

ONE-PARTY REGIME IN TURKEY AND COMMUNICATIONS

1923-1946

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. THE POLITICAL REGIME AND COMMUNICATIONS

By communications, in this essay, I mean all the media of mass communication, although I will talk about the printed media more often than about other forms of communication, simply because the press is much more the center of focus of the political regimes.

In short, the question behind this essay is Frey's reversed(1): Do certain types of political regimes tend to be meaningfully associated with particular forms of communication strategies? In other words, is the press of the Third Reich different from the press of the Third Republic? Is the press of Mexico different from that of early republican Turkey? If so, why? My answer, like many others(2), or the thesis of this research, is that the press almost always acquires the color of the political structure within which it operates. As an intervening factor social structure affects the shades of the main color.

Although many students of communications see the interrelationship between the forms of communications and political and social structures, their approaches to the investigation of this relationship are different from each others. A large group of researchers believe that

it is possible to relate the problems of the development of the mass media, the organization of political articulation

and the expression of interests, and the formation of collective opinions with the individual's reactions to the challenge of new ideas, his groping with conflicting values, and his search for new perspectives -and to demonstrate that all these complex problems underlie the general problem of political consensus(3).

They analyze the problems of political development in terms of communications to provide a common basis for understanding "both the most manifest structural problems and the most subtle questions of attitudes and values in the total process of political change and nation building"(4). From this approach arises the concept of communications as the "independent variable" in social and political development process(5): if the modernizing elite could change the traditional values of a traditional society by means of injecting new and appropriate values through the mass media, the result would be a new society amenable to modernization(6).

The proliferation of approaches to the description of communications and its relations with other aspects of politics shows that there is not a single well-established communications theory. The presence of too many facets of the communication process is, perhaps, the main reason for the proliferation of communication theories(7). For example, some investigators compare the level of media development. The most common indicators include daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population, percentages of households with radio and television sets, frequency of cinema attendance, the diffusion of telephones, quantity of domestic and foreign mail, etc.(8). Taking into account that these aggregate indices measure only the volume of communications, other investigators attempt to establish the index of the relationship between communications and the political process. An important example is the index of press freedom(9). Since the figures used are based on "informed experts' subjective judgments" of government control over newspapers in various

countries, these indices did not yield conclusive results. Work of this kind has often been applied to ideologically biased set of concerns: the researcher almost always seems interested in establishing the determining factors of press freedom or the role of communications in modernization and national development(10). Another perspective depends on the researcher's definition of politics. If politics is defined as the struggle for power among political groups, then the communications process is taken as conveying messages about "the holder's possession of and readiness to exercise (power)... to those expected to respond to it"(11). If politics is about participation, then what is expected from communications is to convey "interests, desires and demands (of the ordinary citizen)... to rulers"(12). If politics consists only of the legitimation of authority, then media express the values and procedural norms of regimes(13). Finally, if politics is about popular choice, then the free flow of news enables citizens to discriminate "the demagogue" from those who offer viable policy alternatives(14).

Without rejecting the relationship between social and political processes and communications, another group of scholars see the direction of causality the other way round. For them, communications only reflect

the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted... To see the differences between press systems one must look at the social systems in their true relationship to the press, one has to look at certain beliefs and assumptions which the society holds: the nature of man, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth(15).

Thus, according to the approach I share, press systems are determined by the prevalent political ideology which shapes the political regime in the first place.

In the final analysis, the realm of politics consists of entire processes of the society and provides a fundamental structure of the polity of which communications are the main blood vessels. It is obvious that the characteristics of the framework should especially be reflected in the vital parts. Obviously, the relationship of mass media to politics has significant consequences(16). In one way or another all political regimes regulate the functioning of all media institutions in the political sphere, because the mass media have a potentially large political impact on the society(17). In short, the mass media set much of the agenda of political debate; they help to establish which political demands will be aired and published, thus articulated, and consequently taken into account by policy-makers.

Following Almond's classification we may assert that political communication may include several aspects of input functions such as political socialization, interest articulation and interest aggregation(18). Mass media affect the changes of governments to ensure fundamental support. Since all systems continue to exist in Almond's terms, insofar as their output functions satisfy inputs, the limits of tolerable (or satisfactory, from the center's point of view) inputs will depend on the ability of the system. Consequently, the range of the care taken by the political regime regarding the practice of communication will be determined by the limits of the system's tolerance. The sort and degree of the regulation of the performance of media institutions may vary from making the media accountable to political agencies to clarifying the rights and obligations of both political and media personnel in the communication sphere, and to defining the limits of its freedom.

The ubiquity of ways of controlling the mass media politically is demonstrated by the fact that even in the most liberal regimes it is evinced that the governments sometimes

get involved in the transaction of newspapers between publishing companies or in the appointments of editors to such institutions(19). However, because they lack common points of departure and some comparative elements, studies in any one country do not lay the foundation of a universal theory of the interface of political regime and mass media of communications.

I share LaPalombara's idea that "... the science of politics can be that only if it is comparative"(20). In order to explain the phenomena we are interested in, we need "conceptual tools that are able to travel"(21). Stretching the concepts developed in, and for, the Western experience into the diffuse politics of the Third World, we can cover more only by saying less in a far less precise manner(22). The student of the process of communications and its interface with the political processes is faced with the questions of how and why. The tools of experimental or statistical analyses and some concepts do not lend themselves to be stretched into the comparatively new areas. The student of communications can, at best, portray the relationship between political organizations and media longitudinally over time within one country's borders and show the changes which occurred during a particular historical period. Therefore, case studies are essential in any attempt to probe and understand why the media of different countries are structured the way they are. Although this need for case studies has long been acknowledged, scientific work in this field has not yielded fruitful results concerning the linkage between the political and media structures.

The pioneering work on communications by Walter Lippmann laid such an important foundation for the research to come that his writings can be said to contain the seeds of later approaches to the study of communications. In 1920,

Lippmann expressed his belief that democracy can function, provided that the public is supplied with reliable and relevant information(23). Many decades later, this idea would be expressed as the theory of free flow of information and as a requisite of political development. This idea was elaborated in those theories of communication whose major emphasis is on the need for transmission of information among individuals or societies. In 1922, in his Public Opinion, Lippmann came close to questioning whether citizens can possibly make rational democratic decisions: the source of difficulty in forming an intelligent public opinion is not man's irrationality, but the necessity, inherent in the modern communications systems, of condensing information into brief slogans; these slogans create a wall of stereotypes between the citizen and the issues to which he is expected to respond. Lippmann recognized that both the external environment and man's own psyche are sources of errors that distort perception and information. Lippman's ideas became the second major trend in communications research, with emphasis on persuasion expressed in the studies during the pre- and post-World War II periods(24).

These two major trends also experienced developments within themselves. In other words, the political objectives which conspicuously affected the scientific study of communications exerted an influence on the focus of research. At the same time, the outcomes of increasing research activities exerted an influence on the perception of the degree of media effectiveness. As a result, the theory moved from political socialization to gatekeeping theories, and from political modernization to agenda-setting. A brief review of these models is in order:

1. Information Model: Social scientists responding to fear for the future of democracy and seeking to reduce the impact of the demagogues, emphasized the importance of news

in the media until the late 1950s. According to the proponents of this model, the outside world is carried to us, by drawing "pictures in our heads"; the media constitute the primary source of political information for children and adolescents. This emphasis on the information aspect of media was based on the assumption of the all-pervasive effect of media(25).

2. Persuasion Model: Another group of social scientists, responding to problems posed by the emergence of new nation-states in the ex-colonies and to the political objectives of politicians who sought to implant western-type democracy in developing countries, began emphasizing the importance of commentaries in the media after the early 1950s. According to this model of the persuasive effect of the media, attitudes, not cognitions, were to be subjected to change and this objective could be achieved only by persuasion of the message-recipients to certain attitudinal changes. Modernization of the theory of communications developed along with many sub-models of individual and societal change(26).

3. Agenda-Setting and Gatekeeping Models: The findings of recent research came to the conclusion that the impact of mass communications was not as large as once hypothesized. As a result of this, the information and persuasion models gave way to their refined and "limited" versions, the "Agenda-Setting" and "Gatekeeping Models". Being based on the limited effect theory of mass media, both models emphasize the media's role in the development of specific cognition of issues in the public domain. The only difference between these two models is that while the Agenda-Setting model assumes that there is a positive relationship between the attention given to various issues in the media and the prominence assigned to these issues by the audience, the Gatekeeping Model assumes that the media shapes the world for us and that the audience does not have an "independent" agenda for public discussion

but only those issues provided by the mass media(27).

Recent research and theoretical analyses showed that what was meant by modernization in many social change theories was not necessarily the inevitable and universal outcome of the progress of human societies; that what is envisaged as political development in theory is not empirically true. Communications research can, therefore, no longer dwell on the premises of the persuasion model. Rather, meaningful research on the communicatory behavior of people and the communicative relations of society may ultimately hypothesize that information disseminated by the entire communication network established in the society determines the individual's concept of reality. This cognitive structure (i.e. information held about objects), in turn, produces the attitudes of people as desired by the controllers of the dissemination of information. The mere existence of mass communications media neither necessitate nor guarantee the emergence of pluralist political relations and a "democratic" system. However, the basic understanding shared by all these theories that mass media institutions have political impact while the political institutions have independent effect on media configuration has not been challenged by recent research. Rather, new sets of linkages and a range of consequences are being devised(28) and the inherent limitation of case studies in generalizing from a single or few instances is thus being overcome. This new generation of media research depends on the understanding that the political attachments of the media, if measured as an independent variable, are capable of bringing out "measurable developments" at any level of political development(29).

Since measurement must be preceded by a concept formation process(30), we have to know the dimensions along which the relations of media to political institutions vary.

There is no agreement on these dimensions among the researchers. One philosophical orientation is that which treats each case of relations between media and political organizations as a matter of kind: every political system has its unique rationale for the media of communication from which develops different "theories" of the press(31). The other orientation, which also underlies this research, holds that the "press systems" have the same dimensions along which their traits vary from country to country and, in the same polity, from time to time. However disagreement among the adherents of this orientation exists: some scholars hold that the media have a passive role in all societies and are dependent on the political regime(32) while some others regard the mass media as neutral socialization agencies(33).

Communication is a social function, performed by a specialized structure which has functional distinctiveness(34). Communication is a feature of life at every level. Happenings in the great world of affairs(35), political socialization, recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication(36), are reflected either in a ballad or tale(37), or in a satellite-relayed television commentary. To have all individuals and associations informed properly about the functioning of all structures requires the separation of the communication function from the other political functions. Although the differentiation of all structures from each other is referred frequently as a "modern" trait of political development, Almond gives many historical examples of the separating-out of the communication function. Even when this function is not performed by a specialized structure, i.e. communicator, every other structure should perform communication as distinguished from its original function(38).

The functioning of the associational interest groups,

political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, can best be communicated to individuals and other institutional role holders through differentiated, thus autonomous, communication structure which is not controlled by those from whom messages are disseminated.

Then the basic question of communication research is whether the communication function is performed as differentiated from the other political functions. This question leads us to review the arrangements through which political influence over the media may be channeled. These structural specifications of the media institutions can be cross-nationally compared.

There are quite a few ways of investigating the arrangements between the media and political institutions. Since the act of communication answers the questions of "Who", "What", "Which Channel", "To Whom", and "With What Effect"(39), the scientific study of the process of communication tends to focus upon one or another of these aspects. Research which studies the "who" and looks into the communicator who initiates and directs the act of communication, is called "control analysis". Scientists who study the "what" do "content analysis". Scholars who focus upon the "channels" study the newspapers, magazines, radio, television, film and book publications and do "media analysis". The impact of the communication upon the audience is the subject of "effect analysis"(40).

The arrangements through which a political regime shapes the media could be investigated from the perspective of the structural specifications of the media institutions(41). This political influence mechanism can be operated through formal and informal channels. The formal mechanism consists of the state control and political commitment of the media.

The informal mechanism is based on the distance between the socio-cultural values of the media elites and the political elites. The impact of these mechanisms are dependent on the nature of the legitimizing formula of the communication institutions.

The mass media of communications are more or less subordinate to government control in every polity(42). The objective indicators of the subordination could be measured, at least hypothetically, along two dimensions: the prevailing political doctrine (i.e. the regime's attitude towards communications) together with the type of social organization, make state control over the media either natural and legitimate, or unthinkable. Monopolistic social organizations when met with authoritative political doctrine lay the basis for an easy state control over the media. In such a society, if the modernizing elites try to impose more popular and "democratic" ideologies, state control becomes a disdained practice. In a pluralistic social organization, popular doctrines make state control quite extraordinary, even unthinkable. However those authoritative doctrines which found a chance to be implemented in pluralistic societies almost always designed special justification(43). Striving to bend the press to their political objectives the political power holders try to establish control over the appointments. When established, the political control over the appointments in media consists in either direct or indirects ways, or both. Sometimes the authorized government agency install politically reliable individuals inside the media. The Spanish government held this right for both the government or "movement-owned" press for more than thirty years(44). Even in democratic regimes governments may have similar rights(45). However the most common form of government control over appointments is the one which is exerted through external pressures and sanctions on the behavior of media staff(46). The authorized

agency may seek the candidates that have only certain political credentials or recruit only those who first undergo approved training courses and indoctrination process(47). Sometimes the personnel intending to be professionals, are licensed by either government agencies or corporative organizations(48). In short, government control over the appointments may be low or high, both of which may be either legally or illicitly implemented.

The state control over the media can be extended to the financial area, too. The sources of the press can easily be subject to government control. If media sources depend on the government budget, the political office holders can manipulate them in order to secure the support of the press. If they are non-governmental then governments can subject their financial sources to government approval and special taxes(49). Usually governments provide subsidiary sources to the press. Government control over the subsidy system can be exerted as discretionary allocation. Even if the system works under the automatically applicable allocations principle, the mere existence of the subsidy system can be interpreted by the political power as a right of control over the media.

The last type of state control over the media is directed to the content of the communications. The mechanism can be pre-publication censorship and/or influencing the attitude of editors in advance or while preparing the output. The deterrent impact of the post-publication punishment, penal codes or illicit harassment methods(50) are among the most common methods of content control of the media. This control may be low, affecting only specific items, or high, regulating the whole content. The authorized control agency may be the political center, the government or a ministry, or intermediary bodies employed by the political authority(51).

Another formal mechanism through which the political influence may be channelled to the media consists of the ties between the media and political parties or government agencies(52). Many authors examine media partisanship under the categories of the formal connections to political parties, the stability of editorial policies and the party affiliations of readers(53). Blumler and Gurevitch observe five levels of the degree of mass media partisanship:

(a) Party Press: Parties are directly associated with the media by their ownership, or membership on management.

(b) Voluntary-Fixed Partisanship: Although the media are not owned by the party, they unconditionally support every action taken by the party.

(c) Voluntary-Conditional Partisanship: The media feel the need of justifying their support seeking qualifications. They occasionally refuse to support certain party policies, though support is given, if any, to only a certain party.

(d) Unpredictable Partisanship: The media's political stance is determined by the merits of the party action in each and every case. Different parties may be supported.

(e) Non-Partisanship: The media is non-political and does not support any political body.

The informal mechanism through which the governmental influence subordinates the media to the state is depicted as the media-political elite integration(54). The political similarity and socio-cultural closeness of these two elites can facilitate government efforts to control the media. If media and political institutions are not differentiated at

all, then there will be no gap between that which the political regime desires to be communicated and that which is actually communicated. But if these structures are differentiated, then the resulting gap may be bridged by inter-elites relations. The media personnel may be recruited from the same social and cultural backgrounds, thus having similar values. The overlap of personnel in media and legislature and administration can also have the same impact. A persuasive relationship between the two elites is another degree of media-political elite integration. Finally, informal interaction, membership of the same organizations or religious institutions promote the growth of mutual understanding among individuals of these two different spheres yielding more responsive exchanges between them.

The formal and informal arrangements of the relationship of media and politics are, in fact, dependent on the degree of professionalism of the media personnel. Professionalism is usually defined as a distancing factor of the practitioners of a profession from the external world by generating internal norms of the profession(55). The code of ethics of journalism imposes upon the professionals a "professional rationality" which, in turn, results in their adopting an "adversary stance in relations with politicians"(56). If the "professionalism" of media personnel in a particular country forces them to behave as if they were "supra-politics", then the degree of media partisanship might be low, media-political elite integration loose and the government forced to exercise coercive control over the communications. However if media personnel see no professional harm in paying allegiance and giving service to some hegemonic or party-determined ideology, then, making state control a very easy task, media partisanship and elite integration can reach higher degrees. In the former, the political influence would be lower and the media's communicative function higher, while in the latter the

political influence would be higher and the communicative function lower.

The arrangements through which political influence over the media may be channelled consist of four dimensions. Of these dimensions, state control results either in subordination or in autonomy of the media. In determining the position of the media in a particular country along this continuum, research would need to employ the examination of the legal texts, statutes, media ground-rules, etc. However those efforts of the regime displayed by the legal texts would not determine the degree of subordination by themselves. Different combinations of state control, media partisanship, media-political elite interaction and the nature of professionalization of the media personnel could have a different influence over the media. For instance, a highly developed belief of the media personnel in the primacy of service to the public would yield more counter-weight against trivial communication when met with increasing state control or forced media partisanship, thus better serve communicative functions promoting politicization. Similarly, even if there were a high degree of media subordination, any increase in the elite-media gap and in media's view of independent political function might increase the political content of communication and thus of the communicative functions.

Of these other dimensions, the study of media partisanship requires both the review of the status of the party-press and the analysis of contents. One might portray the media as of high partisan commitment or as having politically unbiased rather than non-political communication. Therefore, on the part of the media, non-partisanship would be the result of a balanced coverage of all political points of view, while the political commitment would result in the development of formulas to justify a favored treatment of certain political

views. The former is directed to those who seek guidance from the media in an unbiased, non-committed fashion; the latter to those who seek reinforcement of their views in party-linked media.

The media-political elite integration, that is the degree of similarities of socio-cultural and educational background between members of the two elites would require the collection of information for describing the position of individuals within the social system. It would also require information on the exchange of personnel between the two spheres, occupational histories of members of the two elites. The information on the identification of media elite with the political regime would give useful hints on the integration(57).

All these three mechanisms are either facilitated or constrained by the nature of legitimizing ideology of the professionals. Although there are several "measures" of the degree of professionalism in the media(58), the mere existence or absence of a written and/or well-acknowledged code of ethics could not be taken as the "measure" of internal norms of the profession in a particular country. Rather we need to devise a measurement that focuses on media attitudes promoting or decreasing the service of journalists to the goals of political authorities. The content analysis of those views reflecting the journalists' opinion on "the political duty of the press" might help develop such a device.

The impact of the political connections of the mass media might be measured in these four areas of consequences. But the interaction among these four variables might have another measurable consequence on the main issues which shape the political agenda of a society at a particular time. Although the individual issue items would be colored by unique and time bound circumstances, the way they are shaped,

and the sources from which the items emanate would give insights into the independent communicative value of the media. If the interaction among the variables developed would result in autonomous media, then the professionals would be able to inject their own view of the issues into communications that constitute the political debate, and raise the issues that they consider worth the national political debate. In this case the number of the issues as well as the media consensus would be higher over the raised issues. For the application of standardized news value criteria would result in the raising of similar issues.

In the subordinate media, the overall shape of the agenda placed before the public would be directed chiefly by political leaders; the media's self-restraint would be more likely. However, in the case of subordinate media, a single-party system could also yield high media consensus over the issues, because the political authority would let only those issues legitimate to the regime be raised. But if there were a multi-party regime, the consensus would be lower while the number of the issues raised would be higher. The content analysis of the various media outlets might show the ratio of those issues stemming from the perspectives of media professionals to those directed by the regime(59).

II. DEMOCRATIC AND NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES ON COMMUNICATION

The hypothesis that the type of the regime is closely linked with the configuration of media leads us to the classification of political regimes. By the early twentieth century, the number of parties in a polity were gradually seen to be tied with the type of the regime(60). However, the classification of political systems is not an easy task for the political scientists. Although drawing a distinction

between the main kinds of systems on various criteria is, at least theoretically, not necessarily a value problem, even the most classical classifications have been portrayed as value-laden(61). Probably the most value-free criteria are the existence of individualism, of voluntary groups with political effect and publicized opposition(62). According to Dahl, for example, who rejects the idea of fully differentiated types but accepts a process of transition between the two poles, the differing point lies in the extent to which the regimes furnish opportunities for contestation and participation(63).

Here, it is implicitly assumed that competitive and pluralistic systems furnish opportunities for opposition. Many features of political contestation among the opposing groups may so vary in time that the resulting regime may either "allow the free formulation of political preferences through the use of (certain) freedoms for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to rule" or "concentrate power in an individual or his collaborators or in a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency"(64). Therefore, according to Linz, both totalitarianism and authoritarianism are easily differentiated from democratic polity. Since a democratic polity retains its distinction from nondemocratic regimes by simply allowing the use of such basic freedoms as freedoms of association, information and communication(65), all non-democratic regimes would have, to a differing degree, a different attitude toward these freedoms. Consequently, while the totalitarian party retains the function of expressing the demands, aspirations and interests of the society of particular classes of society(66), authoritarian regimes prevent, even forcibly, the political expression of certain group interests(67). It, therefore, seems sufficient to distinguish authoritarian regimes as

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined but actually quite predictable ones(68).

from those which can be characterized with unlimited pluralism (democracy) and those with no pluralism and extensive or intensive mobilization and elaborate and guiding ideology (totalitarianism) to delineate different communication strategies. Before going in to what impact these distinct political regimes might have on communication, we shall dwell on the distinctive features of authoritarianism and democracy. In doing so, we shall employ the model developed by Linz by contrasting authoritarianism both with competitive democracies and with totalitarian system(69).

Authoritarianism is usually placed in between democratic polities and totalitarian systems; it has clear conceptual boundaries with democracy although its borders with totalitarianism are, to some extent, diffused. The path from authoritarianism to democracy is also claimed to be difficult; the Turkish case of transition from a one-party regime to multipartism is taken as an example of the few exceptions to this rule(70). However there are many examples of post-totalitarian authoritarian polities to which the regime changes peacefully. Although one cannot take the authoritarian regime as a transitional or intermediary system between democracy and totalitarianism it certainly has common features with both of them. Certain subtypes of authoritarianism come closer either to democracy or to totalitarianism than some other subtypes. But the distinctive features of authoritarianism are found in "the way of exercising and organizing power,

of linking with the societies, as well as in the nature of belief systems sustaining it, and in the role of citizens in the political process"(71).

Authoritarianism is distinguished from democratic polity and from its institutionalized political pluralism with a limited, non-responsible political pluralism. In an authoritarian polity political groups are tolerated insofar as they do not influence political life and represent only certain legitimate interests. These interests and their politically representative institutions are determined, if not created, by the regime. Apart from democracy, these institutions do not legally and/or de facto determine those who hold the power. Instead,

the men who come to power reflecting the view of various groups and institutions derive their position not of the support of those groups alone but of the trust placed in them by the leader or ruling group(72).

The way an authoritarian regime creates or maintains the power-holders is described by Linz as a constant process of co-optation which results in a heterogeneous political elite with different political backgrounds and career patterns. Since one institution, monopolizing all political life and preventing all other institutions, does not provide all political staff, nor hold them accountable only to itself, the political elite of authoritarian regimes consists of people ranging from the bureaucracy and army to legitimate interest groups.

However, "an official or a single or privileged" political party is also the most acknowledged feature of authoritarianism. The fact that such parties are in some cases monopolistic and claim to perform the same functions as totalitarian parties results in confusion of the

authoritarian party with the totalitarian party. While the totalitarian party is created by those who struggle for power and, once power is taken, used for ideological inculcation, the authoritarian party is usually created by the group in power as a blanket organization for all the recognized interests. It usually does not have an impact on political recruitment, indoctrination and mobilization. However, it can be asserted that in the absence of such secondary organizations as "the Church, the Catholic Action or the Opus Dei in Spain"(73), the single party of the authoritarian regime may become "a reservoir of leadership" and all the monopolistic power acclaimed "on paper" may be enjoyed by the authoritarian party.

Regardless of the fact that the authoritarian party may be as powerful as the legal texts indicate or it may be weak compared to other lay organizations, the regime lacks an elaborate and guiding ideology. Rather, unlike the totalitarian systems, in the authoritarian systems "the ways of thinking and feeling of the members of political class and their ways of reaction to different situations" are non-codified and more emotional than rational(74). Linz describes this intellectual attitude as mentality and contrasts it with ideology. While ideology defines a desired state of affairs as well as the ways and means available and appropriate to its followers, mentality only describes loose boundaries of possible actions and reactions of political power-holders. Linz, however, notes that some scholars, rejecting the distinction between mentality and ideology, holds that mentality, like ideology, shapes cognitive forms of consciousness which, in turn, exert influence particularly on the communication process(75). According to this way of thought, ruling ideas of authoritarian regimes, whether or not they emanate from a guiding ideology, have also a heavy impact on the cognitive status of the nation through the communication process. But we may add that while ideologies can have monopolistic rights over the cognitive

forms of national consciousness, mentalities may leave room for the assertion of alternative policy proposals.

The lack of a precise and binding ideology of authoritarian regimes leads us to the fact that most of these regimes are incapable of mobilizing people around ultimate ideals. Absence of such ideals is shown as the reason for the alienation of intellectuals, students, youth and religious groups from authoritarian regimes. But an authoritarian regime with an important solidaristic ideological component may, and usually does, overcome the problems caused by the alienation of masses. The communication process and the process of politics are affected to the extent to which the pseudo- or quasi-ideologies and the mentality of the rulers of the authoritarian regime unfold.

As implied by its definition, the communication strategy of an authoritarian regime should be different from the strategies of both democracy and totalitarianism. According to Siebert and others, the authoritarian rationale for the communication precedes libertarian and totalitarian rationales since the mass media had been first created under the absolutist rule of the 16th and 17th centuries(76). These pre-modern traditional and semi-traditional monarchic rules are no longer treated as authoritarian regimes(77). But the communication policies adopted by these absolute regimes are widely practiced in many modern authoritarian regimes. The absolutist rationale for the mass media of the 16th and 17th centuries had been developed out of the philosophy of absolute power of the monarch, his government or both. However, after the 17th century, in England, the libertarian rationale for the media developed out of the writings of Milton, Locke, Mill(78); and the general philosophy of rationalism and natural rights had begun replacing the absolutist communication strategies. The chief purpose of the press in the pre-democratic regimes was to support and advance

the policies of the government in power and to service the state. Now by helping to discover the truth and performing a check on the government, it was becoming informative entertaining and salable. While whoever got a royal patent or similar permission had the right to publish under the pre-modern rules, after the emergence of liberalism anyone who had the economic means could enjoy the right to publish. The government patents, guilds, licencing and sometimes censorship were the common ways of absolutist control over the media. According to the libertarian rationale media were controlled only by the "self-righting process of truth" in the "free market place of ideas"(79). Criticism of the political process and of officials in power was no longer forbidden; only defamation, obscenity, indecency and wartime sedition were forbidden, and only courts could control the press compliance.

By the 20th century, almost all the western world, except for the totalitarian regimes, claimed that modern governments should adhere to the principles of libertarian communication strategy. The significant variations in the practical conditions in which the mass media of communication of democracies work may be explained by the wide cultural and geographical diversion of liberal doctrines. Despite these variations, the basic principles governing the mass media are founded upon the answers of the 17th and 18th century philosophers to questions about the nature of man, the nature of society and man's relation to society. The libertarians thought of man as rational animal: happiness and well - being were the individual's goal; he was capable of organizing the world around him; the reason of the aggregate decisions of individuals to advance civilization, the ultimate goal of man, of society, and of the state, is the fulfillment of the individual(80). These basic postulates began gradually replacing the pre-modern theory of the functions and purposes of organized society. First of all, this old theory had

adhered to the assumption that man could attain his full potentialities only as a member of society; as an individual, his activity was extremely limited; the state, the highest expression of organization, had to come before the individual since without it the individual was not capable of developing civilization. Thus the state had become the summation of all powers although it had derived its power to determine the goals, sometimes from divine rights, sometimes from the superior personality of the leadership. Even though this exaltation of the state of the absolutist period runs through all modern authoritarian theories as a common feature, with the development of societies new social factors came into existence and, therefore, the modern authoritarian regimes were based on more elaborate philosophies.

The mass media of the 16th century had been born into a world in which the basic purposes of government were already determined. The dissemination of information, ideas, and opinions among the members of the society had to comply with the predetermined objectives of the state. In the early stages of the development of the mass media this compliance had been secured by negative controls through which the state avoided any media interference with the national policies. Later, however, a more positive policy had been implemented, and, thus, the state actively participated in communication. The government had begun utilizing the mass media as one of the instruments of achieving its objectives. In the 16th century, the British Crown granted exclusive patents of monopoly to selected individuals who held the right to publish newspapers so long as they refrained from interfering in state affairs. Governments in many European countries of the 16th century adopted similar systems of strict surveillance requiring a state bureaucracy. By the 17th and 18th centuries "official" journals, published by the government offices, were established in many western countries. While in some countries only these official media gave the "accurate" picture of government

activities, in some others they existed alongside the competitive privately owned (but officially permitted) publications.

With liberalism's insistence on the importance of the individual and reliance on man's capacity to reason, and with the concept of natural rights, of which freedom of speech was an essential part, political regimes were re-formulated, and mass media were also released from the pre-democratic bonds of the ancient regimes. Man could no longer be guided by the state-dictated or God-given facts but by the truth; the sole method of discovering the truth was "the free competition of opinion in the open market"(81).

However, the completion of the transfer of press from the absolutist regulations to a liberal system was not to come before the end of the 18th century. First the British Crown abandoned its right to regulate the press(82). Second Thomas Jefferson strived to create a society of "mature citizens" who were to be educated and enlightened by the information and guidance of a free press(83).

Despite the early liberal conception of press freedom, in the early 19th century, in democratic circles, the problem of the limitation of that freedom had already emerged. For the American legal system the "establishment of truth as a defense" was enough to save those who were held responsible for undermining the state. In England, courts considered all published material which harmed the government as punishable, whether the content was true or false. The revolutionary provision of the American constitution had enormous impact on the English system, and, in 1843, a parliamentary act adopted the American practice(84). For the British system "the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive to the ends of society" was a crime "which society correct(ed)" (85). On the other hand Jefferson argued that while the press

should be subject to punishment for damages to individuals it should not be held responsible for harm to the reputation of the government. Even today, the discussion of the extent of control over press freedom has not reached a satisfactory end.

The lack of agreement on the problem of limitation notwithstanding, the free media of communication have a special place and function in the democratic world. Since the adherents of democratic theory of government, as well as the citizens of the democratic countries, are keen on the ways and means of keeping governments from returning to authoritarian practices, the most important function of the free press seems to be a "watchdog" of the "inalienable rights" of individual citizens. In practice the existence of democracy and democratic freedoms is equated with the existence of a free press. All democratic countries in the world pay, at least, lip service to a free press. Even the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provides that "(T)he citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: (a) Freedom of speech; (b) Freedom of the press..."(86).

Basically the underlying purpose of the media, under the libertarian concept, is to help discover truth, "to assist in the process of solving political and social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decisions"(87). The essential prerequisite of this function is the freedom from government controls or domination. Since governments in democratic countries usually politically represent one of the parties of the dispute over economic and social problems, the mass media play the independent judge's role in disputes. Neither the government nor the other parties should interfere in the communication of arguments to the public which might even include incorrect information promoting unfeasible alternatives, and messages of demagogues.

Libertarian theorists and law - makers of democratic countries assume that the public, when faced with some possibly false, some possibly true information, could "digest the whole,... discard that not in the public interest and accept that which served the needs of the individual and of the society"(88). Theoretically, in a democracy, everyone who has something to say on public issues can express himself regardless of whether what he says is true or false, and the public ultimately decides. The impact of this theory was to open all instruments of communication to all; anyone with sufficient economic funds could start a communication enterprise, and its success would depend on its profit. Profit, in turn, depended on the enterprise's ability to satisfy the customers. In short, the viability of an instrument of communication would be determined by the public it served.

Despite all the safeguards devised, even the democratic governments still find instruments which help them take part in the communication process(89). The government-operated postal systems, import and export controls, taxes and subsidies are among the widely-known instruments most widely used by governments for imposing controls over the media.

The chief instrument of control, in democratic society, is the judicial system. Courts apply the law to the press, and guard press freedoms against government interference. The laws applied by the courts, in fact, determine the limits on (or limitlessness of) press freedom(90). Although there are no general principles developed and widely recognized in the democratic countries, the protection of the reputation of individuals is considered the duty of the government. Prohibition of defamation, libel, obscenity are also among the most widely recognized restrictions in democratic countries. The protection of public officials and the state against the dissemination of information and opinion which might undermine

their authority is still not a simple problem. While the continental laws provide punishment, the American system inclines to unlimited criticism of public officials and public affairs.

In conclusion, in democratic countries, it is the right and duty of the mass media of communications to serve as a check on the government. The press is to keep public servants and political power-holders from abusing and misusing their authority. To perform this function, the media have to be free from the control of those authorities against which they are to guard the rights of individuals. This common pattern is called the Anglo-American tradition in communication(91). Many democratic countries have transplanted this tradition with varying degrees of success and failure. Although most of the new governments of the developing countries adhere to democratic principles and are proud of their free press which can voice all sorts of ideas, many of them have legislation penalizing publications defending the overthrow of the democratic system of government by force and violence. These governments do not only want to have the press comply with the rules of the democratic game but also like to see it closely adhere to the theory of "objective reporting"(92). The origin of objectivity in reporting is traced by some scholars to the emergence of news-gathering organizations (or as they are called today, news agencies) in the United States of America which provided both the Democrat and Republican partisan press with news stories. The news agencies had to eliminate, as far as possible, all political leanings in the news in order to serve the whole press with acceptable material. By the 20th century, news was taken as the raw material of the "facts of the day", and opinions were to be separated from it. The theory of objective reporting became a matter of professional pride among almost all the journalists in the democratic world.

In recent years, the modernizing elite of the developing countries have been severely criticizing what they call "western journalism" on the grounds that it takes the exceptional as newsworthy and that it does not report the development efforts of those countries which need to reach out to the western public opinion for material and moral support for their development(93). Although this criticism has its merits, most of the proponents of the "developmental journalism" seek to create a communication network which could better be treated under authoritarian regimes' communication strategies.

As implied here, any type of authoritarian regime spells the limited freedom of expression and the obstacles in the communication process. Even in modern times, contemporary authoritarianism is, from the point of view of the press, a system under which all the communication structure is controlled by the ruling group through the government as it was in the 16th and 17th Centuries. But, especially in mobilizational authoritarian regimes a more positive policy can be discerned. That is, the mobilizational regime may actively participate in the communication process and utilize the mass media as one of the important instruments in accomplishing mobilizational purposes. Of the negative policies adopted by contemporary authoritarian regimes, censorship, discriminatory legislation and unofficial methods to discourage the press are the most widespread practices. Censorship is sometimes limited to particular subjects as pornography, obscenity, violence, religious matters, delicate issues in international relations, protection of the young, etc., but often covers subjects potentially disturbing to the leading elite or groups in power.

Censorship may be based on laws(94), more often on discretionary powers or even abuses. Censorship is practised in different ways: (a) as prior censorship, where material is

submitted to a censor for approval before it is published and distributed; (b) as post-publishing, but pre-distribution censorship, where a printed material is subject to censor before it is distributed; (c) post-distribution censorship, where copies of material are confiscated; (d) instructions issued by authorities on how stories about selected events should be written; (e) lists of prohibited stories or subjects; (f) pre-dispatch review of foreign correspondents' messages; (g) banning, seizing or deleting imported publications, films and other items; (h) establishing and "Index" of prohibited publications(95).

Other prohibitive measures consist of suspension, banning or seizure of publishing, printing or broadcasting facilities, boycotts of individual authors or banning of particular material; expelling journalists from professional organizations, thus depriving them of opportunities to publish. Some ethnic and linguistic minorities suffer from a restricted flow of information because the established channels do not supply information that meets their needs, and takes into account their social and economic interests.

Access to news sources, to people, places, documents and information in an authoritarian regime is restricted by administrative measures such as the granting of permission of operation, restriction of journalists' movements, limitations on persons or offices as contacts for newsmen, withdrawal of licence and accreditation. Obviously the very existence of these measures often leads to a large amount of self-censorship on the part of journalists and editors which, in turn, leads us to the positive policies of the authoritarian regime.

Being an elite-based administration, authoritarian regime seeks to create intra-elite communication through which the focus of attention of elite members is reached and

common perspectives are patterned, experiences are shared, common goal values are cleared, and common identities are created(96). The more the elite is gathered around an ideology the more need arises for intra-elite communication. Consequently, authoritarian regimes provide their press with a framework which determines whether or not an event is newsworthy, sets the editorial expectations about future developments, describes the past so that "the present and the future become intelligible to elite and non-elite elements alike"(97). The ruling elite has to prevent the development of counter-ideology and counter-elite. Especially in post-democratic authoritarian regimes, the ruling elite is faced with heightened popular demands which are not met by the societal sources; the authoritarian center has to prepare the public to take in the painful policies of the regime, to prevent the mobilization of people around those who reject the prevailing order. The government or other regime-sanctioned agencies' active participation in the communication process and their utilization of the mass media, therefore, appear to be the case in almost all authoritarian regimes.

The major proposition is, then, that to the extent to which the authoritarian regime places an emphasis on the mobilization, it actively employs the media for the accomplishment of its objectives. Consequently, to the extent to which pluralism is limited, the regime allows the mass media or the major part of them to remain in private hands, in accordance with the degree of limitedness of pluralism, the power center owns or operates or directs all units and messages of the mass media.

The impact of differences among the types of authoritarian regimes on mass communications is not analyzed theoretically. Only some empirical studies on authoritarian legislation has been compiled. The first effort in this vein

is the International Press Institute's 1952 report on non-democratic practices in the world. The IPI report sets up four categories of press regimes in non-democratic situations. Placing the Soviet Union, East European Countries, China, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain in the "complete control" category, the IPI report sets the following categories:

1- Countries where political criticism by the press is formally possible but where censorship operates. Examples: Colombia, Egypt, Syria.

2- Countries where special press laws or other legislation expose editors to arrest and persecution. Examples: Union of South Africa, Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon.

3- Countries where unofficial methods discourage press opposition. Examples: Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia(98).

Siebert also shows the theoretical background of the press regime in non-democratic polities(99).

The research presented in this essay is an inquiry into the communication policy of the authoritarian regime in Turkey which was bureaucratic-military in the beginning, became a single-party, moderately mobilizational type, and transformed itself into a competitive democracy(100). In the next chapter a brief review of the political regime during the single-party era will be presented. The form taken by the limited pluralism, the degree of participation, in short the internal dynamics of the regime will be reviewed. The analysis of the legal institutions concerning the press and communicational configuration will lead us to certain hypotheses. In the third and fourth chapters, the research on communications will be presented. In the last chapter we will try to reach some theoretical conclusions on the relationship between the

regime and the mass media. Whatever its success in establishing the truth in a country, these theoretical remarks will have value only when compared to and completed with other studies of authoritarian press regimes. The purposes of what follows is to explain what the inner dynamics of the regime were in the single party era and the interplay between the regime and the press that I believe has much to do with the dynamics of contemporary Turkish press.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

- (1) Frederic W. Frey seeks an answer to the question of whether certain forms of communications structure tend to be regularly associated with specific types of power configurations in his "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey", in Communications and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye (Princeton, N.Y.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.298.
- (2) Steven H. Chaffe, "Asking New Questions About Communications and Politics", in Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), pp.13-20.
- (3) Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction", in Communications and Political Development, ed. L.W. Pye (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.11.
- (4) Ibid., p.10.
- (5) For a critique of these attributions to the process of communications by the development theorists, see P. Elliot and P. Golding, "Mass Communication and Social Change: The Imagery of Development and Development of Imagery", in Sociology and Development, eds. E. de Kadt and G. Williams (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974), pp.229-254.
- (6) Since the 1960s, under the title of the modernization theory many approaches to the relationship between social change and communication processes developed. Lerner opened the way for those who finally came to work on a "Communication Theory of Political Development". See his "Communication Systems and Social System", Behavioral Science, September 1957, pp.266-275. Schramm, by his "Communication Development and the Development Process", in Communications and Political Development, ed. L.W. Pye (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.30-57, developed Lerner's theory that the communication process is not only the initiator of literacy but also the implementor of changes expected to result in democratic development. The underlying logic of the assumption of a causal link between increasing media consumption and "democratic development" is based upon the belief that the backwardness of those transitional countries is the result of their traditional values which have been static and would be weakened by the modernization process. For a critique of this analysis, see J.R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change", in

Political Development and Social Change, eds. J.L.Finkle and R.W.Gable (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp.15-26. E.Hagen in On the Theory of Social Change (Illinois: Dorsey, 1962) and D.McClelland in The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1961), emphasizing child-rearing and innovativeness as an individual characteristic, Pool, in "Tv: A New Dimension in Politics", in American Voting Behavior, ed. E.Burdick and A.J.Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp.236-261, with his suggestion of modernization as individual internal change, and Parsons, with his social and political models, developed the differentiation theory of social change. The influence of this approach has resulted in the concentration of communication research on the use of the media to promote industrial work ethnic and universalist slogans of free enterprise.

- (7) J.L.Aranguren lists almost all aspects of communication in his Human Communication, trans. Frances Patridge (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), passim. He draws attention to those theorists who, depending on findings of a face-to-face communication experiment, try to reach generalization on communication through artificial channels.
- (8) Lerner, op.cit., W.Schramm, "The Challenge to Communication Research", in Introduction to Mass Communication Research, eds. R.O.Nafziger and D.M.White (Baltimore, Md.: J.H.Furst, 1958) pp.3-28, and F.W.Frey, The Mass Media and Rural Development in Turkey (Cambridge, MA.: Center for International Studies, MIT).
- (9) R.B.Nixon, "Factors Related to the Freedom in National Press Systems", Journalism Quarterly 37(1950):13-28.
- (10) Early modernists bring this out with clarity in their discussion of press freedom; see, e.g.Karl W.Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953), L.W.Pye, op.cit., D.J.McCrone and C.F.Cnudde, "Towards a Communication Theory of Political Development: A Causal Model", American Political Science Review, 61(January 1967):72-79.
- (11) S.Verba, N.Nie and J.Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1971).
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) J.LaPalombara, The Politics within Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); Frey, "Political Development".

- (14) Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States", in Communications and Political Development, ed. L.W.Pye (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.64-77.
- (15) Fred S.Siebert, T.Peterson, W.Schramm eds., Four Theories of the Press, Eleventh Edition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), p.2.
- (16) S.Iskit, Türkiye'de Matbuat Rejimleri (The Press Regimes in Turkey) (Istanbul: Ülku Matbaası, 1939), p.5.
- (17) F.Hirsch and D.Gordon, Newspaper Money (London: Hutchinson, 1975) cited in Jay G.Blumler and M.Gurevitch "Towards a Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research", in Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research, ed. Steven H.Chaffee (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1975), pp.165-193.
- (18) G.A.Almond, "Introduction", in The Politics of the Developing Areas, eds. G.A.Almond and J.S.Coleman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.16-25.
- (19) Detailed evidence of the great increase in the governments' involvement in the publication companies is shown in Antony Smith, ed., Newspapers and Democracy: International Essays on a Changing Medium (London: The MIT Press, 1980).
- (20) LaPalombara, op.cit. (Author's emphasis).
- (21) Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", American Political Science Review 64(December 1970):1934.
- (22) Ibid., p.1935.
- (23) W.Lippman, Liberty and the News (New York: Harcourt, 1920).
- (24) W.Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1922).
- (25) The cornerstones of this model are developed in H.S. Lasswell "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", in The Communication of Ideas L.Bryson, ed., (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948); W.Schramm, ed., Mass Communications. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1949); D.M.White, "The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News". Journalism Quarterly 27 (Fall, 1950): 380-390.

- (26) The pioneers of this model are P.F.Lazarsfeld, "Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research", Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9 (January, 1941):2-16; B.Berelson "The Effects of Print on Public Opinion", in Mass Communications, ed. W.Schramm (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1949); C.I.Hovland, Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).
- (27) For the Agenda-Setting Theory of Communications, see F.Agnir (1975) "Testing New Approaches to Agenda-Setting", in Studies in Agenda-Setting, eds. McCombs and Stone (Syracuse, N.Y.: Newhouse Communications Research Center, Syracuse University, 1975); L.B.Becker and J.M.Mcleod "Political Consequences of Agenda-Setting". (Paper presented to Conference on the Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Communications, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y., 1974). For the Gatekeeping Theories of communications, see L.DonoheW (1967) "Newspaper Gatekeepers and Forces in the News Channel". Public Opinion Q. 31 (Spring 1967):61-68; J.M.Mcleod, L.B.Becker and J.E. Byrnes (1974) "Another Look at the Agenda-Setting Function of the Press". Communication Research 1 (April 1974):131-166.
- (28) J.G.Blumler and M.Gurevitch, "Toward a Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research", in Political Communication, ed. S.H.Chaffee (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), pp.165-194.
- (29) Ibid., pp.192-193.
- (30) For a detailed discussion of "concepts (as) the containers in which data are distributed, see Sartori, op.cit., pp. 1970-72.
- (31) Although he does not express the idea of non-comparability, Siebert so portrays those "theories" of the press that none of them can be compared in terms of "more or less"; see F.S.Siebert, T.Peterson and W.Schramm, op.cit.
- (32) Hoyer et al., for example, assert that essentially the mass media

do not produce anything original; their normal function is to transmit news. At certain moments of history the mass media may be able to influence the timing of political events, but in the long run the media must adapt to the institutions which are its information sources; they are thus likely to reproduce certain

features of the political order. (S.Hoyer, S.Hadenius and L.Weibull, The Politics and Economics of the Press: A Developmental Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p.101).

- (33) Miliband, for example, asserts that the mass media "cannot ensure complete conservative attunement", but they can and do contribute "to the fostering of a climate of conformity, not by the total suppression of dissent, but by the presentation of views which fall outside the consensus as curious heresies, or, even more effectively, by treating them as irrelevant eccentricities, which serious and sensible people may dismiss as of no consequence" (R.Miliband, The State of Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
- (34) Almond, op.cit., p.18.
- (35) H.S.Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", in The Communication of Ideas (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948) (Reprinted in Mass Communications, ed. W.Schramm (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press), pp.102-115), p.105.
- (36) Almond, op.cit., p.45.
- (37) Lasswell, ibid., p.105.
- (38) Almond, ibid., p.46.
- (39) For Lasswell's now-classical definition of communication, see his op.cit.
- (40) Lasswell, ibid., p.47.
- (41) Blumler and Gurevitch present a careful rationale and agenda for this type of research that to date has scarcely been discussed, much less actually performed. This is cross-national comparative study of political communication processes; as they point out, some of the most important questions cannot be addressed by data from less ambitious research undertakings. See, *supra* fn.7.
- (42) Nixon, op.cit.
- (43) The Spanish press regime provides the best example of such an authoritarian communication policy. Giner gives an extensive portrayal of the press' history under the Franco Regime. See Juan A.Giner, "Journalists, Mass Media and Public Opinion in Spain, 1938-1978", paper presented at the Columbia University Conference on Political Culture and Communications: The Iberian

Peninsula in Transition, New York, N.Y., 23-25 October 1978 Trans. Samuel Wegsmann. Also see Juan L.Cebrian, "Democracy and Authoritarianism, and the Role of the Press in Spain", October 1978 (Typescript); Barbara P.Solomon, "A Personal Account of Franco Spain, the Transition, and the American Press", (typescript).

- (44) Giner, op.cit.
- (45) A similar case is that of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The BBC continually wages campaigns to preserve the license fee system, arguing that its present freedom would be threatened if radio and television services depended directly and merely on government allocations.
- (46) In France, for example, no government is "in a position to ignore the newspaper industry's general state of health" writes Antoine de Tarlé in "The Press and the State in France", in Newspapers and Democracy, ed. A.Smith (London: The MIT Press, 1980), pp.127-148. The French state is the direct owner of Havas, the country's largest press agency which handles a high proportion of all advertising placed in newspapers. de Tarlé gives inner story of the "anxieties in government" about the question of "succeeding the very old editors and owners" of the Parisian press in 1975.
- (47) The Franco Regime, in Spain, first established journalism schools and recruitment was restricted to the graduates of these schools. Manuel Fernandez-Montesinos, "Political Opposition and the Press in Spain", (typescript). For the fascist educational program on journalism see B.Underwood, "Journalism Education: Spanish Style", Journalism Educator 21 (February 1966):57-68.
- (48) Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and Turkey have been witnessing this practice since the early 1940s. See Salvador P.López, "Freedom of Information, 1953", report submitted to the U.N. Economic and Social, Council (Supplement No.12).
- (49) The world-wide example of these taxes is the special levy on advertisement revenues. See Sean MacBride, ed., Many Voices, One World: Report by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (London: Kogan Page, 1980), pp.138 ff.
- (50) Ibid., pp.140-155.
- (51) These agencies vary from those which have very democratic façade of Press Council as in India to that Ministry of

Information of the Franco Regime. For a brief story of the Indian press council, see V.M.Nair, The Indian Press and Democracy: Report of a week-long restatement of Press Freedom, November 1977 (Zurich: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, 1978).

- (52) Seymour-Ure illustrates the effects of communication on the election campaign strategies and defines the relationship between press systems and party systems. See Colin Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media (London: Constable, 1976).
- (53) G.Thoveron and J.Nobre-Correia, "Press Concentration in French-speaking Belgium and its Implication for the Content of Newspapers", paper presented to workshop on the Political Role of the Mass Media of the European Consortium for Political Research. Also, D.Butler and D.Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1974), and Blumler and Gurevitch, op.cit., p.176.
- (54) F.W.Frey, Observations on Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1963).
- (55) For a detailed discussion of professionalism see, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 ed., s.v. "Professions", by T.Parsons.
- (56) Bruce M.Swain compiled all the written code of ethics of English-language newspapers in his Reporters' Ethics (Ames, IO.: The Iowa State University Press, 1978). Swain cites an American journalists's fictional White House news conference:

"So, Mr.President, you thought you could get out from under with that half-baked answer. Well, you reckoned without Lank Lancelot, investigative reporter for the Honesty-Is-the-Best-Policy Syndicate".The President tries to bluff his way out. "Listen, Lancelot, I know your kind. If you want an adversary relationship -and this goes for anybody else in this room- I can be more adversarial than you ever dreamed". Lancelot's eyes narrow to a steely glore. "An adversary relationship is exactly what I want, Mr.President. It goes with the press card". The President, seeing himself overmatched, tells all. (Edwin Newman, Strictly Speaking (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p.55 (Emphasis added.))

- (57) The members of the International Study of Opinion-Makers have developed a technique for investigating the background and formation of elites which depends extensively on interviews. Their findings on the Yugoslavian elite are reported in A.H.Barton, B.Denitch, and C.Kadushin, eds., Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia (New York: Praeger, 1973). However, the Symposium at the University College of Rhodesia developed another technique which is not based primarily on formal questionnaires but upon participant observation. See J.C.Mitchell, ed., Social Network in Urban Situations. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities Press, 1975). Although both of these techniques are widely used by social research, neither of them is applicable in historical analyses. Frey uses published data for his elite study: F.W.Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1965). In Turkey, the government issued press identification cards system provides valuable data about the media corps.
- (58) Blumler and Gurevitch, in op.cit., (p.186), cite McLeod and Rush's eleven criteria of professionalism as a measure of the degree of professionalism. See J.M.McLeod and R.R.Rush, "Professionalization of Latin American and U.S.Journalists", Journalism Q. 46 (1969):583-590 and 784-789. However, their criteria-including emphases on special skills and training, a concern for career advancement, respect for colleagues, freedom from internal supervision, etc.- could be applied to the members of any profession. The standard western approaches to journalism as of values of neutrality and objectivity is also useless since it is not the case in many developing countries.
- (59) An increasing number of scholars think that communication research should use the "agenda-setting" technique more extensively claiming that what are communicated to the people set the political agenda. See supra fn. 27. But the analysis of sources of main issues at a particular time concerns only the question of "who says first".
- (60) Juan J.Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Handbook of Political Science Vol.3, eds. F.I. Greenstein and N.W.Polsby (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1976) pp.177-178.
- (61) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 ed., s.v. "Government", by D.Apter.
- (62) E.Brick, In Defence of Politics, Second Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p.176.
- (63) R.A.Dahl, Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p.176.

- (64) Ibid., pp.183, 191.
- (65) Ibid., p.183.
- (66) Ibid., p.200.
- (67) Ibid., p.265.
- (68) J.L.Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain", in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, eds. E. Allard and Y.Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964) (Reprinted in Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, eds. S.Allard and S.Rokkan (New York: Free 1970). (References are to the 1970 edition.), p.255.
- (69) Linz developed his model to cover authoritarian situations as well as authoritarian regimes in his "The Future of an Authoritarian situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil", in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed.A.Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp.233-254.
- (70) E.Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", in Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, eds., A.Kazancıgil and E.Özbudun (London: 1981), p.79.
- (71) Linz, ibid., p.265.
- (72) Ibid., p.266.
- (73) Ibid., p.266.
- (74) Linz cites T.Geigerl's distinction between mentality and ideology: Die Soziale Schichtung des Deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart: F.Enke, 1932).
- (75) Linz cites B.Lamounier, "Ideologia em regimes autoritários: uma crítica a Juan J.Linz", Estudos Cebrap 7 (1974): 69-92.
- (76) Sieberd, Peterson and Schramm, op.cit., p.4.
- (77) For the various classifications and descriptions of modern authoritarian regimes, see G.Almond and G.B.Powell Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); S.P.Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems", in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, eds. S.P. Huntington and C.H.Moore (New York: Basic, 1970).
- (78) J.Milton, Areopagitica, ed. G.H.Sabine, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951) cited by F.S.Siebert,

Peterson and Schramm, eds., op.cit., p.44. For Paine's and Mill's contributions to the development of Liberalism, see G.H.Sabine, A History of Political Theory, Fourth Edition (Hindsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1973), pp.638-651.

- (79) J.S.Mill, On Liberty, ed. A.Castell (New York: F.S.Crofts, 1947).
- (80) R.P.Cuzzort and E.W.King, 20th Century Social Thought Third Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), pp.1-18.
- (81) C.L.Becker, Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life (New York: A.A.Knopf, 1945), p.33, cited by Siebert, ibid., p.44.
- (82) The British licensing system was abolished in 1694.
- (83) T.Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol.11, ed. A.A.Lipscomb (Washington,D.C.: T.Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904) cited by Siebert, ibid., p.149.
- (84) W.Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), pp.29-32.
- (85) Sir W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England Vol.2, (Chicago: Callaghan, 1899), p.1326, cited by Siebert, ibid., p.50.
- (86) Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution. Cited in S.P.López op.cit., p.5.
- (87) Lippmann, ibid., p.263.
- (88) Ibid., p.304.
- (89) See, supra fn.19.
- (90) Danışman discusses the administrative impact on laws. See Ahmet Danışman, Basın Özgürlüğünün Sağlanması Önlemleri: Devletin Basın Karşısındaki Aktif Tutumu (Measures for Providing Press Freedom: State's Active Attitude towards the Press) (Ankara: SBF BYYO Yay., 1982).
- (91) Rosemary Righter, Whose News: Politics, The Press and The Third World (London: Burnett, 1978), pp.76-98.
- (92) Ed. Sean McBride, Many Voices, One World (London: Kogan Page, 1980), pp.156-158.

- (93) For a detailed summary of the "Third World Upheaval" against the "Western News Network Hegemony" see R.Righter, op.cit.
- (94) Many democratic countries have censorship laws that come into play during periods of national emergency; these are not to be compared to indiscriminate or abusive legislation or censorship without legal sanction.
- (95) MacBride, op.cit., p.139 f.
- (96) Arora and Lasswell generate hypotheses on elite-communication in S.K.Arora and H.D.Lasswell, Political Communication: The Public Language of Political Elites in India and the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).
- (97) Ibid., p.7.
- (98) López cites, op.cit., p.61.
- (99) F.S.Siebert, "The Authoritarian Theory of the Press", in Sieberd, Peterson and Schramm, op.cit., pp.9-37.
- (100) Linz, ibid., p.282. Also see Özbudun, op.cit.

CHAPTER TWO

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE POLITICAL REGIME IN TURKEY

I. THE POLITICAL REGIME IN TURKEY

To label the regime of the Atatürk and İnönü years as an authoritarian one-party system(1) seems rather common in recent studies(2). Since there was only one party(3) the regime obviously was a one-party regime. But authoritarianism does not result from the number of parties: there are large numbers of authoritarian countries where there were, or still are, two or more parties(4).

Since the criteria set by Linz for determining the authoritarian character of a single-party regime consist of its limited pluralism, low and limited political mobilization and lack of a totalitarian ideology, we must briefly review the development of the one-party regime. These features are the result of different positions of one-party regimes on the ideology-pragmatism dimension; therefore, to determine whether a regime is authoritarian requires the determination of its position on this continuum(6). Despite the differences of views of some scholars(7) authoritarianism is a result of the degree of pervasiveness, mobilization and monopolistic control of the party over the people(8). Then, secondly, we must review the mentality-related aspects and mobilizational features of the regime.

A. The Consolidation of Power of the One-Party Regime

The cadre which fought the War of Independence as the final episode of World War I was composed of officials, intellectuals and some of the local notables(9). Most of them had been raised with the values of the Ottoman political center which always tried not to delegate power to other groups(10). The fact that no social group had autonomous power provided the framework of the main cultural structure of Ottoman society. The low social differentiation and particularism resulted in the clash between the "Great Culture" as representative of the center and the "Little Culture" as representative of kinship(11). Men of the great culture never considered local structures to be important in their struggle to "save the state" through the entire regulative-reformative period of 1808-1856. Neither the idea of constitutional monarchy behind the 1876 Constitution nor the Young Turks movement was an exception to the traditional Ottoman leitmotiv(12). The vast bureaucratic-centralized statecraft seeking the Empire's integrity and unity against the claims of all groups and minority nationals remained unchanged.

However, the leaders of the Nationalist Movement were also under the impact of the Union and Progress Society (UPS). This association did not only introduce the notion of party as the main unofficial link between the government and people(13), it also set an example to those who wanted to secure intra-governmental coordination at the highest level(14). The legacy of the UPS cum party was the understanding of party as the instrument for controlling the recruitment into politics and promotion in them(15). In this sense, the RPP is not a party evolved in the parliamentary body, though it was founded within the Assembly. Rather, the RPP was the culmination of a crisis of political evolution(16). Therefore, the social

origins of the War of Independence were, at the same time, origins of the RPP.

The allied occupation of Istanbul and Izmir and the plan for the economic and territorial partition of the empire put an end not only to UPS rule but also to the economic order toward which the Unionists had striven for more than a decade. The occupation years witnessed the restoration of capitulations annuled by the UPA. The people who constituted the empire's bourgeoisie and nourished by Unionist rule now saw that the network that enriched them had been altered: foreign trade was being given back to non-Muslims, their joint-stock companies would go bankrupt, and they would never be able to assume the same status again. They realized that there were two alternatives: either to be content with the crumbs left over from European-protected non-Muslim merchants and manufacturers, or, to organize a national independence struggle to retain their interests.

The committees for National Defense (CND) --organizations formally inaugurated by the UPS to intervene in commerce but which had deteriorated into centers of corruption and nepotism-- had become focal points of the resistance movement(17). Local militia were organized and those collaborating with the enemy were terrorized(18). The CND took charge of the financial aspects of total warfare. In the local and regional congresses Mustafa Kemal played the major role as the only high-ranking personality with no embarrassing military defeat in his career, one who had severely criticized the UPS's top officials during the corruption scandals and had in fact been very successful in gaining the leadership of the movement(19).

The dissolution of the last Ottoman parliament by the Allied occupation forces gave the nationalists the opportunity

to convene the Grand National Assembly in Ankara on April 23, 1920(20). The Ankara regime had already been established with the creation of the Representative Committee at the Erzurum Congress on August 7, 1919 and with the foundation of the Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia at the Sivas Congress on September 11, 1919(21). The Representative Committee had drawn up the regulations of the Society(22), and Mustafa Kemal had, on behalf to the Committee, begun sending directives to local CND organizations(23). The temporary regime of the Representative Committee was a highly centralized and authoritative one(24). This character of the effective organization of the Society and of its cabinet, the Representative Committee(25) had facilitated the convention of an "extra-ordinarily authorized assembly". The assembly which consisted in five elected representatives of each and every province in addition to those members of the last Ottoman Parliament who had fled to Ankara, replaced the Society. The presidency of the Assembly, replacing the Committee, assumed all administrative power. The assembly unanimously elected Mustafa Kemal president of the assembly(26).

The first assembly was an extremely heterogeneous body. Frey quotes a prominent member of the assembly in giving a description:

The First Grand National Assembly was an utterly different world. There you could find people who had pulled on jackets over their loose robes, people ranging from a number of bigotted individuals who wore the fez to Kurds, and Circassians wrapped up in their national costumes, astrakhan-wearing nationalists, the doctor, pharmacist, commander, ulema, judge, dervish, sheikh, lawyer, telegraph official -pasha, bey, efendi, aga, hacı, hoca, of every sort, from every occupation, all the types of a society(27).

Despite these enormous differences in social background, and the absence of political parties(28), many small groups and factions emerged in the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal mentioned in his Nutuk (Speech)(29) that these groups had been formed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and securing unanimity of voting during the debates but "brought about contradictory results through their existence"(30). Mustafa Kemal not only regarded the existence of these groups as undesirable since the adherents of each began rivalling with one another and leading to disturbances in the Assembly, but, in the second place, he saw the Assembly as having the "character of a political party"(31). According to his evaluation, local committees were among the second electors, and the Assembly had developed from the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia; "the chief aim of the Assembly... (was to serve) as the basis of the chief aim of the (Society)"(32). Furthermore, the Program of a Popular Policy (Halkçılık Programı) published by Mustafa Kemal on September 13, 1920 had already sought that the Assembly would act in unison preparing the moral and objective prerequisites of national independence. This document had also called for the establishment of a group within the Assembly to impose discipline on the proceedings(33). Finally, M.Kemal himself, had been finding it hard to bring forward a union between the groups and factions in existence "in order to get on with some actual work"(34). He put into practice what had been in his mind for a long time on May 10, 1921, and formed the Defense of Rights Group. This formation, though named a group by Mustafa Kemal, can be considered as a "parliamentary party"(35) holding the majority in the general assembly(36).

Mustafa Kemal became the chairman of the group without election, perhaps because he was the president of the Assembly and all members of the Assembly were supposed to be members of the Group. The regulations drafted by him gave him control

of the votes in the Assembly on the subjects discussed in the Group caucus. According to Article 9 of the regulations, a minority on any subject passed by the group would be bound by the majority view in the general assembly.

However, M.Kemal's new Group did not provide him with absolute control in the Assembly since "some of the opposition to Mustafa Kemal and his associates" also organized into what was called the Second Group a year later(37). Despite the fact that the demarcation line between the First and Second Groups was not definite, the latter would soon prove that there was deeply rooted disagreement over many issues between the two. However, this looseness of the group boundaries resulted in the First Group's carrying some opponents among its ranks into the Second Assembly.

The opposition in the Assembly to the abolition of the Sultanate and the management of the War of Independence, the final victory of the nationalist forces and the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Conference gave Mustafa Kemal the chance to send the Assembly to elections. In a press conference in Izmit, Mustafa Kemal declared his intention to form a real party after the elections. In its decision to renew elections, however, the Assembly did not observe the two thirds majority requirement. Mustafa Kemal had not seen any drawback in sending the deputies to election with a simple majority(38).

While the Assembly enlarged suffrage, amending the Election Law and making all the males over 18 years of age eligible to vote and decreasing the number of population per deputy from 50 thousand to 25 thousand, Mustafa Kemal declared his Nine Principles(39). He sent this declaration to all offices of the Society and informed them that the Society would be turned into a party after the elections. This declaration clearly showed that those who remained outside the

First Group would not be included in the Party. Consequently Mustafa Kemal and his friends asked all the local offices of the Society not to elect those disloyal to the principles of the Society as second electors(40). M.Kemal also appealed to the voters of Istanbul demanding support for the Society's candidates(41). They also saw that no members of the now - defunct Union and Progress Association got elected. The Second Assembly convened on August 11, 1923 with no members of the Second Group but only a few independents who later joined the party ranks.

Following the ratification of the Lausanne Peace Agreement(42) on September 9, 1923 Mustafa Kemal and his associates applied to the Ministry of Interior for the foundation of the People's Party. With the party established, the major "actual work" Mustafa Kemal wanted to get on with was now to establish a permanent political regime because for the last six months there had been no chief-executive or head -of- the State in the country. The Sultanate had been abolished and after the last sultan fled the country the Assembly had elected the Caliph. In spite of his oath to remain loyal to the Assembly, the Caliph had become the focus of opposition. Having established party control over the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal could handle these problems. On September 24, in an interview with foreign journalists, he uttered, for the first time, the word "republic"(43).

In the meantime, however, the Party had become very critical of the government and Mustafa Kemal himself. When the new prime minister Fethi (Okyar) proposed the election of Ferit (Tek) as Minister of the Interior and Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsek) as the vice-president of the Assembly, not only the opposing members but the majority of the party voted for the candidacy of Sabit (of Erzurum) as minister and Rauf (Orbay) as the vice-president. Upon the decision of the party

group, Mustafa Kemal, forcing all ministers to resign, started a government crisis. The party group tried but failed to form a cabinet. Then Mustafa Kemal proposed an amendment to the Law of Fundamental Organization(44) both to solve the crisis and to proclaim the republic. According to his motion, the individual ministers would not be elected by the Assembly but would be nominated by the prime minister and appointed by the President. He presented his draft to some party leaders on October 29, and one hour later to the party group. It was debated for more than 5 hours. Following The debate the Assembly immediately opened, and enacted the proclamation within two and a half hours(45). Thus, in a time less than a work day, the type of government was changed and Mustafa Kemal had scored a considerably important point in the process of consolidating power(46).

Mustafa Kemal was elected the president of the Republic; İsmet (İnönü) was appointed prime minister. Fethi (Okyar) became the president of the Assembly. With the Republic, some alterations took place in the RPP organization and Mustafa Kemal delegated some powers to İsmet regarding party affairs.

Nevertheless, the opposing members of the RPP, under the leadership of Rauf (Orbay) still considered opposition to M.Kemal possible and did not hesitate to show their allegiance to the Caliph. Rauf's statement on the "unnecessary hesitation in proclamation of the Republic"(47); interviews with the Caliph by the Istanbul press, various open letters to the Caliph in some newspapers praising his existence and holiness caused anger in the RPP leadership. Rauf, when back in Ankara, was questioned in the Party group but no disciplinary action was taken against him. İsmet (İnönü), without mentioning any names, accused the protagonists of the idea of "Caliph-cum-Head of State" and said that "they would, in any case, be

beheaded"(49). The letters of the Islamic Association of Indian Muslims and its president Aga Khan to the Turkish Premier, and their publication in the press before actual reception by the Premier, started a new crisis and the Assembly with 22 opposition votes, decided to send an extra - ordinarily authorized Tribunal of Independence to Istanbul. The arrests of journalists and the chairman of the Bar Association, and their immediate trial, silenced the oppositional voices on the subject of the Caliphate(50). By the new year, M.Kemal went to Izmir and there he met the representatives of the press, especially those arrested and tried. He also met the university delegation and top military commanders; after he had secured their agreement to a certain reformation program, the Caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924. This was the second major step in the process of consolidation of power. Again the draft was prepared by the top military and party leadership(51) and again, first of all, some "competent authorities" were informed(52). The proposal itself, however, was presented by a religious authority, Sheikh Saffet and his fifty colleagues. With the abolition of the Caliphate, the Ministry for Religious Affairs was also abolished, and educational affairs were unified under the Ministry of Education(53). It has to be noted that these three proposals had not been referred to commissions but put to the vote immediately.

