

RETHINKING ‘FLEXIBLE’ CAPITALISM:
EXPLORING THE FORMATION OF ‘FLEXIBLE’ CAPITALISM IN TURKEY
THROUGH THE CASE OF THE SHIPYARDS OF TUZLA/ISTANBUL

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BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

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Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı


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
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Thesis Abstract

Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı, “Rethinking ‘Flexible’ Capitalism:
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The Shipyards Of Tuzla/Istanbul”

This thesis deals with the formation of capitalist conduct in and around the shipyards of Tuzla (Istanbul). The complex web of relation between governmental policies, shipyard owners, ship owners, subcontractors and workers are conceived of upon the concept of ‘flexibility’. This concept does not assume a qualitative new form of capitalism but is deployed as a methodology, which puts capitalism within the problematic of power and subjectivity.

The multiplicity of relationships and contestations in and around the shipyards of Tuzla shall lead to an understanding of capital accumulation, which is understood as an attempt to universalize potentialities. It shall be argued that this very process is operative in that this attempt is steadily disrupted and thus leads to a reorganization of the forms to distribute power, contest it and contain resistances.

Tez Özeti

Suphi Nejat Ağırnaslı, “ ‘Esnek’ Kapitalizmi Yeniden Düşünmek:
Tuzla/İstanbul’daki Tersaneler Üzerinden Türkiye’de ‘Esnek’ Kapitalizmin
Şekillenişini İrdelemek”

Bu tez Tuzla (İstanbul) tersanelerindeki ve tersaneler etrafındaki kapitalist işleyişi ele alıyor. Hükümet politikaları, tersane sahipleri, armatörler, taşeronlar ve işçiler arasındaki karmaşık ilişki ağı ‘esneklik’ kavramı çerçevesinde irdeleniyor.

‘Esneklik’ kavramı niteliksel açıdan yeni bir kapitalizm biçimini önermekten ziyade kapitalizmi iktidar ve özne sorunsalı kapsamında ele alan bir metodoloji öneriyor.

Tuzla tersanelerindeki ve Tuzla tersaneleri etrafında dönen ilişkilerin ve karşı koyuşların çoğulluğu, sermaye birikiminin, potansiyaliteleri evrenselleştirme teşebbüsü olarak kavramsallaştırılmasını mümkün kılıyor. Kapitalist işleyişin, tam da sürekli kesintiye uğrayarak ve böylece iktidarı dağıtarak, iktidara yönelen karşı koyuşları ve direnişleri içirme biçimlerini yeniden örgütleyerek iş gördüğü iddia edilecektir.

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This thesis emerged as a by-product of a section in the history of Boğaziçi University and also the overall historical conflicts in Turkey between the years 2005-2011. This thesis owes a lot to the students, who established an initiative in Boğaziçi University during the Kurdish uprising in Diyarbakır, which they called “Boğaziçi-Diyarbakır’a”; this initiative should change its name and try to intervene into the political conflicts in Turkey during a time in which the left and the student movement weakened from day to day. “Toplumla Mücadele Yasası’na Hayır!,” “İz Bırkanlar Unutulmaz,” “Karanlığı Sorguluyoruz,” “Kardeşlik İstiyoruz,” “Tuzla İnisyatifi,” “Gazze Duvarı,” “Çayhane” and last but not least “Starbucks’ta Şenlik Var! Occupy Starbucks” should be the names of its (sometimes they just signed their leaflets as “Boğaziçi’nden Öğrenciler”/ “Students From Boğaziçi”) campaigns. I owe a lot to the students making this mini-movement possible. Especially the awesome guys from the “siyASİ” student review of Boğaziçi University have to be mentioned here. Since this thesis has its political concerns and calls to change the world, I have especially to mention those friends with whom I shared the ways in life, my *yoldaş*, making me what I am: My mom Nuran Ağırnaslı, my dad Hikmet Acun, my sister Berivan Elif Janset Saygılı. My extended family, my other *yoldaş*, were a crucial support to me during these times: Elif, Özge, Çınar, Pınar abla, ‘Kürt’ and dozens of friends, which I cannot count here. This thesis also owes much to my chats and talks with İlker, Can and my dad. The discussions with them gave me further insights of how to handle this problematic and also its very formulation.

I have learned a lot at from Zafer Yenal, Zeynep Gambetti, Faruk Birtok, Abbas Vali, Biray Kolluoğlu, Belgin Tekçe, Nazan Üstündağ, Nükhet Sirman, Yıldız Silier, Stephen Voss and also Koray Çalışkan. My thesis jury consisting of Ceren Özselçuk, Nükhet Sirman, Abbas Vali and Zeynep Gambetti helped me with their criticisms. For instance Nükhet Sirman argued that my concept of articulation has to elaborate more on the emergence of the diverse instances, which come together into being and also gave me insights for my narrative analysis on Flash TV. Abbas Vali showed me that it would be more useful if I would take the concept of uneven and combined development as Leon Trotsky deploys it. Furthermore he noted that I have to address the question of the origin of the subject (similar to Nükhet Sirman) and that Spinoza would be useful with this regard. Ceren Özselçuk noted that I should dwell more on the concept of primitive accumulation and should give more weight to my discussions regarding the post-colonial literature. These are criticisms, which can be put forward with regard to this thesis opening up new ways of inquiry for me. These are my shortcomings; they are also criticisms, which will force me to read more on these subjects. Especially Zeynep Gambetti’s lessons on social movements and Hannah Arendt were an important impetus for me to rethink Marx’ texts. She was not important to me just as a teacher but also with her friendly warmth. I have also to thank a lot to my advisor, Ceren Özselçuk, who guided me a lot, took care of me during this thesis and was patient enough to deal with me. This thesis would not become what it is now without her insistence and help. I am also indebted to the activists of Limter-iş, who helped me a lot during this thesis and with their friendly warmth. Last but not least it shall be noted that this thesis is just an *attempt*.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the common people, who became heroes in their attempt to change the world and free it from all sorts of power and oppression. But especially Süleyman Yeter, who fought for a socialist future in Turkey and was active in the union Limter-iş on the shipyards of Tuzla and far beyond it should be mentioned in this place. He was tortured and killed. He is symbolic for all the pain, joy and heroism to make this country a better place to live in. The struggle of Süleyman Yeter and of Limter-iş, their *hope* made me aware of Tuzla and made this thesis possible.

For Süleyman Yeter...

Never forget, never forgive, never give up!

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The shipyards of Tuzla (Istanbul) made the headlines in newspapers and on TV due to the struggle of the workers union Limter-iş, especially during the mortal ‘accidents’ on the shipyards, which reached their climax between the years 2006-2008. Workers died on the shipyards because of long working hours and insufficient workplace security measurements.¹ The shipyards in Tuzla were not just important because of the mortal ‘accidents’ but also because of the structure of the workflow within and around the shipyards as well as the political implications of the overall formation of the subjectivities related to the formation and transformation of the shipyards of Tuzla.

The activists of Limter-iş called Tuzla a ‘laboratory of neoliberalism’. As it shall be shown in the following pages and throughout the discussions on this inquiry, that Tuzla was indeed a ‘laboratory of neoliberalism’ enabling us to rethink the organization of contemporary capitalism. The shipyards of Tuzla show how much the processes of subjection/subject (trans)formation are constitutive elements in the organizational forms that contemporary capitalism assumes. Seen thus, the shipyards of Tuzla enable us to reflect on the very nature of capital accumulation as a contingent form of power/subjection. As we shall see, there is a complex web of relations in Tuzla between governments, ship-owners, shipyard owners, subcontractors and workers. This inquiry shall lead us to an understanding of capitalism in which the position and power potentials of subjects are negotiated,

¹ The union Limter-iş announced that 144 workers died on the shipyards up until 21 July, 2011: Twenty nine workers died in the year 2008, fifteen workers died between 2009-2010 and thirteen workers died between 2010-2011, see Güvenli Çalışma (2011).

contested and transformed and restructured constantly. A brief sketch of the relations in and around to the shipyards of Tuzla shall lead us to a theoretical approach towards capitalism aligned around the problematic of power and subjectivity.

Skecthing The History Of The Shipyards In Tuzla

The *Aydınlı Bay* in Tuzla was established as a shipyard region with a government decree in 1969. However, shipyard activity began to flourish here in the mid-1980s after the shipyards in Istanbul were forced by the government to move to Tuzla in 1983. The shipyards initially started to employ workers with long-term contracts and as a stable workforce but during the end of the 1980s and 1990s the shipyard owners cut down this stable workforce. This had its reasons.

Maritime activities are one of the major sites of international logistics. Approximately 90% of international trade activities are conducted on the seaway (T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı Deniz Ticareti Genel Müdürlüğü- Gemi Sicil ve İstatistik Daire Başkanlığı 2010, p.V) on a world-wide scale. Seen from this perspective ship construction and repair is closely related to the fluctuations of international trade activities as well as the international competition between shipyards. Subsequently this has direct effects on the shipyards of Tuzla. There is no guarantee for the industry in Tuzla that the shipyards will get orders and will be able to compete on the international arena. Also the time interval between the orders received by the shipyard owners cannot be measured in an exact manner due to global economic fluctuations.

Global competition presupposes low prices. Due to these complications the cost of labor was a burden for the shipyard owners after Tuzla became a center for

shipyards in the mid-1980s, as the industry underwent a boom. Especially with regard to repair activities shipyard owners did not need all of their workers all the time. The question was: If one shipyard would get just one order to paint a ship, what would the welders do or vice versa? But long-term employment was not just a problem for ship repair activities. Ship construction activities also forced the shipyard owners to lower their costs. The shipyard industry was and still is exposed to fluctuations within the global economy. In the mid-1980s the shipyard owners saw the costs for social security and long-lasting employment as a burden; the system of subcontraction emerged. Initially the state-run shipyards on the European side of Istanbul attempted to lower the amount of long-term workers in line with the neoliberal agenda, which emerged after the coup d'état in 1980. This spread to Tuzla and was a formative element of the shipyards in Tuzla. The shipyard owners encouraged their foremen to establish their own subcontraction companies and guaranteed that they would give orders to those subcontractors. Starting from repair activities subcontractors enabled the shipyard-owners to get rid of continuous payments for a stable workforce and social security expenditures. But in the years to come this tendency spread over to activities, which were not just related to ship repair but also to ship construction. The shipyard owners knew the quality of the work done by the foreman and could be sure that the work would continue to be done in the same quality. The foreman knew that they would not be lead to bankruptcy and would get orders from the shipyard owners. Thus seen there was a sort of an informal agreement between the shipyard owners and subcontractors that both would profit from such an enterprise.

The subcontractors seemed to be a good way to get rid of long-lasting costs. But the shipyard-owners wanted also to lower the prices for the orders they gave to

the subcontractors. The shipyard owners enforced other foremen and the workers within the teams of subcontractors again to establish another subcontraction firm and again claimed that they would give these new subcontractors orders; in this way they increased the number of subcontractors. Thus the shipyard owners cut the amount of their core workers down and by the same token established a competition among subcontractors so that they were able to control the prices on the market.

The whole workflow was based on a complex web of subcontractors, which were just working on the shipyards temporarily. After they finished their part on the ships they left the shipyard or the ship in question. Thus they were not fixed to one shipyard and the time span of their work changed from task to task. This implied that workers were hired and fired by the subcontractors according to the amount of orders received by the subcontractors from the shipyards. Since the space (the shipyard in question), the time span (time to finish a job) and the amount of workers required to finish an order varied for the subcontractors, the workers were just hired temporally and had no stable workplace. For instance one subcontractor could get an order to conduct a welding job on a ship requiring thirty workers for twenty days; after twenty days the subcontractor could get another order requiring just ten workers, thus the remaining twenty workers would have to seek a job with another subcontractor or remain unemployed until the subcontractor in question hired them again.

It should be mentioned that the subcontractors mobilized their workers from their (former) co-workers based upon relations of kinship or with reference to a common place of origin. This implies that workers were brought to Tuzla from outside of Istanbul when they heard from their kin or from their fellow county men that jobs were available in Tuzla. In other cases subcontractors directly contacted

people in their place of origin and brought them to Tuzla as their workers. Thus waves of migrants came to Istanbul due to economic difficulties in the countryside, fantasies of upward mobility or as an effect of conflicts related to ethnicity (Kurds) or religious sects (Alawites). Thus this shows how much the formation of the work force in Tuzla is embedded within the relationship of the Turkish state to its subjects. The waves of migration Tuzla developed parallel to the general waves of migration to Istanbul.

The overall organization of the workflow as well as the political conjuncture in which the shipyards emerged was highly marked by the political consequences of the coup d'état in 1980 and the neoliberal agenda following it. This coup was a counter-revolution against the leftist mass movement of the 1960's/1970's; it was an attempt of the Turkish state to establish order.² This coup d'état was followed immediately by a war between the Kurds and the Turkish state as well as Sunni attacks towards Alawites. In these times a shift from ISI policies to an export oriented economy took place in Turkey and workers rights for social security were dismantled. Unions, which were not members of the corporatist Türk-ış confederation, were banned. Thus the shipyards of Tuzla emerged in a conjuncture in which the Turkish state deployed repression towards diverse social groups and by the same token economic policies, which forced further migration from the countryside to the big cities. Seen from such a perspective it is impossible to understand the formation of the subjects in Tuzla without taking these political events into consideration, since waves of migration to Tuzla are related to the effects of these policies and the formation process of subjectivities in and around the shipyards of Tuzla.

² It would be interesting to think about the coup d'état of 1980 in reviewing Franz Neumann's work *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944*.

Most of the shipyards in Tuzla had no legal permission to work up until 2008 and in addition could get public subsidies and were exempted from paying taxes for their activities. Governments were able to support their clientele (in this case the shipyard owners), while opening a realm for non-legal conduct. This non-legality had two major effects. On the one hand the shipyard owners could use public funds for activities, which were not related to ship construction/repair; the shipyard owners could use these funds in a corrupt manner. On the other hand, state officials could also govern their clientele in pushing them to a realm of non-legality. If a conflict emerged between state officials and shipyard owners the activities of the latter could be announced as illegal and thus would have consequences. The whole issue becomes more complex if we consider that there are different state officials and different clientele and each knows the non-legal activities of the other. Seen from this perspective legality might become the weapon of the faction that can make claims on it without having to fear to be the target of a similar strike from the oppositional faction. Not only the shipyard owners, but also the subcontractors operated in a non-legal field and this seemed to be functional in the relationship between both of them. But interestingly, decisions by the International Maritime Organization (a sub-organization of the United Nations regulating maritime activities) and contracts between ship-owners (those who order and run ships) and shipyard owners had legal consequences for the parties involved.

In 2008 the Shipyards of Tuzla underwent a boom in the order of new ships. The main reason for this was that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) prohibited the sailing of ships which were older than fifteen years old from 2005 on; ships with single hulls would also not be permitted to sail after 2015 (Odman & Akdemir, 2008, p.63). Turkey and India were among the cheapest countries for ship

construction and repair. The workflow of constructing ships and their repair implied certain terms of agreements: The shipyard owners negotiated contracts with ship owners according to which the shipyard owners had to complete the construction and repair of ships. For each day they exceeded the planned deadline they had to pay penalties to the ship owners; thus the working day became long and dense for the shipyard workers. Working days up until 12 hours were no exception. A huge amount of workers were mobilized by subcontractors from Tuzla as well as from other parts of Turkey. The dense and long working days and the fact that no real workplace security measures were taken led to the mortal ‘accidents’.

Thus especially with regard to the relationship between ship owners and shipyard owners the contracts, which were signed had validity and each party tried to govern its relation to the other in using and interpreting the terms of agreement to get an advantage and counteract the other to gain advantages from the whole enterprise. While the decision of the IMO and the contracts between ship owners and shipyard owners had consequences, national labor laws did not.

The Labor Act 4857 released in the year 2003 for instance prescribed that the central tasks for the production of goods/services could not be done in deploying subcontractors, these tasks had to be done by the main company (in this case by the shipyards). But this law was violated since the whole workflow on the shipyards was based on a complex web of subcontractors. Outsourcing activities to subcontractors enabled the shipyard owners to be exempted from paying taxes due to legal prescriptions.

The subcontractors did not pay the full amount of legally prescribed social security benefits for workers upon the actual working days and wages. On legal documents the subcontractors minimized the workdays and the wages of the workers

so that they could minimize their labor costs. In most of the cases they did not even pay any legally prescribed social security cost and even not the wages. Seen from his perspective the subcontractors as well as the shipyard owners operated on a non-legal field.

Legal authorities did not intervene until a conflict among shipyard owners, subcontractors, workers and the union (Linter-iş) emerged and until one of the conflicting parties called for the legal instances. Thus the non-legal operation on the shipyards was not sanctioned until the state intervened and legal prescriptions were actualized. The non-legal conduct of shipyard owners and subcontractors could be sanctioned by the state just under these circumstances. As we shall see, laws were not the first and only instance the parties called for within conflicts but it was an effective means to be deployed within a strategy to control and contest each other. The non-legal field on which the shipyard owners and subcontractors operated had not to be illegal in the sense that violating the laws would lead immediately to sanctions. Violating the laws would mean that the violator would be sanctioned, but this was not the case; thus non-legal conduct would not immediately lead to legal consequences as for example the shutting down of shipyards or financial penalties.

One of the parties had to sue the other one. But since both operated on a non-legal field, this was not the first step to be taken. Thus non-legality could become illegality insofar as legal instances were called by one of the conflicting parties. Especially conflicts between workers and subcontractors could take the form of direct action and coercion in addition to/instead of legal processes on the courts, as it shall be shown.

‘Flexibility’ As An Approach

Besides the micro-politics on the shipyards in Tuzla, the overall formation of the relations and subjectivities in question also involved the relationship of the state to its subjects. The formation of Tuzla as a shipyard region and the relationships enabling shipyard owners to finance their enterprises will show how far connections between the shipyard owners and state officials opened up a space of possibilities for capital accumulation to take place. It shall just be mentioned that the shipyard owners had close ties to state officials and some were even politically active in the leading parties of Turkey. As we shall see the relationship of the shipyard owners to state officials was a very complex one and played a role in getting funds for the enterprise.

This leads us to a discussion of whether it is possible to speak of capital accumulation as a linear process with a linear enfolding logic. The account given in this inquiry argues for the impossibility to speak of the formation of capitalist conduct in Tuzla upon capital accumulation as a process having its own linear logic without reflecting on the subjects as a constitutive element of capitalist conduct. In this complex web of relations we see that a multiplicity of factors and possibilities are opened up for the subjects to govern and relate to the field in which they act. Thus the formation and transformation of the subjects in and around the shipyards of Tuzla leads us to a field in which *gaining, sustaining and enlarging power* and the *accumulation of capital* have to be related theoretically.

The subjects in question did not just emerge as a result of the rationale of maximizing profits but also as a result of the economic policies of the Turkish state

as well as the demographic transformations and redistribution of power/wealth resulting from the relation of the Turkish state to its subjects. Also, the legal framework, which the actors (governments, ship owners, shipyard owners, subcontractors, workers, Limter-iş) violate/call for during their conduct can not be understood without taking into consideration the relationship between the Turkish state and its subjects. This relation also implies the fact that the Turkish state did not just establish one form of relationship with its subjects but dealt with them selectively and differently in diverse conjunctures. Thus here we cannot speak of the relationship between the state and its subjects in terms of citizenship as a universal category and legality as a homogenous and monopolized framework to regulate quotidian relationships. But as we shall see in the shipyards in Tuzla, even this non-universality of the law seems to have opened up a space for the emergence of diverse governmental strategies of the subjects involved in the capitalist conduct in and around the shipyards of Tuzla. The subjects involved in this process encounter each other and structure the field of their agency within a given conjuncture. All these subjects have a historical continuity/discontinuity. Seen from this perspective their encounter seems to resemble what might be called *uneven and combined development*. Here ‘development’ does not mean a successful linear progression and ‘combination’; it rather means a constantly changing structure opening up forms of encounter, a conjunction, an *articulation*. The subjects in question emerge due to diverse effects and themselves are effective but they are transforming each other and the field of their conduct in Tuzla; they come into being as constitutive elements of *Tuzla the shipyards in Tuzla*, although their subjectivity can not be reduced to this encounter.

As the following pages will show, such a reading will enable us to establish a relationship between the micro-politics on the shop floor and the transformation of the relationship between the state and its subjects; a relationship between capitalist conduct and legality.

This relationship will enable us to call the field of possibilities on the shipyards of Tuzla ‘flexible’ capitalism. Since this concept does not suggest a new kind of capitalism it is put into quotation marks. If capitalist conduct is read within a complex web and encounters of continuities, discontinuities, contestations and struggles of subject formation and transformation processes then we can not speak of a linear progressing enfolding the logic of capital. With this regard the notion of ‘flexibility’ designates the complex field of possibilities and subjectivities enabling the deployment of a multiplicity of strategies for the subjects to govern and contest each other, opening a contingent realm for subjectivities to emerge. ‘Flexibility’ suggests such a *structure* to understand the relationships on the shipyards in Tuzla. Only a rigid matter can be flexible; flexibility does not suggest liquidity or unstructured accidental events. Thus the relations on the shipyards of Tuzla do not emerge by chance but constitute in their complexity diverse possibilities and also reshape these. The notion of ‘flexibility’ does not imply an accidental and indefinable gambling of actors but a theoretical sensitivity towards conjunctures structuring a complex field of interactions. It implies a certain reading of capitalism, which suggests that the complex relations/formations of subjects are constitutive of capitalist conduct and that this complexity opens up diverse possibilities for the subjects to govern and relate to this complexity. Seen from such a point of view capital accumulation seems like it cannot be read as a process with an linear enfolding logic, its attempt for linear progression (for reproduction) an the very

failure of it opens up a realm of tension, which constantly reorganizes capitalist conduct.

The subjects in and around the shipyards in Tuzla are constituted and re-constituted within a multiplicity of struggles; they emerge on a ground in which the gaining of power is closely directed by the attempt to enlarge the field of possibilities to contest/gain/redistribute power. With this regard the accumulation of capital seems to be just an attempt to establish an index or an abstraction of all these social relations, an *attempt* to translate forms of subjection and government of social relationships into a universal language; potentialities (social context, time, social relations, forms of subjection and government) are *attempted* to be translated on a universal scale. This attempt is done by the entrepreneurs and as a necessity of capitalist conduct to gain sustainability. This *attempt* seems to be the field on which diverse potentialities attempted to be able to speak to each other and open another more complex field for contestation. Capitalism and capital accumulation seem to be a ground on which diverse potentialities (social context, time, social relations, forms of subjection and government) attempt to establish a universal language to cope with each other on a national/international scale and beyond the temporal context of their emergence. Thus capitalism seems to give a format to these diverse practices of conducting power and sustaining/governing them. But the maximization of profit is not the only form power might assume; this is why it is possible to speak of capital accumulation as an *attempt for universalizing potentialities for power* (weaving, organizing and governing social relationships; forms of subjection).³ We shall see

³ The Turkish word for enterprise *teşebbüs* (attempt/trial) or *girişim* (an initiated attempt) points at the contingent character of capitalist conduct and the very possibilities that it might fail. For an account regarding the complex character of personal relations and decisions, which cannot just be reduced to a rationality to maximize profit, see the example of Apple Computer Inc. The example of Apple shows that a certain spirit to change the world (the employers, who tried to convince software companies to

that the subjects in and around the shipyards of Tuzla try to deploy diverse strategies to govern their field of possibilities and also to bypass each other to maximize their advantages from business. But their conduct is not just aligned around a rationality of lowering costs and maximizing profits; their conduct overlaps with social relations, which cannot be reduced to such rationality. Even the value of a ship and the profit gained from it was not a simple matter of extracting surplus value from workers but also an issue related to a multiplicity of struggles between all the parties involved. The shipyard owners and ship owners had to cope with international regulations governing maritime activity as well as the contracts they signed with each other. On the other hand the shipyard owners could violate national laws. These two areas and their transgression structured the field of possibilities for each subject involved in the process. But there was no guarantee that the process of profit maximization would mean immediately a culmination of potentials, since there was no guarantee that the enterprise could be sustained due to the non-legal conduct of the parties involved and conflicts, which might lead to bankruptcy of, advantages and disadvantages for one of the parties. The concept of capital accumulation seems to assume a linear temporality in which potentialities (weaving, organizing and governing social relationships; forms of subjection) are successively culminated. But the shipyards in Tuzla show that this temporality might be disturbed, changed and transformed. Thus it becomes impossible to speak of the homogeneity of time, which seems to be suggested by the concept of capital accumulation. This is why capital accumulation seems just to be an *attempt*.

write applications of Macs call themselves 'Evangelists' –this seems to resemble Max Weber), to lead technological innovations is in conflict with making profitable decisions and also conflicts regarding personal power within the company, see Carlton (1997). Also the whole story of the transformation of Haloid Company to what is now known as Xerox is interesting with this regard, see Dessauer (1971).

Also the laws of the Turkish state did not assume universal validity but were just one of the instances, which could gain effectiveness during conflicts. The non-universality of the laws of the Turkish state and its relation to non-legality seem to open up a field for profit maximization on the shipyards in Tuzla but could also be a threat to its sustainability. Thus we see that not just capital accumulation is an attempt, but also the validity of national laws is effective in its non-fulfillment. Thus the laws of the Turkish state are invoked selectively. Here again the laws of the Turkish state *attempt to expose* a universal validity. With this regard a multiplicity of governmental strategies (those strategies deployed by the subjects to manage the extent and functionality of their relationship in a given conjuncture and for prospective purposes) emerge amongst the subjects in and around the shipyards of Tuzla. Seen from this point of view it seems that this makes it possible for capitalist conduct in Tuzla to assume ‘flexibility’.

This character of abstract fields attempting to expose universal validity (Turkish law, capital accumulation) and the very possibility of the failure of these attempts seems to enable the subjects involved in Tuzla to gain positions and loose them or even contest the very implications of the positions in question; it seems to open up a realm in which it can be claimed that capitalist conduct in Tuzla assumes a ‘flexible’ character. This flexibility shows us that capitalism cannot be understood without taking into consideration subject formation/transformation processes and their contingency. This contingency formulated as ‘flexibility’ would thus be a political reading of capitalism. Seen in this light this thesis derives its main impetus from theoretical discussions, which attempt to read Marx while reflecting on Foucault.

The complex web of relations and the political implications of the conflicts in Tuzla shall be shown in what shall follow. This inquiry is based on observations, which I made during the actions of Limter-iş in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. After having decided to carry out this research I visited Tuzla during the years 2008-2011 to conduct my fieldwork. It shall be noted that while approximately 30,000 workers were employed in Tuzla in 2008 just 5.000 were employed after the global financial crisis in the same year. The actions of Limter-iş reached their climax in this year before the crisis. The shipyard owners and the government were ignorant and aggressive towards Limter-iş. But after the crisis and with the firing of thousands of workers, workplace security measurements were taken more seriously (although mortal ‘accidents’ did not come to an end) and the working hours were decreased. Thus by the time I decided to conduct my fieldwork, Tuzla had changed, and my luck was that it was possible for me to observe the relationships in and around the shipyards intensively before the crisis. But I adopted a systematic approach towards the field after the crisis of 2008.

This inquiry is centered on the year 2008, since the sector underwent its boom during this year and also faced union struggles and the crisis. Seen from this perspective much of my work was a retrospective one. I interviewed and engaged in casual conversations with with union activists and workers during 2006-2008 and conducted interviews with them just after 2008. It was also possible for me to reach subcontractors and some higher officials on the shipyards. Initially my inquiry was highly motivated by two major actions of Limter-iş and problems of the union to mobilize workers to their actions. The actions were a success in raising public awareness towards the conditions in Tuzla but did not lead to the establishment of an organized mass basis for the union. My initial question was centered on this problem.

But as I got deeper into the field I had to look at the overall organization of the shipyards in Tuzla. Thus with time I also decided to look at the shipyard owners, but it was not possible for me to come into contact with them. I had to scan newspaper articles to reconstruct their stories, since they also showed how relations to state officials and non-legal conduct were related to capitalist conduct; this inquiry consists of observations, informal chats, in-depth interviews and newspaper recollections in order to sketch the formation and contestation of capitalist conduct in and around the shipyards in Tuzla especially with a focus on the events in 2008. It should be mentioned that the names of the people, whom I interviewed will be withheld due to field in which they move, one characterized by the vague space between legality and non-legality. This is also the reason why much of the interviews could just be noted down but not recorded.

Outline Of The Chapters

In *Chapter 2*, the literature on Tuzla shall be reviewed and it shall be argued that these accounts come short of providing a theoretical account on subject formation/transformation processes as a constitutive element of the complex relations in Tuzla. The role of the state as well as the concepts of legality, non-legality and illegality shall be shown as constitutive elements within the workflow of the shipyards in Tuzla. Departing from this sketch it shall be stated that the Regulation Approach (RA) opens up a field to understand changes in the organizational forms of capitalist conduct. But in approaching these changes the RA vacillates between taking subject formation as a constitutive element of these shifts into account and perceiving capital accumulation as a process with an inherent

enfolding logic. The struggles on the shipyards of Tuzla between shipyard owners, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and workers shall show how far capital accumulation is a matter of a complex web of struggles, which can not just be reduced to economic rationality.

With this regard in *Chapter 3* it shall be shown that subjectivity and a multiplicity of struggles enabled these organizational shifts in capitalist conduct. It shall be argued that capitalist conduct and the arrangement of subjects is political and thus the shifts of the organizational forms of this conduct can only be conceived of if we move from a discussion of capitalism to one of politics. Thus the very structure of the political in Turkey shall lead us to a point in which we will conceive not just of the workflow in Tuzla as a flexible one but also Turkish politics as based upon fragmenting society. It shall be mentioned that working conditions changed on the shipyards after 2008. This was a conjuncture in which the global ‘financial’ crisis emerged, the union Limter-iş launched major actions and a conflict arose between nationalists/republicans and the AKP (Justice and development Party) government. This conjuncture shall show how much the struggle on and around the shipyards is embedded within an encounter of diverse political agendas and how this struggle shows the very political fragmentation in Turkey.

In *Chapter 4* the very forms of a possibility of an antagonistic subject will be explored as well as what this might open up for revolutionary intervention.

CHAPTER 2 'FLEXIBILITY' A POLITICAL READING OF CAPITALIST CONDUCT

In what will follow the theoretical field of this inquiry shall be explained. Literature on the shipyards of Tuzla shall be introduced briefly. It shall be stated that this literature falls short of accounting for a complex web of subject formation processes as a constitutive element of capitalist conduct on the shipyards in Tuzla and that it does not develop a conceptual discussion between the *gaining power* and '*accumulation of capital*'. It shall be claimed that such a discussion will open up a theoretical field in which the power relations in and around the shipyards of Tuzla can just be understood in reflecting on the relationship of the sovereign to its subjects. Departing from this critique the literature on Tuzla shall be reviewed more explicitly. The constant change of the subjects in question and their positions shall show how 'flexible' capitalist conduct is. This flexibility shall make it possible to claim that capital accumulation has not an enfolding logic but that capitalist conduct on the shipyards in Tuzla takes place in a contingent sphere of encounters, struggles and contestations. Thus seen, the notion of 'flexibility' shall validate the claim that capitalist conduct should be read upon complex subject formation and transformation processes and thus a political reading of capitalism.

The brief sketch of the shipyards of Tuzla given in the *Introduction* showed us that the establishment of 'flexible' capitalism cannot *just* be reduced to an approach having as its main focus the deregulation of formerly "formal" conditions of work and redistribution. What seems to have taken place here is a political process involving state violence (the coup d'état in 1980, a selective violence and discrimination and thus the transformation of populations), a formation process of a

working-class with non-working class origins very similar to processes of *primitive accumulation*⁴; a vague relationship between legality and non-legality, neo-liberal state policies of dismantling social security benefits and supporting an export-oriented strategy of accumulation as well as a multiplicity of dynamics regarding international trade/capitalism. Regarding to the following discussion it can be said that the organization of capitalist conduct in Tuzla seems to have been articulated within a greater problem of the transformation of the whole society resembling discussions on what could roughly be called *uneven and combined development*.⁵ Seen from such a point of view, the discussion, which is headed towards here, seems also to resemble the debate among Marxists upon the concept of *modes of production, articulation and social formation*.⁶

It is hard of speak of the emergence of ‘flexible’ capitalism in Tuzla just within a narrow sense of the dismantling of formal social security benefits and legally sanctioned work conditions. The kind of flexibility in question seems to concern a field in which multiple strategies of subjection and power as well as the distribution of the latter are structured within an encounter of diverse subjects and in a constant flux. These subjectivities seem to have emerged due to the relation of the

⁴ Primitive accumulation is the separation of the laborer from her/his means of production by deploying different forms of violence (coercion, taxes etc.).

⁵ The concept of *uneven and combined development* might –initially discussed by Leon Trotzki– resonate a certain notion of teleology and historicism; at least such a reading seems to be possible regardless of its motive to break with such an approach. The notion of development could at least be read as a change of the field of possibilities and the ground to contest the distribution of power as well as the emergence of subjectivities rather than a continuous line of enfolding succession. Thus the notion of development would imply the contingency of unevenness as a defining element. Here the concept of *uneven and combined development* is just deployed to give an initial idea regarding where this theoretical discussion is heading towards; thus this concept should not be taken literally here and it will not be deployed as a key concept.

⁶ Similar to the concept of *uneven and combined development* the indication of this debate should enable the reader to follow the line of reasoning and theoretical ties of our discussion on the contingent formation of flexible capitalism as a field of possibilities for the distribution, contestation and negotiation of power/subjectivity. For a background of this discussion see Hindess and Hirst (1977) Wolpe (1980) Vali (1993).

sovereign to its subjects. Thus the latter could be accounted for upon historical breaks, continuities, discontinuities and contestations (a genealogy) of this relationship.

The relationship in question seems to have emerged and have been negotiated within a neo-liberal legal framework in which diverse subjects, who emerged within continuities, breaks and transformations of the relationship between the state and its subjects (as well as the *effects* of these processes and their encounter) seems to have encountered each other and thus constantly structured and re-structured their relations. Here the ‘accumulation of capital’ seems to coincide with the distribution of power and a constant reshaping of the possibilities how this power can be negotiated and claimed. It seems that we have to go into a conceptual discussion regarding the relationship between the concept of power/subjection and capital accumulation.

Migration of people to Tuzla in order to work on the shipyards and the possibility that workers can become subcontractors shall be discussed upon the concept of *primitive accumulation*. It will be argued that ‘flexible’ capitalism is based on dispossessing subjects but not excluding them from the possibilities to change their positions. Laborers might be separated from their material possibilities to produce things and thus become workers. But the material belongings are not the only ‘means of production’ (these have to be seen not as material belongings but as social relations). The very possibility that they can become subcontractors shows that it would be misleading if we conceive of primitive accumulation as dispossession. There is also a resistance towards being dispossessed and becoming a worker. It seems that ‘flexible’ capitalism is opening up a room for this resistance in which forms of self-employment or subcontractation are the very forms of containing

resistance and channeling the self-valorization of labor into the politics of capitalist conduct.

The conditions in Tuzla seem not to have been just deregulated upon legislative measures. As we will see in the stories of the shipyard owners, subcontractors and workers even the function of written laws released by state authorities seem to be open to debate; it seems as if the laws open up a realm for non-legality and are functional as supplementary utensil as the agreements and disagreements on this field are negotiated. Seen from such a point of view it seems as if the Turkish state did not establish a universal notion of citizenship equally valid for all its subjects and its strategies to govern the population selectively have opened the way for a flexible realm in which positions can be negotiated. Thus the cracks, continuities and contestation around the *law* and the *sovereign* seem to have paved the way for other ways to regulate daily conduct and reformulate these regulations.⁷ In line with this argument we might propose that the failure of the sovereign to universalize its laws and thus itself has paved the way for a flexible negotiation of positions. Following this argument we may claim that flexible capitalism in Tuzla emerged from this non-universality of the *law* and also of the non-homogeneity of those who formulate it. The *law* and the sovereign seem to have attempted to universalize themselves. If universalization is formulated as an *attempt*, then it might be suggested that the possibility of its non-fulfillment opens up a realm for the negotiation of power relations. As we saw in our brief sketch and as it will be shown more in detail in the following chapters, the Labor Act 4857 was not fulfilled and some minor changes in its formulation were supplemented by regulations after 2008, the regulation of the International Maritime Organization were followed and led to a

⁷ It shall be noted that international political developments were also of crucial importance, since maritime activity has always an international dimension.

boom of the industry. Thus it is interesting that here we see a selective universal character of the laws and regulations. It seems as if flexible capitalism in Tuzla emerged out of diverse forms of regulation within and beyond legal institutions. The call for the latter seems to be just a vehicle for the contestation of the positions and the distribution of power.

All these seems to give us enough matter to speak of flexibility to understand the form capitalism takes at the shipyards in Tuzla as a contingent space of negotiating positions. Such an understanding of flexible capitalism would imply that the concept could not just be reduced to a rationality of economic profit but that the latter implies contingent power relations. In line with such an argument the accumulation of capital would be just an abstraction of an index of the breaks, continuities and transformations of gained power relations and a format in which these relations attempt to be translated to a universal language of economic profitability within the very dynamic structure of capitalist conduct. But since the field in question implies a multiplicity of subjects and their struggles, this culmination of capital as an abstract index of potentialities (weaving, organizing and governing social relationships; forms of subjection), which might be actualized to enlarge the field of possibilities for the subjects in question can not be taken for granted; there is no linear culmination but a contingency. It shall be noted that literature on the shipyards of Tuzla does not account for capitalist conduct on the shipyards of Tuzla within the problematic of power/subjectivity.

Literature on the shipyards in Tuzla⁸ has remained rather descriptive, the inquiry of the *Tuzla Investigation Group* is an exception with this regard, as it shall be shown later on. The descriptive character of the accounts related to the shipyards

⁸ Odman, A. E. (2000), Akdemir (2008), Odman (2008), Odman and Akdemir (2008); Odman, A. (2008), Tuzla Araştırma Grubu (2009)

of Tuzla is problematic. They describe that the workflow in Tuzla is organized around a complex web of subcontractors, that the workers came with waves of migration to Tuzla, that laws are violated and that the shipyard owners do not take workplace security measurements. But conflicts and subject formation processes are not taken into consideration as a constitutive element for the emergence of capitalist conduct in and around the shipyards of Tuzla. Yet, without taking into consideration the conjunction of a multiplicity of struggles it seems not to be possible even to describe the relations in question.

