

QUESTIONING CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL APPROACHES
TO TRANSLATION IN TERMS OF TRANSLATION ETHICS

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Müge Işlak


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in Terms of Translation Ethics

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
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Thesis Abstract

Müge Işlak, “Questioning Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to Translation in Terms of Translation Ethics”

This study is intended to draw attention to the significance of the ethics of translation in the theoretical field of Translation Studies and to provide an account of the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation focusing on its theoretical assessment in terms of the ethics of translation. The descriptive, target-oriented approach, the functionalist approach (*Skopostheorie*) and the post-structuralist approaches to translation are questioned in terms of their accounts of translational ethics and their conceptions and assessments of ideological manipulation in translation.

A case of ideological manipulation violating the ethics of translation is demonstrated by the presentation of a number of quotations from *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888), which are selectively de(con)textualized, translated and reflected as the translations of Charles Darwin's and his friends' “confessions” about the failure of the theory of evolution by the creationist Adnan Oktar in his book *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of The Evolutionists] which is written under the pen name Harun Yahya in 1999.

Through the comparative analysis of these translated quotations and their original contexts, that is, the letters and passages they are quoted from, and also by the presentation of a comprehensive account of the social, historical and theoretical background of the case at hand, it is claimed that this case of ideological manipulation, taking its intended purposes, serious implications and its deceptive strategy into consideration, is doubtlessly against ethics.

As a result of the questionings and analyses conducted for this thesis. It is concluded that the contemporary translation theories in question are inadequate and lacking as to their emphases on the ethics of translation and that they fail to propose the necessary criteria to assess ideological manipulation in translation in terms of translation ethics.

Tez Özeti

Müge Işlak, “Çağdaş Çeviri Kuramlarının Çeviri Etiği Bağlamında Sorgulanması”

Bu çalışmayla amaçlanan, çeviri etiğinin Çeviribilim'in kuramsal alanı için önemine dikkat çekmek ve çeviri etiği bakımından kuramsal değerlendirilmesi odağıyla çeviride ideolojik çarpıtma olgusunu açıklamaktır. Önde gelen çağdaş ve kuramsal çeviri yaklaşımları, yani çeviriye betimleyici, erek-odaklı yaklaşım, işlevselci yaklaşım (*Skopos* kuramı) ve yapısalcılık sonrası yaklaşımlar, çeviri etiğine dair açıklamaları ve çeviride ideolojik çarpıtma anlayışları ve bunu değerlendirmeleri bakımından sorgulanmıştır.

Çeviri etiğine aykırı bir ideolojik çarpıtma örneği, yaratılışçı Adnan Oktar'ın Harun Yahya takma adıyla yazıp 1999 senesinde yayımladığı *Evrincilerin İtirafı* adlı kitabında Charles Darwin ile arkadaşlarının evrim kuramının başarısızlığına dair “itirafı”nın çevirisi olarak yansıtılmak üzere, *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* [Charles Darwin'in Yaşamı ve Mektupları] (1888) adlı kitaptan seçilerek ve bağlamlarından kopararak çevrilmiş olan bazı alıntılar sunulmuştur. Bu çevrilmiş alıntıları özgün bağlamları, yani alıntılandıkları mektup ve parçalarla karşılaştırmalı bir çözümlemesine ve ele alınan örneğin toplumsal, tarihsel ve kuramsal arka planının kapsamlı bir sunumuna dayanarak, ayrıca söz konusu ideolojik çarpıtmanın neden ve amaçlarını, ciddi sonuçlarını ve kullanılan yanıltıcı taktiği göz önünde bulundurarak, bu ideolojik çarpıtmanın çeviri etiğine şüphesiz aykırı olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

Bu tez çalışması dahilinde yapılan inceleme ve çözümlemelerin sonucunda, ele alınan çağdaş çeviri kuramlarının her birinin çeviri etiğini vurgulamaları bakımından yetersiz ve eksik olduğu ve çevirilerde yapılan ideolojik çarpıtmaların çeviri etiği bakımından değerlendirilmesi için gerekli olan ölçütleri ortaya koyamadığı saptanmıştır.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Aim of the Present Study

In the last few decades the majority of the prominent contemporary theories in the field of Translation Studies has brought the concepts of *difference* and *diversity* to the foreground, thus releasing the translator from traditional source-text-bound constraints such as *equivalence* and *fidelity* which have been the major obstacles in front of the development and progress of Translation Studies as an academic discipline and the determination of the translations' and translators' true status and function within the linguistic, literary, cultural, political and even the economical and ideological domains. What I claim here is that there is also another concept which is at least as much important for Translation Studies as the concepts of *difference* and *diversity*, and that is *the ethics of translation*.

It is true that difference and diversity, which are among concepts central to the most influential current translation theories, are pivotal for the development of the field of Translation Studies. However, their introduction to the theoretical field also sustains a serious potential risk of misinterpretation with regards to the ethics of translation or, even worse, by providing theoretical justification for the manipulation of translation for all kinds of ends. Therefore, these concepts have to be defined and described with utmost care and vigilance so as to avoid falling into the trap of misinterpreting them as

concepts whose introduction to the theoretical field legitimately erases the notion of ethics or, at least, the concern for it. In other words, the groundbreaking statement that no text has one single, stable, valid and/or “correct” translation, which is virtually shared by each prominent contemporary translation theory in question, should not be taken to mean that each and every translation of a text can be deemed ethical, or that no translation is unethical. After all, this would entail us to neglect the question of ethics, meaning that there is no such thing as the ethics of translation, and thus erase the concern for ethics from the field of Translation Studies altogether.

A field of Translation Studies without the notion of ethics would not only be lacking a very important component which makes a vast majority of theoretical studies and translation criticism possible and meaningful, but also turns into a field that validates and legitimizes the utilization of translation as a tool for all kinds of ends. Thus, we have to be aware of the fact that the function and effects of translational phenomena amid the asymmetrical power relations governing the world we are living in are much more than mere interlingual and intercultural communication, and that ideological manipulation, mostly carried out in line with a specific ideological agenda in order to gain power and control over a society, in all kinds of translations ranging from literary classics to scientific statements can/does have an influential role in the formation and/or distortion of social and cultural identities.

Although it is neither possible nor necessary to designate a universal set of ethical codes for translation, it is definitely not plausible to abandon the question of ethics altogether. It is indeed the case that when the universality of translational ethics is rejected, the ethical responsibility of the translator gains more prominence because

every singular translation project entails the consideration of its particular context and conditions. This holds true for the translation theoretician and the translation critic as well. There is an endless number of diverse translations and each translation is more or less different from the rest in various aspects. To analyze and/or to criticize a translation with regard to its ethics or any other aspect, instead of blindly following some preset, so-called universal rules, we have to scrutinize its context, the conditions in which it is produced, and its purpose, function and effects, all of which are different from those of other translations and specific to itself in detail.

The introduction of the concepts of diversity and difference to the field of translation, while liberating the translator from the traditional source-text-bound constraints, has assigned her/him with a new type of ethical responsibility. Consequently, it is necessary to raise awareness of the importance of translation ethics and be vigilant of its violation, which presents itself mostly in the form of explicit and implicit ideological manipulation. The aim of the present study is, firstly, to analyze, question and criticize the main contemporary theories which constitute and shape the discipline of Translation Studies as to their conceptions of and emphases on translation ethics, and secondly, to bring the notion of translation ethics to the foreground in general translation theory and stress its significance for the development of Translation Studies and its status in the academia. In order to accomplish this task, the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation is further investigated in relation to the violation of translation ethics from the viewpoint of the main contemporary approaches to translation which this study deals with. Through the depiction of an exemplary ideological manipulation applied in translation and the explication of how and why this

is unethical, as a case study, it is intended to demonstrate the potential insidious danger the ethics of translation is in. Finally, it is aimed to prevent the potential misunderstandings about the nature and importance of ethics in contemporary translation theories and the slippery slope it might find itself even in the evaluation of issues such as ideological manipulation, both of which may be caused by the lack of emphasis on the ethics of translation and also by the ambiguous description of the concepts of difference and diversity which underlie the theories in question.

The Statement of the Content and the Scope of the Study

The second chapter of this study covers the presentation of the main principles of each of the prominent contemporary translation theories this thesis deals with, drawing attention especially to their statements on the ethics of translation and ideological manipulation in the basic texts chosen as introductory to those theoretical approaches which are introduced in detail below. When sufficient explanation on these issues are not available in the introductory texts, their ethical stances are deduced from their main principles.

The third chapter of the study deals with the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation. First, the relations of ideology and translation are examined through an account of the notion of ideology in general and an account of ideology in discourse analysis and the study of translation from a number of viewpoints. Then, among the various forms of ideological manipulation in translation, the way in which decontextualization is utilized for ideological manipulation is investigated, and the significance of ideological manipulation for the question of translation ethics is

indicated.

The fourth chapter consists of the case study which is specifically chosen for this thesis as an evident example of ideological manipulation violating the ethics of translation. The details of this case study are introduced below.

The fifth chapter covers a brief evaluation of the prominent contemporary translation theories in terms of their assessments of ideological manipulation. The conception of ideological manipulation in the framework of each theoretical approach in question is presented and then, those theoretical approaches are evaluated as to their ethical stances towards ideological manipulation.

In the concluding chapter of this thesis, the study is summarized with a brief presentation and discussion of the results of both the case study and the questioning/criticism of the prominent contemporary theoretical approaches in Translation Studies as to their (lack of) emphasis on the issue of the ethics of translation and their evaluation of the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation.

The Theoretical Approaches to Translation To Be Tested

In this study, prominent contemporary theoretical approaches to translation in the field of Translation Studies, namely, the target-oriented approach, the functionalist approach (*Skopostheorie*) and the post-structuralist approaches are presented and tested, with particular regard to their accounts of translational ethics and their assessments of ideological manipulation in translation. The main principles of each of these approaches in question are briefly described in accordance with the basic theoretical texts in which they are introduced by their founders. These approaches are absolutely appreciated and

supported on central issues such as the liberation of the translator and translational phenomena from the limitations of the traditional translation understanding, which are closely related with essentialism, prescriptivism and source-text-bound constraints. Nevertheless, the strength of their emphases on the ethics of translation and their evaluations of ideological manipulation in translation as to their ethical stances are analyzed, questioned, compared, evaluated and criticized throughout the thesis.

The Material To Be Examined and Its Significance

The focus of attention in the case study of this thesis consists of a number of quotations, most of which are from Charles Darwin's personal letters and some of which are his friends' and his son's comments on him, published in *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* which is compiled and edited by his son Francis Darwin in 1888; extracted, translated and (ab)used in a book named *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] written by Adnan Oktar under the pen name Harun Yahya in 1999. I explore how Adnan Oktar has subjected Charles Darwin's expressions in his letters to ideological manipulation, by comparing those translated quotations with their source-texts, particularly taking the letters they are quoted from, also the previous or subsequent letters if they seem relevant, and the editor's remarks on the subject of the letter into consideration as a whole. I demonstrate, as an evidence of intentional ideological manipulation, how some sentences or even parts of sentences are selectively ripped off and isolated from their (con)texts, that is, the letters in which they are originally expressed, to be deceptively presented as translations of Darwin's own

confessions about the alleged failure of his theory of evolution. Additionally, I question the intended purpose and consequences of the ideological manipulations in these translations of Darwin quotations (such as creating a radically religious society which rejects the theory of evolution as a whole) and how they function within the target society/culture. But most importantly, I aim to analyze the strategy operating in this manipulative project of ideology and the (mis)usage of translation as a means to realize this project. Furthermore, I intend to prove why this project has to be considered unethical by analyzing and evaluating the specific ideological agenda behind this and the intended social impact it contributes to.

Before presenting the translated quotations from Darwin's letters in Oktar's book along with their comparisons to their source-texts, I find it worthwhile to overview the prevalent position and reception of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in Turkey. For this reason, I shortly explain my source of inspiration for choosing such an issue as the subject of my research, that is, the scandal of Tübitak censorship which has recently stirred up quite some controversy and occupied the media headlines, articles and TV debates for a long time in Turkey. Since it is another major focus of social controversy, I dwell on the situation of the theory of evolution in comparison with that of “creation” in the elementary and secondary schools' science education curriculum of the Republic of Turkey as well. I also find it necessary to gain some insight to the theoretical conception of religion as ideology and the dangers associated with having the theory of evolution replaced by “creation” in science education curricula, particularly indicating the ideological purposes of this replacement and its intended implications on society. Then I go on to explicate the significance of the translated quotations from Charles Darwin's

letters found in the Turkish creationist sources in question, presenting, firstly, an intertextual analysis of the material by comparing the selected quotations with their originals in the source-texts, i.e. Darwin's letters, and secondly, the explicit de(con)textualization as the evidence and the strategy of intentional ideological manipulation.

The Thesis Statement

The primary purpose of the present thesis is to substantiate that the ethics of translation is a pivotal concept that we cannot do without in the field of Translation Studies. The introduction and highlighting of the concepts of *difference* and *diversity* by prominent contemporary theoretical approaches to translation in the field, which is definitely a major progress for translation theory in general might, however, lead to the illusion that each and every (possible) translation of any piece of text is ethically legitimate or that no translation is unethical, but this is not the case. My claim is that the statement that no text can have only *one* single, stable, valid and/or “correct” translation and that it is perfectly possible for a text to have a number of diverse translations which are different from one another and from the source text due to diverse conditions/norms/purposes/interpretations does not entail that each and every (possible) translation of any text is ethically legitimate. An obvious example of unethical translation are the ideologically manipulated quotations from Darwin's letters, introduced as the translations of “his confessions on the failure and invalidity of the theory of evolution” in Adnan Oktar's book.

The efforts of a group of creationists, led by the notorious Adnan Oktar, to refute

the theory of evolution and degrade the name of Charles Darwin and some of the other evolutionary scientists by distorting their declarations even in the most absurd ways possible have already been indicated and been subject to many debates in the media as well. What I aim to do is to bring in a theoretical analysis of the phenomena of ideological manipulation through the presentation and analysis of this exemplary case study in connection with the ethics of translation, and to integrate my own viewpoint as to its conception and evaluation in the current theoretical framework of Translation Studies, making use of the results of this research and the investigation of the approaches of the contemporary theories in the field to the issue at hand. Thus, I want to contribute to the consciousness of the ethics of translation in the theoretical field and to emphasize the significance of ideological manipulation with regard to translation ethics, for it is a very crucial issue which cannot be ignored, due to the fact that translation is a social and cultural phenomenon, perhaps even more than it is a linguistic phenomenon, and that it always takes place amid the asymmetrical power relations, being not only effected but also (ab)used by them.

The notion of ethics in translation, the concern for it, is of vital importance for the discipline of Translation Studies. However, its importance is not sufficiently emphasized on the part of prominent contemporary approaches to translation, if not totally neglected. These approaches in question very successfully have attempted to break the traditional, essentialist, prescriptive, source-text-bound conception of translational phenomena, taking very beneficial steps by introducing a number of new concepts and understandings into the field. Nevertheless, if they fail to draw the necessary attention to the importance of and concern for the ethics of translation and the

danger of its violation, for example *via* ideological manipulation in the process of translation, some of the concepts and statements they have put forward are left open to misinterpretation or, even worse, to being abused. The present thesis is intended to point out the shortcomings of prominent contemporary translation theories which fail to emphasize or clarify the issue of translation ethics, and calls attention to the unethical ideological manipulations and their implications in translation.

CHAPTER II

THE PRESENTATION OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO TRANSLATION AS TO THEIR ACCOUNTS OF TRANSLATION ETHICS

The Target-oriented Approach of Gideon Toury

A very crucial point to keep in mind while examining Gideon Toury's conception of translation ethics in terms of his descriptive, target-oriented approach is that, contrary to the majority of the former approaches to translation, most of which are source-text oriented and prescriptive, his approach basically relies on the description and explanation of the relationships holding between source texts and target texts (Toury, 1995).

This means that Toury's descriptive translation studies entails an explicit refusal to make any statements on how a translation *should* be, or what kind of a relationship should hold between the translated text and the original text. Toury is primarily concerned with explaining and describing what translation behaviour consists of, rather than making assertions on what it should consist of.

In Toury's descriptive, target-oriented theory, translation activities are assigned a cultural significance. Thus, the acquisition of a set of norms for determining the suitability of a kind of behaviour, namely translation, is a prerequisite for becoming a translator within a cultural environment (Toury, 1995, p. 53). The notion of norms

implies that translation is essentially a decision-making process. In line with this statement, Toury claims that being a translator involves playing a social role rather than simply transferring phrases or sentences (1995).

Since translation is a kind of activity which is conventionally done from one language to another, it inevitably involves at least two different languages and two cultural traditions (those of the source and the target), i.e., at least two sets of norm-systems. While doing a translation, the basic choice to be made is the one between the requirements of the two different sources and this constitutes the initial norm. Thus, a translator may decide to follow the original text and the norms active in the source language and culture, or the norms active in the target culture. If the first case is adopted, the translation will tend to subscribe to the norms of the source text and through them also to the norms of the source language and culture. Toury characterizes this tendency as the pursuit of adequate translation and mentions that it may lead to certain incompatibilities with target-text norms and practices. If, on the other hand, the second case is adopted, the norms of the target culture are chosen to operate in the translation. In this case, shifts (from the original text) may be almost inevitable. Adherence to source norms determines a translation's adequacy as compared to the source text whereas subscription to norms originating in the target culture determines its acceptability (Toury, 1995, pp. 56-57). If a translation demonstrates a higher tendency to subscribe to the norms of the source text, then it is said to be more adequate than acceptable. And if a translation demonstrates a higher tendency to subscribe to the norms of the target text, then it is said to be more acceptable than adequate.

As I mention above, Toury's descriptive approach involves no declaration of a

preference of one of these two options over the other, as a result of the mere fact that it is mainly a descriptive approach. He actually does not even offer the norms of acceptability and adequacy as two poles, but in a continuum. In this sense, for some cases it is possible for the norms of acceptability and the norms of adequacy to overlap. That is, if the norms active in the target culture require the realization of the norms of the source language and culture in translation, then the resulting translation will end up being both adequate and acceptable.

Toury points out that in translations in which the norms of the target language and culture are given priority, i.e., acceptable translations, shifts will be inevitable (1995, p. 56). However, he also adds that even the most adequacy-oriented translation involves shifts from the source text and that the occurrence of shifts has long been accepted as a true universal of translation (1995, p. 57). According to Toury, shifts are a part of the decision making process in translation and are also norm-governed (1995, p. 57). Thus, the notion of norms, the key concept in Toury's descriptive approach to translation, is actually a means of explaining the notions of difference and variability in translation.

Toury argues that the apparent contradiction between the traditional concept of equivalence and the limited model into which a translation has been claimed to be molded can only be resolved by postulating that it is the norms that govern the (type and extent of) equivalence manifested by actual translations. He also adds that what his approach entails is a clear wish to retain the notion of equivalence, which various contemporary approaches tried to do without, while introducing one essential change into it: from an ahistorical, largely prescriptive concept into a historical one (1995, p. 61). He takes a descriptive study as always proceeding from the assumption that

equivalence does exist between an assumed translation and its assumed source. And accordingly, what remains to be uncovered is only the way this postulate was actually realized, e.g., in terms of the balance between what was kept invariant and what was transformed (Toury, 1995, p. 86). This means that, according to this approach in question there is always an equivalence between a source text and a target text, that is, any translation is regarded as equivalent to its “original”. However, the degree and the type of equivalence holding between the source text and the target text might change from one translation to another. Thus, a translation’s equivalence to its “original” is literally taken for granted, but its degree, i.e., how equivalent a target text is to a source text, is dependent on the norms active in the target text.

With his descriptive, target-oriented approach, Gideon Toury suggests a model in which attention is focused on the target text and its position in the target culture. He also argues that while a target text is typically based on another text which is in another language, its identity is not so much dependent on the source text. From this statement it can be inferred that in this theory, the notion of so-called fidelity to the source text is not considered to be essential to the practice and/or the assessment of a translation. Since it is mainly a descriptive approach, neither is there any indication of a preference for faithful translation over unfaithful or vice versa. Toury solely points out that he takes a relationship, which he calls “equivalence” without making any further explanations as to its nature and properties, holding between the target text and its source text for granted, and that the degree and the type of that relationship may, however, change in accordance with the norms active in the target language and culture.

Apparently, there is no statement as to the ethics of translation in Toury's

descriptive, target-oriented approach to translation. Hence, in order to comprehend his ethical stance in translation we have to read between the lines. As I mention above, the descriptive nature of this approach results in a refusal to make any statements on how a translation *should* be, or what kind of a relationship should hold between the translated text and the original text. It can be argued that this principle of the theory in question by itself indicates the lack or ignorance of the concern for the ethics of translation on the part of the approach. That is because, if the theory is not to tell how a translation should be, then it is not to tell that it should be ethical as well. Thus, it follows that from a descriptive point of view there is nothing wrong with a translation if it is done unethically. After all, Toury is primarily concerned with explaining and describing what translation behaviour consists of, rather than making assertions on what it should consist of; that is, if it consists of unethical behaviour, the deed of the translation theoretician is to explain and describe it as so. But here arises another problem, for this approach never touches upon the problem of ethics in translation, the theoretician approaching a translation with this descriptive view has no guidelines to designate it as ethical or unethical. Since a translated text is always regarded as an equivalent of the original text, it is not likely that they can differ in terms of ethics. In other words, if we have two texts equivalent to one another at hand, in what way could it be possible to violate ethics during the translation process? Considering this concept of “equivalence” which is taken for granted between any source text and target text, it seems plausible to claim that Gideon Toury's descriptive, target-oriented approach to translation is lacking not only a sufficient emphasis on, or at least a clear account of the ethics of translation, but also the necessary grounds on which we could build an ethical basis to evaluate

translations. As a result of the fact that the major determinant of the translation process in this approach is the norms active in the target culture and target society, if those norms require a type of translation which is unethical, or if an unethical translation complies with those target society/culture norms, it will follow that in terms of this approach an unethical translation is regarded as acceptable.

The Functionalist Approach, i.e. *Skopostheorie* of

Hans J. Vermeer and Christiane Nord

The *skopostheorie* developed by Hans J. Vermeer and Katharina Reiss encompasses an explicit attempt to revise the issue of the ethics of translation independent of the notions of fidelity and/or equivalence and Vermeer's functionalist approach has been supplemented by Christiane Nord with the addition of the concept of *loyalty*. (Koskinen, 2000, p. 20). *Skopostheorie* describes translating as a purposeful activity guided by the aims and intended functions (the *skopos*) of the translation. Within this framework, the success or the quality of a translation is not dependent on its connection to the original text, but on to what degree it fulfills its *skopos* and meets the needs of the client and the target audience. Instead of being retrospectively equivalent to the source text, the translation “should be prospectively adequate to a target-text *skopos*” (Vermeer, 1996, pp. 77-78). In other words, “the translation purpose justifies the translation procedures” (Nord, 1997, p. 124). Functionalist approaches have changed the perception of the role of the translator radically and described the translator as an expert of intercultural communication, authorized to do whatever he or she considers necessary to fulfill the

intended *skopos* (Vermeer, 1996).

