

MIGRANTS AND THE CITY: GENTRIFICATION, ETHNICITY
AND CLASS IN A BERLIN NEIGHBORHOOD

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AND CLASS IN A BERLIN NEIGHBORHOOD

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Migrants and the City: Gentrification, Ethnicity and Class in a Berlin
Neighborhood

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ABSTRACT

Migrants and the City:

Gentrification, Ethnicity and Class in a Berlin Neighborhood

The term gentrification has found its way into everyday vocabulary. However, neither in the academic nor in the non-academic community does there seem to be a consensus about what gentrification is, how and why it happens and what the consequences for local populations are.

This thesis attempts to contribute to this debate by examining the relation between the gentrification of the working-class neighborhood Reuterquater in Berlin, Neukölln and the social exclusion of immigrants from Turkey. It uses Henri Lefebvre's sociology of space, particularly his notions of abstract and lived space, to understand why, how and with what effects on the local population Reuterquater is gentrifying. Research is based on qualitative methods, combining field work in the form of 80 semi-structured interviews to understand the repercussions of gentrification on the local populace and the analysis of secondary material such as newspaper articles, policy reports, websites and brochures to trace the evolution of this process.

This dissertation firstly argues that research on gentrification must take into account both: economic and cultural change. Secondly, this work shows that the German state, despite its long welfare tradition, has played a pivotal role in Reuterquater's gentrification. Lastly, this study argues that gentrification's consequences go beyond physical displacement and encompass effects such as overcrowding, emotional displacement and diversion to informal work. These effects can only be unraveled by research on the neighborhood-level, taking the experiences of residents into account.

ÖZET

Göçmenler ve Şehir:

Bir Berlin Mahallesiinde Kentsel Dönüşüm, Etnisite ve Sınıf

Kentsel dönüşüm veya 'soylulaştırma' günlük kelime hazinemizde yerini buldu ancak ne akademik ne de akademik dışı camialarda kentsel dönüşümün tam olarak ne olduğu, nasıl ve niye olduğu ne de yerel halklar için doğurduğu sonuçlar hakkında bir uzlaşma var.

Bu tez bu tartışmaya katkı sağlamak üzere Berlin, Neukölln ilçesinde bulunan Reuter mahallesiindeki kentsel dönüşümüne ve orada oturan Türkiye göçmenlerinin sosyal dışlanmışlıkları ile bu kentsel dönüşümün arasındaki ilişkiye bakıyor. Çalışma Henri Lefebvre'nin mekan sosyolojisini ve özellikle soyut ve yaşanan mekan kavramlarına dayanarak, Reuter mahallesiinin niye, nasıl ve ne etkilerle dönüştüğünü anlamlandırmayı hedefliyor. Araştırma niteliksel metotlar kullanarak, Reuter mahallesiinde yapılan 80 yüz-yüze görüşmeyle yerel halk için dönüşümün sonuçlarının ne olduğunu anlamaya çalışıyor ve aynı zamanda gazete makaleleri, politik analiz raporları, internet siteleri ve broşürler gibi ikincil kaynakların analizini yaparak Reuter mahallesiinin niye ve nasıl kentsel dönüşüm sürecine girdiğini açıklıyor.

Bu doktora tezi ilk olarak kentsel dönüşüm üzerine yapılan çalışmaların hem ekonomik hem kültürel değişimleri bir arada okuması gerektiğini savunuyor. İkinci olarak, bu araştırma Alman devletinin, uzun refah devleti geleneğine rağmen, kentsel dönüşümde ne kadar önemli bir rol oynadığını gösteriyor. Son olarak bu tez kentsel dönüşümünün yerden edinmenin ötesinde, konut darlığı, kayıt dışı emek ve duygusal yabancılaşma gibi sonuçlar doğurduğunu ve bu sonuçların sadece mahalle düzeyinde yapılan araştırmalarla ortaya koyulabileceğini savunuyor.

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Kızıma

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2014 it had been 50 years since German-born sociologist Ruth Glass for the first time coined the word 'gentrification' to describe the development of upper-class neighborhoods in inner city London. In the five decades in between, gentrification has grown into one of the most popular subjects in social science. Scholars have tackled this process, which typically entails a class-remake of inner city working-class areas in favor of middle- or upper class use, eventually leading to rising rent levels, indirect or direct displacement and a change of the consumption infrastructure and the built environment, from multifarious angles. In the 1970s and 1980s the main divide among gentrification scholars was among Marxist scholars such as Neil Smith (1979) and liberal scholars such as David Ley (1987) who defended production-side and consumption-side explanations for gentrification respectively. Smith has argued that gentrification is caused by inner city disinvestment and the evolvment of a "rent gap" which opens up the opportunity for reinvestment, while Ley contended that gentrification is a result of the fragmentation of the middle class and their novel consumption patterns raising the demand for inner city living. From the late 1980s

onwards researchers such as Sharon Zukin (1987) have made successful attempts to integrate the two approaches combining to some extent economic and cultural analysis. Since then the field of gentrification studies has been fairly colorful, reaching from scholars who have focused on forms of displacement (Marcuse, 1986; Atkinson, 2000) to those who have provided detailed historical analyses of gentrifying neighborhoods (Mele, 2000; Smith, 1996). Recently the focus on urban policy in fueling or containing gentrification has increased (Slater, 2006). The reason is, according to Smith and Hackworth (2001), that the role of the state in this current phase of gentrification has become more pronounced. Most literature as of today still stems from the American context but studies from Europe and other world regions are on the rise (Van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003; Islam, 2010; Miraftab, 2007).

Despite a constantly growing corpus of literature and the rise of more integrative approaches, no conclusion seems to have been reached on the causes and consequences of the gentrification process. Former senior associate editor of the digital *CITYLAB* Magazine and editor at the *Washington Post*, Amanda Erickson accordingly recently stated that gentrification is the word to rethink in the upcoming years for urban researchers since it has become “so ubiquitous that it's lost most of its real meaning.” (Erickson cited in *CITYLAB*, 2013).

This thesis attempts to contribute to this rethinking by examining the relation between the social exclusion of immigrants from Turkey¹ and the gentrification of an inner city neighborhood in the Neukölln borough of Berlin called Reuterquarter.

Following an integrative approach between economics and culture, this study uses Henri Lefebvre's (1994, 2003) unitary theory of space to theorize the gentrification process in Reuterquarter, particularly his notions of abstract and lived space. This study firstly depicts how Reuterquarter's abstraction as immigrant ghetto on the one hand and multicultural neighborhood on the other has fed into the gentrification process and, secondly, shows how the gentrification process relates to the lived experiences of immigrant residents.

Research Interest

Reuterquarter is a densely populated area in Berlin and has long been subject to territorial stigmatization by agents of the media and the state. The neighborhood is located in the very North of the Neukölln borough. Similar to its neighboring borough Kreuzberg, Neukölln has for long been inhabited by the socio-economically weak and is historically working-class. Partially

¹ By 'immigrants from Turkey' I mean all residents of Germany of the neighborhood who have origins in Turkey, be it in the first, second or third generation.

destroyed during World War Two, Neukölln was rebuilt after 1949 as part of the American Sector. Despite this destruction, one of Neukölln's characteristics is its relatively numerous housing stock left intact from the mid-19th century, particularly in the north part of the district.

While being relatively poor, Neukölln, at the beginning of the 20th century, still consisted of entrepreneurially relatively lively neighborhoods, a status that could, however, not be revived in the post-war period (Taube, 2007: 20). The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the same year in which Germany signed the guest worker agreement with the Turkish Republic, however, changed Neukölln's position in Berlin for worse. Neukölln residents who could afford to leave moved further west and property owners began to neglect the already quite old housing stock. Guest workers who started to arrive in Germany only a few years after the war to confront the labor shortage of the booming economy moved into the now even less desirable boroughs along the western side of the wall (see Figure 1). Most

new in-movers were from Turkey (Kapphan, 2000 and 2001).




Figure 1 West-Berlin boroughs before 1990.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

After reunification, Reuterquarter, in the north of Neukölln, turned into a central and hence more valuable area. Accordingly, the mismatch between the neighborhood's potential value and its poor residents started to become a concern for the city. Urban planners after reunification drew attention to Berlin's impoverishment and the weak socio-economic indicators of immigrant-heavy boroughs and inner-city neighborhoods, such as Reuterquarter. From the mid-1990s onwards studies on, "socially burdened" areas became more numerous with more focus on smaller units such as Reuterquarter (Lanz, 2007: 146, see for example the "social structure atlas"

[*Sozialstrukturatlas*] commissioned for Berlin since 1995). Kreuzberg by then had already entered a gentrification process, luring in students, alternatives and tourists who wanted to experience the new Berlin. With the south of Kreuzberg gentrifying and becoming symbol of the creative and multicultural image urban planners tried to attach to Berlin, Neukölln in the late 1990s took on the spot of being Germany's national ghetto Lanz, 2007: 245-251).

However, about ten years later this seems to have changed, given that North Neukölln and specifically Reuterquarter since the mid-2000s has been into a gentrification process (Gude, 2011), similar to Kreuzberg. The average household income, having been below average for decades, was recorded to have risen one percent over the Berlin average in 2013 (Niewendick, 2013).

My first question has accordingly been why this neighborhood has transformed in this way and how this has happened. My second concern has been how the gentrification process is experienced and understood by the local population, more particularly long-term immigrant residents from Turkey and their following generations. To answer these two empirical concerns I use Henri Lefebvre's (1994, 2003) unitary and three-dimensional sociology of space as a theoretical lens.

Significance of the Research

One of the purposes of this study is to contribute to the development of more integrative approaches to theorize gentrification. Though these approaches have certainly increased (e.g. Zukin, 1982, 2008, 2009; Davidson, 2007), there is still space for development. Specifically, the links between Lefebvre's multilayered sociology of space and gentrification, and more particularly his notion of abstract and lived space, warrants more scholarly exploration, which I aim to achieve in this study. Accordingly, rather than viewing gentrification as either a production- (Smith, 1996) *or* consumption-led process (Ley, 1987), I utilize Lefebvre's approach to integrate culture and capital in my understanding of gentrification. Reuterquarter's way from territorial stigmatization to a gentrifying space shows that we not only need to take account of material but also of discursive change and the images that are involved in the class remake of a neighborhood. Lefebvre's theory provides the proper theoretical and methodological tools to create a multidimensional picture of the gentrification process on the ground. I here particularly draw on his notions of abstract and lived space. Abstract space for Lefebvre is space as defined by powerful groups on the global level such as national and international capital actors, urban planners, the media and the state. Lived space on the other hand, is space as it is constituted and experienced by residents of urban space. For Lefebvre, abstract and lived

spaces are in a dialectical relationship, but the domination of the latter by the former is a constitutive characteristic of capitalism. The assumption that an abstract space exists apart from the lived experience of inhabitants and their social interactions creates the illusion of objective space. In other words, the representation of certain spaces as, for example ghetto is never homogenous but aims at creating a uniform image. At the point we accept these definitions as objective, we support the concealment of the social complexity that is behind these representations. Gentrification then is an expression of the erasure of the lived by the abstract. Capitalist space, for example, a given neighborhood, becomes an exchangeable commodity as opposed to being a product of use value for its inhabitants. It is abstract because it is reduced to homogenous, transparent definitions. Just as the capitalist system works through the abstraction of labor, so is space as a product of labor (produced by its residents throughout time) abstracted under capitalism and the social relations behind it are “conceale[d]” (Jones and Popke 2010: 118).

In this dissertation I argue that Reuterquarter is a particularly poignant example of how abstraction in the Lefebvrian sense creates real consequences for real people. As depicted, the neighborhood has long been stigmatized as Turkish or immigrant ghetto. These abstract representations of Reuterquarter as ultimate symbol of urban decline have in turn legitimized policies that aim at diffusing and regulating the local population. So has the local government on the one hand commissioned a private agency to rent out vacant spaces to

artists and other creative workers in order to make Reuterquarter more attractive to middle-class newcomers. On the other hand, security measures have been increased such as private police patrolling in front of local schools and on public squares to regulate Reuterquarter's ghetto residents. Some of these security services are publicly commissioned and work on a non-profit basis; they employ Reuterquarter's unemployed population, particularly young immigrants. In that sense socio-economically weak groups are set up to expel other marginalized groups (often their own social group in case of young immigrants) from the neighborhood (Eick, 2003 and 2006). These policies, i.e. attracting creative workers and securitization, have supported the gentrification of the quarter because they firstly created the perception that the neighborhood is the "next big cultural thing" (Passig, 2007) in Berlin and secondly have mobilized civil society actors and residents for keeping the neighborhood safe and clean, making it more attractive for middle class newcomers while maintaining its marginal image as a place of subcultural activity. In this sense this study shows how inclusionary and exclusionary discourses and policies are applied simultaneously: on the one hand residents and other non-profit actors become stakeholders in valorizing their own neighborhood and on the other hand, marginalized populations are expelled from public spaces with other residents' help while at the same time these residents risk being confronted with the danger of being displaced

themselves as soon as rents rise, as has been the case for Reuterquarter recently.

When abstract conceptions of space come to dominate the lived experience of residents, as it is, according to Lefebvre, the case under capitalism, then policies and representations are not only constitutive of these spaces but also create — sometimes intended, sometimes unintended — consequences. Debating some of these consequences, I further show that gentrification is a mechanism of social exclusion expressed through space that must be studied beyond its most visible effect, which is arguably physical displacement. Betancur (2011) in this context has argued that while gentrification is widely problematized, there is still not enough critical empirical research on how low-income groups and particularly ethnic/racial minorities are affected in the specific. I suggest that on the neighborhood-level, gentrification has very complex effects on residents, effects that differ in case these residents are also members of an ethnic/racial minority. In that sense gentrification cannot be simplified or, in Lefebvre's terminology, abstracted to the substitution of less powerful groups by more powerful ones. Lived space is more complex: Even in cases where displacement is not immediate, the exclusionary nature of gentrification makes itself known on other more subtle levels, which can only be researched and identified on the neighborhood level. In this context I

- a) Discuss the effects of the changing consumption infrastructure on immigrant small business owners. I here show that even in cases in which local entrepreneurs, who often have a working-class background, adapt or try to adapt to the demands of middle class newcomers and/or tourists, they not only exclude low-income customers who still constitute the majority of inhabitants, but may also remain excluded themselves. Particularly first generation immigrants are in competition with new, often young, middle class entrepreneurs who are frequently disadvantaged. The reason is firstly that their way of conducting business may not fit the demands of newcomers and secondly, that their ability to deal with rent pressure is often limited by language skills and know-how on how to deal with the German legal system. These factors affect their ability to generate profit in a gentrifying neighborhood. Middle class residents with higher cultural and social capital (though not higher necessarily economic capital) here function as gatekeepers who through their demands and consumption patterns decide which businesses remain in the neighborhood and which do not.
- b) Show that gentrification entails a loss of formal and informal networks that are often crucial to long-term residents. Formal networks include institutions such as the local neighborhood house, parents' breakfasts in schools, immigrant or religious associations as well as institutions

set up by the local government targeting unemployed immigrant populations. Informal networks include those relations that long-term inhabitants have built among themselves: meetings during the Friday prayer in the mosque, neighborly relations as well as relations with relatives that live nearby. Both forms of networks can contribute to low-income immigrants' ability to overcome obstacles in daily life – kin help to fill out welfare benefit forms or the local neighborhood house offers homework assistance to their children. Atkinson (2000) has described the erosion of these networks as the “hidden costs of gentrification” – a neighborhood may not necessarily become richer with more affluent people moving in but on the contrary become poorer in resources that are crucial for the poor. It is important to note that these networks are gendered. Women's and particularly immigrant women's networks are often looser and less stable, for which reason that is why spatial proximity is more crucial to their quality of life. This also indicates that formal and informal networks should be evaluated with caution and not seen as a solution to bridge systemic social inequality.

- c) Show that particularly welfare-dependent long-term residents might develop coping strategies to deal with rent pressure that have severe social consequences, such as overcrowding and diversion to informal work. Overcrowding is entangled with gentrification in so far as it can

provide a short-term solution to staying in a given neighborhood: rents increase and a family moves in with their relatives or does not change the apartment despite having new offspring. Informal work on the other hand can help to pay the difference in cases where families or individuals experience rent increase. The German unemployment agencies have regulations on how much rent they pay for their clients, depending on the number of people in the household, accordingly receivers of benefits may seek solution in informal work to stay in a given apartment. These are again particularly prominent strategies among immigrants because in case of overcrowding they typically have larger households and/or often have relatives in the same neighborhood. In case of informal work, they are often able to utilize their networks in the ethnic economy. Though these strategies help to stay in the neighborhood, they also reproduce social inequality. Workers in the informal economy are more easily exploited and overcrowding entails that particularly school children and adolescents have only little space to study and thus to be successful in school, a precondition for integration in the job market in the later course of their life. These findings show that in the gentrification process there are not only two categories – long-term residents and newcomers or victims and perpetrators – but that perceptions, coping strategies and consequences differ with the social, economic and cultural capital

long-term immigrant residents possess or not possess (Bourdieu, 1986). Differences in language skills or know-how of the legal system, for example, can decide on whether one is able to keep his/her tenant contract or not. On the other hand, diversion to informal work or overcrowding is based on capital such as knowing someone in the informal work sector or having relatives in the neighborhood. These strategies, however, might in turn lead to exploitation or limit the choices of future generations who have to live cramped up in one room with their siblings, recreating a cycle of poverty and exclusion.

Furthermore, this research attempts to contribute to gentrification research in the European context. Most accounts on gentrification still stem from North America (Maloutas, 2011). Germany in particular is rather understudied though its long welfare tradition makes it an interesting case to consider, given that it is one of the most advanced capitalist economies worldwide but has taken a different developmental trajectory than the United States. Moreover, as Loretta Lees had already noted in 2000, there is still –almost 15 years later – more need for research on the relationship between gentrification and race/ethnicity (see also Betancur, 2011). Many Marxist studies seem to shy away from explicitly addressing this nexus because of the danger of omitting that gentrification is not an issue of ethnic or racial identity but a class remake of inner city working-class

neighborhoods, a fact that has been proved through numerous empirical studies that do not focus on minority-heavy areas (e.g. Holm, 2006). My aim, rather than making an argument for the equality of class and race as two different systems of exclusion, is to understand for the German case how racial/ethnic stigmatization is employed to justify gentrification on the local level. Neoliberal urban policies and ethnic/cultural exclusion are not viewed as two distinct phenomena but as mutually enabling processes serving to reproduce inequality in support of the capitalist economy. Particularly in Germany, access to low-income immigrant groups is, however, frequently limited by the language skills of researchers, making it difficult to understand their viewpoint. I hope to contribute to advancing this understanding through my own bi-lingualism. Last but not least, my research attempts to contribute to German migration/immigrant literature. Many accounts deal with the question of integration and assimilation into the host society or with the consequences of the exclusion of immigrants from German citizenship (Thränhardt, 1989; De Wit and Koopmans, 2005; Ersanilli and Saharaso, 2011; Öner 2014). Recently, however, there has been an increase of so-called transnational literature or literature that goes beyond the integration debate dealing with the constitution of post-immigrant spaces and identities (Kaya, 1997; Soysal, 2004; Mandel 2008). Much of this literature gives priority to cultural and social transformation, with a few exceptions (see for example Lanz, 2007; Eksner 2013). Research on Germany is

accordingly still in need for finding answers on how immigrants on the local level have become subject to different strategies of exclusion with the transformation of German capitalism in the last decades.

Research Methodology

To engage with the mutually enabling processes of spatial stigmatization and gentrification and the subsequent exclusion of low-income immigrants, I have chosen to conduct a case study in Berlin, with a focus on immigrants. Reuterquarter is, as described above, a pivotal example for studying how discourses of decline and stigmatization are connected to neoliberal interventions in urban space. The reason I am focusing on immigrants from Turkey is for two obvious reasons: Firstly, they are by far the largest group of immigrants in Germany and also by far the most stigmatized. They are also the group that experiences the most severe extent of discrimination on the housing market, as I will further show in this study. Hence, the differential effects of gentrification on marginalized populations can best be studied by looking at their case. Secondly, I am myself daughter of Turkish immigrants who grew up in Germany. Accordingly, my access to this social group is facilitated through my bi-lingualism and my fairly good knowledge of the field. Furthermore, I have chosen the German case because Germany is compared to pioneer states of neoliberalism such as the US and the UK, a

country with a strong welfare tradition including a quite thoroughly regulated housing market. Hence I expected that the implementation and course of neoliberal urban policies is likely to take a different pace. As indicated above, the findings I got from my own research indicate that while gentrification in Reuterquarter indeed proceeds at a slower pace and is likely to do so in the future, German public policies and discourses have played a significant role in pushing the gentrification of the neighborhood.

Though many issues I raise in this study are questions equally valid for other national contexts, this is not a comparative but an explorative case study. Explorative case studies are useful when in-depth investigation is needed. Since my specific field was at the moment of my inquiry and still is in the midst of a substantial transformation process, there are not yet detailed accounts (for some input see Eksner, 2013; conference presentations by Huning and Schuster, 2012; Master's thesis by Förster, 2010). Though the issue of gentrification in Reuterquarter has raised major interest among journalists, politicians, academics and the wider public in general, I expect that we will see more research results in a few years to come. Moreover, there is a theoretical reason why this is not a comparative study, one that derives from my use of Lefebvre: if we want to understand what gentrification really entails and means for long-term residents of different social and economic standing in society, we need to dig into their lived space. Comparison, however, always means abstraction as well.

Focusing on a neighborhood does not mean, however, that I do not embed the evolution of the neighborhood and the perception of the inhabitants in a wider global, national and city-wide context. I look at Reuterquarter and the meaning residents ascribe to the gentrification process within the context of

- 1) global trends in urban policies (chapter two)
- 2) the history of racist discourses and territorial stigmatization attached to Turkish immigrants and their following generations in Germany since the 1961 guest worker agreement, residential segregation and the transformation of the German welfare state (chapter three)
- 3) the neoliberal restructuring of the capital city Berlin (chapter four)
- 4) the territorial stigmatization of the borough Neukölln and the neighborhood in particular (chapter five).

These different layers of analysis, merging existing empirical results from across the globe with national and local developments, I believe have helped me to support my analysis and make sense of how inhabitants from Turkey understand and cope with the gentrification process in Reuterquarter.

This is furthermore a study that can be located in the branch of what Knoblauch (2005) called “focused ethnography”. Focused ethnography means that the researcher is in the field for a shorter amount of time vis-à-vis classical ethnographic research and usually revisits a couple of times for brief periods to observe continuities and changes. Focused ethnography also

means that the researcher does not necessarily spend a long time on observation but typically directly approaches people with questions that are relevant to the research. Accordingly, a larger amount of data is collected in a shorter amount of time. Field notes are important but not as crucial as in standard ethnographic research, instead taping, taking pictures, filming as well as collecting physical evidence such as brochures or flyers is more helpful in focused ethnography. In this sense, focused ethnography attempts to uncover differences within a “backdrop of commonality” (Knoblauch, 2005). I have chosen this approach because I was fairly familiar with some of the dynamics in my field, such as the some of the contentious issues between the German majority society and immigrants from Turkey, the transformation Berlin has undergone in the last 25 years as well as the territorial stigmatization of Neukölln and particularly Reuterquarter, though I had never physically been in the neighborhood before my research. In fact, it has been this pre-knowledge that has intrigued my interest in this specific neighborhood.

All in all this qualitative research combines field work in the form of 80 semi-structured interviews to understand the repercussions of gentrification on Reuterquarter’s immigrant residents with roots in Turkey and the analysis of secondary material such as newspaper articles, policy reports, websites and brochures to trace the evolution of the gentrification process.

Comparative Outlook

In line with everything that has been said above, this study is a case study; however, I include a brief discussion of an additional case through secondary analysis that should serve to provide impetus for further research. This second case is the Prenzlauer Berg locality in East Berlin. The reason I chose to debate this case through secondary literature is because, firstly, it was one of the first areas in Berlin to gentrify after reunification. Secondly, Prenzlauer Berg, due to its specific ownership structure, has been one of the most rapidly gentrifying areas in Germany, with an estimated population exchange of up to 80 percent and is thus much more 'advanced' in the gentrification process (PFE, 2008). Thirdly, and most significantly for this study, Prenzlauer Berg before reunification had a low share of working-class immigrants and today still is mostly home to the German middle- and upper class, with a slightly rising share of middle class immigrants from other first-world countries. Accordingly, Prenzlauer Berg provides an interesting case to analyze gentrification in a context in which discourses of ghettoization and ethnic/racial discrimination are practically absent.

The discussion of Prenzlauer Berg firstly shows that while racist discourses and the discourse of the immigrant ghetto have been crucial in enabling gentrification in Neukölln and Reuterquater, gentrification is not per se and necessarily related to racism. It is a "class remake" (Smith, 1996:

37) that can happen irrespective of the ethnic/racial composition of the population and is led by economic factors. Secondly, it also shows that, at least for Berlin, creatives and sub-cultural lifestyles remain a crucial key-correlate of gentrification. Similar to Reuterquarter, artists as well as political activists have become part of the locality's marketing for investment. However, much different from Reuterquarter, Prenzlauer Berg was already known for its sub-cultural diversity before the gentrification process kicked in. In some aspects the process thus resembles more the gentrification of Kreuzberg, a hub of West German dissent and cultural activity since the 1980s, but with the crucial difference that Kreuzberg, like Neukölln and Reuterquarter, has been subjected to an extensive period of racial stigmatization, particularly before reunification, which cannot be argued for Prenzlauer Berg. Thirdly, despite the fact that ethnic or racial identity did not play a role in Prenzlauer Berg's gentrification, identity did: Since long-term residents are naturally former citizens of the GDR and newcomers are typically from West Germany, the Otherization of long-term residents by newcomers and vice versa has sometimes been packaged in terms of regional identity. On the one hand, East German residents of Prenzlauer Berg have been called out in the media to be relying on the state instead of taking their fate into their hands and on the other hand, in-moving West Germans have been labeled as "white-bread" unwilling to adapt to East German ways. This shows that identity, even in cases where old and new residents arguably

share a racial/ethnic identity, does not lose significance. Class and privilege is still frequently equalized with certain cultural traits. However, this analogy should not be exaggerated: much of this hostility was accompanied by an influential discourse of East and West Germans being one folk. Hence, with the tendencies of Otherization much of the intra-German tensions in the 1990s have been projected onto non-Germans as ultimate Others (Pinkert, 2002).

The Field

Reuterquarter is a large 70-hectare neighborhood that is home to approximately 19,000 inhabitants and thus densely populated. It is located in the very north part of the working class borough Neukölln and directly borders on Kreuzberg (see Figure 2).



Figure 2 Reuterquartier neighborhood, circumscribed in red lines.

Source: Wikimedia commons.

Neukölln, the borough in which Reuterquartier is located, has the highest unemployment rate in Berlin, with around 16 percent. The unemployment rate for Reuterquartier is estimated to be as high as 35 percent (*Quartiersmanagement Berlin* [district management Berlin], 2010). Crime rates are also relatively high by German standards. The age of crime committers is lower than in other boroughs of Berlin, with a higher number of suspects with migration history giving Neukölln the image of being particularly prone to immigrant youth criminality (Gennies, 2012). About a third of inhabitants of Reuterquartier are foreign nationals, if we add individuals with German citizenship who are self- and other identified as non-German the

numbers are probably as high as 60 percent. Among minors numbers are even estimated as high as 80 percent (Janovsky, 2011).²

My first and main visit to the neighborhood took place between November 2012 and February 2013 but I conducted short visits thereafter in the winter and summer of 2014. Before going to Berlin I could already sense the newly gained popularity of the borough, given that I had a hard time to find a flat share. Particularly the neighborhood where I would locate my study was in great demand and, accordingly, the monthly rent for a room was higher than in other parts of Neukölln and even higher than in many other parts of Berlin. Because I could not find a place to live in Reuterquarter for the first half of my stay, I moved to a room in the neighboring quarter (Schillerquarter), one metro station away from Reuterquarter. For the first half I lived with an Italian-Swiss music student who had moved to Berlin from Palermo a few years ago. For the second half I managed to find a room in Reuterquarter, moving in with an unemployed German woman in her late 30s. The fact that I changed apartments and moved in with flatmates with very different socio-economic backgrounds actually made it possible for me to see the two different sides of North Neukölln: young, well-educated and trans-nationally mobile on the one side, socially marginalized on the other. The experiences I gathered at home thus became part of my analysis. I had

² In contrast to the United States and Britain, data collection on ethnic/racial minorities is relatively scarce in Germany. While it is easy to get numbers on un-naturalized immigrants it is more difficult to access exact numbers for naturalized immigrants and their families.

encounters with 80 persons, most but not all of whom were of Turkish origin and who, in very different ways, provided me with information surrounding the questions of if, how and why Reuterquarter has undergone socio-economic change within the last few years and if and how it affects them. Among them were small business owners, artists, civil society activists, property owners and social workers, working-class as well as welfare-dependent residents. About one fourth of my encounters were not formal interviews in the sense that they were arranged, but spontaneous conversations, sometimes only a sentence or two that stuck in my mind and that turned out to be relevant for my research. These spontaneous encounters were thus un-taped; the remaining were generally recorded. Only in a very few cases did interviewees not want me to tape their answers and I took notes instead. The formal interviews lasted between 20 minutes and two hours. For the sake of simplicity all encounters, whether un-taped or taped, spontaneous or arranged, are labeled "interviews" and all persons I encountered and whose statements will be included into my analysis are named "interviewees".

The first and main group of interviewees were long-term residents of Reuterquarter with a Turkish background which I defined to be at least ten or more years in the neighborhood. These were chosen in two ways: middle-class small business owners, Turkish-owned stores were directly approached in most cases and interviews were conducted in the store. This was easy

when the business owner was present (which he or she typically was) and was not too busy. Only in very few instances did small business owners refuse to talk to me. In cases where store owners were busy, I revisited several times until I got an interview. These interviews were mostly one-on-one. To approach working-class and welfare-dependent immigrants from Turkey in the quarter was certainly more challenging. I achieved this mostly through local organizations targeting migrants such as the local neighborhood house, religious organizations or organizations helping welfare recipients with reintegration into the job market. It was mostly social workers with roots in Turkey and sometimes civil society activists who proved to be key informants and door openers for me. One social worker, a 48-year old woman, herself an immigrant from Turkey who worked part-time in the local neighborhood house, provided me with valuable access to the women in the neighborhood house and also introduced me to her wider (mostly middle-class Turkish) circle of friends who lived or used to live in the area. For my access to male interviewees, Kazım Erdoğan³, a fairly well-known social worker in Neukölln who has become famous for initiating Germany's first Turkish fathers' group addressing issues such as domestic violence, gambling, unemployment and divorce, was very helpful. He allowed me to participate in the weekly fathers' meetings where I learned a lot about some of the problems (reaching from gambling addiction to jail

³ Real name.

time) working-class, often unemployed, male residents faced. I must, however, admit that due to my own gender it was easier for me to access working-class or welfare-dependent women, rather than men. Low-income men often seemed to be more resigned, less interested in talking to me and more suspicious, while my access to male small business owners was fairly easy. Possibly, unemployed men did not want to share their misery with someone who is not only female and typically younger but also in an advantaged position, considering my educational and economic capital. In general, interviews with welfare recipients or working-class residents were group interviews or at least there were one or two listeners who would at times contribute. The reason for this is that this group seemed to feel more comfortable with acquaintances around them. In fact, the bigger the group the livelier the conversation would get, so I collected most accounts in events such as parents' breakfasts or meetings with ten or more participants. My questions were not identical in every interview and evolved over time and also changed according to the interviewee, but there was a core of questions that I would always address when interviewing long-term residents:

- When and how did you first come to Reuterquarter (if not born in the neighborhood)?
- Did you experience rent increase (for your apartment and/or store) in the last years?

- Would you consider living somewhere else in Berlin? If yes, where? If no, why not?
- What do you like/dislike about Reuterquarter?
- Have you experienced any changes in the neighborhood in the last couple of years or months? If yes, what are these changes? Do you think the neighborhood is better off than it was before, or is it worse off?

The second, smaller group I looked at were long-term residents who were artists and who had witnessed the marketing of Reuterquarter as “creative quarter” (which I will describe in chapter five). Here I worked mostly with the snowballing method: once I met one artist I was able to approach other artists who had been in the neighborhood for a long time. I directed all the above questions to these interviewees but would add questions circling around urban policies and recent artistic activity in the neighborhood.

Speaking to long-term inhabitants, regardless of class and ethnicity, uncovered many important patterns for me; however, to support my analysis I scheduled several interviews with third parties. That means people who were not necessarily living in Reuterquarter (though they sometimes did) but who could provide me with a structural overview. Included were among others Berlin tenant organizations, the operator of the local market, project leaders who had been commissioned with developing Reuterquarter, social workers, lawyers as well as real estate managers. Their accounts were

extremely helpful in establishing a chronological story line and double-check some of the important facts.

Lastly, a small group of newcomers was also included in the interviews, though I do not offer an extensive analysis of their position in this study. These were mostly approached through my own circle of friends or simply by visiting new establishments in the quarter.

My own position vis-à-vis the interviewees was arguably ambiguous: Since I share the linguistic background and am able to easily switch from German to Turkish and vice versa, I often felt that my interviewees were fairly open to my questions. Interestingly, it even seemed to be easier for me to approach and get a positive reaction from immigrant inhabitants of Reuterquarter – though we do not necessarily share the same class background and may have not much more in common than linguistic skills and some of the experience of belonging to a minority group in Germany – than I have experienced with some of my field work in Turkey during my Master's and PhD course studies. The reason for this might be that in the German context the constructed binary between “them Germans” and “us Turks” is more pronounced than the difference in material standing and educational capital. Simultaneously, however, due to my standing as an academic I was also able to access individuals in third-party positions as well as middle-class (old and new) residents of any ethnic/racial background. This sometimes put me in situations in which I felt almost invisible as someone

with a migratory background. As an example, I felt particularly at unease during my interview with a few property owners of Reuterquarter who made— in my estimation – racist remarks, arguing that Turks and other immigrants in the neighborhood devalue their property. On the other hand, I found it equally irritating when a Turkish interviewee made explicitly homophobic remarks, something I would in a normal situation take a clear stance against. But these are obviously the perks of being an interviewer: our sentiments, our political and ethical principles and the groups (i.e. being Turkish, being against all forms of fascism, being female etc.) we identify with travel with us and of course influence how we conduct our research, though it is not necessarily ethical to call out your interviewees (except in cases when you do action research where the researcher's role is to intervene, see Gibson-Graham, 1996).

In that sense I was in most cases not perceived as an outsider, or at least I did not have the feeling I was, but could fairly easily navigate between the different worlds and most of my interviewees, though some were more short-spoken than others, were not hostile to my request. I introduced myself as PhD student from Istanbul who grew up in Germany and is doing research on the transformation of the Reuterquarter neighborhood. To third parties – that means interviewees who spoke to me in an official capacity, such as some of the social workers, tenant association representatives, urban planners etc. – I was more explicit directly using the term 'gentrification'

when describing my objective. I noticed, however, that even some residents with whom I did not use the terminology, automatically spoke of gentrification, which indicates how much this term has become embedded in everyday language.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

Though I include a secondary analysis of Prenzlauer Berg to provide impetus for further research, this is not a comparative study. The reason is that this case study is explorative in its nature. Not much academic work has yet been produced in respect to the neighborhood and gentrification studies focusing on Germany in general are still rare. Hence, it has been crucial to produce in-depth and less-abstract knowledge. This of course has as its downside that it limits the generalizability of the results, which is left to future research. The recommendations for future research are debated in the concluding chapter.

Structure of the Dissertation

This thesis is divided into six substantial chapters followed by a brief conclusion. In chapter two I engage with the theoretical backdrop that informs this study, particularly focusing on the issues of gentrification and social exclusion. I first contextualize gentrification within Peck and Tickell's

(2007) notion of neoliberalism and then position myself in the existing gentrification literature employing Lefebvre's sociology of space. In the second part I debate the relationship between gentrification and social exclusion and argue that gentrification is a mechanism of social exclusion in which the upward redistribution of wealth (Harvey, 2005: 188) functions through space. This redistribution is reflected in increased urban polarization and often accompanied by racial stigmatization of certain residential areas. Stigmatization, in turn, provides justification for interventionist neoliberal policies that are frequently adapted from other national contexts. I here focus on the instrumentalization of so-called community-discourses and the accompanying employment of the creative city strategy, welfare measures and community policing.

In chapter three I evaluate the residential history and spatial stigmatization of immigrants from Turkey in Germany through the lens of the ghetto discourse. I here firstly argue that some of the reasons why, despite still relatively low levels of segregation, immigrants from Turkey have tended to cluster in certain inner city areas, have been exclusionary spatial regulations brought forward by the national and local government during the first years of settlement (among other things their exclusion from social housing up until the late 1970s) as well as continued discrimination on the housing market. Secondly, I debate how these policies have interacted with exclusionary discourses: starting from the 1961 guest worker agreement

I discuss how in different periods until the 2010s immigrants from Turkey and their children have become subject to national and local debates in which their residential concentration, their habits and beliefs have been depicted as a threat to national cohesion and security. Connected to these alarmist discourses has been the “Americanization” (Freeman, 1986; Faist, 1995; Ross, 1998) of the German welfare state through which unemployment came to be viewed as a result of individual failure and –particularly in case of immigrant populations – as a matter of the “wrong culture”.

In the fourth chapter I discuss Berlin and the transformation of the capital city after reunification with a particular focus on the development of the housing market and the way Berlin within the framework of a creative city strategy has been branded as “poor but sexy” (Wowereit, 2004) city. My claim is that Berlin’s marketing as colorful and cool world city after 1990 has brought along the instrumentalization of minority populations and creative workers for the purpose of boosting economic growth. The ongoing securitization of the city, on the other hand, shows that immigrants or alternative milieus’ activities are only desired in so far they contribute to Berlin’s upgrading to global city status and do not stand in the way of inner city gentrification.

In chapter five I proceed to my specific case. By giving a short history of the Neukölln borough and Reuterquarter’s image as Germany’s ghetto, I trace how the neighborhood has transformed from one of the most

stigmatized to one of the most popular areas of the city with the explicit support of EU funds, the national and local government. In this chapter I show how the theoretical framework adapted in chapter two applies to Reuterquarter, i.e. how discourses of urban decline and the implementation of neoliberal policies such as the renting of vacant spaces to artists and community policing have mutually enabled gentrification.

In chapter six I turn to the perception of long-term inhabitants, i.e. to the question of lived space, while giving more attention to residents with roots in Turkey since they have been the social group to which the stigmatization of Neukölln and Reuterquarter has been mostly attached to. I show here that within the gentrification process the exclusion of long-term inhabitants of different material standing can take different forms, which are often much more subtle than immediate physical displacement. These forms have to be researched at the local level and must be combined with macro-level analysis to provide a more complete picture. In the last substantial chapter I add a secondary analysis of the Prenzlauer Berg locality in East Berlin to show how gentrification proceeds differently in the same local context. The thesis finishes with concluding remarks, including recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NEOLIBERALISM, GENTRIFICATION, SOCIAL EXCLUSION

In this chapter I will lay out the theoretical perspective and concepts that I have used throughout this study and discuss some general empirical findings that studies on gentrification, urban inequality, immigrants and racism have generated. I first briefly contextualize gentrification within Peck and Tickell's (2007) notion of neoliberalization. The way gentrification plays out in specific localities such as Berlin is a primary case for the study of "actually existing neoliberalism [...]" (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 383) in which the gentrification process itself is understood to be "embedded in wider [global] networks and structures" (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 380) but as interacting with local structures and historical particularities. In that sense there are aspects of gentrification that are comparable on a global scale, and there are other aspects that are very specific to the locality the process is taking place in.

Secondly, I will position myself in the grand debate within the gentrification literature: my empirical concern has been to understand why, how and with what consequences Reuterquarter has turned from one of the most shunned areas to one of the hippest parts of Berlin. To understand this I

needed to take account of the material and discursive changes the neighborhood has undergone. Accordingly, while the main divide in gentrification research is between so-called production-side and consumption-side theories (with seminal works by the Neil Smith, (1979) and David Ley (1987) respectively) I am, following Smith (1979, 2002), adapting a Marxist framework without neglecting the cultural aspects of gentrification (Zukin 1987, 1989, 2008 and 2010). The reason I chose to work with an integrative approach is that I argue with scholars such as Mark Gottdiener (2005) that the worlds of production and consumption have become increasingly blurred in the neoliberal era, leaving us with the need to develop theories and concepts that account for the complex relation between material processes and culture. At this point famous urban sociologist Henri Lefebvre's (1994, 2003) unitary theory of space is chosen as an appropriate approach to conceptualize a third way between economics and culture. I will explain why and how gentrification should be contextualized within Lefebvre's perspective of space and his notion of abstract and lived space.

Thirdly, based on Lefebvre's notion of abstract space, I engage with the relationship between gentrification and social exclusion. As announced in the introduction, my focus is on gentrification as a mechanism of social exclusion. The notion of social exclusion is useful and has been adapted in this study because it is, first of all, an umbrella concept that connotes different but inherently connected social problems such as limited access to

the job market, education, health and housing. Secondly, rather than objectifying or shifting the blame on the urban poor, as is often implied by notions such as the “urban underclass” (Häussermann, 1998), it draws attention to inequality as a *process* in which *some exclude* and others *are excluded* (Madanipour et al, 1998; Byrne, 1999). Thirdly, thinking of inequality in terms of social exclusion allows for a heightened focus on institutionalized exclusion. Accordingly, in this context I also discuss the role of the state in constructing abstract space and perpetuating gentrification through policies based on these abstractions (Peck, 2005).

In the course of this chapter I hope to first show how and why to use Lefebvre to make sense of gentrification while relating his holistic approach to the works of other urban scholars such as Sharon Zukin, Jamie Peck, Neil Smith and others and secondly, I hope to explain why it is important for researchers to unravel the qualities of lived space by including the perspective of marginalized long-term inhabitants to understand fully how gentrification affects populations on the neighborhood-level.

Neoliberalism on the Ground: Defining Gentrification

There is obviously a vast theoretical and also empirical literature on all facets of neoliberalism throughout the globe and on how to do research on neoliberalism that will not be further discussed at this point. It can generally

be said that, regarding the literature produced within urban studies, there has been a trend in laying more focus on the role of the local, i.e. on regions, cities, and sub-city units in attracting international capital (see for example, Sassen, 1991 or Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, 2011). I, however, rely on the argument Peck and Tickell (2007) have brought forward: they have reminded us that neoliberalism is not a state but a process. The urban researcher's focus should thus be on *change*. Peck and Tickell (2007) furthermore stand for a middle ground between gross generalizations that speak of one big global neoliberal project implemented throughout the world without looking at local histories and contingent factors and analyses that fail to point out international similarities between different processes of neoliberalization. Accordingly, scholars should "be attentive to *both* the local peculiarities *and* the generic features of neoliberalism" (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 388). According to Smith (2002: 446), gentrification, then is a perfected expression of neoliberal urbanism. Following this we can argue that gentrification is *the* pivotal and global form neoliberalization takes in cities. Accordingly, similar to the study of other neoliberal strategies, when studying gentrification we should thus ask ourselves why and how it is happening across utterly different national and local contexts, pointing out similarities and differences.

In the following pages I will position myself within the grand debate on gentrification between liberals and structuralists. Using Henri Lefebvre's

sociology of space, I place a particular emphasis on gentrification as a mechanism of social exclusion that frequently targets low-income ethnic/racial minority populations by combining discourses of urban decline, racism and social mixing.

Gentrification is originally a term coined by the sociologist Ruth Glass in 1964 and understood as a process in which urban working-class neighborhoods are transformed in favor of middle-class use (Zukin, 1987: 129). Accompanied is this process by new forms of land use and infrastructure. There are several twists on this definition, with some scholars arguing that the neighborhood does not need to be working-class but can for example be largely vacant or a middle-class neighborhood might be transformed in favor of upper-class use, which Lees (2003) has called “super-gentrification”. Others have stated that gentrification is not an “urban phenomenon” any longer but has spread out to rural areas (Phillips, 1993). Though I agree that all of these (vacant neighborhoods, transformation from middle- to upper class, rural) are indeed forms of gentrification, for my own purpose I will largely rely on the gentrification literature produced for inner-city working-class neighborhoods.

Gentrification research was pioneered in the United States in the late 1970s, particularly in the predominantly black inner-city neighborhoods of New York City and Chicago. Despite decades of research, now including not only Europe but also third world cities such as Mumbai (Harris, 2008),

Istanbul (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010) or Johannesburg (Visser, 2002), gentrification remains a “chaotic concept” (Beauregard, 2007) with no agreement in the academic community on its definition, causes, actors and consequences. In an attempt to bring clarification, part of the academic community has developed ideal-typical models. One of these models is the double invasion-succession cycle which posits that gentrification happens in two subsequent phases: In the first phase called revival phase, pioneers who are typically young, well-educated individuals with low economic but high cultural capital take advantage of low rents and vacancies in the relevant neighborhoods and already start to displace former inhabitants who are often part of the working-class, unemployed and/or minorities. In the second phase, the valorization phase, the share of gentrifiers (including investors) whose economic capital exceeds that of the pioneers, among those moving in rises and the remaining old inhabitants as well as pioneers are being displaced completing the gentrification process (Dschangat, 1988; Clay 1979). However, there is still no agreement on whether these phases need to occur in that order or whether they all need to occur to speak of gentrification (Thomas, 2008: 10-39). It has for example been criticized that there is a tendency to take physical displacement due to increasing rents as only legitimate sign of gentrification. Given that gentrification can be a very slow process, long-established inhabitants may, nevertheless, not leave the neighborhood immediately. And even for those who leave eventually, it is

not always clear why they leave. According to Marcuse (1986), for example, there are different forms of displacement that do not need to be rooted in rising rents. Or people may not leave and still feel displaced. Other old-established residents may even take advantage of the change. For Hackworth (2002: 839) this does not mean that gentrification has not happened:

in light of several decades of research the debate that shows that the concept is usefully applied to non-residential urban change and that there is frequently a substantial time lag between when the subordinate class gives way to more affluent users. That is, the displacement or replacement is often neither direct nor immediate, but the process remains 'gentrification' because the space is being transformed for more affluent users.

The transformation is thus not limited to population exchange. The 'necessary condition' applied in this thesis to speak of gentrification is thus, as Hackworth puts forward (2002), the transformation of space for more affluent users, regardless of the method and the rate of population exchange. Having decided on the indicators of gentrification does, however, still leave us with the question of what the reasons for gentrification are. Chris Hamnett (1991) has argued that the academic debate around gentrification entails all major divides in the social sciences: "structure and agency, production and consumption, capital and culture and supply and demand" (p. 173), with Marxist scholars such as the late Neil Smith on the 'structure, production, capital, supply side' emphasizing the importance of capital flows and collective actors in producing urban space subsequently offered to higher-income populations and liberal opponents such as David Ley (1987)

on the 'agency, consumption, culture, demand side' underlining the importance of the "new middle class" and their distinctive demand for inner-city living and the associated emergence of novel consumption patterns.

The Consumption-Side Argument

David Ley (1987) has famously argued that the economic shifts that occurred after the 1970s have been accompanied by an expansion and fragmentation of the middle class with some parts of the new middle class possessing a large purchasing power and developing distinctive tastes that stand in contrast to the standardized lifestyles of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. These new tastes and habits, on the other hand, have increased the demand for urban lifestyles that are associated with individual autonomy. This autonomy, however, is again expressed through consumption, fueling the emergence of a distinctive infrastructure in inner cities that cater to the demands of the new middle class. Ley's argument has been very influential, informing the work of prominent gentrification scholars. So have Butler and Robson (2001) have also shown how gentrifiers for neighborhoods in London chose neighborhoods along the lines of social and cultural capital. Lloyd (2002), on his side, emphasized the role of a new young middle class, which he conceptualized as "neo-bohemia", in perpetuating gentrification. It is within the circle of proponents of consumption-side explanations for

gentrification that we will also find more benevolent views of gentrification: Caulfield (1988) has argued for the case of Canada that gentrification is in fact an emancipatory practice of the middle class opening the opportunity for interaction between different classes and social groups in a heterogeneous inner city environment. Gentrification is seen here as a win-win situation in which the “creative class” (Florida, 2002) is lured into the inner city by cultural diversity and the residents of the gentrifying area benefit from socio-economic upheaval. Others have integrated Ley’s theory into a more critical perspective. Sharon Zukin (2008), for example, has written about the distinctive infrastructure emerging in gentrifying neighborhoods in the form of farmers’ markets or ‘ethnic food’ shops giving gentrifiers the opportunity to “perform difference from mainstream norms” (p. 724) without structurally including those through whom this alleged difference is performed (such as ethnic and racial minorities, sexual minorities etc.).

Critiques of consumption-side explanations have argued that these explanations tend to ignore the social production of demand (Smith, 1979: 540). While students, artists or white-collar workers are easily identified as ‘gentrifiers’ (whether positively or negatively), those who actually enable gentrification through appropriate legal frameworks, economic policies and large capital flows seem to be relegated to secondary relevance. The question why people from utterly different contexts around the world all seem to

demand similar things, such as inner-city living, a distinct infrastructure etc., remains unanswered (Smith, 1992).

The Production-Side Argument

In contrast to Ley, the late Neil Smith (1979, 1996, and 2002) on the 'production-side' has argued that gentrification has nothing to do with individual demand or choice. He explicated famously for the United States how inner cities, previously left to degeneration during a long period of suburbanization since the 1970s, have displayed the possibility for reinvestment with low real estate prices on potentially valuable land.

According to this "rent gap theory", gentrification has chiefly structural causes rooted in the subsequent cycles of dis- and reinvestment and is not caused by individual agency. In contrast to scholars who have seen gentrification as one, possibly problematic, form of urban regeneration (see e.g. Van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003), Smith (1996) and like-minded scholars postulate that this distinction is no longer useful and that all forms of neoliberal urban restructuring are forms of gentrification, some proceeding slower but all with the goal of remaking neighborhoods for middle- and/or upper class use.

Along with Ley, Smith has been extremely influential in gentrification studies. In the same way, scholars around the globe reworked his rent gap

theory and proved its significance in different national contexts such as Berlin (Holm, 2006); Malmö in Sweden (Clark, 1988) or Adelaide, Australia (Badock, 1989). In general, proponents of the rent gap theory, often orthodox Marxists, have been highly critical towards gentrification, arguing that even state regulations through rent control or similar measures do not solve the underlying problem, namely the fact that housing is a competitive commodity. As long as this is the case, gentrification will happen and will necessarily result in displacement. Instead of praising or blaming individual gentrifiers or parts of the middle class, proponents of production-side explanations thus have often argued for a systemic change (Wacquant, 2008; Bernt 2012 or Bernt and Holm, 2009).

Critiques of Smith's rent gap hypothesis have postulated that his approach is economically deterministic. Numerous empirical studies have found that neither all areas whose actual rents are lower than the potential ground value are gentrifying nor that all gentrifying areas previously went through a cycle of disinvestment (Helbrecht, 1996: 5-6). Furthermore, the applicability of Smith's rent gap theory to the European context has been subject to a major debate. Based on research in London, Hamnett and Randolph (1986 and 1988) have, for example, written of a "value gap" arguing that surplus in gentrifying neighborhoods can also emerge out of the conversion of tenant-occupied apartments to owner-occupied ones. Loretta Lees (1994) has called this difference between rent and value gap the

“Atlantic gap”, a gap which originates from the fact that housing in the United States is less regulated than it is in Europe. On the other hand, rent increase can also occur through high tenant fluctuation, as is the case, for example, in cities like Berlin: even if there are limits on how much the rent can be increased for new tenants, if tenants change rapidly, the average rent of the neighborhood will rise accordingly with every change and will, in the long-term, result in a general increase of rents in the whole neighborhood. This process by Van Criekingen (2010) in his study on inner-city Brussels has been named “rental-gentrification”. In these cases gentrification will most likely happen at a much slower pace, which, again does not mean it is not gentrification, it just happens differently.

Towards a Unitary Approach: Lefebvre’s Sociology of Space

The argument I make in this dissertation is inherently a Marxist argument. Gentrification is a politically and economically willed “class remake” (Smith, 1996: 37) and it is under capitalism, as Smith (2002) argues, “generalized”, i.e. it encompasses all forms of urban regeneration. And, significantly, *it is not* an aggregate result of individual choice. I thus fully agree with Smith’s argument regarding the social production of demand (1979: 540):

If cultural choice and consumer preference really explain gentrification, this amounts either to the hypothesis that individual preferences change in unison not only nationally but

internationally-a bleak view of human nature and cultural individuality- or that the overriding constraints are strong enough to obliterate the individuality implied in consumer preference. If the latter is the case, the concept of consumer preference is at best contradictory: a process first conceived in terms of individual consumption preference has now to be explained as resulting from cultural uni-dimensionality. The concept can be rescued as theoretically viable only if it is used to refer to collective social preference, not individual preference.

The problem Smith thus has with Ley's argument is not that he stresses the role of consumption and demand *per se* but that he stresses the role of *individual* demand, an objection I strongly concur with. If moving "back to the city" (Smith, 1979) is a result of individual choice then it is very difficult to explain why people all around the world suddenly make the same choice.