The major account on Tuzla is the MA thesis of Nevra Akdemir, subsequently published as a book. Akdemir (2008) concentrates on the organization process of the production of goods/services in Tuzla. She accounts for the emergence of the subcontracting system just as a matter of profitability and without taking into consideration the conflictual relations between subcontractors and shipyard owners. The state subsidies to the shipyards are mentioned but the fact that the shipyards had no legal permission is not problematized. The work of Odman and Akdemir (2008) goes more into the details of Tuzla and the events in 2008 but this account remains also on a descriptive ground, without the elaboration of a theoretical framework. But it has to be admitted that this latter article takes the demographic origins of the workers more into account and thus also opens a field in which the power relations on the shop floor are related at least to waves of migration. The other works by Odman concentrate more on the neoliberal restructuring of Turkish labor legislation and their institutional context, although this is a significant step forward in the sense that it embeds Tuzla into a greater sphere of political/demographic transformations (Odman, 2008; Odman A. E., 2000; Odman A., 2008). Akdemir as well as Odman were active within the *Monitoring And Investigation Commission For The Shipyard*

Region Of Tuzla initiated by Limter-iş to make the mortal ‘accidents’ on the shipyards public. Their work might not develop a theoretical approach but made a huge contribution to the debates on Tuzla.⁹

The Tuzla Investigation Group of the review called ‘Toplum ve Kuram – Lêkolîn û Xebatên Kurdî’ explores the shipyards upon the theoretical framework of Bob Jessop and concentrates on the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds within the formation process of the labor force in Tuzla (Akdemir, 2008; Tuzla Araştırma Grubu, 2009, p. 119 ff). This account opens up a theoretical framework in which the formation of the Kurdish workforce and the formation of the shipyards are understood within the conflict between Kurds and the Turkish state. The debate is aligned upon a discussion of the failure of the hegemonic project of the Turkish state to establish a homogenous population based on Turkish identity and the counter-hegemony established by the PKK. But this account does not go into the details of the quotidian work-relationships and forms of the distribution/contestation of power around the shipyards. Thus it is very illuminating with respect to the starting point of the discussion, but it does not touch a conceptual discussion on flexible capitalism in general.

I shall try to develop a relationship between the quotidian quest for power around the shipyards in Tuzla and the overall politics paving the way for the emergence of the subjectivities in the shipyards of Tuzla. For the sake of such a discussion I shall further go on to look of how flexible capitalism was accounted for:

⁹ Odman at least interpreted the struggle of Limter-iş as ‘a struggle for rights transcending legality’ in supporting and thus posing the problematic between legality and non-legality with regard of the direct actions of the union Limter-iş. In the following pages this struggle should be rendered. But for the time being it shall be noted that Limter-iş called its form of struggle a ‘legitimate’ one, which implies that the union did not reduce its struggle to legal rights but also to confrontations beyond the legally permitted forms of union activity. The notion of legitimate versus legal struggle was put forward by Limter-iş, Odman supports this notion as a political stance without going into a theoretical debate of the relationship between legality and non-legality/illegality . See (sendika.org, 2008)

The initial discussion shall be that the Regulation Approach¹⁰ –although it is not a homogenous ‘School’- is open to be read upon a straightforward notion of regulation understood as institutional measurements to sustain economic growth. It shall be claimed that such an approach would imply a logic of capital accumulation, which is taken for granted and just mobilizing the institutional framework to sustain itself. So the Regulation School is open to be read in a way in which contingency and the distribution of power relations (as well as its different forms) play a role in the constitution of ‘flexible’ capitalism. But the diverse subjectivities emerging out of complex political processes as well as their struggles seem to be embedded within a framework in which organizational forms and political institutions are transformed for the sake of profit maximization in a smooth way. According to this approach capital accumulation faces crisis and capitalist conduct can be reorganized. Thus capitalism is organized continuously to sustain growth. But their framework is centered on the concept of growth in which politics is consumed by the necessities of capital accumulation. But this seems to imply a notion of politics that is just reduced to institutional measures to sustain profitability. However the non-sustainability of the temporal culmination of capital is not seen within a complex web and struggle of subjectivities but explained within a notion of politics, which is centered on legal frameworks and institutions, as we shall see later on.

With regard to this critique it seems that capital accumulation itself has to be approached upon a conceptual framework of power to understand the contestations on the shipyards of Tuzla. With this regard Read (2003) opens up a realm to approach capital accumulation and power. But the modifications and the field opened

¹⁰ e.g. Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1997), Lipietz and Cameron (1997), Lipietz and Vale (1988), Jessop (1972), Jessop and Kastendiek and Nielsen and Pedersen (1991); Elam in Amin (1997); Jessop and Sum (2006), Jessop (2005)

up for the contestations of power positions seem not just to be reducible to the quotidian conduct in Tuzla but also to be related to the broader social in which they can emerge. Such a field implies contingency as a constitutive element of flexibility.

The Regulation Approach opens up such a realm in that it also admits that power configurations within the state as well as workers resistances had played a role in the formation of flexible capitalism. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt proceed from such a point of view and emphasize the constitutive character of power/subjectivity in understanding contemporary capitalism and its worldwide crisis. But although they emphasize power relations within this process of constitution/subversion, their account has to be brought into a dialogue with discussions related to the question where the subjectivities contesting power relations and reconfiguring them stem from. In the case of the shipyards of Tuzla it seems that here we have to look on the characteristics of the sovereign. Thus a dialogue between Negri/Hardt and Chakrabarty/Chatterjee seem to be of crucial importance. The latter show how the relation of the sovereign to its subjects is a constitutive moment within the emergence of capitalist conduct and a politics, that goes beyond the notions of legality and citizenship. To understand the emergence of 'flexible' capitalism as well as the changes on the shipyards in Tuzla after the worldwide economic crisis, Negri and Hardt are also of importance in accounting for a conception of economic crisis upon the relationship of power and subjectivity.

Such a theoretical discussion would lead us to a conception of 'flexible' capitalism not understood as a field of social relations reducible to profitability but as a form of contesting relations of power and subjectivity deriving its constitutive elements from breaks, continuities, contestations and transformations of the relation between the state and its subjects and thus a fragmented structure of the population

divided into populations encountering changes in international politics. Thus flexible capitalism seems to be a contingent encounter of diverse elements and a field opened to define and redefine the positions of subjects.

Literature on the Shipyards of Tuzla

Akdemir (2008) sums up the discussions of diverse strands of thought and then goes on to describe how the system of subcontracting emerged in Tuzla. Although she gives insightful information regarding the shipyards she nevertheless remains descriptive. The only key concept she deploys within this framework is informalization of production relations, by which she means the whole system of subcontracting and the non-rigid/decentralized form this process brings about for the production of goods/services and the dismantling of employment/social security for workers. She shows how foremen were encouraged to establish subcontractors. She shows how this brings about a web of outsourcing of the tasks done. Thus the whole issue is just reduced to the problem of profitability and competition. She renders the chain of the workflow without showing the relationship of the workers to the subcontractors and how the possibility of self-employment is functional as a phantasy for upward mobility. Within this account the shipyard owners and the workers have no history beyond the workflow. The only problem is an institutional framework that permits the subcontractation process. Workers, shipyard owners, subcontractors and their relationship to each other are just understood as far as the question of profitability is solved; they have no history prior to and outside of the workflow. Thus seen she does not show how the state relates to the shipyard owners,

how the shipyard owners control the subcontractors and how work discipline is established or subjectivities arise.

Akdemir's account remains highly descriptive and her theoretical discussion does not open up a field for debate but remains a comparative literature review. She nevertheless seems to be highly influenced by the Regulation Approach (RA), which she criticizes for not addressing the subject of this process, or formulated in another way, for not mentioning who is regulating the process (p.121). Her account takes the shift to neo-liberal policies on a worldwide scale as a starting point and adopts the common narrative that a shift in the 80s took place due to a crisis faced by capital to maximize its profit. Her account starts with a common and general account of neo-liberalism and ends with Tuzla. Indeed her starting and ending point is the problem of how the production process is organized upon a chain of subcontractors. Diverse social dynamics of Turkey, social conflicts and shifts of the balance of forces in Turkey as well as power relations are only mentioned. Thus the account of Akdemir remains merely a sketch of the relations between legislation-subcontractors-shipyard owners and workers but does not open up a field for debate regarding the emergence and struggle of these subjects as a constitutive element of the complex web of relations in and around the shipyards of Tuzla.

Furthermore her criticism towards the RA regarding the subject of regulation is not addressed. Akdemir focuses more on the emergence of what she calls informal production relations and tries to show that informal practices supplement formal ones; by informal she means non-rigid forms of work organization, which are not regulated via legislative means. The main manifestations of informality are subcontracting companies; since her work is rather descriptive she gives us insights of how the work relations in Tuzla were established (p.177):

Although relations of subcontracting have a past in the Ottoman Empire, subcontracting emerged in the ship construction industry in Turkey in 1982. In the year 1980, as a result of the fact that soft loans with fixed exchange rates were not returned or ‘abused’ by being delivered to ‘those people, who had nothing to do with maritime activities’, and due to the fact that this situation was combined with the circumstances of world-wide crisis; a serious crisis was faced in 1982. Shipyards were obliged to reduce their personnel and similarly their expenditures in adopting themselves to the market conditions, which were exposed to more and more destabilization. Shipyards resisting to this situation faced bankruptcy. As soon as the mid-1980s those shipyards, which did not want to loose their experienced *usta* [foremen], persuaded their foremen to establish companies with a group composed of certain workers while at the same time reducing their personnel, thus they guaranteed that the work is done with the same quality. [...] Thus the firms got rid of severance and social security expenditures, since they did not fix any personnel and by the same token they could avoid paying taxes in getting the bill for the work done. At earlier times the *usta* who became subcontractors sent their team to diverse firms and were content to be ‘their own bosses’. Later on the ship-owners and the shipyards promoted the workers in the teams of these craftsmen to establish firms on their own and thus reduced prices.

What we see in this account is that the whole process of crisis leading shipyard owners to deploy such a strategy is not problematized but taken for granted. The whole process is very smooth and ‘rational’. But the possibilities enabling the emergence of the system of subcontracting and the problem of how these power relations were established within the overall social transformations in Turkey is addressed as far as neoliberalism plays a role in here account. Furthermore although Akdemir shows us that the relationship of workers and subcontractors was based on a common place of origin, kinship ties and relations of mutual trust (ibid, p.171), she does not problematize the process of the formation of this work force at all. But what we see here is not discussion on the question of a possible relationship between the concept of crisis and the formation of the workforce.

It seems that it is exactly the convergence of these two factors that forces Akdemir’s account to be descriptive. The crisis in the 80s as well as the formation of

the workforce are taken for granted, it is just shown how they were recomposed but not why. For instance the coup d'état in 1980 seems only to be relevant in this context as far as it paved the way for fiscal policies and state decisions paving the way for work relations, which are not legally sanctioned (informality). The crisis of the 70s/80s seems also be just a 'fact', without going deeper into the implications of this concept. Thus seen the subjects in Tuzla seem to be pre-constituted and just shift their position due to regulatory shifts imposing an economic rationality on them. What brings them about seems to be a process, which is taken for granted and on which the emerging subjectivities have no constitutive effect.

The question of why capital accumulation faced a crisis on a worldwide scale, why shifts in state policies and the organization of production processes emerged remains open. Thus seen we have just subjects with certain functions in the production process forced to emerge due to the necessities of global market forces with stable functions and positions. This account seems to imply that capital has an enfolding logic of its own and tries to cope with profit squeezes. Capital accumulation is thus seen as an unquestioned drive to generate value. Although Akdemir shows how diverse measures were taken and power distributed within this process she does not question the overall political implications and subject-formation processes involved. In her literature review she mentions that Castells and Portes note that workers resistances have had an impact on the crisis of the 70s/80s but she does not relate this (*ibid*, p. 84) to the Turkish context, thus seen social conflicts are not related to the formation of the shipyards in Tuzla.

Akdemir criticizes the RA but does not deal with the criticism she has stated in her own inquiry, she just mentions that the concepts deployed by the regulation

school do not suffice to explain Tuzla and develops her own account on some concepts (ibid, p.121-122):

The regulation approach does not clarify who the subject is, to which it attributes the task of regulation. Seen from this point of view one can deploy the concepts of this approach by criticizing this approach. Especially the concepts of the regulation approach are constructed within this inquiry in freeing them from the determination of capital and basing them on the contradiction between capital-labor and the unequal-combined development of capital accumulation. Thus, to explain the direction of the transformation of production units and their activities, their restructuring and the possibilities of accumulation the concepts of informalization, formalization and re-informalization shall be used instead of the concepts of regulation, deregulation and re-regulation.

Akdemir attempts to critique economism in claiming that her account is not centered on capital as a determinant instance, she argues that she will position the political nature of the organization of the workflow within the contradiction between capital and labor. But it shall be noted that such an inquiry is not made throughout the whole of her inquiry. She criticizes the RA of being economistic but seems not to feel safe in leaving the theoretical ground of the RA. Akdemir does not account for the ‘subject to which the attribute of regulation is attributed’ and her concepts seem to make such an attempt even more complicated. In Akdemir’s account we just see that Tuzla was established due to a government decree in 1969; that it was subsidized in the 80s and that the global crisis forced companies to lower their costs and thus deploying strategies for a work organization, which led to relations of subcontractation; the state provided a framework in which these work relations were sanctioned to a limited extend in just defining what a subcontractor is within the written laws. Again although she claims that she will not deploy the concepts of the RA in a fashion that is not centered on capital accumulation she says in the same

sentence that she will look at the ‘unequal and combined development of capital accumulation’. Thus seen she seems even to narrow down the implications of the concepts used by the RA. Even more her problematization of addressing the ‘subject of regulation’ and the fact that she herself does not address it seem to relate to the formulation of the problem itself. Her subject seems to be one written with capital ‘S’, her subject is capitalized, subjected to enfolding logic of capital; but we could open up this discussion if we would problematize this subject and claim that we have to seek subjects and subject-formation processes to be able to address the formation of such a complex web of relations.

In her work with Aslı Odman (2008) at least the demographic origins of the shipyard owners¹¹, their political relations and the diverse places of origin of the workers are mentioned and the fact that this requires further investigation. They also emphasize that diverse waves of migration were important in the division of labor on the shipyards and that these waves led also to a certain stratification amongst the workers. The conjuncture in which Odman and Akdemir wrote this article was the time in which the mortal ‘accidents’ had reached a climax and related public debates were going on. Thus this account is more a pamphlet against the arguments of the state officials and shipyard-owners than a conceptual discussion. It is also descriptive but precisely because it was written to intervene into the debates, it involves a framework in which the micro-politics of Tuzla could be linked to the overall transformations in Turkey, although such a line of reasoning is just hinted at. The other accounts of Odman¹² are describing the changes in the Labor Acts and also that in the shipyards of Tuzla the issue of the place of origin and ethnicity played initially

¹¹ As we shall see most of the shipyard owners stem from families coming from the Black-Sea Region of Turkey.

¹² See Odman (2000) and Odman (2008)

a role in the division of labor. But again there are no details about the micro-politics within and around the shipyards. At this point Akdemir's account gives at least an initial picture.

The account of the *Tuzla Investigation Group* has a more complex character. This investigation touches more upon the question of transformations of the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects as well as its relationship to capital accumulation. This group attempts to relate the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state to the conditions in Tuzla. Thus this account operates on a ground in which greater socio-political processes are addressed and a field for a more complex debate regarding the formation of Kurdish workers' subjectivity on the shipyards of Tuzla is opened up. The group underlines that the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state was of crucial importance for the establishment of flexible capitalism in Tuzla. They underline that the *hegemonic project* (Jessop, 2005, p.187) of the Turkish state faced a counter-hegemonic project launched by the PKK. The field of contestation between these two forces brought about a change in fiscal policies – military investments – and a wave of (forced) migration, which produced a work force in Tuzla, which is highly marked by this conflict.

This account goes more into the details of the complex process of the formation of 'flexible' capitalism in Tuzla. The whole process of neo-liberal transformation is seen within a broader political context in which the state tries to establish hegemony -upon the ethnic reference to Turkish identity- and in which this hegemony is contested. But nevertheless there remain certain problems regarding the nature of this conflict. Akdemir, just rendered briefly the micro-politics within the shipyards, while the Tuzla Investigation Group focuses highly on a social conflict regarding the establishment of state hegemony and counter hegemony. The Group

also point to the problem that labor was divided initially upon lines of common place of origin and ethnicity as well as how state expenditures subsidized the shipyard industry; but do not go into the details of the change of this division of labor and the emergence of diverse rationalities of the subjects in Tuzla including but also going beyond lines of ethnic differences. At this point Akdemir, although only making a brief sketch, points that these ties are losing importance and a more 'economic rationality' arises (Akdemir, 2008, p.206-211) while the Tuzla Investigation Group remains hesitant with regard to the distribution and contestation of power within the shipyards. The Tuzla Investigation Group opens up a fruitful field for a conceptualization of diverse power-relations involved in the formation of flexible capitalism. But the implications of the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish state is not related to a an overall problem of the Turkish state with regard to its relation to other subjects than Kurds the discussion does not lead us to a point within which we could also understand the subjectivity of shipyard owners as well as other workers. Thus seen the power relations on the shop floor are not addressed. But the whole debate gives a point of departure to relate the process of subject formation as a constitutive element of the establishment of power relations on the shipyards in Tuzla. Although the point of departure for an account on flexible capitalism deployed by the Tuzla Investigation Group is quite interesting, one cannot say that it is an account on the formation of flexible capitalism in Tuzla; it proceeds from such a discussion and then focuses on the complex relation between class and ethnicity but power relations on the shop floor and are not explored in detail.

First of all it shall be mentioned that the main impetus of both accounts (Akdemir and the Tuzla Investigation Group) is derived from the Regulation Approach, which deals with the emergence of flexible capitalism at length. But it is

quite interesting that such two diverse readings of Tuzla can be made in departing from the regulation school. The descriptive character of Akdemir as well as the lack of a conceptual discussion regarding the relationship between diverse practices of power/subjection (from the sovereign to the shop floor) can be addressed in engaging critically with the Regulation Approach.

To be able to develop a concept of capitalism that conceives of a multi-layered formation of subjectivities as constitutive elements of a field of possibility to gain power and thus capital we have to look closer on the emergence of Tuzla as shipyard region. This will make it possible to ground the critique towards the literature on Tuzla as well as give a point of departure to develop a theoretical argument, which conceives of capitalist conduct within the problematic of power/subjectivity.

The Emergence of Subjects And Their Government

I shall render the emergence of Tuzla as a shipyard region in the following pages. The relations between the state and the shipyard owners, between shipyard owners and subcontractors shall be shown to sketch the constitution of subjectivities in Tuzla as well as to show how each of them tries to govern the field of possibilities within this complex web. The complex web of relations between the state and the shipyard owners will show how political relations were crucial for the establishment and finance of the shipyards. This relation did not remain on the ground of legality. Seen from this point of view capital accumulation in the shipyards of Tuzla emerged within certain relationships between state officials and the shipyard owners in which a field of non-legal conduct was opened up for the shipyard owners. This field of

non-legality could be used by governments to distribute wealth to its clientele and by the same token opened up a field to govern this clientele. The same non-legal conduct was also valid for subcontractors. This shows how the relationship of the state to its subjects was functional in the establishment of the workflow in Tuzla and how each subject tries to use the boundary between legality and non-legality to gain advantages. But the relationship of the state to its subjects was not just functional with regard to legality and non-legality but it also paved the way for the emergence of Tuzla as a shipyard region and triggered the waves of migration, which made the constitution of a workforce in Tuzla possible. This shall lead us to a complex field of relations regarding the emergence of ‘flexible’ capitalism, which will make it possible to give a theoretical account of its formation.

Re-Making Tuzla - Establishing Shipyards

Tuzla derives its name from a salt lake, which supplied Istanbul with salt. In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire Tuzla was a little village in which the population consisted of Greek (*Rum*) fishers, and whose source of income was olive and tobacco production. In these times the Empire brought seventy families from the Balkans and other parts of the Empire to Tuzla so that the vast majority of the *Rum* population left the village; the wooden houses, which they left burned down due to a “huge fire”. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the Agreement of Lausanne, a resettlement of the population in Greece and Turkey took place. This was called *Mübadele* (exchange). In line with this people of Turkish origin in Greece were forced to migrate to Turkey and people of Greek origin living in the territory of the new Republic were forced to migrate to Greece. Thus in 1924 the remaining *Rum*

population in Tuzla left Turkey and migrants from Thessaloniki, Darama, Kavala and Kalkış that were assumed to have Turkish origin were brought to Tuzla.

In the first years of the Republic, the administration of the village of Tuzla was connected to Gebze. During these times 1,200 people lived in three hundred houses. Due to the Marshall Plan and the tractors, which were now deployed in the agrarian sector, a huge amount of migrants came from Anatolia to Istanbul. So the developing small industries in Tuzla gained their workforce from this first wave of internal migration. In 1951 Tuzla has been administratively connected to the district of Kartal and then in 1987 to Pendik. On June 3,1992 it became a district on its own following a government decree dated 27/05/1992, numbered 3806 (Tuzla Kaymakamlığı; Odman, 2008, p.166).

Traditionally the shipyards in Istanbul were built on the European side (mainly in the districts of Haliç, Tophane, İstinye, Beykoz) but with the government decree dated September 22, 1969, numbered 6/1242,1 the Aydınlı Bay in Tuzla was declared as a Ship Constructing and Supplier Industry Region (Akdemir, 2008, p.141).¹³ The parcels within this region were rented to the shipyard owners for forty-nine years. The Ministry for Transportation first encouraged the shipyard owners to move their shipyards to Tuzla (Milliyet Gazetesi, 1978, p.3) and then this was made mandatory (Milliyet Gazetesi, 1982, p.11) in 1983, although some of the shipyard owners claimed that this would lead the shipyard owners into difficulties (Milliyet Gazetesi, 1982, p.4). This was also in line with the project of the Governorship of Istanbul and the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul to clean the Golden Horn (Haliç), where traditionally ship construction and repair activities took place

¹³ I shall note that Tuzla is not just based on the shipyards, there are several shops supplying semi-products/products for ships as well as an important amount of leather mills and shops producing textiles.

(Milliyet Gazetesi, 1981, p.3). Thus the industry was established after the coup d'état of 1980 as a counter-revolution against the militant leftist (an attempt of the Turkish state to maintain order and change the balance of forces –as well as subjects- within society) opposition on the streets and in a time in which union activities (besides the unions, which were members of the corporatist union confederation Türk-iş) were banned. Seen from this perspective the shipyards were able to operate on a ground on which they did not face major contestations from workers.

During the years 1976-1979 the so-called GİSAT-Fund (Ship Construction, Buying, Shipyard Establishment and Development Fund) was released due to the government decree numbered as 7/9245. This fund was given annually to ship-owners (*Armatör*) to subsidize the national maritime industry; these funds were used more actively during the 1980s and attracted also those investors, which were not directly related to maritime activities (Odman & Akdemir, 2008, p.62).¹⁴ In the year 2000 tax exemptions were given to the industry (Adalet Bakanlığı). The sector underwent a crisis in 1994 and was influenced by the overall crisis in Turkey in 2001. But this was followed by a shift in the political balance of forces due to the AKP and a neoliberal restructuring of the economy and the new convention of the International Maritime Organization, which lead to a boom of the industry.

¹⁴ Nowadays the surrounding of the Aydınlı Bay of Tuzla is changing. Tuzla now has a *Formula 1 Racetrack*, new luxury hotels are established and it is assumed that due to the Urban Transformation Project the district will be transformed into a port for yachts. During my last visits to the shipyards in 2010-2011 I could see that even the main road leading to the shipyard region was decorated with a pool and plastic dolphins around it as well as the new convention centers and hotels, which are not far from the Aydınlı Bay. This was not the case during 2008 – 2009. It is not clear whether the shipyards will be removed from Tuzla, but it is known that the new shipyard places in Yalova are becoming more and more attractive for the shipyard-owners.

Financing The Shipyards

My informant at the shipyard RMK (Rahmi-Mustafa Koç) Marine said that the subsidies had a double character. Credits were given for the establishment of shipyards on the one hand and for ship construction on the other. According to his account there is supposed to be corruption in the distribution and use of these credits. For instance the shipyard GEMAK should have received subsidies to construct two ships, but it produced just one and instead deployed the money to establish a chewy gum factory for the company DANDY. Although this might just be speculation, there is for example one incident in 1985 in which the credits of the Maritime Bank were given in an inappropriate way and above the value of the ship to be constructed (Milliyet Gazetesi, 1986, p.6). Two of the stakeholders of the shipyard *Hudem Denizcilik A.Ş.* were Yalçın Tümer and his brother. They were the sons of the commander of the Navy Forces, Nejat Tümer, who actively participated in the coup d'état in 1980 and was a member of the National Security Council, which functioned as an interim military government/administration. The main owner of the company was Halil Uzundemir, who was a ship-owner from Ereğli in the Black-Sea Region. According to Uzundemir, he and Tümer were just friends since childhood and the access to the unlawfully given credits had nothing to do with the surname of his 'childhood friend' (Özdalga, 1986, p.11). It was not possible to trace the further development of this company. To what extent these are just speculations and rumors is not clear. But it is known that a vast majority of 'investors' in Turkey had access to such funds, loans and credits through their relationships to state officials and used such capital for a variety of activities for other purposes than what was actually

foreseen on the paper. This leads us directly to a field closely connected to the formation of the entrepreneurs in Tuzla and to their connections to the government/state.

The Shipyard Owners

Most of the shipyard owners in Tuzla come from the Black Sea Region and the shipyards are run mainly as family enterprises and not as institutionalized corporations with a CEO or a board of directors.¹⁵ These families were previously related to maritime activities. It is interesting to note that the activists of Limter-iş insisted that the shipyard-owners had mafiaesque attitudes but could not figure out what was actually meant by this besides the harsh/violent opposition of the shipyard owners towards union activity. I asked my informants about the stories and the pasts of the entrepreneurs. He said to me that relating to maritime activities in the Black-Sea Region meant to deal with *taka* (crates) and that in the bipolar world prior to 1990 this meant to smuggle arms from the former USSR to Turkey.¹⁶ He said for instance that one could *not come close to* Murat Bayrak¹⁷, meaning that people feared him. As I again spoke with the activists of Limter-iş as to what they exactly

¹⁵ One Exception is RMK Marine. This shipyard belongs to the Koç Group, which is one of the biggest investors in Turkey being active in a huge variety of sectors. The other shipyards have boards of directors but in fact the shipyards are run and directed by the owner of the shipyard or the families to whom the shipyards belong.

¹⁶ For instance Cengiz Kaptanoğlu, who now owns the DESAN Shipyard and was MP from the lists of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), comes from a family from the Black-Sea Region. His grandfather, Hacı İbrahim Kaptanoğlu, made trade with crates between the Black-Sea Region and Russia prior to World War II. Then Hacı İbrahim Kaptanoğlu should have found the Hacı İbrahim Kaptanoğlu Companies. Cengiz Kaptanoğlu himself was the president of the Chamber of Shipping (DTO). He was active in the True Path Party (DYP) until he became an opponent of the then-president of the party Tansu Çiller. He had close connections to the Motherland Party (ANAP) and Turgut Özal. see Yılmaz (1992). His story also shows that close connections to the state are important in the industry. This seems at least to have been the case since the Ottoman Empire. For further information on the historical character of the families and enterprises in the Black-Sea region, which were active in maritime activities see Mahmutzlu (2009) and Yener (2009).

¹⁷ 'kimse yanına yaklaşamazdı'

meant when they were saying that the shipyard owners were mafia, and they told me a short story about Murat Bayrak, the former president of the Shipbuilders' Association (GİSBİR): Everytime he had to negotiate with the subcontractors on the terms, conditions and price of a job, he would first put a gun on the desk and then negotiate while pointing at his gun. Murat Bayrak is from *Of* in *Trabzon* (a city in the Black-Sea Region). His father Habip Bayrak established in 1960 the ÇEKSAN shipyard at the Golden Horn, the shipyard moved to Tuzla in 1986. He was a member of the board of the Shipbuilders' Association (GİSBİR) during 1983-2000 and the president of the board of GİSBİR during 2000-2011. One of the activists of Linter-iş told me the following story (see Appendix-A):

The Torlaks, the Bayraks...all the time we hear about it, we know about it: such strata from such types, they wear weapons on their waist and walk around. One of the obvious characteristics here is that the shipyard owners have close relations to the police. I don't know what can be said about the situation now, but in the past years, especially in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008; if we look from here, then we can speak of a serious relationship. The police station in Tuzla has been built by the shipyard owners, by GİSBİR, at the same time they [the police] were like voluntary members, for example there were pictures of Murat Bayrak and so on hang up in the Tuzla police station. While our friends were arrested once, they said it, later on they had to put the picture down. In 2007, 2008 or 2008 the shipyard owners bought a fleet for the police; they bought 11-12 kango-type cars for the police.

Not just Murat Bayrak, who is known for his close ties with the Nationalist Movement Party (*MHP*) but also other families in the shipyard region of Tuzla had quite interesting connections with and stories about the Torlak, Sadıkoğlu, Kaptanoğlu, Yardımcı and Kalkavan families.

For instance the Torlak family was producing crates in the Black-Sea Region, then they moved to the Golden Horn. As a family enterprise the company was established under the name TORLAK in the early 1980s in Tuzla. But in 1996 a

problem arose within the family regarding the share in the company. Sedat Torlak shot his brother Cahit Torlak down in the family shipyard in Tuzla and then injured his father Zeki Torlak (Özışık, 1996). He also planned to shoot his other two brothers Ali and Nihat Torlak down but was not successful (Avcı, 1996). There are two different shipyards with owners who have the name Torlak; one is TORGEM and the other one is TORLAK. According to my informants at the shipyards and the activists of Limter-iş, both of these shipyards belong to the same family, which was split after this shooting incidence. For instance Durmuşali Torlak (TORLAK Shipyard) was and still is a member of the parliament (MP) of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The boss of TORGEM, Kenan Torlak is also close to the MHP.

The relation between politics and the shipyard owners does not stop here. During the whole conflict between Limter-iş and the shipyard owners, the owner of the shipyard DESAN was MP from the lists of the Justice and Development Party and member of the National Security Commission; the subcontractor Hasan Uzunyayla was the president of the Tuzla branch of the Republican People's Party (CHP). The Minister for Transportation, Binali Yıldırım was in those times also involved in maritime activities. For instance, Mustafa Talha Pepe, the son of the former Minister for Environment and Forests (Osman Pepe - AKP) is one of the stakeholders of the *Altıntaş Shipyard* in Yalova. Kemal Yardımcı is now the vice president of the Ministry for National Security. As these examples show there is a close connection between the shipyard industry and politics. But this relationship seems not to just be a straightforward issue of representation but also to involve calculations around legality and illegality. The example of Kahraman Sadıkoğlu seems for instance interesting with regard to such connections. His example and the shipyard owners mentioned above show how the access to the possibilities for

capitalist conduct are related to establishing links to the state and thus gaining further access to financial means and facilities. Thus gaining power and accumulating capital seem to coincide with each other. But this mutuality has its price. The access to financial means and facilities opens up a realm, which is a mix of legal subsidies and non-legal capitalist conduct. The whole process involves a hierarchy of subjects governing their relationship to each other. Governing the boundaries between legality, non-legality and illegality is in this respect functional. The case of Kahraman Sadıkoğlu is illuminating with regard to the government of relations and capitalist conduct.

The Example of Kahraman Sadıkoğlu

One of the most interesting figures in Tuzla is Kahraman Sadıkoğlu. Sadıkoğlu comes from Rize (Black-Sea Region) and from a family that is involved in maritime activities; he is a relative of the *Kalkavan* (now the owners of the SEDEF shipyard in Tuzla) family. In 1976 he was arrested due to the suspicion that he smuggled thousands of car dampers (Milliyet, 1976). He was brought to the court and should be sentenced to five years.

According to one account written against the new liberal agenda of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, he fled to England. After the coup d'état in 1980, President Tugut Özal released an amnesty for smugglers according to which it became possible to transform imprisonment into a financial punishment, and Sadıkoğlu returned to Turkey in 1985 (Doğru, 1986). But other newspaper coverage from those times report that he was imprisoned, released and got financial punishment (Milliyet, 1976, p.10).

In those times Sadıkoğlu being active in the tourism sector and became a ship-owner (*Armatör*). In 1979 a Romanian tanker called *Independenta* clashed with a Greek transportation ship and sank near the *Haydarpaşa Train Station* on the Asian side of Istanbul. The Maritime Bank (*Denizcilik Bankası*) opened an auction for the deportation of the wreck. First the Command of the Military Naval Forces made attempts to transport the wreck out of the sea, and presented their proposal. They proposed 17 million dollar for the project (Milliyet, 1981, p.8). First the Bank neglected any other option than the Command of the Military Naval Forces (Milliyet, 1981, p.3). Then the Bank decided that the company *Sezen Sokullu* would deconstruct the wreck under the supervision of the Command of the Military Naval Forces in the form of a subcontraction, thus it was planned that the wreck should be transported to the Aydınlı-Bay in Tuzla (Turenç, 1982, p.3; 1983, p.3). In 1985 the subcontractor *Sezen Sokullu* announced that it was not able to sustain the project due to high inflation rates; just thirty five percent of the wreck had been transported to Tuzla (Turenç, 1985). Sadıkoğlu used his connections to the Prime Minister Turgut Özal and got the project (Deniz Haber, 2008). The transportation of *Independenta* by Sadıkoğlu led to huge media coverage in the late 1980's.

At the end of the 1980's Sadıkoğlu rented the ship *Savarona* from the Military Naval Forces for forty-nine years; this ship belonged in earlier times to Atatürk. The ship underwent a fire and the inner parts could not be used. He claimed that he aimed to repair the ship of Atatürk. The ship was given to him. In those times there was a scheme in Turkey, which was established in line with the neo-liberal agenda in the 80's and was called "construct/repair it-run it-give it back to the state or to others" (*yap-işlet-devret*). Thus he should rent the ship from the state, repair it, rent it and after forty-nine years he would give it back to the state. But the parts of

the ship got plundered; he claimed that the plunderers sold him the stolen parts (Çelebi, 1989). Sadıkoğlu repaired the ship and he began to rent it. The luxury ship got involved into diverse scandals regarding the transportation of drugs and a scandal in which it was used for high society prostitution. Later on Sadıkoğlu claimed that there was no furniture belonging to Atatürk in the Savarona as he rented it from the Naval Forces and that he himself collected Atatürk's belongings (CNN Türk, 2011). With regard to the speculation on the plundering of the ship this claim is somehow confusing.

It is known to the public that this ship had Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel as its guests. But the connections of Sadıkoğlu to the political circles cannot be reduced to his closeness to Turgut Özal. In 1994, Sadıkoğlu had a dispute with the former Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and now prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He said that Erdoğan claimed to have demolished four thousand illegal buildings in Istanbul and that he does not believe this claim and that on the contrary the Municipality is giving permissions for illegal buildings and thus gains an immense economic income. If there should be a proof that so many buildings have been demolished, he would give his own helicopter to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to establish also publicity (Bengin, 1994). Sadıkoğlu said that he lost the bet and gave his helicopter to Erdoğan. The whole story had a twist: The Municipality of Tuzla, which was elected from the same party as the Metropolitan Municipality, the *Welfare Party* (RP), had closed down the shipyard of Sadıkoğlu with the claim that this shipyard had no permission. But as soon as Sadıkoğlu gave his helicopter to Erdoğan, rumors circulated that he got a permission to construct his shipyard (Gürsoy, 1994). But to lower the taxes for the delivery of the helicopter to the

Metropolitan Municipality he deconstructed some crucial electronic parts of it (Avcu, 1995).

The story of Sadıkoğlu does not end here; in 2005 Iraqi ‘terrorists’ kidnapped him in Umm Qasr, Iraq, they wanted one million dollars for him but he could be released for 500,000 Dollar. According to his wife the kidnapping would have just financial motives and no ideological ones (BBC News, 2005). He had a ‘swimming house’, which had no permission and he opened a case against the United Nations Development Program for 150 Million Dollars, according to his claims he had made an agreement with the Iraqi Government in 2001 and afterwards with the UN for the deportation of ship wrecks in Umm Qasr and could not get his money from the UNDP (Acar, 2011). He was the owner of the TÜRKTER Shipyard and Tuzla Shipyard up until 2008. Then he sold one of his shipyards to *Kıran* and the other to *Yardımcı*.

Governing Subjects Upon Legality, Non-legality And Illegality

My informant at the RMK Marine shipyard saw a legal trial against the *Fenerbahçe Soccer Club* and its president *Aziz Yıldırım*¹⁸ as a treat to their own company. The Koç Group, to which RMK Marine belongs, is historically close to the CHP. RMK Marine produces mainly yachts and military ships. According to my informant there was a project for a military ship in line with a huge project of the military to establish ‘ghost ships’ which could by-pass radar controls, the so-called MİLGEM Project: The construction company *Çalık Group* and the maritime division of the gold-seller

¹⁸ One of the other three big soccer clubs in Istanbul, *Beşiktaş* owns a shipyard, which is managed by one member of the Kalkavan family (*Ihsan Kalkavan*). *Beşiktaş* is also now under the suspicion of chicanery. A member of the Koç family, Ali Koç is a member of the board of directors of the *Fenerbahçe Soccer Club*.

Atasay Holding –both assumed to be close to the AKP government- were also involved in the auction for this ship project. The DEARSAN Shipyard and indirectly Aziz Yıldırım made another proposal. But just two companies were allowed to make proposals by the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (Hürriyet - Ekonomi, 2011). It was speculated that Aziz Yıldırım made an arrangement with the Undersecretariat so that just RMK Marine and DEARSAN could enter the auction. DEARSAN did not participate in the auction and thus RMK could get the project. This was interpreted as a trick of Aziz Yıldırım; he did not participate in the auction with DEARSAN but paved the way for RMK Marine. Aziz Yıldırım got imprisoned for having organized chicanery during soccer games and due to the suspicion that he is involved in organized crime. Now, my informant at RMK Marine said that the Koç Group could become also a target since it traditionally diverges from the political line and clientele of the *AKP*; as a proof he said that the newspapers mentioned the investment of Aziz Yıldırım in this project and his possible relationship with RMK Marine ‘with just one sentence’. My informant interpreted this incident as a possible treat against RMK Marine, which meant for him that RMK Marine could be on the list of those who will be sanctioned in this or that way by the *AKP* government.¹⁹ Furthermore my informant said that they were the first shipyard, which was closed by state officials, since they had not fulfilled workplace security measures, again he interpreted this as a political strategy against RMK Marine; since the Koç Group was closer to the *CHP* rather than to the reigning *AKP*. He told proudly how he managed to fulfill the measures and thus re-open the shipyard within just a few days. Whatever the facts might be; just the perception of my informant is enough to show that at a certain point a conflict exists between RMK Marine and the government and

¹⁹ This might also be related to his political preferences, since he himself seemed to be closer to the Republican People’s Party (*CHP*) than to the Justice And Development Party (*AKP*).

that the boundary between legality and illegality plays a role in the struggles for capital accumulation. The fact that he perceives the AKP as a treat and his interpretation of the incident of Aziz Yıldırım shows how political calculations are involved in the enterprise and relations of the shipyard owners.

