “Zaki Arsuzi is in Antioch, all the Turks are paralyzed” *Zeki Arsuzi Antakyada, bütün Türkleri de sakatlayan*”. Mrs. Maruf, interview by author, tape recording, Harbiye (Antioch), June 2001.

³⁵⁰ Sanjian, p. 67.

³⁵¹ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 401.

struggle blended with ethnic terminology. This special blend formed the basis of the support of the poor Alawite peasants to Zaki Arsuzi. As people being oppressed under their respective ağa, they lacked the means to be involved in public politics. Nevertheless, Arsuzi was regarded as their natural leader, fighting with the Sunni Turks in Antioch. The feeling of love for Arsuzi functioned as a way of expression of their distrust and resentment towards their Sunni ağas. It was one of the very few instances in which the Arab Alawite peasants of Antioch employed the term “Arab” as the opposite of “Turk” in their narration of Arsuzi.

The development of the Arab nationalism in the Sanjak in its moderate and radical versions, was rather a reaction to the rise of Turkish irredentist nationalism. It is for sure that the heightening Syrian opposition to the French Mandate and the launching of a violent campaign by the Syrian press accusing the French of indulging the irredentism of the Turks had considerable effects on the development of the Arab nationalist ideology in the Sanjak. However, the reaction to the Turkish agitation and the mistreatment of the French, especially towards the Arab Alawites, acted as fertile ground in which Arab nationalism could flourish.

The Nature of the Struggle

I loved Madame Vieux (the headmaster of the Turkish girls' section of the Antioch Lycée). She was a kind woman and she loved me very much. She used to kiss me and give me chocolates, because of my brown complexion... One day, she hit me because I did not sing the French national anthem Marseilles, that feeling had begun to be flourishing for a certain period of time. We hated the French, we used to write on the board “Vivre la Turquie” and they, the Arabs, used to write “Vivre la France”, “Vivre la Syrie”. .. Madam Vieux was a very beautiful, civic woman; she sang French songs very well...lots of girls took private piano lessons from her... She followed the French fashion in Paris and wore very smart furs. Anyway, the French people are a beautiful race, they are elegant people and tall over 1.70, 1.75 cm....

French is the most graceful language over the world... but we hated it so much that...³⁵²

Political factionalism is a public reflection of some other tensions intrinsic or exterior to the ethnic groups themselves in Antioch. The contention in the field of practice and discourse between parties over the domination of the political sphere reveal the underlying sources of these conflicts. An attempt at reconstructing these conflicts will offer some clues about the nature of the struggle.

Accordingly, I argue that the political struggle was mainly between the urban Arab youth, mostly Christian and Sunni, and the urban Turkish youth of Antioch. Small artisans and merchants were also involved in the struggle but under the domination of the educated middle class youth and the pro-Turkish notables. The ones who were wearing *şapka* or *sidara* were still young men, most of whom were the products of the expanding local educational system or university education in Syria or Turkey. Especially before 1938 when the near future of the Sanjak was yet unclear, the intergenerational quarrels inside the houses, mostly owing to the secular religious regulations of the Kemalist Turkey, still continued to be hot inside the Turkish residences of Antioch. Therefore, it was no coincidence that the struggle was concentrated spatially around the Antioch Lycée and among its students. Not only were the demonstrations and strikes centred on the issues concerning the pro-French education of Lycée, or did daily fights break out between the Arab and Turkish

³⁵² Ayşe Eşraf, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. “*Madam Vieux’u ben seviyordum. Evet madam çok iyi bir insandı ve beni çok severdi Hatta esmer olduğum için odasına çağırır, çikolata ikram eder yanaklarımı öperdi. Bir gün Marseilles’i okumadım diye, artık biraz içimizde başladı okumak istemedik, bir tokat vurdu bana...Nefret etmiştik. Onlar Vivre la France yazıyor. Yani Fransa yaşasın, biz Vivre la Turquie, Türkiye yaşasın... Madam Vieux Fransızca gayet güzel şarkılar söylerdi, güzel bie hanımdı. Kültürlü bir hanımdı. Kürkler içinde muhteşem giyinen Fransayı Parisi takip eder. Zaten Fransızlar germen ırkıdan güzel insanlar. Uzun boylu böyle 1 70 75’in üstünde. Zarif insanlar, sonra çok güzel dil konuşurlar. Fransızca diller içerisinde en zarif bir dil.”*

students, but also the backyard of the Turkish section of the Lycée garden served as an informal club where especially the girls was taught Turkishness:

We had 'brothers' (*abilerimiz*) then, studying at Ankara University. They used to enlighten us in the backyard of the Lycée building and we began to hate the French.³⁵³

Another pro-Syrian activist student from the Arab section of the Lycée drew attention to the high number of the supporters of *Usbat* among the students. The Antiochean Christian Arabs and sons of the Syrian Sunni Sanjak officials and few number young Arab Alawites students formed the militant group of the organization.

Another insight regarding the nature of the struggle and the political factionalism was the underlying class difference within and between ethnic groups, one of which was accentuated by the inequality formed and reproduced on the urban-rural axis. In spite of the severing radicalization among the urban youth and gradual depreciation of the intergenerational conflict, especially among the subaltern classes of Antioch, the hierarchy created around being urban or rural functioned in different ways. This argument was in fact more relevant for the Arabs of the Sanjak than for the Turkish community. Although the top four leaders of the *Usbat* were Antiochean Alawites residing in the city, the Arab Alawites as a group were degraded by the Christian Arabs as well as the by other communities in the Sanjak, owing to their being rural and uncultured, as lacking the necessary qualities for being an urban community or otherwise for being a political community. They were viewed as a conservative and devoted religious community rather than as an Arab community. That's why, in order to persuade the Christian and Sunni Arab population of Antioch,

³⁵³ Ayşe Eşraf, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001.

the pro-Arab newspaper of Antioch, *al-Uruba*, reserved much space to articles about the Arabness of the Alawites.

This representation unveils the hegemonic narratives of nationalism and shows that the politics was essentially an urban phenomenon as verified in the words of a pro-Arab Orthodox Christian man from Antioch:

Some sensible Christians were not the followers of Arsuzi. But, of course they want the status quo to continue. Because, they are happy with their lives. They make trade with Lebanon and Syria. They are educated in the best schools of Lebanon. They have consanguinity, marriage and cultural relations with that region. They believe that all these opportunities would be lost when Turkey shows her face. But the Alawites are ignorant. They are uneducated. Arsuzi is like a prophet for them. They are devoted to him from the heart, similar to their conservative devotion to their religions.³⁵⁴

In contrast to the exclusive and restrictive aspect of the peasantry, it also acted as a cross cutting cleavage among different ethnic groups. Especially in the less politicized rural areas of Antioch, the relations between the peasants of different ethnic groups were in most cases cooperative and mutually formative. However, the idioms of cooperation between a Christian and a Turkish village especially after mid-1938 were set up by the empowering Turks. The description of a Christian peasant from Altınözü about the relations between the Turkish village Karsu³⁵⁵ and theirs are indicative of the hegemonic relation. He narrated his story in terms of the patronage of the ağa of a nearby Turkish village.

In the past, there was a village called *Karsu*. They were Turks; they looked after us very well. They were very nice people. They did not want us to be

³⁵⁴ Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. “*Fakat akli başında insanlar Arsuzi arkasında değil. Fakat tabi kalmak istiyorlar aynı şekilde. Çünkü hayatlarından memnunlar. Ticaret güzel. Okumak, güzel. Gidiyorlar, Beyrut’a, Fransa’ya gidiyorlar. Ticaret yapıyorlar, Suriye’den Lübnan’dan beraber. Hayatlarından memnun. Bunların hepsi kayıp olacak. Bunun için yani. Bir düşmanlık meselesi değil. Bu menfaat bakımından böyle. Hem menfaat, hem ilişki var. İzdivaç var, ilişki yani kan var. Kültür var. Fakat Alevi’ler cahiller. Okumamışlar, artık Zeki Arsuzi sanki bir peygamber. Onlar, candan kökten onlara bağlı oldular. Din bakımından biliyorsunuz, dinleri çok bağlı. Alevi dini, daha fazla bağlılar, mutaasıplar*”.

³⁵⁵ This village was often referred in the Turkish press as inhabiting Turkish peasants with full of Turkish patriotism and uncorrupted Turkishness.

disturbed by outsiders; they often visited us. They helped and protected us from the bandits. The ağa of Karsu was Kemal ağa. He was a very influential man here. He was the kindest man in the world. He was the head of the gendarme station. He supported us all the time both under French and Turkish rules; he was he was such a nice man that he patronized our village against any interferences.³⁵⁶

Furthermore, being a peasant working on the lands of an ağa helped to strengthen the local spatial loyalties. The local patronage relationship thereby limited the development of a national identity superseding these loyalties. For the nearby rural areas of Antioch, like Harbiye or Suveydiye, the ağa was the inevitable intermediary between the outside world namely the city, and the local village or neighbourhood. That's why the Turkish propagandists, in order to be able to escape from the mastery of the ağa over his peasants, communicated with the Alawite peasants independent of the mediation of the ağa. The ağa's being a coreligionist of the peasants, as often was the case in Harbiye, strengthened the local attachments. It was one of the few instances in late 1938 during the Antioch demonstration protesting the imprisonment of İbrahim Tuhani, an Alawite notable from Harbiye, by the Alawite peasants of Harbiye that local adherences merged with the national issue of being against Turkish irredentism. Nevertheless, the local identities of the participants coexisted with their ethnic identity. The mounting ethnic violence of the same years brought about the formation of loyalty between some Turkish, Alawite or Christian peasants and their prominent men in Antioch. For the Alawites of Antioch, the most significant figures were Hasan Cebbare and Zaki Arsuzi, as indicated above.

³⁵⁶ Albert, interview by author, tape recording, Altınözü (Antioch), June 2001. "Eskiden burda Karsu köyü var, onlar Türk, bizim köye çok bakarlardı. Çok iyilerdi, istemiyorlar bize dokunmasın kimse, çok sahip çıkarlar bize. Burda rahmetlik bir kemal ağa var. Karsulu. Eskiden şef paşa gibi reisi cumhur gibi. Sözü iki olmaz.. Bize çok bakardı eskiden sahip çıkardı. Kendisi jandarma karakolunun orda müdürmüş. Hem fransız hem türk zamanı."

One day Hasan Cebbare read the French law and he knew it very well. (Cebbare was the most influential man of the Sanjak of Alexandretta). He made an illegitimate business. He examined the French law and charged himself with 7-days jail. Without any pressure, he arrived at the jail. He stated that “Hey, I did an illicit thing, and I must be jailed for 7 days”. When the French military general arrived in Antioch, he gazed at the Jail book and discovered that Cebbare was inside. He realised that Cebbare punished himself though he was not legally accused. He recalled that this man (Cebbare) was a firm man and could undertake the presidency of the state. Then he told to Cebbare that he would award him the governance. Hasan Cebbare became the chief. Four or five of his relatives and his educated people went into the assembly and they governed this Hatay for seven-eight years.³⁵⁷

Based on the above observations, another problem attracts attention, one of which also stemmed from the nationalist and elitist biases. It is the presupposition of a unilinear, homogenous and all encompassing definition of nationalism. Even though the radical nationalist polarization was advanced in Antioch, this did not result in a single or homogenous definition of Arab and Turkish nationalisms.

Zachary Lockman’s and Ted Swedenburg’s studies of Palestinian Arab nationalism through paying attention to the diverse segments of lower classes of both Jews and Arabs are attempts to deconstruct the hegemonic definitions of nationalisms.³⁵⁸

Relying on their theoretical agendas, I approach nationalism as “the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.”³⁵⁹ In the words of Lockman, “nationalism is not a thing but a set of relations and forces

³⁵⁷ Sheikh Fadıl, interview by author, tape recording, Harbiye (Antioch), June 2001. “*Bir gün Hasan Cebbare (hasan cebbara iskenderun sancağının en büyük adamlarından idi) fransız kanunu okuyor ve iyice biliyordu. Yanlış şekilde bir iş yaptı Cebbara. Sonra Fransız kanuna baktı. Yaptığı suç 7 gün mahpus. Kendiliğinden mahpushane kapısına gitti. Arkadaş ben bir hata yaptım ve fransız kanununda hata karşılığı 7 gün mahpusta kalması lazımdır dedi. Fransız generali antakayay geldiğinde mahpushanenin defterini okudu. Bakıyor cebbare hapse girmiş. Baktı general bu adam kendiliğinden kendini cezalandırdı. Bu adam sağlam adam dedi general. Hükümet başkanı olabilir dedi. Sonra çağırıldı. Yanına geldi. Ben senin şu meleketi eline teslim edeceğim dedi. Hasan Cebbare başkan oldu Antakyada. Kendi akrabalarından kendi okuyan kimselerden 4 5 kişi vezir olarak mecliste oturdular. Ve şu Hatay memleketinin idaresini 7 8 sene kadar idare ettiler.*”

³⁵⁸ Zachary Lockman, *Comrades*; and Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: 1936- 1939 Rebellion and The Palestinian National Past* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press), 1996.

³⁵⁹ Prasanjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 1995), p. 8.

that in each case unfolds and takes shape within a specific historical conjuncture, social context and discursive arena. Thus it always means different things to different people in different contexts; it is always used in a variety of ways and cannot be treated as a unitary or self evidently coherent ideal object”.³⁶⁰ More specifically, appropriation or “distortion” and, in this way, escape of the non-elites of Antioch from the formulations of the “proper” nationalism of the middle class elites will demonstrate how the various subordinate social groups handled and dealt with the Turkishness and Arabness issues in the given sociopolitical context. In particular, the way the Arab Alawites of Antioch accepted or rejected in whole or in part the forms of identity that their social superiors seek to disseminate will reveal their appropriation of this new form of identity and the practices that went with it, combining it with other elements drawn from other discourses of identity and their practices.

