

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE WELFARE STATE: THE CASE OF TURKEY

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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON ATTITUDE
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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Date: August 05, 2015

ABSTRACT

The Impact of Social Trust on Attitude

Towards the Welfare State: The Case of Turkey

The significance of the concept of social trust has increased in recent years, particularly within the context of the welfare state. This thesis examines social trust (conceptualized as generalized inter-personal trust) in order to evaluate whether it has an impact on attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey when social-demographic factors (such as gender, age, years of education, discrimination and ethnic group affiliation, unemployment, type of organization worked for, household income, language at home, and the placement of individuals along the left-right ideological spectrum and subjective well-being index -life satisfaction and happiness) are controlled for.

This thesis uses quantitative methods and the 4th round of European Social Survey data of 2008 in order to evaluate whether the specific case of Turkey entails a correlation between the level of trust and the attitudes towards the welfare state. The result illustrates that there is a u-shaped relationship between social trust and welfare state in Turkey: individuals who claim they do not trust others and those who claim they trust others tend to have more positive attitude towards government responsibilities whereas those who are situated in the middle have a negative attitudes towards welfare state responsibilities.

ÖZET

Toplumsal Güvenin Refah Devletine Yönelik Tutumlar Üzerine Etkisi: Türkiye Örneği

Toplumsal güven kavramının önemi son yıllarda özellikle refah devleti bağlamında artmaktadır. Bu tez Türkiye’de toplumsal güveni (genel olarak kişiler arası güven olarak da kavramsallaştırılır) refah devletine yönelik tutumlar üzerinde bir etkisi olup olmadığını değerlendirmek amacıyla incelemektedir. Bu inceleme sosyal-demografik faktörlerle (cinsiyet, yaş, eğitim yılı, etnik ayrımcılık, işsizlik, ne tür bir organizasyon/ işletme için çalışmakta, hane halkı geliri, evde konuşulan dil ve sağ-sol cetveli ve öznel esenlik/refah endeksi –hayattan memnuniyet ve mutluluk) de kontrol edilmektedir.

Bu tez, 2008 Avrupa Sosyal Anketi verilerininin 4. turunu kullanarak, Türkiye özelinde toplumsal güven düzeyi ile refah devletine yönelik tutumlar arasında bir bağlantı olup olmadığını değerlendirmek için nicel yöntemler kullanmaktadır. Türkiye’de toplumsal güven ve refah devleti arasında u-şeklinde bir ilişkinin olduğu sonucu ortaya çıkmaktadır: başkalarına güvenilmez diyen bireyler ile başkalarına güvenilir diyen bireyler hükümet sorumluluklarına yönelik daha olumlu bir tutuma sahip olma eğilimindeyken, ortasında yer alan bireylerin ise refah devleti sorumluluklarına yönelik olumsuz bir tutumları vardır.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my daughters Cansu and Selin.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines social trust (conceptualized as generalized inter-personal trust) in order to evaluate whether it has an impact on attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey when social-demographic factors (such as gender, age, years of education, discrimination and ethnic group affiliation, unemployment, type of organization worked for, household income, language spoken at home) and the placement of individuals along the left-right ideological spectrum and subjective well-being index (life satisfaction and happiness) are controlled for and taken into consideration.

Regarding the concept of trust, Delhey and Newton (2003) cite two broad schools of thought: individual theories vs. societal theories. While personality theory defines generalized inter-personal trust as “personality characteristics that includes optimism, a belief in co-operation and confidence” (p. 95) and concentrates on individual variables, the societal theory defines trust “as a property of the society rather than the individuals [...] but individuals participate in, contribute to, or benefit from a trusting culture, or from social and political institutions that encourage the development of trusting attitude and behaviour” (Delhey and Newton, 2003, p. 96).

The significance of the concept of social trust has increased in recent years, particularly within the context of the welfare state. Most of the current debate concerns the reciprocal and complex interaction between the level of social trust and the welfare state. The study by Bergh and Bjornskov (2010), which covers 77 democratic and semi-democratic countries, found that while “high-trust countries are

clearly able to finance higher total government expenditures and raise larger revenues, they are characterized by less market regulations” (Bergh and Bjornskov, 2010, p. 2). This conclusion illustrates the role that trust can play in shaping welfare outcomes.

Likewise, Delhey and Newton (2003) argue that “trust contributes to economic growth and efficiency in market economics, to the provision of public goods, to social integration, co-operation and harmony, to personal life satisfaction, to democratic stability and development, and even to good health and longevity” (Delhey and Newton, 2003, p. 94).

Furthermore, Putnam (2000, p. 138) argues that the level of trust reveals more about social systems than about the individuals’ personality traits. Accordingly, the level of social trust is a good indicator of the overall trustworthiness of a particular society. According to some social surveys such as World Values Survey (WVS) and European Social Survey (ESS), just like countries such as Macedonia, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Peru and Brazil, Turkey is a country with an extremely low level of social trust, which is less than 10 percent (Esmer, 1999, p. ix). This figure sharply contrasts with those from countries such as Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Ireland, and Iceland, where trust levels range between 53% and 65% (Delhey and Newton, 2004, p. 15). Instead of low trust countries, Delhey and Newton (2004) use the concept of no trust countries to define the societies with a 90% level of untrustworthiness.

Mishler and Rose (2005, p. 3) argue that both institutional and cultural theories highlight the important role of trust in making democracies work. Having said this, instead of highlighting the significance of trust, the institutional theories put the emphasis on the institutional performance.

A cross-section analysis of the OECD countries by Algan et al. (2011, p. 2) reveals a 'non-monotonic relationship' between trust and the welfare state in terms of their share of social expenditure in GDP. In fact, Algan et al. propose three main clusters: low trust and large welfare state (which consist of mostly continental European countries and Mediterranean countries); intermediate level of trust and relative small welfare state (which includes Anglo-Saxon countries); high trust and large welfare state (which comprises Scandinavian countries). I am analyzing this at an individual level and I am trying to come up with a similar result for the specific case of Turkey.

This thesis uses quantitative methods and the 4th round of European Social Survey data of 2008 to evaluate whether the specific case of Turkey entails a correlation between the level of trust and the attitudes towards the welfare state. The dependent variable is attitudes towards the welfare state captured through a set of questions on individual attitudes towards government responsibility.

The independent variables are the level of social trust measured through the social trust index and the control variables consist of gender, age, education level, household total net income, ethnic discrimination, spoken language at home, unemployment, type of organization (employment), well-being, placement on left-

right scale and region. The main objective of this thesis was to examine whether social trust has an impact on attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey. The main finding that there is a strong relationship between social trust and government responsibilities.

This thesis consists of five parts. The first part is the introduction. The second part provides an overview of the general meaning of social trust, welfare state and explains the issues within the framework of the attitudes towards the welfare state. The most appropriate aspects of the relationship between social trust and welfare state are used as a starting point of this section. The third part focuses on the welfare state transformation and social trust in Turkey. The fourth part contains empirical research and methodology in detail. Furthermore, the fourth part includes the descriptive statistics and regression analysis, whereby the hypotheses are tested by using dependent, independent and control variables to predict whether the level of social trust has an impact on the attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey. The fifth part is the conclusion, which incorporates a discussion about the limitations of this study, its policy implications and future research directions.

My thesis is the first study on the relationship between social trust and attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey and aims to contribute to the general literature on social trust and attitude.

CHAPTER 2

WELFARE STATE AND SOCIAL TRUST

This chapter presents a brief historical review of the development of the welfare state in Europe by evaluating the Esping-Andersen (1990) regime typologies as well as various criticisms that his study raised. In fact, the criticism that Esping-Andersen's typology excludes the South European or Mediterranean welfare regime type is particularly important for the Turkish case. Then, I will focus on a detailed historical review of social trust and will present an overview of social trust within the context of attitudes towards the welfare state. Two main approaches will be analyzed in this section. Empirical studies (Roosma et al., 2013; Andreß and Heien, 1999; Svallfors, 1991; and Oorschot and Meuleman, 2011) concerning the attitudes towards the welfare state will also be evaluated in this section. Then, I will briefly elaborate the development of the welfare state in Turkey, with a particular emphasis on the transformation of social security reforms. I will also try to contextualize the Turkish welfare state and its transformation after 2002 by elaborating on its similarities with the southern European countries. Finally, I will focus on social trust literature in Turkey.

2.1 Welfare states

2.1.1 A brief history of welfare states

A welfare state intends to “reduce economic inequality by providing certain floors on income and services and preventing income losses due to certain risks” (Amenta, 2003, p. 28). The state has a central role in the welfare system, which ensures the economic and social well-being of its citizens. The primary objective of a welfare state is to reduce social and economic inequalities and social risks. In his seminal study “Citizenship and Social Class”, Marshall (1949) described the modern welfare state as “a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare and capitalism by using the civil, political and social elements of the citizenship concept” (p. 150). Marshall also argued that the social element comprises “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the rights to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (p. 150).

Historically, the root of the welfare state goes back as far as the Bismarck government in Germany in the late 1880s. Bismarck launched welfare programs for the old age pensions, accident insurance and medical care for the working class. The main aim of these programs was to curb the migration of workers’ to other industrialized countries with higher wages, such as Britain or the United States. In the 1910s, the United Kingdom introduced the welfare programs through the legal liberal reforms such as the Old-Age Pensions Act, the Labor Exchanges Act, and the National Insurance Act (Gough, 2008, pp. 39-40).

The term welfare state gained prominence after the post-war era and was initially used to describe the set of social policies introduced by Britain's Labour government in the post-war period. Modern welfare state and public welfare expenditures increased rapidly in the post-war era due to the success of the Keynesian economic policies in Western capitalist democracies (Quadagno, 1987, p. 109). According to the Keynesian approach, "social expenditures for public welfare could stimulate aggregate demand and even out the instabilities and fluctuations of the business cycle, confidence in continuous expansion" (Janowitz, 1976, cited in Quadagno, 1987, p. 110). In fact, the Keynesian approach has shaped the theories on the origins and growth of the welfare state.

Briggs (1961, p. 221) defines the welfare state as "a system which guarantees to individuals and families a minimum level of income, provides some safety mechanisms against social contingencies" and ensures some equality in social services. Nearly two decades later, Logue (1979) offered another definition of the welfare state: "a state democratic in form, interventionist by inclination, and eager to manage the capitalist economy to achieve steady economic growth and maintain full employment" (Logue, 1979, cited in Goldberg and Rosenthal, 2002, p. 1).

From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, many countries established new social insurance schemes and national social service programs in health and education. According to the OECD's dataset on the expenditures of affluent countries in the period of 1960-1980, the share of average expenditures on social transfers to the gross domestic product (GDP) has doubled from 7.5 percent to 14 percent. With an

increase from 7 percent to over 17 percent, Sweden achieved the most dramatic increase in social expenditures (Quadagno and Myles, 2002, p. 35).

Scholars began to focus on the origins and the development of the welfare state as a governmental institution and particular national social policies during the post-war period. Quadagno and Myles (2002, p. 34) argue that seminal post-war studies by scholars such as Polanyi (1944), and Marshall (1949, 1964) were rediscovered in the 1970s.

The fundamental objective of welfare policies was to provide for citizens who were unable to acquire an equitable income distribution and equal opportunities. The concept of welfare state has fundamentally transformed the relationship between the state, institutions and individuals. The unexpected oil and energy crises during the 1970s slowed down the expansion of the welfare state and the economic paradigm shifted from the Keynesian policies to the neo-liberal policies across the globe. In 1981, OECD declared that the welfare state was in crisis (Quadagno and Myles, 2002, p. 36).

Until the 1990s, the research on the first generation of welfare states focused “on the long, slow growth of the social programs associated with Bismarck’s Germany in the 1880s to the post-war boom in welfare state expansion in the period of high industrialism; turned to theories of industrialism to account for the common trajectory of rising welfare state expenditures throughout the developed world” (Quadagno and Myles, 2002, p. 35)

Quadagno and Myles (2002, pp. 34-37) classify studies on welfare states under five theories: the industrialization theory, the power resource theory, the polity-centered theory, the welfare regime theory and finally the new politics of the welfare theory. According to them, the industrialization theory and the welfare regime theory are two extremely influential theories within the main body of scholarship. While elaborating these five theories, this thesis will focus particularly on the welfare regime theory.

Quadagno and Myles (2002, p. 36) argue that initial studies on the welfare state focus on the industrialization to explain the expansion of welfare state in the developed countries of the West. According to their theory, the industrialization process triggered new demands for public spending as the patrimonial traditions of agrarian societies eroded and growing dependence on wage labor gave rise to new vulnerabilities among the old, the sick and the young. Consequently, the role of the state has expanded to cover the labor force. Quadagno and Myles (2002) argue that Wilensky's (1975) study on the logic of industrialism became a key guideline for future developments, as it was the first study to test empirically the alternative theories on the expansion of the welfare state. In fact, Quadagno and Myles (2002) cite Wilensky's argument that "economic growth is mediated by demographic change", which in turn leads to an increased life expectancy and population aging (Wilensky, 1975, quoted in Quadagno and Myles, 2002, p. 36).

Quadagno and Myles (2002, p. 37) argue that, while industrialization theory puts emphasis on the determining role of the changing forces of production (the logic of industrialism), the early neo-Marxist approach focused on the changing relations

of production (the logic of capitalism). The welfare state is the inevitable product of large economic forces which are beyond the control of both the policy makers and the public that demand a common response. The class-based analytical accounts took a different turn in the late 1970s, with a particular emphasis on political issues, to explain the diversity of the welfare state. What came to be known as “power resource theory” was based on a “theory of distribution” in capitalist democracies.

Quadagno and Myles (2002, p. 38) argue that during the 1980s, the perspective on political issues took a different direction with the aim of explaining a distinctive development of welfare institutions in the U.S. While society-centered approaches put an emphasis on the role of elections and political parties, the polity-centered approach emphasizes the role of organization and the structure of state institutions. According to this approach, in addition to the balance of class forces; the institutional features of the government and the rules of electoral competition also shape the electoral and policy outcomes.

Quadagno and Myles (2002, pp. 39-40) argue that although the industrialization approach was highly influential, Esping-Andersen assumed that politics and political institutions are other key determinants of the welfare state. In his ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ (1990), Esping-Andersen (1990) analyzed welfare states in rich capitalist democracies and concluded that welfare states “could be differentiated not only in terms of expenditure or tax, but also by their institutional logic for assigning welfare functions to the state, the market and the family” (1990, pp. 26-33).

Quadagno and Myles (2002, pp. 47-50) argue that “the new politics of welfare theory flow up from slow economic growth, rising unemployment of the 1970s and 1980s and the impending threat of population aging.” They also maintain that economic globalization has been a key factor which accounts for the change in welfare state policies since the 1970s. The combinations of globalization, slower productivity growth, the increase in unemployment and the oil crisis in the 1970s have stimulated the fiscal pressures from both the government and the welfare recipients. Furthermore, the massive transformation from manufacturing to service sector employment (post-industrialism) has been a major factor that triggered this decline. Meanwhile, the prolific literature on women and the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s enriched the research on traditional the welfare state. In fact, in the contemporary period, gender relations and family forms assumed a central role in the restructuring of the welfare state.

2.1.2 The three worlds of the welfare state

In his book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 26) proposes three main types of welfare states regime and three worlds of welfare de-commodification typologies which focused “on cross-national variations in social legislation and welfare-state configuration in 18 OECD countries”. Esping-Andersen (1990) maintains that the term welfare state comprises two fundamental concepts of social protection and the protection of citizens from the risks of modern society on the basis of social rights.

Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 21-23) argues that “welfare is provided through a complex interaction of the state, market and the family”. Esping-Andersen’s study is based on the assumption that “the holistic employment of ideal types of welfare regimes helps to bring different trajectories in welfare state development into focus.” Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 26-27) defines three ideal types of welfare regimes by using de-commodification index: liberal (or market-oriented), conservative or corporatist and social democratic.

Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 26-27) argues that the liberal type of welfare state puts emphasis on equal opportunity and individualistic equity, where social positions are open to everyone, people are responsible for their own welfare, and they are awarded by the market in accordance to their achievements and efforts. In liberal regimes such as UK, USA, Canada, and Australia, the welfare provision is minimal, while the welfare benefits are modest and often depend on strict entitlement criteria, and the welfare recipients are usually means-tested and stigmatized. The state encourages the market by financing private welfare schemes. The liberal regime type of welfare state minimizes the “de-commodification effects while effectively containing the realm of social rights and erecting an order of stratification” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26-27). Arts and Gelissen (2001, p. 286) argue that in the liberal regime “horizontal and vertical solidarity are low, as is the degree of de-commodification and income redistribution.” The liberal principle of stratification entails a minority of low-income state dependants as well as a majority of people who can afford private social insurance plans.

Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 27) argues that the conservative-corporatist regime type of welfare state emphasizes equity over redistribution by considering status differentials based on social class. “The degree of de-commodification is moderate and depends strongly upon one’s position in the labour market and within the family. Private insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a fairly marginal role.” According to Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 27) the corporatist regimes (such as Germany, France, Austria, and Italy) are also influenced by the Church and are therefore committed to the preservation of traditional family structures. Social insurance excludes non-working wives, while family benefits encourage motherhood. Moreover, the corporatist regimes strongly discourage the participation of married women in the labour market. The principle of subsidiarity is yet another significant trait of the conservative regime type, whereby “the state will only interfere when the family’s ability to service its members is exhausted”. ‘Status differentiation’ of the welfare program is yet another distinctive feature of the conservative welfare state regime, whereby the benefits are often income-related and administered through the employer.

Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 27-28) argues that the social-democratic type of welfare state regime (such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark) highlights the principle of universalism as well as the de-commodification of social rights. In the social-democratic type of welfare state, the state plays a predominant role by taking a full responsibility to ensure the social welfare of its citizens “by guaranteeing everybody a minimum standard of living, providing full citizenship and preventing social exclusion”. This regime type is characterized by a high level of de-commodification, a high standard for meeting citizens’ needs and providing generous benefits that do

not depend on individual contributions. In contrast to the welfare provision in the ‘Third World’ countries, the defining characteristics of social democratic regimes are “universal and relatively generous benefits, a commitment to full employment and income protection as well as a strongly interventionist state” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 27-28).

Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 28) argues that the social democratic regime type leads to the emancipation of the market as well as the traditional family. In contrast to the liberal type of welfare state, the social democratic regime type “crowds out the market and constructs a universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state”.

In the social democratic regime type, irrespective of whether they have children or not, the state encourages the women to take part in the labour market, especially in the public sector. Neither of the two regime types espouses full employment as an integral part of their welfare state commitment. Furthermore, women are discouraged from working in the conservative regime, while the liberal regime is more concerned with the sanctity of the market than the gender.

2.1.3 Critiques of three worlds of welfare capitalism

Quadagno and Myles (2002, p. 41) argue that Esping-Andersen’s most-cited regime typologies theory have been considerably criticized by some scholars for either ignoring or over-simplifying complexities within regime types and for overlooking certain aspects of the gender logic of welfare regimes.

Arts and Gelissen (2002, pp. 142-145) argue that the criticism that the classification of regime types ignores and oversimplifies the complexities within regime types is particularly valid for the Mediterranean countries, which have been systematically excluded. In fact, Italy was categorized as a corporatist welfare state regime, while Spain, Portugal and Greece were not. Esping-Andersen (1990) categorized them in the continental-corporatist model, even though they share certain important characteristics such as Catholic identity (with the exception of Greece) and a strong familialism. Esping-Andersen's systematic failure to take into account the Mediterranean countries has triggered a lively debate over the existence of a Southern social policy model. This debate gave rise to new classifications which try to demonstrate the existence of a separate Southern Model of social policy. Arts and Gelissen (2001, pp. 285-286) propose three more welfare regime-types which are absent in the classification of the ideal typology of Esping-Andersen: The Southern or Mediterranean welfare states, the Antipodean or Radical welfare states of Australia and New Zealand and, the East-Asian communitarian welfare states.

According to Arts and Gelissen (2002, p. 147), the second most significant criticism over Esping-Andersen's regime classification is that it is based on a class-related dimension and therefore ignores the gender-based analysis of the welfare state. Gender critiques maintain that although women obtained full civil and political rights a long time ago, due to their lower status in the labour market they are still suffering from formal or informal discrimination in terms of their social rights. In fact, many feminist authors have highlighted the need to incorporate the sexual division of paid and unpaid work, especially care and domestic labour, in the typology.

In conclusion, the evolution of the concept of welfare state from Kant's period to the industrialization era, which was a radical process that resulted in "the dependence of the individual on the market for survival" and therefore gave rise to the need for social security, "rendered redistribution a matter of social justice and an urgent societal problem". For this reason, the main goal for the welfare state is to promote social justice to mitigate inequalities and to provide protection through a social security system against the market's rigidity (Roosma et al., 2013, p. 237).

2.1.4 The South European welfare state model

Scholars such as Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996) and Gough (1996) elaborated on the similarities of welfare policies among Mediterranean countries in 1990s. Grütjen (2008, p.119) argues that, more recently, studies by feminist scholars on welfare policies also have had an impact on the examination of the welfare states in southern Europe. These studies stress the role of the family as a main component of the Southern European welfare model.

Ferrera's (1996, p. 29) study covered Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. In many respects, Italy's welfare development has paved the way for the entire region. Ferrera (1996) focuses on four key aspects of social security systems which constitute the Southern European welfare model:

1. the peculiar 'excesses' in income maintenance, where peaks of generosity are accompanied by wide gaps in protection
2. in the field of health care, a departure from institutional corporatism and the (partial) establishment of national health services based on universal principles
3. the low degree of state penetration in the welfare sphere and the peculiar mix between public and non-public actors and institutions

4. the persistence of clientelism and the formation, in some cases, of fairly elaborate 'patronage systems' for the selective distribution of cash subsidies" (p. 29).

Ferrera (1996, p. 30) maintains that the four aspects mentioned above certainly do not cover the entire catalogue of peculiarities in South European countries.

According to Arts and Gelissen (2001), although the Southern Mediterranean welfare state model is similar to the conservative type, it is "characterized by a high degree of familialism and an immature social security system with a low level of de-commodification" (p. 286).

The historical review presented in this section has been evaluated in chronological order, with a specific emphasis on the post-World War II period. The three regime types of Esping-Andersen have been evaluated in detail. A specific emphasis was made on the criticism on Esping-Andersen's failure to include south European countries in general and Turkey in particular. In the following section, the concept of social trust and attitudes toward the welfare state will be elaborated in detail.

2.2 Social trust

Based on the theoretical conceptualization, this section first reviews the studies that deal with the term of social trust and second the studies that deal with the link between trust and attitudes towards the welfare state.

To begin with, there is a variety of definitions, meanings and an abundant discussion on the concept of trust. There is an overall consensus among philosophers

and sociologists that the concept of trust is important for social as well as political reasons (Delhey and Newton, 2003, p. 94).

In ancient Greece, Aristotle described trust as a friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle maintains that friendship consists of three elements, namely utility, pleasure, and virtue. According to him, “friendship based on virtue is the most perfect type in so far as it focuses on the pursuit of goodness or moral excellence for its own sake, rather than merely seeking self-interest or individual pleasures” (as cited in Scorza, 2004, p. 89).

In *Leviathan*, the Enlightenment philosopher Hobbes described the concept of trust as a “...cooperation, and norms of reciprocity in anarchy” (as cited in Raub and Voss, 1986, p. 86). He maintains that in the absence of an enforcing agency, it is difficult to establish the norms of cooperation, norms of reciprocity and mutual recognition of property rights, to prevent war of every man against every man where each person represents a threat to others. On the other hand, this war of man against every man could be profitable and could paradoxically generate an environment of peace (Raub and Voss, 1986, p. 86).

De Tocqueville elaborated trust in the context of the American democracy which is an element of the culture for survival of democracy. He also emphasized the concept of distrust as a cause-and-effect determinant of unequal income distribution and a threat to the regime (as cited in Esmer, 1999, p. 24).

Delhey and Newton (2003) state that scholars such as De Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, Durkheim and Simmel assign a central role to the concept of trust within the context of “reciprocity, solidarity, cooperation to make clear social behavior at the individual level, citizen involvement in the local community and its voluntary activities” (p. 97).

Newton (2013) defines the concept of trust as the “belief that others will not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do you harm, and will, at best, act in your interests” (p. 1). The concept of belief could be divided into two parts: social trust is based on the assumption that people would not intend to do anything against their own advantage. Likewise, Hardin (1998, p. 14) defines trust as “encapsulated interest”, Warren (1999) maintains that “trust involves shared interests or lack of malice” (p. 311), while Gambetta (1998) argues that “trust involves the belief that others would behave in a way which is beneficial to us, or which is at least not harmful” (p. 158). On the other hand, Offe (1999) defines trust as the “belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contribute to my/our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us” (p.47).

According to Luhmann (2000, pp. 94-107), the concept of trust has never been covered by mainstream sociology and empirical research has perceived trust too generally and relied on rather general and unspecified ideas. After making a distinction between the concepts of familiarity, confidence, and trust, Luhmann describes trust as “a solution for specific problems of risk, which is based on a circular relation between risk and action”, and depends on perception and attribution. As for Newton (2001), he asserts that “trust involves risks, it is true, but it also helps

to convert the Hobbesian state of nature from something that is nasty, brutish and short, into something that is more pleasant, more efficient, and altogether more peaceful. Social life without trust would be intolerable and, most likely, quite impossible” (p. 202).

The term of trust is intertwined with numerous other concepts. Most of the literature on the concept of trust deals implicitly or explicitly with generalized or particular trust as well as social or political trust. It is important to make a distinction between generalized trust and particularized trust. Bjørnskov (2006, p. 2) elaborates on Banfield’s (1958) study on the difference of particularized and generalized trust. Banfield’s study of a Southern Italian village where individuals are connected by strong bonds within families, while no such connection exists between families. Banfield (1958) coined the term of ‘amoral familism’ to describe the situation where “no trust exists between people who do not know each other through ties such as families or kin groups”. To explain the difference between particularized and generalized trust, Banfield maintains that particularized trust arises from face-to-face interactions, while generalized trust concerns trust towards strangers.

Fukuyama (1995) distinguishes generalized and particularized trust to emphasize the share of moral values. In fact, he argues that “as a general rule, trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior. To some extent, the particular character of those values is less important than the fact that they are shared” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 153). According to Bjørnskov (2006), generalized trust is a

fundamentally different concept from particularized trust in so far as it is “extended to people on whom the trusting part has no direct information” (p. 2).

The terms of generalized inter-personal trust, inter-personal trust and generalized trust are often used synonymously. Likewise, the terms of institutional trust and political trust are often used synonymously. From now on, the term social trust will be used to refer to both generalized inter-personal trust and inter-personal trust.

Even though the concepts of social trust and political trust are occasionally used in the same way, their relationship is rather controversial. Despite certain similarities, they are different in other respects. Newton (2013) makes a distinction between social and political trust where “social trust could be based upon the immediate, first-hand experience of others, whereas political trust is more generally learned indirectly and from a distance, usually through the media. While social trust is considered to be essential for civilized social life, political trust is considered to be essential for a democratic and stable political life” (p. 3). In fact, in an earlier study, Newton (2001) argued that recent studies demonstrate that the chance of citizens paying their taxes increases is based on social and political trust. Accordingly, “trust improves the practical possibilities of social cooperation, while at the same time reducing the risks of free-riding citizens and exploitative elites” (Newton, 2001, p. 205).

Likewise, Mishler and Rose (2005, p. 5) highlight the controversial relationship between inter-personal and institutional trust. In an earlier study, Mishler

and Rose (2003) argued that even though Putnam (1993) defines their relationship as uni-directional (inter-personal trust leads to institutional trust), according to other scholars it is rather reciprocal, “whereby confidence in political institutions and social trust are equally likely to influence each other” (Mishler and Rose, 2005, p. 5). Meanwhile, other scholars are skeptical of any possible relationship between social trust and political trust.

Newton (2013, p. 1) cites Simmel (1950) who maintains that “trust is one of the most important synthetic forces within society.” Newton (2001) also argues that “the most recent variation on these themes is to be found in recent writings on social capital” (p. 202).

Delhey and Newton (2003) argue that trust is at the centre of a set of concepts and is important for practical daily life as well as for social science theory, including “life satisfaction, happiness, optimism, well-being, health, economic prosperity, education, welfare, participation, community, civil society and democracy. Furthermore, social trust is a core component of social capital and is normally used as a key indicator of it, sometimes as the best or the sole indicator” (p.94).

Delhey and Newton (2003) propose two main approaches on the concept of trust which generally accept the following two concepts: The individual property relates to “individual characteristics such as class, education, income, age, and gender” (p. 94), while property pertains to social systems, rather than individuals. According to Delhey and Newton’s analysis, “the study of trust requires a top-down

approach that focuses on the systemic or emergent properties of the societies and their central institutions” (Delhey and Newton, 2003, p. 94).

Furthermore, Delhey and Newton (2003) single out “six main theories of trust, ranging from bottom-up individual to top-down societal theories” (p. 112). Individual level theories highlight the civic engagement, organizational membership, individuals’ life experience of becoming winners or losers in society, optimism and sense of control over the future that is formed during early socialization (p.95). Societal level theories focus on “economic development, democracy, income equality, control of corruption, ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism” (You, 2005, p.3).

Delhey and Newton (2003) found that three of these six theories work better (individual level theories seem to work best for countries with a higher levels of trust, while societal level theories are more appropriate for societies with lower levels of trust). Most importantly, “social trust tends to be high among citizens who believe that there are few severe social conflicts and where the sense of public safety is high. Second, informal social networks are associated with trust. And third, those who are successful in life tend to trust more” (p. 93).

Although trust is at the centre of a set of multiple concepts, in cross-national research in particular, the trust literature comes up with numerous contradictory empirical results, even those that concern a specific country. In contrast to Delhey and Newton (2003), You (2005, pp. 3-6) argues that many empirical studies and explanations are theoretically rather weak, while the empirical tests are far from adequate. According to You (2005), there is such a close correlation among the

variables such as democracy and social trust, effects of corruption, income equality and racial-ethnic homogeneity, aversion of heterogeneity, linguistic and religious homogeneity that it is hard to figure out which one causes which. You argues that “economic development is more likely to be a consequence, rather than a cause of social trust”.

Based on this conclusion, You (2005) offers a new theory concerning the concept of social trust which highlights fairness by arguing that societies which are fair “in terms of distributive, procedural, and formal justice tend to encourage trustworthy behavior as well as trust in others” (p. 6).

An earlier study by Rothstein and Stolle (2003) has also elaborated on the concept of fairness and argued that procedural fairness tends to reinforce social trust. Moreover, Uslaner (2003) links the concept of trust with that of fairness. Uslaner (2003, p. 7) makes a distinction between strategic and moralistic trust. While strategic trust leads to cooperation, resolves problems of trust among a small number of people and reflects our expectations about how other people would tend to behave; the concept of moralistic trust puts emphasis on civic engagement, which defines how people should behave.

According to Uslaner (2003, pp. 8-12), while strategic trust is based on uncertainty, rather than a negative view of the world, moralistic trust concerns positive feelings, so we either tend to trust most people or we do not. The essence of generalized trust– and what distinguishes this concept from distrust as well as particularized trust– is a sense of optimism and control.

Some scholars propose different possible determinants of social trust. According to Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), the possible determinants of social trust are related to three different values: the first one is the intrinsic value, which concerns personal happiness and optimism about the future; the second is political value, which advocates fairer institutions, fostering minority rights and a more tolerant society; the third is economic value, which consists of a positive relation between individual earnings and overall economic development. Uslaner (2003) argues that “wherever there is civic engagement, trust must be either the cause or the effect, or both” (p.70).

In fact, Putnam (1993) describes this situation as a “virtuous circle” which consists of participation, social networks and trust. Uslaner (2003), explains the importance of trust by arguing that “it has a moral dimension and ethical component, and it only matters for forms of engagement that bind us to our larger community” (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, p. 70).

The level of social trust is directly associated with inequality. In fact, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, p.42) argue that economic equality and equal opportunity are the two different and inter-related types of equality that foster social trust. The degree of equality of government policies determines the level of social trust directly.

Accordingly, corruption produces higher levels of inequality, which in turn gives rise to lower levels of trust. In fact, Uslaner’s (2005) analysis of survey data from Romania and Estonia found that in the societies with a perception of high-level

corruption, people tend to be distrustful towards their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, p. 54). Uslaner and Brown (2005, p. 869) suggest that “inequality leads to lower levels of trust” and inequality has an indirect effect on reducing the level of trust.

According to Uslaner (2003, p. 8), even though the level of economic inequality is the strongest predictor of trust in the United States, trust has no direct impact on inequality. Uslaner and Brown (2005, pp. 870-871) describe two aspects where higher inequality leads to a lower level of trust: A high level of inequality reduces optimism for the future, whereby people from different socio-economic levels would be less inclined to have a sense of a common fate. Likewise, You (2005, p. 165) confirms the correlation between inequality and trust in individual-level data and, by making use of the 1995–2001 waves of the World Values Surveys, he presents hierarchical linear models for generalized trust in eighty countries. These models show that trust tends to be lower in countries with higher levels of inequality. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, p. 48) maintain that inequality is one of the best predictors of trust and the relation among trust and economic inequality is very strong.

According to the analysis by Uslaner (2005), a multivariate statistical model of trust has to include standard predictors of trust such as “education, sociability with neighbors, race, age, and economic status, optimism about life in the future, feelings of efficacy in politics, attitudes toward your own in-group, perceptions of desirable traits for children and the belief that one would be better off worrying less about inequality” (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, p. 61).

