

OTTOMAN POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE THIRTY
YEARS' WAR: PAUL STRASSBURG'S EMBASSY TO CONSTANTINOPLE

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
The Ottoman Policy toward Central Europe during the Thirty Years War:

Paul Strassburg's Embassy to Constantinople


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
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
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Date

05.08.2015

ABSTRACT

Ottoman Policy Toward Central Europe During the Thirty Years' War: Paul Strassburg's Embassy to Constantinople

The main concern of this study is to make a foreign policy analysis of the Ottomans, and to try demonstrating how policy-making might have affected the Ottoman take during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Under the light of former studies and primary evidence, I will try to prove that there were concrete instances of Ottoman military intervention in the war. Second, I'll try to answer why the Ottoman Empire should be regarded as a player on the scene of this continental political crisis, even though they remained largely non-participant, by pointing out to the psychological effect of the Ottoman power on the European states, relying on contemporary diplomatic reports. Lastly, I present the study of a primary source: The final ambassadorial report of Paul Strassburg, the envoy of the Swedish King Gustav II Adolph in Constantinople in 1632 and in 1633 is translated from its original Latin transcription and evaluated in its historical setting.

ÖZET

Otuz Yıl Savaşları Süresince Orta Avrupa'ya Yönelik Osmanlı Siyaseti:

Paul Strassburg'un İstanbul Sefareti

Bu çalışmanın asli amacı Osmanlı idari kademesinin dış politika analizini yaparak, Osmanlı karar mekanizmasının Otuz Yıl Savaşları'na (1618-1648) nasıl yaklaştığını tahlil etmektir. Daha önceki çalışmalar ve birincil kaynaklar ışığı altında Osmanlıların bu savaşa somut olarak müdahale ettiği durumları ibraz etmeye çalışacağım. Ayrıca, her ne kadar büyük ölçüde tarafsız kalsalar da, çağdaş diplomatik raporlara dayanıp Osmanlı siyasi gücünün Avrupa devletleri üzerindeki psikolojik etkisine dikkat çekerek, neden Osmanlıların da aslen bir Avrupa buhranı olarak bilinen bu hareketli sahnede bir aktör olarak görülmesi gerektiğini cevaplamaya uğraşacağım. Son olarak da hususi bir birincil kaynak çalışması sunuyorum: İsveç Kralı II. Gustaf Adolf'un 1632 ve 1633 senelerinde İstanbul'da bulunan fevkalade elçisi Paul Strassburg'un nihai raporu, orijinal Latince çevirime yazısından tercüme ve tarihi bağlamı içinde tedkik edilmiştir.

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Ad matrem et fratrem;
Qui mecum sunt,
Et per aspera et in fortuna.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AC: Ambassades à Constantinople de François de Noailles, Savary de Lancosmc, Savary de Brèves, Harlay de Césy et M. de Marcheville (1572-1632)
- BOA: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
- KHG: Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht (1867)
- MHH: Monumenta Hungariae Historica (1882)
- Monumenta Pietatis...: Monumenta pietatis & literaria virorum in republica & literaria illustrium, ... (Mieg et al. 1701)
- RA/OSAOS: Riksarkivet/ Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre
- RAOSB: Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling
- RIMD: Recueil d'instructions et mémoires diplomatiques. XXII
Lettres, instructions, etc. pour l'ambassade de Constantinople (1574-1640)
- TNSTR: The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe (1740)
- ZGGHCC: Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise des Grafen Hermann Czernin von Chudenic nach Constantinopel im Jahre 1644

INTRODUCTION

It has been a long time since works of history started to honour those born with wooden spoons in their mouths.¹ However, just as the statesmen or politicians claim the foremost press coverage in our day, there is no reason for diplomatic history to lose consequence so far as there are available sources to exhaust. The Thirty Years War, with all its official documents, diaries, pamphlets or art works, is just one such prolific area.

In the narrative accounts of the Thirty Years War (which ravaged the heart of the European Continent between 1618 and 1648), the focus has duly been placed on the battles and the diplomatic correspondences of the European belligerent powers. However, the role played by the non-participant parties was by no means ignorable. A closer look at the margins of seventeenth century Europe would hence give us slightly different pictures than the mainstream narratives.

It is true that the Ottoman Empire was one of the three European powers which were not represented in the peace conferences of the Treaty of Westphalia which bid an end to the enduring wars.² This, however, doesn't suggest that the Ottomans had been isolated from the developments taking place right on the other side of their western borders. The theme of this study is, hence, the Ottoman attitude towards Central Europe and the importance the Ottoman political entity bore during the thirty years of almost incessant warfare and diplomatic activity.

¹ Jim Sharpe, "History from below", in Peter Burke (ed.) *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*. (Cambridge, 1991), 22- 41. The phrase on p: 39.

² Helmut Lahrkamp. *Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Frieden Eine Darstellung der Jahre 1618 – 1648*. (Aschendorff Verlag, 1999), 244, 245. The others were the Russian Tsardom and the English Kingdom, while the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth had an agent with the status of an "observer".

Research on Ottoman foreign policy in Europe during this period is not a fresh subject. The Ottoman interest in the European political scene at the time has been studied in a variety of German-language articles for around at least a century, often written by either Austro-German or Hungarian scholars.³ However, most of these studies preferred to address certain short periods of the war and almost exclusively the Ottoman–Habsburg relationship. Only one relatively novel work by Köhbach evaluated quite efficiently why the Ottomans didn't participate in the war, though it just scratched the surface by a short and general survey.⁴ Nevertheless, Zinkeisen's monumental work remains the most comprehensive account of Ottoman presence in central Europe during the period.⁵ My primary intention was to build a narrative by relying on Zinkeisen as the spine of the study, filling in the rest with primary sources and secondary studies when necessary. However, once I realized that it would be a gigantic task to cover around thirty years of political affairs, I decided to focus on certain aspects of the subject in steps.

To start with, one of the main concerns of this thesis is to make a foreign policy analysis of the Ottoman government, and to try demonstrating how policy-making might have affected the Ottoman perception of this European crisis. The Ottoman Empire was indeed a major actor in European power politics, and it would be unimaginable for the Ottomans to neglect the developments taking place on that stage. Under the light of former studies and primary evidence, I will try to prove that

³ I will refer to the relevant authors through the course of this work.

⁴ Markus Köhbach, "Warum beteiligte sich das Osmanische Reich nicht am Dreißigjährigen Krieg?", in Leitsch, Walter & Trawkowski Stanislaw (ed.) *Polen und Österreich im 17. Jahrhundert*, (1999, Vienne), pp. 277 – 294.

⁵ Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, ed. By Nilüfer Epeçeli et al. (İstanbul, 2011). The 3rd and 4th volumes give us a thorough account of the period, majorly by exhausting the letters of Sir Thomas Roe, the English Ambassador at Constantinople (1621- 1629), among many others.

there were concrete instances of Ottoman military intervention in the war: the actions of the Ottoman vassal and frontier forces (which were breaching the peace with the Habsburgs) were tolerated by the Porte, and at times even supported.

Second, I will try to answer why the Ottoman Empire should be regarded as a player on the scene of this continental political crisis, even though it remained largely a non-belligerent state, by pointing out to the psychological effect of the Ottoman power on European states: The documented diplomatic activity regarding the Ottoman Porte makes it clear that the European powers didn't stand short of including the Ottomans or their vassals in their schemes within the framework of an apparently general European war. Diplomats were sent back and forth between the Ottoman Empire and various states in Europe, and both Protestants and Catholics watched the inner developments of the Ottoman Empire with some anxiety.

As the last issue, I will present a primary source in the hope that it will shed more light on the points I will have made within the context of the arguments. The final ambassadorial report of Paul Strassburg, the envoy of the Swedish King Gustav II Adolph in Constantinople in 1632 and in 1633, had aroused my interest from the beginning; when I realized that it hasn't yet been translated, I decided to undertake this task from a transcription of its original Latin text, as a modest contribution to the study of not only the Thirty Years War, but also that of the Swedish-Ottoman relations in their rather earlier phase. In that respect, I'll first try to analyze the historical context of Strassburg's diplomatic mission, and then present the translation of his final relation.

The translation of this report, I believe, is also important for understanding the political climate of the Ottoman Empire; and it is likely to become a useful

complementary to other contemporary European sources, such as travelogues or official diplomatic reports (like the Venetian *dispacci*, and *relazioni*; French, British or Austrian ambassadorial reports, or Dutch embassy *brieven*). The political atmosphere of the early seventeenth century Ottoman Empire is described, as well as the dynamics of the capital city in 1632, at a time when Sultan Murad IV (r. 1632-1639) was reclaiming his authority following a bitter power struggle.

At this point, the insight, which the content and the context of this diplomatic relation can offer, highlights the hard times of crisis the Ottoman Empire was undergoing in the 17th century like many other European states at the time. Strassburg's relation bears the imprint of the political troubles which the Ottoman authors of mirror for princes were wont to underline at the turn of the century. In this vein, the relation might make us better grasp the political ambience and mind-set of the ruling cadres at the time within the framework of the seventeenth century turbulences and political perceptions.

A short look at the diplomatic practices of the early modern period is also present in the report, along with the adventures Strassburg underwent on his way from Germany to Constantinople. In that respect, the report can be regarded both as an official dispatch and a travel account. It is also possible to find information on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Wallachian Voivodeship and, particularly, on the political situation in the Transylvanian Principedom in the early 1630s. I can only hope that this report, once translated, may attract the attention of the students of Northern, Eastern and Central Europe in the early modern era; and I shall be truly delighted if it ever catches that of the Ottomanists, who seem to be by far the most negligent in this respect.

CHAPTER 1

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

1.1 A short assessment of the Ottoman conduct of foreign affairs

The Ottoman practice of diplomacy is habitually studied under two categories. The first is the period of unilateral diplomacy, when the Ottoman Empire deemed it demeaning and unnecessary to establish permanent embassies in neighbouring states, although the Ottoman Empire permitted their resident ambassadors in Constantinople. Whenever the need arose for Ottoman representation abroad, a *çavuş* or a *kethüda*, invested with diplomatic authority, would be sent to the foreign capitals as an actor of *ad hoc diplomacy*. The second diplomatic era is the bilateral one, which took start during the last decade of the 18th century, when diplomatic integration with Europe was initiated with the establishment of Ottoman embassies in major European capitals.

An older tradition of studies on Ottoman diplomacy regarded the Ottoman foreign policy as determined by strict Islamic rules in the *ad hoc* period.⁶ In this view, the world was divided into two opposing spheres: On the one side lay *darü'l-İslam*, the lands already under the rule of Islamic governments; on the other was *darü'l-harb*, the abode of non-believers, against whom Muslims were supposed to wage constant war. However, the actual pattern of Ottoman policy-making had a broader scope and more flexibility, just as any other early modern polity.

The fact that the Ottomans granted *ahdnames* (capitulations) to certain powers and concluded truces with their enemies prompts us to raise questions about

⁶ Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz" in Yurdusev, A.N. (ed.) *Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional?* (Palgrave – Macmillan, 2004), pp. 89- 113. 89.

the obedience to the religious obligations in international relations. Firstly, Veinstein suggests that there were certain European powers, with which the Ottomans were in a relationship of *de facto darü'l- sulh / darü'l- ahd*, namely, the abode of peace; a transitory status for the polities against which no war is waged⁷. Going one step ahead, Yurdusev claims that the Ottoman foreign policy was not orthodoxly Islamic, but rather, it was fulfilling the requirements of the Realpolitik.⁸ Therefore, the perception of *darü'l- harb* and *darü'l- Islam* was not completely the case in their regulation of foreign relations. In a similar vein, Beydilli suggests that the Ottoman political view in the classical period was one which pursued the interest of the state in international relations.⁹

Işıksel makes a more illuminating comment on the issue by specifying that even though the territorial bifurcation of *darü'l- harb* versus *darü'l- Islam* was “instrumental for the organization of trade, the administration of foreign residents in the territory or for the regulation of relations with Christian vassal states”, it would be misleading to evaluate the implications of this bifurcation in foreign policy: The Ottomans could ally themselves with Christian states, or target Muslim ones as enemies even in the 16th century,¹⁰ the golden age of the classical period.

To cut it short, the prevailing understanding regarding the Ottoman conduct of foreign policy is the loose adherence to Islamic laws in favour of a more *realpolitik*, self- seeking pattern in the period under study.

⁷ Gilles Veinstein, “Osmanlılar ve Avrupa Kavramı”, in *Harp ve Sulh: Avrupa ve Osmanlılar* (2010, Kitap Yay.), 50.

⁸ Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude Toward Diplomacy”, in Yurdusev, A.N. (ed.) *Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional?* (Palgrave – Macmillan, 2004), pp. 5 – 35. 16.

⁹ Kemal Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Siyasi Ahlak”, in *İlmi Araştırmalar 7*, (İstanbul, 1991), p. 48.

¹⁰ Güneş Işıksel, “Ottoman-Habsburg Relations in the second half of the 16th century: The Ottoman standpoint”, in Arno Strohmeyer, Norbert Spannenberger (eds.): *Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in*

1.2 Ottoman foreign policy towards Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

In the framework of the analysis made in the previous section, it would be right to begin with the suggestion that the Ottoman attitude towards their western frontier was to follow the basic principle of the “reason of the state”, in which respect, they made a differentiation between different European powers, even though all of them were, and would remain, within the boundaries of the abode of war.

After Sultan Selim I’s successful campaigns against the Safavids and Mamluks during the first two decades of the 16th century, the attention was once more directed to the western front during the early years of Sultan Suleyman I. After the conquests of Rhodes and Belgrade, the victory at Mohacs (1526) made it clear that the Ottoman expansion into Hungary wouldn’t be short lasting.¹¹ The battle also marked the beginning of the long term Habsburg – Ottoman duel in Central Europe, which brought the two empires face to face in a bitter struggle over the former Kingdom of Hungary, starting from the reigns of Charles V and Suleyman I onwards.

In the conflict against the Habsburg dynasty, the Ottomans did more than relying solely on their military power. In order not to overshadow their claims and aspiration to universal monarchy by treating the European Kingdoms as their equals, the Ottoman administration chose securing the allegiance of anti- Habsburg powers not through formal treaties of alliances, but rather through the intended condescension of granting them capitulations. Apart from the earliest capitulations granted to Venice in 1482, we can observe a clear pattern in the choice of the

interkulturellen Räumen: Das Osmanische Reich in Europa (16-18. Jh), (Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag 2013), 51-62. P. 54, 55.

remaining receivers of the *ahdnames* in the sixteenth century, after the beginning of the struggles against the Habsburgs: France in 1569, England in 1580, and the Dutch Republic in 1612, namely, the countries to the west and north of the territories under Habsburg rule in the second half of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, were all given capitulations.¹² It has been argued that the Ottoman administration aimed at acquiring allies in Western Europe against the Habsburgs through these capitulations.¹³ It is also possible to compare the Ottoman policy of circling the Habsburgs by alliances with the powers on the margins of the continent to the United State's strategy of containment over the Soviet Union by the creation of the North Atlantic pact (NATO) during the early years of the Cold War.

This trend is also visible with regard to the context of religious upheaval in Europe at the time. Since the fresh born reformation movement was paving the way for the crawling Protestant political entities in the heart of the staunchly Catholic Habsburg territories, the Ottoman ruling cadres were quick to seize the opportunity: İnalçık suggests that not only the Ottoman pressure helped Protestants receive concessions from the Habsburg Emperors, but also the support for the Protestant and Calvinist cause stated one of the fundamental principles of the Ottoman policy in Europe.¹⁴ An undated imperial letter (a *name- i hümayun*, probably from the second half of the 16th century) written to the Protestant rebels in the Low Countries

¹¹ Géza Palffy, “Die Türkenabwehr und die Militärkartographie der Habsburgermonarchie in Ungarn und Kroatien–Slawonien im 16. Jh”, in *Historični seminar [Ljubljana]*, 11 (2014) [ured. Mojca Žagar Karer], pp. 37–70. 40.

¹² Joris Oddens, *Een vorstelijk voorland. Gerard Hinlopen op reis naar Istanbul (1670 - 1671)*. (2009, Zutphen, p. 18.

¹³ Güneş Işıksel, “Les méandres d'une pratique peu institutionnalisée: la diplomatie ottomane, xv^e-xviii^e siècle”, in *Monde(s): Histoire, Espaces, Relations*, No:5, 2014/1. PP. 43- 55. P: 8 in the word document.

¹⁴ Halil İnalçık, “The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe”, in Karpat (ed.) *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History*. (1974, Leiden), pp: 51 – 58. 53.

exemplifies the point made:¹⁵ The Lutherans, who took up arms against the Papists (i.e. the Spanish) and rejected the idols and the painted depictions in their churches, deserves the compassion of the Sultan, who promises them help from land and sea whenever they will ask for it. It is doubtful if any material effort in this direction was ever made; but at least, the ruling Ottoman cadre definitely had an interest in keeping Europe divided with promises and show of good will towards Protestants. Moreover, the Ottomans would preserve this attitude well into the seventeenth century, especially during the turbulent years of the Thirty Years' War.

1.3 The Ottoman Empire in the early seventeenth century

The last decades of the 16th century marked the beginning of a general crisis for the Ottoman Empire, just as it was the case for the whole Europe. In the spheres of administration, diplomacy, warfare and society, established rules were challenged and the Ottomans underwent such hard times the like of which had not been experienced, probably, since the interregnum of 1402 – 1413.

In the western front, the last war against the Habsburgs between 1593 and 1606 had lasted far too long for too little gain. The disappointment with the shortcoming Ottoman military technology in face of the better trained and more experienced European soldiers who were relatively more at ease with firearms was already enough of a setback. However, the novelty following the war lay in the fact that the concluding Zsitva- Torok Treaty sealed the official Ottoman acceptance of diplomatic equality between the Habsburg Kaiser and the Ottoman Sultan, although

¹⁵ *Mecmua- yı münşeat- ı Feridun Bey. v. 2.* (İstanbul, Takvimhane- i Amire, 1265 - 1274). “Flandra ve İspanya Vilayetlerindeki Luteran mezhebi ashabına isdar buyrulan name- i hümayun suretidir”, p: 450. The majority of the reformists in the Low Countries were actually Calvinists; but the Ottomans probably didn't distinguish between the Protestants then.

the latter *de facto* abstained from treating their neighbours as equals until 1699¹⁶. Even if the official Ottoman discourse in the treaties and documents following Zsitva- Torok kept asserting their superiority, the psychological effect of the inability to attain an easy and glorious victory as in the days of yore must have made a strong place in the minds of the ruling class. Moreover, even though their admiration for this gigantic empire was still largely intact, with a hind sight to the naval battle of Lepanto, the Europeans now had their first clue that the Ottoman armies were not invincible on land, either.

After 1606, the western front generally remained silent until the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in the mid- century. However, the real external threat for the Ottoman Empire was from the east: The Safavids restarted the war with their attacks in 1603, which would last until 1612 and end at the expense of the Ottomans¹⁷. The Ottoman revenge campaign was launched 3 years later, but ended without a major change in status quo in 1618. The last and the most enduring phase of the war started in 1623-4 with the Safavid capture of Baghdad, and lasted 17 years until the Treaty of Kasr- ı Şirin was signed in May 1639¹⁸. These intermittent wars and the campaigns of the main army in the east is one of the principle reasons why the Ottomans didn't exert any serious effort in the west during the Thirty Years War.

Rebellions, of every kind, were also major impediments to inner stability in this period. The first of the serious *Celali* rebellions in Anatolia broke out in 1598, and stated a lodestar for the following ones between 1603 and 1608, as well as

¹⁶ Rifa'at Ali Abou- El- Haj, "Ottoman Attitude Toward Peace- Making: The Karlowitz Case", in *Der Islam: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients*; Jan 1, 1974; 51. P: 131 – 137. 131, f. 3.

¹⁷ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi, Cild III*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 6. Baskı. P: 66,7. The first phase of the war was between 1578 and 1590, and was crowned with considerable Ottoman gains.

causing the *büyük kaçgun* (the great peasant flight away from the countryside) between 1603 and 1606.¹⁹ The second phase of the *celali* revolts came into play after 1623 with the rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa in Erzurum, and was multiplied by others intermittently well into the 1650s.²⁰ Added to this, in Crimea (1624-1628), Egypt, Yemen (late 1620s-1635) and Lebanon (1620s-1635), there were political challenges of the provincial potentates against the central power.²¹ Sporadic Zaporozhian Cossack raids on the Ottoman Black Sea shores during the Thirty Years War didn't stand short of aggravating the chaos.

In terms of administration, the best word describing the situation in the first half of the century is inconsistency. Within the span of four decades, four depositions were made, the second of which is notorious for the violent murder of Osman II; thus, introducing regicide in the Ottoman vocabulary of political imagination. The post of the grand vizier was even more susceptible to rapid changes: Starting from the year 1600, 38 different persons (some of them for more than once) took office until finally Köprülü Mehmed Paşa brought some respite to this rapid tempo in 1656. Different courtly factions as well as recalcitrant janissaries rose as fundamental figures on the political scene in the distressed capital, whereas the *kapıkulu spahis*, in their authority to extract taxes, spread terror in the provinces until Murad IV took the reins in his hands to curb all their power after 1632.

How are we to explain the downturn of the formerly rising profile of the Ottoman Empire, which had reached the zenith of its glory during mid 16th century

¹⁸ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 248.

¹⁹ Oktay Özel. "The Reign of Violence", in Christine Woodhead (ed.) *The Ottoman World* (Routledge Pub, 2012). p: 184 – 202. 189

²⁰ Ibid., 190.

²¹ Robert Mantran, "XVII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti: İstikrar mı, Gerileme mi?", in Mantran (ed.) *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* (İstanbul, 1995), pp: 279 – 318. 285, 6.

as was the prevalent perception in the early seventeenth century? To begin with, the Ottoman Empire shared the same fate with almost all of the early modern states: The influx of massive loads of bullion from the Americas into Europe, a stagnant level of agricultural production due to regressive population growth in comparison to the previous century and a subsequent price inflation together caused a general economic crisis in the 17th century.²² Politically, the main issue causing tension in society was the expansion of the central political structure over the country by infringing on local – traditional privileges of people, as Trevor-Roper claimed.²³ Elliot summarized the inner upheavals of the European states at the time as strife over political power within the framework of an aristocratic- monarchical state.²⁴ Koenigsberger endorsed them both and suggested that “it was in many cases the presumptuous political and fiscal demands of the expanding state power against duly deserved rights which triggered tensions and revolts”.²⁵ Inspired by Braudel, Steensgaard concludes that be it a crisis or not, the seventeenth century saw a dramatic rise of the public expenditure of the contemporary states.²⁶

To what extent was the Ottoman Empire prey to these developments, then? Demographically, the excessive population rise in the 16th century made its effect felt harshly at the end of the century, pressing hard on rural settlements since the expansion in the cultivable land was not commensurate to the population rise. Economically, the wave of silver inflation similarly hit the Ottoman market, and

²² Niels Steensgaard, “Det Syttende Århundredes Krise”, in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, Bind 12, række, 4(1969 - 1970) 3, pp. 476 – 505. 478, 481, 489.

²³ E. Ladewig Petersen, “Oversigt. 1600-Tallets Kriser i Europa”. *Historisk Tidsskrift*(Danish) 94:2. (København, 1994), pp. 337-349. P. 337.

²⁴ Steensgaard, 500.

²⁵ Petersen (1994), p. 340.

²⁶ Steensgaard, p. 503.

coupled with sporadic money debasements, it caused price inflation.²⁷ Apart from the distress of the rise in prices, debasement of money was resented by the central army who were receiving their salaries in cash, and who vented their anger by outright rebellions now and then. Moreover, the changing military technology in Europe required Ottoman reciprocation, which meant a soaring increase in the number of janissary units, who were equipped with fire arms. The expanding size of the central army and the cost of their fire arms bore hard on the Ottoman finances. The change in the balances of royal treasury over the century also attests to the bleak prospect of the expanding state's financial performance: A surplus of almost 130 million *akçes* in 1567-1568 had fallen down to a deficit of 742.000 *akçes* in 1630-1631, and further down to a deficit of around 175 million *akçes* in 1653.²⁸ That the military expenditure constituted 88% of the total spending in 1630 is suggestive at this point.

Political sphere was also in turmoil due to dynastic practices: The tradition of royal princes' appointment as provincial governors (*sancağa çıkma*) was obsolete by early seventeenth century, and all heirs to the throne were now growing up in the Sultan's palace. While the ruling Sultan would be reigning over the realm, his brothers were kept isolated in their lodgings in the palace, which came to be known as the cage (*kafes*) system. This policy brought along a double-fold effect: Firstly, since the new sultans getting on the throne didn't have a "princely household to draw", he had to rely on a group of favourites and the factions they formed at the

²⁷ Şevket Pamuk, "The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, (2001), 69–89. p. 81.

²⁸ The figures are retrieved from the tables in Çakır (2003, p. 37) and Mantran (1990, p.262, 265).

court and the palace.²⁹ Factionalism would remain a major tenet in Ottoman politics for the rest of the century.

The second result stemming from the *kafes* system was an unintended consequence: The recalcitrant elements of the central army (*kul taifesi*) or of the nomenclatura of administrators could now easily justify their disobedience to the Sultan by incriminating his counsellors and the factions he favoured, claiming that they were to blame for the rupture from the previous order (*kanun-ı kadim*) and for the ills of the empire.³⁰ This was possible, however, thanks to the availability “of a different sultan inside the palace”, a member from the Ottoman dynasty as an alternative to the reigning monarch.³¹ Dashing inside the Topkapı Palace to look for the royal princes in order to depose the existant sultan became hence an option for the unsatisfied interest groups.

In a critiquial point of view, this process can be regarded as a regression in the formerly unquestionable authority of the monarch, if not the desacralization of his person³². Within the framework of a relatively recent analysis, it was argued that the political turmoil of the 17th century brought about a structural change at the top of the Ottoman administration, and the formerly patrimonial state which was compared to a hierarchical alignment on the highest step of which the sultan had been sitting was now turned into “a spider web with the monarch at the center but not on top of

²⁹ Günhan Börekçi, *Factions and Favourites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I. (r. 1603 - 1617) and His Immediate Predecessors*, Ph. D. Thesis, The Ohio State University, Graduate Program in History (2010). p. 256.

³⁰ Nicolas Vatin et Gilles Veinstein, *Le Sérail ébranlé. Essai sur les morts, dépositions et avènements des sultans ottomans, XIV e -XIX e siècle*. (Paris, 2003). p. 254.

³¹ Ibid., 231.

³² Ibid., 254: “Démantelement de l’aura sacrée du souverain due a l’aggrandissement extraordinaire de coleres de kouls.”

anyone else”.³³ This argument was further linked to discussions of a popular early modern political debate in European historiography, in which there was a clash between absolutists on the one hand, and the constitutionalists on the other.³⁴ Certain bureaucrats, jurists and janissaries were forming the constitutionalist wing in this equation with their emphasis on the preservation of the ancient order (*kanun-ı kadim*), and they were trying to limit royal authority, wishing to invest the monarch with only symbolical power at the center of this spider web. The absolutists, on the other hand, desired to see the sultan as the actual controller of the web.³⁵ This tension would last for the whole century and add to the catastrophes of the Ottoman Empire.

All in all, the first half of the seventeenth century was a time of troubles for the Ottoman Empire. Both inside and outside the borders, there were many problems with which the central government had to deal one by one. It was, therefore, a blessing for the Ottomans that the European powers were enmeshed in their own confessional conflict during a period which was otherwise quite propitious for a common front against the natural enemy of Christianity.

1.4 Defining the Ottoman western front

The first remark on the geographical location of the Ottoman Empire is that it was *central*. The Ottomans were surrounded by powerful enemies on three sides, and long lasting peace had never been an issue with any of the neighbours. The Safavid Persia in the East, the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Tsardom to the North, and the Habsburgs in the West troubled the Ottoman Empire by turns through the 17th century. The maritime competition with the Venetians and the

³³ Baki Tezcan, “The Second Ottoman Empire: The Transformation of the Ottoman Polity in the Early Modern Era”, in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Volume 29, Number 3, 2009, pp. 556 – 572. 567.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

Spanish were no less burdensome for the Ottomans, either. But among all these problems, the Austrian Habsburgs were the foremost enemies until 18th century, when the Russian Tsardom rose as a comparatively more eminent challenge.

Starting from the beginning, the main direction of Ottoman expansion was towards the West, and a rapid pace of conquests in the Balkan Peninsula brought the Ottoman Empire to the Hungarian frontiers in the early 16th century, as suggested above. Following the battle of Mohacs in 1526, the Hungarian administration (the king and most of the high nobility) was almost totally shattered, and the great medieval Kingdom of Hungary was politically divided into two: While a portion of the nobility had chosen Ferdinand of Habsburg as their king, the rest followed Suleyman the Magnificent's champion, Janos Szapolyai; and two rival kings ruled the realm for one and a half decade.³⁶ When the Szapolyai passed away in 1540, the Ottoman decision to intervene more effectively in the following year resulted in the invasion of Hungary, occupation of Buda, and the partition of the Hungarian Kingdom into three: Western and northern parts were now under royal Habsburg authority; the central and southern Hungary were made into Ottoman provinces, and the northeastern portion became the Transylvanian principality which would exist as an Ottoman vassal state.

The new arrangement in Hungary didn't solve the issue, however. The former Hungarian Kingdom, which rather served as a buffer zone between two great empires,³⁷ was now annihilated, and the Ottoman border lay facing that of the

³⁵ Ibidem. See also Vatin & Veinstein for a similar constitutionalist argument.(2003, p. 192).

³⁶ Gabor Agoston, "Macaristan'da Osmanlı Fethi ve Osmanlı Askeri Serhaddi", in *Osmanlı'da Savaş ve Serhad*. (İstanbul, 2013). p. 184.

³⁷ Arno Strohmeyer, "Krieg und Frieden in den habsburgisch- osmanischen Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit", in: *Die Türkei, der deutsche Sprachraum und Europa. Multidisziplinäre Annäherungen und Zugänge*. Institut für Geschichte der Universität Hildesheim. Arbeitskreis

Habsburgs directly. Feeling the imminence of the Ottoman danger, the Habsburg Royal War Council decided to undertake a major project of building a thousand kilometer long fortified defence line of castles and cities, most of which were modernized in the state-of-the-art model.³⁸ However, this line was no Chinese Wall: There were reciprocal border raids made by frontier governors, which are defined as “small wars” and were limited to small scale quick pillages, slave captures (for ransom) and seldom incidents of sieges.³⁹ These issues often became main bones of contention and stated the primary theme of complaints raised at frontier and central courts on both sides.

Not only for the raiding troops, but also to the tax collectors were the Hungarian fortified defense line similarly porous: The feudal rights of the Hungarian nobles were here and there preserved despite the Ottoman protest, which Agoston names as the “condominium system”, and landowners from the Habsburg (Royal) Hungary did collect their taxes on their lands under Ottoman suzerainty. There were certain areas where double taxation was a fact, but it was out of question to end this practice: the military balance of power (thanks to the permanent garrisons in Royal Hungary) in the border compelled the Ottomans to preserve the *status quo*.⁴⁰

This balance of power was felt seriously by the Ottomans since the so called Long Wars (1593-1606) had indeed lasted longer than the former Ottoman conflicts

Europäische Integration. Historische Forschungen. Veröffentlichungen 10. Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau, 31-50. P. 45.

³⁸ Gabor Agoston, “Doğu Orta Avrupa’da İmparatorluklar ve Savaş, 1550 – 1750: Osmanlı – Habsburg Rekabeti ve Askeri Dönüşüm”, in *Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç* (2012, İstanbul). pp. 169- 212. P.186.

³⁹ Gabor Agoston, “Macaristan’da Osmanlı - Habsburg Serhaddi (1541 - 1699): Bir Mukayese”, in *Osmanlı’da Savaş ve Serhad*, (İstanbul, 2013).pp. 203 – 224. P. 204.

⁴⁰ Gabor Agoston, “Esnek Bir İmparatorluk: Sultan Buyruğu ve Osmanlı Serhatlerindeki Sınırları”, in *Osmanlı’da Savaş ve Serhad*, (İstanbul, 2013), pp. 155 – 178. P.170

in the west, and the gains (only Eger and Kanisza⁴¹) were relatively modest. It was probably because of this that there were no full scale Ottoman campaigns after 1606 until the Köprülü restoration in the mid century. In that respect, all military activity was conducted by the Ottoman governors of border provinces. But even there, instability made any long term policy unachievable: Under less than a generation, 13 Paşas of Buda were replaced⁴² and their following post could be appointed to hundreds of kilometres ahead. On the other hand, the Habsburg activity was likewise limited since the Holy Roman Empire was immersed in its own affairs, enmeshed in the bitter confessional conflict during most of the first half of the 17th century. To say the least, both gargantuan empires were sitting silent on the Hungarian frontier with their backs against each other, though with an anxious eye turned back over their shoulders every now and then.

In this state of affairs, the real loser on this fuzzy border was the Hungarian population: Their erst mighty kingdom had been divided into three and the Magyars were squeezed between two great empires. Whereas the central and southern Hungary was incorporated into the “oriental empire”, the Habsburg (Royal) Hungary served Vienne as a buffer zone between the Turks and the Holy Roman Empire. As for Transylvania, its princes more often followed their own interests than pursue any national cause. Royal Hungarian governor general, Palatine Miklos Esterhazy, was most concerned about the misfortunes of Hungary, and he was arduously striving to reunite the divided Hungarian territories, tying his hopes to the Habsburgs during his two- decade- long service (1625-1645). He was aware that only a concerted European action could save Hungary, and was sponsoring plans and schemes at the

⁴¹ See Appendix B for the toponyms, and Appendix D(2) for the map.

⁴² Lajos Fekete. *Türkische schriften aus dem archive des palatins Nikolaus Esterházy 1606-1645*. Im auftrage des fürsten Paul Esterházy. (Budapest, 1932), p. XXIV.

Viennese court, hoping in vain that the Habsburgs would take the initiative. Neither during the Thirty Years War, nor immediately thereafter was any effort made by the Europeans to restore Hungary and expel the Turk from Europe, to Esterhazy's bitter disappointment.⁴³

⁴³ Istvan Hiller, "Ungarn als Grenzland des christlichen Europa im 16. Und 17. Jahrhundert", in (Ed. RG Asch, K Garber, J Held, W. Fink) *Der Frieden: Frieden und Krieg in der Frühen Neuzeit*. (München, 2001), pp. 561 – 576. P. 573 – 574.

CHAPTER 2

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

It must be pointed out that due to the numerous problems in the early 17th century as implied in the previous chapter, the official Ottoman policy in the western front was to preserve the peace concluded with the Habsburgs in 1606 at all costs. However, the opportunity to benefit from the plight of their arch enemy, the Habsburgs, couldn't be squandered: The Protestant party, i.e. the enemies of the Habsburgs, were constantly favoured by the Ottoman ruling cadre, and did sometimes even receive covert support. Even though there were no major campaigns undertaken under the command of the grand vizier or the sultan, the Ottoman vassal Transylvanian princes were time to time allowed to have their own way in their conflicts against the Habsburg Kaiser, and they even received the support of the frontier Paşas at times.

2.1 The early phase during Gabor Bethlen's lifetime

A simple confessional revolt in Bohemia against the governors of the Habsburgs in May 1618 drew the first circle of a whirlpool that would soon swallow the whole European Continent, just as the assassination of an heir- apparent of the same dynasty would do the same almost three hundred years later, starting the First World War. Some small Protestant principalities and certain regional estates of the Holy Roman Empire coalesced against the Catholic Austrian Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Matthias, whose Catholic representatives in the majorly Protestant Kingdom of Bohemia had caused a popular revolt by their maladministration and mistreatment of the Kingdom and its constitutional structure in early 1618 by curbing the Protestants liberties. But before the war spread far and wide in Europe, Gabor

Bethlen (r. 1613-1629), the Ottoman vassal Prince of Transylvania, was among the fastest to get himself involved in the conflict.

Bethlen, a keen politician and truly an opportunist, was quick to sniff the air in the Ottoman capital. His representatives at the Porte started their efforts to inform themselves about the Ottoman attitude toward the revolt in Bohemia and toward a possible Transylvanian intervention in the conflict as early as July and mid-August⁴⁴. The initial Ottoman position of the Ottoman statesmen was to “by no means interfere in the Central European conflict”.⁴⁵ However, there were always two parties of hawks and doves among the Ottoman top officials, and hence the policy making could be adjusted in accordance with the turns of fortune.⁴⁶

By the end of 1618 and during early 1619, the Bohemian rebels had received the help of the Duchy of Savoy and the Elector Palatinate Friedrich V.⁴⁷ Since the two Habsburg armies were shut out of war by quick Bohemian manoeuvres, Vienna was besieged in May 1619 for a brief period by Count Thurn, the leader of the Protestant rebels of Bohemia.⁴⁸ In the meantime, the Protestants in the remaining Habsburg dominions were likewise in distress in the course of the spring 1619 due to the infringement of their religious rights by the Catholic Habsburgs; and seeing the time ripe for action, the Transylvanian Prince Gabor Bethlen launched his attack into Royal (Habsburg) Hungary in the summer of the same year.⁴⁹ Moreover, on the last day of July, the aforementioned rebellious Habsburg dominions (namely, Upper and Lower Lusatia, Silesia and Moravia) agreed to a confederation with the revolting

⁴⁴ Cristina Feneşan, “Die Pforte und das Eingreifen Siebenbürgens in den Dreissigjährigen Krieg.”, *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeennes*, XXIV/1, 1986, pp. 61-69. P. 63.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 63, 64.