The Local Compressed between the Nationals and the International

The official visit of the governor of Anteb to Antioch on 27 April 1934 sparked the first major demonstration in the Sanjak.³⁶¹ Although the opportune moment for Turkey would come with the conclusion of Franco-Syrian treaty of September 1936, the visit of the governor was significant in terms of the enthusiasm and excitement it created among some Turks in the Sanjak and the fear among the Arabs.³⁶² The governor had already been in Aleppo for the frontier issues and come

³⁶⁰ Zachary Lockman, “ Arab Workers and Arab Nationalism in Palestine” in *Rethinking Arab Nationalism in the Middle East*, James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 254.

³⁶¹ For the details of the visit of the governor of Anteb, see Alexandre, p. 68; du Véou, *Le Désastre*, pp. 50-51, Tekin, *Hatay Tarihi*,

³⁶² du Véou, *La Désastre*, p. 47 and Majid Khadduri, “The Alexandretta Dispute”, p. 409.

to Alexandretta to meet the High Commissioner, Durieux. He had come to Antioch for a night stay in the famous Tourism hotel.³⁶³ According to Sanjian, it was the president of the Anteb *Halkevi* (People's House) that communicated with the Kemalist leaders in Antioch and instructed them to organize a meeting. The local postmaster, already jolted by the contents of this telegram, was instructed by the French authorities to deliver it in person and to inform the Turks that the authorization for such a reception was granted.³⁶⁴ The visit of the governor of Anteb constituted a significant starting point in the Turkish narratives as such "despite the colonial power, thousands of Turks had run out to the streets to welcome the *vali*, lifted up his car. They rubbed the Turkish flag on their eyes and face and pushed the car to the front of the hotel of the"³⁶⁵

Interestingly enough, the Turkish press did not spare any place in the news about the demonstration. Only *Yeni Adana*, the local newspaper of Adana, wrote about the details of the visit and the subsequent Turkish demonstration. In fact, it is not surprising to observe such neglect because the region had not acquired priority on the Turkish state's political agenda yet in 1934. One has to wait until late 1936 to see the aggressive and violent Turkish press campaign propagating the Turkishness of the region. Still, there were some reminders in the press asserting the Turkishness of the Sanjak as a distinct entity from the Arab Syria such as the article of Yunus Nadi on August 22, 1932 in *Cumhuriyet*. Anyhow, the irredentist claims of Turkey remained very marginal and local. The local newspaper, *Yeni Adana* was, the single newspaper frequently giving news about the region and declaring the French tyranny

³⁶³ Melek, p. 54.

³⁶⁴ Sanjian, p. 61.

³⁶⁵ Hamdi Selçuk, *Bütün Yönleriyle Hatayın O Günleri* (İstanbul, 1972), p. 73- 74.

in Antioch. At the beginning of 1923 before the Lausanne Treaty, *Yeni Adana* had stated that “we are looking forward to Turkish soldier to free the imprisoned Turks in the Sanjak and waiting for the days of watching the Turkish flag flying in the skies of Antioch and Alexandretta”.³⁶⁶

The visit of the governor was followed by a general pattern of retaliation demonstrations. The counter demonstration of the Arabs to the Turkish manifestation for the greeting came on May 5. The Arabs tended to equalize the situation with a celebratory demonstration held during the inspection of General Huntziger, the new commander in Chief of the Army of the Levant.³⁶⁷

Direct Turkish involvement in the question of the Sanjak began after the announcement in September 1936 that a draft treaty had been agreed upon in Paris on the Franco-Syrian treaty. The visit of the Syrian delegation to Ankara on their way from Paris to Damascus formed the first instance when the Turkish press started their agitating propaganda on the future status of the Sanjak. Hashim el-Atasi, the head of the Syrian delegate members of which were the prominent men of Syrian National Bloc (*Vatani*), declared that the Sanjak would remain autonomous under Syrian sovereignty. Responses to this declaration crystallized the features of the Turkish nationalist discourse, one of which was the imperial legacy. In the nationalist discourse, the imperial legacy turned into imperial pride and was used as an instrument of discursive domination over the Syrian:

The Turks of Alexandretta and Antioch living on the side of the motherland can never fall into the situation of demanding a minority right from the kindness and endeavour of this and that man.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ *Yeni Adana*, 3 Jan 1923.

³⁶⁷ Sanjian, p. 62.

³⁶⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 Sept 1936. p. 1,7.

Immediately a cliché of the Sanjak was established in the Turkish press. This cliché worked in two ways. On the one hand, the Turkish narrative accused the local French administration of sheltering some “harmful” elements; on the other hand, the discrepancy between the real France in Paris and the local French in the Sanjak was deeply emphasized. The real France was associated with being just, modern and enlightened; the local French with the totally opposite characteristics, as being colonizers and narrow-minded.³⁶⁹ Despite the fact that there had always existed tension between the metropolis and the French officials in Syria, the emphasis of the Turkish press was less on this tension; rather it was a strategic manoeuvre. The newspapers were full of the names of ordinary people, district governors or communal heads who were accused of being at the same time pro-French and pro-Syrian and anti-Turk. The validity of the claims was impossible to prove. These evil personalities and aspects were argued to be dispersed in every part and every administrative level of the Sanjak. Still, their activities were argued to be not only peculiar to the Sanjak, which, according to the Turkish newspaper *Açıksöz*, Çerkez Ethem and his brother Reşit, were involved in anti-Turkish activities in Beirut.³⁷⁰ The French administration was accused of sheltering and favouring these people who continuously provoked (*tahrık*) and oppressed (*tazyik*) the Turkish population of the Sanjak. In addition, the Turkish press inserted the Turkish state’s “others” into its analysis of the conditions in the Sanjak through employing an ethnicist terminology.

Bearing in mind that the audience of these newspapers was the Turkish

³⁶⁹ Yunus Nadi and Ahmet Emin Yalman often emphasized this distinction in the international context of pre World War II.

³⁷⁰ *Açıksöz*, 3 July 1936, p. 1.

citizens and middle class young Turkish nationalists/irredentists in the Sanjak, this discourse helped in the perpetuation of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey. A statement in *Açıksöz* is illustrative in this sense:

The Radical Syrian nationalist youth of Antioch were overexcited and enthusiastic during the celebration of their independence day; they criticized the Istanbul press about their news policy on Alexandretta...Radical Syrian nationalists and Armenians who provoke them, Circassians, men guilty of the punishment code of 150 (*150'likler*) who hesitate the idea of an independent Antioch, the supporters of Entente and Liberal who took refuge in the Sanjak, argue that any tendency other than Syrian nationalism is a kind of treason to the motherland. They contend that such people should be croaked.³⁷¹

Turkish domination was not peculiar to the domain of local and international politics but also to the area of discourse. The daily newspapers, and radios gave daily news about the Sanjak, most of it fallacious, erroneous and misrepresented. They published “scientific” articles about the historical and archaeological origins of the area, and most of the time edited news about the social, political and economic life in the Sanjak. Antioch and Kırıkhan were the two discriminated towns of the Sanjak in terms of the concentration of information appropriated for them in the Turkish press due to the fact that the Turks and the Armenians formed the majority of the populations of these towns respectively. In accordance with this, extensive information on Antioch was provided with the framework of the oppressive conditions to which the Turkish community was subject. Kırıkhan was overemphasized because of the French favouring of the local Armenian population and anti-Turkish collaboration between them. As soon as the dates of the elections were decided to be November 14, 1936, the Turkish press started its intense

³⁷¹ *Açıksöz*, 30 Sept 1936, p. 1-2. “Müfrit Suriye milliyetperverleri ve bunları tahrik eden Ermeniler, Çerkezler, bilhassa Antakyanın muhtariyetinden çekinen 150likler, buradaki mülteci İtilafçılar, Antakyada Suriye miliyetperverliği dışında herhangi bir temayülün bir nevi vaTan ihaneti telakki edilebileceğini ileri sürmektedir ve hatta kımıldananlar gebertilmelidir.”

propaganda activities in early September and instituted an image for Antioch and the Sanjak. The dominant discourse among the Turkish press was “absolute victimization” of the Sanjak’s Turkish population in all their activities, but most importantly in the field of education and public finance:

The Sanjak governor is Kurd Hüsni Bırazi from the Bırazi tribe. He regards and obeys the orders of ex-Beirut consulate delegue adjoint puppet Durieux. He goes well together with the district governor of Antioch, Hacı Edhem Civelek. The *mufti* is a man called Hacı Mesud and he conformed to the French. Anti-Turkish men are recruited in education and public finance. The chief police officer of Antioch is an Armenian brought from Adana. There is a police official in Alexandretta named Karabet who recruits hostile intelligent agents and spies... The Sanjak has a Lycée, French is obligatory, Old ottoman curriculum are applied in the Lycée. The Turkish teacher is Ali İlmi, guilty of law code 150 and the owner of the newspaper *Ferda*. The philosophy teacher is Memduh Selim, the clerk of Hoybun.³⁷²

The visit of the Syrian delegation to Turkey on their return from Paris after the signing of Franco-Syrian Treaty formed the initial news in the Turkish newspapers about “the Turkish Antioch”. The responses of the Turkish press to the Turco-Syrian correspondences were at best contextual. The headline of *Cumhuriyet* on 24 September states that “we cannot recognize the mandate system for Alexandretta and its environs that of which we even do not approve for Syria”.³⁷³ In general, the main controversy was centred on the issue of the representation of the people of the Sanjak. As indicated before, Turkey explicitly declared that as Syria

³⁷² *Tan*, 12 Oct 1936, p.7. “Mutasarrıf Bırazi aşiretinden Kürt Hüsni Bırazidir. Fransız Fevkelade Komiseri Kont de Martelin delegesi eski Beyrut konsolosu M. Driot’un (kuklacı) sözünden çıkmaz. Antakya kaymakamı (Hacı Edhem Civelek) ile de iyi uyuşmuştur. Müftü, Hacı Mesut adında bir adamdır. Fransızlarla iyi uyuşmuştur. Maarife, maliyede adliyede Türkiye aleyhine çalışmış adamlar istihdam edilmiştir. Antakya ser komiseri Adanadan getirilmiş bir Ermenidir. İskenderunda Karabet isimli bir polis memuru var ki maiyetinde vaTansız istihbarat memurları, casuslar çalışır.... Sancağın bir lisesi vardır. Fransızca mecburidir. Mektebde eski Osmanlıca programları tatbik edilir. Türkçe hocası Ferda gazetesi sahibi yüzellikliklerden Ali İlmidir. Felsefe, Hoybun cemiyeti katibi umumisi Memduh Selimdir.”

³⁷³ *Cumhuriyet*, 24 Sept 1936, p. 1. “Suriye için bile kabul etmediğimiz mandanın İskenderun ve havalisine tatbikine muvafakat edemeyiz”.

and France did not embody the necessary juridical and legal rights for the representation of the Turkish Alexandretta, the French could not transfer their official obligations towards Turkey. The tyranny, suffering, cruelty, oppression, maltreatment and abuse of the Turkish people under French rule were acknowledged by the Turkish press as the aspects, which indirectly legitimized the Turkish intention of “saving” Alexandretta and its environs. These conditions also helped to celebrate and glorify the Turks and Turkishness against a despised Arabness, as stated in Ahmet Emin Yalman’s article titled “The Independence of Lebanon and Antioch”:

“While Lebanon deserves independence, it can not be imagined that Antioch Turkishness did not deserve this right.”³⁷⁴ Similarly, yet more aggressively, Aka Gündüz degraded Syria in its incapability even of holding its essential power: “Why do the Syrian newspapers yell at us? Why do these papers, which lost the Arab Druze, is no more of hopeful about Lebanon and is faced with the Armenian power in the Arab desert, raise a clamor?”³⁷⁵

The Turkish presentation of the issue in the League of Nations on 26 September 1936 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüşti Aras, formed the second wave of news in the Turkish press. Simultaneously, an ambitious and aggressive press campaign was launched in Istanbul and Ankara full of news about the official speech that Şükrü Kaya, Turkish Minister of the Interior, would make

³⁷⁴ *Tan*, 1 Sept 1936, p. 5. “Lübnana ayrı bir istiklalae layık görülürken, Antakya Türklüğünün bu hakka layık görülmemesi tasavvur edilemez.”

³⁷⁵ *Açıksöz*, 8 Sept 1936, p. 1. Suriye gazeteleri bize niye bar bar bağıyor, O Arap Dürüzü kaybeden, Lübnandan umudunu kesen, Arap çölünde Ermeni salTanatını sezen Suriye gazeteleri niye bize yaygara ediyor.

before the Council of the League of Nations. Although, the Alexandretta issue was not discussed in the League until 2 October 1936, the newspapers created an atmosphere as if Aras had already voiced Turkish anxieties over the Sanjak as soon as he arrived in Geneva and as if the Alexandretta “issue” was the central and the only issue discussed at the Council of the League of Nations. (The gradual transformation of the names of Alexandretta and Antioch into synonyms with “problem and issue” was already discussed above). The preliminary statements at the League of Nations were followed by an exchange of notes between Delbos, the French Foreign Minister and Suad Davaz, the Turkish Ambassador to France, between 10 October and 10 December. The Turkish government envisaged change in the status of the region and demanded that France conclude a treaty with the delegates of the Sanjak, the vast majority of whom were argued to be Turkish, a treaty similar to the one signed between Syria and France. The media acted as a public demonstration of influence, assured publicity for a particular perspective and a platform to attack the view of others.³⁷⁶ The diplomatic note of the Turkish State before the League of Nations was vulgarised and featured as newspaper headlines.

At the same time, a flow of information commenced concerning various aspects of Antioch and Alexandretta, ranging from the social and economic conditions prevailing in the city to the historical origins of the indigenous people. In particular, very frequently given reports regarding Antioch and Alexandretta were the following: anti-Turkish news in the Syrian and Lebanese papers and magazines; pro-Turkish news in the western press; anti-Turkish incidents in Damascus, like the attack of a young Syrian man on a Turkish flag³⁷⁷; the increase in the number of

³⁷⁶ Milton Israel, *Communications and Power : Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 1

³⁷⁷ *Tan*, 2. October.1936. p.2.

