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AN EVALUATION OF THE EMERGENCE
OF NONALIGNMENT IN THE CONTEXT
OF INDIAN AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN
POLICIES

by

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OF INDIAN AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICIES

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the context of international relations theory, it is still the state as a structure of competition which traditionally has formed the subject matter of today's world politics. Although students of international affairs have recently transnationalized and transgovernmentalized the state until it has essentially ceased to be as an analytical unit, the structure of international system can be understood, albeit imperfectly, by traditional 'nation-state-centric' approach. This approach claims that the state is dominant to such an extent that non-governmental and transnational actors get possession of influence only in so far as they can affect the policies of states. They actually play subordinate role.

Traditional approaches to international relations argue that since states are the only significant actors in world politics, diverse domestic interests had effects on international politics only through governmental foreign policy channels. Thus,

the interplay of governmental policies yields the pattern of behavior that students of international politics attempt to understand and that practitioners attempt to adjust to or control.¹

Every state involves in miscellaneous international issue areas, and this is considered as an expression of its general orientation toward the environment.

(1) Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p.371.

The term of 'orientation' implies, as Holsti argues, "a state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and aspirations and for coping with persisting threats." (2)

According to him, states adopt mainly three fundamental orientations regardless of historical context which are isolation, nonalignment, and coalition making and alliance construction. In regard to this distinction, it is the general purpose of this study to examine what kind of external and internal conditions make such countries as India and Yugoslavia nonaligned. Generally nonalignment as a foreign policy orientation signifies an unwillingness to commit military capabilities to other's purposes. The most common form of nonalignment today is found among those states that refuse to commit themselves militarily to the goals and objectives of the great powers" (3)

But after this definition a conceptual confusion still remains over the differences among such concepts as neutrality and neutralism. Liska proposes a distinction between these concepts focusing on ideological manners. According to him nonalignment can be adopted on the basis of rational estimates of the conditions required for national security and domestic stability. On the contrary, nonrational ideological preoccupations and pragmatic quest for aid and status play key role to pursue militant neutral orientations.

(2) Holsti, K.J., International Politics, Printice Hall, New Jersey, p.109.

(3) Ibid., p.114.

Another distinction proposed by Holsti assume that the main difference between a neutralized state and nonaligned state is that "the former has achieved its position by virtue of the actions of others, whereas the latter chooses its orientation by itself and has no guarantees that its position will be honored by others"(4)

The appearance of newly independent states after the Second World War on the world stage has caused changes, in the literature of foreign policy theory concerning international behaviors and orientations of these states. At the beginning, students of foreign policy making in developing states tended to use, as Hill pointed out, one of three approaches. First one was derived from the models constructed during the study of foreign policy making in the already modernized countries, second includes a special frame of reference which focuses exclusively on the behavior of newly independent states, and third combines the first two approaches by treating different types of state within the same set of concepts. Hill refuses to use the first two approaches respectively and claims that "the variety of problems and decision making procedures encountered by states hardly seems justification for the kind of intellectual separatism that would hive off developing countries into special conceptual categories. On the other hand it also seems to make nonsense of attempts to apply narrowly Western models to radically different cultures."(5)

(4) Ibid., p.113

(5) Hill, C., Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries, London, 1977. pp.1-3.

In the same context Korany criticizes the conventionally accepted foreign policy analysis and points out its lack of empirical relevance to third world actors and proposes an alternative model, 'situation-role' model, for the analysis of foreign policy making amongst newly independent states. By way of simple definition, situational analysis stipulates that the action or behavior of an actor is a function of the situation he confronts. The model "focuses conceptualization on 'situation' of third world actors and attempts operationalization of some specific components of this situation; systemic strain, position in a stratified international system, and national role conceptions," and offers "a way to build upon the contributions of other approaches to foreign policy analysis, while helping to minimize their drawbacks"(6)

According to him, there must^{be} a set of components which has to be multi-level and embrace the domestic subsystem, the international system and the personality variables of the policy maker. Related with the first component, he claims, a plausible hypothesis is to be based on the societal function of foreign policy in third-world actors. Particularly, in terms of newly independent states, there is a crucial linkage between their foreign policy orientations and the domestic necessities.

During the late fifties, as Good pointed out, many of new states have inherited the form of the state but its prerequisites, and therefore foreign policy in these newly independent states has to be considered as a continuation of the revolution

(6) Korany, B. "Foreign Policy Models and Their Empirical Relevance to Third-World Actors: A Critique and an Alternative,"

against colonial rule; as an effort to establish the identity and integrity of the state; as a means of keeping an in-group in power and as a means of reducing foreign influence at home.

"The point is that foreign policy for a new state is mainly a response to domestic conditions, not to external problems. Rather than attempt to manipulate the external environment in ways suitable to the nation's interest, the foreign policy of a new state seeks to affect its internal environment in ways favorable to the building of the state and to maintenance of the regime in power" (7)

On the other hand, it may be useful to remember Hill's argument concerned with theories of foreign policy making for the developing countries which partly rejects Good's four purposes for which foreign policies of newly independent states serve; to continue the revolution against colonial rule, to establish the identity of new states; to keep an in-group in power, and to reduce foreign influence at home.

"it is certainly true that the first two of these functions are by definition restricted to newly independent states. Beyond that, it is difficult to see why 'the uses of foreign policy' should be accepted either as an adequate theoretical approach or as a concept peculiar to one class of states. The idea of 'uses' distracts us from the various environmental constraints under which decision makers have to operate...It implies too much manipulative intent and capability...Furthermore...foreign policies are pursued to help in-groups stay in power in modernised states no less than elsewhere; indeed it is almost an intrinsic attribute of foreign policy that it should help to reduce foreign influence at home" (8)

(7) Good, R.C., "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Neutralism and Nonalignment, (ed.) Martin, L.W., Frederic A. Praeger, New York, 1962. p.11.

(8) Hill, op.cit., p.7.

Korany considers Good's argument, 'domestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state', satisfactory but points out that the utility of these 'hypotheses' was perhaps limited because the author did not provide 'hard data', and underlines Haas's proposition: "internal malintegration of rural countries encourages decision-makers to display non-aligned, non-involved and only warlike patterns of behavior."⁽⁹⁾

It has been conventionally accepted that the structure of the international system is one of the most important component that affects the foreign policy orientations of the states. For instance, it is clear that the more cohesive and a polar system leave less freedom of action for the weaker members of the system and that their orientations are determined by the general distribution of power in the system and by the interests of the great powers. Theoretically, as Holsti argues, "the military capabilities of member units in a hierarchical system are bound....to the center unit... In the polar system, where all states belong to antagonistic blocs, there is similarly no room for...states that attempt to remain...noninvolved in bloc conflicts."⁽¹⁰⁾

Therefore, non-involvement in East-West disagreements has become the most outstanding principle of nonalignment. But it does not mean aloofness as some neutralist argues. For instance, in an address delivered before the Congress of the United States, Nehru said:

⁽⁹⁾ Korany, op.cit.p.16.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Holsti, op.cit.p.115.

"We have to achieve freedom and to defend it. We have to meet aggression and resist it and the force employed must be adequate to the purpose...We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we can not and shall not be neutral."(11)

Additionally, the relationship between national interests and foreign policy making has to be elaborated. According to traditional approaches, foreign policies are the government's definition of a state's international objectives combined with a plan for action to reach them.

"Foreign policy expresses the needs and wants of the state whose fulfilment the government conceives of as beneficial for the state. The sum total of these needs and wants are the state's interests in the international society. More correctly, national interests are the actualized needs and wants...Actually...the specific national interests and the ways provided by the international system to realize them increasingly determined the character of the new state's foreign policies."(12)

Therefore, it may be assumed that a government that refers to its special responsibilities or national roles would take various actions to fulfill them. Also these actions may be consistent with its interests. For instance, during the 1950's, it may be claimed that for the great majority of the nonaligned countries, national interest has been best served by joining neither alliance system and being wooed by both.

(11) Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-1953, New Delhi, 1954. p.122.

(12) Levi, W., "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. XIV., No:1 (March 1970) p.12.

Nevertheless, orientations and role perceptions of the states can not determine foreign policy actions. In other words, as Holsti puts emphasis, "Where there is a conflict between immediate 'national interests' and the duties deriving from national role conceptions, the former may very well prevail."⁽¹³⁾

As a conclusion this thesis will try to evaluate the emergence of nonalignment in the context of Indian foreign policy through emphasis on origins of general foreign policy orientation and type of commitments, and their transformation from idealistic standpoint to more realistic one, and what kind of external and internal conditions make such countries as India and Yugoslavia nonaligned.

⁽¹³⁾ Holsti., op.cit.p.364.

A. International Relations Towards the Second World War.

During the interwar period, a status quo generally existed between great powers in world politics. In this period, "the concept of international relations" was being used to accentuate theories of "interstate relations". Both students and practitioners of international politics tended to concentrate their attention on relationships between states. The state, particularly in theory, was taken into consideration as an actor with its own purposes and power and as elementary unit of action. For instance, N.J. Spykman was one of those who were looking at the existing state of international relations from "systematic" point of view, argued that "international relations are relations between individuals belonging to different states, ... international behavior is the social behavior individuals or groups aimed, ... or influenced by the existence or behavior of individuals or groups belonging to a different state." (14) Thus, the interaction of governmental policies implied the pattern of behavior which students of international politics had to attempt to understand and to which practitioners of the international politics had to adjust or control. In this frame of mind, violence and threats have been placed at the core of interaction, the struggle to come into power is the distinguishing mark of politics among nations. Since "most political scientists and many diplomats seem to accept this view of reality, and a state-centric view of world affairs prevails." (15)

(14) Spykman, N.J., "Methods of Approach to the Study of International Relations," Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related Subjects, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933. p.196.

(15) Keshane and Nye, op.cit., p.IX.

Particularly the political developments between 1930-1939, which were described as 'the period of crisis:the return of power politics' by E.H.Carr, completely destroyed the former idealist and utopian expectations and led to the Second World War. The intellectual construction of international politics by the second part of the period rapidly divorced itself from its all moralistic interpretations which were based on international legal rights and obligations and on the natural harmony of national interests as a regulator for the preservation of international peace. The period between 1920-1930 witnessed the zenith of the League of Nations.⁽¹⁶⁾ But after the economic breakdown in 1929 and its immediate aftermath utopian-idealist interpretations of international relations were crumbled. Stressing confidence in the peace-building function of the 'world court of public opinion' and of 'world government' versus realism resting on the system of nation states, which monopolize the legitimate use of power at national level, was answered as a whole by the Second World War.

Towards the outbreak of the Second World War, Carr analysed the state of international relations resting upon above-mentioned diversity by saying that "the inner meaning of the modern international crisis is the collapse of the whole structure of utopianism based on the concept of the harmony of interests."⁽¹⁷⁾ According to Carr, international morality of the interwar years, upon which utopist views rested, merely justified the interests of the 'English speaking' status quo powers, of the satisfied versus unsatisfied in terms of the results of the First World War.

(16) see Carr, E.H., International Relations Between the Two World Wars, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1947, 10th reprinting, p.98.

(17) Carr, E.H., The Twenty-Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the study of International Relations, Harper and Row, New York, 1964, p.62

After the Second World War, however, the understanding of international relations in Anglo-Saxon countries reversed entirely and the study in this field was strongly influenced and then dominated by the realist approach. Realists considered international relations as a power struggle, ignored 'ideals', became fundamentally conservative, empirical, suspicious against international morality, and respectful of the lessons of history. According to this view, the world consists of a set of states which can control what is going within their borders by capturing and monopolizing legitimate use of power in order to conduct interactions between their citizens and people in other countries and to maximize their national interests through a struggle of power. (18)

The Second World War completely destroyed utopian expectations and fortified the power-oriented realist point of view in Western countries. Lessons of the war seemingly showed that neither international law nor international organization can serve as a substitute for the element of power in international relations. Those countries struggling to obtain their independence from European colonial states, however tried to realize their utopian expectations.

New idealist-utopian views revealed themselves by emphasizing such concepts as nationalism, decolonization, and particularly, independence and self determination.

(18) For a detailed discussion see Morgenthau, H.J. and Aron, R., Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. R. Howard and A.B. Fox, Frederick A. Preager, London, 1967, and see Waltz, K.N., Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Those countries which embraced the new ideas had previously found the United States as the most friendly and clean-handed country in the world. "Self-determination, a word American presidents minted for international coinage", claimed C.W. Maynes, an officer in the Department of state of the United States, "swept the world. New states took their place on the international stage most verbally supporting our values, most visibly copying our institutions...They asked for our help. We seemed to have new friends and new interests."(19)

One of the most outstanding characteristics of the post-war era was that the United States emerged as an omnipotent imperial power on a world scale. The Second World War had left the United States, particularly as compared with the Soviet Union, with an imbalance between the means of projecting power and proper ends for this extension. "The U.S." , Metz argued "was like an ungainly adolescent boy who suddenly finds himself strong, but yet is without the guiding constraints on the use the strength" in the post-world war. (20)

On the same aspect of the United States policies exercised in the post-war era, Deconde shares Metz's views:

"Never had any nation attained such immense power as had the United States at the end of the Second World War. It had a strong battle-tested army, a navy more powerful than all other fleets combined, the world's greatest air force, strategic bases scattered over the globe, and in the atomic bomb held the secret of a weapon capable of such vast destruction that no one had a defence against it . In industrial capacity and production of wealth America was also far ahead of other countries.(21)

(19) Maynes, C.W., Department of State Bulletin, No. 2035, p. 32.

(20) Metz., S., "American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa Political Science Quarterly, Vol. IC. No. 3 (Fall. 1984) p. 519.

(21) Deconde, A., A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II., Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1978, p. 204.

By the end of the war the cooperation between the United States with Western European Powers and the Soviet Union, upon which all hopes of a satisfactory post-war settlement were based, was not forthcoming. Particularly, after the death of President Roosevelt, rivalry between the power poles became obvious, and exacerbated by the possession of the atomic bomb. The United States administration started to promote a policy of expansion designed, firstly, to contain and secondly, to expell all Sovietic influence from Eastren Europe. The new war among old allies the 'Cold War' quickly spread throughout Europe. (22)

Winston Churchill with President Truman, in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, said that from Stettin in The Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended accross the continen

(22) On the issue of 'Cold War', academic profession is divided between 'traditionalists' and 'revisionists'. Traditional historians contend that external factors had little effect on Soviet policies and actions during and immediately after Second World War. Revisionist historians assert that external influences-especially American diplomacy-had a significant impact on Soviet behavior. The former emphasises the aggressive, inflexible, inexorable, inevitable nature of Soviet policies. The latter stress the adaptive, responsive, reactive, flexible nature of Soviet policy, particularly Stalin's willingness to consider alternative courses of action and to negotiate certain crucial issues with his American and British allies. The chief implication of the former approach is that Soviet 'expansionism' was the primary cause of the breakdown of allied cooperation and onset of the Cold War; the latter interpretation; on the contrary, argues that unrealistic and time to time fierce Western diplomacy was the major cause of cold war which reduced policy alternatives open to Stalin and thus induced him to choose 'hard line' policies he might not have choosen otherwise

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and claimed that all those living behind it were controlled from Moscow.

The goal of the United States' foreign policy during this period was the containment of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. The endeavour to create a set of military alliances throughout the southern borders of the Soviet Union was incorporated with another aim: the recovery of Europe's economy based on the exploitation of the natural resources of Africa which was considered essential to this recovery. (23) Under these conditions, status quo became the most important aspect of international policies which the United States put into action. Therefore, despite the enormous changes in the post-war era, the United States turned into an imperial state which increasingly assumed a position of the chief proponent of the status quo wherever and whatever it might be, whether under attack from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries or from anticolonialist and nationalist struggles in Asian-African countries. Particularly during the early 1950s, it was felt that decolonization was blockaded by the United States, supported by the rest of the Western alliance, in order to complete the above mentioned problem of 'the recovery of Europe'. The decolonization process and other political problems in colonial domains, as J.F. Dulles pointed out, "were to be viewed through the prism provided by the Cold War." (24)

(23) Ibid. p. 518.

(24) Ibid. p. 521.

The last statement vividly clarifies the intricate relationship between the United States' policies toward the Soviet Union and those toward the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. For instance, it was felt that decolonization was to proceed only when the allegiance of the new state to the Western alliance could be ensured. In late 1950s, an African expert of the Secretary of State argued that "premature independence and lack of appreciation of the interdependence of the world community may be as dangerous for Africa as the denial of independence."⁽²⁵⁾ The point was reiterated by another African expert, G.M. Williams, in the Kennedy administration: "Our self interests in Africa stem from the acceptance of the idea that there can be no peace for our children or our children's children unless there is stability and satisfaction around the world."⁽²⁶⁾

From another-realist-point of view, decolonization process in Asia and Africa was considered in terms of the military balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"In any case, they (the Soviet Union) seem to attach great importance to the success they expect to gain by non-military means, particularly in the areas presently neutral or neutralist. What matters here is that such success even if attained by economic, propagandistic or subversive means, might have a very serious impact on the world balance of military power."⁽²⁷⁾

⁽²⁵⁾ Holmes, J.C., "Africa its Challenge to the West," The State Department Press Release, No. 32, 27. Jan. 1958.