Taking this perspective and focusing on the production of collective rather than individual demand does not preclude that we pay attention to the images and ideas that are connected to gentrification. Mark Gottdiener (2005: 304-305) in a similar context has argued that the line between production and consumption in reality is rather blurry. This blurriness, on the other hand, is related to the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism or neoliberalism: as the productive industries such as manufacturing that carried the Fordist economies ceased to promise surplus, a shift to the service economy including cultural consumption occurred. This shift, on the other hand, has conflated the "world of work, of production [...] with the world of consumption." (Gottdiener, 2005: 304). Hence, it has become increasingly inefficient to produce and apply theories that strictly separate material from

cultural processes. The process of gentrification must thus also be contextualized within the political, social and cultural shifts that accompanied the material shifts crystallizing from the late 1960s onwards and intensifying in the 1970s and 80s.

As announced above, Henri Lefebvre's sociology of space provides an appropriate third way and is often cited as the pivotal Marxist, dialectical theory of space.⁴ Lefebvre first of all argued that the city under neoliberalism has become a tool for surplus accumulation. To understand how this is happening and how gentrification fits in, we need to understand his conception of space: Lefebvre posited that there are three scales that must be considered in urban research – the global, the urban and the private. The urban for Lefebvre is an intermediary space produced by complex and heterogeneous human interaction and is the realm in which collective action is potentially possible. The urban mediates between the larger global social order (i.e. the state, national and international competition and investment, the neoliberal order etc.) and everyday life (including privately owned buildings, actions confined to private spaces). In Lefebvre's conception the global in capitalism dominates the urban. The urban, on the other hand, is three-dimensional itself consisting of three spaces, physical space (such as

⁴ Though there is a large debate on whether Lefebvre really was a Marxist in the strict sense, I will not dwell into the specifics. For now it suffices that Lefebvre provided a novel reading of Marx in that he theorized space not as part of the superstructure, but as produced by social forces. In that sense he offers a broader understanding of the meaning of production that is not easily reducible to the base-superstructure model (Elden, 2004).

density, borders, and built environment), conceptualized/abstract space (the abstract definition of space by dominant groups such as urban planners) and lived/social space, the space produced by those who inhabit it through complex interaction). For Lefebvre these spaces are in a dialectical relation, inseparable from each other, however, the assumption that an abstract space exists apart from the lived experience of inhabitants and their social interactions creates the illusion of a neutral space, an illusion that manifests itself physically:

Abstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its 'lens.' And, indeed, it renders homogeneous [...] Thus to look upon abstract space as homogeneous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause, and the goal for the reason why that goal is pursued. (Lefebvre, 1991: 287)

In other words, certain representations of space are never homogenous but aim at creating a uniform image and, as declared earlier, at the point we accept these definitions as objective we support the concealment of the social complexity that is behind these representations.

How does gentrification fit into these scales and levels? Mark Davidson (2007) has argued that while scholars following the footsteps of David Ley (1987) and others explain gentrification by evolving middle class taste or habitus (Bourdieu, 1986), they neglect the relation between gentrification and globalization and the role of capital actors. Lefebvre's theory provides us with exactly this link: The global "accommodates the most general, and therefore the most abstract, although essential relations,

such as capital markets and the politics of space” (Lefebvre, 2003: 79).

Gentrification is an expression of the erasure of the lived by the abstract and a domination of the urban by the global. Under capitalism, urban space is thus submitted to the needs of the market. A given neighborhood becomes an exchangeable commodity as opposed to being a product of use value for its inhabitants. Lived space becomes dominated by abstract space because it is reduced to homogenous, transparent definitions.

But what does this then have to do with culture and what is the role of middle class agents that move into marginalized neighborhoods? Simply put they are important agents of gentrification and surely not innocent (see Zukin, 2008) but they are not the reason gentrification is happening. To give a popular example from gentrification research: Smith and DeFillipis (1999) in respect to the Lower East Side in Manhattan argue that in 1980s the area was subject to a gentrification process that was less controlled by the state (the global scale) and more characterized by a *“laissez-faire”* (Smith and Hackworth, 2001: 465) attitude. Zukin (1982) describes for the same context that while real estate agents’ and investors’ goal in Lower Manhattan in the 1980s was to ensure surplus accumulation through upgraded space and the substitution of old buildings by modern office and living spaces, they were met with resistance by middle-class homeowners, professionals, artists, activists and urban planners (the urban scale of collective action). The irony is that it were in the end the same groups who provided agents and investors

an alternative and cheaper route to gentrification: resistant house-owners with capital began to renovate their apartments and some converted them into lofts, alleviating investors of the burden of expensive destruction and reconstruction. They thus took part in the gentrification of their neighborhoods without being necessarily aware of it, valorizing their buildings and by adding cultural capital to the neighborhood through their creative and political activity. Lang (1994: 498) has called this early stage of gentrification, "symbolic gentrification" - a phase in which the actual gentrification of a given area is prepared, often by the media, through the use of certain images and representations such as an overemphasis on cultural activity or a thriving night life. In Lefebvre's terminology we can also label this as a phase in which the erasure of the lived space by abstract space is taking place. Abstract space is necessarily non-dialectic and reduces complex lived spaces to hegemonic definitions. Space becomes readable and thus comparable. Comparability, on the other hand, is the necessary condition for exchangeability. Needless to say that the symbolic gentrification of the Lower East Side was followed by physical gentrification (made possible through the legal and political framework provided on the global level) which has led to a displacement of the working-class from the area as well of some of the artists, professionals and activists who had resisted the first attempt of investors to transform their neighborhood (Zukin, 1982).

In a book edited by Abu-Lughod (1995) the contributing urban scholars make a similar argument about the Lower East Side as Zukin (1982) by putting the neighborhood's transformation in its wider local, national and international political and economic context. In other words, they show that we cannot understand gentrification by remaining on the local level and solely looking at actors (and their habits and tastes) on the neighborhood-level, instead we need to take account of the political and economic currents that lead to these developments. This does not entail a disregard but a re-reading of the role of culture, images and ideas: Within the gentrification process certain -socially produced- middle class lifestyles (often unintentionally) help to create abstract space (a new Berlin "Soho", "multicultural space", "artistic space" e.g.). The main agents of gentrification, however, are not the individuals that pursue these middle class lifestyles but are to be identified on the global level. The question that needs to be asked is how these lifestyles and demands are socially produced and by whom.

Accordingly, the story Zukin (1982, see also 2010), Abu-Lughod (1995) and others tell about the Lower East Side relates to Lefebvre's sociology of space. After Lefebvre (1994) gentrification can be understood as a "process of erasing differences" (Stanek, 2008: 72). My own case analysis benefits from this integrative approach to gentrification because in Reuterquarter the erasure of difference is particularly poignant: As I will further explain in the following chapters, while only about half to mostly 60 percent of the

inhabitants have a migratory background, the neighborhood has been widely marked as immigrant ghetto giving the impression that its demographics are similar to areas such as Harlem or even the slums and favelas in the Global South. Firstly, I will show how these alarmist discourses and stigmatizations have impacted the self-understanding of immigrant and other residents and lowered their chances in the realm of education, housing and work (chapter three and five). Secondly, I will show how the discourse of the ghetto from the mid-2000s has also served as a marketable trait under the banner of the creative and multicultural Berlin (see chapter four). Interventions (which I following Neil Smith (1996) Jamie Peck (2005) further below will conceptualize as “revanchist” and “fast policies”) such as renting out to artists while simultaneously increasing surveillance over Reuterquarter’s population through private security then have been a result of these non-dialectical/abstract conceptions of the neighborhood that are detached from the everyday life of inhabitants, leading to severe social consequences (as I discuss in chapter six). Consequences in turn are so severe because the process of erasing difference is always accompanied by some sort of violence, sometimes more direct, sometimes more indirect:

That is why Lefebvre claims that ‘there is a violence intrinsic to abstraction, and to abstraction’s practical (social) use.’ For Lefebvre, abstraction supported by science and technology is a tool to develop oppressive, classificatory, and phallic space. (Stanek, 2008: 72)

Below I will discuss, keeping Lefebvre's sociology of space in mind, my conception of gentrification as a mechanism of exclusion. I firstly engage with the role of the state in perpetuating urban polarization and gentrification through the adaptation of "fast policies" (Peck, 2005) to then proceed to the question how the discursive racialization of space and poverty are connected to gentrification. Peck's notion of fast policies, I suggest, is related to Lefebvre's conception of abstract space: fast policies are neoliberal policies that travel through different contexts and are relatively uncritically applied as fuel for economic growth. This relates to Lefebvre because fast policies are based on abstract conceptions of space, conceptualizing space as a means for surplus accumulation, with exchange, rather than use value for its inhabitants. Accordingly, fast policies entail a disregard of lived space.

The Neoliberal State and Gentrification

While some scholars have argued that the state is "withering" away and has almost no role to play in the globalized world order (Sassen, 1991) and others have countered that we still live in a state-centric world in which the state is the main actor directing the economy (Weiss, 1998), I argue for a different perspective on the state, again relying on Lefebvre. For Lefebvre the state plays a pivotal role in creating abstract space:

[...] each new form of state, each new form of political power, introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes; and the fact that space should thus become classificatory makes it possible for a certain type of non-critical thought simply to register the resultant 'reality' and accept it at face value. (Lefebvre, 1991: 281)

In that sense the state together with the private sector actively engages in branding spaces and making them readable for others and thus has a pivotal role to play in the neoliberalization process. Thought within this framework, it is not surprising that allegedly 'comparable' spaces emerge in utterly different contexts. Miraftab (2007), for example, shows how certain areas of Cape Town are promoted with reference to New York and London in public-private partnership. Similar references are made in Berlin, as I will discuss in chapter four. But the state itself is also abstracted space, put into a hierarchical relationship with other states in the global world order.

Accordingly, the state versus globalization juxtaposition is a false binary and we must think of globalization in terms of scales and levels rather than in terms of de-territorialization, withering borders or the state as a container:

[...] the *places* of social space are very different from those of natural space in that they are not simply juxtaposed: they may be intercalated, combined, superimposed - they may even sometimes collide. Consequently the local (or 'punctual,' in the sense of 'determined by a particular 'point') does not disappear, for it is never absorbed by the regional, national or even worldwide level. The national and regional levels take in innumerable 'places'; national space embraces the regions; and world space does not merely subsume national spaces, but even [...] precipitates the formation of new national spaces through a

remarkable process of fission. All these spaces, meanwhile, are traversed by myriad currents. The hypercomplexity of social space should by now be apparent, embracing as it does individual entities and peculiarities, relatively fixed points, movements, and flows and waves—some interpenetrating, others in conflict, and so on. The principle of the interpenetration and superimposition of social spaces [...] means that each fragment of space subjected to analysis masks not just one social relationship but a host of them that analysis can potentially disclose. (Lefebvre, 1994: 88)

The state thus is a contradictory scale: while it is part of the global, abstract and abstracting, it also appears as mediator between global, urban and private (Brenner, 1997) making it “subject and supreme object” (Lefebvre translated in Brenner, 1997: 154) of globalization.

What role then does the state more specifically play in gentrification?

On the one hand, the state appears as mediator, adjusting neoliberal programs to national, regional or local circumstances, e.g. through regulating the housing market or distributional measures. Gentrification, however, is also the result of state action which is based on non-dialectical, often binary, epistemologies of space that direct neoliberal urban policies. The state appears as an abstracting force in so far as it for example categorizes neighborhoods according to indicators such as unemployment, share of immigrants, crime rates or housing quality imposing homogeneity on complex urban spaces with different local dynamics. National, regional or local policy makers are accordingly quick to impose relatively standardized programs on diverse urban spaces. Jamie Peck (2002, 2005) has called this

transfer of similar approaches to urban spaces across completely different contexts fast policies:

Confronted by an extremely limited repertoire of politically feasible options, cities threw themselves into a series of zero-sum competitions for mobile public and private investments, thereby inadvertently facilitating (indeed subsidizing) the very forms of capital circulation and revenue competition that were major sources of the problem in the first place. In this climate of beggar-thy-neighbor competition, cities turned to a restrictive suite of supply side and promotional strategies, which were serially reproduced and emulated in the scramble for mobile investment, jobs and discretionary spending. (Peck, 2005: 761)

This fast adaptation of policies (and the related discourses) has facilitated neoliberalization across the globe including gentrification; however, this does not lead to homogenization because these policies interact with local specificities creating their own local, path-dependent trajectory. Policy-makers, private or public stakeholders, accordingly, cannot possibly tell how the implementation of fast policies will play out in a given field. Neither the hegemony of neoliberalism nor the abstraction of space is ever complete. And this is also the point where space opens up for a possible subversion of neoliberal urban policies (Peck, Theodore and Brenner, 2012).

Below I will engage more closely with Peck's concept of fast policies and additionally debate Smith's (1996) understanding of the "urban frontier" and "urban revanchism". I will integrate these different notions into my understanding of Lefebvre's abstract space and the racialization of space as it relates to my case. My argument here is that not only policies, but discourses

travel fast under neoliberalism. Fast policies are the result of spatial abstractions and thus always entail some sort of symbolic and often physical violence. Smith's (1996) "urban frontier" is such, as an abstraction that depicts certain parts of the city as dangerous and unlivable and hence, in need of being (re-)conquered by the middle class in a revanchist manner. Reading Lefebvre (1994, 2003), Peck (2005) and Smith (1996) together makes it possible to relate the racial stigmatization of urban spaces and the subsequent application of interventionist policies, often emulated from pioneer states of neoliberalism such as America, together. I will focus here on a particular exclusionary narrative, that of the racial/ethnic ghetto, and explain how discourses of ghettoization are connected to gentrification.

Gentrification and the Racialization of Space: Abstractions and Fast Policies

So far I have explained how Lefebvre's conceptions of abstract and lived space are proper tools to understand the economic *and* cultural dimensions of gentrification while staying within a Marxist framework. I have also explained how Jamie Peck's notion of fast policies fits in: I suggest that fast policies are the result of abstract conceptions of space, detached from the lived experiences of inhabitants and on the other abstractions are also constitutive of space. Abstractions in this sense turn into self-fulfilling

prophecies leading to justifications for gentrification. Below I will further explain why and how:

Gentrification can proceed through different means and discursive processes, but one particular imagination attached to the gentrification process that I want to emphasize here is that of the ghetto. While marketing, for example, a city such as Paris as the 'city of love' may fuel tourism-driven gentrification (for a study of tourism-driven gentrification see Gotham, 2005), the branding of social space and its reification as racial ghetto or immigrant ghetto may, in cases where surplus accumulation is possible, provide the ground for other forms of urban intervention that eventually lead to gentrification. In this sense gentrification can proceed through crisis or perceptions of threat. Neil Smith (1996) has also famously called this the construction of a "frontier myth", in which certain parts of the city (often inhabited by ethnic/racial minorities) are imagined as frontier to be (re)conquered by the (white or de-racialized) middle class in the form of an "urban revanchism". Simply put, he argues that during the long period of suburbanization in the United States, "the city" (i.e. downtown) was perceived as a dangerous and degenerate place and even as a "wilderness" (Smith, 1996: 9) comparable to the image of the wild wild West. Smith argues that the metaphor of Cowboys and Native Americans, of white, civilized men versus brown, unruly primitives went so far as to create a frontier myth in which the inner city began to be perceived as not-yet-but-to-be-conquered

space. This metaphor obviously not only has class but also racial connotations, given that it is also a frontier between “white” and “non-white” peoples (Smith, 1996: 30). And of course this racial connotation was reflected in the actual demographic make-up of the suburbs at that time, that is, predominately white middle-class and inner-city neighborhoods inhabited predominantly by low-income people of color:

In the language of gentrification, the appeal to frontier imagery has been exact: urban pioneers, urban homesteaders and urban cowboys became the new folk heroes of the urban frontier. In the 1980s, the real estate magazines even talked about “urban scouts” whose job it was to scout out the flanks of gentrifying neighborhoods, check the landscape for profitable reinvestment, and, at the same time, to report home about how friendly the natives were. (Smith, 1996: preface)

While the level of disinvestment and racial/ethnic segregation in Western Europe is not necessarily comparable to the level in the United States, I argue that the discourses of alleged urban decline, ghettoization and the racialization of poverty show similarities across different contexts. They are ‘fast discourses’, so to speak. Though in Europe there is not always a clear overlap between class position and self-and other ascribed racial/ethnic difference (or at least not as clear as it is often the case for the US), the discourse of urban decline is often still packaged in racist discourses. That means even in contexts where we encounter racially/ethnically more heterogeneous neighborhoods than the predominantly African American neighborhoods in America such as is the case for Western Europe, we can

still frequently find a racialization of poverty. This can happen firstly through an exaggeration of the proportion of immigrants in a given neighborhood (on the role of “ethnic packaging” in Toronto, see Hackworth and Rekers, 2005); even ‘white’ working-class individuals can be subject to racialization by discourses that frame them as culturally deviant or different from ‘normal’ middle class society (for a comparison between Germany and the United States see Faist, 1995).

Smith has, as mentioned, called the will to retake urban space from these racialized poor “urban revanchism”. And revanchism, as a result of the rising fragmentation and precarization of the middle class, according to Smith (1996: 207), has been one of the most dominant motives of the legitimization of gentrification since the 1990s:

More than anything the revanchist city expresses a race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and ruling-class whites who are suddenly stuck in place by a ravaged property market, the threat and reality of unemployment, the decimation of social services, and the emergence of minority and immigrant groups, as well as women, as powerful urban actors. It portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed, women, gays and lesbians, immigrants. The revanchist city is screamingly reaffirmed by television programming. The “gentrification of prime time” (B. Williams 1988:107) in the 1980s has given way to an obsessive portrayal of the apparent danger and violence of everyday life. The local news, “Cops,” “Hard Copy,” “911,” a whole cable channel devoted to “Court TV,” together with talk radio, militia radio and late night cruelty mongers like Rush Limbaugh all blend prurience and revenge as an antidote to insecure identities. (Smith, 1996: 207)

In other words: gentrification is a distributional issue in which urban space functions as scarce resource that some have more power over than others and it frequently *proceeds through crisis*. Neoliberal interventions like gentrification are nourished by perceptions of threat, of material and status loss, whether this threat really exists or not. Accordingly, I argue in this context that discourses of ghettoization are discourses that provide justification for the implementation of standardized programs (i.e. fast policies) that in turn facilitate gentrification. The discourse of the ghetto itself is particularly fast if we consider that it travelled from Europe to the United States in the mid-20th century only to be re-adapted in Europe in traversed form – namely, having lost its meaning as space of forceful confinement and as space of possible political empowerment – in the 21st century (Wacquant, 2008).⁵

⁵ The notion of the ghetto dates back to 16th-century Venice, when Jews were ordered to move into certain quarters. This for the Jewish population in Venice did not only amount to isolation but also to protection from a rather hostile environment (Haynes, 2008). The “racialization of urban space” (Haynes, 2008: 348) is thus not new but dates back about 500 years. During the Nazi-regime in Germany and Europe the Jewish ghetto took several forms reaching from open to closed ghettos and finally, to destruction ghettos. These different forms of ghettos mainly served to control and regulate Jews in the short term and keep them together for facilitating Hitler’s vision of the “final solution”, i.e. the complete annihilation of all Jews in the German Reich (Holocaust Encyclopedia, 2013). Though the racialization of urban space was in the 19th and early 20th century not limited to Jews but included for example the spatial regulation of African Americans in Northern cities such as Chicago and New York, the term ‘ghetto’ was until the 1960s more frequently used to describe areas – forcefully or voluntarily – inhabited by Jews and had fewer class connotations, since at least some of the Jewish ghettos were economically lively. The 1960s, as Haynes (2008) argues, proved to be a turning point: firstly, the extent of black segregation fueled the need among social scientists to conceptualize this development and secondly, Kenneth Clark’s (1965) work *The Dark Ghetto* provided an impetus for using the word “ghetto” to describe African American residential segregation. As of the mid- to late 1960s, places such as Harlem accordingly began to be widely referred to as ghettos. Wacquant (2008) argues that,

In relation to my own case, the question whether ghettos exist in Germany or Western Europe, however, is not of theoretical or empirical concern; rather I focus on the question of what the consequences of an uncritical adoption of the concept are for those who are negatively marked. This is not only a question of analytical rigor but has social consequences: Wacquant (1993, 1999, 2007, and 2008) maintains that the usage of the term

similar to the initial Jewish ghettos, the black ghettos of the 19th and 20th centuries marked not only racial confinement and poverty but also protection and empowerment. Wacquant in this respect has posited that the ghetto offered the opportunity for intra-racial mobility. Accordingly, until the late 1960s black ghettos had an important function in the American economy, producing valuable and cheap labor. Today, as Wacquant (2008) argues, these “communal ghettos” have been substituted by what he calls “hyperghettos” in which the poor African American population is more or less imprisoned. The communal ghetto as an instrument of labor extraction has turned into a place for the confinement of the black surplus population and serves as an organizational tool to solve the redistributive issues of the capitalist economy by limiting the choice of certain parts of the population (see also Blokland, 2008: 376). Not everyone agrees with Wacquant: there is today a lively debate on what actually constitutes a ghetto and how to define it. And, as usual in the social sciences, there is again no agreement in the academic community on such a definition. Scholars like Jargowsky and Bane (1997), for example, define the ghetto by a poverty rate of 40 percent (Jargowsky and Bane, 1991: 239). They thus argue that ghettos are defined only through income and are independent of race and ethnicity. According to this definition the postmodern ghetto is not only an American but a worldwide phenomenon. Not surprisingly, Wacquant (1997) strongly opposed this view, arguing that Jargowsky and Bane neglect the historical evolution and meaning of the ghetto as a space of racial segregation. Today there is a relatively deliberate and sometimes arbitrary use of the term ghetto to describe poor neighborhoods in Western Europe. It was again Wacquant (2008) who took a clear stance against this use: He explicated through Paris that ethnic segregation does not take the form of race-based ghettoization in Europe but that disadvantaged neighborhoods in France are ethnically heterogeneous and do not display extremely high rates of criminality and deprivation. Even for the UK, arguably the most similar country to the US in terms of its economic and cultural make-up, studies have shown that residential segregation has by far not reached the level and form as that of the United States (Simpson, 2006 and Simpson and Finney, 2010). Other scholars have even maintained that to speak of a ghetto the defining component is not class or income but only race and that thus all segregated black areas in the United States are in fact ghettos and can historically not be compared to other minority-heavy neighborhoods in Europe (Patillo, 2003). Small (2007) on her side has argued for abandoning the use of the term ghetto for social analysis completely. In reply to Wacquant’s (2008) thesis of the “hyperghetto” she maintains that even the former ghettos of the United States are today much more heterogeneous in regard to their degree of institutionalization, population density, the role of the state and upward mobility.

ghetto in Europe serves as a form of “territorial stigmatization” and claims that this stigmatization facilitates the legitimization of interventionist and punitive policies directed at the poor. Tom Slater (2010), in a review of Wacquant’s book, aptly labeled this “ghetto blasting”. On a similar note, Talja Blokland argues that the usage of the term “ghetto” in the European context rather than connoting a racially homogenous place has a “moral and behavioral connotation” (Blokland, 2008: 372):

A *ghetto*, then, soon turns into another label in a war of words against the poor, to paraphrase Herbert Gans. *Ghettos* become the areas of the undeserving poor. Consequently, those living there are bound to be undeserving. [...] There hence is a shifting back and forth from seeing *ghettos* as areas with extreme poverty, to seeing them as areas with concentrated behavioral problems and deviance. But they are *not* explicitly seen as places where people are involuntary segregated through processes beyond their *own* individual agency. (Blokland, 2008: 373-374).

Blokland (2008) in the same context urges us to think about how discourses materialize and how consequently “ghetto talk” might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy:

Polemically, one may argue that the easy way to deal with the fact that racism is a mechanism that creates and maintains categorical inequality to solve organizational distribution of scarce resources, as one would in Tilly’s framework, is twofold. First, one may deny that there are *ghettos* because the problematic neighborhoods are less extreme than those in the United States. Second, one may define such *ghettos* behaviorally rather than structurally. But once members of ethnic or racial groups start to experience social exclusion from mainstream society and see their residential location as a spatial expression of such exclusion, we are back to the notion of *ghetto* in its original usage. I have no clue to what extent this is the case, and it would be quite hard to establish. But statistical truth is not necessary for

social facts to become true - in their consequences. (Blokland, 2008: 376)

Again, what Wacquant (2008)⁶, Slater (2010) and Blokland (2008) in different forms and for different countries describe can be understood within Lefebvrian terminology: The ghetto itself is an abstract space (Zukin, 2010: 56) that, on the one hand, cannot possibly account for the complexity of the experiences of residents and on the other is constitutive of these experiences. As announced above, we can spin this further in arguing that “ghetto talk” not only turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy in which “categorization and identification” (Blokland, 2008: 375) from outsiders and residents respectively creates objectively verifiable structural inequality but also legitimizes urban policies that are claimed to inhibit ghettoization. I have, in line with Peck (2005), conceptualized these policies as “fast policies”.

In that sense “ghetto blasting” (Slater, 2010) may socially construct the perception of crisis, which worsens actual material deprivation and thus makes the crisis real. This crisis, in some cases helps to justify gentrification. We can thus say that discourse of urban decline, such as of the ethnic/racial ghetto, is connected to fast policies. In addition, like Smith, we can (1996) say

⁶ Unfortunately Wacquant does not use direct references to Lefebvre in *Urban Outcasts*, though this might have been a fruitful extension/clarification to his argument. Ruggiero (2008) makes this point and argues that what is the interesting difference between the two is the agency they ascribe to the state: Lefebvre argues that abstract space emerges due to the forceful impositions on the global (state) level, the state is thus active in the construction of the ghetto. Wacquant in turn argues the opposite: the “hyperghetto” emerges because since the 1970s the state pulled out of the communal ghetto, leaving its surplus population more or less to its own fate, only making itself known through punitive measures.

that these policies can take the form of an “urban revanchism”. Below I will concentrate on a particular branch of these revanchist fast policies, namely policies that instrumentalize community, more particularly the creative city strategy and the securitization of inner cities.

Mobilizing Community for Neoliberal Growth

A popular strategy applied to neighborhoods that are deemed problematic – often in conjunction with prior “ghetto blasting” (Slater, 2010) – is the employment of discourses and policies that evolve around the notion of community. Nikolas Rose (2000) has argued that the dominance of community discourses in urban planning is a sign of a new form of governmentality: citizens are constructed as “moral subjects of responsible communities”. The community approach has its origins in the United States and Britain and is typically described as a “Third Way” or as “governance beyond the state” (Swyngedouw, 2005). Mayer (2007: 95) shows that particularly in areas which have experienced de-industrialization and urban decline, civil society actors are often willing to step into a coalition with the local government and the private sector to promote regeneration, usually with the intention of ameliorating the situation for residents. Individuals are called on to initiate neighborhood projects that are usually aimed at keeping their own environment clean and safe. In this sense, tasks that traditionally

belonged to the state are passed down to local actors finding “themselves managing the new spatial and social polarization on the community level” (Mayer, 2007: 93). Civil society accordingly becomes part “of a community-based system of mobilizing and motivating, tracing and tracking, securing and socially sorting – thus, being at risk (if not willing) to fail in seeking justice for the ‘undesirables.’” (Eick 2011: 21)

Within this logic, those who are perceived as “the excluded” are now becoming part of the problem and are expected to contribute to their own (re-)integration (Mayer, 2007: 98). Furthermore, so-called ghetto populations become responsible of their own fate. As mentioned above, Blokland (2008: 272) has found that, particularly in Europe, the ghetto has fewer racial and more “moral and behavioral connotations” – being a citizen of the ghetto (which is again an imposed category), rather than a result of structural inequality, becomes personal failure. The advantage of the community approach is that such policies seem to include low-income populations and are thus less likely to encounter protest. And this is also the challenge they pose: community discourses conceal existing structural inequalities under the banner of “empowerment” (Mayer, 1997: 109) and push individuals into self-regulation. The vocabulary used – and often described as the vocabulary of the “new right” – is thus akin to that used by post-Marxists and the “new left” though the substance is not (Oldfield and Stokke, 1997). Mayer in this context makes clear that:

Contrary to the argument that this form of neo-communitarianism (Jessop, 2002) might actually provide an opportunity to compensate for the exclusionary effects of neoliberal policies by seeking a kind of middle ground (Gerometta et al, 2007), these urban social policies tend to instrumentalize 'community' and other social networks and assets toward the goal of a competitive and revitalized urban growth machine. (Mayer, 2007: 92)

Though Mayer and Eick are German scholars, advanced neoliberal strategies that can be described as "governance beyond the state" (Sywengedouw, 2005) are not only applied in the Global West or North. Feminist scholar Miraftab in 2007 showed how similar forms of governance dominate South Africa's post-Apartheid regime. She describes how the mechanism of exclusion has shifted from race to class, while indigenous South Africans still remain disproportionately affected because they continue to constitute the lowest tier of society. Miraftab explains how participatory and often well-intentioned discourse of citizen participation and inclusion of marginalized populations brought forward by NGOs are insufficient to address structural inequality, though they might in some respects foster social and cultural inclusion. Furthermore, she emphasizes that "governance beyond the state" does not entail a substitution of sovereign forms of state power by softer community approaches but that punishment or disciplining and governance under the banner of empowerment and participation are complementary, often taking the form of private police patrolling, camera surveillance as well as the expulsion of unwanted groups from public spaces. Keeping these

theoretical and empirical findings in mind, I will discuss and problematize below two complementary policies that evolve around the notion of “responsible communities” and the “moral subject” and that affirms Mirafteb’s (2007) argument on the simultaneous adoption of inclusive and exclusive discourses and strategies to govern the urban: the creative city strategy and the punitive state.

The Creative City Strategy

One policy that is fueled by community discourses is the “creative city” policy (Florida, 2002 and 2003). The idea of the creative city is basically a strategy for economic growth involving the consumption of culture and frequently presented as an alternative to more harmful growth strategies. As Hall (2000) and Florida (2002 and 2003) argue, outsiders and tolerance for them play an important role in constructing the image of the creative city. The existence of ethnic or gay communities or different subcultures, such as a punk rock or a hip hop scene can thus be utilized as important asset for neoliberal growth. Caulfield (1988) has argued in this context that in Canada gentrification is in fact an emancipatory practice of the middle class opening the opportunity for interaction between different classes and social groups in a heterogeneous inner city environment. Richard Florida (2002) has additionally developed several indices such as what he calls the “bohemian

index”, the “gay index” and the “diversity index” arguing that cities that are high on these indices, i.e. they have a high proportion of artists, gay men and women and/or different ethnic/religious minorities, have more potential for socio-economic development because they attract a “creative class” of typically well-educated newcomers. The creative city strategy is a perfect example of the abstraction of space through empty and non-dialectical categories and fueled by the perception that low-income and often minority-heavy neighborhoods should be diffused by middle class influx. Accordingly, it has been intrinsic to many different gentrification processes (Peck, 2005).

Urban planners have been keen to follow Florida’s theses and, according to Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2012) the reason is that a critical mass of people profits from the creative city strategy without encountering a high level of dissent, be it house owners, investors or public authorities. Luring, at least temporarily, creatives into otherwise marginalized neighborhoods has thus become a major kick-off strategy for gentrification. This also explains why artists, as Hackworth and Smith (2001: 467) have argued, are frequently “key correlate[s]” of gentrification, as it has been the case in the Lower East Side (Zukin, 1982; 2010 and Abu-Lughod, 1995): the collective efforts of social groups that are perceived to be somehow alternative and beyond the mainstream, be it creative, entrepreneurial or political activity, can be used for surplus accumulation. Their presence and

activities constitute the background against which the typically young middle class can “‘perform’ difference from mainstream norms” (Zukin, 2008: 724). Nevertheless it is important to remember that the main and sole agents of gentrification are not so-called ‘gentrifiers’ and ‘pioneers’ in search of distinction. Their demands are collectively produced by the market as well and need to be understood in conjunction with the global level at which this production takes place (Smith, 1979).

There are countless programs that have made explicit or implicit use of Florida’s creative city strategy for urban regeneration. An example would be the *No Longer Empty* project in New York launched by a group of international curators and co-supported by the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs. Or the community-led and Southwark Council's Regeneration & Economic Development Sub-Committee-supported *Better Elephant* project in London in which the purpose -namely gentrification - is clearly stated:

Temporary arts and cultural events also benefit developers by helping increase the ‘bohemian index’ of an area, attracting the creative classes and making it more desirable – thereby increasing real-estate values and consequently developer profit margins. There is now clear evidence that art and culture are significant economic drivers in London’s economy. (Better Elephant Official Website, year unknown)

Lawton (2014) has made the argument that the creative city strategy, which I here after Peck have conceptualized as “fast policy”, is not only fast but also explicitly revanchist. In fact, he posits that the creative city is an evolution of

what the late geographer Neil Smith identified as revanchist city, albeit one that is dressed up as soft and cuddly." I have explained why the creative city policy is fast but what makes it also "revanchist"? Akin to other community-oriented policies, the problem with the transfer of the creative city strategy is that local histories and specificities are disregarded. Communities are symbolically but not structurally included (Zukin, 2008; Mele, 2000). This symbolic but not structural inclusion ironically encompasses the so-called creative class whose cultural capital frequently exceeds its economic capital. Accordingly rising rents may eventually lead to a displacement of the "creative class" itself. Artists and other newcomers are instruments to gentrify urban space but they are not the ones "who must be *catered to*" (Peck, 2005: 764). Instead the goal is to boost the competitive edge of city and sub-city units in order to attract big capital even if that means that those to whom the creative city image is attached to (ethnic and sexual minorities, artists, often students etc.) eventually have to leave. Thus we can argue that the creative city strategy, though it uses softer methods and discourses, it is a revanchist strategy that tends to conceal the different interests and opportunities of those who are supposed to represent its image (Lawton, 2014). I will further explain how soft creative city policies are accompanied by measures that are more obviously exclusionary.

The Punitive State: Policing and Workfare

One of the premises of the creative city strategy is tolerance for alternative groups in society and minorities, but this strategy has frequently been accompanied by the securitization of urban space and the increase of punitive measures directed against the poor. I have mentioned above that the rise of inclusive community discourses to govern cities has not entailed an abandonment of sovereign forms of state power. On the contrary, both strategies must be viewed as complementary (Miraftab, 2007).

To understand why, I will first turn to the question what 'punitive measures' entail: Loic Wacquant in *Punishing the Poor* (2009) makes the argument for the United States that welfare and criminal justice policies have increasingly become integrated to create a "government of social insecurity". Populations of color are disproportionately targeted because the punishment or regulation of the poor is tied to a racialization of poverty. Wacquant (2001) has also called this the "punitive state" in which precarization and unequal distribution is managed through penalization and thus further exclusion. Thus one of the constitutive characteristics of the neoliberal state is not that it is small and passive but what needs to be asked instead is in whose lives it intervenes, in whose lives it does not and with what justification. Or as Peck and Tickell (2007: 29) put it:

Neoliberal politicians developed a new repertoire of governmental practices, including privatization, selective 'deregulation', contracting out, and so forth, the aggregate purpose and cumulative effect of which was not, of course to roll back the state in general but to roll back (and restructure) a particular kind of state.

Despite different histories, several scholars have argued for an "Americanization" of European welfare and penal policies, including countries with strong welfare traditions such as Germany (Freeman, 1986; Faist, 1995; Ross, 1998), Norway (Kildal, 1999) or Denmark (Torfing, 1999), though this Americanization may proceed at different paces.

Americanization for countries with social democratic traditions implies that there has been a general shift from welfarism to workfarism (often also referred to as 'welfare-to-work' policies). Workfarism is built on an individualistic view of unemployment and poverty, constructing them as "behavioral problems" (Matejskova, 2013: 988) rather than as systemic outcomes. Frequently thus, governmental assistance is nowadays tied to conditions such as passing language test for immigrants (Joppke, 2007) or accepting jobs under qualification. The penal system kicks in cases of violation of these conditions, including measures such as welfare cuts that may bring families below or close to the national poverty line (for Germany see Handler, 2004: 194).

Workfarism is connected to gentrification. The combined philosophies of individual responsibility and punishment for non-compliance with

typically middle-class ethnic majority values, serve to demonize long-term working class inhabitants, create the perception of inner-city emergency zones (Eksner, 2013) and provide justification for enhanced regulation of the poor. Accordingly, punitive measures are also revanchist and fast policies that often are applied in conjunction with the seemingly softer creative city approach. So have for example private and public security personnel become more visible in urban landscapes. While security in front of schools located in certain – often minority-heavy – areas was until recently largely an American phenomenon, similar measures are now applied in Europe (Shaw, 2001). Furthermore, it is now common to see private security personnel, police or city guards patrolling public spaces in Western European cities such as Berlin (Eick, 2003), Amsterdam (De Waard, 1999) or Gothenburg (Doherty et al, 2008). Again, securitization creates the perception of crisis in the broader public. Youth criminality, homelessness, hanging out on public places, jaywalking and the like are all conceptualized as cultural problems of poverty (Lewis, 1959), deviant cultures which need to be regulated and contained – if possible also through middle class influx. Eick (2003 and 2006) notes for Berlin that community policing serves not only to surveil the population but also to utilize the unemployed: many non-profits work together with public employment agencies in order to ‘re-integrate’ young unemployed men back into the job market through employment in the security sector. Ironically, many of these re-integrated young men are of

immigrant descent in immigrant-heavy boroughs like Kreuzberg and Neukölln and have a Nazi past in formerly Eastern boroughs such as Marzahn-Hellersdorf with high proportions of Neo-Nazis. Both groups in this sense are employed to discipline their own social group and the state in cooperation with the non-profit and private sector creates a synergy of community discourses and punitive measures. Eick (2003: 376) summarizes these strategies as follows:

Three spheres of functions can be distinguished. First, control and order services run by non-profits are used as conflict-adjusting instances and are directed towards the resolving of user conflicts. Second, in so-called 'disadvantaged areas' non profit organizations are seen as a tool to move problematic quarters into self-regulation. Poor are employed against poor, and non profit security agencies are brought into action for disciplining and supervision. Third, inclusion and exclusion processes are connected. Low-wage security workers, employed by non profit organizations, have to expel low-income individuals out of inner city territories.

After having explained what I mean by "punitive measures" and the "punitive state", how do we make sense of the continued exclusion of low-income immigrants while their alleged difference is turned into a marketable trait under the creative city strategy? And how can we explain that public agencies and the private sector are on the one hand pushing the image of a city open for alternative lifestyles while enhancing the control of urban spaces to expel marginalized groups? The answer is that there is no contradiction here. The aim of both strategies is to boost economic growth and make the city fit for investment – to different extents, so-called creatives,

sexual/ethnic/racial minorities or political activists are instruments to achieve this goal. The containment and regulation of behavior, e.g. behavior such as hanging out in public spaces, uncontrollable squatter or political protest that is not consumption-oriented and thus does not contribute to profit-generation is thus a logical outcome.

Below I make an additional argument regarding the discourse of social mixing, which encompasses the creative city approach as well as workfarism and the securitization of the public realm. My critique of these strategies may give the impression that poor minority-heavy neighborhoods should not be interfered with. This is not the case. In fact, it is equally necessary to problematize romantic notions of ethnic quarters and multiculturalism. In this sense my aim is not to critique advanced neoliberal strategies and more particularly gentrification alone, but to critique them in conjunction with the often foregoing or accompanying processes of disinvestment and territorial stigmatization that leave working-class residents and more particularly low-income minorities with limited choices on the job, education and housing market.

Preserving Communities?

Adversaries of the interventionist policies I have discussed above have often been quick to argue that the residential segregation of low-income ethnic and racial minorities is not always fully other-inflicted or negative in its consequences. In these alternative accounts it has generally been posited that members belonging to a minority ethnic/racial group may develop intra-ethnic/racial ties and networks that benefit their survival in the host/majority society without mingling and mixing with the majority. Rather than viewing residential segregation and ethnic segmentation as “mobility trap” (Wiley, 1967), it may thus be seen as a significant advantage for minorities.

Particularly important in this respect has been the notion of social capital: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).

Social capital is a non-material form of capital and is collectively owned since it consists of human relations. In contrast to money, social capital’s worth depends on the social field it is used in. For immigrants this can mean that their name, a trait they possess or the position they held in their country of origin may grant them advantages only among individuals who share this knowledge. For Germany, Esser (1986 and 2001) has argued that immigrants from Turkey in particular often have better chances of social

mobility when competing with co-ethnics rather than with members of the majority society. Hence he postulates that in Germany a process of ethnic segmentation has taken place in which immigrants from Turkey have built up their own relatively protected economic niches.

Lanz (2007: 170-177), however, shows that even these more multiculturalist accounts do not manage to think beyond social constructions of racial and cultural difference and romanticizing notions of alleged communities. Firstly, immigrants might not be as protected in these communities as it is sometimes suggested: Sanders and Nee (1987) have shown that there are limits to intra-ethnic solidarity. In reply to Wilson and Portes' (1980) study on Cuban immigrants in the US, they maintain that while immigrant *entrepreneurs* might indeed be better off in the ethnic enclave, those immigrants who work for them may have significant disadvantages as compared to workers in the regular economy in terms of earnings and working condition. Immigrant workers may still remain in the enclave because their employers "draw on ethnic solidarity to enforce and maintain sweatshop conditions." (Sanders and Nee, 1987: 763). This is a crucial argument, since it reminds us once again that the determining factor is class – immigrant entrepreneurs might actually be better off and ensure their own social mobility (often from working-class to petit bourgeoisie) in the ethnic economy but immigrant workers in general remain exploited.

Secondly, in most ethnic enclave/colony/economy/niche theories immigrants and their families automatically become part of “ethnic colonies” (for Germany see Elwert, 1982) or “ethnic enclaves” (Wilson and Portes, 1980) if they live in certain parts of the city where many of their co-ethnics live as well. However, whether there is on the individual level any kind of identification or social exchange with other co-ethnics remains mostly unquestioned (Lanz, 2007: 174).

Thirdly, even if these exchanges do exist, what do we make of this? Are colonies or enclaves something to be valued? Bukow et al. (2007) argue that notions of ethnic colonies or enclaves miss that low-income immigrants’ strategies are limited by systemic factors. In that sense, so-called communities do not emerge somehow naturally but are often an effect of social exclusion. They are behavioral strategies that emerge as a reaction to constraint possibilities – in the case of working-class immigrants – to ensure their livelihood in the receiving society. The acceptance of (seemingly voluntary) residential segregation as individual or group choice conceals the actual structural inequality that causes this segregation. In Lefebvre’s terms we can thus argue that an uncritical adoption of the notion of community is a form of abstraction that disregards the experiences and histories that are behind the emergence of these communities. It thus also entails a form of violence.

Accordingly do not all immigrants living in immigrant-heavy areas rely on intra-ethnic networks equally (Keim and Neef, 2003): Firstly, not every minority member necessarily needs these networks. Secondly, some minority members might derive more advantage out of these networks than others. That also entails that even if these networks are utilized in one way or the other, they are heavily gendered. Cahill's (2007) research on young women of color on the Lower East Side and their experience of gentrification postulated that the transformation of their neighborhoods has different implications for women because it compromises their agency in different ways (Cahill, 2007: 217). Hagan (1998: 60-61) states that while male immigrants' social networks grow over time and become more ethnically diverse, women's social relations often remain limited to other co-ethnic females working in similar industries such as cleaning jobs in private households or that they remain as homemakers, promising less reciprocity and not necessarily contributing to the enhancement of skills useful in the receiving society. In the long-term then, as Hagan (1998) posits, female migrant networks may be more prone to dissolve than male ones and thus they depend more on spatial proximity. In that sense intra-ethnic networks might only be so crucial to female immigrants because they generally possess fewer options in the receiving society. These weak ties, however, do not solve and may even feed into underlying structural problems, such as institutionalized exclusion in the form of racism and sexism.

What needs to be asked instead is why ethnic/racial minorities in different historical periods and national contexts have tended to cluster in certain areas of the city and with what effects for different social groups within these minorities. For some segments this segregation or clustering may indeed have empowering effects, but not for all segments and certainly not in the same manner. This is the issue I will take up in the next chapter by debating the residential history of immigrants from Turkey in Germany.

Discussion

In this chapter I have laid out the theoretical underpinning of my thesis by contextualizing the gentrification process within the debate on neoliberalism, social exclusion and the role of urban policies. I have firstly posited that neoliberalism must be researched as process that has globally generalizable but also local features, both of which must be traced. Secondly, I have argued that gentrification, rather than being seen as a result of economic processes *or* cultural change, is best explained by choosing a unitary or integrated perspective. For this I have been relying on Henri Lefebvre's sociology of space or more specifically on his notions of abstracted and lived space. Gentrification is understood here as a violent process in which lived space is erased by abstract, exchangeable, readable and thus marketable space. That does not mean that lived space disappears (the erasure is never complete and

the contradiction remains) but it means that lived space becomes dominated by abstractions that are generated by powerful groups who are able to impose their own definitions and benefit from them while reproducing inequality. These powerful groups are, according to Lefebvre, to be identified on the global scale, such as national and international investors, real estate, the mass media and last but not least the state. Lefebvre's holistic approach and his notions of abstract and lived space, I suggest, can be related to the work of other urban scholars, whose arguments I will make use of throughout this thesis:

Neil Smith's (1996) notions of the "frontier" and "urban revanchism" provide helpful starting points in this respect. He argues that gentrification proceeds through the perception of crises, the construction of urban space as degenerate and dangerous. We can also understand this as a form of spatial abstraction à la Lefebvre. These abstract representations, on the other hand, independent of how they relate to lived space (i.e. to the experiences of residents) can serve as basis for utilizing policies and discourses that aim at gentrification which for Smith are part of a revanchist strategy to reclaim urban space for the 'white' or, more accurately, de-racialized middle and upper class. Jamie Peck (2005) on his part has added that what we can increasingly observe in the realm of urban planning is the transfer of so-called fast policies – policies that are adapted through different national contexts and aim at surplus accumulation. Again noteworthy is that these

fast policies are based on non-dialectical, categorizing, and hence abstracting readings of space. But what are these policies in the concrete and what makes them “revanchist” according to Smith (1996) and “fast” according to Peck (2005)? Scholars such as Eick (2003, 2006), Mayer (2007) and Miraftab (2007) have shown that the complementary employment of inclusive and exclusive discourses and policy measures is a characteristic feature of advanced neoliberal governance in cities. I have particularly emphasized the simultaneous employment of the creative city strategy, a strategy based on the consumption of culture as a method for economic growth and of punitive measures, such as public and private policing. Both strategies circle around the notion of community and often attempt to utilize civil society and locals to advance the safety and orderliness of a given neighborhood that has been scripted as urban frontier while simultaneously encouraging the influx of new middle class residents and entrepreneurs (particularly young artists). In context of the creative city strategy, Zukin (1982, 2008, and 2010) has underlined the relation between the consumption of culture and difference and gentrification throughout her work. She has argued that marginalized groups and/or groups that experience socio-economic precarity (ethnic/racial, sexual minorities, creative workers etc.) are frequently instrumentalized to advance a tolerant and inclusive image for the city and offer a background against which middle class ‘pioneers’ and ‘gentrifiers’ can “‘perform’ difference from mainstream norms” (Zukin, 2008: 724). The goal, however, is

not the substantive inclusion of these marginalized groups, but to kick off a class remake and thus prepare formerly disinvested areas for the middle class. This is why these policies are revanchist. They are simultaneously fast policies, because the creative city policy coupled with increased public and private policing is a strategy that has been applied throughout different national contexts in a relative uncritical manner.

It has also been emphasized throughout this chapter that though middle class gentrifiers and pioneers are not innocent since they contribute to the construction of abstract space (Zukin, 2008) and they are not the primary reason why gentrification is happening (Zukin, 1982; Davdison 2007). Instead we must, according to Lefebvre, look at the global level, the level of capital actors and the state, to understand how these demands for distinction are collectively produced while simultaneously certain urban spaces are constructed as being representative of difference (e.g. negatively as ghettos or positively as multicultural or otherwise diverse).

Lastly, I have discussed that a critique of abstract representations of space and revanchist fast policies must necessarily also entail a critique of community discourses. Adversaries of interventionist policies and gentrification are often quick to argue that ethnic/racial minorities are under certain circumstances better off in their own ethnic enclave rather than competing with the majority. These scholars, however, tend to disregard why immigrants or historical minorities sometimes have to rely on this

interdependence. The reason is that their choices are limited, their communities are thus frequently an effect of discrimination. Instead of praising and preserving communities for their own sake, researchers must thus engage with the core inequalities that in many cases produce them in different historical periods, which I shall endeavor to undertake in this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3

IMMIGRANTS, URBAN POLICIES AND DISCOURSES IN GERMANY

In this chapter I will discuss the question of immigrants' residential history in Germany and examine discourses of ghettoization by drawing on existing scholarly literature and my own theoretical framework provided in chapter two. This chapter will show under which historical circumstances and structural constraints some immigrants from Turkey came to live in certain areas of the city and how policies and racist discourses based on abstract categorizations of space have fueled these residential choices. In relation to gentrification I will posit, in conjunction with what has been argued in chapter two, that the German ghetto discourse – a discourse carrying elements from the American debate on Afro-American neighborhoods – fulfills a specific function in providing the necessary justification for opening the way for inner city gentrification through the employment of racist discourses that stigmatize neighborhoods and their populations.

The ghetto discourse in Germany has particularly singled out guest workers from Turkey and their subsequent generations as posing a threat to societal and urban cohesion. What has been practically absent from the media and political debate is why and under what historical circumstances

immigrants from Turkey have clustered in certain parts of the city, and more particularly, what have been the structural constraints that have led to a certain extent of residential segregation and the re-entrance of the ghetto discourse into German public life. Scholars have tackled this question in different forms and at different times, engaging with the development of residential segregation (Dirickx and Kudat, 1975; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnick, 1977; Zapf, 1978; Kapphan 2000 and 2001, Herbert and Hunn, 2001; Hinrichs, 2003; Friedrichs, 2008; Schönwälder und Söhn, 2009) and the spatial regulation of poverty (Kapphan, 2002) in Germany throughout history. In the last two decades academics have additionally become more involved with the question of how immigrant-heavy spaces are experienced and produced by their inhabitants, often using anthropological methods of producing knowledge from the bottom up. They have successfully shown how particularly younger generations' self-understanding is shaped by the places they inhabit and how these places are represented in public discourse. They have thus combined questions of spatial stigmatization with questions of identity-construction, showing that in some cases these – other and self-imposed – identities can have empowering potential (e.g. Kaya, 1997 and Mandel, 2008). How then can we link these two corpuses of literature on residential segregation on the one hand and space- and identity-construction on the other?

I will debate Germany's guest worker history from the 1960s up until the 2010s against the backdrop of the restructuring of Germany's economy and its welfare state and the accompanying racialization of poverty. In the first part I will discuss the settlement phase from the 1960s until the early 1990s, when most guest workers and their families were un-naturalized, partially excluded from social housing and started to move into the relatively poorly-maintained housing stocks in the traditional working class districts of Germany's inner cities. I will also discuss how the German guest worker discourse changed in the 1970s with the suspension of the guest worker agreements when the fear of emerging immigrant ghettos first found its way into the public debate. I will at this point argue that we can understand the re-introduction of the term ghetto in Germany – which was last used during the Nazi regime to describe the confinement of the Jewish population – as the creation of a new abstract space. Though the share of immigrants from Turkey in some of the more immigrant-heavy boroughs of the country does not typically exceed 50 percent, at most 60 percent in some neighborhoods, the alleged existence of Turkish/immigrant ghettos and frequent comparisons with the United States have been instrumentalized by different actors, particularly local and national politics, for different ends. One of the ends will be discussed in the second part of this chapter and relates to the spatial regulation and exclusion of immigrants to support German identity construction and electoral mobilization on the far right after reunification. A

particular focus in this second part will be on the shift from the 'guest worker' or 'foreigner' discourse to religion as primary marker of Otherness. I will conclude with a discussion on the current dwelling situation of immigrants from Turkey and their families.

Recruitment, Settlement and Stigmatization from the 1960s to the 1990s

During the postwar times Germany established itself as an exporter of high-end goods, particularly automobiles and chemicals, and until today these have been important defining products of the German economy, though production has largely moved to China and elsewhere more recently (Tolliday, 1995). From the 1950s onwards, West Germany experienced a tremendous economic growth, standing in stark contrast to the developments in the interwar period. This success was also due to the fact that Germany could rely on a highly skilled labor force promising high productivity (Abelshauser, 1995).

One obstacle to this productivity, however, was the lack of a numerous unskilled labor force, essential for the Fordist production method. This gap from 1961 onwards could no longer be filled by displaced persons from the East, due to the construction of the Berlin Wall. In line with the economic and political developments, the first guest worker agreements with Italy in 1955 and Greece and Spain in 1960 were followed by agreements with Turkey in

1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 1968. Despite the fact that this period of guest worker recruitment, crystallizing in the 1960s, was perceived as part of a new beginning in Germany, the recruitment was very much a continuation of German labor policies before World War One (Herbert and Hunn, 2001: 188 and Herbert, 1986: 9). The recruitment of foreign labor was not limited to West Germany, but a popular strategy across Western and Central Europe; however, relatively speaking, West Germany received by far the highest proportion of foreign labor in the post-war period. Almost three million workers from Turkey applied to work in Germany, only a fourth of whom actually made it due to the infamous health checks that workers had to go through to be accepted (Von Brackel, 2011). Initially the recruitment agreement with Turkey was to last for only two years, but on the request of the German Federation of Employers, the two-year regulation was lifted in 1964 (Bade, 1984).