The control of Mustafa Kemal over all the military and political leaders was apparently not as strong as his control over the RPP. Following these important pieces of legislations and the beginning of a new fiscal year, İsmet (İnönü) appointed new ministers. Similarly fresh elections for the executive committee of the party was held. The nominees of the party leadership lost in the elections. Winning all the seats of the committee, the opposition group had got the control of parliamentary affairs of the Party(54). This group

even asked the prime minister to demand the resignations of some ministers and appoint new ministers(55).

The new constitutional draft was also affected by the lack of absolute control of the top leadership over the Assembly. The draft prepared by the constitutional committee in five months was presented to the Assembly on March 9, 1924. In brief, the Assembly, rejecting the essential articles, turned the proposed presidential system into a parliamentary system. Especially over the right of the President to dissolve the Assembly, though it would be limited, heated debates took place; some proponents of the government, trying to obstruct the opposition, left the Assembly; at the end, this right was denied to Mustafa Kemal(56).

The last but not the least example of the relative independence of political and military leadership from M.Kemal's authority was what M.Kemal described as a "plot" which resulted in the establishment of the oppositional Progressive Republican Party(57). The "plot" had begun with the resignation of Army Inspector General Kazım (Karabekir) from his duty in the Army on October 26, 1923. It should be noted that, until December 19, 1923 military personnel could get elected to the Assembly. General Kazım expressed his belief that he could "fulfill the duties imposed on (him) with greater tranquillity of conscience as a deputy". Four days later, another Inspector of the Army, General Ali Fuat, resigned from his post in order to remain in the Assembly. General Ali Fuat had declined M.Kemal's invitation to dinner, attending a meeting with "his comrades"(58). In the same days, Rauf (Orbay) convinced General Refet to withdraw his resignation from the Assembly. This group was not present at the reception ceremony when M.Kemal returned from a rather long trip to northern and eastern Anatolia. M.Kemal, relating this "sign of resentment" to the resignations, decided that

"(he) was face to face with a plot"(59). According to him, Rauf had, together with generals Kazım, Ali Fuat and Refet and others, drafted a plan of campaign:

They found that, in order to succeed, they must have the army on their side. For this purpose Kazım Karabekir Pasha, after his appointment as Inspector of the First Army, was travelling about in the Eastern provinces, the sphere of his former command, whilst Ali Fuat Pasha, pretending that he had no taste for a political life, and that he wanted to dedicate himself to military service, started out for the inspection of the Second Army, to which office he had been promoted. These gentlemen expected that Cevat Pasha, Inspector of the Third Army, and Cafer Tayyar Pasha, commander of the Army Corps which belonged to this inspection, would participate in their project for a year they worked on the Army to attain their objectives and imagined that they had won it over to their cause. Before handing in their resignations they tried to get some of the commanders to make common cause with them. Certain acts which we had carried through in the course of the same year, such as the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate brought about a closer union between the originators of the concocted plan and drove them to undertake united action(60).

According to Mustafa Kemal, those members the Second Group lost in the elections, "Rauf Bey and his like", in cooperation with the newspapers, Vatan, Tanin, Tevhidi Efkar, Son Telgraf and Toksöz, began with the formation of a certain secret organization. He interpreted a motion to question a minister and an interpellation in the Assembly as being a part of the plot and took what he called "necessary counter-measures"(61). Telephoning the Chief of the General Staff, he demanded his resignation from the Assembly. General Fevzi (Çakmak) complied with M.Kemal's demand. Having obtained the

top-military leaders' consent to the idea of separation of deutyship from all other occupations, M.Kemal asked all those army commanders who were deputies at the same time to resign their political duties. The military functions of two of the six high-ranking commanders who refused the request were ended. Kazım (Karabekir) and Ali Fuat were prevented from attending the Assembly meeting until they formally transferred their military duties to their successors. Despite the criticism of some deputies, the "leaders of the plot" were prevented from attending the session in which the interpellation was to be made. However, many speeches were made against the government's over-all policy as well as the one on the immigration of Turks in exchange for the Greeks driven out of the country. Rauf (Orbay) even proposed a parliamentary investigation. During the heated negotiations, Rauf was forced by the RPP members to declare that he was neither an adherent of the Sultanate nor of the Caliphate, but he added that "(his) opposition (was) directed against any authority which would attempt to seize the rights of these dignities"(62). After the second day of deliberations, the motion regarding the parliamentary inquiry was rejected; İsmet's government received a vote of confidence of 148 votes against 19 with one abstention.

The victory of the government in the Assembly notwithstanding, the discord between the two groups had developed into a profound clash of principles. The personal rivalry between M.Kemal and other military personnel who believed that M.Kemal had usurped some of the credit due to them and had turned it to his own political account(63) helped provoke the opposition into organizing. The day after the vote of confidence, on November 9, 1924, Rauf and his eleven associates resigned from the RPP(64). One day later, the RPP group, modifying an article of the party statute, added the word "Republican" to the name of the party(65). And a week

later, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was formally established(66).

Mustafa Kemal never attributed seriousness and sincerity to the PRP; referring to the provision of the party statute that "the Party respects religious thoughts and religious doctrines"(67). Nevertheless, twenty-nine deputies joined the party(68). The extraparliamentary organization of the party was not stronger than that of the RPP's. The party was supported by the Unionists, the still ambitious Second Group members, conservatives and some elements of the press(69).

The PRP lived only seven months. It was abolished by a decree of the government. The events culminating with the abolition of the PRP, constitutes the last phase in the process of consolidation of power of the one-party regime.

Although Mustafa Kemal, from the beginning, was against the party and had "difficulties in understanding on what basis the PRP was opposed to despotism"(70), not only had the word "Republican" been added to the party's name, but at the same time İsmet (İnönü) had resigned from the prime ministry on November 21, 1924(71). Having established a moderate cabinet under Fethi (Okyar), Mustafa Kemal tried to prevent resignations from the RPP(72). The new party's members even cast a vote of confidence in the new government.

However, after the seemingly peaceful four months, the Sheikh Sait revolt, with the occupation of two towns by rebellious Kurds, began. The Fethi (Okyar) government, according to the ex-premier İsmet and Recep(73), was not strong enough to cope with the situation in the eastern provinces, and, in a meeting of the party group, the premier was forced to resign. İsmet became prime minister again, and

the very day he received the confidence of the Assembly the Law of Restoration of Order and the establishment of two Tribunals of Independence had been enacted by the Assembly(75). The government also declared martial law in the eastern provinces and had the consent of the Assembly for the immediate execution of life sentences handed out by the Tribunals. The Progressive Party did not participate in the Assembly debates and votes on the establishment of the Tribunals.

Two days after the enactment of the law of Restoration of Order, six Istanbul newspapers were closed down by the government, and a very large censorship was imposed on the press. The eastern Tribunal of Independence, claiming that newspapers indirectly encouraged the rebels to revolt and provoked insurgencies, arrested many journalists and closed some other newspapers(75). Similarly, the Ankara Tribunal closed some newspapers, claiming that the reports of the police search in the PRP buildings had been published in an inflammatory fashion, and sentenced a publisher to exile for life(76).

The Progressive Republicans were not able to save the party and themselves from the accusation of the Tribunals of "indirect provocation" of the upheavals. Although only some local executives and minor members were tried and convicted by the Tribunals, several central offices of the party were searched and a large number of party documents were confiscated. The government, on June 3, 1925, only two hundred days after its foundation, closed the PRP permanently(77). In the government decree, it was claimed that the party was related to the reactionary religious groups and provoked the reactionary and obscurantist revolts. However the decree referred to no independent and legal investigation but simply to government conviction. After the

closure, the deputies of the party remained independent in the Assembly.

As put recently by the former prime minister Fethi (Okyar), the closure of the PRP was the last milestone indicating the beginning of the one-party era which "(was to be felt) in every aspect of the political life of the country"(78) except for the brief Free Party experiment in 1930.

Whether it was based on the democratic principle which existed as an acknowledged goal of the leadership(79) or was, as will be proposed below, the result of the limited pluralism of the authoritarian one-party regime, the Free Republican Party was no exception to the consolidated one-party rule from 1925 to 1945 in Turkey.

B. Mentality and Political Mobilization in the One Party Regime

The first years of independence are uniquely significant for the political development of any nation. In these years the frame of reference in which the future of political life develops is set. Despite any great changes brought about by ensuing years, this frame of reference remains in effect. The words and deeds of the Kemalist founders have provided the interpretation of the institutions and legal text for the coming generations.

The mentality of Mustafa Kemal and other top leaders had begun developing even during the war years. The economic model they had in mind was a strategy for capitalist development(80). The very first major undertaking of the Kemalists was to convene a congress on economic policy. The 1923 izmir Economic Congress is of significance not only for adopting a

capitalistic development model(81) but also as the first organization in which the principle of occupational representation was applied(82). The model adopted by the Kemalists was capitalism not only because the "relevant historical experience of the leading elite as well as the class nature of the independence movement was necessitating such a model"(83) but also because of the existing mentality of the military-civilian elite.

The ideological and policy-oriented similarities of the Kemalists and the Unionists suggest that the impact of the last ten years of the Empire on the new rulers was enormous. Both elites strove to create a strong national bourgeoisie. As early as 1923, M.Kemal asked:

"How many millionaires do we have? None. Therefore, we are not going to be the enemy of those who have a few kuruş. On the contrary, we shall work for the emergence of several millionaires, even billionaires in our country"(84).

The harmonization of all interests was the common political program for the two elites:

"The existing classes are necessary... for each other... Therefore, the People's Party can...provide the conditions of progress and welfare for all classes"(85).

If we delineate the ideological motives behind the thoughts and actions of the Kemalists, we may say that (a) the party was the sole representative, and thus, the political articulation mechanism, of all interests; (b) social classes could only be elements of harmony in society and complementary to each other; (c) the nation is not composed of only those who are its members today, but has a

history and a future; the State, therefore, had to take care of the nation at the expense of some present members. The Kemalist political regime was, then, not a political manifestation of particular class interests, although many small town and rural notables were the allies of the leading military-bureaucratic intellectual elite(86). The regime, therefore, did not have to mobilize any particular class around political ideals. The local notables were content with a client relationship with the central elite who was unwilling to mobilize "the incipient urban proletariat and the great mass of agricultural workers and smallholders"(87). The military bureaucratic elite being the major, and the landed local notables the minor partner, the ruling coalition kept the lower strata of society out of the political power - sharing process.

The major partner always kept in mind that any social reform could deprive the local notables of their local power base and that such an action could be detrimental to "implicit trade-off which had materialized between the two groups"(88). Later we will propose that the secularizing and modernizing reforms of the regime were targeted at depriving the rival and old power contenders of communication with the people, instead of changing the traditional social relationships on the rural level. Having secured the strong loyalty of its partner, the military-bureaucratic elite had thus, never felt the need for a mass party; the RPP remained a cadre party, a non-mobilizational organization.

The RPP, at least at the beginning, was not the source for recruitment of state officials. It did not seek penetration into society by means of specialized organizations. Other organizations like industrial enterprises, professional groups, the armed forces kept an autonomy separate from the party. The political decision-making process did not

contain the political party during the early years of the regime. The First Assembly, to a certain extent, played the role of political interest aggregation and political articulation. The civilian and military bureaucracies, interest groups organized along professional lines were the components of the compromise-based decision-making process.

Here it may be concluded that since the military - civilian bureaucracy retained the veto power over the assembly, this transitional process cannot be regarded as the seed of a parliamentary system. Consequently, when the People's Party was officially established in 1923 it was included into the decision-making process as one of the components, and still the decision were reached outside the RPP structure. The party was by no means the predominant component of the whole process. Group interests could be represented within or without the party. Even the number of parties was not the essence of the regime. Consequently, the opposition group which outlived the First Assembly found no way of representation in the RPP-dominated Second Assembly; it finally established the Progressive Republican Party in 1924. The separatist elements of some ethnic minorities showed Mustafa Kemal and his friends that representation of group interests could not provide the desired solidarity for the country and that the state should be the pre-dominant component of the schema.

The 1935 RPP program established the concept that no autonomy should be left by the regime to certain social organizations; and all social "sets of people" must be represented by the RPP. The RPP elite's striving for a monopolistic position notwithstanding, the early and short-lived autonomy left by the regime to certain social organizations, the limited efforts of liberalization and increased social mobilization had created opportunities for the

emergence of an "alegal" opposition(89). This, in turn, strengthened by the lack of a sense of participation, led the peasants and emerging business community to become alienated from the RPP.

When the RPP thus became the only instrument of participation the party leadership began to broaden the party's social base. The elite who had no interest even in manipulated participation now felt the need to mobilize, at least, the representatives of business interests in well-defined monopolistic channels. Thus the professional representation in the Third Assembly became more visible compared to the Second(90). However the regime did not turn into a mobilizational authoritarianism but merely moved from bureaucratic-authoritarianism to single-party dominance. The coalition dominated by army officers and bureaucrats and excluding other groups without commitment to specific ideology, had given birth to an official, government-sponsored party. Instead of being the dominant one in a multiparty regime, the RPP was now becoming a single-party which was, among other things, in need of an ideology.

Ideology consists of the normative expectations of the elites according to which parties work, real phenomena are perceived and the future is designed. As already noted, Linz shows that authoritarian regimes are distinguished from totalitarian regimes by their lack of ideologies "intellectually elaborated and organized, often in written form"(91). Linz also argues that authoritarian regimes are based on mentalities which are "ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to situations"(92). However the idea of the existence of ideologies articulated by those who "are often not very close to the center of power within the party" is not rejected by Linz(93).

The Kemalist Regime is often portrayed as a non-dogmatic regime(94). Atatürk himself pointed out that a doctrine "would freeze the movement"(95). This may be particularly true for a regime which had to maintain unity in a newly-founded polity. Consequently, the "desired state of affairs" as a policy matter was not declared in the First Assembly Foundation Motion (Kuruluş Takriri) (1920) as it was in minds of the founders. It merely stated that the will of the nation should be represented only by the Grand National Assembly (GNA), that it should be within the jurisdiction only of the GNA alone to enforce laws, and that the affairs of the Sultanate and Caliphate should be organized by law after the Allied Occupation was lifted(96). Neither the idea of republic nor a secular state was implied in the early decisions of the Assembly. Similarly, in the Program of Populism ("Halkçılık Programı") of 1921, the pragmatic program of preparations for the War of Independence was established in a non-ideological way. The idea of a completely independent nation-state was praised and the GNA was invited to "organize the Defence of Rights Group of Anatolia and Rumelia to undertake material and moral preparations"(97). Following the victory, the First Assembly was sent on summer leave and M.Kemal took the chance to visit some parts of the country. On his visits, M.Kemal declared the principles of a party he intended to establish (1923). The first principle was a negative condition: the party should not be based on class interests for "we do not have organized classes but only professions"; the party should consist of all the people and personal objectives should be left out of the party program, which should be a "realizable" one. Finally the party should be "revolutionist", not "evolutionist"(98). With the hindsight provided by reforms implemented rapidly, one may assert that the "revolutionism" here only meant "the rejection of gradualism", or, in terms of the RPP's report for the 20th Anniversary, "the negation of incrementalist attitudes of a

group of parliamentarians who had seen (the regime founded with) the Assembly as a temporary one"(99). In M.Kemal's eyes, the Defence of Rights Group of the Assembly had performed its functions successfully and it had to be transformed into an organization which could undertake tasks "ranging from agriculture to commerce, to the fight against poverty, to transportation"(100).

Following M.Kemal's tour of Western Anatolia, 120 members proposed that the Assembly renew elections, and with a minor opposition new elections were accepted. Since the Party was not officially established, the Association of the Defence of Rights declared the new "Election Program" under the title of "Nine Principles"(101). This program can be regarded as the RPP's first declaration of policy(102). The principles were composed of two sections. The first three principles stated that "sovereignty belonged to the people; nobody but the Assembly is sovereign over the fate of the people; the abolition of the Sultanate was irreversable; everything would be based on the (idea of) national independence. The rest of the principles sought that the tithe be abolished, courts and laws reorganized, national banks strengthened, railroads improved, education unified and conscription shortened.

The temporary regulations of the Party came into force on September 9, 1923. According to this document, the party would not be known as a "revolutionary committee" but as a "reformative party"(103). The document also defined the concept of people in the minds of the founders:

From the perspective of the People's Party, the concept of the people is not restricted to any specific class. All those persons who do not acclaim any privilege but accept absolute equality before law are the people. Populists are

individuals who do not accept privileges of any family, class, religious group or individual but acknowledge the absolute freedom and sovereignty (of the people) in law enactment and enforcement(104).

Accordingly, M.Kemal, in his interview by the press in İzmit, said that it would be unwise for the Party, unduly repeating the bad experience of some other nations, to create social classes and encourage contradictions between them. "On the contrary", he said, "by preventing the emergence of exploitive classes we should set an example in the world"(105). However, the populism as defined by M.Kemal promised to shade ideological tones over the mentality in the coming years(106).

Similarly, reformism remained an attempt at limited structural transformations aimed at adopting modern ways of life, while at the same time maintaining basic continuity of political power distribution(107). As early as 1921, M.Kemal declared that the goals of the regime were (1) to assert national economic independence, i.e. anti-imperialism; (2) to break some economic structures to create national solidarity and harmony; and (3) to promote social justice for all sectors of the nation(108). Populism was oriented to a system in which the state would control all economic and social resources to assure that "statism" was not mentioned in official declarations and regulations before 1931 but, as early as 1923, M.Kemal, addressing the government-convened İzmir Economic Congress, equated national sovereignty with subordination of the economic world to the State(110). The central agency charged with achieving these goals was the state, for the political power was real and absolute insofar as it enjoyed jurisdiction over the economic decision.

Another early populist theme was that of "shared development", a principle to achieve maximum social and political harmony. Having rejected the "egotistical indivi-

dualism" of liberalism, and having assumed a community of interests among all groups of the nation, Ziya Gökalp had projected the possibility of achieving development with a minimum of social conflict(111). The Economic Pact adopted by the İzmir Economic Congress was a "romantic"(112) text of a solidarist world-view about the virtues to be sought and vices to be avoided by the Turks. However the resolutions of the Congress must be viewed in the light of M.Kemal's early expressions regarding the economic development. In 1922, in a reply to the Soviet Ambassador, he suggested that

There is no working class in Turkey since we lack a developed industry. Now, it is necessary to turn our petty bourgeoisie into a bourgeois class. The foreigners are crushing us. My aim is to develop our national commerce, to have factories opened and the mineral resources exploited, to help the Anatolian merchant and to make sure that he gets rich(113).

At the Congress, M.Kemal stressed that Turkey was underdeveloped in relation to national resources and that the remedy was not in being content with little(114) but in hard-work. Turkey would be a country of hard-working people. Labor should be completed with capital intensive methods. Capital, national or foreign, would be welcomed insofar as it took the risk and was free of political strings. In his concluding remarks, M.Kemal analyzed the classes of the "Union of Classes".

The interests of our people are different from each other's. Our people consists not of (isolated) classes but of classes of whose existence and results of labor are necessary to each others. My audience, this very minute, are farmers, artisans and merchants. And laborers. Which one of these can be hostile to any others? Who can deny that the farmer is in need of the artisan, the artisan needs the farmer, the

farmer needs the merchant, and all of them are in need of each and every one of them and of the laborer?

In the factories which we have today, and which we wish to increase in number, only our own labor must be employed. They must work in easy circumstances, comfortably and gladly, and all the classes we mentioned must get rich simultaneously, and enjoy the true pleasures of life, and, thus, they will find enough strength necessary to work. It can be, therefore, said on the proposed program that the political form designed in accordance with a national pact of work for people cannot be envisaged as an ordinary party, and I firmly believe that a political organization which could be created in an atmosphere of peace should be successful only when the nation, with unity and solidarity, support each other(115).

The resolutions of the Economic Congress, including that concerning foreign capital were taken seriously by the regime, and government programs of the 1920s were based on them(116). The major government policies in this decade were devoted to the implementation of these resolutions. Some important examples were the establishment of the İş Bankası (1924) for the provision of commercial credit, of the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası (1925) for industrial credit, the abolishment of the tithe (1925), adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (1926) and the Law to Encourage Industry (1927). However, the resolution on the workers' proposal that included the acknowledgement of the right to organize and to strike, was not taken up by the government. It moved in the opposite direction and outlawed the unions and strikes.

A few months later the Kemalist cadre achieved political as well as economic independence with the Lausanne Treaty. According to this Treaty, the capitulations which had been abolished by the Union and Progress government in 1914

but reimposed with even more adverse terms by the Sèrvès Treaty, were abolished; the European controlled Ottoman Public Debt Administration were cancelled and Turkey's sovereignty over her customs was recognized(117). Now the government was free to implement any economic policy generated by itself. Despite the urge of the İzmir Economic Congress for industrialization, most of the development objectives of the government were not expressed clearly. However the government was determined to divert the domestic market for manufactures to domestic industrial production by a protectionist policy, and to provide encouragement and support for industrial accumulation(118).

It can be said that these policies were dependent on the founders' commitment that the merchants, a handful of Turkish manufacturers and ship-owners, the large landowners and other local notables would assume the necessary role for economic development(119). The institutional framework within which the government envisaged development was a capitalist formation but the socio-economic order they sought was not without further qualifications. The leadership was determined to suppress the emergence of class conflicts by political control. The whole structure of the economy would be under the State's final authorization(120). Furthermore, the private enterprises would be allowed to operate insofar as they would assume a dynamic role and thus become "productive capital".

The mentality, then, in Linz' sense, can be summarized as the achievement of a national solidarity in a harmonious society by capitalist development through the enterprises with dynamic and state-authorized roles. The military-civilian intellectual cadres seeking modernization, landed classes striving for the abolition of the tithe and an unconditional regime of landownership, and nascent bourgeoisie waiting for a protectionist policy, exemption of industrial investments

from duties could only be united on such loose doctrinal grounds as nationalism and populism.

Since there were no national and power conflicts and an harmony of interests was retained, the mentality could become more apparent in the Constitution. The liberal argument against the principle of unity of powers was easily rejected on the grounds of nationalism and populism: "Since sovereignty, as a unity, resides in the nation, it cannot be divided by separation"(121). However on the same ground, the right of dissolution of the assembly by the president was rejected because the Assembly was regarded as the representative of the nation. Property rights which precluded land reform on the private lands and freedom of contract as the basis of capitalistic institutionalization were recognized by the new Constitution.

The non-mobilizational character of the regime was also displayed during the negotiations of women's political rights. There were arguments in favor of women, but they were defeated by the counter-arguments which were based on erosion of the traditional family structure of the society(122). The Young Turks had women's organizations as a part of their social mobilization program; but, probably because the Kemalists did not desire a social mobilization increase above the predefined degree, they did not have separate women, workers or youth organizations. All segments undertaking the modernization of society would be collected in umbrella-type organizations. Even this had to wait until the consolidation of political power.

Since the leadership of the War of Independence was not composed of those persons emerging from and mobilizing the grass roots but of those who organized it from above and of different backgrounds, not the party but the Assembly ap-

peared to be the real center where the power was balanced. However, in fighting a war of independence, the nationalist leaders had to expand their majority by co-opting those representing particularistic constituencies like tribal, religious and traditional groups. Linz argues that soon after the independence the actions of the opposition, or the perceptions of them by the leaders, the government's conception of nation-building as excluding peripheral, sectional, tribal demands, the difficult economic problems, and the expectations of the people lead those leaders to prevent, limit or exclude free political and electoral competition(123). Accordingly, as the nationalist movement and its leaders in general and M.Kemal in particular became identified with independence and statehood, the party gained authority. Again as Linz argues, like many other authoritarian regimes, the emerging regime lacked an elaborate single-party ideology with totalitarian or holistic traits. On the contrary, the multipartism of the late Ottoman years, the European impressions of the leaders and the existence of opposition groups in the first assembly and the leadership's great desire for harmonization of interests and prevention of class conflict were already bringing the idea of "another party" into mind and awakening desire for one. Since the regime was limited in regard to pluralism, that is the articulation of specific interests of ethnic minorities, religious groups, if not prohibited totally, was not encouraged, in the beginning, therefore, the second party should abide by certain limitations. The Kemalists tried twice to endure an opposition party, but as soon as they realized that the limitations envisaged by the regime would not be recognized nor welcomed, they closed the parties. However the opposition has become a neglected issue of political analysis of Turkish politics because (as we shall propose below) the regime had imposed censure over the press and, therefore, the opposition affairs had not been reported at length, and the official mentality

which later precluded political opposition had become identified by scientific analysis.

C. The Limited Pluralism of the One-Party Regime and Political Participation

As already indicated, the main characteristic of authoritarian regimes with regard to political participation of certain groups is their exclusionary nature(124). However, they are distinguished from totalitarian regimes by their tolerance to the participation of those groups, the articulation of whose interests is considered to be legitimate(125).

According to Özbudun, the absence of a civil society, that is the low level of socio-economic modernization and the lack of social pluralism, resulted in a rather strong one - party regime in Turkey. The Kemalist elite found only a few competing groups and a weak rival elite; their regime had to tolerate very low social pluralism(126). They very rarely resorted to violence(127).

The groups excluded from politics by authoritarian regimes, usually without commitment to specific ideology, are the masses demanding greater a share in the wealth of the society, particularly workers, farm laborers and under-privileged peasants(128). But, sometimes we find authoritarian regimes in societies without liberal institutions and social organizations where the large rural population has not been introduced to interest aggregation structures. In such societies, authoritarian regimes function with relative ease and exclude only religious, ethnic or cultural minorities(129).

In the Kemalists' case the contending groups had no ties with rural or urban masses. They were composed of religious, ethnic and rival political personalities.

The first opposition to M.Kemal's efforts for a political organization had appeared in Erzurum. While M.Kemal created the Anatolia and Rumelia Defense of Rights Group in the Assembly, "in accordance with M.Kemal's directives"(130) the Communist Party of Turkey was founded legally by his loyal associates in May 1920(131). This party neither established local offices nor contacts with the international communist organizations. The following month, an illegal communist party was established in Ankara(132).

M.Kemal, in an Assembly address, accused this organization of "giving hopes to the Soviets about a possible uprising and revolution in Turkey". By the end of 1920, some deputies, with the help of the illegal communist party, established Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (People's Communist Party) in Ankara and Eskişehir(133). The leaders of the local notables in Erzurum, among them Hoca Raif (Dinç) and Hoca Yeşilzade Salih, were not content with the developments in Ankara especially with the transformation within the Associations of Defence of Rights and the communist parties. They, in turn, established an opposition organization in Erzurum and declared a Program for Elections(134). Having secured the support of General Kazım Karabekir the Commander of Eastern Front, these religious and local leaders could have urged the organization of the opposition group in the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal tried to deal with the Erzurum group through telegraph communication. He wanted to convince Kazım Karabekir that he was not assuming leadership of the nationalist movement. His role was "one of the ordinary executive" due to "the shortage of manpower". His assurance that Turkey would have a Caliph of Islam and a Sultan provided that "the universal understanding of populism" is accepted(135) did not yield positive results and the opposition was organized into the Second Group in July 1922. This group, at the beginning, sought only to influence the negotiations within the group of Defence of

of Rights and to curb the "possible temptations for the leadership"(136). The members of this group acted in unison during the discussions on the extension of the temporary rights of M.Kemal as the Chief Commander of the Military.

The Second Group, compared to M.Kemal's First Group, was neither weak nor undisciplined(137). Its members had their proposals passed by the Assembly and M.Kemal was not able to obtain the two-thirds of votes necessary for the renewal of elections and was forced to be content with simple majority. Those who provided local support to the Second Group in provinces also opposed the 9 Principles of M.Kemal with which he declared his intension of establishing the People's Party. The group's leader Ali Şükrü of Trabzon was assassinated by Topal Osman Ağa, the Commander of the Assembly Guard Brigade, just the day before the proposal of new elections was put to vote but his death was disclosed five days later. However, now M.Kemal's group was strong enough to replace those executive members of the Association in Trabzon who strongly and publicly opposed M.Kemal's order of transforming the Association into the party(138).

However the Kemalists' 1923 elections were not a facile victory. M.Kemal had had to work hard to see that those candidates "who are known to be loyal to the principles of the Association of Defence of Rights" were elected. He appealed to the nation to support the candidates of the Association and especially to the residents of Istanbul not to "split votes to encourage the enemy". It is understood from M.Kemal's declaration to the Association's branch offices that the opposition groups worked against the Association's candidates and tried to replace the center-appointed candidates with their friends(139). The Second Group's members and prominent figures of the Committee of Union and Progress were swept out of existence in the Assembly. M.Kemal, himself,

gives evidence of his intervention in the process of selecting the candidates(140). However the Second Assembly had not been as pliant as was desired, if not full of opposition like the first one. Now the opposition was organized around the issue of the Caliphate and its future.

M.Kemal, "dividing the implementation (process) into several phases, capitalizing on the popular beliefs and opinion, and progressing on a step-by-step basis"(141), first had the Sultanate abolished, 12 months later the Republic declared, and finally (6 months later) the caliphate abolished. The Kemalists were aware of the opposing groups gathered in the Society for the Protection of Sacred Institutions (Muhafaza-i Mukaddesad Cemiyeti) as early as 1921 and of the fact that the delay in driving the Greeks out of Anatolia had stimulated opposition(142). M.Kemal never did bring about the creation of a new polity as one agenda item to the Assembly. However, the clearance of Anatolia from the enemy and the evacuation of Eastern Thrace gave M.Kemal enough power to confront the problem of the Sultanate. Meanwhile, the British government sent invitations for the Peace Conference proposed by the Allies to both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments. The Istanbul government's participation in the peace talks could have resulted in resuming its power. It would have been the end of political and administrative positions for most of the people in Ankara. M.Kemal, therefore, judged that it was the right time to take the first step to end the Sultan's government.

Following the invitation to the peace talks of the two governments, M.Kemal's efforts to have Tefvik Paşa, the grand-vizier of the Istanbul Government, refrain from participation, disturbed the opposition, Generals Rauf (Orbay), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) and Refet (Bele) called him for a private talk in Ankara on October 28, 1922. During the dinner Rauf

expressed the Opposition's grievance on the rumors that "the Sultanate, and perhaps the Caliphate would be abolished"(143). Although he was seeking an opportunity in the Assembly. M.Kemal did not disclose his intentions but said that "the problem in discussion was not a problem of the day, and there was no need for any excitement and anxiety in the Assembly". He had even given a written assurance to Rauf. The following day, the Grand-Vizier applied to the Assembly to send an informed representative to Istanbul to organize the Turkish delegation for the Lausanne Conference. M.Kemal had a general debate opened on Tefvik Paşa's application, and inviting Rauf and Kazım Karabekir(144) to his room in the Assembly and not mentioning the assurance he gave the previous day, asked him to address the Assembly in favor of the abolition of the Sultanate. Rauf addressed the Assembly twice and proposed that the day of the abolition of the Sultanate be celebrated as a national holiday. However, the general assembly, listening to Miralay (Colonel) Selahattin and Ziya Hürşit who were in direct opposition, sent the proposals regarding the separation of the Sultanate and the caliphate and the abolition of the former to different parliamentary commissions. Noticing the reluctance of the Assembly, M.Kemal proposed the establishment of a joint commission, and when the members of the commission began delivering rather long speeches, he himself addressed it. He flatly said that the nation had seized the power from the Sultans and had no intention of returning it to the usurpers, and that "this would be so no matter what happens, if everyone agreed that this (solution) was the natural (development), it would be appropriate; otherwise, sooner or later the facts would be clear but meanwhile some heads would have rolled"(145).

Perhaps not only this threat of violence, but the compromise M.Kemal accepted by retaining the caliphate, resulted in the unanimous acceptance of the proposal. During the

ballot only one member of the assembly shouted that he was rejecting the proposal, but he was silenced by the shouting of "No voice". By this decree, the caliph was left as no more than the leading Muslim religious dignitary, to be chosen by the Assembly at its convenience. The last Ottoman sultan, now the Caliph, Mehmed VI, fled the country sixteen days later, on November 17, 1922, and was deposed as caliph. On November 18, M.Kemal asked Refet (Bele), the new representative of the Government in Istanbul, to contact Abdülmecit, son of Abdülaziz, and find out if he would accept not participating in rule in any meaning, any form, any way, by any means if he was elected caliph. Abdülmecid took an oath not to flee the country and to obey the conditions set by M.Kemal(146). The following day the Grand National Assembly elected him as the Caliph, and the traditional ceremony of homage was performed. This arrangement seemed to appease those who might have opposed M.Kemal had he abolished the sultanate and caliphate together. The Caliphate had then 16 months to live, but, only three months after the election of the Caliph, M.Kemal began propagating against the institution.

In the interview with the six chief columnists of the Istanbul newspapers in Izmit, M.Kemal said that the idea that the Caliphate would make Istanbul the center of Islam and that visitors, students, scholars from all parts of the Islam world would come to Istanbul to study was a "deadly mistake" and that the Caliphate should be absolutely abolished. He added that he wanted to convince the journalists because "(he) want(ed) to have all the journalists help implement this reform program with articles written wholeheartedly"(147). He went on:

There is a group of fanatic hocas; the people are under the influence of this group rather than educated religious leaders... This ignorant and fanatic lot

are, in fact, well-organized and cautious brokers of influence. Applying to the government they say that people would follow them, and if the government did not follow their policies and supply them with what they were asking then this would be fatal for the future of the government; to the people they say that the government was in their hands and if people did not follow them and seek refuge from the government under their cloak they would suffer consequences. If we would not lend these brokers an ear and if we made sure that people understand that the government does not pay any attention to them, they would vanish(148).

The following day he addressed the journalists more formally and expressed his anti-caliphate ideas more frankly:

To keep the (Ottoman) dynasty in the country under the cloak of Caliphate will create a dangerous duality, and thus make harmonious and sound developments impossible. Those colonialist powers want to keep all the Muslim countries bound with the chains of fanaticism, and thus prevent their struggle for their rights and freedom. Because they saw us as a colony to be shared they have been distracting our attention with the idea of the "Caliphate of 300 million muslims" and keeping the nation under the pressure of fanaticism.

But the baselessness of the idea of the caliphate has been proved in the (First) World War when the imperialisms' Muslim subjects had been seen to be on all fronts against us, and when the Holly War declared by us (against the Allied Forces) turned out to be useless. They will not be happy when we abolish the Caliphate, on the contrary, they will be sorry to lose their major instrument in keeping muslims asleep(149).

The "duality" M.Kemal feared was probably the duality

of elites; not only the members of the dynasty but also a certain group of official ulema who would demand the perpetuation of their share in political power. To deny them power required shifting the base of power from the divine right of the Ottoman dynasty to the secular legitimacy of the Republic. This shift was reinforced with some reforms which, in turn, prevented the reproduction of values sustaining the Ottoman system. Among these reforms, the unification of instruction, abolishing religious law courts, incorporation of ulema into the new state apparatus as the officials of the Directory of Religious Affairs, prohibition of the activities of all Islamic brotherhoods, and the change of script from Arabic to Latin are especially important(149). The new regime, changing the bases of the official legitimacy, denied the state machinery to the functionaries of the previous regime(150). This drive for centralized power on the part of the one-party regime led it to create certain devices for diminishing the impact of the old functionaries. The complete divorce of public education from religion, and compulsory, free, elementary education would soon make the ancien order incomprehensible to new generations. However, this drive would be presented to people by those groups who lost their grip over the religious offices as abandoning Islam and would provoke resentment against the regime. In fact, "the state was not anticlerical as long as the ulema made no overt attempt to interfere with reforms"(151). That is, the religious interests were not seen by the Kemalists as legitimately entitled to share political power, and therefore would be excluded from politics. The regime would also limit "the power, organizational capacity and autonomy"(152) of religious elites. The government, establishing martial law and sending the Tribunal of Independence of Ankara to provinces where the people demonstrated against the reform movement, suppressed all the opposition(153) and implemented its exclusionary policies.

Also excluded from political participation were the ethnic minorities. Although the officials of the one-party regime always labelled ethnic upheavals as religious obscurantism, from 1924 to 1938, 18 different rebellions took place in the Eastern and south-eastern provinces(154). Only one of them was in a town in the western Anatolia. The most important of them was the Sheikh Said which took place between February 13-May 31, 1925. The government implied that in the Progressive Republicans were behind the religious provocation and the Tribunal of Independence executed six of the Party's 29 deputies(155). Many local notables, ethnic leaders, were also executed.

The other group excluded from politics was the ex - Unionist leaders(156). The Union and Progress Association had dissolved itself in 1918. But, as Tunçay observes, the Unionists were manning the republic's administrative staff, although its top leaders were left out of the National Struggle and of the new statecraft(157). Among them, Kara Kemal with his extraordinary ability to manipulate associations, and Cavit Bey with his great influence over the members were the most dangerous to the Kemalists' rule(158). Some of the leaders of the Union and Progress allegedly drafted a "secret program" for the 1923 elections(159). However, some of the Unionists, finding it impossible to revive the Association, joined the People's Party and got elected to the Second Assembly. Many of them later joined the Progressive Republicans.

The denunciation of a "plot" to assassinate Mustafa Kemal gave the regime the chance to end the Unionist threat. Those who were implicated in the plot consisted not only of the remaining Progressive Republican deputies but also of the Unionist leaders who had remained outside the Party. The Izmir Tribunal of Independence executed 15 PRP deputies and Unionist

leaders. The Ankara Tribunal, on the other hand, sentenced four of the Unionist leaders to death, and 7 of the PRP members to ten years of imprisonment(160).

The system, however, allowed more pluralism within the Assembly insofar as it guaranteed the prominent role of the military-civilian Kemalist elite and as it implemented policies that would bar the excluded strata from political participation. As Özbudun shows, this was demonstrated by the relative freedom of discussion in the Assembly and in the party's parliamentary group on various issues(161). The silence of the Assembly after the Restoration of Order and the demise of the PRP must have seemed more than the desired situation(162) because Mustafa Kemal suggested that one of his close friends and a former prime minister, Fethi (Okyar), create an opposition party(163). According to Mustafa Kemal, there would be a mild contest between the parties; the President would remain neutral over the two republican, secular and loyal parties(164). The Free Republican Party (FRP) was established on August 12, 1930. It was neither as "artificial" as claimed(165), nor constituted a "liberal alternative to the RPP's 'Statist' development strategy"(166). The Free Party favored more liberal economic policies(167); but it enlisted only fourteen members and participated in just thirteen sittings altogether(168). However, strong local support for the party was displayed in many areas(169). The thrust of the party in the villages especially was more impressive(170). It was rapidly understood by the RPP cadres that the FRP could (and did) turn into the instrument of interest aggregation for those who were kept out of politics. The RPP, again, resorted to the allegations that religious and social reactionaries were infiltrating the FRP(171). The basic nature of the regime, the exclusion of certain strata, was put in jeopardy(172). M.Kemal, under the influence of his own associates in the RPP, withdrew his support(173). The FRP

leadership was convinced to abolish the party, and they did so on December 18, 1930. However, because the leadership of the FRP were "Mustafa Kemal's his own personnel" and not his rivals as were the Progressive Republicans(174), the Party did not meet a violent end.

D. Conclusion: The Type of the Authoritarianism of the One - Party Regime

In the light of foregoing discussions, Özbudun places the Turkish one-party regime between the military-bureaucratic and postindependence mobilizational regime categories of Linz(175). The presentation of national aspirations and grievances, and obliteration of class cleavages by and in the RPP, according to Özbudun, make the party more important than those official government-sponsored single parties of military-bureaucratic regimes(176). But he does not find the regime as mobilizational as the political regimes of the post-colonialistic Africa(177). The civil service and professional army inherited from the Ottoman Empire saved the Kemalists from recruiting new cadres in large quantities. The small staff required by the new administration in Ankara could have been filled by a limited mobilization of the educated urban intellectuals.

Frey, evaluating the RPP as the main unofficial link between the government and people, shows that the one-party concerted the activities of the legislative and executive powers(178). The party was the main recruitment channel into politics and the symbol of identification. It could provide a "democratic environment" for political activity if there were not discord among the party elite on the policies to be implemented after the independence. Naming the situation as a post-independence crisis, Frey observes that M.Kemal only excluded those rival to him(179). However, Frey points

to the fact that democracy was precluded not because of the discord among the elite but as a logical result of the Kemalists' tutelary approach to political development(180). In the early stages of the nation-building process, Frey holds, democratic goals can artfully be held in abeyance while the society concentrates on seemingly prerequisite social and economic reforms; democracy can then be erected on suitable social and economic foundations as a second stage in the construction process(181). As Tunaya rightly observes, such a tutelary position requires a degree of authoritarianism on the part of elite, and the Kemalist one-party displayed an authoritarian character from 1930 to 1946, incorporating its principles into the constitution and party officials into the administration of the state(182). According to Özbudun, the tutelary authoritarianism of the RPP did not aim at the indefinite exclusion of the subordinate groups from politics; on the contrary, by emphasizing the role of an educator, it strove gradually to broaden the scope of political participation(183). Linz also refers to the Kemalist regime as an example of transformation of a bureaucratic military authoritarian regime into a moderately authoritarian regime and later into a competitive democracy(184).

We may say that the regime sought a controlled mobilization, at least until the 1930s. After the frightening experiment of the Free Party, the intimidated RPP elite resorted to limiting the autonomy of privileged groups, too. The economic development determined to what extent those controlling the means of production would be allowed a place in the ruling elite. Similarly, as the elite felt the need to incorporate the underprivileged, controlled organizations, semi-official trade unions and corporative organizations(185) had been established(186). This perhaps explains the increase in the volume of participation at the end of the decade(187). Nevertheless, the Kemalists' conception of nation-building as

withholding democratic goals until the suitable economic and social foundations are laid(188) led them to avoid free electoral competition until the external dynamics forced them.

We may say that the Kemalist one-party regime, with (a) its approximation to limited pluralism rather than to monism; (b) selectively mobilizational character and (c) predominance of a flexible mentality and absence of centrality of ideology, was authoritarian. This regime, like all authoritarian ones, had a strategy for manipulating communications. Linz, among the three criteria for determining whether a regime is authoritarian, counts the share of the one-party in the control of mass media(189). Here I will propose that the Kemalist one-party's share in this had always been higher than the parties of the following democratic era.

II. HYPOTHESES ON THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OF THE ONE-PARTY REGIME IN TURKEY

Many of the changes in the communication strategy moved consistently together with the process of power consolidation. If we could present variation in the consolidation process, it would be seen to flow in one direction to a high point. This variation would also be seen to coincide with an imagined graphic presentation of the alterations in the regime's press policy. This suggested slope is also reflected in the words of the leader about the press.

As early as 1922, Mustafa Kemal thought that the press was the collective voice of the nation and did enlighten and inspire it(190). In 1923, he said that the press could not be subjected to domination and influence by no one(191). Although he continued paying lip service to press freedom in 1924,

since many journalists were being tried by the Tribunals of Independence, in 1924, he began emphasizing that the Republic had the right to demand the manifestation of the will of the founders of the state from the press.

Today, it is essential that the nation remains sincerely and solidly united. This is how the common good and happiness will be assured. The struggle is not over yet. The duty of the press to have this truth properly relayed to the ears and conscience of the nation is of utmost importance(192).

In 1925, he was in a more frontal attack against the "irresponsible members of the press"

We should not pay attention to the ideas presented as the true opinion of the public. We do not pay attention to those who present us as arbitrary despots and our sincere efforts as despotic. They are unfair and mistaken. It is true that we can be violent and merciless against those who try to prevent the improvement of the nation. We cannot let them, consciously or unconsciously, disturb our social order. We have to be excused if we did not tolerate them and refrain from despotism against them(193).

In 1930, he was demanding "more discretion" in the "utilization of the liberty of the pen" because the country had suffered "so many misfortunes resulting from the abuse of liberties".

Mustafa Kemal's words notwithstanding, in the light of the discussion of the political regime, one may perhaps expect that communications would have been limited to those whose participation in politics was legitimate. The new regime had inherited very limited transportation and communication media from the Ottoman. If the one-party regime

envisaged a total mobilization of urban and rural masses around certain ideology, it would rapidly construct new telegraph and railway lines and develop other means of communication and transportation. Since the regime sought only a limited participation and controlled mobilization, the top elite concentrated on the consolidation of their authority within the ruling elite. They did not attempt to create a new society by starting with the masses. I, therefore, propose that the formal communications had to be limited to the top elite and lesser elites of the urban areas. Because the regime's tutelary character required the step-by-step undertaking of social and economic issues, not only the physical range but content-wise scope of communications had to be limited. The messages relayed to the readers and listeners had to solidify the elite's hold on the members of the military and bureaucratic elite.

Such a limiting strategy requires the subordination of the press to the state apparatus; media subordination is realized through government control on appointments of the media personnel, financial subsidy programs and influence over the attitudes of the professionals. In this context, I propose that the one-party regime had to establish control over the media coverage to a degree dependent on the extent of consolidation of power at a given time. As understood from the history of the regime, the Kemalist single party resorted to almost all of the known ways and means of subordinating the press.

Due to the specific circumstances, the Kemalist elite had not only to establish its own communication network, but also to curb rival or alternative communications. The exclusionary character of the regime had forced the elite to cut off the communications link of the representatives of illegitimate interests. Regarding the agenda-setting problem

of the country, I propose that for the formal media, the exclusionary political regime meant refraining from relaying messages of those persons who are or were in overt or concealed conflict with the regime. This required continuing vigilance on the part of the press. That vigilance, in turn, necessitated that those sharing the same values or intimate information with the top elite staffed the media institutions.

However, the regime could not be content with a communication network limited in scope. The Kemalists, desiring gradually to expand their control from elite to mass and to replace social values with those necessitated by their mentality, had to erect specific institutions such as the political party and educational system. Reforming the existing institutions they made the religious functionaries of the Ottoman system unable to perpetuate their old values. But even these institutions refrained from increasing social mobilization rapidly. As the mass media were confined to cities and new means of transportation to urban areas, literacy increased only 9 percent in eleven years; urbanization raised from 32 to 40 per cent (194). Improvement in education was less on the mass and it was on primary level than on the middle and higher levels, because they qualified one for membership in the dominant elite.

The RPP had covered the entire country with branch offices of varying degrees of effectiveness (195). Broad segments of the intellectual stratum were integrated into a political communication network of the party and inculcated into values of the top elite.

The brief analysis of the development of one-party regime perhaps showed that the centralizing and standardizing elite created such a political situation that almost all aspects of the society were shaped in accordance with, if not

by, it. Yet these hypotheses could be supported by research to the extent to which the basic assumption of this essay that political regime shapes mass media and not vice versa holds true.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

- (1) Sartori points at the "current ambiguity of the 'one-party' notion"; asserting that one-party implies no market for political entrepreneurs, but not rejecting that it constitutes a system, he coins the word "uni-partism": G.Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp.220-221. Cf., M.Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931) (Establishment of One-Party Administration in Turkish Republic (1923-1931)). (Ankara: Yurt, 1981), p.10/ft.2.
- (2) These sources, among others, portray the regime as authoritarian attributing different levels of coercion: F.W.Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1965); S.P.Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems", in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. S.P.Huntington and C.H.Moore, (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp.3-47; M.Tunçay, op.cit.; C.H.Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy", in Authoritarian politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, eds. S.P.Huntington and C.H.Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp.48-74; J.Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in The Handbook of Political Science, eds. F.I.Greenstein and N.W.Polsby, (Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp.175-411; E.Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Regime", in Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. A.Kazancıgil and E.Özbudun, (London: 1981), pp.79-103. Sartori also lists Turkey under the monopolistic regimes: op.cit., pp.277-278.
- (3) Since neither the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) nor the Free Republican Party (FRP) had been electoral rival to the Republican People's Party (RPP), the one-party character of the regime had never changed. For the importance of "electoral arrangement" of parties in determining the type of regime, see Sartori, op.cit., p.221.
- (4) On a continuum of pluralism, Linz classifies five different configurations from military-bureaucratic to single-party predominance: op.cit., pp.278 ff.
- (5) Ibid., p.269.
- (6) Sartori, op.cit., p.222. This dimension, as Sartori cites, is the one used by La Palombara and Weiner in their classification of competitive systems. La Palombara and Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, pp.38-40.

- (7) Ibid., pp.223 ff.
- (8) Linz, upon the criticism leveled at his idea that authoritarian regimes lack ideology (Linz, in op.cit., p.267, cites Bolivar Lamonnier, "Ideologia em Regimes Autoritarios: uma critica a Juan J.Linz, Estudos Cebrap, 1974:7, pp.69-92) elaborated his distinction between ideology and mentality. He asserts now that mentality and ideology "...are part of a broader phenomenon of ideas leading to action-oriented ideals (op.cit. pp.267 ff). Concerning the communication process, mentality is, in fact, as determinative as ideology: Mentality delineates the intellectual attitude whereas ideology determines intellectual content (Ibid., p.267); but, in communications, delineating the borders of professional activity is equal to determining the content of communications. From the point of view of communications, Sartori's "one-party authoritarian regime is no different from "one-party pragmatic": "The pragmatic party...can exist on pure and simple grounds of expediency" (Sartori, op.cit., p.224), and any form of expediency spells a design and a strategy of action on a political plane, finally and coming back to Linz' point, it means determination of intellectual attitude. Therefore, regarding communications, authoritarian and pragmatic one-party regimes will be differentiated from both totalitarian and democratic regimes, but will not be significantly different from each other.
- (9) For the dualism of the elite in Turkish history see Frey, op.cit., pp.37-43. Aslo T.Z.Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler (Political Parties in Turkey), (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş, 1952), pp.475-476 gives the occupational profile of the delegates to the congresses which prepared the national movement.
- (10) M.Heper, "Politics of Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", International Political Science Review, I, 1 (January 1980).
- (11) Ş.Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key Concept to Turkish Politics", Daedalus (Winter, 1973): 169-190.
- (12) P.Witteck, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: Luzac, 1965).
- (13) Frey, op.cit., p.301.
- (14) B.Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: Oxford Univ, Press, 1961), p.59.

- (15) Frey, op.cit., p.302.
- (16) For the origins of political parties and their importance on political process see La Palombara, Politics within Nation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp.515-519.
- (17) Y.Tezel, Turkish Economic Development: Policy and Achievements, (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), Ch. V. On the corruption of the UPA the CND and the Society of Tradesmen see also F.Ahmad, "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918", in Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (Turkey's Social and Economic History), (Ankara: Meteksan, 1980), pp.337-339.
- (18) Özbudun, op.cit., p.80.
- (19) On June 21, 1919, in Amasya Mustafa Kemal issued the "Declaration of Independence" and summoned all CND to the Sivas Congress. On July 23-August 6, 1919, the nationalists' congress at Erzurum witnessed the issue of National Pact, on September 4-13, 1919 the nationalists' congress at Sivas established the Representative Committee.
- (20) S.J.Shaw and E.K.Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol.II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.315-317, 344-346.
- (21) For the organizational aspects of this pre-assembly regime, see Tunçay, op.cit., pp.28-35.
- (22) According to Tunçay, the "Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia" had adopted the regulations of the "Society to Defend the Rights of Eastern Anatolia", verbatim. Ibid., p.28, fn.3.
- (23) Tunaya points to the fact that the Society in fact, did not have power over all the local resistance organizations: Tunaya, op.cit., pp.427-527. Also see Tunçay, op.cit., p.33.
- (24) The local branch offices were asked to report to the headquarters at least twice a week. See Tunçay, op.cit., pp.32-34. Also see U.İğdemir, Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanakları (The Minutes of the Representative Committee), (Ankara: T.Tarih Kurumu, 1975).
- (25) Some authors consider the Society as a political party. Cf. Tunaya, op.cit., p.510; D.A.Rustow, "The Development of Political Parties in Turkey", in Political Parties and Political Development, eds. J.La Palombara and M.Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.112, and Tunçay, op.cit., pp.35 ff.

- (26) The local branch offices of the society had applied to M.Kemal to specify the characteristics of those to be lected to the Assembly. Tunçay cites Y.Nadi, Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları, (Memoirs of the War of Independence), (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1978), p.337. However, Turkish representatives repeatedly assured the Allied representatives that elections were not rigged. See S.L.Meray, ed., Lozan Barış Konferansı (Lausanne Peace Conference), (Ankara: SBF Yay., 1969), pp.359-367.
- (27) Frey, op.cit., p.306, cites Kılıç Ali, Kılıç Ali Hatıralarını Anlatıyor (Kılıç Ali Presents His Reminiscences), (İstanbul: Sel, 1955), p.67. Also see Özbudun, op.cit., pp.80-81.
- (28) Tunçay points to the fact that there were two "formally established parties at that date: Turkish Communist Party and Turkish People's Socialist Party. Cf. Özbudun, op.cit., p.81.
- (29) M.Kemal Atatürk, A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927, Second Edition (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981).
- (30) Ibid., p.502. The factions Mustafa Kemal mentioned in the Speech are the Solidarity or Union Group (Tesanüt), the Independence Group (İstiklal), the Union for the Defense of Rights (Müdafai Hukuk), and the Reform Group (İslahat Grubu).
- (31) Ibid., p.501.
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Yirmi Yıl İçinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1943), pp.8 ff.
- (34) Speech, op.cit., p.503.
- (35) Cf. Tunçay, op.cit., p.42, fn 31 and Duverger, Political Parties, (New York: Wiley, 1959, introduction).
- (36) The number of the members of the group is different in various sources. Tunçay notes that it started with 133 members: op.cit., p.43. But according to Frey it was as large as 197 members. Tunaya gives the number as "approximately 262".
- (37) Frey, op.cit., p.307. Also Özbudun, op.cit., p.81.
- (38) Tunçay, op.cit., p.50 fn.52.
- (39) For the analysis of these principles see supra. The ideology of the One-party.

- (40) Tunçay cites Kılıç Ali, op.cit., p.120. Also see appendix 5 in Tunçay, op.cit. for the text of the directive sent to the local committees of the society on the rules for nomination.
- (41) Istanbul had become the center of the opposition. For the analysis of opposition see supra. The Opposition to the One-Party.
- (42) The prime minister Rauf (Orbay) resigned from his post rejecting Mustafa Kemal's idea that the Lausanne Conference and İsmet's (İnönü) achievements there were successful.
- (43) Neue Frie Presse, September 24, 1923.
- (44) 23 article constitution of 1921 remained in effect until 1924. The republic was proclaimed by amending only 3 articles to the text. See A.S.Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri (Turkish Constitutional Texts), (Ankara: SBF, 1953), pp.95-96.
- (45) For the comparative significance of the party group see Frey, op.cit., p.302 fn.2.
- (46) In the Speech, M.Kemal gives a detailed story how he and a few of his friends prepared the draft on the night of October 28 and how they convinced some prominent members of the party on October 29. See Speech, op.cit., pp.664-673.
- (47) Vatan, Tevhidiefkar, November 1, 1923.
- (48) For the letter of the chairman of the Bar Association, Lütfi Fikri, to the Caliph, see Tanin, November 10, 1923.
- (49) Tunçay, op.cit., pp.72-87.
- (50) Although there was no conviction in the Press Trail, Lütfi Fikri was sentenced to 5 years of penal servitude. He was pardoned on February 13, 1924. For the detailed description of trials see A.E.Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (What I Witnessed and Lived Through in the Recent Past) Vol.3, (İstanbul: Yenilik, 1970), pp.94-99. Also Tunçay, op.cit., pp.68-86.
- (51) Present in the meeting at Izmir were İsmet (İnönü); General Kazım (Karabekir), the Minister of War; General Fevzi (Çakmak), the Chief of General Staff. Speech, op.cit., p.700.

- (52) Ibid.
- (53) The unification of instruction is very important from the future legitimation of the regime. See, supra, The Limited Pluralism of the One-Party.
- (54) Tunçay, op.cit., pp.90-91.
- (55) Vatan, March 21, 1924.
- (56) For the debates on the 1924 Constitution, see, S.Gözübüyük and Zekai Sezgin, 1924 Anayasası Hakkındaki Meclis Görüşmeleri, (The Debates in the Assembly on the 1924 Constitution), (Ankara: SBF Yay., 1957).
- (57) Speech, op.cit., pp.703-737.
- (58) Ibid., p.705.
- (59) Ibid.
- (60) Ibid.
- (61) Ibid., p.706.
- (62) Ibid., p.720.
- (63) Frey, op.cit., p.325. Also see Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları (The Fundamentals of our War of Independence), (İstanbul: Sinan Neşriyatevi, 1933); Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, (Recollections of the National Struggle), (İstanbul: Vatan, 1953-57).
- (64) Tunaya, op.cit., p.608.
- (65) Tunçay, op.cit., p.103.
- (66) According to Tunaya the opposition first favored two other names: The Rescue or Demption (İstihlas) and the Radical Republican Party (Cezri Cumhuriyet): op.cit., p.609. Frey finds the first name reflecting the party's true conception of its goal-that of saving the Ottoman heritage from Kemalist spoliation: op.cit., p.326, fn. 22.
- (67) Speech, op.cit., p.734.
- (68) Frey, op.cit., p.330 fn 27. Cf. Tunaya, op.cit., pp. 606, 621.
- (69) Tunaya, op.cit., pp.615-620; Frey, op.cit., p.331; Tunçay, op.cit., pp.103 fn 87, 104.

- (70) For M.Kemal's guarded but illuminative interview on the PRP, see his statement to the Times reporter on December 11, 1924: Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements) Vol.III, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954), p.76. Also see Tunçay, op.cit., p.104.
- (71) İsmet (İnönü) remained as the Deputy Chairman of the RPP. But after his second resignation in 1937, he transferred his responsibilities in the Party to the new Prime Minister, Celal Bayar. For Bayar's letter on this subject to Tunçay see Tunçay, op.cit., p.105 fn 91.
- (72) After İsmet's resignation only three more deputies resigned from the RPP but they did not join the PRP. Tunçay, op.cit., p.106.
- (73) Recep (Peker) was a minister in the Fethi (Okyar) government. But he resigned soon after and was appointed as the Secretary-General of the RPP. Tunçay, op.cit., p.137.
- (74) For the text of the law which gave the government the authority to ban all the activity regarded to be related with the revolt, see Tunçay, op.cit., p.139 fn.19.
- (75) A.E.Yalman, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.179ff. Also for the pressure put by the primer on the members of the Tribunals, see Avni Doğan, Kurtuluş, Kuruluş ve Sonrası (Independence, Establishment and After), (İstanbul: Dünya, 1964). Avni Doğan was the deputy prosecutor of the Tribunal for the eastern provinces. Tunçay, op.cit., p.144.
- (76) The journalists tried by the Eastern provinces Tribunal appealed to the President by a cable, demanding his personal pardon, and were released altogether. Tunçay, op.cit., p.145.
- (77) Tunaya, op.cit., pp.621-622.
- (78) Fethi Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam (One Man in Three Epochs), (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1980).
- (79) Frey, op.cit., p.338.
- (80) The deputy-president of the First Assembly, Celalettin Arif, who was later designated Minister of Justice, had founded a joint mining company with an Italian firm and sold them his concessions in the Ereğli region. He had abused his political influence and position in the validation of his concessions and his contract with the Italians. When some deputies interrogated his dealings

with citizens of a country with which Turkey was still in a state of war, influential members of the Assembly had strongly defended his position and agreements with "foreign capital". For a detailed analysis of the Celalettin Arif debate and the concession granted during the war years to a United States businessman, Admiral Colby M. Chester, see Y. Tezel, "Birinci Büyük Millet Meclisinde Yabancı Sermaye Sorun: Bir Örnek Olay" (The Problem of Foreign Capital in the First Grand National Assembly: A Case Study), SBF Dergisi (25:1) 1970, pp.239-250, and idem, "Birinci Büyük Millet Meclisi Anti-Emperyalist Miydi?". Chester Ayrıcalığı" (Was the First National Assembly Anti-Imperialist: The Chester Concession), SBF Dergisi (25:4), 1970, pp.288-318. In addition, Boratav, Devletçilik (Statism), (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1974), discusses nepotism and corruption, as well as the early capitalistic tendencies during the War of Independence.

- (81) G.Ökçün, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, (Turkish Economic Congress), (Ankara: SBF Yay., 1971), pp.435-437. Tezel analyses the resolutions with regard to specific demands: see Y. Tezel, Turkish Economic Development: Policy and Achievements, (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
- (82) The seven-group occupational classification the RPP has been crystallized in the 1935 Party Program. Also for the representation of the workers by member of the Industrialists' Association, see Boratav, op.cit., passim.
- (83) Tezel, op.cit., ch.5.
- (84) Atatürk, op.cit. vol.1, pp.97-98.
- (85) Ibid., p.82.
- (86) Frey, op.cit., p.182.
- (87) E.Özbudun, "Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey", in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, eds. S.P.Huntington and C.H.Moore (New York: Basic, 1970), p.388.
- (88) Ibid., p.389.
- (89) Linz, op.cit., p.272.
- (90) Frey, op.cit., p.183.

- (91) J.Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Mass Politics; Studies in Political Sociology, eds., E. Allardt and S.Rokkan, (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp.257-259.
- (92) Ibid., loc.cit.
- (93) Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", op.cit., p.324.
- (94) Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime", op.cit., p.87.
- (95) Özbudun cites, Ş.S.Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal, (One Man: Mustafa Kemal), Vol.3 (İstanbul: Remzi, 1966), pp.502, 446, 459.
- (96) Gözübüyük and Kili, op.cit., p.81.
- (97) Yirmi Yıl İçinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, p.8.
- (98) Ibid., pp.12-13. Özbudun finds inkilapçılık (reformism or revolutionism) to be the only expressive component of the Kemalist doctrine and a permanent commitment to change and progress: op.cit., p.91.
- (99) Yirmi Yıl İçinde, p.16.
- (100) Anadolu Ajansı, September 7, 1922.
- (101) Yirmi Yıl İçinde, pp.14-15.
- (102) Tunçay, op.cit., p.45 fn39.
- (103) Ibid., p.362.
- (104) Article 2 of the regulations: Ibid.
- (105) Yirmi Yıl İçinde, p.12.
- (106) According to Özbudun, the Kemalists' mentality was that of the positivist. I find positivism as a specific form of mentality insofar as the word connotes the existence of truth and the belief of the ability of the elite to know it. But the Kemalist "ideological mentality" (if we borrow Sartori's terms) had coloration of other "world views" than positivism.
- (107) F.W.Frey, Observations on Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey (Cambridge, MA.:MIT Press, 1963), passim.

- (108) Tezel, op.cit., ch 5.
- (109) Özbudun, op.cit., p.87.
- (110) Ökçün, op.cit., p.246.
- (111) Ziya Gökalp, in a series of articles he decided to write after a dinner with Mustafa Kemal" (E.B.Şapolyo's introduction to the reprint of articles in 1946) and published in Hakimiyeti Milliye on April 10-20, 1923, offered a political program for a solidarist party.
- (112) Tezel, op.cit. Ch 5.
- (113) Tezel cites Aralov, 1967, p.234.
- (114) He repeated and rejected the Quranic verse: El-Knaatû kenzûn la yûfna. (Contentment with little is everlasting treasure). Ökçün, op.cit., p.255.
- (115) Ibid., p.256.
- (116) Tezel, op.cit., Ch 5.
- (117) For the text of the treaty on economic problems, see ibid., Ch5, fn.44.
- (118) Ökçün, op.cit., pp.255-263.
- (119) Ibid., p.74.
- (120) For the speech of the Minister of economic affairs, Mahmut Esat, see ibid., p.26.
- (121) Yunus Nadi, Birinci Büyük Millet Meclisi (The First Grand National Assembly), (İstanbul: Sel; 1955), p.27.
- (122) Frey, Observations, op.cit., p.153.
- (123) Linz, op.cit., pp.322-324.
- (124) Linz, op.cit., pp.265-266.
- (125) Özbudun, op.cit., p.95.
- (126) Ibid., p.96.
- (127) Frey explains "violence and harshness" of M.Kemal's reaction to the Progressive Republicans: op.cit., p.331. Also on violent politics of the early republican years, see D.A.Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State", in Prof.Dr.Yavuz Abadan'a Armağan (Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1969).

- (128) Linz, op.cit., p.290.
- (129) Ibid., pp.291-293.
- (130) Tunaya, op.cit., p.531.
- (131) The members of the party were Tefvik Rüstü, Mahmut Esat, Mahmut Celal and Yunus Nadi. Ibid.
- (132) Ibid., pp.531-532.
- (133) Ibid. This party was outlawed in 1921 and the Tribunal of Independence sentenced its members.
- (134) Tunçay, op.cit., pp.359ff, gives the text.
- (135) M.Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri: Tamim ve Telgraflar, Vol.5. pp.375-376.
- (136) Tunçay quotes R.Orbay's letter to the President of the Assembly, Kazım (Özalp) after he fled to England, from A.Fuat Cebesoy, Siyasî Hatıralar (Political Memoirs), vol.2, (İstanbul: Vatan, 1957), p.236.
- (137) Tunçay, op.cit., p.50 fn.53. Also Frey shows that the members of the Second Group were younger and better educated than those of the First Group. Op.cit., p.46 fn.41.
- (138) Tunçay, op.cit., p.52, cites Y.Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic), (Ankara: Başnur, 1972), pp.192-193.
- (139) Atatürk, op.cit., p.514.
- (140) Ibid., p.519.
- (141) M.Kemal Atatürk, Söylev (Speech), Vol.1, (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yay., 1966), p.11.
- (142) On July 8, 1922 the Second Group used one occasion to pass the law to end M.Kemal's right to nominate ministers for the Assembly's approval, returning to the original system of electing ministers directly by secret ballot. Similarly, the opposition had gotten the law passed to separate the chairmanship of the council of ministers from that of the Assembly. M.Kemal, retaining only the latter, accepted the limitation of his powers: Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., vol.II, p.362.

- (143) Atatürk, Nutuk, (Speech), Vol 2, (İstanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü), pp.683-685.
- (144) Kazım (Karabekir) is the military commander who refused to arrest M.Kemal when asked by the Istanbul government on December 29, 1919. He later commanded the nationalist forces against the Armenians and saved Kars and signed the peace treaty at Alexandropol in 1920.
- (145) Nutuk, op.cit., p.691.
- (146) For the documents of the correspondance between Mustafa Kemal and Rafet (Bele) regarding the preconditions, see ibid., Vol.3, Doc. no. 266.
- (147) A.Emin (Yalman), "Parti Mi Kuruluyor?" (Is a party being Founded?) Vatan, 9 January 1923. Also, idem, Gördüklerim, Geçirdiklerim, vol.3, pp.28-32.
- (148) Ibid.
- (149) Tunçay, op.cit., pp.149-159.
- (150) Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey", p.313.
- (151) Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., vol.2, p.387.
- (152) Linz, op.cit., p.287.
- (153) Tunçay, op.cit., p.152. Of the 114 persons arrested in Erzurum three were executed; in Rize 8, in Giresun two were also executed. Tunçay quotes newspaper reports regarding 39 executions.
- (154) Ibid., pp.127-128. For the view that these upheavals were religious in origin, see Metin Toker, Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı (Sheikh Sait and His Revolt), (Ankara: Akis, 1968); for the view that the British were behind the rebellion, see Ö.Kürkçüoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri 1919-1926 (Turko-British Relations 1919-1926), (Ankara: SBF, 1978).
- (155) Frey, op.cit., p.331.
- (156) Özbudun, op.cit., p.96.
- (157) Tunçay, op.cit., pp.163-164.

- (158) Mustafa Kemal sought to co-opt these two leaders during the war years: Tunçay, ibid.
- (159) Tunçay cites H.R.Soyak, Atatürk'ten Hatıralar (Reminiscences From Atatürk), vol.1, (İstanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, 1973) pp.288-289. In this program the Unionists sought to separate political power, to reinstitutionalize the Sultanate and carry the capital back to Istanbul.
- (160) The Unionist leaders Kara Kemal, Abdülkadir, Cavit Bey and Dr.Nazım were among those sentenced to death. Kara Kemal committed suicide after the court's rule. Rauf was sentenced to ten years but fled the country, when he returned a sometime later, he was elected RPP deputy of Istanbul. Tunçay, op.cit., pp.165-167.
- (161) Özbudun, op.cit., p.96.
- (162) For the "passive resistance" of the deputies in the Assembly, see Tunçay, op.cit., p.176.
- (163) Özbudun, op.cit., p.97.
- (164) For M.Kemal's letter to Fethi see Tunaya, op.cit., p.633. Also Çetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı (The Free Republican Party Incident), (İstanbul: Karacan, 1982), pp.249-252, gives the correspondance between the President and Fethi (Okyar).
- (165) Tunçay, op.cit., p.251.
- (166) E.Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplum-sal Yapısı (The Social Structure of Turkey From the Empire to our time), (İstanbul: Cem, 1978), p.173.
- (167) Freey, op.cit., p.340.
- (168) Ibid.
- (169) Ağaoğlu Ahmet describes the development of the party in the rural areas in Serbest Fırka Hatıraları (Memoirs Concerning the Free Party), 2nd ed., (İstanbul, 1969).
- (170) For a long popular poem recited by local singers, see Tunçay, op.cit., p.244.
- (171) Yetkin, op.cit., p.20.
- (172) Özbudun, op.cit., p.172.
- (173) M.Kemal had his sister join the Free Party as a sign of his moral support. Yetkin, op.cit., p.46.