⁽²⁶⁾ Williams, G.M., "American Foreign Policy and the Emerging Nations of Africa," State Department Press Release, No. 241.4. Nov. 1962.

⁽²⁷⁾ Wolfers, A., "Allies, Neutrals, and Neutralists in the Context of U.S. Defense Policy," in Neutrality and Nonalignment, (ed.) Martin, L.W., op.cit. p.152.

As the above statements indicate, with the circumstances of the Cold War, the power concept came to hold a key position in international relations. Several scholars in the years after the Second World War elaborated upon the power concept in international relations by arguing that it "signifies a type of relations between states in which certain patterns of behavior are predominant: armaments, isolationism, power diplomacy, power economics, regional or universal imperialism, alliances, balance of power, and war." (28) Also, another scholar of the same period saw the concept to distinguish of modern history from medieval history:

"What distinguishes modern history from medieval history is the predominance of the idea of power over the idea of right; the very term 'power' to describe a state in its international aspect is significant; and the view of the man in the street, who is perhaps inclined to take it for granted that foreign politics are inevitably 'power politics', is not without a shrewd insight" (29)

(28) Schwarzenberger, G., Power Politics: A Study of World Society, New York, Frederick A. Preager, 1951, p.13.

(29) Wight, M., Power Politics, Pamphlet No.8, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p.11.

B. Retreat of British Empire From India and Gandhian Liberation Methods.

The post-war years witnessed the retreat of the European powers from the great empires that they had built in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As a matter of fact, at the outbreak of the Second World War, in the case of British Empire, as Carr pointed out, eventually proved that "the Dominions did not feel themselves bound automatically to follow the lead of Great Britain and that each of them acted in its own right in obedience to a sense of its own prestige and interest." (30)

Certainly, the most imposing, because of its symbolic significance, of all the withdrawals was that of the British from India. "In contrast to later examples of the relinquishment of colonial domains, this was marked for the most part by good sense and political intelligence, and in consequence much evil was avoided." (31) India's importance in the decolonization process stemmed from many reasons. The most impressive and well-known reason concerned the Gandhian philosophy and its implementation which attempted to divorce the 'power' concept from politics. His philosophy and its implementation strongly influenced decolonization movements in other parts of the world under colonial domination.

(30) Carr, op.cit. p.257.

(31) Craig, G.A., Europe Since 1914, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, N. New York, 1966, p.847.

Other reasons which gave to India a very special place of leadership to other countries are related to the size of the country. Regarding its size, India is not merely a country, but a sub-continent. After China it is the second largest country in the world.

Secondly, the Indian struggle for independence under Gandhi's leadership succeeded to obtain freedom from an enormous colonial empire. Other than British colonies regarded the Indian example as a demonstration of direct relevance to their desires for independence since it symbolised a shared colonial history.

Gandhi's philosophy and its implementation influenced many Afro-Asian countries in the struggle for independence. Leaders of these countries tended to adopt, either wholly or in part, methods of civil disobedience, civil resistance, and non-violence. The Indian case became the best known, as Roberts argued, "because of Gandhi's extraordinary generalship."⁽³²⁾

For instance, in June 1949, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana launched the strategy of positive action:

"I described 'Positive Action' as the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India"⁽³³⁾

(32) Roberts, A., "Civil Resistance As a Technique in International Relations," The Year Book of World Affairs 1970, (eds.) Keeton, G.W. and Schwarzenberger, G., Vol. XXIV., Stevens and Sons, London, 1970, p. 30.

(33) Nkrumah, K., Ghana, the Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh, 1959, p. 92.

Concerning African nationalism, Mazrui argues that India had proved, by being the first to achieve independence, that it was possible for a non-white dependency to eliminate the British rule, and this fact was immediately grasped by nationalists in other coloured countries.⁽³⁴⁾ As a matter of fact, in the early years of his life Gandhi considered non-violence as a method which could be well suited for the black peoples of other countries as well as the Indian. By 1936 Gandhi was wondering whether black people, as the most oppressed of all peoples, might not be the best bearers of the message of passive resistance. In his own words, "It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of non-violence will be delivered to the world"⁽³⁵⁾ After independence, Kwame Nkrumah repeated the same point: "We salute Mahatma Gandhi and we remember, in tribute to him, that it was in South Africa that his method of non-violence and non-cooperation was first practised."⁽³⁶⁾

At this stage two important questions regarding the Gandhian philosophy and way of action may be put forward. One links the relationship between the Indian struggle for independence and British politics and Anglo-Saxon liberal ideas. As Mazrui argued:

"Passive resistance works if the régime gives it a certain degree of legitimacy... Gandhism needed to have an enemy with a political ethic which did not equate all political resistance with treason. Anglo-Saxon liberalism was such an ethic. In fact, sustained Gandhian tactics in this century have only worked against Anglo-Saxon régimes. They worked against the British in India and, to some extent, in the Gold Coast."⁽³⁷⁾

(34) Mazrui, A.A., The Anglo-African Common-Wealth: Political Friction and Cultural Fusion, Pergamon Press, London, 1967. p.12.

(35) Harijan, March, 14, 1936. Quoted in Mazrui, A.A., *Ibid.* p.12.

(36) Nkrumah, K., "Positive Action in Africa", in Africa Speaks, (eds) Duffy, J. and Manners, R.A., D. Van Nastrand, Princeton, 1961, p.50. quoted in Mazrui, *Ibid.* p.14.

(37) Mazrui, A.A., *Ibid.* p.20.

The second question concerns the methodological similarity between the pacification of natives' and Gandhi's doctrine of non-violence. Mazrui points that out by calling attention to the relation between non-violence and British colonial policies, the basic, preliminary aim of which was the so-called pacification of natives'. According to him, "the doctrine of non-violence which the imperial power itself had encouraged and fostered as an instrument of pacification and control was now mobilised as an instrument of liberation and indigenous fulfillment: the Indian nationalist movement and its struggle for independence were truly under way."⁽³⁸⁾ In the same context, in another view, to some extent supporting Mazrui, Koestler argues, "India had reached the point of independence not because of 'ahimsa', but because the Empire had gone into voluntary self-liquidation."⁽³⁹⁾

Particularly in terms of postwar utopianism, it might be proposed that Gandhian philosophy and way of action, based on civil disobedience and non-violence, exposed two significant implications: non-military interpretation of politics and mass participation in politics. At both national and international levels, these consequences became the pillars of the most favorite arguments of the leaders of non-aligned countries." Previously, the early years of the Indian struggle for independence, under the leadership of Gandhi, demonstrated a set of aspects of utopianism. The victory of India, Gandhi says, will deliver a message for non-violence to the mankind, and then a new value system will begin to prevail all over the world:

(38) Mazrui, A., "Changing the Guards from Hindus to Muslims: Collective Third World Security in a Cultural Perspective," International Affairs, Vol. LVII, Winter 1980/81, NO. 1, p. 2.

(39) Koestler, A., "Mahatma Gandhi: The Yogi and the Commissar," in Roberts, A., *ibid.* p. 32.

"If India comes to her own demonstrably through non-violence India will never want to carry a vast army... If her self-consciousness rises to the height necessary to give her a non-violent victory in her fight for freedom, the world values will have changed and most of the paraphernalia of war would be found to be useless. Such an India may be a mere daydream, a childish folly. But such, in my opinion, is undoubtedly the implication of an India becoming free through non-violence"(40)

At the national level he began to develop an image of a utopia as well, which he claimed lay buried in India's glorious past. "He began to idealise the prehistory of Hinduism, in which it is impossible to disentangle facts from mythology."⁽⁴¹⁾ His political action coexisted with his religious personality. This provided a framework for his utopian interpretations. He considered himself a religious leader and elaborated politics in terms of religion:

"My bent is not political, but religious, and I take part in politics because I feel that there is no department of life that can be divorced from religion and because politics touch the vital being of India almost at every point. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the political relation between Englishmen and ourselves should be put on a sound basis." (42)

At the international level, Gandhi expressed the desires of newly emerging nation states by suggesting an international league only when all the nations, big or small, composing it are fully independent. Thus, it will be created as a new society "based on non-violence, the smallest nation will feel as tall as the tallest."⁽⁴³⁾

(40) Gandhi, M.K., "A Complex Problem," Young India, May 9, 1929, in Readings in World Politics, (ed.) Goldwin, R.A., Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1959, p. 344.

(41) Ali, T., The Nehrus and the Gandhis: An Indian Dynasty, Picador, 1985, London, p. 37.

(42) Quoted in Ali, Ibid. p. 39.

(43) Gandhi, M.K., "Working of Non-Violence," Harijan, February 11, 1939, in Readings in World Politics, op.cit., pp. 347-348.

At this stage, Gandhian utopianism's last aspect is understood as one of the stimulative elements of the post-war conferences and meetings of newly emerging nation states, more particularly that of nonalignment.

The Gandhian version of post-war utopianism inevitably has been changed into a realistic interpretation in course of time. Gandhi, himself, was aware of his own paradox as a nation-state builder, and predicted India's probable acceptance of power politics in international affairs.

"If India takes up the doctrine of the sword, she may gain momentary victory. Then India will cease to be the pride of my heart...She is not to copy Europe blindly. India's acceptance of the doctrine of the sword will be the hour of my trial." (44)

Mazrui asks, considering Gandhi who tried to make India an independent member of international system of nation-states, whether the use of the Gandhian philosophy in the cause of India's independence was itself a betrayal of that genuine philosophy. India's struggle was Mazrui claims, "a knock on the door of the state system, asking for admission into that system of nation states...The global system of nation-states has in turn been a structure of pressed, international violence." (45) Although India did not take up the doctrine of the sword under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, Gandhian utopianism and way of action, based on civil disobedience and non-violence, seemed in disarray concerning her internal problems. When he was replying to some questions in 1947, he confessed his failure by making a distinction between utopia and reality:

(44) Gandhi, M.K., "My Attitude Towards War," Young India, September 13, 1928, in Goldwin, (ed), op.cit., p. 341.

(45) Mazrui, op.cit., p. 2.

"I must confess my bankruptcy, not that of non-violence...All I can say is that my faith is as strong as ever. It is quite possible that my technique is faulty...Millions like me may fail to prove the truth in their own lives, that would be their failure, never of the eternal law."(46)

The Gandhian way of action and his achievement to drive India into the modern state system predominated robustly an anticolonial outgrowth in other parts of Asia and Africa. Keneth Kaunda of Zambia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and others regarded themselves as followers of Gandhian methods of liberation, and India's guidance of the Third World coupled Gandhi's symbolic leadership.

As a conclusion, the case of India in the struggle for independence exhibits mainly three significant aspects of post-war utopianism which influenced strongly nonalignment as a foreign policy orientation: non-military interpretation of politics, mass participation in politics, and an international society in which 'the smallest nation will feel as tall as the tallest.'

(46) Gandhi, M.K., "Non-Violence," Harijan, June 29, 1947, in Goldwin, (ed.), p. 349.

II. ORIGINS OF INDIAN NONALIGNMENT

On 15 August 1947 India emerged as a new state, but she represented an ancient civilization with a rich cultural background, and this had an important bearing on the formulation of her foreign policy. Nehru in a speech in these early years of independence, pointed out that "a country's foreign policy ultimately emerges from its own urges, from its own objectives, and more particularly, from its recent past."⁽⁴⁷⁾

Having been obliged to fight side by side Britain as a colony during the two world wars, Indian leaders were aware of the potential restrictions that could confront a weak country allied with a great power; and this encouraged them to develop an independent foreign policy. For instance, as early as 1925, the Indian National Congress had established the four cardinal points that determine India's path in international relations. These were: opposition to imperialism and colonial rule; support of subject peoples and oppressed races in their struggle for freedom and equality; promotion of peace and abhorrence of war; and avoidance of foreign entanglements.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Because nonalignment and India have a special association, it is believed that Nehru visualized the idea of nonalignment and was the first Asian leader to adopt it consistently in his country's foreign policy. Therefore, it can be put forward that India's leadership in the Third World was sustained by and after Gandhi, was ascribed to the diplomatic personality of Nehru. In 1950s, as Gunther argues:

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Quoted by Gupta, C., "National Interest and World Reform," in India's Nonalignment Policy, (ed.) Power, P.F., D.C. Heath and Co., Boston, 1967, p.8.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ Dhar, S.N., International Relations and World Politics Since 1919, Asia Publishing House, Calcutta, 1965, p.485.

"The tendency of most emergent Africans is to be neutralist. In other words, the United States has lost ground so far, not gained it; among educated Africans anti-American sentiment is often pronounced. Jawaharlal Nehru is more likely to be the spiritual father of the new Africa than Dwight Eisenhower" (49)

He was known as "the last of the great Indian National Congress figures of pre-independence days, when Mahatma Gandhi nominated him as successor"⁽⁵⁰⁾ Also, Gandhi considered him as a unique personality who would be able to link India to the twentieth century. Nehru was obliged to bridge the gap between those who were westernized under the impact of British education and estranged of Indian reality, and those who devoted themselves to the traditional Hindu way of life.⁽⁵¹⁾

With the particular consideration of nonalignment, it should be added that the initial pronouncement of the most outstanding principles of non-alignment belongs to Nehru. From this point, the birth of the concept might be traced to the broadcast made by him on 7 September 1946:

(49) Quoted in Sengupta, op.cit., p.87.

(50) The Annual Register-World Events in 1964, (ed.) Macadam, I., Longmans, London, 1965, p.81.

(51) Heykel, H., Kahire Dosyası, (translated by B.Buktaş) Bilgi, Ankara, 1974, p.321.

"We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practised. We seek no domination over others, and we claim no privileged position over other peoples" (52)

With the above quote in mind, an elaboration of the origins of Indian foreign policy in light of Nehru's understanding of international politics is merited.

A. Geopolitical Origins of Indian Foreign Policy and Nehru's Beliefs on National Interest.

When independent India began its foreign relations in 1946 and 1947, she had a clean slate on which anything might be written. Although this holds true in terms of her policy commitments, it does not apply in any wider sense. For India, her performance in international relations was conditioned by a variety of inescapable limitations. Primarily, India was conditioned by geography which gives India a central position on the Asian mainland and predisposes it towards a continental Asian feeling. As mentioned above, geographical size and shape are also important determinants of any state's foreign policy.

(52) Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches 1946-April 1961, New Delhi, 1961, pp.2-3.

Territorially, India is one of the largest countries in the world, with almost 12,000 kilometers of land frontiers. The consequence is that hostile relations with neighbours would inevitably create a considerably heightened concern for security and national integrity.

Additionally, the frontiers inherited from the British Empire were not properly delineated in the mountainous north, and were the product of a hasty partition in the west and in the east. (53)

The primary geopolitical factor concerning the physical features of this nation is the buffer role of the Himalayan mountain range on her northern frontier, as this unique geographic periphery of India promotes defence. India lies at a strategic position at the head of the Indian Ocean, and a major feature of the state's geographical location is its long sea frontiers, which stretches for 4500 kilometers. This, taken in conjunction with the fact that the vast bulk of India's external trade occurs through the maritime route, means that any naval role the great powers wish to play in the Indian Ocean affects her vital interests.

From the global perspective, one of the central features of geopolitics is that the South Asian subcontinent is essentially a peripheral region of the enormous Euro-Asian land mass.

Of the three leading great powers, the United States, is located on the other side of the world, geographically the farthest away and the Soviet Union, although belonging to Asia

(53) Lyon, P., "The Foreign Policy of India," in Northedge, F.S. (ed.) The Foreign Policies of the Powers, Faber and Faber, London, 1974,

as much as to Europe, shares no border with India. On the other hand, China is a militant great power with whom she has a long, common frontier, and so India cannot uphold a philosophical view of her northern neighbour that may be possible with regard to the super powers, with whom no direct territorial problems could arise. Whether the relationship is characterized by co-operation or by conflict, China remains a permanent preoccupation by necessity.

India's particular geopolitical location in the world has facilitated her own brand of foreign policy, as was explained by Nehru:

"We are geographically situated to play the role of nonalignment and geography points a great deal in such matters. If you are a small country surrounded by great, big and hostile powers, then it is not an easy matter for such a country to face the situation bravely and to call itself nonaligned."(54)

Nehru elaborated this point in the context of bloc politics by concluding that India is a great country on the world stage.