⁴⁷ C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, (Kent, 1992) p. 82,83.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 91.

Bohemia, whose numbers were later crowded also with the addition of Lower and Upper Austria two weeks later.⁵⁰ Soon enough, Bethlen and Thurn signed an offensive and defensive alliance on 20th August 1619,⁵¹ constituting a fresh but shaky Protestant alliance between the Confederation of 7 Provinces and Transylvania against the Habsburgs. On the 26th August, the rebellious Bohemians deposed their catholic Habsburg King Ferdinand (who would be elected the Holy Roman Emperor two days later, the second of the name) and enthroned instead a protestant, Friedrich V, the Elector Palatinate, as the new King of Bohemia.

The repercussions of these developments were favourable to the Transylvanian cause at the Porte. The brisk spread of the revolt over the Habsburg domains and the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Matthias in March found a positive resonance among some of the Ottoman statesmen with regard to Bethlen's campaign.⁵² During July 1619, the strictly neutral stance of the Grand Vizier Kara Mehmed Paşa slowly melted into well boding neutrality, and eventually turned into passive advocacy of Bethlen's intervention in the war.⁵³ This was also the beginning of the long run strategy the Ottomans would adopt in the years to come until the end of the war: Whereas the actions of the Transylvanian prince, an Ottoman vassal, against the Habsburgs were officially deplored for the sake of keeping the peace (established by the 1606 Zitva-Torok Treaty, and renewed in 1615) in the western front, partial help would be offered to Bethlen by the Ottomans, and his actions in foreign policy would be tolerated in order to undermine the Habsburg power.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Ibid., 91, 94.

⁵⁰ Peter Wilson, *The Thirty Years' War: Europe's Tragedy*.(Harvard Uni. Press, 2009), p. 282.

⁵¹ Wedgwood, 95.

⁵² Feneşan, 63.

⁵³ Ibid., 65.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 67.

Bethlen's incursion into Royal Hungary attained surprising success: In September 1619, he had occupied Košice, the capital of Upper Hungary, where he was elected "the chief and protector of the land" by the Estates General.⁵⁵ On 14th October, Bratislava, the capital of the Royal Hungary surrendered to Bethlen. There, the Bohemian leader Thurn and Bethlen united forces and furthered the campaign into Austria, besieging Vienna with 30.000 Protestant troops on 24th November.⁵⁶ But since the heavy artillery was lacking and the intelligence arrived that Hommonay Drugeth, an enemy of Gabor Bethlen, was attacking Transylvania with the support of Polish troops, Bethlen was left with no choice but to hastily retreat home five days later.⁵⁷ Although Hommonay's threat was already thwarted before Bethlen could appear in person, he didn't go back to unite with his allies but chose to continue occupying the major cities in Royal Hungary.⁵⁸

At this point, Bethlen's attention was actually directed to the Hungarian inner politics in Bratislava: The city was the seat of the St. Stephen's Crown, the symbol of the traditional Hungarian Kingdom, and the Hungarian Diet could very well crown him as the King of Hungary. Herein, however, was Bethlen face to face with a bitter dilemma: *Şeyhü'l- İslam* (the Grand Mufti) had made it clear that "the *Sultan* 'would never allow him to possess Transylvania along with Hungary, since Transylvania was a creation of *Sultan Süleyman*'".⁵⁹ It is understandable that the Ottomans were reticent about a too assertive and powerful vassal on their borders, if they would not

⁵⁵ David Angyal, "Gabriel Bethlen", in *Revue Historique*, T. 158, Fasc. 1 (1928), pp. 19 – 80. 29, 30.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁵⁷ Andrea Schmidt – Rösler, "Princeps Transilvaniae – Rex Hungariae? Gabriel Bethlens Außenpolitik zwischen Krieg und Frieden", in Heinz Duchhardt / Martin Peters (ed.): *Kalkül – Transfer – Symbol. Europäische Friedensverträge der Vormoderne*, Mainz 2006-11-02 (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft online 1). P: 80 – 98.. 84.

⁵⁸ Angyal, 31.

⁵⁹ Feneşan, 68.

deeply resent the recreation of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom they had bid an end to.

In order not to alienate the prospect of help from the Porte, Bethlen discreetly rejected the title of the “King of Hungary” in January, and accepted to be claimed plainly the “Governor of Hungary” and concluded an armistice with the Emperor on 16th January 1620 to replenish his resources for a bit.⁶⁰ The following months would be spent consolidating his power base in Royal Hungary.

In the same month, Friedrich V of Bohemia, sent his diplomatic agent Bitter to Constantinople in order to solicit support from the Ottomans against their Habsburg enemies. Bitter’s mission reached Constantinople together with Bethlen’s representative around mid- April among the protests of the Austrian ambassador (Orator), Ludwig von Mollard.⁶¹ The Austrian Orator related that Bitter was sent to offer a yearly tribute to Sultan Osman II (r. 1618-1622) in return of Ottoman protection; but when Mollard complained of the development to the Grand Vizier, he was assured that the Sultan wouldn’t undertake any action in contravention to the Treaty of Zsitva- Torok, but any Bohemian desire of vassal relationship couldn’t be disregarded, either.⁶² After Mollard was soothed with a final comment that no positive answer was given to the Bohemian mission, a certain Çavuş Mehmed Ağa was sent to Prague, accompanying back Bitter’s mission in May.⁶³

They reached Prague on 3rd July, and Mehmed Ağa was received in great acclamation, and accepted into audience with the King Friedrich of Bohemia just two

⁶⁰ Angyal, 34.

⁶¹ Reinhard Rudolf Heinisch, “Habsburg, die Pforte und der Böhmisches Aufstand (1618 - 1620): II. Teil”, in *Südost Forschungen*; Jan 1, 1975; 34. 79 – 124. P: 96.

⁶² Ibid., 97.

⁶³ Ibidem.

days later.⁶⁴ He presented letters from Sultan Osman II and the grand vizier (addressed to the Estates of the 7 confederated provinces), claiming that the Sultan was ready to support Friedrich with 60 000 cavalry from Buda, if demanded.⁶⁵ For their protection over the Bohemian Crown, the Ottoman demand was 700 000 thalers per annum; and in his response letter dated 12 July 1620, King Friedrich promised to send gifts and pay tribute in return for the Sultan's support against the Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand.⁶⁶ Since this was the Sultan's "expressive approval of the rebellion against tyrant Ferdinand", an official embassy to the Porte was demanded from Friedrich and the Estates,⁶⁷ which was sent within the same month.⁶⁸

While the embassy was on its way to Constantinople, Bethlen broke the silence by starting a campaign against Austria in fall 1620. In August, the Hungarian nobles at Besztercebánya/ Neusohl had deposed Ferdinand II, and chosen Bethlen the "King of Hungary"⁶⁹; he had once more refused to be crowned even though he accepted the title. In the following campaign in autumn, notwithstanding the fact that Bethlen could field a relatively effective army, he couldn't save the Bohemian army to be utterly defeated at the Battle of White Mountain on 8th November, 1620. King Friedrich of Bohemia fled his capital, Prague [and then, Germany], before his abovementioned embassy could reach Constantinople on November 14th. The embassy of a geographically non-existent confederation didn't mean much for the Ottomans now, who received the news of the collapse of the Bohemian revolt in

⁶⁴ H. Forst, "Der türkische Gesandte in Prag 1620 und der Briefwechsel des Winterkönigs mit Sultan Osman II", in *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 16, (1895) 566 – 581.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 569.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 577, 581.

⁶⁷ Heinisch, 106.

⁶⁸ Wilson, 293.

⁶⁹ Gabor Agoston, "Empires and warfare in east-central Europe, 1550 – 1750: the Ottoman – Habsburg rivalry and military transformation" in Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim eds., *European Warfare, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 110-134. 124.

January 1621, and could only confirm it in March.⁷⁰ Stuck between the obligation of the promises already given to the Bohemian Confederates at one side, and the insistence of the Austrian ambassadors on the preservation of the Zsitva- Torok Treaty at the other, the grand vizier quite elegantly extracted himself by claiming that the Porte would grant help to the Confederates, though it wouldn't be against the Emperor, but rather against the enemies of the Sultan, that is, the Spaniards and the Papists.⁷¹ That was by all means a close escape for the Ottoman administration, for if the Confederation could live long enough for the Ottomans to realize the promises made, the peace with the Habsburgs would probably have been broken for the sake of accepting the vassalage of some adventurous movement in central Europe, whose power base was, as yet, slippery at best. The Bohemian chapter of the war was thus rather hastily concluded for the Ottomans, luckily, before any promise could be materialized.

That the Bohemians and Friedrich V were eliminated from the field didn't hinder Bethlen from continuing his campaigns in Royal Hungary though. By December 1620, all the major cities in Hungary (except for Győr and Komárom) were under his control.⁷² Early in the year, February 3rd 1621, Bethlen also managed to get the verbal support of the Porte, though no *ahdname* was written in order not to jeopardize the peace with the Habsburgs.⁷³ The campaign of 1621 had a mixed profile for Bethlen: Despite certain victories on battlefield, the Habsburg push into Royal Hungary resulted in the Habsburg recuperation of Bratislava. The promises given to Bethlen couldn't be kept, either: Due to Sultan Osman II's Polish campaign

⁷⁰ Heinisch, 119.

⁷¹ Ibid., 120.

⁷² Angyal, 38.

to Chocin / Hotin, only 400 Turkish soldiers could be present in Bethlen's army during whole his 1621 campaign, as opposed to the 30 000 Turkish and Tatar troops promised in February.⁷⁴ It was only after the end of the Polish war that the Sultan sent 3000 Tatars to Bethlen's camp, that is, when Bethlen had already started pourparlers for a truce with the Emperor Ferdinand.⁷⁵ Once more, the prospect of help had been raised by the Ottoman centre, but the fulfilment lacked.

Nevertheless, the arrival of the Tatar troops was enough of an intimidation for the Habsburgs, who granted Bethlen Oppeln and Ratibor perpetually, whereas 7 Counties in eastern Hungary was also surrendered to him for life- time; in return, Bethlen had to renounce his claim to Kingship in Hungary, and deliver back his conquests.⁷⁶ The real importance of the peace signed by both sides in January 1622 (as the Treaty of Nikolsburg) was that Bethlen was accepted by the Emperor as a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, and had guaranteed the constitutional liberties of the Protestants in Royal Hungary.⁷⁷

Sultan Osman II was, however, not content about the conclusion of a peace between the Emperor and Bethlen,⁷⁸ but it didn't change much: Since he had some secret plans of his own regarding a large scale reform in the Ottoman central army, he was dethroned, assassinated, and replaced with his uncle Mustafa I (r. 1622 - 1623) by a coup of the janissaries. With the rebellious Emir of Sidon enlarging his power base in the south, a rapid change of the higher echelons of bureaucracy

⁷³ Angyal, 41-42: "...Bien que le Divan, au cours d'un débat d'une journée entière, le 3 février, eut décidé de soutenir Bethlen, il n'envoya pas d'*adhnamé*, ne voulant pas consentir à de grands sacrifices pour le prince."

⁷⁴ Ibid., 47.

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁷⁷ Ibidem.

causing chaos in Constantinople, and a Sultan already once dethroned for mental disorder again on the throne, keeping Ferdinand busy with Bethlen seemed plausible to the authorities in the Porte; in the beginning of 1623, hence, the Porte decided to send Bethlen the frontier Paşas under the command of a *serdar*.⁷⁹

In the meantime, during 1622, even though Bethlen was withdrawn from the battlefield, his diplomatic pawns had been pushed now to the fore. In April 1622, he wrote to the Tatar Khan for a favour of some 10.000 men strong cavalry support against the common enemy.⁸⁰ Moreover, his representatives at the Ottoman Court (one of whom being the aforementioned Bohemian protestant leader, Count Thurn) were also busy with marketing their thorough (but mostly unrealistic) schemes against the Habsburgs to the Ottoman administrators.⁸¹ There, they found the immediate support of the Dutch resident ambassador, Corneli(u)s Haga, who was “consistently interceding at the Porte in Bethlen’s interests”⁸² from the beginning onwards due to the independence struggle the United Provinces (of the Dutch Republic) were waging against the Spanish Habsburgs. Diplomatic support at Constantinople at first, subsidies later on, were the leverages Haga was supposed to offer Bethlen in his struggle against the Habsburg Emperor.⁸³ In the end, their co-operation must have made its effect for Bethlen’s campaign in the following year.

⁷⁸ *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621 to 1628*, (London, 1740). Hereafter, TNSTR.

⁷⁹ Angyal, 49.

⁸⁰ Georgius Pray. “[Littera Bethlenii] Ad Chamum Tartarorum ”(p . 235), in *Gabrielis Bethlenii Principatus Transsilvaniae Coaevis Documentis Illustratu*, (Pestini, 1816). “Et sane Cels. Vestta nobis immensum exhiberet beneficium, si nobis adhuc decem delectorum militum millia transmitteret...”, p. 239.

⁸¹ TNSTR, p.77

⁸² Agnes R.Varkonyi, “Gabor Bethlen and His European Presence” in *Hungarian Historical Review* 2, no.4 (2013): 695 – 732. 718.

⁸³ Alexander H. De Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610-1630* (Amsterdam, 1943). P.163.

In late July 1623, as was promised early in the year, a *firman* from Sultan Mustafa I ordered Serdar Ibrahim Paşa of Buda to set out to the aid of the Hungarian King (i.e. Prince of Transylvania) Bethlen Gabor with the *sancakbeys* under his command, to obey him, and not to return before he would consent to do so.⁸⁴ Putting trust in his own forces, and no less in the Turks,⁸⁵ he started the year's campaign in August, and entered Košice in the following month. His advance into Royal Hungary had been rapid again, and he joined forces with Serdar İbrahim in Trnava (Royal Hungary) on 15th October.⁸⁶ But since November had already set in and rendered the soldiers unwilling for the camp life, Bethlen regarded it best to sign a ceasefire with the Emperor on 20th November before indiscipline, desertion and sickness could ravage the army; a peace was concluded in May 1624.

The involvement of the Ottoman troops in the 1623 campaign had duly been to the chagrin of the Emperor, whose representatives, in October 1623, complained the Porte about the support granted to Bethlen, and demanded the Turkish contingents in the campaign to be recalled.⁸⁷ The Porte now, by early 1624, had already every reason to take a step back and renounce its backing to Bethlen: The expiration of the Zsitva – Torok Treaty was drawing nigh (due 1626), and the overall Protestant profile in Germany was low, especially considering the Austrian victories in late 1622.⁸⁸ A mere child was sitting on the Ottoman throne,⁸⁹ Abaza Mehmed Paşa had started a vengeful campaign against the janissaries in Erzurum in 1622, and the Safavids had restarted the war in 1623. As a result, an Ottoman envoy to the

⁸⁴“ Firman du Mustafa I au Beylerbey de Bosna, İbrahim Paşa (1032 , Ramazan, Evahir), 77”, in Tahsin Gemil, *Relatile Tarilor Romane cu Poarta Otomana în documente turcesti, 1601-1712*, (Bucureşti, 1984).

⁸⁵ Angyal, 52.

⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁷ Zinkeisen, Vol 4, p. 271.

⁸⁸ Wilson, 354, 345.

Emperor offered, on 12th March 1624, the intermediation of the Paşa of Buda for a new treaty, and assured that Bethlen wouldn't be supported again.⁹⁰ The best that could be done was to pay the utmost attention to keep the tension low in the western front.

The following two years were a time of lull before the storm so far as the battlefield is concerned, although diplomatic activities in Constantinople, and those in relation to Transylvania around Europe in general, were quite dynamic. Although Bethlen's credibility vis- a- vis the protestant powers was shattered due to the peace treaty concluded with the Emperor, the political conjuncture in Europe was now calling for him as much as he needed support from outside. Firstly, the new chancellor of the French Kingdom after 1624, Cardinal Richelieu, had an absolutely different strategy than the pro- Habsburg one followed until then:⁹¹ French ambassador Comte de Cesy now received orders to seduce Bethlen with subsidies against the Habsburg Emperor.⁹²

The British, similarly, had now assumed a rather positive attitude toward Bethlen: After King Charles I's desire to marry a Spanish princess was rejected by King Philip III, the British policy was turned against the Habsburgs, and the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, received a letter from Britain, instructing him to support Bethlen.⁹³ From this point on, the Dutch, French and the British were striving for a common cause against the Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II through their efforts at the Porte in favour of Bethlen.

⁸⁹ Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623 - 1639)

⁹⁰ Schmidt- Rösler, 93.

⁹¹ "*Le conseil du Roi a changé de maximes*" is reputed to be written in the first depeche to the ambassadors outside France. See M. Le Comte de Saint- Priest, *Memoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie, 1525 – 1770*, (Paris, 1877).p. 71

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.72.

⁹³ Zinkeisen, Vol. 4, 274.

At about roughly the same time, the envoys and letters sent from Bethlen to the Porte stated that the Swedish King was asking for the friendship of the Sultan Murad IV through Gabor Bethlen's intermediary, which was accorded.⁹⁴ The Swedish King was probably to ask for an alliance against the Poles, if not against the Emperor; but nothing tangible came out of the issue anyway. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Transylvanian Prince was chosen as the middleman shows us the importance Bethlen was slowly achieving in European politics. This became even more visible in 1625.

To begin with, the negotiations between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in Gyarmath (in Royal Hungary) were concluded in May 1625 on the basis of the conditions of Zsitva-Torok (1606 and 1615 renewal). Bethlen's status during the negotiations in Gyarmath was *guarantor*,⁹⁵ and his agents there in vain tried hard to insert clauses to preserve his 7 Counties under Transylvanian suzerainty after Bethlen's death.⁹⁶ However, this was one of the few diplomatic failures Bethlen underwent that year.

Considering the passage of envoys or messengers through war-stricken territories was both difficult and dangerous, Bethlen regarded it more practical to turn to his representatives at the Porte: His propositions were presented to the French, Venetian, Dutch and English ambassadors in Constantinople.⁹⁷ In return of 40.000 troops in a common European alliance against the Emperor, he was

⁹⁴ *Münşeat- ı Feridun Bey*, Vol. II. (p. 365) "Macar Kralı Betlen Gabor tarafına ısdar buyrulan name- i hümayunun suretidir": "...İşveçiyeye Kralı ve bunlarla yekdil ve yek-cihet olagelmiş nice hükkam ve eyalet ve memleket sahibleri ... "

⁹⁵ Friedrich Krüner, "Bethlen Gabor, Fürst von Siebenbürgen", in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Bd. 58, H. 1 (1887), pp. 1- 37.31.

⁹⁶ Angyal, 55.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

demanding 40.000 écus per month.⁹⁸ The ambassadors found the offer promising, but the amount excessive; the English ambassador, Roe, therefore suggested him not to conclude any treaty in Constantinople, but to visit each capital abroad to have a more appropriate result.⁹⁹ This, he would definitely do.

His representatives also negotiated with the Ottoman authorities and asked for permission for the Transylvanian Prince to conclude treaties with anti- Habsburg powers, which were also friends of the Porte. On the issue, *kaymakam* (the deputy grand vizier)¹⁰⁰ had held a council, and disregarding the contrary attitude of the viziers, made it clear “by word of mouth” to Bethlen’s representative that he should

tell his master, That it was the grand signors pleasure, hee should maynteyne his antient leagues and confederacyes with those princes of Germany that are frends with the port, and hold a good correspondence with them, and help and assist them in all their occasions against their common enemy, according to the contract made 5 years past with approbation of this state: and that this warrant was sufficient to this masters purposes.¹⁰¹

Once more, the Ottoman central administration gave Bethlen consent for his machinations, and knew best how to abstain from issuing any official document. Nevertheless, the alleged approbation of the Sultan was a real blessing for Bethlen, though the real issue was to reach a concrete understanding with the allied powers. For this purpose, he had already undertaken concrete steps, appreciating the fact that it wouldn’t be possible to have any plausible result from negotiations in Constantinople. His envoys reached Berlin in September 1625 to ask for Catherine of Brandenburg’s hand in marriage, the younger sister of the Elector of Brandenburg. In this way, Bethlen would be married to the same house with the Swedish King Gustav

⁹⁸ Ibidem.

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁰ Sadaret Kaymakamı Gürcü Mehmed Paşa; the Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa was in campaign in the East, besieging Baghdad.

Adolph, becoming the brother-in-law of one of the leading Protestant powers in Europe.

From among these envoys, Captain Matthias Quadt went his way further to represent Gabor in negotiations with the Danish King, Christian IV, at Nienburg, who was preparing for a campaign into Germany in order to support the Protestant cause. He was, therefore, among the most willing to welcome Bethlen's participation from behind the Habsburg eastern frontier.¹⁰² In November, Quadt reached the Netherlands, where representatives of Protestant powers in the Hague were discussing a plan of concerted action against the Habsburgs. Quadt had brought Bethlen's proposal for a pact and support to the protestant states; he was promising to attack the hereditary lands of the Emperor if he would be granted the subsidies he was asking for.¹⁰³ In December, the alliance between Denmark, Britain and the Dutch Republic was concluded in the Hague; Bethlen was promised the sum he asked for (40.000 ecus monthly) only if he would make the military diversion against the Habsburgs from their eastern frontier, whereas the coalition forces would attack from the west and north.¹⁰⁴ Dutch resident ambassador in Constantinople, Cornelius Haga, was in charge of delivering Bethlen the subsidies.¹⁰⁵

Bethlen's aforementioned envoys in Berlin, in the meantime, had managed to cut the marriage deal, and the marriage plan was approved by the Sultan Murad IV, who sent his wishes of happiness: In the wedding ceremony in Kosice, both the

¹⁰¹ "To Sir Edward Conway, 28 May 1625", in TNSTR, p. 401.

¹⁰² Ibid., 504. From Lord Conway [to Roe], 20 April 1626.

¹⁰³ Schybergson, M.G. *Underhandlingarna om en Evangelisk Allians, åren 1624 – 1625*. (Helsingors, 1880), p. 80, 81. Quadt's remaining propositions (such as the enticement of the Porte or the Tatars against the Emperor or the Poles, respectively) were not realistic at all.

¹⁰⁴ Angyal, 60; TNSTR, p. 503.

¹⁰⁵ De Groot, 173.

Sultan and the Emperor had sent their gifts and representatives in February 1626.¹⁰⁶

Catherine of Brandenburg meant more than a spouse to Bethlen since marriage to her acquired him political prestige with this new affiliation to the Protestant powers.¹⁰⁷

After the marriage, we see Bethlen preparing for politics again: His ambassador at the Porte enlisted, in mid- summer, the support of the English ambassador, Roe, in presenting his master's wishes to obtain the military cooperation of the Paşa of Buda to protect the frontiers conjointly on the one hand, and "to procure a letter to the prince of Transylvania, to encourage him to enter into confederacy with the antient friends of the port[e], and to vnite with them" on the other.¹⁰⁸ As usual, Roe firstly discussed the issue with the Dutch ambassador and the Venetian bailo before speaking to the Ottoman authorities himself.¹⁰⁹ The answer given by *Kaymakam* (Topal) Recep Paşa was also touched by Roe's influence, and Bethlen was hence granted his both wishes around the end of July.¹¹⁰ In a later dated letter, Roe informs us that even though the orders officially given to the Paşa of Buda was to protect the frontier, "to amuse the enemy", and to remain in contact with Bethlen, the *Kaymakam* was also earnest enough to utter that if the Paşa "could take the emperor at any great advantage, that he should use it", and "that he should not loose the opportunity of doing the grand signor an acceptable service."¹¹¹ Once more, the official Ottoman stance vis- a- vis the western front differed from that of the actual attitude the central mechanism had assumed. Once more, the desire to keep

¹⁰⁶ Krüner, 33.

¹⁰⁷ Schmidt- Rösler, 94.

¹⁰⁸ TNSTR, 529.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 559.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 537. Paşa of Buda was ordered to observe the border, and attack the enemy if Transylvanian borders were transgressed by the adversaries.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 560." To Lord Conway", 22 September 1626.

the peace at one hand, and to undermine the Habsburg power on the other, resulted in the differentiation between the official and practical policies.

The answer from the Porte was roughly all Bethlen could ask for. In any case, with or without the Sultan Murad's licence, it was already the time to act by the summer: The protestant powers were already in action, and they had unfortunately been defeated twice early in that year (1626); Bethlen was, now as a flickering hope for the protestant party, supposed to undertake his promised diversion assault on the Habsburg territories.¹¹² In the beginning of August, he started the year's campaign against Royal Hungary, and was waiting for the Protestant commanders (Prince of Saxe- Weimar and General Mansfeld, commissioned by the Danish King) to reach Hungary. With an Imperial (Austrian) army on their back, however, passing through Hungary to meet Bethlen was no easy job for the commanders: They considered going back to Bohemia disregarding Bethlen's commands who would meet them in Nograd. It was, however, Murtaza Paşa of Buda who joined forces with Bethlen instead.

With a frontier army of 15000 troops, Murtaza Paşa had started pillaging Royal Hungary around September, and was besieging Nograd just across the border when Bethlen joined him. The Imperial army was now closing upon the united forces of Murtaza and Bethlen at the end of September, coming very close to combat at Dregely¹¹³ on 30th September.¹¹⁴ Since the geographical conditions favoured Bethlen, the Imperialist commander Wallenstein didn't want to launch a direct attack, and welcomed Bethlen's desire for a nocturnal armistice, which was made because the

¹¹² Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Denmark 1513 – 1660. The Rise and Decline of a Renaissance Monarchy.* (Oxford Uni Press, 2007), p. 267.

¹¹³ *Yeni Palanka* settlement in Royal Hungary, about 10 km. to Nograd

¹¹⁴ Angyal, 65, 66.

latter wouldn't be able to put his trust on his cavalries against Wallenstein's effective infantry fire. There were little clashes between the two sides though, and Murtaza Paşa related to his deputy in Buda that against two casualties of the Turkish side, the Imperialists had lost a hundred men.¹¹⁵ However, Wallenstein accepted the ceasefire before any major combat could take place, and the united Turco- Transylvanian forces retreated to Szécsény (in Royal Hungary) to wait for General Mansfeld's protestant forces before pursuing the withdrawing Imperial soldiers.¹¹⁶

Before mid October, Mansfeld brought Bethlen and Murtaza the remnants of his army, and the pursuit then began. The opportunity for a battle was again missing, but Bethlen was wearing off and isolating the retreating Imperial army, which was already struck by famine and diseases, and with raids.¹¹⁷ After the strength of Imperial army was effectively broken, and his renown in Europe was hence even further spread, Bethlen didn't see any more advantage in continuing the war.¹¹⁸ Murtaza also captured enough of prisoners, and left with Bethlen for looting and winter camps further north to Körmöcbanya, where the mines and mint of the Emperor were to be pillaged.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Fekete (1932), Documents # 10, 11 (p. 38, 39). Letters are both dated 1st October 1626. Doc # 10 "Bujuruldi Murteda Pasas an den Nöbetdzi in Vac": "... *Nemçe taburu ile mukabele olundukta meydan üzerimizde kalub ve hala Seğan altında olub, ol mahalde oturub...*"

¹¹⁶ Ibid. "... *Mançfel ki Çeh askerinin serdarıdır, geldiği birle Nemçe taburunun üzerine varılır.*"

¹¹⁷ Angyal, 66. On 16th October, many prisoners were taken at the assault on Imperial forces at the crossing of the River Gran: "*Deo iuuante, habuerunt conflictum maximum cum exercitu Valstenii, penes fluuium qui vocatur Gran, die 16. Oct. Cæs, sunt ex mililtibus Cæsarianis plurima, et multi captiui: quos captiuos iterum omnes decollauerunt.*" See TNSTR, Letter of Tho. Bursos, resident in Constantinopoli, p. 579.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 67.

¹¹⁹ Fahri Oluk, *El- Vasfu'l- Kamil fi Ahvali Veziri'l- Adil Adlu Yazma Eserin Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirilmesi* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Kayseri Üniversitesi – Yakınçağ Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 2007), p. 92. "... *Karmûsbâne dedikleri mahalle ki, Çâsârın me'adin- i azimesi ve darbhanesi olduğu mevzi'- i ma'rufdur.*"

The initial reception of this victory against the Imperial army¹²⁰ without a decisive open battle was quite warm in Constantinople. Roe informs us at the end of October that three honorary vests were dispatched to the frontier: “One for Gabor, one for Mortesa; the other for Muchemet bassa of Agria, who followed the retrayt of [Imperial Commander] Walstein.”¹²¹ However, things started to have a different face by November, and the French resident ambassador in Constantinople, Comte de Cesy, was writing home to his king [Louis XIII] that the Turks were extremely afraid of starting a war against the Emperor.¹²² The declining situation in the east (the relief forces heading for Baghdad had failed their mission, and the army was quickly being decimated in retreat, as a result of which the Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa was replaced by the former Grand Vizier, Halil Paşa) must have had its effect on the policies regarding the western front:¹²³ Murtaza Paşa was ordered from the Porte to terminate his operations in Hungary and called back to Buda before mid – December 1626.¹²⁴ Roe enlightens us that even though *Kaymakam* had been supporting Murtaza’s pro- active policies, “the mufty, and many great men, had so long murmured at the noyse of a new war, in that season when their affayres of Asya

¹²⁰ The commanding officer of the Imperial troops, as afore named, was the Checz noble / military entrepreneur Albrecht von Waldstein/ Wallenstein, who would rise as a prominent general in the following years of the war.

¹²¹ TNSTR, p. 579.

¹²² Radu Constantinescu, *Lupta Pentru Unitate Natională A Tarilor Romane 1590 – 1630*. (Bucureşti – 1981), p. 166 – 167. “Document # 315: 1626 Novembre 2, Istanbul” : “...*Deux choses qui touchent a cette Porte. L’une est l’extreme craint qu’ont ces gens cy de faire quelque action qui les puisse metre a la guerre avec L’Empereur, et l’autre, la prodigieuse avarice qui possede tous les ministres de ce hargneux, ...*”

¹²³ Uzunçarşılı, Vol. 3, p. 164.

¹²⁴ Murtaza asked for a “*vire kağıdı*” to sign a truce with the Imperialists, and claimed that he wouldn’t leave before having obtained one.(Fekete, Document # 12, p. 42, 251. Letter from Murtaza to Hungarian Palatine Esterhazy, Körmöcbanya , 11th December 1626). For the following developments: *Feridun Bey Münşeati*, p. 372. “Macar Kralı [Bethlen Gabor] tarafından Sadr-ı a’zam tarafına takdim olunmuş olan namenin tercümesi suretidir” (Karmusbane’de 36 Rebiü’l- evvelinin 25. Günü [14th December 1626] yazılmıştır): “...*eğer isterseniz Murtaza Paşa’nın ol canibe şimdiki halde varması her vechile asandır ki anın gitmesiyle, Nemçe’den bir dürlü zarar olmaz, zira birbirlerine kavi vire kağıdların virüb almışlardır.*”

were uncertain; and that therefore he had been enforced to write to Mortesa bassa, to retire his army...”¹²⁵ The Ottoman state clearly couldn't afford simultaneous warfare on two fronts.

Murtaza's withdrawal from the field of operations left Bethlen without choice: On 20th December (1626), Bethlen regarded it to his best interest to conclude the Pressburg Treaty, bidding an end to the third and last campaign he had undertaken against the Habsburgs. Even though the treaty was a diplomatic success in the given situation, guaranteeing the political and religious liberties along with the preservation of the most important clauses of Nikolsburg Treaty,¹²⁶ Bethlen's anger was not quenched: He resented, in a letter to Murtaza Paşa in 1627, the retreat of the Turkish troops and turned his rage against the 'ulema decision-makers in Constantinople, making it clear that he was informed about the *Şeyhü'l-İslam*'s opposition to Murtaza's campaign.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, it was already wise enough for him to give a break to his operations since the subsidies promised by the Protestant powers were not being transferred to Bethlen, except for a mere 30.000 ecus sent to Constantinople by the King of Denmark, which didn't arrive before December 1626 anyway.¹²⁸

¹²⁵TNSTR, 616. [Roe's letter] To the Lord Cornwall, 17/27 February 1627.

¹²⁶ Angyal, 68.

¹²⁷ *Feridun Bey Münşeati*, p. 368. “Macar Kralı Betlen Gabor tarafından Budun Muhafızı Murtaza Paşa tarafına gelen mektubun tercümesi suretidir”: “. . . *Heman hazretinize Dersa'adet'ten birkaç def'a emirler gelüb, mefhumunda Nemçe ile olan barışığı başa çıkarub muharebeden feragat idesin diyü ferman-ı 'ali sadır olmuş, . . . ve gördük ki siz min- ba'd Nemçe üzerine 'asker çekmekten havf üzere olduğunuz ve barışığı mübaşeret eylediniz. Biz dahi gelan evamir- i şerife mütâba'at idüb, cümle fikrimizi ve reyimizi barışmak semtine döndürdük*”. Ibid., p. 369. “*Zira fırsat elimize girüb, meydan bizde kalub, Nemçe'ye her vechile galib olmuşken muharebeden ferag olub barışasız diyü evamir- i şerife varid olmağıla böyle olmuşdur. İstanbul'da 'ulema efendilerin kârı emr- i dine müte'allik olan nesneyi görmek iken, 'asker ve ceng ahvali ma'lumları değil iken, bu makule umura karışub müdahale ile 'ulema efendilerin bila- faide olan ikdamlarından böyle hal olmuşdur.*”

¹²⁸ Angyal, 67.

Diplomatic activity in Constantinople, however, carried on. In March 1627, Bethlen's representatives had succeeded to procure an *ahdname* to recognize the succession of their mistress, Catherine of Brandenburg on the Transylvanian throne. Since Bethlen didn't have a son to follow him on the throne, this was a necessary step to be taken.¹²⁹ Moreover, the chances for the election of a pro- Habsburg Catholic prince seemed to be barred in this manner, which is tantamount to an Ottoman pre-emptive strike against the Habsburgs.

However, since the Ottomans still had their arms full in the eastern front, they couldn't afford more than this for Gabor. The Gyarmath peace (1625) was still not put into effect, and the Imperial (Austrian) resident in Constantinople was putting pressure on the *Kaymakam* in that Murtaza Paşa's actions in 1626 was a breach of peace.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, the Ottoman administration was already aware that the situation was serious, and Murtaza Paşa was conducting the negotiations with Imperial representatives in Szöny in person during summer 1627.¹³¹ The peace was concluded on 12th September 1627, an extension of 25 years was made on the Ottoman western front.¹³²

The peace also marked the end of Bethlen's ventures into Royal Hungary. He had to be content with his gains of December 1626, and he didn't undertake any campaign against the Habsburgs during the following years. When he passed away in

¹²⁹*Feridun Bey Münşeatı*: "Macar Kralı ve Erdel Hakimi Betlen Gabor'un ehline Erdel Hükümeti ihsanıyla isdar buyrulan name- i hümayun suretidir (8th March 1627):" (p.359) " ... kendünün oğlu olmamağla Erdel Vilayeti'nin hükümet ayan ve erkanları üzere 3 milletin rey ve ittifakıyla ... kendünden sonra Erdel Hükümeti müşarunileyha Brandiburgi Katlin Ason himmet 'avakibuha bi'l-hayra tevcih ve 'inayet idüb... bu 'ahidname- i hümayunu verdim."

¹³⁰ Zinkeisen, 4, pp. 310 – 317.

¹³¹ Murtaza Paşa's letter to the Hungarian Palatinate Esterhazy, Summer 1627, in Fekete (1932), p. 256.

¹³² Zeynep Aycibin, *Kâtib Çelebi, Fezleke. Tahlil ve Metin*. (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis; Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi, Ortaçağ Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 2007). 784, 786.

November 1629, not only was Hungary left in turmoil, but also the Protestant cause in Europe was in ruins.

2.2 The later phase under George Rakoczy's reign

The period closely before Bethlen's death was the zenith of the Habsburg power in Europe: The Danish armies were utterly defeated by 1628 and the Restitution Edict, which annihilated all Protestant gains in Germany since 1555, was issued by the Emperor early in 1629. The Protestant cause, both on battlefield and on legal arena, was bitterly tramped. The Imperial armies had reached the Baltic Sea and were conceiving plans for the construction of an Imperial fleet there on Northern German shores: the Habsburg superiority in Europe was abjectly threatening for every kingdom in Europe.