- (174) Tunaya, op.cit., p.624.
- (175) Özbudun, op.cit., p.97. For the seven categories of Linz of authoritarian regimes see Linz, op.cit., pp.277-353.
- (176) Özbudun, op.cit., p.97.
- (177) Ibid., p.98.
- (178) Frey, op.cit., p.301.
- (179) Ibid., p.327.
- (180) Ibid., p.328.
- (181) Ibid., p.4.
- (182) Tunaya, op.cit., p.562.
- (183) Özbudun, op.cit., p.95.
- (184) Linz, op.cit., p.282.
- (185) Ibid.
- (186) The chambers of lawyers, artisans, journalists are examples of corporative organizations of the late 1930s. For a detailed analysis of Turkish politics from the corporative point of analysis, see R.R.Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1977.
- (187) I think this also explains Linz' account of Turkish authoritarianism as mobilizational.
- (188) H.R.Soyak, the secretary-general of the President, is quoted saying that Atatürk had told him that "...Social Freedom.. We will give the nation that. So the nation will develop itself to demand its political freedom". Tunçay cites S.O.Belin, Atatürk Inkılabı ve Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal, Halide Edib (Atatürk Revolution and Ziya Gökalp, Yahya Kemal, Halide Edib), (İstanbul: Güven, 1951, p.81.
- (189) Linz, op.cit., pp.356-357.
- (190) Yılmaz Öz, From Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, (Ankara: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), p.74.

- (191) Ibid.
- (192) Ibid., p.75. (My emphasis)
- (193) Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, op.cit., vol.5, pp.210-211.
- (194) Frey, "Political Development in Turkey", op.cit., pp.317-318.
- (195) Ibid., p.318-319.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS

I. THE PRESS IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

1. The Anatolian and Istanbul Press

Turkish journalists are among the pioneers of the national struggle for independence(1). When Mustafa Kemal and his associates began organizing the congresses and convention of the Assembly there were only a few daily newspapers published in Anatolia and none in Ankara. However with the occupation of Izmir by the Greek armed forces, there appeared some newspapers in favor of an armed resistance(2). In Istanbul, then the capital of the Empire, there prevailed martial law and censorship over the press. The very idea of resisting the occupation forces and conscripting a new army, had divided the Istanbul press into two groups. Those favoring the "movement in Anatolia", İleri, Yeni Gün, Akşam and Vakit, were opposed by Peyami Sabah, Alemdar and Istanbul(3). Tasfiri Efkâr, İkdam and Tercüman were more tolerant towards the developments in Anatolia, while Tanin was pro-Unionist, Sebilür Reşad fundamentalist Islamist and Aydınlık pro-communist. News about or disseminated by Mustafa Kemal and his friends reached Istanbul newspapers sporadically through the trading seamen and often was sold at exorbitant prices(4). Despite the decree issued by Damat Ferid Paşa's government prohibiting articles and news reports in favor of the "Anatolian rebels"(5) on October 9, 1919, four of the Istanbul newspapers applied to Mustafa Kemal and sought a joint interview. Also on October 13, Tasfiri Efkâr published a long

interview with Mustafa Kemal. Although these newspapers were among the most influential ones, there were then more than 40 newspapers published in Istanbul. The new regime in Anatolia had to reach to its own public.

Only five months after his arrival in Samsun, M.Kemal launched his own newspaper, İrade-i Milliye (National Will), at Sivas(6). The four-page newspaper was printed in the official printshop of the government. The Istanbul-appointed governor and other officials of the printshop were members of the local Society of Defense of Rights, and gladly had the newspaper printed. The government's veterinary office, concealing the issues of the newspaper among the official documents, sent them to Istanbul and other provinces(7). When the first issues of the paper reached Istanbul, the Prime Minister protested the governor of Sivas and asked him to ban the newspaper. However, the newspaper, after M.Kemal transferred the headquarters of the temporary regime to Ankara, continued its publication in Sivas(8). The İrade-i Milliye published the full texts of the Congress resolutions, telegrams sent to the Sultan and Istanbul Government, and Mustafa Kemal's speeches in Congress. The leading articles were dictated and sometimes written by Mustafa Kemal himself(9).

The Representative Committee arrived in Ankara on December 27, 1919. A fortnight later, Mustafa Kemal appointed Recep Zühtü as the editor of the newspaper to be published in Ankara(10). The newspaper was composed and printed again in the official printshop(11). During the preparations, Mustafa Kemal announced that, since the "will of the Nation" had been decided to be the "national sovereignty" the newspaper's name should be Hakimiyeti Milliye (National Sovereignty)(12). It was obvious that the temporary regime of the Representative Committee would soon become a permanent one depending on the idea of national sovereignty rather than the sovereignty

of the Sultan.

The first issue of the Hakimiyeti Milliye appeared on January 10, 1920; it was to be published twice a week. In the first issue, in a long editorial "dictated by Mustafa Kemal"(13), the newspaper declared that it was going to be "the medium through which the national struggle would make its voice heard and its course known". The following day, Mustafa Kemal sent an order by telegraph to all offices of the Society, assuring them that the newspaper was under the constant surveillance of the Representative Committee and committed to follow and support the principles and program of the Society, asked them to send subscription fees immediately (14). Six months later, they took a decision to publish the paper three times a week; but due to the failures of the old printing press they were not able to print more than twice, sometimes once a week.

Following the occupation of Istanbul, Yunus Nadi, closing his facilities in Istanbul, transferred his newspaper Yeni Gün to Ankara. This newspaper not only shared the Hakimiyeti Milliye's printing press, but also its policy(15). In September 1920 the first non-Kemalist newspaper, Yeni Dünya was published by Çerkes Ethem in Eskişehir. The editor Arif (Oruç) and the newspaper propagated Turkish and Islamic Bolshevism. Having undertaken negotiations of arms aid with the Soviet Union, Mustafa Kemal could not tolerate an independent communist group which was calling for the Soviets to deliver arms not to the Kemalists but to "true Bolsheviks". Soon after, the communist party established in Ankara by close associates of Mustafa Kemal got in touch with the Eskişehir group and convinced Çerkes Ethem to join its ranks. The Yeni Dünya would be the medium of the Party; the editor and other staff came to Ankara(16). Thus, the newspaper, becoming the official publication of the Party, had come under the Kemalist

control. Winning the first battle with the Greek forces, Mustafa Kemal forced Ethem flee to the occupied area and closed down his newspaper. Now Hakimiyeti Milliye could be printed in Ethem's comparatively modern press. With the new facilities, the newspaper was published daily and Hüseyin Ragıp (Baydur) became its new editor. Hüseyin Ragıp had accepted the position "if and only if the articles and other materials are seen by Mustafa Kemal and approved before publication"(17). The first daily issue of the newspaper carried a long interview with Mustafa Kemal on "the friendship with the Soviet Union and dangers of Bolshevism in Turkey", as well as a small news item on the self-abolition of the Communist Party.

Mustafa Kemal's assignment to Anatolia was followed by the threat of Greek occupation that stimulated the war of independence. While Mustafa Kemal was writing to local resistance forces and governors to suggest ways to resist the Greeks, local notables were trying to raise popular guerilla forces until a regular army could be organized for defence. The local newspapers published during the early phase of the war of independence were, therefore, media of agitation of the local intellectuals and ex-Unionist military leaders, as well as of the local notables. Consequently, the İstikbal (Trabzon, 1918), Öğüd (Konya, 1919), Ahali (Edirne, 1919) Albayrak (Erzurum, 1919), Işık (Giresun, 1919), Ahali (Samsun, 1919) were independent of any organized national movement but appealed to the people to organize resistance against the local ethnic groups. The occupation of İzmir was the most common theme of these newspapers. The financial funds were provided by the members of the local Society for Defense of Rights, and official printshops were made available to them.

These early newspapers and those published after 1920 began reporting the development of the national resistance movement and M.Kemal's efforts in the Congresses. The national groups, with their own commanders and looking

probably to Kazım (Karabekir) in Erzurum or Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) in Ankara for leadership, had begun recognizing Mustafa Kemal's authority(18). The newspapers published in 1920 and afterwards already had either the blessings of or financial support of Mustafa Kemal. The publishers of these newspapers(19) were school teachers, retired and reserve army officers, merchants and manufacturers. There were hardly any professional journalists among them. The newly established Directorate of the Press and Information lent the initiators necessary funds, printing presses, types and news bulletins about the battles fought and legislative actions in the Assembly(20).

The Directorate was under the control of the government which was at that time opposed by the Second Group in the Assembly. Until the abolition of the Sultanate, there prevailed a duality of press regulations in Turkey. While the Istanbul government was imposing censorship on newspapers in Istanbul, the Anatolian press was free of Istanbul's control. In 1921, by a decree, the Istanbul government banned quotations from the Quran and the Prophet's sayings. But, as noted before, Istanbul newspapers had felt a professional urge to report from Anatolia and, despite the censorship, they had published interviews with Mustafa Kemal and the latter's press releases.

During the war years there were two newspapers against Mustafa Kemal and armed resistance: İrşad (published by Kadı-zade Hulusi and edited by Ömer Feyzi in Balıkesir)(21) and Hatıf (owned and edited by Hüsnü Yusuf in Eskişehir)(22) were very critical of the Ankara regime. Both of these newspapers were published in towns under the Greek occupation(23). However, all the hostile publication printed in Istanbul and other occupied areas were already banned by the government of the Assembly on May 6, 1920(24) and none of them had been distributed in the Assembly-controlled area.

2. The Anadolu News Agency

The news agency founded even before the new regime assumed a permanent character with the Assembly can be taken as the second proof of the importance given by Mustafa Kemal to the control of communication. The Anadolu Ajansı (the Anatolian News Agency) sent reporters and bulletins to the provinces and abroad even before the government had sent diplomatic representatives.

The idea of a national news agency had occupied the minds of the Ottoman journalists and politicians since the beginning of the twentieth century. The first movement was the government's proposal to the parliament for the foundation of a "national" agency. Then there were three European news agencies operating in Turkey(25). The government, with the authorization given by the Parliament, exempted the national telegraph agencies from paying a fee for the cables covering nationally important events and not exceeding fifty words a day(26). However, because there was no national news agency, this exemption was useful first to the local institution established jointly by the foreign news agencies(27), and after World War I, the Milli Ajans. These agencies had been subsidized financially by the Ottoman governments(28).

Mustafa Kemal, seeing the inefficiency of the distribution network of the Hakimiyeti Milliye, the newspaper which he had founded, decided to provide the independent local press with uniform information, and proposed the foundation of a national news agency to the Representative Committee of the Society. The occupation of Istanbul and his decision to convene the Assembly in Ankara might have urged the foundation of an organization to release material to domestic and international media. This institution, given the name Anadolu Ajansı by Mustafa Kemal himself, was set up with five officials and with an old mimeograph on April 6, 1920(29).

Following the meeting of the Assembly on April 23, the government proposed the foundation of the General Directorate of the Press and Information to which the Anadolu Ajansı would be affiliated. Until then, however, the Agency had established its own local offices in Istanbul, Zonguldak, İnebolu, Antalya and İzmit, and, using the military wireless communication system, had been gathering international news. The London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Geneva offices and the representative in Washington, DC (USA) were distributing news bulletins, texts of Mustafa Kemal's speeches in the Assembly, and inviting foreign journalists to Turkey.

In 1924, after the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the annual budget law, establishing a state economic enterprise, separated the Agency from the Directorate. The Agency was now able to cooperate with foreign news agencies; the government, banning their operations in Turkey, forced the foreign news agencies to obtain reports only from the Anadolu Ajansı. The government-controlled news agency thus became the only source of information for both the internal and external media(30).

3. The Directorate of the Press and Information

In the early stages of journalism in traditional societies, it is an established fact that direct foreign influence is very important; in some countries, the colonial government itself published journals; in others, resident foreigners opened the way for national journalism(31). The politicians of the same societies, on the other hand, considered the emergent media as "their most valuable auxiliary" and set up political institutions to administer them(32). Both of these findings are apparently true for the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

The first privately-owned Ottoman newspaper was

published by a resident British subject, Mr. William Churchill (33). The second move came from the Sardinian ambassador, who "begged the Porte to grant permission for a weekly literary magazine to be published in Italian and Turkish" in 1849(34). The first newspaper owned by a Moslem subject would follow this newspaper and magazine. The *Tercümanı Ahval* was given official permission in 1860. But, the government had long ago, in 1849, established its first "press administration department" to organize ways for applying for permission and to see that "publication continued according to the valid laws and other regulations"(35). The decision of the government to issue permission to publishers was delivered first to embassies with a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to this note, the foundation of a printshop was regarded as an extra-ordinary craft" and "related to public affairs"; the permission, therefore, would be granted only to those who "assure the local government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that nothing detrimental to religion and the State affairs would be printed". The Ottoman authorities had to wait for ten years for a serious application to publish a daily newspaper. In 1860, Agah Efendi applied to the Ministry of Education, but was granted permission later by the Cabinet itself(36). The government soon afterwards, establishing the Directorate of the Press in 1862, put the application process in order.

The first activity of the Directorate was to close Tercümanı Ahval for two weeks because of severe criticism levelled by the newspaper at the management of educational affairs(37). According to the 1864 Press Regulations the Directorate had to issue publication permission to those whose application to the Ministry of Education or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been accepted. The Directorate was also duty-bound to collect a signed copy of all issues of newspapers. The office of the Director would distribute all

"written official papers and correspondence" to the Press. The Directorate, in fact, would be the only source of the "news about the official world" for the press. The Directorate was annexed to the Ministry of Education, but after 1877 it became connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(38).

The tradition of regulating the affairs of newspapers by a government agency continued until the demise of the Empire, and the new Ankara regime established its own press administration office on June 7, 1920. Having observed that the Directorate of the Istanbul government would not be of use for his causes(39), Mustafa Kemal decided to enlarge the organization they had been forming since their arrival in Ankara. Muzaffer (Ergüder), deputy of Samsun and officer in the Army, had organized an informal "information gathering institution" in Ankara. After the clandestine nationalist organization in Istanbul was broken up by the occupation forces, a new group, the "Müdafai Milliye Teşkilatı" (The National Defense Organization) was founded by civil servants and army officers. It provided the Ankara regime not only with arms and ammunition but with equipment(40) and information. They were also acting as the Istanbul office of the new national news agency in Ankara. The Government submitted its proposal for the foundation of Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdiri-yeti Umumiyesi (The General Directorate of the Press and Information) to the Assembly in June 1920. The Assembly enacted it as the sixth bill on June 7, 1920. At the same day, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was appointed as the director.

The Director would be responsible only to the President of the Council of Ministers about all affairs of the press, guidance and information of the public and publication at home and abroad. The Directorate of the Press could use all the means available to the Ministers; its expenses would be controlled only by the Prime Minister. The İrşad (Guidance)

Committee of the Assembly approved the allocation of 15 thousand liras as the first annual budget(41). The committee also declared in a separate document the supporting reasons for establishing the Directorate. According to the Committee, among the causes of problems the country faced throughout history, the neglect of the press, of the public opinion and of the guidance of the masses should be counted as the most important factors. The committee, therefore, preferred to found not an ordinary government office to issue permission documents to the Press but

an organization, directing its efforts to positive services and using all the means available to the government, would (a) enlighten the public to obtain intellectual and psychological unity; (b) have newspapers published in Anatolia and keep them in excellent condition and under continuous attention; (c) print booklets on the problems of the Turkish and Islamic world, and (d) create enlightenment delegations (İrsad Heyetleri) with the help of schools and send them to the countryside(42).

The chairman of the committee, in his explanation to the Assembly, recounted the differences between the Istanbul and Ankara directorates:

(It has been said that) we are establishing an organization identical to that of the Istanbul administration. That is not true. We all know what that Istanbul organization is and is not. It is an ordinary government office to issue publication permits to, and administer the affairs of, the printshops... We are not concerned with creating an administrative body. Our objective goes beyond that. Our aim is to prove the legitimacy of our interests and the righteousness of our cause to the external world; to create a favorable opinion around our legitimate ideals in the world, as well as in Turkey(43).

Accordingly, the Hakimiyeti Milliye and Anadolu Ajansı were linked to the Directorate which also began to publish the Ceridei Resmîye (The Official Gazette) in October 1920. The information units of all the "Front Commanders" reported to the Directorate. The directorate soon became the major source of information for newspapers. Offices in Europe distributed information material to politicians and press corps, and tried to pre-empt the distribution of "subversive propaganda". The Directorate was now publishing booklets and pamphlets on the Greek atrocities in Anatolia(44). But only after six months of independence, the Directorate of the Press was affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(45), although most of the duties remained the same. During the war years, the Directorate was distributing news bulletins, special war reports and articles to the regional press. These bulletins were mimeographed in Ankara and delivered to the newspapers through the military mail service. Important bulletins were posted on the walls of government offices and hawked in village squares(46). The directorate also provided financial support to newspapers published in Anatolia and to foreigners supporting Turkey(47). The number of the books published by the Directorate was increasing too(48). Its' internal organization was also enlarged to cover Kars and Adana; the New York office was added to the external organization.

In 1924, Anadolu Ajansı became independent once again, but the funds of the agency was still provided by the Directorate. In 1926, the Directorate began publishing weekly magazines in French and English(49). During the rule of martial law of 1925, some offices of the Directorate helped military censor boards established by the law of Restoration of Order.

However, in 1927 the official newspaper of the government

began to be published by the newly established Müdevvenat Müdürlüğü (Directorate of Publication Collection(50); and the Hakimiyeti Milliye became independent of the Directorate(51). The Directorate was put in charge of selecting the newspapers and allocating the financial subsidy after the change of script from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet(52); but, in fact, shares of newspapers were determined elsewhere(53).

By 1931, the Directorate was in charge only of the perusal of the foreign press and the publication of the Ayın Tarihi (History of the Month), a monthly periodical documenting the chronology of important events and official statements. The Foreign Ministry asked the Directorate to vacate the separate building it had been occupying since its foundation and to move into a small hall in the main building of the ministry(54). The government, without any declared reason, stopped allocating a budget for the Directorate to have favorable articles written and distributed to the regional newspapers. The Directorate had become a "translation office" of the Foreign Ministry. Finally, in 1931, with the budget law, the Directorate was abolished.

In the absence of a governmental press administration body, the government proposed the Republic's first press law and got it enacted by the Parliament. The new law brought about educational and professional requirements for practising journalism which could be controlled only by an exclusive agency. Consequently, in 1933, the government, proposing an amendment to the Foundation Law of the Ministry of Interior, set up the General Directorate of the Press (Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü). The Directorate, in this second phase of its life, was connected to the Ministry of Interior. According to the amendment, the Directorate would peruse all the newspapers, magazines and other periodicals published in Turkey and notify the government departments about the material concerning them. The new administration would also see

that all practising journalists met the legal requirements(55).

Despite the brief list of duties recounted in the law, the new Directorate was no less ambitious than the previous one with regard to the positive services to the press:

... The matters related to the Press are the axis of the cultural problems. His excellency the President of the Republic, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Republic, called on all educated Turks to participate in a cultural mobilization. He ordered that we should raise our national culture to the level of contemporary (sic) civilizations. The Turkish press should take not a marginal position, but the very central role in the mobilizational struggle our Great Chief has ordered, and be the most productive in this field.

...

With the regular and sincere cooperation between the organization (of the Directorate) and public opinion institutions cannot but help realize the orders of the Chief. The ability to be conscious and mature at home, and united around and clear about the national cause abroad, on the part of the press and other educational means, can only be the product of cooperation between the nation's institutions such as the newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema and theater which, adhering to the Great Revolutionary ideal, desire to be productive. The States Institution of the press administration will always function properly and methodically(56).

The new foundation law of the Directorate, however, did not limit the organization's functions to the affairs of the domestic press but, again, the institution was charged with external propaganda(57). According to the Law, the Directorate had (a) to peruse all the domestic and foreign publications with regard to the political, economic, social

and cultural matters; (b) to see that the national press met the requirements of the revolutionary principles of the State's policy and the nation's needs; (c) to prevent the propagation of those ideas contrary to the principles of democracy and nationalism and to fight back through the national press; (d) to see that the press assume its role as the most important means of education in the improvement of the nation; (e) to guide the press, to raise its professional level of quality through the congresses, unions, clubs and training courses; (f) to have favorable information about Turkey disseminated in foreign countries and subversive propaganda stopped; and (g) to control such media as radio, cinema and theater that mould public opinion in accordance with the orders issued by the Ministry of Education.

The Directorate convened the first Press Congress in 1935, played the major role in the foundation of the Balkan Press Union in 1937 and Türk Basın Birliği (Turkish Press Union) in 1938. In 1940, with a new foundation law, the Directorate was tied to the Prime Minister and charged with operating the radio network(58).

As from 1934, the Directorate ratified journalists' identity cards issued by the newspapers; from 1941 the Directorate issued cards to those journalists eligible to practice the profession in accordance with the Directorate's point of view(59). According to the legal requirements, only the members of the Turkish Press Union would be issued an official press card, and journalists without it, would not benefit from the reductions provided by the government in trains and airplane fares, telephone and telegraph charges and other privileges such as the free use of city transportation systems. Those without the card would not be allowed to cover official meetings, shows, displays and competitions. The directorate, thus, kept a register of card-bearing journalists.

From 1940, the Directorate, with the authorization of the government, was determined the number of pages of newspapers and controlled the compliance of newspapers. However, the Directorate exempted the Ulus newspaper(60) from the limit on pages.

New duties given to the Directorate especially after the foundation of Press Union and regional press chambers, and the press ID card system necessitated the enlargement of the Directorate's organization. Twice, in 1942 and 1943, several amendments to the foundation law increased the number of personnel of the Directorate. Technical branches and a tourism department were added to the organization to film historic and geographic sites. The Directorate now had an extensive external organization created by the new "press attachés"(61). As the ex-director-general, H.Ragıp Baydur, put it, the Directorate, toward the end of the one-party regime, had become larger than many of the ministries(62).

4. The Press Trials

Several criminal suits were brought against journalists by courts established by the Assembly and composed of deputies before the press regime of the Republic reached its organizational level of the 1930s and 1940s. The Istanbul newspapers had drawn M.Kemal's attention as potential media to form public opinion since the earliest days of the War of Independence; he had found opportunities to meet with editors of the Istanbul newspapers even when Istanbul was under Allied occupation(63). Although he complained neither in his personal interviews nor in his statements in the Assembly about the attitude of the press on the abolition of Sultanate(64), the attitude of the press on the abolition of the Caliphate was met with strong criticism of the regime; some journalists were tried by the Tribunal of Independence of Istanbul.

Both the opposition in the Assembly and the accusations by the press of "One-man Rule tendencies"(65) were increasing. The murder of the journalist and deputy Ali Şükrü just, after the elections(66) had worsened relations between the regime and the newspapers. The opponents of M.Kemal seemed to center their opposition around the subject of the Caliphate(67). During the second Lausanne talks, however, M.Kemal and his associates, terminating the Tribunals of Independence, convening the Izmir Economic Congress and giving concessions to the Chester Project, tried to smooth the political tension in the country. Even the booklet published by Hoca Şükrü claiming that the Assembly belonged to the Caliph and the Caliphate to the Assembly got a mild response in a similar booklet(68). But the opposition's treating the Caliph as if he were the spiritual leader of the nation(69) and its efforts to have the Caliph retain his place in the Republican administration(70) coincided with newspaper reports on the "Indian Muslims' appeal to the Turkish Government". Seyit Emir Ali, the president of Islamic Society and the Aga Khan, the spiritual leaders of Indian muslims, granted statements to several European newspapers on the future of the Caliphate(71). These reflected the attitudes of the Muslims outside of Turkey's boundaries and their concern for the Caliphate. The London Islamic Society's secretary-general sent Fethi (Okyar), then the Interior Minister, a letter demanding that the Turkish Government recognize all the religious and moral rights of the Caliph as legitimate, and, in order to unite the Islamic world, declare Istanbul as the capital of the Caliphate. This letter, before it was received by the minister, was published in three Istanbul newspapers in October 1923. The Aga Khan's letter to the Prime Minister Ismet (Inönü) demanding the clarification of the legal status of the Caliph under the Republic and again its publication before its receipt by the Prime Minister in three newspapers (72), according to the regime, were the signs of a conspira-

torial alliance on the subject of Caliphate designed by the British and put into effect by the Indians Muslims and some Turkish newspapers(73). Consequently, the government proposed to re-establish the Tribunals of Independence(74), and, on the same day, the Assembly passed the law to send a court to Istanbul(75). As its chairman declared, the court was authorized to punish severely those who "again, began to intrigue against the existence of our society"(76). The prosecutor of the court, Vasıf, deputy from Saruhan, arrested the chief columnists of Tanin, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), of İkdam, Ahmed Cevdet, of Tevhidi Efkar, Velid (Ebuzziya), and editors of İkdam, Ömer İzzettin, of Tevhidiefkar, Hayri Muhittin, of Tanin, Baha; the President of the Istanbul Bar Association Lütfi Fikri(77) was also arrested. Despite the appeal of the Istanbul Journalists Association to the Assembly demanding that public debate and press freedom not be intimidated by the arrest of journalists, the court tried the journalists, charging them with high treason. The journalists, especially Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), defended themselves arguing that they only reported, and commented on, the events which, regarding the foundations of the polity and professional ethics, were important enough(78). Although the court found the publication of the Aga Khan's letter to the Prime Minister to be a violation of the law, it acquitted the journalists(79). But, the president of the Bar Association, Lütfi Fikri, was sentenced to five years(80) in prison. The president of the court, Topçu İhsan, promised the journalists to find a way of reconciliation with Mustafa Kemal. This promise was realized during Mustafa Kemal's visit to Izmir. The president of the Republic invited the chief columnists of major newspapers and, among them, those tried by the Independence Tribunal were included(81). For the journalists, it was Mustafa Kemal's effort to achieve an healthy dialogue with the press(82). At the dinner he gave, Mustafa Kemal said that the press should construct an iron castle around the republic, "which is the true will of the nation", and

The republic has, of course, the right to demand that its press fortify national solidarity and unity. The good of the public lies here: the struggle is not over yet. The Turkish press has, therefore a vital role in conveying the messages of truth to the ears and hearts of the nation. We have to accept that the world still does not know us as well as it should. The nation, especially its intellectual and mature sons, should prove to the world that all of us are united around our common causes. Each and every element of division of labor has to help others in this national affair(83).

The press, however, appeared to be more supportive of the reform program of the regime after the Izmir meeting; but the truce did not last. First the press' coverage of the abolition of the Caliphate, secondly the reports on corruptions and nepotism again caused the relations between the press and the government to deteriorate(84). Even the visit to newspapers of the Minister of Interior, Recep (Peker), did not prevent increasing criticism of the "centralist tendencies" of the government(85). When stories of a "new opposition party"(86) filled newspapers it was obvious that relations between the RPP leaders and the Istanbul press were worsening. Mustafa Kemal expressed his resentment, declaring that he was "strongly affiliated" with the Party and he would never be impartial with regard to the political struggle between parties, because "he found political struggle in Turkey untimely"(87). But the opponents of Mustafa Kemal were trying to establish close contacts with the press(88), and the newspaper comments rationalizing the opposition party were irritating to the Kemalist cadre(89).

The opposition party was, however, founded on November 17. Despite the fact that three years later, in 1927, in his week-long speech, Mustafa Kemal would describe the events that led to the foundation of the Progressive Republican

Party as a "plot" and "unmasking of the enemies of the country", the newspapers then reported that the RPP cadre was willing to tolerate the opposition party(90).

The Istanbul press now began demanding that Mustafa Kemal remain neutral towards the parties(91). Mustafa Kemal reacted against them with an interview granted to a newspaper published in Anatolia, and, saying that the Istanbul press has always been critical of the government and hostile to the policies pursued by the cadre which saved the country, confronted all the newspapers(92). The Kemalists saw the party and the coverage it got from the press as the "truly dangerous and familiar threat to...(their) hegemony"(93) and did not hesitate to establish links between the revolts in the eastern provinces and the PRP which had set up its first and strongest branches in the East(94).

The press that supported the opposition party was no exemption: the Minister of National Defense, Recep (Peker), during the Assembly debate on the proposition of the Law of Restoration of Order, accused the press of playing on and inflaming the religious sentiments of the people. Consequently the law covered the press too(95); on the very day it came into effect, publication of six Istanbul and two Anatolian newspapers was suspended by government decree(96). The criterion of the government in selecting newspaper to be suspended was to distinguish only those which were hostile both to the party and the Republic"(97). In the next few days some other newspapers were also closed by the government(98). A member of the PRP, Rüstü Paşa of Elazığ, defending press freedom, tried to put an oral question to the Minister of Interior(99); but all efforts were doomed to fail because Mustafa Kemal, in a "Declaration to the Nation", said that all publication against the Republic would be put to an end (100).

On April 15, the Tanin Newspaper was closed; but the order came from the Ankara Independence Tribunal. The newspaper was found guilty of reporting the search of the PRP building as a raid(101). The chief columnist of the newspaper Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and the responsible editors Muammer and Nuri, the junior editors Baha and Kadri were arrested and sent to Ankara(102). Although the charge against them was of defaming the Tribunal, the chief columnist of the newspaper was asked to explain why he had refrained from writing his daily column after the Restoration of Order Law(103). Hüseyin Cahit, saying that he was a "republican and secular-minded man dedicated to the Nation's progress", argued that it was his right to write or not to write. He added that since the new regime depended on national sovereignty nobody should be convicted because of his ideas and thoughts. Finally he said that he preferred to be the accused rather than the accusing party of that court(104). But he was sentenced to exile for life in Çorum; and editors Muammer and Nuri to two years of imprisonment(105). The same court sentenced Zekeriya (Sertel) and Cevat Şakir (Kabağaçlı) to exile for three years in Sinop and Bodrum, respectively(106).

The rebels were soon disbanded; Şeyh Said, the leader of the rebellious groups, and his assistants were captured. In his interrogation, Şeyh Sait "confessed" that he had collaborators among the journalists and he owed much to them(107). Accordingly, the prosecutor of the Eastern Provinces Independence Tribunal, considering "provocative publication as the major cause of the revolt", demanded the journalists be included in the case. Following its inquiries, the Tribunal issued summons to Velid (Ebuzziya) of Tevhidi Efkâr, Sadri Ethem (Ertem), Fevzi Lütfi (Karaosmanoğlu) and İlhamî Safa of Son Telgraf, Abdülkadir Kemalî (Öğütçü) of Toksöz (Adana) and Eşref Edib of Sebilür Reşad on June 21(108). Next month, the Vatan newspaper was closed too(109), and Ahmet

Emin (Yalman) together with Ahmet Şükrü (Esmer) of Vatan as well as İsmail Müştak (Mayokan) and Suphi Nuri (İleri) of Tanin were arrested and sent to Diyarbakır(110). The journalists, sweating in the court under the threat of gallows, and enjoying the local hospitality at dinner tables, lived a "double life" in Elazığ(111). During the trials, the journalists sent telegrams to Mustafa Kemal and İsmet (İnönü) promising not to practice journalism if they were released(112). However, there were considerable communication between the Tribunal and the Minister of Interior regarding the decision about the journalists(113). Finally, all of journalists, except for Abdülkadir Kemalî (Öğütçü) of Toksöz, who was arrested by the Ankara Tribunal, were acquitted(114), though the publication of their newspapers was not mentioned in the decision(115). Four months later the Ankara Tribunal acquitted Abdülkadir Kemalî (Öğütçü).

During the period of revolts and Tribunals of Independence of 1925, not only was the press silenced(116), but the opposition party, the PRP, was also closed down by a government decree. The Restoration of Order Law remained in force until March 1927, but was renewed in the summer of 1927 and the winter of 1929(117).

II. THE PRESS REGIME OF THE ONE-PARTY RULE

A. The 1931 Press Law

The pliant press of the Restoration of Order era was slowly replaced by opposing newspapers after the abolition of the law in 1929(118). In 1929, Arıç Oruç launched the Yarın newspaper(119). Zekeriya (Sertel), returning to his career after long years of exile, began publishing the Son Posta(120). Zekeriya (Sertel) would describe in his memoirs

the "suffocating atmosphere" the press was then suffering:

The Grand National Assembly, representing not the people but the Party, had turned out to be a mock institution... The press was under heavy repression. It was impossible to disobey the orders given to the chief columnists of the papers by a telephone call. Even a minor mistake could result in the suspension of newspaper for weeks; the responsible editors, therefore, developed a sense of self-sensorship(121).

But for the first six months of 1930, Arif's (Oruç) Yarın was an opposition newspaper(122); soon the Son Posta followed suit. The Izmir newspapers, Hizmet, Halkın Sesi and Yeni Asır joined the opposition press of Istanbul. The early press reports about the project of an opposition party(123) fanned criticisms levelled at the government. Not only were the repressive conditions provoking journalists, but the group intending to establish the Free Republican Party (FRP) was also granting interviews severely critical of the government(125). As if Mustafa Kemal's permission for a second party had also given freedom to criticize the government, some newspapers were now attacking the government. While the opposition newspapers were suggesting that Mustafa Kemal appoint himself as Prime Minister and thus save the country from corruption by the "incompetent administration"(126), the pro-government newspapers, using cautious language, retorted to such criticisms(127). Sometimes news by pro-RPP newspapers were being refuted by the FRP officials(128). During and after the FRP leader Fethi's (Okyar) fruitful tour to Izmir, many were wounded and a boy was killed; not only the politicians but the newspapers were also fighting bitterly with one another(129). The resentment of the RPP leaders, perhaps excluding Mustafa Kemal(130), was added to their anxieties about the forthcoming elections(131). The solution found by

Mustafa Kemal was to have candidates of both parties nominated centrally(132); although the FRP accepted the idea, neither the RPP nor the pro-FRP newspapers supported it(133). Eventually, the RPP top leaders rejected the idea; Mustafa Kemal, giving up the idea(134) resorted to favoring his own party(135). The reluctant FRP cadre found it impossible to continue the political struggle against Mustafa Kemal and dissolved their own party(136).

The FRP's impact on the newspapers was enormous. First, on August 30, Ali Naci (Karacan) launched the Inkilâp newspaper which soon published a poster with a photograph of Arif Oruç labelled "the traitor"(137). The latter, as early as May 1930, was tried and convicted of provocation against the government(138) and his newspaper Yarın was suspended by the public prosecutor(139). After the dissolution of the FRP, Arif Oruç was arrested again and sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment and fined TL 2,500(140). The following month, Yunus Nadi's Cumhuriyet began publishing the minutes of the hearings of the Independence Tribunal which had convicted Arif Oruç in the early 1920s(141).

During the Izmir tour of Fethi (Okyar), the governor of Izmir suspended the publication of pro-FRP newspapers, Yeni Asır and Hizmet; Behzat Arif and Abidin Abdullah of Yeni Asır and Zeynel Besim and Kadızade Bedri of Hizmet were arrested(142). However, the Anadolu newspaper which had published a fabricated news story reporting complaints by Fethi about the military brutality in the East, was not suspended and its editors were tried but not arrested(143).

Despite the repressive measures taken by the government and governors, the FRP experiment and newspapers supporting it encouraged some other politicians and journalists(144).

Having moved into a small section in the main building

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 1, 1929, the Directorate of the Press left most of its functions to other government departments(145). It had no power left over the newspapers regarding the content of publications(146). The official statements distributed by the Anadolu News Agency were allocated very limited spaces in newspapers; and the Directorate which, only four years ago, had determined the size of headlines(147), had no control over the Agency's editorial affairs(148). The government, having fended off the FRP ordeal, and Mustafa Kemal, having been convinced that opposition parties only deepen the sources of discontent(149) could revive the previous relationship with the press, and now these relationships could be so structured that they would not deteriorate again(150). The Fourth Assembly convened in May, 1931, and in June the government submitted the annual budget law. The proposal did not allocate a budget to the Directorate of the Press and thus the department was abolished for the time being with the intention of restoring it later as a part of a larger project(151).

The press law which organized the relationship between the government and the press was the same as the 1909 Ottoman Press Law. During the early years of the constitutional monarchy of Abdülhamid II, imperial decrees, modifying some provisions of the 1876 Constitution, had, among other things, made pre-publication censorship illegal(152). With censorship and other deterring measures of the absolutist rule removed the press had found itself in the mids of chaos(153). With a press freedom and political association unknown to Ottoman society, newspapers blossomed and the empire witnessed a real political campaign(154). The Union and Progress Society was now suffering from both the intimidating publications and internal divisions(155). The UPS, therefore, had the Provisional Board of Press Association founded on July 30, which tried to impose limitations upon the press(156). Soon after, declaring martial law after the repression of the counter-

revolution of April 13, 1919(157), the UPS rule imposed censorship again, and suspended newspapers one after another. The journalists, however, publishing other newspaper with names similar to those of the closed ones, were fighting back(158). But the UPS rulers not only terrorized the press by having three journalists murdered(159), but also silenced the journalists with a press law which more or less confirmed those of Abdülhamit, making newspapers legally responsible for publishing information that might disturb public order, harm individuals or violate the constitution(160). Although the original text was adapted from the contemporary French Press Law, the deputies rejected the government draft, and, negotiating it for more than 70 days, changed major provisions(161). Publishers would only submit a statement to launch a newspaper instead of petitioning for a permit; newspapers should not publish the minutes of the secret meetings of Parliament and courts; publications insulting the recognized religions, sects and orders should be banned; black-mailing and profiteering by the media should be punishable; the right to retort should be recognized by all publications; those newspapers provoking people to a crime should be suspended by the government; in other cases only courts should have the right to stop publication(162).

The law, with 15 repressive amendments and alterations, remained in effect for 22 years; and the number of newspapers kept increasing every year(163). In the UPS years, however, the government closed many newspapers, exiled journalists and had some of them murdered(164). As the difficulties of governing increased, the UPS-controlled governments imposed new rules regulating journalism. In 1912, the requirement of graduation from a high school was imposed for editors; a guarantee fund of 500 liras in Istanbul and 200 liras elsewhere was added to the requirements. With a decree, the government prohibited military personnel from publishing their ideas about the public and military services(165). In 1913, the

government was authorized to seize all publications offending morals, and to suspend all newspapers inflicting harm on the domestic and foreign policies of the government; the deputies and members of the Higher Chamber were barred from being editors of newspapers(166); in 1914, the government forbade the reporting of military maneuvers unless permitted by the military censor boards(167). In 1919, prior permission from martial law censors was required for launching a publication; in 1920 publishing of documents regarding the internal and external security, and, in 1921 publication of verses of the Quran and the Prophet's Sayings were prohibited(168).

In 1931, with the decreasing effects of the Independence Tribunals, the Ottoman Press Law was not of much help to the government to impose the desired order on the press world. Having had the Directorate of the Press abolished the government now had to mould opinion in the Assembly.

The RPP members of the new Assembly were not satisfied with the press. Had the FRP joined elections, the government could have done nothing to prevent the press from supporting the FRP. Some members, therefore, interpellated the government about the "recent behavior of some newspapers"(169). During the interpellation, the government not only found a chance to declare that a new press law was being prepared, but, having the deputies declare their discontent with the press, precluded any opposition to the proposal in the name of press freedom. The government, having the Assembly decree that the full text of speeches delivered during the interpellation should be published by the newspapers, also tried to mould public opinion(170).

During the interpellation, the RPP deputies described the press they wished to have. Ahmet Süreyya, a deputy from Aksaray and a prosecutor of the now-defunct Independence Tribunals, explaining the reasons of interpellation, said that

"a bunch of creatures, gathered under the pretext of press freedom" were trying to get chaos to prevail in the country, and erode public authority:

On the pretext of criticism, free debate and freedom of expression, they are inflicting as much harm to the country as a foreign enemy with its subversive and spy organizations, could. We, therefore, cannot afford a press free from all kinds of control. In all of the civilized world you cannot find a pen that writes whatever it pleases without some kind of control(171).

He asked the government to explain if they had a better plan to hinder "the publications of enemies". Mazhar Müfit of Denizli, made clear that "he was not demanding that the government plug the mouths of those rascals", reminded the government that "all the poison which resulted in the Şeyh Sait Revolt was the product of the press". He added:

"We are of the Kemalist School. Only this school can save the Nation and direct it to prosperity. We and only we can respect press freedom, like other freedoms... Yes we are democrats, but our democracy is a different democracy. Since the press is also a form of education its tutors should be the members of our democratic institutions. Only then can these persons be honorable, respectable, enlightened journalists"(172).

Ziya Gevher (Etili), a deputy from Çanakkale and ex-Director General of the Press, establishing links between political ideas and media, said that there could be "opposition press" if and only if there was an opposition in a country; and since "the assembly of the Party consists of all sorts of ideas in itself", "the press should convey the ideas that emerged here" but not its own(173). Yunus Nadi of Muğla, the publisher of the Cumhuriyet newspaper, however, reminded the Assembly that the press was not indiscriminately "evil", but "quite the contrary, the press is absolutely useful and

necessary"; but he also accepted that the press "like a garden of beautiful flowers", could be tainted with "an undesired element or two"(174). Finally, Ali Saip, a deputy from Urfa and a member of the Independence Tribunals, told the Assembly that Şeyh Sait, during his trial, said that, seeing the newspapers' fearless publications, had decided that there was no government in Ankara and so started his revolt. According to Ali Saip, there was, even today, "similar traitors" in the press(175). Many deputies took the floor to draw the government's attention to their ideas:

- The Assembly had not asked the Nation if it accepted the proclamation of Republic; therefore, it was the Assembly's duty to advance the regime to its natural targets and, thus, establish a "state authority" to cover the press(176).

- The country was in need of a "revolutionary press" which unselfishly serves the Revolution and its objectives(177).

- Any freedom, the use of which may harm the efforts in making the power of the state unnegotiable, cannot be tolerated; those opposing the survival of the regime will be crushed, killed and hanged(178).

- Nobody who has no love of the values created by the regime can live in this country(179).

- The political program of the Party should contain a provisions for utilizing the press(180).

- The saviors of the country toppled the values of the Ottoman and erected an ideal regime; the press is jealously trying to oppose our efforts to save this ideal from destructive activities(181).

- The press, excluding some newspapers keeps publishing stories about suicides which are destructive to the will of people in facing economic difficulties(182).

- French newspapers do not label their prime minister as the murderer of a businessman who, having difficulties in coping

with the world economic crisis, ended his life; but the Turkish press does(183).

- In the West, newspapers attack governments to replace them with another party; which party are those opponents of the Party trying for?(184).

- Journalists must keep in mind the high interests of the country, nation and regime before anything else(185).

- The generation which realized the Revolution and reforms did not do what was expected from it in the field of publication. Is it incapable of doing it? No!(186).

- Our opponents are not only misusing the press freedom; they are enemies of the nation's independence(187).

Some of the deputies, reading excerpts from newspapers, asserted that the opposition press was also against Mustafa Kemal himself(188).

Prime minister İsmet (İnönü), seemingly very content with the opinions expressed said that the government refrained from suspending publications because in the early phases of the regime everybody would think that the Party was unable to endure criticism; but now, having proved that the Party and its government was strong enough, they could "put the problem of press freedom on the agenda without fearing any criticism". According to the Prime Minister, closing newspapers was not a proper way to make them useful to the Revolution; but the people should understand that press freedom, like all others, was to be controlled and used by themselves. Only then would it be possible to keep press freedom unlimited and useful to the country. If the Assembly was bitterly complaining about the press, the Prime Minister added, it should develop the proposal the government was about to submit and pass it rapidly through the commissions(189).

The Assembly did so: the government bill submitted to the Assembly ten days after the interpellation was sent to a joint committee, instead of several committees.

The general assembly negotiated it on July 25, 1931.

In the introductory statement of the bill, the Minister of Justice, author of the proposal, said that he tried to reconcile the ideas of keeping press freedom intact and preventing its abuses:

Our press has a duty to serve to the nation. As we understand it, the major duties of the press are enlightening the people and representing public opinion. There are some deeds based on goodwill but detrimental to the needs of the country; the press is the best medium to correct them. But, as we know by experience, our press can deviate from its tasks and turn out to be the main source of disorder and disobedience.

Press laws of civilized states, being based upon the lessons derived from experience, seek to save the country from the detrimental impact of the press. While these nations always renew their laws, we still have the law designed to meet the needs of the 1900s, which, not incorporating the experience of the last 22 years, became totally obsolete...

It is obvious that the press, being free within the boundaries of law according to the Constitution, is in need of legal guaranties in performing duties demanded from it... These needs shall be met by the present proposal which brings about some restrictions in order to save press freedom(190).

Despite the long deliberations of the joint committee(191), the general assembly spent only a full afternoon session on the bill and, amending only four

articles and correcting some clauses, passed it as proposed by the government(192).

The new law did not only have a long list of prohibitions, like the previous one, but unlike its predecessor it contained a list of pre-conditions for the publishing of a newspaper or a magazine and for practising the profession(193).

a) Pre-conditions

The new press law did not require government permission for publication. However, those who wished to publish a newspaper or a magazine had to comply with certain conditions. He should be a Turkish citizen, over 20 years of age and at least a university or lycee graduate(194). He should never have been employed by a foreign government and/or claimed foreign citizenship. He should not be under any ban or a government employee. According to Article 12, publishers should not be sentenced to five years or more of imprisonment, exiled or prohibited from practising an art or craft(195). However, the requirement of not being convicted by a court or a special board on charge of treason to the country, national struggle, republic and to revolution was the most important provision, because, with it, some publishers of the opposition newspapers could, in fact would, be prevented from publishing(196). Another provision of the law to ban those civil and military personnel who stayed in Istanbul and did not participate in the national struggle, from the publishing business was also important(197). According to the law all responsible editors and chief columnists should also meet the requirements for the publishers(198). Furthermore, with another provision, the law demanded that all informers, correspondents, reporters and columnists should not have been convicted with any of the crimes indicated in Article 12. The law also required that governors' offices keep a register

of all journalists who, according to another article, had to bear an identification card issued by their newspaper or magazine, and endorsed by the governor. Newspaper distributors and deliverers should submit a written petition and be granted permission to practise business.

b) Prohibitions

Although the law consisted of a special section titled "Prohibited Publications" there are several prohibitions besides it.

Any publication provoking people to crimes indicated in the Penal Code was prohibited, and offenders could be sentenced up to five years. Publishing anything related to personal or family matters of individuals, directly or implicitly, without their consent, would be punished with imprisonment up to one month. Also the publication of articles or photographs (199) in a fashion generating suspicion about the members of the Assembly, the Council of Ministers, government departments, official delegations without basing the story on concrete evidence or on results of an official investigation, would be punished with imprisonment up to six months. Obscenity, pornography and indecent publication should be prohibited. Using newspapers as tools of blackmail and extortion would also be punishable. Those fabricating news to inflict harm on the public trust in the currency would be punished too.

Under the title of Prohibited Publications, the law counted many subjects with which one can hardly come across in the so-called democratic countries. Among them are:

1- Indictments which are not yet read in the court room;

2- Minutes about or court hearings on curses and insults, evidence of which is not obtainable;

3- Coronaries' reports the content of which is contrary to public moral;

4- Minutes of secret court hearings;

5- Stories and photographs of those involved in an investigation initiated by the government or by public prosecutors (they are publishable when allowed by the prosecutor, or by an authorized public official);

6- Re-publication of old court rulings with evil intentions;

7- Court proceedings in full detail;

8- Interim decisions of courts before the final ruling;

9- Full details of divorce suits(200).

By another provision the law prohibited full details and photographs of, and comments on suicides; if the highest local police authority gave permission, only the name of person involved would be published. Those who published stories which might tempt readers to follow the life styles of thieves, robbers, bandits, murderers and other criminals would be imprisoned up to one year. Provoking certain social classes against other classes or against government; favoring the sultanate, caliphate, communism or anarchism in the press were also prohibited. Those disregarding these prohibitions would be sentenced to the heaviest penalties(201).

Publications against the idea of the family's indispensability or contrary to women's natural inclination to motherhood would also be prohibited. Newspapers should refrain from publishing anything but a small news item about the law suits against them. Military or civil personnel's articles, statements or opinions expressed in any other form would not be published.

Another important provision of the law was the one prohibiting the articles sent by those expelled in 1924(202).

The law required that all press offences be tried by ordinary courts without preliminary investigation, unless the publication concerned the "general politics" of the country. In that case, the Council of Ministers could suspend the publication temporarily; those whose newspaper was thus suspended could not publish anything else during the suspension.

Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) took the floor only on the occasion of the article authorizing the government to suspend publication and enumerated the situations in which the government would exercise the right. The Prime Minister said that there could be times when governments would not hesitate to employ "this rather undesirable measure". According to him, at least his government would resort to this provision only when publications (1) threaten the regime; (2) inflict harm on the reputation of the Assembly or the head of state; (3) endanger the national security as a part of a hostile plot by foreigners; (4) disturb national unity or military strength or the police's reputation. He admitted, however, that these circumstances were those he happened to remember, and that there would be innumerable possibilities which could force governments to interrupt the offence(203). After the Prime Minister concluded his statement assuring the deputies that the Assembly would be the check on governments' employment of this right, nobody took the floor and the article was passed as it was.

Finally, the law authorized the Interior Ministry to stop importation and distribution of all foreign publication, and seize all copies already distributed. Public prosecutors would be authorized to order the seizure of obscene publications.

The one-party rule, having fended off the opposition party, was now to establish its own press regime with the new press law. The major characteristics of the new legal provisions were the following:

1- Those whose hostility to the regime was proven, were barred from the communication business;

2- Everyone involved in communications would be registered by the government; even the ordinary informer or stringer should not be an "undesirable person".

3- Communication of those ideological material undesirable to the regime would be prevented;

4- Newspapers would not be able to publish all the information they had and found fit to print; all editors would have to be in a position to prove what they published by hard evidence.

5- The regime, barring the publication of government investigations or prosecutors' preparations, would be able to settle internal problems quietly.

6- In case of unrestricted publications, the government would suspend publication.

The regime, determining who would be in the communication business and what would not be communicated, had laid down legal foundations of its press regime; now it could turn to doing same organizationally.

B. The 1935 Press Congress

1- The New Press Administration

The one-party regime consolidated its system at the RPP's third congress. The ensuing years witnessed the

establishment of institutions designed to give life to the party principles(204). Since 1931, the Party, being aware of its uniqueness, was turning out to be an official government - sponsored single party(205). The "Kemalist Phalanx" was formed and despite "post-Free Party accomodation", Kemalism was moving toward the peak reached at the 1935 congress(206). During the period of 1931-1935 the Party became the highest authority in nominating, in fact appointing executive boards of the Chamber of Commerce, charity organizations, even the private companies(207).

In these years the number of newspapers and magazines totalled 230(208). Most of them were insignificant local newspapers, with few pages. But in 1932, a group of six intellectuals began publishing the first weekly review "to develop an ideology for the Kemalist revolution"; it was the Kadro review of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and his associates(209). The articles in this publication were so carefully worded that they were taken to be representing the government's, even Mustafa Kemal's views(210). The Kadro's columnists were enthusiastically supporting the place the party was assuming in society(211). During those days some semi-official circles were trying to draw parallels between Italian fascism's mass organizations and the RPP(212). Under the Secretary-General Recep (Peker) the party had established the so-called Eight Bureau which was to become notorious(213) to organize "the Press, party publications and propaganda affairs"(214). The party-state symbiosis was imminent; the RPP had created a Special Branch of Public Speakers(215). According to its regulations, the organization would have at least one trained orator in every village, 5 in towns and 15 in the centers of provinces.

But, the Kadro group, seeing the "weariness of the revolutionary cadre", was advising the RPP leaders to utilize

the state-owned radio network(216). According to the group, the Istanbul newspapers were imprisoned in the "narrow scope of daily events", and the journalists' cultural level was reduced to that of the readers(217). For them, there was the "selling press" for which publishing was merely a "commercial business" and the "Revolution's Press" which held publication as an "instrument to make the revolution generation conscious of the revolution; to inculcate them with the ideals and principles of the reforms"(218). They were holding that since the revolution put the "unity" principle before everything else there should not exist a duality in the administration and the Party:

Therefore the structure which will raise the cadre of revolution cannot co-exist with a school of political sciences or a faculty of law. We think that the new and young cadre can only be trained by a party school; graduates of such a party school would be the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, courts and the press(219).

The journalist was very important for the Kadro: The revolution had three types of people; the absence of any one type would slow down the revolution. They were

The organizer in the field, or the Chief; the commander in the military; and the columnist in the newspaper(220).

However, their ideas were not free of criticism. First Ağaoğlu Ahmet severely criticized the Kadro group. According to him the kind of statism defended by the group was a "modified version of that of the Marxists"; the group was trying to make the state sovereign in every field of social life; it was the "dictatorship of the cadre"(221). Later the publisher of the Milliyet newspaper, Mahmut (Soydan), a deputy

from Siirt, engaged in a polemical dispute with Kadro(222). According to Mahmut, the irresponsible group in question was trying to take unfair advantage of the state initiatives in Turkey which had come about in the first place not because the leaders' ideas were statist originally, but because of the lack of private capital(223). But Milliyet abruptly stopped criticizing Kadro despite its announcement of the continuation of criticism(224).

By 1934, although the criticism levelled at the Kadro had mounted, the statist ideas of Kadro, being partly attributed to Mustafa Kemal and the government(225), had become quasi-ideology of the regime(226). But in 1934, when one of the group members, Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), was appointed as ambassador to Tirana, Albania(227), the group ceased publication of the magazine(228). Now, two members of the group, Vedat Nedim (Tör) and Burhan Asaf (Belge), were asked to re-establish the General Directorate of the Press, which had been abolished two years ago. Vedat Nedim, who was famous for his ideas on the "third way of development" and state discipline"(229) was appointed as the Director-General of the Press(230). He appointed Burhan Asaf (Belge), his fellow columnist of Kadro, as deputy-director. These two Kadro members supplied the new press administration with their ideas concerning the press and its administration for the next 5 years(231).

Vedat Nedim, circulating a letter to all publishers and editors as soon as he took on his post, reminded them that in "revolutionary countries, like Turkey, mass media such as the press, radio, theater and cinema, were controlled very strictly, and guided and managed very closely by the State"(232). The director, repeating ideas already published by the Kadro, invited all publishers to give up commercial expectations and adhere to the "Great Kemalist

Ideal of the Revolution".

According to the new administration of the Press, the new foundation law of the Directorate was not clear enough on the duties expected from the organization(233). Vedat Nedim and Burhan Asaf drafted a new bill which was passed by the Assembly on May 26, 1934. Now, the administration would carefully peruse the domestic and foreign press paying special attention to their publication on national and international political, social and cultural developments. It would also see to it that the national press act in accordance with the state policies and national needs(234). The new administrators of the press had accomplished the establishment of the Directorate, with a large staff as well as with many duties. Now the Directorate once again was sending news items and photographs to newspapers to be published(235). Within a year, the Directorate achieved the task of transforming what once the Kadro labelled as "the selling press" into a propaganda instrument of the one-party regime(236).

Meanwhile the regime, having also achieved the task of merging the party with the state, had consolidated its single-party character in the fourth congress of the RPP(237). The regime, with "its most homogeneous Assembly, a new history, a new language"(238), was a "unified body" and the Press Directorate convened a congress to "incorporate the press into this unity"(239).

2- The Congress

According to the new foundation law, the Directorate had the task of convening press congresses(240). The Directorate which had changed its name without any legal authorization, but in accordance with the current of "pure Turkish" of the 1930s, to Basın Genel Direktörlüğü(241) from

Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, both meaning the General Directorate of the Press, convened the First Press Congress on May 25-28, 1935 in Ankara(242). The objectives of the congress were declared as (1) to secure cooperation between the press and the Directorate; (2) to design paths for the press to perform its duties in propagating culture; (3) to find the appropriate way for promoting the profession and the journalists, and (4) to establish the Press Association(243). The Directorate planned to set up commissions on the cooperation, culture and professional problems. The delegates were chosen by the daily newspapers and professional organizations; but the non-daily regional newspapers and magazines were represented by delegates selected among themselves(244). The Congress which convened on May 25, 1935, was chaired by Interior Minister Şükrü (Kaya). In his opening address, the Minister said that "the Kemalist regime was the first administration to place a value on the press, and the press, therefore, had to gather around the regime." He assured the delegates that the treacherous publications, with the help of the nation's hatred, had been silenced; today's press did not, and could not, give shelter to such faithless newspapers. Kemalism, he said, could not be content with any level of achievement; it was not satisfied with the present condition of the press, however promoted it might be. In fact, he added, the profession of journalism was not institutionalized yet: no component of the profession was serving its duties in accordance with the universal requirements; none of them was performing responsibly, seriously and honestly. According to the Minister, the reason for the stagnant figures of circulations was to be found in the lack of these qualities. Finally he said that the profit-seeking capitalists did not see enough incentives in the publication business; they did not invest sums large enough to produce quality newspapers; the competition among the newspapers wasted the limited resources. Therefore, he concluded, the state was compulsorily involved

in the press affairs; this congress being a part of the interest the State felt, everything should be done to have the orders of Atatürk(245) realized(246).

In his speech, the Director-General, Vedat Nedim Tör, said that, "the newspapers of Atatürk's Turkey" were

1- The most important instrument in propagating the revolutionary principles and ideals to the people;

2- The best weapon of the revolution against the reactionaries;

3- An honest source of warnings for the revolutionary government; and

4- An influential school for people's training in political economic and cultural fields(247).

The press, which was already experiencing continuing crises, the Director added, could fulfill these expectations only when guided by the State, and this congress was the first step in implementing state guidance(248). The Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, also addressed the congress, and, as the first issue on which the government was seeking the assistance of the press, mentioned the necessity of having an air-defense system; he asked journalists to convey to people his message that the Turkish Aviation Association was waiting for donations. The congress, before adjourning for the committee sessions, resolved to send messages to Atatürk, İnönü and the Party to express its respects and devotion to them(249).

The Directorate had prepared some "Situation and Policy Papers" for each of the three Commissions to direct the negotiations(250); the Commission reports were not much different from those papers submitted to them.

The Commission on the cooperation between the press and the state resolved that the state guidance could only be exacted by a special organization which would cover all institutions and persons in the profession(251). The cultural commission dwelling on the ways and means to "prevent the competition among the newspapers which resulted in an increasing number of pages but decreasing quality", decided that the government should impose page limits on the press. The Commission advised that the paper used for seven issues of a newspaper, all supplements included, could measure at most 94,860 square-centimeters. The Commission left the decision on the maximum paper to be used by weekly publications to the Press Association, which would soon be founded(252). The commission, dividing newspapers into two categories of "quality newspapers" and "mass-circulation newspapers", and advising all newspapers to refrain from being mass-circulation newspapers, recounted the conditions "with which the revolutionary press should comply". The revolutionary press should

- 1- Put the problems of the regime to people in a convincing manner;
- 2- know the people and the country;
- 3- compose the material in accordance with the purpose it was to serve;
- 4- refrain from sacrificing the true and the serious to the sensational and the vulgar;
- 5- enlighten its readers about the world, and the neighbouring countries;
- 6- assist develop national literature with serials of novels and stories;
- 7- be aware of the importance of the harm it might inflict upon the young;

8- keep an eye on the necessity of following the government policies regarding internal and international politics(253).

The commission on the professional problems recommended that the Turkish press be organized into an association which would unite the state, the employers and the employees of the press. According to the resolution, the new institution would compulsorily consist of everyone in the press and news agencies and radio broadcasters, printers, advertisement agents and distributors; all the subgroups would have a representative committee and, thus be represented in the Association. The Istanbul Press Association would dissolve itself and the new institution would have a branch office in Istanbul. The Association would organize compulsory training courses and educate all journalists in the next three years. The commission also advised that the preliminary work should be done by a seven-member committee and the Party and government should send representatives to that committee(254).

In the general assembly of the Congress, the Commission resolutions were endorsed without hesitation. Some delegates emphasized that there already were professional associations, and a new one would be senseless(255). At that point, the RPP representative, Necip Ali Küçüka, a prosecutor of the Ankara Independence Tribunal, made a speech, stressing the importance of state guidance. He said that the press should closely follow the revolution:

For instance, for the revolutionary party, the family is very important. So the press must pay great respect to the family. The revolutionary party always takes facts seriously; therefore the same atmosphere must be prevailing in the press. Those historical stories serialized by newspapers did not have any relation to the truth, and therefore were not connected to the revolution and its mentality. From this

point of view we hope the press will live in the same revolutionary atmosphere as we did(256).

Necip Ali read some parts of a speech Atatürk made "years ago in a closed meeting":

Such important factors as press freedom and political rights which are influential on the consciences of men, must be prevented from being erroneously used to distress and degenerate the society... It is obvious that a press which holds the same values as the Republic will be created by the Republic. As the incurable elements of the old press are purged, the noble and productive press of the Republic is created. It will be this new press and its new mentality which will contribute to the new life of our great nation(257).

The RPP representative concluded that the new press law and the new Directorate of the Press were the results of Atatürk's directives, and that the new Press Association would be the same(258). After this speech only two remarks were made: the president of the Istanbul Press Association asked the Congress to amend the resolution so that the financial sources of the association be left to the Istanbul journalists(259); the representative of the Turkish Language Institute, Fazıl Ahmet Aykaç, one of the architects of the interpellation of the government on its press policy(260), said that to "create a corporation-like institution" would require long deliberations in order that "opposition may not sneak into it"(261). The general assembly endorsed the resolution and decided that Atatürk would be enrolled as the first member of the Press Association(262). The Congress adjourned after the Interior Minister's closing remarks on the future of the press. According to the Minister, since its human element was of a noble and revolutionary character, the press would attain its important place in propagating the

ideals of the republic; otherwise the nation, being aware of its power, would run over the press(263).

The statute and regulations of the projected association were prepared in a month, and submitted to the government. The objective of the Directorate in convening a congress was to have the idea of a compulsory association introduced to, and accepted by, the journalists(264). Journalists were not allowed to express their objection to the press law in the congress(265). Although the Directorate had successfully fulfilled the expectations of the regime, the enactment of the law of the Press Association would wait until 1938.

C. The 1938 Turkish Press Association

1- The Amendments of the Press Law

Despite the delays in establishing the compulsory organization for the press, the one-party rule never ceased being interested in the press affairs. Beginning to amend the law of 1931 as early as 1932, the one-party rule kept fortifying its press regime until 1940.

In 1932, with a one-article bill, the government wanted to extend its right to stop importation and distribution of foreign newspapers and magazines, to all printed and recorded materials. The assembly passed the amendment, but during the debate, some deputies, blaming those who had caused the enactment of the law which hinged upon the press and those who were still forcing the government to make the law more dangerous for the press, expressed their grief about the legislations(266). A few months after this amendment passed the government proposed the bill to include in the ban the stories of suicides which took place abroad(267).

In 1933, the Assembly passing the bill proposed by Hakkı Tarık (Us), a deputy from Giresun and the publisher of the Vakit newspaper, exempted the practising editors and publishers from the educational requirements(268). It was in contradiction with the government's intention of gradually replacing the journalists of pre-republican training with a republican generation of journalists(269); but the government did not reject it because the Ministry of Justice had a project to extend the government's right to seize newspapers: after a few months, the prime minister proposed a bill to authorize the government to seize all "harmful" publications before or after distribution. In his proposal, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü said that the 1931 law was not sufficient for the government to prevent the harm caused by the press before it was done. The Assembly without debating passed the law which authorized both the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Interior to seize all publications. The law did not specify the circumstances in which the government could exercise the right. It only said that the Interior Ministry was to submit its decision to the Council of Ministers as soon as it was implemented(270).

In 1938, the government proposed a bill to amend eight articles which would alter the fundamental provisions of the law. Anyone could publish a newspaper or magazine without prior permission; but after the amendments, the highest local civil authority was required to issue licence to the publishers. With the petition, all publishers would submit a "guarantee letter of a national bank"(271). Most of the provisions regarding the qualifications of publishers remained the same, but there was one rather more important alteration: those who were in disrepute would not be granted licence; those publishing a newspaper or magazine would be punished. Furthermore, all the informers, reporters, writers, artists, photographers, proof-readers, administrative managers

and advertisement agents should comply with the requirements of publishers. Now, like the news stories about suicides, all reports on the undisciplined movements in schools, faculties and the institutes, in the country or abroad, would not be published unless sanctioned by the highest civil authority.

The Prime Minister, Celal Bayar, in his explanation of the proposal stated that, the Constitution having been changed the previous year, it had become all the more important to have the newspapers comply with the characteristics of the Republic(272). The governors were not able to prevent the publication of those newspapers which had filed false declarations, Bayar added that as far as he was concerned, from now on, "all journalists, from the publisher to the simple proof-reader", would be the "pure sons of the republic"(273).

With these alterations, the free publication system was changed to a licence system; the requirement of not being in disrepute did not depend on objective criteria but on the governors' discretion. The ban on news reports of students' unrest which until then was unknown in the Republic, was not only censorship, but a foresight as well(274).

The government did not find these provisions preventive enough. In 1940, with the last amendment to the law, offending national feelings and confounding national history were made crimes and offenders were to be fined 500 liras. With the same amendment, all reports on the ongoing investigations of any act contrary to the State's security or on the measures taken against such acts would be included in the list of prohibited publications(275).

2- The 1936 Balkan Press Union

It is said that Turkish politics in the interwar period

were international politics(276). By the Balkan Entente Pact concluded in February 1934, Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia had promised to refrain from aggression against each other(277). Although the Pact would not survive until World War II(278), on June 11, 1936, the Balkan Countries Press Conference convened in Bucharest and the delegates of the four countries agreed upon the establishment of the Balkan Press Union. Despite the fact that Turkish journalists frequently travelled to neighboring countries for meetings and conferences and received their colleagues in Turkey(279), the initiation of, and all the motives behind, that international organization were official and remained so(280). Turkish journalists who were yet not active in the recently founded International Press Institute were participating in the Balkan Press conferences; all expenses were paid by the host governments(281).

The internal regulations of the Balkan Press Union required that all newspapers and magazines not publish articles or news stories against the member countries: journalists had to contact officials of the countries about which they were to write so that what they published might not be harmful(282). Furthermore, the Union officials, most of whom were government employees(283), could, and did, tell newspapers what to publish. "The same could be achieved on internal issues"; the resolution of the First Press Congress was then "remembered"(284) and the bill was submitted to the Assembly. No objection appeared neither in the Assembly or on the newspaper pages(285).

3- The Turkish Press Association

The initial effort to establish a professional organization to represent practising journalists had come about in 1917(286). The republican administration has always wanted to

keep journalists organized: as early as 1923, the government donated a building to the Association(287); but until 1927, neither journalists nor technicians saw the Association as close to themselves(288). According to its new constitution, the Association would have a binding authority over journalists; but membership was not compulsory and its authority over the members was not as strong as desired by the government(289). What they then had in mind was to organize all professionals into "corporation-like" organizations(290). As the RPP proved unable to get many professionals to participate in politics through the party organization(291), the leaders of the one-party regime tried to have associations operate as specialized agents of interest representation, as channels of political participation and as instruments of social control(292). Among the first compulsory association the government proposed was the Bar Association; the Press Association followed it(293). The government did not even take the trouble to submit a long explanation for the bill. In its 43-word statement of the supporting reasons, the government stated that its intention was to strengthen the relations between the government and the press(294). But the Justice Commission of the Assembly took pains to justify the law.