The focal point of this functional approach is that it is not the source text, or its effects on the source text recipient or the function assigned to it by the author, that determines the translation process, as it is postulated by equivalence-based theories, but the prospective function or *skopos* of the target text, as determined by the initiator's, i.e. client's needs (Schäffner, 1998).

The fidelity rule of *skopos* theory is concerned with intertextual coherence between *translatum* and source text; and stipulates merely that some relationship must remain between the two, once the overriding principle of *skopos* and the rule of (intratextual) coherence have been satisfied. Translation is the production of a functionally appropriate target text based on an existing source text, and the relationship between the two texts is specified in accordance with the *skopos* of the translation. This leads to a reconceptualization of the status of the source text. It is up to the translator as the expert to decide what role a source text is to play in the translation action (Schäffner, 1998). Vermeer states that the translator is “the” expert in the translational action and it is up to him to decide what role a source text is to have in this translational action, the decisive factor here being the purpose, the *skopos* of the communication in a given situation (2000, p.174). Thus, the translator is assigned a superior status and a more dominant role than it is the case with traditional approaches to translation (Schäffner, 1997).

Vermeer emphasizes that one legitimate *skopos* is maximally faithful imitation of the original, as commonly in literary translation (2000, p. 181). According to this statement, fidelity to the source text is regarded solely as one of the possible aims of a

translation, that is, there might be cases in which the client, a publisher for example, wants the translator to translate a particular text so as to produce an exact copy of the source text, being as faithful to it as s/he can be in some way. But aside from those cases, the notion of fidelity is completely irrelevant to the proper translation as it is explicated in Vermeer's *skopos* theory.

Toury describes the *skopos* theory of Vermeer as an alternative target text-oriented paradigm in which the source text is seen as an information offer which the translator must determine by selecting those features which most closely correspond to the *skopos* of the translation and the requirements of the target audience (Toury, 1995, p. 25). In this sense, translation is regarded as communicating something new and original, rather than simply providing the target audience with the same information in a rewritten form. Thus, it can be stated that Vermeer's *skopos* theory has a common point with Toury's target-oriented approach in that it does not see the notion of fidelity to the source text as a quality that is essential to the practice of translation. Nevertheless, Vermeer mentions that fidelity to the source text may be assigned as the *skopos* of a particular translation project and in such a case fidelity becomes the necessary condition for the success of that particular translation. Therefore, the only kind of fidelity that is essential to Vermeer's *skopos* theory is doubtlessly the translator's fidelity to the *skopos* of a translation that s/he undertakes.

In her book *Translating As a Purposeful Activity*, Christiane Nord claims for two interdependent limitations to the *Skopos* model, one of which concerns the culture-specificity of translational models and the other has to do with the relationship between the translator and the source-text author (Nord, 1997, p. 124). Although Vermeer allows

for a relationship of “intertextual coherence” or fidelity to hold between source and target texts, the demand for fidelity is subordinate to the *Skopos* rule. Nord paraphrases the main idea behind the *skopos* theory with the statement, “the translation purpose justifies the translation procedures”, and finds this statement acceptable for every translation case, only if the translation purpose is in line with the communicative intentions of the author of the source text. She gives the example of a hypothetical case in which the translation brief requires a translation whose communicative aims are contrary to or incompatible with the author's opinion or intention and asks what will happen in such a case. In this case, she answers, the *Skopos* rule could easily be interpreted as “the end justifies the means,” and there would be no restriction to the range of possible ends (1997, p. 124). She claims that translators must take the expectations of the readers into account. She does not mean that translators are always obliged to do exactly what the readers expect, yet she asserts that there is a moral responsibility not to deceive them (1997, p. 125). She calls this responsibility the translators have toward their partners in translational interaction “loyalty” and argues that loyalty commits the translator bilaterally to the source and the target sides and it must not be mixed up with fidelity or faithfulness, concepts that usually refer to a relationship holding between the source and the target texts. The loyalty which she speaks of is an interpersonal category referring to a social relationship between people and it means that the target-text purpose should be compatible with the original author's intentions (Nord, 1997, p. 125).

Nord's version of the functionalist approach thus stands on two pillars: function *plus* loyalty, function referring to the factors that make a target text work in the intended

way in the target situation and loyalty referring to the interpersonal relationship between the translator, the source text sender, the target text addressees and the initiator (1997, p. 126). She supports the idea that loyalty limits the range of justifiable target text functions for one particular source text and raises the need for a negotiation of the translation assignment between translators and their clients (1997, p. 126). She argues that her function-plus-loyalty model is also an answer to those critics who argue that the functional approach leaves translators free to do whatever they like with any source text, or worse, what their clients like. The loyalty principle takes the legitimate interests of the three parties involved into account: initiators (who want a particular type of translation), target receivers (who expect a particular relationship between original and target texts) and original authors (who have a right to demand respect for their individual intentions and expect a particular kind of relationship between their text and its translation) and if there is any conflict between the interests of the three partners of the translator, it is the translator who has to mediate and, where necessary, seek the understanding of all sides (Nord, 1997, pp. 127-128). Thus, by granting the translators a greater responsibility with the addition of the notion of loyalty, she provides the *skopos* theory with a deeper sense of ethical concern.

While endorsing the functionalist approach of the *skopos* theory, Christiane Nord finds it too limited from the point of view of the relationship between the translator and the source text author (1997, p. 124). This is her reason for supplementing the theory with the notion of loyalty. Loyalty, according to Nord, is a bilateral commitment to source text and target text situation, and the translator is responsible to both the source text and the target text recipient. It follows that “loyalty limits the range of justifiable

target-text functions: if the function is not compatible with the original author's intentions, the translator is expected to negotiate and mediate" (1997, pp. 125-128). Compared to the notion of fidelity, loyalty does indeed offer a wider perspective. It is not limited to the relationship between the translator and either the source text or its writer. The addition of the notion of loyalty is a beneficial attempt to integrate the discussion of ethics to the other theoretical developments of *skopos* theory. Loyalty builds on ideas of responsibility and trust, which are both highly relevant to discussing the ethics of translation.

Hans J. Vermeer's functionalist approach to translation which is marked by the name *skopostheorie* very successfully accompanies Gideon Toury's descriptive approach in erasing the traditional concept of fidelity to the source text on the part of the translator as a prerequisite for producing a successful or even acceptable translation and in bringing plurality into the field of Translation Studies by suggesting that there can be more than one *skopos* for any source text, and thus, a source text can be translated in a number of different ways in accordance with those diverse *skopoi*, and provided that they fulfill their *skopoi*, all of the resulting target texts can be acceptable. Nevertheless, the *skopos* theory of Vermeer is also no better than Toury's descriptive approach in terms of taking the ethics of translation into account. Although Vermeer grants the translator a great responsibility by declaring her/him "the" expert in the translational action and by stating that it is up to the translator to decide what role a source text is to have in this translational action, he also adds that the decisive factor here is the purpose, that is, the *skopos* of the communication in a given situation, meaning that *skopos*, which is specified by the client, is still a superior determinant in translation activity.

Consequently, if a given *skopos* of a source text to be translated involves an unethical rendering of the text, not only the resulting target text will be acceptable (provided that it fulfills its intended *skopos*), but also the translator will not be responsible for violating the ethics of translation because the only responsibility s/he actually has, according to this theory in question, is the responsibility to decide what role a source text is to have in a given translation project so as to produce a target text which will fulfill its *skopos* in the best possible way. The introduction of the notion of “loyalty” to Vermeer's functionalist approach by Christiane Nord, on the other hand, is evidently a very important advancement as to integrating the concern for the ethics of translation into translation theory. Though it is not comprehensive enough to prevent each and every possible strategy of violating the ethics of translation, Nord's loyalty principle is definitely a noteworthy attempt to stress the urgency of ethics for translational phenomena.

The Post-structuralist Approaches of Rosemary Arrojo and Lawrence Venuti

Brazilian Translation Studies scholar Rosemary Arrojo, one of the leading theoreticians within translation theory since the 1990's, has put forth a post-structuralist approach to translation with a special emphasis on “deconstruction” in the majority of her essays, suggesting a reformulation of the traditional concepts of originality and fidelity. Adopting Derrida's criticism of *logocentrism*, she uses deconstruction as a basis to re-define translation as the active production of meanings, as creation and production,

instead of conservation and protection, and describes translators as faithful only to their own conceptions and understanding in translation (Arrojo, 1997ab & 1998). Rosemary Arrojo questions the logocentric tradition and its presupposition of the existence of an only, single, determined and stable meaning inherent in a text. She argues that our logocentric tradition sees translation as an instance of pure meaning transfer which consequently invokes the notion of fidelity as the central ethical issue which does not only determine the adequacy of such a transfer but also denote the respect a translator has for the author of the original. According to Arrojo, this frame of reference in which logocentrism fits any act of translation presupposes some stable, recoverable meanings which originate from the conscious intentions of an author, and which are “present” in the “original”. This means that, in logocentric terms, the author consciously inserts some chosen meaning in her/his text, and that a good translator is the one who is capable of extracting “the” meaning of a text and “faithfully” transferring them into her/his target language (Arrojo, 1990, p. 76). In such a scenario, the translator’s task entails an ideal preservation of original meaning without any alteration or loss (Arrojo, 1994, p. 3).

Arrojo states that deconstructive thought has turned upside down the apparent harmony logocentrism has created for translation by questioning the possibility of stable, recoverable meanings and the (implicit) possibility of a clear-cut opposition between subject and object. According to this statement, the relationship between an author and his reader as well as the relationship between a translator and the author s/he translates is not necessarily marked by harmony and faithfulness, as logocentrism asserts, but is the *locus* of a struggle for power, which is ultimately a struggle for

authorial power (Arrojo, 1990, p. 76). She claims that it is the traditional knowledge conceived in terms of accumulation and stability, as one of the subsidiaries of the conception of truth as logos, that undergoes one of the most sweeping revisions under the scrutiny of deconstructive and post-structuralist thought (1994, p. 6). In this sense, the acceptance of the impossibility of reaching any pure origin, or that which could be immortal, univocal and beyond any perspective means also the acceptance of the inevitability of interference in any act of alleged re-creation (Arrojo, 1997b, p. 22). Thus, she views the search for “absolute fidelity” not only as a “futile hope” but also as irrelevant to translation, whereas a “critical apparatus” as to determine the kind of strategy that should be used in each translation project to analyze and discuss its own methods of producing “truths” and exercising power is what is actually essential (1994, p. 11).

Rosemary Arrojo agrees with Gideon Toury and Hans J. Vermeer in their assessment of the notions of fidelity and equivalence in her conviction that they are either irrelevant to or unnecessary for the production of a successful translation. But unlike them, who do not necessarily reject the notion in question altogether, Arrojo claims that the so-called fidelity to the source text is a quality that is impossible to obtain. Neither Toury’s descriptive, target-oriented approach, nor Vermeer’s *skopos* theory accepts fidelity to the source text as a necessary condition for producing a proper translation. Nevertheless, they neither imply the impossibility of such a relationship to hold between the target text and the source text which is typically characterized by fidelity or equivalence. In terms of her deconstructionist view of translation, Arrojo agrees with them on the rejection of fidelity and equivalence in the traditional sense as a

necessary condition for a proper translation. But her approach differs from the two previously examined theories – namely Toury’s descriptive theory and Vermeer’s *skopos* theory – in a very crucial and essential point: She rejects even the possibility of a faithful and/or equivalent translation and also the recognition of the notions of fidelity and equivalence to the source text as a goal which can be expected to be achieved. In terms of her post-structuralist approach to translation, there is definitely no such thing as a faithful and/or equivalent translation that can actually be produced. Thus, by rejecting the conception of the meaning of a text as a stable and objective entity inherent in the text, in a number of papers, Arrojo explicitly erases the notion of fidelity and/or equivalence to the source text not only from the list of translation possibilities, but also from the ethics of translation.

Following the post-structuralist terminology, Lawrence Venuti defines translation simply as a process by which the chain of signifiers that constitutes the source-language text is replaced by a chain of signifiers in the target language which the translator provides on the strength of an interpretation (Venuti, 1995, p. 17). He agrees with Derrida in that because meaning is an effect of relations and differences among signifiers along a potentially endless chain (polysemous, intertextual, subject to infinite linkages), it is always differential and deferred, never present as an original unity (Derrida, as cited in Venuti, 1995, p. 17). He takes a foreign text as a site of many different semantic possibilities that are fixed only provisionally in any one translation, on the basis of varying situations, in different historical periods. Thus, meaning is a plural and contingent relation, not an unchanging unified essence, and therefore a translation cannot be judged according to mathematics-based concepts of semantic

equivalence or one-to-one correspondence (Venuti, 1995, p. 18). “Appeals to the foreign text cannot finally adjudicate between competing translations in the absence of linguistic error, because canons of accuracy in translation, notions of ‘fidelity’ and ‘freedom’ are historically determined categories” (Venuti, 1995, p. 18). Although Venuti does not approach translation with the same, exactly post-structuralist stance with Arrojo, the above statement brings us back to Arrojo’s point, implying that there is no ahistorical, stable meaning inherent in a text, and that fidelity to the meaning of the source text in the traditional sense or semantic equivalence itself is only an impossible ideal.

“How can the source message ever be invariant if it undergoes a process of ‘establishment’ in a ‘certain’ target language and culture? It is always *reconstructed* according to *a different set of values* and always *variable according to different languages and cultures*” (Venuti, 2000, p. 470, italics mine). Thus, considering the differences between languages and cultures, namely the linguistic and cultural differences, Venuti maintains that translation cannot be the transference of an invariant source message across languages and that the actual practice of any translation necessarily is the outcome of some degree of interpretation. Being close to the deconstructionist thought, Venuti seems to agree with Arrojo in her assertion that there can be no ahistorical, invariant meaning in a foreign text, to which a translation can be faithful. And because of the very linguistic and cultural differences which underlie the relationship between the foreign text and the translation, the hope of producing a text that is “equivalent” to the foreign text is just illusory. As a result, it has to be accepted that no translation can escape some degree of interpretation on the part of the translator,

for that is inevitable considering that the target language itself is “different” from the source text by its nature. This difference is something that no translation critic shall ignore. According to Venuti, instead of an indeterminate, vague quality of fidelity and/or equivalence to the source text, the criterion for evaluating a translation as to ethics should be the consideration of the prevailing asymmetrical relations of power, and the social, cultural and linguistic inequalities, and thus, all of the *differences* pertaining to the translation activity at hand on the part of the translator.

In Venuti’s point of view, the apparent intervention of the translator in the foreign text, in the form of *domestication* is actually aimed at excluding the differences and peculiarities which signify the foreign culture and society from the translation (i.e. the target text) and thus, assimilating them in the domestic culture in accordance with the needs / wishes of the dominant parties in the domestic (i.e. target) society (1995). In translation, an image [of the foreign culture and society] is derived from the representation of the foreign text constructed by the translator, a communication *domestically inscribed* (Venuti, 2000, p. 482). He argues that the greatest potential source of scandal for translation is the formation of cultural identities, for translation wields enormous power in constructing representations of foreign cultures (1998, p. 67). In this sense, it can be argued that the translated texts, when domesticated in the process of translation, are destined to lose much of their significance and value, for they are completely isolated from their own circumstances and history, and thus, become merely the instruments to be used in the construction of a false image of the cultures and societies in which they originate.

Venuti states what he is advocating as not an indiscriminate valorization of every

foreign culture or a metaphysical concept of foreignness as an essential value; for, indeed, the foreign text is privileged in a foreignizing translation only insofar as it enables a disruption of target-language cultural codes, so that its value is always strategic, depending on the cultural formation into which it is translated. His point is rather to elaborate the theoretical, critical, and textual means by which translation can be studied and practiced as a locus of difference, instead of the homogeneity that widely characterizes it today (1995, pp. 41-42). Thus, the ethical stance he advocates urges that translations be written, read, and evaluated with greater respect for linguistic and cultural differences (1998, p. 6).

Venuti's view of the concept of domesticating translation which erases the differences of foreign cultures and societies overlap with Arrojo's viewpoint particularly in her claim that, as postmodern theories of language and culture have shown, the denial of difference implicit in any project with universalist pretensions has been an efficient strategy for those who are in power to justify and legitimize their options and world view, as well as the violent exclusion of otherness of which the project of colonialism is a powerful example (Arrojo, 1997a, p. 14). Thus, Arrojo seems to share the view that translation can be and actually is used as a tool for manipulation by those parties occupying the dominant position in this world of asymmetrical power relations, and also that most theoretical approaches to translation, up to now, have ignored this dreadful yet fundamental fact of translational practice, pursuing the frivolous hope of establishing translation studies as an "empirical" discipline instead. She agrees with Venuti also in his demonstration that translation is far from being an innocent, "objective" means of cultural transfer between languages interacting in a perfectly balanced dialogue that

contemplates and respects difference, or that can somehow be disciplined by a universal set of ethical principles ideally formulated by a supposedly neutral, non-biased, or rigorous branch of science or philosophy, regardless of circumstances, the languages, and the cultures involved (1997a, p. 17).

Evidently, the post-structuralist approaches of Arrojo and Venuti to translation phenomena in general convey an attempt to draw attention to the significance of ethics in translation theory and criticism. Theirs is a clear attempt to refute the traditional ethics of translation that is based on the essentialist concepts of fidelity and equivalence, which they believe to be concepts made up and put forward by those who are in power to erase the differences of languages, cultures and societies and to justify, legitimize and impose their options and world view on others. These two scholars aim to replace the traditional ethics of translation with an ethics based on difference, that is, an ethics which prioritizes the differences, inequalities and power struggles between cultures, languages and societies. This new type of ethical stance, suggested by Arrojo and Venuti, is a major progress in the discipline as to paving the way for various kinds of interdisciplinary research, for it relates Translation Studies very closely with the fields of politics, international relations, sociology, and cultural and literary studies.

To sum up the accounts of the main principles of the prominent contemporary theories in Translation Studies and their translation ethics, it can be inferred from the above explanations on the conceptualization of fidelity and equivalence that when these notions are taken into account in the traditional sense as the maximum possible resemblance between the source text and the target text, they are definitely out of the question for these theories, not only as relevant to the ethics of translation, but also even

as a necessary condition of a proper and/or acceptable translation. As a result of the developments in the theoretical framework of Translation Studies in the last few decades, either these notions are rejected altogether, or their conception as convenient assessment tools in translation is dismissed from translation theory in general. Thus, the traditional ethics of translation based on fidelity and equivalence, in general, “sameness”, lost its validity and position in translation theory, especially with the advent of post-structuralist and foreignizing approaches to translation, to an ethics of translation based on “difference”. As Kaisa Koskinen puts it, “while pedagogical aims will no doubt always be a part of translation studies, and while translation quality assessment has been among the favorite topics of recent discussions, one could still argue that in translation theory there has been a gradual shift from an emphasis of sameness (fidelity, equivalence) and normativeness to an understanding and acceptance of *difference* in translation. In fact, one could even maintain that contemporary translation studies as a discipline is an extended effort to analyze and explain the differences between source and target texts” (Koskinen, 2000, pp. 16-17).

CHAPTER III

THE PHENOMENA OF IDEOLOGICAL MANIPULATION IN TRANSLATION

As practicing translators or scholars, it is vital for us to “deconstruct” and expose the ideologies of “others”. However, it is of equal importance that we turn to the field of TS with a critical – and constructive – mind. It is only in this way that we will achieve real progress. (Calzada-Pérez, 2003, p. 18)

The Relations of Ideology and Translation

In her “Introduction” to *Apropos of Ideology: Translation Studies on Ideology – Ideologies in Translation Studies*, María Calzada-Pérez states that Translation Studies dig into ideological phenomena for a variety of reasons, and goes on to explain that “all language use is, as CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) contenders claim, ideological. Translation is an operation carried out on language use. This undoubtedly means that translation itself is always a site of ideological encounters (which often turn ‘sour’)” (2003, p. 2). Considering this essential interconnection of language use and ideology, and also that of translation and language use, this section of the present study is aimed at explaining how ideology is related with translation, focusing on ideological manipulation in translation. Firstly, a general account of the notion of ideology as to its connection to language use and discourse is presented. Then, the nature of ideological activities and/or strategies which, again, concern language use are explained in order to draw attention to the ways in which translation can be used and considered as an

ideological tool.

Ideology in General

Almost all literature exclusively on the notion of ideology starts off with an explanation on the difficulty of defining it. Perhaps the most general assumption of “ideology” is that it is the system of collective thoughts and beliefs of groups of people. However, this conception of ideology is lacking in various respects. First of all, as Terry Eagleton also states, the term ideology makes reference not only to belief systems, but also to questions of *power* (1991, p. 5). According to Eagleton, it is possible to define ideology in a number of different ways, one of which may be “the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life” (1991, p. 28). He explains that such a definition is both politically and epistemologically neutral, and is close to the broader meaning of the term “culture”, and that, ideology, or culture, would here denote the whole complex of signifying practices and symbolic processes in a particular society; it would allude to the way individuals “lived” their social practices themselves, which would be the preserve of politics, economics, kinship theory and so on. He views this sense of ideology as wider than the sense of “culture” which, he claims, confines itself to artistic and intellectual work of agreed value, but narrower than the anthropological definition of culture, which would encompass all of the practices and institutions of a form of life. Eagleton clarifies this distinction by expressing that “culture” in this anthropological sense would include, for example, the financial infrastructure of sport, whereas ideology would concern itself more particularly with the

signs, meanings and values encoded in sporting activities (1991, p. 28). He also argues that “this most general of all meanings of ideology stresses the social determination of thought, thus providing a valuable antidote to idealism; but otherwise it would seem unworkably broad and suspiciously silent on the question of political conflict. Ideology means more than just, say, the signifying practices associated by a society with food; it involves the relations between these signs and processes of political power. It is not coextensive with the general field of ‘culture’, but lights up this field from a particular angle” (1991, pp. 28-29).

Having, thus, emphasized the importance of its connection to questions of “power” in a proper account of “ideology”, Eagleton goes on to point to another crucial issue, stating that “not every body of belief which people commonly term ideological is associated with a *dominant* political power” (1991, p. 6). He argues that confining term ideology to *dominant* forms of social thought would be inaccurate and needlessly confusing, and that there is need here for a broader definition of ideology, as “any kind of interaction between belief systems and political power”, adding that “such a question would be neutral on the question of whether this intersection challenged or confirmed a particular social order” (1991, p. 6).

