

A Descriptive Analysis of the Turkish Conservative Right of the 1960s in the Quotidian Realm

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
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


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Abstract

A Descriptive Analysis of the Turkish Conservative Right of the 1960s
in the Quotidian Realm

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Professor Mehmet Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Thesis Advisor

The 1960s was a decade characterized by youth movements, new cultural alignments, student revolts and many anti-establishment movements all around the world. Turkey was no exception. Many studies have focused on the left side of the political spectrum yet only a few historical accounts of the conservative, right-wing movements of the era exist. This thesis intends to shed light on the less-focused, poorly-elaborated social and cultural dynamics of Turkish conservatism during the 1960s. Through an examination of the periodical articles penned by prominent proponents of conservatism, the thesis aims to outline the broad political and ideological currents of the era. Attention will be devoted to the staunch opposition to communism, a heavy emphasis on nationalism and an increasing salience of Islamism in periodicals such as *Babıali'de Sabah*, *Bugün* and *Yeni İstanbul* as well as periodicals *Büyük Doğu*, *Diriliş*, *Milli Gençlik*, *Milli Yol*, *Orkun*, *Selamet*, *Tohum*, *Toprak*, *Türk Düşüncesi* and *Türk Yurdu*, all of which have been inadequately used by pundits of Turkish conservatism. For a background to Turkish conservatism of the era, the global dynamics of conservatism has also been presented, particularly as it developed initially in the European experiences. The study of conservative periodicals of the time reveals the intense emphasis on morality which is considered as the best antidote to communism and other left-wing currents. In this respect, the thesis problematizes the themes revolving around the notion of morality as perceived by Turkish conservatists of the 1960s.

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Özet

1960'lı Yıllar Türkiye'sinde Muhafazakar Sağda Ana Temaları

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Bu çalışma 1960'lı yıllarda yayınlanan muhafazakâr dergilere odaklanarak dönemin entelektüel ve ideolojik konumlanışlarını anlamayı hedefliyor. 1960'lı yıllar söz konusu olduğunda daha çok öne çıkan temalar gençlik hareketleri, düzen karşıtı siyasi oluşumlar ve yeni bir kültürel yapılanma olarak karşımıza çıkar. Pek çok nedenden dolayı siyasi spekturumun sağ cenahında yaşananlar, o cenahta üretilen siyasi ve entellektüel birikim nedense akademisyenlerin radarlarına girmemiştir. Oysa sağ ve muhafazakâr cenahtaki dergilerin analizi bize dönemin bütününe daha derinden anlayabilmek için önemli fırsatlar sunmaktadır. Akademik literatürde bugüne kadar pek az çalışılmış Babiali'de Sabah, Bugün and Yeni İstanbul as well as periodicals Büyük Doğu, Diriliş, Milli Gençlik, Milli Yol, Orkun, Selamet, Tohum, Toprak, Türk Düşüncesi ve Türk Yurdu dergilerin analizi bize ahlak kavramının çok merkezi bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Sol cenah daha çok sosyal dinamiklerin analizi ile zamanın küresel ideolojik akımlarının sentezini öne çıkarırken bu dergiler daha yerelci ve ahlak eksenli bir söylem yürütmüşlerdir. Türkiye'de bu dönemdeki muhafazakarlığı anlayabilmek için bu ideolojinin özellikle Avrupa'da yaşanmış tecrübelerinden yola çıkarak Türkiye'deki özgül serüvenini gözlem altına almak bu tezin en önemli amaçlarındandır.

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Introduction

This thesis aims to analyze the notions that stand out as fundamental characteristics of conservatism in Turkey during the 1960s in the ways they reflect to the daily practices and discourse through an examination of the periodical articles penned by the prominent proponents of conservatism in the form this stance took during the period. As the conservative stance in Turkey during this period was mainly shaped by a staunch opposition to anti-communism, a heavy emphasis on nationalism and an increasing salience of Islamism, these three notions have been the decisive criteria in selecting the periodicals to be studied here.

Chapter I constitutes the theoretical foundation of the thesis, and is comprised of three parts: Part I introduces a number of different approaches to what conservatism is; part II outlines the emergence and historical development of conservatism in Europe, and part III examines the birth and developmental process of conservatism in Turkey. Chapter II, on the other hand, constitutes the core of the study and harbors the discussion of primary notions that have permeated into the conservative discourse relating to the quotidian realm in the 1960s Turkey.

A decent study on the Turkish conservative right of the 1960s mandates a thorough examination of the periodicals, be it journals, magazines or newspapers, published during the decade in question, as periodical articles often

provide the best sources of information about the prevailing notions and established norms of an era, reflecting the dominant frame of mind embraced by a certain clique, thereby enabling the researcher to have a better insight into the mindset of those who embody it. Perusing the articles penned by the prominent figures of an ideology also provides a communion with these figures, enabling the reader to grasp at least a tidbit, if not a large repertoire, of the ideas cherished by the advocates of a school of thought. In this study, therefore, the real value and power of the periodicals that have been studied lie not only in the fact that they constitute a repository of an enormous variety of facts about the Turkish Right in the 1960s but also in the fact that they offer an invaluable window into how self-professed right-wing conservatives interpreted those events at the time.

Even a quick glimpse into the magazines, journals, and dailies published by the conservative right wing circles during the 1960s reveals that the preponderant issue to which great significance was accorded is anticommunism as evinced by the strikingly high number of articles devoted to the debasement of communist ideology and the rejection of advocacy of communism, which is fairly understandable considering the fact that a great number of these articles were penned by the leading participants of anti-communist struggle, namely the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey (Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği, TKMD, 1963–1977).¹ For example, the owner and the Editor in Chief of the Magazine *Toprak*, İlhan Egemen Darendelioğlu, one of the most formidable and bitter opponents of communist ideology, was also

-
- 1 The Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey was established in September 1950 in İstanbul 6 months after a hunt for communists began in the USA with Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy's public declaration that they had a list of the names of 205 people who were members to the Communist Party. This association was one of the many associations established simultaneously in various countries that were considered by the USA to be outposts in the fight against communism and the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. The Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey stated its goal as "to fight against communism via intellectual means by reinforcing the elements that bring into existence and strengthen our national constitution, and enable us to live as a nation; and to this end, consolidate the commitment to our motherland and Allah." Turkish National Student Union, founded in 1947 and the Foundation for Promulgation of Knowledge (İlim Yayma Cemiyeti) founded in 1951 functioned as derivatives of this association in terms of the war they waged against communist ideology.

the president of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey. Since conservatives considered communism to be a danger creeping stealthily into the social texture and moral constitution of society, and placed the highest priority on fighting against it, this allocation of more than ample space to the denouncement of communism as a deplorable infestation seems to be only natural. Likewise, *Milli Gençlik* is the publication of Turkish National Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, which played an active role in the fight against communism in Turkey. *Milli Gençlik* also bears significance in that this periodical represents, despite the incremental incorporation of Islamic motifs into its identity as the 1960s wore on, the outlook of the nationalist conservatives.

However, since the focal concern of this study is to shed light on the daily lives of the actors of the rightist ideology imbued with a conservative disposition and to delve into their quotidian realm rather than to dwell on their political or economic agenda, articles written with a saliently political propaganda have been left out of the scope of this research and those offering insight into “non-political” notions such as gender roles, family life, socialization processes, codes of language in daily conversations, definition of youth and being a student, and preferences relating to clothing or literary tastes have been placed in the center of the research, giving an overwhelmingly heavier weight in the study to conservatism in the socio-cultural domain. Yet again, here, the fact that “every day is political” and the impossibility of completely segregating the two realms of socio-cultural and political should be duly acknowledged, since socio-cultural issues cannot be conceived as totally divorced of politics due to the organic ties and the resulting inextricably intertwined and interdependent relationship connecting these spheres. Therefore, it wouldn’t be wrong to opine that each excerpt selected for examination is inevitably permeated by political discourse, as such issues as gender roles, family life or socialization processes cannot be contemplated as entirely distinct from or totally independent of the political realm.

In this study, initially, the daily newspapers *Babıali’de Sabah*, *Bugün* and *Yeni İstanbul* as well as periodicals *Büyük Doğu*, *Diriliş*, *Milli Gençlik*, *Milli Yol*, *Orkun*, *Selamet*, *Tohum*, *Toprak*, *Türk Düşüncesi* and *Türk Yurdu* have been scanned to sift through the articles reflecting practices and ideation deeply

entrenched in the quotidian realm of informal politics. The number of these periodicals, then, was reduced to 3, leaving only *Toprak*, *Milli Gençlik* and *Selamet* in the shortlist, as, although news articles in daily newspapers are also permeated by the worldviews of those who penned them, the most salient manifestation of a comprehensive conception and apprehension of the world by the proponents of a certain ideology presents itself in journal articles, since these articles offer wider opportunity for the expression of one's stance. A rummaging through the articles in search of the of the Turkish conservative right conception of the world during the 1960s revealed that the articles in *Toprak*, *Milli Gençlik* and *Selamet* would offer a prolific research avenue as they were both firmly grounded in the rightist conservative ideological stance and rich in resource reflective of traces of the daily practices of the conservatives of this period. However, at the end of the selection process, it became evident that an overwhelmingly high number of articles were from the magazine *Toprak* as the articles in this journal have proved most useful in efficiently laying bare the lineaments of the Turkish conservative right of the 1960s, and fundamentally helped pinpoint the points to be discussed in the study, giving a much heavier weight to this journal.

Despite the wide opportunities research through periodicals provide, it also poses certain challenges, some peculiar to the journals themselves and some originating from the inefficiencies in archiving procedures in the libraries. The biggest challenge faced in this research was twofold: One, during the archiving process, while the volumes were being bound, lack of due diligence resulted in cover pages with the dates and issue numbers cut out, making it almost impossible to decipher the details pertaining to the identity of the issue. Two, some journals experienced breaks in their publication life, and no issues were published in certain time periods, complicating the task of tracking down issue numbers and matching them with correct dates. The problem was further compounded as sometimes a single volume was run for two, or even multiple, months. However, despite these difficulties, these journals provided sufficient number of articles with either the date or the issue information to realize this study.

Conservatism in historical perspective

The conservative is a statesman who is enamored of existing evils, as distinguished from the liberal, who wishes to replace them with others.

– Nancy S. Love, *Understanding Dogmas and Dreams*

§ 2.1 What is Conservatism

2.1.1 *Conservatism: A Contested Issue*

Conservatism is a term which finds rather frequent expression in the daily conversations or political statements of many, articulated quite liberally without much attention to its references or nuances, sometimes to define those who have religious sensitivities, sometimes those who oppose change and have a reactionary attitude towards it, reminiscing about the past and desiring to revive it, and sometimes those who display hesitation and skepticism towards the unknown, acting with circumspection due to a risk-averse attitude.

Reflecting this malleability in meaning, Meriam Webster (1994 dictionary provides a number of definitions to the term, defining it as “a disposition in politics to preserve what is established”, “a political philosophy based on tradition and social stability, stressing established institutions, and preferring

gradual development to abrupt change”, and “a philosophy calling for lower taxes, limited government regulation of business and investing.” The term derives from Latin “conservare” meaning “to conserve; to keep, guard, observe”, from “con” (together and “servare” (to keep, conveying the focus of the ordinary usage of the term on the idea of conserving or ‘keeping something intact’. This primary denotation of the term as maintaining what is established dates back to the fourteenth century, and prominent thinkers on conservatism such as Russell Kirk consider this medieval origin highly important, pointing out the conservative perspective inherent in such terms as ‘conservators’ (the guardians of medieval cities and ‘custodes paces’ (justices of the peace (Vincent 2010: 56.

Although the first politically overt use of the term is associated with Edmund Burke’s opposition to and criticism of the French Revolution (1790, the word itself does not appear in his piece *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, but rather introduced after 1815 by the supporters of the newly restored Bourbon monarchy in France, as the title of the political magazine bearing the name *Le Conservateur*, among whose editors aiming to revert the policies of the French Revolution during the Bourbon restoration, author and diplomat François-René de Chateaubriand is credited with the coinage of the term (Mannheim, 1953: 98.

The term was politically adopted in 1830 after its appearance in the *Quarterly Review* journal, when the Tory party of Great Britain and Ireland was defined as such, and then in 1835, when “Conservative” became the party’s official name, replacing “Tory” (Heywood, 2003:69, parallel to an effort within the party to rid it of its “old associations and symbolize, if not a break with the past, at least a change of course” (Blake, 1985: 7.

From the 1840s onwards, the term gained wider currency across Europe, with the effects of industrialization, together with democratization, more profoundly felt. However, the primary developments that had a serious impact on the rather pervasive adoption of the term were the uprisings against conservative monarchs and governments by liberals in various parts of Europe in 1829-30 and 1848 Revolution, which lead the conservatives to dwell intensively on the perils of revolution (Vincent, 2010: 56.

The nature of conservatism has been the subject of much debate, producing five general interpretations which “can be schematized as the aristocratic ideology, the pragmatic ideological position, the situational or positional view, conservatism as a disposition of habit or mind, and, finally, the ideological interpretation” (Vincent, 2010: 57.

Although providing a single and all-comprehensive definition of conservatism and neatly delineating what it actually constitutes pose a serious challenge, it could be argued that the divergent perspectives aggregate mainly around two approaches; one seeing conservatism as a disposition, a tendency and an attitude shaping the way individuals who aim to maintain existing institutions and relations see the world, embodied in the views of many conservatives arguing that conservatism is non-ideological; and two, as an ideology, in the sense that ideology is “elaborate, integrated, and coherent [enough to] justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the causal and moral interconnections between politics and other spheres of activity” (McClosky 1964: 362, having “clear or relatively consistent set of objectives about the purpose of government and the type of society they wish to defend or promote” (Dorey, 2011:32.

An important number of theorists argue that it is impossible to identify a definite list of policies that could be attributed and considered peculiar to conservative stance, because the primary determinant of what should be conserved changes from society to society, as what is considered “traditional” is dependent on a given place and time. Foreexample, Russell Kirk believes that conservatism cannot be confined to a conceptual sphere and goes beyond all cultural designations, earning it the quality of being readily found in a diverse range of places. He also suggests that the conservatives of one country do not resemble those of another since the institutions they cherish and the traditions they uphold would differ significantly, rendering it impossible to define as a political system, but rather a perspective shaping how individuals evaluate civil order. In this respect, due to its fundamental characteristics of history, experience and tradition, conservatism is a “situational” concept, depending on the relations of the groups in society (Huntington,1975:29. Samuel Huntington’s influential article “Conservatism as an Ideology” (1957 describes conservatism as a kind of “positional”, or “situational belief system”, which

continuously takes shape according to the distinctive situation it is in as it responds to the challenges posed by the specific conditions of a particular time and place, lacking any everlasting set of propositions, core principles and substantive content peculiar to it, making it impossible for conservatism to bear the designation “ideology.”

Niyazi Berkes, on the other hand, defines conservatism as a “context, medium, and climate” (Berkes, 1946:43. Such a nature confers conservatism the potential for omnipresence since what gives birth to it is each society’s peculiar conditions, allowing it to emerge and take shape in a wide range of places. From this perspective, conservatism might appear in any political regime, because it may refer to “any line of thought and action that aims to maintain the status quo”, rendering it “a general attitude or manner” (Ergil, 1989:19.

Ergil is neither the first nor the only scholar who views conservatism as a disposition, a tendency and an attitude shaping the way individuals see the world. One of the leading theorists of conservatism, Michael Oakeshott considers conservatism to be a disposition entailing certain preferences, as he defines it as “to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners; to prefer certain kinds of conduct” and “to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices” rather than a doctrine or creed to adhere to (Oakeshott, 1962:168. In this respect, Oakeshott characterizes of conservatism as a disposition that informs and gives shape to thought and action, rather than an ideology or a policy agenda consisting of idealistic theoretical principles, which, in essence, is against the nature of conservatism, and those people adhering to an ideology behave in a way that is the exact opposite of a conservative would. Oakeshott’s definition of conservatism can aptly be summed up as “a non-ideological preference for the familiar, tried, actual, limited, near, sufficient, convenient and present” (Johnson, 2015:1.

Some political conservatives have taken a step further and argued that all people are inherently conservative since this disposition is a natural part of all humans, rendering “humanity, en masse, conservative” (Vincent 2010: 57.

An important scholar of conservatism and studies on tradition, Karl Mannheim, however, associates conservatism with ideology, as he considers conservatism to be a ‘thought style’ which emerged in the form of a reaction against the ideological foundations and Jacobin practices of the 1789 French

Revolution. Mannheim, who conceptualizes conservatism as an ideology, conceives liberalism relational to bourgeois ideology; socialism relational to proletarian ideology, and conservatism relational to aristocratic ideology, which does not strike as unexpected as a considerable majority of conservatives were comprised of aristocrats, the wealthy, title holders, and industrialists. (Mannheim, 1969:13)

Heywood asserts that conservatism adequately deserves the denotation of 'ideology' since it is based on a specific set of political ideas as to societies as well as the members of those societies, and therefore cannot be reduced to a resistance to change merely to provide excuse for defending the benefits of the privileged, conferring it a status far above what pragmatism or opportunism would simply suggest (Heywood, 2003:72. For instance, conservatives' ideas on human nature as imperfect and liable to engaging in vile acts if they are not properly checked by a higher order informs the conservative understanding of a strong government, which should be vested with the power to enforce strict laws and mete out harsh punishments including capital punishment (Heywood, 2003:75.

Another scholar who treats conservatism as an ideology is Robert Nisbet, arguing that conservatism came into being as a reaction against the French Revolution, as well as an ideology based on the criticism directed against the propositions of the Enlightenment thinkers, who are considered to be responsible for preparing the ideological foundations of this revolution. Since Burke's conservatism was not an abstract ideation, but rather a consistent integrated pattern of thoughts, providing the solid elements requisite of an ideology, which espouses "a conduct and action pattern responsive to and commensurate with such thoughts and beliefs" (Loewenstein, 1953: 52, his views served to constitute the intellectual and ideological basis of conservatism.

Friedrich Hayek, on the other hand, sees conservatism as a "flexible ideology" (Hayek, 1960:397, conferring it a degree of transitivity, which allows it to be articulated side by side with ideologies antithetical to the very foundations of it. When conservatism is considered as much a matter of disposition as of doctrine, and as such, used to describe both an attitude of mind and a political tradition, a steadfast adherent to the left ideology, forexample, can be labelled a "conservative" if he or she exhibits resistance to change or new ideas.

Heywood suggests, forexample, that since conservatism cannot be reduced to an automatic response of one determined to “conserve” an existing order, if not to revive certain values of the near past, the uncompromising communists of the USSR in the late 1980s were often referred to as “conservatives” (Heywood, 2003: 72, so much so that a Leninist in Stalinist Russia could, rather comfortably, be considered a conservative (Leddihn, 1955:1. This potential of conservatism to collaborate with other ideologies is wide-ranging, as “conservatism has attempted to defend numerous conflicting institutions and values ranging from monarchies to aristocratic regimes, from representative democracies to dictatorships, protectionist economic practices bolstered through high customs taxes to free market, from nationalism to globalization, from capitalist state to welfare state” (Birler, 2012: 283.

2.1.2 *Common Themes*

Although it is hard to assert that there exists a neatly defined nexus of core concepts to which all conservatives adhere, as, due to conservatism’s ‘political anti-philosophy’, even many conservatives would not accept the denotation of conservatism” attached to their ideas (Allison, 1984: 2, an attempt to arrive at least some sort of lowest common denominator yields a number of interrelated themes intrinsic to conservative thought can be put forth.

As conservatives see the world too complicated to be completely understood by the human mind with its limited capacity to fully comprehend it, they reject ratioanlism, and a very important distinguishing characteristic of connservatism, therefore, emerges as its lack of faith in abstract principles and philosophies, which inevitably informs how conservatives interpret the concept of ideology, “as a manifestation of the arrogance of rationalism” (Heywood, 2003:15, leading them to dismiss “the ‘ideological’ style of politics based on attempts to reshape the world in accordance with a set of abstract principles or pre-established theories” (Heywood, 2003:10. Accordingly, they see principles such as freedom, common good, and humanity espoused by liberals as “petty excuses that have replaced real and tangible virtues” (Beneton, 2011: 21. In short, conservatives countenance the idea of rebuilding society from scratch, under the guidance of theoretical and metaphysical principles, due to their “distate for rational thought” (Heywood, 2003:72, which stemmed from

their belief that due to its limited capacity, “human reason does not represent a divine and infallible authority to appeal to, which is hierarchically above, and therefore independent of, all human values” (Özipek, 2011: 42.

This rejection of rationalism and an endeavor to mould the world according to abstract principles is closely intertwined with another significant element of conservatism, pragmatism, which can simply be defined as dwelling on practical conditions rather than systems of thought abstracted from reality to steer the course of political actions or social policies (Heywood, 2003:11. Therefore, “the understanding of society in conservative thought is not prescriptive but rather descriptive; it is not normative, but realistic and pragmatist”, as conservatism evaluates all concepts such as history, tradition, reason, authority, freedom, property, religion, and social stability based on their functional significance (Güler, 2008: 124, and seeks a viable consensus, representing the negation of the inflexibility imposed by ideologies. This rejection of ideological inflexibility enables conservatism to “abandon theoretical registers and practically adjusts to the current situation in cases when past loses its instrumentality” (Çiğdem, 1997: 33.

In close relation to pragmatism appears, as a distinctive characteristic of conservatism, circumspection in the face of change, and, therefore, opposition to radical change leading the conservatives to reject uprooting and wide-ranging reforms, and rather favor making necessary adaptations to the changing circumstances only in the areas in need of amendment in the form of piecemeal change. Therefore, the concept of revolution, in conservative contemplation, which allows only evolutionary progress, is unthinkable (Heywood, 2003:11, rendering “counter-revolutionary moment as the defining moment in the history of conservatism” (Beneton, 2011: 12. The concept of revolution and its critique takes up ample room in the discussion and elaboration of the body of primary issues of conservatism, which, according to Nisbet, for the past two centuries of conservatism, “is nothing but the development of the ideas put forth by Burke against the French Revolution” (Nisbet, 2017: 50.

Change is the realm of the unknown, and therefore creates insecurity, whereas traditionally established is the realm of familiar, and therefore provides a sense of security. As they are skeptical of what change is to bring about, conserva-

tives display ample prudence when it comes to the concept of change, preferring to maintain status quo and reject change if it is not a sine qua non, a stance which can best be reflected in the aphoristic expression “Where it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change.” by the 17th century English author and politician Lucius Cary. However, this approach should not be misinterpreted as a staunch opposition to and complete dismissal of change, as conservatives deem change as acceptable, and even essential in certain respects, as exemplified Burke’s argument that “a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation” (Heywood, 2003: 86, therefore conservatism is “compatible with all manner of change, provided only that change is also continuity” (Scruton, 1984:11 In other words, although conservatism establishes its political background on the denouncement of revolution, when change is inevitable and irreversible, it channels its effort to bring about stability and temperance within the context of the current order, “adapting to what prudence has failed to prevent” (Özipek, 2011: 83. All in all, the stance of conservatism vis-à-vis change can be summed up as “not an absolute rejection of change but skepticism towards attempts to create a perfect society, castigating Jacobin approaches to mold the community into an ideal form” (Yılmaz, 1996: 189.

Another important ubiquitous trait of conservatism is that conservatives see “experience and history as the surest guide to human conduct”, leading them to avoid ‘a politics of principle’ and rather prefer a traditionalist political approach (Heywood, 2003:10, because tradition refers to the transmission from generation to generation of values, practices, and institutions that have proved themselves as viable and therefore worthy of being maintained. This view is actually the reflection of a functionalist perspective, which postulates that “institutions develop and survive for [the reason] that they contribute to maintaining the larger whole” (Heywood, 2003:79. In this vein, tradition, which is regarded as the “accumulated wisdom of the past” serves another function geared towards contributing to the maintenance of the whole, which is to provide a sense of identity for the members of a society, saving them from rootlessness by creating a sense of connectedness with the past as well as a sense of belonging, and ultimately enabling social cohesion (Heywood, 2003:73.

Conservatives' nostalgic yearning for the past is not a futile lamentation over the long-gone, but rather "a reminiscence of a past eroded by modernism as a political project, as well as a prospect of an alternative future promised by that past" (Bora & Onaran, 2006: 260, which also serves to inform and shape the future, a stance encapsulated in the quote "the further you look back at the past the clearer you see the future" by Winston Churchill.

This strong confidence in tradition and traditional values largely derive from the conservatives' piety, as they see God as the creator of all order and believe that tradition is the God's will incarnated. Another reason why religious faith bears such high significance for the conservatives lie in the conservatives' belief in human imperfection, which is deemed responsible for the immoral acts human beings are prone to engaging in unless they are rigorously monitored, and their conceptualization of religion as a set of principles constituting a moral order necessary to check and deter people from committing crime, which they would inevitably perpetrate if left unchecked by the laws to be vigorously enforced (Heywood, 2003:75. This belief stems from the doctrine of the original sin, according to which human beings cannot be innately good and free because of their imperfect nature (Güler, 2008: 117.

Therefore, the idea of imperfect human nature is closely linked with the conservatives' understanding of social order, which is considered to be the only valid license for a predictable, stable and therefore a happy society. The conservative contemplation of society is an organic one, which sees "society as a living thing, an organism, whose parts work together just as the brain, heart, lungs and liver do within a human organism", where individuals recognize and fulfill their obligations in order to attain freedom (Heywood, 2003:78, which resonates with "conservatives' sympathy for cooperation within social groups in the form of communal solidarity" (Ergil, 1986: 123.

This idea of organic society forms the basis of and informs many other notions central to conservatism, the primary of which are morality, family and nation. Conservatives see family as a model for the nation, both of which serve to bolster the ties among the individual members of the bigger whole (Heywood, 2003:, 79. In this respect, conservatives consider nationalism "a natural ally in maintaining social order and defending traditional institutions" contributing to social cohesion (Heywood, 2003: 173.

The conceptualization of society as an organism is again closely interrelated with conservatives' view of the attempts to reform or revolutionize society based on abstract ideals or principles which are the product of the limited intellect of the imperfect human. Therefore attempt to 'engineer' society is not only futile but also dangerous (Heywood:2003, 78).

The idea of organicism also lends itself to the interpretation of society as "naturally hierarchical, characterized by fixed or established social gradations", which is a view contemplating social equality as not only unattainable but also undesirable (Heywood:2003, 81). Even the policies to improve the conditions of the under-privileged formulated in one-nationism or Tory democracy are aimed to "consolidate hierarchy rather than remove it" since the rationale behind these ideas is to remove a prospective threat to the established order from the less well-off (Heywood:2003, 88).

The definitional problems with conservatism having been set aside, and the common themes having been outlined, it is the ideological account, supported with theoretical background offered by prominent thinkers in each geography, informing and inflecting the political developments which will occupy the rest of this chapter.

§ 2.2 The Birth of Conservatism and Its Historical Development

The inception of conservatism as a novel philosophical idea in Western thought is almost unanimously traced back to the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, the period of Bourbon restoration after the policies of Napoleon failed. It emerged as an attempt by French thinkers to rebuild the pre-revolution political establishments and values, with the idea in their mind that principles of justice should be reinstated and the security of the civilization should be maintained in the face of the threat posed by the Jacobin practices of the Revolution. The Anglo-Irish philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-1797, who staunchly argued against the French Revolution, particularly in his pamphlet *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, is considered to be the founding father of conservatism, basically with his opposition to the Jacobin experiment in France and their radical ideas of individual freedom and equality (Heywood, 2003:74, clairvoyantly claiming that "revolutions devour their

own children and turn into their own opposites". According to Burke, and many defenders of the time-honored established orders, violent, untraditional, and uprooting methods of the revolution outweighed and corrupted its liberating ideals, as he believed that "existing institutions embody the wisdom of the past, and practical experience was a guide in public affairs infinitely superior to the cold abstractions of the French revolutionaries" (Eccleshall, 1990:39).

Burke, who argued in favor of continuity and saw inconstancy as an evil, was mainly concerned about the rationalist ideas of the Enlightenment, and condemned the subversive effects these ideas on the institution of the state as a political entity, which is an institution, as perceived by conservatives, honored by time and materialized as an outcome of wisdom of many generations, since he believed a contract between a person and society differs from other contracts mainly in its seriousness and permanence. He argued that changing conditions are insufficient justification for changing the form of government (Honderich, 2005:11)

Although conservatism is intimately identified with the French Revolution, there also exists an approach that traces its philosophical roots way back to Aristotle and Aristotelian ethics (Auerbach, 1959:8, as it emphasizes, among others, prudence, which Aristotle defines as "practical wisdom" rather than the theoretical wisdom, enabling one to take the right course of action determined by the specifics of a particular situation as opposed to theoretical principles set by a law (Cooper, 1973:380. In this respect, Aristotle's reasoning, which emphasizes that virtue is practical and that acting moderately brings man happiness, enables one to see Aristotle as the archetype of conservative thinkers, as Aristotle denounces excess and exhorts moderation. This view considers prudence and moderation as epitomizing the primary features conservatism (Argin, 2006: 468. Robert Nisbet also traces the roots of conservatism back to the early human history (Nisbet, 2017: 49.

However, as a system of thought, conservatism can be contemplated as a phenomenon of the last two centuries, formulated based on the ideas put forth as a response to three primary developments, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Throughout its development, conservatism has been inflected by the specific conditions of the society in which

it took form. In this respect, conservatism as distinctive lines of thought can be studied in three different countries of the continental Europe.

2.2.1 *Great Britain:*

2.2.1.1 17th Century: Historical Precursors: The English Revolution of 1642-1660 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688

The English Revolution, also known as the English Civil War, which refers to the sequence of events that encompasses the deposition and then execution of Charles I, the replacement of the monarchy with the Commonwealth (1649-1653, Oliver Cromwell's ascendancy to dictatorship, and the ultimate restoration of the monarchy, bears significance in terms of conservative ideology in that the divine legitimacy of an absolute monarch had to be defended against the supporters of the parliament as supreme in political matters, restricting the power of the crown with that of the constitution. Therefore, although the revolution ended with the ultimate restoration of the Stuart monarchy, it laid the foundation for a constitutional monarchy which, particularly after 1688, was quite firmly established in Britain, while many other countries in Europe were still ruled by absolute monarchies (Eccleshall, 1990: 25).

In this respect, the historical roots of the conservative ideas, albeit without such designation, in Great Britain, can be traced back to the Tory movement, which espoused a society based on hierarchy and ruled by a monarch appointed by the Divine, and rejected the rule of the people as well as the power invested on the parliament based on the idea of sovereignty. Therefore, it could be asserted that conservatism dates back to the mid 17th century, to the Restoration period of 1660–1688, by which the monarchy was restored. However, when a constitutional government was established with the defeat of the Tory ideals, and Whig ideology became dominant as of 1688 with the Glorious Revolution, which deposed James II and established a constitutional monarchy in Britain under William and Mary, the character of the political scene transformed with the sovereignty vested in three estates of Crown, Lords and Commons (Eccleshall, 1990: 21).

However, it should also be noted that although the English Revolution in 1688 led to a change of dynasty, it, by no means, brought about a new understanding of sovereignty; on the contrary, it aimed to reinstate the traditional rules and procedures on the execution of power. In other words, the primary goal of this revolution was to restore the relationship between the king and the people. Burke, for instance, sees this revolution as a means which enabled the “historical continuity” as opposed to the French Revolution, which led to a break in this continuity by eradicating traditions and institutions, which are the products of historical wisdom (Beneton, 1991: 17).

2.2.1.2 18th Century: Burkean Legacy

The views of Edmund Burke, who was as a member of the parliament between 1766 and 1794 in the House of Commons with the Whig Party, served to form the foundation of many later conservative thinkers and theorists, were in contrast to those of the Enlightenment philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, according to whom society is based on a hypothetical social contract among the living. Burke, however, conceived this contract as a “partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (Burke, 1909: 233, and therefore considered it both reckless and insolent to subvert an established, time honored, and divine order based on abstract ideals and through coercive measures, which constitutes the basis of his opposition to the French Revolution, which attempted to replace honor, and wisdom deriving from the medieval aristocratic tradition. According to Burke, it is not the individual will that gives life to civilization, but rather the society, as the formation of moral principles, art, science and education can only be achieved through membership to these societies over generations. Therefore, according to Burke, the folly of the French revolutionaries lie not only in their abstract ideas of a perfect society, as modern states are so complex that any attempt to reform them on the basis of metaphysical doctrines alone would inevitably result in despotism, but also in their audacious assumption that humans can assume the role of the creator and “remake” society.

Burke believes that the aristocratic class is the society’s natural leaders, (Auerbach, 1959: 37-40, and despite the malpractices of the French monarchy

and the landed aristocracy, they are the natural rulers of France. However, Burke's stance in this matter is concessionary as while he contends that man's social position is determined by "the consequence of God-given innate qualities" (Weiss 1977: 20 and argues against democracy, which is, according to him, prone to turning into a tyranny of the majority, he concedes that there should be limits on the powers of the crown, as he believes that the parliament is capable of exercising superior judgement in executive matters than appointed officials. Therefore, Burke suggests a constitutional framework which would counterbalance the rule of the landed aristocracy, which Burke sees as the "proper chieftains" of society (Eccleshall, 1990:40, and posits that monarchy should reform itself in a timely fashion, as Burke sees reform not as a fundamental change in essence but rather as a modest modification in the form of a straightforward solution to the particular problem causing complaint (Honderich, 2005: 13.