According to the law in question, the Association would comprise of all publishers and other personnel working on a newspaper or in a news agency and receiving a salary. "Those who should be a member of the Association, shall not practise journalism outside the Association"; those whose application for membership was rejected by the regional and central executive boards(295) could appeal to the Interior Ministry; the ruling of the Ministry would be final (Art. 2). The association, (a) assuring and defending material and non-material, individual and collective interests; (b) protecting

the professional honor and discipline; (c) strengthening solidarity of professionals; and (d) establishing professional training courses, would represent the Turkish press and make sure that it served the interests of the republic (Art. 5). The Director-General of the Press would be the natural member of the annual congress of the Association and would have the right to vote; each region would send one delegate per 50 members and political newspapers would be represented by the publisher or one of the editors; the government could ask the congress to discuss and reach a resolution on any subject; the Ministry of Interior would be able to convene the congress at any time (Art. 8). The congress would have the right to reach a decision on the behavior of its members, but the agenda would be subject of the Ministry's approval. The executive boards would be composed of employers and employees; the central executive board would be able to give specific directives to members on their professional conduct (Art. 12). A board of honor would decide on questions relating to the conduct of members and to disputes between members (296) (Art. 15). The local public prosecutor would be a member of the board. The regional and the central boards of honor could bar a member temporarily from practising the profession or expel him from the association (Art. 18) which would be tantamount to being barred permanently. The boards' ruling regarding the banned journalists would be announced by newspapers. Governments could also file complaints and initiate hearings in a board regarding a member's professional conduct (Art. 19).

The law had provisions regulating the financial and contractual relationship between the employer and the employee in the press; the working conditions of every journalist would be determined in writing within three months (Art. 26); the contracts would be annulled after a period of notification; the employees were to have severance pay (Art. 27). All

journalist would have a paid vacation for a month every year (Art. 29). The Ministry of Interior would issue an identification card to the Association members (Art. 31). Finally all members would pay one percent of their salaries as a membership fee to the Association (Art. 32).

After the passing of the law, a number of journalist - deputies addressed the Assembly, and stressed the importance of the law(297). The Interior Minister also expressed the gratitude of the government to the Assembly, and reminded deputies of "the times when we suffered from the press"; but now, he added, the press and its members would enjoy the assistance and guidance of the State, and assist the regime, in turn(298).

The Press Association functioned in accordance with the mentality of the one-party regime to the very end. During this period, governments kept closing newspapers and magazines, and press laws became more restricted. But the press association issued only eight general directives to newspapers regarding the protection of the individual's privacy(299). No journalists was expelled from the Association(300). But, as a journalist put it, "the press was to breathe freely only after the liberalization of the post-1946 period"(301).

D. The Democratization of Laws and Regulations of the Press

The regime, during the final days of Atatürk, was not free of fears, and struggles, amongst the top elite members: Speculations about the successor to Atatürk, conspiratorial groupings for or against ambitious leaders had been forming since İnönü's resignation after 13 years in the post and Bayar's appointment as prime minister in 1937(302). The Tan newspaper reported on these in-staff clashes and on speculation

about the "post-Atatürk era"(303). The newspaper was closed for three months by the government(304). It seems that the elite still wanted to resolve the regime-related problems without having the public involved. The one-party rule continued to function after the change of leader(305) though no fundamental alteration took place(306).

The neutrality adopted by Turkey in World War II, forced the government to intervene in almost every aspect of life(307). Within the National Defense Law (Milli Korunma Kanunu) of January 18, 1940 the government held in its hands extensive emergency powers to control prices, and to use compulsory labor(308). Wartime requirements, the Turkish - German Nonaggression Treaty of June 18, 1941 and the Trade Agreement of October 9 in particular, raised both criticism and approval in the press(309). The government indiscriminately closed all newspapers supporting the Entente or Allied powers(310). But the newly founded Press Association though very active in regularly organizing its annual conventions and balls, did not interfere with the government decisions(311). The capital levy (Varlık Vergisi) of the same year, designed to tax those who had hoarded wealth during the war, was implemented so arbitrarily that, despite the strict rules, many newspapers levelled criticisms at the government, consequently, almost all of them were closed(312). Some journalists then visited the Prime Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, and asked him to impose "official and open censorship" on the press. The Prime Minister, refusing the request, snapped at journalists:

I do not impose censorship, I do not ignore the provisions of the Constitution. But you shall know your place; you shall never go beyond it. If you do, you shall suffer the consequences(313).

The arbitrariness with which laws were implemented

undermined the popular confidence in the governments of the period(314). Since 1935, all governmental activities were tied to the RPP; those who felt that what they accumulated during the war years was no longer secure, put the first crack to the alliance which had been the basis of authoritarianism since 1923. Statism could no longer be taken as a measure against "the economic crisis of the thirties...ushered in by the Great Crash of 1929"(315) and a natural requirement of the developing economy; not because the idea of statism was tainted ideologically especially after the Kadro's semi-official ideologization, but because new "moneyed classes were now against the existing state monopolies"(316) the years following 1940 became times of serious reflection for the RPP elite.

Until after the 1946 elections they vacillated between a policy of repression which would inevitably result in the employment of more political coercion against the emerging opposition, and a policy of liberalization which would completely encourage opposition and result in a change of leaders(317).

Informal alliances such as that between the Kemalist and local elites, which provide the basis of authoritarian regimes, cannot endure any strong ideological commitment(318). Beside the fact that the victorious western powers with whom the Turkish one-party system identified itself after the war were against the expansion of state control over economic life(319). Statism has always been subject to controversy: neither the RPP nor the government was able to define the limits of state intervention to the satisfaction of the private sector. But it was understood, at least by the İş Bank group and the local notables, that agriculture would not be at all affected by statism; and whenever the private entrepreneur perceived enough incentives the state would yield that area

to him(320). The alienation of people from the regime as a result of material and physical hardship; the trends towards political and economic liberalization after World War II nourished by the defeat of the non-democratic regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan, should be noted among the factors which encouraged the peaceful transition of authoritarianism to a multi-party system. In post-war Turkey, the RPP leadership, with the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression abrogated by Russia and increasing discontent of the moneyed classes and salaried bureaucrats, was forced to lean towards the western powers. Now it was difficult, if not impossible, to veto dissension which emerged especially during the Assembly debates on land reform(321), was the first motion of the one-party rule to mobilize peasantry around a definite popular program.

As it was observed during the Free Party ordeal, the press, once again, began voicing criticism(322). The President, İsmet İnönü, on May 19, 1945, said very cautiously that the "proliferating voices heard everyday (are) the signs of the fact that the country (was) progressing towards democracy"(323). It was obvious that the regime was vacillating towards liberalization: the Council of Ministers, on September 5, granted permission to Nuri Demirağ to establish the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi)(324); the gradually increasing criticism of the dissident group in the RPP was, to the astonishment of the journalists, freely reported by the newspapers. The President went further, stating that what the country needed was an opposition party(325). İnönü, drawing attention to "the peculiar characteristics of democracy which develops in accordance with the character and culture of each nation", promised that the country would have an opposition before the next general elections. Also trying to explain the raison d'etre of the "particular article of Press Law"(326) with the "revolutionary necessities", he said

that priorities of the political system had changed since the enactment of the law(327).

However there were times when the pendulum of the regime did swing in the other direction. The pro-RPP press was not to swallow the criticism of pro-dissident newspapers. With the emergence of the open opposition to the RPP rule, the newspapers had started espousing different ideas. Among them were Yurt ve Dünya, Yeni Ses, Adımlar (weeklies) and Tan favoring leftist ideas, Vatan favoring the dissident members of the RPP, Tasfiri Efkâr, leaning towards the nationalist and conservative groups, the pro-regime Tanin and independent Akşam, Son Posta and Vakit(328). The RPP Istanbul branch, having been disturbed by publication of a new weekly magazine by the Tan newspaper and especially by the posters featuring Celal Bayar's picture pasted all over the city, organized a demonstration. When the organizers of the demonstration lost control, mobs raided the Tan's offices: thousands of mobsters, breaking and looting Tan's machinery and newsprint, made the publication of both the newspaper and the magazine very difficult(329).

The establishment of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti) (DP) on January 7, 1946 promised freedom to the press; but with a small representation in the Assembly, the new party could not keep its promises(330). However, the RPP, trying to wean away the liberal slogans from the DP introduced a liberalization program: the tax for agricultural produce was abolished (January 23); a social security system for workers was introduced; ban on student organizations was lifted (February 4). Accordingly, the extra-ordinary convention of the RPP agreed to change the election system to direct voting, to lift the ban on class-based associations. The party regulations were amended so that İnönü would lose his title of "permanent Chairman" and a chairman would be elected at every convention(331). The Assembly, passing a

government bill, amended the Association Law. Now associations and political parties would be founded without prior permission from the government(332).

As for the Press, the government proposed a bill to abolish the Press Association on May 30, 1946. Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, in a statement attached to the bill said that "with the abolition of the Association, journalists (would) be able to found free organizations of their own"(333). As stated in the Justice Commission's report, journalists were free to set the rules of conduct of their profession in accordance with the changing associational understanding of the country(334). The regime had seen that compulsory associations could no longer mobilize certain interest groups around the regime.

The Saraçoğlu government also proposed a bill to amend Article 50 of the Press Law which authorized the council of ministers to suspend any publication "touching on the general politics of the country". Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, in his statement, said that the provision was a necessary instrument during the early days of the revolution, and that in the changing conditions of the country no longer seemed necessary(335). According to the proposed article, courts, instead of the government, would be authorized to hear cases relating to press offenses, and to suspend publications temporarily or permanently. The bill did not specify which situations would lead to temporary and permanent suspension. Despite the praises of the RPP members(336) the opposition deputies made critical comments about the bill. According to A.Menderes, the deputy from Aydın and one of the founders of the DP, press freedom was so important that, without it, neither Assembly nor government could function in favor of the people; its importance was amplified "because we do not have a well represented opposition in the Assembly"(337). Menderes drew

attention to the hesitation of government in establishing democracy and to its mentality that democracy could be installed with a few amendments. He said that to amend only one article of "wholly anti-democratic law" was another piece of evidence of the government's indecisiveness. The RPP - controlled Assembly, regarding Menderes' demand as a "pre - election political investment"(338), passed the law. The one-party rule, thus took one more step towards the liberalization of the press regime.

The government proposed a bill to pardon all the convicted journalists. The Justice Minister, Mümtaz Ökmen, stated that with the amnesty, the government was seeking to create a peaceful atmosphere before the elections(339). The law also ended all the on-going investigations and dropped all charges against newspaper, magazine and book publishers, authors, columnists and reporters.

Although many members of the Assembly made speeches showing their reluctance regarding the liberalization program, the government granted academic and administrative autonomy to the university(340), and lessened the penalties sought by the National Defense Law(341). However, the martial law imposed by the government at the beginning of World War II was not lifted, and the Martial Law commander kept issuing prohibitive orders to the press.

Despite the protests of the opposition, the Assembly decided to hold early elections on July 21, and thus started a second phase of the regime's transformation(342). The election campaign poisoned the political atmosphere. The pro-DP newspapers thrived on controversial issues. A brochure published by the DP relating the latter's experience of governmental pressures and irregularities in the municipal elections, was serialized by some newspapers(343) and many articles, implying that similar practices were likely to take

place in the forthcoming election appeared as well. The election, though not considered honest enough by the DP and some newspapers, was an overwhelming RPP victory; nonetheless, to the annoyance of many RPP hard-liners, the Democrats won 65 seats out of 465 in the Assembly.

Both the campaign of the DP and the post-war economic problems urged the RPP to opt for radical policies. What the Decisions of September 7, a harsh devaluation of the Turkish lira, eased import facilities, permission for banks to sell gold, and increased prices were for the economy, the July 25 decree of the martial law commander was to the press. The commander, stating that he had tolerated the pre-election exigencies of newspapers and their abuse of press freedom, was prohibiting all articles and news reports "casting doubts on the validity of the election"(344). According to the commander, the Assembly and not the newspapers, was the only proper forum for criticism. On the very day the commander issued his orders, the Chairman of the DP, Celal Bayar, made a statement on the irregularities in the election. All newspapers, except Yeni Sabah and Gerçek, imposing self-censorship on themselves, refrained from publishing the full text of Bayar's statement. The following day, the commander closed these two newspapers. But Recep Peker, the new prime minister and a "die hard monopoly man"(345) saw that the decrees of the commander were not effective and comprehensive enough to prevent "the abuses of press freedom"(346). The prime minister stated that the government intended to put an end to the opposition's tactics of "inciting people to rebellion and disobedience"(347).

The second major amendment of the Press Law was submitted to the Assembly under this mentality: the limits and scope of liberalization were subject to the RPP approval. Consequently, the government declared that its sole aim was

to further the liberalization of the press. This started with the abrogation of Article 50; but the equivocal proposal was lacking in distinct outlines, probably because it was thought out under the post-election conditions(348). However, during the Assembly debates on the amendments, both the deputies and the minister disclosed that they proposed to compensate for "the void created by the amendment of Article 50"(349). The young opposition, declaring that the project was anti-democratic, tried to prevent amendments(350). According to the opposition, the government was trying to revive administrative authority to ban newspapers and to keep journalists under the threat of heavy penalties in order to have them silenced.

The government had proposed to alter the 1938 system of seeking permission to publish a newspaper or magazine and revert to the declaration system of 1931. But now the highest civil authority would be authorized to close a newspaper or magazine if he found the declaration to be "incomplete, incorrect or false" (Art. 12). According to the opposition this article, together with the precondition that no one of disrepute could launch a publicitaion, would be enough to suspend any publication disliked by the government. Faced with the charge of dishonesty, the government accepted to replace the amendment with the opposition's text which authorized courts to hear cases of incorrect declarations. The government had also proposed to amend still another provision which deemed it an offense to publish any thing defaming ministers, deputies and/or public servants without mentioning names and specific offenses. According to the opposition, this article was especially designed to stop all criticism against the government and the Assembly. The majority of the RPP members, reading many examples from newspapers which they considered a breach of law, passed this and other amendments without yielding to the DP. Now all the penalties were increased twice

or three times; governors and public prosecutors were authorized to ask for the true identity of authors of unsigned articles (Art. 34). Those who published reports on the Assembly proceedings and fundamentally altered the negotiations or added fabricated parts to them, could receive sentences of up to three months of imprisonment, and fined up to 500 liras. All reporters, correspondants and informers would be responsible for false news items even if they did not dispatch them on purpose (Art. 38). All the newspapers were to publish responses of official authorities twice as long as the original one (Art. 48). If a newspaper published an accusatory speech delivered in the Assembly, then it would also publish the response of the accused without deleting any part of it (Art. 48).

The RPP majority had the bill passed by the Assembly as it desired but the passage of this and following laws in the Assembly exacerbated relations between the two parties. Although the president promised to remain above parties and resolve problems between them as a neutral party(351), the legal boundaries of the liberalization program of the RPP would not change: the journalists were free to establish their professional organizations but yet the government was given the right by the Associations Law to interfere in their affairs; newspapers would be able to act as check and balance of the system but the state officials would always have the right to say the final word if a polemical exchange were started; newspapers would still be privately-owned organizations, but the government could designate journalists, or at least preclude those persons disfavored by the government from practising their profession.

But, in spite of all these measures and counter - measures of the RPP rule, the press was no longer the pliant press of the one-party years: it was to act within the

boundaries set by the party of one-party rule in a multi-party period. Consequently, the press, like some other institutions of the 1946-1950 period, suffered from the struggle between the moderates and extremists of the RPP. In fact, those who wanted to outdo the Democrats in being liberal at the expense of everything that the RPP represented up to this moment were a minority in the party; but the president, adopting an appeasement policy, helped them against those who wanted to defend all the fields won during the one-party years(352).

The extent of the freedom enjoyed by the press, therefore, kept oscillating. When a major crisis between the two parties resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Recep Peker and Hasan Saka's appointment to the post(353) there was a proliferation of publications. From the extremist conservative newspapers to extreme leftist magazines all kinds of publications spread over the country(354). But, despite all the head way they had made, the Republican moderates were not entirely satisfied: the promises of greater party democracy remained unfulfilled, but "some dangerous and rootless newspapers filled the country"(355). The second cabinet of Hasan Saka did not only fail to impress the DP with its economic stabilization program, but it also began closing newspapers and magazines one by one(356). However, on the first days of the Günaltay cabinet, greater freedom was accorded to the press again(357). But the government was, if anything, tolerant to the religious groups and newspapers published by them, and leftist newspapers were restricted again(358). Starting in 1949, the election campaign of the DP, once again, made all newspapers play its tune; and having won the elections on May 14, 1950, the DP, among the first things, immediately set about changing the press law. Although the 1950 press law had been heavily marked by the RPP press regime(359), its analysis is beyond the scope of this research.

D. Some Remarks on the Historical Development of the Press

The first task of the present essay was to determine the set of dimensions along which the relationships between the newspapers and the regime varied. It could be concluded that the newspapers were subordinated to governmental control. As the political organization became monopolistic they assumed different roles; political truth was believed to inhere in the tenets of the authoritative mentality as interpreted by the ruling one-party; newspapers were primarily expected to uphold such a unitary conception of political truth. In short, newspapers were not expected, individually or in concert, to transmit a variety of political standpoint.

The political control of the media seemed natural and legitimate though its composition required a special justification at times. The one-party governments and special department responsive to their wills exercised their rights to intervene in the affairs of newspapers so as to regulate their activities. In particular, some areas such as access to the profession were singled out because rulers strove to bend the newspapers to their will:

Control over the content is the easiest and ensured by the legal regulation of newspaper reporting. Censorship was not the usual procedure Kemalists applied when the need arose. Rather they chose the way of positively influencing editorial decisions through direct contacts, the Directorate of the Press, etc.

Control over the right to publish seems to be another possible way to exercise political control. Kemalists simply wanted to grant a licence those persons whose socio-cultural background was similar to the political elite.

Control over the appointments could be provided by other legal regulations which ensured the positioning of reliable individuals inside the newspapers. Though direct appointment was not among the selected ways, there were some political criteria relevant to the selection of media personnel.

The degree of partisan commitment exhibited by the newspapers could be different. The manifestations of media partisanship concern different criteria: as one of them, party involvement in mass media ownership, was limited. Another criterion, that is editorial policies of newspapers, however, requires the analysis of their content.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

- (1) Osman Nevres (or, with his penname Orhan Tahsin), the first Turk who fired a pistol against the occupation forces in Izmir, was a journalist. Ö.Sami Coşar compiled the publication stories and available copies of the newspapers published in Anatolia from 1919 to 1922 in Milli Mücadele Basını (The Press of the National Struggle), (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yay., n.d.). Also see İzzet Öztoprak, Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk Basını (Turkish Press in the War of Independence), (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981).
- (2) Coşar, op.cit. introduces 33 newspapers published during the War of Independence.
- (3) Servet İskit, Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları (The Directorate of Press in Turkey and Policies), (Ankara: Basın Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yay., 1943), pp.192 ff. Also see Hıfzı Topuz, Türk Basın Tarihi (The History of the Turkish Press), (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1973), pp.122-126.
- (4) M.Süleyman Çapanoğlu, Basın Tarihine Dair Bilgiler ve Hatıralar (Data and Reminiscents on the History of the Press), (İstanbul: Hür Türkiye Dergisi Yayınları, 1962), p.64.
- (5) İskit, op.cit., p.212.
- (6) According to İskit, the first issue of the İrade-i Milliye appeared on September 19; but I found an issue of the newspaper dated September 14. Five days after the publication of the newspaper, M.Kemal left for Ankara and the form of the masthead of the paper had changed; perhaps İskit regarded the September 19 issue with the new format as the first one. Since Ö.S.Coşar narrates the preparation of the first issue and reluctance of the workmen, giving the date of September 13, the first issue must have appeared on September 14.
- (7) Coşar, op.cit., pp.115-118.
- (8) The first editor of the newspaper was public school teacher, Selahattin, though his name did not appear in the masthead. The only name appearing in the first issue was that of İsmail Hami (Danışment), the representative from İstanbul at the Sivas Congress, who, refusing to Join Mustafa Kemal's journey to Ankara, returned to İstanbul. Despite his very critical and harsh articles in the newspaper, he had been appointed to the Ottoman Embassy in Bucharest: Coşar, op.cit.,

p.114 fn.1. The newspaper, in 1921, supported the opposition against Mustafa Kemal and was closed by the government. On March 2, 1921 it was published as Gayei Milliye by the same group. When the irade resumed publication under news management favored some separatist groups and was closed permanently in March 1922.

- (9) Coşar, op.cit., p.117, Topuz, op.cit., p.128. The contents of the newspapers will be analyzed in the next chapter.
- (10) Recep Zühtü (Soyak) was a reserved officer. He had joined Rauf (Orbay) when he fled Istanbul and met M.Kemal at Amasya. Recep Zühtü commanded the nationalist forces against the Bedirhan tribe when they attacked the town to disrupt the Congress. He had come to Ankara with M.Kemal.
- (11) The official "provincial gazette" had been published since the second convention of the Ottoman Parliament. The printing press of Sivas province was a pedalled plate press, and more advanced compared to Ankara's 1827 made "Marinoni" lithograph: Coşar, op.cit., pp.122-128, 1978.
- (12) The newspaper published in Sivas was named "the national will" (iradei Milliye).
- (13) The author of the article was Hakkı Behiç, a member of the Representative Committee; but only the words "Heyeti Tahririye" (Editorial board) had appeared on the credit line.
- (14) The price of the paper was 3 kuruş, (then 4 U.S. cents). The subscription fee for six months was 160, for a year 300 kuruş: Coşar, op.cit., p.126. Also see Atatürk'ün Tamim ve Telgrafları, Vol.1., p.124.
- (15) Yunus Nadi and editors, composers and printers entire composing room equipment, type cases to Ankara without the knowledge of the occupation forces. The Yeni Gün, therefore, had been composed separately: Coşar, op.cit., pp.180-181. In 1921, the clandestine MM group had carried Yeni Gün's entire printing machine from Istanbul to Anatolia. This Austrian made press had been installed at Kayseri, upon M.Kemal's orders, and from September 1, 1921 on, Yeni Gün was published there.
- (16) In his memoirs, Çerkes Ethem says that transportation was ordered by himself. However the subeditor of the newspaper, Nizamettin Nazif narrates events differently: Tevfik Rüstü (Aras) and Celal (Bayar) (members of the loyal Communist Party) had come to Eskişehir and dined with Arif (Oruç).

After the dinner the group had gone to the printshop. Arif then saw that machines were being boxed by uniformed soldiers. He protested but was silenced with a "large envelope full of money": Coşar, op.cit., p.128 fn.1.

- (17) Ibid., p.130.
- (18) S.J.Shaw and E.K.Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2, Reform Revolution and Republic - The Rise of Modern Turkey: 1808-1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.343.
- (19) The second group newspapers and their first publication dates are Emel (Amasya, September 16, 1920), Anadolu (Antalya, December 19, 1920), Babalık (Konya, April 5, 1921), Dertli (Bolu, 1921), Kalem (Ankara, May 21, 1921) Türkoğlu (Bolu, August 15, 1921), Satveti Milliye (Elazığ, February 24, 1922), Küçük Mecmua (Diyarbakır, June 18, 1922) and Yeşil Yuva (Artvin, August 1, 1922).
- (20) Iskit, op.cit., p.240.
- (21) Ömer Feyzi, in 1919, had published Selamet in Trabzon. This newspaper tried to discourage the members of the local Society for Defense of Rights from attending the congresses organized by Mustafa Kemal: E.B.Şapolyo, Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü ile Basın (History of Turkish Newspapers and Press in all its Aspects), (Ankara: Güven, 1969), pp.218-219.
- (22) Mustafa Kemal refused to exile Hüsnü Yusuf with the members of the Ottoman dynasty, but always kept a poem disgracing him on his table: Şapolyo, op.cit., p.218.
- (23) Although none of its copies was found, Adalet was reportedly published in Bandırma during the brief Greek occupation. The editor of the newspaper, Ali Sami, was an Ottoman navy officer and fled to Greece in 1923 Coşar, op.cit., p.49, fn.1.
- (24) With its degree No.2, the cabinet declared censorship to the Istanbul press and other postal material sent from Istanbul. According to the regulations attached to the decree, there were five censor district in Anatolia and all material received from Istanbul would be opened and controlled by military personnel. For the text of regulations, see Iskit, op.cit., pp.215-217. The five censor authorities were later merged under the General Directorate of Post, Telegraphy and Telephone (August 16, 1920).

- (25) Milli Ajanscılığımızın Onuncu Yılı (Tenth Anniversary of Our National Agency), (Ankara: Anadolu Ajansı, 1935). In fact, in 1935, the Anadolu Ajansı was 15 years old but the officials of the agency may have taken the year of 1925 when the foreign news agencies operation was prohibited as the beginning of the national agency. Cf. S.İskit, Türkiye'de Matbuat Rejimleri (Press Regimes in Turkey), (Ankara Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, 1939), pp.183-184).

The British Reuters, French Havas and German Wolf news agencies had been providing the Istanbul newspapers with foreign news and the world press with the Ottoman reports. However we see some İzmir -or Adana- originated news reports credited to foreign news agencies in the Turkish Press.

- (26) Milli Ajanscılığımız, p.4.
- (27) The three news agencies had established the Osmanlı Ajansı before the legislative initiation of the government: Topuz, op.cit., pp.132-133.
- (28) The foreign news agencies, since their countries had taken sides in different alliances, could no longer cooperate, and the new organization, Milli Ajans was dependent on the German news agency alone: İskit, op.cit., p.187. Reuters and Havas had jointly founded "Türkiye, Havas-Röyter" during the war: Topuz, op.cit., p.133.
- (29) Ibid., p.184.
- (30) Ibid., p.187.
- (31) Herbert Passin, "Writer and Journalist in the Traditional Society", in Communications and Political Development, ed. L.W.Pye, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.99.
- (32) C.Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media, (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1974), p.156.
- (33) Ceridei Havadis was published in 1840, ten years later than the semi-official Takvimi Vekayi, with the permission given by the Sultan "to restore his honor" after Mr.Churchill's arrest. The sales revenue of the newspaper was close to zero and survived only by government subsidies. İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p.4.
- (34) Ibid., p.5.

- (35) Takvim-i Vekayi, Recep 1265 (1849), "Hariciye Nezareti Tezkeresi" (Reminder of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
- (36) However, some other decrees published in the Takvim show that the Cabinet was also discussing applications, as well. The lack of application must have confused the ways of obtaining permission for publication. Iskit quotes the application of a French subject "Kayol the Printer" to the Presidency of the Cabinet for permission to publish an Armenian newspaper. See op.cit., p.6.
- (37) The first director of the press was Sakızlı Ohannes Paşa. During his directorate the first legal regulation of the press was enacted in 1864 (Matbuat Nizamnamesi) and the first restrictions were declared in 1866 (Ali Kararname). Ohannes Paşa served afterwards as the Mayor of the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul, and as the Minister of the Imperial Treasury: Iskit, op.cit., p.13.
- (38) For the full text of the 1864 regulations see Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, appendix.
- (39) On December 12, 1919, Mustafa Kemal sent the Minister of War, Cemal Paşa a telegraph in cipher and complaining that the Minister of Interior Affairs, interfering the affairs of the Directorate, was trying to inflict harm on the national struggle. Also he severely criticized the (Türkiye, Havas-Röyter) news agency as a mere instrument of the occupation forces. Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p.212-218.
- (40) The organization widely known as the "MM grubu" (Group of National Defence) had smuggled the entire printing press of Yunus Nadi's newspaper Yeni Gün from Istanbul, to Ankara.
- (41) According to the list attached to the bill, appropriations were as follows:
- | | | | |
|----------------------------------|----|--------|-----------|
| Personnel expenses | TL | 2,040 | (13.6 %) |
| Guidance and Information Affairs | TL | 12,500 | (83.30 %) |
| Office expences | TL | 60 | (0.40 %) |
| Initiation expences | TL | 160 | (1.07 %) |
- For the full text of the bill see Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, appendix.
- (42) Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, op.cit., pp.220-222 (My emphasis).
- (43) Ibid.

- (44) Ibid., p.226.
- (45) The law dated December 25, 1920, allowed the Directorate to communicate with the Interior regarding the domestic press. Ibid., p.225.
- (46) For the letter of the fifth Director, H.Ragıp Baydur, to Iskit about the activities of the Directorate, see Iskit, op.cit., p.234.
- (47) For the letter of the sixth Director, Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) to Iskit about the activities of the Directorate, ibid., p.237. Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) mentions Yeni Gün in Ankara, İleri in İstanbul, Babalık and Sebilürreşad in Konya, Küçük Mecmua in Diyarbakır as the most regularly supported newspapers. He adds that he himself excluded the Sebilürreşad.
- (48) A textbook of Turkish literature, several books on women's place in Turkish society, and the translations of some volumes on the Paris Peace Conference, etc., were among the Directorate's publications in 1920-1922. Ibid., p.237.
- (49) "L'echo de Turquie" and "The Echo of Turkey" were published for more than three years. Ibid., p.248.
- (50) The name of the official gazette was changed from Ceridei Resmîye to Resmî Ceride, dropping the Arabic genitive construction in 1926. The new Directorate for Collection of Publications was charged to publish the Resmî Gazete.
- (51) Iskit, op.cit., p.256.
- (52) The law no, 1575, beginning in March 1930, established a government subsidy system for three years for the newspapers which were to lose readership because of the change of script.
- (53) There were many complaints voiced in the press during this period. See, Iskit, op.cit., p.257.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) For the law no. 2205, May 22, 1933 see Resmî Gazete, May 24, 1933.
- (56) The circular letter sent to editors and publishers by the Director-General, Vedat Nedim (Tör), in October 1933; for the full text see Iskit, op.cit., pp.270-271.

- (57) For the law no.2444, May 26, 1934, see Resmi Gazete, June 1, 1934.
- (58) For the law no.3837, May 22, 1940, see Resmi Gazete, June 1, 1940. The radio stations were owned and radio programs were broadcast by the privately-owned company, Türk Telsiz Telefon Anonim Şirketi (Turkish Wireless Telephone Company) until 1936. The following four years the radio was operated by the government's Post, Telephone and Telegraph department. In 1940 it was put under the Directorate of the Press.
- (59) The legal authorization of the Directorate to issue ID cards to the journalists came later with the Regulations of the Press Cards of March 18, 1942. For a brief period, the Directorate approved the cards issued by the newspaper companies. Şapolyo, op.cit., pp.48-54.
- (60) In 1934, the Hakimiyeti Milliye changed its name to Ulus.
- (61) For the new foundation law of the Directorate (Law no. 4475, July 16, 1943) see Resmi Gazete, July 16, 1943.
- (62) For Baydur's letter to Iskit, see Iskit, op.cit., p.373.
- (63) Mustafa Kemal disclosed his project of a political party, on January 17, 1923, to the editors during a two-day conference. For details of the conference see A.Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz, vol.3, pp.28-31.
- (64) There are some complaints about, and responses to, the Istanbul newspapers in the Hakimiyeti Milliye. Also for M.Kemal's complaints uttered at several dinners, see Kılıç Ali, Atatürk'ün Hususiyetleri (Characteristics of Atatürk), (İstanbul: Sel, 1955), pp.11-15.
- (65) Vatan, October 5, 1923.
- (66) Ali Şükrü was the editor of the Second Group's newspaper, Tan. The murderer, Topal Osman the commander of the Guard Brigade of the Assembly was allegedly not handed over to the court for a week.
- (67) Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931, (Ankara: Yurt, 1981), pp.68-70.
- (68) (Hoca) Şükrü (İsmail Çelikay), Hilafeti İslamiyye ve Büyük Millet Meclisi (The Caliphate of Islam and the Grand National Assembly), (Ankara: 1923); Hilafet ve Milli Hakimiyet (The Caliphate and National Sovereignty), (Ankara: Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyeti Umumiyesi, 1923). For a detailed analysis of these booklets see Tunçay,

op.cit., pp.64-67; M.Goloğlu, Halifelik (The Caliphate), (Ankara: Kalite, 1973), *passim*.

- (69) Rauf (Orbay), the leader of the opposition, visited the Caliph on October 28, a day before the declaration of the Republic. This visit was the main subject of the Istanbul Press while the government crisis was retaining the primary place in Ankara (and government-controlled) newspapers.
- (70) Rauf's statement on the "haste" for a republic and the importance of the Caliphate appeared in the Vatan and Tasfiri Efkar newspapers on the same day (November 1). In this month almost all the newspapers were reporting the reactions of the Islamic world to the intentions of abolishing the Caliphate (Vatan, November 9), and published articles defending the idea that the Caliphate was indispensable part of the government (Tanin, November 10). Rauf was questioned in the Party group on November 22, when he came back to Ankara. Ismet (İnönü), then the Prime Minister, without mentioning Rauf, accused those "protagonists of Caliph-cum-Head of State, and said "they will, however, be beheaded" Tunçay, op.cit., p.72.
- (71) The Times (London), November 9, 1923; Le Matin (Paris), November 13, 1923. These statements were quoted by M. Kemal's Hakimiyeti Milliye on November 15-16.
- (72) The Aga Khan's letter was published by Tanin and İkdam on December 5, 1923 and by Tevhidi Efkar on December 6.
- (73) According to Mustafa Kemal this conspiratory group was gathered to prevent Turkey's liberation from religious bonds. See, A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1923 (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981), pp.692-697. Also see Y.Hikmet Bayur, Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyaseti (The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973).
- (74) The activities of the Tribunals had been terminated in May. Tunçay, op.cit., p.78.
- (75) Of the 156 present deputies, 22 abstained. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Vol.4, p.314-328. According to Tunçay, absentee votes show that there was, though limited, opposition to the government proposal: op.cit., p.79.
- (76) For President Ihsan's interview, see Vatan, December 11, 1924.

- (77) Lütfi Fikri published an open letter to the Caliph appealing to him not to resign from his post (Tanin, November 10, 1923). On the following days, the prosecutor arrested an aide to the Caliph, Ekrem, the president of the Istanbul Seamen Union, Ali Osman Ağa, a major of the army, Dayı Mesut, İlyas Sami (Kalkavan-oğlu), the communists Mehmet and Şükrü, and a preacher of the Beyazıd Mosque, İbrahim Ethem. The prosecutor filed five suits against the journalists, and Lütfi Fikri, Ekrem, Ali Osman Ağa, İbrahim Ethem. Tunçay, op.cit., pp.79-84.
- (78) For the details of the trials, see Yalman, op.cit., vol. 3, pp.94-97.
- (79) Topuz, op.cit., p.136, quotes Kandemir, Siyasî Dargınlıklar (Political Quarrels), (İstanbul, 1964), vol.2, p.102: The Prime Minister, İsmet (İnönü), while seeing the members of the Tribunal off to Istanbul at the Ankara train terminal, asked the president of the court "to hang (Hüseyin) Cahit (Yalçın) immediately". However, for Tunçay, the aim of the regime was not to destroy the press, but to chastise it: op.cit., p.81.
- (80) Vatan, December 28, 1923. Lütfi Fikri was pardoned on February 13, 1924 and get reelected as the President of the Bar. In the other trials, the aide of the Caliph, Ekrem, was acquitted; Ali Osman Ağa and the preacher İbrahim Ethem were sentenced to one year. This young religious leader would be executed by the Eastern Provinces Independence Tribunal in 1925 in Urfa. The Istanbul Tribunal was dismissed two monts later.
- (81) The arrested and released journalists, Ahmed Cevdet (İkdam), Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) (Tanin), and Velid (Ebuzziya) (Tevhidi Efkar) were invited to Izmir with Mehmet Asım (Vakit), Ahmet Emin (Yalman) (Vatan), Suphi Nuri (İleri) (İleri), Necmettin Sadık (Sadak) (Akşam) and Hüseyin Şükrü (Tercümanı Hakikat). Although he went to Izmir on February 2, Velid (Ebuzziya) was not "invited" to the interview on February 3. It was explained to others that Mustafa Kemal himself did not see any use of discussing politics with someone who has fixed and reactionary ideas. Yalman, op.cit., p.102.
- (82) Ibid., p.103. According to Tunçay, the fact that Kemal wanted the press know that if he wished to use the press even against the people he could do it was a result of his "Jacobian mentality": op.cit., p.85.
- (83) Yalman, op.cit., p.104.

- (84) Bribery by some wealthy Armenians to authorities in order to return to the country got a large press coverage; even though it was denied, soon afterwards the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs accepted the cover-up and authorized an independent investigation team: Yalman, op.cit., p.115. Meanwhile, some newspapers labelled those deputies in favor of a wage raise as "the dishonored" (Vakit, January 17, 1924). Ali Saip, the deputy of Kozan, hit the Assembly correspondent of the Vakit newspaper, Hüseyin Necati. The publisher of the newspaper, Hakkı Tarım (Us), who was also deputy himself, slapped Ali Saip in return; when an aide of Mustafa Kemal, Kılıç Ali, intervened, the incident turned into a feud. The following day, Ali Saip, moved a proposition to legalize armed duel in the country; he mentioned that the help of the law everybody disgraced by the press would be able to restore his honor. His statement accompanying the proposal is important regarding the mentality of the politicians:

Although the assembly has frequently expressed its respect for press freedom, it has never been reported by the press properly. On the contrary, the newspapers are trying to disgrace politicians in the eyes of the constituents. Is this what we call the press freedom?... Why is it that we accept everything newspapers report as the true opinion of public as if there were a private telephone line between the press and the public? (Vatan, January 27, 1924).

- (85) The aim of the Minister in this visit to Istanbul, as reported by some newspapers (Vakit, August 24, 1924; Tanin, August 27, İkdam, August 28) was to reconcile relations and to prevent the campaigns for the local elections. Also see Yalman, op.cit., p.128.
- (86) The Son Telgraf newspaper reported on October 6, 1924 that Rauf (Orbay), İsmail (Canbolat) and Refet (Bele) were about to declare the foundation of a new political party.
- (87) Having spent a month in Bursa, Mustafa Kemal went for a visit to the Black Sea provinces in September 1924. Although his ship passed through the Bosphorus he did not stop by. In Trabzon and Samsun, he said that the Party was the assembly of all people who wanted to contribute to the Nation, and that personal rivalry, if contained in one party, would not inflict harm on the national cause; he, therefore, regarded all the efforts of those who wanted to see today the natural developments of tomorrow as contrary to the national unity. Vatan, September 24, 1924.

(88) Yalman writes that Rauf (Orbay) and Dr. Adnan (Adıvar) visited him inviting him to join the ranks of the new party they would soon establish, but he refused them. Op.cit., p.139.

(89) For Mustafa Kemal's comments on the attitude of the press, see A Speech, op.cit., pp.690-692.

(90) Hakimiyeti Milliye, November 14.

The crisis and confusion in the Assembly are over now. The Turkish Republic has been erected on the basis of national sovereignty. Nobody, therefore, should think of preventing the foundation of more than one party.

On November 11, the official Anatolian News Agency, under the direct order of the Director-General of the Press, issued a declaration denying the press reports about a project to suppress the press (Vatan, Nov. 12); but the Director, Zekeriya (Sertel) was dismissed immediately afterward from the post he had occupied since the foundation of the Directorate. Tunçay, op.cit., p.99 fn.73.

(91) "Mustafa Kemal Türkiye'ye aittir" (Mustafa Kemal Belongs to Turkey), Vatan; November 21, 1924.

(92) Hür Fikir (İzmit), November 28, 1924.

(93) F.W.Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1965), p.327.

(94) Ibid., p.330.

(95) The first article of the Law authorized the council of ministers to close all publication if found, on its own account, related to the causes of disturbances. Resmî Ceride, March 6, 1925. The minister's addressing the press as "serpent" in the Assembly was criticized by some newspapers (Vatan, March 5, 1925).

(96) The closed newspapers were Tevhidi Efkar, Son Telgraf, İstiklal, Sebilür Reşad, Aydınlık and Orak-Çekic in Istanbul and Savha in Adana, and İstiklal in Trabzon. According to Topuz, Toksöz was also closed in Adana: op.cit., p.140.

(97) A spokesman of the RPP said that they were distinguishing "those who are hostile to the Party but supporting the Republic" from those "hostile to both of them": Yalman, op.cit., pp.163-164. For the text of the declaration, see Cumhuriyet, March 7, 1925.

(98) In the second group were Sadai Hak in Izmir, İstikbal and Kahkaha in Trabzon and Presse du Soir in Istanbul. Yalman, op.cit., p.164.

- (99) Tunçay, op.cit., p.142.
- (100) Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol.4, p.520.
- (101) Tanin, April 15, 1925; Vakit, April 17, 1925.
- (102) The Ankara Independence Tribunal consisted of Ali (Çetinkaya) (President), Necip Ali (Prosecutor), and members Kılıç Ali, Dr.Reşit Galip and (Kel) Ali. Ergun Aybars, "İstiklal Mahkemeleri 1923-1927" (Independence Tribunals, 1923-1927) (Inaugural Dissertation, Ankara University, 1979), p.27.
- (103) Topuz, op.cit., p.141.
- (104) H.Cahit Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar (Political Memoirs), (İstanbul: 1976), pp.104-108.
- (105) Aybars, op.cit., p.143. Yalçın stayed in Çorum for two years and was pardoned together with other convicts of the Tribunals. In 1933, returning to journalism, he launched the weekly Fikir Hareketleri, which ceased publication in 1940.
- (106) Topuz, op.cit., p.143; Tunçay, op.cit., p.146 fn 25. According to Aybars, op.cit., p.166, Hüseyin Kenan was also convicted. But Tunçay notes that "Hüseyin Kenan" was Cevad Şakir's penname, and only two journalists were convicted in the Resimli Ay trial.
- (107) Much later, in his memoirs, the prosecutor of the Eastern Provinces Independence Tribunal, Avni Doğan, disclosed that "the statement of Şeyh Sait about the journalists was the result of inspirations (by some court members) and he was promised a lesser penalty if he gave in the names of certain journalists": Avni Doğan, Kurtuluş, Kuruluş ve Sonrası (The Independence, Establishment and After), (İstanbul: Dünya, 1964), p.174. (Paranthesized words are added by Tunçay, op.cit., p.144), Şeyh Sait and his 29 associates, however, were executed on June 29.
- (108) Aybars, op.cit., p.187. Eşref Edib of the Sebilür Reşad was already being tried by the Ankara Tribunal. The trials, however, did not start until August in Elazığ. Yalman, op.cit., p.171. The Eastern Provinces Independence Tribunal consisted of Mazhar Müfit (President), Süreyya (Prosecutor) (later replaced by Avni (Doğan), and Avni, Ali, Saip and Halim (members). Topuz, op.cit., p.141.

- (109) Yalman, in his memoirs, explains how his brother-in-law, the "fellow deputy of Malatya of Ismet (İnönü)", Mahmut Nedim, tried to keep the Vatan newspaper open, but those arrested and summoned to Diyarbakır provoked the Tribunal to suspend the Vatan's publication and arrest its editors along with those of the Tanin who also had not been arrested yet. Op.cit. pp.168-171.
- (110) The journalists, during their journey to Diyarbakır and Elazığ, were accompanied by a policeman, but they were free to stay in towns as long as they wished and to see everybody they wanted to. They were received by the public officials in many places. Yalman, op.cit., pp.172-174: "We were enjoying ourselves as if we were not prisoners of that terrible Tribunal which was hanging people like pears, but tourists exploring new countries and peoples".
- (111) According to Yalman, the president of the Tribunal used to call every morning at the house journalists were staying "for a morning coffee" and tell them his "always successful love affairs", which was "the only penalty the journalists suffered in Elazığ". Op.cit., p.179.
- (112) Only Velid (Ebuzziya) of Tevhidi Efkar did not sign the appeal to Mustafa Kemal, Yalman, op.cit., p.174, Cf. Tunçay, op.cit., p.145. For the text of the telegram, see F.S.Oral, Türk Basın Tarihi, (Turkish Press History), Vol.2, (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, n.d.), p.124.
- (113) According to a personal letter of the prosecutor of the Tribunal Avni (Doğan), addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the message of Mustafa Kemal demanding the release of the journalists in return for their future allegiance to the Party had been very "harmful" to the earlier plans of convicting journalists; it was now impossible to convict them considering the "high honor of His Excellency". Tunçay, op.cit., p.144.
- (114) Hakimiyeti Milliye, September 13, 1925. Abdülkadir Kemali (Öğütçü) was acquitted in Ankara four months later: Cumhuriyet February 5, 1926. The same court sentenced Ata (Çelebi) of Doğru Söz to one year: Tunçay, op.cit., p.146. A.Emin (Yalman) was again questioned by the Ankara Tribunal, in the summer of 1926, about a letter by Rauf (Orbay) found among the documents confiscated from his house. In this letter sent from Paris, Rauf had written about his intention to establish a party "because one party would mean a dictatorship": Yalman, op.cit., p.194.
- (115) For example, Ahmet Emin (Yalman) would be able to re-launch the Vatan newspaper 15 years later, after personally promising Mustafa Kemal to support him at a dinner in Ankara: Vatan August 19, 1950. Also see Yalman, op.cit., pp.217-220.

- (116) "The country paid heavily for the misunderstanding between Mustafa Kemal and the press; and from 1925 to 1936 there was not one publication that was worth being called a newspaper": Yalman, op.cit., p.106.
- (117) According to Shaw and Shaw it was only after the last local rebellion had been suppressed in 1929 that Mustafa Kemal felt secure enough to tell the Assembly that he did not feel the Restoration of Order Law had to be renewed. Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., vol.2, p.381.
- (118) The journalist tried by the Independence Tribunals were forced either to practise some other profession or to support the Party. Yalman (op.cit., pp.194-213) was in the aviation business; H.Cahit Yalçın was teaching at a lycee; Zekeriya Sertel was translating books for children; İkdam and Tasfiri Efkar ceased publication in 1926 and 1927, respectively; İsmail Müştak (Mayokan) would soon launch the newspaper Politika with funds provided by the government (Tunçay, op.cit., p.278, fn.64).
- (119) Arif Oruç, a nephew of Çerkes Ethem, was the editor of the Yeni Dünya newspaper in Eskişehir. When he came to Ankara with his newspaper (see, supra p.) he published Seyyareyi Yeni Dünya. Şapolyo, op.cit., p.236; Topuz, op.cit., p.145. He launched Yarın with Mekki Sait (Esen) and Nizamettin Nazif (Tepedelenlioğlu).
- (120) In fact, Son Posta was financed by Selim Ragıp (Emeç), Ekrem (Uşaklıgil) and Halil Lütfi (Dördüncü); Zekeriya Sertel was editing the newspaper.
- (121) Zekeriya Sertel, Hatırladıklarım (What I Remember), (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1968), pp.189-192.
- (122) Topuz, op.cit., p.145.
- (123) On August 9, 1930, the newspaper Vakit of Hakkı Tarık (Us) and Asım (Us) reported that Fethi (Okyar) had obtained permission from Mustafa Kemal to establish a party; but Fethi (Okyar), in his memoirs, disclosed that the idea was Mustafa Kemal's, not his. F.Okyar, Üç Devirde Bir Adam (One Man in Three Epochs), (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1980), pp.386-388.
- (124) Fethi (Okyar) and Ağaoglu Ahmet who later became founders of the FRP visited A.Emin (Yalman) when he was still serving what he called "a professional exile". A.Emin refused their offer to publish the Party newspaper and get elected to the Assembly. Yalman, op.cit., pp.212-213. Soon afterwards, the Son Posta and Yarın appeared as the organ of the party. Topuz, op.cit., pp.146-7.

- (125) For a detailed analysis of the FRP spokesmen's statements, see Çetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı (The Free Republican Party Phenomenon), (İstanbul: Karacan, 1982), passim.
- (126) Yarın, September 24 and October 16, 1930. However, Mustafa Kemal said that "such offers" were never pleasing to him because his ultimate ideal was to fortify the nation's sovereignty, and not that of "certain persons": Akşam, September 26, 1930.
- (127) Mustafa Kemal's Hakimiyeti Milliye was against the initiation of a second party from the beginning: Falih Rıfki (Atay), the chief columnist of the newspaper, wrote in his column, on September 11, 1930 that

...They have been waiting for a Savior and worrying about how the country would be saved! The Arif Oruç, Sekeriyas in Istanbul, the Zeynel Besims, İsmail Hakkıs in İzmir and Süreyya Paşa and Haydar Bey in Ankara have been aware of the great sorrow of the nation and its great leader! And they were intending to establish the real salvation party and present it to the Gazi as a souvenir of September 9!

This was their humble intention.

Once upon a time!..

And where, do you imagine, that fairy tale is supposed to have come from? From Mustafa Kemal! Mustafa Kemal had allegedly told them that the freedom to criticize and free expression of opinion was very useful to the Republic and that those not agreeing with the People's Party could erect a new one!

The pagan armies used to hang pages of the Holy Quran on their spears; now those enemies of the Republic and the existing order, who are continually stoning the People's Party, pin a picture of Mustafa Kemal on their lapels.

- (128) On September 24, the Hakimiyeti Milliye quoted "a spokesman" of the FRP saying that there were massacres going on in the East, poverty and famine were prevailing in the country, but the government was not properly informing Mustafa Kemal; and the President finally decided to overthrow "İsmet from his throne". The secretary-general of the FRP, Nuri (Conker), denied the statement and disclosed that the person named in the paper was not a party member: Yarın, September 25, 1930.

- (129) Hakimiyeti Milliye, September 4, 5; Cumhuriyet, September 5; Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Hakimiyeti Milliye, Yarın, September 6, 8, 9 and 10. Also see Yetkin, op.cit., pp.166-181.
- (130) For the thesis of the sincerety of Mustafa Kemal in the Free Party event, see Yetkin, op.cit., pp.241-248.
- (131) The FRP nominated its own candidates in the local elections in October 1930, and won 31 of 502 seats in cities and towns (Walter F.Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: the Free Party and its Aftermath, (Leiden; E.J.Brill, 1973), p.115). The 1931 general elections would have not been an easy one, even if had also been a rigged one. Mustafa Kemal once warned İsmet (İnönü) saying "You will be totally burned out (in the elections)": Hilmi Uran, Hatıralarım (My Memoirs), (Ankara, 1959, p.229 cited in Yetkin, op.cit., p.214.
- (132) Ibid., p.222.
- (133) Yarın, November 9, 1930.
- (134) Yetkin, (op.cit., p.223) cites H.R.Soyak, Atatürk'ten Hatıralar (Reminiscences from Atatürk), (İstanbul: Yapı-Kredi Bankası, 1973), p.437.
- (135) Okyar, op.cit., pp.523-526.
- (136) Ibid., p.531; Yetkin, op.cit., pp.226-227. Also see Yarın, November 16, 1930.
- (137) Vakit, November 20.
- (138) Vakit, April 7, May 15, and September 24, 1930.
- (139) Weiker, op.cit., p.56.
- (140) Vakit, December 4, 1930. With Arif Oruç, his editor Süleyman Tefvik was also arrested and convicted for publishing a cartoon disgracing a governor.
- (141) Cumhuriyet, December 4, 12, 25, 1931. Arif Oruç, closing his newspaper after the Press Law, launched the Mücadele in September 5, 1931. His newspaper was closed by the government in the second day, so he started various businesses without success, and on March 7, 1933 was exiled to Bulgaria without a court order: Tunçay, op.cit., p.281 fn.72.
- (142) Yetkin, op.cit., p.174.

- (143) Hakimiyeti Milliye, September 16, 1930.
- (144) For Abdülkadir Kemalî's (Öğütçü) The People's Republican Party (Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası), Kazım Tahsin's the Turkish Republican Workers and Peasants Party (Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Fırkası), the Secular Republican Workers and Peasants Party (Lâik Cumhuriyetçi İşçi ve Çiftçi Fırkası), see Tunçay, op.cit., pp.273-282.
- (145) See supra p. .
- (146) Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, op.cit., p.257.
- (147) Sertel, op.cit., p.193.
- (148) Iskit, op.cit., p.257.
- (149) Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., p.381.
- (150) "The press and the State were rightly striving for the legal arrangements which would lead the press to a position to perform the duties the Nation expected from it" Iskit, op.cit., p.257.
- (151) With a provisional article, the 1931 budget law permitted the government to transfer the Directorate's personnel to other departments. Resmi Gazete, June 1, 1931. Iskit does not see any relationship between the abolition of the ineffective directorate and the forthcoming press law which would be submitted to the Assembly only 45 days later. Cf. Ibid., pp.256-259. However, elsewhere, he admits that the government tried to mould the deputies' opinion before sending the proposal to them. Matbuat İdareleri, pp.378-438.
- (152) To the Article 12 which read "The press is free within the boundaries of law" was added "The publications cannot be subject to censorship and examination before they are issued" (Şeref A.Gözübüyük and Suna Kili, Türk Anayasa Metinleri (Turkish Constitutional Texts), (Ankara: SBF, 1957), pp.69-73. However, since July 24, 1908, the very day Abdülhamit issued a decree to put the Constitution back in force, the editors of the Istanbul newspapers, agreed not to submit their copies to the official censor board; the censor board did not demand it, either. (Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri), p.142).
- (153) If I may say so, press freedom was then limitles; it was not press freedom, but press anarchy; consequently, it gave way to political blackmailing, because the law envisaged no pre-publication censorship, but neither was there post-publication control. There was no government to peruse newspapers", Ibid., p.143.

- (154) In the 45 days after the decree, 200 permits were issued to publishers Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Meşrutiyet Hatıraları" (Memoirs of the Constitutional Monarchy), Fikir Hareketleri, Vol.128, p.375.
- (155) Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., p.274.
- (156) "Refraining from investigations on the past lives of Ministers, the press should only dwell on the actual activities of the administrators, and criticize only if some points are against the public interest": The first decision of the Board. See Ahmet İhsan Tökgöz, Matbuat Hatıralarım (Memoirs in the Press) Vol.I. (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1930), p.47. However, the UPS rule was not in need of legal measurements; it had already closed Hukuku Umumiye, Serbestî and Mizan several times. İskit, op.cit., pp.147-148.
- (157) For the counterrevolution that is known as the "31 Mart Vakası", see Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., pp.279-282.
- (158) In 1909, the court martial authorities prohibited the publication of a newspaper with a name similar to the closed newspapers. Before that decision, Tanin, when closed, was published as Cenin, Renin, Senin; after the decision it was named Hak.
- (159) Hasan Fehmi, a columnist of the Serbestî newspaper, on April 5, 1909; Ahmet Samim, a member of the Ottoman Liberal Union Party and columnist of the Osmanlı newspaper, on June 9, 1910, were assassinated. On the evidence of the UPS's involvement in the killings, see Mustafa Baydar, "Öldürülen Gazetecilerimiz" (The Murdered Newspapermen), Cumhuriyet, July 27, 1967.
- (160) The first reports about the new press law were met with public demonstrations; a public meeting was held in the yard of the Sultanahmet Mosque; those gathered sent a representative committee to the speaker of the House who promised that the freedom of press could not be curbed, on the contrary, what freedom it had would be fortified. İskit, op.cit., p.155.
- (161) It is understood that the deputies were trying to prevent any set back in the hard-gained freedoms. Most of them took floor during the negotiations:

Fazıl Arif - If we accept the government's proposal we give up press freedom. Nobody can find 200 liras for a guaranty fund.

Vartkes - Many young graduates publish a newspaper to serve the country. They do

not have 50 liras when they graduate, let alone 200. Now we are offered to preclude their newspapers. Then, only the rich will publish; the poor and enlightened will not. Thus, we shall deny the majority of people the freedom of expression.

Sabri - How can a man prove that his criticism was just? To prevent the right of criticism of government is to deny the press its basic freedom.

Sait - How shall we know if somebody appointed to a public post is a good man or a bad man without the help of the press?

İsmail Paşa - The freer the press is, the better the governments are. Therefore, to have a vigilant government we have to grant the largest freedom to the press.

Talat - I have heard a copy boy hawking "News about the deputies who have lunch at the Tokatlıyan (restaurant) but do not lay a finger to their duties..."

Boşo - He was not lying at all...

(Topuz, op.cit., pp.98-100).

(162) Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, op.cit., pp.24-29. Also for the text of the law see Düstur, Vol.1, pp.604-608. After a while printing presses and publishers were restricted in the same way: All the Ottoman subjects could have a printshop and publish everything, excluding Islamic text, without a prior permission. For the text of the Printing Presses Law, see Iskit, op.cit., pp.30-32.

(163) The numbers of newspapers and magazines published in those years are as follows:

1909	353	newspapers and magazines
1910	130	
1911	124	
1912	45	
1913	92	
1914	75	
1915	6	
1916	8	
1917	14	
1918	71	

(Topuz, op.cit., p.105; İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, pp. 159-162).

- (164) Zeki, a columnist of the Mizan and Serbestî newspapers was shot dead on July 10, 1911; Hasan Tahsin, a classmate of Mustafa Kemal and publisher of the Silah (Gun) newspaper and known as Silahçı Tahsin (Tahsin the Gunman) was found dead the following year. Baydar, op.cit., July 29, 30, 1967.
- (165) İskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p.163.
- (166) Topuz, op.cit., p.101.
- (167) İskit, op.cit., p.164.
- (168) İskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, p.66.
- (169) Fazıl Ahmet (Aykaç), Ahmet İhsan and Ahmet Süreyya moved the proposal for interpellation. They inquired that since the government's present measures were not adequate in precluding the dangerous direction of some newspapers what kind of new measures should be taken. For the full text of the statements, see ibid., pp.378-438.
- (170) TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol.3, p.44.
- (171) İskit, op.cit., p.382.
- (172) ibid., pp.386-387.
- (173) ibid., pp.389-390.
- (174) ibid., p.398.
- (175) Ali Saip, in his very interesting speech, told stories about some journalists not caring whether he offended them:

Ali Saip (Urfa) - ... (T)here is this Arıç Oruç in Istanbul; he says that he participated in the War of Independence. No he did not. Yes, he came to Anatolia, but he tried to convince a man named İpsiz Recep to rob the groups immigrating to Anatolia... He published Çerkes Ethem's paper... He was sentenced to three years and exiled to a remote town... Following the exile he went to İzmir, and published the Turan newspaper. There he cheated Nalbant Hulusi out of his money and was convicted. But he fled to Istanbul. Now

the printing press he uses belongs officially to his wife to prevent any possible sequestration. He cheated Mehmet Bey of Akşam out of 300 liras; he owes 1200 liras to Sürenyan Efendi and 200 liras to Penha Efendi, 1000-odd liras to the Selanik Bank... He drags himself along the corridors of court houses... Here is the profile of the man who is against us, who is enemy of the regime.

İzzet Ulvi (Afyon) - May Allah punish him...

Ali Saip (continues) - ...There in this Zekeriya. He was writing articles against the missionaries recently; but do not let him deceive you. He himself is a product of the missionaries... During the absolutist rule, the missionaries used to visit the whole country and take Armenian children back with them, inculcate them somewhere, and send them again to Turkey as anarchists, like those Boguses, Haçaturs and others... Please take notice that only the Armenian children, not a Greek nor a Jewish boy or girl, only the Armenian, would be selected. This Zekeriya and his wife were also taken from the country and returned by the same missionaries. I ask you: How can we be sure that this Zekeriya is not a Zaharya?

Hakkı (Van) - Do not slander... He is a converted Jew.

Ali Saip (Continues) - ...There is a man named Kadri, with the money provided by the Administration of Public Debts (of the Ottoman Empire), he joined the Alemdar and there he worked with the infamous traitors like Refi Cevat (Ulunay) and Pehlivan Kadri, and then he joined the exiled Sait Molla's newspaper... His two partners in a book publishing company were illiterate, and all the treacherous publications were controlled by him. Now all of a sudden, he ceases publication. I think he smelled the danger. But we should hold him responsible for any revolt which takes place in the next five years...

Finally there are three newspapers in Izmir. One of them belongs to the man called Zeynel Besim... He is known as Fırlıdakzade Dönek (Fickle the son of trickster). When the Greeks came (to occupy the Aegean region) he served them in Alaşehir, for about six months. But even they saw that he was so untrustworthy that they sent him away... Afterwards his treason was discovered and some documents were prepared to prevent his assignment to a public post. But he launched some newspapers. Once he wrote that his family did not accept his sister to family gatherings because she was not chaste. Now how can a man who does not respect his own family's honor pay respect to the honor of the Nation? As for the Yeni Asır newspaper: there is an İsmail Hakkı in this newspaper which was once the mouth-piece of the Progressive (Republican) Party. This man, with Kamberoğlu -what's-his-name, worked against the regime, against the Republic. All his friends say that he is a traitor. But most important of all is the vagabond who publishes the Halkın Sesi. This man is known as Kirye Sırrı in the region. He is from Chios. He is the man who wrote an article saying "How can we fly the dirty Turkish flag here instead of the sacred blue one?"

Kılıç Ali (Gaziantep) - Is it that man?

Ali Saip (Continues) - ...This rascal has written it and is still doing so. A friend of his, Süreyya, a lawyer, was lynched then, but, somehow, he managed to escape. Why does this man live and how can he publish a newspaper.

It is clear enough: we are struggling against the rascals, cheaters, traitors and dishonest men. Therefore, we should no longer suffer because of them. We are tired of seeing their filthy bodies. Since we call them traitors, let us throw them out of the country.

(TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol.3, pp.435-439).

(176) Şeref's (Deputy from Edirne) speech. Ibid., p.440.

- (177) Ibid., p.441.
- (178) Ibid., p.444.
- (179) Refik's (Deputy from Konya) speech. Ibid., p.446.
- (180) Refik Şevket's (Deputy from Manisa) speech. Ibid., p. 448.
- (181) Ibid., p.449.
- (182) Turgut's (Deputy from Manisa) speech, Ibid., p.450.
- (183) Ibid., p.450.
- (184) Ibid., p.451.
- (185) Hamdi's (Deputy from Mersin) speech. Ibid., p.453.
- (186) Ibid., p.453.
- (187) Rasih's (Deputy from Antalya) speech. Ibid., p.456.
- (188) Halil's (Deputy from İzmir) speech. Ibid., p.454; Fazıl Ahmet's (Aykaç) (Deputy from Elaziz) speech, Ibid., p. 454-460.
- (189) Ibid., pp.460-466. The Assembly decreed the publication of the full text of speeches and the Prime Minister's statement by the newspapers.
- (190) Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, pp.263-265.
- (191) The spokesman of the joint committee said on one occasion that they dwelled on the bill more than 150 hours: ibid., p.427. Since the Assembly received it and sent it to the commission on July 15 and negotiated it on July 25, assuming they worked every day, the committee must have worked on it more than 15 hours a day.
- (192) For the minutes of the Assembly session on the Press Law, see Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, pp.440-476.
- (193) For a brief analysis of the 1931 Press Law, see Topuz, op.cit., pp.150-152. Also for the full text of the law see Iskit, op.cit., pp.730-746.
- (194) Celal Sahir, a deputy from Zonguldak, pointed out that "the requirement of being a graduate of a university or a lycee" was a contradiction; if the government considered a lycee diploma adequate for a man to be a

publisher, then the clause stating "university" should be omitted. But the committee and the Minister of Justice insisted that publishers should be a university graduate if there was a university in their city. Ibid., pp.449-451.

- (195) The crimes mentioned in Article 12 of the law consist of embezzlement, malversation, bribery, disclosing government secrets, lying under oath, forgery, issuing copies of unexisting documents, issuing documents unauthorizedly, misidentifying one's self or others in front of a public office, altering bonds or other commercial papers; raping someone under 15 years of age, raping someone over 15 years of age; sexual intercourse publicly; kidnapping; provoking to adultery; robbery, heft, looting; defraud or false bankruptcy.
- (196) Arif Oruç, for example, closed his newspaper Yarın after the proclamation of the law. See, supra, p.
- (197) Article 12 of the law required that publishers should not be effected by the laws Nos. 347 and 854 which restrict all military and civil personnel of Istanbul who did not join the national struggle and those who, in Anatolia, worked against the National Forces, or those who did not return to the country after the second declaration of the Constitution in 1908.
- (198) Hakkı Tarık, a deputy from Giresun and publisher of the Vakit newspaper was the most insistent member of the Assembly to amend the bill. He also pointed out that it was unnecessary to oblige chief columnists to meet the requirements. But the commission insisted that chief columnists were as important as publishers, Ibid., pp. 450-451.
- (199) Some deputies had severely criticized newspapers for publishing photographs of their buildings, factories and casinos during the interpellation in the Assembly, Ibid., pp.417, 420, 422, 423, 436.
- (200) Those offending this section would be fined up to 200 liras (Article 35).
- (201) Since committing these crimes would be offending the prohibition of provoking people to a crime mentioned in the Penal Code, the original penalty of the latter (up to 5 years imprisonment) would be increased by adding a sixth and totalling six years.
- (202) 150 persons had been expelled from Turkey on charge of high treason. See Tunçay, op.cit., p.47.

- (203) Iskit, op.cit., pp.466-468.
- (204) As Linz pointed out (J.Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", op.cit., pp.267-268) like the similar authoritarian one-party systems, the Kemalists, having fought the War of Independence without a full-fledged ideology, did not elaborate political programs. But as the need to mobilize certain groups to fill the political void arose, the derivative ambiguous and contradictory ideological formulations began to appear. The RPP, in its first seven years, tried to penetrate into the society through some quasi-political organizations such as Türk Ocakları (The Turkish Hearth). The latter was founded after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, and, claiming that the RPP was already addressing itself to the very objectives of Türk Ocakları, the organization dissolved itself. For the mergers between the Party and other associations, see Tunçay, op.cit., pp.295-299. In the Third Congress, the RPP, separating the regulations from the program, declared for the first time a detailed list of policy objectives. Rather loose ideas found their way into the program as "Six Arrows" or six leading principles: Nationalism, republicanism, populism, reformism, secularism and statism. Ibid., pp.304-322. Yet, it should be noted that, as Linz puts it, (Linz, op.cit., p.276), these ideas and symbols were only vague commitments.
- (205) Linz, op.cit., p.285; Tunçay, op.cit., p.332.
- (206) Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, op.cit., p.389.
- (207) Tunçay cites Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk İle Üç Ay (Three Months with Atatürk), (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945), p.98.
- (208) Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, p.177.
- (209) Editorial, Kadro, vol.1; p.3; interview with V.N.Tör, then editor of the Kadro (January 12, 1984); For reproduction of the first volume, see Cem Alpar (ed.), Kadro: 1932-Cilt 1-Tıpkıbasım (Kadro: 1932, Vol.1, Facsimile), (Ankara: İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Akademisi, 1978). Among the magazines published from 1931 to 1935 were, Çığır (1932, by Hıfzı Oğuz (Bekata) and Samet (Ağaoğlu), Fikir Hareketleri (in 1933, by Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Yeni Adam (in 1933, by İsmail Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu), Varlık (in 1933, by Yaşar Nabi (Nayır) and Nahid Sırrı (Örik)), Yedi Gün (in 1933, by Sedat Simavi), Yücel (in 1935), Karikatür (in 1935 by Sedat Simavi), Ayda Bir (in 1935, by Yusuf Ziya (Ortaç) and Orhan Seyfi (Orhon)).

- (210) Ömür Sezgin, "Kadro Hareketi" (The Kadro Movement) in Alpar (ed.), op.cit., p.13.
- (211) Korkmaz Alemdar, "Basın Kadro Dergisi ve Kadro Harekatı İle İlgili Bazı Görüşler", (The Kadro Movement and some views on the Kadro Movement) in Alpar (ed.), op.cit., pp.21 ff.
- (212) "There are striking and pleasant similarities one can easily notice between the Italian nationalist movement known as Fascism and the social ideas and political program we have developed here...": Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), in Ankara in 1931 congress of the Turkish Heart Association. Tunçay, op.cit., pp.296-297 fn.17.
- (213) "It was our nightmare to get a phone-call from the 8th Bureau; an invitation to Ankara by this office was even more terrible": Interview with Ulvi Yenil, a reporter of the Akşam newspaper from 1928 to 1943, Istanbul, December 14, 1983.
- (214) CHF Katibi Umumiliğinin Tebligatı (The RPP Secretary - General's Circular Letters), vol.1, August 29, 1931, cited by Tunçay op.cit., p.319 fn.43.
- (215) For the statute of the organization see appendix 14 in Tunçay, op.cit., pp.455-458. The RPP must have been unsure about the impact of the written communications, and therefore employed oral communication.
- (216) Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), "Halk Evleri" (The People's Houses) Kadro, vol.1, March 1932, p.36.
- (217) Idem, "Yarı Münevverler Klubü", (The Half-Intellectuals' Club), ibid., Vol.1, August 1932, p.41.
- (218) Editorial, Ibid., September 1932, p.3.
- (219) Burhan Asaf, "Fırka Mektebi", (The Party School), ibid., p.32.
- (220) Şevket Süreyya, "Falih Rıfkı ve Son Eseri", (Falih Rıfkı and His Last Works), ibid., p.43.
- (221) Ağaoğlu Ahmet, "Devlet ve Ferd" (The State and the Individual) serial articles; Cumhuriyet, Nov. 13-Dec. 1, 1932. Republished in Devlet ve Fert (İstanbul: 1933).
- (222) Since Mahmut (Soydan) was an executive of the İş Bank, the Milliyet's criticisms were attributed to the business circles gathered around the Bank; see Alemdar, op.cit., p.30.