From the very beginning the goal was to fill the less demanding positions in the German labor market. Hence, even if the recruited workers were by no means all unskilled, many had to take on positions below their qualifications. These foreign workers were an “industrial reserve army” (Nghì Ha, 2003: 65) in the full sense, since they would only be employed in sectors where Germans already enjoyed full employment, ensuring the mobility of the autochthonous working class. During this period the

recruitment of Turkish and other foreign workers did not lead to substantial discussions in the German public since it was an agreement between two states that was seen as a necessary step given the steady growth of the German economy.

The conditions of guest workers in Germany up until the 1970s were rather ambiguous. On the one hand they received equal pay, social benefits and had similar working hours as German workers; on the other hand, they were by no means equal to the indigenous workforce. Due to a lack of language skills they were often assigned the least paid and least desirable positions in the factories, leading to, as previously mentioned, the development of an underclass within the German working class. The behavior of trade unions in regard to foreign workers was equally ambiguous: they played a particularly crucial role in the insurance of equal rights for guest workers and served as one of the first integrative mechanisms for them. Nevertheless, equality also had its limits given that non-EEC country workers were included in the voting procedures but could not stand as candidates themselves, which eventually led to conflicting actions (Chin, 2007: 63). In the summer of 1973, Turkish automobile workers famously staged a sit-in at Ford in Cologne despite contrary instructions by the German Alliance of all Unions and their umbrella union, *IG-Metal*. The protest lasted for seven days with 2000 workers from Turkey involved. The

wildcat strike was fueled by the firing of 300 laborers from Turkey for retuning late from vacation (Kurylo, 2007: 42):

At Ford, what has been simmering just below the surface at many factories appears to have forced its way into the public eye for the first time. The guest workers, this new German proletariat, wanted something better. The fact that it happened here in Cologne is no coincidence. In this metropolis on the Rhine, the problems of guest workers have become evident in an intense way, in residential conditions as well as in the workplace. Foreigners, primarily Turks, tend to live in prewar buildings from the 1870s between Ring Street and the railway tracks near the city center. Most Germans moved out of these buildings long ago; the noise of traffic comes in day and night. The sanitary facilities of these tenements are generally inadequate, and sun hardly makes its way into the backyards. (Kurylo, 2007: 42-43)

As Herbert and Hunn (2001: 200) argue, at that time the residential situation of guest workers had been more of a concern in the German public than the working conditions. Since the strong German welfare state, backed by strong trade unions, ensured equal pay and benefits employing firms sought to cut expenses by providing poor and isolated living conditions (Friedrichs, 2008). When guest workers first arrived in Germany their stay was, as explained, seen as temporary. They resided mainly in dorms and barracks, often living crowded up in one room. Workers did at least initially not organize against these conditions, giving employers the opportunity to place them in inadequate facilities. Hence, “[...] well down into the late 1970s the living conditions of foreign workers remained externally the most visible sign of their underprivileged and disadvantaged states in Germany.” (Herbert and Hunn, 2001: 201)

In 1973 Germany suspended the recruitment of guest workers due to the world-wide oil crisis and the stagnation of economic growth.

Simultaneously, while recruitment was stopped, the immigration flow continued. The number of migrants from Turkey, a country that at that time was in a deep economic and political crisis, entering West Germany from 1973 onwards was higher than those arriving in the 1960s. Though about half of the guest workers returned to their home countries, the ones who stayed brought in their families, under the family reunion law. The dorms and barracks, however, were not suitable for a family to live in. Guest workers therefore began to search for otherwise affordable housing. This affordable housing was typically of questionable quality with insufficient sanitary facilities and located mostly in central districts close to the factories (Zapf, 1978).

In Berlin these more disinvested areas were located along the Berlin wall in districts such as Wedding, Tiergarten, Kreuzberg and Neukölln. When the wall was built in 1961 many original residents started to leave for other boroughs further west and property owners began to neglect their buildings. Many guest workers then started to rent in Kreuzberg, which had been declared a redevelopment area due to its bedraggled housing stock. The plan was to gradually tear down the old housing stock and replace it with better-equipped and modern houses. However, the process proceeded slowly and the vacant and neglected houses were in the meantime frequently

occupied by squatters or rented to guest workers and their families. Property owners and real estate managers saw renting to the latter as a good opportunity to receive profit from otherwise unusable housing stock until the demolition would begin and they signed interim use contracts with guest workers. Particularly guest workers from Turkey would receive the most badly maintained apartments as opposed to those of Yugoslavian and other European guest workers (Dirickx and Kudat, 1975; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnick, 1977).

One significant reason, besides affordability, why immigrants tended to cluster in certain neighborhoods in Berlin despite the ban was the lack of access to social housing: Germany, compared not only to the United States but also compared to its Western European counterparts such as The Netherlands or the United Kingdom, was distinguished through its relatively even distribution of immigrants across the country, including smaller cities and even villages. The reason is the particular structure of the German economy with industry not concentrated in urban centers or in the capital but spread throughout the country, often specialized in different sectors, such as textile and coal mining in the Ruhr region, automobile around Stuttgart or finance in Frankfurt. Hence, guest workers were called to work throughout these different locations, often leading to permanent settlement. Compared to post-colonial migration to the UK, the German state thus played a much bigger role in distributing foreign workers to different places,

forestalling chain migration to a great extent. Within cities and towns, however, this argument holds to a lesser extent: due to its unexemplified social housing stock, the German state was again able to somewhat regulate and mitigate the concentration of economically weak groups in specific neighborhoods. Publicly subsidized housing can (or could; the availability of public housing has decreased considerably in the last decade) typically be found in different parts of cities, though some districts might be have more numerous stock than others and most blocks are concentrated on the outskirts (Schönwälder and Söhn, 2009). However, as indicated above, public housing has not been a determinant in shaping the dwelling choices of foreign-born workers, simply because foreign citizens were excluded from benefiting from public housing until the late 1970s. Hence,

[t]he fact that immigrant families today typically live in inner-city areas - and not mainly in the housing blocks of the *banlieus* - is partly an unintended result of discrimination. (Schönwälder and Söhn, 2009: 1451)

In other words, the reasons why guest workers and their gradually arriving families, particularly those from Turkey, tended to move and stay in certain neighborhoods and boroughs, were related primarily to structural constraints, specifically, affordability and access.

It was also during this time in the early 1970s that the fear of emerging immigrants, particularly in the Turkish ghettos, found its way into German public discourse. The guest worker recruitment was stopped, the economy

began to stagnate and family reunions caused an increased influx of immigrants, when the prominent and center-left news magazine *Der Spiegel* infamously titled “*Ghettos in Germany. One million Turks*”:

Cities like Berlin, Munich or Frankfurt can hardly manage the invasion any longer: Ghettos are emerging and sociologists are already foretelling city decay, crime and social impoverishment like in Harlem [...] Almost all of them stay and procreate diligently. Out of 1720 newborn babies that were born in the communal Urban Hospital [hospital in Kreuzberg, Berlin] in 1972, 650 were Turks-Children. Around 5000 Alis and Selims under 14 live in Kreuzberg according to official counting. In the leisure centers of the redevelopment area they are in the majority, in the youth center in Naunynstrasse they even constitute two-thirds. In kindergarten the number of the youngest Turks rose to 430, one third in the last six months. (Zucht, 1973, translation mine)

As argued in chapter two, the ghetto is an abstract space (Zukin, 2010: 56) and discourses of ghettoization are often uncritically imported from other historical and national contexts. The comparison “like in Harlem” in the above quote is an example of this. Kreuzberg physically was and is nowhere near Harlem, neither regarding its rate of impoverishment and crime nor regarding its rate of ethnic/racial segregation. However, the journalist of *Der Spiegel* in 1973 exactly suggested this comparability and in this way contributed to Kreuzberg’s abstraction, making it more easily readable to his readers while concealing the more complex reality, not at least the reality of why immigrants from Turkey were more numerous in Kreuzberg than elsewhere. Instead of pointing out the policies and economic constraints that have led to this development, Turks were said to “diligently” “procreate”

with their music and smells dominating the streets of Kreuzberg (and thus superseding German music and smells) all culminating in the occupation of German space be it in kindergarten, youth centers or on the streets. And the more the numbers, the higher the bill that Germans would have to pay eventually:

Though it is not exactly proved what the naturalization of all foreign employees would cost, however, whether Berlin's finance senator Heinz Strick calculates '200.000 DM infrastructural costs for every integrating guest worker' or whether Munich's urban planners for their region only calculate 'integration costs of presumably 2.5 Billion' – the unpaid bill is already gigantic. (Zucht, 1973, translation mine)

During this period from the 1970s well into the 1990s the German Federal Republic could actively regulate guest workers' and their families' access to public goods on the basis of citizenship, as was the case for social housing. When the concentration of foreign-born workers in some parts of Berlin started to become an issue of political concern, the government accordingly decided in 1975 to ban Turkish, Yugoslavian and Greek nationals from moving into the three redevelopment areas of Kreuzberg, Tiergarten and Wedding (with 23, 17 and 15 percent residents with foreign background respectively at that time, see *Der Spiegel*, 1974), a ban upheld until 1990. During this time Kreuzberg in particular, despite having less than one fourth immigrant residents, was already labeled as "non-German living space". Mandel has argued that this labeling was a form of "symbolic violence", disregarding not only the remaining population but also marking every

citizen of Kreuzberg automatically 'non-German' (Mandel, 2008: 89). This symbolic violence is exactly what Lefebvre hints at when he reminds us that spatial abstraction is a form of violence.

On a practical level one of the main difficulties following the moving ban was the widespread discrimination on the housing market, which made it difficult for immigrants from Turkey to move elsewhere than into these most disinvested areas (Mandel, 2008: 146-148). Nevertheless, despite the fact that still many guest workers moved to these areas and/or opened small businesses by circumventing the ban in one way or another (i.e. through family reunion, challenging the ban in court or by opening businesses by using the name of German acquaintances (Arin 1996: 205-206)), the neighboring boroughs of Charlottenburg, Spandau and particularly Schöneberg and Neukölln, all redevelopment areas in their own right, then received an increased inflow of migrants (Kleff, 1991: 100-113). Until today this moving-ban policy is seen as one of the main causes for the residential concentration of immigrants from Turkey because it, on the one hand, caused an increase in the neighboring boroughs but also did not serve to stop the inflow in the banned areas, particularly not in Kreuzberg (for a critical discussion of the spatial regulation of poverty in Berlin, see Kapphan, 2002).

But bans were not limited to apartment space; they expanded to educational space as well. In 1973, Bavaria, as the first federal state in Germany, introduced separate classes for the incoming children of guest

workers. Other regions followed. In 1982, again in Berlin, the movement ban was followed by the introduction of a quota to have no more than 50 percent non-German children in one school class, and if the quota was exceeded a class containing only foreigners should be set up. This regulation was held up until 1995 (Çağlar, 2001: 603). That means that de facto thousands of children did not receive a proper education fit for integration into the German job market. While the discourses of ghettoization at that time imply that there was a fear of immigrants isolating themselves spatially, policies like the school quota applied from the 1970s up until the mid-1990s indicate that the goal was not to achieve heterogeneity (and thus forestall the emergence of ghettos) but rather to segregate foreigners/immigrants completely so as to limit points of contact between the majority society and guest workers and their families. It was hoped the problem would solve itself when they returned to their countries of origin. Accordingly, Safer Çınar, then chairman of the trade union for education and science in Berlin (as the first chairman of trade union in a German city with roots from Turkey), concluded in 1989 that class segregation is a “variant of West-European Apartheid-policy” (quoted in *Der Spiegel*, 1989).

The present residential concentration of immigrants in German cities, though still relatively low, is thus primarily due to exclusionary urban policies pursued in the defining phase of immigrant settlement in the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, guest workers from Turkey typically worked in the lowest

tier of the German economy, so they could only afford relatively cheap housing. Secondly, they experienced discrimination on the housing market by house owners, who would give them the worst-maintained housing stock and by the state that would on the one hand limit their access to social housing until the late 1970s. On the other hand, they intervened in their housing choices through moving bans. Lastly, discriminatory practice in schools contributed to the social and physical segregation of the incoming younger generation of immigrants, explaining to some extent how the relative social inequality of immigrants in Germany, and particularly immigrants from Turkey has cross-cut through generations, which is still posing a challenge (as I will further elaborate in the conclusion of this chapter).

“The Boat is Full!” – Immigrants from Turkey in Germany in the Early 1990s

While the moving ban in Berlin was lifted in 1990, the post-reunification period provided the start for another defining phase in guest worker – now immigrant – settlement in Germany. German reunification discourse did not foresee any role for guest workers or guest workers turned immigrants, but the fall of the Berlin wall had a tremendous effect on them. *Aussiedler*⁷ who

⁷ Individuals who have been born on the formally German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line as Germans and their spouses and offspring who ‘returned’ to Germany after

came to Germany after 1990 received German citizenship, while guest workers and their children who had been born in Germany were still considered foreigners, with the majority remaining un-naturalized (Canefe, 1998)⁸. The then reigning Conservative-Liberal government with this policy made clear that their conception of “Germanness” was explicitly ethnic. The Conservatives are also the one mainstream party in Germany that throughout its recent history has been most articulate against any form of relaxation of the citizenship law for non-ethnic Germans and the granting of dual citizenship options (Faist and Triadafilopoulos, 2006 and Erel 2009: 25). The *Aussiedler* and many Germans who had previously lived on the Eastern side of the country now poured into the already de-industrializing West, looking for jobs. Given that they were all citizens of the German Republic *and* at least to some extent ethnically German, they had a competitive advantage over the former guest workers, fueling the potential for ethnic conflict among the working class (Göktürk et al, 2007: 14). There is not much critical academic literature on the relation of ethnic minorities to the fall of the Berlin wall. However, the late May Ayim, an Afro-German poet, activist and educator put her own experience into the following words:

reunification.

⁸ German citizenship law, as has been discussed extensively in academia (see e.g. Triadafilopoulos and Faist, 2006), is one of the most rigid laws worldwide and – though gaining more flexibility recently – it is based on the notion of *jus sanguinis*, i.e. the right of blood. That means access to German citizenship is not determined by birth right but ethnic heritage. Children of immigrants born and raised in Germany until recently had to be in the country for a certain amount of time to be able to apply.

As other black Germans and migrants I knew that even a German passport was no invitation to the East-West celebrations. We sensed that with the upcoming inner-German reunification an increasing isolation towards the outside would come, an outside that would include us. Our participation in the celebration was not asked for. (Ayim, 1993: 304, translation mine).

The need to overcome 40 years of separation and to become one nation again as quickly as possible fueled, among other things, strategies of exclusion towards non-German ethnics. In this respect Anthony Marx (1998) has argued that states construct racial/ethnic and cultural difference to consolidate the nation-state, particularly in times of crisis or the (re-) establishment of a nation. In that sense, processes of inclusion and exclusion in the polity are a centerpiece in establishing and preserving a new social order.

Cord Pagenstecher (2012) depicts how the metaphor “the boat is full!” and related slogans originating from far-right political discourse were gradually gaining acceptance in intellectual and center-left circles and were utilized by mainstream political parties during the 1990s. The beginning of the 1990s then marked a series of arson and other violent attacks on asylum seekers and immigrants across the country. While there was much outrage and condemnation of the attacks, they eventually led to a restriction of the asylum law. In May 1993, pushed by the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and backed by the votes of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberals (FDP), the German parliament decided to substantially restrict and

de facto abolish the right to asylum. Three days later, on May 29th 1993, despite the restriction on asylum, an arson attack in this period on a house in the West German city of Solingen killed five asylum seekers from Turkey, three of them children (Pagenstecher, 2012). Documentarist Can Candan (2000) in this context shows in his trilingual documentary “Walls” how the racist and exclusionary violence and sentiments dominating the early 1990s in Germany impacted immigrants’ sense of belonging and not-belonging. While the physical wall was destroyed, a new wall was built up between those perceived as guests and foreigners and those conceptualized as ‘real’ Germans. It can thus be said that the main factors leading to residential concentration changed in the early 1990s. In that period immigrants from Turkey in particular began to see living in close proximity not only as an issue of access and affordability but also as shelter against racist outburst.⁹

But immigrants from Turkey and elsewhere were not only confronted with racist sentiments; they also started to experience the material consequences of the economic restructuring of the German economy after reunification. The unemployment rate under un-naturalized immigrants from Turkey in Berlin doubled in the decade from 1986 to 1996 from 13 to 30 percent (*Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* (Commissioner for Foreigners of the Senate), 1996: 2). 1996 was also the year in which Germany had the

⁹ As an example: At the end of the 1980s a youth gang of young men, mainly descendants of immigrants from Turkey, emerged in South Kreuzberg. From the early to the mid-1990s the so-called ‘36 Boys’ patrolled in the neighborhood and physically fought Neo-Nazis on the streets.

highest number of unemployment persons (over four million) since the end of the war. However, since the average unemployment rate in Berlin at that time was around 15 percent, we can easily argue that immigrants, and particularly immigrants from Turkey, were disproportionately (in fact, twice as much) affected by de-industrialization, which proves their position in Germany as industrial reserve army (*Berliner Zeitung*, 1996).

These economic restraints, on the other hand, also contributed to the establishment of alternative forms of economic activity in the form ethnic niches or what Esser (2001) described as “ethnic segmentation” in the case of immigrants from Turkey. A segmentation through which immigrants, utilizing their spatial proximity, could counter some of the negative effects of racism, discrimination and de-industrialization. In this respect Hillmann (2006) has argued that in the 1990s the integrative potential of the German labor market (primarily due to its strong economy and trade unions) reached its limits. Accordingly, the result has been a fragmentation through the increased exclusion of foreign workers. The empowering potential of this segmentation, should thus – as discussed in chapter two – be viewed with caution, since it is an effect of structural and symbolic exclusion during that time.

The 1998 Election Campaign and the New Citizenship Debate

Given that throughout the 1960s up and until the 1990s the residential segregation of immigrants from Turkey was encouraged by different factors and historical circumstances, they were already firmly established in certain neighborhoods and boroughs by the end of the 1990s, building up their own networks and local businesses. However, the moral panic over this concentration did not end and once again appeared in a new form, this time coupled with the question of citizenship.

The 1998 elections circled around this issue and were rife with right populism, particularly on the side of the Christian Democrats, who found themselves losing votes to the Social Democrats and were thus fishing for far-right electorates. The probably most infamous campaign started by the CDU/CSU¹⁰ against the Social Democrats and Greens after the latter had won the elections was the 1998/99 signature campaign against dual citizenship. The Social Democrats and Greens had proposed a relaxation of the German citizenship law, including dual citizenship for Turkish nationals. While the ultra-right party NPD supported the signature campaign against the proposal, the action was extensively criticized even within the Conservative party and shunned by the Catholic church in Bavaria for provoking nationalism and racism, particularly because the initiators of the campaign

¹⁰ CSU is the Bavarian sister party of the CDU.

argued that dual citizenship would endanger “inner security” portraying all immigrants, and particular Turkish nationals, who would have been the main beneficiaries of the new regulation, as potential terrorists (Wiegel, 2000).

German nationality today still is widely perceived as award for societal contribution. The demand for dual citizenship, on the other hand, is seen as a lack of loyalty to Germany and thus not evaluated as legitimate claim. What was put forward instead was the “desirability of being German” as an award for societal contribution, a contribution almost exclusively defined in economic terms (Göktürk et al., 2007: 175-176). It was thus expected that immigrants would fulfill many of the duties of citizenship and maybe even more, *prior* to being granted the rights. Accordingly, in 1982 former Chancellor Helmut Kohl defined integration “as fitting into German society without conflict and without access to the right of citizenship.” (cited in Kastoryano 2002: 33).

In the perception of the Conservatives, granting citizenship to Turkish immigrants at that time was expected to limit the ways in which politics could interfere with and restrict immigrants while staying on legal grounds. From this perspective a hasty naturalization would necessarily lead to a loss of control over the ‘foreign’ population and thus inevitably threaten social cohesion and consequently inner security. Ronneberger and Tsianos (year unknown) argue that the CDU mobilized the fear of the uncontrollable

ghetto as “explosive space filled with dynamite, ready to explode”. The dissolution of the foreigner ghettos was seen as a necessary condition for integration, while dual citizenship was perceived as fostering the persistence and further the development of these ghettos. Despite extensive criticism, the campaign was rather successful, the Social Democrats lost one state in the regional elections and thus the majority in the federal assembly, forcing them to step back on the proposed law. A compromise was reached and the citizenship law was relaxed to some extent in 2000 but not in the progressive manner the government had foreseen.

In the media the right-wing ambiance of the 1998 election was in the meantime reflected by an explicitly “biologist” (Gebhardt, 2001: 73) discourse:

An ‘uncontrolled growth’ of Turkish migration has developed in Berlin, ‘that after 30 years is hard to cut back’ [*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1997], Ghettos that have ‘nested’ [*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1998] have to be ‘dried out’, poverty spreads after the logic of an epidemic: ‘A black belt of poverty lays itself upon Berlin’s center, sprawls further outwards. It carries the name Kreuzberg, Wedding, Neukölln and Tiergarten’ and marks rising numbers of unemployed and social benefit recipients, a life expectation below the Berlin average, the decay of whole streets and a rapidly increasing share of foreigners [*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1998]. Like a eutrophic river some districts are considered to be ‘dying’ [former mayor of Berlin Eberhard Diepgen cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1998]. (Gebhardt, 2001: 73, translation mine)

Again this representation of certain spaces inhabited by relatively higher number of immigrants must be understood as a form of spatial abstraction in

the Lefebvrian sense. The ghetto as filthy, colored ('black') space in which the natural (German) 'ecosystem' is disturbed by foreign elements and the image of poverty as a disease leading to the death of the whole system – all leading up to an urgent call for intervention.

The late 1990s and the early 2000s were thus another defining phase in negotiating Germany's limits of inclusion and its means of exclusion. While the Conservatives were eager to keep citizenship as a regulatory mechanism, it became clear that in the long-term the much criticized citizenship regime would be gradually adapted to EU standards. With citizenship fading as primary control and regulatory mechanism, at least to some extent, other strategies of exclusion became more dominant.

The *Leitkultur* Debate and the Americanization of German Welfare:

Leading Motives in the New Century

In 2000 the double citizenship debate transformed into a new debate – the so-called *Leitkultur* debate which intensified after 9/11. It is remarkable that the ghetto trope from that point onwards became increasingly Islamified. Yıldız (2009) rightly asked whether the change of the citizenship law and the extended access to naturalization had propelled new forms of exclusionary practices, one of them being the shift from nationality to religion as primary form of stigmatization.

The first one to drop the term *Leitkultur* in 1998 was Bassam Tibi, a German-Egyptian political scientist. Tibi had defined *European Leitkultur* as the idea of a common culture that promotes an individualistic view and substantial equality among different societal groups, a sort of community with a sense and respect of diversity and mutual interdependence (Esser, 2004: 207). In 2000, however, the term “underwent a metamorphosis” (Pautz, 2005: 44): the prefix *European* was substituted by *German*. This creation belonged to Friedrich Merz, then chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the parliament and was the first to express this revision in the local media. Merz argued that immigrants who wanted to stay in Germany should adjust to the “grown, free German Leitkultur” (cited in Esser, 2004: 199). Subsequent interpretations of the term have varied from ‘immigrants should abide by the laws’ or identify with the constitution (Esser, 2004: 199-200) to demands of cultural assimilation, including, for example, an abandonment of the *halal* ritual slaughter (*Der Spiegel*, 2000). The term *Leitkultur* has been used and utilized by different actors in different manners, but it is clear that the demands in conjuncture with this concept have exclusively been directed at immigrants of the Muslim faith.

Pautz (2005), confirming Yıldız’s (2009) thoughts, argued that *Leitkultur* is simply a concept that substitutes cultural for racial belonging and thus must be seen in conjuncture with the citizenship debate. Since, as noted above, at least a small step towards *jus soli* was inevitable, the CDU, with the

support of more conservative groups in society, introduced “ius cultus” (p. 43). Pautz (2005) locates this discussion in the broader discourse of normalization in Germany that started with former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. This discourse of normalization carries a certain amount of resentment against the ‘culture of remembrance’ (*Erinnerungskultur*) regarding Germany’s Nazi past. Pautz (2005: 41) claims that the ultimate goal of the *Leitkultur* debate was to promote a “‘normal’ German national consciousness” by attacking this ‘culture of remembrance’ (*Erinnerungskultur*).” Similar to the double de-contextualization (firstly, from the Holocaust context and secondly from the US American context) of the ghetto, these culturalist debates must thus be evaluated as doubly problematic in the German context. They firstly constitute a neglect of racism as matter of concern for German society by disassociating present discussions from the past and secondly constitute a strategy of continuing exclusion in the face of the potential loss of citizenship as primary marker of privilege. Jörg Schönbohm (2004), one of the fervent defenders of the concept of *Leitkultur* within the CDU, illuminates this point by arguing that:

In the Middle Ages, ghettos were founded to marginalize the Jews. Today, some of the foreigners who live with us here in Germany have founded their own ghettos because they scorn us Germans. Those who come here have to adopt the German *Leitkultur*. Our history has developed over a thousand years. We do not only have a common language but also cultural habits and rules. We can't allow that this basis of our commonality be destroyed by foreigners. (Schönbohm cited in *Der Spiegel*, 2004, translation mine)

By ignoring a few centuries in between, Schönbohm skipped from the Middle Ages to the alleged immigrant ghettos of today, neglecting the forceful ghettoization of Jews during the Third Reich and thus neglecting the place of the ghetto in German history. This is a typical example of how discourses and concepts that travel between different national contexts can lose their substance. This loss of substance or emptying-out of historically significant terms can be, in Lefebvre's understanding, described as a form of violent abstraction with severe consequences for those who are categorized or disregarded. By using the passive expression "ghettos were founded" sometime in the Middle Ages, Schönbohm avoided mentioning who, just a few decades before, had also founded ghettos for marginalizing and killing Jews, acknowledging the victims (though not the victims of the Third Reich, but Jews as primary subjects of the old ghetto) but not the perpetrators and thus circumventing the question what the role of the German state in the process of ethnic segregation and exclusion might be today (for a discussion of the same point in another context see Marcuse, 1998). Schönbohm's quote also formidably depicts the contradictions of the German ghetto narrative: on the one hand, the fear of disintegration is voiced; on the other hand, however, the bar for inclusion is constantly raised. While language skills used to be the primary demand directed at the former guest workers (see for example Haug, 2008), the *Leitkultur* debate brings in a new quality, expecting

Muslim immigrants not only to speak the language, pay taxes, abide by the laws or have a job, but to assimilate fully, making their inclusion a de facto impossibility *qua* Muslims. Faist and Triadafilopoulos (2006: 10) have stated in this regard that “paradoxically, the objective of ensuring immigrants’ integration has served as a means of prolonging their exclusion, through the imposition of onerous and expensive demands.”

The question that therefore has to be raised once again is whether the goal is really a substantial inclusion, or whether it is the social regulation of migrants’ behavior and options in the receiving society and simultaneously consolidating the German nation by provoking fear of social decay and solving distributional issues. It is no coincidence that around the same time, in the early 2000s, Germany’s welfare system experienced an un-precedented reformation. After a series of privatizations in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, such as the privatization of the German railway transport, telecommunication, power supply and public housing, then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder initiated the *Agenda 2010*, which aimed at modifying the social system and deregulating the labor market, including cuts in income tax as well as significant cuts for pensions, health insurance and unemployment benefits. The most-discussed and maybe the most far-reaching reform concerned the restructuring of the social welfare system. In 2002 the government, fueled by a scandal in the federal employment office, sought to restructure the welfare system to more effectively fit the prevalent market

conditions. The assumption behind the so-called Hartz reforms (named after the man who headed the reform commission) was that the unemployed must be “activated” and that employment rates can only be increased through deregulation of the labor market. Within this new framework the balance between the rights and obligations of the unemployed population changed drastically. The implementation of these neoliberal programs has transformed German welfarism to workfarism in which the responsibility to re-integrate in the labor market is primarily given to the recipients and punitive policies for non-compliance with provisions are employed (Eick, 2003 and 2006; Peck 1998). Several scholars have thus suggested that the German welfare system, though still much more encompassing, has undergone an “Americanization” (Freeman, 1986; Faist, 1995; Ross, 1998), possibly giving way to a new (racist) class conflict. This mirrors the discussion on the “punitive state” in chapter two: poverty and exclusion are seen as results of personal failure, the unemployed subject is thus called to duty to take responsibility for his/her failure to contribute to the economy. Coupled with culturalist and neo-racist arguments the relative material deprivation of immigrant workers becomes an issue of the ‘wrong culture’ not of institutionalized discrimination and capitalist exploitation. The use of the ghetto trope since the early 1970s and the more recent notion of *Leitkultur* are thus not inconsequential connotations but connote a racialization of poverty (first through ethnicity, then through religion) and thus also a

strategy of rendering intelligible and legitimizing social inequality through the use of ethnic and cultural references.

Today the concept of *Leitkultur* is still lingering in German public discourse, popping up from time to time but it has certainly lost prominence today. However, with one debate cooling down, new ones arise on the horizon. When in 2005 in the Parisian *banlieus*, the uprisings of working class youths, many of whom were postcolonial migrants, made headlines around the world, and Germany once again found itself in discussion around immigrant ghettos.

The 2005 Paris Uprisings and the European Muslim Ghetto

And while in the French suburbs cars and supermarkets are burning Germany look full of fear to its problem zones, decried as Turkish and Russian ghettos. Soon to be here? (Drieschner and Klingst, 2005, translation mine)

While American ghettos had so far served as the primary bad example of where Germany might be going, the 2005 Paris riots created a new “reference point” (Stehle, 2006: 57) for the ghetto within Europe. Religion within the *Leitkultur* debate had already turned into the primary marker of Otherness (rather than nationality or national belonging), but in 2005 this shift intensified, turning the ethnic/racial ghetto (whose reference points were places such as Harlem or the Bronx) debate into a European Muslim ghetto

debate. This shift shows, again referring to Lefebvre, how quickly abstract representations of space can be imposed or changed, ignoring the consequences of these representations on residents' experiences and perceptions. Stehle (2006) argues that, within this renewed discussion of Germany's 'problem zones' or ghettos, the agency of inhabitants was utterly ignored and instead only the majority society, "an ominous and unspecific 'we'", was addressed and warned of the emergence of foreign spaces within the own territory (Stehle, 2006: 58). She extends this point by referring to an opinion piece written by German author Peter Schneider for the *New York Times* in which he states that Berlin is divided once again, this time not physically but by race, ethnicity and culture:

There is a new wall rising in the city of Berlin. To cross this wall you have to go to the city's central and northern districts – to Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Wedding – and you will find yourself in a world unknown to the majority of Berliners. (Schneider, 2005)

'Foreign-ness' in these narratives is often explicitly connected to appearance such as relatively dark hair or skin color, and cultural habits. The 'white' German subject, on the other hand, is neutral in his or her looks and behavior. He or she looks normal, smells normal, and sounds normal (see McIntosh, 1988 on the constitution on whiteness as a norm). The standard on which all peculiarity, all difference, otherness and all that is weird and strange must be measured. And this is an otherness that is explicitly gendered. Schneider's (2005) opinion piece begins with the story of Hatun

Sürücü, a young woman born to Turkish parents murdered in an honor killing by her youngest brother on her way to a bus stop in Berlin-Tempelhof. Schneider (2005) referred to this crime and connected it to Berlin's new spatiality, a Berlin divided between 'them' and (male) Muslim immigrants:

For a German of my generation, one of the most holy legacies of the past was the law of tolerance. We Germans in particular had no right to force our highly questionable customs onto other cultures. Later I learned from occasional newspaper reports and the accounts of friends that certain Muslim girls in Kreuzberg and Neukölln went underground or vanished without a trace. Even those reports gave me no more than a momentary discomfort in our upscale district of Charlottenburg. But the books of the three Muslim dissidents now tell us what Germans like me didn't care to know. What they report seems almost unbelievable. They describe an everyday life of oppression, isolation, imprisonment and brutal corporal punishment for Muslim women and girls in Germany, a situation for which there is only one word: slavery. (Schneider, 2005)

The three "Muslim dissidents" he refers to are attorney Seyran Ateş, a human rights activist, author Serap Çileli, and sociologist Necla Kelek. The use of the word "dissident" already implies that Schneider (2005) sees Muslim immigrants in Germany as a fairly homogenous community with its own rules and codes of conduct, a sort of army. Armies, however, exist for war. In a similar metaphor *Die Zeit* (2005), another influential national weekly, describes the relationship between Turks and Germans as "cold peace". The use of the war rhetoric in connection with alleged ghettoization implies that those living in the ghettos are not only foreign but also potential

enemies. Enemies in war usually do not find common ground, but either the one or the other wins, one side must either surrender or leave the territory.

The marking of Muslim girls and Muslim women as slaves is another expression worth underlining. Schneider (2005) implies that women and girls are kept on 'Muslim territory' against their will. He then declares that a German "of his generation" – meaning a German who grew up in the postwar period – is particularly predestined to speak up against any atrocity happening on German soil (because of the atrocity that happened in the past) employing the concept of slavery, which is again borrowed from the American context.

The war rhetoric used in the German context to problematize the presence of immigrants or certain groups of immigrants is persistent. Only a few years later it appeared in a new form this time more explicitly intertwined with the continuing politicization of the German welfare system.

"There is no law against speaking the truth": The Sarrazin-Affair

A similar logic of life and death described above was employed in the summer of 2010 by Thilo Sarrazin, a member of the executive board of Deutsche Bank and the SPD, leading up to another episode in Germany's ghetto narrative. Sarrazin published his debut *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany is abolishing itself) and the book became a bestseller and

generated a major controversy. He claimed that the German immigration and integration policy was a failure, resulting in immigrants having become a burden to German society. As former finance senator of Berlin, his particular emphasis was on the threat immigrants constitute for German wealth and its welfare system. Following the emerged German workfare mentality, Sarrazin singled out Muslim populations as particularly unwilling (and unable) to integrate, producing children rather than surplus for the economy. Sarrazin also employed eugenic arguments arguing that Germans would soon be 'outnumbered' by Muslim immigrants, lowering the average intelligence of the country and eventually leading to its demise. The Social Democrats were rather clumsy in handling their straying party member with reactions reaching from harsh criticism to defending at least some of his statements. Attempts to cancel his membership were countered by online petitions with a significant part of the electorate supporting his views.

As can also be derived from what has already been discussed above, Jäger and Schultes (2012) tell us that it is not surprising that Sarrazin's rather ill-founded arguments appealed to different segments of society:

[...] Sarrazin's theses are solely an expression of a long-enduring racist, and in particular anti-Islamic and not lastly anti-social media-political campaign in Germany, which has led to the majority of German society having racist and still anti-Semitic prejudices, fearing poverty and simultaneously looking down on the poor. (Jäger and Schultes, 2012: 97, translation mine)

In a sense, then, Sarrazin confirmed a 'knowledge' that has already been produced and reproduced in German public discourse in multifarious manners. And the German media did not shy away from further re-confirming this knowledge: The public channel ZDF sent Sarrazin to the migrant-heavy Kreuzberg and Neukölln. The results were as expected and probably as had been hoped by the journalists who arranged the spectacle. Sarrazin was booed and told to "get lost", but without, any sign of physical or verbal violence (Mielke and Schmidl, 2011). Despite the fact that Sarrazin's walk through Kreuzberg and Neukölln was peaceful, the national tabloid BILD claimed the next day that Sarrazin had been "verbally harassed, insulted and chased out of a Turkish café" and that "politicians were enraged about the intolerance of immigrants" (Jungholt, 2011). The intolerance that was ascribed to immigrants from Turkey in face of charges that can easily be identified as blatant racism was obviously an attempt to turn the tables – it was not Germans that were xenophobic or racist but rather, the ethnic minorities that were unable to hear the truth about themselves and therefore reacted aggressively.

It is the neoliberal logic of personal responsibility that permeates the mindset of Sarrazin and his adherents. Individuals who 'failed' to produce enough surplus or were not able to adapt their living quality to middle class standards for whatever reason were called out, marked and blamed.

Resistance to this 'truth-telling', on the other hand, was quickly dismissed as irrational.

Discussion: The Dwelling Situation of Immigrants from Turkey Today –
The Ghetto as Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?

In conclusion, we can say that in the German context the ghetto has travelled “[f]rom Europe, to the US and back” (Stehle, 2006: 52). However, arriving back in Germany on its way, it lost both its historical meaning in relation to the Holocaust and its historical meaning in relation to the black ghettos in the US, which are not only spaces of poverty and segregation but of social resistance and cultural emancipation (Stehle, 2006; Wacquant, 2008). In Germany both meanings have been blurred, creating a discussion of the immigrant ghetto which neither unravels the cruelty of confinement nor possibilities for empowerment. What is absent from the discussion is why and under what circumstances immigrants from Turkey have chosen to live in proximity and how it has enabled (e.g. in the form of networks, businesses and protection from racism) and disabled (e.g. in the realm of education) their prospects in Germany. Instead, emphasis on the responsibility and (bad) intentions of those living in the presumed ghettos was made and the role of public policies and the majority society was mentioned only in a

related discussion on failed integration, naïve multicultural policies and economic costs.

Despite the fact that levels of ethnic segregation among immigrants remain relatively low in Germany, and has in fact decreased over time, there is still a difference between the overall dwelling situations of immigrant families as compared to the majority society, particularly for those from Turkey. Though segregation in Germany does not take the form of the ethnic segregation of one particular group, as it does, for example, in the US and its predominantly black inner-city ghettos, immigrants in general are more likely to live in low-income neighborhoods with comparatively high rates of unemployment and dependence on social benefits but still live together with ethnic Germans (Schönwälder and Söhn, 2009: 1454). As Wacquant (2008) argued in the case of the infamous French *banlieus*, immigrants in Germany thus tend to live in more migrant-heavy (above average) but still ethnically mixed neighborhoods with lower economic status. Furthermore, the rate of segregation increases when we look at schools and kindergartens. This is grounded in the fact that the proportion of individuals with a migratory background increases among children and adolescents and, in fact, German ethnics are more likely to send their children to schools in districts with fewer immigrant children (*Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung* (Author Group on the Report for Education), 2008).

Again, immigrant groups from Turkey are worth particular attention in this respect. Though overall segregation has been decreasing in Germany in the last two decades, groups from Turkey are still more likely to concentrate geographically than other immigrant groups arriving in the guest worker recruitment period. Moreover, a difference that still persists is that immigrants from Turkey from that period are more likely to live in very old housing stock built before 1918 and are more prone to live in overcrowded apartments (Friedrichs, 1998: 1751 and Friedrichs, 2008). In conjunction with what has been discussed in this chapter, the fact that immigrants from Turkey, though not segregated, continue to show some extent of residential concentration in low-quality housing can first be explained by the economic status of this particular immigrant group. Immigrants from Turkey, compared to other immigrant groups, have higher rates of unemployment, tend to be less educated and hence to also have a lower household income on average (Klingholz et al, 2009), affecting their choices on the housing market. The employment gap between German and Turkish workers that developed in the 1990s is thus persisting. The unemployment rate among Turkish nationals (naturalized immigrants not counted) was around 20 percent in 2013, compared to six to seven percent in the total population. Particularly worrisome is the situation in the German capital: In 2005 one out of two Berlin residents with origins from Turkey (naturalized or un-naturalized)

was dependent on social benefits and over 40 percent were registered as unemployed (Brenke cited in Lang-Lendorff, 2008).

Residential concentration is, however, also connected to numerical strength and the evolution of minority infrastructures (Esser, 2001). Hence, groups that are strong in numbers such as immigrants from Turkey may have a higher probability of clustering in certain areas, causing a sort of chain migration *within* the city because they have to rely on non-formal and formal networks with their co-ethnics to counter their own disadvantages (which often as has been discussed and will be further tackled in chapter six, however, leads to a reproduction of these disadvantages in a different form). As I have depicted in this chapter, in Germany the early 1990s were a particularly defining phase in the evolution of these immigrant infrastructures: immigrants' segregation, whose access to housing choices until then had been constrained by discriminatory practice and policies as well as low economic capital, was further perpetuated by a rise of racist and nationalist sentiment and the simultaneous de-industrialization of the German economy. Ethnic economies and the development of other formal and informal infrastructures are, thus, also a result of these exclusionary structures and discourses.

Thirdly, as extensively explicated through the racist debates above, the social distance between immigrants from Turkey and the German majority society remains relatively high compared to other ethnic groups. Friedrichs

(1998: 1753) showed that in 1996 one-third of ethnic Germans would have found it unpleasant to have neighbors from Turkey in 1996 (as compared to 5.9 percent who would have found it unpleasant to live next to Italians). Discrimination on the housing market accordingly hits this immigrant group particularly hard. Kılıç (2010) has, for example, shown that immigrants from Turkey have less access to apartments in high-income neighborhoods and are more likely to get their applications for renting an apartment accepted in working-class areas, which are then, however, marked as ghettos and subjected to negative stereotyping. Stigmatization and abstract representations of space are thus not just discursive problems; they have structural consequences for the residents of these spaces: they fuel discrimination on the housing market, limiting access to certain neighborhoods, which in turn serves as a mechanism for further exclusion through negative stereotyping of those neighborhoods and boroughs to which immigrants have enhanced access, all-in-all producing a self-perpetuating cycle.

These findings, particularly issues of housing discrimination and unemployment, show that inequality has cut across generations of immigrants from Turkey in Germany. Though we are today witnessing the birth of the fourth generation, children of immigrants from Turkey are still more likely to have difficulties in the housing market due to their name and/or looks and are less likely to succeed in education and work. On the

basis of these facts, the question whether the ghetto turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy is of course, as Blokland (2008) modestly states, still difficult to answer. However, what can be claimed is that structural inequality and subsequent territorial stigmatization in the form of discourses of ghettoization indeed have an effect on the way certain groups are perceived and treated in society and, not less significantly, how they perceive themselves. We may further dig into the question of the pain that Otherization and stereotyping causes and how this pain translates into material realities. According to Lefebvre, abstraction is also always a form of violence, a violence frequently supported and even imposed by the state such as in the form of punitive policies. One form of structural violence that entails material dispossession and that is legitimized through discourses of ghettoization, I argue, is the process of gentrification and the psychological and physical displacement it causes in German inner cities.

In chapter four I will turn to the specific case of Berlin and evaluate how, since reunification, the capital has been subjected to a rapid neoliberal restructuring, including the gentrification of its inner city and what role immigrants have played in this process.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMERGENCE OF THE GERMAN NEOLIBERAL CAPITAL

The case of Berlin is discussed separately in this thesis because of its exceptional history. After reunification, Berlin developed into one of the most rapidly changing landscapes of Western Europe. The city has become the stage for major urban projects, such as techno parks, finance centers and high-class residences. Germany's latecomer status has made these undertakings part of a discussion of Germany's assertion of political and economic power in the new century.

I will first engage with the deregulation of Berlin's housing market, which has led to increased urban polarization, leaving particularly low-income immigrants and their families at disadvantage. Secondly, I will give an overview about how Berlin's landscape was transformed after reunification, including the gentrification of its inner city areas. I will then proceed to explain how the fast policies discussed in chapter two have been applied to Berlin. Since 2004 the German capital has been marketed as creative and multicultural city with questionable results for the local populace. This new marketing for Berlin fits into what Harvey's (1990a) notion of the postmodern neoliberal regime: they are characterized by an

increased commodification of cultural forms, a fleeting, open and fragmented world view. Flattened hierarchies in the labor process are matched by a worship of difference and heterogeneity. Zukin (2008) further shows, however, that this worship for heterogeneity remains on a performative and consumerist level, not striving for the substantial inclusion of those marked as different. Not surprisingly, then – despite all proclaimed worship for diversity – Berlin has simultaneously undergone an increased securitization, with measures frequently taking America as a model and targeting immigrant-heavy districts. Today the city has the strongest police force in Germany, supported by numerous private security services.

In will, accordingly, in this chapter argue that attempts by the state and private sector to make Berlin fit for the global market have led to a disregard for the lived experiences of the local populace in favor of an increasingly abstracted and ultimately exclusionary spatial organization with questionable societal consequences.

Berlin's Housing Market: Towards Urban Polarization

Though Berlin's authorities are attempting to make the city fit for global competition, frequently drawing comparisons to more 'advanced' counterparts such as New York, as I will further show in this chapter, Berlin of course is as any other space, unique in its characteristics. Below I will

discuss the particularities of the capital's housing market, drawing attention to the facts of why and how the construction of Berlin after reunification as an abstract and thus marketable space has contributed to increased polarization.

Berlin's housing market is exceptional in the sense that most of population is concentrated in the center. The suburbanization that took place in other cities has not taken place in Berlin because of its specific history. Berlin's borders are drawn tightly (Mayer, 1997: 4) and suburbanization was discouraged by urban renewal in inner city areas. There were attempts to unite Berlin with its neighboring federal state in 1996, which would have somewhat annexed a suburban living space to Berlin. The proposal was, however, rejected with a 64 percent majority (McKay, 1996; Rada, 1997). Compared to other German cities such as Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt or Cologne, urban sprawl thus remains limited in Berlin and just recently has begun to increase slightly. Accordingly, we must be careful to apply the concepts of inner-city disinvestment and reinvestment as well as Smith's (1979) rent gap theory to the case of Berlin.

Moreover, the rate of owner occupation is significantly low, though that too is also recently increasing: only about 16 percent of the total housing stock is owner-occupied. This is also a result of the fact that public involvement in the housing sector has been more intensive and prolonged in Germany and particularly in Berlin – Berlin's isolated state led to high

subsidies from the federal government, compared to other European cities (Bodnar and Molnar, 2010: 801; Kemper, 1998: 1756). Kemper (1998: 1769) reports that of the 550,000 apartments built between 1948 and 1987 in West Berlin, 78 percent fell under the category of social housing. And even the housing stock that was privately owned was subject to public rent control. By the end of the 1970s the city experienced a housing shortage, particularly in the low-income borough Kreuzberg, leading to the emergence of the still famous Berlin squatter movement. The struggles of the squatters led to a policy modification of the West Berlin senate, marking the beginning of the so-called “careful urban renewal” (*behutsame Stadterneuerung*) period. This policy entailed twelve principles targeted at including residents’ opinion and considering the social circumstances in the reconstruction of their living spaces. Though never officially abandoned, the “careful urban renewal” policy lost ground after reunification and so did social housing (Holm, 2006).

While housing regulation has long been a feature of the German social system, the sector has been subject to deregulation at an accelerated rate from the late 1990s onwards: as of 2013 Berlin had only 153,000 social housing apartments left since all public subsidies were terminated by 2003. This was not an ad hoc decision since subventions for social housing were designed from the beginning to last 30 years at most (15 years initial funding + 15 years subsequent funding), the problem is that no new social housing was built to follow up while demand increased. Accordingly, the number of social

housing apartments has sunk to less than one-third, from 480,000 apartments in 1993 (Holm, 2006). This is particularly dramatic if we consider that 60 percent of Berlin households theoretically qualify to benefit from social housing given their low income, yet 85 percent of Berlin's 1.6 million strong rental housing stock is now privately owned and only partially price-controlled¹¹ (*Senat für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt* (Senate for City Development and Environment), 2011: 8).

While the senate, at least until recently, claimed that there is still considerable vacancy, the federation of the housing companies and housing cooperatives with their place of business in the city of Berlin and in the federal state of Brandenburg maintain that vacancy sank to a 2.3 percent and even down to 1.5 percent in inner city boroughs in 2012, indicating housing shortages as of today (Jürgens, 2013). While the cities' major historic sites are reconstructed for touristic consumption, the districts surrounding the center have become subject to intensified competition and thus rising rent levels.

This is particularly true for the lower priced housing segments – apartments in older buildings, fewer square meters and formerly undesirable living

¹¹ Partially price-controlled means that there is usually a limit on what the house owner can demand from a new tenant and that there is a limit on rent increase for already-residing tenants. For residing tenants the rent can be increased 15 percent within three years (with at least one year in between every increase). The increase-allowance was 20 percent before May 2013 but was then lowered to 15 percent. In the summer of 2014 the grand coalition between the Conservatives and Social Democrats agreed on a draft law to be implemented in 2015 that foresees to further lower this number to ten percent. However, this new law would only be valid for areas with a "tense tenant market", on which the individual states would have to decide and is not valid for new buildings or buildings that have been extensively modernized (one-third of the building-price reinvested for modernization). Also, the rent regulation is only supposed to be valid for the next ten years. (*Der Spiegel*, 2014)

areas – exactly that segment in which the majority of immigrants have to compete.

In conjunction with what has been said above, Neil Smith's description of the development of a rent gap through prior suburbanization does not exactly hold for Berlin. As a reminder, Smith argued that gentrification is primarily directed by cycles of dis- and reinvestment; potentially valuable but neglected land is rediscovered by capital actors (including the state) and due to its prior neglect opens up the possibility for surplus accumulation, i.e. higher rents can be extracted for housing that has previously been acquired for low or moderate prices. However, a modified version of his thesis still makes sense: Kemper (1998: 1769), in this respect, writes of an "inner suburbanization" in which new residences were built in the outer part of West Berlin and the areas close to the wall remained relatively undesirable and thus maintained comparatively lower rent levels. Furthermore, Berlin in general had much lower rent levels in the East and the West as compared to other German cities, making it today particularly prone to reinvestment. Today Berlin is still the "cheapest metropolis in Europe" (Schick cited in Bünger, 2011), but the marginalized boroughs at the former border are now in the midst of Berlin and turning into hubs for reinvestment. In this sense we may speak of a case of "rental gentrification" and "value gap" (Van Criekingen, 2010; Holm, 2006) gentrification for Berlin.

Not surprisingly, low-income localities in Berlin have been affected by the increased demand for housing and the de facto end of social housing. Mayer (1997, 2002) has claimed that while Berlin shows many differences to the archetypical global cities, the capital is clearly heading towards a stronger social and economic polarization, similar to its 'advanced' counterparts:

[...] twelve years after the fall of the Wall the city indeed is no longer divided by a 'deathstrip,' but new, more and less visible boundary lines have come to traverse the city, establishing socio spatial patterns of polarization not known before. (Mayer, 2002: 1)

By 1997 Mayer already held that Berlin could no longer be taken as an example of an integrated city and argued that while the German capital does not share many of the preconditions or processes we observe in other global cities such as suburbanization and internationalization, there is strong evidence that a convergence of Berlin with some second-order global cities such as Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Chicago, Zürich or Shanghai is taking place, with signs of increasing economic and social inequality.

This convergence is also reflected in the capital's physical landscape: Berlin's inner city areas have increasingly been transformed to attract tourists and newcomers, a transformation that I will discuss below.

Upgrading Berlin

Past injustice is done and over. The dead are really dead.
(Horkheimer, 1973)

Berlin is, due to its historical disadvantage, lacking industry and a developed service sector, is still economically weak compared to other urban centers in Western Germany and thus has often been depicted as an “exceptional case” (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999). This lack has made the search for a coherent narrative for the new and old capital a matter not only of local but national identity. If Berlin could be reinvented, then Germany may not only benefit economically but also get rid of the demons of the past (Mayer, 1997). Accordingly, attempts to boost Berlin’s image and valorize its “brand” on the global market have been tremendous. Berlin during the 1990s had to become a capital and a global city simultaneously (Cochrane and Passmore, 2001). These endeavors have not always been successful: failed applications for hosting international sports events, a rejected referendum on the unification of Berlin and its neighboring federal state Brandenburg, the highest unemployment rate in the country and a relatively poor populace have caused the confidence that Berlin would become the next European capital to dwindle (Rada, 1997). Berlin thus does not quite fit Saskia Sassen’s (1991) description of a “global city” (yet).

Driven by the angst of not being able to catch up, the German economy has been deregulated for the love of locational competitiveness (often discussed within the so-called *Standortdebatte*, the 'locational debate'). The focus on more decentralized subnational competition has also led to a greater focus on Berlin's resources and the ability of the capital to compete with its own, not only Western European but also West German counterparts, such as Frankfurt, Munich or Hamburg. Neil Brenner (2000: 321) in this respect has argued that the

current neoliberal offensive in postunification Germany has been articulated in a determinate geographical form [...] [that] has entailed a redifferentiation of national economic space into an amalgamation of subnational economic spaces (including *Länder*, regions and cities) which are increasingly said to have their own distinctive developmental trajectories.