The connection of “ideology” to questions of *power* implies that ideology cannot be just a system of beliefs and thoughts of a group of people, and assigns ideology an “active” quality. That is, ideologies, in general, necessitate some kinds of actions or attempts to gain or secure social interests and power. In Eagleton's view, “ideologies can be seen as more or less systematic attempts to provide plausible explanations and justifications for social behaviour which might otherwise be the object of criticism”

(1991, p. 52). Indicating, thus, this active quality of ideology, he explains

“rationalization” which itself is an example of ideology in action, as follows:

An ideology may be seen not simply as “expressing” social interests but as *rationalizing* them. Those who believe that there will be no air left to breathe in Britain if we allow more immigration are probably rationalizing a racist attitude. Rationalization is at root a psychoanalytic category, defined by J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis as a “procedure whereby the subject attempts to present an explanation that is either logically consistent or ethically acceptable for attitudes, ideas, feelings, etc., whose true motives are not perceived.” To call ideologies “rationalizing” is already to imply that there is something discreditable about them – that they try to defend the indefensible, cloaking some disreputable motive in high-sounding ethical terms. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 51)

As Eagleton also mentions, “dominant ideologies, and occasionally oppositional ones, often employ such devices as unification, spurious identification, naturalization, deception, self-deception, universalization and rationalization” (1991, p. 222). The main medium of employment for such ideological devices is, doubtlessly, language and discourse. “To say that the statement is ideological is then to claim that it is powered by an ulterior motive bound up with the legitimation of certain interests in a power struggle” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 16). The “statement” in question here inevitably involves the use of some language. His account of the term ideology covers “a wide range of historical meanings, all the way from the unworkably broad sense of the social determination of thought to the suspiciously narrow idea of the deployment of false ideas in the direct interests of a ruling class” (1991, p. 221). Nevertheless, I believe that Eagleton's main points in his conception of ideology can be summarized as follows: “Very often, it refers to the ways in which signs, meanings and values help to reproduce a dominant social power; but it can also denote any significant conjuncture between discourse and political interests” (1991, p. 221).

Teun A. van Dijk seems to be sharing Eagleton's view of ideology as connected to both social power and discourse in his assertion that “ideologies establish links between discourse and society” (1997b, p. 7). He sees ideologies, in a sense, as “the cognitive counterpart of power,” and stresses the social aspect of language use and discourse in connection to ideology, claiming that “ideologies monitor how language users engage in discourse as members of (dominant, or dominated, or competing) groups or organizations, and thus also try to realize social interests and manage social conflict”, and also that, “at the same time, discourse is needed in the reproduction of the ideologies of a group” (1997b, p. 7). Van Dijk accounts for the pervasive interest of sociologists and political scientists in the notion of ideology expressing that “ideologies are undoubtedly social, and often (though not always) associated with group interests, conflicts and struggle”, and that, “they may be used to legitimate or oppose power and dominance, or symbolize social problems and contradictions”, and “may involve social collectivities such as classes and other groups, as well as institutions, organization and other parts of social structure” (1998, p. 5). He also points to the fact that “many contemporary approaches to ideology associate (or even identify) the concept with language use or discourse, if only to account for the way ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced in society”, adding that “concealment, legitimation, manipulation and related notions that are seen as the prime functions of ideologies in society are mostly discursive (or more broadly semiotic) social practices” (1998, p. 5).

Yet another point on which Van Dijk, in his approach, agrees with Eagleton (1991) is that ideologies are not inherently negative, nor limited to social structures of domination (1998, p. 11). He views ideologies, “in a general and abstract sense, as the

interface between fundamental properties (e.g. interests, goals) of social groups and the shared, social cognitions of their members” (1998, p. 313). Van Dijk also mentions the far reaching social implications of ideology by stating that “the effective reproduction and implementation of group ideologies often requires *organization* and *institutionalization*, typically so by ideological institutions such as those of politics, the media and education” (1998, p. 316).

Ideology in Translation

Maria Tymoczko states that “some of the most searching and revealing discussions of translation in the last decade have focused on questions of ideology”, and that, “indeed, there has been a productive, ongoing academic dialogue about various facets of the issue, extending for years now, with contributions from people on all parts of the globe”; adding that, “raised principally by those who have an investment in social engagement, questions about the translator as an ethical agent of social change have gone to the heart of both the practice of translation and the theory of translation” (2003, p. 181). Hence, I aim to contribute to those discussions on questions of ideology by investigating how ideology actually is implemented on translation or vice versa, starting with the relations between ideology and language use and discourse in general, and arriving at the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation.

According to Teun A. van Dijk, “although discourses are not the only ideologically based social practices, they certainly are the most crucial ones in the formulation of ideologies in their social reproduction” (1998, p. 6). He highlights the

significance of the notion of “discourse” in ideology by stating that “language use, text, talk and communication (together subsumed here under the overall term of ‘discourse’) are needed and used by group members to learn, acquire, change, confirm, articulate, as well as to persuasively convey ideologies to other ingroup members, to inculcate them in novices, defend them against (or conceal them from) outgroup members or to propagate them among those who are (as yet) infidels” (1998, p. 6). Since translation *per se* is a form of language use, text and communication, each and every claim on discourse here pertains to translation as well. Van Dijk also adds that “discourse has a *special function* in the expression, implementation and especially the reproduction of ideologies, since it is only through language use, discourse or communication (or other semiotic practices) that they can be explicitly formulated”, and that, “this is essential in contexts of acquisition, argumentation, ideological conflict, persuasion and processes in the formation and change of ideologies” (1998, pp. 316-317). He also stresses the social aspect of language use by pointing out that “language users actively engage in text and talk not only as speakers, writers, listeners or readers, but also as *members* of social categories, groups, professions, organizations, communities, societies or cultures” (1997b, p. 3). According to his analysis, “*discourse* is obviously a form of action” which is “mostly intentional, controlled, purposeful human activity”, for “we do not usually speak, write, read or listen accidentally or just to exercise our vocal chords or hands” (1997b, p. 8). He holds that “the same is true for many of the higher level acts we accomplish *by* speaking or writing: asserting or asking something, accusing someone, promising something, avoiding an answer, telling a story, defending ourselves, being polite or persuading an audience, are among the many things we ‘do

with words' that we usually accomplish more or less intentionally and purposefully", and defines these actions, despite their many different properties, as "*communicative acts*" (1997b, p. 8). He goes on to explain that "although intentions and purposes are usually described as mental representations, they are socially relevant because they manifest themselves as social activity, and because they are ascribed or attributed to us by others who interpret this activity: others thus construct or define us as more or less rational *persons* and at the same time as social *actors*" (1997b, p. 8).

One definition of ideology presented by Terry Eagleton in his book *Ideology: an Introduction* among his list of "some definitions of ideology currently in circulation" is "systematically distorted communication" (1991, p. 1). Similarly, Van Dijk indicates that "virtually, no short definition of ideology will fail to mention that ideologies typically serve to legitimate power and inequality", and that "ideologies are assumed to conceal, hide or otherwise obfuscate the truth, reality or indeed the 'objective, material conditions of existence' or the interests of social formations" (1998, p. 11). In Eagleton's view, "on the one hand, ideologies are passionate, rhetorical, impelled by some benighted pseudo-religious faith which the sober technocratic world of modern capitalism has thankfully outgrown; on the other hand they are arid conceptual systems which seek to reconstruct society from the ground up in accordance with some bloodless blueprint" (1991, p. 4). Commenting on some of the major ideological devices, he finds "the concept of rationalization" to be "closely allied to that of *legitimation*", asserting that "legitimation refers to the process whereby a ruling power comes to secure from its subject an at least tacit consent to its authority, and like 'rationalization', it can have something of a pejorative smack about it, suggesting the

need to make respectable otherwise illicit interests” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 54). Regarding the relations between ideology and translation as a form of discourse, the above statements point to the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation. Van Dijk elaborates on the special usage of discourse with ideological purposes as follows:

Discourse features a number of special structures or strategies that have been amply described already in classical rhetoric, and that are usually called “figures of style”, but which will here be called *rhetorical structures*. These structures appear at all levels of discourse described above, and assign special organization (repetition, deletion, substitution, etc.) to these levels, for instance by the figures of rhyme and alliteration at the level of sounds, parallelism at the level of syntax, and comparison, metaphor, irony, etc. at the level of meaning. Unlike other discourse structures, these are optional, and serve especially in persuasive contexts, and more generally to attract or manage the attention of recipients.

In an ideological analysis this will usually mean that rhetorical structures are studied as means to emphasize or de-emphasize meanings as a function of ideological opinions. Metaphors may be chosen that highlight the negative character of our enemies, comparisons in order to mitigate the blame of our own people, and irony to challenge the negative models of our opponents. Rhetoric, defined in this sense, is essentially geared towards the persuasive communication of preferred models of social events, and thus manages how recipients will understand and especially how they will evaluate such events, for instance as a function of the interests of the participants. It is therefore not surprising that rhetorical structures play such an important role in ideological manipulation. (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 208)

He also adds that “legitimation”, which is “one of the main social functions of ideologies”, is “pragmatically related to the speech act of defending oneself, in that one of its appropriateness conditions is often that the speaker is providing good reasons, grounds or acceptable motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticized by others” (1998, p. 255). Hence, “the expression of ideology in discourse is usually more than just an explicit or concealed display of a person's beliefs, but mostly also has a persuasive function: speakers want to change the mind of the recipients in a way that is consistent with their beliefs, intentions and goals” (1998, p. 263). This

means, as Van Dijk also contends, that “a more detailed study of ‘ideological discourse structures’ has implications for our insight into the ways in which discourse is used to express ideologies and at the same time into processes of reception and persuasion” (1998, p. 263).

However, it should be noted that “ideologies may be critically examined when (unjustly) legitimating power abuse or domination, but that does not mean that all legitimation, as such, is negative” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 11). After all, as Van Dijk also suggests, “most forms of applied ethics will accept the legitimation of resistance against domination”, and, thus, “it would be rather arbitrary to use the notion of ideology only for the belief systems we do not accept” (1998, p. 11). He points out that “besides such more negative functions of ideology, we may add that ideologies positively serve to empower dominated groups, to create solidarity, to organize struggle and to sustain opposition; and both at the negative and the positive side, ideologies serve to protect interests and resources, whether these are unjust privileges, or minimal conditions of existence” (1998, p. 138). “More neutrally and more generally, then”, he describes ideologies as “simply serving groups and their members in the organization and management of their goals, social practices and their whole daily social life” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 138).

Turning back to the notion of ideology in translation, “the relationship between ideology and translation” is described, by Christina Schäffner, as “multifarious”:

In a sense, it can be said that any translation is ideological since the choice of a source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put is determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social agents. But ideological aspects can also be determined within a text itself, both at the lexical level (reflected, for example, in the deliberate choice or avoidance of a particular word) and the grammatical level (for example, use of passive structures to avoid an expression

of agency, cf. Hodge and Kress 1993). Ideological aspects can be more or less obvious in texts, depending on the topic of a text, its genre and communicative purpose. (Schäffner, 2003, p. 23)

Similarly, Maria Tymoczko claims that “a translation's ideology is determined only partially by the content of the source text – the subject and the representation of the subject – even though this content may itself be overtly political and enormously complicated as a speech act, with locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of the source text all contributing to the effect in the source text” (2003, p. 182). In her approach to translation, “the ideological value of the source text is in turn complemented by the fact that translation is a metastatement, a statement about the source text that constitutes an interpretation of the source text”, and “this is true even when that metastatement is seemingly only a form of reported speech (cf. Jakobson, 1959, p. 233) or *quotation* uttered in *a new context*, for in quoting a source text, a translator in turn creates a text that is a representation with its proper locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary forces which are determined by relevant factors in the receptor context” (2003, p.182, italics mine). Thus, she concludes,

even in a simplified model, the ideology of a translation will be an amalgam of the content of the source text and the various speech acts instantiated in the source text *relevant to the source context*, layered together with the representation of the content, its relevance to the receptor audience, and the various speech acts of the translation itself addressing *the target context*, as well as *resonances and discrepancies* between these two ‘utterances’. (2003, p. 182, italics mine)

Therefore, the determination of how ideological a translation is will eventually involve the consideration of the contents of the source and the target texts, the various speech acts present in the both texts as *relevant to their contexts* and the resonances and discrepancies between these two utterances in question. The italicized terms represent notions which are of special relevance to the case study handled in the next chapter as

an example of decontextualization as a form of ideological manipulation in translation.

Drawing attention to the role of the translator in determining the place and the effects of ideology in a translation process, Tymoczko argues that “ideological effects will differ in every case of translation – even in translations of the same text - because of the translator's particular choices on all these various levels – on the levels of representation of the subject matter, as well as representation of the relevant locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of the source text, and on the relevant locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in his or her own name as translator” (2003, p. 183). This implies that “the ideology of a translation resides not simply in the text translated, but in the voicing and stance of the translator, and in its relevance to the receiving audience”, and that “these latter features are affected by the place of enunciation of the translator: indeed they are part of what we mean by the ‘place’ of enunciation, for that ‘place’ is an ideological positioning as well as a geographical or temporal one” (Tymoczko, 2003, p. 183). Tymoczko, thus, concludes that “these aspects of a translation are motivated and determined by the translator's cultural and ideological affiliations as much as or even more than by the temporal and spatial location that the translator speaks from” (2003, p. 183). Hence, it can be inferred that, since the translator is the most powerful determinant of the many aspects of the outcome of the process of translation, that is, the translated text, translation is a site which is clearly open to ideological manipulation on the part of the translator.

De(con)textualization as a Form of Ideological Manipulation in Translation

This section of the present study is aimed at drawing attention to the significance of the notion of “context” of discourse for the question of ideology in translation. According to Terry Eagleton, ideology is a matter of “discourse” rather than “language”, and “it concerns the actual uses of language between particular human subjects for the production of specific effects”, thus, “*you could not decide whether a statement was ideological or not by inspecting it in isolation from its discursive context, any more than you could decide in this way whether a piece of writing was a work of literary art*” (1991, p. 9, italics mine). He argues that “ideology is less a matter of the inherent linguistic properties of a pronouncement than a question of who is saying what to whom for what purposes”, adding that “this isn't to deny that there are particular ideological ‘idioms’: the language of fascism, for example”, and that “fascism tends to have its own peculiar lexicon (*Lebensraum*, sacrifice, blood and soil), but what is primarily ideological about these terms is the power-interests they serve and the political effects they generate” (1991, p. 9). His general point, then, is that “exactly the same piece of language may be *ideological in one context and not in another*; ideology is a function of the relation of an utterance to its social context” (1991, p. 9, italics mine).

Teun A. van Dijk views *ideology* as one of the fundamental notions which establish a link between discourse and society (1997b, p. 25). Dwelling on the subject of ideological analysis, he also claims that “ideologies cannot simply be ‘read off’ text and talk”, for “what is an ideologically relevant expression in one discourse or context may

not be one in another, or may have an opposed ideological function at another moment”, and “this means that ideological discourse analysis is very complex, and needs to take into account all levels of text and context, as well as the broader social background of discourse and interaction” (1998, p. 210). In his view, “specific structures that in one context function ideologically, may not have that function in another context” (1998, p. 263).

Van Dijk points out that “in the philosophy of language, as well as in psychology and most of the social sciences, meanings are not so much abstract properties of words and expressions, but rather the kinds of things language users *assign* to such expressions in processes of *interpretation* or *understanding*” (1998, p. 204). He stresses the importance of the notion of context in the production of meanings by suggesting that “this also allows for contextual variation: a speaker and a hearer may assign (intend, interpret, infer) different meanings to the same expression, and indeed, the same expression may therefore also mean different things in different contexts”, and “hence, meanings of discourse and language in use are contextual or situated, and depend on the (interpretation of the) participants” (1998, pp. 204-205).

In his attempt to define or to describe the notion of “context”, Van Dijk mentions that “a broad characterization of discourse as a communicative event not only features the various levels, structures or strategies of text and talk, but also those of the context”, and that “despite many informal discussions in socio-linguistics, pragmatics and discourse studies of this notion of context, there is strictly speaking no *theory* of what exactly a ‘context’ is” (1998, p. 211). Adding that “the term itself suggests that it is all that comes ‘with the text’, that is, the properties of the ‘environment’ of discourse”, he

decides to “stay as close as possible with this linguistic version of the commonsense notion of context, and define it as *the structured set of all properties of a social situation that are possibly relevant for the production, structures, interpretation and functions of text and talk*” (1998, p. 211). He supports the theoretical view that “discourse studies should deal both with the properties of text and talk and with what is usually called the *context*, that is, the other characteristics of the social situation or the communicative event that may systematically influence text and talk” claiming that, “in sum, discourse studies are about *talk and text in context*” (1997a, p. 3).

According to Van Dijk, “most of the studies of discourse take place in one or more of the main areas described above: form, meaning, interaction and cognition” (1997a, p. 19). He objects to this situation by pointing out that “we have also seen that the *context* plays a fundamental role in the description and explanation of text and talk” (1997a, p. 19). He, then, states that “although there is no explicit theory of context, and the notion is used by different scholars with a wide variety of meanings, we may briefly define it as the structure of all properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or the reception of discourse”, and that “context features not only influence discourse, but also vice versa: discourse may typically also define or change such context characteristics” (1997a, p. 19). He also mentions, elsewhere, that “discourse manifests or expresses, and at the same time shapes, the many relevant properties of the sociocultural situation we call its *context*” (1997b, p. 4).

Regarding the study of contexts as one of the main principles of discourse analysis, Van Dijk claims that “discourse should preferably be studied as a constitutive part of its local and global, social and cultural contexts”, for “text and talk in many ways

signal their contextual relevance, and therefore context structures need to be observed and analyzed in detail, also as possible consequences of discourse: settings, participants and their communicative and social roles, goals, relevant social knowledge, norms and values, institutional or organizational structures, and so on” (1997a, p. 29). The notion of context, in Van Dijk's view, is essential in social discourse analysis which approaches discourse in order to study social action and interaction:

... the concept of context is also not as straightforward as its common-sense uses in everyday life might suggest. Intuitively, it seems to imply some kind of environment or circumstances for an event, action or discourse. Something we need to know about in order to properly understand the event, action or discourse. Something that functions as background, setting, surroundings, conditions or consequences.

In the study of discourse as action and interaction, contexts are crucial. Indeed, the main distinction between abstract discourse analysis and social discourse analysis is that the latter takes the context into account. It was provisionally suggested that this context may involve such parameters as participants, their roles and purposes, as well as properties of a setting, such as time and place. Discourse is being produced, understood and analyzed relative to such context features. (Van Dijk, 1997b: 11)

Considering the significance of the notion of context for ideological discourse analysis, it should be noted that decontextualization is also another notion, the place of which in discourse analysis worth studying, for discourse can only be analyzed in connection to the context in question, in terms of every possible aspect including ideology. Hence, as Sharon Hamilton-Wieler suggests in her article “The Fallacy of Decontextualization” (1988), the construction of a working definition of “decontextualization” would be beneficial to an understanding of the implications of the concept .

Hamilton-Wieler takes the term “decontextualization” to refer to “the abstraction of a written text or portion of written text from all of its contexts, with the assumption that the isolated text, or portion thereof, is an autonomous container of its own

meaning”, and puts forth “two major areas of contention” that “immediately present themselves: can written discourse be rendered meaningfully context-free? and is the locus meaning solely within the text?” (1988, p. 3). She goes on to ask if writing can ever be “decontextualized” in any meaningful sense, and claims that, to answer that question, we must first consider the prior question of what exactly we are talking about when we talk about “context” (1988, p. 3).

There is, of course, the linguistic context which, in itself, is complex, involving the morphological, lexical, and syntactic functions of the language of the text; then there is the situational context, crucial to understanding the semantic aspect of the text; there is also the cultural context, necessary for incorporating the text into the reader's “social reality” (Firth, 1935/1957: 27); and, finally, there is the textual context; it is constantly developing as the reader progresses through the text. In other words, the text itself contributes to its own context, both through its explicit elaboration and through the implicit premises, conventions, and assumptions which connect the writer to the distant reader. To consider language as decontextualized means to consider it removed from the totality of its contexts. Such an isolation, it will be shown, is theoretically impossible. (Hamilton-Wieler, 1988, pp. 3-4)

She further explicates the impossibility of “meaningful” decontextualization by expressing that “even if we take just a word, phrase, sentence, or paragraph out of ‘context’, for whatever purpose, it will appear in the context of that purpose”, and that “it could be argued that this is a deliberate misunderstanding of what the word implies, [...,] because if it is out of one context, it is, *ipso facto*, into another, more abstract, perhaps, but a context nonetheless” (1988, p. 4). She also calls attention to the importance and necessity of questioning and criticizing books and all kinds of printed media in general, claiming that “one of the most serious problems which arises from the idea that the text is the locus of meaning is that it encourages acceptance, sometimes even worship, of the orthodoxy of the book, of the sacred nature of the printed word, not

to be pondered, questioned, debated, and considered, but to be received as law” (1988, p. 8). Taking the essential role of “context” in its production into account, she views “meaning” as “an event comprised of an experience or feeling of the writer composed into a content which is experienced by the reader who interprets it in the context of patterns of related experience and feelings in both the exterior and the textual world” (1988, p. 9). Thus, she concludes that “decontextualization” is “a flawed concept, is indeed, a fallacy”, and that “rather than viewing writing as an isolated abstraction, we must acknowledge its ineluctable involvement with not only the human lifeworld but also the world of intertextuality” (1988, p. 15).

There is no doubt that translation is a kind of communicative event which involves two separate discourses, namely, those of the target text and the source text. Since those two texts in question are actually two different discourses, their ideological stances can only be analyzed in terms of their own specific contexts. In this equation, the place of translation is of utmost significance because translation itself implies a more or less change of context. As it is put forth in the accounts of the theoreticians quoted above, the very same utterance may be ideological in one context but not in another. Thus, a source text can be ideological whereas its translation is not, and *vice versa*. Indeed, this change of ideological stance can be controlled and, as a matter of fact, manipulated by the translator for whatever ideological purposes. Especially in translating a source text only partially, and selectively, to be quoted in another text written in the target language, rather than producing a whole target text, an example of which I demonstrate in my case study in the next chapter, we can speak of an intended “decontextualization” which isolates an utterance not only from its text but, as a result,

also from its context in order to deprive it of any meaning. The de(con)textualized text piece is thus made available to sound like whatever else desired in another context, (ab)using the author of the source text and the quotations from the source text, masking this ideological manipulation with the process of translation. Since the translator, theoretically speaking, is capable of intentionally assigning the target text any context with ideological purposes in order to manipulate it in some specific way, even if s/he does not manipulate the content of it, this has to be considered a definite ideological manipulation. After all, considering translation in practice, the majority of the target text readers naturally are people who do not have access to the source text, mostly because they do not understand the source language. Hence, if they are not warned about a potential ideological manipulation in a translation they read, and especially if the strategy employed is of such an insidious type like intentionally decontextualizing quotations from a source text to be attributed totally different meanings in line with a specific ideological agenda, there is little chance that they may suspect they are being deceived.

The Significance of Ideological Manipulation for the Question of Translation Ethics

André Lefevere states that since translators are at home in two cultures and two literatures, they also have the power to construct the image of one literature for consumption by the readers of another, and that the study of translations should be subsumed under the more encompassing heading of rewriting. “Translators, critics,

historians, and anthologizers all rewrite texts under similar constraints at the same historical moment. They are image makers, exerting the power of subversion under the guise of objectivity” (Lefevere, 1992, p. 7). He also thinks that the power of the rewriters should be analyzed, as well as the various ways in which they tend to exercise it, because if it is analyzed seriously and comprehensively, it will tell us much more about the influence of power and ideology on creation and education – one of the main issues of our time (1992, p. 14).