- (223) Milliyet, Nov. 5, 1933.
- (224) Mahmut (Soydan) suddenly went to Europe for medical treatment which lasted till May 4, 1934. But he never returned to the subject of the Kadro. Tör recalls the criticisms; but he reminds that Yakup Kadri used to go to M.Kemal and asked his advice; he always said "go on, my boys" (interview with Tör; İstanbul, Jan. 12, 1984).
- (225) Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had published an article on the dimensions of the statism of the government in the Kadro, vol. 2, October 1933, pp.4-6. The leader of the Kadro group, Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) had visited Mustafa Kemal 31 times at the Presidential Palace during the period of 1932-1934: Özel Şahirgiray, (ed.), Atatürk'ün Nöbet Defteri (Atatürk's Log) (Ankara: 1955) cited by Alemdar, op.cit., p.39 fn.70.
- (226) As the bureaucratic-military authoritarianism become a single-party, moderately mobilizational authoritarian regime, the leaders feel that "without the utopian element" it is difficult, if not impossible, to have the young, the students, the intellectuals involved in politics and to provide the cadres for politicization; but the required ideologization is usually done by the unauthorized people (Linz, op.cit., pp.271, 278). However, though Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was supporting the Kadro group (A.Hamdi Başar, op.cit., p.161) against the İş Bank circles represented by Celal Bayar at the party level, the Kadro ideology never assumed the status of an official ideology.
- (227) Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) was not contacted before his appointment, and thought that it was an exile; but the Prime Minister asked him "not to take the decision so hard and never resist the will of the Gazi": Y.Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat (Involuntary Diplomat), Ankara: Bilgi, 1967), p.13.
- (228) According to Alemdar (op.cit., p.40), the Kadro was closed just after Yakup Kadri's appointment; however, İskit writes that the publication was closed after Vedat Nedim's appointment. The last issue of the Kadro was published in the autumn of 1934; Vedat Nedim joined the Directorate on October 6, 1933; in the last few issues Vedat Nedim's articles had not appeared. He must have refrained from publishing his ideas after assuming a public office.
- (229) "In the post-war era, there are three ways of development: (1) to build communism with which Russia is busy; (2) to save the capitalistic system which is the

business of the League of Nations, and (3) to establish a sovereign national economy instead of a colony economy which will be the original contribution of the Turkish Republic to the world": Vedat Nedim, "Müstemle-ke İktisadiyatından, Millet İktisadiyatına", (From Colonial Economy to National Economy), Kadro, Vol.1, Jan., 1932, p.10.

"Just as we cannot let an irregular armed organization exist side by side with the regular Army, we cannot tolerate irregularities in social and economic spheres. We, therefore, need the State's disciplinary and regulative hand everywhere": idem, "Mefhum Teşkilatı Değil, Madde Teşkilatı", (Not an Imaginary But a Real Organization), ibid., Aug. 1932, pp.13-17.

- (230) The new directorate was established on May 22, 1933 and Ali Server (Suner), an inspector of the Interior Ministry, was appointed as the acting-director on June 1, 1933. He was replaced by Mehmet Ekrem (Sevencan), the private secretary of the Interior Minister on July 20, 1933. Vedat Nedim was the third head of the new directorate. But the first two directors had not started any organization.
- (231) It is understood from the list of personnel given by Iskit (Matbuat İdareleri, p.269) that the directorate consisted of (1) a department of domestic press affairs; (2) a section to peruse the English-and French-language press; (3) an administrative office, (4) a department to compose the Ayın Tarihi, a periodical almanac published by the directorate.
- (232) Iskit, op.cit., p.270.
- (233) Ibid., p.272.
- (234) Interview with Tör; İstanbul, January 12, 1984.
- (235) Most of the material sent was the success stories of the statist economic policy. Interview with then journalist Ulvi Yenal, İstanbul, Dec. 14, 1983.
- (236) Topuz, op.cit., pp.155-160.
- (237) As resolved by the Congress in 1936, the general - secretary of the Party, Recep Peker, was appointed as the Interior Minister; all governors were appointed as the local party chairman. Tunçay argues that the State, no longer able to tolerate the relative autonomy of the party fused the party and became preponderant in power, influence and force (Op.cit., p.322).

- (238) For a brief analysis of the official view of history, see Uljed Heyd, Revival of Islam in Modern Turkey, (Jerusalem: 1968). On the official efforts to purify the language, see Agah Sırrı Levend, Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri, (Stages in the Development and Purification of the Turkish Language), Third Edition, (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1972), pp.406 ff.
- (239) The circular letter of the Director-General on April 24, 1935, cited by Iskit, op.cit., p.278.
- (240) "Article 1/e: The directorate will convene congresses, establish a union of journalists and organize a training course for journalists in order that the level of national journalism may be raised". But years later, in the Second Press Congress held in 1975, the Director - General of the Press, Doğan Kasaroğlu, disclosed that the convening of a congress was ordered by Mustafa Kemal: Introduction in E.Tamer (ed), 2'nci Türk Basın Kurultayı (Second Turkish Press Congress) (Ankara: Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1976), p.3.
- (241) Basın, for the press, was the new word put forward by the Turkish Linguistic Studies Institute in 1934: see Levend, op.cit., p.417. I think the word was coined by Naim Hazım in Hakimiyeti Milliye on July 9, 1933.
- (242) The press directorate had published the minutes of proceedings and the commission reports in the Birinci Basın Kongresi (The First Press Congress), (Ankara: Basın Genel Direktörlüğü, 1936). Reprinted by Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü in 1975. Iskit analyzes the congress in Matbuat İdareleri, pp.277-286 and Matbuat Rejimleri, pp.177-183.
- (243) Birinci Basın Kongresi, op.cit., p.3.
- (244) The number of delegates at the First Press Congress can be summarized as follows:

	D e l e g a t e s				Representatives
	Observers	Private Dailies (38)	Private Non-Dail (78)	Magazines (127)	
İstanbul	9	11	0	6	Professional Organizations of Groups 19
Ankara - İzmir	9	7	1	2	Government Agencies and Ministries 14
Other Provinces	2	7	22	8	
Total	20	25	23	16	33
Percent	17	21	20	14	28

When the ratio of all the delegates are compared with the number of newspapers and magazines, it may be concluded that while daily newspapers were overrepresented, weekly and monthly magazines were largely underrepresented. The organizers of the congress must have remembered the idea of "professional representation" of the Kadro. A group as large as the representatives of the regional press was sent by professional organizations (Turkish Press Association, the Istanbul Press Association, the Istanbul Printers Union, etc.) and professional groups (publishers, book-sellers, responsible editors, editors, columnists, translators, free-lance writers, reporters, proof-readers, artists, graphic designers, photographers). It must also be noted that 12 percent of the representatives was from the government agencies and ministries.

- (245) At the beginning of 1934, by a law, all Turks were forced to have a surname (Law no 2525). By a special law, the Assembly bestowed Mustafa Kemal the surname Atatürk (Law no. 258/1) in the same year.
- (246) Birinci Basın Kongresi, pp.17-20.
- (247) Ibid., pp.20-21.
- (248) Ibid., p.22. The directorate handed out a document titled "The Results of a Survey on Readers" according to which readers were not content with the press coverage, contents, etc. For this document see Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, pp.182-183. However, the Directorate was unable to provide me with the questionnaire, sampling method and actual data. Personal Communication, May, 5, 1983.
- (249) Ibid., p.25. The congress sent a team of representatives to the Party headquarters, and it was received by the Secretary-General Recep Peker. The team also called at the residences of the Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Interior Minister and relayed the congress' respects to their children (ibid., p.26).
- (250) Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, p.279.
- (251) Birinci Basın Kongresi, 25 Mayıs 1935 (The First Press Congress, May 25, 1935), (Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1975), p.27.
- (252) Ibid., p.29.
- (253) Ibid., pp.29-30.

- (254) Ibid., pp.30-32. The reports refer to the recommended association as Kurum (institution) and Birlik (Association, or union) interchangeably. However, with the new current of "pure Turkish" the Istanbul Press Association had already changed its name from Istanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti (The Istanbul Press Association) to Istanbul Basın Kurumu (The Istanbul Press Institution) in 1933.
- (255) See the speeches of Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz of Uyanış, Hakkı Tarık Us, the chairman of the Istanbul Press Association, Hıfzı Oğuz of Çiğir, Faruk, a delegate of children magazines: Ibid., pp.34-37.
- (256) Ibid., pp.37-40.
- (257) Ibid., p.40.
- (258) Ibid., p.41.
- (259) Ibid., p.44.
- (260) See supra, p.129.
- (261) Birinci Basın Kongresi, p.49.
- (262) Ibid., p.59. However, the chairman did not put the motion on Atatürk's membership to vote because "it was natural".
- (263) Ibid., p.62.
- (264) Interview with Ahmet İhsan Benim, a delegate to the First and Second Press Congresses, Istanbul, Dec. 4, 1983; "It was thought to be semi-official like the Bar Association, that is its decisions would be sanctioned by the government power".
- (265) "Unfortunately, all efforts to abolish the laws which were incompatible with the Republican ideal were doomed to futilify all the similar requests were unfruitful. Stereotype speeches did not touch on the anti-democratic press law and other regulations which were somehow identified with the regime": Niyazi Acun's speech in the Second Press Congress. For the full text, see Tamer (ed.), op.cit., pp.38-41.
- (266) "This law puts a stain on the democratic character of the regime": Sırrı, deputy from Kocaeli, TBMM Zabıt Cevridesi, vol.8, pp.81-82.
- (267) During the debate only Hakkı Tarık (Us), a deputy of Giresun, saying that the authority to grant the permis-

sion was not clear, opposed the proposal. The commission reworded the government proposal in a way authorizing the police chief at the place of printing. Ibid., vol.9, p.64.

- (268) Ibid., vol.16, pp.114-116.
- (269) Ibid., p.116.
- (270) Ibid., vol.25, pp.299-230.
- (271) Iskit, Matbuat Rejimleri, pp.487. The guarantee fund would be 500 liras in places with a population less than 50 thousand; 1000 liras in places with a population from 50 thousand to 100 thousand; and 5000 liras where the population was over 100 thousand.
- (272) On October 25, 1937, İnönü resigned and Celal Bayar was appointed Prime Minister. In the same year, in addition to nationalism and republicanism, populism, reformism, secularism and statism were incorporated into the constitution. Frey, op.cit., p.76.
- (273) Iskit, op.cit., pp.108-109.
- (274) Topuz, op.cit., p.162.
- (275) Resmi Gazete, April 29, 1940.
- (276) Ferenc A.Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p.6.
- (277) Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy) Vol.1, (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1977), pp.104-105.
- (278) Vali, op.cit., p.199.
- (279) Yalman, op.cit., pp.226-228.
- (280) Iskit, Matbuat İdareleri, pp.288-291.
- (281) Yalman, op.cit., p.227.
- (282) The Greek journalists contacted the Turkish Directorate of the Press only once to inquire if the prohibition of religious garb in daily life was a move against the Orthodox Church; when explained that it was a reform movement, not a political tactic, Greek newspapers did not publish anything against Turkey: Yalman, op.cit., p.226.
- (283) Iskit, op.cit., p.290.

- (284) Yalman, op.cit., p.228.
- (285) "Faced with strict censorship, newspapers were unable to attract public attention" ibid., p.271.
- (286) When the German Journalists Association wanted to invite some Turkish journalists to a tour in Germany, and the German Representatives complained that there was no such organization to represent Turkish journalists, some editors founded the first Turkish Press Association: Osmanlı Matbuat Cemiyeti (The Ottoman Press Association) on June 25, 1917: Almanak (Almanac), (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti, 1933), p.3. Mahmut Sadık and Hüseyin Cahit were the first two chairman. In 1921, Hakkı Tarık (Us) revived the association.
- (287) Ibid., p.7.
- (288) From 1924 to 1926 annual congresses were not held. In 1927, with an extra-ordinary congress Hakkı Tarık was elected chairman again, and the association was given a new building.
- (289) Yalman, op.cit., p.234.
- (290) "The complex and highly variable nature of interest group politics in Turkey is largely the result of...the corporatist network of semi-official compulsory associations": R.R.Bianchi, "Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1977), p.2.
- (291) For the RPP's efforts to become a blanket organization in the 1930s, see, ibid., pp.18-24.
- (292) Bianchi, op.cit., p.2-3: "(The policies of the 1930s) have aimed at corporatizing the most important areas of Turkish Associational life in order to limit political participation and political demands for economic redistribution without abandoning the formal framework of liberal democracy".
- (293) According to the new Bar Law, the Association would be semiofficial and the election of the executives would be subject to the approval of the Ministry of Justice; no lawyer would be able to practise the profession unless accepted to membership by the executive board, whose decisions would be final.
- (294) TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol.18, p.304.
- (295) The association was to have regional offices in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Adana and Trabzon (Art. 4).

- (307) Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., pp.396-399.
- (308) It should be noted that in these days the press law was amended again to restrict press freedom at its lowest level.
- (309) Vatan, on Oct. 21-Dec.4, 1941, published serial articles defending a position in favor of the Allies; Tevhidi Efkar, on the other hand, defended treaties with Germany and urged the government to support that country more actively: June 18, June 19, Nov.6, Oct. 10 and Oct. 14.
- (310) Tevhidi Efkar was closed for a month on October 14, but the government permitted the re-publication of the newspaper after a week; Vatan was closed on December 5 for 45 days. The suspensions of newspapers less than a month are so frequent that when they are not reported by other newspapers they are hardly noticeable. The number of issues collected by two major libraries may give an idea about the hardships felt by newspapers (Since libraries have some missing issues, complements to 365 are not necessarily the number of days newspapers were not published).

<u>Newspapers</u>	Number of Issues in Libraries		
	<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>
Aksam	337	326	340
Vakit	329	284	290
Son Posta	310	296	342
Yeni Sabah	340	319	335
Tasfiri Efkar	325	225	319
Tan	344	265	280
Vatan	289*	240	260

* Vatan started publication on August 19, 1940.

The most important closure decree of the government was in March 1941. All the eight newspapers which reported the attempted assassination of a British diplomat in Istanbul were closed for a week.

- (311) The Association donated its revenues of the 1942 annual ball to the famine-stricken Greeks with the government's request (Yalman, op.cit., p.295).
- (312) Vatan was closed in 1942 for three months because it published a photograph of Charlie Chaplin ("Charlot") making fun of Hitler. See Vatan, Dec. 7, 1942; for Yalman's account of the related speculations see Yalman, op.cit., pp.354-357.

- (313) Ibid., p.305.
- (314) Ahmad, op.cit., p.8; I.Sunar, State and Society in Politics of Turkey's Development (Ankara: SBF Yay., 1974), p.81; C.Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (The Democratic Party: Its History and Ideology), (Ankara: SBF Yay., 1970), p.3.
- (315) Ahmad, op.cit., p.3.
- (316) Sunar, op.cit., p.81.
- (317) Ibid., p.82.
- (318) Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", op.cit., p.268.
- (319) Ibid., p.292; Sunar, op.cit., p.81.
- (320) Ahmad, op.cit., pp.4-5.
- (321) Eroğul, op.cit., p.9.
- (322) Vatan had become the mouthpiece of the dissident group of Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü; Tan was also very critical of the Saraçoğlu Government.
- (323) Eroğul, op.cit., p.11.
- (324) Ibid., p.12; Ahmad, op.cit., p.14.
- (325) Opening address to the Assembly, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Statements and Speeches of İnönü), Vol.I, (Istanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1946), pp.390-399.
- (326) İnönü must have been implying Article 50 of the Press Law authorizing the government to cease publications, which was the focal point of criticism of both the press and the dissident group. See Tan, October 11; Vatan, October 12 and 13.
- (327) İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri, p.400.
- (328) The recently published Yeni Dünya and Görüşler had become the most severely criticized publications. On Dec. 4, Cumhuriyet reported that when the letter "G" of the title of Görüşler (Views) was held upside down it looked like a sickle.

- (329) Tekin Erer, Basında Kavgalar (The Quarrels in the Press), (Istanbul: 1966), pp.78-81; S.Sertel, Roman Gibi (Like a Novel), (Istanbul: 1969), p.327.
- (330) For the DP's promises of greater press freedom, see Eroğul, op.cit., pp.13-14.
- (331) For detailed analyses of the RPP convention resolutions, see Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., vol.II, pp.400-401; Ahmad, op.cit., pp.11-14.
- (332) However the law, retaining Article 29, still authorized the local police to search party and association buildings without a court warrant. Adnan Menderes, one of the founders of the DP and its secretary-general, severely criticized the government bill during the debates: TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol.24, p.51.
- (333) My emphasis. Ibid., vol.24, App. No. 165, p.1.
- (334) Ibid., p.2.
- (335) Ibid., App. No. 169, p.1.
- (336) Şinasi Devrin (Zonguldak) - ... The Government once again proves that it exalts press freedom and considers it as essential to people as bread, air and water. I appreciate the government's initiation to abolish all extra-ordinary provisions although the country still is in extra-ordinary situation...

Ali Rıza Türel (Konya) - While the French government introduces heavier provisions against the press, ours gives up its rights. I wonder if this rapid democratization movement would result in the destruction of the fundamentals of the regime.

O.Şevki Uludağ (Konya) - ...It is impossible for us to consider the press as an institution worthy of general respect. Although we have sometimes benefitted from the press, we have witnessed Mevlanzades, Ali Kemals and Arif Oruç. I mean, the press is a sabre that cuts both ways...

C.Oral (Seyhan) - ...We are approaching democracy with Atatürk's ideals and İnönü's guidance... With this law we will provide Turkish democracy with an essential blood vessel...provided that prosecutors and courts shall be as vigilant as the governments.

(Ibid., pp.261-269).

- (337) Ibid., p.269.

(338) Cemal Barlas (Gaziantep) - ...Adnan Menderes never admits that this government really wants to lay the foundation of democracy... He only tries to propagate his dangerous ideas. Again, abusing this opportunity he tried to flatter the voter... Now, see the newspapers; how they will exaggerate his speech tomorrow...

A.R.Türel (Konya) - ...My dear Democratic friends, please do not forget that if you came to power one day, you would benefit by the law. So, please do not preclude this important opportunity for the sake of election propaganda...

(Ibid., p.271-279).

Five more deputies of the RPP and the Minister of Justice replied to Menderes' remarks. Following these contributions the chairman submitted the law to vote.

(339) Ibid., pp.332-334.

(340) Eroğul, op.cit., p.15.

(341) TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol.25, pp.210-216.

(342) For a detailed analysis of the struggles within the RPP regarding the strategy of transition, see Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1959), pp.169 ff. Also, Ahmad, in op.cit., pp.19-24, analyzes the struggle between the extremists and moderates of the RPP.

(343) Vatan, June 7-14, 1946; Yeni Sabah June 8-9, 1946; Gerçek, June 8-13, 1946.

(344) For the full text of the order, see newspapers of July 26, 1946.

(345) Ahmad, op.cit., p.19. Recep Peker was the Interior Minister and the Secretary General of the RPP. He was among the architects of the merger of the State and the Party in the 1930s. See, Tunçay, op.cit., pp.310-311.

(346) The Prime Minister, answering an oral question put by Cihat Baban, a DP deputy from Istanbul and then columnist of the Tasviri Efkar newspaper, implied that not only were newspapers unfamiliar with the multi-party system, but "such distinguished deputies as Cihat Baban" were also not behaving in accordance with the requirements of the critical transitional period. The Prime Minister added that the press law should regulate matters related to the transitional era. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Vol.25, p.277.

(347) Vatan, Dec. 19, 1946.

(348) During the debate on the bill, Nihat Erim, a deputy from Kocaeli and the chief columnist of the RPP's newspaper, Ulus, asserted that the pre- and post-election attitude of the press was apocalyptic example of its immaturity:

Last year we all learned many things. We have been through many experiences right after setting the press as free as possible; one of the worst lessons was that the newspapers did not bother to resort to the simplest investigation to find out the truth, but they tried to raise circulation and revenues; they did not refrain from publishing news reports, articles, pages-full columns against the state institutions and the government... This experiment of ours in the last year, unfortunately, proved to us that our press is as yet far from meeting the requirements of the desired level.

(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, vol.25, p.426).

(349) Minister of Justice Mümtaz Ökmen (Ankara) - ...Friends, you will remember that, before the recess (of the Assembly) we had great authority provided by Article 50. It had been employed (by the government) whenever we saw (the situation) important enough regarding the State's and society's honor and dignity. When this article was amended, many distinguished lawyers in the Assembly warned us that amending this article would deprive the government of a necessary weapon... As the representative of the commission said later in the general assembly, I then promised them to fill the void and to re-arm the government. That is why these amendments are submitted to you now...

(Ibid., p.397).

Y.Muammer Alakant (Manisa) - ...When we came (to the Assembly) we knew that the people disturbed by the newspapers' behavior during the election were inquiring why we were not saving them (from the harms of newspapers). When we conveyed these

complaints to the distinguished Minister of Justice, Mümtaz Ökmen, he confirmed that there was a legal void because of the abolition of Article 50, and he promised that the government would rectify it as soon as possible...

(Ibid., p.405).

- (350) Adnan Menderes said that the bill would stop even reverse the progress towards democracy:

The government, as the bill suggests, seems to want the press on its knees before it, under the pretext of guaranteeing individual rights and freedom... The newspapers even until yesterday were forced to be in favor of the government. After a brief interval, the government, missing the days of the pliant newspapers, began seeking ways to step free criticism

(Ibid., pp.292-293).

- (351) Ahmad, op.cit., p.20.

- (352) Ibid., p.21, cites M.Ali Aybar's article in Hür, February 1, 1947, which was reprinted in M.A.Aybar, Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm (Independence, Democracy, Socialism), (Ankara: Gerçek, 1968), pp.87-89.

- (353) For the analysis of the crisis and İnönü's statement of July 12, 1947, see Ahmad, op.cit., p.24.

- (354) Topuz, op.cit., p.171, gives the list of the extremist publications.

- (355) Yalman gives the details of criticism levelled at the press at the Seventh Congress of the RPP: op.cit., Vol. 4, pp.119-126.

- (356) Topuz, op.cit., p.172.

- (357) Ahmad, op.cit., p.28, describes the reaction against Şemsettin Günaltay in the RPP.

- (358) Topuz, op.cit., pp.173.

- (359) TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Period 9, Vol.1, pp.726-769.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPACT OF THE MENTALITY AND LIMITED PLURALISM
ON THE PRESS

I. REVIEW OF THE HYPOTHESES AND A NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY

Communications usually get identified as an important causal mechanism. But as hypothesized above(1), instead of assuming that the problem is one of facilitating change in political outcomes via communication, we are examining constraints on communication that affect the intervening process through which the political system operates - and which might just as easily result in political stability as in change. That is, the important questions about communication may be those that identify structural barriers that are properties of socio-political system.

Let us pause for clarification at this stage since such a formulation of a supposedly reversed impact of the political regime on the press has few precursors in the literature. Clearly the relationship of mass media institutions to politics is assumed in all states to have consequences of major import and is never left to chance. The one-party regime, as shown above, had in one way or another regulated the performance of media institutions in the political field. In part this was because the newspapers had access to a potentially independent power base in society; partly it is because newspapers did not merely supply a set of consumer goods but also played a political role. That is, they could set much of the agenda of political debate; they could help determine which political demands would be voiced,

and consequently had a chance of being satisfied. As a result, as hypothesized for authoritarian regimes, the Kemalist one-party regime should take care to specify the terms of media performance. The legal regulations and administrative measurements as discussed above, demonstrate the presence of the assumption of a public stake in media operations. The regime could not achieve its political targets without the demand-and support-regulating assistance of the press. With its help, the regime could set the political agenda all by itself and to its benefit. To do this would require limiting the communications so that the main issues forming the political agenda of the society would be dictated chiefly by political leaders. That is, the overall shape of the agenda placed before the public would not stem from the perspective of media professionals.

The exclusionary mentality of the one-party elite, deepening the impact of non-mobilizational character of the regime, had to preclude certain interests to be aggregated and disseminated to the public. The limited pluralist character of the one-party authoritarianism would strive for a demand-restricting mechanism. A uniform communication in all newspapers, mentioning only certain personalities, covering certain issues and playing a role more analogous to a mirror than to an independent analyst or advisor, would be more suitable to the Kemalist form of authoritarianism. Encumbered by the external control, journalists would refrain from injecting their own view on the issues that count, into the political debate. However research has to demonstrate that in the subordinate press system consensus on issues is the result of external control. But recent research has demonstrated that in multi-party systems, high degrees of professionalism also result in a consensus of issues in the press. Therefore, one has to show that if there was a consensus over issues in the Turkish press it was not as a result

of the high degree of professionalism. But, at least hypothetically, when a professional creed of a high degree meet with external political control the result could be other from a strong consensus. If the political and media-elite were of the same mentality, the latter's acceptance of subordination would be quite willingly and this situation would partly explain the absence of coercive control over the press.

Consequently, the three different areas studied in this research are: (1) the content of communications; (2) the professional creed that legitimized communications; and (3) the media-party allegiencies. In addition to the legal arrangement of the press and administrative organizations, the content of the newspapers, originally intended to inform, entertain and persuade the populace, is of significance regarding the regime within which the political rule keeps the press.

Stimulated by the fact that documents of mass communication reflect broad aspects of the political climate in which they are produced, a set of special techniques known as content analysis, has been developed for describing in systematic form the content of communications(2).

Although this method of studying communications is largely employed in a quantitative way to test hypotheses no content analysis has been done to measure variables; rather it has been used to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various communication phenomena. In this regard content analysis is a method of observation. In order to make a method objective, which implies a somewhat arbitrary limitation of the field by qualitative description of themes, each step is made explicit and systematic: the categories of analysis used to classify the content are clearly and explicitly defined; analysts are not free to select and report merely what strikes them as interesting; some quantitative

procedure is used in order to provide a measure of the importance and emphasis in the material. The last aspect, quantification of material, can be made by ranking, rating or simply counting. But, even in the case of counting, quantification involves the qualitative procedure of assigning each object to a proper category. By and large these problems of content analysis are specific instances of the general problem of analysis and interpretation in the social sciences. Here, as elsewhere, the study demands that (1) a research design, drawing a sample of the material, be developed; (2) categories be established for the classification of data; and (3) the data be systematically tabulated and summarized with respect to these categories.

The Universe and Sample

The first step is to define the universe of content that is to be analyzed which, in our case, is the national newspapers. The one-party regime had established new newspapers after 1920, as well as those inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Other mass media, magazines, reviews, radio broadcast also became popular as the country developed economically and socially. However, since the entire one-party period, newspapers played the most potent role in the formation of public opinion; consequently this research is limited to them.

The techniques of sampling from the mass media are not well developed. Since newspapers vary in degree of influence, there is some difficulty in drawing a satisfactory sample: a small newspaper with daily circulation of 500 copies should not be weighted equally with a giant newspaper distributed all over the country; newspapers representing different geographical areas, political orientations, economic groups and ethnic groups should be included in the proportion in which they are represented in the total distribution of newspapers.

In view of the problems involved, I will use a sample that does not pretend to be fully representative of the newspapers but that could be objectively defined and systematically drawn. A group of experts, old enough to have observed for themselves or heard the first-hand testimony of observers, were asked to name those newspapers with the greatest authority or prestige, preferably based on circulation(3). The newspapers assigned the highest value of popularity by the majority of experts made up the "popularity sample" used in this research(4).

Since the task of this essay is to cover a period of 27 years, analyzing complete issues of each newspaper on the sampling days would be unmanageable. Instead I have chosen to concentrate on such specific aspects as headline-news stories(5) and editorials(6). In order to include a series of years that were evenly spaced throughout the period of 1920-1946, I have opted to include even-numbered years (as well as even-numbered months and odd-numbered days)(7).

Units of Analysis

It is now established that there are five major units of analysis: words, themes, characters, items and time-and-space measures(8). The word is the smallest unit. It is also an easy unit to work with, especially in studying values shared by newspapers with the political regime. The words are simply counted and assigned to appropriate categories. The theme being a more difficult unit, involves more interpretation. However, it is heavily employed in studying the policy-oriented recommendations of newspapers. The item unit is also important in studying agenda-setting problems. Each article or headline story was assigned either to the "vanguard" or "follower" category.

Interviews

Since some of the hypotheses hold the professional creed to be an intervening variable, content analysis would not reach sound conclusions unless the extent of professionalism was explicitly stated. The ground-rules of "political output processing" could be explicated by media personnel under questioning. After deciding what information would be sought, a simple, open-ended questionnaire was prepared for partially-structured interviews. Since the active participants of the press of the one-party period number only seven persons, no sampling was required. The questions, however, were checked by a pretesting carried out on younger journalists.

Network Analysis

A rather new set of techniques, network analysis, seeks to represent persons as nodes in a network and complex relationships between them as lines(9). The hypotheses on the integration of political and media elites required using several aspects of those techniques. However, the metaphor of network is not taken to be more than it is: the notion of network is not permitted to obscure several different aspects of relationship between the media and the political regime. Only the similarities of socio-cultural background between the two elites and the exchange of personnel between the two domain are demonstrated.

II. THE DETERMINATION OF ISSUES

Five dimensions of effects of communication arrangements seem to be directly related to the mentality and the extent of pluralism of the authoritarian one-party regime. They are: (1) the treatment certain personalities receive from the press; (2) coverage given to certain issues by the press;

(3) over-all shape of the political agenda; (4) consensus on the certain symbols of the political regime and (5) lack of strong similarities among the policy-related priorities advised by the press. Each of these dimensions is so conceived as to embrace consequences at both the medium level and the political-elite level. At medium level they were visible in both the ground-rules that professionals were expected to comply with, as well as in the amount and direction of media content that was devoted to political affairs. At the political-elite level these categories demonstrate the orientation of the regime towards the rival elite and its attitudes to others' opinion. Thus, the theoretical research framework proceeds from the performance of media institutions as reflected in variations of content to the structural linkages of media institutions with the political system.

A. Whose Communication?

The first major consequence of structurally-derived effects of political regime on communications focuses on identifications with the main contestants in the political arena. This concerns not only the particular sides that the press may decide to support, but also the individuals involved in the power competitions. Since the regime had conceived politics as excluding certain political orientations from the power-competition, with its consolidation of power, those considered to be excluded from politics would be denied mass communications; the press, willingly or unwillingly would refrain from positively mentioning their names, commenting on their activities and reporting their statements.

I have sought to describe the characteristics of treatment received by certain persons simply by noting whether their representation was favorable, unfavorable or neutral, interpreting favorable mention as indulgent from the

regime's point of view, and unfavorable mentions as deprivational. If the evaluation of newspapers were not in accordance with that of the government, then either the newspaper insisted on its position and thus was closed, or it changed its attitude.

Since 3,349 names are mentioned in sampled items of the sampled newspapers, they will be presented in groups. The use of the main groups seemed to provide a meaningful arrangement of the data. Here the working hypothesis was that the more a group receives favorable treatment or gets its statements published in a favorable style the greater would be the tendency for them to represent those interests which are considered legitimate by the regime. It is obvious that when those representing a rival position to the regime get considerably more favorable treatment, then the press could be regarded as independent from the regime's political control.

Newspapers' output processing during the early years of the Independence Struggle perhaps provides an example of lack of political control. The Kemalists first set out to create a regular army which, may be more than anything else, became the focal point of the new regime in the early 1920s. The commanders of the civilian armed forces and their troops were deprived of power especially after the first republican army won the İnönü Battle in January 1921, and most of them were later annihilated. Although he had some personal difficulties with them, from the early days of the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal praised the commanders of the new army. In other words, in the Allied-occupied Istanbul, for the journalists and the imperial governments, these commanders, being identified with the emergent regime in Ankara, were either heroes or traitors. Despite the difficulties of the time(11), some newspapers somehow managed to publish photographs of Mustafa Kemal in military uniform and to report his and the regular

army commanders' activities(12). But some other newspapers, criticizing the National Forces(13) more than expected by the Occupation Forces' and government's censorship authorities, took a hostile position to the regular army. The imperial government, on the other hand, blessing the efforts of some civilian armed forces, praised and often financially supported their leaders(14). The Ottoman leaders, partly anxious that the re-establishment of M.Kemal's defunct Turkish army would upset the British and partly fearing that he might overthrow the government if he won against the enemy, hoped for the victory of the civilian armed forces against the regular army. Consequently these brigades, especially after the first minor victories of the National Forces against the Greek occupation army, rebelled against the Ankara regime.

The analysis of the sampled newspapers of the period of 1920-1923(15) demonstrated that the Istanbul press was not influenced by the desires of the Ankara regime (Table 1). The newspapers published in Ankara, namely Hakimiyeti Milliye and Yeni Gün, favored the commanders of the regular army(16). The Istanbul government's control, however, was yet not complete: despite the heavy censorship, some Istanbul newspapers favored the Kemalist commanders. While Tevhidi Efkar and Tanin were appearing as potentially critical of the Ankara regime, İkdam, Vakit, Aksam and Vatan were promising neutrality vis-à-vis, if not total support of, the Ankara regime. The good relationship between the Kemalist cadres and the irregular armed groups was reflected in on the treatment the latter received from the Ankara newspapers; but as this relationship deteriorated, Hakimiyeti Milliye and Yeni Gün (as well as the ankara-influenced Istanbul newspapers) turned against them(17). However, it has to be noted that the Istanbul press, being totally free of control from Ankara and favoring the Anatolian army entirely on their own free will, acted more independently against the Kemalist cadres. While the Istanbul newspapers'

TABLE 1- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Leaders of the Civil Armed Forces and Commanders of the Regular Army, 1920-1923 (F: Favorable references, U: Unfavorable; N: Neutral, T: Total)

	Newspaper references to				
	The Leaders of the Civil Armed Forces		Commanders of the Regular Armed Forces		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	496	80.39	49	8.75
	U	74	11.99	415	74.11
	N	47	7.62	96	17.14
	T	617		560	
İKDAM	F	276	51.88	325	55.56
	U	71	13.35	49	8.38
	N	185	34.77	211	36.07
	T	532		585	
VAKİT	F	121	27.82	190	39.50
	U	94	21.61	71	14.76
	N	220	50.57	116	45.74
	T	435		481	
TANİN	F	421	75.58	24	6.45
	U	87	15.62	147	40.05
	N	49	8.80	196	53.41
	T	557	367	367	
YENİGÜN	F	64	13.82	1211	93.59
	U	301	65.01	42	3.25
	N	98	21.17	41	3.17
	T	463		1294	
H. MİLLİYE	F	30	6.73	1401	98.11
	U	287	64.35	11	0.77
	N	129	28.92	16	1.12
	T	446		1428	
AKŞAM	F	101	41.91	274	65.24
	U	109	45.23	41	9.76
	N	31	12.86	105	25.00
	T	241		420	
VATAN	F	96	34.53	134	33.58
	U	47	16.91	64	16.06
	N	135	48.56	201	50.38
	T	278	399		
TOTAL	F	1605	55.81	3608	65.20
	U	1070	37.20	840	15.18
	N	894	6.99	1086	19.62
	T	2876		5534	

neutral reporting and reference to the Kemalist forces amounted to 37 per cent of their total reporting, Ankara newspapers were neutral only in 2 per cent of their total reference. Also Istanbul newspapers slightly favored the civilian armed forces; only 40 per cent of their favorable reference went to the Anatolian forces(18).

As for the coverage given to the statements made by both the parties, the total number of statements made by the leaders of the civilian armed groups is smaller than those made by the Anatolian commanders (Tablo 2). The Istanbul press' coverage of these statements were much more neutral than that of the Ankara newspapers. Obviously, the Istanbul newspapers' each statement of a commander of the regular army was a success story. The comparatively high number of statements by leaders of the civilian armed forces published with rather favorable designs could be explained partly by the Kemalists' dependence on them, at least in 1920 and early 1921 and partly by Çerkes Ethem's wide spread heroism. His brothers, especially Tevfik who was a deputy in the First Assembly, also had many statements published in the newspapers. The proportion of the statements of the Anatolian commanders published in the Istanbul press demonstrates that the government's banning of publications supportive of the Anatolian army was not effective enough; but those newspapers which displayed a negative attitude to the Kemalists also favored the civilian armed forces in obtaining exclusive statements and publishing them in favorable styles. The sheer quantity of statements of Anatolian commanders published in Ankara newspapers demonstrates how the Kemalists wanted all newspapers to act; but the over-all attitude of the Istanbul press was yet far from that point(19).

The commanders of the army which had fought against an occupation army could be taken to be more than representative

TABLE 2- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of the Leaders of the Civil Armed Forces and Commanders of the Regular Army, 1920-1923 (F: Favorable design, U: Unfavorable, N: Neutral, T: Total)

	Newspaper coverage of the statements of				
	The Leaders of the Civil Armed Forces		Commanders of the Regular Armed Forces		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	14	31.82	25	52.08
	U	12	27.27	6	12.50
	N	18	40.91	17	35.42
	T	44		48	
İKDAM	F	11	52.38	41	93.18
	U	3	14.29	0	0
	N	7	33.33	3	6.82
	T	21		44	
VAKİT	F	6	37.50	19	44.19
	U	1	6.25	3	6.98
	N	9	56.25	21	48.84
	T	16	43		
TANİN	F	19	45.24	1	5.26
	U	6	14.29	4	21.05
	N	17	40.48	14	73.68
	T	42	19		
YENİ GÜN	F	26	52.00	39	29.77
	U	3	6.00	9	6.87
	N	21	42.00	83	63.36
	T	50	131		
H.MİLLİYE	F	14	45.16	64	64.65
	U	1	3.23	4	4.04
	N	16	51.61	31	31.31
	T	31		99	
AKŞAM	F	3	42.86	8	30.77
	U	0	0	2	7.69
	N	4	57.14	16	61.54
	T	7		26	
VATAN	F	2	100.00	11	68.75
	U	0	0	3	18.75
	N	0	0	2	12.50
	T	2		16	
TOTAL	F	95	44.60	208	48.83
	U	26	12.21	31	7.28
	N	92	43.19	187	43.90
	T	213		426	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

the new regime. The Sultan and his cabinets, and Mustafa Kemal and his committee of representatives could be better identified with their regimes respectively. The Ottoman leaders' treatment by the Istanbul press was much more favorable than their treatment of the Anatolian leaders (Table 3). 95 per cent of the total favorable reference made to the Ottoman leaders came from Istanbul newspapers alone; the two newspapers published in Ankara provided only 5 per cent. However, the Istanbul newspapers did not neglect the Anatolian leaders; 50 per cent of their reference to the Kemalists was favorable. But the Anatolian leaders got their best treatment from the Ankara newspapers (63 per cent approval). The comparatively higher proportion of favorable reference to the Ottoman leaders by the Ankara press was perhaps due to the sacred personality of the Sultan who was conspicuously respected by the Ankara regime until November 1922. Also the high proportion of unfavorable treatment of them is a result of M.Kemal's effort to humiliate the imperial governments.

The same trend was true for the frequency of the statements of both parties published in the newspapers (Table 4). The struggle between those Istanbul newspapers favoring the supporters of the Union and Progress Society and those favoring the Freedom and Accord Party resulted in their overall ill-treatment of the other's statements. While the Ankara newspapers were favorably publishing a few statements by the Istanbul leaders (Yeni Gün: 0; Hakimiyeti Milliye: 8), the Istanbul press published two-thirds fewer of the Ankara-originated statements than those of the Ottoman leaders; and most of them were published only after Izmir was saved by the National Forces(20).

In the early years of the new regime, neglect by some newspapers of the Kemalist group continued. Those who promised opposition to the new regime as early as the first months of

TABLE 3- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Ottoman Leaders (with the Sultan) and the Anatolian Leaders (without Mustafa Kemal), 1920-1922 (F: Favorable References, U: Unfavorable, N: Neutral and T: Total)

	Newspaper Reference to				
	Ottoman Leaders		Anatolian Leaders		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	1248	77.61	72	3.65
	U	132	8.21	1845	93.61
	N	228	14.18	54	2.74
	T	1608		1971	
İKDAM	F	630	51.34	1221	74.41
	U	192	11.65	48	2.93
	N	405	33.01	372	22.67
	T	1227		1641	
VAKİT	F	537	35.59	492	29.55
	U	162	10.24	63	3.78
	N	810	53.68	1110	66.67
	T	1509		1665	
TANIN	F	960	83.55	12	0.88
	U	144	12.53	840	61.40
	N	45	9.92	516	37.72
	T	1149		1368	
YENİGÜN	F	87	8.64	2151	85.46
	U	651	64.78	27	0.36
	N	267	26.57	357	14.18
	T	1005		2517	
H.MİLLİYE	F	102	6.37	2223	92.43
	U	903	56.37	41	1.70
	N	597	37.27	141	5.86
	T	1602		2405	
AKŞAM	F	528	40.93	597	34.08
	U	129	10.00	15	0.86
	N	633	49.07	1140	65.07
	T	1290		1752	
VATAN (1)	F	201	46.01	216	66.09
	U	97	28.91	47	15.11
	N	149	25.08	191	18.79
	T	447		454	
TOTAL	F	4293	44.45	6984	50.63
	U	2230	23.09	2928	21.23
	N	3134	32.45	3881	28.14
	T	9657		13793	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) From March 26, 1922 onwards.

TABLE 4- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of Statements of the Ottoman Leaders (with the Sultan) and the Anatolian Leaders (with Mustafa Kemal), 1920-1922 (F: With a favorable design, UF: Unfavorable, N: Neutral and T: Total)

	Newspaper coverage of the statements of				
	Ottoman Leaders		Anatolian Leaders*		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	616	92.35	21	20.00
	U	10	1.50	3	2.86
	N	41	6.15	81	77.14
	T	667		105	
İKDAM	F	49	26.06	64	27.95
	U	4	2.13	24	10.48
	N	135	71.81	141	61.57
	T	188		229	
VAKİT	F	104	53.33	74	40.22
	U	22	11.28	16	8.70
	N	69	35.38	94	51.09
	T	195		184	
TANIN	F	209	46.16	21	20.59
	U	184	40.62	46	45.10
	N	60	13.25	35	34.31
	T	453		102	
YENİGÜN	F	∅	∅	504	93.33
	U	24	55.81	20	3.20
	N	19	44.19	16	2.96
	T	43		540	
H.MİLLİYE	F	8	9.76	609	85.06
	U	11	13.41	13	1.82
	N	63	76.83	94	13.13
	T	82		116	
AKŞAM	F	96	35.96	135	69.59
	U	49	18.35	11	5.67
	N	122	45.69	48	24.74
	T	267		194	
VATAN (1)	F	14	33.33	23	35.94
	U	7	16.67	13	20.31
	N	21	50.00	28	43.75
	T	42		64	
TOTAL	F	1096	56.68	1451	67.99
	U	311	16.06	146	6.84
	N	530	27.36	537	25.16
	T	1937		2134	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) From March 26, 1922, onwards,

* Including Mustafa Kemal.

the National Struggle, maintained a position in favor of the opponents of the Kemalist cadres. When some leaders of the National Struggle, claiming that Mustafa Kemal was trying to establish his personal rule and rejecting his plans for reformation and modernization(21), formed the oppositional Second Group in the Assembly. Irritated by the sporadic oppositions, Mustafa Kemal established the parliamentary group of Defense of Rights (known as the First Group) in the Assembly. These two groups, acting in fact as two rival parties, began fighting each other. Those newspapers which never fully supported Mustafa Kemal and his close friends during the war years, now began reporting unfavorably about the First Group (Table 5). Almost all vocal members of the First Group received favorable reference and definite emphasis from Yeni Gün, Hakimiyeti Milliye and Akşam. But, Tevhidi Efkar, Tanin and Tan favored the members of the Second Group. Vatan and Vakit appeared to be more neutral than other newspapers. The over-all position of unfavorable treatment of the Second Group by all newspapers was far from the level probably desired by the Kemalists and displayed by the Ankara newspapers and the newly founded Cumhuriyet.

As to the statements published by the newspapers, some newspapers were acting as the mouthpiece of the Second Group (Table 6). While Cumhuriyet published only 16 exclusive statements made by the Second Group's members (only 2 of them with favorable design), the Second Group's semi-official newspaper Tan published only 6 statements of the First Group's members. Again, the total number of the Second Group's statements was larger than those of the First Group. What was expected by the Kemalist cadres was perhaps best demonstrated by Cumhuriyet and Hakimiyeti Milliye(22).

When the oppositional Second Group was formalized as the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in the Second Assembly,

TABLE 5- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Members of the Parliamentary Second and First Groups, 1920-1924

	Newspaper Reference to				
	Second Group		First Group*		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	447	58.58	100	41.67
	U	101	13.24	91	37.92
	N	215	28.18	49	20.42
	T	763		240	
İKDAM	F	44	10.28	96	29.81
	U	64	14.95	25	7.76
	N	320	74.77	201	62.42
	T	428		322	
VAKİT	F	120	27.59	129	39.09
	U	114	26.21	41	21.42
	N	201	46.21	160	48.48
	T	435		330	
TANİN	F	224	64.74	35	11.86
	U	19	5.49	114	38.64
	N	103	29.77	146	49.49
	T	346		295	
YENİGÜN (1)	F	47	18.73	271	74.45
	U	69	27.49	74	20.33
	N	135	53.78	19	5.22
	T	251		364	
H.MİLLİYE	F	54	20.61	1219	88.72
	U	34	12.98	70	5.09
	N	174	66.41	85	6.19
	T	262	1374		
AKŞAM	F	120	42.25	701	91.40
	U	115	40.49	45	5.87
	N	49	17.25	21	2.74
	T	284		767	
VATAN	F	104	25.37	133	35.19
	U	95	23.17	47	12.43
	N	211	51.46	198	52.38
	T	410		378	
CUMHURİYET (2)	F	21	22.11	211	72.26
	U	64	67.37	25	8.56
	N	10	10.53	56	19.18
	T	95		292	
TAN (3)	F	79	80.61	4	5.41
	U	3	3.06	29	39.19
	N	16	16.33	41	55.41
	T	98		74	
TOTAL	F	1260	37.37	2899	65.35
	U	678	20.11	561	12.65
	N	1434	42.53	976	22.00
	T	3372		4436	

(1) Until 1923

* Excluding Mustafa Kemal

(2) From 1923, onwards

(3) For 68 issues only

TABLE 6- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of the Parliamentary First and Second Groups' members, 1920-1924

	Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of				
	The Second Group		The First Group*		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	380	95.00	22	29.33
	U	4	1.00	14	18.67
	N	16	4.00	39	52.00
	T	400		75	
İKDAM	F	29	65.91	84	90.32
	U	1	2.27	4	4.30
	N	14	31.82	5	5.38
	T	44		93	
VAKİT	F	104	80.62	72	69.29
	U	3	2.33	3	2.88
	N	22	17.05	29	27.88
	T	129		104	
TANİN	F	241	81.69	14	20.29
	U	9	3.05	8	11.59
	N	45	15.25	47	68.12
	T	295		69	
YENİGÜN (1)	F	34	26.98	198	83.90
	U	1	0.79	9	3.81
	N	91	72.22	29	12.29
	T	126		236	
H.MİLLİYE	F	14	45.16	373	71.05
	U	4	12.90	8	1.52
	N	13	41.94	144	27.43
	T	31		525	
AKŞAM	F	42	35.59	79	47.02
	U	7	5.93	8	4.76
	N	69	58.47	81	48.21
	T	118		168	
VATAN	F	172	69.35	47	69.12
	U	14	5.65	6	8.82
	N	62	25.00	15	22.06
	T	248		68	
CUMHURİYET (2)	F	2	12.50	93	80.87
	U	0	0	4	3.48
	N	14	87.50	18	15.65
	T	16		115	
TAN (3)	F	49	72.06	0	0
	U	3	4.41	2	33.33
	N	16	23.53	4	66.67
	T	68		6	
TOTAL	F	1067	72.34	982	67.31
	U	46	3.12	66	4.52
	N	362	24.54	411	28.17
	T	1475		1459	

(1) Until 1923

* Excluding Mustafa Kemal

(2) From 1923, onwards

(3) For 68 issues only

those newspapers which supported the former continued supporting the latter (Table 7). The 39 per cent of the total favorable headline stories and editorials were about the PRP; the negative attitude towards Mustafa Kemal's group, which was mobilized into the Republican People's Party (RPP)(23), was demonstrated by the high level of unfavorable treatment: 61 per cent of all unfavorable stories and article reference was about the RPP. Although Hakimiyeti Milliye and Aksam reported somewhat favorably about the PRP, the comparison between their favorable stories about the PRP and RPP reveals that they mostly wrote about the RPP.

Those newspapers favoring the PRP in their own news stories consequently heavily emphasized the PRP leaders' statements and interviews, and they rarely asked the RPP leaders for exclusive statements (Table 8). From Ankara's point of view, the ratios of the RPP leaders' statements to the PRP leaders' statements were very poor for some newspapers (e.g.: Tevhid: .26; Tanin: .19; Son Telgraf: .56) and less than the probably desired level (over-all ratio 1.61; Cumhuriyet 11.95; Hakimiyeti Milliye 6.47). While some Istanbul newspapers, however, acted neutrally towards both parties, some others published the political program of the PRP which was later held against them as having been a provocation of the riots in the eastern part of the country(24).

Following the silent period of the Law of Restoration of Order during which almost all criticism was muted and the RPP leaders almost always received favorable treatment (Table 9) with the establishment of the Free Republican Party (FRP), again, on the part of the newspapers, the oppositional attitude re-appeared (Table 10). During the short period of such an attitude the FRP received more reference than the RPP(25). The references to the RPP were mostly favorable; but the larger portion of the favorable treatment was directed to the FRP. Once again the over-all attitude of the press was

TABLE 7- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Leaders of the Progressive Republican Party and the Republican People's Party, Dec.27, 1923- * June 3, 1925. **

	Newspaper Reference to				
	The Progressive Republican Party Members		The Republican People's Party Leaders***		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	754	92.50	149	55.81
	U	92	5.17	79	29.59
	N	19	2.34	39	14.61
	T	813		267	
İKDAM	F	69	49.29	841	93.65
	U	24	17.14	22	2.45
	N	47	33.57	35	3.90
	T	140		898	
VAKİT	F	104	61.18	429	75.26
	U	14	8.24	47	8.25
	N	52	30.59	94	16.49
	T	170		570	
TANIN (1)	F	611	86.79	101	30.79
	U	20	2.84	214	61.24
	N	73	10.37	13	3.96
	T	704		328	
H.MİLLİYE	F	3	3.13	819	95.68
	U	74	77.08	22	2.57
	N	19	19.79	15	1.75
	T	96		856	
AKŞAM	F	41	24.12	472	85.20
	U	102	60.00	74	13.36
	N	22	15.88	8	1.44
	T	170		554	
VATAN	F	163	56.21	47	19.50
	U	24	8.28	98	40.66
	N	103	35.52	96	39.83
	T	290		241	
CUMHURİYET	F	16	12.12	349	68.70
	U	102	77.27	21	4.13
	N	14	10.61	138	27.17
	T	132		508	
SON TELGR. (2)	F	306	85.71	32	17.11
	U	7	1.96	74	39.57
	N	44	12.32	81	43.32
	T	357		187	
TOTAL	F	2065	71.90	3239	73.46
	U	409	14.24	651	14.77
	N	398	13.86	519	11.77
	T	2872		4409	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) Closed on April 19, 1925

(2) Closed on April 19, 1925; from 1924, onwards

* The end of Istanbul Tribunal of Independence Trials

** The PRP's closure

*** Excluding Mustafa Kemal

TABLE 8- Sampled Newspapers Coverage of the Statements of the Leaders of the Progressive Republican Party and the Republican People's Party, Dec.27, 1923^{*} June 3, 1925^{**}

	Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of				
	The Progressive Republican Party Members		The Republican People's Party Leaders***		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	270	78.72	49	55.06
	U	44	12.83	11	12.36
	N	29	8.45	29	32.58
	T	343		89	
İKDAM	F	14	15.38	94	71.11
	U	8	8.79	20	14.81
	N	69	75.82	19	14.07
	T	91		135	
VAKİT	F	40	31.75	64	31.84
	U	16	12.70	8	3.98
	N	70	55.56	129	64.18
	T	126		201	
TANİN(1)	F	144	62.07	20	46.51
	U	12	5.17	16	37.21
	N	76	32.76	7	16.28
	T	232		43	
H.MİLLİYE	F	0	0	403	68.42
	U	4	4.40	14	2.38
	N	87	95.60	172	29.20
	T	91		589	
AKŞAM	F	16	29.63	63	45.65
	U	21	38.89	3	2.17
	N	17	31.48	72	52.17
	T	54		138	
VATAN	F	49	39.84	148	83.15
	U	3	2.44	6	3.37
	N	71	57.72	24	13.48
	T	123		178	
CUMHURİYET	F	7	16.67	349	69.52
	U	21	50.00	19	3.78
	N	14	33.33	134	26.69
	T	42		502	
SON TELGR. (2)	F	62	65.96	2	3.92
	U	3	3.19	14	27.45
	N	29	30.85	35	68.63
	T	94		51	
TOTAL	F	602	50.33	1194	61.99
	U	132	11.04	111	5.76
	N	462	38.63	621	32.24
	T	1196		1926	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) Closed on April 19, 1925.

(2) Closed on April 19, 1925; from 1924, onwards

* The end of Istanbul Tribunal of Independence Trials.

** The PRP's closure

*** Including Mustafa Kemal

TABLE 9- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Leaders of the Republican People's Party, June 3, 1925*-Dec.1, 1929**

	Newspaper Reference to the Leaders of the Republican People's Party***				
		N	%	N	%
VAKİT	F	419	61.98		
	U	41	6.07		
	N	216	31.95		
	T	676			
H.MİLLİYE	F	674	61.16		
	U	94	8.53		
	N	334	30.31		
	T	1102			
AKŞAM	F	379	47.61		
	U	33	4.15		
	N	384	48.24		
	T	796			
CUMHURİYET	F	544	67.49		
	U	39	4.86		
	N	223	27.67		
	T	806			
MİLLİYET (1)	F	274	64.28		
	U	101	17.06		
	N	217	36.66		
	T	592			
TOTAL	F	2290	57.65		
	U	308	7.75		
	N	1374	34.59		
	T	3972			
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) From 1926, on wards.

* The PRP's closure

** The end of the Restoration of Order period

*** Excluding Mustafa Kemal

TABLE 10- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Leaders of the Free Republican Party and the Republican People's Party, 1930-1931

	Newspaper Reference to				
	The Free Republican Party Members		The Republican People's Party Leaders *		
	N	%	N	%	
VAKİT	F	141	44.20	68	78.16
	U	154	48.28	14	16.09
	N	24	7.52	5	5.75
	T	319		87	
H.MİLLİYE	F	13	7.74	224	90.69
	U	8	4.76	4	1.62
	N	147	87.50	19	7.69
	T	168		247	
AKŞAM	F	71	54.62	105	72.41
	U	12	9.23	25	17.24
	N	47	36.15	15	10.34
	T	130		145	
CUMHURİYET	F	28	25.23	79	62.20
	U	9	8.11	4	3.15
	N	74	66.67	44	34.65
	T	111		127	
MİLLİYET	F	66	58.41	76	61.79
	U	4	3.54	28	22.76
	N	43	38.05	19	15.45
	T	113		123	
YARIN	F	210	88.61	4	4.76
	U	14	5.91	39	46.43
	N	13	5.49	41	48.81
	T	237		84	
SON POSTA	F	94	65.28	13	25.00
	U	3	2.08	22	42.31
	N	47	32.64	17	32.69
	T	144		52	
TOTAL	F	623	50.98	569	65.78
	U	204	16.69	136	15.72
	N	395	32.32	160	18.50
	T	1222		865	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

* Excluding Mustafa Kemal

totally different from what had been desired: while the ratio of Cumhuriyet's favorable references to the RPP to those to the FRP was 1.14 and Hakimiyeti Milliye's was 1.47, the average ratio of all newspapers was only .71. The Yarın newspaper appeared notably hostile to the majority party to an "unimaginable degree": Yarın's ratio of favorable references to the RPP to those to the 5 FRP was .36(26).

As to the direct quotations of the leaders of the both parties, the press favored the RPP (Table 11)(27); and they published their statements in a more neutral manner. Although the proponents of the RPP did not refrain from quoting the FRP leaders, their exclusive stories and interviews with them were less than those with the RPP leaders (ratio for Cumhuriyet: 2.06; Hakimiyeti Milliye: 5.86; Akşam: 1.72).

The most emphasized character of the one-party regime turned out to be its etatism after the FRP experiment. Especially the Kadro Review, trying to elaborate the regime's ideology, created a situation in which being identified with their ideology was equivalent to supporting the government. The Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, granting interviews and writing articles to the review, sanctioned its position to some degree(28). The debate around this position and creators of it resulted in confrontation between the proponents of the etatist economic policies and the defenders of more liberal economic policies(29). The cadres of now-defunct FRP, and Celal Bayar, the chairman of the İş Bank, formed the liberal front, while Prime Minister İnönü and the Kadro columnists composed the other; newspapers were divided amongst each other according to their stance towards these two fronts from the launch of the Kadro review to the RPP's 4th Congress(30) (Table 12). Milliyet and Son Posta, favoring the non-etatist group, leaned towards them. Milliyet, however, refrained from being highly unfavorable to the etatists; but Son Posta was all out against the etatists; Although the press' general attitude

TABLE 11- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of the Leaders of the Free Republican Party and the Republican People's Party, 1930-1931

		Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of			
		The Leaders of the Free Republican Party		The Leaders of the Republican People's Party *	
		N	%	N	%
VAKİT	F	21	70.00	16	51.61
	U	2	6.67	4	12.90
	N	7	23.33	11	35.48
	T	30		31	
H.MİLLİYE	F	1	3.57	124	75.61
	U	3	10.71	6	3.66
	N	24	85.71	34	20.73
	T	28		164	
AKŞAM	F	12	30.77	48	21.64
	U	8	20.51	12	17.91
	N	19	48.72	7	10.45
	T	39		67	
CUMHURİYET	F	7	41.18	21	60.00
	U	7	41.18	6	17.14
	N	3	17.65	8	22.86
	T	17		35	
MİLLİYET	F	34	61.82	17	47.22
	U	0	0	6	16.67
	N	21	38.18	13	36.11
	T	55		36	
YARIN	F	39	73.58	7	14.29
	U	0	0	24	48.98
	N	14	26.42	18	36.72
	T	53		49	
SON POSTA	F	13	20.97	9	19.57
	U	6	9.68	16	34.78
	N	43	69.35	21	45.65
	T	62		46	
TOTAL	F	127	44.72	242	56.54
	U	26	9.15	74	17.29
	N	131	46.13	112	26.17
	T	284		428	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

* Excluding Mustafa Kemal

TABLE 12- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Defenders of Statist Economic Policies and Proponents of Liberal Economic Policies, 1932¹-1935²

	Newspaper Reference to				
	The Defenders of Statist Economic Policies *		The Proponents of Liberal Economic Policies**		
	N	%	N	%	
VAKİT (3)	F	420	81.71	73	31.33
	U	76	14.79	139	59.66
	N	18	3.50	21	9.01
	T	514		233	
H.MİLLİYE (4)	F	617	81.51	14	8.54
	U	44	5.81	147	89.63
	N	96	12.68	3	1.83
	T	757		164	
AKŞAM	F	124	48.25	27	30.34
	U	62	24.12	18	20.22
	N	71	27.63	44	49.44
	T	257		89	
CUMHURİYET	F	287	76.53	13	23.21
	U	60	16.00	29	51.79
	N	28	7.47	14	25.00
	T	375		56	
MİLLİYET	F	107	49.08	144	73.85
	U	49	22.48	16	8.21
	N	62	28.44	35	17.95
	T	218		195	
SON POSTA	F	74	58.73	205	69.26
	U	39	30.95	18	6.08
	N	13	10.32	73	24.66
	T	126		296	
TOTAL	F	1629	72.50	476	46.08
	U	330	14.69	367	35.53
	N	288	12.82	190	18.69
	T	2247		1033	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

- (1) Since the Kadro review was published
- (2) Until the RPP's 4th Congress
- (3) Its name was changed to Kurun in 1934
- (4) Its name was changed to Ulus, 1934

* Including İsmet İnönü
 ** Including Celal Bayar

was favorable to the etatists, it was not as unfavorable towards the other camp as was probably desired (ratio of Hakimiyeti Milliye's etatists-favorable reports to unfavorable reports was 44.07, Cumhuriyet's 22.08, while the others' was 1.58). Liberal ideas, though existing, were not fully expressed in the press (Table 13). There were 2.76 statements of the etatists published per statement made by the liberals. However, only Milliyet published statements of the nonetalist more than others' (ratio: .66). But Vakit and Akşam, reporting more neutral news stories and not always publishing their statements unfavorably, tried to assume a position of independence from both groups.

The Democratic Party (DP) was not welcomed by the press either (Table 14). While Tan, Tasvir and Vatan(31) reported both more quantitatively and favorably, about the new party, others kept devoting their headlines and leading columns to the top-RPP leadership. However, when they reported, it was not only unfavorably; the rate of neutral reporting about the DP was also high. The proportion of favorable reference made by Vatan to the dissident group of the RPP and later to the founders of the DP was the highest: its ratio of RPP reference to that of the DP was .62; the average of the press was 1.48. But the over-all rate of unfavorable reference made to the DP to that of the RPP was .99; hence the press was fair towards both parties in its criticism.

As to the statements of the DP and the RPP, again, Vatan and Tan were leaning to the DP (Table 15). While Ulus carried 9 RPP-originated statements for each statement made by the DP leaders, Tan published 3 DP-originated statements against a statement of the RPP leaders. Vatan in this respect, seemed to publish equal statements of both parties.

Certain personalities, though they had served the new regime as a power-base, were gradually purged from politics;

TABLE 13- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of Defenders of
 Etatist Economic Policies and Proponents of Liberal Economic
 Policies, 1932¹- 1935²

	Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of				
	The Defenders of Statist Economic Policies *		The Proponents of Liberal Economic Policies **		
	N	%	N	%	
VAKİT (3)	F	195	87.84	4	10.81
	U	3	1.35	18	48.65
	N	24	10.81	15	40.54
	T	222		37	
H.MİLLİYE (4)	F	276	82.14	6	14.63
	U	11	3.27	24	58.54
	N	49	14.58	11	26.86
	T	336		41	
AKŞAM	F	179	60.27	21	25.00
	U	16	5.39	19	22.62
	N	102	34.34	44	52.38
	T	297		84	
CÜMHURİYET	F	244	63.21	6	8.45
	U	18	4.66	16	22.54
	N	124	32.12	49	69.01
	T	386		71	
MİLLİYET	F	79	68.70	134	77.01
	U	19	16.52	19	10.92
	N	17	14.78	21	12.07
	T	115		174	
SON POSTA	F	63	40.65	49	35.00
	U	18	11.61	18	12.86
	N	74	47.74	73	52.14
	T	155		140	
TOTAL	F	1036	68.56	220	40.22
	U	85	5.63	114	80.84
	N	390	25.81	213	38.94
	T	1571		547	
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

- (1) Since the Kadro review was published
- (2) Until the RPP's 4th Congress
- (3) Its name was changed to Kurun in 1934
- (4) Its name was changed to Ulus in 1934

* Including İsmet İnönü

** Including Celal Bayar

TABLE 14- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Incumbent RPP Leaders and Dissident Deputies of the Party, 1944-1947(1)

	Newspaper Reference to				
	The RPP Leaders (*)		The Dissident RPP Members (**)		
	N	%	N	%	
VAKİT (2)	F	617	74.43	51	32.48
	U	39	4.70	87	55.41
	N	173	20.87	19	12.10
	T	829		157	
ULUS	F	754	82.22	24	10.71
	U	19	2.07	153	68.30
	N	144	15.70	47	20.98
	T	917		224	
AKŞAM	F	420	74.73	61	19.37
	U	44	7.83	173	54.92
	N	98	17.44	81	25.71
	T	562	315	315	
CUMHURİYET	F	380	70.11	32	8.91
	U	27	4.98	254	70.75
	N	135	24.91	73	20.53
	T	542		359	
TAN	F	121	30.33	430	88.11
	U	179	44.86	17	3.48
	N	99	24.81	41	8.40
	T	399		488	
TASVİR	F	64	27.59	340	68.97
	U	120	51.72	33	6.69
	N	48	20.69	120	24.34
	T	232		493	
VATAN	F	135	40.42	452	63.55
	U	79	23.65	16	2.96
	N	120	35.93	73	13.49
	T	334		541	
TANIN (3)	F	73	52.90	91	67.41
	U	49	35.51	3	2.22
	N	16	11.59	41	30.37
	T	138	135	135	
SON POSTA	F	87	38.16	72	62.61
	U	106	46.49	8	6.96
	N	35	15.35	35	30.43
	T	228		115	
YENİ SABAH	F	84	23.01	124	52.10
	U	120	32.88	43	18.07
	N	161	44.11	71	29.83
	T	365		238	
TOTAL	F	2735	60.16	1677	54.71
	U	782	17.20	787	25.68
	N	1029	22.64	601	19.61
	T	4546		3065	

(1) Until the RPP's 7th Congress

(2) Its name was changed to Yeni Gazete in 1947

(3) Until 1945

* Including Ismet İnönü

** Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, Tevfik Koraltan.

TABLE 15- Sampled Newspaper Coverage of the Incumbent RPP Leaders and Dissident Deputies of the Party, 1944-1947(1)

		Newspaper Coverage of the Statements of			
		The RPP Leaders (*)		The Dissident RPP Members(**)	
		N	%	N	%
VAKİT (2)	F	254	79.38	27	16.46
	U	44	13.71	96	58.54
	N	22	6.88	41	25.00
	T	320		164	
ULUS	F	386	76.28	12	21.43
	U	24	4.24	8	14.29
	N	96	18.97	36	64.29
	T	500		56	
AKŞAM	F	142	55.69	14	26.42
	U	14	5.49	9	16.98
	N	99	38.82	30	56.60
	T	255		53	
CUMHURİYET	F	163	54.70	47	58.02
	U	21	7.05	20	24.69
	N	114	38.26	14	17.28
	T	298		81	
TAN	F	22	31.43	130	67.71
	U	11	15.71	13	6.77
	N	37	52.86	49	25.52
	T	70		192	
TASVİR	F	19	15.97	97	86.61
	U	17	14.29	3	2.68
	N	83	69.75	12	10.71
	T	119		112	
VATAN	F	86	40.76	124	67.03
	U	23	10.90	13	7.03
	N	102	48.34	48	25.15
	T	211		185	
TANIN(3)	F	5	8.20	33	51.56
	U	12	19.67	11	17.19
	N	44	72.13	20	31.25
	T	61		64	
SON POSTA	F	33	33.67	124	49.66
	U	26	26.53	13	7.30
	N	39	39.80	41	23.03
	T	98		178	
YENİ SABAH	F	43	29.86	58	51.33
	U	17	11.81	31	27.43
	N	84	58.33	24	21.24
	T	144		113	
TOTAL	F	1153	55.38	666	55.59
	U	209	10.04	217	18.11
	N	720	34.58	315	26.29
	T	2082		1198	

(1) Until the RPP's 7th Congress

(2) Its name was changed to Yeni Gazete in 1947

(3) Until 19459

* Including Ismet İnönü

** Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, Tevfik Koraltan.

among them were religious and ethnic leaders. The analysis of the sampled newspapers demonstrated that the press' reference to the people who could be placed in these groups merely by merit of their titles(32) decreased considerably (Table 16). However, the reference made to those religious leaders decreased more than those made to the ethnic leaders or ethnically-named persons. In the early years of the regime most of the reference to the religiously titled persons were not only high in quantity but also mostly favorable. Only Yeni Gün, followed by Cumhuriyet and Hakimiyeti Milliye mentioned their name in an unfavorable manner. But with regard to those named by merit of their ethnic origin, Hakimiyeti Milliye and Yeni Gün, later Cumhuriyet, were no different from the other newspapers: the press was very much favorable to them.

