

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
REALIST CONCERNS OF LIBERAL AIMS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOMALIA AND RWANDA

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
Humanitarian Intervention
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Humanitarian Intervention

Realist Concerns of Liberal Aims:

A Comparative Study of Somalia and Rwanda

Humanitarian intervention, which aims to carry out one of the noblest intentions, seeking to rescue populations that are getting eradicated by their compatriots, and which is conducted via internationally legitimate actions, is a highly debated topic in international politics. The driving forces behind the intervention, i.e. whether it is interest or empathy/help, combined with the question whether intervention in a sovereign state is legal or not, are the main problems of the humanitarian intervention debate. This thesis compares two humanitarian interventions – Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) – conducted by the United Nations to find out realist concerns within humanitarian interventions, as a form of the ultimate liberal cause in current international politics. By doing this, this thesis discusses the prevalence of the realist international politics theory even in liberal aims in an era of increasingly globalized foreign policy.

ÖZET

İnsani Müdahale

Liberal Amaçların Realist Motivasyonları:

Somali ve Ruanda Karşılaştırmalı Vaka İncelemesi

Kendi yurttaşları tarafından katledilen toplulukları kurtarmak niyetiyle yola çıkan ve bu nedenle insanlık tarihinin en yüksek amacını taşıyan, tamamen uluslararası hukuk kuralları doğrultusunda gerçekleştirilen insani müdahale kavramı uluslararası ilişkiler alanında en fazla tartışılan konular arasında yer almaktadır. Bu tartışmanın odağında, bağımsız bir devlete insani müdahalede bulunmanın meşruiyetinden müdahalenin yardım amaçlı mı çıkar odaklı mı yapıldığına dair birçok konu irdelenmektedir. Bu araştırma, Birleşmiş Milletler öncülüğünde, 1992 yılında gerçekleştirilen Somali insani müdahalesi ile 1994 yılında gerçekleştirilen Ruanda insani müdahalesini karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyerek; günümüz uluslararası siyasetinin en liberal eylemlerinden biri olan insani müdahalelerin realist teorik çerçeve ile örtüşen motivasyonlarını ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece, bu tezde dış politikanın giderek küreselleştiği bir çağda, en insani ve liberal eylemlerin dahi realist uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin geçerliliğini koruduğu gösterilmektedir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“People cannot be bribed or forced into changing their history, and no country is powerful enough – even when they think they are – to change the facts.”¹

President Kigame

One of the events that marked the international agenda in 2014 is the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan civil war, which resulted in mass killings of the ethnic group, Tutsi, in Rwanda in 1994. The words above belong to the President of Rwanda while he was speaking in the commemoration ceremony in April 2014. In his speech, he stated, “The passage of time should not obscure the facts, lessen the responsibility, or turn victims into villains”² and blamed France firstly for their support to the militias and then for their indifference which ended with the mass killing of 800,000 people.³

To understand the roots of “indifference”, as President Kigame puts it, this research enquires into the emergence and practice of intervention based on humanitarian claims by comparing two concrete examples of intervention which took place in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994). This research aims for understanding the motivations that lead the international society of states to intervene, thus violating the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Intervention, for the purpose of this thesis, is defined as a military action which undermines the sovereignty of a state by another one or a group of states. Within this context, the

¹ France 24, “Rwandan President Blames France at Genocide Commemorations”, *France 24*, Accessed May 19, 2014.
<http://www.france24.com/en/20140407-rwanda-kigame-president-blames-france-genocide-20-anniversary>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

main focus will be on assessing when and with what motives the international society of states intervenes in domestic affairs of a sovereign state.

Looking at the motives of interventions in the last decades, especially in the post-Cold War era, three main categories could be seen: intervention in internal armed conflicts, intervention due to disruption to democracy and intervention in humanitarian crises⁴. Interventions in Iraqi Kurdistan (1991), Yugoslavia (1999), Liberia (1990), Angola (1995) and Central African Republic (1997) are under the first category, namely internal armed conflicts, whereas the Haiti (1994) and Sierra Leone (2000) interventions are examples for disruption to democracy. On the other hand, Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Eastern Zaire (1996), Albania (1997) and East Timor (1999) constitute examples of intervention in humanitarian crises.⁵

Among these categories, the one that stems from reactions to a large-scale violation of human rights is the last one. It is assumed that interventions in this category serve one of the ultimate liberal causes of international politics, which is protecting human rights and ending human rights abuses, because they are conducted to stop humanitarian crises. As one of the most striking cases in this last category, genocide in Rwanda constitutes “one of the darkest chapters in human history,” as UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson referred to it.⁶ For the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations Security Council devoted a special meeting to this tragic event. Although France refused to accept President Kégréka's blame and refrained from apologizing to Rwanda, in that meeting the former Permanent

⁴ Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, (Oxford University Press, New York:2001), 140 – 150.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ UN News Center, “Rwandan genocide: Security Council told failure of political will led to ‘cascade of human tragedy’”, *United Nations*, Accessed May 19, 2014.
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47596#.VRFXkvysWSq>.

Representative of New Zealand, Colin Keating, who, in April 1994, held the presidency of the Security Council, apologized for their incapacity and indifference and stated, “Even after the genocide had begun, events were being described for several weeks as simply a resurgence of the civil war. The wholesale slaughter of civilians was not being conveyed to the Council.”⁷ Taking President Kegame’s accusations of France for being indifferent into the account, this research, by analysing the decision-making process in intervention, focuses on a state’s motivations for the involvement or non-involvement in humanitarian crises to stop the suffering of people who are citizens of another state and discusses if the decision to take or not to take action is made through realist concerns, which are based on national interest calculation.

Enquiring into these motivations and finding out the linkages between the cases are significant for this research because in the end the state-centric, interest-based approach in the decision-making process will prove the prevalence of the realist international relations theory rather than the international regime theory. In contemporary international relations, it is claimed that the traditional state-centric approach started to leave its place to a more international regime by “economic interdependencies, transnational organisations and movements, and legal obligations undertaken by states that raise the individual as a subject of international politics and law”⁸ and therefore there emerged new dynamics of the international regime. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the possibility of an intervention “which is expressive of the common purposes of international society” is almost zero due to the lack of an international society and due to the current anarchic structure of the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ İhsan Dağı, “Human Rights, Foreign Policy and the Question of Intervention”, *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 6, No.2, 7.

international system; there is no common superior to the states and “their actions and outlooks are of necessity egoistic”.⁹ This makes the realist point of view in the current international relations discipline much more explanatory especially to understand the sovereignty and non-intervention principle under the conditions that consist of large-scale human rights abuses.

For a better understanding of the decision-making process in humanitarian intervention, the starting point should be the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which constitutes the first intervention qualified as humanitarian by the United Nations. Being the first in this category,¹⁰ it also marks the creation of a norm in the post-Cold War era in the area of humanitarian intervention. When it comes to Rwanda, as the first genocide in the post-Cold War era, it is immediately after the Somalia intervention; therefore, it gives a chance to study whether or not the norms created during the Somalia intervention are followed and also to study if there is a causality between the decision-making process in humanitarian intervention in Somalia and that of Rwanda. As a result, comparing the Somalia intervention and the Rwanda intervention in this framework helps to reveal the pattern of decision making of states for humanitarian causes in the post-Cold War era.

Humanitarian intervention, which is put into action by a common decision of the international society, is one of the most important elements of fighting against human rights violations on a large scale and takes its legality from international norms. However, principles, necessities and timing of these common decisions of the international society are a subject to debate. Although the United Nations’ collective

⁹ McCarthy, “International Anarchy, Realism and non-intervention” in *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, 76.

¹⁰ See footnote 4.

security principle could serve as a tool to prevent mass violations of human rights that could end with large massacres, it is obvious that most of the time the intervention comes too late to stop the tragedies in the world. As a part of peace-keeping and security, intervention is allowed in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter enabling member states to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.¹¹ Although Chapter VII grants a right to the Security Council to intervene under the given conditions, both the right to intervene and whether all interventions occur based on this right are a matter of question.

As it is mentioned in “An Agenda for Peace”, which is the United Nations’ new conceptualization of itself, “Power brings special responsibilities and temptations”¹², and what these special responsibilities are would be analysed from the humanitarian crises perspective in this research, because the question whether the society of international states share the burden with France for the inaction or France is the only one to blame, for example, brings the answer about these “special responsibilities and temptations”. It is also an intriguing question taking into account that Sarkozy refrained from offering a full apology and rather said France did acknowledge “serious errors of judgment” when asked by a French journalist if France would offer an apology to Rwanda as other Western nations did in 2014 and it seems he would like to share the burden with the international community.¹³ On the other hand, given the fact that the Rwandan crisis emerged immediately after the

¹¹ United Nations, Charter, “Chapter VII”, *United Nations*, Accessed October 28, 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

¹² UN, S/74111, *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 80.

¹³ BBC News Centre, “Nicolas Sarkozy admits Rwanda genocide 'mistakes'”, *News BBC*, Accessed May 19, 2014. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8535803.stm>.

tragedy in Somalia, where 19 U.S. rangers were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu and the safety of the peacekeeping personnel was seemingly much more important than at any other time, could make it worthwhile to revisit the concept of ‘special responsibilities and temptations’. To answer these questions, this research examines the driving forces for a state to see itself as rightful to intervene in another state and if there is any individual state policy involvement among these forces as well as to what extent national interest is a determinant for a state to be a part of a collective intervention decision in the post-Cold War era.

There are a limited number of humanitarian intervention cases and analysing two of them that were conducted consecutively requires the use of the qualitative method. This would also serve as the main structure of the argument, which is based on the details of the decision-making process of nation-state actors in humanitarian interventions. To get into the details of the Somalia and Rwanda humanitarian interventions, background information on these two countries and roots of the conflict will be covered, as well as the relationship between their former colonizers and them will be a matter of focus, and to “form and identify a viable theoretical orientation”,¹⁴ a descriptive case study will be conducted for these two cases. To standardize the data collection for both cases¹⁵ and to reach a comparable case study, similar sources will be in the focus of this research and this will lead to a structured, focused comparison. The sources consist of not only the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly meeting records but also newspapers, apart from secondary resources such as books and articles on the historical background. Taking

¹⁴ Bruce L. Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for Social Sciences*, (Allyn & Bacon: Pearson, 2008), 327.

¹⁵ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 65.

into account that multiple interaction effects during the decision-making process could have been arisen and it could be “difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables,”¹⁶ process tracing would help to clarify possible causalities. Therefore, decision making in the Somalia and Rwanda humanitarian interventions would be analysed through process tracing.

In the scope of this systematic comparison, factors ranging from the length of the decision-making process of the UN Security Council in the two cases to the questions such as if there was an interest-based relationship between the intervening and the intervened state in the past will be examined. In this enquiry, rather than a content analysis, a discourse analysis will be conducted, because the context in which a specific action took place and the way it happened as well as the possible causalities are much more important than simply what happened. Those specific actions are derived from the primary sources, mainly the UN Security Council Meeting Reports, UN Secretary General’s addresses, UN Secretary General’s reports to the Council, letters from the UN Mission Official to the Security Council and UNSC Resolutions.

The second chapter reflects upon the question of intervention and main debates on humanitarian intervention, such as whether it is a right or duty, or if it violates state sovereignty from the perspective of international law. While focusing on the main debates on intervention, this research does not look for the answer if intervention is ethical or not, because its focus is to understand when and with which aims the international society of states intervenes in domestic affairs of a sovereign state. However, to understand the motivation and reference to moral obligations, the

¹⁶ George and Bennett, 206.

first chapter will shortly address the ethical debate to cover the legal and philosophical basis of the intervention concept. After operationalizing the term “humanitarian intervention” and outlining the main debates, the first chapter of this study will focus on the assumptions regarding humanitarian intervention from the perspective of realist international political theorists and liberal theorists together with a summary of efforts by the UN to institutionalize it as a liberal cause. Then, the reasons why the Somalia and Rwanda cases should be covered in depth will be explained. After conceptualizing what is meant by “realist concerns”, the first chapter also explains how the realist international relations theory helps to answer the research question.

The third and fourth chapters include detailed historical accounts on Somalia and Rwanda, respectively, not only covering the recent conflicts, but also, starting from the pre-colonial rule, information is provided on the structure of the society and economic situation of the two countries through ages. These two chapters end with the references to the United Nations Security Council meetings and make use of public opinion by reflecting upon op-ed articles in major newspapers to give a clear picture of the decision-making process in the interventions.

The fifth chapter consists of a comparison between the two cases to point out their similarities and differences, from the perspectives of their regime type, roots of the conflict, the attitude of the international community and steps taken to intervene in the civil wars, and provides the ground for the realist internationalist theory in these two humanitarian interventions. The chapter also examines the causality relationship between the two, if it exists. Finally, the thesis concludes with the

lessons learned from the two cases and policy advice for the international regime which is able to stop the suffering of humankind from the cruelty caused by their sovereigns.

CHAPTER 2

THE MOTIVATION FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

A military that wants to go nowhere to do anything – or let go of their toys so someone else can do it. A White House cowed by the brass (and we are to give lessons on how the armed forces take orders from civilians?). An NSC that does peacekeeping by the book – the accounting book, that is. And an assistance program that prefers whites (Europe) to blacks. When it comes to human rights we have no problem drawing the line in the sand of Dark Continent (just don't ask us to do anything – agonizing is our specialty), but not China or anyplace else business looks good. We have a foreign policy based on our amoral economic interests run by amateurs who want to stand for something – hence the agony – but ultimately don't want to exercise any leadership that has a cost.

From the journal of a U.S. official during Rwanda Crisis, May 1994¹⁷

On January 11, 2013, France launched a military intervention to halt advances by the rebels and French airstrikes helped Malian government troops drive Islamist rebels from the strategic central town of Konna.¹⁸ It was another one of France's several military interventions in former African colonies. Between 1960 and 2005, France launched 46 military operations to its former colonies, now independent nation-states¹⁹ whose sovereignty is under the protection under the UN Charter. The questions like how one state is able to intervene in the internal conflicts of another in spite of the UN Charter Article 2 (4), which prohibits threat/use of force against territorial integrity or political independence,²⁰ and how one state that is also among

¹⁷ Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why The United States Let The Rwandan Tragedy to Happen", *The Atlantic Monthly*, 288:2, (September 2001), 106.

¹⁸ Reuters, "Timeline: French, Malian troops advance in northern Mali", *Reuters*, Accessed June 30, 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/27/us-mali-rebels-crisis-idUSBRE90Q0AI20130127>.

¹⁹ Christopher Griffin, "French Military Interventions in Africa: Realism vs. Ideology in French Defense Policy and Grand Strategy," Paper prepared for the International Studies Association 2007 Annual Convention, February 28-March 3, 2007, Chicago, IL, *All Academic*, Accessed October 28, 2013. [research.allacademic.com/meta/ p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/6/2/p178629_index.html](http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/6/2/p178629_index.html).

²⁰ Article 2(4), "Charter of United Nations", *United Nations*, Accessed October 28, 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

the parties that signed the Genocide Convention did not take any action against the huge massacres going on in Rwanda for almost four months in 1994 remain unclear.

This thesis does not look for the motivations of intervention for France but aims to analyse motivations for intervention in general, that is to say the answer of what is the driving force for a state to see itself as rightful for intervening in another state. While aiming to carry out one of the noblest intentions, that is to seek to rescue populations that are massacred by their compatriots, humanitarian intervention is most of the time conducted through internationally legitimate actions. In this regard, humanitarian causes are a way of justification for intervention in a world of sovereign nation-states. However, this does not necessarily mean that in all situations humanitarian intervention is applicable; the theoretical debate on right to intervene is also valid for humanitarian intervention. The main problems of the humanitarian intervention debate are, for example, whether intervention includes interest or empathy/help and whether intervention in a sovereign state is legal or not, ethical or not. Furthermore, the absence of a strict set of rules and regulations to create a norm on intervention makes it difficult to decide whether a specific intervention is legal or not.

2.1 What is humanitarian intervention?

There are different definitions regarding the criteria of humanitarian intervention. While some define intervention from a legal angle, others focus on the use of force and the type and the result of the action. However, the common point for all is that intervention in the sovereignty of another state falls under the category of humanitarian intervention if, and only if, the people of the intervened society are suffering on such a scale that “shocks the consciousness of mankind and oblige the

international community to intervene”.²¹ To make it clear, for example, Chesterman provides the legal background by saying, “Intervention exercised in the interest of humanity for the purpose of stopping religious persecution and endless cruelties in the time of peace and war”.²² Meanwhile, Wheeler defines certain criteria to call an intervention humanitarian:

- 1) There must be a just cause ‘supreme humanitarian emergency’
- 2) Use of force must be a last resort
- 3) Meet the requirement of proportionality
- 4) A high probability that the use of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome.²³

Among those several explanations for humanitarian intervention, Parekh’s definition is a more comprehensive one in terms of its defining both the humanitarian causes and the extent of intervention properly; therefore, this thesis references the definition below when it calls an action humanitarian intervention:

Humanitarian intervention is an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge. Humanitarian intervention is not the same as humanitarian aid, which is only concerned to relieve suffering and not to create peace and order, nor is it to be confused with political intervention, which seeks to impose a specific structure of civil authority and was all too familiar during the cold war and is not altogether absent today. Humanitarian intervention is intended to help create conditions conducive to the creation of a structure of civil authority acceptable to the people involved. It differs from other forms of intervention in that it aims to ensure that the structure is evolved by or in cooperation with the affected parties and not externally imposed.²⁴

²¹ Maya Stanulova, “Has Humanitarian Intervention Become an Exception to the Prohibition on the Use of Force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter?”, *Atlantic Community*, Accessed May 14, 2013. http://archive.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Stanulova_Humanitarian%20Intervention.pdf.

²² Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, Oxford University Press, New York:2001, 41.

²³ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, (Oxford University Press, New York: 2002), 34.

²⁴ Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, *International Political Science Review*,18:1 (January 1997), 55-6.

By taking this definition as the centre of the argument, this chapter seeks to clarify the conditions for intervention by looking at whether or not an action of intervention aims to end physical violence led by lack or disproportional use of state authority.²⁵ This chapter also categorizes the type of intervention as military or aid because humanitarian intervention and humanitarian aid are not the same thing, as well as differentiates humanitarian intervention from other types of intervention by making sure that the structure of intervention is discussed with the all affected parties.²⁶

Parekh's definition uses a liberal assumption in humanitarian intervention, because at the end, it does not require an interest of the parties involved in the intervention and also no external imposition of rule is accepted. However, having five states with the veto power in the international institution that is capable of conducting humanitarian interventions, to what extent can interest-free interventions occur? To put it in another way, if there is no interest for the individual states to intervene to preserve the other states' citizens, why should they take action? In fact, these two questions made this thesis author to research the existence of realist intentions under a pure liberal action.

Before moving into the details of factors that lead states to intervene, this chapter first discusses the norms and rules regarding intervention. For many years, unilateral or international military interventions have been part of a big debate; however, there is no clear norm about intervention. Theoretically, there is such a norm; however, in practice we see serious inconsistencies. Therefore, after a short historical summary of the legal debate on intervention, this chapter discusses current practices and laws. This chapter aims to reflect "what happened" rather than "what

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

should be". Therefore, the legal debate will be examined from a positivist international legal perspective, in which lawyers are "distinguished by their common search for rules of international law in the actual practice of states".²⁷ While doing this, different interpretations of the "sovereignty" concept will be referred to when it is needed because arguments provided by jurists are mostly dependent on state sovereignty.

2.2 Does a right to intervene exist?

The intervention debate goes back as early as to Grotius, who claims the "right to wage war for the purpose of punishment to preserve order in a society lacking any higher tribunal to resolve disputes"²⁸ and referring to the concept of "just war",²⁹ where he claims that there is a right to wage war on behalf of the oppressed.³⁰ For him, "where a tyrant should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as no one is warranted in inflicting, other states may exercise a right of humanitarian intervention."³¹ Therefore, there could be a right for "unilateral pro-democratic intervention"³² for some. However, as Chesterman says, this is against the principle of non-intervention,³³ because according to the "constitutional principle of the World Community",³⁴ sovereign states are forbidden to intervene in each other. Sovereignty

²⁷ R.J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, 21-31.

²⁸ Winfield, Percy Henry, "*The History of Intervention in International Law*", (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1974), 12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰ Chesterman, 90.

³¹ J.L. Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate", in ed. Robert O. Keohane and J.L. Holzgrefe, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2003), 26.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.* "The norm of non-intervention has two functions: First is to minimize the interstate conflict and second is preservation of a state's autonomy." Hoffman, "Sovereignty and Ethics of Intervention", 12.

³⁴ Steven Goldman, "A Right of Intervention Based upon Impaired Sovereignty", *World Affairs*, 156:3, (Winter 1994), 125.

in the basic explanation means “independence from any outside authority”.³⁵ As Onuf points out, “In a world with many sovereign states, sovereignty makes intervention unavoidable and its regulation both necessary and resisted.”³⁶ This leads us to the debate on sovereignty³⁷, because for some, if sovereignty is impaired, than there is no legal obstacle to intervene. Traditional jurists justify intervention under four conditions, which are genocide, intervention as a third party against a second party intervention in a sovereign state, in a military base against themselves – as in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis, and nuclear blackmail.³⁸ However, when intervention is justified only by referring to those criteria, bias could occur. As Chesterman says, making a law such as “an undemocratic regime loses the protection of international law by effectively voiding its sovereignty”³⁹ leads to biased interpretations of what is democratic or not and interventions occur arbitrarily. Therefore, this is not a discussion on behalf of democracy. This is a discussion on the legality of intervention under the Westphalian order. Because “it is undoubtedly premature to declare that international society has moved beyond Westphalia and has overcome the idea of state sovereignty. The idea of state sovereignty is alive and well among both the more powerful and less powerful members of contemporary

³⁵ Hoffman, *Sovereignty and Ethics of Intervention*, 12.

³⁶ Nicholas Onuf, “Intervention for the Common Good” in ed. Gene M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno, *Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore:1995), 49.

³⁷ “The modern concept of sovereignty arose from the fusion of 3 conceptual antecedents, each couched in a distinctive political idiom. First, in the idiom of classical republicanism, is majestas, not as the description of an individual but as the measure of an institution. In the degree to which the formality or dignity of an institution inspires respect, that institution possesses majesty (...) Second, in the idiom of empire, is potestas imperandi, the competence to rule is an exclusive grant of agency. Its measure is the territory within which some rules alone or by delegation. Third, in the idiom of radical Protestantism, is a concept akin to stewardship. Rulers act on behalf of and at the sufferance of others, the people, who are ultimately sovereign. Competence to rule is thus an exclusive but provisional grant, which may be withdrawn if agents fail in their duties to others.” Onuf, 48.

³⁸ Schaffer, David J., “Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq and the New World Order” in ed. Louis Henkin, Stanley Hoffman and Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force*, (Council on Foreign Relations, New York: 1991), 7.

³⁹ Chesterman, 90.

international society”.⁴⁰ Therefore, realists see the non-intervention principle as important for also protecting the anarchy in the making of the system.⁴¹ For example, Bull explains the reason for not having a right for humanitarian intervention as it is “dangerous for international order”.⁴² He says, “The society of states that had not experimented with a right of humanitarian intervention because of an ‘unwillingness to jeopardize’ the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by conceding such a right to individual states”.⁴³ However, living in a world where sovereignty and non-intervention are blessed, much before Hedley Bull people realized that in some cases the community of states or a state should have a right of intervention to end the suffering of strangers. This is like making war for peace and the inevitable result is that there are a variety of views built upon or against the “just war” concept. For example, Christian Wolff describes a punitive war as legal only “when waged by a state that has itself received irreparable injury”,⁴⁴ whereas Emmerich de Vattel is looking for the consent of public, i.e. “the brave people who are defending their liberties”,⁴⁵ to justify the intervention.

On the other hand, some of the thinkers search the basis of justification not in the means or intentions but in the ends. For example, Historicus explains intervention as follows: “Its essence is illegality and its justification is its success”.⁴⁶ It looks like a more practical definition to understand to what extent the legality is open to discussion. This positivist step Historicus takes shows us that “positivism considers

⁴⁰ J. Donnelly. “State Sovereignty and International Intervention: the Case of Human Rights”, in *Beyond Westphalia*, 265.

⁴¹ Hoffman, “Sovereignty and Ethics of Intervention” in *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, 13.

⁴² Wheeler, 29.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Winfield, 17.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁶ Chesterman, 42.

international law to be derived fundamentally from the will of states, while natural law maintains that there is a higher authority than sovereignty. For positivists human rights exist only because states permit them to exist, and as sovereignty is the source of rights, it will always be a higher authority”.⁴⁷ This difference is important to explain because it underlines what this analysis is built on regarding state practices and intentions.

Contrary to the legalist paradigm, Walzer defines the six propositions on intervention as:

- 1) There exists an international society of independent states.
- 2) This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members – above all the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
- 3) Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.
- 4) Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by the victim; and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.
- 5) Nothing but aggression can justify war.
- 6) Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.⁴⁸

It is clear that there have been interventions and no common norm has been created yet; therefore, the legalist paradigm could not help this analysis to move on.

⁴⁷ Weiss and Chopra, “Sovereignty under Siege” in *Beyond Westphalia*, 103.

⁴⁸ Forbes, Ian. “Introduction: Intervention and State Sovereignty in the International System” in ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman, *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, (St. Martin’s Press: 1993), 19.

Because, as Navori says:

International legalist paradigm is of little help in sorting out the problems of intervention. Because it is treating international law as if it were a form of domestic law (...). This form of reasoning cannot deal with the normative, legal and moral problems created by a variety of bodies operating together in an uninstitutionalized context.⁴⁹

One can say that this definition of “uninstitutionalized context” appears to contradict the reality of having a UN Charter, which regulates interstate relations. However, looking at the inconsistencies of the UN Charter, it is easy to understand that rights and duties are not well structured. For instance, Article 2 (4)⁵⁰ guarantees a right to sovereignty and Article 42 gives members a duty to maintain peace and security.⁵¹ Even though the statements are clear, they are very much open to arbitrary interpretations; for example, there is no clear definition of what a threat to peace and security means and makes maintaining it indispensable for the international society of states. The practice of the Genocide Convention⁵² also has the same arbitrariness. The articles and duties were clear; however, taking action was not possible until the very end of the mass killings in Rwanda. The “institutional” body of sovereign

⁴⁹ C. Navori, “Intervention, Non-Intervention and the Construction of the State” in *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, 52.

⁵⁰ “prohibits threat/use of force against territorial integrity or political independence” Article 2(4), “Charter of United Nations”, *United Nations*, Accessed October 20, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

⁵¹ “Authorizing United Nations Security Council to take actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Article 42, “Charter of United Nations”, *United Nations*, Accessed October 20, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

⁵² In the Genocide Convention, what is called genocide is very clear: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” And in Article 8, it is allowed to call upon the United Nations to prevent these actions when contracting parties think that there is a possibility to prevent events mentioned in Article 2. Prevent Genocide International, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, *Prevent Genocide*, Accessed June 30, 2013.
<http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm>.

nation-states is there, but the context looks too uninstitutionalized to take action in time. It is obviously not a problem of the absence of norm but a problem of application. Therefore, the will of states stays at the core of the argument. The current interventionist behaviour of the society of states shows that although it is not allowed by international law to intervene, some states do intervene and when there is a responsibility to intervene, often they do not intervene.

When it comes to the right to intervene in terms of the rules and regulations of the United Nations, it is obvious that as one of the main founding principles of the UN, “collective security” grants the Security Council the right to take necessary actions to prevent large-scale armed conflicts against peace and security. To serve this collective security aim, the idea of establishing a United Nations Armed Forces first raised in 1948 under the work of the Military Staff Committee (MSC).⁵³

According to the UN Charter, the main responsibility of the MSC is the following:

To advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.⁵⁴

In 1946, the Security Council asked for a report from the MSC on the feasibility of a standing army owned by the UN.⁵⁵ Composed of the Chief of Staffs of permanent members, the MSC started its work on general principles.⁵⁶ The five permanent members made their offers of contribution to create an “enforceable world law against war”.⁵⁷ However, due to debates on “equality versus comparability of force

⁵³ James W. Houck, The Command and Control of United Nations Forces in The Era of "Peace Enforce-Ment", *Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law*, vol. 4 No.1, Fall 1993, 4.

⁵⁴ UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 47.

⁵⁵ Houck, 4.

⁵⁶ Eric Grove, UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee: A Look Back, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), 176.

⁵⁷ Mastny and Liqun ed., *The Legacy of the Cold War: Perspectives on Security, Cooperation and Conflict* (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series) Lexington Books, USA, 2013, 93.

contributions”,⁵⁸ no agreement could be reached to establish a standing army. Soon after this disagreement, the composition of a unified command of the UN forces in the Korean War under U.S. leadership provided enough evidence that the UN has a single-state model, which enables a powerful state to dominate political and operational action.⁵⁹

This marked the end of the only attempt by the UN at the beginning of the Cold War to create its own force for collective security. During the post-Cold War era, the inability or misuse of power of the international community of states to prevent large-scale massacres led the UN to develop new mechanisms to provide an effective base for the right to intervene. Starting with the effort to find a way that would not violate the sovereignty of states, several apparatuses for protection of human rights were implemented by the UN. The preventive steps consist of the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the establishment of the Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Council.⁶⁰

In 2001, the “Responsibility to Protect” was introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to find answers to the intervention problem.⁶¹ Rather than calling it a right to intervene and finding a place for intervention in the “just war” context, the term “responsibility to protect” was created to serve humanitarian causes, which attributes a “duty to react to situations in which there is compelling need for human protection”.⁶² Also with the adaption of Resolution 1674, a threat to civilians in a conflict is regarded as a “threat to

⁵⁸ Grove, 181.

⁵⁹ Houck, 7.

⁶⁰ Weiss, et al., *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 177 – 191.

⁶¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, VII.

⁶² Evans and Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6, 102.

collective security”⁶³ and this enabled the Security Council to make use of Chapter VII easily for humanitarian causes. However, because the UN’s “main collective body on human rights affairs is made up of states, the actions of these bodies remain politicized”.⁶⁴

The legality debate is about the rights. Legality of intervention is important for this study because when states intervene, they are in need of justifying it to the community of states or they need to convince the members of the Security Council to intervene by showing how they abide by the rules and regulations. However, at the other end of the spectrum, there is the debate about duties – the morality question.

2.3 Is it moral to intervene?

This section gives a summary of basic arguments regarding whether it is moral to intervene or not. This debate is very much engaged with the realist and liberal interpretations of intervention; therefore, the morality debate will reflect very much these clashes. For some, state has a moral significance and for others only individuals are important and therefore state’s morality is dependent on them. Holzgrefe summarized current ethical divides in international law using four criteria: the source, objects, weight and breadth of moral concern are examined under different debates.⁶⁵ State⁶⁶ and objects constitute the main debate on the source of moral concern because non-interventionism focuses very much on the “moral significance

⁶³ Fassin and Pandolfi (ed)., *Contemporary States of Emergency – The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, Zone Books, New York, 2010, 119

⁶⁴ Weiss, et al., 191.

⁶⁵ Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate” in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, 19-20.

⁶⁶ Here are some viewpoints on morality of state: “For Hobbes, the moral state was not only the orderly, unified state but one whose citizens recognized its necessity. For Locke, the primary feature of a moral social order is a responsive political process which limits itself to responding individual and group definitions of need. For Hegel, the state assumes a moral meaning: it is a realm of willing a

of the state versus the claims of humanity”.⁶⁷ Liberals analyse the morality debate as whether it is moral to intervene or not, whereas realists focus on what happens if intervention is morally justified.

In terms of morality of intervention, those who are against the idea of intervention are the classical liberals, such as J.S. Mill and Immanuel Kant. “Mill argued that humanitarian intervention is always wrong because freedom has no value unless the victims themselves fight for their liberation. People cannot really be free if foreigners do the fight for them”.⁶⁸ Additionally, for Kant, “No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state” because it is an intervention in the “rights of an independent people struggling with its internal disease”.⁶⁹ Another concern from a liberal point of view is that “humanitarian intervention is always going to be based on the cultural predilections of those with the power to carry it out”.⁷⁰ However, contemporary liberals such as Teson draw attention to the human rights debates, and based on the liberal assumption that “a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights”,⁷¹ write in favour of humanitarian intervention. Teson’s arguments even found roots in Grotius, for whom “human beings have certain moral duties by virtue of their common humanity”.⁷² According to Teson, “If human beings are denied basic human rights and are, for that reason deprived of their capacity to pursue their autonomous projects, then others have a prime facie duty to help them. The right to intervene thus

greater good. For Weber, the proper state was that with a rational knowing technocratically oriented bureaucracy which served the state’s purposes.” Navari, 65.

⁶⁷ P. Johnson, “Intervention and Moral Dilemmas” in *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, 65.

⁶⁸ Fernando Teson, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention”, in Keohane and Holzgrefe ed., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, 105.

⁶⁹ Immanuel Kant, *On History* (Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing: 1963), 89.

⁷⁰ Wheeler, 29.

⁷¹ Teson, in Keohane and Holzgrefe, 93.

⁷² Holzgrefe, 25.

stems from a general duty to assist victims of grievous injustice”⁷³ and turns the right actually into a duty, at least for liberal democracies. Also, Rawls clarifies the liberal criteria for humanitarian intervention by saying, “States owe a duty of humanitarian rescue to the citizens of outlaw states; that is, to peoples whose governments fail to protect such basic human rights as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide”.⁷⁴ However, under the current situation, to what extent this duty is shared in liberal perspectives of states is questionable. Teson also answers the pluralist critiques by saying that the origin does not matter if the argument is sound and the argument that all persons have rights is universally sound; therefore, it is not acceptable to criticize this argument looking at its origin as being Western.⁷⁵ Although Teson’s arguments are inconsistent and even though there is a place to institutionalize these Western ideas on a worldwide scale in the body of the United Nations, it is worthwhile to analyse whether realists are right in being “sceptical of the notion of international community and to hold that international intervention can still be best understood in terms of the power and interest of particular nation-states, especially great powers, acting individually or collectively”⁷⁶ when it comes to analysing the reasons behind humanitarian intervention.

On the other hand, realists are “traditionally hostile to any intervention that is justified for allegedly ethical reason”.⁷⁷ They claim that “states only act when it is in their interest to do so and therefore when they engage in a humanitarian intervention

⁷³ Teson in Keohane and Holzgrefe, 97.

⁷⁴ Holzgrefe, 32.

⁷⁵ Teson in Keohane and Holzgrefe, 104.

⁷⁶ Lyons and Mastanduno, 13.