Turkish and especially non-Turkish people, in particular Armenians, who favoured hats instead of *fez*; the suffering of the Turkish peasants under very high and discriminative taxes and accusing the local French officials, including the High Commissioner's deputy delegate Durieux and the Syrian officials residing in the Sanjak Durieux, of entrusting important local administrative posts to non-Turkish officials.

Visual material in the form of maps, photographs and caricatures were greatly utilized in the whole three-year campaign. The most favourite themes regarding the images of "Turkish Antioch" were either those showing the natural beauties of the region or those picturing a big crowd of mostly men with hats during a demonstration in the city. The subtitles of the photographs determined the aspects of the newly establishing official discourse vis-à-vis Antioch. The maps displaying "the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the inseparable part of the motherland", together with the nearby Turkish towns; photographs of "Antioch with 300,000 Turks who have always been Turkish", displaying scenes from "lovely Orontes", the "magnificent waterfalls of Turkish Daphne", and caricatures, most of which were drawn by Fikret Mualla, helped in the materialization of the imagined community. The daily appearance of photographs, which were identical with each other in the Turkish papers, provided the image of institutional stability for the viewpoint. They were such generic pictures that the same picture could easily be argued to belong to different Turkish cities under different subtitles.

The Turkish propaganda together with the nationalist hegemony in Turkey at the end of 1930's created the underlying dynamics in the formation of an antagonistic university youth in Turkey who were ready to "naturally" claim the Turkish incorporation of Hatay as pronounced in the words of İsmail Habib,

“Alexandretta and Antioch! You are ours and you will continue to be so.”³⁷⁸ The student demonstrations for the incorporation of Hatay to Turkey were the biggest meetings of the Single-Party Era. The demonstration in İstanbul in Beyazıt square to be held on 22 November, was announced in all the papers and on the radio. All the members of the People’s Houses and Peoples Party, university and secondary education students, trade corporations and the “ordinary people” would attend to the meeting where the leader of Hatay Sovereignty Society, İhsan Mürseloğlu, and Dr. Selim Ahmed would make the speeches.³⁷⁹ However, one day after the encouraging announcements, the meeting was declared illegal by the Turkish State authorities because it was the immediately before the discussion of the dispute before the League of Nations and there were intense western criticism on the discourse and irredentist attitude employed by the Turkish press and the youth respectively. The press suggested staying calm and waiting for the results of the diplomatic negotiations in Geneva. Nevertheless the demonstration was held, the estimated number of the participants was around a hundred thousand and three million. Due to the insistence of the youth in the participation to the demonstration, the National

³⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Sept 2002, p. 1-3.

³⁷⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Nov 1936, p.1-8; *Tan*, 20 Nov 1936, p.1; *Akşam*, 20 Nov 1936, p.1.

Student and Teachers Association was closed down by the state.³⁸⁰ The repercussions of these developments in the Sanjak and in Syria were an increase in the tone of violence between the Turkish and Arab nationalist youth, widespread ethnic crystallization, especially among the subaltern groups in the city, and growing fear among the non-Turkish population as well as the autonomist faction of the Turcophones. The Turkish press portrayed Antioch as a city in absolute and constant terror from the beginning of September 1936. The news about the boycott in the souq in protest of the Syrian annexation of the Sanjak and many others indicated above, reveal the nationalist sensitivity the creation of which was initiated by the Turkish media. Accordingly, 300,000 Turks and, together with them, Armenians and Alawites had closed their shops and undertaken a very anxious demonstration. While the Turks were passing over the Orontes Bridge, the gendarme commander fired. The involvement of the district governor prevented the occurrence of a violent incident. However, an Arab police officer named, Ismail arrested some of the Turkish men who participated in the demonstration and attempted to write down a record about them.³⁸¹

The alarm in the Sanjak was rising. It especially increased in late October when the Turkish press circulated reports that Turkish forces were camped at the frontier from Payas to Islahiye, ready to invade the Sanjak.³⁸² This fear increased the number of non-Turkish people who replaced the *fez* with hats. This displacement encompassed a significant symbolic meaning. The wearing of a hat was displayed as the struggle itself.³⁸³ The act of wearing the hat turned into an action of pro-Turkishness with all its ideological baggage, which was continuously negotiated and

³⁸⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 23 Nov 1936, p.1; *Tan*, 23 Nov 1936.

³⁸¹ *Tan*, 9 Oct 1936, p. 7.

³⁸² Alexandre, p. 113.

³⁸³ *Tan*, 6.1.1937, p.1

redefined. It was a public display of pro-Turkishness and anti-Arabness. In the same way, wearing a *sidara/irakiye* was a reminder of supporting *Usbat*. The French were acknowledged to favour those wearing the *fez*. The local Mandate officials were accused of aggressive and oppressive attitudes towards those people wearing hats and making appointments Turkish fugitives of religious fanatics to struggle against the hat wearers.

Ahmet Emin Yalman's article, titled "The Hat Inquisition in Syria", addressed and questioned the extent of the secularism of France considering its unfair attitude on the hat issue. The French transfer of money to those Arabs wearing *irakiye*; or French manipulation of the League of Nations Committees in Antioch through paying the vagabonds of the city to wear *irakiye*³⁸⁴ were commonplace reports in the Turkish press. The statements of Turcoman women that they were ready to wear hats in case the Syrian gendarmes arrested the men of the tribe; and various exaggerated figures regarding the number of purchases of hat in Antioch such that 2500 hats in 3 days and extra hat provision from Aleppo were used as anecdotes to display the increasing pro-Turkishness among the non-Turkish population.³⁸⁵

However, the contextual nature of nationalism should be kept in mind while considering the perception and meaning of the pro-Turkishness or the pro-Arabness of the subaltern groups who decided to put on hats instead of *fezes* over one night. Translating probably a fear-oriented trend into the conventional terminology of modernism and nationalism served to define and contain the prevailing diversity of motivations and intentions of people. It was certainly different and more complex

³⁸⁴ *Tan*, 12 Jan 1937, p.1; *Tan*, 19 Jan 1937, p.1

³⁸⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Mar 1937, p.1; *Cumhuriyet*, 10 Dec 1936, p.7; *Tan*, 18 Mar 1937, p.3; *Cumhuriyet*, 14 Oct 1936, p.1.

than the imposed official definitions of nationalism that the interviewees acknowledged that their choice in wearing hat was motivated from different incentives in different contexts.

The rivalry of performance was the reflection of the political rivalry between the Turkish irredentists and Arab nationalists of *Usbat* in the public sphere. In addition to the display of hat, there were also demonstrations, petitions and boycotts of competing parties that were following each other. On 1 October 1936, the seven representatives of the Turkish population (*halk mümessilleri*) sent the following telegram to the French High Commissioner, Comte de Martel, for transmission to the French and Turkish Foreign Ministries. The representatives were most probably Abdülğani Türkmen (his own residence was already the People's House), Vedii Münir (Karabay), Şükrü Balcı and Selim Çelenk :

During the past fifteen years our cries and protests to secure our human rights and to establish an independent administration to safeguard our national existence have been heeded. On the occasion of the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, when we were expecting due respect for our rights, we learned with surprise and horror, of the Syrian delegation's statement to Turkish reporters that the Sanjak would continue to remain a part of Syria. We vigorously protest the incorporation like a herd of slaves, of Turkish Antioch and Alexandretta into Syria. We demand the independence and autonomy of our district which, historically and geographically has always been a unit and we expect the speedy recognition of our rights.³⁸⁶

As expected, the non-Turkish communities of the Sanjak immediately sent a counter-resolution to the same administrative agents:

The Sanjak of Alexandretta, with its preponderant Arab majority, negates the petition presented to the High Commissioner by a portion of the Turks of Antioch and we implore your intervention to prevent any foreign claims. This Sanjak with its Arab majority has always manifested its unity with Syria and

³⁸⁶ *Yenigün*, 2 October 1936, p.1.

will continue to preserve its Syrian character with everlasting loyalty to Arabism.³⁸⁷

Interestingly enough, the Turkish press either neglected this telegram or misrepresented it in its own terminology and claims:

The unsound argument of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Press and some Turkified individuals' claim for representation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta do not correspond to a legitimate and just right. We can not accept any change in the status of a necessarily Syrian Sanjak to content a small number of Turks who comprise a quarter of the Sanjak population and less than a half of Cilician Arabs. There exist 150,000 Arabs and 60,000 Turkifieds in the Sanjak.³⁸⁸

The celebrations of 29 October Turkish Independence Day in the People's House, the hub of Turkish nationalism, formed the first crucial event in terms of the subsequent pattern of incidents it created in the form of violent inter-communal clashes and quarrels, strikes, boycotts and demonstrations. The Girls Section of the Antioch Lycée was closed up by the local authorities on 31 October 1936 due to the girls' participation to the 29 October Celebrations in the People's House and their absence in the school.³⁸⁹ A participant in the celebrations described that day in the following way:

We beat up the girls who went to the school that day with sticks... the struggle started when I was a 5th year student...we walked with our whip at hand... We walked against the pro-French teachers... We beat the Sunni Muslim folk who insisted on going to the school.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁷ from Sanjian, *The Sanjak*, p. 88 quoted from Yaprad, 9 Oct 1936.

³⁸⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 1936, p.8. "TC Hariciye bakanının ve Türk matbuatının mugalatı, Türkleşmiş bazı fertlerin İskenderun Sancağını temsil iddiaları, esaslı ve meşru bir hakka istinad etmemektedir. Sancak ahalisinin dörtte birini temsil eden ve Kilikya Araplarının nisfını bulmayan bir avuç Türkün hatırını hoş etmek için Suriyeli bir sancağın şeklinin değiştirilmesini kabul edemeyiz. Sancakta 150.000 Arap, 60.000 Türkleşmiş vardır."

³⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 4 Dec 1936, p.1; Alexandre, p. 115; *Tan*, 4 Nov 1936, p.1

³⁹⁰ Ayşe Eşraf, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. "Sopalarla gidenleri dövdük. 5. Sınıf talebesiyken mücadele başladı. Elimizde kırbaç yürüdük yani. Fransız taraftarı hocalara yürüdük. Giden Türk müslüman çocukları dövdük."

On 2 November, the Boys Section of the Lycée acted with solidarity with the girls and went into strike to protest the closing of the Girls Section.³⁹¹ Four days later, on the night of 6 November, the supporters of *Usbat* responded to this Turkish strike. They wrote the Syrian national anthem over a photograph and hung it to a café situated on the border separating the Alawite quarter, Dört Ayak from its neighboring Turkish quarter.³⁹² The result of the violent fight was four wounded Arabs. The violence continued. One day later in the morning, a quarrel occurred in the Alawite quarter Affan between the pro-Arab Alawites and pro-Turkish Alawites over the issue of wearing hats. On the 10 November, the court prosecutor of Antioch was attacked by Turkish nationalists on the road and the same day all of the Turkish schools in the city went on strike.³⁹³

The November 1936 Elections

There is no election here. The French just appoint and that's all... there was some freedom in Syria, but there was none in Hatay. In here, none of the groups is predominant. The majority is neither in the Sunni Arabs nor in the Christian Arabs nor the others... Here, there is Monsieur Bazantay and High Commissioner Monsieur Durieux. They make the appointments. They say, these people will be the deputies, and no other way. And they are assigned as deputies from Alexandretta.³⁹⁴

Elections for the new Syrian Chamber of Deputies in Damascus were fixed for all Syria in the Franco-Syrian Treaty. The first degree was set for November 14 and 15, and November 30 for the second degree. The repercussions of the election

³⁹¹ Alexandre, p. 115

³⁹² *ibid.*

³⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 116.

³⁹⁴ Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. "*Burda seçim olmuyor. Burda Fransızlar tayin ediyor. Suriye 'de biraz istiklal var, Hatay 'da yok. Burda tam, Sünni Arap bir kuvvet yok, tam Hıristiyan Arap bir kuvvet yok. Burda Fransız Mösyö Bazanti ve Fransız müsteşar Mösyö Durieux, burda tayin ediyor. Kuseyri, Kimse karşısına çıkmıyor. Hacı Mehmet Adalı bu Sadık Mahri, ve Narik Der Kolasyan. Bunlar olacak, bitti, gidiyorlar. Ve İskenderun 'dan..bunun için bunlar tayin ediliyor.*"

process in the local scene, which will form the main discussion of the following section, should be thought of in relation to the Turkish State's domination through various mediums.

Alongside the increasing violence in the towns of the Sanjak and in Syria as well, the Turkish press had already begun its propaganda against the Turkish participation in the elections that were declared as "alien". The boycotting of the elections was confirmed as the public expression of the distinctive character of the Turkish people in the Sanjak and protest against the "alleged" attachment of the Sanjak into Syria. *Yenigün*, the pro-Turkish newspaper, called for the abstaining of the whole Sanjak people (not solely the Turkish community) from the elections. The call for a boycott of the elections was not peculiar to the Turkish nationalists but the Arab nationalists's decision was also in favor of the boycott owing to the absence of *Zaki al-Arsuzi* on the list of the candidates of the party of the Syrian National Bloc (*Vatanis*). The abstention of the Arabs from the election was certainly to the advantage of the Turkish nationalists of the Sanjak and Turkey as well because now they could interpret the Arab boycott for their own use as if the Sanjak people were wholly favoring the Turkish nationalists' claim. In the preceding days of the elections, three of the seven Turkish representatives of the Sanjak, Vedi Münir (Karabay), Samih Azmi, Mustafa Rasim were exiled to Hums and Selim Çelenk and Rasih Bensa to Aleppo by the local Mandate officials, and the newspaper *Yenigün* was suspended.³⁹⁵ Abdurrahman Melek was not allowed to enter to the Sanjak and was sent back to Turkey directly from Alexandretta. The owner of the *Yenigün*, journalist Şükrü Balcı, furious at his arrest by the French, arrived in Turkey on 15 November. Zaki al- Arsuzi was arrested by the local officers, which gave rise to one

³⁹⁵ *Tan*, 1.12.1936, p. 1; Alexandre, p. 117; *Ayın tarihi*, no. 36, p. 81-82.

of the biggest demonstrations in Antioch. The other leaders of *Usbat*, like Muhammad Ali Zarqa, İbrahim Fevzi and Cebrail Nakkul, were also arrested since they clashed with the 26th Squadron against the arrest of their leaders. However, all of the Arabist leaders were released after 17 hours.³⁹⁶

During the whole election period, Turkish newspapers described the elections as fused in the rhetoric of the ongoing struggle for Hatay and depicted certain concepts and figures around which they narrated the incidents. The press, once again, was significant in constructing, defining and excluding the local parties in the Sanjak. It continued to build up its definition of Turkishness and Arabness in an exclusionary way with the novel, fallacious and deceptive information, which were argued to be Antioch-origin.