In the period of 1935-1940 almost all newspapers were either unfavorable or neutral about these groups. Compared to the religious persons, the ethnically named persons received more unfavorable remarks.

B. What is not Communicated

The second major effect of structurally-imposed constraints of the authoritarian regime dwells on the negative determination of the system whose interests would not be aggregated, and thus, communicated. Again the systems' vision of politics as the exclusion of certain interests from the power competition involves communications: not only are certain individuals, as representatives of interests which are illegal from the system's point of view, deprived of mass media, but also certain issues related to these interests are barred from being communicated to public.

Again it is intended to describe the press' treatment of those subjects, to be supportive of which, by Mustafa Kemal

TABLE 16- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Persons who had Titles of Religious and ethnic origin

	Newspaper Reference to Persons who Had									
	Religious Titles*					Ethnic Titles **				
	1920-1925		1935-1940		1920-1925		1935-1940		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
TEVHİD (1)	F	1424	73.03			601	75.69			
	U	319	16.36			74	9.32			
	N	207	10.62			119	14.99			
	T	1950				794				
İKDAM (2)	F	749	50.78	124	29.04	244	47.38	91	64.08	
	U	419	28.41	239	55.97	63	12.23	36	25.35	
	N	307	20.81	64	14.99	208	40.39	15	10.56	
	T	1475		427		515		142		
VAKİT (3)	F	601	38.30	243	33.11	139	29.96	102	28.25	
	U	744	47.42	387	52.72	71	15.30	204	56.51	
	N	224	14.28	104	14.17	254	54.74	55	15.24	
	T	1569		734		464		361		
TANİN (4)	F	1084	69.22			696	62.31			
	U	174	11.11			135	12.09			
	N	308	19.67			286	25.60			
	T	1566				1117				
YENİGÜN (5)	F	601	28.30	47	12.47	301	57.66	47	15.93	
	U	1344	63.28	312	82.76	187	35.82	214	72.52	
	N	179	8.43	18	4.77	34	6.51	34	11.53	
	T	2124		337		522		295		
CUMHURİYET (6)	F	847	48.71	89	27.81	1247	71.26	164	27.29	
	U	613	35.25	97	30.31	314	17.94	408	67.89	
	N	279	16.04	134	41.88	189	10.80	29	4.83	
	T	1739		320		1750		601		
AKŞAM	F	402	30.41	66	32.84	647	61.68	54	35.06	
	U	616	46.60	114	56.72	251	23.93	13	8.44	
	N	304	23.00	21	10.45	151	14.39	87	56.49	
	T	1322		201		1049		154		
VATAN (8)	F	741	67.98			339	51.83			
	U	214	19.63			101	15.44			
	N	135	12.39			214	32.72			
	T	1090				654				
SON. TELGRA (9)	F	174	70.73			847	83.70			
	U	28	11.38			136	13.44			
	N	44	17.89			29	2.87			
	T	246				1012				
MİLLİYET (10)	F			97	34.15			19	8.05	
	U									
	N			147	51.76			44	18.64	
	T			284				236		
SON POSTA	F			86	33.86			33	16.92	
	U			134	52.76			24	12.31	
	N			34	13.39			138	70.77	
	T			254				195		
TOTAL	F	6623	50.63	752	28.96	5061	64.25	510	25.71	
	U	4471	34.18	1320	50.94	1332	16.91	1072	54.03	
	N	1987	15.19	522	20.10	1484	18.84	402	20.26	
	T	13081		2597		7877		1984		

* Hacı, Hafız, Hoca and Molla are considered here,

** Çerkez (Circassian), Gürcü (Georgian), Kürt (Kurdish), Arnavut (Albanian), Arap (Arabia) are considered here.

- (1) Closed in 1927
- (2) Closed in 1928 until 1939
- (3) Its name was changed to Kurun from 1934 to 1938
- (4) Until 1925
- (5) Until 1923
- (6) Since 1923
- (7) Its name was changed to Ulus from 1934 onwards
- (8) From 1922 to 1925
- (9) Since 1924
- (10) Its name was changed to Tan in 1936.

himself and other officials of the regime, had made known to be undesirable. The newspapers' headline stories and leading columns are counted simply according to their stance on certain issues, and their favorable treatment of undesired subjects is seen to reflect lack of control on the part of the regime. As stated earlier, in both the formative and developed periods of the regime, action rather than ideology gave it its particular characteristic. The War of Independence, the reforms, the struggle with counter-elites could be instrumental in re-establishing the mentality behind the regime. This mentality having never been theorized into an elaborated ideology, hardly prohibits anything overtly; neither does it sanction any type of behavior. The categories of undesired subjects and issues condemned by the regime, therefore, were generated simply by interpreting the opposite of the actions of the regime as undesired by the Kemalist cadres. In other words, categories of the denounced issues are not actually and verbally disapproved by the representatives of the regime; but what the regime did in a related field or endorsed by such an action were taken to mean reprobation on the part of the regime.

Since the very first political action of the regime was abolition of the Sultanate, any behavior in favor of the Sultanate, i.e. claiming the Sultan's right of residence in Turkey, or the right of inheritance of the members of the dynasty, would be regarded as being against the interest of the regime; and such action would be denounced by the regime. Until 1931, there was no legal prohibition on the subject, and only with the new press law was it forbidden for the press to take a position in favor of the Sultanate and Caliphate. However, with the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, it became obvious that to praise the Sultan or the institution would be confronting with the regime, and such a challenge was definitely undesired by the regime. The high number of pro-caliphate references made during the period

between the abolitions of the Sultanate and Caliphate, however, inflates the over-all ratio of the period (Table 17).

The favorable treatment the Sultan and the institution received fell sharply, and, though its volume increased, most of the references to them became unfavorable. Very few favorable references to the Sultanate are made in the articles about the rise of the Empire; otherwise, neither the Sultans, nor the imperial institutions were praised. As the Empire and Sultanate became the subjects of history text books, neutral references to them in newspapers increased; but even as late as 1940-1942, unfavorable mention of the Sultanate remained the rule.

As for the particular newspapers, especially those which were closed after the 1925 press trials(33), they were very meticulous lest they make the slightest error or fall short of other newspapers' antisultanate standard: Tevhidi Efkar's rate of unfavorable references to the Sultanate was as high as those newspapers which had been supporting the regime since the very first day. But some newspapers, free from being labelled as pro-sultanate, published serial articles on the early periods of the Ottoman Empire; these articles usually were more than mildly expressed commendations, sometimes eulogies(34).

The Caliphate was not even treated as neutrally as the Sultanate (Table 18). It was true that until it was abolished the institution was mostly treated favorably or, at worst, neutrally. The newspapers which made the highest number of favorable references to the Sultanate did not continue publishing same sort of material after 1925 trials; but when they resumed publication they did not deviate from the over all attitude of the press. As time passed, the Caliphate did not assume the character of historical subject for the press: the number of references to the Caliphate in the 1940s was less than one-third of those to the Sultanate.

TABLE 17- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Sultanate

		1920-1922 (*)		1930-1932		1940-1942	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	168	78.14			6	16.22
	U	0	0			29	78.38
	N	47	21.86			2	5.41
	T	215				37	
İKDAM(2)	F	74	70.48			2	5.00
	U	12	11.43			24	60.00
	N	19	18.10			14	35.00
	T	105				40	
VAKİT	F	89	80.91	0	0	0	0
	U	18	16.36	61	100.00	9	27.27
	N	3	2.73	0	0	24	72.73
	T	110		61		33	
TANİN(3)	F	146	63.48				
	U	21	9.11				
	N	63	27.39				
	T	230					
YENİGÜN (4) CUMHURİYET	F	34	45.33	0	0	6	6.00
	U	23	30.67	317	99.06	89	89.00
	N	18	24.00	3	0.94	5	5.00
	T	75		320		100	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	21	44.68	2	0.87	13	7.26
	U	16	34.04	211	91.74	147	82.12
	N	10	21.28	17	7.39	19	10.61
	T	47		230		179	
AKŞAM	F	83	72.81	12	4.43	0	0
	U	7	6.14	244	90.04	52	76.47
	N	24	21.05	15	5.54	16	23.53
	T	114		271		68	
VATAN(5)	F	6	12.00			0	0
	U	2	4.00			73	87.95
	N	42	84.00			110	12.05
	T	50				83	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			14	7.65	3	1.94
	U			138	75.41	134	86.45
	N			31	16.94	18	11.61
	T			183		155	
YENİ SABAH	F					0	0
	U					47	58.75
	N					33	41.25
	T					80	
TOTAL	F	621	65.64	28	2.63	30	3.87
	U	99	10.47	971	91.17	604	77.94
	N	226	23.89	66	6.20	141	18.19
	T	946		1065		775	

(1) Until 1925 and for only 1940 * Until November 1, 1922.

(2) Until 1928 and for Only 1939 and 1940

(3) Until 1925

(4) Y.Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for only 1940

(6) From 1926; its name was changed to Tan in 1936.

TABLE 18- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Caliphate

		1921-1924 (*)		1931-1934		1941-1944	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	254	52.91			0	0
	U	12	2.80			6	24.00
	N	163	38.00			19	76.00
	T	429				25	
İKDAM(2)	F	15	8.82			0	0
	U	8	4.71			26	100.0
	N	147	86.47			0	0
	T	170				26	
VAKİT	F	135	54.88	0	0	0	0
	U	27	10.96	62	96.88	4	25.00
	N	84	34.15	2	3.13	12	75.00
	T	246		64		16	
TANİN(3)	F	54	40.0			6	20.69
	U	18	13.33			19	65.52
	N	63	46.67			4	13.79
	T	135				29	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	17	30.91	2	1.34	0	0
	U	3	5.45	142	95.30	39	78.00
	N	35	63.64	5	3.36	11	22.00
	T	55		149		50	
MİLLİYET ULUS	F	43	32.82	0	0	1	2.08
	U	16	12.21	69	89.61	41	85.42
	N	72	54.96	8	10.39	6	12.50
	T	131		77		48	
AKŞAM	F	39	48.75	4	7.84	0	0
	U	14	17.50	36	70.59	25	58.14
	N	27	33.75	11	21.57	18	111.86
	T	80		51		43	
VATAN(5)	F	21	31.82			3	4.41
	U	8	12.12			61	89.71
	N	37	54.06			4	5.88
	T	66				68	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			0	0	0	0
	U			48	76.19	19	100.0
	N			15	23.81	0	0
	T					4	4.76
YENİ SABAH (7)	F					63	75.00
	U					17	20.24
	N					84	
	T	578	44.05	6	1.49	14	3.43
TOTAL	F	106	8.08	357	88.37	303	74.26
	U	682	47.87	41	10.15	91	22.30
	N	1312		404		408	
	T						

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. * Until March 3, 1924.

(2) Until 1928 and for 1939 and 1940 only.

(3) Until 1925.

(4) Y.Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards.

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only.

(6) From 1926; its name was changed to Tan in 1936.

(7) From 1939 onwards.

Authoritarian regimes seek to create national unity at a time of early nation-building and thus to impose stability over the pre-regime social disturbances or try to preclude such an occurrence(35). Accordingly, Turkish authoritarianism would have sought to expand the scope and domain of the influence of the state so that it could act as a supra-classes political agent. Class-based politics, for example, would be detrimental to the stability sought by Kemalist regime; even the idea of modernization of labor laws, of agricultural relations between tenants, sharecroppers and landlords, let alone socialist or communist programs, would be undesired by the elite, if they were not designed and timed by the regime itself. Consequently, the regime, from the very beginning, claimed that Turkish people lived in a classless society and, therefore, were brothers(36). The newspapers' articles and headline stories favorable to agricultural and land reforms, egalitarian wage-system and improvement of working and living conditions of industrial workers, existence of social classes and class-based politics, did not decrease; but their proportion did (Tables 19 and 20). As the regime left the opposition-party periods of 1925 and 1930 far behind, these subjects were mostly unfavorably referred to. However, the impact of the multi-party years of the Empire on the press lasted until the Law of Restoration of Order. Although most of the articles were about the destructive effects of struggles amongst the classes, the subject of party plurality was tied to the multiplicity of political programs by the newspapers and upon them they freely expressed ideas. But with the demise of the Free Republican Party, class-based politics and party plurality lost all their glamour for the newspaper: the number of articles criticising class based politics and headline stories in the 1940s was even higher than the total number of references to the related subjects made some ten years ago; articles defending the existence of more than one party decreased sharply in number and became vague in wording. Again, those newspapers that once were hostile to the regime were the

TABLE 19- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Notions Related to Class-Based Politics

CLASS - BASED POLITICS	1920-1923		1930-1933		1940-1943		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD(1)	F	28	30.11			3	1.36
	U	46	49.46			174	79.09
	N	19	20.43			43	19.55
	T	93				220	
İKDAM(2)	F	35	19.02			8	8.42
	U	86	46.74			24	25.26
	N	63	34.24			63	66.32
	T	184				95	
VAKİT	F	19	19.00	0	0.00	16	14.16
	U	61	61.00	86	85.15	84	74.34
	N	20	20.00	15	14.85	13	11.50
	T	100		101		113	
TANİN(3)	F	8	10.81			2	5.56
	U	19	25.64			24	66.67
	N	47	63.51			10	27.78
	T	74				36	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	25	14.20	3	4.00	16	14.16
	U	64	36.36	45	60.00	72	63.72
	N	87	49.43	27	36.00	25	22.12
	T	176		75		113	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	16	12.70	12	13.95	3	2.03
	U	87	69.05	54	62.79	81	54.73
	N	23	18.25	20	23.26	64	43.24
	T	126		86		148	
AKŞAM	F	21	26.92	14	13.46	5	10.64
	U	43	55.13	29	27.88	29	61.70
	N	14	17.95	61		13	27.66
	T	78		104		47	
VATAN(5)	F	22	17.32			8	4.79
	U	76	59.84			97	58.08
	N	29	22.83			62	37.13
	T	127				167	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			163	69.66	144	56.69
	U			28	11.96	43	16.93
	N			43	18.38	67	26.38
	T			234		254	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F					6	3.97
	U					119	78.81
	N					26	17.22
	T					151	
TOTAL	F	174	18.16	192	32.00	211	15.70
	U	482	50.31	242	40.33	747	55.58
	N	302	31.52	166	27.67	386	28.72
	T	958		600		1344	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards

TABLE 20- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Notions Related to Political Freedoms and Multi-Partism

		1920-1923		1930-1933		1940-1943	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	60	37.97			0	0
	U	24	15.19			4	25.00
	N	74	46.86			12	75.00
	T	158				16	
İKDAM(2)	F	20	9.71			2	22.22
	U	139	67.48			7	77.78
	N	47	22.82			0	0
	T	206	22.82			9	
VAKİT	F	39	29.77	14	12.28	7	24.14
	U	16	12.21	47	41.23	18	62.07
	N	76	58.02	53	46.49	4	13.79
	T	131		114		29	
TANİN(3)	F	31	47.69			2	10.00
	U	6	9.23			18	90.00
	N	28	43.08			0	0
	T	65				20	
YENİGÜN CUMHUR.(4)	F	24	18.05	3	6.25	4	36.36
	U	73	54.89	28	58.33	6	54.55
	N	36	27.07	17	35.42	1	9.09
	T	133		48		11	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	43	28.86	0	0	0	0
	U	87	58.39	29	38.16	14	73.68
	N	19	12.75	47	61.84	5	26.32
	T	149		76		19	
AKŞAM	F	18	21.43	10	11.76	8	72.73
	U	20	23.81	46	54.12	3	27.27
	N	46	54.76	29	34.12	0	0
	T	84		85		11	
VATAN(5)	F	46	36.80			7	30.43
	U	3	2.40			0	0
	N	76	60.80			16	69.57
	T	125				23	
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F			12	11.76	14	51.85
	U			7	6.86	6	22.22
	N			83	81.37	7	25.93
	T			102		27	
YENİSABAH (7)	F					11	52.38
	U					5	23.81
	N					5	23.81
	T					21	
TOTAL	F	281	26.74	39	9.18	55	29.57
	U	368	35.01	157	36.94	81	43.55
	N	402	38.25	229	53.88	50	26.88
	T	1051		425		186	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

most careful ones: in Tasfiri Efkar, Tanin and Vatan almost nothing that could be taken to be favorable to political freedom had appeared.

Another character of authoritarian regimes which take power in ethnically-cleavaged societies is their dependence on one group and their deprivational policies against others(37). The division of the Empire in accordance with its national boundaries, however, left the Kemalists with minor ethnic groups; and the regime, therefore, had never assumed a racial character. But even these small groups should not engage in politics; the regime, thus, could be able to attain the social stability it sought. Consequently, the attitude consisting of praising certain ethnic groups, demanding their cultural and/or economic well-being and claiming their separate identity, an attitude which could be tantamount to ethnocentrism, if not to a struggle for ethnic autonomy, gradually disappeared from the newspapers (Table 21). The legacy of an era in which ethnic groups not only did not have a voice in the press but also in political parties and associations survived in the press in the early 1920s. But the favorable treatment which the ethnocentric attitudes and activities received fell sharply in the 1930s and 1940s. The subject, however, retained its importance: the newspapers' over-all approach to the subject was unfavorable and deprivational. The favorable references were made to wedding rites, customary ceremonies etc. It is noteworthy that the Ankara newspapers' attitude towards ethnocentrism in the 1920s and 1930s consisted of the same unfavorable treatment; the Istanbul newspapers though, still had high numbers of favorable references, but gradually turned against the ethnocentrism of those groups other than Turks.

With the National Struggle, the Kemalist cadres won independence at the cost of large irredenta. But irredentism was despised by the regime(38). Kemalist foreign policy was

	1920-1930		1935-1945		
	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD(1)	F	413	69.30	63	41.18
	U	48	8.05	76	49.67
	N	135	22.65	14	9.15
	T	596		153	
İKDAM(2)	F	274	65.39	47	31.54
	U	116	27.68	39	26.17
	N	29	6.92	63	42.28
	T	419		149	
VAKİT	F	326	67.22	22	13.41
	U	113	23.30	69	42.07
	N	46	9.48	73	44.51
	T	485		164	
TANİN(3)	F	97	40.93	24	37.50
	U	38	16.03	33	51.56
	N	102	43.04	7	10.94
	T	237		64	
YENİGÜN CUMHUR.(4)	F	63	17.85	6	10.17
	U	217	61.47	40	67.80
	N	73	20.68	13	22.03
	T	353		59	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	29	8.55	2	4.76
	U	213	62.83	24	57.14
	N	97	28.61	16	38.10
	T	339		42	
AKŞAM	F	73	23.93	4	9.76
	U	89	29.18	32	78.05
	N	143	46.89	5	12.20
	T	305		41	
VATAN(5)	F	62	37.58	72	39.34
	U	74	44.85	83	45.36
	N	29	17.58	28	15.30
	T	165		183	
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F	113	47.68	52	28.57
	U	49	20.68	86	47.25
	N	75	31.65	44	24.18
	T	237		182	
Y.SABAHA(7)	F			11	19.30
	U			43	75.44
	N			3	5.26
	T			57	
TOTAL	F	1450	46.24	303	27.70
	U	957	30.52	525	47.99
	N	729	23.25	266	24.31
	T	3136		1094	

* Articles and news reports consisting the words, Kürt (Kurdish), Çerkez (Circassian), Gürcü (Georgian), Arnavut (Albanian) and Arap (Arab) in relation to the subjects of Turkey.

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only.
It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1941-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

dedicated to the idea of peaceful co-existence in the region. With the help of that pacifist foreign policy, the ideal internal non-conflictual situation between ethnic groups and social classes could be maintained. Irredentist ideas were not totally wiped out from the press (Table 22). In 1925-1930, its favorable references were fewer than its unfavorable ones. As the national boundaries assumed the character of constancy, irredentist ideas were gradually expressed; but the contrary was as powerfully expressed as irredentist ideas. It should be noted that most of the irredentist ideas were expressed as criticism to the Lausanne Peace Treaty. The problem of Hatay, a province left to the French in Lausanne which became an independent republic in 1937, and Mustafa Kemal's own efforts to inflame national feelings about its becoming a Turkish land again(39), aroused irredentist references. But, in the 1940s with Hatay being annexed to Turkey, irredentism had never gained its importance in the press. Quite the contrary, half of all references to the subject were unfavorable; most of the remaining proportion of newspaper material were natural.

Both the principles of nationalism and secularism of the Kemalist mentality involve the denial of political power to the religious institutions and religious elite. The Kemalist cadres, trying to base political power on a national rather than religious community, re-defined the society in accordance with national characteristics: this definition could create a nation-state, different than the multi-national Ottoman society, and a modern statecraft, different than the religion-based imperial bureaucracy. Thus, the elite of the ancien regime would be deprived of their raison d'etre in the new regime. The principles of secularism, therefore, appeared as an indispensable component of the mentality: with secularism, not only state and religion, but also religion and educational, cultural and legal affairs were separated. The regime fortified the beachhead won by the principles of nationalism and secularism with other reforms: Ottoman head

TABLE 22- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Notions Related to Irredentism

		1925-1930		1935-1940		1940-1945	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	13	33.33	6	18.75	2	15.38
	U	2	5.13	2	6.25	0	0
	N	24	61.54	24	75.00	11	84.62
	T	39		32		13	
İKDAM(2)	F	23	29.49	14	25.93	3	13.04
	U	11	14.10	16	29.63	12	52.17
	N	44	56.41	24	44.44	8	34.78
	T	78		54	23		
VAKİT	F	8	18.18	28	49.12	4	12.12
	U	13	29.55	16	28.07	26	78.79
	N	23	52.27	13	22.81	3	9.09
	T	44		57		33	
TANİN(3)	F	14	26.42			0	0
	U	3	5.66			0	0
	N	36	67.92			3	100.0
	T	53				3	
YENİGÜN CUMHUR. (4)	F	9	23.68	34	58.62	3	12.50
	U	22	57.89	8	13.79	14	58.33
	N	7	18.42	16	27.59	7	29.17
	T	38		58		24	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	9	36.00	44	32.84	6	42.86
	U	12	48.00	63	47.01	8	57.14
	N	4	16.00	27	20.15	0	0
	T	25		134		14	
AKŞAM	F	16	27.12	21	21.88	0	0
	U	7	11.86	38	39.58	6	60.00
	N	36	61.02	37	38.54	4	40.00
	T	59		96		10	
VATAN(5)	F	13	22.41	7	25.00	0	0
	U	29	50.00	9	32.14	2	12.50
	N	16	27.59	12	42.86	14	87.50
	T	58		28		16	
MİLLİYET TAN	F	6	10.17	24	26.67	6	16.67
	U	34	57.63	49	54.44	21	58.33
	N	19	32.20	17	18.89	9	25.00
	T	59		90		36	
Y. SABAH(6)	F			49	53.26	10	34.48
	U			17	18.48	13	44.83
	N			26	28.26	6	20.69
	T			92		29	
TOTAL	F	111	24.50	227	35.41	34	16.92
	U	133	29.36	218	34.01	102	50.75
	N	209	46.14	196	30.58	65	32.34
	T	453		641		201	

- 1) For 4 months only in 1925-30 period; for one year only in 1935-40 period.
- 2) For 4 months only in 1925-30 period; for two years only in 1935-40 period; until 1943.
- 3) For 4 months only in 1925-30 period; for 1943-45.
- 4) Yeni Gün Until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards.
- 5) For 4 months only in 1925-30 period; for one year only in 1935-40 period.
- 6) From 1938 onwards.

gear, the fez, was banned as well as other religious garb; the script was changed from arabic to latin characters. Therefore, an attitude in favor of religious institutions' right to intervene in the mundane social and official affairs or hostile to other Kemalist reforms would be regarded as a challenge directed to the bases of the new political regime. Since the early years of the regime, newspapers' treatment of religious rights and practice of praying, as well as the religious institutions' place in social relations, were highly unfavorable (Table 23). Some newspapers, however, being tactful with words, refrained from an utterly anti-religious attitude. Some others, i.e. Tevhidi Efkar and Tanin were all out for religious rights and reported the decisions of the Government and the Assembly without enthusiasm.

After the reforms were concluded in the late 1920s, the press hardly referred to religious institutions' moral importance, let alone their political rights. While newspapers used to report 3 unfavorable articles or headline stories against a favorable item in the early 1920s, some ten years later, the ratio of unfavorable items about the religious rights to favorable items become as high as 49; in addition to that the total references to religious rights were one-third less than the previous period.

With regard to the need to make socio-economic changes, there was an early agreement among the members of the Kemalist elite: the solution to the problems of the masses would be dictated from above. This principle, partly inherited from the Union and Progress Society's reformers, partly resulting from the bureaucratic-middle class nature of the political alliance which served as base to Kemalist cadres' political legitimacy, involves largely the principles of populism and etatism. Turkey should not be a class-ridden country like the European nations; the solidarity between classes was essential(40); none of the social classes, depending on their

TABLE 23- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Notions Related to Religious Rights

		1923-1927		1933-1937	
		N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	34	26.77		
	U	6	4.72		
	N	87	68.50		
	T	127			
İKDAM(2)	F	5	4.72		
	U	92	86.79		
	N	9	8.49		
	T	106			
VAKİT	F	16	14.81	4	6.78
	U	74	68.52	47	79.66
	N	18	16.67	8	13.56
	T	108		59	
TANİN(3)	F	63	70.79		
	U	9	10.11		
	N	17	19.10		
	T	89			
YENİ GÜN CUMHUR.(4)	F	3	3.13	0	0
	U	69	71.88	217	91.95
	N	24	25.00	19	8.05
	T	96		236	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	6	4.41	1	0.47
	U	83	61.03	189	88.32
	N	47	34.56	24	11.21
	T	136		214	
AKŞAM	F	13	9.56	0	0
	U	81	59.56	40	54.05
	N	42	30.88	34	45.95
	T	136		74	
VATAN(5)	F	21	29.17		
	U	47	65.28		
	N	4	5.56		
	T	72			
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F	0	0	6	9.68
	U	38	73.08	44	70.97
	N	14	26.92	12	19.35
	T	52		62	
TOTAL	F	161	17.46	11	1.71
	U	499	54.12	537	83.26
	N	262	28.42	97	15.04
	T	922	645		
	F				
	U				
	N				
	T				

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936.

status in the division of labor was to acclaim political dominance. The state, therefore is the sole authority to solve the problems between the elements of division of labor(41), to lead the private entrepreneurs; and to make major economic policy-decisions. The idea of economic liberalism, therefore, could be a hostile idea. Newspapers, in fact, had never been in favor of economic liberalism (Table 24). Even long before etatism found its way into the constitution, in 1920-1923 most of the newspapers' treatment of economic liberalism was unfavorable. Socio-economic issues maintained their importance for the newspapers: the rates of increase(42) of the total numbers of socio-economic issues were from 1920-1923 to 1930-1933, .03 and, from 1930-1933 to 1940-1943, .24. But those stories upholding economic liberalism did not increase as much as unfavorable references did. However, in the 1940s some newspapers, trying to imply that etatist practices had not become as fruitful as expected, began mentioning liberal policies as viable alternatives: Vatan, and Yeni Sabah appear as the most eloquent defenders.

C. Exaltation in Communications

The third major impact of the system-caused constraints of authoritarianism on communications is the positive determination of what is to be communicated. In this regard, authoritarianism, being an elite-based and elite-run regime, does not only need to prevent the communication of those interests which are illegitimate from the regime's point of view but also to spell out certain views for the elite's members(43). The regime has to disseminate its mentality, or in other words, the affirmations put forward by itself. The regime, thus, provides its elite members with a set of fundamental expectations about future developments; with a vision of the past that helps make the present and the future understandable for the elite. Since the regime, being authoritarian, had pre-set limits for social mobilization, it would so affect

TABLE 24- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Notions Related to Liberalism

		1920-1923		1930-1933		1940-1943	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD(1)	F	0	0			6	25.00
	U	12	85.71			12	50.00
	N	2	14.29			6	25.00
	T	14				24	
İKDAM(2)	F	8	23.53			0	0
	U	2	5.88			24	92.31
	N	24	70.59			2	7.69
	T	34				26	
VAKİT	F	11	20.75	19	25.00	3	6.52
	U	33	62.26	34	44.74	27	58.70
	N	9	16.98	23	30.26	16	34.78
	T	53		76		46	
TANIN(3)	F	6	15.79			6	11.11
	U	19	50.00			19	35.19
	N	13	34.21			29	53.70
	T	38				54	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET(4)	F	24	28.24	7	9.72	8	15.09
	U	39	45.88	46	63.89	43	81.13
	N	22	25.88	19	26.39	2	3.77
	T	85		72		53	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	7	21.88	7	17.07	3	12.00
	U	19	59.38	16	39.02	8	32.00
	N	6	18.75	18	43.90	14	56.00
	T	32	41	25			
AKŞAM	F	15	30.00	23	22.77	21	35.00
	U	26	52.00	56	55.45	36	60.00
	N	9	18.00	22	21.78	3	5.00
	T	50		101	60		
VATAN(5)	F	29	41.43			46	55.42
	U	8	11.43			13	15.66
	N	33	47.14			24	28.92
	T	70				83	
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F			38	38.78	16	34.78
	U			2	2.04	23	50.00
	N			58	59.18	7	15.22
	T			98		46	
Y.SABAHA (7)	F					47	73.44
	U					6	9.38
	N					11	17.19
	T					64	
TOTAL	F	100	26.60	94	24.23	156	32.43
	U	158	92.02	154	39.69	211	43.87
	N	118	31.38	140	36.08	114	23.70
	T	376		388		481	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

the cognitive status of communications that they would recognize the same symbols as noteworthy (rather, newsworthy). The findings of the analysis of symbols usually exalted by the press should show how the regime wanted to impose identical values on the elite and secondary elites(44) via newspapers.

Here it is sought to compare the numbers of favorable, unfavorable and neutral repetitions symbol-words, which the regime highly valued, and strove to have disseminated to the elite and public alike. The type and degree of intensity of repetition of those value-symbols of the regime would be favorable and high enough to give them an ideological significance. In counting references made to certain symbols(45), those paragraphs praising the symbol-words or mentioning them positively were regarded as one favorable reference. Those paragraphs containing a condemnation or negative mention were regarded to be an unfavorable reference. References without any positive or negative connotation were counted as neutral. However, even the neutral repetitions would have an impact on the readership; the numbers of neutral references should be treated as positive indicators from the hypothetical point of view of the regime.

The leader's own name obviously had the highest symbolic value: the elite and lesser-elites had to identify themselves with him. Mustafa Kemal, from the day he assumed the role of the first among equals at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, up to the era when he became the one and only representative of the regime in the 1930s onwards, was the personality most favorably referred to (Table 25). Although until 1924 some newspapers' reference to him was not always favorable; during the one-party period favorable references made to him were much higher than unfavorable and neutral ones. Average favorable reference for 1920-1946 was 62.89 per cent of all references; 5.66 per cent unfavorable and 31.45 neutral. If the references made to the entire leadership of the RPP or

TABLE 25- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
(F: Praising; positively, UF: Condemning; negatively, N: Without any connotation)

	1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASFİR (1)	F	312	33.88					103	63.19	162	40.30
	U	406	44.08					13	7.98	21	5.22
	N	203	22.04					47	28.83	219	54.48
	T	921						163		402	
İKRAM (2)	F	451	56.45	697	75.60			208	66.24	89	39.73
	U	69	8.64	26	2.82			0	0.00	0	0.00
	N	279	34.92	199	21.58			106	33.76	135	60.27
	T	799		922				314		224	
VAKİT	F	356	52.05	839	74.51	619	80.81	741	86.46	341	77.32
	U	124	18.13	14	1.24	0	0.00	18	2.10	29	6.58
	N	204	29.82	273	24.25	147	19.19	98	11.40	71	16.10
	T	684		1126		766		857		441	
TANİN (3)	F	154	22.75							62	59.05
	U	216	31.91							7	6.67
	N	307	45.35							36	34.29
	T	677								105	34.29
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	584	77.87	719	63.18	487	69.37	509	74.63	216	79.41
	U	19	2.53	13	1.14	12	1.71	0	0.00	7	2.57
	N	147	19.60	406	35.68	203	28.92	173	25.37	49	18.01
	T	750		1138		702		682		272	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	306	76.88	503	88.25	628	88.20	419	80.42	222	78.17
	U	7	1.76	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
	N	85	21.36	67	11.75	84	11.80	102	19.58	62	21.83
	T	398		570		712		521		284	
AKŞAM	F	422	51.34	624	82.65	402	74.17	571	85.86	340	86.51
	U	94	11.44	16	2.12	0	0.00	7	1.05	14	3.56
	N	306	37.23	115	15.23	140	25.83	87	13.08	39	9.92
	T	822		755		542		665		393	
VATAN (5)	F	206	35.58	624	82.65	402	74.17	91	87.50	276	67.81
	U	47	8.12	16	2.12	0	0.00	0	0.00	34	8.35
	N	326	56.30					13	12.50	97	23.83
	T	579						104		407	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			446	67.47	573	86.17	447	83.71	166	70.04
	U			11	1.66	29	4.36	3	0.56	24	10.13
	N			204	30.86	63	9.47	84	15.73	47	19.83
	T			661		665		534		237	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							306	56.98	162	54.18
	U							17	3.17	11	3.68
	N							214	39.85	126	92.14
	T							537		299	
TOTAL	F	2791	49.57	3828	74.01	2709	44.59	3395	77.56	2376	68.73
	U	982	17.44	80	1.55	201	3.31	58	1.33	161	4.66
	N	1857	32.98	1264	24.44	3165	52.10	924	21.11	920	26.61
	T	5630		5172		6075		4377		3457	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

to the PRP and FRP were compared to those made to the leader, it could perhaps be concluded that he was the personality most frequently referred to(46). The fact that after he established his charismatic authority, in 1930-1934 and 1941-1946, he received the highest number of unfavorable references, could be explained by the fact that whenever a rival party was about to be established, allegiance of some newspapers was diverted to that party.

The concept, significant even in the imperial years in itself, was that of the state. Kemalists, though tried to cite theirs as Yeni Türk Devleti (new Turkish state), frequently using the expression of Devlet ebed-müddet (ever lasting state), sought to establish the idea of statecraft surviving since the first Turkish state in Asia(47). In a sense, the War of Independence, the Assembly and institutions founded in the ensuing years were identified with the state. This notion, therefore, received as many favorable references as Mustafa Kemal himself did (Table 26). Most of the unfavorable references to the notion of state made in the early 1920s were made by those who, comparing what was named as state by Mustafa Kemal to the Devleti Alî Osmanî (The Supreme Ottoman state), preferred to call the organization founded in Anatolia a rebellious band. For them, to name the state as the Turkish state would be a denial of the existence of other ethnic groups of the Empire(48). However, those expressing negative feelings about the most exalted institution in later years, were mainly thinking in terms of the protection of the individual against the State(49). It is noteworthy that those newspapers which did not continue publication after the 1925 trials averaged higher number of unfavorable references to the notion of State (13.89 per cent) than those which did not face the Independence Tribunals (4.70 per cent). These newspapers, however, after resuming publication did not deviate much from the average press.

TABLE 26- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'State' and 'Türk Devleti' (Turkish State)

	1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASFİR (1)	F	133	35.66					69	70.41	139	52.06
	U	61	16.35					0	0.00	24	8.99
	N	179	47.99					29	29.54	104	38.95
	T	373						98		267	
İKRAM (2)	F	164	40.39	249	55.83			430	71.07	386	83.55
	U	24	5.91	0	0.00			13	2.15	2	0.43
	N	218	53.69	197	44.17			162	26.78	74	16.02
	T	406		446				605		462	
VAKİT	F	79	33.05	849	95.82	757	84.77	505	85.74	579	76.08
	U	13	5.44	0	0.00	8	0.90	12	2.04	36	4.73
	N	147	61.51	37	4.18	128	14.33	72	12.22	146	19.19
	T	239		886		893		589		761	
TANİN(3)	F	144	56.25							187	46.29
	U	39	15.23							0	0.00
	N	73	28.32							217	53.71
	T	256								404	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	356	83.96	547	76.61	321	77.16	374	84.23	419	74.96
	U	0	0.00	4	0.56	0	1.44	24	5.41	16	2.86
	N	68	16.04	163	22.83	89	21.39	46	10.36	124	22.18
	T	424		714		416		444		559	
H. MİLLİYET ULUS	F	287	67.85	407	82.22	536	92.89	397	79.24	436	77.03
	U	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	1.60	4	0.71
	N	136	32.15	88	17.78	41	7.11	96	19.16	126	22.26
	T	423		495		577		501		566	
AKŞAM	F	83	65.35	483	78.79	297	75.00	302	72.25	349	68.84
	U	16	12.60	12	1.96	3	.76	16	3.83	9	1.78
	N	28	22.05	118	19.25	96	24.24	100	23.92	149	29.39
	T	127		613		396		418		507	
VATAN(5)	F	126	57.80					341	70.02	127	34.70
	U	22	10.09					29	5.95	6	1.64
	N	70	32.11					117	24.02	233	63.66
	T	218						487		366	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			200	56.98	354	80.82	274	73.46	309	76.49
	U			15	4.27	8	1.83	0	0.00	19	4.70
	N			136	38.75	76	17.35	99	26.54	76	18.81
	T			351		438		373		404	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							173	40.14	384	86.68
	U							17	3.94	3	0.68
	N							241	55.92	56	12.64
	T							431		443	
TOTAL	F	1372	55.64	2735	78.03	2265	83.27	2865	72.61	3315	69.95
	U	175	7.10	31	0.88	25	0.92	119	3.02	119	2.51
	N	919	37.27	739	21.08	430	15.81	962	24.38	1305	27.54
	T	2466		3505		2720		3946		4739	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

The Grand National Assembly convened in Ankara after the members of the Assembly of Deputies (Istanbul) were exiled to Malta by the British occupation forces, and soon afterwards, despite the frictions and factions within it, the Grand National Assembly became the most attractive symbol of the new regime. The government was referred to as the Assembly's Government, and the regular army was literally commanded by the Assembly. Although it never assumed the character of real center of political decision-making process(50), for the few elite members, the Assembly was what the new regime was all about. Consequently, its favorable treatment by the press increased as the regime consolidated its power (Table 27). Again, the average of unfavorable references by those newspapers which closed in 1925 (39.88 per cent) were higher than that of those which remained active (12.87 per cent). However, the high proportion of unfavorable references were probably due to the compulsorily published communiqués of the Istanbul government.

As one might derive from the analysis, another conclusion is that as the Assembly became the focal point of politics due to rising oppositions as new parties were about to be founded, the proportion of favorable references increased; however, during relatively quiet periods neutral references increased.

As stated earlier, the regular army, during the course of the war against the Greeks became the most valuable asset of the regime. The leaders of the regime, though they left their military duties as soon as the war was over, had a military background and the armed forces had always retained the power of veto(51). Newspapers' references to the Army were very favorable and high in number in the founding years of the regime (Table 28). In the ensuing years, as the armed forces gained the status of an established institution, half of the newspaper references became neutral. Almost all unfavorable references to the armed forces were about the

TABLE 27- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly)

		1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD (1) TASVİR	F	376	41.92					87	47.80	302	68.02
	U	496	55.30					2	1.10	18	4.05
	N	25	2.79					93	51.10	124	27.93
	T	897						182		444	
İKDAM (2)	F	289	52.93	376	58.93			161	60.75	428	74.31
	U	63	11.54	58	9.09			17	6.42	13	2.26
	N	194	35.53	204	31.97			87	32.83	135	23.44
	T	546		638				265		576	
VAKİT	F	481	53.56	394	46.30	463	73.26	524	71.98	476	76.53
	U	276	30.73	65	7.64	21	3.32	32	4.40	10	1.61
	N	141	15.70	392	46.06	148	23.42	172	23.63	136	21.86
	T	898		851		632		728		622	
TANIN (3)	F	128	25.86							23	19.17
	U	234	47.27							0	0.00
	N	133	26.87							97	80.83
	T	495								120	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	344	61.87	265	55.67	365	69.13	481	73.32	506	80.45
	U	38	6.83	14	2.94	19	3.60	11	1.68	21	3.34
	N	174	31.29	197	41.39	144	27.27	164	25.00	102	16.22
	T	556		476		528		656		629	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	289	45.95	486	72.32	512	77.69	598	79.63	541	82.47
	U	24	3.82	19	2.83	21	3.19	14	1.86	3	0.46
	N	316	50.24	167	24.85	126	19.12	139	18.51	112	17.07
	T	629		672		659		751		656	
AKŞAM	F	443	53.76	361	66.12	427	74.78	541	75.03	574	87.37
	U	94	11.41	46	8.42	23	4.03	16	2.22	10	1.52
	N	287	34.83	139	25.46	121	21.19	164	22.75	73	11.11
	T	824		546		571		721		657	
VATAN(5)	F	302	57.97					92	51.98	316	67.67
	U	89	17.08					9	5.08	24	5.14
	N	130	24.95					76	42.94	127	27.19
	T	521						177		467	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			316	59.40	442	80.95	504	88.27	536	92.89
	U			24	4.51	28	5.13	13	2.28	7	1.21
	N			192	36.09	76	13.92	54	9.46	34	5.89
	T			532		546		571		577	
Y.SABAHA (7)	F							211	54.24	357	71.54
	U							42	10.80	18	3.61
	N							136	34.96	124	24.85
	T							389		499	
TOTAL	F	2652	49.42	2198	59.17	2209	75.24	3199	72.05	4059	77.36
	U	1314	24.49	226	6.08	112	3.81	156	3.51	124	2.36
	N	1400	26.09	1291	34.75	651	20.95	1085	24.44	1064	20.28
	T	5366		3715		2936		4440		5247	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923; Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 28-- Sampled Newspaper Reference to Army, Armed Forces and its Branches.

		1290-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	1363	62.72					12	33.33	193	39.31
	U	439	20.20					0	0	17	3.46
	N	371	17.07					24	66.67	281	57.23
	T	2173						36		491	
İKRAM (2)	F	2819	82.98	296	86.80			57	34.55	141	33.25
	U	121	3.56	6	1.76			11	6.67	29	6.84
	N	457	13.45	39	11.44			97	58.79	254	59.91
	T	3397		341				165		424	
VAKİT	F	1219	68.06	187	40.48	224	49.34	196	43.27	122	26.64
	U	74	4.13	19	4.11	31	6.83	3	0.66	24	5.24
	N	498	27.81	256	55.41	199	43.83	254	56.07	312	68.12
	T	1791		462		454		453		458	
TANIN(3)	F	979	59.95							26	42.62
	U	257	15.74							0	0
	N	397	24.31							35	57.38
	T	1633								61	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	1447	86.85	202	37.20	257	55.15	138	69.70	96	40.51
	U	24	1.44	14	2.58	26	5.58	13	6.57	2	0.84
	N	195	11.70	327	60.22	183	39.27	47	23.74	139	58.65
	T	1666		543		466		198		237	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	1623	82.95	128	31.68	147	51.40	217	42.38	105	41.50
	U	47	2.40	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	0.78	12	4.74
	N	289	14.75	276	68.32	139	48.60	291	56.86	136	53.75
	T	1959		404		286		512		253	
AKŞAM	F	1174	86.83	95	40.08	124	57.14	143	59.58	93	32.29
	U	29	2.14	3	1.27	17	7.83	0	0.00	21	7.29
	N	149	11.02	139	58.65	76	35.02	97	40.42	174	60.42
	T	1352		237		217		240		288	
VATAN(5)	F	757	68.57					14	24.56	254	56.32
	U	28	2.54					0	0	33	7.32
	N	319	28.89					43	75.44	164	36.36
	T	1104						57		451	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			120	38.96	147	40.38	124	61.69	74	34.42
	U			27	8.77	33	9.07	21	10.45	13	6.05
	N			161	52.27	184	50.55	56	27.86	128	59.53
	T							201		215	
Y.SABAHA (7)	F							241	54.04	307	66.59
	U							33	7.40	20	4.34
	N							172	38.57	134	29.07
	T							446		461	
TOTAL	F	11381	75.50	1028	44.79	899	50.31	1142	49.48	1411	42.26
	U	1019	6.76	69	3.01	107	5.99	85	3.68	171	5.12
	N	2675	17.74	1198	52.20	781	43.70	1081	46.84	1757	52.62
	T	15075	17.74	2295	52.20	1787	43.7	2308		3339	

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1840-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

financial and other sources that they deserved but which were denied to them by others. It is worth noting that in beginning when the danger of a world war re-appeared, most of the references to the armed forces turned out to be favorable, and, with regard to their deprivations, references were definitely critical.

The Republican People's Party (RPP), soon after its own establishment, assumed the character of the main politicization agency(52); it became one of the symbols of the regime. Accordingly, both the number of favorable and neutral references in relation to unfavorable references was very high (Table 29). Again, the references to the RPP were comparatively more neutral during the opposition-party periods. In the same manner, the proportion of unfavorable references also increased. In the first years of the regime, the average percentage of unfavorable references of the Istanbul press (25.44 per cent) was five times higher than the Hakimiyeti Milliye's critical news and articles about the party. But in the 1930s it was only 3 times higher than Ulus' unfavorable references.

The word "republic" is perhaps the new regime's only symbol most commonly shared and internalized by the public(53); it is the only symbol-word which was almost never referred to in an unfavorable manner (less than 1 per cent of all references) (Table 30). However, the way it was proclaimed caused some unfavorable references in the first years; but later, only in 15 instances, was the republic unfavorably referred to. Again in all those instances the word was used in a sense critical of a permissive regime that deprived authorities of austere policies.

Among its limited and controlled mobilization policies, the regime, aiming to inculcate as many people as possible into behavior sanctioned by the regime, created such organi-

TABLE 29- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Republican People's Party

		1923-1927		1928-1932		1933-1937		1938-1942		1943-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	103	16.02					78	18.53	217	30.61
	U	224	34.83					49	11.64	93	13.12
	N	316	49.14					294	69.83	399	56.28
	T	643						421		709	
İKRAM (2)	F	276	45.77	347	48.26			134	26.91	16	15.53
	U	39	6.47	81	11.27			77	15.46	9	8.74
	N	289	47.76	291	40.47			287	57.63	78	75.73
	T	603		719				498		103	
VAKİT	F	363	49.52	439	53.21	398	45.75	287	35.48	371	44.70
	U	147	20.05	112	13.58	61	7.01	73	9.02	112	13.49
	N	223	30.42	274	33.21	411	47.24	449	55.50	347	41.81
	T	733		825		870		809		830	
TANIN (3)	F	87	18.24							161	30.67
	U	216	45.28							93	17.71
	N	174	36.48							271	51.62
	T	477								525	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	312	60.70	279	47.94	432	50.35	312	48.98	461	51.57
	U	29	5.64	16	2.75	44	5.13	31	4.87	121	13.53
	N	173	33.66	287	49.31	382	44.52	294	46.15	312	34.90
	T	514		582		858		637		894	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	427	58.49	533	56.52	604	62.85	547	68.29	595	63.84
	U	39	5.34	42	4.45	24	2.50	36	4.49	23	2.47
	N	264	36.16	368	39.02	333	34.65	218	27.22	314	33.69
	T	730		943		961		801		932	
AKŞAM	F	244	39.80	376	48.45	442	55.39	347	43.05	254	39.94
	U	93	15.17	82	10.57	67	8.40	72	8.93	88	13.84
	N	276	45.02	318	40.98	289	36.22	387	48.01	294	46.23
	T	613		776		798		806		636	
VATAN (5)	F	94	16.76					235	40.10	112	21.54
	U	173	30.84					39	6.66	102	19.62
	N	294	52.41					312	53.24	306	58.85
	T	561						586		520	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			421	55.25	306	43.90	296	38.44	344	54.17
	U			73	9.58	44	6.31	91	11.82	72	11.34
	N			268	35.17	347	49.78	383	49.74	219	34.49
	T			762		697		770		635	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							136	28.81	204	29.28
	U							43	9.11	100	14.60
	N							293	62.08	381	55.62
	T							472		685	
TOTAL	F	1906	39.10	2395	51.99	2182	52.15	2372	40.90	2735	42.28
	U	960	19.69	406	8.81	240	5.74	511	8.81	813	12.57
	N	2009	41.21	1806	39.20	1762	42.11	2917	50.29	2921	45.15
	T	4875		4607		4184		5800		6469	

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 30- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Republic'.

		1924-1928		1929-1933		1934-1938		1939-1943		1944-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	23	16.43					162	64.29		
	U	52	37.14					4	1.59		
	N	65	46.43					86	34.13		
	T	140						252			
İKDAM (2)	F	319	58.86					216	38.57		
	U	6	1.11					0	0		
	N	217	40.04					344	61.43		
	T	542						560			
VAKİT	F	445	66.32	312	58.21	304	60.58	353	77.58	214	81.99
	U	12	1.79	0	0	2	0.40	0	0	0	0
	N	214	31.89	224	41.79	196	39.04	102	22.42	47	18.0
	T	671		536		502		455		261	
TANİN(3)	F	19	15.83							169	66.27
	U	15	12.50							0	0
	N	86	71.67							86	33.73
	T	120								255	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	271	57.42	456	70.15	364	61.49	249	58.87	198	7.4
	U	4	.85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	197	41.74	194	29.85	228	38.51	174	41.13	135	5.91
	T	472		650		592		423		2284	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	332	62.88	264	38.15	342	58.06	403	67.62	144	40.00
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	196	37.12	428	61.85	247	41.94	193	32.38	216	60.00
	T	528		692		589		596		360	
AKŞAM	F	276	54.76	372	72.66	113	60.75	230	65.53	136	59.39
	U	14	2.78	6	1.17	0	0	3	0.85	0	0
	N	214	42.46	134	26.17	73	39.25	118	33.62	93	40.61
	T	504		512		186		351		229	
VATAN (5)	F	28	15.56					124	56.11	108	46.55
	U	13	7.22					0	0	0	0
	N	139	77.22					97	43.89	124	53.45
	T	180						221		232	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F	144	38.71	341	55.45	254	70.56	102	44.74	271	72.27
	U	4	1.08	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	224	60.22	274	44.55	106	29.44	126	55.26	104	27.73
	T	372		615		360		228		375	
YENİSABAH (7)	F					12	60.00	208	45.32	134	74.03
	U					0	0	0	0	0	0
	N					14	40.00	139	57.68	47	25.97
	T					35		347		181	
TOTAL	F	1857	52.62	1745	58.07	1398	61.75	2047	59.63	1374	61.73
	U	120	3.40	6	.20	2	0.09	7	0.20	0	0
	N	1552	43.98	1254	41.73	864	38.15	1379	40.17	852	38.27
	T	3529		3005		2264		3433		2226	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

zations as Turkish Hearths and People's Houses. Until the RPP fully assumed the role of a single politicizing agency in 1938, these organizations performed important political functions and, therefore, became regime-related symbols. The total favorable and neutral press references to these organizations were always higher than unfavorable references (Table 31). While those newspapers which unconditionally supported the regime blessed these institutions, some others were, to a limited extent, critical of them. The overall references of the press were mainly favorable; but the total number of references, or in other words their exaltation, was not as high as the number of some other symbols.

The most important mentality-related message of the regime was symbolized by the "Six Arrows" which came to be officially called Kemalism, with the addition in 1931 of Etatism and Revolutionism to the earlier four principles of Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism and Populism. Each and all of these principles were the most dynamic elements of the messages disseminated by the regime. However the total references of the press to these six symbol-words was not as high as one might expect (Table 32)(54). This was perhaps due to the fact that, despite their incorporation into the party regulations and the constitution, the regime never saw any ideological formulation as binding beyond a certain degree; each of the principles, therefore, did not receive press emphasis as much as, for example, what the army received. But the periods of increased impetus for generating ideology are marked with increased press references to the Six Arrows (1930-1932 and 1938-1940); during these periods one can easily see newspapers publishing statements of the party officials on party principles more than they did in the previous periods.

Legalism, as Linz points out(55), has also been one of the main characteristics of authoritarianism. Consequently in Turkey, even the Tribunals of Independence which in fact

TABLE 31- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Turkish Hearths and the People's Houses

		1924-1928		1929-1933		1934-1938		1939-1943		1944-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	12						5		4	
	U	19						0		0	
	N	7						24		11	
	T	38						29		15	
İKDAM (2)	F	34	55.74					29			
	U	0	0.0					2			
	N	27	44.26					16			
	T	61						47			
VAKİT	F	67	75.28	15	22.73	24		34	66.67	26	
	U	3	3.37	4	6.06	2		0	0.00	3	
	N	19	21.35	47	71.21	11		17	33.33	12	
	T	89		66		37		51		41	
TANIN(3)	F	2								3	
	U	24								0	
	N	18								14	
	T	44								17	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	54	73.97	76	41.99	83	88.30	21	41.18	6	
	U	0	0.00	3	1.66	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	
	N	19	26.03	102	56.35	11	11.70	30	58.82	13	
	T	73		181		94		51		19	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	47	88.68	64	71.11	31	40.26	54	81.82	16	
	U	0	0	0	0	4	5.19	0	0	2	
	N	6	11.32	26	28.89	42	54.55	12	18.18	26	
	T	53		90		77		66		44	
AKŞAM	F	15		41	53.95	15		14		3	
	U	3		0	0	4		0		0	
	N	24		35	46.05	29		26		16	
	T	42		76		48		40		19	
VATAN(5)	F	14						17		20	
	U	3						4		6	
	N	26						16		7	
	T	43						37		33	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F	2		34	50.75	16		29	52.73	13	
	U	0		8	11.94	0		2	3.64	0	
	N	34		25	37.31	31		24	43.64	6	
	T	36		67		47		55		19	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F					3		25	44.64	19	
	U					0		3	5.36	2	
	N					18		28	50.00	11	
	T					21		56		32	
TOTAL	F	247	51.57	230	47.92	172	53.09	228	52.78	110	46.03
	U	52	10.86	15	3.13	10	3.09	11	2.55	13	5.44
	N	180	37.58	235	48.96	142	43.83	193	44.68	116	48.54
	T	479		480		324		432		239	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 32- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Six Arrows and the 'Party Principles'

	1923-1927		1928-1932		1933-1937		1938-1942		1943-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	17	23.29					161	61.69	105	54.69
	U	29	39.73					11	4.21	24	12.50
	N	27	36.99					89	34.10	63	32.81
	T	73						261		192	
İKDAM (2)	F	141	55.95					249	56.21		
	U	35	13.89					Ø	Ø		
	N	76	30.16					194	43.79		
	T	252						443			
VAKİT	F	204	57.30	344	56.49	634	78.27	398	66.67	257	69.08
	U	16	4.49	21	3.45	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	19	12.50
	N	136	38.20	244	40.07	176	21.73	199	33.33	28	18.42
	T	356		609		810		597		152	
TANIN (3)	F	43	33.08							68	53.13
	U	76	58.46							31	24.22
	N	11	8.46							29	22.66
	T	130								128	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	441	70.56	376	56.71	289	60.46	347	61.63	416	73.63
	U	21	3.36	Ø	Ø	3	0.63	Ø	Ø	8	1.42
	N	163	26.08	287	43.29	186	38.91	216	38.37	141	24.96
	T	625	26.08	287	43.29	186	38.91	216	38.37	141	24.96
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	619	70.34	1214	80.08	744	84.26	689	79.65	435	63.13
	U	14	1.59	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
	N	247	28.07	302	19.92	199	15.74	176	20.35	254	36.87
	T	880		1516		883		865		689	
AKŞAM	F	354	62.43	408	77.57	524	81.24	547	86.28	244	52.70
	U	19	3.35	22	4.18	13	2.02	Ø	Ø	26	5.62
	N	194	34.22	96	18.25	108	16.74	87	13.72	193	41.68
	T	567		526		645		634		463	
VATAN (5)	F	89	35.89					124	52.54	107	54.31
	U	35	14.11					7	2.97	43	21.83
	N	124	50.00					105	44.49	47	23.86
	T	248						236		197	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F	84	45.16	219	54.89	387	63.67	412	79.69	63	46.32
	U	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
	N	102	54.84	180	45.11	207	33.88	105	20.31	44	32.35
	T	186		399		611		517		136	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							103	59.54	82	55.78
	U							7	4.05	16	10.88
	N							63	36.42	49	33.33
	T							173		147	
TOTAL	F	1992	60.05	25.61	68.97	2580	75.28	3030	70.65	1625	60.80
	U	245	7.39	43	1.16	31	0.90	25	0.58	196	7.34
	N	1080	32.56	1109	20.87	816	23.81	1234	28.77	848	31.77
	T	3317		3713		3427		4289		2669	

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- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

functioned in accordance with "revolutionary legality" were established by law. The words kanun (law) and kanunî (legal) are perhaps the most frequently used ones in Mustafa Kemal's speeches. However, the words nizam (order), intizam (regularity), asayiş (internal peace), inzibat (discipline) have always been used in relation to law and legality. Newspapers' emphasis of these notions demonstrated a similarity to the official usage of them (Table 33). Some newspapers, before the Kemalists' consolidation of power, referred to law and order of Kemalists unfavorably. The Ankara newspapers and those which later gave full support to the regime always favorably referred to these notions. The lack of law and order was never emphasized. As the regime approached its final days, newspapers' criticism of what they saw as distorted or reversed legality did also increase. But, in an over-all sense, the press' dissemination of the symbols of law and order was seemingly satisfactory.

The understanding of a populace composed of religious communities (cemaats) was replaced with the concept of a nation composed of Turks. The regime's one other symbol was nation (millet, ulus). These words were usually used with exaltative adjectives as asil (noble) and necib (distinguished). Newspapers usage of the notion of nation was also favorable (Table 34). Those for whom the idea of nation was rather a novelty referred to it unfavorably. Later some others' critical view of Turks regarding their backwardness, idleness, etc., resulted in very few unfavorable references. But the sheer number of favorable references to the notion and repetition of the word was satisfactory from the regime's point of view.

The concepts of country and fatherland were also novel ideas for Turks. During the Ottoman centuries many lands were added to the Empire but none of them was regarded as the fatherland of the nation. Since the early days of the regime,

TABLE 33- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Notion of 'Law and Order'

		1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	347	51.79					19	40.43	279	89.14
	U	69	10.39					Ø	Ø	16	5.11
	N	254	37.91					28	59.57	198	5.75
	T	670						47		313	
İKDAM (2)	F	468	78.13	349	59.56			407	79.34	311	59.92
	U	42	7.01	20	3.41			Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
	N	89	14.86	217	37.03			106	20.66	208	40.08
	T	599		586				513		519	
VAKİT	F	265	53.43	427	78.06	326	66.26	374	75.71	262	75.94
	U	84	16.94	6	1.10	2	0.41	Ø	Ø	14	4.06
	N	147	29.64	114	20.84	164	33.33	120	24.29	69	20
	T	496		547		492		494		345	
TANIN (3)	F	199	44.82							96	37.80
	U	29	6.53							21	8.27
	N	216	48.65							137	53.94
	T	444								254	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	396	62.07	456	58.31	287	63.78	347	62.19	291	67.05
	U	25	3.92	12	1.53	Ø	Ø	7	1.25	Ø	Ø
	N	217	34.01	314	40.15	163	36.22	204	36.56	143	32.95
	T	638		782		450		558		434	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	402	50.25	622	60.33	535	71.14	673	86.73	408	72.99
	U	24	3	11	1.07	16	2.13	Ø	Ø	3	0.54
	N	374	46.75	398	38.60	201	26.73	103	13.27	148	26.48
	T	800		1031		752		776		559	
AKŞAM	F	294	46.30	144	32.88	374	64.04	247	76	173	56.17
	U	19	2.99	Ø	Ø	14	2.4	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø
	N	322	50.71	294	67.12	196	33.56	78	24	135	43.83
	T	635		438		584		325		308	
VATAN (5)	F	135	28.66					134	51.74	254	62.25
	U	49	10.40					Ø	Ø	47	11.52
	N	287	60.93					125	48.26	107	26.23
	T	471						259		408	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			258	55.13	342	62.64	447	71.41	386	64.33
	U			14	2.99	Ø	Ø	16	2.56	Ø	Ø
	N			196	41.88	204	37.36	163	26.04	214	35.67
	T							626		600	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							208	56.52	195	49.87
	U							24	6.52	13	3.32
	N							136	36.96	183	46.80
	T							368		391	
TOTAL	F	2506	52.72	2256	58.57	1864	66.01	2856	72.01	2655	64.27
	U	341	7.17	63	1.64	32	1.13	47	1.19	114	2.76
	N	1906	40.10	1533	39.80	928	32.86	1063	26.80	1362	32.97
	T	4753		3852		2824		3966		4131	

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 34- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the 'Nation'

	1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	535	61.14				124	66.31	1439	84.40	
	U	216	14.40				0	0	47	2.76	
	N	214	24.46				63	33.69	219	1284	
	T	875					187		1705		
İKRAM (2)	F	1224	76.12	1463	77.37		244	54.83	373	54.45	
	U	73	4.54	19	1.00		7	1.57	19	2.77	
	N	311	19.34	409	21.63		194	43.60	293	42.77	
	T	1608		1891			445		685		
VAKİT	F	773	72.58	1339	89.15	1743	77.26	1446	78.42	1649	75.89
	U	18	1.69	24	1.60	41	1.82	37	2.01	28	1.29
	N	274	25.73	139	9.25	472	20.92	361	19.58	496	22.83
	T	1065		1502		2256		7844		2173	
TANIN (3)	F	630	74.38						335	55.37	
	U	87	10.27						25	4.13	
	N	130	15.35						245	40.50	
	T	847							605		
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	994	71.72	1619	84.72	1537	87.38	1783	84.90	1697	80.54
	U	19	1.37	5	0.26	19	1.08	39	1.86	41	1.95
	N	373	26.91	287	15.02	203	11.54	278	13.24	396	17.51
	T	1386		1911		1759		2100		2107	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	1435	82.80	1234	75.02	1664	84.47	1427	80.80	1724	86.94
	U	25	1.44	13	0.79	28	1.42	12	0.68	22	1.11
	N	273	15.75	398	24.19	278	14.11	327	18.52	237	11.95
	T	1733		1645		1970		1766		1983	
AKŞAM	F	739	68.49	1437	73.58	1220	77.56	1624	83.58	1400	77.52
	U	46	4.26	25	1.28	34	2.16	43	2.21	21	1.16
	N	294	27.25	491	25.14	319	20.28	276	14.20	385	21.32
	T	1079		1953		1573		1943		1806	
VATAN (5)	F	1327	76.00					139	56.50	1802	91.66
	U	95	5.44					5	2.03	29	1.48
	N	324	18.56					102	41.46	135	6.87
	T	1746						246		1966	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			839	70.56	1440	75.95	987	73.38	1027	70.34
	U			33	2.78	24	1.27	11	0.82	21	1.44
	N			317	26.66	432	22.78	347	25.80	412	28.22
	T			1189		1896		1345		1460	
YENİSABAH (7)	F							302	55.93	939	72.23
	U							21	3.89	17	1.31
	N							217	40.19	344	26.46
	T							540		1300	
TOTAL	F	7657	74.06	7931	78.59	7604	80.43	8076	77.53	12385	78.44
	U	489	4.73	119	1.18	146	1.54	175	1.68	270	1.71
	N	2193	21.21	2041	20.23	1704	18.02	2165	20.79	3135	19.85
	T	10339		10091		9954		10416		15790	

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

Kemalists established their power on the idea of defense of the country. The concept, therefore, acquired a sacred connotation. Accordingly the words vatan, yurt (country), anavatan, anayurt (fatherland) were almost always referred to favorably (Table 35). Unfavorable references, though very few, existed but they were usually made in relation to the lands lost to neighboring countries. Lack of transportation facilities and construction activities were also among the reasons for unfavorable references made to the idea of country.

The very bases of the new regime were national independence and national sovereignty. The political power of the Sultan was transferred to the National Assembly on the basis that sovereignty unconditionally belonged to the nation. These two concepts, which in fact are used interchangeably, became very important symbols for the regime and they were treated as such by the press (Table 36). Those newspapers still under the Sultan's control, kept referring to them unfavorably during the War of Independence; but following the victory, unfavorable references to these concepts disappeared and almost all the newspapers referred to them positively. During the Hatay crisis both favorable and neutral repetition of the words increased; but in general they had a constant frequency of repetition.