Seeing the danger ripe at his door, the Lutheran Swedish King signed a truce with his enemy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in 1629, and started the preparations for a direct intervention into Germany as the new champion of the Protestants against the Catholic Habsburgs. In summer 1630, he landed with his army in Northern Germany, and started to look around for allies in support of the Protestant cause. However, his range of diplomatic network was not limited to the German princes, and he was turning his attention towards the east of Europe as well.

The Swedish diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe in late 1620s and early 1630s were targeting The Russian Tsardom, The Crimean Khanate, The Transylvanian Principality and the Ottoman Empire at the same time. Early in 1630, we come across a Tatar embassy in Sweden as a result of the Swedish diplomatic initiatives in late 1620s.¹³³ The embassy was offering 30.000 troops in return of

¹³³ Nils Ahnlund, *Gustaf II Adolf inför Tyska Kriget*. (Stockholm, 1918), p. 313.

subsidies, but the progress was slow since the Swedes desired an attack on Habsburg hereditary lands, whereas the Tatars had their eyes on the Polish territory.¹³⁴ The Swedish offer of 150.000 thalers in return for the Tatar aid was eventually accepted by the Khan, and an understanding was reached: Nevertheless, the Tatar troops gathered by the Khan couldn't be sent against the Habsburgs since the Sultan had ordered him to reinforce the Ottoman army campaigning in the eastern front.¹³⁵ The Tatar option was to remain fruitless for the rest of the war.

As the diplomatic traffic with the Tatars was taking place, another agent of the Swedish crown was already on his way to Constantinople through Transylvania around 1632. This legation, led by Paul Strassburg, aimed at soliciting the support of the new Transylvanian Prince, George Rakoczy (r. 1630-1648), against the Habsburgs on the one hand,¹³⁶ and the settlement of the disputes between the new prince Rakoczy and Catherine of Brandenburg (Gabor Bethlen's widow, who was forced to abdicate in late 1630) on the other. In order for Transylvania to conclude an alliance with the Swedish Kingdom, however, the consent of the Porte was again necessary, for which reason Strassburg set out for Constantinople. As Strassburg was conducting negotiations at the Ottoman capital, Prince Rakoczy sent his own agent to the Swedish king, who found the prince's conditions unaffordable and the negotiations came to an end.¹³⁷ In any case, the Ottoman answer was already unfavourable: The eastern front against the Safavids still had the priority for the Ottomans, and the Sultan's plain expression of good will towards the Swedish King

¹³⁴ Ibid., 314.

¹³⁵ David Norrman, *Gustav Adolfs Politik mot Ryssland och Polen under Tyska Kriget (1630 - 1632)*, (Uppsala, 1943), p. 121.

¹³⁶ Gabor Karman, "Främlingskapets Grader: Claes Rålamb's Resa till Osmanska riket 1657 - 1658", in *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok 2008*. pp. 40-107. 41.

¹³⁷ Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden. Vol II, 1626 - 1632*, (London, 1958). 572.

simply meant that the “oriental empire” was to be excluded from the protestant calculations for now.

For the rest of the decade, there were no major attempts at any cross- border activity of any consequence against the Habsburgs in the Ottoman western front. The Transylvanian prince was occupied with consolidating his power in the principality *vis- a- vis* the local nobility, the Ottoman Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor. It was yet early for Prince Rakoczy to venture into international politics. As for the Ottomans, even though the usual reciprocal frontier raids went on, these had no affiliation to any Protestant master plan on the part of the Ottomans, and the peace was not disturbed. Sultan Murad IV was primarily busy with the Safavids: taking the reins in his hands around this time, he twice led his army against the Safavids in person during the campaigns of 1630s. That he didn't have the opportunity to turn westwards was lucky enough for Emperor Ferdinand II, who now had to face also the catholic French Kingdom on battlefield alongside the Swedes after 1635.

After the hostilities were eventually bid an end in the eastern front in 1639, the Ottomans now had their hands free after almost two decades of fighting. This must be a crucial factor in the Habsburgs' willingness to renew the peace in early 1640s. The Habsburg initiatives in 1641, hence, resulted in the renewal of the truce once more, and again at Szöny, in March 1642.¹³⁸ Nonetheless, it was again the Transylvanian Prince who would cause concern in Vienna during the first half of the decade.

Already as early as 1638, the anti- Habsburg party had started including Transylvania in their calculations regarding central Europe. In the summer of that

¹³⁸ Joseph von Hammer. *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Bd. 5. (Wien, 1829). 305.

year, the French King Louis XIII sent an envoy to the prince to invite him for a joint attack against the Emperor.¹³⁹ Even though Louis' initiative had lost effect by 1640, a further attempt in the same direction two years later, this time by the Swedes, proved more future promising. The Swedish chief commander in Germany, Lennart Torstensson, wrote to the Prince in July 1642 to express his wish to establish communication on "a more frequent and secure" basis for the common Evangelical cause, reminding him of the former oppressions of the House of Habsburgs, from which the Transylvanians had as well suffered.¹⁴⁰ In March 1643, the general could express the Prince that his help would be a great blessing for the common cause during a time when the (Austrian) Imperial power was broken overall in Germany, thanks to the efforts of both the French and Swedish rulers.¹⁴¹ Torstensson's efforts bore fruit when finally an "agreement on political and military co- operation was reached" on 24th April 1643.¹⁴² The Transylvanian principality, hence, was on the verge of war again.

The first issue after the agreement was, understandably, to acquire permission for the actions of this vassal principality at the Porte. Therefore, General Torstensson sent a diplomatic agent (Jacob Rebenstock) in his own name to Constantinople through Transylvania in July 1643 in order to negotiate with the Grand Vizier in

¹³⁹ "Meo Cognato Georgio Rakoczy Principi Transylvaniae". [King Louis' letter to George Rakoczy, Ambiani, 29 July 1638] in Alexander Szilagyi (pub.) *Actes et Documents pour servir a l'histoire de l'alliance de George Rakoczy, Prince de Transylvanie avec les Français et les Suedois dans la Guerre de Trente Ans* (Budapest, 1874), p. 19 : "Meo Cognato Georgio Rakoczy Principi Transylvaniae". [King Louis' letter to George Rakoczy, Ambiani, 29 July 1638]

¹⁴⁰ "Illustrissimo ac Celsissimo Principi ac Domino Domino Georgio Rakoczi, Dei gratia Principi Transsylvaniae, Partium Regni Hungariae Domino et Siculorum Comiti, Domino Benignissimo" [Linnardt Torstensson's letter to the Prince], in A. Szilagyi's *Actes et documents...* p. 36.

¹⁴¹ In Torstensson's words: "Wie es nun der gemeinen Ewangelischen Sache, vndt zusonderheit dem jetzigen Kriegsstaat, hindurch ein groszes heill, vnserm Religions feinde, aber ein notable diversion ohnversichtig geben wurde..." in [Tostenston's letter to Prince Rakoczy, 1643, marc. 26.], in A. Szilagyi's *Actes et documents...* p. 44.

person.¹⁴³ Moreover, the French ambassador in Constantinople would similarly do his best to secure the Sultan Ibrahim's (r. 1640-1648) permission from the Grand Vizier.¹⁴⁴ In his part, the French resident ambassador M. de la Haye was informing Rakoczy in September 1643 that he had seen the Grand Vizier to speak on the subject, and was predicting that the latter could be tolerant of Rakoczy's incursion to Royal Hungary, though on the condition of increased tribute in case of victory.¹⁴⁵

The subsequent tidings from Constantinople were ambiguous: In September 1643, a promise of support was given, though a subsequent expression of the Grand Vizier was quite hesitant.¹⁴⁶ After the necessary permission was eventually acquired from the Sultan in early 1644,¹⁴⁷ the Transylvanian Prince didn't lose time and launched a relatively successful invasion of the Royal Hungary in early 1644.¹⁴⁸ Kosice fell under his control quickly and he acquired a significant foothold in Upper Hungary, though he didn't have the popular support Bethlen had once enjoyed from the local Hungarian population.¹⁴⁹ Yet, after a defeat against the Habsburgs in April,

¹⁴² Petr Stepanek, "War and Peace in the West (1644/1645): A Dilemma at the Threshold of Felicity?" in *Archiv Orientalni* (Prague, 2001), pp: 327 – 340. 331.

¹⁴³ "Instruction, wonach der Wohledle Vest und Mannhaftste Herr Obrist Lieutenant Jacob Rebenstock..." [Torstensson's instructions to Rebenstock], in *Actes et documents...*, p. 69.

¹⁴⁴ See among Torstensson's acceptance of Rakoczy's demands: "... *Roy de France, dont l' Ambassadeur résidant a Constantinople a déjà trauaillé, et trauaillera encore suiuant les ordres exprés, qu'il en a de Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne a obtenir le consentement du grand Seigneur...*" in Szilagyi's *Actes et documents...*, p. 280.

¹⁴⁵ In de la Haye's words: "*Mais Mr. De Robenstoch me mande que V. A. aprehende, que si cette proposition se fait de sa part, le Vizir n'en prenne occasion d'imposer quelque nouueau tribut a la Hongrie...*", "Lettre de l'Ambassadeur de France a Constantinople, (6 Sept 1643)", in A. Szilagyi's *Actes et documents...*, p. 276.

¹⁴⁶ Stepanek, p. 332. Also Rebenstock's report dated 18 Nov. 1643, in *Actes et documents...*, p. 121.

¹⁴⁷ Stepanek, 334.

¹⁴⁸ Bela Köpeczi, (ed.) *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens* (Budapest, 1989). 332; Wilson, 696.

¹⁴⁹ Stepanek, 332; Köpeczi, 332,333.

Rakoczy chose to sit on the negotiation table,¹⁵⁰ without abandoning the territories he had occupied.

Ottoman attitude in this period was ambivalent as always despite the promise given. Personal factors and the relative independence of frontier commanders had their bearing on the equivocal product of policy making. During Rakoczy's incursions into (Austrian) Royal Hungary, the Sultan had ordered around 15000 Ottoman troops to be concentrated among the border provinces.¹⁵¹ However, without such written order, the Grand Vizier had instructed the Governor of Bosnia to send aid to Rakoczy during the campaign,¹⁵² whereas the remaining governors could resist Rakoczy's appeal for help due to the Governor of Buda's influence. Hence, only a small contingent of 10 to 15 hundred troops from Bosnia joined Rakoczy's camp in 1644's campaign,¹⁵³ which the Imperial governor of Royal Hungary, Palatine Esterhazy, asked to be withdrawn in spring in a letter to the Governor of Buda.¹⁵⁴

Luckily for the Habsburgs, a change in the government of Buda had prevented a catastrophe: In late spring 1644, Musa Paşa of Buda, who was known to breed anti – Habsburg feelings all along,¹⁵⁵ was replaced by the more pacifist Osman Paşa, who had signed Szöny in 1642 as the Governor General of Roumelia.¹⁵⁶ He

¹⁵⁰ Stepanek, 332. Köpeczi, 333.

¹⁵¹ Hammer, 349. Stepanek, 333.

¹⁵² *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise des Grafen Hermann Czernin von Chudenic nach Constantinopel im Jahre 1644*, (A. Landfrass Sohn in Neuhaus, 1879). 18. Hereafter, ZGGHCC.

¹⁵³ Janos B. Szabo, "Splendid Isolation? The Military Cooperation of the Principality of Transylvania with the Ottoman Empire (1571 - 1688) in the Mirror of Hungarian Historiography's Dilemmas", in Karman & Kuncevic (ed.) *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries* (Brill, 2013). 335.

¹⁵⁴ In Fekete: *Document # 44*, "Abdülbaki, Ofner Kaymakam an Esterhazy" (9 Mai- 6 Juni 1644).

¹⁵⁵ As it reads in the "Finalrelation Nr. 1A des gewesenen Residenten Schmid vom 20. August 1643": "...Musa Bassa di Buda *dovessero levare il governo per le strette pratiche che teneva con Svezzesi.*", in Peter Meienberger (redacted), *Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel in den Jahren 1629 – 1643*, (Frankfurt am Main, 1973). 146.

¹⁵⁶ Fekete: *Document # 44*, "Abdülbaki, Ofner Kaymakam an Esterhazy" (9 Mai- 6 Juni 1644).

had had enough of discretion to accept into Buda the Habsburg ambassador destined for Constantinople in order to present the ratified version of the Szöny Treaty to the Sultan, when a war council for the campaign on Hungary was already gathered.¹⁵⁷ Osman Paşa of Buda had henceforth kept the concentrated Roumelian forces at his side of the border (perchance with the exception of the abovementioned Bosnian contingent) in spite of the continuing promises of help and troops to Rakoczy sent from the Sultan's seat.¹⁵⁸ The Austrian embassy had thus saved the day thanks to the lacklustre bellicosity of the new Governor of Buda.

Back in the Ottoman capital, after his brisk occupation of the Upper Hungary, Rakoczy's agents negotiated for the Sultan Ibrahim's licence for permanent possession of the conquered territories in return of double the amount of the yearly tribute, to which the Grand Vizier responded that only after the first payment was made, could such a decree be signed.¹⁵⁹ It seems that Rakoczy's proposition was taken heed of: The newly appointed governor of Buda (Hüseyin Paşa), before leaving Constantinople for his post in November 1644, was asking the Habsburg envoy Count Czernin (who had reached Constantinople in September) to cede Kosice to Transylvania, just as it had been the case with Bethlen.¹⁶⁰ The same issue was brought before the ambassador once more within the month, and the 7 Counties were demanded again this time by the Sadrazam.¹⁶¹ The most politically correct answer Czernin could give was that he had no such authority.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Stepanek, 337.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 336.

¹⁵⁹ Hammer, 347.

¹⁶⁰ ZGGHC, 39, 40.

¹⁶¹ George Wagner, "Otuz Yıl Savaşları Döneminde Osmanlı ve Avusturya İmparatorluklarının Politikası", in *Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi, II*. (İstanbul, 1981), pp. 147 – 166. 161.

¹⁶² ZGGHC, 40.

The real miracle which saved the Habsburgs from the Ottoman threat was a relatively minor incident in the Mediterranean: An Ottoman galleon carrying the decommissioned Chief Black Eunuch and the recently appointed *kadı* of Kaba was attacked by Maltese corsairs, who landed briefly on the Venetian Crete with the booty.¹⁶³ The news reached the capital in late October and infuriated the Sultan to such a degree that the decision for a campaign was immediately taken.¹⁶⁴ A rapid diplomatic competition at the Porte then started between the Venetian bailo and the Habsburg envoy Count Czernin: Whereas the latter tried to divert the Ottomans to a naval campaign against Venice, the former attempted at exerting influence on the Ottoman administration for a war on land in their western front.¹⁶⁵ We can assume that the French ambassador, De la Haye, and the Swedish envoy, Rebenstock, did their best in shouldering the Venetian burden in trying to persuade the Ottomans to a land campaign against the Habsburgs. However, by the end of December 1644, it was clear that the campaign of 1645 would be a naval one; a true relief for the Habsburgs.¹⁶⁶ Lastly, The Governor of Buda, Hüseyin Paşa, was forbidden to help Rakoczy if the latter would undertake any operation outside Transylvania and the 7 Counties under his occupation.¹⁶⁷ Once more, the Porte decided not to risk a catastrophe by waging two battles (Venetians on the one hand, Habsburgs on the other) at the same time, although the desire to preserve the advantageous status- quo by the retention of the 7 Counties under Transylvanian possession had been expressive of the anticipation towards the increase in the yearly tribute of the principality.

¹⁶³ Muhittin Aykun, *Abdurrahman Hibri Efendi, Defter- i Ahbar (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)*. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Ar. Enst. Türk Tarihi ABD, Yeniçağ Tarihi Bilim Dalı (İstanbul, 2004). 97, 98

¹⁶⁴ ZGGHCC, 38.

¹⁶⁵ Wagner, 152.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 154.

Even though their eastern front was secured of any Ottoman threat now, the Habsburgs were still undergoing hard times in the Continent. Swedish and French forces had scored victories in late 1644 and during the first half of 1645; the (Habsburg) Imperialist army was routed at Jankau (southern Bohemia) in March and the Swedish armies were flowing through Bohemia into Moravia and Austria: the road was now open to Vienna.¹⁶⁸ Encouraged by the approaching Swedish armies, Rakoczy had already galvanized into action: In Spring 1645, Rakoczy gathered an army of 22000 troops and crossed the River Tisza to make it for Moravia, in order to relieve the Imperial siege of Olmütz,¹⁶⁹ where a Swedish garrison was stationed. Rakoczy thus once more seized the opportunity to enlarge his negotiation basis on table by the victories expected on field.

In May 1645, around 15000 Transylvanian soldiers joined the Swedish General Torstensson in Bohemia; and before crossing the Danube to besiege Vienna, the united protestant armies decided to wait for reinforcements, during which time they opted to undertake the siege of Brünn in Moravia.¹⁷⁰ The siege eventually turned out to be not only a failure but also a remarkable disaster: 8 000 Swedish and Transylvanian troops perished during the effort and the campaign petered out while the pressure from the Porte on Rakoczy was already getting tighter. The Grand Vizier had sent letters to the latter to stop the operations against the Emperor and called him back from campaign for several times.¹⁷¹ When the negotiations with the Emperor resulted in his favour (the secession of the 7 Counties in Upper Hungary to Rakoczy along with a more solid guarantee of religious freedom were accepted by

¹⁶⁷ Stepanek, 338,339.

¹⁶⁸ Wagner, 163.

¹⁶⁹ *Theatrum Europeaum, Band 5.* (Frankfurt am Main, 1651). 654.

¹⁷⁰ Wilson, 697.

Ferdinand III), Rakoczy lost no time in withdrawing from the field in August, presenting the return calls from the Porte as his pretext.¹⁷² The truce was transformed into the Treaty of Linz in December 1645, sealing the end of war for Transylvania.

The 1644-1645 campaigns were the last ones the Principality of Transylvania and the Ottoman troops participated during the Thirty Years War. Although diplomatic correspondence (containing Rakoczy's promises of action against Vienne) between the Transylvanian principality and the enemies of the Habsburgs went on for a while,¹⁷³ there were no other instances of Transylvanian military operation; and so long as Transylvania was away from the theatre of war, there was no reason for the Ottomans to pay much attention to their western front, considering that the war against Venice would keep the Ottoman military machine excessively busy during the following years, which turned out to be two and a half decades. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia was settled, and Transylvanian Principality was represented in the peace congresses thanks to the Swedes and the French.¹⁷⁴ The next year, the Imperial (Austrian) envoy informed the Sultan Mehmed IV (r. 1648-1687) that the European war had officially ended in the previous year, and the Treaty of Zsitva-Torok was extended for further two decades.¹⁷⁵ For the Ottomans, it would be all silent in the western front until 1663, at least with regards to their Habsburg frontier.

¹⁷¹ Aycibin, 968: "*Der- i devletden [267a] irsal olunan mü'ekked hükümlere Rakoçi asla i'tibar eylemeyüp Nemçe'ye ta'addiden el çekmedi*".

¹⁷² Köpeczi, 333. Wilson, 697.

¹⁷³ Sergiu Iosipescu, "Relations politiques et militaires entre la France et les principautés de Transylvanie, de Valachie et de Moldavie", in *Revue historique des armées*, 244 | 2006, pp. 11-21. 15.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem.

2.3 The evaluation

In the brief account given above, an attempt was made at presenting the dimensions in which the Ottoman Empire was involved in the struggles of the general European war which engendered much disturbance in the social, economic and political fabric of the Continent. The foreign policy, diplomacy and military aspects of the issue have been laid under scrutiny, and it is possible to come up with the following conclusions.

In terms of the conduct of foreign affairs, we have observed that policy making was an intricate subject: The decision mechanism was for the most time the central administration, the Porte, in Constantinople, in which the decisions of the Grand Vizier were prominent in the absence of an assertive ruler. The Porte, however, was in itself divided into two opposing camps (pro war vs. contra war) for most of the time, and the change in the post of the Grand Vizierate could very well mean a shift in policy making. On the top of it, the frontier Paşas had a relatively large space of freedom of action, although the Sultan's authority was always peremptory¹⁷⁶ and the long run strategy was kept intact. In our specific case, the Ottoman foreign policy towards the Habsburgs during the enduring war had this consistent long run quality, namely, a double faced policy of nominal neutrality: On the one hand, the primary apprehension of the Ottoman Empire was the war in Iran for the most of the period and the statesmen did their best to officially preserve the 1606 peace with the Habsburgs; on the other hand, a cunning policy of undercover

¹⁷⁵ Bertold Spuler, "Die Europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Belgrad (1739) 3. Teil", in *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, Neue Folge, Bd. 11, H. 3/4 (1935), pp. 313-366. 335.

¹⁷⁶ Stepanek, 338.

partial support was given to the enemies of the Habsburg dynasty, aiming at the consolidation of Ottoman power in Central Europe.

In that respect, the Ottomans didn't only approve the anti- Habsburg actions of their vassal Transylvanian princes, but also supported them militarily: Bethlen's campaigns targeting Royal Hungary in 1621, 1623 and 1626, as well those of Rakoczy into Upper Hungary in 1644 were all reinforced by Ottoman troops, and at times even with the joint action of the Paşas of Buda. It was only when the Ottoman support became overtly visible and caused the resentment of the Habsburg authorities (that is, when the Austrian envoys threatened to regard those actions as breach of the Zsitva- Torok treaty) that the operations were called off. At the end of the day, the Ottoman soldiers were fighting alongside or against European commanders of certain reputation in the Thirty Years War (Bethlen and Mansfeld at one side, Wallenstein on the opposing one), making them a behind the stage participant in the European war.

Diplomacy was definitely the most vivid arena on which the Ottoman Empire became an indispensable player in the war. By 1620s, Constantinople had already become a quite dynamic diplomatic centre, and a diplomatic corps of major European powers was well established there.¹⁷⁷ The French, British, Dutch, Venetian and Imperial (Austrian) residents were rather active in not only handling relations between their respective native states with the Ottoman Empire, but also in forging coalitions or diplomatic counter attacks in line with the political alignments of the their home countries among their daily hassles: We have seen that the resident and extraordinary representatives of the anti- Habsburg party in Constantinople were

very well integrated in their common effort to support Gabor Bethlen and George Rakoczy, and even the payment of the protestant subsidies destined for Bethlen was made through Constantinople. On the opposing side, the Habsburg diplomats did their best to preserve the peace with the Ottomans so that the Emperor could sustain his efforts against the Protestants and France during the war. Moreover, the extraordinary envoys of some other Protestant entities (such as those of the Bohemian or Swedish crowns) illustrate the potential role the Ottoman Empire had in their calculations against the Habsburg within the framework of the general (Thirty Years) war. Shortly said, the war ravaging Europe found its reflection in Constantinople in the activities of European diplomats.

In the face of all the importance the Ottoman Empire bore for the Thirty Years War, however, the decision for a thorough campaign with the central army seems to be never considered at all. Since the main concern of the central administration was to limit warfare to one front at a time, the conflicts with the Safavids or the Poles kept the central army engaged in action, and the military activity against the Habsburgs was thus limited to the operations of the frontier Paşas. The absence of the central army was expressive of the desire to officially keep the peace in the Ottoman western front preserved, which was a primary concern for the ruling cadres.

Köhbach's argumentation might prove useful in this respect: Firstly, his remark that there was a lack of consensus among the Ottoman ruling cadres regarding the opportunities against the Austrian Habsburgs during this period is quite

¹⁷⁷ G.R. Berridge, "Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s", in *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' No. 92, May 2004. 5, 6.

well founded¹⁷⁸. As an example, we have seen above that Roe at times repents the change in the post of Grand Vizier for his purposes. Köhbach is also right in his claim that there was a prevalent fear in the Porte that a possible Ottoman assault into Europe could end hostilities among European powers and divert their attention to a common front against the Ottomans: After all, the *unbelievers were a united community of believers* (Ar, al- kufri milla wahida),¹⁷⁹ and the next chapter also gives clear hints in that respect. Only Köhbach's last suggestion that even though the Ottoman policy seemed to have taken a different turn initially during the years 1620/21 and 1644/45, it lacked a strong leading character (Sultan or grand vizier) to stick to it is a little misleading:¹⁸⁰ Even though there had been a headstrong leader at the time, it is doubtful if the main attention would have been directed to central Europe: Sultan Murad's preference for a war against Poland and Ibrahim's campaign against Venice suggest that the Ottoman Porte was determined to preserve the peace in the west until they would feel themselves militarily ready for it (which would take place only after the Köprülü restoration). It was a long term policy in the Ottoman Porte to offer undercover support to the Protestants while the willingness to conserve the peace officially remained alive all the way long.

In the following chapter, a failing diplomatic mission from the Protestant King Gustav Adolph to Sultan Murad IV in 1632 will be laid under scrutiny, whose lack of success owed much to this wish to keep things safe in the western front.

¹⁷⁸ Köhbach, 291.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 292. "... herrschte die Ansicht vor, daß "der Unglaube eine Glaubengemeinschaft ist"..."

CHAPTER 3

PAUL STRASSBURG'S DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Situated on two different margins of the European continent, it was rather unlikely for any inter-state relation of importance between the Ottoman Empire and the Swedish Kingdom to take place. Therefore, the diplomatic ties between them couldn't be strengthened until after the beginning of the 18th century, though the first contact had been made in the late 16th century. In our case, Strassburg's visit to Constantinople in 1632 is the first official diplomatic mission between the two countries, which came into being within the framework of the Thirty Years War. After a short set of information on his life, we will focus on his mission.

3.1 Biographical note on Strassburg

It was still a relatively small kingdom when Sweden assumed the leadership of the Protestant cause in 1630. Not only was the kingdom deficient in population and capital, but also the available labour force bore the imprints of a peasant society character more than the contemporary western European states: Bourgeoisie was proportionally smaller and the university education offered in the Swedish Kingdom could compete hardly with the standards set by British, Italian or German universities at the time. As a result, qualified non-Swedes from Europe were most welcome, the diplomats being pre-eminent among those. Droste notes that Sweden made use of around a hundred and twenty diplomats during the 17th century, two third of whom were non-Swedish: Moreover, two third of these were from the territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and almost half of Sweden's diplomats were of bourgeois background, who had fixed their eyes on upwards social mobility under service of

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 293. His use of primary sources is also deficient.

the Crown.¹⁸¹ Strassburg was just one among the many in this respect, serving the Swedish Crown for long years, be it inside or outside the Kingdom.

Born in 1595 in the reformed city of Nürnberg to a jurist father, he attended university in Altdorf, and later went to Italy in 1613, where he spent 3 years to study in Padua, Bologna and Siena.¹⁸² He presumably received a humanist education, studying history and law, and he did learn Italian and Latin very well, both languages being crucial for the diplomacy of the time. Being a protestant, he joined the army of the Bohemian Crown when the revolt broke out after 1618: He was even a survivor of the Battle of White Mountain (1620). In 1624, we see him carrying out his first diplomatic mission in London to the Elector Palatinate Friedrich V. From Britain, he went back to the Continent, and visited Gabor Bethlen “at the request of Heinrich Matthias von Thurn, but indirectly representing Friedrich V” in 1625.¹⁸³

During Bethlen’s 1626 campaign, Strassburg served as the General Commissioner of the Transylvanian troops, and in 1627, he set out for Prussia, where the Swedish King, Gustav II Adolph, admitted him to his service. Strassburg received the title Councillor of the Court, *Consiliarius aulicus*, which was common for the foreign diplomats in the service of the Swedish Crown, and started his first mission in July 1628: He was going back to Transylvania to invite Gabor Bethlen for a joint action against Poland and reached the Prince’s court in September, where he

¹⁸¹ Heiko Droste, “Unternehmer in Sachen Kultur: Die Diplomaten Schwedens im 17. Jahrhundert”, in *Das eine Europa und die Vielfalt der Kulturen: Kulturtransfer in Europa 1500-1850* / [ed] Thomas Fuchs, Sven Trakulhun, Berlin: BWV, Berliner Wissenschaftsvlg, 2003, 205-226.

¹⁸² Magnus Mörner, “Paul Straßburg, ein Diplomat aus der Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges”, in *Südost Forschungen*; Jan 1, 1956, 15, 327-363. 329. Unless otherwise noted, the rest of the biography presented here is summarized from the same work.

¹⁸³ Gabor Karman. “Gabor Bethlen’s Diplomats at the Protestant Courts of Europe”, in *Hungarian Historical Review* 2, no. 4. (2013), pp: 790- 823. 813.

spent a whole year. Nothing tangible could be achieved, and Strassburg left Transylvania two months before his friend Prince Gabor Bethlen passed away.

In January 1630, he was in Sweden and was called for a new mission to the east of the Continent, though his voyage could start only the next year. As presented in the previous chapter, after a short stay in Transylvania (for two months), he went on to Constantinople in 1632, from whence he returned to Transylvania, and once more back to Constantinople in 1633. Through Venice, he went to Switzerland and then to Frankfurt am Main in 1634. Until 1636, he spent his time attending the Swedish Chancellor (since the Swedish King was dead since late 1632), ministered his business in Germany and assumed many diplomatic errands, after which he also accompanied him into Sweden. There, he started *de facto* to function as a royal councillor next year, despite the objections that he was not a native of the country, nor even a noble.

In 1642, at a relatively old age, he made his marriage to a fellow diplomat's daughter, and after long years, he was once more appointed to a diplomatic mission in 1646, this time, to Paris. There he attained the honour of sharing the same carriage with the French King (yet a child), "without doubt a great moment in the life of the non- noble Nürnberger".¹⁸⁴ In 1651, he retired from service to the Swedish Crown and returned to Germany, where he settled with his wife and four children in Worms.

Not long after, following an enduring illness, Strassburg died on 1st March, 1654. During his almost sixty years lasting life, he had not scored any "heroic" accomplishments as a diplomat,¹⁸⁵ and the most productive years of his career were

¹⁸⁴ Mörner, 359.

¹⁸⁵ Michael Auwers & Nevra Biltekin. "La diplomatie en mémoires: Étude sur les mémoires de diplomates belges et suédois du XXe siècle", in *Ecrivains et diplomates: L'invention d'une tradition*.

those of his councillorship to the Swedish Crown. The foremost diplomatic activity of his lifetime was his mission to the Ottoman Empire, with which he was most famous, and which is also the subject of the following section.

3.2 Paul Strassburg's diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Empire and its historical setting

The Habsburg supremacy over the Holy Roman Empire was so solidly entrenched by 1629 as it had never been since the beginning of the previous century. Feeling his kingdom under threat by the Emperor, Gustav II Adolph of Sweden, a Lutheran king, hastily concluded a truce with the Poles in 1629 after three years of fighting, and undertook an assault against the Emperor under covert French encouragement,¹⁸⁶ landing on northern Germany in 1630. His military preparations were concomitant to his search for allies, and he had diplomatic agents all over Europe, although he had no ally of high political consequence at the time of the landing, at all.¹⁸⁷ Under such circumstances, even the major political entities in the east (and perchance outside) of Europe, that is, the Russian Tsardom, Transylvanian Principality, the Tatar Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire, had to fall within the ambit of his diplomatic reach, as it is suggested in the previous chapter.

Just as the Danish Kingdom had been willing to enlist Gabor Bethlen's support against Emperor Ferdinand II from behind the Habsburg frontier five years

XIXe-XXIe siècles(2012, Armand Colin), pp. 179 – 190. For the definition of the term, see, p. 184: “Pour Neumann, le héros est le « diplomate de terrain », capable d' « établir de nouvelles bases dans les conditions les plus défavorables, de s'engager dans une mission d'enquête particulièrement délicate, ou de préparer et réussir un *fait accompli* dans un cadre politique»”.

¹⁸⁶ E. Ladewig Petersen, “Oversigter. Nyt om Trediveårskrigen: 1. Sveriges krigsdeltagelse”, in *Historisk Tidskrift*(Danish) 99:1. (København, 1999). The Swedish demands in the peace congresses at the end of the war point out to the perceived threat (p. 105): these were the revocation of the 1629 Restitution Edict, the reduction of the Imperial power in northern Germany, and secure footholds for Sweden in Germany.

¹⁸⁷ Paul Douglas Lockhart, *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 50.

before the Swedish King, the latter pursued the same policy with regards to the Transylvanian Principality in 1630, now under George Rakoczy's sovereignty. For this purpose, the choice most naturally fell on Paul Strassburg, who had spent a good deal of time in the principality, serving the Protestant interests both on battlefield and at the court. His personal relationship with some of the Transylvanian statesmen and the widow of the late prince Gabor Bethlen, Catherine of Brandenburg (who was also the Swedish King's sister-in-law and had been in a bitter struggle against the new Prince Rakoczy over the issue of her dowry lands)¹⁸⁸ must have also played a primary role in his commissioning as an *internuntius* to Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Catherine of Brandenburg's case would be a cover while the real intention would be to entice Rakoczy to take up arms against Emperor Ferdinand II.¹⁸⁹

The written instructions he would receive from the king on 29th April 1631 illuminate the scope of his mission in detail: In Transylvania, he would firstly try to see if the rumours about Catherine's conversion to Catholicism were well-founded.¹⁹⁰ And then, he would demand the restitution of Catherine's dowry property to be transferred back to the princess at Rakoczy's court.¹⁹¹ With a considerable tact, on the other hand, he was supposed not to offend the Transylvanian prince and the estates on Catherine's account, and would set out to Constantinople in good grace. In that respect, he was to scrutinize how much of an inclination Rakoczy had towards

¹⁸⁸ See Appendix E (1) for the table of marriage affiliations.

¹⁸⁹ Johann Adlzreiter, *Annalium Boicae Gentis, Partis III* (1662). P. 286. "... misit ad Ragozium Transsylvanum, ea specie, quasi legateretur ad componendas sororis Gabrielis Bethlemi viduæ, cum Ragozio, controversias, re autem vera, ut, si qua posset, Transylvanum ad capienda adversus Cæsarem arma, Gustavi verbis concitaret: atque exinde proficisceretur Constantinopolim, simile quid tentaturus apud Turcam, exploraturus saltem, quid de Suecico bello, rebusque a Gustavo gestis Turca sentiret."

¹⁹⁰ *Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Okirattar Strassburg Pal 1631- 1633 – İki Követsége Es I. Rakoczy György Elso Diplomacziai Össezekötetesei Történetéhez.* Ed. Sandor Szilagyí. (Budapest, 1882). Hereafter MHH. Doc #IV (Gustav Adolph's *libellus memorialis* to Strassburg), p. 17.

the common Protestant cause, and if he had enough authority or willingness to wage war against the Emperor.¹⁹² In the king's letter to Sultan Murad, the sole issue is King Gustav's wish to confide Catherine's case to the Sultan.¹⁹³ Yet, from Strassburg's relation, we can deduce that (leaving the official dimension of the mission at the Porte aside) he would attempt to provoke the Turks against the Emperor on the one hand, or at least to receive permission from the Porte for Rakoczy to attack the Emperor on the other.

While Strassburg was on his way from Sweden to Germany to meet the king on campaign, Gustav Adolph was already breeding hopes, with or without the designated mission for Strassburg, that the Habsburgs would be diverted from the central European theatre by an assault from the Ottomans: the latter were reported to have scored great victories in Asia, and Gustav thought that they would open hostilities against the Habsburgs sooner or later with their own will.¹⁹⁴ However, even though the tidings reaching him (probably those regarding the early victories of Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa's successful campaign to Iran in 1629 – early 1630) were

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 22: "Article XIII. *Deinde cavebit, ne propter abdicationem Serae principis expostulando, modernum principem statusque et ordines Transylvaniae offendat, sed in actionibus et sermone ita se moderetur ut potioem communis loci rationem semper habeat, et cum favore dimissus Constantinopolim versus destinatum iter rectius perficiat.*" P. 21: "Article XI. *[Strassburg] scrutari et penetrare possit, quomodo Ragozius princeps erga causam communem affectus sit, ... utrum ad arma contra caesarem spontaneo ardore er impetu feratur vel iisdem ex necessitate invitus saltem explicetur? Num apud Transylvanos ea auctoritate sit, ut arbitrium belli et pacis habeat?"*

¹⁹³ Ibid., Doc #V: Frankfurt 1631, Apr. 29. P: 24.