Alongside monarchy and landed aristocracy, another time-honored institution that Burke favors is an established church, as he believes that most human beings are innately depraved and tainted by the original sin, and incapable of bettering themselves through reason, which is weak (Weiss 1977: 20, a fact which renders "illusions" and "prejudices" socially necessary. Burke, therefore, argues for the inseparability of the state and religion as important establishments, stating that "in a Christian commonwealth the Church and the State are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole", and that Christianity existed in England for one thousand years, rendering past religion a part of the present English social contract (Payne, 1990, 21. Yet again, Burke tempers his views and allows for a degree of religious toleration, attaching significance to the moral and civilizing qualities of religion (Auerbach, 1959: 53. Moreover, Burke, "who had replied to the enormous theoretical ambitions of the revolutionaries in France with the weight of actual history, expressing a conservative skepticism toward political theory in general" (Mahoney, 2004, p. 200, distinguishing him from the reactionaries of the continental Europe like Maistre and Bonald. Burke's religious stance informs and makes a significant impact on his political conservatism, constituting the source of his views on reform, which, he believes, should take place within God's providence and the moral order defined by Catholicism so as to

be considered a just political change as opposed to unjust change, which Burke calls “innovation” as Burke justifies the social order on the basis of tradition, since tradition represents wisdom accumulated over the years. This constitutes the basis for his preference for community and social harmony over social reforms (Auerbach, 1959: 41.

The continuing influence of Burkean legacy on the later development of conservative ideology is not confined to the philosophical realm but also extends into economic affairs, informing the unfolding of Anglo-American economic conservatism to this day. As an ardent supporter of Adam Smith’s liberal economics, and in line with his views on society as hierarchical, Burke considers free market natural as well as necessary, and sees the laws of the market as natural laws, which are not to be meddled with since, even if the working conditions resulting from the free market may be demeaning, undignified and unhealthy, interfering in a naturally operating market would only exacerbate these circumstances (Heywood, 2003: 90. Interpreting the social and economic conditions of the late 18th century Britain and as response to the emergence of capitalism as the “new” traditional order, Burke justifies his espousal of the capitalist free market with the conceptualization of capitalism as a traditional establishment similar to monarchy or the church (Heywood, 2003: 91.

2.2.1.3 19th Century: The Transformative Effect of Benjamin Disraeli as the Architect of One-Nation Conservatism

The 19th century witnessed an evolution in British conservatism, especially under the influence of the party leader and prime minister Benjamin Disraeli, who assumed a pivotal role in the creation of the modern Conservative Party, with a commitment to democracy, considerably strengthening conservatism as a political influence by extending its scope beyond the philosophical sphere into the realm of politics, thereby playing a major role and becoming a significant actor in politics during the heyday of the British Empire. In this process, the party reconceptualized its understanding of certain ideals as conservatism in this new sense ceased to be merely the defense of the landed aristocracy (Claeys, 2006:195.

One of the primary contributions of Disraeli to British political conservatism is the concept of ‘one-nation conservatism’, which is a paternalistic form of conservatism advocating that established institutions and traditional principles should be preserved while social and economic programmes with a strong emphasis on “social obligation in stark contrast to the extreme individualism then dominant within the political establishment” (Heywood, 2003: 86) are carried out.

Disraeli formulated this philosophy as a reaction to what he saw as the division of the British nation into two as the rich and the poor, and designed his programme to improve the conditions of the people suffering from the rampant inequality and indigence as a result of the growing industrialization, which in turn, Disraeli suspected, would result in revolution as the suffering groups would not passively accept the adverse conditions they were in. Disraeli’s reformative thoughts introduced within a political democracy earned the party larger electoral support by attracting the working-class thanks to the reforms to provide greater protection for workers, who had both gained suffrage thanks to the Second Reform Act of 1867 and benefited from social reforms providing them with better housing and hygiene during Disraeli’s office (Heywood, 2003: 87).

This paternalistic philosophy posits that society should be allowed to develop in an organic way, whereby members of society fulfill their obligations towards each other as the privileged and wealthy pass on their benefits (Vincent, 2009: 64), creating a “benevolent hierarchy”, which would also serve to reestablish the political prestige of the aristocracy by manifesting its capacity to ameliorate the social and economic plight of the peasantry and the labouring classes (Browning & Huggins 2002:265).

In addition to the practical electoral outcomes it promised and yielded, Disraeli’s approach also bore moral appeal in that based on the organic conservative belief that everyone’s assuming the duty and obligations that fall to their lot is actually what keeps society together and that the feudal principle of noblesse oblige requires the aristocracy to be benevolent and munificent, Disraeli’s formulation of a hierarchical society entails an inequality of obligations beside an inequality of privileges and rights, whereby “the wealthy and powerful must shoulder the burden of social responsibility”, which Disraeli

sees as the “price of privilege”. All these ideas put forth by Disraeli to eradicate the rich-poor dichotomy and unite the British nation as one made a very long-lasting impact on conservative ideology, serving to integrate “a radical and reforming tradition”, which, to this day, has led pragmatism and a sense of social duty become integral components of conservatism (Heywood, 2003: 87).

However, within-party tensions and the rivalry between the wealthy business class and the traditional aristocratic conservatives gradually grew, the aristocracy, who opposed the greater representation of the middle class in parliament, becoming stronger and stipulating the maintenance of the institutions of church and state in exchange for supporting the reforms the party intended to make (Auerbach, 1959: 40).

2.2.1.4 The Tamworth Manifesto, Robert Peel, the Conservative Party

In 1834, Tory Prime Minister Robert Peel issued the Tamworth Manifesto, considered to be the document stating the principles of the new Conservative Party, promising moderate political reform, thereby initiating a transformation in the party from Tory reactionism, which favors a traditional society based on hierarchy with the aristocratic class constituting the ruling elite rather than the bourgeoisie or those who have attained their position through commerce or labour, to a modern form of conservatism (Heywood, 2012: 82).

However, the process was not without contestation and the party suffered a split in 1846 because of the disagreement between the traditional Tories led by Benjamin Disraeli and the Earl of Derby, favoring protectionism and the supporters of free trade, led initially by Robert Peel and then the Earl of Aberdeen, the latter group eventually leaving the party and forming an alliance with the Whigs and the radicals from the Liberal Party. While by the late 19th century, a considerable number of traditional business supporters of the Liberal Party had joined the Conservatives, rendering the it a party of business and commerce, in 1912, it became the Conservative and Unionist Party when it merged with the Liberal Unionist Party, increasing the influence of the left on the policies of the party, leading it to make progressive reforms (Feuchtwanger, 1968: 273).

As the 19th century drew to a close and the ideas forming the basis of policy of social reform constituting one-nation conservatism put forth by Disraeli were adopted by another member of the Conservative Party, Lord Randolph Churchill, ultimately coming to be known as ‘Tory democracy’, conservatism, while retaining its “commitment to pre-industrial, hierarchic and paternal values” with an emphasis on the need for “the monarchy, the House of Lords and the church to enjoy wider base of social support”, took on a new appeal to a larger body of electorate, intending to gain the votes of the working class, viewed as a form of Tory welfarism (Heywood, 2012: 82.

2.2.1.5 The 20th Century and the Emergence of the New Right

As of the 20th century, the Conservatives gradually became more influential in government, regaining complete control of the cabinet in 1922, and conservatism dominated the political scene of England during the interwar period.

Despite the interval from 1945 to 1951, when Winston Churchill’s Conservatives lost the election and the government was constituted by the Labour Party under the leadership of Clement Attlee (Rowe: 2004, 37, which implemented a program of nationalization of industry, economic planning and the promotion of social welfare with a system of social security and a national health service (Thomas & Willis, 2016: 154, conservative party continued its influence in much of the 20th century, gaining momentum with especially the emergence of the new right to express general antipathy towards ‘creeping socialism’, and particular hostility towards Soviet communism.” (Heywood, 2003: 21

Having lost the 1945 election due to the voters’ fear of unemployment experienced during the 1930s, and therefore their belief that the efficient way of running the country’s economy could be achieved through socialist planning, (Thomas & Willis, 2016: 155, and in line with one -nation tradition, In 1950s and 1960s, conservative governments employed a form of Keynesian social democracy, which intended to achieve full employment as well as extended welfare provision. This compromising character assumed by the Conservatives, which aimed to strike a balance between “rampant individualism and overbearing collectivism” materialized in the conservative version of planned

capitalism, was articulated in the influential book by Conservative Prime Minister between 1957-63, Harold Macmillan's *Middle Way* (Heywood, 2003: 88, which offered an approach between unfettered capitalism and state socialism, which "entailed public ownership of essential industries, government direction of investment, and sufficient expenditure on welfare to establish an irreducible minimum standard of living." (Eccleshall:2003, 64

Macmillan's middle way, which is actually a revised form of Disraeli's 'one nation' ideal, constitutes a response to the growing unrest in the British society, which, Mcmillan feared, would run the risk of falling prey to totalitarianism, then prevalent in much of Europe either in the form of communism or fascism, unless capitalism was checked. "This modernised Disraelian strand of conservatism became party orthodoxy" for almost two decades, until in early 1970s, an increasing majority of conservatives began to shift from the espousal of the economic planning and extensive social welfare of the middle way, which they saw as a slide to socialism due to the expansion it led in the scope and scale of government interference, to the advocacy of minimal state intervention and an abandonment of economic planning via such policies as privatisation, deregulation, and the marketisation of the welfare state (Eccleshall:2003, 65.

The policies of big government and intensive state intervention mainly in the form of central planning would, to a great extent, be reversed by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, under whose leadership the ideological direction and the policies of the Conservative Party dramatically shifted to the right as of 1980s, with a strong movement towards free-market economic policies. In this respect, neo-liberalism is "counter-revolutionary" in that its fundamental goal is to stop and if possible reverse, the trend towards big government and state intervention that has characterized much of 20th century" (Heywood , 2003:54.

2.2.1.6 The Rise of New Right, Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism

As of her election as the prime minister in 1979, Margaret Thatcher made a complete break from the pragmatic conservatism that characterized the post-war era, and offered a rather stentorian ideological outlook, leaving a huge impact on many aspects of British life not only with her economic policies

antithetical to former post-war economic policies based on Keynesian economic theory but also her views regarding social and private lives of individuals.

The conservative new right was deeply critical of the degeneration observed in public morality which they believed was a result of the over-permissive environment created by the post-war prosperity leading people to find fault with traditional moral and social principles, which enabled the stability of society whose fundamental building blocks were the institutions of marriage and family.¹ Based on the belief that such laxity of social mores posed a serious threat to established values and social order, Thatcher made a call for a return to Victorian values (Heywood, 2003: 99

Being one of them from upbringing, Thatcher could easily relate to the lower middle classes, presenting not only herself as someone sharing their ambitions and desires but also her “attitudes, values and beliefs as if they were beacons of common sense” (Evans, 1997:4. Indeed, Thatcher government’s economic policies were also informed by a long-established conservative view of morality based on imperfect human nature prone to vileness, which makes provides support for Thatcherites’ holding welfare capitalism responsible for “a rising crime rate, promiscuous sex, drugs, unruliness in schools, hooliganism, trade union belligerence and other forms of ‘permissive’ behaviour” that could only be eliminated by a strengthening of law and order (Eccleshall, 2003:66.

The reasons behind Thatcher’s rise to power and success in implementing her then-unorthodox² economic policies at a time when Keynesian paradigm

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- 1 One example to the materialization of her views based on conventional marriage and family life is the inclusion of Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, which states that a local authority shall not “promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship”. Despite the permanence of many views and policies of Thatcher to this day, same-sex marriage was legalized in England and Wales in 2013 (<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-22764954>
 - 2 The dominant conviction was that central planning of industry and society had helped win the war, and these concepts were associated with victory, rendering Keynesian economic the policies the established norm; hence Thatcher’s rejecting state ownership of businesses and socialist central planning was a novelty, although at the time many other right-wingers were

of economic policy-making had been the norm can, to a large extent, be attributed to the economic and political conditions of the 1970s, when the post-war boom experienced during the 1950s and 1960s in the economy was over, leading to economic difficulties mainly in the form of rampant inflation and high unemployment (Green, 1999:18).

Holding Keynesian policies responsible for the country's economic and social problems, the Conservative Party abandoned one-nation thinking (Vincent, 2009: 64 and embarked on a program based on neoliberal economics, which enjoyed a revival especially in the second half of 1970s due to the social and economic crisis Britain was in, raising strong suspicions as to the efficacy of Keynesian economic policies (Dorey, 2011:126, and a belief in free markets as well as a small state through privatization of state-owned industries, cutting public expenditure (Dorey, 2011:104).

Overall, Thatcherism could conveniently be interpreted both as a response to the economic circumstances of the 1970s, and a significant constituent element of a broader international revival of liberal-market and monetarist economics (Green, 1999: 19, reflecting the general developmental pattern in the structure and policies of the Conservative party responsive to the changing circumstances. Tracing the evolution of the Conservative Party reveals that the transformation it went through has been closely related with the change in the basis of its electoral support and how this change rests on wider social and economic developments. In this sense, the allure of the Thatcher government to the electorate may be said to have largely derived from the fact that "it fused an appeal based on nationalism, or at least national independence, within Europe with the promise of strong government and firm leadership" (Heywood, 2003: 174 at a time when the threat of economic and social instability was deeply felt.

Thatcher's policies and stance have been heavily criticized for drastically diverging from conservative values, and Thatcherism, together with the new

adherents of the views of the economists Friedrich Hayek, who was strictly critical of government control of economic decision-making through central planning as he believed that central planning was doomed to be inefficient due to the complexity of the information surpassing the capacity of the government officials, and Milton Friedman, who was a prominent advocate of free markets (Dorey, 2011: 30.

right project, has been deemed not properly fitting within conservative ideology, some commentators even arguing that she was not a true conservative but rather “a nineteenth-century liberal” (Sked&Cook, 1984: 329. Moreover, due to its ideological zeal, Thatcherism is considered to be incongruous with conservatism’s ideological distaste, pragmatist stance and reverence for tradition in constituting an “example of ideological fundamentalism, an acute form of rationalism in politics which wanted society to be reshaped according to a free-market blueprint” as well as their their lack of regard for “a settled way of life in their impatience to dismantle the institutions of what postwar conservatives had hailed as ‘humanised capitalism’” (Eccleshall, 2003: 66 diverging from the conventional understanding of conservatism.

On the other hand, tracing the developmental pattern of the Conservative Party reveals that the party “has not historically been a party of narrow reaction”, but one open to new ideas wherever their origin is located. According to this point of view, Thatcher’s policies “hardly represents a betrayal of Conservative values” (Evans, 1997:40. The new right project may also considered to be a part of conservative ideology in that it maintains its commitment “to traditional conservative social principles such as belief in order, authority and discipline” (Heywood, 2003: 71 Moreover, the policies of Thatcher government were also interpreted to some extent as counter-revolutionary and therefore in line with the conservative outlook in that Thatcherites held welfare capitalism responsible for the creation of a culture of dependence, and championed a reversal to the Victorian values of self-sufficiency, thrift and rugged adventure, which would ultimately revive the Victorian Golden Age. This nostalgia for a glorified past and “the call for a return to a morality based on self-reliance, decency and respect for the rule of law” (Eccleshall, 2003:67

2.2.2 *France*

The political and intellectual environment outside England, which had witnessed the overthrow of absolute monarchy and transitioned to a constitutional one back in the 17th century, however, took on a rather different character especially in countries where autocratic monarchies continued their existence during much of the 1800s, paving the way for a disparate more authoritarian strand of conservatism “faithful to the rigid and hierarchical values

of autocratic rule” (Heywood, 2003: 84, resulting, in general, in an unpromising resistance to change

2.2.2.1 Continental Reactionaries: Joseph de Maistre and Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald

As the country which itself directly experienced the effects of the French Revolution, France witnessed the development of a more reactionary conservatism than the one espoused by Burke. Conservatism in France was largely informed and shaped by the ideas of two Counter- Enlightenment writers, Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, according to whom the revolution lamentably severed the ties between the state and what they believed to be the true spirit of society, stripping the course of action that the revolutionaries adopted off its legitimacy, as Maistre and Bonald staunchly advocated social hierarchy and monarchy (Beum, 1997: 305.

As an ultra-loyalist, and in that respect reactionary, espousing “complete subordination to ‘the Master’” (Heywood, 2003: 84, de Maistre, in 1796, “published his magnum opus, *Considerations on France*, arguably the locus classicus of post-Revolutionary conservatism in France” in which he argued that the Protestant Reformation had unleashed nefarious forces of individualism that culminated in the French Revolution (Hammer & Von Stuckrad, 2007: 214.

Maistre considered monarchy a divinely sanctioned institution, and denounced popular sovereignty as unjust, and ultimately self-destructive. Therefore, in supporting Bourbon restoration, Maistre envisioned “resurrecting a ‘traditional’ France ruled harmoniously by king, Church, and nobles” (Pilbeam, 2005: 57, thereby incorporating Christianity in his contemplation of legitimate rule as he believed rejection of religion based on rationalist ideas was one of the prime causes of the chaos and bloodshed in the aftermath of the revolution because what the revolutionaries had subverted was the consecrated authority deriving its legitimacy from the Divine (Lebrun, 1989: 236. Because “absolute monarchies are based upon deeply established religious ideas, notably the divine right of kings” (Heywood, 2003: 4, conservatives in France found the provenance of legitimate authority in divine providence, and

staunchly rejected the secularism of the French Revolution, as well as the separation of church and state, demanding the reinstatement of monarchy as inseparable with the Catholic Church.

Another philosopher who provided such a theocratic justification for the legitimacy of the ruler, and thus, for the restoration of the *ancien régime* is the implacable adversary of the French Revolution, a noble Catholic Louis de Bonald, according to whom the unity of monarchy and the church would re-establish the order, balance and harmony by bringing together the body and spirit of the nation that were ripped apart by the French Revolution, thereby defeating secular nationalism. According to Bonald, the principle of “sovereignty of the people” espoused by the revolutionaries meant atheism, and therefore revolution alienated people from God, their own essence, their social and historical heritage, dragging them into deviancy (Beneton, 1991: 40.

In the aftermath of World War II, conservatism emerged as the primary political influence in France, becoming especially prominent as of the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Under the leadership and strong influence of Charles de Gaulle, the French President between 1959 and 1969, conservatives in France incorporated certain other elements such as Gaullism, patriotism, and nationalism in their views with a strong emphasis on tradition, order and revival of France as a strong independent nation (Heywood, 2003: 174, as de Gaulle displayed outstanding dexterity in appealing to national pride of the French.

2.2.3 *Germany:*

19th Century: From Hegelian Foundations to Adam Müller

Established on a profound philosophical foundation, conservatism in Germany, despite the features it shares with those in other countries and its adherence to fundamental principles of conservatism, displays a rather distinct character from the conservative thought in the rest of continental Europe, as its origins can be traced back to Hegel, who is commonly accepted as the founder of German conservatism with the significance he attaches to the concepts of “nation” and “state”, and his conceptualization of reality as the perfect form of rationalism. Although Hegel postulates, like the Enlightenment thinkers, a developmental sequence of epochs leading to a linear historical progress,

he does not base his idea of historical progress on the constructive mind and revolution, but the internal dynamic of dialectical progress innate in the spirit of the nation (nationgeist and history (staatgeist (Çaha, 2001:103.

However German conservatism in its modern sense owes much to the ideas of the prominent German conservative Adam Müller, who argued, in his chief work *Elements of Statecraft*, that it is not human reason that gives life to the state but historical development. Having been deeply affected by Edmund Burke's ideas, Müller views the state as a living entity created by God rather than product of rational contemplation, making him, one of the chief opponents of revolutionary ideas in politics. Since his ideal form of social and political organization is based on medieval feudalism, on which modern institutions should be modelled, Müller insists that the former greatness of German estates could only be achieved by restoring medieval principles of government as "Prussia and Austria had declined because even their feudal elites had succumbed to the selfish spirit of liberal individualism (... and had forgotten what feudal warriors understood: that society was a community based on mutual sacrifice for the perpetual struggle against nature and foreign intrusion" (Weiss, 1977: 41 In this conceptualization, it is the intermediary institutions of the medieval times down from the monarchy to the guildmasters, rather than the anti-community character of the individual, that would maintain the justice and social order.

Another concept integral to Müller's conservatism is a sense community as the prerequisite to harmony and order, which has been disrupted due to the staunch advocacy of the liberals of individual rights as well as the social contract principle they attach to. This view of community contributes to the coherence of his conservatism in that it is entirely compatible with his call for a restoration of a medieval feudalism "as medieval man had, not as an aggregate of individuals but as a community of communities in which every citizen was part of a lesser community – nobles, priests, guildsmen, merchants – each with as much power of self-regulation as was consistent with its function and the good of the whole" (Weiss, 1977: 44.

During the late 1800s and early 1900s, despite the Catholic Church's espousal of autocracy, Germany experienced a divergence from autocratic com-

mitment, as Catholic parties such as Zentrum in Germany opted for constitutional government, political democracy and social reform (Heywood, 2003: 89).

Otto von Bismarck, Nationalism and Revolutionary Conservatism

The development of conservatism in Germany cannot be contemplated detached from development of nationalism, which culminated in the creation of the unified German Empire in 1871 with Germany's defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War and the rise of Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of the German Empire between 1871 and 1890, as an important political figure in Europe with his "balance of power" model, which he adroitly employed and "remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost twenty years after 1871, [and] devoted himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers" (Hobbesbawm, 1987: 312).

With his deep skepticism of the rule of the masses and strong distrust he for democracy, Bismarck displayed characteristic features of a conservative statesman in that his government, almost virtually unchecked by the elected parliament, functioned through a powerful and competent bureaucracy consisting of the members of the landed nobility of eastern Prussia. However, his conservatism is "revolutionary" in that the state-building strategy he followed was based on creating loyalty to the state and the emperor not only in the Junker elite but also in ordinary Germans, to which end he created the modern welfare state in Germany in the late 19th century. "His strategy was "granting social rights to enhance the integration of a hierarchical society, to forge a bond between workers and the state so as to strengthen the latter, to maintain traditional relations of authority between social and status groups, and to provide a countervailing power against the modernist forces of liberalism and socialism" (Kersbergen & Vis, 2013:38. In line with this unificatory approach, Bismarck also promulgated universal male suffrage in the new German Empire in 1871 (Moore& Vaudagna, 2003:226. In implementing such policies, Bismarck can be considered to be benefitting from the pragmatist aspects of conservatism, as despite his entrance into politics in 1847 as an ultraconservative advocate of Junker interests and defender of the royalty, Bismarck was by no

means a tradition-bound reactionary, but rather a pragmatist skillfully wielding the principles of political realism as he based his policies primarily on considerations of given circumstances, rather than ideological premises. Therefore his primary goal in establishing a welfare state can be seen as stemming not from his egalitarian ideals, but from his desire to gain support of the working class and not to lose ground to his socialist adversaries.

Conservatism in Germany was also affected by “the particular problems of political unification in the nineteenth century, a vociferous nationalist movement emphasizing völkisch ideas, the dominant position of the authoritarian Prussian Junkers and the heavily metaphysical approach of their leading thinkers” (Vincent, 2010: 63).

20th Century: The rise of Conservative Revolutionary Movement and Far-right Nationalist Policies

In the aftermath of the First World War, conservatism in Germany took on a much radical complexion with the German conservative revolutionary movement, which advocated a specifically German -in fact Prussian- nationalism aiming to prevent the rise of liberalism and communism. Disillusioned with the German defeat in the First World War, coupled with the effects of German Revolution of 1918-1919, and the loss of a monarchical tradition led conservatives in Germany to look for an alternative conceptualization of world order, resulting in a shift towards far-right policies in the late 1920s, and finally co-operation with the Nazi Party, several conservative politicians becoming members of the Hitler Cabinet.

The period of Nazi rule struck a harsh blow in German conservatism, eliminating several prominent conservatives from the political scene, rendering this period for conservatism a time of decline and clandestine activity for conservatism, since, together with all other political parties, conservatives were forbidden, in line with the “national revolution”, which placed the highest priority on obliterating the elements that could stall the implementation of racist and social changes, to which conservatives such as the Catholic, Christian-democratic Zentrum and the Prussian monarchists, would react. To this end many conservative dissidents of the Nazi regime were murdered. After a period of pacification in the Third Reich, notable conservatives were involved in the German Resistance.

German revolutionary conservatism can actually be interpreted as a reflection and an extension of the radical approach conservatism incrementally assumed in Germany as of mid 19th century, which, to some extent is a result of the concept of cultural pessimism (Kulturpessimismus embraced by those who believe that modern bourgeoisie culture institutionalize decline by imposing its hegemony. Cultural pessimists, therefore, have a grim view of the state of affairs as they believe that the culture of a nation, a civilization, or humanity is in a process of irreversible decline, and without the expectation of any change that could reverse this decline, they advocate a 'heroic denouncement of the age', (İrem, 2002: 268. Such views led conservatives to seek a unique realignment of the world order peculiar to Germany, culminating in such theories as "Special Path" (sonderweg, ³ the most solid example of which is the emphasis that Revolutionary conservatives placed on nationalism and contributed to the legitimization of Hitler's policies by holding nation's values as guidelines, as Special Path Theory created an ideology based on the postulation that the history of Germany is the penultimate, German national character is the universal truth, and German race is the most powerful in the world. Within this framework, nationalistic ideology united the society and its members as a whole, and reactionary conservative values served as means of legitimization in the process. With the concept of sonderweg, Conservative thinkers who point out the distinctiveness of Germany's historical and social developmental process from that of the rest of the continental Europe, as well as its key position in between the East and the West Europe argued that Germany should follow a unique developmental process due to the factors stemming from these two localities (Çiğdem, 2002:7. German conservatism has attained "a philosophical deepening of the points Burke had posed, which are then combined with genuinely German elements. Germany achieved for the ideology of conservatism what France did for progressive Enlightenment - she worked it out most fully to its logical conclusions" (Mannheim, 1986: 47.

The transformation in the political and intellectual arena actually did not take place independent of the economic transformation, as with the rise of

3 Regardless of the content of approaches such as concept of cultural pessimism (Kulturpessimismus and sonderweg, such theories are considered to be noteworthy contributions to conservative literature.

Nazism in 1933, agrarian movements faded and was supplanted by a more command-based economy and forced social integration. In the aftermath of the Second World War, interventionist policies were adopted by the Christian the Christian Democratic Party (CDU. Democratic corporatism, which attaches great significance to intermediate institutions rather than a strong centralized state, a stance whereby the binding element which brings together different institutions such as churches and business groups is 'social partnership', which constitutes an abandonment of the heavy emphasis on nationalism (Heywood, 2003: 89.

After World War II, conservatism in Germany had to grapple with totalitarianism, whose champions eventually embraced the principles of a liberal constitutional democracy, thereby obliterating themselves as a distinct political entity.

A Brief Synopsis of 200 Years of Western Conservatism

A classification offered based on the historical nation state idea reveals that there are different circumstances stemming from each nation's peculiar circumstances shaped by its culture and history, which, in turn, makes it impossible to offer an all-encompassing theory, as exemplified in the fact that while French conservatism in its early phases was marked by a more fervent espousal of a religious and moralistic world order, German conservatism stressed a substantial philosophical theory of history, producing a rather well-developed metaphysical and historical perspective. Britain, in contrast, adopted an empiricist approach, and while weak in terms of ideological coherence, and politically concessionary, achieved higher political success (O'Sullivan, 1976: 82-83.

As can be seen in its distinctive developmental patterns in different countries and times, conservatism, which takes shape depending on the historical context it unfolds, has assumed different forms and produced divergent outcomes, a fact which requires the researcher not to contemplate this notion stripped off the circumstances peculiar to its birthplace, as any attempt to make sense of this concept as detached from its profound intellectual background means running the risk of losing a sense of the reality (Türküne, 2004:83. Such variation, however, makes it extremely difficult to propose an overall chronological development encompassing different locations with all

their peculiarities, and inevitably mandates resorting to a rather simplified descriptive abstraction. At this point, the periodization proposed by Tanıl Bora (1998, dividing the developmental process of conservatism into three neat periods of (a from post -revolution to mid-19th century, (b from mid-19th century to the Second World War, and (c the post -Second World War period offers a rather round-up overview.

From post-revolution to mid-19th century

The first period stretching from post-revolution to mid-19th century encompasses the birth and the nascent stages of conservatism as put forth in the ideas of Burke, de Maistre and Müller as a reaction to the French Revolution and the unprecedented developments that unfolded in its early aftermath, as “princes were exiled; nobles became homeless commoners; monks, nuns and priests were exiled or forced to renounce their orders; petty states disappeared from the map; young men were torn from the villages of their ancestors and launched at distant armies in foreign lands; an unknown Corsican became emperor of France and half of Europe, while old laws and institutions crumbled before his sword” (Weiss, 1977: 37. Such unsettling disturbance of a long - established social and political order actually meant a total paradigm shift, which required a whole new perspective and understanding of the world, as reflected in lines of Lord John Manners :

“Each knew his place – king, peasant, peer or priest,
The greatest owned connexion with the least;
From rank to rank the generous feeling ran,
And linked society as man to man.” (Eccleshall, 2003:91

The 19th century was largely marked by the idea of minimal state presence and governmental regulation in economy as according to the prevalent economic view, the unprecedented increase in material wealth derived not from the hard work of the labor force but from the genius of the inventors as well as the astuteness of the entrepreneurs who were shrewd enough to comprehend the niche and put the potential in the market for technical innovations to good use. In other words, rather than exploiting the labor of the masses, entrepreneurs and the inventors who created the surplus value brought about an improvement in the conditions and living standards of the laborers, who, unless guided by the entrepreneurial command, would be doomed to abject poverty.

Therefore, “the technical submission of the majority of men to the guidance of an exceptional minority” was not only necessary but also desirable (Eccleshall, 2003:63).

This early strand of conservatism, which is today commonly referred as the “classical” or “traditional” conservatism, was as a response of those who were disillusioned with the fall of the values and institutions they held dear to the turmoil of the post-revolutionary era, in the form of deeply-felt reminiscence of the past with a yearning for the old order, with its long-established traditions and institutions. However, despite having been developed on the continental Europe, classical conservatism cannot be contemplated as the bearer of the characteristics of the whole continent, as two different strands of conservatism, one Francophone and the other Germanophone, developed on the continent (Çaha, 2001:102).

From mid-19th Century to the Second World War

The second period, which lasted from mid-19th century to the Second World War, constitutes the stage when the idea of nationalism came to be incorporated into conservative ideology as a binding element keeping the community together and creating social cohesion, which is a pivotal development in terms of the evolution of conservatism (Bora, 1998: 62, which assumed a more prominent, vocal and fierce form as a result of the reaction against modernism, liberalism, rationalism in the aftermath of the First World War. This reaction was only to be intensified with the arrival of the Great Depression and the ensuing rise of the anti-democratic sentiments with a strong emphasis on sacrifice, obedience, social duty as opposed to liberal individualism.

In the economic front, growing demand from constituents for social reform, together with increased emphasis on national strength and defence as well as need for improvement in national health forced many governments to re-evaluate their policies of minimal state intervention that marked the understanding of the state characteristic of the 19th century, paving the way for a transformation in the understanding of the role of the state towards welfarism, with growing state intervention in many states due to government effort to provide welfare to their citizens so as to combat social ills such as poverty, disease and ignorance (Heywood, 2003:60

The interwar period was marked by the dominance of the right-wing, taking up the entirety of the political arena with its bifurcation into two strands as the old right representing old-fashioned conservatism averse to mass politics and aspiring a reversal to the old order as exemplified by the stance of General Franco and General Metaxas, and the new right, i.e. fascism, exemplified by the in Hitler and Mussolini with a promise of a revival of the old regime and return to the unified organic society (Mazower, 2008: 31. The distinguishing characteristic of this new right was its heavy reliance on the rhetoric of the return to traditional past, and in line with this discourse, an attempt to recreate the long-lost values and traditions through politics, which actually was an artificially created artifact based on invented traditions (Hobsbawm, 1994:118.

This radical and revolutionary type of conservatism materialized in the policies of Hitler and Mussolini, despite its disdain for the legacy of 1789 and the Enlightenment, was an ardent champion of technology and technical modernity, through which it embarked on a programme to “manufacture” its values and past traditions (Bora, 1998: 66-67. This practice, epitomized most radically by Hitler’s National Socialism, transformed the old, classical conservatism to a new form of pro-capitalist conservatism, which defined the distinguishing features of conservative stance in the post-World War II period.