⁷⁷ Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of Ethical Issues”, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 12 (March 1998), 70

they are really pursuing some other agenda”.⁷⁸ Additionally, realist arguments oppose the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention with the concern that “a doctrine of humanitarian intervention becomes a weapon that the strong will use against weak, unless vital interests are at stake, states will not intervene if this risks soldiers’ lives or incurs significant economic costs, there will be a selective use of legally defined *right of humanitarian intervention* in accordance with national interests, it is the duty of people’s of that state, we do not have a duty to saving stranger”.⁷⁹

Morality itself has been a question of debate ever since Aristotle. However, what is worth analysing here is whether morality is a means or an end. Starting with Teson, for example, he argues that “peace is a major purpose of any rational international order”.⁸⁰ First of all, there is an assumption regarding the international order as “rational” and he puts “peace” into that rationality as the main end. However, even in the liberal internationalist theory perspective, of which Teson is a part, peace is not an end, but it is a means serving the interests of the international society of states, the interest of prosperity and maximizing the scope of free market. Without a well-structured and protected human rights we cannot talk about peace. However, as Burchill argues, “In the modern period, states are both the principal violators of universal human rights and an ultimate authority for their protection”.⁸¹ Therefore, an analysis undermining the role of states and over-emphasizing the international order in the world of nation-states would be lacking the picture of the current international society scheme. These state actors could be analysed from a rationalist point of view, but then this brings the national interest issue into the

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Wheeler, 29-31.

⁸⁰ Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, (Transnational Publ:1988), 4.

⁸¹ Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005), 179.

picture. As Smith says, national interest could vary from “prestige or image on the soft end of the interest calculus or hard interests that are convenient to subsume under the category of humanitarian”.⁸² Therefore, one should also bear in mind that “there is no such thing as an objective reality called national interest. Considerations of the national interest is an ineluctably subjective assessment”⁸³ and “not the idea of interest but the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated”.⁸⁴ Without taking context into consideration, neither the interest of the intervening party nor the morality of the action could be discussed.

2.4 Tracing realism in liberal arguments

This section identifies what “realist concerns” means in the scope of this research and refers the concept of “interest” as it is identified within the realist international relations framework. However, going back to “Machiavelli and the doctrine of *raison d’etat*”,⁸⁵ “the struggle between political necessity and ethical virtue”⁸⁶ would not be a part of the discussion, because ethical virtue sometimes could also be a political necessity, as Morgenthau clearly states:

If we ask ourselves what statesmen and diplomats are capable of doing in furtherance of the power objectives of their respective nations and what they actually do, we realize that they do less than they might be able to do and less than they actually did in other periods of history. They refuse to ... use certain means ... by virtue of certain moral rules of conduct which interpose an absolute barrier against a certain policy...⁸⁷

⁸² Smith, 70.

⁸³ Burchill, 11

⁸⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York, Knopf: 1985), 10-11.

⁸⁵ Burchill, 17.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality”, *Ethics*, LVIII (January 1948), 79.

The modern world is different from Machiavelli's world. All these responsibilities of statesmen to their nation and their concerns for re-election in a democratic state limit and reshape their concept of interest. For example, even if there is no political or economic interest to intervene in a small, faraway country in the middle of Africa, statesmen spend their money and energy to save those who are not a part of their political realm for the sake of public opinion. This is because they are living in an age when public opinion matters. "In this new age the place of the aristocratic rulers [...] has been taken by officials elected or appointed regardless of class distinctions. Those officials are legally and *morally* responsible for their official acts, not to a monarch [...] but to a collectivity. An important shift in public opinion may easily call for a change in the personnel making foreign policy".⁸⁸ Therefore, one can easily realize that interest is not independent from context. It changes in time, it evolves and gains new meanings, because "moral action itself is the result of a conscious weighing of anticipated advantages and disadvantages connected with certain actions".⁸⁹ One cannot talk about an "ethic" up in the sky where no one is able to reach and be a part of. Instead, morality is a part of daily action and calculations of interest. For Nye, national interest could include human rights and "moral values are simply intangible interest".⁹⁰ Just like interest, morality is also much context-dependent for Morgenthau, who argues:

In spite of the hopes of liberals, there is no agreed upon ethic, but only ethical frameworks that arise from specific contexts. Even more problematic, these ethical frameworks are yoked to nationalist ideologies, making them part of the international contest for power and interest.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid., 91.

⁸⁹ Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and The Ethics of Evil", *Ethics*, LVI (October 1945), 1.

⁹⁰ Joseph Jr. Nye, "Redefining the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, No.4, 23 – 24.

⁹¹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 267-9.

When it comes to operationalizing the concept of interest, for this thesis, the common elements between the realist international theory and liberal philosophy should also be covered. In this regard, “interest-driven” policy making, which includes acting only on behalf of its own interests, has something in common with the core of liberal theory. Liberal theory assumes that states are there because they are responsible to meet individuals’ needs. Taking Adam Smith’s famous benevolence dictum⁹² into regard, individual and public interest should be considered as the same thing in such a liberal assumption of state.⁹³ E.H. Carr also supports this argument by explaining how Smith’s conception of interest turns into be the community interest:

It achieves this synthesis by maintaining that the highest interest of the individual and the highest interest of the community naturally coincide. In pursuing his own interest, the individual pursues that of the community, and in promoting the interest of the community he promotes his own. This is the famous doctrine of harmony of interest.⁹⁴

Also for the intervention, the conceptualization of interest for this study rests on the fact that from a realist point of view, a state intervenes on behalf of itself and it aims first to benefit the intervener. Besides, as for public opinion, one could conclude that the conscience of the individual at the end of the day turns into the conscience of the nation in humanitarian cases. This conscience is effective in policy making, too, not because it is moral but because it is for the benefit of the ruler to get the sympathy

⁹²“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” Adam Smith, *An Inquiry to the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations*, Book 1, (University of Chicago Press: 1976), 18.

⁹³ Burchill, 106.

⁹⁴ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crises 1919 -1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*; (Harper Perennial: 1964), 43.

and support of the public. To understand how conscience of the nation affects policy making in the decision of intervention, case studies and looking closer at the causalities between the cases would be helpful.

2.5 Why Somalia and Rwanda?

This thesis benefits from the Somalia and Rwanda humanitarian interventions to understand the decision-making process in intervention. The controversy in the literature regarding the definition of humanitarian intervention, by looking at which case falls exactly into this category, is a part of question, because in some of the literature, intervention in Iraq in the name of saving the Kurds in 1991 is categorized under the topic of “humanitarian intervention”. However, taking the definition of humanitarian intervention by Parekh, there are five humanitarian interventions based on humanitarian crises, being Somalia 1992-1993, Rwanda 1994, Eastern Zaire 1996, Albania 1997 and East Timor 1999, and intervention in Iraq is an intervention to an internal armed conflict.⁹⁵

The significance of Somalia comes from its being the first humanitarian intervention executed after the Cold War with reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the “authority to the Security Council for intervention for explicitly humanitarian reasons.”⁹⁶ Although in the literature, the U.S. involvement is highly debated on the grounds of the motivations that ended up with intervention and it is even mentioned that “no intervention is really humanitarian”⁹⁷, it still falls under the category of humanitarian intervention and constitutes a starting point in the

⁹⁵ The list is taken from Chesterman. He divides intervention into 3 categories as a) internal armed conflicts b) humanitarian crises and c) Disruption to democracy and these 5 belongs to humanitarian crises, 140-150.

⁹⁶ Wheeler, 172.

⁹⁷ Aylin Şeker, *Understanding Intervention: An Inquiry into Ethics and International Affairs*, PhD Thesis, Boğaziçi University Thesis (2001), 181.

creation of a norm. Apart from the Iraqi case, Somalia is also the first of such humanitarian action based on Chapter VII; therefore, it is important legally to compare any decision taken on the basis of humanitarian intervention by looking at the first case, which will constitute a reference point. The Somalia case presents the opportunity to analyse the argument on interest-driven humanitarian actions at the practical level as well as paves the way to provide the ground for liberal oppositions to humanitarian intervention, because the people of Somalia were “struggling with its internal disease”⁹⁸; therefore, “while NGOs were able to deliver food more easily, the Somali political community was no closer to ending its civil war and no closer to bringing a modicum of peace and stability”⁹⁹ and the main reason for this is the fact that the “intervening forces refused to respect the political presence of various political factions”.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the U.S.’s insistence on taking care of the aid by its own, which resulted in the murder of 19 U.S. soldiers on October 3, 1993,¹⁰¹ made it worthy to search whether “humanitarian intervention becomes a weapon that the strong will use against weak”.¹⁰²

The second case in which the decision-making process will be analysed in this thesis is Rwanda. Although both in the Genocide Convention what is called genocide is very clear¹⁰³ and in the Article 8 it is allowed to call upon the United Nations to prevent these actions when contracting parties think that there is a

⁹⁸ Kant, 89.

⁹⁹ Şeker, 181.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 180.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 176.

¹⁰² Wheeler, 29-31.

¹⁰³ Prevent Genocide International, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, Article 2, *Prevent Genocide*, Accessed June 30, 2013.<http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm>.

possibility to prevent events mentioned in Article 2¹⁰⁴, the Rwandan civil war turned into being the shame for the promise of “Never Again” to Jews after the Holocaust.

During the civil war in 1993-1994, the fact that when Force Commander of the United Nations Assistant Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Major-General Romeo Dallaire asked for 5,000 troops to stop the massacre and the only answer he received from the Security Council was reducing the number of peacekeepers¹⁰⁵ makes this case more intriguing. In this case, there is no duty, but the right to intervene, which all the signatories are entitled to by the Genocide Convention. It is argued that the murder of the 19 U.S. soldiers in October 1993 “stopped the Clinton Administration from taking action in Rwanda”¹⁰⁶ and this supports the assumption that “unless vital interests are at stake, states will not intervene if this risks soldiers’ lives or incurs significant economic costs, there will be a selective use of legally defined right of humanitarian intervention in accordance with national interests, it is the duty of people’s of that state, we do not have a duty to saving stranger”.¹⁰⁷ While the U.S. was refraining from calling the massacres in Rwanda as genocide and advised the UN to “learn to say no”¹⁰⁸, France also ignored the slaughters in Rwanda, which is its former colony. When the events broke out, French Foreign Minister Juppé first refused to take action in a form of international community as a global police force in May 1994. However, it is argued that due to increasing media involvement and public call to stop the massacres, France was the one that brought the intervention

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Simon Chesterman and Michael Byers, “Has US Power Destroyed the UN?”, *The Rusi Journal*, 144:4 (1999), 28.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 172.

¹⁰⁷ Wheeler, 29-31.

¹⁰⁸ Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why The United States Let The Rwandan Tragedy to Happen”, *The Atlantic Monthly*, 288:2 (September 2001), 88.

issue to the Security Council in June. Therefore, Rwanda becomes one of the most intriguing cases in examining the extent to which humanitarian interventions are based on liberal humanitarian aims.

To understand the attitude of the international society of states towards intervention and for the justification for the use of force, not only the cause is the determinant factor, but, as Hoffman argues, “to look at the historical origins of the resort to force, actual political ends, appropriateness of the means to the ends, proportionality and long-term effects on the target” is critical, too. Therefore, this thesis focuses on these criteria while examining the decision-making process of the international community in the intervention to Somalia and Rwanda.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Hoffman, “Sovereignty and Ethics of Intervention” in Hoffman ed., 20-1.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: SOMALIA

Well we'd been very deeply involved in the horn of Africa. We had made a large investment in Northern Somalia, and we had certainly used Somalia as an important pawn during the Cold War, I don't think that most people in Washington, certainly on the policy side, could have ignored the fact that Siad Barre was about to visit Washington back in 1987. When people discovered that his forces had killed tens of thousands of people in Habr Gidr. So there was a consciousness about Somalia. In addition, I don't think that people in 1992 were entirely certain that the Cold War was really over, and so there were a lot of considerations that went into that.¹¹⁰

The quotation above is from Walter Clarke, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Somalia between March and July 1993. His words give a clue about to what extent Somalia matters to the U.S. policy makers. This chapter seeks for more answers to this question to trace the process that led the United Nations Security Council to take the decision of the Somalia humanitarian intervention on December 3, 1992.¹¹¹ After explaining the relevance of the Somalia intervention to this research, background information on historical developments that led to the conflicts in Somalia will be provided in this chapter. Finally, this chapter ends with an account of how the decision to intervene was taken.

Not only books, articles and newspapers¹¹² but also the United Nations Security Council meeting records are referred to in this chapter to reflect the public opinion and process inside the UN.

¹¹⁰ W. Clarke, "Ambush in Mogadishu", *PBS*, Accessed October 28, 2013.

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/clarke.html>.

¹¹¹ United Nations, "UNSC Resolution 794", *Security Council Report*, Accessed October 28, 2013. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20794.pdf>.

¹¹² The newspapers are: The NYT, the Washington Post, the Chicago Sun-Times, the Independent London and the Gazette, which is a Canadian newspaper having many columns on global issues. All started to write on the civil war in Somalia as of August 1992. This chapter makes use of both op-eds and news articles to draw the picture of where USA and Canada stood before taking the decision of intervention.

Although this thesis is not about the post-intervention process, this chapter includes the Mogadishu War (October 1993), because it would help to analyse the claims on the causality between the tragic result of this war and the stance of the U.S. in the Rwanda crisis.

Apart from its being the first humanitarian action based on Chapter VII, the Somalia intervention is historic because it is the first time that the Security Council authorized a Chapter VII intervention, without the consent of a sovereign government, for explicitly humanitarian reasons.¹¹³ Furthermore, due to reasons referred to in the previous chapter, the people of Somalia were “struggling with its internal disease”,¹¹⁴ therefore the illiberal steps for such a liberal cause would be elaborated to reveal the realist framework in which the intervention occurred.

3.1 Historical background

Somalia is a country that often appeared in the media with images of starving children. What led to this tragic situation and the conflicts is the main focus of this section. With a strategic location in the Horn of Africa, sharing the borders with Kenya, Ethiopia, Republic of Djibouti and having a coast to the Indian Ocean, Somalia is approximately 637,657 square kilometres and it has a population of about 8 million.¹¹⁵ This historical background part includes records on the social structure of Somalia, the main dynamics during the colonial times, the struggle for sovereignty, the reign of Siad Barre, who was in power for 21 years, and the civil war.

¹¹³ Wheeler, 172.

¹¹⁴ Kant, 89.

¹¹⁵ O.A. Alasow, *Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes The Case of Somalia* (Brill, Nijhoff: 2010), 35.

3.1.1 The social structure

Today 50 per cent of the population in Somalia is pastoral, while 25 per cent consists of farmers and the remaining 25 per cent are urban-based;¹¹⁶ however, the clan system in Somalia is the main element of society because “divisions in society [are] based not only on pastoral/agricultural and rural/urban backgrounds but, more importantly, along genealogical lines to which most Somalis belong”.¹¹⁷ The clan system also serves as “a huge lineage web, whereby, through generations, the ties of common ancestry forge the basis of both alliances and oppositions”.¹¹⁸ “The clanship system and social structure of the Somali people can be described as a confederate system of autonomous clan and sub-clan communities congregated together by common habitat and governed by customary codes of social conduct *xeer* that were reinforced by the authority of clan elders”.¹¹⁹

Not only the social structure but also the political structure is based on the clan system. Especially in the transition process to democracy one can clearly see the traces of clan system in political party shaping and in the voting behaviour. It “attracts significant political and emotional allegiance in contemporary Somalia. This system is also a vital source of protection and social security for its members in light of the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority”.¹²⁰

There are six major clans, divided into two groups as the Samaale (consisting of Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq and Dir) and the Sab (consisting of Rahanweyn¹²¹ and

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, the United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. VIII, (New York, UNDPI: 1996), 9.

¹¹⁸ Maria H. Brons, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?*, (Utrecht, International Books: 2001), 100.

¹¹⁹ Alasow, 39.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 36.

¹²¹ Rahanweyn also called Reewin or Digil.

Mirifl). The Samaale are pastoral nomads, whereas the Sab are settled and deal with agriculture in the inter-river areas of southern Somalia.¹²²

The *World's Most Repressive Regimes* report of the Freedom House also underlines the clan-based conflicts in Somalia. According to the report, “Although more than 80 percent of Somalis share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-influenced culture, discrimination is widespread. Clans exclude one another from participation in social and political life. Minority clans are harassed, intimidated, and abused by armed gunmen”.¹²³ Also, according to *Information and Policy Unit of United Kingdom Home Office Country Report on Somalia*, “an individual will be most secure in an area in which his or her clan are dominant and able to afford them protection”.¹²⁴ Therefore, “to the members of a clan the lives of members of other clans simply have less meaning. This often leads to measures close to that of ethnic cleansing. Minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are the main victims of such attitudes”.¹²⁵ According to UNCU/UN-OCHA Somalia report called “A Study on Minority Groups in Somalia”:

These [socio-economic] problems [faced by minority groups] have arisen as a result of cultural values that segregate and exclude the minority groups from dominant clan societies. These minority groups are considered inferior, without full rights, hence their low social, economic and political status. As a result of social segregation, economic deprivation and political manipulation minority groups were systematically excluded from mainstream government positions and the few minorities who held positions had no power to speak on behalf of their communities. Furthermore, as a result of their distinct ethnic identity, some minorities, particular the Bantu and Bajuni have suffered systematic confiscation of their lands and properties. In other cases, minority

¹²² Alasow, 36.

¹²³ Freedom House, *World's Most Repressive Regimes: A Special Report to the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Geneva, 2003*, Excerpted from “Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties”, 64, *Middle East Info*, Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://www.middle-east-info.org/gateway/mostrepressiveregimes.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Country Information & Policy Unit, “Country Report: Somalia”, *United Kingdom Home Office*, (December 1998), 24.

¹²⁵ Alasow, 40.

groups have been politically manipulated to oppose certain dominant clans. This resulted in animosity between some minority groups and dominant clans.¹²⁶

There is a broad agreement that in Somalia, the clan system causes systematic conflicts, which also end up in humanitarian crises.