"I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater powers and becoming practically satellites of those powers because they cannot help it. The power, opposed them is so great and they have nowhere to turn. But I do not think that consideration applies to India...We are not citizens of a weak or mean country and I think it is foolish for us to get frightened, even from a military point of view, of the greatest of the Powers today."(55)

(54) From a speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs, 5.4.1960, quoted by Appaduria, op.cit.p.485.

(55) From a speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly, on March 8, 1948. Quoted in Nehru: the First Sixty Years, (ed.) Norman, D., The Badley Head, London, 1965, pp. 383-384.

Besides being territorially and demographically one of the largest countries in the world, India is also economically one of the poorest. Therefore, (India's poverty stands as a fundamental fact conditioning her understanding of foreign relations and making mandatory a "policy of non-alienation" with regard to her external economic relations.)⁽⁵⁶⁾ Because the Indian understanding of international relations like that of other countries, has been rested on her leader's interpretation of her national interest, Nehru's concept of 'national interest' has to be taken into consideration. In his views, India's primary national interests have remained unchanging and these are twofold: the maintenance of national freedom and integrity, and economic development. Nehru accepted nonalignment as an extension of these two pillars, as permitting freedom of action which is a part of independence.⁽⁵⁷⁾ He also argued that while nonalignment was a fundamental policy, 'its application to a particular circumstance or resolution, is a matter of judgement.'⁽⁵⁸⁾

In this context, he pointed out that the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to that country. According to him, "a government functions for the good of the country it governs, and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country."⁽⁵⁹⁾

(56) Brecher, M., The New States of Asia, op.cit., pp.114-120.

(57) Nehru, J. "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, April 1963, p.457.

(58) Nehru, J., Speeches: September 1957 to April 1963, Government of India, Publications Division, Vol.4, New Delhi, 1964, p.384.

(59) From a speech delivered in Constituent Assembly, 4.2.1947, quoted by Appadoria, A., op.cit., p.490.

Finally in his approach to international politics, Nehru believed, India had to refuse to enter into any prior obligation, military or political with another state or group of states, and must represent freedom of policy and action, in conformity with international law, and the status of nonalignment. Through these means the objective of national interest is realized.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In deciding that India's foreign policy should be oriented to nonalignment. Nehru was motivated by national interest. In his speeches, he often referred to this. For instance he once said that "I do not think it (nonalignment) is purely idealistic; I think it is, if you like, opportunistic in the long run"⁽⁶¹⁾ On other occasions, he frequently asserted that India could not be a camp follower, and must 'inevitably' follow an independent policy because of India's past and because it was not "some odd little nation somewhere in Asia or Europe", but 'potentially a great nation and a big power', and in terms of domestic politics, nonalignment represented the highest common factor of agreement in India's thinking on foreign policy."⁽⁶²⁾

As a conclusion, Nehru's interpretation of the corresponding relationship between nonalignment and India's national interest is expressed most eloquently in his own words.

⁽⁶⁰⁾ Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy, Government of India, Publications Division, New Delhi, 1961, p.35.

⁽⁶¹⁾ Ibid.p.31.

⁽⁶²⁾ Ibid.p.73 and p.47.

"Now, I am talking in terms of this bloc or that bloc; I am talking independently of the blocs as they have appeared on the world stage. We have either to pursue our policy generally within limitations-because we cannot pursue it wholeheartedly, nevertheless openly-or give it up. I do not think anything could be more injurious to us from any point of view...than for us to give up the policies that we have pursued, namely, those of standing up for certain ideals in regard to...,oppressed nations instead of aligning ourselves with this great power or that and becoming its camp follower in the hope that some crumbs might fall from the table. I think that would undoubtedly be, even from the narrowest point of view of national interest, a bad and harmful policy."(63)

Nehru's thinking on foreign relations of India contains a set of elements, which stem from the continuum between his policies at home and abroad. In other words, the fact that the external relations of a country are a prolongation of its internal policies brings forward his views on the relationship between the Indian understanding of foreign affairs and that of internal questions. After the independence, the most important problem for Nehru was to maintain the integrity of India and to prevent the emergence of new 'Pakistans'. Thus, the hindrance of 'Pakistanism' and other questions concerned with the endurance of integrity of India became the key points of Indian politics.

(63) From a speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948, in Nehru, J., Independence and After, Government of India Publications Divisions, New Delhi, 1949, Quoted in Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. II, Norman, D. (ed.) The Badley Head, London, 1965, p. 383.

The concept of 'Pakistanism' necessitates further explanation. The word principally refers to the separatism based on religious causes. The term derives from the experience of India with the demands of the Muslim League, and its use has since expanded. 'Pakistanism' holds a particular preeminence in the political terminology of African countries which suffer from similar separatist questions. (64)

The question of 'Pakistanism' in internal affairs and the question of Pakistan in foreign affairs played a central role in Nehru's policies. (65)

Muslim separatist movement had further repercussions than that of Sikhs, but the problems of both are well articulated by Nehru. He tried to keep the integrity of India whereby federal states were based on a linguistic ethnic basis. He hoped that the use of English and Hindi would facilitate the unity of country. He emphasized the importance of the question of language:

(64) See for a detailed discussion Mazrui, A.A., "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Atatürk Mirası Açısından Afrika: Siyasal Kültürde Yerellik ve Evrensellik" in Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk, Eczacıbaşı, İstanbul, 1982, pp. 573-592.

(65) It should be noted that Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, was killed because of the same problem, but not because of the Muslim separatism. She spoke of 'Sikh' separatism before she was shot down by Sikh militants: "India is a deeply religious country, and when anything like this happens, people are bound to be hurt...I would say it is a traumatic experience (she refers to the summer 1984 Sikh rebellion) in our long history we have had many such experiences, and we have got over them." from the interview with I. Gandhi in Newsweek, July, 2, 1984, p. 2.

"Greater development of political consciousness among the people, and the growing importance of great regional languages led gradually to demands for the formation of certain states, however, there are other important facts which have also to be born in mind. The first essential consideration is the preservation and the strengthening of the unity and security of India"(66)

When he paid a visit to China in 1954, he concluded at a press conference that "China and India appeared to have an identical purpose to establish and strengthen peace and to channel the energies of their people into the great tasks of national reconstruction in an effort to keep pace with other advanced nations."(67) He complained about the same problem at a public meeting on another occasion: "China's great strength lay in her national unity and the enthusiasm among her people, particularly among the young, to co-operate wholeheartedly in national reconstruction. Whereas India had to eliminate communal, provincial and others' sectional interests. China had no such problem."(68)

Towards the end of 1953, Nehru opposed some constitutional changes which were proposed to give the Pakistani Constitution a more Islamic character.(69) Nehru stated at a press conference that the proposed constitution created "two classes of citizens" and would give the minorities "a sense of frustration", although it was true that they were given protection, the whole conception was "that of a superior giving some kind of protection to an inferior. Additionally, he expressed anxiety lest it should encourage communal elements in India to create ill will and perpetuate the existing tension between two countries.(70)

(66) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. IX. Jan, 9, 16, 1954. p. 13356.

(67) Ibid. p. 13890.

(68) Ibid. p. 13891.

(69) According to this proposal, the head of state would be required to be a Muslim, and religious minorities would have separate representation in the federal and provincial legislatures.

(70) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. IX. December 26, 1953- January 2, 1954, p. 13326.

In the same context, it should be added that the subject was also one of the main distinctions between Nehru and M.Gandhi. "Religion was", states Ali, "according to Nehru the Achilles' heel of the Mahatama, and this created obstacles for all those who were attempting to articulate a secular nationalism. Gandhi was far removed from the crude communalism of the Hindu Mahasabha...or the crazed politics of other religious sects... Nonetheless it was his insistence on using religious symbolism to appeal to the peasantry that made a secular path more difficult to find"(71)

India decided to depend on the diplomacy of nonalignment to promote her internal aims, as mentioned above, and external aims as well, because she wished to reduce her military and economic inadequacies by maximizing the benefits of legal equality. The independence movement had proved moral persuasion to be an effective alternative to physical strength. Nehru put considerable stress on a similar type of force in external affairs. Moreover, the policy conformed to his ethical standards, for he declared, "We believe not only that the ends to be achieved should be good but also that the means employed should be good, or else new problems arise and the objective itself changes."(72)

The concept of nonalignment is not a substantive policy. Despite Nehru's fundamental aim being in 1947 "to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs", he did not rest from creating a comprehensive policy. Its central idea

(71) Ali, T., op.cit.p.38.

(72) Speech delivered on 20 November 1955, Quoted in Appadoria, A. op.cit.p.493.

is maximum flexibility rather than equal distance and this provides an inherent scope for altering the utility and rationale of nonalignment in accordance with alterations in the dynamics of the external environment. (73)

India's foreign policy is firmly based upon a close reading by Nehru of her position in global geopolitics:

"It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No other country will tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against the attack on India." (74)

The geopolitical rationale at the root of nonalignment emerged many years before the Cold War, which merely promoted its functional effectiveness. India's status in the era of tight bipolarity mainly originated from the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, which prevented them from using war as an instrument of foreign policy. (75) They had to try to secure their aims through diplomacy, keeping in mind the United Nations and the Western mass media's enlightenment of world public opinion, and in such an international milieu, India could successfully threaten potential alignment without openly claiming to through the policy of nonalignment. (76)

(73) Nehru, J., Independence and After, Delhi, Government of India, 1949, p.4.

(74) Nehru, J., The Defence of India, Allahabad, 1931, p.15.

(75) Very similar arguments are valid for the promotion of Yugoslav nonalignment which will be pointed out in the following chapters.

(76) Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy, p.35-36.

Therefore, in a world dominated by the super-power blocs, the maintenance of national independence in 'sovereign equality' demanded a policy of the non-aligned nature, which in view of India's weakness, had to give priority to reaction. Nehru stressed this question by arguing that "the Soviet Union being our neighbour, we shall inevitably develop closer relations with it. We cannot afford to antagonize Russia, merely because we think this may irritate someone else. Nor indeed can we antagonize the USA."(77)

B. Traditional Aspects of Indian Nonalignment.

Indian foreign policy was conditioned by an ancient history in which she had developed ties of religion and culture with East, Southeast and West Asia, and by modern imperial history, and finally by a nonviolent movement, which impelled her towards anticolonialism and antiracialism.

The basic assumption of Indian tradition is that man, nature, and society should always be in harmony. Since these are different embodiments of the same fundamental principle, there can be no irreconcilable conflict or confrontation among them. Another basic assumption of Indian tradition is that every individual has a right to seek self-realization in his own unique fashion. This basic assumption leads to the principles of freedom, equality, and justice and also to the acceptance of a plurality of ways to achieve this self-realization. Third assumption of Indian tradition is plain living and thinking.

(77) Quoted in Menon, K., op.cit. pp.229-230.

According to this assumption the goodness of a life depends upon what one is and not upon what one has, upon cultural and spiritual growth and not upon worldly possessions, upon what one gives rather than upon what one consumes. The emphasis of Indian tradition is thus on man and not on things. Finally, Indian tradition places great emphasis on nonviolence toward all living things as an ultimate goal—a equality that should mark the relationship not only between man and man but between man and nature, and between one society and another. This has several significant implications, such as respect for all other individuals; acceptance of the equal rights of every other individual to freedom and self-realization; a tolerance of differing viewpoints; and willingness as well as a capacity to resolve conflicts through discussion, persuasion, mutual give and take, consensus or even personal suffering rather than through resort to violence. (78)

Indian tradition has made its own contribution to the philosophy of Indian foreign affairs. For instance, nonalignment is linked to the nonattachment which is deeply rooted in Indian tradition. Also, Nehru expressed his views on this aspect of Indian understanding of international relations by arguing, "we isolate ourselves in castes, this division and that division, with the result that it is a unique habit in India which does not prevail anywhere else in the world. We live in compartments, and therefore perhaps naturally, we think in terms of isolation easily as a country too." (79)

(78) Naik, J.P., "Development and Gandhian Tradition in India," The Review of Politics, Vol. XLV No. 3 (July 1983) pp. 346-347.

(79) Rajya Sabha Debates, Government of India Publications Division, New Delhi, 1953, p. 18.

It is certain that anti-imperialism anticolonialism which were prominent features of Nehru's foreign policy flowed out of the history and tradition of the Congress struggle for independence. His emphasis on peaceful settlement of international disputes also flowed out of the same tradition and more particularly the teachings of Gandhi. His abhorrence of war, his quest for peace, and his striving for lessening tensions can be equally attributed to the same source. However, there is an exaggeration to the extent that nonalignment is non-violent and Gandhian on the one hand, and is pacifist and Buddhistic, on the other.

It should be emphasized that the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi may provide a basis, as Nehru argued, "nonalignment is a policy...inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom" and "basically our outlook is derived from that old outlook which Gandhi gave us and which made us powerfully in favour of peace and peaceful methods."⁽⁸⁰⁾ But it cannot form the framework of a foreign policy. Nehru also argued that he is "not saying that a military approach can be completely given up in this world", that he is not "speaking like a pacifist."⁽⁸¹⁾ On another occasion, he declared "I am not a pacifist. Unhappily the world of today finds that it cannot do without force."⁽⁸²⁾

(80) Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches:1949-1953, Government of India Publications Division, New Delhi, 1954, p.49 and p.80.

(81) Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy, p.96.

(82) Ibid. p.185.

Infact, the distinction between Nehru and Gandhi on non-violent methods can be traced to preindependence days. At the 1929 Congress in Lahore where the members unanimously voted for complete independence, Nehru explained his attitude to non-violence in contrast to Gandhi:

"The Congress has not the material or the training for organised violence, and individual and sporadic violence is a confession of despair...But if this Congress, or the nation at any future time comes to the conclusion that methods of violence will rid us of slavery then I have no doubt that I will not adopt them. Violence is bad, but slavery is far worse."(83)

Towards the middle of the 1960s and the end of the Nehru period, Toynbee pointed out the age-old distinction by inviting India to give up power politics and arguing that the teachings of Gandhi had to be embraced again.

"Since India attained her political independence, India has been on trial. While she was struggling to win her independence, she embraced Mahatma Gandhi's ideal. But the attainment of independence has brought with a greater moral ordeal than the previous struggle for it. A sovereign independent people-and especially one that has only recently become independent again-is under temptation to behave in the bad old conventional way...With Gandhi's spirit to inspire her, could she not rise to the height of breaking with the traditional conventions of nationalism? Could she not make a new start-a Gandhian start-in her approach to these vexed international questions? This is a hard thing to ask of any nation: it is to ask a nation to rise above itself. Yet this can be asked for India...In the struggle for independence, Gandhi's spirit performed a miracle...is it not time for the miracle to be repeated...The neighbours with whom India has to come to terms now are Pakistan and China. Here are two fresh opportunities for India to recapture the spiritual initiative by making another Gandhian breakway from traditional human behavior."(84)

(83) Quoted in Ali, op.citi, p.44.

(84) Toynbee, A., "Towards One World by Peaceful Change", in The Emerging World: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Volume, Asia Publishing, London, 1964, pp.246-247.

C. Nehru's Personality and Indian Nonalignment.

As a last point, the effective role Nehru personally played in the making of foreign policy decisions during his years in power between 1947-1964 shall be elaborated. The role of Nehru's personality on the formulation of the Indian version of nonalignment is extremely important, since India's foreign policy of non-alignment is the inspiration of Nehru and not wholly the product of vast impersonal forces. His personality, his vision and his background impinged on it and helped to mould it.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Indian nonalignment was framed by him at all times and as Karnik argued, his ideas and ideology, his aims, and aspirations, his judgements and impressions, his desires and ambitions, his dislikes and likes, his passions and prejudices, and sometimes even his 'whims and caprices' constituted the timber which went into the building of that framework.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Nehru became the chief of the foreign affairs department of the National Congress from 1928, and simultaneously held the posts of premier and foreign minister, formulating Indian foreign policy single-handedly. In his words "one part of me fairly important part, was made by England, by Cambridge."⁽⁸⁷⁾ The last point is not particular to Nehru as his educational background holds generally valid with that of Gandhi. They are, as Harrison argued, those who "assumed office in Africa and Asia were scions of the Western-educated class who had turned sour on their rulers: indeed, their demands for independence were often backed up with quotes from the Western political writers they had pored over in their student garrets in Oxbridge, London or Paris."⁽⁸⁸⁾

⁽⁸⁵⁾ Jansen, op.cit. p.117.

⁽⁸⁶⁾ Karnik, V.B., "Jawaharial Nehru: Foreign Policy "in Shah, A.B., op.cit., p.93.

⁽⁸⁷⁾ The Annual Register: World Events in 1964, (ed) Macadam, I., Vol. LXXVI, Longmans, London, 1965, p.523.

⁽⁸⁸⁾ Harrison, P., Inside the Third World, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1980, p.52.