The case of Sadıkoğlu also shows how connections to the state enable these ‘businessmen’ to gain access to facilities and financial means and how blurred the lines between legality and illegality are. The connection to the state seems here to be of crucial importance. But it seems also that the state uses illegality as a form to control the entrepreneurs and thus the dispersion of capital and power. Indeed, as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met in *Dolmabahçe Palace* with the representatives of the industry to ‘solve’ the mortal ‘accidents’ on the shipyards he said in July 2008 in a threatening manner: *“If the number of shipyards with legal permission do not exceed the number of the fingers of one hand in Tuzla, where there are forty seven shipyards, then we should think about it.”*²⁰ It is interesting that the highest political authority knows about this non-legality and by the same token does not intervene by legal means at least not up until 2008. According to the unionists of *Linter-iş*, in this year, approximately fourteen shipyards did not exist at all on any legal document, approximately thirteen shipyards had no permit to work and just fifteen-sixteen shipyards had permits. Although Tayyip Erdoğan spoke in a threatening manner on June in *Dolmabahçe*, he attended the *iftar* dinner of the Association of Ship Owners September 19, 2008 –both took place after the strikes- he know said: *“It is not so that we are not making mistakes, we make mistakes. I speak in your name, but as one belonging to you; no one has the right to put dynamite under this industry and channeling the whole thing into another direction*

²⁰ See Tuzlu (2008)

in making every day actions and such things. This will burn our hearts [çiğirimizi yakar], this is another issue, but we have to come and do that amongst ourselves, we have to do whatever should be done, and solve the problems together. We should not bring this industry to an end."²¹ This stance shows that he is not willing to set the legal sanctions in motion but points to the possibility of such a sanction if it is necessary.

This can be read as a form to distribute power and possibilities for 'capital accumulation' and by the same token to control the development and allocation of financial means/facilities by the hegemonic political orientation (now the reigning party and its clientele). Thus the distribution of capital and the framework for capital accumulation seem to be embedded within political calculations and conflicts; there seems to be a strategy to open up a realm for non-legality as a field to govern the distribution of wealth and call the law whenever a political conflict or a conflict of interests emerges. Thus non-legality can be turned into a field in which the laws can lead to actual sanctions whenever one of the parties can use this as a means to fight the other. Thus non-legality can have consequences for those operating in such a field and become sanctioned, become illegality. The opening up of a field of non-legality by governments (and also the operation of state officials on such spheres) seems to facilitate the enterprise of their clientele, while also being a form of mutual investment to govern this relationship upon the possibility of legislative sanctions, the possibility of turning non-legality to illegality.²² With this regard it is interesting that the shipyards of Sadıkoğlu were bought by Yıldırım (AKP) and that shipyard

²¹ See Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

²² With this regard it would be interesting to look at what the AKP does to change legal procedures especially with the last changes made regarding the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the overall procedures of jurisdiction.

owners in the new-emerging shipyard region of Yalova are close to the AKP. Thus legality plays a role in this fight of factions.²³

It is interesting to note that not just the government or the state attempts to control the flux and distribution of investments in opening a realm for illegality and clientelism. But the workflow within the shipyards also shows how power is distributed and controlled; with regard to this the relationship between the between shipyard owners and subcontractors seems to be illuminating.

Shipyard Owners, Subcontractors and Workers

In the first years the shipyards in Tuzla mainly operated upon a workforce employed directly by the shipyard owners upon long-term contracts. A stable amount of core workers were deployed for ship construction activities. Before the shipyards were moved to Tuzla the sector faced a boom, the Maritime Bank announced that shipyards could no longer accept orders until 1990; they had so many orders that they were not able to accept orders anymore. To be able to compete for lower prices/costs shipyard owners started to outsource some of their tasks to subcontractors to lower their costs (Turenç, 1983). This tendency was furthermore strengthened as the state-run Camialtı Shipyard began also to deploy subcontractors in 1988 (Oral, 1988). Especially in the realm of ship repair, subcontraction firms began to emerge in Tuzla, since not all skills are required all the time but demanded in the context of different cases and problems. The shipyards encouraged their *ustas* (foremen) to establish subcontraction companies. They knew the quality of the task

²³ Tuğal (2009) calls this conflict in Turkey *passive revolution* (departing from Gramsci) and shows that this implies the absorption of islamic contestation to capitalism into the establishment.

of their foremen and trusted their skills. Thus the shipyard owners could get rid of social security expenditures and the cost of a skilled stable workforce.

According to one of my informant at RMK Marine this model was deployed in the early 1980's initially by the shipyard GEMAK/ERKAL; which became later on the Tuzla Shipyard, which was previously owned by Ertan Balin and then bought by Kahraman Sadıkoğlu. The encouragement of the foremen to establish subcontraction companies was not in the form of a direct financial support, shipyard owners promised their subcontractors to give jobs and occupy them in diverse projects. According to my informant the shipyards knew that they would have projects to build ships for five years and calculated that in the following five years they would have no projects. With time this model proved to be profitable not just for tasks related to ship repair but also for tasks related directly to ship construction, since all the costs of the workforce related to labor legislations were no longer the concern of the shipyard owners. This meant flexibility for the shipyard owners since they could now mobilize the workforce whenever they needed it and eliminate costs if they did not need any worker. Shipyard owners went on and deployed the same strategy for their remaining foreman and even the foreman of the subcontractors, with whom they worked. Thus costs were further lowered and the competition between subcontractors grew. The subcontracting system also opened up a realm for the shipyard owners to be exempted from taxes due to legal facilities foreseen for the industry. Thus a mushrooming of subcontractors took place from the 1980's up until 2008. Sometimes a subcontractor could even hire other subcontractors; this chain could establish a hierarchy of up to five subcontractors, at least before 2008.

The subcontractors with whom I talked said that the longest duration for a job is a maximum of thirty-thirty five days, which means that there is always an influx

and outflux of workers, that they are hired and fired again and again. The shipyard owners are dealing with the subcontractors upon certain prices for the tasks, they are opening auctions. But the money for the task done is not all given to the subcontractors. At certain times the shipyard owners give out just a portion of the money and thus controlling the subcontractors. Since the subcontractors are operating in violation of the laws it becomes complicated for them to claim legal rights, although in some cases there are juridical processes going on in the court between subcontractors and shipyard owners. The amount to be paid does not just consist of the profit of the subcontractor but includes also social security payments and wages of the workers, which are given sometimes to workers and sometimes not. In some cases the shipyard owners also did not give the benefits of the workers to the subcontractors. Thus the shipyard owners have the power to force subcontractors to bankruptcy or into conflicts with workers. According to the lawyer of Limter-iş, in such cases the union is not just suing the subcontractors but also the shipyard owners. In such cases especially the little subcontractors close down their companies, go back to their place of origin or open up another company with another name.

But the procedure of getting a job from a shipyard owner as well as the whole relationship seems to be a complicated one. None of the subcontractors as well as the workers could give an account on how the relationship is established and sustained. One technician, who attempted to establish a subcontracting company and worked since the early 90s almost exclusively as a core worker, mentioned the procedure and the relationship between shipyard owners and subcontractors just indirectly; this seems to confirm the insistence of the subcontractors that *'everything in Tuzla depends on your connections'* (see Appendix-B):

I tried to become a subcontractor but it did not work; it is not something everybody can do [*her yiğidin harcı değil*]. Not everybody can do this work. You cannot do that with goodwill...goodwill...You know the subcontractors are always boxing in the dark [*kaçak dövüşüyorlar*], the things with the bills...if you are a good citizen, if you pay the taxes and insurances you cannot become a subcontractor, that's it! Obviously, there are also problems to get the jobs. How is the process going on....those who have sound connections can do that...you may be a very good subcontractor, you may be very good in your work, but when it comes to get the job.....there is a saying...those who have a supporter [*torpil*]..those who have relations can do that, unfortunately. I don't want go into the details regarding this relationship. I have not witnessed something like that, I have just heard it; naturally all this is done behind closed doors, unfortunately. You have to be totally blind if you don't see all these things. You cannot witness this directly. Things are going that way.

He tells his own story and his opinion on the subcontractors in the following way
(see Appendix-C):

Now, what does a subcontractor do...first he establishes his own core team...core team: his foremen and so on. He establishes a core team. Generally there is no one who is a subcontractor on his own, always with his social environment. [*As I ask him whether the company is owned by one person or upon partnership he says the following:*] The owners and their core team are not partners, there is interest.....[*silence and a serious facial expression*].....We witnessed it, that is something known.....Since I did not work for many subcontractors I have no close relations to them [*sıkı-fıkı olmadım*]; there were some for which I worked for one week or ten days, but I work and go out. I have never worked for a long time for a subcontractor. In the shipyards, which I worked, I tried not to establish any relationship with subcontractors outside of my workplace. If this would be not the case it would be understood differently in the workplaces [*meaning that it would lead to speculations/rumors whether he and the subcontractor are doing together any sort of business*]. This is also the case. If you have too many relations with subcontractors outside of work then some different ideas emerge in the heads of some friends at the workplace. 'Is he doing this or that', and so on, 'has he a relation' and such things. There is a saying: Everybody who has a mouth is talking [*ağzı olan konuşuyor*]. [...] They also said to me 'establish a subcontractor company' but I was never sympathetic to that. During the crisis of 1994 I was a subcontractor, I learned my lesson [*ağzımın payını aldım*] and then did not get involved in such things.

His silence and account might point to difficulties, which he had witnessed during his activities as a subcontractor. Again it does not seem to be possible at all that a former subcontractor did not know details about the procedure to get a job from the shipyards; on the one side he says that ‘someone has to be totally blind not to see this’ and on the other hand he keeps silent with a certain resentment.²⁴ His silence and the insistence of the subcontractors on the importance of connections seem to show that the matter of getting jobs and ‘accumulate capital’ can not be reduced just to differences in cost implies a much broader field of governing social relations and making quotidian political decisions. Surely the relationship between subcontractors and workers as well as the relationship between the subcontractors and the shipyard owners seems to be far more complex than a simple ‘matter of business’. It was not possible for me to get any information regarding how subcontractors managed to get orders. This silence itself seems to show that this enterprise involves far more than just low prices offered to shipyard owners, it seems to involve a complex field of relations based on mutual interests. The workers also did not speak about their relationship to the subcontractors; although some of those who got into conflicts were fired or quit the job or even sued the company. In such cases the workers were only mentioning how bad the working conditions were and how the subcontractors

²⁴ He was a technician from Bulgaria, he came to Turkey after 1989, worked in Bulgaria in the shipyards and could not graduate from university since the Bulgarian Turks were forced to change their names in Bulgaria (*‘unfortunately under a socialist regime’*) since he got involved in ‘political incidents’. He had no connections in Tuzla and came directly to Istanbul ‘since the shipyards were here’. In speaking about the shipyards he said: ‘we are saying that we export ships but all the parts are imported’. It remains open whether his claim to be a ‘good citizen’ and references to belong to Turkey and at the same time claiming not to violate labor legislations can be rooted in his story and whether his origin stopped him from gaining enough connections remains open; he did not go into details. He just said that ‘being a Turk was no disadvantage in Istanbul, on the contrary...’ He also quit his job to be part of a team within a new shipyard which should be established in *Inebolu* but this shipyard could not be opened since the orders for ships were stopped due to the crisis in 2008. It shall be noted that there was no wave of migration from Bulgaria to the shipyards of Tuzla and that his case is rather exceptional, but it nevertheless shows that even a good-educated technician with some social relations can not directly enter into and the world of subcontractors since not just the quality of the tasks done by subcontractors but also the connections paving the way to get orders from shipyards, is important.

treated them but details on the relationship between subcontractors and shipyard owners were not available.

The formation of the subcontractors and the networks from which they initially mobilized their core team and workers might be illuminating to shed light on the complexity of the relations among the shipyard owners, subcontractors and workers.

The foremen first established their companies and organized their social web to establish teams. Similar to the previous structure of the shipyards now the subcontractors –typically a company owned by one person- had also a stable team consisting of some of their best workers and craftsmen. The rest of the workers were mobilized again from the social network of the subcontractors. But this social web did not emerge by chance. The subcontractors first organized those people whom they trusted or to whom they had access. Thus they first mobilized a workforce upon kinship ties and from their place of origin. Although kinship ties and common places of origin were not sharp lines for entering a subcontractor it was nevertheless a basis; it was at least an initial basis. Thus during the years 2008-2011 the tasks on the shipyards were distributed along demographic differences: Workers from *Samsun* and *Giresun* (Black Sea Region) did the scrapping and painting jobs; people from *Urfa/Harran* (Kurds and Arabs) did the rough stoning, scrapping, painting, cleaning jobs as well as the transportation of wreck parts²⁵; people from *Kastamonu* and *Tokat* (Black Sea Region) as well as *Bingöl*, *Erzincan*, *Ağrı*, *Sivas* and *Muş* (Southern/South-Eastern Regions) made the welding and assembling tasks; especially the people from *Sivas* became more and more professional with regard to ship deconstruction. This division of labor is also in line with the waves of migration

²⁵ These workers worked only on a temporary basis, thus they were not living in Tuzla for long stretches of time. They are the most pauperized stratum among the workers in Tuzla.

to Istanbul as well as the fact that the shipyard owners come almost exclusively from the Black Sea Region. The first wave of migration to Istanbul was from the Black Sea Region in the 50s, then the inner-Anatolian population moved to the cities and in the last decades a Kurdish population moved to the cities due to forced migration, political oppression/the ongoing war and economic problems.

It is interesting to note that the shipyard owner and MP from the lists of the far-right *MHP*, Durmuşali Torlak, is also in the board of The Union of NGOs From the Black-Sea Region (*Karadeniz Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Birliği*), member of the assembly of the Black-Sea Foundation (*Karadeniz Vakfı*), founding president of the Association of People From the Black-Sea Region in Tuzla (*Tuzla Karadenizliler Derneği*), member of the Solidarity Association of People From Rize/Black-Sea (*Rizeliler Yardımlaşma Derneği*), member of the Association of People From Der pazarı/Black-Sea Region (*Dere pazarı Kültür Eğitim Sosyal ve Yardımlaşma Derneği*). His membership might be a political investment for establishing contacts with his clientele but it shows nevertheless that the reference to the place of origin is functional in gaining power and having access to a web of social relations. It is highly probable that the workers from the Black-Sea Region are also a part of this web and that this is also functional in mobilizing a workforce, at least as an initial starting point.

The reference to a common place of origin was just an initial point of departure for workers to enter into the shipyards and the successive weaving of a social web. The owner of one subcontracting company for instance told me that he was working for twenty years in the shipyards. He came from *Sivas* and entered the shipyards through his relation to his relatives. But initially he did not work for people from his own region but with those from *Kastamonu*. He learned the job and

established a subcontracting company on his own after the first five years in the job. First he did not want to mention that the shipyard owners encouraged him but later on he said that ‘they liked my work and said that I could also become a subcontractor’. He nevertheless neglected that the shipyard owners promised anything. He started with an initial capital of five thousand TL and is now employing 100-150 workers, which means that he is one of the ‘big’ subcontractors.

For him everything was a matter of contact and connections. For instance he said that he bypassed the shipyard owners and established directly relationships with the ship owners, especially after 2008.²⁶ So he is now able to do get repair jobs, which can be done inside the ships without the need for any shipyard; according to him no subcontractor could survive without establishing such direct links to the ship owners. He and other subcontractors, which I interviewed, insisted that labor and tax legislation made it impossible to sustain and develop profitability. The workers in Tuzla as well as the union Limter-iş insisted that the social security payments were not transferred to the Social Security Institution (former SSK now SGK). Social security payments were transferred by the subcontractors to the SSK not upon the actual working days and wages but were minimized by the subcontractors. The subcontractors are hiring and firing the workers due to the concrete task and job they get from the shipyards and ship owners. Thus the subcontractor from *Sivas* said: *‘We are driven to illegality, the state forces us to that point, the taxes and social security payments are too high, if we would fulfill the legal procedures we could not do this job.’* But nevertheless the workers established a relationship of trust with the subcontractors, which can break apart each time the economic interests are threatened. Here the reference to a common place of origin or other ‘common’

²⁶ In 2011 he did not work for the shipyards in Tuzla but transported workers from Tuzla to the new shipyards in Yalova.

features as well as a clientelist relationship between workers and subcontractors is deployed to keep the former under control as one unionized *usta* (foreman) from *Erzincan* (Kurdish-Alawite) said (see Appendix-D):

I know hundreds of subcontractors and they employ people from everywhere. Everybody who shows humility, who does not say anything if he does not get his salary, who does not organize is kept; this is in favor of the subcontractor. In the shipyard in which I work there is a subcontractor from Ağrı, he has approximately sixty workers, approximately forty percent of them are of Kurdish origin, from Van, from Muş; but why does he keep them...when the shipyard does not give money, when he gets stuck, he says 'you are our man, you are not a foreigner, if I get money I will give it first to you, could I ever victimize you, we are working together since years.' Thus he tries to convince them.

He noted that especially after the crisis in 2008 this mechanism functioned better, but insisted that this did not mean that the workers were really convinced. Similarly, another subcontractor noted that the system of subcontraction was essential for the shipyards, that the tasks could not be done in another way and that the steady threat of being unemployed was '*giving the workers a discipline*'. He contrasted them with core workers of state-run enterprises who are accused of being lazy within the neoliberal discourse. We shall dwell on the relationship between workers and subcontractors later on. But it shall be sufficient to show that a multiplicity of social relations (relations to co-workers, to relatives, to their landsman, to shipyard owners etc.) enabled workers to become subcontractors and to govern their relations with the workers. One worker might have at least primary skills to mobilize his social environment and thus run a subcontraction company. For instance the activists of *Limter-iş* said that some former union activists (*Limter-iş*) got frustrated with the fragmented structure of Tuzla and with the difficulties in continuing of their political activity during the 1990s and 2000s. These union activists were also respected

foremen. The shipyard owners convinced them to establish subcontracting companies. The skills, which they had gained in the political struggle/socialist struggle, helped them to lead and govern their relationships effectively. Thus these former unionists (and later on subcontractors) became one of the most efficient subcontractors and also those who were very harsh in disciplining their workforce systematically, although not all of them were operating against the rights of the workers. This shows that the initial skills and environment can have diverse roots.

Here we see that capitalist conduct does not take place in an empty space and time but within a complex web of relations, which have to be governed by each subject. Thus the accumulation of capital seems to be made just possible by deploying a diversity of governmental strategies and tactics. The relationship between shipyard owners and state officials, between subcontractors and workers as well as the relationship between subcontractors and shipyard owners showed that the quest for profits involves the government and weaving of a web of relationships. Thus the capitalist conduct seems to have evolved within the weaving of a web of relations and diverse strategies/tactics to govern them. Managing the realm between legality and non-legality seems to be a crucial part within the distribution of power and possibilities as it was shown in the example of the relationship between governments and shipyard owners. Also subcontractors were violating the Labor Acts and tax legislation. Thus a distribution of positions and their contestation seems to have taken place by conducting on a field of non-legality. This seems to have emerged out of a relationship of the Turkish state with its subjects. It should not be forgotten that as a space Tuzla emerged as a shipyard region as an effect of a forced migration of non-muslims. The flourishing of the region as a center for shipyards took place after the coup d'état in 1980 and during the war between Kurds and the

state. The shipyard owners were subsidized upon relations of clientelism by the state. Also diverse waves of migration enabled the emergence of a workforce in Tuzla. Seen from this point of view the non-universal character of laws seems to be embedded within a framework in which the Turkish state dealt selectively with diverse portions of its population. Thus capitalist conduct and the gaining of power seem to have taken place within the transformations of the relationship of the Turkish state to diverse population groups.

With this regard the Regulation Approach seems to show the very social ‘embeddedness’ of capital accumulation; it seems to open up a theoretical field in which capital accumulation could be understood within a variety of social relations. But as we shall see it falls short of taking into consideration the constitutive character of the subjects involved in capitalist conduct. Their concept of capital accumulation vacillates between an enfolding logic of growth consuming all social relations under that logic and a concept of capital accumulation, which is a contingent field of battles among subjects. The Regulation Approach (RA) seems to attempt to break with economism and by the same token does not leave that ground. The RA gives an impetus for developing a theoretical account on the relations in and around the shipyards of Tuzla insofar as this vacillation is addressed and criticized.

The RA: Vacillating Between Capitalo-centrism and Subjectivity

The flexible character of contemporary capitalist conduct is often understood and elaborated within a broader discussion of the era, which is generally assumed to have emerged after Fordism. At the very heart of these discussions lies the assumption that especially in the 70’s and 80’s of the last century the paradigm organizing all

processes regarding production –and all aspects organized around it – failed to sustain profitability. Generally, flexible capitalism is seen as an organizing principle of the production process, which implies long-term forms of employment, a dismantling of social security systems and the welfare state alongside with a complex web of businesses –with different scales, locations, fields of specialization, and diverse compositions of the elements of production- which interact to supply labor/goods/services upon the notion of just-in-time production. Thus a crisis, which is assumed to have emerged in the 70's and 80's of the last century, has tried to be coped with through a shift in the organization of the production of goods and services as well as in the mechanisms of redistribution. The whole process is assumed to imply a shift from rigid forms of social organization to flexible ones, from formally articulated processes to those that are assumed to be informal.

Within the framework of these discussions, the crisis faced in the 70's and 80's of the last century seems to mark a turning point. Thus the very concept of crisis and the ways to cope with it seem to exhibit a central importance. The discussions seem to share a common ground in departing from a state of crisis, but the definition of the concept of crisis, its origins as well as how to conceive of the shift, diverge. With regard to the crisis in the 70's/80's there were two major economic accounts for approaching this problematic. The neo-classical mainstream economics and the Regulation School as a criticism of the former approached this problematic. The RA was formulated against neo-classical explanations of crisis. These two approaches diverge with regard to the relationship to politics. The shifts, which were observable in the organization of international capitalism, brought about discussions on the very nature of capitalism and the forms of its organization.

Mainstream Economics And The Regulation Approach

From the point of view of mainstream economics (neo-classic economics) the concept of crisis would imply disequilibria between supply and demand and thus a fall in the rates of profits alongside an international trade imbalance. Within this framework *the economy* would have a dynamic and laws of motion on its own, which are open to intervention upon certain fiscal policies and administrative measures. The aim to maximize utility, profit and value implies a rational choice of economic actors. But the dynamics of the market may lead to disturbances in balancing economic conduct, which may lead to an impasse. Models to explain market forces as well as mathematical formula are deployed to show the dynamics of market forces as well as developing tools for fiscal intervention. The problem of crisis is most often perceived as a disturbance in establishing a balance. Thus the main focus on economic crisis is based on models, which claim to explain why the market has not balanced supply and demand and how (general) equilibrium could be established. From this point of view ‘flexible’ capitalism is understood within the framework of innovations, which made it possible to sustain and develop investments on a worldwide scale. This tradition mainly advocates the deregulation of economic conduct and a budget policy, which is highly related to debt/monetary policies and structural adjustments, which are prerequisites put forward by creditors. Disequilibrium in the relationship between supply and demand seemed to have emerged in the 70’s and 80’s. The problem was not seen as a problem of demand and thus advocating policies to strengthen income. Factors in the production and distribution process of goods/services were put into a legal framework, which was not sensitive enough for fluctuations of market dynamics: These factors were

international restrictions on trade, monetary and budget policies, legislations and agreements making the labor force rigid and labor costs insensitive to market prices. The main conclusion was that economic conduct requires a minimum of state measures and sanctions. Thus seen the concept of crisis is understood as a state of disequilibrium, which is handled upon complex mathematical formula and models. All these formula, models and policy suggestions aim to establish a general equilibrium of supply/demand and finances.

The problem of (general) equilibrium and all the models shaped upon so called ‘economic laws’ presupposing rational actors and a conduct of the economy with a spirit on its own remained not without critique. A strand of thought called the *regulation school* or the *regulation approach* (RA) emerged with the crisis faced in the 70’s/80’s. This strand of thought includes diverse authors criticizing mainstream economics (Aglietta, 1987, p.13). Although the authors and texts summed up under this name (RA) diverge in their theoretical traditions as well as political orientations they share a common point of departure. The main criticism the regulationists put forth against mainstream economics is their claim that economic processes do not take place ‘out there’. From this perspective, economic conduct is always embedded within larger social relations and institutional frameworks. The market is not a given constant with dynamics on its own and pre-constituted actors, all economic processes take place within societies, political conjunctures and within class conflicts (Jessop & Sum, 2006, p.5).

Since this approach implies a criticism of neo-classical economics it should not be a surprise that some important representatives of this approach define themselves within a Marxian legacy or are at least deploying and discussing key concepts of Marx –since Marx himself has attempted to distance himself from classical

economics and classical political economy. Thus the RA mainly focuses on given conjunctures and circumstances, which lead to shifts in the organizational paradigms of capital accumulation. The RA (e.g. Alain Lipietz, Bob Jessop, Michel Aglietta) is deploying the concept of capital accumulation and organizes its main concepts around it.

According to their point of view diverse social and political conflicts (such as workers resistances or the changes in the balance of forces towards more conservative governments) as well contradictions inherent to capital accumulation led to an impasse in the 70's/80's, as it shall be shown later on. This crisis led to a rearrangement of the whole process of capital accumulation; the main organizational paradigm due to which goods and services were produced/distributed, the assumptions and strategies deployed to sustain and maximize capital accumulation, the institutional and legislative frameworks in which all the regulation of these processes were carried out changed. The Marxian representatives of the RA attempt to analyze how capital accumulation is managed so that it could be sustained. They look at the organizational forms, which enable capital accumulation to *reproduce* itself; they focus on the *regulation* of capitalist conduct (Elam in Ash, 1997, p.56 pp.). This approach attempts to show that capital accumulation takes place within social relations, which are not just factors confining this process but are active in organizing/realizing this process, they are not supplementary to capital accumulation but actively intervening into it. From this point of view flexibilization implies dynamic forms of business organization/specialization, state policies dismantling restrictions on businesses and labor legislation, fiscal/monetary policies forcing such institutional changes alongside the intensive use of electronic technologies on a worldwide scale (Sabel in Ash, 1997, p.101 ff.).

Different from the classical/neo-classical economics this approach introduces a fertile ground to understand capitalism beyond a narrow notion of *the* economy. It has to be noted that this approach emerged in a state of crisis, paving the way for an account how shifts within the capitalism can be understood and conceptualized. The RA opens up a field enabling a dynamic reading of the process of capital accumulation; diverse social relations and institutional practices as well as the process of capital accumulation can be seen as integrally related and having a relative autonomy. While mainstream economics develops an understanding of its field of inquiry outside social conflicts and practices, the RA tries to ‘embed’ economics within *the* social.

The RA looks at how capital accumulation relates to diverse social relations, and interacts with those, but it seems as if capital accumulation has still a logic on its own and social relations have an existence outside this process; these two elements are then combined theoretically. The RA takes a leap forward relative to mainstream economics but it seems as if a notion of *the economy* as an independent ontological unit is still taken for granted. We have to open up this point a little bit.

The emergence of ‘flexible’ capitalism is generally discussed within the framework of the Regulation School as a turning point marked by a crisis of international capitalism. Capitalism and ‘state capitalisms’ has/have faced a crisis of profitability on an international scale. These states faced difficulties in balancing their national/international trade leading to a fiscal impasse. This should have led to a re-arrangement of social relations and institutional practices maintaining capital accumulation. The main issue at stake here is the problem of how to give a coherent account of the shift of organizational principles and institutional practices regarding the sustenance of capital accumulation. What we face here is not the transformation

from one mode of production to another but a shift in the organizational principles and the institutional framework *within* the capitalist mode of production (Aglietta, 1979, p.12-13). Thus the discussions on the nature of the crisis and the changes following the crisis open up a theoretical debate of how to handle conceptual changes in the management of capital accumulation. If we speak of a set of practices and approaches, which are functional in governing a certain process, we are directly led to a discussion of administration. We might assume that times of crisis are the very point in which debates on the management of economic processes arise, which means that the political character of economic processes moves to the center of theoretical discussions; Alain Lipietz and Michel Vale (1988) explain this development as follows (p.11):

The problems posed at the beginning of our undertaking were a response to the great crisis of capitalism which burst into the open in the 1970s after a long latency period. To understand why things were no longer working required understanding of what had worked, and why. We call "regulation of a social relation" the way in which this relation is reproduced despite and through its conflictual and contradictory character. Thus the notion of regulation can only be understood within a particular schema: relation-reproduction-contradiction- crisis.

Here Lipietz and Vale emphasize the contradictory/conflictual character of economic processes within capitalism and state that these had/have to be governed by arranging the mechanisms and relations concerned. It is assumed that this process is not self-generating but a political process in which diverse dynamics and actors intervene. Thus the problem of the sustenance of capital accumulation is not one that is reducible to statistical variables and models but a complex process of making, un-making and re-making involving a variety of social factors. So, the crisis in the 70's was counteracted through a series of shifts in economic policies leading to a more

flexible organization of capital accumulation processes and a change in the international division of labor. As Lipietz (1997) argues (p.3-4):

The first and most obvious reason for the crisis appeared on the 'demand-side'. Competitiveness between the United States, Europe and Japan levelled out. The search for economies of scale induced an internationalization of productive processes and of the markets between developed countries. Price increases for primary commodities imported from the south (particularly oil) stoked up the competition for exports at the start of the 1970s. In the end, firms from Fordist countries increasingly sought ways to overturn labour regulations by sub-contracting production to non-Fordist countries, 'the socialist bloc' or 'newly industrializing countries' (NICs). Regulation of the growth of domestic markets through wage policy was now compromised by the necessity of balancing external trade.²⁷

[...]

Profits were low because workers were too strong, a product of the fact that the rules of the game were too 'inflexible'. Policies of 'flexibility' were put in place by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, eventually followed by most OECD countries. This repudiation of the long-standing social compromise attained different degrees and was drawn on different fronts: from the rules governing wage rises to the breadth and depth of social security, from the liberalization of employment laws to the proliferation of insecure jobs.

All these developments cannot be separated from international political developments as well as social conflicts. As Jessop and Sum (2006) state (p.4):

Instead it [the Regulation School -RA] typically focuses on the historical specificities of capitalism and regards continued capital accumulation as inherently improbable. This is linked in turn to an interest in the generic or more historically specific crisis tendencies of capitalism and in the major ruptures and structural shifts that occur as accumulation and its regulation develop in and through class struggle. Given these concerns the RA focuses on the changing combinations of economic and *extra-economic* institutions and practices that help to secure, if only temporarily and always in specific economic spaces, a certain stability and predictability in accumulation. In particular, whilst far from neglectful of the essentially archaic role of exchange relations (of market forces) in mediating capitalist reproduction, regulationists also stress the complementary functions of other mechanisms

²⁷ It is also noted that there was also a crisis faced by the supply-side.

(including institutions, collective identities, shared visions, common values, norms, conventions, networks, procedures and modes of calculation) in structuring, facilitating and guiding capital accumulation.

The main assumption goes into the direction that there is a crisis tendency of capital accumulation, which has to be counteracted upon diverse initiatives and strategies.

The latency of the crisis tendency calls for an involvement of politics. Thus the concept of crisis seems to be the point at which also the political emerges. Although the tendency of capitalism to face crisis and its political nature are not new to economics and especially not for those placed within the Marxian legacy a field for debate opens up. If we consider for instance the last statement of Jessop and Sum above we can assume that this crisis tendency has a multi-faceted nature. On the one hand we could say that diverse dynamics and mechanisms to accumulate capital come into conflict and lead at certain times to an impasse. Thus the process as such has to be managed in this or that way leading to shifts in the main accents of the paradigms attempting to structure capitalist conduct. But if we stop here we would conceive of the whole problematic as a field of inquiry dealing with administrative models and approaches, which seems to be not the major concern of the Regulation Approach. They divert themselves from classical economics with regard to the very definition of crisis and politics.

The RA elaborates a theoretical field to establish a narrative about the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. The main discussion is aligned around the question on how capitalism was governed upon what one might call ‘administrative techniques’. To conceive of all these practices in a coherent way the reasons for the crisis and its transformations have to be taken into consideration. This means that

capital accumulation has to be handled not as a self-sufficient process but that it consists of administered and organized social relations.

But this political moment and accent could also be read alternatively. The RA highly emphasizes the administrative/governmental and productive techniques involved in this politics. This could lead to a claim that the RA reads economics from an administrative point of view and does not leave the ground of economics. The RA seems to deploy an understanding of politics limited to administrative measures taken to sustain profitability. Thus this understanding of politics tends to be read just as a field of administration. The accent laid on politics seems to vacillate between an approach, which sees this field as one consisting of diverse administrative measures/governmental techniques and an approach, which takes into consideration the problematic of power/subjectation in the formation of capital accumulation. Thus there seems to be a tension within the RA. They attempt to break with mainstream economics, while at the same time ordering the techniques of the government of profitability under the necessities of capital accumulation. Thus capital accumulation seems to be an enfolding logic, which necessitates administrative initiatives. Politics and capital accumulation could be read as external to each other; they are related but their relation seems to be marked by externality. From such a point of view the RA would be a criticism of mainstream economics, which would not leave the ground of economics; it would take the economy for granted beyond its regulation in the very moment as it tries to connect these. Let us elaborate further on this point.

Economics would just focus on the strategies and practices of the actors involved in the process of capital accumulation and take both of them for granted. Such an approach could also admit that capitalism is political in its nature and has a latent crisis tendency. But it would be descriptive at the very moment in which it

would claim to be theoretical. Every step would show how capital reads the process politically, this would be a gaze from within the standpoint of capital without problematizing the gaze itself, the hermeneutics of capital would be taken for granted.²⁸

The RA seems to differ from such a path although it seems to be open to be read in such a way. The RA could also be read as inhibiting the political gaze of capital towards its accumulation process while also decoding its hermeneutics. Thus the RA tends to be a reading of politics from the point of view of capital, it seems to tend to render how capital reads politics. The RA seems to vacillate between ‘rational actors’ and subjects in accounting for the organizational forms, which capitalist conduct might take. It seems that capital reads politics as a problem of administering processes, in which the actions of rational actors are taken for granted. But we shall note that this is just a possible reading. The RA opens up a realm in which capital accumulation is understood as a process, which is organized. Thus diverse forms of administering this process are seen as a constitutive element of it. The debate was initiated by a crisis and led to the consideration of the organizational forms capitalism takes. This latter point seems to invoke the field of politics. Here we face diverse ways where the understanding of politics within the RA could lead us.

For going deeper into the details we have to say that the position taken by the RA has two dimensions. First of all there is a gaze towards theory and concepts,

²⁸ As Chakrabarty notes for Marx: “Marx decodes abstract labor as a key to the hermeneutic grid through which capital requires us to read the world.” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 55) This should not be read as a criticism of Marx. Chakrabarty shows that the very process of abstraction of value is a process in which subjects are constituted and power operates. Thus value can just be read within a framework of power and subjectivity. He states that Marx decodes capitalism upon subjection/subject formation. It seems that the Regulation Approach vacillates between taking the abstraction process for granted without accounting the very process of subject formation and decoding the emergence of value as within the field of subject formation. The latter seems at least to be a tendency inherent in economics and a point of tension within the RA. On the one hand the RA seems to break with economics and on the other remain within its epistemology.

which reflects upon their very abstract nature. The RA seems to be aware that the distinction between economic and extra-economic instances is just a conceptual distinction. The abstraction of social relations in the form of concepts seems to take place just for the sake of theoretical formulation. Secondly this gaze is marked by a consideration of politics as a moment emergent in the crisis. This implies a political stance, an acceptance of the existence of class struggle as having its place within the concept of crisis, as Aglietta (1979) states (p.16-17):

The definition of the field of economic science does not derive from a universal principle that founds a pure economy. It is solely a methodological demarcation within the field of social relations, one perpetually probed and shifted by the theoretical analysis itself. The study of capitalist regulation, therefore, cannot be the investigation of abstract economic laws. It is the study of the transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both economic and non-economic, that are organized in structures and themselves reproduce a determinant structure, the mode of production. As such, it will elucidate the general lesson of historical materialism: the development of the forces of production under the effect of class struggle, and the transformation of the conditions of this struggle and the forms in which it is embodied under the effect of that development. It is an indispensable component of the experimental procedure, which must orient the tension between abstract and concrete towards the following question: What forces transform the social system and guarantee its long-run cohesion?

Following Aglietta we can say that the conception of crisis cannot be separated from politics. But the understanding of the concept of crisis in political terms implies relations of government. The latter could be formulated as an ensemble of relations of power and subjection.

The concept of regulation seems to refer to an organizational shift in the way capital accumulation is arranged. But if such a shift has taken place then it must relate to a broader field in which power is exercised and distributed. Thus regulation has to be placed within a broader field of politics, as Jessop and Sum (2006) state (p.126-127):

The crisis of Fordism involves more than the forces of production or profitability. Much more fundamental is capital's inability to create a new accumulation regime with appropriate institutional forms, social relations and balance of social forces. Only when a new 'historical bloc' (Gramsci 1971; Chapter 12) is consolidated can accumulation (using both new and old technologies) enjoy a further long wave of expansion. Thus the novelty of post-Fordism involves not only the increasing flexibility of economic relations but also a changing state and the more general reorganization of social relations. This involves a search process rather than an automatic transition from one stage of capitalism to another. Post-Fordism will emerge from several distinct processes variously combined in different societies: technological change, decentralization of production, restructuring 'sunset' industries, expansion of the advanced tertiary sector serving industry (Regini 1986). Although it will inherit features from Fordism, production will be reorganized and the labour force recomposed. And, of course, it will vary across countries just as Fordism did. There will be analogous shifts in modes of regulation and modes of societalization.

We can argue that we have two components of the crisis: On the one hand there are fiscal and international policies to set a framework for capital accumulation, which face an impasse. On the other hand we have the dynamic conflict between subjects and power. The RA shows how a shift in the regime of accumulation, the industrial paradigm and modes of regulation took place. While the first concept includes strategies for capital accumulation, the second one is concerned with the main social and technological shifts taking place in the production/distribution of goods and services; the third concept is the overall institutional framework for policies guiding such a shift. Thus we see that processes of subject and power formation play a crucial role within the emergence and management of what is seen as a latent crisis of capital accumulation. The regulation school seems to focus on what Althusser might call ideological state apparatuses but it does not look at processes of subjection/power.

But another reading could be a statement in the direction that the RA tries to make an inquiry to decode how capital reads its crisis and intervenes into it. The first

reading could be open for blaming the RA of having a capitalocentric stance towards the social as Gibson and Graham (1997) criticize the RA (p.158):

If the regulationists have dispended with the inevitability of capitalist breakdown, they have not dispended with the inevitability of growth. Growth remains an unquestioned 'law' of capitalist development, with the implication for progressive activists that politics must at least accommodate and at most foster capitalist expansion (the alternative to the 'necessary process of growth being a crisis of accumulation).

It should be admitted that the RA is open for being blamed as a variation of economics in that it attributes a 'law' inherent to capitalism. The crisis faced in the 70s/80s is a product of a complex web of factors including the oil crisis, the instability international trade and workers' power to sell their unionized labor power at high 'costs'. In including these factors into their analysis the RA shows how political processes as well as social relations are involved in the structure of capital accumulation and its ways of conduct. Thus with the discussion of crisis and institutional/social frameworks the political moment emerges.²⁹ Capitalism is understood within the framework of politics. But at this point there seems to be a vacillation within the RA: At some points the political emerges as diverse institutional frameworks and social relations, which are understood in an administrative sense. The concept of regulation seems at some points to connote administrative techniques deployed to manage an abstract process of capital accumulation. Here we can relate diverse institutions and social relations to each other and can show how they interact to set the guidelines for the sustenance of profitability. But 'capital accumulation' itself seems not to be seen as an ensemble/index of governing relations and giving them an enlarging coherence over time.

²⁹ See for example Aglietta (1987, p.70-71)

This would be an understanding of politics, which could be equated with so-called ‘administrative sciences’. Thus understood capital accumulation would be a process, which is taken for granted and has a dynamic on its own subsuming social relations and political practices/institutions under its own logic. Although the representatives of the RA render *regulation* as a concept, which establishes a close relationship between diverse social factors and the process of capital accumulation it seems as if the conceptual distinction between the *economic* and *the political/social* is preserved and then related to each other afterwards.