These efforts have been typically undertaken in public-private partnerships. So have several private holding companies/agencies been built up such as the *Olympia GmbH* to promote Berlin's Olympic bid right after the fall of the wall (which eventually failed) or the still active *Partner für Berlin – Gesellschaft für Hauptstadtmarketing GmbH (PfB)* (Partner for Berlin – Society for Capital Marketing) initiated in 1995. Funded for *PfB* is from private shareholders ranging from *Deutsche Bank* to local construction or real estate companies. The Berlin Senate itself has a rather "ambiguous" (Colomb 2012: 120) role: it is not a shareholder but *PfB* works for the Senate as a sort of contractor and the Senate in this way contributes about half of its budget without being a

shareholder (Colomb, 2012: 119-120). This legal status as a private firm receiving large public contribution is a contentious issue: "PfB, in that sense, is part of larger set of quasi-public institutions which have some of the power, but lack the accountability, of traditional public agencies in Berlin" (Colomb, 2012: 120).

Since these aspirations are rather new, compared to other capital cities in Western Europe, Berlin's ongoing reinvention, like that of many newly emerging or aspiring-to-be-global cities, is based on the perception of change and its recognition as "capital in becoming" (*Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin* (Press- and Information Office of the State Berlin), 1995). This 'becoming' has a physical reflection in the major construction sites that have dominated Berlin's landscape in the last 25 years. The most significant physical difference can unequivocally be observed in the central borough Mitte. Mitte literally means 'middle' and formerly comprised an area located on the Eastern side of Berlin. In 2001 Mitte was enlarged through the annexation of two neighboring Western boroughs Tiergarten and Wedding. The original Mitte area, i.e. the former Eastern part and Tiergarten has been subject to reconstruction. Today it has become Berlin's downtown, with major reconstructions initiated on its main street Friedrichstreet. And as can be seen from Figure 3 this reconstruction has frequently been modeled after cities that have already received their status as "global cities" – such as New York.



Figure 3 Role model New York City for latecomer Berlin: The “Upper Eastside” Building at the intersection of Friedrichstreet and Unter den Linden.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

On Friedrichstreet office spaces and residences are complemented by luxury shopping opportunities, not at least the famous Galeries Lafayette with its designer shops. About a kilometer from the Galeries, the Brandenburger Tor on the famous Pariser Platz marks the entrance to a series of major tourist sites, including the German parliament. Right before the government moved back to Berlin in April 1999, the seat of the German parliament, the *Reichstag* (parliament), was redesigned with a modern glass cupola set on top of the 19th-century building in lieu of the cupola that had been destroyed in the

1933 fire. “[A]pparently de-Nazified and even de-Prussified” (Cochrane and Passmore 2001: 345) by this addition the German parliament moved back into the halls that had once been the sight of Nazi propaganda and military preparations in World War Two. The Reichstag is now one of the major tourist attractions of the city and a symbol of how the past can be contained through postmodern construction (Koepnick, 2001: 304-305).

We can make a similar argument in regard to the incorporation of Jewish Berlin and the Holocaust in the image of the city. In 2005, one block south of the Brandenburger Tor, a new Holocaust memorial was inaugurated amidst great controversy. The memorial, it may be critically argued, is part of the mainstream touristic experience that Berlin offers and has become part of Berlin as event space. The Holocaust and the way its remembrance is put into certain architectural forms accordingly has become part of the Berlin brand (Marcuse, 1998).

Further south, still in walking distance from the Reichstag, the Brandenburger Tor and the memorial, the formerly divided Potsdamer Platz has been remade in the image of capitalism with private ownerships by Sony, Daimler Benz, Beisheim and Park Kolonaden. Significantly, Potsdamer Platz had played a crucial role in Hitler’s vision of a global capital Germania; now it is the primary sight of the victory of capitalism over communism. The square, titled as Europe’s biggest construction site in the 1990s, has been extensively criticized for its architectural imitation of US shopping mall

designs and the fact that the square was basically handed over to only four big investors who not only constructed the streets and buildings without public participation but also received the right to the property, i.e. the right to determine who enters the premises and under what circumstances. The management of the 20,500 square foot building complex has clear regulations on how to behave not only in the numerous shops and restaurants, which would be less subject to debate, but also on the exposed roads that lead through the complex. Accordingly political propaganda has been prohibited in and around the Center, making Potsdamer Platz, a formerly politically and culturally highly significant space, post-political in the truest sense of the word (Allen, 2006; Glasze, 2001 and Schmidt, 1996).

Berlin's relatively recent transformation and adaptation to the capitalist world market is an example of the abstraction of space in the Lefebvrian sense. Historically highly significant places have turned into theatrical stages for the performance of Berlin's brand as a city with "ghosts" (Ladd, 2008). The city's historicity is not denied but it is turned into a commodifiable trait. Simultaneously Berlin's uniqueness as sight of German and European atrocity is getting increasingly lost with the emulation of American city building: Friedrichstreet takes the spot as the Upper Eastside with luxurious shopping, high rise office spaces and residences and Potsdamer Platz could probably be any place in Manhattan or downtown Chicago.

A significant question earlier posed by scholars such as Stephan Lanz (2007: 15) is of course how low-income immigrants and possibly other socio-economically weak groups are affected by Berlin's restructuring and how they are included and excluded in urban developers vision of the new Berlin. Not only Mitte has been part of the vision for the new Berlin; other inner city and often immigrant-heavy areas have been included in the marketing of the city in different ways. It is these "new tourism areas" (Maitland and Newman, 2004) I will now turn to.

Mobilizing (Poor) Communities in the New Berlin

In chapter two I debated how the notion of community has become a nodal point around which recent urban policies evolve. These discourses of the "new right" typically use a similar vocabulary as it is employed by proponents of the "new left": local populations are to be 'empowered' to support the enhancement of their neighborhoods. This empowerment usually takes place through the public funding or co-funding of local initiatives. The problem is firstly that this seemingly inclusive approach shifts the responsibility for balancing social inequality on private individuals. Secondly, many recently popular policies, such as the creative city strategy or community policing, employ community discourses to kick off or fuel gentrification. So-called communities create a clean and safe environment,

creatives open galleries and boutiques and ethnic and sexual minorities contribute to the desired feeling of diversity, all in all making their neighborhood good to go for investment and profit.

One particularly poignant example of a policy based on these abstract representations and that is illustrative of the contradictory nature of these representations, is the nation-wide Socially Integrative City (SIC) (*Soziale Stadt*) program. The proclaimed goal of the project is to achieve sustainable development for so-called “disadvantaged districts” or “districts with need for development” in terms of their physical environment and the economic and social situation. More specifically, the local participation, economy, employment and social and cultural infrastructure should be enhanced through the support of diverse community projects initiated by residents, private stakeholders, NGOs and the like. Every neighborhood that is targeted by the program (about 300 in Germany) has a “district management” (*Quartiersmanagement*) whose function is to implement these goals on the local level. SIC resembles other community programs such as Empowerment Zones in the US (Metzner, 2005) or City Strategy in the UK (for an overview see Tomalak and Halloran, 2009). Eick (2006: 69) argues that SIC is a particular expression of the creative moments of German neoliberalism in that it establishes “new or reorganize[s] preexisting institutions and practices, which serve to reproduce neoliberalism” through the activation of community discourses. Emphasizing the connection

between communities and economic growth, SIC attempts to mobilize civil society, particularly grassroots movements. The language used is one of solidarity and empowerment and the antidote used against exclusion is to boost the competitive potential of the targeted areas (Mayer, 2007: 91-92).

When mobilizing city space as an arena for market-oriented economic growth becomes the central goal of urban policy, urban forms of governance also become entrepreneurial. Such forms of governance target pro-growth strategies and include projects aimed at involving residents to enhance 'security and order.' [...] The SIC program, which at the local level is called 'district management' (Quartiersmanagement), reconceptualizes economically poor urban neighborhoods as deprived and mainly migrant, with their residents viewed as being unemployable and dependent on welfare (Eick, 2005). [...] Projects like SIC and state-led initiatives such as community crime-prevention schemes are aimed at 'disadvantaged areas' and link federal, state (Länder), and municipal governments with private and public stakeholders (and their respective financial resources). (Eick, 2006: 73-74)

As Eick (2006: 73-74) hints at in this quote, the choice of districts that qualify as "disadvantaged" within SIC is built on highly problematic premises. Local authorities themselves decide which of their neighborhoods are "problematic", though the state in which the city or commune is located can accept or decline this choice. The evaluation is made on the basis of comparative data on such factors as housing vacancies, housing quality, the health and education level of residents and in particular the reception of social benefits and unemployment. Moreover, soft data is also included in the identification of problematic areas, such as negative image, subjective feelings of insecurity, and so on. The first problematic premise here is that

the main focus is on unemployment and the reception of social benefits (Häussermann et al., 2003/2004). Standing within the “Anglo-Saxon workfare strategy” (Eick, 2007: 276), SIC assumes that participation in the market economy is the only valid way of combating social disadvantages, ignoring the fact that unemployment and consequently the reception of social benefits is a systemic result of market economy itself. An evaluatory study of SIC undertaken by a research team at Humboldt University in Berlin in 2003 and 2004 shows that “problem quarters” are frequently identified on the basis of the extent of immigrant residential concentration. Similar to other urban policy projects in Western Europe, local boosterism and regulatory policies are thus often geared at neighborhoods in which the ethnic minority population is disproportionately high.

The argument is that in those quarters where many immigrants reside weak socio-economic indicators such as heightened crime rates, school dropouts and unemployment prevail, necessitating some form of intervention. The Humboldt University study (Häussermann et al., 2003/2004: 118), however, states that this argument is an “ecological fallacy”: the basic assumption is that the concentration of ethnic minorities leads to weak socio-economic indicators. Accordingly, a solution is sought in policies that aim at the de-concentration of immigrants and social mixing (through among other things, creative city strategies or regulation). What is, however, ignored is the relation between immigrants, legal status and class. The socio-

economic gap between different neighborhoods and boroughs within a city may be better explained not by the clustering of immigrants or minorities in these areas but with the clustering of socio-economically weak “risk groups”, which is not a problem of ethnicity or culture but a systemic effect of capitalism called social polarization or social exclusion that materializes in space (Madanipour et al., 1998). The correlation between ‘many immigrants’ and “disadvantagement” is thus not substantiated through scientific studies but only assumed (Häussermann et al, 2003/2004: 124). As I will further show in chapter five, identifying a high proportion of immigrants as problematic in itself, without acknowledging the structural factors that have led to and maintained this development, is a form of abstraction that leads to the employment of fast policies (Peck, 2005) that are problematic and ill-founded as well. For now it suffices to say that Berlin is one of the states with the highest number of district managements (*Quartiersmanagement Berlin* (district management Berlin) Official Website, 2015).

But immigrants are, as indicated earlier, not only perceived as problems in the new Berlin. Simultaneously, the capital’s multicultural image is attached to them. Quarters and boroughs such as Kreuzberg and Neukölln are increasingly referred to as ‘Turkish quarters’ or ‘Little Istanbul’, again emulating American counterparts such as ‘Little Italy’ or ‘Chinatown’. American anthropologist Damani Partridge (2012) has put forward in this context that certain social groups, such as immigrants and their following

generations, Afro-Germans or sexual minorities, remain as foreign bodies or non-citizens and are only included in so far they serve the fulfillment of exotic desires for the Other, for example if they serve to market spaces as representative of multiculturalism.

We can understand this simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in Lefebvrian terms: I have described in chapter three how, around the turn of the century, the Turkish ghetto with ethnic/racial connotations was superseded by a new representation, that of the Muslim ghetto. This supersession can be characterized as a new spatial imaginary in which 'foreign-ness', 'non-German-ness' and the like come to be defined through religion rather than nationality. To associate neighborhoods that have previously been stigmatized with leisure and consumption is also a new spatial imaginary: Otherness this time takes the center stage in a new representation of the city – foreign languages or an ethnic economy are not exclusively coded in this representation as threat to social cohesion but as an asset. The everyday life of social groups deemed to be 'different', e.g. the foods they consume and sell, the way they look and behave or their hospitality becomes a commodity, ready to be consumed (Maitland, 2010). Lefebvre (1994), relying on ideas earlier brought forward by Gaviria (1974), has described this exotizing gaze on immigrants and other minorities as a form of neocolonization. The Mediterranean is primarily conceptualized as leisure zone for first-world tourists and a particular popular destination for

Germans. Accordingly, the arrival of guest workers from these regions in Germany is an opportunity to consume authenticity and difference 'at home'.¹² Both representations, however – immigrants as threat or as asset – are based on abstract and non-dialectical notions of space and fail to account for the positive (e.g. the advantages of living in proximity) and negative (e.g. social exclusion and material hardship) experiences of those marked as Others. Furthermore when and under what circumstances immigrants' presence and difference are seen as assets is tightly circumscribed by bourgeois norms (Mandel, 2008: 86-87).

Below I will further debate how immigrant-heavy areas in Berlin have become part of the marketing of the city after reunification and simultaneously continue to be regarded as threat to social cohesion.

The Creative City Berlin

The efforts to upgrade Berlin to the status of a global city stretch further than construction sites or memorials. As explicated in chapter two, Richard Florida has maintained that a city can boost its competitive edge through ethnic, sexual and creative diversity while remaining open and inclusive to

¹² It should be noted here that this consumption of Otherness is not confined to immigrants or the 'Mediterranean'. The consumption of so-called 'gay culture' is particularly prominent in Berlin. Former underground clubs with a large gay clientele or dark rooms such as *Berghain* or *Ficken 3000* have become major mainstream tourist attractions (see also Partridge, 2012).

marginalized populations. I have already discussed why this premise is problematic. It has been shown by scholars such as David Harvey (1990a, 1990b) and Sharon Zukin (1982, 2008 and 2010) that the commodification of culture is an integral part of advanced neoliberalism. So-called lifestyles, ideas, images and even human relations have become consumable but they are only included on a symbolic, performative or discursive level without altering or challenging power asymmetries. Nevertheless, urban planners and policy-makers have adapted Florida's theses in a largely uncritical manner across the globe and have based urban policies on his arguments. This is not any different in the latecomer city Berlin:

At the beginning of the new century after construction had been largely completed, a dominant narrative that has been utilized for Berlin is that of the "creative city" (Florida, 2002). The creative city strategy is, as discussed in chapter two, a typical "fast policy" (Peck, 2005) that includes the consumption of culture at its core. It is also "revanchist" (Smith, 1996) because it involves the instrumentalization of creative workers, alternatives and ethnic, racial and sexual minorities for the purpose of making marginalized neighborhoods attractive for investors, tourists and affluent newcomers. The use of the creative city strategy for Berlin is of course not coincidental but highly correlated with the fact that Berlin is already too 'late' to occupy other niches in the global economy such as finance or scientific innovation. The failure to attract enough investment had by 2001 left the city

with a major budget deficit and emphasized the need to develop a new and relatively low-budgeted vision. The idea of Berlin as a Mecca for artists has particularly been vocalized and appropriated by mayor Klaus Wowereit, who declared in 2004 that the capital was “poor but sexy” (*arm, aber sexy*). Since creativity, artistry and ethnic diversity are typically imagined to be juxtaposed to material well-being, “poor but sexy” came to be the header of a series of new or reinterpreted symbolic meanings that are today attached to Berlin.

The new vision is also not completely unrelated to Berlin’s demographic realities; in fact, due to its exceptional status and affordability the city had, without any public planning, long been a destination for artists and creatives, especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Colomb, 2012: 232).

Furthermore, even before Wowereit and other local authorities officially adapted the creative city strategy, temporary use had already played a particular significant role in Berlin’s re-imagination as a creative hotspot.

Berlin’s high rate of housing vacancies and abandoned industrial sites due to the flight towards the West after the building of the wall gave artists and cultural entrepreneurs the opportunity, before and after reunification, to temporarily appropriate space with relative small financial effort. By the early 2000s then,

[p]olicy-makers started to realize that some of the city’s characteristics -previously perceived as weaknesses- could be promoted as strengths to specific target audiences: cheap rents,

space availability and empty sites began to be actively promoted to attract tourists and 'young creatives' [...]. (Colomb, 2012: 242-243)

Today, Berlin has a strong creative labor force with ten percent of the working population employed in culture-related industries generating a fifth of the capital's GDP (Jakob 2010: 195). Colomb (2012: 189) argues that the creative sector in Berlin has shifted the attention from Mitte, Potsdamer Platz and Friedrichstreet and their surrounding areas to the whole city as "exhibition" space, making not all but at least the more centrally located boroughs of Berlin such as Prenzlauer Berg, Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain, Schöneberg and more recently Neukölln, stakeholders in the new Berlin hype.

Berlin's marketing as a creative city is, however, not limited to creative industries but is related to the presence of immigrants in the city and the residential clustering of these immigrants in certain parts of Berlin.

Kreuzberg in particular was already an attractive destination for artists and alternatives before reunification. Cheap rents and vacant houses led to an interesting and – for some – alluring mix between guest workers, working-class Germans and people with high cultural but low economic capital such as students, musicians and last but not least a world-renowned squatter-movement. After the fall of the wall, Kreuzberg and its surrounding area – also North Neukölln today – have become crucial touristic sites for staging Berlin's creative hipness and simultaneously its cultural diversity (Lanz,

2007). Maitland and Newman (2004) have called areas like Kreuzberg “new tourism areas”. Maitland (2010) has argued that consuming the everyday life of certain groups and people that might be labeled different or diverse has turned into a touristic experience, aside from the more mainstream attractions.

The travel guide *Berlin for Young People* (Bienert et al., 2006: 126) thus in 2006 stated celebratory that since Kreuzberg is Berlin’s poorest district “it’s gotta be supersexy” – referencing Wowereit’s “poor but sexy” slogan. This is an almost ironic twist: under neoliberalism even poverty is abstracted and commodifiable under certain circumstances. In several guides, Kreuzberg has been marked not only as fascinatingly poor but also as “Little Istanbul” (*In Your Pocket Essential City Guide*, 2014/2015:48) and Berlin is frequently portrayed by local authorities as a “multicultural world city” (Capital Berlin Official Website, 2015).

Kreuzberg may accordingly be labeled as the archetypical abstracted space in Berlin. Many people, not only in Germany but across the world, who have never been in the borough or even in Germany or Berlin, have an image of Kreuzberg in mind. And this image is usually connected to the presence of immigrants from Turkey and their following generations. However, Mayer (1997) and Lanz (2007) both note critically that Berlin is not nearly as multicultural as some like to present it, particularly when compared to cities like Los Angeles, New York or London. In that sense the physical space

Berlin contradicts the abstract space Berlin: While in absolute numbers, Berlin has, for example, the highest share of immigrants from Turkey in Europe and holds the title of being the biggest Turkish city outside Turkey, in relative numbers the proportion of inhabitants with a migratory background is below the that in cities like Frankfurt, Stuttgart or Cologne (Capital Berlin Official Website, 2015).

There is no borough in which foreign-born individuals or their native-born offspring constitute a majority, though the figures change when we consider children and adolescents in certain inner-city neighborhoods (Schönball, 2007). Nevertheless, acting as if Berlin was as ‘colorful’ and cosmopolitan as its American or British counterparts has become an important urban marketing policy. I am of course again interested in what happens to those people and places, such as Kreuzberg and more recently North Neukölln, that are supposed to represent Berlin’s alleged “subcultural capital” (Thornton, 1996). Berlin is no longer the cheap city that it was a decade ago. Though Berlin is still relatively affordable, generally speaking, compared to its European counterparts such as London or Paris, but prices and particularly rents all over the city are going up.

As discussed, the creative city strategy is highly problematic because it appears inclusionary, embracing difference, but does not question or attempt to alter structural inequality. If minorities, alternative groups and creatives attract tourists and newcomers and if the housing market is simultaneously

deregulated, as is the case for Berlin, then the result will unquestionably be some form of gentrification. In this sense, economically precarious groups and their 'lifestyles' are instrumentalized to further a relatively cheap route to gentrification (Bader, 2009). A further problem is, as discussed in chapter two, that the seemingly soft strategy of the creative city is typically accompanied by increased securitization and punitive measures – measures that frequently target minority-heavy neighborhoods and thus aim to contain the 'diversity' that the creative city is supposed to represent.

Policed Diversity in the New Berlin

In chapter two I discussed the notion of the punitive state relying on Wacquant's (2008 and 2009) findings. The main point here is that softer and seemingly more inclusive strategies such as the creative city approach do not substitute but are coupled with sovereign forms of state power (Miraftab, 2007). Accordingly, while local authorities and private investors are keen to market Berlin as "poor but sexy", suggesting that the city is particularly welcoming of alternative groups and societal outsiders, Volker Eick (2006: 33) states that "[s]ince the mid-1970s the trend in public policy for German cities has shifted from more socially inclusive to more exclusive measures." And this trend is particularly visible in the capital. Private and everyday policing has become much more frequent in Berlin's inner city areas. Not

surprisingly, given the ambitions of urban planners, politicians and private stakeholders to boost Berlin's economy, the capital has the highest number of police officers in Germany today and a growing private security force (Eick, 2006). Again, inclusion and exclusion are in a delicate balance here: As mentioned in chapter two, it has become common practice to employ unemployed young men to expel and discipline other young men and women of their own social group from public spaces, such as immigrants in Kreuzberg and Neukölln or former Neo-Nazis in East Berlin. These practices are funded by the local job centers and are thus publicly commissioned (Eick, 2003 and 2006). As an example, unemployed individuals in Neukölln, including immigrants from Turkey, have started to work as security personnel commissioned and paid by the public job agency since 2011. Copying not only the model but also the name of their New York City counterparts, the *Neukölln Guardian Angels'* public commissioning and presence in Berlin is a perfect example of how discourses (in this case of ghettoization) and subsequent "revanchist" (Smith, 1996) and "fast policies" (Peck, 2005) travel through utterly different contexts. On the one hand marginalized groups are expelled from public spaces in neighborhoods that are constructed as problematic; on the other hand, young unemployed individuals are re-integrated into the job market by being commissioned with this expulsion. The benefit in terms of gentrification is thus twofold: first "cleanliness and order" (Eick, 2003: 365) is restored, making the

neighborhood more attractive for the middle class and capital actors and secondly, marginalized groups are effectively divided through measures of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. I have already explained why and how immigrants can become part of an important marketing strategy, by relying on their 'Otherness' while their activities and presence are regulated simultaneously. As a reminder, these seemingly contradictory approaches are not in effect contradictory but are based on the same abstract constructions of space: minorities are only desired in so far as they serve surplus accumulation, i.e. as long as what they do is sellable and consumable. Since it is the bourgeoisie or the petit bourgeoisie that has the necessary capital to consume, it is also they who determine which forms of difference are acceptable (such as selling Mediterranean food) and which are not (such as wearing a headscarf) (see Mandel, 2008).

Discussion

"Paris is always Paris and Berlin will never be Berlin". French former cultural minister Jack Lang uttered these words in 2001. The German capital is indeed in a constant becoming and has undergone a tremendous transformation in the last 25 years. This accelerated catch-up with global capitalism has certainly left its trace on the local population and, while Berlin might still be considered an "exceptional case" (Cochrane and Jonas, 1999), the city in its

level of urban polarization begins to resemble other second-tier global cities. Particularly low-income immigrants who typically cluster in inner-city districts like Kreuzberg, Neukölln or Mitte find themselves competing with tourists, newcomers and investors.

Local politicians have not only deregulated the housing market, but also adapted fast policies (Peck, 2005), emulated other cities, such as the creative city strategy and increased private community policing to boost Berlin's competitive potential. Ethnic and racial minorities take on a particularly ambiguous role within this 'boosting': While their presence is on the one hand utilized to enhance Berlin's multicultural and tolerant image as "poor but sexy" city, the increasing securitization accompanied by persistent inequality on the housing market and the realm of education (as shown in chapter three) is evidence that their presence is only desired in so far it contributes to surplus accumulation, in this case through gentrification. Miraftab (2007), whom I have mentioned earlier, has argued that, in Cape Town, while more inclusive community discourses such as the image of the multicultural city are certainly not unimportant and may help to change perceptions (e.g. perceiving ethnic diversity as added value rather than as a threat), they do not go beyond the social and cultural realm, leaving material inequality and exclusion untouched. We may even argue that strategies and discourses such as those circling around the creative and multicultural city Berlin help to conceal these systematic inequalities by suggesting that

equality is possible without structural change. In this sense the local government capitalizes on the tastes of the young middle class, including their demand for alternative consumption such as 'ethnic food', but does not aim at avoiding the possible displacement or hardship of those who among others cater to these tastes (Zukin, 2008).

CHAPTER 5

FRONTIER MYTH, REVANCHISM AND ACTORS OF GENTRIFICATION IN NEUKÖLLN

In the past Germans would not even get onto the U7 or U8¹³ after Alex¹⁴ station, only we and the junkies would remain. Until Kotti¹⁵ no one would remain. Now you only hear English and Spanish at Kotti [...] What has been decisive in making it like this and that only one sort of people, this in-scene-people are suddenly here?¹⁶ (Interview #1, Kübra¹⁷, born to Turkish parents in Reuterquarter, December 2012)

“Are you vegetarian?” a young blonde English-speaking woman with an American accent and a colorful long skirt worn over jeans asks the likewise young man sitting in front of her in a small cafe on Friedelstreet in Neukölln, Berlin. She is about to give him recommendations for going out and eating in Berlin. He confirms being vegetarian, also in an American accent, upon which she adds that she also does not eat fish anymore, “I am vegan now”

¹³ Subway lines going through the South of Kreuzberg and North Neukölln.

¹⁴ Alexander Platz, a station in Berlin’s centre.

¹⁵ Kottbusser Tor, station in Kreuzberg center.

¹⁶ All quotes are presented in English. Slang, wrong sentence structure, code-switching between German and Turkish and the like have been corrected. Original quotes (as uttered by interviewees) are offered in the appendix.

¹⁷ I changed all personal names used from the interviews. Almost all social workers’ asked me not to mention their affiliation and names; hence I only indicate their profession. The only real names I use are from those interviewees with people who spoke in an official capacity or who explicitly allowed me to use their names. I will indicate the use of real names in a footnote.

she concludes. Having found an equal basis of what constitutes recommendable food, the young woman, in her early 20s, starts to enumerate must-go places to eat in the German capital. As she leaves, the man continues scribbling drawings into a small vintage jotter. It is freezing cold outside and it is a workday, but the cafe I am sitting on this afternoon is full. Bits of English and Spanish, sometimes French mingle and mix with German. Like me, young people are drinking cappuccino or latte and eating tarte flambée or late breakfasts with their laptops open and their headphones on. Two or three doors next to the cafe a new book shop has opened, two men in their mid or late-30s with brown beards and tweed jackets are running it and I they too are American. Outside is a black sign with white English writing saying "Bargain Book Shop". No German translation is given. The store sells new and second-hand books on design, art, photography and architecture for reduced prices. Between the book shop and café there is a thrift shop specializing on clearing out apartments that belonged to now-deceased residents or social welfare recipients who are no longer able to keep their belongings. North African-looking workers in front of the shop are unloading gold furniture from a truck (see Figure 4).



Figure 4 Second-hand business: Neighborly bargaining for water cans and designer books on Friedelstreet, Neukölln.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

Nothing surprising about this scene – a typical day in a central quarter in a global metropolis. Cafes, bookshops, thrift shops, immigrants from first and third-world regions mingled together in close proximity. However, there is something curious about Neukölln and about this particular neighborhood in the North of the borough called Reuterquarter. And there is something curious about the fact that there is an American woman recommending vegan hotspots to a fellow American on this fine winter day.

It is curious because it is this and other scenes that exemplify of the transformation the North of Neukölln has undergone in the last couple of

years. The immigrant-heavy Neukölln and particularly the neighborhood where I overheard this conversation in the winter of 2012, Reuterquarter, is a place about which virtually everyone in the German Republic has an idea. While Neukölln, the borough in which Reuterquarter is located, has frequently been referred to as the “Berlin Bronx” (*Berliner Morgenpost*, 2013) and has long been perceived as *the* spatial manifestation of German nightmares of ghettoization, violence, foreign infiltration and Muslim fundamentalism, today Reuterquarter is subject to gentrification creeping over from the neighboring Kreuzberg. The change began from the inside out, on the small prettier side streets in the neighborhood. Pretty because they are full of buildings left from the 19th century. Bad quality on the inside but attractive to look at from the outside, some of them are now painted in candy colors. Cobblestones adorn these side streets on which almost monthly a new cafe, bar or restaurant is opening, on which not Turkish or Arabic but English and Spanish are now the dominant foreign languages spoken. Not so on the main streets. They are still filled with Arabic cafes and Turkish travel agencies and with all the signs of poverty and marginalization such as gambling casinos, one-Euro shops, call centers, internet cafes and counseling bureaus for individuals in financial trouble.

But the prosperity of the side streets is already starting to spread out. The discounter *ALDI*¹⁸ on Kottbusser Damm was replaced by a *Bio-Company* in 2011, a big organic supermarket chain. A small espresso cafe had opened on the Arabic-dominated Sonnenalle when I came to the neighborhood. In front of it 20- and 30-somethings were sitting smoking on small benches as Turkish and Arab women with grocery bags were rushing by. North Neukölln and Reuterquarter are gentrifying. And this is derived not only from the changing infrastructure and clientele on the streets but from rising rents, stories of displacement and concrete policies that have aimed to transform Reuterquarter for middle class users. The *Lonely Planet* Berlin travel guide in its chapter on Kreuzberg and Northern Neukölln in 2013 attested:

Kreuzberg gets its street cred from being delightfully edgy, bipolar, wacky and most of all, unpredictable. While the western half around Bergmanstrasse has an upmarket, genteel air eastern Kreuzberg [...] is a multicultural mosaic, a bubbly hodgepodge of tousled students, aspiring creatives shisha-smoking Turks and Arabs and international life artists. [...] All that hipness has spilled across the Landwehrkanal (canal) to the northern part of Neukölln, also known as Kreuzkölln. Once making headlines for its crime and poor schools, the district has catapulted from ghetto-gritty to funkytown-hip in no time. At least partly thanks to an influx of young, creative neo-Berliners [...], the quarter sees trash-trendy bars, performance spaces and galleries coming online almost daily. Come now for a fun offbeat experience: turbo-gentrification is just waiting in the wings. (Schulte-Peevers, 2013: 147)

¹⁸ German discount supermarket chain that is extremely successful with different groups and classes in German society. However, it is often stereotyped to appeal to poor immigrants, particularly Turkish women.

Reuterquarter, the very same neighborhood that had the worst image and the worst socio-economic indicators within Neukölln only a couple of years ago is now the first to gentrify in the borough. But how does a neighborhood transform from “ghetto-gritty” to “funktown-hip” or from ‘no-go area’ to ‘must-go area’ and why? This is the question I am engaging with in this chapter, again relying on my theoretical framework provided in chapter two. As discussed throughout this study, Lefebvre argued for a three-dimensional sociology of space in which researchers take into account physical space, lived space and abstract space. I have paid particular attention to the relationship between the latter two. Building up the “frontier myth”, fueling “urban revanchism” (Smith, 1996) and subsequently gentrification through previously discussed “fast policies” (Peck, 2005) such as the creative city policy (Zukin, 1982), community policing (Eick, 2003 and 2006) or the like are all activities that contribute to the creation of an abstract space that frequently contradicts but also interacts with lived space. Reuterquarter then is a pivotal case on which to observe the consequences of spatial abstraction, i.e. how creating dominant representations of space can firstly fuel social exclusion by stigmatizing residents as dangerous or degenerate and neighborhoods as ghettos and secondly, support gentrification by supporting interventionist policies such as renting out vacant spaces to artists while at the same time increasing the securitization of the neighborhood. Below I will

first discuss Neukölln and Reuterquarter's negative image in the German public perception and how this image has been fueled by powerful actors such as policymakers and the media, all contributing to constructing Neukölln and more particularly Reuterquarter as an "urban frontier", a space representative of all that endangers German society, ranging from poverty to crime to Muslim fundamentalism. Secondly, I will depict how Reuterquarter, despite this negative image, has today turned into one of the most popular spots for young Berliners and tourists to live and go out. I will argue that the gentrification process in the quarter has been supported and fueled by public-private partnerships in which the local government has worked with private agencies to valorize the neighborhood and to lure in middle class residents while simultaneously commissioning civil society and residents with supporting this valorization by keeping the neighborhood clean and safe.

Neukölln's Making as Frontier

As discussed in chapter two, the late Neil Smith (1996) has famously posited that the construction of clichés is a crucial part of the gentrification process. The cliché of his concern was what he called the "frontier myth" (Smith, 1996: 11-16), in which certain spaces are represented as unruly and

degenerate and thus in need of being (re-)conquered by (middle class) urban pioneers who reclaim the area to restore order and security. Not all parts of Smith's theory of gentrification can be applied to the European or the German context, but the construction of the frontier myth, I argue, may go some way in understanding the gentrification of North Neukölln. I have additionally suggested that we can understand Smith's (1996) frontier in Lefebvrian terminology: the frontier myth is ultimately an abstraction, an abstraction that leads to the perception of crisis and thus fuels the need to end the crisis through intervention.

Smith (1996 and 2002) has argued that gentrification is part of a revanchist city policy in which welfare policies and opportunities for social reproduction are increasingly replaced by regulatory and punitive strategies geared at the accumulation of wealth for the upper classes and the control and containment of the working-class, particularly low-income minorities. In Germany, as discussed throughout chapters three and four, discourses of social decay, the ghetto, parallel societies, no-go areas and the frequent comparisons to the United States -despite substantial differences – are hence enabling and legitimizing efforts to “retake” (Smith, 1996: 4) the city, often emulating to a certain extent US neoliberal urban policies.

Neukölln's construction as a frontier has, however, not been sudden and reaches back to before the arrival of guest workers with roots in Turkey: even in the 19th century, the borough's reputation was questionable and

before reunification Neukölln was together with areas such as Kreuzberg and Wedding, one of the more disinvested areas in West Berlin (Dirickx and Kudat, 1975; Hoffmeier-Zlotnick, 1977). Nevertheless, the late 1990s marked a turning point when urban planners increasingly drew attention to Berlin's impoverishment and the weak socio-economic indicators of immigrant-heavy boroughs and neighborhoods. Neukölln rose to unwanted fame during this period when it took on the position of Germany's national ghetto, substituting to a certain extent the neighboring Kreuzberg, which at that point had begun to be marketed as representing Berlin's multiculturalism and alternative flair (Lanz, 2007: 245-251). In 1997 the news magazine *Der Spiegel* published an article entitled "Endstation Neukölln" ("Terminal Station Neukölln") which claimed that "[i]n the center Berlin is booming and shining. But in the periphery the metropolis is turning into slums. In the working-class district of Neukölln, neglect, violence and hunger are marking social demise." (Wensierski, 1997).

In the article, which marked the beginning of a series of fatalistic statements about Neukölln, entering the borough was suggested to have become a matter of life and death:

High-Noon in Rixdorf: On Neuköllnischer Allee several shots pop out on the lively street. Who can is ducking. One remains on the ground. [...] Scenes like this belong to the everyday-world in the Berlin district Neukölln." (Wensierski, 1997, translation mine)

The use of Spaghetti Western terminology (“high-noon”) is not a coincidence if we look at it from the perspective of Smith’s (1996) theory of gentrification. Smith (1996) explores the metaphor of the wild, wild West, the urban frontier and (white) cowboys who are supposed to conquer this frontier and retake the city from the hands of (colored) degenerates. Neukölln’s construction as an urban frontier thus reached a highpoint in the late 1990s. But the frontier construction did not lose pace in the new century: The general increase of Muslim inhabitants after 2000 – due to the increase of inhabitants of Arabic origin – and the shift from citizenship to religion as primary marker of ‘Otherness’ in Germany – further fueled the stigmatization of the borough along the lines of religious/cultural identity. In reference to the rise of Arab and other Muslim residents, the North end of the arterial street Sonnenalle that runs through Reuterquarter and is famous for its Arab-owned businesses was, for example, nicknamed “Gaza Strip” (Ataman, 2008). The Gaza Strip is of course not any specific place in an Arab country but a highly contentious and war-ridden border between what is perceived as ‘Middle Eastern/Muslim’ and ‘Judeo-Western’ or even ‘Judeo-Christian’¹⁹ culture.

The boroughs negative image has been in a reciprocal relationship with weak socio-economic indicators: Neukölln has an unemployment rate of 16 percent, which makes it the front-runner in Berlin. In Reuterquarter

¹⁹ These terms became popular in the West in the 1950s to emphasize a common humanistic heritage between Christians and Jews vis-a-vis Muslims (Hartmann et al., 2005).

numbers are as high as 35 percent (*Quartiersmanagement Reuterplatz* [district management Reuterquarter], 2010). Moreover, in 2004 every third person in Neukölln received some sort of social benefits (e.g. Hartz unemployment benefits, rent-support and/or support for heating) (Neukölln Online, 2004) and crime rates are still relatively high compared to other boroughs and cities across Germany (Gennies, 2012). Stephan Lanz (2007: 251) has argued that with Kreuzberg's construction and marketing as hub of "dynamic multiculturalism" in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new outside was created, leaving Neukölln, which is today home to over 160 nationalities, the spot of

dystopia par excellence [...] in which all debated fears of society – disintegration, poverty, exclusion, youth degeneration, religious conflict, violence- discursively condense into one enormous social and cultural explosive substance and materialize spatially. (Lanz, 2007: 251, translation mine)

Below I want to engage more deeply with Neukölln and Reuterquarter's construction as a dystopia in the new century by drawing attention to a public space of social reproduction: schools. While the borough has had a bad reputation for a long time, its stigmatization as Germany's quintessential ghetto is related to age and gender. That means that Neukölln's male immigrant youth in particular have been subject to public concern and anger. High schools have naturally turned into hotspots to observe and confirm the fear of ghettoization. One particular incident dates back to the winter of 2006, when the Rütli School in Reuterquarter became the subject of a major public

debate on ghettoization after the school's principal wrote an open letter about the dire circumstances at Rütli to the Berlin Senate. Below I argue that the Rütli incident was another decisive turning point in directing and facilitating the neighborhood's gentrification because it enhanced the perception of crisis and thus contributed to the justification of interventionist policies. I use the Rütli School incident as a crucial case study that shows how social inequality (in this case, in the realm of education), territorial stigmatization (as a form of spatial abstraction) and the legitimization of revanchist strategies targeting poor populations and gentrification are connected (frequently taking the form of fast policies).

Showdown in the Wild Wild West: The Fiction and Reality of Neukölln's
Ghetto Schools and the Construction of Crisis

Schools are particularly suitable sites to observe how the abstraction of space impacts the lives of those who are negatively marked. Significant because education plays a pivotal role in determining life chances – schools that are publicly held to be ghetto schools or hatcheries of criminality and social decline will most likely not generate graduates that have good chances on the job market. In this sense, abstraction, or more particularly, the negative stigmatization of schools and their students, is likely to create a self-perpetuating cycle of exclusion and poverty. In Germany the notion of ghetto

schools is relatively new and has increasingly come into use since the early 2000s, again emulating the discourse of ghetto schools in the United States (Eksner, 2013). Given that the reality of German school system is nowhere near the reality of US American schools, Eksner (2013) has argued that the usage of the term ghetto school has helped to create the perception of inner city emergency zones. In that sense the discourse of ghetto schools, similar to that of ghettoization in general, is a discourse that has travelled through different historical and national contexts and along the way has lost most of its meaning but nevertheless creates severe results for students and residents.

The fact that the proportion of individuals with a migratory background, specifically Turks and Arabs, is higher among minors across Germany than among the adult population has made schools into spaces of publicly viewing and confirming the emergence of ethnic ghettos and parallel societies. Having been declared Germany's national ghetto in the late 1990s, Neukölln's schools were accordingly the first ones to be marked as ghetto schools. Particularly those in the north have become notorious for their high rate of Muslim students. Many graduates have been unable to find appropriate trainee positions. On top, almost a fifth of all Neukölln students in 2010 left school without graduating at all (compared to ten percent for all of Berlin) (ISQ, 2010: 114; *Der Tagesspiegel*, 2012).

The stigmatization of Neukölln's schools reached a new high in 2006. In early 2006 a German filmmaker, Detlev Buck, released *Knallhart* (released

in English as “Tough Enough”) based on a novel published in 2003. *Knallhart* is a story about a 15-year-old German youngster Michael from the well-off Zehlendorf district of Berlin moves to Neukölln with his mother after the latter is thrown out by her wealthy boyfriend. In his new school he is immediately attacked and robbed by his classmates, who are led by a Turkish boy Erol. His only friends are two brothers, who are, as suggested by their names, probably Russian *Aussiedler*. It does not take long until Michael, blackmailed by Erol and falling into the arms of an Arab drug mafia that offers him protection, plunges into a criminal career as drug courier. Throughout the movie the myth of Neukölln as frontier is perpetuated. As soon as Michael sets foot onto the borough, his environment is presented as insecure and rough, featuring unfriendly cab drivers, sleazy men who try to get their way with his mother and teenagers hanging out on the streets watching violent video clips on their mobile phones (Pabst, 2009). While the protagonist himself is apparently from a weak socio-economic background, with a young mother who had him as a teenager and makes her way through life by constantly meeting new men, Michael and his *Aussiedler* friends in the movie are depicted as relatively innocent compared to their Turkish counterpart Erol at school. Furthermore, it is Erol who, by blackmailing Michael, pushes him into criminal behavior and it is an Arab drug mafia, fulfilling all clichés including black pinstripe suits, expensive cars and

Russian hookers, that convinces Michael of a career in the drug business (see Figure 5).



Figure 5 Scene from the movie *Knallhart*: Michael in the claws of Neukölln's Arab drug mafia.

Source: Movie picture/film studio/producer.

While critiques opposed the way Neukölln and Muslim immigrants were depicted in the movie, district mayor Buschkowsky praised *Knallhart* for its authentic portrayal of Neukölln:

Buschkowsky: 'What the film shows is authentic. You can see this kind of stuff when young people bump into each other on Richardstreet and hit each other on the head with barstools. When adolescents rob each other on the streets. That all happens on the streets.'

Mutlu: 'It is called self-fulfilling prophecy what you are doing. If you always paint everything black it really becomes pitch-black at some point. Fortunately the reality still looks a little different. But in this way you only destruct your district.'

(Double-interview in *Der Tagesspiegel* with long-term district mayor Heinz Buschkowsky and Greens' Member of Parliament Özcan Mutlu who grew up in Kreuzberg as the son of Turkish guest workers, cited in Füchsel, 2006, translation mine).

Soon after the publication of this interview, it in fact became “pitch-black” in Neukölln. A few weeks after *Knallhart* premiered at the *Berlinale* in February 2006 a vocational school located in Reuterquarter became the nation-wide stage for an unexemplified ghetto spectacle of the sort the directors of the movie had imagined: The Rütli School's principal Petra Eggebrecht wrote an open letter to the Berlin Senate addressing the dire circumstances at her school and demanding its dissolution. At the time of the letter, about 80 percent of the students were said to be Muslim, mostly Arabs or Turks, and with a native German student population of less than 20 percent:

When we look at the development of our school over recent years, we have to conclude that the Hauptschule arrived at a dead end [...]. What point is there in collecting all those pupils who are not shown any perspectives to live their lives purposefully, neither from parents nor the economy, in one school. In most families our pupils are the only ones that get up in the morning. How shall we explain to them, that it is important to attend school and aim for a qualification? The pupils are mainly preoccupied with obtaining the latest mobile and to design their outfit so as to avoid being laughed at, to belong. School for them is also a stage and power struggle for recognition. The multiple offender becomes a role model. There are no positive role models for them in school. They are among themselves and do not meet youth who live differently to them. Hauptschule isolates them, they feel excluded and behave accordingly. (Eggebrecht, 2006 translated in Hilbert, 2011: 39)

The fact that Eggebrecht addressed the problematic nature of the German school system and offered an explanation for what was happening at her

school – “they feel excluded and behave accordingly” – was largely ignored in the aftermath. Eggebrecht’s outcry instead fueled outrage and panic among the wider German public and served as confirmation of all ghetto nightmares that were already held to be true: Turkish kids resembling the character of Erol in *Knallhart* and Arab kids who could be the younger brothers of the men in the movie’s Arabic drug mafia, fighting for control over German space and intimidating German and other non-Muslim children who could be somewhat imagined to be like Michael and his two German-Slavic friends (Hilbert, 2011 and Pabst, 2009).

The German media responded immediately to the letter. For weeks the Rütli incident was the number one topic in the headlines, ranging from tabloid newspapers to respected media outlets, from print to the internet and TV. By April 2006 the Rütli School had turned into a theatrical stage for the angst of Germany’s Muslim immigrants and “foreignization” (*Überfremdung*). *Knallhart* had become somewhat become reality. As shown in Figure 6 crowds of journalists occupied the front of the school yard for days after the letter was published, filming and questioning minors.



Figure 6 Fascination ghetto school – Tens of journalists ‘camping’ in front of Rütli in March 2006.

Source: *Die Zeit*.

Satisfying readers and viewers in some instances also meant that the media themselves created visual facts – students, teachers and even the otherwise alarmist district mayor Buschkowsky claimed that journalists were provoking and paying students to throw rocks and verbally harass them from behind the school fence, leading to the emergence of zoo-like scenes (Lichterbeck et al., 2006). Despite some outrage about the behavior of the journalists, Rütli, nevertheless, continued to be publicly presented as a “space [...] of social and educational emergency” (Eksner, 2013: 345):

Schools in Berlin and especially in the neighbourhood Neukölln can tell [...] horror stories [...]. How is a German teacher to make sure he is respected by Turkish or Arab youth who only accepts his swearing and beating father as a full man, who has never learned to solve conflicts peacefully, and for whom abstinence from violence in a conflict means an unacceptable capitulation? Do teachers have to mutate to pal-like street workers and speak slang in order to be accepted by ghetto youths? (Journalist Güner Balçı (2006), translated in Eksner, 2013: 340)

The explicitly culturalist, racist and gendered discourse around Rütli constructed the school and the neighborhood as dysfunctional space in which young boys were raised to become violent men threatening German peace. Accordingly, the media featured stories of teachers with fantasies of the school “burning down”, disburdening them from stepping in front of their class “just to survive” (Brinkbäumer et al., 2006: 22):

If one looks at the reality of the Rütli School and other schools in Berlin and in the state area, the reality of *Hauptschulen* in particular, then it looks as if what is happening there is how the Bronx looked once. It appears like an assemblage of many small copies of cities like Karatschi or Lagos, cities that are no longer controllable, no longer governable. In Germany these are not whole metropolises but quarters, but they are segregated from the rest of the city, they are ghettos. (Berg et al., 2006: 23-24, translation and italics mine)

The school was depicted as a foreign, somewhat exotic and dangerous world that had nothing to do with the “normal German reality”. A reality of ghettos that is apparently even worse than the reality in the United States and more comparable with the slums of the Third World. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a widely renowned center-left national daily, published an article the same year under the title “*Neukölln, Fremdes Land*” (“Neukölln, Foreign Country”), warning that German society was increasingly drifting not only into a dual-class but also a dual-culture society (Kahlweit, 2006). In all of these articles the Rütli incident was largely constructed as a cultural problem, a problem of non-

acceptance of German values and the secret development of third-world habits behind the 'normal', 'majority' (middle class) societies' back.

Though Neukölln's ghetto image had been built up for decades, in 2006 the borough and particularly Reuterquarter acquired its status as the ultimate frontier. In this sense the Rütli School was a particularly poignant site of the abstraction of space: the journalists in front of the school aimed at catching, provoking and, as claimed by the school principal and the district mayor, even staging a ghetto spectacle that would contribute to Neukölln's already existing stigmatization. The Rütli incident and *Knallhart* are accordingly primary examples of how geographic imaginaries of the ghetto or, in Lefebvre's terms, the abstraction of space can have real consequences for real people, or on their lived space. The effect is that, despite the fact that the objective reality of ghetto schools in the German context is questionable (given that there are almost no private schools in Germany and schools receive equal resources, have equal guidelines etc., see Eksner 2013), schools in Neukölln, and particularly the Rütli School, have been devalued, leading to devastating prospects for the future of children and youngsters in the borough:

The devaluation of local educational capital *in* marginalised zones in Berlin and specifically *for* marginalised low income residents occurs in a context in which the conditions of educational disadvantage are not linked to residency zone or available institutional finances as for instance in the United States. Instead, it is the discourse on 'ghettos' itself that affects

the educational capital attainable by stigmatised residents in urban zones of marginalisation in Berlin. (Eksner, 2013: 349)

The stigmatization and demonization of schools and minors not surprisingly thus leads to long-term consequences such as discrimination in the job market and graduates having a harder time finding apprenticeship positions. Local and national governments, hand in hand with the media and the private sector, create this exclusion and subsequently justify and normalize exclusion on the basis of alleged personal or cultural failure.

Below I want to discuss how the construction of Neukölln as frontier and the Rütli incident as a particular high point of this construction is related to Reuterquarter's gentrification. As Julia Eksner (2013: 350) states in her study of the discourse on ghetto schools in Kreuzberg and Neukölln "the curious co-occurrence of the ghettoisation of targeted populations in a context of accelerating gentrification in marginalised zones calls for exploration." Eksner (2013: 350) argues that the discourse of ghettoization functions to drive low-income residents out of the quarter (what Marcuse, 1986 has called "displacement pressure") since staying makes it increasingly difficult to guarantee a valuable high school diploma for their children, heightens the probability of long-term unemployment and stigmatization in everyday life. I agree fully with Eksner's argument but would add that the discourse of ghettoization not only pushes old-established inhabitants who can afford it out of neighborhoods like Reuterquarter and thus opens the

way for gentrification but also serves as a justification for state-led gentrification. Since, as Eksner (2013: 349) states, the exclusion of particularly low-income Muslim minorities from societal goods such as education and jobs is normalized, and their displacement from the places they inhabit is too. In other words, these marginalized groups come to be perceived as being unworthy of occupying spaces that could have the potential of attracting higher income groups. Not surprisingly then, Reuterquarter, due to its central location after reunification, its good connection to other parts of the city, its relative attractive housing stock, cheap rents and maybe most significantly, its proximity to the already more gentrified Kreuzberg by the mid-2000s was recognized to have this potential.

Urban Revanchism: From Crisis to Profit

Politics propagates social mixing but what is propagated should always be evaluated on concrete measures and these measures are not geared at mixing. If I as a resident of Neukölln have to evaluate these measures I can with certainty say that the result will not be mixing. I will use this word now, the result will be segregation. [...] I think the transformation in Neukölln is for a great part politically intentioned. As a resident of Neukölln I can see this to such extent. (Interview #2, social worker in Neukölln and resident of Reuterquarter, November 2012)

As Smith (1996) indicates with his concept of urban revanchism, a frontier can be conquered. For Smith, urban revanchism is a reaction to the urban poor by the middle and upper classes that feel their historical privilege is

threatened in the face of increasing competition for scarce resource such as housing. This crisis perception is affirmed by public actors, particularly agents of politics and the media, who exaggerate and obsess over the danger inner cities' social composition poses to society at large. Despite warnings that the Rütli incident, as MP Özcan Mutlu had suspected, was turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, the moral outrage after the letter demanded some sort of populist political response consolidating the idea that Rütli was in fact a ghetto school and Reuterquarter accordingly a ghetto. Since the problem was identified as a deviant cultural behavior, the solution was sought in the proposal of punitive and disciplining 'integrative' measures: The Berlin minister of education, Klaus Böger, further reproducing the frontline discourse called to "enforce civilizing principles" and declined the teachers' demanded the Rütli School should be closed, making it clear that they "will not retreat from any location" (cited in Brinkbäumer et al, 2006: 29). In Böger's rhetoric it was unclear which location 'they' would not retreat from was occupied by, but it may not be far-fetched to argue that he perceived the situation at the Rütli School as a matter of 'losing ground' in a German borough to uncivilized (Muslim? Immigrant?) elements. Böger urged the employment of a police force outside of the school that was later substituted with private security personnel still present during the time of my fieldwork.

As discussed in the previous chapters the employment of private security is an exceptionally well-suited example of Neil Smith's (1996: 11-16)

argument for the usage of a “frontier myth” in the legitimization of fast neoliberal policies as defined by Peck (2005): abstract and non-dialectical notions of space (e.g. the ghetto school) lead to the adaptation of policies that disregard local context as well as the actual experience and voice of those subject to these measures. Public good (public education and a public school space) is here ‘defended’ by private outsourcing but not so much for the students who are supposed to benefit from this good but for the ‘civilized’ part of the German population. Furthermore, these measures also confirm Eick’s (2003, 2006 and 2011) theory of the securitization of Berlin’s inner city districts and increasing attempts to socially regulate and discipline the poor not by redistribution and enhanced access to public goods but through private and sometimes public policing, as discussed in chapters two and four. These security measures often target low-income racial and ethnic minorities, more particularly male youth identified as belonging to such minorities. Accordingly, Böger and others also brought forward policy proposals that directly targeted immigrant families, such as compulsory language classes, compulsory primary school enrollment and even deportation for non-compliance (SPD Neukölln, 2006). The depiction of ethnic minorities and particularly ethnic minority youth as threats to national security led to the framing of the Rütli incident as an immigrant problem and, as it became clear over time, a Muslim immigrant problem. Not surprisingly, as one of the responses to the school’s problems, an integration

summit in July 2006 initiated by the minister of interior Wolfgang Schäuble, followed by an Islam conference in September where Muslims were presented as a “particularly ‘integration resistant’ group” (Hilbert, 2011: 44).