According to Lefevere, “neither the poetics nor the ideology of a culture is monolithic; they rather consist of one dominant current and various countercurrents or peripheral currents, and both the poetics and the ideology of a culture are marked by tension and struggle between the center and the periphery, with various outcomes” (1992, p. 86). Thus, the way literary texts are manipulated in translation are not necessarily in line with the dominant ideology holding in the target culture, but the texts can be manipulated according to the peripheral ideologies as well. He additionally states that the difference between image and reality simply does not matter, does not even exist for those readers who cannot compare the source text with its translation, since those readers constitute the great majority of the readers of translations, they may find themselves at the mercy of translators who wish to project a particular image of the original for ideological and poetological reasons or both. And “this possibility explains much of the distrust with which translation and translators have been regarded in the past; it also explains why translators can wield a certain power – and have done so throughout history - and why the images they create may become influential in the development of literatures” (1992, p. 109). I believe that the images they create are

influential not only in the development of literatures, but that they also contribute to the evolution of (target) culture as a whole. Similarly, Thomas Jaques mentions that literary translations are sites of aesthetic, cultural, and ideological exchange between cultures and that translators have been and continue to be responsible for the exchange and manipulation of huge areas of thought (2002, p. 13). In his point of view, the translator, in particular, must be constantly attentive to potential ideological transformations, both in choice of text selection and translation approach (2002, p. 14).

Peter Fawcett explicates the problematic situation of the relations of ideology and translation in the field of Translation Studies, drawing on the subtle dominance of ideology in almost every aspect of humanity as follows:

If, on the one hand, ideology is indeed implicated in every aspect of our human situation, then translation becomes fraught with potential accusations of imperialism every step of the way... If, on the other hand, as Rocher (1993, p.13) says – echoing the deconstructionist cliché – “*l’originare est introuvable*” (“the origin cannot be found”), then all deviations become permissible, needing only the motivation of an ideology to justify them, because there is no original to be copied and because the “violent hierarchy” which gives primacy to the source text can be overturned in favour of the target culture. (Fawcett, 1998, pp. 106-107)

What is suggested in the above quotation is of course the two extreme cases in the evaluation of the place of ideological manipulation/deviation in translation. It is clear that manipulation in translation is ideologically motivated, and that translators manipulate the source text in accordance with their ideological framework via the many decisions and choices they make in the process of translation, but it is not plausible that each and every translation is subjected to ideological manipulation to the same extent. In addition to this, the mere existence of an ideological stance cannot in any comprehensible way legitimize the manipulation of a text in translation. After all, such a

statement would entail a total negligence for the question of the ethics of translation.

The phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation is significant for the question of ethics in translation in terms of violating it in two major ways. First, since translation in itself has the power of representing the “other”, that is, whatever is translated, the source text, the source language, its author, culture and society, this “other” in question has the right to be represented in such a way that is not aimed at humiliating, despising, defeating and/or abusing itself and its otherness. The second way in which ideological manipulation is capable of violating the ethics of translation concerns directly the target society. When a text is translated into another language, the target society, whose main access to the author of the source text is translation, has the right to understand and evaluate that author and his work without the intentional interference, that is, the ideological manipulation of the translator. This situation is especially deceptive for the target reader when the ideological agenda of the translator is hidden, but, unfortunately, this is the usual case with ideological manipulation in the majority of published translations. Besides these rights of the translated “other” and the receiving party, ideological manipulation in translation is significant for the question of ethics also due to the fact that some instances of the phenomena are aimed at altering/controlling the cognition of the society as a whole in accordance with the ideological framework and the various interests of certain groups in such ways that may hinder the scientific, educational, political, cultural and artistic development of the society in question.

CHAPTER IV

AN EXEMPLARY CASE STUDY: QUOTATIONS FROM CHARLES DARWIN'S LETTERS IN TURKISH CREATIONIST SOURCES

This chapter of the present thesis focuses on a case study which illustrates the way some utterances of Charles Darwin are extracted from his various personal letters and, being “translated” into Turkish, are quoted in a Turkish creationist propaganda book as an evidence of Darwin's acceptance and declaration of the failure of the theory of evolution. The presentation of this case study in question with an analysis and evaluation of its social, cultural and ideological background, aims, strategy and implications is intended to exemplify the violation of ethics in translation *via* ideological manipulation.

An Overview of the Prevalent Position and Reception of Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution in Turkey

In order to present a comprehensive examination of the case in question, it is necessary to provide an account of the social, cultural, educational and ideological background on which such a case of ideological manipulation takes place. For this reason, this section of the present study covers an overview of the general image of Charles Darwin and the prevalent position and reception of his work and ideas, specifically the theory of

evolution which is extensively associated with his name, in Turkey. First, a brief account of a recent scandal about the position of the theory of evolution in Turkey, concerning Tübitak, “The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey”, is conveyed as the source of inspiration for this research subject. Then, the situation of the theory of evolution and that of the so-called “theory” of “creation” in the elementary and secondary education curriculum of the Republic of Turkey are questioned in comparison. The ongoing debates around these two issues provide a general idea about the problematic situation of the theory of evolution in Turkey and related speculations on creationist campaigns to which we owe the particular ideological manipulation handles in this case study, among many others.

The Source of Inspiration for This Research Subject:

The Scandal of Tübitak Censorship

Charles Darwin is undoubtedly one of the most influential figures in human history. His theory of evolution by natural selection upended humanity's view of itself and of the world. The year 2009 is both the 200th anniversary of his birth and the 150th anniversary of the publication of his most famous and important book, *On the Origin of Species* (<http://www.newscientist.com/special/darwin-200>). However, the year 2009 also has another significance for Turkey in relation with Darwin and the theory of evolution, for in March of 2009 Turkey has attracted the attention of the media and the science circles of the whole world with a scandal of censorship which has been a subject of debate not only within the country but also on various international platforms for a long time.

It has been stated that the battle between science and its enemies heated up in Turkey, when the editor of the excellent popular science magazine, *Bilim ve Teknik* [Science and Technology] published by the Turkish national science council, Tübitak, was reportedly sacked, and its planned cover feature celebrating this year's Darwin anniversary pulled, to be replaced by one on global warming. The situation is found to be ironic considering global warming is another well-established bit of science often derided by many of the same people with doubts about evolution (MacKenzie, 2009, <http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/03/turkeys-battles-with-islamic-c.html>). Allison Abbott from *Nature* magazine reports that the celebration of Darwin's birth has sparked controversy in Turkey, and maintained that the main Turkish government agency responsible for funding science has provoked outrage by apparently censoring a magazine article on the life and work of Charles Darwin (2009, <http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090310/full/news.2009.150.html>). She explains that the article was stripped from the March issue of the widely read popular science magazine *Bilim ve Teknik* [Science and Technology] just before it went to press, adding that the magazine, which is published by Turkey's research funding and science management organization, Tübitak, also switched a planned cover picture of Darwin for an illustration relating to global warming (2009, <http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090310/full/news.2009.150.html>). It is also pointed out that the row was politically charged because the magazine is published by Tübitak, the national science-funding agency. The agency's vice-president, Emir Cubic, withdrew a cover and 16-page feature devoted to Darwin just before the March issue went to press. He claimed that the editor, Çiğdem Atakuman, had secretly changed previously

agreed content, and he told her that she would be transferred to another department.

Tübitak has then issued a statement confirming its commitment to science and scientific literacy in the country, where many people do not believe in evolution, and reported that Atakuman will remain as the editor of the magazine

(<http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090325/full/458397a.html>).

In the press release on the “March” issue of *Bilim ve Teknik*, it is claimed that global warming was chosen as the main theme of the March 2009 issue of *Bilim ve Teknik*, and that “Dr. Çiğdem Atakuman, on her own initiative, that is consulting neither the Editorial Board of the Journal nor Professor Cebeci, inserted 16 additional pages to the journal, and instructed the technical personnel on duty on Saturday, February 28th to change the cover page graphics from the topic of global warming to Darwin”. It is stated that the particular issue of the journal was thus prepared hastily, without regard to the institutional procedures, and when it was brought to his attention, Professor Cebeci questioned the inclusion of the additional pages on Darwin’s anniversary, put together by an assistant staff and not reviewed by scientific editors. And “realizing her error, Dr. Atakuman directed the staff to change the cover page back to its original form and take out the additional 16 pages”; thus, “during the whole process, there was no application of censor or of pressure on the publication Darwin’s theories, neither from the Tübitak administration, nor from vice director Cebeci”

(<http://www.tubitak.gov.tr/home.do?ot=5&rt=3&sid=0&cid=13697>). However, Dr.

Atakuman sees the situation differently. She has issued a public statement saying that the pages were planned as normal and that Cebeci had ordered her to cancel the piece as it was deemed inappropriate for the “sensitive environment” of Turkey

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=696_1239418951). Whether the cancellation was an administrative glitch, censorship, or just an attempt to sidestep controversy, the row is highly revealing. Evolution is a lightning-rod issue in Turkey. Every leading newspaper reported the story. The Turkish Academy of Sciences called for an investigation and for Cebeci to resign (neither seems likely, although another senior Tübitak official resigned in protest). Scientists, who mostly suspect censorship, demonstrated in Ankara; and readers returned their March issues of *Bilim ve Teknik*. And *New Scientist's* blog raised impassioned comments from Turks

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=696_1239418951).

In order to comprehend clearly what really is going on with Tübitak, among the numerous publications of which the bestsellers were mainly the books written by Darwin or the ones on him and his work until quite recently, we ought to have a look at its close history. In a 2003 article in *Nature* magazine, Tamara Grüner reports that the Turkish parliament was considering the government's second attempt to increase its control over Tübitak, Turkey's main science funding body. She reminds us that the government made its first attempt in 2003, but the law it forced through was later overturned by the country's highest court (2003, <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v434/n7037/full/4341055a.html>). As she mentions, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tripled the council's budget to \$300 million, as part of Turkey's negotiations for membership of the European Union, but it is clear that he would like more control over how the money is spent. According to the article, Tübitak, set up in 1963 as an independent organization, had an executive board that elects new members, who were, from then on, appointed by the prime minister, and

the board also elected a president, who had to be endorsed by the president of the republic, then Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Grüner argues that the trouble started in 2003, when Erdoğan refused to endorse the appointment of six new Tübitak board members. He also refused to pass on to Sezer the board's recommendation that its president, physicist Namık Kemal Pak, should be appointed for a second term. Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Sezer clashed over the issue and the government quickly passed a law allowing it to appoint unelected members and to name the board's president. It then appointed six members and an acting president, engineer Nüket Yetiş of Marmara University in İstanbul. The new arrivals were not welcome: four vice-presidents resigned, saying that Tübitak had been “taken under political control”. And also several scientists complained that the new board members were not sufficiently qualified (Grüner, 2003, <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v434/n7037/full/4341055a.html>). Grüner also points out that with the rejection of the 2003 law, Tübitak's legal status has become unclear, and that some Tübitak-funded researchers have already been excluded from international projects after collaborators were advised by lawyers not to get involved, according to Celal Şengör, a geologist at Istanbul Technical University who currently holds the international chair of the Collège de France. “What has happened to Tübitak is a scandal of unprecedented proportion and an affront to science,” he said. Many scientists in Turkey feared the new law will mean that projects get funding because of political considerations rather than scientific merit. “This would mean the end of independent scientific research,” said Şengör (2003, <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v434/n7037/full/4341055a.html>). Hence, the academic élite was in a situation to resent the government interference in academic

appointments. Since his election in 2003, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had passed two contentious laws that affect universities. One allowed the government to appoint members of the board of Tübitak, Turkey's main research agency, which is a major player in the current EU talks. Critics said that subsequent appointments had been politically inspired, and charged that aspects of the agency's current set-up were unconstitutional. A second law required government approval of university appointments. The government said this was aimed at ending cronyism in the academic world, but critics feared that it would damage academic freedom (<http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v438/n7064/full/438001b.html>).

Taking this scandal of censorship into consideration, it can be said that they were quite right in their fear, for Turkey's "new ruling elite" evidently has a thing against "evolution". It is put forward that the religious circles that form the intelligentsia of AKP [Justice and Development Party], Turkey's ruling party, just scored another victory against reason, science and research, they managed to censor Charles Darwin off a popular science magazine (Özyurt, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/16/turkeys-science-board-cen_n_175442.html).

Tübitak was formed to pursue independent science policies and encourage technological and scientific research, and the appointees up until AKP came to power were mostly chosen according to scientific merit and academic research. It is stated that "after filling the board of Tübitak with anti-evolutionists, conservatives, not-shaking-hands-with-women kind of university professors, AKP's cadre of bureaucrats are now pushing the limits of intellectual thinking and research" (Özyurt, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/16/turkeys-science-board-cen_n_175442.html).

Officials' remarks are even scarier. State Minister in Charge of Science and Research, Prof. Mehmet Aydın told the press, “Darwin made a mistake. But it is wrong to censor this magazine”. It is a widely shared opinion that “Prime Minister Erdoğan's AKP was never fond of science and intellectual thinking, but this is the final nail in the coffin on Turkey's ruling party's understanding of freedom of expression” (Özyurt, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/16/turkeys-science-board-cen_n_175442.html).

Referring to Thomas Hobbes' suggestion in *Leviathan*, according to which in order to shape people's actions one has to shape their thoughts and beliefs, based on his statement that the sole grounds of the power the ruling parties possess is the thoughts and beliefs of the public, İsmail Kaplan points out that to have the public obey the sovereign unconditionally, the sovereign has to act as the grand determiner, the grand censor and the grand assigner. He defines “being the grand determiner” as deciding which thoughts and beliefs the public should be taught, and determining which doctrines are “good” and “beneficial”, “being the grand censor” as preventing the thoughts and beliefs which are described as “bad” and “dangerous” to reach the public, and preserving “peace” by avoiding the spread of such doctrines, and “being the grand assigner” as “determining who will talk to the public, to what extent and in which situations”, and “choosing and assigning the people who can lecture and preach the public in line with the current law” (Kaplan, 2003, pp. 96-97, my translation). Thus, following Hobbes' line of thought, he suggests that in order to maintain their sovereignty, the sovereigns have to preserve their power of creating public opinion. “The power of creating public opinion includes the systematic publicizing of thoughts and beliefs that serve the interests of the sovereign, and, in line with this aim, assigning

the cadre of professors, preachers and orators who adopt such doctrines serving the sovereign to high positions, and also banning the doctrines which can destroy the sovereign” (Kaplan, 2003, p. 97, my translation). The attitude and the actions of the AKP government in the Tübitak affair as mentioned above set an obvious case of a sovereign striving to create public opinion and to shape the public thoughts and beliefs so as to solidify its sovereignty, as described by Kaplan from Hobbes' viewpoint.

Many people in Turkey and abroad also share the fear that Turkey is evolving as a creationist center. It has been two centuries since the birth of Charles Darwin, the father of the theory of evolution, and 150 years since he published *On the Origin of Species*, changing how humanity viewed nature, science and itself forever. But today, there is a growing worldwide movement to oppose Darwin's theory of evolution, and it is centered in Turkey. Adnan Oktar, also known by his pen name Harun Yahya, is the leader of a devoted creationist and anti-Darwinist group what some call a powerful cult. Though based in Turkey, he has been working for more than a decade to spread his message around the globe. He presides over dozens of web sites where his books and pamphlets on the “fallacy of evolution, the virtues of Islam and Jesus' return” can be read or downloaded in fortythree languages. His full-page ads condemning the theory of evolution appear regularly not only in Turkish newspapers, but also in prestigious international magazines such as *Time*. Oktar's followers call him “Adnan Hoca”, and he has two foundations, both aiming to discredit the theory of evolution around the world. The Milli Değerleri Koruma Vakfı [Foundation to Protect National Values] works domestically on a variety of “moral issues”, while the creationism-focused Bilim Araştırma Vakfı, BAV [Science Research Foundation] also has operations throughout

the world and has organized more than 3000 anti-evolution conferences, from the University of Oxford, in Cambridge, to Tokyo to Tel Aviv (Songün, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11102743.asp?gid=244>). It has been reported that Oktar's more than 200 books are distributed in some 150 countries, and that his six-kilogram *Atlas of Creation* was sent for free to academics all over the world. What everyone wonders is where the money for this global anti-evolution campaign comes from. Referring to a previous interview, Oktar said the funding comes from "the sales of hard copies of his books", claiming that eight million copies of his books were sold in Turkey and two million abroad just in 2007. In 2008, sales have doubled, he claimed. His publishing house, Global Publishing, "uses part of the income for distribution," he added. BAV, frequently accused of "brainwashing" its initiates, is also secretive about the source of its wealth. Seda Aral, an official from BAV, said that the foundation did not get any donations from Muslim or Christian creationist groups. The belief in evolution is indeed lower in Turkey compared to Western European countries, as it is in the United States. Among 34 Western countries surveyed, the U.S. ranked 33rd, just above Turkey, in rates of those believing in evolution, according to a survey published by *National Geographic* in 2006. The influence of conservative political leaders in Turkey, including the current AKP [Justice and Development Party] government, in discrediting of the theory of evolution cannot be underestimated, academics comment. With the 200th birthday of Darwin being commemorated, the tension is rising among Turkish scientists as they confront creationism by organizing conferences under the title "Darwin 2009" (Songün, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11102743.asp?gid=244>).

Adnan Oktar has written numerous books under the name Harun Yahya, arguing against evolution. He asserts that evolution is directly related to the claimed “evils” of materialism, Nazism, communism, and Buddhism. Most of his anti-evolution resources are said to be identical to Christian creationist arguments. Since 2007 Oktar has successfully had the Turkish government block public access to several websites. In April 2007, Oktar filed a libel lawsuit against the owners of “ekşi sözlük”, a virtual community widely known in Turkey. The court reviewed the complaint and ordered the service provider to close the site to public access. The site was temporarily suspended so the entry on Oktar could be expunged and locked. Then access to “Süper Poligon”, a news website, was also restricted following Oktar's complaint. In August 2007, Oktar got a Turkish court to block WordPress.com in all of Turkey. His lawyers argued that blogs on WordPress.com contained libelous material on Oktar and his colleagues, which WordPress.com staff was unwilling to remove. Oktar increased his pleas to block websites throughout 2008. On April 10, 2008, even Google Groups was blocked in Turkey following a libel complaint by Adnan Oktar. As of May 5, 2008, the ban remained in effect for TTNNet users. Several months later, on September 19, 2008, a Turkish court banned internet users in Turkey from viewing the official Richard Dawkins web site after Oktar claimed its contents were defamatory, blasphemous and insulting religion, arguing that his personality was violated by this site. In response, Dawkins posted a Turkish translation of his article “Venomous Snakes, Slippery Eels and Harun Yahya” (“Zehirli Yılanlar, Kaygan Yılanbalıkları ve Harun Yahya”) on his website. Then, one week later, a complaint by Oktar led to the banning of the internet site of the Union of Education and Scientific Workers (Türk Eğitim Sen). This was

followed by a block of the country's third-biggest newspaper site, Vatan, in October (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harun_Yahya).

The scandal of Tübitak censorship and the ongoing debates around the position of the theory of evolution in Turkey, thus, led me to examine how such a person who is indeed a convicted criminal that has committed a number of disgraceful crimes, and who, at the same time, is also a notorious manipulator infamous for the brainwashing of many young minds, influences the image of Charles Darwin, one of the world's greatest scientists of all times and the reception of the theory of evolution in Turkey.

The Situation of the Theory of Evolution vs. “Creation” in the
Science Education Curriculum of the Republic of Turkey

Aykut Kence, a prominent professor of biology at Middle East Technical University of Turkey declares that creationism entered biology textbooks in high schools in 1985, after a cooperation between the creationist movement in the U.S. and the Turkish Education Ministry, emphasizing the fact that Turkey is the only secular state in the world that has creationism in its science textbooks (Songün, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11102743.asp?gid=244>). Kence said the official approach in Turkey forced students to choose between evolution and creation, and that the result was harmful to both religion and science. “Later, in 2003 and 2004, the subject of evolution was completely cut off from science textbooks and was replaced by Islamic leaders’ views on the issue,” he said. He hesitated to comment on the Oktar movement, since BAV has sued him twice and one of those cases is ongoing. Kence is

not the first person to have been sued by Oktar. The anti-evolution leader succeeded in having the British scientist Richard Dawkins' web site banned in Turkey by a court order. Turkey's central position in the creationist movement owes much to the post-coup government of the late Turgut Özal, said Kenan Ateş, an academic of Sabancı University's Biological Sciences and Bioengineering Program. "The *Acts & Facts* magazine published by the Institute for Creation Research, or ICR, revealed that Vehbi Dinçerler, Turkey's education minister in 1985, asked the ICR to help them expand creationism in Turkey," Ateş told the Daily News (Songün, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11102743.asp?gid=244>).

On March 3, 2006, The Association of University Councils (Üniversite Konseyleri Derneği) filed a petition to the Ministry of National Education of Turkey in order to modify the curriculum of basic science and biology classes in elementary and middle schools so as to include all of the scientific aspects of the theory of evolution, to give place to scientifically adequate explanations and to dismiss the idea of "creation" totally (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/45>). They claimed that science was the process of formulating theories to explain nature, and of testing those theories by experiments and observations. They also argued that the theory of evolution was scientific because its premises could be tested and questioned by experiments and observations; and that it has indeed been questioned and tested bitterly by thousands of scientific experiments and observations for almost 150 years, and has consequently become a theory stronger than ever. Thus, the theory of evolution is the best theory to account for the current biological diversity (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/45>). "Creation", on the other hand, is not a

scientific but a religious doctrine. The way religion explains life does not rely on a system of thought that can be tested, questioned, and that can pave the way for new researches or questions. Hence, religious approaches, in line with the definition of science education and as in every secular country, have no place in the education of science (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/45>). It is clear that a dogmatic education instead of a scientific one will deprive the oncoming generations of scientific thought, and will, thus, counteract the scientific and technological development of our country (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/45>). This demand of approximately seven hundred Turkish scientists was met with instant rejection on the part of the Ministry of National Education of Turkey (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=180408>). Hüseyin Çelik, the Minister of National Education of the time, responded that the “theory” of “creation” was not to be removed from the curriculum, arguing that there were many theories about creation, and that the theory of evolution was just one one of them, and that it was only “a theory” as it was called. He also claimed that what was indeed against scientific thought was teaching students the theory of evolution without telling about the opposing theories. He added that it was wrong to impose such “fixed ideas” on students because that would be a dogma too (<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=180408>). The Association of University Councils had also officially asked the Ministry of National Education for an explanation about the diminished information on the theory of evolution in the current education curriculum. In the Ministry explanation, however, it was emphasized that the information on the theory of evolution in the education curriculum had not been diminished. But this explanation did not rely on any comparison between the biology

and science textbooks that were being used in classes at the time and those of the previous years, and, resultantly, the difference from earlier curricula and textbooks were not demonstrated in any way (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/44>). What is more, the statement that the current curriculum included the theory of evolution and that it presented it with contemporary data was evidently wrong. The third year high school biology textbook of the year 2005, which the Ministry attached to its explanation included no statement of the validity of the theory of evolution. Besides, although it was accepted by the Ministry that the idea of creation was present in the biology textbooks, the question of whether a religious approach was prevalent in the biology classes was left unanswered. As a result, the Ministry's response to this demand for explanation in question was far from explanatory (<http://www.universitekonseyleri.org/node/44>).