Capitalism is seen as a political and social relation, but the account of this concept seems to inhabit the vacillation mentioned above. This seems to stem from the very fact that the RA is based upon a criticism of neo-classical economics. Not just the RA but the whole history of Marxism seems to be marked by such a vacillation between capital accumulation conceived as an enfolding logic and capitalism read as a contingent encounter and complex web of subject formation processes and their forms of coming together. But nevertheless the RA seems to look at the social/political from the point of view of a distinct economy, which is not conceptualized as a distinct instance. The distinct ontology of the economy within economics seems to have been shifted to the central concept of capital accumulation within the RA. Seen from this point of view the RA can be conceived of as a critical political engagement with economics (one might call it a political economics), which has not left the ground of economics but is a political criticism of it- since a distinct realm of *the* economy conceptualized as ‘capital accumulation’ enfolding its own logic seems to be taken for granted. The vacillation mentioned above seems to have its roots at this point. Reading the political/social from the point of view of capital accumulation would give a priority to this latter concept, which is able to organize all

other instances under its own logic. The RA puts capital accumulation at the center of the social.³⁰ This was also the point Akdemir (2008) attempted to criticize but was in turn adopted by her.

Thus seen the representatives of the RA might admit that capitalism is itself a relation of power but nevertheless could read the organizational framework of capital accumulation as administrative measures. Here the first statement (capitalism is a social relation of power) could be taken for granted and a language within the confines of economics/administrative sciences could be deployed without hesitating. But at this point a methodological problem emerges: If capitalism is a social relation of power what are administrative measures telling us about this power relation, are these administrative measures –conceptualized as regulation- just an combined by a pre-given logic of capital? Let us put it more concrete: Are relations and practices of conducting power on the one hand and the drive of capital to realize itself pre-given and relate as two distinguishable instances to each other in diverse configurations and conjunctures?

Now, what we claimed as a leap forward pushed by the RA against neo-classical economics brings us to an impasse. The RA went beyond a narrow understanding of *the* economy in showing the social and political implications of the process of capital accumulation. But the relationship established between capital accumulation and diverse social/political instances seems to be problematic. If capitalism is a social relation of power we cannot speak of a distinct enfolding logic of capital and power relations, but a coming together of diverse practices of exerting power codified upon an administrative and economic language. The RA tends to vacillate between deploying this latter language when trying to account for power relations. There is a

³⁰ For a criticism of the RA see Gibson and Graham (1997, p.154 ff)

relationship between two instances, which seem to have an existence on their own *and then* brought together.

The relative autonomy and the relationship established between these instances becomes a problem on its own, since it assumes the existence of these instances on their own. Seen from this point of view it becomes difficult to relate a multiplicity of social conflicts to each other. If we conceive of capitalism as a social relation of power then we have at least to give an account of how diverse practices of power relate to each other and how subject formation is effective in this process. With this regard Jessop and Sum (2006) note (p.4):

Rather than define production functions, the RA examines the technical and social division of labour and the labour process in all its conflictuality. Rather than seeing exchange relations as involving nothing but simple commodities, it argues that key monetized inputs of the economic process (especially labour power and money itself) are actually fictitious commodities. Neither labour power nor money is produced in and through capitalist relations of production but outside them. This occurs through the family, education and so on in the case of labour power; and through law and the state in the case of money (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1987a; cf. Marx 1971; Polanyi 1944).

Thus seen the relationship between conceptually distinguished instances (economic and *extra*-economic relations) becomes far more complex. These instances would then not exist side by side on their own and then be subsumed under and mobilized for shifts in the strategies to accumulate capital but a far more complex and interwoven relationship would exist. For instance the attempt made by the Tuzla Investigation Group points to a direction in which capital accumulation and the formation of state power are not taken separately and then brought into a relationship with each other. All these conceptually distinguished spheres seem not only to come together but also to format a realm of their coming together; it is not a summing up of diverse factors but their common coming into existence; their *articulation*. This

does not imply that their moment of emergence is synchronic but they form society upon their multiple effects and change thus their functions and meanings. Their encounter each other as effects and are not reducible to a functionalism but exceed the spheres of their encounter; thus their articulation is always open for disturbances and non-uniformity.

As we will see through the conflicts in the shipyards it seems that even prices and the value of ship construction and repair activities can not be understood without taking into consideration that these are not predetermined but a site of struggle and diverse strategies and techniques to govern subjects. The forms of contestation of the subjects take place within a sphere between legality and non-legality, which cannot be understood without looking at the relation of the Turkish state to its subjects and the relation of the latter to legality. The forms to gain advantage and abstract value cannot be conceived of without taking into account the diverse rationalities of the subjects involved. And again these rationalities do not emerge by chance but overlap with other forms of identity and the weaving of social webs. Seen from this perspective the forms of struggle show us that a multiplicity of positions and relations plays a role in determining the position of subjects in and around the shipyards as well as how far labor can be abstracted. Interestingly Lipietz criticizes Althusser/Balibar (1972) and the 'Althusserian Legacy' (From Poulantzas to Macherey) in that they do not account for the market within capitalism (Lipietz in Kaplan and Sprinker 1993, p.109-110). But if we conceive of the market as a realm of the contingent encounter of diverse subjects, capitalist conduct becomes a contingent field of struggles. If capitalist conduct is seen as a field of an encounter of diverse subjects, which are formed and transformed within this sphere then even capital accumulation, value and prices become not any fluctuating economic

variables but a site of governing relations and struggle. With this regard capital accumulation would not be a linear progressing culmination of money. This would resemble hoarding.³¹ But capital accumulation seems to be the culmination of potentialities, which can be set into motion and combined to enlarge the field of operation of its possessor. These potentialities seem to be the field in which diverse forms of subjection are deployed, social connections and relationships are established, governed, organized and set into motion.

Seen from this perspective, capital accumulation seems just to be an *attempt* to translate these into an abstract index superseding actual time and space to be able to open up other fields of potentialities. This attempt for universality seems to be the presupposition of capitalist conduct; this seems to force the entrepreneurs to behave as if the concrete context of their enterprise is a burden to be governed; the entrepreneurs attempt to universalize their potentialities to give them a character which exceeds the concrete context of their activity to enlarge their field of possibilities in other contexts. This seems to be the qualitative difference between hoarding and ‘capital accumulation’. Thus there would be not a linear culmination of value but a quest for potentialities and the means by which they are negotiated and deployed and actualized. Capital accumulation and the abstraction of value would be just an attempt to translate these into an abstract language (capital accumulation, investment, money, finance speculation), which attempts to assume universal validity. It seems as if potentialities are translated onto such a ground so that they could enable to open the way for other potentialities in diverse times, places and contexts. But it seems that this takes place within a sphere in which subjects encounter each other and are transforming their field of coming into existence and

³¹ For a reading of Marx regarding the distinction between capital and hoarding see Read (2003, p.22-23).

thus transforming each other. So an enfolding logic of capital accumulation with a linear culmination of time would just be a possibility or an attempt, which is open for contestation and disruption. Seen from this point of view we could not make a distinction between economic and extra-economic spheres. The economy would just be a field in which diverse potentialities gained by subjects would attempt to establish equivalences, but also this translation seems as if can not be taken for granted but open for disruptions and transformations. The very operation of abstracting actual social relations (capital accumulation, investment, money, finance speculation) beyond time and space seems to be haunted by the very temporality, spatiality and subjectivity that it attempts to get rid of. The conflictual character of the temporal, spatial and social contexts in which these potentialities are emerging and being contested seem to have an immanent tendency of a possibility that they can not be translated into other times, places and social contexts in a straightforward manner. But even this conflictual character seems to open ways for subjects to emerge and develop governmental strategies and tactics to culminate such potentialities. At least the shifts in the organization of capitalist conduct seem to emerge within this conflictual character of capital accumulation: The non-identity of the abstract character of capital accumulation and its concrete social, temporal and spatial emergence. Struggles between subjects seem to be a transformative element with regard to this non-identity.

In this sense the conflicts in the shipyards of Tuzla will be illuminating. In looking at these conflicts we shall see how the subjects in the shipyards of Tuzla relate to each other. This will show us that prices, wages and profits are established in a complex web of struggles. Especially the forms of conflict between workers/Linter-iş and subcontractors/shipyard owners will lead us to a point in which

we are not able to speak of a field, which can be reduced to claims on citizen rights and legal procedures. This will lead us to the processes of subject formation, which cannot just be reduced to subjection on the shop floor but also relate to the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects structuring the field of possibilities and the struggle of the subjects in and around the shipyards of Tuzla.

Forms of Struggle And Conflict

The International Maritime Organization prohibited ships with single hulls (International Maritime Organization) in 1992; the consequences of this decision and its implementation were accelerated in 2003. This was the result of ship accidents on the seas and also in line with a sense of ‘environmentalism,’ since for instance Greenpeace International is an observing member of the IMO and also welcomes some of its conventions (Greenpeace International, 2003). This brought about a boom in the orders for the shipyards in Tuzla (especially after 2003). The shipyards announced and that they had reached the limits of their capacities in 2008 and would not accept orders up until 2010. The struggle for an environmentalist awareness seems to have been profitable for the shipyard industry and it remains a question mark how far logistic companies and ship builders have an influence on the IMO.³² The sector boomed in Turkey at least up until 2008; prior to the ‘worldwide financial crisis’ and the some major actions of Limter-iş. My informant at the RMK Marine Shipyard told me the following story with regard to the changes this development brought about:

Brokers [finance speculators] came to the shipyards together with those who wanted to own ships and said that they wanted to construct ships.

³² For the functioning of catastrophes on capitalism see the recent book of Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*.

The shipyard-owners became intermediaries between the subcontractors and the brokers but to finance this, banks got involved into this process. In the first times these brokers were related to maritime activity but with time other brokers outside of the industry also made such attempts. The brokers and the shipyard owners went to the Banks to get credits for the projects. The brokers were buying the necessary material for ship-construction. At the final stage of the construction the brokers tried to bypass the ship owners calculating the possibility that the ready-made ship could be sold for a higher price. Since these ships are mainly used for logistics and the profitability of this sector depends on whether one enterprise is able to ship goods, immediately the probability to sell a ready-made ship was high. The shipyard owners witnessed the attempts of the brokers and now tried to bypass the brokers on their own. The Banks, which were involved in this enterprises went to the shipyard-owners and convinced them to build ships on their own, the shipyard owners started producing their own ships as the worldwide financial crisis breaks out. Since the credit of one ship can just be turned back in four years they get financial problems. After the crisis the shipyards change their owners and become owned more and more by companies, which are running ships as in the case of the ADİK, SEDEF, DESAN, ÇELİK TEKNE Shipyards.

It is hard to prove how far this account is true but it nevertheless shows that there is not just a potential for control and struggle between shipyard-owners and subcontractors but a steady struggle as to who will get the advantages of the fragmented sector. For instance another high ranking informant, who was close to the former Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) and also worked with social-democratic oriented Republicans³³, also told me that he tried to force his workers to ‘strike,’ when he could not fulfill the deadline for a ship to be constructed in those times as the shipyards underwent a boom. Due to the contract made with the ship owner the deadline could be exceeded if reasons beyond the control of the shipyard owner

³³ This resembles the case of former workers, who became subcontractors. The skills and political know-how of government can have diverse roots and a genealogy. Thus seen it shall not be forgotten that there is a close relationship between Yuppies and the generation of 1968. The latter developed skills to organize and govern political processes and in a conjuncture in which the struggle slowed down a huge amount of them had to work. Some of them became high-ranking personnel in big companies. Thus seen even the organizational forms of contemporary capitalism could be read within a genealogy of the subjects organizing it and the *effects* of diverse struggles, as we shall see later on in discussing Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.

hindered the production. So he would continue the ship construction but would let some of his workers occupy the deck of the ship in faking a strike.

Once, he should have got an order for ship construction. A certain piece of machinery installed on the ship was necessary to run it. He had two of these machines. He destroyed the one, which was in the ship and said to the ship owner that the deadline could not be kept. Thus he said to the ship owner that he could order such a machine but this would take forty days. The ship owner had two options: He could wait forty days and thus would lose the profit of forty days of transporting goods –which meant for the logistic industry an important amount of time- or would pay more for the ship and could sail directly since there was a second machine in another ship on the same shipyard. The ship owner decided in favor of the second option.

We see a dispersion of power and resources in which the subcontractors are one of the most important actors. Value seems not to be an issue just of ‘market fluctuations’ but of strategies and tactics to use legal means and those beyond it. As one of the most important actors in Tuzla, the subcontractors are also moving in a similar direction, their conduct is also marked by struggles, as it was the case of the subcontractors who are trying to bypass the shipyards and establish direct relations with the ship owners.

The size and strength of the subcontractors depend on the specific tasks, which they do and this also changes their organizational structure, since long lasting jobs with a certain continuity also lead to a more or less institutionalized form of organizing the relationships, while there are also a lot of *ad hoc*/open-and-close subcontractors. Most of the subcontractors do even not know how to conduct legal procedures such as tax and social security payments. The price, which they are

proposing for a job on the shipyards for instance has also to cover the social security payments of their workers but there were dozens of cases in which the subcontractor even claimed that they did not know that he had to make the payments and that the shipyard owner should make them. A legal framework accompanies this ‘confusion’. According to the second clause of the Labor Act number 4857, which was released in the year 2003, companies can outsource ‘just a part of the production process and due to reasons of expertise and technology’; the principal company has also the full responsibility for the fulfillment of the social rights of the workers:

The connection between the subcontractor who undertakes to carry out work in auxiliary tasks related to the production of goods and services or in a certain section of the main activity due to operational requirements or for reasons of technological expertise in the establishment of the main employer (the principal employer) and who engages employees recruited for this purpose exclusively in the establishment of the main employer is called “the principal employer-subcontractor relationship”. The principal employer shall be jointly liable with the subcontractor for the obligations ensuing from this Labour Act, from employment contracts of subcontractor's employees or from the collective agreement to which the subcontractor has been signatory.

The rights of the principal employer’s employees shall not be restricted by way of their engagement by the subcontractor, and no principal employer – subcontractor relationship may be established between an employer and his ex- employee. Otherwise, based on the notion that the principal employer- subcontractor relationship was fraught with a simulated act, the employees of the subcontractor shall be treated as employees of the principal employer. The main activity shall not be divided and assigned to subcontractors, except for operational and work- related requirements or in jobs requiring expertise for technological reasons.³⁴

If this expression should be taken literally the main amount of workers have to be the workers employed by the shipyard owners. But the shipyard owners as well as the subcontractors are taking the risk to violate the law, since the only treat could be that

³⁴ See İş Kanunu

the union sues them; this is a risk that can be taken. Since not paying social security benefits and the whole salary is also a strategy for accumulating capital and gain profits. It shall also be noted that in Tuzla subcontractors conduct almost all tasks. Thus a problem arises of who is responsible for the work conditions. Seen from such a point of view even the employment of so many subcontractors should be illegal and the shipyards would have to employ a higher amount of core workers. Thus for instance Limter-iş sues not just the subcontractors but also the shipyard owners in claiming that they hire subcontractors for ‘main tasks’. Here a realm of non-legality is opened up in which the subcontractors and the shipyard owners can blame each other, can violate the law for the sake of profitability and use this non-legality also against each other at least when workers claim their legal rights.³⁵ On the other hand the contracts between shipyard owners and ship owners are open for interpretation and each term is interpreted to gain advantages, thus the meaning of terms of agreement involves a politics of reading and interpreting. This is also the case with regard to the Labor Act 4857. It is a matter of interpretation of which activities are ‘core activities’ which ones are not regulating the amount of subcontractors to be hired.

The union Limter-iş launched actions dozens of times against subcontractors and shipyard-owners. Most of the times the subcontractors are not giving the salary to the workers or are not paying the social security payments at all or not in line with the salary and work-days. In such cases the union organizes the workers and remains with them in front of the entrance of the shipyard. This is generally accompanied

³⁵ As it was mentioned earlier there is also a struggle between shipyard owners and subcontractors. Shipyard owners sometimes do not pay the full amount, which was negotiated between the shipyard owners and the subcontractors; sometimes they keep the money and sometimes they pay it later on to gain control upon the subcontractor. Thus for instance the unionists claim that especially in the shipyards of GEMAK, SEDEF, especially SELAH, SADIKOĞLU, DESAN, ADA all the subcontractors who entered into any work relations went to bankruptcy.

with a suing of the subcontractor and the shipyard owner. After such events the workers are not joining the union; they get their money and their benefits or the whole issue ends due to the length of the legal procedures and the unwillingness of the entrepreneurs to take any step. There are also cases in which the workers come directly to the union and just sue the subcontractors and again go away after the legal procedure. In other cases the union escalates the conflict, goes to the gates of the shipyard concerned and blocks the entrance, so that no worker and raw material could enter it. In such actions as in the blockades of the streets, the union calls for solidarity and for participation to the action. Sometimes other workers participate and sometimes they do not. This depends generally on the amount of people they see in the action and a calculation of whether the police could attack the action. Another way for showing solidarity and by the same token not losing the job is to claim that the road or the entrance of the shipyard was blocked and that it was not possible to come to the workplace. Thus the workers make diverse calculations in showing solidarity. Road-cutting actions or blockades can begin with three to ten union activists/workers and end up with hundreds or thousands of participants or can remain without solidarity. This results generally with attacks by the police and temporary arrests of the workers and union leaders. This form of direct action is directly linked to the problem that the union cannot organize itself within this fragmented division of labor, the temporary character of the work done and the continuing flux of workers, which are dispersed among the shipyards and among hundreds of subcontractors.

But not just the union is following a line of direct action. For instance the subcontracting company YET Denizcilik, which was working for the TORLAK shipyard, did not pay the legal benefits of 25 workers. The workers began a

resistance and protested the entrepreneurs. On November 9, 2009 the former president Limter-iş, Cem Dinç, and the General Secretary of the union, Kamber Saygılı (who is now the president of the union), went to the shipyard TORLAK. The shipyard owner wanted to speak and negotiate just with Dinç, as he entered the office of Kenan Torlak, he was physically attacked by his bodyguards and by Torlak himself (Limter-iş, 2009).

But the use of violence to discipline workers and suppress their demands cannot be reduced to the shipyard owners alone. There was one story in which subcontractors attempted to attack the union leaders and the workers: Once the union started a protest for workers, who did not get their salaries. Three ‘people in suits came’ to the workers said and threatened them in saying that they ‘came in the name of the shipyard’. An open confrontation took place between about thirty workers and this ‘people in suits’³⁶ close the GEMAK Shipyard. As the latter heard that the workers were unionized, they apologized for their behavior led the workers. According to the accounts of the unionists such people were workers of the subcontractors. They were employed but did not work actively as workers but were responsible for the ‘security’ of the workflow. Indeed some of the workers who were not unionized were saying that they were ‘*the man of*’ this or that subcontractor [*ben... adamıyım*]; such expressions are used in the Turkish language to indicate a more clan-like relationship based on hierarchical structures and an identification with one person as a leader. It should be noted that this was more common prior to the crisis of 2008.

³⁶ It shall be noted that suits in Turkey do not just refer to business clothes, but are also a symbol of the mafia and the fascists/paramilitary forces.

A similar event took place in the case of a subcontractor working for the state-run military PENDİK Shipyard prior to its privatization as one unionized worker tells (see Appendix-E):

This is a very old story but; in the Pendik Shipyard; at those times it was not privatized. We are working for a subcontractor, there was one lieutenant, no, a sergeant major, coming from the military. He retired, came and established a company, a maritime company and got jobs. Now, he gives all his workers a good salary [*I ask if he is a subcontractor*].yes yes, he is a subcontractor. About twenty men from us, he gives good salary, when in those times the salaries were nine thousand liras he gave twelve thousand lira. And he gave us walkie-talkies, without going you could make announcements. He employed five-six foremen, he employed us as foremen. Now this man does not give twelve thousand lira, at the beginning of a month he gives ten thousand lira, if his heart wants it that way [*gönlünden koptuğu zaman*], he gives ten thousand lira but lets you sign for twenty thousand lira. His tactic is the following: Immediately there is a weapon on the desk, a weapon in his treasury, immediately this, he says: ‘This month, I said twenty thousand lira but I won’t give you this amount, don’t pay look at all these [*bakma sen*] we can not earn so much, we said twenty thousand lira but I will give you ten thousand lira, sign that, that you have got twenty thousand lira.’ They do not say anything and sign immediately. Eleven people, we underwent such a situation. Like that, naturally that company could not last for a long time, the workers got their ten thousand lira, naturally we started a resistance at that workplace in claiming that our salaries were not paid totally. He did pay the social insurance costs but not upon the salary we received but upon the legal minimum wage, sometimes it was paid for twenty days, sometimes for fifteen days each month, then we objected. As we objected, we went there with twelve-thirteen friends, this was good and we convinced the other friends. We started an action. He called us. We had a tent dining room in the shipyard, a tent, in the tent he said: ‘I have twelve bullets here, this means one bullet for each of you, you will sign the agreement. We said ‘Go away with that’ [*sen onu geç*’] ‘We already have been shot by bullets; hunger, thirst, poverty, you try to trick us, you said you will pay twenty thousand lira but gave us ten thousand lira, you take the two thousand, you don’t pay our insurances, you are shooting everyday at us. You will give us our money. Then we got the money. But we heard that a lot of people working after us were victimized [*mağdur oldu*]. After having finished his job at the Pendik Shipyard he flee away, closed down, without paying the holdings of the workers.

This story shows that the subcontractors use violent means but nevertheless it involves claims on legal rights, since the narrator of the story was a union activist and knows the labor acts. But this is was not always the case. The workers I met during 2007-2011 in Tuzla did not know their legal rights; the only ones who had such information were stable workers and those who had a relation to the union Limter-iş. Thus there are also cases in which the workers are directly using violence.

For instance a worker told the story of his co-worker, who came from *Maraş*. This worker could not get his salary and was beaten by such affiliates of the entrepreneurs. So he went to the subcontractor and shot him at his legs.

In another case a worker came to the union Limter-iş and claimed that he could not get his wages. The union went to court. The lawyer of the union and the lawyer of the employer met each other during the trial; it turned out that they were friends during their youth. The lawyer of the employer said that he would make arrangements on behalf of the worker were it not the case that the worker already got his salary. The union activists asked the worker why he did something like that and the worker claimed that the employers were blood suckers and that such a step would not be ethically a problem. The union activists discussed with the worker and said that they struggled against the employers but were not dishonest people and thus quit the trial.³⁷

There was another story of Arab workers from *Urfa/Harran*, which are the most pauperized and casual working strata among the workers in Tuzla besides the Kurds from the same region. One of them told me the story of a conflict between a worker from *Harran* and a subcontractor (see Appendix-F):

³⁷ During a lot of trials also some lawyers also tried to bypass the union to make agreements directly with the workers, since a positive result on behalf of workers means that a certain amount of money is distributed among the union, the workers and the lawyer.

The Arabs, I mean those from Urfa, those from Harran once had a fight. Approximately five hundred people gathered together there. It was a matter of money, regarding the subcontractor. Sure, the subcontractor had beaten one of their men. He injured the finger of one and stabbed. I think the subcontractor was from Kastamonu or Samsun, I don't remember but the fight took place at the YILDIRIM Shipyard, twenty-five people from Urfa worked there as stoners, he did not give them their money and should have fled away. Actually, the subcontractor of the subcontractor shall have fled away. The man is already another subcontractor and he should have given the thing to another one and the latter one should have fled away as his company made losses. Now, as the Arabs went there and wanted their money he says 'your man has fled, it has nothing to do with me' the workers say 'how is he not available, we did your work' and so on. In the meantime, actually that subcontractor is deeply rooted in that shipyard; from there he does not take the Arabs serious he immediately beats two of them in the office within the shipyard and says: 'Do not enter this place again, we will clash and distort [*kırarız, dökeriz*] you.' Sure, the Arabs should have gone and made phone calls to everywhere, they should have gathered and as soon as the subcontractor went out of the gates of the shipyard, in such a manner that they did not expect such a thing, they took him and beat him, sure [*he smiles*] actually they also have phoned here and there, their social environment, but they were not so much crowded. The Arabs; their money; the chief of the police and so on made phone calls; they said 'ok, what amount of money is in question? We will give your money', the shipyard came, so this story came thus to an end.

But the negotiation for wages and social benefits does not take just the form of legal procedures of suing, union actions or direct violence. Also the hierarchic relationships within the shipyards are used to negotiate for wages as one technician tells. His story is taking place in the 90's as Kahraman Sadıkoğlu took the job of renewing a huge oil platform³⁸ (see Appendix-G):

I work at SADIKOĞLU, in the times of the platform; in those times I am a welding foreman and administrator, tester and controller of the quality; in those times it was famous in that the wages were not paid on time there. The workers ask all time, they say 'the wages are always not paid on time, one month, twenty days.' Sure the men had no money anymore. The workers came to us; sure they perceived us close to them, sure we had relations in the administration there, we have relations. One

³⁸ See Erdil (2011)

day I said, and we gathered, the foremen and headsmen, the workers come and ask why there is no money. We are nine-ten persons, I said then lets go. Sezen was there in those times, captain Akif was not there in those times, Mr. Kahraman was not there and so on. I said we know the office, lets go there. We go there, I am walking on the front, we go to the turning machine atelier, from there you go upstairs, I got upstairs and looked: At every corner one worker went back, on every corner one man went *anasını satayım*. I went and knocked the door. He said 'Please come in', I opened the door went in. He is a good engineer a good brother of ours. I turned back and looked, there was nobody. I said 'I thought that we came here with nine-ten persons but I turned back and there was nobody, but I will tell you my problem' I said that the friends had problems also regarding their transportation to the shipyards, at those times there was no delivery service of the shipyard. I said that the man had no money anymore, even to turn back home. He said 'Ok, *abi* , I will ask that, come after lunch again. Mr. Kahraman is coming.' He said 'Ok, I will ask, come after lunch and I will give you a response.' He said 'Let us drink some tea' and I said 'No I will go downstairs.' I had also work to do. They came and said '*abi*, what happened, *abi* what happened.' And I said 'the vagina of your midwife happened [*ebenizin amı oldu*].' Later I said nothing and went upstairs two hours later. He said 'In the afternoon they will get their money *abi*, know this and say this to your friends.' I said nothing to them [...] they got their money.

The different forms of conflict and negotiation show that there is not a single line and manner for conflict resolution. Furthermore these accounts show that capital accumulation and contestation is developing parallel to the establishment and reconfiguration of different relationships. The threat of illegality seems to be deployed by the state to control the shipyard owners; this same axis seems to be used hand in hand with financial power by shipyard-owners against subcontractors. By the same token workers are using their connections to contest and negotiate their claims; although there are many cases in which workers went to the court for their rights and could gain them, this way is not the only one and not the most effective one in a field in which the addressee of the problems are vague and can dissolve or use violence. There seems to be a certain distribution and contestation of power, which is organized around the vague lines of legality, non-legality and illegality. It seems as if

the accumulation of capital is just possible within a realm of a multiplicity of conflicts. We see here a complex field in which workers can become subcontractors and subcontractors can face bankruptcy. The case of the subcontractor, who tried to bypass shipyard owners and establish direct links to ship owners to get orders for ship repair (especially after the crisis of 2008), the example of brokers, ship owners, banks and shipyard owners to reconfigure their relationships and in some cases to bypass each other show that the determination of prices and value is directly linked to social relations and their government. As it was shown in the relationship between subcontractors and shipyard owners this relationship involves strategies/tactics as well as a hierarchy in the distribution of power (governments, shipyard owners/ship owners, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, workers) moving in a sphere between non-legality and illegality; thus the 'costs' are not just negotiated upon agreements but also within diverse strategies/tactics to govern relations. Especially with regard to the conflict between workers and subcontractors a multiplicity of techniques of subjection (also involving violence) are used. This was answered by the workers by means of direct violent actions or by calling laws or by intermediaries to reach the employers. What we see here is a constant quest to gain power and bypass another faction. This seems to show that this field opens up possibilities for gaining and losing positions, which makes capitalist conduct flexible and capitalist conduct a matter of power/subjectivity.

But this sketch on the conflicts did not account for the emergence of these subjects and the field of possibilities on which they acted. The forms of direct action and the vague line between non-legality and illegality seems just to be possible to be accounted for in looking at subject formation processes which reach a scope beyond the shipyards of Tuzla. Thus we have to dwell in a more detailed manner on the

process of subject formation and the structuring of the field of possibilities on which they act. The question of how this kind of capitalist conduct could emerge needs to be answered.

CHAPTER 3:
CRISIS, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE
ORGANIZING CAPITALIST CONDUCT

The emergence of the subjects on the shipyards of Tuzla has to be understood within a framework in which capitalist conduct and subjection can be related to each other. This discussion will bring us to a point in which subjectivity and resistance play a central role in the changes of the organization of capitalism on a worldwide scale. With regard to Turkey these struggles are embedded within the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects, which did not bring about a universal notion of citizenship. This opened the way for non-legal conduct and by the same token to subjectivities governing their relationships and struggling in a manner in which the law is not the only instance to be called for. Thus we shall be able to give an account on the emergence of the field of possibilities for the agency of the subjects on the shipyards in Tuzla as well as their emergence.

Crisis: The Emergence of Politics

The RA accounted for the emergence of the shifts in the organizational forms of capitalist conduct in stating that it was a result of a crisis in the 1970's/1980's. The forms of regulation of capitalist conduct needed to be regulated. The concept of regulation seems to imply that the process of capital accumulation deploys hitherto existing social relations as a tool for its own subsistence, as it was shown by the reflection on the Regulation Approach. But seen from such a point of view again we

could not account for the crisis of capital accumulation in 1970's if we do not see it as a coming into existence within broader social conflicts structuring the micro politics of capitalist quotidian conduct. Again an administrative and technical language could be deployed to describe the crisis. But this would just be a description within the confines of administrative and economic sciences. Without opening up the problematic of power/subjectivity and resistance it seems impossible to give a theoretical account for the concept of crisis and thus the organization of capitalist conduct. The only way possible to understand a notion of power would be an approach considering it as a sphere of subject formation. The shipyard owners and workers of Tuzla showed how subjectivities and their constantly changing relations are a constituent element of organizing capitalist conduct.

But how can we approach the organization of capitalist conduct through the concepts of power and subjectivity in order to avoid an understanding of politics in which its constituent elements are muted under a rough conception of administration/management. Here the work of Read (2003) seems to be illuminating. He attempts to establish an organic relationship between what he calls 'the materiality of the capitalist mode of production' and the 'materiality of a mode of subjection' (p.9). Read brings two essays of Marx into a dialogue: *On The So-called Primitive Accumulation* and *On Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*. Thus he points at the political character of the constitution of the capitalist mode of production. According to his reading of Marx the constitution of capitalism presupposes a process of subject formation (p.21):

The fact that capitalist production would continually presuppose itself, it presupposes wealth in the hands of capitalists as well as a population of those who have nothing but their labor power to sell. These elements, capital and workers, are the preconditions of any capitalist production, yet they cannot be explained from it. Capitalist accumulation would

seem to be something of an infinite regress, always presupposing its own conditions. To accumulate capital it is necessary to possess capital. There must then be an original or previous accumulation, one that is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but rather its point of departure and that constitutes the originary differentiation between capital and workers.

In line with this argument capitalism can just develop on the ground that laborers are separated from their means of production and the means of production or at least the possibility to access these have to be concentrated in the hands of another social group (capitalists). This initial separation, which Marx calls primitive accumulation is continued also during the whole existence of capitalism (p.29):

Marx suggests that there is a qualitative difference between primitive accumulation and the capitalist economy it engenders, in terms of the former's bloody discontinuity and the latter's continuity and silent functioning. At the same time, however, Marx would suggest that this qualitative change is best understood perhaps as a change in the form of violence itself, capitalist accumulation is nothing other than primitive accumulation continued onto the shop floor, and thus nothing other than a continuation of the modification of violence begun with "bloody legislation" and the enclosure acts. The violence of law and the police gives way to the coercive force of the shop supervisor and the rhythm of machines.

Not just with regard to the constitution of capitalism and its continuity but also regarding its crisis the field of power/subjectivity seems to have a constitutive character. Thus the factors of economic crisis could also be conceived of within this problematic. The RA as well as mainstream economists are counting an imbalance in supply and demand, monetary problems and the oil crisis as factors, which culminated into a worldwide crisis in the 70's/80's. Now, these fields *seem* not to be *directly* linked to social conflicts, *at least at the first sight*. But it seems as if also these 'macro-economic variables' could be conceived of within the problematic of power/subjectivity; at least the accounts given previously by the theorists within the legacy of the RA counted workers resistance as a component of crisis.

In a similar line the relation of supply and demand and the emphasis on the latter within the context of crisis relates for Hardt and Negri (2003) to a social conflict; the emphasis on the latter within the discourse of economics is a search for governing subjects. On the same token, the financial crisis is also conceived within the same problematic that Negri notes (p.43):

With Keynes, capitalist science takes a remarkable leap forward. It recognizes the working class as an autonomous moment within capital. With his theory of effective demand, Keynes introduces into political economy the political notion of a balance of power between classes in struggle. Obviously, the ideological (but also necessary) aim of Keynes's argument is toward shoring up the system. For Keynes the problem is how to establish a balance of effective demand, in a context where the various balances of power making up effective demand are conceived of as unchanging. This political objective, however, which would require working-class autonomy to be forever constrained within a given existing power structure, is precisely the paradox of Keynesianism. It is forced to recognize that the working class is the driving motor of development, and that therefore Keynes's statically defined notions of equilibrium can in fact never be attained in static terms. Any attempt to define an equation of static equilibrium is, and will remain, a laborious search for equilibrium within what has to be a developing situation.

Here we see that the crisis of capitalism reveals the subjectivities hidden in economic discourse. According to Negri/Hardt demand has been linked to the purchasing power of workers. This power cannot be taken for granted but it is constituted within struggle. This is why Keynes marks a turning point in economics; he is the theoretician of crisis. He sees that under the disequilibria between supply and demand a problem, which has to be governed by the fiscus. Thus capitalism aims to normalize and govern a subjectivity, which it presupposed for its constitution and is not able to incorporate totally; there is excess. This is why capitalism seems to be a constant attempt for normalization. As Read (2003) notes (p.36):

The destruction and creation of new forms of cooperation entails the destruction and creation of the old forms of sociality and subjectivity. Thus it is possible to find in Marx a third moment of primitive accumulation, after the expropriation or destruction of the previous

mode and its violent legislation, a moment of normalization that bears on subjectivity and sociality itself. As Marx writes: 'the advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education [*Erziehung*], tradition, and habit [*Gewohnheit*] looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self evident natural laws' (CI 899/765).

But we have to note that for Negri and Hardt such normalization could just be political problems always postponing an immanent crisis between the subjectivities presupposed by capitalism and capital accumulation. Even such problems as monetary crisis, which could be just counted as 'macro-economic' variables in mainstream economics, are a continuation of such an antagonism for Negri (1991), as he notes in his reading of *Grundrisse* (p.25):

Marx finds himself before 'the first complete form of the modern state, the government of social capital; the first complete form of a modern monetary system, the centralized government of liquidity.' All of this is presented under the form of crisis: Marx's route is that which descends from an adherence to the monetary image of the crisis (crises will always present themselves from now on under the monetary form) to an analysis of the crisis of social relations, from the crisis of circulation to the crisis of the relation between necessary labor and surplus labor. As if in an enormous effort of anticipation, the crisis comes to figure the historic tendency of capitalist development. And it is in this historical projection that the crisis becomes a crisis of the law of value. Within the historical projection of a form of production which becomes increasingly more social, in which the modern function of value is transformed into a function of command, of domination, and of intervention on the social fractions of necessary labor and accumulation.

Money is then just an abstraction or what we might call an index of social antagonisms, which postpones the former into other spheres of society and thus turns the antagonism between capital and labor into a crisis of society.

From such a point of view the crisis faced in the 70's/80's could be read within a process in which the very structure of subject formation, the relation between power and subjectivity was negotiated. For instance if we look at the oil crisis, we cannot

just say that the price of oil begun to rise and thus influenced the costs of production. Even this crisis is linked to the balance of forces in a bipolar world and nationalist/anti-imperialist struggles, which culminated into the establishment and strengthening of OPEC. For instance Caffentzis (2008) notes that the struggle of workers on a worldwide scale overlapped with the anti-imperialist struggles, the latter lead to the emergence of the OPEC, which controlled the prices for oil. Thus capitalism faced a crisis in the 1970's.

Thus not just workers' resistances but a multiplicity of social conflicts seems to have lead to the crisis in the 70's/80's. At this point Negri and Hardt (2000) are giving an account on why the organizational forms capitalist conduct assumes have changed (p. 275-276):

These new circuits of the production of subjectivity, which were centered on the dramatic modifications of value and labor, were realized within and against the final period of the disciplinary organization of society. The movements anticipated the capitalist awareness of a need for a paradigm shift in production and dictated its form and nature. If the Vietnam War had not taken place, if there had not been worker and student revolts in the 1960s, if there had not been 1968 and the second wave of the women's movements, if there had not been the whole series of anti-imperialist struggles, capital would have been content to maintain its own arrangement of power, happy to have been saved the trouble of shifting the paradigm of production! It would have been content for several good reasons: because the natural limits of development served it well; because it was threatened by the development of immaterial labor; because it knew that the transversal mobility and hybridization of world labor power opened the potential for new crises and class conflicts on an order never before experienced. The restructuring of production, from Fordism to post-Fordism, from modernization to postmodernization, was anticipated by the rise of a new subjectivity. The passage from the phase of perfecting the disciplinary regime to the successive phase of shifting the productive paradigm was driven from below, by a proletariat whose composition had already changed. Capital did not need to invent a new paradigm (even if it were capable of doing so) because the truly creative moment had already taken place. Capital's problem was rather to dominate a new composition that had already been produced

autonomously and defined within a new relationship to nature and labor, a relationship of autonomous production.³⁹

Seen from this point of view flexible capitalism was not an initiative taken to maintain capital accumulation but more a process of recuperating resistance.⁴⁰ The subjects it presupposed have to be governed, and thus we can speak of a contestation regarding the structure of subject formation. If we look retrospectively at these struggles we could state the following: The outcome was not a struggle in which ‘the multitude’ was victorious against ‘capital’ but how far the subjectivities presupposed can assume externality, can become antagonistic; how far and in which forms the excess of the constituted subjects might become a force assuming externality; it seems as if the ground and line of antagonism has been negotiated. The movement in the 1960’s/1970’s demanded an exodus from imperialism and capitalism but its failure led to the re-organization of capitalism. In line with that also the remnants of this movement acted on a sphere in which revolution seemed far away, especially after the 1980’s. And all this is a problem of governing subjects and recuperating their potentials; a preventive guerilla war of capitalist conduct.