As discussed in chapter two and throughout this study, Smith (1996) argues that gentrification feeds on crisis. When there is the perception that certain areas of the city, and maybe even more significantly, schools that are typically understood as those public institutions that form future generations, are hatcheries of violence, criminality and possibly even Muslim extremism, gentrification is one of the ways in which these areas – or rather their residents – can be tamed. Noteworthy here is that problems in cities such as those in schools, are detached from their wider socio-economic context: subsequent discourses and policies only marginally acknowledged the causes that led to Reuterquarter’s schools to have such a disproportionately high rate of socio-economically disadvantaged students. Neither the clustering of immigrants and their families in certain spaces is put into its rightful context, nor are the reasons why immigrants, and particularly those from Turkey, continue to experience disadvantages in education, housing and the job market (as discussed in chapter three). Since causes are not rightfully identified, solutions are sought in policies that resolve the crisis through neoliberal strategies that do not challenge but further perpetuate exclusion, strategies I will discuss below.

“Rütli is Cool” – Marketing the Ghetto

Rütli was a crises that was fruitful for the local government in cooperation with civil society, the media and of course the private sector, to further and justify the “class remake” (Smith, 1996: 37) of the neighborhood. While the local population and particularly male immigrant youth was demonized and constructed as a problem to social cohesion and wealth, punitive measures were soon coupled with reinvestment. In 2007, one year after the open letter by Eggebrecht, a new project was launched by the district mayor Buschkowsky and former first lady Christiana Rau. The project attempted to convert Rütli into a comprehensive school (i.e. a fourth school form in the German system where the three other systems are combined, including preparation for university). Part of the new launch was also to create an actual fashion brand in private-civil society cooperation named *Rütli Wear*, which included t-shirts and sweaters made by the students by silk screen printing. The negative image of the ghetto was thus increasingly turned into an asset in which Rütli, Reuterquarter and Neukölln were marketed as cool and appealing. The *Berliner Morgenpost* (2007), a local newspaper, a short time later proclaimed “Rütli now stands for cool fashion”; the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Denkler, 2008), which just two years earlier had warned of a “dual-culture society” in response to the Rütli incident now concluded “Rütli is Cool”. The *Rütli Wear* campaign obviously fit very well into the marketing of

Berlin as “poor but sexy” city and into the strategy of branding the capital as a particularly creative and multicultural city, open to the materially wretched and ethnically diverse (see Figure 7).



Figure 7 Marketing the Ghetto - “Rütli Wear” fashion brand co-designed and presented by students of the school.

Source: RÜTLI-WEAR e.V.

At the same time, district mayor Buschkowsky did not, however, tone down his alarmist discourse of Neukölln. He called for further securitization of the district, following more preventive policing practices and extensive data surveillance from cities like London and Rotterdam (both of which have much higher rates of criminality and ethnic diversity than Berlin or Neukölln, see Open Society Foundations, 2010; Metropolitan Police Crime Figures and Census Update (Office for National Statistics), 2011):

Our police only intervene when the crime has already been conducted. In London and Rotterdam they approach potential

criminals beforehand and warn them: we have an eye on you, we know you. (cited in *Berliner Zeitung*, 2008, translation mine)

Exactly how potential criminals were to be recognized was not further explained by Buschkowsky, but one may critically argue that these preventive warnings would simply amount to racial profiling. But why did Buschkowsky tell the German public how bad the situation in Neukölln was while being engaged in an image-restoration for the Rütli School? As argued earlier, discourses of ghettoization and gentrification are not two different phenomena but can be “mutually enabling” (Eksner, 2013), keeping the negative attention on the district high until the public authorities provide enough resources and energy into kicking in a class transformation is crucial and beneficial for gentrification as long as it does not amount to scaring middle-class pioneers²⁰. Furthermore, as discussed extensively in chapters two and four, so-called ‘diversity’ or ‘difference’ is only supported in so far as it is consumption and thus profit-related. Social groups or individuals that do not contribute to economic growth are still called out and excluded. Inclusive and exclusive discourses and policies are accordingly employed simultaneously, making it more difficult to identify and challenge them (Eick, 2003 and 2006; Mayer 2007; Miraftab 2007).

²⁰ See for example the discussion on neighborhoods with high majorities of African American residents in America which do not gentrify because they exceed the “diversity threshold”, they are no longer diverse but segregated and hence remain unattractive to pioneers and gentrifiers (Sampson and Morenoff, 2006 or Sampson and Hwang, 2014). This level of segregation is, however, unlikely in the German case.

In 2009 the newly organized Rütli School started to take its first students as comprehensive school under the concept banner “CR² - One square meter education”. The so-called *Campus Rütli* has since received considerable amounts of financial and infrastructural contributions, including a school cafeteria, laboratories, new computers and a gymnasium. Despite initial euphoria, however, many observers criticized the selective focus on Rütli as an attempt to cure the symptoms rather than the disease: 27 million Euros were invested after the open letter to turn Rütli into a model school, with no attention given to schools with similar image and structural problems (Eimer, 2010).

Though seemingly unrelated, the launching of *Rütli Wear* and *Campus Rütli* must be seen within the context of a wider project of turning Reuterquarter into a creative hub. At the time *Rütli Wear* was launched, another urban policy under the banner of the creative city was being implemented in Reuterquarter. Below I will discuss this policy, which further contributed to the neighborhood’s gentrification and its relation to the *Campus Rütli* project.

Mobilizing Community and Creatives for Gentrification:

The Interim Use Agency in Reuterquarter

In chapter two I discussed how neoliberal city planning employs different strategies that evolve around the notion of community. Berlin is no exception in this respect: the city has been subject to extensive marketing as a creative city since 2004 and simultaneously, efforts to keep neighborhoods clean and safe have been enhanced through measures such as private security services that employ unemployed young adults and patrol public spaces or in front of schools as described above. The responsibility to 'develop' the neighborhood is thus put on the inhabitants themselves.

Accordingly, the state had a pivotal role in pushing and directing gentrification in North Neukölln, apart from re-launching the Rütli School. Since 1999, long before Rütli, Neukölln has been part of the Socially Integrative City (SIC) program discussed in the previous chapter. As depicted before, part of the SIC program are the local "district managements" that are commissioned with implementing the program's goals on the neighborhood-level. As of now 11 of the 34 Berlin "district managements" are located in Neukölln alone. Reuterquarter's own district management opened in 2003. The premises of the program, including taking a high proportion of immigrants as an indicator of 'disadvantagement', are highly problematic and the goals rather ambivalent; as a result, the methods

applied to support so-called disadvantaged neighborhoods are questionable. One of these questionable methods was tested for the first time in Reuterquarter from 2005 to 2007 and was later introduced in different cities across Germany: Based on the premise of the “broken windows theory” (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) and Florida’s thesis of the “creative class” (2002), the neighborhood’s district management commissioned an interim use agency (*Zwischennutzungsagentur*), a sort of real estate agency, to broker vacant spaces to artists, other creative workers and NGOs for short-term use and relatively moderate rents. This model of renting temporarily to creative workers in relatively disinvested or poor neighborhoods has numerous precursors, some of which have been mentioned in chapter two and is thus a typical “fast policy” employed under the banner of the creative city (Peck, 2005).

According to the project manager, Stefanie Raab²¹, it was not clear at the beginning whether the interim use agency would have the status of a NGO or a private agency, though it was soon decided it had to be the latter:

But we had to learn, that we have to be a private office, because all the property owners drive their own business. If there is someone who drives their own business, you are on the same level. If someone comes from an NGO with very nice idealistic goals, he doesn’t take you seriously. (Raab in an interview with an initiative of the Hungarian Contemporary Architecture Centre, year unknown)

²¹ Real name.

The name of the agency was at a later point changed to *Coopolis*, but the initial name, interim use agency, was adopted by publicly commissioned agencies in other cities such as Wuppertal, Bremen or Munich (*Städteumbau NRW*, 2015; Munich City Official Website, year unknown) led by parties across the political spectrum who took the process in Reuterquarter as role model, all fully funded by public taxes. The pronounced goal of the project was to “connect ‘urban pioneers’ with the local economy” (*Zwischennutzungsagentur* Official Website, year unknown) and thereby to foster urban development in these areas. Already the explicit use of the notion “urban pioneers”, which is a notion that clearly belongs to the vocabulary of the academic gentrification discourse, suggests that SIC, with the help of the private sector, attempted to kick-off gentrification in the neighborhood. Fifty-six floors were refilled according to the interim use agency’s own records during the project period (*Zwischennutzungsagentur* Brochure, 2009).

The idea to support the opening of galleries and boutiques did, however, not come out of the blue but was based on the already present cultural activities in the neighborhood: the interim use project rested on the cooperation with the local artist network that had been established in 1995 and organized a publicly supported yearly art festival called *48 Stunden Neukölln* (48 Hours Neukölln). in the north of the borough. In this sense, the interim use agency, together with local authorities, capitalized on earlier

collective efforts of artists in Reuterquarter, simultaneously reconceptualizing them as “urban pioneers”. *48 Stunden Neukölln* gained more prominence after the district management became a stakeholder in attracting artists to Neukölln. In 2008, the festival won a cultural prize from the German Cultural Policy Society. In the press release following the award, the arts festival was said to function as “developmental aid” (*Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft Official Website, 2008*) for Neukölln, again indicating that the borough was a sort of third-world area in the midst of the developed world that needed artistic first-world impulses.

Numerous scholars have celebrated these attempts, arguing that they contribute to “free the potential of the city” (Louekari, 2006: 463). In 2005 the self-proclaimed German “urban catalyst” and architect Klaus Overmeyer even described interim use as the “miracle weapon” (p. 16) in areas of the city in which “classic urban planning has failed” (p. 20) and in which creatives serve to “whitewash dirty locations” (p. 16):

[...] interim users are pioneers, pioneers are and were always people – like foot soldiers in the past – who explore unknown territory and in this way prepare the field for those who would later settle there. We have intensively studied different typologies of interim use and found out in these space pioneers often are able to get by with a minimum of infrastructure. They recycle existing resources and take what they find and still come similar to a pioneer-plant to blossom without any need for major investment. (Overmeyer, 2005: 16, translation mine)

What Overmeyer describes is obviously very close to what Zukin (1982) described in respect to the Lower East Side and reveals the underlying logic

of the publicly funded interim use project: creatives and sometimes even political activists can provide a cheaper route to gentrification without the risk of extensive public dissent. Together with prior efforts to 'develop' North Neukölln, the interim use project was quite successful in its undertaking. The rising rents in Kreuzberg had at that point already made it increasingly difficult to rent exhibition spaces, and accordingly, the demand from creatives to rent in North Neukölln was high. As of 2005 empty floors gradually began filling with small galleries and boutiques (see Figure 8), not all of which were even supported by the interim use agency, but once artists and designers started to settle in the neighborhood others followed (Interview #3 with Stefanie Raab, head of the project from the interim use agency, January 2013). These artistic spaces were frequently supplemented and at a later point often substituted by gastronomic establishments. So it happened that only a few months after the Rütli incident, in June 2006, the acclaimed journalist and author Kathrin Passig already happily proclaimed that Reuterquarter had the potential of being the "next big cultural thing", stating that she hoped that finally artists would "stream" into Neukölln (Passig quoted in Brautlecht, 2007).

And her wish seemed to come true. From 2007 onwards Reuterquarter's transformation was obvious – rents began to rise (Gude, 2011) and the quarter was now more frequently referred to as 'Kreuzkölln', rather than as Reuterquarter, to emphasize similarities with Kreuzberg in

order to attract more affluent tenants, students and artists who desired to live in the hip areas of the city.



Figure 8 *Silverfuture* – one of the first bars, a self-proclaimed gay bar in Reuterquarter that opened in 2007.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

The interim use project, due to its overwhelming success, had only lasted about two years when the coordinators decided to bring it to a halt:

We said in 2007, mid-2007 we have to stop the brokering of vacant spaces here in Reuterquarter, because a process has started in which the real estate sector realizes that one could call this place Kreuzkölln, that one could raise the rents and furthermore, they started to get their own spaces in basement floors little by little. So, for the second half, the real estate sector can do it on their own, because as users of public funds it is our role only to initiate processes if they do not start by themselves. And we have realized that the real estate managers have learned

and profited, so they had better do it on their own. (Interview #3, Stefanie Raab, January 2013)

When the interim use agency made this decision, Reuterquarter was already well into the gentrification process. As Stefanie Raab herself says, they had already done half of it. It is significant that despite extensive academic and non-academic criticism of SIC as a whole and the interim use project in particular (Häussermann et al. 2003/4; Bernt and Fritsche, 2005; Freiheit und Seidelsohn, 2013), the project continues to be introduced in different cities around the country.

The fact that the *Campus Rütli* project and SIC – and consequently the district management which is SIC's local organization and the interim use agency which is commissioned by the district management – have a direct connection becomes clear when we consider that the former head district manager, Ilse Wolters²², who had collaborated with the interim use agency from 2005-2007, at the time of my field work had become the project leader of the *Campus Rütli* project (*Campus Rütli Official Website*, 2013). Before she made the switch she was already actively involved in *Campus Rütli* (Flatau, 2012). These overlaps are further evidence of the links between the above discussed Rütli 'crisis', the subsequent re-launch of the school, the interim use strategy and the gentrification of the quarter and how this process has brought together public institutions and authorities (ranging from the EU to

²² Real name.

the Berlin Senate to the district mayor and the district management) the private sector (the interim use agency/*Coopolis*, artists and property owners) as well as civil society actors.

Discussion

By the end of the 2000s, a decade after *Der Spiegel* had declared Neukölln to be Germany's terminal station; Reuterquarter had a substantial culture and bar scene, with organized pre-Christmas walks through the numerous galleries, a famous LGBT bar and whole food shops. New networks were built among the Reuterquarter artists and the district management organized monthly meetings. It did not take long for Reuterquarter to advance to a neighborhood where non-residents and even tourists would regularly go out:

Of course there have been people who have been going out in Neukölln at night for a long time. They smoke shisha on Sonnenallee or play cards under neon lights. 'Only for members' is written on many doors. But also if you are not member of a Turkish cultural association nor do you like shishas nor neon lights, one can spend some nice evenings in Neukölln. Especially in the infamous north of the district where the Rütli school is located as well. One only has to dare to get into the side streets that lead from Sonnenallee to Landwehrkanal. Here, in Reuterquarter, there are apartment buildings and corner pubs that are called 'Klasmühle'²³. The streets are relatively empty until a group of good-tempered people stand in front of a door:

²³'Klasmühle' (which means something liken nut-house) would be a typical name for a German hipster bar, using ironic references to German words that are not used in everyday-speech any longer.

students and artists, more alternative than chic. (Brautlecht, 2007 in *Berliner Zeitung*, translation mine)

The journey from Sonnenallee to the side street as a journey from the dark into the light, i.e. the passage of a frontier: from Shisha-smoking and neon-light loving Turks and Arabs to “good-tempered” alternatives and thus from a threatening and insecure (one has to “dare”) to a safe and friendly environment with funny-named bars. In 2007, so it seems, the middle class could finally (re-)enter North Neukölln.

As shown in Figure 9, sometime in 2010 a thrift shop was converted into a winery with the sign of the thrift shop still left intact saying “Buying & Selling – Apartment clearance” (*An- und Verkauf: Wohnungsauflösung*), a relict and maybe a reminder of the actual poverty of the neighborhood.



Figure 9 Wine instead of apartment clearance. The *Weincafe* on Friedelstreet.

Source: Publicly shared image.

The same year, on the corner between Reuter- and Nansenstreet where there used to be an Arab men's café and an Italian restaurant with outlets in Kreuzberg and Friedrichshain opened. In late 2011 the discounter ALDI on Kottbusser Damm was replaced by an organic supermarket chain. In 2012 a sneakers store opened on Hobrechtstreet right opposite of an organic food store that had opened in 2010. The sneakers store's outside walls, craft-fully painted by an artist, were written on and scratched all over by gentrification opponents in the first weeks of its opening, but the store was successful enough to take hold. During my field research in late 2012/early 2013, a pub usually visited by local working-class non-immigrant Germans was closed.

Some people from the neighborhood initiative started an action to rescue the pub but were not successful. Soon a bar called *Stitch* took the pub's place, a bar that turned out to look quite similar to all the other bars that had opened in the neighborhood. *Stitch* did not make it, and was substituted by an even newer bar in 2014. By 2012, as depicted in Figure 10, flyers saying "searching for apartment in this neighborhood. 500 EURO reward" were all over Reuterquater. 500 EURO that Reuterquater's long-term residents are unlikely to possess and that may decide over who will be able to stay in the neighborhood in the future and who will not.




Figure 10 Unfair competition for housing: Searches for apartments in Reuterquater (now increasingly called Kreuzkölln) outside a newly opened hostel with 500 EURO finder's fee.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

By the time I began my research in Reuterquarter, the U7 and U8 subways which drive through Kreuzberg and Neukölln had turned into virtual party trains. Even on weekdays young people from different nations speaking all sorts of Western European languages would make their way into North Neukölln, some of them probably to get to their newly rented apartments, others as tourists from abroad or just from another Berlin borough to have a night out in the vibrating district.

Given that most house owners in the neighborhood either own single apartments or one building but seldom whole rows of houses, and given the existence of social housing and the rights of long-term tenants, displacement from Reuterquarter on a larger scale will probably only become visible and captured in concrete numbers in the long term. However, a study by the city research institute TOPOS showed that already by 2011 Reuterquarter's demographics had shifted towards higher income and higher status residents. According to the study, every fourth household was inhabited by gentrifiers (defined as born after 1960, having at least graduated from an academic high school, income at least 1750 EURO and working in an academic or artistic profession) and a gradually decreasing share of pioneers (defined as born after 1970, having at least graduated from an academic high school, income below 1350 EURO, having one child at most in the household and working in an academic or artistic profession) for whom the rents began to pose a financial burden (Gude, 2011). Not surprisingly then, the average

income in Reuterquarter, having been below the Berlin average for decades, rose to one percent above the average Berlin household income in 2013 (Niewendick, 2013).

In this chapter I have addressed my first empirical concern, i.e. why and how Reuterquarter is today gentrifying. I have shown that the neighborhood's public defamation as "terminal station" breeding ghetto schools and residents who pose a threat to German prosperity and safety is an example of spatial abstraction in the Lefebvrian sense. And I have also shown why, as Lefebvre argues, these abstract representations are forms of violence: firstly, they stigmatize social groups and thus lower their life chances (beginning from the educational realm), perpetuating a cycle of poverty and exclusion and secondly they fuel revanchist strategies that aim at diffusing these social groups by identifying them as problematic and thus justifying a class remake. This remake (i.e. gentrification) is obviously only possible if other structural conditions are met, such as a potential for reinvestment: though the level of disinvestment and in Reuterquarter is not necessarily comparable to the level of disinvestment in American inner cities and though Berlin never experienced the form of suburbanization and urban flight that Smith (1996) describes in his book, the neighborhood provided good potential for surplus accumulation. This is primarily due to its change of location after the fall of the wall, from an area right at the margins to the center of Berlin (and related to this its proximity to Kreuzberg, which had

begun the gentrification process earlier). And secondly, rents in all of Berlin but particularly in Neukölln (and thus Reuterquarter) have been low compared to other Western German cities, opening up the possibility for the development of a “rent” and/or “rental” gap (Holm, 2006) which may not follow Smith’s archetypical American model, but creates similar possibilities for reinvestment.

Given that private and public actors realized Reuterquarter’s potential, they engaged in pushing and accelerating the neighborhood’s gentrification through fast and revanchist policies in the form of renting out vacant spaces to artists, containing the poor (immigrant) population through securitization and simultaneously marketing the quarter as a cool and marginal space that is just the right amount of ghetto.

CHAPTER 6

A VIEW ON GENTRIFICATION FROM THE BOTTOM UP: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES?

Lefebvre differentiated between space as it is conceptualized and abstracted by powerful groups in society – mainly the state and the private sector – and space as it is lived and produced through the interactions of inhabitants in everyday life. He saw both in a dialectical relationship. In the previous chapters I have mainly discussed the construction of abstract/non-dialectical space in the German, Berlin and Neukölln context: the discourse of the immigrant ghetto and ghetto schools, the upgrading of Berlin particularly under the banner of the creative city and the notion of community and how these discourses and fast policies have been employed in Neukölln and Reuterquarter under the leadership of the state.

In this chapter I want to turn to the question how the gentrification process is perceived and understood by those living and/or working in the neighborhood and how it affects them, with a focus on immigrants from Turkey and their children. Betancur (2011) has drawn attention to the fact that critical gentrification research is still short of empirical work that engages with the specific effects of gentrification on different low-income groups, particularly ethnic and racial minorities. I aim to contribute to this stream of research with the following analysis.

I will, however, also include the perspective of other residents, such as civil society actors, property owners, entrepreneurs and artists of various ethnic and racial backgrounds. In this sense I will draw attention to some of the major stakeholders in Reuterquarter who simultaneously shape and are shaped by their neighborhood's gentrification. In other words, in this chapter I am concerned with the question of lived space and how it contradicts and interacts with the positive and negative conceptions urban planners, investors, journalists, tourists, newcomers or political authorities have of Reuterquarter. Important to note here is that this study shows that there are no clear-bond binaries: not all long-term residents are necessarily victims of the gentrification process. How gentrification is perceived, affects and is coped with by different individuals depends on their material and non-material resources. There are thus different levels that must be considered. While there might be at some instances similarities among immigrants from Turkey of different material standing and different class background in the way they see gentrification, this does not mean that they are all equally affected. Furthermore, this thesis argues that gentrification is not only about physical displacement, though it is arguably its most visible effect. As I will detail in this chapter, social exclusion takes place on different levels that go beyond physical displacement and is often experienced "as a personal and collective loss of control" (Cahill, 2007: 217) by long-term inhabitants who

find themselves in a transforming environment in which they must adapt to middle class demands, if they are able.

To work out these different effects of gentrification, I will in the first part include the views of civil society actors and creative workers in Reuterquarter, and in the second part I will discuss more specifically the effects of gentrification on immigrants from Turkey and their families.

Thank You for Gentrifying – The Instrumentalization of Community

Berlin, due to its scarce material resources and latecomer status, has been subjected to alternative growth strategies since the mid-2000s: First is the so-called creative city strategy, which involves the instrumentalization of artists, other creative workers and alternative/minority groups in society to fuel gentrification. Second is the use of civil society to prepare neighborhoods for investment using a language of participation and empowerment. Below I want to discuss the views and stakes of creatives, young entrepreneurs and civil society actors in the gentrifying Reuterquarter.

Many of the so-called urban pioneers, civil society and residents that have contributed to different SIC and/or *Campus Rütli* projects in one way or the other, either by filling empty shops with galleries, boutiques and restaurants in conjunction with the interim use project or by helping to beautify the neighborhood by planting trees and flowers or painting benches,

are now themselves threatened by displacement. The monthly publication of the Berlin tenants' community, as early as 2007, critically described Reuterquarter as an "experimental field[s] of self-exploitation" (Blume, 2007) for artists in which economically precarious groups were instrumentalized to further gentrification:

The 'space pioneers', as the senate for urban development calls the interim users, 'primarily have a lust for founding' [...]. However, though the issue of appropriation is frequently mentioned in connection with 'space pioneers', similarities to the squatter movement can usually not be drawn. In general there are clear contractual agreements stating that [the pioneers] have to leave as soon as better paying 'long-term users' appear. (Blume, 2007, translation mine)

Accordingly, many of the artists who had initially benefited from the publicly funded interim use project had to close their showrooms and often cafes and bars, as spaces of consumption took their place. Dora is a female gallery owner in her mid-30s who has been living in Neukölln for the last 22 years and owns a small exhibition space with her husband on Reuterstreet. Born to a German mother and an Indian father, she was one of the few artists who had been living in Neukölln for longer than a few years when Reuterquarter had not been part of the hype it is today:

[...] the interim use agency came and what I thought was problematic was that they already appeared like real estate agents, because the rents that the people paid despite the agency were still very high. That was simply not OK. To the outside the message was 'guys, come to Neukölln, here you get space for free'. There was in my opinion a lot of PR work for the quarter but at the end it did not play out because most people from the creative industries have closed again. There were people who

went to Mitte because it was cheaper there and they had more customers. It's a crooked situation, on the one hand the rents rise because the streets are now so pretty, but it is not a win-win situation. (Interview #4, Dora, January 2013)

Ulrike, whom I met through Dora, is another Neukölln artist. In fact, she is a hat-maker, owning a small store and an attached atelier on Sanderstreet. She arrived in Berlin in 1988 to study fashion, only leaving Neukölln for a few months in between. She went through some rough financial times in the early 2000s when the neighborhood was reaching a socio-economic low, closed her atelier and moved it to Schöneberg while still residing in Reuterquarter. However, she reopened a store on the same street next to her old store five years later, happy to have been granted a second chance to make it in the neighborhood. Like Dora, she has been part of the artist network in the quarter before the local government included Reuterquarter in the SIC program and before the interim use agency was commissioned. Ulrike states that despite the rough times in the neighborhood, despite the youth gangs in front of her apartment and atelier, she never felt as insecure as she does now:

In the past, however little money I had, I always felt secure. I always knew I could pay my rent, always. I can still pay it but the feeling gets shaky. I see what is happening around me, I don't know what will happen when Mrs. Rösner [her landlord] dies, she is over 90. I have two things here, my store and my apartment. I think it's awful what happens with the rents here and I think it's awful what happens with the people. They have to leave, they are displaced. (Interview #5, Ulrike, January 2013)

And even some of the restaurants and bars that began to substitute many of the artistic spaces in the quarter are presently facing rent pressure, which is a sign that the gentrification process is coming full circle, with the pioneers being displaced by people with more capital²⁴. The same was true for the owner of one of the first pubs that opened in the neighborhood in 2006 and who was seen as a harbinger of a looming gentrification process, declared in 2013 that he would have to close the pub by the end of 2014 because the (also new) restaurant next door wanted to expand (see Figure 11). Ironically, those people and establishments that were initially blamed for causing rent increases now seem to be victimized by the process:

I don't want to make myself more important than I am. It is true that the wave started after we opened. And I ask myself frequently whether I would have done it if I had known what would happen. I came to Berlin in the beginning of the 1990s, and I saw what happened in Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg. But I didn't think it was possible here. (Matthias Merkel, the owner of the *Freies Neukölln* pub in Reuterquarter in an interview for *Berliner Zeitung*, 2013), translation mine)

²⁴ As shown in chapter two, in the gentrification literature this process (when pioneers become victims of displacement) is typically referred to as a transition from the pioneer to the valorization phase, though these two phases are ideal types and not always clearly distinguishable. Andrej Holm, a prominent German gentrification scholar, spoke in early 2013 of a "developed pioneer-phase" in Reuterquarter.



Figure 11 *Freies Neukölln* – the pub opened in 2006 and was seen as one of the first signs of gentrification. As of 2014 the bar was threatened with closure. The owner’s rent contract will not be extended after 2014.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

As Peck (2005: 764) states, under the creative city strategy, urban pioneers are not the ones “who must be *catered to*”. Or as Overmeyer (2005: 16) puts it, they are “foot soldiers” and hence the lowest tier commissioned to “whitewash dirty locations”. Not much more is expected of them unless they have the necessary economic means to contribute to subsequent stages of gentrification.

As mentioned in chapter four, SIC’s district management cooperates not only with artists and the private sector, but also with long-term residents and civil society. In this context a quarter-council has been initiated which includes regular residents, social workers, representatives from the district

management and the Berlin Senate. Council members meet monthly and participate in different working groups such as the “education working group”, “environment working group” and the like. These working groups are also engaged in supporting and initiating projects that beautify the neighborhood, particularly in keeping the area clean (*Quartiersmanagement Reuterplatz* (district management Reuterquarter) Official Website, 2015).

A member of the quarter council, a non-immigrant German single mother in her early 50s who has been living in the neighborhood for over two decades and is employed as a social worker in a local organization, described the contradictory situation in which she found herself after the gentrification process started:

Well, I think it is difficult because the changes that we currently have in our area would have not started in this way without the district management. This is not to blame anyone but simply how I have observed it and how I understand it. Among other things there was the interim use agency and they take up the cause for many things that aren't their accomplishment. That is their publicity. It developed its own dynamic at some point the idea came 'aah we can rent these places' and they tried it. And often they say they did it but if you know the quarter and the people a little bit you know that most artists have rented on their own and the interim use agency has not done much on top. And at some point it just did not stop. At some point someone from the interim use agency said (mimics that person) 'well, now we do not need any more gastronomy', as if they had any say in that, as if they could direct this process, so ridiculous. Because guys that is how it goes, if the house owner says 'ok, I don't care whether another restaurant opens or another bar', then they will do it. And if they want to do that, than the interim use agency can do nothing about it. (Interview #6, Andrea, November 2012)

And the house owners did it, without asking permission from the agency or the state. Many changes in the area appeared in conjunction with the establishment of the district management and the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the SIC program finds expression in the confusion of residents, social workers and activists in Reuterquarter regarding the ultimate goal of the implemented policies:

[...] re-planting of trees on the streets, I don't know what we all did over all those years. No one did profit economically [...] and then you see the effect and say, 'aa great now other people come and profit', in principal that's fine, what is not fine is when you think they come and I must go. (Interview #6, Andrea, November 2012)

Under advanced neoliberalism, civil society actors might find themselves in very ambiguous situations in which their intention is to ameliorate the living quality in their own neighborhood by activating their own resources (i.e. drafting projects, networking with neighbors, identifying problems etc.) but in which their efforts are possibly contributing to gentrification.

SIC receives most of its funds from the EU, one project that was also largely financed from EU funds was the opening of a so-called quarter-gymnasium on *Campus Rütli*. Sometime in mid-January 2013 I met Alkan, a 40-something construction worker and father of three whose two older children went to the Rütli school. Alkan, who had arrived in Germany as the son of Turkish guest workers as a young child, had been active in the school's parent initiative since 2010 and now leads the organization of a

weekly “winter playground” in the newly opened gymnasium. Every Sunday the children from the neighborhood can come to the gymnasium to play for a few hours outside of their homes and protected from the winter cold. Alkan and other volunteers set up the gymnasium with mattresses, banks, swings and other gymnastic equipment. When I called Alkan the first time to ask for an interview on his views on the neighborhood and on the new Rütli School, he seemed busy and shortly said “come to the gymnasium at Rütli and you will see what gentrification is”. I did not really understand what he meant until I did as he said and met him in the freshly inaugurated gymnasium the following Sunday. Tens of children of different ages were running through the freshly painted halls. The parents present to watch their children on the “winter playground” were an ethnically and socially mixed crowd of seemingly autochthonous Germans and immigrant families from Turkey, Arab countries and Sub-Saharan Africa:²⁵

You see, this is it. You can see the change here. Look how many Germans are here. This is a flagship project, everyone comes, but

²⁵ The ones who seemed to be rather absent were, or at least not recognizable to me, were non-immigrant German working-class families. There may be two main reasons for this: firstly, more Germans without a migratory background live in single-person households (21 percent) than immigrants or their following generations (13 percent). Secondly, the majority of Hartz IV recipients are single-person households (see Destatis (Federal Office of Statistics), 2012). Thirdly, there is a generational gap: the average age of old-established Germans vis-à-vis people with migratory background in Reuterquarter is higher. In other words: many of the long-term working-class Germans in the quarter do not have small children. (Ohliger and Raiser, 2005: 33). This demographical structure often gives the impression, when one looks at the streetscape, that the only ones living in Reuterquarter are relatively young middle-class newcomers and working-class Turkish and Arab immigrants.

you know that on the other hand they are stabbing us in the back.²⁶ (Interview #7, Alkan, January 2013)

By engaging in initiatives to offer something better to the neighborhood and his own children, Alkan thinks he is unintentionally contributing to the gentrification of Reuterquarter, which will eventually harm himself and his family. 'They' in this context are the local government and the administration of the *Campus Rütli* project. As discussed in chapter two, tasks formerly belonging to the state, such as ensuring equal education and job opportunities, are passed down to local initiatives, NGOs and private stakeholders. Accordingly, residents like Alkan and his parent-initiative may find "themselves managing the new spatial and social polarization on the community level", mitigating the detrimental effects of neoliberalism (Mayer, 2007: 93). While Alkan and the parent initiative work to provide better opportunities for their own children while staying in the neighborhood, Alkan says that he and his family will not profit from these efforts in the long term. The profit will mainly go to those families that have opportunity – the opportunity to pay higher rent, to benefit from the fresh local infrastructure built up by old-established residents, by NGOs or public funds and the opportunity to reject the not so good infrastructure. Though the "winter playground" was explicitly targeted local students, according to

²⁶ Significant is of course also that Alkan equalizes the presence of Germans with gentrification. I will come back to this equalization and the intersections between ethnicity and class in the following parts.

Alkan many of the children at the winter playground whose parents had moved to the neighborhood more recently were not even registered at a local kindergarten or school.

Discussion

The position of artists and civil society or so-called “urban pioneers” in general is arguably ambiguous: though they are frequently “key correlates” of the gentrification process (Hackworth and Smith, 2001: 467) they are not the reason why gentrification is happening (Zukin, 1982). Accordingly, political activists who resist gentrification, well-intentioned artists who want to integrate with the local population, students or civil society actors may unintentionally find themselves in the position of having become ‘pioneers’ and being eventually displaced themselves (Holm, 2013: 29-39). These groups of people can function as intermediaries who render a given neighborhood more attractive and prepare the ground for reinvestment. What is the solution? There is none, unless it is systemic. Leaving a neighborhood to its own fate, leaving it dirty (as some gentrification-opponents in Reuterquarter seem to suggest, see Figure 12) or leaving it poor will not help as long as housing is a competitive commodity and the legal framework allows for gentrification.




Figure 12 “Neukölln stays dirty” – Graffiti by gentrification opponents.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

Since social scientists can hardly change legal frameworks by themselves, the task of researchers should be to unravel the problems caused by gentrification, accompanied by advanced neoliberal strategies, which seem inclusive but ultimately exclude on more subtle levels. This explains why we need to engage with Lefebvre’s notion of lived space: Only research from the bottom up can give us a more detailed picture of neighborhood transformation and help us to identify the different opportunities and constraints residents face without falling into binary categorizations between victims and perpetrators.

Below I will proceed with my discussion of the lived space of Reuterquarter by drawing on the views of immigrants from Turkey as a social group to whom the stigmatization has been attached, and also on the marketing of the neighborhood.

Immigrants from Turkey in the Gentrifying Reuterquarter

Obviously it is not possible to give a complete picture of the experiences and perceptions of immigrants from Turkey in Reuterquarter, since experiences and perceptions are as multifarious as individuals are. In the following analysis, I have laid particular focus on two groups within the wider category of immigrants from Turkey, whose voices may bring us one step closer to grasping this complexity: Local immigrant entrepreneurs and low-income/welfare-dependent immigrants who are typically part of the working-class. The reason I focus on these groups is first that they are two groups whose experiences with the gentrification process are quite different because they possess different forms and amounts of capital. Put bluntly, a small business owner is far more likely to be able to take advantage of the gentrification process than a welfare-dependent single mother, to take the extremes. Secondly, however, there is an overlap of reasons why gentrification is perceived to be problematic (if it is) between these two groups. That is, even in cases where residents do not necessarily face

physical displacement, they often still share feelings of exclusion across different class positions. In this sense, looking at these two groups, whom I have mainly differentiated by class, gives us a good notion how gentrification affects immigrants from Turkey in Reuterquarter across class, gender and generation.²⁷

Intra-Class Ambiguities and Inter-Class Tensions:

The Case of Local Immigrant Entrepreneurs

Abstract notions of space ignore the different interests, opportunities and experiences urban residents have. The process of gentrification is accordingly often viewed as a process in which one group with relatively homogenous identities and interests is displaced or victimized by another more powerful group with relatively homogenous identities and interests. Research at the neighborhood level can challenge these abstract notions and reveal a more complex picture.

Reuterquarter, despite its relative poverty, has a quite large number of local immigrant entrepreneurs. Most of them have come to Germany as guest workers, some are skilled others are unskilled, often they have worked on

²⁷ Though I write 'two groups', I do not take small business entrepreneurs and working-class welfare-dependent immigrants from Turkey to be two clear-cut categories. I will also draw attention to the differences within these groups, particularly in regard to gender and generation.

construction sites or in factories before being able to acquire a business, frequently with the help of their families. Individuals in Germany with a migratory background are disproportionately higher represented among the self-employed, often because self-employment is a way out of low-wage work and does not necessarily require formal education or immense start-up capital. In that sense it is one of the primary sources of social mobility for former guest workers from Turkey and often the following generations (for more on the so-called 'ethnic economy' in Neukölln, see *Bürgerstiftung Neukölln* (Citizen Foundation Neukölln), 2007).

Landry (1987: 7) has rightly posited that small business owners "occupy an ambiguous position" in the class structure. Specifically, they are, in Marxist terms, part of the *petit bourgeoisie*: They may employ others but work alongside them and typically do not create sufficient surplus to invest in new production. In all of Neukölln there are around 300 businesses registered by entrepreneurs from Turkey. In Reuterquarter, businesses like gastronomy (gastronomy supply, cafes, restaurants, diners etc.), supermarkets, hairdressers and beauty salons, corner stores and clothing are particularly common among self-employed immigrants from Turkey. However, there is also a large number of doctors, accountancy and law offices, all in all providing a relatively diverse palette of services (*Türkesnaflari* Website (Turkish Tradesmen Website), 2015).

In my fieldwork I encountered important differences in the levels of income and precarity among small business owners, reaching from market merchants to individuals who run well-established businesses with employees. Among them are unskilled workers as well as skilled workers and two university graduates. Most are, however, highly dependent on stable rents and tenant contracts. The structural ambiguity of this group (mostly, but not exclusively male, the number of immigrant female business owners from Turkey in Neukölln is rising, see *Bürgerstiftung Neukölln*, 2007) is mirrored in their relatively ambiguous stance on gentrification. Below I will focus on this group in particular to advance the argument that gentrification is not only related to physical displacement but can have differential effects on different groups in a neighborhood. Firstly, not all long-term residents are necessarily victims of the process; on the contrary, they might take advantage of it. However, even in cases in which long-term immigrant entrepreneurs are not displaced, they may still experience other levels of exclusion.

Marketing Diversity

As discussed in chapter two, the shift from the productive industries to the service and financial sector that struck advanced capitalist economies in the 1970s and 1980s is connected to ideological shifts. Culture and consumption

have taken center stage in the accumulation of surplus, entailing a new appreciation of cultural diversity and 'difference' (Harvey, 1990a). Results are advanced neoliberal strategies such as community discourses, the creative city strategy or the discourse of multiculturalism to boost economic growth. Berlin has been one of the center stages to the use of these discourses and strategies in the new century. So-called "new tourism areas" (Maitland and Newman, 2004) have emerged, leading to an increased interests in parts of the city in which alternative or sub-cultural lifestyles can be observed and consumed. The question then is whether ethnic/racial minorities are able to benefit from this increased interest in formerly disinvested or marginalized areas (see e.g. Hoffmann on the valorization of Harlem, 2003). Numerous empirical findings doubt that low-income minorities have control over the economic development of their neighborhoods and can in the long-term benefit from processes such as increased tourism (Mele, 2000; Bader, 2009; Lanz, 2007; Blokland and van Eijk, 2010; Lees 2008).

However, gentrification is frequently a very slow process, particularly in cases where the housing market is relatively regulated as is the case for Germany. Hence, local entrepreneurs of any background might benefit from gentrification at some point, whether or not they will be able to consolidate their profit remains to be answered through long-term observation (see for example Lin, 2005 on Chinese entrepreneurs in China Town, New York). For this reason, evaluations of the gentrification process

are fairly ambiguous and diverse among local immigrant entrepreneurs in Reuterquarter, who find themselves in a situation in which they might be able to generate more profit due to an increased and more solvent clientele but are also precarized and excluded by rent pressure and a rapidly changing consumption infrastructure.

In chapter five I have discussed the Rütli School incident with the aim of showing how Reuterquarter's construction as urban frontier à la Neil Smith (1996) has been connected to the beginning of the gentrification process in the neighborhood. I will now discuss another crucial case in order to show how gentrification affects the lived space of residents, more specifically, residents with a Turkish background. I have chosen to focus on the so-called Turkish market, a decade-old institution on the border of Kreuzberg.

The Turkish market is a site crucial to observing the gentrification process in Reuterquarter, first of all because the physical make-up and the clientele of the market are changing in favor of middle class demands and increasingly excluding the traditionally low-income immigrant clientele. However, the market's image as place of immigrant entrepreneurship and consumption, more particularly its 'exotic' image, is utilized to market it as diverse and multicultural experience to tourists and new residents. In this sense the Turkish market provides us with an understanding of how in Zukin's (2008) sense difference is performed and diversity marketed within

the gentrification process, without, however, challenging structural inequality. The transformation of the market and the concerns of the marketers and the entrepreneurs in the surrounding further show that physical displacement is not the only consequence of gentrification that should interest researchers. Exclusion happens on different, often more subtle levels urging us to think about the complexities of lived experience on the neighborhood-level rather than only developments only rates of displacement.

The Turkish Market

The Turkish market on Maybachshore, right across Kreuzberg, has been an establishment of Neukölln since the first guest workers from Turkey arrived in the 1960s. It was initially created to supply the population from Turkey with goods needed for Turkish home cooking and to provide for the Turkish gastronomy that gradually began to emerge. After over five decades, however, the market has grown beyond its initial purpose. As of January 2005 a new agency was granted operation of the market and with this change the make-up and target clientele of the decade-old institution was transformed considerably. The Turkish market today is still colloquially called the Turkish market but since 2006 it has the official name *Bi-Oriental*, implying that it is still offering an 'oriental' and 'exotic' experience but at the

same time caters the demands of the changing Berlin clientele for an organic lifestyle (see Figure 13). It is now supplemented by flea markets such as the monthly *Nowkoelln Flohmarkt* (Nowkoelln Official Website, 2015) and the weekly artisan market on Saturdays (*Neuköllner Stoff* (Neukölln Fabrics) Official Website, 2015), both of which are both geared towards attracting tourists, young people and artists. The new head operator of the Turkish market (and the Saturdays artisan market as well as a weekday market on Reuterquarter's Hermann square), Rainer Perske says that in early 2005 the market was flagging economically since its primary function, providing Turkish and Arab families and gastronomy with appropriate groceries, had been more or less replaced by the numerous Turkish and Arab supermarkets in the area. When Perske took over the market's operation, it was, according to him, still around 80 percent Turkish and Arab customers, with almost all merchants being Turkish or Arab as well:

I had an economic focus; the market can only function if it functions in itself. Super, great experience and so on but if it does not work economically, it does not work. OK, so I looked at it and I see the Paul Linke shore on the opposite side [which is one of the already gentrified areas of Kreuzberg], ideal location. That is an area where relatively well-situated people live but not 80 percent Turkish-Arab. And when you look at the market and see that 80 percent are Turkish-Arab but the surrounding in the meanwhile has changed to almost the opposite [i.e. 80 percent not Turkish-Arab], [then] the market does not fit the surrounding. (Interview #8, Rainer Perske, December 2012)

Perske's notion of "Turkish-Arab/not well-situated" as being one clear-cut category versus "not Turkish-Arab/well-situated" as the other clear-cut

category and the alleged mismatch between the two exemplifies how Reuterquarter and its surrounding area are transforming for middle-class use and how this transformation is identified with certain ethnic or cultural identities. Accordingly, Perske developed a new vision for the market in 2005 that included a new “ethnic packaging” (Hackworth and Rekers, 2005):

I don't think it only has positive connotation, 'Turkish market', in connection with cheap, I think 'Turkish market' is the wrong direction for marketing. Bio and then oriental – though I had to take stick that that's racist – that is not an ethnic denotation any more, but a geographic one. The subheading 'shopping like in Arabian nights²⁸', of course you can fight about that. What's important is that it signals 'from somewhere else', so how do I address people? Quality from somewhere else. (Interview #8, Rainer Perske, December 2012)



Figure 13 The BiOriental bi-weekly market – “Quality from somewhere else.”

Source: Courtesy of the author.

²⁸ I chose this translation though it is not a literal translation. The original subtitle is “märchenhaft einkaufen.” The word “märchenhaft” in English translates into magical or ‘like in a fairy tale’ but in this context what Perske tries to hint at are not fairy tales in general which also exist in the West but the Oriental fairy tale. That is why this subheading indicates “from somewhere else”. If I had translated the subheading as “magical shopping” or “shopping like in fairy tale” this meaning would have got lost.

The “Turkish-Arab” merchants are indeed those who are from “somewhere else” but probably just not the right “else”. ‘Turkish market’ for Perske is a devaluing label, given that being ‘Turkish’ in Germany is generally held more or less synonymous with being poor, and the market was indeed relatively cheap and thus attracted a low-income clientele. This devaluing label can only be re-valued if the Otherness that is represented by the market and its merchants is wrapped in a different package.

The notion “bio” next to the cultural or geographic connotation “Oriental” does not necessarily mean that all products on the market are actually organic, since Perske has no control over where merchants source their products, but the sheer indication “bio” is sometimes enough to attract the relevant consumer. Sharon Zukin (2008 and 2009) has paid particular attention to the changing infrastructure and the spaces of consumption in gentrifying neighborhoods. In that context, the consumption of organic products can turn into an act of distinction for a part of the middle class that sets itself apart from the working-class through its higher spending on ‘quality’ products. In addition to that, in Berlin the demand for organic products is relatively high and veganism has turned into a movement that has influenced different layers of mainstream society (*Fördergemeinschaft Ökologischer Landbau Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.* (Association for the Promotion of Organic Farming) Official Website 2013). As shown in Figure 14 this demand

also makes itself known in the gentrifying Reuterquarter.



Figure 14 Vegan pancakes as a popular new product in Reuterquarter and the written response by gentrification adversaries - “Hipsters fuck off” on the right side and “Yuppies fuck off” on the left.

Source: Courtesy of the author.

Mehmet is one of the merchants from Turkey who has adapted to the change and has been selling Mediterranean antipasti on his stand for the last few years. In his view, Perske did the right thing by transforming the market; the problem for Mehmet was not the change but his co-ethnics’ shopping habits:

The tourists and the Germans are willing to pay a little more if the quality is right. The Turks always want to bargain down the price, they do not care about quality. (Interview #9, Mehmet, December 2012)

Perske also indicates that the “Turkish-Arab” merchants are not only foreign they also serve a low-income clientele, a clientele that does usually have bigger households, is often neither willing nor able to pay “a little more”. Hence, they are no longer the main clientele the market targets.

The reorganization of the market is, however, not only a question of products and prices but also of space and the use of space: The demand among solvent customers for more individualized, boutique and exclusive products is reflected in the way Perske has reorganized the stands. He introduced new merchants (according to him, “international” ones) to the market and demanded from the old-established merchants to reduce the spaces they occupy and present their products in a different manner, so as to fit the new esthetic of the market. In addition to the higher number of merchants, the market was shortened by 150 meters due to a new fire department regulation. Perske told me that he had numerous quarrels with “Turkish-Arab” merchants who distribute their products across the wooden surface of their stands instead of piling them up in rows and therefore saving space and offering more variety as the “international” ones do.

I looked at the market and there was, for example, very banally, no black bread, very simple things, for example, of course also no pork, of course not, but that’s OK. Apart from feta cheese there was no other cheese. With vegetables, well a Turkish-Arab

vegetable stand is clearly different from the German one. German, let's take the German stand, or let's say international [...] That's so classic, the difference, Turkish-Arab vegetable merchants have, for example, ten or so products to offer, the German or the international has almost a hundred in the same space. (Interview #8, Rainer Perske, December 2012)

This seems like a trivial remark but it is not: distributing across the surface means customers come and literally dig into the mass of apples, potatoes, fabric or what else is offered for the sake of buying several kilos or meters (see Figure 15). Piling up in rows means there is no digging, it means picking products one by one, choosing carefully and slowly and probably buying less. Zukin (2009) has referred to this as "boutiquing".

Boutiquing is, then, part of a broad dynamic of postindustrial change and urban revitalization that may benefit certain residents while deepening economic and social polarization and place low- and middle-income neighborhoods at risk (Smith, 2002; Booza, Cutsinger, and Galster, 2006). It enhances the quality of life of the new urban middle class, including the new black middle class (Taylor, 2002; also see Hyra, 2006; Pattillo, 2007), while making the poor of every ethnic group feel insecure. (Zukin, 2009: 48)



Figure 15 Digging in or piling up? That is the question. The Turkish market on Maybachshore, Reuterquarter.

Source: Courtesy of Gabriele Kantel and tip-berlin.de

Though, as Zukin (2009: 48) rightly states “the poor of every ethnic group” are precarized neighborhood gentrification and the different groups involved and their ability to adapt to the change is frequently coded in ethnic or racial terms. The fact that Perske equalizes “German” and “international” in this context is a significant discursive move. “German-ness” is de-racialized, freed from its particularity and dissolved into some sort of cosmopolitan, flexible and neutral identity while “Turkish-Arab” merchants remain in their frozen and racialized state, unable to adopt to the new realities of their environment. This is exactly what some of the glocalization literature hints at.

Residents of the first world live in *time*, space does not matter for them, since spanning every distance is instantaneous. [...] Residents of the second world live in *space* – heavy, resilient, untouchable – which ties down time and keeps it beyond the residents’ control.[...] Glocalization, to sum up, polarizes

mobility – that ability to use time and annul the limitation of space. This ability divides the world into the globalized and localized. (Bauman, 1998: 45)

For many of the merchants on Maybachshore the transformation of the Turkish market is thus an existential threat, their activities are bound to that space as it is or as it was. What they do and how they do it makes sense and is valuable in a certain more or less circumscribed setting. Some can overcome these limitations more easily than others. Perske realizes that the changes in the market fuel relatively more existential fear of poverty and displacement among the Turkish and Arab merchants who, as he admits “are in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis a German merchants if they would try to find a new job” but also says that he had to make these changes, otherwise the profit margin of the market would dwindle further.

Aykut is a 30-something self-made entrepreneur and high school dropout born and raised in Reuterquarter who, with his two brothers, owns several stores on Maybachshore, where the market is located. He knows almost every merchant in the market and he knows Rainer Perske. Among other establishments, his main business is a store for the manufacturing of curtains. Aykut blames Perske for having ruined the market not only by adding new merchants and reducing space for the old-established ones but also by conforming to the fire department regulation. A private security firm – one that has also been employed at another market that Perske operates in the neighborhood on Hermann square – is guarding the entrance to the

market (*Marktverwaltung Perske* Official Website (Market Administration Perske), 2015). According to Aykut, Rainer Perske also has shares in this security firm.

He had to reduce the market by 150 meters, vehicles cannot drive in any longer. All vegetable and fruit merchants live from vehicles driving into the market. A diner owner drives in to buy fruits and vegetables by the careful for his business, for his restaurant and then he drives out again. All fruit and vegetable merchants have lost 30 percent of their profits. That's not the general idea [of the market]. It's not enough that the market is hip, you steal their [the merchants] bread. What remains? He [Perske] feels confirmed. I was away for one week and then I came back and one of his people says I cannot enter with my car. This man, Perske, he thinks he has a beautiful market here, but he makes use of neighborhood rednecks. That what the neighborhood ejects [he employs in] his security firm. (Interview#10, Aykut, January 2013)

Aykut's words would confirm Volker Eick's (2003 and 2006) thesis on the employment of working-class people against other working-class people in the pursuit of gentrification. In fact, as I was able to observe myself, most security personnel in front of the market were probably children or grandchildren of Turkish and Arab immigrants and as Aykut assured me they were mostly born and bred as Neukölln residents. For Aykut, Perske and his "rednecks" precarize the merchants and restaurant and diner owners and prevent their access to profit in favor of others. And these others, in Aykut's view, were mostly middle class Germans and tourists who fit within Perske's vision of the new market clientele:

Now the German comes. The Turk, when he stands in front of the cheese stand he says 'I want two kilos of this, and four kilos

of this'. Now the tourist or the German customer comes [pitches his voice, in a way emasculating and feminizing the German customer] 'yes, hundred grams of this and hundred grams of this and a knife point of this'. What does he gain? What does this man gain any longer? His stand has become smaller and his customer does not even order a kilo, the customer orders hundred grams. But Perske doesn't care. (Interview#10, Aykut, January 2013)

The Turkish market is one of the sites in which not only the inter-class antagonism (between low-income "Turkish-Arabs" and middle and upper class "German-international" customers) but also intra-class frictions (i.e. between "Turkish-Arab" and "German-international" merchants and between "Turkish-Arab" merchants who willingly adapt to the new organization of the market and those who do not) become tangible. Taking Aykut as an example: Aykut is firmly rooted in the neighborhood. He runs several stores and though he complains about a rent increase, he is not immediately threatened by displacement, given that he and his parents own the apartments they live in. Given his capital, Aykut would probably even be able to profit from the change. He told me for example that he is attempting to open a new parent-child café in the neighborhood, which would probably also serve the new clientele in the area, given that they are often couples with young children (Gude, 2011). Nevertheless, he is not content with what is happening because he is not in control of the change. He mentioned to me he feels run over by the reorganization of the market. No one asked his opinion though he, as he claims, knows the neighborhood, the residents and the

merchants by heart. And this is the crux of the matter: it does not really matter whether Aykut knows the neighborhood better than Perske or better than the new merchants because the neighborhood has already begun to be changed by those who are able to change it and who can overcome its limitations for surplus accumulation.