The cultural and institutional theories on trust are useful in explaining the functioning of and support level for democratic regimes. Mishler and Rose (2005, pp. 3-5) compared cultural and institutional theories and conclude that while cultural theories present three inter-related perspectives as to how and why trust matters, institutional theories challenge the significance of trust for democracies and questions whether this is a cultural trait. In order to test the cultural and institutional theories of regime support, Mishler and Rose (2005) analyzed the data from the New Russia Barometer X survey: “While the results substantiate cultural arguments (which claim that political trust tends to encourage political involvement and contributes to public support for democratic ideals); they also do contradict the hypothesis that trust is a critical factor for political support” (Mishler and Rose, 2005, p. 3).

2.3 Attitudes towards the welfare state

2.3.1 The effects of social trust

Over the last two decades, cross-national studies by various scholars indicated a growing interest in explaining the attitudes towards the welfare state (Andreß and Heien, 1999, p. 2). The literature recommends employing a number of measures due to the complexity of the process for evaluating public attitudes towards the welfare state. In the comparative welfare state literature, the preferences of citizens and their impact on the welfare state come up as a main theme. How are preferences formed and how do they influence welfare state development?

Trust plays a substantial role in explaining the demand for redistribution. The role of trust in shaping the welfare outcomes is highlighted in the work of Bergh and Bjornskov (2010, p. 2). They find that countries with historically high levels of trust currently provide extensive welfare state arrangements compared to those with lower levels of confidence. In fact, many recent studies particularly emphasized the apparent correlation between the high levels of trust in the Scandinavian countries and their extensive welfare policies.

The relationship between trust and the welfare state is examined by Algan et al., (2011, p. 6), who provide a micro evidence analysis to identify a specific relationship between trust and the demand for a welfare state in 24 countries, including Turkey. Their study finds that factors which make a significant impact on the attitudes towards the welfare state are trust levels of individuals, income levels, political orientation, gender, education and unemployment. More specifically, their study finds that at the micro level, trust has a positive effect on attitudes towards the welfare state. While those who tend to place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum, those who are more educated, those who have a higher income, as well as men in general, tend to have a negative attitude towards the welfare state, those who are unemployed have a positive attitude.

In the same study, Algan et al. (2011) test whether trust level of countries has an impact on the size of welfare states. They find a statistically significant U-shaped relationship between trust levels and the size of the welfare state. In other words, there is a non-monotonic relationship between trust levels and the size of the welfare

state, whereby low-trust and high-trust countries tend to have larger welfare states compared to medium trust countries.

The study by Wendt et al. (2011) focuses primarily on Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare regime typology and points out that different form of attitudes and "different types of welfare states create certain patterns of public support" (p. 15). According to Morrone and Ranuzzi (2009), public trust "reflects people's perception of others' reliability and may affect economic and social development by facilitating market exchange, enabling better functioning of public institutions and increasing the capacity for collective action" (Morrone and Ranuzzi, 2009, p. 90).

Institutionally-oriented scholars present institutional trust as a key concept which is related to perceptions of state capacity. By using the European Social Survey 2008 data, Svallfors (2013, p. 366) analyzed the perception of government quality and its impact on the attitudes towards the welfare state. According to him, a few studies by Edlund, (1999, 2006) and Svallfors, (1999, 2002) looked at how political trust affects attitudes towards welfare policies and found that political trust has a fairly 'minor importance' in explaining individual-level differences in attitudes towards the welfare state and none whatsoever in explaining variation among countries in terms of the level of support for the welfare state. Moreover, Edlund (2006, p. 398) employed the Latent Class Analysis, which is based on data from a Swedish national representative survey and found that "distrust in institutional capability is an important cause of general welfare state support withdrawal" (Edlund, 2006, p. 398).

Svallfors and Edlund (2003) maintain that the differences in welfare regime types shape attitudes towards welfare policies to a fairly limited extent. According to national surveys conducted in Sweden and Norway, political trust is strongly linked to the following aspects of welfare policy: “taxation, welfare financing forms, welfare services delivery, tax evasion and abuse of welfare benefits” (Svallfors, 2013, p. 397). Accordingly, people who tend to trust their government are “less discontented with taxes, less permissive towards tax evasion, more willing to finance and manage welfare policies collectively, and less suspicious about welfare fraud, than are people with low trust in government” (Svallfors, 2013, p. 397). Svallfors (2013) maintains that, while political trust does not shape how people view the role of the state, it does shape the way they perceive what the state is actually doing.

Likewise, Pitlik and Kouba (2014, p. 2) argue that some scholars (such as Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer) addressed the role of trust in economic regulation and interventionist attitudes and conclude that individuals who distrust others tend to have a stronger taste for government regulation of economic activities, while people with a high level of inter-personal trust are in favor of less strict regulations and less control by the state. This could also be the case in attitudes towards welfare state.

The boundaries of the European Union and its population kept growing since the beginning of the European integration and member states with very different attributes could still be classified as welfare states. In fact, according to Svallfors (2012), “while Scandinavian countries are so generous and transparent, the Continental European welfare states as large as in Scandinavian countries are

perceived as much less transparent and efficient by their citizens” (p.9). He argues that although there are certain exceptions in the European Union regarding the demands for public responsibility, dissatisfaction with regard to the performance of the welfare state and government responsibility, it could be said that East-West and North-South divisions overshadow other differences between countries. According to Svallfors, in Europe, the East-West division should not only be interpreted by the communist history, but also by the current suffering caused by poverty and unemployment. Moreover, “the current economic crisis will increase the North-South division in Europe since the Mediterranean countries have been much harder hit than those of North-Western Europe” (Svallfors, 2012, p. 9).

Individual subjective well-being is directly linked to trust as well as to attitudes towards the welfare state. The level of well-being is measured on an eleven-point rating scale with these two standard survey issues in the ESS: life satisfaction and happiness. Bjørnskov (2003, p. 10) illustrates that in country-level analysis, there is a significant correlation between social trust (which is perceived as a proxy measure of social capital), life satisfaction and happiness. According to Bjørnskov, in high-income countries in particular, social trust exerts a significant impact on national happiness and life satisfaction. Furthermore, by using data from a survey in Taiwan, Chang (2009, p. 863) concludes that the level of social trust is positively correlated to happiness. He argues that, although previous studies indicated that social trust is associated with the performance of the government, “enhancing the level of social trust in Taiwan does not only increase people’s subjective happiness at an individual level but also makes a corresponding impact by improving government’s performance” (Chang, 2009, p. 863).

Since this thesis aims to test the impact of trust level on attitudes towards the welfare state at an individual level and since the welfare regime type will be constant for a single year study of one country – i.e. Turkey in 2008 – the evidence provided in the literature suggests that trust is expected to make a positive impact on the attitudes towards the welfare state.

2.3.2 Other explanatory factors

This section examines other explanatory factors identified in the literature to explain individual attitudes towards the welfare state: gender, age, education, employment status, household income, life satisfaction and happiness, left–right placement, and ethnicity. Which individual-level indicators provide the best explanation for the variations in individuals’ attitudes toward the welfare state? What are the exact reasons for public support for the welfare state? Why do people support public provision of welfare?

In most industrialized countries, public support is undoubtedly a significant aspect of the ‘legitimacy of the welfare state’. The most important part of the welfare state support depends mainly on whether people benefit from or contribute to the financing of the welfare state. Although the wide range of literature accepts that people with low incomes tend to be particularly supportive of the welfare provision, a number of studies have shifted the emphasis from the significance of the economic situation to the perception of changes in their income level.

Finseraas and Ringdal (2012, p. 74) “constructed a summary scale of the scope of the welfare state as the mean of the scores on six items in order to challenge little differences. High scores indicate support for a wide scope and low scores indicate support for limited government responsibilities.” The findings of the summary index of government responsibility demonstrate that “Europeans are in favour of quite wide-ranging government responsibility for various welfare measures [and] ...almost all countries, [about 30], fall between 7 and 9 on the 0-10 scale [where 10 indicates entirely governments' responsibility]” (Svallfors, 2012, pp. 4-5)

Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003, p. 1) argue that attitudes towards the welfare state derive from both situational and ideological factors at individual as well as national level. Jaeger (2006, p. 321) identifies self-interest and political ideology as the two main factors that shape attitudes towards the welfare state. Andreß and Heien (1999), however, argue there are four different determinants that explain attitudes towards the welfare state: “self interest, values and norms (especially beliefs on justice), different patterns of socialization and national welfare cultures” (p. 5).

I will focus on self interest approach which classified by both Jaeger (2006) and Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) and ideology argument while reviewing Andreß and Heien's (1999) four different determinants.

2.3.2.1 Self-interest

The self-interest approach is based on the assumption that people tend to favour policies that benefit them financially to the extent that individual preferences and support for the welfare state are determined by the use of and need for benefits (Pederson, 2014, p. 38). The rational choice argument hypothesizes the idea that “individuals will evaluate those aspects of the welfare state positively from which they gain personally which maximize utility, and disapprove those aspects that do not appear advantageous for their own interests” (Andreß and Heien, 1999, p. 6). In fact, Andreß and Heien (1999) argue that welfare recipients are more likely to show positive attitudes toward these benefits compared to the people who are less likely to receive them. According to Andreß and Heien (1999, p. 2), empirical studies offer some support for the self-interest argument with regard to the contributor-recipient, class-status group, occupational-income groups, and elderly-middle aged population factors.

Blekesaune (2007) argues that “those who are economically most vulnerable and therefore most likely to receive welfare state benefits are also the most likely to support the welfare state” (p.394). In short, the individuals who personally benefit from the welfare state tend to view it positively, while those who do not benefit as much have a negative attitude.

Andreß and Heien (1999, p. 6) argue that the literature on the support for the welfare state focuses on three types of interests (namely, consumers of services, contributors to the welfare state as a taxpayer, and producers employed in the public

sector), of which are determined by the individual's status in the society. Consumers of services, a group which includes "women, old age pensioners, young families with children, persons with low income or low level of education, ethnic minorities, the unemployed or the disabled", rely on the welfare state for material support and these people then demonstrate a much higher degree of support compared to those who consume less.

The taxpayers who contribute to the welfare state are likely to show negative attitudes towards the welfare state. Yet these contributors not only pay taxes, they too benefit from the welfare state. On the one hand, middle class people, despite their tax burdens, tend to show a strong support for the welfare state as they benefit from healthcare and education services. On the other hand, other scholars claim that although they benefit from the welfare programs, both middle class and working class people tend to oppose the welfare state as they resent having to pay additional taxes.

Producers are those who are employed in the public sector and who tend to be more positive about the welfare state than people in other categories. This is due to nature of their employment as well as the fact that "their careers, working conditions and economic rewards depend on the prosperity of the welfare state" (Andreß and Heien, 1999, p. 6).

Pederson (2014) argues that age helps to explain the variation in attitudes towards different welfare state programs. In fact, age plays an important role in attitudes towards childcare and nursing homes, but not necessarily for pensioners,

healthcare or pension programs. “Younger people are more supportive of childcare programs, while older people tend to favor nursing home programs” (Pederson, 2014, p. 39). Likewise, the study by Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle (2009), which covers 14 OECD countries, analyse relative impact of age on individual attitudes towards the welfare state. The empirical evidence confirms that “in some cases age is a better predictor of welfare state attitudes than income, which confirms that one’s position in the life cycle is more important than income in determining the type of programs an individual is likely to support” (Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle, 2009, pp. 195-212).

Recent empirical studies demonstrate that gender-based differences incorporate both the values and factors of the self-interest approach. Svallfors (1997) concludes that women tend to be more supportive of welfare state policies compared to men. In fact, Svallfors (1997) argues that “even after taking the different class positions of men and women into account, gender differences are clear-cut in all regime types” (p. 296). Likewise, Arts and Gelissen (2001, p. 289) argue that women tend to favour the principle of equality, while men put an emphasis on merit.

Pederson (2014, pp. 39-40) argues that, in general, women are more likely than men to support welfare state programs and welfare redistribution. Women tend to be more supportive of public pension programs due to the fact that their life expectancy is higher than men; they are a more disadvantaged group in the labor market and are therefore in greater need of state benefits. In fact, welfare benefits are almost the sole source of household income for women in most of the countries examined in that study.

Based on class and status group, Pederson (2014) demonstrates that “the wealthiest respondents are the least likely to support redistribution, while the poorest respondents are not necessarily the most likely to support it” (p. 39). How people identify their own social class shapes their attitudes. Accordingly, irrespective of their actual level of income, not being identified as poor or in need impacts on the attitude of the lower classes. Furthermore, those who use welfare programs or face the risk of using these programs as well as those who are unemployed tend to hold more positive attitudes. On the other hand, those who think that their taxes are funding welfare programs tend to be less positive towards the welfare programs for the poor or the unemployed.

Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) analyzed public attitudes towards “welfare state policies using both individual level and country level predictors, assuming that the articulation and formation of these attitudes is made at multiple levels” (p. 7). The results indicate that, in countries with a high level of unemployment, people tend to express more favourable attitudes towards policies of the welfare state compared to those who risk unemployment. They argue that a high level of unemployment tends to increase the level of public support for social welfare programs as high employment raises people’s awareness on the risk of becoming unemployed.

According to Jaeger (2006), old-age pensioners, the unemployed, students and other member of transfer groups tend to show a high level of support for welfare provision. In fact, according to comparative as well as single-country studies, the unemployed and people who are not in the labour force are more likely to express positive attitudes towards welfare provision, compared to those who are in regular

employment. Jaeger also argued that, “in general, self-interest will manifest in attitudinal cleavages among different social classes, as these have divergent political interests in preserving or reducing the scope of public welfare” (p. 322).

2.3.2.2 Political ideology

According to established theories, the political ideology approach is based on the idea that individual political values and beliefs shape the opinions about the expected scope of public welfare provision. Jaeger (2006) argues that “recent studies illustrate that the level of support for welfare provision is embedded within a general and coherent system of political orientations and ideological preferences” (323).

Both single-country and comparative empirical studies support the argument that a wide range of attitudinal variables (such as subjective position on the left/right continuum, beliefs about social justice and social mobility, egalitarian ideology and post-materialist values) are positively linked to individuals' level of support for public responsibility in welfare provision.

The identification of political ideology is one of the determinants of individual attitudes, which are evaluated in a number of ways in the welfare state literature: Ideological tendencies of the individuals determine the attitudes with regard to the welfare state policies. Blekesaune (2007) argues that attitudes towards the welfare state are determined by basic value systems and are particularly rooted in values concerning the relationship between the individual, the state, and institutions such as the labour market and voluntary organizations.

Empirical studies confirm the argument on ideological preferences, which maintains that the endorsement of social rights has proved to be a key predictor of the level of support for the welfare state. The contradictory set of values and beliefs such as achievement-equality, capitalism-democracy and economic individualism-social equality provide the ideological validation for either supporting or opposing welfare benefits (Blekesaune, 2007, p. 394).

Brooks and Manza (2006, pp. 816-827) argue that both the right- and left-leaning members of the public are opposed to welfare state retrenchment. Although both left- and right-wing support the welfare state, Ervasti (2012) argues that “traditionally, left-wing ideologies have promoted values of economic egalitarianism and supported a large-scale welfare state more prominently than have right-wing ideologies” (p. 236). Likewise, Jaeger (2011) argues that “left-wing orientation is associated with higher demand for redistribution, while a conservative/right party preference has no such effect” (p. 17). Furthermore, Jacoby (1994, pp. 336-361) “found a more coherent public attitude toward . . . social welfare expenditures compared to other governmental expenditures, which reflects a stronger ideological conflict over these policy issues”.

Andreß and Heien (1999) argue that the analysis of values and norms assumed that people who favour egalitarian principles tend to be more supportive of an extensive welfare state compared to those who hold anti-egalitarian views. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the attitudes towards the welfare state with regard to values and norms over justice would provide only a partial explanation. On the one hand, they may be affected by determinants such as the individual’s income level

(for instance, groups with a high level of income tend to show a preference for anti-egalitarian individualism). “On the other hand, values and norms are usually interpreted as products of socialization processes, and in this respect, it is helpful to distinguish between socialization processes on the micro- and the macro-level” (pp. 6-7).

The socialization pattern explains the differences in justice beliefs and in attitudes towards the welfare state among individuals. Individual characteristics, such as age or generation, gender, education, and employment, are used as indicators of various processes of socialization. While women demonstrate “a higher preference towards egalitarian justice beliefs and governmental intervention, men tend to prefer individualistic justice conceptions based on personal performance” (Andreß and Heien, 1999, pp. 7-8).

“Individual experiences indicate that the pattern of socialization presents a non-uniform model, while the concept of cultural integration contradicts such heterogeneity. Certain cultural constants such as religious and ideological background within a nation crystallize into the dominant justice or welfare state ideologies (Andreß and Heien, 1999, p. 8). In fact, Andreß and Heien argue (1999, p. 8) that some researchers make a distinction between predominantly Catholic and Protestant countries, while others make a distinction between countries which have a liberal, socialistic or communistic tradition.