3.1.2 Colonial rule

Somalia was formerly an Italian colony. In the beginning of the 20th century, Italy had a policy to rule not only the Mediterranean but also the Red Sea. While the northern half of Somalia was a British Colony, the shores of today's Somalia were known as Italian Somali since 1905.¹²⁷ After World War I, under Mussolini's rule, Italy started to act on its plan called the "March to the Oceans". "In the years after 1936, Italian foreign policy was mainly shaped in response to the main international events. After Fascist Italy allied itself with Nazi Germany, Rome focused its interests on the Mediterranean area, mostly in northern Africa, leaving the Balkans to the Germans".¹²⁸ However, with the defeat of Italy in World War II, the Italians lost control over Somalia. When the United Nations started to establish Trusteeship councils in colonial lands to establish peace and security and foster democracy, the chance came back to Italy. The Italian Trusteeship Administration in Somalia began officially on April 1, 1950. Under the name of *Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (AFIS)*, the Italians were responsible to encourage democracy and promote independence.¹²⁹ However, there were both supporting and opposing clans

¹²⁶ Somraf, "Study on Minorities in Somalia", *Somraf*, Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://www.somraf.org/research%20Materials/Study%20on%20Minorities%20in%20Somalia%20UNCU%20OCH%20AJul%202002.pdf>.

¹²⁷ Tripodi, *Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*, (Palgrave Macmillan: 1999), 36.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 53 – 60.

in Somalia to this Italian rule. “Hawiye, settled in Mogadishu and for this reason historically close to the Italians, supported the Trusteeship Administration, while Darod were the backbone of the Somali Youth League, the popular anti-Italian and pan-Somali movement”.¹³⁰ This clan conflict and the Italian rule created the base for continuous inner disagreements after the independence, too. According to Tripodi:

The main aim of the Italian Administration was to identify the strongest political formation and establish with it links that would remain strong even after the end of the mandate. As a result, AFIS gave up supporting the southern regional political parties in favour of rapprochement with the SYL. With this attitude, which failed to respect Somali traditional structure, Italy promoted the adoption of a form of state.¹³¹

According to the traditionalist theory, the roots of conflict in Somalia are based on this clan system and this unsuccessful passage to the democratic period multiplied this effect. On the other hand, transformationists blame the change in the mode of production and modernization process in general.¹³² For Tripodi, the Italians made use of the clan conflict. After Britain gave Somaliland its independence on May 4, 1960, AFIS had to give Somalia its independence, too, and these two united to declare the foundation of the Somali Republic on July 1.¹³³ The newly established Somali Republic had many people of Somali origin in both Kenya and Ethiopia join in a dream of uniting under a greater Somalia: “Somali national flag was designed to contain five-cornered stars representing the coming together of its five regions formerly under Italy, Britain, Ethiopia, France and Kenya”.¹³⁴ This dream never came true but caused international conflicts.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 61.

¹³¹ Ibid., 82-3.

¹³² Augustine Ohanwe, *Post Cold-war Conflicts in Africa Case Studies of Liberia and Somalia*, (Adonis & Abbey Publishers: 2009), 137-38.

¹³³ News Center, “The Cause for the Failure of the Union of Somaliland and Somalia”, *Markacadey*, Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://www.markacadey.net/news/50040/the-cause-for-the-failure-of-the-union-of-somaliland-and-somalia.html>.

¹³⁴ Ohanwe, 136.

3.1.3 Sovereign Somalia 1960-1990

Following the independence, the clans, which got rid of foreigners, started to compete for political power. Because being a clan member is a definitive character in the society and because the clan is everything for one, nepotism became one the main enemies of a functioning democracy. The first nine years of parliamentary democracy were marked by “misrule and deterioration of politics into clanism, corruption, cronyism, and inefficiency of government”.¹³⁵ Clan-based parties created instability and political violence. Also, for the dream of a “Greater Somali”, the Somali Youth Leagues started to pursue territorial claims in Ethiopia and Kenya. Border conflicts were rising, too. In this turmoil, Somali President Sharmarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969. On the road to the new elections, the army under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless coup.¹³⁶ “Following the military coup, executive and legislative power was vested in a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) headed by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre as its president”.¹³⁷ This gave start to 21 years of oppressive dictatorship marked by violations of human rights and sporadic violations of the laws of war.¹³⁸

Siad Barre allied with both the USSR and the U.S. during his reign. He made use of clan conflicts very well and ended up with major conflicts leading to the disintegration of Somalia. The USSR was the first supporter of militarization in Somalia. During the 1960s, the USSR provided Somalia with “a substantial number of T-34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. Approximately 300 Soviet military advisers deployed to Somalia to

¹³⁵ Alasow, 44.

¹³⁶ I.M. Lewis, “The Recent Political History of Somalia”, in *Somalia: A Historical Cultural and Political Analysis*, A Conference Report Uppsala, (Life and Peace Institute: 1991), 6-7.

¹³⁷ Alasow, 47.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 44.

train the army, and about 500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Union”.¹³⁹ Because Barre not only was the commander of this army but also his power was a product of this army, he started to foster the relationship with the USSR especially with a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1974.¹⁴⁰ From then on, “Supreme Revolutionary Council was closely allied with Soviets and adopted scientific socialism and undertook a radical modernisation campaign that brought several transformations in Somali society; both at a cultural level (improvement of the status of minorities and women, actual writing of the Somali language) and at the infrastructure level (health, education and public works projects)”.¹⁴¹ However, Barre combined this system with his own clan rule. Although he modernized the tribal relationships, he made use of the clan system in the form of what Lewis called as “M.O.D. alliance”. “M stood for the patrilineage of the president. O, for that of his mother, and D for that of his principal son-in-law, head of the national security service”.¹⁴² He “consolidated his power through an alliance of three small clans from the Darod clan family”,¹⁴³ whereas the Hawiye, Isaaq and Rahanweyn clans faced political and economic pressures.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, this military dictatorship started to go hand in hand with clan dictatorship. During Barre’s regime, all anti-revolutionaries and opponents of the military rule were executed in national security courts.

The turning point for the relations with the USSR was the Ogaden war with Ethiopia. The reason for the war was that this Ogaden region on the border is a

¹³⁹ Country Data, “Somalia Foreign Military Assistance”, *Country Data*, Accessed May 14, 2013 <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12055.html>.

¹⁴⁰ Ohanwe, 147.

¹⁴¹ Alasow, 48.

¹⁴² Lewis, *A Modern History of Somali*, (Ohio University Press: 2003), 221-22.

¹⁴³ Alasow, 50.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

predominantly Somali-populated place. Somalia brought the territory with the biggest army of Africa under Barre's control. The Soviets suddenly started to support Ethiopia and Barre was faced with a major defeat in 1978. At this point, he sought help of the U.S. Because Somalia was in a strategic position for the Middle East and Ethiopia was supported by the USSR, in a Cold-War scene, it was very logical for the U.S. to support Somalia. This defeat led to a great domestic opposition to Barre; however, it resulted in a failed military coup. "Majertan clan, consisting mainly of Marxists failed and fled to Ethiopia to establish Somali Salvation Democratic Front".¹⁴⁵ Until the U.S. support, the USSR provided Somalia with 260 million arms between 1973 and 1977. Starting with requesting help from the U.S., Somalia had 154 million arms during 1981–1991. Besides, during conflicts with the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in a border war in 1982, the U.S. helped Somalia with two emergency air lifts or weaponry as well as called Egypt, Italy and Saudi Arabia to deliver help.¹⁴⁶ In that course, Italy provided 380 million arms to Somalia, too.¹⁴⁷ According to Ohanwe, "the rationale behind the US arms sales to Somalia revolved around geopolitics. State department officials were quick to justify their arms supply to Siad Barre's regime on the grounds that it would 'foster stability' in the region".¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front was not the only one that wanted to get rid of Barre's regime. There were regime opponents among the Hawiye clan who were exiled to Kenya and Ethiopia and these were organized in Rome under the name of the United Somali Congress in 1989.¹⁴⁹ Against their unification and threat to overthrow Barre, he started to "reign of terror"¹⁵⁰ against

¹⁴⁵ Ohanwe, 149.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 148.

¹⁴⁷ All weapon statistics taken from Alasow, 57.

¹⁴⁸ Ohanwe, 148.

¹⁴⁹ Alasow, 64.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

civilian Hawiye clan members in the country. The conflict started to turn into a civil war, which ended with the USC conquest of Mogadishu and the fall of Barre in 1991.¹⁵¹ From then on, all millions of weapons started to be abused by clans and a power struggle emerged.

3.1.4 The Fall of Barre and the Civil War

It was January 26, 1991 when the United Somali Congress got control of the Presidential Palace in a bloody battle and 21 years of Barre's rule were over as he fled to Kenya.¹⁵² This was the end of dictatorship but the starting point of a mass civil war. After the USC gained power, they declared Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the president from the Hawiye clan, which most USC members belong to. However, a member of the Habar Gedir clan, a sub-clan of Hawiye, General Mohamed Farah Aideded was discontented with this election. This discontent had been growing day by day and resulted with a civil war starting on November 17, 1991, when Aideded "tried to unseat Ali Mahdi".¹⁵³ During this civil war, UN relief efforts were abused by Somali warlords. After the adoption of Resolution 733 on January 23, 1992, which calls for the implementation of a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia"¹⁵⁴, 68 governments sent their reply letters to show their support for the embargo decision.¹⁵⁵ However, "both Somali factions have claimed other side was receiving arms from some countries in the region".¹⁵⁶ Therefore, the humanitarian aid which was delivered to the region was under control of the warlords and it was almost impossible to deliver the food and

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 65-66.

¹⁵² Ohanwe, 151.

¹⁵³ Jane Perlez, "Somali Capital a Grisly Battlefield as Civilians Die in Clan Warfare", *The New York Times*, November 29, 1991.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations, S/23370, United Nations Security Council Resolution 733.

¹⁵⁵ United Nations, S23693, The Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary General.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

medicine to those who were in urgent need. Relief agencies were calling for support from the UN to open safe corridors to deliver help.¹⁵⁷ According to accounts of the *New York Times*, after three months since beginning of the civil war, if cease-fire talks had not have worked under the leadership of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, then the questions of whether and how to intervene would have come up.¹⁵⁸

Although the agreement on implementation of cease-fire was signed on March 3,¹⁵⁹ at the end of March 1992, Africa Watch and Physicians for Human Rights were reporting that 41,000 people has killed or wounded; besides, according to the report, five million Somalis were about to face with starvation.¹⁶⁰ On March 17, during the talks on Resolution 746, which was “supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism”,¹⁶¹ some of the country representatives were sensitive about the monitoring and calling the United Nations to take more concrete actions. For example, the representative of Nigeria emphasized the importance of monitoring the cease-fire and stated that “the Security Council should take a definitive step to establish a UN presence in Somalia through the deployment of a military observer mission”.¹⁶² Talking also in the name of OAU, Mr. Nwochukwu drew attention to the fact that this “is the minimum action expected from Security Council”,¹⁶³ while the representative of Kenya called for the “active involvement and strong presence of the UN in Somalia”.¹⁶⁴ They both were trying to show how severe

¹⁵⁷ Editorial Desk, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia”, *The New York Times*, February 9, 1992.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ United Nations, “UNOSOM”, *United Nations*, Accessed May 14, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>.

¹⁶⁰ News, “Somalians Face Starvation”, *USA Today*, March 27, 1992.

¹⁶¹ United Nations, “UNOSOM”, *United Nations*, Accessed May 14, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html>.

¹⁶² Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of Meeting 3060, S/PV.3060.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

the situation in Somalia was and to convince the world that Africa should mean more to the world. On the other hand, there were countries such as Belgium and China that explained their concerns as to the kind and size of the operations. While Belgium was concerned about the political/military and humanitarian aspect of operations for budgetary implications,¹⁶⁵ China was concerned about further implications of the operation based on sovereignty concerns of Somalia and stated that “all United Nations activities in Somalia [should] be conducted in accordance with purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.¹⁶⁶

When the summer came, relief agencies were reporting that 3,000 children were dying daily from malnutrition and U.S. Senator Nancy Kassebaum went to Somalia to examine the situation¹⁶⁷ and find ways to deliver help safely. Additionally, UN special representative for Somalia Mohamed Sahnoun was calling for bilateral assistance from governments and asked to deliver humanitarian aid via an urgent airlift operation.¹⁶⁸ This call was answered by the White House in four days and asked the “Security Council to adopt a resolution that would ‘authorize use of additional measures to insure that humanitarian relief can be delivered’ and President Bush was also asking for the assistance of other governments like Kenya to stop starvation”.¹⁶⁹ By August 1992, actually Aidid approved the deployment of 500 Pakistani UN guards in Somalia for monitoring the relief-delivering process. However, anarchy and chaos in the country did not allow the passage of food to the people. The conflict was rising day by day, and it had reached its peak when 11 Red Cross aides were killed by warlords at the end of August. Following the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Marilyn Greene, “Senator reaches out to Somalia”, *USA Today*, July 20, 1992.

¹⁶⁸ Associated Press, “A Lann and Its People are dying in Somalia”, *Chicago Sun-Times*, August 11, 1992.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

developments, the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali proposed to increase the strength of UNOSOM¹⁷⁰ and Somalia airlift to deliver food started on August 28, 1992 after the adoption of Resolution 775, which also invited the Secretary General to establish four-zone headquarters to strengthen UNOSOM.¹⁷¹

When it was September 1992, the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly was also busy with talks on the situation in Somalia. During the General Assembly Meeting held on September 25, most of the country representatives declared that their delegation supported the operations in Somalia. For example, Norway declared that they were supporting the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and were ready to take part. Also, the representative of Norway, Mrs. Brundtland, stated, “Somalia needs assistance in finding political solutions to its internal problems and in building a more sustainable economy”.¹⁷² On the other hand, the representative of Zimbabwe was the first to refer to the events as genocide by describing the situation in Somalia as having “genocidal dimensions”¹⁷³ and also declared their support to the operation. Because the Somalia was the first humanitarian case before the United Nations after the Cold War, it also constituted a challenging case for the General Assembly on how to approach the issue and to what extent the UN should intervene. This issue was also raised by the president of Djibouti, who drew attention to the collective response capacity of the United Nations and said, “The question before us today is not only how to save lives through the delivery of sufficient food to end the famine or how to stop the senseless fighting. Rather, in a scenario like that of Somalia, the question is what the United Nations,

¹⁷⁰ United Nation, S/24480.

¹⁷¹ United Nations, “UNOSOM”, *United Nations*, Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html>.

¹⁷² United Nations General Assembly Meeting Provisional Verbatim Record, A/47/PV.5.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

together with the international community, and devise collectively to reorganize a new nation of Somalia”.¹⁷⁴

Stressing upon to the same point, Mr. Kozyrey from the Russian Federation also stated, “It is time to strengthen the capacity of the Security Council to take swift and decisive action in humanitarian emergency situations arising from mass violations of human rights and inter-ethnic clashes, including those within national borders”¹⁷⁵ and he called for a kind of redefinition of the duties of the Security Council in the new era. Similar to them, President Trujillo of the Republic of Colombia urged “the General Assembly of the United Nations to take at this session a decisive step forward in resolving world conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia”¹⁷⁶ and he stressed that “the key problems of the new world agenda cannot be resolved without active participation of developing nations”.¹⁷⁷

Although the next step was sending 750 peacekeepers from Canada to Somalia under the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in October, the world still drew attention to the ignorance and late response to the Civil War in Somalia. MP Tony Worthington from the House of Commons of British Parliament wrote the Europeans and the British turned their backs to old British Somalia¹⁷⁸ and Sen. Kassebaum explicitly said, “If the Cold War were still on, this probably would not be happening and we would not have allowed the devastation of a country with strategic importance”.¹⁷⁹ This argument clearly shows that this part of the world lost its attraction after the Cold War.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Worthington, Tony. “Inaction in Somalia”, *The Herald (Glasgow)*, October 14, 1992.

¹⁷⁹ Greene, “Death, despair unravel fabric of Somalia”, *USA Today*, September 21, 1992.

In the meantime, country representatives were continuing to reflect their discomfort with this neglect by the United Nations in the talks which took place in General Assembly Meetings in October 1992. For instance, the representative of Malaysia, by drawing attention to the fact that “Somalia is in many ways a casualty of Cold War politics and is now left to struggle on its own”,¹⁸⁰ mentioned, “We are all conscious of the fact that the grave situation in Somalia was largely ignored by the Security Council until the Secretary General took the Council to task”.¹⁸¹ In another meeting, Italy and Yemen delegations also claimed that the United Nations help reached a bit late and a “lack of concern” could be traced from the steps taken to stop the civil war.¹⁸² To develop the intervention and decision-making skills of the United Nations, some delegations also mentioned the importance of drawing lessons from this late response. For example, the representative of Ireland evaluated the current situation as follows: “The international community has the resources and the skills to save Somalia. What is needed is the political will and the organizational drive to harness those resources and deploy those skills”.¹⁸³ Meanwhile, Mr. Hanibalsson drew attention to the significance of learning from mistakes in Somalia in the same meeting.¹⁸⁴ However, although everybody is aware of these facts, when Mohamed Sahnoun declared that the “UN reacted too slowly to the world’s worst famine in decades”, he had to resign.¹⁸⁵

However, according to General Aidid, what happened during the Cold War also creates the responsibility for Somalia. He said, “the U.S. has a moral obligation

¹⁸⁰ United Nations, A/47/PV.9.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² United Nations, A/47/PV.10.