Hence, even if someone like Aykut will not be displaced or plunged into unemployment in the upcoming years, the development of the neighborhood might be, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, experienced “as a personal and collective loss of control” (Cahill, 2007: 217), among other things also over the profit-generating possibilities in his surroundings. Aykut may sense that his possible share of the pie is not as big as it should be and that it could even get smaller than it is now when gentrification proceeds because the way he conducts his business, his social and cultural capital do not “fit”, as Perske would say, the new realities of the neighborhood. Losing, for example, the immigrant population from Turkey and the Middle East in the area to displacement will necessarily affect Aykut since he primarily serves this clientele and may not be able to quickly adapt to a new one. In that sense, many immigrant small business owners like Aykut are dependent on the market and the quarter *as* spaces of immigrant consumption, they cannot easily detach themselves from this space and just continue their entrepreneurial activity somewhere else. They are “localized” (Bauman, 1998: 45).

Someone like Mehmet, on the other hand, may have adapted his strategies to these new realities because of the nature of his entrepreneurial activities, i.e. it might be easier to convert a market stand from a vegetable and fruit stand to an antipasti stand than to convert a curtain store which derives most of its products directly from Turkey to one that would appeal to the tastes of the middle class. It is thus certainly not the case that all immigrants from Turkey in Reuterquarter are all automatically victims of gentrification.

It is important to understand that, on the micro-level, gentrification does not proceed in a uni-linear fashion in which the middle class influx always and more or less immediately leads to physical displacement; instead, exclusion happens on many different and often much more subtle levels. Though Aykut is not physically excluded from Reuterquarter by his way of doing business, his knowledge of the neighborhood has become outdated and largely replaced. What thus needs to be worked out are the different opportunities and restraints that residents face and that create different levels of vulnerability for them. Below I try to show somewhat more of these nuances on the example of middle class, petit bourgeoisie, residents from Turkey and their families and their ambiguous position within the gentrification process. Here I draw particular attention to the fact that experiences of exclusion and territorial stigmatization on the one hand and Berlin's marketing as a multicultural city on the other (what I have discussed

theoretically under the banner of Lefebvre's abstract space) have added another problematic dimension to the gentrification process in Reuterquarter: gentrification is not only perceived as a material process in which low-income population is slowly substituted by the middle class, but as an ethnic/racial remake.

Reuterquarter between Multiculti and the Ghetto and Gentrification as Dispossession

The Turkish market is evidence of Reuterquarter's gentrification. Perske saw the changes in the neighborhood and tried to adapt the market to the new realities, still representing it as a site of multicultural diversity, but what was in his view a more marketable diversity appealing to the new middle class (coded as "German" or "international") residents and visitors. As explained in chapter four, as Berlin is branded as a creative city, a city of "poor but sexy" outsiders, boroughs like Kreuzberg and Neukölln with high shares of immigrants and Reuterquarter as an 'ethnically diverse' neighborhood take on a significant role in the marketing of the reunited capital. In this part I want to engage more closely with how the marketing of diversity and the so-called "multicultural Berlin" (Capital Berlin Official Website, 2015) is entangled with the German ghetto trope and the negative image that was and still is to some extent ascribed to Reuterquarter.

The marketing of areas formerly described as ghettos such as Reuterquarter leads to a substitution or at least complementation of the negative ghetto discourse by the positive label multicultural neighborhood or 'diverse neighborhood'. In this sense, if we go back to Lefebvre (1994), one dominant abstraction of space is accompanied by a new abstraction, both of which are of course unable to catch the complexities of the spaces they claim to describe. The precursor in this respect is Kreuzberg: In the 1980s and 1990s Kreuzberg underwent a "symbolic gentrification" (Lang, 1998) that was not immediately accompanied by structural change. During this time Kreuzberg's ghetto image began to be supplemented by a multicultural image. Alarmist discourses of ghettoization here continued to be employed alongside positive discourses of multiculturalism, leading to contradictory statements and policies (Lanz, 2007 and Lang, 1998). During this time Neukölln, as discussed in chapter five, acquired an increased amount of negative attention, particularly from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. The north of the borough, which is the most immigrant-heavy part, is now, however, undergoing a similar transformation as Kreuzberg in which symbolic gentrification is followed by structural gentrification.

Accordingly, one way of understanding and framing the gentrification process in Reuterquarter is linked to the discourses of ghettoization and multiculturalism. I single out small business owners here because this group was particularly articulate about the connection between multiculturalism,

the ghetto discourse, racism and gentrification. This might, first of all, be a gender effect given that almost all, save three, of the small business entrepreneurs I was able to interview were male. It was not that all women in general were less outspoken, including women with very low socio-economic status, but they were connecting the transformation of the neighborhood more to their personal stories than did their male counterparts, who were often motivated to give me a more general overview about what was happening. Given that women participate less in the public realm, which is largely controlled by men, this is not surprising (an interesting piece on this is Belenky et al's *Women's Way of Knowing*, 1997).

Secondly, it is also connected to class and status: very low-income or unemployed interviewees (men and women) often asked me whether *I* could explain to them why rents are rising. They did often not trust their own answers, asking me to confirm their suspicions; this was certainly not the case for the (largely male) petit bourgeoisie from Turkey in the quarter.

When I asked Aykut why he thought the neighborhood was changing, he did not hesitate to point out the reasons:

Multiculti, muticulti. The Greens' politics, multiculti, multiculti...blah blah. When you come from a Bavarian village and want to move from your billionaire-dad to Berlin, you want to come to the neighborhood to say 'I live with the people', you know? And you let your crib be paid by your dad and drink a beer here and there, this party-society. And then there are those who think they have a responsibility towards the people that live in the neighborhood and they move here and make the biggest mistake. Why don't they move to Zehlendorf? You have plenty

of vacant houses left from former American soldiers there, why don't they move to Zehlendorf? That is even closer to the Uni. No, they need to come to the neighborhood. They want to belong, multiculti. Yes, multiculti my ass. That was once upon a time...no that was actually never, it was never. It was always a parallel society and I know many artists who moved here, why? Yeees, because when you talk with a colleague you can say: 'I live in the neighborhood, yeah, here in the ghetto'. They think it's cool. And there it started [with this kind of thinking]. That did not start in 2007; the first ones came in 2004. In 2004-2005 it already began, you began to see artists and those kind of people on the market because they simply thought it's hip. (Interview#10, Aykut, January 2013)

While Berlin's urban planners and public administration are eager to present the city as particularly tolerant, ethnically and otherwise diverse, there seems to be a contradiction if we consider the previous history of territorial stigmatization and the alarmist discourse of ghettoization that dominated and still dominates the debate around immigrant-heavy neighborhoods for other ~~not-or~~ not-yet gentrified parts of the inner city. As Aykut argues, Berlin was never multicultural, "it was always a parallel society", i.e. a society in which points of contact and solidarity between those who were perceived as part of the majority and those who were not were rather weak. Whether this is true or not, the notion of "multiculturality" and of immigrants being the bearer of this notion impacts the way gentrification is understood in the quarter. Faruk, a former guest worker and 40-something merchant on the market, runs a fruit and vegetable stand with his relatives outside Aykut's curtain store. He affirms the role immigrants have played in producing the Reuterquarter that is now so attractive to outsiders:

They destroyed the market with their Germanness. When we came here they only had their pubs. They did not even know how to put chairs and tables on the streets, how to sit on their balconies. They are coming to the Turkish market because they are curious, whatever the fuck it is they're looking for. We lived this place up and now they say go somewhere else and do the same but why? Why has it become so popular, because of this multiculti. (Interview #11, Faruk, January 2013)

Ahmet is a Kreuzberg-born male barber who was almost evicted in 2011 but managed to stay due to a signature campaign supported by his neighbors.

Ahmet, as Faruk emphasizes, the agency immigrants had in making

Reuterquarter the neighborhood that it is today:

We are Germany's color, we are the color because we have a lot of nationalities and cultures and that makes us very popular now. They [the Germans] are boring, they are very boring. I said it, I said it's not going to go on like that, I tell the Germans, look if you throw us out of here it will be very boring. Why? I say look there is Mustafa outside the door with his cigarette and I am sitting here and say 'you want a tea?', and the Arab from the other side of the street says 'How is it going Habibi?'. [I said] we are colorful; you Germans are conservative you sit around until a customer comes. [...] "The German says 'you're right', because we are the ones who make it attractive here. Because when the colors are gone you watch a bland movie. We are this country's salt and pepper, if you take out the salt it doesn't work. When I talked with the house owner I told him that and he stopped there for a while. (Interview #12, Ahmet, February 2013)

The claim that Neukölln has become attractive because the 160 different nationalities which gave the borough the necessary "color" or "salt and pepper" (see here bell hooks' notion of "ethnicity as spice", 1999) tells us quite a lot about what sort of agency Ahmet ascribes to himself and other immigrants in the quarter: "we are the ones who make it attractive here" –

immigrants not as passive bystanders but as having actively changed and produced Reuterquarter and Neukölln as multicultural (and hence, attractive) spaces.

For residents and businessmen like Aykut, Faruk or Ahmet, Reuterquarter's attractiveness is also the (intentional or unintentional) product of immigrant activity, be it a parallel society as Aykut says or a multicultural and lively neighborhood as Faruk and Ahmet postulate. The entering of new actors who begin to dominate the streetscape and according to whose demands the neighborhood is being reshaped is another process in which ethnicity and racial difference come to dominate perceptions of gentrification, with long-term inhabitants mainly coded as 'immigrant' or 'Turkish' and newcomers mainly coded as 'German':

I mean when you say Kreuzberg or Neukölln it's always a little multiculti, I mean when you say Zehlendorf it's only about Germans and here it seems as if they are trying to throw out Turks and the foreigners by raising the rents, I mean they want to reclaim it but this is of course sad for us, why? We have put our labor into these streets and there comes the time where this neighborhood gets more beautiful, and when it gets more beautiful they want to kick you out. This is such a bitter thing. Why? Why do they kick us out? It is easy to throw out the Hartz IV recipients but then the culture here will change too, this multiculti. Friends come and want to see how the Turks live here but recently a friend came and said that it has changed a lot here, he says it has become more German, he is German himself but he says it is becoming more German. He says 'so why should I come here then, I'll go to Zehlendorf instead. What should I see here? There is nothing to see'. What I see is a certain liveliness [in the neighborhood] but one that is geared towards Germanification, I mean the Turks are moving out little by little. (Interview #13, İnan, Turkish engineer and co-owner of a construction bureau)

Like Ahmet, İnan seems to appeal to urban planners and investors, arguing that what has led to gentrification in the first place – *multiculti* – will get lost along the way and will thus make the neighborhood less attractive to solvent residents. In some sense they are thus looking for a middle way in which the neighborhood should still change and become a touristic hub similar to Kreuzberg, a development they themselves could possibly benefit from, but without displacing the main agents of the neighborhood – old-established immigrants and, more particularly, Turks. Accordingly, gentrification is also seen as a form of dispossession.

Kübra, whom I quoted in the beginning of chapter five, is a 21-year old high school graduate and daughter of a self-employed former worker who established a construction business. She and her family live on Pannierstreet, one of the larger streets that runs through Reuterquarter. Born and bred in the neighborhood, Kübra and her younger sister Hilal illustrate the contrast between the old and new Reuterquarter:

Kübra: My school on Weserstreet, many foreigners, migrant children [...] There were Germans but very few. But the quarter in itself, for example, there was a bordello. That was a real bordello, on Weserstreet. One of the stores was definitely a bordello. Opposite of a school, that's paradoxical. On the other side there was an Arabic café that was very, was very, I mean I didn't feel it was quite legitimate. Now a big café has opened there but it used to be a money-laundering spot for some drug dealers. They were all illegal businesses in these small stores, the quarter was not particularly secure but as a foreigner you did not necessarily feel threatened because I mean you live here, they know you. Security-wise it has definitely become better. For

example, on Pannierstreet 47, where my sister Olcay has her apartment rented out, there used to be an Arabic café. You could not even pass by it. I was a child back then so I didn't care that much but it was kind of disgusting. You didn't used to see tourist girls and boys walks around here. The Germans that were here... (Interview #1, Kübra, December 2012)

Hilal: Drunk heads (Interview #14, Hilal, December 2012)

Kübra: There were Germans who were already drinking at eight or nine in the morning. Besides that you didn't see many Germans.

Hilal: I thought that was nicer.

Kübra: Hmm, not necessarily. It has its bad and good sides. The bad side is that the rents are increasing and you grew up here and this is your quarter where you feel comfortable and suddenly you have the feeling you don't fit in any longer, the whole surrounding, the whole scene. Everything changed and you are now – now they look at me when I go into the apartment with my keys like 'oh, she still lives here'. [...] You see it a little bit on their expressions. There are people who enjoy that there is a little color here, that there are not only tourists or these people from the scene but also a few Turkish people and a few Arab people, that's what makes it interesting for them. But when it comes to the apartments, they have become very popular and thus the prices have risen and that is why you're not necessarily that welcome any longer.

As Lance Freeman (2006) has shown for Clinton Hill and Harlem, the way gentrification is evaluated by residents is often more nuanced than one might expect. Though one must be cautious not to assume that gentrification can actually have a positive effect in the long-term for low-income locals, as Freeman seems to suggest, the perception of what gentrification entails besides rent increase (such as for example cleaner streets, safety etc.) might well be appreciated by residents, particularly if they are not immediately

threatened by displacement. Kübra makes exactly this point: there is an enhanced feeling of safety, no bordello, less “drunk heads” on the streets, the new cafes and galleries are nice to look at and the image of the neighborhood is more positive now but in the long-term, she fears, she and her family will not benefit from these developments.

Kübra’s mother, Büşra, shares her daughter’s resentment regarding the reactions of newcomers to them, though rather than being stared at she feels ignored by them: “It’s like they don’t see you, they look through you” (Interview #15, Büşra, December 2012). Both Kübra and her mother wear headscarves, so it is obvious to outsiders that they are Muslims. Despite the fact that Kübra and her family were, at least at that point, not in immediate danger of being displaced since they have been living in the same apartment for over 20 years and they are not dependent on welfare, they feel displaced and somehow left behind. Peter Marcuse (1986) has, as discussed in chapter two, famously argued that displacement does not necessarily come with rent-increases but can take different forms. One possibility is that families like Kübra’s or for that matter Aykut’s at one point decide to move out of the neighborhood because the neighborhood has become less livable for them, or as Marcuse said, they might fall under displacement pressure:

I had a gay teacher at my school who was really nice and from what he said, most has stuck with me. He once told us like three years ago: ‘you’re only allowed to still live here because you bring a little color, don’t be surprised when you soon will have your ghettos at the edges of Berlin and during the day they drive

you in with buses to make a little multiculti and back in the evening.’ That stuck with me and to see now that it really turned out that way is rough. To see it is taken from you. (Interview #1, Kübra, December 2012)

Kübra and Hilal told me that they do not feel any animosity towards newcomers, that they do not mind how they dress or act and that they even find some of the new places quite beautiful. However, what bothers them is that they are the ones feeling excluded now. The feeling of ‘losing’ the neighborhood can also turn into more outright hostility. For example, Kübra and Hilal’s father, whom I interviewed separately, claims that there is a plan by the German government to get rid of Muslim immigrants in

Reuterquarter:

There are strange things happening now, in Kreuzberg no one else than the Turks lived for years, only we could live around here, we could only find houses here, buy houses here. Now that’s over, Kreuzberg is the center now; all stores had been in the hand of Turks, now only a few are. Neukölln has been given over to gay people, I can state this clearly. When there is an empty house no one else can get it. You can’t compete with them, it works to their advantage. They have money and they stay in groups, in flat shares. And the house owners are content because they can take more than 300 EURO. I pay 1200 EURO currently, if I would get out they would rent it for 2000-2500. Who gives that kind of money? They do. (Interview #15, Eldem, December 2012)

I will not dwell on the obvious homophobic attitude that Eldem displays or elaborate further on the vast literature on what is called “gay gentrification” (Knopp, 1997). My goal is rather to emphasize the conflict potential or the group animosity (Freiheit and Seidelsohn, 2013) that can emerge in cases of

competition for resources, such as space. Eldem is sure that because “the German government knows that they [meaning Turks or Muslims] are bothered by this kind of behavior”, renting to gays is a way of displacing them. In the course of conversation it became clear to me that what Eldem understood under “gay” was not necessarily or only LGBT individuals but people who dress and act in a certain way, men who wear tight jeans or women with short hair could variably fall under this description.

Discussion

As discussed in the previous chapters, ethnic neighborhoods sometimes turn into event spaces for relatively new and alternative forms of tourism. In the 1990s and 2000s Kreuzberg had already become one of the hubs of Berlin’s “new tourism areas” (Maitland and Newman, 2004 and Maitland, 2010) and North Neukölln, due to its geographical proximity and similar physical and demographic make-up, has been undergoing a similar development since the mid-2000s. The Turkish market is obviously a poignant example of this. While on the one hand its structure is constantly changing and the share of customers from Turkey and merchants is slightly decreasing, the operator Perske also relies on its ‘Oriental’ image. The goal is thus not to exclude the ‘ethnic’ (which can variably mean Turkish, Arabic, Oriental or immigrant) character of the market in general

but to circumscribe it in ways that it appeals to the relatively new better-off clientele, which leads to more subtle forms of exclusion.

By essentializing “Germanness” as symbolizing a certain kind of behavior or non-behavior (buying a knife point of cheese instead of the caseful, not putting chairs and tables out on the streets, not living the place up) and their own ‘Turkish-immigrant’ identity as symbolizing as another kind of behavior or non-behavior, residents such as Faruk, Aykut, Ahmet or İnan perceive of the transformation of the neighborhood and the market to be rooted in cultural and ethnic differences. For a neighborhood in Portland, Oregon that is historically black and recently received an increased influx of white middle-class newcomers, Drew (2012) shows that gentrification indeed has a “racial effect” and may accordingly be understood as a form of racism by established inhabitants. Though the contrast between established inhabitants and newcomers in Reuterquarter is not comparable to the neighborhood Drew is looking at (i.e. neither are all established inhabitants in Reuterquarter immigrants, nor are all newcomers German; many of the immigrants in the quarter as well as newcomers and visitors would self- and other-identify as ‘white’) the perception of gentrification as ethnic or racial remake shows important parallels.²⁹ Again, the explanation for this

²⁹ I do not suggest here that this is some kind of false interpretation. As discussed arduously, gentrification indeed has a lot to do with racism. Nevertheless, and this is the purpose of an extended case analysis, we must be careful to contrast and compare the way gentrification is understood by residents of different social and economic backgrounds to the structural realities. The fact is that Reuterquarter was never exclusively immigrant and that

understanding can be derived from Lefebvre's notion of abstract space: Reuterquarter's depiction as immigrant ghetto on the one hand and as representative of Berlin's alleged multiculturalism on the other, has led to abstract conceptions of the neighborhood. These abstract conceptions in turn affect the way transformations in Reuterquarter are framed by long-term residents – middle class gentrifiers become 'Germans' and working-class residents become 'immigrants', irrespective of whether or not this is reflected in actual numbers.

When, in turn, long-term inhabitants emphasize their agency in the production of their neighborhood, then gentrification may accordingly be perceived as a form of dispossession. In the above mentioned study, Drew (2012) also shows that in cases where long-term residents and newcomers do not share the same cultural, ethnic or racial background, the feeling of having become "second-class citizens in their own neighborhood" for minorities might be exacerbated. Similar observations have been made by Jackson (2001) for Harlem or De Bres (1988) for Park Slope, Brooklyn. And this is may even be the case where the racial/ethnic difference between old and new inhabitants is more constructed than real, as it is true for Reuterquarter. This would also imply that in cases where old and new residents are perceived to

not all newcomers are German. I am certain that there will be fewer Turkish and Arab immigrants in the quarter ten years from now and more non-immigrant German residents but to speak of a complete ethnic remake is an abstraction. What is significant is that certain classes and class *habitus* come to be signified by ethnicity and race and we must ask why that is so.

be of the same ethnic, racial or cultural background perceptions of gentrification will differ among long-term inhabitants. Kazım Erdoğan³⁰, a widely known social worker from Neukölln who is Turkish himself, argues that

Because most of the newcomers are Germans, the relationship between foreigner and Germans turns into a negative one again. If most newcomers were from immigrant families from Turkey, then the residents would say 'our people came'. They would speak about it more positively. I think there is still this fear, this hostile atmosphere at a distance but we need to turn this negative development into a positive one. (Interview #17, Kazım Erdoğan, January 2013)

Erdoğan thus claims that gentrification can turn into a ground for inter-ethnic tension if the process goes out of hand and that a 'Turkish gentrification' of some sort would not have had this effect. Studies in the US suggest that this is partly true. Moore (2009: 118) has shown that "black gentrification" (Taylor, 1992) results in a

unique set of opportunities and restraints that produce a group of middle-class African Americans willing to invest their social, economic and cultural capital into improving the quality of life for low-income Black neighborhoods and their residents.

Other studies, however, find that intra-racial/ethnic solidarity has its limits among people of different socio-economic background. So has Jackson (2001: 181-187) in his study of Harlem shown that working-class African American residents may accuse middle-class African American gentrifiers of "acting white" and thereby categorize some people who they would, on the surface,

³⁰ Real name.

consider 'Black' as not embodying 'Blackness'. Again, it seems more crucial how certain behavior, a certain habitus and material possession is coded in terms of ethnic/racial identities rather than whether pioneers, gentrifiers or long-term inhabitants feel they belong to a certain ethnic or racial group or not.³¹ And this is the issue I want to turn to in the following section:

Intra-Ethnic/Inter-Class Tensions and the Competition for Profit

Small business owners have, as argued before, an ambiguous position within the gentrification process. They may feel they are harmed by the process, such as Faruk or Aykut, or they may take advantage of the transformation of Reuterquarter by targeting the new consumer profile. An example of this would Mehmet, whom I have quoted in the sub-chapter on the Turkish market. Mehmet changed his food assortment as to appeal to the new customers on the market by offering antipasti and he is content with the developments in the neighborhood. To adapt such a strategy the immigrants in question must of course have the necessary capital to either open a new

³¹ In the US the so-called 'color-line' has obviously a much different history than in Western Europe and in Germany. Reuterquarter is neither Harlem nor do working class immigrants necessarily occupy the same structural position in German society as do African Americans in the United States. Nevertheless, these findings are not completely unconnected to how long-term immigrant residents express their perception of the gentrification process in the neighborhood. If one uncritically imports notions such as 'ghetto' from the American context, it is not surprising that perceptions among residents might converge though the structural realities are completely different.

store, restaurant or bar or to alter their array of products or the aesthetic style of their business. Thus, gentrification obviously does not affect all old-established immigrants in Reuterquarter in the same way but has different implications not only for welfare recipients, low-income workers or entrepreneurs but also for different groups within these categories.

Semi (2011) argues that local entrepreneurs in inner-city Milan “that have little in common with the huge capital investment that is at stake in real estate development” may “represent the soft side of gentrification.” He further postulates that particularly long-established residents might form “zones of authentic pleasure” that appeal to tourists and middle class newcomers. This is akin to what Mehmet does on the Turkish market with his antipasti stand. My own fieldwork, however, shows that the position of local immigrant entrepreneurs vis-à-vis newly arrived pioneers, gentrifiers and tourists is rather complex. My findings mirror Zukin et al.’s (2009) argument on the fate of long-established local stores in Harlem, that is, local shops do not vanish immediately and may be quite resilient and local entrepreneurs might also benefit from gentrification at some point but one factor that will make it more difficult to stay in the neighborhood in the long-term will necessarily be the rising rents. The same may be relatively true for early pioneers (e.g. students, young start-ups etc.) who are eventually displaced by individuals or companies with higher capital. Last but not least, as Mandel (2008: 87-87) argues the rules according to which “zones of

authentic pleasure” (Semi, 2011) become successful are made by incoming middle and upper class consumers, not by long-term residents. That also means that in cases where immigrant entrepreneurs adapt their businesses to the needs of the new clientele, they are likely to exclude low-income residents or other middle-class residents that do not share the same consumption practices (Zukin et al, 2009).

Ahmet, the barber from Sanderstreet is an example of the ambiguous situation in which small entrepreneurs might find themselves in gentrifying neighborhoods. While criticizing the potential displacement of residents from Turkey like himself, he also sees advantages in the gentrification process:

They killed the a-sociality here that also causes the resistance. I mean people turned their back against the state, they lived a very comfortable life and now the house owners woke up and want to make money. Of course it's bad, people have been displaced but sometimes people have to get hurt. This is what affects the tradesmen here anyway, what can you earn from Hartz IV recipients, nothing. Now there are people with money, the old residents come and buy one packet of cigarettes; the new ones they say give me this or that in addition. The old one would have his hair cut for five lira³², now the new ones pay 12-15 lira and leave three lira tip. (Interview #12, Ahmet, February 2013)

Similar to what Perske said about the old and new customers of the Turkish market, Ahmet argues that the newcomers are more solvent and thus beneficial to his business. Furthermore, he evaluates the situation of Hartz IV

³² Ahmet refers to the Turkish currency Lira though he talks about Germany and actually Euros. This is not a conflation but very common among Turkish immigrants in Germany when they talk in Turkish – they ‘translate’ the currency as well.

recipients as rather “comfortable” before gentrification set in. The fact is, however, that Ahmet himself is not very “comfortable” any longer. As mentioned earlier, he almost lost his barber shop because he overlooked a clause in his tenant contract according to which he should have told his landlord in advance that he is prolonging his stay. In a neighborhood with low rents and vacant stores, landlords might be much less likely to take advantage of such mistakes by their tenants. Nyden et al. (2006:18) show how developers pressure elderly homeowners to sell their homes and Verlic (2013: 9) has noted how landlords in the relatively regulated housing market of Austria even sometimes illegally try to push low-income tenants out of their apartments in gentrifying neighborhoods. Holm (2006) describes how after reunification, in the Prenzlauer Berg locality of Berlin, long-term working class tenants were driven out of their homes by investors through the use of legal loopholes and despite rent control (see chapter seven). Trying to take advantage or taking advantage of gentrification and being eventually displaced is of course not limited to long-term immigrant entrepreneurs in the neighborhood. Similarly, an almost century-old German working-class pub on Sanderstreet closed down in late 2012 and was replaced by a bar catering to a younger middle-class clientele. The owner of the bar just a few months earlier had stated that she “does not notice much of the change”. Her bar had even become part of the cultural events in the quarter, staging live music and theater sessions, none of which brought the

owner much extra profit (*Reuter*, April/May 2012). This shows how fast the change can sometimes be and that even adaptation to pioneers' and gentrifiers' demands may not suffice to keep up a business.

However, first-generation immigrant entrepreneurs might be more affected than native German tenants, in cases where German skills and know-how do not suffice to grasp the perks of the tenant contract. Nevertheless, despite their own precarity, business owners might also be unwilling to cater their low-income co-ethnics, or at least favor middle-class newcomers because they can capitalize on their demands, as one corner-store owner stated:

Kenan: Discrimination, I mean until now I haven't seen that Germans and foreigners were treated differently. I mean, we see it in the newspapers but I haven't seen it. We are more with the Germans...I mean we are Turkish but we are closer with the German customers. They have embraced us, I don't know, it's very comforting. We have more German customers more than Turkish ones, to be honest we don't want Turkish customers.

Defne: Why?

Kenan: Turkish customers are problematic, let's say he bought something, let's say a lighter, even for that he makes a big fuss. He finds it too expensive or wants it for free and because we are Turks as well he thinks he can get away with it. The German customer comes, for example, we have a German customer he comes in and drinks ten beers a day but he does not cause any fuss, he makes normal conversation. The Turkish customer comes in and drinks two beers and begins to fall apart, I don't know our folks, it's their nature, their habits. (Interview #18, Kenan, runs a corner-store/internet-café on Reuterstreet with his family, born and bred in Berlin)

Veli is another corner-store owner who has just opened his store with his brother in one of the most popular areas of the neighborhood along Weserstreet. Both used to work on construction sites and lived in Kreuzberg. The corner-store Veli runs now, similar to the one that closed on Sanderstreet, used to be a German working-class pub. Veli negotiated with the former owner and took over her tenant contract in late 2012. In that sense he and his brother, as former working-class immigrants who took the step to local entrepreneurship, managed to buy out another old-established local entrepreneur with (most probably) a working-class background. Veli tells me that on the opposite corner, the owners of a very successful and relatively new Spanish tapas bar whose tenant contract someone had attempted to take over until Veli came and just made the better offer by paying cash up front. Veli recalls that his young Spanish counterparts were appalled by his way of doing business.

The competition for housing and for stores is quite fierce in Reuterquarter, as Veli's story shows. But Veli was not irritated by this and went on to adapt his store's make-up to what he thought would appeal to the new young clientele in Reuterquarter. He introduced a large assortment of Mediterranean wines and tells me that he was planning to use the backroom of the store as a sort of pub corner where people could immediately drink what they just purchased. For Veli his main target customers are the students in the neighborhood and he says he frequently asks for their advice on how

to style his store and expand his assortment. His will to connect with students and make them his main clientele, goes so far as his not preferring his co-ethnics as customers:

Veli: They [the students] come in, we talk, the conversation has to be warm that is what tradesmanship is about for me. They have to feel comfortable here, there should be no annoyance, I would, for example, not let the foreigners come and disturb anyone here. For me even if there are only three students sitting here I want them to be comfortable, I won't take foreigners in.

Defne: By foreigners do you mean Turks and Arabs?

Veli: Yes, I mean some people that are living here; I don't know if you noticed, they irritate other people. Their children throw snowballs at other people [...] The bad things they do stick with us and it becomes difficult to do business. It is said that all foreigners are the same but there are good and bad Germans as well, but if someone is cultivated his whole attitude is different, it's more relaxed. (Interview #19, Veli, December 2013)

What Veli describes as "foreigners" are neither the Spanish or American students that have more recently arrived nor the, what he calls the "cultivated" Turks and Arabs, but parts of the population from Turkey and the Arabic countries that he sees as uncultivated. It is notable that Veli and his brother were themselves construction workers before they took over the tenant contract. The necessary cash to launch the business came from their uncle. They thus possibly share a similar socio-economic background with many long-term residents of the quarter. What distinguishes them, from Veli's point of view from that of some of the Reuterquarter residents from Turkey and the Middle East are not class in the narrow sense but a certain "cultivated" habitus. The newcomers in the neighborhood, students from all

sorts of countries in particular, are the standard of what counts as “cultivated”.

Veli’s store was not well received by the surrounding business owners: on the other side of the street another corner-store owner who has migrated from Turkey, Doğan, criticizes Veli and his brother for making unnecessary competition, saying that there is no need for another liquor-selling corner store on the same block. Another corner-store owner, Ulaş, agreed with Doğan, telling me that the Turkish and Kurdish corner-store owners in the neighborhood should have each other’s backs and not push each other out of business. Doğan, on his part, has already achieved what Veli was aiming at five years before him: his store called *Späti International* attracts a wide array of students, new middle-class entrepreneurs and creatives. The store even used to have its own website and has advanced to one of the cult-spots in the neighborhood (Stanek, 2013). Doğan, who was also previously a construction worker, tells me that he, like Veli, frequently takes advice from students and two other friends, a writer and a doctor, on how to market the store. In the back, just as Veli planned as well, Doğan arranged a sitting space with vintage armchairs. Mostly young students and generally young artists hang out there, drink beer, sometimes smoke weed. Doğan tells me that his “positivity” and his “multiculti” attitude made his store, where generally Latin samba music vibrates out of loudspeakers, so popular among tourists and new residents in particular. His prices are

therefore a little bit higher than most other corner-stores, though he was forced to lower them when Veli opened his business.

The corner-store business in Neukölln and Kreuzberg is generally dominated by immigrants from Turkey; it can thus aptly be described as an ethnic niche. What is not so much a domain of immigrants from Turkey are the new bars, restaurants and clubs in Neukölln. But there are exceptions: Right around the corner of my apartment on Fuldastreet is a bar operated by a middle-aged Turkish man, the father of five children. He used to run a thrift shop in the same space and has now used some of the armchairs, stools, tables and lamps left from his former business to decorate his new bar. The *Kachellounge 54* (Tile-lounge 54) is a typical Berlin hipster bar with a typical hipster name – dimmed lights, candles, a little bit wretched and retro, in other words fitting the motto “poor but sexy”. Orhan, the owner of the bar, was busy cleaning up when I bothered him for a small conversation. I asked him how he came to the idea to engage in such an enterprise:

I have been living in Neukölln since 1986, 15 years in this street. I know the neighborhood better than the other bar-owners here. But I’m not like them, I do not do it for fun, just for the money.
(Interview #20, Orhan Demirel³³, February 2013)

What Orhan indicates is that the newcomers who now constantly open new cafes and bars in the neighborhood do not share the same existential concerns Orhan has. They do it for fun; he does it because he needs the

³³ Real name.

money. Orhan thus quite clearly points at a substantial difference between himself and other bar-owners in Reuterquarter that is expressed as a difference in material opportunities. Like Veli, Orhan says he does not prefer his co-ethnics as customers in his bar because he thinks it is “bad for business”. And like Doğan and Veli he says he listened to his young and often German guests when it came to how he should promote his bar and what products he should offer. But because he is a “foreigner” (i.e. in this context we might easily translate this as ‘working-class Turk’), as he describes himself, he sometimes has problems drawing in the clientele that he targets, particularly because they think that he, as a Muslim, might be homophobic, which he denied vehemently to me. During an interview for a newspaper, Orhan Demirel reported that sometimes the other bar owners had said he would not make it and that his bar is not authentic because he only imitates the other new bars in the neighborhood:

The other bar owners make fun of me, [...], that hurts me.. I make mistakes, but I learn every day. (Demirel quoted in Janovsky, 2011, translation mine)

The dynamics in Reuterquarter have certainly turned upside down; Orhan Demirel, who has been living in Neukölln for the last quarter of a century, is now the one who has to learn, while bar owners who possibly moved in a few years or maybe even a few months ago have become the ones to teach.

What Orhan’s complaint shows is how new forms of exclusion (and inclusion) can emerge in a gentrifying neighborhood, and how the

perception (or reality) that long-term residents and newcomers are of different ethnic or racial belonging can complicate these forms of exclusion. It would not be possible to gain knowledge on this without research of lived space. Theoretically we can link this to what I have earlier debated in regard to Harvey's (1990) and Zukin's (2008) arguments on the role of cultural commodification and symbolic inclusion: Doğan says he is attractive to young middle class residents because he is held to be representative of the quarter's alleged diversity. He finds that he can draw advantage out of this, for example, by keeping his prices at a higher level (because he adds value through his "multiculti"). However, Orhan's complaint shows that this multicultural inclusion and demand for diversity has its limits, limits in this case defined by religion and probably age. Only certain characteristics held to be 'ethnic' (e.g positive attitude, hospitality etc.) are appreciated while others (e.g. being a Muslim or being marked as such and thus being held to be homophobic) are not. This is akin to what is happening at the Turkish market. The market operator, Perske, makes use of the markets 'exotic' image and markets it as space for experiencing and performing difference (or distinction, in Bourdieu's (1986) terms) but he also seeks to transform the traditional way in which the marketers have conducted their business so as to fit the demands of a new middle class clientele. In this sense, the incoming middle class, and particularly the younger generation, function as gatekeepers, along whose demands middle-aged entrepreneurs such as

Orhan, Doğan, Veli or the marketers and the Turkish market must organize themselves. The difference is thus only acceptable in so far it serves the consumerist habits of the middle class, who can simultaneously satisfy their will to perform their distinction from typical middle-class lifestyles (e.g. by preferring to live in the infamous Reuterquarter, rather than in the suburbs) while creating their own comfort zone through shaping the neighborhood according to their demands.

Discussion

When an immigrant-heavy neighborhood such as Reuterquarter gentrifies complicated expectations of ethnic solidarity, profit-making and relations with new and old residents may come into play. As Lance Freeman (2006) shows in his study of Harlem and Bronzeville, long-term residents might have a nuanced view of the process, appreciating issues such as enhanced safety and economic upheaval while criticizing displacement and rent pressure. This of course depends on their ability to cope with gentrification, and victims and beneficiaries of gentrification are not easily identified. Nor can residents who identify as belonging to the same racial, ethnic or cultural group be expected to solidarize nor can long-term local entrepreneurs expected to share the same interests and perceptions as middle-class pioneers and gentrifiers.

The above examples of small-business owners who try to derive profit from the gentrification of the neighborhoods they live and/or work in, show very well the different levels of exclusion which are, at first sight, sometimes hard to unravel: entrepreneurs like Veli, Kenan, Orhan or Ahmet criticize the behavior and consumption habits of their co-ethnics and Veli and Kenan even prefer 'non-foreign' customers. The irony of course is that immigrants from Turkey who have been living in the quarter, possibly for decades, are coded as 'foreign' while the newcomers who, as everyone who walks through the neighborhood can easily observe, consist of an ethnically diverse crowd, are not. This is one form or level of exclusion in which petit bourgeoisie immigrant business owners exclude their lower-income co-ethnics. But it does not end here. Another level of exclusion targets the immigrant business owners themselves. Orhan, who does not prefer his co-ethnics as customers due to their "bad behavior", does not feel welcomed by the new group of gastronomy owners in Reuterquarter, who are mostly much younger people with different forms of social and cultural capital. He has a disadvantage because he is identified as a Muslim, and thus conceived to be homophobic. He also has a disadvantage because he probably looks different or in some ways behaves different from what is demanded by the new middle class customers. Orhan, as well as Veli and Doğan – they all try to "learn" from the pioneers and gentrifiers in the neighborhood, they try to adapt to their demands but there are limits to this adaptation. Doğan, who

has arguably been the most successful in catering to young middle class needs so far, owes – as he claims himself – at least part of his success to his “multiculti” image. In this sense his inclusion into profit-making is only ensured through self-caricaturization. Accordingly, while these immigrant entrepreneurs choose to exclude some long-term residents by not wanting them as customers, they themselves are excluded on different levels.

How gentrification is evaluated, whether as threat or as chance, depends on the possibilities to capitalize on the process. In the case of the ethnic enclave economy in China Town, New York, Lin (2005) argued that, while some members of ethnic minority groups might substantially benefit from gentrification, either by blending in or by activating their own subcultural capital, the question is whether immigrants that do not have sufficient capital or who fail to negotiate successfully with their landlords, as almost happened in Ahmet’s case and his barber shop, will in the long-run be able to withstand the rising demand for renting business spaces by people and groups that have higher economic capital and possess the necessary language and cultural skills. In that sense even Doğan’s “multiculti” image may become a less valuable asset over time when he can be replaced with other (non-ethnic or more attractive) minority identities, alternative lifestyles or subcultures.

The Differential Effects of Gentrification on Low-Income Immigrants

Sometimes the lessons we draw from fieldwork seem very simple but are nevertheless significant: An important lesson I drew from my study of Reuterquarter was that individuals with different vulnerabilities are differently affected by gentrification. When we think, talk and write about gentrification, it is not enough to theorize the material process but we need to engage with what gentrification really *means* for long-term residents. In other words, we need to engage with lived space and to gain insights about what people say and do and what is at stake for them when their neighborhood is transforming in favor of middle class use.

One of these simple insights that seems obvious but not always informs research on gentrification is that poor people have fewer choices. This seemingly banal statement is one that I would have probably made and agreed with before my fieldwork but really only started to understand after I had heard how the reality of having few choices plays out in reality. Since politics and academic work is usually carried out by middle class people such as me, this is a fact that is in my view seldom internalized by those who are charged with designing policies or with making policy recommendations. And if these poor people are additionally disadvantaged by virtue of their being immigrants, their lack language skills, their lack assertiveness in dealing with German bureaucracy or their having to face severe

discrimination on the housing and job market and in other realms such as health and education, then gentrification may pose an even more severe challenge to their already modest living standards.

Below I will further engage with the lived experiences of Reuterquarter's residents by first discussing how and why low-income and particularly welfare-dependent immigrants from Turkey might be disproportionately threatened by physical displacement. I will then proceed to the question of why they may still chose to stay in Reuterquarter, despite rent pressure, and how they manage to do that. I first show how formal and informal local infrastructure has built up over time in Reuterquarter, which helps particularly low-income immigrants to overcome everyday obstacles, such as local neighborhood houses that help school children with their homework or free-of-charge tenant counseling and language classes. I then show how low-income and/or welfare-dependent immigrant families from Turkey, particularly utilizing their numerical strength in the neighborhood, activate their social capital to stay in the neighborhood by using methods that have severe social implications, e.g. overcrowding and informal work.

Immigrants' Disadvantage in Reuterquarter's Housing Market

In chapter three, I discussed the issue of residential segregation and discrimination on the housing market and how ethnic minorities in

Germany, and particularly immigrants from Turkey and their families are affected by this. In chapter four I discussed the increasing polarization of the Berlin housing market. Here I want to shed light on how this applies to Reuterquarter and how low-income immigrants in the neighborhood might be more easily displaced from their apartments than other segments of the population.

In a local neighborhood house I met Necmiye Gülbol³⁴, a tubby 40-something from Kreuzberg (Interview #21, Necmiye, January 2013). Necmiye and her family had unwillingly become local celebrities when they were faced with being evicted from their apartment on Lausitzerstreet. Necmiye's husband Ali³⁵; a skilled artisan had renovated the apartment on his own and in return had made an oral agreement with the then-landlord: he would not raise the rent and if he decided to sell the apartment, he would sell it to their family. But the former owner, experiencing economic trouble, did not stand by his word and their house on Lausitzerstreet was sold, as were several others in South Kreuzberg, to a Dutch investor from Steglitz³⁶, Andre Franell³⁷. Since Necmiye's husband had only made an oral agreement, rent control was not guaranteed and Franell soon raised the rent. The family sued

³⁴ Real name.

³⁵ Real name.

³⁶ A middle- to upper-class locality in the west of Berlin.

³⁷ Real name.

against this increase but in 2011 the court ordered the family to repay Franel 3500 EURO – the amount that had accumulated during the legal quarrel.

Family Gülbol paid but not within the ordered time-limit, which made them lose their right to the apartment. Neighbors went to the local neighborhood house to report the case and it soon grew into an initiative to forestall the Gülbol family's displacement. Necmiye told me she was embarrassed by the fact that her name was now on pamphlets and in the newspapers.

Unfortunately, however, her unintentional fame did not pay out for her and her family. On the last day of my Berlin stay and despite extensive protest, the Gülbol family was evicted from the building in which they and their extended family had been living for the last four decades. Figure 16 below shows a scene from the morning of their eviction. If the oral agreement with the former owner had been made legal or the Gülbol family had not missed the repayment deadline, they probably would be still living in the same apartment.



Figure 16 Ali Gülbol steps out to announce to the protestors that the eviction is final (19.02.2013).

Source: Courtesy of the author.

The Gülbol family's fate exemplifies the fate of many working-class families in Kreuzberg and Neukölln and is representative of a substantial problem of particularly marginalized groups in society, such as ethnic minorities, single mothers or the elderly are confronted with (Nyden et al, 2006), specifically, access to information and know-how on how to navigate in the German legal system. During my field research I encountered several cases in which immigrant tenants from Turkey had been displaced or had almost been displaced due to minor legal issues and the landlords often saw these mistakes on the side of their tenants as golden opportunities to cancel the

tenant contract and re-rent for a substantially higher price. Asım Güllüoğlu³⁸, a lawyer with Turkish roots on Reuterstreet, confirmed that many of his clients, the vast majority of which are Turkish immigrants, accidentally sign tenant contracts or additional provisions that are to their disadvantage:

When German skills are not sufficient - and even if they let the document be translated by others these other people also do not fully understand what the document says and they sign. After that it is very difficult to get out of it. (Interview #22, Asım Güllüoğlu, November 2012).

Güllüoğlu added that as a lawyer his experience is that, in addition to the lack of language skills and maybe a lack of assertiveness, most of his clients, the Neukölln job center also often “intentionally act unlawfully”:

I always see this. They will not easily give someone their rights if they don't consciously ask for it. What do you do, you go to the court and so on you demand your right. But I mean if I do something like this or you do it for your own interest that is one thing but if a public institution does this, and it is the job center, this is a social institution, an institution that should help. This is horrendous. (Interview #22, Asım Güllüoğlu, November 2012).

Though it is hard to determine in what respect and to which extent job centers in Germany ignore the rights of their clients, it is true that the job center Neukölln in particular has become infamous for preferring to interpret the law to the disadvantage of social benefit recipients. A social worker from Neukölln who works in a free-of-charge tenant consultancy told me that the job center Neukölln deploys the strict upper rent limit for apartments Hartz

³⁸ Real name.

IV recipients are allowed to rent (i.e. depending on the number of persons in the households, Hartz IV recipients receive a certain rent allowance) though the law says that they could increase this upper limit up to ten percent, giving their clients more leeway in choosing apartments (*Berliner Mieterverein* (Berlin Tenant Association), 2012) (Interview #2, social worker, November 2012). It can only be speculated whether in Neukölln the job center's rather inflexible regulations are connected to the borough's high share of immigrants and/or its particular image in society. However, an action research study (on action research see Graham-Gibson, 1996) conducted by the German socialist collective FeIS (2011: 32) at the job center Neukölln at least suggests that immigrant welfare recipients are regularly confronted with racist remarks and that their lack of language skills and knowledge is used by job center employees to their disadvantage. The sometimes harsh regulations of German job centers must, however, not only be contextualized within racism and discrimination but also within the restructuring of the German welfare state and the shift to more workfarist strategies discussed in the previous chapters. Under workfarism punitive or disciplinary measures take the forefront and the balance between rights and duties is shifted in favor of the latter. Accordingly, non-compliance or a legal mistake may be immediately punished.

Apart from the trouble welfare-dependent residents may have with the job center, landlords may furthermore employ strategies such as

conducting unnecessary modernizations, prolonging reparations or blaming tenants for damage in the apartment:

I saved money I didn't go on vacation, yes? The bath tub, everything, yes? And now I have fixed the moisture problem but new moisture comes from my kitchen. And when I tell them about the moisture they say I am to blame. They say I must open windows and ventilate, I ventilate the whole day, it doesn't matter. I had not even cooked and the moisture was back in the kitchen. (Interview #23, Saliha, woman in her 40s from an Arabic origin, moved from Reuterquarter due to increased rent and now lives in an adjacent neighborhood, December 2012)

In Germany the house owner is legally responsible for removing moisture, which is a widespread phenomenon in Reuterquarter where buildings may be quite beautiful but old and of basic quality – as long as tenants engage in average ventilation and heating. It cannot legally be expected that tenants will ventilate all day and heat simultaneously (Frössel, year unknown).

Immigrants might be additionally disadvantaged in cases when their living habits are directly targeted, e.g. one woman told me that her management wanted her to remove the satellite pan on her balcony though it is her right to receive television channels from her homeland, even if she receives Hartz IV (this is valid for cases in which no channels in the mother-tongue are available through cable or through other means, see Scheinert, 2013) (Interview #24, Tülay, December 2012).

Property owners obviously not only discriminate against individuals of foreign origin but they discriminate against the poor in general. Nevertheless, the additional racist discrimination that low-income

immigrants in gentrifying neighborhoods face cannot be denied. In an interview, the head of the Berlin tenant organization Reiner Wild³⁹ pointed at one particular case to illustrate this:

Reiner Wild: We have had an open discrimination with rent increases in social housing where the public subventions' scheme ran out. There it was partially the case that rent increases in inner city districts were only pronounced for tenants with a migratory background.

Defne: Where was that?

Reiner Wild: In Kreuzberg, southern Friedrichstadt. [...] Rents were increased and then these apartments were re-offered on the market for lower rents. The clear goal was to change the tenant structure and to target higher income tenants. And that was, from the viewpoint of the property owners, only possible if the migrant households leave first. It was pretty crass how it went down in that area, with several property owners. The cases are still in court. (Interview #24, Reiner Wild, January 2013)⁴⁰

The fact is, as discussed in chapter three, that once immigrants leave their apartment or lose it they have a much harder time finding new accommodation, particularly with a Turkish or Arabic name (Kılıç, 2010) and this cannot necessarily be avoided through legal provisions:

[...] the problem is of course also discrimination. The ADG, the law against discrimination has urged landlords to be more cautious, which means they still discriminate, but you have to prove that you are discriminated against because of your ethnicity and how will you prove that? When there are five applicants or 25 and you don't get the apartment, then it is not discrimination when only one gets it and all other 20 applicants

³⁹ Real name.

⁴⁰ One case that has recently been fought in court in this respect came to a resolution in early 2015: Two tenants of Turkish origin have to be paid 30,000 EURO reparation by their landlord who discriminated against them based on their ethnic background through selective rent increases (see *Der Spiegel*, 2015)

are quasi-discriminated. That is why you can generally not prove it. (Interview #24, Reiner Wild, January 2013)

In this sense gentrification and the rise of demand for individual apartments might even worsen the chances of proving cases of discrimination and racism. If immigrants compete with not only other immigrants or only one or two working-class non-immigrants but instead with 25 or 50 people who often are not only better-off but non-immigrant or at least not Muslim/Turkish, then it becomes increasingly difficult to single out the reasons why their apartment search is unsuccessful.

The discriminatory attitude is also directly observable among Reuterquarter's property owners, as my fieldwork shows. The interim use agency that was responsible for renting vacant spaces to artists from 2005 to 2007 in Reuterquarter also built a network of property owners to ensure "sustainable real estate business" in the neighborhood as well as "ensuring a balanced tenant structure" (*Eigentümersnetzwerk Reuterkiez* (property owner network) Official Website, 2015). When I met with five of the property owners in the network they unanimously told me that there are in fact no ethical or other principles according to which they chose their tenants other than finding them "likeable" or not:

There are no principles, when someone already comes in drunk then you don't rent, it is sympathy/antipathy, no guidelines or principles. (Interview #25, property owner 1, February 2013)

Defne: Because you have it in your network brochure [that the tenant structure should be balanced etc.].

Well, that [means] that they all [should be likeable]. (Interview #25, property owner 1, February 2013)

When most landlords are middle or even upper-class non-immigrant Germans and they think about which sorts of tenants they, so to say, 'click' with, then it does not take much imagination to sort out the disadvantage that low-income immigrants and possibly immigrants in general can face when looking for apartments in areas for which demand has risen. In my group interview with the five property owners, I also encountered the claim that Reuterquater was not well "socially mixed" in the past and that the "mix" is now better:

Everyone says that for a well-functioning society it must be well mixed and we had a very one-sided population in North Neukölln, which from my viewpoint has contributed to the area's decline because more and more people gathered who are, I don't know how to say it, often didn't work and it is just a really difficult area. I mean I don't want to generalize but it is a difficult population that is why it is actually a good development when something happens in this area, that there is an exchange. Yes right, now everyone screams that the rents go up. But that is necessary because there is much to pick up to and it benefits everyone who lives here and who stay here when it is a little mixed, like it is everywhere else. That's why I think this whole discussion is not honest. (Interview #26, property owner, February 2013)

When I upon this statement asked the owners how the composition in their building was today, the answers revealed that they are presently not mixed either:

That is a difficult topic; it is always a gut reaction. I have a mainly artists now, that's just how it is. (Interview #27, property owner, February 2013)

We have never advertised [...] those people who have are new are mostly self-employed but we didn't choose them but you always act on intuition - can you imagine them as tenants or not. And we realized that most of our tenants are self-employed...it suits somehow or it somehow just happened like that. (Interview #26, property owner, February 2013)

Upon my concrete question whether having mostly artists or mostly self-employed people is a "good mix", one of the owners defended her choice:

I mean I just wanted to add, when you say, yes you are right; if there are mostly artists or academics...I think it has nothing to say. I mean I can claim this for us, that we have so many self-employed people that has just happened that was not a rational decision that I target a specific professional group. It is mostly a gut reaction that you think you will get along with these people or the neighbor will get along with them and I think that is where this mixture nevertheless emerges from. I mean social scientists and natural scientists also fight each other in the corridor rather than getting along. (Interview #26, property owner, February 2013)

In the course of the conversations at least one of the property owners became more explicit about what he thought was problematic about Reuterquarter in particular and why the neighborhood in his view will not develop in the form the already gentrified Prenzlauer Berg⁴¹ in East Berlin has:

To come back to the issue of displacement and Prenzlauer Berg, I have my own philosophy, of course. Prenzlauer Berg was very run down but you had something German there. I mean we had a lot of migrants, Turks etc., I mean around 50-60 percent in this district, today not any longer but still a high share and firstly we don't want to terminate their contracts and secondly they don't let themselves be laid off and this problem did Prenzlauer Berg

⁴¹ Prenzlauer Berg is a former working-class locality in the East Berlin borough of Pankow with a very low share of immigrants and often cited as one of the first areas to have gentrified in the city, with an estimated population exchange of 80 percent in some areas (Siebeck et al, 2010: 146). See chapter seven.

not have. I mean let me put it like that, that [Prenzlauer Berg] is today still an island of bliss when you look at the schools with a foreigner's share of one to two percent and here I mean 80 percent. That is why there was this Swabian effect⁴² that people said they want to move there. I mean you are hardly allowed to say it anymore but when the foreigner's share is not so high then these people move in, and there is then the money. (Interview #28, property owner, February 2013)

What is clearly stated here is that "foreigners", "migrants" or "Turks" devalorize property. That their presence poses a barrier for people with capital to move into the neighborhood and that is why Reuterquarter will never have the kind of money "islands of bliss" like Prenzlauer Berg with almost non-existent shares of immigrants, or at least non-existent shares of working-class immigrants have by now. Whether this is true or not is impossible to say at this point. Whether this property owner's views are representative of the majority of Reuterquarter's property owners is equally hard to tell but it surely matches the findings of the numerous nation-wide studies on discrimination in the German housing market (*Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales*, (Office of the Senate for Integration, Work and Social Issues), 2012; Beutke 2013; Gestring, 2013; Auspurg, Hinz and Schmid, 2011).