The national level approach examines how the characteristics of specific countries influence the attitudes of the public towards the policies of the welfare

state. In fact, country level characteristics concern either institutional types of welfare policies or economic factors regarding employment, unemployment or overall economic growth.

Blekesaune (2007) argues that groups such as nations determine, at an individual as well collective level, public attitudes towards the welfare state. These “collective attitudes are typically viewed as a product of the institutional characteristics of welfare policies in different countries, which constitute distinct regime types” (p. 2). Accordingly, countries’ cultural, institutional and structural settings normally cause the deviation in welfare state attitudes within countries.

The study of Esping-Andersen’s systematization makes a distinction between welfare regimes with a social democratic, conservative and liberal tendency. According to the research on attitudes, each type of regime is linked to a specific attitude pattern towards the welfare state: “social democratic regimes [like Scandinavian countries as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark] should show the highest level of welfare state support, followed by conservative regimes [like]... Continental European countries as Germany, Austria, Italy, or France [and finally by liberal regimes like]... Anglo-Saxon welfare states such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand with the lowest level of support” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26-27)

Andreß and Heien (1999, p. 10) argue that while scholars such as Gundlach, Peillon and Svallfors support and provide evidence for cross-country differences as well as the hypothesized order of regime types; Esping-Andersen’s typology was

“originally limited to capitalist welfare states. Since many (Eastern) European countries have experienced a non-capitalist history, the question remains whether these countries could be seen as a fourth regime-type” prior to their shift towards the market economy. Furthermore, Gelissen (2000, pp. 289-290) finds that there is a correlation between the specific regime type and the level of popular support for the welfare state when comparing among 14 European countries. According to Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), Gelissen’s study came up with a result that contradicts Esping-Andersen’s theory, where the level of popular support is highest in countries with a liberal regime type, as opposed to the welfare states with a social democratic tendency.

Mischke (2013, p. 32) argues that, empirically speaking, researchers find significant differences among countries with regard to attitudes toward redistribution, solidarity beliefs and governmental responsibility for the other aspects of the welfare provision. According to the cultural model that “welfare state support should be highest in regimes where the state plays an important role in welfare provision and most of the population benefit from transfers because universalism serves as the guiding principle” (Andreß and Heien, 1999, p. 10)

Economic change is another national-level argument concerning public attitudes towards the policies of the welfare state. In fact, Blekesaune (2007) argues that the welfare state was conceived as governments’ functional response to social problems (such as unemployment and disability) that are caused by higher levels of economic development. Accordingly, “economic factors and related social risks are

more important than political ideologies in predicting the welfare state expenditure” (Blekesaune, 2007, pp. 394-395).

Leftist political preferences are yet another national level argument concerning the attitudes of the public towards the welfare state policies which relate to the responsibility of the state for economic support as well as redistribution. For instance, Blekesaune (2007, p. 395) cites leftist political ideas which maintain that “periods of economic insecurity and deprivation should lead to stronger public support”. In response to economic hardship and employment insecurity, individuals tend to focus on their class interests. Furthermore, economic hardships make people focus on their self-interest and be less concerned about the plight of the disadvantaged people. This change of attitude is probably due to their assumption that their taxes are being used for the recipients of welfare benefits, rather than benefiting themselves. According to Erikson et al. (2002) that unemployment shifts the public opinion towards the left, whereas inflation leads to a shift towards the right. (Erikson, 2002, quoted in Blekesaune, 2007, p. 395)

2.3.3 Multi-dimensional analysis

Empirical studies on the attitudes toward the welfare state confirm to some extent the methodological arguments on testing whether or not sets of items are clustered in different factors. Roosma et al. (2013) argue that the limited research on attitudes towards the welfare state which were conducted from a multi-dimensional perspective gave rise to a question about “whether attitudes towards the welfare state

result from distinct attitude patterns regarding the various welfare state dimensions or result from one underlying attitude towards the welfare state” (p. 236).

Although studies generally confirm the multi-dimensional nature of the attitudes towards the welfare state, they are not convincing with regard to the attitude patterns’ structure. Roosma, et al. (2013) identify at least three different causes for these inconclusive results: the differences between countries, the differences in ‘operational definitions of the welfare state dimensions used in the studies’ and the differences resulting from using particular methods.¹

Roosma, et al. (2013, pp. 235-255), identify seven dimensions of welfare state that overlap in earlier studies on its multi-dimensional nature. They use Confirmatory Factor Analyses as well as a conceptual framework of multi-dimensional welfare attitudes, which is tested on cross-country data from 22 countries covered by the European Social Survey in 2008. They find that Eastern/Southern European countries show a favourable attitude towards the role and objectives of their respective governments and a more critical attitude about the efficiency and outcomes of the welfare state. By contrast, Western/Northern countries show positive attitudes towards the impact and efficiency of the welfare state.

¹ Roosma, Femke., Gelissen John., and Oorschot, Wim van., The Multidimensionality of Welfare State Attitudes: A European Cross-National Study, Soc Indic. Res. (2013) Volume 113, p.236 (Svallfors (1991) used an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with the assumption of orthogonal factors and Sihvo and Uusitalo (1995) performed an EFA on separate groups of items but Van Oorschot and Meuleman (2011) used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) as a methodological tool for examining all items in one empirical model.)

Andreß and Heien (1999, p. 24) develop a multi-dimensional model of welfare state attitudes by differentiating four main dimensions in order to answer the following question: to determine whether and to what extent attitudes towards a welfare state are affected by the specific welfare regimes themselves. They make use of data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which was conducted by East and West Germans, Norwegians, and Americans in 1992. The result indicates that the variation in support for the welfare state among different countries could be attributed to the different types of welfare regimes: In fact, the level of support for the welfare state tends to be low in liberal regimes, medium in conservative regimes and high in social-democratic regimes.

Having said this, the highest level of support was actually shown in the area which corresponded to the former East Germany, which indicates that the ideal of social policy did not disappear with the communist regime's collapse in the early 1990s.

Svallfors (1991, pp. 612-614) analyses attitudes towards welfare policies in Sweden by using the data from a survey in 1986. Svallfors proposes four dimensions of welfare policy and elaborates on welfare attitudes in Sweden by measuring each of them with a set of indicators by using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). The result indicates that although there is a general support for the welfare policies in Sweden, this support is actually mixed with criticisms over bureaucracy and suspicion about the abuse of welfare programs. Furthermore, class status and the level of income are more important factors in shaping attitudes than gender, private or public sector location or consumption groups.

A study by Oorschot and Meuleman (2011) tries to determine whether citizens who generally object to state intervention in social affairs could at the same time be in favour of specific social policies and their outcomes. In other words, the question is whether ‘the social legitimacy of the welfare state’ is multi-dimensional or not. Based on the Confirmatory Factor Analyses, this study uses the 2006 Dutch survey with ten dimensions. The result shows that “the dimensions are affected by socio-structural position and ideological dispositions. Notwithstanding this, people’s political stance on a left–right scale consistently affected their scores on all dimensions in an expected direction: leftist people tended to be more positive towards, or less critical of, all aspects of the welfare state, compared with rightist people” (p.90).

In sum, the social trust literature cited above elaborates in detail the following two main approaches: the studies that analyze the concept of social trust as opposed to those that deal with the link between trust and attitudes towards the government responsibility aspect of the welfare state. In conclusion, people’s support for the welfare state seems to be motivated by both self-interest and political preferences. In this section, the individual self-interest and political preferences (such as gender, age, income, socio-economic status, placement on left-right scale, and work for public or private), which are the most crucial determinants of attitudes towards the welfare state, have been elaborated. However, the studies seem to be inconclusive about the role of social trust in micro-level analysis. This is the gap that this thesis fills by exercising the case of Turkey and evaluating the factors that are likely to impact attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey. In the following section, I will be explaining the Turkish case by using a detailed analysis of the literature on the transformation of the welfare state and social trust.

CHAPTER 3

WELFARE STATE AND TRUST IN TURKEY

3.1 The welfare regime in Turkey

This section evaluates the welfare regime in Turkey by providing a brief history and by highlighting the transformation of social security reforms. Similarities between the Turkish welfare regime and those in southern Europe are discussed in the light of mainstream literature. The studies on Turkish welfare regime are numerous (e.g. Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Soyer, 2007; Grütjen, 2007; Eder, 2010; Kılıç, 2010; and Erus et al., 2015).

I will be elaborating on the Turkish welfare regime in four main parts: First, I will briefly mention the history of Turkish welfare state. Then, I will briefly mention the period preceding the new social security reform, with a particular emphasis on pension, healthcare and social assistance systems. In the third section, I will elaborate on the new social security reform and the ongoing relevant discussion. Finally, I will evaluate the similarities between the Turkish welfare regime and those in southern Europe.

3.1.1 A brief history of the Turkish welfare regime

Buğra (2007, p. 36) presents the following three periods in the history of social policy in Turkey in terms of the state-society relations: the authoritarian approaches in the single-party era, the informal social pact in a multi-party political system and

moral economy framework, and an open-market economy or economic rationality and Islamic political tradition. Although these periods are comprehensive and although I agree with Buğra's recommendation, I would suggest slightly different intervals. In fact, I think that the third period in Buğra contains a slightly long-term period and merges two divergent stages: market-oriented or neo-liberal period (1979-1999) and transformation period (2000-to present).

The establishment of a modern social security system in Turkey is a recent phenomenon. In fact, the modern concept of social security and welfare state regime began immediately after World War II. In this section, I will simply elaborate this process in a brief history.

The Turkish welfare regime was founded in the post-World War II period, which led to a rapid increase in public welfare expenditures, following the example of Western capitalist democracies (Quadagno, 1987, p. 109). The social security system, which was established in 1946, evolved significantly during the 1960s and 1970s. This system consisted of three separate social security and pension funds: The "Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu-SSK" (Social Security Institution) for blue- and white-collar workers in both public and private sectors was established in 1946, the "Emekli-Sandığı" (Government Employees Retirement Fund) (GERF) was established in 1950, and "Bağ-Kur" (Social Security Organization for Artisans and the Self-Employed) was established in 1971. Furthermore, a small non-contributory pension scheme for the elderly (65+) was established for those who did not have any means of financial support (OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2008, pp. 28-29)

Launched in the late 1970s, the neo-liberal policies gradually transformed into market-oriented economic policies in the beginning of the 1980s. The transformation of the rural and urban structures had a negative impact on informal social support mechanisms as well as the labor market (Kılıç, 2010, p. 166). Simultaneously, the neo-liberal policies have become more apparent in Turkey's politics and society due to the urbanization process and unemployment. In the early 1980s, half of the active labor force was employed in the agricultural sector (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 220).

The military coup in 1980 unexpectedly intervened in the ongoing social policies through the 1982 Constitution, which guaranteed citizens' rights to social security: according to Article 56, "everyone has the right to live in a healthy, balanced environment" and according to Article 60, "everyone has the right to social security and the State shall take the necessary measures and establish the organization for the provision of social security." (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, pp. 19-20)

In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, the conflict in the south-east of Turkey between the Turkish Armed Forces and PKK Kurdish separatist forces forced many Kurdish people to migrate from their villages. Unlike previous waves of migrants, the Kurdish people in the south-east migrated to the cities without having any assurance "provided by the existing networks set up by family members or co-locals" (Buğra, 2007, pp. 45-46). Then, the family as a traditional welfare mechanism demonstrates "a growing inability to protect Turkey's citizens from the challenges of the modern society" (Grütjen, 2007, p. 112).

In the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, several social assistance schemes were launched in response to urban poverty, ethnic dimensions and the process of socio-economic integration. Among these social assistance schemes, the most important one is the Social Cooperation and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (1986), “which is an umbrella organization covering local foundations and providing emergency relief, mostly in kind, to the poor” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 222).

The establishment of the Social Cooperation and Solidarity Encouragement Fund (currently called the General Directorate of Social Cooperation and Solidarity (SYDGM) could be interpreted as a perceived inability of the family to fulfill its traditional role in welfare provision (Kılıç, 2010, p. 166). In 1992, the coalition government of the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP) and the True Path Party (DYP) launched another scheme called “Yesil Kart” (Green Card). This scheme provides health benefits to poor or vulnerable citizens who are unable afford health services. The Green Card program was conceived as a transitional solution until the launch of the Universal Health Insurance (OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2008, pp. 28-29).

3.1.2 The Turkish welfare regime before the 2003 transformation

Buğra and Keyder (2006) argue that Turkey’s welfare regime is a fragmented and hierarchical one and is principally based on a “corporatist character which provides combined health and pension benefits to formally employed heads of household according to their status at work. This separate system coexists with a labour market

structure where self-employment, unpaid family labour, and informal employment practices are very important” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 212).

Moreover, Eder (2010, pp. 154-155) argues that the state assumes a dominant role on social policy in most developing countries, especially when both the welfare state and government-led social policy framework are either not adequately developed or their coverage is too limited. Consequently, instead of the state, it is the family, the community groups, the NGOs and private initiatives that assume an active role in social provision. Likewise, women, who were neglected in this framework, actually play the most crucial role in welfare provision, especially in developing countries and particularly in terms of care for children and the elderly.

Additionally, Grütjen (2007, p. 116) adds the municipalities to the list of other actors that play an important role, along with the state. According to Grütjen, since the 1980s, new actors have emerged in the Turkey’s welfare system whose role proved to be particularly important. This role was initially limited to charity work and aid-in-kind poverty relief. For instance, municipalities set up soup kitchens and provided food and fuel as well as low-level financial assistance.

The social security system in Turkey resembles the Bismarckian model, which entails public pension expenditures and, to a lesser extent, private pensions. The system covers employers and dependent families.

Buğra and Keyder (2006, p. 213) argue that the official social policy in Turkey has encompassed the provision of free public education at all levels, as well

as a combined public health and pension system which depends on employment status. By contrast, the new social security reform consists of pensions, health insurance and social assistance. These three components are relevant to “fiscal constraints, the state’s role over the market and the level of coverage” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 213). Buğra and Keyder (2006) maintain that the content of these arguments concerns the interventions by the World Bank. “Nonetheless, there are particularities deriving from Turkey’s conservative-corporatist history of social policy and the specific ideological mix which pits the Islamic liberalism of the government against the leftist modernism of most of the opposition” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 213).

The first component for the new social security reform is pensions. Buğra and Keyder (2006, p. 216) argue that, in the case of Turkey, the high ratio of pension recipients to active contributors has often proved to be a major problem. This problem stems from demographic characteristics of an ageing population and the young retirement age. Both the minimum retirement age and the minimum period of contribution necessary for entitlement to pension benefits has increased by changes introduced in 1999.

The second component of the new social security reform is health benefits based on employment status. The health system consists of separate institutions with varying levels of coverage and quality of care. While only “active participants in one of the social security institutions, pensioners and family dependants” benefit from medical coverage, Buğra and Keyder (2006, pp. 215-216) argue that according to “household survey data, more than a third of the population remains outside the

health insurance coverage and has to pay for its needs”. The system also introduced a Green Card program for the poor and uninsured people, “namely peasants and workers who are not employed in the formal economy (such as petty producers and those self-employed people who have not paid their premiums) and also those who are unable to prove” that they would qualify for a Green Card. Although this scheme allows them access to doctors and hospitals within the social security system, it does not cover medication.

The last component of the new social security reform is social assistance, which mainly consists of the Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity. Buğra and Keyder (2006) argue that this Fund was set up in 1986 for families that failed to fulfill the traditional duty of care. “The Fund was conceived as an umbrella organization covering over 900 local foundations and was managed by representatives of the central government at the district level with the aid of boards of directors that include prominent members of the local population” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 222).

After the economic crisis in February 2001, the World Bank used the Social Risk Mitigation Project in order to contribute to social assistance provision. “This is a conditional cash transfer programme for the poor families, by way of welfare allocations to pregnant women, pre-schoolers, and children attending compulsory schooling up to eighth grade” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 222). The requirements for the welfare provision entail regular visits to health centres as well as school attendance. After 2001, the welfare support provided in health and education became the most important categories of welfare assistance.

3.1.3 The transformation of the Turkish welfare regime

From 2003 onwards, the social security system has rapidly transformed from the Bismarckian Model to a mixed model of public and private health providers, while the share of out-of-pocket payment has gradually increased.

In 2003, according to the State Planning Organization, approximately 85 percent of the population had some type of health coverage, while the remaining did not have access to formal health insurance, but were implicitly covered for preventive and primary healthcare services and emergency medical care (OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2008, p. 30).

After the general elections in November 2002, various reform attempts were launched in order to take the fragmented health care and social insurance system under control in terms of both funding and provision. An Urgent Action Plan was introduced by the new government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). According to this plan, the Ministry of Health launched the Health Transformation Program whose main aim was to provide basic health services to all citizens and to integrate various social security institutions under one umbrella. The “Social Security Institution Law” (Law No: 5502), and “Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law” (Law No: 5510) were accepted in 2006 (OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2008, p. 13).