After his colonial experience, probably the strongest influences on Nehru's thinking on foreign policy were the events in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, his Cambridge education, and his personal impressions from the intellectual British leftists in the group around Harold Laski and the New Statesman. He was impressed by the apparent achievements of Soviet Russia in its early years. "There is also a great deal of sympathy for the work of the Soviet Union and the remarkable change that this has brought about among the people. This made him see the importance of the Soviet Union as a counterweight to the United States." (89) His mental affinity with the English leftist and the general climate of opinion reflected by the Left Book Club strengthened two political attitudes, which are to be found in his later policies: a condescending attitude toward 'immature' America, which is too rich and powerful for its own good, and a tendency to give Russia the benefit of the doubt.

His emotional tendencies towards socialism were supported by his impressions of the Russian Revolution. Nehru, with his father Motilal Nehru, was invited to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the revolution in November 1927 after attending the International Congress against imperialism in Brussels. In this conference he was introduced to Ho Chi Minh who left a good impression. In Russia, "they missed the celebrations, but observed the new country with some fascination in the short time available to them. They could only stay in Moscow for three days. They took in as much as they could and then, their minds full of their impressions of the Soviet Union, began the journey back to India." (90)

(89) Menon, K., Many Worlds, op.cit., p.229-230.

(90) Ali, op.cit., p.33.

Two years later in the famous congress of 1929, he lectured the delegates on the need to eradicate poverty and class inequalities, and proposed workers' control of industry and the granting of land to tillers. He declared that:

"I am a socialist and a republican and am no believer in Kings or princes or in the order which produces modern kings in industry, who have even greater power over the lives and fortunes of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory as those of the old feudal aristocracy."(91)

Nehru believed that capitalism is the root of imperialism. He wrote in 1938 "Modern imperialism is an outgrowth of capitalism and cannot be separated from it."(92) This naturally, made him worry of the United States, and even prior to India's independence he made such statements as "...the great problem of the near future will be American Imperialism."(93) The United States was psychologically unattractive, because she was geographically distant and yet simultaneously deeply involved in Asian affairs, because of her supreme capabilities and global interests, and because she was closely linked with the European Colonial powers. On the same subject, a conservative oriented western author questioned, "How could this urbane, Cambridge-educated gentleman, dedicated to western democratic values and human rights, repeatedly seem to condone Communist brutality and, at the same time, criticize the lesser evils of western democracies?"(94)

(91) Quoted in Ali, op.cit., p.44.

(92) Nehru, J., loc.cit., p.80.

(93) Nehru, J., Report to the All-India Congress Committee, Allahabad, 1938, p.15.

(94) Lefewer, E.W., "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism" in Martin, op.cit., p.105.

Despite the fact that Nehru was extremely sympathetic to Marxism, he reacted negatively to the Stalinisation of the USSR and to the world Communist movement. He had four major objections to Moscow. He didnot like the regimentation then being imposed in the USSR; he was strongly opposed to that country's lack of individual and cultural freedoms; he was alienated by the semi-religious nature of the dogmatism espoused by the Comintern; and he was unimpressed by the failure of Indian communists to think independently. (95)

Nonalignment also seemed to be the appropriate vehicle for fulfilling Nehru's historical sense of personal and national mission, which made him overestimate India's global significance. Prior to India's independence, he claimed, "India constituted as she is cannot play a secondary part in the world...No middle position attracted me...India will also be as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in south-east Asia and right up to the Middle East." (96)

The influence of Mahatma Gandhi on Nehru cannot be ignored. Gandhian idealism made him detest power politics. By the 1930s, his objective was clearly to prevent independent India from being involved in any power configurations, as these were linked in his psychology, from an early age, with the techniques of out-dated colonialism, which he described as power politics. (97)

(95) Ali, op.cit., p.51.

(96) Nehru, J., Discovery of India, Meridian, London, 1960, p.16.

(97) Nehru, J., The Unity of India, John Day, New York, 1942, pp.268-277.

On the other hand, he was fully aware of the importance of national power. Thus, he said in 1955. "we feel, in so far as international policy is concerned, that right or wrong counts. But it is not the rightness of a proposition that makes it listened to but rather the person or the country which says so and the strength behind that country." (98)

As a last point, Nehru's personality was affected by the philosophy, upheld by both Hinduism and Buddhism, of nonattachment, which led him to remark that "the most intimate ties are ties which are noties." (99) According to him, a nonalienated foreign policy was founded upon Indian tradition and was "inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom." (100) Other Indian political leaders also have been constantly conscious of their country's past glory, coupled with the nationalist struggle against the humiliation of Western colonialism, stimulating them to seek to regain her former magnificence. Therefore, the Indian leadership in particular found difficulty in reconciling itself to the partition of 'Hindustan' by Britain, and centuries of foreign domination sparked a desire to prove the superiority of Indian philosophy over the west.

(98) Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy, .op.cit.p.65.

(99) Nehru, J., Discovery of America, East and West Publishers, Delhi, 1950, p.26.

(100) From a speech delivered by Nehru in Parliament, on 9.12.1958, quoted by Appadoria, "The Foreign Policy of India," in Black, J. and Thomson, K. (eds), Foreign Policies in a World of Change, Harper and Row, 1963, p.485.

III. THE PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN NONALIGNMENT.

India's attainment of freedom coincided with the irremediable breakdown of the wartime alliance between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. When Eastern Europe was undergoing a process of stalinisation; Western Europe was under the domination of the United States. Two years earlier, the Second World War had ceased, and two years later the Communists came to power in Peking. Both events altered the relationship of forces on a global scale. Washington was outraged and the Cold War became a real war in Korea. India's neutral position and mediation during the Korean War had the long-term consequence of compelling the great powers to realize the importance of nonalignment, and this was reflected by the role she played at the Geneva Conference of 1954.

"His refusal to toe the American line in the Korean war enraged Harry Truman, but in Moscow and Peking there was genuine bewilderment. How could this happen? they asked each other. Was not India a thoroughly bourgeois country? Were not India's capitalists solidly behind Nehru?...Could non-alignment then be something real? These questions were not confined to the two capitals of world communism. They were whispered in other parts of Asia and Africa, where burgeoning nationalist movements were beginning to challenge colonialism. They were also discussed in Belgrade, where Josip Broz Tito had broken away from the tutelage of Stalin."(101)

The United States incorporated Pakistan into two of her Cold War alliances, Baghdad Pact since 1955 , and S.E.A.T.O., in 1954. Within this context, Washington provided Pakistan with much military assistance during the next ten years, for use, if required, against communist expansionism, but with no guarantee to stop their use against India. The agreement led to a rash of criticisms by Nehru.⁽¹⁰²⁾ In a speech delivered in the parliament, he articulated his nonaligned posture with a reference to 'Pakistanism':

"The prime minister of Pakistan has stated that by the receipt of this military aid a step forward has been taken towards the strengthening of the Moslem world, that Pakistan has now entered a glorious chapter in her history, and that she is now cast for a significant role in world affairs...I have endeavoured to understand how the Moslem world is going to be strengthened through arms supplied by a foreign power, and how any country is going to play a significant role in world affairs by relying on military aid from another country."⁽¹⁰³⁾

(102) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. IX, October 23-30, 1954, p.13853.

(103) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. IX. March 13-20, 1954, p.13463.

A. Peaceful Coexistence with China.

During the 1950s, India tried to pursue a policy of friendship towards China, founded on a large country's intelligent appraisal of a stronger neighbour. In 1954, Nehru, accompanied by his daughter I. Gandhi, went to China. Before this visit, Nehru had personally worked for recognition of China by the United Nations, arguing that "China is too great, a reality to ignore in Asia as well as Himalaya." On another occasion he also pointed out that "there is the great country of China which is denied admittance in the United Nations. Anything more absurd than this seems to me difficult to imagine." (104)

During the visit he met chairman Mao and Chou en Lai and for the moment all seemed well between them. Nehru and Chou en Lai together discussed the Sino-Indian border dispute. (105)

After the visit, the two countries signed the famous agreement on Tibet, which embodied 'Pancha Sheel' or Five Principles. The principles, not contained in the 'Panch Sheel' were listed as part of this long, detailed agreement on trade and intercourse between India and China. For the most part, the document deals with the movements of traders, pilgrims, and porters between India and Tibet; it lists the market places they may use and the passes in the Himalayas through which they may cross.

(104) Sarvepolli, G., Jawaharial Nehru: An Anthology, Oxford Univ. Press., New Delhi, 1980, p. 377.

(105) During the visit, Nehru noticed that some Indian territory was marked on Chinese maps as being in China. Chou en Lai responded to his inquiry on the matter by revealing that the maps predated 1949 and had not been renewed after the Revolution. Tariq Ali describes Nehru's meeting with Mao as an eye-opener and says "he later told his colleagues in India that he detected a very strong and slightly unhealthy nationalist favour in Mao." see Ali, op.cit. pp. 100-101.

In the section on trade the two governments state that, in order to facilitate pilgrimage and travel, they entered into this agreement, based on the following principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual nonaggression;
3. Equality and mutual benefit;
4. Mutual noninterference in each other's affairs;
5. Peaceful coexistence.

These principles were given maximum importance when Nehru and Choe en Lai put them forward as a universal remedy for peace in a joint statement from New Delhi. Both sides said, "if those principles are applied, not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence."(106)

On the other hand Chou en Lai claimed that India and China achieved peaceful coexistence and succeeded in overthrowing Cold War predicaments in Southeast Asia by this agreement, and that the two countries, as the initiators of the five principles in their mutual relations. He clarified this point by saying that "peaceful co-existence and friendly co-operation between China and India will facilitate the gradual realization of peaceful co-existence among other Asian countries and the countries of the whole world."(107)

(106) Jansen, op.cit., p.130.

(107) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit., p.13890.

Additionally he praised Nehru's policies toward establishing and extending of 'area of peace' in Asia, which he contrasted with that of the SEATO bloc, and promised China's co-operation in this task: "We hope that the established friendship between China and India will be further strengthened and developed so that Sino-Indian relations will be a model for the whole world of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social customs and ideologies." (108)

In his reply, Nehru recalled that in over 2000 years "there is no record of conflict between our two countries" and called attention to the point that "China is a greatest and vast country with a great variety of people, and so is India. In India, while strengthening our basic unity, we also recognize this variety, which gives richness to our national life." (109) He asserted that 'Panch Sheel' was something original, a new application in a particular context, and argued that "both countries (India and China) raised a new voice in the world." However, according to him, besides being new, Panch sheel was also ancient and Indian: "It has been our way of life and is as old as our thought and culture." (110)

When Nehru returned to New Delhi, he began to work towards organising a conference of newly independent nations to discuss their future. After intensive discussions and correspondence, Bandung was assigned as the host city for the conference, to be convened in April 1955. The Asian-African Conference in Bandung is an important landmark in the growth of co-operation among the Afro-Asian peoples and in the emergence of the movement of nonaligned countries.

(108) Ibid.

(109) Ibid.p.13891.

(110) Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.101.

The proposal to hold the conference was specifically made by A.Sastroamidjaja, Prime Minister of Indonesia, on 13 January 1954. In September of the same year, he visited again New Delhi to persuade Nehru to agree to the holding of the conference and also mentioned, in a speech to Indian Parliament, an Indonesian version of the 'five principles', 'Pantja Sila'.⁽¹¹¹⁾ During this visit, Nehru said of the 'five principles':

"We talk also of another 'Panch Sheel' or Five Principles which have recently come to the fore. You may call them Panch Sheel also in the same way, which on the face of it, is difficult to imagine how to oppose them or dislike them unless one think that behind them is hidden some evil motive."⁽¹¹²⁾

From the middle of 1957, China's foreign policy seemed to be changed. Between China and the Soviets, a war of words began. The launching of the Soviet's first sputnik, and of her first intercontinental ballistic missiles in the same year, gave this country a feeling of strength, and made China proportionally disturbed. After 1958 the Sino-Soviet dispute became public. In the meantime, the Chinese government announced in Peking in the late 1957 that it had completed a road linking western Tibet with Sinkiang. The map, which was published in Peking, clearly showed the road running across Indian territory in northern Ladakh. In January 1959, China officially claimed 50,000 square miles of Indian territory, saying that the frontier issue had not been raised earlier because conditions were then 'not ripe' for its settlement.⁽¹¹³⁾

(111) An Indonesian version of the 'five principles' was propounded by President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1945. The principles also built up the philosophic bases of the state of Indonesia. They were: nationalism, humanism, freedom, social justice and faith in God.

(112) Panch Sheel: Its Meaning and History, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1958, p.8.

(113) Jansen, op.cit. pp.322-323.

B. The Bandung Conference.

The first step to the Bandung Conference was the Colombo Powers Conference which was realized through participation of the prime ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and India in 1954. The objective of holding the conference was to cut across the belligerent groupings in the United Nations in order to build up a massively organised third group, supporting what was morally right.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ When the conference concluded on May 2, 1954, the prime ministers unanimously agreed that the forthcoming conference would be organised and would be enlarged to include Asian and African States Prime Minister Sastroamidjaja of Indonesia wanted to host the next meeting at Bondung in Java.

Ironically, while Pakistan was participating in the Colombo Powers Conference, simultaneously reports in American and Pakistani newspapers indicated that Pakistan was on the point of concluding a military agreement with the United States. That agreement was signed and announced in Washington on October 21, 1954, and held that the United States government would give economic aid to Pakistan and would also accelerate deliveries of military equipment to that country.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Pakistan thus, was entering into the first stage becoming a partner within the Western alliance system, opposed to her own northern neighbour. After the signing of the agreement, it criticized it saying that "by arming Pakistan through a military pact with the United States, War was being brought to the door of India."⁽¹¹⁶⁾

(114) Sengupta, op.cit., p.55.

(115) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 23-30, 1954, p.13853.

(116) Quoted in Sengupta, op.cit. p.III.

At the end of 1954, the prime ministers of the Colombo Powers Conference met at Bogor in Indonesia to prepare the agenda of the proposed Asia-African conference. At the Bogor Conference it was agreed that 25 Asian and African countries should be invited to take part in a conference to be held in Indonesia at the end of April 1955. The five prime ministers concluded the conference by deciding to convene the Asian-African conference in Bandung under their joint sponsorship. The main purposes of the conference were set out to be to promote goodwill and co-operation; to consider social, economic, and cultural problems, and the problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples; and finally to view the position of Asia and Africa in the world and the contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. As one of the main initiators of the conference, Nehru noted that the conference will signify an emergence:

"It represents, rather unconsciously, subconsciously, Asia and Africa coming to the forefront. I do not know whether this idea was present wholly in the mind of the original sponsor of this conference, but because the proposal was made at the right time, it accorded with the spirit of the times."(117)

The Bandung Conference of Asian and African states opened on 18 April 1955 by President Sukarno of Indonesia and was attended by representatives of all the 25 countries.(except for the Central African Federation)(118)

(117) From the speech delivered in Lok Sabha on February 25, 1955. Quoted in Sengupta, op.cit.p.96.

(118) In addition to the five sponsoring countries, the following 24 countries participated in the conference. Afghanistan, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam; Yemen.

Sukarno proclaimed that "this is the first inter-continental conference of the so-called coloured peoples in the history of mankind...The 1.400.000.000. people represented at the conference must inject a voice of reason into world affairs, where others depend on power politics and jet bombers."(119) In Sukarno's speeches, anticolonialism played a central role, while Nehru and Sastroamidjaja were mostly preoccupied with the arguments against military pacts and the Cold War in their speeches. Sukarno declared that colonialism was a most dangerous enemy by saying that "wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth."(120)

Sastroamidjaja of Indonesia, as chairman, on the other hand, denied that the conference was intended "to create another source of tension by constituting an anti-western and even an antiwhite bloc," and said that the foremost reason for calling it was "the antagonizing tension from which the world is suffering today."(121)

(119) Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.X., May 7-14, 1945, p.14181.

(120) Ibid, p.14181, He also expressed the same belief on another occasion, a year later in the United States. The conference in Bandung..." was a clear indication of history's direction. Practically all shades of the political spectrum were represented there... They produced a Declaration which explicitly stated their continuing opposition to colonialism in all its forms." see Sukarno, A. "Address to the Congress of the United States on May.17,1956" in Readings in World Politics, p.293.

(121) Ibid, p.14181.

Sastroamidjaja and Nehru seemed to share common approaches on the refusal to enter into military blocs and the transformation of Bandung Conference into a new bloc against Western backed military pacts. Nehru, labelling NATO as "one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism" said that:

"India was not on the side of any power bloc, and was neither Communist nor anti-communist; she considered that both sides were wrong and that their policies would lead to war. Maintaining that every military pact added to the insecurity of the world... It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade and humiliate themselves in this way."(122)

In the same context, Nehru harshly criticized the collective self-defence approach adopted by such countries as Pakistan and Turkey. He declared that 'collective self-defence' must be elaborated as "merely a cover of words to make military pacts acceptable."(123) He also resisted the creation of another bloc by nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa. He argued that to gather a number of nonaligned countries which are militarily weak and to raise their voice in hostility to the great powers would be wrong, because to speak in bloc-politics terms means to adopt to some extent the Cold War approach and language of hostility.