¹⁹⁴ *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling. Senare Afdelningen, Första Bandet (K. Gustaf II Adolfs Bref och Instruktioner)*. Utgifna af Kongl. Vitterhets- Historie och Antiquitets Akademien.(Stockholm 1888). Document # 476 (From the King to the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna)"Ribnitz den [8] Oktober 1630": "... så är doch gemeent, att store imperia, som hvar andre angrentza, icke gerna pläge hvar andre länge låta omolesteret, och kan therföre lätteligen hända, att thett Romerske riket, i medler tijdh att vij thette krich någet kunne oppeholla, medh thett Turkiske imperio i krijgh råka motte, effter som alle aviser confirmera, att, endoch Turken i Asien hafver stoor lycka och framgång, så är han likvel på then sijdan mehra till fridh inclinerad; och således troende, så frampt han ther finge någon rooligheet, thett han tå, effter som han intet länge pläger vara stilla, Romerske riket medh krich antasta motte, hvilket alltsammans en stoor förändring kunde förorsaka och oss till så myckin snarare och tilldrägeligere accord förmodeligen förhjelpa." (p. 656)

true, the fortune of the Ottoman army was reversed after the siege of Baghdad in August 1630. Neither the Ottoman army, nor the troops promised by the Crimean Khan could be positioned in Europe in 1631, as suggested in the previous chapter: the Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa had retreated to south-eastern Anatolia, but he was determined to continue the siege next year, and 20 000 Tatar soldiers summoned by him joined the Ottoman camp in Diyarbakır, leaving both Gustav's hopes and diplomatic effort fruitless in the Khanate.¹⁹⁵

Strassburg, reaching Northern Germany in August 1630, spent around eight months due to an illness in Elbing, where the Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna was arranging the affairs.¹⁹⁶ He was given his first instructions and the letters destined for officials in the Ottoman Empire and the Transylvanian Principality, all prepared by the Chancellor, who also sent him to Frankfurt on the Oder in March 1631, so that he could recommend himself to King Gustav in person.¹⁹⁷ On 29th April, he had received the abovementioned instructions from the king along with a letter of safe conduct, and was sent back to the Chancellor for the last time before the voyage in order to be supplied with "consumption money" for the mission.¹⁹⁸ On the road, he fell sick once more, and this is the inception point of his "relation".

¹⁹⁵ Halil İnalçık, *Devlet- i 'Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar- II. Tagayyür ve Fesad (1603 - 1656)*. (İstanbul, 2014). 203.

¹⁹⁶ Mörner, 337.

¹⁹⁷ *Rikskanslerens Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling. Förra Afdelningen, Sjätte Bandet (Bref 1631)*. Utgifna af Kongl. Vitterhets- Historie och Antiquitets Akademien.(Stockholm). Document # 62 (From Oxenstierna to King Gustav Adolph) "Elbing d. 9 Mars 1631": "Hafver och till samme ende författat någre breeff i E.K. M:ts namn till Turkiske keysaren, veziren, sendebuden i Constantinopel, till Ragozi och gouverneurn i Siebenburgen." (p. 165).

¹⁹⁸ RAOSB, 2.I. Doc. # 24. (From the King to Oxenstierna): "Frankfurt an der Oder den 29 April 1631": "Gustaf Adolph etc. Vår etc. Alldenstund her Cantzläär vij haffve gifvidt Strassburg i commission till att begifva sigh våre värf till Siebenbürgen och Constantinopel, så begäre vij nådigest, att I så vele fournera honom tärepennningar som och försörja honom med visse vexler till sitt entretenement, så lenge han der bliffver. Eder etc." (p. 719).

In Elbing, he was instructed for the last time by Chancellor Oxenstierna, and joined by his retinue: a group of 25 companions¹⁹⁹ started the journey with him from Prussia in November 1631, though they were not carrying any gifts for the Ottoman administrators on the pretext of long distance and insecure roads. In any case, the voyage planned in early 1631 was postponed for almost half a year, and the chancellor was assuring the French embassy in Constantinople that the mission would arrive despite the delay without any loss of validity.²⁰⁰ There was indeed a long way between Elbing and Constantinople, and Strassburg's voyage would last around 4 months until the destination. Hence began the first official diplomatic mission sent by the Kingdom of Sweden to the Ottoman Empire.

The first foreign soil lying before Strassburg was the territory of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, with which the Swedish Kingdom had ended hostilities only two years before, after the conclusion of the Truce of Altmark. However, the animosity between the two kingdoms was still ablaze, since not only the moribund Polish King, Sigismund Vasa (from the same dynastic family with the Swedish King),²⁰¹ had not renounced his claims on the Swedish throne, but also the predominantly catholic Polish Kingdom was duly in opposition to the Lutheran Swedes in political arena on account of its affiliation to fellow catholic Emperor Ferdinand II. This being the case, it was quite natural for the Swedish mission to enter the Polish territory with certain apprehensions. Things didn't get any better

¹⁹⁹ MHH, Doc # XXXVII (Strassburg's memorial to Axel Oxenstierna, 1635): "... *auch dess Polnischen Commissary halben, welcher mit funf dienern vndt soviel Pferden daselbst adjungirt worden 31 Personen vndt ross vnterhalten müssen,..*", (p 127, 8.)

²⁰⁰ RAOSB, 1. VI. Doc # 217.(From Oxenstierna to Marcheville), 10 Nov 1631: "..., *ut post tot menses elapsos nunc demum adpellat, causas indico fuisse morbum, in quem indicit, post impetratam a Sac:a Regia M:te dimissionem, deinde insecutas alias remoras, utpote itineris, qua transeundum fuit, insecuritatem ac similia. Id ergo hisce literis nunc ago, ut... velit sibi certo persuadere, nihil hac mora detractum auctoritati regiarum literarum vel comissioni d:ni Strasburgii...*" (p. 516).

²⁰¹ See Appendix E (2).

when the first town they entered was raided by some irregular soldiers (Lisowscians), whom Strassburg considered to be sent there on purpose in order to scare off the mission. Luckily, they made it to Warsaw without any accident, where they received the assurances for safe passage to Royal Hungary, and were now accompanied by a certain Polish court official Nastacki until the Polish- Hungarian frontier, who did his best to get a clue about the destination of the mission from Strassburg and his suit, although he had already made a well aimed prediction.

Passing the frontier in safety around the New Year's turn (1632 Jan.), the mission stepped on the Royal (Upper) Hungarian territory, and they were now surrounded by the Habsburg enemy. Strassburg doesn't try to conceal his concern that the Hungarian stooges of the Emperor could show up any second, and the Swedish victory against the Imperial (Austrian) forces at Breitenfeld in the previous September couldn't be expected to make anything easier for him. His first station in Hungary was the Munkacs city, where he spent a dozen of days corresponding with Catherine of Brandenburg, who was in Tokaj, another major town in Upper Hungary. At this point, we must make a flashback to the developments in Upper Hungary and Transylvania following Gabor Bethlen's death in order to better highlight the situation Strassburg was facing.

Princess Catherine was made the Prince(ss) of Transylvania after her husband's death in November 1629, but the debates around her succession were quite hot. The late Prince's brother, Istvan Bethlen, was appointed as "governor", and he collaborated with the Transylvanian diet and the royal council to curb Catherine's

princely power:²⁰² Her gender and nativity (she was a German princess, after all) evoked concern among the Transylvanians, and her sympathy toward the Catholics (who were among her close confidants) terribly played against her. In July 1630, a firman from Sultan Murad IV to Istvan Bethlen (*Erdel Gubernatoru*) ordered him to decrease the tension in the principality, keep it safe against the Habsburgs, and asked him to keep the Porte informed about the developments.²⁰³

It wasn't only in Transylvania that she was undergoing hard times: An active lobbying at Catherine's expense was carried out in Constantinople, and Prince(ss) Catherine was doing all she could to persuade the *Kaymakam* (Topal Recep Paşa) that the accusations that she was slowly leaving the Sultan's orbit and drifting elsewhere (i.e, towards the Emperor) were not founded, and that the Porte should preserve its faith in her.²⁰⁴ The Porte's attitude towards her, in any case, was not absolutely supportive. The *kaymakam*'s letters to Catherine in August were admonishing her to follow Dutch Ambassador Cornelis Haga's (*babalığı*) advice and she was confided to George Rakoczy. She was, nevertheless, promised by the *kaymakam* that she would be given back the cities Munkacs, Fogaras, Tokaj and adjacent villages which she had inherited from her late husband;²⁰⁵ but this was a quite complicated issue.

²⁰² Eva Deak, "Principes non Principissa" Catherine of Brandenburg, Elected Prince of Transylvania (1629 - 1630). In: Cruz, Anne J.; Suzuki, Mihoko; *The Rule of Women in Early Modern Europe*; (University of Illinois Press, 2009). 86, 87.

²⁰³ Gemil, *Relatile Tarilor Romane...*: Doc # 92 "1039 Evasıt- ı Zi'l- hicce".

²⁰⁴ Georgius Pray, *Gabrielis Bethlenii Principatus Transsilvaniae...* Doc # LXVII. "Ad Vizirium Kaimakamum, 12 Aug 1630, Alba Juliae".

²⁰⁵ Fekete (1932), Doc # 17; #18 "Autumn 1630". In Doc #17, Recep Paşa also suggests that the Sultan was quite happy about the well boding actions of her brother-in-law the Swedish King (*eništeniz İsveç Kralı'nın yararlığı*), and that the Porte would welcome a Swedish ambassador if it would be requested. In Doc #18: Kaymakam suggests her to take lodging in Fogaras, where she was already forced to be interned by the opposition in Transylvania. Moreover, the admonition to her that she should get on well with Rakoczy (*Rakoçi ile iyi geçinmeniz layık- ı devlet ve levazım- ı maslahattır*) shows that she was no longer receiving the Sultan's favour.

The cities Munkacs and Tokaj were situated in the territory of the 7 Counties in Upper Hungary, and they were supposed to be delivered to the Emperor after Bethlen's death. The governor Istvan Bethlen's son (Istvan Bethlen, jr.) and son-in-law (David Zolyomi) were among the group which was irritated by the issue of the transfer of the 7 Counties and believed that they had to act. During summer 1630, they expressed their wish to see George Rakoczy, erstwhile general of the former prince and a popular figure, as their prince and even encouraged him to gather the support of the Hayduks, who were the only remaining force which could be mobilized for a movement.²⁰⁶ After he was persuaded by the governor Istvan Bethlen with a letter, he didn't lose time for action.²⁰⁷

In September, Rakoczy's consolidation of power had made good progress, which was observed with apprehension by the Hungarian Palatine Miklos Esterhazy, who had found a good neighbour in the meek person of the new Prince(ss). His complaints that Istvan Bethlen, Jr. and David Zolyomi were acting against their will (*hilaf- ı murzımız davranıştıdır*) were received by the *kaymakam*, who assured him that these acts wouldn't be tolerated.²⁰⁸ However, there was no concrete Ottoman intervention, and Rakoczy refused to obey Miklos Esterhazy's calls for cessation of his movement.²⁰⁹ As Rakoczy was growing stronger, the Transylvanian Diet was gathered in Cluj in late September, and a representative from the assembly came to visit Prince(ss) Catherine in order to persuade her to abdicate at her own will.²¹⁰ She

²⁰⁶ Köpeczi, 327.

²⁰⁷ Ibidem.

²⁰⁸ Fekete(1932), Doc # 16. Kaymakam Recep Paşa to Esterhazy (August 1630).

²⁰⁹ István Bársony, "Les types d'intrônisation en Transylvanie", in Klára Papp, János Barta co-editors: Attila Bárány, Attila Györkös: *The First Millenium of Hungary in Europe* (Debrecen, 2002), pp. 159- 169. 166.

²¹⁰ MHH, Doc # I. Catherine's letter to her brother Elector of Brandenburg(Fogaras, 29 November 1630): "... es ist wahr, das, das landt mit E. Dlt. niht allerdings zufriedent ist, nicht allein allss wan E. Dlt. ihnen zu wieder gethan hete, sondern es weil sie nuhr ein Weibs perschon ist, und dieses Landt

was left without popular support, and abdicated on 28th September. Interestingly, it was Istvan Bethlen (the elder) who was elected the new prince by the Diet, thanks to his well established connections with the Ottomans.²¹¹

The father Bethlen was thus standing in a quite awkward position: his son and son-in-law had sworn loyalty to Rakoczy, yet he had elicited the support of the opposition to Rakoczy. He was not, however, insistent on keeping the power for himself and reached an agreement with Rakoczy at the end of October: the Diet would make another election between the two in the coming weeks.²¹² The Ottoman stance was quite impartial: Two letters of confirmation (*ferman*) were sent from Constantinople, one in Rakoczy's and the other in Bethlen's (the elder) name,²¹³ which suggests that the victor of the election would be immediately invested with the princely authority. The final choice fell on Catherine though, and she supported Rakoczy due to her grudge against her brother-in-law Istvan Bethlen (the elder), and the Diet followed their former princess' decision on the first day of December; the news that he was from now on the elected Prince of Transylvania reached Rakoczy in Varad two days later.²¹⁴ The Ottoman frontier forces observed the election carefully, and Vizier Hasan Paşa's (of Buda) men had delivered the confirmation letters to Transylvania, for which he was congratulated by the Sultan for his role in the process.²¹⁵

stehdts mit schwären krigen beladen ist, kan E. Dlt. solches niht regieren, sondern man mues in diesem lande, einen mänlichen fürsten haben ..."

²¹¹ Barsony, 164.

²¹² Köpeczi, 327, 328.

²¹³ Barsony, 166.

²¹⁴ Köpeczi, 328; Barsony, 166.

²¹⁵ BOA 85 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, (Ankara, 2002). Decree #247: (22 Cemaziyelahir 1040/ 26 Jan 1631): "Südde-i Sa'âdet-medârum'a mektûb gönderüp mazmûnunda; "Sâdır olan fermân-ı celîlü'l-unvân ve emr-i kadr-tüvânüm üzre Erdel Hâkimi ve Macar Kralı olan iftihâru'l-ümerâ'i'l-izâmi'l-İseviyye Rakorci Görği hutimet avâkıbuhû bi'l-hayr zikrolunan Erdel hükûmeti ile Macar Krallığı'nda karâr itdürmesinde vücûda gelen ârâ-i sâkıbe vü tedâbîr-i sâyibeni ve serhadd-i mansûremün cümle

The major problem during the time of Rakoczy's election was, as pointed above, the issue of the transfer of the 7 Counties. The Palatine Esterhazy, expecting a Turkish trick for the preservation of the counties, was cunning enough to act in person for the reunification of the territories with Royal Hungary and went to Kosice; a suspicious move which mobilized Ottoman frontier troops.²¹⁶ Two months after Rakoczy's election, Hasan Paşa of Buda sent a letter to the Palatine, and threatened him with a little lie that the Porte had resolved for war against Hungary.²¹⁷ Even though there was no major war, it seems that some clashes between the Palatine and Rakoczy had taken place, in which Ottoman auxiliaries supported the Transylvanian Prince.²¹⁸

The tension between the prince and the palatine seemed so high that the French King was predicting that open hostilities between the two empires would break.²¹⁹ But in fact, Emperor Ferdinand II already had enough of troubles with the Swedes, and the best option he could choose regarding Rakoczy was to recognize him as the Prince of Transylvania with the Treaty of Kosice on 3rd April 1631. Rakoczy promised that he would no longer support the Haiduks, and bid an end to their progress in Hungary.²²⁰

Two months after the peace was signed, Catherine was writing that she had adopted Rakoczy's middle son as the inheritor of Munkacs *at her own will*.²²¹

askeri mevcûd u hâzır olmağla her birinin zuhûr iden hudemât-ı mebrûresin" tafsîl üzere yazup i'lâm eylemişsin. Ber-hô[r]dâr olasın. Senün ve seniñle serhadd-i mansûremde hıdmetde ve yoldaşlıkda bulunan cümle kullarumun yüzleri ak olup ni'am-ı celiyem cümleñüze halâl olsun..." p. 152, 153.

²¹⁶ Fekete (1932), p. XLVIII.

²¹⁷ Ibidem.

²¹⁸ Ibid., Doc#22. From Hasan Paşa of Buda to Esterhazy (25 Marz – 2 April 1631).

²¹⁹ I. Hudita, *Histoire de Relations Diplomatiques entre La France et la Transylvanie au XVIIeme siecle (1635 - 1683)*, (Paris, 1627). 28.

²²⁰ Köpeczi, 328.

²²¹ *MHH*, Doc # X. Fejervar[Alba Julia], 1631, jun. 28.(p. 30)

Nonetheless, we can presume that she might have been exerted a certain amount of pressure from the Emperor, who would later concede her rights over her inherited domains to Rakoczy within the framework of a future peace treaty.²²² It seems that Fogaras, too, was claimed by Rakoczy, and the demand for recognition of these cities for Catherine was the main subject of the conflict between the Prince and Catherine, as well as that of the correspondence between her and Strassburg (who had entered Hungary around January, as noted above) in early 1632.²²³

After Munkacs, Strassburg went over Hust (where he was received by Istvan Bethlen, the elder) to the Transylvanian capital Alba Julia, where he reached around 10th February 1632, and an audience with Prince Rakoczy was arranged. However, neither on Catherine's situation nor about the conditions for the alliance between the Swedish Kingdom and the Transylvanian Principality could they reach an accord.²²⁴ He spent the month in Alba Julia, negotiating over Rakoczy's conditions and, in the meantime, his correspondence with the Dutch Ambassador at the Ottoman capital (Cornelis Haga) yielded a positive result that Recep Paşa had allowed Strassburg to make his official visit even though he was to come without gifts from the Swedish King.²²⁵ Since the Sultan was usually paying the subsistence costs of any foreign embassy in the Ottoman Empire, he deemed it justified to demand gifts from the

²²² Arckenholtz. *Memoires concernant Christine Reine de Suede. Tome III* (Amsterdam & Leipzig, 1759). 105.

²²³ MHH, Doc # XIX (Catherine's instructions to Strassburg on the issues to focus at the Porte, 29 March 1632). In her own words, p.45: "*Primo. ... ut potentissimus imperator Turcarum illum Transylvaniae principem hortetur, quo dotalia bona nostra Fogarasch et Munkatz, cum arcibus, oppidis, et pagis, nec non superioritatibus, jurisdictione, aliisque ad dicta bona pertinentibus, nobis plenarie restituat, et cedat.*"

²²⁴ Onno Klopp, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg bis zum Tode Gustav Adolfs 1632, Band III, Teil 2*, (Paderborn, 1896). 678.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 679. Also, Strassburg's aforementioned letter, Doc # XXXVII (Strassburg's memorial to Axel Oxentierna, 1635), in MHH, 127.

embassies in return.²²⁶ He could otherwise have undergone hard times in this respect; but the good offices of Cornelius Haga and the (pro- Protestant) Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople Cyril Lucaris must have played an important role in persuading Recep Paşa, who was favouring the Swedish cause, if the propelling factor in the sympathy towards Strassburg was not “*the reputation of the Swedish armies thanks to their numerous wonderful successes*”.²²⁷

The next stop for Strassburg after Transylvania was the land of another Ottoman vassal, Wallachia, under Leon Tomşa’s rule. After admiring the fertile and picturesque Wallachian lands, Strassburg entered Ottoman *vilayet* Özi, from where he continued to the Ottoman capital. He reached the outer suburbs of the city on 6th April, and his day of entrance was appointed to 8th. But as he was on his way, not only the diplomatic corps in the city was getting excited but also the Ottoman administration was violently shaken due to a ruthless power struggle at the top of the ruling cadres.

To start with the diplomatic circles, the news of the rapid military progress of the Swedish King in Germany in 1631 was related to Constantinople thanks not only to the efforts of Haga²²⁸ and Cyril Lucaris: The Transylvanian representatives in the city were also promoting an active campaign in favour of the Swedes, often mixed with exaggerations, which were counter- balanced by the efforts of Imperial (Austrian) resident Schmid, who “rushed from one Turkish authority to the other”,

²²⁶ Bertold Spuler, “Die Europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel bis zum Frieden von Belgrad (1739) 2.Teil”, in *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, Neue Folge, Bd. 11, H. 2 (1935),pp. 171-222. 192, 193.

²²⁷ Strassburg`s same letter, dated 1635.

²²⁸ Haga’s Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 20 December 1631: The letter testifies the sympathy in Istanbul among the Ottoman administrators towards the Swedish King: “... *De Conincklijcke Mat van Sweeden heeft hyer een groote renomee bij alle dese ministers becomen, die oock wel soude wenschen*

who assured him that nothing which would put the peace between the two empires at risk would be tolerated.²²⁹ In March 1632, Schmid was writing back home that the tidings related to the Swedish victories were heard everywhere in the city, and since the French, Venetian, Dutch and Transylvanian supported such an enterprise, the Swedish offers of friendship would be definitely accepted by the Turks, should a Swedish envoy reach the city.²³⁰ And indeed, as the French ambassador wrote home, the news had reached the city that the Swedish *internuntius* Strassburg was to arrive soon.²³¹

To the further detriment of the Imperial (Austrian) ambassador, the men of influence at the Ottoman Porte were under the influence of the protestant party at the time of his arrival. Recep Paşa, the erstwhile *kaymakam* until February and the new Grand Vizier after then, was already known to be on bad terms with the Emperor,²³² and the Supreme Admiral of the Ottoman Navy Canpolatzade Mustafa Paşa was even one day spotted having a conversation with Cornelius Haga, who was suggesting him, over a Mediterranean map, to launch a campaign on Naples, the territory of the Spanish Habsburgs. At about the same time, Haga didn't stand short of enticing Recep Paşa for a campaign in Hungary, either.²³³ These and the fact that his communication with home was restricted (his couriers weren't returning) resulted

met deselve vruntschap te maecken.”. In *Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*. Serie 5, Deel 2. (Kemink en Zoon, Utrecht, 1876). P. 377. Henceforth, KHG.

²²⁹ Klopp, 679, 680.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 681.

²³¹ *Ambassades à Constantinople de François de Noailles, Savary de Lancosmc, Savary de Brèves, Harlay de Cézy et M. de Marcheville. (1572-1632)*. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Département des manuscrits, Français 7161[accessed on “gallica.fr”]. (De Constantinople, le 14e Mars 1632): “*On attend un Ambassadeur du Roy de Suede qui vienne a la porte ou il doist arriver dans quatre jours*” [Page 219v]. This document will be named hereafter only AC.

²³² Meienberger, 195.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 249.

in such a harsh motivational break- down that Schmid asked to be called back from his post in March 1632, which was not accepted.²³⁴

Yet it was the inner political turbulences that were hitting the capital hard at the roots: After his siege of Baghdad had failed during the 1630/1631 campaign, Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa was removed from office and Hafız Ahmed Paşa, Queen Mother Kösem's champion and son- in- law, was invested with the royal seal. However, since *Kaymakam* Recep Paşa had not only had his eyes on the Grand Vizierate but also a covert personal grudge against Hafız Ahmed Paşa, he got into contact with the former Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa to seduce the central army (*kul taifesi*), which threw the city into abject confusion.²³⁵

An analytical look inside the political alignment of the political factions might be useful at this point: Both former Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa and *Kaymakam* (Topal) Recep Paşa were of Bosnian origin and had risen to higher bureaucracy from the palace service.²³⁶ The ringleaders of the *kul taifesi* supporting them “were all Bosniacs and Albanians” as well.²³⁷ Thinking in terms of Metin Kunt's *ethnic solidarity*, we might be led to think that certain members of the “westerner” *cins* in

²³⁴ Klopp, 681.

²³⁵ *Solakzade Tarihi*.(Mahmudbeğ Matba'ası, İstanbul, 1297[1880]). P. 750: “Çun Hafız Ahmed Paşa vezir- i a'zam olub Recep Paşa kaim- i makam idi, Hafız Ahmed Paşa bi hasbi's- sadr Recep Paşa üzerine evvel bahara dek tasadduru lazım gelecek ba- husus beynlerinde burudet- i hafiyesi dahi olmağın, bu ahval Recep Paşa'ya gayet giran gelüb, hazm idemeyüb, el altından Hüsrev Paşa'ya haber irsal idüb, ikaz- ı fitne için mükatebe ile yek- dil ve tarafından kul taifesi tahrik ve Köse Kethüda nam zorba-başı Asitane'ye gelüb, yetişüb muhtefi Recep Paşa'ya buluşub, eşkıya ile yek-dil ve İstanbul'da 'azim cem'iyetler idüb...”

²³⁶ Nev'izade Atai, *Şakaik- i Nu'maniye ve Zeyilleri: Hadaiku'l- Hakaik Fi Tekmileti's- Şakaik*, (ed. Abdülkadir Özcan), (İstanbul, 1989). 768, 769.

²³⁷ Aycibin, *Katip Çelebi, Fezleke*. 824.

the Ottoman royal service were forming a coalition against the favourites of the palace.²³⁸

On the opposing front, the court's faction was represented by the loyalists of the Sultan: Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa was Queen mother Kösem's son-in-law. Grand Admiral Canpoladzade Mustafa Paşa had once been a *musahib* (favourite) of the Sultan, and was married to one of his sisters.²³⁹ The present commander of the janissary corps, Hasan Halife had previously been a mentor of the palace and Sultan Murad IV's *musahib*, whereas Musa Çelebi was the present *musahib*.²⁴⁰ We can also assume that the other viziers who were married to Sultan Murad IV's two other sisters were also his favourites: Bayram Paşa, Kenan Paşa, and later on Murtaza Paşa.²⁴¹

The Italian *bailo* at the Porte suggests that, around the time after Hüsrev Paşa retreated from the failing siege of Babylon, Hafız Ahmed Paşa, the Grand Treasurer (Mehmed Paşa), two other viziers and Hasan Halife were apprehensive of Hüsrev Paşa's pride and popularity in the army.²⁴² They had tried to convince the Sultan to destroy Hüsrev's fortune; and the latter's removal from office and his replacement by Hafız Ahmed Paşa must be regarded as the proof of their success. In short, Sultan's servants had turned against each other by February 1632.

²³⁸ Metin İbrahim Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment", in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 5 (1974), pp. 233 – 239. 238.

²³⁹ Abdullah Sağırlı, *Mehmed bin Mehmed Er-Rumi (Edirneli)'nin Nuhbetü't-Tevarih ve'l Ahbar'ı ve Tarih-i Al-i Osman'ı (Metinleri, Tahlilleri)*, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 2010, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Anabilim Dalı. P: 96 in *Tarih-i Al-i Osmani*.

²⁴⁰ İnalçık (2014), 200.

²⁴¹ Barozzi & Berchet (1872). "Relazione di Constantinopoli del Bailo Giovanni Cappello, 1634". Also see the Appendix E (2) for a possible alignment of the courtly factions at the time.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

As the former French resident Césy was writing home five days after the events, the uprisings of the *kul taifesi* reached a climax when, on 10th February, an agitated group of janissaries and *kapıkulu spahis* broke into the palace, and demanded the heads of eight to ten people in the government; Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa, the Grand Treasurer and the former Janissary Aga being the foremost. The Sultan had no option but to sacrifice Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa in the end, and *kaymakam* Recep Paşa became the new Grand Vizier. *Şeyhü'l- İslam* Yahya was also replaced²⁴³ while the Janissary Aga and the Grand Treasurer were later decapitated by the mutineers after they were found wherever they were hiding in the city.

This tragedy had been undergone for more than a month when Strassburg entered the city on 8th April, but it was still a pretty stressful *Ramazān* month for the inhabitants of the city due to the recalcitrant soldiers of the central army. The soldiers were roaming large over the streets to extort money from the inhabitants on the spot, and the atmosphere was especially tense and insecure at nights. At the Porte, the anti-Habsburg Recep Paşa was now wielding the helm of the state, while the Sultan, who was freshly shaking off his Queen mother's (Kösem Sultan) well established authority at the time, was plotting vengeance in his mind. Nevertheless, Recep Paşa's faction was occupying the government posts, and things seemed to be in Strassburg's favour. His entrance into the city was not celebrated as pompously as it was accustomed (the cortege of *çavuşes* leading him was shorter than usual) due to the fresh traces of the *kul* rebellions and to the fact that he was not bringing any gifts.

²⁴³ See "Copie de la lettre de Monsieur de Cesy de Pera, le 15 Fevrier 1632", in *Ambassades à Constantinople de François de Noailles...* p. 209r, 210v, 210r. Comte de Cesy had been French resident between 1620 and 1631, but wasn't called back during Marcheville's scandalous term 1631 – 1634. Cesy resumed the mission in 1634 until 1639.

The representatives of the Dutch Republic (Cornelis Haga) and Transylvania (Michai Tholdalaghi) were accompanying him all the way from the beginning. We can presume that both representatives provided him with many facilities during the mission, and there are concrete evidences that Haga was a most useful ally during the months Strassburg would spend in Constantinople.

He took lodgings at the Bogdan Saray, and an initial payment for his expenses was made right away through the men sent by Grand Vizier Recep Paşa.²⁴⁴ Strassburg seems to have enjoyed the accommodation and company offered him by the Turks.²⁴⁵ Once in the city, the European resident ambassadors visited him during the following days, and he was accepted by Recep Paşa precisely a week after his arrival. Since he had reached the city during the Ramadan month, he celebrated the feast at the end of the month with the Ottoman statesmen, and had his first experience with coffee in *Şeyhü'l- İslam* (Ahizade) Hüseyin Efendi's presence. His second visit was to the Admiral of the Royal Fleet, Canpolatzade Mustafa Paşa, whose interest in astrology became a topic of conversation.

While he was supported by the Transylvanian and Dutch representatives at the Porte, the Imperial resident Rudolf Schmid was alerted by his intimacy with the Dutch, and was doing his best to prevent the same happening with the French ambassador, too.²⁴⁶ He started misinforming the French resident Marcheville that Strassburg was praising his King's fame over that of the French King to the Turks,

²⁴⁴ See Appendix D (3) for a map of the embassy buildings at the time in the city.

²⁴⁵ Strassburg notes that the Moldovian Palace was well protected; and he also asked for a rise in the salary of the official accompanying him in the city: BOA, A.RSK 1502. [Image 8]. (16 Z 1041/ 4 July 1632): "*Dergah- ı Ali Çavuşlarından 9 akçeyi olan Osman ___ ve 17 akçeyi olan Mustafa Abdullah, İsvেçiye Kralı'nın elçisi terakki rica eylemeğın, 3'er akçe terakki verile diyü buyruldu.*"

²⁴⁶ Meienberger, 225: "*Zue des Marcheville zietten (Anno 1632) ist zue Constantinopel angelangt der Paulo Straßburger, Schwedischer Internuntius . . . und am allerersten den Holländischen gesandten haimblich besuecht . . .*"

which might help us explain Marcheville's reserved attitude towards the Swedish ambassador as we come across in his narration. Schmid was also trying to bar the latter's way to audience with the Sultan. The Imperial resident had spoken to the *Şeyhü'l- İslam* and to Recep Paşa in order to effect a refusal in this regard, but the answers were the same: "*The illustrious Porte stands open for everyone*".²⁴⁷ Strassburg's audience with the Sultan was arranged for 2nd May.

He was received by Sultan Murad IV, who didn't speak to him any word at all. His speech during the oration and the King's letters were translated to Turkish for the Sultan, after which the Grand Vizier explained him that the Swedish King's friendship was pleasing and welcome. In his *relation*, Strassburg makes a thorough description of the taciturn Sultan, who was only recently taking charge of state affairs at the time. After the audience with Sultan Murad IV, he starts visiting the other European representatives in Istanbul, as was the tradition.

Strassburg's opinion of the Protestant diplomats at Murad's court is positive: Dutch resident Haga is always helpful and seems to be his mentor with regards to Ottoman diplomatic practices. He speaks also well of the English resident Peter Wyche. Venetian *bailo* Giovanni Cappello seems to be cool toward Strassburg, as he was neutral to Swedish advances in Europe in general.

The French resident (Comte de) Marcheville, however, was not on particularly good terms with Strassburg as insinuated above. The latter suspected that Marcheville was under the influence of the Jesuit Order, and Haga was confirming his apprehensions about Marcheville's "blind enthusiasm" for Catholicism.²⁴⁸ Marcheville was indeed cool towards Strassburg's mission to the Porte: In a letter

²⁴⁷ Klopp, 683.

from Marcheville to his King, we understand that he was reproaching the Ottoman administrators for the compliments they were paying the Swedish envoy.²⁴⁹ In his own conversation with the Swedish envoy, Marcheville must have expressed his concerns about the rapprochement between the Swedish Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, since he received Strassburg's answer that "there was little likelihood that His Majesty the [Swedish] King would send [to the Ottoman Empire] a resident ambassador; or at least that it would be soon".²⁵⁰ After this response, Marcheville must have been relieved, and Strassburg justified that he had had solid reasons to approach the French resident with caution.

The Orthodox Patriarch Cyril Lucaris, with whom Strassburg would develop "a particularly profound familiarity and friendship"²⁵¹, was also in line, and he accepted the letters sent him by the Swedish King, offering his services with regards to the Russians and Cossacks. Lastly, following Grand Vizier Recep Paşa's advice, he paid visits to Bayram and Mehmed Paşas. The latter, Vizier (Tabanı Yassı) Mehmed Paşa, the former Governor of Egypt,²⁵² was interested in the details of the dynastic contest between the ruling Polish and Swedish Vasa families,²⁵³ whereas Bayram Paşa was eager to demand a confirmation if the Swedish King was indeed

²⁴⁸ Haga's letter to the Staaten Generaal, 3 January 1632, in KHG, 387.

²⁴⁹ "Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Marcheville Au Roy, De Pera le 13 May 1632, in RIMD, p:148r.

²⁵⁰ Lettre de Monsieur le Comte de Marcheville escrete Au Roy, Du 18 May, 1632, in RIMD, p: 158r.

²⁵¹ Samuel Gmünd, *Christliche Leich-Predigt/ Bey Begräbnis Deß Wohl- Edlen und Gestrengen Herren Pauli Straßburgs/ . . .*, (Frankfurt, 1654), p. 31.

²⁵² BOA, 85Numaralı Mühimme, Decree #265: (2 Cemaziyelahir 1040/ 6 Jan 1631): "Sâbıkâ Mısır muhâfazasında olan Vezîr Mehmed Pasa'ya hüküm ki: ... Emrüm üzre gelüp Südde-i Sa'âdetüm'de Vezâret hudmetinde olasın.", pp. 163, 164.

²⁵³ Swedish King Johan III Vasa's son, Sigismund, was elected the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1587, and he ruled both countries together between 1592 and 1599, until his uncle Carl IX (Vasa) dethroned him from the Swedish Kingdom. Gustav II Adolph (Vasa) was Carl IX's son; and both cousins raised claims on each other's kingdoms. See Appendix E (2).

using easily portable leather cannons on battlefield,²⁵⁴ to which a great role is attributed for the Swedish victory against the Habsburgs at the Battle of Breitenfeld. Both cases suggest that the central Ottoman administration had either a genuine interest in European affairs, or at least wary ears for the intelligence gathered and emanated in Istanbul at the time.

Around two weeks after his audience with the Sultan, Strassburg and his retinue would experience another political crisis in the capital, this time, in person. The young but assertive Sultan had been designing a counter- coup against the rule of the *kul* soldiers and Recep- Hüsrev Paşa coalition for a while. He had started the strike from the top: Murtaza Paşa had been sent with 3000 men to Anatolia long ago, and he executed Hüsrev Paşa under royal command in late February.²⁵⁵ Next in the list was Grand Vizier Recep Paşa himself: On 18th May, he was summoned to the palace by the Sultan, who avenged Hafız Ahmed Paşa's violent death after giving Recep Paşa one last moment for prayer.²⁵⁶ His corpse was thrown before the *Divan* square²⁵⁷ to make it clear to Recep's followers that the Sultan's day for pay back arrived, and Vizier (Tabanıyassı) Mehmed Paşa replaced him in the post of the grand vizierate.

The Sultan's last target was the *kul* ringleaders of the rebellion: Even before Recep Paşa's execution, Sultan Murad had started recruiting a few thousand new *spahis* from among the *İçoğlans*, and got them swear an oath of allegiance to

²⁵⁴ Michael Roberts, "Gustav Adolf and the Art of War", in *Essays in Swedish History*, (London, 1967), pp. 56 – 82. 69.

²⁵⁵ "De Constantinople, le 14 Mars 1632", in AC, p. 218r.

²⁵⁶ "De Constantinople, le 26 May 1632", in AC, p. 216r. The French resident's depiction of the execution scene is quite vivid: "... on luy demanda le Seau Bul, et luy montrant un petit tapis a faire sa priere il sagenouilla dessus un peu de temps, et tout soudain il se sentit chatouiller le Gosier avec un corde..."

²⁵⁷ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 25 May 1632, in KHG, p. 395.

himself, which was not an accustomed practice.²⁵⁸ Having secured their support, Murad then drew janissaries to his side and isolated the spahis totally. Following *Şeyhü'l-İslam* Hüseyin Paşa's advice, Murad gathered all the viziers, the *Şeyhü'l-İslam* himself, *kadıaskers*, the *ulema*, janissary and spahi commanders around Sinan Paşa Köşkü on 12th June for a meeting (*ayak divanı*), where he called everyone to obedience, which was unanimously answered: "Yes!" Thereafter, Sultan Murad declared that he had been extremely offended by the Spahis and he got

the Mufti, *Kadıaskers* and the other *ulema* declare a sentence, that thereafter all those disobedient to the Sultan's orders must be regarded as infidels, and considered as ignorant of the Prophet, . . . , and those people, *ipso jure*, without any other judicial explanation, deserved death and could be justly executed under the absolute authority of the Sultan (*met recht door des Keyzers absolute autoriteyt*), since they were his slaves in rebellion.²⁵⁹

In the presence of all the gathered witnesses, a public document of assurances (*hüccet*) was signed and each pledged allegiance to the Sultan. This was the turning point in heretofore politically insignificant Sultan Murad's life, since he had thus proven that his years of administrative minority were left behind, and he was the unquestionable master of the empire. What followed was a witch hunt for the recalcitrant *kapıkulu spahis* both in Istanbul and in Anatolia.