In May 2006, the social security reform was introduced (Law No: 5502) and all the security institutions were restructured and combined under the framework of the Social Security Institution (SGK). Public insurance, which consisted of SGK, the Social Security Organization for Artisans and Self-employed, the Government Retirement Fund, Civil Servants and Green Card owners, were unified under a structure in which all citizens were supposed to receive equal treatment. Establishing a financially sustainable system that is fair, easily accessible and supporting the poor was the main objective of the social security reform. (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Health Publication No: 770, November 2008 p. 54)

In June 2006, the Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law (Law No: 5510) was accepted with the aim of eliminating the inequalities in accessing health services by redefining rights and responsibilities and covering the entire population through the social security network.

Furthermore, according to this law No. 5510, children under the age of 18 are entitled to health services without any specific requirement. The retirement insurance has been transformed into a single retirement regime meant to provide equal services to all. In the new retirement system, no changes in the retirement age are foreseen until the year 2035 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Health Publication No: 770, November 2008 p.55).

Accordingly, without any age limit, unmarried women became entitled to survivors' pensions provided that they do not have any income; while men became entitled to survivors' pension until the age of 18, provided they are enrolled in higher

education until the age of 20 or in universities until the age of 25 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Health Publication No: 770, November 2008 p. 55).

Furthermore, in October 2008, the government introduced ‘a single payer system’ for public patients through the implementation of the “Social Security and Universal Health Insurance Law”, whereby both the collection of funds the reimbursement are the responsibility of a single entity (OECD Reviews of Health Systems: Turkey, 2008, p. 12)

Erus et al. (2015, p100) argue that, although people who are unable to afford the premiums can access healthcare if they pass the administrative means testing, (as the state assumes their GHI contributions in a system that inherited the Green Card), a considerable portion of the population in Turkey is still not covered by the healthcare system. Government introduce the means testing program which according to Article 60 of the Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law, “citizens whose domestic income per capita is less than one third of the minimum wage, to be determined using the testing methods and data to be laid down by the Institution, considering their expenses, movable and immovable properties and their rights arising from such” (Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law, Law Number: 5510, Article 60th, 2006). In fact, people who are unable to pay public health insurance premiums are not covered by health insurance and thus not entitled to receive any healthcare service free-of-charge, and if they use the services, they will become indebted to Social Security Institution for the amount of the premium.

The social security law of 1999 set the minimum retirement age as 58 for women and 60 for men (which is expected to gradually increase to 65 until 2036), while the minimum premium requirements were set as 7000 days for workers and 9000 days for civil servants and the self-employed. Moreover, this reform foresaw changes in the pension calculation method as a means of reducing the amount of future pensions (Kılıç, 2010, p. 167).

According to Buğra and Keyder (2006), there are two basic “problems which reflect the nature of the Turkish welfare regime: the unsustainable character of the existing social security system and the challenge of new poverty. They argue that the AKP government’s approach to these problems reflects a liberal residualism, flavored with social conservative values that are premised upon the centrality of the family and the significance of communal solidarity” (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p. 213). Accordingly, Buğra and Keyder describe the attitude of the AKP government’s social policy as a mixture of neo-liberalism and social conservatism.

During the early 2000s, the neo-liberal policies have led to a wave of privatization of health care services, which accelerated after the introduction of the General Health Insurance. The share of private health expenditure in GDP has rapidly increased from 2002 (1.57%) until 2007 (1.94%). During the same period, per capita private health expenditure has also increased from 83 TL (\$55) to 233 TL (\$178). The per capita out-of-pocket health expenditure increased from 56 TL (\$37) in 2002 to 158 TL (\$121) in 2007, while the share of out-of-pocket health expenditures in total health expenditure increased from 19.8% in 2002 to 21.8% in 2007 (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2010, pp. 115-119).

In that period (from 2002 to 2007) , approximately 13 million people were covered by the Green Card Program and the total Green Card expenditure slowly increased from 5.3 percent in 1995-1998 to 6.3 percent in 1999-2002, followed by a two-fold increase to 12.4 percent in 2006. Although this increase could be partly attributed to the incorporation of the outpatient services into the Green Card Program, these two crucial changes provide a better explanation: either people lost their previous social insurance or they gave it up as they believed that the Green Card Program was better than their own previous social insurance program. However, the basic issue remains that the expansion of poverty in Turkey and the Green Card Program has been accepted as a fourth social security program (Soyer et al., 2007, p. 24).

The number of private hospitals, clinics and laboratories increased rapidly in the 2000-2005 period, especially in Eastern Anatolia (from 69 private laboratories in 2000 to 142 in 2005) and in South-eastern Anatolia (from 92 private laboratories in 2000 to 167 in 2005) regions, which entailed the transfer of health technologies to new markets (Soyer et al., 2007, p. 27). Furthermore, according to Eder (2010, p. 171), the medicine consumption increased gradually by 100 percent (in Euros) in the period of 2002-2007 and foreign companies dominated Turkey's pharmaceutical industry (70 percent). These evolutions transformed Turkey into a country with the highest medicine expenditure in the world in terms of its share of the national income, while increasing the dependence on foreign exchange.

The other area of privatization was the new employment practices of healthcare employees, namely the Law on Principles and Methods about the

Purchase of Services Performed by Healthcare and Supplementary Healthcare Personnel in 2004 (Ministry of Health, Sağlık ve Yardımcı Sağlık Personeli Tarafından Yerine Getirilmesi Gereken Hizmetlerin Satın Alma Yoluyla Gördürülmesine İlişkin Esas ve Usuller, 2004). This Law has paved the way for the privatization as much as possible, while causing a significant deterioration in the working conditions of health care personnel (Soyer et al., 2007, pp. 39-40)

The fundamental opposition came from the Turkish Union of Medical Doctors (Türk Tabipler Birliği-TTB), which interpreted such private-public cooperation as a creeping privatization of the public healthcare system. According to Eder (2010), any observer of Turkey's healthcare industry since the late 1990s would confirm that private hospitals and clinics have been flourished and leading international insurance companies flooded the market. Eder (2010, p. 172) analyses similar examples of privatization in the fields of education and care services, particularly those concerning the disabled and the elderly.

3.1.4 The Turkish welfare regime type

The recent reforms have led to a massive transformation of Turkey's welfare regime from a corporatist line to an individualistic line. Kılıç (2010, p. 169) describes this transformation as a "shift from familialism towards to individualism from the perspective of gender, family, and children". According to Eder (2010, p. 159), just like the Latin American and South European counterparts, Turkey has been unable to develop well-funded social assistance programs.

Eder mentions three sets of factors, namely (a) extensive agricultural subsidies in the rural sector, (b) the possibilities of informal housing in the urban areas, and (c) extensive private family and social networks; these have long substituted for the welfare regime in Turkey.

Eder (2010, p. 156) argues that there is an obvious indication for both retreat and extension of the political power of the state due to the fact that the change of welfare regime in Turkey. According to Eder, state's role is apparently shifting to a 'regulatory and controlling' one by a retreat from directly providing social services through financing either the private sector or the households for the provision of such services and/or entirely transferring these services to private actors.

Unexpectedly, Turkey's case demonstrates that privatization could lead to paradoxical and unintended consequences as well as the retreat of the state from welfare provision. Eder (2010) argues that so far, neither privatization nor politicization of welfare provision has been a remedy for the structural poverty and economic vulnerability in Turkey. As a result, citizens become "needy subjects waiting for handouts from the state or voluntary donors, as they become willing and ready to accept any litmus tests or community loyalty in order to survive" (p. 184).

Buğra and Keyder (2006, p. 212) argue that the characteristics of the official social security system in Turkey are similar to those in Southern Europe: "an elaborate, highly fragmented and hierarchical system with a corporatist character that provides combined health and pension benefits to formally employed heads of household according to their status at work." Accordingly, the greatest similarity

between the Turkish regime to the Southern European model is the central role played by the family in welfare provision.

According to Grütjen (2007, p. 128), although the Turkish welfare regime does not fit into the ideal typology of the Southern European model, it is similar to Southern Europe in other respects. A cross-national comparison indicates that there are only a few deviations from the Southern European model: “the low impact of the civil society, market actors, regional authorities in Turkey and its non-universalistic health system” (Grütjen, 2007, p. 128).

3.2 Social trust literature in Turkey

Although there are numerous sources on trust in Europe in the literature, so far only a few scholars have studied the different aspects of Turkey with regard to social and political trust (Esmer, 2008; Erdoğan, 2006; Bülbül and Yashıkaya, 2006; Akgün, 2009; Ekmekçi, 2010; Eser, 2013; Karakoç, 2013; Özcan and Zeren, 2013).

However, none of these studies have empirically tested the explanatory power of its possible impact in determining attitudes towards the welfare state.

The literature illustrates how the concept of trust has been studied in the economics field in general and business administration in particular in relation to criteria such as social capital, social network, and innovation. For instance, the study by İslamoğlu et al., (2012) focused on trust in organizational and business administration, whereas Atalay Güneş’s (2012) monographic study is about the perspectives of entrepreneurs in Mardin. Akçomak and Muller-Zick (2013) analyzed

trust and innovation in Europe and investigate the effect of trust on innovation.

Yükseker, (2003-2004) focused on trust and gender in a transnational market by carrying out field research in Laleli on trade relation with Russians.

Adaş (2009) examined production of trust and distrust in transnational networks, Islamic holdings and the state in Turkey. Gökalp (2003) analyzed the trust factor in family firms in terms of administration type, size and ownership in the Turkish economy. The study by Adaman, Çarkoğlu and Şenatalar (2003) elaborates from the perspective of the business world the reasons for corruption and offers some advice on its prevention, while emphasizing the role of trust in public institutions. Buğra (2002) focused on a trust-based system and tries to find out how large firms with an Islamic identity managed to accumulate millions of dollars in small investments from migrant workers in Europe.

Furthermore, the literature illustrates that the concept of trust, especially political trust, has been studied in political science and sociology in relation to criteria such as value change, NGOs, ethnicity, social polarization and political support. A selected body of literature will be reviewed briefly below.

The level of social and political trust in Turkey has been measured by the World Value Survey, the European Social Survey and the European Value Survey. These surveys, which have been conducted since 1990, demonstrate that Turkey is an extremely low trust country. The available data (ESS 2008) indicate that the mean score for Turkey is 3.01 (on a 0-10 scale where 0 means you can't be too careful, and

10 means most people can be trusted). Turkey holds the lowest position among the 25 European countries included in the study.

Esmer has studied for many years the concept of value change. He proposed to discuss the variables of (a) inter-personal trust and tolerance with sustainable democracy and (b) religiosity in the Turkish context. According to Esmer (2008, pp. 294-300), at least in contemporary Turkish society, the surveys confirm that there is no linear relationship between Islam and inter-personal trust. In fact, Esmer and Pettersson found that there is no correlation between religiosity and support for democracy or interpersonal trust.

Esmer (1999, p. 26) argues that there is a strong correlation between trust and democracy and recommends that the low level of social trust should be analyzed in depth in Turkey. Furthermore, Esmer maintains with certainty that there is also a correlation between social trust and economic growth. Accordingly, the explanatory variables (such as level of education, income, age, religious and political involvement) do not have much impact on the level of trust since the level of social trust or distrust is the same for most people who hold different political ideas.

It is obvious that Turkey has a low level of social trust. This may be due to a number of reasons such as economic inequality, undemocratic practices, military coups, political corruption and political culture within the context of the short history of Turkey's republic. In fact, social trust could be related to economic conditions and democracy as well as the cosmopolitan structure of the Turkish society.

Even though the complex structure of the Turkish society is sometimes perceived as a ‘mosaic’ or ‘harmony’, there have been numerous occasions where it experienced massive social traumas such as conflicts, disunity, executions and wars. The social traumas include the May 1st protests in 1978, the massacres in Sivas, Çorum and Maraş, the armed conflict in the southeast between the Turkish army and Kurdish separatist forces, the State’s conflict with religious groups, and the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Unfortunately, each religion, sect, ethnicity and political ideology or movement in Turkey is transferring its own memories of intolerance to the next generation. Furthermore, during the entire history of the young Turkish Republic, most generations have constantly been inculcated with the perceived geographical threat, which relates to a sense of threat from neighbors.

As seen in the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey, a comparative analysis of south-European and Latin American democracies indicates that Turkey is extremely far from being a tolerant country. According to Kalaycıoğlu (2008, p. 12 and p. 26), the combination of intolerance or distrust with xenophobia and chauvinism will be very risky and drifts Turkey towards an authoritarian future.

The World Value Survey illustrates that while the military is the most trusted institution (about 85% in 2007 and about 74% in 2011), the Parliament is among the least trusted institutions (about 58% in 2007 and about 54% in 2011) in Turkey (WVS Online Result, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>).

Bülbül and Yaslıkaya (2006, pp. 91-105) set forth the hypothesis in their research that there is a comparable relationship between the level of development of

civil society and the level of trust towards the civil society in Turkey. Bülbül and Yaslıkaya (2006) compare the NGOs in Turkey and in Western countries and they investigated the trust relationship between NGOs and Turkey's parliament. According to them, although the studies on the individual trust or on political institutions are sufficient, studies on political institutions' trust in civic society organizations is inadequate. They conducted a survey among the members of the parliament of AKP and CHP parties by asking their attitude of trust towards the NGOs located in Turkey or abroad. According to their findings, the level of trust towards the national NGOs is influenced by the political orientation of the NGO in question. It could be said that the research findings support the hypothesis in Turkey.

Karakoç (2013) studies political trust and Kurdish attitudes towards the political institutions in Turkey. He suggests a correlation between ethnicity and trust level, and offers a number of hypotheses to tests them in the Turkish context by using the European Social Survey conducted in 2008. According to Karakoç, although Kurdish people show low levels of trust towards domestic institutions, this is not a uniform distrust across all institutions. Karakoç finds that, although people who define themselves Kurdish tend to hold a higher level of trust towards international institutions, especially the European Parliament (EP) and the United Nations (UN) compared people who define themselves Turkish.

Karakoç's study illustrates that, contrary to the studies on the winner/loser debate (Andersen and Guillory, 1997, quoted in Karakoç, 2013, p. 93) in long-standing democracies in the West, in the case of Turkey, winners in general and Kurdish winners in particular are "those who voted for the AKP (the winning party

in the 2007 election) are not distinguishable in their level of trust in institutions from the rest of society” (Karakoç, 2013, p. 93). The result shows that Kurds who voted for the AKP tend to link themselves to the political system more while the rest, mainly pro-BDP voters, hold the lowest trust level in state institutions (Karakoç, 2013, pp. 92-114).

Ekmekçi (2010, pp. 234-246) analyzes social polarization and the concept of politics of intention in Turkey by reviewing the literature concerning the interaction of social trust and democracy. He analyses the current level of social and political trust in Turkey by making use of data from the World Values Survey and the concept of politics of intentions. Ekmekçi also evaluates the available means for people and politicians Turkey to counter the high level of social distrust and polarization.

The concept of social capital highlights trust, the norm of reciprocity and social networks as elusive components of a society. Since the 1990s, economists have been discussing social capital in applied and theoretical studies and some of them have accepted it as a new type of capital. Although it can be argued that social capital has an uncertain aspect in economics, economists examine in particular its impact on a country’s level of economic development and generally acknowledge its importance and contribution to development. Özcan and Zeren (2013, pp. 7-36) examined the relationship between economic development and social trust by using a spatial econometrics method in a sample of 27 European countries between 1999 and 2009. The findings of this analysis suggested that a country’s level of social trust has positive impacts on its economic development.

The causes and consequences of political trust in Turkey were analyzed by Akgün (2009, pp. 1-23), with a particular emphasis on citizen support for a political society, a democratic regime and regime performance. He used the World Values Surveys (1990-91 and 1996-97) to explain the determinants of citizen frustration and political support in Turkey. According to Akgün, there is overwhelming support for a democratic regime and political society in Turkey and the majority of citizens are dissatisfied with governmental institutions. His study suggests that, while highly trustful and optimistic voters tend to withdraw from participating in the elections, frustrated voters are more likely to support populist parties as a means of protest.

Erdoğan (2006) elaborates on the concept of generalized trust by focusing on the low level of political participation of the Turkish youth within the context of social capital. According to Erdoğan, it is an unavoidable requirement that Turkey should increase its level of social capital in order to be able to spread democratic values, to increase political and civic participation of young people and to get rid of low level of political participation and the high level of distrust.

Furthermore, a survey among university students dealing with political trust and ethnicity was conducted by Eser (2013, pp. 15-42). The findings of this survey demonstrate that the level of political trust of the participants changes significantly according to their ethnic identities. In fact, while the Kurdish students tend to have civic- or political-based trust, Turkish students tend to display regime-based political trust. The other important findings of this study concern attitudes on racial discrimination, which have a negative and significant relationship to regime-based political trust.