The very existence of ethnic groups, despite the official denial of them, forced the regime to disseminate a special value: national unity. Another most frequently used word group-third after the words nation and country-was composed of those about national unity: milli birlik (national unity), millî beraberlik (national togetherness), millî bütünlük (national entity) and vatanın bütünlüğü (country's entirety) (Table 37). Again, when negative references of some newspapers to these words because of their hostility to the source of the idea were stopped right after the War of Independence, almost all use of them was favorable. The idea of

TABLE 35- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the 'Country'

	1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	1154	83.38					1231	72.03	939	73.53
	U	16	1.16					6	0.35	21	1.64
	N	214	15.46					472	27.62	317	24.82
	T	1384	15.46					1709	27.62	1277	24.82
İKRAM (2)	F	1254	85.95	1164	88.79			306	63.49	1227	83.24
	U	6	.41	0	0			0	0	13	0.88
	N	199	13.64	147	11.21			176	36.51	234	15.88
	T	1459		1311				482		1474	
VAKİT	F	1344	80.85	1472	86.64	1241	90.45	1330	91.66	1147	81.81
	U	4	.24	14	0.8	0	0	0	0	8	0.57
	N	312	18.91	213	12.54	131	9.55	121	8.34	247	17.62
	T	1650		1699		1372		1451		1402	
TANIN (3)	F	1463	83.74							241	63.42
	U	0	0							0	0
	N	284	16.26							139	36.58
	T	1747								380	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	1632	85.71	1442	77.32	1552	87.39	1587	84.33	1693	84.10
	U	0	0	9	.48	0	0	14	0.74	10	.50
	N	272	14.29	414	22.20	224	12.61	281	14.93	310	15.40
	T	1904		1865		1776		1882		2013	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	1814	90.43	1928	77.93	1732	84.00	1795	86.76	1206	85.90
	U	0	0	14	0.57	9	0.44	0	0	4	.28
	N	192	9.57	532	21.50	321	15.57	274	13.24	194	13.82
	T	2006		2474		2062		2069		1404	
AKŞAM	F	1347	84.29	1174	77.85	1436	81.92	1221	79.44	1387	82.86
	U	9	0.56	0	0	19	1.08	0	0	11	.66
	N	242	15.14	334	22.15	298	17.00	316	20.56	276	16.49
	T	1598		1508		1753		1537		1674	
VATAN (5)	F	1521	85.40					107	71.33	1334	84.12
	U	12	0.67					8	5.33	0	0
	N	248	13.92					35	23.33	214	15.88
	T	1781						150		1348	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			489	59.20	1172	79.57	949	73.31	1226	88.46
	U			0	0	14	0.95	24	1.87	31	2.24
	N			337	40.80	287	19.48	319	24.82	129	9.31
	T			826		1473		1285		1386	
YENİSABAH (7)	F							274	60.62	1304	84.57
	U							11	2.43	24	1.56
	N							167	36.95	214	13.88
	T							452		1542	
TOTAL	F	11519	85.14	7669	79.20	7133	84.55	8793	79.81	11504	82.76
	U	47	0.35	37	0.38	42	0.50	63	0.57	122	.88
	N	1963	14.51	1977	20.42	1261	14.95	2161	19.62	2274	16.36
	T	13529		9683		8436		11017		13900	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. it was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923; Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; it name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 36- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'National Independence' and 'National Sovereignty'

	1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	176	40.74					29		201	50.89
	U	39	9.03					0		0	0
	N	217	50.23					15		194	49.11
	T	432	50.23					44		395	
İKDAM (2)	F	398	70.94	457	87.88			139	39.04	102	84.30
	U	0	0	0	0			0	0	0	0
	N	163	29.06	63	12.12			217	60.96	19	15.70
	T	561		520				356		121	
VAKİT	F	432	61.84	374	69.65	581	74.49	461	69.32	210	52.37
	U	14	2.05	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	247	36.11	163	30.35	199	25.51	204	30.68	191	47.63
	T	684		537		780		665		401	
TANIN (3)	F	214	56.76							61	76.25
	U	26	6.90							0	0
	N	137	36.34							19	23.75
	T	377								80	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	412	78.33	514	80.56	472	77.25	661	78.50	371	79.44
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	114	21.67	124	19.44	139	22.75	181	21.50	96	20.56
	T	526		638		611		842		467	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	339	56.88	296	118.52	527	80.09	447	67.62	344	81.52
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	257	43.12	314	51.48	131	19.91	214	32.38	78	18.48
	T	596		610		658		661		422	
AKŞAM	F	246	63.90	461	78.80	345	77.18	498	78.80	247	72.65
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	139	36.10	124	21.20	102	22.82	134	21.20	93	27.35
	T	385		585		447		632		340	
VATAN (5)	F	254	68.10					294	64.05	287	86.71
	U	0	0					0	0	0	0
	N	119	31.90					165	35.95	44	13.29
	T	373						459		331	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			283	59.33	581	72.81	327	78.23	263	77.58
	U			0	0	3	0.38	0	0	0	0
	N			194	40.67	214	26.82	91	21.77	76	22.42
	T			477		798		418		339	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							207	54.76	114	47.30
	U							0	0	0	0
	N							171	45.24	127	52.70
	T							378		241	
TOTAL	F	2462	62.58	2385	70.83	2506	76.08	3063	68.75	2200	70.13
	U	79	2.01	0	0	3	.09	0	0	0	0
	N	1393	35.41	982	29.17	785	23.83	1392	31.25	937	29.81
	T	3934		3367		3294		4455		3137	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 37- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'National Unity'

		1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD (1) TASVİR	F	1335	87.94					217	34.66	1618	88.17
	U	49	3.23					16	2.56	0	0
	N	134	8.83					393	62.78	217	11.83
	T	1518						626		1835	
İKDAM (2)	F	1847	91.75	2435	86.07			347	55.97	219	33.28
	U	63	3.13	0	0			0	0	0	0
	N	103	5.12	394	13.93			473	14.03	439	66.72
	T	2013		2829				620		658	
VAKİT	F	935	75.77	2080	93.94	1419	78.48	2114	84.16	1286	90.56
	U	26	2.11	0	0	13	0.72	0	0	0	0
	N	273	22.12	134	6.05	376	20.80	398	15.84	134	9.44
	T	1234		2214		1808		2512		1420	
TANIN (3)	F	945	72.80							204	39.08
	U	39	3.00							0	0
	N	314	24.19							318	60.92
	T	1298									
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	1804	88.13	1402	76.40	1884	87.22	614	59.79	571	72.28
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	243	11.87	433	23.60	276	12.78	413	40.21	219	27.72
	T	2047		1835		2160		1027		790	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	1620	54.73	2836	81.61	1933	66.45	2413	76.36	1702	91.26
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	1340	45.27	639	18.39	976	33.55	747	23.64	163	8.74
	T	2960		3475		2909		3160		1865	
AKŞAM	F	793	71.70	1993	85.17	2404	89.90	1736	48.74	614	66.16
	U	19	1.72	0	0	0	0	7	0.20	0	0
	N	294	26.58	347	14.83	270	10.10	1819	51.07	314	33.84
	T	1106		2340		2674		3562		928	
VATAN (5)	F	1347	80.85					1273	63.11	911	98.27
	U	13	0.78					0	0	0	0
	N	306	18.37					737	36.54	16	1.73
	T	1666						2017		927	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			2476	72.33	1336	73.61	1402	81.89	293	47.72
	U			0	0	0	0	7	0.41	0	0
	N			947	27.67	479	26.39	303	17.70	321	52.28
	T			3423		1815		1712		614	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							312	30.41	619	92.94
	U							0	0	0	0
	N							714	69.59	47	7.06
	T							1026		666	
TOTAL	F	10626	76.77	13222	82.04	8976	78.97	10428	64.12	8037	78.60
	U	209	1.51	0	0	13	0.1	37	0.23	0	0
	N	3007	21.72	2894	17.96	2377	20.91	5797	35.65	2188	21.40
	T	13842		16116		11366		16262		10225	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

autonomous ethnic groups, however, got a few references in the press, but they did not even become exceptions to the rule. Especially during the period of regional rebellions against the central governments newspapers' reference to these words reached an all-time high score. Again during the Hatay crisis and World War II, newspapers' repetition of the words increased rapidly.

Another value the regime sought to disseminate was similar to unity sought for the ethnic groups: national solidarity. The regime thought of itself as supra-classes and of the party and Assembly as the sole mechanism for interest aggregation and interest articulation. Those masses, forced to seek their interests through the limited political instruments, were in need of certain values. The inter-class solidarity was to be realized with the help of the masses sharing this way of thinking. The symbol-word tesanüd (solidarity) (sometimes millî tesanüt-national solidarity), therefore, became one of the frequently repeated symbols in the press (Table 38). Although only very few unfavorable references were observed in the first years, later no unfavorable reference was made to the idea. But in the late 1940s, Vatan, consciously criticizing what it saw as the compulsory inter-class peace, began demanding collective bargaining and unfavorably referring to the concept(56). Although the number of repetition of the related words was not as high as the regime might have liked it to be, the absence of any unfavorable reference to the words gave the concept they represented a very important social value.

One of the policy objectives determined very early on was to make Turkey a member of the modern civilization. Mustafa Kemal, as early as 1919, declared his desire for this; and henceforth, terakkiyatı asriyye (contemporary progress) and muasır medeniyet seviyesi (the level of contemporary civilization) of the Western world became the primary targets

TABLE 38- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'National Solidarity'

		1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	63	76.83					22		42	72.41
	U	0	0					0		0	0
	N	19	23.17					11		16	27.59
	T	82						33		58	
İKDAM(2)	F	72	63.72	63	79.75			12		34	
	U	0	0	0	0			0		0	
	N	41	36.28	16	20.25			4		13	
	T	113		79				16		47	
VAKİT	F	37	69.81	13		32	62.75	49	46.23	16	
	U	2	3.77	0		0	0	0	0	0	
	N	14	26.42	17		19	37.25	57	53.77	17	
	T	53		30		51		106		33	
TANIN(3)	F	21								7	
	U	0								0	
	N	16								13	
	T	37								20	
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	78	85.71	69	70.41	71	67.62	83	62.88	52	50.49
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	13	14.29	29	29.59	34	32.38	49	37.12	51	49.51
	T	91		98		105		132		103	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	18	34.62	44	45.36	63	56.25	96	88.07	73	80.22
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	34	65.38	53	54.64	49	43.75	13	11.93	18	19.78
	T	52		97		112		109		91	
AKŞAM	F	44	70.97	34		21		36	70.59	39	59.09
	U	0	0	0		0		0	0	0	0
	N	18	29.03	13		27		15	29.41	27	40.91
	T	62		47		48		51		66	
VATAN(5)	F	11						36	57.14	43	47.25
	U	0						0	0	14	15.38
	N	4						27	42.86	34	37.36
	T	15						63		91	
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F			47	67.14	35	44.30	21	28.77	12	
	U			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	N			23	32.86	44	55.70	52	71.23	4	
	T			70		79		73		16	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							28	28.28	22	34.38
	U							0	0	8	12.50
	N							71	71.72	34	53.13
	T							99		64	
TOTAL	F	344	68.12	270	64.13	222	56.20	383	56.16	340	57.72
	U	2	.40	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	3.74
	N	159	31.49	151	35.87	173	43.80	299	43.84	227	38.54
	T	505		421		395		682		589	

(1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.

(2) For 1940-1942 only

(3) For 1943 only

(4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards

(5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only

(6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936

(7) From 1938 onwards.

of the governments and intellectuals. If some newspapers, in the early 1920s, referred unfavorably to the western world as a result of the war being fought against it by Turks, this hostility was put aside from the early phases of the consolidation of power, and these values were always praised by the press well up to the end of the one-party regime (Table 39). Although the frequency of the repetition of the words was quite low, being always favorable, each usage of the words helped make the conception a social value. One noteworthy fact is that while the proportion of favorable references gradually decreased, the number of neutral references which in fact consisted of direct quotations of political personalities, increased.

The press treatment of certain issues which were either first expressed by the Kemalists or acted upon by the political elite in the first years is especially important because the regime's formative guidance could thus be disseminated to the lesser elites. Four concepts tightly related to the armed struggle the Kemalists were preparing for, were Kuvayi Milliye (National Forces, the Anatolian Army), Müdafai Hukuku Milli (Defense of National Rights), Reddi İlhak (Rejection of Annexation) and Asayışı Tam (Total internal order and quiet). These four symbol-words have always been referred to favorably in the press (Tables 40-43). Again those newspapers opposing the idea of armed forces but supporting the idea that the British could influence other Allied Forces in favor of Turkey, were referred to these concepts quite unfavorably. But, first gradually, and, after the Allied troops left Istanbul to the Ankara government, in a more determined way, these newspapers gave up their anti-Ankara attitudes and began praising, or at least neutrally quoting, them. But over-all rate of unfavorable reference was too small to make them appear to the public as important political values.

Two other examples demonstrate the fact that when

TABLE 39- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Contemporary Civilization'

		1920-1924		1925-1929		1930-1934		1935-1940		1941-1946	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD TASVİR (1)	F	11						19	44.19	42	56.00
	U	24						0	0	0	0
	N	0						24	55.81	33	44.00
	T	35						43		75	
İKRAM (2)	F	25		47	66.20			33	73.33	19	
	U	0		0	0			0	0	0	
	N	22		24	33.80			12	26.67	4	
	T	47		71				45		23	
VAKİT	F	38	55.07	31	53.45	39	35.45	94	78.99	25	16.78
	U	6	8.70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	25	36.23	27	46.55	71	64.55	25	21.01	124	83.22
	T	69		58		110		119		149	
TANIN(3)	F	19								16	
	U	7								0	
	N	21								22	
	T	47								38	
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	39		74	69.16	62	81.58	54	39.13	79	63.71
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0		33	30.84	14	18.42	84	60.87	45	36.29
	T	39		107		76		138		124	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	44		177	83.10	207	93.67	121	63.68	60	45.80
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	3		36	16.90	78	6.33	69	36.32	71	54.20
	T	47		213		221		190		131	
AKŞAM	F	24		19	26.76	14	12.96	44	48.35	35	58.33
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0		52	73.24	94	87.04	47	51.65	25	41.67
	T	24		71		108		91		60	
VATAN (5)	F	6						35	64.81	127	81.94
	U	2						0	0	0	0
	N	14						19	35.19	28	18.06
	T	22						54		155	
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F			24		25	34.72	17	17.00	49	34.75
	U			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N			19		47	65.28	83	83.00	92	65.25
	T			43		72		100		141	
YENİ SABAH (7)	F							25		98	64.47
	U							0		0	0
	N							4		54	35.53
	T							29		152	
TOTAL	F	206	62.42	372	66.07	347	59.11	442	54.64	550	52.48
	U	39	11.82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	85	25.76	191	33.93	240	40.89	367	45.36	498	47.52
	T	330		563		587		809		1048	

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 40- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Kuvayi Milliye' (National Forces)

		1920		1921		1922		1923	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD	F	4	4.60	29	32.22	133	64.25	149	44.21
	U	69	79.31	26	28.89	49	23.67	14	4.15
	N	14	16.09	35	38.89	25	12.08	174	51.63
	T	87		90		207		337	
İKDAM	F	12		137	85.63	250	66.84	347	67.91
	U	4		0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	0		23	14.38	124	33.16	164	32.09
	T	16		160		374		511	
VAKİT	F	19		96	43.64	173	71.49	254	44.33
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	17		124	56.36	69	28.51	319	55.67
	T	36		220		242		573	
TANİN	F	3		35	29.91	47	30.92	112	62.22
	U	24		19	16.24	33	21.71	21	11.67
	N	8		63	53.85	72	47.37	47	26.11
	T	35		117		152		180	
YENİGÜN	F	247	83.45	385	75.34	271	70.39	421	66.09
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	49	16.55	126	24.66	114	29.61	216	33.91
	T	296		511		385		637	
H. MİLLİYE	F	324	83.72	635	93.11	502	73.07	721	88.47
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	63	16.28	47	6.89	185	26.93	94	11.53
	T	387		682		687		815	
AKŞAM	F	24		150	67.26	144	36.27	354	64.84
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	23		73	32.74	253	63.73	192	35.16
	T	47		223		397		546	
VATAN(1)	F					173	44.70	392	68.65
	U					0	0	0	0
	N					214	55.30	179	31.35
	T					387		571	
TOTAL	F	633	70.02	1467	73.24	1693	59.80	2750	65.95
	U	97	10.73	45	2.25	82	2.90	35	.84
	N	174	19.25	491	24.51	1056	37.30	1385	33.21
	T	904		2003		2831		4170	
	F								
	U								
	N								
	T								
	F								
	U								
	N								
	T								

(1) From 1922 onwards.

TABLE 41- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Müdafai Hukuku Milli' (Defense of National Rights)

	1920		1921		1922		1923				
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TANIN	F	4		32	42.67	19	24.36	96	50.26		
	U	26		19	25.33	24	30.77	3	1.57		
	N	0		24	32.00	35	44.87	92	48.17		
	T	30		75		78		191			
İKDAM	F	36	65.45	124	66.31	173	67.32	294	75.97		
	U	0	0	6	3.21	0	0	0	0		
	N	19	34.55	57	30.48	84	32.68	93	24.03		
	T	55		187		257		387			
VAKİT	F	27		251	66.93	247	67.86	312	83.65		
	U	3		0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	19		124	33.07	117	32.14	61	16.35		
	T	49		375		364		373			
TANIN	F	6		47	54.65	62	75.61	78	66.67		
	U	19		13	15.12	17	20.73	10	8.55		
	N	3		26	30.23	3	3.66	29	24.79		
	T	28		86		82		117			
YENİGÜN	F	421	87.16	372	76.86	419	75.09	524	76.50		
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	62	12.84	112	23.14	139	24.91	161	23.50		
	T	483		484		558		685			
H. MİLLİYE	F	386	72.83	459	86.44	427	81.49	594	85.34		
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	144	27.17	72	13.56	97	18.51	102	14.66		
	T	530		531		524		696			
AKŞAM	F	21		98	44.14	219	53.16	196	61.25		
	U	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	14		124	55.86	193	46.84	124	38.75		
	T	35		222		412		320			
VATAN (1)	F					224	61.54	319	68.90		
	U					4	1.10	0	0		
	N					136	37.36	144	31.10		
	T					364		144			
TOTAL	F	901	74.46	1383	70.56	1790	67.83	2413	74.66		
	U	48	3.97	38	1.94	45	1.71	13	0.40		
	N	261	21.57	539	27.50	804	30.47	806	24.94		
	T	1210		1960		2639		3232			
	F										
	U										
	N										
	T										
	F										
	U										
	N										
	T										

(1) From 1922 onwards.

TABLE 42- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Reddi İlhak' (Anti-Annexation)

		1920		1921		1922		1923		
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİD	F	14		43	60.56	15		6		
	U	0		4	5.63	0		0		
	N	32		24	33.80	3		12		
	T	46		71		18		18		
İKDAM	F	61	59.22	12		8		19		
	U	0	0	0		0		0		
	N	42	40.78	6		26		0		
	T	103	40.26	18		37		19		
VAKİT	F	31	2.60	24		13		4		
	U	2	57.14	2		0		0		
	N	44		13		0		0		
	T	77		39		13		4		
TANİN	F	3		27		3		0		
	U	0		6		0		0		
	N	0		0		11		29		
	T	3		33		14		29		
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET	F	47		19		31		25		
	U	0		0		0		0		
	N	0		24		10		4		
	T	47		43		41		29		
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	16		44	69.84	20		26		
	U	0		0	0	0		0		
	N	22		19	30.16	3		0		
	T	38		63		23		26		
AKŞAM	F	31		31		41		19		
	U	0		0		0		0		
	N	12		14		2		8		
	T	43		27		43		27		
VATAN (1)	F					3		8		
	U					0		0		
	N					18		4		
	T					21		12		
TOTAL	F	203	56.86	182	61.90	134	63.81	107	65.24	
	U	2	0.56	12	4.08	26	12.38	0	0	
	N	152	42.58	100	34.01	50	23.81	57	34.76	
	T	357								
	F									
	U									
	N									
	T									
	F									
	U									
	N									
	T									

(1) From 1922 onwards.

praised by the elite some symbols were favorably referred to and when condemned or left to stagnate by the elite, they were unfavorably treated by the press. Mustafa Kemal praised the Sultanate(57) and until it was abolished in 1924 he talked of the Caliphate very favorably. But right after their respective abolitions the official attitude became very critical of these institutions, especially, of the Sultanate and last sultans. Accordingly, the concept of tahlisi hilafet ve saltanat (salvation of caliphate and sultanate) from the enemy occupation and other related words, titles and names(58) were among the ones most favorably referred to in 1920 and 1921 (Table 43). After the Sultanate was abolished in 1922, favorable treatment went to the Caliph and unfavorable treatment to the Sultanate and sultans. Again when the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 the Caliph was also added to those receiving unfavorable treatment from the press.

Another example in this regard is the usage of the words demokrat and demokrasi (democratic, democracy). In 1924, when Mustafa Kemal uttered the word publicly for the first time, newspapers whose frequency of repetition of the word in the previous year was almost nil began using the word more frequently (Table 45). During the second opposition party episode the words briefly gained importance once again but then were almost forgotten.

D. Who Is First

The final area where the political connections of the mass media are measured has relation to "agenda-setting" studies that have played such an important part in studying communication effects(59). But what this research is interested in here concerns the order of precedence in setting the issues which later become subject to the political decision-making process. In other words, here the focus of attention is shifted away from the positive or negative

TABLE 44- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Tahlisi Saltanat' (Salvation of the Sultanate) and 'Tahlisi Hilafet' (Salvation of Caliphate)

		1920		1921		1922		1923		1924	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİD	F	374	65.85	426	85.54	201	51.15	41	34.75	71	28.86
	U	0	0	0	0	78	19.85	63	53.39	82	33.33
	N	194	34.15	72	14.46	114	29.01	14	11.86	93	37.80
	T	568		498		393		118		246	
İKRAM	F	216	43.99	193	51.60	69	29.49	28	20.74	9	10.59
	U	0	0	0	0	103	44.02	94	69.63	35	41.18
	N	275	56.01	181	48.40	62	26.50	13	9.63	41	48.24
	T	491		374		234		135		85	
VAKİT	F	284	57.03	351	72.97	47	24.74	21	10.88	16	8.56
	U	0	0	0	0	124	65.26	99	51.30	103	55.08
	N	214	42.97	130	27.03	19	10.00	73	37.82	68	36.36
	T	498		481		190		193		187	
TANİN	F	401	91.97	344	73.66	102	35.79	119	67.61	98	62.03
	U	0	0	0	0	19	6.67	42	23.86	37	23.42
	N	35	8.03	123	26.34	164	57.54	15	8.52	23	14.56
	T	436		467		285		176		158	
YENİGÜN	F	69	39.40	53	50.96	24	12.24	16	13.45	5	2.33
	U	12	0	19	18.27	147	75.00	63	52.94	191	88.84
	N	94	53.71	32	30.77	25	12.76	40	33.61	19	8.84
	T	175		104		196		119		215	
H.MİLLİYE	F	78	64.46	121	57.62	19	6.88	28	11.81	23	9.47
	U	9	7.44	16	7.62	255	92.39	194	81.86	176	72.43
	N	34	28.10	73	34.76	2	0.72	15	6.33	44	18.11
	T	121		210		276		237		243	
AKŞAM	F	241	82.25	194	82.91	21	20.39	10	10.31	13	4.51
	U	0	0	0	0	49	47.57	73	75.26	214	74.31
	N	52	17.75	40	17.09	33	32.04	14	14.43	61	21.18
	T	293		234		103		97		288	
VATAN(1)	F					12	22.64	41	19.81	9	8.82
	U					16	30.19	130	62.80	76	74.51
	N					25	47.17	36	17.39	17	16.67
	T					53		207		102	
TOTAL	F	1663	64.41	1682	71.03	495	28.61	304	23.71	244	16.01
	U	21	0.81	35	1.48	791	45.72	758	59.13	914	59.97
	N	898	34.78	651	27.49	444	25.66	220	17.16	366	24.02
	T	2582		2368		1730		1282		1524	
	F										
	U										
	N										
	T										
	F										
	U										
	N										
	T										

(1) From 1922 onwards.

TABLE 45- Sampled Newspaper Reference to 'Demokrasi' (Democracy) and 'Demokrat' (Democratic)

		1923		1924		1925		1930		1931		1932	
		N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
TEVHİT (1)	F	0		6		14							
	U	0		4		5							
	N	4		2		24							
	T	4		12		43							
İKDAM (2)	F	2		5		9							
	U	0		0		24							
	N	3		3		11							
	T	5		8		44							
VAKİT	F	2		14		10		15	29.41	0		0	
	U	0		0		3		9	17.65	2		6	
	N	9		0		21		27	52.94	11	4		
	T	11		14		34		51		13		10	
TANIN (3)	F	0		3		9							
	U	2		9		3							
	N	6		0		16							
	T	8		12		28							
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	2		8		21		31	45.59	6		0	
	U	0		0		14		16	23.53	9		4	
	N	2		9		0		21	30.88	14		0	
	T	4		17		35		68		29		4	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	2		12		19		6		0		0	
	U	0		1		0		22		4		7	
	N	0		6		24		19		13		3	
	T	2		19		43		47		17		10	
AKŞAM	F	1		5		19		24		0		0	
	U	0		2		9		0		4		2	
	N	3		9		16		20		11		0	
	T	4		16		44		44		15		2	
VATAN (5)	F	2		9		24							
	U	0		0		3							
	N	7		19		16							
	T	9		28		43							
MİLLİYET TAN (6)	F							25	35.21	33	36.26	6	
	U							2	2.82	9	9.89	0	
	N							44	61.97	49	53.85	2	
	T							71		91		8	
TOTAL	F	11		62	49.21	198	40.66	101	35.96	140	31.39	6	
	U	2		16	12.70	79	16.22	49	17.44	77	17.26	19	
	N	34		48	38.10	210	43.12	131	46.62	229	51.35	9	
	T	47		126		487		281		446		34	
	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-1942 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

determination of individual issues towards the overall shape of the agenda placed before the public. The question as to what the main sources of issue inputs are could be answered by tracing the important policy decisions to their origins and seeing if they were dictated chiefly by political leaders or if they stemmed from the perspectives of media personnel. The nature and goals of a political system, whatever its mentality or ideology might be, could be detected from its principal systemic outputs. If these outputs were direct results of some inputs of the environment fed into the system through newspapers, they would probably stem from the professional views of communicators.

The one-party regime's major policy outputs concern the series of reforms which either abolished a traditional institution or process, or adopted a new practice or institution. The research sought to determine the press coverage of the issues which later become subject to principal policy outcome. Newspaper references to the Kemalists' reforms were counted in chronological order (Table 46)(60). Their favorable references could be noted as systemic inputs; but without regarding the type of reference, the mere existence of a newspaper reference to the issue could be taken as the involvement of professional judgment of the journalist.

Prior to the abolition of the Sultanate there are no newspaper references to the subject. Only a few days before the actual disclosure of the decision, the Yeni Gün newspaper published some neutral news stories implying the possibility of abolition. This newspaper report was commented on, positively, by the Akşam newspaper, and negatively by Vakit. Only after the disclosure of the decision did newspapers report and comment on the issue. Most press coverage was favorable, at least, neutral. However, all newspapers, except Hakimiyeti Milliye, published an unfavorable article or two(61).

TABLE 46- Sampled Newspaper Reference to the Kemalist Reforms Prior and After the Implementation

	Abolition of the Sultante, Nov.1921-Nov.1923				Proclamation of the Republic, Oct.29, 1922-1924				Abolition of the Caliphate, March 3, 1923-1925			
	Prior		After		Prior		After		Prior		After	
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
TEVHİDİ EFKAR(1)	F	0	14	23.7	0	36	35.6	0	27	27.8		
	U	0	19	32.2	12	21	20.8	15	29	29.9		
	N	0	26	44.1	11	44	43.6	19	41	42.3		
	T	0	59		23	101		34	97			
İKRAM(2)	F	0	121	60.2	3	273	67.7	0	63	81.8		
	U	0	6	3.0	0	4	1.0	3	0	0		
	N	0	74	36.8	14	126	31.3	21	14	18.2		
	T	0	201		17	403		24	77			
VAKİT	F	0	93	41.3	2	301	69.2	0	150	83.8		
	U	0	4	1.8	1	4	0.9	0	4	2.2		
	N	3	128	56.9	5	130	29.9	11	25	14.0		
	T	3	225		8	435		11	179			
TANIN(3)	F	0	5	8.2	0	41	29.7	0	20	23.5		
	U	0	12	19.7	6	24	17.4	19	16	18.8		
	N	0	44	72.1	2	73	52.9	13	49	57.6		
	T	0	61		8	138		32	85			
YENİ GÜN CUMHURİYET (4)	F	0	161	67.1	3	414	70.5	3	210	77.5		
	U	0	3	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	7	76	31.7	4	173	29.5	6	61	22.5		
	T	7	240		7	587		9	271			
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	0	173	81.2	0	312	59.1	0	172	73.8		
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	N	0	40	18.8	0	216	40.9	4	61	26.2		
	T	0	213		0	528		4	233			
AKŞAM	F	1	85	63.4	4	291	59.8	0	124	66.0		
	U	0	0	0	0	3	0.6	0	3	1.6		
	N	3	49	36.6	5	193	39.6	8	61	32.4		
	T	4	134		9	487		8	188			
VATAN(5)	F	0	124	59.0	0	402	79.4	0	68	42.2		
	U	0	12	5.7	0	11	2.2	7	7	4.3		
	N	0	74	3.5	5	93	18.4	14	86	53.4		
	T	0	210		5	506		21	161			
MİLLİYET TAN(6)	F											
	U											
	N											
	T											
YENİ SABAH (7)	F											
	U											
	N											
	T											
TOTAL	F	1	776	57.8	12	207	15.7	3	834	64.6		
	U	0	56	4.2	19	67	5.1	44	59	4.6		
	N	13	511	38.0	44	1048	79.3	96	398	30.8		
	T	14	1343		75	1322		143	1297			

- (1) Until 1925 and for 1940 only. It was renamed and republished in 1944.
- (2) For 1940-19-2 only
- (3) For 1943 only
- (4) Yeni Gün until 1923, Cumhuriyet from 1923 onwards
- (5) From 1922 to 1925; for 1940 only
- (6) From 1926 onwards; its name was changed to Tan in 1936
- (7) From 1938 onwards.

TABLE 46- Con'd

	Unification of Education, March 3, 1923-1925				Abolition of Title, 1924-1926				Abolition of Fez, Aug. 24, 1924-1926				
	Prior		After		Prior		After		Prior		After		
	N.	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
TEVHİDİ EFKAR	F	0		0		0		0		0			
	U	5		8		0		0		0			
	N	12		25		0		0		2			
	T	17		32		0		0		2			
İKRAM	F	7	84	77.1	3		19	28.8	8		47	65.3	
	U	0		6	5.5	0		0		0		0	
	N	2		19	17.4	8		47	71.2	16		25	34.7
	T	9		109		11		66		22		72	
VAKİT	F	3		102	87.9	2		27	24.5	15		86	87.8
	U	0		0		0		0		0		0	
	N	12		14	12.1	4		83	75.5	21		12	12.2
	T	15		116		6		110		36		98	
TANIN	F	0		41	47.1	16		47	56.6	0			
	U	8		39	44.8	0		0		0			
	N	16		7	8.0	4		36	43.4	0			
	T	24		87		20		83		0			
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET	F	0		141	78.3	5		84	94.4	4		94	79.7
	U	0		0		0		0		0		0	
	N	23		39	21.7	19		5	5.6	2		24	20.3
	T	23		180		24		89		6		118	
H. MİLLİYET ÜLUS	F	13		204	79.4	3		16		0		52	74.3
	U	0		6	2.3	0		0		0		0	
	N	16		47	18.3	8		24		0		18	25.7
	T	29		257		11		40		0		70	
AKŞAM	F	3		81	36.5	0		41		7		34	64.2
	U	0		7	3.2	0		0		2		0	
	N	19		134	60.4	4		9		6		19	35.8
	T	22		222		4		50		15		53	
VATAN	F	19		124	72.1	0		0		3			
	U	4		19	11.0	0		0		0			
	N	16		29	16.9	14		0		6			
	T	20		172		14		0		9			
MİLLİYET TAN	F					0		24		0		47	75.8
	U					0		0		0		0	
	N					0		13		0		15	24.2
	T					0		37		0		62	
YENİSABAH	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
TOTAL	F	30	18.9	777	68.0	29	32.2	177	50.3	37	41.1	360	76.1
	U	13	8.2	77	6.7	0	0	0	0	2	2.2	0	0
	N	116	72.9	289	25.3	61	67.8	171	49.1	53	56.9	113	23.9
	T	149		1143		90		348		90		473	

TABLE 46- Con'd

	Abolition of the Islamic Brotherhoods, Nov.30, 1925-1927				Adoption of the Western Time, 1925-1927				Adoption of the Western Calendar, 1925-1927				
	Prior		After		Prior		After		Prior		After		
	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	
TEVHİDİ EFKAR	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
İKRAM	F	16	52	76.5	0		28	20.0	16	44	67.7		
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		
	N	24	16	23.5	6		112	80.0	4	21	32.3		
	T	40	68		6		140		20	65			
VAKİT	F	8	39	39.0	5		41	68.3	6	22			
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			
	N	20	61	61.0	3		19	31.7	6	16			
	T	28	100		8		60		12	38			
TANIN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET	F	24	112	83.6	14		43	41.3	0	63	60.6		
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		
	N	5	22	16.4	4		61	58.7	12	41	39.4		
	T	29	134		18		104		12	104			
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	13	74	82.2	7		34	53.1	6	47	43.5		
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		
	N	16	18	17.8	2		30	46.9	13	61	56.5		
	T	29	90		9		64		19	108			
AKŞAM	F	2	43	40.2	2		44	46.3	14	32			
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0			
	N	14	64	59.8	14		51	53.7	8	19			
	T	16	107		16		95		22	51			
VATAN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
MİLLİYET TAN	F	6	72	83.7	0		34	31.8	0	62	69.7		
	U	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		
	N	4	14	16.3	0		73	68.2	0	27	30.3		
	T	10	86		0		107		0	89			
YENİSABAH	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
TOTAL	F	69	45.4	392	67.0	28	50.9	668	62.7	42	49.4	238	58.9
	U	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	N	83	23.9	193	33.0	27	49.1	397	37.3	43	50.6	166	41.1
	T	152		585		55		1065		85		406	

TABLE 46' Con'd

		Law Reform, Feb.17,1925-July 1,1929				Women's Rights, Jan.1,1929-Jan.1,1931				Adoption of Latin Characters, 1927-1929			
		Prior		After		Prior		After		Prior		After	
		N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z N	Z	
TEVHİDİ EFKAR	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
İKDAM	F	14		274	54.3	0				24	36.4	147	33.8
	U	0		36	7.1	0				13	19.7	34	7.8
	N	24		195	38.6	14				29	43.9	254	58.4
	T	38		505		14				66		435	
VAKİT	F	24		302	57.3	0		172	76.4	41	49.4	256	42.8
	U	3		21	4.0	0		34	15.1	6	7.2	25	4.2
	N	12		204	38.7	14		19	8.4	36	43.4	317	53.0
	T	39		527		14		225		83		598	
TANIN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYETİ	F	19	30.6	343	73.9	6		254	57.1	61	55.5	263	42.8
	U	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	2	1.8	0	0
	N	43	69.4	121	26.1	0		191	42.9	47	42.7	351	57.2
	T	62		464		6		445		110		614	
H.MİLLİYE ULUS	F	23	37.1	415	57.1	16		74	64.3	33		422	76.4
	U	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0
	N	39	62.9	312	42.9	3		41	35.7	14		130	23.6
	T	62		727		19		115		47		552	
AKŞAM	F	16		214	40.4	0		57	37.3	19	25.7	251	47.7
	U	4		0	0	0		9	5.9	12	16.2	16	3.0
	N	30		316	59.6	14		87	56.9	43	58.1	259	49.2
	T	50		530		14		153		74		526	
VATAN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
MİLLİYET TAN	F	24	39.3	173	30.8	8		121	54.8	0		114	64.4
	U	8	13.1	11	2.0	0		6	2.7	0		0	0
	N	29	47.5	378	67.3	12		94	42.5	0		63	35.6
	T	61		562		20		221		0		177	
YENİSABAH	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
TOTAL	F	120	38.5	1721	51.9	30	41.1	678	58.5	145	43.5	1453	50.1
	U	15	4.9	68	2.1	0	0	49	4.2	33	9.9	75	2.6
	N	177	56.4	1526	46.0	43	58.9	432	37.3	155	46.5	1374	47.3
	T	312		3315		73		1159		333		2902	

TABLE 46- Cond'd

		Metric System, 1930-1932				University Autonomy, 1932-1934				Abolition of Titles, Adoption of Surnames, 1933-1935			
		Prior		After		Prior		After		Prior		After	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TEVHİDİ EFKAR	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
İKDAM	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
VAKİT	F	21	39.6	124	43.7	0		24	35.8	12		25	15.2
	U	4	7.5	13	4.6	0		4	6.0	13		1	0.6
	N	28	52.8	147	51.8	12		39	58.2	4		139	84.2
	T	53		284		12		67		29		165	
TANIN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
YENİGÜN CUMHURİYET	F	18		216	58.5	3		61	69.3	11		129	73.3
	U	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0
	N	20		153	41.5	9		27	30.7	6		47	45.2
	T	38		369		12		88		17		176	
H. MİLLİYE ULUS	F	10		190	80.5	3		102	74.5	21		163	69.1
	U	0		0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0
	N	21		46	19.5	9		35	25.5	19		73	30.9
	T	31		236		12		137		40		236	
AKŞAM	F	4		193	47.0	11		51	62.2	5		69	31.9
	U	4		7	1.7	0		4	4.9	0		0	0
	N	19		211	51.3	4		27	32.9	12		147	68.1
	T	27		411		15		82		17		216	
VATAN	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
MİLLİYET TAN	F	24		204	57.1	9		72	57.6	19		131	49.4
	U	6		14	3.9	1		4	3.2	2		5	1.9
	N	17		139	38.9	6		49	39.2	17		129	48.7
	T	47		357		16		125		38		265	
YENİSABAH	F												
	U												
	N												
	T												
TOTAL	F	73	43.2	927	55.9	26	38.8	310	62.1	68	48.2	517	48.9
	U	10	5.2	34	2.1	1	1.5	12	2.4	15	10.6	6	0.6
	N	86	50.9	696	42.0	40	59.7	177	35.5	58	41.1	525	49.6
	T	169		1657		67		499		141		1058	

A year after the abolition of the Sultanate, Mustafa Kemal for the first time, uttered the word republic in an interview with the foreign press(62). Within a month before the actual proclamation on October 29, the word "republic" was being mentioned in the Turkish press. But both the frequency of repetition and the way it was treated were far from providing the regime with professional journalistic input.

However, the press attitude on the abolition of the Caliphate was, to a certain extent, different and more vigilant. Though almost all of it had abruptly ended by the Independence Tribunal sent to Istanbul three months before the actual decision, the newspapers were generally unfavorable towards the rumors about the abolition of the Caliphate. In the last month, newspapers began implying that the country needed educational and religious reforms(63). Unification of education, being related to the abolition of the Caliphate, received pre-decision press coverage, most of which somehow was in-depth analysis.

Tithe, the land tax on one-tenth of produce, had been a subject for grievance of large rural masses for many decades, but given small press coverage (0.03 item per day per newspaper). Again, the political center was acting on its own, that is without any positive or negative press emphasis on the subject when it abolished tithe in 1925.

The problem of head-gear had always been an issue for the press(64). But the abolition of the fez and adoption of western type hats were never envisaged by the press in the year prior to Mustafa Kemal's first public appearance with a hat and enactment of the government bill by the Assembly in 1925. Press reports on the head gear problem were centered on the difficulties of importing fabric for the fez from Austria. Yet the number of press references to the subject was not high enough to constitute a systemic input.

The Kemalists, accusing them of being sources of idleness and obscurantism, abolished all religious brotherhoods and dervish institutions in 1926. The press coverage of the issue was comparatively high but was due more to opinion-forming statements made by government officials to persuade people, before abolishing deeply rooted institutions. The press initiative on the subject was low, but encouraging: most of the press references to the subject were favorable.

After the series of abolitions came a group of adoptions. The Western time system, the modern calendar, legal codes of European countries, the new alphabet, the metric system, university autonomy and surnames were adopted. Despite the fact that all these fields were closely related to the social life and must have been subject to enactment of the Assembly after strong social inputs manifesting society's need of them, newspapers' coverage of these issues did not evidence journalistic initiative.

Starting on February 17, 1926 with the enactment of the Civil Law and ending on July 1, 1928 with the Penal Code, the Kemalist regime introduced a series of modern laws adopted from European countries. The enacted laws regulated financial, commercial and family relations with a totally new understanding. However, newspaper coverage of the related areas never reflected a need felt by the journalists. What was reported by the press prior to the legislative activity were solely flattering news stories and commentaries on the success of the regime in perceiving the needs of the public and serving it properly. The material published after the legislation was again purely complimentary and intended to disseminate given information.

Beginning with the enlargement of the franchise to cover women in the 1930 elections, much legislation was passed promoting women's rights. Within a year before the election

law only 73 items appeared in the press. None of them was an initiative on women's rights, all were simply follow-up stories.

Problems related to the alphabet, however, received considerable press coverage. The issue, dating back to the Union and Progress Society (UPS) had a long history. Enver Paşa of the UPS had pressed the intellectuals to adopt the vowel system with Arabic characters but failed because his system rendered hand-writing impossible. Although Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) of the ever-hostile Tanin newspaper had once asked Mustafa Kemal when he was going to introduce the Latin alphabet, neither he nor anyone else brought the issue up in the newspapers. Only the vague idea of an "easier script" was circulating in the newspapers and intellectual circles. But, again, because Mustafa Kemal did some prompting for editors in closed meetings(65), newspapers, a month or so prior the official disclosure, began propagating the usefulness of the Latin Alphabet.

The confusion prevailing in the measurement systems of the country must never have come to the attention of journalists, because as fundamental a change as the replacement of all measurement units with the metric system was never preceded by a significant newspaper coverage.

The only university of the 1930s was the institution named Darilfünun in Istanbul. Although it was a university its status was no higher than that of a high-school. Until the Ministry of Education invited Professor Mache of Switzerland to reorganize the university(66) the problem of autonomy was not referred to in the press. After the research of the reorganization team was started, the newspapers became interested in the subject which, in essence, failed to provide the regime with an input.

The last but not least example of the lack of professional initiative is about the adoption of surnames. Only when the old titles were abolished by the regime, did some newspapers mention the difficulty that arose and in a few articles, western surnames were mentioned as a solution.

E. Some Remarks on the Content Analysis

As stated earlier, the degree of media partisanship, another dimension of political control over the press, required the analysis of editorial policies of newspapers displayed in their products. As the analysis of the sampled material demonstrated there was considerably stable and intense editorial commitment to the regime. They continually praised the individuals acceptable to the regime; they refrained from voicing the interests frowned upon by the regime; they exalted the symbols the regime held up with extreme respect; and, since the regime's decision-making process did not necessitate systemic inputs, newspapers did not play the role of the analyst or advisor but merely the mirror of the regime.

Combined with the restraints stemming from the legal order on the rights of the newspaper professionals, that sort of media partisanship would lead to the highest degree of consensus of the press over the issues. This fact might be displayed by the similarity of the frequencies with which newspapers handled certain issues: no newspaper seemed to be specialized in certain social subjects.

But this sort of output processing could have resulted either from a high degree of professionalism or from a high level of media political elite integration.

III. THE NATURE OF LEGITIMIZING CREED OF NEWSPAPERS

It is usually accepted that there are two distinct concepts of journalistic professionalism(67): (a) a neutral and restrained press; (b) a challenging and participant press. The former views the journalist as someone who transmits news to the public that has emerged naturally from events, while the latter endows him with a more creative part to play in cultivating public understanding. But both positions share a common value in shunning particularistic commitments and a taking of sides; both demand detachment from political actors, although professionalism is a factor distancing communicator from the pressures of the "external" world and generating loyalty to the "internally" created norms(68). However the legitimizing creed of newspapers promotes either such an insulation from or allegiance to party-determined ideology. In the former situation journalists who believe in the primacy of service to the readership, emphasize the need to master certain specialist communication skills and perform "the watchdog function"(69) in an adversary stance in their relations with politicians. In the latter situation, journalists primarily believe that they owe duties above anything else to political authority; they simply try to be acceptable to the regime and, therefore, to perform the aggrandizing function in tenets of party guidance. In short, media professionals either believe that they should have a subordinate position(70) or they believe in having an autonomous status.

On line of practical research is observation studies inside media institutions. Through these studies one can gain rich insights regarding the political working of a communication institution and the ground rules of political output processing. But, this research dwells on what those journalists who either practised the profession in the one-party years or witnessed the first-hand testimony of others who had been

practising journalism in those years stated under questioning(71). The valid status of the legitimizing creed of the newspapers in the one-party years is defined by the help of the accounts of these journalists.

A. Belief in the Primary Service

When the small mounted brigade of the Turkish Armed Forces first entered the City on November 4, 1922, the Ankara (now Turkish) government found a press proud of having reported objectively the War of Independence and impartial towards the political organization in Istanbul with regard to the invitation to the Peace Conference(72). When the first Ankara-appointed governor came to Istanbul with the First Army's commanders, these newspapers felt that they could write open letters to the leader of the regime and advise him not to make the regime a one-man system(73); they thought that "this one would also depend on" newspapers when he wanted to learn what the people was thinking(74). Furthermore, they thought that journalists could criticize each other severely and the government, the party and the leader would be material for these polemics(75). But soon afterwards journalists realized that even if they were acting in favor of the regime, the newspapers were expected to spare the leader, the government members and other leaders from public discussions(76). They also found out that the Istanbul newspapers were regarded by some people in Ankara as a "handful of journalists, who blessed the Anatolian Movement and applauded it until their palms bled, but today, suddenly turned hostile to its government"(77).

Now, ex-prime ministers of the regime were being questioned in the party caucus about the statements they made to the newspapers(78). To quote foreign newspapers, or, to employ some journalists skills, which "has been quite professional but not very ethical"(79) to publish a letter

sent to the Prime Minister by a foreign dignitary would no longer be practised by newspapers(80). However, journalists could appeal to the Independence Tribunal and testify that if they had received the letter as those arrested editors had, they would also have published it(81). But Mustafa Kemal and the cadre were determined that journalists owed a duty to the new regime and only those willing to perform these duties could practise journalism(82).

Although the regime was determined to bend newspapers towards its will as early as 1923, newspapers did not follow the lines established by the leader(83). When the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was established, the party officials contacted some journalists to publish a party newspaper or to alter their editorial policy in order to support the RPR(84). In fact the new party benefited from all the communications of all newspapers; it was literally supported by most of the newspapers(85). Then came the riots in the eastern part of the country; Fethi Bey's four-month old cabinet resigned and Ismet Paşa established his cabinet; the new prime minister, in the very session of the Assembly he received the vote of confidence, proposed the law of Restoration of Order. In the party group meeting, Recep (Peker), who would be Minister of National Defense in Ismet's (Inönü) cabinet, called the Istanbul press "swine"(86). Some newspapers were closed by the Independence Tribunals, or by the martial law courts.

Even before the 1925 trials, the centers the journalists believed they owed allegiance to were differentiated. Falih Rıfki resigned his post as chief columnist to join Hakimiyeti Milliye; and those who chose to stay close to the Kemalist cadres and accepted a seat in the Assembly(87) were portrayed as flatterers(88). While these journalists thought that the regime was in need of their service(89), others kept conceiving their duty as being "independent critics who owed no allegiance to any authority but the truth"(90). However, as one might deduce

from A.Emin Yalman's account of these days, those who did not believe they had duties towards the regime were not composed only of journalists with strong professional values. Those who did not believe they had duties towards the regime were not composed only of journalists with strong professional values. Those who once had organizational binding with the Union and Progress Society and been known as the "journalists of the Unionists" were now turning against the Kemalist cadres as the ex-unionists were disregarded by the Kemalists(91); and those who were against the Unionists and, accusing the Kemalists of being Unionists, were now also criticizing the new regime(92).

During the 1925 trials, the letter sent to Ankara by some journalists asking to be pardoned spelled the end of their profession(93) and the country was left with a few newspapers run by those who felt that primacy of their service was to the political authority.

In short there was an adversary relationship, before the trials, assumed by newspapermen and the party officials even without the exchange of threats(94). That stance seemed to be sought as a matter of principle by some editors(95); for the politicians it simply developed in the course of events(96).

B. Skill vs "Being Acceptable"

Whether journalists choose only to master in certain specialist skills or simply to be acceptable to the regime, is affected by the strength of their professional values. It is evident in the accounts of journalists interviewed that Turkish journalists never had an independent news-gathering system. They usually did not take the initiative in interviewing state officials(97). Neither was there a tradition of

independent access to news sources; journalists were dependent on state officials for major news stories(98). They had to be on good terms with police commanders, public prosecutors and judges even to report simple crime stories(99). With the help of these primordial relations, some newspapers published news which in fact were not in favor of the government(100).

But with the consolidation of power of the new regime, there emerged a tacid agreement between state officials and editors not to emphasize social disturbances, economic and financial failures(101). "Government business" had become off limits to reporters(102). Not that investigative stories did not appear in the press(103) but even the most critical stories were concluded with the express belief that the leaders would solve the problem involved(104).

One of the strongest arguments for keeping information out of print, advanced by journalists as well as politicians, was that its disclosure would adversely affect national security. There have been voluntary news blockouts in the name of national security(105), and such decisions were not always the province of editors; many times reporters had to make them on the spot. Suppressed news stories did not need to be of national security magnitude. Scenes at dinner parties, jokes or anger displayed in unguarded moments never reached the editors' desks(106). Some times officials of the Directorate of the Press, acting as trustees for the regime, could decide to suppress information for "the public good" aside from national security consideration(107).

In brief, within the one-party years, journalists did not develop certain specialist skills to gain access to the news but preferred to be acceptable personalities, or at least avoid being persona non grata. They developed a sense of self-censorship because the regime officials were not willing

to issue restrictions to the newspapers and thus be open to blame for giving positive signals by mistake concerning an undesirable person.

C. Watch-dog Journalism vs Responsible Reporting

It would be unfounded to generalize about as highly heterogeneous a group as journalists, but it seems safe to say that the majority voluntarily participated in active politics. For some it was a matter of preference for the role of political observer(108), for others sheer political power was very attractive(109). Nonetheless many journalists stayed out of active participation in politics(110). But whether personally participating in politics or not the ground rules of almost all journalists reflect a "sacerdotal" rather than a "pragmatic" attitude(111): they regarded political coverage as an intrinsically important service that must be provided as of right; they never believed that political material should fight its way into print on its news value alone(112). Journalists did not consider themselves a mere "spectator" of the leading actors performing in the political arena(113).

The press then found itself serving only to transmit messages from the political center to its citizens. The raw material, multiplicity of voices, did not exist(114); and the press became simply an organ for propaganda of regime-sanctioned values. It varied only in the intensity of its enthusiasm for the decisions of the central authority(115). Very often all newspapers contained the same official news, supplied by the Directorate of the Press or Official Anadolu News agency or dictated by the state-owned radio(116).

The rationale properly advanced in the 1930s by the Directorate of the Press was that the newspapers, if effectively guided, could speed up economic and cultural

development(117) and should therefore be part of a national development strategy(118). Many journalists resent the suggestion that they were mouth-pieces of an authoritarian regime (119). For them, the question was one of nationalism, combined with the compelling need for economic and cultural development: if having a press meant accepting one that was detrimental to its strategy, the regime would obviously choose to do without it; newspapers could not afford to take that risk. The regime was to exercise its sovereignty over the news flow by whatever means available to it; and journalists should simply accept it(120).

D. Some Remarks on the Professionals' Legitimizing Creed

Despite the fact that there is no published work on the ethical codes of Turkish mass media professionals, one might deduct that, journalists, at least the majority of them, did not emphasize special skills and training; though they had a concern for career advancement and respect for colleagues, they lacked an understanding of being free from political supervision. In their belief, primacy of service was to political authority and they sought to be acceptable to the political power-holders. Although they based the socialization of journalists on norms of neutrality and objectivity, their over-all attitudes were in the way of inhibiting distancing of journalists from the goals of political authorities.

The occupational creeds generated before the one-party period and embraced by members of the profession seem efficient enough to create a belief in the watchdog position of journalism; the seemingly adversary stance adopted by the media personnel could result in their further commitment to such universalistic criteria of political truth as impartiality and objectivity. But the one-party regime, rather

easily, turned newspapers into its quasi-official instruments. The roots and reasons of that facility of the professionals might be found in the interactive factors between the elites of the two domains.

IV. DEGREE OF MEDIA-POLITICAL ELITE INTEGRATION

The dimensions outlined so far apply mainly to certain formal arrangements through which political influence over the media was channelled. Much of the mutual responsiveness among the personnel working in the politics and the media may be due to less formal aspects of the relationship between them. There is, therefore, a need for an additional dimension, focusing on the degree of integration between media elites and political elites and serving to identify some of the informal mechanisms through which influence flows may be managed.

The focus of concern here is the degree of political likeness and socio-cultural nearness of two different elites(121). The gap between these two domain may be bridged by recruitment of media personnel from the same social and cultural background that characterizes members of political elites. If that is not possible, the political elite staffs the media institutions. The political regime my try to socialize the newcomers to the press into its preferred social and cultural values. Sometimes mere informal interactions result in a growth of mutual understanding among individuals of these different elites, rendering them more responsive to each other's views.

The degree of that integration might be measured along two dimensions: similarities of socio-cultural background might be demonstrated by relevant information describing the

location of individuals within the social stratification system. Information about level and type of education was central to this exercise because the fundamental social distinction was based upon education; other variables such as ethnic origins, personal wealth, however, which could be useful in comparing the two elites, are simply not available. The exchange of personnel between the two worlds is portrayed by the use of the occupational histories of known members of the media elite.

A. Comparison Between the Socio-Cultural Backgrounds of Media and Political Elites

With the 1931 press law, all governors were asked to keep a record of reporters, correspondants, writers, proof-readers and advertising agents. But neither the Directorate of the Press nor the Interior Ministry, being the superior authority over the governors collected these records. However, in 1934, the new foundation law of the General Directorate of the Press authorized the Directorate to ratify the identity cards issued by the newspaper managements to their employees and to keep a registrar of the issued cards(122). The Directorate, with the regulations declared by the Interior Ministry, was to demand a declaration attached to every card sent for ratification. However, in 1936, the right to issue identity cards (better known as the 'press card') for two years was transferred to the newly founded, semi-official Turkish Press Association. In 1938, the Directorate began collecting "press-card declarations". The information about socio-cultural backgrounds of journalists (123) could be compared to the data on the socio-cultural status of the Kemalist political elite compiled and published by Frederic W. Frey(124). Since the press-card statements did not require information about occupations of parents, comparisons submitted here cover only the personal information

of journalists.

Education, being the "hallmark of the elite", provides the most important distinctive quality of the elite(125). The internal subdivision within the elite also depends on education as well as occupation. The Ottoman rulers had thought of western-type education as a remedy to the decline of the Empire, and had established schools of military engineering, military medicine and a War College. Later the secular education provided to the military personnel was enlarged to the civil service area and the Civil Service School (Mülkiye) the Law School and missionary-sponsored schools were established in the late 1800s. In the early 1900s, the Istanbul University (Darulfünun) was reanimated by the Young Turks. With the establishment of the new regime, new faculties in medical, legal linguistic and political sciences were opened, and secondary and primary education were developed. However, as Frey shows, the foundation of public education in Turkey was quite small until the middle of the Atatürk period. One might conclude, therefore, that attendance at an educational institution was the most distinctive social status asset. Attendance at a secular school was the most formative experience; graduates came out with a different conception of the world than those who graduated from essentially religious schools which survived until 1924. School connections became all the more important when the secular-minded, modernization-oriented intellectuals met with the medrese-trained, traditionally oriented intellectuals among the cadres of the new regime. Again as Frey puts it, educational dualism resulted in the production of two conflicting mentalities(126). The new regime, clearly bearing the imprint of the secular-modern mentality, gathered the graduates of the secular schools around the political center.

Frey shows that such political figures as deputies elected to the Assembly between 1920 and 1957 were overwhelmingly of the intellectual character. As Figure 1 indicates, deputies received more schooling than the journalists did(127). Comparing the respective percentages we see that while most of the deputies graduated from university, most of the journalists were lycée graduates. It is noteworthy that, despite the frequent tendency to emphasize formal education in drafting legislation as in the Press Law(128), a great majority of journalists did not go through university experience, which, among others, is known to make students "politically aware" (129). But, though their number was small, the university graduates were in important positions of the newspapers so that they could provide their institution with enough political awareness. Furthermore, the class-solidarity emphasized among Turkish pupils and mentioned in describing the legislature's co-optative character by Frey(130), was probably true for the newspaper editors when they were making fundamental recruiting decisions.

As to the difference made by the level of education of a deputy made, Frey notes that the figures (Table 47) indicate a direct relationship between the level of formal education and the reelection rate for deputies. Looked at differently, the table shows that while fewer and fewer private- and medrese-trained deputies entered the Assembly every term, more and more university graduates got elected. However, he adds, as the lycée system grew, much larger numbers of lycée graduates entered into the Assembly(131). The situation appears to be the same for the media personnel: the number of university graduates grew every year. A few editors with a university degree, recruiting university graduates for openings, increased the proportion of their like. The same is true for lycée- and middle school-graduates.




Figure 1: Educational Attainments of some Deputies (n=265) and journalist (n=4801), 1931-1946.

(Figures about the deputies are taken from Frederic W.Frey, Turkish Political Elite, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1965)).

TABLE 47- Comparison of the Parliamentary and Journalistic Experiences by Educational Level
(First lines: deputies; second lines: journalists)(*)

ASSEMBLY TERMS AND CORRESPONDING YEARS	HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REACHED														TOTAL	
	UNIVERSITY		LYCEE		MIDDLE		PRIMARY		PRIMATE		MEDRESE		UNKNOWN			
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
IV/1931-1934	88	25	5	33	6	23	1	50	3	27	1	13	-	-	104	39
	25	8	720	19	48	26	168	58	74	79	38	78	-	-	1073	22
V/1935-1939	44	22	8	52	7	27	1	50	2	19	1	13	-	-	63	24
	37	13	912	23	36	19	96	33	15	16	10	20	-	-	1106	23
VI/h939-1943	37	18	-	-	9	35	-	-	3	27	4	48	-	-	53	20
	65	22	1056	27	43	23	24	9	5	5	1	2	-	-	1194	25
VII/1943-1946	34	17	2	13	4	15	-	-	3	27	2	26	-	-	45	17
	168	57	1200	31	60	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1428	30
TOTAL	203	100	15	100	26	100	2	100	11	100	8	100	-	-	265	100
	295	100	3888	100	187	100	288	-	94	100	49	100	-	-	4801	100
Mean	51		5		7		1		3		2					
	74		972		47		96		24		12					

(*) Figures about the deputies are taken from F.W.Frey, Turkish Political Elite,
(Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press).

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In short, most of the university graduates who entered the Assembly (first, second or third time) in 1931-1934 period stayed there in the four years between 1935-1939; thus the proportion of university graduates within the Assembly increased. Similarly in 1931-1946, 635 new journalists came to the profession (regardless of whether they had experience in journalism before); and 280 left (132). While 280 persons of primary-, private- and medrese-education were purged from the profession, 635 persons with university and lycée education joined it, making the media corps look much like the Assembly ranks. However, there are a few differences between the two elites. While the relatively small numbers of deputies within the private and medrese categories displayed revealing longevities, those journalists in these categories were not as small a group as the deputies though they did not serve in the press as long as those deputies of the same categories did in the Assembly.

Another similarity, as revealed by Table 48, between the deputies and journalists is about the impact of the knowledge of foreign language: Frey's data show a markedly greater parliamentary longevity for those deputies with some foreign language competence as opposed to those with none. The number of journalists who claimed they knew a foreign language continuously increased: the proportion of those university graduates with some foreign language was higher than those without one; but those graduates of lycée claiming knowledge of a foreign language were fewer than those who did not claim to speak a foreign language.

Frey's conclusion of the criteria of the dominant social background considerations in recruiting political leaders consisted of the following: (1) that the individual had intellectual status; (2) that the individual had official occupational status, and (3) that the individual had some

TABLE 48- Comparison of the Parliamentary and Journalistic Experiences by Educational Level and Knowledge of Foreign Language
(First lines: deputies, n=243¹; second lines: journalists, n=4801)(*)

	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL																	
	UNIVERSITY			LYCEE			MIDDLE			PRIMARY			PRIVATE					
	Yes No	No %	? %	Yes No	No %	? %	Yes No	No %	? %	Yes No	No %	? %	Yes No	No %	? %	Yes No	No %	? %
IV/1931-1934	71/ 41 20/ 7	13/ 43 5/ 36	-	4/ 33 26/ 4	1/ 33 694/ 22	- -	1/ 10 0/ 0	5/ 31 40/ 24	- - 8/100	-	1/ 50 168/ 58	-	1/ 14 85/ 80	2/ 50 27/ 73	-			
V/1935-1939	40/ 23 36/ 13	3/ 10 1/ 7	-	6/ 50 73/ 11	2/ 67 839/ 26	1 100 - -	4/ 40 2/ 18	3/ 19 34/ 20	- - - -	-	1/ 50 96/ 33	-	2/ 29 18/ 17	-/ - 7/ 19	-			
VI/1939-1943	30/ 18 65/ 23	6/ 20 -/ -	-	- 216/ 31	-/ - 840/ 26	- -	5/ 50 3/ 27	4/ 25 40/ 24	- - - -	-	- / - 24/ 9	-	2/ 29 3/ 3	1/ 25 3/ 8	-			
VII/1943-1946	30/ 18 160/ 57	8/ 27 8/ 51	-	2/ 17 376/ 54	-/ - 824/ 26	- -	-/ - 6/ 55	4/ 25 54/ 32	- - - -	-	- / - - / -	-	2/ 29 -/ -	1/ 25 -/ -	-			
TOTAL	171/100 281/100	30/100 14/100	-	12/100 691/100	3/100 3197/100	1/ 100 - -	10/100 11/100	16/100 168/100	- - 8/100	-	2/100 288/100	-	7/100 106/100	4/100 37/100	-			

(*) Figures about the deputies are taken from F.W.Frey, Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press 1965).

(1) Frey excludes the medrese group and education-unknowns (8 persons). His figures are reconstructed from percentages; rounding results in 14 individuals loss.

local community position(133). The relevant characteristic for the media personnel seems to be that those journalists who have some claim to intellectual status. The basic sign of intellectual status was formal education.

As another factor Frey analyzes the age of deputies at first election: those deputies with higher levels of education tended to be initially elected at younger ages than those with less education (Table 49). Also the 635 journalists who filed a declaration for a press card were younger. While there were a few journalists entering the career at higher ages, there was no graduate of lycée middle or primary schools applying to journalism at higher age. That may be so because of the differences between a vocation and an elected post. But the over-all situation clearly shows that journalists of the 1930s and 1940s were considerably young.

Another dimension Frey uses to portray members of political life is their place of birth. Frey found out that despite the fact that deputies came in significant proportions from all regions of Turkey, those born in the Aegean and Marmara regions were overrepresented in the Assemblies (139). Similarly, as indicated by Table 50, most of the new generation of journalists were born in the same regions while those veteran journalists (that is those who were already in the career when they filed their first declaration for a press card) were more evenly distributed. As time passed, eastern and southern Anatolia became quite underrepresented.

The disproportionate distribution of both the deputies and journalists seems to be related to the fact that educational institutions were unevenly distributed, and that since being elite basically meant being educated (rather, formally educated) members of both professions came from the regions with access to better and more schools.

TABLE 49- Comparison Ages of All Deputies (Term 1 to Term 10) At The First Election and Journalists Who Filed Their First Press Card Declarations While Beginning The Career (Percentages; First lines: Deputies; Second lines: journalists)
(N=Deputies 2,210; Journalists: 635)

AGE	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL															
	UNIVERSITY		LYCEE		MIDDLE		PRIMARY		PRIVATE		MEDRESE		UNKNOWN		TOTAL	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
25-29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	26		34		53		41		-		(1)		-		44	
30-34	11		10		5		17		9		4		9		10	
	28		42		38		27		100		-		-		36	
35-39	21		18		16		31		5		9		12		19	
	25		16		9		18		-		-		-		13	
40-44	21		15		18		23		25		9		12		19	
	14		5		-		9		-		-		-		6	
45-49	16		23		24		14		32		13		13		17	
	7		3		-		4		-		-		-		2	
50-54	13		17		23		9		11		35		7		13	
	-		-		-		1		-		-		-		-	
55-59	8		8		9		3		9		22		5		8	
	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		-	
60-64	7		5		4		3		5		-		4		6	
	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		-	
65-69	3		3		1		-		2		-		1		2	
	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		-	
70 and over	1		1		1		-		2		4		1		1	
	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		-	
Unknown	-		-		1		-		-		4		38		6	
	-		-		-		-		-		-		-		-	

(1) There is no journalist beginning his career and filing a press-card declaration with medrese education.

TABLE 50- Birthplaces of the Journalists Entering The Profession

		R E G I O N																							
		North Central		Aegean		Marmara		Mediterranean		North-east		South-east		Black Sea		East Central		South Central		Foreign Born		Unknown		Total	
		No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Veterans		458	11	583	14	669	16	336	8	416	10	249	6	541	13	499	12	249	6	166	4	-	-	4166	
FIRST DECLARATION	1934	2	17	3	25	5	42	-	-	1	8	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	
	1935	-	-	6	24	11	44	2	8	1	4	-	-	1	4	2	8	2	8	-	-	-	-	25	
	1936	5	14	7	20	18	51	2	6	-	-	-	-	2	6	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	35	
	1937	7	16	9	21	21	49	5	12	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	
	1938	6	9	11	16	29	43	3	4	3	4	5	7	7	10	2	3	3	4	-	-	-	-	69	
	1939	8	11	16	21	34	45	3	4	-	-	4	5	10	13	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	76	
	1940	3	3	26	30	47	54	6	7	2	2	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	88	
	1941	1	3	6	16	29	75	-	-	-	-	1	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	
	1942	-	-	2	6	26	85	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	
	1943	-	-	4	10	35	80	1	2	2	5	1	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	
	1944	6	12	8	16	29	56	-	-	3	6	2	4	1	2	-	-	1	2	1	2	-	-	51	
1945	3	5	7	12	39	67	1	2	2	4	-	-	2	4	1	2	-	-	2	4	-	-	57		
1946	4	6	9	14	44	67	1	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	66		

The findings regarding the education, age and birth-place information of both the members of the Assembly and of the media institutions clearly depicted that both groups had socio-cultural proximity. If this evaluation is correct, it should help one gain clues about the political affinity journalists had with the political elite.

B. Elite Within Elite: Comparison of Political Leadership Groups and Managers of the Press

Frey, naming the leadership group as "elites within an elite", looks for the relationship between socio-cultural background and leadership. One apparent device of the regime for ensuring the cooperation of the press was that of including a number of prominent editors, publishers and writers among the deputies. The journalistic group(135) in the Assembly, that is the media elite within the political elite, was one of the most favored groups. Examination of some internal characteristics of this group demonstrates that they outdid the political elite in those very characteristics which typified the political elite: The journalists resembled the Kemalists in educational and social backgrounds; they were less local, more likely to have been born in the Marmara-Aegean region; they had a higher over-all level of formal education; they were young.

If we divide the entire group of 49 journalistic deputies according to their positions within the profession, the largest subgroup appears to be that of the owners, publishers, responsible editors and editing chief-columnists (Tables 51 and 52) constituting 44 per cent of the total; the second group, that of columnists and writers, constituting 22 per cent of the total and the third, of reporters, making up 14 per cent of the total. However, there is a

TABLE 51- Parliamentary Experiences of Journalist Deputies and Their Position in the Profession, 1920-1946 (*)

	POSITION HELD IN JOURNALISM								Total
	Publisher, editor Chief Columnist		Writer; Columnist		Reporter		Other		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
I	5	8	+	-	1	8		-	8
II	7	11	3	12	1	8	3	13	14
III	11	17	4	16	3	23	2	8	20
IV	11	17	4	16	1	8	3	13	19
V	11	17	3	12	2	15	5	21	21
VI	12	18	5	20	3	23	5	21	25
VII	8	12	6	24	2	15	6	24	22
Total	65	100	25	100	13	100	24	100	127
Average	3.1		2.3		1.9		2.4		

(*) Figures about the deputies are taken from F.W.Frey, Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press 1965).

TABLE 52- Positions Held by Journalist-Deputies in Journalistic Profession, 1920-1946

	POSITION HELD IN JOURNALISM				Total	
	Publisher Editor;	Columnist	Writer	Reporter		Other
I	5	-		1	-	6
II	4	3		1	2	10
III	4	1		1	2	8
IV	1	1		1		3
V	1	1		1	2	5
VI	4	4		1	1	10
VII	2	1		1	3	7
Total	21	11		7	10	49
%	44	22		14	20	




Figure 2: Types of Education: Journalistic Group of Deputies, 1920-1946.

group of 10 individuals (20 per cent) who declared their "primary occupation before the election" as journalism but did not specify their position in the profession nor had an established reputation in the press. The status of the journalistic deputies is demonstrated by the fact that while the number of average terms served in the Assembly by members of the first group was 3.1 terms; the remaining 28 journalists' average term was only 2.2. In addition to the longevity of their service in the Assembly, every new term a group of owners, publishers and editors were elected to the Assembly. A similar consistency is observed for reporters: though their years in the Assembly were less than those of the first group, every term a new reporter came to the Assembly. Frey finds this rather long term of service in the Assembly as demonstration of virtual co-optation(136). Seventy one per cent of the publishers and editors and fifty-seven of the others had university education (Table 53). It is also evident that those with higher education served more terms in the Assembly: on the average each university educated journalist was elected approximately 3 times to the Assembly (Table 54).

As for the ages of journalistic group of deputies, those between 30 and 34 constituted the majority of the group, the next one being that of 35-39 year-olds (Table 55). This table perfectly fits to that of the inner leadership group(137). In other words, the journalists in the Assembly were as young a group as the top-RPP leadership. As for the knowledge of foreign languages, the journalists in the Assembly once again outdid the other occupational groups (Table 56): seventy-three of all journalists did claim knowledge of one or more foreign languages. Although more than half of them were born in the Aegean-Marmara region, the journalistic deputies represent almost all of the regions

TABLE 53- Highest Educational Level Reached by the Journalist Deputies and Their Position in Occupation, 1920-1946

Position Held in Journalism	HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REACHED														Total
	University		Lycée		Middle		Primary		Private		Medrese		Unknown		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Publisher Editor	15	49	3	50	1	13							2		21
Columnist	6	19	2	33	3	37									11
Reporter	5	16	1	17	1	13									7
Other	5	16			3	37			2						10
Total	31	100	6	100	8	100			2				2		49

TABLE 54- Journalistic Group of Deputies Parliamentary Experience by Educational Level, 1920-1946

Assembly Terms	HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REACHED												TOTAL			
	University		Lycée		Middle		Primary		Private		Medrese		Unknown		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
I	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50	6	5	
II	12	12	-	-	1	6	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	14	11	
III	16	16	2	25	2	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	16	
IV	14	14	2	25	3	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	15	
V	17	18	1	13	3	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	16	
VI	18	19	2	25	4	25	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	25	20	
VII	15	16	1	13	3	19	-	-	2	50	-	-	1	50	22	17
Total	97	100	8	101	16	101	-	-	4	100	-	-	2	100	127	100
Average	3.1		1.3		2.0		-		2		-		1			

TABLE 55- Ages of All Journalist-Deputies at First Election, by Terms (1920-1946)

Assembly Terms	A G E										Total
	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	70 and Over	
I	2	1	2	1							6
II		8				1		1			10
III		2	3	1			1	1			8
IV			1		1			1			3
V		1	1		1	1		1			5
VI		2	3		2	2				1	10
VII		2	2	2				1			7
Total	2	16	12	4	4	4	1	5	-	1	49
%	4	34	24	8	8	8	2	10		2	

TABLE 56- Knowledge of Foreign Language of Journalist Deputies
(1920-1943)

Assembly Terms	NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES				Total
	0	1	2	3 and more	
I	3	2	-	1	6
II	3	3	2	2	10
III	3	2	2	1	8
IV	-	1	1	1	3
V	1	1	2	1	5
VI	1	7	1	1	10
VII	2	3	-	2	7
Total	13	19	8	9	49
%	27	39	16	18	

(Table 57); among them reporters had more local connections than the editors.