Post-World War II

Unlike the period in the aftermath of the First World War, characterized by uncertainty and economic hardship, the post-World War II period was comparatively more stable, which also enabled conservatism in the West to assume a more coherent character (Bora, 1998: 68 However, although in the early post-1945 period, conservatism was largely shaped by pragmatist and paternalistic ideas, leading the conservatives embrace a qualified form of social democracy (Heywood, 2003: 92, there occurred within conservative stance another bifurcation as classical (traditional conservatives and liberal conservatives, the former, in line with the traditionalist conservative stance, espousing the restoration of traditional values while rejecting liberal economic and political systems; the latter, embracing liberal stances, especially in economic, social and ethical issues. As opposed to the traditional conservatives,

whose influence was confined to a rather restricted circle, liberal conservatives, aiming to appeal to a larger body of electorate, had a transformative effect on conservatism reaching out to the masses thanks to their dexterous use of the flexibility and pragmatism of conservative stance, giving conservatism a fresh look and making it a current ideology followed by large masses.

After the Second world War, gradually being replaced by commitment to political democracy, authoritarian beliefs lost ground among continental conservatives, and paternalistic social traditions of Catholicism were increasingly embraced (Heywood, 2003:89. This denouncement of authoritarian tendencies represented by such ideologies as fascism and communism created a conducive environment for what Heywood calls “a marriage between two apparently contrasting ideological traditions” (Heywood, 2003:93: a collaboration between conservatism and liberalism in the political and economic sphere, which can partly be attributed to conservatives’ acceptance of capitalist economy as contingent upon technological development, as well as to the shift in the focus of conservative reactions to the cultural sphere.

The new neo-conservatism was incomparably conformist and in favor of the preservation of the status quo. What made this new conservatism “new” was the use of “old” values to protect the liberal society (Bora, 1998: 69, which was, according to the conservatives, under serious threat by Communism stands out to be the primary implacable enemy of the conservative right during the 1960s, which is in fact part of a broader, indeed almost global, stance of conservatism in the 20th century, whose strength and coherence “derived from the fact that [it was] defined in opposition to a communist or socialist ‘enemy’” (Heywood, 2003:21. Therefore, it could be conveniently argued that conservatism owes its coherence

Although the birth of neo-conservatism dates back to 1960s, it was only with the arrival of 1970s that this new strand of conservatism gained a systematic character and turned into a powerful movement. As the 1970s were marked by the end of the post-war economic boom, the ensuing recession and high unemployment as well as inflation, conservatives were compelled to re-evaluate their economic programmes, and ultimately began to abandon Keynesian welfarist policies, which they believed was conducive to pervasive welfare dependency as well as a reduced sense of social responsibility and, in

their stead, opted for economic libertarianism fused with state and social authoritarianism (Heywood, 2003:92-93)

With economic globalization as a driving force, and as a constituent element of “a new right ideological project” which aimed to combine laissez-faire economics with an essentially conservative social philosophy, neo-liberalism emerged serving to integrate national and global economies, whereby free and immediate flow of capital was made possible (Heywood, 2003:55-56, which enabled conservatism to enjoy continued popularity and ability to reach out to large masses incorporating new segments of the population into its constituency thanks to neoconservatism’s promise of “unity through pragmatism and bridge-building”, garnering support not only from traditional conservatives by displaying a traditionally conservative moral stance on social issues, but also from classical liberal conservatives on economic issues (Grigsby, 2011: 114, which constitutes the primary tenets of neo-conservatism, as articulated by Irving Kristol as “acceptance of the welfare state but opposition to social engineering by an intrusive bureaucracy; respect for the economic market; and support for traditional values, social order, and religion against the new cultural influences of the 1960s” (Morgan, 1994:110.

Since a defining feature of neo-conservatism is its apprehension of growing “social fragmentation or breakdown [driven by] liberal reform and ‘progressive’ values”, neo-conservatives emphasize the importance of and call for a return to traditional values of authority, morality, and religion, which are the core values upheld by traditional conservatism. According to the neo-conservatives, who are harshly critical of the excessiveness of democracy and the permissiveness of liberalism, the unity of society can only be achieved by exercising strict authority to maintain social discipline, and establishing concord between the modern economic order and the core traditional cultural values (Heywood, 2003: 98.

Although it was sympathetic towards individual freedoms, free enterprise and private property, neoconservatism was aversive to working class movements, as the type of freedom neoconservatives conceptualized was limited to “the opportunity for enterprising individuals to accumulate wealth unhindered by government” (Eccleshall, 2003:66 exclusionary of individual freedoms in the social sphere, since freedom, in this sense, is conceptualized as “a

notion that should not be put to use as a means of undermining the power of authority of any denomination, but rather as one reflecting the social values” (Birlir, 2012: 294.

“By accepting the idea of inherent moral corruption, neoconservatives believe that the roots of disorder reside in the human soul rather than in social justice”, and they champion the implementation of severe punishments to reduce crime and delinquency. Neoconservatives, thus, adhere to a combination of social authoritarianism combined with state authoritarianism as they believe “security is provided by the exercise of authority, in the family by the father, at school by the teacher, at work by the employer, and in society at large by a system of law and order” (Heywood, 2003: 98-99, a stance solidified in their advocacy of pro-family initiatives such as the prohibition of abortion and the ban of pornography, and put emphasis on the importance of religion (Medcalf & Dolbeare, 1985: 26.

The 1980s witnessed the rise of powerful, self-confident conservative leaders to power (Özipek, 2011: 195. Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in the UK refashioned the politics in the second half of the 20th century by conferring new meanings to the conservative philosophy to which they adhered ardently, by drawing ideas from the neo-conservatives who espoused free-market capitalism unrestrained by government interference, and implemented anti-Soviet foreign policies, opposed extensive welfare policies, and urged the revival of traditional values. During the 1980s, conservatives maintained a largely consistent strategy of bolstering the capitalist endeavor by means of retreating the state from the economic sphere. (Eccleshall, 2003:66

In 1990s, however, conservatism lost power with the rise of more leftist politicians to power in the US and the UK for example, which stemmed mainly from the disorientation conservatism suffered as a result of the fall of communism together with the dissolution of the USSR, which, for all conservatives regardless of the doctrinal fissures among them, had been the common enemy to be fought against at all costs, as the disappearance of the communist threat deprived the conservatives of the unificatory element which served to bind them together fighting both politically and intellectually against throughout the Cold War period.

All in all, a brief overview of 200 hundred years of conservatism across different traditions reveals that while in Anglo-American tradition, with a strict adherence to the views of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the principles of ‘enterprise capitalism’, have been ardently followed without much attention to their impact on social cohesion, across much of continental Europe, economic policies were conferred a socially cohesive role and considered to be tools to keep the society together ultimately leading to the emergence of social capitalism. The embracement of Keynesian welfarist policies by Christian democratic parties under the influence of economists such as Friedrich List, who considered the role economy played in terms of political power as pivotal and advocated government intervention to provide assistance to nascent industries against fierce international economic rivalry, led to extensive support for social market economy, whereby, while minimal governmental intervention is exercised over market principles, an extensive welfare system as well as strong public services are provided to the citizens (Heywood, 2003: 89-90.

§ 2.3 Conservatism in Turkey

While many aspects of Turkish conservatism bear similarities with those of classical Western conservatism, there are also differences as indigenous historical, cultural and political circumstances shape the character of conservatism in different societies. Therefore, conservatism in Turkey should also be contemplated within the context of its own peculiarities and exigencies.

Just as a great majority of scholars on conservatism observe that despite the existence of philosophical and socio-political precursors, the real watershed of conservative thought in the West is the French Revolution, that crucial moment for conservatism in Turkey, despite contributions to the pre-republican conservative thought, is widely recognized as the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic (Çiğdem, 2003). This is because although some scholars see important conservative themes prior to 1921, most agree that a systematic and conscious ideology of conservatism in Turkey was worked out in response to the radical aspects of the modernization project undertaken to transform the vestiges of a fallen empire into a current nation state (İrem, 1997.

The nature of conservatism in Turkey took shape as a product of an endeavor to construct a bridge between the past and the present by providing the people with a means to hold onto their traditional values that would enable a generation experiencing a sudden break from the past brought about by consecutive multiple reforms in various areas within a very brief time period. An attempt to delineate the important aspects of conservatism in Turkey, therefore, requires an understanding of the nature of the reforms, criticisms spawned against the way these reforms were implemented, the efforts to produce an ideological foundation for these reforms, and the contributions of the prominent intellectuals to the formation of this ideological background.

2.3.1 *Late Ottoman Period and Pre-Republican Precursors*

While it is hard to talk about a significant impact of neither philosophical nor political conservatism in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey until the second half the 20th century, it is still possible to point out some early representatives, among whom that warrant mention is Prince Sabahaddin together with the League of Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative (Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet, as his ideas were shaped under the influence of counter-revolutionary, aristocratic and Catholic conservative entourage of the French sociologist Frederic Le Play (Zürcher, 2003: 41.

Although he is considered to be a liberal by some scholars, Prince Sabahaddin is a thinker who was profoundly influenced by such representatives of radical right in France in the early 20th century as Demolins, Tourville and Descamps. It is Prince Sabahaddin who imported this fundamentally conservative ideology that emerged as result of the Industrial Revolution and French Revolution, which shook a social system based on religious ideology to its very foundations. Fundamentalist conservatives who espoused the continuity of a communitarian lifestyle within a religious framework despite the existence of a capitalist economic system and a liberal social and political order, attacked this new “modern” way of life fervently and attempted to reformulate their ideology to revive the old order under the changing circumstances (Kansu, 2002:119.

The representatives of conservative ideology in the late Ottoman period, therefore, were mainly those who embraced the concept of “national sovereignty” (hakimiyet-i milliye with the interpretation that this concept meant the maintenance of the institutions of the caliphate and the sultanate, and opposed the rule of The Committee of Union and Progress, which they considered to be overly repressive (Sezgin, 1984:15.

2.3.1.1 Disputes over the Fundamental Law on Organization (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu and the Emergence of Overt Dissent

In the nascent stages of the Republican period, although there was an Islamist and Ottomanist dissent among the public and in the parliament against Mustafa Kemal and the ideology he represented, this group could not openly defend their views under the given circumstances of the period. However, on 20 January 1921, during the disputes over the Fundamental Law on Organization (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu, which would be the first constitution of the modern Turkish state, clashes surfaced, giving way to the formation of two groups in the assembly

(Sezgin, 1984:52, since, although it was stated in article 7 that Sharia principles were to be followed, it was evident in this document that the foundations of a new state were being laid, leading to dismay within and outside the assembly and resulting in abandonments from the Association for the Defence of The National Rights Group (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti).

In Turkish political history the First Group is considered to be “revolutionary” due to its support for the Kemalist reforms, while the Second Group, which was to be officially formed a year later in July 1922 is deemed “conservative” (Sezgin, 1984:82 with its support for such issues as the maintenance of education through religious schools and the ratification of a law prohibiting the use of alcohol, which resulted in the second group’s being closely associated with religious reactionism.

However, decisive steps to suppress any prospective opposition to the promulgation of reforms were taken as early as 1 April 1923, when, in line with Mustafa Kemal’s prognostication that the dissension within the Turkish National Grand Assembly would constitute an obstacle before the reforms, the Assembly abolished itself, and a new assembly was constituted, with all new

members having been selected by Mustafa Kemal himself. Consequently, the Second Group was eliminated from the Assembly and it was this purge of dissent that enabled such drastic reforms as the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty (23 August 1923, proclamation of a republican regime (29 October 1923, abolition of the caliphate (3 March 1924 and promulgation of the Law on Unification of Education.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that it created great consternation and dismay among large segments of society that Islam was not considered to be one of the constituent elements during the consolidation period of the republic and in the identity construction process, since

religious identity had played a significant role in the national struggle period with prominent Islamists such as Mehmet Âkif Ersoy lending their support to Ankara in the struggle for national independence with their poems and sermons, providing the means for the struggle's legitimacy (Bora, 1999:116-118.

2.3.2 *Early Republican Period*

2.3.2.1 The Nature of Reforms and Political Response

The fast pace of reforms geared towards the secularization of Turkey, starting with the abolition of the sultanate on 1 November 1922 and continuing in full throttle during the reform period of 1923-1935 with such implementations as the adoption of a new civil code modelled on Swiss civil law in 1926 and the removal of the clause designating Islam as state's official religion from the constitution in 1928 undoubtedly created unrest among various members of the Turkish society. However, during this period, propagating ideas on clerical and political restoration was unfathomable, as no leniency was showed in the face of a religious reactionary threat, the abolition of The Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası based on the charges that it was involved in the outbreak of The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, which aimed at reviving the Islamic caliphate and sultanate being a case in point (Erdoğan, 1993: 267. Another instance of removal of opposition to eliminate the obstacles before the implementation of reforms and eradicate a prospective reactionary threat transpired when The Free Republican Party (Serbest

Cumhuriyet Fırkası, which was founded under the leadership of Fethi Okyar to represent moderate politics abolished itself on 17 November 1930 just after 9 months it was established.

Although the members of the Progressive Republican Party are classified by some scholars as ‘post-independence conservatives’, the denomination “conservative” in this sense is nevertheless used to depict those champions of democracy who called for a moderation in the evolutionary change, radically diverging from the sense of the term used in the 19th century political philosophy of conservatism (Zürcher, 2003: 52. Nevertheless, although these two parties do not display the characteristics of conservatism proper and can be classified as liberal and democrat, they can also be contemplated as representing a conservative stance in that they constituted opposition to Mustafa Kemal’s personal power as well as that of the clique surrounding him (Yılmaz, 2003:58.

To understand what type of a stance, and to what extent, constitutes conservatism in the early republican period involves investigating the relationship not only between opposition and conservatism but also between Kemalism and conservatism. There is no consensus on whether Kemalism can also be considered as a strand of conservatism as while some scholars see conservative elements in Kemalism and consider it a “reformist conservatism” (Çiğdem, 2003 or a “conservative – modernization” (Bora, 1998, others such as Zürcher disagree with this line of thought and believe that Kemalism cannot be classified under the umbrella of conservatism as Kemalists’ conceptualization of society is not an organic one deriving its legitimacy from tradition and religion (Zürcher, 2004: 41.

2.3.2.2 Ideological Foundations of Kemalism

With the foundation of the Republic, reforms, which were initially being realized through practical implementations, evolved into an ideology and assumed the denomination “Kemalism” in the later stages, as this historical moment was conferred posterity and a universal character (Yüksel, 2002: 544

The culmination of Kemalist reforms and ideals into a distinct ideology, however, was not a product of a conscious effort dictated by Mustafa Kemal himself, but rather through the endeavor of not only those who internalized

the reforms and tried to explain and produce a common ideal as well as a discourse for these reforms primarily through *Kadro* and *Ülkü* journals, but also those who had a conservative intellectual identity in that they deemed some of the reforms in certain areas, or the inflexible approach assumed in their implementation, too radical but articulated their unease in the form of self-criticism, without bordering on opposition to the regime. They, for instance, criticized the positivist and authoritarian factions for their unquestioning reliance on “objective reason” undermining everything they deemed traditional. According to these conservatives, who shared conservatism’s universal hostility to intellectualism and rationalism, the unwavering adherence of these extreme factions to theoretical abstractions meant “reducing the complex Turkish Revolution to simple abstract formulas” (İrem, 2002:98).

Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, aimed to realize the reforms geared towards Westernization and development in line with a pragmatist view rather than a doctrinal stance as evinced in the following anecdote narrated in his memoirs by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an intellectual who worked to formulate an ideology for reforms through *Kadro* journal movement: “One day, while [Atatürk] was reviewing the principles of Republican People’s Party, acting like a know-it-all, I said: ‘My dear Pasha this is by all means a party of revolution, and a party of revolution cannot operate without an ideological or doctrinal basis.’ Then, he looked me in the face as if looking at the face of a naivete and said: ‘Then we would simply got stuck’ (related by Belge, 2002: 36. Due to this pragmatist approach aiming to create a workable consensus, mainly stemming from dependence on the period’s conditions, Kemalism can be contemplated as a modernization project rather than an ideology. If the term “ideology” is used in a fixed doctrinal sense as “a set of inflexible theoretical principles”, it cannot apply to the revolutionary reforms, because “revolution is continuous and therefore represents tangible reality while a strict adherence to theoretical principles contradicts with tangible reality” (Ozankaya, 1999: 504.

However, this rejection of ideology entailed by pragmatism should not be interpreted as a lack of directional and intellectual focus. Kemalism, which should not be contemplated detached from the line of practices geared towards Westernization and modernization dating back to the Ottoman Reform

Period of 1839-1876 (Tanzimat, is actually shaped around the ideal of forming a unified national state with a national identity and consciousness. This consciousness materialized in Kemalism in the form of reforms aiming to create “a new motherland, a new society, a new identity and a new history for this recreated nation” (Çelik, 2002: 75, which gained Kemalism modernization and nationalism as its two most prominent qualities and constituents (İnsel, 2002: 17. These two aspects were to be followed by secularism, which would incrementally come to be constituting one of the core elements of the Republic and Kemalism (Ozankaya, 2000: 15. In other words, the young Republic was based on a social engineering project to produce a homogenous population sharing a single identity comprised by a “new” type of person with a “new” mind-set not only molded by and but also reflecting the values of the “new” Republic (İrem, 2002: 97.

2.3.2.3 The Nature of Early Turkish Conservatism

The primary characteristic of Conservatism in this period is that, not to lose legitimacy in the new regime, the intellectuals and political actors whose ideas clashed with those of Mustafa Kemal opted for moderating their views in line with the implementation of the reforms so as to stay within the confines of Kemalism, which also gave way to the fact that conservatism in Turkey is not a political, but a cultural one.

During the single party period, with the failure of two opposition attempts by the Progressive Republican Party and The Free Republican Party in mind, Turkish conservatism restrained itself within the cultural sphere and refraining from criticizing the established order, it never evolved into a political ideology (Çiğdem 2002:18. On the contrary, the early Republican conservatives not only lent support but also formulated the justification for the new regime’s radical reforms such as the Turkification of religion and language (İrem, 2002: 97.

Therefore, an attempt to understand the nature of conservatism in this period should concentrate on the literary and scientific contemplations of leading intellectuals, academics and politicians of the period, who comprised a significant part of the cultural elite defined by a self-professed “conservative”

stance on cultural issues matched with a “modernist” outlook in political matters (İrem, 2002: 88

Bora (1998 specifies five strands of conservatism stamped by the dominant personalities of the early Turkish thought, which are namely classical cultural conservatism spearheaded by Yahya Kemal, Islamism as conservatism pioneered by Mehmet Akif Ersoy, nationalist-conservatism represented by Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Remzi Oğuz Arık, and Peyami Safa, conservative-revolutionary ideology identified with Nurettin Topçu, and conservative - liberals led by Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ali Fuad Başgil. Despite defining a similar pattern in the development of different strands of conservatism, İrem (2002 offers slightly different denominations for conservative intellectual congregations such as traditional culturalists headed by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, conservatives represented by Peyami Safa, Turkish nationalists -liberals such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, moralists led by Hilmi Ziya Ülken, and finally, those who adhere to Bergsonism, such as Mustafa Şekip Tunç.

As one of the primary notions that informed the foundations of the ideas put forth by these early conservative intellectuals was the birth of the nation-state, many conservatives such as Mustafa Şekip Tunç and İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, highlighting the sui generis nature of the Kemalist state as well as the authentic character of the Turkish national culture, tried to formulate novel strategies to ensure “the stability and order in a new national polity” (İrem, 2002: 98. Therefore, the primary issue to which these conservatives attached great significance was to come up with the solutions to bridge the gap between the necessities of a modern lifestyle and the traditional values of a society whose great majority was comprised of devout Muslims.

This means that the intellectual endeavor of the conservatives in this period to find a mid-ground to harmoniously bring together the traditional values with the requisites of modernity should be read as an effort to strike a balance between change and the established order, which is epitomized in Mustafa Şekip Tunç and Peyami Safa’s conceptualization of nationalism as constituting the primary means to maintain social and political order in a modern era. According to this conceptualization, Kemalism stands for “a conservative force in action symbolizing the Turkish search for a unique national

tradition, which implied a unique style in politics and culture” (İrem, 2002: 98).

Therefore, it can conveniently be argued that what distinguishes almost all the conservatives of the early Republican period, who by no means reminisced nostalgically about a past long gone, from the Islamists is the former’s strong commitment to the principles of Kemalist state, their embracement of republican values and reforms, with a distant manner to religious reactionism.

In other words, despite their postulation that religion is necessary in society to bolster social cohesion and to prevent moral decadence, especially if the “new national moral order” cannot be successfully consolidated, rendering the society easily impressionable by the religious communities, conservatives in this period aspired neither to preserve Islamic relics as the legacy of the Ottoman era, nor to revive an Islamic civilization. Thus, instead of a religious state, they emphasized “the individual’s subjective experience of religiosity in his or her own way” (İrem, 2002: 100, with a commitment to “the secular spirit of the Republic” (İrem, 2002: 99).

All in all, Turkish conservatism in this period should be seen as one not reminiscing about “status quo ante” intending either to revert to the way things were before or to maintain the status quo, but rather as one embarked on a task of creating things worthy of preserving (Çiğdem, 1997: 45).

2.3.3 *The Transition from Single-Party to Multi-Party Politics: From Cultural Conservatism to Political Activism*

After the authoritarian single party period of 1923-1946, parallel to the post-second World War political and economic developments in the world, in various interrelated areas, Turkey began to experience a fast transformation such as rapid industrialization giving way to a reduced share of agriculture in gross domestic product together with increased urbanization and social mobility. With the impact of such transformation coupled with the pressure from within The Republican People’s Party, which materialized on 7 June 1945 with the presentation to the parliament of the motion known as “The Memorandum of the Four” by Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü ve Adnan Men-deres, and also urged by the aim of incorporating with the democratic world

order, Turkey decided to take the decisive step of transitioning from single party politics to multi-party politics.

The “The Memorandum of the Four” was in effect a censure of the current state of political affairs, which stated that to perpetuate a regime restricting freedoms would be a mistake, and that the rights and freedoms defined in the Constitution should immediately be granted, the transition to multiparty politics should be realized and the government should be checked by the parliament. This motion, which actually represented a serious opposition within the RPP, was rejected and Menderes, Köprülü and Koraltan were expelled from the party. On 3 December 1945, Celal Bayar resigned from the party and the four former members of the RPP established Democratic Party (DP on 7 January 1946 (Erdoğan, 1993: 272.

The introduction of Democratic Party (DP into Turkish political life bears ample significance in terms of conservatism in Turkey as it came into being representing the voice of the dissent and as an alternative, rather conservative contemplation of the Republican Revolution, providing the public with a new identity based on conservative values such as tradition bolstered with religious and cultural symbols, which supplanted the highly secular formulations of national identity offered during the single party period.

With the transition to the multi-party politics and the mobilization of large masses who have been offered a new identity by the DP, Turkish political life was marked by a “center-periphery cleavage”, the RPP comprised of the large business owners and military and civil members of the bureaucratic elite advocating a modernization project based on a top-down social transformation through coercive state means representing the center, and the DP comprised of small business owners and craftsmen, and peasants who had been economically, socially and politically cast out representing the periphery, which would relate the demands of the ethnic groups, religious communities and the cults to the center. Holding RPP’s bureaucratic centralism implemented during the westernization period responsible for all the economic hardship that the conservative rural population suffered, DP received 53,3 percent of the votes and won the elections held on 14 May 1950, which was interpreted as a grand triumph by the conservative intellectuals who deemed the

single party period a dictatorship. DP came to power with the motto “government for the people” and promptly embarked on implementing a range of non-secular policies such as the removal of the ban on the Arabic call to prayer and the reintroduction of religious education as an extracurricular elective course (Akıncı, 2012: 291).

Despite the views of some scholars such as Mert, who assert that it is hard to consider DP a conservative political party proper because it lacks a well-defined, conservative programme based on a distinct intellectual conservative ideology, constituting only a reaction to the policies of the single party period with an emphasis on economic liberalism and religious sensitivities (Mert, 2007:134, the DP period warrants attention in terms of conservatism in Turkey in that it coincides with an era of rapid transformation which largely stemmed from Turkey’s alliance with the “free world” especially as response to rising influence of the USSR, which the conservatives deemed as the “the rise of a communist threat”. This alliance with the USA was struck through a line of developments starting with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, furthered with Turkey’s admission into NATO in 1952, and continued with the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, all of which were part of the containment policy that the US launched against the expansion of the USSR into the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean, as due to its “geopolitical position, proximity to the Soviet Union and its historical ties with the Middle East”, Turkey was considered by the US to be “a barrier against the Soviet Union, a guardian of NATO’s southern flank, and an important military base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean” (Atmaca, 2014: 20.

In addition to an alignment with the USA, Turkey established relations with Europe through membership at such organizations as The Council of Europe, OECD and the Common Market. This pro-Western policy during the Cold War had a significant impact on the social, economic, political and cultural structure of Turkey, which resulted in a rise of expectations in the society (Karpat, 1975: 1.

Therefore, conservative thinking in Turkey during this period cannot be contemplated as merely an attack and revision of the Republican ideology; “it should also be seen as an instant response and reaction against left wing ideas, parallel to the rise of the anti-communist discourse in the beginning of the

Cold War period” (Mert 2005, 97. In other words, the conservative intellectual thought in this period was shaped mainly by the impact of the Cold War and the impending and expanding “communist threat”, anti-communism and anti-socialism incrementally becoming the primary elements of Turkish conservative ideology, whose leading figures stand out to be Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Peyami Safa and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu with their unwavering intellectual fight against socialism, Marxism and communism. The remedy formulated by Safa, who is one of the earliest staunch adversaries of leftist ideas and pioneers of the fight against communism in Turkey, was based on the maintenance of “tradition, affiliation with the past and cultural heritage [to] protect youth from spiritual emptiness and from the trap of materialism” to which the youth may fall prey if are detached from their past. Safa, believing in the organicism of society, contends that living organisms should preserve their essential qualities, and rather than being lured by the “deviant new ideas”, they should change while holding onto their traditional values as their crucial constituents. Safa asserts that “only the primitive societies without any division of labor experienced communist regimes” (Mert 2005, 97, which resonates with the ideas of Ülken and Fındıkoğlu, who believe that it is the implementation of appropriate industrialization policies and embracement of the principles of a democratic political order that can enable social balance and order in society.

2.3.4 *Permissive 1960s and Discordant 1970s*

A great majority of 1960s in Turkey was marked by the challenge for the members of the Turkish society of acclimatizing themselves to the growth of democracy, as the 1961 Constitution implemented right after the military coup of 1960, created an unprecedented environment of political and social freedom, which was a development parallel to the global context, leading many conservatives to see the 1960s overly permissive and hold this freedom responsible for the moral decadence prevalent in society, calling for more social authoritarianism regulating private aspects of people’s lives such as religiosity and family.

What shaped the conservative stance during this period is the unrest felt by the conservatives vis-a-vis the rise of the left, represented in Turkey, despite

the minor vote percentage of 3 in 1961 elections, by the Workers' Party of Turkey. Anti-communist and anti-socialist discourse was bolstered with an emphasis on traditional values with a heavy stress on Islam as a complementary element to Turkish national character. However, it should be noted that despite the incremental visibility of Islamist elements during the 1960s, the belief that "parties of an outspoken rightist or Islamist signature" emerged in the immediate aftermath of the implementation of 1961 Constitution, which allowed greater political freedom would be a misconception. Yet again, although Menderes government had been heavily criticized on the charges that the DP manipulated religion for political purposes, "there was no return to the strict secularist, or even anti-Islamic, policies of the years before 1945" in the aftermath of the 1960 Coup D'etat. Indeed, what was at play was a strategic fight against religious fundamentalism by means of displaying a more lenient stance while at the same time introducing "a modern, rationalist version of Islam". To this end, "the curriculum of the colleges for preachers was changed to include sociology, economy and law, [and] the Directorate for Religious Affairs started publication of 'enlightened' sermons and the Koran was published in Turkish translation" (Zürcher, 2004: 247, which actually constituted practices incongruent with the way religion was practiced by large segments of society, creating unease among the conservative circles.

The 1961 Constitution "provided a liberal democratic context for political participation, which produced a wide spectrum of associations, activists and activities married with a plurality of political parties that spanned almost the entire gamut of left- and right- wing ideologies and interests in the 1960s and 1970s" (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 7. While in the 1961 elections which was held just one month after the execution of the DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Relations Deputy Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Deputy of Finance Hasan Polatkan, RPP came out as the party with the highest percentage of votes with 36, 7%, followed by JP with 34,8%, and Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP with 14%, the coalitions formed by RPP proved ineffective. The 1961-1965 period was marked by a fierce rivalry for the votes of the DP, whose sudden elimination from Turkish political life left a void. "Among those seeking to become a successor to the DP, the newly formed Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, AP [under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel] eventually managed

to consolidate its hold on the DP's supporters and organizational network by the 1965 parliamentary elections" (Sayari, 2002: 12).

In this period, on the left-of the spectrum emerged the Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, and the bearer of the conservative banner on the right came to be The Justice Party (JP which, despite the lack of an overt statement in its party programme positioning it as a conservative party, included in its definition of the party such aspects as "nationalist, respectful and loyal to freedoms as well as moral values and beliefs, and anti-communist" (Adalet Partisi Parti Programı, 1974: 3).

1965 elections marked another watershed in Turkish political life, with an indirect influence on how the nationalist conservative front in Turkish politics would be shaped in that upon his return to Turkey, Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, who had been expelled with 14 other members from the National Union Committee joined the conservative RPNP, and upon seizing the leadership, he embarked on a transformation project aiming to evolve the party, which then appealed to only a limited circle of voters and could get only 2.2% of the votes in the 1965 elections, into a party with a large following. Having removed the former leadership, Türkeş transformed the party "into a hierarchically organized, militant party with an ultra-nationalist programme" (Zürcher, 2004: 256. This transformation of RPNP bears great significance in terms of the evolution of nationalist conservatism in Turkey in that while a former member of the Turkish Army known for its devout secularism, Türkeş, as the 1969 elections approached, began to adopt a discourse tinged with Islamic elements arguing that Islam was an important component of the Turkish National Heritage (Zürcher, 2004: 257, and in the Third General Congress of 1969 in Adana, when well-known Islamists secured important positions within the, the party's name was changed to Nationalist Action Party. This change of stance and name was the result of a pragmatist concern to secure higher number of votes, and thus "contrary to the Kemalist concern to define the Turkish national identity and nationalism on the basis of strict secularism, the NAP leadership sought to convert the religious feeling of the predominantly Sunni population of Turkey into active support for the party" (Cizre, 1992: 147.

On the frontier of the youth and students, who would by all means be affected by this sweep of liberal winds, it was the National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) that positioned itself against the leftist ideas and communism, and played an active role in the anti-communist struggle, its right-wing position crystallizing especially in the second half of the 1960s, when with a tumultuous congress in 1965 “a brief period of leftist ideological domination during which Kemalist ideas were fervently espoused” came to a close. As of 1967, the ideology of the Union evolved from nationalist conservatism into an ardent Islamism until the Union was closed with the 1980 military Coup (Okutan, 2004: iii).

Understanding this evolution of the nature of the NTSU whose ideological stance has been shaped by such important notions as nationalism, racism, Turanism, and Islamism, all of which in different periods found intersecting grounds with conservatism in Turkey, may also be effective in contemplating the character of Turkish conservatism as an important constituent of Turkish right, as the history NTSU has been marked by conservative concerns.

The primary phenomenon which took place in the aftermath of 1960 was the emergence of Islamists defining themselves as nationalist conservatives, which translated into the embracement of the members of the NTSU of Islamic values especially in the second half of 1960s (Okutan, 2004: 145. This ideological stance heavily colored by Islamic motifs was also a consequence of contemplation of Islam as the “antidote to communism” as well as a “sanctuary” in the face of any perceived threat from the left; therefore Islam became a point of reference for the right used against a wide range of adversaries, whom were mass categorically treated by the right “as communist or Moskof if they were radicals, liberals or socialists; and as mason or Zionist if they were supporters of monopolist capitalism.” The point is, regardless of their ideological stance, the common denominator for all these adversaries was conceived as their antagonism to Islam, placing religion in the center of what defined “the enemy of the right” (Okutan, 2004: 153).

This rhetoric of belligerence positioning the ideological opponents as enemies afflicted Turkish social and political life for much of 1960s, as “with Pan-Turkist and Islamic dimensions, Turkish nationalism was politicized, radical-

ized and mobilized against communism” (Cizre,1992: 146, culminating in violence at the end of the decade, with fierce clashes between the right and left during the visits by the American Sixth Fleet in July 1968 and February 1969, which resulted in heavy casualties. “From the end of 1968 onwards, and increasingly during 1969 and 1970, the violence of the left was met and surpassed by violence from the militant right, notably Turkeş’s Grey Wolves” (Zürcher, 2004:258. To take the grey wolves under control, NAP ’s hearths of the ideal (ülkü ocakları were closed down after the military intervention of 1971; however, “the ülkücü movement, which was still useful against the communists, continued to exist, [and] in the 1970s, the ülkücüs were trained with the mission of fighting against communism to assist the state when it was weak” (Eligür, 2010: 92.