Subjectivity remains an intrinsic problem of capitalist conduct. The example of the ex-communist high-ranking shipyard official who wanted to provoke a strike to get time for the construction of a ship seems to demonstrate for instance how a story/history of resistance is made functional within other agendas. Also the decision of the International Maritime Organization to ban ships with single hulls and older than fifteen years is explained upon ship accidents and a sense of environmentalism. The latter at least is a product of a long lasting struggle of ecologists and Greenpeace has the status of an observer within the IMO. But interestingly the whole issue turned

³⁹ For a similar approach see Cleaver (2000), Negri and Hardt (2011, p.143-144)

⁴⁰ For a similar report on the ‘autonomist hypothesis’ see Read (2003, p.13)

into a boom for the ship construction/repair industry. It shall also not be forgotten that Tuzla was opened as a space to be transformed into a shipyard region after the forced migration of non-muslims, the shipyards were constituted after the coup d'état in 1980, suppressing the left and within the war between Kurds and Turks, as well as an environment in which Alawites were oppressed. The struggles of the Alawites and the Kurds were articulated within the radical left or at least within its discourse. So even here we see the *effects* of a movement on an international scale.⁴¹ The oppression by the state of non-muslims, Alawites, Kurds and leftists also paved the way for a relationship of the sovereign to its subjects, which was not based on universality. The state dealt differently with diverse portions of its population. The struggles triggered by such oppression even further widened up the non-universal character of the law and positioned the state above it. Thus governments were able to support their clientele and also opened up a field for non-legal conduct for their clientele. State officials gave subsidies to their clientele to run shipyards, which had no legal permissions while they were supported upon public funds and tax exemptions. Thus the non-universal character of the law and the non-universal character of citizenship in Turkey opened up a field in which non-legality and illegality could be used by each subject to govern its relations. The workers came with diverse waves of migration triggered by economic policies and the policies of

⁴¹ Negri argues that there is no outside of capitalism and that a bio-politics of capitalism has permeated the whole of social life. But it has to be insisted that this does not mean that there is a temporal synchrony of the subjects and their hermeneutics. For instance it would be interesting to see how struggle in one sphere of a society/country is turned into a story in another sphere/country. A case in point are the socialists of non-working class origins or ask why a socialist of Alawite-peasant origin discusses the 'betrayal of the 2nd International' with a university student stemming from a middle-class family in the year 2000, or why Ernesto Che Guevara is a mythos cross-cutting all spheres of society. The non-simultaneity of subject formation processes and their representation seem to be a crucial part of a hermeneutics for resistance in other spheres/times/places. It is open for questioning for instance, why the struggle of the 60's-70's took place leading to an overall reorganization of societies including but not limiting itself to 'macro-political/economic' explanations.

the state against certain groups of the population. This alone shows the field of possibility for the emergence of the shipyards and the struggles around it within the problematic of subject formation/power and as forms of primitive accumulation. Interestingly the emergence of the system of subcontraction opened the ways for workers to become entrepreneurs. Thus the subcontraction system and the conflicts in the shipyards opened a way in which workers could use their social relationships to become entrepreneurs and also went to bankruptcy. Thus the conduct on the shipyards made even primitive accumulation and its reversal a matter of struggle between shipyard owners and subcontractors.

Here we face a problem with regard to the concept of primitive accumulation. The separation of the laborer from her/his means of production seems to imply that 'means of production' as possessed things. But it seems that there is also a struggle by the 'dispossessed' to resist primitive accumulation. Seen from this point of view it seems as if the very meaning of what 'means of production' are have been contested and integrated into capitalist conduct. If we conceive of 'means of production' not as things possessed but as social relations then we can see that contemporary capitalism opens up a realm for workers to resist becoming and remain workers. If we think of former workers becoming subcontractors (or contemporary forms of self-employment or even writing *Curriculum Vitae* or the whole 'literature' on personal development) then social relations and abilities seem to be the result of workers resisting being workers. Although the amount of money earned might not exceed the salary of an employee at least the fantasy to be ones own boss seems have a function within contemporary capitalism to open up realms to incorporate the attempts of workers for self-valorization. This seems to lower prices and triggers a keen competition. From this point of view even the concepts of surplus value and its

temporal structure and even the concept of ‘means of production’ as to be thought about. But especially the non-legal conduct of subcontractors (and to a certain extend shipyard owners) seems also to be a resistance against how the value generated should be redistributed upon taxes and social security benefits. Thus non-legal conduct seems to have been not just the result of the relationship of the state with diverse groups in society and the non-universal character of citizenship but also an act to counter the attempts of the state to redistribute and have a share in capitalist enterprise. Seen from this point of view capitalist conduct becomes not just a sphere outside of the state but the very form which biopolitics and the formation of subjects/selfs assumes today. Akdemir and Odman (2008) are deploying the concept of ‘alternate poverty’/‘nöbetleşe yoksulluk’ with regard to the shipyards of Tuzla. They mean that the first migrants gain a better position with regard to those coming later. But this concept does not reflect on the concept of primitive accumulation and also the diversifications within the migrants; thus it resembles more a form of stratification than a constant contestation of it. Flexible capitalism seems to be the expansion of the selective dealing of the state to its subjects and the fragmentation of society, thus also a form to distribute wealth/power beyond legal means. Thus we move from capitalist conduct to politics.⁴²

⁴² One might draw a genealogy between the emergence of ‘flexible’ capitalism and the historical breaks and continuities within the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects from the Ottoman Empire up until today. Here we will not go into such an inquiry but just note that Balibar indicates that Marx draws parallels between capitalism and the Asiatic Mode of Production (Althusser & Balibar, 1972, p. 218-219). Here the relationship between communities and the state seem to be interesting if one could show a genealogy to the emergence and functioning of the system of subcontractation nowadays. Also with regard to forms of contesting the state, the incorporation of contestation and redistribution of power and wealth one might draw a parallelism with regard to the discussion on legality, non-legality and illegality in this thesis. For an illuminating work with regard to the relation of the Ottoman Empire to bandits see Barkey (1997). Also after having conducted my fieldwork, and while editing the final version of this thesis I wondered whether the subcontractors and also the workers were involved in agrarian small commodity production as small farmers in their past and also now. This also might give us further insights for the continuities and breaks of dispossession (primitive accumulation) and resistance to it.

Formations Of Capitalisms

If we look at the multiplicity of the struggles noted by Negri and Hardt we could state that the concept of class struggle and crisis cannot be reduced to a contestation around the shop floor alone. Thus the very orientation of diverse practices of exerting power and their distribution play a crucial role in the modification of ‘capital accumulation’, as for instance Read (2003) notes (p.89):

For both Foucault and Marx the “structure,” apparatus or mode of production, is stretched to include, on the one hand, the entire social field, while it is also reduced, on the other hand, to include the multiplicity of specific spatial instantiations of this structure. As Marx writes in the Grundrisse: “Production is always a particular branch of production—e.g. agriculture, cattle raising, manufactures etc.—or it is a totality ” (G 86/21). It is with respect to this first direction, the specific apparatus or particular branch of production, that the structure is more thoroughly identified and implicated within a concrete and even technological instance, such as the factory or the prison. If these directions are, as Deleuze argues with respect to Foucault, noncontradictory, they are also nonidentical. The relation between the two directions is one of tension: between the immanent cause and its specific instances. Capitalism, the capitalist mode of production, cannot be identified with the factory, just as “disciplinary” power cannot be identified with the prison. The immanent social field is constituted by a multiplicity of apparatuses or relations, in the case of capitalism, the mode of production is also constituted by relations of distribution and consumption, which, although constitutive of the social field, have differing and divergent logics from those found in production proper. The nonidentity of the two directions of analysis—the immanent relations of the social field and the concrete structures—is also the nonidentity of the antagonistic strategies across these vectors. Resistances on the smaller scale, in the factory or prison, have different effects on the larger scale.

With regard to these effects Negri and Hardt see the shift from sovereign power to diverse disciplinary practices and the recuperation of resistances in diverse contexts to it as the very scene on which the modification of capitalist conduct is grounded.⁴³

Seen from such a point of view a problem arises whether the formation of subjectivities and the contestation of this very process could be directly related to capital accumulation or a logic of capital. For instance if we look at the multiplicity of struggles, which culminated in the formation of 'flexible' capitalism we do not just see workers' struggles but a variety of struggles. But this variety of struggles does not just seem to be an extension of a single antagonism. Now, the problem here is a problem of whether there is a synchrony between the subjects or whether a complex history (with its continuities, discontinuities, breaks and struggles) of the formation of capitalism led also to an asynchrony. But again it has to be asked whether all the struggles can be perceived within a history of Capital or in the asymmetry of the constitution of diverse capitalisms and powers. Here a tension seems to be opened up between the *attempt* of capital to be universalized (by the entrepreneurs) and the concrete historicity of the emergence of diverse capitalisms. Balibar notes in his reading of Marx the following Althusser & Balibar, 1972, p.264-265):

For there is totalization only in the actuality of the social division of labour at a given moment, not in the individual adventures of capitals. This is expressed by Marx when he says that the analysis of reproduction envisages social production exclusively in its result ('If we study the annual function of social capital...in its results', Capital, Vol. II, p. 392 -- modified). As we know, this result is production as a whole and its division into different departments: the operation that reveals it is not therefore a section through the movement of the different branches of production, of the different capitals, at a moment chosen with reference to a common external time, and hence dependent both in principle and in actual realization on this movement; it is an operation

⁴³ Here for instance Read (2003) argues that the process of subject formation for Foucault and for Marx diverge (p.88-90). But Negri seems to be able to read each of them against another.

in which the peculiar movement of the capitals, the movement of production in each of its divisions, is completely set aside, suppressed, without any kind of conservation. Marx bases his whole analysis of reproduction from the first very general exposition of simple reproduction (Volume One) to the system of reproduction schemes (Volume Two) on this transformation of succession into synchrony, into 'simultaneity' (in his own term: *Gleichzeitigkeit*). Paradoxically, the continuity of the movement of production finds its concept in the analysis of a system of synchronic dependencies: the succession of the cycles of individual capitals and their intertwining depend on it. In this 'result', the movement which has produced it is necessarily forgotten, the origin is 'obliterated' (die Herkunft ist *aufgelöscht*) (Capital, Vol. II, p. 110). To move from the isolated act, from the immediate production process, to the repetition, to the ensemble of social capital, to the result of the production process, is to install oneself in a fictive contemporaneity of all the movements, or, to put it more accurately, applying one of Marx's theoretical metaphors, in a fictive planar space, in which all the movements have been suppressed, in which all the moments of the production process appear in projection side by side with their connexions of dependence. It is the movement of this transition that Marx describes for the first time in the chapter of Volume One on 'Simple Reproduction'.

But this temporality and simultaneity seems to be just a fictive one. The very structure of capitalist conduct seems to *attempt* to abstract from its concrete contexts of emergence and thus universalize itself to be able to reach a synchrony with other contexts and translate the generated 'value' to a potential to gain and enlarge power in other contexts. But interestingly it seems that the diverse forms its constitution takes cannot suppress this temporal aspect and thus constitute diverse forms of subjectivity and operations of power. For instance if we look at the concept of primitive accumulation there may be diverse ways of separating the laborer from its means of production as well as diverse ways opening up access to capital for the capitalists. The way in which this is realized may not just be a pre-history of a capitalism but also constitutive of its ways of conduct and thus the subjectivities as well as conflicts transforming it. Thus there seems always to be a tendency between the ideal *presuppositions* of capitalist conduct and the historical concrete pre-

conditions of its emergence (this is a point which Read and Balibar also hint at). The prefix *pre* seems to be the suppression of capitalist conduct; an excess to be recuperated and thus forcing capitalist conduct to changes. It is more its future than its past.

Here we have to look at the instance from where primitive accumulation stems from. If there is a multiplicity of resistances shaping capitalism and thus multiple subjectivities, which are not reducible to workers struggles than we have to note that there are different forms of the constitution and negotiation of capitalism, which are not moving simultaneously but are non-identical.⁴⁴

If we can speak of multiple subjectivities and struggles changing the organizational forms of worldwide capitalism than we have to note that this multiplicity has to be understood within the framework of the diverse forms of the constitution of capitalisms and re-organization of capitalisms. The struggle of Limter-iş against the mortal accidents is interesting with this regard. The union shows us how the oppression of the Alawites, Kurds and the left paved the way for a militant contestation of the working conditions on the shipyards. But this struggle was effective not in organizing a mass base among workers but in being able to be heard by the mass media in 2008, within a conjuncture in which nationalists and the supporters of the AKP fought with each other. Diverse political actors could use the struggle to criticize the government. The struggle overlapped with the world-wide financial crisis of 2008 and thus lead to the firing of approximately thirty thousand workers. After 2008 the working hours were reduced and the shipyard owners took work-place safety measures more seriously. This shows that the organization of capitalist conduct and resistance to it are embedded in an encounter of diverse

⁴⁴ It is known that this was the main concern of Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao.

subjectivities with different agendas and as a result of a multiplicity of effects, which encounter each other, as the struggle of Limter-iş shows. Thus this whole debates leads us to the very fragmented nature and asynchrony of capitalist conduct; thus to politics read as an encounter of multiple effects and effective in shaping conjunctures.

Resistance And Political Agendas

There were two unions on the shipyards of Tuzla. Dok-Gemi-iş was a union connected to the Confederation of Turkish Workers' Unions (Türk-iş). Türk-iş was found in 1952 in line with the attempts of the states beyond the Soviet Union to control the workers under centralized unions, which resembles for instance the founding process of the German Confederation of Trade Unions (*DGB*) in the Cold War period. Türk-iş contributed to the formation of a corporatist economy during this period. Dok-Gemi-iş was established under the name Sea-Workers Union (Deniz İşçileri Sendikası) in 1946 and was closed down due to a decree of the marital rule in the same year. It was established again in 1947. It was organized in the old shipyards in *Haliç*, *Cami Altı* and *Hasköy* in these years. It went on to organize workers on the shipyards. But in 1967 some unions split form Türk-iş and established the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers' Unions (DİSK). This confederation was the main center of workers militancy up until the coup d'état in 1980 and still has a more leftist stance than Türk-iş.

Limter-iş was established in 1976 and became part of DİSK. While Türk-iş was not closed down after the coup d'état in 1980, DİSK and all its unions were

banned. After DİSK could be legally re-established in 1991, Limter-iş started its activities again in the mid-1990s. Dok-Gemi-iş concentrated more on organizing core workers and workers of state-run shipyards, Limter-iş attempted more and more to organize the workers who were employed by subcontractors. Dok-Gemi-iş was ignorant to these workers who became more and more the main workforce. While Dok-Gemi-iş⁴⁵ is avoiding confrontation with the employers, Limter-iş is a militant union, which adopts a socialist world-view and has a clearly formulated anti-capitalist stance. It was this latter union, which confronted the employers and state authorities with regard to the precarious work conditions of subcontracted workers as well as the mortal ‘accidents’ on the shipyards in 2008.

The Activists of Limter-iş

Although the founders of Limter-iş in 1990’s had a connection to the shipyards, they were more socialist cadre than workers. At the end of the 1990’s the leadership of the union Limter-iş was transferred to another socialist circle. This political current was also historically a radical leftist group with revolutionary aspirations. This political current as well as the union Limter-iş take a stance on behalf of the Kurdish resistance; both consist to an important extend –but not exclusively- of Kurds and Alawites.⁴⁶ Since the activists of Limter-iş are socialists and committed to the

⁴⁵ Once this union even tried to buy a shipyard which should be privatized.

⁴⁶ Especially after the coup d’état the state launched a massive attack against leftists. Sunni-Islam was supported by the state and Alawites faced harsh oppression. Also the Kurdish regions were massively occupied by the military, which led to uprising and armed clashes. So these social groups were historically close to the left. The unionists themselves are also mainly comprised of Kurds and Alawites, having lived through the coup d’état of 1980 and the state oppression during up until today as revolutionary leftists. For example an account on the life of the former education expert of the union Limter-iş gives further insights to this demographic/political fact see Varyos Yayınları (2000). On the other side especially during the boom period of 2005-2008 the amount of Kurdish workers and especially workers from Urfa (Arabs/Kurds) was immense in Tuzla; while 30,000 workers worked at

perspective of socialist revolution, legality plays a minor role in their struggle and is just a pragmatic level through which some economic rights could be gained for workers. But even to achieve these rights on the court the union believes that social action should take place. The unionists believe that the laws in Turkey are not opening a democratic space and thus that they have to take actions (blocking roads, occupying ships etc.) which can not be limited to the legal framework in which opinions can just be expressed to a limited extent. Thus they say that their struggle cannot be limited to legality but that the struggle concerned is a 'legitimate' one. This is not just the consequence of their concrete analysis but also an ethical stance of the "Turkish revolutionary left" (those groups adopting a stance beyond legality to smash the Turkish republic) to mark a clear line against the establishment: Revolutionary struggle is revolutionary in so far as it does not accept legal means but just uses them tactically and pragmatically, that is the understanding of the revolutionary left. But this is not a fantasy as some might assume. In the 90's the police attacked every action of the union and the office of the union was burned down with firebombs twice. The education specialist of Limter-iş (Süleyman Yeter) was tortured and murdered by the police in 1999.⁴⁷ The activists of the union Limter-iş were related to the Socialist Platform of the Oppressed. The Socialist Platform of the Oppressed (ESP) faced a campaign of the Turkish state of mass arrests in the year 2006, the activists of the union Limter-iş were also arrested. The courts claimed

the shipyards in 2008 this amount diminished to five thousand to eight thousand. Thus we can say that the most mobile workforce was the one, which went away at first. So today there are Kurdish workers and still casual workers from Urfa but most of them left. Some of them turned back to their place of origin, some to other unskilled jobs and others to the building constructions or seasonal works in the agrarian sector.

⁴⁷ Up until now the state is attacking and surveilling the union.

that the activists of the ESP were connected directly to the illegal Marksist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).⁴⁸

Thus seen the militancy of the union can not just be reduced to the working conditions in Tuzla but has also its roots in the relationship of the Turkish state with these ethnic/religious groups as well as the historical/political radicalism emerging out of the clashes between the left and the state. From such a point of view it shall be noted that there is a coincidence in Tuzla. On the one side there are workers who are not immediately/directly using legal procedures to gain their wages as well as a space in which violence is a part of the quotidian work relations, on the other hand there were militant leftist unionists, who had also a distanced stance towards the notion of legality/state in line with their revolutionary-socialist aspirations.⁴⁹ Seen from such a point of view the conflict in Tuzla, the accumulation of capital by shipyard-owners upon credits and subsidies and their relation to the political elite as well as the formation of the workforce seem not to be explainable within a

⁴⁸ There are no indications that prove a connection between the ESP and the MLKP. The latter was found in 1994 as a result of a unification process of diverse minor radical leftist groups. Their main backbone in the past was Maoism and to a certain extend Guevarism. During the end of the 1980's and the 1990's it was heavily influenced by the ideas of the Albanian Labor Party and its leader Enver Hoxha. It should be noted that illegality in the revolutionary left had multiple dimensions. On the one side it was a clean-cut stance against the state. On the other side it connoted a sort of secretly operating in the underground. This was attractive for formulating a break with the state and also facilitated the government of party/organization members. But also the state was able to govern contestation in controlling and surveilling these organizations and sanctioning them by means of state violence and jurisdiction, especially in times in which those organization lost their mass basis and hegemony. The ESP is not a platform anymore but a legal party (since 2010), the Socialist Party of the Oppressed (ESP). Even this change has to be reflected on within the overall changes in the form of contestation and the restructuring of politics in Turkey; it seems as if new forms of hegemony also give format to how contestation can articulate itself; give format to resistance. But this should not be understood as a linear process but also within its excesses and contingencies and also the as the effect of resistances.

⁴⁹ I met a subcontractor together with a unionist and they talked to each other. The subcontractor said to the unionist "your friends from the union became subcontractors, why don't you become one, do you have no interests [çıkar]?" The unionist made claims that the number of ex-unionists, who became subcontractors were low and that a person had to be ideologically strong. His discourse -I should admit that I respect him very much- was a revolutionary ideological stance based on ethical notions. The subcontractor could not understand him and just smiled. This shows the different roots and rationalities behind the whole confrontations in Tuzla.

straightforward economic narrative of transformation, but seem to be embedded in the formation, transformation of and contestations against the Turkish Republic as well as the changes of its governmental procedures; they seem to be embedded in the forms of the state to govern its population, distribute/control power through notions of legality and illegality as diverse subjectivities emerging out of those historical processes.

Two Sit-in Strikes

The number of workers dying on the shipyards rose between 2006-2008. Since the shipyards worked to their full capacity; the working hours were long and there were almost no workplace safety measurements. The rates of the deaths on the shipyard rose especially in a drastic manner especially in 2008.

By the summer of 2007 mortal ‘accidents’ in the shipyards had become a major issue and protest actions launched by the union DİSK/Limter-iş had made these mortal ‘accidents’ public. This was a year during which debates and clashes took place on whether the 1st May march should take place in the historical Taksim Square, the workers of the Turkish Telekom, the food enterprise YÖRSAN, the women workers of the medical company NOVAMED and the workers of the Turkish Airlines were involved in strikes and mass actions. Furthermore the tension between nationalists/republicans and the AKP government grew and culminated in mass actions (the so-called ‘Republican Meetings’) and the clashes between the PKK and the military gained a provisional climax (Winter 2007). During the second half of 2007 the number of the mortal ‘accidents’ in Tuzla rose and culminated to a sit-in strike on February 27-28, 2008.

After a rise in the rate of mortal ‘accidents’ in the year 2007, the union Limter-iş launched an initiative in order to investigate the reasons for the mortal ‘accidents’ – or as the union calls it ‘work assassinations’. An independent commission was found consisting of representatives from the shipyard workers’ union DİSK/Limter-iş, the Union of Chambers of Turkish Architects and Engineers – Istanbul Coordination Council (TMMOB-İKK), the Istanbul Medical Chamber (İTB), the Workers’ Health Institute of Istanbul and independent social scientists (including Akdemir and Odman). This commission called itself *Monitoring and Investigation Commission for The Shipyard Region of Tuzla* and released on December 16, 2007 the first version and on January 22, 2008 the second/final version of its report. The release of the report was important, since it showed that Limter-iş was able to establish a broad coalition of professionals and confirm as a result of indepth investigations, interviews, statistics and field research, that the system of subcontractation and the drive of the shipyard-owners to maximize their profit were the main causes for long-work hours and insufficient work-place security measures. The report was introduced with a clear anti-capitalist stance. It also proposed solutions. One of the main demands of Limter-iş was to form an independent commission consisting of all associations and NGO’s (including the employers), which were active in the sector to monitor the shipyards and develop solutions. This demand was never fulfilled. But the report was important in the sense that it helped Limter-iş to establish publicity. Nevertheless this publicity was not able to exert enough pressure on the government and the employers to change their ignorant attitude: The proposition of the union to establish an independent commission was never fulfilled. Thus Limter-iş took action, since the rate of mortal ‘accidents’ did not stop in any sense. Limter-iş decided to launch a *de facto* strike. It

was not a strike organized from workplace to workplace, since the union did not have a stable organized mass basis among the subcontracted workers, who were the main workforce and are fragmented among dozens of subcontractors and shipyards. It was a blockade of the main road, which is the main supply road for raw materials; workers also use this road to go to their workplaces. Thus it was more a sort of a direct action than a strike. Thus the spatial centralization of the shipyards was used for disrupting the workflow.

The Shipyard region of Tuzla is built along the Aydınlı Bay; approximately forty-four shipyards are placed side by side. They all are close to the sea. Their entrances are placed along a road parallel to the contour of the bay. This is also the main supply road for the raw materials used in ship construction and repair. The major actions of Limter-iş generally happen at the entrance of this road. This is for two reasons: There are no major squares around the shipyard region and the blocking of this main road means that the supply of raw materials and the vehicles transporting workers have to stop temporarily. It has to be emphasized that this road has a main starting point but that there are also other possibilities for vehicles to enter it. Nevertheless blocking the main entrance to this road seems to be the only effective way to attract attention in a place where there are several workplaces.

In the morning of February 27, the activists of Limter-iş blocked this main road. The police came and arrested the unionists brutally and attacked the workers, which were half-joining/half-witnessing the action. A few hours later another group of workers and union activists -who did not participate in the road-cutting action in the morning and waited as a reserve force to continue the action in case that the first group could be arrested- and diverse leftist groups, unions and social movements met at the nearest train station (*İçmeler*) and marched toward this road. The road was

blocked again and speeches were held. Now not Limter-iş but also the confederation DİSK managed the action and opened the microphone for establishment politicians with a semi-leftist outlook. A few hours past by the unionists were released, and came to the main road shouting slogans. Then they gained control over the action but the police did not attack the protesters anymore due to the publicity and the backing/presence of the representatives of DİSK. But an agreement was met; the protesters would not stay at the main road anymore but on a more or less large area in front of the first major shipyard next to the entrance to the main road. Speeches were held, songs were sung and approximately one hundred people spend the night there.

The next day the action continued at the same place, workers and leftists came to the meeting again, speeches were held again and the action came at noon. Although the activists of the union Limter-iş had a radical leftist world view and were connected to the Socialist Platform of the Oppressed (ESP), the whole action was not limited to the narrow organizational interest of the ESP but adopted a radical stance from within the workers, the language deployed during the action seemed to me to open up again a possibility for an encounter between the radical left and another social strata (in this case workers). This sit-in strike aimed at the improvement of work conditions and called for initiatives to realize workplace security measurements. Approximately two thousand people joined this action; besides the representatives of diverse social movements and leftist organizations at least more than a half of the participants were shipyard workers. Besides the whole publicity, no major improvement took place. Between February and June 2008 the mortal ‘accidents’ in Tuzla remained in the headlines of the newspapers.

The mortal accidents did not stop. Limter-iş launched agitation campaigns and actions. But no change was in sight. The union Limter-iş again decided to organize a strike.⁵⁰ Although there was a high public awareness regarding the mortal accidents in Tuzla, the union Limter-iş had -besides its prestige amongst the workers- no real organized mass base, since it tried to organize not core workers but the majority, which worked precariously and casually for different subcontractors making the issue of organizing highly complex. A meeting with approximately 150 workers took place, and it was decided to launch again a major action.⁵¹ It was decided that the strike itself should not take place inside the shipyards but should take the form of a protest involving the whole shipyard region, thus it should resemble the February sit-in strike. The union had to make a decision; it could use the publicity to launch again a mass action or could make minor actions. Such a mass action could change the position of the union and thus it might gain an organized mass base. Limter-iş announced this action approximately one month before the day of action and started a campaign to make the strike public amongst the workers. Due to the publicity and the increase in the number of mortal ‘accidents’ nobody knew what would really happen that day. –The workers although not permanently- attended the actions of Limter-iş and it seemed as if this little militant union was on the way to gain strength. So NGOs, the entrepreneurs and even the government followed closely what Limter-iş was trying to do.

⁵⁰ It was decided that this strike should take place on 16th June. This date refers to the major action of workers against an initiative of the government to make it more difficult for workers to change their unions, which meant *de facto* a campaign against the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers’ Unions (DİSK); this action took place on June 15-16, 1970.

⁵¹ Here we shall note that since Tuzla has a metropolitan structure, leftist, Alawite and Kurdish workers attended that meeting and most of them seemed to be in favor of a strike. But my impression was that this stance cannot just directly be linked to their social positions as workers but also to their world-view and cultural/political origins; one young man for instance said that the strike could also be held on the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution.

During this whole process commissions in the parliament were established to investigate the mortal accidents, Limter-iş could directly speak to the officials of the Ministry for Work and Social Security and to the MPs within the commission. But even these dialogues did not culminate in practical steps on behalf of the officials to change the working conditions. The only measure, which was taken by the government, was the provisional closure of some shipyards. But the opponents of Limter-iş argued that the whole struggle of the union was harming the sector and that all this trouble would only produce unemployment.

Indeed, Limter-iş became the main force representing workers⁵² during February and June; it was invited –or the organizers were forced to invite- to diverse meetings between the representatives of NGOs and the representatives of the shipbuilding sector. The government/state and the entrepreneurs did not feel comfortable to establish any kind of dialogue with these ‘subversive elements’. The union in which core workers mainly of the military shipyard were organized, Türk-İş/Dok-Gemi-iş launched together with the Shipbuilders’ Association (GİSBİR) a march and claimed that Limter-iş was infiltrated by the PKK and that it aimed to harm the prospering shipyard industry and thus national interests. This argument was in line with the statements of government officials (NTVMSNBC, 2008).

On June 16, 2008 the main road was cut again but this time the whole action seemed not to be a workers action but a meeting of leftists, unionists and social movements on behalf of the workers. Approximately two thousand people attended

⁵² During the activities of Limter-iş to organize the strike I was able to see the life conditions of the workers. A major portion of them lived in so-called unwedded-houses. These were barn-like “flats” around the shipyards in which approximately ten-twenty male workers lived together; most of them were casual and migrant workers. The flat owners did not rent these places according to the physical properties of the flat but upon a fixed rent for each person. Actually it is hard to call these places flats, since they were mostly places, which were designed to be storages or shops, some were just basement rooms. Some of the workers lived in the shantytown around the shipyard region and some came from farer regions, there was a rumor that even some came to work from the European side of Istanbul, which is very far from Tuzla.

this meeting, which lasted from the morning up until afternoon. After this action the leaders of Limter-iş claimed that they got the information that although workers did not attend the march/meeting they also did not come to the workplace. Furthermore the unionists claimed days before the strike that the employers organized ships to transport the workers to the shipyards over the sea, so that they would not come into contact with the action. Whatever the reasons for the low workers presence were it could be said that the action failed to mobilize the workers, at least in the sense that the workers were not involved actively in the struggle.

On June 19, 2008 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with the representatives of the shipbuilding industry and the union Dok-Gemi-iş (excluding Limter-iş) at the Ottoman Dolmabahçe Palace where he deployed a rhetoric suggesting that the mortal accidents were harming the image of the industry and the country, that measures should be taken and this situation could not be accepted. He delivered these statements with an authoritarian stance like that of a father yelling at his children. The exclusion of Limter-iş from this meeting showed a tradition of the Turkish Republic not to deal in any sense with the representatives of any social group following a political line, which can not be absorbed into the establishment within the framework of pragmatic politics; thus the meeting seemed more to deal with how this process could be managed instead of taking steps to solve the problem. It seems to be of crucial importance that this meeting took place after the action of Limter-iş, since this action seemed to be a sign for the government and the representatives of the industry that Limter-iş will not be able to do ‘harm’ anymore and that the ‘problem’ could now be governed.

In the whole period between February 2008 and June 2008 media coverage on the mortal ‘accidents’ and the working/living conditions of the workers in Tuzla

was highly important. Limter-iş had no long lasting strategy to organize the main mass of workers, which were employed under subcontractors. The union launched minor actions for the improvement of the work conditions in several shipyards but as soon as the problem was solved in this or that way the workers did not establish any stable ties with the union. Thus the line of Limter-iş was more oriented towards street actions and juridical support for workers. But exactly because the union took actions on the street and pushed the boundaries for expressing opposition within the public sphere, media coverage became an important issue. This does not imply that the union insists on coverage of its actions in the 'bourgeois media'. But taking action on the public sphere is directly connected to publicity and media coverage. Especially between February and June 2008 the media covered intensively the conditions in Tuzla due to the actions of Limter-iş, which were mostly faced with attacks by the police. Thus at the very moment when Limter-iş tried to appeal not just to particular workplaces but to the general shipyard region it also opened up and expanded the boundaries of the public sphere, which was indirectly also connected to media coverage. Indeed, this little union gained more and more strength among workers when their leaders appeared on TV, although it had not organized a steady mass base among the workers. For some time one could gain the impression that the mortal 'accidents' were more a of significance for the general public and especially for leftists than for the workers themselves, especially if one looks at the fact that the action on 16th June was more attended mostly by leftists rather than by the workers themselves.⁵³

⁵³ There are a lot of rumors of why the workers did not participate actively to the action; the unionists say that they have the information that important activities of the shipyards stopped at that day, that the workers were threaten by the employers and that some of them were transported to the shipyards with boats and not in using the usual main road.

It was the militancy and the road-blocking actions as well as the blockades of the union, which made the mortal ‘accidents’ in Tuzla public. The government closed down the shipyards temporally and opened them again; the shipyards were penalized. But although there were dialogues between Limter-iş and officials, the government tried not to sustain such a contact and saw as its main addressee the bosses of the industry as well as the nationalist union Dok-Gemi-iş, which organizes core workers mainly in the state-run shipyards. But the working hours remained long and workplace security measurements were taken just slowly.

After the massive protests of the union Limter-iş, which culminated in the action on July 16, 2008 another interesting coincidence took place. After a few months the worldwide economic crisis led to a shortage in the financial possibilities of the shipyards due to the fact that banks did not want to risk their investments as well as the fact that the orders for ships were stopped. According to a report of the Shipbuilders’ Association (GİSBİR) 13,545 people were employed on the shipyards in the year 2002, this number rose up to 33,480 on August 2008 and fell down to eight thousand on January 2010 (GİSBİR, 2009, p. 2). The activists of Limter-iş are assuming that currently (August-September 2011) eight-five thousand people are employed on the shipyards. Limter-iş and GİSBİR are linking this change to the world-wide financial crisis. Although several minor actions were launched by Limter-iş during the end of 2008 and 2011 the whole dynamism of the struggle as well as the position of the shipyard industry of Tuzla within the overall economic picture of Turkey lost relevance. The struggle of Limter-iş overlapped with the financial crisis and with the diminishing of the amount of the workers. Some of the demands of Limter-iş were fulfilled, although state institutions and the shipyard owners do not perceive the union as a collocutor. The mortal ‘accidents’ on the

shipyards did not stop immediately but safety measures on the shipyards were raised and the working hours were shortened. The workflow remained a steady hurry and time was still important, at least the shipyard owners and subcontractors are organizing this feeling. At RMK for instance the subcontractors become more and more a part of the shipyard. Other subcontractors remained in Tuzla but now tried to tighten their connections to ship owners and also mobilized their web of relations to the shipyards in *Yalova*. Besides the Labour Act 4857 defined which jobs could be subcontracted; another legal framework, which was called after the deaths of the workers in Tuzla the ‘Tuzla Regulation’ attempted to narrow the definition of this relationship towards the end of 2008. But it was not and still is not fully transferred into the practical conduct of the shipyards. But what can be said is that there is always a before and an after 2008 in Tuzla. The struggle coincided with the financial crisis; although the industry faced a crisis in 1994 and an overall economic crisis was faced in Turkey in 2001 such measurements were not taken. In 2008 regulatory measures were taken but this times with a minimum of workers and orders as well as financial difficulties faced by the shipyards. Now, the shipyard owners are calling for subsidies and support from the government. Regulation came with a crisis and without the huge amount of workers, which were involved in this process. Although it cannot be said that all the demands of *Limter-iş* were fulfilled a certain improvement in the working conditions took place. But the system of subcontraction remains and the wages as well as the social insurances of the workers are not paid to the full extent.

Governing Struggle

The whole struggle on the shipyards was taking place within a conjunction of a multiplicity of subjects, which emerged as the effects of the relationship of the sovereign to its subjects and genealogy diverse strands of resistance. We saw how Limter-iş related to the conflict but it will be illuminating to show how the state and the media related to that struggle. As it was mentioned media coverage was important for the struggle to be effective. But this media representation also implied a politics, especially before and after the sit-in action of Limter-iş. But this was not just a matter of representation but showed how subjectivities could be governed and mobilized for diverse political agendas. Thus seen the struggle is not just an effect of the conjunction of diverse subjectivities but is also mobilized to become effective for diverse political agendas, as we shall see. Thus the struggle is governed within a complex field of national politics.

Media Coverage: Separation And Social Cohesion

The entrepreneurs, Dok-Gem-iş, the government/state officials deployed the notion of ‘terrorism/subversion/separatism’⁵⁴. For instance, a rumor circulated that as the first group of workers and unionists were arrested in the morning of February 27, 2008, the police brought them to the local Tuzla police station. The police thought about keeping the unionists in the local police station of Tuzla and bring the other workers to the Counter-Terrorism Branch of the Police (*Terörle Mücadele Şubesi*-

⁵⁴ It has to be mentioned that since Limter-iş takes an open stance on behalf of the Kurdish Liberation Movement a lot of workers of non-Kurdish/non-Alawite origin have a distanced stance towards the union, although they might establish relations to the union due to their problems at the shop floor.

TMŞ). Then the police changed its strategy and wanted to keep the workers while releasing the union activists. All these attempts were made to separate the workers from the unionists and give the impression that the unionists would do harm on the workers. But the unionists did not agree with their release. As another crowd of unionists, workers and protesters gathered at the main road in Tuzla and continued the protest the police released all of the arrested. The union made an insistence on not losing the ties with the workers while at the same time following a militant line.

On June 16, 2008, during the second sit-in strike attempt, a rumor circulated that the shipyard owners called the workers to the workplace earlier than the usual beginning of the working-day and that some workers were brought to the shipyards not in using the main road but upon the sea.

The strategy of the police as well as the shipyard owners was an attempt to separate the workers from the unionists. While the union was not able to enable an active involvement of the main mass of workers it was able to use publicity to exert pressure on shipyard owners and the government. Thus the press emerged as an intermediary to represent the conditions on the shipyards. But this representation was not a depiction but involved political conflicts in Turkey. The conditions on the shipyards changed as an effect of the struggle of *Limter-iş*, which exerted pressure on shipyard owners and officials upon the media and due to the crisis in 2008. Thus ‘publicity’ was not just an intermediary but involved a politics of representation, the ways in which mass media deals with problems. Thus while the police and the shipyard owners were trying to separate workers from the unionists the media tried to victimize them.

It was the militancy of the union, which made the mortal ‘accidents’ public. This publicity had an immense influence in the whole process. The process was

governed by diverse strategies of the union Limter-iş and forces against it. While Limter-iş tried to open up a realm for the workers to resist and by the same token mobilize other oppositional forces, its opponents tried to split this attempt for unity. Limter-iş has an anti-establishment attitude. This means that it does not perceive its political line close to the Kemalists as well as the AKP/liberals. Thus for instance the union activists wondered why the media gave so much attention to the case and did not want that speculations about their political orientation arise. For instance one activist said that *'In those times the newspaper SABAH was oppositional to the AKP and used our cause against the government. Every political orientation, especially within the split between Kemalists and AKP followers tried to use our struggle against the other faction. We tried to open up a third path.'*

Besides the active involvement of non-nationalist and non-liberal leftists in the actions of Limter-iş, the press which was close to the AKP government governed the case in victimizing the workers in neglecting their subjectivity during 2008 and then after the crisis to show the model of a new Turkey. It shall not be said that this represents the whole media coverage and that there were no reporters just making the news out of their conscience. Also Limter-iş was shown on TV and in newspapers and could make its statements.

But the case of Tuzla and two of its representations show how the case of the workers was made an exception and thus making the support for that case a question of conscience, which is typical for the Turkish mass media in dealing with the stories of the deprived/pauperized. Yet, also the union made an insistence that 'Tuzla is conscience' and thus gained support, but one representation of the workers is especially illustrative in how an emotional tie organized conscience can discursively subvert also a practical political unity.