The leading statesmen of the sponsoring countries manifested their thoughts and hopes organizing the conference. Nehru emphasized that the countries of Asia and Africa were 'nonentities' in political, economic, and international affairs, and that their destinies were controlled by other peoples in other countries. He went on in the following terms:

(122) Ibid.p.14183.

(123) Ibid.p.14182.

"This was something deeper than a political change, this consciousness of freedom and desire to rely upon themselves in co-operation with others... They did not think in terms of isolation but they (the Afro-Asian countries) thought in terms of self-determination, self reliance and self-progress which they desire to achieve in peace and in friendship with other countries. It was that common desire of the people and countries which was bringing them together in Bandung."(124)

The conference considered problems of common interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed the ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation. Political questions and considerations received more attention than others. The conference was held in the days of Cold War, when attacks on national independence, sovereignty, and the right to free development were expressed in the most ruthless and most aggressive forms. For this reason the protection of national independence, sovereignty, and the right of each country to opt for their own socio-economic, political, and cultural development without interference were established as a principle representing the central commitment and platform of the nonaligned countries at the Bandung Conference. Principles of the conference repeated 'Panch Shila' of India, expressing the wish of the participant countries to provide opportunities for all countries of the world to develop in peace, independence, and full national sovereignty, without foreign threat and interference

(124) The Hindustan Standard, 14 April, 1955, Quoted in Appadorai, A., "The Bandung Conference," Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 1955, p.28.

In the final communiqué, the ten principles of Bandung, which were named later as the 'Bandung Ideals' were listed as follows:

1. the respect for human rights in agreement with the UN Charter;
2. the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and states;
3. the principle of equality of all races and nations, regardless of their population;
4. the principle of nonintervention and noninterference with the internal affairs of other countries;
5. the right of every nation to defend its freedom and independence in agreement with the UN Charter;
6. the avoidance of membership in military organizations threatening the interests of other countries;
7. the principle of avoiding aggression and threat by aggression in international relationships;
8. the solution of conflicts by peaceful means;
9. peaceful co-operation and common actions directed towards common human interests;
10. respect for international justice and international obligations; (125)

As mentioned above, the conference declared its full support of the principles of self-determination of peoples and nations and deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of the world.

(125) See for complete text of Bandung Conference's Final Communiqué, Goldwin, R.A. et al., eds., World Politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 535-543

Additionally, the Conference emphasized colonialism with particular reference and declared that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end.

A carefully considered and pointed statement maintained that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace.

Generally, at the Bandung Conference was manifested the desire of Asian and African countries not to have extraneous conflicts and decisions thrust upon them by the super powers. The hoped-for solidarity between newly independent nations was realized to some degree. The 'Bandung Ideals' provided a practical framework for foreign affairs of some participant countries. For instance, after the conference, Nehru officially visited a number of countries and signed agreements based on those ideals. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union joined those which enacted agreements resting on the principles. A joint statement which was issued on June 22, 1955 by India and the Soviet Union pointed out that "the base of relations between the two countries will be the five principles."⁽¹²⁶⁾ In a speech he delivered in the Soviet Union after the conference, Nehru noted that

"It was in recognition of the right of each country to fashion its own destiny that India and the People's Republic of China agreed that the 'Five Principles' should govern their relations with each other. Subsequently, these principles were accepted by Burma and Yugoslavia, and the Soviet government has also expressed its approval of them."⁽¹²⁷⁾

⁽¹²⁶⁾ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol X. August 13, 20, 1955, p. 14372.

⁽¹²⁷⁾ Ibid. p. 14372.

The Bandung Conference was realized in the atmosphere of the Cold War. Western countries looked at the conference as an attempt to organize a reaction against SEATO and NATO. On the contrary, Socialist countries described the conference as an anti-imperialist organization. Then the 'Bandung Ideals' were adopted rapidly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, while Western countries met them with a grain of salt. The Soviet Union declared herself a close follower of the five principles. Bandung leaders were compared to the dwellers of an island in the middle of a divided stream, trying to build a bridge to both shores.

"Quite suddenly the inhabitants of the eastern bank, hitherto unfriendly, change their attitude completely and take the initiative in building their half of bridge to midstream. It is understandable that the island dwellers view the aloof inhabitants of the western shore with irritated impatience, for if only they, too, would co-operate, the beautiful bridge would be complete."(128)

Probably, the most important outcome of the Bandung Conference was the creation of a 'Bandung Generation' including Nehru, Sukarno, Kotewala, U Nu, Abd-al Nasser, and so on. According to Ajami, they are only dreamers whose world they lived in was not really theirs and the basic case made in Bandung was simple and issued from classical liberal roots: "Men come together and create states and these states could fulfill their dreams."(129) He considers them men in a hopeless situation:

(128) Jansen, op.cit., p.229.

(129) Ajami, F., "The Fate of Nonalignment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. LIX, No. 2, Winter 1980-1981, p. 367.

"All of them knew the weaknesses of the traditional order in their own societies. Each one of them felt intensely the crisis of backwardness and decay. Each one of them believed that the state should arrest decline and stagnation and shake off the burden of centuries...In their own way, these were the non-western children of the Westphalian nation-state system that had emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century and was now being globalized."(130)

The Bandung Generation created a 'Bandung Myth'. Towards the end of the 1950s, it was the most respectful foreign policy orientation in the eyes of leaders of the newly independent nations. This myth was valued as the sole panacea for peace. But the enthusiasm of the 'Bandung Generation' of 1955 seemed exhausted in the early 1960s because two of its main creators, China and India, become enemies and poor examples of peaceful co-existence. The concept of a unified, moralising Afro-Asia that was the basis of the Bandung Myth, was unable to stand the test of time or the challenge of conflicting national interests. Additionally, as Jansen said, the Bandung Myth faded because "by that time nonalignment had made its way in the world, and was no longer in need of supporting myths."(131)

Nehru, both in preparatory conferences and in Bandung, provided many of reasons for newly independent countries of Asia and Africa to adopt nonalignment-oriented foreign policies. There is, for instance, the argument that the problem of the Cold War, and the 'isms' and ideologies behind it, are all European and remote from Afro-Asia.⁽¹³²⁾ According to him, the new countries have inherited no legacy of hatred towards either side in the Cold War; "Why should we then start this train of hostility now with any country?"⁽¹³³⁾

(130) Ibid., pp. 368-369.

(131) Jansen, op.cit., p. 247.

(132) Nehru, J., India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru -1946-1961, Publications Division, Government of India, New Delhi, 1961, p. 262.

(133) Ibid. p. 45.

In Bandung Nehru strongly opposed bloc politics and described the concept of nonalignment in detail. He condemned bloc politics, defended the refusal to enter into military pacts, and consistently opposed the Super Power rivalry, which he viewed as inevitably leading to a catastrophe. According to him, there is a solid link between policies against bloc politics and the quest for peace:

"I belong to neither bloc and I propose to belong to neither, whatever happens in the world...If all the world were to be divided up between these two blocs what would be result? The inevitable result would be war...It is an intolerable thought that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only degrade and humilitate themselves in this way...Every pact has brought insecurity and not security to those countries which have entered into them."(134)

After the Bandung Conference, Nehru succeeded, by participating in international conferences and in visits around the world, in winning a position of great prestige in international affairs, both for his country and for himself as its leader. "Since those early days of independence, New Delhi... has become one of the world's main meeting places. For the rest of his life, Nehru continued energetically to stride the international stage."(135)

(134) Quoted in Mazrui, "Changing Guards", pp. 6-7.

(135) Tyson, G., Nehru: The Years of Power, Pall Mall Press, 1966, London, p. 73.

Between 1955 and 1958, Chou en Lai tried to establish a creditable status for itself in Asia and to prove its peaceful external objectives. Therefore, nonaligned countries' leaders like Nehru were praised and their countries were supported. (136)

C. The Indo-Chinese Crisis.

After the border fightings of the previous summer, in April 1960, Chou en Lai visited Delhi to discuss the problem, but talks gave no significant resolution. After his talks he returned to Peking via Kathmandu where he held a press conference at which he was reported to have made the following remarks:

"The statement Prime Minister Nehru made in February in Parliament was not so friendly towards China. The statement I made at the press conference in Delhi on the evening of the 25th was very friendly towards India. But how did Prime Minister Nehru treat us? He did not say it face to face, but as soon as we left he attacked the Chinese government as an aggressor. That is not an attitude to take towards guests." (137)

(136) An interesting aspect of the relationship between Chou en Lai and Nehru was called to attention by an Indian columnist: "After the Bandung Conference, Nehru started getting hard knocks from Chou. For example, he heard the taunting statement of Chou en Lai: Nehru took me round and introduced me to one delegation after another (in Bandung). It appeared that he (Nehru) thought that I needed introduction to other nations. He behaved like an older statesman" in Sengupta, op.cit., p.105.

(137) Quoted in Tyson, G., Nehru: The Years of Power, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.73.

Thus, the era of 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' (Hindus and Chinese are Brother) ended. By the early years of the 1960s the two countries were drifting toward a war which finally broke out in late 1962. Since the beginning of 1960, Indian public opinion appreciated China as the greatest threat to India, and by the end of 1962 Nehru declared Chinese aggression as the "greatest menace that has come to us since independence"(138)

Nehru did not consider the aggression as a simple dispute which stemmed from border questions, but looked at it as an assault which was devised against the principles of non-alignment and that of peaceful coexistence.(139) According to Ali, the aggression meant "to humiliate the Indian government, force it closer to the United States and demonstrate to the Russians and the Third World the real nature of so-called nonalignment,...and the conflict was essentially intended to do no more than display China's strength."(140) In terms of China, Ali notes,"The Sino-Indian border conflict can therefore be seen as a side-show designed to demonstrate to Russia and the world that China was totally self-sufficient and independent. It was not pure nationalism, but a sui generis variety intended to damage Soviet strategy in the Third World, peaceful coexistence, and other aspects of Soviet policy.(141)

(138) Annual Register World Events 1962, op.cit.p.66.

(139) Heykel, op.cit., pp.312-313.

(140) Ali, op.cit., p.107.

(141) Ali, op.cit., p.106.

From this point of view, the Sino-Indian war meant a death blow to the so-called "Bandung spirit". An Indian observer resentfully said: "Indian looked back sadly to the days of the Geneva Conference when Chou-en Lai had made New Delhi almost his second capital visiting there often and going places including Tagore's Santiniketan where he was beating the drum himself and doing Manipuri dance with boy and girl students." (142)

On the other hand, Mazrui characterized the conflict as an ordeal of faith in coexistence:

"Up to 1962, Nehru had resisted efforts by the international press and many Western leaders to undermine the trust in the five principles of coexistence with China and other communist countries, and to alert him to the dangers of communism. China's invasion was therefore a devastating blow to the whole concept of peaceful coexistence; the five principles seemed to be compromised; Nehru's pet doctrine of non-alignment seemed to be in disgrace." (143)

The 1962 crisis made New Delhi recognize the fact that in international politics nothing can ensure total national security. The crisis destroyed one of the premises of non-alignment. The need to expand India's armed forces rapidly and to double the defence budget eliminated one of the pillars of Nehru's original external policy. He confessed in December of 1962 that the war made India realize that she had become "out of touch with the realities of the modern world." (144)

(142) see Sengupta, op.cit., p.106.

(143) Mazrui, Changing Guards...p.8.

(144) Annual Register: World Events 1962, op.cit., p.66.

The Indian-Chinese war of 1962 left a profound impact on the ideals of nonalignment. Firstly, it destroyed the dreams of making Southeast Asia one of the major areas of peace and turned it to a nuclear armament region. Eventually, China (in 1965) and India (in 1974) became nuclear powers. The era of the five principles was substituted by an era of an armament race between the two countries.

The first impact of the war on India was her movement moved closer to Washington as a result of the United States' prompt response to India's request for military supplies against China.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ Under the new Foreign Aid Act of September 1961, Indian-American relations, which had been swamped with suspicion and misunderstanding since 1954 when the United States military aid had begun to flow to Pakistan, became warmer and closer.

When geo-political reasons naturally aroused Moscow's interest in India, the emergence of China as a military power made New Delhi even more significant in the Kremlin's perceptions. In the following years, India engaged in power politics, based on the idea of the containment of China in Southeast Asia. This aim, "seemed to have become a common objective of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and India fitted well into their global strategy of the super-powers against China."⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

(145) "If the Chinese invasion did anything good to India", as an Indian observer pointed out, "it was to drive her towards readjusting her foreign policy in tune with defence requirements." see Sengupta, op.cit., p.110.

(146) Choudry, G.W., "The Emergence of Bangla Desh and the South Asian Triangle," The Year Book of World Affairs 1973, Longman, London, p.65.

Until the war, New Delhi's nonaligned stand held that economic assistance was permissible, but military assistance was not politically palatable. From 1962, New Delhi received military assistance from foreign states, but, at the same time, emphasised that it would not allow foreign military bases on its territory.

After the war, as one author argued, to be aligned with both the superpowers appeared to be as acceptable as being aligned with neither in terms of India's position. (147) Because of the same reason, Krishna Menon claimed, "The China clash, if anything, only reinforces nonalignment," (148) and Nehru declared, 'the policy of nonalignment has not broken down and stands confirmed.'" (149)

Nevertheless, India's dependence on external military assistance during a major crisis to protect her own territory stressed her shortcomings and raised grave questions about the feasibility of the nonalignment stance as a technique capable of defending the fundamental national interest of survival. Psychologically India's posture and orientation became inward-looking' there was a sense of rootlessness and despair. (150)

(147) Misra, K.P., (ed) Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1969, p.186.

(148) Brecher, M, India and World Politics, op.cit., p.12.

(149) Nehru, 'Changing India', in Foreign Affairs, April, 1963. p.464.

(150) see Heykel, op.cit., p.313.

However, the acceptance of foreign military assistance did not cause any global alteration in India's nonaligned posture in either the political or the security dimension. Her bilateral relations with the Super Powers witnessed a continuity. After the signing the military aid agreement with the United States, Nehru declared in the Parliament that the forthcoming military assistance "is unconditional and without any strings. It does not, therefore, affect directly our policy of nonalignment." (151)

Nehru could not confess that strict nonalignment was viable only under particular circumstances. The basic details of the functional dimension of the concept were not clearly enunciated, as was inevitable because its core consisted of a reaction any response to the initiatives of the Great Powers. However, the direction in which Nehru led India during the last two years of his premiership revealed that the rationale and the basis of nonalignment could be jettisoned when the protection of the national interest needed the use of military force or a short-term political alignment.

The increasing modesty in the character of India's external policy showed that some of the rules of international politics were imposing themselves: the inescapable reliance of external policy on national potential, and the priority of massive domestic problems over external affairs. Until the mid 1950s, the success of the independence struggle had instigated the pursuit of an irrationally ambitious external policy. After the war with China, India avoided the moral and dogmatic attitudes which were common during the years between 1947-1960.

(151) Quoted in Power, op.cit., p.70.

The reaction of various nonaligned countries to the Chinese move on India must be addressed. The first reaction come from President Nasser of Egypt who sent a message to Nehru suggesting that he might be mediator by keeping in touch with both sides and putting forward mediatory and compromise proposals.⁽¹⁵²⁾ Despite its bitter dispute with Communist China and despite its nonaligned friendship with India, Yugoslavia's reaction was curiously mute. After Nehru's appeal to all governments of the world asking for their sympathy and support, President Tito, cautiously replied by declaring his expectations for a peaceful settlement. This noncommittant attitude was particularly criticised by Indian public opinion.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Considering the Yugoslav attitude towards India on the war with China, Jansen argues, "Yugoslavia may be a heretical Communist, but her ideological links with the Communist world were considered to be more important than her association with her oldest friend among the Afro-Asian non-aligned countries."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ But the most interesting criticism came from President Nkrumah of Ghana who declared himself gravely distressed and saddened at the prospect that Britain would supply military aid to India, on the ground that "it might aggravate an unfortunate situation."⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

(152) Heykel, op.cit., p. 315.

(153) Ibid., p. 316.

(154) Jansen, op.cit., p. 327.

(155) Annual Register: World Events 1962..., p. 66.