Nevertheless, the most striking points of the defense of the Ministry of National Education are the two following critical assertions: The Ministry considers the theory of evolution as a yet unproven theory. Thus, it is not accepted as certain knowledge. The idea of “creation”, on the other hand, as opposed to the theory of evolution, is also scientific. Thus, there is nothing against it being presented in school science textbooks (<http://www.bilimvegelecek.com.tr/?act=2&sayi=63&id=45>). The only grounds of the Ministry of National Education, mentioned in their defense, is a foundation called “Discovery Institute” which is established in the U.S. by christian communities and the assertions of which have been repeatedly denied by the National Academy of Sciences. Therefore, the Ministry which is actually responsible of maintaining a secular and scientific education, has in a way declared war on the statements of foundations which represent the world science as a whole. It is not reasonable to think that a Ministry

which opposes world science can maintain a secular and scientific education

(<http://www.bilimvegelecek.com.tr/?act=2&sayi=63&id=45>).

A recent research conducted by Oğuz Özdemir (2008) revealed the fact that most of our future biology teachers have difficulties in understanding and/or adopting the theory of evolution. Özdemir states that teaching the theory of evolution in science classes together with “creation” was very confusing for the students

(<http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/454971.asp#storyContinues>). Professor Aykut Kence shares this discontent claiming that the position of the theory of evolution in the current educational system of Turkey is highly unsatisfactory. He mentions that the idea of “creation” which is a solely religious idea has been included in the curriculum of high schools in 1985, and that in biology classes this idea is being taught together with the theory of evolution which is a scientific theory. Kence adds that what is even worse is that in the recent years, the parts of elementary education curriculum which cover evolution are cut off. He also mentions that Turkey is the only secular country in which both evolution and “creation” are taught in science classes at the same time (<http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/454971.asp#storyContinues>).

The teaching of “creation” in elementary and secondary schools, in itself, is so contradictory to the conception of a secular and scientific education system that even though it was not officially encompassed by the curriculum of science and biology courses and was limited to the compulsory religion and morality courses, the implications of it would still be problematic. İsmail Kaplan states that in the 6th, 7th and 8th grades of elementary school, the religion classes are also aimed at making the students “know that Islam is the ultimate and the most developed religion”, “in

defending the country and national issues, adopt the feeling of valour cultivated and ripened by the Turks throughout history”, “apprehend the religious and national consciousness which is rooted in the main sources of our national identity and our religion” (1999, p. 374, my translation). In high schools students are educated so as to adopt the theory of creation, and under the heading “Islam and the Universe”, issues such as “the creation of the universe”, “the creative quality of Allah”, “our world according to the Qur'an”, “the creation of man” and “the superior being: human” are covered (Kaplan, 1999, p. 374, my translation). Kaplan comments that it is probably impossible to deny that a course with such contents has got nothing to do with secularity, freedom of thought and conscience, or science and rationality (1999, p. 374, my translation). However, students are still being brainwashed with these kinds of dogmas at the present day despite all talk of secularity and war against fundamentalism, and, what is more, they also have to be tested and graded on these dogmas (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 374-375, my translation). In order to avoid any misunderstanding, Kaplan further highlights the fact that these are not suggestions or promises of a fundamentalist political party in its election manifesto, but, on the contrary, are topics listed in the official general education curriculum as parts of the educational policy which is directly under the control and supervision of the Kemalist, “secular and modern” government (1999, p. 375, my translation).

When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, the whole education system was reformed from high school to the universities. Atatürk himself wrote some chapters in the famous *Tarih ve Medeni Bilgiler* [History and Civilized Knowledge] textbook for high schools, which defended evolution, materialism, and Western science (Afetinan,

1968; Perinçek, 1994 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). The participants in the reforms of the Turkish Revolution included intellectuals, scientists, politicians, law professors, and so on, who were educated in Europe (especially France and Germany). Between 1928 and 1948, books about quantum theory, relativity, evolution, Western literature, and modern and classical art were translated into Turkish by the government and delivered to people for free or at low cost. Creationism and compulsory religious instruction were nonexistent in the education system of Turkey during this period (Sayın & Kence, 1999). However, the applications of the education system of Turkey changed rapidly over only a few decades. Under the rising influence of the fundamentalist party of Necmettin Erbakan through the 1970s, the right-wing governments made religion courses, as well as the recitation of prayers in high schools, compulsory once again. Memorizing and reciting Arabic prayers became obligatory in the 1980s. Thousands of Qur'an courses followed, some outside of the high school curriculum, but all meant to institute government-sanctioned religious instruction (Sayın & Kence, 1999). At first, creationism was taught only in religion and morality courses in high schools (Ayas & Tümer, 1994 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). Later, in the mid-1980s, creation was made compulsory in biology courses (Kence, 1985, 1995; Edis ,1994 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). In 1985, Vehbi Dinçerler, the Minister of Education in Özal's government and a member of a religious tariqa, sent a bulletin to high schools that accused educators who taught and defended evolution of being communists, and the fear of communism was as effective for intimidating people in Turkey as it was in the McCarthy era in the U.S. and has been used successfully more recently by BAV to combat evolution (Sayın & Kence, 1999). Thus creationism was introduced to high

school biology textbooks as an alternative “hypothesis” (Güven et al., 1985 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). “This form of creationism was mostly adopted from Henry Morris' Scientific Creationism (Morris, 1974), which was translated into Turkish by the Ministry of Education in 1985”, and creation was explained in the biology textbooks as follows: “In creationism's opinion, all living entities and species were created by Allah separately. Although they may have undergone some changes since the day they were created, neither did any evolve into other species” (Güven et al., 1997, p. 68 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999).

Sayın and Kence mention that even though evolution was still in the textbooks, it was taught in a biased, ludicrous, and non-scientific way, so that it could be discredited easily by some of the religious high school biology teachers. One of the ridiculous statements found in the high school books is as follows: “... contrary to what evolutionists claim, it has been demonstrated that frog, mouse, and snake bloods are closer to human blood than that of monkeys” (Ayas & Tümer, 1996, p. 12 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). Another sentence misconstrued Darwinism by stating that “according to Darwin, strong ones would live, and weak ones would be eliminated. However strong organisms such as dinosaurs, and mammoths have become extinct, whereas some weak organisms such as earthworms could survive” (Ayas & Tümer, 1996, p. 13 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999).

When the Social Democrats came to power in 1998 under prime minister Bülent Ecevit, the biology textbooks were revised, and chapters related to Darwin and Lamarck were rewritten more objectively (Korkmaz et al., 1998 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). Creationists' arguments were still presented as alternative hypotheses, but to

make the books appear more secular, phrases such as “according to Islam” were replaced with “according to sacred books”. The modifications in the biology textbooks infuriated and mobilized those who wanted evolution to be taken out of the curriculum, including fundamentalists and BAV (Sayın & Kence, 1999).

According to Sayın and Kence, with its considerable political support, it seems that BAV could achieve its goal of replacing evolution with a form of creationism. BAV aims to convince the majority of the politicians in the parliament that evolution is not a fact, but a hoax. In February 1999 a representative from the fundamentalist Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party] proposed a Bill of Anti-Evolution to ban teaching of evolution in the schools and to collect and destroy all the books about evolution in the official libraries, on the grounds that evolution is against Islam (Hürriyet, March 9, 1999 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999).

BAV is a radical fundamentalist foundation established in 1991 by Sheikh Adnan Oktar. It is an integral part of the rise of fundamentalist Islam in Turkey. BAV is not an independent organization and the source(s) of its funding remain very obscure. Its activities and publications utilize millions of dollars each year, so it is difficult to imagine that this amount of funding can be supplied just by donations, as some at BAV claim. The newspaper Hürriyet revealed that Adnan Oktar and BAV have strong connections with Necmettin Erbakan, the former leader of various fundamentalist parties. The newspaper Cumhuriyet reported that other support for BAV comes from “Fethullahçılar” — a tariqa established by Fethullah Gülen who used to preach the evil and wickedness of evolution (Cumhuriyet, June 29, 1999 as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). It is widely known that BAV has also published several books under the pen

name Harun Yahya and has delivered copies to the public free of charge. BAV has a long history of contact with American creationists, including receiving assistance from ICR (The Institute for Creation Research). Duane Gish and Henry Morris of ICR visited Turkey in 1992, just after the establishment of BAV, and participated in a creationist conference in Istanbul. Morris, the former president of ICR, became well acquainted with Turkish fundamentalists and Islamic sects during his numerous trips to Turkey in search of Noah's Ark (*Acts & Facts*, 1998a, 1998b as cited in Sayın & Kence, 1999). Sayın and Kence explain that during the early 1990s, when Harun Yahya's small inexpensive books started to circulate among the public, academics did not take BAV and Harun Yahya seriously, despite the long continuing dissonance between university and scientific circles and right-wing governments over democracy, secularism, and the creation/evolution issue. University academics simply ignored the books, and most of the biology and medicine professors considered it beneath their dignity to answer the arguments of Harun Yahya and other creationists. However, at the turn of the millennium, scientists and academics in Turkey realized that they were besieged by fundamentalist Islamists and a public convinced by Harun Yahya that evolution has collapsed. Even so, most of the scientific organizations and university professors remain unmoved to act against the pseudoscience of BAV. However, Sayın and Kence believe that defending science and evolution is indispensable in a democracy, and that every single statement of Harun Yahya and BAV should be opposed by using scientific knowledge (1999).

Religion vs. Science: An Ideological Battle for Control

The attempts to set forth religious ideas as an alternative to or, even worse, as a much more appropriate replacement for scientific theories, especially in a doubtlessly most influential field such as education system can only be explained in terms of an ideological agenda to gain power and control over the society. Hence, it is necessary to understand how religion becomes ideology and in what ways it functions within a society as ideology. It is also necessary to investigate the dangers associated with such an attempt in the field of education system taking into consideration the ideological purposes behind it and its intended implications on society.

Religion as Ideology

In his 1969 paper Şerif Mardin proposes that even if a type of ideology which he should call “hard” was on the wane – and, as he states, that was not certain – questions pertaining to the workings of “soft” ideologies were just beginning to be taken up by social scientists and should occupy much of their time in the future (Mardin, 1969, p. 3).

What he meant by “hard” ideology was a body of doctrine which has been systematically worked out, which refers to basic theoretical writings and which is limited to the culture of the elite, and by “soft” ideology, he meant the much more diffuse, unfocused and amorphous cognitive and belief systems of mass publics

(Mardin, 1969, p. 3). This thesis which focuses on the workings of a certain religious ideology that can be described as a “soft” ideology rather than a “hard” one as defined by Mardin is also an attempt conforming to his above suggestion that social scientists in the future should deal with “soft” ideologies.

According to Mardin, the expansion of the problem of ideology into that of the dimensions of social knowledge is one which has resulted from the advances of the social sciences in our time (1969, p. 6). This means that social knowledge today is highly effected or - to some extent - even shaped by ideologies. As Mardin points out, contemporary insights into the relation between culture, religious symbols and thinking have now placed the study of ideology within an infinitely more varied framework than existed in the nineteenth century (1969, p. 6). The present study is aimed at providing an example to this statement by examining the relations between ideology, translation, manipulation, science, education, ethics and society.

In the course of his study of religion as ideology, Mardin adopts the anthropologists' definition of religion as “a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men”, and as Mardin also mentions, this definition nevertheless fits perfectly our concern with the study of religion as “soft” ideology (1969, p. 7). Yet, he claims, the functions of religion can be interpreted, in exactly the opposite manner, as a transcendence of differences. “This attempt at social transcendence and the establishment of common symbols of allegiance would seem just as important an aspect of religion as its concern with supernatural beings” (Mardin, 1969, p. 8). Thus, it can be inferred that religion, in a way, attempts to erase differences among people, mostly as to life styles, social knowledge and attitudes,

and to create a uniform society in which there are no ideas and/or attitudes that are in opposition to the framework supervised by religion. For example, as the case study of this thesis exhibits, religion – in our case, namely, Islam – asserts that human beings are created by Allah instantly in their original form, and that there is no way for human beings to be of the same descent with any animals. When the major religion of a country is Islam, like in the case of Turkey, and when, at the same time, all people of that country are tried to be persuaded to reject the theory of evolution and to adopt the idea of “creation” by some religious group, we can speak of religion as ideology.

Mardin explains the ideological properties of religion which are specific to Islam as follows:

There are indications that Islam is not the only religion where the idea of God serves as a force allegiance transcending differences.[...] for Islam, which carries so many of the social and political burdens of the Moslems, the ideological functions have been much more pervasive. Religion here so closely penetrates social reality – both in dogma and in fact - that many social processes can be referred to God. As to political processes, they overlap almost completely with religious processes in the legitimate scheme of things. Because of this interpenetration, both the principles of community solidarity and the conciliatory features of the Divine can be more frequently invoked in Islamic society than in societies where Christianity is the major religion. (Mardin, 1969, p. 9)

Since the religion Islam is of such a nature to penetrate into social reality so closely, the intervention of some religious groups in the officially accepted national science education in schools in order to alter the general attitude of the society towards a universally valid and supported scientific theory can only be explained in terms of an ideological agenda where religion itself becomes ideology.

The Danger of Having the Theory of Evolution Replaced by “Creation” in Science

Education Curriculum: The Ideological Purposes of This Replacement

and Its Intended Implications on Society

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Never there were so many people being educated collectively and systematically in formal institutions especially designed for this purpose as in current times. And never were students required to stay in schools for such a long period of education as it is today. Taking these facts into consideration, Louis Althusser who differentiates the repressive state apparatuses (the government, administration, army, the police, courts, prisons, etc.) and the ideological state apparatuses (educational, cultural, religious, communicative, familial etc. state apparatuses) refers to the educational state system, that is, the school system, as the dominant ideological apparatus of the modern state in capitalist societies. According to him, the school system plays the main part in the reproduction of the relationship of exploitation in the capitalist order by the inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class under the cover of teaching some skills. (Kaplan, 1998, p. 6)

Approaching the issue from such a stance as explained by Kaplan, it is no surprise that the same ideology which is behind the Tübitak scandal of censorship and which led to the manipulation of Darwin's letters, also interfered with the school system, for it is the dominant ideological apparatus as described above, such a powerful instrument to shape the thoughts and beliefs of the public would hardly be ignored by the ruling class.

Such attempts to add the idea of creation and to get rid of the theory of evolution in the education curriculum as described in the previous sections of this study are causing discomfort not only in Turkey, but also in other European countries. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe seems to be worried about the possible ill-effects of the spread of creationist ideas within education systems and about the consequences for democracies, warning its members that if they are not careful,

creationism could become a threat to human rights which are a key concern of the Council of Europe. On June 8, 2007, a committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—Committee on Culture, Science, and Education, which reports to the Council of Europe—published a report, with a draft resolution, entitled “The dangers of creationism in education”, drawn up by Guy Lengagne, a senior French member of the committee. In his report, Lengagne proposes that the theory of evolution is being attacked by religious fundamentalists who call for creationist theories to be taught in European schools alongside or even in place of it, and claims that from a scientific view point there is absolutely no doubt that evolution is a central theory for our understanding of the Universe and of life on Earth (2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314). He explains that creationism in any of its forms, such as “intelligent design”, is not based on facts, does not use any scientific reasoning and its contents are pathetically inadequate for science classes. He also mentions that creationism, born of the denial of the evolution of species through natural selection, was for a long time an almost exclusively American phenomenon, but today creationist theories are tending to find their way into Europe as well and that their spread is affecting quite a few Council of Europe member states (2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

Guy Lengagne points out that the prime target of present-day creationists, most of whom are Christian or Muslim, is education. Creationists are bent on ensuring that their theories are included in the school science syllabus. Creationism cannot, however, lay

claim to being a scientific discipline. We are witnessing a growth of modes of thought which, the better to impose religious dogma, are attacking the very core of the knowledge that we have patiently built up on nature, evolution, our origins and our place in the universe. There is a real risk of a serious confusion being introduced into children's minds between what has to do with convictions, beliefs and ideals and what has to do with science, and of the advent of an "all things are equal" attitude, which may seem appealing and tolerant but is actually disastrous (Lengagne, 2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

The Assembly has constantly insisted that science is of fundamental importance. Science has made possible considerable improvements in living and working conditions and is a not insignificant factor in economic, technological and social development. The theory of evolution has nothing to do with divine revelation but is built on facts. [...] The war on the theory of evolution and on its proponents most often originates in forms of religious extremism which are closely allied to extreme right-wing political movements. The creationist movements possess real political power. The fact of the matter, and this has been exposed on several occasions, is that the advocates of strict creationism are out to replace democracy by theocracy. [...] The teaching of all phenomena concerning evolution as a fundamental scientific theory is therefore crucial to the future of our societies and our democracies. For that reason it must occupy a central position in the curriculum, and especially in the science syllabus. Evolution is present everywhere, from medical overprescription of antibiotics that encourages the emergence of resistant bacteria to agricultural overuse of pesticides that causes insect mutations on which pesticides no longer have any effect. [...] Investigation of the creationists' growing influence shows that the arguments between creationism and evolution go well beyond intellectual debate. If we are not careful, the values that are the very essence of the Council of Europe will be under direct threat from creationist fundamentalists. It is part of the role of the Council's parliamentarians to react before it is too late. (Lengagne, 2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

Today, creationists of all faiths are trying to get their ideas accepted in Europe. As a result, we have seen several initiatives from these various movements on the Eurasian

continent in the last few years, with schools apparently the main target.

Lengagne states that the beginning of 2007 saw an offensive by the Turkish creationist Harun Yahya, who sent his last and very lavish work, entitled *The Atlas of Creation*, which claims to denounce the deception of the theory of evolution, to a large number of French, Belgian, Spanish and Swiss schools. In France, the Ministry of Education, after consulting specialists, immediately reacted by expressly calling for this work to be removed from the resource centres of the schools concerned as the book met none of the quality requirements laid down for classroom teaching (2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

In his report, Guy Lengagne also mentions that Harun Yahya has his own publishing house, which enables him to publish his works in large quantities, and that without this, it would never have been possible to disseminate them to the same extent. (2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

According to Lengagne, Turkey, which has been one of the few officially secular Muslim countries since the republic was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, now seems to be one of the main cradles of Islamic scientific creationism. The Turkish Islamist preacher Harun Yahya, whose real name is Adnan Oktar, is one of the most symbolic figures of this movement. He is around fifty years old and has been publishing works on creation or religion for about twenty years. He also has his own publishing house, Global, the head office of which is in Istanbul. In 1991, Oktar set up the science

and research foundation Bilim Araştırma Vakfı (BAV). Since its establishment, BAV has been very active in trying to have any reference to evolution removed from Turkish education. It also organizes many conferences on creationism in the principal Turkish towns and cities. As Sayın and Kence point out, the Islamic version of “scientific creationism”, as promoted by BAV, sprang up and gained power under these circumstances in the early 1990s, with the support of the Islamic fundamentalists and radical Islamic sects (tariqas) (1999, <http://ncseweb.org/mcse/19/6/islamic-scientific-creationism>). It would seem that BAV has close links also to the American Institute for Creation Research (ICR) (Lengagne, 2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314). The latest work by Harun Yahya appeared in December 2006 and is entitled *The Atlas of Creation*. It is a large book and is the first volume of a series of seven. It attempts to refute Darwinism and the theory of evolution in 772 richly illustrated pages. Its conclusion is clear: “creation is a fact” and “evolution is a deception”. Moreover, the author sharply condemns “the secret links between Darwinism and the ideologies with blood on their hands, such as fascism and communism”. At the beginning of 2007 Yahya launched an offensive aimed at the mass distribution of his work in Europe and throughout the world (Lengagne ,2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

Lengagne additionally notes that the creationist ideas are already to be found in some Turkish school textbooks, and 75% of Turkish secondary school students do not believe the theory of evolution. However, protest movements have been set up in

Turkey (2007,

http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

In Lengagne's view, prohibiting the teaching of key theories, such as evolution, is totally against children's educational interests. Education has a duty to be a means of enabling children, young people and adults to become important players in the transformation of societies, whereas adopting a denialist stance on scientifically proven theories constitutes a brake on education and the intellectual and personal development of thousands of children. Science is a prominent player and plays a big and active role in this process of the evolution and transformation of societies (Lengagne, 2007,

http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

This does not mean that we should banish teaching any theories other than the theory of evolution. As Lengagne emphasizes, the teaching of alternative theories can only be considered if they provide sufficient guarantees as to the scientific nature and truth of the ideas put forward. However, by denying proven facts, the creationist theories do not contribute to the transformation of societies but to making them become archaic. The creationists are in fact supporters of a radical return to the past, which could prove particularly harmful in the long term for all our societies. This is therefore a crucial issue (Lengagne, 2007,

http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

By only presenting "facts" without any theory or proof, Harun Yahya abuses the credulity of individuals who listen to him or read his works. Moreover, the

BAV and Harun Yahya in Turkey, just like the American Institute for Creation Research, resort to partial, indeed erroneous, references to develop their creationist arguments.

The authors do not hesitate to quote magazine articles that defend evolution but *they succeed in turning the meaning round by shortening the quotations*. This is nothing less than intellectual dishonesty, which is particularly harmful (Lengagne, 2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314, italics mine).

In sum, Lengagne accounts for the significance of teaching the theory of evolution to students of elementary and secondary education by stating that the teaching of evolution by natural selection as a fundamental scientific theory is crucial to the future of our societies and our democracies, and that, for that reason evolution must occupy a central position in the curriculum, and especially in the science syllabus (2007, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/EDOC11297.htm#P221_39314).

Having thus viewed the worries of Europe about the attempts of fundamentalist groups which are aiming to promote scientific creationism and refute the theory of evolution in Europe mainly by distorting the education curricula, through the observations, analysis, comments and also warnings of Guy Lengagne, in order to make clear the gravity of the situation, we shall return to our own country where, as Sayin and Kence claim, Islamic scientific creationism has become a threat not only to science but also to democracy and the secular system. According to Sayin and Kence, Islamic creationism, unlike Christian creationism, is a critical part of the rise of an extreme religious movement and has actively contributed to the decline of democratic reforms

and progress in scholarship and research in the Turkish Republic. They warn the Turkish society and officials that if groups like the BAV are unopposed by Turkish science organizations, universities, the government, and individual scientists, they will continue their propaganda unchecked, and that if they succeed in their efforts, they will influence not only the believers but also the rest of the society, since there is a very weak scientific foundation among the vast majority of the Turkish public (1999, <http://ncseweb.org/rncse/19/6/islamic-scientific-creationism>). Hence, as Sayın and Kence suggest, we must recognize the power of the BAV's appeal and take a page from the successful opposition to the ICR and its allies in the US, for the only hope for Turkish science and society is a vigorous campaign to expose and oppose Islamic creationism in every forum throughout the country (1999, <http://ncseweb.org/rncse/19/6/islamic-scientific-creationism>).