Though the Turkish papers argued as if “democratic” elections were taking place in the Sanjak that was indeed not the case. As discussed in the previous chapters, the landowner class occupied the administrative posts and the Sanjak deputies to the Syrian parliament involved the same two aged members of this group, and Christian and Armenian notables of Alexandretta and Kırıkhan. Hacı Mehmet Adalı, Mustafa Agha Kuseyri were the deputies from Antioch; Moses Derkolasyon was the one from Alexandretta. The interviewees, even the most politicised ones, rarely mentioned the elections, although they did stressed the public incidents that occurred after the elections. Those who mentioned argued that the elections seemed more like French appointments, which in some cases worked against the will of even the notable men of the Sanjak.

The call for boycott by the local Sanjak Turkish nationalists and the supporters of *Usbat* was almost successful. The elections were a failure with only

³⁹⁶ Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001; Ibid, P. 118.

eight percent of the voters casting ballots the abstention of nearly all of the pro-Turkish voters.³⁹⁷ The results were not just the result of propaganda made with words but more often with guns, manipulation and Turkish intimidations of Alawites and other non-Turkish communities. Arms were reported to have been smuggled in on a large scale for the pro-Turkish elements.³⁹⁸ Upon the expected participation of those villages in the elections (Hanlar, Küreci, Narlıhöyük, Karıcalı and Arablı uşağı), the pro-Turkish nationalists erased their records and pretended as if they had abstained from the voting.³⁹⁹ On the other hand, the local French officials threatened the Sanjak people with a 50 Syrian Lira penalty in case they did not attend the elections. They also manipulated the ballots.⁴⁰⁰ The Turkish newspapers were full of numbers and percentages showing the very low level of participation of the Turkish and non-Turkish communities in the first degree. Although the results of the elections in the Turkish press varied each day, the final results, according to *Cumhuriyet* were as follows: In Antioch, 319 out of 5,829 voters participated to the elections (4.5 percent); in Alexandretta 630 out of 2,340 (27 percent); in Beylan 203 out of 1,600 (12.5 percent); in Reyhaniye 231 out of 2,500 (9 percent) and in Kırıkhan, 21 percent.⁴⁰¹ Those who voted in Antioch were argued to be the local officials, the gendarme, the Dashnak Armenians, the relatives of Syrian officials and some poor Turks who were dragged to the ballot boxes by the Syrian gendarmes.⁴⁰²

The results of the first degree elections was greatly celebrated due to the firmness and determinacy of the Turkish community as well as the correct attitude of

³⁹⁷ Although Sanjian, depending on Du Véou, estimates 50 percent participation to the elections, both *Yenigün* and the Turkish press, and Khoury of the British Foreign Office, estimated it was between 5-8 percent.

³⁹⁸ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 500.

³⁹⁹ *Ayn Tarihi*, no. 36, p. 82; *Akıyam*, 19 Nov 1936, p.2

⁴⁰⁰ Pehlivanlı, "Milli Emniyet", p. 174 and *Ayn Tarihi*, no. 36, p. 83.

⁴⁰¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 Nov 1936, p.1.

⁴⁰² *Cumhuriyet*, 16 Nov 1936, p.1.

the non-Turkish communities against the oppression, torture, manipulation, bribes and threats of the local gendarmes and the Syrian soldiers brought from Aleppo.⁴⁰³ The atmosphere created in Turkey was so tense and aggressive that it allowed for any kind of exaggerated and contradictory information. The press did not hesitate to state that the local officials killed the peasants who sought to abstain from voting. The press would one day declare the withdrawal of “anti-Turkish” Mustafa Kuseyri and other first-degree candidates from the elections⁴⁰⁴. The next day the same newspaper would pronounce that only seven people had participated in the elections out of 40,000 Turks in Antioch and that those that had, were Kuseyri Mustafa, his son, his brother’s son, a steward and his three servants.⁴⁰⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the second degree elections on 30 November 1936, the level of violence increased in the Sanjak after the French military intervention into a crowd that attacked the houses of two Turkish deputies of the Sanjak, Kuseyri Mustafa and Adalı Hadji Muhammed. The result was the death of three Turkish demonstrators and seventeen others injured. Following this incident, Turkish papers explicitly began to pronounce some irrendentist statements, with titles such as “We love playing with guns as much as we love peace”.⁴⁰⁶ They accused delegate Durieux of giving the order to have the gendarmes more against the innocent Turkish people. But mostly, the press was aggressive against the two “so-called” deputies and Turkish traitors whom they argued had started shooting towards the crowd.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ *Açıksöz*, 15 Nov 1936, p.1; *Açıksöz*, 16 Nov 1936, p.1; *Açıksöz*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1

⁴⁰⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 Nov 1936, p.7, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Nov 1936, p.8; *Tan*, 14 Nov 1936, p.1; *Tan*, 15 Nov 1936, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁵ *Akşam*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1; *Cumhuriyet*, 5 Dec 1936, p.1

⁴⁰⁶ *Tan*, 4 Dec 1936, p.1.

⁴⁰⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 3 Dec 1936

CHAPTER V

UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR: AGAIN?

Turkey was successful at managing the division of labour between its diplomacy, the press and the people. The fragile order was sustained by strategic manoeuvres through utilising the international power games in the pre World War II period. In the case of any disorder in any of these fronts, direct and authoritarian measures were undertaken by the state as concretized in the straightaway closing of the National Student and Teacher's Association. In late 1936 and early 1937, the Turkish strategy played in Geneva with the French was precursor of the days leading up to the establishment of a new regime in the Sanjak.

The Franco-Turkish dispute was discussed by the Council of the League between 14 December and 16 December 1936, though French was unwilling to call the situation a Franco-Turkish dispute but a divergence of requests submitted by the Turkish government and the doctrine of the Mandate.⁴⁰⁸ Aras and Viénot presented their respective cases. Turkey demanded that both France and itself should guarantee the independence of the Sanjak and asked for a free demilitarised port at Alexandretta. The report presented by League-appointed rapporteur Sandler did not solve the dispute in the Sanjak but offered conservative measures in the Sanjak until an agreement could be reached. The issue would come up again at the end of January and until that date three observers were to be appointed and sent out to the Sanjak in order to observe the situation there. In the meantime, negotiations between France and Turkey were being held but they finally proved to be deadlocked. Turkey proposed a confederation of Syria, Lebanon and the Sanjak, all three on an equal

⁴⁰⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 15 Dec 1936, p.1.

footing with jurisdiction over foreign affairs, customs and monetary union in common however; the Turkish proposal of confederation was silenced and disregarded in the Turkish press.⁴⁰⁹

With the arrival of the three League observers in the Tourism Hotel on 31 December 1936, the rivalry between the pro-Arab and the pro-Turkish parties intensified.⁴¹⁰ Pro-Turkish demonstrations and pro-Syrian counterdemonstrations were staged wherever the observers visited and activists vied with each other to impress the observers.⁴¹¹ Both the People's House and the Arab Committee for the Defence of Alexandretta.⁴¹² prepared booklets for the Committee involving historical, ethnographic, language and demographic information about the region. The Committee was greeted with sympathy nearly everywhere they visited like Kuseir, Jabal Mousa, Hajilar, Sueydiye, Arsuz, Bayır, Bucak (in Latakia). They were cautious in making any discrimination towards those people and groups who wished to speak to them. Particularly, in the Antioch Lycée Boys Section, they spent eight hours interviewing each teacher one by one and they joined in each lecture in the Girls Section for one day.⁴¹³ On January 9, there was a strike of Turkish shopkeepers and a procession of Arab schoolchildren in Antioch.

On January 10, a clash between Turkish and Arab factions at Reyhaniye claimed twenty casualties and one fatality.⁴¹⁴ This was followed by a Turkish demonstration in Antioch, later a counterdemonstration of pro-Arabs on January 11 and again of 25,000 Turks on January 12. The Turkish demonstrators after singing

⁴⁰⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 24 Dec 1936, p.7.

⁴¹⁰ The observers were as follows: J. Caron, former governor of the island of Celebes; H. Holstad, the former president of the Commission for the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey; K. Wattenwyl, Colonel brigadier. *Cumhuriyet*, 22 Dec 1936, p.1.

⁴¹¹ Alexandre, p. 126.

⁴¹² The Arab Committee for the Defence of Alexandretta was founded by Fakhri al-Barudi in January 1937 in Damascus and was officially recognized by the Syrian government.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, p. 129.

⁴¹⁴ *Tan*, 13 Jan 1937, p.8; *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Jan 1937, p.1.

the Turkish national anthem shouted as “Long Live Atatürk”, “Long live Autonomous Hatay” and “Long Live the League of Nations”⁴¹⁵ whereas the slogans of the pro-Arab party were “Long Live Syria”, “Long live United Syria”, “Long Live Independent Syria”, “Long Live France”, “Long Live league of Nations” and “Long Live Zeki Arsuzi”.⁴¹⁶ The manifestations of especially the Turkish party were well planned and organized by the People's House but sometimes the weather conditions did not allow them to follow up the preparations in the intended way. One such instance occurred when the Turkish women were prepared for a demonstration between 11.00 and 13.00 p.m. but heavy snow averted them holding the intended show after which they all together went to a Turkish bath.⁴¹⁷ The Turkish press accused the local authorities of hindering the Turks from meeting the League Committee and not delivering the protest petitions to the Committee members. The local authorities were blamed for favouring the pro-Syrian party, who were argued to be transported from nearby Armenian and Arab towns and villages.⁴¹⁸

Related to these political performances, Alexandre, argued that “for the first time all the non-Turkish elements of the Sanjak united into a single pro-Syrian bloc.” His argument was based on an interesting incident in Antioch on 12 January when the Alawite Arabs held a prayer meeting in the Orthodox Christian Church in order to display their solidarity before the Committee and to emphasize their common Arab identity regardless of their religious loyalties.⁴¹⁹ Though at first sight this argument may seem irrelevant, yet this observation needs a critical elaboration since it points to an explicitly increasing trend in Antioch.

⁴¹⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Jan 1937, p.8.

⁴¹⁶ Alexandre, p. 127

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁴¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Jan 1937, p.1.

⁴¹⁹ Alexandre, p. 128.

The trend was the gradual formation of a critical distance between the Sunni Turcophone notable families and the French administration and the supporters of political autonomy for the Sanjak. The deliberate deviation of these notables away from the French and their increasing sympathy towards the pro-Turkish side had already started during the election process. The frequent news in the Turkish papers about the French removal of the Turkish officers from office and their replacement with non-Turkish and pro-French/pro-Syrian officials or their voluntary resignations particularly those of holding relatively higher posts corresponded to or at least coincided with this trend. The compulsory permit given to Süreyya Halef from the district governorship of Kırıkhan in November 1936 and the replacement of his post temporarily by the Kırıkhan court magistrate Sadık Mardini and later Halef's permanent removal from office in April 1937 and the substitution of his position by Selahattin Kuseyri⁴²⁰ coincided to the time of his involvement in the pro-Turkish party and becoming one of the Turkish representatives in Antioch in 1937.⁴²¹ Similarly, the removal of the Antioch public prosecutor Cemil Bahadır by the local authorities and his exile to Alexandretta, the resignation of the communal heads of Armenian-abundant areas like Hacılar and Ordu due to the French pressure for participation in the elections and their simultaneous rapprochement to the pro-Turkish claim may not be coincidental.⁴²² Nevertheless, there were still outstanding Sunni Turcophone figures like the mayor of Antioch, Hacı Ethem Civelek, and the two Antiochean deputies in the Syrian parliament, Kuseyri Mustafa and Adalı Hacı Mohammed, who were not alienated to the French in the sense of their close relatives

⁴²⁰ *El-Liwa*, 17 April 1937, p.1; *Akşam*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1; *Açıksöz*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1.

⁴²¹ Tekin, *Halefzade*, p.75.

⁴²² *Akşam*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1; *Açıksöz*, 17 Nov 1936, p.1.

did, and they continued to hold their administrative posts until the end of the Mandate. The underlying force of the reorientation of the political preferences of the urban elites was related to the uncertain political future of the Sanjak, which carried the potential of an inevitable reconfiguration of the prevailing power relations. Though a clear-cut expectation regarding the future of the Sanjak was difficult to make even by the Turkish State officials, the local and international atmosphere signalled that it would be the Turkish claims, which would be accomplished. Accordingly, the urban elites who were anxious to lose their economic power and social influence regarding urban affairs found their interests on the side of Turkey. The establishment of more solid and ideological links between the Turkish state and the Sanjak Sunni Turcophone elites was an attempt to continue the existing status quo in the society on the part of them. Hence, they felt obliged to enter into the newly institutionalizing political and social networks in order to survive.

The Turkish nationalist ideology turned into a tool in the hands of some of the Sunni Turkish notables to sustain their legitimacy in the society. As mentioned earlier, the near absence of a political, social and cultural polarization and factionalism among the Sunni Turcophone notables was characteristic of the elites of Antioch. Especially, Türkmen, Bereket, Kuseyri and Yahyaoglu (Adalı) were close relatives due to complex marriage undertakings and they had not been isolated and estranged from each other even after 1936. The ideology of Turkish nationalism did not necessarily create a physical distance and hostility between the notables. The role played by Türkmens (headed by Abdülgani Türkmen the leader of the People's House) with Kuseyris and Berekets, was also detrimental in the rapprochement. The long night talks by Türkmen to Kuseyri Mustafa in order to persuade him that it would be the Turkish Republic who would be on the winning side in the near future

proved to be ineffective primarily by the participation of Kuseyri Mustafa as a candidate in the 1936 elections and Kuseyri Alaaddin as the governor of Kırıkhan.