After Britain granted military aid to Nehru's government, Nkrumah immediately wrote to Macmillan, Chairman of the Commonwealth, in following terms:

"Are you sure that by giving support, whatever this is, to one side against the other you will be able to increase the chances of bringing an end to hostilities? Assistance by ways of arms and equipment to any country engaged in a conflict with another, in my view, is likely merely to occasion a counter offer assistance to the other party to the dispute. The balance of military strength, therefore, remains the same but the dispute is made much more difficult of solution through the involvement of outside powers."(156)

On this adverse view, Mazrui says, "Nehru's own ideas of non-alignment were being used by his own African disciple against his receiving aid from the West at a time of a military challenge from China. The principles of the most important founder of nonalignment, Jawaharlal Nehru, seemed suddenly to be in a disarray."(157) This made Nehru offhand in his dealings with Presidents Sukarno, Tito and Nkrumah.(158)

Therefore, it can be said that after the war with China the domestic setting, the external, and the pattern of Indian thinking changed. The nonaligned concept and policy was shaken. After 1962 Indian foreign policy makers still had some faith in nonalignment, but the commitment and devotion to it were not the same as prior to 1962. The 'betrayal' by China, and the unwillingness of outstanding leaders of nonaligned countries to support India caused a rethinking about India's framework of action and foreign policy approach.

(156) Ghana Today, November 7, 1962., Quoted in Mazrui, A.A., "African Diplomatic Thought and Supra-Nationality", in Africa: The Next Thirty Years, (eds) Mazrui, A.A., and Patel, H.H., Julian Friedman Publishers, Sussex, 1974, p.125.

(157) Mazrui, "Changing Guards", p.9.

(158) Jansen, op.cit., p.328.

Two fundamental changes occurred.

1. Nonalignment was no longer an absolute policy, the absolute answer to India's diplomatic problems, nor the absolute basis of India's diplomatic relationships,
2. There was a need for a military machine and the approach was to buy arms wherever possible; this inevitably implied having a military and diplomatic relationship with NATO and WTO states even if this was undertaken under the fig of Indian nonalignment.

D. An Analysis of the Nehru Era : Conclusionary Remarks.

The primary ideological dimensions in India's foreign policy have been anti-imperialism, liberal internationalism, neutralism, neo-Marxism, Gandhism, and Hindu nationalism. All dimensions, except Hindu nationalism, have been openly affirmed by most Indian administrations. As a result of her own history and her outlook on global politics, India's anti-imperialism has produced an anti-western bias, which in turn has had a major impact on her external orientation. (159)

In light of her internal realities and of her external environment, one wonders whether India had any viable alternative to her policy of nonalignment. After careful study, it is obvious that she had no other option. Non-alignment was the middle course between the poles of neutralism and alignment. A noninvolved neutralism was unacceptable, for two major reasons: firstly, for emotional reasons-it would not conform with her

(159) Power, P.F., "On Ideologies in India's Foreign Relations", in The Indian Political Science Review, January-December, 1974, p.2.

past glory nor fulfil her aspiration for future greatness; secondly, for considerations of power politics-in 1947, she was one of the newly emerging weak states in a bipolar world, and under such circumstances she needed to pursue an active anti-imperialist policy, in order to free the colonial territories of Africa and Asia, and thus consolidating her own position in the United Nations and in international politics.

Geographical and historical factors dictated that India neither should nor could enter into an alliance after achieving independence. In the contemporary international system, a state only seeks military alliance, whether bilateral or multi-lateral, when it believes that it does not, on its own, have sufficient capability to deter, let alone defend, itself against a major external threat. In 1947, as Nehru pointed out, "We appeared to have no inherited problems and conflicts with any country."⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ For instance, Pakistan was regarded as a potential threat, but she was not only militarily weaker, but also territorially and demographically much smaller. China was in the midst of a civil war, and in any case, the Himalayas could be guaranteed to prevent any thought of a conventional conquest from the north. Having suffered a long independence struggle, it was unthinkable that India should willingly subscribe to super power domination within either Cold war bloc. Nonalignment prevented India "from becoming a satellite state". Krishna Menon stated; "Basically there is no alternative to what is called nonalignment."⁽¹⁶¹⁾

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Nehru, J., "Changing India", in Foreign Affairs, April, 1963, p.453.

⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Quoted in Power, op.cit., p.11.

Therefore, the emergence and continuity of nonalignment as India's normative and operational foreign policy vis-a-vis the great powers is due to a constellation of important reasons. It is deeply rooted in a configuration of powerful historical, cultural, geographical, political, economic and moral factors. Nonalignment serves the primary national interests, of political independence, military security, and socio-economic progress, as defined by India's top leadership.

In Nehru's era India faced a set of important factors which determined the decision to pursue nonalignment: the Indian nonalignment was in harmony with India's philosophical and cultural heritage; It possessed moral value as a rejection of the shortcomings of power politics; it advanced peace in South Asia which was required for economic development; it created an opportunity to seek assistance from states belonged to different camps; it facilitated freedom of manoeuvre; it projected India's prestige; it stimulated internal unity; and it conformed to India's potentialities and geographical realities.

During the Cold War years, it was seen that a nonaligned India exploited the balance of power structure and competition between the super powers in the international system in order to advance her national interests. (162) But it is a contradiction that India's nonalignment in itself is not a primary factor in determining the policies of the super powers towards India. It is, rather, a global perspective of their national interests and the evolving balance of power in Soviet-American relations which has brought India within the overall focus of

(162) Rana, A.P., "The Intellectual Dimensions of Nonalignment", The Journal of Asian Studies, February, 1969, p. 311.

the super powers in the 1950s, the Cold War competition between the super powers for the support of newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia brought attention to India. The same super power policies were repeated in the 1960s: the Americans drove to contain China, and the Sino-Soviet split led to support from both the super powers within the framework of the very early years of detente.

Indian nonalignment survived as an article of faith and as a specific stance in international affairs. With the thawing of the Cold War during the early 1960s, the utility of India's nonaligned role in pacifying the two blocs became less important.

IV. NONALIGNMENT TOWARDS 1960S.

From the beginning of the 1960s the centre of nonaligned gravity shifted significantly westward from India and Indonesia to Egypt and Yugoslavia. The leaders of these countries, Tito and Abd al Nasser began to act in concert, and summoned the Cairo Conference. After the Brioni Conference in Yugoslavia in 1956, held by Tito, Nasser and Nehru, a close working alliance between the leaders of Yugoslavia and Egypt emerged and became a distinctive characteristics of politics of the nonaligned area. The two men found more in common with one another than between themselves and Nehru. According to Jansen this was understandable from the geo-political point of view because the two countries are similar in size, compared to India, and in the type of their authoritarian regimes, both of which claim to be revolutionary, whereas India has a parliamentary democracy. In addition, Yugoslavia found Egypt a useful link with the Arabs and Africa, as well as receptive of its ideas, while Egypt felt that she had much to learn from Yugoslavia about industrial organisation.⁽¹⁶³⁾ Yugoslavia was furthermore propelled towards Egypt rather than India because of an adhesion to being a nonaligned country, under the shadows of Nehru. As expounded upon in previous chapters in the initial phase of nonalignment this policy orientation was invented and formulated in many ways by Nehru and nonalignment as a basis of the foreign policy of new states was fostered more effectively by India's example than by that of Yugoslavia.

⁽¹⁶³⁾ see Jansen, op.cit., p.278.

There were reasons which prevented Yugoslavia from becoming involved in Third World politics as a leading country like India during the 1950s. Primarily Yugoslavia was a European country, and this made it less of a model to Africans and Asians at that particular time of assertion of independence. Secondly, Yugoslavia had little influence on its neighbours, which are the first circle of international influence.

A. Yugoslav Nonalignment.

Yugoslav nonalignment dates from 1948 when the country was expelled from the Cominform. After the emergence of ideological differences, the Cominform officially called upon the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to purge its leaders on 28 June 1948. By this decision the Cominform pointed out that Yugoslavian leaders overestimated the internal, national forces of the country and their possibilities: "The Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist parties of other countries, without the support of the people's democracies, without the support of the Soviet Union."⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Yugoslavia then appeared not so much to have chosen nonalignment, as to have been isolated through rejection by both sides of the Cold War, finding herself nonaligned between the East, who saw her as a betrayer to Communist heretic, expelling her from the Cominform, and the West, who considered her as sort of communist and supported Italy versus Yugoslavia in their dispute over Trieste.

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939-1943: A Documentary Survey (ed.) Clissold, S., Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1975, p.210.

Yugoslavian alienation in Europe compelled her to look for new friends in other regions of the world. Previously, some Yugoslavian Communist Party officials travelled to India and Burma, in order to create new links between Yugoslavia's position and socialist implementations and nonaligned orientations in the foreign policies of the two countries. Another aspect of the Yugoslavian version of nonalignment was supported by its socialist approach, because by the 1950s most Asian and African countries were paying lip service to socialism. And also as a developing country, Yugoslavia's economic problems were not very different from those countries.

After the Cominform decision Tito clarified his nonaligned position, manifestly stating, that Yugoslavia had no intention of joining any other camp. During the first years of Yugoslav nonalignment, Tito tried to link his country's domestic and foreign policies with some references to 'revolutionary-socialist' and 'ideological' rhetoric "We are not in anyone else's camp, we are not a part of any bloc. We are a country that is building socialism with an enlightened conscience of all our peoples, conscious of their capabilities and of their possibilities, and we intend to do so in the future, come what may."⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ On another occasion, he deliberately point out that nonalignment oriented foreign policy would nourish domestic politics at home.

(165) From speech at Titovo Uzice, February 18, 1950, Tito on Non-Alignment, Jugoslavenska Stvarnost, Beograd, 1976, p.14

"This consistent, principled foreign policy pursued by our Government has greatly enhanced the prestige of our country in the world. We will continue on this path in the future, because this is the only way in which we can contribute the most to the safeguarding of peace in the world and to the strengthening of the independence of our socialist homeland. Our foreign policy has its roots in the freedom loving soul of our peoples: not a behind-the-scenes, Machiavellian foreign policy, but an open and honest foreign policy which must be based on strict principles, imbued with the spirit of peace. Such a policy is in accord with the aspirations of our citizens, because it is also appropriate to the interests of our socialist country."(166)

In the report at the second session of the National Assembly on 27, April, 1950, Tito listed the main points of Yugoslav foreign policy and pointed out that Yugoslavia would not only take a negative position, but would also exert great efforts in international forums against the formation of blocs and spheres of interest. According to him, the present Cold War conditions could be abolished only through the workings in the United Nations towards a patient search for solutions to outstanding international issues.

During the early years of the 1950s, Tito intensified, his efforts to create solid links between Yugoslavia's socialism and nonalignment. He claimed that a new Yugoslavia composed of many nations would bring some new concepts to the political lives of newly emerging nations, through the creation of a new nation in the Balkans.

(166) Ibid., p.14.

"We have managed to unite peoples who had been dis-united for centuries and centuries; we have managed to create a strong national community, to create conditions for the accomplishment of a new society, for the attainment of socialism. But we do not have only a new system; we have new people, people with new concepts of international relations."(167)

At the same time, Tito clarified his attitude against bloc politics refusing to create a "third bloc". He replied to a question concerning bloc politics by arguing that "we are absolutely against blocs; but since they do exist, we are compelled to play our part in mitigating conflicts that might eventually arise...In our view it is not a third force at all, but a unanimously desire among the forces of progress to settle the problems which are bedeviling the world today."(168)

During the crisis over Trieste with Italy in 1953, Yugoslavia's isolation was particularly exploited by the western countries. After the crisis, Tito paid a series of visits to India and Burma from December 1954 to January, 1955.(169) During the visit President Tito emphasised that India and Yugoslavia, in spite of their geographical separation, were linked together by their common desire for the maintenance of their national independence, of peace, and of peaceful co-operation with other countries.

(167) From the speech at a meeting in Dolenjsko Toplice on 14 September 1952, Ibid., p.26.

(168) From answers to questions by representatives of the press, October 1951, Tito, J.B., Selected Speeches and Articles-1941-1961, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1963, p.31.

(169) On this visit, Jansen says that India, at first, was not disposed to take the Yugoslav leader too seriously; his fondness for heavily braided sky-blue uniforms did not appeal to the solemn Indian cast of mind, and India's first ambassador to Yugoslavia had only been appointed that year. see Jansen, op.cit., p.234.

Another point made by Tito was that it was incorrect to suggest that his visit and the strengthening of the Indo-Yugoslav relations was an attempt to create a 'third bloc', as their aim was rather to increase the number of states and nations who place the safeguarding of peace above all else. In a speech Tito delivered at the Indian parliament, he expressed clearly his views on bloc politics and asked, "Is it not absurd to imagine that we who have so vigorously opposed the division of the world into blocs, should now wish to create some sort of third bloc?"⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ In this speech he clearly criticized the Soviet Union and called all nations to practice self-reliance in foreign policy: "During the first post-war years, disillusioned by the far-from-friendly attitude of the western allies, especially at the time of concluding treaties, when the contributions and sacrifices made by our country were ignored, Yugoslavia primarily relied upon the Soviet Union for support, a country whose foreign policy at the time was not overly concerned with the interests of the new Yugoslavia either. All these elements exercised a strong influence upon us and made us realize that we must, first and foremost, practice self-reliance and not allow ourselves to serve as an appendage to anyone's foreign policy."⁽¹⁷¹⁾

⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ Tito, J.B., Selected Speeches and Articles-1941-1961, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1963, p.165.

⁽¹⁷¹⁾ From the speech in the Indian Parliament, in Tito on Non-Alignment, loc.cit., p.21-22.

A joint statement by Nehru and Tito summarized their talks, emphasising that "the policy of non-alignment pursued by both countries...is neither neutrality or neutralism...but a positive, active, and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace upon which alone collective security can really rest."(172)

Tito went to Burma after India talked to President Ba U and U Nu. Discussions between them showed that "Yugoslavia and Burma have hitherto adopted the same attitude towards the same problems, and that at the present time their views on the problems are identical."(173) When President Tito was paying his visit to India and Burma the 'Colombo Powers' gathered at Bogor where they completed their last preparations to convene the Bandung Conference the next April. Tito and Nehru had further talks upon the latter's return from the Bogor Conference. Yugoslavia could not participate in the Bandung Conference since it is not an Afro-Asian country, but Tito praised the results of the conference, saying, "Although I expected that the Conference would be of enormous importance, I did not anticipate that so many problems would be dealt with and that in the majority of cases decisions would be reached."(174)

During these visits, Tito described the situation of international relations as resting upon the concepts of the 'stabilization of peace' and 'active international co-existence'. He recognized the fact that there were different social and political systems in the world and various sorts of ideologies,

(172) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. X., February 5-12, 1955, p.14040.

(173) Ibid.

(174) From a statement to Radio Belgrade on April 27, 1955, Tito, op.cit., p.176.

but in his view, these differences do not have to give way to the emergence of international disputes and have to be considered as the results of their internal developments.

"Respect for the rights of every state to free and independent internal development, which is inherent in the policy of co-existence...that they are inevitable...Coexistence...is founded on respect for sovereignty and independence, and it completely excludes any interference in the affairs of other states... Coexistence demands equality in international relations, for only equal members of a community can co-exist...over a lengthy period of time."(175)

Towards the end of 1956, Tito and Nehru seemed to be close friends. Nehru admitted "Yugoslavia is a country with which we change our appraisal of the world situation more frequently than with any other country"(176)

During the second half of the 1950s, Tito increasingly played a central role in the making of his country's foreign policy. In this period, he seemed to create a personal image, identifying himself with Yugoslavia "He saw himself" as a student of Yugoslavian politics, "not only as the personification of his country, but also as one of the progressive leaders of the world. He made protected journeys...and delighted in personal encounters with other heads of government."(177)

(175) From the speech at Rangoon University, Burma, on January 16, 1955, Tito, loc. cit., p.172-173.

(176) From the speech delivered on 20 November 1956, quoted in Jansen, op. cit., p.248.

(177) Hondius, F.Z., The Yugoslav Community of Nations, The Hague, Paris, 1968, p.293.

Thus, he tried to institutionalize a Yugoslav version of nonalignment and to make his country a respected arbiter of international issues and a model to be emulated by smaller Third World nations. Bordwicz considers these efforts in the context of the continuity between internal and external politics and argues that the obvious dividends of such a policy would be an increase in Yugoslavia's stature abroad and an added encouragement to the feuding national groups to pull together at home. (178)

His aim, parallel with Nehru's in international relations, was to constrain the influence of the two power blocs and intensify that of the newly emerging nations of Third World. He skillfully capitalized on the hostility of nonaligned nations toward what is frequently referred to as "American imperialism". According to Bordwicz, through nonalignment, he was telling those countries exactly what they want to hear: there should be no monopoly of power and influence, no deals between the blocs; and what Tito has succeeded in accomplishing is to give Yugoslavia a reasonably strong political position among the developing nations without any lasting obligation. (179)

His efforts to bolster the other newly emerging nonaligned countries, in fact, supported Yugoslavia's position in Europe both economically and politically. Finally, in contrast to India, which adopted a nonaligned-oriented foreign policy as a result of its geo-political situation in the post-war world, Yugoslavia was driven to follow this policy in order to ward off increasing Soviet encroachment.