The Significance of The Quotations from Charles Darwin's Letters

Found in Turkish Creationist Sources

Following the two previous sections in which the idea of “creation” versus the theory of evolution controversy in the media and the science circles of the whole world, focusing on Turkey, and the contradictory dual presence of those two conceptions in the education curricula are explained with their intended purposes and implications, this section of the present chapter illustrates one of the ways in which a certain creationist, or probably a certain team of creationists, try to refute the theory of evolution and to convince the Turkish readers on its failure and invalidity. As it is demonstrated in this

case study, the attempts and the project of those creationists in question are comical and far from dignity, and they have got absolutely nothing to do with neither science nor religion. Nevertheless, the following quotations from Charles Darwin's personal letters which have been “translated” for Harun Yahya's *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999) by an unknown/unidentified translator, in order to serve as Darwin's, his friends' and his son's confessions about the failure of the theory of evolution constitute a very interesting case of ideological manipulation via translation. What is more, this case at hand is also significant in another dimension, for it touches upon a serious contemporary problem related with the future of the Turkish society, as described in the previous sections.

The highly controversial Turkish creationist Adnan Oktar, under the pen name Harun Yahya, and most probably with the help of a team, has written approximately two hundred books all of which are aimed at refuting the theory of evolution, persuading the readers to reject the ideas of the evolutionist scientists and their supporters, and promoting the idea of “creation” as the ultimate truth, in connection to Islamic fundamentalism. *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999) is one of those creationist propaganda books which are translated into approximately fifty languages and which can also be downloaded for free in any of those languages from his web site <http://www.harunyahya.com/>. In addition to the numerous online sources in which it is possible to find the contents of *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999), and which probably belong to himself or his supporters, there are two more official Harun Yahya web sites exclusively dedicated to this book; <http://www.harunyahya.org/evrim/evrincilerinitirafiri/itirafilar01.html> and

<http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/index.php>.

In this case study, I deal mostly with the first and the second chapters of this book, namely, “Charles Darwin'in Teorisi Hakkındaki İtirafı” [Charles Darwin's Confessions Regarding His Theory] and “Evrincilerin Darwin İle İlgili İtirafı” [Evolutionists' Confessions Regarding Darwin]. In these chapters Harun Yahya “quotes” Darwin's personal letters which are written to and received from his close friends and colleagues, compiled and edited by his son Francis Darwin, a few years after his death, in the book *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888). Harun Yahya, at the same time, has these quotations “translated” into Turkish by an unidentified translator, and listing them line by line as “confessions” without offering much information on the particular letters each of them are quoted from, he asserts them as the evidence of Charles Darwin's and his friends' acceptance of the failure of his theory. Harun Yahya's main strategy aimed at persuading the readers of this book, as it is depicted in the course of the present case study, is de(con)textualizing Darwin's and other evolutionary scientists' expressions and intentionally presenting them as meaning something very different that would serve his own ideological aims. This is the reason why this can justly be classified as a case of ideological manipulation in translation.

In the preface he has written for *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888), Francis Darwin points out that in choosing letters for publication he has been largely guided by the wish to illustrate his father's personal character, adding that his life was so essentially one of work, that a history of the man could not be written without following closely the career of the author (1896, v.1, p. iii). Thus, almost all of the letters compiled in the book are closely related with Darwin's various work. Indeed, most of his close

friends were also his colleagues; consequently, although there surely are other and/or trivial subjects discussed too, it is no surprise to see that the most common issues among the letters are all work and science related. As a result, such a source of Darwin's sincere expressions of his honest and even intimate feelings, thoughts, doubts and complaints of difficulties related with his work is viewed as a gold mine by Harun Yahya who also has the bad reputation to manipulate many statements of the evolutionary scientists and their supporters on various dimensions.

The Presentation and the Intertextual Examination of the Material in Question:

The Comparison of the Selected Quotations with their Originals

in the Original Texts, i.e. Darwin's Letters

In this section I present twelve selected exemplary quotations from *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888), most of which are originally Charles Darwin's own expressions in his letters and some of which are his close friends' and his son Francis Darwin's comments and explanations, translated into Turkish for Harun Yahya's creationist propaganda book *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999) and listed under the headings “Charles Darwin'in Teorisi Hakkındaki İtirafı” [Charles Darwin's Confessions Regarding His Theory] or “Evrincilerin Darwin İle İlgili İtirafı” [Evolutionists' Confessions Regarding Darwin]. In some of the presented examples, the quoting author's, namely, Harun Yahya's preceding explanatory sentences, are also given to better indicate the way in which he wants these quotations to be taken. In order to demonstrate the intentional

de(con)textualization operating in each example, after the translated quotation that is listed in Harun Yahya's book, the original (con)(text) of the quoted expression, that is, Charles Darwin's or his friends' letters presented in *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888/1896), or the part of the book in which Francis Darwin, the editor of the book in question, comments on his father or his studies are presented as well. I also refer to some additional letters from the book or parts of the book that I find relevant to the example and useful in explaining it. In selecting the examples presented below for this case study, I have focused on the ones in which the intended manipulatory effects of de(con)textualization are most obvious and those that are the most representative of the author's typical strategy of ideological manipulation. In the following list of examples, firstly, Harun Yahya's translated quotations are given in italics, and then the corresponding English phrases are introduced (underlined) in/with their contexts. Each example is briefly examined by a simple comparative analysis focusing on the role of “context” in the production/attribution of meaning so as to exhibit the manipulatory effects of de(con)textualization and how it can be intentionally utilized to produce such effects.

Example-1:

Bu çalışmaların (Türlerin Kökeni için kullandığı çalışmaları), bunları yaparken harcadığım zamana değip değmediğinden şüphe ediyorum. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitirafлари.com/02.htm>)

In October, 1846, I began to work on “Cirripedia.” [...] To understand the structure of my new Cirripede I had to examine and dissect many of the common forms; and this gradually led me on to take up the whole group. I worked steadily on this subject for the next eight years, and ultimately published two thick volumes, describing all the known living species, and two thin quartos on the extinct species.

[...]

My work on the Cirripedia possesses, I think, considerable value, as besides describing several new and remarkable forms, I made out the homologies of the various parts—I discovered the cementing apparatus, though I blundered dreadfully about the cement glands—and lastly I proved the existence in certain genera of minute males complementary to and parasitic on the hermaphrodites. This latter discovery has at last been fully confirmed; though at one time a German writer was pleased to attribute the whole account to my fertile imagination. The Cirripedes form a highly varying and difficult group of species to class; and my work was of considerable use to me, when I had to discuss in the “Origin of Species” the principles of a natural classification. Nevertheless, I doubt whether the work was worth the consumption of so much time. (Darwin, C., as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 66-67)

This sentence is quoted from Charles Darwin's “Autobiography”, given in the first chapter of *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1896), on which Francis Darwin comments as follows: “ My father's autobiographical recollections, [...] were written for his children,—and written without any thought that they would ever be published. To many this may seem an impossibility; but those who knew my father will understand how it was not only possible, but natural” (1896, v.1, p. 25). As it can be deduced from the above paragraph quoted from the “Autobiography” in which the sentence at hand is declared, Darwin here is not commenting on any of his work that is directly related with the theory of evolution. His work was not solely limited to evolution, and in fact he had worked on a number of different subjects related with various species, though none of those works have never been as popular as the theory of evolution. Here, Darwin only mentions that the results of his lengthy work on a certain group of species called the Cirripedes was of considerable use to him in discussing in his masterpiece *On the Origin of Species* the principles of natural classification, and also it is not the case that the whole of the book in question is on evolution. Thus, by just looking at this sentence, it can not be claimed that Darwin had regretted spending so much time on those studies.

Even if he did utter this sentence in relation to his work on the theory of evolution, it is still far from being a confession of the worthlessness of his work, due to the fact that it is declared in his “Autobiography” which, as stated by his son quoted above, he had written for his children to be read only by them, and without any thought that it would ever be published. That is, in writing those lines, Darwin intended just to express the feelings and thoughts he had about his studies to his children and to share the difficulties he had faced in the course of his work with them only. Hence, when the “context” of the utterance in question is taken into consideration as a whole with its particular characteristics, that is, for whom it is written and with what purposes, it becomes evident that the singular sentence in question means something quite different than what it is directed to mean when listed, in total isolation from its con(text), under a heading such as “Charles Darwin'in Teorisi Hakkındaki İtirafı” [Charles Darwin's Confessions Regarding His Theory].

Moreover, in the following parts of *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1896), namely “The Monograph of the Cirripedia” (1896, v.1, pp. 314-318), it is repeatedly emphasized that, in spite of Darwin's complaints about it taking so long, his work on the Cirripedia turned out to be a great success. The following passages from that part of the book, featuring the comments and explanations of Francis Darwin and those of Thomas Henry Huxley, another prominent English biologist and Darwin's close friend, which, I believe, are also parts of the “context” of the quoted sentence in the present example, indicate that contrary to his previous doubts, Darwin's work on the Cirripedia was indeed worth the consumption of so much time.

Writing to Sir J. D. Hooker in 1845, my father says: “I hope this next summer to finish my South American Geology, then to get out a little Zoology, and hurrah

for my species work...” This passage serves to show that he had at this time no intention of making an exhaustive study of the Cirripedes. Indeed it would seem that his original intention was, as I learn from Sir J. D. Hooker, merely to work out one special problem. This is quite in keeping with the following passage in the Autobiography: “When on the coast of Chile, I found a most curious form, which burrowed into the shells of Concholepas, and which differed so much from all other Cirripedes that I had to form a new sub-order for its sole reception.... To understand the structure of my new Cirripede I had to examine and dissect many of the common forms; and this gradually led me on to take up the whole group.” In later years he seems to have felt some doubt as to the value of these eight years of work,—for instance when he wrote in his Autobiography—“My work was of considerable use to me, when I had to discuss in the ‘Origin of Species’ the principles of a natural classification. Nevertheless I doubt whether the work was worth the consumption of so much time.” Yet I learn from Sir J. D. Hooker that *he certainly recognized at the time its value to himself as systematic training*. Sir Joseph writes to me: “Your father recognized three stages in his career as a biologist: the mere collector at Cambridge; the collector and observer in the Beagle, and for some years afterwards; and the trained naturalist after, and only after the Cirripede work” (Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 314-315, italics mine).

Professor Huxley allows me to quote his opinion as to *the value of the eight years given to the Cirripedes*:

“In my opinion your sagacious father never did a wiser thing than when he devoted himself to the years of patient toil which the Cirripede-book cost him. [...]”

Your father was building a vast superstructure upon the foundations furnished by the recognized facts of geological and biological science. In Physical Geography, in Geology proper, in Geographical Distribution, and in Palæontology, he had acquired an extensive practical training during the voyage of the Beagle. He knew of his own knowledge the way in which the raw materials of these branches of science are acquired, and was therefore a most competent judge of the speculative strain they would bear. That which he needed, after his return to England, was a corresponding acquaintance with Anatomy and Development, and their relation to Taxonomy—and he acquired this by his Cirripede work.

Thus, in my apprehension, the value of the Cirripede monograph lies not merely in the fact that it is a very admirable piece of work, and constituted a great addition to positive knowledge, but still more in the circumstance that it was a piece of critical self-discipline, the effect of which manifested itself in everything your father wrote afterwards, and saved him from endless errors of detail.

So far from such work being a loss of time, I believe it would have been well worth his while, had it been practicable, to have supplemented it by a special study of embryology and physiology. His hands would have been greatly strengthened thereby when he came to write out sundry chapters of the “Origin of Species”. But of course in those days it was almost impossible for him to find facilities for such work. (Huxley, as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 315-316, italics mine)

No one can look at the two volumes on the recent Cirripedes, of 399 and 684 pages respectively (not to speak of the volumes on the fossil species), without being struck by the immense amount of detailed work which they contain. The forty plates, some of them with thirty figures, and the fourteen pages of index in the two volumes together, give some rough idea of the labour spent on the work. The state of knowledge, as regards the Cirripedes, was most unsatisfactory at the time that my father began to work at them. [...] It is interesting to learn from his diary the amount of time which he gave to different genera. Thus the genus Chthamalus, the description of which occupies twenty-two pages, occupied him for thirty-six days; Coronula took nineteen days, and is described in twenty-seven pages. Writing to Fitz-Roy, he speaks of being “for the last half-month daily hard at work in dissecting a little animal about the size of a pin's head, from the Chonos archipelago, and I could spend another month, and daily see more beautiful structure”. (Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, p. 317, italics mine)

Example-2:

Görüşlerimin, sayısız miktarda zorluklarla dolu olduğunu göremeyecek kadar kör olduğumu sanma...(as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrimcilerinitirafлари.com/02.htm>)

C. Darwin to L. Jenyns.

Down, [1845?].

[...]

With respect to my far distant work on species, I must have expressed myself with singular inaccuracy if I led you to suppose that I meant to say that my conclusions were inevitable. They have become so, after years of weighing puzzles, to myself alone; but in my wildest day-dream, I never expect more than to be able to show that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of species, i.e. whether species are directly created or by intermediate laws (as with the life and death of individuals). I did not approach the subject on the side of the difficulty in determining what are species and what are varieties, but (though why I should give you such a history of my doings it would be hard to say) from such facts as the relationship between the living and extinct mammals in South America, and between those living on the Continent and on adjoining islands, such as the Galapagos. It occurred to me that a collection of all such analogous facts would throw light either for or against the view of related species being co-descendants from a common stock. A long searching amongst agricultural and horticultural books and people makes me believe (I well know how absurdly presumptuous this must appear) that I see the way in which new varieties become exquisitely adapted to the external conditions of life and to other surrounding beings. I am a bold man to lay myself open to being thought a complete fool, and a most deliberate one. From the nature of the grounds which make me believe that species are mutable in form, these grounds cannot be restricted to the closest-

allied species; but how far they extend I cannot tell, as my reasons fall away by degrees, when applied to species more and more remote from each other. Pray do not think that I am so blind as not to see that there are numerous immense difficulties in my notions, but they appear to me less than on the common view. (Darwin, C. quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 394-395, italics mine)

At the end of the above passage from a letter Darwin has written in response to a colleague who was apparently criticizing him for some of his assertions, we observe that the quotation listed in Harun Yahya's book as one of Darwin's confessions regarding his theory is not even the translation of the complete sentence, but of a part of a source-text-sentence. What is significant in this example is that the part of the source-text-sentence which is excluded from the translation/quotation, is actually following the translated/quoted first part with the grammatical coordinating conjunction “but”, which indicates a contrast or exception. It seems unreasonable to deny that when a concluding “but ...” part is added to a sentence or excluded from it, the general meaning that will be attributed to the sentence will change to a certain degree, if not drastically.

Although it seems that Darwin really accepts the assertion that there are numerous immense difficulties in his notions, which, by the way, are probably difficulties not inherent in his notions, but difficulties associated with the ways they are explained and/or understood, as it can be inferred from the above passage from the letter, he adds that they appear to him less than on the common view, meaning that, again, the real difficulty is clarifying these notions so as to be properly understood and accepted by others.

Example-3:

Doğanın tamamı gerçekten inatçı ve benim istediklerimi yapmıyor ve şu an sadece eski midyelerimden başka yeni hiçbir şey üzerinde çalışmak istemiyorum.
(as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/02.htm>)

C. Darwin to J. D. Hooker.

Down, [1855.]

[...]

Everything has been going wrong with me lately; the fish at the Zoolog. Soc. ate up lots of soaked seeds, and in imagination they had in my mind been swallowed, fish and all, by a heron, had been carried a hundred miles, been voided on the banks of some other lake and germinated splendidly, when lo and behold, the fish ejected vehemently, and with disgust equal to my own, all the seeds from their mouths.

But I am not going to give up the floating yet: in first place I must try fresh seeds, though of course it seems far more probable that they will sink; and secondly, as a last resource, I must believe in the pod or even whole plant or branch being washed into the sea; with floods and slips and earthquakes; this must continually be happening, and if kept wet, I fancy the pods, &c. &c., would not open and shed their seeds. Do try your Mimosa seed at Kew. (Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 415-416)

In describing these troubles to Mr. Fox, my father wrote:—“All nature is perverse and will not do as I wish it; and just at present I wish I had my old barnacles to work at, and nothing new.” The experiment ultimately succeeded, and he wrote to Sir J. Hooker:—“I find fish will greedily eat seeds of aquatic grasses, and that millet-seed put into fish and given to a stork, and then voided, will germinate. So this is the nursery rhyme of ‘this is the stick that beats the pig,’ &c. &c.” (Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 416, italics mine)

The translated/quoted sentence in this example, again, does not have much connection to the theory of evolution, for it is simply an expression of Darwin's complaints about the technical difficulties of an experiment he was conducting on fish, which he shared with a friend in his letter. Besides, in another letter written on the same issue to his closest friend Joseph Dalton Hooker, one of the greatest English botanists and explorers of the 19th century, quoted above, it is seen that despite all the troubles, Darwin was not willing to give up on the experiment and was sufficiently motivated to try new solutions

to make it succeed. And right after quoting this sentence of his father's, Francis Darwin points out that the experiment ultimately succeeded.

Example-4:

J. D. Hooker'a yazdığı mektubundan:

Bazen, yakında tamamen yenilgiye uğrayacağımdan şüpheleniyorum. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/02.htm>)

C. Darwin to J. D. Hooker.

Down, Jan. 15 [1861].

[...]

I have not read H. Spencer, for I find that I must more and more husband the very little strength which I have. I sometimes suspect I shall soon entirely fail... As soon as this dreadful weather gets a little milder, I must try a little water cure. Have you read the "Woman in White"? the plot is wonderfully interesting. I can recommend a book which has interested me greatly, viz. Olmsted's "Journey in the Back Country." It is an admirably lively picture of man and slavery in the Southern States...(Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 151-152)

In this quotation, the verb "to fail" is translated into Turkish as "yenilgiye uğramak", but when the part of letter from which the sentence in question is quoted is considered the context of that sentence, it is seen that this part of the letter does not dwell upon work or science-related issues, but on other issues irrelevant to work, such as novels and literature, and thus, it becomes obvious that this utterance is not related with the theory of evolution in any way. It is not even related with Darwin's any other kind of work, but with his health, for in the previous sentence he mentions that he has to "more and more husband the very little strength which he has", and in the following sentence he states his wish to try "a little water cure". But of course, in Harun Yahya's list of translated quotations, none of these explanations are offered, and the term "to fail", which is used by Darwin in his letter in the sense of "breaking down" or "worsening" in terms of bad

health, is deliberately translated in a narrow sense as “yenilgiye uğramak” in order to make it sound like a confession of his suspicion of the failure of his theory, instead of a statement of his ill health.

Example-5:

Tamamen yanlış bir inancın içinde olduğumu düşünmeye başladım. Bana bu konunun on sene içinde tamamen unutulacağını söylediğinde haklıydı. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/02.htm>)

C. Darwin to J. D. Hooker.

Sudbrook Park, Monday night [July 2nd, 1860].

MY DEAR HOOKER,—I have just received your letter. I have been very poorly, with almost continuous bad headache for forty-eight hours, and I was low enough, and thinking what a useless burthen I was to myself and all others, when your letter came, and it has so cheered me; your kindness and affection brought tears into my eyes. Talk of fame, honour, pleasure, wealth, all are dirt compared with affection; and this is a doctrine with which, I know, from your letter, that you will agree with from the bottom of your heart. . . . How I should have liked to have wandered about Oxford with you, if I had been well enough; and how still more I should have liked to have heard you triumphing over the Bishop. I am astonished at your success and audacity. It is something unintelligible to me how any one can argue in public like orators do. I had no idea you had this power. *I have read lately so many hostile views, that I was beginning to think that perhaps I was wholly in the wrong, and that—was right when he said the whole subject would be forgotten in ten years; but now that I hear that you and Huxley will fight publicly (which I am sure I never could do), I fully believe that our cause will, in the long-run, prevail.* I am glad I was not in Oxford, for I should have been overwhelmed, with my [health] in its present state. (Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 116-117, italics mine)

By the time Darwin wrote the above letter to his friend Hooker, it hadn't been even a year since *On the Origin of Species* was published, but Darwin had already been overwhelmed with hostile views and attacks. His health was getting worse as he became frustrated, not being able to explain his notions and to defend his ideas as clearly as he wished to. His friends Huxley and Hooker were defending his ideas in various debates

and that was his sole relief. The translated quotation in the present example which is listed as two sentences is actually the middle part of a single sentence in the source text, that is, there are two parts which are excluded from the translation/quotation, the first of which is an explanatory part to the first sentence of the translated quotation, the second part following the second sentence of the translated quotation, just like in Example-2, with the grammatical coordinating conjunction “but”, indicating a contrast. If that sentence was translated as a whole instead of partially, the readers of Harun Yahya's book would not be led to believe that Darwin actually did, all of a sudden, and without a given reason, begin to suspect that he was utterly wrong just thinking to himself. Instead, it would be clear that Darwin was beginning to think that way because of the many hostile reviews he had read, and that he did not actually believe that his critic was right when he said the whole subject would be forgotten in ten years, but he was so depressed that he felt so only momentarily until he heard that his friends Hooker and Huxley would fight publicly (which he was sure he never could do), and since then he fully believed that their cause would, in the long-run, prevail. Leaving out those very crucial explanatory parts of the sentence doubtlessly changes the way in which the translation of this sentence can be interpreted, especially when isolated from its context as a whole, drastically.

Example-6:

Bana kitabımı soruyorsun, sana söyleyebileceğim tek şey intihar etmeye hazır olduğum; kitabın çok makul bir şekilde kaleme alındığını düşünüyordum, fakat şimdi tekrar yazılması gerektiğini anladım. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/02.htm>)

The manuscript of “Insectivorous Plants” was finished in March 1875. He seems

to have been more than usually oppressed by the writing of this book, thus he wrote to Sir J. D. Hooker in February:

“You ask about my book, and all that I can say is that I am ready to commit suicide; I thought it was decently written, but find so much wants rewriting, that it will not be ready to go to printers for two months, and will then make a confoundedly big book. Murray will say that it is no use publishing in the middle of summer, so I do not know what will be the upshot; but I begin to think that every one who publishes a book is a fool.”

The book was published on July 2nd, 1875, and 2700 copies were sold out of the edition of 3000. (Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 500-501)

It can easily be inferred from the context in which this utterance, quoted from a letter written by his father to a friend, is presented by Francis Darwin that what made Darwin metaphorically express his readiness to commit suicide is nothing related with the theory of evolution or its alleged failure in any way, but the stylistic issues related with preparing an utterly irrelevant work called “Insectivorous Plants” and some technical problems he had in having it published. Thus, what Harun Yahya asserts as a confession of Charles Darwin regarding his theory is just a metaphorical expression of complaints which does not even have anything to do with either science or theory. What is more, though it is irrelevant to the theory of evolution, it should be noted that this book, the writing and publishing process of which led him to think of committing suicide, has been very successful too, selling, as mentioned by Francis Darwin, 2700 copies out of the edition of 3000.

