

## Tez Özeti

Ahu Erdoğan, “Kişilikle Uyumlu ve Kişiliğe Aykırı Otobiyoğrafik Anılardaki

### Özellik Farklılıkları”

Mevcut literatürde benlik ve otobiyoğrafik hafıza arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyen çalışmalar bulunmasına rağmen, kişilikle (benlikle) uyumlu ve aykırı otobiyoğrafik anılar pek araştırılmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı kişilikle (benlikle) uyumlu ve aykırı otobiyoğrafik anıları anı özellikleri açısından incelemektir. Kırk yedi katılımcı birer kişilikle (benlikle) uyumlu ve birer aykırı anı bildirdiler ve her bir anı için katılımcıların anıyı hatırlamaları sırasında yaşadıkları görüngüsel deneyimleri ölçen Bellek Deneyimleri Anketi'nin Türkçe versiyonunu doldurdular. Bulgular kişilikle uyumlu anıların kişiliğe aykırı anılara göre daha canlı ve tutarlı olduklarını, daha çok duygusal detay içerdiklerini, benlik/öz kavramına daha yakın olduklarını, daha olumlu bir duygusal ton içerdiklerini, ve daha çok birinci kişinin bakış açısından hatırladıklarını gösterdi. Bu iki anı çeşidi duygusal yoğunluk, erişilebilirlik, paylaşım ve zamanın net olarak hatırlanması özellikleri bazında bir farklılık göstermedi. Ayrıca her iki çeşit anı da oldukça canlı ve tutarlıydı; duygusal detaylar ve duygusal yoğunluk içermekteydi, erişilebilirdi, zamansal bir netlikle hatırlanmakta ve paylaşılmamaktaydı. Bu bulgular, benlik/öz kavramının anılarla uyumluluğunun onlara kişiliğe aykırı anılara göre birçok açıdan ayrıcalıklı bir konum sağlamasına rağmen, kişiliğe aykırı anıların da aykırılık bazında da olsa sadece benlikle ilişkili olmaktan dolayı aynı açılardan yarar sağlayabileceklerine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar sözcükler: otobiyoğrafik hafıza, benlik, kişilikle uyumlu anı, kişiliğe aykırı anı

## Thesis Abstract

### Ahu Erdoğ an, “Characteristics of Self-Consistent and Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories”

Although the relationship between self and autobiographical memory has been examined in the previous literature, the nature of self-consistent and self-discrepant memories has not been explored. The purpose of the present study was to examine self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories in terms of memory characteristics. Forty seven participants reported one self-consistent and one self-discrepant memory and completed the Turkish version of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire, which measures aspects of participants’ phenomenological experiences at retrieval, for each. Results revealed that self-consistent memories were more vivid and coherent, involved more sensory details, were closer to the self concept, more positively valenced and remembered more from a first person’s (field) perspective than self-discrepant memories. The two types of memories did not differ in terms of the characteristics of emotional intensity, accessibility, sharing and time clarity. Also both memories were highly vivid, coherent, had high emotional intensity and sensory details, were accessible, had time clarity and were not shared. The findings indicate that although the consistency of memories with the self concept provides them with a privileged condition over self-discrepant memories in many aspects, self-discrepant memories may also benefit from these aspects just by being related to the self, even if this relationship is in terms of discrepancy.

Key words: autobiographical memory, self, self-consistent memory self-discrepant memory

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Autobiographical Memory and the Self

Autobiographical memories are personal episodic memories involving recollective experience in the form of reliving, vivid imagery and belief in their accuracy (Rubin, 1998; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Since they are autobiographical they consist of memories of experiences of the self.

The self is defined as the awareness and consciousness of one's own existence, being and uniqueness (Buss, 1992; cited in Durkin, 2004; Rogers, 1965; cited in Carver & Scheier, 2000). It is indicated to be a social entity, existing in a social context. Communicating through symbols and self awareness are argued to be two of the crucial characteristics of the self since they help to evaluate somebody's actions in the context of others' actions and reactions leading to the regulation of behaviors and to the construction and reconstruction of the social world. The self is also conceptualized as growing out of both maturation and socialization instead of being present from birth (Franzoi, 2000). Conway (2005) also defined the self as the set of active goals and the images of the self that are related to these goals.

James (1948) defined the self as consisting of two subsystems, I, the knower, and Me, the known. I is the active part of the self that initiates an action, perceives and knows, whereas Me is the part that is perceived and known by I. The subjective I perceives the objective Me. The Me, proposed by James as involving material, social and spiritual aspects, also constitutes self concept which includes all thoughts and feelings about the self in the form of a theory about one's own self.

Self concept is the set of characteristics which are perceived as parts of one's self (Carver & Scheier, 2000). Also it is structured as a knowledge base that is

internally consistent and stable although it is also flexible and dynamic (Epstein, 1973). The cognitive structures of self schemas, which are the beliefs that people hold about themselves as a result of their generalizations from personal experiences, play an important role in the formation of self concept (Markus, 1977).

In the present study, the self will generally be used to refer to the self concept. In other words, of interest to this study is the relationship between autobiographical memory and self concept, how somebody perceives himself/herself.

### Self Defining Autobiographical Memories

By definition, any autobiographical memory has to be associated with the self. In other words, autobiographical memories are memories of the self that are chosen to be kept by the self and eventually constitute the self. For instance, autobiographical memories serve directive functions in keeping the association with the person's identity and goals (Pillemer, 1998, 2001). However it could be claimed that memories with different content might be more or less central to the self concept, causing some autobiographical memories to be regarded as "more" self defining than others.

Although this concept of self defining memory is used in the literature by different theorists, there is no clearly agreed upon definition of what kind of autobiographical memories it stands for. The main purpose of this study is to explore self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories, and to find out their similarities as well as their differences.

### Theories relating Memory and the Self

#### Self Memory System (SMS)

One of the models depicting the relationship between autobiographical memories and self in a comprehensible way is the Self Memory System (SMS;

Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). SMS is claimed to be a superordinate system, having two components, the autobiographical knowledge base and the working self, and an emergent system since it exists as long as these two subsystems interact with each other.

SMS proposes that the autobiographical knowledge base is organized through different hierarchical levels of specificity; namely life time periods, general events and event specific knowledge (ESK), getting richer in terms of specificity respectively. Life time periods are periods with known beginning and end points; involving general thematic and temporal knowledge about significant others, locations and activities belonging to that period; for example, the times that somebody had been at high school or university or had been married to somebody. General events form a narrower category, consisting of both repeated and single events associated with each other and revolving around a common theme. “Mini-histories” which were defined as vivid memories of events related to goal attainment and therefore were thought to be important for the self (Robinson, 1992; cited in Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), first time memories and “self-defining memories” (Singer & Salovey, 1993; cited in Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) are also included in the general events level. Examples for general events might be the weekly meetings of the school magazine or the semester breaks in elementary school. ESK is conceptualized to be the most specific level of information and it contains visual imagery and sensory perceptual details which lead to belief in those memories. The memory of the first class at school or the memory of receiving the news of the birth of a sibling belongs to this category.

The relationship between self and autobiographical memory is assumed to be formed during both the encoding and retrieval of autobiographical memories through

the working self. The working self, which is proposed to be a control mechanism governing executive functions in an analogy to working memory, encodes and constructs memories according to the current goals of the self as well as activating memories consistent with these goals. These goals are also thought to be hierarchically organized. Emotions are thought to both indicate changes in working self goals and be allowed when reexperiencing them by remembering the memory they were attached.

SMS states that retrieval occurs either by the elicitation of a memory directly with a cue (called direct retrieval) or indirectly through control processes according to the current goals of the working self (called generative retrieval).

The bidirectional relationship between the autobiographical knowledge base and the working self leads to encoding, retrieval and construction of autobiographical memories which are consistent with current goals. At the same time, the autobiographical knowledge base determines the range of goals the working self can hold (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).

Recently SMS was modified and new components were added to the original model (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005). The goal dependent activation of the working self and the autobiographical knowledge base were elaborated with the introduction of two concepts, correspondence and coherence. Correspondence refers to the accuracy of the memories whereas coherence refers to the consistency of memories with the self concept. Autobiographical memory is divided into the episodic memory and the long term self and the long term self is further divided into the autobiographical knowledge and the conceptual self.

Autobiographical knowledge has a hierarchical organization that is the same as the original model with an added level of life story schema, which is introduced as

the most general level containing information about the individual, his goals and activities, including self images. ESK was omitted as a level of autobiographical knowledge since those memories are replaced by the category of episodic memories. Also the conceptual self is claimed to consist of abstract and schematic knowledge that is socially constructed about the world, others and the self, organized in hierarchical levels of personal script, possible selves and belief.

Recent memories are claimed to serve the adaptive function of correspondence while long term memories serve the function of maintaining self coherence. Also episodic memories are retained as long as they are relevant to the current goals of the working self and will be lost in incidences of goal change if they are not integrated into the long term self through consistency with long term goals. Therefore, accuracy would be prioritized in recent memories whereas self coherence would be more prioritized in older memories.

Conceptual self knowledge and the goals of the working self are regarded as the two main sources of the control processes. The working self tries to serve the demands of both correspondence and coherence since striving for goals requires the monitoring of reality reliably together with the maintenance of self coherence which is crucial for the construction of those goals in the first place. In cases of discrepancy between the outcomes of the two functions, which is not desirable, either goal change or self change occurs. In extreme cases psychopathology can also emerge.