Islamic tendencies, whose foundations were laid in the 1960s with the alliance struck between the two elements of religion and nation, became rather prominent, and with the support of the USA for the dissemination of Islamic ideology in the southern flank to counterbalance and confine the influence of the USSR, Islam established itself as an independent, separate movement and found its way into the mainstream political system of Turkey thanks to the conducive environment created by anti-communism (Bora, 1998:130.

A political actor putting religious sensitivities at play during this period was the National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi established in January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, who had been a member of the Justice Party until he left the party in 1969 and elected as an independent member from Konya, the city considered to be the bastion of religious conservatism in Turkey. Having already established himself during his presidency of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry as “the voice of the smaller businessmen who criticized Demirel and the JP for being subservient to big business and, especially, foreign capital”, Erbakan succeeded in appealing to the votes of the religious conservative electorate in 1969 elections with the religious elements in his criticism of the “JP for being an instrument of Freemasons and Zionists that had turned its back on Islam” (Zürcher, 2004:257. Although a short lived attempt in that it was closed down after the Turkish Military Memorandum of March 12 was issued, on the charges of violating the secularist articles of the consti-

tution (Uslu, 2003: 50, NOP warrants mentioning in that it played a significant role in religious conservatism in Turkey not only as the predecessor of the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi to be established in 1972 but also as the founder of the “National Outlook Movement”, which is a religio-political vision adopted by series of Islamist parties inspired by Necmettin Erbakan and turned into an important movement (Avcı, 2006: 63.

The dissolution of The NOP did not result in a disappearance of Islamic sentiments in Turkish political life. On the contrary, the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi, which was again an Islamist political party led by Necmettin Erbakan, gradually gained popularity, and in 1973 elections, received 11.8% of votes and was granted 48 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Atacan, 2005: 191. In the same elections, “[RPP] obtained the plurality of the votes and seats in the [parliament] and decided to form a government with the newly established political Islamist [NSP] on the grounds that both the [RPP] and [NSP] were anti-establishment parties”, which marked the beginning of an era lasting until 1980 with multiple weak coalitions and minority governments (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 7 resulting in a lack of decisive authority on the part of the government, which translated into political instability.

This political instability was coupled with political violence which escalated especially towards the end of the decade, as the radical members of the leftist organization National Democratic Revolutionary Movement (Milli Demokratik Devrim Hareketi “decided that agitation was not enough and that only ‘armed propaganda’ (in other words terrorist attacks and an armed guerrilla struggle could bring about a revolution”, with other groups such as Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, Turkish People ’s Liberation Army (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu and Turkish People ’s Liberation Party/Front (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi propagating armed struggle and urban guerilla warfare (Zürcher, 2004:256. These extremist left groups were countered by the Grey Wolves and fundamentalists on the right, [fighting] for control of the streets and the campuses” (Zürcher, 2004:263 deepening the destabilization of the country and resulting the military coup of 1980.

2.3.5 *1980s and Onwards: The Incorporation of Islam into the Official Ideology*

1980s constitute a period which is stamped by the visibility of conservatism as well as Islamism becoming unprecedentedly prominent in Turkish political life, as with the coup, the military-supported policies to “Islamify” Turkey as a remedy to social fragmentation experienced during the 1970s were systematically implemented. With the intention of undermining the leftist movements that had been becoming stronger as of 1960s, and to restore the state authority, the new military government embraced “Turkish Islamic synthesis” as its official ideology (Çarkoğlu & Rubin, 2006: 50. Turkish Islamic synthesis, whose foundations had been laid back in 1970s by the Hearth of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı was conceived of as unificatory element that would bring various segments of society at a time when “the military government felt the need for an ideology that could effectively mobilize the people against what they perceived to be the existential threat of communism, and Sunni Islam provided an immaculate contrivance” (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 9. Turkish Islamic synthesis, which is a doctrine based on the postulation that the prerequisite to be and remain a Turk lies in Islam (Dursun, 2004: 60, was superimposed on the Turkish society as a top-down project and an in line with this project, “under the military’s tutelage, religious education was made a compulsory subject in all schools. Quranic classes were opened, and state-controlled moral and religious education was promoted” (Larrabee & Rabasa, 2008: 37. Since the primary motivation that lied behind the implementation of this project of Islamification was to fight against communism and leftist ideologies, starting with the early 1980s and lasting until the fall of the USSR in 1991, “Islamic (Sunni and ethnic Turkish nationalist ideas were systematically promoted in the media, press, and educational policies of the conservative party governments that came to rule Turkey between 1980 and 1991” (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009:15.

However, despite this promotion of Islam during the period, Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP, which was the major Islamist party, was not allowed by the military authorities to run in the general election of 1983, as only three political parties, the Populist Party (PP - Halkçı Parti, the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP-Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, and the center -

right Motherland Party (MP-Anavatan Partisi) were allowed to run in the elections. The party that emerged victorious, with 45.1 % of the votes and 211 seats in parliament, from this election was the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, who “argued that his party represented four different ideological strands: conservatism (Sunni Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy (Eligür, 2010: 76-77).

When the fact that MP also received the votes of the parties which were not allowed to contest the elections and its contention that it represented right-wing, conservative, liberal, and Islamist interests are taken into consideration, it could be argued that the body of the electorate which cast its vote for the MP in this election, constituted the conservative core of Turkey (Göka, Göral, Güney, 2003: 310, to whom MP appealed with its emphasis its party programme and public discourse on such primary conservative values as family and social order. MP’s party programme states that “family constitutes the foundation of the [Turkish] nation. The re-definition and re-determination of the natural hierarchy of responsibility of our family structure should be made in regards to the perpetuation of our social life in a harmonious and powerful manner, the education of our youth, the maintenance of morality, [as well as] the national and spiritual values (Anavatan Partisi Parti Programı, 1993: 24.

On the economic front, MP implemented a series of neo-liberal economic policies, and continued to implement the economic adjustment programme known as “the 24th January 1980 Decisions” prepared by the IMF before the military coup had taken place. MP’s economic policies brought about “a more outward-oriented and market-based economic system (... [in which] an entrepreneurial society and the pursuit of wealth formed the core principals” (Özcan & Turunç, 2011: 67) Moreover, MP’s privatization and deregulation policies, largely modeled on “Reaganomics and Thatcherism” aimed at rolling back the frontiers of the state while weakening organized labor, and resulted in the emergence of “a new generation of indigenous entrepreneurs and conservative Anatolian urbanites [who] began to undermine the state elite and their middle class allies” (Özcan & Turunç, 2011: 68

In this environment of economic and political liberalization, where religious orders and Islamic brotherhoods became more visible, Islamic revivalism continued at full throttle, creating “a religious market [in which]

Nakşibendi orders, the Fethullah Gülen movement, and the political National View movement of Necmettin Erbakan competed over the meaning and proper role of Islam in Turkish society” (Larrabee & Rabasa, 2008:36.

The removal of the ban in 1987 over the pre-coup political leaders allowing Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan, Bülent Ecevit, and Alparslan Türkeş to return to politics, as well as intensified economic problems brought about a fall in the vote share of the MP as of mid 1980s and although MP had secured the leadership of the country once again in 1987 elections, in 1991 general elections, JP’s successor True Path Party (TPP-Doğru Yol Partisi came out of the election as the party with the highest electoral support, and formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP- Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, which would rule the country “until the 1995 general elections, when [the Welfare Party (WP-Refah Partisi] became the largest party ” (Eligür, 2010: 78, which was unprecedented in Turkish political life, as WP would be the first Islamist party in power, and Erbakan, the first Islamist prime minister in the history of the Turkish Republic.

While in office, Erbakan could satisfy neither the fundamentalist Islamists nor the secular circles. He lost the support of the former as he not only failed to keep his promise to repeal the treaties with Israel but also betrayed his anti-western rhetoric, which played a pivotal role in securing votes from the devout conservatives, when he accepted the Customs Union. He disappointed the latter, who were already skeptical about his political motives, with his immoderate remarks such as “rectors of universities would have to kiss the hands of female students wearing headscarves”, his moves in foreign policy such as his “trip to Libya and the promotion of an Islamic economic grouping (the D-8 as an alternative to the EU”, which signaled that he was intending to pursue an Islamist foreign policy (Larrabee & Rabasa, 2008: 44.

The term of government of the first Islamist prime minister in power did not last long, as its “eventful coalition with the [TPP] eventually collapsed in the aftermath of rising pressures from the secularist circles spearheaded by the Turkish military after the so-called post-modern coup of February 1997” (Çarçaklı & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 98.

However, although short-lived, the WP experience by the close of the 20th century bears ample significance for Turkish conservatism in that it heralded

a period which would witness the further rise of Islamic conservatism in the 21st century Turkey, which constitutes a whole other literature due to the transformation conservatism went through in the post 28 February era.

2.3.6 *A Brief Synopsis of Conservatism in the 20th Century Turkey*

A brief chronological overview of the developmental process that conservatism in Turkey has gone through in the 20th century illustrates that conservatism in Turkey in a systematic manner originally emerged as an attempt to formulate the means that would enable the society to adapt to their fast changing environment which was the product of a colossal reform project that had been undertaken to modernize the society. As this attempt took form with a concern about the risk of losing legitimacy in the eyes of the strictly secular Kemalist state in the authoritarian single party period, conservatism in the early republican era was confined to the cultural sphere, avoiding directing criticism to the regime. On the contrary, conservative thought in this period formed as a product of the endeavor not only to maintain cultural values by redefining them vis-a-vis a modernization project imposing radical change but also to provide an ideological foundation through which Kemalist reforms could be justified. In parallel to this exigency of the period, while nationalism stands out to be a primary element of Turkish conservatism in the reform period, Islamism, which will incrementally constitute a point of discussion in later stages, is pragmatically excluded from or incorporated in subtle undertones to conservative contemplation. In short, the defining characteristic of conservatism in pre-multiparty period is its embracement of Kemalist reforms, avoiding a reminiscence about pre-republican order (Çiğdem, 1997: 45).

With the advancement of multi-party period in which a phase of integration with the West through a number of developments such as the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey's admission into NATO and the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Turkey began to experience a social, economic and political transformation, which translated into the emergence of a comparatively more liberal political and economic environment, in which conservative discourse started to incorporate religious sensitivities. However, this

comparative visibility of Islamic rhetoric was brought to an end with the military coup of 1960, which took place as a response to “the DP’s policies toward the Islamist movement, and its repressive policies toward freedom of the press and freedom of expression” (Eligür, 2010:59).

However, in the aftermath of the 1960 coup, while the military maintained its propagation of “enlightened Islam” as a remedy to reactionary religiosity, conservative rhetoric continued to include religious motifs, and “the coalition governments continued the DP policy of allocating substantial state resources for religious institutions (mosques and prayer leader and preacher (imam - hatip schools ” (Eligür, 2010: 60. 1960s were also the period when, in the ideologically split atmosphere of the Cold War, the militarization of the right against left tendencies began, and with the incorporation of Islam by the nationalist conservatives into their ideology as an integral characteristic of the Turkish nation, an alliance of religion and nationalism officially advocated by Nationalist Action Party under the leadership of Alpaslan Türkeş was struck (Cizre, 1992: 145. These Islamist and militant nationalist groups would be deployed to counterattack the left-wing workers’ and students’ movements throughout the 1970s, and although a military memorandum was issued in 1971 with the stated aim of restoring order, when it became clear that “the restoration of law and order was equated with the repression

of any group viewed as leftist (... the youth organization of the Nationalist Action Party, the so-called ‘Idealist Hearths’, began to act as vigilantes against those they identified as leftists” (Ahmad, 1993: 148-149 paving the way to the terror leading up to the 1980 military coup.

The post 1980 era was marked by the strand of conservatism that developed with the integration into the official ideology of Turkish Islamic Synthesis. This doctrine was developed in the mid-1970s by the Intellectuals’ Hearth by bringing together Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism to be utilized in the fight against the leftists, and in the aftermath of the coup, fervently employed the military government (Eligür, 2010: 65. This escalating influence and visibility of Islam formulated as an integral part of a conservative lifestyle continued in the much of 1980s and 1990s during the two consecutive governments by the Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal and “Islamic revivalism continued to be treated with the utmost sympathy (Çarkoğlu &

Kalaycıoğlu, 2009:10, as well as during the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, until the interlude it experienced with the post-modern coup of 28 February 1997.

Conclusion

When the conditions leading to the emergence, as well as the circumstances shaping the developmental pattern, of conservatism in the West and in Turkey are taken into consideration, inevitably, certain similarities and divergences can be discerned as it is the situational factors peculiar to each society that determine what should be maintained in the form of “tradition”.

While continental and Anglo-Saxon conservatism was developed primarily as reaction to the French Revolution, and directed harsh criticism of the revolutionary cause together with its rationalist and positivist ideology coming from the Enlightenment, in the context of Turkey, conservative ideology did not position itself against the Republican Revolution. On the contrary, Turkish conservatives, either due to exigencies of the period creating a concern of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the Kemalist state and ensuring survival, or due to their full-hearted internalization of the modernization project, refrained from criticizing the regime and its reforms, which confined the Turkish conservatism within the limits of ideological contemplation. Therefore while conservatism in the West, especially in Britain, could evolve into political conservatism, and conservative parties played a significant role in politics, conservatism in Turkey, especially during the single party period, remained within the limits of cultural conservatism and did not spawn political parties with a singularly conservative identity and agenda. Conservative motifs, therefore, have been incorporated into the identity and policies of the right-wing parties as auxiliary aspects as part of an interplay with other notions such as Islam and nationalism.

This peculiarity of conservatism in Turkey based on the interaction of religious sentiments initially being suppressed and then, as the 1950s wore on, finding their way to the surface as a complementary element to nationalism, which had always been a primary aspect of conservatism in Turkey since the nation building period, gains meaning when the historical facts are taken into consideration. While the national independence struggle began with the stated aim of freeing the institutions of caliphate and the sultanate from the

yoke of the foreign powers, it culminated into not only the declaration of a republican regime together with the repeal of these two institutions but also the introduction of secularism as the dominant principle regulating the political and everyday life, forcing Islam into a “clandestine existence”, during the single-party period, marking the beginning of the conflict that would continue to this day.

Yet again, despite the differences in the origin and the developmental pattern of conservatism in Turkey and Europe, it should be conceded that in the context of the 20th century, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, when global integration gained pace, it would be impossible for conservatism in Turkey not to experience a convergence towards the conservative ideology at large. Therefore, when, coupled with the international political and economic conjuncture, the domestic dissatisfaction deriving from economic hardships and the politically oppressive environment mandated the transition to multiparty politics, religious sentiments made an appearance in the agenda of the political parties with a conservative stance attached to their identity, and the salience of these sentiments gradually increased, indicating a divergence between the strictly secular practices of the state elite in the early Republican era and the everyday life of a population a great majority of which is comprised of religious Muslims. This proposition finds its strongest corroboration in the fact that Republican People’s Party could never achieve political success in the elections in the aftermath of the single-party period.

At this point, as an international factor shaping conservatism in Turkey, the impact of phenomena such as the Cold War warrants special attention, as it was the set of policies implemented as part of a pro-US foreign policy, whose origins date back to the alliance struck between the US and Turkey through a number of developments such as the declaration of the Truman Doctrine or Turkey’s admission into NATO during the DP period. As of 1950s onwards, various developments such as the evolution of the Republican Peasant Nation Party with a view based strictly on Turkish nationalism into Nationalist Action Party, advocating Islam as an integral component of national Turkish identity; the leniency displayed towards the militarization of the right-wing Islamists seen instrumental in the fight against communism, the development by the Intellectual’s Hearth of the Turkish Islamic synthesis doctrine during the

1970s to be employed in the anti-communist struggle, the incorporation of this doctrine into the official state ideology by the military government in the aftermath of 1980 coup, are all the outcome of the interplay between the sui-generis characteristics of Turkish society and the international developments giving shape to the global conjuncture.

It is no coincidence that conservative movements in various geographies, including Turkey, based their ideology on anti-communism in the second half of the 20th century until the fall of the USSR in 1991, leaving the conservatives disoriented and leading them to look for alternative interpretations of conservatism.



Main themes in conservative journals in the Turkey of the 1960s

*Father, mother and me
Sister and auntie say
All the people like us are we,
And everyone else is they*

– Rudyard Kipling, *We and They*

The examination of the articles in three conservative journals of the period, *Toprak*, primarily representing the anti-communist stance, *Milli Gençlik*, mainly reflecting the nationalist outlook, and *Selamet*, chiefly offering the Islamic interpretation, have revealed that there are a number of preponderant and recurring issues, which are all inter-twined, feeding as well as being informed by each other, that stamp the daily discourse of conservatives in the 1960s Turkey. The issues to be discussed in this chapter are as follows: Morality as an overarching notion; religion and piety as the fundamental basis nurturing morality; youth and their education; the process of Westernization and the response to the embracement of Western values; stylistic choices in clothing and personal grooming; social order in tandem with hierarchy and conformity; stability; moderacy; nationalism; sense of responsibility; obligations to be

assumed by students; family, gender roles and marriage; hostility towards Leftism, Socialism, Communism and Marxism; progressivist vs reactionary debate and the claim to the monopoly over license to knowledge and common sense; embracement of Kemalist Ideology and the claim to the right Interpretation of Atatürkism, the practice of tagging and othering; arts and literature; and community and a sense of solidarity.

§ 3.1 Morality as an Overarching Notion

A careful examination of these articles has revealed that one of the overarching themes recurrently visited in these periodicals is the concept of morality, which might be considered a catch-all category due to its all-encompassing nature regulating various aspects of people's lives ranging from manner of social conduct to style of daily conversations as well as defining their understanding of authority, and its natural offshoots, the notions of obedience and conformity.

A recap of what constitutes morality, in addition to universally accepted prerequisites such as veracity and conscientiousness, as conceived by the conservatives can be found in the article *The Morality of a Muslim Turk* (Müslüman Türk'ün Ahlakı, *Selamet*, July 1962, issue 4, pg. 11 penned by Hüsnü Dikeçligil. He defines a Muslim Turk as someone with "perfect physical, mental and spiritual balance and the capability to equally coordinate these three qualities towards maturation, giving a struggle to this end... They would never care for their own interests; they prioritize the interests of the country and the nation. They fear Allah. They respect and love the Prophet. Qur'an and the Sunnah are their guide. They try to cultivate a commitment in this respect."

Since the concept of morality bears great significance for the conservatives, condemnation of what conservatives believed to be moral crudity has also been allocated a good deal of space in these periodicals. This is particularly true if the perceived immorality of the opponent is documented so as to serve to corroborate the claims of the conservatives about the moral degeneracy of those who situate themselves in an antithetical position such as Çetin

Altan, a vocal left-wing columnist famed for his carping articles. *Toprak* featured Çetin Altan in many of its issues, depicting him as a hypocrite, who purportedly championed the rights of the downtrodden and the laborers while actually indulging in a life of luxury and entertainment, sipping American whiskey and smoking American cigarettes. In the article Çetin Altan in a Nightclub (Çetin Altan Bir Gece Kulübünde, *Toprak*, October, issue 44 accompanied by a photograph of Altan dancing with a woman, Altan is portrayed as a day-time advocate of workers' rights, who shifts into a fallen character in pursuit of sensual pleasures and entertainment at night. The article juxtaposes Altan's manner of conduct with tenets conceived by the conservatives as inherently incompatible with this type of behavior, stating "[Çetin Altan is] a man who espouses socialism in taverns, cares for poor peasants while dancing with women cheek to cheek, and broods about traitors in whiskey glasses; a person experiencing 'the concept of honor' in seducing women, 'gentlemanliness' in typical drunkenness and 'nationalism' in Kent cigarette smoke....yet in reality disrobed of all these [virtues] ...that is the most rueful of all. Stinking whiskey in the mouth, bearing the lipstick stain on his collar, a journalist who leaves bed at almost 2 PM to get to his desk! In this state of yours, you can defend no peasant, no driver, no worker." In various other issues of *Toprak*, Altan is again portrayed as a humbug, a charlatan who pretends to be caring for the poor but in reality indulges in a life of entertainment and profanity, another example of which is the photograph featured in issue 49 (May 1966, pg. 21 with the caption "SOCIALIST (! Çetin Altan who seems to defend (! the rights of the poor in his writings while entertaining himself at night at AS-KULÜP, which the capitalists routinely frequent" underneath.

In the article The SCANDAL of the Newspaper that Gave away the Translation of Our Holy Book Qur'an (Okuyucusuna Mukaddes Kitabımız Kuran'ın Tercümesini veren Gazatenin REZALETİ, *Toprak*, June 1963, issue 18, pg. 10-11 by Zübeyir Koç, Çetin Altan is lambasted as a faithless hypocrite who writes at a newspaper—namely, *Milliyet*—which has given away (most probably based on the coupons collected by the readers from a number of issues of the paper the translation of Qur'an, because of his article dated 20 May 1963 at *Milliyet*, in which Altan adopts a [Socratic] approach asking peasants questions about how God came into being, a discussion at the end of which the

peasants dismisses Altan, stating that they wouldn't know who created Allah. Koç asserts that Altan has left no doubt about his true identity as an enemy of faith, deriving his inspiration from articles written against religion in the socialist press. The author then collaborates his claim with a citation from one of Altan's articles, which reads: "it is the humans who created the God. Why did Hallacı Mansur say 'Enel Hak' (I am God? [Because] God exists within us all. We discovered this sentiment and called it God, and attributed anything unfathomable to us to it.'" Koç calls these words as "the utterances of a drunkard, who used to imbibe rakı but switched to vodka and whiskey, because rakı is a domestic good and Altan is the fondest friend of the Jews, who are the principal enemy of Turkishness and Islamic faith." "Altan," Koç concludes, "is a Semitic writer, who admires the Kibbutz in Israel, which is another form of Kolkhoz Organization of the Soviet Russia."

Conservatives attack Altan for the ideology he embraces quite frequently and treats him as an infiltrator attempting to spread communism under cover as is seen in the article Socialist (Sosyalist, *Toprak*, 1964, issue 34, pg. 15 by Tuncer Sertışık, whereby Sertışık reprehends Altan for soliciting support and seeking employment for an 18-year-old ex-convict, who served a sentence of 1,5 years in prison for being a communist and whose father is still an inmate in the penitentiary. Sertışık states that this situation is highly suggestive and documents what type of an ideology Altan adopts as he corroborates the rumours about himself by doing so. Sertışık points out that there are many people without a criminal record, looking for a job, and addresses Altan with the following lines: "While, in this country, there are almost a million poverty-stricken and jobless people who have never defied the democratic order and been convicted on charges of communism, you have never spared a space in your coloumn for them, and now, you are looking for a job for the man in question. You might have a slashing pen but you also have a dumb head as the socialist mask you are wearing is being torn apart. Was it not you who said a true socialist stands against communism? Now you are in their defence!"

Çetin Altan is referred to as "Mao Çetin" on the cover of *Toprak*, (March-April 1967, Issue 55, with a number of his portraits dispersed among the portraits of Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong spread over the whole page. On the first page of this issue, a detailed comparison of Çetin Altan with

Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong is made, divulging the similarities between the opinions and declarations of the said statesmen with those of Altan, the sum and substance of the argument being that Çetin Altan is now an exposed communist, who mendaciously declares himself to be a socialist and is strongly against religion and piety, the wealthy and the capitalist as well as the notion of nationalism. He is also an instigator who incites people, especially peasants, to revolt, thereby disrupting social order and peace of the society, another evidence of which is his photographs featured in April 1966 issue of *Toprak*, one taken while he was conversing with Ruhi Su, with the caption "socialist Çetin Altan with communist Ruhi Su", and the other showing Altan while consuming an alcoholic drink, with the caption "a member of the Labor Party, which is called the Communist Party by people, leftist Altan addressed people at a coffee house in a poor district of Istanbul and told them he is one them, and in the evening of the same day rushed to AS-KULÜP, where millionaires entertain themselves. Caviar in his mouth, whiskey in his hand, poverty in his rhetoric." Altan is further depicted as a mason through the publication of the invitation card to Altan's admission ceremony to Free Masonry (*Toprak*, April 1966, issue 48, pg. 18 together with those of many other prominent figures among Turkish intelligentsia such as Professor Mustafa İnan from İstanbul Technical University and Erol Simavi, the owner of the Newspaper *Hürriyet*).

As Çetin Altan is not the only ideological opponent who is frequently the target of slating criticism by conservatives, leading men of arts and letters of the 1960s receive their share of lampoon in such articles as İlhan Selçuk Hold Your Horses (İlhan Selçuk Beri Gel, *Toprak*, October-November 1966, issue 52, pg. 7 or The Books that Öktem, who spoils the leftists, has Confiscated (Solcuları Şımartan Öktem'in Toplattığı Kitaplar, *Toprak*, issue 40, pg. 11, as well as Just Before Leaving Office, Öktem Banned 3 Nationalist Magazines while Extolling Works Published by Leftist Publishing Houses (Öktem Giderayak Solcu Yayınevlerinin Eserlerini Tavsiye Ederken 3 Milliyetçi Dergiyi Yasakladı, *Toprak*, issue 40, pg 12 which could be read both as a plea to end the adverse attitude toward conservative circles and an endeavor soliciting to purge those who do not share their worldviews from government office.

§ 3.2 Religion and Piety

In the canon of the conservatives, the definition of morality cannot be contemplated as stripped off religious sentiments: Indeed the laws of Islam are considered to be what constitute the moral codes that regulate both the everyday and the political realm. Erdoğan Hançerlioğlu's article *Morality in Islam* (İslamda Ahlak, *Toprak*, October- November 1966, issue 52, pg. 9 equates morality directly with a strict adherence to the rules of Islam. Stating that it is one's soul that renders one's body valuable, and that one's soul can be healed only to a certain extent with the help of a doctor and medicine, Hançerlioğlu asserts that an effective treatment of the soul is possible only through a set of rules, namely morality. The author, then, equates morality to one's unconditional surrender to Allah, stating that "morality derives its source from Allah, the Holy Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad his holiness, and his lifestyle." Defining extensively how to become moral individuals, Hançerlioğlu encapsulates this unity of morality and Islam putting forth that "a subject who obeys the rule of the Creator, Allah and his Prophet Muhammad, his holiness, is the one who has found real happiness, become a true believer, and a moral individual."

It is in the context of these concerns that frequent calls for adoption of a pious lifestyle fashioned around Islamic faith are made. In the article *Our Generation and the Sentiments it Invokes* (Neslimiz ve Düşündürdükleri, *Milli Gençlik*, December 1967, Special issue, by the President of National Turkish Student Union İsmail Kahraman states that "it is of utmost importance to establish a faithful and sensitive youth respectful of its national and moral values." He also adds that it is imperative that Turkish nation make effort to this end altogether, with its education system, social life and philosophical foundations so as to perpetuate the existence of the Turkish nation and assure its future.

Since conservatives deem piety a prerequisite for moral uprightness and virtuousness, they make frequent calls for the institution of religion lessons in schools, demanding public visibility of religion, which they envision as a necessary means to maintain social order. The article *Why is there a Need?* (Neden Lüzum Vardır?, *Milli Gençlik*, December 1967, Special Issue by Saffet Solak, the President of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey,

enumerates the reasons why conservatives believe that religion lessons should definitely be among the compulsory courses in the curricula of middle and high schools. Solak asserts that "to believe and have faith is an innate tendency [and] an inborn quality. Therefore, if people cannot obtain or be provided with a system of faith, they would opt for following odd and deviant belief systems, which would ultimately be detrimental for both themselves and their society. While the maturation of the mind is possible [only] through learning, the maturation of the mind is possible only through religion. Indeed, since the progressive mind can fall victim to degenerate feelings, even reason can only be attained thanks to religion. In this connection, according to Islamic faith, a 'wise person' is someone who harbors goodwill in their chest. Otherwise, science becomes an instrument of evil, the wise become an instrument of cruelty." Solak asserts that "there have been attempts to replace religion with philosophy, but as modern philosophy admits, human reason and its product, philosophy, cannot comprehend what is beyond the physical world. Philosophy without religion has named the field that falls beyond reason 'metaphysics'. This designation is a product of incapability, and the sole capable institution in this respect is religion." In the rest of the article, Solak presents religion and faith as agents that factor into every field of life and equates religion with an omnipotent entity regulating all arenas of life. He contends that religion is indispensable for people to leave aside their self-interests and have good-will and benevolence as well as conscientiousness to carry out their duties in a responsible manner, summing up his convictions with the statement that "while civilization is peripheral, religion is central." He finally calls for a constitutional regulation, whereby religion lessons are instituted in the curriculum of formal education, and taught by instructors who have embraced the Islamic faith by heart, living in accordance with the tenets of Islam.

The article *It is a Must to Institute Religion Lessons in Our High Schools* (Liselerimize Din Dersi Şarttır, *Toprak*, May-June 1967, issue 56, pg. 13) relays that Kayseri Deputy of Justice Party (AP, Mehmet Ate şoğlu, submitted a second note summoning the government to introduce religion lessons in high schools. The grounds that Ateşoğlu puts forth in his argument that religion lessons are an integral component of [formal] education are presented, quoted directly from Ateşoğlu's note, as follows: "Unless religion lesson is included in

the curriculum of high schools and students are provided with an effective and penetrating religious education, moral degeneration will continue at full throttle since a faithless heart, even if teeming with atom, is bereft of vigor and energy. A sound education will cultivate Turkish spirit and faith and save Turkey from this moral debasement. The faith and backbone of the Turkish nation is Islam; the morality of the Turkish nation is Islamic ethics." Bolstering his argument for the indispensability of religion by quoting from Stalin's daughter, who is reported to have said "it is difficult to live without belief in God", Ateşoğlu holds secularism culpable of the moral decadence Turkey is in. In the same issue of *Toprak*, another article demanding, along the same lines, the religion lesson to be instituted in schools as part of the formal education given is Yes, We Want religion Lesson at [Our] Schools (Evet Okullara Din Dersi İstiyoruz, issue 56, pg. 15

Another piece criticizing the lack of religious education as part of formal education at schools is the subsection DERS in the section Whips (Fiskeler, *Toprak*, September-October 1967, issue 59, pg 14, which upbraids those who espouse Freud's proposition that sexual education should be instituted at schools, while objecting to having religion lessons on the grounds that establishing religion lessons at schools would constitute an act of reactionism.

Since morality serves as an umbrella term inclusive of almost all other categories, it permeates in the discussion of each and every realm, relegating all other categories to the position of its subcategories. It is important to note here that the framework which codifies the conservatives' understanding of morality should be studied in tandem with the set of tenets that define their piety and spiritual world as well, as in conservative ideology, moral outlook and religious faith are inseparable concepts that go hand in hand. The article The Need for Nationalist Staff (Milliyetçi Eleman İhtiyacı, *Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg 16-17 manifests the interwoven character of the conservatives' conceptualization of morality together with religious faith and national loyalty. The article, while relating the news about the developments concerning the prosecution of Lamia İren, an instructor of English at Vefa High School, on charges of spreading Communist propaganda, refers to the testimony of the civil defense expert of the school, Mehmet Özgen, who stated that the said teacher professed atheism. The article's author, Hayrani Ilgır capitalizes the

word 'god' when relating Özgen's testimony that Iren said she did not believe in ALLAH, and states that "the mutual characteristics of all extant religions is their faith in ALLAH. It is only in Russia that religion is considered to be opium, and great effort is made to rip faith off people's hearts. Whatever verdict the court reaches in the face of this teacher's lack of faith, it is obvious that she will be declared an infidel by the public." The discussion of a teacher's indictment on account of propagating Communism with the additional information about her lack of faith in Allah under the heading "The Need for Nationalist Staff" reveals the interlaced nature of morality and piety in conservative interpretation of these concepts and how patriotism is described as an antithesis of communism. When read against the grain, the excerpt also suggests that conservatives expect the translation of the moral norms they uphold into enforceable rules and find their way into legislation so that laws can be shaped by their moral standards as to be applicable to all. This formulation of universality of morality as perceived by the conservatives can easily be identified in many other fields, most notably in education. Another message of this article is that to protect their faith, conservatives deem it necessary to fight communism, the proponents of which, according to another article *Why and How Should We Fight against The Left (Sola Karşı Niçin ve Nasıl Mücadele Ederiz, Toprak*, December 1966, issue 53, pg 10-11 by Dr. Hikmet Ertez, communists and leftists should be fought against because they "feign to respect religious beliefs but actually can't stand to see these beliefs revealed. Above all, if a political figure pronounces the name of ALLAH, leftists lose no time to launch a severe attack on that person. According to these people, such behaviour is against secularism and the Constitution, and means using religion as a political tool."