The media coverage of *Flash TV* in 2008 –close to the AKP- is elusive in the respect how pauperization is represented in Turkey as a matter of fate and thus depoliticized so that no counter-hegemony could emerge. This coverage seems to resemble the strategy of the police during the arrest of the unionists and the workers but with quite a different modification and on nation-wide realm. In victimizing and making Tuzla an exception it was possible to cut the possibility for a counter-hegemony; Tuzla was a too extreme situation. Victimizing the workers could have two effects. On the one hand the conscience of the audience could be set into motion and by the same token a hierarchy could be established. The quotidian experience of capitalism in Turkey and those who live within it could just feel sad, but could not identify themselves with the workers in Tuzla. At a time in which several union protests and social unrest begun to articulate itself, such a situation could have been effective. *Limter-iş* could establish a front but could not become a long lasting vanguard force of a possible counter-hegemonic movement. The *Flash TV* report was made before the sit-in strike of February 27-28th and victimized the workers. Although up to that point *Limter-iş* made the whole cause known it was not mentioned and the only addressee were the ‘officials’; this ignorance of the union was also the line of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the whole conflict.

On the other hand there is also media coverage on the unionists of Tuzla right in line with a new political agenda in Turkey in 2010- after the crisis and changes on the shipyards. The newspaper article *Two Radicals in Tuzla*, which was published right in the first page. This newspaper belongs to the media conglomerate Aydın Doğan, who got into conflicts with the AKP government. But nevertheless the new editor of the liberal newspaper had a vision of Turkey and a sense of democracy will called for consensus and incorporation. One shipyard would be a model for this

political project. Here a political fragmentation on a nationwide scale and the ways the state deals with them are opened up for discussion in showing an example of one shipyard in Tuzla. All this shows how the whole struggle, contestation and re-shaping of Tuzla is also embedded within and mobilized by diverse political agendas. Thus seen the issue becomes an issue about governing subjectivities; it becomes involved in the question to what extent these subjectivities can change their conditions and of the relationship between the governed and the governing. How a void is opened up to fragment society and thus hinder the emergence of counter-hegemony.

A Plot of Deprivation

The mass media was not homogenous with regard to its relation to and representation of the workers. Some of them blamed the shipyard owners since they very obviously stated that “such things happen” and the subcontractation system; some of them with quite anti-capitalist interpretations (anti-capitalism as long the mass media is not defined within it); others *just* victimized the workers. The latter attitude was intrinsic to all of the news and shared among all newspapers and channels although in quite diverse modifications.

Flash TV is one of those channels which are mostly watched by the poor and people of working class/subaltern origin mainly in poor districts –similar to the news paper *POSTA*, which resembles the German *Bild* or the English *Sun-*, which deploys a moral discourse to appeal to this audience. A few days before the strike on the dockyards, Flash TV News tried to show Tuzla as “another world” but this time not on the dockyards but in the site where the workers were living, in the “bachelor

rooms (bekâr odası)”. We shall reconstruct the news here as like a theatre play to see how this narrative works⁵⁵ (see Appendix H).

We know that TV news have a certain time interval per day in which the news have to be presented in a certain order. This ordering of the themes can vary to the degree of importance and sensation, so that the maximum amount of ratings can be yield during the whole news program. Since the particular news have a certain duration, the issue at hand has to be shown with the highest degree of authenticity, which is nothing but selected and composed on the cut desk of a tape from among various takes. Thus the event, which is shown is configured in such a way that spatiality, causality, the relation (action-reaction) of actors to each other, the modifications and changes in this relation are shown in putting the issue into a nodal point within the public time. Thus the temporality of the actors is put into a shared sense of time. This public sense of time on the other way round is also configured by diverse dynamics, which turn the audience into a public; by the mass media. But it is not just the relation of the explicit temporal coordinates of the “event” to the time of the public (Ricoeur, 1980, p.176); but there is also a form of making news and ordering space, time, causation and event into a coherency, which might not be predictable during watching the news but acceptable (ibid, p.174).

Spatiality is transmitted upon geographical references such as names of cities and places; the temporal coordinates connecting the public to the particular event may be references to dates or as a succession of certain crucial events. But what

⁵⁵ Flash TV Haber (2008)

It is difficult to reconstruct something audio-visual in form of a script. But nevertheless we have made here an attempt to show the sequence of the news tape here. The texts in brackets are audio-visual elements. If there is a category entitled “1” and under it “a” then these two are at the same time on the screen; if there is a category “1” and then “a, b, c”, then “1” remains while there is a succession during “1” between “a”, “b” and “c”. Sometimes also the subcategory “a” has its own subcategory “i”, which also means that “1”, “a” and “i” occur at the same time.

remains is the content of the news after once put into the general temporality and spatiality enabling the public to put the event into a time and a place. The ordering of the rough audio-visual material is guided by a text, since it seems that the pictures taken do not suffice to transmit content on their own without a narrator in the background. Thus the cut of the rough material is supported by written words and sounds corresponding to a certain narrative. The narrative organizing the succession of text, sound and video becomes more crucial and deploys literary elements especially in what is termed “special reports”. This kind of news do not just transmit the content of an event, which occurred here-and-there/then-and-then but select a particular issue and focus on it which has more or less close ties to the grant agenda (*gündem*).

It is the narrative alongside which the cut of video material in the foreground and sound in the back is organized. Thus these special reports intensify the particularity of an issue and thus organize information in a logical order of causality, so that the development of events can be transmitted. This could be the case for example the reports of BBC or CNN. Despite ideological preferences and political concerns, news channels deal with special reports at a certain distance to the protagonists so that a sort of claim for objectivity is tried to be embedded into the whole narrative. But what is with reports, which do not just transmit their material in the format of “information” but in that of “sensation”. Since the word “sensation” connotes a spectacle with reference to the sensuous; it does not work with distance in the format of succession of “facts” (BBC, CNN etc.) but with a moral standpoint. This is also a very crucial feature regarding the differences of the audience to which the “informational/factual” and the “spectacular/sensational” speaks to. The latter calls for conscience, culture, belief and moral assumed to be shared by a certain

public; namely the deprived, the poor, the working-class. This why for instance Flash TV did not to turn its microphone to all parties but can render just the ‘fate’ of the workers; it muted Limter-iş.

What is interesting is that channels like Flash TV in presenting their news seem to mimic channels like CNN/BBC. Thus it is not just a boom of emotions, but a multi-layered discourse in which judgment is tried to put under the format of “cold facts”. If news and special reports of BBC/CNN are organized around the principle to make the succession and ordering of events acceptable, such channels as Flash TV move forward and find a common ground of value judgment with the audience. This does not mean that CNN or BBC has less ideological concerns than Flash TV; but the modifications of their narratives are quite different.

These kinds of “news” or “special reports” are not a result of something, they do not relate to something; they happen out there. The event has its own temporality, namely the temporality of the protagonists, their internal time. What links the audience to this temporality is tried to be established through value judgments and emotional devices; which are separated from the quotidian of the audience can have no subversive consequences but just present “moving pictures”; the pictures move, are moving the audience emotionally without moving the body, collectively and politically in a subversive manner. The personal fate of the protagonists serve as the constitutive outside of the “collective destiny” of the audience; which both escape any intervention; this is done exactly by a difference of temporality (and spatiality as well) of the protagonists and the audience. Since it would be the possibility of intervention, which could transcend such a representation and constitute a narrative linking the quotidian (audience) to the protagonists, in which the latter would seize to be protagonists within a distinct temporality. As Riceour puts it (ibid, p.177):

Nevertheless, in the instant of acting, when the agent seizes hold of such circumstances and inserts his or her action into the course of things, the temporal guides provided by the chain of meaning attached to manipulable objects tend to make world time prevail over the time of action. So it is in the phenomenon of intervention, in which our powers of action are linked to the world order, that what could be termed the structure of intersection characteristic of within-time-ness is constituted, in the nether zone between ordinary time and true historicity.

Thus especially with regard to “special reports” and “sensational/spectacular news” on channels like Flash TV the relation established between subsisting things, which the concern of the protagonists counts on (*das Vorhandene*) and the utensils offered to their manipulation (*das Zuhandene*)⁵⁶ seem to be related in a certain configuration. Since intervention would be the active effort to alter the field of *das Zuhandene* to change *das Vorhandene*.⁵⁷ But in the narrative of Flash TV *das Vorhandene* is given and almighty, destiny and *das Zuhandene* is mundane, quotidian, emotional and simple. There is an imbalance between these two aspects, which frame the field for possible actions of the protagonists. There is a certain interval in which they can move and relate to these. It is exactly the simple, quotidian aspect of the protagonists upon which a connection with the audience is developed. The link between the quotidian of the audience and that of the protagonists is the point, which disconnects the common *Zuhandene*; personal fates disrupted from the “collective destiny” of the audience and protagonists. And in this way especially the deprived can be presented exactly to themselves, without establishing any common ground. Thus a shared position within society is made anonymous/distant in exactly

⁵⁶ See Ricoeur (1980, p. 172)

⁵⁷ If we would read primitivae accumulation upon the concepts of *das Vorhandene* and *das Zuhandene*, then we could argue that deprivation means the separation of the subject from *das Zuhandene*. But such a distinction between *das Zuhandene* and *das Vorhandene* might also be too Cartesian. A discussion on the relation of the concept of primitive accumulation with regard to *das Vorhandene* and *das Zuhandene* could lead us to an entire new field of inquiry regarding capitalism and subjectivity.

establishing another temporality within a narrative. The muting of *das Zuhandene* in the form of fate and thus elevated to a mystical point is the field in which this kind of narratives work as Lukàcs (1976) puts it (p.194):

Mythologies are always born where two terminal points, or at least two stages in a movement, have to be regarded as terminal points without its being possible to discover any concrete mediation between them and the movement. This is equally true of movements in the empirical world and of indirectly mediated movements of thought designed to encompass the totality. This failure almost always has the appearance of involving simultaneously the unbridgeable distance between the movement and the thing moved, between movement and mover, and between mover and thing moved. [...] And thus there arises what at first sight seems to be the paradoxical situation that this projected, mythological world seems closer to consciousness than does the immediate reality. But the paradox dissolves as soon as we remind ourselves that we must abandon the standpoint of immediacy and solve the problem if immediate reality is to be mastered in truth. Where as mythology is simply *the reproduction in imagination of the problem in its insolubility*. Thus immediacy is merely reinstated on a higher level. The desert beyond God which, according to Master Eckhart, the soul must seek in order to find the deity is nearer to the isolated individual soul than is its concrete existence within the concrete totality of a human society which from this background must be indiscernible even in its general outlines. Thus for reified man a robust causal determinism is more accessible than those mediations that could lead him out of his reified existence. But to posit the individual man as the measure of all things is to lead thought into the labyrinths of mythology.⁵⁸

Thus the narrative of Flash TV regarding the dockyards workers is especially bound to the problem in its insolubility; since the link between the quotidian of the audience and the narrative is disrupted. Tuzla in one word is “another world”, what we share is that “they are also humans, especially with intense emotions, like you and me”. It is not in the power of the protagonists to alter *das Vorhandene* by means of *das Zuhandene* as well as there is no place in which any intervention can take place

⁵⁸ This also resembles the concept of *society effect*. See Althusser and Balibar (1972).

despite “the responsible persons”. The story has no beginning and no end; it is placed within an interval without duration and without any point of reference to the history of the nation or temporality of the deprived.

From a technical point of view, the tape of Flash TV consists of diverse takes, which are then cut together. Technically there are video sequences with certain durations, which are cut and composed. The “special report” does not consist of just takes but also of a narrative written by the reporter, when she/he turns back from the shootings and interviews. Thus the visual material at hand and the narrative have to be orchestrated, with addition to music and texts.

If we look at the report of Flash TV, it is distinguished in the announcement from other reports, which have so far focused on the workplaces; now we will see how ‘they’ live. The reporters were the guests of the workers and “came back with certain pictures”.⁵⁹ It is with this introduction with which first of all a spatial difference, a sense of “out there”, is established and strengthened with the title “Another World: The Tuzla Shipyard”, although we do not see any shipyard during the whole report. The subtitle “86 Workers Died, Will We Wait For the 87th?” is complementary to the title; it seems to open a realm of intervention since it calls for the negation of waiting. But it is especially the kind of intervention called for at the end of the tape to its reference to “the responsible”⁶⁰ which does not call for action by the subjected (the workers). It is exactly an operation “to make the issue public” and “to make pressure on the responsible”.

⁵⁹ Epic Prelude

⁶⁰ Fragment VIII

After an introduction to the work conditions and deaths the narrator says that “until yesterday nobody wanted to hear about these deaths”⁶¹ but what happened that “today” this issue is discussed. Since the report was shown a few days before the strike of Limter-is, it is exactly this shift of temporality, within which a political subjectivity made anonymous, is repressed. Then a sudden shift is made in saying that “It is as if here laws were functioning quite differently”⁶², but the difference is muted again. If previously the subjectivity of the union was repressed it is now with this difference that a whole politics of government and employers is made anonymous. The responsibility to the work conditions and deaths is given to “precarious work conditions”⁶³ and “the system of subcontractation”; are there any protagonists, any actors? The succession of these two phrases with which the very coordinates within which the whole narrative will move is revealed; there are no protagonists since there is just a situation but no antagonism. But can a protagonist emerge without something anticipating it, without any antagonism? Thus we shall see that more than protagonists we have fragments of lives without any interventional force towards what is lived; thus we shall call the protagonists deprived of all subjectivity “figures”, since they do not *act* within their given framework but *behave*, they have quotidian traits and a story prior to “what happens now”, their only subjectivity is hidden in their “story” which is colonized by the narrative of the “special report”. Thus the persons presented do not actively relate to live but pass through it.⁶⁴ They remain variants and derivatives of deprivation and in

⁶¹ Intorduction/7/c

⁶² Inroduction/7/e

⁶³ Introduction/8/a

⁶⁴ (Blanchot & Hanson, 1987, p. 17)

their singularity play a figurative role in the semantics of the whole narrative; thus they are figures.

We shall see all these when the mysterious world, about which we did not know anything, is revealed to us in fragments of fate. The place of Tuzla subsumed to the shipyards (the title on the screen) and under the ever-presence of death (the subtitle on the screen) is spatially as well as temporally separated from the time of the public with the very emergence of the inner-time of the workers. The introduction “*here is that world*”⁶⁵ and then the confusing sentence “*life wasn’t that different...beside the ships in which they live close to death, here was an other world also*”⁶⁶ establishes a visual presence coinciding with a loss of concrete spatiality and temporality, since it is another world, regardless of the deaths narrated in the past tense. Although the sentences following it will be narrated in the present tense, it seems with this introduction that the present tense usages following the past tense introduction are a derivative of the latter, are hierarchically ordered under it, and the present tense seems to refer to the repetitive character of the occurrence. Thus what happens has a presence but it is not existence in the temporality of the audience. Thus here presence coincides with the figures, since like the figures time of occurrence is a derivative of another temporality, which is detached from the sequence of past-present-future. Cosmological time (linear succession of hours, days, life-death) and phenomenological time (past, present, future)⁶⁷ are fused and subsumed into another phenomenological order of occurrences. Since cosmological time with its focus on preoccupation/concern and phenomenological with its focus

⁶⁵ Fragment I/2

⁶⁶ Fragment I/3

⁶⁷ As Paul Ricoeur calls them.

on care (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 180) refer to a certain way of action of the protagonists, the figures in the “special report” present within occurrence but not existent in action. Thus it is not the succession of their intervention but a time, which dominates the figures; not the act, which presupposes an actor but the occurrence of which the figure is a derivate of, determines the temporality of the narrative of the “special report”. This occurrence is a repetition, which can just be interrupted by leaving Tuzla or death. Because these two solutions are the only possibilities for action; the transcendence of the framework in which the narrative structure works is the only possibility to be existent at all, by being not present to the realm of the narrative at all. It seems to be only in representing immediacy (as Lukàcs uses the term) either as a self-referential logical chain of causation or as a narrative in which temporality can be without actions but the succession of occurrences within which reification might work. But the causality of the occurrence is also suppressed, thus occurrence takes the form of repetition of fragments with a limited interval, which have no duration since it is disrupted by another fragment. This seems to coincide with the fragmented structure of the special report. Since after the work we see workers sitting, the only active action, which is taking place is cooking⁶⁸ but again at the very point of this activity the narrator speaks for the workers and attributes to them a feeling of joy⁶⁹.

When another tired worker enters the room⁷⁰ again the narrator speaks for him and relates the migration of the worker to the non-existence of work⁷¹ since nobody would choose to come to Tuzla if there were no logical reason into which

⁶⁸ Fragment II/4

⁶⁹ Fragment II/5-8

⁷⁰ Fragment III/3

⁷¹ Fragment III/7

one is forced. Thus a double operation is done; on the one hand the misery of Tuzla is underlined in a logical order so that everyone (audience) can follow the line of argument and again the reasons for the non-existence of work, for unemployment are hidden by the abstraction of unemployment from any causal link. This is the point in which an appeal to a certain logic (no work-migration) is linked to an appeal to emotions (empathy). Suddenly, while speaking about kin and relatives and the communication with them, another worker intervenes and shifts the attention to his beloved. Then suddenly a worker is introduced to us, who wants to sing; again the reason for this is transmitted not by the worker himself but by the narrator, who posits himself now in the close but dominant position of “abi/bro”⁷²; the only way out of the misery seems to be “a return to the beloved”⁷³. Here a sense of closeness between the workers and the audience upon the song which the worker sings; then a realm is opened up, which seems focus more on the details of the lives of the workers and their non-fragmented own narratives. Thus while the reporter and a worker are in an intimate chat (*koyu sohbət*),⁷⁴ we do not know what the content of this talk is and it is at this point in which a sudden rupture takes place.⁷⁵ The owner of the house wants that the reporter gets out and the reporter tries to show with his question⁷⁶ that the owner of the house is repressing/veiling something; thus the reporter on the one side gives information about the amount of the rent the workers are paying and on the other hand puts this in a format in which the reporter defends

⁷² Fragment IV and Fragment IV/5a

⁷³ Fragment IV/4 and Fragment IV/6a

⁷⁴ Fragment V/1

⁷⁵ Fragment V/2

⁷⁶ Fragment V/4/a

the workers indirectly. The experience with the owner of the house is common in Turkey; thus these could be a point to establish homogeneity of experience between the audience and the represented. But this is suddenly disrupted. We see this especially in the last words of the reporter⁷⁷, which are a recollection of the chronological fragments and configures them retrospectively. Thus “there is a lot of to be said” but “what is important is” if the workers will be alive or not. The void of information in what is to be said recollects the fragments and tries to give a motive out of the misery, blame someone, say something against and for someone etc. It is exactly this mute position, which enabled the whole narrative to be fragmented, to be temporally distinct than the audience; since there is no logical order of causation but the situation; what remains is the “threat of death tomorrow”. Especially the reporter, who sits in the midst of the workers and speaks emotionally, reveals us the position, which the “special report” wants to take. The whole tape was a construct; the whole story was a construct on the cut board. The everyday life was not how it repeated itself but became fragmented in representation with the coming of the reporters; since misery had to be found and pornographically depicted. When the reporters are away everything will repeat itself⁷⁸, the only interruption possible is death, escape or a change in the mind of “the responsible”⁷⁹.

Thus the fragmented narrative structure, in which succession without any inner connection is established, makes something possible; it works: Since the workers can do nothing but suffer, die or escape and nobody is blamed besides the responsables; the suffering has to be the leading motive of the whole narrative. Thus

⁷⁷ Fragment VI/a

⁷⁸ Fragment VII

⁷⁹ Fragment VIII

it can just be lived through. It is this structure of the narrative that allows not any preoccupation or concern to be uttered and any protagonists to emerge who reckon with time. Time is detached from action; it is a succession of loose fragments. Thus it seems that we here have a different character of time, with autonomy for itself detached from action and resembling a plot. And this might be by the very structure of the narrative in which just the reporter and the intentions of the author of the narrative have any subjective role at all.

Thus what Lukàcs calls reification/mystification seems to be exactly at work here.⁸⁰ It is a good riddance, a good way of getting rid of workers' subjectivity and employers' responsibility in calling the state as the only responsible instance. The mystification of suffering detaches Tuzla from all other spheres; like the Turkish saying “there is something worse than bad”.

In this way the capitalism, neoliberal policies, employers and workers' organizations are out of sight; there is no subjectivity anywhere put the “pressure” fictionalized by the press in organizing passive conscience. Did it not work? Yes it did! The strike of Limter-is was made possible by the deaths of the workers and the press interest in the life and work conditions of the workers; which was also a result of the long struggle of Limter-is to make these issues public. Besides the political polarization of the society in Turkey (nationalists/republicans, AKP supporters and the PKK/Kurds) the possibility of establishing a culmination of strikes (the Turkish Airlines strike, Turkish Telekom strike, the NOVAMED and YÖRSAN strike) and thus a counter-hegemonic sphere for social unrest seemed not to be possible anymore, since was Tuzla detached from Turkish capitalism was an exception. This enabled such a significant support for the concern of the union, while making the

⁸⁰ It shall be noted that his discussion on mystification/reification seems also to be compatible with the concept of ‘soceity effect’ deployed by Althusser in (Althusser and Balibar, 1972)

establishment of a long-lasting counter-hegemony lead by the union very difficult. It is exactly to show the exception in the quotidian and thus to turn it into suffering in which the temporality of the audience and the inner-temporality of the reported are clearly distinct that conscience can work without any political meaning. It is a good way to get rid of any kind of subversive subjectivity, a good riddance, a good way of opening a void between the audience and the represented ones; a political primitive accumulation to disposses the audience/represented from their means to change their lives collectively.

It has to be noted that the difference that the narrative established between the audience and the shipyard workers cannot just be reduced to a matter of a politics of audio-visual representation. It actually seems to resemble a social stratification on a nationwide scale. Indeed, there is a difference between the life conditions of the most pauperized and casual working shipyard workers, the steady shipyard workers and the overall working population in Turkey.

The union Limter-iş was for a long time actively struggling for the improvement of working conditions and established a catalogue of demands during its sit-in strikes in 2008. Thus the union established a link between the deaths but also the everyday workflow of Tuzla; the former was seen as a consequence of the latter. But the conditions in Tuzla became known to the public upon the deaths and later on projected to the living conditions of the most pauperized and causal working strata of the workers. Although the left and social movements were in solidarity with the union and there was a publicity around these conditions, it seems as if it was not possible to establish a link between the everyday capitalist working conditions in Turkey and those in Tuzla, the whole issue remained on the ground of conscience/ideological preferences than a gathering of social demands. The

stratification of the workforce in Tuzla and of the working class in Turkey seem to have turned the whole issue into an exception. Although the amount of workers dying on building constructions is higher and a lot of workers died in the jeans sweatshops due to the lung disease silicosis, these incidents could be turned to exceptions; since the whole matter was reduced to a question of live and death and thus transferrable into an ethic discourse. Thus the experience of 'flexible' capitalism and the working conditions in Turkey diverged within the working and poor population; temporal working opened a realm to escape one industry or one sweatshop, one city. Thus those who were working under casual conditions and within a high mobility seem not to have identified themselves with the current conditions in the shipyards. Those workers and poor outside of Tuzla could just establish a relationship upon conscience or even ignore the whole issue. For other parts of the working population, which worked and lived under flexible capitalism were poor but not pauperized in the same way as a certain stratum of the shipyard workers. Thus 'flexible' capitalism seems not just to function in stratifying the workforce, mobilizing it and opening realms/phantasies to escape one situation and enter into condition but also within a non- contemporaneity of those involved. Thus it seems as if the 'flexible' capitalism seems not just to fragment the workflow, work process and the whole life but also encounters –at least in Turkey- a historically/demographically fragmented population. Thus the distance established in the narrative of Flash TV between the pauperized workers and the audience seems have a social counterpart, as Chatterjee (2004) notes (p.6-7):

He [Benedict Anderson] speaks of 'he remarkable planetary spread, not merely of nationalism, but of a profoundly standardized conception of politics, in part by reflecting on the everyday practices, rooted in industrial material civilization, that have displaced the cosmos to make way for the world.' Such a conception of politics requires an

understanding of the world as one , so that a common activity called politics can be seen to be going on everywhere . One should note that time in this conception easily translates into space, so that we should indeed speak here of the time-space of modernity. Thus, politics, in this sense, inhabits the empty homogeneous time-space of modernity. I disagree. I believe this view of modernity, or indeed of capital, is mistaken because it is one-sided. It looks at only one dimension of the time-space of modern life. People can only imagine themselves in empty homogeneous time; they do not live in it. Empty homogeneous time is the utopian time of capital. It linearly connects past, present, and future, creating the possibility for all of those historicist imaginings of identity, nationhood, progress, and so on that Anderson, along with many others, have made familiar to us. But empty homogeneous time is not located anywhere in real space—it is utopian. The real space of modern life consists of heterotopia. (My debt to Michel Foucault should be obvious, even if I am not always faithful to his use of this term.) Time here is heterogeneous, unevenly dense. Here, even industrial workers do not all internalize the work-discipline of capitalism, and more curiously, even when they do, they do not do so in the same way. Politics here does not mean the same thing to all people. To ignore this is, I believe, to discard the real for the utopian.

Thus this temporal heterogeneity seems also able to be related to the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects. Especially if we look how demographic differences functioned initially to mobilize the workforce in Tuzla, how the state related to the entrepreneurs and the latter to the state then we have to admit that the fragmentary character of ‘flexible’ capitalism seems to be historically related to the history of the state; thus also to the continuities and discontinuities in the historicity of its subjects. Seen from such a point of view there seem to be diverse relations and strategies of the state towards different population groups and thus a differentiation of the histories of these groups, which seemed to have opened up a realm in which made the emergence of flexible capitalism possible. We shall explore this point later on in our theoretical discussion.

It shall just briefly be mentioned that the polarization of the society into Kurds, Turkish Nationalists and followers of the line of the AKP may have made it difficult for Limter-iş to establish a counter-hegemony. Tuzla was ‘flexible’

capitalism taken to its extremes. A neoliberal transformation and flexibilization took also place in other spheres of Turkey but the struggle upon the deaths in Tuzla could not become a hegemonic realm on which these demands could gather around. The neoliberal agenda and its concrete forms seem to have been experienced in different contexts quite differently, which might be right a form of political flexibility to realize this agenda. It might be that the heterogeneity of the time experienced may have been also a problem for the whole struggle. It gained support but could not become a signifier for articulating and structuring social demands (Laclau, 2005) against ‘flexible’ capitalism, thus it could not open a realm for counter-hegemony.⁸¹ For instance the occupation of the *Sakarya Square* in Ankara by the workers of the state run monopoly TEKEL and the change in the status of the work conditions of its workers could establish such a counter-hegemonic force in 2010. But these workers were more or less working under regulated conditions and experiences similar working conditions. The whole struggle took place as there was a fight between Kemalists and the AKP regarding who should control the juridical institutions in which the former were holding power and the latter attempted to gain finally the overhand. The workers were organized in the union Türk-İş/Tek-Gıda-İş, which follows a nationalist and clientelist line. But since the enterprise was historically run by the state and the state controlled the workers upon Türk-İş and its clientelist structure, there was a sense of organization. The workers remained for approximately

⁸¹ It has to be noted that this has also other reasons. The neoliberal agenda in Turkey could be realized in smashing the organizations of diverse popular strata upon the coup d’état in 1980. Although unions could be established after the coup, these were mainly organized around big private enterprises with core workers and state-run enterprises. The organizations emerging after the coup d’état were mainly organized around common places of origin, sectarian/religious lines and splitted due to demographic differences, especially in Istanbul. The left was pushed to remain just organized amongst Alawites and Sunnis, although a much broader portions of the society was influenced by the left prior to the coup d’état in 1980. Thus the organizational base to articulate demands against flexible capitalism along lines of a common experience, crossing demographic differences, are just developing slowly. This also seems to make it impossible to perceive politics just upon ‘clean’ demands without reflecting on the possibilities for their emergence.

seventy days on the Square and lived in spontaneously constructed tents coming from every corner of Turkey. The nationalists/Kemalists used the case against the AKP. But interestingly the main force behind the whole action was the tent of the Kurdish workers from Diyarbakır. This action for instance could establish a counter-hegemony in that it became symbolic for the deregulation of state-run enterprises and the working conditions there. Several political parties (MHP, DSP, CHP, BDP) as well as socialists visited the tents and declared their support. Unions, striking workers, NGOs and initiatives came or even opened their own tents, with their own demands. It is open to be questioned whether the resistance in Tuzla could have led to such a popular protest. But the conjuncture of these two events as well as the main force behind them diverges and shows that even these both sectors of workers were experiencing the year 2008 differently. One part lived within flexible working conditions the other one feared the loss of its privileged status. The latter ones were representing also a traditionally broad workforce; the public sector was a main economic force in Turkey and its neoliberal reshaping concerns a huge variety of industries and sectors. Thus the demands to the state/government were not just a call for intervention but the state was also the employer, which opens up a realm in which at least the demands of a huge amount of civil servants and those working for the public sector upon contracts could be articulated. The situation in Tuzla could not find such a huge 'employer' or a similar symbolic character, which could have mobilized organized forces elsewhere. Tuzla was not privatized; no formally fixed privileges were lost. Privileges were a matter of strategies of upward mobility upon subcontracting. Tuzla and its workforce were born within flexible capitalism, within a multiplicity of policies leading to primitive accumulation. This multiplicity and

encounter of diverse subjects on the shipyards also shows that the society in Turkey is not based on a universal notion of citizenship.

Fragments of Tuzla

The concept of primitive accumulation led us to the question of where this initial step could come from. As it was shown throughout our whole account on Tuzla, the initial capital for the formation of the shipyards stemmed from state subsidies, primitive accumulation and regulations opening up the space of Tuzla for shipyards. Here we saw that the owners of the shipyards were mostly involved in maritime activities but had close relations to state officials. But it was the GISAT-Fund and the credits of the Maritime Bank,⁸² which enabled them to enter into such a huge enterprise. The access to this capital presupposed the connections to state officials. Thus relationships had to be woven and governed. The shipyards were established after the coup d'état of 1980, which was invoked against the left opposition on the streets and thus leading to the establishment of an authoritarian regime with a neoliberal economic policy. The workers came with waves of migration due to economic problems and around the effects of state repression towards certain groups of the population. The contestation was organized by a union, which had its history within the radical left prior to the coup d'état. Labor Acts, taxes and permissions for shipyards were just one utensil in a fight for power between the state, shipyard owners, ship owners, subcontractors and workers. The forms this contestation took were not just bound to the institutional legal framework but by selectively calling it.

⁸² It has to be noted that the issue of getting credits and funds has shifted more to the private sector after the crisis of 2001. Nevertheless the shipyard owners are calling the state to intervene and facilitate the Access to capital.

Thus the whole contestations took place in a sphere, which was not immediately linked to legality.⁸³

It is interesting for instance that the formation of the workforce in Tuzla coincided with the possibilities for self-employment. First the most experienced and ‘oldest’ workers, foremen, begun to be self-employed and employed first their surrounding, which was first based on kinship and commonplace of origin, and then others came into that business, a workforce, which was newer, came with a different wave of migration or was brought directly to Tuzla by the subcontractors. The reference to a common place of origin was important as long as it opened access to relations and control them. Access to skills and a politics of governing relationships was crucial for all actors to benefit from the enterprise. Not just the work done on a shipyard or besides one subcontractor was temporary but also the possibility of getting rid of being employed by subcontractors.

The state distributed financial means and facilities while opening a door for non-legal form of conduct, which enables the diverse governments to serve their clientele and fight against those with which it gets into a conflict of interest. The shipyard owners try to control their creditors as well as the ship owners. The creditors try to bypass the ship owners. By the same token the shipyard owners try to control prices in faking ship owners, accumulate capital in ‘faking’ the state and creditors, while at the same time encouraging workers to establish subcontraction companies in order to lower prices. The shipyard owners try to control the subcontractors in giving them not the full amount of their money and leading them to bankruptcy. All are paying not the taxes and social security benefits to the workers. The workers try to bypass the subcontractors and establish their own relationships to

⁸³ For a good discussion on the relationship between law and custom see Althusser and Balibar (1972, p.228-229).

establish subcontractor companies while at the same time trying to bypass the shipyard owners and establish direct links to the ship owners. Since every actor moves on a ground of non-legality the law can be used as a weapon, but again time is important and the bureaucratic legal apparatus can sometimes be too slow so that the process might end but the penalized person is away. Thus a chain beginning from the state down to the workers is established which has no rigidity. The actors involved were the product of multiple effects of multiple forms and transformations of power and contestation to those.

Thus what was contested was not the power of one constituted class against another but the very definition of what the position and possibilities of changing positions were. The positions were in constant flux and it was of crucial importance to mobilize connections as we saw in the example of the shipyard owners, subcontractors and the workers. Here we cannot speak of pre-constituted positions but the contestation of those positions and their content. Frederick Cooper notes in his work on the dockyards in colonial Mombasa, that he takes a phrase from Adam Przeworsky and renders his study not as one on the struggle *of* classes but *about* class; these workers sometimes overlapped with petty-traders, self-employed artisans, small subsistence plot owners, criminals and job seekers (Cooper, 1987, p.7).⁸⁴ Also in Tuzla, class seems not to be something which could be taken for granted; here this position and its meaning seems to be fluid and open for constant questioning.

It seems as if the initial constitution of the subjects involved can be read within the continuities, discontinuities and struggles regarding the relation of the

⁸⁴ But different than the shipyard workers of Tuzla the common experience of the life on the dockyards could be a point of departure for common action in Mombasa, the overlapping mentioned above did not prevent such a collectivity to emerge.

sovereign to its subjects. This relationship seems to have led to a non-universal character of the law; the law seems just to be supplementary in negotiating power. Thus the law could be just understood as an *attempt* for universality but also functional in its non-universal state. This non-universal character seems to have been functional in the emergence of ‘flexible’ capitalism on the shipyards of Tuzla. My informant, who established a subcontracting company, said that one could not be a subcontractor and a ‘good citizen’ in the same time. With this regard Chakrabarty (2000) sets his account on the jute mill workers in Calcutta within a discussion on the hermeneutics of citizenship:

If Marx gave the working class a special place and mission in history, it is also clear that he situated this class within a framework of bourgeois relationships. The figure of the worker involved in this exposition of the category of ‘capital’ was that of a person who belonged to a society where the bourgeois notion of equality was ingrained in culture. Thus Marx considered labor to be a ‘moment’ (i.e. a constituent element) of capital, and capital, according to him ‘is a *bourgeois production relation*, a production relation of bourgeois society.’ The laborer of Marx’s assumption had internalized and enjoyed ‘formal freedom,’ the freedom of the contract (which brought legal and market relations together), and he enjoyed this not just in abstraction but as ‘the individual, real person’. Until this was ensured and so long as precapitalist, particularistic ties made up and characterized the relations of production, capital, as Marx understood it, was ‘not yet *capital as such*’. This is why Marx thought that the logic of capital could be best deciphered only in a society where ‘the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice (ibid, p.3).

“What happens, then when we have a ‘working class’ born into a culture characterized by the persistence of precapitalist relationships (or by the absence of notions of ‘citizenship,’ ‘individualism,’ ‘equality before the law,’ and so on)?”⁸⁵

⁸⁵ (ibid, p. ixix)

It is interesting to note that even Germany was not a ‘bourgeois society’ based on the notion of citizenship as we understand the term now and that capitalism in Europe itself did not emerge in such societies, workers resistances/insurgencies seems to have been crucial for the formation of notions of citizenship even in Europe and this resistances could also be read as ones against becoming workers. I owe this idea to my father Hikmet Acun.

Even at a less abstract level, it may be said that the so-called economic, technical, or political factors, on their part, do not operate outside culture. Behind the jute industry's demand for cheap unskilled labor, its problems of industrial discipline, or its choice of technology, lay the culture of the 'bosses' - a deeply entrenched mercantilist outlook and the cultural milieu of the British Raj in India. This culture did not always act in the best 'economic' interests of the industry. The same may be said of the jute-mill laborers. Their notions of authority, their modes of protest, the problems of their organizations, and the weakness of their solidarity all reveal, on inspection, the existence of a pre-bourgeois culture and consciousness that in a combination with and acting through the so-called economic and political factors, impaired their capacity to act as a class. This is what eventually leads us to emphasize the importance, in Marx's discussion of labor-capital relationship, of this assumption regarding a hegemonic bourgeois culture.⁸⁶

We have to leave aside whether such a group has to 'act as a class'. But nevertheless the problematic Chakrabarty opens up is interesting since it seems to fit into the picture of the shipyards in Tuzla.

The conduct on the shipyards does not follow just a rational fight for advantages. There is also an overlap of diverse forms of subjection, which cannot just be reduced to a question of profits and costs. For instance one *usta* workers told me that a torch was needed on a shipyard. There were ones for 50 TL and ones for 150 TL. The latter were better and could be used for a long time. But instead of buying the torch for 150 TL, the shipyard owners bought cheap torches again and again. I asked why the *usta* did not intervene so that better torches were bought. They said that it was not even possible to make such a claim.⁸⁷ They also told that subcontractors came and left shipyards in using the machines very harsh. This is also one of the reasons for accidents especially related to electrical machines. The *usta*

⁸⁶ (ibid, p.12)

Later on Chakrabarty criticizes his own approach and claims that his reading of the working-class consciousness remained historicist and that he posed his question in ascribing a transcultural character to the working-class (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.91-92).

⁸⁷ 'Can you ever demand something like that, no you cannot' / 'Böyle bir şeyi isteyemezsin ki, isteyebilirmisin...'

insisted that the shipyard owners organized the whole workflow in a very chaotic way and stated that ‘they have established an order according to their own minds’.⁸⁸ My informant of RMK insisted that the shipyard owners learned to run shipyards in Tuzla; they did not know it previously. But according to one technician they knew how to run shipyards but in a ‘chaotic’ way. This is interesting with regard to the fact that most of them were related to maritime activities and even some of them run shipyards before the establishment of Tuzla.

There was one incident in which workers and intern engineers were put into a lifeboat to test whether it slid well with the people inside on the GISAN shipyard (Saat and Kuburlu, 2008). This incident occurred on August 12, 2008 (which means after the two major sit-in actions of Limter-iş). There was a vertical metal part of the railing of the ship; it was forgotten and thus not cut. The lifeboat hit this metal part, turned upside down to the sea and its windows were broken. Three workers died. The union Limter-iş claimed that these tests had to be made with sacks filled with sand. Also Murat Bayrak, the president of the Shipbuilders’ Association had to admit that this test could not be done with living people. But interestingly my informant at RMK insisted that the lifeboat was from China and was low in quality and that this test could be done with humans. Seen from this perspective the conduct in Tuzla cannot just be reduced to an economic rationality, at least not one that is looking forward for sustainability. This resembles the sketch of Chakrabarty regarding the culture of the bosses. It seems as if they just try to get the job done.⁸⁹ Workers said that there is always a hurry on the shipyards and also after 2008. As far as a ship for

⁸⁸ *‘Kendi kafalarına göre bir düzen kurmuşlar’*

⁸⁹ It is even questionable how these bosses relate to the ships. Since international maritime activity is the main field of transportation it seems even possible that this involves smuggling of diverse illegal items.

repair arrives the subcontractors would come to the shipyards to get orders and workers would then be forced to make the tasks in a fast manner. But it seems that not just the question of time or of costs is here a matter but other forms of subjection that cannot be explained just within an economic rationality, which have also a symbolic meaning, a performance of power for the sake of performing power; or just as a form of capitalist conduct which is organized chaotically.