Example-7:

Lyell'e yazdığı mektubundan:

Çeşitli konularla ilgilenen pek çok insanın yıllardır bir illüzyon içinde olduğunu düşünerek oldukça seviniyorum. Sık sık üzerime soğuk bir ürperti geliyor ve kendi kendime bütün hayatımı bir fantaziye adayıp adamadığımı soruyorum. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitirafлари.com/02.htm>)

C. Darwin to C. Lyell.
Ilkley Wells, Yorkshire,
November 23rd [1859].

MY DEAR LYELL,—You seemed to have worked admirably on the species question; there could not have been a better plan than reading up on the opposite side. I rejoice profoundly that you intend admitting the doctrine of modification in your new edition; nothing, I am convinced, could be more important for its success. I honour you most sincerely. To have maintained in the position of a master, one side of a question for thirty years, and then deliberately give it up, is a fact to which I much doubt whether the records of science offer a parallel. For myself, also, I rejoice profoundly; for, thinking of so many cases of men pursuing an illusion for years, often and often a cold shudder has run through me, and I have asked myself whether I may not have devoted my life to a phantasy. *Now I look at it as morally impossible that investigators of truth, like you and Hooker, can be wholly wrong, and therefore I rest in peace.* Thank you for criticisms, which, if there be a second edition, I will attend to. I have been thinking that if I am much execrated as an atheist, &c., whether the admission of the doctrine of natural selection could injure your works; but I hope and think not, for, as far as I can remember, the virulence of bigotry is expended on the first offender, and those who adopt his views are only pitied as deluded, by the wise and cheerful bigots. (Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 24-25, italics mine)

In this example, the way in which the translated quotation can be considered a confession of the failure of the theory does not seem to be very intelligible.

Nevertheless, in the quotation the Turkish sentence is constructed so as to imply that the reason why Darwin rejoices is his thinking of so many cases of men pursuing an illusion for years. This is not only nonsense, but also contradictory to the corresponding source text- sentence, particularly when the context of the sentence is taken into account. As Darwin states in the preceding and the following sentences of the very same letter, his friends among which were the prominent geologist Charles Lyell, who, until then, used to reject evolution, and Joseph Dalton Hooker were supporting his theories, and evidently this is the reason why he rejoices. After expressing his occasional anxiety and doubts on his studies in the translated/quoted part of the sentence, he points out in the

following (untranslated) sentence of the letter that from then on he sees it morally impossible that investigators of truth, like Lyell and Hooker who admit Darwin's ideas, can be wholly wrong, and that he therefore rests in peace. This following explanatory sentence which is highly significant in expressing Darwin's final feelings and thoughts on the issue mentioned in the quotation is, of course, not translated/quoted.

Example-8:

Thomas Huxley (En yakın arkadaşı ve evrim teorisi konusunda en büyük destekçisi. Hatta evrim teorisini Darwin'in adına yüksek sesle savunduğu için “Darwin'in buldog köpeği” olarak anılır):
Aynen diğerlerimiz gibi onun da biyoloji bilimi üzerinde doğru düzgün bir eğitimi yoktu. (quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/03.htm>)

Writing to Sir J. D. Hooker in 1845, my father says: “I hope this next summer to finish my South American Geology, then to get out a little Zoology, and hurrah for my species work...” This passage serves to show that he had at this time no intention of making an exhaustive study of the Cirripedes. Indeed it would seem that his original intention was, as I learn from Sir J. D. Hooker, merely to work out one special problem. This is quite in keeping with the following passage in the Autobiography: “When on the coast of Chile, I found a most curious form, which burrowed into the shells of Concholepas, and which differed so much from all other Cirripedes that I had to form a new sub-order for its sole reception.... To understand the structure of my new Cirripede I had to examine and dissect many of the common forms; and this gradually led me on to take up the whole group.” In later years he seems to have felt some doubt as to the value of these eight years of work,—for instance when he wrote in his Autobiography—“My work was of considerable use to me, when I had to discuss in the ‘Origin of Species’ the principles of a natural classification. Nevertheless I doubt whether the work was worth the consumption of so much time.” Yet I learn from Sir J. D. Hooker that *he certainly recognized at the time its value to himself as systematic training. Sir Joseph writes to me: “Your father recognized three stages in his career as a biologist: the mere collector at Cambridge; the collector and observer in the Beagle, and for some years afterwards; and the trained naturalist after, and only after the Cirripedework. That he was a thinker all along is true enough, and there is a vast deal in his writings previous to the Cirripedes that a trained naturalist could but emulate.... [...]*” (Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp.314-315, italics mine)

Professor Huxley allows me to quote his opinion as to the value of the eight years given to the Cirripedes:

“Like the rest of us, he had no proper training in biological science, and it has always struck me as a remarkable instance of his scientific insight, that he saw the necessity of giving himself such training, and of his courage, that he did not shirk the labour of obtaining it” (Huxley as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, p. 315, italics mine)

His close friend Thomas Henry Huxley's quoted declaration on Charles Darwin, when read within the totality of its context in which it is mentioned in the book in question, is doubtlessly not intended to draw attention to a deficiency in Darwin's education or knowledge. To the contrary, since Huxley maintains his statement that Darwin, like the rest of them, had no proper training in biological science with the claim that it has always struck him as a remarkable instance of Darwin's scientific insight, that he saw the necessity of giving himself such training, and of his courage, that he did not shirk the labour of obtaining it, it becomes obvious that being far from a confession, which definitely has a negative connotation, on Darwin, this declaration of Huxley is almost a praise for him. Besides, he probably had employed the term “proper” here in a sense close to “official”, in other words, to imply that they did not study biological science in the college. In addition to this, the years given to the Cirripedes work, which Huxley considers a long training in biological science, and, as Hooker mentions, the value of which as systematic training was later recognized by Darwin himself too, according to Hooker, assigned him with the status of a trained naturalist.

Example-9:

Evrimci arařtırmacılar, çoęu kez yalnızca bir diř veya bir ene kemięi parası ya da ufak bir kol kemięinden yola ıkararak insan benzeri hayali yaratıklar izer ve bunu sansasyonel bir biimde insan evriminin bir halkası olarak kamuoyuna sunarlar. Bu izimler oęu insanın zihninde var olan "ilkel insan" imajının oluřmasında byk rol oynamıřtır.

Evrimin, sahtekarlığa ve yanlı yoruma en açık olan bu konusunda evrimciler yine sık sık itiraflarda bulunmak zorunda kalmışlardır.

Charles Darwin:

Bana “insan” konusuna girip girmeyeceğimi soruyorsun. Sanırım bu konudan tamamıyla uzak duracağım... Benim yirmi yıldır üzerinde çalıştığım bu yapıtı ise hiçbir şeyi çözümlmeyi veya cevaplamayı başaramayacak. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/16.htm>)

C. Darwin to A. R. Wallace.

Down, Dec. 22nd, 1857.

[...]

You ask whether I shall discuss "man." I think I shall avoid the whole subject, as so surrounded with prejudices; though I fully admit that it is the highest and most interesting problem for the naturalist. My work, on which I have now been at work more or less for twenty years, will not fix or settle anything; but I hope it will aid by giving a large collection of facts, with one definite end. I get on very slowly, partly from ill-health, partly from being a very slow worker. I have got about half written; but I do not suppose I shall publish under a couple of years. I have now been three whole months on one chapter on Hybridism! (Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 465-467, italics mine)

These three sentences are quoted from a letter Darwin had written to Alfred Russel

Wallace, another English scientist who is mostly known for almost simultaneously and independently proposing a theory of natural selection, to exchange some ideas with him while preparing *On the Origin of Species* for publication. The second sentence of the translated quotation is, again, the translation of only a part of a source text sentence, in the untranslated rest of which Darwin's reason for avoiding the subject of “man” and his thoughts on the issue are indicated. Thus, by reading this quotation in Harun Yahya's book, we are led to think that Darwin avoided that subject because he was not capable of explaining it, whereas in his letter he stated that he avoided it because it was so surrounded with prejudices at that time, adding, in the same sentence, that he fully admitted that it was the highest and most interesting problem for the naturalist. The third sentence of the quotation, that is, his alleged “confession” that his work, on which

he had then been at work more or less for twenty years, would not fix or settle anything, is not in fact a confession of failure or anything else as it is argued, but an expression of modesty, for in the source text this sentence is longer than that and the translated part is followed by the explanation, “but I hope it will aid by giving a large collection of facts, with one definite end.”

Example-10:

Sir Charles Lyell:

Darwin'e yazdığı mektuptan:

Bu çok önemli özetin ilk sayfası gözün oluşumu ile ilgili itirazlarla başlıyor. Bu itiraza cevap vermek ve ortadan kaldırmak için sayfalar dolusu yazı gerekiyor. Eğer ikna etmek istiyorsan, bu konu hakkında hiçbirşey söylememek daha iyi olur. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/18.htm>)

C. Lyell to C. Darwin.

October 3rd, 1859.

[...]

The first page of this most important summary gives the adversary an advantage, by putting forth so abruptly and crudely such a startling objection as the formation of “the eye,” not by means analogous to man's reason, or rather by some power immeasurably superior to human reason, but by superinduced variation like those of which a cattle-breeder avails himself. Pages would be required thus to state an objection and remove it. It would be better, as you wish to persuade, to say nothing. Leave out several sentences, and in a future edition bring it out more fully. Between the throwing down of such a stumbling-block in the way of the reader, and the passage to the working ants, in p. 460, there are pages required; and these ants are a bathos to him before he has recovered from the shock of being called upon to believe the eye to have been brought to perfection, from a state of blindness or purblindness, by such variations as we witness. *I think a little omission would greatly lessen the objectionableness of these sentences if you have not time to recast and amplify.*

... But these are small matters, mere spots on the sun. Your comparison of the letters retained in words, when no longer wanted for the sound, to rudimentary organs is excellent, as both are truly genealogical. (Lyell as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 2-4, italics mine)

C. Darwin to C. Lyell.

Ilkley, Yorkshire,

October 11th [1859].

MY DEAR LYELL,—*I thank you cordially for giving me so much of your valuable time in writing me the long letter of 3rd, and still longer of 4th. I wrote a line with the missing proof-sheet to Scarborough. I have adopted most thankfully all your minor corrections in the last chapter, and the greater ones as far as I could with little trouble. I damped the opening passage about the eye (in my bigger work I show the gradations in structure of the eye) by putting merely “complex organs.” But you are a pretty Lord Chancellor to tell the barrister on one side how best to win the cause! The omission of “living” before eminent naturalists was a dreadful blunder. (Lyell as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.2, pp. 4-5, italics mine)*

It is observed in the above letters that Charles Lyell read his friend Darwin's book before publication and made suggestions to him to render his book more persuasive and less prone to objections. Harun Yahya's quotations from this letter are aimed at making the reader believe that Lyell was actually putting forward that Darwin was not capable of accounting for the formation of the eye at all. Although it is true that the issue of the formation of the eye did give Darwin a hard time, it was definitely not the case that he had no idea whatsoever to say on the subject. To the contrary, he was working on it with perseverance. This is the reason why Lyell, after claiming that pages would be required thus to state an objection (to the formation of the eye) and remove it, and that it would be better, as Darwin was wishing to persuade, to say nothing, advised him to leave out several sentences, and in a future edition, to bring it out more fully, for he did not want Darwin's work on the issue to be wasted with objections. Lyell also suggested that a little omission would greatly lessen the objectionableness of some of his sentences if he had not time to recast and amplify, and in a letter Darwin had written in response, he thanks Lyell cordially for giving him so much of his valuable time in writing him such long letters and declares that he has adopted most thankfully all his minor corrections in the last chapter, and the greater ones as far as he could with little trouble, that he

damped the opening passage about the eye (in his bigger work he shows the gradations in structure of the eye) by putting merely “complex organs.”

Example-11:

Evrinciler ise, bir türün içindeki varyasyonları teoriye delil olarak göstermeye çalışırlar. Oysa varyasyon evrime delil oluşturmaz, çünkü varyasyon, zaten var olan genetik bilginin farklı eşleşmelerinin ortaya çıkmasından ibarettir ve genetik bilgiye bir özellik katmaz.

Bu konuyla ilgili evrimci itiraflar ise şöyledir:

Charles Darwin:

Yıllar süren karmaşık düşüncelerin ardından birtakım sonuçlara vardım. En abartılı hayallerimde bile türlerin değişmezliği sorusunun iki farklı yönü olduğundan öteye gidemiyorum. Yani, türler doğrudan yaratılmışlar mıdır; yoksa ara kanunlarla mı (bireylerin hayatı ve ölümü gibi) meydana gelmişlerdir. Türlerin ne olduğu, cinslerin ne olduğu konusunun zorluğu nedeniyle bu hususa fazla yaklaşmadım. (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/21.htm>)

C. Darwin to L. Jenyns.

Down, [1845?].

[...]

With respect to my far distant work on species, I must have expressed myself with singular inaccuracy if I led you to suppose that I meant to say that my conclusions were inevitable. They have become so, after years of weighing puzzles, to myself alone; but in my wildest day-dream, I never expect more than to be able to show that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of species, i.e. whether species are directly created or by intermediate laws (as with the life and death of individuals). I did not approach the subject on the side of the difficulty in determining what are species and what are varieties, but (though why I should give you such a history of my doings it would be hard to say) from such facts as the relationship between the living and extinct mammals in South America, and between those living on the Continent and on adjoining islands, such as the Galapagos. It occurred to me that a collection of all such analogous facts would throw light either for or against the view of related species being co-descendants from a common stock. A long searching amongst agricultural and horticultural books and people makes me believe (I well know how absurdly presumptuous this must appear) that I see the way in which new varieties become exquisitely adapted to the external conditions of life and to other surrounding beings. I am a bold man to lay myself open to being thought a complete fool, and a most deliberate one. From the nature of the grounds which make me believe that species are mutable in form, these grounds cannot be restricted to the closest-allied species; but how far they extend I cannot tell, as my reasons fall away by

degrees, when applied to species more and more remote from each other. (Darwin, C. as quoted in Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 393-395, italics mine)

First of all, in this example, Darwin, in this letter in question, does not only state that he has arrived at some conclusions, as it is presented in Harun Yahya's quotation. In this argumentative and slightly defensive letter he has written to his friend Leonard Jenyns, another prominent English naturalist, he claims that those conclusions became inevitable, adding the very crucial explanation that they became inevitable to himself alone. By asserting that they were inevitable, but only for him, he probably implied that he had difficulty in making those complex studies and their conclusions clear for the others. Similarly, he did not, in his letter, express that even in his wildest day-dream he could not imagine anything more than that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of species, as it is translated and quoted in Harun Yahya's book. What he actually declared was, as seen in the above quotation, in connection to the previous sentence, that he never *expected* more than *to be able to show* that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of species, i.e. whether species are directly created or by intermediate laws (as with the life and death of individuals). Hence, this is, again, an expression of the difficulties related with clarifying his findings and making them known and accepted by the public, a great majority of which was, naturally, not sufficiently informed on biology, or biased towards such innovative, groundbreaking assertions.

The last sentence of Harun Yahya's translated quotation presented in this example is deceptive too, for when the “corresponding” sentence in the letter is examined, it is seen that Darwin indeed did not state that he did not approach the subject because of the

difficulty in determining what are species and what are varieties and close the case just like that. As a matter of fact, he did not even state that he did not approach the subject at all. When the complete sentence, including the part untranslated in Harun Yahya's book, in the letter is read, it is seen that what Darwin actually stated was that he did not approach the subject on the side of the difficulty in determining what species are and what varieties are, but from such facts as the relationship between the living and extinct mammals in South America, and between those living on the Continent and on adjoining islands, such as the Galapagos. He also continued his explanations on why he preferred to approach the subject in this way in the following sentences, as seen in the above quotation.

Example-12:

Francis Darwin (Darwin'in ođlu):

Babam 1844'teki alıřmasında “ok nemli bir problemi” gz arđ etmiřti; karakterlerdeki farklılık sorunu. Bu husus ‘Trlerin Kkeni’nde tartıřılıyor, fakat tm okuyucular bilmeyebileceđi iin bu sorunun zorluklarını ve zmn anlatacađım. Yazar, cinslerin kendi ierindeki farklılıkların trlerin arasındaki farklılıklardan daha az olduđunu belirtiyor. Ve řyle devam ediyor: “Yine de benim grřme gre, cinsler aslında geliřmekte olan trlerdir... Peki o zaman cinsler arasındaki bu daha az olan farklılıklar daha sonra trler arasındaki daha byk farklılıklara nasıl dnřmř olabilir?” (as quoted in Yahya, 1999, <http://www.evrincilerinitiraflari.com/21.htm>)

In the Autobiography (Vol. I. p. 84) *my father has stated what seemed to him the chief flaw of the 1844 Sketch; he had overlooked “one problem of great importance,” the problem of the divergence of character. This point is discussed in the “Origin of Species,” but, as it may not be familiar to all readers, I will give a short account of the difficulty and its solution. The author begins by stating that varieties differ from each other less than species, and then goes on: “Nevertheless, according to my view, varieties are species in process of formation. . . . How then does the lesser difference between varieties become augmented into the greater difference between species.”* He shows how an analogous divergence takes place under domestication where an originally uniform stock of horses has been split up into race-horses, dray-horses, &c., and then goes on to explain how the same

principle applies to natural species. “From the simple circumstance that the more diversified the descendants from any one species become in structure, constitution, and habits, by so much will they be better enabled to seize on many and widely diversified places in the polity of nature, and so be enabled to increase in numbers.”

The principle is exemplified by the fact that if on one plot of ground a single variety of wheat be sown, and on to another a mixture of varieties, in the latter case the produce is greater. More individuals have been able to exist because they were not all of the same variety. An organism becomes more perfect and more fitted to survive when by division of labour the different functions of life are performed by different organs. In the same way a species becomes more efficient and more able to survive when different sections of the species become differentiated so as to fill different stations.

In reading the Sketch of 1844, I have found it difficult to recognise, as a flaw in the Essay, the absence of any definite statement of the principle of divergence. Descent with modification implies divergence, and we become so habituated to a belief in descent, and therefore in divergence, that we do not notice the absence of proof that divergence is in itself an advantage. As shown in the Autobiography, my father in 1876 found it hardly credible that he should have overlooked the problem and its solution. (Darwin, F., 1896, v.1, pp. 376-377, italics mine)

The above quotation of Harun Yahya from Francis Darwin's comments on his father in his *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888) is explicitly aimed at creating the impression that Francis Darwin had detected a weak point in his father's work and that he posited as a major flaw in his theory. However, when the corresponding passage of Francis Darwin is read in the totality of its context, it becomes obvious that, similar to all of the previous examples presented above, this part is selectively translated, excluding all of the other parts which would interfere with their intentions, in order to give that false impression. That is because, it was actually Charles Darwin himself who detected that flaw in question in his own work, for Francis Darwin, quoted above, openly points out that his father had stated in his “Autobiography” what had seemed to him the chief flaw of the 1844 Sketch; and that, he had overlooked “one problem of great importance,” (in Charles Darwin's own words) the problem of the divergence of

character. Presenting the once overlooked problem and its solution both as suggested by his father in his “Autobiography”, Francis Darwin also mentions that he had found it difficult to recognize this point as a flaw in reading the Sketch of 1844, and that his father, on the other hand, had found it hardly credible that he should have overlooked the problem and its solution. Therefore, in the context from which Harun Yahya has ripped his above quotation off, Francis Darwin is not confessing that his father's work is deficient by positing a major flaw which detected in it, as claimed by Harun Yahya. On the contrary, he is highlighting his father's self-critical, honest and meticulous personality and how seriously he takes his work and reads his sketches over many years again and again to make sure there are no flaws left behind.

The Demonstration of the Explicit De(con)textualization of the Translated Quotations as
an Evidence of Intentional Ideological Manipulation and the Analysis
of Their Intended Purposes and Implications

It is pointed out in Chapter 3 that the ideological function of an expression is dependent on its context, that is, as both Terry Eagleton (1991) and Teun van Dijk (1998) agree, the very same expression may have an ideological significance or function in one context, but not in another, or it may have a different, even opposing one in yet another. Teun van Dijk, as already mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, defines the notion of “context” as “the structured set of all properties of a social situation that are possibly relevant for the production, structures, interpretation and functions of text and talk” (1998, p. 211). Hence, it follows that an expression or a piece of text cannot be analyzed

and/or evaluated in terms of any possible aspect without taking its contextual features into account. It can also be argued that the meanings that can be assigned to a text or a text piece by the readers are restricted to the frame of relationships which the readers can establish with its context as they view it.

Since the activity of translation in itself entails a compulsory change of context, that is the linguistic and cultural context, it can be said that each translated text inevitably goes through a process in which it loses some of its contextual links in terms of which it was interpreted, but at the same time, gains new ones which are usually intended to be the closest to those of the source text, but are nevertheless different. However, the examples presented in this case study are far from illustrating such a simple and ordinary translation process. As mentioned earlier, Harun Yahya's quotations from *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888) are all intentionally decontextualized with the purpose of ideological manipulation, and presented to the reader as the translations of Darwin's and his friends' confessions about the failure of the theory of evolution, when, in reality none of the corresponding passages or sentences in the source text involved in this “translation”, taking their context into account, can be claimed to be such confessions.

The common point of all of the exemplary quotations covered by this case study is that none of them are quoted from a scientific book, article or declaration, that is, an officially scientific text that is published. Most of them are from Charles Darwin's personal letters which he had written, assuming that it would be read only by the addressee, to express his thoughts, feelings, doubts and problems related with his life in general, focusing on his work. The others are the letters Darwin received from his

friends, the explanations of his son Francis Darwin, who also edited the book, on Darwin himself and his work, and his friends' comments on Darwin compiled together with the letters by Francis Darwin, all of which are presented in the book by Francis Darwin in order to reflect his father's personality and life. Nowhere in the book there is such a statement that the book was written with the aim of explaining Darwin's various ideas and work making use of his personal letters. Thus, even without going into a detailed examination of the quotations and comparing them with their source text letters, it would be plausible to argue that quoting texts which are not published as officially scientific books or articles, and most of which are actually personal letters of Darwin that are written to or received from his close friends with such assumptions and intentions as mentioned above, and positing them to readers as confessions about the failure of the theory of evolution in a book named *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] is itself an ideological manipulation of the quoted letters and passages. Nevertheless, the case is also significant for the field Translation Studies, for in this case of decontextualization, translation is utilized for masking the strategy employed, therefore is put to work in ideological manipulation. In other words, Harun Yahya, in an extremely selective way, decontextualized certain expressions of Darwin and his friends, sometimes taking one or two sentences, sometimes taking only part of a sentence, at other times combining random sentences as he likes, and isolating them from their contexts, in order to strip off any contextual links which would aid the readers in the production of meaning, so that those expressions were made available for being presented as the translations of Darwin's and his friends' confessions of the failure of his theory quoted from a book named *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888)

that was in English and that covered Darwin's biography and letters.