Both in the original model and the modified version, distribution of memories over the life span are explained with the goals of the working self. Specifically, childhood amnesia, defined as the inability to access memories of the first 3 years of life and accessing very few memories before 4.5-5 years of age, is argued to result from the change in the goals of the self in the transitional period of five years of age.

Also the reminiscence bump, which refers to recall of unexpectedly more memories from the period of life between 10 to 30 years, is explained with the beginning of the formation of self concept and identity in these ages that rather stabilizes thereafter. The recency part is also associated with the persisting goals of the working self. Moreover, the retrieval models of generative versus direct retrieval are preserved as in the original model.

The distinction between episodic and conceptual memories is of importance for the theory since episodic memory is claimed to be a more primitive memory system that is present in animals and in infants. On the other hand, conceptual memory is indicated to be a more evolved system unique to humans and developing in later stages of development (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005).

#### Personal Event Memories

Although not as clearly established as the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005) in details, as a model of the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self, another conceptualization relating autobiographical memories and the self is the Personal Event Memories proposed by Pillemer (1998, 2001). This model aims to explain why some specific episodes in life are remembered or retained well, and it introduces the reason as these specific events' functional and directive effects on the individual's life. Personal event memories are defined as single episodes belonging to a certain place and time, remembered with vivid details containing perceptual and sensory information and belief in their reality. The reason such episodes are well retained is suggested to be their association to the identity of the individual and his/her goals across the life span. The increase in remembering personal event memories in the reminiscence bump in the life time distribution of memories is explained with the



period's transitional nature. The directive functions of these memories are introduced as guiding the individual in such transitional periods when the emerging period is novel. Directive functions are identified as memorable messages, symbolic messages, originating events, turning points, anchoring events and analogous events. Memorable messages are directly given messages and statements whereas symbolic messages do not have to be explicit or intended by the person who gives the message. Originating events are thought to symbolize the beginning of the execution of a long term goal by the individual and they serve the function of motivating the person. Turning points signify the sudden redirection toward a new goal and they support the construction of causality. Anchoring events are distinguished from originating events or turning points as they symbolize the beginning of a long term belief system rather than the execution of a goal. Finally, analogous events are defined as invoked memories of similar general structure in cases when the person faces a new event. The possibility that these memories could be identified retrospectively is emphasized and also the memories of these events rather than the actual things happening in these memories are argued to be crucial (Pillemer, 1998, 2001).

Individual differences in terms of remembering specific memories and especially the inability to recall specific episodes, named overgenerality, is claimed to be problematic since these personal event memories are thought to be necessary for the individual to make decisions in his current processing. Also the interpretation of these memories is emphasized and the possibility of reinterpreting events is claimed to make positive life changes possible (Pillemer, 2001).

### Life-Story Theory of Identity

A theory related to the issue of the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self is the Life-Story Theory of Identity (Mc Adams, 1985, 1993, 1996; cited in Mc Adams 2001, 2003) which is fundamentally a theory of identity. However, some of its conceptualizations overlap with autobiographical memory theories.

According to this model identity, in the form of an internalized narrative, is composed of a continuously reconstructed past, the present as it is perceived and the expected future. This evolving life story begins to be constructed by adolescence which is the time for the beginning of identity formation according to Erickson's Psychosocial Theory of Development (McAdams, 1994). The life story consists of a plot, chapters, characters, places, scenes, themes embedded in a psychosocial context, an ideological setting of beliefs and values shaped through the ethical and religious attitudes, and it involves different roles of the self and different times. The plot or the interpretation of the plot has a narrative tone of either optimism or pessimism from infancy and later on, it is accompanied by imagery in the form of both sensational experiences and metaphors and similes. From the beginning of later childhood, themes appear with the motivational components of agency and communion, appearing as one dominating the other at different times, standing for the individual's separation from and union with the environment, respectively. By adolescence the person begins to situate him/herself in the ideological, ethical, religious beliefs and values and starts to form her/his life story by choosing among autobiographical memories, marking key events and major turning points, namely nuclear episodes. These nuclear episodes are composed of high points, low points, beginning points, ending points and turning points, specifically named as scenes. In

young adulthood the main characters of the life story, the “imagoes”, idealized versions of the self are formed, which turn into internalized social roles in adulthood. Though there can be many imagoes they still make up a single individual with unity. These imagoes are then elaborated through middle ages, until the point where people try to end the construction of their life stories with meaningful endings that serve generativity. The properties of this evolving life story of identity are coherence, flexibility, credibility, differentiation in terms of elaboration and richness, reconciliation as unity of multiple selves, and generative integration in the end.

### Similarities

In comparison with autobiographical memory research, life story theory has important similarities with SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The life time periods of SMS refer to chapters of the life story theory whereas ESK or episodic memory of the modified version of SMS refers to nuclear episodes and specifically specific scenes. These scenes include turning points and low versus high points. In this regard the nuclear episodes are also very similar to personal event memories (Pillemer, 1998, 2001), which are also similar to ESK or episodic memory. The example that ESK / nuclear episode, in the form of a turning point scene / personal event memory, of a conversation with a very extraordinary teacher of literature leading the person to be a successful writer in the future in the life time period / chapter of high school years, might make this similarity relationship clearer. The life story involves self defining information consisting of autobiographical knowledge base and it is assumed that these memories are reconstructive and dependent on the personal goal structure, therefore vulnerable to distortions, consistent with SMS. Nevertheless, the life story also includes the expectations about the future in the form of an imagined future, which is absent in other autobiographical memory theories

(Mc Adams, 2001, 2003).

## Different conceptualizations on Autobiographical Processing

### Autobiographical Reasoning and Life Span Perspective

Furthermore, autobiographical reasoning is introduced as a concept which is claimed to relate autobiographical memories with narrative processing (Habermas & Bluck, 2000). Autobiographical reasoning refers to the formation of relationships between autobiographical memories through temporal, thematic and interpretive links. This reasoning emerges in adolescence since the individual is not thought to develop comprehension of temporal, causal, biographical and thematic coherences fully until adolescence. These four components are regarded as crucial for autobiographical reasoning. Temporal coherence is defined as the knowledge about how the events are sequenced in a story. Biographical coherence is defined as the knowledge about the memories to be included in a life story and it is dependent on culture. Thematic coherence refers to deriving lessons and messages out of memories while causal coherence refers to the comprehension of explanations and motives that have led to the memories. Also the need to position one's self in the larger society through the construction of psychosocial identity is argued to be the main reason for the development of autobiographical reasoning. Through practicing autobiographical reasoning, the life story is thought to emerge, which indicates that this narrative is more complex than the autobiographical memories themselves (Bluck & Habermas, 2001, Habermas & Bluck, 2000).

Employing the concept of autobiographical reasoning and uniting a life perspective with a life span perspective to autobiographical memory, Bluck and Habermas (2001) constructed a framework of autobiographical memory. They questioned whether all memories of somebody's personal past do have

autobiographical significance and whether an association of memories to the life story should be important if autobiography is considered as the sum of specific memories that constitute a meaningfully related whole together. Taking a life perspective, the whole life story consisting of autobiographical memories is treated as the unit of interest and three levels of analysis are offered, namely specific events, life periods/domains, and life story. In a consideration of the past, autobiographical reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) rather than memory search is claimed to be play a more dominant role though the two processes are thought to work in combination. The life span perspective indicates that how humans consider these three levels of their lives depends on the age of the person and the cultural and biological context that the age involves. From this perspective, autobiographical memory is also continuously reconstructed according to the typical interests of the age.

#### Construction through Conversation

A rather different conceptualization is concerned with the construction of past experiences and identity through conversations (Pasupathi, 2001). Conversations about personal memories are considered and these memories include specific or extended events, experiences or interpretations about those experiences. Two concepts are suggested as important in talking about memories, namely coconstruction and consistency. The memories are argued to be coconstructed by the interaction of both the speaker and the context which also involves the listener. The content, interpretation and the details included are all dependent on this dynamic nature of the conversation. Both speakers' characteristics, culture, gender and the goals of the speaker during conversation are thought to affect what and how the speaker is going to tell about past experiences. At the same time even the presence of

the listener or the idea of his/her presence and the characteristics as well as goals and nonverbal behavior of the listener are also claimed to influence the coconstruction of the memories to be told. Moreover the interaction of the speaker and the listener, examined in cases of collaborative remembering, also influences the conversation on memories.

Consistency refers to the consistency of a memory with its earlier recollections rather than with reality. The memories told in conversations are argued to be consistent as long as they are rehearsed frequently or are grounded on a certain schema as a result of their storied form. But at the same time they are vulnerable to source memory errors since telling episodes might interfere with the original episode. Apart from these factors, consistency is also affected by social factors such as approval, social consensus or cognitive dissonance.

In the context of conversations about past experiences, autobiographical memories are thought to emerge through both coconstruction and consistency. These socially constructed memories are argued to influence adult development, however, through adulthood they are subject to change, too. The stability in identity or identity change is also believed to occur through conversational recounting of memories, with both coconstruction and consistency that is established by rehearsal (Pasupathi, 2001).

#### Self-Discrepant Autobiographical Memories

In the light of these different conceptualizations it is relatively easier to define “self-consistent memories” than “self-discrepant memories”. Since no conceptualization of this definition exists in the autobiographical memory literature up to date, it is meaningful to try to examine the concept of “self-discrepant memory” from the perspective of each of these theories, suggesting a relationship

between the self and autobiographical memory.