§ 3.3 Youth and Education

Since the view of morality that conservatives profess is one that defines every aspect of life, it should also be expanded into education and the young should be provided with the kind of education, delivered either in school or at home, which includes morality as an integral element. In the article *Moral Education*

(Ruh Terbiyesi, *Toprak*, issue 35-36, pg 8, the author A. Rahim Balcıoğlu, depicts the conduct of the youth as spoiled and defiant, which, he believes, is an outcome of lack of their instruction in the moral realm. Balcıoğlu asserts that moral education bears a far greater significance in the education of the young than intellectual education or the training of the body, and that morality should be incorporated in the education of the young as it is an indispensable aspect of human life just as water, food and oxygen are. Since the youth, when deprived of moral education, is rendered reckless, rebellious and unruly, the young generation should be provided with an education which inculcates the basic tenets of their religion, Islam. Balcıoğlu contends that while moral education moulds the character as well as enables one to comprehend God and his/her own self, a generation bereft of moral education inflicts more harm than good on their community, and it should be the lofty goal of the ministry of education to deliver this kind of education in schools to raise people well-versed in terms of moral outlook and religious faith. However, he condemns the education system in effect, criticizing it for raising soulless and idle people deviating from every kind of national and religious creed and displaying admiration for the new world and a cosmopolitan lifestyle. This criticism directed at the youth and the education system raising them is understandable since it's common among conservatives to denigrate a lifestyle emulating Western cultural forms.

A similar assertion that a debasement of moral standards has become ubiquitous and led to dire consequences is made by the author of the article Path to Salvation (*Selamet Yolu, Selamet*, April 1962, issue 1, pg. 2, Halim Baki Kunter. In this introductory piece, Kunter states that the humanity is afflicted with a grave moral crisis, which has become prevalent even in developed countries with a high level of welfare. Having stated that this spiritual decadence inflicted on humanity is a global one which rages all nations and all sects of society regardless of economic or social status, Kunter identifies the source of the problem as humanity's inability to keep pace in terms of moral development with the progress in science and technology. He states that a profound sentiment of dissatisfaction prevails at both the individual and the social level since the poor, the middle class, and the wealthy are all discontent with their conditions and haunted by a lack of, and therefore, yearning for a

spiritual serenity to fill the void they feel. Kunter furthers his argument that a technological and economic development should be accompanied by a moral one with the assertion that although such a progress is underway thanks to a joint effort of institutions such as the [Turkish] government, which takes broad measures to ensure justice and order at the national level, or the United Nations, which prioritizes social assistance and solidarity at the international level, as a result of a universal comprehension of the fact that material wealth without inner peace would not suffice, such efforts are still inefficacious in eradicating the discontentment which is [paradoxically] and noticeably prevalent in nations possessing ample financial opportunities. As well as this feeling of discontent, Kunter adds, according to reports by experts, not only the level of inner peace and spiritual serenity declines as a result of a progress in civilization but also the number of psychological disorders and mental diseases increases, which can only be attributed to an erroneous path adopted by the members of a society and not to the civilization itself, and to be able to remedy the mistake of holding material things in high regard while disregarding the need for morality, people should embrace their faith. Having reiterated his conviction that it is only through moral education that people can find inner peace, Kunter corroborates his proposition relating God's stipulation in the Holy Qur'an that all human beings have been given dignity and superiority over other creatures and stating that individuals and societies who are provided with such an education as well as nurtured by pious adherence to the Faith of Islam develop immunity against spiritual crises that cripple social life.

Moral Crisis (Manevi Buhran, *Milli Gençlik*, February-March 1969, Special Issue, pg 62 is yet another article whereby the author Feyziye Deniz maintains that there is a profound moral crisis afflicting the whole world in the 20th century, in every arena of life. Deniz attributes this ubiquity of crisis to the effacement of moral and religious principles from daily life and the relentless effort of some to have these principles fallen into obscurity. Deniz contends that the youth of the 20th century is floundering entangled in this moral crisis because "they are now a puppet youth who know no moral value; disregard the concepts of motherland, nation and family; care about nothing but entertainment, stagger in oblivion; have been captivated by their desires and enslaved by perverted ideologies."

The article *Because They are Traitors* (Çünkü Haindirler, *Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg 9-10) defines the situation of Turkey as poised in the midst of an undeniable spiritual and moral crisis, whereby the society has become so corrupt as to totally forget about such venerable principles as respect, affection and mutual cooperation. The author of the article, Hüseyin Bahar, deems education culpable, pointing out the reverse correlation between the level of education and faith in Allah, and furthers his argument by stating that all ties between education and piety were severed so as to phase out madrasah (Muslim educational institution system and the bigotry it posited, now it has become impossible to instill moral values in the hearts of the youth. He suggests that the education system that supplanted the madrasah is no superior than what it replaced, and unless a better system is put in place, the society is doomed to a fate far grimmer than the earlier situation. This portentous warning that a youth bereft of the core values of Islam will be rendered soulless miscreants is accompanied by a number of analogies in which a land where religious values do not prevail is likened to desolate ruins, on which poisonous nettles, rather than roses, thrive and ominous owls replace stately eagles. The message underlying these comparisons are nothing more than the restatement of the assertion that people who do not harbor religious faith in their chests will do harm and be of no use to their country, another example of which is the article *First Homeland, First Faith* (Önce Vatan Önce İman, *Toprak*, October -November 1966, issue 52, pg. 6. In this article, the author Zübeyir Koç elaborates on the reasons why homeland and religious faith should take precedence before anything else asserting that religious faith is omnipotent and should constitute one's primary guide. In this piece, Koç cleverly employs repetition as a literary tool to achieve a strong impact on his readers and says: "It is religious faith that brings one salvation and peace of soul. It is religious faith that saves one from the dark and sacrilege. It is religious faith that winnows falsehood from truth. It is religious faith that keeps one's moral judgment sound and clear. It is religious faith that brings one divine light. It is religious faith that unites and elates believers. It is religious faith that defeated polytheism and heresy in Badr. It is religious faith that smashed the indestructible castle walls and vanquished unconquerable Byzantium. It is religious faith that planted the flag of Islam on the forts of the infidels, raised the banner of tawhid

on the strongholds of the heretics. It is religious faith that sows the seeds of enlightenment from the Great Wall of China to the Atlantic Ocean. It is religious faith that subdues the merciless, stops the wail of the oppressed. It is religious faith that makes the believer just, this truth one should never distrust ...” Koç’s choice of a poetic style bolstered through the repetition of the phrase “It is religious faith that” together with allusions to history glorifying the deeds of the Islamic army serve to inculcate firmly the idea that faith is the overarching sentiment regulating all aspects of life and endowing the believers with the power they need. Koç, then, goes on to elucidate why motherland should be given priority over other things maintaining his rhythmical and symbolic style: “Homeland is the mother’s bosom, martyr’s abode; it is where the taste of freedom, the name of the crimson flag lie, it is where we pray at liberty, dome after dome rise our sanctuary. Anyone who has been abroad, whose freedom has been fettered knows the value of their homeland. It is where the best soil forms, it is where the lush green grows. It is where my mother drowned Moskof, it is where the invaders my grandfather drove off. A man without a homeland is like a nonentity, a man without homeland has troubles in plenty.”

§ 3.4 Westernization and West Values

This moral crisis and depravity that conservatives deem Turkey to be mired in is frequently linked to the emulation of Western values and adoption of a Western lifestyle, which- according to the conservatives- leads to a grotesque subversion of morality of Turkish nation. In the article *Our Generation and the Sentiments it Invokes* (Neslimiz ve Düşündürdükleri, *Milli Gençlik*, December 1967, Special issue,, the President of National Turkish Student Union İsmail Kahraman sees the adoption of the Western values as the core problem and states that the institutions of family, education and society degenerate because of the unquestioning embracement of the Western values and a complete disregard of national values, thereby abandoning the quintessence of one’s own being. Kahraman identifies the primary threat to the Turkish nation’s national values as the imitation of European values and an attempt for Europeanism.

In the article *They are not This Land's Own Children (Onlar Bu Toprağın Öz Çocuğu Değillerdir, Toprak*, September, 1963, issue 21-22, pg. 11 those who have been interviewed by, as *Toprak* refers to, a female columnist of the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* are criticized for stating that they feel they are not properly understood by the Turkish society, or that they are planning to move abroad. These interviewees are referred as rootless and degenerate individuals imitating the characters they have seen in movies, and as those who have never turned an honest penny or earned their living by means of their own efforts. The article suggests that the interviews be held with youngsters from Zeytinburnu or Sağmalcılar, who work hard eleven hours a day to earn their living rather than with the ones from Kadıköy or Suadiye beaches, the underlying message intended here being that those who cannot identify with many of the norms in Turkey do not belong here because of their admiration and emulation of Western values.

The article *Those in Search of Heaven in the Drowsiness of Whiskey (Viski Mahmurluğunda Cennet Arayanlar, Toprak*, May, 1964, issue 29, pg. 4 serves as a concise summary of what the conservatives identify most of the Western practices with, the writer of the article, A. Rahim Balcıoğlu, harshly attacking people whom he calls pseudo-Muslims who have happened to receive such names as "Ahmet" or "Mehmet" as a result of an unfortunate twist of fate. Balcıoğlu asserts that these people "with their prim look in their ironed trousers and sharply stiffened collars are actually cosmopolitan, soulless, substance abusing, modern snobs who make a fuss in their ivory towers whenever they see an Islamic movement - especially if this movement is an intellectual one; in other words, if it is a movement of the justice of the god and the people... These hopeless creatures have always denied their own religion, traditions and conventions at every opportunity possible...The spiritual depravity and deprivation of national spirit and consciousness of these miserable creatures are ignominy enough in the eyes of Turkish people, 95% of whom are Muslims." In his article heavily laden with emotive language bolstered through the use of various deprecating adjectives modifying his opponents, Balcıoğlu argues that the people he is targeting recognize no value, be it material or spiritual, of the land they are living on, because they contend that it is a prerequisite of being modern to deny one's essence. Posing the rhetorical question "Whichever one

of these dark-souled people ever served in the name of God or for the good of the people?", Balcıoğlu asserts that these people are "pseudo-intellectuals intoxicated by the whiskey they constantly consume, whose only sincerity is observed in their trade of obscene photography publishing in the newspapers where they have snatched a spot with the photographs they import primarily from Europe of naked women." According to the author, these people's Turkishness, faith in Islam, or intellectuality consist not of fear of God, Qur'an, the Prophet or the love of their nation, but only of being informed of the color of the piece of bikini which covers the private parts of a Hollywood actress." The upshot of Balcıoğlu's argument materializes in the final paragraph of the article with the lines "If we stake our hopes for national spirit and national consciousness, our sublime and sacred moral values peculiar to Islam and Turkishness, which are necessary for the perpetuity of Islam and Turkishness, on perverted admirers of the West who misinterpret Westernness, on Westerners and on Westernization, unfortunately it is too late.

Another point of criticism related to the issue of Westernization is the emulation and import of the cultural elements such as decorating Christmas trees. In the article *The Bigger of the Problems* (*Derdin Büyüğü*, *Toprak*, August 1961, Issue 81, pg. 17, the writer M. İlhan Lostar writes, "Other than the communist agents working systematically in our country, there is a group of people who have weak national will and forgotten Turkish customs and traditions. They adorn their homes and workplaces with Christmas tree and Santa Claus on the New Year's. They put candles on the birthday cakes on their children's birthdays. Another comparable pity is that they copy the fashion of the French for their personal tastes, and wear short skirts. They have their hair cut imitating the Style of Diba.¹ Yes they imitate the garb of Paris and the hair of Diba, but never think about whether such practices conform to Turk's character... Why would they imitate their Santa Claus when we have ancestors like Dede Korkut?² Why would they blow candles when we have our own customs

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- 1 Lostar most probably refers to Farah Diba Pahlavi, the Empress of Iran, who was known for her Western look in her choice of clothes and hair style.
 - 2 In the famous Central Asian epic, *The Book of Dede Korkut*, consisting of twelve legends, the character Dede Korkut is a soothsayer and bard and serves to link the stories together. (Saritaş,

and traditions? If the goal here is to Westernize, Westernization cannot be achieved by imitating them like a monkey, but by understanding their mind-set. It is foolishness, and even stupidity to believe that we will be Westernized by imitating everything in the West, especially the religious customs.”

§ 3.5 Stylistic Choices in Clothing and Personal Grooming

The condemnation of an admiration of the West seeps into various other fields of life including people’s stylistic choices of clothing and self-grooming such as one’s preference for a particular choice of haircut or model of shaving. In the section titled Whips (Fiskeler, *Toprak*, 1968, issue 64, pg. 16, while the writer Aydil Erol reprimands those - whom he sardonically refers to as ‘progressivists’ - who demand the expulsion of Americans from Turkey chanting “Go home Americans” for their inconsistent behavior of dressing up in loafers, blue jeans and t-shirts; smoking American cigarettes and singing the melodies of Texan cowboys. Erol furthers his criticism with a rebuke of the outer appearance of the ‘progressivists’ with the lines: “Above all, those hair styles, another catastrophe...sideburns in imitation of Elvis Presley, hair in imitation of the lice-infested wretched, beard in imitation of the missionaries. Look at this inconsistency!” As customs of the broad mass of the population and their continuity bear great significance for the conservatives, any divergence from conventional ways of grooming such as opting for unorthodox hair styles or clothing is frowned upon, receiving harsher criticism in the case of an emulation of a foreign style becoming too salient. Another facet of the strict control exhorted on the individualistic choices of the style is closely related to the exemplary function such choices serve for the society at large, wreaking harm on the traditions and nationalist character of the society by setting undesirable precedents.

Another article that condemns the stylistic choices observed in the outer appearance of some youngsters is Yes, We Want religion Lesson at [Our]

Süheyla, “Arts: Storytellers and Raconteurs: Turkey”, in: Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures, General Editor Suad Joseph. Consulted online on 5 May 2019 http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1872-5309_ewic_EWICCOM_0296f First published online: 2009

Schools (Evet Okullara Din Dersi İstiyoruz, *Toprak*, May-June 1967, issue 56, pg 15, which reads " The pathetic condition of our youngsters who, virtually deriding every attribute of the Turk on the avenues and streets of big cities, have surrendered themselves to the contemptible and abysmal fashion of foreign countries has become a social wound that keeps festering. The article, which is written by an Imam Hatip High School student, Sultan Üstüenalp, goes on to refer to the foreigners visiting Turkey as "mice infested tourists afflicting our country". According to Üstüenalp, legions of "presumptuous buffoons of Europe are flooding Turkey in order to undermine our national and religious morality. Their disgusting condition, however, is being emulated by some of our youngsters who have lost their identity. These youngsters blemish the name of the Turk and the Muslim. Do the parents of these pathetic youngsters assume their parental obligations to be over once they bear these children into this world?" Üstüenalp furthers her argument stating that parents are obliged to raise their kids with proper upbringing so as to equip them with due moral standards, adding that "parents who have not bestowed the society religious and moral individuals will be responsible before Allah." According to Üstüenalp, "It is these pathetic youngsters who deem religiosity reactionism and defy their faith. In this era, there is no trace of moral uprightness or modesty, and immorality reigns supreme. Youngsters who have been hurled idly following a group of vagabonds, and who have no definite end endangers our future." Citing lines from Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Üstüenalp concludes her argument with the remedy she deems fit and states that having religion lessons established in schools can solve the problem.

Another instance manifesting conservatives' conception of a proper look is the small piece titled This Man... (Bu Kişi..., *Toprak*, October-November 1968, issue 52, pg. 6, the central goal of which is to reveal the fact that the associate professor in question is a member of the Labor Party and sympathetic to communist ideas, and therefore dangerous for his students, yet still offers a glimpse into the understanding of an appropriate dress and hairstyle deemed fit for a professor as the article reads "This unshaven disheveled man you see in the photograph is Sencer Divitçioğlu, an associate professor of the School of Economics of Istanbul University." Apparently conservatives' idea of what being a professor entailed and how a man of letters should look clash

with that of a certain part of the population who do not establish a direct link between one's looks and brains.

As evinced by the discussion of the distinctive garb and garments preferred by the leftists and censured by the conservatives, another theme that dominates the discourse of the conservatives is the perception of the "foreign" and the adoption of foreign elements including ideological tenets to be followed. In the article *Crisis at the University* (Üniversitede Bunalma, *Milli Gençlik*, February-March 1969, Special Issue, pg. 24 by Sezai Karakoç, Europeans are portrayed as insidious adversaries who "surreptitiously planted the obsession of socialism among [Turks] so that an inefficient, rather than a healthy, opposition favoring the West emerges." Karakoç, who believes that the intent behind the introduction of Marxism to Turkish society is to suffocate Turkish people's own worldview, asserts that "the revolutionaries did not hesitate to collaborate with the Marxists against Islam."

§ 3.6 Social Order, Hierarchy, Authority and Conformity

Since conservative ideology deems certain social orders and hierarchies as inevitable, dissent from established norms is strictly frowned upon, constituting one of the many issues where the direction that the ethical compass of the conservatives points diverges significantly from the direction pointed by that of the leftists. The article *Two Anecdotes and the Morality of the Communists* (İki Hatıra ve Komünistlerin Ahlakı, *Toprak*, July, 1963, issue 19, pg. 14 written by Hasan Sami Bolak aptly illustrates the different universes of morality that conservatives and so-called communists inhabit. In the article, Bolak recounts two incidents he experienced and relates that two years earlier, he witnessed the statements of a man who repaired the printing press at the editorial office of the newspaper he worked at. He states that two days before this incident, Peyami Safa had written an article titled "They have Gone too Far" and Bolak was reading aloud the article in a stern tone with a couple of his friends. The repairman, who is referred to as A.A. in the article, abandoned his task and remarked: "as if there were a trace of thought in that fascist's article...What does he say? They have gone too far! The time [for the leftists] to rear up is soon." Bolak then relates that they went into a heated argument with him, and

goes on to narrate that the same man, while talking to the owner of the printing house, told that he had an apprentice whom he frequently swore at and beat, and whose weekly wage he frequently cut off so that the apprentice would retort back, but all his efforts were in vain and the apprentice would not utter a word, let alone attack back. A.A is frustrated by the apprentice's resigned manner and states that he would revere and reward him with a pay increase if he defied him. Bolak finds these words disgusting and states that an employee's cursing his employer and then being rewarded and applauded by the employer in return is an act of immorality.

A very important notion that should be examined in relation to the concepts of authority and conformity is protest, which is believed by the conservatives to breed unrest in society since conservative ideology postulates, while not rejecting a sense of justice, that social stratification is only natural, and a quest for a classless society where everyone is accorded equal status is not only an exercise in futility but also a noxious endeavor jeopardizing the order of the society and the well-being of the state. Thus, in the conservative conceptualization, an ideal citizen, who harbors patriotic feelings in his/her chest, should appreciate the limits to his/her control over his/her fate and environment, and accordingly refrain from engaging in a misguided pursuit of establishing a society void of inequality. In the same vein, conservatives denounce the idea of attempting to cure society's ills through protest, and deem attempts to establish an egalitarian society illusory, if not destructive of the social order proper.

Obedience and conformity to norms are endorsed and exhorted in various circumstances and via a plethora of means such as excerpts from religious sources as in the example of the Hadith-i Sharif related by the periodical *Selamet*, which, by and large, serves as an instructive source in theological matters for its readers rather than delve into and interpret the daily political and social events taking place during the period, thereby providing universal guiding principles which should be interpreted into an all-inclusive way of conduct about how to act in the face of the daily occurrences. In the Hadith-i Sharif (Hadis-i Şerif, *Selamet*, September 1962, Issue 6, pg. 5) an anecdote that transpired between Abu Bakr and Umar Al-Farouq in the 8th year after the Hijira, which corresponds to 630 AD, is related to illustrate the importance of

obedience. In the episode, a recent convert to Islam and the Commander of the Islamic army, Amr bin El-Âs forbids the army to light a fire on a chilly night, an order which stirs the soldiers and leads them to complain about the situation to Umar Al-Farouq, who flames up as he finds the command inane on such a freezing night, only to be placated by Abu Bak's reminding him of Prophet Muhammad's decision to appoint Amr bin El-Âs as the commander of the army, whereby he should be obeyed under all circumstances. Abu Bakr says: "The Prophet has named him our commander. The commander should not be meddled with and his orders should be strictly followed. We will do what he tells us to do and refrain from doing what he tells us not to." The next day, the Islamic army takes its enemy unawares and triumphs over it as the enemy has no idea about the size of the Islamic army since they did not build a fire the night before thanks to the order of Amr bin El-Âs. In addition to this anecdote, three hadith-i sharifs on obedience are related: "Obey your ruler even if he is an Abyssinnian slave", "One who obeys his superiors, obeys me: one who does not, defies me", and "Whether orders are agreeable to you or not, they should be followed", which serve as a transition to the discussion of the importance of obedience in society as it is stated that "a society where disobedience to superiors prevails is doomed to perish because obedience brings unity [whereas] disobedience creates divisions." This argument is further bolstered by the following assertions: "When history is studied, it is clearly seen that disobedience that initially pervades the army and then the society has impaired the national solidarity, and this detachment and discord have induced the tragic end and fall of many early nations." Conservatives promote conformity as opposed to protest chiefly because they believe the former is the quintessence of a smoothly running pre-ordained system. According to conservatives, people should respect social hierarchy, as social order is necessary for human life.

§ 3.7 Order and Stability

Another prime value that aligns with the conservative right and again should be studied in relation to conservatives' perception of authority is stability, which, according to conservatives, can only be attained through conformity.

In the article, That Newspaper called Cumhuriyet (Şu Cumhuriyet Denen Gazete, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg. 4, the columnist H üseyin Albayrak, launches a scathing attack on Cumhuriyet for its appeal to The International Federation of Journalists (Dünya Gazeteciler Federasyonu and International Press Institute, upon the arrest of one of its writers as well as its editor in chief on charges of spreading communist propaganda. Albayrak puts forth his criticism of Cumhuriyet's repudiation of the order of arrest, seeking justice elsewhere and resorting no non-national organizations as follows: "One who has trust in Turkish justice would know well enough to keep silent in the face of a prosecution [or conviction] and to seek his right through extant laws without trampling upon Turkish dignity and honor", which, Albayrak believes, is a result of Cumhuriyet's taking the issue to foreign organizations. He rhetorically asks, "Have you not felt any shame in proudly publishing the photocopy of a letter by a foreign organization, which scoffs at and makes fun of Turkish justice, and aims to disparage it?"

§ 3.8 Moderacy

Respect for authority, acceptance of status quo and maintenance of stability through conformity are all core values held in high regard by the conservatives, which call for a personality trait of avoiding excess, namely moderacy. In this context, acts and ideas perceived to be immoderate such as aspiration for unfettered freedom or acts of civil disobedience should be strictly refrained from by all. However, although the virtue of temperance is an advice meted out for everyone, teachers are accorded a special status by the conservatives because of the role they play in the education of the young and the construction of future generations. Therefore, articles dwelling on the issue of how teachers should behave is a common occurrence encountered in almost every issue of these periodicals. One such article preaching teachers moderacy is the one penned by Hasan Basri Albayrak, a primary school inspector, Our Message to those in charge of the Federation : A Teacher should Possess Conscience, Reason and Common Sense, and should not be Mised or Led Astray (Federasyon Mesullerine Diyoruz ki, *Toprak*, May 1963, issue 17, pg 8, which,

on the whole is a condemnation of the meeting organized by the Turkish National Federation of Teachers Associations on 20 February 1963, in Ankara. Having stated that they, i.e., those against socialist/leftist stances and organizations, approve of neither the attitude of the organizers of the meeting nor the meeting itself held in Akdoğan Square, defines the rally 'a public demonstration of brute force', which he cites as a reason for their refrainment from participating the event. Aktan blames those in charge of the Federation of dragging teachers to streets with posters in their hands, thereby rendering these teachers a street mob, which ripped them of their nobility, dignity and solemnity. Aktan furthers his argument by questioning the sincerity of these teachers who stated that they took to the streets in protest of the misdeeds perpetrated against them, and insinuates hypocrisy regarding the intentions of the protestors by directing such questions as "Are these teachers impartial? Are they devoted to their duty or swayed by the trivia of the day? Do they call the people of this country 'bigoted, reactionary, ignorant, and fanatic individuals who are the enemies of Revolution'? Are they respectful of the traditions, conventions, morality, and religious beliefs of this society? Do they look down on people, or show reverence for and appreciation of people's sacred values, chastity and honor?" Aktan's suggestive remarks regarding these protestors' approach to traditions, conventions, religious faith and dignity, and his implications that they have ulterior motives, together with his assertion that teachers should assume a dignified manner, which requires them to abstain from engaging in protest should be contemplated in the context of the tenets of the conservative ideology, which asserts forcefully that a teacher should never be led astray by immoral and immoderate impulses and take to the streets to protest the practices of the government, as such an act is fundamentally incompatible with the decorum preached by the conservatives. The ideological pursuits of the teachers should be tempered by the considerations of representing a role model for future generations. In this vein, the hostility that conservatives display towards the kind of excessive idealism defined as such by the conservatives is understandable as their ideas are informed by their underlying moral orientation.

The article A Conversation with a Young Teacher (Genç Bir Öğretmenimizle Bir Hasbihal, *Selamet*, July 1962, Issue 4, pg. 3 penned by Halim Baki

Kunter is just another example of exhortation of such a moral orientation whereby teachers are characterized by dignified propriety in conduct, manners, appearance and character. By means of a personal anecdote relating details about an acquaintance of his, Aysel Üstün, who has just graduated from Beşikdüzü Teachers' Training School for Girls, Kunter advises the teachers to display such attributes as virtuousness and dignity with the following address: '...Another feature you should develop, even before erudition, is morality as knowledge not embellished with good manners is incomplete and incapable of conferring the aspired dignity, honor and bliss on the beholder... Veracity, propriety, modesty, self-possession, diligence, cleanliness and an eagerness to acquire knowledge should be your guiding principles...One who keeps his/her solemnity maintains his/her dignity, reputability and honor, thereby protecting his/her integrity and probity, which serve as strongholds that defend our sacred values.'" The columnist is convinced that many a dangers can be averted and one's status can be elevated through the embracement of solemnity and dignity. He, then, advises young teachers not to get swept by vanity and pride, not to look down on anyone, and not to be carried away by rage, and he repeatedly underlines the characteristics of moderation, temperance, decency and contentment with what one has, which are claimed to protect one from malice. It may be this line of thought that may explain the abhorrence that conservatives display against acts of defiance to long-established institutions such as family or the state apparatus as one is constantly advised to exercise utmost self-restraint while refraining from engaging in activities that exceed the bounds of legality or legitimacy.

It is in the context of these principles that articles such as *The Titan that Ended up in Streets (Sokağa Düşen Dev, Toprak, March 1963, issue 15, pg 6* in which, as the title suggests, teachers are compared to Titans which have been banished to the Earth because of engaging in the debasing act of protest, or *Teachers of Tekirdağ Protested the Teachers Rally in Ankara (Tekirdağ Öğretmenleri Ankara'daki Öğretmenler Mitingini Protesto etti, Toprak, March 1963, issue 15, pg. 9* should be read. In the declaration issued by the Executive Board of Tekirdağ Teachers Fraternal Association (Tekirdağ Öğretmenler Yardımlaşma Birliği, it is stated that the Union does not approve the attitude of Turkish National Federation of Teachers Associations, and believes that the

Federation has lost its identity as the representative of teachers associations and unions, and therefore can no longer represent the 90,000 teachers. According to the report, the Federation's insistence on being the representative of all teachers can only be termed as the oppression of the minority over the majority. The declaration also claims that the Federation is exploiting the teachers for its own interests under the pretext of engaging in an effort to elevate the status of teachers to a level where they are aptly venerated. It can easily be seen that the primary reason behind this censure directed towards the Federation because it organized a mass protest whereby the teachers took to the streets is that defying the set norms and rules is frowned upon by the conservatives as evinced by the following lines in the declaration: "We believe that to urge the teachers through rallies organized in the name of earning them their rights to take the streets leaving their schools which they deem sacred is the gravest malice that can be wreaked on the teachers."

It is quite natural that an ideology that places great importance on the past and tradition, and allows change when it is only incremental and not leading to drastic changes overnight, holds wisdom coming from the accumulated experience in high regard. Therefore veneration of experience and endorsement of traditional values, long established norms and social rules is emblematic of conservatism. In the piece *A Conversation with a Young Teacher* (*Genç Bir Öğretmenimizle Bir Hasbihal*, *Selamet*, July 1962, Issue 4, pg. 3, the author Halim Baki Kunter depicts experience as a valuable lesson whose worth fools either comprehend when it is too late, or fail to benefit from, and tells young teachers to make use of both their own and other people's experiences, deriving valuable lessons from them.

§ 3.9 Nationalism

It is evident that the conservatives' sense of right and wrong doesn't align with that of the leftists, and the conservatives meet many of the ideals embraced by the leftists with skepticism, if not with hostility. Since the exponents of conservative ideology deems one's unquestioning loyalty and unwavering devotion to their country a sine qua none of an ideal citizen, and the youth is contemplated as the foundation of the future of a country, they frequently address

the young advising them to keep to nationalist principles and to hold their country's interests above all. According to conservatives, nationalism is a necessary sentiment to mold the youth's character so as to cultivate strong ties with one's fellow people. In the article [Advice] to my Brothers in High School (Liseli Kardeşlerime, *Toprak*, April 1963, issue 16, sf 21, the author Osman Türkünlü, who is inferred from the article to be a university student, addresses high school students referring them as "the son of Turk" and tells them that among the many ideologies presented to them by various circles ranging from family to friends, only nationalism can benefit them, as nationalist people can be of better service to their country. Türkünlü then goes on to providing a prescription of how to become a true nationalist, and as he puts it, the criteria that should be used to determine whether one is a true nationalist consist of the following questions: "Does one love Turkish nation and motherland?", "Does one believe in Islam, which is the loftiest pinnacle of religion?" "Is one devoted to his/her duty?", "Does one admire N. Kemal, Gökald, Akif and Yurdakul?", "Does one love Atatürk and follow his footsteps?", "Does one prefer morality over material things?" In the article, in which Turkishness is frequently exalted as the "noblest of races and the most veracious of people", youngsters are warned against adopting "amorphous" ideologies, which refers to, though not overtly stated, to leftist, socialist and Marxist thinking as the author Türkünlü states that these ideologies are the methods to destroy Turkish nation employed by Marxist USSR, which he refers to as "vile Moskof (Moscow aspiring to avenge the days of its servitude to the Turk, "

In the same vein, a bevy of articles such as Responsibilities that Lie with our Youth (Türk Gencine Düşen Vazifeler, *Toprak*, June-July 1967, issue 56, pg 1&14 by Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kafesoğlu address the Turkish youth, and while extolling the qualities they possess, remind them of their duties towards the nation. Kafesoğlu refers to the Turkish youth as "the bearer of a 4000-year-old history" and "the representative of a long and glorious struggle", and states that they "now once again stand to carve their name in golden letters in the history of the civilization." Kafesoğlu identifies the occasion as an attack on Turkey, "which has become a close and the foremost target of a horrific regime that, via a plethora of plots and intrigues targeting national values, aims to

bury national systems into the darkness of an ignominious servitude." However, Kafesoğlu presents the situation as an opportunity, and calls the youth on duty to unwaveringly defend and save the world civilization in the moral self of the Turkish nation. Turkish Youth, who has been vested the responsibility of protecting and maintaining the integrity of the nation, is called upon to attend to their own national culture, which Kafesoğlu depicts as enabling the existence of the Turkish nation as the dominant one thanks to its elements such as Turkish language, religion, Turkish morality and Turkish decorum. According to Kafesoğlu, when national culture is strengthened and enriched, science will progress, expanding the technical capabilities and increasing people's level of welfare. The author furthers his designation of the duties that fall on the shoulders of the Turkish youth by stating that "Islam, which has established itself as the common religion of the Turkish realm will be preserved as a unique bond, and every effort will be made to advance Turkish morality and decorum."

Since the champions of conservative ideology are steadfast in their belief that one's primary allegiance should be to his/her country and fellow citizens, they prescribe certain tenets to which they expect the youth to stick to, aiming to raise the young generation in accordance with the principles of Turkish nationalism and in full compliance with the set norms and rules, which seems immediately apparent via a quick leafing through the pages of the periodicals. In the article An Address to [Our] Youth (Gençlere Hitap, *Toprak*, May 1963, issue 17, pg 14-15, the author F. Cemal O ğuz Acar judges the content of the character of the Turkish youth, whom he censures for their engagement in acts of protests in İzmir, İstanbul and Ankara. Acar terms these rallies in which the youngsters participated as "nothing more than a clamorous disturbance of innocent people." He, then, provides a description of how university youth proper should be, whom he portrays as "one who seeks ideas and sets goals beneficial to his/her country, one who firmly objects to foreign doctrines and ideologies, and one who shows reverence for people's rights and liberties as well as for rules and laws".

The Gem of Humanity: TURK (İnsanlığın Ziyneti: TÜRK, *Milli Gençlik*, May 1964, issue 8, pg. 6 penned by Kemal Sar ıgöllü is an article which is a paragon of the unfettered glorification of Turkish nationality, bolstered

through religious allusions splattered all through it, thereby attributing the necessity of extolling the national tenets to divine provenance, and conferring this act of glorification a sublime quality as well as through historical references, thereby corroborating the claims of self-worth through direct quotations from various foreign rulers ranging from Romain IV Diogene, defeated by Seljuk Turkish forces led by Alp Arslan at the Battle of Manzikert to Swiss King Charles XII who, having been defeated by Russia, sought refuge in Turkey.