This section elaborated the history of the welfare state in Turkey, with a particular emphasis on the transformation period which began in 2003. In the meantime, similarities and differences of Turkey's welfare state from the South European welfare regime typology was analyzed. Then trust literature in Turkey was evaluated. This literature review highlights the need for proper studies on attitudes towards the welfare state and its relation to social trust. The next chapter will elaborate on the methodology in terms of hypotheses as well as independent, dependent and control variables.

CHAPTER 4

DATA, METHOD AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Data

This thesis uses data from the fourth round, Country File, 2nd edition of the European Social Survey (ESS), which was carried out in 2008 and 2009. The country file includes data from the fourth round of fieldwork. The survey is based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample. It is representative of all individuals aged 15+ who were living in private households, irrespective of nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. My sample covers only Turkey, where interviews were conducted in the period between November 2008 and May 2009, for an N of 2,416 respondents by 65.2 of response rate.²

The complete dataset in SPSS format was obtained from the website of European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is an academically-driven cross-national survey which has been conducted every two years across Europe since 2001. It provides valuable information about social and political attitudes and about beliefs and behavior patterns of diverse populations in over thirty nations. This cross-national survey also includes basic demographic information (age, gender, education, etc.) about the respondents.³

I have selected this particular ESS study for a number of reasons. The first one is the model of welfare attitudes data. The Welfare Attitudes in a Changing

² http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/deviations_4.html

³ <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.html>

Europe module was developed for Round 4 with the aim of analyzing the attitudes of the European public towards the welfare state. The welfare attitudes model consists of the following elements: the scope and responsibilities of the welfare state, collective financing, different models of welfare, service delivery and the target groups and welfare recipients (Svallfors, 2012, p. 3). The second reason is that this survey contains micro-level data from Turkey.

4.2 Method

4.2.1 Dependent variable

For the dependent variable, I use an index of attitudes towards the government responsibility as the index variable. To address this aspect, Questions from D15 to D20 within Source Questionnaire Amendment 03 Round 4, 2008/9 (see Appendix C and D) is used as a measure of this indicator. Respondents were asked to what extent a government should be responsible for the following aspects: “People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. On a continuum where 0 means it should not be governments’ responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments’ responsibility.” This inquiry includes the tasks:

1. ensure a job for everyone who wants one
2. ensure adequate health care for the sick
3. ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old
4. ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed
5. ensure sufficient child care services for working parents

6. provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members

Svallfors explains the need for a summary index of the six questions mentioned above to find out how far individuals think the government should be involved. The responses were summed and divided by the number of variables. Accordingly, the new summary index value 0 indicates that a respondent thinks that none of the mentioned items should be the government's responsibility, whereas 10 indicates that the respondent thinks that all these activities should be the government's responsibility entirely (Svallfors, 2012, pp. 4-5).

In order to create an index, I took the mean of the six variables: Government Responsibility = MEAN (six responsibility items; gvjbevn, gvhlthc, gvslvol, gvslvue, gvclder, gvpdlwk). On the 0-10 scale where 0 means it should not be governments' responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments' responsibility.⁴

4.2.2. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

The attitudes towards government responsibilities demonstrate the mean score of the dependent variables which measures the central tendency (Table 1). The original scale for government responsibilities in the European Social Survey (ESS) ranges

⁴ I analyzed three different methods to decide which method was most appropriate for my analysis. In the first method, I indexed six variables by using mean scores only. In the second, I used mean scores with factor loadings for these six variables to create an index. In the third method, I used the sum of variables with factor loadings to create a government responsibility index. Then, when I did re-estimation with factor loadings, the result indicated that the level of significance and the sign are very close for all three methods. As a result, I chose the first method for my further analysis.

from 0 to 10. Table 1 reveals that government responsibility index values mean score is 7.84 with a standard deviation of 2.012.

Table 1. Government Responsibility Variables

Variables	Definition	V. Name	Coding	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max
ensure a job for everyone who wants one	Job for everyone, governments' responsibility	gvjbevn	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2365	7.42	2.590	0	10
ensure adequate health care for the sick	Health care for the sick, governments' responsibility	gvhlthc	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2372	8.20	2.289	0	10
ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old	Standard of living for the old, governments' responsibility	gvslvol	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2372	8.19	2.357	0	10
ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed	Standard of living for the unemployed, governments' responsibility	gvslvue	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2360	7.83	2.519	0	10
ensure sufficient child care services for working parents	Child care services for working parents, governments' responsibility	gvcldcr	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2336	7.32	2.872	0	10
provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members.	Paid leave from work to care for sick family, governments' responsibility	gvpdlwk	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2361	8.11	2.427	0	10
Government Responsibility Index		Gov.Res p	0=Not governments' responsibility at all, 10=Entirely governments' responsibility	2384	7.84	2.012	0	10

Table 1 clearly illustrates that respondents think all the activities mentioned above should be entirely the government's responsibility. These activities may be divided in two main groups: the first group consists of activities with a score lower than the mean, such as job for everyone (7.42), standard of living for the unemployed (7.83) and child care services for working parents (7.32).

The second group consists of activities with scores higher than the mean, such as health care for the sick (8.20), a standard of living for the old (8.19) and paid leave from work to care for sick family (8.11).

Figure 1 illustrates that nearly 70 percent of respondents tend to think it is entirely the government's responsibility to ensure a job for everyone who wants one. As indicated above, while only 10.17 percent tend to think it is not the government's responsibility, 20.43 percent think the government should assume a moderate level of responsibility.




Figure 1. Jobs for everyone.

Figure 2 illustrates that almost 82.67 percent (which is the highest mean score) of the respondents agree that it is entirely the government's responsibility to ensure adequate healthcare for the sick. Furthermore, as indicated in figure 4, if we add the 11.26 percent in the level of medium in this place, a quasi-totality (94 percent) expect healthcare services for the sick.




Figure 2. Health care for the sick.

Figure 3 shows that approximately 81.40 percent of respondents (the second-highest mean score) think that ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the old is the government's sole responsibility. As indicated in Figure 5, 12.28 percent are in the medium category, while 6.33 percent said that this is no longer the government's responsibility.




Figure 3. Standard of living for the old.

Figure 4 indicates that 73.26 percent of the respondents think that the need to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed is entirely government's responsibility. In the medium category the percent is 19.78, while 6.96 percent think that this is no longer the government's responsibility.




Figure 4. Standard of living for the unemployed.

Figure 5 demonstrates that almost 66.64 percent agree that ensuring the provision of sufficient child care services for the working parents is entirely government’s responsibility. Additionally, as indicated in Figure 8, the medium level is higher than other services, about 21.39 percent, and also 11.98 percent believe that to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents is not the government’s responsibility.

The result of Figure 5 supports the Turkish welfare regime as a Mediterranean welfare state due to the fact that the triangle of gender, family and children, as Kılıç (2010, p. 169) explained, is “shifting from familialism towards individualism” by working women and changing gender roles of who in the family is the breadwinner.




Figure 5. Child care services for working parents.

Figure 6 shows that to provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members is, interestingly, emphasized more than child care services for working parents. Almost 77.49 percent agree that it is entirely the

government's responsibility. It could be concluded that people do not support childcare services for working parents but they expect support in paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members. Additionally, as indicated, the medium level is about 16.41 percent, and 6.09 percent also believe that to provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members is not the government's responsibility.




Figure 6. Paid leave from work to care for sick family members.

Figure 7 illustrates the new government responsibility index values that Turkish people express that almost 73.52 percent agree with the entirely government responsibility. Additionally, as indicated, the medium level is about 21.44 percent and also 5.04 percent believe that it is not the government's responsibility.




Figure 7. Percent of government responsibility index.

Table 1 illustrates that three of the six items — to ensure adequate health care for the sick (8.20), to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old (8.19), and to provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members (8.11) — are significantly set apart from the other three: to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed (7.83), to ensure a job for everyone who wants one (7.42), and to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents (7.32) . The first part receives relatively higher scores than the second part. The result indicates that the first part advocates a wide scope, while the second part advocates limited government responsibilities.

The scores indicate that the practice of care, elderly, illness (health care, elderly care and care for sick family members) is prominent in Turkish social policy. It could be said that in risky situations, Turkish people expect basic provisions from the government instead of their families. A number of these services are not affordable for the majority of Turkish people. As the literature indicates, the ‘objective’ and ‘perceived’ risks of future income loss in Turkey influence welfare

state preferences. This result confirms Kılıç's (2010, p. 169) argument that Turkish welfare regime is "shifting from familialism towards to individualism" as the percentage of working women increases.

4.2.3 Independent variables

This analysis makes use of the following primary explanatory variable: social trust index. The effects of independent variables on individual's attitudes towards government responsibilities are tested by using a multiple regression analysis. The social trust index, which is measured on an eleven-point rating scale with three standard survey questions: trust, fair and helpful (Newton, 2013). Within Source Questionnaire Amendment 03 Round 4, 2008/9, social trust index measures the inter-personal trust by Questions from A8 to A10 (see Appendix A and B). Trust is formulated as follows: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Self placement on a continuum where zero refers to you can't be too careful and ten refers to most people can be trusted.

Yamagishi et al. (1999, pp. 145-161) argued that "being careful does not necessarily mean a lack of trust and that this question of trust is not well-designed." However, the finding by Glaeser et al. (2000) and Knack and Keefer (1997) could be interpreted to mean that trust and trustworthiness are closely correlated, and that trusting people tend to act in a trustworthy manner. Moreover, inferring trust from a person's behavior is more difficult than inferring trustworthiness, considering that it is harder to read someone's mind than to judge his/her actions (You, 2005, p. 15).

Fairness is formulated as: “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” Self placement on a continuum where zero refers to people would try to take advantage of me and ten refers to most people would try to be fair. And helpfulness is formulated as: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” Self-placement is on a continuum where zero refers to people who mostly look out for themselves, while ten refers to people who mostly try to be helpful.




Figure 8. Model of trust.

“Source: [model of the trust component of social capital, 1999]”.⁵

The index for trust is calculated by taking the average of ppltrst, pplfair, and pplhlp on the 0-10 scale where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means most people can be trusted.⁶

⁵ Paxton, P. (1999). Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105, 88-127.

⁶ I analyzed three different methods to decide which method was appropriate for my analysis. In the first method, I indexed these variables (trust, fairness and helpfulness) by using mean scores only. In the second method, I used mean scores with factor loadings for these three variables (trust, fairness and helpfulness) to create an index. In the third method, I used the sum of variables with factor loadings to create a social trust index. Then, when I did re-estimation with factor loadings, the result indicate that the level of significance and the sign are very close for all three methods. As a result, I chose the first method for my further analysis.

4.2.4 Descriptive statistics of independent variables

The low level of social trust demonstrated in Table 2 with mean scores of the independent variables which measures the central tendency. The original scale for trust, fairness and helpfulness in the European Social Survey (ESS) ranges from 0 to 10. Table 2 reveals that the social trust index values mean score is 2.78, with 2.370 the value of the variable's standard deviation.

Table 2. Social Trust Index Variables

Variables	Definition	V. Name	Coding	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max
Trust	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	ppltrst	0=You can't be too careful, 10=Most people can be trusted	2412	2.26	2.635	0	10
Fairness	Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair	pplfair	0=Most people try to take advantage of me, 10=Most people try to be fair	2375	3.16	2.878	0	10
Helpfulness	Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves	pplhlp	0=People mostly look out for themselves, 10=People mostly try to be helpful	2395	2.93	2.805	0	10
Social trust Index		Trust	0=You can't be too careful, 10=Most people can be trusted	2412	2.78	2.370	0	10

Table 2 demonstrates that on the eleven-point scale ranging from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust), the mean score for Turkish society is only 2.26, with 2.635 the value of the variable's standard deviation.

Figure 9 illustrates that Turkish people do not trust each other and have low levels of trust. As indicated below, while only 9.04 percent tend to show a high level

of trust, 18.55 percent of them do not trust at all, and the remaining 72.41 percent are mostly doubtful.




Figure 9. Percent of trust.

Figure 10 illustrates that, while only 13.63 percent found most people to be fair, 58.82 percent of them believe that most people try to take advantage of them. Table 2 clearly illustrates that the mean score for the most people try to be fair response is 3.16, with 2.878 the value of the variable's standard deviation. Although this score is relatively higher than the trust level, it is still typically at a very low level.




Figure 10. Percent of fairness.

Figure 11 illustrates that while only 12.55 percent found that most people try to be helpful, 62.19 percent of them believe that people mostly look out for themselves. Table 2 visibly exemplifies that the mean score for the mostly people try to be helpful response is 2.93, with 2.805 the value of the variable's standard deviation. Comparatively, this score is higher than the trust level but still typically very low.




Figure 11. Percent of helpfulness.

Figure 12 illustrates the new social trust index values that Turkish people do not trust each other and have low levels of trust. According to social trust index value as indicated below, the high level of trust value falls from 9.04 to 6.32 percent, mostly doubtful level of trust falls from 72.41 percent to 69.57 percent and the level of no trust at all rises from 18.55 to 24.11 percent.




Figure 12. Percent of social trust index.

4.2.5 Control variables

This analysis also includes the following control variables: gender, age, years of education, discrimination due to ethnic affiliation, unemployment, what kind of organization the respondent works for, the main source of the household income and the net amount of it, language at home, subjective well-being index and left-right placement. As individual and demographic factors, these variables influence attitudes towards government responsibilities.

Gender is coded 1 for females and zero for male. Ages are grouped according to the bands used by Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat): 15-19, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and 75+. The level of education is categorized according to the number years of schooling (see Table 3).

Table 3. Control Variables

Variables	V. Name	Coding	N	%	Definition
Gender	Gndr		2416	100.00	Gender
Female		1	1242	51.40	
Male		0	1174	48.60	
Age	Agea		2392	100.00	In years, age of respondent in 2008
15-19		1	279	11.70	
20-24		2	327	13.70	
25-34		3	588	24.60	
35-44		4	417	17.50	
45-54		5	372	15.60	
55-64		6	221	9.20	
65-74		7	127	5.30	
75 plus		8	61	2.60	
Education	Edlvtr		2415	100.00	Education in years
Illiterate		1	267	11.10	
Literate		2	136	5.60	
Primary (5 years)		3	904	37.40	
Primary (8 years)		4	197	8.20	
Secondary-General		5	228	9.40	
Secondary-Vocational		6	29	1.20	
High-General		7	374	15.50	
High-Vocational		8	100	4.10	
University		9	166	6.90	
Master's degree		10-11	3	0.10	
Other		12	11	0.40	

Table 3. Control Variables

Variables	V. Name	Coding	N	%	Definition
Ethnicity: Discrimination of respondent's ethnic group	Dscretn		2416	100.00	On what grounds is your group discriminated against? Re-coded (1) for discrimination of ethnic group. (0) for other response
No		0	2369	98.06	
Yes		1	47	1.94	
Unemployed, actively looking for job	Uempln		2416	100.00	During the last 7 days: unemployed, actively looking for job? Re-coded (1) Unemployed and actively looking for a job. (0) Other response
No		0	2116	87.60	
Yes		1	300	12.40	
What type organization work/worked for	tporgwk		969	100.00	What type of organisation work/worked for? Re-coded (0) for Public (Central or local government, Other public sector (such as education and health) and a state owned enterprise) (1) for Private (A private firm, Self-employed and Other)
Central or local government		1	104	10.73	
Other public sector (such as education and health)		2	66	6.82	
A state owned enterprise		3	13	1.31	
A private firm		4	471	48.63	
Self-employed		5	177	18.26	
Other		6	138	14.25	
Household's total net income	Hinctnta		2123	100.00	Taken from a household income variable asking respondents to place themselves into predetermined income deciles from the following question: "Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?" Deciles are converted to relative income by first taking the average of the top and bottom values of the decile.
J - 1st decile		1	543	25.60	
R - 2nd decile		2	172	8.10	
C - 3rd decile		3	347	16.30	
M - 4th decile		4	231	10.90	
F - 5th decile		5	282	13.30	
S - 6th decile		6	189	8.90	
K - 7th decile		7	147	6.90	
P - 8th decile		8	81	3.80	
D - 9th decile		9	64	3.00	
H - 10th decile	10	67	3.20		
Ethnicity: Language at home	Inghoma, Inghomb		2416	100.00	What language or languages do you speak most often at home?" Re-coded (0) for Turkish, (1) for Kurdish; other languages are excluded
Turkish,		0	1974	81.70	
Kurdish		1	442	18.30	
Region, Turkey	Regiontr		2416	100.00	Re-coded as for (1) Istanbul, Western and Eastern Marmara (2) Aegean and Mediterranean (3) Central Anatolia and Western Anatolia (4) Western and Eastern Black Sea (5) North Eastern, East and South East Anatolia
Istanbul		1	506	20.94	
Western Marmara		2	80	3.29	
Aegean		3	249	10.31	
Eastern Marmara		4	260	10.77	
Western Anatolia		5	210	8.70	
Mediterranean		6	268	11.11	
Central Anatolia		7	63	2.61	
Western Black Sea		8	74	3.08	
Eastern Black Sea		9	31	1.28	
North Eastern Anatolia		10	86	3.55	
East		11	169	6.99	
South East	12	419	17.36		

Discrimination due to ethnic affiliation, which is another control variable, is covered

via a yes/no indicator variable. Question C25 within Source Questionnaire

Amendment 03 Round 4, 2008/9 is used as a measure of ethnic discrimination. The

ethnic discrimination is worded as “On what grounds is your group discriminated against?” 1 refers to colour or race, 2 nationality, 3 religion, 4 language, 5 ethnic group, 6 age, 7 gender, 8 sexuality, 9 disability, 10 other. If the answer is 5, the ethnic group discrimination is re-coded 1 for yes and 0 for no (see Table 3).