Two definitions can be suggested while describing “self defining memories”, resulting in two different conceptualizations of “self discrepant memories”. Self defining memories could either consist of both self consistent and self discrepant memories, or be composed only of memories that are consistent with the self concept. In the first case, all the conceptualizations formulated in terms of self defining memories would be valid for self discrepant memories. In the second case, there would be different conceptualizations.

Among the abovementioned conceptualizations, SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005) is the only theory that seems to make a differentiation between self consistent and self discrepant autobiographical memories. According to SMS, self discrepant memories would not be encoded in the first place, even if they were encoded they could not benefit from the retrieval process since they are not consistent with current goals of the self which constructs autobiographical memory. Although self discrepant memories could be encoded and maintained for recent times because of the correspondence process serving accuracy; they would not be maintained in the long term because of the coherence process serving the consistency of autobiographical memory with the self concept.

Within the framework of Personal Event Memories (Pillemer, 1998, 2001), The Life-Story Theory of Identity (Mc Adams, 1985, 1993, 1996; cited in Mc Adams 2001, 2003), and Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) theory on the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and narrative processes, the function of the memory rather than its consistency with the self concept is crucial for it to be defined as a self defining memory, despite the fact that self discrepant memories are not mentioned in

these theories. So the properties these theories propose about self defining memories can also be acceptable for self discrepant memories. In the Life-Story Theory of Identity (Mc Adams, 1985, 1993, 1996; cited in Mc Adams 2001, 2003) and Habermas and Bluck's (2000) theory, self and identity are defined as the whole coherent life story composed of autobiographical memories. The content of individual memories independent of each other do not seem to be crucial as long as they play an important role in the structure of the story or identity as a coherent whole. Therefore, the different contributions of self consistent and self discrepant memories to this coherent life story are not proposed and are exploratory in terms of research.

Adding to our understanding about the relationship between the self and autobiographical memory, Pasupathi's (2001) theory which concerns the dynamic effects of contexts in conversations on personal memories, is not directly relevant to the purposes of this study since it requires the presence of others in the role of listeners and reactors. But the emphasis it puts on the effect of the need for approval or cognitive dissonance might lead to the implication that self discrepant memories will not be reported as often as self consistent memories, receiving less rehearsal and being left to eventually fade.

#### Some General Themes Arising from Different Theories

A general picture depicting the nature of the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self as constructing each other can be derived from the abovementioned theories. All theories take a functional approach to autobiographical memory, so that memories serve the construction and reconstruction of self concept and identity. Moreover, memories are not regarded as individual, independent events without any meaning attached to them; rather they are



associated in a variety of ways, creating a meaningful whole.

The most relevant study in the literature on this issue was conducted by Wagenaar on the updating of the conceptual self, by using himself as the only participant and his memories kept in a systematically designed diary as the research material. On the basis of the assumption that the updating of the conceptual self is achieved through autobiographical memory, he investigated whether this was a process of slow updating, which is the storage of events that are discrepant from the self image and their adaptation to the self image when sufficient and consistent information is obtained. Through this conceptualization, it was hypothesized that extremely discrepant memories would be stored as exceptions, such as very unpleasant events that were related to the self.

The most remarkable event of each day was selected and recorded between the years 1979 and 1983; ending in a sample of 1605 events altogether. Each event was recorded with the information covering the who, what, where and when questions and a critical detail. Also during the recording phase, the event was rated in terms of its salience, ranging from 1 "1 in a day" to 7 "1 in a lifetime", emotional involvement, ranging from 1 "nothing" to 5 "extreme", and pleasantness, ranging from 1 "extremely unpleasant" to 7 "extremely pleasant". These events were categorized into groups as self related versus other related and as unpleasant versus pleasant.

As expected the results revealed that self related unpleasant events were recalled better than all other categories while there was no difference between self related and other related pleasant events. These findings supported the hypothesis that the conceptual self is updated by autobiographical memory through the process of slow updating, encoding the very unpleasant events as exceptions. Considering the

concerns of the current study, this study by Wagenaar might predict that the concept of “self defining memory” includes self consistent as well as self discrepant memories.

#### Phenomenological Characteristics of Autobiographical Memories

In the Basic Systems Approach to autobiographical memory by Rubin (2005), it has been suggested that autobiographical memory works through the integration of different systems, namely systems of individual senses of vision, audition and olfaction, a spatial system, emotion, narrative and language systems accompanied by an external memory system. Visual, auditory and spatial imagery, emotional, language and narrative components were defined as component processes; and importance, rehearsal, number of occurrence, extension of the event and age of memory were defined as reported properties of autobiographical memories. The two main factors of the memory system; recollection and belief were conceptualized as metacognitive judgments. Recollection was defined as a sense of re-experiencing, like mentally traveling back in time, leading to a mental state of auto-noetic consciousness (Tulving, 1983, 1985; cited in Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003, Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), in which the mind becomes conscious about a previously experienced consciousness. Belief was defined as the confidence that the event in the memory had really occurred instead of being imagined or dreamed. Both recollection and belief are a part of the retrieval process, they are crucial in distinguishing autobiographical memories from autobiographical facts, imagery and dreams, and they are predicted by the interaction of the component processes.

In the study conducted to test the Basic Systems Approach, Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) developed the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire, in which recollection was operationalized with the sense of reliving and mentally

traveling back in time whereas belief was operationalized with whether the memory was remembered like being re-experienced or it was just known to have occurred as a fact and whether the event in the memory was real or imagined. The AMQ consisted of 19 items rated on Likert scales. Recollection was found to be predicted by dominantly visual imagery and relatively less by auditory imagery, emotional content and narrative coherence. Belief was found to be predicted by spatial context and narrative coherence. Visual imagery also had a predictive role in belief but only if the spatial context was disregarded.

Another multimodal approach to autobiographical memory was revealed in the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Suengas & Johnson, 1988). MCQ involved the five basic properties of vividness / clarity, sensory details, contextual information, intensity of feelings, and feelings and thought; distributed through 39 items rated on a Likert scale.

Since a multimodal approach provides a better comprehension of the nature and processing of autobiographical memory, the present study also employed such a multimodal approach. The recently developed Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin, & Robins, 2007), which was constructed by factor analyzing several items mostly from the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire and Memory Characteristics Questionnaire; ending up with the ten memory characteristics of vividness, coherence, accessibility, sensory detail, emotional intensity, visual perspective, time perspective, sharing, distancing, and valence; was used.

#### Current Study

The aim of this study is to examine self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories, exploring whether and how self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories differ - if they do differ- in terms of the

phenomenological characteristics.

### Hypotheses

If the self and autobiographical memory relationship holds true for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories, then these two types of memories will not differ in terms of the phenomenological characteristics of vividness, coherence, accessibility, sensory detail, emotional intensity, visual perspective, time perspective, sharing, distancing, valence and age of memory.

However, if this relationship between the self and autobiographical memory is peculiar to self-consistent memories, stationing in opposition to self-discrepant memories, then the two types of memories will be expected to differ in terms of these phenomenological aspects. The directions of these differences are expected to be as follows:

1. Self consistent memories will be more vivid than self discrepant memories.
2. Self consistent memories will have more sensory details than self discrepant memories.

These two hypotheses about the phenomenological characteristics of vividness and sensory details are dependent on the logic that more attention might be directed to the events consistent with the self concept than to the events that are discrepant from the self concept, leading to an advantage for self consistent memories in terms of better encoding over self discrepant memories.

Moreover, vividness and having sensory details are two of the characteristics that memories of emotional events entail. This phenomenon is thought to be dependent on many factors such as the relation of events to-be-remembered to the person's goals, their importance as a result of which they may have aroused emotions, and the rehearsal afterwards in terms of thinking in our minds or talking to

others about them (Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Yet, it is hard to make a claim that self-consistent memories would be more emotional than self-discrepant memories.

3. Self consistent memories will be more coherent than self discrepant memories.

4. Information regarding the time of the event will be more confidently remembered for self-consistent than for self-discrepant memories.

5. Self consistent memories will be more frequently shared with others than self discrepant memories.

6. Self consistent memories will be more accessible than self discrepant memories.

Since self-consistent memories stand for events and acts approved by the self and inversely self-discrepant memories stand for events and acts disapproved by the self; self-consistent memories are expected to be shared with other people more often than self-discrepant memories. Through this sharing and rehearsal, pathways to self-consistent memories will become stronger than pathways to self-discrepant memories, resulting in an advantage for self-consistent memories in terms of better retrieval over self-discrepant memories. As well as being well encoded and following the same logic, self-consistent memories will be better organized than self-discrepant memories, becoming more coherent, accessible and characterized by a more confident time aspect than self-discrepant memories.

7. Self-consistent memories will be more likely to be remembered from a first person's (field) perspective than from a third person's (observer) perspective.

Inversely, self-discrepant memories will be more likely to be remembered from a third person's perspective than from a first person's perspective.