The incident which happened in front of the house of Kuseyri and Adalı after the elections that generated three Turkish fatalities was a very upsetting event for Türkmen.⁴²³ The terminology of the urban elites of Antioch in the description of this unpleasant event drew attention more to the mob and to the irrationally radical character of the crowd than to the Turkish nationalist aspect emphasized in the Turkish press.⁴²⁴ The elite's narrative of the incident raises another significant yet underestimated character of the nationalist movements, in particular the Turkish nationalist movement in Antioch. It is the cooptation of the middle class nationalists by the established aristocratic class. I argue that the Turkish nationalist ideology among the Turkish elites helped to strengthen the already existing bonds within themselves and to ensure their families' leading roles in the reshaping political structure in the Sanjak. Paradoxically, the new nationalist organizations had both carried the nucleus of breaking the monopoly of the traditional elites on authority, but at the same time they relied on the power, influence and networks of some factions of the traditional elite to materialize their claims. Namely, on the one hand, the nationalism of the middle class youth was conceived as a progressive ideology breaking the power of the *ağas* and the Sunni *ulema* associated with them. On the other hand, the notable families like the Turkmenzade, Mürselzade and Miskioglu turned out to be the leaders of the Turkish nationalist organizations in Antioch and the Sanjak. As mentioned previously, the participants of the new nationalist organizations were not only the young generation of the notable families but also

⁴²³ Afife Zade, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001.

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

non-elite people involved in varying degrees in each ethnic group. The new nationalist organizations induced the expansion of political participation and utilized networks other than the customary bonds of patronage and consanguinity. The new forms of mobilization and organization paved the way for the marginalization, recontextualization, and integration of traditional and parochial modes of organizations, a process which had already started in the mid-1930s. New bonds of vertical loyalty had already begun to be formed in the newly opened cafés, souqs or schools. In this way, they had helped in the gradual erosion of the vertical loyalties and parochial modes of organization.

However, the notable families acknowledged that the emerging social forces were a threat to their hegemony, the solution of which was co-opting them. They sought subordinates whose services proved indispensable for intervening in the expanding middle class and public sphere. The process by which the notables of Antioch attempted to contain the political activity of the middle class is not peculiar to the nationalist movement in Antioch but intrinsic to other nationalist movements in other colonial and non-colonial contexts, like the western case where the ancien régime of Europe retained so much of its authority and power despite the transformation of Europe's class structure.⁴²⁵ Watenpaugh raises the same issue in the context of Aleppo under the French Mandate. He examines the relationship between Edmond Rabbath, a 26 year-old Greek Orthodox lawyer and Sadallah Jabiri, 36 year-old Istanbul educated leader of a branch of the notable family Jabiri. He argues that Rabbath served as Jabiri's intellectual dragoman and provided Jabiri with an ideological basis for justifying his and his notable family's continued hegemony

⁴²⁵ Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

through translating the Ottoman basis of Jabiri's authority into a recognizably modern vernacular of power.⁴²⁶ Like the young middle class of Antioch in the liberal professions, Rabbath often mentioned the reactionary tendencies of the aristocratic notability contrary to both the ends of democracy and the goals of the power of the middle class; nevertheless, he chose to collaborate with them like his Antiochean counterparts.⁴²⁷

The New Regime

At the Council of the League of Nations, which met in Geneva on 21 January, French premier Leon Blum revealed a major change in French policy.⁴²⁸ It was a compromise plan to satisfy the Turkish government by setting up an autonomous regime in a demilitarized Sanjak and guaranteeing the right for Turkey to use the port of Alexandretta. An agreement on the future status of the Sanjak was reached on 27 January 1937. The result was celebrated with enthusiasm in the Turkish press and Istanbul radio, which had recently begun to make Arabic broadcasting.⁴²⁹

Accordingly, the Sanjak would be a separate entity enjoying full independence in its internal affairs, but the State of Syria would be responsible for its foreign affairs.

Turkish would be an official language along with another language decided by the League. The Sanjak would be demilitarized. Turkey would obtain certain rights and facilities in the port of Alexandretta. The Statute and the Fundamental Law of the

⁴²⁶ Keith David Watenpugh *Bourgeois Modernity, Historical Memory, and Imperialism: The Emergence of an Urban Middle Class in the Late Ottoman and Inter-War Middle East Aleppo, 1908-1939* (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1999), p. 210.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁴²⁸ For the full text of Leon Blum's letter see, *L'Asie Française*, 37, (March 1937), p. 79.

⁴²⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 27,28,29, 30 Jan 1937, p.1; *Tan*, 27 Jan 1937, p.1.

Sanjak would enter into force as soon as the Council so decided.⁴³⁰ A Committee of Experts was appointed by the League to discuss the statute (the international charter) and the fundamental law (internal organization) of the Sanjak.

In the Report of Experts, two issues led to controversy between the Turkish side and the experts: The issue of the second official language and the dispute on the three districts Bayır, Bucak (al-Akrad) and Basit.⁴³¹ On 29 May 1937, the League approved the Report of the Experts and November 29 was set as the date for the establishment of the new regime of the Sanjak. Accordingly, the Sanjak was recognized as a distinct entity enjoying full independence in its internal affairs, and its foreign relations were to be conducted by Syria. The Council of the League would appoint a supervisory delegate of French nationality to serve as a liaison between the league and the Sanjak. Sanjak citizenship would imply Syrian citizenry, Syrian passports would be issued to Sanjak citizens but no international agreement that might affect the independence and sovereignty of Syria would apply to the Sanjak without the prior consent of the League. The Sanjak would be demilitarized and only local forces would be organized. Elections to the Sanjak's legislative assembly, which would consist of a chamber of forty members elected for four years, would be based upon a system of proportional representation.⁴³²

With the approval of the Geneva Accord of 29 May 1937, the sovereignty of Syria over the Sanjak was reduced to a minimum and the first stage of the Sanjak's separation from Syria was complete.⁴³³ The president of the League Council of Experts appointed a five member Commission to prepare for the first elections to the

⁴³⁰ Sanjian, p. 115- 116.

⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 122- 123.

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 507.

Assembly of the Sanjak to be held on April 1938, including French and Turkish representatives to be sent out to the Sanjak to supervise the registration.

The January report was celebrated with great and well-organized demonstrations in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Konya, Denizli and Izmit.⁴³⁴ In the meantime, the names of some Istanbul pastry shops were changed to “Hatay”, projects were proposed for the foundation of Hatay Bank, or Turkish sport teams were sent to Hatay for sportive activity.⁴³⁵ The local Sanjak administration, especially Husnu Barazi and Antioch governor Hacı Edhem, together with the pro-Arab faction of the population, were blamed for undertaking misleading action and propaganda. They were accused of preparing false reports and sending them by gendarmes and tax collectors to the villages for conformation. The fake reports had stated that the Hatay people were not content with the new agreement and wished to be attached to Damascus instead of Ankara. The Turkish press was anxious about those presumptuous propagandists, who claimed that the final accord in the League was a preliminary step in the annexation of the Sanjak by Turkey which would bring about the subjugation of the non- Turkish population to the Turkification processes.⁴³⁶ The names of “fake deputies” were declared in the press, which served to display the list of the “others” of the official Turkish nationalist discourse: Adalı Hacı Mehmed, mayor of Antioch Hacı Edhem, Kuseyri Salahaddin (governor of Kırıkhan), Kuseyri Dr. Mithat, Armenian deputy Moses der Kalosyan, lawyer Izmirliyani, deputy Sadık Maruf (Cilli), Antioch governor Abdülkadir Asvat, gendarme commander captain Münir, police head Karabet, Rabi Örfi, Salih Ali, Sanjak minister of Finance Hüsnu Cebbare, Sanjak finance inspector Fuad Cebbare,

⁴³⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 30, 31 Jan.11937, p.1; *Tan*, 30 Jan 1937, p.1.

⁴³⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 31 Jan 1937, p. 7; 9 Feb 1937, p.1; 13 Feb 1937, p. 1.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 14 Feb 1937, p.1

leader of the organization Kavmi (*Usbat*) Zeki (Arsuzi), Nuri İskif, public prosecutor Damascene Emin Caferi, Damascene Selahaddin, and Memduh Selim of Hoybun.⁴³⁷

Concurrently, the Geneva Accord of May 29 precipitated alarm and induced serious outburst in Syria. The popularity of the National Bloc acquired by the Franco-Syrian treaty began to turn into disillusionment and suspicion; and the power of the National Bloc began to decline.⁴³⁸ Khoury argues that Mardam Bey had already written of the Sanjak and chose to use it as a bargaining point to extract further concessions from the French.⁴³⁹ Nevertheless, the Arab nationalist youth as well as the Syrian Chamber protested against the Geneva decisions' severing from Syria a large area and endowing it with complete autonomy. The Committee for the Defence of Alexandretta organized large demonstrations in Damascus that claimed to fight for the dignity and unity of Syria on June 3 and June 7.⁴⁴⁰ The French were accused of duplicity and there was an increasing mistrust of the French in Damascus.⁴⁴¹ Dr. Shahbandar, the president of the Committee for the Defence of Alexandretta, denounced the "glaring inconsistency of the Turks" and stated that, "If this is the end of the mandate, it is the beginning of colonization."⁴⁴²

The atmosphere in the Sanjak following the Geneva Accords was rather calm, yet the tension in Antioch began to increase with the approaching meeting in Geneva in May. At the time, a general amnesty was announced to 42 Syrian political activists, including Dr. Shahbandar.⁴⁴³ The Arab representatives of the Arab community of the Sanjak during their meetings in Antioch prepared a resolution

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 15 Feb 1937, p.7.

⁴³⁸ Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 209.

⁴³⁹ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 506.

⁴⁴⁰ *Great Britain and the East*, no.38, (June 17), 1937, p. 859.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Sanjian, p. 137.

⁴⁴³ Alexandre, p. 131.

stating that they would disobey the government emerging from the new Statute, obstruct its activities in every manner and pay their taxes directly to the Syrian government at Damascus.⁴⁴⁴ Hüsnü Barazi, the Sanjak guardian, appealed to the Sanjak people for unity and claimed that the Arabs of Syria were ready to defend their rights in the territory with their blood.⁴⁴⁵ Hasan Cebbare, the Sanjak Minister of Finance, prepared a memorandum, which proposed certain modifications to the Geneva accord.⁴⁴⁶ The announcement of the Geneva decision was protested by the pro-Arab population of the Sanjak through telegrams to Beirut and Geneva and subsequently the Arab souqs of Antioch were closed between 24 and 27 May.⁴⁴⁷ On May 22, the Alawite Arabs invited the Orthodox Christians of the city to attend to one of their religious ceremonies. The scouts from Aleppo were also present in the meeting where dispute was commonplace between the Turks and the Antiochene Scouts especially at night. On 31 May, the Arab souqs of Alexandretta, Sueydiye and Antioch were all closed despite the atmosphere of joy and rejoice prevailing among the pro-Turkish population. There occurred frequent clashes especially in the pro-Turkish village of Kuseyr; Şirince and Karbeyaz.

On June 4, the 5th French Battalion intervened in a violent clash where ten people were injured and one was seriously injured. The incident occurred between the Tourism Hotel and the Orontes Bridge when some pro-Turks sang Turkish patriotic songs in an Arab quarter and were attacked by some members of *Usbat*. Following this incident, the souqs of Arabs and Turks were both closed and it became nearly impossible for Turks to pass through an Arab neighbourhood and vice

⁴⁴⁴ Sanjian, p. 132.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 133. Quoted from G. Izmirlian, "Aperçu général sur l question du Sandjak d'Alexandrette", Unpublished study, Damascus, 1945, 49 pages. Izmirlian, a supporter of Tashnaks, was the lawyer in Alexandretta.

⁴⁴⁷ Du Véou, *Desastre*, p. 75.

versa.⁴⁴⁸ These days are remembered primarily as the period leading to increased spatial segregation between the ethnic groups. The Lycée and the areas around the Bridge were held by Christian and Alawite Arabs. The French acted as a buffer zone in between. Nevertheless it was some fifteen days before the Arab population could pass through the Turkish side where the souqs were also located.

Despite these disturbances, the French put in effort to enforce of the Sanjak's new regime. Roger Garreau, former French consulate in Egypt, was appointed as the new delegate in the Sanjak to replace M. Durieux, who resigned from the position he had held for fourteen years.⁴⁴⁹ Garreau met with the notables and chiefs of different quarters of Antioch and appealed for their cooperation.⁴⁵⁰ His first activity was to remove the Sanjak's Arab governor, Husnu Barazi, for mishandling his province and defying the Turkish element. Nevertheless, the Turkish papers and the government protested against the reorganization of the local administration as being contrary to the regulations of the new regime. They accused Garreau of anti-Turkishness and of supporting the non-Turks by still appointing anti-Turkish Syrian officials, non-Turkish gendarmes and arming non-Turkish villages.

The pro-Turkish representatives' of the Sanjak, Abdülğani Türkmen, Şükrü Balcı and Abdurrahman Melek, took refuge in Dörtyol⁴⁵¹ and Garreau brought in troops in order to reduce Turkish pressure. Especially during the days preceding the official establishment of the new regime in November 29, the repression of political activists and parties increased. The political repression was not peculiar to the pro-Turkish party of the Sanjak, but also the pro-Arab faction, the *Usbat*, and its leaders were intimidated and threatened with closure under the new delegate. Under the

⁴⁴⁸ Alexandre, p. 132-134.

⁴⁴⁹ *Tan*, 24 July 1937, p.1

⁴⁵⁰ *Correspondance d'Orient*, "Au Sandjak d'Alexandretta", p. 470.

⁴⁵¹ *Tan*, 13 Aug 1937, p.1.

order of Garreau, the *Usbat* was closed down and its leader, al-Arsuzi, was arrested.⁴⁵² The Turkish youth who travelled to the villages of Antioch to teach Turkish language were given penalties. It seems that the new delegate somewhat attempted to curb the radical factions in the Sanjak rather than following a peculiar anti-Turkish or an anti-Arab policy. Though impossible to recover the communal hostilities that have formed and been forming through such measures, he tried to enlarge the area of movement for the moderates.