What Harun Yahya intended by subjecting Charles Darwin's letters and his son's comments on him to ideological manipulation making use of a strategy which can be named decontextualization, isolating certain declarations he has picked from those texts from all of their contexts, and also making use of translation to hide his manipulation, translating these quotations and presenting them as translated confessions of Charles Darwin and his friends about the failure of the theory of evolution, is to distort the image of Darwin as a prominent and respectable scientist, to humiliate him and to reflect him as a helpless man so lost and stranded that had to confess that his theory was deficient in almost every way. Following this utterly unscientific, awkward and, most importantly, unethical strategy, he aims to defeat the theory of evolution and to convince his readers and as much of the Turkish society as he can to reject it, so as to replace it with the totally religious and dogmatic belief of “creation” which is asserted as a “scientific theory”, though it has absolutely nothing to do with scientificity, by the opponents of this idea, namely, the “creationists” who mainly adopt and serve the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism.

Among the readers of Harun Yahya's book *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999), those who do not read in English have almost no chance of having access the source texts of these “translated” quotations in question, because its only translation into Turkish as a complete book, *Charles Darwin: Yaşamı ve Mektupları*, translated by Hüsen Portakal and published by Düşün Publishing House in Istanbul in 1996, is out of stocks for a long time by 2009, and it seems that can be very rarely found in bookstores. However, even for the ones who do read in English, it

is not so easy to find the exact source text indicated in the bibliography of Harun Yahya's book as *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, published by D.Appleton and Company in New York in 1888. This edition, to my knowledge, is unfortunately not available in any library or bookstore in Turkey. Thanks to the world-wide-web, for a few years, another edition of the same book which was published by John Murray Publishing House in London in 1887 is accessible online: in http://darwin-online.org.uk/EditorialIntroductions/Freeman_LifeandLettersandAutobiography.html

Like all the other books written by Harun Yahya, *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999) has a quite exaggerated look with its colorful and gilded binder, and it is sold for a low price which would not be expected of such a printing. Of course, it is intended to be attractive and affordable in order to reach as many people as possible to spread the ideology. It can also be downloaded from Harun Yahya's website for free or read online in various sources. The contents of the book, that is, the ideologically manipulated Darwin quotations through decontextualization and translation, are presented by many other creationist websites and quoted by fierce creationists in a number of local and global discussion forums as the evidence of the failure of the theory of evolution as confessed by Darwin himself, just as intended.

Harun Yahya's ideological manipulations on various dimensions are known or heard by many people, but there is need for much more research to draw attention to the issue. In some websites such as <http://hycarpitmalari.blogspot.com/> and <http://yaratiliscilaracevaplar.wordpress.com/>, the various manipulations of the creationists are examined and presented by the diligent supporters of the theory of evolution. However, in order to put an end to the creationists' manipulations of almost

every evolutionary scientist's works and expressions and their attacks on the supporters of the theory, these kinds of examinations should be supported by the media and reach much more people.

CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPTION OF THE ETHICS OF TRANSLATION AND IDEOLOGICAL MANIPULATION IN TRANSLATION FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN TRANSLATION STUDIES

Having examined the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation focusing on the ways in which ideology is defined and described in relation to the notions of discourse, context and translation, and having illustrated an exemplary case of de(con)textualization as a form ideological manipulation in translation with its many aspects in Chapters 3 & 4, it is time to turn back to the theoretical field of Translation Studies to see how this phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation, the significance of which is demonstrated both in theory and in practice with its multifarious aspects in these two previous chapters, is conceptualized by the prominent contemporary theories. Such a questioning is aimed at providing us with the insight to evaluate those theories at hand as to their ethical stances towards ideological manipulation, which will, in turn, aid us in assessing their adequacy and credibility as the most prominent contemporary theories of translation, prevailing in the field of Translation Studies and guiding the majority of studies and researches conducted in the field.

The Understanding of the Ethics of Translation and the Conception of Ideological Manipulation in the Framework of Each Theory in Question

In terms of the descriptive, target-oriented approach of Gideon Toury, translations and everything related to translations are dependent on the norms prevalent in the target society/culture. Thus, the question whether a translation project is ethical or not is determined by the target norms as well. For every translation, Toury takes *some* relation with the source text for granted, but he does not suggest any principle or criteria. That is because, according to him, this also varies according to the prevalent target norms. Since every target society/culture is different from one another, and also, since the norms of a society/culture inevitably go through changes in time, it seems plausible to suggest that the translation ethics of Toury's target-oriented approach, in a way, is an ethics based on difference.

As Kaisa Koskinen also claims, the shifts, and the decision-making involved in translation, according to Toury, are all norm-governed, and the notion of norms, Toury's central concept, in short, is one way of explaining the differences and variability of translation. (Koskinen, 2000, p. 18) She interprets Toury's approach to the notion of ethics in his descriptive translation theory as follows.

Referring to sociology and social psychology, Toury defined norms as “the translation of general values and ideas shared by a community – as to what right of wrong, adequate or inadequate, into performance instructions appropriate for and applicable to particular situations, specifying what is prescribed and forbidden as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioral dimension”. The definition makes it quite explicit that norms are intrinsically related ethico-moral issues. This, however, is a dimension Toury forcibly avoids. He never touches the issue himself, and is openly critical of the attempt to

incorporate ethical aspects in another target-oriented theory, skopos theory. The obvious reason for this unfortunate omission is Toury's wish to develop translation studies into a systematic, empirical, and most importantly, non-prescriptive scientific discipline. (Koskinen, 2000, p. 18)

Toury seems to support the idea that through translation something new, that is, something foreign has to be brought into the target culture by mentioning that, "much as translation entails the retention of aspects of the *source text*, it also involves certain adjustments to the requirements of the *target system*, and at the same time, a translation is always something which hasn't been there before: even in the case of *retranslation*, the resulting entity – that which actually enters the recipient culture – will definitely *not* have been there before" (Toury, 1995, p. 166). Yet his main emphasis is on building a purely descriptive and empirical discipline of Translation Studies, thus, he strictly avoids making any claims on ethics. Hence, although he neither makes a statement regarding ideological manipulation in translation nor offers any criteria or guidelines for evaluating such phenomena in terms of the ethics of translation, I think it is reasonable to infer from the basic principles of his approach that he would probably choose to describe such manipulations in terms of the norms, namely, the ideological norms, prevalent in the target society/culture without suggesting that they should be evaluated or criticized in any way.

Hans J. Vermeer's conception of translation ethics in his *skopos* theory seems to be similar to Toury's to a certain degree, for it is based on the notion of difference too. In *skopos* theory, a translation is assessed solely in terms of how well it fulfills its specific *skopos*, for Vermeer states: "The *skopos* theory merely states that the translator should be aware that some goal exists, and that any given goal is only one among many

possible ones. (How many goals are actually realizable is another matter. We might assume that in at least some cases the number of realizable goals is one only.) The important point is that a given source text does not have once correct or best translation only” (Vermeer, 2000, p. 228). Thus, it can be claimed that a translation is good as long as it fulfills its *skopos* in a satisfactory way, and that if the *skopos* of a translation necessitates that translation to be ethical (however this “ethical” is defined) then it has to be ethical. Hence, fulfilling the *skopos* comes before being ethical. These seem to be the two hypotheses on the conception of translation ethics that can be inferred from the basic principles of *skopostheorie*. Nevertheless, considering the fact that there might be an infinite number of *skopoi* assigned to a translation project, it can be argued that Vermeer does not offer any concrete criteria to determine whether a translation is ethical or not either. Yet Vermeer’s functionalist approach is quite different from Toury’s target-oriented, descriptive approach in a very important aspect. Besides the great liberty he assigns the translators with, he also saddles them with the responsibility of the process of translation as a whole. Thus, the translator is responsible for every decision s/he makes in the translation process, for Vermeer writes: “The translator is basically free to deviate from source-text functions (and strategies) and source-text producer’s/sender’s intentions as long as he informs the target text recipients about his procedure and its reason.” (1996, p. 82). He also points out that according to a general theory, any *skopos* is possible for translating, but that culture-specific conditions may prevent the acceptance of a *skopos* and/or a translation (= target-text) produced according to this *skopos*; and such conditions may include a certain concept of “translating” or “translation” (for example paraphrasing) or change of function from source to target-

text, etc (1996, p. 84). Therefore, he assigns the translator with the liberty to refuse to translate as well.

Given these outlines of *skopos*theorie, ideological manipulation in translation can be explained in terms of the change of *skopos*, that is, as the target text having a different purpose than that of the source text. Regarding this issue, Vermeer states: “The important change comes with the introduction of the ‘confession’ argument, i.e. that the translator has to inform the potential target-culture recipients about any deviations or changes in the source-text author's intention, whenever a new *skopos* is introduced, if such are the commissioner's and target-culture recipient’s expectations” (1996, p. 85). Though no more explanation is offered on the part of Vermeer on this “confession argument”, it seems to indicate the responsibility the translator has towards the potential readers, and that, in my opinion, is the responsibility to acknowledge whatever s/he has done with the source-text, how s/he translated, changed, or even ideologically manipulated it. And if the translator is not willing to take the responsibility of subjecting the source-text to ideological manipulation, or of “confessing” it, which is, as depicted in the previous chapters, something contradictory to the “implicit” nature of the great majority of ideological manipulations, s/he would better refuse to translate the source-text with such a *skopos*.

In her 1997 article, Rosemary Arrojo questions the belief in the possibility of elaborating a general ethics which could be implemented universally, covering all translation activities, regardless of the languages and the ideological, cultural, political, or historical interests and circumstances involved (Arrojo, 1997a, p. 6). As a result of this questioning she draws on the impossibility of formulating “a universal set of ethical

principles that could transcend history and ideology” (1997a, p. 6). Arrojo severely criticizes the traditional theories of translation for their “pretentious expectation that the very theory, the very science, the very method which they happen to defend or propose might eventually elaborate a set of universal principles that should rule over all translations and all translators, which already suggests a relationship between theory and practice, or between theorist and translator, which is necessarily inscribed within an asymmetrical power play in which the translator knows little and should thus not make any decisions or choices without the approval or the guidance of the specialist, the theoretician, the scientist, or the philosopher” (1997a, pp. 12-13). According to her, “this authoritarian scenario can only be devised on the basis of a belief in the possibility of the transcendental truths and values and, of course, a single, ‘correct’ reading and translation of any text; in other words, from such a perspective there is somewhere a universally acceptable translation ethics, and it is the task of the translation specialist to find it” (1997a, p. 13). In this problematic situation of the ethics of translation in the theoretical field of Translation Studies, she brings forth her suggestion, emphasizing the importance of responsibility as follows:

Within such a context, in which there’s no single translation ethics that can bridge the gap between the two languages and cultures involved or promote the interests of the cultures, languages and contexts that necessarily constitute any act of translation, the only coherent ethical principle to be adopted both by “subaltern” and “dominant” cultures and languages seems to be that of giving voice to the translator and explicitly unmasking the interventionist thrust which is inherent in any act of interpretation.[]The visible translator who is conscious of his or her role and who makes as explicit as possible the motivations, allegiances, and compromises of his or her interpretation is also the translator who must take responsibility for the texts he or she produces, as it is impossible to hide behind the anonymity of the ideal “invisibility” which has allegedly been given up. (Arrojo, 1997a, p. 18).

Highlighting the notion of the “visibility” of the translator in relation with responsibility and making explicit the motivations of his/her interpretation, she moves from the rejection of a universal set of ethical principles designated for translation, and approaches an ethics based on difference and responsibility. In her viewpoint, it is the acceptance of the difference and responsibilities which must go along with the “visibility” of the interests of translation and the theoretical statements dedicated to its understanding which will help translation studies emerge as a discipline in its own right, as well as developing its considerable potential as an appropriate field for the study of cultural and linguistic relations. “In such a context, the only sound universal principle to maintain is exactly that of the refusal of any absolute universal” (1997a, p. 22). She also claims that it is the recognition of the translator’s name as proper and rightful that will free the translator's visibility from the stigma of impropriety or abuse; and in the wake of post-structuralism and postmodernism, the visible translator's claim to bear his or her name may finally begin to change the age-old prejudices that have always ignored or humiliated the production of meaning that constitutes the inescapable task of any translation (1997b, p. 31).

According to Arrojo, “emphasizing the need for translators to take full responsibility for their inevitably authorial intervention in the writing of the target text, anti-essentialist research on the ethical implications of the translator’s visibility and of the notion of translation as ‘regulated transformation’ has certainly begun to offer us a much needed instrument not only to raise awareness among practicing translators about the conflicting relationships they tend to establish both with theory or ‘science’ and with their own work, but also to equip aspiring professionals with the critical background

which will allow them to become fully responsible translators, well aware of their authorial voices” (1998, p. 44). Thus, by rejecting the universality of translation ethics, Arrojo has brought the necessity of the consideration of the particular conditions of each translation project in relation to its evaluation as to its ethical stance to the foreground, and she has suggested this along with the responsibility of the translator which requires her/him, at the same time, to be visible. In this sense, ideological manipulation is also a fact of translation which has to be evaluated considering its particular conditions, and the one who has to justify her/his ideological aims and make her/his manipulation visible is, of course, the translator. Nevertheless, I find this suggestion of “confession”, in Vermeer's term, or “being visible”, in Arrojo's terms, in the sense of taking responsibility of the translation decisions on the part of the translator highly questionable when it comes to the violation of the ethics of translation via ideological manipulation which is something that has to be carried out, by its nature, implicitly, and thus, can hardly ever be confessed or made visible.

The Evaluation of the Theories in Question as to Their Ethical Stances Towards Ideological Manipulation

Offering the translator the liberty and the responsibility together as a package, Vermeer's *skopostheorie* is one step ahead of Toury's target-oriented approach which deliberately leaves the question for ethics out of his approach altogether. But still, some aspects of *skopostheorie* seem highly questionable as to its conception of ideological manipulation in terms of its ethics. For one thing, it seems to take the legitimacy of

every *skopos* for granted, thus, it lacks pointing out the necessity to question it in terms of ethical validity. For a translation to be deemed ethical by a theoretical approach, I think, the ethical validity of its *skopos* has to be questioned, even before considering the question of how well the translation fulfills its *skopos*. A source text can doubtlessly be translated in line with an infinite number of *skopoi*, but the important point is what those *skopoi* in themselves are, and what they are aimed at and what they imply.

With her addition of the notion of “loyalty” to the functionalist approach of Vermeer, Christiane Nord solidified the responsibility of the translator, emphasizing the importance of the expectations of the potential readers (of the source text author's intention). Intending to make up for a serious deficiency of *skopostheorie*, and bringing in a much deeper and sound sense of ethical concern, she contributed to the theory with a plausible answer to criticisms of lacking an ethical stance that focus on the statement “the translation purpose justifies the translation procedures”. Complementing this statement by pointing out that she found it acceptable for every translation case only if the translation purpose is in line with the communicative intentions of the author of the source text (1997, p. 124), and mentioning that there is also a moral responsibility not to deceive the readers (1997, p. 125), she did not only remind the concern for ethics in translation theory, but also rule out implicit ideological manipulation from the range of legitimate and/or ethically valid *skopoi* for translation projects.

Kaisa Koskinen states that “the critics of deconstruction are doubtless quite right in claiming that deconstruction as a philosophical stance or method that does not rule out the possibility of misuse and unethical implementation, let alone guarantee that those arguing in favour of it would always be morally impeccable in their private lives”

(Koskinen, 2000, p. 32). She adds that “no philosophy can be expected to accomplish that; but in my opinion the claim that deconstruction would be oblivious or indifferent to ethical aspects is far more difficult to sustain” (2000, p. 32). She aims to show that, “against some allegations, deconstruction is *not* necessarily amoral or anti-ethical. It does indeed involve aspects of ethical responsibility. But its ethical dimension, brought forth by the suspension of choice and by affirmation of difference and undecidability, does not give any directly applicable guidelines for ethical action” (2000, p. 32).

Considering the two previous theoretical approaches this paper deals with, it seems that the deconstructionist approach, in this respect, is no different in providing a precise description of their translational ethics. Nonetheless, it contributes to the consciousness of the ethics of translation, since, as Koskinen claims, “instead of formulating a ready-made ethics, postmodern ethics maintains that it is in the end our own responsibility, yours and mine, to evaluate the moral aspects of our situation and to act accordingly” (2000, p. 32). Thus, the emphasis is on “particular situations” as opposed to universal laws of ethics which have been the basis of the ethics of the traditional approaches to translation.

Koskinen also points out that “the view of translation as manipulation and other recent developments in translation studies have brought forth the issue of the visibility of translation” (2000, p. 68). She believes that “manipulation does not need to be a sneaky business, but undercover activity, leaving readers unaware of what they are actually reading, may lead to morally questionable situations, no matter how much of a standard procedure it is to leave out of metatextual information” (2000, p. 68).

Concerning with the ethics of translation from this perspective, Koskinen emphasizes

the role of the publisher as central, for “they can either offer or withhold information” (2000, p. 68). In her point of view, if translating is seen as a process of making choices, a point on which, I assume, almost all of the contemporary approaches agree, it follows by definition that it includes moral aspects and value judgements; and she defines ethics as attempts to evaluate and justify actions (Koskinen, 2000, p. 14).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In her 2008 work on “ideology in translation” and “ideological translation”, Alev Bulut argues that since it is a decision-making process, translation is intrinsically ideological. She illustrates that the decision can subconsciously be determined by a priority, an attitude or a view of life, adding that, in some types of translation and their sub-processes, however, this intrinsic and unintentional ideological feature may be added with “intentionality”, *viz.* intentionally made ideological decisions. Those intentional ideological renderings are said to be observed most frequently in translations of ideological, conceptual and political texts, and in those of texts which are produced in order to influence the recipients, such as news and advertisement scripts (Bulut, 2008, p.108, my translation).

The case study presented in this thesis focuses on *Evrimecilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists] (1999) which is written by Adnan Oktar under the pen name Harun Yahya. The book in question can be justly classified as a creationist “propaganda book” with its sole purpose of influencing its readers in a certain way, that is, to make them reject the theory of evolution and to embrace the idea of “creation” as the ultimate truth. Since it is written with such a clear-cut purpose and in accordance with a highly distinctive ideological agenda, as explicated in Chapter 4, none of the decisions made in the writing process of this book including, to our concern,

those of selectively translating and quoting *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin* (1888) can be expected to be unintentional. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, those selectively de(con)textualized quotations from Darwin's and his friends' personal letters are misleadingly presented as the translations of their confessions regarding the failure of the theory of evolution in a Turkish book with such an assertive name as *Evrincilerin İtirafı* [The Confessions of the Evolutionists]. This, indeed, is such an extreme case of intentionality in making deceptive ideological decisions that, as argued throughout this thesis, those quotations set evident examples of ideological manipulation that violate the ethics of translation.

Having provided an account of the relations of ideology and translation with the focus of the phenomena of ideological manipulation, appealing to discourse analysis, and having designated “de(con)textualization” as an ideological manipulation strategy in translation on the basis of the significance and necessity of “context” in the attribution/production of meaning, in Chapter 3, the ways in which the type of ideological manipulation in question violate the ethics of translation are further investigated. The presentation of the case study in Chapter 4 has covered the background of the case at hand with its contemporary and historical, and also theoretical and practical dimensions. Thus, taking its intended purposes, implications and its specific strategy of “de(con)textualization” into consideration, Harun Yahya's translational activity in question featuring an obvious case of ideological manipulation is claimed to be a definite violation of the ethics of translation.

The aim of the present study is to draw attention to the significance of the ethics of translation in the theoretical field of Translation Studies *via* the demonstration and

analysis of a case of ideological manipulation in translation illustrating the violation of ethics, and to question and evaluate the prominent contemporary theoretical approaches to translation as to their emphases on the ethics of translation and their conceptions and assessments of the phenomena of ideological manipulation in violation of the ethics of translation within their theoretical frameworks. The main principles of those contemporary translation theories are examined, in Chapter 2, in order to illustrate their emphases on translation ethics and to explicate their overall ethical standpoints. After having exhibited the significance of the phenomena of ideological manipulation for the ethics of translation by the presentation of the case study in Chapter 4, their conceptions and assessments of ideological manipulation in the framework of their translation ethics are further investigated in Chapter 5. As a result, it is brought out that in the face of such serious issues like the ethics of translation and ideological manipulation in relation, all of those translation theories in question remain inadequate, lacking the necessary emphasis on ethics and failing to propose any precise or satisfactory criteria for evaluating translations as to ethics.

The descriptive, target-oriented approach of Gideon Toury appears to avoid the question of ethics deliberately, for this would inevitably involve the evaluation of translations, which is something contradictory to his claim of remaining strictly descriptive. Thus, his conception of ideological manipulation can be nothing more than viewing it within the norms prevalent in the target culture, without making any reference to the ethics of translation. The functionalist approach of Hans J. Vermeer, namely, “*skopos*theorie” actually involves an attempt to integrate a criterion for the ethics of translation, bringing the notion of responsibility to the foreground. However,

this attempt of conditioning ethical translations to taking responsibility for every translation decision and to informing the recipients on whatever is done with the source-text does not offer any sufficient criterion for determining ethically valid translations, because, besides the fact that it is not plausible to think of an ideologically manipulated translation with a preface stating that it is ideologically manipulated, acknowledging such a manipulation does not justify it in any way either. Nevertheless, Christiane Nord's addition of the concept of “loyalty” to “*skopos*theorie” is seen as a progress as to its ethical stance by taking the expectations of the potential readers into consideration. Rosemary Arrojo and Lawrence Venuti, though they definitely follow distinct stances of the theory, seem to have post-structuralist approaches to translation. The common point of these post-structuralist approaches to translation as described from their viewpoints, that is, the highlighting of the notions of “difference” and the “visibility of the translator”, do signal a concern for ethics. Thus, it cannot be claimed that these post-structuralist approaches are totally anti-ethical as they are frequently accused of being. However, it should also be noted that they are no better than the previous approaches in terms of offering some intelligible and applicable criteria for assessing translations as to their ethical validity either.

Hence, it follows that none of the theoretical approaches questioned in this study are adequate and/or satisfactory in terms of their emphases and/or explanations on the ethics of translation or their conceptions and assessments of ideological manipulation in violation of translation ethics. Even the ones that seemingly take these issues into consideration in principle do fail to propose the theoretical criteria that is necessary for the practice of evaluating translations as to their ethical validity in academic studies and

for translation criticism.

To sum up, this thesis is intended to contribute to the development and progress of the discipline of Translation Studies by pointing to a very important notion connecting the theoretical and the practical fields of translation in academic studies, that is, the ethics of translation and its violation *via* ideological manipulation, and to raise awareness for the need to supply translation theories in general with adequate and satisfactory criteria for evaluating translations as to their ethical validity and for determining and assessing the phenomena of ideological manipulation in translation, an exemplary case of which is presented in detail in this thesis in order to convey the gravity of its social and cultural implications, from an ethical standpoint.

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