It has been conceptualized that since the act of remembering involves re-experiencing the original event (Tulving, 1983, 1985; cited in Rubin, Schrauf, &

Greenberg, 2003), the recollected memory will be visualized from a first person's (field) perspective (Crawley & French, 2005). However, it has also been stated that as the memory gets older it becomes more likely to be visualized from a third person's (observer) perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; cited in Crawley & French, 2005). Furthermore, previous literature on the relationship between the self and memory perspective showed that perceived self change results in a change of the perspective of the memory, so that the closer a memory is to one's current self the more likely it will be remembered from a first person's than a third person's perspective, inversely the more discrepant a memory is to one's current self the more likely it will be remembered from a third person's than a first person's perspective (Libby, & Eibach 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005).

8. Emotional intensity was to be explored rather than hypothesized in a certain direction since people might have intense emotional experiences about both self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories.

9. Although it could be speculated that a self-discrepant experience would create discomfort, and therefore result in a negative emotional tone just because of being discrepant, this speculation is not enough by itself to construct a hypothesis. So emotional tone or valence was also to be explored among self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories.

Bradley, Greenwald, Petry and Lang (1992) examined the effects of valence and emotional intensity, in terms of level of arousal, with recall and recognition tests and concluded that it was the level of arousal rather than the valence of the emotion that affected overall memory performance. However, since the unique effects of self-consistency and discrepancy on phenomenological characteristics rather than overall memory performance is of interest in the present study, valence is also kept as a

characteristic to be explored.

10. Self-discrepant memories will be more distant to the current self than self-consistent memories.

11. Self-discrepant memories will be events from the more recent past than self-consistent memories whereas self-consistent memories will be equally dated recently and remotely.

According to the modified version of the original SMS theory (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005) in recent memories accuracy and correspondence are more privileged than self coherence while the opposite holds true for more remote memories.

12. There will be content differences between self consistent and self discrepant autobiographical memories, such that the events mentioned in self consistent memories will overlap with each other more than the events mentioned in self discrepant memories.

Deriving from a life script approach to autobiographical memory, people belonging to the same culture are expected to agree upon a script of events an ordinary individual from that culture would normally live throughout his/her life and to form schemas accordingly. Although people might differ a lot in individual characteristics, it could be claimed that for moral characteristics, which are by definition more dependent on the culture than individual characteristics, people can show more consensus on the events reported as self consistent memories than events reported as self discrepant memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).

## CHAPTER 2

### METHOD

#### Participants

Forty seven participants took part in this study with a mean age of 26.99 years (SD = 4.29); 13 males ranging in age from 23 to 45 (M = 28.15, SD = 5.74 years), and 32 females ranging in age from 22 to 35 (M = 26.52, SD = 3.54 years). 4.3 % were high school graduates, 38.3 % university graduates, and 53.2 % were either graduate students or had graduate degrees. Two did not report their age, gender and education. All participants participated voluntarily.

#### Instruments

##### Memory Experiences Questionnaire

The Turkish version of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin, & Robins, 2007) was constructed by factor analyzing 104 items assessing autobiographical memory components, derived from a variety of scales previously used in autobiographical memory literature, especially the most widely used questionnaires of Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) and the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). The ten factors of vividness, coherence, accessibility, sensory detail, emotional intensity, visual perspective, time perspective, sharing, distancing, and valence constituted the major phenomenological properties. Each factor was assessed through five to eight items, forming 63 statements altogether, rated on a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

A pilot testing of the Turkish version revealed that participants became inattentive to the statements tapping the same construct if these statements were



presented in blocks. Depending on this finding the statements were shuffled, in the same order as was used in the original questionnaire. In this kind of an order, no two items tapping on the same aspect were ordered after one another. This is thought to lead participants to pay attention to each statement as they go through the questionnaire.

The booklet presented to the participants was made up of three parts each involving two A4 pages. In the first part (page 1 and 2) they were required to write two autobiographical memories. (see Appendix A) Below the demographical questions requiring the age, gender and education status of the participant, at the top of the first page, was the definition of memory accompanied by a request asking for either a self-consistent or a self-discrepant autobiographical memory. Participants were given half of the A4 paper space to write their memory. On page 2, the same instructions were given except the demographical questions.

Each page of the second part of the booklet (pages 3 and 4), (see Appendix B) involved a question asking the day, month, and year of the event mentioned in the memory, followed by two open ended questions asking why the participant thought that the memory was self consistent/self discrepant and the other asking what meaning the memory revealed for the participant. Finally, there were three Likert scale questions. In the first, participants had to rate how consistent or discrepant the memory they had reported had been, with or from their self concept on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (hardly consistent ) to 7 (totally consistent) for self consistent memories; and from 1(hardly discrepant ) to 7 (totally discrepant) for self discrepant memories. In the second question, they rated whether they would like this memory to be included in their biography, on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (definitely would not like) to 7 (definitely would like). In the third question, they

indicated how appropriate and acceptable the event in the memory was according to the norms of the culture they lived in, on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not appropriate at all / could not be accepted) to 7 (totally appropriate / could totally be accepted). They completed each of these two pages for the corresponding memories they had reported in the first part of the booklet. In the third part of the booklet, the two MEQs for the two memories were presented (see Appendix C).

#### Procedure

Participants were required to complete the tasks individually. The duration of each session took approximately 40 to 60 minutes. They were informed that this was a study about self consistent and self- discrepant autobiographical memories. Then they were given the 6-paged booklet and were instructed not to turn the next page until they had completed the previous one. The order of the presentation of memory was counterbalanced, so that participants either reported their self-consistent memory first and self-discrepant memory second or vice versa.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESULTS

#### Descriptive Analyses

Ten measures regarding phenomenological characteristics for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were calculated by averaging the ratings given to the items for each dimension. The means and standard deviations of these variables can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1. Means and standard deviations of the 10 measures regarding phenomenological characteristic

	SELF-CONSISTENT		SELF-DISCREPANT	
	M	SD	M	SD
Vividness	4.19	0.68	3.76	1.08
Sensory Detail	3.69	0.77	3.37	0.85
Coherence	4.55	0.51	4.29	0.70
Time Perspective	3.62	1.05	3.51	1.11
Sharing	2.59	1.07	2.29	1.02
Accessibility	3.63	1.07	3.51	1.05
Visual Perspective	3.67	0.82	3.16	0.91
Emotional Intensity	3.35	1.15	3.45	0.97
Valence	3.27	1.41	1.91	1.05
Distancing	1.69	0.68	3.50	0.88

In order to further examine how the items were distributed in the study, three confirmatory factor analyses were conducted for self-consistent, and self-discrepant memories and for their averaged items. The distributions of items can be seen in

Appendices D, E and F, respectively.

Content of Memories

Content analyses were also carried out, exploring the location that the memory took place, the people who were involved, and the general theme of the event in the memory. The distribution of context, other and theme variables and their corresponding percentages are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively.

Table 2. Distribution of memory contexts (where the event in the memory took place) among self-consistent and self discrepant memories

Self-Consistent Memories	Percent	Frequency
General public places	21.3	10
Academic	19.1	9
Work	17.0	8
Family	10.6	5
Sports / outdoor	4.3	2
Home	4.3	2
Vacation	2.1	1
Friend / lover's houses	2.1	1
Other	2.1	1
Not specified	17.0	8
<hr/>		
Self-Discrepant Memories		
General public places	19.1	9
Academic	17.0	8
Friend / lover's houses	10.6	5
Home	10.6	5
Sports / outdoor	6.4	3
Work	4.3	2
Family	4.3	2
Vacation	4.3	2
Other	4.3	2
Not specified	19.1	9

Table 3. Distribution of other people involved in self-consistent and self discrepant memories

Other people involved in self-consistent memories	Percent	Frequency
Friends	38.3	18
People at work / school / team	21.3	10
Family members	14.9	7
Girlfriend / boyfriend	8.5	4
Alone	4.3	2
Neighbors / acquaintances	4.3	2
Other	8.5	4
<hr/>		
Other people involved in self-discrepant memories		
Friends	31.9	15
People at work / school / team	19.1	9
Girlfriend / boyfriend	14.9	7
Family members	10.6	5
Alone	4.3	2
Neighbors / acquaintances	4.3	2
Other	14.9	7

Table 4. Distribution of themes in self-consistent and self-discrepant memories

Self-Consistent Memories	Percent	Frequency
Helping others	17.0	8
Staying calm	17.0	8
Standing for rights	10.6	5
Being honest/frank	6.4	3
Being social and communicative	6.4	3
Easily getting anxious/worried		
Doing something crazy	6.4	3
Helping animals	4.3	2
Quarrel/fight/aggression	4.3	2
Forgiving easily/not being hostile	2.1	1
Being stubborn	2.1	1
Showing affection for loved ones		
Trusting people	2.1	1
Being there when needed	2.1	1
Acting carelessly/being inattentive		
Being easily offended/ fragile	2.1	1
Other	2.1	1
	2.1	1
	2.1	1
	10.6	5
<hr/>		
Self-Discrepant Memories		
Quarrel/fight/aggression	31.9	15
Staying silent in the face of injustice	8.5	4
Behaving in an unusually extraverted manner	6.4	3
Lying to somebody	6.4	3
Doing harm to animals	4.3	2
Making harmful /inappropriate jokes	4.3	2
Staying calm	2.1	1
Not helping others	2.1	1
Doing something crazy	2.1	1
Cheating on somebody	2.1	1
Getting drunk/losing control	2.1	1
Upsetting somebody	2.1	1
Having sexuality with a friend	2.1	1
Unfaithful action/tendency	2.1	1
Acting carelessly/being inattentive	2.1	1
Being unsuccessful	2.1	1
Acting cowardly	2.1	1
Other	14.9	7

### Context

Context variable has been defined in the present study as the context where the event in the memory was experienced. Among self consistent memories, most of the events took place in general public places (21.3 %), followed by academic context (19.1 %), work context (17 %), and family context (10.6 %). Also 17 % of the participants did not specify the context of the memory. Among self discrepant memories, most of the events also took place in general public places (19.1 %), followed by academic context (17 %), friend / lover's houses (10.6 %), and at home (10.6 %). Again a substantial amount of the participants did not specify the context of the memory (19.1 %).