(178) Bordwicz, A., Yugoslavia after Tito, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, New York, 1978, p. 61.

(179) Ibid., p. 63.

B. Towards the Belgrade Conference.

Emerging tension between India and China pushed the latter to gather a 'Second Bandung Conference' in order to replace the former's leadership in Southeast Asia. In April, 1961, the Chinese foreign minister visited Indonesia to support Sukarno's continuous attempts to hold a Second Bandung Conference. In their joint communiqué, they declared that it "was very necessary to convene a Second Afro-Asian Conference in the shortest possible time."⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ On the contrary, in terms of Nasser's and Tito's standards, if a conference was to be held, it was preferable that this should be among the like-minded non-aligned rather than among the various African and Asian countries. Moreover, the two leaders considered that a Second Bandung would exclude European Yugoslavia. The same point of view was shared by India because Nehru did not want to participate in such a gathering, which would be sponsored by China and exclude Yugoslavia.

Nasser decided to play a key role by convening a preparatory meeting in his capital. He felt himself increasingly alone in the Arab World, having suffered from many disappointments with his Pan-Arabic ideals, which produced the United Arab Republic with Syria, but showed no signs of gaining new member states.

The preparatory conference in Cairo from June 5-13, 1961, was attended by representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, the Somali Republic, the Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ Quoted in Jansen, op.cit., p.280.

Mexico declined the invitation to take part, and Brazil was represented only by an observer. The question of the Congo gave rise to some controversy, as several of the countries concerned recognized Gizenga's pro-Lumumba regime at Stanleyville as the legal Government; following the formation of Adoula's government, Adoula was invited with the understanding that Gizenga would accompany him. (181)

The conference was scheduled to last for four days, but continued for eight days. The representatives tried to define what nonaligned foreign policy exactly meant and the criteria to invite the nonaligned countries to Belgrade where the main conference would take place. The conference, however, did not succeed to put a detailed definition of nonalignment and that of criteria in order to invite the countries to the next conference. Representatives agreed that invitees could not be members of any military alliances, but failed to define what a military alliance precisely was. (182)

At the end of the first four days, this important question could not be solved and was handed over to a committee of the ambassadors in Cairo of the participating countries. After the following four days, no clear definitions of the criteria to apply to the invitees were agreed upon by the committee. In addition, another sort of problem soon arose. It was "difficult, if not impossible, out of diplomatic politeness if for no other reason, for the envoys to eliminate a country whose ambassador was present; nor could an ambassador accredited to Cairo easily say that in his opinion one of the United Arab Republic's close friends failed to qualify." (183)

(181) Keesing's..., op.cit., p.14040.

(182) See for a comparison, Mates, L., "Role of the Founders in the Movement of the Non-aligned," in Non-alignment in Eighties, (eds) Tadic, B. and Petkovic, R., Jugoslavenska Stvarnost, Belgrad, 1982, pp.85-93.

(183) Jansen, op.cit., p.286.

The conference agreed upon an agenda for Belgrade which including a general exchange of views on international problems: The rights of peoples to selfdetermination; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; the struggle against racial discrimination; a general and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear tests, and the question of foreign military bases; peaceful co-existence; the role and the structure of the United Nations; and problems of economic development, international economic co-operation, and technical assistance. (184)

After the conference, a fundamental controversy among the participating countries overtly appeared, and the countries parted from each other as 'inclusives' and 'exclusives'. The former group were those who wanted a larger grouping at the main conference and the latter were those who were quite content with their own close clique. The exclusives were the 'Casablanca' countries (185) and Yugoslavia, for whom the nonaligned area was a closed society, an exclusive club to which they had the right to control admission. The 'Inclusives' were generally Asian like India, Burma, Afghanistan and Nepal and some Africans like Ethiopia and Sudan. For them the non-aligned area was to be an open society. Accordingly, they argued at Cairo that the conference of the nonaligned countries ought to represent all the diverse tendencies of neutralism. On the contrary, the 'Exclusives' put forward some general principles and objected to members of multi-lateral military alliances and to those who granted military bases to Western powers with bi-lateral agreements such as Nigeria, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco.

(184) Keesing's...op.cit. p.14870.

(185) Casablanca countries were the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and at that time the Algerian Provisional Government.

During the eight days of the conference, it became clear that on the eve of the Belgrade summit conference there was little consensus on what constituted a "nonaligned policy".

C. The Belgrade Conference.

The Belgrade summit was held at a time when the tension between the super powers was at its height, and it looked as if war was imminent. United States-Cuban relations accelerated. United States-Soviet tensions which warmed up to a point of head-on clash between the super powers. (186)

The conference was dominated by two important international problems: the Berlin and Germany crisis and the announcement by the Soviet Union of its decision to resume nuclear tests, which was followed on September 1, 1961, by the first of a series of such tests. The timing of the explosion was significant as a brutal reminder to the nonaligned countries of where real power lay.

The Western countries seemed to agree with the 'exclusive' group in antipathy to any further expansion of participating countries to nonalignment. Therefore, some pressures were put on Lebanon and Cyprus not to accept the invitation to Belgrade, and the United States ambassador to Brazil told that government that while it was free to consider itself nonaligned and to attend the conference, the United States would not consider it as nonaligned. (187)

(186) Following countries was represented as full members at the Belgrade Conference: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia. Three countries were represented by observers: Bolivia, Brasil, and Ecuador.

(187) Jansen, op.cit., p.292.

At Belgrade, Nehru pointed out that the course of events since the issue of invitations had enhanced the importance of the conference, and the issues to be considered were more serious than ever before. He, in particular, emphasised that the threat to world peace was so grave as to overshadow all other issues. Nehru emphasized that there is no choice involved in attempts at negotiations for peace. If people refuse to negotiate they must inevitably go to war.

"They must negotiate, and I am amazed and surprised that rigid, proud attitudes are taken up by great countries—all being too high and mighty to negotiate for peace. I submit with all humility to them and to others that this is not the right attitude, because it is not their pride that is involved but the future of human race. But our indicating the lines for a settlement by negotiation may hinder, instead of help, because we are dealing with proud nations and they may react wrongly. Therefore we cannot really lay down any terms on which they should negotiate. But it is our duty to say that they must negotiate, and that any party that does not to do so does tremendous injury to the human race."(188)

This point embodied the central problem in the discussions, because it was not shared by all the delegations. An Indonesian spokesman, for example, said that his government considered the 'question of colonialism' as important as that of war and peace, pointing out that "although at the moment there was no nuclear war, there were bitter colonial conflicts in Angola, Algeria and elsewhere."(189) Both questions, world peace and colonialism, were important, but which one, at that particular time, should take priority.

(188) Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade 1-6, 1961, Jugoslaviya, p.74.

(189) Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XII., February 17-24, 1962, p.18601.

According to the first eight speakers, including Presidents Tito, Sukarno, Nasser and Nkrumah, it was colonialism. But according to Nehru, the conference's main task, almost its only task, was to do what it could to start negotiations to avert the immediate threat of war, "For if war comes all else for the moment goes." (190) His speeches were general pessimistic. According to him, the conference should not try to tell 'proud nations' what they should or should not do, because the solution of the world's problems lay essentially with the super powers. But it should urge them to negotiate, and to do this through a special and separate declaration that should be 'put not only foremost but so that it catches every persons attention'. (191) After referring briefly to the questions of Algeria, Bizerta, Angola, Rhodesia, and South Africa, Nehru continued to speak in a pessimistic way:

"Whatever we may do about other problems, the dominating problem today is this danger of war. The danger of war depends on many factors, but essentially on two major countries—the USA and the Soviet Union. It will do us no good if we start condemning this country or that. It is not a very easy thing to do anyhow. But apart from being easy or difficult, if we are to be peacemakers, and if we want to help in the cause of peace, it does not help to start by condemnations. We want to win over and to influence and induce them to follow the path of peace, and if we denounce countries we cannot influence them." (192)

(190) Ibid.

(191) Jansen, op.cit., p.296.

(192) Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, ...p.76.

After the plenary session, only three speakers agreed with Nehru that the question of peace was impressive. They were Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus, Bandaranaike of Ceylon, and King Hassan of Morocco.

It was also Nehru who objected manifestly to the Soviet decision to resume nuclear tests. He said:

"I am not in a position to know all the facts which underlie these decisions, but one thing I know-this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. Therefore I regret it deeply, because it may well lead to other countries also starting tests. And then, apart from the danger inherent in nuclear tests-that is, radio-active fall out-that this brings us to the very verge and precipice of war. That is what I deeply regret. It has become even more urgent that negotiation should begin without any delay, without thinking of who is going to ask whom first."(193)

Tito, however, blatantly justified the Soviet resumption saying that "we are not surprised so much by the announcement of the resumption of atomic and hydrogen bomb tests, as we could understand the reasons given by the Soviet government." But he rejected the timing of the test, saying that they were more surprised by the fact that the tests were executed on the day the peace conference begun.(194)

During the first day, there was no new attempt to clarify ill-defined criteria for membership at the Cairo conference, and instead of that, speakers preferred to describe the summit as having 'moral strength' or as 'the conscience of mankind', or in Sukarno's words, 'a co-ordinated moral force'. The leaders tended to accept the principles of nonalignment as taken for

(193) Ibid.p.18603.

(194) Ibid.p.18603.

granted, and nobody succeeded in saying anything new on its concept or content. However, some attempts were made, however, to elaborate the concept of coexistence. While some speakers were trying to define the concept, Sukarno for instance, objected by arguing that coexistence entailed accepting the status quo and did not cover Indonesia's relations with the Dutch. (195) Tito approached the concept in another way, saying, 'the practice and theory of co-existence seems different in different areas'. (196)

On the second day of the conference, Nasser proposed that the drafting committee should begin its work. The committee was not a selected group but included representatives (generally foreign ministers) of all the participating countries. At the first meeting Nehru's proposal for a special appeal for urgent summit negotiations was discussed. The idea was accepted and ratified at the first working session of the heads of the delegations meeting the next day. In the general debate, the proposal was supported by the Asian countries except Yugoslavia, whereas it was questioned by the Casablanca countries, except Morocco. No country had the boldness to oppose a separate declaration on the need for peace, but the proposal passed without enthusiasm because it implied that such subjects as the anticolonial question did not take precedence. (197)

The drafting committee continued to meet separately to pursue the task of drawing up the communiqué covering the other items on the agenda. Its second session on the night of the 4th September lasted for seven hours, but did not produce any significant result or consensus.

(195) Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries...p.47,95.192.

(196) Jansen, op.cit., p.299.

(197) Jansen, op.cit., p.301.

The draft of final communiqué provoked a diversity of opinion between those who wanted specific references and proposals on all issues and those who wanted a brief, generally worded communiqué . As at the preparatory conference in Cairo, the 'exclusive' group wanted to prepare a detailed document, whereas the 'inclusive' group wanted a brief one. Thus, the old Asians, seemed more moderate while the young Africans adopted more enthusiastic way of expression in the committee. For instance, the question of fixing a limit for the ending of colonialism became another subject of debate. The African group claimed that a fixed time limit had to be assigned, whereas the Asian, India-lead group argued that any precise date for the termination of colonialism would be demagogic and unreal. (198)

By the last days of the conference it became clear that India was isolated from most African countries and particularly from Indonesia. According to the quasi-official journalists of Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Egypt, India was trying to sabotage the conference, she was threatening to walk out; and Nehru no longer understood nonalignment. The official Indonesian news agency reported that there were differences between Sukarno and Nehru, and Tanjug, the Yugoslav official news agency, reported this back from Jakarta in a bulletin to every journalist in Belgrade. These events symbolized the significant divisions that had arisen between the outstanding leaders of non-alignment and signalled the shattering of once-United movement.

(198) Ibid.

Another interesting aspect of the conference was that Africa had not really been adequately represented at Bandung where its particular problems had been relatively overlooked. Since the Bandung Conference, twenty-five independent African states had emerged, and only six of them were at Belgrade. "The great fact that Africa had truly become part of Afro-Asia was ignored because a small clique of non-aligned Africans excluded the rest, on the pretext that their non-alignment was not pure enough." (199)

In the final communiqué, the Asian group succeeded in advancing their own considerations on every important issue. As Jansen argued, until the end of the conference, 'the Indian elephant simply sat down and was discovered to be singularly immovable object.' Accordingly, supporting Yugoslavia and Russia in one of their doctrinal disputes with China, the conference rejected the thesis on the inevitability of wars under the impact of the Indian approach. Comments in the British and the United States press suggested that the final declaration reflected the moderating influence of Nehru, who was supported by U Nu of Burma, Bandaranaike of Ceylon and Makarios of Cyprus, and on certain issues by Nasser of the United Arab Republic, Bourgiba of Tunisia, and King Hassan of Morocco. The conference unanimously adopted on September 6 a 27-point declaration setting forth the views of the participants but produced no concrete results, Le Monde expressed that "the only real gainer from this meeting was the G.P.R.A., (ie, the Provisional Government of Algerian Republic) which had been recognized by Afghanistan, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Ghana and had received promises of future recognition from Cyprus, Burma, the Congo, and Ceylon." (200)

(199) Jansen, op.cit., p.289.

(200) Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.XIII. p.18605.

Finally, the communiqué did not include any reference to a permanent organization of nonalignment.

D. An Analysis of the Concept of Nonalignment After the Belgrade Conference.

As mentioned above, the foundations of nonalignment had been laid long before the Belgrade Conference. In addition, participating leaders of the summit had not conceived the conference as the beginning of an organizational or institutional process. It was not a conference started to prepare a charter of nonaligned countries, nor to reach a strict description of the concept of nonalignment, to list criteria of membership, or so on. Even at the preparatory conference of the Belgrade Conference in Cairo, it was observed the word "non-alignment" was not used, and the term 'uncommitted countries' was preferred instead of non-alignment. The official communiqué issued in Cairo on the preparations for the Belgrade Conference concluded that "the general discussion on matters concerning the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Uncommitted Countries was held in an atmosphere of friendship and understanding...They agreed that the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Uncommitted should be held in Yugoslavia early in September."⁽²⁰¹⁾ President Sukarno of Indonesia pointed out in Belgrade that there was no prior consultation and agreement between the participants before they adopted their respective policies of nonalignment.

⁽²⁰¹⁾ Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, ...p.13.

"No, we each arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences. There was no attempt at compromise among us, no attempt to round off disagreements to make our policies identical."(202)

According to these views, after the Bandung Conference and the tripartite summit in Brioni in 1956, the principles and objectives of nonalignment rapidly evolved and crystallized by the way of policy enunciation of leading nonaligned countries and as a result of the individual state practice they pursued. Consequently, they argued that the criteria were not "rules worked out de novo by the working group", and they had to be considered as a set of rules which were derived from the accumulated experience and widely recognized and accepted features of what had come to be identified as the 'policy of nonalignment'."(203)

On the other hand, some leaders of participating countries of the first summit seemed to either take for granted the meaning of nonalignment or to define the concept by referring to what it does not mean. Selassie of Ethiopia was one of those who tried to clarify the concept in the latter way.

"Those who would righteously denounce one side on every major problem or issue while reserving nothing but praise for the other cannot claim to be non-aligned, nor can those whose policies are shaped for them elsewhere and who wait patiently to be instructed whether they are to be for or against, be called uncommitted."(204)

(202) Ibid., p.24.

(203) Krishnan, N., op.cit., p.257, latter emphasise is mine

(204) Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.,...p.89.

During the first summit there was an attempt to distinguish the concept of non-alignment from the concept of neutrality. For instance, Sukarno of Indonesia pointed out that nonalignment was not the sanctimonious attitude of a man who holds himself aloof. According to him, nonaligned policy was not a policy of seeking a neutral position in case of war; nonaligned policy was not a policy of neutrality without its own color; being nonaligned did not mean becoming a buffer state between two giant blocs."(205)

Another example of an attempt to define the concept may be extracted from the speech delivered at the conference by Nehru, who succumbed to pessimism due to the downfall of his 'five principles' in relations with China. Outlining the situation with regard to war and armaments, he defined the concept of nonalignment by explaining it as a positive reaction to the dangers of war.

"We call ourselves a Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Now, the word nonaligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used, and coined almost, with the meaning nonaligned with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining up for war purposes...Therefore we keep away from this and we want to throw our weight...in favour of peace."(206)

During the Belgrade Conference the majority of leaders tended to explain the concept in terms of universal moral principles and general ideals rather than in terms of concrete and idiosyncratic claims.

(205) Ibid.p.25.

(206) Ibid.p.118.