The overcritical disagreement at both the local and international levels began over the electoral regulations, which were set as the primary necessity in the implementation of the League's decision of May 29. The League had transferred the organization and supervision of the elections to an international commission, which stayed in the Sanjak between 20 October and 9 November and prepared the draft of the electoral law. By this time, the anxiety of invasion, the fear of the possibility of resubjection to mass execution, the dissatisfaction and weariness of the disorder and violence in everyday activities stimulated those people to look for other solutions for sustaining their living. The trend of emigration rose once again. 116 families of Arabs and anti-Kemalists had already emigrated from the Sanjak to Syria; others were waiting their turn, yet still unsure. The forthcoming electoral proceedings would help them to make their decisions in favour of leaving.⁴⁵³

The Elections: Persuasion or Coercion

Upon the arrival of the electoral commission to the Sanjak, the dates for

⁴⁵² *Tan*, 14 Oct 1937, p.8.

⁴⁵³ Du Véou, *Désastre*, p. 67- 68.

electoral proceedings were announced. Accordingly, the registration of electors would begin on January 15, 1938, and end on February 20. The first degree of elections in the Sanjak was to be held on March 28 and the second degree to be completed on April 15. The peculiar characteristics of the regulations were that the constituencies were divided along both racial and linguistic lines into six communities, namely Turkish, Alawite, Arab, Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Kurdish. A seventh unit was designated as Other Communities. The representation of each community in the assembly was proportional to the number of names registered in each community. Therefore, registration in terms of number was regarded as a very important preliminary step before the first elections.⁴⁵⁴ The division of the population according to both race and ethnicity in the electoral regulations was seriously criticized by the pro-Syrian and autonomist Arabs since it considered the Alawites as a separate group from the Christian and Sunni Arabs. *Al-Uruba*, the pro-Arab newspaper under al-Arsuzi's guidance which began its publication on 30 October 1937 in Antioch, called attention to the issue of separation of Alawites from the Arabs in its issues between 21 -29 January 1938. The newspaper underlined the relationship between the categorization of the commission and the efforts of the Turkish state to define the Alawites as Hittite Turks.⁴⁵⁵

Simultaneously, Turkey, having objected the schedule and the electoral regulations on certain points, demanded a change in the method of registration of electors and forwarded the electoral report back to Geneva. Originally, the electors had to declare the community to which they claimed to belong; the electoral law required particulars of space, year and where possible date of birth, and occupation.

⁴⁵⁴ Khadduri, pp. 420- 422.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 420; Watenpaugh, "Creating Phantoms", p. 372.

Turkey called for the acceptance of the applicant's unsupported self-declaration as sufficient for registration. A new compromise was reached between France and Turkey on March 1938 in the Council of the League. The League appointed a new electoral commission, including Turkish and French representatives to be sent to the Sanjak to supervise the elections. In addition to this, the most striking change in the new regulations was about the registration of voters. The new regulations stated that the registrants no longer had to provide evidence of their ethnic or religious origins. However, there was no question of the registration of electors from each community, which was to govern the distribution of assembly seats amongst the various communities, would be the decisive stage in the entire electoral proceedings.⁴⁵⁶ Regardless of the registration, five of these communities were assured a minimum number of deputies: Turkish 8, Alawite 6, Arab 2, Armenian 2, and Greek Orthodox 1. The date of the first elections was postponed to 15 July 1938. Registration was resumed on May 3.⁴⁵⁷

Turkey and its local representatives exerted great effort to secure an absolute majority in the registrations, but in spite of all the intimidation and manipulation they resorted to, they were not able to achieve the intended majority when the registration was resumed in May 1938. Neither the bribery through Turkish funds nor coercion worked. The calls from *Yenigün* as "Call yourself Turkish" (*Türk yazıl*) did not help.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, the convoys of Sanjak-born Turks, then residents in Turkey, who were asked to return to the district to register and participate in the forthcoming elections, were not enough to surpass the number of the non-Turkish population. Only five percent of the Arabs, no Armenians and no Syrian Christians registered

⁴⁵⁶ For a detailed description and comment on the electoral regulations, see Weisband, pp.182-200.

⁴⁵⁷ League of Nations, Question of Alexandretta Final Regulations for the First Elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, 19 Mar 1938; *Tan* 16 Dec 1937, p.1. d

⁴⁵⁸ *Yenigün*, 28 April 1938, p.1.

themselves as Turks. Most of the Alawites, Kurds and Circassians registered within their own communities and the conservative Turks took advantage of the existence of the category for "Other Communities" and registered themselves as Sunni Muslims.⁴⁵⁹

In the Sanjak, the propaganda and intimidation intensified and gained new momentum after the League approval of the new electoral regulations. The pro-Turkish party, demanding complete and unequivocal independence for the Sanjak, increased its activities in a number of ways and in many directions. Its primary aim was to increase as much as possible the number of people who would declare themselves as "Turkish" in the forthcoming elections. At the same time, it initiated a program to create consent within the Sanjak people that the improvement of the Sanjak was in the hands of the Republic of Turkey. In order to achieve its end, which had indeed been on its agenda since the beginning of 1936 elections, persuasion, coercion and seduction were all exploited in varying degrees towards different groups of people in different contexts.

The pro-Turkish activities were aimed at obtaining the support of both the non-Turkish communities and the conservative Turkish community, which was hostile towards the Kemalist reforms. It asked for the approval of both the elites and non-elites of each community and followed different strategies and employed different local discourses towards the elites and subordinate classes of each ethnic and religious community. They took into consideration the local internal dynamics and the social organization of communities while making the necessary negotiations. In general, persuasion and seduction were used for the elites of the Alawite, urban Christian and the Armenian communities; and coercion and repression for the non-

⁴⁵⁹ *Great Britain and the East*, 30 June 1938, p. 727; Sanjian, p. 156; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 509.

elites of especially the Alawites and Sunni Arabs of Amik. Nevertheless, the Turkish action predominantly targeted the 62,000 Alawites of the Sanjak, who were referred to as “our Alawite Turkish brothers”, relying on the knowledge that they formed the most impotent and powerless section of the Sanjak population with minimum alternatives.⁴⁶⁰

Although the division of labour between the elites and the non-elites of the pro-Turkish party was not as strict and rigid as described here, in general, the Turkish urban elites around the People’s House in Antioch undertook the task of persuasion of the notables of the non-Turkish communities as well as the conservative Turkish notables. They employed their prevailing networks in order to negotiate with the Alawite notables (most of them were sheikhs) and to a lesser degree with the Christian urban notables. The news about the Ankara visits of the Alawite sheikhs who came to a consensus with the pro-Turks appeared more frequently starting from the end of 1937 in the local paper *Yenigün*. Those Alawites who began to take sides with the pro-Turkish party added the prefix of *Eti Türk* (Hittite-Turkish) and most of the time their surnames were replaced by another surname acknowledging the Turkishness and the Turkish origins of the Alawites as displayed in the case of Alexandretta Alawite Sheikh Hayyat: “The Alexandretta-Hittite mufti Mr. Sheikh Abdulhamit Hayyat and his son, and Mr. Sheikh Selim Hayyat” left the city for Ankara”.⁴⁶¹ One month later, Sheikh Hayyat returned to

⁴⁶⁰ In the meantime, Turkey launched a campaign in order to prove the Turkishness of the Alawites and that they formed the indigenous population of the area. Afet İnan’s conference on the Hittites at the University of Geneva (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Feb 1937, p.2.); and the speech of Şükrü Kaya at the Adana People’s House which proposed for the abolition of the backward Ottoman words like *fellah* and *Alawite* since they provoked segregation between the people who in reality belonged to the same race., *Cumhuriyet*, 9 Mar 1937, p.3. These are some examples of the Turkish attempt of cooptation of the Alawites of the Sanjak and of Adana.

⁴⁶¹ *Yenigün*, 5 Feb 1938, p.2.

Alexandretta with a new surname, with new political engagements and its corresponding symbol world.

Sheikh Abdulhamid Tümkaya- Alexandretta Hittite Religion leader, was greeted in Alexandretta with an exceptional ceremony. He arrived to the city with a ferry of Turkish Sea Lines. He has adopted the surname "Tümkaya". Upon his arrival, he directly visited the Turkish consulate and the People's House and sent a telegram to Şükrü Kaya.⁴⁶²

However, the process of persuasion was not attractive to a significant number of Sanjak notables who were already organized around the party *İttihad-ı Anasır* in July 1937. They championed the autonomy of the Sanjak, and supported a territorial nationalism for the prevalence of the status quo. The party, which was acknowledged as the "party of the local government", had branches in Antioch, Reyhaniye, Suveydiye and Alexandretta.⁴⁶³ Some of the proponents of the party were Şahin Cebbare, Hasan Cebbare, Kuseyri Mustafa, Kırıkhan municipality doctor Liyon Minasiyan, Edward Noun (the owner of the newspaper *al-Liwa*), Reyhaniye Armenian priest, Minister of Finance tax collector Yusuf Galip and İsmail Maruf, Antioch clerk Sadık Maruf, Doctor Albert Beyluni and some Orthodox youth, two ağas from Harim Ali Bermeda and Ahmet Mustafa Bermeda, İbrahim Tuhani (one of the Alawite sheikhs of Harbiye), Sheikh Ali Garip, Mehmet Köse Diyap, some Circassian notables, Kurd Koço, Moses Derkalosyan, Edhem Civelek and Salahaddin Kuseyri.

Although the *İttihad-ı Anasır* did not politically address the pro-Syrian youth of *Usbat*, there was an intense rivalry between the two groups over winning the support of the Alawite peasantry and the maltreated Sunni Arab peasantry in

⁴⁶² *Yenigün*, 10 Mar 1938, p.2. "Şeyh Abdülhamit Tümkaya İskenderun'da görülmemiş bir merasimle karşılandı. İskenderun Eti Dini başkanı Türkiye Deniz Yolları idaresinin bir vapuru ile İskenderuna gelmiştir. Tümkaya soyadını almıştır. Doğrudan doğruya Türk konsolosunu ve Halkevini ziyaret etmiştir. Şükrü Kaya'ya telgraf çekmiştir."

⁴⁶³ *Yenigün*, 5 Feb 1938, p.2

Reyhaniye. Most of the time, there was verbal dispute between the two via the newspapers *al-Liwa* and *al-Uruba*. *Al-Uruba* accused the “Sanjak Union” of conservatism and mismanagement of the Sanjak. There occurred also public clashes like the one between *Usbat* leader Mehmet Ali Zarqa and Unionist Dr. Beyluni⁴⁶⁴; or the case brought by Dr. Beyluni against the *al-Uruba* director Elseyyid Suphi Zahir who was finally sentenced for two months jail⁴⁶⁵; or the trial of *Usbat* members Mehmet Ali Zarqa, İlyas Saba Levend and Celal Hannuf for their harassment of the reports of *İttihad-ı Anasır*.⁴⁶⁶ The delegate Garreau’s closing down of the *Usbat* Antioch headquarters and the arrest of Arsuzi, Subhi Zahir and Cebrail Nakul did not exhaust the violent atmosphere prevailing among the *Usbat*, *İttihad-ı Anasır* and the pro-Turkish party, especially during the days preceding the May elections.⁴⁶⁷

In order to be able to set the non-Turkish subordinate population to register themselves as Turks, put otherwise, to choose Republican Turkey over Arab Syria, coercion, repression and seduction were the methods utilized by the pro-Turkish faction towards the Arab population whether they were pro-Syrian or not. Particularly, in the relatively peripheral and rural parts of Antioch, the level of coercion into submission was more threatening. The Electoral commission as early as 1937 had ascertained that the Turkish ağas of the Amik district on whose lands Sunni or Alawite Arab and Kurdish peasants worked, threatened these workers to register themselves as Turks and during the electoral proceedings pressured and used violence for the same end otherwise be driven off the land.⁴⁶⁸ The pages of *al-Liwa*

⁴⁶⁴ *Yenigün*, 26 Jan 1938, p.2.

⁴⁶⁵ *Yenigün*, 27 Jan 1938, p.2

⁴⁶⁶ *Yenigün*, 3 Feb 1938, p.2

⁴⁶⁷ *Atayolu*, 26 May 1938, p.1.

⁴⁶⁸ Sanjian, p. 154.

and *al-Uruba* were full of such incidents where especially the Arabs in Reyhaniye were attacked, discarded and insulted by their respective Turkish ağa.⁴⁶⁹

Seduction was another tool utilized by the Turkish state and pro-Turkish party in their encounter with especially the rural and non-politicized Alawite population of the district. The Turkish propagandists did not exclusively rely on the mediation of the ağas in order to confront and finally co-opt the Alawite peasantry. They did not solely view the peasant through the patronage of the ağa. Instead, they played out such a strategy that in the discursive level, they tried to disjoin the ağa from the peasants; yet at the same time they adapted the shortcut and utilized the influence of the Alawite ağa over his peasants, on the condition of his being a “Hittite-Turkish Alawite ağa”. “The praiseworthy Hittite Turks arriving from Adana to undertake their national duties”⁴⁷⁰ undertook a significant role in the pro-Turkish propaganda among the Alawites of Antioch. The discourse of the propaganda employed by these visitors focused on the suffering that the Antiochean Alawites experienced under the Ottoman and French rules and the much better conditions that those Alawites from Adana had been living under the Turkish rule. The Turkish rule was presented as the only salvation from the poor conditions they endured. The structure of landownership, landlessness and the power of the Sunni urban notables were blamed for the economic impoverishment and degradation of the Alawites of Antioch. Turkey was celebrated for its abolition of the power of the big landowners and the Sunni religious establishment. Even, in some cases, Atatürk was argued to

⁴⁶⁹ *Yenigün*, 9 April 1938, p.2.

⁴⁷⁰ *Yenigün*, 19 April 1938, p.2.

belong to the Alawite sect.⁴⁷¹ In the same way, Syria was blamed, due to the Sunni origin of the National Bloc, for the disturbances and the prevailing uncertainty in the country.