The question of F8a (which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days) is used for unemployment status. The variable includes nine categories, (1 in paid work, 2 in education, 3 unemployed and actively looking for a job, 4 unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job, 5 sick or disabled, 6 retired, 7 in community or military service, 8 domestic work, looking after children or other persons, 9 other). If the answer is signed 3, the unemployed is re-coded 1 and the employed is re-coded 0 (see Table 3).

The Question of F23 is worded as “which of the types of organization on this card do/did you work for?” for what kind of organization the respondent works for. 1 refers to central or local government, 2 other public sector (such as education and health), 3 a state-owned enterprise, 4 a private firm, 5 self-employed, 6 other. The answers re-coded public as 0, and private as 1 (when the answers is signed 1, 2 or 3, re-coded public and rest of is re-coded private) (see Table 3).

The Question of F32 is worded as “using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate.” Household income is related to self-assessment of one's household economic well-being on a 1 to 10 scale of economic satisfaction, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the

highest. First of all, as coded by TurkStat , households total net income sorted in ascending order, and secondly it is divided into 5 parts and finally income group is labeled with 1 as “the first 20% decile”; 2 as “second 20% decile”; 3 as “third 20% decile”; 4 as “fourth 20% decile”; and finally 5 as “last 20% decile” (see Table 3).

The Question of C31 is worded as “what language or languages do you speak most often at home?” This open-ended question could be answered in one of two languages, namely Turkish and Kurdish. In fact, although there are a number of other languages spoken at home, this thesis focuses on Turkish and Kurdish (see Table 3).

In his research, Karakoç used ethnicity measurement and re-coded Kurdish as ‘1’, and those who speak Turkish are coded as ‘0’. About 1.5 percent of the respondents, those who marked other languages such as Arabic, English, and German, are excluded from the analysis. In the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset, the two variables of lnghoma and lnghomb deal with the language spoken at home.

Karakoç’s analysis is based on the first variable (lnghoma) and the second variable (lnghomb) is excluded. In fact, Karakoç concludes that 9.4 percent of the population speaks Kurdish. I used two variables in my analysis and found that the Kurdish-speaking citizens increased to 18.3 percent. Unlike Karakoç, who excludes the second variable in his analysis, (Karakoç, 2013, p.99) my thesis makes use of both variables to refer to those who are Kurdish. Discrimination due to ethnic affiliation and the language spoken at home are the proxy variables for ethnic

identity. As it can be seen from Table 4, the majority of Kurds in the sample live in the East and Southeast of Turkey.

Table 4. Region and Kurdish Speakers at Home

Region	Language at home: Kurdish	
	Count	Column %
Istanbul and Marmara	39	8.90
Aegean and Mediterranean	9	2.10
Central Anatolia	10	2.30
Black Sea	0	0.0
East and Southeast Anatolia	383	86.70
Total	441	100.00

In Turkey, Statistical Regional Units Level-1 consists of 12 regions. These are Istanbul, western and eastern Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean, western and central Anatolia, western and eastern Black Sea, north eastern, east and south east Anatolia. Regions are recoded as for (1) Istanbul, Western and Eastern Marmara; (2) Aegean and Mediterranean; (3) Central Anatolia and Western Anatolia; (4) Western and Eastern Black Sea; (5) North Eastern, East and South East Anatolia (see Table 3)

The subjective well-being index is measured on an eleven-point rating scale with these two standard survey items: life satisfaction and happiness. Within Source Questionnaire Amendment 03 Round 4, 2008/9, the subjective well-being index measures the individual well-being with Questions B24 and C1. Life satisfaction (stflife) is formulated as follows: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Self placement on a continuum where zero refers to extremely dissatisfied and ten refers to extremely satisfied. Happiness (happy) is formulated as follows: “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” Self-placement on a continuum, where zero refers to extremely unhappy and

ten refers to extremely happy. The index for subjective well-being is calculated by taking the average of stflife and happy. On the 0-10 scale where 0 means extremely dissatisfied/unhappy and 10 means extremely satisfied/happy (see Table 5).

Table 5. Well-being Index Variables

Variables	Definition	V. Name	Coding	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max
How satisfied with life as a whole	How satisfied with life as a whole	Stflife	0=Extremely dissatisfied, 10=Extremely satisfied	2324	5.54	2.917	0	10
How happy you are?	How happy would you say you are?	Happy	0=Extremely unhappy, 10=Extremely happy	2336	5.48	2.684	0	10
Well-being Index		wellbeing	0=Extremely dissatisfied/unhappy, 10=Extremely satisfied/happy	2412	5.52	2.411	0	10

The questionnaire includes a scale on the left-right placement for political opinions.

The Question of B23 is worded as “in politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” (see Table 6).

Table 6. Placement on Left-Right Scale

Variables	Definition	V. Name	Coding	N	Mean	St.Dev	Min.	Max
Placement on left-right scale	Placement on left-right scale	lrscale	0=Left, 10=Right	1918	5.78	2.769	0	10

4.2.6 Model and hypothesis

As illustrated by Figure 13, in order to ensure that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is non-spurious, 11 control variables are also included in the model.




Figure 13. Attitudes towards government responsibility model.

The statistical analysis was conducted in two stages. The first stage contains a cross-sectional analysis at the individual level, which uses the Fourth Round of European Social Survey (ESS). This stage tests the level of social trust and the respondents' attitudes towards government responsibilities. The thesis examines whether one could determine the individual characteristics that influence an individual's opinion towards government responsibilities.

This thesis tests the following hypotheses:

H1: If individuals who have high level of social trust, it is expected that their attitudes towards the government responsibilities will be more positive.

H2: Individuals who tend to be more satisfied and happy are expected to have a more positive attitude towards the government responsibilities.

H3: Women tend to have a supportive attitude towards the government responsibilities then men.

H4: Older individuals tend to have a more positive attitude towards government responsibilities.

H5: The support for government responsibilities tends to increase with years of education.

H6: The ethnic groups who believe that they are discriminated or those who emphasize their ethnic identity tend to show a high level of support for the government responsibilities.

H7: The unemployed would be expected to show a high level of support for government responsibilities.

H8: It is expected the public sector employees are more supportive of government responsibilities than the private sector employees.

H9: The income level impacts positively on the level of social trust, whereby people belonging to the lower economic strata will tend to hold favorable views on welfare state.

H10: Turkish-speakers tend to be more supportive of the government responsibilities than Kurdish-speakers.

H11: Individuals who define themselves on the left of the scale of the left-right placement are expected to have a more positive attitude towards the government responsibilities.

H12: Individuals who residents living in the west tend to be more supportive than individuals who residents living in the east.

My analysis uses a correlation and regression analysis to test these hypotheses and to get an answer to my research question. The European Social survey (ESS) uses a cross-sectional study approach, which designs research according to a single observation at a specific time by covering a sample or a section of a population. In this way, cross-sectional studies provide a picture of the outcome and the characteristics associated with it at a specific point in time. According to Babbie (2010), the disadvantage of “the cross-sectional studies is that, although their

conclusions are based on observations made at only one time, typically they aim at understanding causal processes that occur over time” (p. 106).

The literature section provides concepts and hypotheses about how and why the two variables (social trust and attitudes towards to the government responsibilities) are inter-related. The main focus will be on the independent variable (the level of social trust), while the number of relevant variables will be analyzed with control variables as described above.

The Design Weight (dweight) variable is used in this analysis because of the fact that several sample designs were used by countries participating in the European Social Survey (ESS). It was not possible to give the same chance of selection to all individuals aged 15+. The purpose of the design weights (dweight) is to correct the unequal probabilities for selection caused by sampling design. For instance, “the un-weighted samples in some countries over- or under-represent people in certain types of address or household, such as those living in larger households. The design weight corrects for these slightly different probabilities of selection, thereby making the sample more representative of a ‘true’ sample of individuals aged 15+ in each country.”⁷

⁷ Weighting European Social Survey Data, Accessed on:
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?v=2&submode=abstract&study=http%3A%2F%2F129.177.90.83%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2FESS4e04.2&mode=documentation&top=yes>

4.3 Analysis

4.3.1 Exploratory factor analysis

The KMO index, i.e. the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy, compares the values of correlations between variables and those of partial correlations. If the KMO index is 0.90, then it is suitable for factor analysis (Sharma 1996, p. 116). In the 0.80's is considered commendable, in the 0.70's adequate, in the 0.60's ordinary, in the 0.50's miserable, and below 0.50 unacceptable.⁸

The “Bartlett’s test compares the observed correlation matrix to the identity matrix. In other words, it checks if there is a certain redundancy between the variables that we can summarize with a few number of factors. If the variables are perfectly correlated, only one factor is sufficient. If they are orthogonal, we need as many factors as variables.”⁹ If all diagonal elements are 0 and all off-diagonal elements are 1, implying that variables are uncorrelated. If the sig. value for this test is less than our alpha level, we reject the null hypothesis that the population matrix is an identity matrix.

According to Table 7, the KMO index is 0.70 for trust and 0.81 for government responsibilities. The results are adequate and commendable. Additionally, the sig. value carries out to reject the null hypothesis according to Bartlett's Test of Sphericity. There are thus correlations in the data set that are suitable for factor analysis.

⁸ http://eric.univ-lyon2.fr/~ricco/tanagra/fichiers/en_Tanagra_KMO_Bartlett.pdf p.4

⁹ http://eric.univ-lyon2.fr/~ricco/tanagra/fichiers/en_Tanagra_KMO_Bartlett.pdf p.2

Table 7. Suitability for Factor Analysis: KMO and Bartlett's Test

		Social Trust	Government Responsibility
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.706	.815
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2470.954	9099.226
	df	3	15
	Sig.	0.000	0.000

Table 8 visibly exemplifies for trust that the first factor accounts for approximately 73 percent of the variance and it is widely acknowledged that this percentage is significant for factor analysis. Moreover, Table 8 confirms for government responsibilities that the Initial Eigenvalues is about 65 percent of the variance and this percentage is relatively suitable for factor analysis.

Table 8. Trust and Government Responsibilities: Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Fairness	2.187	72.902	72.902	2.187	72.902	72.902
Helpfulness	.472	15.724	88.626			
Trust	.341	11.374	100.000			
Health care for the sick	3.894	64.900	64.900	3.894	64.900	64.900
Standard of living for the old	.875	14.588	79.488			
Job for everyone	.489	8.146	87.633			
Standard of living for the unemployed	.377	6.287	93.920			
Paid leave from work to care for sick family	.230	3.841	97.761			
Child care services for working parents	.134	2.239	100.000			
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.						

Table 9 contains component loadings, which are the correlations between the variable of trust and the component, and Table 9 shows the loading of the three variables on the one factor extracted. The higher the absolute value of the loading, the more the factor contributes to the variable.

Table 9 includes component loadings, which are the correlations between the variable of government responsibility and the component and the table illustrates the loading of the six variables stable structure under the one factor extracted.

Table 9. Trust and Government Responsibilities: Component Matrix

	Component 1
Trust	
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair	.871
Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves	.869
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	.821
Health care for the sick, government's responsibility	.849
Standard of living for the old, government's responsibility	.847
Job for everyone, government's responsibility	.822
Standard of living for the unemployed, government's responsibility	.811
Paid leave from work to care for sick family, government's responsibility	.788
Child care services for working parents, government's responsibility	.707
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.	
1 component extracted.	

4.3.2 Correlation analysis

Correlation analysis is a statistical technique which measures whether and how strongly pairs of variables are related. If the resulting value, the correlation coefficient, is strong or high, it means that two or more variables have a strong relationship to each other; if the resulting value is weak or low, correlation means that the variables are almost unrelated.

Correlation coefficients can range from -1 to +1 and if the value is less than 0 and near to -1, this represents a perfect negative correlation while a value of +1 represents a perfect positive correlation. If the value is 0, it means that there is no relationship between the variables being tested (Crossman, 2011). "The sign of r (+ or -) indicates the direction of the relationship between variables. The magnitude of r

(how far away from zero it is) indicates the strength of the relationship ($r \approx 1$: very strong positive linear relationship, $r \approx 0$: No linear relationship, $r \approx -1$: Very strong negative linear relationship between variables.)”¹⁰

Table 10 represents the correlation analysis between sets of variables. The Pearson correlation r can be seen in Table 10. The sign of **99 represents that it is significant in 99% in confidence interval and the sign of *95 also indicates that the result is significant according to the Pearson correlation r . Some variables are re-coded, for example, 0=male and 1=female for gender, 0=Turkish and 1=Kurdish for language at home, 0=public and 1 private for what type of organization work for, 0=not marked and 1= marked for both discrimination and unemployment in order to do correlation analysis.

Table 10 illustrates that there is a very strong relationship between social trust and government responsibility with a negative correlation (social trust $r = -.083$). The well-being index is also moderately correlated with government responsibilities in a negative direction (well-being $r = -.046$).

There are a number of control variables that show a significant correlation with the dependent variable. Results from a correlation matrix confirm that age and ethnic group discrimination are very strongly and in a positive direction associated with government responsibility (age $r = .071$ and discrimination of respondent's group: ethnic group $r = .102$). Left-right placement is also moderately correlated with government responsibilities in a positive direction (left-right placement $r = .056$).

¹⁰ Accessed from: <http://sites.stat.psu.edu/~jls/stat100/lectures/lec16.pdf>

Only the language at home variable is strongly correlated in a negative direction with government responsibility (language at home $r = -.150$).

Table 10. Correlation Analysis

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Government Responsibility	r	1												
	N	2384												
Social trust	r	-.083**	1											
	N	2380	2412											
Social trust ²	r	-.034	.934**	1										
	N	2380	2412	2412										
Well-being	r	-.046*	.208**	.187**	1									
	N	2382	2408	2408	2412									
Gender	r	-.005	.006	-.014	.050*	1								
	N	2384	2412	2412	2412	2416								
Age of respondent, calculated	r	.071**	.011	.035	-.079**	-.032	1							
	N	2360	2388	2388	2388	2392	2392							
Highest level of education, Turkey	r	-.004	.016	-.027	.076**	-.154**	-.369**	1						
	N	2382	2410	2410	2410	2414	2391	2414						
Discrimination of respondent's group: ethnic group	r	.102**	-.050*	-.033	-.012	-.012	-.056**	-.028	1					
	N	2384	2412	2412	2412	2416	2392	2414	2416					
During the last 7 days: unemployed, actively looking for job	r	-.040	.002	.035	-.111**	-.269**	-.085**	-.012	.051*	1				
	N	2384	2412	2412	2412	2416	2392	2414	2416	2416				
What type of organization work for	r	.015	-.025	.001	-.072*	-.021	-.142**	-.283**	.038	.124**	1			
	N	964	968	968	969	969	963	969	969	969	969			
Household's total net income, all sources	r	.018	.007	-.063**	.131**	.004	-.082**	.471**	-.072**	-.224**	-.301**	1		
	N	2101	2118	2118	2118	2122	2104	2120	2122	2122	856	2122		
Language at home	r	-.150**	-.069**	-.017	-.063**	-.019	-.097**	-.197**	.190**	.240**	.033	-.335**	1	
	N	2384	2412	2412	2412	2416	2392	2414	2416	2416	969	2122	2416	
Placement on left right scale	r	.056*	.090**	.097**	.169**	.023	.050*	-.121**	-.109**	-.094**	.025	.057*	-.179**	1
	N	1899	1916	1916	1917	1918	1901	1917	1918	1918	823	1727	1918	1918

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). / * . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4.3.3 Regression analysis

Through a multiple linear regression, this thesis tested the hypotheses identified through the examination of the literature on attitudes towards a welfare state. More specifically, having in mind that individuals' self interest and political ideology are likely predictors of the variability in attitudes towards the welfare state, this thesis first carried out a multiple regression by creating a model that includes self-interest and political ideology variables as independent variables.

The self-interest approach is captured by age, gender, level of education, well being, type of organization, whether the person is unemployed or not in the results of this regression. Ethnic origin (whether the person is Kurdish or not) and whether the person has felt discrimination based on his/her ethnic identity are also part of the self-interest variables. In order to control for the impact of region, this thesis employed dummy variables. These regional differences can also be interpreted as a self-interest variable. The placement on the left-right scale is the variable which captures whether political ideology impacts one's attitude towards the welfare state.