That Reuterquarter's development will be different than that of Prenzlauer Berg is in any case likely, independent of the share of immigrants,

⁴² He points at the fact that many middle-class people from Southwest Germany (who are often part of a German folk group called Swabians) have moved to Prenzlauer Berg. See chapter seven.

because property owners typically own small shares of housing stock and big capital does not seem have entered the neighborhood for now. However, the property owners I was able to talk to assured me that they constantly get offers from investors, which they have not accepted so far. Whether this ownership structure will continue, or whether investors who buy several blocks at once will enter the game, remains to be seen in the future.

The Meaning of Neighborhood and People as Infrastructure

As mentioned earlier, the American scholar Betancur drew attention in 2011 to the fact that the specific effects of gentrification on different low-income groups are still understudied. In his own attempt to shed light on some of these effects, he argued that, in the case of Chicago, Latinos are more adversely affected by gentrification because they are more dependent on the local infrastructure and networks which have emerged over the years through spatial proximity:

Gentrification may result from supply and demand processes, unmediated by race or class, as market purists allege; or it may be a free choice, a blessing or a natural evolution. These descriptions, however, do not fit the experience of Latinos in Chicago. The cases examined here portray combined class and race/ethnicity dynamics within an uneven playing-field in which an exchange value rich group with options, mobility and ability to profit from rent manipulation clashes with a lower-income community anchored in place due to its high dependency on place-based social fabrics to survive and move up. (Betancur, 2011: 399).

Below I want to make a similar argument regarding Reuterquarter. Because of the widespread problems in Reuterquarter, such as lack of language skills, know-how, discrimination and of course unemployment, immigrant residents of Reuterquarter are frequently relying on informal and formal structures in their surroundings to cope with housing challenges. As for the formal structures, there are several public and semi-public institutions in the neighborhood geared towards the support of Hartz IV recipients and unemployed immigrants in particular. Reuterquarter is, as are many other marginalized neighborhoods across Germany, well-equipped with social institutions of all sorts that help to socially, psychologically and financially manage the lives of immigrants, and in particular, unemployed immigrants in the quarter. Examples are the local neighborhood house, language courses as well as free-of-charge tenant consultancies. There are currently 14 organizations geared towards the need of immigrants at the quarter (*Quartiersmanagement Reuterplatz* (district management Reuterquarter), 2012).

But it not only the structures provided by the state or NGOs that bind immigrants to the neighborhood but also the institutions and networks they have built up themselves such as mosques, Turkish and Arabic cafes and of course the numerous Turkish and Arab-run businesses and services. In other words, to understand what gentrification and the threat of displacement possibly means for immigrants in Neukölln, we have to engage with the question of what the neighborhood means to them and offers them:

Why do they [immigrants] want to stay? Simple, in Neukölln there are many opportunities, there is a mosque a man regularly goes to or an association the wife goes to, there is some sort of social activity. They don't want to leave that, where should they go? It could only be Kreuzberg but that is even more expensive. Neukölln is close to the center and where do they want to send the Turks? To the East, they want to send them to the Eastern side, to Marzahn, to Hellersdorf. Turks will never go there, the right, the rightists are there, no one will send their children there. They have become used to this place for years, their whole circle is here, their friends, the cafes they hang out in the evenings. (Interview #15, Eldem, December 2012)

The fact that the job center frequently advises its clients to move to Marzahn-Hellersdorf in East Berlin, given that it is one of the last boroughs left in Berlin with very moderate rents and relatively numerous social housing stock, is rather tragic and shows how far the job center consultants are from understanding the reality of immigrants in Germany. I have heard several times from immigrant residents that they would do anything but move to the Eastern parts of Berlin, the fear of Nazis and of the protection offered by co-ethnics is enough reason for immigrants in Reuterquarter to decline the offer of moving out. This may be even more valid for female residents, especially if they wear headscarves and are thus easily identifiable as Muslims:

I, for example, don't go to Marzahn when I'm here in Neukölln I'm like 'oohh' [exhales with relief] it is almost like in my country, also in Kreuzberg. After midnight I am afraid to be on the streets elsewhere but here it doesn't matter, when something happens you see a boy, a Turk or an Arab and you immediately know nothing will happen to you as a woman but in other boroughs it's surely different. (Interview #29, Aisha, Arab woman in her 40s, dependent on welfare, December 2012)

While Neukölln is frequently associated with feelings of insecurity among the majority society and more particularly propagated as dangerous space in the media, for Aisha Neukölln this signifies exactly the opposite: a space in which she feels secure from being discriminated or sexually harassed as opposed to Marzahn, infamous for Neo-Nazi activity though much less publicly problematized. What is depicted as foreign and wild in the German media and politics is perceived as secure and familiar. Thought in Lefebvrian terms, Aisha's lived experience is different from the abstraction in the media and by politics. If we were to disregard lived space and remain on the abstract and/or physical level, we would not be able to understand why people, and more particularly immigrants, are willing to live in Reuterquartier beyond reasons of affordability. Accordingly, we would also not understand why people want to stay and how they achieve this (or not). The proximity of co-ethnics and often their relatives in my interviews proved to be an important factor in binding immigrants from Turkey and elsewhere to Reuterquartier, despite rising rents. Welfare-dependent women in particular and more particularly young welfare-dependent mothers may seek help from relatives living nearby and local institutions that are geared at their needs when they experience difficulties. Local neighborhood houses, parents' breakfasts, language courses or knitting classes do not only function as family support or to acquire skills for the job market but also as socializing spaces in which immigrant mothers who often arrived in Germany after their

husbands, have lower language skills and are less mobile, find possibilities to socialize outside of the house, with their children taken care of by someone else. So it is not surprising that I, for example, observed that many mothers who are supposed to pick up their children from elementary school show up one or even two hours before the end of class just to be able to meet with other mothers in the school foyer and chat.

I also frequently became witness to how local formal and informal infrastructure was utilized as a system of support by mothers. One mother told me visiting the neighborhood house and picking up her children from homework-support classes were her only possibilities to get out of the house (Interview #30, Tuba, January 2013). Furthermore, in the local neighborhood house families are given the opportunity to organize birthday parties in exchange for a small fee. This is often demanded by mothers because apartments are simply too small to invite friends and other places are not affordable to them. Given that almost none of the women I spoke to has a driving license or metro card, having everything nearby – relatives, Turkish markets, Turkish-speaking doctors and lawyers, immigrant institutions etc.- proved to be an important factor in providing them with opportunities to go out of the house, get their daily routine done, to meet other women and to get some free time from their children. These infrastructures, besides the fact that there is a Nazi-problem, do simply not exist in Marzahn-Hellersdorf, as

they do not exist in other boroughs that have a low proportion of immigrants.

Similar arguments might be made for the older generation of immigrants, even in cases where they would have the material resources to move out:

We have no other chance than living here. We go out on the streets here 'selam aleykum brother Mehmet' and he says 'aleykum selam'. That is my life energy. I cannot go to Steglitz. I have the financial means, I have the knowledge. I could, for example, look after my garden there beautifully and the living conditions are better but there is no Ayşe, no Mehmet. The Turks won't leave here. The Spaniards, the Greeks they'll go. Our families are here. We won't leave them. Our family ties are strong. I have an acquaintance who retired and they asked him why he doesn't go back to Turkey. He said he gets anxious there, the daughter is not there, the son is not there, no grandchild. They don't go back, that is why we stay as well. (Interview #31, Halil, 70-year-old corner-store owner on Hobrechtstreet, December 2012)

The positive perception of low-income immigrants actually living in and experiencing daily life in Reuterquarter stands as mentioned in stark contrast to the neighborhood's public representation or abstraction. Co-ethnics and the institutions built over decades to cope with problems such as unemployment are valuable assets that provide particularly low-income immigrants with opportunities to cope with everyday life. In that sense even if low-income immigrants are not economically displaced because their rent does not increase, for example, gentrification may still pose a serious challenge to them. Even without physical displacement, gentrification can

still cause considerable harm if the local (migrant/minority) infrastructure begins to erode with the transformation of the neighborhood if, for example, local authorities cut support because the neighborhood is 'doing better' (Atkinson, 2000).

For Reuterquarter, an apt example to describe this infrastructural impoverishment is the fact that now, as the median income in the neighborhood is rising and the median unemployment is decreasing (because the unemployed are displaced and solvent residents are moving in), the local district management is facing closure⁴³. The district management, as described extensively above, has done much to foster the gentrification in Reuterquarter but it is also initiator of important projects such as providing children with the opportunity to build up a healthy relationship with nature by organizing school classes in the forest. Urban Aykal⁴⁴ (Interview #, Urban Aykal, January 2013), an employee at the district management and child of Kurdish immigrants from Turkey, pointed out this problem to me by arguing that because Reuterquarter's image is improving and the median income is rising, the perception among politicians is that the neighborhood does not need that much public support any longer. But the problems for the vast majority of Reuterquarter's inhabitants remain the same. Their living conditions do not improve only because a new winery has opened next door

⁴³ According to the Reuterquarter district management's official website, the district management will end its work by the end of 2016. The goal is to 'stabilize' the structures that have been built up and leave it to residents to continue them from 2017 onwards.

⁴⁴ Real name.

or because the Turkish market is now also selling French cheese. In that sense, gentrification, while enriching the neighborhood by introducing middle class residents, may impoverish a neighborhood in many other respects (Atkinson, 2000).

We must, however, be cautious to accurately understand the problematic at hand. The problem is, as discussed in chapter two, systemic. It is not enough to argue that immigrant-heavy neighborhoods are institutionally impoverished by gentrification, because this would entail only that we should leave these neighborhoods alone and not aim for change. We must also draw attention to the fact that low-income immigrants are dependent on local formal and informal networks and structures *because* their opportunities are limited. Below I want to draw more attention to this ambiguity by discussing the coping strategies of low-income immigrants which often have severe social consequences.

Immigrants' Social Capital as a Way of Coping with Gentrification

While I argue that low-income immigrants are differentially affected by gentrification since they may lack important social assets such as language skills, networks or traits such as assertiveness, this does not mean that they do not possess social capital. As already hinted at above, on the contrary, networks among immigrants may be quite effective in coping with adverse

situations such as gentrification. Given that Reuterquarter for many immigrants is not only their home but also provides them with important infrastructure such as Turkish markets, language courses, support agencies for welfare recipients, NGOs, neighborhood houses and the like, the will among my interviewees to stay in the neighborhood or at least close by was relatively strong. The methods chosen are diverse and can reach from individual efforts such as getting help from relatives to more collective efforts such as seeking help from local institutions. Though ethnicity-based networks can be effective in avoiding displacement, my goal is not to romanticize these efforts. As discussed, these networks often evolve out of necessity and they are not always to the advantage of either side. I want to focus on two strategies here to illustrate this point: informal work and overcrowding.

Informal Work

In cases where unemployed immigrants were faced with rent increases, I always asked them how they managed to stay. One frequent answer was informal work. If the job center does not help, residents help themselves. In 2005 almost half of unemployed immigrants in Berlin with roots in Turkey were engaged in some sort of informal work (Schneider, 2005). This is a contentious issue in German public discourse because immigrant welfare

recipients in particular are often accused of taking advantage of the state because they earn themselves 'extra money'. However, the reason why immigrants are more likely to supplement their unemployment benefits through informal work is that they are typically less qualified for the German job market and face discrimination and thus stay unemployed for longer periods, meaning they have fewer opportunities to legitimate work opportunities. Almost all of my interviewees who were receiving unemployment benefits were either working informally once in a while themselves or their spouses were:

You tell them 'you will not make your own money and we will not support your rent, we will only support you if you move somewhere in the East'. You don't want to go so what do you do? You pay the difference by working illegally; they will try, as simple as that. It's not going to be easy; I mean it will not be easy to get them out. (Interview #15, Eldem, December 2012)

Access to informal job opportunities, is often ensured through co-ethnics:

Here the poor, the lowest tier of society, live and why do they live here? Because, one knows the other, the other knows another and they help each other. You get some social benefit from the state, do you understand? You tell the state 'give me work' but the state says 'no I can't give you work' or says 'well if do this or that, work for one Euro 50 cents'. And you say you would even work for one Euro 50 cents but sometimes you can't even find that because you are in that kind of situation. So if in someone else's house there is something to move or repair then I say 'I know Hassan', and I say 'Hassan go do his work', I mean illegally, without papers, without taxes, without this or that, and you go and do that work and get five Lira out of it to put in your pocket. (Interview #31, Halil, 70-year-old corner-store owner on Hobrechtstreet, December 2012)

On a larger scale, co-ethnics not only help but may also take unfair advantage of one another. As Sanders and Lee (1987) show in respect to Cuban immigrants in Miami, there are clear limits to intra-ethnic solidarity. Ethnic segmentation and economic enclaves do not necessarily and only mean protection but the enhanced mutual trust among co-ethnics can turn into a vehicle of exploitation. A young man whom I met during a weekly meeting of Turkish fathers from the Neukölln borough and who was dependent on Hartz IV, voiced that he could name several businesses with owners from Turkey that used (and in his view, exploited) informal workers. "But what is the solution, should I tell on them?" he asked the crowd, realizing the impasse. The unemployed are often dependent on informal work opportunities if they want to stay in the neighborhood of their choice and are confronted with rent increases, but informal work of course does not make precarization disappear but instead creates new forms of precarization by leaving employees without insurance and protection against exploitation.

Overcrowding

A Turkish social worker at the local neighborhood house who later proved to be one of my key informants pointed me to one particular problem: overcrowding. Most of the families who came to the neighborhood center had young children who could still stay together in one room. Once these

children grew up, so she noted, the problem of displacement would be much more urgent (Interview #32, Melek, December 2013). Overcrowding was actually a more urgent problem after family reunifications, since Berlin at that time (more specifically in the 1980s) was experiencing a housing shortage and guest workers moved out of the barracks and dorms to search for cheap apartments, which were often quite small (Kapphan, 2002; Häussermann und Kapphan, 2000). Many of these families at some time, however, managed to move into more spacious places, mostly around Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding.

Now, with gentrification, we may observe a new phase of overcrowding in Kreuzberg and North Neukölln. Many immigrant families had moved into their (bigger) apartments when they maybe had one or two very young children or babies. The apartments they inhabited were thus more or less apt for them ten years ago. But families grow, children grow and many of the mothers and fathers I met had three, four or even five or six children. And suddenly, in 2012/2013, they found themselves inhabiting two and sometimes even one-bedroom apartments with five people:

I have a thirteen-year-old boy and eight- and two-year-old girls. We came thirteen years ago. It's our first apartment in Germany. It was sufficient back then but now my boy is thirteen wants his own room. We are searching for an apartment. The job center would give 735 EURO, and I say we can make up the difference to 900 EURO but for now we haven't found anything. (Interview #33, Ayşe, dependent on welfare, December 2012)

The job center has a certain prescription as to what constitutes an appropriate space for families of different sizes, such as for example 45 square meters for a single person plus 15 square meters for every extra person in the household, though the exact numbers may differ in different communes, and it has prescriptions for the maximum rent (HARTZ IV Consultation Website, 2015). If the only apartments with an appropriate size and rent left in Berlin are, however, in East Berlin, there will only be a few immigrant families who will move out. If they cannot pay the difference through other means, such as informal work, many will remain in the apartment and overcrowd. In one case a mother of four who had moved from Reuterquarter to the south of Neukölln due to a rent increase told me that they only registered two of their children to get the allowance from the job center to move into the new apartment (Interview #30, Tuba, January 2013).

Overcrowding is a coping strategy to remain in the neighborhood (or close by) but, just as informal work, it is also a strategy that has severe societal consequences. I want to refer to a particularly serious case I learned of in the local neighborhood housing during a pre-Christmas celebration. This story summarizes very well all aspects of how gentrification may affect immigrants in Reuterquarter differently and how it endangers the livelihood of low-income residents in general:

Hatice: My pipes burst. Now we have been wretched for one-and-a-half years. Three kids, five people we are in a one-and-half

room apartment.” (Interview #34, Hatice, dependent on welfare, December 2012)

Ayşe: Oh, it seems I’m still doing fine, two-and-a-half rooms. (Interview #33, Ayşe, dependent on welfare, December 2012)

Defne: How many children do you have?

Ayşe: Three also.

Defne: Where is your new apartment Hatice?

Hatice: In the same building, fifth floor. It’s not my fault that the apartment was flooded. My only fault was that I lived on the first floor.

Defne: But did the owner not fix it?

Hatice: No, we just had cancelled our insurance and were about to start a new one when this happened. So we went to my sister-in-law.

Defne: Where does she live?

Hatice: On the same street, all my relatives are there. She has a big apartment but how long can you stay, that is why we accepted to take the other apartment when it emptied.

Defne: What happened to your old apartment?

Hatice: Germans rented our apartment. Students I think. They didn’t give it back to us because you have signed in for the other apartment.

Defne: Why did you sign?

Hatice: Because I didn’t want to take the risk. It was not clear whether the owner would repair it or not. Let me at least take this smaller apartment I said to myself. Now the building has been sold and the new owner has quickly repaired the damage and they took in new tenants. Our building is like a motel anyway, new people coming in all the time. I even went to the Red Cross and they say I need to move. They say the rents are low in Marzahn but I can’t go. The children grew up here, they went to school here. We were at my sister-in-law’s for one-and-a-half weeks and they [the job center] offered us money for a hotel

and I made a mistake there and declined. I should have told the housing administration from the first evening on but we went out so sudden and went to my sister-in-law. And once we were there we didn't want to go to a hotel. We were fasting, it was Ramadan, a hotel would have been difficult. On top of that, when I moved into the new apartment I was fined by the job center. I was blocked for three months.

Defne: What do you mean blocked?

Hatice: They weren't going to give me any money. Thank God youth services intervened. We got the money back, 1200 Euro, they said you are in a bad situation anyway we shouldn't harm you. The children's psychology was disturbed. They go to therapy but what does it change. I say the problem is that the apartment is too small, if we cannot solve this problem what is therapy for? I don't understand it, they give a lot of money for therapy but if they would give us the opportunity to move into a new house it would be cheaper for the state and the children would be happy too.

Defne: How old are the children?

Hatice: The girl is the youngest, 12 [she was sitting with us]. The boys are 17 and 22. One sleeps early the other late. One gets up to the toilet everyone wakes up. The girl goes to school sleepy and of course her grades are bad. For the Germans it's different.

Defne: But you don't think about moving into another part of the city?

Hatice: Our family relations are close. They don't understand it. We help each other. On the other hand, the fact that there are many Turks here is our refuge. They say you got used to living here so you can get used to live in another neighborhood but we are foreign in this country and at least we have a home here. We can't get out to the surrounding places. Actually it's not good, we are wrong as well. We didn't learn the language; we stayed dependent on this neighborhood. In some sense its desperation.

I wanted to lay out this conversation in this length and detail since it is representative of different dimensions of how gentrification affects low-

income immigrants differently. A lack of know-how on how to deal with housing administrations and the job center (Hatice did not tell the housing administration immediately about the pipe burst, she signed too early for the new and too small apartment and she did not insist that the administration fix the damage, she did not accept to move to a hotel), people as infrastructure/social capital (Hatice immediately moved to her sister-in-law's apartment on the same street, all her relatives live in the same area), an inflexible and punitive welfare state that works against the interest of its clients (and rather pays for Hatice's children's therapy than to allow her to move into a bigger place) and finally overcrowding with severe consequences for the emotional well-being of Hatice's children. Educational failure, school drop-outs and unemployment are almost never contextualized within the issue of gentrification and overcrowding. But we may all ask ourselves how a 12-year-old girl can succeed in school when she has neither room to do her homework nor to sleep properly. That is what we may appropriately call a state-sponsored cycle of poverty.

Discussion

When rents go up and the local clientele transforms, it counts who is able to adapt to the change and who is not. Low-income immigrants and welfare dependent immigrants in particular are naturally more disadvantaged in this

situation. Particularly women, the elderly and first-generation immigrants typically possess fewer and less flexible resources, which makes it more difficult for them to overcome local limitations, because they possess fewer language skills, are less mobile and are often also less assertive compared to their younger (male) counterparts. The transformation of the immediate (walkable) environment here might pose a more existential threat than for other groups in society. Additionally they face discrimination on the housing market.

Gentrification affects low-income immigrants differently but they also have different strategies to deal with increasing rents and enhanced competition in the housing market and these strategies of course differ according to the opportunities these immigrants have at hand. Hartz IV recipients in particular often divert to paying the difference between what the job center offers as rent support and the actual rent by taking on jobs under the tax radar or by remaining in an apartment that is way too small for the number of people in the household. These are arguably coping strategies with severe societal consequences that may create a cycle of exploitation and poverty. The actual rate of population exchange is therefore, as Hackworth (2002: 839) rightly argues, not necessarily a sufficient indicator to evaluate the course of gentrification. Many processes that happen at the neighborhood level, such as informal work or overcrowding, can be harmful to local populations without immediately causing physical displacement. These

micro-level processes must be taken into account when we think about gentrification, given that we really want to know how the process affects local populations beyond physical displacement.

It can thus again be suggested that researchers should take account of lived space, the way a neighborhood is produced and what binds its residents to it and what they are willing and/or able to do to stay. More specifically, this chapter first shows that the effects of gentrification are as complex as are human experiences. It is thus not easy and not always helpful to define gentrification primarily in terms of its most immediate or visible consequences. Gentrification is a class remake where, as Hackworth (2002: 839) puts in some way or the other, “the subordinate class gives way to more affluent users”. How this exactly happens, whether through extensive and immediate physical displacement , for example, or whether some residents manage to stay through entrepreneurial activity or avoid displacement through harmful coping strategies such as overcrowding is for the researcher to unravel. Secondly, the findings in this chapter suggest that the lack of widespread physical displacement does not imply a lack of other forms of emotional displacement and exclusion. Residents may still feel displaced in the face of changing infrastructure, losing control of what is happening around them. Furthermore, diversion to strategies such as overcrowding and informal work, as shown above, perpetuate cycles of poverty and

marginalization leading to a reproduction of social exclusion in the long-term.

CHAPTER 7

COMPARATIVE OUTLOOK: PRENZLAUER BERG

Neil Smith, in his seminal work *The New Urban Frontier Gentrification and the Revanchist City* published in 1996, focuses on the history of gentrification and urban resistance on Manhattan's Lower East Side. However, he attempts to make a more general argument on the basic functioning of the gentrification process that can be applied globally. For this purpose he included a chapter in his book dealing with "generalizations and exceptions" (pp. 163-184) in three European cities – Budapest, Paris and Amsterdam. While the general sentiment among gentrification scholars seems to be that the European experience is much different from the American one (Lees, 1994; Lees and Bondi, 1995; Musterd and Van Weeseep, 1991; Helbrecht, 1996), Smith holds that, despite important particularities, supra-local and cross-national generalizations in gentrification research are possible.

As previously discussed, many strategies that have been applied by the local government to spur gentrification in the quarter, such as the mobilization of civil society and artists, are not reducible to Berlin, Neukölln or Reuterquarter but have been applied in a very similar manner in completely different contexts. Furthermore, the territorial stigmatization and racialization Neukölln residents have been subjected to, lend themselves to

comparison with other stigmatized urban areas that inhabit great shares of racial/ethnic minorities. On the other hand, it is important to draw attention to the particularities of the German and Berlin housing market as well as to cases in which gentrification has proceeded at an almost completely different pace. The latter is the aim of this chapter.

My aim is not to provide a comprehensive comparison following models such as most similar or most different systems designs but rather to offer impetus for future research. The case I am engaging with is a secondary reading of a particular process of gentrification in Berlin: the Prenzlauer Berg locality in the East. The reason I chose to discuss this case through secondary literature is because it is one of the first areas in Berlin to gentrify after reunification. Additionally, Prenzlauer Berg, due to its specific ownership structure, has been one of the most rapidly gentrifying areas in Germany with an estimated population exchange of up to 80 percent (Siebeck et al., 2006: 146). Finally, and most significantly for this study, Prenzlauer Berg had an extremely low share of working-class immigrants before reunification and today still is home to the mostly German middle- and upper class, with a slightly rising share of middle class immigrants from other first-world countries. Accordingly, Prenzlauer Berg provides an interesting case to analyze gentrification in a context in which discourses of ghettoization and ethnic/racial discrimination are practically absent.

This discussion shows that while racist discourses and the discourse of the immigrant ghetto have been crucial in enabling gentrification in Neukölln and Reuterquarter, gentrification is not necessarily a given or related to racism. It is a “class remake” (Smith, 1996: 37) that can happen irrespective of the ethnic/racial composition of the population and is led by economic factors.

The discussion also shows that, at least for Berlin, creatives and sub-cultural lifestyles remain a crucial key correlate of gentrification. Similar to Reuterquarter, artists as well as political activists have become part of the locality’s marketing for investment. However, unlike Reuterquarter, Prenzlauer Berg was already known for its sub-cultural diversity before the gentrification process kicked in. In that sense the process resembles more the gentrification of Kreuzberg, a hub of West German dissent and cultural activity since the 1980s. Furthermore, the interim use agency has not played a role in the process.

Moreover, despite the fact that ethnic or racial identity did not play a role in Prenzlauer Berg’s gentrification, identity did. Since long-term residents are naturally former citizens of the GDR and newcomers are typically from West Germany, particularly from the Swabia region in the southwest, the Otherization of long-term residents by newcomers and vice versa has sometimes been packaged in regional identity. East Germans have frequently been called out for being lazy and state-reliant while the new-

incoming West Germans have been blamed for disregarding the localities' rich working-class and political history. Hence, identitarian thinking sometimes still exists on other levels in the gentrification process, even if old-established residents and newcomers arguably share an ethnic/racial background.

Prenzlauer Berg

Prenzlauer Berg is one of the most thoroughly gentrified areas of Berlin and often taken as the pivotal example of Berlin's neoliberal restructuring with a heavy involvement of the state. The locality of the Pankow borough by the city Berlin is described as the "precursor of all trend-districts" (Capital Berlin Official Website, 2015). Similar to Kreuzberg and Neukölln, it is a historical working-class area with a relatively old housing stock stemming from the turn of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 20th century Prenzlauer Berg was a densely populated area with several families sharing toilets and bathrooms. Under the German Democratic Republic (GDR) the locality became disinvested, leading to out-migration by working-class families who settled into newly built high-rise buildings further east. As was the case for Kreuzberg on the other side of the border, the vacant apartments lured in squatters and Prenzlauer Berg quickly came to be seen as the East German symbol for political dissent and alternative living. It was one of the main

sights for the 1989 protests that eventually culminated in the fall of the wall (Levine, 2004: 92). Today, however, not much of the revolutionary spirit of the former borough, which in 2001 was incorporated into the East German borough Pankow, is left. State-sponsored modernization and a rapid transformation of the ownership structure in the 1990s have changed Prenzlauer Berg from a typical East German working-class borough into an area in which the income and educational level is above Berlin's average (Peters, 2013). In contrast to other currently gentrifying areas in Berlin such as Kreuzberg and Neukölln, Prenzlauer Berg has gentrified much more rapidly and is already home to fewer students, artists or young people who are still at the beginning of their careers and is largely inhabited by middle- and upper-class professionals. Particularly journalists have suggested that the locality has already lost its hip status from ten years ago and is today "is as stiff as its ageing population" (Peters, 2013). Hence, Prenzlauer Berg seems to be a more or less 'finished' product of gentrification, however, since there is no clear end to gentrification, "super-gentrification" (the transformation from middle- to upper class, see Lees, 1994) might be just underway.

The Role of the State

Due to the extent of dis- and reinvestment, Smith's rent-gap theory goes some way in explaining the gentrification of Prenzlauer Berg, however, there

are also important limitations since state-involvement, which fueled but also regulated gentrification, was much more extensive than in the examples we know from American gentrification research (Holm and Bernt, 2005). As was the case Neukölln, reunification gave the right impetus for gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg, which proceeded quite differently from the West German borough. How so? Due to the extent of disinvestment and the ownership structure in Prenzlauer Berg, gentrification in this area happened much faster. While Neukölln was well-populated at the time of reunification, mainly because the numerous guest workers and their families had settled there for good and did not leave with deindustrialization, there was a relatively large number of vacant houses in Prenzlauer Berg in the early 1990s (10-20 percent, see Holm, 2006: 115), some of which were occupied by squatters but easily retrieved from them.

Since the situation in the beginning of the 1990s in Prenzlauer Berg was historically very particular – no developed capitalist housing market, no experience or agreement on ground prices – re-investment did not happen solely through free market sources, which would have allowed for a straightforward use of the Smith's rent gap theory to explain Prenzlauer Berg's gentrification. Prenzlauer Berg marked the end of Germany's and Berlin's careful urban renewal period, discussed in chapter four. Housing that was expropriated in the beginning of the 1990s in the GDR was given back to the original landlords, who suddenly had the opportunity to gain

surplus from their previously unprofitable property. Since they themselves typically did not have the means to modernize, apartments and buildings were quickly re-sold, opening the door to large investment companies who subsequently modernized the acquired housing with subsidies from the state. Sixty percent of the first modernizations conducted between 1992 and 1995 were publicly funded. Andrej Holm (2006), one of the pivotal scholars to conduct a thorough study of Prenzlauer Berg, holds that the area is a perfect example of “roll out neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell, 2007) since the state has been heavily involved in its restructuring:

The renewal of the Berlin district known as Prenzlauer Berg –the largest renewal area in East Berlin– exemplifies this neoliberal turn of urban policy. All of the typical characteristics of urban renewal in the 1990s are visible here. Without the ballast of former policies, the political elite in Berlin was able to introduce and implement new strategies of urban renewal in Prenzlauer Berg after the reunification of Germany. East Berlin became a laboratory for the transformation from socialism to capitalism, as well as for new urban policies. (Holm, 2006: 114)

In this first phase during the early 1990s rents were controlled, largely avoiding displacement. At the end of the 1990s the Berlin Senate gradually pulled out of the borough, modernization activities were left to private stakeholders, though the local government still offered tax reductions to investors. Due to concerted subsidies by the state, a spill-over effect to neighboring parts of Prenzlauer Berg was avoided. During this second period, rents were still controlled but private stakeholders began to circumvent regulations by taking advantage of legal loopholes. The

increasing social polarization of Prenzlauer Berg occurred in this phase since on the one hand displacement started and on the other, long-term tenants (who had lived in the buildings before modernization started) who were rent protected and new tenants who often paid twice as much began to live together in the same buildings.

Presently, Prenzlauer Berg has lost many, though not all, of these long-established tenants. The state has “rolled back” from the area. About 95 percent of the housing stock is owned by private investors (Heebels and Van Aalst, 2010: 354). Modernization is now increasingly privately financed and made profitable through conversion of apartments into single-owner units, which usually necessitates an exchange of population made again possible through legal loopholes and financial incentives given to old tenants to leave their homes (Holm, 2006). Today it is estimated that about 80 percent (Siebeck et al, 2006: 146) of Prenzlauer Berg’s population moved into the area after reunification though there have been urban scholars who argue that this number is estimated too high (Häussermann, 2010).

To date, the gentrification of Prenzlauer Berg has taken a much different trajectory than we can up to now observe in Reuterquarter and its surrounding area. So far the big players of real estate have not entered Reuterquarter, house ownership is relatively fragmented and property owners are reluctant to sell. Thus we should also expect a different pace in

the future though it is almost impossible to tell whether at some point the big players will come into the picture in Reuterquarter as well.

The Role of Arts, Political Dissent and Diversity

In contrast to Kreuzberg or Neukölln, Prenzlauer Berg has never been an ethnically diverse locality, neither before nor after its gentrification.

“Symbolic gentrification” (Lang, 1994: 498), the phase in which a district is marketed to potential pioneers and gentrifiers with the use of certain images and representations, happened without the need for “multiculti” or a charming ghetto fantasy. As stated above, Prenzlauer Berg has a history of political dissent and was the East German counterpart to Kreuzberg’s squatter movement. Since Prenzlauer Berg with its old housing stock was neglected by the GDR regime, it increasingly became home in the 1980s to alternative milieus who found some freedom in the borough to pursue their nonconformist lifestyles. Political authorities did not pay much attention to these activities since they would have stopped, if the wall had not fallen, as soon as the old housing was demolished and replaced by high-rise buildings. This neglect of course had consequences. By the late 1980s Prenzlauer Berg had turned into the main gathering point for adversaries of the SED regime and one of the focal points for the beginning of the countrywide demonstrations that eventually culminated in the fall of the wall. Similarly,

since the 1980s the locality has been home to creative workers, including media stars and independent rock and punk bands. It thus fulfilled important criteria for confirming Richard Florida's "creative class" thesis.

After reunification, Prenzlauer Berg's cultural and political activity continued with the participation of young West Germans, and now, among other things, took the form of a thriving alternative gastronomic industry that popped up in the borough (Häussermann, Holm and Zunzer, 2002). The locality was now considered to be Berlin's "most creative neighborhood" (Van Heerden and Bontje, 2014: 466) and while West German creatives and students had largely been 'confined' to Kreuzberg before the fall of the wall, Prenzlauer Berg now provided an attractive and, at that point, cheap alternative.

By the mid-1990s, Prenzlauer Berg, similar to Kreuzberg, had become stage to large Mayday demonstrations that were also reactions against gentrification and accompanied by strong police presence (Häussermann, 2004: 51-52). This pre- and post-reunification history of dissent has ironically become part of the gentrification process. Dissent is commodified and becomes symbolic capital that eventually transforms into economic surplus Holm (2013: 33-36). While political authorities, through a strong presence of the police and measures such as ID controls, re-established control over Prenzlauer Berg, its image as a space of alternative culture and leftist political activism fueled into the already-started gentrification process. And as is the

case for Reuterquarter and its new unofficial name 'Kreuzkölln', Prenzlauer Berg was by the end of the 1990s increasingly and diminutively referred to as 'Prenzlberg'.

The state-led transformation described above eventually led to an extensive displacement of exactly those parts of the Prenzlauer Berg population that had once made the district so charming to others. The local daily *Berliner Morgenpost* in this context sarcastically stated:

Mayday outrage? All over. One complains in written form in composed words. That shows: the times of Mayday outrage and bloody Walpurgis nights [night from 30st April to 1st May] is long over. Prenzlberg are now those who have an above-average income. Multiculti and tolerant and wanting to be all but white-bread. In Prenzlauer Berg about as many foreigners live as under-18-year-olds. Most of them, however, have French citizenship or Italian or US American or British, 'G-8-foreigners'. In this way one can feel tolerant without having to overcome huge cultural differences. (Kesse, 2008, translation mine)

In Prenzlauer Berg's case, creative workers and political activists were thus once again key correlates of gentrification. They unintentionally helped to market the area, though they have certainly not caused gentrification. This process has, however, been more akin to what happened in Kreuzberg than to what happened in Neukölln. While Reuterquarter did have an artist network and some creative initiatives before the interim use agency intervened, the borough was not widely known for being a creative hub, while Kreuzberg had been known as such since the 1980s. This shows that even without direct state-involvement such as the commissioning of an

interim use agency, creatives can be instrumentalized in gentrification, making it very difficult to generate fruitful protest. Holm (2013: 34-35) in this respect argues that not only in Berlin but in cities such as Amsterdam or Hamburg, local governments have been actively engaged in legalizing the occupation of individual houses by squatters and subsidizing artists in the occupied buildings by helping them to find living/working space. In this way the “symbolic surplus that self-organization and collectivity generate is absorbed without a loss of control over property” (Holm, 2013: 34).

The Role of Fast Policies

Though Prenzlauer Berg is arguably part of Berlin’s creative city strategy, it was not subject to creative city policies in the way Reuterquarter was. The interim use agency was not active in the area – probably because during the time this idea emerged, in 2005, central quarters of the locality had already been taken out of “intensive district management” programs and activities were reduced to resident-initiatives. Furthermore, as discussed above, Prenzlauer Berg was already considered to be a creative space. Accordingly, locality has currently no district management (*Quartiersmanagement Berlin*, 2015).

However, there were several quarters in Prenzlauer Berg that were targeted by the Socially Integrative City program and had district

managements in the past. One of the quarters within Prenzlauer Berg that deserves particular attention is the area around Helmholtzsquare, which was part of the program until 2008 (with a reduction of activities between 2005 and 2008). Helmholtzsquare used to be a gathering point for alcoholics, the homeless and punks during the period of disinvestment. The district management started a project whose proclaimed goal it was to re-gain the square for residential use in cooperation with the local population. Holm (2001) argues that what was hidden under the cooperative and citizen-friendly language was a form of “careful displacement” and “valorization through exclusion”. Without direct confrontation the square was increasingly regulated through a prohibition of alcohol, noise and unleashed dogs, enforced through police-patrols to ensure that undesired segments of the population would give up the square. Non-conformists were among those threatened with social benefit sanctions. But not only were punitive measures enforced, drinkers’ spatial use was also regulated by commissioning social workers to move their programs targeting the clientele to somewhere outside the square.

This is akin to what we can observe in gentrifying neighborhoods like Reuterquarter and the application of fast policies (Peck, 2005). Community discourses are utilized for boosting economic growth and private and public policing plays a crucial role in this process. Notions of empowerment are coupled with sanctions for non-compliance. The marginalized in this context

are not immigrants or their children, as it has been mostly in Reuterquarter, but mostly unemployed non-immigrant Germans, more particularly the homeless population and/or alcoholics. Neighborhoods are “whitewashed” as the self-proclaimed “urban catalyst” Overmeyer (2005) puts it, and prepared for the middle class through working-class expulsion from cityscapes. We may therefore argue that the utilization of community – in this case with the help of social workers – and the employment of security measures is a general pattern that lends itself to intra- and international comparison.

Racialization without Races? The “Ossi”–“Wessi” Conflict in Prenzlauer Berg

In terms of its history, Prenzlauer Berg shows similarities to Kreuzberg and North Neukölln, whose alternative charm, coupled with cultural diversity has become a major part of its brand. Since Prenzlauer Berg is not an immigrant-heavy locality, it is a good example of how gentrification proceeds without prior discourses of ethnic ghettoization. Nevertheless, identity has played a role. There has been an Otherization of long-term residents by newcomers and vice versa that was packaged in regional identity. Long-term inhabitants are naturally East Germans, in Germany often called “Ossis”, and newcomers are majority West Germans, often referred to as “Wessis”. They are typically not from West Berlin and often

from the wealthier southwest of the country known as Swabia⁴⁵. These regional contrasts have led to less obvious forms of spatial “culturalization” in Prenzlauer Berg. So has the resistance against gentrification often taken the form of outrage against Swabians (see Figure 17). Wikipedia even has an entry on “Swabian-hate”, referring to a sentiment in East Germany that has led to widespread discussions in the media and politics. In early 2013 a Twitter user even called out to organize a “Swabians-Out” protest in Prenzlauer Berg which, however, eventually did not take place (*Berlin Kurier*, 2013).



Figure 17 “Swabians out” – graffiti in Prenzlauer Berg.

Source: *Preussische Allgemeine*.

⁴⁵ While “Ossis” and “Wessis” are not ethnic groups, though are often treated as if they were. Swabians are a specific ethnic German people who have roots in the states of Baden-Württemberg and parts of Bavaria.

On the other hand, particularly in the 1990s and now more less so, there has been a general racialization of “Ossis” and “Wessis” in which the respective populations have been perceived as relatively clear-cut categories of people with different memories and cultures. Within this discourse of “Ossis” and “Wessis”, the latter often established superiority, and similar to immigrants from other countries, “Ossis” were seen as burden to the thriving German economy soon after reunification. Frequently, East Germans’ will to work was called into question (Huysen, 1995). In the context of Prenzlauer Berg, East Berliners complaining about gentrification have often been described as “yammer-Ossis” (Preissler, 2010), implying that they would just have to take responsibility for their individual fate instead of relying on the state (as they allegedly used to do in the GDR).

Despite this clear tension it should not be forgotten that much of this hostility was accompanied by an influential discourse of East and West Germans being one folk. Hence, despite tendencies of Otherization between so-called “Ossis” and “Wessis”, much of the intra-German tensions in the 1990s have been projected onto non-Germans as ultimate Others (Pinkert, 2002). Thus, despite less obvious forms of regional xenophobia in which groups of people who are mainly distinguished by class (again, not all newcomers are of course Swabians) have been essentialized according to some imagined cultural or historical attributes, there have been calls by German politicians taking sides with the long-term residents of Prenzlauer

Berg, calling on Swabians to “integrate” themselves into East Berlin (Thierse, cited in *Merkur Online*, 2012), a call which so far has not been issued for Kreuzberg or Neukölln, where the call to “integrate” is still and continuously directed to “non-German” immigrants, even if they have been in a neighborhood much longer than some of the non-immigrant newcomers.

Accordingly, it would be far-fetched and over-ambitious to claim that the hostility towards “Ossis” is anywhere near the discrimination and racism working-class immigrants experience in Germany or that the levels of territorial stigmatization are comparable. My aim was rather to show that ‘identity issues’ can pervade the gentrification process in different localities, even without other- and self-ascribed ethnic/racial difference. Class conflict is diffused here because class attributes are equalized with certain cultural or historical identities.

Discussion

Gentrification does not take one specific form but runs at different paces and can happen in neighborhoods with different preconditions. It is not easy to foresee what the ultimate outcome of gentrification will be and what the effects are on the local level will be if we do not engage in micro-analysis. In the case of Prenzlauer Berg we can see how factors such as ownership

structure, state involvement, the rate of vacancy and the involvement of big investors can pace or accelerate the gentrification process.

Furthermore, it shows how other creative workers, particularly in the case of Berlin artists, and people marked to represent 'alternative' lifestyles have played a key role in fueling gentrification. Without denying the agency of these actors it is crucial to note that they are not the reason gentrification is happening. It rather shows how, under advanced capitalism and the employment of advanced neoliberal urban policies, even subversive activities can be abstracted, commodified and rendered exchangeable on the free market. And as is the case in boroughs like Neukölln, these groups' activities are only desirable in so far as they contribute to economic growth, undesired behavior that diverts from middle class norms is easily regulated through punitive measures or with softer strategies and with the help of civil society.

The Prenzlauer Berg case also reminds us that gentrification per se has nothing to do with racism, but is a structural process in which the only necessary condition is the restructuring of a given area for middle and/or upper class use. This area can be wasteland or it can be densely populated by groups in society which have different vulnerabilities to the gentrification process. However, it is crucial to see that neoliberalism is heavily intertwined with identitarian thinking and categorizations. The racialization and/or culturalization of socio-economically weak social groups is thus not limited

to individuals who actually self- and other-identify as belonging to an ethnic or racial minority, but includes members of the majority society.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Summary of Research Findings

This thesis has explored the interrelated processes of gentrification and the social exclusion of immigrants from Turkey in reference to the Berlin neighborhood Reuterquater in Neukölln. I had two empirical concerns: first to find answer to why and how Reuterquater is gentrifying and secondly what the effects on the local population are, more specifically on immigrants from Turkey and their families. To answer these questions I employed Henri Lefebvre's sociology of space (1994, 2003) as theoretical lens. I have suggested that Lefebvre's unitary approach to space is an appropriate way to deal with the economic and cultural dimensions of the gentrification process while remaining within a Marxist framework. In this sense I have posited, following Lefebvre, that gentrification is a class remake that cannot be reduced to middle class habitus as David Ley (1987) and others have suggested but whose primary actors have to be identified on the global level, i.e. capital actors including national and international investors, real estate agents, mass media and last but not least the state. All of these actors are

involved in producing collective demand for inner-city living. I have particularly emphasized Lefebvre's distinction between abstract and lived space, arguing that gentrification is the result of an abstract, non-dialectical reading of space by powerful groups on the global level that disregards local histories and experiences (and is thus a domination of lived space by abstract, market-oriented abstractions). I have employed Lefebvre's approach and related it to the work of other urban scholars such as Neil Smith (1979, 1996 and 2002), Sharon Zukin (1982, 1987, 2008 and 2010) and Jamie Peck (2005) because it gives us a clearer understanding of how capital and culture are connected.

How so? Throughout this thesis I have described how local authorities and the media during the 1990s and 2000s were heavily engaged in stigmatizing Reuterquarter and presenting it as an inner city emergency zone in need of intervention. I have shown how discourses of the immigrant/Turkish ghetto have worked as an abstracting force with severe consequences for the local population, such as the de-valuation of their educational capital, as the Rütli incident discussed in chapter five shows. To make sense of how this de-valuation is connected to gentrification, I have suggested that Neil Smith's (1996) argument on the "urban frontier" and "urban revanchism" comes in handy. Smith has posited that gentrification can be understood as a process in which areas of the city which have previously been declared dangerous and degenerate are (re-)taken by the

“white” or de-racialized middle class. Reading Smith alongside Lefebvre, I have suggested that the construction of an urban frontier can be understood as a form of abstraction in which stigmatizing categorizations are imposed on neighborhoods and their residents without taking regard of the voices and experiences of those who are negatively marked. The discourse of the ghetto is particularly poignant here because it involves a racialization of poverty and thus provides us with an understanding of how racism, such as discrimination on the housing market or the exclusion of immigrant children from educational resources, is connected to gentrification. In Reuterquarter structural constraints such as access and affordability in the defining phase of guest worker settlement during the 1960s until the 1990s as well as the rise of racist violence in the early 1990s, have been among the reasons why low-income immigrants from Turkey are relatively numerous in that particular neighborhood (as discussed in chapter three). This relatively higher proportion, coupled with weak socio-economic indicators, such as unemployment has fueled perceptions and propagations of Reuterquarter as problematic zone or more particularly as ghetto. The remedy has, however, not been sought in challenging systemic inequality but in the employment of “revanchist” (Smith, 1996) strategies. Smith has argued that revanchism entails a backlash on the urban poor and attempts to (re-)take the spaces they inhabit for surplus accumulation (while a necessary condition is that these spaces are profitable), often directly targeting ethnic/racial minorities. In this

sense abstract readings of spaces such as Reuterquarter, through their stigmatization as ghettos, can lead to justifications for interventions that aim at diffusing local populations deemed to be problematic, in this case immigrants from Turkey in particular and Muslim immigrants in general. Referring to Jamie Peck (2005), I have further suggested that neoliberal urban policies do not only frequently take the form of revanchism but that they are “fast” as well. Peck has put forward that, under advanced neoliberalism, governments are likely to transfer urban policies from other national contexts, in which they have already been put into practice, disregarding local specificities. Hence they are fast travelling.

Against this backdrop, I have explained the role revanchist and fast urban policies have played in directing and perpetuating gentrification of Reuterquarter (chapter five). I have shown that urban policies’ relationship to gentrification is not always as direct as in cases where the state engages in outright destruction of working-class neighborhoods (see for example Goetz (2011), the demolition of housing projects mostly inhabited by African-Americans in Chicago or New Orleans, or Uysal (2012) on Istanbul’s Sulukule neighborhood). The German state in this case has taken on a more ambiguous role: the German housing market is still relatively regulated, and even while writing this dissertation new propositions have been made to stop excessive and arbitrary rent increase. This is also thanks to the politically conscious housing activists and urban scholars, whose efforts I

could not discuss here but who constantly pressure the government to tame gentrification. This does not, however, mean that politics had no part to play in Reuterquarter's transformation: Berlin after reunification has been subject to series of urban restructuring measures, often undertaken in private-public partnership (chapter four). These policies have aimed at and contributed to the gentrification Berlin's inner city, which is the area in which – due to reasons discussed in chapter three – the larger part of the low-income immigrant population lives. I have laid particular focus on two complementary policies, both of which circle around the notion of community or “governance beyond the state” (Swyngedouw, 2005): firstly the creative city policy, which is a policy that relies on the symbolic inclusion of alternative and often subordinate groups in society, such as artists, ethnic/racial and sexual minorities. The creative city is promoted through tolerance for these groups, however, without challenging their structural disadvantages. Immigrant-heavy boroughs such as Kreuzberg and Neukölln have taken on an important spot in this marketing. For Reuterquarter I have shown how the creative city strategy as it has been developed by scholars such as Richard Florida (2002) has served as direct reference for ‘developing’ the quarter by renting out vacant spaces to artists, or as they are officially called “urban pioneers”, who are expected to prepare the neighborhood for further investment. The publicly funded local district management has commissioned a quasi-real estate agency with pursuing this goal. This policy

is “fast” (Peck, 2005) because it is again built on abstract categorizations in which the clustering of immigrants is perceived as a problem without identifying the socio-economic factors that have led to this development and without enhancing an understanding of why class and race/ethnicity often overlap. It is also “fast” because it has been quite uncritically adapted from other national contexts, similar urban policies that attempt to lure in the “creative class” have earlier been explored in cities such as New York and London. Though the creative city strategy seems to be a softer and more inclusive approach, I have taken the viewpoint that is a revanchist strategy, albeit one that is relatively more advanced and opaque in that it avoids immediate confrontation (Lawton, 2014).

Secondly, I have discussed the enhancement of punitive measures in the form of an increased regulation of the unemployed population through workfare measures and surveillance of marginalized groups, particularly male immigrant youth, through private and public policing. These punitive measures are conceptualized as another revanchist fast policy. As discussed in chapter four, the city of Berlin has not cut down on but has increased inner city securitization and has particularly targeted male immigrant youth while continuing to be presented as a multicultural world city. As Eick (2003, 2006) shows, this securitization is often implemented with the help of non-profits who are commissioned by the local job centers and re-integrate immigrant young adults into the job market by employing them as private security

guards. In this sense, they are commissioned to expel their own social group from public spaces. Today in Reuterquarter we can observe this development in front of local schools, local markets and public squares.

I have made sense of these seemingly contradictory policies, which are simultaneously inclusive (tolerance for outsiders etc.) and exclusive (regulation through surveillance, punishment and expulsion) by referring among others to Sharon Zukin's (1982, 2008 and 2010) and David Harvey's (1990a and 1990b) work on the commodification of culture. With the shift from the industrial to the service economy in the neoliberal era, ideas, images and ways of life have become commodifiable, sellable and consumable on the world market. Harvey (1990a) has argued that within this process a worship of heterogeneity has emerged in advanced capitalist economies, in which mass consumption is rejected in favor of distinction from mainstream norms. Performing difference or distinction from social norms, among other things, is realized through the consumption of the lifestyles (and cultures) 'alternative' groups produce, such as ethnic/racial minorities (Zukin, 2008: 724). Neighborhoods that are marked to represent these alternative lives accordingly become attractive destinations for all those who display the demand to be different, making previously stigmatized neighborhoods prone to gentrification. However, while these discourses may contribute to some sort of social and cultural change of mentality among the wider public, they do not challenge and often even disguise persistent structural

inequalities. So it is not surprising that, inclusionary and exclusionary strategies are implemented simultaneously.

The above reiterated ambiguities show that neoliberal governance in cities is complex. Inclusion and exclusion are in delicate balance. Gentrification not always proceeds in a straightforward manner and actors are not easily identified. Instead, researchers should be aware of how discourses of decline, the marketing of diversity, revanchist and fast policy interventions and gentrification are related and mind that there is not always a bulldozer involved.

But the reasons and ways in which gentrification happens are complex, and so are its effects, which brings me to my second question, namely, what consequences the gentrification of Reuterquarter has on its residents, particularly on immigrants from Turkey. Based on four months of fieldwork, 80 semi-structured interviews and observation, I have concluded that gentrification can bring about different forms of exclusion which can be different if long-term inhabitants are also part of an ethnic/racial minority. I have discussed this with respect to the different groups in Reuterquarter, including artists and civil society, small business entrepreneurs and working class/unemployed long-term inhabitants. All of these groups are confronted with different restraints and possibilities. Artists and civil society actors have been mobilized with the help of public funds to ameliorate living conditions in Reuterquarter but are now themselves frequently under rent pressure,

feeling instrumentalized by the interim use agency and local politics.