Although coreligionist, the ağas were blamed as the source of poverty of the Alawite peasants, these very same people were drawn into negotiations to turn in favour of Turkey due to their influence over the local population. In other words, while the Antiochean pro-Turkish urban notables engaged in constant negotiation with the Alawite notables based on the knowledge that the guarantee of the peasants' calling and registering themselves as Turkish passed through the ağa, a group of young Turkey arrivals or members of the indigenous population tried to seduce the Turkish rule among the Alawite peasants.

Above all, the tension in the streets and neighbourhoods of Antioch reached its peak. Street fights were commonplace; spatial segregation was becoming more explicit day by day. The fighters of both parties were mostly artisans, local toughs, shopkeepers and the unemployed. One of the interviewees recalled the daily violent clashes between the pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish forces as an evil propaganda, which underlies the exodus of the educated and civic upper-class Christian notables from Antioch to Syria and Lebanon.

Hamit Urfalı is a chauffeur. He is from Amik. Later, he became a leader. Politics was left to him. In those days, a few porters were making propaganda in the souq as following: "Turkey will come; we will take your property and your daughters"... Eighty percent of the Christians in the souq were ignorant... They were furious about them...Politics was left to this and that person. A few chauffeurs, porters and vagabonds...Politics was like that

⁴⁷¹ Sheikh Fadil, interview by author, tape recording, Harbiye (Antioch), June 2001.

then... Every time a disagreement rose, the city was closed. They were all beaten up because all of them were left in the Turkish quarter.”⁴⁷²

The manipulations in the registration process under the supervision of the local forces, the fraudulent documents of the Turkish immigrants, who were at least 3,000 in number, and hundreds of Arabs arriving from Syria and Lebanon under the supervision of local authorities, formed an important source of tension in Antioch and the Sanjak.⁴⁷³ The Sanjak-born new arrivals comprised of the “Cilician Alawites, the dearest of the Turkish community”⁴⁷⁴ as well as the Republican school graduated state officials, teachers, dyers, doctors, and carpenters whose advertisements appeared in *Yenigün*.⁴⁷⁵ The Turkish government issued orders announcing that civil officials that were sent to Turkey were allowed to be on leave for two years and paid in foreign currency and that the final exam dates of the Hatay-born university students had been postponed.⁴⁷⁶ New conflicts and divisions were added to the existing violence in the city due to the reconfiguration of political identities among ethnic groups, especially of the Alawites under the escalating Turkish propaganda. There occurred violent quarrels between the pro-Turkish Alawites and pro-Arab Alawites in the Antioch Alawite quarters of Orhaniye, Dörtayak and Affan as well as in Sueydiyye. The proponents of *Usbat* attacked the pro-Turkish Alawite sheikhs Mehmet Derviş Künefeci, Edip Gali and Cemil Alya in their visits to an Alawite

⁴⁷² Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001. “*Amik Hamit Urfalı bir şoför. Sonra, lider oldu. Şoför onlar, siyaseten ona bırakmışlar... O zaman bunlar bir kaç Tane hammal, Çarşı’da propoganda yapıyorlar. Türkiye gelecek, sizin malınızı, kızlarınızı alacağız...Ordaki çarşıda çalışanlar, yüzde sekseni cahil bunların. Korktular bunlar... Hallu culluya bırakmışlar bu siyaseti. Birkaç Tane şoför, birkaçTane hamal, birkaç Tane kopuk...Siyaset o zaman böyle Bir zaman bir anlaşmazlık oluyor. Şehir kapatılıyor. Onlar hepsi, dayak yiyorlar orda. Çünkü orda hepsi Türk.*”

⁴⁷³ Khoury, *Syria*, p. 508; *Yenigün*, 28 April 1938, p.3, *al-Liwa*, 28 April 1938.

⁴⁷⁴ *Yenigün*, 8 April 1938, p.2.

⁴⁷⁵ *Yenigün*, 17.Feb 1938, p.3, 20 Feb 1938,

⁴⁷⁶ *Cumhuriyet* Arsivi (Republican Archives), 22 Feb 1938, 18 Mar 1938, 5 May 1938, 12 Nov 1938, File: 402-41, no: 2/8229, 2/8315, 2/8746, 2/9856.

village for propaganda.⁴⁷⁷ The houses of Hittite Turk leaders were attacked.⁴⁷⁸ The daily *Usbat*- Hitite Turk quarrel in Dörtayak turned into a violent clash which resulted in two fatalities and the declaration of martial law in Antioch by Gareaux. The incident occurred close to the Hittite Turks' café *Köroğlu* in Dörtayak, the meeting place of the pro-Turkish Alawites similar to the café *Mihail Vekil* of the proponents of *Usbat*.⁴⁷⁹

The outbreaks of violence were so often and the chaos resulting from attacks and counter-attacks was so disturbing that Moroccan and Senegalese troops were sent into the city on May 11 and very strict controls were exercised on political parties.⁴⁸⁰ The final big step of Turkey, which was declared on May 28 after the backfire of the pro-Turkish party in the May registrations which was either silenced or misrepresented in the Turkish and the pro-Turkish Sanjak presses⁴⁸¹ could not even hold an immediate pompous resonance among the Sanjak public.⁴⁸² On May 28, it was announced in Turkey that the French had guaranteed a Turkish majority of 22 seats out of 40 in the future Sanjak Assembly. It was indeed the result of a private arrangement, or "Gentlemen's Agreement", between the French Foreign Minister Tessan and Turkish Prime Minister Menemencioğlu in March 1938 in Geneva.⁴⁸³ Alongside the predetermined conclusion of the outcome of the August elections, the Turkish troop movements on the Turkish borders and an aggressive Ankara⁴⁸⁴, a futile Paris and a chaotic Syria, the near future of the Sanjak was clear.

⁴⁷⁷ *Yenigün*, 3 May 1938, p.1.

⁴⁷⁸ *Atayolu*, 17 May 1938, p.1; *Yenigün*, 8 Mar 1938, p.2.

⁴⁷⁹ *Yenigün*, 7 May 1938, p.2.

⁴⁸⁰ *Atayolu*, 23 May-3 June, 1938.

⁴⁸¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1938, p.1.

⁴⁸² *Atayolu*, 29 May 1938, p.1. The headline of the newspaper was only "The Turkish Republic has decided to settle Hatay dispute in a clear-cut way." (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hatay meselesini kati surette halle karar verdi.*)

⁴⁸³ Weisband, "The Sanjak", p. 201; Khadduri, "Alexandretta Dispute", p. 422; Abdullatif Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Syria* (London, 1969), p.353

⁴⁸⁴ Republican Archives, 29 June 1938, File: 49-20, no: 2/9376.

The French replacement in early June of the delegate Garreau by Captain Collet, who was known to be much more sympathetic to Turkish interests in the Sanjak, was no more than a further step of favouring Turkey in conformity with the French policy in Paris. In this way, the relative deprivation period for the autonomist urban notables started under the pro-Turkish policies of Collet. He replaced a number of pro-Turkish officials from the People's House in the local administration. Abdurrahman Melek was placed as the Sanjak governor (*umum vali*) on June 5 Süreyya Halef as the district governor of Antioch (*kaymakam*), and Vedi Münir Karabay as the Antioch mayor.⁴⁸⁵ For the non-Turkish officials and the community, the situation was worse. Circassian gendarmes, who were registered in the Turkish community, were recruited to guard voting bureaus under the supervision of Moroccan soldiers. Pro-Syrian Alawite officials were replaced with pro-Turkish Alawites. Most of the Arab and Armenian officers were removed and the pro-Turkish party was favoured in their movement for propaganda.⁴⁸⁶ In mid June, he closed down *Usbat* and arrested its leader, Zaki al-Arsuzi. The Arab quarters of Antioch were shut down completely in protest against these measures until the Moroccan troops were sent into the quarters on June 28. The Turkish atrocities against the Alawite, Armenian and Christian communities increased. The new governor, Abdurrahman Melek, was unable to prevent the Turkish atrocities against the Alawites and the Armenians in Jabal Mousa.⁴⁸⁷ Neither his civic image nor his elite networks with the Christian notables of Antioch were constructive of peace in the city after an incident in which some pro-Turkish urban tough marked and labelled

⁴⁸⁵ Tekin, *Hatay*, p. 193.

⁴⁸⁶ *Atayolu*, 5 June 1938, p.1; Sanjian, p. 164; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 510.

⁴⁸⁷ Paul du Véou, *Chrétiens en péril au Moussadagh! Enquête au Sandjak d'Alexandrette*, (Paris: Editions Baudimière, 1939), p. 189-190.

the houses of some Antiochean Christians with red crosses.⁴⁸⁸ The League Electoral commission left the Sanjak toward the end of the June, after which the French military command authorized the entry of Turkish troops into the Sanjak on June 5.⁴⁸⁹ The League appointed a new registration committee of which 3 of the 4 members were Turkish. On August 30, the new election results were announced. The pro-Turkish party showed a 63 percent majority with the French grant of 22 seats out of 40. Nine seats were granted to the Alawites, 5 to the Armenians, 2 to the Greek Orthodox and 2 to the Sunni Muslim Arabs.⁴⁹⁰ The assembly of the Hatay met on 2 September 1938. Significantly enough, Hacı Mehmed Adali opened up the Hatay assembly as he had the Syrian parliament in Damascus being the eldest deputy of both. Tayfur Sökmen was elected as the President of Hatay and Abdülgani Türkmen as the Speaker of the Assembly. Nearly all of the Turkish notables, no matter if they had been autonomist or not, were re-elected/appointed to the deputy post.⁴⁹¹ However, the same was not valid for the non-Turkish notables.

The exodus from the Hatay had already started in June 1938 before the Hatay Assembly met and took severe Turkification measures and the final settlement of annexation by Turkey on 23 June 1939. Although, after 1938 the Turkish state authorities exerted great effort to prevent the emigration of especially the Armenians, fear, rumor and fear-originated imagination played a more decisive role both in making the decision to emigrate and in the creation of consent for those who did not possess the necessary means to leave. Still, for some, leaving was as furious, burdensome, exhausting and obscure as staying:

If we left, where were we going? There on the opposite of the road, the French soldiers made camps. A French captain called me and asked, "My son,

⁴⁸⁸ Edvard Huri, interview by author, tape recording, Antioch, June 2001

⁴⁸⁹ Sanjian, p. 172.

⁴⁹⁰ *L'Asie Française*, September-October 1938, p. 247.

⁴⁹¹ For the list of the deputies in the Hatay assembly, see Tekin, *Hatay*, p. 208.

why don't you come with us?" I said "*Capitaine*" He was astonished when he heard me speaking in French. "Where are we going, to the deserts of Deir-ez Zor or to France?" He understood my question and said "I don't know." In those days, (pre-WWII) French was to occupy Libya. I told him that the French was going to send us to her Libya front... Where will we if you leave here?. I was a fiancé then. I had my father and another sister who was married at that time. How will I earn my life? There was no job. And the French will apply compulsory military service. It was a matter of life and death. I comprehended these all. The French captain could not respond to me.⁴⁹²

Just two months after the Sanjak's transfer to Turkey, Syria had already received some 50,000 refugees. The largest number were the Armenians, who had begun to leave the Sanjak in June 1938. Following the announcement that a Franco-Turkish agreement had been signed and that the Sanjak would be left to Turkey a month later, most of the remaining Armenians had left. Most of them had been evacuated by the French and some of them had left of their own accord. With the exception of the Armenians in the Qassab district which was detached from the Sanjak, as many as 22,000 Armenians left by June 1939. In addition some 22,000 Alawites, 10,000 Sunni Arabs and 5000 Christian Arabs left.⁴⁹³

The remaining Christian and Sunni peasants (though very few in number) and Alawites turned their submissiveness into "respect". Fear together with respect displayed the ways of appropriation of the new form of identity and the practices that went with it. Soon came to be competing with each other on the issue of "who put the hat first".

There was nobody here who put on a hat before us. We have a record at Ankara stating that our village was the first to wear hats. We bought them

⁴⁹² Avadis Papazciyan, interview by author, tape recording, July 2001 in the only remaining Armenian village in Jabal Mousa, the *Vakıf* village. "...*gitseydik nereye gidiyorduk? Orda yukarıdaki yolun karşısında çadırlar, askeriye orda otururdu. Orda bir Fransız yüzbaşı "Oğlum dedi. Niçin gitmiyorsunuz bizle?" "KapiTane dedim, deyince -yüzbaşı demektir-şaşırdı. Der Zour Çöllerine mi mi, yoksa Fransaya 'mı gidiyoruz. O düşündü düşündü, ne cevap verecek. Bilmiyorum dedi. "Mösyö dedim, ben biliyorum." O zaman Alman maraşı, bunlar Libya'da Mısır üzerine, bunlar Mısır'I işgal edecekler. İtalyanlar'ın elidneydi o zaman. Dedim ki biz taa o cepheye gideceğiz. Burdan gidersen nereye gideceksin?. Nisanlıydım ben, bir babam, öbür bacım evli. Peki ne yapacağım ben? İş yok. Ve seni mecburi askere alacak. Ya ölüm, ya kalım. Ben bunları biliyordum. O bunlara cevap veremedi."*

⁴⁹³ Khoury based his numerical expectations on the findings of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and British Foreign Affairs; Khoury, *Syria*, p. 513.

from Antioch....Suddenly, everyone began to wear hats. (Why did you put on hats?) I don't know. It was an order, order...from Turkey.⁴⁹⁴



3

⁴⁹⁴ Albert, interview by author, tape recording, Altınözü (Antioch), June 2001. "Bizden evvel şapka giyen yok. En. İşte kaydımız var ankarada.ilk şapka giyen bizim köy., sarılar mahallesi. şapkaları Antakyadan alıyorduk...(Niye şapka gidiyordunuz?)... Ne biliym ben. Emir emir... Türkiye"

CONCLUSION

The people of the Sanjak of Alexandretta experienced their first modern state under French indirect colonial rule. Despite the fact that its degree of diffusion was uneven among various groups of people in different parts of the Sanjak, and that it was different in many respects from classical colonialism and its more dominating version in inner Syria, the French rule nonetheless intended to “civilize” the natives as well as to turn upper class Antiocheans into Francophiles.