### Others Involved

Others involved variable indicates whom the event in the memory involved. When the event involved people who could belong to different categories, the category that the major character belonged to was coded. This major character was defined as the person in terms of whom the theme of the event was evaluated by the participant. Among self consistent memories, most memories involved friends (38.3 %), followed by people at work, school or team (21.3 %), and family members (14.9 %). Among self-discrepant memories, most memories also involved friends (31.9 %), followed by people at work, school or team (19.1 %), lovers (14.9), and family members (10.6 %).

### Theme

Among self-consistent memories, "helping others" (17 %) and "staying calm" (17 %) were the most frequently reported themes, followed by "standing for rights" (10.6 %). Among self-discrepant memories, "quarrel / fight / aggression" (31.9 %)

was the most frequently reported theme. A substantial amount of events in the memories could not be categorized and were labeled as “other” (14.9 %).

### Analyses of Hypotheses

A variable was constructed by averaging the items for each phenomenological characteristic and the Cronbach’s alphas, which were used to measure the reliabilities of these variables, ranged between .742 and .954. Repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out in order to analyze the hypotheses regarding phenomenological characteristics and the hypothesis on age for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories. Because of high correlations between variable dimensions, in all repeated measures ANOVAs, Mauchly’s test of sphericity was highly significant ( $p < .001$ ), leading to the violation of the sphericity assumption. So in all repeated measures ANOVAs, results of the corrected tests of Huynh-Feldt were reported. The means of phenomenological characteristics for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Means of phenomenological characteristics of self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories  
*Note.* \* indicates significance at .05 probability level and \*\* indicates significance at .01 probability level.



Hypothesis 1 stated that self-consistent memories would be more vivid than self-discrepant memories. As expected, self-consistent memories were found to be more vivid than self-discrepant memories,  $F(1,46) = 7.781$ ,  $MSE = .565$ ,  $p < .01$ .

Hypothesis 2 stated that self-consistent memories would involve more sensory details than self-discrepant memories. As expected, self-consistent memories were found to involve more sensory details than self-discrepant memories,  $F(1,46) = 6.898$ ,  $MSE = .349$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Hypothesis 3 stated that self-consistent memories would be more coherent than self-discrepant memories. As expected, self-consistent memories were found to be more coherent than self-discrepant memories,  $F(1,46) = 5.190$ ,  $MSE = .295$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Hypothesis 4 stated that self-consistent memories would be remembered with a more confident time aspect than self-discrepant memories. Contrary to the expectation, self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were found to be remembered with an equal amount of confidence,  $F(1,46) = .360$ ,  $MSE = .739$ ,  $p = .551$ .

Hypothesis 5 stated that self-consistent memories would be shared more frequently with others than self-discrepant memories. Contrary to the expectation, there was no significant difference between self-consistent and self-discrepant memories in this respect,  $F(1,46) = 2.809$ ,  $MSE = .760$ ,  $p = .101$ . In order to find out whether sharing might be related to valence, correlations between these two variables were measured but for neither self-consistent,  $r(45) = .049$ ,  $p = .742$ , nor self-discrepant memories,  $r(45) = -.070$ ,  $p = .638$ , valence and sharing were associated.

Hypothesis 6 stated that self-consistent memories would be more accessible than self-discrepant memories. Contrary to the expectation, self-consistent and self-

discrepant memories were found to be equally accessible,  $F(1,46) = .313$ ,  $MSE = 1.067$ ,  $p = .579$ .

Hypothesis 7 stated that self-consistent memories would be remembered more from a first person's than a third person's perspective whereas self-discrepant memories would be remembered more from a third person's than a first person's perspective. Contrary to the expectation, both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were remembered more from a first person's than a third person's perspective. However, self-consistent memories were remembered more frequently from a first person's perspective than self-discrepant memories,  $F(1,46) = 10.984$ ,  $MSE = .563$ ,  $p < .01$ .

The hypothesis concerning emotional intensity, Hypothesis 8, was exploratory. It was found that there was not a significant difference between self-consistent and self-discrepant memories in terms of emotional intensity,  $F(1,46) = .262$ ,  $MSE = .763$ ,  $p = .611$ .

The hypothesis concerning valence, Hypothesis 9, was also exploratory. It was found that self-consistent memories had a more positive valence than self-discrepant memories,  $F(1,46) = 25.314$ ,  $MSE = 1.695$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Hypothesis 10 stated that self-discrepant memories would be more distant from the self than self-consistent memories. As expected, self-discrepant memories were found to be more distant from the self than self-consistent memories,  $F(1,46) = 135.884$ ,  $MSE = .565$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Hypothesis 11 stated that self-discrepant memories would be more recently dated than remotely dated whereas self-consistent memories would be equally dated recently and remotely. A paired groups t test revealed that there was no significant difference between the age of self-consistent ( $M = 5.33$ ,  $SD = 6.32$ ) and self-

discrepant memories ( $M = 5.09$ ,  $SD = 5.95$ ),  $t(45) = .32$ , 2-tailed. Among self-consistent memories, 38.3 % were from the last one year and 59.6 % were from the last five years. Among self-discrepant memories, 28.3 % were from the last one year and 65.2 % were from the last five years. Moreover, the ages of self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were positively and highly correlated,  $r(45) = .674$ ,  $p < .001$ . The distribution of age for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories can be seen in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Distribution of age of self-consistent and self-discrepant memories

When participants' ages at the time of the event were analyzed, it was found that there was no significant difference between self-consistent ( $M = 21.37$ ,  $SD = 5.61$ ) and self-discrepant memories ( $M = 21.57$ ,  $SD = 5.30$ ),  $t(43) = .265$ , 2-tailed. The distribution of participants' ages at the time the event was experienced for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories can be seen in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Distribution of participants' age at event for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories

Hypothesis 12 stated that the contents of the events reported in self-consistent memories would overlap more than the contents of the events reported in self-discrepant memories. Although no statistical analysis was conducted to analyze this hypothesis, it was not supported, since there was not more overlapping in terms of the themes mentioned for self-consistent memories. There were 6 events for self-consistent and 4 events for self-discrepant memories mentioned with more than 5% frequency. Also the most frequent events were mentioned by 17.0 % for self-consistent and by 31.9 % for self-discrepant memories.

#### Analyses of Other Characteristics

Self-consistent memories were rated higher in terms of consistency with the self than self-discrepant memories rated in terms of discrepancy from the self,  $t(46) = 3.19$ , 2-tailed. Self-consistent memories ( $M = 4.83$ ,  $SD = 1.68$ ) were found to be more culturally consistent and socially acceptable than self-discrepant memories ( $M = 3.57$ ,  $SD = 1.74$ ),  $t(46) = 3.586$ , 2-tailed. Ratings given to the self-consistent memories ( $M = 4.89$ ,  $SD = 1.88$ ), were significantly higher than ratings of self-

discrepant memories ( $M = 3.98$ ,  $SD = 2.13$ ) in terms of including their memory in the biography,  $t(46) = 2.883$ , 2-tailed. Thus, participants were more willing to include self-consistent than self-discrepant memories in their to-be-written biography. The ratings on including the memory in someone's biography for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories was also positively correlated,  $r(45) = .417$ ,  $p < .01$ . The means of consistency/discrepancy degree, cultural consistency degree and biography of self-consistent and self-discrepant memories can be seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Means of consistency/discrepancy degree, cultural consistency degree and biography

*Note.* \* indicates significance at .05 probability level.

## CHAPTER 4

### DISCUSSION

The present study explored the self- memory relationship with reference to self-discrepant and self-consistent memories. A multimodal approach to autobiographical memory was employed in examining the phenomenological experiences during the retrieval of self-consistent and self-discrepant autobiographical memories. Further, the effects of age of memory, age of the participant at the time of the event, the degree of consistency or discrepancy of the memory, the degree of social acceptance of the event and the content of the event were also examined.

Self-consistent memories were found to be more vivid, more coherent, closer to the self concept, remembered more from a first person's (field) perspective, to involve more sensory details and more positive valence than self discrepant memories. However, the two kinds of memories did not differ in terms of sharing, accessibility, remembering the time of the event confidently and emotional intensity. Furthermore, they differed neither in terms of age of memory nor in terms of age of the participant at the time of the event. Also self-consistent memories were more culturally consistent and socially acceptable than self-discrepant memories, and the participants' willingness to include the memory in their to-be-written biographies was more for self-consistent than self-discrepant memories. Moreover, when the memories' degree of consistency and discrepancy was compared, it was found that participants preferred to report memories with higher levels of consistency than of discrepancy.