¹⁸³ United Nations, A/47/PV.13.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Reuters AP, “UN trouble-shooter for Somalia resigns; Sahnoun quits because he was rebuked for criticizing his employer”, *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), October 30, 1992.

to help Somalia since it contributed to Siad Barre's dictatorial regime through financial aid and arms shipment".¹⁸⁶ This argument was also raised in a General Assembly Meeting in October when Mr. Tshering from Bhutan stated, "The supply of arms over the years has made it possible for conflicts in Somalia and other regions of the world to continue despite major changes in international scene."¹⁸⁷

On the other hand, being the leader of the most powerful clan in Somalia, Aidid openly said that the UN did not talk to them to learn what was going on and they were just sending 3,000 additional troops, which was not necessary, according to him. Aided said that they were asking for aid, not for troops, and this was an inner problem, so the solution should come from inside, and having more troops in Somalia would create more problems in the future.¹⁸⁸ He also added that the weapons were the national property of Somalia. Therefore, the stocking procedure could be monitored by the UN; however, they did not want to give weapons back to them. He clearly said this was the only solution.¹⁸⁹ These explanations reflect very much the point that the intervention was not asked for; only support and guidance according to local people's needs were asked for, and it is quite clear that sending more troops there would create much more instability and conflict. This shows the importance of the will of people and impossibility of curing an inner disease from outside. However, the story did not continue in the asked path. This is also the starting point for debates on intervention without the approval of sovereign authority. According to the principles of sovereignty, the UN has no right to send troops somewhere that does not want them. Furthermore, Aideed declared that they would not protect the

¹⁸⁶ Kelley, Jack. "Clan chief: U.S. bears moral burden to help", *USA Today*, September 21, 1992.

¹⁸⁷ United Nations, A/47/PV.28.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

peacekeepers. By November 1992, Pakistani peacekeepers took control of the Mogadishu airport to facilitate the U.S. airlift of humanitarian aid. However, UNOSOM I was attacked at the airport in November. Although at first the U.S. was against even the financial aid because they were too occupied with problems in Iraq and the EU was too engaged with Yugoslavia, the U.S. itself offered troops for Somalia at the end of November and they said that if, and only if, the control of the nationwide enforcement mission was under the national command and control, they would help.

3.2 Operation Restore Hope or restore post-Cold War image?

At the end of the first year of the civil war, relief workers were reporting the situation in Somalia as still “total anarchy” and calling for a UN army to restore order.¹⁹⁰ In addition to these reports, in a letter by the Secretary General to the President of the United Nations Security Council dated November 29, after the evaluation of the seriousness of the situation in Somalia, the Secretary General of United Nations listed five options for a solution.¹⁹¹ The first option was strengthening UNOSOM as a peacekeeping force and making use of it intensely, the second offered to leave the negotiations to the humanitarian agencies by withdrawing military elements from UNOSOM.¹⁹² The third option proposed that “UNOSOM undertake a show of force in the city of Mogadishu in order to create conditions there for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and to deter factions and other armed groups there from withholding cooperation with UNOSOM”.¹⁹³ Meanwhile the fourth suggestion asked for a “country-wide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of member

¹⁹⁰ Offley, Ed., “Relief worker calls for a UN army to restore order”, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, November 25, 1992.

¹⁹¹ United Nations. S/24868.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

states”.¹⁹⁴ The last option also suggested an operation but under the “United Nations command and control”.¹⁹⁵ All of these options were discussed at the Meeting 3145 of the Security Council. During the discussions on whether and how to intervene, Pentagon and White House officials were arguing that the intervention is feasible because “Somalia presents none of the daunting challenges of Bosnia and all of the operational advantages of Operation Desert Storm”.¹⁹⁶ The intervention was decided upon “to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible” on December 3, 1992 by the UNSC resolution 794.¹⁹⁷

Although the Resolution 794 unanimously gave the U.S. the authority to lead the Operation Restore Hope¹⁹⁸, some of the delegations declared their objections to the U.S.-led operation.¹⁹⁹ For instance, Zimbabwe’s representative Mumbengagwi stated that because the Somalia case has humanitarian and political dimensions, it “cannot be addressed in the context of one member state or a group of member states. They have to be handled in the context of international community.”²⁰⁰ Similar to that, the permanent member of the Security Council, China’s representative Li Daoyu stressed, “We will vote in favour of the resolution but we wish to point out that in spite of the fact that the Secretary General has been given same authorization the draft resolution has taken the form of authorizing certain countries to take military actions, which may adversely affect the collective role of

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Jim Hoagland, “On Somalia, a Mysterious Decision: Neither ease nor guilt is sufficient reason for a nation to engage its military force abroad”, *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1992.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations, UNSC Resolution 794, *United Nations*, Accessed May 14, 2013. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ United Nations, S/PV/3145.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

United Nations”.²⁰¹ Belgium was also among the ones that preferred the fifth option, together with Zimbabwe and China.²⁰²

The absence of a unified rule in Somalia was the justification for the intervention without local consent because the lack of a unified rule was leading to disasters and the intervention was based on humanitarian reasons. The Operation Restore Hope started under the leadership of the U.S. The following day, President Bush was giving his national address to justify sending troops to Somalia as follows:

...I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs, but we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement... First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handling the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force... This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary... Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping of their own people.²⁰³

According to the president's declaration, the operation would be compatible with the post-Vietnam doctrine of invincible force; however, it took more than they expected and it lasted almost five months.

For some, what drove the U.S. and President Bush to lead this operation cannot be explained within the realist framework. For example Finnemore says:

US intervention in Somalia poses a significant problem for realist theory because it was undertaken in a state of little or no strategic or economic importance to the principle intervener. Realists fail to recognize that changing norms of legitimate intervention reconstitute state interests, making

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ AP, “Mission to Somalia; Transcript of President's Address on Somalia”, *The New York Times*, December 5, 1992.

intervention possible on behalf of humanity rather than in the service of strategic or economic interests.²⁰⁴

However, the civil war had been fought for one year and the situation was getting worse day by day. It is questionable that if there had not been a new president who criticized the moral attitude of the government, President Bush would have been really under pressure to take the lead, especially taking into account that, let alone military intervention, the Senate was even asking to cut the financial aid. Media reports also indicate that in the transition period from President Bush to President Clinton, first of all, President Clinton had an inclination to criticize President Bush for being indifferent to Somalia. Therefore, this is one of the reasons for which President Bush decided to take action. Another reason was the increasing media coverage after August, regarding the starvation and killings in Somalia. Besides, while declaring the decision of intervention, the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that it was militarily doable and they did not to expect that they will be engaged in heavy combat. Furthermore, President Bush mentioned that only a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently could save thousands of innocents from death.²⁰⁵

Taking all these into account, first of all, the Secretary of Defense Cheney's stance could be explained within the rational actor framework, in which he calculates the costs and benefits rather than jumping up with pure humanitarian intentions. When it comes to President Bush, it is clear that he wanted to show his people that he took action in line with the call of his people and this is also a rational actor stance to survive in the coming elections. In opposition to President Bush, who saw the risks

²⁰⁴ Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in ed. Peter J. Katzenstein *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Accessed May 10, 2013. <http://www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Finnemore.pdf>.

²⁰⁵ AP, "America Must Act: Bush sends troops to Somalia to save thousands", *Chicago Sun-Times*, December 4, 1992.

as relatively low and also wanted to take an action in response to the criticisms for inaction over Bosnia,²⁰⁶ Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in his speech on December 6 claimed that the moral impulse to save lives has to be balanced against the costs and risks involved.²⁰⁷ This selectivity of response, according to realists, is a major objection to legitimacy of humanitarian action for Wheeler. Another answer from Wheeler to Finnemore's argument is:

As realists are at pains to point out to those who will listen, there is nothing in their tradition that precludes states from having an interest in the promotion of moral goals. Therefore, realist inclinations behind the intervention decision is still worthy to further the research.²⁰⁸

Therefore, the moral goals of actions should be clearly identified and not be considered apart from interest. In the Somalia case for the U.S., it is apparent that interests were calculated and that moral image of the post-Cold War situation was evaluated before taking action. If this had consisted of a quick response rather than a well-framed, strategic action, it would not have taken 18 months to take a "meaningful action"²⁰⁹ for the UN. The action was taken only when the U.S. pushed the UN to solve the problems in Somalia. As Bolton clearly states:

U.S. experience there demonstrates the hard truth that the United Nations works only when the United States leads the organization to a final conclusion. There is no multilateral system with a life and will of its own. There is only leadership by one or more like-minded nations that persuades the United Nations' other members to follow. Within the U.S. system, Congress wants American leadership – whether through the United Nations or otherwise – only where clear American national interests are at stake.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶ Wheeler, 180-1.

²⁰⁷ AP, "U.S.: Somalia Sets No Precedent; Pentagon Won't Become Global Welfare Agency", *Chicago Sun-Times*, December 7, 1992.

²⁰⁸ Wheeler, 202.

²⁰⁹ Alasow, 74.

²¹⁰ John Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1994), 66.

As Ohanwe argues, it took the U.S. 18 months to take action, because:

Although it was a UN force, UNITAF flew the US flag. The UN-US relationship in this regard poses an issue for debate. Washington was alleged to have refused to entrust its soldiers to UN command. It actually took over the responsibility to organize, control and command, while Bush seemed to have assigned a supervisory role to both Boutros-Ghali and the Security Council.²¹¹

Even the UN accepted this fact. During the accusations in autumn 1992 that the UN did not take action and it lacked coordination, a UN official responded to these criticism as follows: “The UN is the sum of its governments and the Security Council only recently authorized security forces. It is the countries themselves within the Council that have to put teeth into any kind of action”.²¹² Therefore, one can conclude that without an interest of a member of the UNSC, taking action to solve a crisis is not possible.

In the meantime, from Mogadishu, the picture of the intervention is taken a bit differently. It was supposed to last for a short time, but it lasted very much longer than expected and the entire struggle to capture General Aidid ended with the Battle of Mogadishu that led to the death of 19 U.S. soldiers on October 3-4, 1993. It was a civil war with the involvement of sovereign states and these sovereign states paid the bill for intervention very dearly. Therefore, apart from the taking action problem, the issue to intervene in a civil war without consulting the locals created a disaster.

²¹¹ Ohanwe, 164.

²¹² M. Robert, “UN responds to Critics on Somalia”, *Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA)*, September 2, 1992.

3.3 Morality, media and realism

President Bush was saying that the soldiers in Somalia were doing the God's work.²¹³ The need for delivering humanitarian aid safely was there for months and there was nobody to do God's work. Some explain it as the CNN effect, which made the U.S. and other governments to take action; however, there are two dimensions to this point.

First of all, if what led the UNSC members to make a stronger commitment to saving strangers in Somalia really was the media coverage, one should bear in mind that this is also a part of the "interest" perspective, because the definition of interest is changing within the realism, too. Promotion of moral goals could be a part of interest. The classical understanding of "power" is still subject to change; even within the remains of the Cold War, one can see that systemic understanding of relative powers has changed. Morgenthau foresaw it, stating that

The stage is set for a contest among nations whose stakes are no longer their relative positions within a political and moral system accepted by all but the ability to impose upon the other contestants a new universal, political and moral system recreated in the image of victorious nation's political and moral convictions.²¹⁴

Therefore, one can conclude that all these humanitarian liberal holy duties are a part of national interest and a nation could feel responsible for another when it receives news about the suffering of another.

This leads us to the other side of the coin, which is specific to the Somalia case. The claims that drove attention to the power of the media coverage were based on the fact that there was no interest in the involvement in Somalia in the post-Cold

²¹³ AP, "Mission to Somalia; Transcript of President's Address on Somalia", *The New York Times*, December 5, 1992.

²¹⁴ Morgenthau, "The Twilight of International Morality", 97.

War era. However, there were still interests and remains of the Cold War vision in the U.S., and besides, the media coverage did not play a role in foreign policy making, but foreign policy made use of the media coverage to justify the intervention in the Horn of Africa. In a work by Pierce Robinson, which analyses the rates of articles before and after the intervention decision and uses content analysis by counting the critical words used in the news, one can understand the use of the media in convincing the public to accept the foreign policy goals but not convincing the decision-makers to take action.²¹⁵ This could also be explained by “manufacturing consent” because media “served to mobilize support for special interests”.²¹⁶ One can see in the findings that the coverage was very low before the decision of intervention and in the usage of words, rather than words such as “intervene, civil war, fighting”, the words such as “rescue, protect, save, starvation” were intensely used.²¹⁷ Besides, another analysis that makes use of television news supports this argument, having found out that

Television is clearly a player in the foreign policy arena, but the evidence from Somalia is that journalists set the news agenda and frame the stories they report in close collaboration with actors in Washington. In the case of Somalia, television turns out not to be the independent, driving force that much of the commentary on its influence would lead one to believe.²¹⁸

Therefore, rather than putting the morality and responsibility questions into the picture, one could analyse the Somalia intervention on the basis of what were the motivations that lead the United Nations to act in that specific time and shape under the leadership of the U.S.

²¹⁵ Piers Robinson, “Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion of a news Media Driven Intervention”, *Political Studies*, Vol. 49 Issue 5 (2001), 943.

²¹⁶ Chomsky and Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of The Mass Media*, xi.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 949.

²¹⁸ Jonathan Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, No. 3 (Autumn, 1997), 403.

In this chapter, the first humanitarian intervention that carried out by the UNSC decision was discussed. By examining the conditions that led to the civil war in Somalia and by looking at the explanations of decision makers for the decision of intervention, this chapter draws a picture of the events that led to the intervention. These findings revealed that the interest and power politics have shifted into also the moral arena and all actions could be analysed from a realist perspective in a humanitarian cause.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY: RWANDA

*The world is ruled by a belief that will permit other genocides. The superpowers had no interest in you, they were only interested in Yugoslavia. Thousands upon thousands of soldiers were sent there, and here I barely had 450. The guiding principle was that in Rwanda it's tribalism, it's history repeating itself. In Yugoslavia, it's different...It's ethnic cleansing. It's European security. It's white. Rwanda is black. It's in the middle of Africa. It has no strategic value. And all that's there, they told me, are people, and there are too many anyway.*²¹⁹

Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide

The quotation above is from the former United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) commander, General Romeo Dallaire. It is taken from his speech delivered to Rwandan people in Amaharo Stadium, Kigali, in 2004, that is to say a decade after the genocide. The quotation itself tells much about why it happened and why it was not prevented. The key importance of this statement is also determined very much by the person who made it. It is neither an analytical evaluation of an editor looking far beyond to the region nor a conspiracy theory fabricating every story for a big-brother-watching-you reproduction. Its strength comes from its being sound, its validity comes from its belonging to a real person in the field. A person who had “pleaded for just 5000 troops to stop the slaughter, and gotten the Security Council’s first reaction as to reduce further the number of peacekeepers on the ground after Belgium withdrew its troops”.²²⁰

This study’s second case is the Rwanda humanitarian intervention, which the UNSC was able to carry out after four months of great massacres. This chapter starts

²¹⁹ Andrew Wallis, *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide*, (I.B. Tauris: 2006), 11.

²²⁰ Chesterman and Michael, 28.

with the significance of Rwanda intervention in analysing the “realist concerns under liberal aims”, then gives the background information on historical developments in Rwanda together with the main characteristics of the Rwandan society. Then, it focuses on the roots of the conflict in Rwanda. After doing this, the relationship between the intervener, France, and Rwanda is analysed. This chapter concludes with the four month-period, which culminated in the decision of intervention.

The background of the Rwandan genocide and the decision-making process to intervene is worthwhile closely looking at while one is searching for the realist concerns within humanitarian interventions as a form of the ultimate liberal cause in current international politics. Apart from the debates reflected in the first chapter on whether an intervention is a duty or a right, there is a specific definition and consensus on what genocide is and how states should act when there is genocide.²²¹ Therefore, the case of Rwanda theoretically fits into the assumption that “unless vital interests are at stake, states will not intervene if this risks soldiers’ lives or incurs significant economic costs, there will be a selective use of legally defined right of humanitarian intervention in accordance with national interests, it is the duty of peoples of that state, we do not have a duty to saving stranger”.²²² It is not always easy to reveal all the interest connections for a specific intervention, because it is most of the time multidimensional; however, to show the absence of interest and how an interest is created for the intervener is easier to understand. Therefore, this chapter looks closely at the decision-making process in the Rwanda humanitarian intervention decision.

²²¹ The Genocide Convention has already been mentioned in the first chapter.

²²² Wheeler, 29 - 31.

4.1 History and society

Society's structure of Rwanda has been subject to change in accordance with historical developments. Therefore, a chronological political history of Rwanda will also analyze the structure of the society chronologically.

To start with, one specific thing is certain about the Rwandan society for all times. It is the fact that there have been three segments of the population in Rwanda, namely, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The Hutus have always been the majority and the demographic rate of the Tutsis has been subject to change from 9 per cent to 17 per cent depending on what historical period one refers to. Lastly, the Twa constitute 1 per cent of the population.²²³ During the colonial rule, Rwanda was ruled by Germany and after the World War II, Belgium ruled the country as a part of the United Nations Trust Territory.²²⁴ During those years, Tutsi were considered as the ruling elite and the Hutu clan was in their service.

For the evolution of ruling culture, there are two contradictory theories on whether the “pre-colonial Hutu-Tutsi relationship was one of symbiosis or domination”.²²⁵ One of them is based on a European imposition of ruling culture, and this theory claims that both Germany and Belgium made use of ethnic differences in Rwanda and they sharpened this distinction. To rule the country effectively, these states needed to collaborate with local officials. As a result of this remote-ruling system, the Europeans supported the Tutsi for being the head of the local administration and this small group of Tutsis oppressed the Hutu majority, according

²²³ Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, (Brooking Institution Press: 2001), 5.

²²⁴ The United Nations and Decolonization, “Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999)”, *United Nations*, Accessed May 10, 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselvgov.shtml>.

²²⁵ Kuperman, 6.

to this school.²²⁶ On the other hand, Hutu politicians and some other historians believe that before the arrival of the colonial powers, there was already a discriminatory system and colonial rule helped to legalize and institutionalize this system. Against this, some still believe that “the monarchic institutions in Rwanda was locally grown from among the Hutu population”.²²⁷ Despite these conflicting theories, the common ground for claims is that during these years, “an elite group of Tutsi exploited Hutu as second-class citizens”.²²⁸ Besides, regardless of which was the ruling clan, Prunier claims that there is a “monstrous degree of social control”.²²⁹ Prunier says that the Rwandan society met with the centralized form of political authority and social control at very early stages²³⁰ because of the high density of human occupation and the high capacity for producing all the basic necessities of life in plenty.