The traditional Sunni Turcophone landowning class and chiefly the Christian merchants largely benefited from the colonial rule. The social, economic and religious influence of the landowning class on the urban affairs and on the countryside remained relatively unchallenged. They continued to hold the administrative posts they did in the late nineteenth century. The new upstarts, who resembled a commercial bourgeoisie, also owned large tracts of land and were the representatives of banking and merchant capital in the Sanjak. Sunni Turcophone notables allied with Christian notables formed the dominant class in the Sanjak and their children favoured distinctions in the cultural field. There was a reciprocal kind of relationship between the urban notable class and the French. The French co-opted this cohesive class in order to sustain political and economic hegemony in the cities and the countryside. In Antioch, they relied on the Sunni Turcophone notables, whereas in Kırıkhan and Alexandretta they went into negotiation more with the Armenian and Christian notables.

An analysis based solely on the persistence of the dominant classes in the Sanjak, locates the breaking point in the history of the Sanjak at the foundation of Turkish rule (1939), when the hegemony of the traditional ruling elite was shaken by

the new social climbers. Confining change exclusively to the elite designs or interventions from above uncovers the transformations in the terms of identities of the people of the Sanjak and particularly Antioch.

The Mandate era opened new space for politics, initiated by people from similar social backgrounds but different ethnic communities. They were members of the younger generation of men of the Sunni notable families who had been educated in Turkey; the middle class Antiochean youth and a marginal group of artisans who were frustrated by the impoverishment of the Sanjak after the Great Depression. The people of the Sanjak developed new practises of representation in youth clubs, libraries and cafés. These spaces helped in the constitution of a public space in the city, where the different inspirations of the participants contested for domination. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Arab and Turkish youth, with close relations apprehended and strived for the “well being” of the Sanjak, which they believed could be attained with anti-traditionalism and anti-establishmentism. Neither the discourse nor the practices of the members of these clubs achieved the level of a coherent ideology. However, their significance lay in the preparation of a fertile ground in which the dominant ideologies could thrive, appropriate and dominate. Anyhow, this reasonable anti- traditional movement did not attract widespread participation into its ranks in the early 1930s. Although it carried the potential of a popular, territorial nationalist movement and of incorporating the non-elite local population through the creation of new vertical loyalties, the activists of the movement were soon scattered and found safer places within the official Turkish and Syrian nationalist state ideologies.

For the majority of the peoples of Antioch, the years preceding the annexation of the region by Turkey were experienced as being caught between

rivalling communities of discourse where staying indifferent was the hardest choice. The great efforts of Turkey exerted in the Sanjak to establish its ideological and physical hegemony produced a counter-hegemony, that of Syria, although yet much less powerful and less advantaged in the international context. Intergenerational conflict, between the conservative elder people and the radical nationalist youth became a common phenomenon in Antioch.

Despite the fact that the destiny of the Sanjak was a matter to be resolved between Turkey and the Great Powers, the nationalist ideologies had to win popular consent and to appeal to the people. The nationalization of the masses and consent was attained through persuasion and coercion where the choice between the two depended on the social background of the disseminated group of people. Persuasion was most of the time employed towards the elites of each community whereas coercion turned out to be a common practice in the every day life of the city and its rural hinterland. The increasing tendency among the Sunni Turcophone urban notables to appear as the supporters of the Turkish cause occurred in this period. The most influential factor underlying the change in their political preferences was their concern about the loss of their economic and social power. They exploited their elite networks in order to co-opt some prominent Alawite sheikhs through whom their clients could more easily be brought to the Turkish cause.

The registration of the ethnically non-Turkish people as "Turkish" in the final registrations in August 1938 deeply confused me. I soon came to understand that nationalist identities were themselves contextual. The oral interviews gave me the occasion to realize the complex web of popular, nationalist, religious and localist strands in the subaltern political identities. I conducted oral interviews with people from different social backgrounds and ethno-religious communities. Most of all, they

assisted me to further elaborate my inquiry on politics and the contested nature of the public sphere. Unfortunately, I was unable to capture the struggle of the competing publics in its whole. Throughout the thesis, a considerable emphasis is put on the rural Alawite and Christian populations, whereas the inspirations and motivations of especially the urban artisans and small merchants were underrated. However, this neglect was not intentional; It points to a greater process, that of the articulation of a rival public with the dominant principles and reduction of its “improper” characters. Therefore, on the part of urban poor this thesis proved unable to display one of its central arguments, that the subaltern classes asserted their own interests and recast the official versions in different ways.

Aware of the constructed nature of oral history as much as other historical methods, my attention was drawn by the interviews to the contradictory relation between the official narratives of history and private remembrances. The discrepancy between the personal experience and the official narratives confirms Gramsci’s statement that a dominant class’s hegemony is never “total or “exclusive”, it is rather a process, a relation of dominance, which must continually be renewed, recreated, defended and modified. Although, the personal experience was never expressed directly in taboo areas, especially the informal oral accounts of the Christian and Alawite Arab peasants about their everyday lives and relations with their superiors divulged the hegemonic and at times coercive aspects of the process of the creation of consent.

The oral interviews also helped me to develop an alertness to the process of domination of the “popular experience” by the hegemonic ideology. Particularly, the intensification of the violent ethnic conflict after 1936 under the fearless involvement of Turkey and to a lesser degree Syria, and later during the first years of the Turkish

rule, generated a certain change in the “systems of meaning”, especially among the remaining non-Turkish people and relatively depoliticized faction of the city.

Therefore, an attempt willing to study the social history of Antioch under the French Mandate should take into consideration how the Sanjak of Alexandretta is described and imagined in Turkish historical writing.⁴⁹⁵

The oral interviews helped to uncover the spatial, ethnic and class based aspects of the nationalist struggle after 1936 silenced by the Turkish and Syrian accounts. Standard Turkish texts like an article in a Turkish newspaper, a conference in People’s House in Turkey about the historical origins of the city, a memoir written by some Sanjak activists, and the pro-Turkish newspaper *Yeniğün* added to my comprehension of the nature and peculiarities of the struggle. They not only were written in order to consolidate a Turkish identity by affirming its superiority to an inferior and hostile Other, but also meant to persuade the inhabitants of the Sanjak, especially the minorities and helped in the creation of public opinion and the imagining of a Turkish community, however Turkishness was attributed different meanings by different groups of people.

Delving into research in a relatively small city in Turkey on a highly sensitive period (sensitive especially for the notables) carried its own advantages and limitations. With the absence of a municipal document enlisting the neighbourhood residents, the names of merchants or shopkeepers and even a complete list of the members of the administrative councils in the Sanjak led me to gather pieces of information, from a variety of sources as well as from oral accounts, like a detective. My lack of Arabic and the absence of the local Sanjak newspapers aggravated the

⁴⁹⁵ The inspiration for this argument came from Edward Said’s argument in reference to İbrahim Abu Lughod on the production of knowledge on Palestine, see Edward Said, “Introduction” in Edward Said et. al., *Blaming the Victims, Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* (London: Verso, 1988); and Ted Swedenburg, “Popular Memory and the Palestinian National Past”.

situation. In addition, the French Mandate and later Turkish attempts at domination in Antioch were not topics discussed in public, particularly among the strongly interconnected elites and some ethnic minorities of the city. This was mostly due to the involvement of the urban notables in the Mandate administration and later the degradation of their embroilment under the Turkish rule where, interestingly enough, they continued to hold similar posts. For the minorities, the fear predominated in their efforts at narrating a “coherent” story that deferred to their *ex-ağas* and social superiors and in their support for a defensive Turkish nationalism. This generated the thesis to be a tentative one, which laid the necessary launch for further elaboration utilizing the French, Syrian and Turkish archives as well as Syrian newspapers.



APPENDIX A

Table I: Chart on the artisans of Antioch in 1935.

Pierre Bazantay, *Enquête des Artisans a Antioche*. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), pp. 8- 10.

Statistiques des artisans d'Antioche
établies en Janvier 1935

Métiers	Boutiques ou Ateliers	Sunnites turcophones en général	Alouites arabophones	Orthodoxes arabophones	Arméniens arabophones & turcophones
Ebénistes	21	65			1
Menuisiers	40	55			
Charpentiers		70	10		2
Scieurs de long		20			
Tourneurs	5		7		
Charrons	7	25			
Fabricants de peignes en bois	3		1		2
Fabricants de noriahs	2	8			
Nattiers			130		
Imprimeurs d'étoffes	1	1		1	
Fileurs de soie	6			12	
Ouvriers des séchoirs de cocons	2		12	38	
Feutriers	8	18			
Tisserands d'étoffes	6	15		1	
Tisserands de kilims	20	52		4	
Tisseurs de poils de chèvres	23		50		
Tailleurs	47	25		90	4
Tarbouchiers	7	8	2	2	1
Brodeurs	6			32	
Chemisiers	6	3		7	
Repasseurs	3			3	
Tanneurs	23	70			
Cordonniers	52	110	12	25	9
Bottiers	80	240			
Savetiers	8	30	2	6	2
Savetiers ambulants		30	30		
Selliers	10	18			
Bâtiers	15	7		9	2
Forgerons	22		70		4
Maréchaux ferrants	20	15		12	
Couteliers	14	25	25	5	
Ferblantiers	16	45		2	
Chaudronniers	12	1	14	8	2
Etameurs	21	4	66		8
Bijoutiers	18	3		26	3
Maçons et tailleurs de pierres		4		80	
Carriers		3	1	2	
Chaufourniers (1)				100	
Fabricants de ciment et carreaux	1	8			
Briquetiers	9	3	30	1	7
Potiers	3	6	8		3
Meuniers	4	12	6		
Boulangers	32	6	64	4	1
Broyeurs de burgul		18			
Bouchers	90	25	90	2	
Restaurateurs	9	10			2
Pâtisseries	8	8	3	1	1
Fabricants de knafa	14		20		
Fabricants de bon- bons	25	6	24		
Fabricants d'eau gazense	2	2		2	1
Fabricants de glace	1	4			
Fabricants de sorbets	5	15	6	3	
Fabricants de Fuliyé et humsiyé	12	14	6		

Métiers	Boutiques ou Ateliers	Sunnites turcophones en général	Alouites arabophones	Orthodoxes arabophones	Arméniens arabophones & turcophones
Huiliers et savon- niers	11	168	30		
Garagistes	5	9			
Chauffeurs		50	5	10	10
Mécaniciens	4	1		2	6
Coiffeurs	85	94	40	40	5
Employés de bains	6	24			
Cireurs		12	1	12	
Portefaix		70	59	3	
Crieurs publics		6		2	
Fabricants de sceaux	4	6			
Fabricants de brase- ros, poêles et seaux	8			9	2
TOTAL	802	1547	824	556	78

(1) Se concentrent surtout dans les environs du village de Dersounié.

Table II: The Sanjak Budget

YEAR	REVENUE	EXPENDITURE	SURPLUS	SURPLUS%
1928	1,632,279	1,017,377	614,902	37,6
1929	1,600,519	1,083,427	517,092	32,3
1930	1,589,363	1,218,390	370,973	23,3
1931	1,253,485	1,072,226	180,259	14,4
1932	1,092,401	958,359	134,042	12,2
1933	970,868	862,352	108,516	11,1
1934	831,908	723,178	108,730	13,0
1935	784,943	728,328	56,615	7,2
1936	730,447	718,398	11,519	1,6

Table III: 1936-1937 Sanjak population figures

L'Asie Française, "L'Affaire d'Alexandrette", 36, (December 1936), p. 323.

Turks	85,242	39 %
Alawites Arab	62,026	28 %
Sunni Arabs	22,461	10 %
Greek Orthodox Arabs and other Christian sects	18,051	9 %
Armenians	24,911	11,4 %
Kurds	4,831	2,2 %
Jews	474	0,2 %
Circassians	954	0,4 %
Others	130	
TOTAL	219,080	

APPENDIX B

Figure I: A linguistic sketch of the Sanjak

L'Asie Française, "L'Affaire d'Alexandrette", 36, (December 1936), p. 324.




Figure II: The sketch of Antioch displaying the quarters.
 Jacques Weulersse, "Antioche Essai de Géographie Urbaine", *Bulletin d'études Orientales*, Volume IV, (Beirut : Institut Français de Damas, 1935), p. 41.





Figure III. The sketch of Antioch's souqs.

Jacques Weulersse, "Antioche Essai de Géographie Urbaine", *Bulletin d'études Orientales*, Volume IV, (Beirut : Institut Français de Damas, 1935), p. 67.



CROQUIS IX. — Les Souqs. RÉPARTITION ETHNIQUE ET PAR MÉTIERS.

- a : Mosquée.
 b : Khan ou savonnerie en activité.
 c : Boutiques formant souq occupées par des Turcs.
 d : Boutiques formant souq occupées par des Chrétiens (Arméniens et Grecs-Orthodoxes).
 e : Boutiques formant souq occupées par des Alaouites.

BAZARS.

- I. au petit bétail.

- II. aux fruits et légumes.
 III. au bois.
 IV. aux nattes.
 V. du Jeudi.
 VI. au gros bétail.
 VII. aux grains.

SOUQS.

1. aux fruits et légumes.
 2. de la Porte de Ville.
 3 et 3^{bis}. des Maréchaux Ferrants.
 4. des Tisserands.

5. des Couteliers.
 6. des Feutriers.
 7. S. Vieux des Tanneurs.
 8. des Chaudronniers.
 9. des Tisseurs de poil.
 10. des Forgerons.
 11. des Marchands d'habits.
 12. du Meydân.
 13. des Droguistes.
 14. des Orfèvres.
 15. des Colporteurs.
 16. des Négociants.

17. des Marchands de babouches.
 18. des Tourneurs sur bois.
 19. des Menuisiers.
 20. des outils agricoles.
 21. du Vendredi.
 22. des Cordonniers.
 23. des Brodeurs.
 24. des Ferblantiers.
 25. Souq Long.

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