While considering the differences as well as similarities, it has to be kept in mind that there might be differences due to culture, like the different distribution of

factors of averaged items, or due to memory types, like the distribution of factors of self-consistent and self-discrepant memory items. Although the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin, & Robins, 2007) has been reliable in terms of its ten memory dimensions, even slightly different factor structures might be indicative of different ways of remembering or reporting memories in the Turkish culture or differences between self-consistent and self-discrepant memories. Another crucial point that needs to be considered is the word “*kişilik*” which was used instead of the word “self”. Although the exact meaning of the word “self” is “*benlik*” or “*kendilik*”, both translations are used dominantly in academic contexts and are not appropriate for daily usage. On the other hand “*kişilik*”, which is the Turkish translation of “personality”, is a word that is frequently used to refer to the self. It is not thought to have misled the study; nevertheless, it needs to be considered.

#### Phenomenological Characteristics of Self-Consistent versus Self-Discrepant Memories

##### Vividness

The results confirmed the hypothesis, revealing that self-consistent memories were more vivid than self-discrepant memories. However, it should be considered that both types of memories were rated above average on the 5-point Likert scale, indicating that self-discrepant memories were also vivid. In this respect both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories could be claimed to fit into the personal event memory definition of Pillemer (1998, 2001), though self-consistent memories were remembered with more vividness than self-discrepant memories.

##### Sensory Detail

As predicted, self-consistent memories were found to involve more sensory details than self-discrepant memories. However, similar to the case for vividness, the

above-average sensory detail ratings given to both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories should also be taken into consideration, showing that both memories involve sensory details. Involving sensory details might be another property that can help to identify both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories as personal event memories (Pillemer, 1998, 2001), with self-consistent memories being a closer example than self-discrepant ones.

### Coherence

As expected, self-consistent memories were found to be more coherent than self-discrepant memories. Again, the two types of memories were highly coherent. Although it had been suggested that sharing and rehearsal might be the reasons for coherence, the lack of a difference in terms of sharing but the difference in terms of coherence, falsify that reasoning. Another possible reason might be that these memories could be well organized since they help to define the self.

### Sharing

It was hypothesized that people would share their self-consistent memories more than their self-discrepant ones, and that they would think about them more. Contrary to this expectation, it was found that people shared their self-consistent and self-discrepant memories equally with others. More interestingly, the sharing ratings for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were lower than average; indicating a general tendency of not sharing the memories with others. One reason might be that the memories reported in the present study did not have a significant effect on the person's life and were just one of the many memories that supported their knowledge of self concept or just an unimportant event discrepant from how they defined themselves. Another reason could be about the specific emotion that the memory entails, since it can be expected that an embarrassing event would be less



likely to be shared with others than a happy event; which is a possibility that can not be tested in the present study. It could also be claimed that valence had an effect on sharing, that people were more willing to share their positive memories than their negative memories. However, neither for self-consistent nor for self-discrepant memories did valence have a relationship with sharing.

#### Accessibility

In the Self Memory System theory of memory, it was conceptualized that the working self would both encode and retrieve memories consistent with the goals of the current self; thus one could expect self-consistent memories to be more accessible than self-discrepant memories as was hypothesized in the present study. However, according to the results the two types of memories were found to be equally accessible. A speculative explanation might be that self-discrepant memories are stored in association with self concept with a tag emphasizing their discrepancy like exceptions, which was also argued by Wagenaar (1992) in his study on the updating of the conceptual self.

#### Visual Perspective

Both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were found to be remembered more from a first person's (field) than a third person's (observer) perspective. However, the hypothesis on visual perspective has been partly confirmed in that self-consistent memories were remembered more frequently from a first person's perspective than self-discrepant memories. Although it was suspected that the age of the memory could affect visual perspective, the lack of an association between the age of the memory and visual perspective ratings for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories, suggests the possibility that an association to the self even within a relationship of discrepancy might have caused the memory to be

remembered in a way of re-experiencing, resulting in the first person's perspective.

### Emotional Intensity

There was no hypothesized difference regarding emotional intensity among self-consistent and self discrepant memories. The results indicated that both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were rated as emotionally intense and that the two types of memories did not differ in this respect. It could be claimed that memories related to the self concept in either the direction of consistency or discrepancy might lead them to be encoded and retrieved with emotional intensity.

### Valence

In congruence with common sense, self-consistent memories were rated to have a more positive emotional tone than self-discrepant memories. This result also supports Wagenaar's study(1992), in which he employed the assumption that very unpleasant memories would be discrepant from the self and found that very unpleasant self related memories were remembered better than both very pleasant self and other related memories as well as unpleasant other related memories. Nevertheless Wagenaar's study should be considered with caution since he used himself as the only participant.

### Distancing

As expected, self-discrepant memories were found to be more distant to the self concept than self-consistent memories. In the design of the present study, rather than testing a phenomenological characteristic, this finding confirmed that the participants had followed the instructions, since a self-discrepant memory, just by being discrepant from the self, had to be distant to the current self. However, it is important to note that although self-discrepant memories were more distant to the self than self-consistent memories, the two kinds of memories were equally

accessible. So this distance does not prove that self-discrepant memories are less available for retrieval than self-consistent memories.

#### Other Characteristics of Self-Consistent versus Self-Discrepant Memories

##### Age of Memory and Age at Event

Incongruent with the prediction made about the age of memory, that self-discrepant memories would be more recently dated while self-consistent memories would be dated equally recently and remotely, no difference in terms of age between the two types of memories were found. Also the participants' age at the time of the reported event did not differ between self-consistent and self-discrepant memories. Interestingly, the age of self-consistent and self-discrepant memories were positively correlated, revealing that participants tended to choose their second memories from the period their first memory belonged to both when they had reported a self-consistent and a self-discrepant memory first. In other words, a priming effect emerged in terms of the times that the memories came from.

##### Consistence and Discrepancy of the Event in the Memory

The degree of consistency of self-consistent memories was rated higher than the degree of discrepancy of self-discrepant memories. In other words, people did not report memories with the same degree of consistency or discrepancy when they were asked for each. This might be because extremely self-discrepant memories could be harder to access; they could invoke emotions such as shame, embarrassment or other negative feelings; or they could be harder to share even in the context of research.

##### Cultural Consistency of the Event in the Memory

Self-consistent memories were found to be rated higher on cultural consistency and social acceptance than self-discrepant memories. Despite the fact that self-consistent memories were rated above average, indicating consistency and self-

discrepant memories were rated below average, indicating incongruence with cultural norms and social acceptance; both were very close to the average, implying that cultural consistency or social acceptance did not really have an impact on these two types of memories.

#### Inclusion in the Biography

People wanted to include their self-consistent memories more than their self-discrepant memories in their biographies if they were to be written. Although they did not want to include their self-discrepant memories in their biographies, just as was the case for cultural consistency and social acceptance, the ratings were very close to the average, showing that the concept of inclusion in biography was not informative about the two types of memories.

#### Memory Content: Theme, Context and Others Involved

Taking the perspective of a life script approach to autobiographical memory (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), it was predicted that the content of the self-consistent memories would overlap more than the content of self-discrepant memories. That was because it was thought that self-consistent memories would follow the script, which is determined by the culture people belong to; whereas self-discrepant memories would involve events which were just out of the script so they would have much more variability. Contrary to this prediction, self-consistent and self-discrepant memories had almost equal variability in terms of the theme of the memory. As a matter of fact, the most commonly reported theme of the self discrepant memories, the theme of quarrel/aggression/fight was mentioned almost twice more frequently than the most commonly reported theme of self-consistent memories, the theme of helping others. However, the total number of themes in the two types of memories was nearly the same. This result and the general themes mentioned especially in self-

discrepant memories suggests the possibility that what is discrepant might not be as unstructured and undefined as it had been hypothesized. The discrepant might also have a script of its own, which could be determined by the culture, too.

Furthermore, the life script approach (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004) claims that the script would include dominantly transitional events. Transitional events are also thought to be central to the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self in the personal event memories of Pillemer (1998, 2001) and in the life story theory of identity (Mc Adams, 1985, 1993, 1996; cited in Mc Adams 2001, 2003). However, when the themes of the events reported in this study are examined it is clear that almost none of them can be considered as transitional. These events have more to do with what somebody in this culture should and should not do in general, daily living. Another important point about themes was that considering both self-consistent and self-discrepant memory themes, it can be claimed that participants have dominantly tried to enhance their self images by presenting themselves as consistent with their selves while doing “positive” things like helping others and as discrepant from their selves while doing “negative” things like fighting.

The two types of memories were also examined and compared in terms of the context of the event in the memory and the others involved in the event. Eight contexts were identified for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories; namely general public places, academic, work, family contexts, outdoor, home, vacations, and friends' or lovers' houses. The two most frequent contexts were the same for both types of memories, general public places followed by academic context. Others who were involved in the memory were identified in six common categories for both memories, as friends, people at work, school or team, family members, lover, neighbors or acquaintances and for memories which involved only

the participant, alone. Again, the two most frequent categories of people were the same for both self-consistent and self-discrepant memories, friends followed by people at work, school or team. Although adding to our understanding of the content of the memories, context of the event and others involved in the memory were not informative by themselves, especially when they did not differ for self-consistent and self-discrepant memories. A deeper analysis of content might be more informative.