During the late 1940s and in the early years of the 1950s, like other parts of Africa, Rwanda was also affected by anti-colonial movements.²³¹ The Tutsi started to look for independence and when the Belgian realized that, “they started to support and educate Hutus to be a middle class in 1950s”.²³² As a result, Hutus started to create a political movement “based on historical claim that the Tutsi has subjugated the Hutu for hundreds of years” and the Hutu Emancipation Party (PARMEHUTU) was established.²³³

²²⁶ Kuperman, 6.

²²⁷ Gérard Prunier. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, (Columbia University Press: 1997), 17.

²²⁸ Kuperman, 6.

²²⁹ Prunier, 3.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Kuperman, 6.

²³² Prunier, 44-5.

²³³ Kuperman, 6.

On the one hand, there was the struggle of Tutsi with the support of communist countries to get rid of colonial rule, and on the other hand, there was the struggle of Hutu against the Tutsi domination. These struggles resulted in a large-scale violence when Hutu tried to seize power in 1959.²³⁴ During these process, Hutus who were supported by Belgium burned houses, killed hundreds of Tutsis, caused thousands of Tutsis to flee to Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire and they finally seized power, and Rwanda in the hands of Hutu gained independence in 1962.²³⁵ In the meantime, Tutsi refugees were trying to come back to their country and they started attacks to gain power. These attacks were countered by the Hutu regime in a rule based on oppression of those Tutsis who were in Rwanda. The main aim of the extremist Hutu rule was to deter Tutsi from rebellion.²³⁶ The extremist Hutu regime under the rule of President Kayibanda met the most serious threat from the refugee Tutsis in December 1963 when Tutsis from Burundi came as close as within ten miles of the Rwandan capital, Kigali. However, the answer by President Kayibanda was another series of massacres, as he declared in 1964, “If the Tutsi ever seek to obtain political power again they will find that the whole Tutsi race will be wiped out”.²³⁷ As a result, from 1959 to 1967, 20,000 Tutsi were killed and 300,000 of them fled.²³⁸

²³⁴ Ibid., 7.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Grunfeld, Fred and Huijboom. *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, (Brill: 2007), 31.

²³⁸ Kuperman, 7.

4.1.1 The rule of Habyarimana

At the end of the 1960s, there was a rising discontent among the Hutu with the Kayibanda rule; the Hutu were aware that he was not good at ruling the country and he was favouring his home-region with the sources he held. This discontent ended up in Kayibanda being overthrown by Army Chief of Staff Juvénal Habyarimana.²³⁹ When he came to power, Habyarimana outlawed all political parties including PARMEHUTU and in 1975 he created his own political party named *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND). This marked the beginning of institutional discrimination because Tutsi were politically marginalized.²⁴⁰ The rule seemed to be democratic because the demographic majority held political power in their hands. Like Kayibanda, the new president was favouring his own region, i.e. the north-western Rwanda.²⁴¹ People from this region were among the key position holders in the army, government, MRND and business. In the meantime, the other regions of the country were suffering from not getting investment from the government. As a part of this ruling behaviour, the first lady of Rwanda was very powerful and also made use of the resources for her own clan, Abagoragu. President Habyarimana was ruling the country with his wife and political decisions were made by these two. This co-operation was at such a scale that Prunier says, “Her husband [President Habyarimana] relied on her and her family for many things, but he also gradually became their prisoner and eventually victim.”²⁴²

The difference of the new president mainly stemmed from his being more tolerant to the Tutsi. He was trying to protect the Tutsi population of the country not

²³⁹ Kuperman, 7.

²⁴⁰ Prunier, 75-6.

²⁴¹ Kuperman, 8.

²⁴² Prunier, 86.

to be criticized by Western powers and as long as the Tutsi did not get involved in politics, they were left in peace.²⁴³ There was only one Tutsi battalion in the army and one Tutsi minister among the 30 ministers in the cabinet. Also, members of the army were prohibited from marrying Tutsi women.²⁴⁴

Things began to change in the late 1980s when Rwanda's economy was shrinking due to declining global agricultural prices. The former supporters of PARMEHUTU started to criticize the government, and domestic political opposition gained rise.²⁴⁵ At the same time, Tutsi refugees were trying to turn back to their homeland and finding places for themselves in the Ugandan army. The refugee problem was also on the agenda of the international community to be solved by Habyarimana.²⁴⁶

When president's authority started to be shaken, the succession plans focused on a close friend of the president, Colonel Stanislas Mayuya. Le Clan de Madame (also known as Akazu), who were unhappy with Tutsi existence in the government, felt the fear of losing control and led the assassination of Colonel Mayuya in April 1988. This Mayuya affair caused the rising discontent among the clans and the violence among the clans started.²⁴⁷

At the same time, Rwanda was suffering from a mini-drought in 1988-89 and a budget reduction was applied to cut social services, which led to uprisings.²⁴⁸ All these turmoils led to a decision by Tutsi refugees to attack Rwanda. On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the command of Tutsi refugees

²⁴³ Prunier, 76 and Kuperman, 8.

²⁴⁴ Prunier, 75.

²⁴⁵ Kuperman, 8.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Prunier, 87.

²⁴⁸ Prunier, 87.

started an invasion from Uganda.²⁴⁹ On October 2, President Habyarimana asked for the help from the French. When the French arrived with 150 men and the Belgian with 400 paratroopers to support the Presidential Guard, their mission was to prepare for a possible evacuation of foreign nationals.²⁵⁰ Therefore, the European forces did not want to engage in the war at the beginning; however, “to dramatize the perceived gravity of the situation, Presidential Guard staged a fake attack on Kigali by ‘enemy’ troops”.²⁵¹ As a result, France sent 600 troops to Rwanda. With the support of European powers, the Habyarimana regime started Tutsi-hunting. Actually, the operations were not against only the Tutsi but also opposition-minded Hutu. Almost 10,000 educated Tutsi were arrested and the army threatened the RPF that if they should enter the capital Kigali, then all the detainees would be killed.²⁵² The RPF could not win the war; however, they proved their military capacity and from then on President Habyarimana had to take them into account while addressing political reforms.²⁵³

When the rebels were limited to the Ugandan border, Belgian forces went back to their countries and the French remained in Rwanda.²⁵⁴ France also supported the democratic transition of Rwanda during its presence in the country, and on June 10, 1991, a new constitution was proclaimed²⁵⁵ and multi-party regime was established. However, this did not help to prevent the killings. Between 1991 and 1993, Hutu extremists killed 2,000 Tutsi and the RPF in return started to become more offensive and the rebels reached up to Kigali. What stopped the rebels from

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 93.

²⁵⁰ Kuperman, 9.

²⁵¹ Prunier, 101.

²⁵² Ibid., 108-9.

²⁵³ Ibid., 120.

²⁵⁴ The relationship between France and Rwanda will be covered in the coming section.

²⁵⁵ Prunier, 126.

getting stronger was the existence of the French troops supporting the Presidential Guard.²⁵⁶

In the meantime, the cease-fire negotiations were held. Starting from July 12, 1992 and ending with August 3, 1993, the Arusha Accords period was marked by the peace initiatives of outsiders. The possible solutions have been under discussion in the agenda of the United Nations since when the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations asked for “the deployment of a team of United Nations military observers on both sides of the frontier between Rwanda and Uganda”²⁵⁷ from the President of the Security Council on February 28, 1993.

Following this request, the Resolution 812 was adopted on March 12, 1993 to invite the Secretary General to examine the situation.²⁵⁸ During the discussions, the Rwanda representative, after explaining the massacres and violence in Rwanda, stated, “It is a humanitarian imperative that Rwanda be provided with a multi-purpose international force”.²⁵⁹ Similarly, the Moroccan representative, referring to the Somalia case, mentioned that they “remember well the past and present horrors experienced by the people of the brotherly country of Somalia” and urged the Council that the developments in Rwanda “could lead to a greater deterioration of the situation in that country”.²⁶⁰ After the adoption of the Resolution, the representative of France stated, “The deployment of United Nations observers at the border could contribute to creating a more peaceful climate in the region.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Kuperman, 10 and Prunier, 136.

²⁵⁷ United Nations, S/25.355.

²⁵⁸ United Nations, S/PV.3183.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ United Nations, S/PV.3183.

What followed that Resolution was the establishment of UNOMUR to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border with an eye on guaranteeing that arms are not allowed in Rwanda by Resolution 846 on June 22, 1993.²⁶²

The peace agreement was signed between President Habyarimana and the RPF to end the war. The Arusha Accords, which was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, guaranteed the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda, opened up a period for a transitional government, which would include RPF also, and a peace implementation period based on the United Nations peacekeeping force.²⁶³ However, Habyarimana left this agreement just on paper and never implemented it. Following the peace agreement, on September 24, 1993, Secretary General in his report on Rwanda recommended that “the Security Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government”.²⁶⁴ In their 3288th meeting, the Security Council discussed the proposal and voted in favour of the establishment of UNAMIR provided by Resolution 872²⁶⁵ on October 5.

When the Hutu President of Burundi was killed by the Tutsi on October 21, 1993, the Hutus of Burundi killed 50,000 Tutsi, and 150,000 Tutsi and 300,000 Hutu fled the country.²⁶⁶ This event sharpened the radicalization among the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and the notion of a “final solution to ethnic problem” gained ground.²⁶⁷

When as a part of the Arusha Accords, on November 1, the United Nations

²⁶² United Nations, S/PV.3244.

²⁶³ Philip Gourevich, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families*, (Picador: 1999), 99 and Prunier, 192.

²⁶⁴ United Nations, S/26488.

²⁶⁵ United Nations, S/PV.3288.

²⁶⁶ Prunier, 198-9.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 200.

Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) arrived in Kigali, the French forces withdrew and this radicalized the conflict, too.²⁶⁸ As a result of this radicalization, Hutu extremists imported thousands of guns and grenades and hundreds of thousands of machetes. Besides, they created an anti-Tutsi private radio channel to make propaganda against the Hutu and spread the word of hate against Tutsi.²⁶⁹ They did so because they believed that if there were no Tutsi, there would be peace in the country. This was followed by Resolution 891, in which the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR up to six months²⁷⁰ on December 20.

4.1.2 The French in Rwanda

Before moving on to the assassination of President Habyarimana and how the mass killings started, the relationship between France and Rwanda should be explained in detail. As mentioned before, after the first attack by the RPF on Rwanda, the Presidential Guard was supported by French troops and also a humanitarian intervention decision enabled by France in the field.

When looked at the situation, it is ambiguous why France sent its own soldiers to “save strangers” in Africa. According to Prunier, it is not easy to understand the motivations behind this and to explain this attitude. He quotes from American journalist John Darton, “It is not when the French government intervenes that he has some explaining to do, it is when it doesn’t”,²⁷¹ taking into account the Franco-African political culture. What lies behind this so-called Franco-African political culture for Prunier is the following: “African countries are part of the family

²⁶⁸ Kuperman, 11.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ United Nations, S/PV 3324.

²⁷¹ Prunier, 102.

for France, common language and culture is a motivation and besides there are some material rewards for using Africa as a money-laundry machine”.²⁷²

The birth of this relationship goes back to the Anglo-Saxon and Francophone rivalry. Directly related with their Fashoda syndrome, France was not only fearful of losing a client government with which it could do business, but of having it replaced by the most vilified of projected rivals, ‘les anglais’.²⁷³ During the Fashoda Incident in 1898, withdrawing its garrison from the Sudanese town of Fashoda, losing it to the British, led to a mindset for the French as to African policies.²⁷⁴ Therefore, Central Africa was considered a francophone zone and an area of policy that continued to unite socialist and Gaullist political groups and this seemed to override all other political, military and strategic viewpoints. Rwanda was perceived as the border of this region, and human rights and morality were also overridden by this mindset.²⁷⁵ This claim is also supported by a French diplomat saying, “our credibility towards other African states with which we have similar accords (Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Togo) would be seriously damaged, and we would see those countries turning to other supporters”.²⁷⁶ Not to lose the support of these African countries, France used all the means for Rwanda by supporting its army. Behind this support, the mindset prevailed. A confidential letter dated May 23, 1994 reveals this mindset clearly. In the letter found in French government circles, it is stated that “the region cannot be left in the hands of an English-speaking strong men completely aligned to American views and interest”.²⁷⁷

Therefore, one can conclude that France was supporting President Habyarimana

²⁷² Ibid., 103.

²⁷³ Wallis, 12.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 13.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 12-3.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 25-6.

²⁷⁷ Prunier, 279.

since 1990 against the RPF. This support included not only sending troops but also machinery and command support. “In 1990–1994, France gave Rwanda Gazelle helicopters, heavy mortars, radar equipment, Milan rockets, Panhard tanks and armored [fighting] vehicles, as well as a variety of small arms”.²⁷⁸ A French commander was needed to train the personnel for using these hi-tech arms and a letter from the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French ambassador Martres on February 3, 1992 reveals this fact: “He [Chollet] has just received unlimited power to direct all military operations in this war ... our army is now run by a Frenchman”.²⁷⁹ When this information was leaked to the media, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs objected to claims and remove Chollet from power.²⁸⁰ At the same time, the French prime minister was trying to make his people believe that this is a republican duty to save the French citizens in Rwanda and nothing more will be done.²⁸¹

However, what drove the French government more to take action in Rwanda was the U.S. diplomacy in Harare talks, for Willis. He draws attention to the fact that

When US deputy assistant secretary Irvin Hicks arranged for the RPF and Rwandan government to have talks in Harare in July 1992 alarm bells immediately rang in Paris over the audacity of the USA trying to hijack France’s attempts to bring order to its own pré-carré (backyard). Nothing was more guaranteed to produce a swift reaction in Paris than the thought that the Americans may be about to tread on their own neocolonial toes.²⁸²

It was the same reason why French military felt as being “impinged on” when the French had to leave their place to UNAMIR.²⁸³ Therefore, the existence of French

²⁷⁸ Willis, 31.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 33.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 43.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid., 69.

troops in Rwanda and the decision of France to support the Rwanda Presidential Guard should be examined by taking the above things into consideration.

4.2 The “Big Clean-up”

When the word of the “big clean-up” was first spread among the extremists to solve the ethnic problem, it was late 1992.²⁸⁴ This means that while the Arusha Accords were being made to open the way for Tutsi refugees to come back to their homeland, the extremists were already preparing to fight against them. Although there has been a constant conflict for a couple of decades, the idea of the “big clean-up” was brought into reality when President Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash on April 6, 1994.

There is no clear evidence on who was behind this plane crash. There are several theories on who did it; however, still nobody knows the answer.²⁸⁵ Some blame the RPF because in the beginning of 1994, the RPF was unhappy with the non-implementation of the Arusha Agreement and the president was threatened with breaking the cease-fire by the RPF unless he implements the agreement.²⁸⁶ However, everybody is aware of the fact that “with the presence of UNAMIR the Front could not afford to put itself into position of aggressor”.²⁸⁷ Besides, for Prunier, the clash is not two-sided as it is assumed to be. For him, the game is three-sided; “between the Habyarimana regime jockeying for survival, the internal opposition struggling to achieve recognition and the Tutsi exiles trying to make some sort of come back”.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, as the famous “genocide fax” by UNAMIR commander General

²⁸⁴ Prunier, 200.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 213-225.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 205.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 205.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

Roméo Dallaire stated, the plans of Hutu extremists at the same time started in the beginning of 1994. Dated January 11, 1994, the fax contains a warning that according to information taken from a person with a code name Jean-Pierre, extremist Hutu paramilitary organization Interehamwe was preparing for wide-scale killings.²⁸⁹ “The informant, a member of the militia and of Habyarimana’s security staff, told Dallaire that the UN ‘were to be provoked’, with Belgian troops especially targeted and killed to produce their withdrawal from Rwanda”.²⁹⁰ However, the only answer Dallaire was able to receive was that he should inform the president and the ambassadors of France, United States and Belgium about the location of weapon stores.²⁹¹ Furthermore, the reply clearly stated that they could not provide UNAMIR with more power and troops because it goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under Resolution 872. Dated October 5, 1993, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 defined the duty of UNAMIR as monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.²⁹² Actually, this was only two days after when 19 U.S. rangers were killed in Somalia during the Olympic Hotel battle. Therefore, the U.S. only supported financial aid and the Clinton Administration together with the United Nations chose to “stand by and watch Hutu militias and Rwandan security forces slaughter over a million Rwandan civilians between April and July 1994”.²⁹³ The UN was in such an ignoring position that “when the medical supplies ran out, in March of 1994, New York said there was no cash for supply”.²⁹⁴ Under these conditions, General Dallaire was “unable to persuade the international community that this tiny, poor, overpopulated country and its people were worth

²⁸⁹ Willis, 74.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² United Nations, SC Res 814.

²⁹³ Wheeler, 172.

²⁹⁴ Power, 88.

saving from the horror of genocide – even when the measures needed for success were relatively small”.²⁹⁵

Immediately after the assassination of President Habyarimana, Interehamwe and Presidential Guard soldiers started to look for the responsible ones for the murder. However, the way they conducted it was so organized and well-prepared beforehand that they were looking for the enemies via a “house-to-house search”.²⁹⁶ Their first victim was Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was killed in her house together with the 10 Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who were responsible to protect her.²⁹⁷ This was followed by the assassination of the president of the Constitutional Court, leaders of the opposition parties and negotiators of the Arusha Agreement. What was going on was like a realization of what was said by Jean-Pierre to General Dallaire: the militia was as powerful as to kill up to 1,000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.²⁹⁸ The difference was that the killings did not only include the Tutsi however the opposition Hutu were also the target.²⁹⁹ In a statement on April 7, 1994, the Security Council issued a message condemning the massacre.³⁰⁰

When the new government was constituted on April 7-8, the new prime minister tried to reduce the violence, but his calls were ignored by the militia.³⁰¹ While the constant fight between the RPF and the army was continuing, the French and the Belgian started operations to evacuate all their nationals in Rwanda on April 9 and 10.³⁰² Belgium already before the assassination was aware of the

²⁹⁵ Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, (Da Capo Press: 2004), 515.