§ 3.10 Sense of Responsibility

The youth is frequently lambasted in various occasions due to their perceived idleness and referred to as "slackers" who waste their time malingering and thus shirking serious work. In the article Idle Youth (Dalgacı Gençlik, *Milli Gençlik*, June-July 1964, issue 9-10, pg. 4, Güner N. Artamlı denounces the way the youth lived and says they are too absorbed with trivial matters and do nothing worthwhile. According to Artamlı, the youth are wasting their time at cinema theatres, theater halls, cafes gambling halls and beaches, providing no benefit for their country. Acknowledging that it is one's right to visit such places, Artamlı stipulates that one must first do his/her responsibilities and fulfill his/her obligations, suggesting that students are derelicts neglecting their duty. Artamlı finds a 3-month summer holiday too long for university and high school students, who, as Artamlı puts it, study just before the exams and banter in the majority of their time.

The reason of the attitude of Turkish youth, deemed irresponsible by many conservatives, is frequently attributed to the influence of the West on the young people and that these youngsters are raised in too detached a manner from their own customs, traditions and values. The article Anatolia and Anatolian Youth, (Anadolu ve Anadolu Gençliği, *Milli Gençlik*, November 1968, issue, pg. 34, where the Turkish youth is likened to fertile Anatolian soil if properly ploughed, holds youth's severed ties with its roots responsible for their misdemeanor, attributing their reprehensible attitude to "the influence of the foreign powers, which obscure the values [of the Turkish youth] and distort and misrepresent the reality in an attempt to alienate the youth from

their own self through the employment of foreign ideologies.” The author of the article, Osman Yumak asserts that great dangers such as an irreversible state of anarchy are awaiting Anatolia and its youth if these foreign influences are overlooked or condoned. Yumak sums up the situation with the following lines: “We have a problem of a youth who don’t know their past, and therefore, can’t be certain of their future. This problem stems from the fact that their bonds with their [national identity] are badly severed.”

Another article along the same line is *Our Generation and the Sentiments it Invokes* (Neslimiz ve Düşündürdükleri, *Milli Gençlik*, December 1967, Special issue, by the President of National Turkish Student Union İsmail Kahraman, whose following words echo those of Neil Howe and William Strauss in that each generational archetype defined in generational theory finds fault with the deeds of the previous generation in power, and consequently, rather than resembling their elders, young adults create opposing archetypes: “Today’s young generation is discontent with their situation. The generation of yesterday does not appreciate today’s generation. At this rate, today’s generation, which has a high regard of neither itself nor its elders, will not approve of tomorrow’s generation.” Kahraman finds it odd that those who regret the situation are the ones who are actually the prime culprits. He states that although this generation admits that they have many failings, they still bury their head in the sand and keep making the same mistakes, which will render the future generations incompetent and inadequate. Kahraman uses the analogy of the ripples from a pebble tossed into the water, explaining that the pebble is responsible for the formation of even the outermost circle, and states that, likewise, the current situation is a result of long years of negligence and irresponsibility. Kahraman pinpoints the problem as “spiritual starvation”, stating that “the youth is floundering due to a lack of goals and ideals”, and identifies the solution as raising a youth with faith and respect for national as well as moral values. Having stated that a materialistic philosophy poses the greatest threat to the nation’s survival, Kahraman, then, calls for a collective awakening, together with the education system, social life and philosophical foundations.

§ 3.11 Obligations to be Assumed by Students

It should be noted here that it is not only university students but also high school students who are attached considerable importance in terms of their role in perpetuating conservative thought, the primary pillars of which are nationalism, piety and conformity.

The article The Rights and Responsibilities of the Turkish Youth (Gençliğin Hak ve Ödevleri, *Milli Gençlik*, February March 1969, issue ..., pg. 5 penned by the Vice President of National Turkish Student Union (MTTB, Atilla Özer, states that although "youth" is comprised of huge masses, it is the university youth who can function as a pressure group, so the author undertakes the task of listing the rights and responsibilities of university youth, who are reported to be struggling with various financial problems and staying in over-crowded dormitories, and thus falling prey to dangerous ideologies. Özer says, "Turkish youth, who is faced with many difficulties, is obliged to carry out many responsibilities so as to elevate our country to the level of developed countries. The foremost thing that our youth should do is to turn to its true identity and refrain from acts which are out of line with Turkish dignity and solemnity. Our youth should bring together the morality of Islam and Turkish national conscious in its entity. Our youth should be realistic and reformist, they should denounce foreign ideologies and assess issues from a nationalistic perspective. They should be nationalists and regard the benefit of the Turkish nation above all else. Their first goal should be to influence the society so as to develop our country in material and spiritual arenas. Then, they should strive to bring Turkey to its natural borders. Turkish youth will certainly march decisively towards this goal of raising Turkey to a strong and prosperous position. This way, Turkey will rise in feelings of solidarity and brotherhood, pleasing its friends and grieving its foes". While leaving what exactly he meant by the statement "they should strive to bring Turkey to its natural borders" unexplained, Özer makes it clear that a strong adherence to nationalism and morality defined by Islamic code is what is expected from the Turkish youth.

Since students are seen by conservatives as invaluable gems to whose lot the construction of the future of the country falls, student organizations, the strongest and most widely spread of which is National Turkish Student Union

(MTTB, are accorded great significance, and the reports of the acts they engage in and declarations they make are spared a considerable amount of space in the periodicals. One such report is about the press conference held by the Student Association of the Faculty of Literature, which functions under National Turkish Student Union. The report, The Youth have Protested Those who Feign Democracy (Gençlik Demokrasi Maskesine Bürünenleri Protesto Etti, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg 17 gives the full declaration delivered by the President of the Organization, Nadir Bayır, verbatim, and relates that the youth stand against those who demand the abolition of the Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbid communism. By quoting the lines from the articles in question, Bayır attempts to prove those who want the abrogation of these articles wrong, and states that these articles attract the most attention from the leftist circles as if they were the most flagrant anti-democratic laws. Basing his argument on the direct citation of the lines "Those attempting to establish or establishing, or arranging or conducting and administering the activities of, societies in any way and under any name, or furnishing guidance in these respects, with the purpose of establishing domination of a social class over other social classes or exterminating a certain social class or overthrowing any of the established basic economic or social orders of the country, shall be punished by heavy imprisonment of five to fifteen years" from the said articles, Bayır asserts that these articles are instituted to deter the subversive acts of traitors, geared towards incitement, sabotage and a change of regime. As the style of the language and choice of words in the crafting of this report suggest, while the youth opposing leftist/Marxist ideologies are embraced as "ours", those advocating communism are disavowed as traitors.

In the piece of news report Nationalist Youth Says Stop (Milliyetçi Gençler Dur Diyor, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 13, pg. 2 accompanied by a photograph of a commotion between two groups of young people in struggle with each other, one group trying to forcibly enter a building from a balcony and the other trying to prevent them from doing so, it is stated that left-right struggle in Turkey has intensified. The report reads as follows: "Our patriotic university youth aptly gives a warning lesson to those who abuse the amply democratic clauses of our constitution. The photograph depicts the youth who say stop to

the abusive mentality of Labor Party (İşçi Partisi in G ültepe, while these young people are trying, through the window, to get into the meeting which has been closed to the youth despite having been announced to be open [to all]."

§ 3.12 The Institutions of Family and Marriage, and the Role of Women

One issue that receives a similar scolding by the conservatives is the perceived freedom enjoyed by the progressivists in issues relating to family, marriage and intersexual relations because of their endorsement of a society that retains a traditional form of family with rigid gender roles defined by paternalism and authority. Family is frequently extolled as the building block of the society in such articles as The Morality of a Muslim Turk (Müslüman Türk'ün Ahlakı, *Selamet*, July 1962, issue 4, pg. 11 penned by H üsnü Dikeçligil, defining family life as a sacred entity and a blessing, whose value a Muslim Turk knows well. Dikeçligil conceptualizes the family life befitting a proper Muslim Turk as one in which utmost moderation and orderliness with respect to private lives are exercised while pretention and exaggeration are diligently refrained from.

According to conservatives, since the family is the core institution whereby societies reproduce themselves and pass moral knowledge to the young, they put marriage on a pedestal, rejecting cohabitation or any form of extramarital sexual relationship.

Exponents of conservative ideology believe that a country derives its strength from the power of its population and encourage having multiple children, equating the magnitude of the number of people with greater national capability. In this line of thought, family planning is more than often seen as a conspiracy plotted against the Turkish nation to rip it off its potency. Therefore, in every platform possible, conservatives issue warnings against the damage that could be incurred by adopting the recommended family planning methods. In the article Social Issues of Our Country (Yurdumuzun Sosyal Me-seleleri, *Toprak*, May 1963, issue 17, pg. 11, having explained that the population growth rate of Turkey, which is 3% at the time, has been deemed too high

by the authorities and that some birth control methods have been under contemplation, the author Oğuz Özbek unequivocally states that employing any form of birth control is against Turkey's national interest and detrimental to its future, as such a practice would harm its fertility and efficiency. The author furthers his argument by asserting that "it is treason to act in such an incapacitated manner to resort to a course of action geared towards razing the root of a nation rather than taking measures necessary for economic development." Despite acknowledging the problems stemming from overpopulation such as unemployment, the author diverges from the advocates of birth control in his view that even curbing the population would not remedy the problem unless economic policies to improve Turkey's economy are implemented.

Another piece condemning antinatalist practices, the use of contraceptive pills in particular, and reiterating the conservative view on women's function and responsibility pertaining to child bearing and rearing is REWARD (MÜKAFAT, *Toprak*, September-October 1967, issue 59, pg 14, which - among many other similar pieces in the section Whips (Fiskeler informing the readers about a variety of topics such as prohibitions imposed on the Turkish minority in the Western Thrace forbidding them to speak Turkish - relates the news of mothers who bear three children being rewarded with bonuses in Japan while, in a disapproving tone, contrasting the situation in Turkey, "where ", as the piece reads, "free contraceptives are distributed to prevent women from carrying out their primary duty, which is to bear children. "

According to conservatives, the particular orientation of marriage is and should be towards the bearing and nurturing of children, and cohabitation of unmarried couples is unacceptable as such a practice is subversive to family life, which will inevitably and eventually subvert the nation. Since sexual conduct without marriage signifies depravity in the moral judgment of the conservatives, they sanction sexual intercourse without marital bond and consider children born of unmarried parents illegitimate.

Just as the utmost purpose of marriage is considered to be bearing children out of this marital unity, the primary role of women is contemplated within the spheres of motherhood, which is characterized by certain qualities as defined in the article I am Looking for a Mother... (Bir Anne Arıyorum..., *Toprak*, May 1961, issue 78, pg. 17 by Çırakoğlu Rekin Ertem. Ertem depicts the

proper mother as someone "whose lips, cheeks and eyes are not covered with make up; who is against the ideas of women of society who wear skirts at knee-length. A mother who does not expose the stink in her underarm, the size of her breasts, her spine and shoulder blades, and [thereby] seduce the youth; but one who maintains her dignity at all times, in all places. A mother who does not spend her time at cocktail parties, balls and pleasure palaces; but one who inquires after her kin, relatives, neighbours and the needy. A mother who does not secretly squander her husband's money on fuss and feathers just to allure men; one that does not spend the whole day wandering around shopping with the intention of drawing all the attention on herself using her artificial beauty; but one who strives for the well-being of her home, children and husband; and one who can conceive herself as belonging to her husband." While providing insights into the conception of proper behaviour deemed appropriate by the conservative outlook for a mother, this article also touches upon the professional sphere, and provides commentary on the issue of whether women should take part in professional life, revealing that such an engagement in public life would be frowned upon. Ertem furthers his words as "a mother who does not work as a typist out of an ambition for throwing herself at officials' or her superiors' arms; but one that is devoted to her home waiting for her children to throw themselves in her arms." The writer also maintains that piety is a highly important attribute of a mother by stating that a proper mother should be "the one that seeks remedy in the holiest of the Books, Qur'an and not in liquor, wine and whiskey." Pertaining to the proper look, appropriate dress style and behavioral propriety a mother should adopt, Ertem comments, "a mother who does not behave coquettishly at the beach sunbathing, or in a shamelessly flirtatious manner acting playfully in bras and bathing suits in the sea before men; but one who seeks happiness and joy at home and in the flowers of her garden."

In the article *A Travesty of Honor* (*Gerçek Namusun Sahtesi*, *Toprak*, issue 37-38, pg. 16 anonymously featured in the section titled "Squib", upon defining the term "honor" as "people's compliance with the mores of their society" and then the term "mores" as "the rules of conduct people have to obey in a society", the author states that the concept of honor assumes its most tangible form in the institution of family as, traditionally, the most revered concepts in

Turkish family are honor and moral conduct. The author then goes on to allege that one of the first institutions that Communism aims to destroy is family, because family is the foundation of a society upon whose subversion all other legal institutions will automatically fall apart. After providing the definitions of the core terms on which the article is built, the writer critiques the content of an article titled "Pseudo Honor" published in a left-wing newspaper and written by an author who is sardonically referred to as "progressivist". The author of the section "Squib", sums up what this progressivist writer, who assumes the role of both the defendant and the expert witness, asserts, and provides an excerpt from the article which reads as: "a marriage in which a woman feels bound to stay in due to financial reasons is as vile as prostitution, and a woman who earns her living and cohabits with her partner without wedlock is much more honorable than a woman living off her husband, because while in the latter, love is not fettered by money, in the former, the situation has turned into a tenured servitude based on a contract guaranteeing the woman to be taken care of by her husband, and desperation because of lack of means on behalf of the woman. Why would a chaste woman keep loyal to a man whom she is not in love with? In my opinion, she is committing the gravest act of immorality. She has no self-respect [as] she offers herself to a man she does not love in return for material gains. It is usually the sake of children that is offered as an explanation, but it is just an excuse since a woman earning her living can raise her children by setting [even] better examples for them than living with the man she loves." Then the author of the section "Squib", picks up a harangue against the writer of the excerpt, who is reported to have been living in Sweden for over a year, and rejects the idea that a woman who earns her living and cohabits with her partner without wedlock is much more honorable than a woman who lives in wedlock with a man she is not in love with. He then furthers his argument stating that a child born out of wedlock is considered illegitimate all over the world, including Sweden and Patagonia, and in every country of the world, even in Soviet Russia, the institution of marriage, be it legal or religious, exists. The author concludes his remarks by stating that the ulterior motive of the writer he is criticizing is the subversion of, initially, the institution of family, and ultimately the nation.

This great importance attached to family and familial ties also manifests itself in other realms of everyday life, penetrating even into the terms of address used within social circles, especially those connoting. The form of address "abi", which translates as elder brother, is used to emphasize endearment blended with an overtone of hierarchical superiority in terms of age and experience, is employed when referring to those who function as mentors or counselors for the relatively unexperienced youngsters, denoting a power differential as the asymmetric use of names and address terms is often a clear indicator of social rank, which is yet another important concept regulating the lives of the conservatives.

The article Why and How Should We Fight against The Left (Sola Karşı Niçin ve Nasıl Mücadele Ederiz, *Toprak*, December 1966, issue 53, pg 10-11 by Dr. Hikmet Ertez is yet another piece underlining the significance of family while denouncing the practices adopted by the leftists, which the conservatives see as giving great harm to the institution of family and, consequently, Turkish society. Ertez states that "[Leftists] are purportedly respectful of the institution of the FAMILY, but there are those among them who deem it exploitation for a woman to tie her life to a man through wedlock. These people also believe that a woman who lives with a man she loves without wedlock is more chaste than a house wife bound to her husband through marriage. They attempt to rip the institution of family off its dignity and turn the society into a herd."

Together with the institution of family, children bear great significance for the integrity and the continuity of society in the conceptualization of the conservatives, and as such, how children should be reared is accorded due consideration. In the July 1962 issue of the periodical *Selamet*, the author of the article The Morality of a Muslim Turk (Müslüman Türk'ün Ahlakı, issue 4, pg 11, H üsnü Dikeçligil asserts that a proper Muslim Turk raises children of faith, and in the same issue, the writer of the article Moral Education (Moral Eğitimi, issue 4, pg 4, Neda Armaner posits that the attributes that suit a child are deference and obedience. Armaner states that according to the psychology of religion, the period of childhood is of great importance in terms of religious life because of children's readiness to believe. As Armaner puts it, "children embrace rules and prohibitions readily and unquestioningly. Survey results

indicate that children cannot be considered true adherents of religion until the age of 13 as they do not have the concept and the experience of religion in its real sense. Another consequential aspect of childhood is the proclivity of children for supernatural might and entity...Allah exists in its real sense for a child. Therefore a child's fondness for Allah is sincere and unique."

In the article You Grand Ulunay, What a Plaything You have Become! (Hey Koca Ulunay, Ne Oyuncak Hale Geldin, *Toprak*, 1964, issue 34, pg. 15 a columnist of the Newspaper Cumhuriyet, Refi' Cevad Ulunay, who is reported in this article to be known as a nationalist, conservative, pious Muslim inimical to communism, is lambasted for writing at Cumhuriyet, which publishes the photographs of lightly dressed or barely clad women to increase its circulation and raise more money, a factor that, according to conservatives, silences Ulunay and keeps him from objecting to such practices. This article is one of the many targeting the newspaper Cumhuriyet, as conservatives firmly situate themselves against the ideology that Cumhuriyet represents. As evinced in the strong diction used in this article, conservatives do not hesitate to make explicit the frame of values that determines their moral outlook, and refer to women in the photographs as whores acting under the guise of artists. In this article, Cumhuriyet is censured also for employing a communist who was tried in court together with Nazım Hikmet, and sentenced to 10 years.

§ 3.13 Hostility towards Leftism, Socialism, Marxism, and Communist

Another valuable means which could shed light into the recess of individuals who constitute a community with shared interests and ideals is the common discourse they employ both among themselves and while referring to those perceived as others. In this vein, a peculiar body of vocabulary constituting a code of language among conservatives may be the ideal tool to plainly lay bare the sentiment that the interlocutors of those words harbor in their chest for the receiver of the intended messages. In this respect, the common language, or the adjectives, terms, phrases and nicknames a speaker prefers in order to modify the object of his/her message, constitutes a useful means of asserting the perspective of the producer of these words.

A quick glimpse into periodicals of the period makes it immediately apparent that exponents of the either ideology, be it conservatism or progressivism, vilify anyone who dares oppose their agenda, and the style of language that is adopted by either clique obviously surpasses the respectful bounds of courtesy and borders on the verge of inflammatory discourse, the feelings of either side easily mushrooming into hostility and open attacks on each other, in the article *The Most Reactionary* (En Gerici, *Toprak*, September 1963, issue 21, pg. 16, the author İsmail Oğuz uses a multitude of derogatory adjectives in defining one of his ideological opponents whose stance is so unerringly antithetical.

The writer of the article *Noble Turkish Girl* (Asil Türk Kızı, *Milli Gençlik*, Special issue, November 1968, pg 35 Fevziye Deniz is yet another proponent of conservative ideology who reflects a fervent disdain for the leftists, which is manifest in appellations such as "deviant miscreant" and "red-faced creature" referring to the proponents of leftist ideology. Deniz addresses Turkish girls as "My faith-thirsty sister who is searching for the well to quench her thirst, who wavers in ambivalence, who does not know which direction to go! The path on the left leads you to the land of darkness burning in flames of blasphemy. The path on the right, on the other hand, leads you to ISLAM, bright with a sun that will never dim till the doomsday, where exist the faithful who will take you to their bosom." Utilizing a metaphorical rhetoric, Deniz exhorts Turkish girls to be modest and faithful while avoiding "pompously ornate dresses adorned with fake jewelry." To sway the opinion of her readers, Deniz addresses them directly posing them the question: "Sister! Why are you still ambivalent; why don't you follow the call of the faith?" and then tones down her fervent statements and offers a concession and says, "You might have some reason to be so indecisive, because you have not been nurtured with the spiritual nourishment to strengthen the faith innate in you." Deniz, then, urges Turkish girls to follow the rules of Islam citing various verses, particularly from the chapter (sūrah Al -Baqarah of the Qur'an, and making call with the following promise: "This path will bring you closer to Allah and give back to you your true self which you have lost; it will save you from the enslavement of the nafs (desires and render you a servant of Allah; it is the path that will give you a life full of welfare and peace in both worlds. It is THE PATH OF ISLAM, and the first stop on this path is CONFESSION of FAITH, its guide is

Qur'an, its leader is the Holy Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, its means is the ritual prayer, and its last stop is the HEAVEN."

In their articles which are studded with rancor and contempt for their ideological adversaries, conservatives launch a scathing criticism on leftists which, at some points might border on petty invective, which could be exemplified by the poem Earthworms (Solucanlar by Nureddin Paky ürek, published in *Toprak* (January 1963, Issue 13, pg. 16. The first part of the poem, which could aptly be defined as a blistering attack on the leftists, laced with scorn and fury reads as follows: "From their Godless boss / That blight on humanity/ From the Sadistic Siberian bear / Do they receive orders / Those servants are they /Who know no motherland, no flag / Those sucker red earthworms". In the rest of the poem, Pakyürek uses the analogy of a grand plane tree to liken Turkey and says this tree is being consumed by the earthworms while the gardener, which is another metaphor that seems to stand for the government, has gone woolgathering.

Whips (Fiskeler, *Toprak*, September-October 1967, issue 59, pg 14 is a collection of news on a variety of topics, which is written in a highly mocking tone, abundantly using derisive adjectives and nicknames denoting socialists or communists. In one of these pieces, the subsection Reason, it is reported, with a play on words, that "the most primitive socialists are in Turkey, and the reason of this is that ours are not socialists but rather social 'it'", "it" being a pejorative term in Turkish meaning "dog". Another subsection Aybarof is actually how Mehmet Ali Aybar, the President of Labor Party, is referred to by the author of the section, who has morphologically distorted Aybar's name so as to make it sound like a Soviet name. Yet another subsection TASTE explains that a foreign actress has stated that she fancies vagabonds and wags, and she must be, according to the writer of the section, without doubt must be referring to the socialists. A further derisive piece is BLINDNESS, which states that 400 red guards have gone blind, only to disparage communists, positing that they could never have been red had they not been blind. Yet another article that refers to the disciples of socialist or communist ideology in deprecatory terms is A Proposal on Behalf of the Left-Handed (Solaklar Hesabına Bir Teklif, *Toprak*, September, 1963, issue 21-22, pg. 11, which calls these people "left-handed servants" or "those in red rags."

The combative tone interjected in almost every article is also manifest in the piece I want to Stand Upright (*Ayakta Durmak İstiyorum Toprak*, October November 1966, issue 52, pg 10 by Mahmut Genç, which intends to criticize the way the daily newspaper *Akşam* has made the news of the play "Ayakta Durmak İstiyorum" by Tarık Buğra with the title "The state theatre is staging a racist and Turanist play", and referred to Peyami Safa as "Peyami Safakofil Tarık Buğra", paradoxically resorting to the same way that *Akşam* employs and weaving bitter sarcasm into his piece by addressing Nazım Hikmet as "Nazım Hikmetoviç" and "Nazım Hikmetofil", who, as Genç asserts, owes all his fame to his perverted ideology. Genç ends his piece with a not-so-implicit admonition reciting a well-known aphorism by Ziya Paşa: "One who does not come to his senses when so advised should be reprimanded, when the reprimand fails to suffice, he should be given a beating.", adding that this much of a warning should be enough.

Yet again, the author of the article Communism is not an Idea (*Komunizm Fikir Değildir, Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg 17, İmdat Akmermer, calls the proponents of communist ideology "some brainless pinheads who play the erudite", discommending them for their efforts to disseminate communism, which Akmermer believes to be "the most notorious enemy of humanity" and refers to as "red microbe". Akmermer terms the endeavor of the advocates of communism Moskof sycophancy, if not utter ignorance, and adds such references as "red microbes, stealthy enemies, cosmopolitan dogs, and soulless and brainless creatures" to his list of disparaging nicknames for those who espouse communism. Other examples of derogatory terms and phrases that are considered befitting the advocates of leftist or communist stances include "rodents exploiting people's goodwill" (*Toprak*, April 1963, issue 16, pg.19,

In the article Because They are Traitors (*Çünkü Haindirler, Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg 9-10, the author Hüseyin Bahar states that religious and patriotic people are deemed reactionary, which would translate into a constitution of population 95% of whom are reactionists. The author uses a variety of analogies to refer to those who believe themselves to be the intelligentsia and states that these 'learned' people assume religious people devoted to their country to be bigots, and this 'intelligentsia' should go through a process of

disillusionment so as to see how morally dispossessed Turkey has been rendered; however, they are a herd of ostriches who have buried their heads in the sand and led by a group of conniving shepherds who intend harm for Turkey. Behar's slithery usage of the word 'intellectual' in his depiction of the 'intellectuals' as naivetés beguiled by calculating leaders should be noted due to its negative connotations.

Many of the writers of the periodicals amuse themselves in petty invective against their adverseries as is seen in the part titled "News" in May-June 1967 issue of *Toprak*: "Seeing that Çetin Özek is fainthearted, ³physicians decided to exempt him of military service." Another piece of "news" published in this part is: "Veracious socialists are reported to be establishing an association for the witless." (*Toprak*, issue 56, pg. 16,

One form of attack that falls within the realm of the norm due to the frequency the writers resorted to it is name calling, especially with a play on words to attribute demeaning connotations to them, such as the one exemplified in the title of the article: (Aldı Toplumbaz Aldı Devrimbaz, *Toprak*, May-June 1967, issue 56, pg. 16. The suffix -baz is of Persian origin and adds the word it is suffixed to the meaning "who plays, feigns, engages in", so in this example leftists are depicted as people who only purportedly care about their society (toplumbaz, and who play a game of revolution rather than being true revolutionaries (devrimbaz. ⁴

RESPONSE by Aşık Fedai⁵ (CEVAP, *Toprak*, June 1962, issue 6, pg. 7 constitutes one of the many other examples which demonstrate that almost all written transactions between the leftists and the conservatives devolve down

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- 3 The Turkish term used here is "yüreksiz" chosen with the intention of punning. The Word literally translates as "lacking a heart" and means "coward". Apparently, the said person has a heart condition, which disqualifies him from joining the military.
 - 4 To further illustrate, "dilbaz" means one who emerge triumphant from any battle of ideas tanks to his skill in playing with the language; "dinbaz" means one who uses religion to his/her own interests.
 - 5 The name of the writer of this piece seems to be a pen name as the piece is written in the form of a poem and "Aşık" means "a minstrel" and "Fedai" means "a person who risks his life for a cause", implying that this person is an ardent follower of the ideology he follows and can do anything to defend his cause

to trading of insults rather than constitute an exchange of ideas as seen in the following lines composed as a short poem: "To the insolent writer of the notorious and abominable newspaper, who dared to call idealist Turkish nationalists 'Rightist Looters'⁶: "A homeless⁷ at Vatan called us 'Looters'/ This way bark some, when they are godless and faithless!../ Yes we are 'Rightists' and what are you, 'Leftists'?/ Give an answer -if you can- Hey! you, sycophantic and heartless." Another designation that illustrates how offensive the ideological put-downs can get is the one on the cover page of *Toprak's* 81th issue (August 1961: "Sublime Porte Earthworms Nourished by the Red Ideology."

Yet another similar example that reveals the great deal of animosity felt towards the leftists can be given from the "Squib" (Dikenlik section by Ayd in Erol of the 56th issue of *Toprak*, where there are various short pieces on a variety of topics written in a highly sarcastic, at times denigrating, tone. While the part Prick (HIYAR ⁸ reads as follows: "A dutch firm has stated that the best cucumbers are grown in our country and it wants to import them. Having read the news in the newspaper, my nephew said, "Look uncle, how obvious it is that they mean the never-lying socialists.", the part CAPITAL PUNISHMENT reads: "Those who make communist propaganda will be executed. Do not celebrate too soon; not in Turkey, but in Greece."

The same kind of squabbling with the intention of dispensing hurt can also be seen in the Whips (Fiskeler sections of numerous issues, the one in the 59th issue (September-October 1967 sampling only one of them. The organizational structure of the whips section is identical to that of Squib, featuring short commentaries on diverse topics. The part with the title "TASTE" reads as follows: "A foreign female artist said she liked vagabonds and charlatans. How obvious it is that she means the never-lying socialists!.." The part "AYROBOT", evidently referring to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, reads, "Ay-robot gave a speech on Vietnam on August 1, 1967 at Park Hotel, [which is frequented by] billionaires. Then, it is now our turn! You filthy capitalist,

6 The original Word used here is "çapulcu" which also means "marauders" or "bums", and used to connote uselessness and lack of significance on behalf of a person

7 The original word here is "vatansız."

8 In Turkish, te Word "hıyar" means both "cucumber" and "incompetent, dumb and unrefined person."

happy minority, you little pickle petty bougie . Just who do you think you are fooling!"

In the article Answer to a Dwarf (Bir Cüceye Cevap, *Toprak*, April 1963, issue 16, pg. 7, outraged by one of his adversary 's allegations about himself, Nejdet Sançar provides another example of loss of civility in the discourse each party employed when addressing each other while accusing his opponent of throwing mud with the lines "There is a gang who attack Turkism and Turkish nationalists from the pages of the newspapers and journals at their service at every opportunity possible, because they are either depraved by nature, depraved in mind or depraved in faith. However, they are never manful in their attacks. Ideed, they are contemptible at unprecedented levels, because the weapon they use in their attacks is only lies and slanders, and they spread these lies and slanders by hiding behind pseudonyms. In ther words, they refrain from coming forward using their real names. However, this avoidance is not because of embarrassment felt due to the lies and slanders they spread, but because of cowardness." Sançar resorts to insulting slang, calling his opponent various names in including "a vile creature with a base soul" among other epithets such as "despicable creature in the form of a human being."

§ 3.14 Progressivist versus Reactionary Debate and Monopoly over the License to Knowledge

This "progressivist versus reactionary" debate permeates in so many discussions and is spared a place in such a high number of articles that it is possible to come it across in almost every issue of all periodicals of the period, frequently finding place on the cover of the issues. One such cover is that of March 1963, issue 15 of *Toprak*, where the line on the cover reads "In the Newspaper Calling Nationalists Reactionary, Marx and Lenin are depicted as Progressivists", suggesting that it is Marx or Lenin who should be considered reactionaries. Another article devoted to the deliberation of what the terms "progressivist" and "reactionary" refer to is University Students Discuss: What is reactionism? What is Progressivism? (Üniversiteliler Konuşuyor: Gericilik Nedir? İlericilik Nedir?, *Milli Gençlik*, June-July 1964, issue 9-10, pg. 6-7, which is rather a survey based on the question what the terms "reactionism"

and "progressivism" signify to a number of university students, many of whom actually could not help but added to their response that these terms are widely exploited and abused by many to blame people from different perspectives.

The writer of the article *Progressivist-Reactionary* (İlerici-Gerici, *Toprak*, May 1965, issue 39, pg 12 İsmet Güngör is another proponent of right-wing conservative ideology, who undertakes the task of elucidating the matter of progressivism vs reactionism. Güngör vehemently rejects the stigmatization of the conservatives for being reactionary, and just on the contrary, deems this stigma fit when attached to the leftists, socialists or communists. Güngör's views, which actually embody those of the bulk of right wing conservatives, are as follows: "In reality, those who assume themselves to be 'progressivists' and recklessly call those who are not of the same opinion with them 'reactionary' are the true ignoble reactionaries who harbor evil intentions towards the integrity and welfare of this nation. They are a far cry from being progressivists. They are the enemies of faith, and they presume this [enmity towards faith] to be progressivism. They call faithful people 'reactionary'. They are deprived of national spirit and they consider those who blaspheme against their race 'progressivist', and those who hold their nation and faith in high regard 'reactionary'. Because they have weak morals, or no morals at all, and loose principles, they long for sex parties and lewdness practiced centuries ago by the Romans or the Byzantine on the streets, a practice that has been delegated to the annals of history but aspired [by the 'progressivists']. They assume those moral people who do not desire [this depravity] reactionary". They know no concept of family and see no distinction between their wives and the wives of others. They stigmatize anyone contradicting their views as 'egotists' and embrace those who share their views as 'progressivists'." Güngör furthers his argument by outlining what he perceives to be the ulterior motives of those who call conservatives 'reactionary' and alleges that these people "aim to set people against each other by dividing them into groups as 'progressivists - reactionary', to debilitate them and to impair the solidarity and amity between them, to turn them into degenerates, to deprive them of their attributes allowing them to be the members of a grand nation. Thereafter, on the orders they receive, it is all very easy [for them to attain their goals of] making a present to their masters of this splendid land whose bounties they consume and whose fresh

and untrammelled air they breathe in." Güngör also claims that wherever 'progressivist - reactionary' debate takes place, it is there that the communists take the stage because, as Güngör puts it, "the first time that the imputation of reactionism emerged was during the 1917 Russian Communist Revolution, when Trotsky accused those who did not embrace communism of being reactionary and hailed those who adopted it."

Another striking means of delineating the socialists and communists as perceived by the conservatives is the visuals spread across many issues of the magazines. In the caricature with the caption Who Calls People Reactionary (Vatandaşa Kimler Gerici Diyor, *Toprak*, November 1963, issue 23, pg 13, three types of men are portrayed: the first with the caption "leftists", a man with a bottle of whiskey in his hand and a book in his pocket, with the inscription on its cover of the names of Marx and Engels; the second with the caption "Infidels", a laid back, whistling man with a book titled "Reform in Religion" in his pocket; the third with the caption "the Insane", a man with a funnel on his head.