These developments are only superficially touched upon by Strassburg in his final relation, probably because it didn't make much difference in the Porte's foreign policy. With or without Recep Paşa's sympathies towards the Swedes, uprisings in Anatolia (İlyas Paşa) and the Middle East (Fahredden Ma'anoğlu) were aggravating the situation which was already delicate with a war at hand against the Safavids in

²⁵⁸ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 24 July 1632, in KHG, p. 408, 409: ". . . heeft den Keyser, . . . , eerst eenige duysenden nieuwe Sepahyen uyt de Itzoglanen (dat sijn sijne slaven, die jn sijn eygen ende verscheyde andere Saraglies opgevoet en geïnstrueert werden) gemaect ende deselve met solemnele eeden getrouwicht en gehoorsaemht tot sijne geboden doen sweeren, 'twelck te vooren onder de Turcken niet gebruyct geweest."

the eastern front. Grand Vizier Mehmed Paşa stated to Haga and Strassburg that no further answers would be given than that of Recep Paşa's.²⁶⁰ It is true, as Mehmed Paşa was writing to the Russian Patriarch Philaret, that the friendship of the Swedish King had been accepted:²⁶¹ But, that was all. Recep Paşa had formerly made it clear to the Venetian *bailo* that they were keen to preserve the peace with the Habsburgs and wouldn't break it without provocation. Moreover, even after Mehmed Paşa had pleasantly listened to the Swedish progresses from Strassburg, his stance was that "if the [Ottoman] Empire had their arms free from other wars, they would have considered one against the Emperor; but the Turks didn't resolve at the moment for such an enterprise without provocation".²⁶²

His conclusions in the last couple of pages of his relation illuminate that Strassburg was aware of his mission's deadlock on account of the following reasons: The Ottoman ruling cadres had concerns that if the Europeans would achieve peace, the prospect of a common Christian front against the Ottomans was not bleak, in which case it was the best not to kick the hornet's nest by dashing into Europe. Moreover, there were also apprehensions that the western front had been silent for over quarter of a century, and the European military technology must have been considerably improved *vis- a- vis* the Ottomans during this lull. Last but not least, the most peremptory resolution of the Porte was not to conclude any peace in the eastern front before Baghdad would be re- captured from the Safavids. This being the case,

²⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 412.

²⁶⁰ Klopp, 686.

²⁶¹ BOA, YB (1) 1- 8: Sadrazam Mehmed Paşa'nın Rusya Başvekili Flaret Nikitiç'e gönderdiği mektup, Evail- i Zilhicce 1041[18 – 28 June 1632]. “. . . *Ve İsveçkiye Kralı olan Gustavuş Adolhuş konşunuz ve kavi dostumuz dahi baş sırrı ve müşaverecisi İstraçburgdil nam ademi dostluk üzere bu canibe geliüb, dostlukları kabul olundu. Ve anlar dahi tarafımız ile ziyade dost oldukları huzur- ı ferman i'lan eylemişlerdir. Onlarla dost olduğunuzdan dahi külli hazz eyledik. Ve kendisine olan ri'ayet ne vech olduğu mezbur Urum Toma'dan istima' idersiz.*”

²⁶² “Relazione di Constantinopoli del Bailo Giovanni Cappello, 1634”, in, Barozzi & Berchet, p. 60.

there was no hope for dragging the Turks into a war in the western front in any close future.

The reticent attitude of the Porte regarding the European frontier might also be interpreted as the political self-consciousness of the ruling cadres: The literature of “mirror for princes” had been flourishing since late 16th century, and 1630s were especially rich in this sense. At least two authors pointed out to the corruption of the military – administrative system of the time, and offered ways to fix it. Aziz Efendi prepared his treatise on the swollen numbers of the central army and vizierate cadres some time between summer 1632 and summer 1633 [Lunar 1042].²⁶³ Similarly, Koçi Bey, an aged but familiar figure to the Sultan, presented his treatise to the Sultan within the same lunar year Strassburg first visited the city [1041].²⁶⁴ He also pointed out to the danger in the increasing numbers of the central army corps and suggested a reformation of the land fief system (*timar*) as an urgent must both in his treatise and in his subsequent *telhises*.²⁶⁵ We can conclude that the the Viziers in Strassburg’s accounts might also have been affected by this “crisis atmosphere”, breathing in the same “climate of self-criticism” present in many early 17th century minds.²⁶⁶

Strassburg appreciated the impossibility of realizing his Ottoman scenario for military operations in central Europe and turned his attention elsewhere. Since he was well received among the Ottoman high officials, he defended the cause of Princess Catherine and received promise that a certain Yusuf Ağa would be sent to Rakoczy to convince him for the restoration of her dowry lands to the princess.

²⁶³ Rhoads Murphey, *Kanun-name- i Sultan Li Aziz Efendi*. Harvard University Press, 1985. P. VIII

²⁶⁴ 1631 – 1632.

²⁶⁵ *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, (ed. Zuhuri Danişman). Kabcacı Yayınevi, 2008. p. 15. Telhis was usually an abstract written to inform the Sultan himself, see Bayerle (1997, p. 154).

²⁶⁶ Rhoads. Murphey, “The Veliyyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between Koçi Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings”, in *Belleten* 43 (1979): pp. 547 – 571. 555.

After this was assured, he tried to benefit from the innate Ottoman animosity towards the Habsburgs by at least making his case that, in case of open hostilities, Prince Rakoczy's actions should be tolerated against the Emperor. Strassburg could, in the end, manage to effectuate a royal order for the mobilization of the Rumelian troops in the Hungarian border. And this was the end of his diplomatic mission in the Ottoman capital.

His valediction ceremony was arranged for 24th June, and the Sultan received him with extraordinary pomp and panache in the Sinan Paşa Köşkü: Cornelis Haga was writing home that he

had never seen or heard such a ceremony arranged for any ambassador before, as was now staged; [it was] partly to make a showcase of the grandiosity of the Ottoman Emperor, and partly because of the high esteem placed on his Royal Majesty of Sweden, whose audacious deeds and victories against the powerful House of Austria were received with greatest amazement.²⁶⁷

He received the Sultan's letters, paid his last visits to the high officials at the Porte in the following days, and parted for Transylvania on 12th July, 1632. The relation ends here, and the remaining time he spent in the Ottoman Empire is not well documented. However, we can still draw a rough itinerary of Strassburg's voyages and missions in the Ottoman Empire.

Strassburg travelled back to Transylvania and continued defending Catherine's interest, for which his request of full authority was granted from Catherine who was now in Kosice, which was under the Emperor's authority.²⁶⁸ At his visit in Transylvania, Strassburg were on rather bad terms with the Prince, and he

²⁶⁷ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 10 July 1632, in KHG, 405.

²⁶⁸ Catherine's Letter to Paul Strassburg, 1632 Sept 6, Kosice, in MHH, Doc # XXVIII.

left Alba Julia rather discontented in May 1633.²⁶⁹ The tension might be attributed to the impasse of Catherine's situation, whose conversion to Catholicism in spring 1633 made things irreversible for her. Strassburg noted that Yusuf Ağa, the Ottoman official in charge of dealing with Catherine's case, had left without having accomplished anything, either.²⁷⁰ In the end, the situation was solved by Imperial (Austrian) intervention, and Catherine reached a compromise with Rakoczy,²⁷¹ though she lost her husband's heritage (Munkacs in particular) to the Prince as the price paid by the Habsburg Emperor to keep Rakoczy away from the Swedish Crown's orbit.

Thereafter, although Strassburg's original intention was to directly head for Venice, he seems to have visited the Ottoman Hungary in June 1633, and got into contact with the Ottoman frontier Paşas. He was invited by the governor of Temesvar, since "at the time, the news of the victory of the Swedes against the enemy army was spread in the [Ottoman] frontier cities, just like in Buda".²⁷² The Pasha was quite curious if the Prince would sign any alliance with the Protestants, and became rather disappointed when he learned that Rakoczy and the Emperor had freshly signed a peace.²⁷³ Strassburg then got into contact also with the governor of Buda, and left for Venice with a Turkish companion appointed by the governor to accompany them to the doge of Venice early in July.²⁷⁴ However, with an

²⁶⁹ Mörner, 340.

²⁷⁰ Strassburg's letter to Haga, 12 Oct. 1632, Varad. Doc # 3, in Szilagyi's *Actes et documents* ...

²⁷¹ Mörner, 340.

²⁷² Beke Antal & Barabas Samu. *I. Rakoczy György es a Porta. levelek es okiratok.* (Budapest, 1888). P. 52. Letter from Strassburg to Rakoczy, 1633, Junius 13, Temeszvar.

²⁷³ Hudita, 31. The peace was signed on 5 April, 1633.

²⁷⁴ I "Documenti Turchi" dell' archivio stato di Venezia, # 1436: Fi 27 Şehr- i Zi'l- hicce, sene 1042 [5 July 1633]: ". . . *inha ve i'lam olunan budur ki: Bi'l- fi'l İsvetçiye Kralı dostunuz tarafından sa'adetli ve 'azimetli ve şevketli Padişahımız e'azzai'l- Mevla ensarahu ve za'ade iktidarehu hazretlerine izhar- ı 'ubdiyyet ve 'arz- ı hulusiyet için Asitane- i Sa'adet- Aşıyane'ye irsal iylediği ilçisinin birkaç nefer adamları ol canibden krallarına revane ray u tedbir ve ma'kul ve münasib*

unexpected change of route, Strassburg and his retinue made it for Constantinople once more in late summer 1633, going over Belgrad.²⁷⁵

Mörner suggests that his main activity in the Porte during August 1633 was to undermine the rapprochement between the Emperor and Rakoczy.²⁷⁶ The complaints raised by Puchhaimb, the Imperial (Austrian) envoy who reached Istanbul in 1634, were on the one hand expressing the resentment for the respect Strassburg had received at the Porte; and demanding the removal of the governor of Buda on account of his contact with the Swedes on the other.²⁷⁷ In the end, nothing had materialized regarding Rakoczy; and neither Emperor Ferdinand II nor the Protestant party could acquire any alliance from the Prince in this occasion. Strassburg had left Constantinople before late September 1633 in the company of a certain Osman Çavuş,²⁷⁸ and reached Venice in October, from whence he would later set out for Switzerland.²⁷⁹ Against the expectations of a fellow diplomat at the Swedish court, he had left without being able to get Rakoczy in to the war, and without being of much use to the Swedes.²⁸⁰

In the meantime, the Ottomans kept a watchful eye on the western front as Strassburg was conducting his negotiations in Transylvania. Hacı Yusuf Ağa was

görölmekle ağalarımızdan olan resanende- i varaka- yı ___ Mehemed Ağa zide- kadrehu ile ma'en koşub, siz devletlü dostumuza irsal iylemişüzdür. İnşa- el- Mevla- te'ala huzuruna varub vasıl olmak müyesser oldukda sa'adetlü ve 'azimetlü Padişahımız hazretlerine olan dostluğunuza binaen mezburları her ne tarikle olur ise İsvetçiye Kralı dostunuza ulaştırmağa bezl- i ikdam ve sa'y ve ihtimam eylesesüz ki mezburları mahalline isal eylemek ile hem bu canib- i dostunuza ziyade minnet olub, sa'adetlü Padişahımız hazretlerine dahi bu babda hidmet etmiş olursuz."

²⁷⁵ Mörner, 340.

²⁷⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷⁷ Zinkeisen, Vol. IV, p. 330.

²⁷⁸ Haga's Letter to Axel Oxenstierna (22 September 1633), in Arckenholtz, Vol. I, p. 486.

²⁷⁹ RA/OSAOS, E 657, 4133, From Marinus to Axel Oxenstierna (February 1634, Zürich): "D. Strasburg iam Venetiis est, per Tigurum in Germaniam rediturus".

²⁸⁰ RA/OSAOS, E 708 A, From Salvius to Oxenstierna (23.11.1633, Hamburg): "4. att alla medell i verlden sökes thet Ragotzijk opväckes på den ungerische sidhan. Till hvilcken ända iagh inthet tviflar Strasburgl ad portam och i Cascow godha officia göra kann."

shuttling back and forth between the Ottoman Porte and Transylvanian Prince Rakoczy to negotiate the Transylvanian demand of help for the intended anti-Habsburg campaign. Haga informs us that as August 1632, the Ottoman ministers were trying to gather information from the Prince and the governor of Buda on the developments taking place in Germany regarding the Swedish advance; they needed to know the Swedes really had the upper hand in the struggle,²⁸¹ and had to consider their options thoroughly before sending the messenger back to Transylvania:²⁸² Keeping the resolutions pending and delaying the answer as much as possible seemed the best option.²⁸³

Playing the intimidation card didn't go unconsidered either. The order for mobilization of the Buda, Temesvar, Eger and Kanizsa troops was issued late in 1632;²⁸⁴ and this is probably the decree referred to by Strassburg at the end of his relation. However, the decision to remain aloof from further involvement must have emanated from a disappointing tidings coming from inside Germany: The news of Gustav Adolph's death on the battlefield of Lützen in November 1632 reached Constantinople on 27th December, and was confirmed by the Venetians on 11th February 1633 as Haga illuminates us.²⁸⁵

The Austrian ambassador Schmid rejoiced over this news, whereas the remaining Christian ambassadors at the Porte partook in the incredible sorrow (*een*

²⁸¹ Haga's Letter to Axel Oxenstierna (Late 1632), Doc # XXXIII in Szilagyi (1882, MHH), p. 67: "*Per le incertezze delli affari di Germania, e diversi rumori sparsi qui tuta questa estate, non s'ha potuto cavar da questi ministri ferma resolutione alle domande fatte da parte del sermo principe Raccocy, non volendo qui metter a risico la pace col Imperatore, sin che non lo vederanno in stato disperato per poter risorgere.*"

²⁸² Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 20 August 1632, in KHG, 416.

²⁸³ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 15 January 1633, in KHG, p. 424: "*Ick bemerck wel, dat men de saecken veel liever in suspens soude willen houden, als tot het een off ander te resolveren...*".

²⁸⁴ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 15 November 1632, in KHG p. 423.

²⁸⁵ Haga's Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 21 February 1633, in KHG, 428.

ongeloofflijcke droeffheyd) felt by the “Viziers and some other Turks”.²⁸⁶ The slightest possibility to trespass the Austrian border to start a direct war against the Habsburgs was thereafter erased from the minds of the Ottoman ministers.²⁸⁷ Furthermore, even though the Porte was discontented with the peace negotiations between Emperor Ferdinand II and George Rakoczy during spring 1633,²⁸⁸ they were equally anxious that, considering Gustav Adolph’s death, a peace between the German princes and with the Emperor at that moment could prove rather destructive for the Ottoman Empire which was still bogged down in the eastern front.²⁸⁹ Comprehensibly, by summer 1633, reciprocal extraordinary ambassadors had been chosen by both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans,²⁹⁰ since an exchange of diplomats and gifts had been decided in the last treaty signed. Once more, the Ottoman enthusiasm for hitting the Habsburgs hard at home was disappointed for practical purposes.

Returning back to Strassburg, after undertaking certain diplomatic missions in Switzerland as implied above,²⁹¹ he went to Frankfurt am Main in April 1634, and wrote down his final relation on the 1632 mission to Constantinople, which he sent with a letter to the reigning Swedish Queen Christina, late Gustav II Adolph’s daughter, on 26 August 1634. Mörner points out that a copy of the relation was demanded in 1656 from a Council member (Strassburg’s brother- in- law) for a new official Swedish embassy to the Ottoman Porte, this time under a Swede named

²⁸⁶ Ibidem.

²⁸⁷ Paul Ricaut. *Histoire des trois derniers Empereurs des Turcs, Depuis 1623 jusqu’a 1677. Traduite de l’Anglois du Sr. Ricaut.* Tome Premier. (Paris, 1683). 70.

²⁸⁸ Haga’s Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 12 July 1633, in KHG, 434.

²⁸⁹ Haga’s Letter to the Staaten Generaal, 1 August 1633, in KHG, 442.

²⁹⁰ Ibidem.

²⁹¹ *Theatrum Europeaum*, Band 3, Anno 1634.(Frankfurt a/M, 1670) , p. 300.

Claes Rålamb,²⁹² who starts narrating his observations on Turkey by referring to Strassburg's final relation in his own report.²⁹³

In the end, Paul Strassburg's mission in the Ottoman Empire had been a real failure. Rakoczy's support against the Habsburg Emperor couldn't be enlisted, and the Ottomans were not willing to make any effort in the same direction, either. With regards to the official aspect of the mission, Gustav Adolf's efforts to restore Catherine of Brandenburg's heritage was only partially successful. Nevertheless, Strassburg was by no means to blame for the shortcomings of his mission: He had accumulated eight years of diplomatic experience by the time he had reached the Ottoman capital. He did his best with his limited finances,²⁹⁴ and was venerated at the Ottoman Porte beyond usual. The odds are high that had the Safavid war not been exhausting Ottoman resources in the east, both bellicose Sultan Murad IV and the ruling Ottoman elite would have seriously flirted with the idea of opening large scale hostilities in the western front. In that case, Strassburg's diplomatic mission in the east could have been a success story.

²⁹² Mörner, 344.

²⁹³ Claes Rålamb, *Kort Beskrifning om thet som wid then Constantinoplitaniske Resan år föreluppit* (Stockholm, 1679), p. 44: "... Herr Strasburger war wid Portam Ottomanicam, hwilken effter han widh the troubler som uthi Sult. Amuratis förste anträdande til Regementer föreluppe/ och defectione Babyloniae sin Relation lychtat..."

²⁹⁴ He was yearly paid 4000 Reichsthalers, and had to borrow 2000 from Cornelis Haga during his first stay in Constantinople.

CHAPTER 4

STRASSBURG'S FINAL RELATION

Strassburg wrote down the final relation in 1634, as it is abovestated, and sent it to Stockholm where it was kept in the national archives. In our knowledge, there are no complete translations of the document; and even if there is, none has been published so far in any case.

Early in the 18th century, a transcription of the relation somehow found its way into a codex of Latin texts probably due to the political significance of the document, under a long and descriptive name: *Pauli Strasburgii, Sueciæ Regis Quondam Consiliarii Secretioris Aulici et ad Amurathem IVtum Legati, Relatio de Byzantino Itinere ac negotiis in Ottomannica Aula peractis, nec non de statu ac facie Orientalis Imperii, qualis erat circa Ann. MDCXXXIII.*²⁹⁵ The transcription is in well shape: It was meticulously prepared by the editors in that majuscule letters and punctuations are correctly put, facilitating the reading effort for the audience. However, in comparison to the manuscript, there are certain passages missing in this version.

Almost two centuries later, a Hungarian historian (Sandor Szilagyí) undertook the project of collecting documents affiliated with Strassburg's diplomatic mission to the Transylvanian Principality and the Ottoman Empire, along with related correspondences.²⁹⁶ Szilagyí made his own transcription of the final relation

²⁹⁵ *Monumenta pietatis & literaria virorum in republica & literaria illustrium, selecta: quorum pars prior exhibet collectanea Palatina, quae ad illustrandam Historiam Ecclesiae Palatinae cum promissis faciunt, posterior eruditorum superioribus duobus seculis celebrium epistolas nondum editas, comprehendit, in quibus memorabilia multa, illorum temporum occurrunt : cum annexo indice rerum contentarum.* Mieg, Ludwig Christian; Nebel, Daniel; Alting, Heinrich. *Historia ecclesiastica Palatina.* 1701. Sylburg, Friedrich. *Catalogus librorum manuscriptorum Graecorum, in Bibliotheca Palatina Electorali.* (1701 Frankfurt am Main). P: 85 – 226. Hereafter only “*Monumenta pietatis...*”

²⁹⁶ MHH, pp. 83 – 126.

from the Stockholm archive, and included it in the compilation with Strassburg's accompanying 1634 letter to the Swedish queen. Szilagyi's version is less careful about the punctuation, but gives a thorough study of the text. An introductory page addressing the Swedish Queen by Strassburg is present along with the passages missing in the *Monumenta pietatis*....

Onno Klopp and Magnus Mörner have utilized the final report in their studies, but the attempt closest to a translation is the four- page- long translation into Romanian in *Călători străini despre Țările Române*,²⁹⁷ which was chosen for the depiction of Wallachia, in today's Romania. More recently, those four pages were translated from Romanian to English by Bagiu,²⁹⁸ and I thus had the chance to cross check this particular passage with my translation.

The relation covers the period between late 1631 and mid 1632 with retrospective annotations here and there. But, as we noted, since Strassburg visited Constantinople once more in 1633 and wrote the relation even later (in 1634), he also points out to the events which took place after summer 1632 in the Ottoman Empire and at times makes chronological confusion in the text. Lastly, his humanist education is also densely sensible in the text, especially with regards to the Ottoman geography where we can hardly encounter any Turkish toponyms: Strassburg sticks to the classical Greek or Latin place names as many other contemporary diplomats did²⁹⁹.

²⁹⁷ *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, vol. 5, volum îngrijit de Maria Holban, București, Editura Științifică, 1973, 60–68.

²⁹⁸ Lucian Vasile Bagiu, “The Image of the Romanians in the Travelling Impressions of 17th Century Scandinavians”, in *Transylvanian Review*, The Center for Transylvanian Studies, The Romanian Academy – The Branch of Cluj Napoca, 2011. 381 – 403.

²⁹⁹ That the language of the text was Latin might be another denominator in this sense.

Below is the full translation of Strassburg's final relation, in which I followed the pagination of *Monumenta pietatis*, and placed brackets whenever there were additions from the original manuscript in the Stockholm archive from

Szilagyi's edition:

Relation of Paul Strassburg, once Secret Counsellor of the court of the King of Sweden and the Envoy to Sultan Murad IV, about the Voyage to Constantinople, about the Negotiations undertaken in the Ottoman Court, and no less about the present state and shape of the Oriental Empire, as it was in the year ca. 1633

[The Introduction Addressing Queen Christina of Sweden in Szilagyi Sandor's Edition]

The Most Serene and Powerful Queen and Lady,
My Most Clement Lady.

Military accomplishments [may have] carried the name and glory of Gustav the Great far and wide; however, his skills in peace time and prudent rule acquired no less fame and celebrity to his Majesty. For, even if the House of the Austria-Spanish³⁰⁰, under the rule of Ferdinand II, had climbed the top of their hope of domination with many bright victories, their successes were utterly disturbed by the virtue and good fortune of the divine King Gustav, as a sign of transcendental kindness. And the deep roots, which the Reigning Family had grown during the span of so many years and generations, started to shake and tremble due to the disastrous defeats; therefore, if we consider the brevity of time and the astonishing vicissitudes [of fortune], nothing greater or more sublime can be imagined (by a man of spirit) than Gustav Adolph's accomplishments in any age: Wise men, however, have been thinking that it is rather with the singular foresight and strong perspicacity of the Holy Royal Majesty himself that the fundament of such a Body had been established many years before: Powerful friendships were built at first; and with the neighbouring empires and kingdoms, either the good neighbourhood policy was readjusted,³⁰¹ or armistices were signed, or peace with agreements worthy of immortal glory was concluded. In order to realize this with greater influence, lots of distinguished and large Legations were sent by the Incomparable King to various parts of the European continent. Among those, it fell to my share, that in the 31st year of this century, I was sent, most mercifully, both to the Kingdoms of Hungary and Transylvania, and to the capital of the Oriental Empire by the Holy Royal Majesty. The embassy, undertaken for the common cause of the kings and the princes, was so heroic due to both the decisions taken at that time, and to its consequences in the future. At first, it is memorable because of the importance of the mission, of so

³⁰⁰ The Habsburg Dynasty

³⁰¹ *iura vicinitatis reculta*

numerous and diverse peoples and folks, of the long route and the vast spaces of land, and finally of dreadful accidents, pains, deaths, revolts and uprisings which we encountered, and which almost toppled the Sovereign of the Ottoman Monarchy itself; these are closely accounted for. All of which I will correctly and faithfully relate to Your Holy Royal Majesty in this humble text.

[End of the Introduction]

(185) After I had left Frankfurt (on the Oder),³⁰² a violent sickness struck me, from which I recovered with the help of the Divine Hand, and took the road to Prussia without delay. Here, I was joined by my noble companions, servants, and was provided in great care with carriages, horses, ornaments and other paraphernalia, determined to convene to the grandiosity and Dignity of H[is].R[oyal].M[ajesty]., so that I may start the journey to the Peoples of the Orient with pomp, just as I was commanded by H.R.M, and as my Lord the most Illustrious and Excellent L[ord] Axel Oxenstierna, the Great Royal Chancellor [of Sweden], kindly instructed me. Then, when everything was prepared for departure, letters from Warsaw and Danzig arrived, which informed us that my way through Poland was watched with attention and all passages to Hungary were occupied with soldiers. Therefore, a proper man was consulted to be dispatched to Warsaw and procure there a Letter of Safe Conduct. But when an intense suspicion rose that (185)

(186) the Poles would not consent to any motivation for a journey to Constantinople, the Most Illustrious and Excellent Lord Royal Chancellor decided that I may myself hasten to the Polish Court without premonition in order to negotiate for the Safe Conduct in person. Thus, on the 22nd day of the Month November,³⁰³ I departed from Elbing with my retinue, and took the way towards Działdowo³⁰⁴ through Ducal Prussia, and around midmorning entered the first town of the Poles, Mlavva, on the 27th of the same month. At the time of our arrival, there was a great consternation in the town; people of all sexes and all ages were fleeing and running around in trepidation, struck by fear. In fact, others were dragging their spouses and children, while some others were carrying wheresoever their chests, tools, clothes, and whatever they held precious in great clamour to the cemetery, the towers and the temple. Having asked for the reasons [of this chaos], they responded, [that it was because of] the depraved mortal race, who were called the Confederates and the Lisovscians³⁰⁵ in Poland, some handful of robbers attacking, pillaging their vicinity, and spreading around the terror of ferocity and villainy far and wide. In order to run away from their rage and furious attacks by one way or the other, they carried their dearest pledges to holy shrines, such as the Asylum, trusting in the strength of the place, and [intending to] dare put up defence, if a larger force would attack. The danger of hostility affected our faces and minds with anxiety. Indeed, since the Poles

³⁰² See Appendix A for the chronology of Strassburg's mission and Appendix D(1) for the map of the road he followed.

³⁰³ 1631

³⁰⁴ Soldaviam: It must be the German "Soldau".

³⁰⁵ Lisowski, Aleksander (1575-1616), officer of the Polish Army. "... Lisowski's soldiers distinguished themselves with cruelty and looting, and he was considered a hero and a villain at the same time. He died unexpectedly during the operations in Russia, but his units were so useful that Hetman J. K. Chodkiewicz formalized the existence of the "Lisowczycy," who gained fame during the Thirty Years' War and survived until the end of the seventeenth century. PSB, XVII, 470-472.", in Lerski, *Historical Dictionary of Poland* (1996).p. 307.

often raised threats about my passage with their usual grandiloquence, it was to be feared, that they might have themselves agitated some people against us and have prepared ambushes by creating a false tumult through some rascals. Therefore, I contemplated the issue deeply in my mind, and considered entering the Polish frontier, leaving not only King Sigismund ignorant [of my presence], but also the royal ministers without my greetings, so that whatever trouble we might encounter, the fault could in no way be attributed to the Confederates or Lisowscians, nor excused by the Poles with the pretext or fiction of robbery. However, there were 3 things to be done in this case; namely to proceed directly to Warsaw, and fall right into the hands of the robbers; or to halt in the town Mlavva for a bit, and thus meet the fire and sword of the abominable people; or withdraw to Ducal Prussia in great shame and disgrace. While I was turning these issues over in my head with an anxious mind, and considering all the ways of deliverance [from this situation], (186)

(187) the opportunity came forth, and I found a house in the town, which was constructed with solid stone and would stand firm, I thought, against the attacks of the Poles. Therein, it was suitable to put together the servants, the inventory and the horses; to expel the [hostile] force, if exercised, with arms; and to commit the events to the Divine will and providence. In the meantime, couriers and messengers from the local magistrate were running here and there, asking diligently where that band of robbers had gone, while people all around were scared to death by the savageness and cruelty of the perfidious people, and were having an anxious sleepless night among whispers and murmurs. This sad and bleak view of events, in the face of darkness and thick fog, had its effect also among some in my retinue, and fomented the imminent danger. I was, however, rather firmly determined to accept whatever fate waiting for us than return with a tarnished fame of the Legation, in disgrace. The aforementioned Confederates were attacking from both sides of the town, wandering around for pillage in barbarous tumult, and it was already reported that they were about to come, while we were standing ready for their attack, barricades placed on both gates of the house, weapons at hand, and water prepared to extinguish a possible fire. Truly, the benevolence of the Heavens, the Protector of those who follow his ways abroad with a legitimate vocation, turned the evil away from us, here too. The Scouts, indeed, withdrew before the rise of the Sun. The Lisowscians took the road to Electoral Prussia, and turned towards Przasnysz.³⁰⁶ Then on, having been emancipated from fear, we prepared for the journey without losing time, and on public ways and safe routes we headed for Warsaw. Often I wondered if it was right to think, that those military operations with murder, pillage and fire took place just next to the Royal Seat all by chance? Or if the Poles regarded it for certain, that I might change my mind by such fearsome events and by the opposition of the Cossacks, and might withdraw in fear, neglecting the Legation [mission]. Whatever the truth may be, it is entirely certain that they repeated the same [violent acts] afterwards, and caused tragedies again before I was reaching the borders of Hungary. Then, reaching closer to Warsaw, I halted with my retinue in the Dabrovka village, a mile away from the city, and sent from ahead letters- confided to faithful men- of Most Excellent Lord Royal Chancellor [Oxenstierna] to Jacob (187)

(188) Zadzik, the High Bishop and the Great Chancellor of Poland; at the same time

³⁰⁶ Prasznitium

I wrote to him, and indicated myself as the envoy from H.R.M my Most Clement Lord [The King of Sweden] to the Most Serene Prince[ss], My Mistress Marchioness Catherine of Brandenburg, the Widow of the Prince of Transylvania, and also implored that he permit me continue my way under his authority, and that he provide me with Letters of Safe Conduct on the just basis of the Truce.³⁰⁷ At the time, the Polish Court was in grave lamentation and confusion because of the poor health of the King Sigismund, of the unexpected death of their Queen, of the horrible disaster of the Emperor Ferdinand, and of the unfortunate tidings from Prague, which reached Warsaw on the very same day. Therefore were my men received with hardly cheerful faces when it became known to the Poles that I was setting out directly for Constantinople with royal mission. So, aforesaid Chancellor Zadzik, with Marshall of the Crown Opalinski³⁰⁸ and Voyvode Dönhoff of the Council, deliberated seriously about my request of passage for two days, at the end of which Royal Chamberlain Stanislaw Nastacki was sent to the Dabrovka village to [see] me. Here, ceremonial praises having been made and the letters of the Chancellor being presented, he made apologies for the delay, speaking in the usual Polish eloquence. The tenor of the letter was this: The Chancellor had wished to respond me in the matter of free passage to the Hungarian Kingdom, and was highly astonished that I was not given the usual safe conduct in a foreign kingdom, [but] only letters of voyage. Because even if the legations are allowed to move here and there according to the laws of nations and mutual agreements, this can't take place, however, without the awareness of those who are administering the government of the realm. Then, although they were troubled by serious reasons on account of which voyages of this sort had to be prohibited, in this case, however, he demonstrated his eagerness to cherish the agreement, and he had concluded that it was to be given with the letters of the Most Illustrious Lord Chancellor of the Kingdom of the Swedes, so that I can continue my journey through Poland. In this manner, I could reach the Hungarian border safely; and the Royal Chamberlain would accompany me. I responded to this in appropriate with the reason of the time and place, and demonstrated with many examples and arguments that I was allowed to come to the Royal Court of the Polish people, and at the same time accepted the Chamberlain respectfully and elegantly, and set the date for departure over a few glasses [of drink]. (188)

(189) Indeed, when my future companion was drinking himself to a more and more friendly manner, we had a long speech about the scope of my legation and my passage, and openly admitted that the Great Chancellor and the other statesmen had predicted that I was travelling not only to Hungary and Transylvania, but also to the Ottoman Court itself with an ambassadorial duty: This was indeed rather unpleasant for all, on the account of suspicions and conjectures that were springing from the novel friendship of the Swedes with the Ottomans, at the very particular time, when it was necessary to act for the affairs of perpetual peace between the most Serene Kings and Kingdoms far away. While he was speaking those words boldly as it was the local costume, I listened to him with a pleasant and cheerful face, not interrupting him with objections or jokes during the meal; [but] I said, I was wondering from whence such fictions were gathering their source, because H.R.M of Sweden, my most Clement Lord had never commissioned me with a duty of that sort: The people

³⁰⁷ Signed in 1629 between Poland and Sweden, the Truce of Altmark was intended to last until 1635.

³⁰⁸Oppalinski: Łukasz Opalinski

of shrewd disposition often diverged to conjectures and empty concerns.³⁰⁹ Thereafter, the conversations and pleasures having lasted until the night, we exchanged salutations, and I sent away the annoying visitor, who returned to his people and whom I, later on, received again at the crossing of the Vistula after having drawn some water. I left Dabrowka on December 6th, and reached Lublin without any obstacle, from where they had carried away Roussel's³¹⁰ men to Warsaw in chains on that day, who had been inconsiderately sent to Zaporozhian Cossacks, which rendered me hideous and quite a suspect. Because the Captain of Lublin had complained seriously to the aforementioned Nastacki and, the royal commands having been accurately inspected, suspected his faith, who demonstrated the letters of the Great Chancellor with great caution in order to erase the peevish man's doubts. On the way, Nastacki tried every possible tactic in order to figure out anything about our plans; at every occasion, place, and time between the promenades, and no less in the carriage, at the lodging or during meals, he consistently kept asking about this or that. For that reason, warning myself that I was facing a shrewd man who was well versed in the investigation strategies of the Jesuits, I behaved rather considerately and carefully during our conversations. Therefore, he resorted to different means, started chatting with the nobles and servants [in my retinue] more intimately, asking with a feigned frankness, what the scope and the intention of my journey was? and what missions I had received from the King? (189)

(190) where, then, I was keeping my secret stuff? Moreover, he pretended not to know the German language, but used it secretly to collect information. Truly, my men had sniffed out the fraud [in his manners] from the very beginning, and were turning modestly away his attempts at conversation. When, in Przemysl, he was asked where we were heading, he lied that we were the Embassy of the Emperor. In fact, he was ashamed to publicly claim that the Counsellor of H.R.M of Sweden was traversing Poland openly. Not seldomly he wrote to the Great Chancellor Jacob Zadzik, I think, in a way he made up and contrived. We reached the ancient city of Sambor,³¹¹ which borders Hungary, in the evening of the Nativity of our Lord³¹²; and the following day, the holy celebrations having been made in the Evangelical rite, we were accompanied again to the edge of the Polish borders. We had to cross the ignoble river in the neighbouring valley, which lied all the way up to the very roots of the Carpathian Mountains. The river had risen due to continuous rains and augmentation of water, tightened by northern winds and consolidated as if it was stone. Hither, our carriages and baggage tried to advance on the road which was shortly before crossed by light Polish vehicles; and when the half way was stridden, the crusts of glacier, succumbing to the weight, sat on a boulder, the servants, carriages and the inventory immersed deep. Even though such a sorrowful sight affected me with an overwhelming grief, I started to fear, more than anything, that I was losing the Royal command with this fall, along with the travelling money, provisions of the Legation and the whole inventory. Therefore, I encouraged as many

³⁰⁹ Lusus

³¹⁰ Jacques Roussel: Swedish envoy to Poland and Muscovy. Karman suggests that he was in Riga at the time. Gabor Karman, "Gabor Bethlen's Diplomats at the Protestant Courts of Europe", in *Hungarian Historical Review* 2, no. 4. (2013), pp: 790- 823. 813. 807

³¹¹ Today's Sambir in Ukraine.