²⁹⁶ Prunier, 229.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 230.

²⁹⁸ Power, 88.

²⁹⁹ Prunier, 231.

³⁰⁰ United Nations, S/PRST/1994/16.

³⁰¹ Prunier, 231.

³⁰² Prunier, 234.

situation, which was getting serious due to mass killings, and therefore they were asking for a more active role for peacekeepers, but the United Nations declined. After the killings of 10 Belgian blue helmets, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes asked the UN to enable UNAMIR to intervene militarily and stop the mass killings; however, France opposed this idea.³⁰³ Belgium did not have the withdrawal in their agenda at first. They tried to convince the world to stop the slaughter; however, when they realized that there would be no answer to their calls, they decided to withdraw.

On April 8, Belgian prime minister after negotiating with the cabinet declared, “Because of the death of the ten Belgian paras the Belgian public opinion is traumatized to such a degree that the continuation of the Belgian participation in UNAMIR is be questioned”.³⁰⁴ By this statement, Belgium also declared its withdrawal from UNAMIR and executed a separate evacuation.³⁰⁵ Belgium declared its decision to the UN by a telex saying because the Arusha Accords failed, there is no need to continue to UNAMIR.³⁰⁶ Therefore, regardless of General Dallaire’s asking for more troops to stop the slaughter, the United Nations reduced the number of troops in Rwanda.

General Dallaire was helpless in his attempts to make his voice reach Washington. The solution he found in this situation was to use the power of the media. He asked Mark Doyle from the BBC not to leave Rwanda and “become the voice of what was happening” in return for protection by UNAMIR.³⁰⁷ However, before April 8, there was no news emphasizing the importance of the mass killings in the U.S. and Canadian media. As Prunier says, “In contemporary Western society

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Report of the Council of Ministers of April 8, 1994, (Belgian Senate: 1994), 534.

³⁰⁵ Grunfeld and Huijboom, 184.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 189.

³⁰⁷ Dallaire, 332.

events not seen on a TV screen [does] not exist”.³⁰⁸ Therefore, most of the Western societies were not aware of the genocide. They were refraining from using the word “genocide” and described the situation as a “civil war”. The media were only giving the news about the evacuation of foreign nationals during this conflict. For example, President Clinton declared on April 10 they would transfer their citizens safely back to the States.³⁰⁹

In the meantime, General Dallaire was trying to broker a cease-fire among the fighting groups, but neither the RPF nor the militia were willing to agree.³¹⁰ All the Tutsi were the target of the killings just because they were Tutsi. A French medical emergency NGO employee describes the cruelty of the attacks as follows: “Any wounded person was killed. The Army men would come inside the hospital, take the wounded, line them up, and machine-gun them down. All our Tutsi medical staff, doctors and nurses were kidnapped and murdered in Kigali in April”.³¹¹ The mass killings were so marginalized that after a point, it was not only the militia and the RPF who were fighting but ordinary peasants were involved in the genocide as one of the main agents.³¹² Between the second week of April and the third week of May, 80 per cent of the genocide was conducted.³¹³

On April 21, 1994, the United Nations Security Council held its 3368th meeting, in which it adopted the Resolution 912, which only includes an extension of the mandate of UNAMIR and emphasizes its role in mediating the conflict and

³⁰⁸ Prunier, 274.

³⁰⁹ Robert Pear, “Envoy in Rwanda Decides on Overland Convoy to Evacuate Americans”, *The New York Times*, April 10, 1994, 6.

³¹⁰ Prunier, 236.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 254.

³¹² Prunier, 247.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 261.

monitoring the cease-fire.³¹⁴ During the talks, the country representatives mentioned the options offered by the Secretary General to stop the massacres. The Nigerian representative said:

Option one, which recommends the massive deployment of a United Nations force in Rwanda under Chapter 7 of the Charter, is, in the circumstances, not feasible, considering that no such force can be raised immediately. Option three recommends withdrawal of UNAMIR is not acceptable, reducing level of UNAMIR and redefine its mandate and role is reasonable.³¹⁵

Similarly, the representative of Oman drew attention to the security concerns and stated, “UNAMIR will not be able to carry out its duties effectively, prefer to reduce presence of UNAMIR due to the fact that it is hard to guarantee the safety of the personnel.”³¹⁶

In the letter by the Secretary General to the Security Council dated April 29, 1994, he stated, “I urge Security Council to re-examine the decisions which it took in the Resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take or could authorize member states to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres”.³¹⁷

While the massacres were continuing, the steps taken were not enough to prevent people from killing. In a letter by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations dated May 2, 1994, he asked for the strengthening of UNAMIR and increasing the staff and capacity of UNAMIR.³¹⁸ Additionally, in the report of the Secretary General to the President of Security Council, he “recommend[ed] to the Security Council that it approve the phased expansion of

³¹⁴ United Nations, S/PV.3368.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ United Nations, S/1994/518.

³¹⁸ United Nations, S/1994/53.

UNAMIR to enable the mission immediately to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda”³¹⁹ on May 13, 1994. When the Human Rights Watch reported there were almost 100,000 dead and called world community to use the word “genocide”, the West started to see the real picture.³²⁰ According to Kuperman,

The main reason behind this is the president of the United States could not have determined that a nationwide genocide was under way in Rwanda until about April 20, 1994. First, violence was initially depicted in the context of a two-sided civil war—one that the Tutsi were winning—rather than a one-sided, ethnic genocide against the Tutsi. Second, after a few days, violence was reported to be on the wane when in reality it was accelerating. Third, most early death counts were gross underestimates, sometimes by a factor often, and did not reach genocidal proportions. Fourth, the initial focus was almost exclusively on Kigali, a relatively small city, and failed to indicate the broader scope of violence. Fifth, no credible and knowledgeable observers, including human rights groups, raised the prospect that a genocide was under way until the end of the second week.³²¹

However, as mentioned above, both the BBC and General Dallaire were trying to draw the attention of the United Nations to this genocide. Finally, as the signatories of the Genocide Convention,³²² the UNSC gathered to issue Resolution 918, which expanded the duties of UNAMIR with the deployment of 5,500 men under Chapter VII.³²³ During the talks on the adoption of the resolution, Oman, Pakistan and Djibouti declared their support.³²⁴ However, all these were not still enough to provide a secure environment in Rwanda. As it is mentioned in a letter dated April 21 from the minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda to the Security Council president, the situation kept its magnitude and Rwanda was calling the Security Council “to take action under Chapter VII to terminate the aggression”.³²⁵ Keeping up with the news of the disaster, on May 16, the European Union stated that

³¹⁹ United Nations, S/1994/565

³²⁰ Power, 69.

³²¹ Kuperman, 24.

³²² See Chapter 1.

³²³ Prunier, 276.

³²⁴ United Nations, S/PV.3377.

³²⁵ United Nations, S/1994/586.

it is eager to increase its humanitarian aid whenever such aid can be brought.³²⁶ Also, a letter from the Israeli delegation dated May 23 stated that they “call international community to act urgently to stop the massacre and ready to take part in humanitarian activities because after experiencing Nazi holocaust they cannot stand idly by in the face of the horror in Rwanda”.³²⁷

However, France was still not keen on the decision of intervention. Although the decision to send troops was taken, no troops arrived for weeks. Jakobsen claims that France did not want to intervene because Rwanda was not their first priority.³²⁸ However, for the French, to lose control over that region was unacceptable and if there were an international community to take control of the region, this would mean that they would upset the francophone Africans. Before the UNSC Resolution 918 dated May 17, on May 11 then Foreign Minister Alain Juppe openly declared that “the international community could not act as a global police force and send peacekeepers to all the places where people fight”.³²⁹ According to Stephen Kinzer’s article in the New York Times on May 25, European governments were still reluctant to intervene. Kinzer reflected upon a debate in the British Parliament, asking, “Is there one law for Europeans and another for black Africans?”³³⁰ In the same article, Kinzer mentions that only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal accepted to send troops to Rwanda but the time and management were not still clear by May 25. In the meanwhile, on May 31, in his report to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary General, for the first time, called the massacres genocide:

³²⁶ United Nations, S/1994/598.

³²⁷ United Nations, S/1994/608.

³²⁸ P.V. Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.33, No. 2, (1996), 210.

³²⁹ Jakobsen, 210.

³³⁰ Stephen Kinzer, “European Leaders Reluctant to Send Troops to Rwanda”, *the New York Times*, May 25, 1994, 1.

The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be unimaginable but for its having transpired on the basis of the evidence that has emerged there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group.³³¹

Following this report, on June 8, Resolution 925 adopted in Meeting 3388 of the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR, which was expiring on July 29, 1994, until December 9, 1994.³³² During the meeting, the representatives of the Czech Republic and Spain also called the massacres genocide, referring to the secretary general. When it comes to France, it was more willing to hold the control so that the representative stated, “My government stresses that while the priority objective is a humanitarian one, we must not forget that only a political solution can restore lasting peace and stability in Rwanda”.³³³

By mid-June, when the French people started to watch on TV screens about the mass killings in Rwanda, they have changed their mind. “Operation was complex and risky”,³³⁴ for Juppe; however, public opinion led them to do something more than watching.³³⁵ Not only public opinion but also the efforts of the Secretary General made the forthcoming intervention possible. In a letter dated June 19 to the President of the Security Council, Secretary General stated:

With the failure of member states to promptly provide the resources necessary for the implementation of its expanded mandate, UNAMIR may not be in a position ,for about 3 months, to fully undertake the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions (...) In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorization, a French commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other member states under Chapter 7 of Charter of United Nations.³³⁶

³³¹ United Nations, S/1994/640.

³³² United Nations Security Council Resolution 925.

³³³ United Nations, S/PV.3388.

³³⁴ Jakobsen, 210.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ United Nations, S/1994/728.

Now, France's Defense Minister was claiming that if they can save one child, it will be worth it.³³⁷ For this aim, in a letter dated June 20 from the Permanent Representative of France to the Secretary General, they asked for a resolution under Chapter VII,³³⁸ and this led France to bring to the UNSC agenda the Operation Turquoise. With Resolution 929, France led the UN intervention decision issued on June 22, 1994.³³⁹ New Zealand, Pakistan, Nigeria, Brazil and Chad abstained.³⁴⁰ According to the Lyons, the main reason for Brazil and New Zealand to abstain was the fact that the French offer was too limited and a bigger UN operation was needed.³⁴¹ However, Mr. Keating, the representative of New Zealand, referred to their security concerns and stated:

We are not convinced that this operation will be able to protect civilians from massacres (...) Somalia has shown us that even where we have the best of humanitarian intentions, if we do not employ the right means, tragedy can be the result. The Security Council must learn from the history. Security risks increased dramatically.³⁴²

For similar reasons, China also abstained by stressing the fact that

The actions the draft resolution would authorize cannot guarantee the cooperation of the parties to the conflict. On the basis of experience and lessons of the UN peace keeping operation in Somalia, the Chinese delegation will abstain.³⁴³

On the other hand, the chief U.S. delegate Madeline Albright said, "We must be flexible enough to accept imperfect solutions when no perfect solutions are available

³³⁷ Stanger, Theodore and Hammer, "Nice Idea, Wrong Army", *Newsweek*, July 4, 1994., p. 48.

³³⁸ United Nations, S/1994/734.

³³⁹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 929.

³⁴⁰ United Nations, S/PV. 3392.

³⁴¹ Richard D. Lyons, "French Officer is First Step Toward a Multinational Force" *New York Times*, June 23 1994.

³⁴² United Nations, S/PV.3392.

³⁴³ Ibid.

to us”.³⁴⁴ New Zealand offered an extension for UNAMIR II; on the other hand, the Organization of Africa Unity stated a French intervention is no acceptable to the RPF because the French were the main actor to support the Hutu.³⁴⁵ However, at the end, France did not give the permission for intervention in her own control arena by the Anglo-Saxon camp. The reason was a combination of a public-opinion-driven decision and the possible interveners’ being the archenemy.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the historical background for conflict in Rwanda and reflects upon the main relationship of the local actors with the colonial states. The situation is clearly the way Hammer puts it: “Though Africa owes much of its current plight to Western meddling, the outside powers have worsened matters by turning their backs during the most desperate times,” and according to his reasoning, “fresh memories of disastrous Somalia intervention, the lack of a perceived national interest and bickering over logistics”³⁴⁶ resulted in genocide. As Brian Atwood, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, explains, the world’s biggest threat was communism during the Cold War and it was easy to define and fight with; however, now the threat was chaos and they did not know how to deal with it.³⁴⁷ This picture of the intervention revealed that what drives a state to intervene in another for preventing mass killings is not only driven by humanitarian causes.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Willis, 128.

³⁴⁶ Joshua Hammer, “A Generation of Failure”, *Newsweek*, August 1, 1994, 32.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

In the French case, one could say that it is possible to intervene as a part of the civil war when there is constant fighting, but it is much more difficult to support the intervention for humanitarian purposes. As Dallaire very well experienced in the field:

The international community, of which the UN is only a symbol, failed to move beyond self-interest for the sake of Rwanda. While most nations agreed that something should be done, they all had an excuse why they should not be the ones to do it. As a result, the UN was denied the political will and material means to prevent the tragedy.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁸ Dallaire, p. 516

CHAPTER 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In spite of the hopes of liberals, there is no agreed-upon ethic, but only ethical frameworks that arise from specific contexts. Even more problematic, these ethical frameworks are yoked to nationalist ideologies, making them part of the international contest for power and interest.³⁴⁹

After having examined the historical background and humanitarian intervention decision-making process for Somalia and Rwanda interventions, in this chapter, I would like to give a comparative account on both countries and then I would like to identify the linkage between these two separate actions. Because historically they follow each other, as I have mentioned in the first chapter, the late decision of intervention in Rwanda was affected by the experiences in Somalia. After showing the linkages between these two cases, I would like to go back to the humanitarian intervention debate and reconceptualize my arguments in the light of detailed accounts of the two cases.

5.1 The roots of the conflict: a common heritage

When one looks at the common characteristics of the Somalian and Rwandan society, it is possible to see similar roots for the conflict. First of all, both have pre-colonial linkages with the European states. The lines of the both countries were drawn by the colonizers in the sand of the Dark Continent. Their common geography led them to share common historical practices. Somalia and Rwanda, being the colonial regions for Italy and Belgium, consecutively experienced the social segregation sharpened by the colonizers.

³⁴⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 267-9.

The clan system in Somalia is somewhat similar to the ethnic divisions in Rwanda. Somalia's clan system has a strong impact on determining the political life, just as the social structure of Rwanda shapes the politics. Whereas minority clans in Somalia were "systematically excluded from mainstream government positions and the few minorities who held positions had no power to speak on behalf of their communities"³⁵⁰, the minority Tutsi in Rwanda were driven out of the politics. Both the German rule in the earlier colonial era and then the rule of Belgium to create a working state structure through locals in Rwanda created first a Tutsi elite³⁵¹ and then sharpened the Hutu-Tutsi hatred between these ethnic groups.

At end of the colonial rule, both countries were given to trustees in accordance with the United Nations Trust Territories project. The main aim of the Trusteeship System was to "promote the advancement of the inhabitants of Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence".³⁵² To realize this aim, Italy and Belgium took the responsibility for Somalia and Rwanda. Although their main duty was to facilitate the democratization process and monitor the developments, they caused much more internal conflict. It is not my intention here to argue whether the Trusteeship System caused conflicts all in all or not; however, for the two cases that are examined, it is possible to see that the Trusteeship System contributed to social discontent. In Somalia, because Italians "did not show respect to Somali traditional culture and favored the political parties closer to them"³⁵³, some of the clans were not happy with the Italian rule. This led to

³⁵⁰ Somraf, "Study on Minorities in Somalia", *Somraf*, Accessed May 14, 2013.
<http://www.somraf.org/research%20Matrerials/Study%20on%20Minorities%20in%20Somalia%20UNCU%20OCH%20AJul%2002.pdf>.

³⁵¹ Kuperman, 6.

³⁵² United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *United Nations*, Accessed May 14, 2013.
<http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/>.

³⁵³ Tripodi, *Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*, 82-3.

the internal conflicts between the ruler and the ruled. In the meantime in Rwanda, when Tutsi – as the ruling elite created by the colonizers – started to be affected by anti-colonialism ideas, Belgium made use of the Hutu majority by creating a middle class from them and eventually this resulted with the establishment of the Hutu Emancipation Party, PARMEHUTU.³⁵⁴ What followed these developments is a sharpening and deepening ethnic conflict. Therefore, one cannot deny the impact of outsiders in the creation of societal conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda.

Above these local ruling habits, the main system in which the game was played included a bipolar rivalry scene. What contributed to these local conflicts to reach a larger scale is the fact that historical habits were bringing archenemies face to face in the Dark Continent. For Somalia, one can easily see the traces of the Cold War behind the militarization of this country. First, with the support of the USSR and then after the Ogaden War, with the help of the U.S., Somalia reached the position of a country that had the biggest army of Africa.³⁵⁵ Later on, for the intervention the assumption of this Cold War rivalry was used to explain the mindset of the interveners. When we look at the case of Rwanda, there is another historical rivalry we can see, the one between the Francophone hegemony and Anglo-Saxon hegemony. The continuing Fashoda syndrome led France to support the Hutu rule and Habyarimana regime against the RPF.³⁵⁶ Therefore, one can conclude that a particular interest that was shaped by history led foreign states to intervene in the social structures of Somalia and Rwanda. The armament was provided by foreigners and also the ruling system was promoted and protected by them.