The Dark Watch (Karanlığı Bekleyenler, *Toprak*, May 1966, issue 49, cover page is a symbolism depicting T İP, Cumhuriyet, Akşam, Milliyet, Yön, and Akis as pitch black bats perched on a line side by side providing a breeding ground and shelter for turpitude, devilry and wickedness. Since, in popular culture, bats are frequently associated with portent of villainy and thus known as the bird of evil omen, they are perceived to be the "Guardians of the Night", with many of their fear-based symbolic meanings. This symbolism which cast the bat in a negative light because of the emblematic ties to death and the underworld clung to it in people's imagination, is extended into other issues, and the political party and the media outlets in question are positioned as "the enemies of faith, wealth, property, family, history, the ancestors [of the Turkish Nation], [Turkish] traditions, nationalism, sacred values [of the Turks], legitimate governments, the NATO, neighbour countries which do not belong to the Iron Curtain bloc, the Islamic World." Both on the cover page and in the the article This Press, These Çetins; They Want Bell Tolls of the Church instead of the Azan,⁹ Enslavement instead of Freedom (Bu Basın, Bu

9 Islamic call to prayer

Çetinler; Ezan Sesleri Yerine Çan Sesleri, Hürriyet Yerine Esaret İstiyorlar, *Toprak*, July-August 1966, issue 51, pg.

In the final paragraph of the article An Address to [Our] Youth (Gençlere Hitap *Toprak*, May 1963, issue 17, pg 14-15, the author F. Cemal O ğuz Acar, addressing leftist/socialist youngsters, says " In Turkey, there is no reactinaory, bigot or fascist in the sense that you contemplate; there are only the quasi revolutionaries, opportunists, self-seekers, liars, slanderers, charlatans, sycophants, cosmopolitan individuals and swindlers who toy with the fate of Turkey under the disguise of being progressivists, intellectuals and socialists as well as the paid servants of Moskof", lucidly summing up, with all these words used to depict the ideological opponents, how either side views the other.

As has been illustrated throughout the chapter, the "progressivist-reactionary" debate is a primary point of discussion that frequently crops up in every occasion possible, each sect labelling the other one "reactionary". The article A Gullible Professor who Presents Marx and Lenin as Progressivists (Marx ve Lenin'i İlerici Gösteren Gafil Bir Profesör, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg 19, in which Cahit Tanyol is censured for arguing against the ban on Marxist and Leninist books, again teems with the derogatory adjectives such as "dimwitted, fool, left-handed (connoting stealth and sneaky behavior, pretentious, pervert". The acrimony in the tone of these articles is hardly subtle as conjuring up an insult to attack one's opponent is the norm that held sway at the time, since steadfast conservatives see the leftists and communists, and the ideas they supported as a serious threat to the existence and perpetuity of the Turkish nation as exemplified Necdet Sançar's article The Biggest Threat (En Büyük Tehlike, *Toprak*, June 1961, Issue 79, which defines communism as "the biggest and the most horrendous threats of all."

As the articles lay bare, the conservatives resent the fact that they are derided as bigoted for rejecting the attributes deemed constitutive of left-wing and embracing ideals that oppose the agenda of the leftists. The harsh condemnation of a piece of news issued by a left-wing newspaper for insinuating the nationalists for the disappearance of the president of Turkish National Student Union (MTTB: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği makes it manifest that the conservatives are deeply offended by being referred to as reactionaries and held responsible for an alleged abduction of the Union President. To demonstrate

their annoyance, with a tinge of sarcasm, *Toprak* poses the question: "Is it also the nationalists who cause earthquakes?" In this commentary on the piece of the news headlined "Is it the Reactionaries who have Kidnapped the President of the Turkish National Student Union?", it is explained that the term "reactionary" has been transferred from Bolshevik language, and is used by socialists and communists to refer to nationalists.

It can also be easily observed that the common discourse employed by the conservatives relies heavily on the practice of "othering" of those who do not share the same ideals with them, a strategy which is also adopted by the leftists in the same period as polarization of the society further deepened especially in the second half of the 1960s as both sects frequently pointed out, and thereby, deepened the numerous differences that mark the divide between the two, rendering it no secret that there is a great deal of belligerence between conservatives and the leftists. Even the title of the article Why and How Should We Fight against The Left (Sola Karşı Niçin ve Nasıl Mücadele Ederiz, *Toprak*, December 1966, issue 53, pg 10-11 by Dr. Hikmet Ertez suffices to manifest the animosity either party bear for each other. Placed adjacent to this article is a call to Turkish citizens by the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey to take part in the struggle against communism. Equating communism to a dire threat, the proclamation reads as follows: "Above all, it is observed that some business people and employers harbor communists in their enterprises and provide them with financial aid." Having termed this as a lack of circumspection, the notice enumerates what should be done in a direct and straightforward tone: "Do not protect the COMMUNIST. Do not shelter them in your enterprise. Do not help them financially otherwise we will have a disastrous end. Know the communists in your province and identify them. Do not read communist publication even out of curiosity. Do not have your advertisements published in their press. Every dime you spend for that purpose serves as a subscription fee for the communist party. Communism thrived thanks to the money of the well-off in every country it has sneaked into, and then the first thing it did in those countries has been to wipe those people off."

In tandem with this utilization of acrimonious discourse as well as a process of relentless othering and stigmatization, a categorical language is consistently employed also in the understanding and conception of erudition,

making a stark contrast between those who could be considered a savant and those who could not. One such article making a sharp distinction between who could be deemed erudite and who could not is *We are Sick and Tired of Declaration Enthusiasts!* (*Bildiricilerden Bıktık Usandık!*, *Toprak*, March-April 1967, issue 55, pg. 5 by Asuman Aydınlı. In the article, which is intended as a censure for those who oppose the promulgation of the Law of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Aydınlı castigates some university professors, evidently insinuating those with a leftist stance, for "engaging in a war of words over daily issues, acting as the aggressive proponent of a political party, or parrot ideas incompatible with the material and moral realities of [Turkey]." The writer asserts that the way such people act is incongruous with the principles of science, and that these people are pseudo-scholars, who behave in a sycophantic manner to ingratiate themselves with certain ideological circles. Having maintained that one of the gravest plights afflicting [the Turkish society] is the problems created by those people who have secured posts in institutions of education by pretending to be scholars. Aydınlı contends that "men of knowledge should serve as a means of stability, peace and affluence as well as order in their society", a course of action, which Aydınlı believes enables such men to attain an exalted level of dignity. However, as Aydınlı puts it, an "incident of Sycophancy of the Pundits" (*Müdahane-i Ali-man* transpires in Turkey. To make her point, the writer quotes the following verses of a famous poem by the 18th century Divan poet Keçecizade İzzet Hoca: "It is undisguised truth that the universe would not fall into wrack and ruin due to heresy / That what destroys it is the wise men's sycophancy." (*Malumdur ki fisk ile olmaz cihan harab / Anı, eyler Müdahane-i Ali-man harab.* Aydınlı, then, goes on to outline the defining characteristics of a true scholar, stating that "the responsibility of a true scholar ends when s/he presents her/his knowledge and opinion, either in direct or indirect ways, to the authorities in power, for as much as playing an active role in politics is not the job of the proper scholar nor of those who have devoted themselves to science. If a scientist gets involved in active politics, s/he would either digress from science or makes his title, if s/he has one, or otherwise his/her science an instrument of politics, and abuses it." Aydınlı asserts that the Law of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which is still in the making during the period in question, "intends to

thwart the efforts of the ignominious Communists to suppress the freedoms and disrupt the order in Turkey." The freedoms that Aydınlı mentions in her article to be particularly under attack the communists are the right to property as communists advocate the nationalization of all property. Aydınlı asserts that communists look down on citizens and disesteem their vote and aspirations, aim to bring all aspects of life and institutions under state control, wipe off all democratic procedures, and change national and public life altogether. Aydınlı also addresses the university professors as calls upon "those faculty members of Middle East [Technical University] and other similar universities" to stop commenting on the daily developments of the country, stating that their "animus and wrath towards the government has nothing to do with erudition, but in fact constitutes a betrayal of Turkey with all its democracy, soil and nation."

This categorical definition of who could be deemed members of intelligentsia derives from, and therefore in line with, the conviction that communist doctrine does not merit the designation of "ideology" as exemplified in the article *Communism is not an Idea* (Komunizm Fikir Degildir, *Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg. 17 by İmdat Akmener, who calls the adherents of communist or leftist ideology "a couple of brainless nitwits pretending to be progressivist intellectuals who try to present communism as if it were an idea". In the article, Akmener defines communism as "the plight which has afflicted humanity since the dawn of history, which has not given our ancestors a moment of peace, which caused the shedding of millions of Muslim Turks' blood to reach its vile and base goals at every opportunity, pioneered by a devilish enemy; knows no family, morality, virtue, dignity, humanity, right, fairness, justice, freedom, religion, faith, sanctity, Allah, the Prophet, the Holy Book", and asks the rhetorical question: "Can we acknowledge the red microbe communism as an idea?" followed by the straightforward response: "Never!" Akmener elaborates his proposition and provides further support for his grounds with the following lines: "Ideas are the product of free thinking, communism, [however], is the product of lack of intelligence... Respect is shown and freedom is granted to ideas, but to communism, never! This is because communism is a senseless and soulless monster which desires to disintegrate nations and then swallow them. Showing respect and granting freedom to it

means committing suicide." The writer, then, warns the readers and says, "Let 's be careful and not fall for red microbes who pretend to be intellectuals [and] progressivists. Taking advantage of the benefits of democracy, these red microbes demand freedom in democratic countries; they virtually act as the apostles of freedom; however their demand for freedom is only for their own sake and until they get the hold of the country. As soon as they get the control of the country, they eliminate all freedoms and grant liberty only to themselves, and so, having established a red dictatorship, they go on their lives dishonorably, exploiting nations." Akmeners consider it unacceptable to remain detached from the issue and not to take action against communism and its adherents and call those who remain apathetic "cosmopolitan dogs" and "soulless, brainless creatures". Akmeners conclude his argument with the proposition that adherence to Turkish nationalism requires one to consider communism the most ferocious enemy of humanity and uproot it completely.

There are various articles almost in all issues of *Toprak* and the periodicals adopting the same line of thought, expressing almost identical opinions as to the nature of communist and leftist ideologies and what course of action to take in the face of these doctrines, just another example of which is Communism and the Intelligentsia (Komunizm ve Aydınlar, *Toprak*, May 1966, issue 49 by Erdoğan Hançerlioğlu: "This reprehensible ideology which threatens and aims to eradicate the existence and the freedom of the Turk, transferring this goal from generation to generation in the form of an international doctrine, has seized the opportunity to get a grip spread in our society because of the abject bird-brains who pretend to be pundits." Having provided a definition of communism and labelling it as a threat, Hançerlioğlu calls people from various walks of life, including workers, employers, syndicalists, scholars, writers, artists, students and administrators, to fight against this threat with the words, "In the name of Allah, I beg you not to let Moscow-Beijing admirers to jostle Turkey, Turk's second and final homeland, into the bloody abyss of red imperialism." Hançerlioğlu reiterates his urge with the unequivocally clear exhortation "In short, do not die before killing the enemy.", which undoubtedly would serve to deepen the divide between the sects and intensify the belligerence between them, diminishing the prospects of finding a common ground.

Another example of situating ideological rivals as diametrical opposites is the piece *Akıl, Namus ve Komünist* (*Toprak*, July-August 1966, issue 50, which makes the bold and categorical claim that it is not possible to be a communist and an honorable and intelligent individual at the same time. This strongly worded piece makes it clear that, according to conservatives, being a communist automatically rules out the probability of possessing the virtues of chaste, honor and wit, rendering the two notions mutually exclusive.

Another form of othering and employment of categorical language ripping the other party off the eligibility for certain qualities such as erudition and virtue is the claim that the leftists/socialists either misunderstand or manipulate Kemalist reforms and principles, and that only the right-wing is following and implementing these principles truthfully. In the article *Those who Misunderstand Atatürk* (*Atatürk'ü Yanlış Anlayanlar*, *Toprak*, May 1966, issue 49, pg. 8-9, the writer A. Rahim Balcıoğlu undertakes the task of refuting the claims of those who call the right-wing conservatives "reactionaries" by providing a definition of reactionism as put forth by the leftists, as Baltacıoğlu contends, as "embracing the indispensable elements that make up a nation ardently". Having outlined these elements as language, religion, nationalism, and an ensemble of traditions, and posed the rhetorical question whether it is an offense to meticulously embrace these elements so as to keep one's nation alive, Baltacıoğlu asserts that according to this definition all Western nations, which we call civilized are reactionaries. Then, to further bolster his argument, Baltacıoğlu alludes to Atatürk and states that Atatürk professed his unwavering nationalism by professing that the biggest enemy of the Turkish nation is communism and imperialism, to which nations would fall victim should they not embrace these elements. Baltacıoğlu, then, addresses his ideological adversaries by asking, "Supposedly you follow Atatürk? Are you not betraying him and the principles he laid out by equating nationalism with reactionism?", and states that "Atatürk and Atatürkism are [Turkish] nation's national spirit; in fact, what makes Atatürk, Atatürk is the fact that he comprehended the national essence, unique capabilities and aptitude of this noble nation, and established these as his source of inspiration and banner...Those who serve nations other than our own and take vile pleasure in contaminating the naive children of this nation should know that Atatürk and Atatürkism

means Turkish homeland and Turkish nationalis." Balcioğlu calls the adherents of leftist and socialist ideologies "a throng of nondescripts who act as if they have had Atatürk principles registered on them" and "a pretentious mob who hide behind Atatürk's grand spirit" and deems this situation a "moral murder, whose punishment is already too late." Balcioğlu puts forth his belief that nationalists are oppressed by the leftists, and Atatürkism is exploited to this purpose with the following lines: "In reality, Atatürkism is not a slogan to be used to by the minority to oppress the majority. Atatürkism is the banner of an ideal. It can not be monopolized by any single group, because it defies monopolies. Atatürk is not a commodity to be abused at will by foreign ideology brokers and merchants who sold their souls."

In another piece titled Communist Student in Moscow (Moskova'daki Komunist Talebe, *Toprak*, October-November 1968, issue 52 , the Periodical Kemalizm's adherence to Atatürk principles is impugned as a member of the executive board of this periodical, Yüksel Ütügen, is now a student at Lulumba University in Moscow, learning communist methods. Displaying on the right-hand side the identification tag of the monthly journal Kemalizm, which defines itself as "the media outlet of Turkey Kemalists' Organization; mostly economic, social, cultural and revolutionary journal", the article reads, "Turkish public has once again understood today that the Atatürkism of the leftists, socialists and those imposters who situate themselves to the left of the center is nothing but a mask." Yüksel Ütügen, who is identified as the managing director of Kemalizm on the identification tag, is said to "have operated under the guise of Atatürkism, as all other communists in Turkey do, been a part of the group who came to destroy the executive office of *Toprak*, and attempted to lynch İlhan Egemen Darendelioğlu, and know learning methods of placing red dynamites beneath the freedom and the future of the Turk."

Another piece that attests to how both sects of the society, the right-wing conservatives and left-wing progressivists, claim to be the only ones to be interpreting Atatürkism and Kemalist reforms correctly is The Ultimate Betrayal Possible to the Reforms (İnkılaplara Yapılabilecek en Büyük İhanet, *Toprak*, February 1962, Issue 2, pg. 5. The author of the article M. Zeki Sofuoğlu states that "having gone through a process of continuous improvement, renewal and reforms for the past two hundred years, the Turkish nation has fully grasped

both the meaning and the necessity of attaining modern civilization." Sofuoğlu, then, quoting from one of Atatürk's speeches cites the lines "Offer something logical to the Turkish nation, and it is impossible that [this nation] rejects it", states that great leaders know the character of their nations very well, and Atatürk was a great leader, who assigned the direction of the history of the Turkish nation as he knew his nation very well. As proof to his assessment, Sofuoğlu points out the fact that "Atatürk passed away as a fortunate leader who had witnessed in person the success of the reforms he pioneered as they had been fully embraced by the vast majority of his society." Pinpointing the problem with the Kemalist reforms in the way they are being implemented by certain cliques of the society, Sofuoğlu blames the successors of Atatürk for "looking down on people, calling them reactionaries and assuming that the reforms were exclusively in their possession and under their dominion. According to this distorted opinion, if large masses of people are left on their own, both the reforms and the principle of reformism would be lost." Insinuating that the people who succeeded Atatürk used the danger of Kemalist reforms' collapse as a pretext to secure their positions in government offices, Sofuoğlu says, "in order for Atatürk reforms to survive, they had to be in power for a long time, and at all costs. This nation needed tutelage and the tutelars had to be them!" Then he states that "on the face of the earth, there is no other place where such an absurd practice whereby those who are governed are so flagrantly disparaged and so scornfully treated has been heard of or witnessed." Sofuoğlu contends that representing such a mentality and stance and then talking fervently about democracy and the sovereignty of the people are completely incompatible, and constitute a contradiction and discrepancy recognized by people from every walk of life, with the following words: "if the mouths and pens that have kept saying 'one chief- one party' and inculcated the philosophy of dictatorship, see and show the reforms and reformism as exclusively peculiar to their coterie, would it not be evident that there is something fishy here?" Having directed his criticism to those who have held power and implemented the reforms so as to serve their own interests, Sofuoğlu deems this practice as the gravest betrayal to Atatürk and his reforms as these reforms have been embraced by all.

§ 3.15 The Practice of Exposure and Tagging

The employment of a categorical discourse, othering and stigmatization go hand in hand with the practice of exposing the adherents of the antithetical ideology and pointing them as targets through lists of newspapers and journals naming which ones are nationalist and conservative, and therefore merit being read and which are socialist and leftist, and therefore should be avoided. The cover page of *Toprak's* 7th issue and a whole-page piece (July 1962) are devoted to classifying rightist and leftist newspapers. While *Milliyet* is designated as a socialist newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Dünya*, *Öncü*, *Kudret*, and *Ulus* are classified as leftist newspapers. *Toprak's* 8th issue identifies these classificatory practices are so elaborate that *Toprak* meticulously lists names of university professors, journalists and people of pen and arts who have a leftist stance. The cover of *Toprak's* June 1961 issue, which reads Defendants of Communist Traitor Nazım Hikmet with the names Ahmet Emin Yalman, İhsan Ada, Burhan Belge, Cavit Yamaç, Nadir Nadi, Burhan Arpad, Oktay Rifat, F. Rıfık Atay, Refik Halit Karay, Yaşar Nabi Nayır, Cevdet Kudret Solok, Vala Nurrettin, Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu, Selim Ragıp Emeç, Halide Edip and Melih Cevdet Anday spread over the whole page, representing only one of many similar instances.

The piece Prof. Mukdil Gökdoğan is a Mason Too (Prof. Mukdil Gökdoğan da Mason, *Toprak*, July 1966, issue 51, pg. 8) accompanied by a copy of an invitation card to a masonic ceremony for the degree ritual of 5 members, Orhan Hançerlioğlu, Arif Hikmet Holtay, Josef Margulies, Avni Teoman, and Bedri Şakir Yalier covering almost the whole page, with a capitalized caption: "HERE IS THE DOCUMENT" is one of the many copies of invitation cards for initiation ceremonies, carrying the same caption, with the intent of corroborating the claim that the exposed people are working against the interests of Turkey. On the left-hand column of this piece is the following explanation provided: "As you can see on the document, Prof. Mukdil Gökdoğan, who was assigned a ministry in National Union Committee, and who is still a professor at [İstanbul] Technical University is one of the masonic masters. In a recent survey conducted at [İstanbul Technical] University, out of 1000 participants,

911 professed to be socialists, 13 nationalists, 6 conservatives, and the remaining said they did not profess any ideology. Our journal declared in earlier issues that there are 85 leftist, socialist, Marxist faculty members at our university, exposing their names. In this issue, we are informing you that 37 faculty members are masonry. We will declare their identities with their full names in our future issues." Comparing the number of universities, which is below 10 at the time, to the number of leftist, socialist, marxist and masonic faculty members, which exceeds hundreds, the writer of the piece states that this is a seriously dangerous situation, against which measures should be taken in order to protect university youth.

§ 3.16 Arts and Literature

As contemplating a complete picture of the aspects of daily life cannot be fully achieved without looking into what the human effort falling within the realm of artistic pursuit means, articles providing an insight into the characteristics of art as conceived by the conservatives of the 1960s have proved enormously useful.

In the article National and Noble Art (Yerli ve Soylu Sanat, *Milli Gençlik*, Special issue, November 1968, pg 37, having described art pro per as "art produced by a musing shepherd swayed by the mild mountain wind who then leads his herd by his moving voice and mellifluous pipe", the author Durali Yılmaz argues that leftist magazines have undertaken the task of resuscitating Nazım Hikmet, whose art Yılmaz portrays as characterized by repetition of sounds. Yılmaz asserts that dwelling on Nazım Hikmet at a time when Turkish poetry has already surpassed him is intentional, the goal being to set an obstacle before the poet who wants to transcend materialistic poetry. Yılmaz states that "young artists who want to achieve fame and be talked about gradually start to emulate Nazım, and leftists do everything in their power to make Nazım Hikmet's poetry popular again. It is a fact that if such a thing happens, our young artists will run the risk of being buried in Nazım Hikmet's grave. We believe that art can be art the day it transcends the material. We invite young artist to national, local and noble art."

Yet again, not surprisingly, a perusal of the articles written on the subject of art reveals that the notion of morality has also seeped into and regulates art. The article *Morality in Art* (Sanatta Ahlak, *Toprak*, February 1961, pg. 6 by Oğuz Çetinoğlu attests to how art and morality are conceived as intertwined concepts, inseparable from each other. Çetinoğlu contends that casting a glance at the subject matter of art and morality would suffice to corroborate his conviction, and states that "morality is an order instituted to keep people in the pursuit of the good. Art, on the other hand, is an effort to express beauty. This means they both take the human as their subject matter. In essence, there is no moral rule implemented for animals or art performed for plants. Having chosen the human as their mutual subject matter, morality and art come to an agreement on the concepts they aim to convey to human beings, because one tries to cherish the good, the other beauty in humanity. As a general rule, there is good in beauty and beauty in good... That is to say, in real art, which is art for art's sake, there is always morality. Therefore, many a number of artists have never disregarded the fact that there are certain moral norms they have to comply with." To exemplify his point, having referred to Dostoyevsky's *Karamozov Brothers* in which although one of the characters in the story originally questions the existence of God, finally "sees the Lord", proving that Dostoyevsky abides by the principles of morality despite narrating the vacillations the character went through as to the existence of the Creator, Çetinoğlu cites Dante's *Divine Comedy*, in which, according to Çetinoğlu, Dante acted in full compliance with the moral and religious norms. As examples from Turkish art and literature, Çetinoğlu cites Yahya Kemal, who, as Çetinoğlu asserts, "has always narrated the good and beautiful in his works." Çetinoğlu contends that "there is no immoral aspect in [Kemal's] works. He has always addressed national sentiments in his verses." Another poet Çetinoğlu cites as an example to a man of art who epitomizes a poet adhering to moral principles is Yunus Emre. Çetinoğlu asserts that "Yunus Emre is our greatest moral poet. Mehmet Akiz, likewise. They employed art and morality together, and created masterpieces. Ömer Seyfeddin, on the other hand, always acted within the realm of morality in his stories. That is why his works are valuable." Çetinoğlu then makes the conclusive assertion that it is religion that guides morality, and only works that conform to religious principles can be beautiful, and thereby attain

the status of work of art. To further bolster argument, Çetinoğlu moves on to explicating what cannot be considered art and why with the following his line of reasoning: "In art which is not circumscribed by the principles of morality, unfettered sentiments are communicated to people. These are passions. It is commonly accepted that passions are base. That is to say, art without morality is not beautiful. It is seamy. Therefore, art loses its artistic quality. It is necessary to come up with another designation for this type of art. What drags people into catastrophe is their passions. Did Napoleon not fall victim to his passions? Did Hitler not perish because of the same reason? People who knew this fact well in advance set limits through moral rules to their passions. This is, indeed, the goal of religion." As these lines manifest yet again, in conservative contemplation, religion and morality are inseparable, neither complete without the other, both serving as overarching and all-regulating concepts giving shape and providing guidance to all areas of human effort from education to art. Çetinoğlu denounces a kind of art that breaches the boundary set by moral norms, and claims that it is a strict adherence to these restrictions that make one a true artist. He cites Mevlana and Pakistani Poet Iqbal as two magnificent poets who attained their glory and attained the status of national poets thanks to their strict adherence to the limitations set by their religion. Çetinoğlu concludes his remarks with the following assertion, reiterating his conviction that art proper can only be produced if the artist follows principles set by religion and morality: "Art based on morality reminds people that they are not merely carnal beings but that they have will. Thereby, it keeps people from engaging in acts of animalistic nature."

Just as in the field of theatre and literature, in other art forms ranging from music to cinema, an adherence to national tenets is exhorted, and to support this view, pieces of news such as Turkish Folksongs (Yurt Türküleri, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg. 3, or Akif Day in Malatya (Malatya 'da Akif Günü, *Toprak*, January 1963, issue 13, pg. 23 are published to inform the readers of the events relating to these fields, so that people could have the chance to follow artistic events of national character.

Another news piece providing insight into the conception of art proper as a national product produced by those with national ideals and which play-

wrights and actors are held in high regard by the conservatives during the period is the one announcing that all the vacancies in the quota have been filled and no more students could be admitted to the "Theatre School" opened by MTTB Directorate of Theatre (*Milli Gençlik*, Special Issue, 1970, pg. 29. In the news article, it is reported that Tarık Buğra teaches History of Turkish Theatre and Theatre Critique: Nejat Uygur, Theatre Set; Engin Uludağ, Dramaturgy and Misenscene-Effect; Halit Fahri Ozansoy, History of World Theatre: Ahmet Kabaklı, Drama; M. Cahit Atasoy, Turkish Music and Diction; and Sabri Akdeniz, Western Music. The article goes on to inform the readers that the play Kurt Kapanı (Wolf Trap written by Üstün İnanç and produced by High Islamic Institutes Student Federation is on stage at MTTB Theatre Hall, and that it dwells on, within the context of [Turkish] history, influential masonry leaders and their servile followers.

It is plainly evident that those directors, playwrights or actors with a leftist stance, most notably Nazım Hikmet, and Muhsin Ertuğrul are strictly denounced and presented as grave dangers to Turkish society. The April 1964 issue of *Toprak* (issue 28 dedicates its cover page to the announcement of the appointment of Muhsin Ertuğrul, who is frequently lambasted in various other issues for staging Brecht plays, as the head of the City Theatres with the self-explanatory statement: The Man who Sold his Vision, Heart and Soul to Stalin is at the City Theatre (Gözünü, Gönlünü Ruhunu Stalin'e Satan Adam Şehir Tiyatrosunda, *Toprak*, April 1964, issue 28, cover page.

Yet again, another article intending to disclose the ultimate allegiance of these prominent figures of literature and art, Communist Revolutions and Atrocious Realities (Komunist İhtilalleri ve Korkunç Gerçekler, *Toprak*, June 1966, issue 50, pg. 1-3, which aims to expose the evil practices and immoral conduct of communists in both foreign countries and Turkey, features a photograph of Nazım Hikmet and Muhsin Ertuğrul with the caption "Muhsin Ertuğrul, for whom millionaire Koç and Eczacıbaşı Corporations have announced that they are going to open a private theatre, is together with Nazım Hikmet.", aiming to reveal Muhsin Ertuğrul's close affiliation with known communists, thereby corroborating their claims that Muhsin Ertuğrul also poses a danger to Turkish society. Yet again in another issue of *Toprak*, Muhsin Ertuğrul, who is introduced as "the left-wing extremist theatre director of City

Theatres" is reported to have delivered an exhaustive eulogy in the magazine *Darülbedayi* to "communist revolutionaries, who want to wreak carnage throughout the world" on his return from Moscow (*Toprak*, May 1966, issue 49, pg. 20).

Yet another article intending to corroborate Nazım Hikmet's avowed communism, *To the Fans of Nazım Hikmet (Nazım Hikmet Hayranlarına, Toprak*, issue 37-38, pg. 16, issued anonymously in the section "Squib" (Dikenlik, enumerates Hikmet's various laudatory statements regarding communist ideology and statesmen: "When Nazım Hikmet fled from Turkey to Russia in 1951, and was surrounded by the reporters of such newspapers as *Pravda*, *Kızıl Yıldız*, *Komunist*, and *Izvestia*, he said, word by word, 'I am so elated that words are futile in explaining my ecstasy. However, I will be brief as I have been overwhelmed by my joy and excitement. I owe all my life, ideal and love to this city. I am a son of the Soviet Union. I consider my return to this city a reunion with my MOTHERLAND. Stalin is a very important figure for me. He is the apple of my eye, the source of my ideas. He created me, I studied in Moscow at the university which bears his name. I owe everything I have to him. He is not only the greatest man of the world but also the one who illuminates me.' Appalled and dumbfounded, we witness the efforts of the sycophants with servile character who aim to heroize this traitor."

Another article penned with the same goal refers to Nazım Hikmet as "Nazım Hikmetof" and to those who regard him a patriot, "Moskofbaz", which could translate as "charlatans serving Moscow" (*Toprak*, April 1963, issue 16, pg. 19). The author of the article asserts that Hikmet 's statement "I have been a communist since 1921 and actively serving the cause of communism" published in a French magazine with a high circulation contradict the claims of those gullible enough to present him as a patriot.

In the article *We will End in Disaster (Sonumuz Felakettir, Toprak*, October, issue 44, pg 11 a photograph of Gülriz Sururi is featured with the caption "Gülriz Sururi acting in Nazım Hikmet's Play" as an evidence corroborating Sururi's communist affiliations, which on the whole is actually one of the many plays condemned in the article as threats to Turkey's national welfare. The article states that "in one theatre a play by communist traitor Nazım Hikmet; in another, a play by a foreign communist who received awards from

Lenin and Stalin; in another one, a play by a man who has worked at Communist Party of France as an active agitator; yet in another one, a play by a left winger who instigates people and youngsters against the government is being staged while all most stages are deprived of nationalistic plays." Then the article goes on to making the admonition that a disastrous fate is awaiting Turkey so long as such leniency and tolerance prevail.

Likewise, a significant number of the movies made are deemed not only incompatible with the social texture of the Turkish society but also detrimental to its fundamental principles, as exemplified by the article We will End in Disaster (Sonumuz Felakettir, *Toprak*, October, issue 44, pg 11, which suggests that the society finds the content of the movies in question extremely vexing and intolerable as recapped in the lines "The provocative nature of the movies filmed this year (1966) have exhausted the patience of our people. "

The field of cinema is again construed in the conservative ideation as art form that should strictly conform to national customs and traditions, rejecting foreign elements not complying with the Turkish national character and morality. The piece Snakes in Turkish Cinema (Türk Sinemasında Yılanlar, *Toprak*, May 1962, Issue 5, pg. 13 aptly illustrates this line of thought. Having provided the rationale for the necessity of censorship to protect a nation's conventions, the writer of the article Ahmet Güner regrets the fact that there is a laxity in Turkey in terms of censorship, stating that "For years, Turkey has been rendered the marketplace for any kind of ideology and intention, films of propaganda of various nature have been repeatedly shown to Turkish viewers due to a lack of state censorship. The same absence of censorship mechanism has allowed any kind of vileness, superficiality and impertinence in the domestic film sector. How odd a manifestation it is that the same censorship mechanism is censured by a pack of notorious villains who aspire to drag Turkish cinema to the Left. Dissatisfied with the [already unfortunate] situation, Leftist writers call for a complete abolition of censorship mechanism in Turkey." Attributing this approach of the Leftists to the fact that some parts of the movie "the Vengeance of the Snakes" (Yılanların Öcü that has been adapted to the cinema from Yaşar Kemal's novel have been censored, the writer states that the intention of such men as Burhan Arpad, Nejat Özön, and Yaşar Kemal

is all too obvious and nothing more than dividing the Turkish society into two as peasants and urbanites.

As expected, it is also the most frequently read or suggested readings, be it periodicals or books, that not only encapsulate the philosophy a particular sect of society embraces but also uncover the concepts which the minds of the proponents of a certain ideology are barricaded against as evinced by the recommended readings in various issues of the periodicals. For example, a recent publication of a book, *Batı Materyalizmi Karşısında İslam* (Islam vis-à-vis Western Materialism, by Margaret Marcus, who is reported to be a recent convert to Islam, is promoted by Rana Güven in the January 1963 issue of *Toprak* (issue 13, pg. 5 as a worthwhile work deserving careful perusal. (Another work that is highly recommended in the same issue of the periodical in question is the book by Yücel Hacaloğlu, *Neden Köy Enstitüleri Değil* (The Why of [Our] Remonstrance against Village Institutes, whose central argument is that village institutes cannot be a viable option for raising conscientious and patriotic individuals as these institutes have been heavily permeated by communist ideology, thereby becoming a breeding ground for communists.