³¹² 25 December 1631.

people around me as possible with a great urge to aid the ones in peril before it was too late; and they, challenging the danger, hurled themselves into the water promptly and audaciously, helping quickly the weak and weary ones with shouts, hands, warnings, until they could touch the ground, respiring for a moment, and swim to the opposite shore with the help of the God. The Polish Nastacki, since he was willing to demonstrate his magnanimity before all others and [tried] to break through the whirlpool, was only inches away from his ruin and destruction: He had sunk with his horse and was washed away into the deep, the streams drove him here and there for a long while; his oblong Polish vesture with fox hide was carried away, floating in the shape of a ball. I could hardly suppress a laugh, when I saw Nastacki, [normally] a high-spirited man, [but now] totally soaked in the tough winter, rigid from the intense frost, and struggling with the torrent in haste: (190)

(191) He had until then led me like a captive, busy with his attempts to penetrate into my secrets, scrutinizing my face, trying to understand and interpret my actions. Anyway, we got away with tolerable loss from that hazard, and desiring a lighter baggage, the carts and carriages were dismounted; when we reached an inn in the middle of the night, everyone was wet all over. This was a modest house of the Ruthenian Alps,³¹³ recently built with clay, in which you could see nothing but smoke and dung, making it worse than the Lithuanian and Livonian ones: Here now we could, after such long labours and miseries, rest our fatigued limbs and celebrate the feast of Nativity without meal or beverages. Because, since nothing at all is cultivated in those places, the local people were eating rough, half-baked black bread. Beer is rare here, and made of not barley or wheat, but of oat. They prepare whisky³¹⁴ of a base quality from corn. They herd sheep, and sustain their lives with goat milk. Going towards Pannonia, 6 days were to be spent among these mountains. In the half way, around the Krifka village, lies the border line between Polish and Hungarian Realms, in which Nastacki bade farewell to me, while I was greatly rejoicing that I was [at last] emancipated from the occult enemy. However, for the sake of manners, he accompanied me to the approaching Hungarians, who came on foot, leading 80 horses, deeming it safe and honouring to receive the Royal Legation with solemnity and prestige. And since they were marching in deep ranks for order and discipline while exposing their open banners against Poland, the ceremony vexed and perturbed Nastacki vehemently. Therefore, he retreated in abject anger, and requested through a noble boy, that I write in detail to the Great Chancellor Jacob Zadzik about my fortunate passage, which I did on the same day. Thus I had escaped alive from the hands of the Poles, but by no means a better lot or more favourable conditions were waiting for me among the Hungarians who had slippery faiths. Thus, Janos Ballingh, the Captain of Munkacs, of the Evangelic Religion, was assigned [to us], who was favouring our party deeply, and had been attached to me with intimate friendship during the reign of the Most Serene Gabor [Bethlen]: However, the neighbouring regions and provinces were declared by Emperor Ferdinand, subjected to the jurisdiction and authority of the enemy. Therefore, the roads being occupied, nothing was easier than catching me, along with the royal commands and my retinue: (191)

³¹³ Ruthenorum alpestrium - Probably the Southern Carpathians.

³¹⁴ crematum

(192) Especially, when Homonnay, among the Papist nobles, had a considerable force of 300 paid German foot soldiers, and was quite close to us; and, to add more, the Poles had instructed the Hungarians about my arrival and intention of voyage to the Orient. Valentinus Diack, the commissary of the Captain of Munkacs, an honest and prudent man, was diligently focusing on this issue along with the officers and the leader of the horsemen, sending many scouts here and there, and hurrying with me day and night until they left behind the hazardous locations, and the son of the aforesaid captain came to meet us with a large number of cavalry and footmen. Our group augmented by his leadership, we reached our destination, the Munkacs city, without any impediment. The citadel and its territory, situated in Upper Hungary, were 12 miles³¹⁵ away from Kosice, the capital of that region. The city enjoys ample jurisdiction, and it has a strong castle positioned on an elevated mountain, everywhere around it being flat. It looks over three towns and up to a hundred and forty villages, among which Beregszasz is esteemed highly on account of its high fertility and of the abundance of its own excellent vine, which is also sold extensively in the Polish realm. Gabor Bethlen, the Prince of Transylvania, assigned it to his wife Milady Catherine, Marchioness of Brandenburg among the dowry goods, and procured the agreement of Emperor Ferdinand and the Hungarian Estates. However, when Gabor Bethlen passed away, they prepared a plot against the Captain Janos Ballingh, and against justice and the faith for the agreement, demanded the city Munkacs and the garrison to be delivered to the Palatine Esterhazy in the name of Emperor Ferdinand. Then, the abovementioned Captain Ballingh pled for help from George Rakoczy of Transylvania, who was not the Prince yet and who resisted with arms the Palatine Esterhazy and other papists around the County of Maramaros. Therefore, while we were heading closer to the town, a surprising crowd of Nobles welcomed us on the way; and in order to publicly honour the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, their joy was attested with crashes of catapults and the soldiers' rifles. War being waged in the Austrian domains, what was done seemed unusual and insolent to many people. I sojourned for 12 days in that castle, messengers and couriers running back and forth [between us and] the Most Serene Prince[ss] Lady Catherine who was (192)

(193) in the town Tokay. About her condition and situation, I not only pondered thoroughly, but I was also informed accurately by faithful friends. Forsooth, Her Serenity had been persuaded and cajoled by the Hungarian Count Istvan Csaky³¹⁶, and was delivering the fortified citadel Tokay to the Emperor Ferdinand, relieving the garrison of the oath of fidelity. And she was commanding the Captain of Munkacs, Janos Ballingh, to hand in the goods to the Palatine. The money being prepared by Csaky, he confided the ornaments imprudently to the Chancellor of Hungary, Istvan Seney. She acquiesced to the extraction of a signed and sealed attestation document from herself and the substitution of Rakoczy's sons as heirs. Again, Rakoczy deceived Her Serenity with a fantastic trick, and he supported the conflicts and dissensions through various means, to which they intervened with the Governor of Transylvania Istvan Bethlen, the brother of the deceased Prince, until he was to obtain the Principality both by [the confirmation of] the Estates of Transylvania and [of] the Ottoman Porte itself, under the approval and assent of Her Serenity. Because, after the Most Serene Princess Catherine was removed from the

³¹⁵ German mile.

³¹⁶ Stephano Czaky Ungaro Barone

administration and rule of the realm, Istvan Bethlen, the Governor of Transylvania, solicited George Rakoczy, through his sons and son-in-law, to take control of the Principality in his hands, because he was convinced that in the face of the vigorous opposition of the Papist faction, he wouldn't be able to reach that position. Then, his elder son, the Captain of Varad,³¹⁷ visited the Vizier of Buda with 300 horsemen, to convince him to support the cause of the new Candidate; at the same time, the son-in-law David Zolyomi of the Governor left for George Rakoczy in Patak: in his father-in-law's name he was confirming him on the subject, and bestowing him all the resources, assent and clients of the Bethlen family. While these were done, the fortified Diet³¹⁸ in Cluj was surrounded by Transylvanians, among whom as many Evangelical as Papist magnates confirmed the Count Istvan Bethlen as the Prince with unanimous vote; some [had supported him] on the account of his religion and merits, others because of their jealousy towards and approaching fear of Rakoczians. This had happened beyond the hope and expectation, and was perturbing Istvan Bethlen vehemently: Because the situation was such that he was either to refuse the dignity offered to him, (193)

(194) or to fail Rakoczy's trust. Since he remained vacillating on this issue for a long while, he let himself to be persuaded by the Catholics that he should inform Rakoczy with letters about his election, asking friendly that he should not invade Transylvania with an army, knowing that he was mightier and stronger, and that he would be responsible for a civil war in Hungary in this manner. Truly, things got more complicated. In fact, Rakoczy had left his home, and the Governor's son and son-in-law had sworn loyalty to him hastily, even the citadel of Varad was imprudently delivered for reasons of security. Moreover, the Free Hajduks³¹⁹ were flocking around George Rakoczy in great numbers, and the most Serene Princess Catherine, loathe to the Governor (by whom, she was complaining, she was removed by force and deception) was passing to his side with the foremost Nobility; supporting constantly His cause and election until Istvan Bethlen was forced to retreat from the Principality. Therefore, the friends were relating that with the beginning of the new Sovereignty, Rakoczy was presenting a showcase of thankfulness, and wanted to honour the most Serene Lady Widow with pompous flattery, so that he later on more effectively disarm and seize her incautious. The feigned sincerity and benevolence was regarded with much credulity by the women Prince, and her obedience could easily follow. As a matter of fact, her Highness (beyond the normal [feeling of] human sympathy) had rejected the natural inclination towards her fatherland and sympathy for her kind. She was declining the services of the Germans and wholly trusted herself to the Hungarian flatterers. As a result of these, those favoured ones were directing their minds and efforts not to the dignity and benefit of Her Serenity, but to their individual ends and to (new) Prince Rakoczy's favour. I will relate more of this prolific issue later, and now I am to continue the voyage. My entrance into the frontiers and territories of the Emperor was by no means unknown, [so] I was to make a serious consideration about tricking Nicolas Forgacs, the General of Upper Hungary, because Tilly's fatal disaster near Leipzig had vehemently perturbed the Catholic souls, and the House of Austria was alerted with contempt that I had entered

³¹⁷ Today's Oradea.

³¹⁸ Comitia armata

³¹⁹ Liberi Haydones

hostile territory along with the fame of this fresh victory.³²⁰ It was further due to the fact that Ferdinand (the chosen) King of Hungary, Cardinal and Archbishop of Esztergom Peter Pazmany, Palatine Miklos Esterhazy, (194)

(195) Istvan Seney/Stecny, and the aforementioned General Forgacs, and other High Captains of the border cities were in great terror and panic, as much because of the immense advances of the Holy Royal Majesty (in the most glorious of memories³²¹) and his victorious armies, as because of the continuous excursions of the Turks, which were forerunners of war and evil. For, even if they were busy with preparing and refreshing the exhausted forces through the Assembly, their endeavours for more aid were falling on deaf ears of the offended and the exasperated people, whose memories of persecution and injuries were still fresh. The High Nobility and the Magnates, the larger part of the Nobility and the Burghers were all vehemently alienated, both because of Religious diversity, and on account of the bitter despotism of the Palatine and his intolerable presumption; this being the case for the people, they were watching everything at a side, waiting to act in accordance with the eventual result. The Archbishop and the Palatine were in most bitter opposition, being unable to reach a concordance upon anything, and not even because of necessity. Hence, among hesitant and risky considerations, and in an unfortunate vacuum of authority, resources and deliberations, everything could be changed by a slight movement, especially if the Prince of Transylvania was attacking the weak and the desperate unexpectedly. Moreover, Hungarian Peter Kovacs, who was aiding the Emperor as Commander of 600 cavalry troops, was altogether defeated by the Saxons not far away from Lemburg³²² (a Bohemian town) at that time, and the fugitives from that calamity had caused great terror in all parts of Ferdinand's Hungary. Therefore, since I had learned each and everything which concerned the situation of the most Serene Lady Widow through her letters, friends and messengers, I started thinking about the advance and the security of the voyage, and I urged the Captain of Munkacs seriously to send scouts under various pretexts, and to scrutinize the surrounding areas, observing diligently the garrisons of Kosice, Tokay, Nagykallo and Szatmar. At the same time, I arranged my retinue to answer, with a serious face, anyone questioning our journey that the condition of the Seren. Prince required that I send messengers to Rakoczy and stay in the city Munkacs for that whole month. Furthermore, I commanded that Istvan Csaky's nobles and Servants, who were carrying letters from the Princess, were to be dealt with special grace and benevolence, dallying under cover of honours and benevolence, until (195)

(196) I would become sure that there was nothing dubious about telling them my day for departure. Eventually, the voyage having been arranged, I had a long conversation with Captain Janos Ballingh, who planned that some cavalry would be sent ahead, and the broken bridges would be repaired on the road, upon which he was certain that the enemy was waiting for us, and in this way, he was playing a trick to the Emperor's men. In this manner, I had to carry back each and everyone from this place, facing a very dangerous and incredible difficulty and hazards, which were thus

³²⁰ It most probably refers to the Protestant victory at the Battle of Breitenfeld, near Leipzig, on September 7, 1631.

³²¹ The Swedish King Gustav Adolph II had passed away on 6th of November 1632, that is, more than a year ago when this account was written down.

³²² Lemburgo Bohemiae oppido

eased under these circumstances. With the Good God [by our side], I departed on the 25th of January³²³ and accompanied by a guard of 500 soldiers, I advanced on broken roads and through places in the back of beyond, and we diverted our way to the fortified city of Hust, to Count Istvan Bethlen, the senior. On the way to the neighbourhood of the enemies, I observed attentively the shrewdness, power, the slippery loyalty of my Pannonians, their fickleness and pusillanimity; and I concluded that the Hungarians, from their origins, were a naturally treacherous folk; being certain that if the Emperor's men were approaching, all of them would slip off, leaving me alone. In that case, the only solace left to me was an honourable death in order to escape the Tyranny of the Austrians. By the way, his foresight did by no means disappoint the Captain of Munkacs. Because, 700 Hungarian horsemen, 300 German infantry had left the nearby fortresses of Szatmar and Nagykallo at night, occupying the road they had predicted and setting traps on our route. And when David Zolyomi, the General of the Transylvanians saw this, he curbed and broke their courage with the forces gathered from all around. Then, we continued safe and sound to Istvan Bethlen and having been treated kindly for three days long, set out towards Transylvania on a direct route through inaccessible mountains of Maramaros. I acted on the issue of the shameful abdication of the most Serene Prince[ss] Widow as I was prescribed by the most merciful Holy Royal Majesty, and I protested vehemently to the good old man. However, he made me aware of many facts and presented his excuses and the series of all the events in written form. At the time of our departure, he declared his highest loyalty and sincerity towards us, and gathered 800 people from the vicinity of his County, who climbed (196)

(197) very high snowy tops, cut through forests, and made way for us in places never frequented before, so that we could stay away from the common roads and avoid the danger from the rule of the Austrians. Thirty oxen were set before each carriage, and the animals under rough and straight yokes were struggling with great effort and staggering hooves. From fifty miles away from the city of Sambor until the salt mines of Dej,³²⁴ the horses entirely ceased to be of use because of the heavy snow, and hence, I was compelled to advance on foot for most of the road. These [difficulties] eventually having been overcome, I bid my farewell both to Hungary and to the dangers to be feared from Ferdinand. And now, from the town Dej, as the representatives of Prince Rakoczy, Istvan Erdely and György Vitez came to meet us on the way and welcomed us with an exquisite pomp. But as barbarity reigns in those places, the morals of the people are rather unpleasant. Because, when they feasted at a Banquet table, they were not only devouring beyond imagination, but they also brought jars of wood or clay, all inappropriately shaped. This politeness and elegance of theirs continued all the way long until the court of the Prince. Here, on 9th February, Chancellor Istvan Kovacsoczy left Alba Julia with 80 horsemen and some carriages, and in the usual habit, rejoiced at my arrival, bid me a good day in Prince Rakoczy's name. On the following day, Royal Treasurer Ferenc Miko³²⁵ visited me and after a long conversation, he expressed, among other things, that most Illustrious Prince Rakoczy was offering me his services and was particularly asking that I be willing to tell His Highness more assuredly, if my Legation was intended for official

³²³ 25th of January, 1632.

³²⁴ Does/ Doesia in the texts.

³²⁵ Franciscus Miko Transylvaniae supremus Camerarius.

business and common good, or if it concerned the circumstances and affairs of most Serene Prince[ss] Lady Catherine. In this way, his Highness might more justly deliberate and moderately speak about the presented arguments. Because if it had anything to do with situation of Her Serenity, it would be most pleasing for His Highness that I relate the benevolent will and orders of the Holy Royal Majesty to the Royal Counsellors, since His Highness was away and absent. When the reason of this debate was to my knowledge, we were to speak about Lord Governor Bethlen and the Estates of Transylvania. To which I responded that the tenor of the orders given by my most merciful Lord Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden (197)

(198) was such that it concerned the Prince and the Estates of Transylvania in both official and private matters, which couldn't be separated in any way. Furthermore, it would be an insult to the Holy Royal Majesty if the Prince of Transylvania sent me to his Counsellors about such important and serious matters; even though His Highness might be far away, he should nonetheless hear precisely the words and wishes of the most Powerful King of the Swedes before I would leave for Constantinople. Although Miko was actually approving this, he adamantly insisted that the Prince had decided not to involve himself in the controversy over the issue of abdication and that he was not present in that discussion. Thereafter, forsooth, I swore that I would rather keep my letters of credential, fail the mission, and set out for Wallachia without greeting Prince Rakoczy than accept any insult and dishonour directed against the Holy Royal Majesty. After he stood listening to my steadfast sentences, he persuaded Prince Rakoczy that he should soften his obstinacy and be present with the Royal Counsellors to hear the exposition of the Legation (which they generally call audience). The arrangement was (thus) made for the 9th day of February around 9 hour. The aforementioned Chancellor Kovacsoczy, as it happens in other places, came down to me for a hospital reception with the horses and the carriage of the Prince; and before him, the courtiers, as they name, a huge crowd of half-naked people was coming. At both sides of the Prince's carriage were there attendants, and Bodyguards³²⁶ were positioned as long rows in the open, all the way to the forecourt of the Palace of Master of the Supreme Court,³²⁷ Sigismund Kökedi. A throng of the servants occupied the reception hall,³²⁸ whereas the Nobility was walking in the other rooms, and the inner Chamber was in use by the Royal Counsellors. The Prince, with his head uncovered, was standing at the entrance, his face reflecting remarkable courtesy and pleasure, with a purple robe covering him from top to ankle, and decorated with heron plumes; and his two sons of 10 and 8 years of age were following him. The clock³²⁹ of the Bavarian Duke was placed on the table, which was of spectacular craftsmanship, glittering with spikes gilded with jewels. When I had saluted him in the name of the Holy Royal Majesty, and delivered him the embellished words (of praise) appropriate with his good will and kindness, he made much reverence (198)

(199) with his gesture and speech in turn, and received the presented letters of credential with due honour and elegance: Furthermore, I was congratulated with

³²⁶ Praetoriani

³²⁷ Sigismundus Kokedi Curiae Magister

³²⁸ atrium

³²⁹ horologium

Latin idioms for the victories of the H.R.M and the (following) course of events. After the letters being read, he ordered the Counsellors to get inside, namely Sigismund Kornitz, Chancellor Kovacsoczy, Istvan Erdely, Wolfgang Czereni, Ferenc Miko, György Appafi, Istvan Haller, Sigismund Kökedi, Paul Nadus, Ferenc Maczkaschi and Istvan Kassej. These were standing in line with their ranks and with a serious expression cast on their faces, listening to me as I was expressing the issue of abdication according to my instructions. When I finished, the Chancellor asked each of them their opinions with an elevated voice, and responded on behalf of all in the end: The demand and kind wishes of his Holy Royal Majesty were received with reverence and respect by all the Counsellor of the Realm of Transylvania, and they were all ready and willing to give, as soon as possible, account of whatever was done in the affair of the abdication and to sufficiently satisfy H.R.M; requesting me only that I should patiently wait for a few days, during which they'd confer altogether on the gravity of the issue, consider the explanation of the controversy and present it in written form. In the meantime, while the meal time was drawing nigh, the Master of the Supreme Court invited me to a banquet; saying that the desired time had come that I could have my share in the joy of marriage which was to be celebrated: the Most Illustrious Prince was marrying his Sister to the Distinguished Lord Samuel Allia: He was asking insistently and diligently that I accept to be present among Their Highnesses. For the wedding, a big part of the Nobles and Magnates were convoked to Alba Julia, who flooded there in great crowds to gratify their Prince Rakoczy. The groom was praised for his splendour, looks, and wealth; gifts and messengers from Poland, Hungary, Moldavia and Wallachia were present. The ceremony was short, and the feast ended without drinking; dances were graceful and plain, and there was no interception of any irritating Papist murmuring, as far as the honour and the dignity of H.R. Majesty are concerned. For the rest of my time in Transylvania, I was tediously dealing with Rakoczy, who was proposing no conditions of [any meaningful] pact at all, (199)

(200) but those which were hardly congruent or accordant with the situation at hand; thus, I was forced to spend the whole month of February in order to polish and smooth them, and eventually, I sent the mitigated terms with my humble excuse to H. R. Majesty, and I requested them to abate their harshness. I had to postpone the case and affairs of the most Serene Lady Widow up until my return from Constantinople. As I was leaving, the Chancellor came for valediction under the command and instruction of the Prince, and obstinately requested that I praise His Highness to the Sultan of the Turks³³⁰ and to the Courtiers in the name of H.R. Majesty. He also told me, among other things, that a few months ago, he had been to the court of the Emperor with the Master of the Supreme Court Sigismund Kökedi as ambassadors, aiming to obtain the confirmation of the Kosice treaty from Ferdinand. He had found, in fact, all the high officials of the court so arrogant and disdainful that they didn't at all deign to address him or his Colleague, and forced them to wait uncertain and confused for six months long, [exposed to] a great mockery until Tilly's army suffered such a defeat that minds were changed all of a sudden and every demand was granted generously; and for the sake of appearances, they were sent back in gestures of good will and great kindness.³³¹ Then, I left Braşov³³² on the 4th day of

³³⁰ Imperatori Turcarum

³³¹ Hereafter starts the 4-page-long translation of Bagiu, though I kept translating from the original.

³³² Corona in the text.

March (which was a city hard to despise and was bordering the Wallachian territory), advancing towards Targoviște, [once] the capital of the Voyvodeship.³³³ Thither the Prince and Voyvode Leon, of Greek nation,³³⁴ had sent his Representative, so that they could accompany us to the capital Bucharest, which is now the residence and capital of the Voyvodeship. While I was reaching the city, the Voyvode himself was preparing to come for greetings with many soldiers and Wallachian flags, which I declined for various reasons. Nevertheless, after we entered within sight of the vast gigantic city, 100 noblemen of the country (which they call Boiars), carrying quivers [hence, bows] and galloping rapidly as if in an aggressive manner, and dismounting from their horses, congratulated us for our arrival on Voyvode Leon's behalf, and guided us to our lodgings. In the same evening, the aforementioned Voyvode sent the Great Court Marshal³³⁵ to invite us to lunch on the following day. And when the Nobles [Boiars] and carriages arrived on the fixed hour, we left for the palace at once. On the way, (200)

(201) a surrounding crowd of 200 Croatian guards³³⁶ were with us, who were better armed and clad than the Transylvanians. All the streets and market places of the city were filled with precious merchandise, which were in sale by Greek, Wallachian, Turkish or Armenian merchants. There was such a crowd and chaos of people that it was as if the whole Wallachian nation was flowing down there. The courtiers were no less numerous, attracted by the ceremony, reflecting luxury in their clothes and on the ornaments of their horses. The Palace was in a ruinous state because of its old age and of the frequent change of Voyvodes. The Voyvode, with his head covered, was waiting for me next to the gate of the hall and paying respects, his hands being attached to his chest as the Turks do, and bowing his head. Two chairs had been placed on the higher part [of the hall]; the one on the left was reserved for me, which was the more honourable among the barbarians, but I rejected it. Some Turkish notables³³⁷ were seated at his side, who, I think, were judges or counsellors. To the right, the high officials of the Country and the Court³³⁸ were standing, all wearing sable fur coats, and were ornamented as if it were a public festival celebration. I made my speech in Italian to this audience, and presented the letters of his Holy Royal Majesty along with my greetings, and requested that he promote my passage through his territory. The translator of my speech was Brother Benedict, a Cretan and the Public Speaker of the Court³³⁹, who was well versed in Italian, Latin, and even German besides Turkish and Greek; and he had spent 7 years in Wittenberg to study

³³³ *Sedem Palatinam* in the *Monumenta Pietatis...*, but *olim palatinam sedem* in Szilagyi Sandor's edition.

³³⁴ Bagiu points out that Leon Tomșa, the Wallachian Voyvode, was not Greek, but was raised in Constantinople, and hence could speak Greek.

³³⁵ *Praefectum aulae*: Bagiu annotates that this term could refer to the Great Court Marshall/ Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a boyar named Mano (16. 01. 1632 – 11. 08. 1632).

³³⁶ *Dalmatae Praetoriani*: Bagiu comments that “these were probably from Ragusa (nowadays Dubrovnik in Croatia)”.

³³⁷ *Primarii Turcae, rerum arbitri & consilarii*.

³³⁸ *Provinciae & Aulae ministri* – Bagiu translates it as “high officials of the country and the court”, hence I stick to it.

³³⁹ *Concionator aulicus* – I opted for Bagiu's choice for the term, but *concionator* might also mean a preacher.

Theology. He translated eloquently my speech into Greek and Turkish, and promised on behalf of the Voyvode that proper people, with knowledge of the folk, the customs and the language, would carry me safely to the very gates of Constantinople. When the conversation was over and the negotiations reached an end, horns were blown and trumpets played aloud to start the lunch which had already been prepared. The right side of the table was offered to me and my retinue, while the left was reserved for the Voyvode and his Wallachians. Before the Voyvode were silver dishes, and polished ceramics were in the middle; to the end stood wooden plates and bowls. During the whole meal, no food was removed [from the table], and hence, one dish was piled up on the other continuously for hours, gradually rising like a mound. The wine was exquisite and of a very high quality, and the more it was drunk, the laxer and sincere became the conversation between the guests. (201)

(202) When the Voyvode, eventually, raised his big goblet and made a toast to the health and victories of his Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, catapults and (bronze) cannons were fired with such loudness that the ruinous building was shaken, and even the ceramics struck each other. Whenever the foremost magnates and the Boyars of Wallachia raised their cups to wish good health and success to the Voyvode, as it was their ritual, they made a genuflection and drank on their knees. In such a delightful company, conversation and drinking lasted into the night until each returned to their lodgings. On the following day, the Voyvode wanted to accompany me for departure, leading the whole Court, 1000 cavalry and 600 infantry. In order to render it more pompous, red banners of extra-ordinary size, which had been sent by Sultan Murad, were stretched, along with other ensigns of the Wallachian Voyvodeship. Trumpets and tambours were resonating in the nearby forests and neighbouring groves. On both sides, the magnates and the Boyars were advancing on Asiatic horses, and in splendid clothes. Next to the Voyvode, there was a chorus of instruments³⁴⁰ and musicians, chanting aloud an ancestral song in the Wallachian language. When I asked the Voyvode, while we were riding, how many soldiers he could muster from the territory he ruled, he responded: “10 000 cavalry and 2 000 infantry more”. And this was not done without a sigh and a grave expression in his face: 50 000 men were under arms during the reign of the Voyvode Michael.³⁴¹ When I asked him about the revenues of the country, he affirmed that almost 300 000 ducats³⁴² could be gathered from the title of fisheries, salt, wax, honey, herd of cattle and sheep flocks, besides the usual census³⁴³ tax calculated in cash and the extraordinary tributes. Rich gold and silver mines and their utilization are deliberately ignored so that the Turks will not be enticed by the magnitude of their wealth, which could, otherwise, prompt them to snatch away the country from Christians for good. He was complaining about his subjects because of their perversity, malice and inclination to rebellion; and annotated that he had, not long ago, suppressed one such important rebellion in an open battle; and on the very road we were advancing towards the city Bucharest, he pointed out with his hand the

³⁴⁰ Citharoedi – citharists would not make sense here.

³⁴¹ He probably refers to Michael *Viteazul*, or Michael the Brave, who shrewdly managed to rule all three principalities together for a brief period at the turn of the century.

³⁴² Trecenta fere aureorum millia – I remained faithful to Bagiu (p:389).

³⁴³ Censum parata pecunia numerari solitum- In Bagiu’s text : “...the census / quit rent that is customary to be paid in cash...” (p: 390)

battlefield and the graves of the fallen ones, along with the crosses which were signs of victory. Some of the fugitive Magnates (202)

(203) made it to Transylvania, and when the Voyvode claimed them back, Prince Rakoczy rejected, wherefore rose a dispute between the two at the Porte. Because in Wallachia, it is an old tradition that the claimants to Voyvodship are punished by the ripping off of the right nostrils, a mark of eternal disgrace, by which reason they were rendered unable for voyvodship. Matthias,³⁴⁴ the instigator of the rebellion (who was hiding, at the time, in Transylvania, and then succeeded to Leon, and now is reputed to have defected to the Poles) was keeping that in mind, and hence wished to purchase the protection of Prince Rakoczy for a good amount. Then, after we continued the way for another hour, the Voyvode seriously asked to take a break at the beautiful valley in the vicinity, until the breakfast was fetched with a wagon. In the meantime, he occupied himself with the exercise of javelin game and race with his select horses, with stretching the bow with a fascinating power, and with firing the rifles to hit an aimed target. The High Officials and the Boyars were imitating the dexterity of their Voyvode, and each was proving his experience with arms in a vivid contest. In this spectacle, the Voyvode, in order to stimulate the bravery of each, showed particular generosity, gave with his own hand a good deal of gold to those who excelled in skill and agility. Among the others, a noble from our group proved his worth in accuracy, too, and he was rewarded ten cubits of silken cloth brought from Bucharest without delay. By then, the solar heat had started bothering us, which prompted the Voyvode, as a gesture of honour and kindness, to order a large flag of Wallachia to be stretched upon us like a tent in order to prevent the rays of the Sun. We spent such a long time admiring these games that the breakfast turned into a festival lunch, after which the Voyvode returned with his soldiers and the court; the carriages and his high officials led us to the bank of the Danube. I would dare claim that no Christian soil is more fertile than the one in Wallachia. For, the pastureland is abundant everywhere and numerous flocks of fat sheep and cattle are to be seen. The forests and groves are full of wild beasts and birds. Wool, flax and furs are sufficiently available for the people. The salt mines are rich and not [yet] exhausted. The Danube, Argeş³⁴⁵ and other rivers produce more fish (203)

(204) than any other European country. They breed an excellent race of horses here. The bees produce honey on their own. Metal veins abound, and the rivers have golden sand. Vineyards are easily grown, and the soil is worked with bundles of thorn.³⁴⁶ The people conduct trade mutually with the Transylvanians, the Polish, the Turks and the Serbs,³⁴⁷ and preserve their authentic money intact. Lastly, they enjoy mild climate and fresh air. The Danube separates Wallachia from Bulgaria, and it has the same width with the Elbe around Hamburg, though with a more rapid flow. On both banks of the ford, there are the castles of Giurgiu and Ruse,³⁴⁸ which are

³⁴⁴ Mattei Basarab, ruler of Wallachia (1632 October - 1654).

³⁴⁵ Hierasus – Bagiue suggests that it would most probably be Ardesos/ Argeş.

³⁴⁶ Spinarumque fasciculo terram arant – Bagiue suggests that “the author makes confusion between the harrow and the plough” and I preserved his format. (p. 391, footnote 31)

³⁴⁷ Illyriis

³⁴⁸ Gorgo & Horozcik- Bagiue annotates that Horozcik is Rusciuc in Romanian, Rusçuk in Turkish, and the modern Ruse in Bulgaria; whereas Giurgiu in today’s Romania was the Turkish Yergöğü.

fortified on an average level.³⁴⁹ Thereafter, the large and populous city of Razgrad³⁵⁰ was not far away, which was the capital and the metropolis of Silistra, in which Abaza Pasha,³⁵¹ the administrator of the Province, had his seat. Here, when they saw us approaching in German dresses, they were, so to speak, altogether astonished at the unusualness of the situation, and the people flocked together to gaze curiously at the new strangers of the city. For the Legations of the Polish and Hungarian Kings, while they were traversing those provinces, didn't wear utterly dissimilar attires to those of the barbarians; the French, English, Italians and Dutch³⁵² were using the maritime routes to Constantinople, where exotic and foreign dresses had already been around for a long time. Bulgaria, up until the Balkan Mountains,³⁵³ is sufficiently fertile and cultivated, and laden with villages. The inhabitants asserted to have come from the River Volga, since we understood their speech and it seemed that it bore similarity³⁵⁴ with the Slavonic language. They were Christians and followers of the Orthodox faith,³⁵⁵ by customs and in brutality; however, they were gradually degenerating into Turks, and had little trust in their masters, by whom they were oppressed in slavery.³⁵⁶ There, indeed, they were disarmed and the debris of the destroyed fortresses came into sight here and there, and no refuge had remained. The Balkan Mountains are celebrated by great authors since the ancient times, and they had dense and dark forests on quite a few places, [rendering] the roads tight and the passage difficult. At their³⁵⁷ hillsides, villages were dispersed here and there, exempt from any tax or burden, so that [the villagers] could purge the brigands away from the region and keep the roads safe for the merchants; wherefore they were keeping vigil day and night.³⁵⁸ The summit of Balkan Mountains can't match in height that of the Carpathians, the Pindus³⁵⁹ and the Raetic Alps;³⁶⁰ (204)

(205) they can be passed over in two days' time and separate Bulgaria, or the lower Moesia,³⁶¹ from Thrace. The [latter] place is called Romania in our day, cultivation is low and villages are rare because of the harsh climate and the roughness of the soil:

³⁴⁹ This is the ending point for Bagiu's translation.

³⁵⁰ Rasgrad – Hezargrad in Ottoman; modern Razgrad in Bulgaria.

³⁵¹ Abassa Passa: He became the Governor of Özi/ Özü, which included the Silistre Sancak, however, only in 1633. See: Mehmed Paşa (Abaza) in *Sicill- i Osmani, Cild IV*, p. 1039.

³⁵² Belgæ

³⁵³ Mons Hæmus

³⁵⁴ Cognatum- more like the blood relation between kinsmen; cognate languages.

³⁵⁵ Græcam Religionem

³⁵⁶ ob servitatem – It can also mean servitude.

³⁵⁷ The Balkan Mountains

³⁵⁸ These must be the so- called *derbentçi* villages, which enjoyed certain tax exemptions in return of protecting the roads and offering guidance. See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Çiftçi Sınıflarının Hukukî Statüsü", in *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler 1*, (İstanbul, 1980), 785–786. 740.

³⁵⁹ Epiri

³⁶⁰ Rhæticularum alpium – Rhaetia was the name given to the Roman province, which used to cover roughly parts of today's Austria and Switzerland. Hence, the Rhaetian Alps are the Alp Mountains as we know them today, as opposed to the aforementioned Carpathian Alps of Ruthenia.

³⁶¹ The ancient Roman name for Northern Bulgaria and Romanian Dobruja.

It is close to Macedonia, and separated from it by the river Struma. It has the metropolis Byzantium, which was once founded by Pausania, and now called Constantinople by Constantine, who established the capital of the Empire here. More and more we approached here, I deemed it necessary to make the Illustrious man Cornelius Haga, Mr. Ambassador of the Dutch Republic in the Ottoman Porte,³⁶² aware of my proximity. I had written to him from Transylvania and Wallachia in detail about the scope and quality of my Legation as it was most clemently expected of me by the Holy Royal Majesty, and I requested him to inform the Grand Vizier: Therefore, it was known not only to the Administrators at the Porte,³⁶³ but also to the Sultan himself, that I hadn't been able to bring any gifts in this situation and time because I was travelling partly through mistrustful friends, or partly through open and declared enemies. However, I was carrying important letters with me, given by the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, both to the Sultan, the Viziers, and the Representatives³⁶⁴ of Kings and Republics. I had served as a legate to Prince Rakoczy, and held seat as Counsellor at the court of his Holy Royal Majesty. The most glorious expeditions, the power and the victorious army of his Holy Royal Majesty were to be taken into consideration before all: The Sublime Porte³⁶⁵ should not pay attention or respect to the presents in any way, since the status and condition of the Oriental Empire was such that the friendship of no other king and monarchy in Europe would be of greater importance. These being considered, the Grand Vizier was affected with great joy, and promised that the messenger and the letters of his Holy Royal Majesty would be most pleasing. Therefore, Cornelius Haga and the legates of the Transylvanian Prince, Michai Tholdalaghi and Istvan Seredi came to the village Litros³⁶⁶ in the vicinity of Constantinople on the 6th day of April [1632], where consideration was made about my arrival, and it was decided that I would enter the city on the 8th of April, as it was the custom, with a cortege of preceding Çavuşes³⁶⁷ and a proper retinue of some 30 men and an equal number of horses, which was done modestly and honourably. (205) [*An extra extract from the copy in the Royal Archives of Stockholm, inserted by Szilagyi Sandor*:³⁶⁸ It is otherwise the custom that the Legates of Kings are received by the Çavuşbaşı, a man of particular dignity, under the command and order of the Ottoman Porte, on a place one mile away from the city with about 60 Çavuşes, mounted and in ceremonial pomp; and the noble secretaries of all the Ambassadors, for the sake of the honour of the court, appear there with carriages and horses of whatever number. However, since the grave revolts and uprisings had not yet completely come to an end and it was heard,

³⁶² Cornelium Hagam, Dn. Dn. Statuum Confoederati Belgii in Porta Ottomanica Legatum Ordinarium

³⁶³ Principibus Portæ: It refers, I suggest, to the members of the Divan- ı Hümayun, the [Ottoman] Imperial Court.

³⁶⁴ Oratores: Resident representatives of foreign states at the Ottoman Capital, see Gabor Karman, "Sovereignty and Representation: Tributary States in the Seventeenth-century Diplomatic System of the Ottoman Empire", in Karman & Kuncevic (ed.) *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries* (Brill, 2013).pp. 155 – 186. 160. It would be facilitative to call them representatives or ambassadors, as the English Orator Sir Thomas Roe bears the title "ambassador" in the secondary literature.

³⁶⁵ Excelsa Porta

³⁶⁶ Zitros in Szilagyi Sandor's edition, MHH.