As can be seen from Table 11, whether an individual has felt discrimination and the region where they reside are the two variables that are statistically significant. All the other self interest and political ideology factors are insignificant. According to these results, when all other factors are controlled for, those who claim that they have faced discrimination based on their ethnic identity tend to have more positive attitudes towards the welfare state in comparison to those who have not faced discrimination. In other words, they would prefer the state to be in charge of welfare provision than those who did not feel discriminated against. This is an

intuitive result, since those who felt discriminated against would prefer more protection from the state to compensate for their disadvantaged or threatened position in society.

Table 11. Model-1: Trust and Trust² are Excluded

Model-1		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	7.056*	.496		14.219	.000
	Placement on left right scale	.027	.023	.043	1.140	.255
	Discrimination of respondent's ethnic group	1.808*	.612	.108	2.953	.003
	Ethnicity: Language at home	.180	.275	.029	.654	.513
	Unemployed, actively looking for job	.362	.211	.068	1.712	.087
	Type of organization (employment wellbeing)	-.110	.184	-.024	-.596	.551
		-.040	.030	-.051	-1.345	.179
	Age of respondent, calculated	.005	.005	.041	1.006	.315
	Gender	.219	.158	.051	1.383	.167
	Level of education	-.025	.034	-.033	-.729	.466
	Region: Istanbul and Marmara	.679*	.244	.183	2.778	.006
	Region: Aegean and Mediterranean	1.558*	.258	.369	6.040	.000
	Region: Central Anatolia	1.231*	.289	.218	4.259	.000
	Region: Black Sea	.820*	.365	.100	2.247	.025
	Income: Second 20%	-.015	.198	-.004	-.074	.941
	Income: Third 20%	-.045	.218	-.011	-.204	.839
Income: Fourth 20%	-.101	.250	-.020	-.406	.685	
Income: Last 20%	.004	.305	.001	.014	.989	
a. Dependent Variable: Government Responsibility Index *p<0.05/ Anova (F): 4.260 /Adjusted R Square: 0,070 / N:733						

As Table 12 shows, half of those who felt discriminated against based on their ethnic identity live in the East and Southeast regions. Interpreting the region fixed effects, one can claim that in comparison to the East and Southeast of Turkey, living in another region, positively and significantly impacts attitudes towards the welfare state (see Table 11). The impact is greater in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Central

Anatolia regions. The Istanbul-Marmara region and the Black Sea region are statistically significant as well.

Ethnic discrimination can be interpreted by reference to the negative experience that the inhabitants of the East and Southeast have had with security forces – including the military. Furthermore, in the East and Southeast of Turkey, there is a willingness to be autonomous from the centralized decision-making structures and a desire for greater decentralization, which would allow local governments and local authorities to determine policies. More recently, the Kurdish movement has been demanding democratic autonomy for their region, which could also be used to interpret the negative attitude of this region towards the welfare state (see Table 15 in Appendix E for the same regression model where the results are reported with respect the Istanbul-Marmara region and where residing in the East and Southeast has a statistically significant and negative impact in comparison to residing in Istanbul-Marmara region).

Therefore, unless they have been discriminated against, the residents of East and Southeast Turkey tend to favor less government responsibility.

Table 12. Region and Ethnic Discrimination

Region	Discrimination of respondent's ethnic group	
	Count	Column %
Istanbul and Marmara	14	30.40
Aegean and Mediterranean	0	0.00
Central Anatolia	6	13.00
Black Sea	1	2.20
East and Southeast Anatolia	25	54.30
Total	46	100.00

Having seen that the impact of self interest and political ideology variables are not significant in impacting the attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey, the next step is to test the hypothesis related to trust: those who are more trusting will have more positive attitude towards the welfare state.

Table 13 shows the result of the second regression, where trust is added to the regression model. The positive and statistically significant impact of discrimination based on ethnic identity and the region fixed effect do not change but although the trust variable is statistically significant in explaining the variation in attitudes towards the welfare state, the direction of the relationship is the opposite of what I had hypothesized at the beginning of this study.

In contrast to the positive relationship between trust and attitudes towards welfare state identified in the literature (see Algan et al. 2011 for regression results using WVS for 24 countries), this study finds that there is a negative relationship. However, Algan et al. (2011) had identified a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between trust and the size of the welfare state in cross OECD aggregate data. In order to test whether there is a U-shaped relationship between trust levels and attitudes towards welfare state at the micro level, I first checked the scatter plot between index of trust and government responsibility index. Figure 14 reveals that there is a U-shaped relationship.

Table 13. Model-2: Trust² is Excluded

Model-2		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
2	(Constant)	7.318*	.496		14.758	.000
	Social trust	-.119*	.030	-.144	-3.915	.000
	Placement on left right scale	.028	.023	.045	1.198	.231
	Discrimination of respondent's ethnic group	1.604*	.608	.096	2.637	.009
	Ethnicity: Language at home	.042	.274	.007	.153	.878
	Unemployed, actively looking for job	.399	.210	.075	1.907	.057
	Type of organization (employment)	-.121	.182	-.026	-.662	.508
	Wellbeing	-.023	.030	-.029	-.773	.440
	Age of respondent, calculated	.005	.005	.043	1.063	.288
	Gender	.227	.157	.053	1.446	.149
	Level of education	-.021	.034	-.028	-.620	.535
	Region: Istanbul and Marmara	.698	.242	.189	2.883	.004
	Region: Aegean and Mediterranean	1.478*	.256	.350	5.770	.000
	Region: Central Anatolia	1.219*	.286	.215	4.257	.000
	Region: Black Sea	.800*	.361	.097	2.215	.027
	Income: Second 20%	-.054	.197	-.014	-.277	.782
	Income: Third 20%	-.075	.216	-.018	-.349	.727
Income: Fourth 20%	-.168	.248	-.033	-.677	.499	
Income: Last 20%	-.060	.303	-.009	-.198	.843	
a. Dependent Variable: Government Responsibility Index*p<0.05 / Anova (F):4.956 /Adjusted R Square: 0.089/ N:733						




Figure 14. Scatter plot: Government responsibility and trust.

A U-shaped relationship indicates that adding a quadratic term to the regression model will improve the explanatory capacity of the model. Therefore, in addition to trust, trust squared is also added to the model.

The regression output in Table 14 reveals that the coefficients on trust and trust squared are statistically significant. Whereas trust is negative, the trust squared is positive. This indicates the existence of a U-shaped relationship between trust and the government responsibilities. Discrimination and region fixed effects are still statistically significant and positive in this last regression. The adjusted R square of this model is higher compared to the previous two models, indicating a better fit. The interpretation of this finding could be that individuals who exhibit low levels of trust

would not be able to rely on informal mechanisms for the provision of welfare and would be willing to rely on the state for these services. Those who reported high levels of trust would also prefer more state involvement in the provision of welfare since they would feel closer to and have more empathy towards their compatriots and would like them to achieve better living standards. In contrast, it can be argued that those who exhibit intermediate levels of social trust prefer a lesser role for the state in the provision of welfare since they would believe that others – who cannot be trusted – would abuse the state services if more of these services would be provided by the state.

Table 14. Model-3: Independent and Control Variables

Model-3		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
3	(Constant)	7.639*	.502		15.218	.000
	Social trust	-.388*	.087	-.470	-4.459	.000
	Social trust ²	.038*	.012	.344	3.298	.001
	Placement on left right scale	.021	.023	.034	.923	.356
	Discrimination of respondent's ethnic group	1.403*	.607	.084	2.310	.021
	Ethnicity: Language at home	.012	.272	.002	.045	.964
	Unemployed, actively looking for job	.354	.209	.066	1.699	.090
	Type of organization (employment)	-.140	.181	-.030	-.774	.439
	Wellbeing	-.024	.030	-.030	-.812	.417
	Age of respondent, calculated	.004	.005	.033	.803	.422
	Gender	.264	.156	.062	1.690	.092
	Level of education	-.015	.033	-.020	-.441	.659
	Region: Istanbul and Marmara	.706*	.240	.191	2.937	.003
	Region: Aegean and Mediterranean	1.382*	.256	.327	5.393	.000
	Region: Central Anatolia	1.168*	.285	.206	4.100	.000
	Region: Black Sea	.810*	.359	.099	2.259	.024
	Income: Second 20%	-.002	.196	.000	-.008	.994
Income: Third 20%	-.009	.216	-.002	-.042	.967	
Income: Fourth 20%	-.113	.247	-.022	-.459	.646	
Income: Last 20%	.017	.301	.003	.056	.955	

a. Dependent Variable: Government Responsibility Index *p<0.05 / Anova (F):5.332 / Adjusted R Square: 0.101/ N:733

In the literature, socio-economic variables (such as income, unemployment and employment in the public or private sector) play a decisive role in shaping views on government responsibility. According to the results of the regression analysis, none of these variables have a meaningful impact on the government responsibilities. Likewise, although the socio-demographic variables (such as gender, age, years of education and subjective well-being) have an influential role in shaping views on government responsibility, none of these socio-demographic variables have a significant impact in the case of Turkey.

This thesis found that there is a U-shaped relationship between trust levels and attitude towards welfare state in the case of Turkey. In addition to this important finding, the regression outcome indicates that whether a person has been discriminated or not based on his/her ethnicity also has a significant and positive impact on attitudes towards the welfare state. Furthermore, it was found that in comparison to the East and Southeast, residing in other regions has a statistically significant and positive impact on attitudes towards the welfare state.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this thesis was to examine whether social trust has an impact on attitudes towards the welfare state in Turkey. Although the literature on attitudes towards the welfare state talks about institutional as well as self-interest and political ideology factors as significantly impacting variations in attitudes towards the welfare state, this study found that none of the socio-economic or socio-demographic factors impact attitudes towards the welfare state in the case of Turkey, with the exception of discrimination based on ethnicity.

This study also found that residing outside of the East and Southeast of Turkey positively impacts attitudes towards the welfare state. The most important finding of this study is that there is a statistically significant and U-shaped relationship between trust levels and attitudes towards welfare state: individuals who claim they do not trust others and those who claim they trust others tend to have more positive attitude towards government responsibilities, whereas those who are situated in the middle have a negative attitude towards welfare state responsibilities.

Accordingly, although the Turkish society has a strong tradition of respect for the state, nearly all surveys conducted after 1990 illustrate that both inter-personal and institutional level of trust are gradually decreasing in Turkish society. This subject is beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, it is not possible to use the ESS dataset to explain why the trust level is very low in Turkish society and how this could be increased. However, the low-level of trust is undoubtedly associated with

improvements in the reliability of government institutions and better quality of services provided by the welfare state. Actually, there are even more important matters concerning the very low trust level in Turkish society, such as intervention in citizens' lifestyles (whether by military or civilian governments), political corruption and ideologically motivated policies.

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONS: TRUST, FAIRNESS AND HELPFULNESS

A8 CARD 3 Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful³ in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

<i>You can't be too careful</i>												<i>Most people can be trusted</i>	<i>(Don't Know,</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88		

A9 CARD 4 Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage⁴ of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

<i>Most people would try to take advantage of me</i>												<i>Most people would try to be fair</i>	<i>(Don't know)</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88		

A10 CARD 5 Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful⁵ or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please use this card.

<i>People mostly look out for themselves</i>												<i>People mostly try to be helpful</i>	<i>(Don't know)</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88		

Source: European Social Survey Questionnaire Amendment 03, Round 4, 2008/9.

APPENDIX B

SORULAR: GÜVEN, ADALET, YARDIMSEVERLİK

A8 KART 3: Sizce genelde insanların çoğunluğuna güvenilebilir mi, yoksa insanlara karşı hiçbir zaman dikkati elden bırakmamak mı gerekir? Lütfen bu kartı kullanarak 0 ile 10 arasında bir puan veriniz. "0" dikkati hiç elden bırakmamak gerekir ve "10" insanların çoğuna güvenilebilir anlamına geliyor.

<i>Dikkati elden bırakmamak gerekir</i>												<i>İnsanların çoğuna güvenilebilir</i>	<i>(Bilmiyor)</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10			88

A9 KART 4: Sizce insanların çoğu fırsatını bulursa sizi kullanmaya, sizden çıkar sağlamaya mı çalışır; haklı ve adil davranmaya mı çalışır? Lütfen bu kartı kullanarak cevap veriniz.

<i>Çoğu insan benden çıkar sağlamaya çalışır</i>												<i>Çoğu insan adil olmaya çalışır</i>	<i>(Bilmiyor)</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10			88

A10 KART 5: Sizce, insanlar çoğunlukla birbirlerine yardımcı olmaya mı çalışırlar yoksa çoğunlukla kendi çıkarlarını mı düşünürler? Lütfen bu kartı kullanarak cevap veriniz.

<i>İnsanlar çoğunlukla kendi çıkarlarını düşünürler</i>												<i>İnsanlar çoğunlukla birbirlerine yardımcı olmaya çalışırlar</i>	<i>(Bilmiyor)</i>
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10			88

Kaynak: Avrupa Sosyal Taraması Araştırması (ESS) R4, Forma A 2008/9.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY

CARD 29 People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments⁴⁵ should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments' responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments' responsibility. Firstly to...**READ OUT...**

		Should not be governments' responsibility at all										Should be entirely governments' responsibility (Don't know)	
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D15	...ensure a job for everyone who wants one?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D16	...ensure adequate health care for the sick?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D17	...ensure a reasonable standard of living ⁴⁶ for the old ⁴⁷ ?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88

STILL CARD 29 And how much responsibility do you think governments should have to...**READ OUT...**

		Should not be governments' responsibility at all										Should be entirely governments' responsibility (Don't know)	
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D18	...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed ⁴⁸ ?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D19	...ensure sufficient child care services ⁴⁹ for working parents?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88
D20	...provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88

Source: European Social Survey Questionnaire Amendment 03, Round 4, 2008/9.

APPENDIX D

SORULAR: HÜKÜMETİN SORUMLULUKLARI

KART 29 İnsanların hükümetlerin görevleri ve yerine getirmesi gereken sorumluluklarıyla ilgili farklı görüşleri vardır. Şimdi okuyacağım her bir görevin ne ölçüde hükümetin sorumluluğu olması gerektiğini söyleyiniz. 0 'bu kesinlikle hükümetin görevi değildir', 10 'bu tamamen hükümetin görevidir' anlamına gelmektedir.

Öncelikle hükümetler...

ANKETÖRE: ŞIKLARI OKUYUNUZ...

		Hiç bir şekilde hükümetlerin sorumluluğu olamaz										Tamamen hükümetlerin sorumluluğu olmalı.		Bilmiyorum
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10		
D15	...iş sahibi olmak isteyen herkese iş imkanı sağlamak	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	
D16	...hastalar için yeterli sağlık hizmeti sağlamak	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	
D17	...yaşlılara makul bir yaşam standardı sağlamak	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	

YİNE KART 29 Sizce hükümetlerin aşağıdaki görevlerle ilgili ne kadar sorumluluğu olmalı?

ANKETÖRE: ŞIKLARI OKUYUNUZ

		Hiç bir şekilde hükümetlerin sorumluluğu olamaz										Tamamen hükümetlerin sorumluluğu olmalı		Bilmiyor
		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10		
D18	İşsizlere makul bir yaşam standardı sağlamak	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	
D19	...çalışan anne babaların çocukları için yeterli çocuk bakım hizmeti sağlamak	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	
D20	Geçici olarak, hasta/yatalak olan aile üyelerine bakmak durumunda kalan çalışanlara ücretli izin vermek	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	

Kaynak: Avrupa Sosyal Taraması Araştırması (ESS) R4, Forma A 2008/9.

APPENDIX E
REGRESSION MODEL

Table 15. Model-4: Trust and Trust² are Excluded

Model-4		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
4	(Constant)	7.720*	.467		16.547	.000
	Placement on left right scale	.027	.023	.043	1.140	.255
	Discrimination of respondent's group: ethnic group	1.808*	.612	.108	2.953	.003
	Language at home	.180	.275	.029	.654	.513
	Unemployed. actively looking for job	.362	.211	.068	1.712	.087
	Type of organization (employment)	-.110	.184	-.024	-.596	.551
	wellbeing	-.040	.030	-.051	-1.345	.179
	Age of respondent. calculated	.005	.005	.041	1.006	.315
	Gender	.219	.158	.051	1.383	.167
	Level of education	-.025	.034	-.033	-.729	.466
	Region: Aegean and Mediterranean	.879*	.170	.208	5.177	.000
	Region: Central Anatolia	.553*	.217	.098	2.547	.011
	Black Sea	.141	.304	.017	.462	.644
	Region: East and South East Anatolia	-.679*	.244	-.130	-2.778	.006
	Income: First 20%	.015	.198	.003	.074	.941
	Income: Third 20%	-.030	.184	-.007	-.162	.871
Income: Fourth 20%	-.087	.219	-.017	-.395	.693	
Income: Last 20%	.019	.277	.003	.068	.946	

a. . Dependent Variable: Government Responsibility Index *p<0.05/ Anova (F): 4.260 /Adjusted R Square: 0.070 / N:733

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