Entrepreneurs may have the opportunity to adapt their businesses to middle class demands, as a result. However, they tend to exclude lower-income residents and often remain excluded themselves because they are not in control of the transformation of Reuterquarter. Moreover, their perceptions of the gentrification process shows that foregoing and continuing discourses of ghettoization and the multicultural Berlin have contributed to their conceptualization of gentrification, not only as class but also as ethnic/racial remake. This shows that, in cases where long-term residents and newcomers are perceived to belong to different ethnic/racial groups, group animosity is likely to emerge. Last but not least, the study shows that some of the low-income immigrant residents in Reuterquarter, who have the least space for maneuvering in a gentrifying neighborhood, have chosen to divert to methods such as overcrowding and informal work, which in turn have severe social consequences and reproduce poverty and exclusion. These results show that researchers must really grasp what a neighborhood means to its inhabitants, which is only possible through a methodology that includes the views of the local population. Particularly in countries with strong welfare traditions and relatively regulated housing markets such as Germany, the detrimental effects of gentrification are not easily detected. A research design that takes into account the perceptions and coping strategies

of residents, i.e. the lived space, can help to uncover more complex and subtle forms of exclusion.

In an additional chapter I have added a comparative outlook, taking the Prenzlauer Berg locality in East Berlin as an example. This comparison does not include an evaluation of lived space, i.e. the experiences of residents but remains on the abstract level and thus rather serves to show that gentrification is a highly path-dependent process that takes different trajectories depending on preconditions such as vacancy, ownership structure, social composition and political climate. This tentative comparison suggests that some patterns are repetitive. As has been the case for Reuterquarter and for Kreuzberg before, we can see in Prenzlauer Berg that artists, creative workers and political activists have been a “key correlate” (Hackworth and Smith, 2001: 467) of gentrification. Their subcultural activities are commodified for the purpose of marketing Berlin as an on the fringe and alternative city that sets itself apart from its more established Western European counterparts. This commodification on the other hand, makes it difficult for gentrification opponents to effectively challenge the process without falling into the trap of unintentionally contributing to it. The comparison with Prenzlauer Berg also shows that gentrification is a class remake that can victimize the entire working-class without being accompanied by racist ghetto discourses, given that the neighborhood has almost no immigrant populations. On the other hand, it also shows how

identitarian thinking may work through alternative categories, in this case through the “Ossi”-“Wessi” discourse. It is thus suggested that researchers of gentrification should look at how class conflict is diffused through identity-categories inhibiting effective resistance by creating divisions among the working-class. I will conclude this study by promoting some of the possible trajectories future research on Reuterquarter and similar neighborhoods could take.

Future Research

I have already indicated in the introduction that there are obvious limits to this study. The most significant limit is that this is not a comparative work. For future research, however, comparative work would be helpful to uncover similarities and differences with other gentrifying (or not gentrifying neighborhoods). I have focused on three forms of comparison that could provide a fruitful research agenda:

First, inner-German research could be conducted to unravel patterns of gentrification in the German case. Since local and regional politics are quite strong in Germany, given that it is a federal state, it would be interesting to see what the effects of local difference are on gentrification while there is a simultaneous tendency of global neoliberalization. In this context it would also be important to compare cases like Reuterquarter with

other gentrifying immigrant-heavy neighborhoods such as Wilhelmsburg and Altona in Hamburg or Ehrenfeld in Köln or immigrant-heavy areas that are not gentrifying such as Marxloh in Duisburg.

Secondly, an inner-European comparison would contribute to the proliferation of European gentrification studies since the field is still dominated by North American research. Here it would, for example, be crucial to compare Germany with other states with strong welfare traditions such as The Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries to work out what trajectory neoliberal restructuring in cities takes when in interplay with welfare institutions.

Thirdly, a comparison with cities in the United States would be a challenging but worthy effort. Though Germany's institutional history differs considerably from that of the US, this comparison would help to answer the question whether, in Lefebvre's (1994) words, "the global level" (i.e. the world-wide implementation of advanced neoliberal policies) leads to some sort of homogenization. Furthermore, it would uncover how revanchist and fast policies such as the creative city policy take different paths and create different and often unexpected effects in different contexts.

All of these comparative studies would necessitate a high level of resources and particularly if several cases are included, research by a research team should be more feasible than a study conducted by a single researcher.

APPENDIX A

ORIGINAL INTERVIEW TEXTS

Interview #1, Kübra: Eskiden ya, U7, U8'a binmezdi bile Almanlar. U8'de Alex'den sonra bir biz bir de Junky'ler kalırdı. Hele Kotti'ye kadar kimse kalmazdı. Jetzt wird am Kotti nur noch Englisch und Spanisch gesprochen. [...]Was war denn ausschlaggebend das es hier so geworden ist und nur eine Art von Menschen, diese Szene-Menschen plötzlich hier sind. (cited p. 149)

Interview #2, social worker: Politik propagiert eine Mischung, ich denke was da propagiert wird das sollte man immer an den konkreten Massnahmen messen und die sind nicht auf eine Mischung aus. Wenn ich die Massnahmen bewerten soll, ich jetzt als Bürgerin dann kann ich nur sagen die Ergebnisse werden nicht Vermischung sein. Ich benutz jetzt mal das Wort, die Ergebnisse werden Segregation sein [...] Also ich glaube wie gesagt, das die Veränderungen in Neukölln zu einem ganz grossen Teil politisch auch gewollt sind. Als Bürgerin von Neukölln kann ich das zum Teil auch sehen. (cited on pp. 170-171)

Interview #3, Stefanie Raab: Wir haben dann 2007, mitte 2007 gesagt wir müssen mit dem Leerstandsmanagement hier im Reuterkiez aufhören, weil es beginnt ein Prozess das die Immobilienwirtschaft merkt das man jetzt Kreuzkölln sagen könnte, das man die Mieten anheben könnte und ausserdem beschaffen die sich jetzt selber ihre Räume im Erdgeschoss Stück für Stück. Also die zweite Hälfte, die sollte die Immobilienwirtschaft auch bitte tunlichst selber tun, weil unsere Aufgabe als Verwender von öffentlichen Geldern ist es immer nur dann Prozesse zu initiieren wenn die nicht eigenständig anfangen. Und wir haben gemerkt die Immobilienwirtschaft hat gelernt und profitiert, dann soll sies auch selber machen. (cited on p. 182)

Interview #4, Dora: [...] dann kam die Zwischennutzungsagentur und was ich da etwas problematisch finde ist war, finde ich das sie eben schon eher wie Makler aufgetreten sind, weil die Mieten die die Leute da gezahlt haben trotz Zwischenutzungsagentur waren trotzdem sehr hoch. Das war einfach nicht ok. Die Vermittlung nach aussen war aber 'Leute, kommt nach Neukölln hier gibts Läden umsonst'. Das wurde aus meiner Sicht wurde sehr viel Öffentlichkeitsarbeit gemacht fürs Quartier aber letztendlich ist es ja nicht in Erfüllung gegangen weil die meisten aus der Kreativwirtschaft die haben

wieder zugemacht. Es gab Leute die sind mit ihren Läden nach Mitte gegangen weil es da billiger ist und sie mehr Kunden haben. Man verdient hier kein Geld. Es ist eine schräge Situation, einerseits steigen die Mieten weil die Strassen so hübsch sind, auf der anderen Seite ist es eben keine win-win Situation. (cited on p. 191)

Interview #5, Ulrike: Ich hab mich früher, egal wie wenig Geld ich hatte, ich hab mich immer sicher gefühlt, ich wusste ich kann meine Miete immer, immer, immer bezahlen, immer. Noch kann ich sie auch bezahlen aber das Gefühl wird wackelig. Also ich krieg mit was um mich rum passiert, ich weiss nicht was passiert wenn Frau Rösner irgendwann stirbt die ist über 90. Ich hab hier zwei Sachen einmal meinen Laden und meine Wohnung, ich finde das sehr schlimm was mit den Mieten passiert und ich finde auch schlimm was mit den Leuten passiert. Die müssen abhauen, die werden verdrängt. (cited on p. 192)

Interview #6, Andrea: Naja, ich find schwierig irgendwo weil ich glaube die Veränderung die wir jetzt gerade hier im Moment in diesem Gebiet haben, die wäre so nicht gestartet ohne das Quartiersmanagement, also das ist jetzt nicht eine Schuldzuweisung sondern einfach wie, wie ich das beobachtet habe und ich das verstehe. Also es gab unter anderem die Zwischenutzungsagentur und die schreibt sich auch gerne viel auf ihre Fahnen was gar nicht ihres ist, das ist deren Publicity dann, das war irgendwann ein Selbstläufer irgendwann kam die Idee 'aha das kann man so und so mit den Vermietern machen' und haben es dann selber probiert und da haben die dann oft gesagt das waren sie, aber wenn man dann so ein bisschen den Kiez kennt und die Leute kennt dann weiss man, ok die Läden da haben die Leute sich selber gemietet, da haben die eigentlich gar nichts mit dran gemacht und das ist irgendwann so ein Ding ohne Ende gewesen. Irgendwann hat auch irgendjemand von der Zwischennutzungsagentur gesagt 'ja also mehr Gastronomie brauchen wir jetzt nicht', als hätten die da irgendeinen Einfluss drauf, als könnten die irgendwas steuern, also so lächerlich irgendwie, ja weil Leute so läuft es wenn die Vermieter sagen 'ok mir doch egal, da kommt jetzt noch ein Restaurant oder noch eine Bar hin' dann machen die das irgendwo und wenn die das nicht wollen dann machen die das, da kam dann die Zwischenutzungsagentur überhaupt nichts dran drehen. (cited on pp. 194-195)

Interview #6, Andrea: Neuanpflanzen von Strassenbäumen, keine Ahnung was wir über die Jahre noch alles gemacht haben. Da hat irgendwie niemand wirtschaftlich davon profitiert [...] Und dann kommt der Effekt wunderbar, 'aha jetzt kommen andere Leute profitieren auch davon', das ist erstmal grundsätzlich auch ok, was aber nicht ok ist wenn man denkt die kommen und ich muss gehen. (cited on p. 195)

Interview #7, Alkan: Burada değişimi görüyorsun. Ne kadar çok Alman var. Burası Vorzeigeprojekt, görüyorsun herkes geliyor, ama işte bir yandan da, yani arkadan da vuruyorlar. (cited on p. 197)

Interview #8, Rainer Perske: Ich hatte einen wirtschaftlichen Fokus, der Markt kann nur funktionieren wenn er in sich funktioniert. Super, tolles Erlebnis und so weiter aber wenn er nicht wirtschaftlich funktioniert, bringt es nichts. Ok, dann hab ich mir angeguckt was war, ok gegenüber das Paul-Linke Ufer, ideale Lage. Das ist die Gegend wo relativ gut situierte Leute sitzen, aber nicht zu 80 Prozent Türkisch-Arabischer Herkunft. Und wenn man dann auf den Markt sieht, dass 80 Prozent Türkisch-Arabischer Herkunft sind von der Kundschaft aber das, dass Umfeld inzwischen nahezu umgekehrt ist, also der Markt passt nicht zum Umfeld. (cited on p. 205)

Interview #8, Rainer Perske: Ich finde es nicht nur positiv besetzt, Türkenmarkt, in Verbindung mit billig, dann ist Türkenmarkt meiner Meinung nach die falsche Richtung zum Marketing. Bio und dann oriental, obwohl da hab ich mir schon wieder anhören müssen das ist rassistisch, das ist dann keine ethnische Bezeichnung mehr, sondern das ist eine geographische. Der Untertitel 'märchanhaft einkaufen', klar kann man sich drüber streiten. Was wichtig ist, das es signalisiert 'woanders her', also wie spreche ich den Leute an? Qualität von wo anders. (cited on pp. 205-206)

Interview #8, Rainer Perske: Und dann hab ich mir das angeguckt und es gab zum Beispiel ganz banal kein Schwarzbrot, ganz einfache Sachen natürlich auch kein Schweinefleisch, natürlich nicht, aber ist auch ok. Es gab ausser Feta, ausser Schafs- und Ziegenkäse nichts anderes an Käse. Beim Gemüse, also ein Türkisch-Arabischer Gemüsestand unterscheidet sich ganz klar vom Deutschen, also nehm wa mal Deutsch, also sagen wir mal international [...] Also das ist so klassisch, also so krass der Unterschied, Türkisch-Arabischer Gemüsehändler haben zum Beispiel zehn Sorten oder Produkte die sie anbieten, der Deutsche, oder ein internationaler hat fast hundert auf der gleichen Fläche. (cited on pp. 209-210)

Interview #9, Mehmet: Turistler ve Almanlar biraz daha fazla ödemeye hazırlar kalite varsa. Türkler hep pazarlık yapmak istiyor, kaliteye önem vermiyorlar. (cited on p. 208)

Interview #10, Aykut: Der hat 150 Meter vom Markt kleiner machen müssen, Fahrzeuge dürfen nicht mehr reinfahren. All die Obst- und Gemüsehändler leben von den Fahrzeugen die reinfahren. Ein Imbissbudenbesitzer der fährt rein kauft beim ihm kistenweise sein Obst, sein Gemüse für sein Geschäft, für sein Restaurant und dann fährt er raus. Haben alle Obst-, Gemüsehändler 30 Prozent ihrer Umsätze eingebüsst. Das ist nicht Sinn der Sache. Es reicht

nicht das ein Markt hip ist, du klaust den Leuten das Brot. Was bleibt denn? Er fühlt sich bestätigt, ich war eine Woche weg bin dann zurückgekommen. Da kommt ein Mitarbeiter und sagt der lässt mich nicht rein. Dieser Mensch, der Perske, der denkt das er hier einen schönen Markt hat, er bedient sich an Proleten. Das was der Kiez abwirft, seine Securityfirma. (cited on pp. 212-213)

Interview #10, Aykut: Jetzt kommt der Deutsche. Der Türke am Käsestand, wenn der am Käsestand steht sagt der ich möchte zwei Kilo von dem und vier kilo von dem. Jetzt kommt der Tourist oder der Deutsche Kunde 'ja Hundert Gramm von dem und Hundert Gramm von dem und ne Spitze von dem'. Was verdient der? Was verdient der Mann noch? Sein Stand ist kleiner geworden und der Kunde bestellt nich mal en Kilo, der Kunde bestellt Hundert Gramm. Aber das ist dem Perske egal. (cited on p. 213)

Interview #10, Aykut: Multikulti. Multikulti. Die Grüne Politik, Multikulti. Multikulti blablabla. Wenn du aus eine Bayrischen Dorf von deinem Millionärspapa nach Berlin willst, ich leb im Kiez, ich lebe unterm Volk, ja? Und dir deine Bude bezahlen lässt, da mal ein Bierchen trinken gehst und da mit Freunden feiern gehst, diese Patygesellschaft. Und dann gibt es Leute die denken sie müssten, die haben eine Verantwortung, den Leuten die im Kiez wohnen gegenüber und ziehen hierher und machen den grössten Fehler. Warum ziehen sie nicht nach Zehlendorf? Da stehen zum Beispiel die ganzen Wohnungen von den damaligen Amerikanischen Soldaten leer. Warum ziehen sie nicht dort hin ist auch viel näher zur Uni. Warum ziehen sie nicht dort hin? Nein, sie müssen in den Kiez. sie gehören dazu, Multikulti. Ja, Multikulti fürn Arsch. Mutlikult is fürn arsch. Das war mal, das war noch nie, das war noch nie. Es war immer ne Parallelgesellschaft und ich kenn viele Schauspieler die hierhergezogen sind, ja warum? Jaaa, wenn du dich unterhältst so mit deinen Kollegen dann kannst du sagen 'ich wohn im Kiez wa, hier im Ghetto'. Das halten die für cool. Und da hat es angefangen. Das hat nicht 2007 angefangen, die Ersten sind 2004 hergezogen, 2004-2005 gings schon los, da hass du hier auf dem Markt so Schauspieler gesehen, weil die es einfach für hip halten. (cited on p. 219)

Interview #11, Faruk: Pazarı Almanlıklarıyla bozdular, kurallarla. Biz buraya geldiğimizde sadece Kneipeler vardı, bir sandalye dışarıya atmayı bilmiyorlardı, balkonda bile oturmayı bilmiyorlardı. Türk Market'ine geliyorlar çünkü merak ediyorlar, ne bok varsa. Biz burayı canlandırdık, şimdi diyolar ki, 'gidin başka yeri canlandırdın' ama niye? Bizim kendi yaşam alanımız var o yüzden başka semtler Türkleri ilgilendirmiyor, bakmıyorlar bile. Ama Turistler bize bakıyor, alışveriş yapıyor. Niye popüler oldu? Bu mulitkulti yüzünden. (cited on p. 220)

Interview #12, Ahmet: Biz şu anda Almanya'nın rengiyiz, wir sind die Farbe denn wir haben viele Nationalitäten, viele Kulturen, das macht uns jetzt sehr beliebt. Die sind langweilig, onlar çok langweilig, ben dedim buranın devam etmeyeceğini söyledim çünkü Almanlara da söylüyorum, diyorum bakın siz bizi buradan atarsanız burası çok langweilig olur niye? Bak diyorum: Mustafa var karşıda çıkıyor kapıya ellinde sigarasıyla ben oturuyorum burada diyorum 'willst du einen Tee' diyorum, karşı taraftan Arap diyor 'alo wie geht's Habib' diyor, şimdi biz renkliyiz siz Almanlar konservatifsiniz oturursunuz müşteri gelene kadar. [...]Almanlar haklısın diyorlar çünkü buraya cazip kılan biziz. [...] Çünkü renkler giderse tatsız bir film seyredersin. Biz de bu ülkenin tadıyız tuzuyuz, tuzu çekersen olmaz. Ben ev sahibiyle konuşurken de bunu söyledim, adam şöyle bi durdu. (cited on p. 220)

Interview #12, Ahmet: Burada biraz asosialiteyi öldürdüler isyan biraz ondan, yani insanlar sırtını dayamıştı devlet çok rahat bir yaşam yaşıyorlardı, bir sirkilendi ev sahipleri de şöyle bir para kazanım dedi. Kötü mü kötü, çok insan evlerinden oldu, ama bazen bazı insanların canı yanması lazım. Buradaki esnafı etkileyen de o zaten, burada Hartz IV ile oturanın getirisi ne ki, yok. Şimdi paralı insanlar var eskisi gidiyordu bir paket sigara alıyordu, bu bundan ver ondan da ver diyor, eskisi beş Liraya saç kestiriyordu şimdi 12-15 Liraya kestirip üç Lira bahşiş bırakıyor. (cited on p. 232)

Interview #13, İnan: Yani Kreuzberg veya Neukölln dediğin zaman biraz multikulti, yani Zehlendorf dediğin zaman sırf Almanlara yönelik burada da sanki Türkleri ve yabancıları kovmaya çalışıyorlar, kiraları yükselterek yani burayı böyle ıslah etmek gibi bir şey var ama tabii bu da bizim için üzücü niye: yıllarca emek vermişsin bu caddelere, zaman geliyor buralar çok güzelleşiyor, güzelleşince seni kovmaya çalışıyor. Bu da çok acı bir şey. Neden? Neden bir bizi kovalıyorlar? Hartz IV çıkarmak çok kolay ama o zaman zamanla buradaki kültür de değişecek bu multikulti. Arkadaşlar geliyor buradaki Türklerin yaşamına görmek istiyor ama en son bir arkadaş geldi burası çok değişmiş diyor, Almanlaştı diyor, kendisi Alman ama bu cadde Almanlaşıyor diyor. Ee o zaman niye geleyim diyor, Zehlendorf'a giderim diyor. Ne göreceğim diyor? Görecek bir şey yok diyor? Benim de gördüğüm bir canlılık var ama Almanlaşmaya yönelik bir canlılık var yani Türkler çıkıyor yavaş yavaş. (cited on pp. 221-222)

Interview #1, Kübra and Interview #14, Hilal: Benim okulum mesela Weserstrasse de, sehr viele Ausländer, Migrantenkinder, Türk de çok, Arap da var, o zaman o kadar Arap da yoktu, Sonnenallee falan Arap değildi. Alman çocuk da vardı aber sehr wenig. Es gab verschiedene Bosnien den çok

vardı, Polanyalı, Fin vardı, Arap vardı, İtalyan vardı, Albaner, Türken, sehr multikulti. Ama die Gegend an sich mesela, genau gegenüber der Schule war das noch ein Bordell. Das war richtig ein Bordell, das war Weserstrasse. Dükkânlardan bir tanesi Bordell'di auf jeden Fall. Gegenüber der Grundschule das ist schon paradox. Bu yanı, okulun bu yanı var son Arabisches cafe, sehr auch sehr also war mir immer schon nicht besonders kosher. Karşıda şimdi büyük bir Cafe açıldı, das war auch so eine Geldwaschanlage von irgendwelchen Drogendealern. Waren alles sehr illegale Geschaefte diese kleinen Laeden und so was, also so besonders sicher war die Gegend zwar nicht aber yani, jetzt als Ausländer hat man sich nicht unbedingt bedroht gefühlt weil ich meine du wohnst hier, die kennen dich auch alle mehr oder weniger. Von der Sicherheit ist es jetzt sicherer geworden, ist es besser geworden. Mesela Panierstrasse 47, Olcay Abla'nın orda dairesi var, orda da mesela Arap kahvesidi, da konnte man nicht vorbeilaufen. Ich war damals noch sehr jung, ich war noch ein Kind, hat mich jetzt nicht unbedingt so beschäftigt. Aber das war schon eklig wie, man hat hier nicht so oft die ganzen Touristen Maedchen und Jungen hat man hier nicht so oft vorbeilaufen sehen. Die Deutschen dir hier waren..."

Hilal: Säufer.

Kübra: Alman vardı die schon um acht oder neun saufen gegangen sind. Anonsten hat man hier nicht so direkt Deutsche gesehen.

Hilal: Fand ich schöner.

Kübra: Hmmm, nicht unbedingt, dass hat schon seine guten und seine schlechten Seiten. Seine schlechten Seiten, die Miete ist sehr hoch geworden, du bist hier aufgewachsen, das ist deine Gegend, das ist deine Gegend wo du dich wohlfühlst und aufeinmal hast du das Gefühl, dass du hier irgendwie nicht reinpasst, die ganze Umgebung, die ganze Szene und so. Alles verändert und du bist jetzt – manchmal gucken die dich an, wenn ich jetzt reingehe mit dem Schlüssel hani so 'ach, die wohnt hier noch'. [...]Das siehst du auch so ein bisschen an denen. Es gibt auch Leute die das einfach geniessen das hier ein bisschen Farbe ist, dass hier nicht nur Touristen sind oder nicht nur diese Szene-Leute sondern son bisschen Türken und ein bisschen Araber, das macht das auch interessant für die. Aber wenn es um Wohnen geht, sind die Wohnungen hier ja alle sehr populär geworden, deswegen sind die Preise gestiegen und du bist hier jetzt nicht mehr unbedingt so willkomen. (cited on pp. 222-223)

Kübra: Ich hatte einen schwulen Lehrer auf der Schule der war voll nett von dem ist am meisten hängengeblieben bei mir. Der meinte mal vor drei Jahren

oder so: passt auf wenn ihr hier noch wohnen dürft, dann nur weil ihr ein bisschen Farbe bringt. Wundert euch nicht, wenn ihr bald am Rand von Berlin eure Ghettos habt, tagsüber fahren die euch mit Bussen rüber um ein bisschen multikutli zu machen und abends wieder zurück. Das ist damals voll hängengeblieben aber wir dachten natürlich der übertreibt. Jetzt zu sehen, dass es sich so entwickelt, ist krass. Zu sehen, dass es einem weggenommen wird. (cited on p. 225)

Interview #15, Eldem: Şimdi tabii çok acayip şeyler var, Kreuzberg de semt olarak senelerdir Türklerden başka kimse oturmuyordu, buralarda yalnız biz oturabilirdik, burda ev bulabiliyordun, burda ev alabiliyordun. Şimdi bunlar kalktı, Kreuzberg tamamen merkez oldu, dükkanların hepsi Türklerin ellindeydi şimdi çok az, aldılar, ya da satılar. Neukölln'de tamamen eşcinsellere taktim edildi diyebilirim çok net olarak. Boş ev olsa, başka birinin alma şansı yok. Onların önüne geçilmiyor, tamamen onlara göre çalışılıyor. Onların parası da var artı kalabalık kalıyorlar, yani WG'lerde, Gemeinschaft yapıyorlar. Ev sahiplerin de işine geliyor, 300 Lira alacakları yerden...ben şu anda 1200 Euro kira ödüyorum, ben çıksam benim orası 2000-2500. O parayı veren kim? Bunlar veriyor işte. (cited on p. 225)

Interview #15, Eldem: Şimdi niye kalmak istiyorlar? Basit, Neukölln'de imkânlar çok, Neukölln'de adamın gittiği, sürekli gittiği bir camii var veya hanımın dernekte felan filan, sosyal aktivitenin olduğu şeyler var yani. Onları bırakmak istemiyor, nereye gidecek? Ancak Kreuzberg olurdu, daha pahlı, Neukölln merkeze yakın yer, Türkleri nereye göndermek istiyorlar? Doğuya, doğu tarafında göndermek istiyorlar, Marzahn tarafında, Hellersdorf tarafına. Oralara da Türkler hiçbir zaman gitmez, sağcılarının yoğun olduğu yer, kimse çocuğunu oraya göndermez. Buraya adam kaç senedir alışmış zaten, bütün çevresi burda, arkadaşları burda, akşam takıldığı kafeler mafeler hepsi burda. (cited on p. 255)

Interview #15, Eldem: Siz adama diyorsunuz ki 'senin kazıncan yok biz de sana kira yardımı yapmayız, ne zaman yaparız sana, Ost rafanda herhangi bir yere gidersen'. Gitmek istemiyor, napacak? İlegal işlerden kazandığı parayla farkı kapatacak, deneyecek yani, o kadar basit. Kolay olmayacak, yani kolay kolay çıkartamayacaklar. (cited on pp. 262-263)

Interview #17, Kazım Erdoğan: Yeni gelenlerin çoğu alman olduğu için, yabancıların ve Almanların ilişkisi tekrar olumsuzlaşmaya dönüşüyor. Eğer gelenlerin çoğu Türkiye kökenli göçmen ailelerden gelseler o zaman vatandaşlar diyecek ki 'bizden birileri geldi'. O zaman onu olumlu olarak dile getirecekler, yani bir korku bir uzaktan güreşme atmosferinin hala var olduğunu düşünüyorum ama bi bu olumsuz gelişmeyi olumsuzla çevirmek

zorundayız. (cited on p. 229)

Interview #18, Kenan: Türk şey ayırımı ben bu zaman kadar, Alman veya yabancı ayırımı hiç görmedim yani. Çoğu gazetelerde görüyoruz ya hani, görmedim yani. Daha çok mesela Almanlarla, biz de Türküz mesela, biz Alman müşterilerimizden böyle, hani Türklerden olduğundan samimiyiz, onlarda bizi benimsedi yani, bilmiyorum yani, çok rahat yani. Alman müşterilerimiz daha çok, Türk müşterilerinden, daha doğrusu Türk müşterisi de istemiyoruz.

Interview #18, Kenan: Ya Türk müşterisi mesela sorunlu oluyor, mesela bir şey aldı, birşeyler alıyor, diyelim ki çakmak falan filan böyle. Alman müşteri geldiği zaman mesela, bizim bir müşterimiz var günde on bira içer bazen, sesi çıkmaz yani normal sohbet eder, Türk müşterisi gelir iki bira içer sonra başlar dağlmaya, yani bizim milletimiz ne bilim, oluşumdan dolayı, tavırlarından dolayı. (cited on p. 234)

Interview #19, Veli: Geliyorlar, konuşuyoruz, milletle sohbetin sıcak olması lazım, esnaflık odur benim için, yani adam buraya girdiği zaman kendini rahat hissetmesi lazım, sıkıntı olmaması lazım hani ben gelip de burada yabancıları alıp da burada oturan birini rahatsız ettirmem yani benim için burada üç tane öğrenci oturursun rahat olsun, yabancı almam içeri. (cited on p. 236)

Interview #19, Veli: Evet yani bazı yerlerde, burada yani öyle insanlar da yaşıyorlar, bazı bilmiyorum farkında mısın rencide ediyor, çocuklar kar topu atıyor [...] onların yaptığı kötülüğü bize kalıyor o zaman yani ticaret zor oluyor. Bütün yabancılar aynı deniyor halbuki Almanın da kötüsü var iyisi de, insan kültürlü olduğu zaman görüntü farklı oluyor, değişik oluyor, daha rahat oluyor. (cited on p. 232)

Interview #20, Orhan Demirel: Neukölln'de 86'dan beri yaşıyorum, 15 senedir bu sokakta. Burayı diğer bar sahiplerinden daha iyi biliyorum. Ama onlar gibi değilim, ben eğlence için yapmıyorum, bizim ekmek parası kazanmamız lazım. (cited on p. 238)

Interview #22, Asım Güllüoğlu: Almanca yeterli olmadığından başkalarını da okutsalar, okutan kişi de iyi bilmiyor. Tam böyle davrayamıyor, böyle böyle diyor, imzalatırılıyor. Ondan sonra işin içinden çıkmak çok zor. (cited on p. 246)

Interview #22, Asım Güllüoğlu: Burdaki Job Center bile bile yasanın dışına çıkıyorlar. Bunu her zaman görüyorum. Göre göre hakkını kimseye

vermiyor. Ne yapıyorsun şimdi mahkemeye felan gidiyorsun, mahkemede hakkını arıyorsun ama bunu siz yapmanız ben yapmam, kendi menfaatlarımızı korumak için yaparız, ama bunu devlet kurumu yaparsa, bir de job center, Soziale Einrichtung, yardım edebilecek bir kurum. Çok vahim bir şey yani. (cited on p. 246)

Interview #23, Saliha: Ich hab gespart, ich hab keine Urlaub gemacht, ja? Badewanne alles, ja? Jetzt ich habe endlich alles gemacht aber Schimmel kommt schon wieder von meine Küche. Und wenn ich erzähle diese Geschichte von Schimmel dann sie sagen es kommt von mir, ja. Ich muss Fenster, ich muss Lüftung, ich lüfte ganze Tag ja, das spielt keine Rolle. Ich hab noch nicht gekocht und der Schimmel von meine Küche ist wieder zurück. (cited on p. 248)

Interview #24, Reiner Wild: Wie haben eine offenkundige Diskriminierung bei den Mieterhöhungen gehabt und zwar in den Sozialwohnungen, die ohne Anschlussförderung waren. Da ist es teilweise so gemacht worden das in den Wohnanlagen die Innenstadt nah waren wurden tatsächlich Mieterhöhungen ausschliesslich für Migranten ausgesprochen. (cited on p. 249)

Interview #24, Reiner Wild: Kreuzberg, südliche Friedrichstadt. [...] Und da wurden Mieterhöhungen ausgesprochen einfach nur um die Leute rauszukriegen und dann wurden diese Wohnungen auf dem Wohnungsmarkt wieder angeboten und da wurden die viel niedriger angeboten. Also da gings wirklich ganz klar darum die Bewohnerstruktur zu ändern weil man sozusagen von vornerein eine Klientel mit einem höheren Einkommen setzen wollte. Die konnte man aber nur kriegen aus Sicht der Eigentümer wenn man die Migrantenhaushalte erstmal raus hat. Das ist ziemlich krass gelaufen dort in der Umgebung, bei mehreren Eigentümern. Und da laufen auch noch Verfahren. (cited on p. 249)

Interview #24, Reiner Wild: Das Problem ist auch Diskriminierung, also ADG, dieses Gesetz gegen Diskriminierung sind natürlich alle Eigentümer total vorsichtig geworden, also die diskriminieren aber man muss denen das ja beweisen das man wegen seiner ethnischen Herkunft diskriminiert wurde und wie will man das beweisen? Ja wenn da fünf Bewerber sind oder 25 und man kommt nicht zum Zuge, dann ist das ja noch keine Diskriminierung weil es kommt nur einer zum Zuge und 20 werden quasi diskriminiert. Deswegen kann man das in der Regel nicht beweisen. (cited on p. 250)

Interview #25, Property Owner 1: Es gibt keine Prinzipien, wenn bei einer Anzeige einer schon besoffen hinkommt dann vermietet man nicht also ist

Sympathie-Antipathie ist keine, keine Richtlinien oder Prinzipien. (cited on p. 251)

Interview #25, Property Owner 1: Naja, das alles sympathisch sind. (cited on p. 251)

Interview #26, Property Owner 2: Alle sagen eine Bevölkerung, damit sie gut funktioniert muss durchmischt sein und wir hatten in Nord-Neukölln eine sehr sehr einseitige Bevölkerung, was aus meiner Sicht auch doll dazu beigetragen hat das das hier sehr runtergegangen ist weil sich hier immer mehr diejenigen versammelt haben, die also ich weiss nicht wie ich es sagen soll die ganz oft nicht selbst arbeiten gehen und ja ist schon echt ne schwierige Gegend hier. Also ich will das nicht verallgemeinern aber ich glaube schon es ist einfach eine schwierige Bevölkerung, deswegen ist es doch eigentlich eine positive Entwicklung wenn man sagt in einem Gebiet passiert etwas, dass da doch ei, ja ein Austausch stattfindet. Ist richtig und alle schreien jetzt das hängt damit zusammen das die Mieten in die Höhe gehen. Ich sage jetzt mal, es ist notwendig weil auch ein ganz hoher Nachholbedarf da ist und es tut doch allen gut die hier bleiben wenn sich das ein bisschen durmischt wie es auch anderswo ist. Deswege finde ich diese Diskussion, so wie sie geführt wird an vielen Stellen unehrlich. (cited on p. 251)

Interview #26, Property Owner 2: Wir haben nie inseriert [...] diejenigen die neu gekommen sind, sind meistens selbständig aber wir haben uns das nicht ausgesucht es ist so das es geht auch immer schon so das der Bauch auch sagt 'kannst du dir das vorstellen oder kannst du dir das nicht vorstellen'. Und dann haben wir festgestellt, dass wir oft mir Leuten die selbständig sind so...das passt einfach irgendwie aber das haben wir uns nicht ausgesucht oder so das hat sich einfach so ergeben. (cited on p. 252)

Interview #26, Property Owner 2: Ja also ich wollte auch nochmal sagen, also wenn sie jetzt sagwn, ja geb ich Ihnen Recht, wenn jetzt überwiegend Künstler oder Akademiker, das hat aus meiner sicht nichts zu sagen also das behaupte ich mal von uns also ich kann nur sagen das bei uns viele Selbständig sind, das hat sich aber so ergeben das ist ja nicht kopfgesteuert gewesen, dass ich jetzt gezielt nach einer bestimmen Berufsgruppe schau. Das ist massgeblich bauchgesteuert, dass man denkt man kann mit den Leuten und der Nachbar kann wieder mit anderen Leuten und das ist aus meiner Sicht wie trotzdem diese Mischung kommt. Also sozialwissenschaftler und Naturwissenschaftler die schlagen sich doch lieber auf dem Flur als das die miteinander klarkommen. (cited on p. 252)

Interview #27, Property Owner 3: Das ist ein schwieriges Thema, dass ist immer eine Bauchentscheidung. Ich hab jetzt Schwerpunkt- mässig an Künstler vermietet, dass ist einfach so. (cited on p. 252)

Interview #28, Property Owner 3: Um nochmal das Thema Verdrängung und Prenzlauer Berg aufzugreife. Ich hab ja meine eigene Philosophie, wenn Prenzlauer Berg, also Prenzlauer Berg sicher auf der einen Seite weil es runtergekommen war aber da hatte man sag ich mal was Deutsches, wir hatten ja sag ich jetzt mal hier sehr viel Migranten, Türken etc, sag ich mal zu 50-60 Prozent in diesem Bezirk, heute ja nicht mehr aber immer noch anteilmässig viel und erstmal wollen wir die nicht kündigen und ausserdem lassen die sich auch nicht kündigen und diese Problematik hatte der Prenzlauer Berg ja nicht, ich sag mal so das war eine oder ist heute noch eine Insel der Glückseligkeit, wenn man sich die Schulen anguckt ist der Ausländeranteil 1-2Prozent und hier ist er sag ich mal 80 Prozent. Deswegen war da auch dieser Schwabeneffekt, dass die sagten wir wollen jetzt dahin, also man darf es ja heute kaum noch sagen, aber da wo der Ausländeranteil eben nicht so hoch ist und dann sind die natürlich dahin gegangen und haben dementsprechend das Geld. (cited on p. 253)

Interview #29, Aisha: Ich gehe zum Beispiel nicht Marzahn weil ich bin hier in Neukölln 'ooooh', ich weiss nicht das ist fast wie meine Land oder Kreuzberg oder hier aber wann man geht ab zwölf uhr wirklich ich habe Angst woanders, aber hier wirklich ist egal, weil gibt es viele Sachen, wenn was passiert, siehst du eine Junge, Türkische, Araber, du weisst passiert nichts eine Frau, sofort. Aber bestimmt bei andere Bezirke ist nicht. (cited on p. 256)

Interview #31, Halil: Burda oturmaktan başka şansımız yok. Burda sokağa çıkıyoruz 'selam aleykum Mehmet Abi' diyoruz o da 'aleykum selam' diyor. Bu benim hayat enerjim. Ben Steglitz'e gidemem ki. Maddi durumum var, bilgim de var. Mesela orada bahçemle güzel ilgilenirim, oturma şartları de daha iyi. Ama Ayşe yok, Mehmet yok. Türkler buradan gitmez. İspanyollar, Yunanlar gider. Bizim aileler burada. Biz onları bırakmayız. Aile bağlarımız kuvvetli. Bi tanıdık var, emekli oldu niye Türkiye'ye dönmüyorsun diye soruyorlar. Daralıyorum orda diyor, kız yok, oğlan yok, torun yok. Onlar dönmüyor. O yüzden bizler de burada kaldık. (cited on p. 263)

Interview #31, Halil: Fakir yani, en alt tabakada yaşayan insanlar buralarda, bunlarda niye buralarda yaşıyorlar ben efendim seni bilirim, o onu bilir, o onu bilir ben yardımlaşıyorum. Hem devletden üç-beş sosyal yardım alıyorum, anlıyormusun? Devlet de diyom 'yahu bana iş ver', devlet diyor ki 'hayır iş vermem sana' diyor ve yahauta efendim şunu şunu yaparsan, yap git diyor efendim saat başına bir Euro, 50 Cent'e çalış diyor (.) 'Ben bir Euro,, 50 Cent'e çalışıyorum bazen onu da bulamıyorum ama bu boyuta olduğum

için. Senin evinde Tapeten yapılacak ya da yük taşınacak ben diyorum ki 'Hassan'ı tanıyorum' diyorum 'Hassan git şunun işine', yani illegal olarktan, kağıtsız, vergisiz şu bu olmadan, sen gidiyorsun onun işini yapıyorsun beş Liralık para alıyorsun ve cebine koyuyorsun. (pp. 258-259)

Interview #33, Ayşe: 13 yaşında oğlum var, sekiz ve iki yaşında kızlar. Bu eve 13 sene önce geldik, Almanya'daki ilk ev. O zaman yetiyordu ama şimdi 13 yaşında oğlum kendi odasını istiyor. Ev arıyoruz yok. Jobcenter 735 euro verecekti, ben de 900 e kadar tamamlarız diyorum ama dur bakalım bulamadık daha. (cited on p. 265)

Interview #34, Hatice and Interview #33, Ayşe: Reichenbergerstrasse de oturuyorum. Evimi lam bastı. Şimdi bir buçuk senedir perişanız. Üç çocuk var. Beş kişi 1,5 odalı evdeyiz.

Ayşe: Ayy ben yine iyi durumdaymışım. 2,5 zimmer.

Defne: Kaç çocuğun var?

Ayşe: Üç benim de.

Defne: Yeni eviniz nerede?

Hatice: Aynı binada. Beşinci kat'da. Evime lam basması benim suçum değil. Tek suçum birinci kat'da oturmam oldu."

Hatice: Yok tam sigortayı iptal etmiştik yeni sigortaya geçecektik bu olay oldu. Biz eltime gittik. O da aynı sokakta, bütün akrabalar orda. Büyük evi var ama ne kadar kalabilirsin ki orda? O yüzden o öbür ev boşalınca kabul ettik.

Hatice: Bizim eve Almanlar geldi. Öğrenci galiba. Bize geri vermediler çünkü dediler ki, siz diğer evi imzaladınız.

Hatice: Çünkü riske girmek istemedim. Adam reparieren yapacak mı yapmicak mı belli değildi. Bari bunu alayım dedim. Şimdi ev satıldı yeni sahibi reparieren yaptı hemen ve yeni kiracılar aldı. Bizim ev zaten pasniyon gibi devamlı yeni giren çıkan. Rote Kreuz'e bile gittim onlar da ordan taşınman lazım diyor. Marzahn'da kiralar düşük diyorlar ama ben gidemem. Çocuklar burda büyüdüler okulla gittiler. Biz elimdeyken 1,5 hafta sonra bize otel parası vermeyi kabul ettiler. Ben kabul etmedim. Orada hata yaptık ben direkt ilk akşamdan Verwaltung'e haber vermeliydim ama işte apar topar çıktık elitme gittik. Oraya da yerleşmişken otele gitmek istemedik.

Oruçluyduk, şimdi otel zor olacaktı. Ben yeni eve geçip jobcentere haber vermediğim için bir de ceza yedim. Üç ay sperre aldım.

Hatice: Para vermeyeceklerdi Allahtan Jugendamt engelledi, geri aldık o parayı, 1200 EURO, dediler zaten zor durumdalar daha daha mağdur bırakmayın. Çocukların psikolojisi bozuldu. Terapiye gidiyorlar ama gitseler nolur. Ben diyorum sorun evin küçük olması, onu çözmedikten sonra terapiye ne fayda? Ben anlamıyorum dünyanın parasını veriyorlar terapi için ama yeni ev için imkan verseler daha ucuz olacak devlette hem çocuklar mutlu olacak.

Hatice: Kız en küçük, 12. Oğlanlar 17 ve 22. Biri geç yatar biri erken. Tuvalette kalkıyorlar, herkes uyanıyor. Okula uykusuz gidiyor kız, tabii notları da kötü oluyor.

Hatice: Almanlar için daha farklı. Bizim akraba ilişkilerimiz yakın. Bunu anlamıyorlar. Yardım ediyoruz birbirimize. Bir yandan da burda çok Türkün olması bizim sığınağımız. Siz buraya da alıştınız başka mahalleye de alışırıyorsunuz diyorlar ama biz zaten yabancıyız burda, en azından burda bi evimiz var. Çevreye çıkamıyoruz. Aslında iyi değil, bizde de hata var. Dil öğrenmedik, buraya bağlı kaldık, yani aslında çaresizlikten. (cited on pp. 266-270)

APPENDIX B

ORIGINAL NEWSPAPER CITATIONS

Zucht, 1973, Der Spiegel: Fast eine Million Türken leben in der Bundesrepublik, 1,2 Millionen warten zu Hause auf die Einreise. Der Andrang vom Bosphorus verschärft eine Krise, die in den von Ausländern überlaufenen Ballungszentren schon lange schwelt. Städte wie Berlin, München oder Frankfurt können die Invasion kaum noch bewältigen: Es entstehen Gettos, und schon prophezeien Soziologen Städteverfall, Kriminalität und soziale Verelendung wie in Harlem. [...]Fast alle bleiben im Lande und mehren sich redlich. Von 1720 Neugeborenen, die 1972 im städtischen Urban-Krankenhaus zur Welt kamen, waren 650 Türken-Kinder. Rund 5000 Alis und Selims unter 14 leben nach offizieller Zählung am Kreuzberg; in den Freizeitstätten des Sanierungsgebietes haben sie die Mehrheit, im Jugendzentrum an der Naunynstraße gar mit zwei Dritteln. In den Kindertagesstätten stieg die Zahl der Kleinst-Türken im letzten Halbjahr auf 430, um ein Drittel. (cited on pp. 99-100).

Zucht, 1973, Der Spiegel: Zwar ist noch nirgends exakt belegt, was die Einbürgerung aller ausländischen Arbeitnehmer kosten würde. Doch ob Berlins Finanzsenator Heinz Strick "für jeden sich integrierenden Gastarbeiter Infrastrukturkosten von 200 000 DM" veranschlagt oder ob Münchens Stadtentwickler allein für ihre Region einen 'Integrationsbedarf von vermutlich 2,5 Milliarden' errechnen -- die unbezahlte Rechnung ist schon jetzt gigantisch. (cited on p. 100)

Schönbohm cited in Der Spiegel: Im Mittelalter sind Ghettos gegründet worden, um Juden auszugrenzen. Heute hat ein Teil der bei uns lebenden Ausländer selbst Ghettos gegründet, weil sie uns Deutsche verachten. Wer zu uns kommt, muss die deutsche Leitkultur übernehmen. Unsere Geschichte hat sich in über tausend Jahren entwickelt. Wir haben nicht nur eine gemeinsame Sprache, sondern auch kulturelle Umgangsformen und Gesetze. Wir dürfen nicht zulassen, dass diese Basis der Gemeinsamkeit von Ausländern zerstört wird. (cited on pp. 111-112)

Drischner and Klingst, 2005, ZEIT: Und während in den französischen Vorstädten Autos und Supermärkte brennen, blickt Deutschland voller Bangen auf seine als Türken- oder Russenghettos verschrieenen Problemzonen. Demnächst auch bei uns? (cited on p. 115)

Wensierksi, 1997, Der Spiegel: High-noon in Rixdorf: In der Neuköllnischen Allee peitschen mehrere Schüsse über die belebte Straße. Wer kann, geht in Deckung. Einer bleibt auf dem Boden liegen. [...] Szenen wie diese gehören zum Alltag im Berliner Bezirk Neukölln. (cited on p. 159)

Füchsel, 2006, Der Tagesspiegel: Buschkowsky: [...]Das, was der Film zeigt, ist authentisch. Das können Sie sehen, wenn junge Leute in der Richardstraße aufeinander prallen und sich mit Kneipenstühlen über die Schädel hauen. Wenn sich die Jugendlichen auf den Straßen abziehen. Das findet auf den Straßen alles statt. (cited on p. 164)

Mutlu: Das nennt man self-fulfilling prophecy, was Sie da machen. Wenn man immer so schwarz malt, wird es auch irgendwann pechschwarz. Aber noch sehen die Realitäten glücklicherweise anders aus. Auf diese Art und Weise machen Sie nur Ihren Bezirk kaputt. (cited on p. 164)

Berg, Brinkbäumber, Cziesche, Hardinghaus, Ludwig, Röbel, Verbet and Wensierksi, 2006, Der Spiegel: Wenn man sich die Wirklichkeit der Rütli-Schule und anderer Schulen in Berlin und im Bundesgebiet ansieht, die Wirklichkeit von Hauptschulen vor allem, dann sieht es so aus, als ginge es dort inzwischen zu wie einstmals in der Bronx. Es wirkt wie eine Ansammlung vieler kleiner Kopien von Städten wie Karatschi oder Lagos, Städten also, die nicht mehr zu kontrollieren, nicht mehr zu regieren sind. In Deutschland sind es keine ganzen Metropolen, es sind bloß Viertel, aber sie sind abgetrennt vom Rest der Stadt, sie sind Ghettos. (cited on p. 167)

Author unknown, 2008, Berliner Zeitung: Unsere Polizei schreitet erst dann ein, wenn bereits eine Straftat begangen wurde. In London und Rotterdam geht sie vorher auf mögliche Kriminelle zu und verwarnt sie: Wir haben Euch im Blick, wir kennen Euch. (cited on p. 175)

Brautlecht, 2007, Berliner Zeitung: Natürlich gibt schon lange Leute, die nachts in Neukölln ausgehen. Sie rauchen Wasserpfeife in Shisha-Cafés in der Sonnenallee oder spielen Karten unter Neonlicht. 'Nur für Mitglieder' steht an vielen Türen. Doch auch wenn man in keinem türkischen Kulturverein Mitglied ist und weder Shishas noch Neonlicht mag, kann man seit einiger Zeit angenehme Nächte in Neukölln verbringen. Vor allem im berühmten Norden des Bezirks, dort wo auch die Rütli-Schule liegt. Man muss sich nur in die Seitenstraßen trauen, die von der Sonnenallee in Richtung Landwehrkanal führen. Hier, im Reuterkiez, liegen Wohnhäuser und Eckkneipen, die 'Klasmühle' heißen. Die Straßen sind ziemlich leer - bis plötzlich eine große Gruppe gut gelaunter Leute vor einer Tür steht:

Studenten und Künstler, eher alternativ als schick. (cited on pp. 183-184)

Blume, 2007: Bei den 'Raumpionieren', so nennt die Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung die Zwischennutzer, sei in erster Linie eine Gründerlust zu entdecken, so Junge-Reyer. Zwar ist im Zusammenhang mit den 'Raumpionieren' auch von Aneignung die Rede, als politischer Akt ähnlich den Hausbesetzungen lässt sich die Zwischennutzung aber in der Regel nicht ansehen. Denn zumeist gibt es klare vertragliche Vereinbarungen, den jeweiligen Ort zu verlassen, sobald sich ein - besser zahlender – 'Dauernutzer' einstellen sollte. (cited on pp. 190-191)

Merkle cited in Berliner Zeitung, 2013: Naja, ich möchte mich nicht wichtiger machen, als ich bin. Es ist sicher so, dass die Welle losging, nachdem wir aufgemacht haben. Und ich frage mich oft, ob ich es gemacht hätte, wenn ich gewusst hätte, was hier passiert. Ich kam Anfang der 90er nach Berlin, ich habe mitgekriegt, was in Mitte und Prenzlauer Berg passiert. Aber ich habe das hier nicht für möglich gehalten. (cited on p. 193)

Demirel cited in Janovsky, 2011: Die anderen Barbesitzer lachen schon über mich, [...], das verletzt mich. Ich mache Fehler, aber ich lerne jeden Tag (cited on p. 239)

Kesse, 2008, Berliner Morgenpost: Maikrawalle? Alles vorbei
Man beschwert sich schriftlich in gesetzten Worten. Das zeigt: Die Zeiten der Maikrawalle und blutigen Walpurgisnächte sind längst vorbei. Prenzlberger sind jetzt die, die überdurchschnittlich verdienen. Multikulti und tolerant und bloß nicht spießig sein wollen. In Prenzlauer Berg leben etwa genauso viele Ausländer wie unter 18-Jährige. Die meisten haben aber die französische Staatsangehörigkeit oder die italienische, US-amerikanische oder britische – überwiegend also 'G-8-Ausländer'. So kann man sich tolerant fühlen, ohne große kulturelle Unterschiede überwinden zu müssen. (cited on p. 281)

APPENDIX C

ORIGINAL ACADEMIC CITATIONS

Ayim, 1993: Ebenso wie andere Schwarze Deutsche und ImmigrantInnen wußte ich, daß selbst ein deutscher Paß keine Einladungskarte zu den Ost-West-Feierlichkeiten darstellte. Wir spürten, daß mit der bevorstehenden innerdeutschen Vereinigung eine zunehmende Abgrenzung nach außen einhergehen würde – ein Außen, das uns einschließen würde. Unsere Beteiligung am Fest war nicht gefragt. (cited on p. 104)

Gebhardt, 2001: Ein 'Wildwuchs' von türkischer Migration ist in Berlin entstanden, der 'auch dreißig Jahre später schwer zurückzuschneiden ist', Ghettos, die sich 'eingenistet' haben, müssen 'trockengelegt' werden, Armut breitet sich nach der Logik einer Epidemie aus: 'Ein schwarzer Gürtel der Armut legt sich über Berlins Mitte, wuchert weiter nach außen. Er trägt die Namen Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Wedding und Tiergarten' und weist steigende Arbeitslosen- und SozialhilfeempfängerInnen zahlen, eine Lebenserwartung unter dem Berliner Durchschnitt, Verwahrlosung ganzer Straßenzüge und einen rasch ansteigenden Ausländeranteil auf. Wie ein eutrophierter See gelten bestimmte Stadtbezirke als 'umgekippt'. (cited on pp. 108-109)

Jäger and Schultes, 2012: [...] dass die Thesen Sarrazin selbst nur Ausdruck einer seit langem andauernden sowohl rassistischen wie auch insbesondere anti-islamischen und nicht zuletzt auch noch antisozialen mediopolitischen Kampagne in Deutschland sind, die dazu geführt hat, dass die deutsche Bevölkerung mehrheitlich rassistisch und größtenteils auch immer noch antisemitisch vorgenommen sind, sich vor Armen fürchtet und zugleich auf Arme herabsieht. (cited on p. 119)

Lanz, 2007: [...] Unort *par excellence* zu verkörpern, ein Ort an dem sich alle debattierten Bedrohungen der Gesellschaft -Desintegration, Armut, Ausgrenzung, verrohende Jugend, Religionskonflikt, Gewalt- diskursiv zu einem gewaltigen sozialen und kulturellen Sprengstoff verdichten und räumlich verdichten. (cited on p. 160)

Overmeyer, 2005: [...] Zwischennutzer sind Pioniere. Pioniere sind und waren ja immer Leute -wie früher die Fußsoldaten-, die unbekanntes Terrain erkundschaf teten und so das Feld vorbereiteten für die, die sich später dort niederließen. Wir haben sehr intensiv unterschiedlichste Typologien von

Zwischennutzungen untersucht und festgestellt, dass diese Raumpioniere oft mit einem Minimum an Infrastruktur auskommen. Sie recyceln vorhandene Ressourcen, nehmen das, was sie vorfinden, und kommen trotzdemähnlich einer Pionierpflanze zur Blüte, ohne dass große Investitionen nötig wären.
(cited on p. 180)

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