#### A general Comparison of Self-Consistent and Self-Discrepant Memories

Self-consistent memories reported in the present study were highly vivid and coherent, had emotional intensity and sensory details, were not shared with others, were highly accessible, remembered from a first person's (field) perspective with a clear time perspective, had a positive emotional tone and were not rated as distant from the current self concept. More than half of these memories came from the last five years of the reporters' lives and were highly consistent with their self concepts. They had a just above average rating of cultural consistency and social acceptance, and people's willingness to include these memories in their to-be-written biographies was again just above average.

Self-discrepant memories, on the other hand, were also vivid and coherent, had emotional intensity and sensory details, were not shared with others, were accessible, and were remembered from a first person's (field) perspective with a clear time perspective, had a negative emotional tone and were rated as distant from the current self concept. More than half of these memories also came from the last five years of the reporters' lives and were merely discrepant from their self concepts. Cultural consistency, social acceptance and people's willingness to include these memories in their to-be-written biographies were again just below average.

The advantage of self-consistent memories over self-discrepant memories in

terms of vividness, sensory details, coherence, visual perspective which is indicative of recollection in the form of re-experiencing, and being positively-valenced as well as being less distant to the self concept, seemsto be due to the consistency of these memories with the goals of the working self as proposed in SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Conway, 2005). Self-consistent memories could also be categorized as personal event memories (Pillemer, 1998, 2001), fulfilling the requirements of vividness, emotional intensity and sensory details and association with the person's identity and goals, despite the lack of testing for any directive functions in the present study. The only characteristic of self-consistent memories reported in the present study, that is difficult to explain is sharing. It could either mean that people did not intend to share the memory or that the memory was not seen as important enough to be shared.

Although disadvantaged with respect to self-consistent memories, in terms of vividness, sensory details, coherence and visual perspective, being negatively-valenced as well as being distant to the self concept, self-discrepant memories nevertheless share a good amount of similarities with self-consistent memories such as accessibility, clearness about time, and emotional intensity. Bluck and Habermas (2001) argued that every personal memory might not have an autobiographical significance and that the unit of interest should be the whole life rather than individual memories. This whole life story consisted of autobiographical memories that were combined together with meaningful associations, resembling the Life Story Theory of Identity (Mc Adams, 1985, 1993, 1996; cited in Mc Adams 2001, 2003). When this life span perspective is considered with the emphasis on autobiographical reasoning with respect to memory search, the parts that will construct the whole could be considered in a graded way. The lack of a control group, for example in the

form of autobiographical memories that are reported in response to cue words, makes it necessary to be cautious in interpreting these similarities. However, self-discrepant memories could be located someplace in between ordinary personal events that do not have autobiographical significance and memories that are highly associated with the self concept, like self-consistent memories.

#### Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

Sample size and relative homogeneity of the sample in terms of education level and age, in the present study, makes it hard to come up with firm conclusions. A replication of the study with a larger sample size, consisting of participants from different ages, different subcultures and belonging to different SES categories as well as education levels would be beneficial. Another problem with the present study has been the lack of a control group, that could report memories that did not have autobiographical significance in order to make better comparisons between self-consistent and self-discrepant memories and memories that had relatively little relevance to the self. Replication with a control group as well as employment of different methodologies such as cue word method and retrospective identification of the memories as self-consistent and self-discrepant either by the participant or the researcher would add to the understanding of these memories.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Although it no longer makes sense to question the existence of a relationship between the self and autobiographical memory, the processing and extent of this relationship has not been empirically tested much. This study could be evaluated as a preliminary effort, aiming to examine the structure of self-consistent and self discrepant memories in the context of the relationship between the self and autobiographical memory. It might be considered as important in that self discrepant autobiographical memories were found to be vivid, coherent, to entail sensory detail and emotional intensity. They were also found to be accessible and were remembered with a confident time aspect and dominantly from the first person's perspective. These properties indicate that they are not memories that are not stored or simply ignored by the self. Understanding the processing of discrepant memories can improve the location of the self-consistent as well as self-discrepant memories and lead to a better evaluation of the concepts of autobiographical memory and the self.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: FIRST PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE : MEMORIES AND  
DEMOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS

Yaş: Cinsiyet: Eğitim:

### **ANI 1**

Bu çalışma otobiyografik anıların hatırlanmasıyla ilgilidir. Sizden istenilen anı “belirli bir yerde belirli ve kısa bir süre içerisinde olmuş belirli bir olay” dır. Zaman içinde tekrarlanmış olaylar anı kapsamına girmez. “Anı” tanımının doğru anlaşılması önemlidir.

**Burada sizden istenilen kişiliğinizle uyumlu olduğunu düşündüğünüz, kişiliğinizi iyi bir şekilde yansıtan bir anınızı birkaç paragrafta mümkün olduğunca detaylı bir şekilde anlatmanızdır.**

Örnek: Kendimi ..... bir insan olarak görürüm. Bir de fasında .....

## **ANI 2**

Bu çalışma otobiyografik anıların hatırlanmasıyla ilgilidir. Sizden istenilen anı ‘belirli bir yerde belirli ve kısa bir süre içerisinde olmuş belirli bir olay’ dır. Zaman içinde tekrarlanmış olaylar anı kapsamına girmez. ‘Anı’ tanımının doğru anlaşılması önemlidir.

**Burada sizden istenilen kişiliğinize aykırı olduğunuzu düşündüğünüz, kişiliğinizle hiç örtüşmeyecek ve tamamen ters düşecek şekilde davrandığımız bir anınızı birkaç paragrafta mümkün olduğunca detaylı bir şekilde anlatmanızdır.**

Örnek: Kendimi ..... bir insan olarak görürüm. Bir defasında .....

APPENDIX B: SECOND PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE: OPEN ENDED  
AND SCALE QUESTIONS







APPENDIX C: THIRD PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE : THE TURKISH  
VERSION OF THE MEMORY EXPERIENCES QUESTIONNAIRE

Lütfen yazdığınız birinci anıyı düşünerek, aşağıdaki her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı, 1'den 5'e kadar size en uygun olan sayıyı işaretleyerek değerlendiriniz.

1	2	3	4	5		
HIÇ KATILMIYORUM		TAMAMEN KATILYORUM				
		1	2	3	4	5
1	Bu anıyı sık sık ailemle ve arkadaşlarımla paylaşıyorum.					
2	Bu olayla ilgili anım net.					
3	Bu anıdaki olay sırası kağıtçıdır.					
4	Bu anın aklıma gelmesi benim için zordu.					
5	Bu anıdaki kişiyle ortak pek bir yanımda yok.					
6	Olayı hatırladığımda, zihnimde seslerini duyabiliyorum.					
7	Şu anda bu olayı hatırladığımda, hislerim çok yoğun.					
8	Bu anıyı hatırladığımda anıdaki olayı kendi gözlerimle görüyorum.					
9	Bu anın yaşandığı yıla ilgili anım net.					
10	Bu anın genel havası olumlu.					
11	Bu olayla ilgili anım flu.					
12	Bu anıdaki olay sırası net.					
13	Bu anı yönergeleri okurken birden aklıma geldi.					
14	Bu anıyı nadiren başkalarına anlatıyorum.					
15	Bu anıdaki davranışlarım kişiliğimle uyumlu.					
16	Olayı hatırladığımda, o zaman hissettiğim duyguları hissedebiliyorum.					
17	Bu olayla ilgili hislerim çok yoğun.					
18	Bu anıyı sanki bu deneyimime dışardan bakan bir gözlemciymişim gibi görebiliyorum.					
19	Bu anın yaşandığı yıla ilgili anım flu.					
20	Bu anıda tanımlanan deneyim olumlu.					
21	Bu olayla ilgili anım çok canlı.					
22	Hatırladığım anıdaki olayların sırası gerçekçi görünüyor.					
23	Bu anı benim için hatırlaması kolay bir anıydı.					

24	Yaşandığından beri, bu olayla ilgili birçok kez konuştum.					
25	Bu anıdaki kişinin bugün olduğumdan farklı bir kişi olduğunu hissediyorum.					
26	Bu anın içinde kendi bedenimi hissedebiliyorum.					
27	Bu olayı yaşadığım sırada güçlü duygular hissettiğimi hatırlamıyorum.					
28	Bu anımda, deneyimimi bir başkasının gözünden görüyorum.					
29	Bu anın yaşandığı günle ilgili anım net.					
30	Bu anın genel havası olumsuz.					
31	Bu olayla ilgili anım çok belirsiz.					
32	Bu anıyı tutarlı ve mantıklı bir hikaye olarak değil, parçalar halinde hatırlıyorum.					
33	Bu anıyı hatırlayabilmem için öncesinde bir süre düşünmem gerekti.					
34	Sık sık bu anı hakkında düşünür ya da başkalarıyla konuşurum.					
35	Bu anıyı hatırladığımda, “ben artık bu değilim” diye düşünüyorum.					
36	Bu anıyı hatırladığımda, olay olduğu anda hissettiklerimle aynı şeyleri hissetmiyorum.					
37	Bu olayın anısı güçlü duygular uyandırıyor.					
38	Bu olayı hatırladığımda, kendimi olayı izleyen bir gözlemci gibi görüyorum.					
39	Bu anın yaşandığı günle ilgili anım belirsiz.					
40	Bu anıda tanımlanan deneyim olumsuz.					
41	Bu olayla ilgili anım kaba taslak.					
42	Bu anı bir kez belirli bir yerde ve zamanda olan tek bir olayla ilgilidir, bir çok benzer ya da ilişkili olayın bir özeti ya da birleşimi değildir.					
43	Bu deneyimi hatırlamak için hafızamı iyice araştırmam gerekti.					
44	Bu anıyı başkalarıyla paylaşma ihtiyacı hissetmem.					
45	Bu anıdaki kişinin bugün olduğum aynı kişi olduğunu hissediyorum.					
46	Bu olayı hatırladığımda, olay olduğu anda düşündüğüm aynı şeyleri düşünüyorum.					
47	Bu olayla ilgili güçlü duygularım yok.					
48	Bu anıyı hatırladığımda, deneyimimi kendi gözlerimle görüyorum.					