³⁶⁷ Chiaussis

³⁶⁸ This piece in brackets, hence, is not available in "*Monumenta pietatis ...*"

as a rather insolent and unusual occurrence [for the Turks], that [our] Royal Legation was coming to the Porte without gifts, the prudent men deemed it more convenient that, in the disturbed situation of the Empire of the barbaric folk, the beginning of such an undertaking should be rather moderate and cautious]

(206) In the name of the Sultan, the lodgings were assigned in the Palace of the Moldavian Voyvode, the furniture was manufactured with public budget, and as it is the custom here, some money was sent for expenses. The Moldavian Palace was surrounded by a fence of high and very strong walls, and was fortified with dense double gates; the strength of the building would come in handy for our security in face of the accustomed rebellions and frequent fires of the city. The management of each house was entrusted to the faith and protection of the Janissaries. The tables and chairs were set with great care in accordance with our customs. Two rooms were furnished with curtains and carpets, which were offered to the first coming Legates as a gift. They had attached very elegant and colourful couches to the walls, which were made of silken cloth and interwoven with gold threads, which were softly bending down when we sat. The floor was covered and the windows were decorated with flowers, and nothing was omitted, in which way they could declare that our presence was welcome. I had just entered the city, when the Grand Vizier Recep Pasha³⁶⁹ politely greeted me through the Officials of his court, Zülfikar Ağa and Yusuf Çavuş³⁷⁰ and this would mean that he wished to allow my arrival. Zülfikar had brought 4000 aspers³⁷¹ in an embroidered purse and put it on the table when he was about to leave, which was worth, according to our calculation, 36 Imperales.³⁷² When we asked the reason why the money was delivered, the interpreter responded that this paltry amount was offered for the moment as a proof of affection in order for us to cover our expenses with more facility: having been informed more correctly about the number and the quality of our persons, they would not fail in their duty, either: Because, as in other places, it was considered customary at the Porte that the embassies of foreign sovereigns (since they were bringing gifts to the Sultan and the viziers, and recalling the treaties of good vicinity and friendship) be relieved of their costs and expenses. Then, the Ambassadors³⁷³ of the Most Christian³⁷⁴ and of the Great Britain Kingdoms, and no less Cornelius Haga, greeted me through their Secretaries without delay; the Venetian [bailo] and the Patriarch Cyril on the following day. Due to the holiday of the Resurrection of the Lord, negotiations were called off for a brief period, and my visit to the Grand Vizier and to the other Grandees³⁷⁵ was fixed publicly and duly for the 15th of April. When, by all means,

³⁶⁹ Supremus Visirius Regiep Passa: Topal Recep Paşa (incumbent: 10 February – 18 May 1632)

³⁷⁰ Per aulæ suæ Ministros Solficarum Ağa & Josephum Chiauss: Zülfikar Ağa was probably the Head Dragoman of the Porte.

³⁷¹ See Appendix C for a rough comparison of the contemporary currencies.

³⁷² Imperales was probably the Spanish *8 reales*, which was equal to around 110 aspers/ *akçes*, or to 1/2 Venetian ducats. See the table provided in Şevket Pamuk, *A monetary history of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 144.

³⁷³ Regum Oratores

³⁷⁴ Probably the French King

³⁷⁵ Visitatio Aliorumque Magnatum

the Legates were going to the High Officeholders and Pashas of the Ottoman Court,³⁷⁶ (206)

(207) they would be led by some Janissaries for the sake of honour and protection, who were carrying staffs with ivory or tin embellishments in the handles, that is, an indication of duty and protection. They were followed by the servants of the Ambassadors, advancing in a long raw of pairs. Eventually, before the Legate itself, the secretaries, nobles and the Dragomans, or Interpreters, constituted the procession. In the public visits of the Asiatics, it's habitual to use ornamented horses; only the Austrians utilize carriages. Because, the streets of Constantinople are tight and full of obstacles; the stones on the ground are worn away and slippery due to long and frequent use. The city is placed on seven hills just like Rome, and so populous that it could fill two Paris(es).³⁷⁷ When I wanted to see the Grand Vizier, the Transylvanian Legates asked to accompany me, and to salute the Vizier together, doubtless in order to benefit somewhat from the splendour of his Holy Royal Majesty's friendship in regard of the Porte. Recep Pasha had long been a relentless enemy of the Spanish and the House of Austria, and was dedicated to our party³⁷⁸ in great measure. Therefore, nothing more pleasant could happen if I could narrate him the successes and victories of his Holy Royal Majesty, and the situation of all the States [involved in the war]. Having entered into His Palace, a big crowd of people were to be seen; the high born Austrian horses of the Viziers and the Pashas; and among the other carriages, the one- man- wagon³⁷⁹ of the *Şeyhü'l- İslam* was present, too, covered with a red cloth and drawn by a pair of cheap horses. While ascending the stairs, no one came to meet us; in the middle of the entrance hall, the Selam Çavuşu³⁸⁰ (who helped the Vizier during the negotiations with the Legates) alone received us after we came within his sight, and showed us a room close by (which they called ante-chamber) to sit comfortably. When I asked the Transylvanians the causes of this despise as it was shown to me, they responded that the Ambassadors of the Christian Kings and Princes had a very high prestige in the days of yore, and in the era of Süleyman. However, their successors of Christian names, less zealous because of their personal advantages and gains, had accepted to be deprived of all dignity. Therefore, now, in the Ottoman Court, not only the Legates of France and Great Britain, but also those of the Emperor Ferdinand and of the Polish Kingdom have little esteem: In such a disgraceful mortification, (207)

(208) the morale of the barbarians were even raised day by day, so that they considered themselves deservedly to be paid and delivered taxes and such honours by Christian Kings. [It was so], since, before all, the Ambassadors were discordant among themselves due to silly causes, and one attacked and weakened the honour of the other with various accusations. While the Transylvanians were referring these to me, the abovementioned Selam Çavuşu informed the Grand Vizier of my presence,

³⁷⁶ *Portæ Ottomanicæ Principes & Purpuratos*: The meaning is rather ambiguous, but it should indicate the high ranking members of the Palace and the Divan .

³⁷⁷ *duas Lutetias*

³⁷⁸ *nostrisque partibus*: The Protestants

³⁷⁹ *Simplex Mophtii*

³⁸⁰ *Salam Chiauss*

after which he kindly sent away the Chief Captains of the Spahis,³⁸¹ who were lingering there, and ordered us to be admitted in without delay. The Legates of Kings make reverence to the Grand Vizier and to the other Grandees of the Ottoman Empire with their heads covered³⁸² and a slight bending of the body, to which they respond with a nod in turn. There were low, flat and square chairs, standing at most 3 paces away, arranged in a straight line against each other. One of these, which faced the entrance and the doors, was taken by the High Officeholders, the other was pointed out to us, and the Dragoman was standing between them in the middle. While I was being received honourably by the Vizier in accordance with the usual practice, the Transylvanians were approaching him with uncovered heads and fast treads, offering their obedience and smothering the lower part of his vesture with kisses. In the meantime, the Vizier was inquiring about the health, whereabouts and situation of the Holy Royal Majesty, whose letters I presented with due respect and reverence, and he received them with both hands raised to his breast and a cheerful face, which was habitually done for the sake of singular respect. To the left of the Vizier, the Mufti was sitting, with the name Hüseyin Efendi,³⁸³ a man of considerable age, slender body and Saturnine face; [he is] the judge in the court, and the first man of the whole Monarchy after the Sultan. For, although it behoves solely and uniquely the Vizier to administer the affairs of war and peace in such a vast Empire spread on three continents of the World, he rarely makes any important decision without the confirmation of the Mufti. Therefore, he goes to him again at night, his advice and opinion is consulted in affairs of consequence. The Grand Vizier gave the letters of the Holy Royal Majesty to the Dragoman before me in order to get them translated to the Arabic language.³⁸⁴ And, since our visit was arranged in the very period of time, during which the Turks were celebrating the fast for 40 days³⁸⁵ continuously, and (208)

(209) didn't dare taste any beverage or food before the sun set, the Grand Vizier asked the Mufti if he could offer us Şerbet³⁸⁶ (a sort of drink made of sugar and prepared with juice of lemon or rose, diluted with ice)³⁸⁷ for the sake of honour and kindness without breaching the [religious] law. When it was rejected for being against the custom and the established law, he excused himself with suave and kind words. I think that the superstitious old man, the Interpreter of the Mohammedan law and the foremost Teacher, didn't wish to cause a scandal in the Turkish audience with his approval and consent, since the Arabs were numerous in the court of the Vizier, who surpassed all the other Nations of the Orient with their filthy and defiling jealousy. After I bid farewell, the closest Valet of the Vizier put on my cloak a

³⁸¹ Proceres Spahinorum Capitaneos: It must refer to the leaders of the Kapıkulu Cavalry, which was divided into 6 companies.

³⁸² tecto capite

³⁸³ Hussein Afendi: must be the Grand Mufti, or the Şeyhü'l- Islam Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi (1632-1634).

³⁸⁴ in Arabicam linguam verterentur: the Arabic script.

³⁸⁵ The Ramadan month lasts, just like any other lunar month, for 29 - 30 days.

³⁸⁶ Zerbethum

³⁸⁷ frigidaque dilutum

narrow and tight chlamys,³⁸⁸ stretching down to the heels, made of golden cloth; this having been done, it was the time to depart by going down the entrance hall and the stairs under the staring eyes of the people. Similar to this cloak, but of lower value, the nobles and Dragomans in my retinues were adorned, who were descending those places with equal pride and grace. The chlamydes, given as honorary gifts, were carried by the servants as if in a public ceremony through the streets and squares of Constantinople on the way back to our lodgings, which the common people were watching and admiring in stupefaction. By the way, the Legates and the Ambassadors at the Court had introduced a very shameful and troublesome tradition, that when they were to visit the High Officeholders and the Viziers, they offered money to their servants, to the Doorkeepers, to the valets, to the Çavuşes, to the guards, and to the others in complementary places. This practice was indeed so much consolidated over a long time that the barbarous people started to demand it with great insolence from the Dragomans of the Ambassadors as if it was their due share, claiming it, indeed, like a tax or tribute. Therefore, I, too, was to pay 30 Imperales. Within a few days, I visited the Mufti and the Captain Pasha during the week, in which the Turks were celebrating their Easter holiday, which they call Bayram,³⁸⁹ and in the accustomed manner, (209)

(210) the Viziers were visiting the Mufti for the sake of piety and reverence. He was staging a particular appearance of holiness at the time, advancing to the fore for each person, and meeting the coming people with a torrent of Arabic words of benediction. After they had taken seats, a drink in tiny bowls³⁹⁰ was served, which they call Coffee,³⁹¹ and consume hot via draining through the tips of their lips with a spirting sound,³⁹² and which they consider to be a remedy against nasal flow and the Catarrh.³⁹³ Furthermore, each of them had covered their heads and shoulders with a silken cloth of admirably fine fabric, and the aloe wood was placed on the faintly burning coal, from which an enticing vapour was slowly rising to [fill] the nostrils and the heads.³⁹⁴ In the end, each stroked his face and beard, using both hands, with the odorant water extended to them by the servants. This was offered by the Mufti to the Viziers as a gesture of honour and kindness. I made a visit to the Kapudan Pasha, or the Supreme Admiral of the Imperial Navy³⁹⁵ in the dock of Constantinople, who accepted the letters and greetings of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden with amazing kindness and goodwill. His name was Canpolat³⁹⁶, and he was considered the wisest among all the High Officeholders of the Ottoman Monarchy; he had

³⁸⁸ It refers to the honorary *kaftan*, placed over the clothes, the “*hil’at*” in the Ottoman sources. Sir Thomas Roe, as a contemporary observer of the Ottoman Constantinople (1621 - 1628), names them “vests of honor”. See TNSTR, 572.

³⁸⁹ festum Paschatis, quod Bajaram vocatur, celebrabant

³⁹⁰ Exigua scutella: cups, or “*fincan*”.

³⁹¹ Caphe

³⁹² supremis labris pitissando attrahunt

³⁹³ ... contra superfluitatem homorum & Catarrhi ...

³⁹⁴ ad cerebrum & nares:(mind and nostrils) might as well point out to the intoxicating effect of the burning aloes.

³⁹⁵ Capitaneus Passa, vel supremum maritimi Imperii Præfectum: Kaptan-ı Derya

³⁹⁶ Zambolath: Canpolat[zade] Mustafa Paşa

particular authority and grace vis- a- vis the Sultan, and was married to the latter's sister. Profoundly familiar with the astronomical judiciary³⁹⁷ of the Chaldean sort, he was asking quite curiously, under which grade of the sky and what climate the Realms of Sweden was situated; how the character of the people was; who the neighbouring Princes were. A terrestrial globe being brought, I showed him that, in the present situation, the jurisdiction and the Dominion³⁹⁸ of the Holy Royal Majesty extended from the borders of Lapland down to Strasbourg,³⁹⁹ whose amplitude he seriously admired. When I entered the dock, there were giant heaps of coins amassed on both sides of the passage, as they said, in order make payments of the fleet. The Interpreter affirmed that it was 80 000 Reales, or Philippicus.⁴⁰⁰ When I was about to leave, the Kapudan Pasha bestowed me a precious vesture, and promised that he would recommend the friendship of the Holy Royal Majesty to the Sultan. Then, the second day of May was approaching, which the Sultan had assigned me for audience with pomp and procession. The place for the exposition of the Legation was the palisade of the Grand Seignior,⁴⁰¹ which contained (201)

(211) the Palace and extended from the Region of Chalcedon to the shore of Bosphorus.⁴⁰² Nine o'clock in the morning was fixed for the ceremony, and it was announced early by the order of the Grand Vizier through his secretary and the Çavuşes. At the arranged time, I travelled directly to the gate Ahırkapı through the Bosphorus⁴⁰³ with a decent retinue and splendour in three boats. There, the Arabic horse of our Lord Cornelius Haga, decorated with precious ornaments, was waiting for me. Having mounted it, I headed towards Murad's palisade, preceded by servants, nobles and Dragomans in the accustomed manner. I was admitted in through the outpost of the Janissaries, and was accepted benignly by the general of the Doorkeepers, Kapıcılar Kahyası.⁴⁰⁴ Here was the garden of the Grand Seignior, which was astounding by its largeness and amplitude, abundant in every kind of fruits, and decorated with infinitely long cypresses and very beautiful flowers; in short, a delightful site, indeed. There I sat waiting for the arrival of the Vizier for a brief period, who approached me without delay with his retinue, splendidly prepared.

³⁹⁷ *Astronomia iudiciaria juxta Chaldaeorum artem: Chaldean astrology*

³⁹⁸ *Imperium*

³⁹⁹ *Argentoratium- Strassburg* refers to the territories in the south, invaded mostly during the 1631 -2 campaigns, which were almost entirely taken back by the Imperialists within the following 2 years. The Swedish occupation of the southern Germany was only momentary.

⁴⁰⁰ *Octaginta Realium vel Philippicorum millia: It's not clear if it is the coin of the reigning Philip IV.*

⁴⁰¹ *in septo Magni Domini: It must refer to the Topkapı Palace (see. Giovan Battista Montalbano, Turcici Imperii Status. Accedit De Regn. Algeriano atque Tunetano Commentarius. (Lugduni Batav. [Leiden], 1634), p. 43: "Domini Septum, alio nomine Porta nuncupatum...").*

⁴⁰² Strassburg probably took the Stavros Palace (and the gardens surrounding it) in Scutari to be an extension of the premises of the Topkapı Palace. He made his second valediction speech there in September 1633, for Sultan Murad IV seems to be spending the summer therein. See, Murad's answer for the final "hand-kissing" demand in Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Memalik- i Osmaniye'de Demirbaş Şarl* (İstanbul, 1332 [1913- 1914]), p.8: "*Yarın el öpmez. Üsküdar'da öper*".

⁴⁰³ *Per Canalem Constantinopolitanum ad portam Achircapi: He must have navigated from the Boğdan Sarayı through the Golden Horn, and then down to the Ahırkapı.*

⁴⁰⁴ *Capıcılar Kihara: Kapıcılar Kahyası/ Kethüdası, that is, Commander of the Imperial Gatekeepers. See, Gustav Bayerle, Pashas, begs, and effendis: A historical dictionary of titles and terms in the Ottoman Empire, (Isis Press, 1997). 102*

My men were standing in a long row and paying respects to him in the Christian way as he passed by. After an exchange of words of honour and reciprocal salutations, he took me to the rooms and the palace of the Sultan. On the way, Bostancıbaşı, Çavuşbaşı, Kapıcıbaşı⁴⁰⁵ and other men of high dignity met us. Having entered the court, we took breathe for some time; and after I had put on the offered Imperial vesture over my cloak, the Bostancıbaşı on my left, and the Çavuşbaşı on my right, came closer to me and squeezed both of my arms: It was a practice that was consolidated after those times when a follower of the Serbian Despot Lazarus killed Murad⁴⁰⁶ in disguise of a Legate. In the first place, the Grand Vizier went to the Sultan, and his proper duty was to assist the Legates of Kings to the Grand Seignior. After that, the abovementioned High Officials⁴⁰⁷ brought me inside, while I was walking with great difficulty because of the length and width of the vesture. The Chancellor of the Porte and my interpreter arrived last. The chamber of Sultan Murad was of a square shape and had a fine symmetry, the walls and the ceiling was decorated with various examples of craftsmanship and ornamented with gilded flowers. Through the windows, over the walls of the palisade, was the landscape visible, the Bosphorus Channel was lying down there and Bithynia was across, (211)

(212) and the floor was covered from all sides with precious carpets. On the left corner of the room looking towards the door, the Sultan was sitting on a low and flat place, with a serious face, his hands calm and both feet folded under his vesture, carrying over his head a high covering of thin bright linen, which they call turban.⁴⁰⁸ His vesture was reaching the ankles, made of a very high quality cloth and dark colour Sable fur. The lower tunic was produced of white silk; and the surrounding covering⁴⁰⁹ was distinguished with magnificent craftsmanship and gems. The Grand Vizier was standing three steps away from the Sultan, little behind were the Kapı Ağası and the Başdefterdar,⁴¹⁰ the first of whom was the man in charge of the whole Court, while the latter was the Treasurer. After the Officials who brought me in made me kiss all the stretched vesture of the Sultan as it is the custom for the Legates, I was held down to face the ground. In the middle of the room, there were some high steps, next to which my Interpreter knelt and gently struck his face. No Legate can appear before the Grand Seignior with uncovered heads, except for the Transylvanians, Moldavians and the Wallachians, the vassals of his Empire; and it is a false assumption that the Ambassador of Friedrich, the King of Bohemia,⁴¹¹ did so. While I was delivering my speech in Italian, the Dragoman was holding with his both hands the letters of the Holy Royal Majesty, enveloped in golden cloth; and after I

⁴⁰⁵ Bostanzi Passa, Chiaussiorum Passa, Capici Passa: Respectively, Commander of the Gardener Corps, Commander of the Çavuşes of the Divan, Head of Imperial Gatekeepers (Bayerle. Pashas, Begs and Efendis). Strassburg confuses “Başı” with “Paşa”, as it was a common mistake with invariably all contemporary visitors.

⁴⁰⁶ The assassination of Sultan Murad I after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.

⁴⁰⁷ Dicti Purpurati

⁴⁰⁸ turbantum

⁴⁰⁹ peristromata

⁴¹⁰ Capi Aga & Dephterdar Magnus

⁴¹¹ It refers to the early stages of the war when an envoy from Prague was sent by the Friedrich V of Pfalz, the so called Winter King of Bohemia to Constantinople to seek help against the Habsburgs. (See Chapter II.)

concluded my oration, he delivered them to the Grand Vizier. After the ceremony of kissing the vesture of the Sultan was repeated, I was dismissed, and the Sultan did give no response to my oration. Then I was brought down to the entrance hall by the Officials,⁴¹² and saw, at the door of the chamber, around forty mutes, jester dwarves, eunuchs and fools standing, who were intimately familiar to the Sultan for the sake of entertainment,⁴¹³ the disgrace not only of such a Sovereign, but also of the mankind. In the meantime, the Grand Vizier was conveying the letters of the Holy Royal Majesty to the Sultan along with their translations; and then he came to me with a cheerful and merry expression in his face after having explained the reason of the Legation. And he thoroughly affirmed that not only the friendship of the Mighty King of the Swedes was welcome and highly pleasant, but also it was going to be preserved with utmost care by the Ottoman Porte in the future. Thereafter, he treated me, in the habitual manner, with Coffee and Şerbet, (212)

(213) and ordered silk and golden chlamydes of various colours to be brought forth for the nobles and the Dragomans. On our way back, the younger Dragoman distributed ten thousand aspers, or hundred Imperials, to the Çavuşes, gardener doorkeepers⁴¹⁴ and the soldiers of the outpost, and the chlamydes of the Sultan were demonstrated to people until the Gate of the Jews.⁴¹⁵ [An extra extract from the copy in the Royal Archives of Stockholm, in Szilagyi Sandor's transcription: Otherwise, the Legates and Ambassador of Kings, if they were lucky enough to obtain an audience with the Sultan, were accompanied by the Çavuşbaşıs on their way to the Divan, or the Public Court, where the Vizier waited to admit them into the Sultan's presence. This ceremony was neglected at my arrival due both to military revolts and uprisings, and to the fact that I had brought no gifts for the Sultan at all, which would as a rule be displayed by the Janissaries in ceremonial ostentation while the Legate was heading for the Sultan.] As for the rest, Sultan Murad is a man of mediocre stature, 27 years old,⁴¹⁶ with a fat face, dark glimmering eyes, short neck, broad shoulders, plump body, short limbs; and he is particularly agile in riding and has strong muscular arms. Furthermore, he is bold, arrogant, ruthless, vengeful, in tactless mood, devoted to women more than normal, obstinate, ambitious, dissembler, covetous, and has a strong memory and sharp reasoning, along with a profound judgement capacity. He tries with all his power to restore an empire which had collapsed during the reigns of his grandfather, father and brother and endeavours to elevate it to its former dignity and glory. I went to visit the Ambassadors of the Christian Kings and States after the letters were presented to the Sultan and the visits to the High Officeholders were paid, as it is the established tradition. I avoided the courtiers,⁴¹⁷ and speaking up for the Princess Catherine, which was confident, I directed my speech to the present situation, and decided to examine the opinions of

⁴¹² Purpuratis: Bostancıbaşı and Çavuşbaşı

⁴¹³ recreationis causa

⁴¹⁴ Chiaussis janitoribus hortulanis & stationi militum:

⁴¹⁵ Porta Judæorum: Not clear, but possibly the Porta Hebraica/ Neorion, or Bahçekapı around modern Sirkeci - Eminönü. Uzunçarşılı points out that the diplomatic representatives would be sent away from the Kireç or Vezir quay, the modern Sirkeci İskelesi, which confirms the Bahçekapı suggestion. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*.(Ankara, 1988), p. 284.

⁴¹⁶ Born in July 1612, he actually hadn't even completed his 20th year.

⁴¹⁷ præmissis curialibus

each one separately. The Ambassador of the King of France in the Porte was then Henri de Gournay, Comte de Marcheville, a Man of strange splendour, and excessively assiduous about princely elegance, [though] not much experienced in managing affairs and negotiations. Since he was superstitiously devoted to the Roman cult⁴¹⁸, and was following the advice of the Jesuits as if a prophecy, he often believed many things carelessly and wrongly. During our greetings and reciprocal visits of honour and goodwill, he was speaking thoughtfully about the successes and the victories of the Holy Royal Majesty; in such a way, though, that often his expression was stern and he looked anxious and extremely worried, repeating this: It should be feared that in the future, the war which had started because of political causes and situations, and for the common interest of the kings, princes and public freedom, would finally end in religious conflict and discordance. Nothing would be more favourable to the Spaniards, since it would not only drive into pieces the French Kingdom, but also the other princes. From this, I understood that the Jesuits were active in such advices to the Legate, (213)

(214) and that their slanders were to be checked; and in order to accomplish this, I took every precaution. The Legate⁴¹⁹ of the King of Great Britain, Peter Wyche, was a knight bachelor,⁴²⁰ and was at first a little suspicious about our party on account of Buckingham's favour, but afterwards became eager for the common cause and particularly anxious about Friedrich, the King of Bohemia, his wife and children. As much as I could inform myself, he was always extremely respectful towards all the cult of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden, who was sustaining his glory and dignity against the evil ones, fighting boldly and harshly in Prussia.⁴²¹ At the time of my arrival to Constantinople, however, he gave clear testimonies of his sincerity and most genuine feelings for the happiness of His Holy Royal Majesty, asserting publicly everywhere to the High Officeholders of the Porte that among all the Kings of our time, his Majesty had been the one and only, who had supported the hesitant State with troops, and who had proved to be the pillar and the Atlas of the moribund and struggling Liberty. He praised in an amazing manner the friendship between the old Kingdoms of Sweden and Britain, and praised with great eulogies the favour and good will of the Holy Royal Majesty towards Friedrich, the King of Bohemia, and His afflicted House. Thereafter he discussed each and everything which could be expected from the servant of the friends and connections of the King. The Venetian Ambassador Giovanni Cappello was regarded by everyone as a serious and prudent man, but he was so meticulous in his affairs and negotiations that he didn't in the slightest dare promote the common cause. Towards the successes and the glorious victories of the Holy Royal Majesty, he was lukewarm; and in a long conversation, he wished for the neutrality of Bavaria, ceasefire and peace in the future. From which I judged that the advances and the increasing power of the Holy Royal Majesty was scaring the Venetians, and nothing more could be expected from them than impeding the course of the good fortune through treaties. Therefore I deemed it necessary for the contentment of the Holy Royal Majesty to more eagerly assert a pursuit of general harmony and tranquillity, and as much as possible, to relieve the

⁴¹⁸ Catholicism

⁴¹⁹ Legatus: i.e, the ambassador.

⁴²⁰ Eques auratus

⁴²¹ Borussia

Italian Legate of his apprehensions. As for Cornelis Haga, he had been opposing (214)

(215) the adversaries and enemies of the Holy Royal Majesty audaciously in the Porte for so many years with his influence, efforts, advice, and money; and he was keeping the Viziers diligent to always overturn the plans of the enemies and slanderers. Truly, at the time of my presence, this man (so honest and faithful to His Holy Royal Majesty) by all means procured me in good faith with all the things he could, keeping watch over me for honour and convenience in the duty expected of me, acting with concern and diligence as if he was serving his own Majesty. The Patriarch Cyril⁴²² accepted the letters of the Holy Royal Majesty with highest obedience and respect, and declared himself to be alacritous in everything he could be of use for the common cause *vis- a- vis* the Russians,⁴²³ the Cossacks and in the Porte. He was a profoundly cultivated man and zealously eager for the propagation of the Christian Religion. He truly rejoiced by all means over the victories of the Holy Royal Majesty in particular, thanking the God in all sincerity. After I had visited the Ambassadors and the Patriarch, the next in line, following Recep Pasha's advice, were the Viziers Mehmed and Bayram, one of whom was the Governor of Egypt,⁴²⁴ while the other was an intimate of the Sultan. Mehmed wanted to know, among other things, on what account the late King of Poland and His heirs were excluded from and deprived of the Royal Crown of the Swedes. Bayram asked if it was indeed true, as he had heard as a rumour, that the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden was using leather cannons⁴²⁵ in his campaigns. When I affirmed it, he responded that these could be of great use in the war against the Persians if Murad could possess some, considering the long distance and the difficulty of the roads. These have been the essentials of what happened on the road to Constantinople⁴²⁶ through Poland, Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, lower Moesia and Thrace; in my audience by the Sultan, and visits to the High Officeholders and the Ambassadors; and in the conversations, ceremonies, and about the courtiers. This is all that is worthy of noting. Now I will turn to the present situation of the Ottoman Empire. Large masses of this Oriental Empire were founded by great and bellicose Princes, and it remained intact with the increasing virtue of the successors for almost three hundred years, that is, until the reign and administration of Mehmed III, when the power and the might of the Empire started to decline. Indeed, when the Monarchy was new born and the Princes of the Empire were of mature age and competent disposition, they administered everything wisely and boldly in person, (215)

(216) and led their military expeditions themselves. In later times, for around the last thirty years, with Divine permission, such a mass has been sleeping due to the weakness⁴²⁷ and young ages of the Sultans Ahmet, Mustafa, Osman and Murad. They put the responsibility of managing the Realms and Provinces on the shoulders

⁴²² Cyrillus: Cyril Lucaris

⁴²³ Moscum

⁴²⁴ Prorex Aegypti: Viceroy of Egypt, (*Mısır Valisi*) Tabaniyassı Mehmed Paşa, later, Grand Vizier after Recep.

⁴²⁵ Coriaceas machinas & tormenta

⁴²⁶ Byzantine profectio

⁴²⁷ imbecillitati

of worthless ministers in order to carry this burden, and tolerated the intervention of the mother Sultanas in governance. Starting with the reign of Ahmed, Tebriz⁴²⁸ and the neighbouring regions were recuperated by the Persians and the army of the Turks was routed with a great defeat. Asia was shaken with internal movements;⁴²⁹ misfortune and dangers impending, peace was concluded with the Emperor Rudolph in the Year 1606. Mustafa, mentally disordered, was quickly incarcerated with the decision of the High Officeholders. Osman made a disappointing attempt against Poland, and fell victim to a conspiracy of the army, and [then] to parricide, an unprecedented phenomenon. Murad was 14 years old when he was put in charge of affairs; weak, he experienced grave riots and rebellions of his subjects against the rule of the impotent Sultan Mother. He lost many provinces of the Empire; the dignity and the power of the Ottoman House diminished a lot. Moreover, the God roused against the young Sultan, at the very beginning of his reign, the formidable enemy Shah Abbas, the King of the Persians, who was duly regarded as one of the most famous Kings of his time due to his long rule, war waging, influence, wealth, prudence, audacity and successes. He took the new Babylon⁴³⁰ (which is called Baghdad⁴³¹ by the Turks) under control on 27th January, 1624, when Murad had been sitting for hardly nine months on his father's throne. Then, however, the King of the Persians was approaching with a big army and Bekir Pasha, the protector⁴³² of Babylonia, was aware that Osman was dethroned with a violent homicide, Mustafa was incarcerated anew, and the administration was in the unable hands of the Eunuchs and the Sultanas due to the young age of Murad; and the Viziers were often changed easily with a feminine fickleness,⁴³³ and [lastly] there was no hope of help considering that the things were [so much] unsettled in the Ottoman Porte. He⁴³⁴ started flirting with the advice of treason, and surrendered the city of Babylonia to the King of the Persians with its very well fortified castle and three hundred bronze cannons. Thereafter, the theatre of war shifted to Murad's Realms and Provinces, and the hold of the Turks (216)

(217) in Asia was seriously impaired, and the whole structure of the Monarchy was vehemently shaken. It needs, however, to be discerned that as much as Shah Abbas was the enemy of Murad, it is remarkable that he also occupied the city of Kandahar and the stronghold of Ormuz during the same time he was subduing Babylonia to himself. Therefore, in the abovementioned year 1624, his Legate to the Orange Prince and the States General of the Dutch Republic⁴³⁵ was seen to boast deservedly that his King and Lord had added to the Kingdom and rule of Persians three insurmountably fortified and remote lying cities in that very year: Evidently, Babylonia in Mesopotamia, Ormuz in the Persian Gulf⁴³⁶, and Kandahar in the Hindu

⁴²⁸ Taurisium

⁴²⁹ The Celali rebellions

⁴³⁰ Novam Babylonem

⁴³¹ Bagadet

⁴³² Praeses: Subaşı

⁴³³ Muliebri ambitu et levitate

⁴³⁴ Bekir Subaşı of Baghdad

⁴³⁵ Auraico Principe & Senatu Belgii Ordinum

⁴³⁶ In Sinu Arabico

Kush Mountains.⁴³⁷ The Persians had invaded Ormuz with the help of the English, whose fleet was supported by the [Persian] infantry, and with the accompaniment of fourteen tunnels of mine, they eventually seized the place. The conditions for the provided help were that the English would have one fifth of the tax⁴³⁸ and the entire pillage captured from the city, which was estimated to be very high because of the precious pearls and gems discovered there. By the way, starting from Ahmet's rule until these times, war is waged with fluctuating fortunes between the Turks and the Persians around Babylon. Since the peace had been concluded with Emperor Rudolph, Murad Pasha⁴³⁹ led the army against the Persians. And the Georgians changing sides now and then, the Turks had much authority between the Euphrates and the Tigris. Nasuh Pasha⁴⁴⁰ succeeded Murad [Pasha], and signed an armistice⁴⁴¹ with the King of the Persians. After these were done, Mehmed⁴⁴² obtained the seat and dignity of Grand Vizierate, and when his management of the affairs proved a failure, he was removed from office. Halil⁴⁴³ followed him, who restored to some extent the declining power and authority of the Turks: He not only reconquered Tebriz and Hamadan⁴⁴⁴, but also advanced deep into Persia with fire and sword: [But] he was called back to the Porte, and there was neither war nor peace between these people, until Osman directed a massive army towards Poland; and in order to be able to move, he concluded peace with the Persians, according to which each would keep occupying the territories they had conquered. (217)

(218) Osman had passed away, and Babylon was delivered to Shah Abbas; the Sultana was ruling on behalf of her son Murad (IV), and her son-in-law Hafiz⁴⁴⁵ Pasha was, this time, sent as the Commanding General⁴⁴⁶ with a large army to Babylon; and when the defeat was accepted in 1626, he raised the siege, losing all the cannons. Then, here⁴⁴⁷ was sent Halil;⁴⁴⁸ but due to the Abaza⁴⁴⁹'s uprising, he had to retreat in Assyria⁴⁵⁰, and when the enemy was not spotted, he was forced to retreat. Hüsrev Pasha⁴⁵¹ was assigned to the following expeditions, and (after) the army of the Persians (were) defeated in a regular battle⁴⁵², he penetrated into the

⁴³⁷ Ad montes Paropamissi

⁴³⁸ Quintam vectigalium partem

⁴³⁹ Murath Passa: Sadrazam Kuyucu Murad Paşa (11 Dec 1606 – 5 Aug 1611)

⁴⁴⁰ Nassuph: Gümülcineli Damat Nasuh Paşa (5 Aug 1611 - 17 Oct 1614)

⁴⁴¹ The Treaty of Nasuh Paşa, 20 November 1612.

⁴⁴² Mehemetes: Öküz Kara Mehmed Paşa (17 Oct 1614 – 17 Nov 1616)

⁴⁴³ Helill: Damat Halil Paşa (17 Nov 1616 – 18 Jan 1619)

⁴⁴⁴ Taurim et Ecbatana: It should be only Tebriz, but perchance also Erdebil, though the army progressed deep into Hamadan. (Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4. TTK, p. 248).

⁴⁴⁵ Havis Passa: Hafız Ahmed Paşa (Jan 1625 – Dec 1626)

⁴⁴⁶ Supremus Dux: Serdar- ı Ekrem

⁴⁴⁷ Baghdad

⁴⁴⁸ Chalil: Damat Halil Paşa again, Grand Vizier for the second time (December 1626 – April 1628)

⁴⁴⁹ Abassa: Abaza Mehmet Paşa

⁴⁵⁰ Assyria

⁴⁵¹ Hüsrev Passa: Grand Vizier / Sadrazam Hüsrev Paşa (Apr 1628 – Oct 1631)

⁴⁵² İusta acie

Kingdom, but retreated from Babylon with a failure. During these vicissitudes, Shah Abbas had passed away, and since shortly before he had his son murdered due to his ambition of the throne,⁴⁵³ his grandson Safi⁴⁵⁴ replaced him. After the death of his grandfather, Safi sent forces against the Georgian Princes Teimuraz and Daud Khans⁴⁵⁵, and assigned the Grand Vizier of Persia and the Pasha of the City Shiraz (which was once Persepolis, the royal capital of the Zoroastrians⁴⁵⁶ and of the whole Orient) as the General. Teimuraz had joined the Turks while Hüsrev was approaching, and Daud had been the administrator in the Nakhchivan Province of Persia (whence an abundant supply of silk is sold to Aleppo). After Shah Abbas' death, Daud had rebelled against his successor. Their forces put under [Persian] authority, Shah Safi made an attempt to extend his borders, and to besiege with a strong force the fortified city of Van,⁴⁵⁷ located on a high cliff, and surrounded by ditches (It was 5 days' journey away from Babylon). However, Vizier Mehmet Pasha, Junior,⁴⁵⁸ boldly maintained his ardour and attacks with forces mustered briskly, and he is still in Assyria, commanding the army. After so many defeats and turbulences received in Mesopotamia, the young Sultan was also seriously afflicted by rebellions in Yemen,⁴⁵⁹ which had been immutably faithful to the Ottoman Kings since the time of Süleyman. Indeed, a strong and daring man from the blood and lineage of those who once had been the Princes of Arabia, named Imam,⁴⁶⁰ seized the opportunity and urgently stirred the people of his clan to revolt, until those, who were irritated by the despicable youth of the Sultan and the harsh domination of the Eunuchs, renounced allegiance around five years ago; (218)

(219) Imam was restored as Prince and ruler in Yemen on the basis of his family rights and prerogatives. The capital of Arabia, Sana'a, called Mocha Port, was governed in the Sultan's name by Kansu,⁴⁶¹ who was sent with a formidable strength⁴⁶² by the Grand Vizier Hüsrev to recuperate the lost territory. However, since the giant army was worn out by the heat of the Sun, famine and contagions, the expedition bore no fruit or success. No less to add to Murad's calamities was the rebellion of Fahrettin Maanoğlu,⁴⁶³ who was called the Emir of Sidon.⁴⁶⁴ He boasted

⁴⁵³ affectati Regni causa

⁴⁵⁴ Sefi: Shah Safi of Persia (Reign: 28 January 1629 – 12 May 1642)

⁴⁵⁵ Georgianorum Principibus Tamri & Davidi Chanis

⁴⁵⁶ Regia Magorum sedes

⁴⁵⁷ Munitumque castrum Vaan

⁴⁵⁸ Princeps Visirius Mehemetes Passa Iuvenis: Not clear. Perhaps, Strassburg refers to the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paşa, who was appointed to the eastern campaign in H. 1043 (1633 - 1634). See *Solakzade*, p. 752.