We see a similar relationship between legality and the actors in Tuzla. On the one side the decision of the International Maritime Organization to ban ships with single hulls and older than fifteen years could claim universality, the contract between ship owners and shipyard owners could have a sanctioning function, while permissions to run the shipyards or the labor acts as well as the relationship between subcontractors, workers and shipyard owners was not directly sanctioned by any effective law. The law was not the first instance to be claimed on but more the trail to use certain relationships and direct forms of action were important. One example are those shipyard owners and subcontractors who used violence against workers to deal with unrest.⁹⁰ The fight of the workers from *Harran*; the worker from *Maraş*, who shot at his subcontractor; or the technician, who asked when the wages would be paid to the workers, show that the law was not the first instance to resolve problems.

This resembles the discussion of Partha Chatterjee (2004). He shows how in ‘most of the world’ the society is split into civil society and a political society. While the former can make claims of citizen rights the latter can only access these upon intermediaries and certain connections, while transgressing the law; this is what he calls the *politics of the governed*:

⁹⁰ Here it would be interesting to discuss the issue of work discipline upon the concepts of *formal subsumption* and *real subsumption* in the case of the shipyards in Tuzla. But we should just point here that such an field of inquiry could be taken. Such a discussion would boost the framework of this thesis.

In illustrating what I mean by political society and how it works, I will describe in the next chapter several cases studied in recent fieldwork where we can see a politics emerging out of the developmental policies of government aimed at specific population groups. Many of these groups, organized into associations, transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work. They may live in illegal squatter settlements, make illegal use of water or electricity, and travel without tickets in public transport. In dealing with them, the authorities cannot treat them on the same footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social pursuits. Yet state agencies and nongovernmental organizations cannot ignore them either, since they are among thousands of similar associations representing groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient instruments for the administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population groups. These groups on their part accept that their activities are often illegal and contrary to good civic behavior, but they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right. They profess a readiness to move out if they are given suitable alternative sites for resettlement, for instance (p.40).

It should be admitted that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the description of Chatterjee and the case of the shipyards in Tuzla. Chatterjee focuses more on the access to public rights. But nevertheless we see a similar chain regarding the access to the instances upon which rights could be claimed. Although it is virtually commonplace that social security payments are not given to the workers of Tuzla they nevertheless react if the immediate wages become a concern. As seen in the forms of contestation and struggle in Tuzla, in which workers deploy diverse relations to make claims against the authorities in question (subcontractors, shipyard owners etc.)⁹¹. Thus even the access to legality can just function upon the union or lawyers and this remains a temporary relationship. Also with regard to collective action rendered by Chatterjee it has to be noted that the forms of collective action are

⁹¹ The state is important as far as the Labor Act can be invoked.

not stable associations or at least not reducible to them.⁹² But at least it seems as if the notion of political society seems to fit into the relations on the shipyards in Tuzla. It seems hard to speak of *rights* regarding the demands of the workers. Since the reference to the legal framework guaranteeing the fulfillment of agreements seems not to be invoked in every case. This demanding might take the form of a transgression of laws but it seems as if the forms of contestation move in a realm, which should not be conceptualized as illegal but non-legal. It has not immediately be the violation of any law but a sphere in which the law plays a minor role in that it is just a tactical tool. Seen from the point of view of civil rights the state had at least to intervene when the workers died on these shipyards. But even this was not the case. Government officials just celebrated that GİSBİR constructed a hospital whose purpose is not clear and the shipyard owners offered money to the relatives of the victims so that they did not go to court.⁹³ Thus even a bio-politics of the state towards its subjects was not the case as long as the relatives did not went to court.

It seems to be possible to set the subjectivities within and around the shipyards of Tuzla into the theoretical field, which approaches the problem of subjectivity within notions of citizenship and non-citizenship. It seems as if this ambiguous relation of the law is functional in making quotidian capitalist conduct flexible in opening a realm in which power relations are contested continuously. Thus for instance not just the state is beyond the law but it seems that within factional fights and clientelism the governments are also subcontracting this position

⁹² The union has approximately thousand to 1,500 members and does not succeed the legal barrage to bargain legally with employers foreseen by the laws.

⁹³ See Holzer, Erzurumlu and Özgüven (2008), Özbakır (2008). It was even claimed by the union that there were negotiations between this shipyard owners and ship owners regarding this money and that it was included as a possible cost of a ship. We shall not go into the details of this debate but it resembles what Giorigo Agamben calls *homo sacer* and *state of exception*.

of being beyond the law, while they are also able to quit this ‘agreement’ as we see in Tuzla with regard to the shipyard owners and their relation to the state.⁹⁴

The regulations on the shipyards now are also not fulfilled but these were invoked after the crisis of 2008 and with the firing of the main corpus of the workers. Thus the workers were got rid of and ‘regulation’ emerged afterwards. But this did not change the flexibility on and around the shipyards in an essential way changing the very structure of this flexibility. Actors got out, the line of negotiations changed; subcontractors and shipyard owners faced problems to more interference of the state. But this happened not while the sector was in a boom and prior to the boom but in a conjuncture in which crisis was articulated with the resistance of *Limter-iş*. Nevertheless the non-legal conduct of shipyards as well as subcontractors and workers has not gone away. Still Tuzla is ‘regulated’ upon diverse quotidian struggles for positions and non-legality.

Seen from such a point of view flexible capitalism seems not just to be related to capital accumulation but a transmutation of a politics upon temporal difference, possibilities for upward/downward mobility as well as a constant redistribution of power and a realm on which the forms of government are negotiated, as the article in the newspaper *Radikal* shows.

⁹⁴ For instance the ‘security’ company, which was called previously Blackwater (now Xe Services LLC) supplied ‘special forces’ for the US government during the occupation of Iraq and was involved in the incidents in Fallujah. Initially it moved in a sphere beyond international right since it was not an army but a company. This seems to be analogous to what the Turkish state makes with its clientele. It opens up a sphere for illegal conduct. One faction liquidates the other in using the law, while opening again spaces for its own clientele to operate beyond the laws.

New Radicals Inc.

The Newspaper *Radikal* changed its layout and printing format soon after the referendum on laws regarding certain changes in the constitution of Turkey in the year 2010. May be not the fundamental written laws of Turkey and their “spirit”, but the discussions in the media regarding –roughly said- the relationship between the state and the society underwent a change, at least since the second electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2007 and its electoral victories in the local elections in 2009.⁹⁵

Radikal was a liberal-oriented newspaper, which was found in 1996. Its main readers were more or less secular minded, educated, middle class people, who distanced themselves from the main interpretation of Kemalism by the Kemalist elite, if not from Kemalism itself. Found by one of the strongest media company, Doğan Holding, it became an oppositional voice against the *raison d’etat* in Turkey, although not in a subversive sense but on the ground of a more or less liberal understanding of parliamentary democracy. Especially after a “car accident” in the city of *Susurluk* in 1996 in which the incidents turned out to be mafia bosses, ‘state security personnel’ and politicians, especially operating against the PKK, a mass movement against this mafiatric-corrupt relations begun to flourish, which was not Kurdish in its origins and which came under the control of some parts of the media. *Radikal* was a part of this process (Akman, 2010).

⁹⁵ For an illuminating study of the relationship between the AKP and the state upon the concept of ‘passive revolution’ see Tuğal (2009).

Soon after the referendum on changes in the constitution of Turkey, promoted sarcastically as a fundamental change on behalf of liberties by the AKP and as a break with the coup d'état of 1980, the newspaper completed its restructuring process. It has to be kept in mind that during these times the owner of the newspaper Aydın Doğan got also into conflicts with the government. He owns also newspaper with more conservative lines such as *Hürriyet*, *Posta*, the soccer daily *Fanatik* and *Hürriyet Daily News* besides its periodicals and TV channels. It was in a context in which a realm was opened up to discuss the future of the Turkish state and its relation to its subjects. So *Radikal* underwent a change. Its outlook began to resemble *The Guardian* and got a different outlook than the main liberal newspaper *Taraf*.

The pro-AKP militant newspaper *Taraf*, which was one of the main forces within the fight of the AKP against the military-Kemalist status quo in Turkey was not able to incorporate the left, since it blamed main parts of the left of being Kemalist. This had its reasons. *Taraf* understood the change in Turkey in terms of a struggle within the state, especially provoked by the problem of how to deal with the multitude, the crowd, the masses.

The Kurdish liberation movement was the main representative of this problem and *Taraf* had an ambiguous relationship to this “mass.” At least it differentiated between the Kurds and the PKK. Until the victory of the AKP reforms in the referendum in 2010 *Taraf* was the main vanguard of the transformation process in Turkey besides the more Islamic *Zaman* and *Yeni Şafak*. But soon after the referendum, the newspaper *Radikal*, which was not able to compete effectively with *Taraf* underwent a change and opened up another coalition. It declared its own process of change as “radical revolution” within its advertising campaign. Soon after

changing its layout and columnists, *Radikal* started a campaign regarding the “solution” of the Kurdish question, in which it proposed that the state should start a dialogue process with the PKK for a final peaceful solution, it declared that appealing for a negotiation process, that being on behalf of peace would be a radical stance. The newspaper supported its campaign by opening up a web-page in which people would put their names under a declaration and would themselves write about peace, the whole campaign was entitled “we seek 500,000 radicals who say: do not fight but speak”.⁹⁶

The new editor of the newspaper Eyüp Can declared that the newspaper would have no partisan stance, would take not part in the process of political polarization in Turkey and that the newspaper would be a leftist newspaper on behalf of liberties (NTVMSNBC, 2010). After this ambiguous declaration the newspaper began to deal more intensively with social problems and tried to make its readers part of the process of developing the newspaper. It opened itself up to the readers in enabling them to publish photos, videos, texts on the online edition of the newspaper and send its columnists to the street, so that they would not just sit on their chairs (ibid).

So it seems plausible to speculate that the main difference between *Taraf* and the ‘new’ *Radikal* is a difference in their relationship to the crowd, the masses, the multitude. It could be said that *Taraf* used the violence and anti-democratic history of the Turkish Republic, to support a fight within the state, between the AKP and parts of the military. Here the masses are just victimized. All those who were the real victims of state violence in the past, demanded more than just a little transformation of state policies and had mainly (leftists, Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis etc.) maintained an

⁹⁶ Later one of the *Radikal* columnists, Ertuğrul Mavioğlu, interviewed the leader of the PKK, Murat Karayılan and then was sued by the state.

subversive character or at least had maintained their own –sometimes controversial- political agendas. But *Taraf* did not want to mobilize but to construct a passive consent on behalf of the AKP, the agency of those concerned, of the masses, the crowds, the multitude was fearsome –as Spinoza would formulate it. Since the gap between the AKP and parts of the Kemalist status quo, could have opened up a realm for an independent political agenda, a mobilization of the masses seems to have been too risky, too incommensurable. But the ‘new’ *Radikal* approached this issue differently. It began to use the Internet as an participatory environment, tried to relate to social movements and the left. Although the newspaper had opened up a realm for leftists and social movements also prior to its own ‘revolution’, this time the relationship became more dynamic. *Taraf* tried to weaken the Kemalist elite and the main parts of the military; it tried to gain consent for the AKP. But the ‘new’ *Radikal* tries to incorporate the ‘masses’, in its publishing techniques as well as regarding its orientation. This coincides with a process in which the classical Kemalist party CHP and a major Islamic party SP (Virtue Party) face also a transformation, face splits or become more moderate. The realm in which political differences are fought shifts as the war with the PKK -with those not incorporable- since it is this constitutive outside of the regime and the political, which is tried to be incorporated as the hegemonic conflict, representative of all other subversive subjectivities.

Taraf was trying to establish consent within a certain readership, a certain field of influence, within a certain radius, the ‘new’ *Radikal* attempts to open up a field in which social demands can be articulated and incorporated; at least the articulation of social demands can be incorporated without having to confront the regime directly, without having a subversive and insurrectionist character. Thus the conjuncture of the ‘new’ *Radikal* is different than the conjuncture in which *Taraf*

was born. In those times the conflict within the state seemed to be have come to a certain point in which the AKP and those forces it represents have become the overhand, the conflict seemed be have been displaced. If it is possible to weaken the existence of a force that is not representable within the state mechanism (PKK), if it is possible to open up a realm in which social demands can be articulated without having to place themselves outside of the regime, then it is possible to govern the multitude, to make it politically measureable. Now the battlefield between the AKP and the weakened Kemalist elite has shifted, the realm opened up has lead to cracks within the latter political position. The ‘new’ *Radikal* opens ideally, virtually a field for a social contract, a realm in which ideas fight without polarising the society to extremes. The ‘new’ *Radikal* did not make publicity with a certain radius of influence, but it shifts the very ground of articulating political positions, it aims to incorporate those at the margins of the regime for preparing the ground for a new ‘social contract’. It has no radial effect but it touches the radix of the political. This could also be read as an attempt of Aydın Doğan to incorporate social demands into a field where they can be articulated without becoming subversive and by the same token open a space to contest also the AKP.

Soon after its ‘revolution’, *Radikal* published an article about the shipyards in Tuzla, introduced in the front page of the printed version of the paper. This report by İsmail Saymaz was entitled ‘*Two Radicals in Tuzla: Unity of Labor and Capital in Tuzla*’ (see Appendix-I).⁹⁷

⁹⁷ See Saymaz (2010).

I asked the General President of Limter-iş if he had really spoken like it is reported in the last quote. He said that he just mentioned that this situation is better than the condition of other shipyards and that this was everything he said. According to my observations he would also not insist on the importance of ‘tranquility within business life’ at least not in that way.

Indeed the DESAN Shipyard was the first one opening its gates for the inspection by the committee. But if we look closer to its owners and Muhsin Divan than we can see an interesting point. The DESAN Shipyard belongs to Cengiz Kaptanoğlu. He was active in the central-right True Path Party (DYP) and then was expelled from the party together with Divan in 1995.⁹⁸ Kaptanoğlu was an MP from the lists of the *AKP* during the events in 2008. Divan was also active within the *AKP*.⁹⁹ Whatever his relation to the *AKP* might be at least Divan presents and upon the newspaper article represents a certain mentality of government in line with the new outlook of *Radikal* and the political currents it represents.

Here one shipyard functions as a model for governance, to depict a model of dealing with subjectivities. On the one side there are the other shipyards, which are taking measures but slowly and without the interference of the union, on the other side the ‘clever capitalist knowing his business’. If we look to the political networks in which Divan is and was involved, look at the conjuncture in which *Radikal* changed its outlook and published this article we can see that a certain way of governing is at stakes here. The matter here is not just the representation of a shipyard but the overall structure of governing; the shop floor becomes the model for an overall contestation of how subjectivities should be governed. Thus we cannot separate the structuring of power from the overall struggles about how subjectivities are governed and incorporated most effectively. Thus understood capitalist conduct has to be understood within the framework of the concept of power and struggles relating to how to deal with subjectivities. While other shipyard owners and the government did not establish a dialogue with Limter-iş and got rid of the ‘problem’

⁹⁸ See Milliyet (1995).

⁹⁹ Now both of them seem to have no significant official function within the *AKP*, which might indicate that they lost power or are not favored by the party central.

by means of the crisis, DESAN is incorporating the contestation and determines the ground on which contestation should take place. This is what *Radikal* tried to impose on the overall politics of Turkey in those times: ‘Do not fight but speak’. But can the subaltern speak? This seems possible as far as their subjectivity can be transformed and recuperated; in the case of Tuzla this means a time in which the union is weak and the major amount of workers is fired (after the crisis of 2008).¹⁰⁰

Not just *Radikal* but also NGOs tried to support and fund Limter-iş after the major actions in 2008. For instance the Shipbuilding Committee of the European Metal Workers’ Federation (EMF) held its annual meeting in Istanbul between 8th and 10th October of 2008 in order to investigate the situation of the shipyards in Tuzla and to show solidarity with Limter-iş (EMF, 2008). The meeting paid attention to the situation in Tuzla, but after a brief presentation of Limter-iş regarding the actual developments, the EMF meeting went on and the ‘colleagues’ shared with each other ‘experiences’ of how they were productively involved in the process of ship design and seemed even to perform how far there is a peace between workers and entrepreneurs in Europe. This showed how much the relationship between employers and workers was different in Europe and in the case of Limter-iş and the employers in Tuzla.

In informal dialogues the EMF Shipbuilding Committee representants said to Limter-iş: ‘We need you and you need us’. It was a matter of principle for Limter-iş not to be funded by any institution –and especially not by the governments/NGOs of

¹⁰⁰ It has to be mentioned that in September 2011 the union Limter-iş won a trial against DESAN. Limter-iş started a trial on behalf of a worker employed by the subcontractor ‘Pruva Denizcilik’ at the DESAN shipyard after he was fired. The court decided that the worker has to be employed by the shipyard and not by the subcontractor. Limter-iş perceived this trial as a victory, since it claimed for years that the main responsible on the shipyards were the shipyard owners. In the case that this decision should be approved by the high court, workers of subcontractors would be perceived legally as employed by the shipyard owners. This would have consequences regarding the legal rights of workers, According to Limter-iş. The union announced this as the ‘legal victory of our direct/practical [fili] struggle’ see Limter-iş (2011).

the EU- and to mark a clear divide between entrepreneurs and workers, their harsh anti-capitalist stance was out of discussion. Especially the German representative of the EMF Shipbuilding Committee suggested that Limter-iş could come into dialogue with the established unions in Europe and even more that a step towards ‘cooperation’ could be taken. But the EMF Shipbuilding Committee could not understand the militant stance of Limter-iş towards capitalism and its commitment to socialist revolution. In informal dialogues the representatives of the EMF Shipbuilding Committee¹⁰¹ suggested that the political line of Limter-iş –formulated as class unionism by the union itself- was a stance, which has been outlived in Europe for long times.¹⁰² It seemed to me that the EMF Shipbuilding Committee was acting diplomatically and pragmatically while Limter-iş put its anti-capitalist stance before pragmatic solutions within the establishment. Thus a superficial dialogue seemed to be possible but any cooperation seemed impossible. Funding and making publicity on an international scale was the only way of cooperation for the EMF. But funding/political support in this sense is also a way of recuperating resistance; Arundhati Roy calls this the ‘NGO-ization of resistance’ (Democracy Now 2004):

In the long run, NGOs are accountable to their funders, not to the people they work among. They’re what botanists would call an indicator species. It’s almost as though the greater the devastation caused by neo-liberalism, the greater the outbreak of NGOs. Nothing illustrates this more poignantly than the phenomenon of the U.S. preparing to invade a country and simultaneously readying NGOs to go in and clean up the devastation.

[...]

¹⁰¹ They seemed to have social democratic backgrounds resembling the German SPD. It has to be noted that this meeting was arranged with the help of the Turkish branch of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, which is affiliated with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).

¹⁰² For Limter-iş there can be no final peace between the working-class and the bourgeoisie; the union assumes that this conflict is political in its nature. Class unionism is a formulation according to which a union has to adopt a clear-cut stance against capitalism and not reduce its line just to the improvement of work conditions but also mobilize workers for a socialist struggle implying the overall transformation of social relations.

Eventually—on a smaller scale but more insidiously—the capital available to NGOs plays the same role in alternative politics as the speculative capital that flows in and out of the economies of poor countries. It begins to dictate the agenda. It turns confrontation into negotiation. It depoliticizes resistance. It interferes with local peoples' movements that have traditionally been self-reliant. NGOs have funds that can employ local people who might otherwise be activists in resistance movements, but now can feel they are doing some immediate, creative good (and earning a living while they're at it). Real political resistance offers no such short cuts.

The NGO-ization of politics threatens to turn resistance into a well-mannered, reasonable, salaried, 9-to-5 job. With a few perks thrown in. Real resistance has real consequences. And no salary.

Seen from this perspective it becomes complicated to account for the possibilities for resistances to develop their own agenda and not being recuperated. This opens the field for a debate regarding of how conflicts can be understood within capitalism and if there is a tendency for the emergence of subversive subjectivities.

Colonizing Life - Exodus

It seems as if the whole life of the workers on the shipyards of Tuzla is interwoven with the non-rigid distribution of positions and their contestation. With the regard of the relationship between the lives of the workers it seems to be interesting how the process of extraction of surplus value and the life beyond the work process relate to each other (abstract labor and living labor). With this respect Chakrabarty (2000) notes that there are two histories, in his reading of Marx. He notes that capital has a history, this is its abstract temporality and that there is an excess of the lives of the workers, which capital cannot consume totally (p.66):

History 1 is the past that is internal to the structure of being of capital. The fact is, that worker at the factory represents a historical separation between his/her capacity to labor and the necessary tools of production

(which now belong to the capitalist) thereby showing that he or she embodies a history that has realized this logical precondition of capital. This worker does not therefore represent any denial of the universal history of capital. Everything I have said about ‘abstract labor’ will apply to him or her. While walking through the factory gate, however, my fictional person also embodies other kinds of pasts. These pasts, grouped together in my analysis as History 2, may be under the institutional domination of the logic of capital and exist in proximate relationship to it, but they also do not belong to the “life process” of capital. They enable the human bearer of labor power to enact other ways of being in the world—other than, that is, being the bearer of labor power. We cannot ever hope to write a complete or full account of these pasts. They are partly embodied in the person’s bodily habits, in unselfconscious collective practices, in his or her reflexes about what it means to relate to objects in the world as a human being and together with other human beings in his given environment. Nothing in it is automatically aligned with the logic of capital.

In this account we see that History I represents a continuity of primitive accumulation, it seems to be the temporality of subjection. History II seems to be a realm having the possibility of being not reduced to this temporality. It seems that History II has a very complex relationship to History I. We saw that in and around the shipyards of Tuzla the ‘pasts’ of every actor were mobilized to gain a position and negotiate these positions. Furthermore there was the possibility for workers to become subcontractors. They could be lead to bankruptcy but they could also survive. They mobilized their workforce from within their web of social relationships, in which a reference to a common place of origin was and weaving further social relations was initially important. It seems that the workers becoming subcontractors could use their relationships in transforming them to ‘means of production’; thus the producer, who was initially separated from his (her) means of production can mobilize other social relations and turn them into his (her) ‘means of production’. Seen from this point of view we face a complexity regarding the relationship between the temporality of capital accumulation/subjection (History I)

and ‘other ways of being in the world’, which seem not to be reducible to this temporality (History II). This tension remains as long as capital is conceived as a logic. But as it was argued earlier, this ‘logic’ or ‘abstract’ character of capital was just an *attempt* to translate potentialities into an abstract form to enlarge these beyond the concrete context of its emergence. But also this attempt implies a labor of abstraction on the side of those who attempt to abstract labor and translate it to value. To what amount the abstracted labor is accomplished seems to be a quest in a contingent field of struggles. Even the prices and the costs of a ship or the price of the ship itself were negotiated upon diverse tactics, strategies the use of time and recuperation of resistances. Thus the labor abstracted seems to be e-valuated within a politics in which relationships are governed/contested. Seen from this perspective we could not speak of a logic of capital beyond quotidian relations of power. And even this e-valuation of abstracted labor seems to imply a labor of abstracting. Thus life and History II is interwoven with these relations. Chakrabarty seems to project a subversive potential within History II. Even the labor of abstracting seems to live; it is also a living labor. Thus it becomes highly complex to account for such a distinction like History II and History I beyond concrete times, spaces and conjunctures.¹⁰³

For instance Negri and Hardt note in their recent work that there is no outside of capitalism and that capitalism becomes more and more internalized. Those common elements that are not the property of capital are attempted to be consumed by it but resist more and more such consumption.¹⁰⁴ They note that capitalism

¹⁰³ For a similar problem in Balibar see Althusser and Balibar (1972, p.283 and 264-265). It would quite be interesting to read the concept of History II with Max Webers *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

¹⁰⁴ With this regard they note that the concept of primitive accumulation becomes an important conceptual tool see Negri and Hardt (2011, p.138).

becomes more and more a form of life permeating and shaping every sphere of existence: according to them, capitalism becomes biopolitical. With this regard they attempt to look at the everyday-life of capitalism than to apocalyptic narratives in which a central role is attributed to the sovereign:

The primary form of power that really confronts us today, however, is not so dramatic or demonic but rather earthly and mundane. We need to stop confusing politics with theology. The predominant contemporary form of sovereignty—if we still want to call it that—is completely embedded within and supported by legal systems and institutions of governance, a republican form characterized not only by the rule of law but also equally by the rule of property. Said differently, the political is not an autonomous domain but one completely immersed in economic and legal structures. There is nothing extraordinary or exceptional about this form of power. Its claim to naturalness, in fact its silent and invisible daily functioning, makes it extremely difficult to recognize, analyze, and challenge (ibid, p.5).

Capital too functions as an impersonal form of domination that imposes laws of its own, economic laws that structure social life and make hierarchies and subordinations seem natural and necessary. The basic elements of capitalist society—the power of property concentrated in the hands of the few, the need for the majority to sell their labor-power to maintain themselves, the exclusion of large portions of the global population even from these circuits of exploitation, and so forth—all function as an a priori. It is even difficult to recognize this as violence because it is so normalized and its force is applied so impersonally. Capitalist control and exploitation rely primarily not on an external sovereign power but on invisible, internalized laws. And as financial mechanisms become ever more fully developed, capital's determination of the conditions of possibility of social life become ever more extensive and complete. It is true, of course, that finance capital, since it is so abstract, seems distant from the lives of most people; but that very abstraction is what gives it the general power of an a priori, with increasingly universal reach, even when people do not recognize their involvement in finance markets—through personal and national debt, through financial instruments that operate on all kinds of production from soybeans to computers and through the manipulation of currency and interest rates (ibid, p.7).

Now, we have to emphasize that Negri and Hardt insist on the antagonism immanent in capitalism and resembling History II. But it has to be noted that Negri and Hardt

seem to confirm what is at stake in Tuzla and deploy a narrative, which might be to hasty with regard to the sovereign. At least in our example the sovereign played and plays a crucial role in the formation and conduct of capitalism.

It seems that we have account of History II as an element, which can be articulated within quotidian relations of power. The latter might also be articulated with an internalization of capitalism. Thus seen History II would be not external to but an internal element of capitalist quotidian conduct. Negri and Hardt might not be sensitive *enough* with regard to the historicity of diverse subjects in the sense that there seems to be just one temporality of capital in their account. Even if a master temporality of capitalism might be attempted for this does not mean that the subjects constituted within this temporality have no history. Thus the subject formation is uneven and multiple. Their concept of multitude seems to resemble such a line of thought. But even the constituent elements of the multitude seem not to evolve in a synchronic and even manner. Thus we cannot speak of the emergence of History II without taking into account the diverse genealogies of subjects and the effects of their contexts of encounter. For instance, while there was a system of subcontractation there was also *Limter-iş*. It has to be noted that History II can only become an antagonistic character as far as it is the mutual constitution of the stories of resistances attempting to have a message beyond time and space and thus shaping subjectivities. If there is an attempt of subjection to abstract and universalize its conduct so that these potentialities could open up the access to other potentialities (capital accumulation), then there seems also to be metaphysics of resistance. The subjectivities, which *Limter-iş* renders visible, seem to be an overlap of a multiplicity of resistances in Turkey, which also attempt to give the message of emancipation beyond time and space. Why would the revolutionary offshoot of the German Social

Democrat Party (SPD) else call itself Spartakusbund (Spartakus-Union) before naming itself as the Communist Party of Germany (KPD)?¹⁰⁵ The effects of resistances in a concrete social/temporal context might be transformed into stories having their effectively in other context by being able to address the experiences, desires and resistances, the wish for 'other ways of being in the world'. But it shall be mentioned that these 'other ways of being in the world' are also not antagonistic on their own. Just remember the workers, who behaved like mafia bodyguards against the workers. This also implies an escape of being a worker and being reduced to labor power. Fascism is the best example of it. This involves a labor of making stories of resistances metaphysical and effective. And this is also a formative element in social conflicts and the emergence of resistances and their effects. Seen from such a point of view History II is not an antagonistic element on its own. It might be a frictional element. Such a history seems to be a matter of the effects of a multiplicity of resistances translated into concrete times and spaces permeating the hermeneutics of the subjected. Even this whole inquiry is the effect of such resistances and our search for a possibility beyond capitalism.

If we want to account for an immanent antagonism within capitalism, then we should be aware that the historicity and genealogies of the subjects and the conjunctures in which they act are also constitutive with regard to their potential for translating the antagonism into an emancipatory project or at least heading towards what Negri/Hardt now call *exodus*. In this regard we should speak not of History II but of a multiplicity of History IIs and differentiate between them. Not every History II seems to have the potential to exceed capital at every time and place. This seems more to be a matter of conjuncture. At least a principle of a *common*, a principle,

¹⁰⁵ This argument is informed by the *Thesis on History* by Walter Benjamin.

which resists being consumed by power relations (what Alain Badiou calls the ‘communist hypothesis’) seems to be necessary for a History II to gain an antagonistic character and at least tend to establish a universal claim to be subversive or send a universal message to open the way for *exodus*.

We shall leave this debate open and just point to a possible discussion with this regard. But it shall be noted that the regulation of capitalism on the shipyards of Tuzla evolved in a realm, which was constituted by state policies. The non-interference of the state in some cases or at least the fact that law was not called for in each situation seems also to be able to be read as the politics of the state and a genealogy of its subject formation processes. The subjectivities emerging out of the genealogy of the Turkish Republic had diverse effects on the shaping of the quotidian conduct of power on and around the shipyards of Tuzla. Seen from this point of view we cannot know from which corner a resistance, a messenger of *exodus* might come from but it seems to soon to cancel out the role of the sovereign as well as to put aside the histories, stories of its subjects and the form in which they were told. May be there are also what one might call stories II -with reference to Chakrabarty-, which can constitute History IIs heralding *exodus*.

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION

In this thesis the question was posed of how the shipyards in Tuzla could be conceived of theoretically. The main focus was on the formation of subjectivities in and around the shipyards of Tuzla. The life stories of the shipyard owners, narrative of workers and shipyard officials as well as medial representations were read within the problematic of power/subjection. The main argument was that capital accumulation cannot be understood as a progressive linear enfolding logic. Capital accumulation was understood as an *attempt* to abstract relations of power/government to open up new fields beyond the actual context of their emergence. This attempt is always disturbed by the tension between the concrete relations within which capitalist conduct takes place (and time) and the attempt of entrepreneurs for abstraction and re-actualization (in other places and times). Seen from this perspective there seems to be an inherent tension in capitalism, which is productive in the sense that it forces constant re-organization. Capital accumulation in and around the shipyards of Tuzla came into being within a framework in which also the laws of the state had no universal validity. This was the outcome of a complex historicity of the relationship of the Turkish state to its subjects. These subjects encountered each other and structured the field of possibilities of their agency. Seen from this capitalism seems to imply combined and uneven development. Here combination points to the articulation of these subjectivities in a given conjuncture and development does not imply a linear progression but the shift of the field of struggles of a multiplicity of subjects and their mutual transformation. Here we see that the accumulation of capital cannot be separated from the

accumulation and government of social relations, but also that the second cannot be reduced to the first, as Balibar notes (Althusser and Balibar, 1972, p. 271):

Marx's formulation ('the process of production does not only produce material objects but also social relations') is not therefore a *conjunction* but a *disjunction*: either it is a matter of the production of things, or else it is a matter of the (re)production of the social relations of production. There are two concepts, the concept of the 'appearance' and the concept of the effectivity of the structure of the mode of production. As opposed to the production of things, the production of social relations is not subject to the determinations of the preceding and the succeeding, of the 'first' and the 'second'. Marx writes that 'every process of social production is at the same time a process of reproduction. The conditions of production are also those of reproduction'; and at the same time they are the conditions which reproduction reproduces: in this sense the 'first' process of production (in a determinate form) is always-already a process of reproduction. There is no 'first' process of production for production in its concept. All the definitions concerning the production of things must therefore be transformed: in the production of the social relations, what appeared as the conditions of the first production really *determines identically all the other productions*.

Thus it is even questionable whether we can speak of a logic intrinsic to capital beyond quotidian relations of power. It is open for discussion whether capital is also not an abstraction of making power relations talk to each other and thus opening up a realm for equivalence. At least money and the commodity form can be read in this direction. Seen from such a perspective flexible capitalism in Tuzla seems not to be an organizational form to accumulate capital but by the same token a whole web of relations, which might become functional with regard to abstract relations of power as capital or might disturb such an attempt. Thus we come to a concept of flexible capitalism, which marks a contingent field for the translation of subject positions into an universal equivalent: capital, in which every subject negotiates its subjectivity. Flexible capitalism thus seems to question whether it is possible at all to distinguish between what Read called 'the materiality of the capitalist mode of production' and the 'materiality of a mode of subjection' (Read, 2003, p.9) since it

the hierarchies of who is subjected with regard to whom are constantly negotiated at least within a certain field of possibilities.

It was claimed that the notion of ‘flexibility’ does not imply the emergence of a new form of capitalism and that there is no master form of capitalism. Thus ‘flexibility’ is more a reading of capitalism from within the problematic of subjectivity than a signifier pointing at a qualitative deviation.

Furthermore it seems as if flexible capitalism also opens up a debate on primitive accumulation. If the access to capital is organized upon quotidian relations of power and if these can be negotiated constantly, if capitalism assumes the form of what Hardt/Negri called biopolitical, if self-employment or becoming a subcontractor is a constant possibility then we have to think of whether and how the laborer is separated from her/his means of production. This should also be seen as a form of resistance of the laborer for opening up fields of possibility to claim/negotiate positions of power. Laborers might be disposed of their material belongings of production. But if means of production are understood as social relations and (a field of possibility to gain power) it seems possible to counteract this dispossession and by the same token resisting of being a worker. Thus social relations and even the self can be turned into ‘means of production’. Seen from this point of view there seems to be a struggle over the meaning of ‘means of production’ and even which activities are productive to gain power positions. Thus it seems as if the dispossession of the laborer (from material belongings to produce) forces her/him to mobilize ‘other ways of being in life’ to claim and negotiate power and thus turn social relationships into productive means. This seems also to show us why not just material production but ‘ways of life’ become more and more a commodity and personal strategies ‘assets and skills’, which can be written down on CV’s.

It seems as if social relationships and the body of the worker itself could be turned into means of production (in becoming subcontractor or self-employed), at least with regard to the system of subcontraction on the shipyards. Thus even for the character of primitive accumulation and its continuity as well as its character flexible capitalism seems to open up questions. We shall not dwell on this point but note that the problematic of subjectivity/power opens up such a field for debate regarding the character of flexible capitalism. This points also to the problems of the antagonism immanent in capitalism and the question of how far History II can gain an external character to capitalist relations.

This account was based on the shipyards of Tuzla and focused mainly on the events of 2008. Thus one might argue that it could not be representative enough to approach the concept of flexible capitalism, but it shall be noted that this was not the intention of the thesis. The trough and through political character of capitalism was the main concern. This thesis should just give a contribution to the debate.

Whether subcontraction/self-employment can be turned into cooperatives/collectives and thus an initial *common* ground for workers to negotiate their conditions collectively; whether non-legality could be turned into a political force to subvert the law and the state (state form); whether stories could speak to each other to constitute a History II of exodus/revolution is open. But it seems that flexible capitalism opens a realm for alternative ways to conceive of revolutionary politics and intervention.

This also presupposes a labor of enabling stories to speak to each other and resonate, so that fields can be opened up for forms of 'other ways of being in the world'. This implies a perspective in which humans and the nature are not reduced to their biological functions. Within this fragmented nature of capitalism it seems as if

the metaphysics of resistance implies the establishment of a project claiming universality. Even the statement that there are multiple forms of resistances implies a notion of resistance, which implies an identity in the forms of contestation; also the conceptual reflection on the multitude and on History II implies an underlying drive to smash capitalism, to actualize and implement the communist hypothesis. This remains the universal project today. But the very political nature of capitalism and its flexibility seems to propose the constitution of an antagonistic subject claiming universality. This intellectual engagement itself has a universalist stance.

Antagonism seems not to be self-evident but ‘made’ and necessitates a sort of mediation between the multiplicities of ‘other ways of being in the world’. Seen from this perspective this also necessitates the constitution of a political subject, which is capable of reading and translating the metaphysics of resistance to diverse spheres of society. An organized subject, which organizes life upon principles of the common and by the same token launches a flexible war of position and war of maneuver. An emancipatory project has to make use of the possibilities opened up by ‘flexible’ capitalism. Forms of self-employment might lead to the organization of collectives/cooperatives to relate to capitalist conduct¹⁰⁶ and by the same token open fields of coming together beyond an economic rationality and the very political implications of capitalism call for a sort of voluntarism and intervention, the constitution of an ethics of intervention: A universality, conceived of as a field of barter of the wishes for ‘other ways of being in the world’, a field for encounter and articulation of these wishes in their multiplicity.

¹⁰⁶ I owe this idea to İlker Cörüt, who thought loudly whether Limter-iş could run their own subcontracting company in form of a workers cooperative, although this might become a very risky enterprise.

APPENDICES

Quotations in Turkish
(in the order of appearance)

Appendix-A

Torlaklar, Bayraklar...hep duyuyoruz, biliyoruz: Bu kesimden bu tipler bellerinde silahlarıyla dolaşıyor. En açık karakteristiklerden biri tersane sahiplerinin polisle yakın ilişkide bulunması. Şu andaki durum hakkında ne denebilir bilmiyorum, ancak geçmiş yıllarda, özellikle 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008; buradan baktığımızda ciddi bir ilişkiden söz edilebilir. Tuzla'daki polis karakolu tersane sahipleri tarafından, GİSBİR tarafından yapıldı, aynı zamanda [polisler] gönüllü üye gibiydiler, örneğin Murat Bayrak'ın falan resimleri Tuzla polis karakoluna asılmıştı. Arkadaşlarımız bir keresinde göz altına alındığında bunu söylediler, sonra resmi indirdiler. 2007, 2008, veya 2008'de tersane sahipleri polise bir filo aldı; on bir-on iki kango tipi araba aldılar polislere.

Appendix-B:

Ben de taşeron kurmaya çalıştım ama olmadı, her yiğidin harcı değil. Bu işi herkes yapamaz. İyi niyetle yapamazsın...iyi niyet...biliyorsun taşeronlar her zaman kaçak dövüşüyorlar, faturalar falan..iyi bir vatandaşsan, vergileri ve sigortayı ödüyorsan taşeron olamazsın, öyle! Tabi, işi alma konusunda da sorunlar var. Nasıl oluyor..sağlam bağlantıları olanlar yapıyor..iyi bir taşeron olabilirsin, işini iyi yapabilirsin, ancak mesele işi almaya gelince...bir deyim vardır...torpili olanlar...ilişkileri olanlar yapabilir, maalesef. Bu ilişkinin ayrıntılarına girmek istemiyorum. Böyle bir şeye tanık olmadım, sadece duydum; tabi bunların hepsi kapalı kapıların ardında oluyor, maalesef. Tüm bunları görmemek için kör olman lazım. Buna doğrudan tanık olamazsın. İşler böyle yürüyor.