49	Bu anın yaşadığı saatle ilgili anım net.				
50	Olay zamanındaki duygularım olumsuzdu.				
51	Bu olayla ilgili anım çok ayrıntılı.				
52	Bu anı belirli bir olayla ilgili bir anı değil, birçok benzer ve ilişkili olayın bir karışımı.				
53	Bu anı üzerinde pek sık düşünmem.				
54	Bu anı bugün olduğumu düşündüğüm kişiyle uyumlu.				
55	Bu olayı hatırladığımda, pek de o deneyimi yeniden yaşıyormuşum gibi olmuyor.				
56	Bu anı bende güçlü duygular uyandırmıyor.				
57	Bu anı gözümden canlandığımda, bu olayı net bir şekilde kendi gözlerimden görebiliyorum.				
58	Bu anın yaşadığı saatle ilgili anım belirsiz.				
59	Olay zamanındaki duygularım olumluydu.				
60	Anımın yaşadığı mekanı hatırlıyorum.				
61	Bu olayla ilgili anım çok fazla duyuşsal bilgi içermiyor (sesler, kokular, tadlar, vs.).				
62	Bu olayı tutarlı bir şekilde hatırlamakta zorlanıyorum.				
63	Bu olayı hatırladığımda, bu deneyimim sırasındaki belirli fiziksel tepki ve duyularımı hatırlamakta zorlanıyorum.				

APPENDIX D: DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS FOR SELF-CONSISTENT  
MEMORIES

Factor 1:

- 1- I often share this memory with friends or family.
- 5- I don't have much in common with the person in the memory.
- 7- As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense.
- 16- As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.
- 17- My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
- 37- The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
- 46- When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened.
- 47- I do not have strong emotions about this memory.
- 55- When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the experience.
- 56- This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me.

Factor 2:

- 2- My memory for this event is clear.
- 3- The order of events in the memory is confusing.
- 8- I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes.
- 12- The order of events in the memory is clear.
- 21- My memory for this event is very vivid.
- 22- When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic.
- 31- My memory for this event is very vague.
- 32- This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story.
- 48- In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes.
- 51- My memory for this event is very detailed.
- 57- When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own perspective.
- 60- I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place.
- 62- I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner.

Factor 3:

- 10- The overall tone of the memory is positive.
- 20- The experience described in this memory is positive.
- 30- The overall tone of the memory is negative.
- 40- The experience described in this memory is negative.
- 50- My feelings at the time were negative.
- 59- My feelings at the time were positive.

Factor 4:

- 4- It was difficult for me to think of this memory.
- 11- My memory for this event is dim.
- 13- This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions.
- 23- This memory was easy for me to recall.
- 33- I had to think for a while before I could recall this event.
- 41- My memory for this event is sketchy.
- 43- I really had to search my "memory" for this experience.
- 52- This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event

Factor 5:

- 14- I rarely tell others about this memory.
- 24- Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
- 34- I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
- 44- I do not feel the need to share this memory with others.
- 53- I do not think about this memory often.

Factor 6:

- 36- When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the event originally happened.
- 49- My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear.
- 58- My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague.
- 61- My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.).

Factor 7:

- 15- My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality.
- 25- I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
- 35- When I recall this memory, I think, "that's not me anymore".
- 45- I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today.
- 54- This memory is consistent with who I think I am today.

Factor 8:

- 18- I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience.
- 28- In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others.
- 38- As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself.

Factor 9:

- 9- My memory for the year when the event took place is clear.
- 19- My memory for the year when the event took place is vague.
- 26- I can bodily "feel" myself in this memory.
- 27- I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event.
- 63- As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience.

Factor 10:

- 6- As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.
- 29- My memory for the day when the event took place is clear.
- 39- My memory for the day when the event took place is vague.
- 42- This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events.

APPENDIX E: DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS FOR SELF-DISCREPANT  
MEMORIES



Factor 1:

- 2- My memory for this event is clear.
- 3- The order of events in the memory is confusing.
- 6- As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.
- 9- My memory for the year when the event took place is clear.
- 11- My memory for this event is dim.
- 12- The order of events in the memory is clear.
- 19- My memory for the year when the event took place is vague.
- 21- My memory for this event is very vivid.
- 22- When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic.
- 26- I can bodily "feel" myself in this memory.
- 29- My memory for the day when the event took place is clear.
- 31- My memory for this event is very vague.
- 32- This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story.
- 39- My memory for the day when the event took place is vague.
- 41- My memory for this event is sketchy.
- 48- In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes.
- 51- My memory for this event is very detailed.
- 57- When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own perspective.
- 62- I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner.
- 63- As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience.

Factor 2:

- 7- As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense.
- 16- As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.
- 17- My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
- 36- When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the event originally happened.
- 37- The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
- 47- I do not have strong emotions about this memory.
- 53- I do not think about this memory often.
- 55- When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the experience.
- 56- This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me.

Factor 3:

- 10- The overall tone of the memory is positive.
- 20- The experience described in this memory is positive.
- 30- The overall tone of the memory is negative.
- 40- The experience described in this memory is negative.
- 50- My feelings at the time were negative.
- 59- My feelings at the time were positive.

Factor 4:

- 1- I often share this memory with friends or family.
- 14- I rarely tell others about this memory.
- 24- Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
- 34- I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
- 44- I do not feel the need to share this memory with others.

Factor 5:

- 18- I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience.
- 28- In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others.
- 38- As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself.
- 42- This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events.
- 52- This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event.

Factor 6:

- 4- It was difficult for me to think of this memory.
- 13- This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions.
- 23- This memory was easy for me to recall.
- 33- I had to think for a while before I could recall this event.
- 43- I really had to search my “memory” for this experience.

Factor 7:

- 15- My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality.
- 25- I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
- 35- When I recall this memory, I think, “that’s not me anymore”.
- 45- I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today.
- 46- When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened.
- 54- This memory is consistent with who I think I am today.

Factor 8:

- 27- I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event.
- 49- My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear.
- 58- My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague.
- 60- I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place.

Factor 9:

- 5- I don’t have much in common with the person in the memory.
- 8- I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes.

Factor 10:

- 61- My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.).

APPENDIX F: DISTRIBUTION OF THE AVERAGED ITEMS OF SELF-  
CONSISTENT AND SELF-DISCREPANT MEMORIES

### FACTOR 1

- 2- My memory for this event is clear.
- 3- The order of events in the memory is confusing.
- 6- As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind.
- 8- I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes.
- 9- My memory for the year when the event took place is clear.
- 11- My memory for this event is dim.
- 12- The order of events in the memory is clear.
- 19- My memory for the year when the event took place is vague.
- 21- My memory for this event is very vivid.
- 22- When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic.
- 26- I can bodily "feel" myself in this memory.
- 29- My memory for the day when the event took place is clear.
- 31- My memory for this event is very vague.
- 32- This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story.
- 39- My memory for the day when the event took place is vague.
- 41- My memory for this event is sketchy.
- 46- When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally happened.
- 48- In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes.
- 49- My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear.
- 51- My memory for this event is very detailed.
- 57- When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own perspective.
- 60- I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place.
- 62- I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner.
- 63- As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience.

### FACTOR 2

- 7- As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense.
- 16- As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.
- 17- My emotions are very intense concerning this event.
- 36- When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the event originally happened.
- 37- The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions.
- 47- I do not have strong emotions about this memory.
- 53- I do not think about this memory often.
- 55- When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the experience.
- 56- This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me.

### FACTOR 3

- 10- The overall tone of the memory is positive.
- 20- The experience described in this memory is positive.
- 30- The overall tone of the memory is negative.
- 40- The experience described in this memory is negative.
- 50- My feelings at the time were negative.
- 59- My feelings at the time were positive.

#### FACTOR 4

- 1- I often share this memory with friends or family.
- 14- I rarely tell others about this memory.
- 24- Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times.
- 34- I frequently think about or talk about this event with others.
- 44- I do not feel the need to share this memory with others.

#### FACTOR 5

- 15- My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality.
- 25- I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today.
- 35- When I recall this memory, I think, "that's not me anymore".
- 45- I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today.
- 54- This memory is consistent with who I think I am today.

#### FACTOR 6

- 4- It was difficult for me to think of this memory.
- 23- This memory was easy for me to recall.
- 33- I had to think for a while before I could recall this event.
- 43- I really had to search my "memory" for this experience.

#### FACTOR 7

- 18- I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience.
- 28- In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others.
- 38- As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself.

#### FACTOR 8

- 13- This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions.
- 42- This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events.
- 52- This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory about a particular event.

#### FACTOR 9

- 58- My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague.
- 61- My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.).

#### FACTOR 10

- 5- I don't have much in common with the person in the memory.
- 27- I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event.

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