Sukarno endeavoured to define the term by expressing that "non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, and the freedom to be free. It is the determination to serve this cause; it runs congruent with the social conscience of man."⁽²⁰⁷⁾ Contrarily, on the grounds of sweeping statements of the final communiqué of the Belgrade Conference, Martin says that the participants were "prone to slogans and facile generalities for constructive analysis of the broader issues of international politics. This is what The Daily Telegraph had in mind when it dubbed the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference a 'lazy document'."⁽²⁰⁸⁾

However, it was seen that third part of the final communiqué, while not bothering to record a definition or statement of the concept, included an important point: participating countries "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot constitute a bloc" and "regard the further extension of the noncommitted area of the world as the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies."⁽²⁰⁹⁾

It is obvious that this part of the communiqué includes some obvious implications of the concept of nonalignment.

On both questions, ie. definition of the concept and criteria for membership, the conference seemed to refrain from an open controversy and to agree upon either the least common denominator or clear vagueness.

⁽²⁰⁷⁾ Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, p.25.

⁽²⁰⁸⁾ Martin, L.W., "A Conservative View of the New States", in Martin, (ed.) op.cit., p.71.

⁽²⁰⁹⁾ Ibid., p.271.

The question of the absence of an exact definition of the concept partly may be linked to the decision-making process which requires reaching decisions by consensus.

Since 1961, all proposals which attempted to redefine the concept were refused to be put on the agenda at the preparatory conferences. From the same point of view, official authors of leading nonaligned countries argued that the non-aligned movement was identified not as an institutionalized organization but as a new policy and platform with a unified view on contemporary international relations, expressing general world tendencies toward emancipation and liberation in all spheres, so that the form of decision-making at nonaligned conferences never was a disputed issue.

"Voting, as an expression of reshuffling and the formal adoption of different views, currents and stands, and in international relations as the expression of the sovereign right to decision-making of independent countries, was out of question due to the very essence of the nonaligned movement."(210)

Resting on a similar argument, the need to clarify the concept of nonalignment as a set of explicit and concrete principles is refused by some students of the field. For instance, according to Tadic, the lack of a more complete codification of the rules of behavior in the nonaligned movement hinders the activities of the movement, but at the same time, shows its aspiration for continuous adjustment to new conditions and needs.

(210) Mojsov, op.cit.p.257, emphasis is mine.

"This lack of strict rules", Tadic says, "is not therefore primarily an expression of disagreements on the elements which are to be built into these rules, though such disagreements exist in some domains. This is actually, the result of a need to leave open broader possibilities for adoption of flexible solutions,...particularly in those spheres where independence of members of the nonaligned movement, as their supreme value, is fully expressed."⁽²¹¹⁾ An elaboration of the arguments of Yugoslav authors and some outstanding foreign policy-makers is now appropriate. For instance, Petkovic, conflicting with Tadic's above mentioned argument, say that the documents of the Belgrade Conference and of all later summit conferences between 1961 and 1979 contain the principles of nonalignment which determine the independent, extra-bloc, and global character of the policy and movement of non-alignment."⁽²¹²⁾

The declaration of the second summit conference in 1964 did not contribute to the improvement and the clarifying of the concept. It referred to the policy and the principles of nonalignment as though they had already been defined or were self-explanatory.

(211) Tadic, B., "Non-Alignment as a Factor of Democratization of International Relations and as a Form of Democratic Rallying of the Countries and Nations in the Contemporary World", in Misra, K.P. and Narayanan, K.R., (eds), op.cit., p.229.

(212) "The Authentic Principles of Non-Alignment", in Non-Alignment in Eighties, (eds) Tadic, B. and Petkovic R., Yugoslavensko Stvarnost, Belgrade, 1982, p.66.

However, the declaration spoke of a new criterion to test nonalignment in concrete terms: "objection to the setting up of bases and the stationing of troops by a Power or Power bloc on the territories of other countries against the expressed will of those countries," because it constitutes a gross violation of the sovereignty of states and a threat to freedom and international peace.⁽²¹³⁾ The condition of 'against the expressed will of those countries', however, conclusively exterminates the validity of an essential principle of non-alignment. Actually, the point which needs to be grasped first is that this condition is to accommodate the situation of many existing member states of the movement, allowing foreign military bases and foreign troops on their territories. In this context, the second point is that the meaning of the concept is obfuscated and it does not even present an obvious foreign policy orientation for present or potential members. And therefore, the basic distinction between alignment and nonalignment is effaced.

The final communiqué issued by the preparatory meeting in Dar-es-Salaam for the following summit in Lusaka in 1970 reaffirms the adherence of the participants to the 'principles and criteria of nonalignment as expressed at the Nonaligned Conferences of Belgrade and Cairo'⁽²¹⁴⁾ Also in the Lusaka summit conference, it was declared that "what is needed is not a redefinition of non-alignment, but a rededication by all non-aligned nations to its central aims and objectives."⁽²¹⁵⁾

⁽²¹³⁾ Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1978, Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1978, p.25.

⁽²¹⁴⁾ Ibid., p.37.

⁽²¹⁵⁾ Ibid., p.45.

However, paradoxically declaration manifested the rededication to the central aims and objectives of the nonaligned movement as a necessity, despite the concept has never before been defined.

Another point of the declaration of the Lusaka summit, is that it included a comprehensive statement of the basic aims of nonalignment. But, these aims cannot be qualified as distinctive to the movement. As a matter of fact, many of them are equally shared by the aligned states or by the member states of the United Nations. (216)

The Libyan delegation at the fourth summit in Algiers tried to elaborate the concept of nonalignment and criteria for membership. The problem was addressed by their proposal for 'a new definition or stricter interpretation' of the concept, but it was refused to be put on the agenda of the conference, probably for lack of consensus. Therefore the most outspoken criticism of the criteria for membership was pronounced by Kadhafi of Libya, referring to the 'aligned' aspects of nonaligned countries.

(216) For instance, some of them may be listed as follows, "the pursuit of world peace and peaceful coexistence by strengthening the role of nonaligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective obstacle against all forms of aggressive action and the threat or use of force against the freedom, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of any country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a negation of human equality and dignity; the ending of arms race followed by universal disarmament;" and so on, Ibid. p.45.

"It is not possible for our group to undertake joint economic action...What we should do is pledge that none of us will tie himself economically to international monopolies or allow himself to be drawn militarily into either of the two large blocs. I know that some of us are economically and militarily associated with the imperialist Powers of the East or of the West."(217)

The political declaration of the summit eventually referred to 'aims, principles and practices' of the policies of nonalignment, but gave no clue to understand specifically what they are and mixed up somewhat different elements sowing a new set of confusing remarks on the concept. The declaration put down, for example, another global aim for nonaligned countries; that of democratizing international relations: The policy of nonalignment together with other peace-loving, democratic and progressive forces, constitute an important and irreplaceable factor in the struggle for the freedom and independence of peoples and countries, for general peace and...for the democratization of international relations, for general and equitable co-operation, for economic development", and so on.(218)

The following declarations issued by the other summit conferences are similar to the others in terms of the consistent lack of an attempt to define the concept clearly. Generally, it is observed that each declaration adopted either a more ambiguous approach to the concept or took the concept for granted.

(217) Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XIX, October 1-7, 1973, p.26119.

(218) Documents of the Gatherings of Nonaligned Countries, 1961-1978,...p.88. It should be noted that democratization of international relations was mentioned as an imperative previously by the Lusaka Declaration of 1970. see Ibid, p.42.

The final communiqué of the conference of nonaligned countries stated that "it is imperative that its members exercise unceasing vigilance to preserve intact the essential character of non-alignment, maintain unswerving fidelity to its principles and policies..."⁽²¹⁹⁾ The conference of foreign ministers held in Belgrade in 1978 maintained similar words by affixing the ritual of 'preserving its distinct identity and authentic character.'⁽²²⁰⁾ The final declaration issued by the Havana Summit in 1979 also reaffirmed a set of sweeping aims and certain principles which compromise objectives common to all member states of the United Nations, such as indivisibility of peace and security the development of international co-operation on the basis of equality; and so on.⁽²²¹⁾ The same tendency continued in the final communiqué of the last nonaligned summit in New Delhi in 1983. This declaration reaffirmed "the criteria for participation in the Movement, as formulated in Cairo and adopted in Belgrade in 1961 and called for their strict observance."⁽²²²⁾

The main documents of the conferences of nonaligned countries demonstrate that the member states have not cared to define what the concept of nonalignment exactly means, and have consistently strewn confusion by mixing up concepts, principles, and objectives in their declarations.

(219) Ibid., p.147.

(220) Ibid., p.282.

(221) Review of International Affairs, Vol. XXXIII., No. 773, June 20, 1982, p.17.

(222) Review of International Affairs, Vol. XXXIV. No. 792, April, 5, 1983, p.22. emphasis is mine.

Therefore, nonalignment today has come to mean everything to everybody and there are as many definitions of nonalignment as there are nonaligned countries and possibly even more because many of these concepts and principles are not distinctive to the member countries.

If an authorized definition of the concept had been built up during early years of the movement the definition could have been revised from time to time when the conditions of international environment changed. As a matter fact, the mere existence of an authorized definition of the concept would not have hindered the emergence of paradoxes between the proclaimed policies and the foreign policy initiatives of those countries. However, it would provide a set of criteria to judge the foreign polices of nonaligned countries. Because of this reason, one should ask that if there is no clear definition, how can one judge a deviation from the genuine concept.

The lack of a clear definition of the concept caused an expansion in the scope of the movement's membership and that of its activity. A high price has been paid, however, for these achievements in terms of the quality of membership and of persistent divisions and controversies among the member countries.⁽²²³⁾ If the movement had decided not to pay this high price, the strength and unity of the member countries would have been much higher than they are at present. As one of the students of the field argues,

(223) Emphasis is mine.

"the exhilaration resulting from the continual expansion of membership has misled the founding members of the movement into believing that the increase in numbers has not affected the quality of the concept policy as conceived originally in the early 1960s or that it has not caused the policy to undergo considerable devaluation."(224)

As a conclusion, the general impression derived from the declarations, statements, and speeches delivered at summits and intergovernmental conferences of nonaligned conferences since 1961 is not sufficient to accurately define concept of nonalignment. Secondly the outstanding elements of the concept are recorded together with many other aims and values which are not idiosyncratic for the participating countries of the conference.

However, it is possible to decipher the more or less explicit elements of the concept despite its existing ambiguity. These elements, which the definition of the concept requires, might be listed as follows:

- Pursuit of an independent policy conforming to the principles of active and peaceful co-existence;
- Support to the struggle for national liberation;
- Refusal to enter into any multi-lateral military-political alliance formed in the context of conflict between the great powers.

Particularly the last element incorporates the essential precondition and organic feature of the bloc-free character of nonalignment. According to this characteristic, it is

(224) Rajan, M.S., "Non-alignment and the Basis of Membership of the Movement," Misra and Narayanan, (eds.), op.cit., p.239.

possible to test whether a country is aligned or nonaligned because any kind of military association with the big powers represents the very essence of alignment, and voluntary acceptance of foreign military bases on the territory of any country makes a country aligned.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

In this study, it has been tried to elaborate the emergence and development of nonalignment as a foreign policy orientation in the context of Indian and Yugoslav foreign policy experiences between the years of 1947 and 1962, and the conceptualization of nonalignment at various summit conferences. Consequently it was concluded that nonalignment whose emergence has been symbolized by Indian independence in 1947 raised and played most effective international role in this period.

During the postwar period, nonalignment was identified with Indian foreign policy and Nehru became its outspoken pioneer. In part, Nehru's diplomatic personality, and geopolitical position and size of India has made her most outstanding leading country among nonaligned countries. This period in Indian foreign policy has been named as 'Nehru period' which started from independence in 1947 and continued to 1964 when he died. During the first years of nonaligned Indian foreign policy, India's primary goal was normally to keep herself in an equidistant location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. The main efforts of Indian diplomacy concerned relations with these countries in order to receive economic assistance and to search for international status.

It should be accepted that India's international status originated in an extraordinary combination of domestic and external circumstances. Firstly India has obtained her independence from most enormous colonial empire, British Empire.

Nehru's diplomatic personality, India's size and population, and bipolarity has given great significance to her. Eventually the Cold War policies of the United States and the Soviet Union made India acquire an international status which she could not have secured through her own capabilities. India's neutral position and mediation during the Korean War had the long-term consequence of compelling the great powers to realize the importance of nonalignment and this was reflected by the role India played at the Geneva Conference of 1954. During these years nonaligned Indian foreign policy has reached to zeal point of its international status.

In 1954, the United States incorporated Pakistan into C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. According to this agreement, Washington provided Pakistan with much military assistance during the next ten years, for use, if required, against Communist expansionism, but with no guarantee to stop their use against India. After these events, India felt herself allocate more financial resource to the strengthening of its armed forces and then opposed all United States military-diplomatic strategies in Asia, and relations between New Delhi and Washington was characterized by a series of verbal quarrels.

The absence of prior relations between India and the Soviet Union allowed both countries to build their policies towards the other on logical than on emotional foundations. In 1955, it was seen an alteration in the Soviet Union's policy towards New Delhi, and then Khrushchev and Bulganin paid an official visit to India declaring his approval of India's stand versus Pakistan over Kashmir.

After 1957, the beginning border disputes with China made India recognize the fact that in international politics a nonaligned foreign policy cannot ensure total national security. 1962 border clash crumbled to dust one of the premises of nonalignment, for the need to expand to India's armed forces and enlarge the defence budget eliminated main arguments of Nehru's traditional foreign policy understanding. In the same context India's dependence on external military assistance during this crisis to protect her own territory underlined certain shortcomings of a nonaligned foreign policy, and raised grave questions about the feasibility of the non-alignment stance as a diplomatic technique capable of defending the fundamental national security requirements.

After border clash of 1962 with China, India entered into 1960s defending somewhat changed foreign policy principles. In the November of the same year, a new Indo-US military agreement replaced the mutual security accord of 1951 and in July 1963 the United States announced an agreement with the United Kingdom and India to improve the latter's defence against any future aerial assaults from China.

The Sino-Indian border conflicts of 1962, had a profound impact on the South Asian triangle. It brought an end to Indo-China friendship; the era of Pancha Shila was substituted for an era of confrontation between the two Asian giants. After the war Nehru wrote in 1963 that "in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace...it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with friendly countries in the lights of the changing actualities of the international situation." (225)

(225) Nehru, J., "Changing India,"...p.462.

Consequently, the foreign policy direction, which Nehru adopted last two years of his premiership, revealed that the rationale and the basis of nonalignment could be jettisoned when the protection of the national interest needed the use of military force, and having largely abandoned, towards the mids of 1960s nonalignment of India survived merely as an article of faith.

1960 was accepted as the year of Africa since many African country obtained their independence. This led to the numbers of nonaligned countries to increase in the short run. Nonalignment manifestly accorded with aspirations of these newly emerging countries. However it is hard to say that increasing number of participating countries to the conferences resulted in increasing credibility of the movement. Particularly, the continual expansion of membership caused the movement to undergo a visible devaluation. Reverse effects of the increase in numbers primarily rooted from the absence of a clearer conceptualization of the nonalignment, and from the absence of accurate criteria for the admission of members, and from some injudicious admissions. Therefore the last chapter was devoted to elaborate the question of conceptualization of nonalignment.

Yugoslavia seemed to adopt the general principles of nonalignment after the banishment of Cominform in 1948 and Trieste Crisis in 1953, which were important turning points in Yugoslav foreign policy. Tito began long-range diplomatic travells to such nonaligned countries of southern Asia as Burma, Indonesia and India, and then Yugoslavia was manifested as one of the

nonaligned countries. In this context it should be noted that diplomatic relations between those famed nonaligned countries and Yugoslavia were begun officially in this year. Tito's aim in international relations has consisted of efforts to restrict the influence of Western and Eastern powers on Yugoslavian foreign policy and to find new friends from non-aligned countries to share his country's loneliness. After general 'admission' Tito tried to institutionalize his own concept of nonalignment, 'peaceful co-existence which implies manifestly Yugoslavia's geopolitical position between East and West. Finally, Tito succeeded to make his country a respected arbiter of international issues and a model to be emulated by smaller developing countries. On the whole, he managed to capitalize on the hostility of many Third World nations toward what is frequently referred to as American imperialism on the one hand, and to create a new-alternative to orthodox socialist implementations which was named 'self-management'.

Tito's aim was to constrain the influence of the two power blocs and intensify the activity of the newly emerging nations of the Third World. His efforts to bolster these countries supported Yugoslavia's position in Europe both economically and politically.

As a conclusion, there is a difference between motivations which made India and Yugoslavia adopt nonalignment as a foreign policy orientation. In contrast to India, which adopted a non-aligned foreign policy as a result of its geo-political situation in the post-war world, Yugoslavia was driven to follow this policy in order to ward off increasing Soviet encroachment.

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