The journalistic deputies had so close a relationship with the leader of the regime that it cannot be displayed by statistical analyses. The leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, had a long-standing custom of dinner-table meetings with his friends(138). He used his dinner-table as a conference hall set in a more friendly atmosphere. There are 169 names mentioned in two detailed narratives of these sessions as frequent participants of them(139). Of the 27 journalists which served in the Assembly in 1920-1938, 16 had frequented Atatürk's dinner-table sessions. They all had affinity to the leader in their own way: Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu) is the first among journalists who came to Anatolia as soon as Mustafa Kemal transferred his headquarters from Sivas to Ankara in 1920. He published the second newspaper in Ankara after Mustafa Kemal launched his Hakimiyeti Milliye. He was an active member of language and history commissions which developed programs for purification of the language and official theses on Turkish history. Celal Nuri (İleri) was also in the first Assembly and in the First Group; he participated in various delegations sent by the Assembly to neighboring countries. A young reporter, Mustafa Necati (Uğural), from İzmir, drew Atatürk's attention in the early days and was appointed Minister of Justice and Minister of Education.

When the War of Independence was over and Mustafa Kemal had opportunity to nominate candidates for the election, he added 10 more journalists to those who were already on the ticket, totalling 16. These new journalists consisted of, among others, Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın), Falih Rıfkı (Atay), Hakkı Tarık (Us), Y.Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. Of this group, Falih Rıfkı and Yakup Kadri

TABLE 57- Birthplaces of Journalist Deputies, 1920-1946

Assembly Terms	REGIONS									Foreign Born	Unknown	Total
	North Central	Aegean	Marmara	Mediterranean	North-East	South-East	Black Sea	East Central	South Central			
I	-	4	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	6
II	1	2	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	-	10
III	1	2	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	8
IV	1	2	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	8
V	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3
VI	-	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	5
VII	-	-	5	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	10
Total	2	10	17	2	2	3	4	1	-	8	-	49
%	4	20	36	4	4	6	8	2	-	16	-	

would be his official biographers and very close friends. Hakkı Tarık would convince all Istanbul editors to gather in the official Press Association in the 1930s. Ahmet Ağaoglu would draft the constitution and be the founding member of the Free Republican Party under the leader's orders.

Of those journalists who joined the Assembly in the third term, Asım (Us) and Necmettin Sadık (Sadak) also became very close to Mustafa Kemal(140). Asım (Us) and Yunus Nadi were known for their reporting of controversial issues in which Mustafa Kemal did not want to take a direct part; both the government and the top-elite used to know that when the Vakit and Cumhuriyet newspapers praised a certain attitude it was in fact praised by Mustafa Kemal; if they criticized certain governmental attitude or decision, which was quite unimaginable in itself, it was known that the criticism stemmed from the leader(141). In brief, though proportionally small, the journalists in the inner-circle of the regime were as close to the leader as to be his intimate friends.

The directorate of the press could be regarded as a boundary institution playing roles both within the administration and over the press. The personality and socio-cultural characteristics of the directors of the press, therefore, could be regarded as important indicators of media-political elite integration.

In the one-party period, 28 directors and acting-directors of the press were appointed. Most of them had only administrative experience and no journalistic past before their appointment to the directorate(142). While in the Atatürk era, only 6 directors came from solely administrative background, in the following years all of the directors appointed had administrative experience. In the

TABLE 58- The Highest Educational Degree Reached by The Director-Generals of the Press and Their Occupational Experience Before The Post, 1920-1946

	HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL DEGREE REACHED						Total	
	University		Lycée		Unknown		N	%
	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Journalistic experience only, before the Directorate	1	4	1	50			2	8
Administrative experience only, before the Directorate	16	67			2		18	64
Mixed Experience	7	29	1	50			8	29
TOTAL	24		2		2		28	
%		86		7		7		

era of Atatürk, two journalists without any administrative experience had been appointed to the directorate. Seven of the sixteen directors without any press experience, however, entered the media occupations after their service in the directorate.

Individual life stories of the members of this group show that they served in many capacities in the one-party administrations. Four of them were later appointed as ambassadors; five directors returned to teaching positions; six of them got elected to the Assembly; three obtained managerial posts in peripheral institutions such as Turkish Hearths and People's Houses.

C. Some Remarks on the Media - Political Elite Integration

In one-party Turkey, neither legal arrangements nor ownership patterns had enabled the regime to have newspapers acting in total accordance with the desires of the regime. But, since the newspapers entirely complied with the dictums of the regime, the relationship between the media and political regime requires a special explanation regarding the type of the bridging between the two. The analysis of socio-cultural backgrounds of journalists and their comparison with those of the formal political elite demonstrated that the two elites were recruited from among those of the same socio-cultural background. Furthermore, journalists, especially owners of newspapers, publishers, editors and editing columnists were co-opted by the regime. Over one half of the journalistic deputies were editors and publishers, and these individuals displayed a higher average election rate than did the other journalists. They were members of the party; they undertook responsibilities in party groups; they

thought of themselves as warm adherents of the regime, rather than independents. Formal and informal interaction between the two elites rendered journalists more responsive to the political elite's views and problems. Journalists found formulas to justify favored treatment of them by the regime in the prevalent mentality of the regime: it was a revolutionary regime and it was quite normal for the government to have special access to the press.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

- (1) See, supra, pp.84-88.
- (2) With regard to the techniques of content analysis I have depended on B.Berelson, "Content Analysis", in G.Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol.I, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), ch.13; C.Selltiz, et.al., Research Methods in Social Relations, 3rd ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1976), pp.386 - 397; F.N.Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp.525-534.
- (3) The group included Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, İffet Halim Oruz, Niyazi Acun, Ahmet Esat Ben'im, Abdülkerim Kanık, Tahir Karauğuz, Ligor Yaveridis and Ulvi Yenel. All those in the panel were members of the First and the Second Press Congresses. They were provided with a full list of all newspapers, regional and national, and were requested to assign them a point between 1 and 10, representing the lowest and the highest popularity, respectively. The consistency between the experts (inter-judges reliability) was .85 or higher.
- (4) Only the Yarın newspaper, which did not receive enough points from the experts, is added to the sample because of its self-evident importance of being the most critical newspaper.
- (5) If there were several headlines, one which had larger letters on headline was chosen.
- (6) Since there is a tradition of a leading article (başmakale) in the Turkish Press, the editorial (the article written by the editor) slightly loses its meaning. However the author of the leading article (başmuharrir, başyazar) was regarded as editor and held responsible by the Press Law until 1950.
- (7) In case of critical events, sequence of newspapers are not broken: e.g. the proclamation of the Republic, RPP congresses, the Free Republican Party's Izmir tour, etc.
- (8) Berelson, op.cit., pp.507 ff.
- (9) The use of the network analysis of this research depends on J.C.Mitchell, ed., Social Networks in Urban Situations (Manchester: The University Press, 1969).

- (10) For the importance of the regular army in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal and his friends, see F.R.Atay, Çankaya (İstanbul: Bates, 1980), pp.271-293.
- (11) M.Kemal and the military personnel under his command were sentenced to death by the Istanbul Martial Law Tribunal in 1930; and referring to them with their military titles or praising their activities was prohibited. See, Vakit, June 16, 1920.
- (12) Asım Us narrates the story of publication of such photographs and the editors' trial because of that publication: Gördüklerim, Duyduklarım, Duygularım (What I Saw, Heard and Felt), (Istanbul: Vakit, 1964), pp.20-36.
- (13) Tevhidi Efkar, under the editorship of Talha and Velid (Ebuzziya) brothers, used to refer to the Anatolian army, which had named itself Kuvayı Milliye (National Forces) as Kuvayı Bagiye (Rebellious Forces) for an example, see Tevhidi Efkar, June 20, 1920.
- (14) For the Sultan's support to the rebellious armed forces, see Atay, op.cit.
- (15) Istanbul was vacated by the Allied occupation forces on October 2-4, 1923, and henceforth the Istanbul press went under the control of the Ankara regime. This analysis covers the newspapers before the vacation of Istanbul.
- (16) The leaders of the civilian forces mentioned frequently by the newspapers were Topal Osman, Çerkes Ethem, Reşit and Tevfik (Ethem's brothers), Demirci Efe, Bogos Nobas Paşa, Antran, Deli Baş, and Anzavur Paşa. The commanders of the Anatolian army were Yusuf İzzet Paşa, Bekir Sami Bey, Fahrettin (Altay), Kazım (Özalp), Kazım Karabekir, Fuat Paşa, Refet (Bele), Ali Fethi (Okyar), İsmet (İnönü), Cafer Tayyar, Rüşti, Fevzi (Çakmak), Cevat, Çürüksulu Mahmut, Reşit and Esat.
- (17) Hakimiyeti Milliye, in its headline stories and editorials, referred favorably to the civilian armed forces' commanders 18 times in 1920, 12 times in 1921. In 1922 and 1923 it only mentioned them in unfavorable or neutral terms. Inversely proportional to the favorable treatment, Hakimiyeti Milliye's hostile articles and news stories increased in these years.
- (18) If we exclude the government's and Martial Law authorities' communiques from the figures of the Istanbul press, which were compulsorily published under law, the percentage of the Istanbul newspapers' favorable reference to the Anatolian leaders slightly increases.

- (19) The Ankara regime imposed a total ban on Istanbul newspapers until the end of the Sakarya Battle (September 1921). But henceforth Akşam and İkdam, though unofficially, were permitted to be distributed in the Anatolian towns: Us, op.cit., p.19.
- (20) Two days after the Turkish Army and Mustafa Kemal entered the city, Asım (Us) of Vakit, A.Emin (Yalman) of Vatan, Falih Rifkî (Atay) of Akşam and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) of İkdam went to İzmir to interview Mustafa Kemal. The Allied and government censorship authorities somehow did not prevent the publication of interview. (Mustafa Kemal, however, said in this interview that, since İzmir was saved, Turkish soldier would now turn to İstanbul to save the Sultan from captivity. See Vakit, Vatan and Akşam, September 14, 1922; İkdam, September 15, 1922).
- (21) Frey analyzes the roots of the oppositional groups in The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1965), pp.406 ff.
- (22) This negative attitude of the press towards the Kemalist cadre was followed by the commissioning of the highly - authorized Independence Tribunal in İstanbul to try some journalists. For the details of the trial see, supra, pp.118-124.
- (23) The People's Party added Republican to its name right before the PRP was founded in 1924.
- (24) The Independence Tribunals established by the Law of Restoration of Order during the riots tried many journalists, and closed Tevhidi Efkar, Tanin, Vatan and Son Telgraf in April 1925.
- (25) Despite the over-all silence during this period, the increase in the neutral reporting seems noteworthy. Also the total reference to the RPP leaders is less than that of the 1920-1923 period (4409 vs 3972).
- (26) Atay, op.cit., p.466. After the Free Party ordeal, the Press Law was amended, and Yarın was closed. See, supra, pp.125-126.
- (27) Aġaoġlu explains why the FRP leaders were so reluctant to grant interviews to the "Party" newspapers. See Ahmet Aġaoġlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları (The Free Party Reminiscences), 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), pp.45 ff.
- (28) See, supra, pp.139-142.

- (29) This confrontation was portrayed by some scholars as one between the Kadro group and the İş Bank group; see supra, p.140.
- (30) The 4th congress of the RPP endorsed the policies of İnönü and, in a sense, ended the debate. See Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (Ankara: Yurt, 1981), p.322.
- (31) Vatan on September 25-27 and Vatan, Tan and Tasfiri Efkar on September 30 (for varying periods) were closed by the Government. See, supra, p.120.
- (32) With the surname law, all Turks assumed a surname (1934, law no. 2525); some Ottoman titles, having become obsolete, were banned later (1934, law no. 2590). The law cited titles as hacı, hafız, hoca, molla, ağa, efendi, bey, beyefendi, paşa, hanım, hanımefendi and hazretleri. The first four were addressed to the religious office-holders or religious authorities. Although naming people after their ethnic origin (e.g.: Çerkez Ethem-Ethem the Circassian) was never banned by law, this way of addressing was also obsolete after the regime's declaration in constitution that "all citizens of the Republic are Turks".
- (33) See, supra, p.118.
- (34) For an example see Vakit, June 10-20, 1941, for a ten - day serial article.
- (35) J.Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", op.cit., pp.265-266.
- (36) For the details of the populism of the regime, see supra, p.65.
- (37) Linz classifies them as racial democracies. See, ibid, p.326 ff.
- (38) For an analysis of the Kemalist maxim "Peace at home, peace abroad" see S.Kili, Kemalism (İstanbul: Roberts College Rub., 1969), pp.113 ff.
- (39) M.Kemal dictated five articles which were very critical of government to Asım Us, the publisher of Vakit and a deputy, on the question of Hatay: Us, op.cit., pp.150 - 161; Vakit, January 22-27, 1937. Also see N.Ahmet Ban- oğlu, Atatürk Başmuharrir (Atatürk the Chief Columnist) (İstanbul: 1967), passim.
- (40) For the impact of the 19th Century Solidarist theories on Kemalism, see Kili, op.cit., p.92.

- (41) The word "class" had never been esteemed by the political elite. M.Kemal meticulously refrained from using the word. See ibid, pp.93-103.
- (42) Rate of increase is calculated by the formula $(x_2 - x_1) / x_1$: H.Blalock Social Statistics, 2nd ed., (London: McGraw Hill, 1972, p.37.
- (43) S.K.Arora and H.D.Lasswell, Political Communication: The Public Language of Political Elites (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p.10.
- (44) The newspapers' then circulation would render them to be the media of intra-elite communications. See, appendix.
- (45) Repetition of the symbols which were to be counted were selected from a list of names of personalities, institutions and other concepts mentioned with certain frequency in M.Kemal's speeches. The full list of names and concepts was presented to four scholars of Turkish politics who were asked to grade them a point between 1 and 10 according to its representativeness of the regime. Those words received the top point from more than one expert are selected for analysis. Inter-judges reliance was .80 and higher.
- (46) See, supra Tables 5, and 10.
- (47) The Kemalists', that is, official, view of history asserts that Turkish have always had a state since the Creation. For a critical analysis of this official view see Tunçay op.cit., pp.300-304.
- (48) For an example see Tevhidi Efkar, April 25-28, 1920, on the new Assembly.
- (49) For an example see Vatan, Jan. 1, 1941, Tan, Feb. 6, 1941.
- (50) F.W.Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey", in L.W.Pye (ed.) Communications and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), pp.300-303.
- (51) F.Tachau and M.Heper, "The State, Politics and Military in Turkey, "Comparative Politics, (October), 1983, pp. 17-33.
- (52) Özbudun points to the fact that the RPP did not lose its decision-making character in the regime, either. See op.cit., p.93. But, as one might say, for the public,

the party was the sole mechanism for political recruitment and interest aggregation.

- (53) "Cumhuriyet" (republic) is given to newspapers, shops, restaurants, hotels, coffee-parlors, etc., as a name. In the first years of the republic, people named their daughters Cumhuriyet.
- (54) It should be noted that each and every occurrence of these words in the analyzed material were not regarded as a reference to the party sanctioned symbols; they were counted if and only if they were used in relation with the party principles.
- (55) Lînz, op.cit., p.287.
- (56) See Vatan, May 15, 1945.
- (57) Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements) Vol.I, (Istanbul: Türk İnkilap Enstitüsü, 1945), passim.
- (58) Newspapers use almost 20 different titles to name the Sultan and the caliph.
- (59) L.B.Becker, et.al., "The Development of Political Cognitions", in Political Communication (Beverly Hills: Sage Pubn., 1975), pp.21 ff give a detailed summary of agenda setting theories.
- (60) All issues of the newspapers starting one year before the submission of the reform bill to the assembly or disclosure of government decree or Mustafa Kemal's personal statements on the reforms were analyzed.
- (61) Another very supportive newspaper Yeni Gün carried three apologetic articles. See, Yeni Gün Nov. 19, 20, 1922.
- (62) Neu Frie Presse, Sept. 24, 1923.
- (63) On February 3, Mustafa Kemal met with representatives of the Istanbul newspapers in Izmir, one month later the Caliphate was abolished. See supra p.
- (64) Atay summarizes the various attitudes voiced in the press on the head-gear. Op.cit., pp.433-435.
- (65) Ibid., pp.437-444.
- (66) S.Irmak, Atatürk Devrimleri Tarihi (The History of Atatürk's Reforms) (np: Yapı Kredi Bankası, nd) p.235.

- (67) J. Johnstone, E. Slawski and W. Bowman, "The Professional Values of American newsmen", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 36 (1972-73), pp. 522-540.
- (68) J. G. Blumler and M. Gurevitch "Towards Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research", in Political Communication, S. H. Chaffee, ed., op. cit., pp. 177.
- (69) Ibid.
- (70) Subordination should not mean as ungraceful a status as the word connotes. As R. Crossman aptly explains in the Politics of Television (London: Panther, 1969) there is a large group of media-men and scholars that believe subordination promotes politicization and autonomy results in losses in significance of political messages. But, of course, communication is not only to promote politicization.
- (71) The interviewed group consisted of those journalists who joined the first Press Congress in 1936 (some of them did not continue practising journalism later) and the second Press Congress. İffet Halim Oruz was interviewed on December 10, 1982, Niyazi Acun on December 14, 1982, Tahir Karauğuz on August 21, 1983, Ahmet Esat Ben'im on December 4, 1983, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay on January 4, 1984 and Vedat Nedim Tör on January 12, 1984. Ligor Yaveridis answered my questions in a personal letter dated November 7, 1983. Ziyad Ebuzziyat answered questions about his Father Velid Ebuzziya of Tevhidi Efkar and Tasvir on April 3, 1982. Niyazî Ahmet Banoğlu narrated on September 7, 1983 what he has been hearing for years from the "old generation" of journalists in the 1940s and 1950s. Many journalists memoirs and newspaper articles are consulted to check the accounts expressed in the interviews. Henceforth only names will be mentioned for interview references.
- (72) The Tefvik Paşa cabinet in Istanbul was willing to attend the Peace Conference with the Ankara delegates. That demand of the imperial government resulted in the abolition of the Sultanate and its government. See Atatürk, Speech, op. cit., p. 487.
- (73) Vatan, October 5, 1923.
- (74) Interview with Ben'im.
- (75) Interview with Yenâl.
- (76) The Directorate of the Press warned newspapers editors not to mention names of the top-leaders in the news

stories about the mis-conducted welcoming ceremony in Istanbul. This warning was the first one after the vacation of Istanbul by the Allied Forces (Interview with Ben'im).

- (77) Hakimiyeti Milliye, October 16, 1923. "Hakimiyeti Milliye should not accuse all the journalists with such severe expression if it were not authorized by Mustafa Kemal... When they read the newspaper, Ahmet Emin (Yalman) of Vatan, Velid (Ebuzziya) of Tasvir, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) of Tanin put a stop to the duel of the pen that had been going on for weeks between their newspapers" (Interview with Yenel).
- (78) In the Party Group meeting, Rauf (Orbay) was invited to answer certain questions about his statement published in Vatan (Nov. 22, 1923).
- (79) Interview with Yenel.
- (80) Five journalists were arrested by the Tribunal of Independence under the charge of publishing the Agha Khan's letter to the Prime Minister on Dec. 10, 1923. See supra, p.119. "Ahmet Emin was warned by some authorities that he should not try to make Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) look innocent... Upon this warning, he did not dwell on the subject of the arrested journalists" (Interview with Ben'in).
- (81) Yalman, op.cit., Vol.3, p.86.
- (82) Yenel's comments on M.Kemal's statement to the editors in Izmir.
- (83) "Unfortunately, the best wishes of the Gazi did not work out, the promised cooperation was not realized. Defeatism came from the Press. Hüseyin Cahit, though he had wholeheartedly accepted the fine principles set in Izmir, held them of no account, and renewing his old contacts with the Unionists, opened fire. Other newspapers could have decided on a truce; they did not. Velid Ebuzziya, feeling resentment at having been denied audience with teh Gazi, even after being asked to go to Izmir, was now harsher than before... Nevertheless practices worth criticism were not absent in Ankara, either. As a result, the Istanbul press made the Gazi and his associates very, very angry". Yalman, op.cit., p.106.
- (84) In October 1924, ex-primer Rauf (Orbay) and ex-chairman of the Assembly, Dr.Adnan (Adıvar) visited some journalists and asked them if they could cooperate with

the party they were about to establish. Yalman, op.cit., p.139.

- (85) Interview with Ben'in.
- (86) "Ahmet Emin responded by saying that an able statesman like Recep Bey should not name a national institution as he did; but this rejoinder cost him a trip to Elazığ (to face the Independence Tribunal)" Interview with Ben'im. Ahmet Emin Yalman gives the text of his response to Recep Peker's address in op.cit., pp.162 - 163.
- (87) Journalists Falih Rifkî (Atay), Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), Asım (Us) and Halide Edip (Adivar) got elected to the Second Assembly.
- (88) "We were being labelled as dalkavuk (flatterer of the regime) by newspapers. Because public opinion could not put up with (sic) a supporter of Ankara, I left Akşam and joined Hakimiyeti Milliye. Atay, op.cit., p.402.
- (89) "We had understood that it was not the time to seek our occupational or professional aims. The regime was ours. Before (the War of Independence) the politics was a game between two closed groups. But now things had changed. The country, the Nation were in need of our service. We did not have the right to be as selfish as we once were" (Interview with Gökay).
- (90) "Ahmet Emin, Hüseyin Cahit, Sadri Ethem and many others would disregard all other loyalties when journalism was in question" (Interview with Ben'im).
- (91) Hüseyin Cahit was the most famous of those journalists whose names were connected to the Union and Progress: "An esteemed journalist as he was, Hüseyin Cahit always remained morally bound to the (Union and Progress) Society" Us, op.cit., p.14.
- (92) Talha and Velid (Ebuzziya) after the official demise of Union and Progress, supported Freedom and Accord Party and continuously wrote against the Unionists. Topuz, op.cit., pp.122-123; "For the Ebuzziya brothers, the Ankara regime was a continuation of the Union and Progress. Though their newspaper was the first one which took pains to publish Mustafa Kemal's life story as early as 1920 and sent a reporter to the front to report war activities, the first reform movements were regarded by these brothers as evidence of the unionist character of the Kemalist cadre" (Interview with Ben'im).

- (93) See, supra p.124.
- (94) Interview with Karauğuz.
- (95) Interview with Ben'im.
- (96) Interview with Karauğuz: "They (those sent to the Independence Tribunal) certainly have angered most of the politicians in Ankara. So they did not come courting journalists".
- (97) "The government member, if he had a message to the public, would send for the journalist who, with his former behavior, had demonstrated that he was close to that particular official and ask him to publish the pre-prepared text (Interview with Yenal).
- (98) "We used to go in(to the offices of minor officials) with some information we thought they would be interested in - things one had come across that were not common knowledge. You used to get into sort of competition, then you steer the conversation to something you are really interested in" (Interview with Karauğuz).
- (99) The Press Law prohibited reporting preparatory investigations unless the highest police authority or the public prosecutor gave special permission.
- (100) Interview with Yenal.
- (101) "To break through the walls of secrecy and gain access to 'undesired' information was totally unimaginable" (Interview with Yenal).
- (102) "It was taken granted by the governments that state business was something which should be kept secret, at least until it became ripe enough to be disclosed to the public" (Interview with Yenal).
- (103) Vatan's reporting of the corruption in the Supreme Exchange Commission, which would organize the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece, was met with total silence by other newspapers: "But when they saw that thunderbolts would not fall on the head of Vatan, all others followed it and many members of the commission were used" (Interview with Ben'im).
- (104) Interview with Karauğuz and Acun.
- (105) "The director of the Press used to phone editors of leading newspapers asking them to delay stories on

certain events. If an already published story was found to be against the national security then the editor would be warned not to publish follow-up stories. Editors were usually glad that they were warned beforehand" (Interview with Karauğuz).

- (106) "All the Ankara reporters had to be expert in deciding what was desired and what was not. If you mistakenly dispatched an un-printable news story and the editor killed it, first thing he would do was to inform some officials that you were not reliable but he was careful enough to catch out such mistakes" (Interview with Yenel).
- (107) "From 1925 to 1930, we used to check every news story about the rebels with the Directorate of the Press. Sometimes they could not answer immediately and had to go to the government. They would tell us whether we were to give that particular event prominence or not" (Interview with Karauğuz).
- (108) Journalism was something political; or as dangerous a profession as politics. Many friends of ours became party member and got elected to the Assembly. It was natural for us. Thus we could be able to observe from the inside" (Interview with Yenel).
- (109) "Once you were a deputy all the avenues were open to you. Bank credits, membership in executive boards, etc. I know many people either joined journalism or published his own newspaper only to attract the attention of the party leaders and, thus, to open the path to politics" (Interview with Yenel).
- (110) "If I had said 'yes' to any one of the thousand offers made to me I would be rich, owner of my own printing press and free of troubles of ever-growing debts" Yalman, op.cit., p.372.
- (111) For a detailed analysis of these two attitudes, see Blumler et.al., op.cit., p.179.
- (112) "Newspapers used to devote a larger proportion of their space to political questions. The content they provided used to concentrate on explaining and interpreting the substantive issues of politics. For a few it was a mud slinging contest to be watched" (Interview with Gökay).
- (113) "We (the Ankara correspondents of Istanbul newspapers) had to fight with the trivializing tendencies of some editors. We should bring political stories in line with the high regard and respectful attention that this

supremely important sphere of life deserved" (Interview with Acun).

- (114) "As an editor, you should be able to sniff out if a speech made in the Assembly, or in the party group, or in a simple, ordinary opening ceremony would comply with the standards of the government. If it would probably not be met with the government's never-declared consent then you should drop it. As the level of the speaker increased your touchstone would also increase. For example, you had to ask yourself if that minister whose exclusive statement was at your desk was one of the favorites of the Prime Minister, or was he kept in the cabinet for the sake of a concession" (Interview with Yenal).
- (115) "Though there were times when none of the newspapers displayed fervent enthusiasm about certain government activity. Then Prime Minister İsmet Paşa (İnönü) would complain to Mustafa Kemal at the dinner table and say 'You see these friends of mine, Sir, they accept everything in your presence but they write adversely in their newspaper' Atay, op.cit., p.318.
- (116) "We all had motocyclists to pick up official bulletins from the Directorate and the Agency. Many Ankara correspondents used to have news pools among themselves. This newspaper's story would fit that newspaper. Some of us used to serve two or three newspapers at the same time with the same text" (Interview with Acun).
- (117) Interview with Ben'im. Ben'im recalls Director of the Press Vedat Nedim Tör's letter to the editors. For the text of the letter, see Server Iskit, Türkiye'de Matbu- at İdareleri ve Politikaları (Ankara: Basın Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü, 1943), pp.270-272.
- (118) Topuz, op.cit., p.154.
- (119) Except A.E.Ben'im, all the interviewed journalists rejected the idea that the press of the one-party era was not free and that the newspapers were mouth-pieces of the regime.
- (120) Turkish newspapers, which, because of their indulgence in top-level political struggles, did not give the public the perfect that was expected of them, since 1930, has become true weapons of the republican administration. Only after that date we see in-depth analyses of social and cultural problems of the country. Only after that date we can speak of a press serving the struggle for progress and development.

Sadri Ethem (Ertem) "Makinadan Fikre Kadar Türk Gazeteciliği", (Turkish Journalism from Machinery to Idea) Matbuat Cemiyeti Salnamesi (Yearbook of the Press Association) (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1932), pp.129 - 131.

- (121) According to the modern social change theories, these two worlds are two differentiated structures. Since the research reported so far demonstrates that it is not so difficult to speak of structural differentiation; the social structural gap could be bridged only in human aspects. Parsons concludes that two human factors to bridge structural gaps are political affinity and socio-cultural proximity. T.Parsons, "Social Structure and the Symbolic Media of Interchange", in P.M.Blau (ed.) Approaches to the Study of Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp.94-120.
- (122) For the text of the law, see Iskit, op.cit., pp.272-274.
- (123) It is understood that partly the occasional floods and mainly the indifference and ignorance of the authorities have destroyed many of the collected declarations. Unfortunately, there are only 7,146 persons' declarations filed in between 1934-1946 and kept up to date in the archives of the Directorate. 2,314 of them are unintelligible; of the remaining 4,832 declarations 31 are not complete. The research covers 4,801 declarations.
- (124) Frey, op.cit., passim, gives detailed statistical information and figures about 2,210 deputies and ministers.
- (125) Ibid., pp.29, 31.
- (126) Ibid., p.40; my emphasis.
- (127) For the sake of comparison, Frey's figures for the years for which data about journalists are available were singled out from his aggregate table. Compared to Frey's figure of educational attainments of all deputies (op.cit., p.44), among those elected to the Assembly between 1931-1946 more were university educated.
- (128) The press law of 1931 required reporters and similar employees to have at least a lycée diploma and owners and editors to be university graduates.
- (129) Frey, op.cit., p.48.
- (130) Ibid., p.49.

- (131) Ibid., p.50.
- (132) Of the 635 declarations filed for the first time 143 were given by university graduates, 480 by lycée graduates, 12 by middle school graduates (whom must have had vested rights). Of the 280 persons who did not file declaration again, 168 were primary school graduates, 74 were of private education and 38 were from medrese.
- (133) Ibid., p.54.
- (134) Ibid., p.184.
- (135) Frey, including all deputies of the first ten assemblies, finds the number of journalists in the Assembly 75. In the first 7 assemblies, however, there were 49 journalistic deputies.
- (136) Ibid., p.52.
- (137) Ibid., p.250.
- (138) For a brief analysis of Atatürk's dinner table conferences, see Hikmet Bil, Atatürk'ün Sofrası (Atatürk's Dining-Table) (Heilbronn: Uncu Verlag, 1981), passim. Also Atay gives details of some sessions in Çankaya (op.cit.), passim. (Çankaya is published in English: F.R.Atay, The Atatürk I Knew, Abridged and translated by G.Lewis, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Bankası, 1981).
- (139) Bil and Atay give 136 names in common. Bil adds 29 and Atay 4 different names. See supra n.138.
- (140) Necmettin Sadık (Sadak), first met Atatürk in Izmir, in his press conference right before the abolition of the Caliphate. Later he wrote Falih Rifki Atay a letter and described his feelings about him:

I am glad we have organized that meeting...
I was fascinated with the determination of the man. His absolute determination and will certainly overcome all the obstacles. But he needs new cadre. Now he must forgive the unionism, etc. to people, and utilize all the capable persons he can get. The ideas of the Gazi are so progressive that, those who are in his society today are not able to understand such a grandiose scheme, let alone to act accordingly. God Almighty, at last, granted the country such

a great man! It will be cardinal sin against Allah if we do not understand his worth. The Gazi will go to Ankara in a month. Until then I will stay here...

Atay, op.cit., pp.389-391.

(141) Interview with Vedat Nedim Tör.

(142) If we exclude the ten post-1938 directors, the number of those directors without journalistic experience drops to six, which makes them fewer than those of mixed experience.

CHAPTER FIVE EVALUATIONS AND SOME GENERALIZATIONS

I. COMMENTS ON THE COMMUNICATIVE SETTING

Implicit throughout the research presented here, a verbal model provided the basic areas of study: Formal communications take the color of the social and political context within which they convey content of some consequence(1). The 'formal communications' are mainly the function of newspapers; 'the context' is the communicative setting consisting of controls over facilities, administration, and legal and organizational arrangements; 'the conveyed content' is the subject of communicative behavior.

The importance of the legal and organizational arrangement of newspapers was brought out in the analysis of the development of the press. It was obvious that the press in Anatolia was created by those who would be elite-members of the regime. Ex-Unionists, local intellectuals and local notables publishing their own newspapers before and during the War of Independence made use of formal communications. Although we do not have certain measures about the effectiveness of these newspapers, for one thing one might be certain that they provided an elite-communication, for the rate of literacy was very low and their area of distribution was quite narrow. However, right after the formal establishment of the regime, newspapermen began seeking political endorsement of their content(2). The political power-center, founding a national news agency, and bestowing it with a monopoly

status, controlled the in-flow of news stories to newspapers. Since the early days of the regime, communications were but to inculcate in masses as large as possible a certain way of behavior. The Assembly did not see the foundation of the Directorate of the Press as an affair of the Interior Ministry but as a matter of public education(3). In this sense, the relationship between the personnel of newspapers and the political cadres was not adversary but a positive and cooperative one. Met with the professional mentality of the Istanbul journalists, the political regime's attitude towards them changed to a certain degree. Some of them were not willing to carry out the communicative plan of the regime; the powerholders, therefore, behaved more roughly toward them than they did toward those who were willing to cooperate on their professional terms.

The leader of the regime almost always tried to win newspapers to his cause. Trials of journalists in extraordinary Tribunals were but mere shows to intimidate the others(4). Mustafa Kemal, observing some misdemeanor on the part of the press, issued a warning to them as he did prior to the abolition of the Caliphate(5), before actually resorting to Tribunals or other coercive measures. By those gradually implemented measurements, the regime denied communications to certain personalities who could be either members of, or spokesmen for, the rival elite. But exclusion of these individuals was not deemed sufficient: the remaining cadres of the press should act in accordance with the tenets of the regime. But, since the regime lacked an elaborate, guiding and compelling ideology, the press merely turned into media of political communication. However, the outside-ideologization did also exert its effects on the press: the wave of creating a revolutionary press of the 1930s resulted in a press congress and a semi-official press association.

In the light of these developments we could discern three phases of the Kemalist press policy:

1- Meeting the Press, 1920-1925

The regime did not yet have a definite press policy, though the leader sought to utilize it when he started organizing the War of Independence. The political elite, familiar with the Anatolian press of the National Struggle years, pliant and helpful as it was, expected spontaneous willingness of the national newspapers to go under the disposal of the regime. But, to the annoyance of the new rulers, the Istanbul press, as a whole, was trying to follow their professional guidelines and act under the impact of their old acquaintances. From 1923 to 1925, the regime, suspending publication of some newspapers and sending 21 journalists to Tribunals, and trying to convince editors several times, sought to secure their cooperation. Finally, in 1925, with the law of Restoration of Order, there prevailed a total silence in the press.

2- Restoration of Silence, 1925-1933

The rebellious upheavals in the eastern provinces forced the regime to establish a repressive order in the country. But the politician was about to use the extra - ordinary authority provided by the Assembly against the press, too. The martial law authorities, regularly questioning editors and reporters exacted their total obedience to the will of the regime. Under the Law of Restoration of Order, as a veteran journalist put it, there was nothing left worthy of the name "newspaper"(6).

With the repressive law and related regulations lifted in 1930, the press raised its voice again. The establishment

of the Free Republican Party re-created what was named as the opposition press. The regime responded to this development with the 1931 Press Law. Once again, the media cadres saw that the regime was not to yield to their criticism. Furthermore, the regime was to replace most of the old-generation rank and file of the press with the "pure sons" of the Republic. The resulting concession on the part of the journalists was to keep their places in exchange for total silence(7).

3- The Press of the Revolution, 1933-1946

In the wake of the statist economic policies, the press had become as pliant as was desired by the politicians. But yet, as the then Director of the Press saw it, it was like 'an empty sack': it was obedient, but disseminated only 'non-useful' material as information(8); it had to disseminate the revolutionary messages of the regime.

From the re-establishment of the Directorate of the Press in 1933 to the abolition of the compulsory Press Association in 1946, the regime furnished the press with guiding legal amendments, associations and congresses. Thus the political regime created the press which exalted the symbols important for itself, reported mainly the messages of personalities with whom the regime was identified, and did so in a manner acceptable to the regime.

The liberalization program ended not only the press regime but also many other policies of the one-party rule.

II. THE COMMUNICATIVE STATUS OF THE PRESS

The analysis of content of the newspapers demonstrated

that the main issues which formed the political agenda of the society in the one-party years were dictated chiefly by political leaders. Had what these leaders had in mind been, for instance, a liberal political development scheme, the issues would have been professionally selected by the media personnel among those who freely voiced matters of interest to the public. A uniform communication which was, among others, closed to the representatives of those interests which were unacceptable, or at least seemed untimely, to the regime, is perhaps the best evidence of the limited-pluralist character of the regime. This is reflected in four aspects of communications of one-party era.

1- The rival-elite was denied the media of communications: The press, in an overall evaluation, refrained from mentioning names of and publishing statements of those individuals who were political rivals of the Kemalist cadres, However, until 1925, the press was freer in the selection of whose statement they were going to publish and how it would be published. But after certain legal arrangements were realized, newspapers became more cautious in selecting and editing material.

2- Issues raised by the rival elite were not communicated. Throughout the one-party period, certain opposition movements were organized around some issues. Sometimes these issues were institutions distained by the Kemalists, sometimes they were social habits and customs. These subjects were almost always treated unfavorably. When overall press behavior was favorable on an issue of this kind, it became unfavorable after the political regime made its decision or attitude known to public. In particular, none of the social classes, being unable to voice their demands in the press, had a dominant position in the society.

3- The regime's symbols were exalted by the press. The

political elite, in need of pronouncing its mentality on certain issues, utilized the press to the largest possible extent. Newspapers, refraining from positively mentioning anti-regime symbols, exalted those upheld by the politicians. However, their efforts in this context never amounted to the level of elaboration of an ideology. In-depth analyses on the regime's mentality, and press coverage on social issues, due to the lack of its points of view on certain issues, had only superficial value and was not more than simple repetition of the politicians' words. The regime's lack of interest in having a solid, compulsive ideology is perhaps best portrayed by the lack of genuine social and political studies in the press. Especially those symbols which had gained importance after the ideologization efforts of Kadro group never attained exaltative status in the press. The range of the exalted symbols did not go beyond such stereotype phrases and concepts as 'state', 'republic', 'National Independence', etc.

4- The political elite was always first to produce the subjects of the political agenda placed before the public. Being intimidated from injecting their professional views into the subjects they published and without the guidance of solid political programs, the media personnel refrained from raising issues by themselves. Social figures who stayed out of the Party did not do so, either. The result was that all major policy alternatives were designed by the political cadres and priorities for implementation were set up by the politicians. Many major issues about social problems, therefore, remained unvoiced until the regime handled them.

III. JOURNALISTS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE POLITICAL ELITE

The subordination of the press resulted in its high

level politicization. Subordination served to check trivializing tendencies of the journalists. But it also precluded their developing a sense of accountability to the audience. Whatever message was produced by the political sphere was directly conveyed to the audience. Partly intimidated from injecting their professional views into the conveyed messages in order to make them 'readable' stories, partly lacking the skills necessary to make political messages 'human-interest-stories', journalists of the one-party era published whatever they received from the political center. The resulting verbiage became the most common characteristic of all newspapers.

The research demonstrated that journalists of the one-party era did not have a strong and common professional creed to counter-weight increments of subordination; contrariwise, media elite decreased the distance between themselves and political elites. Instead of a universal adversary attitude towards the political figures, most of the journalists believed that they should be acceptable to the regime in order to practise the profession, and for that purpose they primarily served the one-party and its governments.

This was so because of the high level of integration of media and political elites. Comparison between their respective backgrounds demonstrated that media personnel, and especially publishers and editors, had the same cultural and social characteristics. Furthermore, the political elite sought to secure the compliance of the press by co-opting the media elite: being a party member and a deputy was not against the media elite's professional ethic. Rather, they regarded active participation in party politics as a natural extension of their profession.

Perhaps the most important reason for that integration

on the part of the political elite was that the lesser elites' information about the political developments came primarily from the newspapers; any discorded media coverage would be much more detrimental than what could be in a communication-rich context. However this situation precluded any further development of professional formulas. This reliance on official sources stemming from rationalizations about the "revolutionary press" reduced in turn the amount of effort that had to be devoted to preparing a contemporary newspaper. The stress on the primacy of political news reduced the problem of producing human-interest news stories. Focusing on the activities of the government officials simplified the task of deciding what subjects to cover. Press subordination increased with the dependence of newspapers on the government activities. In other words, the more the media elite became integrated to the political elite, the more their coverage devoted to the regime-related activities increased, and the more the press became subordinate.

The connection between the party and newspapers can be summarized by reference to two characteristics of party system:

1- Party Organization

The existence of newspapers controlled by parties was common in the Ottoman context. In the Republic era this tradition went on. Mustafa Kemal transferred the control of his newspaper, Ulus (former, Hakimiyeti Milliye), to the party. Editors and other news executives of that newspaper were appointed by the party central committee. The Party's Propaganda Committee did not have direct authority over appointments and dealt exclusively with newspapers. The party had always been interested in transactions of newspapers. The change of the Milliyet's proprietorship, to quote an obvious example, had become subject to Mustafa Kemal's consent. Another

fact linking the Party and newspapers was that party membership among journalists was favorable(9). Although the party did not attain a status of nationally radiated organization, the regime's limited-pluralist character enabled the party indirectly to control such matters as newsprint supply, etc. The party, in fact, establishing compulsory occupational organizations wanted to establish its control over the matters such as entering the profession.

2- Party Goals

Newspapers were in fact bound to support party goals. In the early years newspapers were supplied by the government with leading articles. Later, Hakimiyeti Milliye's (later Ulus) policy, being governed by the top-leadership of the party, was widely taken as a lead by other newspapers when defining the party line. But the lack of a long-range and elaborately defined set of party goals, forced newspapers only to report what had happened. Since nobody would be sure whether what had happened was implemented on purpose and as a part of a plan or was simply an action by an unpopular individual or group of individuals before any official declaration, newspapers were bound to publish announcements of the party and government, sometimes verbatim.

In short, the press was linked very closely to the party both in organization and in goal loyalty. Since the party-ownership did not gain that character of tradition, except for one newspaper, this linkage depended mainly on media and political elite integration. If the regime did not secure goal loyalty in some newspapers by indirect means, then those newspapers were harried out of existence especially after 1925.

IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN TURKISH AND SPANISH AUTHORITARIANISMS REGARDING THEIR PRESS REGIMES

If the wider distribution of power and existence of reciprocity in power relations are what political development is all about(10) and if, implicit in its differentiation, the media of communications primarily contribute to political development(11) can one argue that the communications performed by the press positively served political development in Turkey? Before concluding the findings of the research submitted here, one might like to observe the developments of communications, and scholars' evaluation of the press performance in similar situations(12).

Spain, being depicted as having a consolidated authoritarian rule like one-party Turkey, might appear "similar enough" to be compared with Turkey regarding the press regime. After reviewing the evaluation of students of the Spanish press system, we might draw conclusions on the Turkish press.

A. Journalists, Mass Media and the Political Regime in Spain, 1938-1980

Some students of the Spanish political life prefer to name the political regime of 1938-1966 as totalitarian(13) but some others show that the initial rigor of what looked totalitarian to the latter was immediately diminished. Giner, portraying the period between 1938 and 1945 as a totalitarian information system, analyzes the Press Law promulgated in 1938(14). Although the Mussolini-inspired Press Law was provisional, it remained in effect until after World War II. Stating in the first article that "...control of the national institution of the news press belongs to the state", the 1938 Press Law established a totally anti-liberal press

regime(15). The Spanish press, which, unlike the press of Turkey in the 1920s, had a liberal past, was, with great difficulty but successfully, transformed into the regime's instrument. The ideologues of the regime then wrote that the state had the right to set up its own information defense(16). The compliance of the press was assured with state intervention: government bought (in fact, seized) newspapers and lanunched new ones and put them under the control of Prensa del Movimento (Movement's Press). In 1941, finding the incumbent journalists rather independent on the regime and professionally-minded, the Spanish government established the Official School of Journalism, and decreed that only graduates of that school could enter the journalistic profession. Furthermore, another government agency, Public Opinion Institute (IOP), detecting "rumors", investigating the reactions of public to political developments and studying readership behavior, established state control over informal, oral communications. Now the Spanish press, "for the first time"(17) was serving only and exclusively the State.

As those regimes with which the Spanish regime had close ties, declined, the Franco regime loosened the reins of censorship in the postwar period. Although lessened, censorship and government censors were still legal, and journalists were forced to adopt their own criteria to save themselves from "the red pencil of the censor", creating an "oblique language"(18). However, with the normalization of Spain's external relations, the regime developed a new information policy: now the press would be moulded into a docile instrument with the help of the apparently voluntary syndicalist organizations. Governments kept sending detailed instructions as to the handling of certain subjects(19); the newly founded Ministry of Information and Tourism determined the information to be published by the newspapers(20); the official public opinion poll system was revived. Despite the govern-

mental commitment that the Institute would only serve to "know" public opinion, the party-affiliated members of the IOP used their political influence to direct it(21).

Following international normalization, came the era of economic liberalization. In 1957, the Spanish regime ended its two-decade old autarchic economic policies. With economic liberalism, the government stopped "forced censorship" and started "delegated censorship". Now editors would determine what was fit to print: criticism of local and provincial authorities was tolerated; the central government was still to be spared. The monopoly of the Official Journalism School was put to an end; universities could, in fact did, open their own journalism schools. Finally, in 1966, the government proposed a new press bill, promising a better information order in the country. Now obligatory censorship was limited to the non-print media; but abusing the legal authority, governments were still controlling the press. Editors trying to save their organs, applied self-censorship to their own material. Passing through the painful transition period, and following the demise of the leader of the regime on November 20, 1975, the Spanish press attained its freedom from government control. In Giner's words, after the Franco regime, (a) new newspapers were launched; (b) the once clandestine newspapers went public; (c) ideologies became visible in newspapers, and (d) the party-press declined and the independent press flourished(22).

Despite the difficulties presented by the judicial, economic and professional set-backs, journalists, whose public image was restored gradually, began playing a "democratizing role"(23) and providing the public with a multiplicity of ideas(24).

The most remarkable fact about the press of the Franco's

authoritarian regime was that in the forty years of repression, newspapers' circulation continually decreased so that it went below the 1934 figures. The Spanish journalists, at least those who were practising the profession before the political repression came, always retained their adversary attitude toward the regime: they strove to win freedom(25). But the repression was so severe that, according to some students of the Spanish press, it had lost its active role as permanent promoter of alternative ideas and had eventually turned into the mouthpiece of the regime(26).

As Siebert and Peterson put it, the press always takes the form and coloring of the social and political structures within which it acts(27). Consequently, Spanish authoritarianism, which had distinct colors of totalitarian leaning at the beginning(28), did not tolerate even the structural differentiation of communications.

The 1938 Press Law, dictated by Franco in the midst of civil war, sought to add the mass communications function among the roles of political structures. Spanish authoritarianism, being implanted into a post-democratic society, and carrying more ideological tones, sought temporary accommodations with autonomous groups and organizations; the emerging party-state was totalitarian in ideology, but not in reality(29). As asserted above(30), mentality or ideology, if it has non-democratic colors, first affects the media, for any sort of authoritarianism seeks to control systemic inputs by limiting pluralism and impose stability by limiting mobilization(31). The regime, in its early days, sought to co-opt elites of certain autonomous groups and organizations, the Church, and the landed local notables for example, but tried to prevent their probable communications with those groups which did not benefit from even the quasi-autonomy. Thus, the first function grabbed by the political structures

was that of the media: they were incorporated into the political mechanism; what would later be called the Press of the State came into existence(32). However, the regime, lacking totalitarian traits in reality, did not put the press directly under the government control as in the case of real totalitarian regimes(33), but under an apparently independent organization: the National Delegation of the Press and Propaganda.

Finally, as the regime found it impossible to continue on authoritarian grounds in the face of the difficulties of an autarchic economic policy, it came into close contact with the international community; the external dynamic began to exert its impact on the internal configuration of politics. Those journalists who already had maintained an adversary position to the control of the press throughout the years of repression quickly assumed their independent position.

B. Press and Politics in Turkey, 1920-1946

Compared to the Spanish case, Turkish authoritarianism was also forced to yield to certain groups, but they did not bear the same resemblance to those autonomous groups in authoritarian Spain: in Turkey, those local notables which had rather an autonomous position vis-à-vis the public policies of the Kemalist regime had never access to mass communications, neither did urban industrial or rural agricultural masses. Furthermore, the Turkish press was traditionally the media of intra-elite communications. Therefore, the Turkish press regime in the authoritarian period had its own traits.

Had the Kemalist revolution been aiming at mobilizing masses around a certain developmental and totalitarian ideology, it would have extended the scope of communications. But

it was a modernization-oriented movement born out of an independence struggle run by bureaucratic-intellectual civilian and military cadres, which, in the first place, had not gathered around a certain ideology. They shared a common mentality: a developmental mentality geared at fortifying what Frey calls the beachheads won by modernists for the last five decades with the help of incremental strategies and probably designed with military skills they gained during their career in the Armed Forces. The resulting political configuration was a party without an elaborate ideology, an Assembly not constituting a reward for a political class, and a government without the authority to develop major schemes of social change. The sole decision-making unit was the leader and his close friends; all other institutions and organizations were mere instruments to implement the policies designed by the top leadership group.

Put another way, all the apparently autonomous mass institutions were created to conduct the main business: to focus the elite's attention on the same policy-objectives. That business, however, required the enlargement of the orientation of the top elite to the lesser elites. The top elite, while doing so, should not let them come under the influence of what was left of a rival elite. Mass communications were very important in this context. The lack of communications between the elite and mass was a vital factor; by this, the central elite would not be busy with untimely demands of the masses. But the media of communications, with whatever degree of penetration it had into the elite, would be a useful instrument in adjusting the attention, manipulating expectations, etc., of the lesser elites.

The Kemalist press strategy was, therefore, two-fold: on the one hand, it would prevent access to the press by those unacceptable rival elite individuals; on the other hand

it would ensure that the newspapers were available to convey the messages of the center to the outer layers of intellectuals.

The limitedness of the journalistic cadres, furnishing the regime with alleviating easiness for their co-optation, was the major factor taken into consideration by the ruling elite. The resulting press system could be summarized in a few words:

1- The legal arrangement of the press did not impose strict government control over the press. The Kemalist regime did not establish official censorship boards (as, for example, did the Spanish government), nor did it officially ask journalists to censor their own work. The press law provided editors with certain guidelines: for instance, to defame government personalities was prohibited; but to exalt them was never legally ordered.

2- The boundary-agencies such as the Directorate of the Press, did send newspapers prepared material to be published for a very short period of time during the war of Independence. When the normal circumstances returned, this practice was ended. The directors, however, were in close relationship with editors; they could see each other frequently, and exchange views. Nevertheless, during the long years of martial law, the military offices could, and did, call newspapers to tell them what to do or what not to do.

3- The ordinary reporters, correspondents and columnists were not recruited by the regime. Nor had it established strict guidelines for the editors. The press law and other regulations rather defined who could not be employed. According to these vague provisions, those individuals not carrying traits of the rival elite could be recruited.

4- The organizational arrangement of the press was not effective enough to furnish the political regime with administrative power. The most salient example of this sort came into existence when some out-of-center circles began elaborating an ideology for the regime: the Turkish Press Association of 1938. Nevertheless, this move sought to unify the press around an ideological stance developed by the governmental press agency. But after the demise of Atatürk, neither that effort to elaborate an ideology nor the semi-official press organization survived; a few years later the Association was abolished.

The analysis of legal-organizational arrangement of the press and statistical analysis of both content of newspapers and personal characteristics of journalists does but prevent us from rejecting the assumption that the media and political elite were alike in regard to their socio-cultural backgrounds. Nor can it but accept the hypothesis that similar socio-cultural backgrounds, if not colored by different ideological inculcations, result in the choice of similar political stances. The army, the bureaucracy, the political party, the university, the judiciary and the press of the Kemalist regime were relatively autonomous from each other; but, because of their dependence on certain individuals of similar socio-cultural backgrounds, they functioned in concert. All of them, as Frey puts it, were primarily concerned with symbol manipulation(34). As the tutelary regime reached the level beyond which the reversal of modernizing, secularizing and centralizing reforms would be difficult, if not impossible, these institutions became more autonomous and turned solely to their own functions(35).

IV. CONCLUSION

The political component of social life has almost always dominated other aspects. This is true for communications perhaps more often than for other spheres. Julius Caesar, a consummate politician, posted his version of the day's news, the Acta Diurna on the walls of the Roman Senate. This billboard clearly sought to neutralize his opponents by preempting their version of the day's events. Since then, the politician have struggled to impose their own version of news on the public's mind.

The ensuing centuries brought about changes in the relationship between the politician and the public, if not in politics itself. One principle deeply engraved on the mind of the people, according to social scientists, is the central role of the freely operating press in a participant polity. That, in turn, required the existence of an autonomous communicative structure. Any autonomous, thus freely operating, communications system has the power to turn a traditional society into a modern one.

Normative beliefs in democracy should have led the student of the history of journalism to underemphasize the persistent evidence of less-than-ideal levels of performance for both political systems and media. The sheer existence of autonomous media system has long been taken as evidence of a perfectly well-operating communications. The direction of causal relationship between the politics and communications was assumed to run from the latter to the former. The contrary situation holds true in totalitarian regimes only, because in such regimes everything is under state control, and the press, like many others, is not an autonomous institution.

The case overlooked by the student of communications is that of those regimes where democracy hovers in the distance. In this type of situations, too, the media's perceived task is to help develop modern, competitive and tolerant political values. Being autonomous, media convey views; the plurality of views expressed through media result in a true democratic contest.

The research submitted here has tried to demonstrate that this autonomous communications principle is a deeply ingrained assumption in the study of communications. Any generalization on the effects of communication would be incomplete without taking into account the outcomes of studies of those countries where so-called autonomous communication structures do not function properly. The brief analysis of the history of journalism in an authoritarian regime has shown that (a) certain expected outcomes do not emerge from autonomous communications in an apparently representative political system, and (b) apparently representative political systems, by not allowing the mass media to function freely, prevent the expected outcomes. Once interfered with, the entire process of communications loses its function. Even when that interference stems from the good sense of politicians, acting for the benefit of the nation, the resulting press is poor in criticism, weak in analysis, unsubstantial in reporting and impotent in creating and conveying alternatives. This perhaps is inevitable because regimes other than democracies cannot afford a press rich in criticism, strong in analysis, substantial in reporting and fertile in alternatives.

Turning back to the question posed in the Introduction, one may conclude that authoritarian political systems do have different communicative system than those of democratic systems. While the press of democratic systems produces values

which sustain democratic values, authoritarian regimes effect communication in order to sustain belief in values central to their existence. All other differences between these two communicative systems can, I believe, be traced to this one.

NOTES FOR THE CHAPTER FIVE

- (1) Our model is elaborated on Siebert's model. See F.S. Siebert, et.al. Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), p.1.
- (2) As an example, the condition set by editors of the Hakimiyeti Milliye might be cited. See, supra, p.107.
- (3) The bill was passed by the Irşad (Guidance) Commission.
- (4) Except, of course, in the case of Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and his two editors.
- (5) See, supra, p.122.
- (6) A.E.Yalman, Gördüklerimiz ve Geçirdiklerimiz, Vol.3, p.16.
- (7) The recognition of the vested interests of those incumbent journalists who did not meet the educational requirements of the new law was welcomed by some deputies who praised the "new behavior of our journalists". See, supra, p.
- (8) Interview with Tör.
- (9) The press card declarations did not contain data on party membership. However all the journalists I interviewed were party members at one time or another. They emphasized that party membership was not regarded as contrary to the professional ethic.
- (10) F.W.Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey", in Communications and Political Development, L.W.Pye (ed.) (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1972), p.301.
- (11) B.Rubin, Media, Politics and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.xi.
- (12) For the treatment of 'similar appearance' as the basis of comparability, see G.Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", APSR, Vol.64, No.4 (December, 1970), p.1035.
- (13) J.A.Giner gives a summary of literature on the Spanish political regime in "Journalists, Mass Media and Public Opinion in Spain" in the Press and the Rebirth of Iberian Democracy, K.Maxwell (ed.) (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp.33-53.

- (14) In outlining the Spanish press regime, I heavily depended on Giner's studies. I am grateful him for sending manuscripts of his contribution to R.W.Worces-ter's edited volume Political Opinion Polling (London: Macmillan, forthcoming), and his paper submitted to Columbia University Conference on Political Culture and Communications (New York: October 23-25, 1978).
- (15) Giner, "Journalists, Mass Media", op.cit., p.34.
- (16) Giner cites Prof.Manuel Ramirez, España 1939-1975 (Madrid: 1978).
- (17) Giner cites the editor of La Vanguardia, Luis de Galin-soga.
- (18) Ibid., p.36.
- (19) J.A.Soler, "The Paradoxes of Press Freedom: The Spanish Case", in Newspapers and Democracy, A Smith (ed.), (Lon-don: The MIT Press, 1980), p.154.
- (20) Giner, op.cit., p.37.
- (21) Ibid., p.38.
- (22) Ibid., p.43.
- (23) Ibid., p.47.
- (24) Soler is, however, of the contrary opinion:
- It is generally held that as the press in Spain has achieved grater official tolera-tion and freedom since the death of Fran-cisco Franco in 1975, so it has lost its credibility.
- (op.cit., p.153).
- (25) Ibid., p.155.
- (26) J.L.Cebrian, "Democracy and Authoritarianism and the Role of the Press in Spain", (mimeographed) (October, 1978), p.17.
- (27) F.S.Siebert, op.cit., p.1.
- (28) For the analysis of organic statism of the Franco Spain, see J.J.Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Handbook of Political Science, F.I.Greenstein and N.W.Polsby (eds) (Reading,MA.: Addison-Welsley), pp.184 ff.

- (29) A.C.Janos, "The One-Party State and Mobilization: Eastern Europe Between the Wars", in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, S.P.Huntington and C.Moore (eds), (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p.233.
- (30) See, supra, p.63.
- (31) Linz, op.cit., pp.179-180.
- (32) Cebrian, op.cit., p.19.
- (33) L.J.Martin and A.G.Chaudhary, Comparative Mass Media Systems, (New York: Longman, 1983), p.71.
- (34) Frey goes on saying that

All of them later on, ...proved to be the main barriers to the anti-democratic activities of Adnan Menderes and his associates.

(op.cit., p.317)

and implying that the co-opted elite of these institutions were of strong democratic belief. He is right in saying that these institutions were against Menderes' efforts to establish his personal rule; but I think they did not do so because of their democratic commitments. For a detailed analysis of the military intervention which toppled the Menderes government, see Metin Heper, et.al., "Latin Amerika Deneyimleri Işığında Türkiye'de Asker-Sivil İlişkisi", (The Military-Civilian Relations in Turkey in the Light of Latin American Political Developments) İktisat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.37 (1979), pp.71-98.

- (35) The autonomous communication, after its initial development, would, and did, raise unexpected expectations in the rural masses; but this aspect of its development and that sort of impact of communications fall beyond the scope of this research. For a brief analysis of the developmental impact of the press in the multi-party period of 1950-1960, see Frey, op.cit., pp.320-326.

APPENDIX - NEWSPAPER CIRCULATIONS IN THE ONE-PARTY PERIOD

Newspapers circulation figures are usually regarded as one of the main indicators of their character of their character and the type of their readership(1). While mass circulations are seen to be indicating popular newspapers, rather limited circulations are seen to suit opinion newspapers. Besides predicting the type of newspaper from its circulation, the number of the issues sold at least distributed to be sold, can be taken as one of the illuminative indicators of the newspaper's effectiveness. Although newspaper effectiveness does not have a one-to-one relationship with the bulk of its readership as evidenced by the fact that the most influential newspapers are opinion newspapers with limited circulations rather than popular ones with mass circulations(2), yet the circulation figures are the next best indicators in determining the range of impact of newspapers.

Governments, having had to channel official paid-announcements to newspapers in proportion with their circulations began demanding disclosure of precise circulation figures after 1960. Newspapers thus started to make their circulation figures public as a part of their promotion campaigns. But in the early days of the republican era, newspaper circulations were kept a 'company (or, family) secret'; neither newspaper managements nor professional associations published there figures. For the first time, in 1929-30, when they began losing readership because of the change of script, newspapers wailed and, tried to secure bigger shares from the government's subsidy fund, declared their previous circulation figures and their loss. After 1932, they no longer published circulation figures.

One of the most reliable ways to re-establish the circulation tables of selected newspapers would be resorting to company records. Since most of the one-party newspaper had

ceased publication many years ago, and the managements of the surviving ones have been changed(3), company records were not available. Another way could be the examination of the records were not available. Another way could be the examination of the records kept by distribution companies. Although the distribution networks shared by more than one newspaper are the products of the post-1960 developments of the press, in the 1920s there were certain individuals (kahya) who collected copies of newspapers from the printshops and delivered to outlet kiosks (bayi) and to smaller deliverers (müvezzi). Some of them developed their rather minor distribution networks tied to a newspaper, or two. The Büte family has been operating in Istanbul since the Armistice Period(4). Some ill-kept records related to the newspaper circulations were still among the preserved records of that family. Since these networks distributed certain newspapers, the Büte records were helpful only for the Vakit and Vatan newspapers and some news-magazines. There are some other networks still known by journalists, but no records of them was available. Since the governments have not published the figures of newsprint consumption, one can not calculate each newspaper's share to reconstruct approximate circulation figures. But the Financial Department of the Istanbul Province (Defterdar) has figures of the stamp duties paid by newspapers which was calculated with a fixed rate for advertisements according to the circulation(5). These figures were checked to control our figures.

Some editors, however, in their memoirs, comparing their newspaper's performance with that of others', or comparing their own management with the previous one, give circulation figures. Server Iskit, sometimes depending on editors' accounts, sometimes on his own information, writes also about the circulation increases and decreases(6). Finally five government-sponsored Yearbooks(7) give cumulative circulations of all newspapers.

Table A.1 has been compiled from various sources. As indicated by the table, even depending on all available sources does not enable the student to reconstruct figures with some precision. Despite its shortcomings, Table indicates that newspaper circulations were rather small and stagnant in the 1920s. The Anatolian Government's ban on the Istanbul newspapers might be effective on that stagnation. From the mid-1920s to the Alphabet Reform of the 1928, newspaper circulations considerably increased. But the closure of some newspapers in 1925 and after resulted in overall decrease. Furthermore, according to various sources, from 1928 to 1930 newspapers suffered huge circulation losses. However, by the foundation of the Free Republican Party(8) and the polemics among the newspapers restored circulations. Some records evidence circulation increases after 1934. Only by the new world war threat, newspaper circulations began increasing (Figure A.1). The events began with the Law of the Restoration-of-Order and ended with the Free Republican Party ordeal exerted their impact on the natural trend of development of the newspapers.

Although there are conceptual problems begged by it, the number of newspaper copies per 1,000 population provides an illuminative indicator of newspaper development(9). Figure A.2. displays the path of the selected Turkish newspapers' development. Again, the political interference is evident in the interrupted trend of circulation increases.

Besides the political interference in their developments, both the absolute number of circulations and the number of copies per 1,000 population show the fact that printed media of communications had very limited area of impact. They were mainly devoted to the urban-intellectual population. Compared to the minimal standard of 100 copies of daily newspapers per 1,000 population(10), and to the figures derived from the least developed countries(11) both the 1940 and the

TABLE A.1- Sampled Newspaper Circulations With Re-Established Figures, 1920-1946

NEWSPAPER	Y E A R S								
	1920-1922	1923-125	1926-1928	1929-1931	1932-1934	1935-1937	1938-1940	1941-1943	1944-1946
Tevhidi Efkâr Tasviri Efkâr	3,000	5,000					15,000	20,000	25,000- 30,000
İkdam	3,000	5,000	15,000-20,000				10,000	15,000	15,000
Vakit Kurun	3,000	5,000	20,000-25,000	4,000-25,000	40,000	25,000	20,000	20,000	15,000- 20,000
Tanin	4,000	6,000						15,000	10,000- 15,000
Yeni Gün Cumhuriyet	500- 800	5,000	10,000-15,000	3,000-15,000	25,000	25,000	20,000	20,000	20,000- 25,000
Hakim.Milli. Ulus	1,000-1,500	5,000	10,000-15,000	3,000-10,000	20,000	15,000	10,000	15,000- 20,000	10,000- 15,000
Akşam	2,000	3,000	7,000- 8,000	3,000-10,000	25,000	30,000	35,000	40,000	25,000- 30,000
Vatan		5,000-20,000					25,000	30,000	25,000- 40,000
Milliyet Tan							20,000	15,000	
Yeni Sabah							25,000	35,000- 40,000	40,000- 60,000
T O T A L	16,500-17,300	39,000-54,000	72,000-93,000	19,000-75,000	140,000	125,000	175,000	225,000-235,000	185,000-250,000




Figure A.1- Sampled Newspapers Total Circulation, 1920-1946.




Figure A.2- Sampled Newspaper per 1,000 Population in Turkey, 1920-1946.

1969 figures demonstrate that newspapers did not have massive circulations. Depending on this statistical analysis, one might conclude, with Frey(12), that newspapers of the one-party period remained primarily as the media of the intra-elite communications; and neither the press had access to the rural areas and their problems, nor did the masses have dependence on the newspapers for their communication.

N O T E S

- (1) C.S.Steinberg (ed.), Mass Media and Communication, 2nd ed. (New York: Hastings House, 1972), p.123.
- (2) However, Bauer holds that opinion papers' influence is generally amplified by the opinion-leaders of the communities. Those opinion-leaders read opinion papers, learn the message probably disseminated for the elite and lesser-elites, add their comments to the disseminated message and convey it to their communities. R.A.Bauer, "The Audience", in Handbook of Communication, I. de Sola Pool, et.al. (eds.), (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1973), pp.141-150.
- (3) In fact, only the Cumhuriyet of the 18 major newspapers published in Istanbul between 1920-1946 has been continuing publication under the management of the same family. Aksam (now, Bulvar) is under new management; Ulus (now, Ankara Ulus) is no longer owned by the Republican People's Party; Milliyet's proprietor has been changed several times.
- (4) According to some family members, they had as remote branch offices as those of Adana, Erzurum, Trabzon, etc. (Interview with Alaattin Büte, November 14-15, 1983, Istanbul. I gladly acknowledge my gratitude to Mr. Büte for making some note-books and ledgers available to me.
- (5) The officials of the Istanbul Financial Department think that newspapers accounting departments always try to make circulations look smaller lest they should pay high duties. Besides, the Department does not have duty records before 1936.
- (6) Server Iskit, Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları, (Ankara: Basın Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü, 1943).

- (7) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Salnamesi (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1926, 1927, 1928); Devlet Yıllığı (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929, 1930).
- (8) The Vakit newspaper, printing more than 60 thousand copies on August 9, 1930, established the highest circulation record for that time. Asım Us, Gördüklerim, Duyduklarım, Duygularım (Istanbul: 1964), p.9.
- (9) E. de Kadt and G. Williams (eds), Sociology and Development (London: Tavistock, 1974) compiles many analyses critical of the developmental view of the press.
- (10) UNESCO, Mass Media in the Developing Countries: Reports and Papers, No: 33 (Paris: UNESCO, 1961).
- (11) Newspaper circulations for the main regions in 1960 were 11 copies per 1000 population in Africa, 299 in the North America, 65 in the South America, 341 in the East Asia, 16 in the South Asia, 259 in Europe and 321 in the Soviet Union (130 in the world): UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (Paris: 1969). I have calculated the same figure for Turkey as 61 copies of daily newspapers per 1,000 population in 1969. However, 49 per cent of the world population was then below the 100 copies standard of the United Nations.
- (12) F.W.Frey, The Mass Media and Rural Development in Turkey, (Cambridge, MA: Center For International Studies, MIT, 1966), passim.

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