⁴⁵⁹ Arabiae Felicis

⁴⁶⁰ Imam

⁴⁶¹ Chanus Zan: Kansu Paşa

⁴⁶² With more than 20 000 troops (İdris Bostan, "Osmanlı İdaresi", under the "Yemen" entry. *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Cild 43. "Yemen", p 409).

⁴⁶³ Fakredini Man-Ogli (1570 - 1635). See Feridun Emecen, "Fahredden, Ma'noğlu", in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Cild 12.

⁴⁶⁴ Emir de Saida

of having descended from Bouillon, the Liberator of Palestine,⁴⁶⁵ and it is claimed that he had lived in Rome, Naples and Florence, been once a friend of the Duke Cosimo [II de Medici] of Tuscany⁴⁶⁶ and the Duke of Osuna. He has a hereditary Principality, and his seat and domicile wasn't far away from the ancient Tyre and Sidon,⁴⁶⁷ which now lie buried under water. As tribute, he paid 40 000 gold, and enjoys such a fertile soil that in his harbours and Provinces, two hundred Christian ships are loaded in short notice. His territory abounds with riches, feeds a trained army and stretches down to Jaffa⁴⁶⁸ near the sea shore. So, not long ago, an expedition was unfortunately launched against him by the Turks. In these problems and difficulties must be included the rebellions of the Tatar Girays Mehmet and Şahin; uprisings of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania; raids and pillages of Zaporozhian Cossacks, who almost came down to Walls of Constantinople; and lastly, the tumults and insurrections of soldiers from every rank, who partook in horrible conspiracies against the lives of High Officeholders and the prosperity of their Sovereign.⁴⁶⁹ Whatever was worthy of remembrance to us, I'll explain thoroughly with the causes and the origins. Nobody can deny that the greatness of the Ottoman Empire had been fatal and pernicious to the Christian World for some centuries. However, in those times, some people had attributed the endurance of this massive empire to the absolute power of the rulers, and to the structure and disposition of the Empire, and deemed that it was supported by the pillars of Law, Wealth and Army. This opinion may stand on plausible reasoning, but anyone who wishes to know a little more accurately its (219)

(220) circumstances and secrets should understand that at the Ottoman Court, power and authority mostly rest on those who, in managing and directing such a Monarchy, are hardly sufficient. Therefore, it seems worthy of admiration that this Empire didn't collapse long ago, and that it wasn't hurled down from its zenith by inexperienced leaders. Indeed, since the Ottoman Kings didn't always possess the prudence and the determination necessary for the exercise of absolute power in the manner their ancestors did, the management of the state affairs was diverted to the Eunuchs, Kapı and Kızlar Agha;⁴⁷⁰ the former of whom had the men of the entire palace⁴⁷¹ under his command, whereas the latter ruled the women. To them are added the Sultanas, the mother, the spouse and the sisters of the Sultan, and eventually the favourites and the servants; they shift the Grand Signior's decisions arbitrarily and disturb the successive works of the Grand Vizir. It's their will and whim which choose, keep, or dismiss those, on whom the Monarchy stands and rises: That's why, the High Officeholders anxiously obtain the grace of the Eunuchs and the servants, and preserve it with remarkable gifts and presents without which they can't even be sure of their honour, life and fortunes for a single moment. This type of headstrong people, surely, for their caprices and avarice, often ignited the Sultan's hatred against

⁴⁶⁵ Palastinae Liberatore Bullionæo: Godfrey de Bouillon

⁴⁶⁶ Ducibus Hetruriae Guisio & Ossunæ: (H)etruria must be Florence.

⁴⁶⁷ Non procul Tyro & Sydone veteri

⁴⁶⁸ Joppen

⁴⁶⁹ Fortunas Principis

⁴⁷⁰ Capi et Kislar Aga

⁴⁷¹ Totius septi mares

great people, and didn't spare even the innocent. Therefore, when the Viziers learn from the male prostitutes⁴⁷² that the ultimate decision, their ruin, is drawing nigh, and that they are doomed to die so disgracefully in the hands of the executor⁴⁷³ for no reason [at all], they search everywhere for an escape from their ruin. Some of these seek refuge and embark on ships en route to Christian ports and Realms; the others rebel against the Sultan with their entire Provinces; some slaughter the fatal messengers of their deaths (Kapıcı Başıs, or Commander of the Imperial Doorkeepers) and turn the armies entrusted to them against their Sovereign; finally, many of them oppose this violence and tyranny through the uprisings in Constantinople, the conspiracies of the magnates and the grandees,⁴⁷⁴ and military riots. What took place during our visit was this: the mother of the young Sultan, with the Eunuchs and the favourites, was removing prudent and worthy men from the administration under the guise of royal command,⁴⁷⁵ and was granting the highest honours and offices to those, who were considered the best to gratify the (220)

(221) wishes of this headstrong woman. And when they wanted to strip the Grand Vizier Hüsrev Pasha of his office and dignity with their⁴⁷⁶ usual method of obtaining a royal order, he was compelled to hasten to the court from the army encampment. Having heard this, the Eunuchs and the servants tried to dissuade him from coming to Constantinople again through letters and messengers. However, Hüsrev, a man of strong will, despised and ignored their warning and went to the Porte against all opposition. It is hardly credible how much the Directors of the Sultan were thrown into alarming confusion, when they saw Hüsrev exercise his former authority with great rigour as the Grand Vizier, intending to amend the interior of the court, along with a change of the servants and the favourites. Indeed, in the Divan, he openly complained that the young Sultan was imbued with the worst of advice, and those who tainted the illustrious character of the Sovereign with their contagious touch were not to be tolerated. Since he also elaborated his arguments in effect, he amended the Sultan's court for his own share with the consents of Kaymakam Recep Pasha and Canpolat, the Admiral of the Seas,⁴⁷⁷ and restrained the insolence of the [Queen] mother and the servants to a certain degree. But since Hüsrev, in the meantime, went back to Amasya after the things were settled in the Porte, the usual vices of the court resurged: Even Murad felt himself to be degraded by his servant with armed force. Therefore, with the common acceptance and approval of the remaining High Officeholders and the magnates, it was concluded afresh that Hüsrev would be removed from the dignity of Grand Vizierate, and the Sultana's son-in-law Hafız Pasha replaced him. Furthermore, [since Grand] Mufti, Recep Pasha and the Admiral were friends to, and acting in concordance⁴⁷⁸ with, Hüsrev, they were deprived of their ranks and offices with the same reason; and the insolent slaves

⁴⁷² Visirii Principes intelligunt ab exoletis

⁴⁷³ Carnificisque manu

⁴⁷⁴ Magnatumque & procerum

⁴⁷⁵ Sub larva Imperialis mandati

⁴⁷⁶ mulierum

⁴⁷⁷ Cahimacho Regiep Passa, nec non Zambolath Præfecto maris: Strassburg's mistake- French ambassador Cesy notes that Admiral Canpoladzade was a favourite of the Sultan.

⁴⁷⁸ conspirantibus

having been tamed, majesty and absolute rule⁴⁷⁹ was confirmed to the Young Sultan. Offices and honours of those, for whom Murad had resolved the ultimate punishment, were promised to the loyal and faithful Pashas, Murteza, Abaza, and other envious ones, so that he eliminate the inimical and hateful ones against himself with their help. But [before all this happened,], hardly Hüsrev Pasha's power had been abrogated, or the Kaymakam's dignity tainted, when such a horrible uprising was set in motion in Constantinople that the Sultan Himself, with the foremost Magnates, narrowly escaped death and destruction. (221)

(222) For, in that rage, the new Grand Vizier Hafız Pasha, Janissary Agha, Grand Treasurer and other people of high authority were dismembered and maimed; their mutilated and torn cadavers were hanged on the nearby trees for mockery, and nothing was standing in the way between this cruel attack and the Sultan's seat.⁴⁸⁰ Indeed, in such a grave hazard, Murad had agreed to deliver the most select of the favourites to death in the hands of the furious soldiers; and was forced to show that his younger brothers were alive. When the Sultana mother, too, was demanded for execution, she took measures and escaped swiftly and for a long time hid in the old palace among aged women. And this was the result of a hasty advice since the young Sultan was blindly seized by the persuasion of the mother and the servants that he was in such a peril that the Commanders of the Spahis were considered to be about to deprive him of his life and throne like Osman, and afterwards, [he feared that] his younger brother Bayezid would be invested with authority. Murad avenged this violence and insult with endless blood-shed and did away with the Grand Mufti, the Grand Vizier Recep Pasha and the Admiral, and punished, with various means, a great number of people within the span of the following year. However, once the Majesty of the Empire is scorned, its power and might also are doomed to decline. As a matter of fact, not only are the confines of the Ottoman Monarchy restricted and shaken in many places, but also it is seen that the reverence to the Mohammedan law and the superstition of its people ceases. Added to this, the military ranks and the soldiers⁴⁸¹ are incredibly effeminate, discipline is loose and the morals are corrupt; maritime power is almost inexistent, trade is diminished and coinage debased; military expeditions are only slightly successful; there is discordance and jealousy between the High Officeholders, and they don't cherish respect or their former sympathy towards the Sovereign; if anything ill happens to the Sultan, he will enjoy little faith from the high officeholders and the magnates. These are what I wanted to present briefly about the present shape and situation of the Ottoman Empire. Now I will continue with what I undertook in the Sultan's Court with regards to the activity of my mission. In the beginning, I often visited the High Officials Mufti and the Grand Vizier in friendship, and defended the cause of the Most Serene Princess Catherine. At the same time, I also thoroughly explained the condition and situation of the Holy Royal Majesty, (222)

(223) His deeds, corporal talents and high spirit; the admirable position and the strength of the Realms of Sweden, their power, might and resources; the long lasting wars and especially the last expeditions into Livonia, Prussia and Germany;

⁴⁷⁹ Absolutum arbitrium

⁴⁸⁰ Fastigio Imperatoris

⁴⁸¹ Ordo militaris & castrenses viri

eventually the character of the places and the regions there, and Martial dispositions of the people. The High Officials, a curious folk highly interested in novelties, listened to these with particular joy and admiration. [*In Szilagyí Sandor*: Moreover, I examined diligently if, while the Persian war was going on, the Turks were in a position to attack Europe too, and to keep themselves busy with Emperor Ferdinand or Polish King Sigismund.] However, I understood that our actions were rather dreadful and suspicious for the Barbarians; so to speak, they feared that a peace between the Christian nations would unite them, and the whole mass of wars would fall down on their own Realms. And they know that the European soldiers are superior to theirs in terms of experience, discipline, arms and strategies of combat⁴⁸²; and they prefer to settle their disputes with the Austrians with any possible delays than to declare War and hostility. They strove to avoid war with the Polish, since they were persuaded that the Poles have been in arms since Osman's defeat, and surpassed themselves with their experience in military issues. Since even if Murad breeds an incredible hatred against the Polish people and expresses his desire for vengeance, the Viziers vehemently fear expeditions to Europe, and by exaggerating the magnitude of the Persian War, they curbed the Sultan's attempts by whatever reason and means. Surely, it is firmly agreed upon in the Porte that Babylon will be recuperated with all their forces, and no peace or truce will ever be concluded with the King of the Persians before it is restored; in contrast, Shah Abbas, on his deathbed, adjured his grandson to preserve Babylon in the Persian Empire and, likewise, to defend all his State and Realms against danger. In addition, during the time I spent in the Ottoman Court, the Viziers welcomed me honourably and with highest goodwill, and no easier audience was given to any other Ambassador. Moreover, in the name of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha,⁴⁸³ many gifts were offered to me one after the other in official ceremony: Lambs, birds, fruits, spices, Şerbet, high quality vines, barley for our horses, and other things of this kind. Since this was done beyond the habitual and accustomed manner, it caused rage among our adversaries, so to speak, among those who knew that no Legation of any King (223)

(224) was so much honoured, not even the Emperor's.⁴⁸⁴ On the top of it, news were brought by the Venetians that the Holy Royal Majesty had struck down the army of Emperor Ferdinand and the League near the river Lech⁴⁸⁵ in Bavaria; that message was received with favour by all the Magnates. In addition, the Voyvode of Moldavia informed the Vizier Mehmed Pasha through letters at the same moment that since King Sigismund of the Polish was dead, the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden was among the principal Candidates for [the throne of] that Kingdom. Therefore, the resident (ambassador) of the Emperor thought that now had come the time to calumniate rashly my presence there, and assuming the role of informers to the Turks, his party raised suspicions against me through whispers and ruthless letters to the High Officials. As a matter of fact, he was asserting that the Holy Royal Majesty

⁴⁸² genere pugnandi

⁴⁸³ Supremii Visirii Mehemetis Passae nomine: Tabanyassı Mehmed Paşa (18 May 1632 – 2 February 1637)

⁴⁸⁴ In Szilagyí Sandor's work (MHH), this passage is slightly different: "...qui noverant Ferdinandi imperatoris, Persarum regis et Moscaviae magni ducis extra-ordinariis legationibus tantum honoris non exhibitum." : ..., so to speak, among those who knew that the extra-ordinary legations of Emperor Ferdinand, the Persian King, and the Grand Duchy of Moscovy were not so much honoured.

⁴⁸⁵ Prope flumen Lycum in Bavaria: The Battle of Rain am Lech, 15 April 1632.

of Sweden had a quite large horizon in his actions and intentions, in which once Germany was conquered, he would raid against the Austrian King and the European Realms and peoples of the Turks. For this reason, [his argument went on], he had sent me as a Legate not only to Transylvania, but also to the Porte itself, so that he could prompt, through Rakoczy, the Moldavians, Wallachians, Transylvanians and Hungarians attached to him to a future rebellion; through Patriarch Cyril,⁴⁸⁶ he was trying to join the Zaporozhian Cossacks and other Greek subjects of the Porte of Felicity to his ranks, and he was negotiating with the Ambassadors of the Great Britain and the Dutch Republic about the dispatch of a fleet to the Archipelagos.⁴⁸⁷ He had sent messengers even to the King of the Persians for friendship and a bellicose alliance against the Muslims. What could [otherwise] mean my meetings and sincere conversations with the Dutch Ambassador and Patriarch Cyril, who, as a matter of fact, explored the circumstances and the secrets of the Turkish Empire and then revealed it to the King of the Swedes in turn. Therefore, during my negotiations, no other Translator was employed than that of Cornelius Haga, so that the secrets would not leak out and the grave conspiracy would remain hidden. The Imperial Ambassador wrote down these incriminations and took pains to have them translated to the Arabic Language⁴⁸⁸ and presented to the Mufti and the Viziers through his emissary Süleyman Agha; [though, afterwards,] I easily refuted them. Furthermore, the Emperor was feeding and sustaining not only his Ambassador, but also a certain Yusuf, the Arabic Translator, along with paying some Çavuşes. (224)

(225) The Spanish also had many spies, both in Constantinople⁴⁸⁹ and in the main Islands of the Aegean Sea, who frequently dispatched letters to Messina. Ecclesiastical Orders of the Roman Pontiff, the Franciscans, the Jesuits and the Capuchins were neglecting their duties (while) searching for the secrets of the Turkish Empire here and there. On behalf of the Poles, a certain Otwinowski⁴⁹⁰ was present, sent here by the Palatine of Russia to learn the Arabic language and speech. Other Christian Kings and Princes, through their Ambassadors and Jewish, Epirian and Armenian Translators, were examining the secrets of the Ottomans. But, to return to the series of negotiations, I acted as desired for the cause of the Most Serene Princess Catherine by the High Officials. Indeed, since the Most Serene [Lady] declared in her letters sent to the Porte that she had resolved to submit herself to the generous will of the Holy Royal Majesty of Sweden and was conceding to me the authority to act and negotiate on her behalf, I convinced the Mufti and the Viziers that they would send Yusuf Ağa, an honest and prudent man, to Rakoczy in Transylvania, so that he could bring into effect the demands of the Most Serene Princess with the Order and Will of the Sultan, and take care of the issue of Her full restoration. [*This section is from the Szilagyi Sandor edition, and doesn't exist in*

⁴⁸⁶ Cyrillum Patriarcham: the Orthodox Patriarch Cyril Lucaris in the Ottoman Capital, who was known for his well established contact with the Protestant powers.

⁴⁸⁷ in Archipelagum: The Aegean Islands were “ the archipelago ” of the classical world. Moreover, Montalbanus makes the following clarification: “... & mari Ægæo, quod Archipelagus alias apellatur...” (p. 158).

⁴⁸⁸ Arabica Lingua: Again, he must mean Turkish language in Arabic script.

⁴⁸⁹ Urbe Byzantina

⁴⁹⁰ Otwinoffski: Not clear, since there were no official Polish ambassadors at the Porte in 1632 (See Spuler, Teil V, and the webpage of the Polish Embassy in Turkey). But probably, he was the orientalist expert Samuel Otwinowski.

Monumenta Pietatis..., although he doesn't point out that this is an extra passage: Moreover, since I was convinced that the particular Magnates of the Porte were aloof from the idea of European campaigns, and that they were not to wage any direct war against the provinces and peoples of Emperor Ferdinand or Polish King Sigismund given the present situation, I decided to use all possible means in order at least to solicit support for Rakoczy. For, even if the unity of power and spirit required for enduring expeditions was absent among the Turks, they were conspiring resourcefully for the ruin of the Austrian House, waiting diligently for an opportunity. Hence the internal discordances didn't trouble them indeed, they strictly ordered the Vizier of Buda to have all the soldiers of Europe⁴⁹¹ in preparedness, and to send the Pashas of Temesvár and Eger, along with the cavalries of Moldavia and Wallachia, to reinforce the Prince of Transylvania, and to bring the remaining troops to the borders of Styria. Camps were set up near the city Eszek,⁴⁹² whence there are no rivers to pass, no mountains or forests obstructing their way, but plains and easy access to the Hereditary Provinces of Emperor Ferdinand. They were persuaded that this was not only a fearful and valid way to disrupt the plans of the enemy, but also a great hindrance to them for refreshing forces and mustering soldiers.] Henceforth, the commission of the Holy Royal Majesty having been executed at the Ottoman Porte, I asked for a reply and permission for my departure and did my valediction to the Sultan on 24th June. During this occasion, a lot was presented and granted to the Holy Royal Majesty, which was beyond the usual practice; and hardly could the Ambassadors resident in the Porte remember any Legate undergo such a [fortunate] event. As a matter of fact, the Palace in the garden of the Grand Seignior was chosen for my farewell speech just as for my arrival, and a huge number of people from the household were positioned on each sides of the passage, and some eighty Asiatic horses were standing as a long column, shining with gold and gems, followed by high ranking Officials and Grandees; the whole interior of the court was arranged with pomp and splendour for the sake of honour and reverence. Murad himself was sitting on high ground and was wearing an Imperial vesture, looking cheerful and watching me with a kind face during the speech. The oration was delivered in Italian briefly for a second time by the courtiers, and the Translator followed it in the Turkish language. Twelve precious vestures were presented to the nobles from my retinue, (225)

(226) and after this was done, just as I had been guided in, I was taken back to the gates of the Palace with the Grand Vizier walking before me. That day, there was much rumour in Constantinople about the extraordinary splendour and ostentation of the Ottoman Court, and about the unusual manner of showing honour and generosity. The adversaries and the enemies of the Holy Royal Majesty were absolutely infuriated, the Legates of the other Kings were venting their angers mixed with envy and jealousy, and everybody was looking for the reason of this novel treatment. After I completed the ceremony of reverence and valediction to the Sultan, I went to see the Grand Vizier for a last salutation, and he received me with peculiar kindness, and requested me to personally recommend his services to the Holy Royal Majesty. Shortly after the Sultan's response was conveyed, with a gesture of dignity and kindness in his face, he also gave his letters to me. Finally, to bid their farewells,

⁴⁹¹ *Omnem Europaeam militem*: All of the Ottoman soldiers on the European Continent, that is, Rumeli.

⁴⁹² *Prope urbem Essegk*: The Ottoman city of (Cisr- i) Ösek in Hungary.

nobles from my company were admitted, and ten vestures of honour were gifted. The letters of the Sultan were written with much courtesy and embellishment, as it is the usual Turkish way; and nothing was neglected which could deserve the favour of the H.R. Majesty. After a few days, I received the parting responses⁴⁹³ of the Mufti, the Kapudan Pasha, Ambassadors and the Patriarch. Then, after the visits were paid, I set out towards Transylvania on 12th July with the Imperial mandates and wagons, accompanied by a Çavuş. There were events worthy of remembrance on my way back to Germany; however, in order not to bore the reader with them, I intend to cut the Report to an end here; praying the GOD that He increase the courage of the Ancestors and augment the glory gained to the illustrious Kingdom and people of the Swedes by the deeds of Gustav the Great, and that He preserve it forever. (226)

⁴⁹³ responsorias

CONCLUSION

In this study, I tried to argue why the Ottoman Empire must be regarded as a *de facto* participant in the Thirty Years War. Many different aspects of the issue were laid under scrutiny and a case study was carried out along with a translation attached. There are a handful of remarks I would like to make on the analyses made above.

Before delving into to the main story, a depiction of the Ottoman foreign policy towards Europe in 16th and early 17th centuries is made: The Ottoman western front was shortly portrayed and the Ottoman attitude towards Protastanism was evaluated. Moreover, the inner and external political conditions of the Ottoman Empire was accounted for. Thereafter, the main arguments of the thesis were propounded.

Firstly, it was argued that even though no central Ottoman army was sent on campaigning against the western front, the Ottoman vassal Transylvanian Principality and the frontier pashas (governors of Buda, mostly) were at times condoned or even buttressed by the Porte in their actions against the Habsburgs within the framework of the Thirty Years War. It is true that the Ottoman Empire was unwilling to break the peace with the Habsburgs and even renewed it for several times during this time span; however, the undercover support they offered to the anti- Habsburg elements in Central Europe is undeniable. This was a long term double policy of keeping the peace with the Habsburgs on diplomatic table on the one hand, but covertly tolerating the anti Habsburg military operations on the other.

Second, the diplomatic activity in, and with, Constantinople in that era was quite dynamic. Diplomatic representatives of both anti- and pro- Habsburg powers went to and fro between the Porte and their own states to respectively include or

exclude the Ottomans among the belligerents of the great war. This was a clear sign that, although it never was an indispensable option, the Ottoman Empire was often included in the political calculations of European powers which were enmeshed in the Thirty Years War. Moreover, the solidarity between the diplomats of the Protestant party present at the Porte suggests that a collateral reflection of the hostilities on the European theatre of war was found on diplomatic arena at the Ottoman capital. Even though the great hopes of the Protestant party from the Ottoman Empire were largely disappointed, the Transylvanian principality made the best of the Ottoman presence in Europe.

In the third and the last chapters, the final relation of Swedish internonce Paul Strassburg was evaluated within the same context. His final relation and the contemporary letters reveal clearly that even though the Porte had a definite interest in the progress registered by the anti- Habsburg party, the Swedish envoy's calls for an alliance had to fall on deaf ears due to the Porte's adamant willingness (if not compulsion) to preserve the peace in the western front while ongoing warfare raged in the east against the Safavids and sporadic rebel leaders.

Apart from the main arguments of the thesis, some complementary remarks can also be concluded: Focusing both on Strassburg's relation and on the other contemporary ambassadorial correspondence from the Porte, it can be claimed that Istanbul was a dynamic diplomatic centre at the time and the news from Europe was emanated to the Ottoman administrators in the city. Moreover, the ruling cadres kept an open eye for the developments taking place in Europe, which becomes evident from their personal communication with the European diplomats in the city.

Moreover, the changing political structure of the late 16th and early 17th centuries was projected within the boundaries of the case study. The city Strassburg

visited was a crisis- ridden capital: Political factions were clashing at the seat of the sultanate, and a young sultan at the center of the struggle was trying to assert his personal rule from the middle of the spider web of factional politics; a challenge he successfully dealt with. In Strassburg's conversations with the Ottoman viziers, we could get a glimpse of the mindset of the Ottoman administrators, which seems to have shared certain common points with the Ottoman advice writers of the time, such as Koçi Bey or Aziz Efendi: The Empire was undergoing a serious crisis and the glory of the past was left behind. In this political deadlock, the Ottoman decision makers chose not to make any binding commitments on the western front, but promised to try their best with regards to keeping the territorial integrity of their vassal, the Transylvanian Principality, in case of a Habsburg attack.

All in all, even though the Thirty Years War was a majorly European conflict, we shouldn't fail to see the Ottoman elements in it. The Protestant entities in Europe found a potential ally in Constantinople and the *de facto* involvement of the Ottoman Empire was a matter of fact in many ways. It is doubtless that this still remains a relatively unpenetrated issue, and more case studies are needed to highlight it thoroughly.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGIA OF STRASSBURG'S MISSION

- 29.04.1631- Strassburg receives instructions from King Gustav Adolph at Frankfurt am Oder.
17. 09. 1631- Swedes victorious at the Battle of Breitenfeld, near Leipzig.
10. 1631 - Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa is replaced by Hafız Ahmed Paşa.
- 22.11.1631- Strassburg leaves Chancellor Oxenstierna in Elbing and sets out with his retinue.
- 27.11.1631- The diplomatic mission reaches Mlavva.
- 05.12.1631- Polish Chancellor sends Strassburg the demanded letters of safe conduct at Warsaw.
- 25.12.1631- The legation reaches Sambir.
- 25.01.1632- Strassburg and his suit leave Munkacs.
- 09.02.1632- Audience with Transylvanian Prince György Rakoczy at Alba Julia.
- 10.02.1632- Grand Vizier Hafız Ahmed Paşa is assassinated by the rebels in Constantinople.
02. 1632 - Former Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa is executed late in the month.
- 04.03.1632- Strassburg leaves Brasso for Wallachia.
- 08.04.1632- Strassburg and his retinue enter Constantinople, accommodated in *Boğdan Sarayı*. Dutch, French, British embassy secretaries are sent to greet him.
- 09.04.1632- The Venetian *bailo* and Orthodox Patriarch Cyril Lucaris presented their greetings.
- 15.04.1632- Audience with Grand Vizier (Topal) Recep Paşa. Swedish King victorious against the Imperialists on the Rain am Lech.
- 21- 23. 04. 1632- Strassburg's visit to *Şeyhü'l- İslam* Ahizade Hüseyin and Grand Admiral Canpoladzade Mustafa Paşa.
02. 05. 1632- Strassburg's audience with Sultan Murad IV at the Topkapı Palace.
- 02- 18.05.1632- Strassburg visits French ambassador Comte de Marcheville, English ambassador Peter Wyche, Venetian bailo Giovanni Cappello, Patriarch Cyril Lucaris; then viziers (Tabaniyassı) Mehmed Paşa and Bayram Paşa.

18.05.1632- Grand Vizier Recep Paşa executed under royal command; Murad IV's personal rule starts.

18.05- 24.06. 1632- Strassburg's audience with new Grand Vizier (Tabanıyassı) Mehmed Paşa.

24.06.1632- Strassburg's parting audience with the Sultan.

12. 07.1632- Strassburg and his retinue set out from Constantinople for Transylvania.

09. 1632 - Strassburg in Cluj.

10. 1632 - Strassburg in Varad.

16.11.1632 - Swedish victory at Lützen, Gustav Adolph falls dead.

05. 1633 - Strassburg left Alba Julia after negotiating with Rakoczy.

06. 1633 - Strassburg in Ottoman Hungary (Temesvar).

07. 1633 - Strassburg in Ottoman Hungary (Buda).

08. 1633 - He is back in Constantinople.

09. 1633 - Strassburg leaves for Venice after audience with the Sultan.

APPENDIX B

TABLE OF COMPARATIVE TOPONYMS

| Ottoman | German | Hungarian | Slavonic | English |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| İştiryaya | Steiermark | Stájerország | | Styria |
| Yanık / Yanıkkale | Raab | Győr | Ráb | |
| Komaron | Komorn | Komorom | | |
| Estergon | Esztergom | Gran | Ostrihom | Latin: Strigonium |
| Pojun/ Pojon | Pressburg | Pozsony | Bratislava | Bratislava |
| Ljubljana (Tr.) | Laibach | | Ljubljana | Ljubljana |
| Kassa/ Kaşa | Kaschau | Kassa | Košice | Kosice/ Lat: Cassovia |
| Eğri | Erlau | Egre | Jager | Eger/ Latin: Agria |
| Göle | Jula | Gyula | | |
| | Karlstadt | | Karlovac | |
| Papa | Papa | Papa | | |
| Tata | Totis | Tata | | |
| Kanije | Großkirchen/ (Groß) Kanischa | Nagykanizsa/ Kanizsa | Velika Kaniža | |
| | Sathmar | Szatmár | | |
| Vajon | | Nagyvázsony | Vázsony | |
| Karniol (Tr.) | Krain | | Kranjska | Carniola |
| Blagay | | | Blagaj | |
| Ostroviç | | | Ostrovica | |
| Zagreb | Agram | | Zagreb | |
| | Kreuz | | Križevci | |
| | Warasdin | | Varaždin | |
| Semendire | | Szendrő | Smederevo | |
| | Kleinwardein | Kisvarda | | |
| Kulpa | Kupa | | | |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Korona | Korana | Korana | | |
| Vişegrad | Plintenburg | Vişegrad | Vişegrad | |
| Damaş | | Damásd/ Ipolydamásd | | |
| Novigrad | Neuburg | Nograd | Novohrad | |
| Peç/ Peçuy | Fünfkirchen | Pécs | | |
| Tirnova | Tyrnau | Nagyszombat | Trnava | Trnava |
| | Ödenburg | Sopron | | |
| Polata | Palota | Várpalota | | |
| Tihon | Tihany | Tihany | | Tihany |
| Berzençe | | Berzence | | |
| Babofça | | Babócsa | | |
| Şegeş | | Segesd | | |
| Kapoşvar | Chaposvivar(?) | Kaposújvár/ Kaposvár | | |
| Zigetvar | Sigeth | Szigetvár | | |
| İsklavonya/ Slavonya | Slawonien | | | Slavonia |
| Samartin/Senmartin | Sankt Martin | Pannonhalma | | St. Martin |
| Serem/Sirem | | Szeremseg | | |
| Karmusbane | Kremnitz | Körmöcbanya | Kremnica | Kements |
| | Eisenstadt | Kismarton | | |
| Munkaç | Munkatsch | Munkacs | Mukachevo | |
| Varat | Grosswardein | Nagyvarad | Romanian: Oradea | Latin: Varadinum |
| Erdel | Siebenburgen | Erdely | Sedmohradsko | Transylvania |
| Erdel Belgradı | Weissenburg/ Karlsburg | Gyulafehérvár | Rom: Alba Julia | Alba Julia |
| İstolni Belgrad | Stuhlweißenburg | Székesfehérvár | Stoličný Belehrad | Lat: Alba Regia |
| Belgrad | Griechisch Weissenburg | Nandorfehérvár/ Fehérvár | Beograd | Belgrade/La t: Alba Graeca |
| Tisa (Nehri) | Theiss | Tisza | | Tisza |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Bihaç/ Behke | Wihatsch | Bihács | Bihać | |
| Ciğerdelen | Gockern | Parkany | Parkan/ Šturovo | |
| Vaç | Waizen | Vác | | |
| Leve/Leva | Lewenz | Léva | Levice | Lewentz |
| Budin/Budun | Ofen | Buda | | Buda |
| Peşte | Pest | Pest | Pešt' | Pest |
| Kaloşvar | Klausenburg | Kolozsvár | Rom: Cluj | Latin: Claudiopolis |
| Hayduşak | Hajduckeï | Hajduság | | |
| Nitra/ Nitre (Nehri) | Neutra | Nyitra | Nitra | |
| Uyvar | Neuhäusel | Ersekújvár | Nové Zámky | |
| Zerinvar/Zirinvar/ Yenikale | Neu Serinwar | Zrinyújvár | | |
| Ösek /Cisr- i Ösek | Esseg | Eszek | Osijek | |
| | Kärnten | | | Carinthia |
| Braşov/ Praşova | Kronstadt | Brassó | Rom: Braşov | Lat: Corona |
| Lak | Lack | Lak/Öreglak | | |
| Adakale/ Irşova | Orschowa | Orsova | Rom: Orşova | Orşova |
| Lipova | | Lippa | | |
| Yanova | | Jenő | | |
| Segedin | | Szeged | | |
| Fülek | Fülek | Filek | Fil'akovo | |
| Seçan/Sıçan/Seçen | Sechien | Szecsény | | |
| | Neusohl | Besztercebánya | Banská Bystrica | Neosolium |
| Eflak | Wallachei | Havasalföld | Valašsko | Wallachia |
| Boğdan/Buğdan | Moldau | Moldva | Moldavsko/ Rom: Moldova | Moldavia |
| Bükreş | | | Rom: Bucureşti | Bucharest |
| Yergögü | Zurz | Gyurgyevó | Giurgiu | Lat: Gorgo |
| Yaş | Jassenmarkt/ Jassy | Jászvásár | Rom: Iaşi | Jassy/ Iassy |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------------------|---|
| | | Maramaros | Rom: Maramureş | |
| Ruşçuk | | | Rom: Rusciuc | Ruse/ Lat: Horozcik |
| Koca Balkan Dağları | Balkangebierge | | | The Balkan Mountains/ Lat: Mons Haemus |
| Hollok/Holluk | Raabenstein | Hollokö | | |
| Sibin | Hermannstadt | Nagyszeben | Rom: Sibiu | Lat: Cibinum |
| Hust | Husst | Huszt | Ukrain: Khust | Lat: Hust |
| Maroş (Suyu)/Muriş | Marosch | Maros | Rom: Mureş | Lat: Marisus |
| Kopan (Livası) | | Koppány | | |
| Temeşvar/ Dımışkar | Temeschburg | Temesvár | Rom: Timişoara | Timişoara |
| Demirkapı | Eisernes Tor | Vaskapu-szoros | Rom: Porţile de Fier | Iron Gates |
| Jidve Boğazı | Žitava (Mündung) | Zsitvatorok | Žitava (River) | Žitava (River) |
| Sön | | Szóny | | Szóny |

APPENDIX C

COMPARATIVE CURRENCIES IN ASPERS (AKÇES)⁴⁹⁴

| Duka [Venetian Ducat] | Esedî Guruş [Leeuwensdaller] | Riyal [Imperales] | Zolota [Zloty] | [Reichsthaler] | [Ecu] | [Sterling] |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------|------------|
| 1632 | 1632 | 1632 | 1632 | | | |
| 220 | 100 | 110 | 70 | 100 – 110 | 130 + | 200+ |

1 German mile = 7,5 km (approx.)

⁴⁹⁴ The figures are gathered from Pamuk (2000, p. 144) and “Conventions” section in Parker (1997).


APPENDIX D

MAPS

Map 1: Strassburg's road map 1630-1632




Map 2: Ottoman western front



(Fekete, 1932: Map behind the back cover)

Map 3: Embassy buildings and lodgings circa mid- seventeenth century



(Karman, 2013b, p. 170)

3. (Probably) Ottoman Factions for 1632

Westerner *cins*

| | |
|--|--|
| [Mere Hüseyin Paşa] | [Albanian, a former Grand vizier who promoted Recep Paşa to the Office of the Admiral (d.1624)] |
| Hüsrev Paşa | Bosniac, co- opted with Recep Paşa. |
| (Topal) Recep Paşa | Bosniac, ignited the <i>spahi</i> revolt, using his influence on Albanians and Bosniacs. |
| Sali Ağa, Sakka Mehmed, etc... (<i>Sipahi Zorbaları</i>) | The Bosniac and Albanian ringleaders of the revolting spahi cavalry regiments |
| [Köprülü Mehmed Paşa] | [Albanian, a protégé of Hüsrev Paşa.] |

Sultan Murad IV's favourites and champions

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Hafız Ahmed Paşa | Sultan's brother in law, assassinated. |
| Murtaza Paşa | Sultan's brother in law. Married Ahmed Paşa's widow. |
| Canpoladzade Mustafa Paşa | Sultan's brother in law. |
| Musahib Musa Çelebi | Sultan's favourite, assassinated. |
| Janissary Commander Hasan Halife | Sultan's favourite, assassinated. |
| Bayram Paşa | Sultan's brother in law. |
| Kenan Paşa | Sultan's brother in law. |

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