Appendix-C:

Şimdi bir taşeron ne yapar...önce kendi çekirdek ekibini kurar...çekirdek ekibini: ustabaşı falan. Bir çekirdek ekip kurar. Genellikle kimse kendi başına taşeron olmaz. [taşeron şirketlerin tek bir kişi mi yoksa bir ortaklık şeklinde mi kurulduğunu sorduğumda:] Taşeron sahipleri ve çekirdek ekipler ortak değildir, çıkar var.....[sessizlik ve ciddi bir yüz ifadesi].....Tanık olduk, bu bilinen bir şey.....Çok fazla taşeron için çalışmadığımdan ötürü onlarla pek sıkı fıkı olmadım; bir hafta veya on gün çalıştığım taşeronlar oldu, çalıştım, çıktım. Uzun süre taşeronda hiç çalışmadım. Çalıştığım tersanelerde taşeronlarla iş dışında hiçbir ilişki kurmamaya çalıştım. Böyle yapmasam farklı anlaşılır. Bu da var. İş dışında taşeronlarla çok fazla ilişkin varsa işyerindeki kimi arkadaşların kafasında farklı

fikirler oluşuyor. ‘Şunu mu yapıyor, bunu mu yapıyor’ vs. ‘bir ilişkisi mi var’ gibi şeyler. Bir deyim vardır: Ağzı olan konuşuyor. [...] Bana da ‘taşeron şirket kur’ dediler ancak buna hiç sıcak bakmadım. 1994 krizi esnasında taşerondum, ağzımın payını aldım ve böyle şeylere karışmadım.

Appendix-D:

Yüzlerce taşeron tanıyorum ve her yerden adam çalıştırıyorlar. Boyun eğen, maaşını aldığı anda ses çıkarmayan, örgütlenmeyen herkesi alıyorlar; bu taşeronun işine geliyor. Çalıştığım tersanede Ağrılı bir taşeron var, yaklaşık altmış işçi çalıştırıyor, bunların yaklaşık yüzde kırkı Kürt kökenli, Vanlı, Muşlu; ama niye bunları tutuyor. tersane para vermediğince, sıkıştığında ‘sen bizdensin, yabancı değilsin, para aldığım anda ilk sana vereceğim, seni hiç mağdur eder miyim, yıllardır birlikte çalışıyoruz’ diyor. Onları böyle ikna etmeye çalışıyor.

Appendix-E:

Bu çok eski bir olay ama; Pendik Tersanesinde; o zaman daha özelleşmemişti. Taşeronda çalışıyoruz ; askeriyeden gelme bir üstteğmen, ahaaa şey, başçavuş vardı. Emekli olmuş, gelmiş, şirket kurmuş, denizcilik şirketi ve iş almış. Şimdi bütün işçileri çok güzel de maaş veriyor, biz de yirmi-yirmi beş tane adam, iyi de maaş veriyor işte maaşlar o zaman işte dokuz bin lirayken o on iki bin lira veriyor. Bir de bize telsiz vermişti, hiç gitmeden hemen anonsla. Beş tane altı tane ustabaşı aldı, bizi ustabaşı olarak aldı. Şimdi bu adam on iki bin lirayı vermiyor, ay başı geldiği zaman gönlünden on bin lira koptuğu zaman on bin lira veriyor ama sana on iki bin liraya imza attırıyor. Taktiği de şu: Hemen masada, kasada bir tabanca, onu hemen, diyor ki ‘sana bu ay on iki bin lira konuştuk ama, çok oluyor böyle, kazanamıyoruz işte, bakma sen, on bin lira veriyorum, ama sen şuna imza at on iki bin lira aldım diye.’ [...] Bir şey demiyorlar hemen imza atıyorlar. Biz orada on bir kişi böyle bir olay yaşadık. Ona benzer, tabi o şirket fazla tutunamadı. İşçiler on iki bin lira maaşını aldı ama biz direniş yaptık o işyerinde, ücretlerimiz tam verilmiyor, altı ay çalıştık her ay on lira veriyor iki lira içeride kalıyor. Sigorta yatıyor, ama aldığımız ücret üzerinden değil, asgari ücret üzerinden. Bazen geldiğimiz gün yatıyor bazen on beş gün yatıyor her aya göre. Sonradan itiraz ettik işte. On iki-on üç arkadaş beraber gitmiştik. Diğer işçi arkadaşları da ikna ettik. Eylem yaptık. Çağırdı bizi. Bir tane yemekhanemiz vardı çadırdan, tersane içerisinde çadırdan yemekhanemiz vardı. Çadırın içerisinde çağırdı bizi. ‘Burada on iki kurşun var,’ dedi ‘hepinize bir kurşun düşer, sözleşmeye imza atacaksınız.’ Dedik ‘Sen onu geç, biz zaten kurşunu yemiştik, açıklıktan, susuzluktan, karşı karşıyayız. İki bin lira paramızı gasp etmişsin, paramızı yatırmıyorsun, sen zaten her gün bize vuruyorsun. Sen onu geç. Sen bizim paralarımızı vereceksin. Biz de paralarımızı aldık o şekilde. Ama o r daha sonra çalışan insanların mağdur olduğunu daha sonradan da o Pendik Tersanede işi bittikten sonra da işçilerin alacaklarını vermeden kaçtı gitti, kapattı.

Appendix-F:

Arapların, yani Urfalıların özellikle, Harranlıların bir kavgası olmuştu. Neredeyse beş yüz kişi falan toplandı. Parayla ilgili, taşeronla ilgili. Tabi taşeron bunların bir-iki adamını dövmüştü. Birinin parmağı...Zannederim ya Kastamonuluydu şeydi ya Samsunlu, hatırlamıyorum taşeronu ama YILDIRIM tersanesinde olmuştu. Orada taş işi yapan yirmi yirmi beş tane Urfalı, Arap kökenli arkadaş çalışıyor, bunların paralarını vermemiş, taşeron kaçmış. Aslında taşeronun taşeronu kaçmış. Adam başka bir taşeron o da tutmuş başka birine vermiş, o da kaçmış gitmiş. Araplar gidip parasını isteyince ‘sizin adamınız kaçmış,’ diyor ‘benimle alakası yok’. ‘Nasıl alakası yok biz senin için çalıştık’ falan. Aslında o taşeron da biraz tersanenin içinde köklü bir taşeron. Oradan, hani Arapları önemsemeyerek, görmeyerek, hemen iki tanesini tersanenin içerisindeki büroda iki tanesini dövmüş: ‘Buraya ayağınızı basmayın, kırarız, dökeriz.,’ falan filan. Tabi Araplar akşam her tarafa telefon açmışlar, toplanmışlar, bu taşeronu tam tersanenin kapısından çıkar çıkmaz, tabi bunları beklemediği bir tarzda, bunu araya aldılar, dövdüler tabi; [gülüyor] ondan sonra tabi bunlar...eee. onlar da çevresini, şurayı burayı aradılar falan filan ama az sayıda. Tabi Araplar paralarını falan, Emniyet Müdürü falan araya girdi, hemen dediler ‘kaç paranız var’ işte ‘verecez.’ Olay da kapandı

Appendix-G:

SADIKOĞLU’nda çalışıyorum, platform döneminde; orada yine yöneticiyim, kaynak formeniyim, test alanındayım, kalite kontroldeyim; orada bizim meşhurdu maaş gecikmeleri falan vesaire. İşçiler genelde soruyorlar ‘maaşlar zamanında ödenmiyor, bir ay, yirmi gün.’ Adamlar tabi paraları kalmıyordu. Tabi bize geliyordu, yakın görüyordu; biz de yönetimde tabi tanıdıklarımız var, ilişkilerimiz var. Bir gün dedim, hadi toplandık, formenler ustabaşılar, işçiler geliyorlar soruyorlar ‘para niye yok?’ Dokuz-on kişiyiz, ‘gidelim, o zaman aşağı’. Sezen vardı, Akif Kaptan da yoktu o zamanlar, Kahraman bey de yoktu falan vesaire. Ben dedim ‘ofisine gidelim’. Gidiyoruz abi, ben önde yürüyorum, torna atölyesinden basamakları çıktık, çıktım baktım, her köşede bir adam eksilmiş, her köşede bir adam eksilmiş anasını satayım. Kapıyı vurdum. ‘Buyur gir,’ dedi, açtı kapıyı, içeri girdim. ‘aha abi buyur,’ dedi Sezen. Tanıyoruz, biliyoruz, iyi bir kardeşimizdir, iyi bir mühendistir. ‘Buyur,’ dedi. Bir döndüm arakama baktım. Hiç kimse yok. Dedim böyle böyle ‘ben dokuz-on kişi geldik sandım ama bir döndüm arakama baktım kimse yok ama ben yine de derdi anlatayım,’ dedim. Böyle böyle dedim, ‘arkadaşların paraları kalmadı artık, gelecek paraları da yok.’ O zamanlar tersanelere servis kalkmıyordu. ‘Adamların artık eve dönecek parası dahi yok, maaşları ne zaman ödenecek onu sormaya geldim’ dedim. ‘Tamam abi, ben sorayım, yemekten sonra gel, Kahraman bey de gelecek,’ dedi. ‘Bir sorayım,’ dedi ‘Sonra yemekten sonra bir cevap vereyim sana.’ Ben ‘tamam’ dedim. ‘Çay içelim’ falan dedi ‘yok, aşağıya ineceğim,’ dedim, işim de vardı. Geldiler, ‘abi ne oldu,’ dediler ‘ebenizin amı oldu,’ dedim. Sonra hiçbir şey söylemedim, iki saat sonra yukarı çıktım. ‘Akşam paraları dağıtılacak abi, haberin olsun, arkadaşlara da söyle,’ dedi. Hiçbir şey söylemedin [...] paralarını aldılar.

APPENDIX-H:
FLASH TV NEWS (English)

EPIC PRELUDE

ANnouncer: Dear audience, Tuzla shipyards are continuing to kill workers, such that, over 80 workers have lost their lives until now, just during the last 7 months 19 workers lost their lives in seeking to earn their lives. As much as working conditions, the places where they live are also miserable. Almost in all of the news bulletins you hear them, watch them in their work places, yet FLASH HABER visited their homes -if they can be named as homes- and look with which scenes it came back;
Here you are; with the *special report* of our reporter Aytaç Can and cameraman Ali İhsan Eren:

[Fixed Elements during the tape on the screen:

- title on the screen: AN OTHER WORLD: THE SHIPYARD OF TUZLA
- fixed subtitle: 86 WORKERS DIED, SHALL WE WAIT FOR THE 87TH ?
- Fixed emotional music]

INTRODUCTION

- 1- [A worker on the screen like a portrait filmed from the right side]
 - a. Worker: During this time 14 of our friends lost their lives.
(circumscription: - in 3 months 14 of our friends lost their lives.)
- 2- [Boom sound]
 - a. ['14 WORKERS DIED in 3 MONTHS' on the screen]
- 3- Worker: *...And one always has a close brush with death* (circumscription: - we are very close to death)
- 4- [Boom sound]
 - a. [' DEATH is ALL AROUND THE TUZLA SHIPYARDS' on the screen]
- 5- >>Music sound level gets higher>>
- 6- [diverse workers at work]
- 7- Narrator: *In the last one month 6 workers perished in the Tuzla Shipyards.*
 - a. [Workers faces then the shipyards on the screen in a box "6 workers died"]

- b. Narrator: All of them were very young, all they wanted was working and earning money, but they couldn't. Some of them, while painting ships....
 - i. [painting worker]
 - c. Narrator: ...fell down from meters of height and died. Some of them were shocked while welding.
 - i. [Electricity cables on the shipyards]
 - d. Narrator: Nobody has minded these deaths until these days. [*Bu ölümlere daha düne kadar kimse kulak asmadı*]
 - i. [Workers sitting]
 - e. Narrator: Here, laws were working , so to say, differently. [*Sanki burada yasalar bir başka işliyordu.*]
- 8- [Reporter sitting with worker, the worker is turned back and reporter can be seen listening intensively to the worker.]
- a. Worker: Almost forty thousand people are working here.
 - i. [Transition by zoom-in zoom-out]
 - 1. Worker: there aren't more than five or six thousand insurances paid. [*en fazla yatan sihorta beşbin altınbini geçmez.*]
 - i. [Another worker, who spoke at the beginning of the tape]
 - a. Worker: As far as this subcontracting system is staying, these deaths will continue.
(circumscription: The deaths will continue, until subcontracting comes to an end.)

MAIN PART

Fragment I

- 1- [From the top down with 45 degree we see a room in which 5 workers are sitting and one entering the room]
 - a. [The fixed subtitle 86 WORKERS DIED, SHALL WE WAIT FOR the 87th? is removed from the screen]
- 2- Narrator: here is that world [*işte o dünya*]
 - a. [Worker entering the room and saying 'Selamınaleyküm'; The other workers stand up and say 'aleyküm selam']
 - b. [Camera close on a worker's face another behind him and the subtitle 86 WORKERS DIED, SHALL WE WAIT FOR the 87th? Again on the screen]
- 3- Narrator: life wasn't that different...beside the ships in which they live close to death, here was another world also. [*yaşam pek farklı değildi....ölümüne yaşanan gemilerin dışında da burası bir başka dünyaydı.*]
 - a. [Workers sleeping on the floor next to each other]
 - i. A box with the inscription "THAT'S WHERE THEY LIVE" on the screen]
- 4- Narrator: Whom nobody wants to see...
 - a. >> music gets louder >>
- 5- Narrator: very fourteen workers are living one on another just in this one room.

- a. [Workers are sitting on the floor in a line on the left side while the reporter sits on the right side and listens intensively to them]
- b. [A worker prepares food in the room on a gaz tube]
- 6- Narrator: they have a heater to heat themselves and a small gaz tube for filling their stomach.

Fragment II

- 1- [Reporter with a microphone with the Flash TV logo]
 - a. Worker: In our homeland we call this barn, really we call this barn, that's not a house, a barn. (circumscription: in our neighbourhood we call this a barn.).
- 2- [A lot of workers sitting at the floor and preparing for dinner]
 - a. Narrator: workers most of who have no insurance
 - i. [a box with the inscription "MOST OF THE WORKERS ARE WORKING WITHOUT INSURANCE"]
- 3- [Plate with meal at the foreground and pan in the background, hands moving towards them blurred in the background]
- 4- Narrator: are dining altogether from one evening to the other.
 - i. [A worker filmed from the ground upwards with 45 degree]
- 5- Narrator: *Kadir is cooking for them, first he puts the teapot onto the gaz tube,*
 - i. [Teapot on gaz tube and the hands of a worker making fire]
- 6- Narrator: *than he prepares eggs.*
 - i. [Hands putting eggs on a pan]
 - ii. [Hands mixing a meal in a pot seen from 45 degrees downwards]
- 7- Narrator: *once he warms up the tomatoe and pepper meal left from yesterday*
 - i. [Workers eating together on the floor]
- 8- Narrator: *let them be in high spirits[deymeyin keyiflerine.]*
 - i. [workers eating]
 - ii. >>music louder>>
 - 1. [The subtitle 86 WORKERS DIED, SHALL WE WAIT FOR the 87TH ? is removed from the screen]

Fragment III

- 1- [A worker at the left and the reporter on his side with the microphone of Flash Tv]
 - a. [The subtitle 86 WORKERS DIED, SHALL WE WAIT FOR the 87TH ? again on the screen]
- 2- Worker half smiling: we are coming very tired, may God bless him [Kadir].
 - a. [Camera moves downwards to the meal, 4 plates with meal aligned around a pan with eggs and little teaglasses with 3 parts of divided bread, a hand is taking a tea glass]
- 3- [Again camera upwards to the speaking worker]
 - a. Worker: *Kadir is cooking for us*
- 4- [another worker entering the room sitting workers stand up]
 - a. Narrator: *Meanwhile Beytullah Doğan who just finish his shift is entering to the room.*
 - b. [worker wearing out his jacket and hanging it to the place where other jackets are hung from 45 degrees upwards]

- 5- Narrator: his face is very very tired; he is 36 years old
 - a. [Worker sitting and wearing out his socks just this part of his body on the screen]
- 6- Narrator: He has left his wife and two kids in Diyarbakır. Has come abroad...[İki çocuğu ve eşini Diyarbakır'da bırakmış. Çıkmış gurbete...]
- 7- [Reporter interviewing worker with flash tv microphone]
 - a. Reporter: *With which dreams did you come here?*
 - b. Worker: Actually, we came to earn some money, to build a nest egg but...unfortunately it isn't like what we expected. (circumscription: we couldn't find what we hoped for)
- 8- Narrator: there is no job, if there was, would I ever leave my beloved ones and come here, he says...
 - a. [interviewed worker sitting and then slight transparent transition to his face while speaking]
 - i. Worker: shall I send money to them, or buy telephone credit, shall I give it to my meal or to their meals [*Parayı, onlara mı göndercem, kontöre mi vercem, yemeğime mi vercem onların yemeğine mi göndercem*] (circumscription: shall I send money to home or spend it for my living [*parayı eve mi göndereyim kendime mi yetireyim*])
 - ii. Worker: What I mean by phone...that's...we call them by phone in ten days or three-five days.

Fragment IV

- 1- [Another worker's face zoomed]
- 2- Narrator: Tarık with his touching voice is singing a song, he says: my beloved came to my mind, broo [*Yanık sesli Tarık şarkı patlatıyor, sevdiğim aklıma geldi aaaabi diyor*]
 - a. [the face of the worker from a distance like a portrait while worker is singing zoom out so that other workers sitting around him are seen and camera moves around the room workers seem sad]
 - i. Worker: what has happened to me in this *gurbet*/ you lack my bread, food with poison/ I will cry if someone touches [*şu gurbette neler geldii baaşıma / zehir kattın ekmeğiiiime aaaşımaaa / şimdi dohunsalar aglaayacaaaguu*]
- 3- [worker sitting and box with the inscription [HE IS IN TUZLA FOR BRIDE PRICE]]
- 4- [worker with pen and paper in his thenar]
 - a. Narrator: *Tarık is illiterate*,
- 5- [workers face close on screen]

- a. Narrator: but he says; is this possible anyhow, no, the money I get isn't enough brooo, how can I manage to go back. [*ama nerdeee aldığım para yetmiyor aaaabi diyor*]
- 6- [worker speaking to the flash tv microphone and looking into the camera]
 - a. Worker: I wish I hadn't come from there, I hadn't come leaving my beloved there, I wish I hadn't seen that shipyard region, ones I go from here, I repent, I will never come back to here anymore.

Fragment V

- 1- Narrator: While we are on a deep talk with Tarık
 - a. [reporter speaking with Tarık]
- 2- Narrator: suddenly the householder comes in and starts shouting at our team
 - a. [the room and an old men speaking then turned back]
 - i. [A box with the inscription HE TAKES 1400 TL FROM WORKERS PER MONTH]
- 3- Old man: Leave the house [*Lan çık buradan*]
- 4- [reporter speaking from the background]
 - a. Reporter: Why? Do you take 100 million liras per person..
- 5- [old men interrupting reporter and turning to the camera]
 - a. old man: but .. it doesn't belong to you, I'm telling you..leave here. [*yaw sana ait değil sen çık buradan deyom.*]

Fragment VI

- 1- [Reporter speaking into the camera, camera is zooming out so that we can see that the reporter sits in the middle with workers sitting around him]
 - a. Reporter: indeed there are too many things that should be said, but what is really important is whether these people will be alive or not tomorrow. Because they are working under hard conditions and at any moment they are under the risk of death.

Fragment VII

- 2- [Workers stressing bedclothes]
 - a. Narrator: they are clamped together. It's sleeping time. So, tomorrow is working day. [*yatak yorgan iç içe kenetlenmişler birbirilerine. Uyku vakti. Malum yarın iş var*]
- 3- [workers sleeping side by side and 14 PEOPLE IN ONE ROOM on the screen]
 - a. Narrator: Beds are layed and the expatriate workers are falling asleep. [*yataklar seriliyor ve gurbet işçileri uykuya dalıyorlar.*]

Fragment VIII

- 1- [the cutting of a red tape by the minister for work and social security, Faruk Çelik, in formal suits and others around him then one man on the screen]

- a. Narrator: after all things that had happened, this is the answer, which the most authorized person gives:
- b. Man speaking: Just because of one negative event...you cannot close down all the shipyards (circumscription: Just because of one negative event...you cannot close down the shipyards)

APPENDIX-H:

FLASH TV NEWS (Turkish)

EPİK GİRİŞ

Spiker: sevgili izleyiciler Tuzla tersaneleri işçi öğretmeye devam ediyor, öyle ki, şimdiye kadar hayatını kaybeden işçilerin sayısı 80'i geçti; sadece son 7 ayda 19 işçi ekmek parası peşinde canından oldu. İşçilerin çalışma koşulları kadar kaldıkları yerler de içler acısı....Hemen hemen bütün bültenlerde, onları, çalıştıkları yerlerde dinlediniz, izlediniz; ama FLASH HABER Tuzla işçilerinin evlerine –ki buraya ev denirse- konuk oldu ve bakın hangi görüntülerle geri döndü; İşte muhabir arkadaşımız Aytaç Can ve kameraman Ali İhsan Eren'in özel haberi:

[Fixed Elements during the tape on the screen:

- title on the screen: BİR BAŞKA DÜNYA: TUZLA TERSANESİ
- fixed subtitle: 86 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ 87.'Yİ BEKLEYECEKMİYİZ?
- Fixed emotional music]

INTRODUCTION

- 9- [A worker on the screen like a portrait filmed from the right side]
 - a. Worker: *Bu süre içerisinde 14 tane arkadaşımız hayatını kaybetti* (circumscription: - 3 ayda 14 tane arkadaşımız hayatını kaybetti.)
- 10- [Boom sound]
 - a. ['3 AYDA 14 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ' on the screen]
- 11- Worker: *...Ve her an ölümle burun burunasın* (circumscription: - ölümle burun burunayız)
- 12- [Boom sound]
 - a. ['TUZLA TERSANELERİNDE ÖLÜM KOL GEZİYOR' on the screen]
- 13- >>Music sound level gets higher>>
- 14- [diverse workers at work]
- 15- Narrator: *Son bir ay içerisinde tam 6 işçi Tuzla tersanesinde can verdi.*
 - a. [Workers faces then the shipyards on the screen in a box "6 işçi Öldü"]
 - b. Narrator: *Hepsi çok gençti, tek istedikleri çalışıp para kazanmaktı ama olmadı. Kimi ya gemi boyarken*
 - i. [painting worker]
 - c. Narrator: *metrelerce yükseklikten düşüp öldü, kimini kaynak yaparken elektrik çaptı*
 - i. [Electricity cables on the shipyards]
 - d. Narrator: *Bu ölümlere daha diine kadar kimse kulak asmadı*
 - i. [Workers sitting]
 - e. Narrator: *Sanki burada yasalar bir başka işliyordu.*
- 16- [Reporter sitting with worker, the worker is turned back and reporter can be seen in listening intensively the worker.]

- a. Worker: *Burada yaklaşık gırhbin gişi çalışıyo.*
 - i. [Transition by zoom-in zoom-out]
 - 1. Worker: *en fazla yatan sihorta beşbin altınbini geçmez.*
- j. [Another worker, who spoke at the beginning of the tape]
 - a. Worker: *Bu taşeronluk sistemi kalkmadığı sürece bu ölümler burada devam edecek* (circumscription: Taşeronluk bitmediği sürece ölümler devam edecek.)

MAIN PART

Fragment I

- 7- [From the top down with 45 degree we see a room in which 5 workers are siting and one entering the room]
 - a. [The fixed subtitle 86 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ 87.'Yİ BEKLEYECEKMİYİZ? is removed from the screen]
- 8- Narrator: *işte o dünya*
 - a. [Worker entering the room and saying 'Selamınaleyküm'; The other workers stand up and say 'aleykümselaaam']
 - b. [Camera close on a workers face another behind him and the subtitle 86 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ 87.'Yİ BEKLEYECEKMİYİZ? Again in the screen]
- 9- Narrator: *yaşam pek farklı değildi....ölümüne yaşanan gemilerin dışında da burası bir başka dünyaydı.*
 - a. [Workers sleeping on the flor next to each other]
 - i. A box with the inscription "İŞTE YAŞADIKLARI YER" on the screen]
- 10- Narrator: *Kimsenin görmek istemediği...*
 - a. >> music gets louder >>
- 11- Narrator: *Tam ondört işçi bu tek göz odada iç içe,*
 - a. [Workers are sitting on the floor in a line on the left side while the reporter sits on the right side and listens intensively to them]
 - b. [A worker prepares food in the room on a gaz tube]
- 12- Narrator: *ısınacakları bir soba, karınlarını doyuracak küçük bir tüpleri var.*

Fragment II

- 9- [Reporter with a microphone with the Flash TV logo]
 - a. Worker: *Bizim orada biz ahır diyoruz buna, gerçekten ahır diyoruz, yani ev değil ahır.* (circumscription: bizim orada ahır diyoruz buna).
- 10- [A lot of workers siting at the floor and preparing for dinner]
 - a. Narrator: *zaten çoğu sigortasız olan*
 - i. [a box with the inscption "ÇOĞU İŞÇİ SİGORTASIZ ÇALIŞIYOR"]
- 11- [Plate with meal at the foreground and pan in the background, hands moving towards them blurred in the background]
- 12- Narrator: *işçiler topluca akşamdan akşama yemek yiyorlar.*
 - i. [A worker filmed from the ground upwards with 45 degree]
- 13- Narrator: *yemeklerini Kadir yapıyor, önce çayın altını yakıyor*
 - i. [Teapot on gaz tube and the hands of a worker making fire]
- 14- Narrator: *sonra da yumurta kırıyor*
 - i. [Hands puting eggs on a pan]

- ii. [Hands mixing a meal in a pot seen from 45 degrees downwards]
- 15- Narrator: *dünden kalan domates- biberi de ısıttı mı*
 - i. [Workers eating together on the floor]
- 16- Narrator: *deymeyin keyiflerine.*
 - i. [workers eating]
 - ii. >>music louder>>
 - 1. [The subtitle 86 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ 87.'Yİ BEKLEYECEKMİYİZ? is removed from the screen]

Fragment III

- 9- [A worker at the left and the reporter on his side with the micophone of Flash Tv]
 - a. [The subtitle 86 İŞÇİ ÖLDÜ 87.'Yİ BEKLEYECEKMİYİZ? again in the screen]
- 10- Worker half smiling: *yurgun yurgun geliyoz işte Allah razı olsun*
 - a. [Camera moves downwards to the meal, 4 plates with meal aligned around a pan with eggs and little teaglasses with 3 parts of divided bread, a hand is taking a tea glass]
- 11- [Again camera upwards to the speaking worker]
 - a. Worker: *Kadir de yimegimizi bize yapıyo.*
- 12- [another worker entering the room sitting workers stand up]
 - a. Narrator: *bu sırada mesaisi yeni biten Beytullah Doğan giriyor içeriye.*
 - b. [worker wearing out his jacket and hanging it to the place where other jackets are hung from 45 degrees upwards]
- 13- Narrator: *yüzü yorgun mu yorgun; 36 yaşında*
 - a. [Worker sitting and wearing out his socks just this part of his body on the screen]
- 14- Narrator: *İki çocuğu ve eşini Diyarbakır'da bırakmış. Çıkmış gurbete...*
- 15- [Reporter interviewing worker with flash tv microphone]
 - a. Reporter: *Ne hayaller kurarak geldin buraya?*
 - b. Worker: *Valla üç beş gurus para kazanırız diye geldik ama..maalesef umduğumuz gibi değil* (circumscription: *umduğumuzu bulamadık*)
- 16- Narrator: *iş yok olsa gelirmiyim bırakırmıyım sevdiklerimi diyor...*
 - a. [interviewed worker sitting and then slight transparent transition to his face while speaking]
 - i. Worker: *Parayı, onlara mı göndercem, kontöre mi vercem, yemeğime mi vercem onların yemeğine mi göndercem* (circumscription: *parayı eve mi göndereyim kendime mi yetireyim*)
 - ii. Worker: *Telefonda üçbeş günde on günde kont telefon açıyoz işte*

Fragment IV

- 7- [Another worker's face zoomed]
- 8- Narrator: *Yanık sesli Tarık şarkı patlatıyor, sevdiğim aklıma geldi aaaabi diyor*

- a. [the face of the worker from a distance like a portrait while worker is singing zoom out so that other workers siting around him are seen and camera moves around the room workers seem sad]
 - i. Worker: *şu gurbette neler geldiii baaaşıma / zehir kattın ekmeğiiiime aaaşımaaa / şimdi dohunsalar aglaayacaaaguum*
- 9- [worker siting and box with the inscription BAŞLIK PARASI İÇİN TUZLA'DA]
 - a. Narrator: *Tarık okuma yazma bilmiyor,*
- 10- [worker with pen and paper in his thenar]
 - a. Narrator: *sekiz ay önce gurbete çıkmış, ikibin lira başlık parası biriktirirse, Mardin'e, sevdalısının yanına dönecek*
- 11- [workers face close on screen]
 - a. Narrator: *ama nerdeee aldığım para yetmiyor aaaabi diyor*
- 12- [worker speaking to the flash tv microphone and looking into the camera]
 - a. Woker: *keşke oradan gelmez olaydım, sevdiğimi bırakıpta gelmez olaydım, şu tersane bölgesini görmez olaydım, ama buradan gidersem tövbeler tövbesi bi daha buraya gelmem.*

Fragment V

- 6- Narrator: *Tarık'la koyu sohbeta dalmışken*
 - a. [reporter speaking with Tarık]
- 7- Narrator: *birden ev sahibi giriyor içeriye ve başlıyor ekibimize bağırıma*
 - a. [the room and an old men speaking then turned back]
 - i. [A box with the inscirption İŞÇİLERDEN AYDA BİN 400 YTL ALIYOR]
- 8- Old man: *Lan çık buradan*
- 9- [reporter speaking from the background]
 - a. Reporter: *Neden kişi başı 100 milyon para mı alıyorsun*
- 10- [old men interrupting reporter and turning to the camera]
 - a. old man: *yaw sana ait değil sen çık buradan deyom.*

Fragment VI

- 4- [Reporter speaking into the camera, camera is zooming out so that we can set hat the reporter sits in the middle with workers sitting around him]
 - a. Reporter: *aslında söylenmesi gereken çok şey var ama, asıl önemli olan bu insanların yarın hayatta olup olmayacakları. Çünkü ağır çalışma koşullarında çalışıyorlar ve her an ölüm tehlikesiyle karşı karşıyalar.*

Fragment VII

- 5- [Workers stressing bedclothes]
 - a. Narrator: *yatak yorgan iç içe kenetlenmişler birbirilerine. Uyku vakti. Malum yarın iş var*
- 6- [workers sleeping side by side and 14 KİŞİ BİR ODADA on the screen]
 - a. Narrator: *yataklar seriliyor ve gurbet işçileri uykuya dalyorlar.*

Fragment VIII

- 2- [the cutting of a red tape by a man in formal suits and others around him then one man on the screen]
 - a. Narrator: *tüm olanların ardından en yetkili kişinin yanıtı da böyle*
 - b. Man speaking: *Bir olumsuz olay oldu diye...siz tersanelerin tümü kapatamazsınız* (circumscription: bir olumsuz olay oldu diye tersaneleri kapatamazsınız)

APPENDIX-I:

TWO RADICALS IN TUZLA (English)

Two Radicals in Tuzla: Unity of Labor and Capital in Tuzla

One of them is a capitalist, the other one is unionized socialist worker. Their ways crossed each other during a protest action after the death of a shipyard worker.

In fact they belonged to different ‘classes’...

Hakkı Demiral is a shipyard worker since 20 years. Master Hakkı has lost his 20 year old son, Sezai, during a shipyard accident. He is general secretary of Limter-İş in which subcontracted workers are organized. He believes in socialism, he supports the Socialist Party of the Oppressed (ESP).

Muhsin Divan, on the other hand, is vice chairman of the administrative board of the DESAN Shipyard in Tuzla. Contrary to master Hakkı, he is a ‘capitalist’ looking to the world from the window of liberalism, he is a former provincial chairman of the True Path Party.

Their ways crossed each other in the 18th of February 2008.

The 25 year old Mikail Kavak, who worked for a subcontracting company of DESAN, was captured by electricity while he was welding. Kavak, was the 80th worker given to work accidents as sacrifice since 1985.

62 workers should follow Kavak.

He Apologized

Next morning, workers, who were members of Limter-İş ran to the entrance of the shipyard. While the workers, who were protesting the death of Kavak made their declaration the gates of the shipyard opened. It was the vice chairman of the administrative board of DESAN Muhsin Diavan, who was coming out. Divan joined the workers. First he apologized. He is the one who explains what happened afterwards: “I said, colleagues, let us shout together but also let us find a solution to this issue [iş]. We are in a state of panic but what shall be done? Come, let us do it together, I said. They said, ‘I you do not let us enter the shipyard.’ I said, why could we not let you go in, after you brothers’.”

Master Hakkı, now entered the DESAN Shipyard with the title of a unionist, from which we was put off, because he tried to gain his rights. ‘Blood sucking capitalism’, said to master Hakkı and his friends ‘here you are’. There they were...

Master Hakkı and his friends told Divan about the ‘Tuzla Shipyards Inspection and Investigation Commission’, which they found recently. They complained that the committee, which also consists of engineers, doctors, job safety experts and researchers were not let into the shipyards.

A Capitalist Knowing His Business

Divan, who is ‘a capitalist who knows his business’, did not let the opportunity to pass by: “They want to inspect my shipyard voluntarily. If I would attempt to do this by paying for it, it would cost big bucks. Here you are my brother, I said, watch over our shipyard, give us reports.”

After a MP, who saw master Hakkı in the shipyard at that time asked Divan “Why don’t you give him a job”, master Hakkı began to work as a job safety expert. Ruhiye Levent, who lost her husband İbrahim during a work accident, should also work with master Hakkı.

The Comitee inspected the shipyard. The Report noting the deficits was put on the desk of Divan. In saying ‘because leftist thought takes issues regarding humans and the life seriously throughout the whole of history, its suggestions for solutions are better. Thanks to them the shipyard has found its right way,’ he explains what happened afterwards.

In line with the report the Jog Safety Unit, in which also master Hakkı takes part, has been found. Scaffoldings and electricity cables have been changed. Transformers were put inside cages. A health unit has been found. The gas system has been placed underground. The workers have been educated. It was controlled whether their insurances were paid or not.

Also the Union is Supporting it

Despite of this, two workers died, because they fell from a high position. Although master Hakkı thinks that the change in the shipyard is of importance he does not find it sufficient. According to him the solution is the abolition of subcontractation. And Divan says ‘the sistem has to be rehabilitated’. He underlines that other employers are taking this application as an example. The opinion of the General President of Limter-İş: “Although it is natural that DESAN has employed master Hakkı, it is a positive example if we consider Tuzla. Anyway tranquility within the business life can just be established in this way.”

APPENDIX-I:

TWO RADICALS IN TUZLA (Turkish)

Tuzla'da iki radikal: Tuzla'da Emek Sermaye Birlięi

Birisi tersane yöneticisi bir kapitalist, dięeri sendikalı sosyalist bir işçi. Yolları bir tersane işçisinin ölümünden sonraki eylemde kesişti.

Onlar aslında farklı 'sınıfların' insanı...

Hakkı Demiral, 20 yıllık tersane işçisi. Hakkı usta, 20 yaşındaki oğlu Sezai'yi beş yıl önce tersane kazasında yitirdi. Taşeron işçilerin örgütlü olduęu Limter-İş'in genel sekreteri. Sosyalizme inanıyor, Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi'ni (ESP) destekliyor.

Muhsin Divan ise Tuzla'daki DESAN Tersanesi'nde Yönetim Kurulu Başkanvekili. Hakkı ustanın aksine, dünyaya liberalizm penceresinden bakan bir 'kapitalist'; Doğru Yol Partisi'nin de eski il başkanı.

Bu, iki insanın yolları 18 Şubat 2008'de kesişti.

DESAN'ın taşeron firmasında kaynakçı olarak çalışan 25 yaşındaki Mikail Kavak, 17 Şubat 2008'de kaynak yaparken elektrięe kapıldı. Kavak, 1985'ten beri iş kazalarına kurban verilen 80. işçiydi. Kavak'tan sonra 62 işçiye daha sıra gelecekti.

ÖZÜR DİLEDİ Limter-İş üyesi işçiler ertesi sabah soluęu tersane önünde aldı. Kavak'ın ölmesini protesto eden işçiler açıklama yaparken tersanenin kapısı açıldı. Kapıdan çıkan DESAN Yönetim Kurulu Başkanvekili Muhsin Divan'dı. Divan işçilerin arasına katıldı. Önce özür diledi. Sonrasını kendisi anlatıyor: "Dedim ki arkadaşlar, beraber bağıralım ama bu işe de bir çözüm bulalım. Biz de panik halindeyiz ama ne yapmak lazım? Gelin beraber yapalım, dedim. Dediler ki, 'bizi tersaneye sokmazsanız.' Dedim, niye sokmayalım, buyrun kardeşim!"

Hakkı usta, iki ay önce hakkını aradıęı için çıkarıldıęı DESAN Tersanesi'ne bu kez sendikacı sıfatıyla girdi. "Kan emici kapitalizm", Hakkı usta ve arkadaşlarına, "İçeri buyrun" diyordu. Buyurdular...

Hakkı usta ve arkadaşları Divan'a bir süre önce kurdukları 'Tuzla Tersaneleri İzleme ve İnceleme Komisyonu'ndan bahsetti. Aralarında mühendis, doktor, iş güvenlięi uzmanı ve araştırmacıların da bulunduęu komitenin tersanelere alınmadıęından yakındılar.

İŞİNİ BİLEN KAPİTALİST

(Democracy Now 2004)'İşini bilen bir kapitalist' olan Divan, bu fırsatı kaçırmadı: "Gönüllü olarak tersanemde inceleme yapmak istiyorlar. Parayla yapmaya kalkışsam, dünyanın parasını öderim. Buyurun kardeşim, dedim, tersanemizi izleyin, bize rapor verin."

Bu arada, tersanede Hakkı ustayı gören bir milletvekili, Divan’a “Neden kendisine iş vermiyorsunuz?” diye sorunca Hakkı usta iş güvenlik uzmanı olarak işe başladı. Eşi İbrahim’i iş kazasında yitiren Ruhiye Levent de Hakkı ustayla birlikte çalışacaktı.

Komite, tersanede inceleme yaptı. Eksikleri içeren rapor Divan’ın önüne konuldu. Divan, sonrasını “Sol düşünce tarih boyunca insana ve hayata dair meseleleri ciddiye aldığı için çözüm önerileri de daha iyi oluyor. Onlar sayesinde tersane yola girdi” diye anlatıyor.

Rapor doğrultusunda Hakkı ustanın da aralarında olduğu İş Güvenliği Birimi kuruldu. İskeleler ve elektrik kabloları değiştirildi. Trafolar kafese alındı. Bir sağlık ünitesi kuruldu. Gaz sistemi yeraltına indirildi. İşçiler eğitildi. Sigortalarının yatırılıp yatırılmadığı denetlendi.

SENDİKA DA DESTEKLİYOR

Buna rağmen sonraki iki yılda iki işçi yüksekte düşerek öldü. Hakkı usta, tersanedeki değişimi önemseseydi de yeterli bulmuyor. Ona göre çözüm, taşeronlaşmanın kaldırılmasında. Divan da “Sistem ıslah edilmeli” diyor. Diğer işverenlerin uygulamayı örnek aldığını da vurguluyor. Limter-İş Genel Başkanı Kamber Saygılı’nın görüşü: “DESAN’ın Hakkı ustayı işe alması, doğal olmakla birlikte, Tuzla’yı hesaba kattığımızda olumlu bir örnek. Zaten çalışma yaşamında huzur ancak böyle sağlanabilir.”

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