Similar articles also serve to reveal the nature and kind of the reading material both denounced and recommended by conservative following, another such article being *The Seed that The Minister of Education Sowed is Burgeoning* (! Are Turkish Children to be Educated as Leftists? (Maarif Vekilinin Attığı Tohum Yeşeriyor (! Türk Çocukları Solcu mu Yetiştirilecektir?, *Toprak*, January-February 1964, issue 25-26, pg. 11. The article states that despite denials by the Ministry of Education, a struggle against nationalist and sacrosanct publications has been embarked on, elaborating on the assertion as follows: " The struggle which began on December 13 in the high school of our city assumed the character of a terror act on December 21, when works such as *Tohum*, *İhlas*, *Türkiye'de Komünist Hareketleri*, *Türkiye'de Komünizma ve Köy Enstitüleri*, *Dua*, *Gençlerle Başbaşa*, *Ey Oğul*, *Terbiyeye Dair*, *İslam'da Edep*, *Manevi Kardeşlik*, *İslamın Müdafaası*, *Yılın en Güzel Şiirleri* as well as other books and magazines were confiscated by the principal of the high school in person upon the sleight of the teachers who inspected the school. Nationalist and pious students were raked about from each and every class-

room and questioned, and those who read these books were sent to the disciplinary committee. This deed of the high school administration caused apprehension, fury and indignation among nationalist teachers, students and public." The article, then, goes on to state that the teachers in the inspecting committee launched a campaign to give the students the false impression that the confiscated works were reactionary and against Atatürk principles.

In the same vein, the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, situated entirely antithetical to the professed beliefs of the conservatives as it undergirds leftist causes, is frequently denounced for the stance it maintains and derided as the occasion arises. In the derisive piece *Significant News (Mühim Haber, Toprak*, issue 37-38, pg. 16, *Cumhuriyet* is mocked due to its first page coverage of the piece of news announcing that Russian State Circus is coming to Turkey. That *Cumhuriyet* devoted its front page to this piece of news is ridiculed with the ironic statement: "A very significant piece of news! Because it appeared on the front page of *Cumhuriyet*." *Cumhuriyet* is also referred to as a "pathetic excuse for a newspaper, whose ulterior goal is to disseminate poisonous ideas in society, extol leftists and socialists while disparaging nationalists and labeling them 'unprogressive reactionaries' in the article *That Newspaper called Cumhuriyet (Şu Cumhuriyet Denen Gazete, Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg. 4. The author of the article, Hüseyin Albayrak, deems *Cumhuriyet* "a travesty of a newspaper" and criticizes it for its silent attitude in the face of the arrest of a nationalist journalist Yücel Hacaloğlu while vocally and actively protesting the prosecution of its [own] editor in chief and the writer of an article with which the writer was accused of making communist propaganda. Albayrak articulates his criticism as follows: "[When its editor in chief and one of its writers were prosecuted] it made great effort [to free them]. It not only berated the concerned authorities through insinuations so as to pervert the course of justice, but also took the issue to The International Federation of Journalists and International Press Institute, an organization whose sole goal is to spread masonic ideals through press and to establish a global masonic domination as well as to oppress nationalists and the people of faith. These two organizations took immediate action to save their comrades. The first thing The International Federation of Journalists did was to declare that there is no freedom of press in Turkey and notify Ankara Union of Journalists, in an admonishing

tone, the unreasonability of the apprehension of Editor in Chief of Cumhuriyet. Why did you, Cumhuriyet, which claims to be the champion of democracy and freedom, remain silent in the face of the prosecution of such journalists as Yücel Hacaloğlu?"

Cumhuriyet is further inculpated by *Toprak* on the charge of exploiting Atatürk, abetting leftists and communists and spreading immorality, defying all norms of proper conduct and conceivable bounds of morality. In the piece The Outrageous Ignominy of the Exreteme Leftist Writer, Enamored of Nazım Hikmet, of the Newspaper exploiting Atatürk (Atatürk İstismarcısı Gazetenin Nazım Hikmet Hayranı Aşırı Solcu Yazarının Rezaleti, *Toprak*, May 1964, issue 29, pg. 13, an excerpt from a fiction, which is referred to as a unworthy piece of writing under the guise of a novel, by Melih Cevdet Anday, who is also discommended for his admiration for Nazım Hikmet, is related and commented on. The excerpt from Cumhuriyet of April 22, 1964, which relates the dialogue between an 18-year-old girl and a man who is depicted as conversing with the girl as he has only his undershirt on, is harshly criticized for the following lines: " 'I will get you and lock up in home' said the young man laughingly, sitting across the girl with his undershirt on. 'I will get you and lie with another man on the first night.' responded the girl. They asked with whom she would sleep with. 'I would find a negro.', replied the girl who seemed to be around 18 years of age, 'a woman who has not slept with a negro is incomplete. '" These lines, which the author of the article finds outrageously immodest, are unsparingly renounced as incongruous with any frame of morality, let alone with that of Turkey, where the dominant ideologies are nationalism and conservatism. The writer adds that these lines deserve robust reaction by the society and the masks of both the crafter and the publisher of these lines should be stripped off so as to disclose their true identity.

As opposed to Cumhuriyet, to which the conservatives direct scathing criticism, some certain newspapers which uphold similar ideals to those of *Toprak* coloumnists, are held in high regard as instanced by the conveyance of a piece of news in the May-June 1967 issue of *Toprak* (issue 56, pg. 13. In the news article announcing the expulsion of Günal M. Oral, a student who was to graduate in 2 months from Military College for reading nationalist period-

icals such as Akşam and Yön, state authorities in charge of administering justice are implicitly censured for contributing to the spread of turpitude and villainy in Turkish society. Günel is depicted as a patriotic Turkish youngster who has been fortunately vindicated in the military court of the charges against him in the piece, conferring the article a tone supportive of the expelled student's way of conduct, thereby condemning the state of affairs in Turkey.

The precipitous divide between the worldview of the conservatists and leftists manifests itself also in the realm of literature, where the discourse the conservatives adopt diverges significantly from that of the leftists as is seen in the condemnation of the excerpt from the 1963 yearbook of the Turkish Union of Literati (Türk Edebiyatçılar Birliği by the author of the article A Yearbook of Disgrace (Bir Utanç Yıllığı, *Toprak*, March 1963, issue 15, pg. 13 in the "Squib" (Dikenlik section, where the author Yusuf Işıklı - though acknowledging the inclusion of valuable men of literature such as Behçet Necatigil, İlhan Geçer, Feyzi Halıcı, Fikret Baha Berke and İsmail Ali Sarar - castigates the majority of the contributors to the yearbook for the language they used, which he deems indecent, and apologetically exemplifies with the following lines from a writer from the periodical *Despot*: "Are you fucking sick in the head, man? He is going to speak his bloody mind, huh? Don't make me laugh. The lad's got their dick down his throat! He can't speak." Işıklı, then, laments the fact that literature is being practiced by those whom he considers mere parodies of real literati, who are fooling around as they have found the opportunity to run riot as they see fit.

In the piece This is Far Too Reprehensible (Bu Ayıptan da Öte, *Toprak*, August 1963, Issue 20, pg 15, the writer of the the section "Squib", Yusuf Işıklı lists a number of books which were reported to have been rejected by Sıtkı Aydın, the clerk responsible for registering the books donated to Diyarbakır National Library on the grounds that these books made communist propaganda, and poses the rhetorical question whether the said clerk knows what communism is, naming the following books and their authors: *Kimya-ı Saadet* (Chemistry of Happiness by Imam Gazali, *İslam Dünyası Niçin İlerlemiyor* (Why does the World of Islam not Progressing by Sait Halim Paşa, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* (Turkification, Islamification, and

Modernization by Ziya Gökalp, Şeyh Şamil (Sheikh Shamil by Hızaoğlu Mustafa Zihni, Eski Türk Seciye ve Ahlakı (Character and Morality in ancient Turks by İ.H. Danişmend, Beynelmillel Yahudi (The International Jew by Henry Ford, Batı Materyalizmi Karşısında İslam (Islam in the Face of Western Materialism by Meryem Cemile and Mahutlar (The Notorious by Peyami Safa. This piece and the incident that it has reported to have transpired once again serves to demonstrate that, just like in various other arenas, conservatives and the leftists inhabit fundamentally distinct worlds in terms of what they read, and read only those publications aligned with their own ideology.

The article The Tragedy at the Military Academy (Harp Okulundaki Dram, *Toprak*, July-August 1966, issue 50 reminds that because they read the periodicals *Toprak* and *Ötügen*, 27 military school students were subjected to prosecution, and three of them, Günel Orel and two of his friends were expelled from the academy while many others were made to fail their classes. The piece reads as follows: "Those who read the magazines *Toprak*, *Ötügen* and the like are patriots, enemies of communism, conservatives, and nationalists. No bigger idiocy than contemplating otherwise could be imagined...The point is, while, in the past, military academy candidates used to be subjected to a thorough scrutiny via secret police investigations to see whether they are Turkish or not, we learn today that the works of ŞEVKET SÜREYYA AYDEMİR, who is a communist with a criminal record are freely read, and even recommended to the students by the regimental commander at the Academy. We are certain that those who distributed these books to the students are either too unsuspecting or gullible. Of course no other goal can be thought of. However, we would like to remind you of the necessity of investigating who the authors of the recommended books are." The writer of the article, which is anonymous, outlines certain aspects of Aydemir's personal history to corroborate his claim that his books should be allowed in the Academy, stating that Aydemir is an ex-convict, who had been sentenced to 10 years, he worked together with those who founded the foreign bureau of Turkish Communist Party in Moscow, he revealed in his book *Lenin and Leninism* that he is a deranged admirer of Lenin, he said "Lenin's demise is a big loss not only for Russia but also for the entire world.", he commenced his words "my prophet Lenin commands"

even while being tried at the court. Having summarized the facts that he believes to be rendering Aydemir's work not worthy of reading, the writer of the article concludes that even the name of Aydemir should not be articulated at the Academy, let alone recommend his books and that *Toprak* and *Ötügen* are on the list of the forbidden journals is a big mistake.

In addition to the immediate purpose of inculcating the tenets of conservatism, reading the leading authors identified with conservative ideology serves another pivotal purpose with the symbolism it bears as carrying the books of the authors whose line of thought they embrace enable a coalescence among the disciples of this ideology. This unificatory power of symbols, a shared literary taste in this instance, cultivates a strong sense solidarity that otherwise would be difficult to invoke.

§ 3.17 Community and Sense of Solidarity

Another, and final concept that could be mentioned as fostering social bonds amongst the conservatives is promoting a sense of tightly knit community, and thereby encouraging solidarity through social cohesion, which would bring to fore certain obligations such as an active participation in matters of communal and national interest. To this end, conservatives make constant effort to create a sense of familiarity and belonging which translate into or give semblance of common identity, allowing a strong presence of mutual trust and confidence in the members of one's own social and ideological clique. Therefore it is not uncommon to see these periodicals functioning as the way dailies would, and publish pieces of news covering personal information about the members of the conservative clique to be published in various issues, a practice that entails a mutual commitment and obligation among the various members of the society.

Such pieces of news range from the bith of a baby of one of the nationalists, celebrating his fatherhood as in the piece One of our Nationalist Authors, Yılmaz Gürbüz, has had a Son (Milliyetçi yazarlarımızdan Yılmaz Gürbüz'ün Bir Oğlu Oldu, *Toprak*, May-June 1967, issue 56, pg. 15 to news of promotion such as Çavuşoğlu has become an Assistant (Çavuşoğlu Asistan Oldu, or of

returns of some members from abroad to Turkey as Tanyu Yurda Döndü (*Toprak*, April 1963, Issue 16, pg. 22, to the List of the Names Elected for the Executive Board of Faculty of Law Student Association (Hukuk Fakültesi Talebe Cemiyeti İdare Heyetine Seçilenlerin İsimleri (*Toprak*, March 1963, Issue 15, pg. 8. Though seemingly insignificant, such pieces of news fulfill the significant function of forming interpersonal attachments between the individual members necessary to create a sense of community working towards a common goal, as all these members know each other to some degree thanks to the informatory role of the personal news, binding the proponents of the conservative ideology around a mutual ideal by fostering commitment and trust that could be felt only towards someone one knows well. This promotion of a culture of solidarity and encouragement of a spirit of sharing connect the individuals, instilling in them a feeling of unity and mutual collaboration to urge them work together with an awareness of shared interests towards a common goal.

§ 3.18 Conclusion

If we are to achieve a comprehensive understanding of what being a conservative in the quotidian realm meant during the 1960s Turkey, a perusal of periodical articles written on daily issues becomes almost imperative. Since periodicals provide a first-hand historical record of the past, they make great primary documents providing in-depth information about the values firmly ingrained in the minds of the authors who penned the articles in these periodicals. In this vein, articles written by the people who went onto become towering figures for the Turkish conservative right during the 1960s and its aftermath are invaluable sources of information, since a considerable number of the people in the journals' teams of writers also played an important role in the determination of the course the conservative right took during the years leading up to the turbulent 1970s. As the 1960s progressed, slowly but surely, the tone of the conservative right got more aggressive, and gradually as well as more visibly incorporated Islamic motifs into its discourse because of the

limitations imposed by the electoral politics in a country comprised of a population the majority of which is Muslim in order to appeal to larger masses (Cizre, 1992: 145).

In the context of Turkish conservative right, the driving force for this change can also be attributed to an endeavor to protect the cultural values of the Turkish society, threatened by the rise of leftist ideologies in a tense political atmosphere during the mid 1960s, stemming from the Cold War conditions and the rivalry of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, to enlarge their sphere of dominance, causing a sharp split between the adherents of the communist, leftist and socialist ideologies and the conservative right sympathizing with the policies of the USA in the face of the "red threat", each party claiming a monopoly of commonsense and knowledge and denying the other party's line of thought, creating a context where members of the neither faction were welcome in each other's designated territory.

At the end of the day, conservative right's distant, if not hostile, manner towards communism and the adherents of this ideology is entirely compatible with the significance they attach to certain cultural values, one of the most important of which stands out as religion in the case of Turkish society. To the right-wing conservatives, communism represented the ultimate subversion of all values they held dear; therefore, a great fear of communism dominated the conservative discourse, while US-led Cold War policies were adopted in the face of the "red scare". Many nationalist conservatives, pragmatically disregarding the influence of the USA as a foreign element, established a natural connection between the imitation of the West and communism/leftism, considering communism the ultimate embodiment of Westernism (Edibali, 1991:192, as they considered the set of tenets that represent communism, socialism and Marxism as the epitome of such perversions as cultural deracination, alienation, cosmopolitanism as well as becoming heathens, all of which, in the conservative ideation, were entirely against the nature of a Muslim Turk. As evinced in many of the articles that have been scrutinized in this chapter, a single person is attributed various ascriptions such as being a mason and a

communist at the same time, as in the discourse of the conservatives “the symbols of hammer-sickle, double triangle,¹⁰ and the cross”, which are considered to be the sources of foreign imperialism are all intertwined (Kabaklı, 1970:131.

As 1960s was a time when different sects of society began to direct unabashed criticism towards those who cherished opposing viewpoints, such criticisms were rarely without condescension or condemnation. According to the conservatives, every well-wisher to the welfare and prosperity of Turkey had to fight communism as communist agenda was being foisted upon the Turkish nation by external forces, and at stake was the posterity of Turkey. Therefore, popular involvement in the fight against communism was openly solicited, communism pre-sented as a conspiracy organized by foreign powers against the Turkish nation to extirpate it through plots set in motion by agents functioning within the Turkish society under the disguise of being academics or journalists, by gradually stripping it off its values of religion, morality, and family.

To the untutored eye, while such a proposition might seem too out of place to mobilize large segments of society, when the historical dynamics of the era, and the integrality of religion, state and nation as fused with each other in the mindset of a great number of people, are taken into consideration, the reaction, fanned by constant admonitions, given to a threat as big as communism can be more readily apprehended. At this point, it should also be noted that when an adversarial frame of mind is wrapped up in one’s cultural identity, it produces powerful emotions, resulting in unremitting attacks comprised of emotionally-charged words exuding a sense of collective disgust for one’s ideological opponents. Considering the political climate of the era, when both camps were ready to split each other asunder with incessant attacks, both physical and intellectual, on their ideological opponents, the entirety of the process of stigmatization and othering assumes a more comprehensible character, as is seen in the articles studied here, composed of sentences written with such magisterial certainty about the legitimacy of the course of action to be taken in the face of the communist threat.

10 Jewish symbol; refers to the Star of the Jew or the Star of David, composed of two equilateral triangles stacked on top of each other.

As the 1960s progressed, the belligerence between the right-wing conservatives and left-wing progressivists, both of whom seem to exult in heaping insult after insult on their dissenters, intensified, and just when a violent clash loomed large, the aggressive tone that has been exemplified in this study in various articles paved the way for the incidents on 16 February 1969 known as "bloody sunday", which started as a rally organized by the leftists to protest the arrival of the American 6th Fleet in Turkey, as a result of which two demonstrators, Ali Turgut Aytaç and Duran Erdoğan, lost their lives (Kasaba, 2008:226-266 when the protesters chanting "No to imperialism and exploitation" clashed in Taksim Square with the ringhtist counter-protest group, chanting "Muslim Turkey", organized by the National Turkish Student Union.¹¹ The press played an undeniably pivotal role in the intensification of the pressure during the days leading up to the incident.¹²

Certainly, it would be too naive an approach to expect the youth of the 1960s to exhibit indifference towards politics and shun the activities associated with the governance of their country at a time too turbulent to display apathy as the ubiquity of violence was undeniable and the young were systematically beaten- sometimes to death as in the case of a İstanbul Technical University student Vedat Demircioğlu, who was allegedly defenestrated from the dormitory of the university by the police and lost his life, or Middle East Technical University student and one of the leading figures of 68 Student Movement in

11 On the said date, the chairman of the National Turkish Student Union was İsmail Kahraman. During the elections for the 27th presidency of Turkish Grand National Assembly, as Kahraman was the candidate from the Justice and the Development Party, he was protested by the members of the Republican People's Party on account of his presidency of the Union at the time the incident occurred and his responsibility of the disastrous outcome; Kahraman, however, denied that he was the president of the Association at the time when "bloody sunday" took place. (http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/english/874343/ismail_Kahraman_conceals_his_past.html but then admitted his presidency, but denied responsibility.

(http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/876449/ismail_Kahraman_dan_Kanli_Pazar_a_hazirlik_mitinginde___Biz_yaktik__itirafi.html

12 In the eve of the "bloody sunday", the columnist Mehmet Şevket Eygi made the following public call in the newspaper Bugün: "Oh, Turkish People, oh virtuous Muslims... Everyone should get ready for a war against the communist sacrilege... Your faith is in danger... Your religion is in danger... Oh, Muslims, Stand up. Get into action." (Taşkın, 2002:618

Turkey, Mustafa Taylan Özgür, who was shot to death at the age of 21 by a police officer in Beyazıt, where he had come for the election for İstanbul University Student Association. Since there was no culture of negotiation let alone reconciliation, marital bliss between these opposing sects, which had always been at odds with each other was no more than a utopia. Forcing square pegs through round holes, after all, would lead to sordid affairs, which would open festering wounds difficult to heal.

So, the distinguishing characteristic of the conservative right during this period is the struggle made against communism, which the conservatives considered to be the enemy of all values that constituted the Turkish nation. Therefore, the salience of anti-communist sentiment that ooze into almost every article should not strike the reader as surprising.

In this respect, one of the most important figures among the writers of these articles that have been examined here is İlhan Egemen Darendeli-oğlu, who had worked in nationalist organizations since he was a student at İstanbul University. Darendelioğlu was elected as the president of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey in 1965, as fighting against communism was one of his top priorities, for the sake of which he dedicated the magazine *Toprak*, of which he was both the owner and the editor in chief. Besides this journal, he also wrote books reflecting his ideology, some of which are Communist activities in Turkey (Türkiye'de Komünist Hareketleri, Sundays were Bloody (Pa-zarlar Kanlı İdi, and What is Communist, Who is Communist (Komünist Nedir, Komünist Kimdir. Darendelio ğlu also became an influential figure in the political life of Turkey as he became İstanbul member of the parliament from Justice Party (Adalet Partisi in 1969 elections, and when he was discharged from the party, worked together with such names as Saadettin Bilgiç, Celal Bayar's daughter Nilüfer Bayar Gürsoy, and Faruk Sükan under the leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyle to found Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti. When Democratic Party was disbanded, he joined Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi and continued his active political life in İstanbul organization of this party.

Another important figure that stands out among the writers of the articles that have been examined here is İsmail Kahraman, who, during his youth, served as the president of the Student Union of İstanbul University Faculty of

Law, and as the president of National Turkish Student Union (MTTB during the 48th term. He was among the founders of the Foundation for the Dissemination of Knowledge (İlim Yayma Vakfı and worked in the board of trustees of this foundation. Kahraman became a member of the parliament from the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi in 1995 elections, and served as the minister of culture in the coalition government of the Welfare Party and the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi. He became a member of the parliament again in 1999 elections from the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, which was established after the Welfare Party was closed. Kahraman, who did not become a candidate in 2002 elections, returned to the Parliament in 2015 elections from the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi and was elected as the 27th president of the parliament.

Yet another name who served as the member of the parliament among these writers is Hasan Basri Albayrak, who served in the parliament during the 14th term from the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, where he continued his anti-communist/anti-leftist stance and voted yes for the execution of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İn an in the show of hands at the Grand National Assembly on April 24, 1972.

Nurettin Pakyürek is yet another writer who played an active role in Turkish politics as he became a delegate member of Republican Peasants' Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi and was among those decision makers who had Alparslan Türkeş as the new president of the party, and changed the party name to Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi in the party's 1969 general assembly in Adana. He is the author of the book National Issues and Türkeş (Milli Meseleler ve Türkeş.

A name which warrants due attention among these writers is Hasan Sami Bolak, who, during Türkeş's presidency, established the first Kayseri organization of the Republican Peasants Nation Party in Kayseri, while he was working as the Media Director of Kayseri Municipality, and later, established the first summer camp, known as the commando camps which the "idealist youth" attended in Kayseri in 1968. He actively took part in the theoretical and practical training of the youth in this and other three camps he later founded. He served as the Kayseri Provincial Head of Nationalist Action Party for 2 years before the party was closed on September 12, 1980.

Saffet Solak, who worked in the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey during the 1960s, also served as the president of the İzmir branch of this association. He was among the founders of National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) together with Necmettin Erbakan.

Among the writers of the articles examined in this study and should not go unmentioned here is Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who was a historian, Turkologist, academic and an important ideologue of Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Copeaux, 2006: 73 and the cofounder and the first president of Intellectuals Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı, which "quickly became a prominent nationalist conservative think tank (Döşemeci, 2013: 183. Kafesoğlu and his companions worked at this hearth to establish a connection between modern Turkey and its Ottoman past, and while not overtly, directed a significant criticism against official Kemalist ideology for "distancing Turks from both their historical roots and their culture" (Döşemeci, 2013: 184

Nejdet Sançar is a name who contributed to Turkish right wing conservatism as a prolific author with such books as The Heroes of Our Race (İrkımızın Kahramanları, Reckoning with Hasan Âli (Hasan Âli İle Hesaplaşma, The Red Heaven Story (Kızıl Cennet Masalı, What is Communist? (Komünist Nedir?, Turkish Moskov and Communist (Türk Moskof ve Komünist, Secret Communist Documents (Gizli Komünist Belgeleri, Reckoning with İsmet İnönü (İsmet İnönü ile Hesaplaşma, Nazım Hikmet Story (Nazım Hikmet Masalı, and Articles on Turkism (Türkcülük Üzerine Makaleler.

Among the writers of the articles examined in this study, a final name worth mentioning here due to his influence in Turkish conservative right circle could be Hüsnü Dikeçligil, who served in the parliament as the Kayseri Senator from Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) for 3 terms in the aftermath of 1961. He assumed responsibilities in organizations for fighting communism; supported the efforts to establish Imam Hatip Schools and High Islamic Institutes.

Even casting a brief glance at these articles written by people who have revealed certain outstanding traits of the conservatives, made it possible to understand the essential characteristics, and thereby know more about the mindsets of these people pertaining to the non-political sphere. This perusal has also made it possible to trace the evolution that the conservative right went

through during the 1960s, the early 60s having been dominated by the nationalist ideology, the late, by a more-heavily religious doctrine, which can partly be attributed to the fact that conservatism is actually a reaction, a response molded by the geopolitical conditions of each country and period, having principles taking shape primarily according to peculiar social, political, economic and historical conditions of a particular country.



Conclusion

The main argument that constitutes the premise of this thesis is that political is deeply intertwined with the "everyday", and the quotidian realm of people's lives cannot be contemplated detached from neither the political developments nor the dominant ideological stances of a period. As the three main pillars of conservative ideology in Turkey during the 1960s, parallel to the dominant global developments shaped by the exigencies of the Cold War conditions and the fierce rivalry between the USA and the USSR for ideological domination, was anti-communism, nationalism and Islamism, I engaged in a perusal of the articles written by the leading conservative figures of the 1960s Turkey in three journals: *Toprak*, primarily and staunchly propagating anti-communism; *Milli Gençlik*, as the publication of Turkish National Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, primarily basing its position on a nationalist perspective with a fundamental focus on the youth; and *Selamet*, as an Islamist periodical aiming to inculcate Islamic tenets without delving into a critical evaluation of the political environment. With the postulation that the political developments and ideological positions would inevitably reflect on the everyday aspects of people's lives, and inflect everyday discourse, and with the assumption that the articles studied here would throw some light on how this translation of political and ideological into everyday took place, I winnowed out the pieces that were not written mainly on daily aspects, and focused on those which took as their subject matter people's everyday practices

such as where and how they socialize, what determines the boundaries of their relationships with the opposite sex as well as the gender roles they assign to each sex, what their understanding of family and society are, what kind of an education they should provide their children with, whom they read as part of their literary pursuits, what dress code they endorse, and what type of art they deem appropriate and enjoy.

This assumption that the articles written by self-professed conservatives of the period would make it possible to comprehend the essential characteristics of the conservative ideology shaping the everyday life has been substantiated by the wealth of information on these people's mindsets pertaining to the non-political sphere. This research has also been instrumental in outlining the transformation that Turkish conservative right went through during the 1960s, the first half fundamentally shaped by the nationalist ideology, and the second incrementally colored by a more-heavily religious one, as the 1960s constitute a period when the visibility and the influence of religion in Turkish political life gradually increased as a counterforce against the growing leftist stance. That this evolution of conservative right reflected in these articles is hardly surprising since what gives conservatism its defining principles in a certain time period and geography is the geopolitical, social and economic conditions as well as historical legacy of the country in question (Wilson, 1980:7).

At the end of the evaluation of the articles in chapter II, it became evident that a great majority of these articles were formulated not as a propagation of a systematic body of principles endorsed by the conservative circles, but rather as criticism directed against the life style adopted by those with a leftist/communist (the terms are used interchangeably in the articles stance, which actually resonates with the approaches viewing conservatism as a negative doctrine of reaction rather than a well-defined ideology. A great majority of the articles target the adherents of the leftist ideologies as enemies of the Turkish nation with their "immoral, decadent, and deviant" lifestyle, and they demand more state authority to regulate such aspects of people's lives as religion and family with an ardent call for religion being instituted as a compulsory component of formal education at schools and the purge of state employees with a leftist stance from state posts.

A great majority of criticisms in these articles base their premise on the overarching theme of morality nurtured through piety, which could only be achieved by the embracement of Islamic tenets, which is bolstered through greater emphasis on national and traditional values such as reverence for family constituting the smallest building block of society, and respect for authority finding expression in conformity to the laws, rules and social norms, all of which actually gain a deeper meaning when these notions are conceived as integral components of a larger concern: communism as a threat to nation's survival.

Therefore, almost all the pieces penned by the leading right-wing conservative figures of the 1960s are shot through with acrimonious anti-communism, which also demonstrates that the rivalry between the two camps of the right and the left in 1960s Turkey was played out with a battle of contested issues, each camp attributing its own interpretation of the same political and social vocabulary to the terms such as morality and justice, as both sides claimed a monopoly of truth as well as commonsense, and therefore, refuse to tolerate the ideas put forth by the opposing clique. Yet again, that these writers preach a single definition of morality and an exclusionary view of moral and social standards is line with conservatives' equating plurality in moral, social and cultural issues with instability (Heywood, 2003:38).

This aspect should also be read within the context of international developments informing domestic politics, which in turn reflect on the everyday life, as the articles examined in chapter II reveals that the primary themes upheld by conservatives in Turkey during the period bears important similarities with the those embraced by the conservative new right taking shape outside Turkey. Just like for the Turkish conservatives, the primary issue that created great consternation for the proponents of the conservative new right, which also positioned itself primarily as a reaction to "communist threat", was the decline in public morality, which according to these neoconservatives, was a consequence of the "permissive 1960s". According to them the increase in the level of income levels, material wealth and prosperity in the years following the Second World War resulted in "a growing willingness, especially amongst the young, to question and criticize conventional moral and social standards",

which, according to the conservatives, posed a serious risk in terms of public morality, constituting the foundation of social stability (Heywood, 2003: 99. Although conservative ideology in Turkey during the 1960s, just like in much of other time periods, paints an incoherent and somewhat fragmented picture in that it constitutes a meeting point for a variety of outlooks bound together with each other solely through their opposition to communism, the fact that conservatism has always existed side by side even with ideologies inherently contradictory to its very core principles makes it comprehensible that a large swath of outlooks can find room under its umbrella. From this perspective, the growing strength of nationalism and Islamism, which in fact constitute two of the primary traditional values cherished by conservative masses in Turkey, in conservative outlook does not strike as surprising. Bora (1998:8-9, suggests that nationalism, Islamism and conservatism comprise the three main pillars of the Turkish right and offers the analogy of "the three states of matter" which can transform into each other as the circumstances mandate, conservatism constituting the "gaseous state" due to its transitivity and malleability in that it represents a "a state of mood, stance, perception and syle transcending contexts, patterns and ideological content". In this analogy, while nationalism represents the "solid state" of the Turkish right, Islamism resrepresents the "liquid state".

Because of the transformation Turkey went through during the 1960s, with a greater fear of communism instilled in people's heart, Islamic tenets gained more significance with the synthesis between religion and ethnnc nationalism, a process that would gain more momentum and become more overt during the 1970s, as evinced, forexample, in the transformation witnessed in Republican Peasants' Nation Party, which was a small ultraconservative and ultranationalist party, but changed its name to Nationalist Action Party in 1969 Adana general congress, becoming "more populist and less elitist" (Cizre, 1992:145 with Alpaslan T ürkeş as the new president of the party, and adoption of a new party programme embracing Islam as Turkish nation's one of inalienable characteristics, contradicting T ürkeş' former attitude until 1969 as a prominent secularist defending Kemalist secularism in his public declarations, barely mentioning religion (Jenkins, 2008:130.

Since the conservatives considered many of the ideas and practices of the progressivists, a threat to their ideals, they refused to sit as idle spectators to the diminution and destruction of the values they held in high regard. While some assumed a relatively milder attitude, those who seemed to be extremely concerned about the break-down in traditional values such as İlhan Egemen Dar- endelioğlu demanded a harder line and engaged in staunch opposition to the spread of communism. In such an atmosphere, a political culture barren of tolerance was gradually being cultivated, which eventually escalated into brutal violence, either party, be it progressivists or conservatives, seeming to reserve the right to condescend or condemn their adversaries' beliefs thinking theirs are superior and devalue each others' opinions, as also exemplified in the rivalry for intellectual endowment. The conservative right bitterly resented the fact that intellectualism was almost exclusively associated with leftism, and took umbrage at the left's gradually increasing intellectual-cultural hegemony, and aspired to gain an intellectual character, which materialized in the formation of Intellectuals Club (Aydınlar Kulübü, founded in 1961 for the nationalist and religious circles to have conversations and exchange of ideas. While the club was closed in 1965, in 1970, Intellectuals Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) was founded as a reaction to growing revolutionary sentiment (Dursun, 2004:61. The name "Intellectuals Hearth" chosen for the organization on the advice of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek might be interpreted as a reflection of the conservative right's ambition for assuming an intellectual nature and producing an authentic and native intellectual identity (Taşkın, 2003:389 as opposed to an imitative, artificial intellectualism based on exported ideas.

It is against the essence of scientific endeavor to draw sweeping conclusions, yet it would be safe to say that the information compiled from the articles, which have served the central purpose of this study by casting light on the core values of the Turkish conservative right of the 1960s, in these periodicals has manifested the foundational principles of Turkish conservatism during the 1960s as morality bolstered through principles of Islamic faith as well as Turkish nationalism, which should be inculcated into the minds of the youth through education to avert the subversion of cultural values and extermination of the Turkish nation, which could only be achieved by raising generations with a distinctive cultural profile comprised of piety, a strict adherence

to moral principles, moderation, deference to authority, and conformity to the rules and laws, which are the outcome of long years of experience.



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