³⁵⁴ Kuperman, 6.

³⁵⁵ Ohanwe, *Post-Cold War Conflicts in Africa Case Studies of Liberia and Somalia*, 148.

³⁵⁶ Willis, 30-3.

As Makau Matua, a Kenyan attorney and project director of the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School, says, for African leaders “the state is seen as a vehicle for personal gain”.³⁵⁷ Therefore, the two dictators Barre and Habyarimana favoured their own families and established their family organization among the ruling elite, one as the M.O.D. Alliance³⁵⁸ and the other as le Clan de Madame.³⁵⁹ When these U.S.-funded and France-funded dictators of Somalia and Rwanda fell, the internal conflicts came to surface. The rivalry for power between the ruling families and opposition led to the civil wars. Then the question arises as to what led the UNSC to intervene in a civil war and what caused the ignorance of genocide. The answer lies in the timing of these two dramatic events.

5.2 Intervention in civil war

What Somalia has experienced is a clear example of a civil war. They were struggling for power inside and this struggle led to the death of 41,000 people in two months.³⁶⁰ Although the country had lost its strategic importance after the Cold War, there were many newspapers talking about the starvation problem and the struggle for survival. According to George Kennan, the mass coverage of the suffering people in Somalia by the media led to the emotional reaction in the form of intervention.³⁶¹ Of course, it is not the only reason; however, it is one of the reasons that the U.S. public opinion shaped the foreign policy at that time, motivating it to intervene. The duty was sacred and it was the mission of humanity to end this suffering. However, the people of Somalia did not ask for this kind of intervention. They did not ask for

³⁵⁷ Hammer, “A Generation of Failure”, *Newsweek*, August 1, 1994, 32.

³⁵⁸ Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia*, 221-22.

³⁵⁹ Prunier, 87.

³⁶⁰ News, “Somalians Face Starvation”, *USA Today*, 27 March 1992

³⁶¹ Steven Livingston, *Limited Vision: How Both the American Media and Government Failed Rwanda*, 188.

soldiers coming with name of humanitarian causes to solve their power struggle; the only thing they had asked for was the safe delivery of the relief. However, the White House and Pentagon made the calculations and decided that the operation was feasible on the basis of geography and money; therefore, the Operation Restore Hope started under the leadership of the U.S. However, this intervention resulted in the Battle of Mogadishu, mostly because of the fact that “intervening forces refused to respect the political presence of various political factions”.³⁶² There was a need to deliver food for starving people, that is certain; however, the type of the action, the insistence of the U.S. on taking care of the aid by its own resulted in the murder of 19 U.S. soldiers on October 3, 1993.³⁶³ This tragic event constituted a turning point in the foreign policy of United States. From then on, the U.S. revised its ultimate humanitarian missions and decided only to give financial support.

When the UNSC gathered for giving a decision about the situation in Rwanda only two days after the Battle of Mogadishu, the U.S. approved only the financial aid.³⁶⁴ Therefore, one can say that it was “the ghost of Somalia that led the Clinton Administration to stand by and watch Hutu militias and Rwandan security forces slaughter over a million Rwandan civilians between April and July 1994”.³⁶⁵ The same behaviour was also observed for Belgium in Rwanda. After the death of 10 blue helmets, “Belgian Chief of Staff told the army would never again take part in any peace-keeping operations under a UN command”.³⁶⁶

As we can see once more the calculations during the decision making for the intervention were made in accordance with the priorities of the nation that takes the

³⁶² Şeker, 180.

³⁶³ Ibid., 176.

³⁶⁴ United Nations, SC Resolution 872.

³⁶⁵ Wheeler, 172.

³⁶⁶ Prunier, 274.

decision. Therefore, while it was an easy decision to intervene in a civil war, it took long time to intervene in a clear genocide. Even on June 10, 1994, spokeswoman of State Department Christine Shelly was arguing, “Although there have been acts of genocide in Rwanda, all the murders cannot be put into that category”.³⁶⁷ Even if it was a civil war, as for a long time the UNSC considered it to be, the question is then what led the UNSC to intervene in the Somalian civil war and not to intervene in the Rwandan. The answer is clear: “Unless vital interests are at stake, states will not intervene if this risks soldiers’ lives or incurs significant economic costs, there will be a selective use of legally defined right of humanitarian intervention in accordance with national interests, it is the duty of people of that state, we do not have a duty to saving stranger”.³⁶⁸ Therefore, the tragedy of Rwanda caused by late decisions was not “a case of an error of commission but of omission”.³⁶⁹ For this reason, it is not surprising that an American officer could openly say that “the lives of 800,000 Rwandans were only worth risking the lives of then American troops”.³⁷⁰ It was the same reason why Belgians withdrew after their 10 soldiers were killed and were not interested in the humanitarian cause.

Then the question comes to the point why the French became involved in this humanitarian cause. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, there is more than the humanitarian causes involved in the intervention. Prunier says it is a weakness for France to look for humanitarian causes for an armed return to Africa and according to him, “France had needed no such rationale for sending its troops to Kigali – its ‘special relationship’ with Africa was enough”.³⁷¹ It is strange enough

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Wheeler, 29-31.

³⁶⁹ Grunfeld, Fredand Huijboom, 23.

³⁷⁰ Dallaire, 522.

³⁷¹ Prunier, 103.

that France did not want to be involved in a humanitarian action in a place with which it has a special relationship. However, the answer is clear that the special relationship is between the ruling class of Rwanda and France, not between the suffering people of Africa and France, just as the U.S. had a “moral obligation to help Somalia because it has contributed to the dictatorship of Barre”.³⁷² Therefore, one should accept that the Western states “have fallen back on the yardstick of national self-interest to measure which portion of the planet they allow themselves to be concerned about”.³⁷³

Another common characteristic of the interventions was the fact that the U.S. and France, which led forces, were directly reporting to their home countries³⁷⁴, not to the UN. Furthermore, the intervention by France is suspect was the RPF in terms of being a “purely humanitarian mission” because, as Dallaire mentions, “a number of officers who became part of Turquoise had been French military advisers to the Rwandan Government Forces until the start of the war”.³⁷⁵ Jacques Bihozagara, the European representative for the RPF, also declared, “We will consider French soldiers on our soil as invaders”³⁷⁶ and supported the claim made by Dallaire.

Taking these common behaviours of the intervention in these two cases into regard, one could say that during the 1990s, humanitarian intervention could also include self-interest; however, as Walzer says, “Even if a state intervenes for a mix of self-interested and humanitarian motives, the intervention may still be labeled ‘humanitarian’ if there are humanitarian benefits”.³⁷⁷

³⁷² Jack Kelley, “Clan chief: U.S. bears moral burden to help”, *USA Today*, September 21, 1992.

³⁷³ Dallaire, 517.

³⁷⁴ William Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, 387.

³⁷⁵ Dallaire, 427.

³⁷⁶ Stanger, Theodore and Hammer, “Nice Idea, Wrong Army”, *Newsweek*, July 4, 1994, 48.

³⁷⁷ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration*, 104-8.

5.3 Tracing the clues of the realist theory in humanitarian intervention

Having the two detailed cases of inclusion of self-interest of states into seemingly pure liberal causes, now it would be useful to go back to the theory of humanitarian intervention and revise it in accordance with the states' behaviour. It is obvious that since the first humanitarian intervention (Somalia), there has been no clear rule to intervene and since the acceptance of the Genocide Convention, there has been no clear application when it was necessary. These two cases were examined to look for the motivations for the intervention; therefore, in a sense it is accepted that there is an intention to intervene, whether for pure humanitarian causes or national interest.

In the beginning, it was stated that this research would make use of Hoffman's criteria while analysing the interventions. For analysing a military intervention, Hoffman says the historical origins matter, as well as "actual political ends, appropriateness of the means to the ends, proportionality and long-term effects on the target".³⁷⁸ When the historical linkages between the intervener and the intervened are checked and the means applied to stop the suffering are looked at, realist implications are found, such as the self-interest of nation-states and acting in accordance with the public opinion. One can say that the public opinion or the involvement of such an end to stop suffering of strangers could not apply with the rules of realism. However, in a post-Cold War world, realism, as it has always been, is developing its application areas. It has been revising itself according to the conditions and it has prevailed in this way for many years. Of course, the realism of the times of Machiavelli is not the same realism of a bipolar world and also not same for the post-Cold War world. Therefore, the only thing shown in these cases is that

³⁷⁸ Hoffman, 20-1.

states intervene only under the conditions that their interest calculations make it fit for them to intervene. It is not purely self-interest because “careful realists have always recognized that the ‘id’ of state self-interest must conform to a ‘superego’ of general normative principles of state behavior in order for the state to function effectively and avoid destruction”.³⁷⁹ Therefore, it is possible to say that for the Somalia and Rwanda intervention, the international community decided to intervene when the motivation of intervene overlapped with their states’ interest and when it was justifiable as a legitimate action and had a reference to the principles of international order.³⁸⁰ For Somalia, it is obvious that interest is included from the very beginning; however, one should find a reference in the principles of international order. For Rwanda, on the other hand, intervention was allowed by the principles of international order and there was enough legitimacy to intervene; however, the international community waited until the motivations to intervene fit with their national interests. Therefore, not the liberal ethics for intervention is used, but the realist ethics supports the thesis that there are realist concerns included in purely liberal causes.

To conclude, the reality is that there is still no clear guidance on when to intervene; instead, there is evidence for states’ reluctance about humanitarian causes. The humanitarian rhetoric, when the leaders made use of it while justifying sending soldiers to a distant continent, is only remembered in the times when they consider intervention suitable for their goals. Therefore, the horror and tragedy that humankind faced with since the end of the Cold War are doomed to be forgotten

³⁷⁹ Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention”, *Ethics & International Affairs*; 19, 2, 2005, 57.

³⁸⁰ Criteria of Realist Ethics taken from Wesley, 58.

until a time comes when a threat arises to Western legacy in the Dark Continent. As a conclusion, this is also supported directly by the quote from Gérard Prunier to make this claim clear:

Cynical as it may sound, if the RPF had not existed or if they had been able to defeat it militarily, the plotters would probably have succeeded. After the genocide, there would have been a period of shocked reprobation; then possibly a UN-sanctioned (partial) economic boycott; then many violations of the boycott, some probably discreetly organized from Paris, then renewed relations with some non-respectable countries such as Serbia, China or Iran (building one or two mosques might have done the trick); and then, arguing on the basis of their 'traditional ties' the French, the Belgians and possibly the Germans would have come back too. After all, Hutu power, genocidal or not, presents no threat to European interest. Who remembers the half-million Chinese killed on the orders of President Suharto of Indonesia in 1965? Or the hundreds of thousands of natives the same President has massacred in Timor over the years? Aung San Suu Ky is still under house arrest despite her Nobel Prize, and the Rangoon military dictatorship is still in power after slaughtering thousands of its own unarmed citizens who dared to ask for a free society. It is not necessary to be as powerful as China for the foreigners to forget about one's little Tien An Mens.³⁸¹

³⁸¹Prunier, p. 228-9

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Based on internationally legitimate actions, humanitarian intervention carries out one of the noblest intentions, seeking to rescue populations that are getting eradicated by their compatriots. However, it remains a controversial issue in international politics. The main issues in the debate on humanitarian intervention focus on either the question what motivations to intervene, i.e. interest or empathy/help, are the driving force behind the intervention or on whether intervention in a sovereign state is legally justifiable. In this research, a structured, focused comparison is used for the humanitarian interventions conducted by the United Nations in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) and the answer for the motivations to intervene is sought within the framework of the realist international politics theory. At the end, this research shows the prevalence of realism in one of the most liberal causes in current international politics – humanitarian intervention.

Although the main debate regarding humanitarian intervention focuses on ethics and legality, this research did not dwell on whether intervention is ethical or not or on whether it is legal or not. After covering different interpretations of humanitarian intervention on the basis of ethics and law, this research focused on understanding when the international society of states intervenes in domestic affairs of a sovereign state and with which aims they do so.

First of all, in this research, humanitarian intervention is considered as a military intervention that is conducted to end physical suffering of people caused by the misuse of state's authority. The liberal cause for humanitarian intervention stems from the fact that it aims to end the mass-scale human rights abuses carried out by

the domestic government. It is assumed that such a liberal cause should not be based on the interest of the parties involved in the intervention. However, to what extent interest-free interventions can occur in the prevailing structure of the United Nations remains a question. That is especially, taking into account not only the unanimity rule of the Security Council but also the lack of ability of the UNSC to take the decision of intervention without a state that offers to intervene and share most of the economic and military burden. To put it in another way, if there is no interest for the individual states to intervene in another sovereign state to end suffering due to human rights abuses, to what extent do they take action? In the quest for answers to these questions, this thesis enquires into the existence of realist steps in a pure liberal action. In this enquiry, two case studies – Somalia and Rwanda – help to understand the process behind the decision making in intervention. The primary concern of this research is to understand how the mechanism of intervention works at the global level rather than to look at the results of the intervention.

Intervention is also a threat to sovereignty, which is a key element for the continuation of the current political dynamics that have prevailed since the Peace of Westphalia with the creation of the nation-state structure. Therefore, the debate on humanitarian intervention in international politics should cover the discussions in favour of intervention and against intervention for humanitarian reasons. Those who are against the idea of intervention on the basis of the argument that nobody should intervene in the struggle for freedom of a society and each society should take its own struggle in their own societies are the classical liberals, such as J.S. Mill and Immanuel Kant. Conversely, realist arguments that oppose the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention are based on the fact that if there were a legally defined right of humanitarian intervention, states could make use of it for their national

interests. On the other hand, the morality debate comprises the arguments on whether intervention is a duty or a right. While Hugo Grotius argues that under the conditions of violence used by a tyrant against his people, other states have a right to intervene, many contemporary thinkers claim under the condition of mass abuse of human rights, other states have a duty to save the people from suffering.

Whether it is a duty or a right to stop the suffering of people, one can say that it is moral to do so. In this case, this thesis argues that ethical virtues sometimes could be a part of politics and national interest. Therefore, the realist paradigm for this research refers to the time and case-based interest calculation, and throughout the research, it is assumed that every single factor could be a part of the interest calculation, because a state intervenes on behalf of itself and for itself. This interest calculation does not only include becoming more powerful in the international arena, as earlier realists put it, but in the post-Cold War period, the interest calculation also includes actions based on public opinion. The CNN effect is one of the most significant examples of such a calculation, because it is for the benefit of the ruler to get the sympathy and support of the public by acting in line with the voters' ideas and motivations.

To understand the interest calculation at the practical level, the Somalia and Rwanda humanitarian interventions will be helpful. A research on humanitarian intervention should include the case of Somalia because it constitutes a reference point due to its being the first humanitarian intervention after the Cold War. When the civil war broke out after the fall of Siad Barre, to guarantee the distribution of relief effectively, the U.S. was willing to lead an operation in Somalia. Although the people of Somalia were waging their own civil war and a military intervention by a foreign state or a group of states was not a matter of choice for them, the United

States of America managed to convince both the international society of states and its own people to intervene and led the operation. The peacekeeping operation under UNITAF was not welcome in Somalia and the civilian discontent paved the way for the Battle of Mogadishu, which resulted in the death of 19 U.S. rangers. When the “humanitarian” duty of “saving strangers” – as Nicholas J. Wheeler refers to it – turned into be a disaster for its own people, the U.S. refrained from being a part of military intervention decisions, but preferred to provide financial aid as a result.

The second case study is the Rwanda humanitarian intervention, in which the delayed decision by the UNSC led to genocide. In this case, although it is allowed for the signatories of the Genocide Convention to intervene to stop the genocide, the international society of states had been calling it a civil war for a long time and disregarded the reports of the UN force commander, who was urging the UNSC and asking for more peacekeepers. Even if it was a civil war, there could have been an intervention just like in the case of Somalia; however, the world agenda was very busy with the conflict in Bosnia and it was not preferred to send soldiers to Rwanda, especially after the experience of the Battle of Mogadishu. The holy duty of “saving strangers” turned out to be a burden for the United Nations Security Council and they ignored the mass killings until the huge media coverage revealed the tragedy. When the world public opinion made it impossible to close the eyes and ears to the massacre, under the initiative of France, whose Prime Minister formerly refused to intervene in the inner conflict in Rwanda, the UNSC took the decision of intervention and extended the functions of UNAMIR. Even when the Security Council took the decision to intervene, it was not taken unanimously, and the main reason for abstaining for countries such as China and Brazil is the fact that they did not want to face the same experience as the one which the UNSC and the U.S. faced

in Somalia. Finally, the constitution of a peacekeeping force took two months, and France decided to lead the forces and do the peacekeeping in a war which was allegedly caused by French-trained government forces in Rwanda.

The cases of Somalia and Rwanda suggest that states decide to intervene in a civil war because it fits their national interest and domestic public opinion is favourable toward intervention for ending massive human suffering. By closely examining the stages of conflict leading to intervention and looking at the decision-making process, this research showed the common ground for these two interventions. Further research is possible to extend the scope of the cases.

This thesis discussed the birth of intervention habits in the post-Cold War era and tried to show linkages between the humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Rwanda by emphasizing how the learnings and experiences in the former caused the delay of the necessary intervention in the latter. Through these two cases, it is possible to come across with realist steps by nation-state actors for a liberal cause in international politics. As a result, as long as the contradiction between the theoretical ground for intervention and its practice continues, humanitarian intervention decisions will continue to be taken on the basis of national interest calculation.

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